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**OLDER REFUGEE SETTLEMENTS
IN AFRICA
FINAL REPORT**

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
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INTRODUCTION

A. DESCRIPTION AND RELEVANCE OF THE STUDY

"Refugee problems demand durable solutions" is the opening statement of the Principles for Action in Developing Countries, adopted by the Executive Committee of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in October, 1984. Without a durable solution, refugee assistance would have no time limitation, and international commitments for refugee assistance could accrue to immense levels. For the past quarter century, UNHCR has established planned rural settlements for refugees in Africa as one method of pursuing durable solutions.

This paper is the report of a study conducted by the Refugee Policy Group of older refugee settlements in Africa through a grant from the U.S. Agency for International Development. The objectives of the study were to investigate:

1. The factors and policies which can contribute to, or hinder, the attainment of self-sufficiency by organized refugee settlements; and,
2. The experiences of such settlements after achieving self-sufficiency, particularly in terms of their ability to reach a durable solution. Such a durable solution would include sustained economic self-sufficiency as well as political and social integration into the host country.

The study was prompted in part by the recognition of the information gap which exists concerning refugee settlements in

their later years after international attention has shifted to newer refugee crises.

The research has included a review of materials contained in the Resource Center of the Refugee Policy Group, and materials gathered in Geneva, from the T. F. Betts Archive at the Institute of Development Studies in Sussex, England, and from field work in Africa. Interviews were conducted with personnel of UNHCR and of the main voluntary agencies assisting African refugee settlements. Two field visits to six refugee settlements (Mugera, Mutara, Muyenzi, Mwezi, Mishamo, and Katumba) in three countries (Burundi, Rwanda and Tanzania) provided the opportunity to gather information from host government officials, from local people living near the settlements, and, of course, from the settlement residents themselves.

Organized settlements are one of two main types of settlements for refugees. The other type is what has been called spontaneous settlement, or self-settlement. The proportions for each type cannot be exactly known, but a rough estimate would be that half of all African refugees are spontaneously settled (a minority of them in urban areas) and about one-quarter live in organized settlements. The remainder would be in relief or post-relief refugee camps where they are dependent on food rations and other international assistance. The present study focuses on the organized type of settlement as they have been the main recipients of the international aid provided for refugee settlements (although there have been increasing efforts to devise effective ways for UNHCR to assist spontaneously settled refugees

as well).

It should also be noted that the study is of rural, agriculture-based settlements. While a small number of organized settlements have been created which are not agriculture-based (such as wage-earning settlements in the Sudan), these exceptions are few in number and none have yet been declared self-sufficient. Therefore they are not included in this study.

For purposes of brevity, we have used the term "refugee settlement" in the body of this paper to refer to organized rural refugee settlements. Any other type of settlement (i.e. urban, wage-earner, or spontaneous) will be identified explicitly if we mean to refer to them.

The study is limited to refugee settlements in Africa, as the overwhelming majority of such settlements world-wide (107 of 111 as of 1982) have been located there.* Among the African settlements, the primary focus is on the 30 organized refugee settlements that were declared self-sufficient between 1966 and 1982, and which are still in operation. Two-thirds of these 30 settlements attained self-sufficiency at least a decade ago. Of the 30 settlements, 21 have received renewed international assistance since being declared self-sufficient.

*The starting point for this analysis is a 1982 UNHCR report (Heidler, 1982) and its accompanying table, "UNHCR-Assisted Rural Settlements - Situation at the Beginning of 1982." The table lists 107 settlements in Africa. In order to be able to deal with a stable sample, we have not attempted to add any settlements that have been established in the last few years. Where possible, we will mention these additional settlements but they are excluded from the overall statistical analysis.

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Recent conditions have made this study particularly relevant. Refugee numbers in Africa and elsewhere have greatly increased and many refugees from recent disputes are not likely to return home in the near future. Many developing countries which host refugees have increasingly turned toward planned settlements rather than allowing refugees to settle spontaneously among the local population. This may be due in part to the recognition that organized settlements can serve as a focus for international assistance, while spontaneously settled refugees draw little international assistance to meet either the needs of the refugees or of the areas on which their presence can have adverse impacts.

Furthermore, many host governments have become more insistent in requesting levels of international assistance which they feel are more commensurate with their refugee burdens. These requests center on assistance to expand and strengthen their social and economic infrastructures so they may better cope with this burden. In July, 1984, the Second International Conference on Assistance to Refugees in Africa (ICARA II) had before it requests for infrastructural assistance costing \$362 million, as well as additional requests for over \$10 million to aid five of the rural settlements that had previously been declared self-sufficient.

Local integration of the refugees into the host country (of which organized settlements are the most funded mechanism) is now widely discussed as the most viable durable solution for refugees in Africa. This reflects difficulties with the other two durable

solutions as much as it does the documented success of attempting local integration. Resettlement in third countries is rare for African refugees. Voluntary repatriation has become more difficult in recent years, primarily due to the fact that African refugees today are increasingly the result of wars between sovereign African nations or of internal civil wars, rather than of wars of independence which could lead to a mass return after victory.

B. THE COSTS OF SEEKING DURABLE SOLUTIONS

The high costs of operating camps in which refugees receive care-and-maintenance assistance adds to interest in durable solutions as a way to turn off the faucet of international assistance for at least some portion of these refugees.

However, the cost of seeking durable solutions for African refugees is also substantial. Approximately 39 to 58 percent of UNHCR expenditures for Africa from 1982 through 1985 (which averaged about \$150 million per year) have been allocated for implementing durable solutions, of which organized settlements are a major component. Further, other international organizations such as the World Food Program (WFP), the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), and the International Labor Organization (ILO) have sizeable programs or are increasing their involvement in durable solution efforts, and there are large bilateral assistance programs as well.

Regarding organized settlements in particular, a survey of budget allocations from 1964 to 1979 for 78 settlements in 15

different African countries indicated that an average of \$536 was required for UNHCR to settle a family of six.* However, if total costs are calculated including government and voluntary agency contributions and WFP rations, "the average cost per family would easily reach U.S. \$900" (Diegues 1981). Average costs, of course, can be misleading. Costs may vary greatly depending on factors such as climate, quality of soils, quantity of water, amount of infrastructure to be built, and the length of time needed to reach self-sufficiency. For example, total UNHCR per capita costs for an irrigated agricultural settlement in Djibouti were \$1,345 compared to \$108 per capita for non-irrigated settlements on Tanzania's savannah.

Over the years, the cost of settlement assistance has risen greatly. In 1964, UNHCR expended \$1.5 million on settlements. By 1978 this had risen to \$12.6 million and, for 1985, \$70 million is projected for local integration costs, most of which are for settlements.

C. A BRIEF HISTORY OF EARLY RURAL REFUGEE SETTLEMENTS

International assistance to rural refugee settlements did not originate with UNHCR's activities in Africa. For example, assistance to settlements was part of the international response in Greece to aid Asia Minor refugees in 1922 and in India and Pakistan after 1948 for refugees resulting from the partition of the former British colony of India. UNHCR itself had some prior

* All costs quoted in this paragraph reflect cumulative costs over the life of the settlement.

acquaintance with agricultural settlements through its aid to the Indian Government's program for Tibetan refugees after 1959.

Refugee rural settlements first appeared as a form of UNHCR assistance in the early 1960's. They were developed as a response to large flows of African refugees fleeing from independence and nation-building struggles - "At the end of 1964 UNHCR was faced with a new situation in Africa, characterized by a large influx of rural refugees estimated at about 400,000," (Diegues, 1981).

The earliest of these settlements were for part of the approximately 140,000 Rwandese who had fled to Burundi, Tanzania, Uganda and Zaire (then the Congo) and who had little prospect of returning home.

The first UNHCR refugee rural settlement in Africa was Bibwe in Kivu, Zaire begun in October 1961 for Rwandese refugees. It was followed in 1962 by two additional settlements (Ihula and Kalonge) in other parts of Kivu. UNHCR's involvement with refugee rural settlements grew rapidly in 1963 and 1964. Besides the three in Zaire, some 14 settlements in three countries (four in Burundi, three in Tanzania, and seven in Uganda) were established. All were for Rwandese refugees and, with one exception (Kinyara in Uganda), reached self-sufficiency and are still in existence.

The Rwandese were soon followed by refugees from Zaire, Portugese Guinea (now Guinea-Bissau), the Sudan, and Mozambique. From 1961 to 1982, UNHCR opened 107 settlements in Africa, assisting some 940,000 refugees.

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D. REFUGEE SETTLEMENTS IN THE CONTEXT OF NEW LANDS SETTLEMENT

Refugee rural settlements are a small part of the larger category of new lands settlements. Within this larger field, refugee settlements are closest to what Scudder (1984)* calls "compulsory settlement sponsored primarily by government agencies." Such compulsory settlements are usually "a by-product of larger scale events," such as dam relocations, "in which the future settlers find themselves embroiled." (Scudder, 1984)

Overall, the results of new lands settlement "have been disappointing." New lands settlements have been marked by many setbacks, including steadily increasing costs per settler family, exaggeration of the "capacity of new lands settlements to absorb population surpluses," "economic rates of return at least 50 percent below those in project appraisal documents," and "multiplier effects [which have] not been impressive." (Scudder 1984) In brief, planned settlements for nationals have been difficult to implement successfully, even with the full backing of the government.

The difficulties which new land settlements have encountered in meeting their economic objectives may not be directly applicable to organized refugee settlements in all respects, as the objectives for new lands settlements are often much larger. These include seeking "to stimulate an ongoing process of integrated area development" and to produce "major multiplier

*Scudder's report is a comprehensive review of over 100 settlement areas in 35 countries. It involved literature searches, field studies, and site visits. It is a state-of-the-art evaluation and is thus a basic resource on new land settlements.

effects". At the same time, while rural refugee settlements are more modest in terms of their economic goals, they usually encounter other major obstacles and handicaps that can make their success and viability even more difficult.

In non-refugee situations, settlers tend to be recruited and selected according to a relatively narrow set of criteria - "Pioneer families tend to be relatively young, often with only one or two small children". (Scudder, 1984) Refugee settlements, however, have far less selectivity and tend to receive an abnormal proportion of fragmented families and non-productive members (e.g. elderly, very young, or handicapped persons). Many refugee settlers may be those who have had difficulties as self-settlers, or who have been forced into settlements by the authorities, or who are the weaker parts of families sent to the settlements while the stronger members remain outside.

While in the early years of a new lands settlement" it is not unusual for relatively large numbers of both spontaneous and government sponsored settlers to drop out," (Scudder, 1984) in some refugee situations those who wish to leave a settlement find serious obstacles to their being able to do so. Since control of a refugee population is a frequent motivation for host country governments to set up a refugee settlement, limits on departure are common. On the other hand, in refugee settlements authorities are restricted in their ability to evict unsatisfactory refugee farmers.

Refugee settlers are in a new socio-physical environment where their previous know-how may be of little use. Climate, land fertility, and cropping patterns and techniques may be different

from those back home. While this is a problem faced by both refugee and pioneer settlers, refugees also face the special problem of dealing with a new government without the rights of citizenship. Participation by refugees in the management of settlements often remains minimal because of host government reluctance to allow non-citizens to have a role. Refugee settlers may also have to deal with unfamiliar voluntary organizations, and with UNHCR, as well as with potentially resentful neighbors.

For most new lands settlers, their response to a precarious new setting is to be risk-averse and to cling to familiar persons, such as relatives and former neighbors. Refugee camps and settlements mix persons from different villages or towns and from different social groups. This can result in a longer, more painful adjustment process and in greater difficulties in regaining a functioning social organization and a sense of community. Adjustment may be especially difficult for those refugees who are townspeople or middle-class persons. Such persons are often reluctantly or unwillingly present in rural refugee settlements.

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This paper is divided into four chapters: Chapter I describes a chronology of events which takes place in a "typical" refugee settlement over time, and the role of the main institutions involved.

Chapter II reviews the track record of refugee settlements in Africa for attaining self-sufficiency, and analyzes the major obstacles which the older settlements experienced in seeking to reach self-sufficiency. It also discusses specific difficulties which have occurred at handover and afterwards in terms of management issues as well as in terms of problems regarding abuse of power and protection for the refugees. Attention is also given to the question of how durable the inputs into a refugee settlement prior to handover have turned out to be in the long run, and to problems which refugees have faced regarding integration into the host country.

Chapter III begins with a review of the difficulties which settlements have had in reaching a durable solution, primarily because of problems regarding integration. This information suggests that refugee settlements are most realistically viewed in the context of extended asylum, rather than as durable solutions. A number of issues regarding post-handover assistance to settlements are then discussed, with suggested guidelines for the types of assistance which should be the responsibility of the international community versus those for which the host country should be responsible. The chapter concludes with a review of the implications of this study for the current discussions of "refugee aid and development".

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Chapter IV summarizes the findings of the study and its main conclusions. The Appendix also contains a substantial amount of information about the history of the 30 settlements in Africa which were self-sufficient as of 1982 and which are the main focus of this study.

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CHAPTER I:
REFUGEE SETTLEMENT PHASES

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INTRODUCTION

At the time of a refugee influx, and for some time afterwards, assistance efforts are of an emergency nature. This emergency phase usually takes place away from the actual settlement site at some location near the border crossing-point. Its focus is on meeting the immediate survival needs of the refugees.

While many of the refugees who eventually become residents of an organized settlement may come directly from an emergency relief phase, others may come via an interim care-and-maintenance phase. In this interim phase they continue to be dependent on food rations and other assistance for periods that can stretch out to many years. Recently, efforts have been made to develop programs in this phase which can make the refugees more self-reliant, usually through some kind of income-generating activity. Unfortunately, the success of these programs to date has been very limited. Many of the world's refugees (perhaps a majority) currently remain in this interim state, awaiting some durable solution for them while the emergency phase recedes into the past.

It should be pointed out that not all refugee settlements are begun with the agreed upon goal of attaining a durable solution for the refugees. In some cases, most prominently in the Sudan, host governments may limit the goal of a settlement to attaining economic self-sufficiency for the settlers, while

making it clear that it has intention of accepting them permanently. However, for most of the older settlements the question of whether the refugees would eventually become citizens of the host country or not was left undecided at the onset, pending further consideration and negotiation.

In this chapter, we describe the events which should ideally take place in a settlement as it proceeds from creation to an end point of full integration into the host country. This will provide the reader with an overall framework in which to consider the more limited processes which have occurred in reality.

Conceptually, there are two main phases in the creation of an organized refugee settlement scheme: (a) the land settlement phase to assist the refugees to settle on the land and become self-supporting, and, (b) the consolidation and integration phase to complete the development of the settlements infrastructure, to promote a sense of community, and to integrate the settlement into the larger economic, social, administrative, and political life of the host country.

A. THE LAND SETTLEMENT PHASE

Site selection, one of the most critical decisions which determines a settlement's viability, is done at the very beginning of this phase. A site which has poor soils, or insufficient rainfall, or one which lacks adequate drinking water, or one which is placed next to hostile neighbors is going to face tremendous odds in ever becoming successful. Site selection is often made difficult by the lack of good data on prospective sites. However,

even the kind of "quick-and-dirty" studies which are possible have sometimes not been done due to a lack of appreciation of the dire consequences of selecting a poor site. Ultimately, site selection is the prerogative of the host country government, although international agencies often play a major role on survey and selection teams.

Once the site has been selected, the refugees are moved onto the land allocated by the host country government. The land normally requires clearing and preparation prior to planting crops. Most of this work is generally done by the refugees themselves although they are sometimes assisted by local hired labor or through the use of tractors or other mechanical equipment. The refugees are provided seeds, implements, and in some instances, fertilizer. The goal of this assistance is to help the refugees to become self-supporting primarily through agriculture, animal husbandry and other agriculture-related income-generating activities.

The process of putting in the settlement's infrastructure also gets under way at this time. This generally includes such inputs as roads, health and education facilities, administrative and maintenance centers, and drinking water.

Food rations are typically provided by the World Food Program (WFP) in declining amounts over time as the refugees clear the land and increasingly meet their own food needs. Under ideal conditions, WFP assumes that food assistance will be needed for a period of two years -- "for the agricultural settlements, food would be distributed for two years: 12 months full ration, 6 months semi-complete ration, and 6 months partial ration,"

(World Food Programme, 1983). By the end of this time it is hoped that the settlement will have achieved food self-sufficiency. Some settlements have followed this ideal timetable, but many have experienced delays for years, while others may never reach this goal.

Establishment of a rural refugee settlement involves more than merely giving the refugees land, a hoe and seeds and then watching an agricultural community come into being. There are many design and policy considerations that need to be addressed at the onset. The following is a list of fifteen such considerations that a UNHCR specialist has singled out for attention in the setting up of a refugee settlement (many of these points will be discussed in more detail later in this report). These include:

- a) The fundamental purpose of the settlement itself, the level of development to be achieved at handover and the target date for handover to local government administration.
- b) The economic basis of the settlement taking into account the land, skills available among the refugees, and marketing potential. As agriculture production, usually based on food crops, constitutes the basis of the refugee settlements (at least in the first years), special attention should be paid to farming organization, land clearing, and procedures to maintain or even increase soil fertility through crop rotation, intercropping, and use of manure and fertilizers.
- c) Secure access to land, which might serve as an incentive to higher agricultural production and greater settler satisfaction. Local customs and national laws on land tenure have to be taken into consideration.
- d) Optimum size of the settlement taking into account management constraints, the experience of local communities in the area, and the maximum carrying capacity of the proposed sites.
- e) Population growth. Land should also be made available

to cover the natural growth of the population at a given planning horizon.

- f) Level of services and their organization (health, water supply, education, agriculture, extension work) should be planned in such a way that they can be easily administered after handover to the government because they will fit into the existing administrative framework.
- g) Technology: An unsuitable technological choice can negatively affect the self-reliance of a rural community and even destroy its social, ecological and economic basis. An appropriate technology, on the other hand, should be controlled by the local people (in terms of repair and maintenance) and should benefit the whole community.
- h) Participation of nationals in the project. Very often it is desirable that the surrounding population also benefit from the facilities provided for the refugees. The number of nationals benefitting from the project, and the level of assistance to be provided, should also be decided upon.
- i) Community development and social organization of refugees. It is desirable that refugees participate in the management of the settlement from the outset, through committees, cooperatives and specific groups, such as women's associations, recreation clubs, etc.
- j) The level of material assistance such as clothes, food, kitchen and farm implements, blankets, hut-building materials, etc. to be given to the refugees should be determined.
- k) Implementation of a strict policy of distribution and termination of the rationing of food and other commodities should be based on the degree of self-sufficiency refugees reach after each harvest.
- l) Consideration of a plan for "matching contributions" by government and refugees, each bearing specific burdens and responsibilities for project implementation.
- m) Integration of the rural settlement project in regional development plans. If there are projects in the region for nationals organized by other UN agencies, ways of integrating refugee rural settlements with them should be devised.
- n) The procedures for handover of the settlement, including the possibility of phased handover of sectors to

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local government for operation and maintenance once initial establishment and installation has been completed. (Diegues, 1981)

In terms of institutional roles, organized refugee settlements always involve at least two main institutional entities, and usually a third. The first two are the host country government and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) which represents the international community. The third is one or more of the international Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO's).

Responsibility for administration of the settlement lies with the host government, although in practice a good deal of this responsibility on a day-to-day basis may be handled by an NGO, if one is involved. The host government may be represented by either a regular local government official or by a special settlement head representing the government's national agency responsible for refugees (in countries where one exists). Such officials are responsible for law and order, adherence to any special refugee legislation, interpretation of government policies, liaison with local and regional government authorities, and other duties.

UNHCR, which is basically a non-operational agency, funds and assists settlement schemes through a few standard mechanisms. The main responsibility for implementing programs in the settlement is normally borne by an agency known either as an operational partner or as an implementing agency. The key distinction is that an operational partner contributes some of its own resources to the project while an implementing agency is a sub-contractor working for UNHCR. Implementation may be done either by a unit

of the host government (which would be considered an operational partner due to the governments allocation of land for the settlement) or an NGO.

A tripartite agreement between UNHCR, the host country government, and the NGO (or an equivalent agreement if only the host government and UNHCR are involved) is generally the basic project document for a settlement. For most of the recent settlements, this document serves as the multi-year plan of operations, complete with a time schedule, a budget, and definitions of the main roles and responsibilities of the entities involved.

Once the initial design decisions have been made, the successful fulfillment of the day-to-day task of bringing them into being depends heavily on the experience and quality of the program implementors. In the early years there was a certain lack of clarity about what working with settlements actually entailed. A number of the organizations who were involved in these early years, such as the International Labor Organization, the League of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, and a number of NGO's, soon found that this work did not fit well within their institutional mandates and expertise. As a result, the numbers of organizations involved soon diminished.

For the 30 self-sufficient settlements that are our chief concern, program implementation in 21 of them was handled by one of only three organizations. A Belgian NGO, Association Internationale de Development Rural Outremer (AIDR), was the implementing agency for seven settlements (four in Burundi, one in Rwanda and two in Zaire). The Lutheran World Federation (LWF) has been

the operating partner for six settlements in Tanzania (through its affiliate, the Tanganyika Christian Refugee Service) and two in Zambia (through the Zambia Christian Refugee Service). The Ugandan Government has been the operational partner for seven settlements for Rwandese refugees.

Utilizing a few proven agencies has obvious advantages, such as being able to build on previous experience. On the other hand, it also reflects a significant problem for settlements today, and for longer-term refugee assistance programs in general. This problem is the relative lack of agencies with the interest and competence to take on this kind of work. Most NGO's who work with refugees are focused on the relief phase, and even then concentrate on only a few sector areas (most frequently health care). Settlements work calls for agencies who can make longer term commitments, and who have staff with the wide variety of expertise which this exercise in community building requires. Recently UNHCR has had some difficulty in finding a sufficient number of qualified agencies to work with settlements in the Sudan and in Somalia.

B. THE CONSOLIDATION AND INTEGRATION PHASE

Consolidation and integration, the second phase in a settlement's life, has two parts. The first, consolidation, is largely internal. This refers to achieving settlement self-reliance and a sense of being a community. The second, integration, is largely external, and involves the settlement's relationship to the local population, markets and towns, and to various levels of government. While the two parts generally take place at the same time,

problems with integration usually remain even after consolidation has been completed.

Consolidation requires that the settlement be able to stand on its own. Its economic viability entails not only food production but also some extra income from cash crops or other income-generating activities. This allows for marketing and exchange for basic requirements such as salt and sugar, as well as the purchase of consumer goods such as clothing, household utensils, and agricultural tools.

During this consolidation phase the basic facilities of the settlement, such as schools and roads, should be completed. Perhaps most important, the settlement should become a community entity with its own leaders, decision-making committees and councils, and the other attributes that allow it to handle its own affairs.

No settlement, however, really stands alone. It must depend on the local government for many of its services and for much of the upkeep of its infrastructure. To thrive, it must also be part of the larger local economy. It is therefore important that the refugees be perceived as valuable and contributing members of the regional and national community through participating in markets, providing goods and services, and paying taxes and fees.

Such integration is directly related to achieving a durable solution. The settlement should be assimilated into the region's development plans and administrative framework, and in order to reach the status of a durable solution, the refugees should have standing and legal rights equivalent to those of the

local inhabitants. In both ideal and practical terms, integration should include citizenship. "Refugees are aliens, they are 'guests,' they are not voting citizens, and they have little or no political leverage." (Coat, 1978).

The handing over of a settlement from UNHCR to the host country government is a key indicator that a major portion of this consolidation and integration process has occurred. Ideally, international assistance should end at this point as the settlement's infrastructure is firmly in place, and the host country government takes over responsibility for the operation of this infrastructure.

This ideal has not been realized in most instances, and the term handover itself can therefore be misleading by implying a completeness and formality to this transition which is not usually the case. At least 21 of the 30 core settlements received renewed assistance after handover, and most have been handed over informally, and often piecemeal, as international assistance was phased down as each input was completed.

Given this information, perhaps the term "handover without phase-out" would be more accurate than "handover". However, as handover is the term commonly used, we will continue to use it as well, with the understanding that it demarcates the (sometimes blurry) point at which international assistance for the creation of a settlement has been completed and the host country has assumed the major responsibility for its ongoing needs.

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CHAPTER II:

REVIEW OF THE EXPERIENCES OF THE OLDER SETTLEMENTS

A. THE TRACK RECORD FOR ATTAINING SELF-SUFFICIENCY

In this report it has not been possible to independently evaluate the self-sufficiency of refugee settlements. Instead, we have relied on UNHCR's standards and reports regarding a settlement's dependency or self-sufficiency. To the extent that this introduces some bias into the analysis, most of those interviewed in the course of the study felt that it is probably in the direction of underestimating the number of self-sufficient settlements at any time. These persons argue that UNHCR is more likely to declare a settlement self-sufficient some time after it has actually achieved this status rather than too early.

The starting point for our analysis of older refugee settlements is a 1982 UNHCR report (Heidler, 1982) and its accompanying table, "UNHCR-Assisted Rural Settlements - Situation at the Beginning of 1982." The table lists 107 settlements in Africa which were in existence between 1961 and 1982. Of these:

Table I

21	were closed due to repatriation with 7 being self-sufficient before being closed
2	were abandoned
30	were self-sufficient (but 21 received renewed aid)
54	were not self-sufficient.

107 Total

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While we have collected and analyzed a certain amount of data on the 84 settlements which were still operating in 1982, our main focus is on the sub-set of 30 settlements that UNHCR had declared to be self-sufficient by 1982 or before. For the most part we have been able to track their status into late 1984. (See Table III, following page. More detailed histories of each of these settlements are provided in the Appendix.)

