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# Country Development Strategy Statement

**FY 1985**



## Mauritania

January 1983

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**COUNTRY DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY STATEMENT**

**1985**

**MAURITANIA**

**Submitted by**

**USAID/Mauritania**

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## LIST OF ACRONYMS

AGRHYMET	CILSS Agro-meteorological/Hydrological Program
CILSS	Interstate Committee for the Struggle against the Drought in the Sahel
CNERV	Centre Nationale d'Elevage et de Recherche Vétérinaire
CNRADA	Centre Nationale de Recherche Agricole et de Développement Agricole
CSA	Commissariat de Sécurité Alimentaire (Mauritanian grain sales parastatal)
ENFVA	Ecole Nationale de Formation et de la Vulgarisation Agricole
FED	Fonds Européen de Développement
GIRM	Government of the Islamic Republic of Mauritania
OCLALAV	Organisation Commune pour la Lutte Anti-acridienne et la Lutte Anti-aviare (organization for the struggle against grasshoppers and birds)
OMVS	Organisation pour la Mise en Valeur du Fleuve Sénégal (Senegal River Basin Development Authority)
RAMS	Rural Assessment/Manpower Survey
SNIM	Société Nationale d'Industries et de Mines
SONADER	Société Nationale pour le Développement Rural
SONELEC	Société Nationale d'Electricité
SONIMEX	Société Nationale d'Importations et Exportations
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNEP	United Nations Environmental Program
UNSO	United Nations Sahelian Office

## I. SUMMARY: THE STRATEGY AND AGENCY PRIORITIES

The purpose of U.S. economic programs in Mauritania is to advance our humanitarian and foreign policy objectives by assisting the government in improving the economic and social condition of the rural population. In recent years, efforts focussed mainly on agricultural production and food aid, primary health care and environmental protection. A number of constraints limited the success of these ambitious undertakings. Budgetary and administrative problems made it impossible to carry out a fully effective program in all of these fields. The difficult physical environment and the widespread geographic distribution of projects produced major logistical and managerial difficulties. The general weakness of Mauritanian institutions and the lack of strong, positive policies have been especially severe obstacles to development.

Recognizing this situation, our strategy has been modified to place greater priority on institutional development and policy reform. Human resource development will assume an enhanced role as a means of redressing evident managerial and technical weaknesses. In policy reform, we will concentrate on encouraging increased producer prices for grain (through P.L. 480), reduced agricultural input subsidies and the transfer of services from parastatals to the private sector. The sectoral concentration on environmental protection will be dropped. Technology transfer and research activities will continue, but their geographic scope will be narrowed. These changes will promote greater efficiency in the use of our assistance dollars and, of great importance, will also improve Mauritania's capability to deal with its pressing development problems.

## II. ANALYSIS

### A. The Economy

Development prospects for Mauritania for the short and medium terms are meager at best. Annual gross domestic product (GDP) growth for the last five years averaged only about three percent per year. The general output of the rural sector has fallen from 65 to 25 percent of GDP from 1959 to 1979 and crop production has fallen from 14 to below 3 percent of GDP during the same period.

Mauritania is now compelled to import, regularly, at least two-thirds of its total food consumption needs, and foreign aid as a proportion of total expenditures has remained slightly above 60 percent since 1976. Military spending continues to account for about one-third of total current spending. The budgetary deficit for 1982 constituted more than 40 percent of total current budget and debt servicing for 1983 to 1988 is scheduled at an annual rate of one-third of the current budget. On the other hand, transport, commerce, and administration have expanded rapidly since 1977. Inflation and the earlier very rapid economic progress from 1960 to 1975 have pushed the per capita income figure to about U.S.\$ 485 per year (for 1981).

### B. Identification and Status of Rural Majority

1. Identification: The basic target population of U.S. assistance is that portion of the rural population which is able to sustain initial investments in new production techniques. Included in the target group are small

farmer/herders (women and men) who possess usufructory rights to land and/or modest quantities of livestock, and merchants who can play a vital role in supplying material inputs to rural communities. Mid-level technical personnel will also be targetted to the extent they plan programs and provide extension services to rural populations.

2. Status: The average per capita rural income in 1980 was about \$ 317 according to a RAMS project survey. Cash crops have never been a strong factor in the rural economy, but the sale of crops has become an even less important source of income in recent years. This loss has been offset by continued emphasis on herding, remittances from abroad and greatly expanded participation in the army, civil service and commercial establishments. This situation is indicated in the following table:

<u>Structure of Rural Revenues</u>	<u>Sedentary</u>	<u>Nomadic</u>	<u>Total</u>
Sale of Agricultural Products	6%	2%	5%
Sale of Livestock Products	14%	60%	22%
Fishing	2%	-	2%
Artis@anal Activities	1%	7%	2%
Commerce	18%	7%	16%
Debt	4%	4%	4%
Salary	26%	4%	22%
Pensions, Family Allowances	5%	-	4%
Remittances	13%	7%	11%
Gifts	4%	9%	5%
Miscellaneous	8%	-	7%
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>

In the past, rural to urban migration has served as a means for escaping a deteriorating environment and finding employment to support family members remaining in the rural areas. However, current economic constraints mean that urban employment is unlikely to expand further. The transfer of revenue from the modern sector will therefore stagnate. Given this situation, the U.S. will concentrate a large portion of its resources on reinvigorating the declining agricultural sector in order to lower local food deficits and increase the share of crop production in rural incomes.

C. Economic Objectives and Plans of the GIRM

The Fourth Development Plan, 1981 - 1985, in little more than outline form as of February 1983, identifies a long-term strategy of greater economic independence and emphasizes the development of human resources. The five-year goals are fiscal austerity, consolidation of prior investments, and a "restructuring" of the economic base, including reform or abolition of public enterprises where appropriate.

The "principal practical recommendations" for implementation of the plan are:

- investment policies favoring low capital intensity and high employment generation, and the "productive sectors" in general;
- limitation of foreign indebtedness in relation to export earnings;
- limits on the relative growth of the tertiary sector;
- "growth through decentralization of the people's and the private sector's participation in order to orient private savings towards productive activities"; and
- rehabilitation of the para-public sector by "reinforcing its management".

The major objectives for the rural sector as expressed in the plan's outline are as follows:

- long-term development of irrigated farming and reconstitution of the national livestock herd;
- environmental rehabilitation measures such as village reforestation and protection of infrastructure against sand invasion;
- improvement of rural living conditions and increased peasant incomes; and
- promotion of local production and consumption of fish.

Priority will be given to participatory projects entailing the smallest possible outlay for recurrent costs. Involvement at the grass roots level is being encouraged by a GIRM campaign, begun April 1982, for launching minor public works activities in rural villages and urban areas. The plan's outline further notes that there are a number of outstanding juridical problems which impede rural development. Improvements in land, forestry and water legislation are all required.

