

PA-KAS 638

ADHE
Cyria Cenera

12A 51000

FOLLOWING UP A GUATEMALAN "NATURAL EXPERIMENT ON WOMEN IN DEVELOPMENT"
GENDER AND THE ALCOSA AGRIBUSINESS PROJECT IN 1985 VS. 1980

5960097

Rae Lesser Blumberg

University of California, San Diego

with the assistance of

María Regina Estrada de Batres

and

Josefina Xuyá Cuxíl

DRAFT FOR DISCUSSION ONLY

001373

S

00153

S

Agency for International Development

Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean

Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
I. INTRODUCTION	1
II. THE GUATEMALAN CONTEXT	4
A. The Socio-economic and Gender Setting	4
B. The Development Context: AID Strategy, LAAD Agribusiness Loans and ALCOSA	6
III. THE "NATURAL EXPERIMENT IN WOMEN IN DEVELOPMENT": THE SITUATION IN 1980	9
IV. A BRIEF SKETCH OF THE METHODOLOGY	14
V. THE 1985 FINDINGS: WHATEVER HAPPENED TO THE "WID NATURAL EXPERIMENT"?	16
A. Patzicia: A Case of Economics Eroding Cultural Traditions on Women's Work?	16
B. Chimachoy: Overtaken by Events	18
C. Santiago Sacatepeques: the Cooperative Flourishes but Policy Changes Hinder Women	19
D. The Women ALCOSA Plant Workers of San José Pinula: WID Paradise Perceived?	25
VI. A FAST REPORT CARD ON THE "NATURAL EXPERIMENT" AND "WID LESSONS LEARNED"	32
APPENDIX A	
BIBLIOGRAPHY	

1

FOLLOWING UP A GUATEMALAN "NATURAL EXPERIMENT ON WOMEN IN DEVELOPMENT"
GENDER AND THE ALCOSA AGRIBUSINESS PROJECT IN 1985 VS. 1980

Rae Lesser Blumberg
University of California, San Diego

I. INTRODUCTION

This paper presents something unusual in the social sciences: a follow up on a "natural experiment." The research being followed up was not originally focused on "women in development" (hereinafter, WID). Nor had it been planned as a "natural experiment." Rather, Ken Kusterer, a sociologist from American University, had spent four months in 1980 conducting a study published as "The Social Impact of Agribusiness: A Case Study of ALCOSA in Guatemala" (U.S. Agency for International Development, 1981).^{*} He studied three villages where poor peasants - mainly Cakchiquel-speaking Mayan Indians - grew cauliflower, broccoli, and snow peas on contract for ALCOSA, a wholly-owned subsidiary of a U.S.-based multinational company, Hanover Brands. In addition, he studied the Ladina women who worked at ALCOSA's processing plant, where the vegetables were frozen and packed for export to the U.S. market. The work represents development research at its best: an insightful combination of qualitative and quantitative techniques that sharply illuminates the human impact of large-scale development. And because Kusterer's well-written and fascinatingly detailed monograph paid attention to both men and women, the ground was laid for a serendipitous discovery.

By rearranging the data from the four sites studied, one can construct a "natural experiment on women in development" (Blumberg, 1983). These sites can be arrayed in a sequence to show how (a) the sexual division of labor and (b) the sexual division of resources can affect not only the men and women involved, but also the development process itself.

Although the field of women in development has accumulated a rich body of knowledge and increasing policy prominence in the years since Ester Boserup's

^{*}Kusterer shared authorship with his two Guatemalan researchers, so it is listed as Kenneth C. Kusterer, María Regina Estrada de Batres and Josefina Xuyá Cuxíl.

landmark 1970 book, Woman's Role in Economic Development, funding for in-depth field research is not abundant. So here, at low cost, one could do a "five years after" follow up of what unexpectedly turned out to be a striking array - from low to high - of women's involvement in the process and rewards of development.

As matters evolved, this follow up research was to serve a double purpose. On the one hand, it was funded by the Agency for International Development's Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC). To LAC, it represented the field follow up of an earlier research effort (Blumberg, 1983). In that project, I analyzed the "paper trail" of available documentation for a sample of 45 LAC projects. The guiding research question was: to what extent had females been taken into account in these development aid efforts? But this question could be answered to only a limited extent from project documents - most of the answers lay in the field. Among the projects I most strongly recommended for field research was the Guatemalan agribusiness effort.

On the other hand, the second purpose of the research was as part of the ambitious effort undertaken by the Center for Development Information and Evaluation of AID's Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination (PPC/CDIE). Entitled "The Women in Development Evaluation Synthesis: Experience of a Decade," this research project had begun with a "paper trail" phase also. A random sample of 98 projects was drawn from a worldwide universe of projects in which gender had emerged as an issue. The researchers analyzed available project documentation by means of a series of questionnaires (covering design, implementation and results phases of the projects) and a qualitative summary. The sample encompassed five development sectors: agriculture/rural development, education, energy, income generation/employment, and water. Once again, however, the "paper trail" proved insufficient to answer the main research questions. Accordingly, in order to

ascertain the importance of gender for socio-economic development, field research involving 10 AID projects was undertaken in the spring of 1985. The 10 projects were spread around Africa, Asia and the Middle East, as well as the LAC region. A total of four of the field research projects involve LAC countries: my Guatemalan study and a study I undertook of a Dominican Republic credit project for the urban informal sector (Blumberg, 1985a); a large Caribbean agricultural extension project (Schmink and Goddard, 1985); and an innovative small WID project involving income-generating "appropriate technology" in Bolivia and Ecuador (Flora, 1985).

By exploring the importance of gender for socio-economic development by means of an analysis of AID project experience, the overall PPC/CDIE study could accomplish two aims.*

In the broader sense, the research represents an attempt to codify what the field of women in development has learned about issues of planned change; gender stratification; the internal dynamics and economy of the household; and how organizational/institutional variables can act as facilitating or constraining factors in channeling benefits of development to the poor and powerless - including, obviously, the female.

In the narrower sense, the research represents a progress report on the extent to which the Agency for International Development has fulfilled the 1973 Percy Amendment (Section 113) to the Foreign Assistance Act. That amendment stipulated that development assistance activities:

shall be administered so as to give particular attention to those programs, projects and activities which tend to integrate women into the national economies of foreign countries, thus improving their status and assisting the total development effort.

*A first summary of the findings of the research were presented at the July, 1985 Nairobi conference which ended the United Nation's Decade for Women (1976-1985).

This paper attempts to weave in elements of both the broader and the narrower concerns of the larger PPC study. Thus, on the one hand, the paper will highlight the wider implications of what happens - to the women, their men, families and communities, and to the project itself - when planned development deliberately or incidentally affects the gender division of labor and/or resources. On the other hand, the paper also will examine the findings from the project standpoint: To what extent is the project a success, independent of its attention to women? To what extent is it a success from the WID perspective?

Organizationally, the paper is arranged as follows: First, some background is presented on the setting and the development context in which the project - and the 1980 and 1985 studies - took place. Second, the 1980 study is presented as a "natural experiment" - arranged as an ascending sequence of women's involvement in and control of benefits from the ALCOSA agribusiness venture. Third, a brief mention is made of the methodology used in the 1985 research. Fourth, the findings of the 1985 field work are presented and compared with the earlier data. Finally, the last section synthesizes what has been learned from theoretical, empirical and policy standpoints; some conclusions and recommendations also are ventured.