The fact that 54 of the 84 settlements had not attained self-sufficiency by 1982 does not seem very encouraging. However, the Sudan is host to 36 of these 54. By splitting off the Sudanese settlements from the others, a seemingly bleak picture becomes brighter for the rest of Africa.

Table II

	<u>Sudan</u>	<u>Rest of Africa</u>	<u>Total</u>
Not self-sufficient	36	18	54
Self-sufficient but aid renewed	1	20	21
Self-sufficient	<u>1</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>9</u>
Number of settlements	38	46	84

Of the 38 settlements in the Sudan listed above (the 1984 total was 65), only the two oldest were self-sufficient in 1982. These two are Rajaf, started in 1970, and the original Qala en Nahal, begun in 1969. While old Qala en Nahal is not listed by UNHCR as a recipient of renewed aid, it is so enmeshed with the aid program at the new settlement that we have added it to the "renewed aid" group. It has also recently received renewed WFP

TABLE III: REFUGEE SETTLEMENTS SELF-SUFFICIENT BY 1982

Host Country	Name of Settlement	Year of arrival/ Self-suff. year	Number of refugees and origin	Comments
Burundi	Muramba	1962-1969	9,900 Rwanda)	1982 Team finds not fully viable; \$773,000 for food production & marketing coops, vocational training, technical exp. cen., school repairs, water pipes. \$2.5 m for area hospital.
"	Kayongazi	1962-1969	5,300 Rwanda)	
"	Kigamba	1963-1969	11,800 Rwanda)	
"	Mugera	1963-1969	18,700 Rwanda)	
Tanzania	Karagwe	1962-1966	2,500 Rwanda)	No recent aid. Incomplete naturalization only issue.
"	Muyenzi	1962-1969	5,000 Rwanda)	
"	Mwezi	1964-1971	3,000 Rwanda)	
Uganda	Oruchinga	1961-1974	4,750 Rwanda)	Major repairs needed due to 1979 Tanzanian invasion. 1981 request by gov't to cover ½ of some recurrent costs, \$1m. 1982 attack on Rwandese in rural areas & on settlements causes severe damage & overcrowding. New settlement, Kyaka II plus repairs to 7 old ones to cost \$5.3 m in 1983-85.
"	Nakivale	1962-1974	8,405 Rwanda)	
"	Kahunge	1963-1974	9,220 Rwanda)	
"	Ibuga	1964-1974	2,350 Rw & Sud)	
"	Rawanwanja	1964-1974	2,820 Rwanda)	
"	Kyaka	1964-1974	2,230 Rwanda)	
"	Kyangwali	1966-1974	9,465 Rwanda)	
Zaire	Ihula	1961-1970	3,000 Rwanda)	14 years of no aid & Kalonge listed as abandoned. ICARA II request for \$264,000 for schools & dispensaries not provided before.
"	Bibwe	1962-1970	5,000 Rwanda)	
"	Kalonge	1962-1967*	1,190 Rwanda)	
Rwanda	Mutara	1974-1977	3,100 Burundi	\$300,000 for 84-85 to repair & increase water system, build more schools, equip health center.
Tanzania	Ulyankulu	1972-1980	26,000 Burundi)	\$27 m ICARA II request (includes Mishamo) for primary coops, agricultural training & research, roads, health delivery, water supply & education. Additional \$9 m from UNHCR for primary coops & health & family planning. Cited serious jeopardy to progress if preventive measures not taken.
"	Katumba	1973-1978	74,000 Burundi)	
Zaire	Mutambala	1976-1979	1,700 Burundi	Only educational scholarships since 1980.
Sudan	Qala en Nahal	1969-1975	34,000 Ethiopia	Qala failed immediately after handover due to water & tractor pool problems. Marginal now only with NGO aid. Villages near food self-sufficiency. Plots too small for long-term fertility.
Djibouti	Mouloud	1979-1980	90 Ethiopia	no news in recent years.

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Botswana	Etscha	1968-1975	1,800	Angola	All refugees are citizens
Zambia	Mayukwayukwa	1967-1973	1,400	Angola	No aid last decade.
"	Meheba	1970-1982	11,066	Angola	ICARA II request for \$3 m for secondary school, health center, fish ponds.
Zaire	Cataractes	1976-1981	c.100,000	Angola	Assisted self-settlement. Food sufficiency since 81. ICARA II - \$4 m rebuild roads, \$2 m community dev., \$2.9 m dispensaries, \$½ m medical assistance.
"	Kanyama	1971-1972	750	Zambia Lumpa sect	no aid
Tanzania	Pangale	1966-1971	700	Zaire	ICARA II c.\$50,000 day care & rural comm dev.
Sudan	Rajaf	1970-1977	5,000	Zaire	no renewed aid.

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food rations as a result of the severe drought which is affecting most of the Sudan. The other 36 settlements begun in 1977 or later (1977-4, 1978-2, 1979-9, 1980-7, 1981-7, 1982-7) are still dependent on aid.*

Arguably, part of the reason why these 36 settlements had not reached self-sufficiency by 1982 might be that they simply had not had adequate time to do so. However, our review of information about these settlements indicates that it is unlikely that any large number of them will reach self-sufficiency even by 1986, and many observers question whether the majority will ever reach this goal unless they are radically altered.

Achieving self-sufficiency in the Sudan has been made difficult by three major factors. First, the refugee situation in the Sudan is not stable. In most years there have been new influxes of refugees into both of the regions where most of the refugees are found. In some years these influxes have been merely large, while in others, such as in 1984-85, they have been immense. These influxes disrupt ongoing settlement programs by diverting resources and personnel into the relief effort and the opening of new settlements. Second, the Sudan is experiencing its own major crises including the overthrow of the government, civil strife in the south (which has caused its own refugee flow into Ethiopia) and drought and famine conditions for many Sudanese in several regions. Third, Sudanese government policies have

* Settlements in eastern Sudan are for Ethiopian refugees and the ones in southern Sudan care for Ugandan refugees. Generally the ones in the south are doing better than the ones in the east.

made matters worse. Several settlement sites in the east were chosen against the recommendations of international survey missions. Many settlements in the east have also been provided with plots of land one-third to one-sixth of the size needed for long-term viability, while other settlements are hampered by title disputes (Cree, 1983; WFP, 1983).

Nonetheless, any criticism about the Sudan's failure to promote settlement self-sufficiency for most of the settlements on its territory needs to be seriously muted because of its commendable record of humanitarian support for the principle of asylum. Ravaged by drought and political instability, the Sudan "has opened its doors to a seemingly endless flow of refugees" (UNHCR, 1985). Clearly this extraordinary generosity has had an impact on its ability to assist refugees to self-sufficiency. With stricter border controls, the Sudan might have limited its refugee burden and perhaps achieved greater success regarding settlement self-sufficiency.

The progress since 1982 of settlements in Africa outside of the Sudan has been much better. Of the 18 settlements which were not self-sufficient in 1982 (see Table IV), two are now "highly self-sufficient"; eight are at the level of the local population; three were scheduled for handover by the end of 1985; and five others expected gradual handover of certain sectors in 1985. The record of the rest of Africa standing apart from the Sudanese program appears to be one of reasonable effectiveness and progress.

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TABLE IV

Settlements Not Self-Sufficient in 1982 (Other than Sudan)

Host Country	Name	Year Created	1982 Population	Comments
Angola	1. Cassege	78	1,050 Zairians	highly self-sufficient
	2. Dongue	79	1,200 Zairians	highly self-sufficient
	3. Sta Eulalia	81	2,850 Zairians	for numbers 3-6: handover planned for 1984, but evaluation in '84 decided "additional relief and self- sufficiency programmes needed... to be viable."
	4. Cacanda	81	300 Zairians	
	5. Kitola	81	1,760 Zairians	
	6. Maua	81	210 Zairians	
Botswana	7. Dukwe II	80	650 varied	major increase in '83 to 3,700 Zimbabweans; 3 year drought; partial handover in '85
Burundi	8. Bukemba	74	5,330 Rwandese	conditions similar to other Rwandese settlements
Swaziland	9. Ndzevane	80	5,200 South Africans	handover end '84 put off to 1/1/86 due to severe drought

Tanzania	10.	Kigwa	80	70 varied	244 refugees; urban self-employment
	11.	Mishamo	78	30,800 Burundi	handover in 1985
Zaire	12.	Kimbianga	78	8,400 Angolans	for numbers 12-14: 1984 at level of local population but still need some maintenance aid
	13.	Lundu-Matende	78	10,000 Angolans	
	14.	Mfuki	78	8,600 Angolans	
	15.	Birindi	81	80,000 Ugandans	for numbers 15-18: numbers dropping - a total of 45,000 in '84; expect 35,000 in '85 due to spontaneous repatriation; expect gradual handover in '85
	16.	Tole	81	80,000 Ugandans	
	17.	Popo	81	80,000 Ugandans	
	18.	Adranga	81	80,000 Ugandans	

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B. ATTAINING SELF-SUFFICIENCY

This section includes:

- o A review of operational problems in defining self-sufficiency;
- o A summary of the older settlements that were either abandoned or which suffered major population declines in the process of reaching self-sufficiency, and the specific factors that caused these problems;
- o An elaboration of the nature of these various factors;
- o A description of UNHCR's Project Management System for better design, monitoring, and implementation of settlement schemes.

1. Operational Problems in Defining Self-Sufficiency

UNHCR's own working definition of self-sufficiency has undergone some modifications over time. In earlier years, self-sufficiency was usually only roughly defined by UNHCR. However, there was a certain consistency in viewing it as more than basic subsistence. Economic health was always considered paramount, and social services for the settlements (such as health and education) and ties to the local community were also consistently promoted.

More recently, UNHCR has taken what it calls the Basic Needs Approach (BNA) towards designing a strategy for promoting self-sufficiency:

"Basic needs, as the concept is used here, refers to the minimum requirements essential for decent human existence, including items of private consumption (food, shelter and clothing) as well as certain socially-provided services (safe drinking, sanitation, public transport, health and educational facilities). In addition to these material needs there are certain non-material needs [participation, community development, counseling]." (Bakhet, 1981)

The Basic Needs Approach is a "country specific concept" with objectives that should be within the host country's "resources capacity, socio-economic aspirations and cultural values." Usually the aim is "to reach the level of living achieved by the host communities in the vicinity of any given refugee settlement." (Bakhet, 1981) It is understood that differences in the standard of living between host countries means that this level will vary from country to country.

The Basic Needs Approach tries to provide the tools to set realistic targets for settlement viability and to measure and monitor performance and progress towards these targets. This usually involves:

- a) selection of a core bundle of basic needs;
- b) for each core item, specification of appropriate indicators or attributes;
- c) setting a time-frame for meeting Basic Needs targets;
- d) formulating policies to achieve targets;
- e) design or programs reflecting desired policies; and,
- f) if necessary, monitoring performance and introducing adjustments.

The Basic Needs Approach utilizes indicators to define minimum standards of basic needs. These indicators can then be used to measure access or lack of access to social services, the provision and distribution of goods and services, and the levels of economic output. They can also show which members of the refugee population are above or below defined minimum standards. These indicators need to be measurable and easy to construct and

use over time. However, according to UNHCR, "measurability is not synonymous with quantification; measurements of changes can be expressed in non-quantifiable forms without any loss of validity." (Bakhet, 1981) The Basic Needs Approach is a recent development within UNHCR, and although it builds on past experience and practice as well as borrowing heavily from development research, it will be extremely difficult to fully implement in many cases.

Another especially practical approach to defining self-sufficiency, and one that nicely highlights the relationship between economic self-sufficiency and the broader self-sufficiency needs of a settlement, comes from the the Sudan:

- a) Dura [food] Self-Sufficiency - An average refugee family can produce a sufficient quantity of dura [basic foodstuffs] off their allocated land to pay for all costs of production and yet have enough left for the family's annual consumption.
- b) Family Self-Reliance - Dura self-sufficiency and enough income from other sources to cover the costs for the minimum household requirements (e.g. clothing and bedding, fuel, household utensils, grinding charges).
- c) Settlement Self-Reliance -- Family self-reliance plus an overall income surplus is generated which can cover the operating costs for the minimum settlement infrastructure requirements in administration and support services, water supply, education, health care and sanitation. (Cree, 1983)

Clearly the target indicators for having reached self-sufficiency will vary from one place to another. Nonetheless, a definition of settlement self-sufficiency can be seen as including reaching the economic level and general standard of living of the local community and being integrated into the economic life of the area on a sustainable basis. In addition, a

settlement should be able to produce sufficient government revenues to allow the government to operate its standard set of services for the residents of the settlement (e.g. health facilities) and to maintain the settlement's infrastructure at a level consistent with those elsewhere in the country. A settlement that routinely required international assistance, or that was experiencing a situation which required external assistance in large amounts, could not be considered self-sufficient.

Problems have arisen increasingly in recent years with instances in which matching the target levels for a settlement's self-sufficiency to the level of the local population may in fact lead to renewed aid later. If the local level is marginal and precarious, i.e., if one poor harvest can put people at risk, then it may be necessary to raise the refugees above the existing standard if one wishes to avoid renewed aid. This is because the refugees lack the accumulated resources and networks to weather hard times.

However, raising these levels is fraught with difficulties. It may create a situation of privileged refugees resented by the local population that could impede integration efforts. "The local population without exception takes a very keen interest in everything done for the refugee group and watches closely for signs that the outsiders are receiving privileged treatment" (Holborn, 1975). Thus, assistance beyond the local standard of living can hardly be done for the refugees alone. This leads to a dilemma where one must choose between leaving the refugees in an unsatisfactory condition or engaging in developmental assistance for both refugees and the local population. A middle

ground between these choices may be to accept that the refugees will be more dependent on outside assistance than the local population is, and to be willing to periodically provide this assistance as the need arises.

2. Settlements Which Were Abandoned or Which Experienced Major Population Declines

A quick overview of the older refugee settlements might give one the mistaken impression that self-sufficiency has been attained more easily than has actually been the case. While the clear majority of the older settlements were eventually declared self-sufficient, it is well to recall the troubles which they experienced on the way to that status. Half of the 30 self-sufficient settlements experienced major difficulties and sharp population declines before reaching a stable level. Further, another eight settlements were so troubled that they had to be abandoned.*

The settlements in Burundi of Muramba, Kayongazi, Kigamba, and Mugeru all experienced large out-migrations in their early years. In fact, some of the settlements lost as much as 90 percent of their settlers due to poor soils, a desire to be reunited with family members located in other asylum countries, resistance to becoming farmers, and a lack of opportunities for refugees from urban areas.

* Although our primary listing of settlements (Heidler, 1982) lists only two abandoned settlements, our research indicates at least six others have also been abandoned.

In Tanzania, Muyenzi declined from 10,000 to 5,000 refugees as settlers fled authoritarian officials and reunited with scattered family members. In the late 1970's, Ulyankulu had its population more than halved as a preventive measure to accommodate inadequate soil and water resources.

Several settlements in Uganda had major difficulties, and one was abandoned. In 1965, Kinyara failed and Ibuga had its Rwandese refugee population leave (although they were replaced by Sudanese refugees) because of a lack of water and community facilities. Oruchinga in 1964 had 12,000 refugees but land for only 5,000, and Nakivale peaked at about 30,000 before stabilizing at less than 20,000 settlers. Both settlements were overcrowded because they were near the border and authorities kept sending newly arrived refugees to them. Eventually their excess populations were transferred to new settlements in the north.

In Zaire, six settlements - Kakobo, Mamba, Rambo, and Lemera, Mulenge, Tshaminunu - were abandoned in the mid 1960's when they became involved with the Congo rebellions and the host government ordered that they be closed. Another settlement, Kalonge, was initially thought to have been abandoned for the same reason but survived at about one-third of its former size. Two other settlements, Bibwe and Ihula, were attacked by local residents but survived. However, their combined population declined from 13,000 to 5,000 refugees. Lastly, Kanyama was planned for 10,000 Lumpa refugees but only received 750 as most decided at the last minute to repatriate to Zambia.

Qala en Nahal in the Sudan virtually failed immediately

after handover due to overly complex and highly capitalized designs for provision of water and of tractor services.

Lastly, in Zambia, two settlements, Lwatembo and Mayukwayukwa, were begun without soil surveys. Lwatembo eventually was abandoned, and Mayukwayukwa proved viable only after two-thirds of its population was transferred to Meheba.

3. Key Obstacles to Attaining Self-Sufficiency

The history of the older refugee settlements in Africa thus indicates a number of factors which can be major obstacles to the attainment of self-sufficiency by a refugee settlement. While the following discussion is based primarily on the experience of the older settlements, written and interview information on more recent settlements indicates that these lessons of the past have considerable validity for more recent settlements as well.

a. Site Selection

Proper site selection is critical for attaining self-sufficiency. The three chief characteristics of a suitable site are good soils, adequate rainfall (or a source of irrigation water), and sufficient drinking water. Simply put, these are the primary and permanent factors that determine self-sufficiency. All other factors - such as plot size, overcrowding, refugee attitudes, etc. - are secondary. If the secondary factors are positive, a settlement can speed on its way; if they are negative, these factors can hinder the development of the settlement. However, the key attribute of the secondary factors is that they can be changed, improved or overcome if they are a

hinderance. If permanent factors can be overcome at all, it is only at prohibitive expense. If they are available but only in limited amounts, then these limits will determine the viable population capacity of the settlement.

In some host countries, "land is abundant...[and] its allocation to refugees is not at the expense of neighboring nationals" (UN, 1984). However, such unused land may have been avoided for good reasons, and may be remote or marginal. In other countries, finding unused or unclaimed land may be difficult. Many of the settlements established in the 1960's were either in countries with abundant land or those where land in less populated areas (by local standards) was in the process of being opened for new settlement. However, the future prospects for suitable open land for refugee settlements are declining because of very large population increases in Africa in the last few decades, and similar increases are projected for the future. More remote or marginal land with little pre-existing infrastructure may have to be pressed into service. Settlement activities in eastern Sudan and in Somalia operate under such constraints.

Although the choice of a settlement site rests with the host government, it is exceptionally important that UNHCR and the international donors take an active interest in the decision. The long-term consequences of a poor site choice can be extremely expensive in monetary terms and in the labor, energy, and hopes invested in trying to make a poor site workable.

As the overwhelming majority of refugee settlements in Africa are based on agriculture, soil quality is of paramount

importance. Into the 1970's many settlements, even major ones, were undertaken without adequate soil surveys. In some, cursory surveys were made that did not uncover all of the important local variation which existed. In others, the expansion of a settlement led into unsurveyed areas.

Soil surveys should be used to determine the limits of a settlement's population, the size of its plots, and the nature of its agricultural activities. Marginal soils are especially susceptible to rapid deterioration, so that good harvests of the early years often cannot be maintained without measures to ensure fertility. It may also be necessary to allow for variations in plot sizes to take into account individual variations in the quality of soils on different plots.

Much of the above seems obvious to the non-agronomist authors of this report. Nonetheless, it is not clear that soil surveys have yet been elevated to priority status. It is understandable that at the beginning of an influx, or in the rush to begin settlement, soil surveys may be neglected. However, soil surveys can be done very early in a settlement's life, even while refugees are arriving and plots are being cleared, if they are considered a top priority.

The 1982 Mid-Term Review of Mishamo, Tanzania, (conducted years after problems with soil quality and rainfall led to tens of thousands of refugees from Ulyankulu settlement being sent to Mishamo) noted that after three and one-half years of Mishamo's existence:

One-third of this area has been surveyed at semi-detailed level, and about another third at reconnaissance level. With the exception of soil fertility

(based on only chemical data), all other land qualities were extrapolated.

i. The soils of the settlement vary greatly within short distances and that the utilization of the semi-detailed soil survey (FAO/NSS, 1978) for implementation of the project was not adequate; several villages have had to be sited on very marginal soils...

ii. ...several families have had to be advised to move from their currently impoverished soils to better areas - an idea that does not seem to be accepted by many.

iii. There seems to be an over-rating of the soil suitability for some crops... People who have visited Mishamo will have noticed...bananas ... doing not too badly. This is fine as far as the first and possibly the second crop goes... with time...nutrients (especially potassium) will be depleted... the crops will die out." (UNHCR 1982d)

If soil surveys at a settlement which received refugees from another settlement because of soil problems "are not sufficient to give a proper basis for project implementation," (UN 1982 d) can soil surveys be said to be receiving adequate priority?

Regarding rainfall, while it is very difficult to do timely meteorological surveys, it must be understood that for rural settlements, no rain means no crops. If the settlement is not within an area that has been previously surveyed, one must rely on extrapolations from surrounding weather stations and on the experience of local residents. A period of several years is needed to begin developing harder data on the settlement weather pattern and its microclimates. However, many settlements are so clearly within, or beyond, the adequate rainfall zone that detailed information is not essential to making a proper site selection in many cases.

Irrigation is, of course, an alternative to rain. The complexities and difficulties of irrigated farming are well-known

and it seems doubtful that a settlement based on irrigation can meet the operating costs and maintenance requirements without continuous outside assistance.

Drinking water is likely to be the most immediate problem in a new settlement and is likely to be addressed even before investigations of soil and rainfall. Drinking water must be continuously available for a settlement to function, whereas the impact of inadequate soils or rainfall is more gradual and long-term, as soil fertility declines or awaited rains fail to come. Moreover, WFP rations can delay confrontations with soil and rain problems.

The quality of drinking water can be a major problem. Treatment of water or pumping from deep wells can be expensive and the recurring costs may require repeated external assistance. Problems with the repair and maintenance of water systems have been a frequent cause of renewed aid to settlements after hand over. The availability of drinking water has limited the size of several settlements, and access to water has repeatedly been a point of conflict between refugees and local residents.

b. Relations with the Local Population and Government

While African nations have often been generous in providing asylum to refugees, the record of the older settlements shows numerous cases of severe difficulties regarding integration. Many settlements found themselves embroiled in the ethnic politics of the host country, thus diverting energy from economic activities and delaying self-sufficiency. Involvement in local politics was the major cause for the abandonment of several

settlements. A number of the settlements which did not experience difficulties with their neighbor may have done so simply because their site was so isolated that they had few neighbors to begin with.

c. Attitude of the Refugees

Many settlements in their early years experienced refugee resistance to any activities which might imply that they were putting down roots in the new land, rather than planning to return home. This was especially pronounced in the case of Rwandese Tutsi's, many of whom sought to forcibly regain control of Rwanda. One outcome of the international friction generated by the military activities of some of these Tutsi's was the establishment of a UNHCR policy that refugee camps and settlements should be moved away from border areas.

These Rwandese refugees in particular also experienced difficulties in changing from being primarily pastoralists to becoming farmers, which many viewed as a lower status occupation. This problem of changing livelihoods can also be seen in the more recent settlements for refugees from Ethiopia in Somalia and the Sudan, and for those from Uganda in southern Sudan.

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d. Overcrowding

Once a settlement has opened there is a great temptation to continue to send newly arrived refugees (or spontaneously settled refugees who have been rounded up), to the site. The plan may be to expand the settlement, or to use it as a transit center or holding camp, while planning an additional settlement or hoping for repatriation. The government is often reluctant to accept the need for additional settlements, feels constrained by lack of staff and resources, or is disinclined to go through the search and negotiations required to provide another settlement site. Sharp population declines may actually enhance a settlement's ultimate viability. Overcrowding can be a sign of poor planning, unrealistic beliefs about a settlement's viable size or ability to expand, or a failure to think clearly about a site's functions. Sharp reductions in size may be needed to bring available resources which often were not surveyed in advance into balance with the number of refugees. This process could continue over many years if inadequate provision has been made for maintenance of soil fertility which would lower a settlement's carrying capacity over time.

e. Agricultural Programs and Policies

Agriculture is the cornerstone of most refugee settlements. In addition to meeting the food needs of the residents, achieving an adequate agricultural income is vital to the development of refugee livelihood. The sale of crops is a source of cash on which other activities and employment depend. Many of the agriculture-related problems of refugee settlements are connected

with larger African problems; Africa is the only continent to suffer declines in per capita agricultural production over the past two decades.

(1). Plot Size

A major problem seen in the field trips, and often mentioned in reports, was that plot sizes have often been too small to allow the refugees to maintain soil fertility by fallowing or engaging in crop rotation. In other cases, plot sizes are too small to allow a family to even feed itself, let alone practice good soil management. This condition is further exacerbated when some refugees receive plots which are smaller than the specified size (Rogge, 1985) or when there is great variation in the soil quality between equal sized plots. Inadequate plots lead to subsistence farming with no ability to grow surpluses for sale. Not only does this make for poverty for the family, but it also reduces the economic locomotive effect that cash produces for the settlement and the region, and makes it harder for the government to recover its service costs through taxation and fees.

Small plot sizes can encourage deforestation with problems of erosion and lack of fuelwood. People may eventually begin to strip ever-widening areas of vegetation. However, this appears to be more of a problem for refugee camps in the emergency or care-and-maintenance phases than for refugee settlements, as agricultural settlements are usually in a better ecological balance with their environment than are camps.

Inadequately sized plots make it almost inevitable that children will have to move off their parents' land. This may

require moving to a new site, which may be many miles away in some of the larger settlements, thus dividing the families. Moving to a new plot may be difficult if the refugees lack citizenship, or identity papers, or are restricted to the settlement. In cases in which many young people move away from the settlement, the long-term viability of the settlement may be questionable.

