


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African Views on Democracy and Cooperation Among the Democracies

REGIONAL SEMINAR
Mauritius
May 6-8, 1986

Convened by the
Committee for a Community of Democracies-USA
and
The International Committee
for a Community of Democracies



ICCD Seminar Series
Vol. I

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AFRICAN VIEWS ON DEMOCRACY
and
COOPERATION AMONG DEMOCRACIES

Regional Seminar
Mauritius, May 6 – 8, 1986

Convened by the International Committee
for a Community of Democracies

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Generous financial support for the seminar was provided by the J. Howard Pew Freedom Trust and the U.S. Agency for International Development. The ICCD is grateful for their encouragement and understanding in the face of logistical and other difficulties encountered in organizing the seminar at a distant location.

Much of the seminar's success was due to U.S. Ambassador (Ret.) William G. Bradford, Project Director, whose wise counsel and indefatigable energy overcame a host of obstacles, and to Robert Foulon, ICCD Secretary and CCD-USA's coordinator for the seminar, who also assisted Amb. Bradford in compiling and editing this report.

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Foreword

The Committee for a Community of Democracies-USA (CCD-USA) began preparation in 1984 for convening an international conference to consider measures to strengthen solidarity and cooperation among democracies. It acted on a conviction that the time has come to fill a void in the existing array of international organizations and movements. In a world divided by East-West ideological and North-South economic differences only the democracies lack a forum where all of them can meet on the basis of shared values to consider measures for mutual support and ways to assist fragile and emerging democracies.

The conference, called PREFACE, that convened in April 1985 at the Wingspread Conference Center near Racine, Wisconsin demonstrated that CCD's conviction was shared by influential persons of widely varying backgrounds from 26 democracies representing all regions and every level of economic development. Heartened by the surge of democracy in southern Europe and Latin America, the participants called for the establishment of an Intergovernmental Association (or Forum) of Democracies, an International Institute for Democracy, and other measures to promote inter-democratic cooperation and to assist fragile democracies and democratic movements.

The Wingspread participants also called for the convening of a conference of all the democracies to review the PREFACE proposals with a view to recommending them for action by governments. They also constituted themselves as an International Committee for a Community of Democracies (ICCD) to support and promote the proposals and they agreed, *inter alia* to convene a series of regional seminars to obtain additional views on the proposals and their applicability to each region.

This report covers the proceedings and conclusions of the first seminar, which brought together a group of distinguished African personalities on May 6 - 8, 1986 in Mauritius. Other seminars have met in Costa Rica November 11 - 13 for the Latin American-Caribbean region, and in Australia November 22 - 24 for the Asia-Pacific region. A European seminar is planned for early 1987.

Acknowledging that democracy has achieved only a limited presence in Africa, the participants agreed that better organized cooperation is needed not only for mutual support among established democracies, but also to encourage and provide appropriate forms of assistance to pro-democratic individuals and groups in Africa. These African voices remind us that democratic institutions cannot be expected to develop everywhere on patterns established by classic western models.

September 1986

Samuel De Palma
President, CCD-USA

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Overview

As requested by the ICCD at PREFACE, CCD-USA took the initiative in organizing the African Seminar with the purpose of seeking African views on ICCD's agenda.

The African Regional Seminar was held in Mauritius at the invitation of Prime Minister Jugnauth May 6 - 8, 1986 under the chairmanship of Sir Harold Walter. There were participants from Botswana, Cameroon, Gambia, Kenya, Mauritius and Senegal as well as ICCD members from Fiji, Jamaica, the United Kingdom and the United States. The Seminar discussed the concepts, theory and practice of democracy on the African continent.

The Seminar endorsed the PREFACE proposals and made several recommendations for their implementation in Africa. These include *inter alia* the establishment of local groups of private citizens in all countries in the region where feasible, and the encouragement of greater contact and communication among voluntary organizations throughout Africa in order to raise and increase the level of consciousness on the meaning, practice and advantages of life in democratic systems.

A full report of the Seminar session follows, as well as a selection of related documents.

In order to build upon the momentum and interest generated at the Seminar, the ICCD is identifying appropriate local leaders, encouraging the setting up of local committees in the countries at the Seminar as well as several others and is exploring ways to facilitate the establishment of an independent African regional network of private citizens interested in democratic development. The ICCD would welcome the possibility of cooperating with such companion organizations in developing democratic institutions and encouraging respect for human rights in Africa.

To this end Amb. (Ret.) Bradford, the Project Director, made a five-week trip through Africa in September and October visiting most of the participants and others who had expressed interest in the ICCD. The trip, covering eleven countries, was highly successful. ICCD committees are in the process of being formed in Mauritius and Botswana, and the establishment of an "African League for the Promotion of Democracy" is under consideration.

The League objectives would parallel many of the aims of the ICCD, but would be a separate entity. It would probably include at the outset representatives from about twelve African nations, which are either practicing democracies or one-party states with democratic tendencies. The League would comprise: 1, a group to promote democratic practices by governments; 2, a

group interested in the protection of human rights; and 3, a group of scholars to conduct studies on democracy. While the League would not actually be a part of the ICCD, the latter has offered to assist such an organization in a search for funding once it was formed. However, the ICCD made it clear that, while it was happy to act as a catalyst, the initiative and ideas must come from the African participants.

Final Statement African Seminar

The first Regional Seminar of the ICCD was held in Mauritius, May 6 - 8, 1986.

The opening ceremony was held at the University of Mauritius in the presence of the Governor-General. The Prime Minister of Mauritius, Mr. Anerood Jugnauth, Q.C., M.L.A., who made the opening speech in the presence of the Leader of the Opposition, was introduced by Sir Harold Walter, Q.C., as Vice-Chairman of the ICCD. This was followed by a speech from the Pro-Chancellor of the University and messages of goodwill from Prime Minister Seaga of Jamaica, presented by Senator Dorothy Lightbourne, and from the Chairman of the ICCD, Ambassador Samuel De Palma.

There were 15 participants from Botswana, Cameroon, Gambia, Kenya, Mauritius, Senegal, Fiji, Jamaica, the United Kingdom and the United States. The working sessions were held under the chairmanship of Sir Harold.

The Regional Seminar discussed the concepts, theory and practice of democracy on the African continent. The participants noted that although Africa fought for and achieved independence through rallying the people to democratic ideals, there has been a movement away from democratic institutions in many countries. In many cases, even where parliamentary democracy still exists in form, the role of parliament has been reduced in relation to the power of the executive. It noted especially the importance of a strong and independent judiciary in the maintenance of democratic institutions. The conferees noted that the existence of multiethnicity and of classes is not insurmountable in the practice of democracy if practical constitutional arrangements are instituted. It called for tolerance, restraint, moderation, flexibility, cooperation, compromise and pragmatism as essential means in obtaining democratic order and for preserving basic freedoms.

The seminar emphasized the importance of promoting development under systems that provide democratic freedoms. It agreed that rapid economic development can succeed best when the individual has the opportunity of self-fulfillment and makes his maximum contribution to the development of the nation.

It also strongly urged the importance of civic and other forms of education of the people in order to advance and sustain democracy and democratic values in Africa. It further expressed the hope that African leadership be strongly attached to democratic values and the maintenance of basic freedoms and human rights.

The Regional Seminar reviewed the recommendations of the first ICCD Conference at Wingspread, Wisconsin, U.S.A., and made the following

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observations:

- (1) It agreed on the first recommendation of forming an Association of Democracies at the inter-governmental level to:
 - (a) assist young democracies or those that are beset by problems of survival;
 - (b) arrange for exchanges of democratic experiences;
 - (c) promote human rights and economic and social justice;
 - (d) act as a forum for the resolution of mutual problems;
 - (e) study the practical possibilities for partnership in the management of economic relations; and
 - (f) pursue efforts to redress the disadvantaged trading position of the Association's developing members and to promote the flow of knowledge and technology to them.
- (2) It expressed interest in establishing a consultative group of democracies at the United Nations at some time in the future, but did not consider this an urgent objective.
- (3) It endorsed strongly the formation of an International Institute for Democracy that will have full academic autonomy and that among other things will concentrate on teaching and research, particularly in the area of comparative studies, which should focus on the process of transition from authoritarianism to democracy and on problems of development and political stability. It is hoped the Institute will work in close collaboration with universities and other centres of higher learning in Africa. It was certainly understood that such an Institute should be academic in nature.
- (4) It adopted the Wingspread resolution on combating violations of human rights and socio-economic deprivations and encouraged intensified cooperation in the elimination of international terrorism and of apartheid and other discriminatory policies.
- (5) It strongly supported the formation of international working groups of experts that will meet from time to time to review and assess the condition of democracy in the region and make recommendations thereon for broad dissemination.
- (6) Finally, the Seminar also supported the Wingspread proposal for the formation of private citizen groups that can promote education on democratic values and principles in their respective countries and establish cooperative contact with similar groups in the region and the world.

Having reviewed and supported the Wingspread proposals, the Regional Seminar made several recommendations which the ICCD and local CCDs should pursue. These are:

- (1) CCD branches should be established in all countries in the region where feasible.

- (2) There should be greater contact and communication throughout Africa among voluntary organizations in order to raise and increase the level of consciousness on the meaning, practice and advantages of life in democratic systems.
- (3) The ICCD should encourage and support individuals, groups and institutions in the region working for democratic ideals.
- (4) The ICCD and its local chapters should support organizations fighting abuses of human rights and help publicize their findings.
- (5) The CCDs should oppose all forms of discrimination, be they racial, ethnic or religious.
- (6) The ICCD should continue to organize and hold conferences on democracy both globally and regionally.
- (7) The ICCD should impress upon industrialized democracies of the West the importance of exerting pressure on non-democratic regimes.

In its deliberations the Seminar considered a background paper on "The Prospects for Democracy in Black Africa", which reviewed the theory and practice of democracy in the region since independence. A second paper on "Democracy and Development" discussed the importance of social, political and economic development to the existence and practice of democracy and ways in which an Association of Democracies could facilitate development. A final paper on "Democracy in Developing Countries" highlighted the problem of ethnicity, class and the state as they relate to competition and maintenance of political power.

Participants in the regional seminar welcomed the open invitation to consider adherence to the ICCD.

Summary Record of Discussion

The following record was prepared by the appointed rapporteur of the Seminar's proceeding Dr. Raj Mathur, Senior Lecturer at the University of Mauritius.

It summarizes under various topical headings the matters discussed and reflects the most salient observations made by the participants. As could be expected, individual observations were not always unanimously supported. The agreed position of the Seminar is set forth in the Final Statement.

1. Prospects for Democracy in Black Africa

The first working session of the Seminar was devoted to setting forth its purposes and discussing the background papers prepared for the Seminar (See Appendixes A, B, and C). By far the greatest emphasis was placed on the paper of Professor Odhiambo, which traces and analyzes the loss of momentum towards democratic development in the African states since independence.

1.1 Discussion of the Status of Democracy in Africa

The discussion of democracy in Africa traced the experience of African countries in relation to democratic principles and practice. This discussion included the following aspects:

- the colonial experience;
- the influence of African cultural and political factors after independence;
- the development of the one-party system;
- the role of African leaders; and
- the role of Africans attached to democratic ideals.

The point was made by one participant that freedom is an instinctive part of human nature and that it lies at the root of human nature. Freedom is not alien to African tribal societies. Admittedly in pre-colonial Africa there was no organized opposition, but nevertheless the tribal leaders were strongly controlled by the Council. African tribal Councils very often disagreed and split. Thus it is a myth to believe that the concept of opposition is alien to African values. The African states were born during a period of state intervention and were, therefore, heavily influenced by such thinking. Therefore the natural tendency was towards greater imposition of the state, in ways contrary to democratic values. The one-party system was an aspect of the concept of state intervention.

1.2 Illiteracy – The Main Impediment to Democracy

Participants noted that the level of literacy in Africa is a serious impediment to the progress and advancement of democracy. No African country can claim 80 per cent literacy. Unless education becomes the number one priority, efforts to encourage the seeds of democracy, to see that they grow and to help those who believe in democracy, will take a long time to materialize. Since education is the primary objective of any democracy, the ICCD could do well to promote education. It was suggested that to defend democracy one has to be educated and that the ICCD should, accordingly, encourage efforts to educate the population on dangers of losing freedom.

However, education raises the expectations of the people for white-collar jobs; unless economic development keeps pace with the rise in the level of education, it would lead to frustration. Accordingly, the education which is promoted should not concentrate on producing PhDs; rather it should help to create awareness of democratic values, of patriotism, and of an understanding of the meaning of freedom and democratic institutions. While it is difficult for democracy to flourish, given the present low level of literacy, political parties are in a privileged position to bring about an awareness of democratic ideals through political education. However, education alone is not sufficient; there is also the corresponding necessity of economic development.

The task of democrats is a difficult one because some governments feel that certain ideas should not be spread as they might lead to social agitation and the disruption of society. These governments consider that the priority of priorities is economic development. Furthermore, ordinary people are easily persuaded that government knows best what is in the people's interests.

1.3 Respect for Minority Rights

The conferees noted that democracy is not a zero-sum game in which winner takes all. Democracy can better be promoted in a homogeneous society where, despite the cleavages of interest that may exist, there is a community of feeling. Democracy implies built in checks and balances to safeguard the rights of the minorities, whether they be communal or ethnic. Democracy means real respect for fundamental rights and freedoms, for the rule of law, for an independent judiciary. Participants felt that over and above the insertion of these rights in the Constitution, there must be some safeguards to ensure that in reality they will be respected.

Democracy means sharing power, respect for the aspirations and the rights of the minorities. It implies mutual tolerance and an awareness of minority

sensibilities. While democracy means majority rule, due regard must be paid to the protection of minorities. It should not, however, go to the other extreme whereby minority dictatorships are established over the majority.

1.4 Absence of Democratic Leaders

Discussion then turned to some of the discouraging prospects for democracy in Africa. One of the principal obstacles to democracy in Africa is that few leaders are themselves believers in democracy and democratic values. While a constitution may be "democratic", enshrining democratic values, the leaders themselves often do not share a commitment to such democratic ideals.

Mere forms, such as a multi-party system and periodic elections, are not in themselves sufficient guarantees that democratic principles will flourish. In certain one-party systems, there may be more democracy than in some multi-party systems. Indeed, in certain one-party systems democratic practices may be quite advanced, with a multiplicity of candidates taking part in the national elections or the elections of the party leaders, where in multi-party systems there may be persistent and effective abuse of the rights of the opposing parties.

The colonial experience of Africa has led some respected African leaders to frown on democracy, viewing it as a neocolonialist concept. It is therefore important to educate the people, to make them understand that democracy is not a neo-colonialist concept, nor another form of colonialism, but rather that it leads to an improvement in their quality of life. The emergence of military regimes in Africa is due primarily to the lack of respect for democratic institutions and, therefore, for democracy.

The concepts that one wishes to see in a democratic society are freedom of movement, freedom of thought, freedom to develop materially, intellectually and morally, and freedom to live a fuller life. The democratic countries have a moral duty to give firm support to the little voices striving for democratic values under less democratic regimes. The ICCID's main task should be to help the development of freedoms inside any political system – be it one party or multi-party. The ruling elite must be encouraged to overcome its fear of the opposition.

2. Development: Africa's Main Preoccupation

Some participants noted that the concept of development, like democracy, is a foreign implantation in Africa. As a goal, development was deemed appropriate by newly emerging countries, following the examples and precepts set largely by Western nations. However, African countries are struggling hard for development not merely to pursue some foreign notion or to

seek status, but in order to provide a better life for their people. The concept of development, as we know it today, is usually associated with the world's capitalist system which encourages production along capitalist lines. Even though it is seen in this world-wide context, the concept of development is popular because it means increased growth, increased wealth and therefore an improvement in the standard of living of the people. The whole exercise of government power is, very often, geared towards such developmental goals.