II. THE GUATEMALAN CONTEXT

A. The Socio-economic and Gender Setting

At first glance, the beauty of the setting throws such a dazzling light that the poverty and all the other problems are cast into shadow. The three villages of poor contract growers and the town where the processing plant are located all are part of the lush, green areas of Guatemala within easy distance of the capital. The three villages are to the west, in the "Indian Highlands" zone; the processing plant town is roughly to the south, in a Ladino area. Although Guatemala must be considered a racially divided society - with the various Mayan In-

dian groups definitely subordinate to the dominant Ladinos - moving from one group to another is possible. One has to speak Spanish instead of an Indian language, and abandon Indian customs and clothes. That so many Indians resolutely cling to their traditional identity in the face of so many obvious disadvantages is a key fact in understanding contemporary Guatemala.

The women retain much more of their visible Indian personas. They are more likely to speak almost exclusively in their Indian tongue. Indian females get less schooling than males; often, their Spanish is rudimentary at best. And whereas most Indian men wear largely Western, modern clothing, their women literally provide the color for which Guatemala is famous. Large numbers of them continue to wear their magnificent native costume, or traje, a hand-woven marvel of brilliant hues and distinctive designs. Wearing the traje is both an act of proud tradition and of courage. Given the racial hierarchy, it is a beautiful stigma - and one they are reluctant to abandon.

The Indians of the Highlands adopt a "family subsistence strategy" (what some have termed a "peasant mode of production") in order to scrape by. The main subsistence crops are corn and beans. In addition, a variety of traditional horticultural crops are grown: radishes, carrots, cabbage, etc. While the extent of their involvement in field work varies from village to village, the women have a long tradition as market vendors - marketing the family's surplus production in the town and city markets. The women also raise chickens and other small animals, tend kitchen gardens in many areas, and perform all the relatively invisible tasks that keep the household economy going and reproduce its labor force. They and their children fetch water, fodder and fuel; process harvested crops; and handle the cooking, cleaning, childcare and other domestic activities. Weaving is an important activity for many, for both use and sale. Unhappily, with the fall of the

quetzal in the last several years, women's weaving faces increasing hardship. Until the early 1980s, the quetzal (Q) had been on par with the U.S. dollar; by June 1985, a dollar bought almost Q3 on the parallel market. And the price of the bright-hued threads - virtually all imported - has been skyrocketing. Meanwhile, income has not kept pace. Seasonal migration (especially by men) to the coastal plantations and other possible job locations helps round out an increasingly precarious household survival strategy. This precariousness was intensified during the years of "the violence" which peaked in 1981-82. It was the Indians who, in many areas, paid the highest price in dislocation and death for the guerrilla/military conflict. Adding further to the woes of both the Indians and Guatemala, recent trends of the world economy have brought higher prices for petroleum products and lower prices for traditional agricultural exports. Concurrently, the economy, under a succession of military governments, fell into disarray.

B. The Development Context: AID Strategy, LAAD Agribusiness Loans and ALCOSA

LAAD de Centroamerica is a subsidiary of the Latin American Agribusiness Development Corporation. It was launched with a \$6 million dollar AID loan which began disbursements in 1972. But the ALCOSA story starts in 1975, the year AID loaned LAAD de Centroamerica an additional \$5 million. LAAD's low-cost loans came from AID's Regional Office for Central American Programs.* LAAD develops nontraditional agribusinesses, and AID has insisted that LAAD-financed projects directly benefit small farmers and farmworkers.

In 1975, LAAD promised a low-cost loan to Hanover Brands' new, wholly-owned subsidiary, ALCOSA (Alimentos Congelados Monte Bello, S.A.). In fact, according to LAAD informants, it was on the basis of that promise that ALCOSA opened its doors. In 1975, the world economy was in deep recession as the result of the first energy crisis. The economic situation in Central America, Guatemala inclu-

*ROCAP.

ded, was grim. AID had recently embraced its 1973 "New Directions" approach to development. This was a strategy that attempted to concentrate on the rural poor - even the "poorest of the poor." Previously, development projects had been more "top down" in focus. The new, grass-roots approach would directly target the rural "poor majority" and/or aim the larger share of the benefits at them. This strategy recognized that, to date, the "trickle down" approach had rarely trickled in the intended direction. In fact, in many documented instances, benefits aimed at the rural poor had been redirected to, or coopted by, the not-so-poor and the not-at-all-poor, i.e., "trickle up," rather than the reverse, had occurred.

Therefore, AID was looking for new programs and ways to reach the rural poor at this time. It also sought to promote agricultural diversification and agribusiness. The 1975 LAAD de Centroamerica loan project seemed to touch all the bases. According to the 1975 Capital Assistance Paper (the principal project proposal/design document), the overall goal was:

to create an environment or the conditions in which the rural poor will have increased opportunities for participation in the benefits emanating from development (CAP, 1975:26).

To accomplish this:

This project will contribute substantially to the promotion, development and expansion of agribusiness systems and enterprises in Central America through addressing constraints in agricultural production and supply systems where capital, management, training, technical and financial assistance can be productively applied. To this end, LAAD will provide its specialized resources to agribusiness opportunities which offer maximum potential for beneficial economic impact on a priority target group composed of small farmers and landless workers. The project goal is consistent with the Congressional Mandate of AID and the development objectives of the countries for improving and diversifying agricultural production and rural development (CAP, 1975:26).

The more specific project purpose is listed as two-fold:

- 1) To develop agribusiness activities in Central America in non-traditional agriculture which increase the participation of the rural poor; and
- 2) To develop LAAD into a self-sustaining financial operation based on commercially available capital (CAP, 1975:26).

A sub-loan to ALCOSA fit in quite well with the project purposes. ALCOSA was backed by Hanover Brands, and would introduce contract growing of non-traditional horticultural crops (principally cauliflower, broccoli and snowpeas) to poor and very poor Guatemalan farmers. As Americans changed their health, exercise and dietary habits in the 1970s, the market for many commodities - from jogging suits to "healthy veggies" - boomed. Opportunities were created for enterprises located in the Third World to enter those markets. Enter ALCOSA.* And, given the sometimes strange interdependencies of the world economy, the lives of poor campesinos in the 17 contract grower villages where ALCOSA was operating by 1980 would be transformed. Indeed, the lives of the several hundred female employees in its processing plant would be revolutionized.

But in 1975, WID was not yet a real AID concern, let alone a priority. An Office of Women in Development had just been created in AID/Washington. Even earlier (on July 25, 1974), the Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean took its first step toward implementing the "Percy Amendment" (Section 113) with an airgram from the Assistant Administer. It stated that:

All new and updated sector analyses and assessments and new loan and grant projects submitted for AID/W approval after August 1, 1974 will be expected to address the policy expressed in Section 113.

Nevertheless, the word "women" does not even appear in the 1975 Capital Assistance Paper for the LAAD loan project that would fund ALCOSA (as one of its sub-loans). Nor, in 1975, was WID a concern of the Guatemalan government. Absolutely nothing in the 1975 LAAD project or its ALCOSA sub-loan was geared to recognition of gender - let alone gender analysis or the adaptation of the project to promote the incorporation of women. In short, although women would participate in varying degrees, and benefit in varying degrees, in the different contract grower villages and the processing plant, this was not because of any

*By 1985, according to Tom Mooney of LAAD de Centroamerica, ALCOSA has grown to the point where Hanover Brands' success is now significantly dependent on its ALCOSA operation.

deliberate development program.