(2). Individual Ownership of Land

In Somalia, Tanzania, and Zambia, there have been many difficulties when authorities tried to require communal or cooperative farming, usually as a part of national policies. Like people in general, refugees need incentives to work hard and produce, and they may see little return through participating in communal farming. The record appears to show no settlements that achieved self-sufficiency while practicing collective agriculture as the predominant farming model, and major increases in production when refugees who were formerly forced to farm communally were allowed to farm their own plots. In some settlements in Tanzania, refugees were at pains to point out how much more productive they were on their individual holdings than on communal plots. Unclear title to the land can also discourage refugees from fully committing themselves to agricultural production.

f. Community Facilities

The late 1970's saw the beginning of criticism about the overconstruction of refugee settlements, particularly in Tanza-

nia. Critics felt this represented an over-emphasis on visible capital projects as opposed to a concern for economic viability. However, in the 1960's, UNHCR was faced with the opposite concern. In the settlements for Rwandese refugees, delays or a failure to provide community facilities contributed to delays in the refugees beginning to work energetically towards self-sufficiency.

Community facilities play several important roles in settlements beyond the obvious provision of health, education, training, etc. They give a sense of permanence and acceptance to a settlement - many refugees are not ready to accept their exile as permanent, and a lack of facilities does not encourage putting down roots. Refugees who leave the settlement because of these problems can create a burden on host country facilities outside of the settlements. A related problem is that many of those who leave for this reason are persons who had been in the upper socio-economic levels back in the home country. The skills and leadership abilities which such people often possess can be of great help to a settlement.

g. Other Factors

A number of other factors have been noted as creating difficulties in attaining self-sufficiency, but have either been less pronounced in their effects or have only been noted in a limited number of cases. The ones below stand out in particular as being likely to cause greater difficulties in the more recent settlements.

One of these factors has been the lack of refugee participa-

tion in determining the priority needs which assistance programs are to address, and of refugee input into the design and implementation of such programs. This often reflects an attitude by some host government officials that refugees are guests who should not control affairs which occur in the host country. However, even NGO's which advocate refugee participation on paper often fall short of this ideal in practice.

Too often, those who make the key decisions regarding the operation of settlements see refugee involvement in this process as a hinderance, not a help. What is not adequately realized is that most of the work in a settlement is typically done by the refugees on their own initiative. In most of the older settlements, the problems with top-down management were not intrusive enough to prevent the refugees from getting on with their own business, but they did represent a wasting of the limited resources available to refugee assistance programs.

Selecting the proper level of technology for a settlement's operations, especially regarding agriculture, is an area which is likely to be a problem in the more recent settlements. As the overwhelming majority of the older settlements have relied on traditional rainfed agriculture, the primary point of contention has been whether fertilizers should be provided to the settlers or not. However, for settlements in places such as Somalia and eastern Sudan (and which are often sited on very marginal land), the question of the appropriateness of mechanized, or even irrigated farming is likely to become more contentious. Certainly the experience of Qala en Nahal, which has required the ongoing presence of an NGO (Euro-Action Acord) to assist with its

mechanized farming scheme, does not give one optimism about the sustainability of such programs. As most African host countries are in the midst of their own economic crises, including the lack of hard currency to finance out-of-country procurement, it is difficult to see how settlements for non-citizens can have their own procurement needs met by the government or the host country's private sector.

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4. UNHCR's Project Management System

Discussing the problems and failures of settlement schemes in Zambia in the late 1960's and early 1970's, T.F. Betts (1980) noted:

The causes of these failures are not hard to [find] - the initial ignorance of UNHCR in the 1960s, and of its field officers, of rural living and the detailed requirements of successful settlement; the hesitancy arising from the expectation of early repatriation; and the inadequate technical assessment of the proposed settlement areas.

In the mid-1970's, UNHCR was confronted with major difficulties at two of its largest settlement schemes - Qala en Nahal and Ulyankulu. Qala en Nahal experienced disaster and near abandonment shortly after handover because local authorities were late in allocating fuel for mechanized plowing, and because its sophisticated water system lacked fuel and spare parts. Ulyankulu had to have its population more than halved due to inadequate water and soil resources. Inadequate technical assessment, and poor planning and implementation contributed to the difficulties at both settlements.

As a result of sharp donor criticism of such operations, UNHCR initiated the Project Management System (PMS) which had its initial application in 1980. PMS has four main elements - project formulation with improved technical input, monitoring and reporting of progress, formal project evaluation, and improved project implementation.

PMS relies heavily on technical expertise from the UN system, NGO's and outside consultants. A Specialist Support Unit created in 1982 "assists with in-house specialists on planning and design of rural settlements," (UNHCR, 1983a). Improved pro-

ject formulation also involves setting specific project objectives, detailed descriptions of activities, clear budgets, and accurate time-schedules. "The formulation of indicative multi-year plans of operation is encouraged, especially for those projects leading directly to self-sufficiency such as organized rural settlements," (UNHCR, 1982a).

PMS also "requires careful monitoring of progress and financial control through periodic review," (UNHCR, 1984a). Standardized reporting formats were developed: year-end self-evaluations by the implementing agency; mid-project reviews of selected larger, usually multi-year activities to be done by the implementing agency, and UNHCR headquarters field offices; and for major programs, end-of-project final evaluations to be conducted with the assistance of outside expertise.

Lastly, "efforts to improve the implementation of projects continue to be a major preoccupation. Sometimes, the needs of refugees outstrip the available implementing capacity," (UNHCR, 1983a). To assist its implementing partners UNHCR has resorted to the following methods: financing specific posts in the implementing agency in such fields as accounting, project control and program monitoring; "reinforcing core government personnel with seconded or specialized staff"; more training of implementing partners; and greater use of specialists, experts, and consultants to advise on implementation. "Sometimes, circumstances are such that UNHCR is obliged to play a more directly operational role for a limited period of time," (UNHCR, 1983a).

PMS is an indication that UNHCR learned from its early

experiences and from its critics. However, it is too early to know if the results of PMS projects will be any better. Few of the settlements in which it has been utilized have had enough time to reach self-sufficiency. In addition, the numerous problems with the settlements in the Sudan suggest there may be limitations on what an improved project management system can accomplish.

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C. ISSUES IN THE HANDOVER AND IMMEDIATE POST-HANDOVER PERIODS

The following sections examine issues which have arisen in refugee settlements at the time of handover and in the immediate post-handover period. These include:

- The timing and criteria for handover; and,
- Specific management problems and an exploration of what steps might be taken to help alleviate these problems.

1. The Timing and Criteria for Handover

The timing and criteria for handover have generated considerable tension in a number of situations, and the desire on the part of some in the international system (and in UNHCR in particular) to seek more technical, quantifiable standards on which to base these decisions.

Part of this tension is probably an inevitable result of the differing roles and perspectives of the key players involved. Donor countries are generally seen as being advocates of an early handover date, with a concern that outside aid not be continued at substantial levels beyond the time period which is necessary to put the settlement on a firm footing. Host country governments are often described as having more of an interest in a later handover date. Their concerns may include insuring that they are not stuck with the bills for inputs which should have been completed before handover, that the recurring costs of the settlement are not going to be a drain on national resources and, on some occasions, a desire to maintain international assistance (including as a source of hard currency) in times of

economic decline. In such situations, UNHCR can find itself caught in the middle, brokering between these two points of view. In those instances in which a Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) is involved, most observers tend to see the NGO as supporting a later date. This may be based in part on concern that the settlement have the best possible chance for success after handover by insuring that all inputs are in place and functioning before handover. According to some, it may also reflect an NGO's desire to continue its own operations in the field.

It is interesting to note that in the instances of handover which we were able to study, the economic self-sufficiency of the refugees themselves did not appear to have been a major factor in determining the timing of handover. In most cases the refugees had attained self-sufficiency several years before the actual handover date. Rather, the focus of discussions primarily concerned the quantity and quality of the infrastructure of the settlement, with the handover date being set to reflect its completion. The readiness of the host government to assume functions previously handled by other entities, including providing government staff for administrative positions and the existence of financial mechanisms to cover the recurring costs, was also a factor.

This analysis does not give one optimism that the creation of more technically-based and value-free criteria for the timing of handover can easily be accomplished, or would be that useful. Disagreements principally relate to basic design questions such as whether the level of inputs to be provided for refugees should

differ from that provided for the average citizen, the sustainability of different types of inputs, the question of whether one can "buffer" a settlement against a post-handover decline by raising the level of input prior to handover, and many others.

One positive step in recent years has been UNHCR's efforts to utilize the PMS system to establish target handover dates and to identify the requisite infrastructure inputs at the time of the creation of the settlement. This can at least set general parameters for these discussions.

2. Management Issues at Handover

a. Lack of Adequate Numbers of Trained Staff at Handover

This is especially likely to be a problem in cases when the implementing agency in the settlement has been an NGO, which is now handing over its functions to an arm of the host country government.

One would naturally expect to see some decline in the efficiency of any operation when many experienced key staff are replaced simultaneously by new personnel. For refugee settlements, this problem is aggravated by instances in which the new personnel themselves are in greater need of training and initial support than those of host government staff in other parts of the government.

Refugee settlements have not always attracted the best quality host country staff. Few host country personnel seek a career in refugee service. A host country which is short of competent administrative talent and technicians for its own overwhelming

development needs will often give low priority to staffing a settlement for foreigners. Further, many settlements are in more remote regions, which may have few amenities. Finally, in some cases, the new staff arrive scant days before, or even after, handover, while the contracts of most expatriates expire soon after handover, if not before.

Suggestions for improving this situation were raised by a number of those consulted during this study. One suggestion was to extend the contract length of key implementing agency employees to allow for their presence in the settlement for some months after handover. This would, of course, require that such persons be able to provide advice and information without seeking to in effect retain their old positions. Another option is the increased use of refugees in mid- and upper-level management positions. Such persons are likely to remain in the area after handover and therefore can provide administrative continuity as well as making it easier for refugees to know of important settlement issues and have a voice in resolving them.

b. Failure to Put Mechanisms in Place Prior to Handover to Cover the Operating Costs of the Settlement

During the pre-handover period, the true recurring costs of running many programs are not always clear. As long as international assistance is continuing, programs may be subsidized in ways that do not become apparent until such assistance is withdrawn.

Recognition of the full extent of these costs often occurs

after handover. The government must then bear the brunt of refugee resentment when it begins to impose taxes, user's fees, etc. due to its lack of funds to maintain these programs.

A related problem can be the lack of a clear understanding between UNHCR and the host country government about how revenues collected by the government from the refugees will be used to benefit the refugees, especially in covering these ongoing costs. In the cases for which we were able to obtain information, refugees in settlements which have been handed over are paying taxes and providing other government income (through such mechanisms as parastatal sale of crops) at a level equivalent to or above that of local citizens. However, in some instances a disproportionate amount of these monies are said to be spent outside of the settlement.

It is reasonable to assume that the government can cover the recurrent costs for those settlement services which it routinely provides to its citizens elsewhere as long as refugees are providing comparable government revenues. For any non-routine service, such as for the use of tractors, it would be helpful if the special funding mechanisms required could be instituted prior to handover. This may ease the jolt which may now occur after handover and allow for sufficient time to work out what level of user's fees for example, are required to cover the true costs. It would be helpful to work through this difficult process while UNHCR, and any NGO operational partners, still have staff in the field to offer technical assistance.

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c. Attaining a Reasonable Life Expectancy for Key Equipment.

A recurring problem in settlements after handover is the early demise of equipment such as water pumps and vehicles. The main source of this problem is the lack of spare parts and of adequate maintenance (although the improper seizure of these assets by local authorities has also been a factor in some cases).

Given the high costs of creating settlements in which these pieces of equipment play a critical role, it may be cost-effective for UNHCR and donors to provide some limited post-handover assistance as a routine measure to address these ads. Suggestions from the field include the ongoing use of an NGO, or some other organization with access to hard currency, to provide spare parts beyond those provided at handover (as well as concern that the handover stock be sizable and appropriate). A second suggestion is the implementation of programs for mechanics training by a skilled mechanic (and possibly post-handover supervision of mechanics in the case of very large settlements).

d. Prevention of the Stripping of Settlement Assets.

Items which can be physically removed from a settlement have been known to present "targets of opportunity" for local officials and powerful citizens after handover. In such cases the refugees themselves are hardly in a position to protest their actions. The withdrawal of outside staff, and the infrequent nature of visits by UNHCR staff which has often been the case post-handover, gives the refugees few channels to register their

complaints.

Clearer contracts regarding the end-use and disposition of these items, arrived at in advance of handover and in detail between UNHCR and the host government, may help to deter these actions, and to allow for stronger central government action to remedy this problem once it has occurred.

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D. ABUSE OF POWER AND REFUGEE PROTECTION AFTER HANDOVER

The handover of a refugee settlement, with all of the pomp and ceremony which may accompany it, is frequently seen by outsiders as a day on which refugees should feel pride at their accomplishments in the country of asylum. Too often, however, this day marks the beginning of a difficult period for the refugees in a number of respects.

Central to these potential difficulties is the fact that international attention to the needs of the refugees markedly diminishes after handover. At the same time, there is no corresponding increase in their rights and status as residents of the country of asylum.

Prior to handover, a settlement's administrative personnel may have included a number of NGO in important positions, as well as the occasional presence of a UNHCR staff person. Some of the better known settlements have also received a stream of outside visitors, both national and international. This has had the effect of increasing the extent to which the management of the settlement has been monitored by outside persons.

After handover, the settlement is often left more or less on its own, with no NGO staff and, in many cases, no active field presence by UNHCR. The net effect is to concentrate tremendous discretionary power in the hands of a few persons, and often to also reduce the numbers of avenues for refugee input into the administrative system. While many persons who come into positions of power in the administration of a settlement perform admirably, in the inevitable cases where such power is abused,

there may be little counterbalance or deterrence to such abuse.

As refugees everywhere are well aware, there is a large gap between the provision of rights on paper and their existence in the field. Effective protection for refugees is more often a function of preventing abuses rather than of punishing the guilty parties after the fact. Unfortunately, this may not be reflected in the structure of some UNHCR Branch Offices. Most of the work of a Protection Officer often concerns cases that come to his or her attention in the capital city. Much less priority may be given to establishing a regular physical presence in the camp or settlement to see that such abuse does not occur in the first place.

A review of some of the problems identified by refugees themselves may give a clearer picture of the kinds of potential abuse which may occur. Arbitrary arrest and the threat of expulsion of the refugees from the area, if not from the country, were noted. Corruption through the requirement of paying sizable sums of money for services which were supposed to be free was often a problem. An especially disturbing abuse was the reported predilection of a particular settlement commander for requiring that young girls sleep with him in order to obtain places in secondary schools. Examples of problems which relate to the lack of citizenship for the refugees and their lack of political clout include the inability of refugee primary school graduates to attain a place in the secondary school system (one settlement hadn't placed a student in a public secondary school in almost 5 years). Another problem noted was the lack of refugee input into how the

monies which they paid in local taxes and other government revenues were to be used.

The danger for the refugees lies in the assumption that "no news is good news" regarding these settlers. Much like in the case of spontaneously settled refugees, there is a tendency to assume that because one hasn't heard of problems, things are probably all right. The reality may simply be that the refugees lack channels for effectively communicating their concerns to authorities outside of their local area.

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E. THE DURABILITY OF INPUTS INTO REFUGEE SETTLEMENTS

1. The Durability of Settlement Infrastructure and Services After Handover

Information about the status of infrastructure and services in settlements after handover is sketchy at best. For those settlements which have not experienced some post-handover catastrophe, visitors with an interest in this question are few and far between.

It might seem reasonable to look at the projects which have been proposed for a number of settlements after handover to learn more about post-handover needs. In reality, one should be very careful about drawing conclusions based on these projects. Refugee assistance programs in general do not do a good job of designing projects based on systematic needs assessments and project feasibility studies. In reviewing recent proposals for assistance to settlements after handover (including a number of ICARA II projects), it was discouraging to note the general absence of systematic project planning. The usual rationale for the lack of planning in refugee situations, "We just didn't have time for it because of the emergency nature of our work," is hardly applicable to settlements which in some cases have been in existence for a decade or more.

Given this lack of information, it may be worthwhile to review the information and impressions gathered through field visits to sites in Burundi, Rwanda, and Tanzania, and a review of the existing literature undertaken as part of this study.

Vehicles, tractors, and other machinery which require fuel, maintenance, and spare parts were observed to have relatively short life expectancies. Lack of trained mechanics, of hard currency, and of mechanisms for obtaining fuel and spare parts, all contribute to this problem, as can an attitude of inattentiveness to the maintenance of public property. As noted earlier, there have also been instances in which vehicles and other inputs have been removed from the settlement after handover, or appropriated for personal use. Taken together, these factors indicate that those settlements whose future depends heavily on mechanized farming, or on maintenance of roads through the use of heavy machinery, are likely to have serious problems which may require renewed aid.

Systems based on the use of diesel or petrol water pumps face similar problems. It is rare to find examples of drinking water systems using such pumps which are still functioning long after handover. In many instances the refugees have reverted to taking their drinking water from local streams, with all of the predictable health problems.

Serious problems are also experienced with the durability of those innovative programs undertaken before handover which are not part of the standard set of services provided by the host government. Literacy programs, women's groups, day-care centers, and agricultural field research and extension services seem to have markedly declined or ended soon after handover. In a number of cases, refugees reported that many of these programs were desirable and had been effective when in operation, but simply could not be sustained after handover, primarily because of lack

of staff. Many felt that such programs were less critical once the settlement was on its feet than in its early years. Day-care programs are a good example of this kind of program. Most women interviewed in settlements which had had such programs in the pre-handover phase felt that they were of great help in the first few years when land clearing and preparation were difficult for women (who often out-number men in the settlements) to undertake, but were less needed later. The idea that such innovative programs would be carried on by the refugees on a self-help basis seems to have been unrealistic in most cases.

Refugee health care often receives what some have argued is an inordinate amount of attention in the early years after the refugees arrive. This may partly reflect the tendency of those from Western countries to over-emphasize the extent to which health care is a problem for refugees, based on repeated over-exposure to fund-raising activities utilizing images of helpless refugees. Part may also be due to the lack of experience which many Western medical staff have with the realities and limitations of medical care in the Third World. In defense of setting standards for refugee health care which are above that of the host country, it might be argued that refugees initially have unusually extensive health problems, and that the provision of such health care may be reassuring to them in a new setting. It is clear is that the level of health care provided to refugees is often a major source of resentment towards refugees on the part of local citizens (albeit much ameliorated when such citizens are included as recipients of the services themselves).

The experience of settlements post-handover indicates that settlement health care facilities are limited by the same problems which confront the host country in general. Drugs and equipment are in short supply, as are trained, experienced staff. Regarding staffing, there are instances where the training of refugee health workers before handover has eased this problem incrementally. The increased emphasis by UNHCR in recent years on training refugee primary health care workers may help improve this situation in the more recent settlements. Another possibility which was raised in field interviews is that the staffing levels of health facilities in settlements may be raised by the construction of more durable buildings, and in greater numbers per capita, than may be the case country-wide. The explanation given is that host governments often distribute their available staff into the existing physical facilities. The field visits and interviews did consistently report that host countries were staffing refugee health facilities at a level comparable to those in other parts of the country.

Primary education for refugees is rarely controversial. Generally this is an area where the host country government is heavily involved prior to handover, and any subsequent declines appear to be mostly related to wear and tear on buildings, and to country-wide problems of lack of furniture, books, and other teaching materials. As with health care staff, host country governments generally appear to be providing teachers in numbers, and of a quality comparable to elsewhere in the country.

More problematic is the question of post-primary education. This is an area which consumes a major portion of UNHCR's yearly

expenditures in many longer-term refugee situations. Scholarships to secondary schools, and even the heavy subsidization of a college which caters extensively to the needs of refugees in one instance (College St. Albert in Burundi), are highly visible inputs. Such assistance has been criticized by some as being too academically oriented, rather than focusing more on technical skills. The concern is that this perceived academic focus may add to the widespread problem in many developing countries of unemployed persons who insist on white-collar positions while the country suffers from a lack of skilled labor such as trained mechanics. Some have also noted a lack of attention to the compiling of data required in order to measure the proportion of refugees who are receiving post-primary assistance in comparison to this ratio for the overall host country population. One result is that it may be difficult to refute accusations of favoritism towards refugees.

Whatever its other merits, one may question the value of post-primary education for the settlements themselves. Information collected in post-handover settlements indicated that very few refugee secondary school students, and virtually none of the college students, ever returned to the settlement.

Transportation is a key problem for many refugee settlements. As settlements must be placed on available land, which normally means in the less populated areas of a country, they can be poorly situated in terms of existing transportation systems. This can be a problem not only in terms of the isolation which refugees may feel, but also in terms of their ability to market

their crops and obtain key inputs, such as fertilizer. The maintenance of roads and of settlement vehicles declined in most cases after handover. However, in instances when the refugees have had a substantial amount of a desirable commodity to market, and the transportation obstacles have not been overwhelming, their ingenuity and energy have often solved the problem to some extent.

One observation from the site visits is that refugees in the main work hard and show initiative for activities which they can see will be of direct benefit to them or their families, or in some cases, to some larger aggregate for which they have a close affinity (such as other refugees who have come from the same village back in the home country). Individual land holdings are worked intensively, and entrepreneurial spirit is much in evidence. What is not evidenced is much enthusiasm for "self-help" programs that are actually the creation of those in the assistance and/or government system. These often appear to the refugees as efforts to coerce free labor for projects that they had little voice in creating.

A key conclusion of these site visits is that host country governments in general have been meeting the staffing and supply needs of the various services provided in settlements at a level comparable to elsewhere in rural sections of the country. What they have not done as extensively is to assist in the repair and maintenance of settlement infrastructures. It is important to note that this tentative conclusion is based mainly on the experience of post-handover settlements in Tanzania, Rwanda, and Burundi - countries which have had especially good records in

terms of accepting refugees. The conclusion regarding staffing and supplies might be less optimistic if there were more information available regarding post-handover settlements in places such as Uganda and Zaire where refugees have experienced major integration problems.

2. The Implications of Post-Handover Decline for Pre-Handover Assistance

What are the implications of the preceding information for considerations of the quantity and type of inputs that should be provided to a settlement before handover?

One suggestion is that the importance of various inputs may change as the settlement ages. The examples in our study suggest that services such as education, health, and safe water supplies are very important in the early years of a settlement. Refugees are initially ambivalent about a settlement, often with dreams of returning home. Education holds a high value for many of them, and may help persuade them to remain in the settlement. Health facilities may be especially necessary to restore a debilitated exile community to a productive level. Agricultural services and extension can help convert non-farmers into cultivators and assist experienced farmers to adapt to new crops, climate, and conditions. However, with the passage of time, the decline or absence of these services becomes more tolerable because they have already performed a large part of their function.

The reaction of the refugees to the decline of certain services and facilities also appears to change over time. Ini-

tially, with clear memories of better services, the refugees are dissatisfied by the decline. After some years this view seems to moderate. Most refugees interviewed in the course of this study now compare their situation to that of the host country citizens and appear in most cases to find it satisfactory.

The impact of the kinds of post-handover declines described earlier appears to have a minimal effect on the economic self-sufficiency of a settlement. A tentative hypothesis for why this may be so is that the majority of expenditures for inputs before handover may often go for items that are only very indirectly related to the attainment of economic self-sufficiency, if at all. A preliminary review of the pattern of expenditures for settlements in eastern Sudan, for example, concluded that administrative costs and expenditures for infrastructure such as education and health services far out-weighed spending for agriculture, income-generating activities, and other programs targeted on economic self-sufficiency. Most of those interviewed in the course of this study, including many UNHCR, host country government, and implementing agency staff, felt that this might be true regarding the majority of refugee settlements. However, it would be necessary to compile information now in pieces in various locations (mainly within departments of UNHCR) in order to make a more firm conclusion.

The standards for inputs for refugee settlements appear to have changed somewhat over time, with a tendency towards becoming more complex and costly. The frequently stated maxim that "the level of refugee assistance should not exceed that available to the local host population" has often been changed in more recent

settlements to read "not greatly exceed".

A number of observers noted what they feel is a reversal of the position of many host governments on this point. The tendency in earlier years had been to restrict inputs in order to avoid resentment of the refugees and to insure that the government would be able to operate the infrastructure with the resources that were likely to be available to it. More recently, a number of governments have sought to raise these levels significantly.

Part of the reason may be the desire of the host government to assist the local population via international refugee assistance. Host governments have become more aware of the possible spill-over affects of the general operating principle of UNHCR that services for the refugees should be made available to the local population as well. One result is that they may now advocate a level which is perceived by the local population as a step up for its own services. It is also thought that refugee settlements may bring in new resources beyond those normally available to the government which may help accelerate the development process in the area around the settlement.

In some places, refugee settlements have become showplaces for the government. Government development plans may set target standards that are simply out of the realm of possibility for most of the country, especially in these times of economic downturn for most of sub-Saharan Africa. Refugee programs often do not have the same limitations on funding which development programs do, and may therefore end up being held to these higher standards in spite of their being in existence almost nowhere

else in the country.

An argument frequently advanced in support of higher levels is what might be called the "buffer theory." According to this viewpoint, it is necessary to pitch the level of inputs prior to handover artificially high (relative to those of the host country in general) not only to help the refugees get off to a good start in the early years, but also to cushion the settlement against too precipitous a decline after handover. The thought is that the buffer may:

- 1) slow the process of post-handover decline, and
- 2) elevate the level at which a settlement eventually stabilizes after any post-handover decline.

It is very difficult to evaluate the first point. It would seem that the construction of durable buildings, roads, etc. does lengthen the time before repairs are needed. Other inputs which require more continuous attention for their existence, such as special programs, decline quickly enough that it is hard to see that buffering has bought any additional time.

