COOPERATIVE AGREEMENT ON HUMAN SETTLEMENTS AND NATURAL RESOURCE SYSTEMS ANALYSIS

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

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Ethnicity and Social Class Formation in the Bolivian Lowlands

by
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Introduction

In October 1984, members of a number of settler communities in the vicinity of the San Julian settlement project blockaded the German Highway east of the Rio Grande, near where it passes the project entrance, in order to force government action on a list of grievances. The 22 grievances covered a variety of issues; including government inaction on evidence of corruption among personnel of the National Colonization Institute (INC), inadequate road maintenance, failure to construct wells that had been promised to settlers, inattention to settler demands for teachers, and failure to implement legislation specifying that settlers were to be provided with legal title to lands (El Mundo 1984d; Appendix). As the hours passed, traffic on the heavily travelled road backed up for a considerable distance in both directions. Tensions between settlers and truck drivers continued to mount until armed truck drivers comandeered a National Road Service bulldozer and attempted to break the blockade. As the bulldozer laden with truck drivers firing weapons into the air approached the roadblock, settlers attacked with machetes and clubs. The melee that ensued left five dead and 22 injured (El Mundo 1984c).

The incident electrified the entire department. In the capital city of Santa Cruz, an open assembly called by the Pro-Santa Cruz Committee (Comité pro Santa Cruz) exhorted the national government to expel the highland settlers from the department. An armed mob set out from the city with the intention of "... reconquering our eastern territory on behalf of the sovereignty of Santa Cruz" (El Mundo 1984b; Presencia 1984d).

An attack on the settlers was averted only when the army seized the river crossing leading into the area and refused to let the mob pass.

In Montero, the second largest city of the department, the regional peasant union organized a demonstration in support of the settlers, and in opposition to the actions taken in the city of Santa Cruz. The union accused Santa Cruz politicians of seeking to use the incident to undermine the authority of the national government in order to further their own regional interests at the expense of settlers, and demanded that the national government immediately undertake an investigation of the entire incident (Presencia 1984a, 1984b). The call was subsequently echoed by the university students' union (Federación Universitaria Local) and the Santa Cruz department human rights commission (Presencia 1984c). Days later, despite official pronouncements that calm had been restored, settlers were reported to be abandoning their holdings due to a lack of guarantees for their safety, and the president of the San Julian Civic Committee requested that a military garrison be established in the area to protect the settlers (El Mundo 1984a).

Peasants in Bolivia frequently use roadblocks as a means of calling attention to grievances, and conflict with truckers who are affected is not at all uncommon. In other areas of the country such incidents receive little notice. Why the events near San Julian were regarded as threatening by the rest of Santa Cruz department is therefore an interesting question. Indeed, as the immediate crisis subsided, government officials, representa-

tives of the foreign development agencies operating in Santa Cruz department, and citizens began to try to understand how the original incident and subsequent events had happened. In general, explanations were not much different from those that sought to interpret previous outbreaks of violence that have occurred in Santa Cruz. These conventional explanations, while sometimes exhibiting great variety in their details, begin and end with discussion of the "camba/kolla conflict," which is viewed as a contemporary manifestation of the historically strong regionalist sentiments found in Santa Cruz. Regionalism and the rivalry between cambas and kollas are treated both as inherent conditions in the region, and as causal variables giving rise to specific events.

It is not the intention of this paper to deny the exstence of conflicts between cambas (people born and raised in Santa Cruz who claim Spanish ancestry) and kollas (migrants to Santa Cruz from the Andean highland and valley regions of Bolivia)(Map). Nor does it seek to deny the strength of regionalism as a force in the political life of Santa Cruz. Both are facts of life in the department. However, when simply cited as a prima facie explanation, these conditions mask the true nature of the social forces that give rise to conflict and violence. These social forces have their origins not in innate inter-ethnic antagonism nor in regional chauvinism, but in the process of class formation that is an important feature of capitalist expansion into the geographic and economic frontier of Santa Cruz. The importance of the dynamics of regional and national class formation has been recognized as central to an understanding economic development in

Santa Cruz (cf. Blanes et al. 1984). However, Sandoval (1983) has noted that possible political repercussions have dissuaded many investigators from undertaking a systematic investigation of the theme. The present paper hopes to serve as a starting point for discussion in this area.

