

Country Development Strategy Statement

FY 1984

SUPPLEMENT TO FY 1983



Senegal

January 1982

Agency for International Development
Washington, D.C. 20523

BEST AVAILABLE

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COUNTRY DEVELOPMENT
STRATEGY STATEMENT

S U P P L E M E N T

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INTRODUCTION

Senegal's FY 1983 Country Development Strategy Statement was approved in Washington in March, 1981. That document, based upon a year's joint evaluation and planning with the Government of Senegal, presents a plan for achieving food self-sufficiency (to include trade and storage) by 2000 A.D. Pending further study, however, the FY 1983 CDSS for Senegal as submitted leaves several questions unanswered. What part -- if any -- should a health/nutrition/population program play in this food strategy? How much should AID do in the field of education and training to implement this strategy? What measures should the USAID take to evaluate its program, and to reevaluate its strategy, in the Planning Period, FY 1983-1987?

The present submission, a supplement to the FY 1983 CDSS, seeks to answer these particular questions in some detail. The answers given follow the recommendations of three surveys prepared over the past nine months, with the full cooperation of the Government of Senegal, involving AID specialists and private consultants under the leadership of the Senegal Mission. As such, this paper does not offer a fundamental reexamination of Senegal's economic and social situation.⁽¹⁾ Although Senegal's plight has grown more serious with the failure of the harvests in 1980/81, events over the past year have tended to confirm, rather than challenge, the FY 83 CDSS analysis of Senegal's problems and prospects. The basic lines of the CDSS strategy -- a greater emphasis on non-project assistance, on opening a "second track" to the rural producer, and on donor coordination -- have borne up well under

(1) A complete summary of the current economic difficulties, prepared for the USAID by Louis Berger, Inc. (December, 1981) accompanies this submission.

the scrutiny of recent experience. The present paper therefore seeks to complete, not to alter or reverse, the CDSS food self-sufficiency strategy presented a year ago.

The CDSS strategy takes as Senegal's Number One priority the need to substantially increase national per capita agricultural production. Senegal's per capita productivity has declined by an average of 0.2 percent each year since the mid-sixties. There are various reasons for this. Natural limitations are partially to blame, especially low and irregular rainfall and poor soils. Senegal's population growth is high (2.8 percent per year, officially). But even more constraining to Senegal's per capita productivity have been policy and institutional factors, a complex mechanism of low guaranteed farm prices, expensive input subsidies, government directed and non-representative "cooperatives", and parastatal marketing and supply monopolies. This system has handicapped, not helped, the agriculture sector. It lies at the heart of the productivity problem.

Faced with otherwise certain disaster, then Prime Minister Abdou Diouf introduced in December, 1979, a comprehensive structural reform package for Senegal, the Plan de Redressement. With the encouragement of Senegal's major donors, including the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and France, the Prime Minister set forth a detailed set of guidelines designed to balance Senegal's budget and stimulate national production, especially in agriculture. Among the most important of the measures called for were those aimed at increasing prices to farmers and at withdrawing parastatal supply and marketing agencies from rural areas in favor of private traders and village producer groups. Senegal's Reform Plan seeks to curb

government bureaucracy, dismantle in stages the centralized system of controls, and allow private enterprise increasing rein.

The FY 1983 CDSS lists the impressive steps which Senegal took in 1980 towards implementing this Reform Plan. Since Abdou Diouf became President, in January 1981, this progress has continued. Included among the reform measures which the Government has taken in 1981 are: the significant, across-the-board increase in agricultural producer prices (April, 1981); the signing of formal performance contracts between the Government and several important parastatals (SAED, SODEFITEX) to better define and direct their activities; and the reduction of expensive subsidies on key items such as fertilizer and imported rice. In January, 1982, the Government announced the increase of the official consumer price of rice by one third.

Senegal's advance along this path of reform in 1981 was significant enough to satisfy her major donors and public creditors. Facing a budgetary deficit for 1981/82 of \$269 million, Senegal concluded on terms of strict conditionality, a stand-by agreement with the International Monetary Fund in September, 1981 for \$82 million plus \$55 million in IMF compensatory financing. In February, 1982, after reviewing Senegal's performance over the September-December period, the Fund renewed the Agreement. The World Bank, after a separate review in December 1981, judged that Senegal had fully complied with the terms of the \$60 million structural adjustment loan/credit granted in 1980. The Bank thus appeared ready to approve the release of the second and final tranche (\$20 million). Similarly, Senegal's major public creditors met at a session of the Club of Paris in October, 1981,

and rapidly agreed to provide Senegal with debt relief amounting in 1981/82 to \$76 million.

Because the USAID shares the conviction that increased per capita agricultural productivity in Senegal is impossible without structural reform, the FY 1983 CDSS places major emphasis upon assisting the Government to implement its Reform Plan. With this end in view, and acting upon the findings of the Joint Senegal-U.S. Assessment held in 1980, the CDSS recommended three principal modifications to the USAID/Senegal program as it then stood. In the year since this strategy was approved, the USAID can report significant progress in all three areas.

First, the CDSS calls for a greater emphasis upon non-project assistance. At the present time as Senegal suffers serious economic difficulties, such aid serves a number of purposes. Not only will it help to ease Senegal's balance of payment crisis. Non-project aid also will generate local currencies and thus extend greatly the in-country work which can be affiliated with dollar-funded projects. Because non-project assistance of the magnitude which the CDSS recommends touches upon sectoral and even national issues, it can serve as a means of engaging the Government in a policy dialogue, both bilaterally and in conjunction with other donors. The CDSS favors an annual level of non-project aid for Senegal approaching \$20 million by 1983, composed of a new Title III program and an Agriculture Sector Grant.

The USAID has evaluated the Title III program in the course of the past year. While the local projects funded by Title III show notable success, the program has encountered difficulties owing to the comparatively high price (and therefore slow sales) in Senegal of American whole grain rice.