Democracy is not necessarily synonymous with development; there are other forms of development. However, the participants did believe that democracy leads to a more fruitful and lasting type of development.

2.1 Internal and External Factors

On the internal plane, the consensus was that democracy is the best way to achieve development. Thus the government's main preoccupation must be to create understanding, confidence and trust. People should be free to express themselves. They should have a sense of personal security.

Internally two methods are possible, namely free enterprise and state bureaucracy. It is too simple to say that free enterprise is good and bureaucracy is bad. Free enterprise, it must be conceded, does contain certain seeds of abuse and therefore the interference of the state is, at times, justified. One cannot leave the running of public services in the hands of the private sector. On the other hand, the government should not believe that it can produce growth better than the private sector. A fair balance must be struck between the public and the private sector.

It was further noted that African nations inherited governments around which everything happens, revolves and evolves, a situation that has persisted since independence. People turn to the government to provide jobs, and expect the government to do practically everything - to develop the economy, to provide the social services, to find jobs for the school-leavers. It is difficult for democracy to thrive in such an environment. For democracy to flourish, there should be less state intervention in the economic life of the nation. The private sector should be left the responsibility for things that it can do best to promote growth and development. The government itself cannot produce growth. Growth can only come from the efforts of the people and their efforts thrive best in the private sector.

On the external front, the Third World countries are in a state of utter helplessness and have no influence over the world monetary system. In this age of high technology, the educational institutions of the indus-

industrialized world are largely closed to the developing world because of the prohibitive costs of education. The Third World produces the products, but has no control over their prices, which are completely dependent on which country will import what products and at what price. While appreciative of the amount of aid coming from the industrialized world, Africans would like to see more meaningful aid given to Third World countries in a form that will allow them to produce and sell their products at a reasonable price. A healthier development of their economy would ensue. The primary ills of the international economic system are due to the unequal exchanges between the developed and the underdeveloped world - the exorbitant interest rates, the exchange rates of the international currencies, and the unfair terms of trade. Third World countries do not want prevailing types of aid. They want the technology of the developed world and better terms of trade.

2.2 Aid Relationship

It was stated that the relationship between the North and the South is an aid relationship. Aid has become the main instrument of foreign policy of the North. There is, in the ICCD concepts, an opportunity to revise this relationship. Effective assistance can be given in a direct way which by-passes the government-to-government basis. Assistance can be provided to groups and individuals instead of governments. The ICCD proposals can be used to help transform not only the relationship, but also the nature of development cooperation as a whole. The new relationship must be based on trust. It cannot be effective among countries which are suspicious of one another. It can only take place among countries which agree on fundamental principles. Cooperation among democracies could provide a golden opportunity to transform the whole relationship between donors and recipients.

2.3 Development Without the People

Twenty-five years after independence, when various political systems and ideologies have been tried in Africa, it is sad to observe that the continent is still static. It is confronted by grave economic problems, social upheavals, and heavy indebtedness vis-a-vis the industrialized world. The rural population is further impoverished and the conditions of living have, as a whole, deteriorated.

The deterioration in the living conditions of the population has come about mainly because people are not involved enough in development plans. The plans are conceived by the leaders who decide what is good for the people. The modalities of international aid and cooperation are

decided in the great capitals of the industrialized countries -- London, Washington and Paris. In all these decisions the people are absent. This, perhaps, explains why the remedies prescribed by the IMF and the World Bank -- especially, the reduction in public expenditure -- have brought social unrest in many third-world countries.

It must be realized that development can only come about with the cooperation and, therefore, consent of the people. In the new strategy for development, governments should go to the people. Development can only succeed if the people cooperate and the people will only cooperate if their needs are taken care of.

3. The ICCD Proposals

The Regional Seminar reviewed the ICCD recommendations made a year ago at the Wingspread Conference.

3.1 Cooperation Among People

Participants felt that the ICCD should favor new forms of cooperation to bring direct contact not only among governments but also among peoples. Once democracy is realized, other developments will follow in its trail. The countries which will constitute the proposed Inter-governmental Association of Democracies should be genuinely democratic. In countries which are not democratic, private individuals could benefit from and relate to the proposed International Institute for Democracy. Part of the role of the Institute should be to inform the people about the state of democracy prevailing in their respective countries. The ICCD should be a network of people who subscribe to the ideals and values of democracy. Thus ICCD can promote the concepts of freedom and democracy at the level of the citizen.

The view was expressed that the Association of Democracies should involve not only nations but also individuals. While we must strive towards an association of nations, we must not forget that it is people we are trying to unite. Some urged that membership in the Association be extended on a personal basis as this would facilitate dealings with the democratic elements in countries which are not democratic or sufficiently democratic. It was further noted that the Institute could facilitate interchange among intellectual elements in less developed countries. It was recognized, however, that to avoid being considered purely as a debating club, the support of the governments must be enlisted.

3.2 Intergovernmental Association of Democracies

The main problem with an Intergovernmental Association of Democracies is that all countries, irrespective of the nature of their regimes, would like to join such an Association, for fear of being ranked as anti-democratic. There would, certainly, be no difficulty in creating the Association and having it accepted by the majority of the African states, since very few African countries would like to be singled out as non-democratic. The problem is to determine the basis for membership. It was suggested that once the Association had been formed by like-minded democratic countries, the various member governments would then have to work out the basis for deciding on membership.

3.3 Foreign Intervention

It was suggested that the great democracies should assist voices of freedom in Africa and that they should give moral support to individuals striving for the respect of individual rights and liberties in their respective countries. It was admitted, however, that such actions and support could easily be construed as being 'interference' in the national affairs of the countries concerned. Nevertheless, the consensus was that, by its very nature, the Association would provide support for the voices within a country which are fighting for the respect of individual rights and freedoms.

3.4 Dictatorships and the Association of Democracies

The importance of reaching groups even in countries where dictatorship prevails was stressed. Although in dictatorships it would be difficult to set up pro-democracy groups, membership could be organized on an individual basis. Individuals could contact the ICCD even though they might be in exile. The ICCD should be in touch with these 'democratically-inclined' people. It would have to be made clear, however, that as members of the ICCD these democratically inclined persons were not a subversive organization aiming at overthrowing the government but that their basic goals were rather to promote democracy and democratic ideals.

3.5 Violations of Human Rights

The participants agreed that the Association should address itself to gross violations of human rights. The aim should be to sensitize world opinion and attitudes on any abuses that might exist in their region. The reports of Amnesty International, which highlights countries where human rights are not respected, are not treated with indifference by incriminated governments. The type of actions taken by Amnesty Inter-

national should, therefore, inspire the Association. There was also a suggestion that the Association should publish an annual report on the state of democracy in the world. It was pointed out that the book of Dr. R.D. Gastil, Vice-President of CCD-USA, which is updated every year, could be useful for that purpose.

3.6 Economic Co-Management

One member moved that besides seeking to "help new and struggling democracies, arrange for exchanges of democratic experience, promote free and pluralistic communications and media, further human rights, consider the impact of economic and social problems on democratic systems, combat terrorism and act as a forum for the resolution of mutual problems," the Association should also study the practical possibilities for a system of economic co-management to deal with economic problems. Co-management implies joint management of the problems affecting the member countries. The Association should aim at improving the economic relationship between the partners.

3.7 Combating International Terrorism

The PREFACE proposal relating to terrorism reads that the "democracies be urged to improve cooperation to combat violations of human rights, social and economic injustice, and international terrorism." Fears were expressed that international terrorism might be construed to include revolutionary movements in exile, and reassurance was sought that the reference was not intended to apply to revolutionary movements, such as those in exile fighting apartheid in South Africa.

3.8 Consultative Group at the UN

The PREFACE proposals also recommended "The formation of a Consultative Group of Democracies at the United Nations and other international organizations, as appropriate. Such groups should aim to harmonize views and, when possible, to concert action on selected issues, but it would be understood that participants shall not be bound to act in accordance with any consensus and would remain free to voice different positions." While it was agreed that the formation of a consultative group of democracies at the UN and other international organizations could be effective, the priority of the Association of Democracies should be to develop an identity first before trying to influence the United Nations. Since many UN issues are regionalized, it would be better initially to defer action in the UN.

3.9 Conference of Parliamentarians

It is generally admitted that for an Association of this nature to be effective, it has to involve governments. Members present agreed to use their influence within their own countries on their respective governments and on their parliamentarians in order to convince them to abide by democratic values. The PREFACE proposal that "a conference of parliamentarians and other influential persons from all practicing democracies be convened as soon as feasible to consider these and similar proposals with a view to recommending action by their governments" was considered. Institutions like the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association, the Lomé Convention and L'Association des Parlementaires de Langue Française could be used to start discussions with a view to forming a little group of interested parliamentarians. Thereafter, a Conference of Parliamentarians could be convened with a view to encouraging governments to take note of the seminar's recommendations and ultimately act upon them.

3.10 Regional African Organization

In Africa, regional organization should start at any private level -- academic, private citizens, parliamentarians. Initially private groups of citizens with a well defined objective could be set up. These small Committees for a Community of Democracies (CCDs) would report to the ICCD. These CCDs, which are expected to be very strong citizen groups, could sensitize the politicians. Only at a later stage would inter-governmental groups be formed.

3.11 CCD Courier

Notice was also taken of the recommendations made in a signed article in the Courier of April 1986 (which did not necessarily reflect the views of CCD-USA) that an Association of Democracies was needed in order to:

- "(1) Mediate between governments and oppositions that do not trust one another to conduct the transitions to democracy peacefully;
- (2) Inspect election processes and validate the results of properly conducted elections;
- (3) Arrange asylum for officials who are willing to go gracefully when they see they are losing, but who fear for their safety."

These recommendations were considered to be much too far-reaching. It was felt that *mediating* between governments and oppositions, *inspect-*

...ing election results and *validating* the same, and arranging for *political asylum* were outside ICCD's competence.

4. Prof. Odhiambo's Recommendations

Prof. Odhiambo's recommendations as set out in his paper "The Prospects for Democracy in Black Africa" were unanimously approved by the participants. These recommendations can be summarized as follows:

- (1) Organize CCD branches in all countries.
- (2) Encourage voluntary organizations in the democracies to communicate with their counterparts in Africa.
- (3) Support individuals and institutions which are actively engaged in the quest for democracy – e.g. individuals, groups and institutions who are in peril for articulating democratic ideas.
- (4) Support human rights.
- (5) Encourage UN Committees opposing all forms of discrimination.
- (6) Hold regular conventions on the principles of democracy in Africa.

5. Seminar's Conclusions and Recommendations

The official Final Statement of the Seminar was approved after thorough discussion.

RAJ MATHUR,
Rapporteur of the Seminar
University of Mauritius,
Reduit,
MAURITIUS.
21.7.86

Communique

The first Regional Seminar of The International Committee for a Community of Democracies was held in Mauritius, May 6 - 8, 1986 under the chairmanship of Sir Harold Walter. There were participants from Botswana, Cameroon, Gambia, Kenya, Mauritius, Senegal, Fiji, Jamaica, United Kingdom and the United States. The Regional Seminar discussed the concepts, theory, and practice of democracy on the African continent.

In reviewing the recommendations of the first ICCD International Conference held at Wingspread, Wisconsin, U.S.A. in 1985 under the chairmanship of Amb. Samuel De Palma, the Seminar -

- 1) strongly endorsed the immediate creation of an International Institute for Democracy, and the eventual establishment of an Association of Democracies at an intergovernmental level;
- 2) adopted the Wingspread resolution on combating violations of human rights and socio-economic deprivations and encouraged intensified cooperation in the elimination of international terrorism and discriminatory policies such as apartheid;
- 3) strongly supported the formation of international working groups of experts that will meet from time to time to review and assess the condition of democracy in the region and make recommendations thereon for broad dissemination; and
- 4) supported the Wingspread proposal for formation of private citizen groups that can promote education on democratic values and principles in their respective countries and establish cooperative contact with similar groups in the region and worldwide.

The Seminar made several recommendations for the implementation in Africa of the foregoing proposals. They are:

- 1) CCD branches of private citizens should be established in all countries in the region where feasible;
- 2) There should be greater contact and communication among voluntary organizations throughout Africa in order to raise and increase the level of consciousness on the meaning, practice and advantages of life in democratic systems;
- 3) ICCD should encourage and support individuals, groups and institutions in the region working for democratic ideals;
- 4) ICCD and its local chapters should support organizations fighting abuses of human rights and help publicize their findings;

- 5) The CCDs should oppose all forms of discrimination be they racial, ethnic or religious;
- 6) ICCD should continue to organize and hold conferences on democracy both globally and regionally; and
- 7) ICCD should impress upon industrialized democracies of the West the importance of exerting pressure on non-democratic regimes.

In closing, the Seminar expressed its deep appreciation to Prime Minister Jugnauth and the Government of Mauritius for its warm welcome and gracious hospitality, to the University of Mauritius for its outstanding cooperation, and to Sir Harold Walter for his thoughtful preparation for the Seminar.

8th May, 1986

Participants

BOTSWANA	Ms. Clara Olson, <i>Member of Parliament</i> Mr. B.C. Nthume, <i>Vice-Chairman, Botswana Federation of Trade Unions</i>
CAMEROON	Mr. Ben Muna, <i>Lawyer</i>
GAMBIA	Mr. Amadu Samba, <i>Ministry of Justice</i> Haji Dembo Jatta, <i>Deputy Speaker of Parliament</i>
KENYA	Ms. Rose Waruhiu, <i>Member of Parliament</i> Dr. N. Nyangira, <i>Head of Political Science Department, University of Nairobi</i>
MAURITIUS	Sir Harold Walker, <i>Kt., Q.C.</i> , Sir Hamid Moolan, <i>Q.C.</i> Mr. Marc David, <i>Q.C.</i>
SENEGAL	Mr. F. Ndiaye, <i>Secretary-General PSD</i>
FIJI	Mr. James M. Ah Koy, <i>Member of Parliament</i>
JAMAICA	Ms. Dorothy C. Lightbourne, <i>Member of Senate</i>
U.K.	Mr. J. Leech, <i>Chairman, Rural Investment Overseas Ltd.</i> ,
U.S.A.	Mr. Robert Foulon, <i>Secretary ICCD</i> Mr. W. Robertson, <i>Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs</i> Dr. R. Gastil, <i>Vice President CCD</i>
CONFERENCE COORDINATORS	Amb. W.G. Bradford Dr. Sydney Moutia

Selected Seminar Document

A. Letter of Invitation from Prime Minister Jugnauth

Port Louis,
Mauritius

The Honourable Anerood Jugnauth, Q.C., M.L.A.,
Prime Minister

4th October, 1985

Dear Mr. De Palma,

My very good friend and colleague at the Bar, Sir Harold Walter has introduced me to the International Committee for a Community of Democracies and I am indeed impressed by the objectives of the Committee. I am particularly pleased that the committee has initiated a programme to promote greater solidarity and cooperation among the democratic countries of the world. Mauritius, I am proud to say, is an example of a living democracy and my Government will leave no stone unturned to see to it that the ideals of democracy are upheld.

I am advised by Sir Harold that you are programming a seminar to be held in March 1986 which is intended to be probably the first regional seminar. I note with satisfaction that your aim is to elicit African views on the subject of democracy and to ask Africans to consider how the Planned Association of Democracies and the International Institute for Democracy might best function to assist African countries in democratic development along lines appropriate for Africa.

