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FERTILITY AND EMPLOYMENT: AN ASSESSMENT OF ROLE INCOMPATIBILITY AMONG AFRICAN URBAN WOMEN

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Students of population change, moved perhaps more by malthusianism than by feminism, have been interested in female employment largely as a variable affecting fertility. Feminists are bent on freedom of choice. They wish to be free to control their fertility but will not accept any mutual exclusivity between productive and reproductive roles.

But the two roles clearly interact. Our purpose here is to study that interaction among women in the large and growing capital of the Ivory Coast -- a setting which imposed new conditions on a population with largely rural roots. Altered women's roles and the availability of Europeans means of avoiding pregnancy are among these new conditions.

But in focusing on the interaction of employment and fertility, we must not overlook all the other factors which may affect fertility levels. Thus the introduction situates employment among other variables potentially altering fertility and then states the central hypothesis regarding women's fertility levels and work status. Then, following a brief description of the study's method and sample, we present data on employment and fertility, desired family size, household help and respondents' explanations of their work status. In concluding, the theoretical basis of the hypothesis is re-evaluated.

Differences in fertility levels are the intended and unintended consequences of behaviors dependent on a variety of factors.[1] One example associated with modernization, is that the delayed age of marriage and thus a later start bearing children will reduce the total number of child-bearing years, and thus reduce family size. Another familiar example is the failure to respect traditional norms dictating sexual abstinence from the birth of a child until weaning

(or, in other societies, until the child walks) will reduce spacing between children and thus increase fertility. Of course, infant mortality may be decreased by modern medical care, particularly vaccinations, which increases the proportion of children born who live to adulthood. Medical care and health conditions will also effect the number of miscarriages and the number of infertile women. While marital instability is likely to decrease the regularity of sexual relations and thus decrease the total number of pregnancies.

The list of factors could be lengthened considerably, but these examples (all a propos of contemporary West Africa) draw our attention to the complexity of changes in fertility levels. First, this complexity reminds us that fertility levels may decline for reasons other than access to and use of modern contraceptives, or even reasons other than behaviors intended to limit family size. But contraception or abstinence, if used to avoid early pregnancy by students, will reduce completed family size if all other factors are equal. If, for example, advanced schooling results in better access to and more effective use of modern medicine, and if women no longer respect norms of post partum abstinence, a greater number of surviving children may well result. Thus in a modernizing society, a number of fertility-related behaviors are likely to be changing simultaneously, some with an unintended positive - or - negative impact on fertility. Also, hypothesis regarding such complex interacting processes are extremely difficult to verify empirically.

Changing attitudes toward fertility is another relevant area of research. One major hypothesis links the changing economic value of children to changed attitudes toward desired family size. Thus the move from farm to city renders each additional child a family

burden rather than productive labor -- altering motivations regarding the number of children desired. In the long run, this rationality theory may be correct, but in the short run the path is a tortuous one. Rural pronatalism persists among migrants to the city not only because of the mother's attitudes; the pronatalist values of influential kin and her spouse must change as must her communications patterns with her spouse. Alternatively, the woman must assume a considerable social risk in acting autonomously to limit her fertility in the face of others' pronatalist values. Thus we may assume at least a two step process in value change -- the first in which some awareness of the advantages of alternative behaviors develops, and the second in which a significant number of conditions favor changed behavior to lead to effective goal-oriented behavior. Similarly increases in infant mortality which mean increasing probabilities of survival for each child born, are initially welcomed by pronatalist adults. But eventually the greater number of children will combine with continuous cost of living pressures to alter pronatalist attitudes.

These examples should suggest how complex are the models one can construct to explain fertility levels in a population. Also, it is apparent that a model including all logically pertinent variables would more closely resemble Rube Goldberg's grandest creation than an empirically testable set of propositions. The optimal strategy for research on fertility change is, I think, to select some variables which -- given the context of research -- appear promising, and to explore them with explicit awareness of the assumptions and preferences underlying the choice of model.

Role Incompatability: Productive and Reproductive Roles

The focus on role compatibility/incompatibility of motherhood and labor force participation (hereafter L.F.P.) has enormous appeal for contemporary women researchers as explorations of fertility levels. Most of us are keenly aware of the conflict between these two roles and many of us have elected to limit, more or less, our fertility to permit continued LFP. And as we worry about baby sitters, we have thought now convenient it would be to have some role yielding income, status, and autonomy which could be conducted while caring for children. Peasant women or women in cottage industries of the past or of contemporary Africa come readily to mind, for those women can and do integrate their reproductive and productive roles with little apparent strain. And yet we tend to assume that the forces of modernization will mean pressures and easier methods favoring fewer children. Urban living brings innumerable pressures, including entirely different work conditions and education with new aspirations and knowledge of the availability of European contraception. What is, then, the evidence regarding this expectation that West African women will, like Westerners, seek to limit their family size?

Boserup offers two hypotheses that are relevant.[2] First she states that urban residence entails pressures (of a primarily economic nature) which tends to limit fertility. The cost of food, clothing, fuel, education are all constraints on high fertility which should influence the fertility attitudes of men and women.

Boserup also observes that the transition from rural to urban residence is associated with a decrease in female LFP. In African agriculture, women constitute an estimated 80% of the total number

of "man hours" expended. The rural woman is a member of the productive labor force, and her work is easily combined with her maternal role. Infants can nurse at her work, children can be scolded while she works, and older children are free to assist their mothers.

Among urban West African women, LFP is markedly less than in rural areas.[3] A survey in Sierra Leone showed less than 50% of the urban female population to be economically active, for the most part in petty trade.[4] My sample also showed less than half of urban women with less than nine years of schooling (the great majority of the female population) worked with "work" broadly defined to mean any form of cash-generating employment.

Boserup's two propositions lead us to focus on the link between fertility and labor force participation. Do urban women have lower LFP rates than their rural counterparts? Is it because urban women can less easily combine their work roles and their maternal roles? Who are the urban women who work? Are they distinguished from those who do not work by differential fertility? If there is a differential is it because women who work limit their fertility -- presumably to permit continued LFP? Or does involuntary infertility lead to LFP?

Stycos and Weller address these questions in a succinct proposition:

> If acceptable means of contraception is not available, then low fertility leads to employment and not the reverse.[5]

Presumably, by "acceptable means of contraception," Stycos and Weller mean some pharmaceutical barrier to conception rather than abstinence. Their proposition further implies that in the absence

of such contraceptive products, women are unlikely to avoid pregnancy in order to work. The maternal role thus is primary and independent, and employment actively secondary and dependent. As a result, women who are involuntarily subfecond will be more likely to work than women who have normal fertility levels.

There are other aspects of this proposition to be noted. "Acceptable means" suggests that the problem with contraceptive acceptance is one of means (aesthetics, comfort, convenience) rather than ends (whether persons really want to limit the number of children they have). I suggest that perhaps both the ends and the means must be acceptable before fertility behavior will be intentionally changed in a pronatalist society.

Secondly, the underlying assumption of incompatibility between maternal and LFP roles does not specify the nature of a viable solution. Is one child as conflict producing as eight (or more so, if older siblings can care for younger ones). Nor does it specify children's ages are germane (that is, pre-schoolers cause insoluble conflict which school age children do not). When this role conflict centers on the mother's primary role as caretaker of the children, a viable solution is finding some other person to care for her children. This caretaker may be an older child (if she does not go to school), a co-wife (largely a political negotiation, or a kinsman (dependent on household space and husband's willingness to house that kinsman, and the costs versus benefits of maintaining such a kinsman). Or a woman may use paid help (again, dependent on cost relative either to total household income or to the wife's income, if the husband insists childcare is her responsibility).

