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SENEGAL'S RURAL COUNCILS:  
Decentralization and the Implementation of  
Rural Development

Prepared under U.S.A.I.D. Project 685-0256 Senegal  
ENEA RURAL MANAGEMENT PROJECT

by

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## INTRODUCTION

The current Senegalese administrative structure in many ways resembles its colonial predecessor. Its goals, responsibilities, and orientation have, of course, changed, but the highly centralized bureaucracy remains. Today's administrative system might be described as a hybrid of the colonial administration that predated it and the various reforms undertaken by the government to modify the colonial system since independence. One of those reforms, the Territorial and Administrative Reform of 1972, is an attempt to decentralize local administration and bring government, and thus development policies, closer to the people.

In this monograph we will attempt to shed some light on the impact of the 1972 reform from the perspective of those it was intended to benefit --- the local population. How successful has the reform been? Do rural councillors feel the institutions created by the reform have given them more control over local-level development? What are the dynamics of the relationships, both administrative and informal, that the reform set in motion? What issues are local rural councils addressing and, in the opinion of the councillors themselves, are their actions effective? It is hoped that the answers to these questions will give policy makers a better feel for what is really happening within the structures created by the 1972 reform. Accurate information of this kind should aid in making future decisions about how to improve the reform through changes in administrative procedures, retraining of councillors and administrators, or other

actions designed to make the system more responsive to the goals of decentralization.

Before addressing these questions, however, readers who are not familiar with the Territorial and Administrative Reform of 1972 might benefit from a brief description of the institutions it created and an overview of its historical context. Those already familiar with these aspects of the reform may choose to skim through this section.

#### Administrative History \*

The French colonial structure divided Senegal into administrative units called "cercles," "subdivisions," and "cantons." The largest units in this highly centralized system were the 13 "cercles," each headed by a French "commandant" who was responsible only to the colonial governor himself. The commandant executed his responsibilities (mainly the maintenance of law and order, tax collection, and insuring the expansion of cash crop, especially peanut, production) through African "chefs de canton" who operated at the lowest level in the hierarchy.

The administrative reforms of 1960 (at independence) and 1964 restructured the colonial administrative system and renamed some of its elements. The 1960 reform was designed to bring government closer

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\*(This section draws heavily on Sheldon Gellar's (1980) discussion of the administrative context of Senegalese rural development in Animation Rurale and Rural Development: The Experience of Senegal, Chapter I, pp. 18-32.)

to the people by decreasing the size of the basic administrative unit, the "cercle." First, the country was divided into seven regions; the regions were then divided into new "cercles" (28 as opposed to 13 during the colonial period) which, though smaller in size and population than their colonial predecessors, were to remain the system's most important administrative unit. (Gellar, 1980: 20) The "cercles" were further divided into "arrondissements," each headed by a "chef d'arrondissement," and the old "cantons" were formally abolished. After 1960, local government administration was staffed almost entirely by Senegalese personnel.

In a further attempt to "decolonize" the administration, in 1964 the government changed the names of some of the field administrative units and their personnel:

Colonial Admin.	1960/64 Reforms
-----	-----
(non-existent)	Region
Cercle	Departement
Commandant	Prefet
Chef d'arrondissement	Sous-Prefet
(in a later change)	
Arrondissement	Sous-Prefecture

Thus the 1960 and 1964 reforms left the colonial bureaucracy largely intact from a structural and a behavioral point of view. The physical size of the "cercle" (later "departement") was decreased to provide better access to government agencies and facilities, but the hierarchical structure remained. The cosmetic changes in names which have now been in effect for more than twenty years, have been accompanied by relatively few organizational and procedural changes.

An important innovation of the 1960 reform was the granting to local administrative units of responsibility not only for standard administrative tasks, but also for developmental actions in their respective geographic areas. No longer were public administrators concerned solely with tax collection, law and order, and peanut production. The government set other economic and social development objectives, and local administrators were now for the first time responsible for attaining them. Decentralized economic planning was situated at the regional level, and the "arrondissement," the administrative level closest to the population, was to oversee local-level development actions.

A new unit created to respond to these new responsibilities was the "Centre d'Expansion Rurale" ("CER"). The "CER", a multi-functional development agency responsible for virtually all aspects of local-level development, were to be the government's front line contact with the rural population. One "CER" was created in each "arrondissement" (later sous-prefecture), and agents from various government technical services were assigned to it to create a local-level, multi-disciplinary development team. The "CER" is important in the context of this monograph because the 1972 administrative reform gave it responsibility for the technical implementation of development programs administered by the new rural communities. (Vengroff and Johnston, 1984)

#### The Administrative Reform of 1972

By the late 1960s and early 1970s, Senegal had undergone several

years of uneven economic performance. Progress had been made in certain sectors: industrial development in Dakar showed positive results, tourism was increasing, and the mining sector looked promising. The agricultural sector, on the other hand, was stagnating. Rural producers, because of bad weather, government policies that stifled local initiative, and an almost total lack of economic incentives, had begun to switch production from peanuts to other crops, thus avoiding the risk, uncertainty, and low producer prices which had become the trademark of peanut cultivation. Production dropped to its lowest level since the colonial period. Since the peanut is the country's main export crop, foreign exchange earnings suffered. This "malaise paysan" in the agricultural sector, a recurrent phenomenon during this period, served to awaken Senegalese leaders to the problems that existed in the administration of the agricultural sector.

Once again the government turned to administrative reform to try to make government more responsive to the needs of the rural population. While the 1960 reform had much the same goal in mind, it assumed that the problem could be solved by simply rearranging the size and structure of the administrative system. Thus in 1960, reformers more than doubled the number (halved the physical size) of the basic administrative unit, the "cercle." In addition, as mentioned above, they made local-level agencies responsible for the economic and social development of their respective geographic zones.

The critical element neglected in the 1960 reform, however, was

one the government tried to address in 1972 --- that being to encourage popular participation in the management of local affairs. It was not enough to improve access to well-intentioned development agencies. Reformers realized that the local population had to take an active role in the making of development policy, not just operate within policies made by others. Only in this manner could the government hope to cope with the rising tide of the "malaise paysan."

### Decentralization

Direct local participation in the affairs of government implied a need for the deconcentration of political power, which was, and to a large extent still is, centered in Dakar. Decentralization soon became the catch-word for the 1972 reform. Interior Minister Jean Collin, in a memo outlining the organization and functioning of the reform during its institution in the Thies region in July 1972, stated that the objectives of the reform were the decentralization of administrative institutions, the responsible participation of socio-economic groups, and the deconcentration of certain powers of decision to governors, "prefets," and "sous-prefets." (Collin, 1972)

Deconcentration, which is only one of the many forms of decentralization, the others being devolution, delegation and privatization, was selected as the most appropriate form by the government of Senegal. Deconcentration implies that "authority of responsibility for specific functions has been shifted by the central government to a lower level of administration, but one that remains

within the central government structure." (Rondinelli, Nellis and Cheema, 1984 : 15) Although a variety of different motivations and rationalizations for initiating programs for decentralizing administration have been identified, problems associated with the implementation of rural development seem to be quite critical in this regard. According to Diana Conyers,

"decentralization has been seen as a way of increasing the effectiveness of rural development programs by making them more relevant and responsive to local needs and conditions, allowing greater flexibility in their implementation and providing a means of co-ordinating the various agencies involved at the regional and local level." (Conyers, 1983 : 99)

This is one of the factors associated with the initiation of the "decentralization" program in Senegal.

The possible advantages of employing a strategy of decentralization include increased participation for the rural poor (Leonard and Marshall, 1982 : 30-31; Korten, 1980) decreasing the communication gap between the center and the rural areas, improving local and regional planning, facilitating project implementation, increasing the capacity of local level administrators and increasing local participation. (Rondinelli, Nellis and Cheema, 1984 : 45-46; Bryant and White, 1982 : 155-173) Although the apparant advantages are many, experience with decentralization in a number of third world countries indicates that the results are somewhat less satisfactory than anticipated. (Rondinelli, Nellis and Cheema, 1984 : 27-28) Nevertheless, political considerations often intervene in the assessment of such programs, thus making evaluation of administrative

performance irrelevant to the initiation and maintenance of decentralization.

The type of system adopted in Senegal does not represent a major departure from French administrative practice in the sense that the "State" and its agents retain full supervisory control over all aspects of local level actions. As Conyers has perceptively noted, "the majority of decentralization programmes are seen as attempts to decentralize the national government rather than to establish a second tier of government -- a subtle but significant distinction." (Conyers, 1983 : 105) The aim of this paper is to assess the impact of the program of decentralization currently being implemented in Senegal. Because of the emphasis placed in the literature on the importance of decentralization for mobilizing the rural population, we will concentrate our examination at the base of the system on the rural councils. Since "autonomous financial responsibility is at the core of the concept of decentralization," (Rondinelli, Nellis and Cheema, 1984 : 43) we will look especially at the budgets and budgetary powers of the rural communities.

In addition to the goal of "responsible participation," as it was called by government reformers, the 1972 law set out to give local collectivities the financial means to assure their own development. In order to attain these objectives, the reform created several new local-level institutions: (Ministere de l'Interieur, 1972 Titres I-IV)

- 1) rural communities --- a number of villages in a certain geographic zone grouped together to form a local-level political unit.
- 2) a rural council in each rural community composed of representatives, two thirds of whom were elected by the local population, the rest appointed by local cooperatives.
- 3) the post of president of the rural council, a position of responsibility filled by an elected councillor chosen by his colleagues.
- 4) a rural community budget designed to permit local management of rural community resources.
- 5) "groupements ruraux," which provided for collaboration between rural communities to aid in implementing infrastructure projects beyond the means of a single rural community.

### The Rural Community

The rural community was at the heart of the 1972 reform. All other institutions (rural councils and their presidents, "groupements," and local fiscal management) depended on the creation of the rural community. According to the text of the reform, the rural community consists of a group of villages "united by a solidarity which results from their neighborliness and common interests ... capable of finding the resources necessary for their own development." (Ministere de l'Interieur, 1972) The reform theoretically gave the "mythical" rural community both legal standing and financial autonomy.

Unlike the 1960 reform which only redrew administrative boundaries, the 1972 reform left most existing boundaries intact; it simply took the lowest level administrative unit, the "arrondissement," and divided it still further into smaller units, the rural communities. Thus, depending on its physical size and population, each "arrondissement" now consisted of between two and

seven rural communities each with its own rural council. In addition, local ("sous-prefecture"), departmental and regional development committees were established to plan and coordinate development activities within and between the various administrative levels.

Administrative, financial, and political constraints led the government to adopt a phased timetable for the application of the reform in the various regions:

Region	Year
Thies	1972
Sine-Saloum (Kaolack and Fatick)	1974
Diourbel (Diourbel and Louga)	1976
Casamance (Ziguinchor and Kolda)	1978
Fleuve (St. Louis)	1980
Senegal Oriental (Tambacounda)	1982
Dakar	1984

(Ministere de l'Interieur, 1984: 9)

Thus the implementation of decentralized administration throughout Senegal was spread over a period of more than a decade. Consequently, the efficiency of the system as well as the experience of both administrators and rural councillors in operating it can vary widely from region to region. Theoretically, those regions where the reform was implemented later would profit from the experience of those which preceded them.

### The Rural Council

To insure "responsible participation," the affairs of each rural community are to be managed by a representative body, the rural

council. The number of councillors depends on the population of the rural community:

12 members for rural communities with less than 5,000 inhabitants  
 15 members for rural communities with 5,001 to 10,000 inhabitants  
 18 members for rural communities with 10,001 to 15,000 inhabitants  
 21 members for rural communities with more than 15,000 inhabitants

(Ministere de l'Interieur, 1972:Loi no. 72.25, Titre II, Article 3)

The total number of councillors in any one rural community is always divisible by three, since two thirds are elected by the population and one third chosen by the general assembly of cooperatives in the rural community. Elected councillors and those representing the cooperative all serve five-year concurrent terms. Elections are conducted using a winner-take-all party list system. Thus, all elected councillors in a given rural community are always from the same party. Unfortunately, this effort to insure unity may in fact undermine the vitality which multi-party competition could bring to these institutions. Elected councillors and those representing the cooperative alike all serve five-year concurrent terms.

#### The Rural Council President

One of the "sous-prefet's" first actions after the local elections is to call the council into session in order to choose the rural council president. The president is chosen from among all elected councillors; representatives of the cooperatives, are ineligible, as are village chiefs, and councillors not directly involved in "rural" activities (such as artisans, traders, transporters, etc.) (Ministere de l'Interieur, 1984: 35)

The president of the rural council is considered to be an agent of the state and is the sole legal representative of the rural community. It is the president's responsibility to inform the population of laws and governmental regulations, to execute these laws and regulations, and, in compliance with administrative authorities, insure order and security within the rural community.

The rural community president is also responsible for the implementation of the rural council's deliberations, and has the option of seeking technical assistance in these matters from the "chef de "CER"." Being an agent of the state, the president of the rural community comes directly under the authority of the sous-prefet. If the sous-prefet feels that a decision taken by the president is untimely, is illegal in any way, or does not conform to the spirit of the rural council debate to which it applies, he can either return the decision to the president for revision or suspend its execution or both. (Ministere de l'Interieur, 1984: 42)

There is an extremely important exception to the president's role as executor of the rural council's actions. The president has no authority over the execution of the rural community budget which is legally the responsibility of the "sous-prefet."

#### The Rural Community Budget

In addition to the encouragement of responsible participation outlined above, the 1972 reform also set out to give the rural communities financial autonomy through the creation of a rural

community budget. Before the reform, a "regional tax" was collected and used in part to finance the government agency charged with the distribution of agricultural inputs (ONCAD) (30%), in part for the financing and functioning of so-called "regional" projects (45%), with the remainder going directly into the government treasury (25%). (Kandji, 1985) The reform replaced this regional tax with a "rural tax," the proceeds of which were to be managed and budgeted directly by the rural communities themselves. Reformers hoped this initiative would heighten peoples' awareness of the direct link between the collection of taxes and its use for local public investments in their rural community.

Reformers wanted the rural community budget to be an investment budget. Spending on the upkeep and maintenance of previous investments was, of course, inevitable and obligatory, but it was strictly specified that funds allocated for day to day operations ("fonctionnement") could not be used to hire personnel of any kind. It was feared in the beginning that the rural communities would waste their resources hiring unnecessary salaried workers (a problem that had occurred in the municipal communes), so the hiring of such personnel was forbidden. The rural community is to rely on central government employees, particularly those working in the "CER", for technical assistance.

The investment section was to be the "motor" of the rural community budget. The intention was for local leaders to commit the greatest share of the budget to economic investments such as tube- and

large-bore wells, vaccination parks, markets, irrigation schemes, or any other action promoting the agricultural development of the rural community. The budget could also be used to finance local health projects such as the construction, supply, and upkeep of dispensaries, maternity clinics, and village pharmacies. Community centers, youth centers, spending to improve public places, markets, roads, waterworks, and cemeteries were also suitable areas of intervention. Although traditionally it was the state that took care of education, the reform did not rule out the use of rural community budget money for classroom construction, though payment of teachers, as with all personnel, was strictly the domaine of the government. (Ministere de l'Interieur, 1972: Loi 72.25, Section III)

Each rural community was also required by law to contribute 25% of its annual rural tax to a National Solidarity Fund for the "development of rural communities." (Ministere de l'Interieur, 1972: Loi no. 72.25, Article 79) This fund was intended to insure a more even distribution of the proceeds of the rural tax, i.e., to supplement the budgets of poorer rural communities and of those facing drought, famine, or other emergencies. Yet between 1972 and 1985 none of these funds were ever distributed to the rural communities. Instead, they somehow "disappeared" in the administrative morass in Dakar.

During the 1980/1981 fiscal year, the average budget for a rural community in Senegal was 8,679,953 francs (\$20,423). (Bouat and Fouilland, 1983: 65) Similarly, during the fiscal year 82/83, the

average budget for a rural community in what is now the area covered by the Kaolack and Fatick regions was (425 CFA = \$1.00):

Kaolack	--	10,575,000 francs CFA	(range: 3,097,000 - 21,896,000)
		(\$24,882)	(\$7,287 - \$51,520)
Fatick	--	6,934,500 francs CFA	(range: 1,411,000 - 14,149,000)
		(\$16,315)	(\$3,320 - \$33,292)

(Source: ENEA, 1984)

Finally, budget data is available from 11 of the 14 rural communities included in this study. For the most recent years (83/84) the figures for those 11 rural communities are:

(Total budget approved by the rural council)

Mean ( $\bar{X}$ )	--	8,900,356 francs CFA	(range: 1,181,500 - 17,840,592)
		(\$20,942)	(\$2,780 - \$41,978)

Median	--	8,077,741 francs CFA
		(\$19,006)

Thus, the figures for the rural communities that are the object of this study appear to be consistent with figures available from other sources.