The USAID has concluded that unless commodity problems can be fully resolved, the Title III program should not be greatly expanded, but should be renewed for three years at a level (\$8 million per year) only slightly above the present. In addition to Title III, the Mission has designed and submitted in PID form the Agriculture Sector Grant, a \$25 million activity over five years, with the initial obligation set for FY 1982. Finally, the USAID together with the Embassy have set in train the process for approval of an Economic Support Fund (ESF) grant, totalling \$10 million annually, to commence in FY 1983. The Mission has scheduled preparation of the final ESF project paper for June, 1982. If these three programs are operational by FY 1983, as expected, AID's annual non-project assistance to Senegal will total \$23 million, compared with \$11.5 million budgeted in conventional project assistance for the same year.

Meanwhile, to support the policy dialogue which must accompany effective balance-of-payments assistance of this comparative importance, the USAID, the Embassy, and the Senegalese Government have laid firm plans. First, the USAID and Embassy have decided to establish a joint economic/commercial unit beginning May 1, 1982. In addition to the Embassy economic officer and his commercial affairs deputy, the unit will include the USAID direct-hire economist and a macro-economist, familiar with IMF/IBRD transactions, on two-year secondment from the organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in Paris.

Second, the Michigan State University team, financed under the Agriculture Research and Planning Project (685-0223), will arrive in April, 1982 to begin work over a four year period. The MSU team will perform macro-economic research on the agriculture sector, in addition to their farm systems studies,

for Senegal's Institute for Agriculture Research (ISRA).

Third, Princeton University will undertake, beginning in March, 1982, a three-year series of studies for the Ministry of Plan into key questions associated with agriculture policy formation. The ground has been laid for mutual reinforcement between the Princeton and Michigan State research teams. Finally, the Government of Senegal has recently requested AID's assistance in two areas of great importance to the long-term goal of food self-sufficiency, broadly defined: a plan for national cereals storage and marketing, and a scheme for the overall development of the Peanut Basin, including problems of soils regeneration. The USAID has initiated a search for appropriate expertise, to be financed initially under present and planned activities. Taken altogether, these developments assure a greatly strengthened policy dialogue over the Planning Period and beyond.

The second major change in USAID programming which the CDSS recommends is the opening of a "second track" of assistance directly to the rural producer. In order to assure this effort coherence and power, the CDSS urges the concentration of all USAID activities in three (rather than six) regions of Senegal. Developed in the period 1975-1980, the Mission's "first track" assistance to the agriculture sector was through Senegal's Regional Development Agencies (RDA's). These parastatal bodies are charged with increasing all crop yields in their respective regions. Noting the significant present-day problems of these state Agencies, the CDSS maintains that the Mission should continue its work to improve the RDA's in their primary function as extension agencies, while helping them to divest themselves of other functions. But at the same time, the CDSS urges the USAID to find ways directly to assist rural private entrepreneurs and community-based producer groups in the three regions selected

for their production potential (the Sine Saloum, Casamance, and the Fleuve). Because of the localized nature of this approach, the CDSS recognizes that its success will depend in large part upon the success of the Mission's effort to launch non-project activities (the first major change recommended) which will generate local currency.

The USAID and Embassy believe that the building up of sturdy, representative local councils and producer groups, and the unleashing of the private sector, constitutes the single most important key to economic development in Senegal. So long over-centralized and bureaucratized, Senegal may be brought to realize under the Reform that the country's real "growth and modernization points", as Sheldon Gellar has called them, are the institutions and enterprises at the local, not the national, level.

In the course of the past year, pursuing this "second track" recommendation, the USAID has undertaken a series of studies and preliminary project designs. The Mission has prepared to the PID-stage a prototype project for encouraging rural entrepreneurs in the Sine Saloum Region and for strengthening Senegal's national credit apparatus for small and medium enterprises. The USAID has explored ways and means for improving Senegal's investment code, to encourage private investment. Next, in conjunction with CLUSA (Credit League of the U.S.A.), the Mission has investigated possibilities for assistance to village producer groups, as part of the effort to reorganize Senegal's outmoded system of cooperatives. To support this effort, the USAID has scheduled the preliminary design of a PVO/Cooperatives Sector Grant in April, 1982, for initial funding in FY 1983. Finally, the USAID is now taking an active part in the Prime Minister's special committee for revising Senegal's rural credit system. Partial funding to cover local costs in these three

areas -- the rural private sector, producer groups, and farmer credit -- has been programmed under the Agriculture Sector Grant. The Mission has submitted this project to AID/Washington in PID-form for review in March, 1982. In these several ways, discussed in detail in the Human Resources Chapter, the USAID has launched a program of direct support to local producers in AID's three geographic zones of concentration.

It would be a serious mistake to view U.S. assistance to Senegal in isolation from that of other major donors, notably the IMF, the World Bank, France, and, increasingly, OPEC sources. As we have suggested earlier, Senegal's extraordinary magnetism in donor circles continues. To speak only of bilateral donors, France extended \$155 million in exceptional aid to Senegal in 1980/81, in addition to 1,400 technical assistance personnel (1,000 are teachers). In the same year, Saudi Arabia granted Senegal \$50 million. Canada and West Germany offered important support.

Given this very considerable international interest, the CDSS called for a third and final major change in the USAID program, namely the establishment of a Consultative Group for Senegal to mobilize maximum assistance for Senegal's Reform Plan and to reinforce the policy dialogue with the Government. According to the CDSS, the Senegalese Government, and principally the Ministry of Plan, should form and chair the Group, which would then act at the three levels of (a) macroeconomic support, (b) assistance in framing effective policies, and (c) aid for specific programs and activities.

Important steps have been taken to put this scheme into effect. With the vigorous action of Senegal's new Minister of Plan, together with

substantial staff support from the World Bank, the Government convened Senegal's major and minor donors for the first time (October 19-21, 1981) at IBRD European Headquarters in Paris. The purpose of this meeting was to review Senegal's general economic situation and to request important new assistance to cover Senegal's counterpart share of ongoing development projects. Following this successful session, the Minister of Plan has shared with the USAID his intent to convene a similar meeting at perhaps 16 month intervals. Next, the Minister has scheduled for the second quarter of 1982, a multi-donor review in Dakar of policies and programs in the rural sector. He has requested the Club du Sahel/CILSS to assist with the preparations for the review, an arrangement which fits nicely the new CILSS mandate to work increasingly at the national level. Thirdly, the Minister has also called for meetings of participating donors to review specific programs (e.g. SAED, in February, and forestry, in May 1982) and projects (e.g., Dakar's container port in March, 1982). The USAID's policy dialogue with the Government, thanks to these continuing developments, has assumed its proper international dimension. And the impetus behind the Government's Reform has gained new force.