Isolation and Regionalism

Throughout most of its post-Conquest history Santa Cruz has been separated from the major urban centers of the continent by geographic obstacles and distance. Because of this, it experienced a degree of regional autonomy matched by few other parts of the Spanish empire early in the colonial period. This privilege was jealously guarded, and efforts by central government authorities to extend their influence were regarded at best as unwelcome interference and at worst as grounds for violent secessionist movements.

The site of the first city of Santa Cruz was occupied in 1561, as capital of the lowland province of Moxos, pertaining to the Audencia of Charcas of the Viceroyalty of Lima. Soon thereafter, tensions between the lowlanders and the central government began to rise. Audencia of Charcas authorities sought to increase their control by attempting to establish a new capital of Moxos that would be more accessible from the highlands. Two attempts ended in failure before a new settlement was actually established in 1604. The residents of Santa Cruz refused to be resettled there as the Audencia had ordered, however. Instead, they created their own town several kilometers

from the official provincial capital. After 17 years, they reluctantly agreed to move into the official town, renaming it to Santa Cruz de la Sierra and coming to dominate its political, economic, and social life (Stearman 1976:51-53).

Santa Cruz remained loosely tied to the Audencia of Charcas until 1778, when jurisdiction was shifted to the Audencia of Buenos Aires under the newly formed Viceroyalty of La Plata. Given this realignment, it was not unreasonable that Santa Cruz sent its delegation to Buenos Aires to represent the region's interests as the new nations of South America were being defined and their boundaries established following the Wars of Independence. As a result, Santa Cruz did not have a full delegation present when the Assembly of Provinces of Upper Peru met in La Paz, in 1825, and annexed the region as a department of Bolivia (Heath 1969:255; Stearman 1976:54-55).

The ensuing years saw a continuation of the uneasiness that had characterized Santa Cruz' relationship to the central government in the highlands. The government at times viewed Santa Cruz as a faraway place to which it relegated its thornier political problems, as when the Ballivian administration (1841-1847) sought to dismantle a bloated military by establishing colonies of former soldiers there (Klein 1982:121). As the 19th century drew to a close, the central government became increasingly concerned with the retention of political control over its lowland domains in the face of encroachment and annexation by its neighbors. In 1886, Bolivia established a Ministry of Colonization, and in 1901, it offered large expanses of land in the eastern part of the country to Europeans and North

Americans recruited through its consular offices. Despite offers of easy credit and other inducements, this effort to attract settlers who would populate the lowlands and invest in their development failed (Hess 1980:56). Bolivia's desire to settle the eastern lowlands increased in the wake of it loss of large tracts of land to a successful annexation by Brazil. In 1905, it designated eight areas encircling the eastern lowlands as a "frontier ring." In the absence of a concrete development plan, however, the designated settlement areas remained little more than features added to the maps of the nation (Fifer 1982:411).

While it was preoccupied with external aggression, the central government also had to be concerned about threats to its sovereignty from within Santa Cruz. In 1920 and 1924, separatist sentiments flared into armed revolt, which the army forcibly repressed, primarily with highland troops. Secessionist movements became a particular concern as hostilities grew with Paraguay preceding the Chaco War. The government in La Paz feared that Santa Cruz would support the Paraguayans against Bolivia. When war broke out, in 1931, the government forbade the formation of lowland regiments and denied political posts to people from Santa Cruz. These actions may have been successful in heading off possible efforts to use the war as a means of secession. However, they also deepened the regional antagonisms that made them appear necessary in the first place (Heath 1969: 256-257; Stearman 1976:58).

In 1949, Santa Cruz was the seat of a revolt on behalf of the emergent Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario (MNR) party.

Although it lasted only a few weeks before being put down by the central government, the revolt spread to a number of cities before it was brought under control, and it marked Santa Cruz as a center of agitation on behalf of the MNR. When the MNR successfully seized power in 1952, however, sporadic revolts in Santa Cruz continued, indicating that regional leaders had had their own motives for supporting the revolution. These revolts were not put down decisively until 1959, when a militia of highland peasants was sent into the department. Atrocities committed by the soldiers during their suppression of the revolt and the subsequent occupation of the department deepened regional dislike of highlanders, and slogans such as, "Be patriotic, kill a kolla," came into common usage (Heath 1969:274).

