

PN-AAU-551

1501

CONTEXT AND STRATEGY IN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT MANAGEMENT:  
LESSONS FROM SIX AGRICULTURAL PROJECTS

by  
George Honadle

July 1985

002125

003433

=

9300085

Development Alternatives, Inc.  
624 Ninth St., NW  
Washington, DC 20001

DEVELOPMENT MANAGERS ARE MERE MORTALS IN A WORLD WHERE  
THE OLYMPIAN DECISIONS ARE MADE IN THE PRESIDENTIAL  
PALACES AND FINANCE MINISTRIES AND PARTY HEADQUARTERS.\*

--- Jerry Wolgin

Economist,  
Africa Bureau,  
U.S. Agency for  
International  
Development

THE FIRST THING WHICH WE MUST RECOGNIZE IS THAT EFFECTIVE  
MANAGEMENT . . . IS THE MOST CRITICAL FACTOR IN THE DEVELOP-  
MENT PROCESS OF ANY COUNTRY.\*\*

--- Philip Ndegwa

Governor of the  
Central Bank of Kenya

\*Jerry Wolgin, "Development Management Amid Economic Crisis"  
(Paper presented to the Workshop on Development Management in  
Africa, Easton, Md., September 1984), p. 10.

\*\*Philip Ndegwa, Africa's Development Crisis (Nairobi:  
Heineman Educational Books, 1985), pp. 127-128.

## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Authorship of a paper, like management, is often ascribed to an individual even though it reflects the contributions of many. Among those whose comments, criticisms, and clarifications were most instrumental in shaping the final product are: Tony Barclay, Russell Betts, Don Bowles, Gerald Britan, Coralie Bryant, James Cotter, Chris Hermann, Michael Horowitz, Kenneth Kornher, David Leonard, Laura McPherson, Norman Nicholson, Haven North, Craig Olson, Dennis Rondinelli, Irving Rosenthal, Matt Seymour, Margaret Shaw, Nena Vreeland, and Marion Warren. Editorial contributions by Linda Robinson and word processing assistance by Carol Kulski and Cereta Dudley are also appreciated.

As it evolved, this paper passed through various iterations with the shifting importance of different lessons. "Promoting Performance in Agricultural Projects" and "Olympians and Mortals in African Development" were titles of earlier drafts. Comments on the first version by participants in the Workshop on Development Management in Africa in April 1985 helped focus the draft. Pat Fleuret contributed significantly at this stage, as did Merlyn Kettering. A review committee within the Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination, Center for Development Information and Evaluation (PPC/CDIE), of the U.S. Agency for International Development was especially helpful at later stages, as was internal review at Development Alternatives, Inc. (DAI).

The field trip to Lesotho was a most engaging experience as a result of the efforts of Marion Warren, Bob Walter, and Sam Montsi (the other team members), and the staff of USAID, the contractor, and the Government of Lesotho. Their dedication and insights are most appreciated.

The paper and field work were supported by AID through contract no. PDC-1406-I-23-1097-00 with DAI. Although support and assistance from these organizations and individuals are acknowledged, responsibility for all conclusions and opinions, as well as any errors of omission or commission, remains that of the author alone.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

|   | <u>Page</u> |
|---|-------------|
| <b>CHAPTER ONE</b>                            |             |
| INTRODUCTION . . . . .                        | 1           |
| VIEWS OF THE PROBLEM . . . . .                | 1           |
| RESPONDING TO THE NEED . . . . .              | 4           |
| OVERCOMING PERCEPTUAL BARRIERS . . . . .      | 6           |
| <b>CHAPTER TWO</b>                            |             |
| THE PROJECTS AND THEIR SETTINGS . . . . .     | 9           |
| PROJECTS REVIEWED . . . . .                   | 9           |
| A CONTEXTUAL MAP. . . . .                     | 11          |
| OBJECTIVES AND STAKEHOLDERS . . . . .         | 12          |
| INSTITUTIONAL AND OTHER CONSTRAINTS . . . . . | 13          |
| <b>CHAPTER THREE</b>                          |             |
| PROJECT STRATEGIES AND PERFORMANCE . . . . .  | 19          |
| MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES . . . . .               | 19          |
| MANAGEMENT ENHANCEMENT STRATEGIES . . . . .   | 25          |
| PROJECT PERFORMANCE . . . . .                 | 30          |
| <b>CHAPTER FOUR</b>                           |             |
| LESSONS FROM THE EXPERIENCE. . . . .          | 37          |
| GOALS AND BENEFITS. . . . .                   | 37          |
| REDUCING STAKEHOLDER RISK . . . . .           | 41          |
| TIME HORIZON. . . . .                         | 43          |
| RESOURCE MANAGEMENT . . . . .                 | 45          |
| MANAGERIAL LEADERSHIP . . . . .               | 47          |
| TRAINING AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE . . . . .   | 51          |

CHAPTER FIVE

|   |    |
|---|----|
| CONCLUSION . . . . .                        | 55 |
| CONTEXT . . . . .                           | 55 |
| MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES . . . . .             | 56 |
| MANAGEMENT ENHANCEMENT STRATEGIES . . . . . | 57 |
| IMPLICATIONS. . . . .                       | 58 |
| NOTES . . . . .                             | 63 |
| ANNEX A: LIST OF CASE STUDIES. . . . .      | 67 |

## LIST OF FIGURES

|  | <u>Page</u> |
|--|-------------|
| 1 Contextual Factors and Projects . . . . .                        | 16          |
| 2 Management Strategies . . . . .                                  | 21          |
| 3 Management Enhancement Strategies . . . . .                      | 27          |
| 4 Project Performance . . . . .                                    | 33          |
| 5 Considerations for Development Assistance<br>in Africa . . . . . | 61          |

## CHAPTER ONE

### INTRODUCTION

The Wolgin and Ndegwa citations that introduce this paper represent very different interpretations of the importance of management relative to policy reform strategies for addressing Africa's economic crisis. This paper argues, however, that:

- The policy/management apposition is overly simplistic -- management practices can constrain or expand policy opportunities and results just as policies can help or inhibit management;
- Project performance results from the interaction between strategy and context; and
- The solution to the crisis lies less with the importation of cures (whether policy or management) than with an understanding of local context and building appropriate responses to that context.

To support these arguments, however, three points must be discussed. The first is the evolution of perspectives on the relative importance of development policy and management. The second is the place of this study in that evolution. The third is the perceptual barriers that will have to be overcome for this study to achieve operational results. Each point is addressed below.

### VIEWS OF THE PROBLEM

Since the publication of the World Bank's Berg Report in 1981, a predominant view of the source of Africa's crisis has emphasized the impact of inappropriate economic policies.[1] As policy-oriented perspectives have gained currency in the development community, the need for policy reform has grown from an insight to a blanket prescription. Indeed, a mechanical view of the benefits that will result from policies such as getting the prices right or revaluing currency has obscured the reasons why

those policies came about as well as the nature of the terrain through which reformers must travel.[2] Structural adjustment programs are often specific about policy reforms to be accomplished but vague about how to achieve them. That is, the management dimension of policy reform is typically left out of structural adjustment programs.

The World Bank's 1984 follow-on to the Berg Report ostensibly stresses the need for management capacity and appropriate technical assistance as the second of its four emphases.[3] The authors of this report, however, still see the management problem largely in macro terms. The chapters on managing policy reform and supporting policy reform view the issue as one of donor coordination, macro management of the economy, and debt servicing. Thus, even though management is noted as important, the prescribed way out of the crisis avoids direct confrontation with management processes. To the authors of the report, convincing the Olympians to adopt preferred economic policies remains more important than supporting the management efforts of the lowly mortals.

Other writers, however, were concurrently recognizing that the management of development efforts was an important element for explaining successes as well as failures.[4] Management was not the only determinant of results, but its relative importance was great enough for the World Bank's World Development Report, 1983 to dwell on the theme of management in development. Even so, there was dissatisfaction with the report's treatment of management.[5] Until the dimensions of development management could be more clearly articulated and refined, neither policy reform nor management assistance was likely to be conducted more effectively. Although this applies to all geographic regions, the intensity of Africa's current crisis makes it most salient there. But there are different views of how to solve Africa's development management problems.

One view is that Western methods and theories can be applied universally, and they will yield results similar to those obtained from their application in industrial settings.[6] Another view is that each area of the world is permeated with unique historical and cultural characteristics that negate any imported theories or methods.[7] But two recent studies have taken some initial steps toward resolving the impasse between these two positions.

The first study examined journal articles that focused on organization and management in the developing world to determine the breakout between those that took the first position and those that took the second. Furthermore, the reasons for the division of opinion were explored.

The major finding of this study was that, when Western theories and methods were determined to be appropriate, the articles were concerned with internal issues tied closely to the organization's production technology. When the theories and techniques were found not to fit, however, the articles dealt with processes that extended into the organization's environment.[8]

The authors of this survey of academic literature concluded that:

In general, each time the environment is involved, the theory developed for Western settings does not apply, because it assumes contingencies that may not be valid for developing countries. In these situations, utilization must be preceded by a situational analysis to identify the relevant contingencies and their inter-relationships.

A study of 24 rural development projects came to a similar conclusion. This exercise argued that Western management theories and methods were appropriate for building roads, bridges, and clinics or delivering goods and services. But the need to induce local responses to those services and the mandate that development projects stimulate self-sustaining dynamics created an intense interaction between project organizations and local environments. As a result of these interactions, the imported perspectives often lost their predictive power.[9]

Using an analytic model based on project objectives and linkage processes, the authors of this study concluded that:

Orthodox management science does offer sound guidance for delivering goods and services . . . . But generating local action and sustaining benefit flows are objectives that fall outside the domain of formalistic Western management theory . . . . Universalistic management science is a useful starting point for the first linkage in the model, but the contextual mappers may possess the key tools required to forge the second and third linkages.

Both academic literature and field studies, then, support the importance of context in development management. A clear picture of development management must be based on an environment that is lighted and focused, rather than on an imported theory that casts its own dark shadow and blurs the background of the subject.

#### RESPONDING TO THE NEED

In response to this need for a sharpened understanding of how to fit organization and management approaches to African circumstances, the United States Agency for International Development in 1984 commissioned a series of case studies of the management dimension of six agricultural projects in Africa. The

studies were jointly sponsored by AID's Center for Development Information and Evaluation in the Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination, and the Bureau for Africa. The effort was under the direction of Irving Rosenthal, Sector Coordinator for Development Management.