### Summary

Senegal's administrative reform of 1972 deserves loud applause for the broad initiative it represents. Senegal is among only a handful of African nations which have taken active steps to institutionalize a system designed to bring political and financial power down to the level of the rural producers. The reform is more than 15 years old, and rural communities now function in every region in Senegal.

Yet the reform is not problem-free. It is ironic, for instance,

that the application of this decentralizing reform is overseen by a central agency, the State Secretariat for Decentralization, headquartered in Dakar. Attached to the Ministry of the Interior, the Decentralization Secretariat has the unique role of intermediary between a highly centralized bureaucracy on the one hand and a decentralized (deconcentrated) system of rural communities on the other. It is directly responsible for the application of the 1972 reform, but has at best indirect contact with the daily operations of the rural communities themselves. While the Decentralization Secretariat does control the "Centres d'Expansion Rurale" ("CER"), it is the Territorial Administration (a different section of the Ministry of the Interior) that plays the more influential role of supervisory agency, or "autorite de tutelle."

The 1972 reform includes a strong role for an "autorite de tutelle," or supervisory agency, which is responsible for overseeing and correcting actions taken by the rural communities and their councils. (Ministere de l'Interieur, 1984: Chapitre X) The "autorite de tutelle" was not precisely indentified in the texts, but the role eventually devolved to the territorial administration, whose agents are the governors, "prefets", and "sous-prefets". All actions, decisions, and deliberations undertaken by the rural communities, their officers, and their councils are subject to the approval of the agents of the territorial administration. This gives the supervisory agency (especially the "sous-prefet", the agent at the base of the hierarchy) considerably more power than the popular institutions themselves possess. It also adds another facet to an already

complicated system which consists of two hierarchical government agencies --- the territorial administration and Secretariat for Decentralization --- and 319 rural communities.

To give an example of the supervisory agency's power, the budgetary process mentioned earlier, which was supposed to give the rural council the power to decide on its community's development priorities, is dominated by the "sous-prefets". The rural council's degree of involvement in the budgetary process depends solely on the "sous-prefet's" personal judgment, mood, philosophy, and willingness to seek that participation. It is the "sous-prefet" who proposes the budget to the rural council for its approval, rather than the reverse. (Bouat and Fouilland, 1983: 34) The council can modify and rework the document if it so desires, but the final version is still subject to approval in turn by the "sous-prefet", the "prefet", and the governor. Under certain conditions, the latter can even make their own ex post facto changes in the document without further consultation with the rural council. (Ministere de l'Interieur, 1972:Loi 72.25, Articles 71, 72, 73)

Again in the area of financial management, rural communities are obligated to allocate 25% of the rural tax they collect to a central solidarity fund which is supposed to be re-distributed to the neediest rural communities. Since it was created, this solidarity fund has yet to return a single franc to the rural communities. But even if the fund operated correctly, twenty-five percent is a substantial percentage of a rural community's resources to be obligated each year

with no debate or recourse to alternative action. This practice may have roots in the old regional tax system described earlier of which 25% was automatically destined to the government treasury.

Many national leaders, too, are still reluctant to give free rein to the idea of deconcentration. The typical francophone administrative mind set which emphasizes central control is a difficult idea to modify, especially for those steeped in its tradition. Landing Sane, former State Secretary for Decentralization, has said:

Everything that is done at the base (of the administrative system) must obey a certain national ethic ... it's impossible to let every rural community do what it wants to. The supervisory agency is obligated to reorient (the rural community's) actions ... " (Soleil, 1985)

The central government, however, may have no choice in the future but to turn more responsibility over to the rural communities. Overseeing the actions of 319 diverse rural communities scattered throughout Senegal is not an easy administrative task. With limits on government spending, freezes on hiring, logistical difficulties, and the general move toward austerity, the government is beginning to recognize that it does not have the means that "an efficient application of its legislative dispositions necessitates." (BOM, 1982: 38)

There are other positive indications that future policies will lean toward more independence for the rural communities. An evaluation conducted by the Senegalese government lists one of the reform's major problems as the growing demand by rural councillors to

assume control of the rural community budgetary and accounting processes. (BOM, 1982: 38) The Secretariat for Decentralization has addressed that issue publicly, saying it is now "necessary to accede to a claim by the population; that is, to let them exercise themselves, the management of their own affairs ... Principally ... it is a question of financial management." (Secretariat d'Etat a la Decentralisation, 1985: 1). The problem is how to provide largely illiterate councillors with the skills necessary to adequately manage the rural community budget.

Thus the relationships between the reform's actors, between centralized and decentralized institutions on the one hand and between administrators and rural councillors on the other, will be evolving in the years to come. This monograph will attempt to shed some light on the nature of those relationships as they exist now. Improved understanding of these issues may help decision-makers to formulate better policies to improve the existing system of decentralization and to make future training more responsive and better adapted to the needs of administrators and rural councillors alike.

## SECTION II


### DATA AND METHODS

The basic purpose of this study is to gather and analyze baseline data on rural councillors in Senegal so as to better determine their needs and the needs of the rural communities (communaute rurale) they serve. In addition these data should help us to better understand the nature and impact of the implementation of Senegal's decentralization program at the base of the system. The examination of the role, activities, attitudes and perceptions of the rural councillors is part of a larger study aimed at examining the potential of the rural communities as a base for rural development, especially economic development. The selection of rural communities for inclusion in this study is based on an effort to provide broad coverage of Senegal's diverse ecological zones and economic interests. Given resource and time limitations, 14 rural communities were chosen for study. These 14 rural communities, located in 9 of Senegal's 10 administrative regions (see Table 1 and Map 1), touch much of the ethnic and environmental diversity of the country.

In order to assess the degree to which these 14 rural communities are representative of Senegal's 319 rural communities in general, some key background characteristics of the rural communities in each region were examined and compared with the comparable characteristics of the rural communities included in the study. The six characteristics

TABLE 1  
The Sample Rural Communities and Councillors

* *Rural Communities *	*Counc. *N n		*Type of councillor *			*% of the sample *
			*Pres.+V.P. *	*elected *	*Coop. *	
*Sangalkam	21	11	2	6	3	7.64
*Diamacouta	15	11	1	7	3	7.64
*Kunkane	15	11	2	6	3	7.64
*Niaguis	15	11	2	6	3	7.64
*Lambaye	21	11	1	7	3	7.64
*Pete	18	9	1	4	4	6.25
*Mbane	21	11	2	6	3	7.64
*Bamba	18	11	1	7	3	7.64
*Dialacoto	15	11	1	7	3	7.64
*Malicounda	18	10	2	4	3	6.94
*Mboro	15	8	2	6	0	5.56
*Kelle Gueye	12	11	2	6	3	7.64
*Velingara	12	9	1	6	2	6.25
*Toubacouta	15	9	2	4	3	6.25
*Total	231	144	22	82	39	100.01



examined are the population according to the last census (1976), the number of wells, schools, cooperatives, health posts and villages (formal tax collection units with a designated local chief). (PNUD, 1984) The means ( $\bar{x}$ ) of each characteristic for all the rural communities in each region were compared with the figures for the sample rural communities in that region. If the characteristics of the sample rural community was within one standard deviation of the regional mean it was considered to be representative. The six characteristics were examined as a group and those rural communities which were representative on five or six of these characteristics were considered to be generally representative of their regions. Those meeting these criteria on four characteristics are considered marginally representative and those meeting the criteria for three or less characteristics are generally unrepresentative.

As can be seen from table 2, five of the ten regions (Ziguinchor, Tambacounda, Thies, Louga and Kolda) are well represented by our sample rural communities. Although data is not available for the Dakar region it is assumed that Sangalkam is reasonably representative of the two rural communities in the Region. The two sample rural communities in the St. Louis Region are at least marginally representative of the region. The sample rural communities in Louga and Thies respectively which are only marginally representative, complement the more representative rural communities in the sample from the same regions.

The main weakness of the sample lies in the areas which

TABLE 2  
Representativity of the Sample of Rural Communities

* Rural Community and Region	POP '76'	WELLS	SCHOOLS	COOPS	*
* Niaguis RC	6971	22	9	5	*
*(Ziguinchor)	Region (X)	61 +	8 +	6 +	*
* st. dev.	1880	40	2.7	3.4	*
* Lambaye RC	15646	96	2	8	*
*(Diourbel)	Region (X)	41 -	2.8 +	5 -	*
* st. dev.	6274	31	2.9	2	*
* P(t( RC	12219	15	12	10	*
*(St. Louis)	Region (X)	23 +	6.9 -	6 +	*
* st. dev.	4510	23	2.6	4.9	*
* Mbane RC	12833	21	6	7	*
*(St. Louis)	Region (X)	23 +	6.9 -	6 +	*
* st. dev.	4510	23	2.6	4.9	*
* Bamba RC	7389	41	3	11	*
*(Tambacounda)	Region (X)	48 +	3 +	6.4 -	*
* st. dev.	2998	44	2	3.5	*
* Dialacoto RC	5797	41	2	5	*
*(Tambacounda)	Region (X)	48 +	3 +	6.4 -	*
* st. dev.	2998	44	2	3.5	*
* Malicounda RC	17369	61	9	5	*
*(Thi)s)	Region (X)	109 +	5.3 +	5.7 +	*
* st. dev.	4515	48	3.9	2.5	*
* Mboro RC	25079	105	8	10	*
*(Thi)s)	Region (X)	109 +	5.3 +	5.7 -	*
* st. dev.	4574	48	3.9	2.5	*
* Ke1 Gujye RC	5854	52	1	2	*
*(Louga)	Region (X)	28 +	1.8 +	3.5 +	*
* st. dev.	4213	29	1.4	1.9	*
* V(lingara RC	2859	4	1	2	*
*(Louga)	Region (X)	28 -	1.8 +	3.5 +	*
* st. dev.	4213	29	1.4	1.9	*
* Toubacouta RC	13096	128	8	8	*
*(Fatick)	Region (X)	38 -	4 -	4.9 -	*
* st. dev.	6034	43	2.1	3.0	*
* Ndiamacouta RC	16516	144	3	11	*
*(Kolda)	Region (X)	113 +	4 +	7 -	*
* st. dev.	2971	75	2.3	2.8	*
* Kounkane RC	11544	184	4	6	*
*(Kolda)	Region (X)	113 +	4 +	7 +	*
* st. dev.	2971	75	2.3	2.8	*
* Sangalkam RC	---	---	---	---	*
*(Dakar)	Region (X)	---	---	---	*
* st. dev.	---	---	---	---	*

KEY--- + representative, - not representative

TABLE 2 (cont.)

		HEALTH POST	VILLAGES	+/-total	
*					*
* Niaguis	RC	3	12		*
*(Ziguinchor)	Region (X)	2.7 +	20 +	6/6	*
*	<u>st. dev.</u>	<u>1.5</u>	<u>14</u>		*
* Lambaye	RC	1	52		*
*(Diourbel)	Region (X)	0.9 +	36 -	3/6	*
*	<u>st. dev.</u>	<u>0.4</u>	<u>13.4</u>		*
* Pété	RC	6	36		*
*(St. Louis)	Region (X)	2.3 -	33 +	4/6	*
*	<u>st. dev.</u>	<u>1.4</u>	<u>20.4</u>		*
* Mbane	RC	2	63		*
*(St. Louis)	Region (X)	2.3 +	33 +	4/6	*
*	<u>st. dev.</u>	<u>1.4</u>	<u>20.4</u>		*
* Bamba	RC	2	63		*
*(Tambacounda)	Region (X)	1.5 +	47 +	5/6	*
*	<u>st. dev.</u>	<u>1.2</u>	<u>27</u>		*
* Dialacoto	RC	1	38		*
*(Tambacounda)	Region (X)	1.5 +	47 +	6/6	*
*	<u>st. dev.</u>	<u>1.2</u>	<u>27</u>		*
* Malicounda	RC	2	22		*
*(Thiès)	Region (X)	1.8 +	51 +	6/6	*
*	<u>st. dev.</u>	<u>1.3</u>	<u>30</u>		*
* Mboro	RC	2	66		*
*(Thiès)	Region (X)	1.8 +	51 +	4/6	*
*	<u>st. dev.</u>	<u>1.3</u>	<u>30</u>		*
* Kel Guèye	RC	1	40		*
*(Louga)	Region (X)	0.5 +	54 +	6/6	*
*	<u>st. dev.</u>	<u>0.6</u>	<u>23</u>		*
* Mélingara	RC	1	65		*
*(Louga)	Region (X)	0.5 +	54 +	4/6	*
*	<u>st. dev.</u>	<u>0.6</u>	<u>23</u>		*
* Toubacouta	RC	3	51		*
*(Fatick)	Region (X)	1.5 -	27 -	1/6	*
*	<u>st. dev.</u>	<u>1.2</u>	<u>19</u>		*
* Ndiamacouta	RC	2	90		*
*(Kolda)	Region (X)	0.6 -	52 -	2/6	*
*	<u>st. dev.</u>	<u>0.6</u>	<u>26</u>		*
* Kounkane	RC	1	79		*
*(Kolda)	Region (X)	0.6 +	52 -	5/6	*
*	<u>st. dev.</u>	<u>0.6</u>	<u>26</u>		*
* Sangalkam	RC				*
*(Dakar)	Region (X)	---	---	---	*
*	<u>st. dev.</u>				*

key---- + representative, - not representative

constitute the heart of the peanut basin, Diourbel, Fatick and Kaolack. The rural community of Lambaye in the Diourbel region is larger and better equipped than the typical rural community in the region and was found to be representative on only three of the six characteristics. Toupacouta (Fatick) is much better equipped than the typical rural communities in the region and can be considered to be representative only on one characteristic, population. There are no rural communities in the sample from the Kaolack Region. Thus, the ex-Sine-Saloum, composed of the 41 rural communities in Kaolack and the 35 rural communities in Fatick are only marginally represented in the sample. Unfortunately, the organizers of the broader study failed to recognize the limitations of their selection and were unwilling to consider modifications suggested by the CAIDS team.

The sampling design took the form of a multi-stage cluster sample. Within the context of the selection of rural communities a sampling frame of councillors was constructed. Within these clusters three separate groups were selected for interviewing (council officers, elected councillors, councillors representing the cooperatives). Because of their importance, all presidents and vice presidents of the sample rural communities were targeted for interviewing. The remainder of the councillors were divided into two groups according to the manner in which they were selected. Two thirds of the members of every council are selected by popular vote using a party list system with a winner take all decision rule. The president and vice president are selected from among this group of councillors. The remaining one third of the councillors are selected

by the cooperatives in the rural communities, again using a party list and winner take all decision rule.

A stratified random sample of both types of councillors was drawn in the proportions of two to one. Within each rural community the list of interviewees included the president and vice president of the council, six elected councillors and three councillors representing the cooperatives. Thus, the elected councillors, who include the council president and vice president, are slightly over represented in the sample in relation to the councillors representing the cooperatives. In addition, the smaller rural communities are slightly overrepresented because the samples drawn from them are the same size as those drawn from the larger rural communities which have more councillors.

A system for the random selection of replacements was devised for use in cases in which selected councillors were not present in their respective rural communities during the week when the interviews were being conducted. Of the sample consisting of 154 councillors (not including replacements), 144 interviews were conducted, resulting in a completion rate of 93.5%. Our sample of 144 councillors actually interviewed represents 62.3% of the universe of 231 councillors in the fourteen rural communities included in the study.

In spite of the fact that the rural communities included in the study are not fully representative of the rural communities in Senegal, there is no reason to suspect that there are significant

differences in councillors between those seven regions which are well represented in the sample and the three which are not. However, because of the resultant uncertainties surrounding the sample, the results and inferences drawn from these data should be regarded as indicative rather than definitive. That is, any effort to generalize from these findings should be undertaken with appropriate caution.

The survey instrument developed for this study consists of 45 questions, some with multiple parts (see Appendix 1). The questionnaire, which was written in French, was translated into three local languages, Wolof, Mandingue and Pulaar. After multiple translations and confrontations between translators, a "best fit" translation was agreed upon for each language. The translations were recorded on cassette tapes and distributed with tape recorders to the interviewers for them to study. A three day training course was held for interviewers. During these training sessions problems and irregularities were ironed out and practice interviews held. All interviewers are graduates of ENEA's Colleges of Planning or Land Use Planning and have extensive prior experience as interviewers in the rural milieu. In addition, several interviews were conducted by Senegalese staff members of ENEA.

The interviews were well executed and few problems were experienced by the interviewers in the field. However, the validity of the results of several interviews conducted in Sangalkam in the Dakar Region are questionable. In direct contradiction to the standard interviewing process, an expatriate member of the ENEA staff,

without prior permission, sat in on several interviews conducted in Sangalkam. It is clear from the results that this had a negative impact on the candor of the interviewees. The number of questions for which the respondents either said they did not know the answer or to which they refused to respond is significantly higher in these interviews than in those conducted in any other area. Problems in this rural community may also result at least in part from the fact that Sangalkam is a new rural community and the councillors, at the time of the interviews had not as yet ever had a meeting or voted on a budget.