The second point raised in support of buffering reflects a concern that unless pre-handover levels are raised, the declines which take place after handover will end up dropping the level of the settlement's services and infrastructure below that of the local population.

Most refugee settlements which we were able to study seem to have stabilized in economic terms at a point equal to, or often above that of the local population. It is not clear that buffering is the primary reason for this, among the many that might be suggested. As noted earlier, it may well be the case that the

kinds of inputs which go into a settlement before handover, and which therefore constitute the major portion of this "buffer", are not in the main targeted on economic self-sufficiency. Their importance may be greater in terms of giving the refugees a sense of community and in generating enthusiasm for remaining in the settlement than in making the settlement economically more viable. Economic viability may in fact be more determined by the energy and commitment of the refugees, by site selection, and by key policy decisions about such things as land ownership and plot size than by inputs such as schools and health posts, as long as these are provided at some minimal level.

An argument raised against buffering is that it may itself be the major factor in the creation of a post-handover decline through setting pre-handover levels at a point where decline is inevitable. Refugees may then suffer some psychologic and material pain as inputs decline to the same point that they would inevitably have reached anyway, given the limitations of the host country.

While the effort required to resolve these arguments concerning "buffering" was beyond the limits of this study, it is certainly worthy of further research and is likely to remain a subject of considerable controversy.

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CHAPTER III: DISCUSSION

A. ORGANIZED REFUGEE SETTLEMENTS: DURABLE SOLUTION OR EXTENDED ASYLUM?

Local integration of the refugees into the host country is often discussed today as the most viable durable solution for refugees in Africa. Organized refugee settlements have received considerable attention and funding as a mechanism for attaining such a durable solution. Unfortunately, the history of African refugee settlements does not support the view that most settlements have either attained a durable solution, or are on the way to doing so. For both the more recent settlements as well as for the older ones, the view of handover and phase-out that developed in the 1960's and early 1970's -- UNHCR withdraws, the host country assumes responsibility, and a durable solution is achieved -- has not held true. We would conclude that organized refugee settlements are more accurately viewed as variations of extended asylum than as a mechanism for attaining a durable solution.

Most of the more recent African refugee settlements are viewed as "temporary" even when the prospect of voluntary repatriation is dim or nil and the refugees have had sanctuary for a decade or more. Social and political integration is rejected by the host government, which offers only temporary asylum and insists that the refugees will eventually return home. This means that even after the passage of decades, the refugees and their children remain aliens, and are still viewed as charges of the international community by the host country government.

The clearest cases of such temporary settlements are found in the Sudan. The Sudan has the largest number of refugee settlements in the world, approximately 65 in 1984. It also accounts for over two-thirds of the African settlements that are functioning but which are not yet self-sufficient. Not only does the Sudanese government view the refugees as temporary settlers--despite the fact that some arrived as early as the 1960's--but it has also chosen settlement sites known to have poor prospects for self-sufficiency.

For the older refugee settlements, there is evidence that while many have made significant progress towards a durable solution, they cannot be said to have attained it fully, in spite of all of the time, effort, and expense that has been involved. One indication is the renewed aid which over two-thirds of them received after handover. While our conclusion is that this aid does not reflect any crisis in the economic viability of the settlements concerned (with the exception of Qala en Nahal in the Sudan), it does indicate that the transfer of responsibility for the settlement from UNHCR to the host country government has been less than complete.

It is in the area of political and legal integration where these older settlements have most fallen short of a durable solution. One interesting finding of the review of these settlements in their pre-handover years was how often different settlements faced serious setbacks, or in some cases were actually abandoned, due to friction with the local population and government. Perhaps it should not be surprising then that integration

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remains a problem for them today.

While such integration is difficult to measure, a key indicator is the offering of citizenship to the refugees. Our review indicates that this is happening only in very exceptional cases. Even in the most widely cited case of successful integration, that of Tanzania, the field visit noted that only a very small percentage of the refugees from Rwanda have actually received citizenship, and virtually none of those from Burundi. This was surprising to many persons even within Tanzania, as the central government's public offer of citizenship to these refugees several years ago received wide publicity. In fact, the reality that this decision had not been effectively implemented in the field caught even UNHCR by surprise, and was only discovered as a result of the threatened expulsion by the Tanzanian government of refugees who had arrived from Uganda in 1982. When UNHCR staff interviewed those persons whom the local officials had rounded up, they discovered very few recent arrivals. Rather, the great majority were refugees from the 1960's or even earlier who had never received their citizenship papers, in spite of repeated attempts to do so. Whether UNHCR efforts to remedy this problem in 1985 will be successful remains to be seen.

Elsewhere in Africa, Botswana has granted citizenship to a portion of the small number of refugees in its country, and a limited number of Tutsi refugees in Burundi received citizenship some years ago (although the Burundi government soon closed this door and has shown little desire to reopen it in the foreseeable future). These few cases represent a small fraction of the refugees in African settlements.

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In order to know the full significance of this lack of citizenship for refugee settlers one would have to undertake a more complete study of the situation in each of the host countries in question than was possible in this study (which has focussed on questions regarding the attainment of self-sufficiency). It is clear that a major basis for the calls for renewed post-handover aid is based on the fact that the settlers remain refugees. However, more study needs to be given to problems which surfaced in the course of this study such as the apparent lack of refugee input into how their taxes, etc. are spent, their ability to hold local office or even vote for positions such as village chairman, possible restrictions on travel or trade, limitations on the number of refugees which can be employed in particular types of work (or even by refugee assistance agencies) and their vulnerability to being pushed out of the country (as happened to some Rwandese refugees in Uganda in 1982).

One concern raised by a number of persons interviewed in the course of this study is that by providing post-handover assistance, UNHCR may in fact be discouraging a durable solution. The message may be that international aid can be provided as long as citizenship has not been granted. Whether one agrees with this position or not, it would be useful for there to be more clarity about what kind of post-handover needs UNHCR would, and would not be willing to address on principle (as we have attempted to do in the following section of this chapter). A priority concern would be to try to identify the kinds of

assistance programs and policies which could contribute to, rather than discouraging, attaining a true durable solution.

Unfortunately, it is likely that integration problems will increase, not decrease, in sub-Saharan Africa in the foreseeable future, and thus make prospects for reaching a durable solution poorer. Two key factors are likely to be the poor economic situation of most of these countries, and increased pressure on the remaining uncultivated land resulting from population explosions.

The economic crisis faced by most sub-Saharan countries, while clearly aggravated by drought in many cases, has deep roots, and there are few economists who are willing to predict a general upturn for at least a decade or more. Simply put, a decreasing pie is likely to make the prospect of sharing some with a newcomer particularly unattractive.

Africa is also experiencing tremendous population increases which show no signs of slowing in the foreseeable future. This in turn is cutting dramatically into the amount of uncultivated arable land. As such land becomes scarcer, the burden which refugee settlements represent for host countries will markedly increase and integration and acceptance of refugees in such circumstances will become more difficult. UNHCR can obviously do little about the decrease of available arable land. However, it does need to give more conscious attention now, while time is available, to the study of how refugees can be "wedged in" in the likely future scenarios in which it will not be possible to find large amounts of contiguous available land for settlements.

Viewing organized refugee settlements as variations of

extended asylum rather than as a mechanism for attaining a durable solution is certainly not an encouraging state of affairs for the international system, with its implications for ongoing aid. However, the unrealistically optimistic assumption that a durable solution has been reached for refugee settlers ignores the very real problems which these refugees face.

B. ISSUES REGARDING POST-HANDOVER AID

Introduction

As noted in Chapter I, handover ideally was meant to signify, among other things, that the host government was accepting responsibility for the economic and material needs of the refugees, making further outside assistance unnecessary. The reality of the experiences to date with refugee settlements is considerably more complex.

First of all, only 10 of the 30 settlements established prior to 1982 which have been declared self-sufficient at one time or another have actually been formally handed over by UNHCR to the host government. Most have been handed over informally, and often piecemeal. One result has been a certain lack of clarity in many cases as to what are the respective post-handover responsibilities of UNHCR and the host government (1).

Secondly, (as shown in Table V), at least 21 of these 30

(1) This formal handover procedure may occur in a higher percentage of settlements in the future as a result of the institution of the Project Management System (see Chapter II). However, PMS may also increase the amount of friction between UNHCR, donors, and host country governments as issues which previously could be quietly negotiated, or ignored, may become subjects for official discussions.

TABLE V

I - No Renewed Aid.

Etscha, Botswana	1,800
Moulard, Djibouti	90
Rajaf, Sudan	5,000
Karagwe, Tanzania	2,500
Muyenzi, Tanzania	5,000
Mwezi, Tanzania	3,000
Kanyama, Zaire	750
Mutambala, Zaire	1,700
Mayukwayukwa, Zambia	1,400

II - Minor Renewed Aid to Provide New Facilities or Repair Old Ones.

Mutara, Rwanda	3,100
Pangale, Tanzania	5,000
Bibwe, Zaire	3,000
Ihula, Zaire	1,190
Kalonge, Zaire	700
Meheba, Zambia	11,000

III - Major Renewed Aid to Improve or Maintain Economic Viability.

Muramba, Burundi	9,800
Kayongazi, Burundi	5,300
Kigamba, Burundi	11,727
Mugera, Burundi	18,692
Qala en Nahel, Sudan	30,000
Ulyankulu, Tanzania	26,000
Katumba, Tanzania	74,000
Cataractes, Zaire	100,000

IV - Substantial Aid to Restore Settlement to Full Functioning.

Oruchinga, Uganda
Nakivale, Uganda
Kahunge, Uganda
Ibuga, Uganda
Rwanwanja, Uganda
Kyaka, Uganda
Kyangwali, Uganda

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settlements have subsequently received renewed aid (2).

In many cases, renewed post-handover aid is of a relatively minor scale, and is not requested for a long time (over a decade after handover in some cases). Much of this renewed aid in Category II is for the repairs and upkeep that are needed in a community as it ages. The intention of handover is that such expenses ought to become the responsibility of the host society. Our attention is drawn to the renewed aid not so much by the nature of the assistance, but by who is paying the bills. If they were paid by the host out of taxes and fees the settlement would be judged to have lasting self-sufficiency. If paid by the international community, we ought not proceed to a judgement of lapsed self-sufficiency.

This category also includes relatively minor aid in order to add facilities such as health posts which were not originally part of the settlements but which are now commonly found in other refugee settlements.

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- (2) We have not been able to find evidence of renewed aid to nine settlements, but would not rule out the possibility that some minor aid may have been provided to one or another of them at some time in the past.

It is worth noting that virtually all of the largest settlements over 10,000 refugees, are included in category III, settlements needing major assistance to improve or maintain economic viability. The reasons for this grouping are not clear. One might suggest that large settlements are too complex to administer and sustain. However, discussions with those familiar settlements and field visits to a number of them indicated that they are not doing badly. It may therefore just be that size attracts attention and viability missions -- the squeaky wheel gets the grease -- and that these settlements are too large to ignore or to let deteriorate.

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More controversial are those instances in which renewed aid is given for reasons related to the design and functioning of the settlement itself. For the eight settlements receiving substantial post-handover aid aimed at improving or maintaining their economic viability (Category III), the aid might be seen as substantial enough to call into question the self-sufficiency of the settlements themselves.

The aid for the seven Rwandese settlements in Uganda (Category IV) has not been required due to any failure of planning, implementation or maintenance. Rather, it is due to external factors. These settlements first were severely damaged in the 1979 Tanzanian invasion, and then fell prey to the violence carried out against the Banyarwanda people of southwest Uganda with the alleged active support of government officials. Major assistance has been required to repair damage to these settlements, and to take care of the new influx of Banyarwanda people into them. Many of these new residents are refugees formerly spontaneously settled outside of the official settlements.

In some cases, renewed aid has less to do with the state of affairs in the settlement than it does with other factors--the poor conditions of the host economy, or its attitudes towards integrating refugees, or its relationship with UNHCR and international donors.

For example, in 1982 in Burundi, a program costing \$773,000 for a variety of projects -- cooperatives, workshops, vocational training centers, school repairs, and water pipes -- was begun for four settlements containing an estimated 45,000 refugees. The impression obtained during field visits to Burundi was that

these settlements had been successful for many years in economic terms, but were experiencing resentment by nationals. Many higher status persons especially were said to resent the Rwandese refugees as competitors for the better positions in the country. This resentment, which is said to be an important factor in the ending of the earlier offer of citizenship to the refugees, may explain why the government is seeking renewed external aid as much as any compelling problems within the settlements.

1. Renewed Aid and the Transfer of Responsibility for the Refugees.

Most post-handover assistance to refugee settlements comes from either UNHCR or the host government, with the main exception being some forms of bilateral aid (as may occur for many projects which are funded through the ICARA II process). All concerned would agree that handover marks an important point in the transfer of responsibility for the refugees from the international system to the host country government. An important indication of how extensive this transfer has been can be seen by looking at what types of post-handover aid the host government is providing versus those provided by the international system.

Post-handover assistance can be one of six types. We have arranged these types below in order, beginning with the ones for which we feel UNHCR (and the international donor countries) should be most responsible, to those for which they should be least responsible:

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Who is Responsible for What Form of Post-Handover Aid?

Greatest Responsibility of UNHCR and the International Community

1. Assistance to a settlement which has been severely damaged by a man-made or natural disaster.
2. Assistance to improve the economic viability of a settlement.
3. Development-oriented assistance to the settlement region which is meant to alleviate the burden which refugees represent for the host country.
4. Installation of inputs which originally were not put in the settlement but which are found in other settlements.
5. Assistance to deal with population growth in the settlement.
6. Repairs and maintenance to the settlement.

Least Responsibility of UNHCR and the International Community

As with most orderings, this list is more useful as a discussion tool than as a perfect ordering of priorities. We feel more certain at its extremes and expect disagreement regarding the middle rankings.

For the first category, disasters, there is little disagreement. It is widely assumed that UNHCR and the international assistance system will cover most of the costs of settlements which have faced problems such as those that have come under attack in Uganda and those suffering from drought in the Sudan, as long as the settlers remain refugees and have not been offered citizenship. This would also apply to situations in which a new influx into a settlement takes place (as opposed to a natural population increase) which would necessitate aid for the needs of this new group.

At the other end of the continuum, it is our conclusion that

repairs and operating costs of a settlement ought to be assumed by the host government in all but the most exceptional cases. Generally, if international assistance is needed it ought to be requested through the regular development assistance channels rather than by tapping the refugee assistance pipeline.

As noted earlier, while most settlements experience some decline in services and infrastructure after handover, this decline appears to stabilize at a point which is consistent with levels in the rest of the host's rural areas. Government inputs for recurrent costs and maintenance and repairs comparable to the rest of the country may not maintain inputs at pre-handover levels, but it is not the goal of the international system to maintain some favoritism towards the refugees. In fact, the newness of the infrastructure generally does provide a post-handover time period of reduced costs for maintenance and repairs.

It is assumed that the government should provide services to refugee settlements comparable to services provided elsewhere as long as they are receiving tax and fee revenues from refugees comparable to those received from local citizens (as appeared to be the case in the countries visited during this study). However, more attention may need to be given to insuring that the financial inputs of the refugees are recognized, that a fair share of these funds are applied to their needs, and that the settlements are integrated into the regular budgeting and administrative processes of the host country.

It should also be noted that in terms of the use of local services and facilities, it was more often the case that local citizens were using facilities provided because of the arrival of

the refugees than the reverse situation of large numbers of refugees using pre-existing local facilities. (Spontaneously settled refugees, however, are more likely to place a burden on local facilities.) Where this was not true was in instances in which refugees utilized facilities outside of the immediate settlement area, such as roads, regional hospitals, and secondary schools. These kinds of usages are discussed later when we deal with Category 3, development-oriented assistance.

Assistance to deal with population growth in a settlement after handover, Category 5 above, is very similar in nature to providing repairs and maintenance to a settlement. Population growth is as normal and constant as leaking pipes or broken furniture. If the international community has an obligation to repeatedly return to a settlement to expand its facilities because of a growing population, the obligation would be endless. As the host government provides for its own expanding population, it ought to provide comparable facilities for the refugee settlements. One might soften this view somewhat by noting that refugee settlements are not always demographically configured along normal lines. Settlements often have a disproportionately young population with a high reproductive potential. One-time assistance to address this anomaly -- family planning programs, expanded social facilities, etc. -- thus might be appropriate.

Category 4 is for inputs which were not originally part of a settlement when it was established, but which are now commonly found in more recent settlements. The primary example of this is the provision of schools and dispensaries for three of the oldest

settlements in Zaire. The reasoning here is that if such inputs can be provided to refugees in one settlement, isn't it fair to provide them for earlier ones as well? This would in fact seem reasonable, as long as the provision of the inputs is limited by the ideas of the Basic Needs Approach. It is not a goal of refugee assistance to have identical facilities in all settlements. Refugee assistance should be country specific, aimed at bringing the refugees to the level of the nearby local communities. However, this relative standard is modified somewhat by the idea of certain basic needs that ought to be met in an absolute sense. It is our view that it is appropriate to return to a settlement to provide additional inputs that satisfy minimum standards of basic needs, but not to provide facilities simply because they are found in other settlements.

Category 3 refers to development-oriented assistance to the region in which the settlement exists. Such aid is meant to alleviate the burden which refugees represent for the host country, and is a subject that has received a great deal of attention recently in the context of the Second International Conference on Assistance to Refugees in Africa (ICARA II). African host countries viewed the ICARA II process as an expression of their concern that donor countries and UNHCR were not sufficiently aware of the burden which refugees represent for their countries. They articulated the need for more of this burden to be borne by the international community, rather than by the host countries, which are generally among the least economically developed countries in the world. The kinds of burdens which refugees might

represent for host countries may be divided into four categories:

1. Impacts on the environment.

This may involve overgrazing or the stripping of vegetation for the fuelwood or construction needs of the refugees, as well as competition with local residents for other limited resources such as drinking water and agricultural land.

2. Impacts on the economy.

Refugees may markedly affect the local economy for example through altering the local wage structure. This may result in bonanzas for wealthy land owners who see wages fall, and hardship for poor local residents who cannot compete for wage labor with refugees who are already receiving free food rations and can therefore accept lower wages. International assistance of the scale involved in major refugee situations may also have profound effects on the national economy.

3. Strain on the host government infrastructure.

This may occur locally as refugees use pre-existing health posts, schools, etc. as well as through the drain on the limited number of trained government officials and staff persons. On the national level this can include additional strains on roads, ports, etc.

4. Issues regarding political and social integration.

Refugees can represent serious problems for a host country government not only in terms of its dealing with the country of origin of the refugees, but also for matters such as its internal balance of relation-

ships between ethnic groups. On the local level refugees can become embroiled in friction between groups in a fashion that may hurt their long-term changes for integration and may exacerbate pre-existing local problems.

When examining the burdens described above it is necessary to make a distinction between the burdens caused by refugees in settlements and camps versus those caused by spontaneously settled refugees. International assistance is mainly directed towards official camps and settlements, with little assistance provided to help a host country deal with problems created by spontaneously settled refugees. However, our concern here is only with refugees in official settlements.

It is our conclusion that refugees do create burden for the host country during the early years of an influx and during the creation of a settlement. This burden becomes less in the later years of a settlement's existence, and in many cases, post-handover settlements may represent a positive impact on balance for their areas.

Post-handover settlements do not seem to represent a serious environmental burden. Competition with the local population for natural resources was not a problem for most of the 30 settlements, as they were set up in relatively sparsely populated areas. This is likely to change in the future as the rapidly expanding populations of most sub-Saharan African countries makes the availability of such sites rarer. Already this can be seen in places such as Rwanda. Here, refugees from Burundi were well settled in the 1970's, but recent refugees from Uganda face a

foreseeable future in refugee camps where little agricultural activity is possible. This is due in part to the fact that there is now virtually no decent agricultural land left unclaimed in the country.

Most of the settlements by the time they reach the point of handover have attained a state of reasonable equilibrium with the local ecosystem. The exceptions are those in which plot sizes are inadequate. This can lead to burning out of soils, stripping of vegetation for fuelwood in ever-widening zones around the settlement, and the need for the settlement to expand its borders to handle population growth, thus potentially coming into conflict with local residents over limited environmental resources.

The impact of refugees in post-handover settlements on the host country economy appears on balance to be positive. The major economic dislocations which refugees can cause tend to occur mostly in the early years after their arrival. Settlements seem to integrate into the host economy fairly quickly, especially when contrasted with the slower pace of political and social integration.

There is not much evidence of a refugee burden on government infrastructure after handover. Refugee settlements appear to be receiving no more than their fair share of government resources in most cases, and seem to be providing revenues for the host country government at a rate equal to or above the norm for citizens in their areas.

The final possible type of burden, that of integrating the refugees politically and socially, is the most problematic, as

discussed in the preceding section.

It is difficult to determine what kind of changes in assistance could help to improve social and political integration. The need to avoid stirring up resentment against the refugees by keeping the level of services available to the refugees comparable to that which exists in the host country, and to include local citizens as well, has been part of assistance policy for some time. In those cases in which the refugees are not living in an area populated almost exclusively by their ethnic kin, one can find the same kinds of problems of xenophobia that exist elsewhere in the world. How assistance can help overcome such problems, as opposed to what steps are necessary to see that it is not exacerbated, is hard to determine. Lacking such clarity, UNHCR can be in the uncomfortable position of appearing to buy acceptance of the refugees through providing extra benefits to host country citizens which can only occur as long as the refugees are allowed to remain.

Lastly, renewed assistance to improve the economic viability of a settlement, Category 2 above, generally ought to be provided by UNHCR, but with caution. Economic viability is the heart of a settlement, and there may be little choice if one must choose between threatened hardship or even abandonment versus continued existence. Of course the choices may not be so extreme, and the aid may only be labelled "preventive assistance." However, under most circumstances, it will be difficult to neglect a settlement's economic viability. Renewed aid may be given 1) because of built-in weaknesses in the original planning or implementation of the settlement or 2) due to changing national conditions or

policies in the host country.

Built-in weaknesses in the original planning or implementation may arise because insufficient attention was paid to the social, institutional, and economic background of the refugee group (e.g. trying to change cattle-raisers or city-dwellers into farmers), or to the physical or economic environment of the settlement, or because the initial insertion of inputs, facilities, and services was faulty or otherwise did not take root. If there were flaws in the original provision of international assistance, then there is an obligation to renew aid and set things right.

A more difficult situation exists when the decline in economic viability is due to changing national conditions or policies in the host country. In many parts of Africa, national economic conditions have declined severely due to a combination of ill-advised national policies, natural calamities, and endemic turmoil (World Bank, 1981). Such a general decline will often include refugee settlements. Another situation exists when specific national policies have an adverse impact on settlements.

[In Tanzania] in the early seventies well-functioning rural cooperatives were abandoned in favour of regional trading parastatals in accordance with government policy. These organizations, however, proved less capable than expected of assuming the roles of the former cooperatives (and, in the opinion of many observers, actually hindered rural economic growth). (UNHCR, 1984d)

In either case, one is dealing with soundly conceived projects that are endangered by host government actions or omissions. Here there is a danger that renewed international aid will not only encourage perpetual dependence but will signal national

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authorities that they are not accountable for mistakes. However, this danger is offset by the fact that while some refugees may have contributed to the problems, the majority had nothing to do with bringing about the situation. The dilemma is that while renewed aid may send the wrong signal, it would be cruel to deny further assistance in such circumstances. It is likely that no general rules can be generated to deal with such cases and that the decision on renewed aid will be dependent on the attitude of the host government, the international community's leverage with the host government, the size of the settlement in jeopardy, and the magnitude of the settlement's problems.

2. Economic Crisis and New Attitudes Towards Refugees and Assistance

One limitation of the preceding analysis of who should provide what forms of post-handover assistance is that it does not take into consideration the troubled economic, and sometimes political conditions of most host countries. "Zaire has experienced an economic crisis of greater magnitude than that in most developing countries." Tanzania's "positive approach" to refugees has been hindered by an "economic crisis, which [has] resulted in a real decline of GDP." "The Sudanese economic situation has been aggravated over the past several years...little real growth over the past five years." "Burundi is one of the least developed among the developing countries." (UN, 1984b) Besides poverty and economic decline, aggravated by drought and famine in most host countries, two of them, Uganda and the Sudan, have also had recent changes of government by coup.

Under such difficult economic and political circumstances, the host country suffers shortages of trained staff, has difficulties importing spare parts, fuel, fertilizer, etc., and roads, facilities, and other infrastructure are not repaired or maintained. As the entire country suffers under conditions of scarcity, the refugee settlements will not have a strong position regarding the allocation of national resources. However good the host government's intentions may be, it may be beyond its means to assume settlement recurrent costs or to maintain facilities. Indeed, the settlement residents may be more fortunate than their neighbors in having a special relationship to international resources.

There is considerable difference between the 1960's and the 1980's in terms of host government attitudes towards both asylum issues as well as international assistance. All of the host governments then were new and inexperienced; indeed, several received their first influxes of refugees before their own independence. But now yesterday's mood of economic optimism has been replaced with a chronic crisis. An underpopulated, land-rich continent is now subject to population and land pressures. Traditional hospitality and solidarity with refugees from independence struggles is weaker, but still impressive, as hospitality is strained by open-ended flows of refugees from now-independent states. Although the first influx of refugees may be well received, concerns about costs and the welfare of host country nationals arise as the fifth and sixth waves appear. Further, in the 1970's, African host countries witnessed the great leap in

refugee assistance expenditures made on behalf of Asian refugees. At Arusha in 1978 (the Pan-African Conference on the Situation of Refugees in Africa) and at ICARA I and II, African host countries pressed for more burden-sharing. This reflects a decreased willingness to shoulder post-handover costs and an increased reliance on the international community.

