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ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM AND PLANS
FOR DECENTRALIZATION IN HAITI:
PROBLEMS, PROGRESS, AND PROSPECTS

Report Submitted to USAID

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FOREWORD

This report was the product of a collaborative team effort not only of the principal advisors listed on the cover page, but most importantly with the officials of the Government of Haiti. The reform plans evaluated by the USAID team were wholly the initiative of the Haitian Government. They represent a bold new direction in public administration which, once implemented, will spell a new era of public service responsibility and capacity to provide the essential goods and services so urgently needed by the Haitian people.

The report and its recommendations were thoroughly reviewed in draft with the Administrative Reform Commission and with the Ministry of Plan. Their comments and suggestions have been incorporated into the document that follows.

As Director of the USAID Mission to Haiti, I wish to express my deep appreciation for the outstanding professional quality of this product, its insightfulness and clarity, and most particularly for the manner in which the work was accomplished. The collegial and open collaboration of the officials of the Haitian Government, their readiness to critically analyze their administrative deficiencies and requirements, and their frank and direct professionalism were essential to the success of this mission.

Personally, I wish to thank each member of the USAID team. But I also want to thank Dr. Gérard Dorcely, President of the Administrative Reform Commission and his colleagues; Minister Pierre Sam and the personnel of the Secretariat of Plan; and my own colleagues in the USAID Mission and the U.S. Embassy for their support of the team's efforts.

This report is both the opening of an important dialogue between the Government of Haiti and the international donor community on administrative reform and the beginning of a plan of action that merits our generous support.

Harlan H. Hobgood
Director, USAID/Haiti

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List of Acronyms

ARC	Administrative Reform Commission
BCA	Bureau de Crédit Agricole
CAC	Conseil d'Action Communautaire
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
CNC	Conseil National Coopératif
CONACOS	Comité National de Contrôle et de Supervision des Entités de Développement Communautaire
DARNDR	Département de l'Agriculture, des Ressources Naturelles et du Développement Rural (Ministry of Agriculture)
DATPE	Direction de l'Aménagement du Territoire et Protection de l'Environnement (part of SEP)
DRIPP	Développement Régional Intégré de Petit-Goave et de Petit Trou de Nippes
DSE	Direction des Services Extérieurs (part of SEP)
DSPP	Département de la Santé Publique et de la Population (Ministry of Health)
FONDEV	Fonds du Développement Rural
GOH	Government of Haiti
HACHO	Harmonisation de l'Action des Communautés Haïtiennes Organisées (formerly Haitian-American Community Help Organization)
IDB	Inter-American Development Bank
IHPCADE	Institut Haïtien de Promotion du Café et des Dénrées d'Exportation
INAGHEI	Institut National d'Administration, de Gestion, et des Hautes Etudes Internationales
ODN	Organisme du Développement du Nord
ODPG	Organisme du Développement de la Plaine des Gonaïves

ODVA	Organisme du Développement de la Vallée de l'Artibonite
ONAAC	Organisation Nationale d'Alphabétisation et d'Action Communautaire (part of Ministry of Education)
ONAPI	Office National pour la Promotion des Investissements (part of Ministry of Commerce and Industry)
PVO	Private Voluntary Organization
SAC	Société de Crédit Agricole
SENECA	Service National de Commercialisation Agricole
SEP	Secrétairerie d'Etat du Plan (Ministry of Planning)
SEPRRN	Service d'Entretien Permanent du Réseau Routier National
SLELC	Service de Location d'Équipement Lourd et Construction
SNEM	Service National des Endémies Majeures
SNEP	Société Nationale d'Eau Potable
TPTC	Département des Travaux Publics, des Transports et Communications (Ministry of Public Works)
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
VSN	Volontaires de la Sécurité Nationale

OVERVIEW

Among the plans of the Government of Haiti (GOH) for the 1980s is a revitalization of the public sector in order to improve its capacity to manage effectively development and service delivery functions. Responsibility for the design and implementation planning of this revitalization lies with two GOH agencies: the Secrétairerie d'Etat du Plan (Ministry of Planning) and the Commission Administrative (Administrative Reform Commission). A three-pronged program of changes in the country's public administration has been elaborated which includes:

- a) fiscal and budgetary reform to consolidate revenue gathering systems and to rationalize ministries' operating budgets;
- b) changes in GOH operating systems, installation of uniform personnel practices, pre-service and in-service training, modification of organizational structures at the national, regional, and local levels; and
- c) creation of a deconcentrated planning system that will establish vertical linkages that feed local-level planning initiatives into national development planning, and horizontal linkages that permit multi-sectoral integration and coordination of public and private investments.

In support of this program, USAID/Haiti provided a seven-person technical assistance team to assist the Ministry of Planning and the Administrative Reform Commission in evaluating progress to date, identifying potential problems, and formulating action steps for the implementation of the program. In addition, the team provided USAID/Haiti with a set

of recommendations for consideration for donor assistance in support of GOH initiatives in public sector reorientation.

The team spent three weeks in Haiti, from October 25 to November 15, 1981; with the team leader spending an additional week at the end for final drafting of the report and debriefings. The team reviewed numerous GOH documents, plus AID and World Bank studies and reports; and interviewed substantial numbers of GOH personnel, members of the international donor community, and private sector businessmen. Throughout its stay in Haiti, the team worked in close collaboration with technical staff in both the Ministry of Planning and the Administrative Reform Commission. A list of persons interviewed and a bibliography are contained in Appendices 3 and 4. Various team members took field trips outside of Port-au-Prince. Two members travelled by air to the Northwest, visiting Port-de-Paix and Baie de Henne; and four travelled by road to the south to visit Jacmel and environs. On both these occasions team members met with local officials.

The report is divided into two major sections. The first deals with the specifics of the proposed reform of the Haitian public administration, which is the major responsibility of the Administrative Reform Commission. The second section addresses the twin issues of decentralization and regionalization that are the major concern of the Ministry of Planning. The sections present an overview of the situations in both these areas, report on the team's assessments of GOH plans in administrative reform and decentralization, and close with two sets of recommendations--one relating to the reform and the other to decentralization and regionalization.

The team would like to acknowledge the excellent cooperation received from all the GOH personnel interviewed, in particular the staff of the Ministry of Planning and the Administrative Reform Commission. In addition, the personnel of USAID/Haiti deserve mention, especially the support staff without whose tireless efforts this report could not have been produced.

SECTION ONE

THE HAITIAN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND
THE ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM COMMISSION

Introduction

The GOH has recognized that in order for the public sector to guide effectively Haitian development, whether through a centralized or a deconcentrated and decentralized set of structures, substantial modification of the ways in which human, financial, and physical resources are managed must take place. Thus the perspective of the GOH civil service reform emphasizes change in the "nuts-and-bolts" of GOH agency operations that relate to the management of these resources.

As part of its mission, the USAID team examined these operations and the plan, elaborated by the Administrative Reform Commission, for instituting change in the Haitian public administration. The first chapter of this section provides a brief overview of the current situation in the GOH public sector. The second lays out the reforms proposed by the Commission. Comments on the proposed reform are presented in Chapter III. Due to the emphasis upon training in the reform, a separate chapter is devoted to training needs: Chapter IV. The fifth and final chapter of this section presents our list of recommendations.

I. Present State of the Civil Service

At the present time in Haiti it is somewhat misleading to refer to a "Civil Service" or a "Fonction Publique", which would connote a unified public administrative system serving all the ministerial departments and other functional units of the Government. What actually exists is a collection of separate departments, each with its own procedures and internal rules and regulations. Each minister sets the tone of his department and personally approves its procedures, its regulations. He also is responsible for appointments to his department, promotions within it, terminations and disciplinary matters. We are told that 75% of all new appointments are based on some form of patronage or sponsorship. There are no specific provisions for retirement and pensions. Each and every official who reaches an age at which he or she wishes to retire must personally petition the Minister; and the Minister, if he supports the petition, must negotiate an appropriate pension in each individual case with the Minister of Finance. Officials currently hold their posts at the discretion of the Minister and do not enjoy any security of employment. Since changes of Minister are not infrequent, officials have a high sense of insecurity.

Such a system may have worked satisfactorily when the tasks of Government were less demanding and the numbers of people involved were small. Given the current objectives of the Government of Haiti and the number of Government personnel, the situation is unsatisfactory in many respects. Notably the lack of a uniform system and the consequent placing of all civil service matters in the hands of departmental Ministers result in low morale on the part of some officials, an absence of rational utilization of available qualified manpower, an unnecessary burden on the Ministers and a total domination of the bureaucracy by the executive branch of the Government. A secondary result but one of primary importance, is the lack of specialized managerial know-how within the civil service.

Coupled with this extremely unsatisfactory situation is the fact that the salaries of most officials are too low to provide adequate remuneration in the Haitian context, given their responsibilities and qualifications. In some cases to increase their total remuneration, officials obtain appointments to more than one post (and draw more than one salary). In one case brought to our notice, an upper-middle level official held five different posts and drew five salaries. Needless to say in such cases the amount of time and energy expended by the official in each of his official posts is limited and in extreme cases, officials may do little more than sign in each day. In even worse cases there are people who are on Ministry payrolls who do not work and only appear once per month to collect their pay checks. Whereas this provides some form of social security, there are other cases where salaries are being paid to former officials who have not been near their offices for years or who have left the Republic.

Compounding the disarticulation and fragmentation of the Haitian public administration is the manner in which it is financed. Public sector entities are funded out of two parallel but separate mechanisms: an operating budget and a development budget. This situation has created a dualism in the public service such that there exists for practical purposes two systems of public service, and the gap between the two is widening constantly. The system financed by the development budget absorbs the bulk of available resources and absorbs the bulk of available resources and thus contributes to the weakening of the system dependent upon the

operating budget. The weaker system consists of those public servants charged with the regularized and recurrent tasks of public service delivery. This unequal situation means that those public servants who eventually will be called upon to assure the institutionalization of development projects are becoming steadily less able to do so effectively. This seriously handicaps one of the major long-range objectives of the public service--planning for national development.

The fault lies to some extent with those who give and administer external technical assistance. From the very beginning, the donor community promoted the creation of a planning agency that eventually was formed with some of the best technical personnel from the different ministries. The donors, and consequently the central government, concentrated their attention upon training a very small number of people who were directly involved with development projects. Despite the risks associated with this strategy, current recruiting of Haitian technicians living and working abroad is being done mainly to reinforce the administrative capacity of agencies involved in development projects. Most of these technicians are highly paid through different schemes that keep them out of the operating budget. No long-range provisions are currently contemplated to integrate them permanently into the public administration's existing structures. This policy affects the process of coordinating the various activities of the ministries and the autonomous agencies increasingly involved in complex programs that extend beyond their individual sectoral or institutional boundaries. Further elaboration on this point is contained in the sections of the report dealing with decentralization and regionalization.

The lack of rational procedures in the operation of GOH ministries and agencies, besides producing wide variation across the public service, has also resulted in unnecessarily complex and cumbersome processes that impede day-to-day operations as well as the larger tasks of planning, coordination, integration, etc. For example the Management Sciences for Health team working with the Ministry of Health (DSPP) analyzed the DSPP's present disbursement process for both the operating and development budgets. It was found that thirty-one separate steps involving a host of actors both within and outside the ministry are required in order to disburse funds. Even the initial determination of the availability of money is clouded. It appears that the Chief of Accounting makes such a determination according to criteria that are largely undocumented and unknown to others. Furthermore, there are six points where the payment process can break down, and no effective system exists to inform the DSPP that progress has been sidetracked. At the end of the process, supporting documentation is sent to the Superior Court of Accounts where it is eventually stored at the Ministry of Finance for a minimum of five years. Apparently, the information contained in these documents is not used for planning or monitoring purposes.

While the procedures in other ministries have not been analyzed to the extent that those in the DSPP have been, our understanding is that the situation is similar throughout the public service though the particular procedural details may vary. In fact, this is an area that the Administrative Reform Commission has been very concerned with, and it has proposed changes for the rationalization and simplification of such procedures.

Two other major trends in the GOH public administration are evident at the present time: a certain disregard for professional expertise and the domination of the public service by the executive branch of government, mentioned above. Very little concern is shown for technical competence in the recruitment, selection, and training of public servants. Because of this practice, serious conflicts have occurred between specialists working in the government who value professional norms and the GOH executive arm. In the past this situation resulted in disenchantment among the technicians and their departure from Haiti in search of positions in foreign countries and international organizations where their professional competence was appreciated and their promotion decided upon achievement and merit. Thus, the GOH public sector has been deprived of the expertise of some of its best qualified technical manpower who either left Haiti or moved into the private sector. These dynamics to some extent explain an important element of the current incapacity of the GOH public administration to play an effective role in national development, and it also explains some of the reasons behind the overall low productivity of the public sector.

There is a massive effort underway to combat this brain drain by reversing the flow of technical cadres out of Haiti and by bringing back those currently working overseas. Special salary arrangements have been made to provide those returning with remuneration close to what they were earning abroad. Others are integrated into some of the projects financed by external financial assistance and receive the same treatment as foreign experts. Although this practice has been effective, it contributes to the public sector dualism discussed above; and because few provisions are made

to retain these cadres permanently within public service structures, it is highly likely that they will move on to different positions in new development projects as soon as the financing for their current slots expires. As a consequence, there is a lack of follow-up in most development projects since the technicians supported by external financing pass responsibility for continued operations to their less-qualified, lesser-paid colleagues upon their departure for other "greener pastures" within the GOH.

Thus the Haitian public service exhibits certain enclave characteristics in which a mobile pool of skilled and privileged technical personnel operate within a bureaucratic milieu of weak mid-level management, low morale, extremely poor administrative communications, excessively centralized structures, lack of essential working materials, and low salaries. Moreover, the effectiveness of this pool of talent has been undermined by such shortcomings and its members are often unable to put their skills to work for the government. A sort of vicious cycle has been created that needs to be broken in order to improve GOH capacity and performance.

The magnitude of the task is apparent from a look at the growth of public sector employment. The number of public servants has almost doubled over the past 10 years increasing from 15,604 for the fiscal year 70-71 to 29,318 for FY 1980-1981. A positive aspect of this increase is that most of it took place in the vital development service areas such as agriculture, health, education, industry and trade. The number of public servants in the agricultural sector increased over the past 10 years from 3,088 to 3,157; in the Industry and Trade sector from 404 to 579 over the same period; in the Health sector from 4,478 to 5,725; and finally the education sector experienced the most significant increase. In this sector, the number

of public servants more than doubled over the 10 year period, from 4,980 to 10,672. The average monthly salary of public servants increased by 155 per cent over the past 10 years, from 244 Gourdes to 622 Gourdes. However, it is difficult to determine how many of the new public servants are effectively engaged in governmental activities since, according to the Administrative Reform Commission's own estimate, 75 per cent of all new appointments are based on patronage. Many of the patronage positions are being financed by discretionary funds given to each minister. Unfortunately, the amount of these funds increased almost ten-fold over the past ten years from 1,901,332.00 Gourdes to 19,387,498.00 Gourdes.

Despite the fact that, compared to other countries in the developing world, the ratio of Haitian public servants to total population is relatively small, in terms of effective functioning most GOH agencies are overstaffed. Social and economic realities related to employment levels have precluded the political viability of government personnel reductions. Thus an underlying, but well-recognized, aspect of Haiti's public administration is its role as a welfare and employment agency. This adds a substantial burden to Haiti's development. High personnel expenditures leave only limited resources for needed equipment and supplies thereby in many cases rendering those expenditures extremely unproductive.

While the magnitude of the obstacles confronting the GOH public sector makes the prospects for swift change in government practices bleak, there appears to be a growing realization that the status quo is untenable. This has produced at least a surface momentum for system change. From the interviews we have conducted, it seems clear to us that there is a consensus among

government officials that changes are needed that will provide for a rational civil service system with standardized rules and regulations; which offers job security; which is centrally administered by a non-political personnel agency; which offers adequate remuneration in accordance with a rational compensation scheme based on job classification; which carries entitlement to retirement on pension after a career of satisfactory service; in which professional competence is respected and performance and productivity are rewarded; and which is run by professionally trained and competent managers.

The Administrative Reform Commission (Commission Administrative) has gone a long way in drawing up the blueprints for such a civil service in Haiti and we have been impressed by the thoroughness of the work already accomplished by the Commission. A summary of the changes proposed by the Commission is given in Chapter II below.

It should be noted, however, that despite the general support for civil reform, many people, including those whose support for these measures is essential for their approval and implementation, will in some way be affected adversely at least in the short run. When powers of appointment and promotion and the power to set salary levels are rationalized, Ministers will lose very significant powers of patronage. Similarly, civil servants at present drawing multiple salaries will only be able to hold one post and draw the single salary attached to it. As one senior official said to us, everyone in the civil service will have to make some sacrifice for the reforms to be effected. For the vast majority of officials, we believe (as does the Administrative

Reform Commission) that the advantages of the proposed changes will greatly outweigh the disadvantages. For the Ministers we believe that the long term advantage of having a much more effective administrative machinery at their disposal will outweigh the short term disadvantage of the reduction of their powers of patronage. However, it would be highly unrealistic to believe that the administrative reforms can be implemented without considerable hostility and opposition from some quarters. Without the reforms projected by the Commission both for the central government and regional level it is a virtual certainty that the GOH will not be able to play its required pivotal role in shaping the future of the Haitian economy and its development.