The study process began in September 1984, with a workshop held in Easton Maryland, to equip the teams to undertake the field studies. Field work began in October 1984, and ended in late March 1985. Visits to Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Niger, Senegal, and Zaire were made during this time. In late April 1985, a workshop was held to reassemble the field teams and compare case findings.[10]

The focus of the studies covered three main areas of concern:[11]

- Contextual factors related to management, including the impact on the project of local physical, environmental, political, and cultural factors, as well as worldwide economic and political conditions;
- Management strategy, including organizational structure and institutionalization choices encompassing both formally established and informally constituted working relationships among affected organizations and people; resource control encompassing financial, commodity, and logistics management; and the approach to getting things done in an effective and efficient manner; and
- Management enhancement strategy, involving attempts to change administrative processes such as ways of carrying out development programs in the local setting; and human resource management and behavioral considerations such as the skills, performance, and management capacity of the people who are part of, or who will benefit from, the project.

The first area emphasizes the impact of the local environment on the project. The second area is concerned with the way the project was designed and managed to encounter and change that

environment. The third area relates to those actions taken to strengthen the management and institutional capacity of those people who will inherit the project after donor funding ends.

This paper synthesizes the findings of the case studies and highlights lessons that emerged from them. But for those lessons to be taken seriously, it will be necessary to overcome some perceptual barriers that obstruct an acceptance of important roles for organization and management in the development process.

#### OVERCOMING PERCEPTUAL BARRIERS

Any discussion of the management of development programs has four handicaps:

- It runs the risk of stating what non-management specialists consider to be obvious;
- It must include the dimension of leadership, which to many people boils down to just getting the right managers to run things;
- It invariably leads to messy sets of problem causes and solutions instead of clear individual ones, making the discussion seem fuzzy, non-prescriptive, and loaded with qualifiers; and
- The effect of management decisions and behavior often seems fleeting and difficult to see, adding to the fuzziness and keeping management out of the realm of expert knowledge and in the realm of common sense.

The practical problem that arises from these perceptual barriers is that good management is taken for granted. It is assumed that what must be done is universally obvious and that if problems occur they can be overcome by a change in personnel or some training. But this simplistic approach seldom works. Attempts to transfer experience from one setting into another

without adjusting for differences among those settings can lead to the failure of the intuitively obvious when it is empirically dubious.

To deal with this difficulty, this paper follows a progression from context to strategy to performance to lessons. This progression is used to reveal and specify the complex, inconsistent, or counterintuitive elements of successful development management. Moreover, it suggests a process for tailoring general knowledge to fit specific circumstances.

## CHAPTER TWO

### THE PROJECTS AND THEIR SETTINGS

The projects reviewed here are distributed throughout sub-Saharan Africa. Three are in Anglophone countries, and three are in Francophone countries. One is in East Africa, one is in southern Africa, and four are in West Africa. A brief description of each project follows.

#### PROJECTS REVIEWED

The project descriptions that follow are intended to give the reader a sense of the major activities undertaken to provide a grounding for the later discussion. These descriptions are not expected to replace or summarize the individual case studies. This paper deals with crosscutting themes rather than project-specific issues and recommendations. Readers wishing more details should consult the cases studies, which are listed in Annex A.

The Egerton College Expansion Project in Kenya aimed at upgrading a training institute for extension agents. Faculty were sent to the United States to obtain advanced degrees while technical assistance staff took their places. Simultaneously, a quadrangle consisting of a library and two other buildings was built on the Egerton campus. Later, a fourth building was added under the project, which began implementation in 1980 and was completed in 1984.

The Land Conservation and Range Development Project in Lesotho aims at reversing severe soil erosion and range deterioration while improving the economic opportunities available through the productive use of livestock. The project uses a two-pronged approach to the problem. First, training and staffing

divisions of conservation and range management at a national level within the Ministry of Agriculture provide an organizational base for addressing the national problem. Second, the establishment of a pilot area to build a range management association provides a means for implementing policy and testing field approaches for later replication throughout the country. The project began in 1981 and will end in 1987, but it is one in a series of three linked projects, the first of which began in 1976 and the third expected to begin implementation in 1986.

In Liberia, a sequence of two projects, the Agricultural Sector Analysis and Planning Project and the Agriculture Development Program, focus on upgrading the capacity within the Ministry of Agriculture to conduct sector analyses and use those data for planning purposes. The project is placed within the Ministry of Agriculture at the national level. Training and technical assistance form the core of the Monrovia-based projects. The first project began in 1980 and the second will be completed in 1986.

The Niamey Department Development Project in Niger uses different line agencies, at the sub-national level, to develop and extend technical packages to increase food production. In addition to raising production, the project is expected to improve existing technical services and the linkages among them. Project funding is used to augment ongoing efforts of the line agencies. Implementation began in 1982 and will be completed in 1987.

The Bakel Small Irrigated Perimeters Project in Senegal is attempting to diversify agricultural production and reduce the risk of drought in this Sahelian country. The project is implemented through a sub-national parastatal organization focusing on riverine areas. Training of farmer groups plays a major role in

the effort, and a phase-out of parastatal responsibilities and build-up of local organizational responsibility are planned. The project began in 1981 and is expected to end in 1986.

The North Shaba Rural Development Project in Zaire is located in the northern part of what was formerly Katanga Province. This project aims at increasing maize production through the introduction of new technologies, the strengthening of local organizations, and the improvement of the grain marketing system. The project was initially implemented through a semi-autonomous project management unit, but responsibility is now being transferred to private sector and village organizations. The project began in 1977 and will be completed in 1986.

Thus, the emphases of the six projects cover a wide range: an agricultural college, land conservation and range development, sector planning, irrigation, maize production, and integrated rural development are all represented. Organizationally, they are equally diverse, with parastatals, sub-national line agencies, a national line agency, a national line agency with a geographically isolated field area, and a self-contained project management unit all used as implementation mechanisms. This variety poses the question of what contextual factors promoted such a wide range of responses.

#### A CONTEXTUAL MAP

A focus on context requires some organizing scheme to put boundaries on this notion of significant surroundings. Unfortunately, the state of the art has not advanced to the point at which there is a commonly accepted contextual map. Contingency theories of management agree that appropriate practices depend on circumstances, but the theories do not agree on what circumstances are important.[12] Moreover, many exposi-

tions classify environments in such abstract terms that, at first glance, they are difficult to use in developing country settings.[13]

But returning to a classic study suggests a key factor defining a relevant environmental dimension for management purposes -- the goals of an organization (project) in relation to the goals of significant environmental organizations and institutions.[14] This perspective is compatible with the conclusions of the studies of project implementation and journal articles noted above. It is also consistent with other work examining the political context of leadership and management decision making in both Western and non-Western settings.[15]

When this perspective is made specific, it suggests at least two major classes of contextual factors that must be examined. The first class relates project objectives to those organizations and individuals that stand to gain or lose from the successful achievement of project objectives. These are the project stakeholders. The second class identifies institutional elements and others that affect relationships between projects and their stakeholders. Both sets of contextual factors are noted below.

#### OBJECTIVES AND STAKEHOLDERS

The origin of project ideas offers an initial insight into an initial set of stakeholders, and a brief look at the projects suggests some very different purposes behind each one. The project in Senegal, for example, was requested by a sophisticated set of villagers. The project in Zaire, however, was based largely on the national government's interest in the project area. In Lesotho, national-level recognition of the severity of the soil erosion and range degradation problem was complemented by the support of an influential chief in the project area.

The project in Liberia was ostensibly more the idea of a donor than of the government. Thus, the origins of the projects indicate the involvement of one set of stakeholders -- those who initially saw that they would benefit if the objectives were achieved.

One way to view the contexts of the six projects, then, is to begin with project objectives and to move on to an analysis of those who stand to gain or lose from project operations. Figure 1 begins this way. Each of the six projects is listed on the vertical axis of the chart. Along the horizontal axis, the first two items noted are the objectives each project addresses and the stakeholders who stand to gain or lose something as a result of project success or failure.

In some cases, such as in Kenya, the risk bearers are non-existent or peripheral. In other cases, such as in Liberia, those who stand to benefit in some ways may also be those who can lose in other ways, and they may also be central to project operations. Moreover, the degree of risk appears to be higher in Lesotho, Liberia, Senegal, and Zaire than in the other two projects.

The nature of the stakeholders and the risk level they encounter can affect policies in the project environment. Policies and other factors can also determine the risk that these stakeholders will take.

#### INSTITUTIONAL AND OTHER CONSTRAINTS

The horizontal axis of Figure 1 also shows relevant aspects of the social and policy settings as well as other factors that affect project activities and thus influence the strategy for organizing and managing each project. Different contexts will require different approaches.

In some cases, such as in Lesotho, unclear policies can be seen as a direct outcome of the risks being borne by one set of stakeholders. National policy makers feared a loss of local support if needed regulations were clearly stated and vigorously enforced. In most cases, however, the interaction is mutually reinforcing. In Zaire, for example, the different sets of stakeholders are likely to see the situation as one in which one group's gain is another's loss, and thus the conflict level is apt to be high. In Kenya, this is much less the case.

Five of the six field study teams were favorably impressed by the quality of the local personnel. This, in combination with other findings, has implications for appropriate training approaches in Africa. These implications will be discussed later.

Also included among other factors are specific characteristics of the project area or institution that were not common attributes of other settings within that country. Four of the projects were able to identify and build on favorable circumstances that, although they might make replicability difficult, made the management task easier than it would have been elsewhere in the country. When administrative, ecological, and ethnic boundaries all coincide, the management task is simplified. And when the chief who presides over the area supports the project, it is surely time to go to work, just as the project in Lesotho did.

A major conclusion about the six contexts relates to the centrality of project objectives to the social setting. Lesotho, Liberia, Niger, Senegal, and Zaire all had projects aimed at changing basic behavior. The projects focused on basic values, such as in Liberia, or basic behavior patterns, with Zaire the

most extreme example of this emphasis. Kenya, however, restricted its emphasis to an expansion of current behavior. It did not attempt basic change. This is displayed in Figure 1, which sets the stage for assessing the different organization and management strategies that were used to help achieve project objectives within the different contexts.

