


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WOMEN, THE STATE, AND REPRESSION
IN IMPERIAL JAPAN

by

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Abstract: This paper argues that the minimal political participation of women in Japan before World War II was determined by systematic state policies aimed at rapid industrialization, rather than by the mere persistence of premodern values and attitudes in society. In particular the Public Peace Police Law of 1900, which barred women from attending political meetings until 1922 and from joining political organizations until 1945, is examined in terms of its promulgation, ideology, and enforcement. The law was aimed first of all at textile workers, who were over 50 percent female and essential to the success of Japan's industrialization and export promotion. While attempting to bar women from political participation and self-interested demands, the state actively promoted their new social roles in factory labor and in educated motherhood and social service.

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WOMEN, THE STATE, AND REPRESSION IN IMPERIAL JAPAN*

The exclusion of women from politics was one of the definitive features in the history of Imperial Japan (1895-1945). This exclusion was not parallel to the political impotence of the majority of Japanese men, who won universal suffrage only in 1926 and were constrained thereafter by the weakness of parliamentary institutions. The political potential of Japanese men was differentiated by property qualifications in elections before that time and by education, talent, and connections. In contrast even the most elite women were legally prohibited from elementary political activities: attending meetings, joining organizations, and voting. In addition, censorship was widely employed against men and women advocating peaceful and legal change in the status of women or merely describing the realities of feminine experience and emotion; this repression of women and feminism attacked a broader spectrum of discourse than repression of the left. Moreover, the total exclusion of women from political power contrasts with their dramatic initiation into new, constructive social roles in modern Japan; for example, women were permitted to take national qualifying examinations in medicine as early as 1884 but not in law until 1933. Law, one of the last professions to open to women, was the key to bureaucratic or legislative careers. Though the toppling of legal barriers would not, of course, guarantee Japanese women access to power, an examination of these barriers affords considerable insight into the state's compelling interest in manipulating female behavior.¹

In considering the promulgation, ideology, and enforcement of measures barring women from political participation, this essay attempts a preliminary contribution to the broader problem of state policies toward women, which has thus far received little attention from historians. The boom in Japanese women's history since the mid-1970s has tended to focus on reformers or social groups remote from the center of power, while treatments of the bureaucracy and political parties have continued to ignore their relationship to women. In contrast, this essay attempts to show that the political exclusion of women in Imperial Japan was enforced by specific and articulate state policies which were of great significance in the nature of that state and also in the evolving social position of women.

Japanese industrialization was the planned creation of the new state born in the Meiji Restoration of 1868. Sponsored by the old ruling class under the threat of Western military and economic domination, the Meiji Restoration created a new society rather than being created by it. The Meiji state was able to shatter former institutions such as the samurai monopoly of army and government or the extreme localism of the ancient regime. It made history, though it did not make it just as it pleased, and found both the old and new institutions capable of fueling opposition. Opposition was unwelcome in an age of international crisis threatening the very existence of the nation, and Meiji bureaucrats shared with their Tokugawa predecessors an interest in managing the thought and behavior of Japanese subjects but possessed a vastly enhanced capacity to do so through centralization, mass education, military conscription, and modern technology. Thus, the decision to exclude women from politics was part of a systematic strategy to mold the populace to state ends--industrial and military strength--and not a mere reflection of popular customs and prejudices. Like other Meiji policies, this decision, once made, acquired its own vitality and constituency, with lasting effect on Japanese society. Therefore, it seems most productive to begin with the question of what the Meiji state expected from Japanese women and why.