A crucial ambiguity of Stycos and Weller's hypothesis concerns

the meaning of role compatibility. Does role incompatibility mean roles which cause stress (for example, two roles requiring difference in pace of attitudes and thus imposing difficult transitions)? Or roles which are mutually exclusive?[6] Regarding childcare, compatibility becomes relative to cultural values. Clearly if work requires separation from children, then a mother cannot fill both roles at once. But if childcare substitutes are acceptable, then an acceptable solution to the conflict would be determined by cash flow factors and given woman's views regarding the adequacy of various childcare arrangements. The more stringent definition of mutual exclusivity is in the spirit of Stycos and Weller's hypothesis: role incompatibility indicates roles which offer no alternative solutions. This does not exclude an element of subjectivity. Nineteenth century English factory women gave their babies opium to silence them while the mothers were at work -- this was a solution to the incompatibility of their roles. Rarer, the mutual exclusiveness definition poses directly the question of alternative solutions.

How, in the population under investigation, do womens' jobs differ regarding the conflict between productive and reproductive roles? Can women with children satisfy both at once? If no role conflict is present <u>or</u> if alternative solutions which resolve the role conflict are available, then whether or not a woman works may depend on factors <u>other</u> than fertility levels.

In Abidjan, "salaried employment" always means work outside the home. Given the low level of industrialization in West Africa, salaried female labor typically means clerical or professional white collar work. Less educated women have very little opportunity to

find regular work, and they are largely relegated to self-employed petty trade involving food preparation or sale, or resale of imported toiletries, foodstuffs, kitchenware, etc. Some of these women sell for a few hours a day in front of their homes. Others rent space and sell daily at one of the city's big markets. Although the latter clearly cannot bring their household to their work place, they can bring infants on their backs and they can alter their hours or miss a day if family responsibilities require their presence. Thus petty trade is clearly not as incompatible with mothering as is salaried work, although most types of petty trade in Abidjan also require some assistance with family responsibilities. The survey data on household help -- including (a) paid help or (b) informally paid family members -- will help us to understand the relationship between LFP and household obligations.

Concepts and measures used in this study

We turn now to the empirical relationships between employment and fertility found among Abidjan women. Respondents' status has been trichotomized to distinguish women who are inactive (have no money-earning activity), petty traders (including all self-employed home manufacturers and market sellers), and salaried workers (including all regularly paid salaried workers.) This categorization most accurately distinguishes the conditions of work relevant to incompatibility to maternal roles.

Data on respondents' household help is presented with salaried help distinguished from kinsmen who receive room, board, and some pocket money. These two categories certainly do not cover all possible childcare solutions. Indeed, in the stereotypic African

household (a less than accurate picture for Abidjan) co-wives, kin not brought to serve as household help, older children, etc. are all sources of childcare. Furthermore, while we can show whether persons who have what they call "household help" are more likely to work, we cannot verify the causal link, that is, whether an individual sought work because she had childcare available or sought childcare in order to work.

Another source of data on role compatibility is an open-ended question: "why do you work" (or "not work"). In an open-ended question, respondents are not guided or limited in their responses, as they are in a multiple choice or agree/disagree item. The detailed codes, established from a 10 percent sample of the completed questionnaires, include all responses given, ranging from "Because I have no one to care for the children" (indicating role conflict), to "Because I am ashamed to be a street seller/market woman" (with no apparent role conflict).

The data on fertility includes desired number of children, knowledge and use of African and European contraceptive methods, and actual family size (including children born alive and children surviving at the time of the interview.) The desired number of children shows whether the extremely pronatalist rural tradition is undergoing modification, presumably due to the many pressures of urban life and economic change on Abidjan women. Contraceptive knowledge and use has been shown elsewhere to be largely a function of education (that is, education as a summary measure of context and social network, not of specific classroom content). To collect our data on contraceptive use, we asked if the respondent had ever used some means of limiting or delaying pregnancy, and if so, what.

Thus those respondents tabulated as "users" of contraception could be persons who have used contraception during a specific period with no desire to limit over all births, or a person contracepting to achieve a particular number of children.

The Data Base

The sample of 880 respondents interviewed in 1973-74, was drawn from three quarters of Abidjan selected for their differing socio-economic characteristics.* It is a purposive stratified sample aimed at over-representing the upper and middle status minorities in the city's population rather than representing the entire population in accurate proportions. The three neighborhoods were selected on the basis of known rent and value of housing, type of housing and approximate income of inhabitants. Thus the upper status quarter, Cocody, is the elite neighborhood of the city housing white collar Ivoirians, members of the diplomatic corps and Europeans. Housing, either apartment buildings or single family dwellings, are all valued at a minimum rent of 18,000 francs cfa. The second neighborhood, Nouveau Koumassi, is a semi-state-owned housing estate of one story row houses ranging in rent from 7,000 to 15,000cfa. These two neighborhoods contrast with the third in that they all have running water, flush toilets and electricity and are all designed in the European manner as single family dwellings. The third neighborhood, Treichville, is the old African quarter of the city; its dwellings are the traditional

* This study was conducted in 1974 under the auspices of the Ministry of Planning of the Ivory Coast. I am grateful to The Ministry of Planning, the Population Council and the African-American Scholars' Council whose support made this research possible.

courtyard usually lodging several families and 85% of all rents less than 8,000cfa. While its inhabitants' life styles are more "traditional," and their standard of living clearly lower (66% have electricity, 18%, flush toilets, 36%, running water), Treichville cannot be characterized as "typically lower class." It is centrally located and its sanitation facilities and health services are far superior to most of the cities' peripheral areas. Thus the sample must be assumed to exclude the lowest status group of the population. Secondly, by drawing approximately the same number of respondents in each of the three neighborhoods, it is skewed to over-represent the higher socio-economic strata. Thus a meaningful statistical comparison of women of different socio-economic characteristics is gained at the expense of an accurate profile of the city's entire population.

Within each neighborhood, maximum care was taken to draw a representative sample of eligible respondents. Eligible women are of all marital statuses aged 20 to 44 years, and of the Bété, Baoulé or Dioula ethnic groups. The ethnic groups selected represent major cultural types in the Ivory Coast. The Bété are patrilineal forest dwellers, the Baoulé matrilineal forest dwellers, and both animist or Christian. The Dioula are Mande-speaking, patrilineal Muslims from the Savanna regions of the Ivory Coast, Guinea and Mali. The three groups maximize quantitative representativity, constituting nearly one half of the Ivoirian population. A complete census of randomly selected clusters yielded a list of eligible women. Each woman was then interviewed by an interviewer of her ethnic group in her maternal language unless she wanted to respond in French. Thus every effort was made to assure a positive

rapport, comprehension of questions and reliability of responses.

Employment status and fertility

Before exploring the relationship between employment and fertility behavior in detail, the distribution of employment among Abidjan women deserves note. The table below shows the very strong positive relationship between employment and education.

(TABLE I ABOUT HERE)

Among the women at university and professional school levels, nearly all of those not currently students or apprentices are salaried workers. Only two percent are inactive and five percent are self employed in commerce. Among women with little or no education, about half are inactive. The compelling attraction of labor force participation among the better educated is clear. It is due to the access of this strata to better jobs, the great demand for educated Ivoirian workers in the Ivory Coast, and the social pressures on women to avoid financial dependency on spouse or family.[7] For the purposes of our inquiry, we cannot therefore compare the fertility of active and inactive women among the educated elite -- because the inactive group is too small to be measured statistically. Thus we cannot fully test the impact of employment upon fertility by using a "control group" of educated but inactive women because women able to get good jobs in Abidjan simply do not stay at home. But we can look at the fertility of these women in comparison with other groups: we turn now to that question.