What follows in this FY 1983 CDSS supplement is a discussion of how health and education/training activities will be used to strengthen the Mission's strategy for food self-sufficiency, broadly conceived. This supplement concludes with details of a scheme to evaluate the effectiveness of the entire program, and the strategy itself, in the 1983-1987 Planning Period.

HEALTH STRATEGY

INTRODUCTION

The first question one must ask in conceiving an AID health strategy in Senegal is: should the USAID finance any program at all in the health area? Given the urgent requirement to boost production in Senegal and the comparatively modest level of USAID funding, the Mission has taken this question most seriously.

In responding to this question, one must examine the overall USAID development strategy in Senegal, which is Senegal's achievement of food self-sufficiency through increased agricultural productivity. Because the major input into agricultural productivity in Senegal is labor, it is essential that labor output remain consistently high with as little down time as possible. Given this emphasis on productivity, we must analyze the major interventions that will insure that labor outputs remain high. Though not based on specific quantifiable data, observations at each of the AID agricultural project sites - Bakel, the Groundnut Basin, and the Lower Casamance - indicate that the quantity of food cultivated and harvested by farmers is significantly limited by the prevalence of infectious disease and malnutrition. Both phenomena reach peak incidence during the rainy season (June-September) preceding the annual harvests. During this period, malaria, diarrheal diseases, and malnutrition take their greatest toll on the population precisely when there is the greatest demand for energy output.

Studies in the Gambia (1) (conducted in regions bordering two of AID's three emphasis zones) have recorded the caloric intake of women, those who till

(1) Gambia Medical Research Council Presentation during CDC Seminar in Banjul, April 1980.

the crops, at barely 50% the level considered adequate to perform hard physical labor during the rainy season. Though seasonal in nature and partially the result of diminished reserves from the previous year's harvest, the effects of malnutrition during this critical pre-harvest period should not be underestimated. When adults are performing manual labor with such an inadequate caloric intake, labor suffers obvious adverse effects. The synergism of infectious diseases and malnutrition in turn causes childhood mortality, which also peaks in the harvest season, causing an undetermined but significant amount of labor time to be spent caring for the ailing infants - time that would otherwise be spent in the fields.

In addition to disease and malnutrition, which directly affect labor availability and output, population growth rates have a significant impact on food availability. If current rates of population increase and urbanization in Senegal continue at the same pace over the next fifty years, food self-sufficiency will be increasingly more difficult to achieve and sustain. Senegal's present official annual population growth rate is 2.7 percent, but various reports prepared for USAID point to a more likely rate of 3.0 - 3.3 percent. Given a demographic profile that shows 44 percent of the population under 15 years of age, Senegal's total population may double within the next 25 years, reaching 11 million by 2000 - 2010, despite high rates of infant mortality. Furthermore, Senegal's rate of urbanization through migration and natural increase is high -- about 30 percent -- even for sub-Saharan Africa, with population particularly concentrated in the Dakar-Thiès axes. At the present rate of urbanization, the Cap-Vert region (Dakar and surroundings) will account for 40 percent of Senegal's population distribution by 2000. The continued growth of Dakar at this pace

will tend to reduce the proportion of the population engaged in cultivation and to increase pressure on food imports, which already reached 386,000 MT of rice and 100,000 MT of wheat in 1980 (valued at \$90 million). At this rate, population is growing faster in Senegal than the production of basic foods.

Both the direct effect of disease and malnutrition on the productivity of Senegalese farmers and the long-term effect of population growth on per capita food availability in Senegal argue strongly in favor of a health/nutrition population complement to the USAID food-production program.

The USAID health effort, comprising only six percent of the total USAID/Senegal life of project funding for ongoing or FY'82 budgeted projects (excluding PL-480 programs), nevertheless promotes prototype health activities which in the future may be supported and sustained by the GOS. These activities include a village-based primary health care program in the Sine Saloum, a Family Health Project, and two smaller primary health components in the Bakel Small Perimeters and Casamance Integrated Development Activity projects. From a political, cultural, and economic point of view, USAID feels these projects represent the most effective method of introducing health interventions in Senegal to help ameliorate disease, malnutrition, and population factors that presently limit the productive output of the country.

These village-based health activities may later serve to spark interest and encourage village cooperation in other development activities. Because of the vested self-interest people have in maintaining their own health, they are likely to organize around health-related endeavors. The structures established through this process, such as community-based management

committees and local monitoring and evaluation systems, could also be applied to agricultural projects; for example, the same skills required to organize a village committee to manage the purchase and distribution of drugs could be adapted to managing a village-level coop that would carry seed and fertilizer as well as soap, sugar, and other commodities. Improvements in rural health services will make life in the village more attractive and help stem the rural to urban migration. Greater population in the rural areas will result in increased availability of labor during the crucial growing season, and thereby contribute to increased productivity.

In the last two years, the GOS has taken significant steps toward supporting this village-based primary health care system. In 1980, the Government introduced the "participation" policy, under which Senegalese are required to pay a modest fixed fee for services rendered at all levels of the health care system. Although this system is currently far from being completely user-financed, a structure for the payment of services and the management of these funds has been established. The importance of this system cannot be overstated. Beyond just setting up a fee-for-service policy, the GOS has determined that, henceforth, the villagers themselves should decide how to use the funds generated by their user fees to improve their own health care. This self-management, or "auto-gestion" measure, coupled with the participation policy, represent to our knowledge the first time a West African country has faced the reality that the state cannot afford to provide free health care to the general population through taxation-generated revenues alone. At the same time, Senegal has recognized

the importance of allowing local communities to make decisions affecting the nature of their health care. Though the development of an extensive and inexpensive rural health care system in Senegal will require patient government and donor support over perhaps the next twenty years, the user fee and self-management policies together provide the necessary policy framework in which this system has a chance to develop.