The definitive measure by which women were excluded from politics in Imperial Japan was the Public Peace Police Law (Chian keisatsu hō) of 1900, which barred women from joining political organizations or attending political meetings. It had evolved from the Peace Preservation Regulations (Chian jōrei) of 1887, and both measures were formulated under the personal supervision of preeminent Meiji oligarch Yamagata Aritomo. The Peace Preservation Regulations, aimed at suppressing demands for democracy in the Popular Rights Movement (Jiyū minken undō), had banned secret societies and assemblies and empowered the police to halt political meetings as they deemed necessary, to confiscate publications inciting disturbance, and to impose virtual martial law in time of riot. These regulations were modelled on Bismarck's antisocialist legislation of 1878, but neither the original Japanese nor the German measure excluded women from political meetings and organizations, though the Popular Rights Movement included women activists and proposals of women's political rights. The later exclusion of women from politics was a distinctly Japanese departure from an otherwise European-derived law and, as such, reveals unique features of Japanese politics and society.²

The Public Peace Police Law also drew from earlier legislation regulating assemblies and meetings, which had barred first public servants then women from political organizations. Public servants had been defined to include persons outside the government whose occupations gave them special influence on education and public opinion. Military men, policemen, and public and private school teachers and students were categorically barred from joining political organizations in the Regulations on Public Meetings (Shūkai jōrei) of 1880. Women, minors, and those deprived of civil rights were added to this list in a final, hasty, and unexplained act by the outgoing government just before the Meiji Constitution went into effect in 1890; furthermore only women and minors were also barred from even attending political meetings.³

The Public Peace Police Law of 1900 incorporated these provisions of the Regulations on Public Meetings, broadened the police authority to ban meetings and confiscate publications earlier granted in the Peace Preservation Regulations, and included new measures outlawing unions and strikes. It thus served as the definitive instrument of the repression of women until 1945, except that the ban on women's attendance at political meetings was rescinded in 1922. In contrast the notorious Peace Preservation Law (Chian iji hō) of 1925 posed no new restraints based on gender; by outlawing dissent from the imperial and capitalist systems, it increased the repression of radical women, but not on the basis of their femininity. Thus, the state's interest in the repression of women must be considered in terms of the turn-of-the-century timing and the ideology of public service.⁴

The timing of the Public Peace Police Law in 1900 suggests its relevance to broad social trends rather than a specific target such as the Popular Rights Movement which had obviously inspired earlier legislation on assemblies and meetings. The Meiji Constitution of 1890 had stymied the Popular Rights Movement by offering a restricted version of parliamentary politics

and simultaneously enshrining the divine Emperor as locus of sovereignty and foundation of the state. Meanwhile victory in the Sino-Japanese War had inspired extraordinary national unity and cultural confidence, stamping the 1890s as a conservative decade contrasting with the cosmopolitan iconoclasm of the 1880s. Cultural confidence which contrasted the altruistic Japanese woman with the egotistic Western woman was, and remained, a significant strand of anti-feminist rhetoric. In opposition, the embryonic labor and socialist movements turned their attention to the dismal plight of Japanese factory workers, of whom well over half were women. Thus, at this time, the exclusion of women from politics, coupled with the ban on unions and strikes, aimed at consolidating the existing social hierarchy.⁵

The ban on women's political participation illustrated the complexity of managing an industrializing society by incorporating two contradictory themes: that women bore public duties so weighty as to preclude their indulgence in mere politics and that women were politically incompetent. The grouping of women with minors, felons, and mental defectives strongly supports the theme of political incapacity; and, certainly, notions of the biological limits on women's mental and emotional functions were deeply embedded in contemporary Japanese culture. Nevertheless, other evidence strongly suggests that the Japanese elite preferred to justify women's political exclusion in terms of their special place in the family, and the family's relevance to the state, rather than their biological inferiority. For example, the civil code of 1898 permitted an adult single woman--but not a married woman--to head a household and represent herself in financial and legal transactions. Women acting on their own behalf were not biologically incompetent, but socially disruptive. Ideological reformulation of the patriarchal family and its relation to the state encouraged new and constructive social contributions from women, while vitiating their potential to assert their own interests.⁶