We are glad that you are inclined towards Mauritius as a venue for the seminar and are proposing to delegate US Ambassador William G. Bradford to visit Mauritius in the course of an African tour.

As far as Mauritius is concerned the following facilities may be offered –

- (i) the Auditorium of the University of Mauritius; and
- (ii) appropriate support from the University of Mauritius itself.

The Government, however, will not in any way, be financially committed in the holding of the seminar. It is hoped that with the help of Sir Harold and other friends it will be possible for the Committee to mobilize the necessary resources for the holding of the seminar in Mauritius.

I wish to thank Sir Harold Walter for having introduced me to your Committee and I express the hope of having the pleasure of meeting you and other members of your Committee in the near future.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Sir Harold.

With kind regards,

Yours sincerely,

Anerood Jugnauth
Prime Minister

Mr. Samuel de Palma
President

International Committee for a Community of Democracies,
Suite 310
1725 DeSales Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
U.S.A.

Copy to:-

Harold Walter, Kt
Chambers
Port Louis

Selected Seminar Document

B. Opening Address of Prime Minister Jugnauth

It gives me great pleasure to be here this morning and I thank the organizers, and particularly Sir Harold Walter, for having given me the honour of opening this welcome Seminar, the theme of which "Towards Democratic Solidarity", is as stimulating as it is of enduring interest.

I note with satisfaction that the aim of the International Committee for a Community of Democracies is to elicit African views on the subject of democracy and to ask Africans to consider how the planned Association of Democracies and the International Institute for Democracy might best function to assist African countries in democratic development along lines appropriate in Africa.

May I say how glad we are to have our distinguished visitors among us. I sincerely hope you will find discussions and talks useful and your stay in democratic Mauritius interesting as well as enjoyable. Though you have come from countries which may differ in their political objectives and systems, you are united in fostering the rule of people. You know that the laws you make can command obedience only to the extent that they embody high principles and secure the people's welfare.

Mauritius is a sovereign democratic state, and I am sure that the choice of Mauritius as a venue -- and we are justly proud of this choice -- has been motivated by your knowledge and appreciation of our country as a striking example of a genuinely living democracy.

Our country owes an eternal debt of gratitude to the Father of the Nation, the late and beloved Sir Seewoosagur Ramgoolam, and to his fellow freedom-fighters, among whom Sir Harold Walter himself, and our respected Governor-General, Sir Veerasamy Ringadoo, for having won independence, and with it, freedom and dignity, without a single drop of blood. The ballot box for us is a supreme, sacred and eternal value.

The Father of the Nation also achieved for our country the beautiful miracle of peaceful co-existence, with unity in the richness and splendour of diversity, with tolerance and the brotherhood of man as two undying values.

Our Constitution guarantees human rights and offers protection for minorities. It is the solid foundation of all our democratic institutions which my democratically-elected Government has been preserving with utmost vigour. Free elections and free press, freedom of conscience and of associ-

ation, freedom of movement, -- all these and others are a testimony that Mauritius, a sophisticated country, has very successfully withstood the transitional period from colonial status to independence, and, in its maturity and adulthood, has successfully been operating a truly democratic system. Our independent judiciary is a safeguard for our citizens and adds to the overall joy of our people to live, grow and progress in a country where freedom is not simply a word bandied about and used in a lip-service exercise or as a cosmetic or window-dressing stratagem. In Mauritius freedom is freedom. It is genuine. It is forever.

In our modern society, however, freedom cannot be the unrestricted play of individualism not the apotheosis of private interests and private enterprise as against *social interest* and the *public good*. Freedom lies in a delicate and continuous balancing of the rights of the *individual* with the rights of *society*.

We gained our freedom after long and hard years of suffering and sacrifice. Naturally, our concern must be to preserve and strengthen it and to give it content. We are certainly not prepared to abdicate our judgement of right or wrong in terms of our own assessment, or to abandon our right of action as a sovereign nation. We concentrate on our development, free from outside interference. On matters affecting the international community, we do express our own opinion. We believe in enlarging the areas of peace and reconciliation. We are deeply convinced that the world can survive and progress *not* by conflict but only through meaningful cooperation.

As the late Shrimati Indira Gandhi said --

"The world is too complex and diverse to be fitted into any neat pattern of ideology of one kind or another. Our ancient sages have pointed out that the roads to Truth are many. Peaceful co-existence and non-interference in each other's affairs can no longer be regarded as moral injunctions but intensely practical necessities, without which international relations cannot be meaningful. We, who live as different nations, must be made conscious of what we have in common but we must also learn to accept our differences so that our very diversity contributes to the richness of life".

In the African continent, and the world over, many thinkers agree that the difficulty about democracy, not only as a concept but also as a way of life, is that countries with quite different political ideologies use the same word -- "democracy" -- to describe their respective systems.

In fact, democracy expresses both *principles* and, as Professor K.A. Busia said in his book "Africa in search of Democracy" *principles* which those who believe in democracy wish to be given practical expression in the laws and institutions of society; and *ideals* which provide goals towards which men in society should constantly aspire for the betterment of society.

Democracy is founded on respect for the human being -- every human being. As professor Busia puts it --

“Respect for the dignity of man carries other implications besides the principle that the dignity of all men should be equally respected. Democracy has other values which derive from the same source. Every man, according to democratic belief, should have certain civil liberties without which no social order can be characterised as democratic”.

We in Mauritius pride ourselves of being a truly democratic country. Our people love and enjoy peace, tranquility, and freedom. And we, as a Government, shall leave no stone unturned to consolidate our democratic institutions and values, and to enhance our democratic way of life and living.

I have great faith in Mauritius, I have great faith in Africa. Africa needs peace, the friendly hand of aid of the peoples of all parts of the world to travel the thrilling road to economic prosperity, social progress and democracy. But to build a modern, prosperous and just society for the African in Africa, the African must find his own *soul*.

The youth of Mauritius, the youth of Africa believe that the future belongs to them. African youth have faith in Africa's greatness. The late Dr. R.E.G. Armattoe in one of his poems "They Tell Me You are True" expressed his faith in Africa in these words:

"Come peace or come war,
Come love, life or death,
In splendid array and glamour
I'll remain steadfast in my Faith".

Ladies and Gentlemen, it gives me great pleasure to declare this Seminar open, and to wish it all the success it deserves.

Selected Seminar Document

C. Greetings From Prime Minister of Jamaica

I take this opportunity to send greetings on behalf of the Government and people of Jamaica, an assurance of our support for the objectives you pursue and sincere wishes for the success of the efforts you make towards building and strengthening an International Community for Democracies. Your meeting today and all the efforts that have been made in this regard since 1979 acknowledge the need, in a world of growing complexity, for linkages between the people who believe in the principles of democracy.

It has been the disadvantage in the past that we assumed the virtues of our philosophy to be self-evident and thus not needing to be promoted among men and nations. We assumed a common understanding without building it on communication and an exchange of ideas; and since the Second World War and lately in the decade of the seventies we have seen the growth of the illusion that basic human needs might be met and human rights given full expression in systems that place no premium on the dignity of man and that sacrifice the freedom of the individual to the power of the state. The result of these experiments has been to increase human misery, to destroy life, liberty and happiness and it has created a reaction in favour of democracy which we are seeing in the decade of the eighties. On several political fronts in the world today dictatorships of the left and right are on the retreat and the forces of democracy are advancing. We have welcomed back to the family of the democracies Spain, Portugal, El Salvador and Grenada, Brazil, Argentina and Uruguay, and more recently the people of the Philippines and Haiti have been given hope of achieving democratic government.

We need to strengthen and encourage these developments through greater international solidarity among the people that believe in democracy and that it is the challenge that faces this Committee. We need the proposed International Institute that may strengthen the institutions and procedures of democratic government and we need to encourage the development of citizens groups which are the very foundations of democracy.

I am sure that you are aware of other initiatives that have been pursued in the world movement for democracy; of the International Democrat Union (IDU), and lately the Caribbean Democrat Union (CDU), which was formed in January of this year and which I have the honour to lead. At some point the efforts of democratic organizations must converge and that convergence will have a tremendous bearing on the future; the possibility of making the

eighties the Decade for the Democracies and of making the freedom of the individual the great principle that the 20th century endorses over to the 21st.

EDWARD SEAGA

May 2, 1986.

Selected Seminar Document

D. Address by Sir Harold Walter

It befalls upon me as the Mauritian Vice President of the International Committee for a Community of Democracies to welcome you this morning, and to thank you for having graced by your presence the official opening of our African Regional Seminar by the Prime Minister, the Honourable Anerood Jugnauth.

In the introduction which I have been called upon to make before the Prime Minister addresses us it would be useful to recall that we are gathered here to-day in the first regional seminar which the ICCD has called since its establishment just over a year ago in April 1985. Then a group of private citizens of countries ranging from India to Fiji through Jamaica, Australia, the United Kingdom, the United States, France and Sweden amongst others agreed to make a call for an Association of Democracies.

To attain that objective a conference of all democracies would be called in 1987, and to ensure success of that conference with adequate participation and voicing of opinions from various parts of the world and from all forms of practicing democracies, regional seminars would be held. Others will follow in Asia, in Latin America, in the Pacific, and in Europe.

We are not therefore judging democracies, and our invitation has reached individuals in all the countries where the people directly, or by their representatives, participate in the governing of their country. At this stage we have taken an active part in the support of the democratic principles by which the governments of their respective countries act.

Because democracies exist under all stages of economic development and also because the industrial development which we in the Third World are experiencing now took place in the developed countries over a century ago under different circumstances, it was important to relate democracy to development. And because development cannot be the result of actions taken in isolation, the theme for our seminar is "Democratic Development and Solidarity".

May I be allowed, Honourable Prime Minister, on the morning when you are going to face the supreme test of a parliamentary democracy -- a vote of no confidence in parliament -- may I be allowed to stress that there are no two democracies identical in their approach to the administration of the form of society which they have chosen. It is thus a mean exercise to try to compare systems and then to write about democratic principle being trampled. If democracies are not identical, they have similarities, and not-

withstanding any definition one may care to give to democracy, one finds everywhere that inherited class distinctions in the exercise of power tend to disappear and the will of the people, with an evident respect for minority views, takes pride of place.

One may well ask what is development if it is not what the people want? Although we talk of the people we never forget that we are talking about a mass of individuals, not in their search for material gain alone but also in their intellectual and spiritual search for advancement. Democratic development is thus the natural form of development, being the collective wish of the people as a result of their individual expression of their freedom to think and act.

It is not an easy process to transform the wish of the people into reality. Now more than ever, with the means of communications by radio and television enhanced by satellites, wishes are no longer dreams. They relate to the daily reality in some other part of the world, not always materially more fortunate, to have enterprising and pioneering people working in an environment conducive to attainment of individual objectives within the framework of the general advancement of the community.

Such communities need support; in a world more than ever dependent on trade, solidarity takes a special meaning. If we all try to produce everything we need, then we shall be fast approaching what we dread most: barriers to trade. For historical as well as for geographical and climate reasons we in Mauritius have a pattern of agricultural, and now industrial, production which makes us very dependent on a healthy trade environment for continued democratic development.

Our African brothers and sisters here to-day will probably tell us just as much about the risks which their chosen types of development run if the products of their efforts fetch prices which are increasingly insufficient to meet the minimum requirements of a healthy development. The terms of trade, the barriers to trade, are not just hiccups in the North-South dialogue; they are rather a lack of solidarity between partners in the exercise of democracy.

In the manifestations of terrorism we have seen lately, the targets and victims were mainly the western democracies. We have also seen that they have the means and the will to fight terrorism and there has been an expression of solidarity amongst all peace-loving and freedom-loving people of the world. Yet when it comes to the terrorism of the powerful in world-trade, might becomes alarmingly right. If our seminar could convey the thought that the development of democracy is not just a political exercise, in which human rights and values are paid lip service and no more, but an active involvement in the maximisation of the human values and the physical resources of countries through non-oppressive means, then we would have gone some way to stress the need for solidarity in providing those countries

with means, and with the unfettered right, to trade rather than with the provision of continuous aid alone.

To chart us on our possible routes on the way to Democratic Development and Solidarity we have called on some eminent Africans to guide us. Unfortunately not all of them have been able to be with us for the seminar, but we can rejoice at the presence of those who made the journey. We are also thankful to no less eminent personalities from other parts of the world who have come to share with us their experiences. The discussions we shall be having would not have been possible but for the interest which the Prime Minister has shown right from the start on the forms of democracies which might best suit our continent. May I on behalf of ICCD express our thanks to him who has kindly agreed to be with us in spite of his heavy commitments.

Our thanks are also due to the University of Mauritius whose collaboration is of great importance. That the Pro-Chancellor, who I understand is a front line speaker in the motion of no-confidence I referred to earlier, should be addressing us later is evidence of how highly he and the University regard the practice of democracy and the urgency of development.

Before I conclude, may I say that ICCD is not a league of some people sharing the same views against others with different views. Democracy, by any definition, cannot be against people. It does not have a negative approach to the solution of problems. On the contrary it is essentially positive: it is for participation of the people; it is for freedom of thought, of speech, of the individual and his numerous rights and for the freedom to participate in the government of his country. Those who choose to see in a community of democracies some anti-league have confessed to their opposition to democratic principles. They are dangerous people, but they will not deter us in our search for freedom for all the peoples of Africa and the solidarity we shall express with all oppressed people in their fight for justice and for democratic rule.

I shall end in wishing all our visitors a pleasant stay in our island. I would like also to apologize for any failings in our hospitality, but may I assure them that we highly appreciate their coming to us, and we shall do our best to satisfy their wishes as an expression of our solidarity.

Selected Seminar Document

**E. Statement By
Chairman ICCD
Amb. Samuel De Palma**

I would like first to express our gratitude to the Prime Minister and the Government of Mauritius for their warm welcome and most helpful assistance to the International Committee for a Community of Democracies in arranging for this African Regional Seminar about democracy and the prospect for improved ties and cooperation among practicing democracies and democrats worldwide.

I am particularly disappointed in having had to cancel at the last moment my plans to be with you. The more I learned about Mauritius, the more I looked forward to visiting this interesting and beautiful country which is such an outstanding example of how democracy can work. And I had particularly wished to attend the first of the four regional seminars which were planned last year by the ICCD when it was formed at our first international meeting at Wingspread in Wisconsin.

The purpose of these seminars is three fold.

FIRST, while we are proposing broad world-wide means for cooperation among democracies, we wish very much to take full account of regional differences of a cultural or historical nature in applying democratic principles, in designing these means and working toward them. Indeed, there may be good reason to consider the need for specific regional arrangements or efforts.

SECOND, we hope to obtain your recommendations on the structure and functioning of the new mechanisms of cooperation proposed last year by the ICCD, including particularly the formation of an Intergovernmental Association (or Forum) of Democracies and an International Institute for Democracy. Your recommendations here will be taken fully into account by the other regional seminars in Latin America and Caribbean, in Europe, and in the Asia-Pacific area as well as by a large private conference of all democracies that we hope to be able to convene in the next year or two.

THIRD, we wish to expand our international network of private citizens working in support of democracy and democratic cooperation.

In expressing these goals, let me stress that we in the ICCD do not intend our efforts to be anti any country or group. We hope to work for the positive goals of democratic values and human rights and to build bridges of cooperation so that democracies and democrats can achieve positive goals on the basis of shared values.