Between 1975 and 1980, when Kusterer undertook his research, LAAD and ALCOSA did well. LAAD's third loan, for an additional \$6 million, was being planned in 1980, and authorized the following year. By then, ALCOSA had been the beneficiary of several LAAD sub-loans, with an authorized limit of \$750,000. But whether ALCOSA was doing good, over and above doing well, had become quite controversial. On the one hand, the project had been praised for positive socio-economic impact in Congressional testimony. On the other hand, it had been criticized by Frances Moore Lappe and Joseph Collins in their book, Food First, for unexpected negative consequences that hurt some of the poor contract growers.

Accordingly, the main aim of Kusterer's research was to clarify ALCOSA's impacts - favorable or otherwise - on the lives and fortunes of its contract farmers and processing plant workers. As it turned out, many of the effects on women fell into the "unintended consequences" category and included both the positive and the negative. That Kusterer looked at women as well as men was not accidental. The Scope of Work that formulated the research very clearly directed him to do so - and that Scope was the deliberate effort of an AID professional who was knowledgeable about, and committed to, WID (Roma Knee of LAC, who "wore the WID hat" in addition to her duties in evaluation and human rights - an unsung job).

III. THE "NATURAL EXPERIMENT" IN WOMEN IN DEVELOPMENT": THE SITUATION IN 1980

To arrange Kusterer's research sites in the 1980 WID-related progression (from low to high) in which they will be presented here, we find three villages in the Cakchiquel-speaking western highlands areas - (1) Patzicia, (2) Chimachoy, and (3) Santiago Sacatepequez - and (4) the town of San José Pinula where the ALCOSA plant is located, in the Ladino area just south of Guatemala City.

Patzicia. Scene of the last major Indian uprising, in 1944 (over 1,000 were killed on both sides when the Cakchiquel inhabitants revolted against Ladino immigration), Patzicia retains an Indian majority and deep ethnic tensions.

What is striking about Patzicia in women in development terms is that: (a) neither Cakchiquel nor Ladina women worked in the fields in pre-ALCOSA days, (b) the ALCOSA vegetables are extremely labor-intensive, (c) by 1980 the contract farmers found themselves with such critical labor shortages that large farmers had generally abandoned contract growing entirely and some of the poorer farmers were forced nevertheless, to spend scarce resources on expensive "labor-saving" farming methods, yet (d) as of 1980, women still did not work in the fields, to their husbands' disadvantage:

Only Patzicia has such sharp problems of labor supply because only Patzicia overlooks what has emerged in the other two villages as the obvious solution: farm labor for women (Kusterer, 1981:52).

What had happened in the intervening five years? Would I find that tradition had continued to triumph over economics? Would there still be farmers engaged in contract growing for ALCOSA? And if they were doing field work in 1985, would I still find the women of Patzicia to be as male-dominated, submissive and timid as they were in 1980 - when Kusterer found that, whereas, in Chimachoy and Santiago, where women had been pulled into field work on the new vegetables:

we rarely came across a woman who stated that she felt incompetent to discuss farm or household affairs; in Patricia this was the most frequent response (1981:55).

this.

Chimachoy. 1980 was a bad year for/ Cakchiquel village of about 100 families, top of a mountain reached by According to Kusterer, located on/a barely passable dirt track. /Chimachoy was the most negatively affected of the three villages by ALCOSA's 1980 "crisis of overproduction." After several years of good returns, the town's farmers, already highly skilled vegetable growers, heeded ALCOSA's continual calls for more production. They cut back on traditional food crops to expand their cauliflower production. So when ALCOSA was hit with an unexpected torrent of cauliflower from its 17 grower villages in July 1980, and abruptly suspended its purchase, some 2/3 of Chimachoy farmers were left with no viable outlet for their crop (1/3 were not then harvesting). There was hunger, there was anger and there were drastic losses* .

* ALCOSA claimed it had to suspend purchases or go bankrupt, contracts aside; it

There was even an attempt to burn down ALCOSA's buying shed. Many of the villagers were left with outstanding debts. The better off had been building concrete block houses to replace their cane and straw huts, many with special loans, and many of the poorer ones were paying installments on small purchases.

With respect to WID, what is significant is that (a) the women, who previously had helped in the fields only during planting, now were pulled into 2-3 days of horticultural labor on top of their normally over-burdened schedules. As a result, they (b) had to cut back on their marketing trips to town, which produced their only independently-controlled income. In consequence, (c) Kusterer found them increasingly dependent on their husbands and with possibly decreased voice in household affairs. The question of the possible negative consequences of the women's added labor and diminished financial independence was not fully explored, however. Even so, it was clear that the women were working 2-3 days per week on the ALCOSA vegetables, and the ALCOSA payment came in the form of a check (that had to be cashed in the nearest big town) - made out solely to the husband. In short, in Chimachoy, Kusterer found the situation that has become a classic in the WID literature: a development project that increases women's labor burden while (1) failing to give them a direct share of the new benefits and (2) eroding their existing resource base. In the WID literature, such a scenario often has been tied to lowered productivity and efficiency and even the failure of the project itself. So what had happened to Chimachoy, the project and the women since 1980?

Santiago Sacatepequez. In 1980, this was the most successful of the three villages with respect to the project. A Swiss-formed cooperative (Cuatro Pinos) dealt directly with ALCOSA on behalf of its 400+ members - and in order to sell to ALCOSA a farmer had to be a co-op member. Results have been exceptional:

The average farmer in Santiago has lower costs than his counterparts in the other two towns, yields that are more than twice as high, proportions of first-quality product that are 15% higher than Patzicia and 20% higher than Chimachoy, and net income per unit of land that are many times higher than elsewhere (1981:61).

As possible explanation,

/Kusterer cites the labor-intensive farming methods used on the small plots (Santiago is only 20 km. from Guatemala City and on the fringe of suburban development, so holdings are very tiny), better initial knowledge, and better advice from the co-op's agronomists than that dispensed by ALCOSA's. Might there also be a connection with the project's 1980 "WID status"?

Specifically, in 1980, Kusterer found that the women worked more as partners than as helpers to the men. Although the ALCOSA vegetables were new, these women already had an agricultural tradition. Moreover, in 1980, women seemed to be sharing in direct benefits. Women were as likely as men to deliver produce to the co-op, and were frequently lined up with the men at the window where cash payments were made. There had been a price: in addition to an added "double day" burden, the women had to cut back on their formerly frequent marketing trips (their main source of independently-controlled income) to Guatemala City's main terminal market. The extent to which women actually shared in direct benefits, and the consequences, had not been directly addressed by Kusterer. Nevertheless, it was clear that Santiago women were getting more direct benefits than women in the other two villages. Questions for 1985 would include how Santiago women were faring relative to their husbands. Other questions would include the relative success of the project for (a) the co-op, and (b) the people affected, both collectively and disaggregated by sex, class, co-op membership, etc.

San José Pinula's processing plant workers. In 1980, some 85% of the permanent workers and 100% of the seasonal ones were female. ALCOSA paid the minimum wage and legally mandated benefits - a far from universal practice among Guatemalan employers. Moreover, during most of the year, ALCOSA works very long

shifts: 12 hours, and sometimes up to 16 hours during peak periods. As a result, the ALCOSA female employees made from 150-300% as much as they could have made in market selling and domestic service, the two main alternatives, and as much as:

men can earn in the most common blue-collar occupations such as construction labor, and much more than men can earn in the typical occupation of the outlying villages, farming. This ALCOSA wage is at least the equal of the normal family income of small-town blue-collar workers or village farmers(1981:9).

In consequence, fully 95% of the ALCOSA women said that they were highly satisfied with their pay, jobs and lives as working women, and wanted to continue working indefinitely, regardless of any husband or children subsequently acquired.