Table II shows the mean number of children ever born per respondent grouped by LFP (salaried, petty trade or inactive) and

by age. Comparisons of the means for the same age groups shows whether work as a petty trader or as a salaried employee is related to lower fertility. Age controls are particularly necessary in fertility studies. First, the older the woman, the greater the number of children she is likely to have -- in the absence of contraception or abstinence. Second, we cannot assume that the age distribution of all salaried women is equal to that among all housewives. (Indeed, the unemployed tend to be younger than the others, and petty traders tend to be older.) Thus the mean number of children by employment status alone could be misleading.

(TABLE II ABOUT HERE)

The other data in Table II show no evidence that children are an insurmountable barrier to LFP. The market women 20 to 35 years old have higher fertility levels than either the inactives or the salaried women. The salaried women have the fewest children -- except among the oldest age cohort (women 35 to 45), where they have the most children.

This jump in fertility among salaried women under 35 compared to salaried women 35 and older is intriguing, although it must be interpreted tentatively. A possible interpretation is that salaried women who, in the Ivory Coast, are drawn from among the more educated and also constitute the vast majority of the more educated women, have lower fertility levels initially because they delay marriage for schooling but that they "catch up" to the other women in their later years. However, we cannot be certain that younger salaried women will, in a decade or two, "look like" women currently ending child bearing.[8]

These show that the older more educated women had lower than average fertility when they were 20 to 35 -- supporting our interpretation regarding salaried women. Of course, only when the younger women have themselves completed their childbearing will we be certain. It is possible that the younger cohort will stop bearing children -- perhaps through use of contraception -- with a smaller number of children than their older salaried counterparts. (See the data on desired family size below.)

(TABLE III ABOUT HERE)

Table III presents the respondents' total number of surviving children to complement the data above on the number of children ever born at the time of interview. These means are also grouped by age and employment status. As long as women lose a number of children in childhood, they will continue to want many children to ensure that "enough" reach adulthood. Thus a low rate of infant mortality may be a prerequisite to voluntary limitation of family size.

Also, the more educated, intellectually and financially more able to benefit fully from available medical care, may be expected to have lower infant mortality. Thus, in our sample, we would expect the infant mortality to be somewhat lower among the salaried than among the petty traders. If so, this would narrow the gap between petty traders' and salaried women's fertility levels observed above in the 20 to 35 age cohorts. The differences between children born and those surviving is lowest among salaried women, and highest among traders. This difference is a partial explanation of the greater number of surviving children among salaried women in the oldest (35+) age cohort, with traders lowest and inactive women

falling between the two.

The data do not, on balance, show the negative relationship between fertility and LFP predicted in the presence of incompatibility between maternal and employment roles. There is a low level of fertility among younger salaried women, apparently due to prolonged education and later onset of childbearing. But this disappears when salaried women are over 35, and becomes reversed when infant mortality is taken into account: in the oldest cohort, salaried women have the largest number of surviving children! It is, of course, doubtful that salaried work per se increases family size (education and medical care are the probable explanations). But the incompatibility proposition finds little support.

What about attitudes toward family size? Are there differences in attitudes regarding the number of children respondents say they would like to have which are consistent with a role stress hypothesis, if not a role incompatibility hypothesis?

Work Status and Desired Family Size

In a sequence of changes leading to the intentional reduction of family size, new attitudes favoring smaller families will precede actual behaviors limiting family size. Data on desired family size is of particular interest because many women in Abidjan may well be at that transitional point between attitudinal and behavioral change. Abidjan is a very new and rapidly growing city in which the full range of pressures to limit family size is surely not a generation old. Women are experiencing the impossibility of growing any food for consumption at home, great housing scarcity

and cost, and nearly universal primary school attendance with its attendant fees and consequent loss of household help from older children. Access to European contraception is recent and family planning is not publicized. (Although the legality of contraception is ambiguous, it can be obtained through private and some public doctors.)

There are many reasons we may expect women not to have acted effectively to limit family size. However, the data on desired family size will suggest whether working mothers, despite having found some form of childcare, want fewer children because of the strain and cross pressures of their dual roles. Perhaps, also, as cash earners as well as consumers, they appreciate more fully the cost of urban living than do their inactive counterparts.

(TABLE IV-A AND IV-B ABOUT HERE)

Table IV shows mean number of children desired: (the response to the question, "How many children would you like in all, if you could choose," is grouped by work status only (in Table IV-A) and then by education and work status (in Table IV-B). Most women answered with a number, but some (113 women) refused to adopt other than a wholly passive stance: guided perhaps by tradition, perhaps by religious piety, these women said only "As many as God gives" or "As God wishes." These responses cannot be included in the numerical averages. However, these women were certainly adverse to contraception or any other means of limiting family size. Rather than altering the averages to reflect these pronatalist respondents,[9] I have excluded them from the calculation of means, but listed the

number of respondents saying "as many as God gives" next to each category. Thus Table IIIB, shows that most of these 113 women are those with no European education. Such a passive acceptance of traditional pronatalist values regarding family size disappears with increasing education in the great majority of cases.

Although in all groups the mean number of children desired is very high from a European perspective, such respondents differ by work status. The salaried workers have the lowest mean (5) number of children desired while the petty traders are highest (7) and the inactive women only slightly lower (6.8) then the petty traders. Since salaried work is far more inflexible regarding separation of mother and child than petty trade, role incompatibility may explain these differences in aspiration. However, we must examine a competing explanation that increases in education are related to the decline of traditional, rural pronatalist attitudes.

Table IIIB shows that education has a far greater impact on desired family size than employment status. Among the salaried, the inactive and the petty traders, the desired number of children drops from over 7.5 among those with no European education to 4.6 or less among those who have reached at least the upper level of secondary school. The very skewed nature of the distributions within work status groups makes clear that the relationship between work status and pronatalist attitudes is spurious. Note, for example, the great concentration of salaried workers in the highest educational category, but also that the tiny number of uneducated salaried women are as pronatalist as any group. The data also show that the most educated among the inactive (also a tiny number: 8 out of 268) want the smallest family of any group.

We are still not certain what the completed fertility of younger working women -- or younger inactive women will look like. They live in a changing society and they may not follow the path of the older educated women. However, while they are less pro-natalist than the less educated, the number of children they say they want is about what they appear likely to achieve! Salaried women 35 to 50 average 5.2 living children which is very close to the 5.1 which all salaried women say they want. Similarly, women 35 to 50 with at least 9 years of education average 4.9 living children; all of these more educated women said they wanted 4.5. The data suggest that the more pronatalist less educated women are unlikely to reach their ideal family size, while those wanting fewer children may well have about their desired number.

LFP and Household Help

In a further effort to explore how working women solve their childcare needs, we asked respondents whether they had someone to help them at home apart from their co-wives. The household help category was further separated into salaried help or non-salaried residents. The latter are very often family members or needy villagers who do housework in return for room, board and pocket money. It may seem inappropriate to categorize such persons as "unsalaried help," because women often assist kinsmen by assuming responsibility for the upkeep of one or more family members. Thus the unsalaried help need not be primarily or solely a benefit to the receiving household. However, from the perspective of role compatibility, such help does constitute substitute childcare. Lastly, in cases where a respondent had both paid employment and

resident kin assisting with childcare, she was categorized as having "paid help."

By correlating work status and the presence of household help (either paid or unpaid), we can see to what extent women in the labor force appear more likely to pay cash to meet their household obligations. Secondly, the presence or absence of unpaid kinsmen suggests to what degree extended family institutions provide the solution to women's conflict between productive and reproductive roles.