## SECTION III

## BACKGROUND CHARACTERISTICS OF COUNCILLORS

The 144 councillors interviewed in the course of this study were drawn from 14 rural communities in nine of Senegal's ten regions. Among these councillors 22 or 15.4% are either presidents or vice presidents of their respective councils, 82 or 57.3% are elected councillors and 39 or 27.3%, were chosen as representatives of the cooperatives (see Table 3). As previously stated, the elected councillors are slightly over-represented in the sample and the councillors representing the cooperatives slightly under-represented. Whereas 33% of all councillors are representatives of the cooperatives, 27.3% of our sample is drawn from this category.

The ethnic breakdown of these councillors is presented in Table 4. The largest group of them is Wolof (32.6%), followed by Peul (22.2%), Mandingue (10.4%), Toucouleur (9.7%), Serere (9.0%) and nine other ethnic groups, each comprising less than 5% of the sample of councillors. When we compare these figures with the distribution of the national population by ethnic group, our sample of the councillors seems to reflect the ethnic distribution of the population nationally. This is probably the result of a conscious effort by the Socialist Party (Parti Socialist) to carefully balance party lists ethnically. As can be seen from a comparison of Tables 5 and 6, the ethnic distribution of councillors by rural community mirrors the ethnic

TABLE 3  
Types of Councillors Interviewed

Post	n	Percentage (%)
President of the council	11	7.69
V. President of the council	11	7.69
Elected councillor	82	57.34
Councillor representing the Cooperatives	39	27.27
TOTAL	143	100.0

TABLE 4  
Ethnic Groups of Councillors Included in the Study

* ETHNIC GROUP *	n	Percentage (%) (per cent national pop.)
* WOLOF *	47	32.64 (41.0)
* SERERE *	13	9.03 (14.7)
* TOUCOULEUR *	14	9.72 (10.8)
* PEUL *	32	22.22 (12.4)
* DIOLA *	5	3.47 (5.4)
* MANDINGUE *	15	10.42 (2.9)
* BAMBARA *	4	2.78 (1.3)
* SARAKHOLE *	1	0.69 (1.2)
* LEBU *	6	4.17 (1.9)
* BALANTE *	1	0.69 (0.7)
* MALINKE *	2	1.39 (0.5)
* MANJAAC *	2	1.39 (0.9)
* MAURE *	1	0.69 (1.2)
* DIAKHANGKE *	1	0.69 (--)
* TOTAL *	144	100.0

distribution of the population in each rural community. This general degree of ethnic representativeness of the councillors also holds for the offices of president and vice president of the council. The main exception seems to be the smaller ethnic groups. They have little chance of electing one of their own to council offices, except where they are concentrated in the same rural community. The Lebu, who are dominant in Sangalkam, are a good example of such an exception.

As expected, the level of formal education of the councillors is, by any standard, quite low. Nearly a quarter have had no formal education whatsoever. Sixty per cent have gone to a Koranic school only. Only 16 per cent have been to a standard primary or secondary school, with 5 per cent completing primary school and 3 per cent having had any secondary education at all. The problems associated with representatives who lack basic literacy skills could perhaps be at least partially overcome with training courses and workshops designed to familiarize the councillors with the routines and regulations governing the work of the council. Here too we find an important shortcoming. Only 38 per cent of the councillors have participated in any kind of training in preparation for their roles as councillors. The difficulties experienced by the rural councils in managing their affairs are, at least in part, linked with this lack of both education and on the job training.

The mean age of the councillors is 52 years. Forty three per cent of those interviewed were 55 years of age or older (the mandatory retirement age in Senegal is 55). The councillors range in

TABLE 5  
Ethnicity of Councillors by Rural Community

RURAL COMMUNITY	n	ETHNICITY OF COUNCILLORS			
		PRINCIPAL ETHNIC GROUP	SECOND	THIRD	FOURTH
SANGALKAM	11	Lebu (54.5)	Wolof (36.4)	Serere (9.1)	-
DIAMACOUTA	11	Peul (54.5)	Toucoui.(45.5)	-	-
KUNKANE	11	Peul (72.7)	Manding.(9.1) Diakangk.(9.1)	-	-
NIAGUIS	11	Diola (45.5)	Manding.(18.2) Manjaac (18.2)	Balante (9.1) Wolof (9.1)	- -
LAMBAYE	11	Wolof (90.9)	Peul (9.1)	-	-
PETE	9	Toucou.(88.9)	Peul (11.1)	-	-
MBANE	11	Wolof (45.5)	Peul (45.5)	Maure (9.1)	-
BAMBA	11	Wolof (45.5)	Manding.(27.3)	Peul (18.2)	Ser.(9.1)
DIALACOTO	11	Manding(54.5)	Bambara (18.2)	Peul (9.1) Sarakhol(9.1) Malinke (9.1)	- - -
MALICOUNDA	10	Serere (50.0)	Wolof (30.0)	Bambara (20)	-
MBORO	8	Wolof (87.5)	Serere (12.5)	-	-
KELLE GUEYE	11	Wolof (90.9)	Peul (9.1)	-	-
VELINGARA	9	Peul (77.8)	Wolof (22.2)	-	-
TOUBACOUTA	9	Serere (55.6)	Manding.(33.3)	Malinke(11.1)	-

TABLE 6  
Ethnicity of the Population by Rural Community

* RURAL COMMUNITY	* ETHNICITY OF THE POPULATION *			
* SANGALKAM *	-	-	-	-
* DIAMACOUTA	Toucouleur (78.2)	Manding.(7.2)	Peul (1.3)	-
* KUNKANE	Peul (87.1)	Manding.(11.2)	-	-
* NIAGUIS	Diola (32.1)	Manding.(29.6)	Manjaac(14.8)	-
* LAMBAYE	Wolof (93.1)	Serere (6.2)	Peul (0.7)	-
* PETE	Peul (50.5)	Toucoul.(49.5)	-	-
* MBANE	Wolof (58.7)	Peul (37.8)	Maure (3.5)	-
* BAMBA	Wolof (41.3)	Peul (33.4)	Manding(11.6)	Ser.(8.6)
* DIALACOTO	Mandingue (55.3)	Peul (34.8)	-	-
* MALICOUNDA	Serere (48.0)	Wolof (25.6)	Bambara(19.6)	-
* MBORO	Wolof (80.1)	Peul (19.9)	-	-
* KELLE GUEYE	Wolof (93.5)	Peul (6.5)	-	-
* VELINGARA	Peul (82.8)	Wolof (11.1)	-	-
* TOUBACOUTA *	-	-	-	-

\* Data on Ethnicity not Available

TABLE 7  
Level of Education of the Councillors

* LEVEL OF EDUCATION *	n	Percentage (%)
* NO FORMAL EDUCATION *	32	23.53
* KORANIC SCHOOL *	81	59.56
* SOME PRIMARY EDUCATION *	12	8.82
* COMPLETED PRIMARY SCHOOL *	7	5.15
* SOME SECONDARY EDUCATION *	4	2.94
* TOTAL *	136	100.0

age from 26 to 79. With age being associated with wisdom and leadership in rural society, it is not surprising that in spite of the fact that the young are a large majority of the population, they constitute a very small proportion of the councillors (12% are between the ages of 26 and 35 and 13% between 36 and 44). This same phenomenon prevails in terms of the leadership positions in the council, that is, there is a positive correlation between age and the holding of positions of authority. Although 43 per cent of the councillors are 55 or over, 62 per cent of the council presidents and vice presidents are in this category. While 26 per cent of the councillors are less than 45 years of age, only 9.5 per cent of the council officers are drawn from this age category.

Most councillors earn their livelihood as farmers, although other occupations are also represented in the sample. Since the job of councillor carries with it neither salary nor expenses or per diem, many individuals find this job to be a costly affair. For example in one of the rural communities included in this study some councillors reside as much as 150 kilometers or more from the seat of the rural community. Every time a council meeting is called or the councillors are asked to be present for a presentation to be made by a government official, the councillors must drop their work and spend money for travel, food and lodging in order to attend. They complain that the village chiefs at least get a per cent of the rural tax as compensation for their work but they, as councillors, receive nothing. Although virtually all of the councillors farm, about 30 per cent also have another occupation such as running a small shop, masonry work,

TABLE 8  
AGE OF COUNCILLORS

* YEAR OF BIRTH *	* AGE (YEARS) *	* n *	* percentage (%) *
* 1906 - 16 *	* > 68 *	* 12 *	* 8.45 *
* 1917 - 30 *	* 55 - 68 *	* 49 *	* 34.51 *
* 1931 - 40 *	* 45 - 54 *	* 45 *	* 31.69 *
* 1941 - 49 *	* 36 - 44 *	* 19 *	* 13.38 *
* 1950 - 59 *	* 26 - 35 *	* 17 *	* 11.97 *
* TOTAL *		* 142 *	* 100.0 *

$$\bar{X} = 33.37$$

$$\text{ST. DEV} = 11.77$$

TABLE 9  
AGE BY POST OF COUNCILLORS

* * * POST	* * AGE (YEARS) *		
	* * 26-44 *	* * 45-54 *	* * 55-69 *
* * PRESIDENT & V.P.	* * 2 * (9.5)	* * 6 * (28.6)	* * 13 * (61.9)
* * ELECTED * COUNCILLOR	* * 24 * (29.6)	* * 29 * (35.8)	* * 28 * (34.6)
* * COUNCILLOR- * COOPERATIVES	* * 10 * (25.6)	* * 10 * (25.6)	* * 19 * (48.7)

weigher for a cooperative, fishing, etc. In addition 5.7 per cent are village chiefs as well as councillors (even though this is formally prohibited) and 4.3 per cent are local Muslim religious leaders (marabouts).

Given the fact that the council can not directly employ people there is little if any patronage to distribute. The contracting process for the council is usually handled directly by the "sous-prefet", thus limiting potential councillor influence in this domain as well. The only field in which the councillors can potentially exercise considerable influence is in the important area of land allocation. Thus, there appear to be few advantages to be gained by serving on the council. In addition to the problem of expenses, councillors are often blamed by their constituents for their failure to bring development projects and other benefits to their home villages. Thus, their local status as well as their personal finances often suffer as a result of their positions as councillors.

This being the case, we would expect there to be a fairly high turnover rate among councillors. For three of the fourteen rural communities in the sample, Sangalkam, Bamba and Dialacoto, the first set of councillors was elected in 1984 so it is impossible to examine the question of turnover in these cases. For the remaining eleven rural communities the turnover rate for the 1984 elections is just under 50 per cent (47.3%) with a range between 18.2 and 90 per cent. Considering the fact that the elections are by party list and the lack of direct benefits available to the councillors, it is apparent that

TABLE 10  
OCCUPATIONS OF COUNCILLORS

OCCUPATION	n	PERCENTAGE (%)
Farmer or Livestockman	98	70.0
Village Chief	8	5.7
Marabout (Muslim religious leader)	6 (7*)	4.3
Merchant and Farmer	9	6.4
Bureaucrat (retired)	5	3.6
Farmer and other (fisherman, mason, weicher, carpenter, shoemaker)	12	8.6
Other	2	1.4
TOTAL	140	100

\* One of the village chiefs is also a marabout.

TABLE 11  
INCUMBENCY ON THE COUNCIL

RURAL COMMUNITY	REGION	% OF COUNCILLORS ELECTED IN 1984 FOR THE FIRST TIME	n
Diamacouta	Kolda	72.7	11
Kounkane	Kolda	36.4	11
Niaguis	Ziguinchor	63.6	11
Lambaye	Diourbel	90.0	10
Pete	St. Louis	22.2	9
Mbane	St. Louis	18.2	11
Malicounda	Thies	50.0	10
Mboro	Thies	75.0	8
Kel Gueye	Louga	36.2	11
Velingara	Louga	22.2	9
Toubacouta	Fatick	33.3	9
		$\bar{X} = 47.3$ range = 18.2 - 90.0	110

\* In the regions of Dakar and Tambacounda the administrative reform did not actually go into effect until 1984. Therefore all of the councillors in Sangalkam, Bamba and Dialacoto were elected for the first time in 1984.

most of those who decide not to stand for re-election do so voluntarily. However, as expected, those holding office as either a president or vice president of a council are generally serving at least their second term in office. Only 15 per cent of the top officers on the councils were elected to the council for the first time in 1984. Thus, serving at least one term in the council seems to be a prerequisite to being elected as president or vice president. But here too, longevity is uncertain. Less than half of all council presidents in our sample are serving for a second or third time in that post.

In terms of religious affiliation, the councillors, like the population as a whole, are overwhelmingly Muslim (98%). Among the various Islamic sects and brotherhoods the Tidjanes appear to be dominant in the political arena with 59 per cent of the councillors in our sample as adherents. The Mourides are second with 20 per cent, followed by the Khadrya with 19 per cent. Catholics make up only about 2 per cent of the sample. When we examine the leadership positions (presidents and vice presidents of the councils) the Tidjanes are represented in proportion to their percentage of councillors, but the Khadrya are slightly over-represented and the Mourides under-represented in leadership positions (see table 12).

The religious affiliation of councillors is not evenly distributed among the rural communities in our sample. For example, the Mourides are the dominant group among councillors in two rural communities, Lambaye and Kelle Gueye, where they represent 100 and 91

TABLE 12  
RELIGION BY RURAL COMMUNITY

* RURAL COMMUNITY	n	MOURIDE %	TIDJANE %	KHADRIYA %	CATHOLIC %
* SANGALKAM	11	9.1	81.8	9.1	-
* DIAMACOUTA	11	-	100.0	-	-
* KUNKANE	11	-	72.7	27.3	-
* NIAGUIS	11	18.2	27.3	27.3	27.3
* LAMBAYE	11	100.0	-	-	-
* PETE	9	-	100.0	-	-
* MBANE	11	-	63.6	36.4	-
* BAMBA	11	9.1	72.7	18.2	-
* DIALACOTO	11	-	18.2	81.8	-
* MALICOUNDA	10	10.0	90.0	-	-
* MBORO	8	12.5	75.0	12.5	-
* KELLE GUEYE	11	90.9	9.1	-	-
* VELINGARA	9	22.2	77.8	-	-
* TOUBACOUTA	9	-	55.6	44.4	-
* PERCENTAGE AND (n)	100 (144)	20.1 (29)	59.0 (85)	10.9 (27)	2.1 (3)
* <u>PERCENTAGE OF PRES.+V.P.</u>	100 (22)	13.6	63.6	22.7	-

per cent of the councillors respectively. This is as expected since these two rural communities are both relatively close to the seat of Mouridism, Touba. However, what is surprising is the degree to which the Mourides are concentrated. These two rural communities include nearly three fourths of all Mouride councillors in the sample. It is in this concentration of supporters and wealth that the Mourides find their political strength. The Khadrya are dominant in one rural community, Dialacoto, but are more evenly distributed among the other councils with 3 or 4 councillors on each of four other councils. The Tidjanes are represented on all but one of the fourteen councils and dominant (are in an absolute majority) on ten of the fourteen councils. This is consistent with the important role played by the Tidjanes as office holders in national politics.

In sum, the councillors tend to be closely linked to their respective rural communities by ethnicity and religion. They are somewhat older than the population as a whole, overwhelmingly male, and generally farmers by trade. Their level of education is very low and they have had little if any on the job training to compensate for this shortcoming. There is a relatively high turnover rate on the councils, even among council leaders. Council officers tend to be incumbents at the time they are selected for these posts. Quite clearly, the backgrounds of the councillors suggest that the managerial experience and capacity of the councils as organizations capable of promoting rural development are limited.

## SECTION IV

## COMMUNICATION PATTERNS

From the behavioral perspective, the information circulating in the council and the contacts between the councillors and various other authorities are extremely important. Not only do they exercise a considerable influence over actions in the council but also over perceptions of the council and the government in general. Councillors in the rural areas find themselves generally isolated from regular contacts with central government authorities and must therefore depend largely on local contacts to help them understand and react to both national and local policy and problems. The level of development of communication networks can provide us with an indicator of the degree to which the rural councils are fulfilling the role assigned to them by the administrative reform, that is "the management of local development efforts by the rural communities and their elected representatives themselves." (Secretariat d'Etat a la Decentralisation, 1985: 1).

Contacts by Councillors

If councils are acting in an independent fashion, it would be expected that councillor contacts would concentrate on the president of the council and the "chef de CER" who are charged respectively with

acting as the leader and prime implementation agent for council actions. The purely administrative authorities should have less impact and involvement in both policy making and execution than the council and those generally charged with implementation. Councillors in their role as representatives of local public opinion, are also expected to maintain regular contact with local elites, such as village chiefs, religious authorities and cooperative leaders. Thus, a high level of contact is expected in this direction as well.