I wish to express my thanks to Sir Harold Walter for taking the lead in making arrangements for this seminar in Mauritius and chairing the meetings as the host Vice Chairman of the ICCD. In doing so, Sir Harold is continuing the important role he played in the success of our meeting at Wingspread.

Lastly, I wish you every success in this important and ambitious endeavor. We trust your meeting will lead to future constructive efforts not only in Africa but everywhere. On that note, I hope before long to meet all of you and we all look forward to future joint efforts.

Selected Seminar Document

African Views on Democracy
Typed by: H. Greene
Edited By:
Date: 12/1/86
File: 28
Fonts: 28,29,30,31
Page: 76

F. Letter From William Robertson

United States Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520

June 11, 1986

Mr. Samuel De Palma
President
Committee for a Community of Democracies - USA
1725 DeSales St. N.W. - Suite 310
Washington, D.C. 20036

Dear Mr. De Palma,

This letter is a followup to the June 6 meeting I held with William Bradford, Robert Foulon, and you, concerning the African Regional Seminar in Mauritius, May 6 - 8. As I said in our meeting, I found the seminar to be a very positive event. The participants, though small in number, coalesced into an excellent and effective working group which accomplished a great deal in just a few days.

The men and women associated with the seminar appeared genuinely interested in building a strong foundation towards democracy in Africa. They did not reject democracy as a western concept, acknowledging that such a system could take hold in a number of developing nations.

I concur with your assessment that the onus to pursue the recommendations made in Mauritius should remain with the African delegates. Working with these distinguished individuals on a private level, rather than in an official governmental capacity, should prove to be the best method of pursuing democratic principles in Africa. I hope to work with each one of them again, as I now consider them friends as well as associates.

Should you or any members of your organization require assistance in the seminar followup activities, please don't hesitate to contact me. I also look forward to meeting with Cameroonian delegate Ben Muna during his upcoming July visit to the U.S.

Respectfully,

William B. Robertson
Deputy Assistant Secretary
for African Affairs

Background Paper

A. The Prospects for Democracy in Black Africa
by Atieno Odhiambo, Ph.D.
Senior Lecturer, History Department,
Nairobi University, Kenya

African Views on Democracy
Typed by: H. Greene
Edited By:
Date: 12/1/86
File: 29
Fonts: 28,29,30,31
Page: 78-81

1. The Historical Background

The Second World War marks a special turning point in the political history of Africa, for it was during this war that African soldiers were awakened to the free world's concern with such potentially liberating ideas as Democracy, Freedom, and Self-Determination. These soldiers, fighting as British or French subjects in imperial armies, had initially been recruited to fight to defend "Empires". It was the rhetoric of Churchill and Roosevelt that injected the new vocabulary into their discourse. The educated ones amongst them listened carefully, and drew their own conclusions for their individual colonies: they would demand these very values when peacetime came. Meanwhile, the educated civilians, intelligentsia and students alike, were also independently coming to the same conclusion as they listened to the radio broadcasts and read newspapers in the towns of Africa and in the university corridors in France, Britain, and the U.S.A. The Four Freedoms applied to their countries too. This group also bided their time, waiting for peacetime so as to begin their struggle for independence. In winter 1945, some of them like Kwame Nkrumah and Jomo Kenyatta from Africa, and Marcus Garvey and George Padmore from the western hemisphere, held a meeting in Manchester, Great Britain — the Fifth Pan African Conference — and made a pledge to fight politically for the freedom of Africa, with the aim of attaining full independence. The era of decolonization had begun.

The period between 1945 and 1960 then, spans the decolonization era. It also constitutes the first period of the history of Democracy in Africa. During this period, the majority of African colonies moved from being colonies ruled by unrepresentative aliens into full sovereignty. From 1884, the year of the partition of Africa in Berlin by the Western Powers, to 1945, the African had lost his power, his freedom, his sovereignty. The era of decolonization reversed this position and by its end restored dignity to the erstwhile subjects. And this restoration took place under the umbrella of Democracy. These years from 1946 to 1960 witnessed the formation and organization

of political parties, many of which insisted indeed on calling themselves democratic parties: like Houphouet-Boigny's Rassemblement Democratique Africain in West Africa, and Benedicto Kiwanuka's Democratic Party in Uganda. These parties committed themselves to the *electoral* process, competing with one another for *majority* votes. They furthermore urged for *One Man, One Vote*, for universal franchise that is. They accepted, too, that the elected leaders would act as their *representatives* in elected *parliaments*. And within these parliaments, one of the most binding instruments would be the *Constitution*, usually approved of by these same parliamentary assemblies. Many constitutions were also characterized by their basic concern with the *Bill of Rights*, which entrenched the rights of individuals to freedom, life and property as against the state. These constitutions then became the instruments of power which the British and the French handed over to the incoming Presidents and Prime Ministers at independence. They also constitute the beginning of the discussion of this paper.

II. The Idea of Democracy

In writing these Constitutions, the new governments were indeed joining the mainstream of an idea which has been the heritage of Western political tradition. Western democratic theory has traditionally been concerned with processes by which ordinary citizens exert a relatively high degree of control over their leaders. The classical theory of democracy is anchored in the supportive concepts of the *people*, *will*, and *consent*. Democratic government is government in which the will of the people is *sovereign*. One of the expected characteristics of a democracy in modern times is that there will be *open* competition for leadership. This competition assumes a high premium being placed on the value of *plurality* and *debate*. This form of democracy also presupposes a *consensus* about both the *means* and *ends* of society, which are the preservation of *order* for the enjoyment of *liberty*, particularly by "a strong middle class with a sufficient stake in the system to have a vested interest in the preservation of order" [Gellner, 1954: 26]. Thus it has been argued that the basic precondition for the attainment of this Western-type liberal democracy is "a cultural climate that is relatively open and tolerant" [Frankel, 1962: 46]. *Toleration* itself is a predicate of two ideational forces, on the one hand *liberty*, and on the other *democracy*. The correlation between toleration and liberty is *attitudinal*. Its correlation with democracy is *institutional*. Those who love liberty will sponsor attitudes of tolerance. And those who cherish democracy will require that public institutions exercise restraint --- i.e., tolerance --- particularly in their reception of and reaction to discordant ideas. Toleration is a species of liberty [King, 1976: 17], a species that obtains within the parameters of the conjoint rights to assemble, debate, and vote within a wider framework of competitive politics. The

essential point about the discourse on tolerance is that it accommodates an asymmetrical relationship between the rulers and the ruled. It is the appeal of the powerless to the powerful to accept democracy as the *norm*; and to accept that the powerless have a legitimate right to exercise their liberty in articulating their views. In this sense toleration is a means to a political end [King, 1976: 124] which from the *Republic* of Plato down to our times has been the pursuit of *Justice*. Toleration thus is an *instrumental* right. Evidently, its praxis assumes a consensual political arena, whose baseline is grounded on popular sovereignty.

A modern argument puts it that democracy thrives best in those societies with a "democratic civilization" [Lipson: 1964], and within a political culture which asserts that "no government is legitimate which does not derive its powers and functions from the consent of the governed" [Hallowen, 1964: 49]. This political culture, Hallowen continues, must underwrite the civil liberties, for as he argues:

"There can be no consent where there is no freedom of *speech*, of *press*, and of *assembly*. Individuals must be protected from *arbitrary* arrest and imprisonment . . . Individuals must be free to present *petitions* to the government and to ensure *publicly* their grievances. Individuals must feel secure in their persons, homes, papers and effects against unreasonable and arbitrary *searches* and *seizures* . . . There must be an impartial system to settle disputes in terms of the rule of law" (1964: 49) [My emphasis].

Furthermore, these civil liberties must be enhanced by *electoral politics* and *parliamentary* government, which must at the same time be *constitutional* government, he adds. Above all there is a moral foundation of democracy, namely moral law, which in Hallowen's terms is derived from the Judeo-Christian heritage, but in our terms must embrace all nations and cultures upon earth.

Historically, according to a leading intellectual, Western liberal democracy has had its material basis in capitalism. Seymour Martin Lipset has argued that the conditions that have made it possible for the attainment of democracy in Western Europe and North America include: an open class system, economic wealth, an equalitarian value system, a capitalist economy, literacy, and high participation in voluntary organizations [Lipset, 1969: 151-193]

It has been necessary to recapitulate the essential ingredients of Liberal Democracy because we need them to serve as a mirror image for our discussion. The claim is not that they are universally available, or even uniformly applicable. Rather the assumption is that democrats everywhere will recognize some of these ingredients as being central to democratic thought. Thus it is a mirror image with a core, a core all the more easily defined by what

it is not: it is not authoritarianism, or dictatorship, or totalitarianism. Its central concern is with political man in pursuit of his political freedom.

III. Africa's Experience, 1960 to the Present

We noted above that Africa regained her political independence through the midwifery of democracy. The masses were mobilized both to shout *Uhuru!* (Freedom!) and to describe that democracy in Abraham Lincoln's terms. "A government of the people, for the people and by the people" was recited in the public rallies as a matter of commitment and faith. Indeed Africa entered into sovereignty with both a constitutional model, which was labelled the Westminster model and a political idea, namely democracy. Much of her postcolonial experience has witnessed a perennial tussle between the two notions.

To begin with, the new regimes swore that they would adhere solemnly to the independence constitutions. But soon enough there emerged expressions of discontent from among some of the ruling regimes against the Westminster model. The early critics of this model included such heads of state as Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana and Julius Nyerere of Tanganyika (later Tanzania). In their view, the institutionalization of multiparty politics was a destabilizing factor in society, for it created factions in society at a time when what was in the national interest of the new states was national *unity*. Furthermore, oppositional parties were looked upon with suspicion in that they were deemed susceptible to infiltration by foreign interests. More specifically, these regimes saw the existence of the opposition as unnecessary, since the goals of society were, to their mind, already known and settled. At the level of theory, these pundits also argued that the idea of an opposition was culturally alien, un-African. The argument went that in precolonial Africa government business proceeded by *consensus*: "the elders sat under a tree and discussed till they agreed." So, it was averred, the new states should fall back on this heritage, because it represented the true African heritage. This fall-back was deemed as being an essential part and parcel of what became known as *African Socialism*. This notion was itself articulated to embody such African values as brotherhood, familyhood, classlessness, and a distaste for social differentiation. The call for African socialism was deemed therefore to be a process of reverting to what was best in traditional Africa, an idyllic past that eschewed competitive politics in favour of consensus.

Behind this elaborate facade lay the fact that what these exponents really aimed at was *monopoly of power*. They soon invented the One-Party State as the convenient construct for achieving this aim. The postcolonial period has witnessed the legal changeover into One-Partyism in such states as Tanzania (1965), Zambia (1968), Zaire (1972), and Kenya (1982). The argument for these moves was that One-Party Statehood consolidates unity, and

therby enhances national sovereignty, which is a prerequisite for development. The pragmatic aspect of that argument, however, obscures the fact that it is not only the opposition which is banished in Single-Party systems. The process of Single-Partyism has involved the subordination of voluntary Organizations — trade unions, professional associations, women's organizations, for example — to the Party. The combination of Party and State also tends to give the state, rather than the party itself, the upper hand in political discourse with the citizens. In the experience of Africa, such organizations as the Kenya Civil Servants Union, and the Kenya University Staff Association, have been banned by the State, not the party, at moments of discomfiture.

The argument can also be made that the liquidation of Opposition parties impoverishes Parliamentary democracy, as the single-party also endeavors to lay the limits of what is permissible for discussion both within and without the precincts of parliament. In extreme cases, but by no means rare, members of parliament have been arrested from within the precincts of parliament for articulating views deemed contrary to State policy, as happened in Kenya in 1975.

But the advocates of Single-Partyism would argue that they do remain democratic in important aspects. They would cite the fact that countries like Kenya and Tanzania regularly hold *elections*, in which the citizens freely *participate*, as is evidenced by the fact that the citizens do reject many of the previous representatives. This argument, while sound, does not take into consideration the fact that the exercise merely succeeds in distancing the candidate from the party: it is a clear case of reaffirming the hegemony of the Party.

An alternative way of looking at it is to say that the voters are achieving all this *in spite* of the regime. So part of the recommendation of this paper will be that democratic forces in the world should not abandon those voters who take great risks to exercise their political right to vote against party-approved candidates, some of whom may indeed be favourites of the regimes. It is particularly significant, too, to take note of the fact that many of these one-party regimes are actually *No Party* regimes. They are highly autoeratic One-Man shows. *Personal Rule* has easily flowed, and followed from the institutionalization of the sole party. In such countries as Malawi and Zaire, the President *has* become the Party and the Nation. Yet the citizens have not stopped yearning for the democratic idea. It is thus important that democratic forces in the world must continue maintaining an interest even in those countries where the citizens are besieged by Single-Parties or personal rule by autoocrats.

But Africa has also experienced vigorous experiments with the Multi-Party system, in such countries as Senegal, the Gambia, and Nigeria from time to time. The lessons to be learned from their experience are important for the enhancement of democracy in Africa. Taking Nigeria as an example, it

is a political culture that has genuinely been concerned during the periods of civilian rule (1960-1966, 1979-1983) with issues of freedom and democracy. The Nigerian constitution-makers of the 1976-1979 period did demonstrate that there is an intelligentsia capable of discussing and hammering-out a constitution which entrenched democratic values with conviction. The press displayed almost superpatriotic concern with the future of the nation, and the reading audience demonstrated that questions of democracy are comprehensible and close to the heart of the common man. The lesson of Nigeria, germane to all of Africa, is that the ordinary citizen yearns for democratic opportunity. It also gives the lie to the patronizing attitude in some quarters that Africa is not yet ready for democracy.

The case must also be made that the world's democratic forces need to be even more vigilant, and support democratic tendencies within those countries that live under military rule. It is significant that every coup-maker in Africa recites the denial of democratic rights as being part of the military's reasons for overthrowing a ruling regime. These plotters do cash in, in most cases, on a genuine grievance, which is why the masses initially turn out in their large numbers to celebrate the overthrow of such dictators as Sekou Toure of Guinea and Baby Doc of Haiti. The challenge lies in not allowing the in-coming juntas to cynically manipulate the democratic dreams of the masses for their own gain.

In sum, the argument so far is that there is potential for democracy in Africa, which many incumbent regimes are busy liquidating. The challenge is for the world's democrats to keep these forces constantly in view.

IV. Democracy in Africa: Possible Options

One of the salient lessons from the narrative so far is that we may not hope to reproduce all the optimum preconditions for liberal democracy as it obtains in the West within Africa. What is useful to identify is that there are *tendencies* within Africa which must be strengthened, and these tendencies will vary from country to country. There are, first, some countries where regimes open up for *popular consultation*: they bring certain issues to the masses, as the current military regime in Nigeria has done with respect to the IMF loans. Regimes which are thus disposed need to be encouraged to bring even more issues, particularly issues relating to democracy. There are, secondly, regimes which are involved in creating *democratic institutions*. The issue has been recently manifest with regard to Presidential succession in Senegal and Tanzania, where structures have been built up. Such success stories ought to be popularized. There are also regimes which from time to time emphasize the *rule of law*. These exhortations should be taken up by the world democratic community. The point is that the optimal mix will not

obtain, but beginnings must be made towards making inroads and facilitating supports.