The danger is that separate accounting for refugees does not foster eventual integration and a durable solution, but rather a view that they are still foreigners.

C. REFUGEE AID AND DEVELOPMENT

A major conclusion of the international meetings convened regarding refugee aid and development, and of the two International Conferences on Assistance to Refugees in Africa (ICARA I and II), was that refugee assistance itself should be more development oriented. In particular, it was suggested that refugee assistance should help promote the development of the area where refugees live.

In considering whether refugee assistance itself provided development benefits for the host population near the older settlements, it is important to remember that most of these settlements were created with the objective of having the refugees attain the level of development of the local population, not a higher one. Thus, while a settlement's services and facilities might have made the area more attractive, they necessarily had a limited effect on raising the overall development level of the area. Some of the more recent settlements which do seek to reach standards somewhat above that of the local population, may

have a stronger effect. The large settlements in Tanzania of Ulyankulu, Katumba, and Mishamo certainly bear watching in the future to see if they will be "islands of development", or whether they will be able to elevate the development of their local areas as well.

A number of settlements were set up with the conscious intention of opening up relatively unpopulated areas for further development. This was especially true for the settlements in Zambia and Tanzania of Meheba, Ulyankulu, Katumba, Mishamo, and Mwezi. The high productivity of most of these settlements has produced considerable additional crops for sale outside of the settlements and thus has promoted the overall development of the area. However, while the settlements are doing well economically, they have not attracted significant numbers of host country residents to these areas, or significant amounts of new international development assistance (as opposed to aid from refugee assistance sources). Local residents have benefitted from access to the settlement facilities, but the relative remoteness of these sites has meant that such residents are few in numbers.

In Rwanda and Burundi, countries which have very high population densities, the refugee settlements were placed in less populated areas (by local standards) that had not been intensively cultivated beforehand. The refugee settlements were soon followed by influxes of nationals to the area, which was especially heavy in Rwanda. It is doubtful that population pressures would have left the lands so underpopulated for much longer, regardless of whether or not refugee settlements were created.

However, as many of the facilities which were originally placed in the area for the refugees have been utilized by the new host country settlers as well, refugee assistance may have been a factor in facilitating and accelerating the further development of the area.

The clearest case of nationals benefiting from a settlement to date would be Qala en Nahal in the Sudan. The local residents are generally described as having been destitute and unproductive before Qala en Nahal's establishment, and have benefited enormously from the settlement and its infrastructure. The local population, constitute only about 10 percent of the total settlement population but have about half of its cultivated area. They also control almost all of the surrounding pastures, have been favored by local authorities in the allocation of resources, and are producing more than three times the profits of the best refugee farms. In Qala en Nahal's case, however, the refugees have achieved only a precarious self-sufficiency.

A number of the older settlements were involved in what were called zonal development plans, notably in Zaire and Burundi. These had very uneven results. Most of the problems encountered seemed to relate to difficulties in managing these complex programs, especially in terms of effectively coordinating the inputs of all of the different entities which were involved.

There are also difficulties in using a refugee settlement as the centerpiece of an integrated area development scheme because of the time constraints involved. Area development schemes are often years, even decades, in their planning, negotiation and funding while a refugee settlement proceeds on a timetable of

weeks, months, or a year to start at most. However, it is possible that one effect of the attention now being given to more effectively merging refugee and development assistance will be that higher priority will be given to funding development programs in refugee impacted areas.

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CHAPTER IV:

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

This research has concentrated on the experience of the older refugee settlements in Africa, and in particular on the 30 which were in existence in 1982 (the baseline year for the study) and which had been declared self-sufficient by UNHCR by that time. While it has also included an extensive review of other materials regarding refugee settlements, it should be understood that the lessons learned are heavily based on the experience of refugees from Rwanda and Burundi in particular, and the settlements that they live in in the adjoining countries of Central and East Africa. These settlements were created in the period stretching from UNHCR's initial involvement with African settlements in the early 1960's, through the mid-1970's.

It is clear that these settlements encountered numerous difficulties, especially in their early years. Eight settlements were eventually abandoned, and of the 30 settlements which constitute our core study group, over half experienced major population declines before eventually attaining self-sufficiency.

Part of these difficulties may be attributed to the lack of information and experience regarding refugee settlements which characterized many of the organizations involved in administering these initial settlements. A number of these organizations soon withdrew as it became clearer that this work did not fit well with their institutional mandates and strengths, and that their original expectation that aid to a settlement would only be

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required for a few years was unrealistic.

A review of the experience of these older settlements reveals a number of factors which have been major obstacles to their being able to attain self-sufficiency. These include:

o **Poor sites-** Sites with poor soils, or inadequate rainfall or drinking water have proven very difficult to ever make viable, especially at the higher population densities which many originally had.

o **Relations with the local population and government-** In spite of the popular notion that "African hospitality" has minimized integration problems for refugees on this continent, the experience shows many settlements which were hampered by, or even came under direct attack as a result of becoming embroiled in tribal politics in the host country.

o **Attitudes of the refugees towards settlements-** A number of the settlements took many extra years to attain self-sufficiency because many refugees rejected activities which might imply their acceptance that they were not going to return home soon. This was especially true of Tutsi's from Rwanda.

o **Overcrowding-** Settlements were often disrupted by the continued addition of new refugee arrivals, and many became so crowded that self-sufficiency for the residents was not possible until the population declined to match the carrying capacity of the site.

o **Harmful Agricultural Policies-** The chief problems were (a) plot sizes which were too small to allow for more than mere subsistence farming (which would thus eliminate any economic locomotive effect of agriculture in stimulating the total settlement economy) and for necessary conservation measures, and (b) efforts to coerce refugees into communal farming, which produced considerable resistance and minimal crop yields when compared to families farming their own plots.

o **Other factors-** A number of other factors appeared to cause problems in attaining self-sufficiency, but were either less powerful, or were only noted as critical in a few instances. One was authoritarian administrators who left little room for refugee input or participation. Another was overly complex technologies which could not be sustained without continued outside assistance (which may be more of a problem in recent settlements which include mechanized farming).

A review of the experience of the more recent settlements

indicates that, with the major exception of those settlements in the Sudan. their progress towards self-sufficiency appears to be smoother than was the case for the older settlements. The settlements in the Sudan face serious difficulties in ever being able to attain self-sufficiency, mainly due to a) the disruption of continued influxes of new refugees; b) drought, and internal economic and political crisis within the Sudan, and; c) the government's selection of highly marginal sites for many of the settlements. For all of the more recent settlements, however, the attainment of self-sufficiency is being complicated by the poor economic situation of the sub-Saharan countries.

The study made a special effort to look into the situation of settlements after handover, as there is generally little information available about what happens to settlements in the long run. Declines in the level of infrastructure and community facilities were common after handover. In most cases, with Qala en Nahal in the Sudan as the major exception, these declines did not appear to have threatened the settlement's existence. Sometimes the decline was part of a leveling process bringing the services in the settlement into balance with those available in the surrounding region. Information from site visits undertaken as part of this study indicates that host governments in Tanzania, Rwanda, and Burundi are maintaining services in the settlements at a level comparable to that of the surrounding area. The record suggests a lack of confidence in the continued operation of facilities and services at pre-handover levels. Our review also suggests that compensatory measures such as providing a higher level of facilities as a buffer against the decline may

buy time, but not prevent the decline. The level of inputs into a settlement appear to have risen markedly in the more recent settlements, with host governments generally requesting these higher levels of aid.

Refugees in a number of the post-handover settlements visited as part of this study noted that they have felt virtually ignored by those in the international assistance system. Their concerns were less about the need for further assistance than about questions of protection from abuse of authority by local officials, and about equity issues, such as and having some input into how the money they pay in taxes, fees, etc. is to be used.

We would conclude that integration into the host country is a major difficulty facing older refugee settlements and their residents. As noted earlier, many settlements were either abandoned or seriously disrupted prior to attaining self-sufficiency by becoming involved in local tribal and political tensions. Further, for many of the more recent settlements in particular, host governments have made it clear that their agreement to allow the creation of the settlement does not imply any willingness to integrate the refugees socially or politically. Rather, they view these settlements as temporary, even if the refugees have been in the country for many years and have little prospects of being able to return home. Finally, the granting of citizenship to refugees is happening only in the most exceptional cases. Even in Tanzania, often cited as the model for such integration, only a small minority of the refugees have ever been offered

citizenship.

We would therefore suggest that organized refugee settlements are in fact rarely a vehicle for attaining a true durable solution for African refugees. Rather, such settlements can be most realistically viewed as cases of extended asylum, and analyzed in this context.

It should also be recognized that the obstacles facing the integration of refugees into the host country are likely to increase, not diminish, in the future. Reasons for this include the continuing decline of host country economies and their swelling populations which are rapidly eliminating the amount of unclaimed arable land on which refugee settlements could be sited.

The reality that refugees are not becoming citizens of the host countries, and the concern of African host countries for more of the burden of assisting the refugees to be borne by the international community, calls for more thought about which institutions ought to be responsible for what types of post-hand-over assistance. Such thought is necessary in order to base decisions about renewed aid in so far as possible on well-reasoned principles, rather than on political bargaining.

In summary, the older refugee settlements in Africa have generally attained economic self-sufficiency (although experiencing major problem along the way, including the abandonment of a number of settlements) but have also fallen short of attaining a durable solution for the refugees. The lessons learned from these experiences have led to improvements in the capacity of the refugee assistance system to more effectively design and adminis-

ter future settlements. However, these improvements are more than offset by worsening conditions in the overall context in which future settlements are likely to have to operate. This gives little optimism that future settlements will have more success than the older settlements did in attaining a durable solution, and may even have difficulty in reaching an acceptable state of extended asylum.

In the conducting of this study, it has become clear that further research is needed in a number of additional areas. These include:

1. Spontaneous Settlements

Spontaneously settled refugees are arguably a much larger group than those in official refugee settlements. They also constitute the major portion of the unmet burden which refugees can place on a host country, since these refugees, and the countries which host them, receive little aid in comparison with refugees in official camps and settlements. In particular, more information needs to be obtained about the material and assistance needs of these refugees, about their impact on the local population and resources where they reside, and about their experience in terms of integrating into the host country.

2. Evaluating the Refugee Burden on Host Countries

Most refugee programs which have assisted host country residents have not come about based on an analysis of the impact on

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the refugees on these people, but rather as a result of political concerns. There is a need to better evaluate the major effects which refugees, and refugee assistance programs, have on host countries, both pro and con. In addition, more study is needed concerning who in particular is most harmed by the refugees' arrival, and what specific kinds of programs can alleviate these problems.

3. Refugee Participation

Refugee participation may be the concept with the worst ratio of rhetoric to reality in the entire refugee assistance system. Improvements in this ratio could come from a) a study of the procedural and policy changes which could be made at various levels within the system to advance the state of such participation, and b) producing written materials based on actual efforts with using participatory methods in refugee programs in order to give those in the field more practical ideas about how to carry out such work.

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APPENDIX A:

CASE STUDIES OF THE SELF-SUFFICIENT SETTLEMENTS

This appendix contains short case studies of the 30 rural refugee settlements that were listed by UNHCR as being self-sufficient in 1982. The 30 settlements are listed in a rough order determined by chronology and country of origin, and background information on the causes of the exodus of these refugee groups is also provided:

* * *

** The Background of Refugee Movements from Rwanda and Burundi

I. Settlements in Burundi

II. Settlements for Rwandese Refugees in Tanzania

III. Settlements in Uganda

IV. Settlements for Rwandese Refugees in Zaire

** A Summary of Important Points Regarding the Settlements
for Rwandese Refugees

V. The Settlement for Burundi Refugees in Rwanda

VI. Settlements for Burundi Refugees in Tanzania

VII. The Settlement for Burundi Refugees in Zaire

** The Background of Refugee Movements from Ethiopia

VIII. The Settlement for Refugees from Ethiopia in the Sudan

IX. The Settlement for Refugees from Ethiopia in Djibouti

** The Background of Refugees from Angola

X. The Settlement for Angolan Refugees in Botswana

XI. Settlements in Zambia

XII. The Settlement for Angolan Refugees in Zaire

XIII. The Settlement for Zambian Refugees in Zaire

XIV. The Settlement for Zairian Refugees in Tanzania

XV. The Settlement for Zairian Refugees in the Sudan

Background - Refugees From Rwanda and Burundi

Rwanda and Burundi in the 1950's were virtually identical twins but their paths have been drastically different since 1959. Both are small, landlocked, densely-populated central African countries of over three million people (in the 1950's) that were colonies of Belgium. Each is very rural with only one large town, few villages, and most people living on their own farms. Before taking different routes, each had two main ethnic groups, a Hutu majority of some 85% who were dominated by a Tutsi minority. The Tutsi are tall, slender cattle herdsman who several centuries ago came from the North and established themselves as feudal aristocrats ruling over the smaller Hutu farmers in each country.

In Rwanda, in 1959, a brief but vicious civil war between Tutsis and Hutus broke the power of the Tutsi and led to the first small exodus of several thousand Tutsis plus some Hutu followers. Rwanda gained self-government in 1960 on its way to independence in 1962. In 1961, a Hutu coup d'etat ended the Tutsi monarchy and subsequent fighting led to an exodus of about 150,000 Tutsis to Uganda, Zaire, Tanganyika, and Burundi.

Tutsi exiles, unwilling to accept permanent exile and loss of power, formed a guerrilla-terrorist movement called the Inyenzi. After many months of minor raids, a major Inyenzi invasion from Burundi and Zaire in late 1963 came close to the

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capital before being defeated. Mass reprisals against those remaining Tutsis who had supported the Inyenzi led to a further exodus. Other border incursions continued for several years and a final major Inyenzi attempt was made in late 1966.

The late 1963 invasion led the host countries to take efforts to move the Tutsi refugees away from the border. The host countries also saw that repatriation was unlikely, and put more emphasis on settlement schemes.

Burundi in the 1960's had violent internal politics in which Tutsi exiles from Rwanda often played a part. While the Tutsi ruler, the Mwami, tried to play a balancing role between Hutu and Tutsi, many Hutu leaders and less extremist Tutsis were victims of assassination. In 1965, a Hutu mutiny failed but killed many prominent Tutsis. In reprisal, most Hutu military officers and many other prominent Hutus were killed or imprisoned.

In 1966, the Mwami was deposed, a republic was declared, and power was taken by Tutsi dedicated to continuing their domination and superiority.

In late April, 1972, fighting broke out between Hutus and Tutsis. The Tutsi government response was a savage massacre of Hutu soldiers, government workers, and educated persons, leaving the group leaderless. Some estimate that as many as 250,000 Hutus were killed and approximately 200,000 refugees fled the country, mainly to Tanzania but also in significant numbers to Zaire and Rwanda.

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I. Settlements in Burundi

1. Muramba - 9,822 Rwandese refugees. The refugees arrived in June, 1962, and the settlement was declared self-sufficient in March, 1969.

2. Kayongazi - 5,302 Rwandese refugees. The refugees arrived in late 1962, and the settlement was declared self-sufficient in March, 1969.


3. Kigamba - 11,727 Rwandese refugees. The refugees arrived in early 1963, the settlement was declared self-sufficient in March, 1969.

4. Mugera - 18,692 Rwandese refugees. The refugees arrived in 1963, and the settlement was declared self-sufficient in March, 1969.

These settlements, and the Rwandese settlements in Tanzania and Zaire, were UNHCR's first settlements. All are in Cankuzo district of Ruyigi Province in northeast Burundi--away from Rwanda and near Tanzania. The area was less populated than most of Burundi, lacked adequate water, and was tsetse-infested but had high soil potential after drainage (Holborn, 1975).

The first three settlements--Muramba, Kayongazi and Kigamba--were set up by the International Labour Organization (ILO) with help from League of Red Cross Societies (LRCS), UNHCR, Oxfam, and the Belgian, and U.S. governments. While very little attention was paid initially to the economic viability of the first three sites, the fourth settlement, Mugera, had more planning work done in this regard.

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


Mercator Projection
Scale 1 : 600 000

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REPUBLIC OF BURUNDI

AREA: 11,000 sq. mi. 28,490 sq. km.
 POPULATION: 4,500,000 (est. for July '83)
 CAPITAL & LARGEST CITY: Bujumbura
 (151,000 '79 census)
 GNP: \$235 per capita, 1981



In 1963, a joint ILO mission with UNHCR, FAO, WHO, UNESCO, and UNICEF established the UNHCR/ILO Integration and Development Program for the first three settlements, which lasted from 1964 until 1967. It included a \$1 million zonal development plan for the region which encompassed 29,000 locals and 24,000 refugees. The project's objectives included draining marshes, improving livestock, providing a ferry boat, and promoting handicrafts. The results were very uneven, and malaria and drought led to a large out-migration and the need for renewed food distribution. The refugees were mainly pastoralists, and many resisted the idea of being in a settlement based primarily on agriculture. Many dreamed of invading and retaking Rwanda.

In May, 1965, the Belgian NGO, AIDR took over management of Mugeru. Due to good progress there, in early 1967, AIDR was given responsibility for all four settlements. At Mugeru, AIDR sent in planning experts and mapped out 62 villages of 100 families each. They then began tillage, built access roads, established a water supply, initiated tsetse control, distributed tools, and encouraged good farming practices. Sweet potatoes, beans, coffee, and cassava were grown. At the other settlements, AIDR drained marshes to increase the amount of land per family to above two hectares and introduced cash crops of coffee and groundnuts. They also built community centers for each settlement as well as buildings for shops, dispensary, schools, a social center, administrative buildings, and staff housing.

Consolidation of the settlements began after 1967. Subsistence was reached, but the refugees had little cash economy or trade. A 1969 UNDP zonal development plan, the "Mosso-Cankuzo

Integrated Rural Development Project", brought in UNDP funds, with FAO as the executing agency and AIDR as the subcontractor. The project included the idea of bringing Burundi citizens from crowded regions of the country to the areas opened up by the refugee settlements. (Originally there were almost as many refugees as locals, but today they are outnumbered 3:1 to 6:1 by the locals.) Tensions with the local population, who are mainly Hutus, have continued in part because the refugees are resented as the former Tutsi elite of Rwanda. Some refugees, in turn, resent their lack of integration and representation in local government, as well as less accessibility to post-primary schools in comparison to the Burundi Tutsis.

In March, 1969, UNHCR transferred responsibility for the settlements to UNDP and FAO, rather than to the host country government. After the handover, there are numerous reports of renewed aid to the four settlements. In the late 1970's aid remained at a modest annual level of \$65,000 to \$75,000. The main expense was for maintenance of facilities for which local authorities stated that they lacked the necessary funds. These projects included repairing communal buildings, schools, and dispensaries, paying certain operating costs, and buying equipment for vocational training centers.

In the mid-1970's the settlements were said to be deteriorating and steady outflow to a newer settlement at Bukemba occurred. In addition, each year there was the expense of transferring 1,500-2,000 refugees back to the settlement from the capital of Bujumbura, where they had not been able to integrate.

Many of these appeared to be refugees who tried to leave settlements and were regularly rounded up and sent back. Others, however, were able to leave the settlements, avoid round-ups, and settle among the local population.

In April, 1982, a multi-disciplinary team including representatives of ILO, WHO, and UNESCO, found that the settlements were not fully viable. They designed a \$773,000 program for:

- a) food production and marketing cooperatives at Mugeru and Kigamba;
- b) a technological experimentation center at Kigamba;
- c) a vocational training center at Mugeru for masonry, simple mechanics agricultural tools, meat and agricultural processing;
- d) a workshop and vocational guidance center;
- e) a vocational training center at Muramba;
- f) repairs to schools at Mugeru; and
- g) piping water to Mugeru and Kigamba.

In addition, \$2.5 million for a hospital in Cankuzo was also allocated.

Burundi requested \$70 million at ICARA I for schools and social centers and \$10 million at ICARA II for roads, schools, and social-educational centers. None of the projects, however, appeared to attract much interest. Donors were wary of the government's high refugee count (which suddenly jumped from 55,000 in 1981 to 234,6000 in 1982), its poor performance on other development projects, and evidence that the refugees did not appear to need additional aid.

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A field visit to Burundi as part of this study, came away with the impression that after major problems in the early years, the settlements did reach economic self-sufficiency for the remaining refugees, and that most are doing as well or better than their neighbors (according to some reports assisted in part by income gained in smuggling across the nearby Tanzania border). Ironically, however, the success of the refugees within, and especially outside of the settlements, may have led to a hardening of feeling, and of policies, against them. It appears that lack of acceptance of the refugees by the government, rather than a lack of the necessary financial resources, may have caused the reliance on UNHCR for payment of maintenance costs. The minority of refugees who were offered and accepted citizenship in the 1970's appear to have done quite well, and in fact became effective competitors to the local ruling elite. This case study points out the potential conflict between promoting economic advancement for refugees and facilitating their acceptance by the host population and government.

The Tutsi refugees in Burundi were very slow to accept the loss of Rwanda as final. As noted earlier, refugee soldiers invaded Rwanda on several occasions and Burundi and Rwanda were reported close to war during the early 1960s. Burundi's support for the exiles began to soften after the formation of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), which encouraged recognition of Rwanda. In 1967 Burundi finally agreed to disarm the rebels.

Nonetheless, this political activity amongst the exiles affected the progress of the rural settlements. Many refugees

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hopeful of going home refused to engage in activities that seemed permanent. Huts were built in a temporary fashion, permanent crops were not cultivated, and little land was cleared. The refugees at first were satisfied with subsistence farming because they believed that their exile was not permanent. Militant refugees even put pressure on those refugees who seemed enthusiastic about the settlement project. With a full effort the refugees might have achieved self-sufficiency in two years or less, but their acceptance of exile did not come until after the failure of the invasions and an attitude change by the Burundi authorities.

Settlements for Rwandese Refugees in Tanzania

5. Karagwe -- 2,500 Rwandese (Tutsi) refugees. The refugees arrived in 1962, and the settlements were handed over in 1966.

6. Muyenzi -- 5,000 Rwandese (Tutsi) refugees. The refugees arrived in the area in 1960-61, settlement began in 1962, and the settlements were handed over in 1969.

(Census figures are early 1970s from Holborn, 1975.)

Muyenzi is in the West Lake District near the Tanzania-Burundi-Rwanda juncture. Refugees entered the area as early as 1959. By 1961, there were 10,000 to 12,000 refugees, of whom 5,000 were completely destitute. At first the Tutsi refugees were able to convince Tanzanian leaders that they were actually freedom fighters. (Rwanda had not yet received independence from Belgium.) This support encouraged the refugees in their hopes of return. Inyenzi fighters were active in Tanzania and across the

border in Burundi. Most refugees in these early years saw exile as temporary, and were unwilling to commit themselves to settlement. Much factional political activity existed amongst refugees.

By 1962, Tanzanian leaders had withdrawn support from the exiles, mainly due to OAU resolutions, and saw no hope of their repatriation. Wanting to end the relief program, the government decided to institute a permanent rural settlement program to move the refugees from near the Rwandian border to Muyenzi, which is east of the Ruvuvu River and further away from Rwanda.

The first refugees into Tanzania had come from northern Rwanda. Later this clan was outnumbered by the arrival of a clan from central Rwanda whose leadership then became dominant amongst the refugees. At the time of the cross-river move to the settlement, the smaller clan appealed to be allowed to move to the Karagwe district further north, near to Uganda. Permission was granted and 4,000 refugees moved. At first these refugees were scattered amongst the local population. The refugees then petitioned to be allowed to form a settlement, and their wish was granted. Refugee leaders participated in the selection of the site.

The Karagwe settlement (which had two centers, at Kimuli and Nkwenda) thus began through the refugees' own initiative. It was sufficiently isolated to be relieved of Inyenzi pressures. It had effective leaders who had traditional ties with some of the local population. Further, because the Tanzanian government had acceded to their wishes, the refugees had a certain confidence in the intentions of their hosts. With these favorable attitudinal

factors, the Karagwe refugees from the beginning concentrated on agricultural pursuits.

By 1966, UNHCR assistance to Karagwe ceased, and in 1967 the refugees began to pay Tanzanian taxes and the local district council took over medical and water supply services. The settlement received limited assistance from the Tanganyika Christian Refugee Service (TCRS), the local arm of the Lutheran World Federation (LWF), which assisted with agriculture. Two Danish volunteers who had played an important role in the evolution of the settlement had a limited role by 1967.

The refugee plots were in a continuous block, concentrated around the water points of a system built by government water engineers, assisted by the Danish volunteers. TCRS provided seeds, and the refugees were earning a substantial amount of cash from vegetable gardening by 1966. TCRS also provided dispensaries in Kimuli and Nkwenda, and continued its presence in Karagwe into 1969.

The general atmosphere of ambitious cooperation served the refugees well. Self-help activities included an access road system and construction of a cooperative shop and community center. Not all of the refugees, however, stayed with the settlement. Between 1962 and 1966 the population declined from 4,000 to 2,500, although in the late 1960's some 800 refugees moved back to the vicinity.

Muyenzi, meanwhile, had a drastically different development. The politicised refugees rejected permanent settlement and refused to plant permanent crops. They built grass huts, cleared

only part of their plots, and many treated those refugees who became involved in settlement activities as traitors.