Hierarchy in the family was equated with monarchy in the state in late Meiji ideology. First to propound this theme was political philosopher and official Katō Hiroyuki who, during the 1880s, proposed that the traditional values of loyalty (*chū*) and filial piety (*kō*) were actually one and the same (*chūkō itchi*). His formulation was distinctively modern and distinctively Japanese, though, of course, not lacking in medieval and foreign inspiration. The application of the family motif to larger structures drew deeply from the trends of medieval and early modern Japanese, when warrior and commercial organizations had adopted quasi-familial relations. It also expressed a strong sense of ethnic identity which had been evolving since the fourteenth century. While precedents for the concept of the family-state existed in Chinese and German tradition, Maruyama Masao has distinguished the Japanese version as more literal, a tangible reality based on racial homogeneity rather than a metaphor. Katō, like other Meiji authorities, was thoroughly versed in East Asian statecraft as well as contemporary Western, especially, German, legal theory; and he drew eclectically from these sources to fashion an ideology appropriate to the particular circumstances of late nineteenth-century Japan. Thus, it was unsurprising that the new state should embrace Katō's formulation by articulating the Emperor's new authority in terms of

patriarchy, in which the filial piety of children toward parents paralleled the loyalty of subjects to the state. Certainly the family was literally the locus of state authority for wives and daughters, who could not act in politics, law, or financial transactions except through the male household head. State authority over females was exercised through the family. Moreover, family disobedience was literally equated with lese-majesty, as will be shown in censorship cases.⁷

Most works on women's education in Imperial Japan stressed service to the state through the microcosm of the family, appealing to fundamental themes in modern Japanese political culture. The quasi-official Meiji onna daigaku (Meiji Greater Learning for Women), compiled by Nakashima Tokuzō and other scholars under the auspices of the Ministry of Education, declared baldly that "the home is a public place where private feelings should be forgotten" and "from the state's view, it is the ultimate school." While pre-Meiji thought had distinguished the "public" orthodoxy of the ruling class from the "private," selfish concerns of commoners, the Meiji transformation included all citizens in the public realm without sanctioning private interests. Moreover "politics" gradually came to be equated with the private realm, tarring political parties and elected representatives with the charge of selfish representation of special interests, while the Emperor, bureaucracy, and military maintained the pose of transcendent representatives of the nation as a whole. Thus challenging the government was political but supporting it was not, and women were encouraged to join mass patriotic organizations such as the Aikoku Fujin Kai of 1901. These conceptions of family and state, public and private, politics and patriotism afforded a parallel between women's unselfish service to their families and the national service of the military, police, teachers, and students. In addition, the general articulation of women's unselfish service to the family-state, rather than her particular biological nature, permitted a wide range of constructive social roles. From the state's viewpoint, new social roles and political exclusion were complementary in the interests of industrialization. Thus, no uniform or monolithic conception captures the diversity of women's experience in early twentieth-century Japan.⁸

The modernizing Japanese state made enormous new demands on women as it did on men, first of all in the industrial labor force. The labor force was overwhelmingly female in textiles, the first significant mechanized industry to develop during the 1880s. Although Meiji economic statistics are not wholly reliable and subject to divergent interpretations, the Public Peace Police Regulations appear to have coincided with the peak importance of textile production. At the turn of the century textiles constituted about 40 percent of manufacturing output and 60 percent of the critical export commodities which permitted the import of raw materials and advanced technology, with a labor force 60 to 80 percent female--much higher than in Western nations at any stage of development. Textile factories were small and widely dispersed in the countryside, utilizing the preindustrial pattern in which the patriarchal stem family--the household--combined farming with by-employments.

The typical Meiji worker was a peasant girl in her teens, contracted for one to five years by her father who received a lump sum payment from the factory recruiter in advance. Thus her labor was not an alternative to family duty, but a part of it. Debt and filial piety bound her to fulfill the terms of the contract, while the marginal role of her earnings within the larger household encouraged toleration of minimal wages. Her parents tended to be suspicious of strikes and unions, which might raise wages and benefit the entire household but also emancipate her from family control. Her submission was also encouraged by the temporary nature of her employment, for she usually returned to the farm before marriage though she might resume factory work if the family suffered poor fortune.