V. What the CCDs can do

The challenge lies in creating a community of democrats under diverse African regimes. Our point of take-off must be that peoples are desirous of democracy although regimes may not favour it. So my first recommendation is that *the CCDs must not abandon the democratic forces in Africa* by focussing merely on the nature and constitutions of the incumbent regimes in individual African states. The movement must maintain an interest in Africa – irrespective. One way is of course is to organize CCD branches in countries where this is possible. [Recommendation 1]

Another is to encourage *voluntary organizations* within the existing democracies to take a keen interest, and to create and maintain contact with the counterparts in African countries. It would be useful for student movements in a democracy like India to make meaningful contact with their Nigerian counterparts, for example, so as to work on a common agenda for the promotion of democracy in their own countries. [Recommendation 2]

Thirdly, the various country CCDs can maintain an “earthwatch” on democracy in Africa, and come out in support of individuals and institutions which are actively involved in the quest for democracy. As an example, the movement must take an interest in *all* political parties in countries where the multi-party system obtains. *Strategies to strengthen the political basis of these parties must be worked out.* Within the single-party regimes, likewise, the movement must identify with the democratic tendencies that from time to time arise from within the various factions within the same party. *The point is to universalize, through the media, the quest for democracy by individuals, groups, and institutions.* In the same vein, the movement must come out in clear support of those individuals, groups, even nationalities who are in peril for articulating democratic ideas. As a world community we must be sensitized both to the plight of democratic individuals as well as institutions. There are cases in Africa where the democratic *lone voice* has been maintained by an individual long enough to enable the world community to take notice. [Recommendation 3]

At another level, there already exist Africa-wide organizations whose work correlates easily enough with the intentions of the CCD. Such bodies as the Association of African Lawyers, already keep a watch on human rights, and have drafted a charter by that title. Democratic forces should study and adopt those documents and use them in furthering the democratic ideal. Indeed the issue of Human Rights should stand out as a specific agenda in the re-democratization of Africa. [Recommendation 4]

And, at the global level, such United Nations agencies as the Committee

on All Forms of Discrimination, must be goaded by the CCD to be more visibly active in championing the cause of democracy in Africa. [Recommendation 5]

As a practical measure, we could do well to hold a convention, or conventions, on the principles of democracy in Africa from time to time. [Recommendation 6]

This is also the right year to start, as its highlights already have been, "People Power" in the Philippines, and mass organization under a voluntary agency in Haiti. For good measure, President Reagan has declared war on all autocracies both of the Left and the Right. This is the time indeed to follow up his cue, and pressure his administration and other democratic administrations to raise the questions of democracy and human rights in their dealings with the various African regimes. This leverage can be used to enormous good. [Recommendation 7]

HARAMBEE!

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Background Paper

B. Democracy and Development By John Leech CCD, United Kingdom

"The strongest principle of growth lies in human choice."

(George Eliot)

"Democracy is good. I say this because other systems are worse."

(Jawaharlal Nehru)

Introduction

Development can be taken to mean the increasing production of resources and their distribution for socially desirable purposes. Both parts of this statement have meaning. The mere production of resources cannot be considered an end in itself, as the failure of the "trickle-down" theory of development has shown. Equally, the willing of social improvement without a commensurate expansion of resources leads first not to alternative development but to economic decline. In such circumstances, e.g. Sri Lanka in the mid-1970s, the very improvement of education will lead to political change.

Democracy is one of the possible political systems under which the process of development and the investment of its proceeds can be pursued. It is clearly not the only one and there is empirical evidence to suggest that rapid development may be promoted by more authoritarian systems, as for instance in South Korea or Taiwan.

Why then do we believe that there could be a traceable relationship between the process of development and the particular system we call democracy? Can there, in fact, be a stable causal relationship between any given political system and its social product?

In the late 1930s it was fashionable to excuse some of Hitler's excesses by pointing to his economic achievements: motorways, employment creation, an end to recession. To this day, elderly Italians remember Mussolini as the man who made the trains run on time. From Seoul to East Berlin, from Chile to Algeria, we see sound economic growth apparently traded for political or personal freedoms. Many other more liberal countries believe that the pluralist element of democracy is inconsistent with accelerated development and a one-party state provides a more appropriate framework.

The purpose of this paper is to examine whether the efficiencies necessary to economic development can be reconciled with the diffuseness and unpre-

dictability of the democratic process. As Bertrand Russell put it at a time when the march towards independence in Africa was beginning, 'If one man offers you democracy and another offers you a bag of grain, at what stage of starvation will you prefer the grain to the vote?'

The emphasis will be more on the needs of development than on the virtues of democracy. First and foremost, development depends on the quality of economic management; yet, as with any other branch of government, this cannot be unaffected by overall political goals. It is therefore necessary to appreciate the framework they set.

Political goals in Africa

Neither the history nor the struggle for independence of African countries is homogeneous, but certain factors are common to most. Thus the three fundamental impulses determining an African policy framework may be seen as anti-colonialism, nation building and tribal reconciliation.

The first of these is perhaps a state of mind rather than a policy objective. Yet it colours not only relations with former colonial powers and gives rise to vigilance over neo-colonialism; it also leads to an interest in linkages with others similarly inclined within the OAU, the non-aligned movement and with the Soviet Union and other communist countries. A positive aspect of anti-colonialism is that it continues to provide the cement to bind together African populations in the effort of nation-building. The independence struggle has become transmuted to a series of economic goals on the one hand and continuing concern to unite often disparate populations within the state on the other.

The survival of anti-colonialism is most frequently evident in perceptions of the world economic framework. Industrialized countries are seen as manipulating the rules of trade, the pricing of commodities, and even the politics of aid. The system of institutions built up since World War II to regulate these matters is regarded by developing countries with much skepticism and suspicion. In the desperation of having to compete in a world where a sudden rise in the dollar can wipe out a couple of *year's* gain in productivity, or a fractional rise in interest rates, a hard-fought balance-of-payments turnaround, even neutral bodies such as the GATT and the International Monetary Fund are seen as presiding over the interests of their original creators.

Aid programmes, far from earning unmixed gratitude for the donor, also attract criticism as to their volume, orientation and the practices they *entrain*. The donor's objectives are often perceived to conflict with national goals by favouring projects rather than programmes, cash crops rather than food security, tied hardware rather than housing and social costs. Above all, the imposition of aid management systems and the encouragement of the private

sector, local and foreign, to participate in the process can arouse suspicions of aid as a stalking horse for capitalist values.

In some countries tribal divisions present agonizing choices. Preserving the unity of the state demands their pacification or satisfaction. Secessionist wars, such as Katanga or Biafra, are fortunately rare. But neglect or insensitivity can result in situations such as Southern Sudan or, at worst, the continuous tragedy of Uganda. More often the choice lies between strong central government and a looser administrative system allowing minorities to express their basic aspirations. That choice, too, reflects fundamental attitudes to the principles of democracy, even if on a group rather than an individual basis.

Outsiders often fail to grasp that African political systems and preferences are as much a product of their history as are western institutions and attitudes. The system of village government is the progenitor of modern central government – and the justification for the one-party-state – as the extended family principle is that of African socialism. An African statesman recently put it succinctly, "No African village has two or more chiefs. A chief is chosen and then he has to work with all the different groups and factions, taking their views into consideration before deciding on a policy. That way dissent is aired but is done within the system."

In all these senses the independence struggle continues, now aimed at liberation from the perceived injustice of the world's economic system and at maintaining full sovereignty over economic and political choices. The extent to which such an ambition is any more realistic than the clinging to a vanishing sovereignty by the industrial countries will be discussed at the end of this paper. Particularly in the economic sphere, sovereignty can be seen in full retreat from interdependence.

Competing ideologies

The resisting of western values is by no means the only ideological force in the developing world. Yet colonialism and the independence struggle have left their imprint on the pattern of government. The centralism of colonial administration could be taken over intact, its need reinforced by tribal and regional centrifugal tendencies. Equally, the populism of marshalling political forces toward independence, when allied to the extended family system, produced the African brand of socialism.

The reality of this concept is interpreted differently in different countries; but its universal meaning remains as a symbol of the freedoms won in the 1960s, akin perhaps to the motto of the French Republic "Liberté, égalité, fraternité." Only where the struggle has continued, due to factionalism, do sharper Marxist ideologies appear to have been adopted. As in Zanzibar,

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Angola and Mozambique, these have maintained themselves more by *virtue* of alliances than by dedication to their political precepts.

Religious ideologies are often more potent. Islam in particular is rooted in a long tradition which began to be carried through Africa from the 8th century. Post-independence progress and the consolidation of the secular state have often offended religious sentiment and, in the more extreme expression, religious ideology can be a major determinant of the rate and directions of economic progress.

Within these limits, it is possible to observe marked changes in outlook and objectives of second-generation political leaders. This trend has been clear for some time in Asia where the policies of successors to the original leaders became notably more pragmatic. In Korea, Indonesia, now even China, second-generation leaders have abandoned ideological nationalism in favour of adaptation to a realistic assessment of their country's position within a regional or even global economic system. A similar trend is observable in those African countries where power has been transferred constitutionally.

Although there are numerous developing countries in which democratic traditions are strong, democracy often lacks the ideological force of those systems which challenge it. In general only those who have it will go to the barricades to preserve it; the world over, they will take it for granted until it is seriously threatened. But for those who do not have it, there is a deeper reason than complacency. Rightly or wrongly, the word democracy has become identified with western, and often specifically US interests. It has fallen victim to the "friend or foe" attitude which gave rise to the non-aligned movement.

Most independence constitutions, with their bicameral, pluralist democratic institutions and procedures, have had a hard time of it. Virtually all have had to be modified, many have been scrapped or suspended. It is clear that democracy must be home-grown if it is to become sturdy enough to survive. And yet, here and there it has been seen as the natural successor to the political awakening of those who fought for their freedom from colonial domination.

Impact of ideology on economic management

All these attitudes and ideologies will determine the framework within which the development process is to be carried forward. In particular they will affect the allocation of available resources, the very crux of politics. Politics is basically concerned with the use of resources, economic management with their production. It requires a political decision whether to make funds available for the construction of a road, since the purely economic case is modified by the trade-off between those who benefit from the road and those required to forego the political benefit of the funds allocated to

it. Ideological factors, favouring workers or peasant farmers rather than industry or richer zones, co-religionists rather than minorities, or tribal areas in preference to more electorally sensitive ones, will substantially influence such resource allocations.

Such policies may also be applied, wittingly or unwittingly, to the production of goods and resources. The most common is the promotion of state ownership of manufacturing and other enterprises. This will at once give government a dual role which not uncommonly leads to confusion between resources belonging to the budget and those required for the functioning of the enterprises themselves. A notorious example of unwitting involvement is food pricing policies, intended to benefit the urban poor but often succeeding in depressing rural production.

Religious ideology can also profoundly affect the development process. The introduction of Shariya law in Sudan led to considerable uncertainties over commercial procedures and a marked hiatus in development. In other countries resistance to population control education, let alone measures, places increasing strain on available resources.

It is important to stress that, so long as a government itself is constitutional, such ideologies are totally legitimate. No doubt its policies represent a reasoned balance between the overall objective of the society it seeks to create and the physical needs of that society in terms of economic productivity. But the economic cost of such policy determinants, and their impact upon development need to be acknowledged.

Role of the Bureaucracy

Political orientation will also affect the role of the bureaucracy and its efficiency. It can determine whether the administrative machine acts as accelerator or brake in the development process. If the overall policy goal is to maintain the political status quo, it will be idle to expect civil servants to take a more dynamic approach than their leaders.

More importantly, an efficient bureaucracy is the product of sustained social investment, especially in education. Not surprisingly, the countries of Southeast Asia lead not only in terms of growth but also in secondary school enrollment. Compared with other developing countries the result is a broadly efficient civil service instead of the thin stratum of highly qualified top officials lacking adequately trained technical and administrative support.

Two questions arise: Is it possible to conceive of an independently constituted force for economic management? And how is it possible to govern without loyalists to implement one's policies?

The condition postulated by the first of these effectively already exists. Most of the poorer and smaller developing countries are so short of highly educated and trained people that the more promising are singled out at an

early stage for special advancement. The lure of Government service will ensure that they become concentrated in the public sector where World Bank and bilateral training programmes will equip them further. The real prospects for sound economic management may well lie with such an elite.

The second question, however, is in conflict with the first. Government needs to be based on trust between those who hold office and the bureaucracy required to carry out their policies. Resistance to policy directives can be variously interpreted as the impartial advice of a technician or the obstinacy of a political opponent. In addition, governing and reelection depend on a system of patronage. In the industrial democracies this has largely ceased to be personal and relates more to the implementation of policies broadly beneficial to the groups whose vote is sought. In many developing countries, however, jobs, influence and even a basic livelihood continue to be at a premium. Thus patronage can too easily result in the preferment of people unable to perceive their real responsibilities. This in turn can nullify the abilities of their superiors, however capable and highly trained.

Politics in the hands of economic needs, fear or neglect of investment in education, and the client-patron relationship thus strongly influence the quality of economic management. A system offering redress, and one responsive to the universal demand for education, is likely in the long run also to produce the most competent bureaucracy. It may well remove the paradox in George Bernard Shaw's biting comment that "Democracy substitutes election by the incompetent many for appointment by the corrupt few."

Economic and Political Pragmatism

The most successful developing economies are by and large those which have left ideology behind and have felt able to allow economic affairs to be in competent hands, essentially those of non-political technocrats. They are capable of adaptation to events without having to defend ideological positions or being accused of sail-trimming.

Once the initial phase of liberation and nation building has been accomplished, this group of countries has concentrated on non-dogmatic, socio-economic development, on economic management allowed to set its own objectives; outstanding examples are South Korea, Singapore and Taiwan. In a longer historical perspective the same applies to Thailand and indeed the modern Japan. To these can now be added the most recent examples of a dramatic gear-change in this direction, India and China. It is essentially when countries become less concerned with interpreting the past and firmly fix their sights on the future that such pragmatism becomes possible.

Outside Asia examples are fewer and less distinguishable, now mostly hidden behind a mountain of indebtedness. However, in the Americas, Barbados, Ecuador and Costa Rica must be cited; and in Africa the second

generation-led countries of Botswana, Cameroon and Kenya, whilst Ivory Coast and Swaziland are striving to maintain the gains of an already enlightened and pragmatic first generation leadership. However, their existence serves sharply to underline the thesis as well as to allow a good deal of optimism for the future.

None of these countries has dispensed with old traditions and beliefs. Ideological views and religious doctrines remain respected, but as a part of the traditions that formed a people and a nation now set on living in the modern world. These values provide a background to the social fabric but are no longer determinants in the conduct of government or business. The benefits have been reaped in terms of economic development.

Economic performance in turn is essentially what allows the development of political freedoms. What counts is not the capturing of "the commanding heights of the economy" on behalf of the people but the benefit that the people derive through the way that the economy is operated. Once these benefits really begin to flow, politicians can afford to submit their record to public critique. Furthermore, economic performance provides a measurable yardstick for such accountability, in contrast to the mystical goals held up by old-style politicians.

But such mature pragmatism cannot be achieved without enlisting the full resources of the people as well as their capacity for informed judgment. Thus all the countries that serve us as examples have made a substantial investment in education. It is clear that those who feel they need first to be rich enough to afford this investment represent those countries which today are still stagnating – and still feeding their people not bread but yesterday's ideology.

In liberating the energies and motivation of their people countries inevitably move closer to a democratic system. The road may be long and far from direct. In some, like South Korea, it may be perceptible only in increasing pragmatism and responsiveness of what remains, for the moment, a dictatorship. Others may at first restrict full democratic liberties by introducing a one-party system. China under Deng moved overnight from classic communism to a "pragmatic creed" allowing the reasonably free play of individual enterprise and initiative.

Progress and Democracy

If, even on a protracted time scale, democracy becomes the product of economic progress, what evidence is there to support the assertion that greater political liberalization will in itself promote such development? Is there some empirical proof that people and economies perform better under a liberal system?