Moreover, Kusterer found, (a) they retain ultimate control over their income (not a single woman reported giving all of it to her husband), and, therefore, (b) they have become empowered in their domestic relationships and decision-making. Moreover, (c) they increased in independence, self-reliance, self-respect and self-esteem (a change in self-image that "may be the most important and most positive of all" (1981:81)). Finally, (d) there were indications of a negative effect on fertility.

In a nutshell, the Kusterer study had found the whole array of effects that have been hypothesized in the WID literature (by myself included) as flowing from an increase in women's independently controlled economic resources. Would the same relatively high wage level prevail in 1985? Would the labor force still be overwhelmingly female, by management policy? And if so, would these well-paid women still manifest the same consequences? In other words, would there be further support for the WID hypotheses on the positive impact of significant increases in women's relative economic resources?

To reiterate, the 1980 research had serendipitously covered four sites that could be arranged in the following "WID progression": (1) women don't/participate ^{work or} in project; project suffers (Patzicia). (2) women work in project, but receive no direct benefits - while project erodes their existing resource base; women nega-

tively affected, project may be (Chimachoy). (3) women work in project, and receive (at least some) direct benefits; despite some erosion of prior female resource base, it appears that women, men, family and project all benefit (Santiago Sacatepequez). (4) women work in project, and receive substantial direct benefits; their relative economic position rises vis-à-vis males and family; many consequences ensue with respect to their family/gender power and decision-making role, personal autonomy/independence, perceived self-confidence and fertility behavior - while, concurrently, their increased resources enhance the "basic human needs" of family members and get spread around the community (San José Pinula ALCOSA processing plant). Although many other research issues were investigated, following up on this basic "WID progression" or "natural experiment" will provide more than enough material for the present paper.

IV. A BRIEF SKETCH OF THE METHODOLOGY *

Since I was following up Kusterer's findings, I attempted to use his research team. Fortunately, I was able to do so. Lic. Maria Regina Estrada de Batres, an anthropologist, once again undertook the bulk of the interviews with the processing plant workers in San Jose Pinula, and aided greatly in preliminary analysis and interpretation of results. After considerable complications and adventures, both Josefina Xiyá Cuxíl and her brother, orge, were located. They repeated their roles in interviewing the men and women Cakchiquel speakers in the three villages, and supplemented my interviews in Spanish. They were invaluable.

To facilitate the restudy, I used and repeated parts of the 1980 questionnaires (both the instruments for male and female farmers, and the instrument for the plant workers). Moreover, wherever possible, 1980 respondents were re-interviewed. The methodology employed was Rapid Rural Analysis (RRA), which involves the "triangulation" of diverse data gathering approaches, from interviews with key informants, to analysis of records, to group meetings, to small surveys.

* The methodology is described in more detail in Appendix A.

Other RRA techniques employed included participant observation, and meetings in which my preliminary findings and interpretations were discussed by people with varying perspectives on the project and the situation in Guatemala (e.g., ROCAP and USAID/Guatemala officials).

Counting only the ALCOSA female plant employees and present and former ALCOSA growers of both sexes, a total of 101 people were interviewed, most of them in their homes. (This enabled us to get a better sense of their level of material well-being.) Among the plant workers, we deliberately interviewed one-half employees who had been there since the previous study in 1980, and one-half workers who had been hired in the last couple of years. In the villages, we also attempted to split our interviews among recently contracted ALCOSA growers, those who had had contracts since the previous study, and those who no longer were growing vegetables for ALCOSA. The breakdown of respondents by gender and location is as follows:

TABLE 1

INTERVIEWS:	<u>MEN</u>	<u>WOMEN</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
A. Patzicia	13	10	23
B. Chimachoy	8	10	18
C. Santiago Sacatepequez	13	17*	30
D. San Jose Pinula	-	30	30
	—	—	—
	34	67	101

*Here, 11 were interviewed at a group meeting

V. THE 1985 FINDINGS: WHATEVER HAPPENED TO THE "WID NATURAL EXPERIMENT"?

A. Patzicia: a Case of Economics Eroding Cultural Traditions on Women's Work?

In their 1980 interviews, Ken Kusterer and Josefina and Jorge Xuyá had found no female participation in agriculture. In our 1985 interviews, we found a considerable degree of female involvement in the single most labor-intensive, time-sensitive operation: harvesting. Harvesting of both cauliflower and broccoli extends ~~over~~ a two-month period (at different times of the year) and typically is done three times a week. Of the 23 people interviewed, we tried to get about half 1980 ALCOSA grower families and half newer people. The newer families were located near the main Pan American Highway, and most of the older ones (which is located not far away on an older road) were found in the town itself. Although newer families seemed a bit more likely to claim the wife's participation in agriculture, there were 13 of 23 cases where the woman was described as working (in one case, just "a little"). Of the 10 women, five said they worked in cultivation/harvesting and five said they didn't. Of the 13 men, 8 said the wife worked in the fields (including the case of "a little"). One man was a bachelor and three men said no. So did a fourth man - in town by far the most prosperous man interviewed (the extended family lived/in a two-story, two-vehicle modern middle-class home) - but his wife, in a separate interview, told me a different story. ¶ Her first response to the question was to deny that she did field work. But under further probes (what about during the broccoli harvest: do you ever help out with the cutting (el corte?)), she said that she did. Three days a week, in fact - and for both the broccoli and cauliflower harvests. Her children also helped when they weren't in school. And no, field work was something she had never done before they began growing the ALCOSA vegetables. Yes, it was a good deal of extra work, but the family benefitted economically... She did not sell in the market, she said, and had no outside source of income whatsoever. Meanwhile, her husband had told Jorge that his wife dedicated herself exclusively to her home and children.

The best clue to the situation comes from the five people (three men and two

women) who explicitly told us that the woman's involvement in field work has occurred just since they began growing ALCOSA vegetables. As mentioned, these are more labor-intensive than traditional crops and ALCOSA's standards are very exacting and their days for accepting product predetermined at each location where they operate. It appears that over time, the earlier participants are placing economic criteria over cultural convention - or perhaps are no longer contracting with ALCOSA. Newer participants may be willing to be more flexible about women's work (or be drawn from a different segment of the municipality). All this requires more rigorous follow-up than proved possible with our limited time.

But the bottom line is a changed picture from 1980. In 13/23 cases (or 13/22 if the bachelor is eliminated) - over half the interviews - women were described as working in ALCOSA field work.

From the standpoint of the broader WID research, Patzicia also provided support to another hypothesis. In 12 cases with data (9 women - the 10th woman is a single farmer who has an ALCOSA contract in her own name - and 3 men), a relationship emerged between the woman having independent income and the man consulting with her on household decisions. The income was derived from marketing and in most instances merely contributed to "el gasto" - the household subsistence expenses deemed to be women's domain. But if a woman made a material contribution to this subsistence budget, in those cases where we had data, it got her some degree of consultation in decision-making. Nevertheless, only a few individuals claimed that decisions were "mutual." In cases of "consultation," the husband takes the wife's input before making his decision.

Overall, we had no cases of women too timid to voice an opinion. In cases of joint interview, however, the man dominated the conversation. And while we found of the three villages the women of Patzicia to be the most dependent and male-dominated, the impression and less submissiveness of 1985 was of more openness than Jorge and Josefina described of 1980.

Also relevant from both the standpoint of WID hypotheses and the human angle is the case of a Ladina woman whose family had arrived only nine months before. It indicates that: (a) it is independently controlled income rather than mere work in production that is more important in determining household power and decision-making leverage, and (b) how quickly a woman's position relative to her husband can erode in the face of abrupt economic change.