These objectives fit well within overall U.S. assistance objectives and our perception of local needs. However, assuming such a plan were formally adopted, the real question is to what extent the GIRM can be expected to implement these objectives, or even whether there is a real, as distinct from rhetorical, political commitment to them.

#### D. Resource Strengths and Weaknesses

1. Natural: The most critical natural resource constraint is lack of water. Most of Mauritania is desert. Crop production is generally limited to oases and to a band roughly 50 kilometers wide in the southern part of the country. Average annual rainfall across the country ranges from less than 40

mm to 500 mm. Rainfall in the dryland areas is irregular and causes wide variation in production. The Senegal River represents a major water resource for the country but fluctuations in volume are extensive and affect production from recessional agriculture. There are deposits of groundwater, although not enough is known about depths and discharge rates. Six known major aquifers underlie about 20 percent of the country.

Desertification continues because of excessive human and animal use of the fragile environment. USAID's recent agricultural sector assessment pointed out the importance of ecological considerations for agricultural development activities in drier areas:

"... zones that are marginal for production ... are sensitive to short-term deterioration and long-term degradation. In a sole use scenario, far from the desert advancing southwards, the expansion of live-stock or crop production activities could be perceived as a cancerous force, spreading northwards to feed on a relatively healthy but fragile system until the system is destroyed".

Resources abundant in Mauritania are extensive iron-ore deposits and deep-sea fishing grounds. Iron ore at present suffers from a low price and reduced sales on world markets. Mauritania could increase returns from the annual fish catch of roughly 550,000 tons by implementing proper negotiating policies on profit sharing with foreign entrepreneurs.

2. Human: The Mauritanian population, estimated at 1.5 million, is relatively small for a country three-fourths the size of Alaska. The bulk of the population is concentrated in the Senegal River Valley, Nouakchott, and several other towns, and a few oases. The Moors are mostly nomadic or semi-nomadic and

speaking Hassaniya, a dialect of Arabic, the national language. Several important ethnic minorities are mainly sedentary and speak languages other than Hassaniya. There were riots in 1966 when Arabic was declared to be the national language. French remains the language of government. The GIRM plans to introduce three additional languages at the primary education level by 1985; Poular, Soninke and Wolof. This could further encumber communication and the efficiency of educational programs.

The literate population numbered less than 17 percent in 1977. Among the literate, more than half read or wrote Arabic only, one-fourth Arabic and French, and the remainder other languages. The educated people are mostly concentrated in the capital city and some regional cities.

The educational level of most government employees is deficient. Only six percent of the Civil Service employees by 1980 possessed the equivalent of a high school diploma or better, and only eighteen percent possessed the equivalent of a junior high school diploma. Educational levels are higher in the parastatals, but are still deficient. Accounting and management skills are in very short supply, affecting the planning and management of development programs, while technical skills are also scarce, thereby impeding implementation.

Government salaries have remained very low since 1974. Increases average barely two to three percent per year, while inflation has run at a 10 percent annual rate. More frequent increases in grade and increased fringe benefits have eased the problems posed by inflation.

Currently, more than 1,600 Mauritians are studying abroad under GIRM auspices, many in advanced and technical programs. An equal or greater number study abroad on their own or outside any GIRM program. Many who obtain governmental employment on their return do not have opportunities to use their newly acquired skills, or are employed in positions unrelated to their studies. All these factors help explain the low quality of GIRM services.

3. Finance: Mauritania's financial situation ranks among the worst in the world with the budgetary deficit on current account at about 40 percent of current expenditures. Nearly two-thirds of total spending is financed by foreign assistance.

Until recently most foreign assistance was in grant form; but budget support grants declined for 1982 to only about \$ 4 million compared to the peak of \$ 105 million in 1978. Food and project grants are now valued at about \$ 70 million per year, loan project assistance at about \$ 100 million per year and budget support loans at about \$ 40 million per year. Outstanding loans at commercial interest rates constitute only 12 percent of total debt obligations; however, this total passed \$ 1 billion during late 1982, pushing debt servicing to about one-fourth of the current budget and 14 percent of GDP, the highest in Africa and one of the highest in the world.

United States grant assistance, in the form of food shipments and project assistance grants, has comprised about five percent of total foreign assistance in recent years. Its importance is far greater, given the tangible value of food as a commodity and the sizable share of the food deficit covered by U.S. food (about 25 percent).

The GIRM adopted an Economic and Financial Rehabilitation Plan in September 1978. The basic goal of the Plan was to start reducing the bloated budget deficit. The Plan calls for the streamlining of public enterprises, austerity in public expenditures, vigor in tax collection efforts, and debt rescheduling. This Plan was supported by International Monetary Fund (IMF) assistance totalling \$ 41 million from August 1980 - March 1982.

A significant achievement has been a freezing of current expenditures in nominal terms at about \$ 180 - \$ 200 million annually since 1978.

Unfortunately, this achievement required drastic curbs on procurement of material and supplies, rendering services less effective. Individual salaries were also restricted to annual increases of less than three percent.

However, because of insufficient restraint on recruitment, government employment levels have grown by seven to eight percent per year since 1973. Budgetary equilibrium will prove difficult; personnel reductions are unlikely and supplies and equipment have already been cut severely. Despite rhetoric about increasing tax collection efforts, domestic revenues have increased little since 1978.

Faced with debt service payments ranging between 35 and 50 million dollars per year between 1978 and 1981, the GIRM successfully rescheduled its debt so that actual payments averaged only 26 million per year. Yet, continued and accelerated unwise investments have turned this aspect of the Plan into a significant failure. Debt servicing is now scheduled to soar to an average of \$ 73 million per year during the 1983 - 1988 period, or over one-third of current budget levels, a clearly unmanageable position. Adding the

obligations of the Central Bank and the iron mines parastatal SNIM, the average debt servicing becomes \$ 118 million per year. Further debt rescheduling is inevitable.

The current Plan calls for 22 percent of total public investment in the rural sector compared with only 10 percent realized under the previous five-year plan. Public investment expenditures are expected to total \$ 1.6 billion, which is nearly three times the figure for the period 1976 - 1980. The GIRM expects that about 12 percent of this total would be financed from the budget and the balance from foreign aid.