II. Changes Proposed by the Commission

The Administrative Reform Commission was created by Presidential Decree on September 11, 1974, and its operating methods were specified in a Presidential Order dated August 5, 1977. The Commission was to be responsible for the total reform of the Haitian civil service. It was charged with developing: a legal framework organizing a career civil service; a systematic organizational infrastructure (administrative organization of the ministries, O & M and Personnel Units); operational strategies through the intermediary of Personnel and O & M Units in public agencies (to promote efficiency and effectiveness). It was also to contribute, with the collaboration of INAGHEI, to pre- and in-service training of public employees.

In January of 1981 the chairman of the Commission was replaced following GOH disappointment at the lack of concrete results. A Presidential Decree dated April 16, 1981 reorganized the Commission and converted it into a consultative organ of the executive branch for matters related to administrative reform and placed it under the administrative tutelage of the Ministry of the Presidency which had been created the previous year.

According to the 1981 Decree, the Commission has the responsibility for preparing and submitting to the Ministry of the Presidency a reform plan covering the following:

a) the reorganization of the ministries, autonomous agencies, the administrations of regional development agencies and of public enterprises, as well as the communes, in order to adapt them to the changing socio-economic conditions of the development process;

b) the organization of a career civil service;

c) the revision, adaptation or modification of the systems, methods and procedures of the national administration in order to simplify and improve them.

The 1981 Decree defined six tasks for the Commission:

1. To prepare surveys, studies and recommendations for the reform program;
2. To participate in the preparation of all legislation necessary for the implementation of the reform program;
3. To prepare training programs and in-service training procedures for administrative personnel, in consultation with INAGHEI;
4. To establish a system of administrative appeal to protect the civil servants against arbitrary firing;
5. To control and evaluate the execution of all decisions in the area of administrative reform;
6. To give technical assistance to any public agency soliciting such assistance.

In order to coordinate its work with reform activities in the various ministries and autonomous agencies, a series of reform committees with three members each were formed in each of these administrative units. Together, these committees form an inter-ministerial working group on administrative reform. The group currently meets with members of the Administrative Reform Commission three days per week.

The Commission has identified three priorities for its work:

1. The transformation of public sector employment practices into a unified civil service career system. A draft law was prepared and approved by the Cabinet, and legislative action to convert it into law is pending. Actions contemplated by the proposed law include the elimination of the practice of many public servants of holding several positions in different ministries, uniformity of rules and regulations affecting civil servants of the different ministries, uniformity of salaries and pensions, and most important of all the establishment of a Commissariat Général de la Fonction Publique to serve as the implementation mechanism for the rationalization and standardization of personnel policies.

According to the proposed legislation, appointees to senior political positions such as Prefect, Ambassador, Director-General and Secretary-General of the Ministries, the Director-General of parastatal organizations and members of the Ministries' private offices are excluded from the regular civil service. Such appointees could be drawn from among the members of the civil service on secondment with the right to regain their previous position without loss of seniority and other privileges. The proposed law covers in great detail the personnel procedures by the Commissariat and includes some detailed instructions regarding personnel assessment.

2. Another priority identified by the Commission is the analysis and modification of the present organizational structuring of the public sector in order to establish the scope of these various organizations' responsibilities and prevent the creation of a continuous flow of new

institutions to carry out new administrative tasks. The Commission intends also to sponsor several studies by private local consulting firms to analyze the different functional systems within the GOH public administration such as budgeting and public accounting, planning, tender procedures for public contracts, information and statistics and computer use. The Commission has already approached a local firm, Capital Consult S.A., to study the planning system.

3. The third priority identified by the Commission is the decentralization of the GOH public administration through a strengthening of local-level structures and an intermediary regional network.

As a first step in addressing this third priority, a training program had already started. Two administrators from each of the 131 communes will attend a 4-month course in Port-au-Prince, at INAGHEI, over a 3-year period. The first group was selected by the Ministry of the Interior, but the subsequent groups will be selected by the Commission itself. After their training, these administrators will have their salaries upgraded and will be integrated into the bureaucracy of the Ministry of the Interior. They will go back to their communes on secondment from the Ministry of the Interior. This arrangement was necessary because of the lack of resources of the communes and their inability to pay the higher wages.

Besides this medium-term training course for the agents of the communes, the reform strategy envisages a multi-year program of training which will also include 2 to 4 month-courses for personnel managers, financial managers and O & M personnel. Shorter seminars lasting from 1 to 4 weeks will also be organized when the need arises.

III. Comments on the Proposed Changes

In most countries where an administrative reform program has been undertaken, the process has been a long and expensive one. The continued need to reconcile the technically desirable aspects of administrative reform with political feasibility contributes to the difficulty of carrying out the reform. While the activities of the Haitian Administrative Reform Commission over the seven-year period of its existence have not, in the eyes of many observers, produced concrete steps toward concerted reform action, any evaluation of its progress should be set against the experience with reform in other countries. For example, administrative reform in Venezuela took more than fifteen years, and considerable amounts of money were expended in laying preliminary groundwork even before specific reform measures were implemented. We kept this "yardstick" in mind during our assessment of the Commission's work.

In general the Plan de Réforme Administrative and the detailed objectives and proposals of the Administrative Reform Commission deserve the fullest support. Their plans for the rationalization and standardization of personnel policy, as set out in the Projet de Loi portant Statut Général des Agents de la Fonction Publique, are comprehensive and well adapted to the particular requirements of the Haitian situation. Excellent use has been made of Haitian specialists in management in the preparation of the Commission's proposals.

We were greatly impressed by the amount of detailed work of high professional quality that has been carried out in the relatively short period since the present incumbent, Gérard Dorcely, was appointed President. We were also very favorably impressed by the Commission's modus operandi, which involves regular step-by-step discussion of each measure with representatives of affected ministries and through this procedure the creation of a climate of involvement and participation in the Commission's work. We feel that this approach will give the reforms a much greater chance of gaining acceptance and being implemented within the public service after they have received legislative approval.

Another positive aspect of the Commission's work is that some attention has been given to matters of process as well as to structural matters. In our experience this is not by any means always the case in public service reforms, but we feel that an equal emphasis on process is a pre-requisite for the achievement of the overall objective of creating a results-oriented and effective public service.

These pluses notwithstanding, we feel that several reservations need to be expressed concerning the Commission's work. Our reservations concern, first, the danger that personnel procedures may be written down in the law in so much detail that the proposed National Public Service Commission (Commissariat National pour la Fonction Publique) when created may not have the necessary flexibility for it to be able to carry on the dynamic process of the continued modernization of the public service. Although the absence of an administrative doctrine in Haiti somehow justifies the insertion of so much detail into the law, we hope that such action will not create certain implementation problems.

An example is the detailed instructions regarding personnel assessment which have been written into Articles 81 to 84 of the Projet de Loi portant Statut Général des Agents de la Fonction Publique. We feel that in this case, if the bill becomes law as at present drafted, the National Public Service Commission will be saddled with the task of implementing a personnel assessment system which does not accord well with modern personnel practice and with which the members of the commission might well be dissatisfied. We would prefer to see general principles laid down (such as that the performance of all civil servants will be appraised annually in accordance with detailed instructions to be prescribed by the N.P.S.C.) and that the detailed regulations be left to the N.P.S.C. to formulate and implement.

Our second reservation concerns the magnitude of the task of implementing the changes. Although we find the Administrative Reform Commission's organizational structure potentially suitable for the implementation of the reform and its staff highly competent and quite able to utilize effectively the services of experts, we are not totally confident that it will be able to overcome the strongly entrenched resistance to change that exists in various ministries. It could be very difficult to follow through with the proposed reforms given that influential persons may have vested interests in the continuation of the present situation.

Introducing radical system-wide changes in any set of public or private sector organizations is an enormous task. From overcoming

normal resistance to change, unfreezing old behaviors and initiating new ones, to institutionalizing the new patterns and structures, the possibilities for unforeseen obstacles requiring quick and creative response are practically guaranteed. Implementing the reform involves putting in place an entirely new orientation throughout the public service and will require time and the employment of many kinds of resources including Haitians highly trained and skilled in the management of change. Then there is the technical task of job analysis and classification which must encompass every post in the Fonction Publique.

There is the task of designing and introducing all the new procedural systems. These will relate not only to personnel management, but to budgeting, accounting, procurement, record keeping to name only a few. Along with these tasks is the gigantic task of training. This training will involve not only training to produce the new technically proficient managers to run the new system (e.g. personnel managers, financial managers, O & M specialists, etc.) but a massive re-education of all existing public servants to familiarize them with the new systems and enable them to operate effectively within them. The total number of people to be trained equals the total number of persons employed in the public service, i.e. about 30,000. The length and costs of training required obviously varies greatly, from periodic attendance at short seminars for senior officials to training programs of several months duration at the administrative technician level (e.g. personnel specialists, financial managers, management analysts, etc.).

Such a massive training effort will require funds, training facilities and trainers in quantities not currently available in Haiti. A more detailed summary analyzing the training needs follows in Chapter IV below.

Another factor that may impede the implementation of the reform could be its potentially high costs. Although we have been assured that sufficient funds for the payment of adequate salaries already exist within the ministries' present resources, we feel that the elimination of the line items for discretionary funds normally reserved for patronage positions will be resisted by almost all of the ministers. Furthermore, the Commission has yet to undertake an in-depth study to understand the long-range budgetary implications of its proposed restructuring of public service salary scales.

In considering the link between the proposed reform and development activities, we see a need to devise a tie-in between the reform strategy and the processes of development programming and institutionalization. At present, as mentioned in Chapter I, there is a lack of attention paid to ensuring that new activities are designed and implemented in ways that heighten the probability that they will be continued once outside funds and technical assistance come to an end.

Regarding the training of the Agents Communaux, that has already begun, we have some reservations about the system of remuneration planned for after their successful completion of the course. Because of

the fact that the Ministry of the Interior is traditionally in charge of all the GOH police forces (regular and V.S.N.), the payment of the Agents Communaux' salaries by this ministry might raise some serious questions later in terms of the ability of the newly-trained technicians to function free of pressures from the Ministry. There is a possibility that the training program undertaken to strengthen the Communes and accelerate deconcentration through regionalization may end up in fact increasing the control of the central government over local-level entities in ways that may not be conducive to local development. We feel that the agents should be integrated into the global regionalization scheme of the Ministry of Planning as soon as it becomes operational.

A final comment relates to what was said above about the magnitude of the reform task. Given this magnitude, we feel that the Commission needs to develop a detailed implementation strategy and plan in order to program its interventions into the GOH public sector system once the legal framework is in place. This involves establishing intermediate objectives and timetables that will allow the Commission and the Commissariat to monitor closely progress in implementation and to make appropriate modifications on an ongoing basis.

IV. The Training Needs For Civil Service Reform

A comprehensive review of the training needs for the public service arising from the proposed civil service reform has been undertaken by the staff of the Commission Administrative. An outline of this is contained in the Commission's working paper entitled " La Formation et le Perfectionnement des Agents Publics dans le cadre de la Réforme Administrative " . The present lack of managerial skills within the public service has been stressed a number of times by the staff of the Commission in our discussions. The training proposals aim at providing the public service with the professionally trained and competent manpower needed. As has been stated above, the task is one of gigantic dimensions.

The Commission envisages a multi-year program of training which will include medium-term (e.g. 3 or 4 months) training courses and shorter term seminars. So far detailed plans have been drawn up for training courses for Agents Communaux, personnel managers, financial managers and O & M personnel. The only program that has actually started operation is the training for Agents Communaux. The first of a series of six four-month training programs was held earlier this year with 37 participants (35 males and 2 females) drawn from the urban communes. Another five programmes are proposed at the rate of two per year. The aim is to train two Agents from each of the 131 communes. The training is conducted by the Institut National d'Administration, de Gestion et des Hautes Etudes Internationales (INAGHEI). The instruction

was delivered partly by INAGHEI faculty and partly by adjunct faculty drawn from practitioners in relevant fields. The total cost of the course was \$52,000, though, in the opinion of the Commission's training specialist this amount was on the low side and resulted in certain desirable elements having to be dropped from the program. The end of program evaluations completed by the participants were very favorable. The trainees are now at work in the Communes, but as yet it is too early to evaluate their effectiveness on the job.

The stated objectives of this training is to provide at the commune level a capacity to :

- i) manage administrative action at the local level;
- ii) participate effectively in the development process;
- iii) play the role of permanent links between the local population and the central power.

The Agents were recruited by the Ministry of Interior from the residents of the Communes where they will be working. They were placed on the Ministry payroll from the beginning of their training.

The training design has been based on an analysis of the tasks the Agents will be expected to perform and also contains considerable emphasis on communication, personal and public relations skills. It appears to have been designed and delivered with a high level of training competence.

This particular program has been examined in some detail, partly because

it is the only one that has actually been conducted to date, but also because the proposed training in personnel management, financial management and O & M follow very similar lines.

The personnel management program is to be of three months duration and it is planned to hold four courses over a two year period. At 30 participants per session this will provide the Ministries and public organizations with a total of 120 officials with some professional training in personnel management (2 per organization). The O & M program is to be of 4 months duration and the financial management program will be 3 months. All the programs are planned to be conducted by and at INAGHEI.

A very rough estimate of the costs of running these four programs alone would be \$1 million, without allowing for inflation. The training thus far envisaged, however, is only the tip of the iceberg. The far greater task is the re-education or re-training of the entire public service to familiarize officials with the new orientation of the Fonction Publique and the new procedures, processes and regulations that follow from this new orientation. At the highest level this will involve attendance at seminars covering such diverse topics as :

- problem analysis and decision making
- planning and development
- human and public relations
- induction of new officials
- attitudes to clients
- the problems of record keeping
- supplies management in the public service
- procurement and conservation of equipment and supplies

- monitoring of public service management
- construction of administrative buildings and premises.

At all levels in-service training is envisaged to enable officials to gain greater in-depth knowledge of specific administrative techniques. The accent is to be on innovations in the administration, taking into account the specific needs of each organization. Induction courses are also envisaged for all new recruits to the public service.

To carry out the actual delivery of all these training activities the Commission is looking to INAGHEI. This has many advantages. For one the Director General of INAGHEI is also the President of the Commission, so there is no danger of there being anything less than perfect understanding between the Commission and INAGHEI. INAGHEI also enjoys a high reputation and courses offered there carry with them prestige. There is a competent faculty and library. Nevertheless it is very doubtful whether INAGHEI at present has the capacity to cope with the additional work that the proposed program involves. Already it has an enrollment of 600 students and runs four year degree (licence) programs in international relations, public administration, business management and accounting. It conducts evening as well as day time classes and its limited classroom space appears to be already virtually fully utilized. We are told that the Institute hopes to acquire land next door to its existing facilities, and that if this land is acquired CIDA has indicated a willingness to underwrite the construction of additional buildings. The classrooms themselves at INAGHEI are designed to be suitable for instruction by lecture. They are not well

suited for training purposes, where the use of small groups or a U-shaped format is often desirable. They are not equipped with audio-visual equipment such as overhead projectors, closed circuit television, slide projectors and tape recorders which would be desirable for training purposes.

We would recommend therefore that while INAGHEI should indeed be the executive arm through which the whole training program is implemented, some ways should be found to strengthen INAGHEI's capacity, both in terms of facilities, equipment and materials, and in terms of training personnel. With regard to the need for training and development personnel it is clear that additional specialists in many fields are required. They will be needed to make possible the implementation of new approaches, procedures and processes that the Commission has recommended as part of both the Civil Service reform and the regionalization plan it developed in collaboration with the Ministry of Planning. One example is the introduction, initially on a pilot basis in one or two government organizations of Rationalisation des Choix Budgétaires (PPBS). This will require specialists with an in-depth knowledge of the subject who will both design and introduce the new system and train other officials in its operation. Such training will, of necessity, occur mainly on the job.

Other areas identified for us by the Commission staff for which specialists will be required include:

- management training
- communication skills
- human relations
- financial management
- project analysis

- project design and preparation
- project management
- project monitoring and evaluation
- records management
- management information systems
- job analysis
- classification
- compensation
- management science
- supplies management
- budget analysis (for the local as well as the central level)
- planning (i.e. practical planning at the local level)

Among these various specializations the highest priority should go to job analysis, job classification and compensation as well as O & M management science, since without an adequate supply of these skills the rationalization of civil service posts and salaries cannot be implemented.

Another equally high priority will need to be given to the training of trainers. It should be clear from the preceding paragraphs that the needs for trainers will be very great. The supply is unfortunately all too small. The trainers made available for the training program for Agents Communaux appear to have been of very high quality, but they are only a small number and most of them undertook these training activities in addition to their normal work load.

At present no training programs are available in Haiti for the training of trainers. In order to begin to build capacity in this crucial area, attention needs to be given to the training of a nucleus of trainers . This could be accomplished either by sending a selected small group of subject specialists for training overseas in a trainer training program or, preferably, by having a training team come to Haiti to conduct a six-week to three-month training of trainers program on site for up to about 30 Haitian participants. This latter course would be much more cost effective, but it could be made even more viable if one hand-picked Haitian could be trained as a trainer in the institution from which the training team was selected and could be a part of the team to conduct the program in Haiti. This person would then be in a very strong position to supervise future trainer training programs.

To summarize the needs that will follow, in the area of training, from the proposals of the Commission Administrative, and which cannot be met (or cannot be fully met) from Haiti's existing resources, we see needs for :

1. Short term technical assistance in job analysis, job classification and compensation. The purpose would be to help in the on-the-job training of Haitians and to assist with the initial stages of the implementation of the rationalization of the grading and salary structure of the Fonction Publique.
2. Overseas training for Haitian specialists in job analysis, job classification and compensation. We foresee the need for at

least twenty people trained in these skills.