(TABLE V-A and V-B ABOUT HERE)

Table V shows the relationship of LFP and household help among respondents with none of their children living with them (Table V-A) and those with one or more living with them (Table V-B). (This does not reveal whether respondents have one or more children which they have sent to live with kinsmen -- often precisely because they themselves are in school or working.) Comparing the number of respondents with no help, salaried help, or unpaid help among women with and without childcare responsibilities -- will suggest the extent to which help is brought in to care for children of working mothers -- rather than being present regardless of childcare needs.

It is rather surprising that 40% of the women without children have help, paid or unpaid. 71% of the petty traders without children at home and 73% of those with children at home say they have no help, while only 36% of the salaried women without children say they have no help. There is clearly no positive relationship between household help and the ability to conduct petty trade. In contrast, salaried women with children are more likely to have

assistance than their childless salaried counterparts (86% to 64%). Does this mean that women in trade have no problem working and caring for children, but that the salaried employees experience great conflict between their roles? Or is the difference between the groups explained by their income levels more than by role conflict -- that salaried women's greater incomes permit them the relative luxury of household help?

The difference regarding household help is greater between salaried women and traders than it is between women with and without children. And while some inactive women with children and some traders with children have salaried help, salaried women with children are nearly four times as likely as traders to have regular paid help. Indeed, salaried women often pay their household help solely from their salaries, for household maintenance is, their husbands say, the wife's responsibility. Traders' incomes vary greatly, but the majority, earning a few dollars a day, would be hard pressed to purchase their replacement in the home.

The greater income of salaried women compared to (most) petty traders appears to explain the salaried women's greater frequency of household help. But is there support for a competing hypothesis that salaried work, because of longer and inflexible hours, requires formal (salaried) childcare? For example, women trading in the city's main markets leave for home by two P.M., while salaried women must work until 5:30 or 6:00. Does this mean that there is less role conflict among traders than salaried workers?

This argument can be greatly overstated. Market women must leave their homes early to get wholesale goods. They can take an infant on their backs to work at the market, and thus avoid missing

feedings, but in Abidjan market sellers very rarely take more than one child to the market. Of course, other aspects of their work, such as food preparation, cloth dyeing, and sewing, are compatible with childcare. Nonetheless, most petty traders certainly need some regular and reliable assistance in order to fulfil their mothering roles. Thus the 73% of traders with children who cited no household help apparently rely heavily upon the more traditional family structure; the presence of an adult kinsman, co-wife, or older child (not attending school) is essential.

To what extent does childcare appear to be a problem to respondents? Is it a common determinant of employment status or is it a matter for which solutions are fairly easily available?

At the end of the survey respondents were asked (depending on their reported work status) "why do you/do you not work"? The question is totally open ended and interviewers were instructed to note everything the respondents said. Then, based on a 20% sample of the questionnaires, comprehensive coding categories were established (17 coded responses for working women, 13 for non-working women). Because this particular questionnaire has been primarily devoted to fertility attitudes and history -- respondents were surely cued to cite "children" or childcare if they felt such a response were at all relevant. Furthermore, if a respondent's answer coincided with more than one coded response, both (or all) responses were included in the analysis. (This inclusion of up to three responses per respondent explains why the total number of responses exceeds the total number of respondents: there are 831 responses for 482 respondents.)

(TABLE VI-A AND VI-B ABOUT HERE)

Given the high fertility levels and high LFP we have seen thus far, it is not surprising to see that only 2 individuals (0.2% of responses) give the one response suggesting a tradeoff between work and children; that is, say they work because they have no children. This response, corresponding directly to Stycos and Weller's hypothesis, receives negligible support. The most frequent response is the conventional "help out with household/children's costs." Another widespread response is "my own little needs," -- a response far more common among petty traders than salaried women. This rather self-effacing expression reflects the husbands' view that women should look after their own needs (including clothing and social obligations requiring cash) and women's oft-stated view that "It makes one ashamed to hold out one's hand to one's husband." This is evidence that the new dependence of urban women is not easily accepted by men <u>or</u> women. The greater frequency of the response among traders is, I think, an accurate reflection of the meager possibilities afforded by the small earnings of many petty traders. The response that "I work in order to aid my family (that is, my <u>own</u> kinsmen, not by relatives by marriage)" is also more frequent among salaried women than traders. This is perhaps to those assuming that because the salaries are more educated, more "modern" they are also less traditional in their maintenance of family ties and their resistance to the limitation of the nuclear family. This is surely not the case; indeed, educated women often felt particular responsibility to help out their own family because, they say, 'my parents sacrificed to get me through school, so also now I must thank them.' Work as a source of

pleasure and self-esteem is a notion made current by Western press and particularly by the women's movement: it is not surprising that this is primarily a response of the (more educated) salaried workers.

The question "why don't you work" -- (perhaps a bit accusatory, although interviewers were told to avoid such a tone) seems, to a contemporary American, an invitation to extol women's role as mother, or at least, to note her responsibility for childcare. Table VI A and B presents the response frequencies. Those who responded that they were students or apprentices are excluded from these percentages, because students over 20, like apprentices, all said they would work when their studies were ended.

Among the 271 inactive respondents remaining, the most common response (28%) was that their spouses forbade them to work. This tension between spouses regarding women working outside the home appears to be fairly common in West Africa. Men complain about women's flirtatious nature and the devious nature of other men as well as women's tendency to become headstrong when they have their own income.[10] The tension is exacerbated by the common separation of earnings by spouses, and husbands' insistance that women do not contribute enough to household upkeep, spending on herself and her kinsmen.[11] (Women in turn note men's expenditures on their mistresses and on their kinsmen.)

Another major response category groups women who cast themselves as eligible only for petty trade (as we have seen, few eligible for salaried work are inactive) 22% of the responses concern the absence of conditions to start trading ("Not enough capital or no selling place on the market"). The last response

(.7%) "lost my working capital" is similar.

The 16% who said that they had no occupation or were illiterate either misunderstood the question as referring to salaried work only or they are indicating their preference for salaried jobs, to which they have no access. In the same vein, 6 women (only 0.7%) said that they did not like petty trade or were ashamed to do it. Such responses reflect the greater earning and status of salaried work, which is, given Abidjan's low level of industrialization, largely white collar work. I have shown elsewhere that the less educated, for whom salaried work is inaccessible, are nearly four times as likely to be inactive, because their only option is petty commerce -- a saturated sector in which earnings are slight and risks great.

Three response categories indicate role conflict between mothering and work. Eight percent of the responses were "I have no one to care for the children," which meets the definition of role conflict directly. Eleven percent said they prefer caring for their children, which also underlies the necessity of choice, but not a forced choice. Another 4% of the responses indicated that they are inactive because they have recently or are about to give birth -- again indicating role incompatibility for the moment. These three explanations total 23% of all responses -- a significant percentage ranking just below husband's opposition to wives' LFP and just above the absence of capital or a place on the market to sell. Another 9% of responses concern role conflict in a broader sense: housework, visits to village or trips home are obligations (or desires) which a part of the respondents' role in the extended family. Like "husband's opposition," "visits to

village, etc." does not indicate role conflict in the narrow sense employed here: when no solution is available permitting respondents to fill their maternal and work role simultaneously. "Husbands' opposition" (assuming obedience to be a condition of marriage) and familial role obligations ("visiting kin," etc.) constitute conflict between respondents' roles as spouse, and as kinsperson and employment, but not her role as mother and worker.

What then is our conclusion regarding the complimentarity or conflict between the roles of mother and of labor force participant? We have looked at the average number of children by mothers' age and employment status and seen little evidence that employment correlated with fertility levels. The data suggest that an apparent relationship between salaried work and fertility up to 35 years old is really due to the postponement of childbearing while in school. LFP among the more educated -- who hold jobs the most incompatible with childcare -- is strikingly high, dramatically disproving our hypothesis.