Attached are development indicators for the countries of sub-Saharan

Africa; with a population of more than 1m. These broadly show the growth in GDP achieved, its reflection on a per capita basis and its use for social purposes such as education and medical facilities. From the food aid statistics may be deduced not only the extent to which countries were affected by drought in 1982/83 but also, in comparison with earlier years, a continued dependence on imported food as distinct from the development of local production. The private investment column, though incomplete and prone to great variation from year to year, is an indicator of the economic policies pursued.

For control purposes a worldwide average for each of the income groups is also given. Despite the dissimilarities of other continents, Africa was not alone in suffering from drought or starting from a pitifully low per capita income base.

From the point of view of growth, countries which have maintained their overall rate in the difficult decade to 1983 above an average of 4% and income per capita above 2% are Malawi, Rwanda, Kenya, Lesotho, Cameroon and Congo. Those which have at the same time made notable advances also in the social field are Kenya, Congo and to some extent Cameroon.

Other countries like Zimbabwe, Ghana, Nigeria and to a lesser extent Ivory Coast and Zambia, have made strides in the social field, but based either on the distribution of earlier growth or at the expense of present growth. Such statistics are, however, only a snapshot and, as pointed out earlier, may represent a considerable investment in the future by way of wider education.

The food aid statistics, too, may be an indicator of economic management. Allowing for the distortion of drought, they appear to support the efficiencies imputed to Kenya, Cameroon, Nigeria, Congo and Zimbabwe. Similarly, the flows of private investment confirm Kenya, Nigeria, Cameroon, and latterly Congo, as principal beneficiaries.

It is fruitless to go into the finer definitions of democracy in relation to these countries. Some of them have tried a fully democratic system and found it wanting (in some cases the alternative has proved even less acceptable). Others have been authoritarian from independence. What matters is the extent to which they have acknowledged that sound development depends on economic pragmatism and social investment. Even Congo, for long in isolation from the outside world, has turned to pragmatism and a welcome for foreign investment to bolster up its social achievements.

The combination of these two approaches will ensure the gradual drift toward more civil liberties and a recognition of the role of the individual. It will set in motion the dynamic of development based upon the potential of a people willing to participate in the process; that ultimately means democracy.

Perhaps one day these and other governments desperate to enlist all their

nation's potential in the process of development will come to share Mahatma Gandhi's view that "True democracy cannot be worked by twenty men sitting at the centre. It has to be worked from below by the people of every village."

A Community of Democracies

World events are inexorably driving nations together as their economies become ever more dependent upon each other. Even the largest countries in the world are no longer able to manage their affairs in isolation. Developing countries are doubly vulnerable to external influences and decisions taken by others.

In recognition of these realities more and more regional organizations are being created so that nations can collectively increase their strength. The European Community is the furthest advanced, showing that even highly developed countries need to depend upon each other. ASEAN, the Andean Pact, Caricom and a number of free trade or currency areas within Africa are other examples.

Many of the economic problems faced by developing countries in being on the fringe of the world's trading system would be alleviated by a system of co-management within an association which also grouped their more powerful partners. The latter have the means to deal with the most pressing of today's problems: currency and exchange rate reform, indebtedness, impediments to trade flows, commodity fluctuations – in short, the breakdown of the long-standing customer-client relationship between producer and consumer. What they lack currently is the commitment to act. A new relationship with reciprocal privileges and obligations could provide this.

Attempts to promote economic integration among developing countries alone have not so far been successful. They usually fail because their members export the same type of goods, mainly basic commodities. For the developing world, therefore, it is imperative to seek a decision-making framework which includes their real customers, as well as those who finance their trade and to some extent their development.

All these are arguments which have led to the proposal to establish a global Community of Democracies encompassing all those likeminded countries having a common interest in resolving their problems through committed cooperation rather than confrontation. The first step toward this is intended to be an Association, an inter-governmental body that will provide the basis for an evolving democratic consensus which could help to bridge the rich-poor divide.

Only a few weeks ago the President of the World Bank, Tom Clausen, made the point with striking clarity, "While a measure of economic growth can result purely from internal adjustments, sustained and larger economic growth depends on the measure of adjustment undertaken in IECD

economies, in the world trading system and in international institutions.”

There is a curious echo of Karl Marx who was the first to see that new forms of economic activity required radically new institutions. Thus the feudal principalities of Europe had to give way to wider, more corporate modern democratic states in the face of the industrial revolution. The developing countries now face the same imperative.

Why only democracies? The functional case has been set out in preceding sections of this paper: the disposition toward better, more pragmatic economic management, the relegation of ideology to its traditional role, an outward-looking philosophy basic to cooperation with other countries, and a system with checks and balances offering social justice and redress for the wronged. More important still, the fact that the people stand behind their elected authorities will provide a common bond based on shared ideals and aspirations of the most fundamental kind. Not only governments but people must be able to work together in such a Community. In the words of Jean Monnet, the father of the European Community, “We are not coalescing states, we are uniting men.”

Such men and those who lead them must not only share the same ideals. They must believe that it is right to help and sustain each other in a common cause with all the resources they can muster.

20.3.86

Background Paper

C. Democracy in Developing Countries Implications for Democratic Development in Africa* By Larry Diamond, Senior Research Fellow, Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace

In the past several years, the broad trend of political development in the Third World has been toward democracy. The recent breakdowns of longstanding dictatorships in the Philippines and Haiti are only the latest in a striking chain of developments. Since the transition back to democratic government began in Brazil in the mid 1970s, virtually all of the "bureaucratic-authoritarian" regimes in South America have given way to fresh attempts at democratic government with substantial popular legitimacy. Among the previously democratic countries, only Chile continues to hold out, and its military dictatorship is coming under rising domestic and international pressure to withdraw. In Central America, popularly elected and at least semi-democratic regimes are now in place in every country but Nicaragua, and are struggling (most dramatically in Guatemala) to overcome daunting legacies of military domination, brutal repression, massive inequality, and political polarization and violence.

Despite the assassination of Indira Gandhi and continuing communal tension and violence, democracy endures in India, the second most populous country in the world, and is showing signs of renewal under its new Prime Minister. Pakistan and Bangladesh are moving gradually toward democratic government, and elsewhere in non-communist Asia, democratic pressures are growing, as in Indonesia and Taiwan. Events in the Philippines have invigorated democratic aspirations throughout the region, and appear to have had especially strong impact on South Korea, where popular demands for

* This paper is based on research for the Project on Democracy in Developing Countries, which Larry Diamond is editing in collaboration with Seymour Martin Lipset and Juan Linz. The project, which includes case studies of 27 Third World countries, is being supported by the National Endowment for Democracy and the Hoover Institution. The views expressed in this essay, however, are Mr. Diamond's own, and not necessarily those of the Endowment, the Hoover Institution, or his project collaborators.

a full transition to democracy have recently escalated sharply, and socioeconomic conditions for democracy appear to be propitious.

Currently, the prospects for democracy in Africa are considerably less encouraging. If we define democracy as a system of institutionalized competition for governmental power, through regular, free and fair elections, buttressed by a high level of civil and political liberty, few of the countries in Sub-Saharan Africa would classify as democracies today. Recent new attempts at democratic government have broken down in Ghana, Nigeria and Uganda, and human rights abuses are graver and more widespread in Africa than in any other region of the world today. Moreover, by the conventional theories of the conditions for democracy, Africa's standing as the poorest and least developed region of the world would seem to offer little prospect of democratic progress in the near future.

However, I do not share the deterministic view that authoritarian government is more or less inevitable in Africa for the indefinite future. Careful study of the conditions for democracy and successful transitions to democracy in developing countries indicates much greater scope for political leadership and choice than is commonly assumed. Moreover, the social and economic conditions that shape the democratic prospect are not immutable. Rather, they may be reshaped and even transformed by the development strategies, constitutional designs, political behavior and socioeconomic policies of political elites. Hence, if the conditions for democracy and lessons of other developing country experiences can be properly understood, the democratic prospect in Africa will become more a matter of political skill and will than developmental fate.

Political Values and Beliefs

The experience of developing countries in recent decades strongly supports the argument that democracy requires a political culture of moderation, tolerance and restraint. Because democracy is a system of institutionalized competition for power, there is always the danger that political competition will become too intense and even violent. A number of structural factors, reviewed below, affect the degree of intensity, intolerance and violence in politics, but to some extent this is shaped independently by the values, beliefs and behavioral styles of political actors, especially at the elite level.

Democracy is much more likely to endure where political leaders manifest mutual tolerance, respect and trust, and especially where this is developed into what Robert Dahl terms a system of "mutual security." This gives competing parties and groups confidence that they will not be eliminated, nor their interests trampled, in the event of defeat. Hence, elections, censuses, and other dimensions of the struggle for power do not become "zero-sum" contests, but can be conducted with a measure of civility within the rules

of the democratic game.

The political climate in this sense is heavily shaped by the choices and behavior of political leaders. One important reason why democracy has endured in Venezuela and Colombia for more than two decades now is that, in each country, the major competing parties forged political "pacts," consensual agreements to reduce the temperature of political competition, purge the system of political violence and vituperation, and create a framework for cooperation and compromise between parties. In Colombia, this went so far as to limit political competition under an agreement in which government power was divided equally between the two main parties and the Presidency was alternated between them for sixteen years. Such limitations on political competition were necessary to end a period of inter-party violence that had claimed some 200,000 casualties.

In a different context, the moderation, flexibility and pragmatism of the Indian political elite has been a major factor in that country's capacity to manage and contain potentially explosive political crises. Perhaps not coincidentally, the electoral dominance of the Congress Party for most of the past four decades has permitted it to strike an accommodating posture without great fear of losing power, but then that posture has also contributed to its continuing electoral strength.

By contrast, where political competition has become deeply polarized and suffused with demagogic appeals, vituperative rhetoric, mutual distrust, fanaticism and violence, democracy has decayed and usually collapsed. This has been the formula for democratic breakdown in Turkey, where military coups in 1960 and 1980 followed a deterioration in relations among civilian forces so severe that the military had to intervene to preserve public order. Similarly, military coups in Nigeria in 1966 and in Chile in 1973 followed catastrophic polarization of the political system (in the former case along ethnic lines and the latter between class-based parties). In Sri Lanka, increasing polarization and enmity between parties and ethnic groups has visibly damaged both the stability and democraticness of the parliamentary system in recent years. In fact, political polarization, fanaticism and violence have commonly attended the process of democratic collapse throughout Latin America, Asia and Africa, as well as Europe in the pre-World War II period.

Ethnicity, Class and Other Cleavages

Anti-democratic behavior is also induced by structural circumstances which may raise the stakes in the political arena and undermine mutual trust and tolerance. Among the most important factors here are the patterns of social cleavages, in particular, ethnicity and class. Stable democracy requires that these cleavages either be limited in their depth and intensity, or managed effectively.

In contemporary Africa, ethnic divisions represent one of the primary threats not only to democratic stability but to political stability of any kind. Indeed, so powerful is the symbolic content and mobilizational potential of ethnicity (i.e., linguistic and cultural identifications) that some scholars maintain democracy is impossible where ethnic identities are intensely felt and highly politicized in the Third World. The record of democratic breakdowns in Asia and especially Africa certainly testifies to this, but it does not mean that democracy is impossible in multi-ethnic societies.

Despite extraordinary fragmentation along cultural and linguistic lines, democracy has survived in India, in part because the social and political structures have contained the explosive force of ethnicity. For one thing, ethnic divisions are crosscut by religious, class and caste divisions. For example, a Hindu may or may not speak Hindi; he may be a Brahmin or a member of a scheduled caste, a businessman or peasant. Hence, to the extent that these crosscutting affiliations are all politically salient, individuals and groups tend to be pulled in different directions from issue to issue, reducing the intensity of political conflict. For this reason, crosscutting cleavages are regarded by many democratic theorists as an important condition for stable democracy.

In addition, the elaborate Indian system of federalism, which gives the twenty-two states a large measure of autonomy over their own affairs, has served both to decentralize political conflict, relieving the strain on the national political arena, and to give major ethnic and regional groups some degree of mutual security. By contrast, the absence of an adequate arrangement for power sharing in the unitary systems of Sri Lanka and Peru has contributed enormously to the extremist mobilization and violence of the Tamil minority in Sri Lanka and to the regionally based insurrection of the Maoist "Shining Path" in Peru.

Nigeria may offer the most dramatic evidence of the extent to which intense ethnic divisions can be managed with imaginative constitutional designs. The division of the unworkable three-region system into 12 states, and then in 1976 into 19 states, has functioned quite visibly to decentralize political conflict, so that a political crisis within a single state is much less likely to infect and polarize the entire political system than it was in the regional system of the First Republic. In addition, by breaking up the three major ethnic groups (Hausa, Yoruba and Igbo) into multiple states, and making ethnic minority groups the dominant force in roughly half the states, the Nigerian federal system has weakened the ethnic and regional solidarities that led to civil war.

Constitutional provisions during Nigeria's Second Republic (1979-83) enhanced the crosscutting effects of the federal system. Ethnic parties and symbols were prohibited, and parties were required to demonstrate a viable presence in two thirds of the states in order to be recognized. In addition,

a Presidential candidate had to win at least a quarter of the vote in two-thirds of the states in order to be directly elected, and major presidential appointments had to "reflect the federal character" of the country. These provisions achieved considerable success in generating cross-cutting cleavage in politics. While ethnicity remained the most common and deeply felt basis of political identification and mobilization, the political system did not become polarized around ethnicity, and significant new ethnic coalitions began taking shape within the party system. Other factors lay behind the failure of Nigeria's Second Republic.

The State and Society

Chief among these other factors was the relationship between state and society. This encompasses one of the most profoundly important conditions for democracy in the Third World. To the extent that the state has a domineering or monolithic control over the economy and society, the prospects for democracy are sharply diminished for several reasons. First, this puts too much at stake in the political arena, where the state is the primary source of wealth and economic opportunity, individual and group aspirations for a better life become fixated on the struggle for power. This makes of politics a sum-zero game, since loss of office means loss of access to jobs, loans, import licenses, development projects, patronage, kickbacks, scholarships, and most of the other resources for accumulation of wealth and socioeconomic progress. Hence, elections become vitriolic and violent affairs, as parties, factions and candidates seek to win and retain power at any price. Norms of tolerance and restraint tend to be overrun by the enormity of the stakes. Efforts at accommodation and compromise fail to bridge the deepening polarization of a zero-sum contest. The political dialogue becomes poisoned as political competition takes on the trappings — and, quite literally, the weapons — of war.

This phenomenon, more than any other, explains the repeated breakdowns of democracy in Nigeria and Turkey, and has contributed to democratic instability in many other developing countries. On the other hand, the existence of a strong capitalist class, with a base of wealth and opportunity outside the state, has contributed significantly to the survival of democracy in Botswana and Papua New Guinea, despite their relatively low levels of socioeconomic development. The implication is clear: if political competition is to be kept within the boundaries of legality and civility, the stakes must be reduced. The size of the state and the scope of state ownership and intervention in the economy must be reduced. Opportunities must be generated for private entrepreneurs to prosper and individual communities to develop without state patronage and license. That class which is now so underdeveloped in Africa — an authentic bourgeoisie of capitalist producers,

both grand and petite, agricultural and industrial — must somehow be invigorated and unleashed.

There are several other reasons why a domineering state represents a hostile terrain for democracy. In the absence of autonomous sources of power and wealth, it becomes difficult to check the power of the state and to make it accountable to the people. Such a domineering state becomes tempted to see itself as the sole embodiment of the national purpose, and so to incorporate and control intellectuals, trade unions, the press and other potential sources of pluralism. In such a corporatist framework, liberty suffers and the social basis for democracy is weakened.