Having confirmed that health/population measures constitute an important factor, though modest in terms of budget allocations, in AID's food strategy for Senegal, we must now turn to the question of how best to develop these activities. We must therefore analyze the nature of the health problems of the target populations within the three USAID emphasis regions.

HEALTH CONDITIONS

The USAID health strategy has as its principal target group the populations of the three AID emphasis regions established in the 1983 CDSS: the Fleuve (565,000), the Sine Saloum (1,400,000), and the Casamance (804,000). The fundamental health problems of this group are well known, although hard data on disease incidence and distribution are often incomplete and inaccurate. Generally, the leading killers are malaria, measles, and diarrheas, all compounded by underlying malnutrition. Approximately 30 percent of young children lose their lives primarily through this combination of causes, although tetanus and a range of viral respiratory infections also contribute significantly to the high number of deaths. ⁽¹⁾

(1) "Enquête Sénégalaise sur la fécondité", 1978 - République du Sénégal, Ministère de l'Economie et des Finances, Juillet 1981.

For adults, malaria, although less lethal after the age of 15, is still a serious cause of debilitation; especially, as we have seen, in the rainy season, when agricultural activities require the maximum physical effort. Diarrheal ailments aggravate the problem. In addition, bilharzia, which exists in the Casamance and Upper Senegal River Basin, will become more problematic as irrigation is extended, as will malaria. Tuberculosis, tetanus, and wound infections also kill or debilitate the adult labor force. All of these ailments can be prevented or treated through the rural health care system USAID is supporting.

A compounding factor in these diseases is malnutrition, defined here as widespread caloric deficiency. Studies performed by the World Bank, the World Health Organization, and the Government of Senegal identify it as a serious public health problem for people of all ages. A 1979 study funded by the World Bank in Diourbel and the Casamance revealed chronic protein-caloric malnutrition in more than 20 percent of all infants under five.⁽¹⁾ A further 25 percent were acutely malnourished. The 1977 WHO national study described first degree malnutrition as "normal" in Senegal.⁽²⁾

The World Bank estimates per capita daily food availability as 1800 calories and 40 grams of protein, with extreme regional and seasonal fluctuations in the degree of this malnutrition.

(1) James Pines, Consultant, Transcentury Foundation, "An AID Nutrition Strategy in Senegal". October 1981.

(2) Ibid.

The major causes of malnutrition among the target population are limited income and aggregate food availability, amplified by inadequate home storage, poor food habits (especially related to infant weaning), and constant exposure to parasites and other infection. For adults, this coincidence of minimum food availability and maximum exposure to infection in the pre-harvest period, combined at that time with maximum energy requirements, causes dramatic weight loss and weakness. This classic example of the interaction between malnutrition and infectious disease carries especially heavy consequences for productivity and output. The high mortality rate of Senegalese children under five ⁽¹⁾ (Casamance: 36.1%, Sine Saloum: 28.6%, Fleuve: 25.4%) is complicated by what President Diouf, ⁽²⁾ in January 1982, called the "galloping" demographic increase (perhaps 3 percent). It has been estimated that Senegalese women have an average of seven live births each. ⁽³⁾ This total fertility rate is second only to that in Kenya for all of Africa. The consequent short birth intervals leave women anemic, exhausted, and more susceptible to disease. It also exposes their children to a greater risk of death. While no formal study has been made, it is clear that the purely economic costs to Senegal of this statistic in terms of lost earning time, employment potential, food, and health care must be considerable.

(1) "Enquête Sénégalaise sur la Fécondité". OP. CIT.

(2) Excerpt from a speech given by President Diouf at the opening of a health and development conference in Dakar. Printed in "Le Soleil" February 1, 1982.

(3) Clark, Sarah and Al. "Multi-Year Population Strategy for Senegal" March 9, 1981.

VILLAGE BASED APPROACH

USAID supports the development and extension of a village-based, self-financing health system, closely allied with income producing agricultural production programs. The goal of the health strategy is to reach the primary victims of disease and malnutrition in the rural areas. An analysis of the country's health conditions indicates that death and disability can be reduced most effectively through the following means: (1) immunization (especially against measles, tetanus, and whooping cough), (2) malaria prophylaxis, 3) prompt treatment of wound infections and tuberculosis, 4) education in oral rehydration and nutrition, 5) encouragement of longer birth intervals, 6) dietary supplements from vegetable gardens and the local consumption of peanuts, and 7) urging the production of other proteinaceous and nitrogen-fixing foods such as cow-peas (niébé), in addition to income-producing crops. The revenues generated from the cash crops will help assure the self-supporting nature of the village health services. These revenues, reinvested in health care, will result in still better health and even greater food production.

This village-based, Primary Health Care (PHC) approach offers preventive and curative care and provides the only effective means of combatting malnutrition and unwanted fertility among rural Senegalese. Since it is consistent with the comparatively limited financial and management resources of the Government of Senegal, this health system has the best chance of being sustained and extended. However, a village-based health care will require support from higher levels, particularly for drug supply, training, and referral services. In addition, the control of bilharzia is currently

an expensive and complex task which requires coordination and financial support from more central levels of the health care system.

Ultimately, USAID hopes to link family planning services to this sort of village-based health system. However, attitudes stemming from traditional, anti-modernist, and certain religious beliefs and reinforced by high infant mortality, oppose the early introduction of family planning services into rural areas. In addition, though the Government supports family planning, its current policy is that oral contraceptives can only be dispensed by trained health workers who must be present to diagnose and treat or refer complications of their use. To accommodate this policy, one needs to integrate family planning services into the national health care system in urban clinics, where people would be more receptive.

In fact, urban families are in the greatest need of these services. Death rates among children are the lowest, and traditional practices that limit fertility, such as breast-feeding and postpartum separation, are expected to decline in urban areas. The population growth rate in the cities will increase at an even higher rate than in the countryside if women who want to space their births are not provided the means to do so. These urban families also have a relatively greater affinity for rice and other imported food stuffs, and thus contributes differentially to the balance-of-payments problem.