As Thomas Smith has shown, the combination of agriculture with rural manufacturing and the pooling of income from members' different activities were long-term and highly efficient trends deeply embedded in the social and economic structure of early modern Japan. The break-up of the large rural household into nuclear families or independent individuals would have required great increases in wages or reductions in living standards, either one disruptive to the state-sponsored industrialization program. Thus, the broad conception of women's unselfish service to the family-state and submission to patriarchy supported the system of low-paid and docile women workers, while a narrow preoccupation with her domestic roles would have contradicted it.⁹

Female domesticity, especially the social significance of educated motherhood, formed a minor and somewhat more progressive strand within the family-state ideology until World War II. Fearing the illiterate mother as an infectious carrier of national backwardness, the state from the 1870s had defied popular custom and prejudice by inaugurating coeducational, universal, compulsory primary schools. Peasants resisted, distrusting girls' education and relying on their household, farm and factory labor. Nevertheless, girls' enrollments reached 88 percent of the school-age population by 1899 in spite of lagging well below those of boys. As proclaimed by the leading architect of Meiji education, Mori Arinori, "the foundations of national prosperity rest upon education; the foundations of education upon women's education."

Mori was an early proponent of the "good wife, wise mother" which gradually became the dominant feminine ideal of the Japanese middle-class. Although reformers and many historians have assumed this ideal to be a survival of women's subordinate position in premodern Japan, Sharon Sievers has described it as a "revolutionary" Meiji innovation contesting the earlier axiom of danson jōhi--"revere the male, despise the female." Earlier standards of feminine behavior (such as the seventeenth-century Onna daigaku, Greater Learning for Women) had indeed demanded obedience to the husband but had placed duty to the parents-in-law even higher and had not discussed the processes of childrearing, according to the hierarchical norm of household structure in which the duty of the younger was to accommodate the elder. In contrast, the ideal of "wise mother" was suffused with the educational needs of the modern Japanese nation and aimed at the nurture of patriotic and scientifically minded children. The "wise mother" also appealed to many

educated and even activist women, by stressing competence and responsibility to the new generation rather than submission to the elders and husband. Gradually the ideal of "wise mother" overshadowed the traditional values of filial piety during the 1920s and 1930s, as the importance of female labor decreased due to the rise of heavy industry and a permanent male work force trained in more advanced technology. The "wise mother," however, accorded with the general paradigm of women's unselfish devotion and exclusion from politics.¹⁰

Enforcement of the exclusion of women from politics was directed at middle-class feminists, for working and radical women were usually dealt with under separate and gender-neutral legislation banning unions, strikes, and sedition. Enforcement was generally limited to breaking up meetings, confiscating publications, and detention without arrest, in contrast with the frequent arrest, trial, and imprisonment of radicals. Thus, feminism was definitely deemed a breach of the public peace requiring official action but not the most serious threat. The state's reliance on informal administrative and police actions in the repression of feminism left only scanty and haphazard documentation. (Liberal journalists who freely criticized repression afford one source of documentation, since police action was directed more at theoretical challenge to the family-state and less at criticism of specific acts.) Enforcement apparently reached a peak around 1911 as rising public interest in democracy and the "women's question" clashed with force-feeding of state morality in the wake of the trial of anarchist Kōtoku Shusui for an alleged attempt to assassinate the Emperor. A lull during the more liberal and pluralistic 1920s was evidenced by the refusal of one Home Ministry official to interfere with a women's group demanding suffrage, on the grounds that a group composed exclusively of women could not, by definition, be a political organization and thus did not fall under the Public Peace Police Law. The rise of militarism after the Manchurian Incident of 1931 brought a new peak of repression in which feminist groups dissolved into mass patriotic organizations.¹¹

Censorship was legally distinct from political exclusion, authorized by a series of press laws rather than the Public Peace Police Law. Its ideological rationale, however, was the same: the family-state. In both cases the institutional locus of enforcement was the Home Ministry, though the Ministry of Education also occasionally initiated interference in feminist publications. The target groups were the same since all major feminist organizations published journals or newsletters and generally experienced restrictions on meetings and censorship of publications during the same periods of time. In addition, censorship is somewhat better documented than interference in meetings and thus may be examined in order to illustrate the enforcement of the policy against women's political participation.