GIRM Financing of Counterpart and Recurrent Costs

The GIRM capability to finance its counterpart and recurrent cost obligations is linked to resolving its budgetary crisis. When the structural distortion of GIRM spending patterns is corrected, the GIRM should have little difficulty meeting counterpart and recurrent cost obligations imposed by development projects. This structural distortion is revealed in the following analysis of the 1978 GIRM budget, performed by Fernand Mattart of the University of Montreal (millions of dollars):

Recurrent Costs for Educational Projects	26
Recurrent Costs for Other Specific Projects	8
Recurrent Costs for Economic or Social Services not attributed to specific projects	11
	—
Total Recurrent Costs	45
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Security Expenditures	80
Other General Services	27
Subsidies and Transfers	12
Interest on Public Debt	8
	—
Total Operating Budget	171
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Recurrent costs for specific development projects represented only 19 percent, or, using the broadest definition, 27 percent, of the total operating budget. It thus appears that there is substantial room for the expansion of the GIRM's recurrent cost financing. The most politically feasible way to do so is to reduce the excessive general services proportion of the GIRM budget through inflation, i.e. hold the nominal value of general services constant while allowing recurrent cost financing to expand by at least the inflation rate. This process could take a decade before significant restructuring of the budget is achieved.

Recent information from the Central Bank of Mauritania and the IMF indicates that the GIRM has already achieved some structural reform of expenditure patterns over the last four years. Any further shifts toward gradually higher spending in agriculture, health, and education should continue to be encouraged. Desirable financing expansions must perforce be gradual, and must be accompanied by reasonable generosity in donor assistance during the next few years of continuing budgetary tightness. Donors should also continue to design projects so as to minimize recurrent cost burdens consistent with achieving anticipated project benefits. Determined government efforts to raise domestic revenues much more than in the past would also assist efforts to increase its coverage of recurrent costs.

#### E. Policy Constraints

1. Economic: The poor state of Mauritania's economy can be blamed to a large extent on improper policies adopted by the central government and poor execution by various governmental agencies.

The military forces, that expanded eight-fold in the mid-1970's (in response to budget support from conservative Arab States for prosecuting the Western Sahara war), command a high proportion of the GIRM budget for an activity of low productivity. Military spending has accounted for about one-third of total GIRM spending (12 percent of GDP) for the last five years.

The major industrial and mining projects are all owned and operated by the GIRM. A number of ill-conceived projects are already operating or are planned that will seriously undermine the country's economy. A \$ 95 million Arab loan-financed revival of the copper mines has been taking place and over \$ 100 million have been spent on constructing and opening sugar and petroleum refineries. This has occurred despite evidence that the projects are not economically viable, and strong indications that the projects' operating and debt service costs will drain the economy. The entirely loan-financed \$ 100 million Gorgol Noir irrigation project will also sap the economy when loan payments are made, because costs are higher and benefits lower than anticipated.

The \$ 450 million Guelbs iron mining project is also likely to damage the economy severely. Since petroleum processing costs are much higher than were envisaged before 1979 and iron-ore prices much lower, the internal rate of return (IRR) for the Guelbs project will probably be negative and the scheduled loan repayments (some \$ 35 million yearly from 1985 - 1992) will be much higher than the excess of revenues over operating costs during that period. Probably, the most economically negative project is the \$ 300 million Nouakchott - Nema highway. The GIRM rejected World Bank advice to

build the east-west highway through the agriculturally productive and densely populated Senegal River valley in the south. Traffic densities on the northern road, chosen by the GIRM for political reasons, are much less than 100 vehicles per day and the tens of millions of dollars per year in loan repayments during the 1980's and 1990's will far exceed the indirect benefits of the road.

Improper policies or poor execution have also been adversely affecting the economic potential of the country's rich fishing grounds. Fifteen different countries used the fishing grounds during 1978 for a total catch valued at about \$ 300 million. Mauritania received only about \$ 30 million of this total in fishing royalties. In 1979, the GIRM initiated a new fisheries policy to replace the former licensing system with joint venture arrangements. As a result, revenue, together with new export taxes on fish, plummeted to an annual average of about \$ 15 million during the 1979 - 1982 period. The GIRM must moderate its tough negotiating posture and must improve the functioning of its regulatory and promotional services if GIRM fishing revenues are to expand to a potential \$ 80 million annually over the next few years.

The GIRM has opposed exchange rate reform, posing difficulties for the few emerging small industries attempting to compete with imported goods. Other policy weaknesses which are limiting the GIRM's contribution to Mauritanian development include too rapid an increase in GIRM employment levels and insufficient vigor in tax collection efforts.

2. Recent Policy Improvements Resulting from Donor Efforts: The IMF stand-by program for Mauritania includes a number of institutional measures meant to improve the viability of the parastatal organizations. Accounting and

administrative capabilities of the iron-mining parastatal, SNIM, have already been restructured under this program. The commodity marketing parastatal, SONIMEX, has been improved, and similar improvements are currently slated for SONELEC (electricity), SONADER (rural development) and CSA (grain sales).

The GIRM has increasingly acknowledged the principal that project beneficiaries pay for assured services. The USG-funded Trarza Rural Medical Assistance project, the Integrated Rural Development project in Guidimaka, and the P.L. 480 CRS Food and Nutrition project have provided the major stimulus for this change in attitude. For Trarza, the Ministry of Health accepted the principle of charging beneficiaries for village health worker services and supplies in order to extend coverage. The MOH now proposes to extend this system to other regions and has permitted CRS to levy a participant's fee to cover a major portion of local costs. The Guidimaka project was permitted to sell livestock vaccines in Guidimaka at cost price although elsewhere these vaccines are distributed free. While moving cautiously, the GIRM seems to have adopted some of these project policies as its own, seeking to expand them to new regions and activities.

The Commissariat for Food Security (CSA) accepted price increases in marketed P.L. 480 food aid to assure greater incentives for the domestic production of cereals. It has since expanded price increases to cover all food aid regardless of donor. Ultimately, P.L. 480 grain will be sold at selected CSA branches at its CIF (cost, insurance and freight) value. Farm gate prices were raised by at least 25 percent in September 1981; further rises are to be more gradual. Recent discussions with the GIRM confirm its willingness to

allow prices under the new P.L. 480 Title II, Section 206 project to increase to the CIF level over five years.

At the moment, the GIRM policy on subsidies for agricultural inputs is more rigid. But, in negotiations with the OMVS and the World Bank on assistance toward the development of irrigated perimeters, the GIRM has made a commitment to a gradual reduction of fertilizer and irrigation pump subsidies. The GIRM, in response to this and the other initiatives outlined above, is gradually modifying some policies in order to obtain project financing.

3. Social Factors in Policy Reform: Major differences among population groups, both ethnically and racially, pose some tensions while pursuing economic development efforts. The politically dominant Hassaniya-speaking Moors are a majority in every region, except in the southern tier along the Senegal River. The Moors are composed of two major sub-groups: the Haratin, former slaves from tributary groups largely of black African origin; and the Bidan who predominate in religion, commerce, livestock and the military service. The Haratin have either been integrated into larger Bidan encampments, work as herders in their own encampments, as farmers in their own agricultural communities, or earn their livelihood by fishing in the coastal region with smaller Hassaniya-speaking sub-groups and non-Moor fishermen. Hassaniya culture is that of a traditional tribal nomadic society with a few central markets, resting places, or religious centers located generally in the oases areas.