The government, which was paying for the settlement by itself, reacted to the refugees' political plotting and refusal to cooperate with a heavy authoritarian hand. It arrested 50 refugee leaders, withheld rations, and closed schools. The lack of confidence between government and refugees, and fears of possible forced repatriation to Rwanda, led to a mass exodus to Burundi in 1963. Burundi refused to accept the refugees and they were forced to return to Muyenzi. Faced with total disaster in its settlement program, Tanzania turned to the UNHCR.

In August, 1963, the League of Red Cross Societies (LRCS), at UNHCR request, stepped in with an 11 month settlement program. Local government political interference ceased. The Red Cross regrouped the scattered refugees into about 29 villages of 50 families each. Refugee leaders were released from jail, which helped to restore the refugees' confidence in the program. Increasing cultivation began, bringing the refugees close to food self-sufficiency, and a water system was built.

In mid-1964, LRCS felt that the emergency had ended and ceased providing rations. However, a devastating drought soon struck and in 1965, TCRS provided rations for 5,000 refugees. By 1966, there was again enough successful cultivation to begin another phase-out of rations. However, UNHCR estimated that 35 percent of the refugees were poorly settled, 41 percent were sufficiently settled, and 24 percent were doing very well. The main problem of the settlement remained the refugees' resistance to permanent exile.

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With TCRS encouragement and assistance, Muyenzi improved and stabilized after 1966. Refugees lived on their own plots of about ten acres. Land was easily available, but refugees wanted to be close to one another in order to prevent destruction of crops by wild animals. A water system was installed. The 1964 drought indicated that the area had uneven rainfall which sometimes meant very poor harvests. Health care and community centers were provided by TCRS, while schools were supported by other aid agencies. By the time the government took over the settlement in 1970, the population had declined to 5,000 from a peak of 10,000 in 1963. In 1972, TCRS ceased funding entirely. In 1975, there was a mass exodus to Burundi from Malebo village in Muyenzi when the Settlement Commandant ordered the village to move to a new site as part of his vision of the government's Ujamaa policy.

Information from a field visit to Muyenzi undertaken as part of this study, as well as discussions with refugees familiar with Karagwe, indicate that the two settlements continue to have different fates. The main differences seem to be in the economic productivity of the sites and in their relations with local authorities. Karagwe's rainfall is more reliable than Muyenzi's, and the land is also considered better. Karagwe appears self-sufficient and has successful cash crops of bananas and vegetables, whereas Muyenzi has more uneven harvests and lacks cash crops. Muyenzi does make up for this with an ability to smuggle cattle into Burundi for six times the Tanzania price. Young people reaching adulthood were reported to be clearing land and

staying in Karagwe, while less than half were reported staying at Muyenzi. Muyenzi is in an area whose inhabitants are part of the larger Hutu group, and thus relations with the locals have never been good. Karagwe's local elite, on the other hand, is Tutsi-related and friendly, although the rest of the local population is not as well-disposed towards the refugees.

7. Mwezi -- 3,000 Rwandese (Tutsi) refugees resettled from Zaire. The refugees arrived in November, 1964, and June, 1965, and the settlement was handed over in 1971.

Tanzania's acceptance of these refugees from Zaire was the first case of refugee resettlement between African countries of asylum in Africa.

The settlement area, the Mwezi Highlands, was remote, underpopulated, and earmarked for development by the government. Site preparation required an access road from the market town of Mpanda, which is 75 miles away. Settlement is on a plateau at an elevation of 6,000 feet. Eight villages were set up for a total of 100 families, each situated on hills near streams. The hilltops were relatively clear of the tsetse fly and have good grazing. However, as the refugees were flown into the area from Zaire, they came without cattle and did not acquire any for several years. TCRS was the operational partner.

The Rwandese refugees in Zaire had been in danger because of the general turmoil of the civil war in Zaire, and specifically because the Inyenzi had become involved in it. They were informed in advance of conditions of the Mwezi site and upon arrival were pleased with the location because it reminded them

of Rwanda, although the climate was cooler.

TCRS did extensive pre-planning for settlement and generally had a staff of six on location. Very good progress was made from 1965 to 1967. Although the refugees received rations, they began to grow sufficient crops for themselves and produced a tiny surplus in spite of the fact that many of the refugees apparently had been either pastoralists or officeworkers rather than cultivators. By the end of 1967, TCRS had completed a fairly elaborate infrastructure including schools and a community center. Refugee teachers ran the schools, adjusting to the Tanzanian curriculum and teaching in Swahili and English.

Problems emerged in 1967 regarding settlement self-sufficiency and refugee attitudes. It was necessary at this time to develop cash crops in order to raise the settlement above subsistence. Without cash crops there would be no taxes and the government would not be willing to take over communal facilities such as clinics, schools and roads. Cash cropping was inhibited by the location (75 miles from the market town), by heavy rains which lasted for six months at a time, damaging crops and leaving the road impassable, and by the refugees' inexperience as farmers.

Strained relations between the refugees and Tanzanian authorities also hampered the achievement of self-sufficiency. In 1967, about half of the refugees refused to accept Tanzanian identification cards (not citizenship), because they felt it would make their exile permanent. As a result of this refusal, some went to jail. Further, the refugees, as a former elite ruling class, were not enthusiastic about the egalitarian goals

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of Tanzanian society. Lastly, the refugees resented the cessation of rations and other assistance. Holborn (1975) notes: "The Tutsi are unquestionably a very proud people with a well-developed sense of the rights and privileges due them."

In 1969, instead of going ahead with an Oxfam-World Bank pilot scheme to achieve self-sufficiency, the government decided to use the Mwezi infrastructure for other purposes. It moved up to 10,000 Chagga tribesmen from the overpopulated Kilimanjaro region to the Mwezi Highlands. Their settlement was near the refugees and they used the facilities at the refugee settlement. The initial success of the Chagga settlement seems to have stimulated the refugees, and some cash crops were grown in 1970. The new settlers brought cattle with them, giving the refugees an opportunity to augment the cattle received in later years via TCRS.

In July 1971, the Tanzanian government took over operation of the refugee settlement.

A field visit to Mwezi in 1985, undertaken as part of this study, indicated that after handover medical services declined somewhat, electricity ended, bus service and post office facilities were closed, and the community center was converted into a courtroom. Most of the Chagga are reported to have left the area long ago because of poor relations with the refugees and an inability to grow familiar crops. Although it is widely believed that the refugees have received citizenship, only a few actually received certificates several years ago. Now the cost of a certificate is 1,000 Tanzanian shillings, and refugees would

like UNHCR to pay the fee as they had agreed to do when the offer was first made some years ago. No UNHCR visit had occurred for several years.

Nonetheless, the refugees report that they are doing well. In general, there are few problems with local residents, perhaps because there are few such residents. Refugees operate businesses, including driving lorries to the market in Mpanda. They also grow bananas, yams, sweet potatoes, and millet, and are attempting to grow coffee. In addition, the refugees sell substantial amounts of beans and maize to the government which has recently constructed a warehouse in Mwezi to handle these crops. Cattle now exist in substantial numbers, and there is plenty of available land. Besides the issue of citizenship, the refugees note difficulties in getting their children into secondary schools, in finding adequate numbers of vehicles for transportation, and with the maintenance of the road to Mpanda.

At Muyenzi, Mwezi and Karagwe Settlement Commandants have been a repeated source of difficulty. These difficulties reportedly increased greatly after the departure of expatriates. Besides an authoritarian attitude towards the refugees, some Settlement Commanders are accused of diverting relief and construction funds to their own use and, in one case, of taking advantage of young girls seeking entrance to secondary school. In one instance, UNHCR had been told that schools and staff housing at Mwezi had been completed when instead the official responsible had disappeared with the funds. As a result, the buildings were never built. Unfortunately, it appears that several of the Commandants, after service at these settlements,

have moved on to other settlements.

This high-handed approach* also appears in reports of: 1) government officials using and living in building originally meant for the settlements, 2) the failure of a tractor service at Karagwe due to "bad accounts" and the eventual transfer of the tractor to the District Council, and 3) a government official's transfer of the Karagwe lorry to Muyenzi, leading to the collapse of the Kimuli communal vegetable farm because it could not market its produce. Some local officials reportedly responded to refugee requests and other problems with threats to throw the refugees out of the country. Although this has not happened, and while such a threat may lose some of its sting after many repetitions, it could hardly have benefitted refugee relations with officials in the early fearful years. In general, refugee participation in matters affecting them has not been encouraged.

Citizenship for the Rwandese refugees is another problem. A 1978 program to provide naturalization certificates gave citizenship to only a few refugees, although international reports erroneously indicate that a significant number were naturalized. The fee is now 1,000 shillings and naturalized refugees will not automatically receive voting rights.

Without voting rights, refugees are not allowed to speak up in local politics, or even to serve as their own village chairmen

*Gasarasi (1984) states that "I however feel that the Refugee (Control) Act of 1965 has been adequate as the legal instrument in force. The spirit of the Act has predominantly been a disciplining one, and as a result it has in most cases produced authoritarian Settlement Commandants who have often developed antagonistic relationships with the refugees."

in Muyenzi. In 1976, a UNHCR official recommended that Rwandese settlements be re-visited without "the company of any Ministry of Home Affairs official." Refugees, however, reported long gaps between visits by UNHCR officials.

Despite these difficulties, the settlement refugees appear to be doing at least as well economically as the local inhabitants. Many of the problems of maintenance of roads and facilities are shared by Tanzanian nationals in the area.

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II. Settlements In Uganda

The first Rwandese Tutsi refugees began to arrive in 1959, and their numbers grew to 35,000 by 1962. In 1963, an invasion by Tutsi militants failed and an increased exodus followed, building eventually to some 72,000 refugees. About 38,000 were in six settlements and the remainder were settled spontaneously.

Uganda has consistently insisted that the refugees will eventually repatriate. Thus, more than any other African country of asylum, Uganda has been unwilling to accept measures aimed at the consolidation and integration of refugee settlements (Holborn, 1975). Settlement progress toward self-sufficiency was very slow because capital expenditures were kept to a minimum, crops for immediate subsistence were emphasized, and cash crops were not promoted. Community facilities such as water supplies, health and education were not provided, and this contributed to refugees leaving the settlements to settle spontaneously. Even as late as 1967, every refugee settlement in Uganda still required WFP rations.

Uganda's restrictive policies were born out of its troubled circumstances in the 1960's. Besides the Rwandese refugees, Uganda also received refugees from civil wars in the Congo and the Sudan. Independent itself only in October, 1962, Uganda was relatively prosperous but ridden with internal political, religious, and tribal splits that have murderously troubled it to this day. Not only did the Uganda government fear that the refugees might combine with friendly or kinship groups in Uganda, it was also greatly disturbed by refugee involvement with

UGANDA

Area	236,026 sq.km.
Estimated population	14,120,000 (mid-82)
Population density	Approx. 59.8 per sq.km.
Rainy season	Approx. February/March to October/November



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militant guerrilla movements which compromised Ugandan security and embroiled it in controversies with its neighbors.

The view of the settlements as temporary had other effects as well. The sites were chosen less with an eye to viability and more with a concern to avoid land disputes with local people. Thus, they were scattered 200 to 500 miles from the border. Pre-planning was neglected and this contributed to many setbacks in the settlements, including the abandonment of one and the virtual abandonment of another.

It should be noted that the Ugandan view of the settlements as temporary was welcomed by many refugees, particularly the leaders. The refugees' dream of retaking Rwanda was strong and only dimmed in the late 1960's. Viewing their exile as temporary, the Tutsi were not inclined to overcome their longheld resistance to a settled agricultural life.

In 1967-68 UNHCR indicated that the end of assistance was approaching. Thus, Uganda faced the prospect of taking over the entire burden of settlements which, although technically self-supporting, would continue to function precariously due to the lack of facilities appropriate for long-term settlement. Although not wavering in its view that the refugees would eventually repatriate, Uganda permitted some consolidation assistance.

UNHCR assistance from 1968 was aimed at promoting the economic success of the settlements. Projects to improve community facilities began. More land was made available, cash crops were introduced, and tsetse fly control was increased. The government and the YMCA began a government agricultural

assistance project in each settlement to improve crop quality and marketing. More refugee children were allowed to go to Ugandan schools, and four secondary schools were expanded to accept refugees. Self-help primary schools in the settlements were replaced with permanent buildings.

In 1974, the refugees reached economic parity with the local rural population. Major international assistance began to be phased out. The government administered the settlements and assumed responsibility for completing infrastructure consolidation programs. No new UNHCR funding was planned. By 1979, the majority of the refugees were growing their own food, growing cash crops successfully, and paying taxes. By 1984, it was reported that "Many of them are virtually integrated into the Ugandan economy and society. They are found in a variety of professional occupations... The refugees move freely around the country and are given the same opportunities as nationals." (UN, 1984b)

Other than some long-delayed repairs to the Nakivale water system, UNHCR had little concern with the settlements until 1979. The Tanzanian invasion of that year caused 14,000 Rwandese refugees to flee north from Oruchinga and Nakivale. Over the next two years, fighting, disorder, and the general decline of the Ugandan economy created serious problems and very severe damage at the settlements. A lack of spare parts and maintenance caused boreholes and water systems to fall into disuse. The health facilities at Nakivale and Oruchinga were affected, and services at Kyangwali were strained following the transfer of

refugees from other settlements.

At ICARA I, in 1981, Uganda noted that for years it had borne salaries and other administrative costs of the settlements at a cost of \$1 million per year. Considering its troubles, it asked the international community to assume half of those costs for two years. It was noted that prior to the events of 1979, most of the refugees were well-integrated socially and economically. Now major repairs were needed but were not possible because of the generally unsettled conditions in the country.

Unfortunately, the events of 1979 were followed by further problems in 1982. On October 1, the youth wing of the ruling Uganda Peoples Congress and some police attacked the homes of Rwandese refugees, immigrants and Ugandan citizens. Those Ugandan citizens who were attacked were mainly pre-independence migrants from Rwanda as well as ethnic Rwandese who were incorporated into Uganda due to a colonial period border change. Many people fled to Rwanda, and thousands fled to Nakivale and Oruchinga which collectively almost doubled in size from 27,000 to 53,000 refugees. All told, some 31,000 refugees with 50,000 head of cattle moved into the Rwandese settlements in Uganda. A new settlement for 17,000 refugees and their 22,000 cattle was opened at Kayaka II.

The settlements had achieved self-sufficiency in the 1970's but they were extensively damaged in the 1979 war and its aftermath. The international assistance that resumed then has now had to be upgraded urgently to cope with the aftermath of the 1982 attack.

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In the last two years, UNHCR activity in Uganda has centered on strengthening and improving the existing settlements, particularly at Nakivale and Orvchinga, and on the establishment of a new settlement at Kyaka II. Due to local conditions -- this is an area rife with rebellion particularly since the overthrow of the Obote government -- assistance needs in the Mbarara region have been greater than expected, and repairs and improvements to infrastructures have been unsatisfactory. Major repairs in Ibuga have not taken place as planned and other activities are behind schedule. UNHCR has given implementation of Kyaka II to the UN Center for Human Settlements and is arranging to transfer implementing responsibility for the seven older settlements to the ILO. At ICARA II, the Ugandan government requested almost \$19 million for seven projects in the southwestern and western regions, but only one, for marketing cooperatives, directly concerns refugees.

8. Oruchinga -- 4,750 Rwandese (Tutsi) refugees. (All census figures for the Ugandan settlements are for 1971, from Holborn, 1975.) The settlement was begun in November 1961, and was declared self-sufficient in 1974. Originally, 11,000 Rwandese and several thousand cattle were moved by the government from locations on the border with Rwanda to a valley away from the border because of attacks into Rwanda. The area soil was fertile but subject to rapid decline due to poor, unreliable rainfall. A water crisis had occurred in the mid-1960's when the river cut a new course to Lake Victoria and the valley dried up. At this time, UNHCR and an NGO drilled wells. In 1964,

there were 12,000 refugees in the area but only enough land for 5,000. Communal farming was tried at first, but was soon abandoned. The settlement shifted to the use of individual plots and crop rotation to protect the soil. The site was constantly disrupted by its use as a reception center for new arrivals, and 20,000 refugees passed through it from 1964 to 1967. Oruchinga was thus overcrowded until the refugee population was reduced in 1966. Between 1964 and 1966, Oruchinga and Nakivale had several outflows of refugees being sent to the newer settlements of Kahunge, Ibuga, Rwanwanja, Kyaka, and Kyangwali.

9. Nakivale -- 8,405 Rwandese (Tutsi) refugees. The settlement was begun in 1962, and was declared self-sufficient in 1974. Originally, Nakivale was very overcrowded, with 9,000 families and 17,000 cattle. As the area was not far from border, it was also disrupted by its use as a reception center for new arrivals near Lake Nakivale. The area was infested with tsetse fly until sufficient bush was cleared. In 1964, the settlement dam burst and refugees had to use an unsafe distant marsh for water. In 1968, UNHCR developed an inadequate system of seven deep wells and four tanks, which was finally fixed in 1970. The refugee population was reduced in 1966, as refugees were sent north.

10. Kahunge -- 9,220 Rwandese (Tutsi) refugees. The settlement was begun in 1963, and was declared self-sufficient in 1974. The Kahunge settlement originally took several thousand refugees from Oruchinga, and in 1966 took several thousand from

the failed settlement at Kinyara. The first refugee group quickly achieved crop subsistence and introduced a second group to viable agriculture. In 1970, the Norwegian Refugee Council built a vocational training center.

11. Ibuga -- 2,350 Sudanese refugees and a few hundred Rwandese (Tutsi) refugees. The settlement was begun in 1964, and was declared self-sufficient in 1974. Originally, Ibuga consisted of 900 Rwandese refugees with 1,600 cattle who were moved from the border to a site 200 miles to the north. The Rwandese were part of a new influx, resulting from the failed 1963 invasion. A rapid population decline occurred as refugees left the settlement for other settlements or settled spontaneously because Ibuga lacked community facilities and drinking water. In 1967, 2,000 Sudanese were moved to Ibuga from the north and did well. The settlement's water problems were solved in 1970.

12. Rwanwanja -- 2,820 Rwandese (Tutsi) refugees. The refugees arrived in 1964, and the settlement was declared self-sufficient in 1974. The site is 200 miles north of the border, and 3,000 refugees and 5,000 cattle trekked to the settlement after the failed 1963 invasion of Rwanda. Dairy marketing was introduced in 1970.

13. Kyaka -- 2,230 Rwandese (Tutsi) refugees. The refugees arrived in 1964, and the settlement was declared self-sufficient in 1974. Kyaka originally consisted of 2,000 refugees and 3,700 cattle who trekked 200 miles north after the failed 1963

invasion.

14. Kyangwali -- 9,465 Rwandese (Tutsi) refugees. The settlement was begun in late 1966, and was declared self-sufficient in 1974. Kyangwali is located almost 500 miles north of the Rwanda border on a favorable site with good soil near Lake Albert. The settlement was established to take the overload from Oruchinga, and also to take refugees and equipment from the failed settlement at Kinyara. Established after the hope of repatriation had dimmed, Kyangwali got off to a fast start. A self-help primary school was developed with 24 volunteer teachers, and cash crops of cotton, tea, and tobacco were produced. The refugees faced the problem of destruction of their crops by wild animals. In 1970, a health center was built.

IV. Settlements for Rwandese Refugees In Zaire

15. Ihula -- 3,000 Rwandese (Tutsi) refugees. The settlement was opened in October 1961, and international assistance ended in 1970.

16. Bibwe -- 5,000 Rwandese (Tutsi) refugees. The settlement was begun in 1962, and international assistance ended in 1970.



17. Kalonge -- 1,190 Rwandese (Tutsi) refugees. The settlement was begun in 1962, and was listed as largely abandoned in 1967. (Note: All above are 1984 population figures - UN, 1984.)

Between 1959 and 1961, approximately 60,000 Rwandese, mainly

ZAIRE

Area	2,354,409 sq.km.
Estimated population	30,260,000 (mid-82)
Population density	Approx. 12.8 per sq.km.
Rainy season	North-East: March-November
	East: September-May
	West: October-May

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Tutsis but with some Hutus as well, fled to many parts of Kivu province, Zaire. Some brought cattle with them, but by 1962, some 35,000 refugees were considered destitute. The others had self-settled, found employment, or were aided by the numerous Rwandese immigrants who were already in the area. Unfortunately, these immigrants had already generated substantial local resentment and this soon attached itself to the refugees.

In mid-1961, many refugees were forced out of the town of Goma in northern Kivu. They were assisted by UNHCR in moving further north to set up a settlement on a very fertile, heavily forested site at Bibwe. A Congolese rural settlement agency already familiar with the area, the Mission des Installations des Populations (MIP), assisted with the settlement. At first there were 2,000 refugees who cleared forest, built huts, and planted crops on four hectare plots. Approximately 50 refugees died from lack of food. UNHCR's role was still unofficial and conditions in the area were unsettled.

In 1962, the League of Red Cross Societies took responsibility for Bibwe and four other settlements. Bibwe was enlarged and a second settlement was opened nearby at Ihula. Refugees were given five hectare plots of fertile land and were assisted by MIP and Caritas. Three other settlements were established in southern Kivu in the vicinity of the town of Bukavu. Kalonge was assisted by the Norwegian Protestant Mission, and it had very small plots of 1/10 to 1/20 of a hectare. The refugees, who viewed their stay as temporary, planted only quick harvesting crops. Lemera and Mulenge were assisted by a Swedish Mission. These four new settlements had a total population of about 18,000

refugees.

In 1963, more Rwandese refugees arrived by way of Burundi and many Rwandese were expelled by Zairian authorities from urban areas. Four more settlements -- Kakobo, Mamba, Rambo, and Tshaminunu -- were opened south of Bukavu for 12,000 refugees.

As they did in Uganda, Burundi, and Tanzania, many of the Rwandese Tutsi became active in the militant guerrilla movement, the Inyenzi, to try to regain control of Rwanda. Besides its impact on the willingness of refugees to undertake settlement activities in Zaire, these military activities embroiled the Rwandese in deep political trouble. The Congo was descending into civil war, rebellion, and chaos. Several times the refugees got caught between sides or involved with the losing side.

For example, Bibwe and Ihula in the north at first worked impressively. The refugees avoided the Inyenzi, grew crops, built and staffed schools with self-help, and, by 1963, did not need rations. However, they became a focal point for local hostile feeling which really involved grievances against the Zairian government. In 1963, an extremist politician led efforts to drive the refugees out, the settlements were constantly harassed, and MIP staff were beaten. Many refugees fled to Uganda and the population at Bibwe and Ihula dropped from 13,000 to 5,000.

Even worse, in 1964, because of Inyenzi involvement with the rebels, the government began to treat the refugees harshly. This was at the height of the Congo rebellion. In August, 1964, mass arrests of refugees began. Then the UNHCR representative

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and the ILO representative were murdered by rebels. Finally, still in August, the government ordered the expulsion of all refugees, an order that was not lifted until the end of 1966.

Contact was lost with the settlements. Part of Kalonge survived with 1,500 out of an original 3,000 refugees. The other southern settlements ceased operations. Fortunately, Bibwe and Ihula in the north were out of the trouble area and doing very well with their crops. However, estimates were that only 28,000 of original 60,000 Rwandese refugees remained in Zaire.

From 1964 to early 1967, UNHCR administered a holding operation in Zaire while waiting for the lifting of the expulsion order. Although the goal was only to maintain subsistence at the settlements, Bibwe and Ihula made good progress. Some refugees moved in, bringing Bibwe to 5,000 and Ihula to 2,000. Good relations developed with the local population, and the crops on terraced hillsides (beans, maize, potato, cassava, ground nuts) produced a surplus. Tea and tobacco provided cash. Timber was developed and a carpentry cooperative produced furniture. Six self-help schools were built and staffed. The site was rich; "no more favourable natural conditions existed in Africa." (Holborn, 1975)

Kalonge merely held on for those three years. Then in 1967, just as aid was to resume in full, a mutiny led by white mercenaries broke out around Bukavu. The settlement was badly affected and the refugees scattered. The program thus had to be abandoned. Only the settlements in the Bibwe-Ihula zone had managed to survive political conditions in Zaire, and only one-third of the original 60,000 refugees remained.

The final consolidation assistance to Bibwe and Ihula concentrated on medical assistance, education, and community development. ILO assisted with consolidation of cooperatives involving both refugees and locals. The refugees achieved an equal economic footing with the local population, and in 1970 assistance ceased.

Between 1970 and 1984, there is virtually no mention of Bibwe and Ihula in UNHCR reports, and Kalonge was simply listed as largely abandoned as a result of events in Kivu in 1967. However, at ICARA II, Zaire (through UNHCR) requested additional assistance of \$264,000 to build and equip dispensaries and schools at the three settlements. A primary and secondary school for Bibwe, a secondary school for Ihula, a primary school at Kalonge, dispensaries at Bibwe and Ihula, and an all-terrain vehicle for Bibwe were requested. In addition, equipment for a Protestant mission dispensary at Kalonge was requested. The installations were to be available to the local Zairian population as well. It was indicated that the Rwandese refugees are self-sufficient but have not been naturalized although UNHCR has made a demarche to that effect. Continued aid has been justified on the grounds that "earlier UNHCR programmes for these refugees did not include the construction of dispensaries or schools for refugees settled at Bibwe, Ihula and Kalonge." (UNHCR, 1984b)

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**A Summary of Important Points Regarding the Settlements for
Rwandese Refugees**

Of the thirty self-sufficient settlements which had been declared self-sufficient by UNHCR by 1982, fully 16 are for refugees from Rwanda (primarily Tutsis) who fled in the late 1950's and early 1960's to Burundi, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zaire. These settlements were the learning ground (often through trial and error) for the UNHCR, FAO, and other international organizations, as well as for NGOs such as the League of Red Cross Societies, AIDR, and Lutheran World Federation.