The training required would probably be of two to four months duration. As much as possible of the training should take place through practical attachments to an overseas organization.

If English speaking candidates were available the Personnel Division of the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey would be an excellent venue for this training. If training in a Francophone environment is required then a suitable organization in Canada would seem to offer the best possibilities. The Public Service Commission of Canada is likely to be able to be of assistance.

3. Short term technical assistance to provide one or more training of trainers programs in French on site in Haiti. If possible a team of French-speaking trainers skilled in U.S. management training would be preferred. The emphasis on a North American , rather than a European approach is considered in line with the general approach to management development that permeates the recommendations of the Commission.
4. Overseas training in the systematic design and management of training for the person designated to supervise future training of trainer activities. We would envisage a program of about three months duration.
5. Short term (i.e. three to six months) overseas training for specialists in all the areas listed in paragraph above.

These specialists, who should also go through the training of trainers program in Haiti, will provide specialist instruction for the extensive program of courses and seminars projected by the Commission.

6. Funds for the financing of the projected training programs. It is impossible at this juncture to forecast the total funds that will be required. The ballpark figure of \$1 million for the four training programs in O & M, personnel management, financial management, and commune administration indicates that the total figure is not likely to be less than about \$ 5 million over the five year period of the implementation of the reforms.
7. Expansion of INAGHEI's present facilities. At a very minimum four additional training rooms will be required. The phrase "training room" rather than "classroom" is used advisedly since these rooms will need to be adapted to training and seminar rather than traditional school needs. They should be equipped with tables and chairs so that the room can with equal ease be organized in a U-formation or into separate groups of people with each group sitting around a table. Ideally, smaller seminar rooms suitable for groups of four to eight people to meet together should also be provided. INAGHEI's ability to provide the space for the enlargement

of its facilities is dependent of the purchase of the adjoining land by the Government of Haiti.

- .8. Training equipment and materials. This includes audio-visual equipment, such as overhead projectors, closed circuit television and video recorder, slide projectors, tape recorders, screens for the projectors, etc. Training rooms should be equipped with curtains so that the rooms can be blacked out when necessary. Relevant software, such as films, video-tapes etc. will also be required. Books and other printed materials are also at present in short supply. These will be needed in sufficient quantities to permit the trainees, after training to take with them a small reference collection of books related to their fields of specialization.

V. Recommendations

Our recommendations are grouped under three headings. The first group contains those measures we recommend for implementation by the Administrative Reform Commission. The second subsumes recommendations requiring action by the GOH. And the third heading groups recommendations that need external assistance for their implementation.

A. Measures that can be Taken by the Administrative Reform Commission

1. The Commission should initiate a detailed study of the budgetary and financial implications of the proposed reforms. Some technical assistance may be needed to carry this out.
2. The Commission should ensure that the Commissariat National is invested with adequate powers to make rules and regulations that are legally binding on all branches of the public administration. A corollary recommendation is that the Commission avoid the enactment of legislation that will hamper the Commissariat National as it proceeds with the continuing and dynamic process of the modernization of the Public Service. (An example of the danger of the type of procedure that could be frozen into the law in too detailed fashion is given above in Chapter III.)
3. The Commission should give detailed attention to the problems associated with the implementation and management of the radical change that the Commission's proposals involve. The Commission might wish to consider some technical assistance in developing an implementation plan and strategy for the reform.

B. Measures Requiring Action by the GOH

4. The Government of Haiti should continue to accord administrative reform the highest priority. We urge that the Government work toward the installation of all the legislative foundations required for reform as expeditiously as possible in order that implementation can move ahead.
5. The Government of Haiti should acquire the land adjacent to INAGHEI and proceed with its plans to expand the Institute with financial assistance from CIDA.
6. The Government of Haiti should transfer the communal agents at the end of their training program, to the Ministry of Planning where they could be integrated into the regional planning units.

C. Measures Requiring External Assistance

7. The following audio-visual equipment needs to be provided to INAGHEI for the training of public servants:
 - i) 4 overhead projectors and screens,
 - ii) 1 video-tape recorder and closed circuit television set up with two cameras one of which should be equipped with zoom lens,
 - iii) 1 16 mm. sound movie projector,
 - iv) 2 cassette tape recorders.
8. Audio-visual software, including films and video-tapes in French should be acquired for use by INAGHEI in the proposed training programs.
9. Suitable management text books in French need to be provided for the proposed training programs. These should be supplied in sufficient quantity for each trainee to be provided with a set of basic reference texts.

10. Fellowships to enable up to 12 Haitian officials to attend training programs overseas should be provided. The training programs would be of 3 to 6 months duration. The first priority should be given to training in job analysis, classification and compensation. Other training should be in the fields listed in Chapter IV in accordance with priorities to be determined by the Administrative Reform Commission.
11. Technical Assistance in the area of implementation, planning and the management of change needs to be given in order to provide guidance to the Administrative Reform Commission and its soon-to-be established operating arm, the Commissariat, in designing and carrying out a detailed strategy for implementing the reform once the legal framework is in place and the requisite studies are completed. This assistance could be either long-term or short-term, though long-term would be preferable. In order to be of the fullest utility, at least 12 person-months would be required. (See recommendation 3.)
12. Technical assistance in the form of a 12-month one-person team to study the long range budgetary implications of the proposed reforms should be furnished. (See recommendation 1 above.)
13. Twelve person-months of technical assistance in job analysis, classification and compensation are recommended. This could be two persons for six months each or one person for twelve months. The necessary expertise does not currently exist in the public service.

14. Six person-months of technical assistance to conduct a training program in the systematic design and management of training in French in Haiti should be provided. A two-person team for three months is recommended. This team would conduct a six to eight week program for 25 to 30 Haitians selected to be trainers.
15. Training overseas for the person designated to head up the GOH's training of trainers program should be considered. A three-month program is recommended. It would be advantageous if the training took place at the same institution from which the two person training team in Recommendation 13 was selected. The Haitian person trained would also be a member of the team that conducts the training program in Haiti, so this training must take place before the two-person team arrives in Haiti.
16. In order to reduce the costs to the Government of placing trainees at INAGHEI from the interior of the country in expensive hotels, and in order to increase the collegiality and dialogue between these trainees while they pursue their courses of study, we recommend that the GOH procure or build a student dormitory at or near INAGHEI's training facilities.

SECTION TWO

DECENTRALIZATION IN HAITI AND THE PROPOSED REGIONALIZATION PLAN

Introduction

The Administrative Reform Commission places a high priority on decentralization of administrative structures. Its plans for decentralization include two aspects:

- (i) the strengthening of capabilities at the level of communes, primarily through the training program discussed in the other major section of this report,
- (ii) a detailed proposal for development of regional planning and coordination institutions, including channels for consulting local community opinion. This regionalization scheme has been developed in close consultation with technical divisions of the Ministry of Planning.

The USAID Administrative Reform Team was asked to assess the regionalization plan. To do so, we had first to develop an understanding of the existing institutions and relationships, at the national, intermediate, and local levels, as they bear on the need for and prospects of decentralization. The first chapter of this section of the report sketches our findings. The second chapter describes and assesses the proposed regionalization scheme. The third offers some suggestions for advancing the goals of decentralization, both within and outside of the framework of the plan put forward. Finally, the fourth chapter contains a summary of our recommendations.

It may be helpful, before proceeding further, to note the several different aspects or dimensions of decentralization. The concept includes: a) administrative deconcentration, b) citizen participation (particularly at the local level), and c) wider territorial dispersion of economic and social development efforts. Each of these has a different rationale; or, to put the point differently, different advantages or goals are sought through each. Each aspect also entails certain risks or problems. All three are implicit in the specific scheme the team was asked to assess.

The rationale for administrative deconcentration usually includes:

- (i) More rapid implementation of administrative tasks, by moving decision-making authority closer to those directly responsible for implementation.
- (ii) Fuller, more accurate, and more timely information on local/regional needs and on implementation progress and problems.
- (iii) Greater flexibility in project design and choice of implementation techniques, to take account of local/regional needs and resources.
- (iv) Improved coordination among the activities of various ministries at the regional and national level.
- (v) Increased capacity to cooperate with non-governmental organizations, including community action groups, the private business and commercial sectors, and voluntary associations.
- (vi) Generation of a wider range of ideas and approaches to specific problems. Techniques or designs developed in one locality may turn out to be helpful elsewhere.

The major risk associated with deconcentration is loss of central control over technical and administrative standards, and the possibility that delegated authority and funds will be used for unauthorized or low-priority purposes. Deconcentration is also often resisted, of course, by officials at the center reluctant to reduce their own power.

The rationale for expanded participation by local citizens in determining development priorities and designing and implementing projects usually includes:

- (i) Identification of development priorities in accord with felt needs.
- (ii) Fuller information on local conditions, hence more appropriate project design.
- (iii) Utilization of existing resources and development of new resources at the local level, specifically the capabilities to plan and manage projects.
- (iv) Raising local resources in the form of labor, materials, and small-scale cash contributions.
- (v) A sense of commitment to projects undertaken and completed, hence better prospects for adequate maintenance and full utilization.
- (vi) Encouraging co-operation among different groups at the community level and promoting a sense of community identity, hence facilitating resolution of community problems.
- (vii) Enhancing the dignity and self-confidence of the individuals involved in successful community-level endeavours.

Increased local participation may also carry certain risks, and usually entails a number of difficulties. The risks associated with increased popular awareness and demands on government are that these demands may extend beyond the capacity or willingness of the government to respond. Increased local participation also often generates challenges to established local political arrangements. In addition, there are the logistic and administrative difficulties of encouraging community action in isolated and little-developed areas.

Advocates of greater territorial dispersion of economic and social development efforts usually have several objectives in mind:

- (i) Increased equity: the desire to reduce the disparity in living standards (including income, services, employment opportunities) as between the metropolitan city, smaller cities, and the countryside, and also between poorer and richer regions of the nation.
- (ii) Increased economic efficiency: the hypothesis that the concentration of public and private investment in the metropolitan center is greater than is justified by cost-benefit considerations in the medium and long run. Put differently, decentralization is advocated on the grounds that resources outside the metropolitan center are being neglected, and therefore that more investment to smaller towns and rural areas would be more productive than similar sums invested in the metropolitan area.
- (iii) Improved population distribution and reduced or altered migration flows: the belief, or hope, that more employment, higher incomes,

and better services in rural areas and small cities will reduce rural out-migration and/or divert substantial numbers of migrants to smaller cities, thereby slowing the growth of the metropolitan center and (in Haiti's case) reducing emmigration.

The risks or questions entailed in pursuing decentralized economic and social development vary with each country's specific circumstances, and with the particular patterns or strategies of decentralization being advocated for that country. Some of the questions raised by the particular strategy advocated in the regionalization scheme--promoting the growth of medium towns as growth poles and counter magnets to Port-au-Prince--are considered briefly in the assessment of that scheme in chapter II of this section.

I. The Institutional Framework for Decentralization in Haiti

A. The Ministry of Planning

The Ministry of Planning (SEP) was established to consciously coordinate economic and social policies, programs and projects to achieve stated goals. The present organization of the SEP consists of 9 major parts. They are the office of the Secretary of Planning, the Director-General, the Administrative Directorate and 6 technical directorates. Several additional units, including the Statistics and Information Institute, the Institute for the Preservation of National Heritage, the Food and Nutrition Planning Unit, the National Bureau of Technology, and the Environmental and Erosion Control Council are related to the SEP.

Operations consist of an enumeration of all the resources which are available for goal attainment, a consideration of alternative policies governing the ways in which the resources may be used, and a check for consistency as to whether the goals can be achieved with internal and external resources. The SEP is now considering decentralization of the institutions under which Haiti's planned growth is to occur, the distribution of goods and services, and the concentration of activities in certain areas and the strains that this will produce. In attempting to create favorable development conditions, the structures of SEP have reached out to 14 public sector planning Agencies including but not limited to: Agriculture, Mining and Energy Resources, Commerce and Industry, Potable Water, Health, Education, Social Affairs, Community Development. The SEP has authority to establish channels for consulting with the private sector but so far has not set these up*

* For fuller information on the structure and operations of the Ministry of Planning, see Appendix 1.

Foreign assistance and non-government organizations have a major influence on all development activities in Haiti. In 1979-1980 foreign assistance amounted to approximately \$136 million. It was distributed among eight sectors: Development Policy and Planning 29%, Transport and Communications 23%, Agriculture 16%, Education 10%, Health 8%, Natural Resources 6%, Population 3%, Employment, Social Development and Industry 3%. Multi-lateral programs provided about 50% of all foreign assistance, and bilateral aid covered the other 50%. Non-government organizations are mainly religious and number over 130 organizations. Their main contribution is on-the-spot technical assistance. The SEP has difficulty in trying to keep abreast of all these various donor-funded and/or operated activities. Since the SEP has no control over nor does it evaluate foreign donor agency programs and projects, it is frequently by-passed by GOH sectoral agencies and by the donors. The constant interplay of donor agent activity renders the GOH development planning environment less coherent and more reactive.

B. Regional Administrative Structure

Once one leaves Port-au-Prince, the state administrative structure becomes quite attenuated. The main representatives of the central government are under the Department of the Interior, a very powerful ministry that also controls the military. Its regional units consist of nine départements and twenty-seven arrondissements. The first of these does not have great development significance, for the département is basically a military unit, and there exists no political or administrative office at this level that could supervise or coordinate the programs of the various

technical ministries. These other ministries do have offices in the départemental capitals, but the administrative vacuum that exists there makes it impossible, under present conditions, for regional planning and programming to occur.

The arrondissements are less of an empty box, there being both a prefect and an army colonel, as well as a justice of the peace and a V.S.N. officer. The prefect is the central figure here, but his duties focus on control and supervisory functions, and little attention is given to development activities.

1. Ministry Field Staff

The majority of the operational ministries have some form of regional field staff. The nature and number of these staff are dependent upon both the mission of the particular ministry and the resources available to it for support of regional staff. The following is a description of the current situation in which ministries operate outside of Port-au-Prince.

a. Ministry of Planning (SEP)

The Ministry of Planning has the core of a field staff in its Directorate of Exterior Services (DSE). A planning professional with general skills in economic development is based in each of four recently established field offices, located in Cap-Haitien, Gonaives, Cayes and Jacmel. The intent is for the staff to work with the regional counterparts from other ministries. Basically, the staff performs technical and research services for the SEP and other ministries, deals with the international donor agencies at the regional level, works with mayors' offices at the commune level, and collects information in their regions.

All of the studies are project-oriented, but do feed into the regional date requirements of the annual plan.

b. Ministry of Agriculture, Natural Resources and Rural Development
(DARNDR)

DARNDR has several forms of regionally based resources in place. The District Agronomes (13) serve as the basic staff mechanism for the supervision and management of DARNDR projects and services. The District Agronomes report to the Director General of DARNDR and are an important locus for mobilizing resources to address local problems. Within the Technical Divisions there are also regionally based resources. In the Division of Agriculture, for example, the Extension service provides the basic human resources for agriculture initiatives in the field. Although there is a central office for the Extension Service, it appears that the agents are responsible to the District Agronome. The Extension Service has approximately 131 agricultural agents covering, in addition to agricultural extension, Home Economics, 4-C Clubs, and other local organization issues. They are based in both the District Offices and in rural communities. Their level of education and experience is highly varied, as is commitment and motivation. Resources are minimal for extension activities. The Division of Rural Development is the largest component of DARNDR in terms of resources. There were over 2,100 persons in this Division as of 1978, of which over 1,700 were rural primary teachers. The balance of staff in the Community Improvement Service (Animation Rurale), form part of a diverse set of local rural actors helping to develop local development capacity such

as community councils. The respective roles of organizational entities, such as Animation Rurale and those of ONAAC (Organisation Nationale d'Alphabétisation et d'Action Communautaire--part of the Ministry of Education) appear to be complementary given the sparseness of staff and limits of staff capacity.

DARNDR also conducts many of its projects in specific areas in co-operation with other organizations. For example, DARNDR staff cooperate in the field and through the central office, with the National Cooperatives Council (CNC) in building cooperatives and farming and artisan organizations. Similarly, DARNDR staff work with the semi-autonomous Bureau de Crédit Agricole in regional offices to help provide loans to local credit groups.

In the area of commercialization of agriculture, several entities have been created. Their level of regional activity, however, is uncertain. One of these, SENECA (Service National de Commercialisation Agricole) started in 1976 with the development of staff capacity in commercialization, and has made efforts to send staff into the field to work on providing price information and aggregating cereals and other agricultural products for sale. The program objective was to provide price information to 25 different market representatives in rural, local and urban areas, and work towards establishing consistent purchasing linkages between small producers and markets. One element of this effort was to be the improvement of physical facilities, such as silos and covered markets in rural areas. In 1979-1980 nine projects for improvement of markets

were proposed--six regional and three urban. SENECA also is intended to encourage linkage of rural markets to export opportunities. No information about the status of the regional market development activities is available at present, although the staff development component of the effort was reported in place. SENECA's program complements the on-going coffee market projects through the IHPCADE (Institut Haitien de Promotion du Café et des Denrées d'Exportation) and the small coffee farmer lending efforts of BCA. These efforts, which are not officially under DARNDR (as semi-autonomous agencies), have on-going projects that focus on rehabilitation of coffee plantations, formation of cooperatives, provision of better coffee production equipment, and aggregation for sale.