Armed guerrilla campaigns orchestrated by the right-wing falangist party broke out in 1964, in connection with the deposition of President Paz Estenssoro and his replacement by General Rene Barrientos. Violent incidents reflecting separatist sentiments continued to flare up throughout the 1960s (Heath 1969:257-259). In the 1970s, the groups responsible for these incidents operated openly as paramilitary units supporting the policies of Colonel Hugo Banzer, a Santa Cruz native who led the army in a bloody coup that brought him to power in 1971. In 1980, these same paramilitary units played a key role in securing Santa Cruz on behalf of General Luis Garcia Mesa, who overthrew the provisional government of President Lydia Gueiler and prevented the democratically elected government of Hernan Siles Zuazo from assuming office. Since 1981, when Garcia was forced to resign and Siles was elected a second time, the falange has

played a major role in orchestrating sentiments against the central government through strong-arm tactics against political opponents, selective terrorism against kollas, and through participation in civic groups seeking to assert lowland cultural identity in the face of continuing in-migration by large numbers of people from the Andean highlands and valleys.

Traditional Society and Economic Growth

An important factor underlying the separatist sentiments in Santa Cruz was the different nature of the economy in the lowlands from that of the rest of the country and the weakness of the linkages joining the two economies. Since early in the colonial period, the economy of the Andean highlands and valleys was built around the mining industry, and was linked through mining to the expanding international capitalist economy. Agriculture provided the mining centers with food and acted as a labor reservoir, providing workers when mine production expanded in response to favorable conditions and absorbing them when the industry contracted (Klein 1982).

In Santa Cruz, however, a classic manorial economy with weak linkages to other regional economies prevailed. Large estates dominated the region, and cattle raising and the production of crops to satisfy internal food and fiber needs were the predominant productive activities. These estates were the property of a landed gentry, which used the land to extract labor from a peasantry through both tenant farming and renting. Because land was abundant and labor perpetually scarce, the

exploitation of the peasantry may have been less oppressive than in areas where this was not the case. If they were willing to locate far from roads and the few periodic markets, and to cut themselves off from the benefits they may have accrued through patron/client ties with their landlord, land was available so that tenants and renters could clear their own farms out of the forest. In fact, freeholders were a prominent feature of the region's peasantry.

A distinct merchant class did not develop in the traditional regional society because of the few opportunities it presented for entrepreneurial activity. The small number of periodic markets to be found were located on one or another of the large estates and controlled by the landlord. Absentee landlords resided in the towns of the region, and their estates provided a major part of their household consumption needs. Thus, they did not exert the sort of demand that would give rise to an active commerce.

With the assumption of power by the MNR in 1952, the traditional society was irrevocably changed. The MNR took two initiatives which radically altered relations of production throughout rural Bolivia, and stimulated a rapid expansion of capitalist agriculture and industry in Santa Cruz department. These were the Bolivian agrarian reform and the solicitation of a massive infusion of foreign and national capital for the development of commercial agriculture and agroprocessing in Santa Cruz.

The agrarian reform, which was enacted in 1953, was the more widely known of the two initiatives. Before the reform, large

estates which extracted labor and personal service from a resident peasantry in return for usufruct rights to land, were the predominant landholding units in the highland and valley regions of the country. Under the agrarian reform, estate lands were expropriated and redistributed among the peasant families residing there. Peasants were relieved of their labor and personal service obligations that had previously restricted their freedom to leave the estates and seek opportunities elsewhere.

Over time, the new freedom of movement combined with the increasing inability of peasant households to subsist on the lands they had been allotted under the reform. This led growing numbers of people to seek jobs in Bolivia's cities or work on the commercial agricultural agricultural enterprises that were beginning to develop in the lowlands. The agrarian reform also incorporated the peasantry of the highland and valley regions into national political life. They organized peasant trade unions and popular militias. Through these institutions, the peasantry of the highlands and Andean valleys played a central role in transforming the national society (Albo and Barnadas 1984; Carter 1964; Paz 1983).

The agrarian reform had a less direct impact upon life in the lowlands of Santa Cruz. There, little land was actually expropriated; but, the MNR used the threat of expropriation to discourage opposition and reward supporters. The expropriations carried out were selective, and the impact on lowland peasants was also less direct. Lowland peasants had never had the strong community and communal institutions found in the highlands and

Andean valleys, and did not respond to the reform by organizing unions and other organizations. Rather, many chose to remain on the estates where they had been serving, and those who did not generally moved into the forest in search of their own lands (Heath 1969:291-295).