FIGURE 1  
CONTEXTUAL FACTORS AND PROJECTS

| Country & Project   | Objectives  | Stakeholders  |  | Institutional Factors  | Other Factors   |
|---|---|---|--|--|---|
|   |   | Potential Beneficiaries   | Potential Risk Bearers   |  |   |
| KENYA: EGERTON COLLEGE EXPANSION PROJECT  | Expand teaching capability<br><br>Construct buildings   | Faculty and staff<br><br>Students<br><br>Employers of graduates<br><br>Local laborers | Students   | College has autonomous parastatal status<br><br>Graduates no longer guaranteed government jobs<br><br>Expected upgrade to university status<br><br>Strong leadership<br><br>High-quality staff | Ethnic rivalry<br><br>Highest population growth rate of any country<br><br>Devaluation of shilling  |
| LESOTHO: LAND CONSERVATION AND RANGE DEVELOPMENT PROJECT  | Contain soil erosion<br><br>Manage livestock as a productive asset<br><br>Establish land conservation and range management program for replication  | Villagers, livestock owners<br><br>Ministry of Agriculture                            | Chiefs who might lose power<br><br>Livestock owners and users<br><br>Politicians who would lose support if project displaces local leaders and does not work | Contradictory and unclear range regulations<br><br>High-quality staff<br><br>Ethnic harmony but stratified family system   | Unique juncture of administrative and ecological zones in project area<br><br>Influence of South Africa<br><br>Weakness of the rank<br><br>Lack of knowledge of livestock use in area |
| LIBERIA: AGRICULTURAL SECTOR ANALYSIS AND PLANNING PROJECT, AND AGRICULTURE DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM | Develop statistical data for agricultural planning<br><br>Establish sector planning capability in Ministry of Agriculture<br><br>Identify and meet organization and management needs created by technology transfer | Rural populations<br><br>Professionals in Ministry of Agriculture                     | Ministry officials   | Administrative culture based on a strong tradition of patronage<br><br>Irregular salary payments and lack of performance incentives<br><br>Well-trained individuals                            | Political coup<br><br>Rapidly deteriorating economy<br><br>High uncertainty among domestic and international investors  |

FIGURE 1 -- Continued

| Country & Project                                 | Objectives   | Stakeholders   |  | Institutional Factors  | Other Factors  |
|---|--|--|--|--|--|
|   |  | Potential Beneficiaries  | Potential Risk Bearers   |  |  |
| NIGER: NIAMEY DEPARTMENT DEVELOPMENT PROJECT      | <p>Increase food production</p> <p>Strengthen local organizations</p> <p>Strengthen technical services and linkages among them</p> <p>Develop and extend effective technical agricultural packages</p> | <p>Farmers</p> <p>Civil servants</p> <p>Local cooperatives</p>   | <p>Civil servants who follow project priorities rather than line ministry priorities</p> <p>Peasants who go in debt for technical schemes and invest energy in questionable activities</p> | <p>Change in leadership</p> <p>Project must compete with technical agencies for priority of field managers and technicians</p> <p>Inheritance of centralized administration</p> <p>Inefficient distribution of agricultural inputs by state agencies</p> <p>Staff quality varies</p> | <p>State in fiscal crisis</p> <p>Transition from policy promoting large regional projects to one promoting small-scale interventions</p>             |
| SENEGAL: BAKEL SMALL IRRIGATED PERIMETERS PROJECT | <p>Diversify agricultural production</p> <p>Reduce risk of drought</p>   | <p>Farmers with riverine land</p> <p>Parastatal would strengthen mandate to develop riverine areas</p> <p>Ministry of Health</p> | <p>Villagers could lose independence</p> <p>Those who might contract bilharzia</p>   | <p>Change in style of leadership</p> <p>High-quality staff</p> <p>Patronage-based administrative culture</p> <p>Highly sophisticated villagers requested help</p> <p>Produce to be sold to parastatal; changed to allow competitive buying</p>                                       | <p>High remittances from France to project area</p> <p>Low prices foster parallel market</p> <p>Tradition of independence in remote project area</p> |

FIGURE 1 -- Continued

| Country & Project                                  | Objectives  | Stakeholders  |  | Institutional Factors   | Other Factors   |
|--|---|---|--|---|---|
|  |   | Potential Beneficiaries   | Potential Risk Bearers   |   |   |
| ZAIRE: NORTH SHABA<br>RURAL DEVELOPMENT<br>PROJECT | <p>Increase food production in project zone</p> <p>Satisfy political desire for program in geographic area</p> <p>Improve organization of grain production and marketing</p> <p>Reduce national food imports and foreign exchange drain</p> | <p>Villagers, farmers, producers</p> <p>Grain merchants</p> <p>Civil servants (project staff)</p> <p>Non-producer populations in project area</p> | <p>Merchants do not want to be displaced</p> <p>National government wants to show interest in area</p> <p>Donor wants successful project</p> <p>Villagers fearful of national penetration into their lives</p> | <p>Inefficient and corrupt bureaucracy</p> <p>High-quality individual civil servants</p> <p>Villagers not prone to cooperation among themselves and suspicious of outsiders</p> <p>Ethnic rivalries and kinship system strong</p> | <p>Exchange rate discriminates against domestic production</p> <p>Production technology questionable</p> <p>Staff-local marriages helped legitimacy</p> <p>Lack of knowledge about project area</p> <p>Logistics difficult (distance)</p> |

### CHAPTER THREE

#### PROJECT STRATEGIES AND PERFORMANCE

Given the diverse problems addressed by the projects and various contexts within which they were placed, two questions arise:

- What strategies were used to accommodate to these different situations?
- How well did those strategies work?

Each question is addressed below.

#### MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES

Before differences and similarities can be identified among the project management strategies, the components of a management strategy must be identified. The cases, the literature, and the original scope of work support the use of four components for this analysis:

- Goals and benefits;
- Organization and process;
- Resource management; and
- Time horizon.

Goals and benefits refer to the choice of trying to mobilize people around clear and simple goals versus using multiple goals and multiple benefits to muster support. Under different circumstances, either approach might work.

Organization and process indicate the host in which the project is placed as well as the linkages to significant actors or beneficiaries whose cooperation is necessary for the project to succeed. More than one organization may be needed simultaneously, or there may be a shift from one to another during implementation.

Resource management refers to the approach to financial management, procurement, and logistics. Decisions about who does what and how funds are controlled make up the major dimensions of this component.

The time horizon component introduces the way in which sustainability considerations are built into the strategy. Contradictions may arise between the needs for short-term service delivery and long-run viability.

Figure 2 compares the six project management strategies along these dimensions. In some instances, management strategy components can be seen as derived from specific contextual factors. For example, five of the six projects adopted multiple or vague goals to accommodate multiple stakeholders as part of the management strategy. Kenya provided the outlier.

In terms of organization, two projects used parastatals as their base, one was housed in a sub-national government body, one used an autonomous management unit to bypass pre-existing structures, one was based in a national office of a line ministry, and one adopted a two-tiered approach using a ministry at the national level and a semi-independent unit at the field level. Thus, there was a wide range of responses to the different settings, each reflecting an attempt to avoid or strengthen a stakeholder group.

FIGURE 2  
MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES

| Country & Project   | Aspects of Management Strategies   |   |   |  |
|---|--|---|---|--|
|   | Goals & Benefits   | Organization and Process  | Resource Control  | Time Horizon   |
| KENYA: EGERTON COLLEGE EXPANSION PROJECT  | Simple and clear goals<br>Benefits to those within target institution and employers of graduates   | Project based in autonomous parastatal<br>Managed by principal  | Local control of training schedule and local resources<br>Procurement USAID responsibility  | Short-term focus on buildings and trainees<br>Little attention to recurrent costs, retraining of faculty         |
| LESOTHO: LAND CONSERVATION AND RANGE DEVELOPMENT PROJECT  | Multiple -- livestock quality, land conservation, program building<br>Immediate benefits include training, dip tanks, and shearing sheds | Integral to ministry at national level<br>Informal policy link<br>Area-based and autonomous at field site, but reporting to national division<br>Grazing association linked to pre-existing structures -- high participation strategy | Technical assistance control of dollar funds<br>Gradual local assumption of national range management division costs<br>Local control of local contribution | Seven-year project<br>Grazing association to inherit project functions<br>Follow-on to previous project          |
| LIBERIA: AGRICULTURAL SECTOR ANALYSIS AND PLANNING PROJECT, AND AGRICULTURE DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM | Introduce sector planning, broad goals<br>Support benefits multiple actors in ministry   | Based in Ministry of Agriculture headquarters<br>Collaborative approach   | Reliance on ministry for logistical support<br>Close USAID monitoring   | Follow-on projects<br>Organizational implications addressed<br>Focus on changes in the basis for decision making |
| NIGER: NIAMEY DEPARTMENT DEVELOPMENT PROJECT  | Multiple objectives represented by different components as marginal additions to ongoing programs  | Attached to local government<br>Director from Ministry of Rural Development<br>Reliance on multiple technical service agencies for implementation<br>Strategy emphasizes self-management and participation by local organizations     | Close control of local funds by director<br>Close USAID monitoring  | Farmer training centers established<br>Shift from production to institution building<br>Long-term phased project |

FIGURE 2 -- Continued

| Country & Project                                  | Aspects of Management Strategies   |  |  |  |
|--|--|--|--|--|
|  | Goals & Benefits   | Organization and Process   | Resource Control   | Time Horizon   |
| SENEGAL: BAKEL SMALL IRRIGATION PERIMETERS PROJECT | Multiple -- crop diversification, drought risk reduction, health, labor-saving devices, credit, new land opened, food production increased through collaboration between parastatals and farmers, integrated technologies introduced | Based in decentralized autonomous regional parastatal<br><br>Builds on village leadership<br><br>Uses village groups as production unit<br><br>Initially top-down, became interactive<br><br>Confrontational interaction with farmer federation led to more participatory approach | Uses local organizations to enforce credit repayment<br><br>USAID hands-off role except for procurement<br><br>Supplies agricultural inputs  | Phase-out of parastatal production responsibility and shift to planning<br><br>Turn over of credit function to private sector as well as marketing and transportation<br><br>Medium project lifetime   |
| ZAIRE: NORTH SHABA RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT       | Multiple -- maize production, farmer organization, assistance to merchants, testing technical packages, political integration  | Autonomous management unit bypasses ministry with few external linkages<br><br>Multiple subunits reflect multiple goals<br><br>Informal processes paramount<br><br>Co-leadership by government-supplied staff and donor-funded contractor<br><br>Participation stressed            | Donor control of dollar funds<br><br>Special logistics unit in project<br><br>Local accounting for local resources<br><br>Project independent from both donor and government for daily control | Shift from project management unit to different locations for subunits<br><br>Shift from short- to long-run focus<br><br>Some functions going from quasi-public to private sector over life of project |

Although the organizational components varied considerably, the approaches to resource control were similar. Procurement and administration of dollar funds remained largely in the hands of AID missions and contractors. The imposition of external record systems on local organizations was largely avoided. For example, the principal at Egerton College could locate funds, but the system he used was not one that an American accountant could follow.

The question of time horizons yields a variety of approaches. In Liberia, the need to consider the organizational implications of project success and to provide incentives to support the continuation of project-introduced innovations becomes central, even though they were not included in the original project design. The project in Lesotho focused on the establishment of a beneficiary organization to inherit project functions at the field level. The project in Zaire emphasized the dissolution of the management unit and the assumption of its functions by public and private entities. A similar approach was used in Senegal. The project in Niger shifted its focus from production to institution building.