In sum, there are few regionally based staff, other than those attached to specific projects. Most of these are supported by donor agencies in collaboration with DARNDR. District Agronomes, extension agents and rural development personnel, are funded by the GOH.

c. Ministry of Commerce and Industry

The Commerce Ministry is in an initial phase of institutional development at the present time. There is a Bureau of Regional Coordination, within the Directorate of Inspection Control which has as its mission the supervision of administrative units established across the Republic, the acquisition of information relative to activities of commercial and industrial enterprise from these units for the Ministry, and the transmission of instructions of the Ministry back to regional business entities.

The state of development of these regional offices is not known, but they are probably on the drawing board or partially in place.

d. Ministry of Public Works (TPTC)

The Ministry of Public Works has set up a fairly extensive regional staff as part of its normal operations throughout Haiti. The Regional and Departmental Service collects and analyzes regional data on topography, and traffic patterns, and meteorologic data (from DARNDR stations) pertaining to road development, and directly conducts rural road development and maintenance in the countryside. There are a number of well developed road maintenance stations with equipment for road work. Nine Departmental Engineers are in charge of regional services, acting as representatives of the Secretary for Public Works. The Engineers directing the regional offices report to the Executive Engineer, who is also the Director of the Western regional office, headquartered in Port-au-Prince. He is responsible for helping District Engineer staff in public works activities. The Departmental Engineer is also expected to serve as an organizer of local project efforts (as an animateur), a planner, coordinator and supervisor of work projects in his district. When necessary, due to geographic or road patterns, districts may be broken into administrative subdivisions to facilitate public works activities. These districts, when created, should have a structure similar to the Regional offices. In addition to regional offices of TPTC, there are also regional offices of autonomous agencies in related fields such as SNEP (Société Nationale d'Eau Potable).

e. Ministry of Health

The field staff of the Ministry of Health at the region, district, and local level varies by number and type. At the moment there is no national staffing requirement for health facilities. Our limited investigation of the Secretariat supports the position that qualified manpower to staff the facilities is available but there is a problem of distribution. The highest concentration of health manpower, as expected, is in the urban areas.

Manpower and material distribution point out one of the basic management problems of the Ministry. It has 5,700 employees with an authorization of 6,500 in the current budget. Systems for tracking and directing their allocation in an unroutinized management environment are in the initial design phase with AID-funded technical assistance.

f. Ministry of Education

The Ministry of Education has teachers distributed countrywide. It also has a strong field staff in ONAAC (Organisation National d'Alphabétisation et d'Action Communautaire), which is the major agency charged with community development work in Haiti. The predecessor to this organization had been charged primarily with promoting adult literacy, but it became apparent that an effective literacy program required strong community organizations that could serve as the point of contact with the local population. ONAAC thus evolved into an organization that both organizes communities and provides educational services. Its techniques parallel those of animation rurale agencies in other francophone countries;

that is, it uses animateurs to aid local people in becoming aware of their capacity to take control of their lives, to help set up community organizations, and to work with local leaders to execute community development projects.

DARNDR also does community organizing through the Service d'Animation Rurale of the Division of Rural Development. Before ONAAC was created, the Ministry of Agriculture had in fact the primary responsibility for animation work. Rather than give up this function, the ministry continues to provide services that to some extent duplicate those of ONAAC, although its focus is supposed to be on the agricultural aspects of community development. In 1980/81, DARNDR had 60 animateurs and ONAAC had 140.

Shortages of physical and financial resources are, however, the major constraint on community development programs. ONAAC's nine regional coordinators, for example, currently have seven functioning vehicles. The 31 zone coordinators and all of the field staff have to find their own transport. ONAAC's operating budget is about \$800,000 (1981/82) and often funds that are earmarked for various development projects are not disbursed on time. In 1980/81, for example, only 74 percent of the expenditures that were anticipated for community development were actually made. Until the logistical bottlenecks and resource constraints are reduced, ONAAC's organizational work is unlikely to have a significant impact on the rural population. Recently passed legislation (discussed below) anticipates

that community action groups will be set up in every Section Rurale, but this will not happen unless Haiti's ability to provide animation services is greatly augmented.

2. Autonomous Regional Development Organizations

There are five governmental or quasi-governmental organizations in Haiti that conduct multi-sectoral activities within specific rural regions. Three of these--ODN, ODPG and ODVA--are clearly government agencies, attached to the Ministry of Agriculture (under its tutelle) but with substantial operating autonomy. Associated with each is a foreign donor. The World Bank has conducted an integrated rural development project in the North in collaboration with the ODN for some years. The Germans assist the ODPG in the Plaine des Gonaives area. The IDB works closely with the ODVA on irrigation and agricultural development in the Artibonite Valley. We did not have time to learn much about these three agencies* with the partial exception of the ODVA.

The interesting question to examine is the extent to which their autonomous status has facilitated efficient implementation of programs and the coordination of activities that would normally be under the jurisdiction of several separate ministries. ODVA has concentrated its efforts heavily on the rehabilitation and expansion of irrigation works, and on agricultural research and extension services closely linked to the irrigation efforts and focused largely on state-owned farms. Hence cross-sectoral coordination has not been terribly important. In principle,

* Gustave Ménager, former ODN director, is now located at Damien, and would be a useful source, especially since the ODN offices are in Cap-Haitien and are therefore more difficult to consult.

regional autonomous agencies also provide a focus within which to develop regional (e.g., sub-national) planning and programming capacities. Thus far ODVA has relied for such expertise almost wholly on its IDB associates.

The Développement Régional Intégré de Petit-Goave et de Petit Trou de Nippes (DRIPP) is, properly speaking, a program rather than an agency. Of course, there is an organizational structure, which may well be better developed than those of one or more of the three regional organizations just discussed, but the DRIPP has no sanction in Haitian law and presumably will go out of existence when the program terminates. The program itself is largely conceived and financed through Canadian aid. It began in 1976, and is based on the principle of joint planning and implementation with the Government of Haiti. The program is attached to the Ministry of Agriculture. For the first five years of its existence, it was supervised by an inter-ministerial committee chaired by a representative of the Ministry of Agriculture. The Director of the program was (and is) Haitian and his deputy Canadian. With minor exceptions, the sectoral units conducting the program (Agriculture, Education, Health) were headed by Haitians who held simultaneous appointments in their respective ministries; most administrative and staff units were headed by Canadians. During its first years, the program carried out a broad range of rural development activities, concentrating on roughly a third of the area within which it is authorized to work, and utilizing a payroll of roughly 525. Its program included considerable emphasis on development of community action groups.

As the first five-year phase of the program drew to a close, CIDA (Canadian International Development Agency) concluded that certain changes were essential if it were to continue supporting the program. A detailed program for the next five years has been drawn up, but the Canadians have committed themselves only to the initial eighteen months of that period, pending evaluation of altered arrangements. The main changes concern top-level supervision, and tightened financial, personnel, and other administrative procedures. The supervisory council, renamed the Comité Mixte d'Orientation, is now chaired by the Minister of Planning and includes the Ministers of Agriculture, Health, Education and Public Works as members. It is to meet monthly, at least for a time. While ministers can designate representatives rather than attending meetings in person, they are required to give their representatives the authority to make decisions. The tightened procedures are designed to give CIDA a fuller voice in personnel selection, and closer control over finance and implementation including means for preventing expenditures outside of the approved program. The revised arrangements reflect an on-going effort to balance two goals: working with the Government of Haiti rather than attempting maximum distance, and at the same time retaining adequate control and autonomy to ensure efficient and operations and prevent diversion of resources.

HACHO (Harmonisation de l'Action des Communautés Haitiennes Organisées) conducts development activities in the poor and isolated Northwest;

but its juridical status is vague and its funding and staffing are both insecure and inadequate. HACHO was first established in 1966 as the Haitian American Community Help Organization, with a primary focus on disaster relief and medical services. From the early years it has received support from CARE, as well as USAID resources (mainly food aid) channeled through CARE. The organization reached its zenith in the mid and late 1970s. In 1978 it had 245 employees, and had broadened its activities to include construction and maintenance of feeder roads, small irrigation and drainage works, potable water projects, some agricultural extension and tree nursery projects, and a scattering of crafts and retail co-operative endeavours, in addition to nutrition and health clinics and several hospitals. On many of the projects community action councils were used to organize labor, which was usually paid with PL 480 food; HACHO workers therefore were also engaged in community organization.

While government ministries in theory co-operated with HACHO, in fact they had virtually no field staff in the region. Meanwhile AID support for HACHO was phased out, stopping entirely in 1980. Funds from the Government of Haiti, begun in the early 1970s, increased substantially but fell far short of compensating for AID's withdrawal. CARE and the German government have continued some support, but HACHO has had to cut back drastically on personnel, while transport and material support never very adequate, has almost evaporated. Moreover, relations with the Ministry of Agriculture, always lukewarm, have deteriorated to

the point that the Ministry disowns the organization. Recent efforts to shift HACHO's tutelle to the Ministry of Planning were not approved*.

C. Institutional Framework at the Local Level

1. Local Government and Administration

Local administration in Haiti begins at the commune. Haitian law provides for the election of the maire (mayor), who is the executive authority for each of the country's 131 communes. In fact, this provision has not been enacted, and the maire is appointed by the central government. The incumbent has no fixed term and holds his position at the pleasure of the Minister of the Interior, to whom he is responsible. Assisting the mayor are two assistants; the three of them form the conseil communale which handles communal affairs.

Though the mayor is not popularly chosen, some attempts have apparently been made in recent years to place in office persons who have some technical and administrative skill, in addition to the requisite political loyalty. Moreover, the local populace seems to have some residual "veto" power, in the sense that a very unpopular individual would probably not hold office for long.

The next tier of government is the 560 Sections rurales. Again provisions for a popularly elected council have not been implemented, and administration is carried out by the Chef de section. This person combines a variety of police, executive, and other functions. Evidently, there have in the last twelve months been very limited experiments with elected Conseils sectionnaires, but the results are unknown and whether such a model might be extended on a larger basis is highly problematic.

* For more detailed information on HACHO, see Carol V. Pfrommer et.al., Evaluation of the Haitian American Community Help Organization: Phase II, USAID/Haiti, (Oct.1976) and Glen R.Smucker and Jacqueline N.Smucker, HACHO and the Community Council Movement, USAID/Haiti (Jan.1981).

Below the Section there is no official level of governmental administration. There is, however, the informal and vaguely determined Habitation. In other countries these might be called villages or communities, but these terms are misleading in the Haitian context as there tend neither to be nucleated settlements nor tightly-knit communities. One estimate is that about 4,600 such localities exist, or perhaps 8 to 10 per Section.

One of the most striking facts about government administration in Haiti is how little "penetration" there has been in the periphery. This, of course, is another way of stating that the government is overly centralized, helping to create economic, social and regional imbalances of major dimensions. The Ministry of the Interior, as noted above, has representatives down to the Section rurale. The V.S.N., a "voluntary" paramilitary organization, also known as tonton macoute, is represented at this level, too. But while security and surveillance functions are relatively well served, technical and social services are not. In 1978/79, for instance, there were only 1,803 public primary school teachers in rural areas, 187 family education agents, and 200 community development animateurs from the Ministries of Education and Agriculture. Similarly, in 1975/76, the agricultural extension service was reported to have only 131 farm agents and 55 home economists to serve the entire rural population.

It is this shortage of technical and service personnel, compounded by a lack of adequate training, transportation, and equipment, that poses perhaps the greatest constraint on local development in Haiti. Given the likelihood that the public sector will not soon have the ability to augment its personnel, it is imperative to find ways of using these scarce human resources more effectively.


2. Community Councils

The community council, now known officially as the Conseil d'action communautaire (CAC), is a relatively recent phenomenon in Haiti, dating from the late 1950s. At first a largely political movement with little popular support or geographic coverage, community councils have gradually evolved into local institutions of considerable importance. This was due largely to their sponsorship by HACHO and other development agencies, and to the animation activities conducted by ONAAC and DARNDR.

The councils have gone through several incarnations, and there has been considerable variation in size, activities, and performance. A series of laws passed in 1981, however, has tried to impose greater uniformity upon the movement (See Figure 1). The current model is a group of 100-300 individuals, led by nine to eleven elected officers, who form the executive committee. The officers of the CAC must come from the locality--foreigners, clergymen, and, perhaps most significantly, government functionaries are not permitted to sit on the executive committee. The current law also restricts people to holding office for only two terms, evidently to prevent local elites from becoming entrenched in leadership positions. This is a worthy goal, though given the dynamics of rural social life, excluding elites may not be practicable, or indeed desirable, for without the support of local notables a CAC might well wither away.

Figure 1

Structure of Conseils d'action communautaire



Previously, the councils tended to be smaller and perhaps more accessible to rank-and-file members, but this advantage was believed outweighed by the administrative difficulties of dealing with very small units. In principle CACs are located at the Section level; though where population density and settlement pattern dictate, two or more councils may be formed. Current legislation also permits CACs to divide themselves into territorial groupements and functional sub-committees, and thus tries to optimize both economies of scale and the benefits of face-to-face organization.

There are at present 1,146 officially recognized CACs, though ONAAC estimates the total is about 2,000 when one includes councils that have yet to be granted legal status. The awarding of legal status is a recent development and represents an attempt by the state to regulate and rationalize the community council movement. This regulatory function is carried out by the newly formed Comité national de contrôle et de supervision des entités de développement communautaire (CONACOS), a body that reports directly to the President. To obtain legal status a council must meet criteria required by CONACOS regarding council structure and activities; in return the council becomes a legally constituted body and is entitled to work with various development agencies. Significantly, unofficial councils are expressly forbidden to commence projects with foreign donors.

The CACs are expected to organize themselves into communal and departmental Federations when appropriate. To date such regional Federations have been inactive, but could become a forum for planning and implementing projects beyond the capacity of individual communities.

Membership in CACs is open to all adults in a locality, and members are expected to contribute to the group's fund, attend meetings, and participate in projects. General meetings are supposed to occur monthly, executive committee meetings bi-weekly. The specific functions of the CACs are broad and variable, depending on local needs and interests, and the organization seems designed to act as a kind of de facto local government. As ONAAC officials explain, community councils can act as a pressure group for winning services from central government agencies, as well as serving as a fulcrum for local self-help activities.

Detailed recent data on the councils is available.* These suggest that membership is fairly widespread, with almost half of persons interviewed in five communes claiming to belong to a council. The members were quite representative of the rural population as a whole, with a slight skewing toward the better-off and more literate local residents. As might be anticipated, council leaders were significantly above average in socio-economic status, but this should not obscure the fact that they, like most rural Haitians, are poor and are not removed from other members by large gaps in wealth, income, or literacy.

Membership by itself may be a poor indicator of participation, but other indicators suggest that many council members are quite active in council affairs. A majority of interviewees thought meetings were well attended, though observers of meetings indicated most people in attendance did not initiate suggestions or engage in debate. Rural residents tended to agree with this latter assessment, with member apathy and indifference the most frequently cited reason for councils not being well established.

* See Project Paper: Haiti, Integrated Community Development, USAID/Haiti, 1978, esp. Annex F2a and F2b.

Beyond participation in community decision-making, there also seems to be fairly widespread involvement in the implementation of community projects. All the councils studied had started or completed projects, most frequently road construction, irrigation, and reforestation. Our discussions with a variety of persons familiar with rural Haiti confirmed that the rural population is quite willing to take part in public works and other activities sponsored by community councils.

One observation frequently made about CACs is that they are often dependent upon outside support and therefore incapable of sustaining community development. Rural animateurs themselves distinguish between konsey mangané (food councils), created only to participate in externally-directed food-for-work projects, and konsey seryé (serious councils) that are viable and autonomous. The prevalence of dependency relationships has rightfully been the object of considerable criticism, and has led several observers to question whether the community council model is appropriate for rural Haiti.

It has been suggested along similar lines that because the CAC is alien to peasant society, being built on a formal, democratic model, it cannot work well under Haitian conditions. Poverty and a history of political and economic oppression make it difficult for peasants to exercise power through the CAC. Rather, there is a tendency for local elites and government personnel to dominate the councils. Though such leaders are not necessarily corrupt or repressive, the possibility certainly exists that peasants will be exploited through the CAC and encouraged to join in projects that benefit others more than themselves.

The criticisms of the community council system are serious ones. We nevertheless believe the councils are a valid and useful development institution. They do not fully meet the criteria sometimes established for effective community organization--autonomy, self-sufficiency, democracy--but these criteria are themselves ideal-types. We are impressed with the progress achieved by the movement and its demonstrated capacity to mobilize people for collective endeavors. Further, the government has now accepted the CAC model as the major institutional form for promoting community development in Haiti. These facts suggest that serious consideration ought to be given as to how these organizations might be better assisted to promote economic growth, social equity, and other goals.

3. Groupements

In reaction to some of the shortcomings of the community council system, there has also emerged a local organization known as the groupement, which builds more closely on indigenous organizational forms. Work groups such as the coumbite and the escouade have long been used by Haitian farmers, the former to accomplish particular tasks, the latter to do work on a longer-term basis. These work groups are generally egalitarian, voluntary, and of quite small-scale, and the groupement approach to rural development attempts to preserve these features of the traditional organizational system.

The groupement model involves the formation of groups with 10-20 members, who focus their efforts on joint economic activities. A groupement is thus considerably smaller than a community council, is less suited for communitywide projects, and, because of its commercial and production orientation, is hopefully more self-reliant. Membership tends to be homogenous and based on "natural" groups, without the formal and hierarchical

structure of the CACs. In some areas they may work land in common and participate in other joint enterprises. Study sessions are also used regularly, both to educate members and to build group solidarity.