After Promotion Humaine agents have sensitized villagers to the advantages of child spacing and have determined that a need for family planning services exists, the village-based infrastructure will have evolved to the point where contraceptive services can be safely and effectively delivered at the village level.

HEALTH STRATEGY

To complement the chief purpose of AID's presence in Senegal, food self-sufficiency by the year 2000, the USAID health program proposes the following two goals:

1. To improve the productivity of rural Senegalese, and
2. To ease the growth rate of the Senegalese population, consistent with Senegal's policies of food self-sufficiency and improved health conditions for all its citizens by 2000 A.D.

Derived from these goals and the analysis of prevailing health conditions in Senegal, the USAID health effort aims for four main accomplishments in the period 1983-1987:

- The establishment in the Sine Saloum Region of a model rural health care delivery system, at least partially self-financing and capable of providing simple preventive and curative services, including family planning and nutrition surveillance and counseling at the village level.
- The formulation by the Government of a national population policy, which supports the expansion of Maternal Child Health/Family Planning services in urban centers and the departmental health centers of the Sine Saloum, Thiès, and Casamance Regions.
- The development of a national nutrition policy, based upon a well coordinated process of nutrition planning and analysis at the national level and linked to nutrition surveillance and services in the Sine Saloum Region.
- The testing of simple, affordable systems for monitoring and controlling vector-borne diseases in irrigated perimeters in the Casamance and Fleuve regions.

A. Rural Health Care

USAID's Sine Saloum Rural Health Care Project (\$3.3 million) is among the first and is by far the most extensive of Senegal's Primary Health Care activities. Originally, the aim was to establish 600 village level health care units, each with its own village health committee and three village health workers, covering six departments of the Sine Saloum Region, the heart of Senegal's Peanut Basin. In addition to construction and the supply of medical equipment, the project undertook the organization and orientation of the village health committees and the training of the village health workers in first aid, hygiene and midwifery. Although the project formally began in 1977, huts actually began operating in 2 of 6 departments in 1979. Since then it has received constant national attention and coverage in the Senegalese press.

The AID Administrator singled out the project for a special impact evaluation, performed in March-April, 1980, as part of the USAID Government of Senegal Joint Evaluation. The evaluation strongly cautioned against attempting to establish health huts before carefully briefing village committees and health workers and before ensuring that higher levels of the system - at the arrondissement level (health post) and above that, the department level (health center) - could provide adequate support and supervision. The GOS and the USAID reorganized the project accordingly; a major effect of this reorganization was a postponement of the date set for achieving total health hut coverage of the Sine Saloum Region, including the large Department of Kaffrine, into at least Phase II of the project. Any expansion from the present base of four departments will depend upon

the results of regular evaluations at roughly two year intervals. The next review is scheduled for May, 1982.

If this next evaluation shows that the reorganization has had a positive effect and that further growth of the village health system seems feasible, the USAID will recommend approval of a second phase of the program, first to improve, then to expand the Sine Saloum model. Chief among the improvements to be introduced within the first fifteen months of Phase II are an organized immunization against measles, tetanus and whooping cough, and control of diarrheal disease mortality through the oral rehydration (salt and sugar solution) method. The project will also introduce nutrition surveillance and education at the village level. Finally, it will improve the existent malaria control component, which assures the periodic administration of chloroquine, particularly during the rainy season. (For clarity of presentation, we defer discussion of the nutrition component and of Phase II population activities to the sections immediately following).

If undertaken in isolation, the proposed vaccination campaign would be prohibitively expensive. The Ministry of Health, however, already plans to establish refrigeration facilities for vaccines at the level of the eight health centers in the Sine Saloum region. Phase II of the project will merely extend this government service by establishing a system whereby each health post nurse delivers these vaccines to the villages during his or her regular monthly supervision visits. Under this system, refrigeration at the level of the health post itself, much less the village health hut, should not be necessary. The additional cost imposed by this extension of services to the village level will therefore be relatively minor.

To assist with the introduction of both the immunization and diarrheal control activities, the USAID will provide a special advisor to the regional health headquarters in Kaolack, also site of the project office. The Mission will recruit this adviser under the auspices of the project "Combating Childhood Communicable Diseases", to be financed by AID/Washington.

When the present system, with the addition of these new elements, has been evaluated and found to be functioning at an acceptable level, the project will expand geographically. The USAID has budgeted for Phase II to begin in Fiscal Year 1983. We estimate that the horizontal expansion of the system will take place beginning in 1984. This expansion will be of two sorts. First, the system will extend into the large Department of Kaffrine where no services of this sort now exist. The project also will seek to refurbish and reinforce primary health care efforts in the Sixth Department, Fatick, where a project financed until recently by the Dutch Government has been active. The base for this horizontal expansion, involving up to 400 additional villages, will be laid during 1984 and 1985. During 1986 and 1987, the project will also expand from the larger villages where it is now active, numbering between 500-750 inhabitants, to those smaller surrounding or "polarized" villages which demonstrate the will and resources necessary to support a trained health worker.

The Government of Senegal clearly regards the various elements of Sine Saloum village health program as the model for generalizing health services throughout the country over the next 15 years. In light of its commitment to the project, the Government has requested AID financing for two senior level experts in the Ministry of Health who will help transfer experience gained from the Sine Saloum project to other primary

health care activities in Senegal. Both experts, in addition, would provide direct support to the USAID Sine Saloum project.

The first specialist requested by the Government is an epidemiologist for the statistical department of the Ministry's Research, Planning, and Training Division. The epidemiologist will, on the one hand, assist Sine Saloum project personnel in the further development of the information and evaluation system, already part of the project. On the other hand, this central ministry specialist will assure that the Sine Saloum information-evaluation system forms part of a common and standardized national system for the continuing evaluation of all primary health care activities, financed from any sources.

The second specialist is a health economist, whose first task will be to assure the full participation of the Ministry of Health in designing and executing a study of the recurrent costs of the Sine Saloum model, as well as of the willingness and ability of communities in the Sine Saloum to cover these costs. This study will be financed under AID/Washington's Primary Care-Operations Research project (PRICOR) and will be conducted by a Senegalese institution. Similarly, the central ministry economist will be responsible for the systematic analysis of the recurrent costs of all primary health care activities. The USAID plans to fund both positions - the epidemiologist and the economist - together with short-term technical advisors to the Ministry under Phase II of the Sine Saloum program.