As can be seen in Table 13, these expectations are at least partially met when we examine frequency of contact. The figure with whom councillors have the most frequent contact are village chiefs. More than half of the councillors see their village chief every day or every other day. As noted in the previous section 5.7% of the councillors are themselves village chiefs, thus the figure of 50% is actually conservative. It should also be noted that more than three quarters of all councillors see the village chief(s) at least once a week. Thus, the continuing influence of the traditional elites on behavior in the councils cannot be ignored.

TABLE 13

## CONTACT BETWEEN COUNCILLORS AND OTHER LEADERS

* * *	SOUS-PREFET		CHEF CER		COUNCIL PRES.		OTHER COUNCILLOR*		* *
* * FREQUENCY	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	* *
* * EVERY DAY	3	2.08	5	3.47	27	20.0	18	12.8	* *
* * EVERY OTHER DAY	7	4.86	5	3.47	20	14.8	21	14.9	* *
* * ONCE A WEEK	42	29.17	27	18.75	62	45.9	60	42.6	* *
* * ONCE A MONTH	54	37.50	37	25.69	13	9.6	32	22.7	* *
* * < ONCE A MONTH	38	26.39	70	48.61	13	9.6	10	7.1	* *
* * TOTAL	144	100	144	100	135	100	141	100.1	* *
* * MEDIAN	1/MONTH		1/MONTH		1/WEEK		1/WEEK		* *

TABLE 13 (cont.)

VILLAGE CHIEF		RELIGIOUS AUTH.		PRES.OF COOPERATIVE	
n	%	n	%	n	%
49	35.77	10	7.3	36	27.69
20	14.6	20	14.6	14	10.77
37	27.01	28	20.44	37	28.46
12	8.76	20	14.6	17	13.08
19	13.87	59	43.01	26	20.00
137	100.01	137	100	130	100
EVERY OTHER DAY		1/MONTH		1/WEEK	

A second figure of great importance to the councillors, the president of the local cooperative, is representative of some of the local economic elites. In spite of the fact that the cooperatives have not functioned very effectively for many years, those individuals who preside over them are still influential both in local economic affairs and as pillars of the ruling party. More than two thirds of all councillors in the sample have contact with the president of the local cooperative at least once a week. The influence of the cooperative presidents and changes in this influence resulting from the reform of the cooperative movement have a major impact on the functioning of the council.

The president of the council seems to provide the main focus for interaction within the council. He is in regular contact with most members of the council, more than 80% saying that they see him at least once a week. There is a similar high level of interaction among councillors themselves, but in this case it generally represents small groups of councillors or individual contacts between two councillors from the same geographic zone in the rural community. The council president plays a more vital role because of the bridge he forms between various other leadership groups.

Contacts between the councillors and government agents, the "sous-prefets" and the "chefs de CER," are quite limited. Only about a third of the councillors have contact with the "sous-prefet" once a week or more and about one fourth have weekly contact with the "chef de CER". This is somewhat surprising given the fact that the "chef de

CER" is charged with executing rural community policies in the area. However, given the fact that most "chef de CER" are responsible for between two and seven rural communities, their time must be divided among a number of different areas, thus limiting contact with any specific rural community or set of councillors. Even this cannot explain the fact that almost half of all councillors report having virtually no contact with the "chef de CER" (less than once a month).

Finally, contacts with religious authorities by councillors are somewhat limited. However, the significance of these contacts should not be underestimated, especially given the importance of the link between religious authorities and cooperative leaders. This is especially so in the peanut basin and perhaps more so among the Mourides than for other religious groups.

#### Contacts by Type of Councillor

Since it appears that the council presidents are at the center of communications for the council, it would perhaps be more enlightening to disaggregate our sample into different categories of councillors to see what the main links are between council officers and other types of leaders. In this way we can minimize the problem which results from examining communications among individuals who are only marginally linked to the important influence networks. For example, there is a big difference between being part of a communications network and being central to that network. It appears from the reports of the councillors themselves that the presidents and vice

presidents are central, while the role played by many other councillors is marginal.

An examination of Table 14 reveals some rather interesting differences between the average councillor and the presidents and vice presidents of the same councils. First, in examining the level of interaction with government authorities, namely the "sous-prefet" and the "chef de CER", it can be seen that the level of communication-interaction is much more frequent for council officers than it is for other councillors. Council officers generally have weekly contact with government officials while other councillors tend to see these individuals once a month or less. For example, 72.8% of the presidents and vice presidents see the "sous-prefet" at least once a week, while the comparable figures for elected and cooperative councillors are 34.1% and 18.0% respectively. Similarly, 59.0% of the officers see the "chef de CER" at least once a week while for the other councillors the figures are 23.2% and 12.9% respectively. Thus, the role played by these government officials as vectors for communication in the council is undoubtedly much greater than appears to be the case when we examine only the aggregate figures.

A look at the disaggregated figures for communication by councillors with village chiefs and with local religious authorities is equally instructive. The contact with these leaders is much less frequent for council presidents and vice presidents than it is for other councillors (elected plus those representing the cooperatives). Thus, the impact of traditional authorities on decision making is more

Table 14

## FREQUENCY OF CONTACT WITH LEADERS BY DIFFERENT TYPES OF COUNCILLORS

* POSITION BY CONTACT	EVERY DAY	EVERY OTHER DAY	1/WEEK
* Pres.+ V.P. (22)	0	27.3	45.5
* Sous-pref. Elected (82)	2.4	0	31.7
* Coop. (39)	2.6	2.6	12.8
* Pres.+ V.P. (22)	4.5	13.6	40.9
* Chef de CER Elected (82)	3.7	1.2	18.3
* Coop. (39)	2.6	2.6	7.7
* Pres.+ V.P. -	-	-	-
* Couns.Pres. Elected (82)	17.1	18.3	45.1
* Coop. (39)	30.8	5.1	46.2
* Pres.+ V.P. (22)	18.2	22.7	40.9
* Other Cons. Elected (60)	9.8	12.2	45.1
* Coop. (38)	15.4	15.4	35.9
* Pres.+ V.P. (22)	18.2	9.1	31.8
* Village Chief Elected (79)	41.5	9.8	26.8
* Coop. (36)	28.2	25.6	20.5
* Pres.+ V.P. (19)	0	13.6	18.2
* Rel.Leader Elected (80)	8.5	9.8	29.3
* Coop. (37)	7.7	23.1	0
* Pres.+ V.P. (20)	40.9	4.5	27.3
* Pres. Coop. Elected (75)	18.3	9.8	25.6
* Coop. (34)	30.8	10.3	25.6

Table 14 (cont.)

ONCE A MONTH	< ONCE A MONTH	*
18.2	9.1	*
36.6	29.3	*
51.3	30.8	*
9.1	31.8	*
26.8	50.0	*
33.3	53.8	*
-	-	*
8.5	11.0	*
12.8	5.1	*
18.2	0	*
20.7	9.8	*
25.6	5.1	*
9.1	27.3	*
9.8	8.5	*
5.1	12.8	*
9.1	45.5	*
13.4	36.6	*
15.4	48.7	*
9.1	9.1	*
13.4	24.4	*
10.3	10.3	*

likely to be indirect, operating through regular councillors rather than directly on those in leadership positions in the council. This is underlined by the regular contact between councillors and the leadership of the councils.

The most surprising finding is the frequency of contact between the council presidents and vice presidents and the presidents of the rural cooperatives. Nearly 41% of the council leaders have daily contact with the leaders of the cooperatives. This level of interaction is even higher than that between the councillors representing the cooperatives and the cooperative presidents. Even though the cooperatives have lost much of their power during the years of drought and with the cessation of the credit system, they still remain the dominant economic force in many rural communities and are therefore a power which must be reckoned with, both in the context of the council and the ruling party. Some individuals have gone as far as to suggest that the council leaders are in effect stand-ins for these local economic elites. The importance of this link however, may be modified by the implementation of the new cooperative policies ("section villageoise").

### Subjects of Contact

At this point it will be interesting to note the issues which are the subjects of the encounters discussed above. First we will examine the views of the councillors in the aggregate, then we will turn to the same question from the perspective of those occupying different

roles in the council. In analyzing the impact of these communications two factors must be taken into account, the frequency of contact with a given official and the frequency with which a particular issue is discussed. For example, someone with frequent contacts with official 'x' may have a lower percentage of those contacts centered around a particular subject than a second councillor who has fewer contacts but a higher percentage of those contacts concentrated on a particular issue.

The individual cited most frequently as having regular contact with the councillors is the village chief. Of those having such contacts, the most often cited subject of these encounters is personal problems, followed by the rural tax and land ownership problems. Thus, although the village chiefs are frequently contacted, the nature of that contact as it effects council business seems to be concentrated on raising the revenue on which the council depends (the rural tax) and the vital question of land management with which the council is officially charged but over which the chiefs formerly exercised authority. In other fields, such as budgetary matters and local projects, the chiefs are rarely consulted. However, it should be noted that the chiefs serve a vital communications function in the diffusion of reports of actions taken in the rural council. Well over half of the 144 councillors interviewed indicated that the "minutes" of the council meetings and other information on council actions are diffused through the village chiefs.

On the government administration side of the equation,

councillors seem to rely on the "sous-prefet" in the area of council budgets, taxes and land problems. Surprisingly, the "chef de CER," who must execute rural community programs is rarely consulted regarding budgetary questions. The main subjects of communication with the "chef de CER" appear to be questions relative to local projects and some considerations about land use.

As expected, cooperative presidents are most often consulted regarding cooperative matters and religious leaders are most often consulted in reference to personal problems. On the other end of the spectrum, the council presidents and vice presidents are the targets of communications involving virtually all issues affecting the council. The same holds true for consultations between the other councillors.

When these data are disaggregated by the type of councillor (president and vice president, other elected councillors and councillors chosen by the cooperatives) we can get a better perspective on who speaks to whom and about what. As indicated in table 16, council officers are most likely to discuss problems effecting the council, land problems, budget questions and even local projects, with the "sous-prefet" than with any other leader. Their level of discussion of the same issues with other councillors is equally high. Thus, the council officers seem to serve as intermediaries between the councillors and the administration. This seems to confirm the importance of the "sous-prefet" in council affairs. It is a situation which also provides the potential for



Table 15 (cont.)

VILLAGE CHIEFS	RELIGIOUS LEADERS	COOP. PRESIDENT*
n = 144	n = 144	n = 144
7.64 %	0.69 %	0.69 %
25.69 %	6.25 %	3.47 %
13.19 %	4.86 %	6.25 %
43.06 %	4.86 %	3.47 %
29.86 %	35.42 %	15.97 %
50 %	35.42 %	31.94 %
12.5 %	4.17 %	5.56 %
13.19 %	2.08 %	65.28 %
8.33 %	1.39 %	13.19 %

TABLE 16

What is (are) the subject(s) of your discussions with...  
(P.V.P=pres. or vice pres., CE=elected councillor, CC=councillor representing the coops)

	SOUS - PREFET			CHEF CER			COUNCIL PRESIDENT		
	P.V.P!	CE	CC	P.V.P!	CE	CC	P.V.P!	CE	CC
	n=22 %	n=82 %	n=39 %	n=22 %	n=82 %	n=39 %	n=22 %	n=82 %	n=39 %
Civil law	59.09	17.07	20.51	9.09	0 %	5.13	22.73	25.61	23.08
Land allocation	54.54	31.7	20.51	36.36	20.73	15.38	31.81	41.46	38.46
Council budget	63.64	37.8	30.77	9.09	15.85	15.38	22.73	45.12	38.46
Rural Tax	63.64	32.93	46.15	13.64	10.97	2.56	13.64	34.15	25.64
Civilities	13.64	20.73	12.82	13.64	8.54	12.82	9.09	26.83	35.90
Personal problems	27.27	29.27	20.51	13.64	17.07	20.51	18.18	36.58	53.85
Questions relative to projects	27.27	5.10	10.26	0.5	24.39	15.38	9.09	21.95	15.38
Cooperatives affairs	22.73	8.54	35.90	18.18	8.54	28.20	13.64	6.10	33.33
Collection of debts	13.64	2.44	2.56	0	0	5.13	0	6.10	12.82

TABLE 16 (cont.)

OTHER COUNCILLORS			VILLAGE CHIEFS		
P. U. P.	CE	CC	P. U. P.	CE	CC
n=22	n=82	n=39	n=22	n=82	n=39
27.27 %	14.63 %	5.13 %	9.09 %	7.32 %	7.69 %
63.64 %	37.80 %	23.08 %	36.36 %	28.05 %	12.82 %
68.18 %	39.02 %	33.33 %	9.09 %	12.19 %	17.25 %
36.36 %	29.27 %	15.38 %	59.09 %	43.90 %	33.33 %
36.36 %	25.61 %	38.46 %	18.18 %	34.15 %	28.20 %
40.91 %	41.46 %	46.15 %	18.18 %	51.22 %	66.66 %
31.81 %	20.73 %	25.64 %	18.18 %	10.97 %	12.82 %
22.73 %	8.54 %	30.77 %	18.18 %	8.54 %	20.51 %
0	2.44 %	5.13 %	4.54 %	9.76 %	5.13 %

TABLE 16 (cont.)

RELIGIOUS AUTHORITIES			PRESIDENT OF THE COOPERATIVE		
PVP	CE	CC	PVP	CE	CC
n=22	n=82	n=39	n=22	n=82	n=39
4.54 %	0	0	4.54 %	0	0
9.09 %	8.54 %	0	13.64 %	1.22 %	2.56 %
4.54 %	7.32 %	0	22.73 %	3.66 %	2.56 %
4.54 %	6.10 %	2.56 %	9.10 %	3.66 %	0
40.91 %	37.80 %	25.64 %	27.27 %	13.41 %	15.38 %
22.73 %	27.80 %	35.90 %	31.82 %	31.71 %	33.33 %
0	7.32 %	0	9.09 %	4.88 %	5.13 %
4.54 %	0	5.13 %	68.18 %	63.41 %	66.66 %
0	2.44 %	0	13.64 %	13.41 %	10.26 %

severing these ties if the council presidents and vice presidents who serve as the intermediaries decide to exercise a more independent role. This point is reinforced by the fact that for the other elected councillors their communication on most council issues is dominated by contact with the council officers more than by any other leader or group of leaders. The same holds true for councillors representing the cooperatives. As expected, however, the cooperative presidents are the key communication links for all categories of councillors on cooperative matters.

#### Summary

In summary, the communication networks which exist in the council clearly place the council officers in the vital role of communications link between various local elites and the administrative authorities of the state. The presidents and vice presidents are the focus of attention of the other councillors on almost all issues affecting council action. In terms of downward linkages, the village chiefs continue to play a key role as transmitters of information from the council as well as the source of revenue (as collectors of the rural tax) for the council and as advisors on land allocation matters. The president of the cooperative is the key contact for the council leaders in the economic domain. Thus, it appears that the councillors themselves act as an elite, at least one step removed from the peasants in terms of regular communication. It should be noted that the level of horizontal communication between councillors is quite high. It is when we turn to vertical linkages that the existing

patterns are more disturbing. The "sous-prefet" continues to be the key figure in this chain. This would in and of itself be little cause for concern if the council were basically informing the government of its activities through the local administrative authority. However, as will be seen in the following pages, the role of the "sous-prefet" is a much more active one.

In order to round out our discussion of communication patterns in the council and their link to actual behavior it is necessary to examine the importance attributed to various actors in actual decision making and the importance attributed to the various subjects debated in the council. This will enable us to assess the relative degree of power of the various actors involved in decision making in the council. This subject will be dealt with in the next chapter.

## SECTION V

## DECISION MAKING IN THE COUNCIL

In order to determine the nature of decision making in the council and the importance of various participants in the decision making process, it is necessary to first determine which issues are considered most important by the councillors as topics of discussion. We can then try to determine the importance of the various actors in the decision process in the different substantive areas. In this fashion we should be better able to understand the nature of the actions undertaken by the councils and the degree to which they are indicative of the notions generally associated with a system of decentralized rural development.

Issues Debated in the Rural Councils

If the important issues are largely determined by forces representing the central administration, the limited effectiveness of the councils as organizations can be at least partially attributed to inadequate implementation of local government reforms. In this case, structural change or behavioral reforms should most probably be aimed at government officials, especially the "sous-prefets." If on the other hand, it is the council and its members who directly influence the major decisions, then any cure for the problems of local administration must take the form of in-service training for councillors and additional information sessions for the population

and/or different selection procedures.