Conclusion

In summary, we have shown that:

(1) Fertility does not keep women from working. The fertility data give no reason to believe that women are voluntarily limiting their family size in order to work. Even the highly educated with an initially lower number of children due to delayed childbearing appear to "catch up" to their cohort because of lower infant mortality.

(2) How women who work meet their childcare needs varies. Clearly, for the foreseeable future, salaried women will be able

to benefit from the very cheap household help available. Only when unskilled salaried women's work approaches domestic help in pay level will salaried women be unable to hire outside help. The family network also serves as a backup. However, this resource may be limited by increased universal education and by more, better paying jobs which compare favorably to living and working with kin.

(3) The profits of most petty traders are small enough that these women are generally unable to hire or maintain outside help. Thus the less educated who do work are more likely to depend on kinsmen or cohabitants than outside help. The free childcare essential to many of these petty traders will diminish as older daughters continue longer in school, as housing become more costly and more crowded, and as extended families disperse or lose the cohesion necessary for regular and reliable assistance.

(4) Although social change will probably decrease the availability of familial childcare, one wonders if this will be the cause of women's withdrawal from the labor force. The responses of the inactive women in this study suggest that insufficient employment opportunities rather than unavailable childcare lead to women's declining LFP.

The concept of role compatibility is perhaps deceptively attractive and finally of limited usefulness. Vast numbers of women fill urban work roles and have large families. Focus on the availability and cost of childcare substitutes offers a better analytic tool entailing the calculation of costs and earnings to find the breakeven point between the two.

Our failure to demonstrate any impact of maternal and employ-

ment role incompatibility is supported by other research from West Africa. Research from Ibaden and from a rural state tea plantation in Cameroon replicate the finding that high fertility is not negatively related to employment.[12] The absence of incompatibility is partially explained by legal and social structures. At independence, most West African states inherited elements of social legislation from the European colonial powers which were far more generous to working women than contemporary practice in the United States. Maternity leaves, assurance that jobs would be saved and seniority retained, maternity allowances, and, in the francophone countries, family allowances paid regularly for each child to the head of household have reinforced pronatalism nor reduced conflict between work and maternity for the few women in modern sector jobs. African family structure offers considerable opportunity to locate unpaid (or informally paid) sources of childcare -- via co-wives or kin.

Yet the extended family is not the universal panacea it may appear to be. In Abidjan and elsewhere women recount their dissatisfaction with their country kinswomen who serve as childcare substitutes. Their reasons suggest their changing awareness and values. Some mention basic health care and worry about correct preparation of infant formulas. Others are concerned about the quality of the French (or English) the children are learning, saying that proper grammar is essential to success in school. European style housing and changing expectations between spouses produce increasing dissatisfaction with resident kinsmen from the spouse's family. When Abidjan women were asked by the new Ministre de la Condition Feminine what they wanted, women listed crêches

(nurseries) second only to more employment opportunities. In Lagos, commercial nurseries are a widespread and growing phenomenon.[13] Research on nurses and teachers in Ghana bears ample witness to the strains of running the household and working long hours.

If role incompatibility is not present, role stress certainly is. But the result has not been withdrawal from LFP; rather there appears to be considerable innovation regarding new childcare solutions. Clearly we observe a social process rather than a mechanical balancing between two roles. Understanding the path that process takes involves understanding the values supporting both labor force participation and continued high fertility.

There is room for research and analysis on both. The West African woman has always assumed a major role in the productive economy of the household. She desires to avoid dependency on her spouse and to be a vital participant in the support of her children and her parents. Attachment to LFP seems deep rooted and central to her well-being.[15] High fertility, some argue, remains the rational economic choice of most West Africans.[16] Pronatalist attitudes, based on an agricultural economy with intense seasonal labor shortages, is only partial cause. Even when the costs of living, schooling, and getting ahead move a person to limit family size, he/she will find himself obligated to assume care of several children of a kinsman because he/she, having but a few, should share the extended family's burden.[17] Thus the argument goes, until the extended family is replaced by the nuclear family -- until the reproductive unit of husband and wife coincides with the productive (and consuming) unit -- lowered fertility will not be economically rational.

It may be argued that Stycos and Weller's role compatibility hypothesis has not been fully tested until longetudinal data on women's share of jobs has been collected (and specifically data on jobs of women with and without children). It is possible that while some women are innovating to resolve role stress, another larger group is withdrawing from LFP, accepting the growing "incompatibility" of roles.

These trends need to be explored as does the economic rationality thesis regarding lowered family size and paid childcare to permit mothers to work. Further, rationality in both instances needs refinement to determine the benefits of different options to husband, wife and the family taken collectively. Indeed this may be the most important contribution, for it will shed light on the dynamics of women's options and their responses to changing familial and economic conditions. But any analysis must explore the interplay of maternal and employment roles.

FOOTNOTES

1. Kingsley Davis and Judith Blake in "Social Structure and Fertility: An Analytic Framework", Economic Development and Cultural Change, April 1955, Vol. 4, No. 3, p. 111-135 note eleven factors (voluntary and involuntary) affecting fertility levels, emphasizing that these "intermediate variables" must always be assessed and explained by social structures.

2. Ester Boserup, Women's Role in Economic Development, London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1970.

3. Ibid. On the basis of available data, she finds Southeast Asia has much higher rates of employment among urban women, and the Middle East low rates of employment among both rural and urban women. In Africa the intense competition for urban employment and the colonial pattern of male education and vocational training has resulted in a particularly sharp difference in the productive activities of rural and of urban women. But Boserup's data are scattered, and include East and Southern Africa. Data from West Africa suggest a somewhat greater proportion of urban females in economically productive activities.

4. Thomas Low, "Family Planning in Sierra Leone", Population Studies, Vol. 2, No. 8, and "Family Planning Patterns in Sierra Leone, Population Studies, Vol. 2, No. 10.

5. J. Mayonne Stycos and Robert Weller, "Female Roles and Fertility," Demography, Vol. 4, No. 4, 1967, p. 210-217.

6. Virginia DeLancey, "The Relationship between Female Labor Force Participation and Fertility: Compatibility of Roles on a Cameroon Plantation", Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the African Studies Association, Baltimore, Nov. 1-4, 1978; p. 17, discusses the meanings of compatibility; I have used the standard DeLancey adopted.

7. I explore the relationship between education and LFP fully and discuss the peak of inactivity among those with "some primary school education (which I see as related to their unrealistic aspirations of finding work in the modern sector) in "Economic Activity and Marriage among Ivoirian Urban Women" in Alice Schlegel, ed., Sexual Stratification: A Cross Cultural View, New York: Columbia University Press, 1977, p. 161-192.

8. See the Age Specific Fertility Rates in my "Etude sur La Fecondité, l'emploi, et le Statut de la Femme en Ville", multicopied, Abidjan, Ivory Coast: Ministry of Planning, 1975, p. 42 and p. 50.

9. For example, one could perhaps defend assigning a numerical value such as 10 to such verbal responses and then including them in the averages.

10. DeLancey, op. cit.

11. Christine Oppong, Marriage Among A Matrilineal Elite, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974.

12. O. O. Arowolo, "Female Labor Force Participation and Fertility: The Case of Ibadan City, in C. Oppong, Adaba, Bekombo, Preso, Mogey, eds., Marriage, Fertility and Parenthood in West Africa, Canberra, Australia: Australian National University, 1978, p. 533-565.