The ethnic groups in the Senegal River Basin are the Toucouleur, Peul, Wolof, and Soninke. Soninke society, which predominates in the Guidimaka Region where USAID has worked extensively, is characterized by traditions stressing the welfare of the extended family and the community over the individual, and a patriarchal organization to mobilize people to work together.

The country's population has shifted from mostly nomadic to mostly sedentary, including a rapidly growing urban population which is still closely tied to rural values and does not represent the well-established urban communities found in other African countries.

Some segments of the Mauritanian population, particularly the dominant Moor groups, are still heavily influenced by their traditional hierarchal social system and nomadic life. These values include emphasizing a life of commerce, administration, or leisure, and disdaining manual labor, especially laboring for others. Members of some groups tend not only to refuse manual work, but also oppose the advancement of other groups. These values tend to influence investors to seek capital-intensive investments, in effect undermining the initiative of those willing to work manually by denying the capital necessary for them to go into business for themselves. These values, however, are being modified by more cooperative attitudes encouraged by self-help projects promoted by the government.

Finally, disputes on land ownership represent a major constraint to agricultural production. Progress in overcoming this problem is slow.

4. Political Factors in Policy Reform: Moctar Ould Daddah became Mauritania's first President at independence in 1960 and ruled until he was ousted in a military coup d'état in 1978. Lt. Colonel Mohamed Khouna Ould Haidalla became Chief of State in 1980 after several rapid changes in government and in 1981 he also became head of the Military Committee for National Salvation. So far, the 1980s have been difficult years for the country politically, both domestically and in foreign affairs.

Internationally, Mauritania continues to suffer the effects of the war in the neighbouring Western Sahara. The war began in 1976 after Spain relinquished colonial claims to the area. This prompted some residents of the Sahara to form the Polisario Front in an effort to establish an independent state, independent of Morocco and Mauritania. Mauritania made peace with the Polisario in 1979 by ceding its portion of the Western Sahara, which was immediately appropriated by Morocco. 1981 saw a major battle at Guelta Zemour in the Western Sahara near Mauritania's border which provoked concern in the Government, particularly when it was announced that the Polisario had been using SAM - six missiles against Moroccan aircraft. However, Mauritania maintains its tenuous neutrality and appears to want to continue to do so.

Domestically, the political situation has been strained. A move towards civilian government, begun in December 1980 with the appointment of a civilian prime minister, ended in April 1981 with a reversal in government policy and the appointment of a military prime minister and several military ministers. A small group attempted a coup d'état on March 16, 1981 by attacking the Presidential Palace and other key places around Nouakchott. The Mauritanian

government alleged that the plotters - Mauritanian citizens - had acted with the support of Morocco, and broke diplomatic relations with Morocco the next day. Bitterness between the two countries prompted Saudi Arabia to call the foreign ministers together at Ta'if to seek a reconciliation of differences. The Ta'if accords were signed by Morocco's King Hassan and President Haidalla, but were soon nullified as each side accused the other of bad faith. Relations between the two countries still remain hostile and have led to an increase in the influence of Algeria, Libya, and Iraq in Mauritania, offset, to some extent, by the competing influences of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and other conservative Arab states.

Domestic political turmoil has also had its effect on economic development in Mauritania. Pressing economic issues have often had to take a back seat to the political whims of local politicians. Senior GIRM policy makers are apt to devote large amounts of time and energy to consciousness-raising campaigns such as the "Education of the Masses Program", giving little thought to the country's overall economic development programs. The question of race is also a problem in Haidalla's government. Few blacks hold high office. Most blacks tend to find the arabization process unpalatable, and a way of preserving an inequitable status quo. The quiet illegal persistence of slavery, the GIRM's tendency to promote donor funding for projects in Moor dominated areas, and the tendency to interpret Islam through an Arab prism are all reasons why many blacks see the Haidalla military government as an instrument of Moor dominance.

F. Institutional Constraints

Institutional constraints, specifically of organizations involved in development, have become a critical factor in slowing the implementation of U.S. financed projects and reducing anticipated results. These constraints are summarized as follows:

1. Inadequacy of funding of counterpart obligations and extension activities.

The U.S. financed Renewable Resources Management project was terminated in part because of lapses or inadequacies in counterpart funding. Field personnel of the Directorate of Agriculture are not able to fulfill adequately their extension functions because of limitations on fuel, technical material, and other essential supplies. Maintenance of roads and equipment is continually deferred because of funding shortages. Plans by SONADER to expand extension activities into existing and new irrigated areas have been delayed, thus jeopardizing the development of the Senegal River Basin. These institutional deficiencies can only be gradually overcome through budgetary restructuring as indicated in the section on financial constraints.

2. Ineffective project planning and follow-up. This is caused in part by the critical dependence of the GIRM on external sources of project financing (90 percent of public investment funds). Each funding source has its own set of administrative procedures which are superimposed over those of the government and stifle efforts at self-generated planning and project implementation. Planning and technical personnel devote much of their time to negotiating with donor missions and complying with their special requests.

The Directorate of Projects within the Ministry of Plan has recently been strengthened by management training designed to improve project administration and obtain higher net benefits from GIRM and foreign investments. USAID plans to selectively expand the numbers of host country project managers receiving specialized training, thus promoting GIRM capabilities in effective project management.

3. Rigid procedures and cumbersome bureaucratic relationships.

The complex government structure and operating style hinder decision making and the conduct of private business activities. The fisheries sector provides examples in which rigidity in procedures reduced program effectiveness. Maintenance of an inflexible tough negotiating posture on new terms for the privilege of ocean fishing led to the withdrawal of Japanese and Korean fishing fleets from Mauritanian waters and fruitless negotiations with the European community. The requirement that fishing entrepreneurs must receive clearances from numerous GIRM officials, plus the lack of firmly accepted guidelines on these clearances, leads to long bureaucratic delays or large special payments, greatly discouraging investments. The prevalence of such procedural rigidity explains, in part, why USAID is not recommending assistance to fisheries projects. The other major reason is that other donors - Japan, the European Community and United Nations Agencies are already heavily involved.

SONADER's managerial energies are fragmented because it is burdened with both extension activities and administration and collection of credit payments for irrigated perimeters along the Senegal River. Credit activities should be handled by the banks and a promising new institution, the National Development Fund (FND). Commencement of FND operations appears to be obstructed by

bureaucratic rivalries among existing institutions. The absence of procedures for collaboration between the extension services of SONADER and the Directorate of Agriculture reduce the effectiveness of each.