While it did not vigorously pursue the agrarian reform in Santa Cruz, the MNR government did give high priority to promoting capitalist development in the region. The state hoped that the development of Santa Cruz would create economic opportunities for the many people in the highland and valley regions of the country, who continued to live in poverty despite the sweeping changes instituted under the agrarian reform. President Paz Estenssoro requested and received large amounts of economic and technical assistance from the United States to support lowland development under the Point Four Program. For their part, Point Four officials were determined that Santa Cruz should be a model of what development aid could accomplish, and Bolivia became the single largest recipient of Point Four assistance in the world (Heath 1969:258).

The threat of expropriation posed by the agrarian reform was an incentive for large landowners to invest in capitalist agriculture on their estates, and the Point Four Program made it relatively easy to do so. Point Four helped support the construction of a sugar mill and alcohol distillery, stimulating cane production. It also paid the cost of paving the highway from Cochabamba to Santa Cruz, improving access to markets for lowland products, and making seasonal migration from the highlands and valleys easier as peasants sought employment on the

expanding lowland enterprises. Coffee, cotton, sugar cane, and rice came to be widely produced on a commercial scale. In fact, sugar cane and rice production expanded so rapidly that the region was suffering from chronic overproduction of these crops by the early 1960s, a problem which continues to the present day (Heath 1969:289-299; CORDECRUZ 1984a; 1984b).

Highland Migration to Santa Cruz Department

While foreign assistance did support the clearing of tropical forest, the creation of agroprocessing facilities, and the improvement of infrastructure within the region, it did not facilitate the replacement of labor power by capital in the production process itself. As a result, the growth of commercial agriculture in Santa Cruz has depended from the outset upon the seasonally available labor power from the Andean highlands and valleys. In 1976, for example, agricultural employment in Santa Cruz ranged from 18,000 people in February to 95,000 people in the month of August, when new lands are cleared for cultivation (Riviere d'Arc 1980:158).

The growth in the demand for labor power by commercial agriculture coincided with state efforts to encourage highland and valley peasants to claim lands for themselves in the eastern lowlands. Many of the people who went to Santa Cruz for the first time as seasonal wage laborers ultimately remained there, either as settlers claiming a parcel of land or as part of an expanding rural proletariat. Census figures indicate that the total population of Santa Cruz increased from 286,145 in 1950 to

715,072 in 1976 (Klein 1976:297). Since 1950, some 135,000 people are estimated to have migrated permanently to Santa Cruz department (Garcia-Tornell and Querejazú 1984).

State interest in resettling highland and valley peasants in Santa Cruz grew with the realization that large numbers of families could not meet their basic subsistence needs on the land allotted to them by the agrarian reform. Through radio announcements, leaflet campaigns, visits by government officals, and advice dispensed by Bolivian and foreign representatives of several churches, directed and undirected settlement efforts were encouraged. Directed settlement projects were supported by a number of international donor organizations, including the United Nations, the Inter-American Development Bank, and the U.S. Agency for International Development, as well as by smaller private agencies, many of which were church affiliated. In 1965, the Bolivian government established the National Colonization Institute (INC) to formulate general settlement policy, administer land allotments, and award land titles in those areas of the country designated as settlement zones.

Experience with settlement as a development strategy proved disappointing. In the first place, in spite of the impact it has had in Santa Cruz, not enough people have moved out of the highlands and valleys to increase the resource base of those who remained, as many policy makers in favor of encouraging settlement had hoped would happen. In the settlement areas themselves, the state has not provided an adequate water supply, and schools, health posts, and other services remain scarce. Inadequate access to markets forces settlers to rely on a few low

value crops for their income, and production is primarily for household subsistence. Many settlements are poorly located, so that they are frequently flooded. In the directed settlement projects, dependence upon the sponsoring agencies is frequently cited as a problem (cf. Fifer 1982:413-417; Hess 1980:102-116; Painter et al. 1984). The settlement areas have received considerable attention from social scientists and development planners. However, while interesting as by-products of the expansion of capitalist agriculture in Santa Cruz, the settlement areas have not yet contributed directly to or benefitted from that expansion.