Although there were some commonalities, the strategies attempted to custom fit each project to the particular circumstances of its environment, including stakeholder dynamics, opportunities in the project areas, and the relationship between pre-existing organizations and clientele groups. This last factor offers a partial explanation for the decision to bypass a ministry in Zaire as opposed to using existing technical services in Niger.

The combination of strategy components was different for each project. In Kenya, simple goals, organizational autonomy, divided resource control, and an immediate focus on training and

buildings characterized the approach. The Lesotho project strategy, however, was very different except for resource control -- multiple objectives; multiple organizational components, including informal linkages; and a long-run focus distinguished it.

In Liberia, broad goals, simple organization, close monitoring, and a long-run awareness offered a different combination of strategy components. The Niger project offered still another mix -- multiple objectives, multiple implementing agencies, close monitoring, and a long-run emphasis.

The Senegal project used multiple objectives, put implementing authority in a sub-national body while using village groups, took a less active role in resource management, and moved from an immediate to an extended time perspective. The Zaire strategy encompassed multiple objectives, an organizational bypass, and a shift of time horizon. Thus, different local contexts produced different mixes of management strategy components in each project.

These attempts to fit the project into the local organizational setting, either as an integral part of an ongoing operation or as a separate entity where there was no appropriate host, stemmed mainly from management concerns -- the need to get things done. But another set of concerns also required an adequate fit -- concerns about strengthening the capacity of local people to manage new initiatives after the end of project funding. The Ndegwa citation at the beginning of this paper focuses on this issue -- the continued ability to manage people and resources is called for if any project is to contribute to lasting success.

## MANAGEMENT ENHANCEMENT STRATEGIES

For many people, management enhancement, or capacity building, is equated with training. But this linkage misses the variety of management enhancement possibilities. Certainly, training in its various forms is an important element of management capacity building. But there are other elements as well.

A second element is technical assistance. The substantive emphasis of the technical assistance staff as well as the roles played by these people directly influence enhancement activity. If technical, but not management, support is offered, the effects may be different than if both are provided. Similarly, when technical assistance staff do a job, rather than helping someone else do it, the outcome is not the same. Thus, the technical assistance component of a management enhancement strategy must be considered.

A third element is leadership and participation.[16] That is, who is guiding and participating in implementing the effort and whose capacity to carry on is being built? This element is linked to technical assistance and training, but it emphasizes the focus of those efforts. Without clarifying the leadership element of a strategy, it is hard to know whether the training and technical assistance elements are directed at the most appropriate positions and people. Participatory approaches that incorporate multiple decision makers and actors will have different requirements than directive approaches.

These three elements of management capacity building -- training, technical assistance, and leadership and participation -- have a human emphasis -- that is, they focus directly on people. But individuals alone do not define management. Manage-

ment takes place within organizational settings, and two aspects of those settings greatly affect the ability of managers to manage.

The first aspect is policy. Policies do make a difference, and they cannot be ignored. Economic policies can affect the rewards and risks attached to alternative actions, and they can support, inhibit, or be neutral to management efforts. Enhancing management performance may require lightening or removing the burdens imposed by inappropriate policies, or it may require the establishment of new communication channels or operating processes to develop and implement policies.

The second aspect is structure. Without discretion, control of resources, communication links, or legitimacy, it is difficult for a manager to lead. The right skills imparted to the right person sitting in the wrong place may have no effect on performance. Moreover, participatory decision-making processes will require structures that accommodate group interaction rather than individual isolation.

Figure 3 groups these five components of a management enhancement strategy under two major headings -- human emphasis and organizational emphasis. Using these categories, the approaches implicit in the six projects are compared and contrasted. This framework allows a more complete assessment of complementarities, contradictions, and gaps than would have been possible by looking at just training tactics and depicting them as the totality of the management enhancement approach.

The six projects varied considerably in their approaches to management enhancement. Some emphasized policy, whereas others ignored it. Some gave only technical training, whereas others mixed technical and managerial training. Some emphasized

FIGURE 3  
MANAGEMENT ENHANCEMENT STRATEGIES

| Country & Project   | Human   |   |   | Organizational  |   |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|   | Training  | Technical Assistance  | Leadership and Participation  | Policy  | Structure   |
| KENYA: EGERTON COLLEGE EXPANSION PROJECT  | In technical fields only<br>For faculty only  | Technical assistance staff substituted for faculty being trained overseas<br><br>Understudy to procurement officer<br><br>No attempt to build other management capability | Principal of the college directed the project   | None  | None  |
| LESOTHO: LAND CONSERVATION AND RANGE DEVELOPMENT PROJECT  | Mixed technical and management<br><br>Government staff and local leaders<br><br>Apprenticeship relation to technical assistance | Counterparts and mentor relationships at national level (substitutes also)<br><br>Scapegoat role at field site helps local organization in short run                      | Chieftainship and village leaders integral to grazing association -- participatory field structure and process<br><br>Training in management to build leadership skills<br><br>Technical assistance provided leadership in beginning at field level<br><br>Local and technical assistance staff sharing at national level | Range regulations translated into dialect<br><br>Informal studies<br><br>Direct focus of project to identify and improve policy | Established grazing association for local resource control<br><br>Increasing percent of division budget locally assumed<br><br>Informal dialogue used at all levels |
| LIBERIA: AGRICULTURAL SECTOR ANALYSIS AND PLANNING PROJECT, AND AGRICULTURE DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM | Technical only<br><br>Ministry of Agriculture staff<br><br>On-the-job after academic<br><br>Flexible plan                       | Technical skills predominant<br><br>Functioned as role models   | Shifted between minister and technical assistance staff   | Objective was to improve policy   | Plan for organizational needs prepared by technical assistance team met resistance because of need for major change in decision-making process                      |

FIGURE 3 -- Continued

| Country & Project                                 | Human  |   |   | Organizational   |   |
|---|--|---|---|--|---|
|   | Training   | Technical Assistance  | Leadership and Participation  | Policy   | Structure   |
| NIGER: NIAMEY DEPARTMENT DEVELOPMENT PROJECT      | <p>Joint planning exercises</p> <p>Accounting and record keeping for local organizations</p> <p>Technical</p>  | <p>Computerization</p> <p>Accounting, record keeping, technical</p> <p>Local organizational development</p> <p>Input supply</p>                             | <p>Focus often on individuals with marginal authority</p>   | <p>None</p>  | <p>Project acted as funding mechanism</p> <p>Technical agencies implemented activities</p>  |
| SENEGAL: BAKEL SMALL IRRIGATED PERIMETERS PROJECT | <p>Multiple levels</p> <p>Classroom plus applied</p> <p>No management component except for zone chief</p> <p>Inventory control and maintenance skills in parastatal</p>  | <p>Confused roles, became performers</p> <p>No management component</p>   | <p>Project-farmer contracts and supervision at group level strived for participatory approach</p> <p>Built on village leaders</p> <p>Used local project director in parastatal</p>                            | <p>Changes in organization policy and national agricultural policy key to performance</p>  | <p>Decentralization supported</p> <p>Participation by beneficiaries in management</p> <p>Staff development and incentives in parastatal</p> |
| ZAIRE: NORTH SHABA RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT      | <p>Mixed technical and management</p> <p>Inadequate quantity in relation to need</p> <p>Apprenticeship to technical assistance subunit head, on-the-job training</p> <p>Secondary focus, most local staff previously trained</p> | <p>Varied roles, shifted from mentor relationships to direct management roles</p> <p>Management and technical advisors</p> <p>Mixed quality of advisors</p> | <p>Participation used to develop local sense of ownership</p> <p>Heavy emphasis on technical assistance leadership in beginning</p> <p>On-the-job responsibility for local staff received strong emphasis</p> | <p>Change in agricultural pricing policy</p> <p>Permanent government presence changed to dissolution and absorption of project</p> | <p>Brigade established for infrastructure maintenance</p> <p>Phase-out of project management unit, transition to private host</p>           |

building capacities in government staff, some stressed capacity building within beneficiary groups, and others did both. For some, participation in decisions plus managerial experience was the foundation of the strategy; for others, it was training alone. Zaire provided the most experience-oriented example, whereas Kenya followed the most training-oriented path. The other four projects fell between these two extremes.

The project in Kenya focused entirely on the human dimension and ignored the organizational one. In Liberia, the initial focus was the same as in Kenya, but the overwhelming importance of the organizational factors led to a switch in emphasis. The majority of the projects included both dimensions, but the human emphasis received the most attention.

On a project-by-project basis, the following summaries may be made. Kenya focused on the human dimension by giving individuals technical training and ignoring institutional aspects. Lesotho mixed technical and managerial training with a strong emphasis on leadership and participation while directing efforts toward policy and structure constraints.

Liberia began with an emphasis on technical training but tried to shift to a focus on organizational structure as the constraints on skill use became apparent. Niger's approach was more incremental and augmentative, like Kenya's, with an emphasis on the human dimension. Senegal, in contrast, mixed policy, organization, leadership, participation, and training into an integrated set of components with only technical assistance becoming confused. In Zaire, the human dimension was dominated by technical assistance, leadership, and participation whereas the organizational dimension loomed larger as implementation progressed.

It is not yet possible to draw conclusions about the relative quality of any strategy. The test of a strategy is how well it performed in the different contexts within which it was designed to operate. This is true of both management and management enhancement strategies.

#### PROJECT PERFORMANCE

In most of the projects, it is too early to assess the long-term impact of the various management approaches, but it is possible to identify certain short-term outcomes. To do so, this section assesses the use of the different approaches in different settings against five performance categories. Two of the categories are drawn from the original scope of the review, two are based on findings highlighted in the field studies, and one is a catch-all category.

The first category is resource management. Actual performance along this dimension is mixed. On the one hand, these projects did not have major problems in the flow of funds or budget overruns. On the other hand, one-half of them were severely criticized for a lack of bookkeeping and accounting procedures, and two were scored average or mediocre. Only one project was thought to perform well in this area, and even that one had minor performance problems and was characterized by an informal and secretive record-keeping system on the part of the local contribution.

The second category is training. It played a large role in five of the project strategies. Performance in this category was outstanding. All of the projects met their targets, even though the amount of training given by one project was determined to be inadequate to its task. Two projects exceeded their targets by using a combination of tight supervision of the schedule and surplus funds that were generated by the dollar's strength.

The third performance category is adaptation. This category was added as a result of a consistent pattern noted in the case studies. All of them identified some changes in resource use, shifts of substantive emphasis, or evolving organizational linkages that reflected important management decisions about changes that were needed to address new circumstances or discoveries that could affect project success or failure.