Survey work among groupement members in two areas indicates the membership is drawn overwhelmingly from small farmers (91%). Between 7 and 19 percent were women. Attendance at groupement meetings, however, was somewhat disappointing, and seemed to rely more than might be hoped on outside initiative and guidance. Nor is it clear whether groupements will prove viable over the long-run. Those studied had an average age of only one to two years, and up to one-fifth had disbanded within their first year.*

Though some non-governmental community organizers prefer the groupement model, these organizations may not be the most effective point of contact for major development agencies. Their size makes them incapable of absorbing a large volume of resources and they are not structured to implement the public works and social service projects that are a major need in rural Haiti. A groupement, for example, would not be the right body to plan the location of a rural clinic or construct a local school building. Such activities are better done at a higher level, such as the Section. Further, new legislation encourages donor agencies to work through CACs, which implies that government policy is to de-emphasize the groupement approach, whether in the interest of achieving greater efficiency in the delivery of services, or more ominously, of asserting greater control over the periphery.

It should be noted, too, that there continues to be some role for groupements within the current CAC framework, for the councils are expected often to break into smaller bodies, officially called groupements communautaires. Though these bodies are not identical to the autonomous groupements

* See Ira Lowenthal and Harlan Attfield, Integrated Rural Development in Haiti, USAID/Haiti, March 1979.

discussed above, they could provide opportunities for development agencies, whether private or public, foreign or local, to work directly with small groups of peasants on various projects. We believe the most appropriate type of projects for these groupements would be production-oriented, much like the traditional work groups from which they evolved.

4. Cooperatives

There has been a cooperative movement in Haiti since 1937, that is, a movement to establish jointly-owned economic enterprises based on Rochdale principles. This organizational form has not had a significant impact on rural areas--in 1977 only 40 cooperatives were officially recognized, and of these half were coffee marketing bodies. There are only four production cooperatives, and service cooperatives are said to be virtually non-existent*.

Little research has been done on cooperatives in Haiti, so evaluation of the potential of these organizations to contribute significantly to development is difficult. The general point has been made that, like CACs, cooperatives are imported, overly-sophisticated, and unfamiliar organizations that have little relevance for Haitian peasants. Local elites often dominate these groups and the very poor are sometimes excluded from participation. In many cases rural coops have been observed to be dependent on external inputs, and there is a real question whether a democratic institution can function in this country. On the other hand, some comparatively successful cooperative enterprises have been observed, and the model may be appropriate for some projects, particularly those oriented around the production and marketing of cash crops.

* See Diane Wolf and Joelle Jean-Julien, Cooperatives in Haiti: A Study of Nine Cooperatives, USAID/Haiti, September 1978.

It should be noted, too, that in 1981 legal changes occurred at the national level vis-a-vis the cooperative movement. The Conseil National Cooperatif (CNC) has been placed under the Minister of Planning. The CNC is charged with registering cooperatives, with developing a national plan for cooperative development, with supervising their activities, and with acting as a conduit for technical, financial and other assistance. Granting official recognition is perhaps the CNC's most significant function, for a coop so recognized has a legal status and receives tax reductions and other benefits from the government. No group that has not met the guidelines enforced by the CNC is permitted to represent itself as a cooperative, under penalty of fine and imprisonment. As was the case with CACs, government policy seems designed to impose more uniformity and control on these organizations.

5. Sociétés de Crédit Agricole

Sociétés de Crédit Agricole (SACs) are local groups affiliated with the Bureau de Credit Agricole (BCA). The BCA is the primary source of small farm credit in Haiti and has conducted the bulk of its lending through the SACs since 1966. These groups were established in an attempt to reduce the administrative costs of the Bureau's loan program and to combat the large number of bad debts. It was believed that lending to groups of farmers, rather than to individuals, would be more cost-effective, and that the assigning of group liability for loans would increase the rate of repayment. Repayment under BCA traditional lending program has been good although delinquency under the AID-financed Coffee Project was a significant problem.

In 1980 there were 1,730 SACs with 15,500 members. Some \$1.7 million was made available through these bodies. Unfortunately, little is known about how SACs actually function. As part of AID's new rural credit project, research in this area is planned. We urge such research to be done quickly, for it will permit an assessment of the actual and potential role of SACs in Haitian rural development.

D. Summary and Implications

The administrative structure of the Haitian government is not suited to the urgent task of national social and economic development. Several basic problems afflict the system, impeding the flow of information and resources from Port-au-Prince to the rural periphery, and diluting the effect of even well-intended government programs. The most important of these constraints are as follows:

1. Lack of coordination at the center: The Government is not at present capable of formulating a coherent development strategy that can inform the programming activities of the technical ministries. This is a function the Ministry of Planning is supposed to perform, but it lacks both the capacity to work out detailed development targets and the authority to coordinate sectoral programs. Compounding the difficulty, donor agencies have themselves exerted a strong independent influence on the shape of the development program, without much regard for overall national priorities. Even within the sectoral ministries, different divisions often seem out of step with each other. The result is chaotic planning and implementation. Government programs are launched without taking advantage of opportunities for integration with other programs or for coordination with other agencies.

Clearly, reforms are needed to insure more coordination, whether this be done by strengthening the Ministry of Planning, creating an effective inter-ministerial development committee, or by some other means.

2. Over-centralization: The Government of Haiti is highly centralized. It is often necessary for decisions, even those of a trivial or technical nature, to be referred to the highest levels for resolution. Delays, waste, and missed opportunities are the inevitable results, with severe consequences for development efforts. Streamlined procedures and some deconcentration of authority are needed to correct this problem.

3. The gap between center and periphery: With governmental resources concentrated in the capital, there is a dearth of administrative manpower, even poorly-trained manpower, in other areas of the country. Moreover, the basic regional administrative structure--départements and arrondissements--is a largely empty shell, meaning there is no effective institutional mechanism for regional planning. This very top-heavy system cannot carry out even well-designed programs, and it is therefore imperative to build up the field staff of the various technical ministries. This requires not only more personnel, but better training, more attractive salaries, improved transportation, and so on.

4. Overlapping jurisdictions: Most government agencies appreciate in principle that efficiency requires them to deconcentrate some of their authority to territorial subunits. However, to the extent that these agencies have allowed some autonomy for subunits, each has adopted its own framework. This creates a crazy-quilt of administrative areas, making it difficult for field staff to coordinate development activities at the regional level. Some consolidation and rationalization of administrative boundaries could facilitate greater coordination.

5. Lack of coordination in the periphery: No formal mechanism exists in the field for development agents to discuss among themselves the technical and physical inputs required by their programs, the implications their programs have for each others' activities, or any possible sequencing of activities that could make everyone's tasks easier. Some informal planning and cooperation may occur intermittently, but more effective means are needed. This problem is compounded by the absence of any office with sufficient authority at the regional level to settle disputes among technical staff.

6. Personalism: Given unclear lines of authority, ill-defined job descriptions, overlapping areas of jurisdiction, and the lack of formal planning mechanisms, the successful implementation of programs depends heavily on informal relations among officials. To a certain extent this is true in any bureaucratic setting, but the problem seems more acute in

Haiti, particularly in view of the rapid turnover of the ministers and other top personnel. The same applies at lower levels, where good working relationships may result in some ad hoc planning and coordination but where personal animosity or indifference can sabotage any such effort.

7. Inadequate field staffing and support: Compounding these organizational and jurisdictional problems is the sheer inadequacy of field staffing, in terms of numbers and training of personnel and material support (especially transport) available to them. Some regions, like the Northwest, have virtually no ministerial field staff working in them. Improved structures and coordination would enable fuller use of available personnel and funds, but would not solve this basic problem.

8. Absence of popular input: The Haitian political system does not empower its citizens to allow them much control over the direction and pace of government programs that directly affect them. This is closely related to the larger issue of centralization, for greater popular input would shift more government resources to the periphery, where a majority of people live. But of more immediate concern, the lack of effective grass-roots political institutions means that the resources that do filter to the periphery are not always used in ways people would want, for purposes people would choose.

A few bright spots stand out in the midst of all these problems. We were favorably impressed with the extent of local community organization and involvement in development efforts. While the community action councils and the smaller groupements are not equally active everywhere, are often dependent on Food-for-Work to mobilize labor, and may often skew projects to benefit local elites; the fact remains that there are many councils capable of organizing and sometimes even initiating local projects. That is an important resource. Recent government legislation to regulate and control the councils suggests both a recognition of their potential and a certain wariness lest they become too strong a force.

At the national level, a few ministries or units within ministries are concerned with or even dedicated to deconcentration. The Ministry of Health is certainly moving in this direction. Similar reforms are authorized for the Ministry of Education, though not yet being carried out. ONAAC is energetic and enthusiastic, if understaffed, in its mission of community organization. The training program for commune-level administrators, already under way under the auspices of the Administrative Reform Commission, is intended to improve capacity for local-level government in general, including development activities. The Ministry of Planning has recently established several field offices, although they remain embryonic.

Thus the ambitious plan for regionalization and deconcentration supported by the Administrative Reform Commission and the Ministry of Planning, does not enter an entirely unprepared setting. The following chapter describes that plan and assesses its prospects for adoption.

II: The Proposed Regionalization Plan and its Prospects

A. History

In August 1981 the Administrative Reform Commission plus representatives of the Ministry of Planning (primarily the two technical units concerned with regional planning) drew up a detailed proposal for the creation of regional institutions in Haiti. The proposal is designed to encourage meaningful regional planning, allow substantial delegation of decision-making authority regarding both planning and implementation of development programs, create coordinating mechanisms for development activity at the regional level, and facilitate some local popular input to the planning process. The underlying objectives of the scheme include decentralization of economic development and more specific stimulation of Ca-Haitien, les Cayes, and Gonaives as poles of development and counter-magnets to Port-au-Prince. Preparation of this plan after its consideration by the Cabinet is now under way and presently being revised to follow the pattern of the decentralization plans of the Ministry of Health developed somewhat earlier for its own internal purposes.

The regionalization scheme developed during August and September of this year has only very recently been circulated to various ministries. At the moment it is simply a draft proposal prepared at the technical level. The reaction of the Minister of Planning himself is not yet known, much less those of other ministers. Nonetheless, the scheme warrants careful consideration, both because of its source and because it incorporates a great deal of imagination and careful preparation.

B. Substance of the Proposal

The regionalization scheme divides Haiti into four regions as follows; North (centered on Cap-Haitien, and including the present departments of North and Northeast); Transverse (centered on Gonaïves, and including the present departments of Northwest, Artibonite, and Center); West (centered on Port-au-Prince and including the departments of West and Southeast), and South (centered on Les Cayes and including the departments of South and Grande Anse). The metropolitan area of Port-au-Prince is to have its own separate structure, which is not spelled out within the regionalization scheme. In some of the regions, sub-regions are designated; one of these is the Northwest as a sub-region within the Transversal Region.

For each of the four regions, a délégué régional will be appointed by the President, on the joint recommendation of the Ministers of Interior, Planning, and Presidency. This délégué will have very substantial powers of coordination and supervision over the field activities of the various ministries. The proposed regional institutions also include a regional planning unit, a consultative assembly giving local interests some voice in early stages of the planning process, and a regional council with modest advisory powers regarding development issues. At the national level, the system is capped by an interministerial commission attached directly to the Cabinet. This commission will consist of five senior officials appointed by the President on the advice of the ministers of Interior, Planning, and Presidency. One of the five will be designated as Commissaire Coordonnateur, and will be entitled to attend Cabinet meetings when invited, and to place specific items on the agenda of Cabinet meetings.

The scheme envisages that a substantial fraction (as a rough guideline, 40%) of the national capital and operating budgets be set aside for "regional projects". (If the Government of Haiti shifts to program budgeting, as recommended by the Administrative Reform Commission separately from the regionalization scheme, the distinction between the capital and operating budgets will of course disappear.) The interministerial commission is to allocate these funds among the four regions. The precise sequence of the planning/budgeting process is not spelled out, but it is expected that the regional planning units will formulate their plans within guidelines provided by the Ministry of Planning, and possibly with some knowledge of the regional funding available for the coming year. The planning units are also to have some input, presumably through meetings and/or written submissions, from the consultative assemblies composed of representatives of local level bodies including the community action councils. The regional planning units include field offices of the Ministry of Planning, and the regional staffs of the sectors (e.g., operating ministries). These latter are to clear with their superiors in the capital proposed projects within their areas of responsibility, e.g., health projects would be cleared by the Ministry of Health before being incorporated into the regional plan. Once formulated, the integrated regional plan would be submitted for review and comment to the regional délégué and to the regional council.

The conseils régionaux are defined considerably more carefully than the consultative assemblies in the documents describing the scheme. Each is to be composed of two representatives elected from among the prefects of the arrondissements in the region; two deputies similarly elected; two representatives of the community action councils, two representatives of the commune-

level official bodies (most probably mayors), and three representatives of the private sector chosen by the Chambers of Commerce and the Chambers of Industry. The council is authorized to express its desires regarding the allocation of the regional budget; to consider regional studies; to discuss subsidies, tax advantages, and guarantees designed to encourage public, mixed, and private enterprises in the region; and more broadly to consider the regional development program. It seems to be conceived mainly as an advisory body. Presumably it would have authority to recommend changes in the proposed regional plan, and (if the délégué concurred) such changes might be incorporated into a revised plan by the regional planning unit.

The regional plan would then be submitted to the interministerial commission for review, prior to being presented for Cabinet approval. Assisting the interministerial commission there is to be a technical unit, consisting of the regional planning office (DATPE) currently within the Ministry of Planning, which is to be transferred to the commission. The final step in the planning process is cabinet approval.

After the regional plans are approved, the délégués régionaux would have substantial powers to ensure their implementation. They are to have a formal mandate from each operating ministry recognizing their positions as the administrative superiors of the ministerial field staffs. Each délégué is also to have a small technical staff attached directly to his office. Problems of implementation that the délégué cannot resolve at the regional level would be referred to the interministerial commission. A four-man coordinating unit is to be attached to the commission, with each staff member responsible for one region. The function of these coordinating unit members is to act as facilitators, in Port-au-Prince, for the implementation of the regional programs. Presumably they would telephone or visit

ministry offices as necessary to resolve delays, misunderstandings, or disputes. More serious issues would be dealt with at the level of the interministerial commission or, if necessary, referred to the cabinet.

The entire structure below the level of the interministerial commission is to be under the general authority of the Ministry of Interior. The team did not get a precise understanding of what this would mean in practical terms.

Existing regional autonomous agencies such as ODN, ODVA, ODPG and DRIPP operate within the boundaries of one or another of the proposed regions. The staff who developed the regionalization scheme would like to see such autonomous agencies gradually phased out. But as long as such agencies continue in operation, those who devised the scheme believe it should be fairly easy to arrange their cooperation with the proposed planning and implementation arrangements.

C. Prospects for Implementation

It is simply too early to predict whether the proposed scheme (or a modified version) will be approved. The authors of the scheme make no assumptions about its prospects. Operating ministries clearly will not relish the prospect of the regional délégués' authority over their field staffs, nor of potential intervention in their operations by the interministerial commission or its coordinating unit. The sectoral ministries, plus Finance, predictably will dislike handing over a sizeable chunk of the budget for programming at the regional level, despite the safeguard in the scheme that gives them an early veto on proposed activities within their fields. Elements within the Ministry of Planning may challenge the increased priority for regional as distinct from sectoral planning, signaled

by the transfer of DATPE from the Ministry of Planning to a staff unit of the interministerial commission. The prospect of increased participation, channelled through the regional councils and consultative assemblies, is likely to cause concern in some quarters, despite the modest advisory roles assigned these bodies by the scheme. Reportedly, some of the early reactions to the proposed regionalization plan characterize it as establishing "four governments" or "four republics" in Haiti.

There exist several possible sources of support for the proposal. It is widely recognized within the government that the lack of harmonized jurisdictions (e.g., uniform or consistent geographic units for field activities) impedes coordination and cooperation among field staffs of different ministries, beyond the local cooperation between field agents of different agencies who happen to have good personal relations. The Minister of Planning might well view the scheme as substantially enhancing the ability of that ministry to conduct realistic planning, based on fuller and more accurate information about local and regional conditions. Reportedly, the Minister of Finance, in his earlier post as Minister of Planning, expressed real interest in promoting "bottom-up" planning. The proposed arrangements also clearly increase the power of the Minister of Interior, although to what extent and for what purposes remain unclear (and probably would differ under different incumbents). The regionalization scheme might possibly be viewed in some quarters as a promising long-run approach to reintegrating into GOH operations some of the foreign donors' activities now channeled through regional autonomous agencies or PVOs to avoid the difficulties of working with the national governmental bureaucracy.

D. Summary and Appraisal

The regionalization scheme developed by the Administrative Reform Commission and technical units within the Ministry of Planning is bold, innovative, and in many respects carefully thought through. If it is adopted, without major revisions, it has considerable potential for shifting operational decision-making outside of Port-au-Prince, permitting greatly improved coordination of development activities at the regional level, and encouraging meaningful regional planning. It also provides channels for some voice for local communities in the annual and perhaps the longer-term planning process.