Shifting political currents and mass appeal were key factors in Home Ministry decisions of whether or not to intervene in feminist meetings or publications. For example, in 1912 Shimamura Hōgetsu's translation of Hermann Sudermann's Magda, a melodrama about a daughter who provokes her father's fatal stroke by refusing a respectable marriage, circulated freely

in script version in Waseda bungaku which had a limited circulation of a few thousand intellectuals. The Home Ministry, however, closed performances of the staged version at the Geijutsu theater where the voluptuous actress Matsui Sumako (then carrying on a notorious affair with Shimamura) was cast as the heroine. The responsible official, in one of the few recorded explanations of such an action, commented that many parts of the play threatened "loyalty and filial piety, Japan's essential virtues" but, most particularly, the renowned Matsui was "so bewitching that I myself felt her appeal." Nevertheless, performances were permitted to resume after Shimamura appended a closing soliloquy in which Magda (Matsui) apologized and criticized herself. Thus, some version of new ideas about women could reach a large and interested audience.¹²

The sporadic character of enforcement contrasted with the totalitarian state ideology. Women of the Heiminsha (Commoners' Society) protested their political exclusion annually before the Diet until prevented by the police in the aftermath of the Kōtoku trial. The following year the Seitōsha (Bluestocking Society) formed and held meetings and public lecture forums with clear political implications; the public lectures were soon banned, and police harassment of internal meetings is generally cited as one of the reasons for the group's dissolution in 1915. Nonetheless, several of its members founded or joined organizations aiming at women's political rights during the 1920s.¹³

Despite the erratic and officially unexplained character of repression, banned women's and feminist publications seem to fit three themes: sedition, pornography, and socialism. Fictional accounts of family confrontation such as Magda might be banned in accord with the identity of family and state. Even arguments for legal and peaceful change in the status of women might be banned as was John Stuart Mill's The Subjection of Women in 1910. Any portrayal of female sexuality, even if confined to psychological musings, risked censorship as pornography, the fate of several works of naturalist literature around the time of the Russo-Japanese War and certain issues of Seitō. Finally, while this essay attempts to distinguish repression of women qua women from repression of the left, contemporary police and moralists showed a pronounced tendency to identify the two. Several early feminists did turn to socialism as the comprehensive economic, political, social, and ideological answer to the problems they confronted as women, notably Fukuda Hideko of the Popular Rights Movement, Aoyama (Yamakawa) Kikue of the Seitōsha, and Tajima Hide and Yamanouchi Mine of the suffragist Shin Fujin Kyōkai (New Woman's Society). Genuine leftist commitment, however, was not required as a qualification for being accused of propagating socialism. In 1932 the advocacy of equal property rights for women by Professor Takikawa Yukitoki of Kyoto Imperial University Law School was cited as one evidence of his anarchist/Marxist convictions, since such a program entailed an assault on the property rights of men. Thus, women's groups and feminism were suspected of disturbing family harmony and social hierarchy, vitiating loyalty to the Emperor, and propagating pornography and socialism. No wonder Shimamura bitterly complained the public was in danger of confusing the phrase "women's question" (fujin mondai) with "publication banned" (hatsubai kinshi).¹⁴

The erratic nature of repression and censorship, and the lack of severity of its penalties, requires careful delineation of its effects on Japanese women. Chronic and petty official harassment exacerbated the divisions between women interested in political rights and those committed to social work. Others were probably discouraged from entering public affairs at all. Censorship, by means of the post-publication confiscation of entire runs of a journal or book, wreaked havoc with the shoestring finances of small, avant-garde intellectual and political groups. Though repression and censorship affected only a small number of persons directly, the numbers of political women and their impact on public consciousness would have been more substantial had the state maintained neutrality on this issue. The state's impact in excluding women from politics was probably less in the negative provisions of the Public Peace Police Law than in the positive assertion of the complementary ideology of unselfish service to the family-state. Political non-participation and self-abnegation struck chords of profound cultural values held with particular intensity by Japanese women. (Had this not been the case, repressive legislation might well have spawned more opposition than it stifled.) State ideology proffered a clearly articulated focal point for the vague altruistic impulses which permeated the culture and linked them inextricably with national wealth and strength. The resonance between state initiative in industrialization and women's role socialization prompted the vast majority of educated women into charitable or patriotic voluntary associations for the upper-class, employment in teaching or social service for the younger middle-class. (Women constituted one-quarter of the primary school teachers in 1916 and received one-third the average salary of their male counterparts.)