Adaptation, then, refers to the exercise of discretion, employment of flexibility to meet new challenges, and even elements of redesign during implementation. It reflects the degree to which the project adopted a learning, or process, approach as opposed to rigidly adhering to a predetermined design, or blueprint.[17] Adaptation is included here not just because it has been commonly associated with success, but also because the individual case studies of these six agricultural projects strongly indicate that adaptation was an important contributor to substantive accomplishment. The question, then, is what form did adaptation take in each project?

All six projects showed evidence of some major or minor midcourse shifts. In some cases, the shift was critical, such as the policy link in Lesotho or the focus on organization in Liberia. The project in Senegal was even faulted for an overadherence to some inappropriate objectives set at the design stage. Three of the field studies concluded that flexibility to readjust targets, organization, and procedures was necessary so that implementers would not be handicapped by the imperfect knowledge of designers and an inability to take advantage of new circumstances.

The fourth category, sustainability, refers to the prospects for the initiatives begun under the project to continue after the end of outside funding. Sustainability does not refer to the perpetuation of an organization, but to the continuation of

services, new behavior, and benefit flows.[18] This category was included because most of the case studies emphasized that, even though these projects showed high success in achieving short-run objectives, project chances for long-run viability were uncertain.

The basis of this concern varied. In Kenya, the future ability to assume recurrent costs was the issue; in Lesotho, Senegal, and Zaire, it was the capacity of local organizations to carry on; in Niger, there was doubt about the validity of the project-promoted technology; in Liberia, local commitment to the project mission was questionable. Most of the field teams saw the issues as important enough to analyze them in a separate section in their case studies.

The final category, other targets and benefits, contains two types of outcomes that go beyond the previous categories. The first is the substantive problems addressed by the projects. The second is unplanned effects. Figure 4 analyzes the projects in relation to each of these aspects of performance.

Summarizing the performance of these projects leads to the following four conclusions:

- Intermediate targets such as training, construction, and agricultural production were largely achieved.
- Some form of adaptation occurred with all the projects, and four of the six registered major shifts in focus or operations (the projects in Kenya and Senegal were the exceptions).
- Resource management had a mixed record, with three projects doing well and three managing resources poorly.
- There are serious doubts about the sustainability of some dimension of all the projects.

FIGURE 4  
PROJECT PERFORMANCE

| Country & Project   | Resource Management   | Training  | Adaptation   | Sustainability  | Other Targets and Benefits  |
|---|---|---|--|---|---|
| KENYA: EGERTON COLLEGE EXPANSION PROJECT  | Generally excellent<br><br>Only notable failing with procurement of library books   | Targets exceeded<br><br>Schedule met  | Extra funds resulting from dollar appreciation used to build resource center<br><br>Savings in training budget used to train more people | Recurrent cost burden raised<br><br>Inattention to management needs generated by expansion  | Building targets exceeded   |
| LESOTHO: LAND CONSERVATION AND RANGE DEVELOPMENT  | Satisfactory overall<br><br>Local budget contribution less than planned   | Targets exceeded<br><br>Not enough attention to needs of non-government personnel       | Extra funds used for training<br><br>Informal policy link important<br><br>Study of local practices introduced                           | Questionable at field level<br><br>Chances good at national level   | Range management changing<br><br>Replicability questionable -- project area uniquely controllable<br><br>Participation high   |
| LIBERIA: AGRICULTURAL SECTOR ANALYSIS AND PLANNING PROJECT, AND AGRICULTURE DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM | No major problems<br><br>Lack of alternative government discretionary funds limited performance<br><br>Local contribution less than planned | Targets met (flexible)<br><br>On-the-job training and in-country seminars well received | Focus on organizational requirements dealt with critical factor not in original design   | Difficult to instill the values underlying the use of the techniques -- no rewards at present<br><br>In doubt   | After initial strengthening of capacity to generate basic data, overall Ministry of Agriculture performance deteriorated as a result of factors outside project control; capacity to conduct annual surveys remains |
| NIGER: NIAMEY DEPARTMENT DEVELOPMENT PROJECT  | Poor record keeping and inventory control<br><br>Decision blockages result in delays<br><br>Key position unfilled                           | Farmer training (CPT) successful<br><br>Inadequate follow-up to cooperative training    | Shift from production to institution building  | Little strengthening of local organizations or participation achieved<br><br>Questionable technical packages<br><br>Ownership has not transferred to technical agencies | Training center targets met   |

FIGURE 4 -- Continued

| Country & Project  | Resource Management  | Training  | Adaptation   | Sustainability   | Other Targets and Benefits  |
|--|--|---|--|--|---|
| <p>SENEGAL: BAKEL<br/>SMALL IRRIGATED<br/>PERIMETERS PROJECT</p> | <p>Poor management<br/>accounting</p>  | <p>Positive impact but<br/>mostly at staff level</p> <p>Replacement of technical<br/>assistance staff erratic</p> <p>Increasing village<br/>training</p>                | <p>Tested unplanned<br/>technology</p> <p>Use of informal<br/>system</p> <p>Adherence to<br/>inappropriate<br/>objectives</p>  | <p>Local organizations<br/>strengthened</p> <p>Participation stressed</p> <p>National price policy<br/>changed</p>   | <p>50% of increased hectare<br/>target achieved</p> <p>Production per hectare<br/>targets exceeded</p>  |
| <p>ZAIRE: NORTH SHABA<br/>RURAL DEVELOPMENT<br/>PROJECT</p>      | <p>Financial management<br/>poor, but did not<br/>impede output</p> <p>Excellent logistics<br/>operations</p> <p>Local financial<br/>resources less than<br/>planned</p> | <p>Inadequate in scope<br/>and intensity, but<br/>original targets met</p> <p>On-the-job development<br/>of local staff<br/>capability contri-<br/>buted to success</p> | <p>Shift from production<br/>to institutional focus</p> <p>Use of informal system</p> <p>Adapting components<br/>to field realities<br/>contributed to<br/>success</p> | <p>Unknown</p> <p>Now devolving some<br/>functions to private,<br/>village, and public<br/>organizations</p> <p>Recognized belatedly<br/>as management issue --<br/>may yield future<br/>lessons</p> <p>Participation high</p> | <p>Maize production increased</p> <p>Road brigade established</p> <p>Research center created</p> <p>Maize marketing improved</p> <p>Beginnings of more<br/>cooperative production<br/>efforts</p> |

Performance also appears to be related to the fit between context and strategy. The Egerton College strategy of simplicity, autonomy, and a training focus worked in a setting in which there was little organized stakeholder risk or opposition. But simple objectives and avoidance of the institutional dimension of management enhancement would most likely have led to a quick collapse of the projects in Lesotho, Liberia, and Zaire, where potential opposition could have been readily mobilized without broad, flexible clusters of goals and benefits. The same can be said, but with less certainty, for the projects in Niger and Senegal.

For the management strategy, the stakeholder profile largely determines the appropriateness of different approaches to goals and benefits, organization and process, and time horizon. These strategy components are the links between the project and its environment. Resource management (in terms of dollar funding), however, is more internal to the project and less dependent on environmental influence. In fact, performance within this component is only tenuously related to performance within any of the other components. But the fit to the stakeholder configuration is key to the performance of the management strategy.

For the management enhancement strategy, the institutional elements of context indicate key factors that will be encountered and should be incorporated into the approach. With the exception of the project in Kenya, either policy or structure, or a combination of both, is depicted as key for the sustainability of the management enhancement strategy. The context determines the relative importance of particular dimensions, but failure to go beyond the human emphasis greatly lowers the probability of lasting impact. Even in Kenya, inattention to recurrent costs and new management needs introduce some doubt about long-run

improvement. The policies, incentives, and social dynamics that constitute the institutional context will be influential in determining the effectiveness of alternative management enhancement strategies.

Thus, the link between context and strategy has influenced the performance of these six agricultural projects. The task now is to extract some crosscutting lessons from these findings.

## CHAPTER FOUR

### LESSONS FROM THE EXPERIENCE

This section extracts lessons from the preceding analysis of project experience. These lessons are to assist with the design, implementation, evaluation, and improvement of future efforts. But certain limitations inherent to this exercise should be recognized. The analysis is based on examinations of just six agricultural projects in six African countries. The field-work portion of each study was done in approximately one month. Thus, both the size of the sample and the time frame limit the universality of any patterns emerging from the exercise.

The concentration on the management dimension provided both advantages and disadvantages. The narrow focus and the prior preparation helped the field teams organize the effort and sift out the peripheral aspects of the observations.

Recognizing the exercise's limitations, it is possible to discern some patterns and relationships within this body of information. These crosscutting lessons should be viewed not as final pronouncements of truth, but as guidelines for further inquiry and experimentation.

### GOALS AND BENEFITS

A central concept in classical management theory is goal clarification. That is, concurrence on clear objectives is seen as a prerequisite for successful management. Lack of ambiguity over priorities and eliminated conflict over goals are thus posited as both necessary and virtuous. Single objectives and the resources to attain them, according to this view, constitute good strategy design.

This approach sometimes appears to be an important asset. For example, the Egerton College Project in Kenya involved the expansion of an agricultural college. Buildings were built, and people were trained. Straightforward objectives using tried and true technologies in an autonomous organization may help account for some of the success of the project and for its low level of implementation problems.

Lack of competing objectives combined with the autonomy of both the host institution and the project, certain technologies, committed leadership, and a growing economy proved successful in the case of Egerton College. But other field experiences yielded far different conclusions about the role of objectives in strategy design. Multiple, conflicting, or moving goals do not always impede success. In some settings, they may contribute directly to it.

The Zaire case study asserted that after nine years of implementation "there is still no agreement on whether [the project] was a maize or food production project or whether it was a multisectoral rural development project designed to improve farmer income." As a result of the project's geographic isolation and the extreme social competition both within the area and between it and metropolitan centers, making anything positive happen was bound to require cooperation among numerous public and private and local and national actors. Each set of critical actors needed to see how they had a stake in the project.

Different goals and purposes were interjected during the life of the project. Although from an external perspective this confused the process, the result allowed both alternative interpretations of project objectives to different local actors and actors with very different agendas to continue to cooperate (or at least not to refuse to cooperate), and thus maintain implementation momentum.

But it was not just interpretation that kept people involved. They gained short-run advantages by helping the project. Initial project objectives included:

- Bank credit to small grain merchants and cooperatives to purchase trucks and spare parts as well as grain;
- Small farmer production credit;
- Business training for grain merchants; and
- Assistance to the national cereals office to train agents, license merchants, and purchase or rent equipment.

In fact, these did not all occur. But the exchange between the project and stakeholders in terms of fuel, haulage, seed distribution, and other resources did serve to gain support among competing groups. Thus, cooperation with the project gave a wide range of actors a stake in its operations and success. Multiple goals generated multiple supporters because the goals encompassed multiple benefits.