More questionable aspects of the scheme, aside from the basic question of whether it will be adopted, include the following:

- i) The four délégués régionaux created by the scheme would be appointed by the President, and would have very substantial powers, in some respects perhaps as great as those of some ministers. This power could be used to pursue development more effectively. It could also be used for other purposes.
- ii) At its worst, if inappropriate people were appointed as délégués, the system would create a new series of layers of bureaucracy, patronage, and potential for corruption.
- iii) Even if the bleak prospect just described does not occur, the decentralization of authority and of funding implies spreading opportunities for corruption and patronage more broadly throughout Haiti. However, that is not necessarily bad.

iv) Aspects of the economic and developmental rationale underlying the scheme may be questionable. No one challenges the importance, both for over-all economic growth prospects and for equity reasons, of greater attention to rural and agricultural development in Haiti (though the most promising agricultural strategy may be open to examination), nor the importance of improving some kinds of facilities and services in the towns outside of Port-au-Prince as a correlate of such growth. But the regionalization scheme is designed not only to spread economic and social development more widely, but also more specifically to promote the growth of Cap Haitien, Les Cayes, and Gonaives as poles of development and counter-magnets. In other countries (including some much larger than Haiti), efforts to promote the growth of smaller cities and towns have had mixed results at best, and often have consumed substantial resources with little results. Moreover, part of the rationale for the growth pole strategy is the hope that more dynamic growth in these towns would divert rural migrants from going to Port-au-Prince or abroad. But even if the growth of these towns were successfully promoted, both knowledge about migration determinants in general, and the practical experience of other nations, strongly suggest that such growth may fail to have the desired effects on migration. Indeed, there is some reason to expect that successful development activities in rural areas and small towns might even accelerate rural out-migration, and the increased flows would not all be absorbed in the small towns.

On balance, despite these risks and limitations, the proposal deserves support and encouragement. At a technical level, aspects of the scheme probably need simplification. There is a rationale for every component in the scheme, yet the combined effect may be cumbersome and self-defeating. Two of the arrangements that might perhaps be eliminated without damaging the system as a whole are the technical councils at the level of the arrondissements, and the coordinating unit attached to the interministerial commission. If the system were put in place without these components, and a need were felt later for either or both, they could be added. But it would seem advisable to start with as simple a structure as possible, keeping in mind the basic goals of the scheme.

Additionally, the regionalization scheme, appropriately enough, sets aside the question of the development of Port-au-Prince and the administrative changes that will be necessary to permit its orderly and healthy growth. Yet we can predict with confidence that regardless of the success of development efforts in rural areas and smaller towns, Port-au-Prince will roughly double in size in the next fifteen years, and its share of the total population of the nation will increase to perhaps a third. Thus, it is imperative that the Government move ahead with the arrangements for the metropolitan district mentioned, but not elaborated, in the plan for regionalization.

Regarding the separately conceived decentralization reforms under way in the Ministry of Health and authorized for the Ministry of Education: these reforms should expedite the operations of each of these ministries, and therefore complement and augment the broader regionalization scheme.

If that scheme is adopted, some changes in the ministries' plans will be necessary to bring their geographical units of decentralized administration into line with those established by the regionalization plan. But these changes should not pose serious difficulties. If the broader scheme is not adopted, the separate ministries' plans are still helpful in their more limited spheres of action.

III. Options and Alternatives for Decentralization in Haiti

The regionalization scheme prepared by the Administrative Reform Commission and technical units within the Ministry of Planning is the most promising option for decentralization in Haiti today. It is also a long shot. Its known supporters, at the moment, are confined to its authors. Moreover, it may take months, perhaps a year or more, before its prospects for adoption, modification, or rejection are clear.

Meanwhile, it is prudent to begin to consider alternative, more modest strategies to move toward at least some of the objectives of decentralization. The regionalization scheme addresses all three aspects of decentralization simultaneously: that is, administrative deconcentration, popular participation, and economic decentralization. It is possible to disaggregate these aspects and to consider ways to promote each separately.

A. Administrative Deconcentration: Devolution of Authority and Regional Coordination Mechanisms

1. An incremental Approach to Administrative Deconcentration for the Government of Haiti

Much though not all of what the regionalization scheme attempts to achieve with respect to delegation of authority and improved regional planning and coordination can be accomplished incrementally, by a series of more modest innovations. If all these innovations were adopted over a period of some years, the final structure would in many ways resemble that proposed by the regionalization scheme. There would of course be differences, not least the length of time required to develop the institutions. But if the regionalization scheme should fail, it is worth considering the feasibility and desirability of an incremental approach.

First, each of the ministries with major development responsibilities should be encouraged to start or continue reforms designed to delegate responsibility within the ministry to appropriately organized field offices. This point is no less important for being obvious.

Second, informal mechanisms could be developed to permit some consultation and coordination among field staffs of various ministries, and between such staff and local officials and community council officers. One of the most encouraging initiatives the team encountered was the informal "round table" that has served for a year or more as a co-ordinating device for officials at the local level in the vicinity of Jacmel. The arrangement could not be simpler: the prefect of the arrondissement, the mayor of Jacmel, the ONAAC departmental director, the president of the community action council (in turn representing smaller community action groups in the vicinity), the district agronome, and occasionally some other ministerial field staff officials, meet monthly to exchange information and discuss problems. The creation of this informal coordinating committee was eased by the unusually good working relations among the individuals involved. But the Administrative Reform Commission and others interested in promoting decentralization might be able to devise incentives or encouragement for similar committees in other localities.

The inconsistent territorial units now used by ministries for their field administrations complicate, but do not preclude, an informal approach of this kind. ONAAC has departmental directors, but the Ministry of Agriculture's agronome is in charge of a district that does not coincide with departmental boundaries; there are several arrondissement prefects within any department and so forth. Nonetheless, the field offices of the various

ministries (and of the autonomous regional development agencies) tend to cluster in certain towns. Such locations offer a potential for coordinating committees, where personal relationships or the local context are not unfriendly to such an evolution.

Where reasonably active coordinating groups are established, a second step in an incremental strategy of decentralization might entail establishing a small technical planning unit (perhaps two people) from the Ministry of Planning, to work with the coordinating committee on the development of larger-scale projects and perhaps on sections of a more integrated plan of development for the area. The Ministry of Planning would have to be flexible in its location and staffing of field offices, but might gain dividends in terms of improved information on local conditions and closer links between plans, actual programs, and successful implementation.

Both of these steps—establishing a coordinating committee where the local social and administrative climate permits, and reinforcing that committee with some planning and programming expertise—would be facilitated by a decision at the national level to harmonize the geographic units of administration used by each of the operating ministries. Even if the regionalization scheme is rejected, the need for harmonization of field units may be widely enough recognized to permit action on that issue. Since the rationale for the four regions proposed in the regionalization scheme rests on a medium city strategy, if that aspect of the scheme is dropped then a larger number of geographic units—perhaps six, or even the present nine departments—might be preferred on various administrative grounds. All that is required is one shared unit (region or department) intermediate between the national and commune levels. Differences in the administrative needs of individual ministries may well produce different field staff arrangements below that level.

Once a harmonized or standard territorial unit of administration is established, an important further step is creation of a new position of regional co-ordinator. For whatever territorial unit agreed upon (whether the department or some smaller number of regions), the co-ordinator would have some degree of authority over the field representatives of the various operating ministries in that territory. At this point the similarities with the regionalization scheme emerge clearly. The co-ordinator would be analogous to the *délégué régional* in the regionalization scheme, although he would not necessarily have as full powers. He should probably be appointed by the President with the advice of the Ministers of Interior, Planning and Presidency. He might report to any of these ministers alone, but each presents some obvious drawbacks. The best arrangement for supervision and guidance of the regional co-ordinators (or *délégués*, or super-prefects) at the national level is probably that proposed by the regionalization scheme—an interministerial commission. As the scheme also proposes, this commission should have a technical staff. It might also have a small staff to serve as facilitators in Port-au-Prince for the regional co-ordinators, helping them resolve routine delays or other problems with the operating ministries.

In short, most of the aspects of the regionalization scheme that bear on delegation of administrative authority, decentralized planning capabilities, co-ordination among the field staffs of the operating ministries, and communication between them and local authorities and groups, can be accomplished piecemeal and incrementally. This possibility is clearly less desirable than the regionalization scheme, but might offer a useful fall-back option.

2. Autonomous Regional Development Agencies

A second approach to administrative deconcentration (and to decentralized economic development) is increased reliance on autonomous regional agencies. The obvious drawback of this approach is that it evades, rather than addresses the fundamental problem of deconcentration of the Haitian government more generally. Moreover, to the extent that such agencies replicate training program and administrative support systems which already exist or are being created in the main-line ministries, they spread farther the limited internal and external resources available to Haiti for administrative improvement. Staff of the Administrative Reform Commission and the Ministry of Planning are reluctant to expand the number of such agencies, for sound reasons.

If donor preferences and/or the urgent need to move quickly on specific development tasks in particular regions do lead to increased reliance on this approach, new agencies should probably be supervised by an interministerial committee chaired by the Minister of Planning, rather than attached to DARNDR or some other operating Ministry with responsibilities primarily in a single sector. This arrangement would also facilitate co-operation between the planning and programming unit of the regional organization and the Ministry of Planning. In organizing such agencies, consideration might be given to planning from the outset for their eventual re-integration into the operating ministries.

B. Popular Participation

1. Action at the Community Level

Development specialists have increasingly recognized that participatory local organizations can play an important role in the development process.

Experience in a variety of countries suggests government programs and projects often fail because they neglect to involve local people. While by no means a sufficient condition, popular input and support is usually necessary for effective development activities.

Participation of the type needed can best take place through effective local level institutions. Haiti, though an authoritarian polity, has taken steps toward establishing a nation-wide system of community councils that are a potential mechanism for involving more people more effectively in the development process. Indeed, it appears to us that these organizations have been underused by planners and field personnel. Greater employment of Haiti's organizational resources ought to become a specific consideration in the design of future development programs.

There are at least four general functions that can be performed by the emerging community councils. One, long noted by experts in community development, is to generate information about "felt needs", about unique local problems and opportunities, about particularly pressing local constraints, and so forth. Government planners need to be more aware of such information, and some form of consultative/coordinating institution ought to be established to mesh national objectives with local needs and capacities.

Information flows from the top-down as well, and a second important role for these local-level groups can be to disseminate a wide range of instructions, announcements, and the like. Financially-pressed governments have often found working with groups is the most efficient means for conveying information to a target population.

A third important function is these groups' capacity to mobilize members' resources--whether labor, land, cash savings, or locally available materials--for group or community benefit. Given the constraints faced by Haiti, this source of additional resources is obviously attractive, especially in view of the extent to which labor is currently underemployed. It is essential to make fuller use of available manpower, and this could be done partly through the creation of more local-level development projects. These in turn would provide a long-term stream of benefits.

At the same time, however, the greater use of local skills and resources cannot by itself improve significantly the wellbeing of community members, so outside assistance is needed for mounting more effective local development activities. A fourth function for community councils to perform, therefore, is to act as a conduit for externally-generated resources. Perhaps the clearest message we received from those engaged in community development work in Haiti was that they needed more aid, and though the risk exists of making local groups dependent on external support, means can be found for enhancing the local resource base without destroying popular input and participation.

To encourage community councils to perform these functions it is necessary first to bolster ONAAC's or some successor agency's capacity to organize rural people. Though councils exist in most of the country, many are undoubtedly moribund. A first step toward building the council movement would be to combine all community development programs in one office. More important, however, is an increased commitment of public resources to community projects and programs.

It would be useful in this regard for USAID to reconsider the proposed Integrated Community Development Project, which reached the project paper stage before being abandoned in 1978.* One of the conditions for implementing that project--clarification of the legal status of the CACs--has already been met by the GOH. It might no longer be appropriate to support the project as it currently stands, but a review of the earlier proposal is worthwhile if only to renew interest in community councils.

Should a nation-wide community development program prove unacceptable, another approach is to concentrate ONAAC's resources in one or two areas. A particularly backward region, such as the Northwest, might be chosen, though the limited resource base there makes a successful community development program problematic. An alternative is to begin with a better endowed area, where community organizers are likely to get better results for an equivalent effort. Any regionalized program, of course, raises difficult questions regarding equity, and the choice of how to resolve these can only be made by Haitian authorities.

The establishment of a system of community councils of whatever dimensions presumes these councils will have concrete tasks to perform. Animation and "conscientization" may be important, but peasants are undoubtedly less interested in discussion than in projects that improve their material well-being. Though many beneficial actions can be undertaken by rural people themselves, outside technical assistance and capital are necessary for many community development projects.

There are two issues here. One is that the GOH does not have the inputs and personnel to meet current needs. A backlog of CAC projects already exists,

* See Alvin L. Bertrand & Lynn L. Presson, Integrated Community Development, USAID/Haiti, Sept. 1978

to which rural people are willing to contribute if they can obtain assistance from the government or some other donor agency. The second difficulty is the risk of creating local level dependency, a phenomenon that has been widely observed in Haiti. The provision of external resources has in the past tended to undermine communities' capacity for self-help.

The shortage of resources is the more difficult problem, for it requires a commitment by the GOH to shift its budgetary priorities to rural and community affairs. Such a shift could perhaps be most easily made when regional planning and budgeting reforms take place--an event which itself is problematic. Pressure from a major donor could, if done skillfully, also encourage some reordering of spending priorities to favor rural areas. Where there a commitment to devote more government resources to community development, these should be used both to hire additional technical staff, and to acquire physical inputs for community programs.

Acquiring additional staff is important because ONAAC's existing multi-purpose staff lack the capacity to advise community councils on most technical matters. Having the necessary inputs--such as cement, pipe, machinery--readily available is also essential, for logistical bottlenecks currently constrain the procurement of such inputs by community councils. There appears to be increasing frustrations among peasants who want to take on projects, but lack the wherewithal. If ONAAC controlled a storage and delivery system, its clients might be able to obtain inputs more quickly. Demand could, of course, overwhelm any such system, so it might be appropriate for ONAAC to make clear that it can provide support for only a very few types of projects, e.g., construction of rural schools or clinics. The list of supportable projects could then be regularly changed so that next year the emphasis might be on potable water or irrigation.

An alternative means of ensuring more timely delivery of inputs would be to establish, perhaps at the arrondissement level, an inter-ministerial body where development agents and technical personnel could discuss the types of community development projects to be supported in the area. These officials could then commit themselves to providing technical and capital assistance to CACs.

The second major problem relating to government resources--that of creating dependency--could be reduced by establishing a clear quid pro quo for the provision of assistance. Land, labor, and some cash would be supplied by CACs; other resources would be the government's responsibility. Paying for "self-help" labor with food or cash should be avoided on local projects, though it may be appropriate for larger-scale projects, whose benefits accrue to a wider population.

One way of ensuring that communities make a sufficient contribution would be to establish a fund, perhaps at the departmental level, to provide support for worthy community projects. CACs would compete for these funds, which would only be disbursed for projects that met certain criteria. There would need to be a limit to the size of the grant for any one project, and a requirement that local people bear a certain percentage of the total cost. Assurances could also be established to prevent a small number of communities from monopolizing these funds year in and year out.

A somewhat different option would be to use "block grants", that is, to provide each Section rurale with a fixed amount of cash (or some physical input) to be used as its CAC chooses. These might be channeled

through ONAAC or perhaps such regional authorities as might be developed. To reduce the risk of embezzlement and waste, procedures could be established to deny future grants to communities that did not implement satisfactory projects. In either case the effect would be to provide an incentive for mutual action, without destroying the community's capacity to help itself. Moving beyond the question of planning and executing strictly local projects, the CAC system could play a role in any decentralized planning system that might evolve at the regional level. Were there to be, for example, a departmental or regional planning committee, procedures could be established for CAC representatives to participate in its sessions. Whether their role were consultative or authoritative, their input would be essential for effective planning, which must take account of what local people are willing and capable of contributing to development activities. There is evidently some interest among certain factions within the government in "bottom-up" planning; and though any significant movement in this direction is probably a long time off, the community council system would be the logical base on which to build. In the meantime councils can have a constructive role in a more modest program for local development projects.

2. Regional or Departmental Level Popular Participation

In addition to consulting more closely with local community groups and utilizing their resources more fully, it is desirable to establish some channels for popular participation in planning and assessing development priorities on a larger scale, at the level of the department or region. Larger-scale projects and programs clearly call for ways to determine felt needs, priorities, and information from a broader territorial perspective.

In the Administrative Reform Commission/Ministry of Planning scheme, the composition and role of the Conseil Regional reflects a considered balance between Haitian conditions and experience on the one hand, and the principle of a popular voice in significant government decisions on the other. In the scheme, the council is not directly elected, but instead represents a variety of governmental and non-governmental groups and interests. Its role is largely advisory to the délégué. If the proposal is accepted and the councils are established, they will not produce any dramatic shift in the center of gravity from national to regional levels, but they will provide a systematic channel for a number of groups and interests at the regional level to exchange views among themselves and to present any consensus they may reach to an executive officer, the délégué, who is required to consider though not necessarily to accept their views.

Viewed in this light, some of the functions of the regional councils envisaged in the regionalization scheme could also be performed through the "round table" approach sketched earlier. Regular meetings of intermediate-level government officials with representatives of community action groups, commune-level officers, perhaps one or more deputies of the national assembly, and perhaps representatives of any local chambers of commerce or of industry, would include the same groups as the proposed regional councils. The arrangement would be less formal and systematic, but not necessarily much less effective as a forum for exchange of information and viewpoints.

If uniform regions were established (or departments were accepted as the uniform intermediate level for ministries' field staff structure), the

arrangement would have to be somewhat more formalized, to the extent of arranging for election (or some other means of selection) of representatives of the prefects of arrondissements, deputies, community action groups, etc., to have a co-ordinating group of manageable size. The potential effectiveness of such groups also is enhanced if they have a single executive officer with some authority to coordinate various ministries' and agencies' activities within the region or department. However, if the coordinating official is not sympathetic to popular input and a team approach, his presence may reduce rather than enhance the effectiveness of any informal coordinating group.

An attempt to spell out organizational details is probably both presumptuous and fruitless, but the main point is that an incremental approach to indirect popular consultative mechanisms at the regional or departmental level should not be ruled out as impossible.