Advocacy of the needs of infants and children was an especially prominent theme even among feminists and radicals: Seitōsha founder Hiratsuka Raichō devoted most of her life to securing protective legislation for mothers and children; Shin Fujin Kyōkai officer Tanaka Takako founded Tokyo's first public family counselling center in 1932, and anarchist Itō Noe denounced abortion and declared that all women should bear children. The mass scale of social service organizations for Japanese women--over three million members in the Kansai area alone in the 1920s--contrasts with the miniscule numbers in political movements. The Japanese Women's Suffrage League (Nihon Fujin Sanseiken Kyōkai), the largest though not the only women's rights group, had a mere 1511 members in 1930. The aversion of Japanese women toward politics also contrasts with the West, where there were eighty thousand members in Denmark's National Women's Council in 1899, one hundred thousand in the National American Women's Suffrage Association in 1915, and even eight thousand in the Russian Union for Women's Equality in 1905. Among those Japanese women whose energies were not wholly absorbed in survival, the vast majority accepted the state's dictum of enhanced social utility and political exclusion.¹⁵

In conclusion, the exclusion of women from politics in Imperial Japan demonstrated the state's compelling interest in securing women's contributions to industrialization, especially in factory labor, educated motherhood, and social service, while discouraging their demands. It was rationalized

in terms of the desirability of social hierarchy and the superiority of Japanese culture and not the biological nature of women. Within the paradigm of women's unselfish devotion to the family-state, which allowed labor outside the home, the theme of educated motherhood gradually came to predominate as female factory labor diminished in relative economic importance. The state's combination of negative repression and positive ideological initiative insured that most rural and factory women were too weak economically, politically, and legally to make demands on the system, while the more fortunate and better educated were deeply drawn to the ethos of absolute altruism. In consequence, Japanese women never developed a success ethic comparable to that of Meiji men, which demanded rewards commensurate to achievement, nor an effective political movement. Their immense contributions to industrialization were but poorly rewarded in income, power, and status.

NOTES

- * An earlier version of this paper was presented to the Midwest Japan Seminar and Midwest Conference Association for Asian Studies, Ann Arbor, Michigan, October 15, 1982.
1. For a general outline of politics in Imperial Japan, see Tetsuo Najita, Hara Kei in the Politics of Compromise (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967) and Peter Duus, Party Rivalry and Political Change in Taisho Japan (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968). Susan Pharr stressed role socialization as a constraint on the political activity of Japanese women after their acquisition of political rights in 1945 in Political Women in Japan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981). On women in medicine and law, see Lois Dilatush, "Women in the Professions," in Joyce Lebra, et al. (eds.), Women in Changing Japan (Boulder: Westview, 1977), 51-55; and H. von Straelen, The Japanese Woman Looking Forward (Tokyo: Kyo Bun, 1940), 103.
 2. Kōchiken, Tokubetsu Kōtōka, Tokubetsu kōtō keisatsu kankei hōki kaigu shūroku. Tokkō kyōyō shiryō, no. 9 (March 1929), 19; Wakamori Rintarō and Yamamoto Fujie, Nihon no joseishi (Shūei, 1971), 4:67-150 and 6:286-87; Richard Mitchell, Thought Control in Prewar Japan (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1976), 23; Roger Hackett, Yamagata Aritomo in the Rise of Modern Japan (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971), 105-06; W. W. MacLaren (ed.), Japanese Government Documents (Washington, D. C.: University Publications of America, 1979), 2:495-504. On Bismarck's legislation against the German social democrats, see Vernon Lidtke, The Outlawed Party: Social Democracy in Germany, 1878-1890 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), 73-78.
 3. MacLaren, pp. 495-504; Elise Tipton, "The Civil Police in the Suppression of the Prewar Japanese Left" (Ph.D. dissertation, Indiana University, 1977), 121-32; Sharon Sievers, "Feminist Criticism in Japanese Politics in the 1880s," Signs 6 (1981), 615.
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 5. Yoshimi Kaneko, Fujin sanseiken, vol. 2, Nihon kindai joseishi, (Kajima, 1971), 102.
 6. The Civil Code of Japan, trans. W. J. Sebald (Toronto: Butterworth, 1934), 2-5, 168-69, 174-89, 227.
 7. Maruyama Masao, Thought and Behavior in Modern Japanese Politics, Ivan Morris (ed.) (London: Oxford University Press, 1969), 36-37.
 8. Nakashima quoted by Kazuko Tanaka, A Short History of the Women's Movement in Modern Japan (Tokyo: Femintern Press, n.d.), 12.