In the settlement of the Rwandese refugees during the early 1960's, UNHCR played a more limited role than it does today. At the beginning of the Rwandese exodus in 1959, and for several years afterward, UNHCR had no branch offices in sub-Saharan Africa. It played a minor or non-existent role in much of the relief phase of assistance. During the settlement establishment phase, UNHCR worked through implementing agencies, and in several cases settlements began without UNHCR involvement. UNHCR was only invited into the settlements after the host's resources were strained or other difficulties emerged. Initially, UNHCR knew little of rural African life and the requirements for a successful settlement, and failed to take a strong stand on site selection, farming techniques, size and function of the settlements. Also, UNHCR appeared to leave most of the settlements very soon after subsistence or food self-sufficiency was achieved, or as soon as the host government was willing to assume

responsibility. Hence, most of the consolidation and integration of the settlements took place after UNHCR's withdrawal. Host governments did not appear to have been insistent about levels of aid, and with a few exceptions, most of the settlements received minimal infrastructures in the form of schools, medical facilities, and other community facilities.

The Rwandese Tutsi refugees were a difficult first settlement experience for UNHCR. As an exiled elite, they are often described as being acutely aware of the rights and privileges due them. Their sense of superiority frightened and alienated many of their new neighbors, and their negative attitude towards settlements delayed their progress toward self-sufficiency. As many were pastoralists, they rejected cultivation, and as militant exiles hoping to retake their homes, they rejected the permanence of settlement. The refugees' view of their exile as temporary was often shared by the host governments, who expecting repatriation, gave little thought to site selection and saw no reason to invest heavily in infrastructure for such temporarily resident aliens. Lastly, the militant and violent activities of many of the Tutsi through the Inyenzi guerillas involved them in dangerous forays into the internal politics of three of their host countries.

Part of the legacy of the Rwandese Tutsi refugees can be seen in today's policies concerning moving refugees away from the border, limiting refugee political activities, and viewing the granting of asylum as a non-hostile action. The legacy shows also in UNHCR's concern about promoting friendly relations with

local inhabitants and giving due attention to the economic viability of settlements. A further lesson learned has been the need to provide infrastructure and community facilities early in a settlement's life. Infrastructure provides a message that the settlement is permanent, and it encourages those refugees who value education and other services to remain at the settlement rather than to settle spontaneously.

As pastoralists, the Tutsi were forced to make a major adjustment to a new life as cultivators. They were quite fortunate to enter countries such as Zaire and Tanzania that still had vast tracts of open land, and to receive land that was still relatively underutilized in Burundi. Although most of the Rwandese settlements had a lengthy and difficult transition to self-sufficiency, most of them today (with the obvious exception of the settlements in Uganda) are doing at least as well economically as their neighbors.

V. The Settlement for Burundi Refugees In Rwanda


18. Mutara -- 3,100 Burundi refugees (Heidler, 1982).

UNHCR reports that the refugees arrived in 1973 and that handover occurred in 1976, but other reports indicate that refugees did not reach the site until 1974, and that handover to the host government was in 1977.

Rwanda is a land-locked least-developed country with the highest population density in Africa and a very high rate of population growth.

Mutara is located in the northeast, at the furthest point from Burundi. Refugees originally were concentrated at Bugesera

Area 26,338 sq.km.
 Estimated population 5,510,000 (mid-82)
 Population density 209 per sq.km.
 Rainy season November - April



0 100 Km.
 ■ Capital ★ refugee settlement
 ● Town or village ▨ Region of (former) refugee influx

in the south central area and in the southwest corner and were moved away from the border to Mutara in a two-stage move lasting over one year. Before settlement, the Mutara area was mainly a Tutsi grazing area that was relatively unpopulated after their flight. Soils were good, partly because most of the area had not been farmed previously.

Refugee settlement was the leading edge of the overall settlement of this area, with many Rwandese moving into the area after the refugee settlement was established. A government agency known as OVERPAM assisted Rwandese settlement. The refugees may have been a majority at first but are now outnumbered about 8:1 in the administrative jurisdiction in which they live.

AIDR was the implementing agency, establishing the infrastructure (a water system, access roads, primary schools, and health centers) and dividing and allocating land for agriculture. Each family received a plot of one to two hectares along an access road. AIDR allowed the refugees to arrange themselves so as to maintain family and friendship units. The fact that the refugees and the local residents shared a common language and culture eased relations. Rations were provided for two years by WFP through AIDR, with distribution largely handled by the refugees. There was a one-time distribution of tools and seeds, mostly for familiar crops. Catholic Relief Services (CRS) also aided agricultural development.

By January, 1976, the settlement was virtually self-supporting and the government assumed responsibility for it. Land titles were issued to the refugees, the government staffed

the medical center, and the qualifications of refugee teachers were recognized. However, UNHCR program support was not concluded until 1979 and was then resumed in 1981-1982. By 1978 the settlement was considered self-sufficient but there was a problem with a group of unemployed refugees for whom no land was available. In 1981, aid was resumed for certain individual refugee needs for housing and medical care and it was noted that economic difficulties had become more acute in the Mutara region. Since then, renewed UNHCR assistance has built and repaired water distribution stations and schools.

UNHCR, through AIDR, established the original water, school, and health systems for the refugees. While these facilities have suffered from wear and tear and lack of maintenance, a major problem has been that of strain from the very large influx of Rwandese nationals into the area. For example, the water system (gravity-fed from hills 20 kilometers away) has been overtaxed by Rwandese settlers using the system as it passes through their area to the refugees. Although it is probably still sufficient (if maintained) for its original refugee population, the refugees have resorted to using local streams and water sources.

Although UNHCR aid has resumed, the field visit undertaken during this study noted the general impression that the refugees are better off than many Rwanda nationals in the area. This may be because the refugees are the older residents of the area and the aid which they received allowed them to incur fewer debts in the course of becoming established.

There is some concern for the future of the area because the

influx of Rwandese nationals is leading to a shortage of agricultural land. Refugee plots of one to two hectares are too small to allow for fallowing or to subdivide for children. Although this also affects nationals, the problem is more acute for refugees who must remain in the settlement area. Overall, however, the area is still productive due to the newness of the soil, and it is even considered a food basket area for Rwanda.

The refugee settlement is administered by the local government as part of its regular administrative system. The refugees are involved in the mandatory Saturday communal work program and pay all taxes and fees. However, as foreigners they are not allowed to vote, or hold office. There are some restrictions on formal employment, although they can and do operate licensed small businesses. Refugees can travel freely but are not permitted to settle elsewhere.

Citizenship rules are unclear but there seems to be a requirement of a ten-year wait. Although some refugees might be eligible by now, the question has not been pushed by UNHCR or the bulk of the refugees. It has been reported that a few refugees have applied for citizenship but were hampered by local officials. At the very beginning of the settlement, however, some of the richer and better-educated refugees were able to get citizenship. There were no reports of the refugees being badly treated.

A problem existed for those refugees trying to get into secondary schools but this was ameliorated by a generous UNHCR scholarship program. There were also some reports that lately refugees were having difficulty being employed as teachers.

Rwanda submitted ten projects to ICARA II but none were for this settlement.

VI. Settlements for Burundi Refugees in Tanzania

19. Ulyankulu -- 26,000 Burundi (Hutu) refugees. (All census figures are from ICARA II documentation - UN, 1984b). The refugees arrived in 1972, and the settlement was handed over in June 1980.

20. Katumba -- 74,000 Burundi (Hutu) refugees. The refugees arrived in August, 1973, and settlement was handed over in June, 1980.

Mishamo -- 32,300 Burundi (Hutu) refugees. Established in 1978 for the transfer of 24,000 refugees from Ulyankulu and 2,000 spontaneously-settled refugees from the Kigoma region. Handover took place in mid-1985. (Mishamo is not part of the group of 30 self-sufficient settlements, but it is included in this narrative because of its close link with the other two settlements for assistance to the Burundi refugees.)

In the Spring of 1972, Tutsi massacres of Hutu's in Burundi led to a massive exodus of Hutu refugees to Rwanda, Zaire, and Tanzania. The Kigoma region of Tanzania was familiar to the refugees, who are related to its inhabitants and speak the same language. Emergency relief began early with the involvement of the Tanzanian government, UNHCR, WFP, and TCRS. Planning also began immediately for a more durable solution.

Ulyankulu, with 1,000 square kilometers of relatively flat, thinly forested land some 85 kilometers northeast of Tabora,

opened in 1972 and had 6,300 refugees by year's end. This grew to 32,500 in 1973, 46,500 in 1974, 54,000 in 1975, and a peak of 60,000 in 1976 and 1977. As the influx continued and Ulyankulu filled, a decision was made to establish a second permanent settlement. Katumba, 1,000 square kilometers of rolling country criss-crossed by perennial small rivers and streams, began in August, 1973, and grew rapidly to Ulyankulu's size by the end of 1974. By 1977, both settlements were on half-rations and rapidly approaching self-sufficiency. However, a Viability Mission requested by UNHCR found that Ulyankulu's population was too large for sustained self-sufficiency. Although rainfall was adequate on average, it was extremely variable, with frequent one-year droughts. The soils were found to have poor to very poor fertility, and were liable to degenerate in a very short period of time if intensively cultivated. The Viability Mission recommended that half the refugees be transferred elsewhere so that water resources would be sufficient for the remaining refugees and soil fertility could be maintained.

The Viability Mission accepted the fact that it had been necessary to choose a settlement site for the Burundi refugees quickly, but criticized the failure to conduct ongoing surveys after the initial surveys had been completed or to do adequate planning. The mission indicated that:

Some ability to plan in a crisis should be developed... Within a reasonable time it should become possible to conduct the studies and complete the planning necessary to develop a suitable area into a viable, self-sustained settlement. (Betts, 1981)

The action taken to reduce Ulyankulu's population was

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preventative; disaster loomed but had not struck. However, the mistakes at Ulyankulu meant that 24,000 refugees who had already achieved food self-sufficiency had to begin their efforts anew at Mishamo, and had to be provided again with food and other inputs.

Mishamo, physically the largest of the three settlements with 2,000 square kilometers, opened in late 1978 after a good deal of preparatory work. It was planned from the start as one of the first settlements established under UNHCR's new Project Management System (PMS). The system, which was partly a response to the Ulyankulu experience, includes a detailed project agreement, a plan of operations, and a regular monitoring system. About 1,000 refugees arrived in late 1978, and another 24,000 from Ulyankulu, and 2,000 self-settled refugees from Kigoma brought the population to 27,000 by late 1979.

At Ulyankulu and Katumba, refugee families were given 3.5 hectare plots which were laid out on a grid, or block pattern, along access roads. Refugees lived on their plots, as was traditional in Burundi, rather than grouping their huts. Ulyankulu was divided into 13 villages (since reduced to ten), and Katumba was divided into 15 villages. The Viability Mission seriously criticized this layout, feeling that the subdivisions were an administrative convenience but were not villages in the true sense of the word. The villages were contiguous with no fringe for expansion or fuel supply, and no community center to provide for cohesion. Further, the villages were very large, averaging 720 plots at Ulyankulu and 550 plots at Katumba.

TCRS, the implementing partner for all three settlements, provided refugees with seeds and tools to clear their land and

build a home. Agriculture extension service workers, demonstration plots, fertilizer, nurseries, livestock programs, milling, and marketing services were part of the effort to promote self-sufficiency. Refugees were expected to clear almost one hectare of land in the first year and plant maize, beans, cassava, cowpeas and banana suckers. By two years, two hectares were to be cultivated with the addition of rice, sweet potatoes, ground nuts, and soya beans. Tobacco, particularly at Ulyankulu, was an effective cash crop. The third year it was hoped that food self-sufficiency would be reached, together with an increasing surplus to earn cash. WFP provided food rations during this period of increasing cultivation, planning full rations for two seasons and one-half or one-quarter rations for an additional season.

By 1977, both Katumba and Ulyankulu had an estimated 60,000 refugees each, (a census prior to the transfer in 1978, however, showed only 47,558 persons in Ulyankulu) and both were considered self-sufficient in food. However, while Katumba was fortunate in having perennial water sources and moderately fertile soils, the judgment to reduce Ulyankulu's population was firm.

Mishamo, reflecting the experience of the other settlements and the Viability Mission report, is laid out on a more village-oriented pattern. There are 16 villages, with a capacity to increase to 20 villages. Although a grid pattern with houses on individual plots is used, the villages are smaller 400 five-hectare plots with 375 occupied initially. Also, there is more non-agricultural land between the villages. In addition, there has been greater attention to placing community facilities such

as first aid stations, cooperatives, schools, and demonstration plots in each village to promote cohesion.

Mishamo is a very large settlement, approximately the size of the island of Zanzibar. The remoteness of the site makes it difficult to recruit and retain staff. The original water plan was based on a system of shallow wells, but 1,500 trials have produced only 43 wells. In 1981, the tripartite partners agreed that deep borehole drilling would be necessary. A disagreement over the number of boreholes to be drilled impeded handover. Government representatives wanted 394 wells drilled (the highest number recommended by one of several consultants) while the other partners believe 175 wells will be sufficient.

"Refugees in all three settlements have, for the most part, attained minimum self-sufficiency as farmers and have produced modest surpluses for sale outside the settlements. Sustained economic growth at originally anticipated rates, however, has not been possible in the settlement due largely to the increasingly depressed economic situation in Tanzania as a whole. Indeed, economic gains achieved in Katumba and Ulyankulu by the time of their hand over are now in serious jeopardy. The same situation is likely to occur in respect of Mishamo after hand over if certain preventive measures, including additional infrastructural inputs are not provided." (UNHCR 1984d)

The "serious jeopardy" that the settlements now confront is in part an outgrowth of problems first identified in the 1970's. The Viability Mission and other visitors to Ulyankulu and Katumba criticized several other features of the settlements, besides the problems with the water supply and the lack of follow-up studies. These criticisms included the reliance on fertilizers supplied by the implementing partner which might give an appearance of fertility and self-sufficiency that may prove illusory if supplies were withdrawn; the need to recognize and emphasize the crucial importance of agricultural development as the basis of

refugee livelihood and the source of cash for purchases on which other employment depends; and the need to diversify sources of income and the economic base by encouraging non-agricultural employment opportunities. Another problem area identified was the functioning of the settlement primary cooperatives which were said to be too narrowly based, not innovative, had management who had received no special training, and were vulnerable because the main demand for their services came from the implementing agency. Additional problems included the poor quality and maintenance of road works; self-reliance activities (daycare, building of schools and roads) which involved refugee self-help but little refugee initiative or participation; and a fear that social service considerations (dispensaries and schools in particular) might overshadow economic needs. (Note: Robert Chambers, paraphrased by Betts (1981): "the construction of buildings had been a major preoccupation for refugee settlements in Africa, and while many had been completed and used, many others were too often under-utilized or abandoned.")

In addition to the above difficulties, the three settlements were placed in virgin territories that initially lacked an elementary level of public services. Given its own national economic difficulties, Tanzania has been unable to provide the refugee areas with the infrastructure required -- health, roads, education, water, etc. At ICARA II, in 1984, Tanzania turned to the international community with an extensive list of requests, costing some \$36 million. (Not all of the requests were solely for the three settlements, but their requirements covered the

lion's share of the costs.)

The ICARA II project list addressed many of the same difficulties identified in the late 1970's. The list includes: \$2.4 million to strengthen existing primary cooperatives which are to provide agricultural inputs; \$2.8 million to expand two agricultural training institutes and \$640,000 to establish an agricultural research substation at Mishamo; \$9 million for emergency rehabilitation of roads connecting the settlements to commercial towns; \$1.5 million for rural development community centers and daycare centers; \$7 million for health and family planning to address the extremely high rate of population growth in the settlements and \$3.5 million to improve health delivery services; \$4.5 million to construct a College of National Education to prepare refugees to be teachers; and \$5.4 million to improve water supply in the settlements. Some of the aid requested is not due to problems in the settlements but is intended to bring the infrastructure up to the standard of the Tanzanian Master Plan, itself an ideal level that is not attained in much of the country.

Many of the problems addressed by ICARA II projects were noted in the course of a field visit undertaken in this study to Mishamo and Katumba. The primary cooperatives have been given a prominent role in providing agricultural inputs and in the marketing, processing and transportation of agricultural commodities. However, the field visit noted serious, longstanding complaints about the primary cooperatives, including their domination in one settlement by a few refugee businessmen, their limited services, and their lack of financial and inventory

control. Many refugees have not been educated in the purpose and procedures of cooperatives. Further, it was noted that after handover, problems worsened. Unfortunately, the newly funded project appears to mainly supply equipment, and has only a very modest training component.

The sheer size of these settlements (which are the three largest in Africa) contributes in some ways to their difficulties. Rapid population growth has greatly strained their facilities. Such growth, however, is a longstanding problem in sub-Saharan Africa. At 1,000 square kilometers (Ulyankulu and Katumba) and 2,000 square kilometers (Mishamo) they are vast. There is space on the periphery of each for additional villages, but this fails to meet the desire of young people to stay near their families.

Given the many new projects planned for the three settlements, it is clear that the settlements are experiencing handover without phase-out of international assistance. Ulyankulu and Katumba have been self-sufficient for a number of years but have clearly experienced declines in services and other sectors since handover. Much of this is attributable to the economic crisis in Tanzania but some may also be blamed on the behavior of certain settlement administrators and on certain ill-advised national policies interfering with well-functioning enterprises.

VII. The Settlement for Burundi Refugees in Zaire

21. Mutambala -- 1,700 Burundi (Hutu) refugees (Heidler, 1982). The refugees arrived in late 1976, and the settlement was handed over to the government at the end of 1979.

In 1972, approximately 24,000 Hutu's fled from the massacres in Burundi to Kivu Province in Zaire. The soil in the area is good and many refugees were able to self-settle with marginal UNHCR assistance for seeds, tools, schools for refugees and local residents vocational training, and mobile health teams. However, many refugees remained on relief and received only marginal settlement aid while awaiting a decision by the government of Zaire on whether the refugees could stay indefinitely.

In 1976, the government decided that the refugees could stay, and planning for a settlement began. With AIDR as the implementing agency, Mutambala opened in late 1976 as a mixed farming and fishing community. The three villages of the settlement are on Lake Tanganyika, south of Bukavu. Due to substantial voluntary repatriation, a second movement from the Ruzizi plain in 1977 was smaller than planned. By the end of 1977, the number of refugees in Kivu dropped to 11,300 as many Hutu's voluntarily repatriated or moved elsewhere. AIDR provided permanent schools, wells, a road to the lake for the re-established fishermen, and agricultural assistance. The farming was quickly successful. AIDR construction work was delayed by a lack of cement for communal facilities and of fuel for vehicles, but by April, 1979 it was able to withdraw with only some work on wells to be finished. At the end of 1979 the refugees at Mutambala were self-sufficient, as were the self-settled refugees, and the settlement was taken over the government. Facilities at the settlement are open to Zairians.

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Since 1980, the only assistance to the Burundi refugees has been scholarships to keep approximately 100 to 200 students in lower secondary schools, 200 in higher secondary schools, and several dozen in university.

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Background of Refugee Movements from Ethiopia

Ethiopia is the largest single source of refugees in Africa and has produced refugees in various ways. The primary refugee flows have been a result of the following: a struggle for autonomy in Eritrea; a similar struggle in Tigray; a rebellion amongst the Oromo peoples (the largest single ethnic group in Ethiopia); and fighting in the Ogaden region, which is primarily populated by ethnic Somali's, with the intention of joining that area with Somalia. In addition, since the 1974 overthrow of Emperor Haile Selassie, Ethiopia has had a Marxist-Leninist government whose suppression of opposition groups, such as the "red terror" of 1977-1978, has produced many political refugees. Lastly, Ethiopia has been continually beset with drought and famine which have caused massive dislocations of people.

Ethiopia is a multi-national state dominated by the Amhara ethnic group. As a growing empire in the last century, the Amhara's have extended their control over several areas that are now in varying stages of rebellion. The revolutionary government is dominated by Amharas and is determined to protect Ethiopia's territorial integrity.

Eritrea is a former Italian colony which was federated with the Ethiopian empire after World War II. In 1962, the Emperor moved to annex Eritrea. Although the Eritrean struggle to regain autonomy began immediately, substantial refugee flows did not occur until 1966-1967, when clashes between guerrillas and the military drove more than 30,000 refugees into the Sudan.

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Ethiopia then was dominated by the Coptic Christian Church, while Eritrea contains many Moslems. By the late 1970's, the Eritrean liberation movements, aided by the turmoil of the revolution, seemed on the verge of victory. Massive Soviet arms shipments, and the lack of unity among the liberation fronts, allowed Ethiopia to regain much lost territory. Since then, fighting has seesawed in Eritrea and each new offensive has produced new waves of refugees into the Sudan. The recent famine in this area, with relief complicated by politics, has greatly exacerbated the situation. There are almost one million Ethiopian refugees, mostly Eritrean and Tigray, in eastern Sudan.

Somalia seeks to annex the ethnic Somali Ogaden region. In 1977 and 1978, the Western Somalia Liberation Front, backed by Somali troops, took advantage of revolutionary turmoil and almost seized the region. Massive Soviet and Cuban assistance helped defeat this effort, and caused hundreds of thousands of refugees to flee to Somalia and 30,000 to flee to Djibouti. The border conflict continues to this day. In 1983 and 1984, the majority of the refugees in Djibouti repatriated to Ethiopia. In Somalia, the government announced in 1983 its intention to settle those refugees who wished to stay in Somalia, but little action has been taken to date.

VIII. The Settlement for Refugees from Ethiopia in the Sudan

22. Qala en Nahal -- 34,000 Ethiopian (Eritrean) refugees (Rogge, 1985). The refugees arrived in 1969 and 1970, and the settlement was handed over in 1975. The refugees are Moslems, and most speak Arabic.

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There was a massive influx of Ethiopian refugees into the Kassala area in March, 1967. By year's end there were 28,600 refugees plus 12,000 camels and other animals. An initial settlement effort 200 miles to the south planned by UNHCR, FAO, and UNDP had Sudanese approval but had to be abandoned because a survey showed that the site was not viable.

A new site, Qala en Nahal, 60 kilometers south of Gedaref, was chosen in 1968. The site was on a rail line and had rich soil, but had little drinking water and limited rainfall. Overall the site was marginal: most nationals tended to avoid this region and most of its inhabitants lived in abject poverty.

With the government of the Sudan as the operational partner, the site was prepared for approximately 24,000 refugees in six villages ranging from 2,300 to 5,600 refugees each. The settlement scheme had 103,000 feddans (one feddan is slightly more than an acre) of land, of which 74,000 feddans were useable. The government divided the area into 10 feddan plots, giving one to each of approximately 5,000 refugee families and one to each Sudanese individual. (This generosity was to compensate the local residents for their loss of land rights.)

Water is provided by a 21 mile, eight-inch pipeline from the Rahad River. There are two huge reservoirs near the river which are filled during its six months of flow and four other reservoirs near the six villages. Large diesel pumps lift and move the water. This system has been a source of major difficulties due to a lack of maintenance and occasional fuel shortages.

A pilot group of several hundred refugees were moved to the

first village, Saqata, in 1969. They were given huts and expected to assist with land clearance, the water project, and with building huts for new arrivals. This effort went slowly because the refugees refused to work without substantial incentives. (This lack of cooperation had not been typical of UNHCR's experiences with other settlements.)

Movement to the settlement began in earnest in 1970; 10,000 refugees were moved by rail and 3,000 others came on their own. The villages of Salmin and Burush began in 1970, Zarzur and Adengrar in 1971, and Duheima in 1972. By 1973, 24,500 refugees were reported at Qala en Nahal. Refugee homes were grouped in the traditional Sudanese style with the fields surrounding the villages. Each village was given schools and dispensaries were provided in each by the Swedish Red Cross.

Land clearance was slow. The first major harvest, in 1972, was on only 12,000 feddans out of more than 50,000 allocated. The main crops are sorghum (dura), sesame, and cotton. Although most of the Eritreans had had little experience with cultivation, Qala en Nahal is based on modern agricultural methods. The settlement is part of a larger World Bank supported sesame mechanized farming regional development project. Cultivation thus depends on the functioning of a tractor pool. Until very recently the tractor pool had been run for the refugees with only limited refugee participation in its management. Its true costs have also not been passed on to the refugees. Maintenance has been a problem, and in 1976, UNHCR had to rent tractors "pending the repair of settlement equipment." (UNHCR, 1977)

To a certain degree, Qala en Nahal has been used for attempting innovations. Modern agriculture has required the semi-nomadic refugees to adjust and adapt to a radical change in lifestyle. Further, "the schools at Qala en Nahal are a radical departure from those seen in the average Sudanese rural villages as they were "designed to serve a number of auxiliary purposes: community centre and meeting place, cinema, theatre, adult education and vocational training centre, dispensary if necessary, and so on." (UNHCR, 1972).

In July, 1975, the Sudanese government took over the settlement. However, infrastructural consolidation continued into 1976 with a \$259,000 UNHCR allocation for school construction, tractors and spare parts, agricultural equipment, and the establishment of a market gardening scheme.

After the government took over, a precipitous decline occurred that almost caused the abandonment of the settlement. Poor maintenance and a lack of spare parts and fuel severely cut the capacity of the complex water system. Further, for two planting seasons, 1975 and 1976, local authorities were late in allocating fuel for the tractor pool, resulting in greatly reduced planting and poor harvests. From over 20,000 refugees at handover, the settlement declined to 13,000 by late 1976. Some accounts suggest that the population may have declined to as few as 7,000 to 8,000 refugees (Rogge, 1985).