We sit on chairs by her hearth. Her pots and pans are nice and contrast with her new adobe, mud-floored home. Her husband had lost his job (working in surveying) in Guatemala City, inherited a small plot of land from his father, and moved the family to try their luck growing vegetables for ALCOSA on a farm near the Pan American Highway. She had always worked in the city (usually as a domestic) and felt that her income gave her more independence and household power (voz y voto - "voice and vote") there. Previously he had given her the money for "el gasto" and decisions were mutual. Here, although the initial decision to plant for ALCOSA was mutual, she works three days a week in the fields, has no outside income, and now he makes the decisions: how much to spend on food, clothes, school expenses, etc. She would like to have some sort of business (market commerce) here, but she has no one to take care of the younger of her 6 children. Fertility? No more children - her husband has decided that it is now too expensive. Meanwhile, she and her children work harder and longer than ever before.

B. Chimachoy: Overtaken by Events

Initially, Josefina, Jorge and I arrived in Chimachoy on an exceptionally clear morning. The volcanoes of Acatenango and Agua loomed in the foreground and background, respectively. The view was one of the few things that hadn't changed. Briefly, Chimachoy was a victim of the 1981-1982 violence. Except for a very small number of cane and straw houses that are still inhabited, the previous location of the village is mainly deserted. The walls of some cement block houses remain at the old site, But the tin from their roofs now, we were told, tops some of the roofs of the new cane and pressboard houses where up to 60 remaining families now live, in a new colony located just before the point where the road to old Chimachoy frequently became impassable. There are around 40 widows, and the people of Chimachoy are very hard-pressed economically. ALCOSA hasn't operated in the village since 1981, although a small num-

ber of farmers manage to haul their produce to the municipality seat, San Andres Itzapa, where ALCOSA has a buying shed. It's a difficult trip, however, and few have ALCOSA contracts.

Subsequently, we were accompanied by AID officials. All told, we interviewed ten women and eight men. Most were in Cakchiquel, although one articulate widow spoke eloquent Spanish. Most say that since ALCOSA left, the women work less in the fields. Several of the men would like to see ALCOSA come back to the village. The widows cultivate a bit, do day farm labor, or weave. The 1981-82 guerrilla/military war that was fought in several of the main Indian areas (mostly in Cakchiquel- and Quiche-speaking zones), with great civilian loss of life and livelihood, hit Chimachoy with traumatic force.

Now, the overriding problem is subsistence. The huts and houses are virtually empty, containing almost no furniture (e.g., no beds) or store-bought items; they have dirt floors. We saw no trace of the installment purchases the research team found in 1980, when the results of several good years with ALCOSA could be seen in people's houses. They've been through a lot since 1980, and it shows.

C. Santiago Sacatepequez: the Cooperative Flourishes but Policy Changes Hinder Women

Santiago is a different world from Chimachoy. Its story is complex. Briefly, however, the co-op has thrived, but a policy change has eroded women's access to direct benefits, with repercussions for female autonomy and family welfare. In 1985, the co-op - larger, with more expertise and economic leverage - now exports directly to the U.S. via brokers. ALCOSA was only one factor in the Q1,000,000 (then still worth close to U.S. \$1,000,000) worth of broccoli, cauliflower, etc. it sold last year. As the cooperative has grown and bureaucratized, its dedicated professional staff have changed some of the earlier policies. One change is that there are now three days a week when produce may be delivered to the co-op's impressive physical plant. But there is only one day a week when the members

are paid for deliveries. And since an incident in 1983 (more below), the co-op has strongly requested that the person who comes for the payoff be the co-op member. The number of women co-op members was not clear: somewhere between 2 and 8 of the 580 members (about 500 of them active). And since 1984, the payoff is usually given in the form of a check - made out exclusively to the member.

In short, the 1980 situation whereby women were seen sharing in the direct benefits is gone. Under the new system, many women don't know how much their

member husbands received, thereby further weakening their claim to a share. Co-op professional staff - the founder/chief technical advisor, the head of the Swiss-funded "social program" and his two female home economists, among others - agree that the position of the women has deteriorated and they are now more dependent on their husbands. As we shall see, the women of Santiago Sacatepequez have a long history as skilled horticulturalists, and most co-op wives are reported to be heavily involved in all phases of ALCOSA vegetable production. But there is less time and space on their small parcels - threatened by encroaching suburbanization - to grow the traditional horticultural crops which women have traditionally sold (at least partly for their own gain) in the Guatemala City market. And with the ALCOSA-type vegetables earmarked for sale to the co-op, where women's direct access to gains is now choked off, they are now doubly disadvantaged - while working at least as hard as ever. Based on their typical 3-4 days a week of field work, could women be made co-op members in their own right, along with their husbands? Unthinkable, according to the head of the "social program." In his opinion, the men would never allow it. In Guatemalan co-ops, there has been only one member from a household - the head, who bears official financial responsibility. Unfortunately, this particular interview occurred at the end of my stay in Guatemala, too late to go back to Santiago and do another round of interviews with both men and women to elicit their reaction to the possibility that wives be admitted to membership, and hence the host of benefits provided by the co-op.

In terms of WID "lessons learned," what we have here indicates: (a) the importance of delivery channels as gatekeeper mechanisms affecting women's access to benefits, (b) how fast the balance can tip against women -when someone is not continuously "riding herd" on institutional policies and procedures as they differentially affect each gender; and (c) the finding, frequent in the development literature, that benefits - especially valuable ones - have a tendency to be distributed on the basis of...

This has been noted in a number of instances where the initial target group were those on the bottom of the class pyramid. And a parallel finding has emerged in the WID literature: even where they initially obtain benefits, it is difficult for women to retain them if they are valuable.

The incident that triggered the policy change, I finally learned, involved a woman's claim to have been shorted Q200. The co-op paid, alleging that she was mistaken (her husband had been away attending a co-op-sponsored conference, and he threatened to call in all authorities, including military, it seems), I also learned that the following year there was a reorganization and resignations among accounting personnel. Female illiteracy was then used as the general rationale for requiring husbands to pick up the money (although, as skilled market sellers, women's numeracy is not in question). Men, women and staff all mentioned the problem of female illiteracy when asked about the policy change. I never learned if the woman in question was literate or not.

But the erosion of women's position predates the Q200 incident: as their labor burden increased with the more profitable, guaranteed-sold co-op vegetable crops, women had both less time and less reason to sell traditional crops in the market. Although my interview data from the men and women of Santiago indicate that the women still have some voice in agricultural decisions, the two home economists think it is less:

Before the women in the villages (whose access to the market has been more curtailed than the women of the town of Santiago itself) were more independent and sold surplus crops in the market. They had a voice in what to plant because they knew what sold best. Now that the co-op buys, the men make the economic decisions.

The head of the "social program concurs and adds:

The participation of the woman has fallen with the cooperative...Now her knowledge has been affected. She has lost a certain independence and the taking of household decisions.

Tulio Garcia, the founder of the co-op, shares in the assessment of women's deteriorated position and notes that there is less improvement in home and "basic

human needs" consumption - including diet/nutrition - than in economic consumption. Men save for scarce and ever-more expensive land. There are many big-ticket items such as pickup trucks among the better off members. But there is still malnutrition; in fact, a new INCAP study will look into the problem among the people of Santiago.