During the whole of this period, the USAID will be introducing production projects into the Sine Saloum alongside the health program, in accordance with the CDSS Strategy approved in March 1981. These activities will be designed to encourage the rural private sector and community-based

organizations. USAID's support to SODEVA for agriculture research and extension will shift emphasis by 1985 from SODEVA's operations in the Thiès and Diourbel Regions to its work in the Sine Saloum.

It would be wrong to leave this discussion of village health with the impression that a partially self-supporting system providing the services already indicated, together with nutrition and family health, will be securely in place in the Sine Saloum region by the end of the Planning Period (1987). To train community health workers and their immediate supervisors to apply simple, inexpensive technology leading to decreased morbidity and mortality will require years of trial and error. During these years of program development, it is only realistic to expect that the donor community must be prepared to defray the relatively expensive start-up costs. Only after a reasonably effective health system has been developed can we expect poor communities to assume a majority of the costs. Income-producing activity in the region will advance the time when this becomes possible. Improved health, in turn, will increase yields from the production programs.

B. Nutrition

The encouragement of agricultural production side by side with village health programs should, but does not automatically have, a direct effect on malnutrition. Because disease and malnutrition are so closely associated, the USAID will seek as first priority to introduce the means of combating malnutrition into the Sine Saloum village health system. In addition, the USAID and GOS will first evaluate, and then, if necessary, redirect

the Title II Maternal Child Health feeding and education program for maximum benefit to nutrition. Finally, at the national level, the USAID will encourage the raising of a "nutrition consciousness" in the Government. Such an awareness will improve planning and lend support to the actions undertaken in rural areas.

The nature of the rural actions follows from the character of rural malnutrition in Senegal resulting from an interaction of three factors: (1) absolute caloric deficits and relative deficits of proteins; (2) maldistribution of food within the family unit, unduly favoring adult males; and (3) infectious diseases that decrease the absorption of calories and, at the same time, increase the demand for calories to repair the disease-induced damage.

To address malnutrition at its source, the USAID and Government will train village health workers within the Sine Saloum project to monitor the nutritional status of young children, weighing them periodically. Pregnant and lactating women will receive special nutrition education, and when a child is identified as malnourished, the mother will receive guidance in making better use of locally grown food, especially groundnuts, niébé, and vegetables. Nutrition-related tasks and training, however, can only be carefully phased into the Sine Saloum program as village participation increases and as health workers and their health post supervisors learn to perform their appointed tasks effectively.

Secondly, the USAID and Government will perform an evaluation in the spring of 1982 of the \$7 million annual Title II program. Over 80 percent of this program is designated for the feeding of 216,000 mothers and infants.

Distribution is effected through Senegal's health posts. The Catholic Relief Service administers this program, conducts nutrition surveillance, and provides nutrition education. Most likely because distances between villages and health posts are often too great to walk, however, the Catholic Relief Service estimates that this program actually serves only 20 percent of the neediest children nationally, including less than 15 percent in the Sine Saloum region. Using the results of this evaluation as a guideline, USAID will target the nutritional aspect of the Title II program more effectively, so that it can reach and affect a much larger proportion of the neediest population.

At the national level, Senegal's present Food Investment Strategy (1977-1985) aims primarily at replacing imported foods, particularly rice and wheat, with foods grown locally. A full Nutrition Strategy, however, would focus on identifying those elements of the population most in need of better nourishment at any particular time, and searching means for improving the condition of these malnourished groups. To ensure the closer links between production, health, and nutrition, such as those which the USAID and Government will attempt to forge in the Sine Saloum, a degree of awareness and coordination between key ministries and other official bodies will be essential.

To strengthen means that already exist for coordinating nutrition planning and to sharpen awareness of nutrition issues at the national level -- particularly regarding AID emphasis zones to start off -- the USAID plans two specific actions to be financed from the Agriculture Sector Grant.

First, the USAID will support the Government's Nutrition Council, (CANAS), chaired by the Ministry of Plan, by providing funding for a full-time nutrition planner, as well as for a modest budget to allow the committee to function as intended. CANAS will serve to bring various departments of the Government together to organize around nutrition efforts, introducing nutrition education into the primary and secondary school curriculum and devising a complete national nutrition strategy. CANAS will review key production programs from a nutrition standpoint (with no power of approval) and will promote discrete activities among its participating agencies, such as an evaluation of the effectiveness of supplemental feeding programs.

Second, the USAID will support the effort to develop an efficient method of national nutrition surveillance and of monitoring food flows. To develop this system, in addition to supporting CANAS, the USAID will fund a full-time nutrition expert to work alongside the Michigan State Agriculture Research team assigned to the new Macro-Economic Analysis Unit of Senegal's Agriculture Research Institute (ISRA). Among the questions we hope to address are: 1) What is the least costly, yet most effective nutrition surveillance system we should be establishing in Senegal? and 2) What are the major determinants of a food monitoring system that will provide the most rapid feedback mechanisms concerning regions or groups of people who are suffering or will soon suffer acute food scarcities?

C. Population

The USAID is persuaded that an effective, nationwide population program in Senegal will depend upon the sort of village health system that AID is now helping to set in place in the Sine Saloum Region. The Government

itself now fully recognizes that closely spaced births in Senegal, complicated by common infections (especially malaria and hepatitis), malnutrition, and anemia, lead to high levels of maternal and infant illness and death. It agrees that family planning activities must become part of the national Maternal and Child Health Program. Yet, for the reasons already mentioned, a rural, village-based population program is not feasible at this time. Thus, the USAID will begin with a family health project that integrates family planning into the national health care system in urban clinics and health centers, to be followed by health posts.