13. Eleanor N. Fapohunda, "The Child-Care Dilemma of Working Mothers in African Cities: The Case of Lagos, Nigeria", paper presented at the symposium on Women and Work in Africa, Arpil 29 to May 1, 1979 at University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

14. Christine Oppong, "The Crumbling of High Fertility Support: Data from a Study of Ghanaian Primary School Teachers", in The Persistence of High Fertility, ed. John C. Caldwell, Canberra, Australia: Australian National University, 1977, p. 331-361

15. Lewis in Schlegel. op. cit.

16. John C. Caldwell, "Toward A Restatement of Demographic Transition Theory", Population and Development Review, Vol. 2, No. 3 and 4, Sept. and Dec., 1976, p. 321-366, and "A Theory of Fertility" From High Plateau to Destabilization", Population and Development Review, Vol. 4, No. 4, Dec., 1978, p. 553-577.

17. Ibid. and Helen Ware, "Economic Strategyand the Number of Children,"in Caldwell, ed., The Persistence of High Fertility, op. cit., p. 469-595.

Appendix

Note on Contraceptive Use

The analysis of contraceptive use among women interviews distinguished African methods [purges, traditional charms (cited by 1.2%)] from European methods[(cited by .5%), rhythem method (cited by 6%) and other pharmaceutical producted (cited by 0.2%)]. On this basis, 11% of the sample had at some time used some European method intended to avoid pregnancy. Seventy five percent of the "users" lived in the elite neighborhood of Cocody; the rate of use among the other women in the sample, in neighborhoods far more typical of the city, was thus negligible.

Contraceptive use is heavily concentrated among the students and salaried works —(76% of all users) who are, of course, the most educated. Fifty-two percent of the users had attended technical school or university — although such educated women are a tiny group in the entire urban population. Users who have attended some secondary school or more compose 76% of all users. As already noted, the number of educated inactive women is too small to permit statistically reliable conclusions regarding the causal role of education versus employment regarding the adoption of contraception.

TABLE I EDUCATION BY EMPLOYMENT STATUS
(refers to French education only)

	no educ.	some primary	some secondary	university or profess.	total pct.
inactive	44%	55%	23%	2%	36%
commerce*	52%	20%	4%	5%	32%
salaried worker	2%	21%	57%	71%	25%
student, apprentice	1%	4%	16%	22%	7%
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

*"commerce" refers to petty traders, self-employed throughout.

TABLE II MEAN NUMBER OF CHILDREN BORN ALIVE BY AGE AND EMPLOYMENT STATUS

CODE	VALUE LABEL	SUM	MEAN	STD DEV	VARIANCE	N
		2909.0000	3.3322	2.5059	6.2794	(873)
age	20-24	452.0000	1.7121	1.3595	1.8484	(264)
empl.	INACTIVE	248.0000	1.7589	1.2644	1.5986	(141)
"	COMMERCIAL	88.0000	1.9130	1.4579	2.1256	(46)
"	SALARIED	116.0000	1.5065	1.4566	2.1217	(77)
age	25-29	812.0000	2.9853	1.8122	3.2839	(272)
empl.	INACTIVE	277.0000	3.0778	1.7368	3.0164	(90)
"	COMMERCIAL	334.0000	3.3737	1.9409	3.7671	(99)
"	SALARIED	201.0000	2.4217	1.6012	2.5639	(83)
age	30-34	788.0000	4.3060	2.2809	5.2025	(183)
empl	INACTIVE	250.0000	4.6296	2.0585	4.2376	(54)
"	COMMERCIAL	332.0000	4.8116	2.4928	6.2140	(69)
"	SALARIED	206.0000	3.4333	1.9776	3.9107	(60)
age	35-50	857.0000	5.5649	3.1163	9.7114	(154)
empl.	INACTIVE	199.0000	5.5278	3.2380	10.4849	(36)
"	COMMERCIAL	444.0000	5.4815	3.0908	9.5528	(81)
"	SALARIED	214.0000	5.7838	3.1281	9.7853	(37)

TABLE III MEAN NUMBER OF CHILDREN SURVIVING AT DATE OF INTERVIEW BY AGE AND EMPLOYMENT STATUS
* AND DIFFERENCE BETWEEN NUMBER EVER BORN AND NUMBER SURVIVING

CODE	VALUE LABEL	SUM	MEAN	*	STD DEV	VARIANCE	N
		2532.0000	2.9003		2.2057	4.8651	(873)
age	20-24	390.0000	1.4773		1.2206	1.4900	(264)
empl.	INACTIVE	213.0000	1.5106	.24	1.1809	1.3945	(141)
"	COMMERCIAL	71.0000	1.5435	.4	1.1295	1.2758	(46)
"	SALARIED	106.0000	1.3766	.13	1.3479	1.8168	(77)
age	25-29	714.0000	2.6250		1.6252	2.6411	(272)
empl.	INACTIVE	254.0000	2.8222	.3	1.6732	2.7995	(90)
"	COMMERCIAL	274.0000	2.7677	.4	1.6215	2.6291	(99)
"	SALARIED	186.0000	2.2410	.2	1.5269	2.3315	(83)
age	30-34	687.0000	3.7541		1.9442	3.7799	(183)
empl.	INACTIVE	213.0000	3.9444	.7	1.8471	3.4119	(54)
"	COMMERCIAL	287.0000	4.1594	.7	2.0481	4.1948	(69)
"	SALARIED	187.0000	3.1167	.3	1.7668	3.1218	(60)
age	35-50	741.0000	4.8117		2.7953	7.8140	(154)
empl.	INACTIVE	178.0000	4.9444	.58	3.0042	9.0254	(36)
"	COMMERCIAL	371.0000	4.5802	.9	2.7698	7.6716	(81)
"	SALARIED	192.0000	5.1892	.6	2.6650	7.1021	(37)

0.8 PCT.

TABLE IV-A MEAN NUMBER OF CHILDREN DESIRED BY WORK STATUS OF RESPONDENT

CODE	VALUE LABEL	SUM	MEAN	STD DEV	VARIANCE		N
		4685.0000	6.2886	2.8537	8.1438	(	745)(13)
empl.	INACTIVE	1817.0000	6.7799	2.8991	8.4045	(	268)(48)
	COMMERCIAL	1620.0000	7.0130	3.0609	9.3694	(	231)(54)
	SALARIED	1248.0000	5.0732	2.1292	4.5334	(	246)(11)

TABLE IV-B MEAN NUMBER OF CHILDREN DESIRED BY WORK STATUS AND EDUCATION OF RESPONDENT

* NUMBER RESPONDING "As many as God gives" OR "Up to God" LISTED AT EXTREME RIGHT BUT NOT CALCULATED IN MEANS

	VALUE LABEL	SUM	MEAN	STD DEV	VARIANCE		N
		4685.0000	6.2886	2.8537	8.1438	(	745)
empl.	INACTIVE	1817.0000	6.7799	2.8991	8.4045	(	268)(48)
ed.	NO EDUCATION	1212.0000	7.5750	3.0603	9.3654	(	160)(43)
	PRIM-SECON (1-9)	571.0000	5.7100	2.2170	4.9151	(	100)(5)
	HIGH (10+)	34.0000	4.2500	0.4629	0.2143	(	8)(0)
empl.	COMMERCIAL	1620.0000	7.0130	3.0609	9.3694	(	231)(54)
ed.	NO EDUCATION	1410.0000	7.2680	3.0978	9.5962	(	194)(50)
	PRIM-SECON (1-9)	168.0000	6.0000	2.6667	7.1111	(	28)(4)
	HIGH (10+)	42.0000	4.6667	1.5811	2.5000	(	9)(0)
empl.	SALARIED	1248.0000	5.0732	2.1292	4.5334	(	246)(11)
ed.	NO EDUCATION	90.0000	7.5000	4.8897	23.9091	(	12)(4)
	PRIM-SECON (1-9)	469.0000	5.7195	2.1446	4.5954	(	82)(4)
	HIGH (10+)	689.0000	4.5329	1.4690	2.1579	(	152)(3)