Two of the cases, in Senegal and Zaire, introduced the idea of multiple benefits when they mentioned that "success breeds success." Three more, in Lesotho, Liberia, and Niger, make the same point without using this phrase. That is, some early benefit flows can create an aura of effectiveness that generates support for future project-related efforts. When this aura does not emerge early in implementation, the project may be in danger of being labeled as a failure, and the process of securing support becomes more costly and difficult. The quick appearance of tangible results such as dip tanks, roads, clinics, fertilizer, or transportation can win immediate friends and influence future performance.

These benefits may be peripheral to the technical objectives of the original project design, but crucial for success. In some cases, they may co-opt potentially strong bystander opposition to upcoming activities, whereas in other cases, they may serve to build support among those intended beneficiaries who will later be asked to make behavioral changes or sacrifices.

An example of this occurred in the Land Conservation and Range Management Project in Lesotho. A long-term objective was to stop the severe erosion that is devastating the country. For this goal to be realized, the use of the rangelands will need to change, and this requires basic changes in how decisions are made about the use of this resource. The primary beneficiaries of the project, those who graze their cattle, goats, and sheep in the immediate project area, will thus be asked to give up their autonomy in terms of who decides where and when they will use different ranges. Instead of households deciding, a grazers association will do so.

Project management realized that the transfer of decision-making authority from households to the grazing association would take time and require education and capacity building. To help buy this time, the project provided beneficiaries with some immediately useful services. Dip tanks, shearing sheds, and veterinary services are giving people a feeling of immediate payoff, and their resistance to surrendering their autonomy is slowly eroding. The educational process of the grazing association is made easier by multiple benefits.

In situations such as this, early visible benefits are important. If credibility is not established quickly, the chances for long-run success decline. The formal technical objectives enshrined in project documents are not the main objectives propelling many of the major actors in implementation.

The management process, then, involves balancing and mixing these other agendas to produce actions that are not directly contrary to, if not always totally supportive of, the technical objectives. Delaying the implementation of particular components, pursuing peripheral issues, and otherwise satisfying potential opponents may be necessary. Bolstering the positions of actors whose agendas are supportive may be the most important area of management activity, and designing a project with multiple objectives may assist that effort.

When project designers ignore or minimize the complexity of developing country societies and organizational settings, they do so at the project's peril. Development is a multi-level, multi-dimensional process that requires involvement, acquiescence, support, or active commitment from those who compete with one another for limited resources. This competition often manifests itself in the implementation process, and success often depends on equipping a project with sufficient flexibility to accommodate this competition.

A central design issue is therefore to identify the role of objectives in the management strategy. Do certain technologies and autonomous organizational settings support the use of single objectives, or will the need for the involvement of many different actors push toward a design that provides multiple benefits to them? Different projects and different settings will require different strategies. A key is the match between the approach and the setting, including the array of stakeholders and the risks they will incur.

#### REDUCING STAKEHOLDER RISK

Closely linked to the role of goals and benefits in implementation dynamics is the need to reduce the risks for key stakeholders so that they cooperate. Five of the six projects

contained elements of this process. A separately identifiable project unit or identity was sometimes used to offer a potential scapegoat in the event of poor performance. Highly visible technical assistance teams, such as those in Zaire and Lesotho, also played this role.

In Lesotho, local decision makers were able to distance themselves from politically unpopular, but technically necessary, decisions by attributing these decisions to the project. The short-run strategy was to use multiple benefits and a scapegoat to initiate some fundamental changes in local resource deployment. Although it was not without its difficulties, the approach was working.

One relevant factor was the riskiness of policy reform. Some national political leaders agreed with the need for change, but they also feared its possible repercussions. They needed a success story to help to justify and support new policies. Thus, there was a double bind -- the project needed new national policy to work, but the politicians needed a success story of a working project before the new policy was safe.

Three elements were used to deal with this delicate situation. The first was a mixed benefit package that co-opted some potential opposition to the politicians. The second was the visibility and autonomy of the project, allowing it to become the scapegoat if things did not work. The third was the use of informal mechanisms for policy analysis and communication. This technique defused the apparent risk by keeping the policy evolution process out of the limelight. Action by managerial mortals determined the range of options open to the Olympian policy makers.

The more socially and politically central the changes addressed by a project, the greater the need for risk reduction. The distribution of power in the local setting will affect risk, both real and perceived. Important projects in high-risk settings are likely to require an emphasis on informal decision processes, a long-term presence of a scapegoat, and a recognizable project identity. Just as the need for multiple goals and mixed benefits supported non-linear thinking, so too the disruptive nature of much policy reform and institutional development requires a perception of risk reduction and management roles that goes far beyond simple views of just getting things done, no matter what the process or the cost to different participants or bystanders. Often, this perception involves assessing the tradeoffs between giving immediate benefits to defray the cost of future risk, or asking for current sacrifices with the potential for future gain. In either case, it requires a focus on the time horizons that compete for management attention.

#### TIME HORIZON

The emphasis on need for immediate benefits spotlights one difficulty inherent in development. That is, what is needed for short-term performance can stand in the way of long-run objectives. Direct performance by project staff and technical assistance teams can make it more difficult for local citizens and civil servants to initiate the new efforts the project is trying to stimulate and to carry on after the project is done.

All six cases were high-performance projects. That is, they were seen as having achieved a high proportion of their objectives -- training, construction, and service delivery targets were met or exceeded. And yet all six case studies questioned the sustainability and ultimate impact of the projects.

Delivering goods and services on time and as specified requires a preoccupation with achieving direct action by project staff. This situation often leads to authority concentrated in a relatively autonomous body such as a parastatal or project management unit, and to a management style that ignores requests to support initiatives originating within beneficiary groups for fear they will interfere with the prescribed service delivery schedule.

The use of an autonomous unit in the project in Zaire, for example, had helped bypass an ineffective Ministry of Agriculture and complete construction. But as the project's end approaches, the issue of recurrent maintenance, staffing, and funding of project-initiated activities becomes crucial. What worked in the short run makes the transition to sustained development difficult.

Similarly in Lesotho, one project component is working with a grazers association. Some immediate results have been registered by having the project and the technical assistance staff play a heavy-handed role in decision making. This approach took the pressure off the local officers of the association and facilitated some controversial decisions regarding livestock movements. But the project crutch extends as far as financial subsidy for the association. Long-run viability, however, will require a different approach. Training the association to run its own affairs, make its own decisions, and cover its own costs must supersede the current technical assistance style of doing it for them.

Although the six projects showed evidence of some form of early performance, all eventually encountered questions of post-project viability, local capacity, and incentives for future

action on the part of beneficiaries, counterparts, and bystanders. Without permanent institutions equipped to carry on, future prospects look slim.

The difficulty lies in the fact that although direct action is necessary in the early years it can entrench an operating style that is counterproductive later on. Thus, high short-term performance cannot be equated with sustained success. At the same time, however, immediate production is needed to mobilize support and move the project toward its ultimate goals. Thus, it is not an either/or situation. Both short- and long-term achievement are necessary. A key need, then, is for designers and managers to balance performance requirements with capacity requirements. The short run must be conquered, but the long run must be uppermost in managers' minds and resource commitments.

A long-run focus is not just a matter of managers with vision, however. If project budgets emphasize immediate physical output, evaluators measure it, and the project has no flexibility to adapt to changing circumstances, managers will have difficulty focusing on the long run. Designs and supporting actors must facilitate a focus on sustainability. Otherwise, the spotlight will shine on immediate targets, such as resource control.

#### RESOURCE MANAGEMENT

Of the six projects reviewed, none of them had exemplary financial management practices. Three had poor practices, with some interim evaluations recommending termination because of the state of their financial affairs. The other three were acceptable, with one characterized by a concern that if the low capability of a beneficiary group was not raised, long-run impact would not be achieved.

These projects attained high intermediate performance without the benefit of an attribute that is widely held to be an absolute necessity for performance -- sophisticated financial tracking and control systems on the part of the host country implementing organization. This suggests that, within the contexts of these projects, local use of imported techniques is far less important than was previously assumed.

One contextual factor may be an important qualifier, however. These projects began after the economic shock emanating from the fuel price increases of the early 1970s. Thus, the planned foreign exchange components built the expectation of high inflation and costs into the project budgets. The recent strength of the dollar, however, has served to generate excess foreign exchange funds and lower pressure on this aspect of management concerns.

At least three of the cases encountered loose yet seemingly effective informal financial management practices that characterized local behavior. One key to performance appeared to be the lack of an attempt to impose outside procedures on the host country project managers.

This point is important. Five of the six projects kept procurement responsibility with the technical assistance contractor or AID staff. In the sixth project, responsibility was not clear, and poor procurement caused a minor setback that marred the project record.

The use of local managerial styles and locally acceptable procedures for applying the local funds was therefore key. If possible, resource management procedures should not stand in the way of the exercise of managerial leadership.

## MANAGERIAL LEADERSHIP

Leadership is important for success. The experience of these six projects suggests three key aspects of managerial leadership. They are:

- A focus on interactions between a project and other organizations;
- The use of informal communication and decision-making processes; and
- A sense of team work and compensation that shifts responsibilities among different actors.

These three key aspects are examined below.

To non-management specialists, a manager is often described as a person who supervises others, gets them to work hard, and makes sure that they comply with the organization's procedures for doing things. But this internally focused orientation may not be the distinguishing characteristic of those who guide successful development efforts.

Effective managers in these projects played a role that stressed smoothing the interactions between the project and other organizations that influenced the project's ability to operate. If local court support was needed to enforce range regulations, as in Lesotho, building good relations with the judges may prove to make the difference between success and failure. Similarly, when the cooperation of another ministry was critical, as in Zaire, management time was be devoted to obtaining that cooperation.

Policy directives, such as crop prices or range regulations, can also help or hinder implementation by affecting participation by beneficiaries and action by staff. In Lesotho, a link to policy makers and access to information about policy were crucial for success. The original design called for an advisor to the minister to attend to this issue. The ministry deleted this element from the project that was finally approved and implemented. But management recognized the vital role this position would play and continued negotiation after implementation had begun. The result was the inclusion of an advisor at a lower level in the ministry. This advisor worked on human resource issues and informally undertook policy-related studies, translations, and information dissemination activities. Management initiative in pursuing this issue led to improved project performance as a result of a link to a key aspect of the local setting.

When opportunities appear, they must often be seized quickly or the chance to make changes will disappear. In Senegal, leadership turnover combined with simultaneous pressure from both donors and beneficiaries allowed a manager to institute some basic alterations in project operations. Without the outside support, these changes would have been difficult to make. But the manager saw the opportunity and took it. The result was the turning around of a deteriorating project. External linkages, and their strengthening, formed a major part of implementation activity.