A complex labor code raises the cost of doing business. Inadequate or confused delegations of authority have led to implementation delays in projects with the Food Security Agency (CSA) and the Environmental Protection Service. Processing of purchase orders and payment vouchers is excessively time consuming, both within the Ministry of Finance and such line agencies as the CSA.

Frequent ministerial level reorganizations occur which reflect short-term modifications of political and economic policies. The present Ministry of Plan and Regional Development, for example, has been reorganized 14 times during the last 22 years and has incorporated, for short periods, such functions as rural development, mining, tourism, industrial development and fisheries.

Provision of better trained personnel under various donor programs, including our own, should produce an environment in which procedures and organizational relationships relevant to rural development can be improved.

4. Widely dispersed rural populations. The vast distances separating villages and encampments and inadequate communications facilities render the extension of health and agricultural services a difficult and expensive task. This is exacerbated by the decided preference among most trained personnel to serve in the capital. Inducements for them to serve in rural areas are apparently not adequate and the resulting shortages lower the quality of rural services.

5. Composition of personnel in GIRM development organizations. The numbers of personnel appear adequate or even excessive in most ministries and departments, but there are across-the-board shortages of highly skilled managers and technicians. Skilled individuals tend therefore to assume disproportionate workloads, a condition largely responsible for excessive implementation delays and an extensive, long-term reliance on expensive, expatriate personnel. For example, of 100 physicians in country, only 38 are Mauritanians and, of these, half serve in administrative capacities. Most of the secondary level teachers are French nationals. Less specialized or attractive vacancies go unfilled or to ill-suited candidates. For example, design work, construction activities, supervisory roles, equipment maintenance, and project management are all impeded because of vacancies or inappropriate assignments in both the Rural Works Department (Ministry of Rural Development) and the Ministry of Transport and Equipment. In-service training proceeds slowly if at all. Many of the numerous donor-sponsored training opportunities go unexploited by the Ministry of Employment and Staff Training. Again, with managerial personnel spread thin, this Ministry is not yet able to follow the progress of scholarship recipients, let alone match candidates with upcoming opportunities. U.S. Mission proposals, designed to redress training shortcomings, will also specifically address the blockages within this ministry, the primary implementing organization for participant training.

### III. PROGRAM STRATEGY

#### A. The Goal of U.S. Assistance

The overall U.S. goal is to assist in improving the health and productivity of the Mauritanian rural population. Experience to date indicates that the concentrated application of improved technology in Mauritania can have a marked impact on agricultural productivity and the health status of the population. We have indicated, however, in the preceding analysis that weak institutional structures and policies have often undermined the attainment of substantial improvements in the rural sector and have often limited the success of USAID projects. Therefore, these problems must be addressed as matters of priority.

However, an exclusive focus on institutional and policy constraints in the short run would deprive the rural sector of needed immediate assistance. Some marginal improvements in rural livelihoods through technology transfer and research can be attained now, albeit in a geographically concentrated area due to the limitations on the level of U.S. financing. Projects which seek to improve rural technologies and productivity can also be designed to test changes in policy and new systems of management. Encouragement of such testing through U.S. supported development projects has been effective in promoting limited institutional change.

U.S. assistance over the duration of the planning period will thus have a dual purpose: (1) to promote research, infrastructural development and, where possible, technology transfer which will have an immediate, if limited, impact on rural health and agricultural productivity, and (2) to emphasize institutional

development and policy reforms which will make possible, in the long run, the diffusion of sustainable improvements in health and agriculture throughout Mauritania.

In summary, project interventions will be designed to accomplish the following:

- (a) provide opportunities for newly reinforced and upgraded institutions to gain experience in the use of new management and operational techniques;
- (b) provide opportunities for trainees to gain experience in utilizing newly acquired skills;
- (c) provide a proving ground to test policy initiatives and possibly bring about broader national policy adjustments;
- (d) provide project resources to actually affect policy change;
- (e) demonstrate that rural development projects can produce positive results, thereby encouraging the GIRM as well as other donors to expand rural investments.

#### B. Sectoral Emphases

1. History: U.S. assistance to date has focussed on three sectors:
  - (a) agricultural production and food security;
  - (b) environmental conservation and regeneration; and
  - (c) rural primary health care.

Operating over a broad swath of southwest Mauritania, assistance projects were designed to improve the productive capacity, economic output and social stability of populations of the rural interior. This strategy was over-ambitious given the fragility of the Mauritanian institutions involved, the low economic returns from some of the projects themselves, high implementation

costs, and the difficulty of managing a geographically dispersed project portfolio in a hostile environment.

These factors, plus budget realities which contrasted sharply with expectations (see below), made it imperative to reassess the scope of the program in each sector.

Long Range Planning Figures by Fiscal Year (\$ 000)

<u>ABS Document</u>	<u>1981</u>	<u>1982</u>	<u>1983</u>	<u>1984</u>	<u>1985</u>
For FY 1981	7,700	10,000	15,000	15,000	15,000
For FY 1982	10,000	10,000	15,000	15,000	15,000
For FY 1983	8,500	10,000	10,000	11,000	12,000
For FY 1984	-	6,550	6,800	8,100	9,000
Actual Figures	8,500	6,307	5,600*	5,100*	

\* Recent projections.

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The earlier strategy could not be sustained, as shown by the fact that the FY 83 OYB is one-third of what was anticipated in the FY 81 and 82 planning documents.

Reevaluation of our assistance priorities required us to halt or alter planning for several proposed projects. An initiative in alternative energy as well as endeavors in agriculture and environmental protection were shelved, including assistance to the national agricultural school (ENFVA) and expansion of the Renewable Resources Management Project. (This entire project was eventually terminated because of GIRM inability to support it and poor contractor performance). As a result of all the foregoing, USAID will halt its emphasis on environmental protection. We will retain, however, our sectoral emphases in agriculture and health and will also focus more heavily on human resource development.

2. Agriculture and Food Aid: The rural population is involved primarily in herding and cereal production. Herds have almost regained predrought levels with production expected to meet domestic needs through this century. Without a massive infusion of new resources, however, the U.S. could not assist in achieving meaningful improvements in the livestock subsector. Substantial advances in agricultural production can be achieved as demonstrated in the irrigated perimeters along the Senegal River where rice yields of 5 - 7 tons per hectare have been reached (see FY 82 evaluation of Small Irrigated Perimeter project - 682-0226). Harnessing the Senegal River, by construction of the Diama and Manantali dams, will facilitate expanding the amount of land under irrigated cultivation. For dryland areas, the current Guidimaka I.R.D. project has shown that yields for cereal crops can be increased up to 100 percent through use of improved varieties and improved cultivation practices. Improvements in both irrigated and rainfed agriculture are essential to the reduction of the massive gap between cereals production and consumption in Mauritania.