C. Decentralization of Social and Economic Development Programs

The most fundamental objective of the regionalization scheme is dispersed or decentralized development. Administrative deconcentration and popular participation are both viewed as inherently valuable, but both are also means to the basic goal of more widely diffused economic and social growth and broader distribution of the benefits of growth. As noted earlier, the specific decentralization strategy underlying the scheme is promotion of the three medium towns as growth poles and counter-magnets.

The team could not attempt to evaluate this particular strategy. The recent IDB commitment to help finance industrial parks in Cap-Haitien and Les Cayes, based on the findings of a study group headed by Hugh

Schwartz, certainly would seem consistent with the regionalization scheme's approach*. Cap-Haitien and Les Cayes are probably acceptable locations from the standpoint of attracting and holding managerial personnel; Gonaives may be less acceptable. Experience in other countries warns against too great a commitment to a medium cities approach, especially through subsidies and other policies which may distort true economic costs and benefits. But such reservations are compatible with vigorous efforts to encourage growth in these towns. As noted earlier, such efforts should not be justified primarily on grounds of expected effects on migration streams to Port-au-Prince or abroad. Such expectations are almost certain to be disappointed. The main point to note here is that should the regionalization scheme fail, a variety of other approaches can be taken to either a growth poles strategy or to any other patterns of decentralized economic and social development that may seem preferable. These approaches are complementary, not mutually exclusive. They include the following possibilities.

1. Ministry of Planning Tasks

One approach is through a more powerful Ministry of Planning at the center, with enhanced technical capabilities and--more important--greater control over the budget. An integrated program budget along the lines proposed by the Administrative Reform Commission would facilitate such control, but shifts in the division of responsibility between Finance and Planning are also crucial. Even in the absence of significant institutional changes, the Ministry of Planning could build on existing analyses and move beyond them to attempt to establish a convincing rationale for a medium towns

* See Hugh Schwartz, etc., Possibilities for Investment in Haiti, IDB, 1979. Available through Charles Pressoire at IDB.

strategy (based on consideration of economic potential, not migration). The Ministry might want technical assistance to that end. If a convincing rationale can be established, it might provide a framework within which external donors would consider targeting their aid. At a minimum, a serious analytic effort of this kind would help establish the potential and the limits of the medium towns approach.

If the rationale is strong, the Ministry of Planning's own field structure should reflect that fact. As noted earlier, the Ministry has fairly recently established field offices in Cap-Haitien, Les Cayes, Jacmel, and Gonaives. These field offices are still very small and their capabilities are limited. If a medium towns strategy is to be pursued, priority to building up the relevant field offices would seem sensible. Coordination arrangements among donors (possibly including the major PVOs) and between them jointly and the GOH, clearly would also facilitate any targeted decentralization strategy for which a convincing rationale can be made.

2. Autonomous Regional Development Agencies

An entirely different approach to decentralized economic and social development builds on the range of models offered by the autonomous regional agencies (ODN, ODVA, DRIPP, etc.) and, potentially, on the experience of regional development authorities in other countries (SUDENE in Northeast Brazil, the Tennessee Valley Authority, etc.). Autonomous or semi-autonomous regional development agencies could be used, of course, to promote a medium towns strategy. They can also be used as vehicles for other decentralized development strategies, including special efforts in poorer regions such as the Northwest and the Southwest areas of Haiti.

Regional development authorities can offer flexibility and speed of action, and coordination of various sectoral programs within their territory. In a country like Haiti, with poorly developed central government capabilities, the benefits are obvious, and have led most major donors to resort to channeling the bulk of their aid through such agencies. As already noted, the costs are also high, in terms of setting aside the task of long-run institutional development at the center. Among other effects, the tendency of donors to develop their own activities and to channel them through semi-autonomous agencies focused on specific regions or sub-regions poses serious obstacles to meaningful national planning efforts. As the number of well-trained Haitian officials interested in development gradually increases, hence augmenting potential capability to do integrated programming, this pattern of donor activity becomes an increasingly serious problem. There seems to be considerable sentiment in some units of the Ministry of Planning and also in some sectoral agencies for a higher level of integration of donor activity into the national governmental structure.

Since regional development is a long-term task, especially in the poorer regions, one key criterion to consider is the long-term outlook for autonomous regional agencies. Each of those now in Haiti relies heavily on one or more outside donors, both for funds and for managerial, planning and programming, and evaluation capabilities. But few, if any donors are willing and able to commit themselves to long-term aid--say, fifteen to thirty years. Thus institutional arrangements should be such that the agency stands some chance of surviving the withdrawal of sizeable foreign funding and technical aid before the task of generating self-sustaining regional growth is completed. To survive, such agencies must either have some well-recognized status within the governmental structure, including provision for funding, or they must move into a position to generate their own funds from private sources.

All the regional autonomous agencies now in Haiti (ODN, ODVA, ODPG, DRIPP, and HACHO) are under the tutelle of the Ministry of Agriculture, but the actual position vis-à-vis that Ministry varies widely. DRIPP's status is close to that of a jointly administered program, though with very substantial autonomy. HACHO's links with DARNDR have always been tenuous and strained; for the past couple of years the Ministry of Agriculture has essentially refused to acknowledge the organization, while efforts to attach it elsewhere, for example under the Ministry of Planning, have been blocked. While autonomy from the cumbersome central bureaucracy is desirable, a complete absence of status and liaison channels is a serious handicap.

Conversations with people familiar with the operations of ODVA, HACHO, and DRIPP indicated that all have severe difficulties working primarily through the Ministry of Agriculture. In view of the multi-sectoral nature of their activities (with the possible exception of ODVA, which concentrates heavily on irrigation and associated agricultural development efforts in the Artibonite Valley), it would seem logical to place them under the tutelle either of a ministry with cross-sectoral responsibilities (Planning, Interior, Presidency) or under a interministerial commission attached to the Cabinet. Each of the three ministries named is in one way or another inappropriate for such a responsibility, and the interministerial commission approach might be both politically and administratively the most plausible arrangement.

The existing regional agencies have at best embryonic programming and planning capabilities. At least in principle, the DRIPP structure is the best designed to work toward greater capability independent of the presence of foreign advisors or technicians. ODVA has plans (which may now

be moribund) to convert the resources now located in the joint ODVA-IDB Bureau into a programming office for the entire organization, and presumably would work gradually to replace IDB technicians with Haitians. HACHO at present has no programming or planning capabilities.

If regional autonomous agencies were to be used to channel development efforts towards a medium town-growth pole strategy, ODN and ODPG's areas of activity correspond with two of the three targeted towns. Unfortunately, from the little information the team was able to gather, these two agencies are perhaps the least dynamic and efficient of the lot. No regional organization concentrates on the area surrounding Les Cayes.

HACHO should clearly be involved in any program focused on the Northwest. Indeed, the sectoral ministries have virtually no field staffs in the region, so that HACHO remains virtually the sole functioning quasi-governmental system for delivery of such services as are available, with the exception of a hospital and a few nutrition centers now operated respectively by the Ministry of Health and FONDEV. Even TPTC has accomplished very little in the region. Moreover, HACHO has the important asset of being well-known and trusted in the region. But HACHO was never conceived and organized as a full-fledged regional development agency, and its capabilities have seriously eroded in the past two years. It could be a useful component, but probably not an adequate channel, for a regional development effort.

3. Decentralized Economic Development Channeled through New Regional Governmental Structures

If the regionalization scheme is approved, or if, over a longer period, an incremental approach to administrative deconcentration creates

new planning, co-ordinating, and implementation capabilities at the level of the department or region, additional channels for encouraging decentralized economic development become available. One option for the government and for donors would be block grants to regional coordinators. The regionalization scheme envisages such block grants, in the form of regional tranches of the national budget, to be allocated substantially at the discretion of the délégué with the advice and technical assistance of the regional planning office, the regional council, and the consultative assemblies representing local interests. Donors might also wish to make grants directly to a regional government. Regional development banks might be a further possibility.

IV. Recommendations

Our recommendations fall into four general categories. The first covers steps that could be taken in the near-term to help strengthen local capacity to plan and execute development projects. These steps are important in their own right and can be taken irrespective of the fate of any larger decentralization scheme. The second group of recommendations pertains to the current Ministry of Planning/Administrative Reform Commission plan for decentralizing Haiti's public administration. This plan has merit and there are several things which might be done to further clarify and implement it, though there is at present no assurance the GOH will finally approve the many governmental changes required. Our third group of recommendations, therefore, suggests actions that can be taken that would achieve some of the same objectives as the major decentralization scheme now under discussion. These represent, as it were, an incremental approach to decentralization. Fourth, are several options that apply particularly to the Northwest, where there has been strong donor interest in a special regional development program.

A. Community Development

1. Support the emerging network of community action councils. The CACs have a good record of promoting community development activities. Now that their legal status is clear, more avenues should be explored for strengthening these local organizations.

2. Encourage consolidation of animation rurale services. Having these functions divided between ONAAC and DARNDR is inefficient. They should be brought under ONAAC (or some successor agency), whose community development program is stronger than DARNDR's.

3. Explore means for establishing a fund to provide supplementary resources for certain community level projects, to be carried out by community action councils. These funds could be established at the regional level should new regional units be created.

4. Provide training for ONAAC personnel and explore means for expanding the size of ONAAC's field staff. Grants for vehicles, educational materials, and other equipment would also be appropriate.

5. USAID should review and reconsider funding the Integrated Community Development Project it abandoned in 1978. Considerable effort went into this well-designed project, and some or all of it may be worth salvaging, pursuant to point (1) above.

6. USAID could also investigate the possibility of Peace Corps Volunteers working with ONAAC on community development. This would be an appropriate and constructive role for PCVs in Haiti. It would be preferable that they be used as technical advisors rather than as community organizers, per se.

B. Current Plans for Regionalization

7. The general outlines of the Regionalization Scheme developed by the Administrative Reform Commission and the Ministry of Planning ought to be supported by the donor community and approved by the GOH. A detailed program for its implementation should be worked out as soon as possible, particularly to identify needs for trained personnel.

8. Consideration should be given to implementing the scheme on a pilot basis in one or two regions.

9. As donors formulate ideas about new program initiatives during the coming months, they should frame them in terms compatible with the Regionalization Scheme, or at least formulate one option in these terms. In other words, donors should be prepared to work within the new regional framework should it gain GOH approval.

10. If the Regionalization Scheme is adopted, training of regional field staff should proceed. Establishing four regional systems will strain existing technical capabilities, and the GOH may wish to seek technical assistance in establishing a training program within existing institutions (e.g., INAGHEI), or alternatively may seek training grants to provide for a year's overseas training in specific skills. Further details in this area figure among the recommendations listed at the end of Section One.

C. Other Means for Decentralization

11. The Administrative Reform Commission working jointly with Plan and other ministries should seek approval of a standard unit or region for administrative purposes, either endorsing the current departmental units or designing larger regions.

12. The ARC should also consider means to encourage informal coordinating committees of ministerial field representatives, local officials, community action groups, and representatives from the private sector. These could be placed in those locations where a number of officials are clustered, regardless of the varying boundaries of their jurisdictions. If point (11) above, is accomplished, the ARC should consider means to encourage informal or possibly officially authorized coordinating committees at the level of the uniform territorial unit established.

13. The Ministry of Planning should give considerable priority to strengthening its field offices. This does not so much require larger staffs, as better-trained staffs with adequate material support. Field offices of the Ministry should not only be charged with conducting studies and gathering data, but also with working with regional or local officials and coordinating committees on the development of projects that cut across more than one ministry's responsibilities.

14. The ARC should continue to press for a program budget, consolidating the now separated development and operating budgets.

15. Consideration should be given to how best to provide the Ministry of Planning with sufficient control over the budgeting process to permit the entire planning process to be significant.

16. The Ministry of Planning should consider undertaking a carefully designed analysis of the potential and the limits of a targeted medium towns strategy, assessing the advantages and drawbacks of such a strategy compared to:

(i) a more scattered, medium-and-small towns strategy;

(ii) a rural development strategy.

It might seek technical assistance in this analysis. The purpose would be to establish medium-run objectives and priorities clearly enough, with sufficiently well-supported analysis, to persuade donors to channel their assistance within the GOH objectives.

17. The Ministry of Planning should have a stronger structural relationship with foreign assistance donors and non-government organizations that exert strong influence on the direction of development programs and projects.

18. The GOH should explore ways of sharing ministerial resources that are already in the periphery, in ways that increase their productivity and relevance for local projects. This involves coordination in such matters as multiple use of vehicles, office space, clerical staff, and information.

D. Regional Development in the Northwest

19. Since the sectoral ministries have almost no field staff in the Northwest, a sizeable program in that area has little choice but to work through a semi-autonomous organization.

20. HACHO should be a part of that organization, but is not itself an adequate skeleton framework for it. If HACHO were integrated into a new regional organization, the question of HACHO's status vis-à-vis the GOH would be finessed.

21. The revised structure and procedures of DRIPP should be carefully reviewed as a possible model for a Northwest Development agency. Advantages of DRIPP's structure include: supervision by an interministerial commission headed by the Minister of Planning, joint Canadian-Haitian staffing at key points in the organization (this aspect might be carried further than in DRIPP), detailed operational programming and newly tightened personnel and financial procedures. Detailed program planning, however, may prove unwise initially.

22. It is worth coordinating plans for training and developing field agents with ONAAC, and seeking an agreement with ONAAC that that agency will gradually incorporate community animateurs developed by the Northwest agency into its own cadres (as is now the case for DRIPP). Similar arrangements should be sought with TPTC, Health, and ideally with DARNDR, for field staff in these areas. In other words, in a country the size of HAITI it is

not at all clear that a regional development agency should become a permanent feature of the government, and the prospects for such an agency surviving the withdrawal of external funds are not good. Thus planning should start from the outset for the reintegration of the organization into the GOH eventually--either by dissolving its functions into those of the regular government agencies, or by arranging for perpetuation of its status with GOH funding.

23. Finally, we recommend that the Ministry of Planning and the National Commission of Administrative Reform initiate a technical sub-group of the different donors to discuss their participation in the follow-up of the plan of action suggested in this report.

APPENDICES

- Appendix 1: The Ministry of Planning
- Appendix 2: Key Operating Ministries
- Appendix 3: Persons Interviewed
- Appendix 4: References

Appendix 1: The Ministry of Planning (SEP)

The Ministry of Planning was established in 1978 as the successor to the National Council of Development and Planning (CONADEP). Its mission was to present long and short term national plans and to establish objectives and priorities for social, economic, and regional development. The present organization of the SEP consists of nine major units. They are the office of the Secretary of Planning, the Director General, the Administrative Directorate and six Technical Directorates. Several units are attached to the SEP: the Statistics and Information Institute, the Institute for the Preservation of the National Heritage, the Food and Nutrition Planning Unit, the National Bureau of Technology, and the Environmental and Erosion Control Council.

A. The Office of the Secretary of Planning

The Secretary of Planning is the Chief Executive of SEP and is the final decision-maker on all policy matters. There are 2 Staff Offices which provide support to the Office of the Secretary; the Director, plus the Director of the Cabinet and the Councillors to the Cabinet.

B. The Director General

The Director General is the highest ranking civil servant in the SEP. He works very closely with the Secretary and is involved in both policy development and daily management of the SEP. He participates in the establishment of an overall strategy of the Ministry. He coordinates

and supervises the comprehensive activities of the technical units and makes sure that the instructions of the Secretary are implemented.

C. The Administrative Directorate includes the Administrative Director and personnel services. It is responsible for the maintenance of the daily operations of the SEP and for establishing a documentation center.

D. The Directorate of Economic and Social Programming (DPES) does research that is intended to provide technical assistance on planning techniques to all economic and social sectors. It establishes plan methodology and presents development alternatives that assure internal coherence of the National Plan. It sets up the basic principles, planning guidelines, and plan objectives. Technicians at DPES focus on social, industrial, agricultural, fiscal, and budgetary processes. They coordinate the planning operations with the planning units of the development sectors. The staff may have several sectoral responsibilities which cut across various disciplines. DPES internal structure permits micro/macro, short term/long term, and horizontal/vertical aspects of sectoral planning to be considered. It collects and coordinates data with the Statistical Institute, Customs, Finance, other Directions at SEP and other organizations.

E. The Directorate of Regional Planning and Environmental Protection (DATPE) conducts research in the domain of regional planning in light of long term socio-economic development of the country. Its focus is upon

elaborating a national strategy of geographic decentralization and regional development. It determines regional boundaries in conjunction with the proper authorities and makes recommendations to ensure the protection of the environment. DATPE determines spatial distribution of socio-economic activities and of the population. It studies internal and external migration movements, inter and intra-regional disparities and rural-urban trends. It carries out regional research either on its own or with other SEP units.

F. The Directorate for Project Promotion (DPP) is charged with the identification of projects in line with the objectives and strategies of the SEP. It defines project methodology and offers technical assistance to the development sectors. It initiates preliminary economic and financial evaluations of development projects and establishes study groups to look at different development problems. DPP has six technical service sections that reach out to the development sectors and try to formulate projects. It provides decision-making criteria to the sectors for possible proposal preparation. It performs sectoral analysis and investment analysis with the ultimate aim of obtaining funds for projects.

G. The Directorate of External Donor Cooperation (DCE) is intended to augment GOH capacity to coordinate the technical and financial aspects of foreign assistance. It facilitates the liaison between the Government and bilateral and multilateral donors, and also private aid. DCE seeks to assure that projects of foreign donor agencies are consistent with and conform to the objectives and priorities of SEP. It coordinates and directs

development funding programs and studies, the possibility of obtaining new sources of financing. This direction collaborates with the different directions of SEP and the development sectors in evaluating technical assistance and external financing.