The success of Thailand's bureaucracy and military, and of Mexico's one-party state, in coopting and circumscribing new social groups has clearly impeded democratic development in those two semi-democratic countries. By contrast, a strong network of autonomous organizations and voluntary associations represents an important foundation for democracy. The multiplicity, vigor, and increasing sophistication of these cultural, economic and professional associations have been an important factor in the persistence of democracy in India, Costa Rica and Venezuela.

Where associational life is rich and autonomous from state control, it may also prevent the institutionalization of authoritarian rule, and generate effective pressure for democratization. It was these associational networks — businessmen, lawyers, intellectuals, students, and most of all the Catholic Church — that sustained democratic aspirations and ultimately brought down the Marcos dictatorship in the Philippines. The Church has played a similar role throughout Latin America, most recently in Haiti. In South Korea, students, intellectuals and professionals have been at the forefront of the campaign for an end to military rule.

In Nigeria, efforts to sustain authoritarian rule have been frustrated by the vigilance of the press, the Bar Association, student groups, trade unions, business associations, and circles of intellectuals and opinion leaders, who have been consistent in their demands for liberty and accountability. Such groups not only limit state power, they may also foster democratic values, provide experience with democratic practices, recruit democratic leaders, and absorb some of the political energy and demands that would otherwise focus upon and perhaps excessively strain the formal political arena.

Finally, the swollen state in Africa, as elsewhere, undermines democracy by fostering corruption and economic stagnation. Human nature being what it is, corruption is present in every complex political system to some degree. But where it is blatant and unchecked, it destroys the legitimacy of the democratic system. To the extent that the state is the dominant economic factor, entrepreneurial energies and aspirations will be diverted into politics, and the accumulation of wealth will be pursued through illicit means. State revenues will be diverted for private ends, and social well-being and

economic growth will suffer. This chain of causation has figured heavily in the demise of authoritarian regimes in Iran, Nicaragua, the Phillipines and Haiti, and of democratic regimes in Ghana, Nigeria and elsewhere in the Third World.

This should not be construed to imply that weak states are fertile ground for democracy. There is a difference between the size of the state and its strength, or capability. Particularly in poor or developing societies, leaner states may actually be more efficient, and better able to maintain public order and improve public health, welfare and education. Certainly, democracy presumes governability. To the extent that the authority of the state is not well established, and agreement is lacking on the object of political allegiance, any form of government will be unstable.

Legitimacy

Stable democracy requires not only the consolidation of state authority, but also a high degree of popular legitimacy for democracy as a form of government. If people believe that the democratic system is more appropriate for their society than any other type of government that might be established, and so deserving of obedience, democracy will be able to endure, even through periods of severe crisis. A high degree of popular legitimacy offers a virtual immunity against a military coup. Only where consensus about the appropriateness of existing political institutions has broken down do we find civilian regimes being toppled by military coups in the Third World.

Legitimacy depends primarily on two factors. One is the degree to which the political institutions are consistent with the cultural values and historical traditions of the country. One reason why the post-independence democratic regimes in Africa so quickly and pervasively broke down was because they lacked this continuity with traditional values and forms of authority. By contrast, democracy in Spain and the semi-democratic system in Thailand have been buttressed by their identification with a revered and longstanding monarchy. This implies that traditional rulers could potentially play a democratic role in Africa, as symbols and defenders of a national commitment to liberal, accountable government. As in Malaya, it might be possible to develop a kind of surrogate monarchy in the form of a council of traditional rulers, in which the leadership position — and symbol of constitutional authority — was regularly rotated.

Legitimacy is also tied to the performance of the regime. This is why corruption and economic stagnation have been so poisonous to democracy in the Third World. It is also why they have been particularly damaging to the infant regimes of new nations. A long record of successful performance tends to build a large reservoir of legitimacy that can be drawn on in times of economic misfortune and political crisis. And the greater the legitimacy

of a regime, the more effective it is likely to be in responding to such downturns and crises. But the legitimacy of new regimes depends more heavily on their immediate performance; the failures of the first government tend to be viewed as flaws endemic to the system. Newly inaugurated regimes are thus much more vulnerable and often tempted or pressured to try to do too much too fast in order to consolidate their positions.

If new and fledgling attempts at democratic government are to survive in Africa, they will need to find creative ways of articulating with cultural values and political traditions that already have legitimacy. More emphasis on local government and community participation might be a step in this direction. In addition, these democratic regimes will need assistance and justice from the international community in restructuring their international debts in ways that do not sap the resources needed so desperately for productive investment, nor leave them in a position of permanent debt bondage. At the same time, African governments must abandon failed policies that have robbed peasant producers and incipient entrepreneurs of the incentive to invest and the resources to produce. Without these fundamental shifts in both international and domestic economic policies, it is difficult to imagine how democracy or development will be possible in Africa.

Constitutional Structure

Finally, consideration must be given to the political and constitutional structure of democratic government. Given the centrifugal tendencies and immense development needs of Third World countries, the tendency has been to concentrate power in the executive branch. Along with the powerful and attractive example of the United States, this has created a preference, especially in Latin America but increasingly in Asia and Africa as well, for a presidential form of government. Presidentialism does provide for more stable governments, since the executive is elected for a fixed term of office. But the stability of governments may be quite different from the stability of the regime, as the case of Italy demonstrates.

Particularly where the electoral stakes are enormous and political divisions intense, presidentialism may heighten destabilizing tendencies in the polity. Juan Linz has noted, "The presidential election 'game' has a zero-sum character, whereas a parliamentary system offers the possibility of dividing the outcomes This reduces the frustrations of the loser, creates expectations for the future, and often allows the loser a share in power." In a presidential system, where the winner of even a narrow plurality gains complete control over the executive branch of government, "the opposition is likely to feel impotent and even enraged," and the presidential victor may infer from the electoral outcome a mandate that vastly exceeds his real support.¹

This is only one dimension of a larger issue: the clear and compelling need to check, balance and disperse power if democracy is to endure. The need is particularly compelling in developing democracies, where democratic breakdown has frequently come in the form of executive coup. Here, several requirements suggest themselves. One is a powerful judiciary, whose independence from executive control and preeminence in interpreting the law and the constitution is rigorously imbedded in the constitution. While it is true that any would-be dictator in the presidential palace may ask, "How many troops has the Supreme Court?" the supremacy of the courts may prove decisive in defending the constitution against a creeping seizure of power by a leader or party which lacks the ability, will or nerve to blatantly terminate the democratic system.

In Sri Lanka, where the constitution does not provide for judicial review after Parliament enacts legislation, the weakness of the judiciary and the concerted effort of the executive to erode its autonomy have been important factors in the deterioration of the democratic system in recent years. On the other hand, a forceful, sophisticated and independent judiciary has played a crucial role in the defense of human rights and democracy in Zimbabwe, and in frustrating Indira Gandhi's attempts to entrench authoritarian rule during the 1975 - 77 Emergency in India.²

There may also be a need for developing countries to innovate in the construction of limits on government power and checks against the abuse of power. In multi-ethnic societies, it is imperative that there be some devolution of authority to local centers, through federalism and/or other arrangements. The institution of an "ombudsman," in the form of an office or commission "to investigate alleged abuses of administrative power and to protect the rights of citizens against such abusive action," may also strengthen democracy in developing countries.³ Perhaps most importantly, there must be some truly independent and effective structure for monitoring, investigating and punishing political corruption, which has been a major source of democratic decay in the Third World.

The Constitution of Nigeria's Second Republic contained such a structure: a Code of Conduct requiring all public officers to declare their assets at regular intervals; a Bureau to monitor compliance with the Code's strict provisions; and a Tribunal to hear charges and assess stiff penalties against offenders. However, neither of these bodies ever functioned as intended because their activation, funding and supervision were entrusted to the politicians whom they were to regulate. This same problem plagued the conduct of the 1983 elections.

Where the political stakes are so enormous, and bureaucratic autonomy and professionalism so weak, the conventional checks and balances may prove inadequate to insulate such crucial regulatory functions from partisan abuse. In Nigeria and elsewhere in Africa, it may be necessary to entrust

the supervision of these sensitive functions to a new body or branch of government independent of partisan politics. This might be a military council, or a council of representatives from the bar, the judiciary, the press, traditional rulers and other groups that have some autonomy from politics and command general respect in the society.

Political Parties

The corruption and chaos of party politics in developing countries have been cited to justify the elimination of party competition. Such a step may at times be imperative for the restoration of political tranquility, but it is not simply another variant of liberal democracy. Political parties are the primary organizational instruments for the aggregation and representation of interests in modern, complex democracies. To the extent that political parties are harassed, constrained or altogether banned, the political system is less democratic. Stable democracy requires a vibrant party system. Political parties should have sufficient structural depth and complexity to mobilize, articulate and represent competing interests, but they must also have a sufficient maturity of purpose and commitment to democracy to be able to cooperate with one another.

Generally, where one finds stable democracy in the Third World, one finds mature parties. The Congress Party of India stands as the quintessential example. But as that example indicates, mature parties take time to develop — the Indian National Congress had six decades between its formation and Indian independence — and the particular misfortune of decolonization in Africa was that they were not given that time, but rather suppressed until very late in the game. Parties need time to develop coherent identities, and organizations that can involve people at the grassroots. They also need time to learn to live with one another, to accommodate themselves to the rules and constraints of democracy, and to work out between them some system of mutual security and tolerance.

Transitions to Democracy

This suggests the value of a gradual and staged transition to democracy, especially where parties and other political institutions are not well developed, as is generally the case in Africa. Such a lengthy, phased transition might begin with electoral competition at the local level, then for state or regional governments, then for a national legislature, and finally, perhaps after a decade or so, for the right to form a national government. This would require that the military remain on hand as a referee of political competition, to ensure that parties play by the rules of the game and to impose high costs upon them if they do not. Where the authoritarian regime seeks itself to

become a player in the new political framework, this role becomes more problematic.

A gradual and deliberate pace of transition may also afford a better opportunity for the development of the social infrastructure of democracy: a pluralistic and professional press; free, autonomous and responsible trade unions; a dense network of professional and voluntary associations; a critical, creative and independent intellectual and artistic climate. To the extent that such organizations and networks exist when democracy is fully inaugurated, political participation will be more widespread and sophisticated, liberal values more prevalent, and abuses of democratic authority more difficult to sustain.

Conclusion

One need only cite the case of India to demonstrate that socioeconomic democracy is possible without a high level of socioeconomic development. It is more difficult and fragile, and may in practice be less democratic than what obtains in the industrialized democracies, but it is possible. Moreover, where it is able to endure in the Third World, it will be likely to deepen and mature gradually, as it has in the West over decades and centuries of political development.

While poverty and ethnic divisions impose large obstacles in the way of democratic development in Africa, these are not insurmountable. Rather, they pose a challenge to political leaders to rethink the relationship between state and society; to innovate in constitutional designs; and to strive to evolve responsible styles and effective structures of partisanship. Democracy can be developed in Africa if political elites have the will to commit themselves to it — irrespective of whatever power and fortune it may bring them — and the patience and skill to build the institutions and forge the understandings on which stable democracy depends.

Notes

¹. Juan J. Linz, *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Crisis, Breakdown and Reequilibration*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978, pp. 72 – 3.

². Richard Sklar, "Developmental Democracy." Paper presented to the 1985 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, pp. 12 – 13.

³. Ibid, pp. 15 – 16.

Background Paper

D. Proceedings of ICCD Organizing Meeting (PREFACE)

Antecedents of PREFACE

The CCD movement was born of an awareness of the need for closer cooperation and cohesion among democratic countries for mutual support and to foster and protect democracy. The need arises from a host of factors.

One group of factors, affecting all nations regardless of political orientation, includes the familiar array of international economic, technological, environmental and demographic pressures upon national policy choices. In responding to such pressures the democracies enjoy certain advantages because they are open to pragmatic experimentation and because their people are free to develop and employ their talents. At the same time, democracies are constrained by the need to develop and mobilize popular support for governmental policies and actions. Similar advantages and constraints apply when democratic governments deal with more traditional and narrowly defined national security problems.

Another set of factors is of particular concern to democratic governments. They have to do with destabilizing external pressures brought to bear by Marxist and other anti-democratic forces, such as militant religious movements, and internal pressures, such as those generated by poverty and separatist movements. Open democratic societies are particularly vulnerable to such pressures, especially when manifested in the form of terrorism.

The inability of existing international organizations to deal effectively with many of these factors has left a void in the international system which the democracies could help to fill if only more of them were willing to act in concert. Before that can happen, however, the democracies will have to develop a sense of community as well as the confidence and will to act in accordance with their dedication to freedom, their respect for human rights and their tolerance of pluralism.

Recognition of this need, then, was the genesis of the Committees for a Community of Democracies composed of private citizens dedicated to promoting a community of democracies. The first committee was formed in Washington, D.C. in 1979 (CCD-USA). Another was formed soon after in London and others began organizing in the U.S., Belgium, Portugal and Australia. Initial discussion related to forming a community among the industrially advanced democracies and to the institutions such a community

would need to make it functional. But in the back of people's minds was the thought that a broader approach was needed, for the sake of democracy everywhere and for an expansion of the community concept.

At the first CCD international meeting in London in 1982 (with representatives from North America, Europe, Australia and Japan), the Committees for a Community of Democracies agreed that:

1. Attempts should be made to form a large association of all genuine democracies which would be dedicated to the ideal of democracy itself (its advancement and preservation throughout the world);
2. As many of the members of this association as wished should move toward a fusion of interests of their peoples in which the good of all should be dominant.

It was also agreed at that time that "autonomous groups of independent private citizens" should be formed in as many democracies as possible to consider how these purposes might be realized. A provisional international steering group was appointed.

Soon thereafter CCD-USA proposed that efforts at this stage should focus on goals related to advancing and preserving democracy and enhancing mutual understanding among democracies through some form of association of all the democracies, a caucus of democracies at the United Nations and an international institute for democracy.

Recognizing that international public opinion would have to be mobilized to persuade governments to consider these proposals, CCD-USA planned a program of expert studies and regional meetings among private citizens leading to a Conference at which all practicing democracies would be represented and which would seek agreement on final proposals for consideration and action by governments. It was decided to begin with a planning meeting of private citizens from a representative group of democracies, which was styled PREFACE.

Overview of PREFACE

Thirty-six participants from twenty-six countries came to the planning meeting at the Wingspread Conference Center near Racine, Wisconsin. Also present were some observers, CCD-USA staff and staff of the Johnson Foundation, which operates the Center. The twenty-six countries represented were all practicing democracies. They encompassed the full range of economic development from heavily industrialized to hardly industrialized, and all regions of the world. The participants were broadly representative in terms of profession, age and sex. Thirty-three were from outside the USA. They included lawyers, parliamentarians and ex-parliamentarians, journalists, retired diplomats, businessmen, academicians, leaders of non-

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governmental organizations, etc. Quite a number were in their 50s and 60s but there was a group in their 30s. Five of the participants and several of the observers were women. Despite such diverse backgrounds, they coalesced almost immediately on the agenda of the CCD's proposals, with few excursions to side issues and none of the confrontational rhetoric normally heard at conferences combining representatives from the First and Third Worlds.