Such improvements can generally be concentrated in the south-central portion of the country, specifically the Guidimaka Region and that part of the Gorgol Region which is contiguous to the Senegal River. These areas possess the greatest potential for achieving major increases in irrigated and rainfed cereals production.

This geographic concentration allows us to take advantage of knowledge gained from our previous work in the Guidimaka. It will also simplify execution and management of projects. Activities which we will support in the area include the continuation of our integrated development efforts in the Guidimaka through use of P.L. 480 grain receipts and the U.S./OMVS sponsored irrigated perimeter

and agronomic research projects.

Current activities which lie outside this area of geographic concentration include the Rural Land Reclamation project and the Oases Development project. As a consequence of the poor economic returns to investment projected for the former project, financing for it will be phased out. Given the promising results shown to date, work will continue on the Oases project which is scheduled for completion in 1986.

The ultimate objective in the agricultural sector is to improve productivity and increase production. If accompanied by appropriate policy reform measures and the requisite institutional and human resource development, introduction of improved varieties, technology, and management will increase production and farmer income. Nevertheless, we firmly believe that local production will still be far below Mauritania's food consumption requirements for the foreseeable future. This means a long term need for P.L. 480 assistance as well as for food aid from other donors. Our strategy links food assistance to price policy reform and the use of food sales proceeds to support selected rural development activities.

3. Rural Primary Health Care: The Mauritanian population suffers from one of the highest infant mortality rates in the world (170 - 190 per 1,000) and the loss in early childhood of a significant portion of its children to diarrheal diseases, malnutrition, respiratory infections, malaria, measles and meningitis. Debilitating diseases such as malaria, schistosomiasis and guinea worm also sap the productivity of the adult population.

Our strategy is to assist in the introduction and institutionalization of the delivery of a selected number of primary health care services to rural communities. The package will accent disease prevention through immunization, disease control through appropriate use of drugs, nutrition and disease surveillance, oral rehydration therapy, health and nutrition education, and first aid.

The Rural Medical Assistance or "Trarza" project (682-0202) and the Expanded Program of Immunization (625-0937.5) have already prompted the government to emphasize rural primary health care. Our proposed follow-on assistance will introduce appropriate health care technologies in limited geographic areas. Training components will build on an existing institutional base generally stronger than that in agriculture. We intend to expand and promote rural primary health care initiatives by assisting in training village health workers while simultaneously improving the capability of a core of health practitioners and administrators.

4. Human Resources: Given limited financing, the U.S. cannot assist in attacking the problem of human resources development in all its dimensions. We have no intention, for example, of supporting development of primary and secondary education systems. However, the lack of trained personnel in virtually all fields impedes U.S. development interventions, as well as those of other donors.

The goal of U.S. human resources interventions will be to upgrade personnel skills in those institutions directly linked to U.S. programs in agriculture and health, and to upgrade the skills of GIRM policy makers

including those who plan and manage public training programs. To reinforce our existing efforts, we will develop and implement a new project which focusses exclusively on attaining these goals. This activity will enhance, over a period of years, Mauritania's capacity to better manage its own resources and those supplied by the donor community.

C. Four Administration Priority Concerns

The four priority concerns of the Administration - policy reform, institutional development, research and technology transfer, and private sector initiatives - all play an important role in U.S. assistance to Mauritania. Policy reform and institutional development are critical elements in creating an environment more conducive to rural development and represent major emphases in our planned program. The other two priority concerns are addressed in on-going and planned projects to the extent possible in this country. Many policy issues targetted for reform involve expansion of the private sector in rural development and promoting greater use of adaptive research. Institutional upgrading should lead to more effective technology transfer, improved research capabilities and stronger private sector initiatives.

The matrix below summarizes the relationship of U.S. assisted projects to the four priority concerns.

<u>Project Number</u>	<u>Project Name</u>	<u>Policy Reforms</u>	<u>Inst. Dev.</u>	<u>Tech. Trans.</u>	<u>Private Sector</u>
Bilateral Program					
682-0207	Oases Development			X	
682-0214	Rural Roads		X	X	
682-0230	Rural Medical Services	X	X	X	X
682-0231)	Title II, Section 206	X	X	X	
P.L. 480)					
P.L. 480	Title II, CRS - MCH	X	X	X	
	Human Resources Devel. Project		X		
Regional Program (Principal Projects)					
625-0928	Integrated Pest Management		X	X	
625-0928.6	Regional Food Crop Protection		X	X	
625-0937.5	Land Tenure - AIP	X	X		
625-0960	Sahel Manpower II		X		
625-0621	OMVS - Integrated Devel. Project	X	X	X	X
625-0957	OMVS - Agricultural Research II		X	X	
625-0958	OMVS - Groundwater Monitoring			X	

1. Institutional Development: As noted in the analysis section, Mauritanian rural development agencies often lack the planning and managerial capacity to properly utilize the limited resources and technology at their disposal. Staff training, ranging from on-the-job to long-term participant training, is already being used to address this problem. Along with the GIRM, we plan to design a new project specifically focussed on training needs. This focus fits well with Administration priorities as expressed in the Administrator's January 1982 "Guidance Cable on Participant Training" which stressed human resources development at all levels as one of the most cost-effective long-term investments. Institutional development will be assisted further by upgrading management systems for government services associated with U.S. supported projects. Our intention will be to demonstrate the effectiveness of such improved systems for more general use by the GIRM.

The majority of other U.S. funded activities focus on institutional development as well:

(a) The regional Sahel Manpower Development project (625-0940) will continue to support training of key personnel, increasingly emphasizing those associated with rural development;

(b) The Rural Health Services project (682-0230) will concentrate on continuing efforts to reorganize selected components of the Ministry of Health and provide training appropriate to the needs of an expanded primary health care program;

(c) An activity of the P.L. 480, Title II, Section 206 project will promote improved management of the country's grain stock; and

(d) A series of regional projects will benefit institutions working in the field of agricultural development: support for the development of the country's crop protection service, through the Integrated Pest Management and Regional Food Crop Protection projects; the national agricultural research center (CNRADA), from training of its researchers and technical support in operational and financial management through the OMVS Agronomic Research project; and the rural development parastatal SONADER, charged with the development of irrigated agriculture in Mauritania, through the OMVS Integrated Development project.