9. Gary Saxonhouse, "Country Girls and Communication among Competitors in the Japanese Cotton-Spinning Industry," in Hugh T. Patrick (ed.), Japanese Industrialization and its Social Consequences (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976), 98-99; William V. Rapp, "Firm Size and Japan's Export Structure," in Patrick, 208; Yasue Aoki Kidd, Women Workers in the Japanese Cotton Mills, 1880-1920 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, East Asia Papers, no. 20, 1978); Sheila Matsumoto, "Women in Factories," in Lebra, 51-55; Mikiso Hane, Peasants, Rebels and Outcasts: The Underside of Modern Japan (New York: Pantheon, 1982), 30-31; Thomas C. Smith, The Agrarian Origins of Modern Japan (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1959).
10. Ivan Parker Hall, Mori Arinori (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1973), 422-24; Sievers, 602-09. On the changing nature of the labor force after World War I, see Koji Taira, Economic Development and the Labor Market in Japan (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970).
11. Incidents of repression and censorship are cited in notes 12-14 below. Kathleen Molony quoted the explanation of failure to ban women's suffrage groups in the 1920s in "One Woman Who Dared" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan, 1980), 155-56.
12. Ishibashi Tanzan, Ishibashi Tanzan zenshū, vol. 1 (Tōyō Keizai Shinpō, 1972), 215; Ide Fumiko, Seitō (Kōbundō, 1961), 61-62.
13. Murakami Nobuhiko, "Fujin mondai to fujin kaihō undō," in Iwanami Kōza, Nihon rekishi, 18 (Iwanami, 1975), 283; Pauline Reich, "Japan's Literary Feminists: The Seitō Group," Signs 2 (1976), 284-85. See also Molony, 273-74 and 311.
14. Nancy Andrews, "The Seitōsha: An Early Japanese Women's Organization," Papers on Japan 6 (Cambridge: Harvard East Asia Research Center, 1972), 49; Fumiko Coyne, "The Censorship of Publications in Japan, 1868-1945" (M.A. thesis, University of Chicago Library School, 1967); Shimamura Hōgetsu, "Kindai bungei to fujin mondai," Chūō kōron 28, special issue on "Fujin mondai" (July 1913), 9-10. Another work censored for purely familial themes was Tanizaki Jun'ichirō's Sasameyuki in 1943; the officer responsible remarked that the last thing needed in a country at war was a portrayal of "individualistic women." See Hatanaka Shigeo, Shōwa shuppan dan'atsu shoshi (Toshō Shinbun, 1965), 166.
15. Molony, 139-51, 244; Tanaka Takako, Tōyō (Yōa, 1943); Ken Miyamoto, "Itō Noe and the Bluestockings," Japan Interpreter 10 (1975), 199; Ishizuki Shizue, "Fujin undō no tenkai," in Koyama Hitoshi, Taishōki no kenryoku to minshū (Hōritsu bunka, 1980), 156, 167; Richard Stites, The Women's Liberation Movement in Russia (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978), 227.

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