A lack of settler cooperation exacerbated problems. Rogge (1985) quotes a 1972 settlement report which stated:

528 families ... refused to clear land under the impression that refugees all around the world were not supposed to work and that

their status of refugees gives them the right to be maintained as long as they continue to be refugees.

Aid had to be resumed, and Qala en Nahal was repopulated with refugees recently arrived in the Sudan. In 1977, 2,600 refugees were transferred; in 1978, 2,700 more, in 1979 another 2,500 were moved; and a final 6,300 refugees were transferred in 1980. Recently the population was officially listed as 34,000 refugees. The new arrivals have added greater diversity to the mixture of Eritrean groups. Many of the new arrivals cultivate less than the 10 feddans of farmland deemed necessary to achieve self-reliance. Indeed, in 1981, 47 percent cultivated 5 feddans or less (Rogge, 1985).

Although the more than 14,000 transferred refugees were placed in the same six villages that housed the original refugees, UNHCR makes a distinction between the old and new settlements. In reality, old Qala en Nahal does not stand separately. The distinction refers to the levels of aid and services that the refugees are eligible to receive. Organically there is one Qala en Nahal, and it is not self-sufficient.

In 1981, Euro-Action Acord, an NGO, became actively involved with assistance to the settlement. At that time the settlement was at a level of severe poverty. Euro-Action Acord's efforts have been widely praised. A WFP Interim Evaluation indicated that Qala en Nahal was "being assisted very effectively by a voluntary agency (Euro Action Acord)," and that it had become self-sufficient in food production.

A 1983 mission for UNHCR (Cree, 1983) surveyed the six

villages and found that "four of the Qala en Nahal settlements approached dura (food) self-sufficiency" and the others were close to, but below that level. The best of the six villages had a profit level of only about one-third that of the neighboring Sudanese farmers. The refugee farmers were as productive as the Sudanese but their limited land allocation severely limited their income. The Sudanese farmers had an average plot of 31.25 feddans, whereas the refugees, at most, had ten feddans. Lack of sufficient land to allow for fallowing will harm the refugees' long-term yields. This lack of land also limits their ability to diversify their crops, and although many of the semi-nomadic refugees arrived with livestock, grazing disputes have caused the numbers of animals to be restricted.

IX. The Settlement for Refugees from Ethiopia in Djibouti

23. Mouloud -- 90 Ethiopians and locals. The settlement began in 1979, and became self-sufficient around 1980.


Within the context of a mass influx of Ethiopians into tiny Djibouti, a pilot irrigated farming scheme for a dozen refugee families and an equal number of locals was established at Mouloud. A French voluntary agency (Association Francaise des Volontaires du Progres) supervised vegetable production, construction of a warehouse and dwellings, and establishment of a cooperative. Due to poor soils, the harsh climate, and persistent drought, the per capita cost was high -- \$1,345 -- and it was not possible to repeat the effort on a large scale.

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DJIBOUTI

Area 21,733 sq. km.
 Estimated population 320,000 (1979)
 Population density Approx. 14.7 per sq. km.

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Background of Refugees from Angola

Angola is a major source of refugees, with two distinct periods of exodus -- before independence in 1975, and afterwards. Independence came after fourteen years of fighting against Portuguese colonial rule, with the struggle producing almost a half million refugees. Most fled to Zaire, but some also went to Zambia and Botswana. In the initial years of the liberation struggle, fighting was concentrated in the west and northwest of Angola, and in the Cabinda enclave. Approximately 150,000 refugees fled to Zaire at the start of the conflict, and this figure rose to 450,000 by independence. During this period there were ebbs and flows of spontaneously repatriating refugees or new exoduses as the pace of the conflict varied.

After Zambian independence in 1964, several liberation movements began to operate in the Angolan provinces, which adjoin Zambia. Around 1966, refugees began to flee into Zambia, and in 1968, some fled to the south into Botswana. Besides fleeing the fighting, many refugees fled forced movements into aldeamentos, Portuguese-controlled fortified villages.

Most of the refugees were ethnic kin of their hosts in Zaire, Zambia, and Botswana and were able to settle spontaneously. Only a few settlements were established: Lwatembo, Mayukwayukwa, and Meheba in Zambia, and Etscha in Botswana.

At independence in November, 1975, the hoped-for massive repatriation of all the Angolan refugees did not occur, due to continued fighting between the three main liberation movements. Control of the new government was taken by the Popular Movement

for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) with the aid of Cuban troops brought in by a Soviet airlift. The other forces, however, have continued to fight.

Most of the Angolans in Zambia and Botswana did not repatriate at independence and the settlements have continued to operate. The movements of the 500,000 Angolans who were in Zaire around the time of independence are unclear. Apparently, most either repatriated spontaneously or were forced home by Zaire and the liberation movements in anticipation of independence. The returnees were soon replaced by wave after wave of new arrivals who were loyalists of the losing liberation movements. By 1977, the refugees in Zaire totalled an estimated 500,000 persons.

Since independence, Angola has been continually beset with civil war as well as by repeated invasions of southern Angola by South African troops. As events have fluctuated, there have been many partial repatriations and new flows, but the overall trend has been a decrease in the number of refugees. In 1984, there were several hundred thousand internally displaced persons, 83,000 refugees in Zambia, plus an officially estimated 225,000 refugees in Zaire.



X. The Settlement for Angolan Refugees in Botswana

24. Etscha (Etsha) -- 1,800 Angolan refugees (Heidler, 1983). The refugees arrived in 1968, and the settlement was declared self-sufficient in 1975. Some refugees have been naturalized. The World Council of Churches (WCC) was the implementing agency in tripartite agreement with the Government

BOTSWANA

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Area 600,372 sq. km.
Estimated population 790,000 (mid-79)
Population density 1.3 per sq. km.
Rainy season Approx. October - April



■ Capital

★ Settlement of refugees or displaced persons.

of Botswana and UNHCR.

Work on the settlement began in mid-1969 at the settlement location picked by the government. The area had been previously farmed, but was fallow due to tsetse fly infestation, which had just been cleared so land was available for the refugees. The government of Botswana and the WCC constructed roads, and provided storage facilities, administrative blocks, dispensary, and schools. Each family received two hectares, tools, seeds, and donkeys. The settlement is on a river with good fishing. The government provided extension services, and the World Food Programme supplied food rations.

The total refugee influx numbered about 4,000, and as the same tribe lived on both sides of the border, the refugees were quite familiar with the area. About 13 villages were built along traditional styles. The refugees were able to retain the social groupings that had existed in Angola, which helped create a positive and energetic approach to settlement.

1969 -- Refugees arrive, good start but severe drought ruined first harvest.

1970 -- Harvest produces surplus estimated sufficient for 2 years.

1971 -- Second good harvest, refugees buy cattle.

-- Refugees receive residence permits allowing them to diversify economic activities.

-- UNHCR sets up schools. Phase out of assistance begins.

1972 -- 3,700 refugees at settlement but some voluntary repatriation to Angola.

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1974 -- Refugees processed for citizenship.

1975 -- Many refugees receive citizenship. UNHCR program ends.

In recent years, it has been reported that most of the refugees have repatriated, and others have moved to the Dukwe II settlement, a more recent settlement in Botswana.



XI. Settlements in Zambia

25. Mayukwayukwa -- 1,400 Angolan refugees (Heidler, 1982). Established in January, 1967, and handed over to the Zambian Government in June, 1973.

Mayukwayukwa is located in Zambia's Western Province, some distance from the border, and has ninety square kilometers of very mixed quality soil near the Luene River. The province also has approximately 10,000 spontaneously-settled Angolan refugees, who make up about 12 percent of the total population.

Large numbers of Angolan refugees began to openly arrive in Zambia in 1966. The refugees were already familiar with the area, having strong kinship relationships with the local population and long being accustomed to migrate or travel across the border. The first settlement for the Angolans, Lwatembo, was opened in 1966 without a soil survey, and was closed in 1971, when its population was transferred to Meheba. It had quickly become overcrowded and a second settlement, Mayukwayukwa, was opened. Mayukwayukwa is on a site selected by the government, again without a survey. It had difficulties from the day of its inception. The settlement was opened for an initial 1,500 refugees, but only 452 arrived in January, 1967, as the others

Area 752,614 sq.km.
 Estimated population 6,030,000 (mid-82)
 Population density Approx. 8 per sq.km.
 Rainy season November - April



- Capital
- ★ Settlement of refugees or displaced persons.
- Town or village
- ▨ Region comprising a population of refugees or displaced persons.

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refused to leave their cattle at the border. This sort of problem with the number of refugees present as opposed to the number in the plan continued until the settlement stabilized in 1972.

In late 1967, 1,700 refugees were transferred from the overcrowded Lwatembo settlements bringing the population in Mayukwayukwa to 2,200. During 1968, an additional 1,500 refugees from Angola and Namibia were sent to the settlement, many of whom had no huts and had to sleep in unfinished communal facilities. Although Mayakwayukwa thus began 1969 with almost 4,000 refugees, it was down to only 3,000 by mid-year as many drifted away. A round-up of "defectors" by the government brought the settlement up to 3,700 by early 1970. At the end of 1970, a new influx of Angolan refugees brought the settlement up to 5,000 refugees. By mid-1971 over 1,000 had drifted away. At the end of 1971, much of the population was transferred to the new settlement at Meheba, leaving Mayukwayukwa with only about 1,000 refugees.

The population fluctuations, which greatly disrupted the settlement, were the result of several problems. Farming at Mayuwayukwa was communal, which many refugees disliked. Furthermore, as the later decision to reduce the settlement population confirmed, the soil was inadequate to support so many refugees. The government added to the problem by using the settlement as a handy place to hold newly arrived refugees. Lastly, many refugees after 1970 knew of the plans for establishing Meheba and did not wish to put effort into a settlement that was not to be their permanent home.

In January, 1968, the Zambian Christian Refugee Service

(ZCRS), an affiliate of the Lutheran World Federation (LWF), took over as operational partner at Mayukwayukwa. (ZCRS was set up by LWF at the invitation of Zambian government and UNHCR to replicate the pattern already being used in Tanzania.) Following the government's plan of communal farming, ZCRS gave each refugee only a one-quarter acre plot while expecting all refugees to spend most of their time and effort on the communal lands. WFP provided the refugees with full rations which were used along with free blankets and clothing to encourage the refugees to do the communal work. Most refugees, however, worked on their own plots or went off to hunt.

In 1968, ZCRS also built a very large school (the second largest in the district) as well as a clinic, a community hall, staff housing, storehouses, administrative offices, and later, a water tower, and wells. Refugees were induced to do some of the work through small cash payments or in exchange for clothing. Many of the facilities were open to the local population and the school was taken over by the government in 1971. As part of the construction program, many refugees were trained in mechanics, carpentry, brickmaking, and other skills. Most of these skilled refugees left in 1971 to help build Meheba.

ZCRS provided the refugees with agricultural assistance by means of an extension service, the provision of tools and seeds, and direction of the communal farm. A successful small livestock program of poultry and rabbits was introduced. The main problems, however, were the refugees' lack of interest in communal farming and the lack of good land to support 4-5,000

refugees. Irrigated land near the river that was cleared and worked communally showed good results in maize, groundnuts, potatoes, cowpeas, and vegetables.

The transfer of two-thirds of Mayukwayukwa's refugees to Meheba in late 1971 greatly changed the settlement. The remaining 150 families were given private plots of five acres each. These refugees clearly benefitted from all of the land clearance and other work done by those who were transferred. Communal farming was ended and the refugees were productive on their private plots growing maize, sugarbeans, cassava, and vegetables. They were almost immediately self-sufficient in food and earned cash from sales of maize. The remaining refugees also benefitted from an infrastructure designed for a larger group.

International aid ended in 1973, and Mayukwayakwa was handed over to the government in June, 1973. Little has been heard of the settlement since then. The current population is officially 1,400 refugees. They have Zambian identity cards "to enhance their mobility," and no special aid has been requested for them. The area in which they live has been struck by drought and famine, but no special assistance has been given to the settlement.

26. Meheba -- 11,066 refugees (from ICARA II documentation - UN, 1984b). Approximately 92 percent are Angolans, five percent are from Zaire, and the rest are from Namibia and South Africa. Opened in 1970, with handover in April, 1982.

Meheba is a very large settlement (580 square kilometers) in Zambia's Northwestern Province. It was established to take

refugees from both the abandoned settlement at Lwatembo and the overcrowded Mayukwayukwa settlement. The site was inspected and approved by a 1969 FAO mission, which found thick brush, perennial streams, good rain patterns, and good soils in a virtually uninhabited area.

Work began in 1970 when 700 able-bodied refugees, plus some Zambian local labor, cleared brush in preparation for larger numbers of refugees. By 1972, there were 6,000 refugees on 1,500 family plots of 5 hectares each. Some spontaneously settled Angolans were also brought to Meheba, as were 780 Namibians.

By 1975, the settlement had over 8,000 refugees. After Angolan independence in 1975, about 500 refugees left, but the fighting in Angola led to major new influxes in subsequent years. In 1976, 4,000 Angolans arrived. In 1977, there were major fluctuations as more Angolans arrived, as did 400 refugees from the fighting in Shaba, Zaire. In 1978, 3,000 refugees came from Shaba, bringing the settlement to 15,000 refugees. Later, in 1978, most of the Zaireans and 2,709 Angolans repatriated to their respective homelands. This brought Meheba's population down to under 10,000 refugees. Since then, there have been only small flows of refugees in and out of Meheba. At handover in 1982, the population was 10,503. Since then it has increased slightly.

Due to the large fluctuations in Meheba's size throughout the 1970's and the holding period at the time of Angolan independence, no new capital investments were made during that period. As a result, this inaction greatly slowed the settlement's efforts towards stability and self-sufficiency.

Each of the new influxes required WFP rations for a couple of years and many refugees, unsure about permanent exile or repatriation, deferred activities that might have led them beyond subsistence.

The Zambian Christian Refugee Service was the operating partner for Meheba. At first the settlement was laid out with roads one kilometer apart and in plots of 100 meters by 500 meters. Initially the settlement was decentralized into three sections, each having a field officer and an agricultural extension agent. In 1980, it was reorganized into seven villages to encourage greater refugee participation.

With relatively good rainfall (although there were droughts in 1973 and 1984) and abundant land, agriculture at Meheba has been productive. Maize, beans, sweet potato, cassava, groundnuts, vegetables, and tobacco as a cash crop, have been grown. The arriving refugees were given a low level of inputs; each adult received a bucket, ax, and hoe and two items of clothing and a blanket. WFP food rations generally held to the two-year schedule. Refugees also received free seeds and fertilizer for two years. To encourage good agricultural practices, only those refugees whose plots were well-tended were eligible for cash jobs on roads and buildings. The abundant ground water resources and swamps allowed development of many fish ponds and irrigated vegetable plots. Meheba is now described as the main supplier of vegetables to Solwezi which is 72 kilometers away. ZCRS also ran a tractor pool on a full fee in advance basis that had more takers than there was available

tractor time.

Construction of educational facilities began early. By 1973, there were 24 classrooms and 12 teachers' houses. Students also worked on a poultry and duck scheme and on a vegetable and fruit scheme. In 1974, the Zambia Education Ministry took over responsibility for education. In 1977, a secondary school for 50 students was established.

ZCRS community development activities included courses and workshops in carpentry, blacksmithing, bicycle repair, and tailoring. A clothes-for-work scheme encouraged refugees to work on wells, latrines, and roads. This program was ended, however, because of corruption and other difficulties. In the late 1970's ZCRS encouraged a variety of secondary economic activities such as a bakery run by urban refugees, maize mills, charcoal production, and timber and carpenter cooperatives. The carpenter cooperative produced furniture for the schools through a contract with the Ministry of Education. The timber cooperative was successful in the early years but illegal timber cutting stripped the area of large trees. As a result, this activity diminished rapidly.

There was a long delay in beginning primary cooperatives at Meheba. This was due to government officials resisting the idea that non-citizens could form a cooperative. Once it began in 1980, however, refugees reportedly spent most of their meeting time in issues of who had spent how much for what and not on questions such as marketing, getting a license to be able to officially sell outside of the settlement, etc., which were more important to the long-term future of the endeavor.

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The National Marketing Board has a depot in the settlement to buy the refugees' surplus produce. However, its slow payment for crops led many refugees to take their produce directly to Solwezi. By the late 1970s Zambia's economic difficulties also affected Meheba, particularly through a lack of fertilizer.

Once the settlement population stabilized in 1979, Meheba made substantial progress towards self-sufficiency. The refugees are good farmers and water and soils are adequate. WFP rations ended in 1980. Handover took place in April 1982. In 1984, there was a serious drought in the area, but no renewal of aid. At ICARA II, Zambia requested \$3 million for a secondary school, health center, and fish ponds for Meheba.

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XII. The Settlement for Angolan Refugees in Zaire

27. Cataractes - 100,000 to 150,000 Angolan refugees.

Refugees arrived in 1976, possibly earlier. UNHCR's integration program began in 1978; major aid ended in 1981 when refugees were "now considered to have reached the same level as the local population." (UNHCR, 1982a)

Cataractes is not an organized rural settlement. It is better described as an assisted self-settlement with UNHCR providing "marginal assistance towards spontaneous local integration." (Betts, 1980) However, because it is included in the list of "UNHCR-Assisted Rural Settlements" it is described here.

From 1961, until November, 1975, there were increasing numbers of Angolan refugees who fled due to the struggle for independence from Portugal. Eventually they totaled an estimated 460,000 exiles. Independence produced a massive but incomplete voluntary repatriation, as the three liberation movements fought for control of the new state. The result was new waves of refugees which began to flow from northern Angola into the Cataractes sub-region of Bas-Zaire and into other parts of Zaire.

It is suggested (Betts, 1980) that many of those who fled after late 1975 were not the same peoples who had repatriated earlier, but rather were those who had been in Angola supporting the two defeated liberation movements. There is a "welter of irreconcilable figures" (Betts, 1980) for the Angolan refugee movements of this period. Part of the confusion concerns refugees who never repatriated and whose status is unclear.

However, in Cataractes' sub-region UNHCR was concerned with approximately 20,000 refugees in 1976, with an influx of perhaps 60,000 new arrivals by early 1978, and a total of 100,000 refugees by 1979. At ICARA II in 1984, 150,000 Angolan refugees were reported to be in Cataractes.

The rapidly changing refugee situation in Cataractes caused UNHCR to make major revisions in its assistance plans. Initially, in 1977, the plan was to settle 5,000 in organized settlements assisted by AIDR during 1978. This was adjusted after the first massive influx in late 1977 to settlements for 15,000 refugees who would need assistance for only two harvests. The next influx upset these plans. Coupled with an early 1978 report from a joint WFP-UNHCR mission, which found most refugees were women and children and most were totally destitute, new plans were formulated. UNHCR's Local Integration Program emphasized "marginal assistance towards spontaneous local integration" for 100,000 refugees. (Betts, 1980)

Spontaneous settlement had provided for almost all of the Angolan refugees before independence. It, too, would have been relied upon for the bulk of the post-independence refugees even if the organized settlement program had gone forward. Both refugees and local inhabitants are members of the Bakongo tribe, who share a strong tribal identity and familiarity with one another because of high levels of migration across the artificial international boundary. The local people did not view the refugees as foreigners, but since there had been extensive suffering in the first spontaneous settlement, it was likely that 100,000 to 150,000 refugees would be a major burden on the

approximately one million local inhabitants.

From 1976 to 1979, UNHCR and WFP provided relief to the refugees with AIDR, and a network of missions in the area assisting also. However, AIDR, which had become involved due to the plans for organized settlement, pulled out when the assisted self-settlement program was beginning because the new tactics did not fit into its resources. Instead, the program--both relief and local integration--was conducted by a joint team of Swiss volunteers and Mediciens Sans Frontieres (MSF). A drought in 1978 and 1979 caused acute difficulties for the refugees.

The marginal assistance toward local integration included construction of classrooms, dispensaries and wells, along with WFP provision of domestic utensils, agricultural tools and seeds. Many schools in the area were underutilized due to shortages of materials and equipment. Zairian chiefs provided land to the refugees who planted maize, sorghum and cassana.

In 1978, it was hoped that a crash planting program in the fall would allow rations to be quickly reduced. The drought, however, continued and there were delays in getting tools and seeds to the refugees. This was repeated in the fall of 1979, but the program was "too grandiose to administer." (Betts, 1980) There was too little transport to deliver seeds and cuttings to 100,000 scattered refugees (many refugees integrated into Zairian villages or founded new villages where either refugees or nationals might be the majority). UNHCR was forced to assume that the refugees would be able to get agricultural aid from their tribal kin.

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In 1980, major seed and tool distribution and other aid was ending and, for the most part, ceased in 1981. While medical and education assistance continued, the refugees were considered to have reached the level of the local population by 1981.

However, "for the past decade, Zaire has experienced an economic crisis of greater magnitude than that in most developing countries." "It is currently one of the poorest countries in the world with a dismal short-term economic outlook." (UN, 1984b) The standard of living of the local population is hardly satisfactory. Furthermore, the assistance program from 1978 to 1981 concentrated on agriculture and on putting an end to ration provisions. Although the aid effort fell short of its targets for delivering resources, the refugees were nonetheless food self-sufficient by 1981. Unfortunately, this represented a rather incomplete sense of self-sufficiency.

Zaire's ICARA II request for the Cataractes sub-region indicates some of the refugees' unmet needs: reconstruction of 350 kilometers (out of 2,600 kilometers in the entire sub-region) of feeder roads that mainly serve the refugees to stimulate marketing of agricultural produce; rehabilitation of 50 dispensaries in Cataractes, plus the establishment of three central zone health offices used to supervise and train health personnel and encourage preventive medicine; two social development centers to train refugees to be technicians, clerks, and craftsmen and to train women in handicrafts and sewing; and, an agricultural training center to produce extension workers. According to ICARA II documents, the present agricultural extension program is extremely inadequate and without proper advice

the refugees are likely to exhaust the soil, deforest the land, and cause widespread erosion. Zaire listed the 1984 Cataractes population as 40,000 adult men, 50,000 adult women, 35,000 adolescents, and 25,000 children.

XIII. The Settlement for Zambian Refugees in Zaire

28. Kanyama - 750 Lumpa Church refugees from Zambia (Holborn, 1975). The refugees arrived in July 1971, and the settlement was self-sufficient by the end of 1972.

After mid-1964, fighting between Zambian authorities and members of the Lumpa Church, followed by the banning of the sect and jailing of its prophetess, led to an exodus of Church members to Zaire, especially to the southern Katanga Province in Zaire where they had ethnic kinfolk. By late 1967, 15,000 Lumpa were in exile.

Subsequently, the two governments tried to cooperate on a peaceful return and, in 1968, some 2,000 Lumpa refugees voluntarily repatriated to Zambia. UNHCR was asked to assist and, after a survey of the remaining refugees, found that most were willing to move to other parts of Zaire, away from the border. A 1969 UNHCR, ILO, FAO, and AIDR mission selected a site at Kanyama some 400 miles away in northwest Katanga. The settlement was planned for 10,000 to 13,000 refugees and the International Organization for Rural Development (IORD) was selected as operational partner. (IORD is connected to AIDR.)

After long delays by the Zairian government, in 1971, the first refugees (183 families), moved to Kanyama. The remainder suddenly decided to return to Zambia. A settlement planned for

10,000 refugees was left with only 750 settlers.

Kanyama settlement has two villages, Kamvunu and Katwishi, which quickly became self-sufficient. Food rations were provided for two harvests. The refugees planted maize, groundnuts, paddy, soya and cassava on the good soil. Some refugees brought livestock and poultry with them from the border.

Permanent schools were built in 1971 and taken over by Zaire in 1972. Refugees use the local health services, and about 30 percent of the overall population are local inhabitants. Relations were good, with both groups cooperating on self-help projects and sharing the schools. A Catholic Mission in the area also assisted the refugees. Assistance ceased at the end of 1972.

XIV. The Settlement for Zairian Refugees in Tanzania

29. Pangale - 700 refugees, most from Zaire. Begun in 1966, and handed over in 1971.

Pangale was set up near Tabora, Tanzania in 1966 for refugees fleeing rebellion in the Congo in 1964, 1965, and 1966. The refugees were mostly from Congo border tribes. When the settlement was opened, most repatriated rather than move inland. The Government of Tanzania was the implementing partner with aid from UNHCR and TCRS. The refugees have grown cash crops and produced charcoal. The settlement has served as a combination agricultural settlement and transit center. It was used by Burundi refugees on their way to Ulyankulu.

There is a small ICARA II request for a rural-development community center.

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XV. The Settlement for Zairian Refugees in the Sudan

30. Rajaf - 5,000 refugees from Zaire. Arrived in 1970, self-sufficient in 1977.

In 1967, the Sudan, working with UNHCR, tried to repatriate 4,700 former Simba rebels to Zaire. The effort failed. In 1968, 2,000 more refugees arrived, followed by 500 more.

In July, 1968, the government of the Sudan agreed to establish a settlement. Progress was slow because the first site selected was unsatisfactory. The initial plan was for 5,000 refugees to settle with an equal number of Sudanese while the government was held responsible for half of the costs. The government was unenthusiastic and moved slowly. Eventually, the refugee transit location itself was surveyed and a decision made to go ahead. The site is in the eastern Nile region below Juba. Although planned for 10,000 people about 2,000 Congolese and a few hundred Sudanese joined the settlement. In 1976, the government of the Sudan took responsibility for the settlement.

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