2. Policy Reform: We have found that prospects of food and financial assistance can influence government policy. A number of on-going projects have influenced policy with positive results but generally only after long and hard negotiations. For example, negotiations with the Commissariat for Food Security and its predecessor organizations have resulted in a 60 percent increase in producer prices for sorghum and millet. The Guidimaka Integrated Rural Development project (682-0201) which has sold veterinary drugs and agricultural implements to farmers at cost has demonstrated on a limited scale that herders and cultivators can and will pay for the costs of needed inputs. Prior GIRM policy was to provide these services at no charge. The Rural Medical Assistance project has demonstrated successfully community willingness to support village health workers including paying to replenish drug supplies.

Further reforms relevant to rural development will be pursued to complement the successes achieved to date by our assistance. As part of our P.L. 480, Section 206 program, we will continue negotiations on the schedule for increasing market prices of grains. The OMVS Integrated Development project has targetted a number of policy reforms, particularly the reduction of subsidies on farm inputs such as fertilizer and pumps.

3. Research and Technology Transfer: Adaptive research needs for agricultural development are substantial. Much agricultural research has been done by expatriate agronomists. We will assist with participant training to develop host research capacities through the OMVS Agronomic Research project. Trainees will undertake priority agricultural research assignments on rejoining the National Agricultural Research Center at Kaedi. The Agronomic Research project will also improve the financial management of the Center, develop a medium range research plan and budget, and begin the initial phases of farming systems research in irrigated areas. It will be linked with other U.S. assisted agricultural activities to facilitate the dissemination of results.

Technology transfer is a key part of many U.S. assisted projects. The Rural Health Services project will apply new techniques in rural primary health care. The Guidimaka I.R.D. project has introduced new dryland agricultural techniques and materials to area farmers, including improved cultivation practices and the use of animal traction. We expect to continue this effort through a sub-project of the P.L. 480, Section 206 program. The Oases Development project is demonstrating improved varieties, cultivation techniques and water management systems appropriate to agricultural development in oases areas. The dissemination of technology on irrigated agriculture will be a key component of

the OMVS Integrated Development project. Research into and the development of appropriate technology for pest management is supplied through the Regional Food Crop Protection and Integrated Pest Management projects.

4. Private Sector Initiatives: The private sector is not well developed except for fishing, retail trade, and transportation. Many activities such as agricultural input distribution and marketing of agricultural products are parastatal responsibilities. For example, the CSA purchases grain crops and SONADER supplies agricultural inputs and rural credit to irrigated perimeters. To encourage the transfer of responsibilities to the private sector, we will seek a relaxation of subsidies. This will be accomplished through policy reforms encouraged by the OMVS Integrated Development project and related programs. This project will promote private sector activities in general throughout the Senegal River Basin. The World Bank will demand similar reforms in their River Basin project.

A major constraint in rural areas is the high cost of transportation. Merchants have been unwilling to move into areas lacking decent roads. The routes targetted under the Rural Roads project (682-0214) should ease access for merchants to both the Guidimaka project area and the River Basin and reduce prices for agricultural inputs. However, a lack of complementary infrastructure and volume markets will continue to limit private sector expansion.

Recognizing that in certain areas communities have the capability to pay for vaccines and other services, the GIRM has begun promoting private sector involvement in pharmaceutical distribution by phasing out free services. These initiatives will be supported by the proposed Rural Health Services project (682-0230).

D. GIRM Absorptive Capacity

The government's managerial capacity is overburdened and financial resources to support rural development projects are modest. U.S. assisted projects have encountered major delays and procedural difficulties. Consequently, our involvement in one project was terminated and plans for several new initiatives were shelved. Effective counterparts are few and spread very thinly.

Officials in ministries dealing with rural development are overwhelmed by ministerial responsibilities, administering donor-funded assistance projects, and duties involving international coordination and research institutions. Whatever their level of dedication or motivation, they cannot devote adequate attention to donor-assisted projects.

The heavy public debt, an emphasis on large industrial projects, high military expenditures, and support of public sector employment limit GIRM ability to support rural development. Both parties to project agreements often ignore commitments to make local resources available in deference to GIRM financial constraints. The capacity of host government entities to maintain accounts on the use of donor-supplied financing is very limited. To date, USAID has very rarely released U.S. assistance funds directly to the GIRM, but has managed funds through contractors or its own internal systems. This style of operation applies to commodity procurement as well, creating a substantial management burden.

Frequent personnel shifts, particularly at the project level, undercut interest in development schemes, delay decisions, and reduce support responsiveness. We expect these limitations to decrease as planned improvements in human resources are felt.

In view of these limitations, we are reorienting the bilateral portion of our program to overcome selected technical, managerial, and financial skills shortages. Our proposed Human Resources Development project will be the principal means for achieving this objective.

Problems of absorptive capacity also must be thoroughly addressed in all regionally funded projects. While the current regional initiatives in pest management and manpower development have functioned adequately in Mauritania, there is a need to further examine whether required local support will be adequate for any new initiatives.

#### E. Other Donor Activities and Coordination

Four major projects involving U.S. assistance demonstrate extensive cooperation with other donors:

- Negotiations on the P.L. 480, Section 206 project have concentrated on price reform as an essential ingredient to placing food aid on a developmental basis.

These negotiations have been coordinated with other food aid programs in Mauritania (WFP, FRG, and France among others). The GIRM has now agreed to apply the recent and scheduled price increases negotiated through the 206 program to all food aid, regardless of donor;

- We are collaborating with the World Bank on irrigated perimeter development for the Gouraye Sector of the Senegal River, while France, Holland and the European Development Fund (FED) are assisting perimeters in other parts of the river and many European, international and Arab donors are financing the diversion dams;

- The United Nations Sahelian Office (UNSO) has been financing construction of the northern section of the M'bout - Gouraye road; U.S. financing will continue this construction on the southern section; and

- We have been working with WHO, UNICEF and Arab countries in financing and implementing the Expanded Program of Immunization (625-0937.05).

Other U.S. funded activities associated with other donor efforts include: the animal traction experiments of the Guidimaka Integrated Rural Development project which build upon prior efforts of the FAC (Fonds d'Aide et de Coopération - France) and Lutheran World Federation; the Regional Food Crop Protection project which has been coordinated with similar FAO and CILSS/OCLALAV pest control activities; and the Oases Development project, which has applied lessons from French date palm experimentation.

Donor activities which we do not assist will still contribute to the achievement of broader USG development objectives. Port improvements and the construction of other roads will lower the cost of delivered inputs and thereby increase economic returns from crop development activities. Fishing promotion activities, if successful, will provide a major share of the foreign exchange earnings needed to finance the Mauritanian counterpart and recurrent cost contributions of all foreign financed development projects. (See Section II, Institutional Strengths and Weaknesses, which explains why we are not involved in fisheries assistance). World Bank, Saudi Arabian and Iraqi support of educational institutions and training programs - depending on the appropriateness of the training - will help to alleviate personnel constraints described throughout this document. The absence of effective multilateral coordinating mechanisms should be noted. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Plan and the UNDP provide limited coordination, but the GIRM opposes formal consultative mechanisms among donors. Therefore, coordination is most often bilateral and informal.