The USAID anticipates that once women become more accustomed to the concept of family planning, there will be a need to make family planning information and contraceptive services available at the village level. At present, women find the distances between the villages and health posts too great to walk even to receive free food. The two year \$1.9 million Senegal Family Health program (685-0217) will officially begin in the spring of 1982 when the amended project agreement is signed. Activities will commence in Dakar and the urban areas of the Sine Saloum region. The project will train a cadre of national program managers, education and information agents from the Human Development Ministry, and clinical personnel from the Ministry of Health. After appropriate publicity, the Ministry of Health will provide complete Maternal and Child Health and Family Planning services, including the diagnosis and treatment of infertility through its system of clinics. Once services are underway in the major MCH centers in the Cap-Vert and Sine Saloum regions, a similar process of publicity and provision of services will begin in the Casamance and Thiès regions. By the end of 1984, the project will have trained personnel at the level of

the departmental capitals in the four regions which contain 80% of Senegal's population.

During the second phase of the project, USAID will explore with the proper GOS authorities the possibilities of extending the availability of contraceptives through subsidized sale in retail pharmacies or through distribution at the village level by the community health worker trained under the Senegal Rural Health project.

The USAID intends to finance a major portion of the activities of the "Association Sénégalaise pour le Bien-Etre Familial" (ASBEF), the private family planning association. It hopes to support those activities which are directed toward the private sector or which, for whatever reason, the Government prefers not to embrace.

Finally, in its effort to encourage the formulation of a national population policy, the USAID will encourage collaboration between U.S. research centers and Senegalese institutions. Emphasis will be on improving the analysis of existing data rather than on doing new studies. In this respect, Battelle Institute, funded by AID/W, will assist a number of local institutions, such as the Commission Nationale sur la Population (CONAPO), and the Centre for Applied Economic Research and the Basic Institute of Black Africa, both affiliated with the University of Dakar, and the Division of Demography of the Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs. The U.S. Center for Disease Control and the International Fertility Research Program will support Senegalese institutions in biomedical research. Plans for studies of the sequelae of abortion or the importance of factors, such as breast feeding or postpartum abstinence on fertility, are already underway.

While the Government of Senegal has taken many positive steps toward forming a national population policy, not all officials recognize the consequences of rapid population growth or support an action program to address them. USAID recognizes the importance of supporting informed discussion of population-related issues, while allowing the policy formation process to evolve without direct U.S. involvement. The USAID therefore intends to support CONAPOP both to follow-up the RAPID project and to develop a series of applied studies and analytic seminars on population issues at the national level. This support will be provided through AID/W funded contracts with the Futures Group and Battelle Institute.

D. Surveillance and Control of Vector-Borne Diseases

As noted, agricultural projects that stress irrigation could cause an increase in water-borne diseases such as schistosomiasis. Thus, the USAID has supported health surveillance as part of all three AID-funded irrigated production programs in Senegal: the Voluntary Agency (OFADEC) rice and banana project at Wassadou, on the Gambia River South of Tambacounda; the Small Irrigated Perimeters project at Bakel, signed in 1977; and the Casamance Integrated Development project, officially begun in 1978. It plans to continue these surveillance actions that contain small health services components as well.

Of the three activities, those at Bakel and Casamance are the most important. The Bakel health component, budgeted at \$402,000 calls for surveillance of water-related diseases, especially schistosomiasis, and has trained health workers in 22 project villages. It likewise provided

for the construction of two "essential drug" depots at the regional and departmental levels in Tambacounda and in Bakel. The regional depot was set up as an annex of the national distribution centers in Dakar for medicines and medical equipment.

The Mission will recommend that this health activity be continued as part of the OMVS Integrated Development Project, now under design. The emphasis will be on perfecting a model for simple surveillance and control of vector-borne, water-related diseases and malnutrition. The health component of the Senegal River Basin Organization (OMVS) project will also stress coordinated health planning for the river basin, involving all three member states.

In the Casamance, the health component (\$775,000) has been exclusively concerned with vector-borne disease surveillance. While this activity will continue, USAID, in February, 1982, will finance the design of a Primary Health Care component to train village health workers in 18 villages surrounding the Guidel Dam. Here, the Mission will adopt the model under development in the Sine Saloum to emphasize nutrition surveillance and education coupled with other MCH services. This project will pay comparatively greater attention to the role of the female health workers while also stressing the special role of the male health workers in preventing illness among the most productive workers during the agricultural season.

INTERACTION OF THE PROPOSED USAID INTERVENTIONS WITH THOSE OF OTHER DONORS

The foregoing strategy was conceived in collaboration with the many other donors interested in the health sector in Senegal and complements

their intended assistance. The MOH is, naturally, interested in the upgrading of its physical facilities. Happily, the Swiss, the Brazilians, and the Italians appear committed to providing a large percent of the financing necessary to renovate and equip the more than 250 dispensaries or health posts and the 36 health centers in Senegal.

The World Bank is in the final processes of negotiating a five-year program of approximately ten million dollars which will concentrate on the renovation of approximately 12 health centers. It will also finance the retraining of health workers at the level of the health centers. The third major thrust of the World Bank's effort will be directed at rationalizing the drug supply system in Senegal.

The French Government remains committed to providing highly skilled medical personnel to provide services and train counterparts in the tertiary care system and at the institutions of advance training. During the recent Journées Médicales with the theme of "Health and Development", however, the French Minister of Health announced that France was prepared to undertake with Senegal a reexamination of their traditional methods of cooperation aimed at making French assistance more directed toward the theme of the conference.

Both the Governments of Belgium and the Netherlands remain committed to supporting the training of community health workers. Belgium continues to support this type of training in the Dakar suburb of Pikine, and it supports a similar intervention in the Matam Department of the Fleuve region. The community health worker training program financed by the Dutch Government in the Fatick Department of the Sine Saloum terminated in late 1981. It is likely, however, that the GOS will request and the Dutch will provide

financing for a similar undertaking in another department.

As a result of all this interest in the health sector, USAID's health strategy, aimed at the development of a self-sufficient rural health care delivery system, appears to have a high likelihood of success. Confident that the training of higher level personnel will be assured by the World Bank, the French, W.H.O., and others, USAID can concentrate on the training of community health workers and their dispensary level supervisors. Because of other donor assistance, USAID will not be required to divert considerable amounts of resources to the renovation of infrastructure.