A second key aspect in all of the case studies is the importance of informal processes for getting things done. Communication channels, meeting places, financial decisions and records, policy recommendations, and economic transactions outside prescribed organizational channels and hierarchies dominated activity in all projects.

Managers who got things done recognized and used the informal systems, and observers who understood what was happening were those who saw the signs of the informal at work. Sometimes informal bureaucratic practices mirrored village ways of operating, whereas other times they did not.

The experience with informal management ranged from the use of parallel markets to stretch project budgets, to the use of social gatherings and ethnic alliances to de-escalate opposition to decisions, to straightforward political bartering with project resources, to training awards designed to remove opponents, to confidential studies of policies that impinged on project objectives and processes. For these approaches to be taken, however, required managers who were sensitive to the opportunities offered by informal dynamics.

Projects are temporary, artificial creations that are deposited into environments marked by resource scarcity and by pre-existing rules for moderating the battles for those resources. Those rules often cannot be publicized without making them ineffective. In Zaire, for example, trading project fuel in return for construction materials was an effective way of ensuring that project construction did not fall behind schedule, but publicizing the transaction would trigger a series of events that would embarrass cooperators and bring activity to a standstill. Good managers recognize this characteristic of informal processes and keep them out of official reports and processes.

Thus, identification of these rules and the location of key people within informal networks become important practices for managers. What works is not always what is officially sanctioned. Moreover, what worked before may not be appropriate in new circumstances or with new people. Strategy implementation is a never-ending battle against the forces of decay. But who

leads the charge can shift. In a team situation, one actor can pick up the banner at the point where another has slipped. This introduces the third key aspect -- teamwork and compensation.

There is no one element among those mentioned above that guarantees success; instead, it is the interplay and balance among them that leads to the observed results. Good performance often resulted from a number of elements working in concert. In Senegal, the juncture of staff turnover, pressure from farmers for more participation, pressure from AID to deliver goods and services, and the relative autonomy of a parastatal all combined to present an opportunity to a newly arrived manager who was then able to turn around a failing effort. During a later period in Senegal, AID followed a hands-off policy, and it was appropriate at that point. But if the initiative had not been taken by other actors, the result might have been poor performance.

This depiction of management as a balancing act goes beyond the relationships among the actors in the process. It also encompasses goals, procedures, and organization. The need to deliver short-term benefits to one group versus the need to build management capacities within another provides one example of the balancing of goals. Similarly, an organizational host appropriate at the beginning of implementation may not be suitable toward the end. This was the case in Zaire, but it may not always be sequential solutions that are needed. The Lesotho project wedded itself to the ministry in one component but operated autonomously in another.

As individual staff members or leaders move from one position to another, the value of particular organizational relationships changes. For example, with a weak manager as director of the parastatal in Senegal, AID followed one interpre-

tation of the project organization, but when an effective individual moved into the position, the interpretation allowed more autonomy from the national organization.

No realistic review of management can ignore the pivotal role played by key individuals. At the same time, building a project strategy on the leadership of a single person is risky. Moreover, long-run success requires the institutionalization of new behavior patterns. This means getting beyond relying on, and interpreting options in terms of, one individual, and thinking and acting on the basis of the continuity of similar actions by different people.

The problem here is the same as with short- and long-run objectives. In the beginning the individual is critical for performance, but eventually the exceptional doer gets in the way of the need for functions to be assumed by the common group. A generational transfer must occur. Active leading must yield to passive supporting. Few people, or projects, are comfortable during this transition.

#### TRAINING AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

Training often means providing educational qualifications for the counterparts of the technical assistance staff. Those to be trained, so the logic goes, will be given technical skills that will allow them to return home and take over from the technical experts. But five of the case studies cast doubt on the accuracy of this view.

A common problem is that trainees often do not return to project-related technical positions. Scarcity of trained personnel often pushes them up the civil service ladder to management positions. Thus, they do not fit into the designated slots.

Given this propensity, the project in Lesotho included management training along with technical certification. Although this approach did not result in any exceptional benefits to the project, those receiving that training found it to be very useful. In addition, an informal link to someone in a position outside the project but in an influential division within the host ministry proved to be a boon. Recognizing the fluidity of skilled personnel is more realistic than assuming that project technical functions occupy the highest priority for either the individuals or the organizations that employ them.

The organizational dimension is key. Five of the case studies were favorably impressed with the quality of personnel in the projects and the organizations supporting them. The problems dealt less with the skills of the individuals than with the difficulty of applying those skills in the organizational settings surrounding the people. Management enhancement efforts that assume only that skills are needed miss the target. These cases demonstrate that the policy and structural aspects of the organizational dimension are important.

Narrow views of who trainees should be also miss important opportunities. In Lesotho, much non-civil servant training was needed to strengthen initial attempts at beneficiary participation. In Niger, multi-level training was needed in a beneficiary organization, but only the officers had been given any.

There is also political value in on-site multi-organizational training. Inter-organizational relations can be improved through shared training experiences. When training is viewed as a tool for strengthening organizations rather than simply as a conduit for imparting skills to individuals, it is more likely to

improve performance and outcomes. Multi-level, work-group-oriented efforts dealing with real problems can enhance local management capacity.[19]

The same is true of technical assistance. Different styles at different organizational levels, or within individual project components, may be needed, as was the case in Lesotho. Or the evolution of different approaches may need to occur sequentially, as in Zaire and Liberia. Eventually a transition from a doer role to a supporter role will be needed.[20] The issue is not just for expertise to be brought from outside to do something correctly (the right policy?); instead, it is to establish an ongoing local capacity to make and implement effective decisions. Successful development management leads to institutional development: mentor relationships, shared responsibility, scapegoat roles, and skills in mobilizing local resources characterized technical assistance styles that support the enhancement of local capacities.

These six key lessons -- goals and benefits, stakeholder risk, time horizon, resource control, leadership, and training and technical assistance -- represent the major management concerns emerging from the cases. The implications of those lessons are explored in the concluding section.

## CHAPTER FIVE

## CONCLUSION

The findings and lessons presented in this paper add up to a realization that development managers -- those mere mortals -- influence both the decisions made by the Olympians and the impact those decisions have. The experience of six agricultural development projects in Africa indicates that management is an important element in development performance. The ways in which this happens are sometimes straightforward and obvious, but other times, this is not so. Effective strategies are often counter-intuitive at first glance, and performance usually results from interactions among multiple aspects of context and strategy -- not from simple single factors.

Agricultural projects provided the empirical basis for these conclusions, but the insights that emerge from a study of the cases go beyond the boundaries of agricultural projects. They are especially relevant to policy reform and human resource development programs because they focus not on the programs alone but on the interactions between the programs and their contexts.

## CONTEXT

Different contexts often will require different management strategies. It is particularly important to identify who stands to lose and who stands to gain from project success or failure and what level of risk each stakeholder will bear.

Simple, clear-cut objectives are helpful to managers in situations in which organizational autonomy and no key losers exist. In settings where risks are high and potential losers are key actors in the implementation process or are influential

bystanders, however, the manager's job is made easier by multiple objectives supported by project components that deliver benefits to the affected parties.

Socio-political factors, inter-organizational relationships, and policy settings are all important. Universal solutions to local problems may or may not be appropriate, but the implementation of any solution must take local circumstances into account if it is to succeed.[21] This is intuitively obvious, but what is not so obvious is that multiple objectives and complex projects may be necessary to contend with local circumstances successfully. This may be particularly applicable to the settings surrounding efforts at policy reform as a result of the resistance that is raised to the management of those efforts.

#### MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES

Management strategies that work can, under different circumstances, incorporate either clear simple goals or multiple complex goals. Effective strategies are custom fitted to the project's objectives and the local setting, especially the array of stakeholders surrounding the project. The cases support this conclusion as a pattern explaining success.

Successful management also follows a second pattern -- informal practices and communication channels are associated with most examples of success. Informal dynamics are adaptation mechanisms, and attempts at policy reform ignore this fact at their peril. Management practices can raise or lower the riskiness of reform efforts.

Design flexibility also assists the management effort. A project's original objectives, organization, or components often prove incapable of adapting to new knowledge or situations.

Adaptation, however, is characteristic of success. Olympians may need to be informed by, and learn from, the experience of mortals.

The creation of new autonomous organizations to bypass existing but inappropriate administrative machinery can help to achieve short-run performance. But this arrangement often encounters difficulty in the attempt to achieve long-run sustainability. Moreover, projects that are successful at meeting immediate service delivery targets are not necessarily sustainable.

This situation can introduce a dilemma -- the need for quick benefits to placate key stakeholders may require one approach, whereas the need to build capabilities in local institutions may require another. Different organizing approaches for different components, or an evolving series of organizational changes, are options that have been used with some success.

Rigorous local financial management practices are less important for project performance than is commonly assumed. This was the case, at least, in projects implemented when dollar funding was enhanced by the relative strength of the dollar. Auditors and evaluators should be sensitive to the situational nature of effective resource control and should not equate the importation of sophisticated tracking methods with development success. Enhancing local capacity is more important than compliance with imposed procedures.

#### MANAGEMENT ENHANCEMENT STRATEGIES

Management enhancement is often equated with training. But training is only one component of management enhancement. Technical assistance, participation, and leadership are also part of human enhancement strategies. In addition, two elements of

enhancement strategies focus on organizations rather than individuals. They are policy and structural changes.

The six cases indicate the importance of economic policy and organizational structure. In fact, the case studies found fewer problems with the human dimension than with the organizational one. The use of skills was constrained by the settings in which they would be applied. Liberia and Zaire were the most vivid examples of this situation, but it is common throughout the cases and the continent.[22]

Although Africa is commonly seen as a continent with deficiencies in skilled personnel, the six projects reflect a different situation. Fifteen years ago, large-scale participant training may have been the appropriate response. Today, however, training is still important, but key constraints appear to be poor policies and organizational arrangements. This suggests the need for a higher priority on organization and management assistance, policy reform, and action-oriented training applied in mutually supportive ways. From this perspective, policy reform and training become dimensions of a management enhancement strategy, and policy change becomes one of the multiple objectives to be obtained through a management process.

#### IMPLICATIONS

Some of the conclusions of this paper were intuitively obvious before the case studies, but others were not. Obvious or counterintuitive, few are easily accomplished. None will occur simply as a result of new policy directions or assuming good management. Management is a constant battle that necessitates one actor picking up the challenge as another becomes tired. In

projects in which a team spirit is established, the chances for success improve. This conclusion is applicable to the process of policy reform as much as to agricultural development efforts.

The links among context, management strategies, management enhancement strategies, and project performance contain practical implications. Some are pertinent for action -- project design, management, and evaluation. Others are pertinent for future research.