#### IV. RESOURCES

A key characteristic of U.S. assistance to Mauritania is that the bilateral operating year budget of \$ 5.6 million is only one quarter of the financial resources to be managed directly by USAID. The P.L. 480 program will require an additional \$ 10 million in FY 83. Approximately \$ 5 million more will support certain regionally-funded activities requiring project agreements with the host government, direct oversight by USAID/Mauritania project officers and financial control by the Controller's office. These particular projects such as the Sahel Manpower Development project (625-0960), OMVS Agronomic Research (625-0957), OMVS Integrated Development (625-0621), Regional Food Crop Protection (625-0928.6) and the redesigned Integrated Pest Management project (625-0928) will therefore be implemented in a manner similar to any bilateral project. As shown below, the bilateral OYB may constitute an even smaller share of the overall program in future years.

USAID/MAURITANIA ESTIMATED FINANCIAL REQUIREMENTS (\$ 000)

<u>PROJECT</u>	<u>NUMBER</u>	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>	<u>FY 87</u>
Oases Development	682-0207	2,949	-	-	-	-
Rural Health Services	682-0230	1,342	2,660	1,000	-	-
Devel. Assistance - 206	682-0231	1,269	-	-	-	-
Small Project Assistance	682-0232	40	40	-	-	-
Human Resources Program*		-	2,000	2,000	2,000	2,000
New Devel. Assist. - P.L.480*		-	-	-	<u>1,000</u>	<u>1,000</u>
Sub-totals		5,600	4,700	3,000	3,000	3,000
OMVS - IDP**	625-0621	3,000	3,000	3,000	3,000	3,000
Integrated Pest Management	625-0928	500	500	500	500	-
Regional Food Crop Protection	625-0928.6	500	500	500	500	-
Agricultural Research	625-0957	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000	-
SMDP	625-0960	300	300	300	300	-
New Ag. Research Project		-	-	-	-	<u>1,000</u>
Sub-totals		5,300	5,300	5,300	5,300	4,000
P.L. 480 (including transport)		<u>10,000</u>	<u>10,000</u>	<u>10,000</u>	<u>10,000</u>	<u>10,000</u>
TOTAL		20,900	20,000	18,300	18,300	17,000

\* Estimated resources required for new, largely undefined projects.

\*\* Figures for all regionally funded projects are gross estimates based on available financial data.

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P.L. 480 requirements under the Title II, Section 206 program are 20,000 metric tons of grain annually during FY 83 - 85. We anticipate the same amount will be required from FY 85 forward, most desirably under the 206 format or similar vehicle. The maternal child health and outreach activities sponsored by Catholic Relief Services (CRS) will require approximately 4,708 metric tons of foodstuffs during FY 83 and 4,320 metric tons during FY 84. USAID estimates an annual need, from FY 85 forward, for approximately 4,750 metric tons of foodstuffs for

CRS-type programs. The value of all this food aid, exclusive of shipping costs, is estimated at \$5.5 - \$6.2 million per year for the planning period.

Approximately \$3.6 million of this will be required annually by the 206-type program with the balance committed to MCH and outreach activities. Shipping costs will raise the annual financial requirements to approximately \$10 million.

The expansion of regionally funded projects and P.L. 480 supported sub-projects will demand the retention of some USAID staff positions which might otherwise have been cut because of reductions in the bilaterally funded project portfolio. Nevertheless, some reduction in the direct hire staff is possible. The current direct hire staff ceiling level stands at 19. By FY 85, this level can be reduced to 17 supplemented by appropriate numbers of PSC, PASA, TCN and FSN employees.

USAID/MAURITANIA

PROJECT DESCRIPTIONS BY SECTOR

AGRICULTURE AND FOOD SECURITY

Oases Development (682-0207): designed to investigate means of improving agricultural production and other aspects of economic livelihood in oases areas of the Assaba Region of central Mauritania. Focus: technology transfer and research.

P.L. 480, Title II, Section 206: designed to assist in alleviating critical Mauritanian food shortages while utilizing proceeds from grain sales to promote research and technology transfer in agricultural production. Project also is playing key role in encouraging producer price increases for grains. Focus: policy reform, institutional development, technology transfer.

P.L. 480, Title II, CRS - MCH: program uses distribution of grain and other foods to improve maternal and child health status and as an incentive to attract attention to educational programs in maternal and child health care. Focus: technology transfer, institutional development, policy reform.

Rural Roads (682-0214): rationale for this infrastructural development project is to connect Mauritania's prime agricultural lands in the Guidimaka and Gorgol Regions to the existing national road network. Focus: infrastructure development, institutional development (improvement in skills of local road workers and technicians).

Integrated Pest Management (625-0928): research program aimed at identifying principal agricultural pest problems and developing means of controlling them. Focus: research/technology transfer and institutional development (building indigenous capability to employ pest management research techniques).

Regional Food Crop Protection (625-0928.6): applies results from IPM and other research work to the eradication of agricultural pests. Focus: institutional development (creating and reinforcing Mauritanian Crop Protection Service) and technology transfer.

Land Tenure (625-0937.5): program of training and applied research designed to improve Mauritania's capacity to deal with the critical problem of land tenure from a field as well as policy perspective. Focus: institutional development, policy reform.

OMVS - Integrated Development Project (625-0621): will provide training, physical resources and technical advice on expanding and improving the productivity of irrigated agriculture along the Senegal River. Focus: institutional development, technology transfer, policy reform and some promotion of private sector initiatives.

OMVS - Agricultural Research II (625-0957): research project aimed primarily at identifying and promoting improved varieties and cultural practices for irrigated crops. Focus: research/technology transfer, institutional development (national agricultural research center at Kaedi).

OMVS - Groundwater Monitoring (625-0958): effort designed to monitor the effects on groundwater of major dam construction projects on the Senegal River. Focus: research/technology transfer.

#### PRIMARY HEALTH CARE

Rural Medical Services (682-0230): designed to promote institutionalization of primary health care program in rural Mauritania. Focus: institutional development, technology transfer/research, policy reform and some support of private sector initiatives in input marketing.

#### HUMAN RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT

Human Resources Development Project: to assist in training technicians and managers in the fields of health and agriculture. Project will also target Mauritanian policy planners. Technical assistance to improve the management of the institution responsible for coordinating public sector training programs will also be provided. Focus: institutional development.

Sahel Manpower Development Project (625-0960): broad-based training project aimed at improving technical and managerial capabilities of Mauritians. Focus: institutional development.