H. The Directorate of Evaluation and Control (DEC) collaborates with the Budget Office of the Secretariat of Finance in targeting financial resources for development. It establishes program and project priorities within the various sectors for entry into the Development Budget. It assures control and carries out evaluation of projects during implementation. DEC prepares estimates and forecasts of program and project expenditures of the Annual Plan and sends a monthly report to Finance on the status of projects. To perform these tasks, DEC has a programming and public investments section, a monitoring section and an evaluation section. These sections prepare studies intended to measure the effectiveness and efficiency of programs and projects and their impact on the socio-economic environment. DEC is the point of budgetary control for all projects in the SEP.

I. The Directorate of Exterior Services (DSE) undertakes efforts to strengthen regional planning and to improve liaison between regional programs and projects and the central administrative offices of the SEP. It evaluates the local human and financial capacity to attain the objectives of the programs. It coordinates all activities of the SEP outside of Port-au-Prince. DSE established the Regional Directorate of Planning which is supposed to carry out basic socio-economic analyses of the four regions.

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It is in the DSE that the Secretariat has the core for a field staff. A planning professional with general skills in economic development is based in Cap-Haitien, Gonaives, Cayes, and Jacmel. The intent was for the staff to work with their regional counterparts from other ministries. Basically the staff performs technical and research services for the SEP and other ministries, deals with the international donor agencies at the regional level, works with mayors' offices at the communal level, and collects information in their region. All of the studies are project-oriented and feed into the regional data requirements of the annual plan.

J. To further understand the operations of the SEP, one can follow the processing of proposed programs and projects which could be prepared by one of the field staff of DSE. The documents are sent to the sector program unit and to the DSE who reviews them and sends them with appropriate recommendations to the designated technical directorate, i.e. DATPE or DPPD. DATPE looks at the consistency of the proposed programs with the recommended strategy. The DPPD, after ensuring that the proposed programs are in line with the objectives and strategies of the SEP, evaluates their economic and financial feasibility. DATPE and DPPD work in cooperation with the sectors involved as well as with the DPES in order to finalize and include the proposed programs and projects in the sectoral plans. The finalized documents are returned to the DSE. A Technical Memorandum is prepared and the proposed program is returned to the field staff. It is then forwarded to the DPES to ensure consistency with the Five-Year Plan and Annual Plan. The National Plan is then presented by the Secretary of State for Planning

to the Council of Secretaries of State for discussion and approval. Then it is forwarded to the Legislative Chamber which approves it with or without modifications. It then becomes law and is published in Le Moniteur.

Appendix 2: Key Operating Ministries

The following is a brief description of the overall goals and structures of the key operating ministries in the Government of Haiti. The ministries discussed include: the Ministry of Agriculture (DARNDR), the Ministry of Public Works (TPTC), the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, and the Ministry of Health (DSPP). The Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Social Affairs are not discussed.

A. Ministry of Agriculture, Natural Resources and Rural Development (DARNDR)

DARNDR is perhaps the most broadly focused ministry in the Government of Haiti. The DARNDR is headed by the Minister of Agriculture to whom report three sets of administrative units. These include the undersecretary (or sub-secretary) of agriculture, the directors of the key semi-autonomous agencies--Organisme de Développement de la Vallée de l'Artibonite (ODVA), Organisme de Développement du Nord (ODN), Organisme de Développement de la Plaine des Gonaives (ODPG) and the Dean of the Faculty of Agriculture and Veterinary Medicine (FAMV).

The Principal actions of DARNDR are taken through the programs and projects of the divisions of agriculture, natural resources and rural development, and through the actions of the staff of the 13 district offices of the Ministry. The directors of each Division report to the Undersecretary of Agriculture, through the Director General of DARNDR, as do the District Offices.

The Programming Unit, responsible for translation of DARNDR data, priorities, and project opportunities into planning materials for the Ministry of Planning, also reports to the Director-General. The Unit has the authority to work and plan with all of the DARNDR divisions. The unit has been operating

for seven years. The Programming Unit has six basic areas of responsibility. These include: helping DARNDR's Administrative Council to develop and select specific approaches to problems; development of an effective communication system with the other ministries and external agencies, and autonomous organizations; design of procedures for implementing national and sectoral planning; formulation of short-term development plans that establish production priorities; development of plan components for the mid-term and five year plan; and collaboration in external project development with the Ministry of Planning. There are approximately ten professional staff, a higher number than many of the other ministerial Programming Units. This unit is an important element in DARNDR operations, particularly in terms of analysis, planning, and coordination with those external to DARNDR.

The three technical divisions of DARNDR provide for a variety of technical services. The Ministry of Agriculture has seven services:

1. The Extension Service
2. The Research Service
3. The Agricultural Economics and Statistics Service
4. The Agricultural Mechanization Service
5. The Animal Breeding Service
6. The Veterinary Medicine Service
7. The Cooperative Service

The Division of Natural Resources has six services:

1. Soil Conservation, Forest and Wildlife Service
2. Irrigation and River Control Service
3. Geology and Mines Service

4. Meteorology Service
5. Agricultural Chemistry Service
6. Fisheries Service

The Division of Rural Development has four key services:

1. Rural Teaching Service
2. Community Improvement Service
3. Educational and Information Service
4. The Teacher and Vocational School Service

In addition the the three technical divisions under the Director-General of DARNDR are the offices of the 13 District Agronomes. These District Agronomes have responsibility for managing DARNDR division staff in each district. Each District Agronome has extension agents working for him in the field and it is these persons who have the most immediate contact with rural residents. Interaction between the District Agronome and Technical Division staff varies according to the District and the array of projects under way. Except for extension agents and rural teachers, the majority (two thirds) of DARNDR staff are based near Port-au-Prince (Damien).

B. The Ministry of Commerce and Industry (DCI)

The Ministry of Commerce has as its legally constituted mission the following: definition of commercial and industrial policy in accord with the objectives determined by the Government of Haiti, application of measures to promote commerce and industry, organization of an economic development strategy, design of international trade agreements pertaining to commerce and industry, and establishment of conditions strengthening industrial growth through such means as technology transfer. Specifically

the Minister of Commerce has an executive staff that are responsible for eight directorates. These are the directorates for:

1. General Directorate - This unit coordinates and supervises the activities of the other directorates and is charged with the development of relationships with national and international organizations, public relations, the commerce library, and special tasks pertaining to commercial and industrial development.

2. Administrative Directorate - This Directorate manages personnel and materials.

3. Commerce Directorate - This Directorate has six functions, primarily informational (many of which are in embryonic stages) including market studies and contacts with commercial business, promotion of exports, licensing and permit services, studies of trade agreements, weights and measures, commercial and industrial information.

4. Industrial Directorate- There are four units in this Directorate: Industrial Promotion, Management Council, Industrial Protection, and Textile and Fiber Industry Services. The Management Council works in collaboration with the National Office for the Promotion of Investments (ONAPI), a semi-autonomous agency attached to the Ministry.

5. The Pricing Directorate - This Directorate has responsibility for following the evolution of national and international markets and informing the public on market price changes for commodities and other goods to assist in price setting. These are two service units in the process of being established. These are the Price Study Service, and the Price Evaluation Service.

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6. The Inspection Control Directorate - This Directorate has responsibility for four services which include Quality Control, working with Public Health, Agriculture, and other public and private organizations; Price Control, which follows price movements and informs market participants on price fluctuations (in development); Public Market and Business Inspection Services; and the Bureau of Regional Coordination, which is intended to obtain information on regional commercial and industrial activities and inform policy-making within the Ministry. This bureau is to have regional offices.

7. The Statistics Directorate - This Directorate has two services, one that collects information on commerce in general and analyzes data on an on-going basis pertaining to commercial activity, and one that synthesizes data pertaining to industry in general and industrial sectors to inform Ministry policy.

8. The Jurisdictional Study Directorate - This Directorate has as its mission the provision of advice on legal questions pertaining to commercial and industrial legislation, or with regard to conflicts resulting from the application of regulations. There are five services in the Directorate which are: Study and Consultation Services, Industrial Ownership Services (trademarks and patents), Industrial and Commercial Corporation Services, Stamp Issues, and the Registry of Foreign Businesses and Shipping.

There are three semi-autonomous organizations under the aegis of the Ministry. These include the Postal System Administration, the Office for Commercialization of Perfumes of Haiti, and the National Office for the Promotion of Investments (ONAPI). ONAPI is a recently created organization intended to serve as an intermediary between Haiti and foreign investors.

ONAPI prepares and disseminates marketing information on industrial development, including information on favorable tax treatment, labor costs, and the availability of industrial development sites. ONAPI is currently working with other quasi-governmental organizations in Haiti, such as the Industrial Parks Corporation (IDIA) which has as its function assisting new companies to obtain suitable buildings and land for development. This group is currently involved in attempting to establish industrial parks in regional centers.

There is some coordination between the Ministry of Planning and Commerce on an informal basis. However, at the ministerial level, the Director-General is the principal point at which program interaction between ministries occurs.

C. The Ministry of Public Works, Transport and Communication (TPTC)

The Ministry of Public Works is directed by the Minister for Public Works. There are five components of the Ministry that come under his authority. These include the Programming Unit, Organizational Services, Implementation Services, Support Services and Regional and Departmental Services. The operational management of Public Works activities is vested in the Engineer-in-Chief and the Executive Engineer, who report to the Secretary.

The Programming Unit of the Ministry of Public Works has as its objective the coordination and development of the activities of the different services and semi-autonomous organizations that are under the aegis of Public Works. This is intended to facilitate their appropriate participation in national development processes. In addition, the Programming Unit is intended to provide support to the Ministry of Planning in development of national planning activities, and in support of the design of

projects using donor funds. The Unit has broad responsibility for developing Ministry plans and recommendations that include public works, urban development, transportation, energy, potable water, and communications.

It is currently composed of two sub-units, the Planning and Programming Council and the Technical Programming Unit. The Planning and Programming Council is a coordinating and support group for the Minister. It meets every six months and comments on annual planning, with subgroups meeting periodically. It defines Public Works policy, coordinates objectives, assists interministerial relations, and makes reviews of problems identified by the Technical Programming Unit. The members of the Council include an Executive Officer, Directors of the Public Works Services, and Directors of autonomous organizations.

The Technical Programming Unit is composed of engineers, architects with planning skills, economists and statisticians. This unit's mission is to do studies necessary for understanding developmental problems in public works, prepare well-organized programs of action for units of the Ministry, coordinate external assistance on public works projects, do preliminary project plan feasibility studies, evaluate sectoral plans within the department, complete and analyze periodic reports from the Ministry and autonomous agencies, inspect and evaluate regional activities of the Ministry, and generally monitor the implementation of the programs of the Ministry. A particularly important aspect of the Technical

Programming Unit's work is coordination with different ministries, such as Planning, national agencies (IHS, ONB, and BRH) and external sources of financial support for projects and programs.

The Organization Services Unit of the Ministry includes six sub-units. These include: the Autonomous Transportation Service (SAT) which develops plans and submits recommendations for transportation in the public and private sectors to TPTC and Ministry of Planning; the Office of Financial Control, which prepares financial analyses and monitors fiscal outlays for projects; the Central Electric Control Service which supervises studies of electric power development and private sector power development projects; the Potable Water Control Service, which establishes specifications for water needs and construction; the Organization and Methods Service, which is concerned with internal operations and personnel; the Urban Planning Service, which prepares physical and economic plans for urban and rural areas, designs projects, and monitors their implementation. This service is responsible for formulation of objectives and strategies that are part of the National Development Plan, in conjunction with the Ministry of Planning's Division of Regional Planning (DAPTE), in particular focusing on sanitation, drainage, and related support structures. This service prepares all contractual documents for studies and public works improvements.

The Implementation Service has three sub-units. The Construction and Supervision Service has the responsibility for carrying out all infrastructure works in transportation. It supervises projects and evaluates them, as well as coordinating works projects funded either by the GOH or

by donors. It also implements traffic management measures and maintains street signs. The Urban Area Service is responsible for management of urban infrastructure, including construction and conservation of public buildings and monuments, streets, parks and drainage. The National Highway and Road Maintenance Service (SEPRRN) is responsible for a variety of road repair projects and has special laws covering its status. It is supported by USAID funding and technical assistance.

Support Services include a variety of institutional and administrative functions. Among these are the Vehicle Weight Control Service, the Personnel Administration Service, the National Building and Public Works Laboratory, Garage Services, Geologic, Cartographic and Topographic Services, and the Construction Equipment Rental Service (SLELC), which rents machinery for projects carried out by the private sector pertaining to public works. The Regional and Departmental Service assists or participates in the execution, development and improvement of roads, drainage, ports and airports in the nine regions of Haiti.

D. Ministry of Health (DSPP)

The Ministry of Health consists of five major parts. They are the office of the Secretary of Health, the Director-General, the Division of Administration, Technical Services, and Administration of the Health Districts. Two semi-autonomous units, SNEM (Malaria Eradication Program) and the Division of Family Hygiene are related to the Ministry.

The framework for establishing the Health Regions and Districts is in the Law of November 1975. Currently there are two regions and 11 districts countrywide. Six regions were specified in the law. There was to be a

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metropolitan region at Port-au-Prince; the North region at Cap-Haitien; the North-West at Gonaives; the Central at Hinche; the West at Jacmel; and the Southern region at Cayes. The Southern Region with its districts at Cayes, Miragoane and Jérémie has been established. A northern region exists, but its districts have not been defined. Administratively, the Districts and the two regions are on the same hierarchical level except in the Southern Region.

The geographic boundaries of the region and districts are not well defined and do not correspond to the delineations of any other government agency. The district is not a "health service area" in the usual sense of the term. Instead, the existence of a hospital may have determined the district. There is one hospital per district except in the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area. Clinics, health centers and dispensaries in the districts are not attached to the hospital. They are linked to the District Health Administrator who may not necessarily be the director of the district hospital. In Port-au-Prince they are linked to the office of the Director-General who is the de facto district administrator.

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Appendix 3: Persons Interviewed

Ministry of Planning (SEP)

Claude Weil, Directeur Général

Théophile Roche, Directeur, Direction de Programmation
économique et sociale (DPES)

Guy Bien-Aîmé, DPES

Yvon Guirand, DPES

Françoise Molière, DPES

Hervé Denis, DPES

Ludovic Pierre, Directeur, Direction de Contrôle et d'Evaluation

Yves Blanchard, Directeur, Direction de la Coopération Externe

Hervé Dalencourt, Directeur, Direction des Services Extérieurs

Gilbert Duperval, Directeur, Direction de la Promotion de
Projets de Développement

Hervey Sylvain, Directeur, Direction de l'Aménagement du Terri-
toire

Ministry of Finance

Artaud Toureaux, Directeur Général

Fritz Viala, Directeur Général, Office du Budget

Odonel Fénestor, Directeur Général, Bureau des Contributions

Ministry of Public Works, Transportation, and Communication (TPTC)

Fritz Etienne, Ingénieur en Chef

Frantz Merceron, Ingénieur-Directeur, Service de Construction et
de Supervision

Fritz Benjamin, Coordonateur, Unité de Programmation

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Ministry of Commerce and Industry

Carl Férailléur, Directeur, Direction des Etudes Juridiques

Josette Lacombe, Directrice, Direction Administrative

Raymond Turnier, Consultant

Ministry of Agriculture, Natural Resources and Rural Development
(DARNDR)

Nicot Julien, Sous-Secrétaire d'Etat

Montaigu Cantave, Directeur Général

Lelio Etienne, Directeur, Division de l'Animation Rurale

Marc Simon, Coordonateur, Unité des Plans et Programmes, Division
des Ressources Naturelles

Rodini Conte, Directeur Général, Bureau de Crédit Agricole

Ministry of Education

Edwige Kernizan, Directeur Général

Herns Henry, Directeur de Planification

Gérard Dorcely, Directeur, Institut National d'Administration,
de Gestion et des Hautes Etudes
Internationales (INAGHEI)

André Limontas, Directeur, Division d'Action Communautaire,
Office Nationale d'Alphabétisation
et d'Action Communautaire (ONAAC)

Jean-Claude Cajou, Coordonateur Regional de Jacmel, ONAAC

Ministry of Social Affairs

Raymond Petit, Directeur de Projet St. Martin, Office National
du Logement

Ministry of Health and Population (DSPP)

Jérémie Théodore, Secrétaire Général

Bogard Marseille, Chef, Division Administrative

Jon Rohde)
William Emmett) Management Sciences for Health
Pierre Mathurin) Consultants to DSPP
Suzanne Prysor-Jones)

National Council of Cooperatives (CNC)

Francis Défay, Directeur Général

Administrative Reform Commission

Gérard Dorcely, Président

Serge Tardieu, Coordonateur

Anacita Duperval, Chef, Section de Formation et Perfectionnement

Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA)

Réal Lalande, Directeur

André Deshènes

U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)

Jerry Russell, Director, Public Health Office

Jean Veillard, Public Health Office (formerly HACHO community
development agent in the Northwest)

Other

Jean Soso, Political Officer, U.S. Embassy

Judy Collins, CARE

Alberto Salinas, Director, IICA Swine Fever Eradication Project
(former consultant to ODVA)

Jacques Kawly, Maire de Jacmel

Joseph Jean-Pierre, Préfet de Jacmel

Clément Beauvais, Président du Conseil Communautaire de Jacmel

Maurice de Young, USAID Consultant

Jacqueline Rodriguez, USAID Consultant

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