Ethnicity and Regionalism as Idioms of Class Conflict

Attempts to explain violent incidents such as the one described at the outset of this paper in terms of regionalist sentiments in Santa Cruz or the cultural conflicts arising from the influx of large numbers of highlanders have a basis in fact. As has been described, Santa Cruz has a long history of strong regionalist and separatist movements. Furthermore, the large-scale movement of highland and Andean valley people into the region did bring people with distinct cultural heritages into sudden and rather intimate contact. The differences between Santa Cruz natives and the newcomers are reinforced daily through differences in clothing, housing, and dietary preferences, language, and segregated residence in both urban and rural settings. Furthermore, the highland and valley peasants brought with them forms of community organization and practices of

political mobilization that were unknown in Santa Cruz prior to their arrival (Heath 1964, 1966, 1969; Stearman 1976).

However, while interpretations of violence based upon such factors may reflect people's understanding of their own behavior, they are not convincing explanations. In the first place, the strong regionalism and demographic trends upon which they rely are characteristic of Bolivia, but not necessarily of other Amazonian frontier areas. However, both violence and the tendency on the part of regional elites and political authorities to blame that violence on the poorest sectors of the population are endemic throughout the Amazon (Foweraker 1982; Schmink 1982; Wood and Schmink 1979). This suggests that the violence may have less to do with the peculiarities of the situation in Santa Cruz than it does with more general processes of class formation and emergent class conflict in a region of the world that is both a geographic frontier and on the frontier of capitalist expansion.

Secondly, even if one chooses to interpret violence in Santa Cruz as a uniquely Bolivian phenomenon resulting from regionalism and cultural conflict, there are apparent paradoxes that must be addressed. For example, the regionalist and separatist sentiments of Santa Cruz grew out of geographic isolation and neglect by central government authorities, punctuated by what was locally regarded as unwelcome meddling. However, since the assumption of power by the MNR, Santa Cruz has been anything but neglected. It became a focal point of capitalist development and a growing force in national political life. The importance of the region was clearly signalled in 1971, with the taking of the national government by Colonel Hugo Banzer, a Santa Cruz native.

Banzer actively sought to represent the interests of regional elites through actions such as making government loans for investment in commercial agriculture available under very favorable terms, refusing to include seasonal wage laborers under the protection of Bolivian labor laws, and by mobilizing the army to assist in massive recruitment campaigns of temporary workers for commercial agricultural enterprises (Pérez-Crespo 1985:3). Thus, if traditional regional grievances were responsible, one would expect violence in Santa Cruz to have declined in the years since 1952. Instead, the regional elites who have benefitted from the growth of capitalist agriculture and who depend upon the highland and valley peasants for labor are also the ones who decry the threat they pose to traditional "camba" culture and values.

In addition, while the cultural differences between cambas and kollas are certainly real, they do not necessarily prevent them from working together for goals that are in their common interests. In the settlement area of San Julian, for example, there is a tendency for villages to be segregated along camba/kolla lines. However, camba settlers have taught counterparts from the highlands and Andean valleys about securing and preparing local foodstuffs, lowland agricultural techniques, and the use of medicinally useful herbs and plants. Kolla settlers, in turn, have taught lowlanders about the advantages of strong community organization, and how peasant federations can have an influence on regional politics (Hess 1980; Painter _et al_. 1984; Pérez-Crespo 1985).

While the incident at San Julian was portrayed in the media and widely interpreted as an example of violence between cambas and kollas, the actual cultural identity of the participants was not quite so clear-cut. Kolla settlers outnumber camba settlers, so that presumably a majority of the protagonists on the settler side were from the highlands and Andean valleys. However, the settler villages that participated in the action included both villages that are predominantly kolla and others that are predominantly camba. On the other side, kollas were almost certainly well represented among the truck drivers, as the transport industry in the region has been an important area of kolla entrepreneurship (see Heath 1969; Stearman 1976).

Conclusions

Strong regionalist sentiments and conflictive social relations among cambas and kollas are empirically visible aspects of life in Santa Cruz department. However, they are best viewed as manifestations of an emergent class struggle involving smallholding settlers and an agricultural proletariat on the one hand and a newly formed regional capitalist class seeking to consolidate its power on the other. Interpretations of violence in terms of regionalism and cultural conflict represent manipulation of the idiom of class struggle by the dominant classes of the region.