TABLE V-A RESPONDENTS' WORK STATUS BY HOUSEHOLD HELP (NO CHILDREN LIVING WITH RESPONDENT)

	no household help	salaried	commercial	inactive	
		(25) 36%	(34) 71%	(58) 74%	(117) 60%
unsaliried house-hold help	(14) 20%	(10) 21%	(12) 16%	(36) 18%	
salaried household help	(31) 44%	(4) 8%	(8) 10%	(43) 22%	
	(70) 36%	(48) 26%	(78) 40%	(196) 100%	

TABLE V-B RESPONDENTS' WORK STATUS BY HOUSEHOLD HELP (ONE OR TWO CHILDREN)

	no household help	salaried	commercial	inactive	
	(21) 14%	(180) 75%	(155) 64%	(362) 53%	
unsaliried house-hold help	(40) 21%	(34) 14%	(47) 19%	(121) 18%	
salaried household help	(21) 85%	(33) 13%	(42) 17%	(196) 29%	
	(82) 28%	(247) 64%	(244) 33%	679 100%	

TABLE V-C NUMBER OF CHILDREN LIVING AT HOME BY WORK STATUS

	none of her children at home	one or more of her children at home	
inactive	(78) 40%	(244) 36%	
commercial	(48) 25%	(247) 36%	
salaried	(70) 36%	(188) 28%	
	(196) 22%	(679) 78%	(875) 100%

TABLE VI-A REASONS WHY RESPONDENTS WORK BY WORK STATUS

	commerce	salaried	total
1. to support the household (aid husband, buy for children, house)	49%(250)	40%(145)	45%(375)
2. my own little needs	27%(126)	12%(45)	21%(171)
3. aid my family ("mes parents")	12%(59)	19%(70)	16%(129)
4. to not hold out hand to husband, to be independent	5%(25)	7%(24)	6%(49)
5. pleasure of working, contacts, to get out, develop myself	2%(8)	11%(40)	6%(48)
6. insurance for old age, to prepare for my future	0	2%(9)	1%(9)
7. because I have no children	.2%(1)	.3%(1)	.2%(2)
10. necessity, obligation to work	.4%(2)	2%(6)	1%(8)
11. need for money	.4%(2)	1%(4)	1%(6)
12. to attain a higher standard of living, move up	.4%(2)	.5%(2)	.4%(4)
13. to build a house	.5%(3)	.5%(2)	.5%(5)
14. for anything that might happen (deaths, etc.)	.5%(3)	0	.3%(3)
15. parents sent me to school; am educated, must work.	.8%(1)	3%(10)	1%(11)
16. nothing else to do	.4%(2)	2%(6)	1%(8)
17. for the country.	.2%(1)	.5%(2)	.3%(3)
	56%(465)	44%(366)	100%(831)

TABLE VI-B REASONS WHY RESPONDENT DOES NOT WORK (all inactive) (apprentice, students all included because they say that they will work; and they are very likely to find employment)

2. husband opposed	28%(81)	6. no time, visits to village; obliged to leave home	9%(26)
3. no money to begin; no place in market	22%(63)	7. prefer caring for children	11%(31)
4. no one to care for children	8%(23)	11. don't like petty trade, ashamed to do it.	2%(6)
5. no occupation; illiterate	16%(48)	12. just gave birth or pregnant	4%(11)
		13. life is too expensive or lost credit.	7%(2)
			100%(346)

TABLE VII MEAN NUMBER OF CHILDREN BORN ALIVE BY AGE AND EDUCATIONAL LEVEL OF RESPONDENT

CODE	VALUE LABEL	SUM	MEAN	STD DEV	VARIANCE	N
		2914.0000	3.3341	2.5051	6.2754	(874)
	20-24					
age	NO EDUCATION	452.0000	1.7121	1.3595	1.8484	(264)
ed.	PRIM-SECON (1-9)	204.0000	2.2174	1.4436	2.0841	(92)
"	HIGH (10+)	187.0000	1.5328	1.1295	1.2758	(122)
"		61.0000	1.2200	1.4469	2.0935	(50)
	25-29					
age	NO EDUCATION	817.0000	2.9927	1.8129	3.2867	(273)
ed.	PRIM-SECON	531.0000	3.2981	1.8502	3.4231	(161)
"	HIGH (10+)	162.0000	2.8929	1.7339	3.0065	(56)
"		124.0000	2.2143	1.5458	2.3896	(56)
	30-34					
age	NO EDUCATION	788.0000	4.3060	2.2809	5.2025	(183)
ed.	PRIM-SECON (1-9)	525.0000	4.7297	2.3118	5.3445	(111)
"	HIGH (10+)	153.0000	4.3714	1.8164	3.2992	(35)
"		110.0000	2.9730	2.1146	4.4715	(37)
	35-50					
age	NO EDUCATION	857.0000	5.5649	3.1163	9.7114	(154)
ed.	PRIM-SECON (1-9)	613.0000	5.4732	3.2130	10.3236	(112)
"	HIGH (10+)	97.0000	6.9286	3.4298	11.7637	(14)
"		147.0000	5.2500	2.4133	5.8241	(28)

0.7 PCT.

TABLE VIII MEAN NUMBER OF CHILDREN EVER BORN BY AGE, EDUCATION AND EMPLOYMENT STATUS OF RESPONDENT

CODE	VALUE LABEL	SUM	MEAN	STD DEV	VARIANCE	N
		2909.0000	3.3322	2.5059	6.2754	(873)
age	20-24	452.0000	1.7121	1.3595	1.8484	(264)
ed.	NO EDUCATION	204.0000	2.2174	1.4436	2.0841	(92)
empl.	INACTIVE	123.0000	2.1579	1.3731	1.8853	(57)
"	COMMERCIAL	66.0000	2.2000	1.4948	2.2345	(30)
"	SALARIED	15.0000	3.0000	2.0000	4.0000	(5)
ed.	PRIM-SECON (1-9)	187.0000	1.5328	1.1295	1.2758	(122)
empl.	INACTIVE	118.0000	1.5128	1.0780	1.1622	(78)
"	COMMERCIAL	22.0000	1.3750	1.2583	1.5833	(16)
"	SALARIED	47.0000	1.6786	1.2188	1.4854	(28)
ed.	HIGH (10+)	61.0000	1.2200	1.4469	2.0935	(50)
empl.	INACTIVE	7.0000	1.1667	1.6021	2.5667	(6)
"	SALARIED	54.0000	1.2273	1.4445	2.0867	(44)
age	25-29	812.0000	2.9853	1.8122	3.2839	(272)
ed.	NO EDUCATION	526.0000	3.2875	1.8510	3.4263	(160)
empl.	INACTIVE	213.0000	3.2769	1.7634	3.1096	(65)
"	COMMERCIAL	305.0000	3.3889	1.9062	3.6336	(90)
"	SALARIED	8.0000	1.6000	1.3416	1.8000	(5)
ed.	PRIM-SECON (1-9)	162.0000	2.8929	1.7339	3.0065	(56)
empl.	INACTIVE	59.0000	2.5652	1.6467	2.7115	(23)
"	COMMERCIAL	25.0000	3.5714	2.5728	6.6190	(7)
"	SALARIED	78.0000	3.0000	1.5492	2.4000	(26)
ed.	HIGH (10+)	124.0000	2.2143	1.5458	2.3896	(56)
empl.	INACTIVE	5.0000	2.5000	0.7071	0.5000	(2)
"	COMMERCIAL	4.0000	2.0000	1.4142	2.0000	(2)
"	SALARIED	115.0000	2.2115	1.5884	2.5230	(52)
age	30-34	788.0000	4.3060	2.2809	5.2025	(183)
ed.	NO EDUCATION	525.0000	4.7297	2.3118	5.3445	(111)
empl	INACTIVE	217.0000	4.5208	2.0730	4.2974	(48)
	COMMERCIAL	294.0000	4.9831	2.5223	6.3618	(59)
	SALARIED	14.0000	3.5000	1.2910	1.6667	(4)
ed.	PRIM-SECON (1-9)	153.0000	4.3714	1.8164	3.2992	(35)
empl	INACTIVE	33.0000	5.5000	1.8708	3.5000	(6)
	COMMERCIAL	23.0000	3.8333	2.3166	5.3667	(6)
	SALARIED	97.0000	4.2174	1.6225	2.6324	(23)
ed.	HIGH	110.0000	2.9730	2.1146	4.4715	(37)
empl.	COMMERCIAL	15.0000	3.7500	2.2174	4.9167	(4)
	SALARIED	95.0000	2.8788	2.1177	4.4848	(33)
age	35-50	857.0000	5.5649	3.1163	9.7114	(154)
ed	NO EDUCATION	613.0000	5.4732	3.2130	10.3236	(112)
empl.	INACTIVE	199.0000	5.5278	3.2380	10.4849	(36)
	COMMERCIAL	402.0000	5.4324	3.1102	9.6735	(74)
	SALARIED	12.0000	6.0000	8.4853	72.0000	(2)
ed.	PRIM-SECON	97.0000	6.9286	3.4298	11.7637	(14)
empl.	COMMERCIAL	28.0000	7.0000	3.5590	12.6667	(4)
	SALARIED	69.0000	6.9000	3.5730	12.7667	(10)
ed.	HIGH	147.0000	5.2500	2.4133	5.8241	(28)
empl.	COMMERCIAL	14.0000	4.6667	2.0817	4.3333	(3)
	SALARIED	133.0000	5.3200	2.4786	6.1433	(25)