The most important topics debated in the councils (see Table 17), according to the councillors, are questions involving the budget for the rural community, the rural tax (a subject directly related to the council budget), land allocation problems and questions related to local development projects. More than nine out of ten councillors (92.4%) rated budgetary questions as being very important issues in council debate. No other topic approaches this question in terms of the importance attributed to it. The second ranking issue, the rural tax, is considered very important by 72.9% of the councillors interviewed. Since it is the rural tax which provides the overwhelming portion of the funds available for use by the rural councils, it is an issue which is directly related to council budgetary matters. Land allocation problems, for which the council has an important responsibility, are third in the importance attributed to them by councillors.

When we look at the rural communities individually, we find few significant differences in the importance of these issues from one community to another. Budgetary matters remain at the top of the list almost everywhere. In eleven of the thirteen rural communities for which we have data (The fourteenth, Sangalkam is excluded because there has never been a session of the council held at the time this study was undertaken. The budget was instead simply imposed by the "prefet".), budgetary questions are ranked first in importance by the councillors. In one of the remaining two rural communities in our

Table 17  
Importance of Issues Discussed in Council Meetings

* Subject	* $\bar{X}$	* stand- dev.	* n	* Un- important %	* of little import %	* important %	* very im- portant %
* Budgetary * Questions	2.89	0.44	119	1.68	0	5.88	92.44
* Rural * Tax	2.66	0.61	107	0.93	4.67	21.5	72.9
* Land Allocation * Problems	2.53	0.79	116	3.45	8.62	18.96	68.97
* questions about * projects	2.33	0.85	100	6	7	35	52
* Civil Law	2.23	0.83	105	3.81	14.29	36.19	45.71
* Debt * Collection	2.01	0.95	86	10.47	12.79	41.86	34.88
* Cooperative * Business	1.92	0.90	100	11	12	51	26
* Civilities	1.44	0.82	98	14.29	34.69	43.88	7.14
* Personal * Problems	1.03	0.91	100	36	29	31	4

sample budgetary problems ranked second, just after the rural tax (an issue linked directly to budgetary considerations). In only one rural community, Mboro, did budgetary matters rank as low as third in importance out of the nine issues considered. In Mboro, local taxes and land allocation issues ranked first and second respectively. Given the industrialization, movement of urban population to this area, and the growing importance of market gardening, this is not surprising.

In a similar fashion the rural tax and land use problems consistently rank quite high regardless of rural community. In eleven of the thirteen rural communities the rural tax was rated as among the top three issues debated in the council. The same holds true for nine rural communities with respect to land use and allocation questions.

What is somewhat surprising is the relatively low degree of importance attached to local development projects as a topic for discussion. In only four of the thirteen rural communities are projects considered to be among the top three issues considered by the councils. In seven of these councils projects ranked at or below the middle of the nine issues considered. Several possible explanations for this can be suggested. First, with the extremely small budgets available to most rural communities, few if any projects are undertaken, thus the issue is not considered to be as important as a number of other subjects of debate. Second, as will be seen in the following paragraphs, councillors often feel that their views are not taken into account in the initiation and execution of local

development projects. In this case there is little reason to rank projects as an important issue for discussion. Third, after the annual budget vote which allocates money to projects, contracting and execution are in the hands of the "sous-prefet" and the "chef CER" respectively. However, it is possible that questions and problems associated with projects are channeled to these figures directly, without becoming the subject of regular communication.

Do different types of councillors have different priorities regarding issues debated in the council? When the data are broken down by the type of councillor (president or vice president, other elected councillors and councillors representing the cooperatives) little if any difference is found between their ranking of the various issues considered by the council. All three groups rated the top issues in the same order, budgetary questions, the rural tax and land allocation problems respectively.

#### The Importance of the Various Decision Makers

Who, from the perspective of the councillors themselves, are the most important figures involved in decision making in the council? It is not surprising that the councillors rate themselves, the president of the council and the "sous-prefet," in that order, as playing the most important role in council decision making. The council president and the councillors in general are rated first in a virtual dead heat, followed by the "sous-prefet." What is important from the perspective of the role played by the council is the fact that 87% of the

Table 18

Importance of Subjects Debated in the Council  
(Ranked by Importance by Rural Community)

	Rural Community					
	Mbane	Pete	Kelle Gueye	Veling-ara	Bamba	Diamacouta
* civil law	4	4	3	7	3.5	3
* land allocation problems	2	6	1.5	2.5	2	4
* budgetary questions	1	1	1.5	1	1	2
* rural tax	6	3	4	2.5	3.5	1
* civilities	8	7	8	8	8	9
* personal problems	9	8	9	9	9	9
* questions relative to projects	3	2	6	5	5	5
* cooperative business	7	9	7	6	6	7
* debt collection	5	5	5	4	7	6

Table 18 (cont.)

Rural Community						
Kunkane	Niaguis	Touba-couta	Lam-baye	Mali-counda	Mboro	Diala-coto
7	5.5	5	5	6	3.5	6
3	1.5	2	6	2.5	2	4
1.5	1.5	2	1	1	3.5	1.5
1.5	3	2	3	2.5	1	1.5
8	8	7	7	9	8	8
9	9	9	9	8	9	9
5	5.5	4	2	4	7	3
6	4	6	4	7	6	6
4	7	8	8	5	5	6

Table 19

Q.35 Importance of the following individuals in decision making in the Council

	$\bar{X}$	stand. dev.	n	un-import ant %	of little import %	important %	very im- portant %	* * * * *
* * 35-A. the * councillors	2.58	0.77	137	4.38	4.38	19.71	71.51	* * * * *
* * 35-C. council * president	2.56	0.67	138	1.45	5.8	27.54	65.22	* * * * *
* * 35-B. * "sous-prefet"	2.33	0.81	138	4.35	8.7	36.23	50.72	* * * * *
* * 35-D chef de CER	1.49	0.87	137	13.87	34.31	40.14	11.69	* * * * *
* * 35-H * cooperatives	1.42	1.07	128	28.13	17.97	36.72	17.19	* * * * *
* * 35-E the party	0.99	1.03	128	42.19	27.34	19.53	10.94	* * * * *
* * 35-F religious * leaders	0.97	0.92	129	37.21	34.11	22.48	6.2	* * * * *
* * 35-G village * chiefs	0.90	0.91	130	41.54	32.31	20.77	5.38	* * * * *

councillors think that the "sous-prefet" is important in council decision making and more than half (50.7%) think that his role is very important.

Disaggregating the sample has hardly any impact on these findings. There is very little difference between the various rural communities on the importance attributed to the various actors in council decision making. When the sample is broken down by the type of councillor, only a slight difference is noted. The presidents and vice presidents tend to consider their role as more important in council decisions than that of the other councillors. They are also more likely to consider the role of the "sous-prefet" to be important than are their colleagues.

#### Initiation and Execution of Council Actions: The Budget

From the perspective of the independence of the council, it is important to know if the council initiates and manages a variety of actions on its own or if it is dependent on the administrative authorities of the central government. To what extent does the council merely serve as a convenient rubber stamp for policies and actions initiated at the center? Although we can not determine the exact origins of council actions we can get a sense of the degree to which councillors feel free to consider and if they wish reject actions initiated in Dakar or in their regional capital.

Councillors were asked to comment on their perceptions concerning

council actions and/or reactions to initiatives coming from administrative authorities. More than half of the councillors (52%) said that such initiatives are never rejected by the council and about a third (33.9%) said that such initiatives were rejected only from time to time. Only 14.2% said that their council often rejected administratively initiated actions and not one of the 127 councillors responding to the question said that they rejected such actions very frequently..

An important difference emerges when we examine the responses to this question by different types of councillors. While over half of the councillors taken as a whole said that their council never rejected administrative initiatives, only a third of the presidents and vice presidents offered this response. They are much more likely than their colleagues to say that such actions are rejected from time to time. However, the responses of the councillors representing the cooperatives leaned in the opposite direction from those of the presidents and vice presidents. While only a third of the latter said the council never rejected administrative initiatives, nearly 72% of the former (cooperative councillors) chose this response. This may in part be a function of their general reaction to central government decision making. Actions relating to cooperatives, such as the establishment of village sections for the cooperatives taken after only minimal consultation with the farmers, are good examples.

This in itself does not demonstrate administrative dominance over the decision making process. It is possible that these initiatives

are launched only after considerable consultation with the councillors, the party and other local elites. The communications data in the previous chapter show considerable interaction between the councillors and the "sous-prefet" on the question of the budget. Thus, acceptance of these initiatives may be more the result of a consensus than of the imposition of a set of actions by local authorities representing the "state".

Related to this issue is the degree of collaboration which takes place between the councillors and the administrative authorities. If that collaboration is generally open and two way, then the fact that the council does not often reject proposals coming from the administration is less significant. If prior consultation has already resulted in a basic accord, then consensus is more likely. Most councillors seem to feel that the level of collaboration is reasonably good. More than a third (34.4%) strongly agree with the statement that such collaboration is open and frank and more than half (54.7%) agreed, but with some reservations. Only one in nine (10.9%) disagreed. These results are consistent for all three types of councillors. However, as will become more apparent in the following paragraphs, the councillors do not appear to be saying that they are equal partners in this collaboration.

Since the councillors themselves identified the budget as the most important area of decision making in the council, it will be instructive to examine perceptions of decision making in this key area. When the councillors were asked to react to the following

statement "the budget of the rural community is determined by the "sous-prefet" instead of by the council," the responses are nearly equally divided between those who agree (48.3%) and those who disagree (51.7%). An examination of the distribution of responses underlines the fact that this is a view supported strongly by a significant number of councillors (35.6%). At the same time it is totally rejected by a much smaller group (7.6%). When the respondents are divided by the type of councillor, no significant differences appear between the responses of the council officers and the other elected councillors. However, the councillors representing the cooperatives appear to be much more likely than their colleagues to feel that the "sous-prefet" dominates the budget making process.

The apparent uniformity of responses to the involvement of the administrative authorities in the initiation of the rural community budget disappears when the sample is broken down by rural community. Of the thirteen rural communities for which data are available, in five of them 60-100% of the councillors interviewed agreed that the "sous-prefet" dominated the budgetary process. However, in four other rural communities in the sample less than 25% of the councillors interviewed shared this same opinion. In the four remaining rural communities in our sample the councillors are about evenly split in their views. It is important to note that this variation is not related to the date of the implementation of the reform.

This seems to indicate that although the "sous-prefet" remains an important figure from the perspective of the legal and administrative

hierarchy, there is considerable room for flexibility. The "sous-prefet's" perception of his role and the nature of his interaction with the council are probably more closely linked than either of these is with the formal texts. As is usually the case with administrative behavior, the individual administrator has more flexibility in decision making than he would like both his clients and his superiors to believe.

The next step in the budgetary process, the execution of the budget is, as noted earlier, formally under the authority of the "sous-prefet," although other actors have a role to play in this vital function as well. An important issue in this domain is the degree to which the process remains open to public scrutiny or at least to perusal by the council. It is not uncommon to hear charges leveled against the "secret and illegitimate" actions undertaken by the administrative authorities during the phase of execution of the budget. The councillors clearly regard the "sous-prefet" as the most important person in the execution and control of the budget. Nearly two thirds (63.8%) of those interviewed said that the role of the "sous-prefet" is extremely important in this regard. An additional 33% said that his role is important. However, almost as many councillors suggested that the president of the council is very important in this area as well.

Given the importance of the "sous-prefet" in budget execution, the degree to which the process is considered to be open and above board can be quite significant. As can be seen in table 20, less than

one in five councillors (18.7%) completely agreed with the statement that the management of the budget of their rural community is open. An additional 37.4% agreed but with at least some reservations. Forty-four per cent disagreed and 26.2% of the total strongly disagreed. Thus, there is considerable division of opinion over this issue. There are no significant differences in perceptions between the different types of councillors.

One of the most important actions to be undertaken in the execution of the budget is the awarding of contracts. Even though the rural community budgets are quite limited, in the local context the sums involved can be quite substantial. Influence over the awarding of contracts has great potential for both generating political power and individual wealth. When the councillors were asked how contracts for construction (eg. schools, village health centers, council meeting rooms, etc.) are awarded, most, 59.9%, said that it was handled by the "sous-prefet." Only 3 out of the 132 councillors responding said that such work was put out for bids. Favoritism and kickbacks in the awarding of such contracts are not unknown. Since the "sous-prefet" is not held accountable to the council, the council has very little recourse in such cases.

#### Land Allocation Decisions

The second most important area of decision making in the council, according to the councillors is the allocation of land. The council depends very heavily on the "sous-prefet" in the area of the budget.

Table 20  
Perceptions of the Role of the "Sous-prefet"  
in Relation to Rural Community Budgets

* * * * *	QUESTIONS	$\bar{X}$	n	completely agree %	agree %	disagree %	disagree totally %	* * * * *
* * * * *	Budget of the RC determined by the "sous-prefet" in- stead of the RC	2.23	118	35.59	12.71	44.07	7.63	* * * * *
* * * * *	Frank collaboration between the coun- cillors and the admin. authorities	1.76	128	34.38	54.69	10.93	0.0	* * * * *
* * * * *	Openness in the management of the budget of the Rural Community	2.51	107	18.69	37.38	17.76	26.17	* * * * *

Table 21  
The Budget of the Rural Community is Determined by the "Sous-prefet"  
Instead of by the Rural Council

PERCENTAGE OF THE COUNCILLORS IN AGREEMENT BY RURAL COMMUNITY			
Rural Community	%	n*	Region
Diamacouta	50	(10)	KOLDA
Kunkane	100	(8)	KOLDA
Diaguiss	81.8	(11)	ZIGUINCHOR
Lambaye	77.8	(9)	DIOURBEL
Pete	62.5	(8)	ST. LOUIS
Mbane	9.1	(11)	ST. LOUIS
Bamba	25.0	(8)	TAMBACOUNDA
Dialacoto	10.0	(10)	TAMBACOUNDA
Malicounda	60.0	(10)	THIES
Mboro	50.0	(8)	THIES
Kelle Gueye	45.4	(11)	LOUGA
Velingara	42.9	(7)	LOUGA
Toubacouta	16.6	(6)	FATICK

\* n who responded other than "I don't know" (Sangalkam is not included because they had never held a council budget meeting at the time the survey was conducted).

In land allocation decisions the councillors seem to be much more independent. This is perhaps the case because this is a function performed by village chiefs in the past. From experience in their own villages, most councillors are thoroughly familiar with how this activity is conducted. Thus, it is relatively easy for them to begin exercising this function in the council.

The councillors suggest that an individual, in order to receive cultivable land, must make his request of the council (72.9%). Only two per cent of the councillors stated that the "sous-prefet" should be involved in this process. A second question was posed regarding an individual who wanted to set up his own market gardening project in the rural community. In this case as well, the overwhelming majority of the councillors said that the procedure to be followed involves an examination of the proposition by the rural council. Once again the suggestion that the "sous-prefet" should be or is involved in land allocation decisions is minimal (2.9%). Just where the village chiefs fit into the equation is unclear but based on the communications data, it is apparent that they are, at least in some cases, consulted by the council. Unfortunately, a thorough examination of the land allocation questions is beyond the scope of this study.

In general, it seems that, for better or worse, the councils have taken over the function of local land allocation with little direct involvement by administrative authorities. That is not to say that administrators and other government authorities do not enter the process in order to gain land for themselves and their relatives and

friends, but only that the council apparently has the authority to decide. In some rural communities, such as Sangalkam, a high percentage of the arable land is already directly under the control of absentee landlords in Dakar, thus limiting the flexibility of the council.

### Organized Groups

In addition to the individual roles we have examined up to now we must round out the picture of decision making by looking at what organized groups exist at the level of the rural community and the degree to which these groups play a role in or exercise an influence over the rural councils. Most of the councillors said that there are youth associations and women's associations in their respective rural communities. It appears that in thirteen of the fourteen rural communities sampled there are functioning youth associations and women's organizations. Other organizations are less prominent but are found in a number of rural communities none the less. For example, about half of the rural communities studied have youth centers and/or village associations.

Very few of these organizations are represented directly on the councils by members of their groups. Only two of our sample rural communities had any councillors who were also members of one of these groups. Roughly half of the councils claimed to have given financial aid to youth associations, while about a third offered assistance to youth centers and/or women's organizations. None of the councils had

offered funds to village groups. Two rural communities gave funds to three different types of groups, while on the other end of the spectrum five rural communities gave no financial aid to such groups even though they exist within their territorial boundaries.

### Summary

In conclusion it can be said that the role and relationships established by the council in the process of internal decision making are somewhat mixed. The councillors identify the budget, land allocation and the rural tax as the most important decision areas for the council. Local projects seem to be given a much lower priority than expected by the council. In general the councillors, the council president and the "sous-prefet" are identified as the most important actors in the decision making process. None of the external actors, local party leaders, religious leaders or traditional authorities were openly recognized as playing a significant role. This is somewhat contradictory of the assessment made on the basis of the communication data. However, such influence as is exercised by these other actors is more indirect.