There are two ironies involved here. First, a stratification seems to be emerging between co-op members and non-members in the town of Santiago and its seven villages - and the co-op members are increasingly being seen as the rising stratum. Second, the programs being aimed at both "the women" and "the problem with health and nutrition" are of the most traditional home economics sort. (In keeping with the "trickle up" hypothesis, though, the three people chosen by the village leaders to be trained by the co-op as health/nutrition promoters are not the requested two women and one man; rather, three rather well-off young men were named - on the grounds that they can more easily get away for the four weeks of training.)

The Swiss-funded "social program" promotes women's groups of the sort I witnessed at a group meeting in Pachalí, one of Santiago's outlying villages. Eleven females, mostly well-dressed adolescent girls, attended a cake-baking demonstration by the home economists. The cake was baked in ^{the community center in} a modern stove donated by a U.N. agency. None of the families have anything like it.

An elderly widow who is a co-op member (one of 2 she knows about) said that a previous women's group started with 22 members but soon only 6 were left. They had many domestic arts demonstrations but the women wanted something with more economic potential.

This women's group composition (mostly young girls) corroborates the frequent experience of other home economics-oriented "women's projects." Older women with more obligations and less time need income. They don't come - or long remain - with such groups. Also echoing the experience of other such programs are the attitudes of both the home economists and the head of the social program - they

really would like to find a more income-oriented program that would increase female involvement and well-being. But such economic activities are not easily found. (And meanwhile, attendance at their meetings is low: the women in the villages, whose marketing and relative position have dropped off more sharply, must now ask permission of reluctant husbands even to attend meetings; the women of the town of Santiago itself, who still carry a crushing burden of heavy farm work and frequent marketing trips to Guatemala City market, have no time for such meetings.)

Aside from a tiny bakery project the women of one village have launched, the only other economic activity idea that surfaced is a bee-keeping project. Originally, the co-op was investigating bee-keeping for the men, but decided they were too busy. Since their understanding is that bee-keeping takes only one morning a week (an underestimate when hives are in full production, I've been told), they felt that this could be added to the women's schedules. Then, the co-op would market the honey. This would give the women both direct access to income and, perhaps, the boon of co-op membership in their own right: as bee-keepers on a part-time basis, not as farmers on a year-round basis.

My interviews with the men showed their support for an activity that provided income to their wives. And the interviews also revealed that although hours worked in agriculture has gone up for women since the co-op, most claimed they had always cultivated. Nevertheless, co-op technical assistance was directed to the male members, thereby confirming another of the most frequent "WID lessons learned": even where women are traditional farmers, it's the men who overwhelmingly get the training and extension help (Kathy Staudt has written extensively on this, for example),

Having given an overview picture of the major women in development problems that have emerged with the Santiago co-op since the 1980 study, let me conclude by showing just how successful the cooperative has been as an enterprise.

As mentioned, in 1984, the co-op sold a million dollars worth of product. Their plans for 1985 are to ship 3,500,000 pounds, overwhelmingly confined to four principal crops:

TABLE 2

1985 PLANS:	PROFIT LEVEL	ANTIC. PRODUCTION (LBS.)	DESTINATION
<u>Snow peas</u>	highest*	1,500,000#	75%=Miami broker; other export=25% (Los Angeles, New York, London)
<u>Broccoli</u>	2d best	750,000	50%=ALCOSA; 50%=other Guatemalan firm (e.g., CIUSA)-none for export
<u>Cauliflower</u>	3d best	1,000,000	50%=ALCOSA, 50%=direct export with new U.S. broker
<u>Brussels sprouts</u>	dropped	-	growing season too long
<u>Sugar snaps</u>	new	200,000	100%=Miami broker.

*In 1984, average selling price was US \$1.00-\$1.20/lb., but fluctuation is great

A new venture is parsley, which fetches Q8.75/kilo, dried, for the co-op. It is sold to Maggi (Nestle) and Paviera (Green Giant) in Guatemala for soups, and similar products.

The co-op has become a large employer. It has 30 permanent employees, and from July to February, employs about 100-125 people as packers. Of these, 2/3 are women and 1/3 are men. (A brief experiment, tried last year by the co-op directors, ended in failure. Disturbed by the "constant talking" and "romances" of the women employees, they fired them, and put in all men employees. Production nose-dived so sharply that they fired the men after only one week and hired back the women - who continued to be high producers and talkative at the same time. The directors now view packing as "women's work" because of the women's allegedly greater manual dexterity - and tolerance of the boring routine.)

Moreover, its members have become employers as well. The average member employs one essentially full-time, year-round (or, for a minimum of 9 months)

agricultural laborer. The variance is from 0 to 4 such full-time employees. And while income figures for members are a little vague, average yearly income seems to be up to Q3,000, with the most successful members making perhaps Q10,000 per year. In fact, the co-op has become enough of a factor in Santiago to affect market prices in the traditional horticultural crops (such as carrots, cabbage, beets, potatoes): since co-op members are growing less - to the detriment of their wives' economic independence - there is less of a supply, and the fluctuation in price is down while the lowest price (peak season) has risen. Finally, spurred by the success of the co-op, other highlands farmers are planting what Tulio Garcia estimates to be 4,000-5,000 manzanas (1 manzana=0.7 hectare) of the new, non-traditional horticultural crops that the co-op specializes in. These are grown for export via ALCOSA and several newer (and still shaky) firms. In sum, the most dramatic contrast involves /how quickly and how much the co-op has grown, and the position of the women has deteriorated. Further analysis - and, probably, further field study, - is needed to draw all the lessons learned from the Santiago Sacatepequez experience.

D. The Women ALCOSA Plant Workers of San José Pinula: WID Paradise Perceived?

To summarize large volumes of data, the situation of the women processing factory employees is at least as good as in 1980, when it was terrific.

Income remains high - as the result of the long shifts - and not a single woman claimed she was less than satisfied with the work. Much of the satisfaction continues to emphasize the economic side, which continues to have strong repercussions on the women's power and decision-making leverage in their households. The proportion of women who are married has gone up since 1980, but there is still not a single woman who turns over all her pay to her husband.

The big news is the strong confirmation of the first fertility trends noted in 1980: fertility seems strongly curbed by ALCOSA employment. Almost half (14/30) the sample say they won't have more children; and they have only 2.6 at a median age of 33.5. In fact, the 30 women (all age 18-39) average only 1.8 children

Let us first look at the women who are "1980 veterans." Their median age is 32.5 years. They have an average of 2.2 children each. Ten of the 15 gave birth/since 1980 (3 women had 2 children each and 7 had one additional child each). Now, 7 of the 15 say they will not have any more children. These 7 have a median age of 37 and have produced an average of 2.3 children. By the standards of Guatemalan fertility, these figures reflect a remarkably low level of childbearing. Compare them, for example, with the data for Patzicia, the only one of the three villages with a substantial Ladina population. There, data were collected on the fertility of 20 women (including one single woman of 36 who was a childless full-time farmer with her own ALCOSA contract). Their median age was 33.5 (vs. 32.5 for the 15 women ALCOSA "veterans"). But whereas the 15 workers in San José averaged 2.2 children each, the 20 Patzicia women averaged 5.2 (5.5 excluding the woman ALCOSA contractor).

TABLE 3

FERTILITY COMPARISONS:	ALCOSA EMPLOYEES 1980 (N=15)	NEWER EMPLOYEES (N=15)	(N=30) TOTAL GROUP	20 PATZICIA O +
Median Age	32.5	26.0	29.0	33.5
Mean No. of Children	<u>2.2</u>	<u>1.5</u>	<u>1.8</u>	<u>5.2</u>
Won't Have More:	47%	47%	47%	No Info
Median Age	37.0	31.0	33.5	-
Mean No. of Children	2.3	3.0	2.6	-

Furthermore, a total of 9 of the 30 women are single and childless: 1 of the 15 1980 veterans (age 30) and 8 of the 15 newer employees. The median age of childless these 9/women (30% of the 30) is 24 years: another extraordinary statistic by Guatemalan standards.