The casting of the discussion in these terms accomplishes several goals. First, it creates an ideology that facilitates labor control. It encourages the division of the oppressed classes against themselves by asserting that it is the kollas,

through their deviant personal lifestyles, disruptive behavior, and large numbers that are responsible for strife and violence. It suggests that poor cambas can escape the retribution to be visited upon the kollas by alligning themselves with the dominant classes. Indeed, they are morally obligated to do so in order to defend their regional heritage from being swept away by the onslaught of kolla hordes.

Ignoring the dependence of commercial agriculture in Santa Cruz on outside labor, this interpretation operates on the premise that if it were not for the influx of kollas with their alien culture and disruptive behavior, there would be no violence. However misguided their actions might be in a particular instance, reactions in defense of local values and lifeways become not only comprehensible, but worthy of sympathy and support. This places the onus for whatever happens squarely upon the kollas, and sets the stage for justifying violent repression of any effort by them to organize in defense of their own interests. In addition, it rationalizes the denial of development resources to the kollas in the settlement areas by defining them as part of the problem rather than as members of the regional society entitled to share in its development.

Conversely, the defense of regional values provides a unifying theme for the different sectors of the capitalist class, which frequently have diverse short term interests (Riviere d'Arc 1980). Large landowners, for example, may oppose the encouragement of smallholder settlement on the grounds that settlers may encroach upon lands they regard as theirs. These,

tied to the regional lumber industry may favor such settlement because of the penetration roads into the forest that accompany it. Such differences create fissures that threaten the position of the class as a whole. But, regardless of their short term concerns, all members of the class understand the need to control the kollas upon whom they depend.

The need for unity is particularly important as the Santa Cruz elites compete with interests tied to the mining economy for national dominance. The encouragement of capitalist agricultural development and smallholder settlement in Santa Cruz was intended to aid the mining economy, reorganized under the MNR revolution, in two respects: first, by relieving the social pressures in the highland and valley regions resulting from the poverty in which much of the rural population lived, even after the agrarian reform; and, secondly, by diffusing regional separatist sentiments through a transformation of the lowland economy. While Santa Cruz' economy was transformed, the population movement to the lowlands did not relieve social pressures in the highlands and valleys. Santa Cruz found that under the new order regional interests could be advanced through competion for dominance of the national economy, as well as by attempts at secession.

In this setting, settlers represent a potentially explosive group that holds little power in its own right but which may be used to great effect by competing national interests. The weakness of the settlers is evidenced by their appeals to the national government to defend them and the absence of mobilization to defend themselves against violence by urban-based

vigilantes. Despite their weakness, however, settlers remain potentially important in the regional and national political contexts. Many settlers were seasonal migrants who worked on capitalist agricultural enterprises prior to claiming lands in the forest (Painter et al. 1984). Because production on settler lands is largely a subsistence activity, it remains relatively easy for regional agricultural elites to create conditions that would bring them into the labor market, and into competition with workers migrating seasonally from the highlands and valleys.

On the other hand, because of their shared kolla identity and the repression that both settlers and seasonal workers feel at the hands of the regional, camba elite, settlers and seasonal workers sympathize strongly with one another. Should the regional elites mismanage relations with the two groups so as to permit sympathy to become a working political alliance, the consequences would be disastrous for their continued dominance. When a central government is controlled by interests that do not favor increasing the influence of Santa Cruz elites over national economic and political life, this dynamic may be used to exert influence over the course of events in the lowland department. Support for groups defined as kolla is a means of interfering with the ability of Santa Cruz elites to control their own labor supply. Under these circumstances, the virulence of the regional response to any event that might alter the political relationship between capital and labor becomes more understandable.

Notes

1) This paper was presented to the Joint Meeting of the Canadian Ethnology Society, the Canadian Association for Medical Anthropology, the Society for Applied Anthropology in Canada, and the American Ethnological Society, Toronto, Canada, May 9-11, 1985. As a working paper, the views presented are tentative, and comments and criticisms are welcome. The research upon which this paper is based was conducted in 1984 under the sponsorship of the Cooperative Agreement for Settlement and Natural Resource Systems Analysis of the Institute for Development Anthropology, Clark University, and the U.S. Agency for International Development. The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the positions of those institutions. The author thanks Jane Collins and Carlos A. Pérez-Crespo for their comments on an earlier draft of this paper. However, responsibility for any errors of fact or interpretation remains that of the author.