Design implications are:

- Social and administrative soundness analyses should include stakeholder profiles to determine appropriate management strategies for projects;
- Management enhancement strategies should go beyond training to remove constraints on effective performance;
- Consideration of the need for multiple objectives and quick benefits should influence implementation planning and sequencing; and
- Flexibility should be built in.

For management, key implications are:

- The reduction of stakeholder risk will be a major consideration;
- Informal communication and decision-making approaches should be explored;
- The balance between production and capacity building should consistently be weighed;
- Scapegoats roles may be needed;
- The promotion of team approach will be necessary; and
- The long run, and post-project sustainability, should be overarching concerns.

For evaluation:

- Helping managers to articulate strategies, identify shifting circumstances, and adopt new tactics should be a major concern;
- Appreciation of the informal will be needed; and
- Overemphasis on resource control is to be avoided.

For further research:

- The focus should be on the context-strategy fit rather than just intervention attributes as independent variables; and
- A refined typology of contexts is needed for the state of the art to advance.

These points are all presented in Figure 5.

The six case studies and this synthesis paper have attempted to identify important dimensions of the context of development management in Africa, but much remains to be done. More refined typologies of context and project fit are needed. And real typologies will not spring full grown from the tools of any single discipline. Development management goes beyond the simple delivery of goods and services to encompass local capacity building and institutional development. To bring the environment into focus, political, economic, and anthropological perspectives will all be needed. Olympian-watchers alone are not enough.

The experience reported here does not dismiss the importance of Olympian decisions or decision makers, but it does upgrade the importance of the mortal manager and the development administration specialist. It further suggests that management strategies are important and often contain counterintuitive elements, that

FIGURE 5

CONSIDERATIONS FOR DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE IN AFRICA

|                                 | Design   | Management  | Evaluation   | Research  |
|---------------------------------|--|---|--|---|
| CONTEXT                         | <p>Stakeholder profile is useful</p> <p>Knowledge of constraints and incentives for performance is needed</p> <p>Flexibility is needed to adapt to contextual change</p>   | <p>Shifts in emphasis is necessary to adjust to changing circumstances</p> <p>Informal mechanisms are useful for juggling contending perspectives among key actors</p>  | <p>Evaluations should identify project responses to changing circumstances</p> <p>Constraints on flexibility and adaptation should be identified</p>   | <p>A more refined typology of contexts is needed</p> <p>The fit between context and project characteristics, rather than project characteristics alone, should comprise the independent variables</p> |
| MANAGEMENT STRATEGY             | <p>Multiple stakeholders support use of multiple objectives, benefits, and organizational components</p> <p>Informal linkages can be more effective than formal ones in high-risk situations</p> <p>An initial phase producing quick benefits may be needed to induce long run changes later</p> <p>Organization choices should be based partly on stakeholder profile</p> | <p>Ability to reduce stakeholder risk is key to performance</p> <p>Multiple actors must be able to take up the slack if anyone falters -- division of responsibility not rigid</p> <p>Scapegoat role sometimes useful for lowering risk</p> | <p>Evaluations should help management articulate the initial strategy and identify shifts and implications</p> <p>Overemphasis on resource control is to be avoided</p> <p>Evaluators should be sensitive to the importance of informal processes</p>              | <p>A typology of management strategies, including their appropriateness for different contexts, is needed</p>   |
| MANAGEMENT ENHANCEMENT STRATEGY | <p>Training for individuals is seldom adequate -- assistance in changing organizational constraints is needed</p> <p>Multi-level training is often appropriate</p> <p>Mixed technical and managerial training may be useful</p> <p>Attention to policy constraints may be key</p> <p>Leadership and participation elements should be matched to context</p>                | <p>Mentor relationships, management responsibility, and participation should become integral parts of implementation</p> <p>At some point in the project life, a shift from production to capacity building is likely to be needed</p>      | <p>The balance between production and capacity building should noted</p> <p>Constraints on skill use may need to be identified</p> <p>Evaluations should help management articulate the initial strategy and identify shifts, implications, and contradictions</p> | <p>A typology of management enhancement strategies, including their fit into different contexts, is needed</p>  |

the strategies should be based on knowledge of local settings, and that there should be complementary strategies to enhance local management capabilities. When this is not done, unnecessary barriers are raised in the path of development management in Africa.

## NOTES

1. Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: An Agenda for Action (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 1981).
2. Robert Bates, Markets and States in Tropical Africa: The Political Basis of Agricultural Policies (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981).
3. Toward Sustained Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Joint Program of Action (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 1984).
4. See, for example, Coralie Bryant and Louise White, Managing Development in the Third World (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1982); Merilee Grindle, ed., Politics and Policy Implementation in the Third World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980); George Honadle and Rudi Kiauss, eds., International Development Administration: Implementation Analysis for Development Projects (New York: Praeger, 1979); Jon R. Moris, Managing Induced Rural Development (Bloomington, Ind.: Institute for International Development, 1981); Elliott Morss and David Gow, eds., Implementing Rural Development Projects (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1985); Dennis A. Rondinelli, Development Projects as Policy Experiments (New York: Methuen, 1983).
5. D.J. Murray, "The World Bank's Perspective on How to Improve Administration," Public Administration and Development 3, no. 4 (1983): 291-297.
6. David K. Leonard, Reaching the Peasant Farmer: Organization Theory and Practice in Kenya (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977).
7. See Moris, Managing Induced Rural Development.
8. Moses Kiggundu, Jan Jorgensen, and Taieb Hafsi, "Administrative Theory and Practice in Developing Countries: A Synthesis," Administrative Science Quarterly 28 (1983): 66-84.
9. George Honadle and Jerry Van Sant, Implementation for Sustainability: Lessons from Integrated Rural Development (West Hartford, Conn.: Kumarian Press, 1985).
10. Merlyn Kettering, Synthesis of Lessons and Guidelines for Development Management in Africa, Development Program Management Center, U.S. Department of Agriculture, July 1985.

11. The original scope of work specified five categories of information: contextual factors related to management, organizational structure and institutionalization, administrative process changes, resource input management, and human resource management and behavioral considerations. Discussion at the workshop held in Easton, Md., however, emphasized the two types of strategy, whereas the papers presented emphasized different aspects of African contexts. Keeping the details of each of the five categories, I have rearranged them into three -- context and the two strategies.
12. See, for example, Don Hellriegel and John W. Slocum, Jr., Management: A Contingency Approach (Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1974); Fremont Kast and James Rosenzweig, Contingency Views of Organization and Management (Chicago: SRA, 1973).
13. F.E. Emery and E.L. Trist, "The Causal Texture of Organizational Environments," Human Relations 13 (1965): 21-32.
14. Ibid.
15. See, for example, F.G. Baily, Strategems and Spoils: A Social Anthropology of Politics (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1969); Norman Uphoff and Warren Ilchman, The Political Economy of Change (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969); Marc Lindenberg and Benjamin Crosby, Managing Development: The Political Dimension (West Hartford, Conn.: Kumarian Press, 1981); Richard Heaver, Bureaucratic Politics and Incentives for Rural Development, World Bank Staff Working Paper No. 537, 1982.
16. See David K. Leonard, "The Political Realities of African Management" (Paper delivered to the Workshop on Development Management in Africa, Easton, Md., September 1984); Philip Boyle et al., "On the Analysis of Organizational Culture in Development Project Planning" (Paper delivered to the Workshop on Development Management in Africa, Easton, Md., September 1984).
17. Charles Sweet and Peter Weisel, "Process versus Blueprint Models for Designing Rural Development Projects," in Honadle and Klauss, International Development Administration; and David Korten, "Community Organization and Rural Development: A Learning Process Approach," Public Administration Review 40, no. 5 (1980): 480-511.
18. See, George Honadle, Fishing for Sustainability: The Role of Capacity Building in Development Administration, IRD Working Paper no. 8 (Washington, D.C.: Development Alternatives, Inc., 1981).

19. George Honadle and John Hannah, "Management Performance for Rural Development: Packaged Training or Capacity Building?," Public Administration and Development 2, no. 4 (1982): 295-307.
20. See, Jennifer Ann Bremer, "Building Institutional Capacity for Policy Analysis: An Alternative Approach To Sustainability," Public Administration and Development 4, no. 1 (1984): 1-13; George Honadle, David Gow, and Jerry Silverman, "Technical Assistance Alternatives for Rural Development: Beyond the Bypass Model," Canadian Journal of Development Studies 4, no. 2 (1983): 222-240.
21. The argument here is not that the wheel must be reinvented for every setting. This is certainly not the case -- there are patterns of relationships. But suburban commuting, grand prix racing, and off-the-road driving all place different performance demands on tires. Similarly, different Third World settings require different approaches, and some of those approaches will contain complex counter-intuitive elements.
22. Among the many analyses of how organizational and institutional factors inhibit skill use in Africa, the following offer arguments particularly related to the conclusion of this paper: Chikwendu C. Ukaegbu, "Are Nigerian Scientists and Engineers Effectively Utilized? Issues on the Development of Scientific and Technical Labor for National Development," World Development 13, no. 4 (1985): 499-512; Goran Hyden, No Shortcuts to Progress: African Development Management in Perspective (London: Heineman, 1983); Robert Price, Society and Bureaucracy in Contemporary Ghana (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975); Steve Wiggins, The Management of Rural Development Projects in Developing Countries, University of Reading Department of Agricultural Economics and Management, Development Study no. 27, 1985; David Gould, Bureaucratic Corruption and Underdevelopment in the Third World: The Case of Zaire (New York: Pergamon, 1980).

**ANNEX A**  
**LIST OF CASE STUDIES**

## ANNEX A

## LIST OF CASE STUDIES

1. Between Tradition and Modernity: Development Management in Lesotho, by Marion Warren, George Honadle, Sam Montsi, and Bob Walter. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Agency for International Development, 1985.
2. Development Management in Africa; The Case of the Bakel Small Irrigated Perimeters (BSIP) Project in Senegal, by Matt Seymour, Laura McPherson, and David Harmon. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Agency for International Development, 1985.
3. Development Management in Africa: The Case of the Niamey Department Development Project (NDD), Niger Republic, by Thomas M. Painter with Roger Poulin, David Harmon, and Douglas Barnett. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Agency for International Development, 1985.
4. Development Management in Africa: The Case of the North Shaba Rural Development Project in Zaire, by Irving Rosenthal, Leroy Jackson, Ruth Mara, and Laura McPherson. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Agency for International Development, 1985.
5. Egerton College Impact Evaluation Report, by Norman K. Nicholson, Donald Bowles, Ndungu Gathinji, and Elinor Ostrom. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Agency for International Development, 1985.
6. The Management Impact of Liberia's Agricultural Sector Analysis and Planning Project and the Agriculture Development Program, by Chris Hermann, Margaret Shaw, and John Hannah. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Agency for International Development, 1985.