Let us now compare the 1985 data with the 1980 data for marital status, for another perspective on fertility patterns of the female ALCOSA plant workers.

TABLE 4

MARITAL/FERTILITY STATUS OF ALCOSA WORKERS: +	1985 DATA			1980 DATA
	1980 VE- TERANS (N=15)	NEWER GROUP (N=15)	TOTAL (N=30)	TOTAL (N=42)
Married, w/ children	47%	20%	33%	21%
Single, no children	7	53	30	38
Single, widowed, divorced with children:	<u>46</u> 100%	<u>27</u> 100%	<u>37</u> 100%	<u>40</u> 100%
Single, w/ children	27% 1	7% 1	17% 1	
Div. " "	13 } 46%	7 } 27%	10 } 37%	
Widow. " "	7 } 1	13 } 1	10 } 1	

In Table 8 we see that the 1985 data indicate that women who remained with ALCOSA (the "1980 veterans," the key group) have indeed been "at risk." A much higher proportion are married: 47% vs. 21% of the Kustarer 1980 sample and 20% of the newer 1985 employees. Only 7% of the "1980 veterans" remain childless. The big news is that although these women are reproducing, they are doing so in moderation. Although 10 of these 15 women had 13 babies since 1980, not one woman has more than two children under 5; and, of course, 5/15 had none. These "1980 veterans" are young enough to have had considerably more children: they range from 25-39. The median age for the 10 who had babies since 1980 is 30, vs. 34 for the 5 who didn't. (Since the 1985 sample is not random and is quite small, these data may not be generalizable to the full universe in question.)

Two related points should be mentioned. First, the quite low fertility of these women factory workers is related to the high costs they experience for children - both financial and personal. For example, 10 of the 21 women in the total 1985 sample who have children mention that they pay for childcare (6 to rela-

tives and 4 to employees). In fact, all the women who gave reasons for not intending to have more children mentioned economic costs as a factor.

A single mother of 3 summed it up. After talking about her childcare hassles, the current economic crisis, her long shifts and her struggles, her response to the question of having more babies was almost a wail: "Aaaaay, how much these children have cost me!"

Second,

/single or married, these women have considerably more leverage to realize their fertility preferences than most of the farming women in the three villages. There, a frequent complaint from women with many children - who were economically dependent on their husbands - was that she didn't want more but he did, so she would have to continue having babies.

The only case among the ALCOSA factory women that seems initially similar reveals some significant differences.

The 32-year-old mother of 7 had more children than anyone else of the 30 interviewed (only one other had more than 4 children, in fact). Her youngest were 3 and 2. More children? "I don't want to but because my husband wants them I have to continue." Do you use any birth control method? "No, I am afraid of them." This was also the woman whose husband was most strongly opposed to her working. Yet she has steadfastly refused to quit. (She began in 1980). She gives her husband nothing from her pay. Her money has given her independence: "before I worked I wasn't allowed to go anywhere and he used to humiliate me." Now he just gives her children.

The second point can be stated more explicitly. These women make an income high enough to support their family on their own, if they so choose. They keep independent control of that income (only two newlyweds even pool their income with their husbands). And their income gives them power in their personal relationships with spouses, parents and children. It also gives them more leverage in household decision-making: not only in economic matters, but also in domestic affairs and in fertility behavior. In short, their income from production gives them decision-making power over their reproduction. The decision to have further children was hers in 65% of the cases with data (13/20), primarily hers in another 5%, mutual in a further 10%, never discussed in 5%, and principally the male's in only 15%.

The economic basis of these women's household power came out repeatedly in the interviews. For example:

One 37-year-old woman's common-law husband is an agricultural day laborer - who therefore earns very little. She has been with ALCOSA since its beginning in 1975 and 3 of her 4 children are "ALCOSA babies" (ages 7, 4 and 2). A servant does the housework and childcare. She makes well over 75% (the top category) of total family income and pays not only for the household expenses ("el gasto") and the servant but also for some of her husband's agricultural expense. However, she gives nothing of her salary to him, controlling it all herself. She feels more independent and self-confident, and receives more respect from her husband since she works for ALCOSA. She also has more power in the household as a result: "One has one's resources and says 'I can buy and do.'" Most tellingly, she now feels that the woman is superior to the man - and at any rate: "I am superior: I bring in the money and he takes me into account. If he wants to do something, he consults me first."

While the final quote is more blatant in asserting her money-based power than in other interviews, the patterns described in the above quote are found in much of the sample. Let us examine some of the aggregate statistics.

Work:

- 93% of both the "1980 veterans" and the newer employees are "very satisfied/satisfied."
- 93% of the sample (87% of the veterans and 100% of the newer workers) want to continue indefinitely with ALCOSA (83% even if they have more children).
- Only 3% (1 person) does all her housework; the others have delegated it to paid or unpaid other women - or their children. This contributes to the next:
- Given the standard 72-hour work week (that often goes over 80 hours) for the greater part of the year, note that only 20% consider total workload "excessive;" in contrast, 47% find it "supportable" and 33% find it "comfortable." (Total workload includes both ALCOSA and household labor.)
- Specifically, hours worked at ALCOSA are greater than their last job in 66% of the cases, equal in 14% and less in 19% - all domestic servants.

Economic contribution/control of income:

- None of the women's income is less than 25% of total household income;
23% " " " " " from 25%- 50% " " " "
40% " " " " " " 50%- 75% " " " "
37% " " " " " over 75% (usually 100%) of total income.
- In 83% of the cases, the woman herself decides how she wants to spend her income.

- Parents vs. husbands - although only 30% of the women fail to give something of their income to their parents (in 66% of the cases to the mother), in only two cases of newlyweds did the women pool any of their income with their husbands. (Of 9 cases of "pooling" income, only 1 put it all in.)

How ALCOSA income has changed their economic situation:

- Previous to ALCOSA, 37% reported that their economic situation was desperate;
" " " 26% " " " " " difficult
" " " 37% " " " " " comfortable.
- Now, however, 70% have been able to make purchases beyond subsistence-level needs (e.g., furniture, appliances, etc.).
- All told, 87% report that their lives have changed. Economic/income was the overwhelming response to this item, with greater liberty second most frequently mentioned.
- Confirming this, 87% report their economic situation to have improved, and 13% state that it stayed the same; not one person reported a decline.

How ALCOSA/income has changed their self-perception and perception by others:

- 82% report greater self-confidence than before. Many offered economic reasons, e.g., "I have the money to back me up."
- 80% report greater independence (53% give explicitly economic reasons for this).
- 67% report greater respect on the part of family members - again, economic reasons are sometimes offered spontaneously.

(Note: the statistics given in this aggregate view are compiled from preliminary tabulations by Maria Regina de Batres; they will be cleaned and checked for the final paper on the research.)