From the perspective of collaboration, initiation and execution of council actions, the role of the council vis-a-vis the administration is mixed and somewhat variable. Most councillors seem to agree that there is close collaboration between the council and the administrative authorities, most notably the "sous-prefet". The councillors are evenly split on the degree to which they think that

council budgets are initiated by the "sous-prefet" rather than by the council itself. This varies considerably from one rural community to another in accord with the level of consultation on the part of the "sous-prefet". The councillors are likewise split over the openness of the "sous-prefet" in the execution of the budget. It seems that the administrative authorities continue to play a strong role in rural community affairs, particularly the budget. However, there is considerable variation in the degree of such administrative intervention. Councils may in fact be becoming more independent than they are generally given credit for. In any case there is apparently some room for maneuvering in this domain.

In the vital area of land allocation, the council seems to be exercising its mandate. While there are considerable external influences brought to bear on this process, the council still retains ultimate control. That is not to say that the council is involved in a thoroughly rational process, but only that it has adapted itself to decision making in that area.

Finally, organized groups exist at the level of the rural communities but their influence on the councils appears to be limited. In some cases they receive financial support from the council. However, they have clearly not realized their full potential in relation to the rural councils.

In sum, the decision making role of the councils are varied. There is considerable potential for expanding that role, particularly

with respect to administrative authorities. This can be expected to happen over time as the councillors become more aware of the potential of their roles.

## SECTION VI

## COUNCILLOR ATTITUDES AND ROLE PERCEPTIONS

In previous sections we have observed the backgrounds, communications patterns and decision making roles of the rural councillors. At this point let us turn to the question of how these individuals regard their roles and how they perceive themselves and their councils vis-a-vis the government, both national and local. Their generalized attitudes toward administration may impact on the actions they seek to undertake in the council. In turn this may influence the nature and effectiveness of the councils as representative institutions in the context of a decentralized system of administration charged with assisting with rural development.

Role Perceptions

In order to provide a concrete base for the assessment of the roles of the councillors we selected the issue of the rural community budget as a starting point. Since this is considered by the councillors to be the most important issue discussed by them, their perceptions of their function in this domain in relation to the electorate is indicative of their overall view of their role. One of the most important questions is how the councillors view their own work in relation to the views of their constituents. Does the councillor feel directly obligated to do the bidding of his constituents or is he more reliant on his own judgement on behalf of the community?

The councillors interviewed were given descriptions of two different councillors, each representing a different role model and asked to decide which they felt was more appropriate (i.e. the better councillor). The first councillor described to them tries to determine local public opinion on the issues confronting the council and acts in accord with the wishes of his constituents. The second uses his own judgement rather than relying on public opinion. He supports actions in the council which are consistent with what he perceives to be the "public interest" rather than public opinion. In sum they were presented with the models of the "delegate" and "trustee" often found in the literature concerned with the analysis of legislative roles. (Miller and Stokes, 1966)

In their assessment of which of these two individuals is the "better" councillor, about two thirds (67.6%) preferred the "delegate" or "pulsotaker" type while the remaining third (32.4%) preferred the "trustee" who relies more on his own judgement than on public opinion (see Table 22). Just what this public opinion is and how it is determined by those choosing the delegate role model is somewhat unclear. In most cases it seems to refer not to the rural community as a whole but to the village from which the councillor comes. If we look back at the communication data presented in an earlier section it can be seen that the village chief and the head of the rural cooperative are among those most frequently in contact with councillors. It is these individuals and other local opinion leaders rather than the public as a whole which constitute the relevant constituents of the councillors.

TABLE 22

QUESTION 13  
 (Which is the better councillor in your opinion?)

* * COUNCILLOR *	n	%	n=22 Pres V.P.	n=77 Elec ted	n=39 Coop. *
* *Councillor 1 *He trys to determine exactly what those *who elected him want. Even if he is *not personally in agreement with their *priorities, he supports a budget which *reflects their views. *	94	67.63	50.0	75.3	61.5
* *Councillor 2 *He believes that he must use his own *judgement and not just follow public *opinion. He is for a budget which is *consistent with the needs and interests *of the population, even if these prior- *ities aren't in agreement with those of *the population. *	45	32.37	50.0	24.7	38.5
* * TOTAL *	139	100	100	100	100

Since the presidents and vice presidents of the councils must consider a much broader set of interests than those that effect only their home villages and since they are in the difficult position of being between the administration and the peasants, we would expect them to prefer the trustee role model to a greater extent than do their colleagues. The differences in role perspectives between the three categories of councillors are consistent with our expectations. Whereas half of the presidents and vice presidents prefer the trustee role type, only 24.7 percent and 38.5 percent of their elected and cooperative colleagues respectively share this perspective.

While this sense of an ideal type role model may have some influence on behavior, it is clearly modified in the local socio-political environment. Are all constituents treated in the same fashion by the councillors or are some categories of individuals given special attention? The reaction of the councillors to the statement that "to perform his job a councillor must pay special attention to the demands of certain influential people," is, in general, agreement. About 37 percent are entirely in accord and an additional 28 percent are generally in agreement. Only about a third (34%) disagree and less than 1 percent are in total disagreement. Interestingly, the distribution of responses to this question is very similar to the distribution found when local level Senegalese functionaries were asked a similar question. (Vengroff and Johnston, 1984: 40-41) It seems apparent that both councillors and local bureaucrats find it necessary to respond to the same set of local elites. This is not to say that these elites get whatever they want, but only that their

views are weighted more heavily than those of the public in general. Furthermore, when we examine the perspectives of the three different types of councillors, no significant differences are found between them on this issue.

On the one hand we have the perspective of the councillors toward their constituents, on the other hand we have their views regarding the role of the council in relation to the government and more particularly with respect to the problems associated with rural development. The councillors were asked whether they thought that the development of the country is the responsibility of the rural community, of the government in Dakar or of both. About a third (31.7%) suggested that development is the responsibility of the government in Dakar while just over 40 percent said that it is the council which is responsible. The rest (28.2%) feel that both levels of government are jointly involved in the fight against underdevelopment. The council officers (presidents and vice presidents) and the cooperative councillors were much more likely than the other elected councillors to attribute the responsibility for development to the central government. The elected councillors are more likely than are their colleagues to feel that the council and the rural community have a more important role to play in development.

TABLE 23

Question 29

The Development of the Country is Especially the Problem for:

		row percentage		
*Type Councillor (n)		The government in Dakar	Rural Community	both
* Pres. et V.P.	(22)	45.5	31.8	22.7
* Elected councillor	(80)	21.3	49.8	35.0
* Coop. Councillor	(39)	46.2	35.9	17.9
* Total	141	31.7	40.1	28.2

$$\chi^2 = 10.52 \quad p < 0.5 \quad d.f. = 2$$

Table 24  
Councillor Attitudes

* * QUESTIONS *	X	n	agree completely %	agree %	disagree %	disagree* totally* %	* *
* A councillor must * pay special attent * ion to the request * of <u>import. people</u> * administration	1.98	138	36.96	28.26	34.06	0.72	* *
* begins actions * without taking * account of the * <u>needs of local pop!</u> * poor comportment * by local govt.	2.52	138	13.04	26.81	54.35	5.80	* *
* agents toward the * rural councillors	2.63	128	8.59	29.69	52.34	9.37	* *
* insufficient * resources to * <u>develop the zone</u> * good level of * collaboration * between the councl. * <u>and the chef CER</u>	3.22	137	5.11	7.30	48.17	39.42	* *
* The government * isn't concerned * about people like * <u>us</u>	2.56	133	13.53	27.07	48.87	10.53	* *
* lack of collabor- * ation between the * village chiefs and * the rural council- * <u>lors</u>	2.52	138	14.49	29.71	44.93	10.87	* *
* lack of motivation! * by govt. agents * working in the * <u>rural milieu</u>	2.52	133	14.28	28.57	48.12	9.02	* *
* the PVDs start * projects without * consulting the * <u>rural council</u>	2.55	99	10.10	29.29	55.55	5.05	* *
* the CER has done * very little for * the development of * <u>our rural comm.</u>	2.1	130	25.38	40.77	32.31	1.54	* *
* the coop. reform * has a negative * impact on the * actions of the * <u>rural council</u>	2.47	101	15.84	28.71	47.52	7.92	* *

### Attitudes

Directly linked with the role perceptions of the councillors is their sense of efficacy. To what extent do the councillors or the council make a difference? To what extent do the councillors feel alienated from the system of which they are a part? Of primary importance here is the degree to which they think that they actually possess the means to effectively undertake local development efforts in their respective rural communities. Not surprisingly, when read a statement that the council had sufficient resources to help develop their zone, only 12.4 percent of the councillors agreed. Given the pitifully small budgets with which the rural communities have to work, this perception is probably quite accurate. The potential impact of this view is extremely important in that it may determine the degree to which the councillors take the work of the council seriously. If the council can do very little because of the lack of resources and if external authorities such as the "sous-prefet" exercise considerable influence over the use of the limited resources which are available, the councillors sense of efficaciousness must necessarily be quite low. This may help explain the relatively high turnover rate in councillors noted in an earlier section.

Several questions were posed which are designed to reflect more directly on the degree of alienation existing in the council. Over 40 percent of the councillors agreed with the statement that "the government is not concerned about people like us." About the same percentage agreed that "the government undertakes actions without



taking account of the needs of the local population." In this case, the likelihood of agreement is greater for council officers than it is for other councillors. Similarly, about 40 percent say that the PVOs initiate projects without consulting the council.

Further support for the alienation proposition comes in the form of reaction to the cooperative reform recently instituted by the central government after virtually no consultation with either those directly affected or those charged with its implementation. Fully forty-five percent of the councillors felt that the impact of this reform on the councils would be negative. The representatives of the cooperatives are even more likely to hold this view than are their colleagues. This may be a reaction to the change in the status quo which might upset the existing cooperative structures represented by these individuals. However, this same sense of alienation permeates reaction to the execution of local development efforts by the implementation services, most notably the "CERs". Two thirds of the councillors feel that the CER has done very little for the development of their rural community.

Thus, we can see that the level of alienation among the councillors is quite significant. They have only limited faith in the potential effectiveness of the councils and feel that they as councillors have little impact on government actions or development efforts. Although the majority of councillors still appear to have positive attitudes toward government institutions, it should be noted that all of these individuals represent the ruling party. If the

opposition parties, almost all of which boycotted the last local elections, were taken into account, the level of alienation would certainly be considerably higher.

In passing from the question of general alienation from the structures of the system to reactions to local administrators charged with executing those actions, we can see to what degree this alienation is reflected in day to day behavior. In an earlier section we noted that the councillors overwhelmingly said that they engaged in frank collaboration with the administrative authorities (the "sous-prefet"). Even though most councillors feel that the "CER" has contributed very little to the development of the rural community, better than four out of five (83.6%) agree that there is a good amount of collaboration between the council and the "Chef de CER". One must ask the question as to whether there is any substance to that collaboration. Based on the totality of responses, including the communication data presented in an earlier section, the answer is, apparently not. The general reaction of councillors to other local agents is not as positive. An important minority of councillors (42.85%) believe that functionaries working in the rural areas lack motivation. But only about a third (35.3%) of the councillors believe that the behavior of these agents in relation to councillors is inappropriate.

At the base of the administration, the councillors perceptions of the local chiefs are mixed. A majority of the elected and cooperative councillors (57%) feel that there is a good level of collaboration

with local chiefs. This is consistent with the communication patterns noted earlier. However, a majority of the presidents and vice presidents (62%) believe that this collaboration is lacking. Undoubtedly, there must be some friction over the transfer of authority over land allocation from the chiefs to the council. Thus, in council relations with local officials are variable but they do little if anything to ameliorate the fairly widespread sense of alienation and the relatively low sense of efficacy which permeate the councils.

#### Summary

The vast majority of councillors tend to perceive their role as that of a delegate charged with the task of representing public opinion in the actions of the council. However, they recognize that they are in a situation which requires that they modify their actions in accord with the demands of the more "influential" individuals who have interests in the rural community. Their sense of efficacy, given their positions, is relatively low. Directly related to this low sense of efficacy is a feeling of alienation common to a significant number of councillors. In light of the limited resources and powers available to the council in the face of an enormous set of development tasks, this is not surprising. Unless the government is willing to undertake a series of reforms which will rectify the situation the sense of alienation on the part of both the councillors and their constituents is likely to grow.

## SECTION VII

## PERCEIVED NEEDS OF THE RURAL COMMUNITIES

Given the role perceptions, attitudes, communication patterns, decision making processes and backgrounds of the councillors, how do they perceive the problems and needs of their rural communities and to what extent are these needs being met or capable of being met by the councils? Councillors were read a list of actions taken by rural communities in Senegal. They were then asked to state whether they thought that such an action would be very important, important, of little importance or of no importance for their respective rural communities. They also had the option of suggesting additional items which did not already appear on the list. The responses to these questions were combined and an overall average score for each action or investment activity was calculated. Based on these scores, the items were ranked from most to least important (see Table 26).

Since the standard of living in most of the rural areas of Senegal is relatively poor and the state of the infrastructure and services provided at that level is minimal, it is not surprising that a majority of councillors thought that every action mentioned was at least important. As expected, more councillors said that the construction of wells is very important than any other action. However, what is somewhat surprising is that when we examine the overall distribution of responses for each "perceived need", wells

TABLE 26  
Rural Community Needs Identified by Councillors

Rank	Expressed Need	$\bar{X}$ *	n
1.	millet mill	2.80	142
2.	local health hut	2.78	143
3.	maternity clinic	2.78	144
4.	consumer cooperative	2.69	142
5.	road repairs or construction	2.68	142
6.	well construction	2.64	142
7.	market (construction or improvement)	2.63	142
8.	classroom construction	2.54	136
9.	garden wells	2.38	143
10.	literacy hut	2.34	138
11.	vaccination pens	2.33	140
12.	livestock project (goats or sheep)	2.23	128
13.	construction of council	1.93	137
14.	youth center	1.76	140
15.	peanut separator	1.68	139
16.	construction of a tourist camp	1.50	129

\* 0 = unimportant, 1 = of little importance, 2 = important, 3 = very important

finish in sixth place. In fact, the distributions for the first six or seven items, millet mill, village clinic, maternity clinic, consumer cooperative, well, road and market construction, are so similar that the differences between them are not significant. These can thus all be considered high priority items.

It is perhaps more useful to break down the data into rural communities to see the degree to which these expressed needs are uniform priorities throughout the sample areas. By taking the top five items in order of perceived importance in each rural community we can see how frequent an issue is a priority item among the rural communities. By totalling the number of rural communities in which an item figures in the top five, we can compare their overall importance in a more general sense. When we do so the different actions seem to break down into several different categories. The first group consists of those four problems identified as among the top five priorities in at least 10 of the 14 rural communities in our sample. This first group consists of a millet mill, well construction, a rural health clinic and a maternity clinic. Thus, the most important issues at the level of the rural community involve primary health care, and the daily necessities of water and the grinding of millet in food preparation.

Our confidence in the validity of these data is reinforced by making reference to the data presented in Table 2 in an earlier section of this study. For example, among the three rural communities which did not rank wells as among their top five priorities are

TABLE 27

Priorities by Rural Community (Top 5)\*

<u>Rural Community</u>	<u>Region</u>	<u>Top 5 Priorities</u>
Mbane	St. Louis	wells, garden wells, maternity clinic, vaccination pen, roads, classrooms
Pete	St. Louis	wells, vaccination pens, millet mill, market, consumer corps
Kel Gueye	Louga	wells, maternity clinic, millet mill, classroom, village clinic, garden wells
Velingara	Louga	wells, vaccination pen, roads, village clinic, maternity clinic
Bamba	Tambacounda	maternity clinic, consumer coop, village clinic, roads, vaccination pens
Diamacouta	Kolda	roads, consumer coop, wells, maternity clinic, village literacy classroom
Kunkane	Kolda	wells, village clinic, millet mill, roads, maternity clinic, market, consumer coop
Niaguis	Ziguinchor	wells, village clinic, roads, millet mill, market
Toubacouta	Fatick	village clinic, millet mill, village literacy classroom, consumer coop., classrooms
Lambaye	Diourbel	village clinic, millet mill, consumer coop., roads, market

Table 27 (cont.)

<u>Rural Community</u>	<u>Region</u>	<u>Top 5 Priorities</u>
Malicounda	Thies	wells, village clinic, millet mill, maternity clinic, market
Mboro	Thies	village clinic, garden wells, maternity clinic, village literacy classroom, vaccination pens, consumer coop.
Sangalkam	Kakar	market, millet mill, consumer coop, wells, village clinic, maternity clinic
Dialacoto	Tambacounda	wells, classrooms, maternity clinic, garden wells, roads

\* - Where more than 5 are listed, there were ties for 5th place.

Toubacouta (Fatick) which has 128 wells compared to an average of 38 per rural community in the region and Lambaye (Diourbel) which has 96 wells compared to an average of 41 for the rural communities in that region.