CODE	VALUE LABEL	SUM	MEAN	STD DEV	VARIANCE	N
		2537.0000	2.9027	2.2056	4.8645	(874)
age	20-24	390.0000	1.4773	1.2206	1.4900	(264)
ed.	NO EDUCATION	166.0000	1.8043	1.2600	1.5877	(92)
	PRIM-SECON (1-9)	168.0000	1.3770	1.0782	1.1624	(122)
	HIGH (10+)	56.0000	1.1200	1.3498	1.8220	(50)
age	25-29	719.0000	2.6337	1.6285	2.6521	(273)
ed.	NO EDUCATION	454.0000	2.8199	1.6313	2.6611	(161)
	PRIM-SECON (1-9)	148.0000	2.6429	1.6562	2.7429	(56)
	HIGH (10+)	117.0000	2.0893	1.4927	2.2282	(56)
age	30-34	687.0000	3.7541	1.9442	3.7799	(183)
ed.	NO EDUCATION	447.0000	4.0270	1.9700	3.8811	(111)
	PRIM-SECON (1-9)	138.0000	3.9429	1.5519	2.4084	(35)
	HIGH (10+)	102.0000	2.7568	1.9207	3.6892	(37)
age	35-50	741.0000	4.8117	2.7953	7.8140	(154)
ed.	NO EDUCATION	521.0000	4.6518	2.8019	7.8506	(112)
	PRIM-SECON (1-9)	84.0000	6.0000	3.3050	10.9231	(14)
	HIGH (10+)	136.0000	4.8571	2.4300	5.9048	(28)

KKSTA TABLE X MEAN NUMBER OF SURVIVING AT DATE OF INTERVIEW BY AGE, EDUCATION AND EMPLOYMENT STATUS

CODE	VALUE LABEL	SUM	MEAN	STD DEV	VARIANCE	N
		2532.0000	2.9003	2.2057	4.8651	(873)
age	20-24	390.0000	1.4773	1.2206	1.4900	(264)
ed.	NO EDUCATION	166.0000	1.8043	1.2600	1.5877	(92)
empl.	INACTIVE	105.0000	1.8421	1.3600	1.8496	(57)
"	COMMERCIAL	51.0000	1.7000	1.0222	1.0448	(30)
"	SALARIED	10.0000	2.0000	1.5811	2.5000	(5)
ed.	PRIM-SECON (1-9)	168.0000	1.3770	1.0782	1.1624	(122)
empl.	INACTIVE	102.0000	1.3077	0.9711	0.9431	(78)
"	COMMERCIAL	20.0000	1.2500	1.2910	1.6667	(16)
"	SALARIED	46.0000	1.6429	1.2237	1.4974	(28)
ed.	HIGH (10+)	56.0000	1.1200	1.3498	1.8220	(50)
empl.	INACTIVE	6.0000	1.0000	1.2649	1.6000	(6)
"	SALARIED	50.0000	1.1364	1.3740	1.8879	(44)
age	25-29	714.0000	2.6250	1.6252	2.6411	(272)
ed.	NO EDUCATION	449.0000	2.8063	1.6272	2.6478	(160)
empl.	INACTIVE	193.0000	2.9692	1.7136	2.9365	(65)
"	COMMERCIAL	248.0000	2.7556	1.5601	2.4340	(90)
"	SALARIED	8.0000	1.6000	1.3416	1.8000	(5)
ed.	PRIM-SECON (1-9)	148.0000	2.6429	1.6562	2.7429	(56)
empl.	INACTIVE	56.0000	2.4348	1.5905	2.5296	(23)
"	COMMERCIAL	23.0000	3.2857	2.4300	5.9048	(7)
"	SALARIED	69.0000	2.6538	1.4951	2.2354	(26)
ed.	HIGH (10+)	117.0000	2.0893	1.4927	2.2282	(56)
empl.	INACTIVE	5.0000	2.5000	0.7071	0.5000	(2)
"	COMMERCIAL	3.0000	1.5000	0.7071	0.5000	(2)
"	SALARIED	109.0000	2.0962	1.5372	2.3631	(52)
age	30-34	687.0000	3.7541	1.9442	3.7799	(183)
ed.	NO EDUCATION	447.0000	4.0270	1.9700	3.8811	(111)
empl.	INACTIVE	185.0000	3.8542	1.8792	3.5315	(48)
"	COMMERCIAL	250.0000	4.2373	2.0623	4.2531	(59)
"	SALARIED	12.0000	3.0000	1.4142	2.0000	(4)
ed.	PRIM-SECON (1-9)	138.0000	3.9429	1.5519	2.4084	(35)
empl.	INACTIVE	28.0000	4.6667	1.5055	2.2667	(6)
	COMMERCIAL	22.0000	3.6667	2.0656	4.2667	(6)
	SALARIED	88.0000	3.8261	1.4350	2.0593	(23)
ed.	HIGH	102.0000	2.7568	1.9207	3.6892	(37)
empl.	COMMERCIAL	15.0000	3.7500	2.2174	4.9167	(4)
	SALARIED	87.0000	2.6364	1.8844	3.5511	(33)
age	35-50	741.0000	4.8117	2.7953	7.8140	(154)
ed.	NO EDUCATION	521.0000	4.6518	2.8019	7.8506	(112)
empl.	INACTIVE	178.0000	4.9444	3.0042	9.0254	(36)
	COMMERCIAL	336.0000	4.5405	2.6802	7.1853	(74)
	SALARIED	7.0000	3.5000	4.9497	24.5000	(2)
ed.	PRIM-SECON	84.0000	6.0000	3.3050	10.9231	(14)
empl.	COMMERCIAL	25.0000	6.2500	4.5000	20.2500	(4)
	SALARIED	59.0000	5.9000	2.9981	8.9889	(10)
ed.	HIGH	136.0000	4.8571	2.4300	5.9048	(28)
empl.	COMMERCIAL	10.0000	3.3333	2.5166	6.3333	(3)
	SALARIED	126.0000	5.0400	2.4082	5.7960	(25)