A final word on the impact of ALCOSA employment. Since the plant employs close to 300 women during most of the year (75-85% of the labor force; I was given two figures for total employment by the ALCOSA second-in-command in two separate interviews), there has been a spread effect of their wages. Not only do the women pay for childcare, a somewhat smaller proportion pay for housework and/or laundry. Local women sell foods to the ALCOSA workers who come out to the factory gate during their lunch or breaks. And there is now a definite rental market for rooms - something that was in the most rudimentary stage in the 1980 research. Several buildings that I saw during the course of one day's interviews in the town

center of San José Pinula seemed to have been recently constructed for that purpose. They are one-story affairs that have a string of rooms with separate outside entrances along an entrance passageway. Other rentable quarters are now found in private homes or their back "courtyards,"

By the standards of ALCOSA's parent company, Hanover Brands, its labor practices and wages relative to the/legal minimum probably would not be anything unusually favorable. But for women in Guatemala - and especially for women in a town caught between farming and urban/industrial growth, ALCOSA and its jobs represent a rare opportunity. Supervisors can afford to be very strict about "the right attitudes" (although this emerged as an implicit rather than an explicit demand in the interviews) since there are lots of local women who would be all too pleased to work for ALCOSA. Parents (mostly mothers) who sat in on the interviews of their daughters mentioned their hopes that other daughters could eventually find employment. In 1980, the jobs were viewed more ambivalently by some parents because of the "fast" reputation of the well-dressed and quite independent young women. At that time, about one-fourth of the 1980 sample had changed their household arrangements more to their own liking, and only a fifth of the sample was married. In 1985, 27% of the 30 women interviewed are female heads of household, but the proportion married is higher in this group.

Is ALCOSA's impact stabilizing or disrupting women's domestic arrangements? Since all the statistics presented above are based on a non-random sample of only about 11% of the current ALCOSA labor force, no inference is possible. (And a reminder is given that the 1985 statistics/cannot be inferred to the total ALCOSA female labor force.) This is a topic worth more rigorous field follow-up, since in a traditional double-standard country like Guatemala, the notion that economic improvement for women leads to the disintegration of their families could be a strong disincentive for encouraging female employment in ALCOSA-type/level of return jobs. Nevertheless, the present 1985 data do not support a family disintegration/ scenario.

In sum, by the standards of women's work in Guatemala, the women of ALCOSA have found a very positive situation. By the standards of the four research sites, this is now the only one that provides direct benefits to women, and the consequences seem, if anything, to be more positive than in 1980. It may not be a "WID paradise," but the situation of the ALCOSA women interviewed does provide a treasure trove of (preliminary) support for many key WID hypotheses. But in order to nail these down, subsequent research on the impact of ALCOSA not only would have to involve a more rigorous sample of females, also it should/include a sample of males: the "significant others" of the ALCOSA women, to directly assess what the women say about these men and their attitudes.

VI. A FAST REPORT CARD ON THE "NATURAL EXPERIMENT" AND "WID LESSONS LEARNED"

The situation in 1985 proved very different than that which prevailed in the four research sites in 1980. No longer is there a clear-cut progression that can be labelled: "WID effects - from low to high." But much has been learned. we note

First, in Patzicia, the substantial incorporation of women in cultivation (even if it was somehow a sampling fluke, which it doesn't appear to be: women now working in the harvest include Ladina and Cakchiquel, older and younger, poorer and "comfortable," residents of the town of Patzicia itself and those who live on its farthest outskirts near the Pan American Highway). That what was seen in 1980 as such a stubborn - and indeed inexplicable - "cultural tradition" was so substantially and rapidly breached must be viewed as significant. Its significance is both positive and negative. On the positive side, it indicates that "the dead hand of tradition" will not/sustain a gender-related practice that has become economically counter-productive. (If it is merely less productive, and the people have enough of a cushion of surplus to tolerate some inefficiency in the name of preserving the comfortable status quo, the gender-related practice probably will survive.) On the negative side, it indicates that positive

(from the WID perspective) gender-related practices may also be quickly undermined. Such undermining can/came from unplanned or very macro-level economic transformations and trends. Or it can occur as the unintended consequence of institutional policy shifts and/or choice of delivery channels (e.g., what happened in Santiago Sacatepequez, as will be reviewed below). But either way, the lesson learned is that the relative position of women vis-à-vis men, work, and resources is much more volatile than is often thought to be the case.

A second point about the emergence of female participation in cultivation in Patzicia is that work, per se, can be cashed in for few "WID prizes." Slaves, workers and peasants have long labored in the major productive activities of their milieu - without inheriting the earth or much of anything else. So the women of Patzicia are not likely to find that their work in harvesting brings them much more leverage in major household economic decisions or much more status (vis-à-vis males) in the local community. But work in production does seem to be a first step on an often long and problematic journey whereby women gain a share in productive resources (or at least that universal solvent, income).

And the data from all the various research sites indicate support for the proposition that women's relative degree of independent control of economic resources/income is (a) more important than "mere work" and (b) affecting their degree of control over their own lives, and (c) using this control to enhance their family's as well as their own well-being.

Meanwhile, the women of Patzicia are working harder than ever before but are justifying it (vs. bemoaning their "double day" load) on the grounds that it's OK because it enhances family welfare. So they see themselves as contributing more, and thus far they seem to feel good - and a bit more important - as a result.

In Chimachoy, the problem has shifted drastically: from concern about an apparently uncompensated "double day" (the Patzicia women's emergent situation) to concern about survival. At the moment, all other research questions are off.

Among the lessons learned of Santiago Sacatepequez is that keeping benefits channelled to an underdog population (ethnic, gender, class, or whatever) requires a good deal of "help from their friends." If the underdog population does not have an advocate who can assess the impact of even ostensibly "mere procedural" changes, their chances of keeping such benefits over time probably are not good. Why? In addition to apparently innocuous policy and procedural changes that turn out to be anything but (e.g., the suspension of the Solidarity Group component in the Dominican Republic ADEMI project (in Blumberg, 1985a)), as well as the shift in payment policy and procedures in the Santiago cooperative), there will probably also be some outright attempts to coopt or coerce those resources out of the hands of the underdog population. ~~The~~ The ideal situation is one where it is in the interests of the non-underdog population to keep certain benefits among the more vulnerable group. One obvious scenario is to head off social explosion. But since women are rarely perceived as constituting an immediate and violent threat to the government palace or its private sector counterparts, that will rarely be a WID scenario. A more probable one is that which emerged in both Santiago Sacatepequez and San José Pinula's ALCOSA plant: women were hired (or re-hired in the case of the Santiago Cuatro Pinos co-op) as the preferred labor force because they are seen as more productive - as well as more tractable - in certain and tasks. A WID lesson is how more such "win-win" scenarios can be developed/adopted.

Since the evidence of a direct connection between women's independent control and of resources and enhancement of their self-confidence, independence, decision-making power, is so prevalent in the four research sites, only more rigorous specification would seem to be at issue. This will be attempted in the final reports. preliminary summary

Accordingly, as time and space for this/paper run out, let me close by underlining the link between women's economically-derived leverage and their ability to realize their particular utilities in fertility outcomes. In this study, as in

many (but not all) others, women's fertility preferences seemed to be lower than that of many of their husbands. The fact that the ALCOSA women interviewed have regulated their fertility at such modest levels for women of such modest education and other fertility "determinants" is important. (Incidentally, 10% of the 1985 ALCOSA sample is illiterate, 45% have 1-3 years of education, 33% have 4-6 years, and only 10% have 7 or more years of schooling.) Once again, it shows that changes often viewed as culturally embedded and glacially slow can come rapidly if there is enough of a change in the underlying economic costs/benefits. And fertility is clearly more costly to these women now. It is also more costly to many developing countries, and women continue to have 100% of the world's babies...Maybe there is another case for a "win-win" scenario where the interests of "mainstream" and women in development goals coincide.