The second set of actions, from the point of view of priorities, are those which were identified as among the top five needs in about half of the fourteen rural communities in our sample. These actions include the construction or improvement of local markets and roads, construction of classrooms and the opening of a consumer cooperative. Thus, this second group of activities centers around the establishment of the economic infrastructure for the development of the rural community. Other "economic" activities such as the construction of wells for market gardening and of vaccination pens for livestock generated more limited interest.

There are a few additional items which are worthy of note here. There is a strong emphasis in central government policy on the need for functional literacy on the part of the rural population. There are a wide variety of programs in a number of different ministries designed to address this question. Considerable finance for such programs has been provided by a number of donors. What is notable here is that at the level of the rural communities, the vital area of basic literacy has yet to penetrate the local consciousness. Overall, the construction of local literacy classes ranked only tenth out of sixteen issues. The councillors in only two rural communities considered alphabetization among their top five priorities (in both

cases it was fifth). Thus, rural councils do not as yet seem prepared to participate very actively in literacy programs, given the greater importance they attach to other problems. The fact that the councillors are much more favorable to the construction of "modern" classrooms than they are to investment in facilities for literacy programs is indicative of their general perspective on education. Clearly, literacy programs, if they are not to be perceived as projects "parachuted" into the local community by PVOs or government services, must undertake an effort at sensitizing the local population and their representatives on the rural councils.

Taking all these factors into consideration, what are the prospects for the rural communities to undertake actions designed to directly contribute to productivity and rural development? The fact that the budgets of the rural communities are extremely small and that the most basic services such as water and health are still lacking in most rural areas suggest that it will be many years before the orientation of the councils can be expected to change. Most rural communities currently spend the lion's share of their annual budgets on the development of water supplies, most notably wells. Data from the rural communities in the Kaolack and Fatick Regions suggests that the annual expenditure on water by the rural communities averages between 30 and 40 percent of the annual budget, while expenditures on health and education run 7 and 14 percent respectively. (ENEA, 1984)

The rural community budgets for these regions show an annual per capita expenditure of only 700 FCFA (\$1.65 U.S.) hardly enough to

provide for the needed investment in productivity oriented projects. Thus, the rural communities can at best be expected to meet some of the needs of their constituents in the area of basic services, most notably water. While they can provide some of the needed facilities in the health sector financial support for the professional help required to staff these facilities is beyond their capacity.

Demands for very basic services such as health and water dominate the thinking of the rural councils. Council resources are so limited that even these fundamental needs are at best, only partially dealt with. The involvement of the councils in "productive" projects only seems possible through external financing. However, the council itself generally has little or no influence over externally funded projects. Coordination and cooperation remain major problems. On the positive side it can be said that rural community budgets seem to generally respond to the priorities expressed by the councillors. This lends some support to the notion that the "sous-prefets" at least consult with the councils before putting together a budget to propose to them. In light of the very limited resources available to address even basic needs, the prospects for the rural community as an entity capable of promoting rural development are not very bright.

## VIII

## SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The administrative reform of 1972 represents a broad initiative in the area of decentralization. Senegal is among only a handful of African nations which have taken active steps to institutionalize a system designed to bring political and financial power down to the level of rural producers. The reform is more than 15 years old, and rural communities now function in every region of the country.

Yet the reform is not problem-free. It is ironic, for instance, that the application of this decentralizing initiative is overseen by a central agency, the State Secretariat for Decentralization, headquartered in Dakar. Attached to the Ministry of the Interior, the Decentralization Secretariat has the unique role of intermediary between a highly centralized bureaucracy on the one hand and a decentralized system of rural communities on the other. It is directly responsible for the application of the 1972 reform, but has at best indirect contact with the daily operations of the rural communities themselves. While the Decentralization Secretariat does control the "Centres d'Expansion Rurale" ("CER"), it is the Territorial Administration (a different section of the Ministry of the Interior) that plays the more influential role of supervisory agency, or "autorite de tutelle."

The 1972 reform includes a strong role for the supervisory agency ("autorite de tutelle") which is responsible for overseeing and

correcting actions taken by the rural communities and their councils. (Ministere de l'Interieur, 1984: Chapitre X) The "autorite de tutelle" was not precisely indentified in the texts, but the role eventually devolved to the territorial administration, whose agents are the governors, "prefets", and "sous-prefets". All actions, decisions, and deliberations undertaken by the rural communities, their officers, and their councils are subject to the approval of the agents of the territorial administration. This gives the supervisory agency, especially the "sous-prefet", the agent at the base of the hierarchy, considerably more power than the popular institutions themselves possess. It also adds another facet to an already complicated system which consists of two hierarchical government agencies --- the territorial administration and Secretariat for Decentralization --- and 319 rural communities.

The budgetary process, which was supposed to give the rural council the power to decide on its community's development priorities, is dominated by the "sous-prefets". The rural council's degree of involvement in the budgetary process depends solely on the "sous-prefet's" personal judgment, mood, philosophy, and willingness to seek that participation. It is the "sous-prefet" who proposes the budget to the rural council for its approval, rather than the reverse. (Bouat and Fouilland, 1983: 34) The council can modify and rework the document if it so desires, but the final version is still subject to approval in turn by the "sous-prefet", the "prefet," and the governor. Under certain conditions, the latter can even make their own ex post facto changes in the document without further consultation with the

rural council. (Ministere de l'Interieur, 1972: Loi 72.25, Articles 71, 72, 73)

Again in the area of financial management, rural communities are obligated to allocate 25% of the rural tax they collect to a central solidarity fund which is supposed to be re-distributed to the neediest rural communities. Since it was created, this solidarity fund has yet to return a single franc to the rural communities. Even if the fund operated correctly, twenty-five percent is a substantial percentage of a rural community's resources to be obligated each year with no debate or recourse to alternative action.

Many national leaders, too, are still reluctant to give free rein to the ideas of either devolution or deconcentration. The typical francophone administrative mind-set which emphasizes central control is difficult to modify, especially for those steeped in its tradition. Landing Sane, former State Secretary for Decentralization, has said:

Everything that is done at the base (of the administrative system) must obey a certain national ethic ... it's impossible to let every rural community do what it wants to. The supervisory agency is obligated to reorient (the rural community's) actions ... " (Soleil, 1985)

The central government, however, may have no choice in the future but to turn more responsibility over to the rural communities. Overseeing the actions of 319 diverse rural communities scattered throughout Senegal is not an easy administrative task. With limits on government spending, freezes on hiring, and the general move toward austerity, the government is beginning to recognize that it does not have the means that "an efficient application of its legislative

dispositions necessitates." (BOM, 1982: 38)

There are other positive indications that future policies will lean toward more independence for the rural communities. An evaluation conducted by the Senegalese government lists one of the reform's major problems as the growing demand by rural councillors to assume control of the rural community budgetary and accounting processes. (BOM, 1982: 38) The Secretariat for Decentralization has addressed that issue publicly, saying it is now "necessary to accede to a claim by the population; that is, to let them exercise themselves, the management of their own affairs ... Principally ... it is a question of financial management." (Secretariat d'Etat a la Decentralisation, 1985: 1) The problem is how to provide largely illiterate councillors with the skills necessary to adequately manage the rural community budget.

Thus the relationships between the reform's actors, between centralized and decentralized institutions on the one hand and between administrators and rural councillors on the other, will be evolving in the years to come. This monograph attempts to shed some light on the nature of those relationships as they exist now. Improved understanding of these issues may help decision-makers to formulate policies designed to improve the existing system of decentralization and to make future training more responsive and better adapted to the needs of administrators and rural councillors alike.

## DATA AND METHODS

The basic purpose of this study is to gather and analyze baseline data on rural councillors in Senegal so as to better determine their needs and the needs of the rural communities (communaute rurale) they serve, and to provide a better understanding of the nature and impact of the implementation of Senegal's decentralization program at the base of the system. The examination of the role, activities, attitudes and perceptions of the rural councillors is part of a larger study aimed at examining the potential of the rural communities as a base for rural development, especially economic development.

The selection of rural communities for inclusion in this study is aimed at providing broad coverage of Senegal's diverse ecological zones and economic interests. Given resource and time limitations, 14 rural communities were chosen for study. These 14 rural communities, located in 9 of Senegal's 10 administrative regions, touch much of the ethnic and environmental diversity of the country.

The sampling design took the form of a multi-stage cluster sample. Within the context of the selection of rural communities a sampling frame of councillors was constructed. Within these clusters three separate groups were selected for interviewing (council officers, elected councillors, councillors representing the cooperatives). Because of their importance, all presidents and vice presidents of the sample rural communities were targeted for

interviewing. A stratified random sample of both other types of councillors was drawn in the proportions of two to one. Within each rural community the list of interviewees included the President and vice president of the council, six elected councillors and three councillors representing the cooperatives. Our sample of 144 councillors actually interviewed represents 62.3% of the universe of 231 councillors in the fourteen rural communities included in the study.

#### BACKGROUND

The councillors tend to be closely linked to their respective rural communities by ethnicity and religion. They are somewhat older than the population as a whole, overwhelmingly male, and generally farmers by trade. Their level of education is very low (only 8% have completed primary school), and they have had little if any on the job training to compensate for this shortcoming. There is a relatively high turnover rate on the councils, even among council leaders. Council presidents and vice presidents, however, tend to be incumbents at the time they are selected as officers. Quite clearly, the backgrounds of the councillors suggest that the managerial experience and capacity of the councils as organizations capable of promoting rural development are limited.

### Communications

The communication networks which exist in the council clearly place the council officers in the vital role of communications link between various local elites and the administrative authorities of the state. The presidents and vice presidents are the focus of attention of the other councillors on almost all issues affecting council action. In terms of downward linkages, the village chiefs continue to play a key role as transmitters of information from the council as well as the source of revenue (as collectors of the rural tax) for the council. The president of the cooperative is the key contact for the council leaders in the economic domain. Thus, it appears that the councillors themselves act as an elite, at least one step removed from the peasants in terms of regular communication.

It should be noted that the level of horizontal communication between councillors is quite high. It is when we turn to vertical (upward) communication that the existing patterns are more disturbing. The "sous-prefet" continues to be the key figure at this level. This would in and of itself be little cause for concern if the council were basically informing the government of its activities through the local administrative authority. However, the role of the "sous-prefet" is a much more active one.

In order to round out our discussion of communication patterns in the council and their link to actual behavior it is necessary to examine the importance attributed to various actors in actual decision

making and the importance attributed to the various subjects debated in the council). This enables us to assess the relative degree of power of the various actors involved in decision making in the council.

### Decisions

The role and relationships established by the council in the process of internal decision making are somewhat mixed. The councillors identify the budget, land allocation and the rural tax as the most important decision areas for the council. Local projects seem to be given a much lower priority than expected by the council. In general the councillors, the council president and the "sous-prefet" are identified as the most important actors in the decision making process. None of the external actors, local party leaders, religious leaders or traditional authorities were openly recognized as playing a significant role. This is somewhat contradictory of the assessment made on the basis of the communication data. However, such influence as is exercised by these other actors is more indirect.

From the perspective of collaboration, initiation and execution of council actions, the role of the council vis-a-vis the administration is mixed and somewhat variable. Most councillors seem to agree that there is close collaboration between the council and the administrative authorities, most notably the "sous-prefet." The councillors are evenly split on the degree to which they think that council budgets are initiated by the "sous-prefet" rather than by the

council itself. This varies considerably from one rural community to another in accord with the level of consultation on the part of the "sous-prefet". The councillors are likewise split over the openness of the "sous-prefet" in the execution of the budget. It seems that the administrative authorities continue to play a strong role in rural community affairs, particularly the budget. However, there is considerable variation in the degree of such administrative intervention. Councils may in fact be becoming more independent than they are generally given credit for. In any case there is apparently some room for maneuvering in this domain.

On the vital issue of land allocation, the council seems to be exercising its mandate. While there are considerable external influences brought to bear on this process, it still retains ultimate control. That is not to say that the council is involved in a thoroughly rational process, but only that it has adapted itself to decision making in that area.

Finally, organized groups exist at the level of the rural communities but their influence on the councils appears to be limited. In some cases they receive financial support from the council. However, they have clearly not realized their full potential in relation to policy making at the local level.

In sum, the decision making role of the councils are varied. There is considerable potential for expanding that role, particularly with respect to administrative authorities. This can be expected to

happen over time if the councillors become more aware of the potential of their roles and if the government is willing to loosen the reins.

### Attitudes

The vast majority of councillors tend to perceive their role as that of a delegate charged with the task of representing public opinion in the actions of the council. However, they recognize that they are in a situation which requires that they modify their actions in accord with the demands of the more "influential" individuals who have interests in the rural community. Their sense of efficacy, given their positions, is relatively low. Directly related to this low sense of efficacy is a feeling of alienation common to a significant number of councillors. In light of the limited resources and powers available to the council in the face of an enormous set of development tasks, this is not surprising. Unless the government is willing to undertake a series of reforms which will rectify the situation, the sense of alienation on the part of both the councillors and their constituents is likely to grow.

### Needs

The demands for very basic services such as health and water dominate the thinking of the rural councils. Council resources are so limited that even these fundamental needs are at best, only partially dealt with. The involvement of the councils in "productive" projects only seems possible through external financing. However, the council

itself generally has little or no influence over such externally funded projects. Coordination and cooperation remain major problems. On the positive side it can be said that rural community budgets seem to generally respond to the priorities expressed by the councillors. This lends some support to the notion that the "sous-prefets" at least consult with the councils before putting together a budget to propose to them. In light of the needs identified and the resources available to address them, the prospects for the rural community as an entity capable of promoting rural development are not very bright.

### Recommendations

#### 1. The Budget of the Rural Communities

Financial autonomy remains one of the most important aspects of successful decentralization. Unfortunately, "authority is commonly delegated to local organizations but they are not given the resources to perform their new functions." (Rondinelli, Nellis and Cheema, 1984: 31) This is clearly the case in Senegal. In addition, those charged with providing technical support to the rural communities, the CERs, suffer from similar problems of under-financing and under-staffing. (Vengroff and Johnston, 1984)

The budget making powers of the rural communities are among the most important actions to be undertaken by the councils and need to be reinforced if the representative role of the councillors is to be fulfilled. This requires an important modification in the role

currently played by the "sous-prefet" both de jure and defacto in the establishment and execution of rural community budgets. The role of the administrative authorities representing the state should be one of oversight rather than of dominance. The councils need to be given a much freer reign in proposing and executing their own development programs.

While the "sous-prefets" should play a role in attempting to coordinate local efforts with both national and regional plans this should come in response to rather than in terms of the initiation of local efforts. The "CERs" should be more directly involved in the budgetary process through the provision of technical advice and cost estimates associated with the establishment of council priorities. In addition they should provide the technical expertise to assist with the execution of the council budget. The role of the "sous-prefet" should be that of auditor. He should insure that contracts have been given out fairly and that council funds have not been misappropriated.

## 2. Council Revenue

Sources of revenue for the councils are woefully inadequate and need to be expanded to as great an extent as possible within the constraints imposed by the local and national economies. A first step in that direction should be the abolishment of the so-called solidarity fund which currently takes 25% of the local tax revenues while returning nothing to the rural communities. Although this alone would be inadequate it would in one stroke increase local revenues by

as much as 33%.

There is clearly a need for a national solidarity fund to provide assistance to those rural communities suffering from drought or other natural disasters, but this fund should have its origin at the national level. Ideally, such a fund should be supported by foreign donors. It would provide the opportunity for donors to provide assistance which would be felt immediately at the local level. In any case it is clear that the rural communities themselves lack the resources to provide such funding. Additional sources of revenue are also greatly needed but it is difficult to identify an appropriate source which would not have negative consequences for local development efforts. If and when the central government ever is able to put its own financial house in order, some form of revenue sharing would be extremely useful.

### 3. Councillor Training

An effective system of training for rural councillors needs to be designed and implemented as soon as possible. Literacy training is obviously of some importance but training in the fundamentals of financial management and budgeting are also of prime importance. There is a clear need to move away from the notions of classical education which have dominated some past training efforts. A more active format emphasizing problem solving and active participation in the analysis of concrete cases is clearly needed. The model of the budget board, tested by the Rural Management Project in Keur Serigne

Basirou (Ndoffane) is one which should be adapted to the needs of the rural community and implemented in the immediate future. The CAIDS - Texas Tech team in conjunction with ENEA and the Decentralization Secretariat is currently developing and testing such materials. Hopefully, this system can be implemented nationally after a training of trainers program is organized. Additional finance and participation by other agencies is necessary if this effort is to bear fruit.

#### 4. Electoral Reform

The current electoral system, a party list with a winner take all plurality decision rule, insures that only one party will be represented in any given council. This system minimizes representation and cuts back on the presentation of alternatives in the council. Either a proportional system or a system based on wards (single member districts) would be an improvement. This would force the majority on any given council to be more responsive to local needs, especially when the councillors feel that an electoral threat hangs over their heads. A multi-party council would also provide the basis for a more critical examination of council policies and the role of administrative authorities in local decision making.