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APPENDIX

El Mundo, 27 de octubre de 1984

Petitorio de los colonizadores de San Julián, escenario de sangrientos hechos

En el lugar de los sangrientos acontecimientos ocurridos en el Norte cruceño, dirigentes de la Federación Especial de Colonizadores de San Julián entregaron a EL MUNDO una copia de su petitorio dirigido al Gobierno, que [illegible] ser debidamente respondido provocó el bloqueo.

La resolución enviada dice:

1.- Intervención del INC., Agencia Regional de Santa Cruz, sus dependencias y La Dirección General por el compañero Demetrio Barrientos, con movilización de bases.

2.- Pedir a las autoridades nacionales y Departamentales, la inmediata destitución del agente regional Juan Terrazas Fuentes, del director Nal. Oswaldo Pope Pérez, Félix Peña Zambrana, Franklin Salazar Anaya, los esposos Barrios, Imaña, Dr. Mancilla y el radio operador de la Dirección General y a todos los malos funcionarios que no cumplen con su trabajo y quienes estuvieran implicados en el mal manejo de la Dirección y la Regional de Santa Cruz.

3.- Pedir a la Contraloría Departamental de Santa Cruz la inmediata realización de auditoría, para instaurar cargos coactivos si el caso requiere.

4.- Pedir al Fiscal del Distrito la instauración de juicio de responsabilidades contra Juan Terrazas F., Lic. Félix Peña Zambrana y otros implicados en la suscripción de contratos y convenios, recepción de dineros para perforación de pozos de agua e incumplimiento.

5.- Pedir a la Confederación Nacional de Colonizadores, la inmediata expulsión del seno de ese organismo matriz de colonizadores, por traficante sindical y traición a las clases campesinas, a Juan Terrazas Fuentes.

6.- Declarar al señor Juan Terrazas Fuentes enemigo de la clase colonizadora a nivel nacional.

7.- Pedir el inmediato traslado de cañerías de Montero a la zona San Julián.

8.- Exigir la inmediata devolución de las maquinarias que salieron del INC., PSJ, las volquetes, prensa hidráulica en poder del convenio CORDECRUZ, neumático del tractor FANATRAM, gomas de repuesto, gato de la camioneta y otras herramientas, y el "Butinier".

9.- Exigimos el cumplimiento a los contratos de perforación de pozos de agua con los colonizadores de San Julián.

10.- Reposición cupo mensual de los 10.000. Litros de diésel, para trabajos en la zona con destino a los colonizadores.

11.- Reposición de la multa pagada por la Empresa Constructora CALAVI, para arreglo del tractor oruga D8, que se encuentra en el núcleo 44.

12.- Exigir inmediata revisión convenio CORDECRUZ—INC y otros, franqueo de las planillas de sueldo del personal correspondiente al convenio.

13.- Pedir a la Dirección General del INC., el envío inmediato de sueldos correspondiente a agosto y septiembre del Dr. Efraín Choque, Cristóbal Quispe, Macario Tintaya, de nuestro jefe de zona Emilio Soto y su ratificación nombramiento oficial a ítem.

14.- Pedir a la Contraloría Departamental, la investigación sobre pago de sueldos a personas que no trabajan en el Instituto.

15.- Exigir la inmediata entrega de las oficinas de la Confederación Nacional de Colonizadores, al compañero Demetrio Barrientos, elegido en el IV Congreso, realizado en Montero.

16.- Exigir la inmediata entrega de la maquinaria de Puerto Norte, a los colonizadores de San Julián.

17.- Exigir la aceleración de trámites sobre los títulos ejecutoriales de tierras de acuerdo a ley.

18.- Exigir al Ministro de Salud Pública, la dotación de cuotas de medicamentos de la farmacia popular y su distribución equitativa a cada Central.

19.- Exigir al Ministro de Educación y Cultura la dotación de ítem para la zona San Julián.

20.- Exigir al Gobierno un financiamiento para el ripiado del camino Brecha-Casarabe.

21.- Rechazar enérgicamente el alza de precios en las tarifas del autotransporte que dañan en la economía de la familia colonizadora.

22.- Participación de la FECSJ, la intervención en las decisiones en todo los casos.



BOLIVIA: Geographical Regions