The agenda included three CCD-USA proposals and one proposal by Professor Wilkinson of the UK, all under the general rubric of promoting solidarity among the democracies:

- **An Intergovernmental Association of Democracies** — to provide a forum or meeting place;
- **An International Institute for Democracy;**
- **A Caucus of Democracies in the UN** — to exchange views and to concert action as much as possible without trying to create a voting bloc; and
- **Democratic cooperation against international terrorism.**

The organization of the meeting provided for a chair — Mr. Samuel De Palma of the USA, and three vice chairs — Dr. Peter Corterier of West Germany, Dr. Rodolfo Cerdas-Cruz of Costa Rica, and the Hon. James M. Ah Koy of Fiji. The vice chairs also presided at the separate study sections on the Association, the Institute and the Caucus/Terrorism proposals.

Beginning with a high degree of interest, the meeting soon became enthusiastic. Particularly strong support was given the proposals by a group of young, politically involved Latin Americans, and others from India and the southern Pacific region. Almost all participants contributed positive suggestions.

The interest and enthusiasm did not rule out differences of opinion, however. There were, for example, different views on who was to be represented in an Association of Democracies — just governments, or additionally parliamentarians and private organizations? Some participants, worried about political systems that see-saw in and out of democracy, wanted to make sure that democratic elements of a country which had gone non-democratic would still have a hearing at the Association forum. Nevertheless, general agreement on the structure of the Association was reached. It would be intergovernmental but have a parliamentary component of advisory character and co-terminous membership. Private groups — non-governmental organizations — could be promoters and supporters, but the question of what other involvement they might have with the Association was left open.

On the Institute proposal, participants suggested a specific set of practical functions that an Institute might successfully initiate without an elaborate structure.

With regard to the Caucus proposal, it was agreed that a Consultative Group of Democracies should be formed at the United Nations and other international organizations as appropriate.

The proposal for cooperation against international terrorism was broadened and included in a resolution urging the democracies to improve cooperation to combat violations of human rights, social and economic injustice and international terrorism.

All the above proposals appeared in the Final Act adopted by participants on April 17, entitled "A Call for an Association of Democracies."

The group decided to constitute itself the International Committee for a Community of Democracies (ICCD). Mr. De Palma was acclaimed chair of this committee and thirteen persons (representing half of the twenty-six countries) were named vice chairs to help direct planning activities in their regions. These planning activities point toward a conference of all the democracies to be held somewhere outside the United States in 1988. The conference would be attended by parliamentarians and other influential private citizens from all participating democracies. It would seek agreement on final proposals to be presented to democratic governments for action.

To lay the groundwork for this conference the new ICCD decided at PREFACE to hold regional meetings in all the major areas of the world — to share the results of PREFACE with a larger audience and to promote local CCD activities — and two expert workshops to complete the designs for the Association and the Institute. All participants, not already members of CCD, departed with the stated intention of establishing CCDs in their own and in neighboring countries.

Funding for these activities is now being sought. At PREFACE, it was stressed that everyone would have to help. In response, various participants expressed optimism that assistance could be secured in their countries for holding a regional meeting or even the All-Democracies Conference.

So ended a meeting that was unique — the first of its kind, an international gathering of private citizens from both industrialized and developing democracies to consider how all democracies could organize themselves for increased cooperation and mutual support.

The meeting appeared to confirm CCD-USA's assumption that conditions are favorable for a major effort to organize the democracies. With continued bipartisan support at home and wide support abroad, CCD-USA is convinced that this timely initiative can succeed and that it can contribute to a better and more peaceful world.

Report of Section A
on
Proposal for an Association
(Or Forum) of Democracies

Typed by: H. Greene
Edited By:
Date: 11/24/86
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Fonts: 28,29,30,31
Page: 50-51

By general consensus the members favored and recommended the establishment of an Association of Democracies, along the lines set forth below, for the purpose of strengthening and fostering democracy.

The group accepted the paper prepared by Dr. R. D. Gastil, entitled "Proposal for an Association (or Forum) of Democracies" as a useful basis for further consideration by citizens groups, by expert groups and by governments interested in fostering closer cooperation among practicing democracies. In particular, the group accepted the Introduction to the paper as the basic rationale expressing the need for an Association of Democracies. This recognizes that since the democracies have widely varying national interests the Association will confine its attention to those issues that most closely express the shared values of the membership.

The group recommends that the purposes expressed in the Gastil paper and to be served by an Association of Democracies be pursued along these organizational lines at two distinct levels: (a) intergovernmental and (b) private citizens' groups.

Governmental Level:

At the governmental level, the group recommends that an Association be formed among governments at the executive level by all practicing democracies, worldwide, which desire to cooperate for the purposes set forth below. Also at the governmental level, the group recommends that an inter-parliamentary body, of advisory character, be established among the parliaments of members of the Association along the lines to be considered at future private and governmental deliberations on the proposed Association.

The group proposes, for future consideration, that the purposes to be served and the functional roles of the Association of Democracies include the following:

1. Exchange of experience in democratic practices and methods.
2. Support for new and struggling democratic countries.
3. Consideration of the impact of economic and social problems on the democratic system.
4. Assistance in the development of free and pluralistic communications and media.
5. Furtherance of human rights.

6. Consultation among democratic governments in international bodies.
7. Cooperation in combating international terrorism.
8. Resolution of mutual problems when consideration is acceptable to all members of the Association.
9. Promotion and use of common research facilities in the field of democracy.

Private Level:

The group favored the formation of private citizens' groups to promote and foster the practice of democracy and cooperation among democracies along lines recommended at the PREFACE meeting in Wingspread.

Future Consideration:

The group proposes that both the paper prepared by Dr. Gastil and its recommendations and deliberations, as well as others stemming from the PREFACE meeting, serve as the basis for deliberations at meetings of citizens, of experts and of governments convened to consider the establishment of an Association of Democracies.

Participation in Section A

Chair: Dr. Peter Corterier (West Germany)
 Resource Person: Dr. Raymond D. Gastil (USA)
 Mr. Kiatro O. Abisinito (Papua New Guinea)
 Mr. Kenneth Aldred (UK)
 Professor Bashiruddin Ahmed (India)
 Professor Carlos Ayala C. (Venezuela)
 Hon. James J. Carlton (Australia)
 Mr. James R. Huntley (USA)
 Dr. H. W. Lessing (UK)
 Senator Dorothy C. Lightbourne (Jamaica)
 Professor Luigi Vittorio Majocchi (Italy)*
 Mr. Ernesto Samper Pizano (Colombia)
 Dr. J. D. Sethi (India)
 Hon. Joris J. C. Voorhoeve (The Netherlands)
 Hon. Sir Harold Walter (Mauritius)
 Rapporteur: Mr. Robert Foulon (USA), CCD Staff

* The report was presented unanimously with this one abstention.

Report of Section B on Proposal for an International Institute for Democracy

African Views on Democracy
Typed by: H. Greene
Edited By:
Date: 11/24/86
File: 19
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1. The Institute should have full academic independence in its relations with the Association and with governments. This does not contradict the need for a strong link with the Association, based on common aims of securing and promoting democracy. There is a need for consideration of the composition and selection of the Board of Directors of the Institute, considering the criteria for selection (geographical distribution, some representation of all regions being needed) and means of linkage with Association personnel.

2. Some suggested areas of research are: comparative research; transition from authoritarian regimes to democracy; stabilization of young democracies; reasons why democracies can lose their democracy, and why they may regain it (problems of crisis and breakdown of democracy); and conditions — social, economic, developmental — of democratic government and stability. There is some disagreement concerning the degree of attention to be paid to the latter question of the broader conditions of democracy; on the one hand it is an enormous field, in which there is already a tremendous amount of work; on the other hand, countries as in Latin America, where some people are living in the eighteenth century, feel this problem acutely.

3. Information should be gathered about existing resources in this field — existing repositories of information, such as national parliaments, the Council of Europe, and other international bodies, and existing institutes — for studies relating to democracy, of which several were represented among the participants of the section.

4. The working document submitted by Professor Goldman is approved as a basis for development of the proposal. It is to be revised systematically on the basis of the discussion in the section, with further input from correspondence from members of the section. Members are expected to write to Professor Goldman shortly, with relevant information, especially on existing institutions, and he is to proceed to produce a revised draft.

5. There is probably no need for new regional or local institutions in most cases, but rather a need to use existing regional and national institutions as correspondents of a central Institute whose construction is the main order of business. Once the central Institute is formed, new regional institutes may have to be formed if the need arises, for example, due to ideological control by factions in existing local institutes. A good part of the work of

the Institute should be in-house; it should not be a mere clearinghouse or foundation. However, it would also be a clearinghouse, and this role would probably be especially strong in its initial stages, with in-house research building up with time. The degree of external contracting of studies is a question for further study.

6. The Institute should serve as a catalyst to encourage the exchange of scholars, who may spend visiting sessions at local institutes or at the central Institute, thus enhancing communications among the institutes.

The International Steering Group (ISG) which is anticipated to be set up for the coordination of follow-up on this meeting shall integrate the general strategy for solicitation of funds for the Association and the Institute. It is not anticipated that there will be any independent solicitation of funds for the Institute, except through consultation with the ISG and with its full approval. However, Professor Goldman is to proceed with the revision of the draft paper and with the development of a proposal for funding, and then bring it to the CCD and ISG. It may prove to be the case that the Institute will be available for more immediate action than the Association, and in that event it shall proceed in a manner that is not contrary to the broader plans of CCD and ISG. If the Institute is set up first, its studies of relations among democracies may lead to the recommendation to form an Association.

Report of Section C
on
Proposal for a Democratic
Caucus at the United Nations
and
Proposal for Democratic
Cooperation Against
International Terrorism

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Two proposals were considered by the section: (1) the establishment of a democratic caucus at the United Nations and other appropriate organizations, and (2) the promotion of a democratic movement to combat international terrorism. It was agreed that both could be subsumed under an Association of Democracies, but that pending its emergence it would be possible nevertheless for democratic governments to establish a workable caucus which might be useful to democracies at every stage of economic development. In this connection, note was taken that a substantial number of developing democracies were represented at PREFACE.

Democratic Caucus

The desirability of a caucus was uniformly supported. There was some difference of opinion, however, upon the desirability of specifying at this stage particular issues to which the caucus might address itself. The argument was made that the caucus could publicize itself by trying to focus an entire special session of the UN General Assembly on one or two leading issues related to the 40th Anniversary of that Assembly, thereby promising a renaissance of its original humanistic and democratic purposes. The general view, however, was that the main effort should be to emphasize the value of common democratic approaches to particular issues in the successive agendas of the international organizations rather than making a major effort at reform at the outset. The value of prior discussion of issues by representatives of democratic governments would be self-evident to governments considering the proposal for a caucus.

As for the areas in which a caucus could have concrete significance, it was felt these were already sufficiently defined in the caucus paper.

As for who would initiate the caucus, it was agreed that an Association of Democracies would do this nicely, but that in its absence a group of small democracies could best undertake the task, perhaps led by a Third World democracy, and that industrialized democracies would support them.

The Chairman, noting that consensus on the concept had been achieved, called for consideration of the specific recommendations to be made by participants at PREFACE. Following discussion of the several recommendations in the paper proposing a caucus, some modifications were made. It was agreed that the recommendation should read:

1. Accordingly, it is recommended that a Caucus of Democracies be established at the United Nations and other international institutions, as appropriate.
2. The Caucus should aim to harmonize views and, when possible, to concert action on selected issues, but it would be understood that participants are not bound to act in accordance with any consensus and remain free to voice different positions.
3. The Caucus could meet in the early days of each session of the UN General Assembly or other appropriate organization. The Caucus could meet as necessary thereafter to monitor progress on issues of common concern.

International Terrorism

With regard to the proposal for a concerted democratic approach to combat international terrorism, the general concept was warmly received. There was agreement that democracies have a co-national interest in suppressing terrorism, that international terrorism is equally abhorrent to all democracies. It was noted, however, that the response to terrorism could be influenced by a variety of strategic circumstances. Three questions were addressed:

1. Under what auspices could the democratic countries work most effectively together?
2. How specific should our comments and recommendations be with regard to specific causes and cures?
3. When should our recommendations be forwarded to governments?

It was agreed that the proposed Association of Democracies would be the best umbrella for the effort. Private groups, whatever their research capability, do not have enforcement capability. The UN has members promoting terrorism and is obviously unsuitable. NATO is

too narrow.

It was agreed that it would be tendentious of this group to try to identify specific causes of terrorism and pretentious of it to enumerate specific actions to governments.

Finally, it was agreed that since the Association would be the best umbrella for action, no specific recommendations should be made to governments other than that they utilize the prospective Association in combating terrorism.

The section adopted the following recommendation for action:

It is recommended that an appropriate and urgently desirable task for the Association of Democracies would be to promote a public information campaign to create and improve cooperation among the democracies to combat international terrorism.

Persons in Attendance

Hon. James Michael Ah Koy (Fiji), Chair
Hon. Samuel De Palma (USA), Resource Person on Caucus
Prof. Paul Wilkinson (UK), Resource Person on Terrorism
Hon. Shulamit Aloni (Israel)
Dr. Amelia Augustus (USA), CCD staff
Hon. Bernard Destremau (France)
Mr. Niels Jorgen Haagerup (Denmark)
Mr. Akira Naka (Japan)
Mr. Andrew Noss, Observer
Dr. Charles Patrick (USA), CCD staff
Ms. Patricia Paulow, Observer
Ms. Shantini Senanayake (Sri Lanka)
Ms. Isabel Soares (Portugal)
Mr. Flor van de Velde (Belgium)
Dr. Ir. J. J. C. Voorhoeve (Netherlands)
Hon. John M. Wheeldon (Australia)
Maj. Gen. (ret.) A. E. Younger (UK)
Dr. James V. Martin, Jr. (USA), CCD staff, Rapporteur

Implementing Resolution

for

The International Committee for a Community of Democracies

1. We have agreed to form private citizen groups to support and promote the recommendations and objectives agreed upon by the PREFACE Meeting at Wingspread.
2. We agree that representatives of these groups, including interested participants at PREFACE, should be constituted as an International Committee for a Community of Democracies (I.C.C.D.) to coordinate the activities of these citizen groups and to promote the objectives of this meeting.
3. To lead and coordinate this effort, we appoint, on an interim basis, the following officers of the Committee:

Chair

Amb. Samuel De Palma (USA)

Vice Chairs

Hon. James M. Ah Koy, M.P. (Fiji)
Ms. Shulamit Aloni, Member of Knesset (Israel)
Prof. Carlos Ayala C. (Venezuela)
Mme. Beatrice Bazar (Canada)
Hon. James J. Carlton, M.P. (Australia)
Prof. Rodolfo Cerdas-Cruz (Costa Rica)
Dr. Peter Corterier, Member of Bundestag (F.R.G.)
Mr. Sam Levy (Portugal)
Senator Dorothy C. Lightbourne (Jamaica)
Mr. Akira Naka (Japan)
Dr. J. D. Sethi (India)
Hon. Harold Walter, Kt., Q.C. (Mauritius)
Maj. Gen. (Ret.) A. E. Younger, D.S.O., O.B.E. (U.K.)

Treasurer: Mr. Thomas Stern (USA)

Secretary: Mr. Robert Foulon (USA)

Assistant Secretary: Mr. Kenneth Aldred (U.K.)

Convener and Vice Chair,

I.C.C.D. Advisory Council: Mr. James R. Huntley (USA)

4. We encourage the officers appointed to take all measures necessary and appropriate to attaining the objectives and recommendations of the

PREFACE meeting at Wingspread. We urge the officers to make a maximum effort to publicize the initiative taken at Wingspread.

Wingspread Conference Center
Racine, Wisconsin, U.S.A.
April 17, 1985

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