#### 5. Land Allocation

Rural councils have easily adapted themselves to performing the land allocation function previously executed by traditional authorities.

However, there are some serious problems associated with demands for land by government and party officials living in the urban areas. In some cases, most notably Sangalkam, virtually all land which can be used for market gardening has been taken by outsiders from Dakar. The local population will soon feel the effects of extreme pressure on the land, even though the population density in the area is not extremely high. Land use planners, many of whom find themselves with little work to do in their service in Dakar, could be effectively employed as technical advisors to the rural councils. This might involve their integration into the "CERs" or some other agency with a presence in the rural areas. If these individuals could work with the council in putting together local land-use plans, the task of land allocation by the council might become more rational and beneficial to the rural community.

#### 6. The Role of the Cooperatives

Given significant changes in government policy and the changing role of the cooperatives it is no longer clear why one third of all seats on the rural councils are reserved for representatives chosen by the cooperatives. The role of the cooperatives varies greatly from one region to another. In some areas providing representation to the cooperatives leads to the maintenance of a fiction. In other areas the cooperatives may be viable entities. This issue should be carefully examined but it does not appear that the current system improves in any way the functioning or representativeness of the rural councils.

APPENDIX I  
SURVEY INSTRUMENT

RURAL COMMUNITY COUNCILLORS STUDY

ECOLE NATIONALE D'ECONOMIE APPLIQUEE - TEXAS TECH UNIVERSITY

RURAL MANAGEMENT PROJECT

COUNCILLOR QUESTIONNAIRE

Name of interviewer \_\_\_\_\_ Date of interview \_\_\_\_\_

Number assigned to interviewee \_\_\_\_\_

Length of interview: from \_\_\_\_\_ to \_\_\_\_\_  
(hour and minute)

Rural Community (write the name)  
\_\_\_\_\_

Interviewee position (circle)

- |                             |   |
|-----------------------------|---|
| 1. President of the Council | 2. Vice President of the Council        |
| 3. Elected Councillor       | 4. Councillor representing cooperatives |
| 5. Other (write) _____      |   |

1. What year were you born? 19\_\_ (Write the year. Estimate if necessary)

2. What province were you born in? (write the name of the province/region)

3. What village were you born in? (write the name of the village)  
\_\_\_\_\_

4. What is your religion? (circle)

- |  |
|--|
| 1. Moslem (if moslem ask if s/he is a. Mouride b. Tidiane<br>c. other (write) _____) |
| 2. Christian (if Christian ask if s/he is a. Catholic b. Protestant)                 |
| 3. Other (write) _____   |

5. Which ethnic group are you from?

- |                         |             |               |           |          |
|-------------------------|-------------|---------------|-----------|----------|
| 1. Wolof                | 2. Serere   | 3. Toucouleur | 4. Peul   | 5. Diola |
| 6. Mandingue            | 7. Bambara  | 8. Sarakhole  | 9. Lebu   |          |
| 10. Balante             | 11. Malinke | 12. Manjaac   | 13. Maure |          |
| 14. Other (write) _____ |             |               |           |          |

6. How long have you been a councillor? (write year began) 19\_\_\_\_\_
- (if he is also President of the council, ask question 6a)
- 6a. How long have you been president of the Council ? 19\_\_\_\_\_
7. What is your occupation? (circle)
1. farmer
  2. livestockman
  3. merchant/private business
  4. marabout
  5. teacher
  6. civil servant
  7. other (write) \_\_\_\_\_
8. Did you go to school? (circle)
1. yes
  0. no
- (if his/her answer is yes, ask question 8A)
- 8A. What is the highest level of education that you have completed? (circle)
1. No formal education
  2. Koranic school
  3. incomplete primary school
  4. Primary school
  5. secondary school
  6. Baccalaureat
  7. National school
  8. University (circle) "licence", "maitrise", "DEA", "Doctorat"
- 8B. Have you had any training or seminar on the activities of rural councils or on the administrative reform ? (circle)
1. Yes
  0. no
- (If his answer is yes, ask questions 8C & 8D)
- 8C. Who sponsored the training ? (circle)
1. The party
  2. The administration
  3. other (write) \_\_\_\_\_
- 8D. What subjects were dealt with? (circle)
1. land management
  2. budget process in the rural community
  3. structure of the rural community
  4. the functioning of the rural community
  5. the means of the rural community (financial resources)
  6. the power of the government authority in the rural community
  7. the areas of intervention of the rural community
  8. other (Specify) \_\_\_\_\_
9. How often do you see the "sous-prefet" ? (circle)
1. every day
  2. every other day
  3. once a week
  4. once a month
  5. less than once a month.

9b. What is the purpose of your meetings with the "sous-prefet" ? (DON'T READ THE LIST TO HIM. JUST CIRCLE HIS ANSWERS)

1. Civil affairs
2. land problems
3. budgetary matters
4. taxes/rural tax
5. civilities
6. personal problems
7. matters related to projects.
8. cooperative affairs
9. debts recovery
10. other (specify) \_\_\_\_\_
11. other (specify) \_\_\_\_\_

10. How often do you see the chief of CER ? (circle)

1. every day
2. every other day
3. once a week
4. once a month
5. less than once a month

10b. What is the purpose of your meetings? (DON'T READ THE LIST TO HIM. JUST CIRCLE HIS ANSWERS).

1. civil affairs
2. land problems
3. budgetary matters
4. taxes/rural tax
5. civilities
6. personal problems
7. matters related to projects
8. cooperatives matters
9. debts recovery
10. other (specify) \_\_\_\_\_
11. other (specify) \_\_\_\_\_

(DON'T ASK THE PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL THE FOLLOWING TWO QUESTIONS)

11. How often do you see the president of the council ? (circle)

1. every day
2. every other day
3. once a week
4. once a month
5. less than once a month.

11a. What is the purpose of your meetings with the president of the council ? (DON'T READ THE LIST TO HIM. JUST CIRCLE HIS ANSWERS)

1. civil matters
2. land problems
3. budget matters
4. taxes/rural tax
5. civilities
6. personal problems
7. matters related to projects
8. cooperative matters
9. debts recovery
10. other (specify) \_\_\_\_\_
11. other (specify) \_\_\_\_\_

12. How often do you see the other councillors ? (circle)

1. every day
2. every other day
3. once a week
4. once a month
5. less than once a month

12a. What is the purpose of your meetings with the other councillors? (DON'T READ THE LIST TO HIM. JUST CIRCLE HIS ANSWERS)

1. civil matters
2. land problems
3. budget matters
4. taxes/rural tax
5. civilities
6. personal problems
7. matters related to projects
8. cooperative matters
9. debts recovery
10. other (specify) \_\_\_\_\_
11. other (specify) \_\_\_\_\_

(READ THE QUESTION TO THE INTERVIEWEE AND CIRCLE HIS ANSWER)

13. Let's assume there are two councillors in a rural community like yours. One is trying to determine exactly what the people who elected him want, and intends to have a budget that reflects their desires, even though he personally disagrees with their priorities.

The second thinks he should use his own judgement and not rely on public opinion. He fights for a rural community budget which, according to him, serves the needs and interests of the population better, even if the population does not agree.

Who is the best councillor according to you ? (circle)

1. the first
2. the second
3. he does not know.

(READ THE FOLLOWING SENTENCE TO THE INTERVIEWEE BEFORE ASKING HIM THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS)

I am going to read to you several statements and I would like you to tell me if you are in complete agreement, if you agree, if you disagree, or if you totally disagree with them.

14. To do his job, a councillor should pay particular attention to the needs of important and/or influential people. (circle)
  1. totally agree
  2. agree
  3. disagree
  4. totally disagree
  5. s/he does not know
15. The administration takes action without taking into account the needs of the local population. (circle)
  1. totally agree
  2. agree
  3. disagree
  4. totally disagree
  5. he does not know
16. Government agents have a bad attitude toward rural councillors. (circle)
  1. totally agree
  2. agree
  3. disagree
  4. totally disagree
  5. he does not know
17. The means at the disposal of the rural community are sufficient to develop the area. (circle)
  1. totally agree
  2. agree
  3. disagree
  4. totally disagree
  5. s/he does not know
18. In your rural community there is good collaboration between the rural council and the "chef of CER". (circle)
  1. totally agree
  2. agree
  3. disagree
  4. totally disagree
  5. he does not know
19. The government is not concerned with people like us. (circle)
  1. totally agree
  2. agree
  3. disagree
  4. totally disagree
  5. he does not know
20. There is a lack of collaboration between traditional authorities and the rural council. (circle)
  1. totally agree
  2. agree
  3. disagree
  4. totally disagree
  5. he does not know
21. Government agents, working in rural areas, are not sufficiently motivated. (circle)
  1. totally agree
  2. agree
  3. disagree
  4. totally disagree
  5. he does not know
22. The ONGs start projects without consulting the rural council. (circle)
  1. totally agree
  2. agree
  3. disagree
  4. totally disagree
  5. he does not know
23. The rural community's budget is determined by the "sous-prefet", not the rural council. (circle)
  1. totally agree
  2. agree
  3. disagree
  4. totally disagree
  5. he does not know

24. There exists an open and honest collaboration between the councillors and administrative authorities. (circle)  
 1. totally agree            2. agree            3. disagree  
 4. totally disagree            5. he does not know
25. There is complete openness in the management of the rural community budget. (circle)  
 1. totally agree            2. agree            3. disagree  
 4. totally disagree            5. he does not know
26. The team of the CER has done very little for the development of our rural community. (circle)  
 1. totally agree            2. agree            3. disagree  
 4. totally disagree            5. he does not know
27. The cooperative reform has had a negative impact on the actions of the rural council. (circle)  
 1. totally agree            2. agree            3. disagree  
 4. totally disagree            5. he does not know
28. (READ THE FOLLOWING SENTENCES TO THE INTERVIEWEE. THEN READ EVERY ACTION TAKEN, ASK THE QUESTION AND CIRCLE HIS ANSWERS)

I am going to read to you a list of actions taken by rural communities in this country. We would like to know according to you, what priority should be given to each action or investment for the development of your own rural community. Is this action or investment 0 - without importance, 1 - of little importance, 2 - important, or 3 - very important for the council of your rural community? (In case he does not know, circle 4)

	(circle)				
	0	1	2	3	4
a. construction of wells	0	1	2	3	4
b. health huts	0	1	2	3	4
c. wells for gardening	0	1	2	3	4
d. construction of offices and halls for meetings	0	1	2	3	4
e. maternity clinic	0	1	2	3	4
f. literacy hut	0	1	2	3	4
g. vaccination pen	0	1	2	3	4
h. youth center	0	1	2	3	4
i. millet mill	0	1	2	3	4
j. peanut sorter	0	1	2	3	4
k. market (construction or improvement)	0	1	2	3	4
l. roads (repair or construction)	0	1	2	3	4
m. consumer cooperative	0	1	2	3	4
n. classroom (construction)	0	1	2	3	4
o. construction of tourist camping site	0	1	2	3	4
p. small animal breeding	0	1	2	3	4
q. others (write) _____	0	1	2	3	4
r. others (write) _____	0	1	2	3	4

29. What do you think? The country's development is the responsibility of:  
(READ THE ANSWERS TO THE INTERVIEWEE AND CIRCLE)
1. The government in Dakar
  2. the rural community
  3. other \_\_\_\_\_
30. Does the council reject initiatives coming from the administrative authorities? (circle) (READ THE ANSWERS TO THE INTERVIEWEE)
1. Yes, very often
  2. yes, often
  3. yes, from time to time
  4. never
31. How is a building contractor chosen for construction projects (health clinic, school, etc.) in the rural community? (circle) (READ THE ANSWERS TO THE INTERVIEWEE)
1. recommended by the "sous-prefet"
  2. recommended by the rural councillors
  3. after consultation between the council and the "sous-prefet"
  4. by competitive bidding
  5. other (write) \_\_\_\_\_
32. How important is the participation of the following people in the control of the execution of the rural community budget? (READ THE ANSWERS TO THE INTERVIEWEE)
- 0 - without importance, 1 - less important, 2 - important, 3 - very important
- |                                 | (circle) |   |   |   |
|---------------------------------|----------|---|---|---|
| a. the councillors              | 0        | 1 | 2 | 3 |
| b. the "sous-prefet"            | 0        | 1 | 2 | 3 |
| c. the president of the council | 0        | 1 | 2 | 3 |
| d. local leaders of the party   | 0        | 1 | 2 | 3 |
| e. others (write) _____         | 0        | 1 | 2 | 3 |
33. Some new compound heads who settled in other rural communities, asked for farm land from either the "sous-prefet", the chief of the village, the rural council or the villagers. How can land be obtained in your rural community?
- a. "sous-prefet"
  - b. chief of village
  - c. rural council
  - d. villagers
  - e. other (write) \_\_\_\_\_
34. To start his gardening project in one rural community, a private farmer made an arrangement with the owner of the land. If an investor came to you how would you proceed? (DO NOT READ THE ANSWERS TO THE INTERVIEWEE. JUST CIRCLE HIS ANSWER)
- a. the same way as in the above rural community
  - b. study the problem at the rural council level
  - c. it is up to the "sous-prefet" to decide
  - d. it is up to the village to decide
  - e. other (write) \_\_\_\_\_

35. According to you, what is the importance of the following people in the decision making of the council? (READ THE ANSWERS TO THE INTERVIEWEE) 0 - without importance, 1 - less important, 2 - important, 3 - very important.

		(circle)		
a. the councillors	0	1	2	3
b. the "sous-prefet"	0	1	2	3
c. the president of the council	0	1	2	3
d. the "chef de CER"	0	1	2	3
e. the party	0	1	2	3
f. religious leaders	0	1	2	3
g. traditional authorities	0	1	2	3
h. cooperatives	0	1	2	3
i. organized groups	0	1	2	3
(specify) _____	0	1	2	3
(specify) _____	0	1	2	3
k. other (write) _____	0	1	2	3

36. There are rural councils in which there is solidarity among councillors. There are other rural councils in which there is faction among councillors. In your council what kind of relation exists among councillors? (READ THE ANSWERS TO THE INTERVIEWEE AND CIRCLE)

1. solidarity
2. faction
3. compromise
4. other (write) \_\_\_\_\_

37. How often does the council meet? (circle)

1. once a week
2. once a month
3. once every two months
4. once a semester
5. once a year
6. other (write) \_\_\_\_\_

38. What topics are debated in rural council meetings, and according to you, how important are they? Is each topic I am going to read to you : 0 - without importance, 1 - less important, 2 - important, or 3 - very important?

(READ THE ANSWERS TO THE INTERVIEWEE AND CIRCLE HIS ANSWERS)

		(circle)		
1. civil matters	0	1	2	3
2. land problems	0	1	2	3
3. budget matters	0	1	2	3
4. taxes/rural tax	0	1	2	3
5. personal problems	0	1	2	3
6. matters related to projects	0	1	2	3
7. cooperative matters	0	1	2	3
8. debt collection	0	1	2	3
9. other (specify)	0	1	2	3
10. other (specify)	0	1	2	3

39. How often do you see the village chiefs ?

1. every day
2. every other day
3. once a week
4. once a month
5. less than once a month

40. What do you discuss with the village chiefs?

1. civil matters
2. land problems
3. budget matters
4. taxes/rural tax
5. civilities
6. personal problems
7. matters related to projects
8. cooperative matters
9. debt recovery
10. other (specify) \_\_\_\_\_
11. other (specify) \_\_\_\_\_

41. How often do you see religious authorities in the framework of your actions as a rural councillor?

1. every day
2. every other day
3. once a week
4. once a month
5. less than once a month

41a. What do you discuss with religious authorities ?

1. civil matters
2. land problems
3. budget matters
4. taxes/rural tax
5. civilities
6. personal problems
7. matters related to projects
8. cooperative matters
9. debt recovery
10. other (specify) \_\_\_\_\_
11. other (specify) \_\_\_\_\_

42. Do any of the following exist in your rural community?

	yes	no
1. young people's association	1	0
2. youth center	1	0
3. womens association	1	0
4. village association	1	0
5. other (specify) _____		



44a. What is the purpose of your discussions with the president of the cooperative ?

1. civil matters
2. land problems
3. budget matters
4. taxes/rural tax
5. civilities
6. personal problems
7. matters related to projects
8. cooperative matters
9. debt recovery
10. other (specify) \_\_\_\_\_
11. other (specify) \_\_\_\_\_

45. How were the councillors representing the cooperatives chosen?

1. recommended by the rural cooperative
2. recommended by the local union
3. recommended by the traditional authority
4. recommended by the cooperative extension agent
5. recommended by the party
6. other (specify) \_\_\_\_\_

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