Dutch and Belgium Governments interest in the training of community health workers is fortunate for three reasons. First, it will encourage the GOS to test and evaluate different approaches to the development of community health teams. Secondly, the fact that these two governments are willing to support similar activities will allow the GOS to experiment with the development of community health teams throughout the country. Finally, USAID will be able to concentrate on perfecting the model in the three regions of particular interest and in this way, USAID will contribute to the WHO's goal of "health for all by the year 2000".

HUMAN RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT

INTRODUCTION

Of all areas of Senegalese public life, the education sector, it can be argued, is in greatest need of root and branch reform. A product of over a century of French "assimilation" vigorously applied, Senegal's school system is the outstanding example of the traditional colonial approach to education in francophone Africa, essentially unchanged since Independence. Its successes and shortcomings are writ large in Senegal, and its roots run deep.

Senegal thus boasts a superbly educated elite in such areas as the law, the military, the arts, and higher administration. By contrast, the shortcomings of this system -- so familiar throughout Africa -- appear more stark. The costs of education are high (33 percent of the recurrent budget in 1980). Coverage is low: only one-third of primary age children attend school; 15 percent drop out before attaining literacy; and 80 percent fail to pass to secondary school. Typical of many countries on the continent today, Senegalese schools in a rural, agriculture-based society are oriented towards the urban-based, government elite. Results have thus been increasingly dysfunctional. The education reform announced in 1971 has had slight effect.

Today, as a consequence, Senegal's education system is under fire. Not only are 30,000 primary school graduates each year unable to continue their schooling without qualification for employment; but even more serious politically, in 1981, with the Government pledged to cut back the civil service, 400 liberal arts graduates from the University of Dakar, plus 80 engineers, were also without jobs. And the pipeline is full.

Senegal's agriculture training system and non-formal programs, meanwhile, are failing to pick up the slack. Whereas an estimated 85 percent of the adult population is illiterate, efforts to impart functional literacy in local languages are at an irreducible minimum. This is due partly to lack of funding but more importantly to paralyzing contradictions which still persist regarding literacy in the Peanut Basin. Senegal's rural radio, which flourished in the 1960's -- an advanced program that involved the farmers and development agents in listener groups, production campaigns, and auditor feedback -- has withered.

Secondly, it is now apparent that the Government's program of pre-vocational training for primary school leavers has failed. Instead of the 800 centers that Middle-Level Practical Teaching (Enseignement Moyen Praetique, EMP) was to have open by 1982, only 15 are functioning. The Etats Généraux, an all-parties education reform conference held in the first month of the new Abdou Diouf administration (January, 1981), recommended that EMP be discontinued entirely.

Third, by 1980, several of Senegal's rural professional schools and vocational training centers had badly deteriorated. Senegal's chief mid-level agriculture school, for example, the National School for Rural Officials (ENCR) at Bambey, was nearly devoid of equipment. Its facilities were severely run down and its curriculum was in need of a thorough overhaul. Generally speaking, on the one hand, Senegal's professional schools were underutilized, since they were entirely oriented towards the public sector where job opportunities were increasingly slim. On the other hand, vocational centers for the rural areas,

where production was declining, were even less effective. Senegal's Rural Professional Training Centers, set up with ILO assistance between 1965 - 1975 to train representative adult villagers in useful trades, had by 1980 reached an advanced state of decay. The community support required to keep these schools in trim was almost entirely lacking.

Reform and refurbishing, with a swelling sense of urgency, thus marked the meeting of the national education conference (the Etats-Généraux), of January, 1981. Although the meeting was not convoked by the State, the fact that representatives of all interested parties could meet for the first time, encouraged by a key-note address from the Prime Minister, seemed to signal a new range of possibilities for education in Senegal. Religious leaders, teachers' unions, parents' organizations, cooperatives, and government officials expressed remarkable unanimity. The Etats Généraux gave solid support to the teaching of literacy in national languages, to the greater interaction between school and community, and to other measures that would relate schools and teachers more directly to national development. Events over the past year, including signs of a rekindling of the Government's interest in literacy and rural radio, indicate that the possibilities for reform in Senegal are, at last, to be taken seriously. But as the will is gathering, the means are wanting.

The Education/Training Strategy

What should AID's role be in such circumstances? Research sponsored by AID and the World Bank, among others, increasingly shows the strong correlation between an increase in minimum schooling of 4-6 years, on the one hand and, on the other, increased agricultural

productivity, reduced birth rates, the higher status of women, and broader public participation. In Senegal, where total illiteracy approaches 80 percent, the national school system, if redirected, could powerfully influence the country's development. Without redirection, however, the system appears to be working increasingly at cross purposes with Senegal's Reform Plan for decentralization and increased rural production.

Despite the undisputed correlation between education and development, the USAID believes that the most important present measures to be taken to boost Senegalese productive capacity lie, not in the area of the formal school system, but through Senegal's policies and institutions that directly affect the rural producer today and over the next five years. Even if education reform were the most essential step to be taken toward invigorating Senegal's economy, and even if the government were committed to a plan for such reform, other donors, such as France (with over 1,000 teachers in Senegal) and the World Bank (currently lending \$5.9 million to strengthen primary education) would be in a commanding position to finance the measures necessary.

Because limited means dictate a choice, the USAID elects to stand by the decision expressed in the FY 1983 CDSS, to assist the rural producers both through improved extension services (the Regional Development Agencies) linked firmly to better research, as well as to encourage them more directly through local producer institutions and the rural private sector. The USAID nevertheless will follow carefully the unfolding of Senegal's plans to revise formal schooling and will help, if requested, with the training of education planners through the Sahel Manpower Development Program. But at least until the Government

demonstrates serious resolve to pursue education reform, with the effect that lead donors in this sector begin to organize a response, the USAID sees more potentially useful opportunities for assistance in the training area.


Training to support USAID's two-track approach: this will be the essence of the Mission's Human Resources Strategy during the Planning period. Because these training activities are planned to support USAID's work in the agriculture and health sectors, and do not constitute a separate sector in themselves, the target group is identical, namely the populations of the Fleuve, Sine Saloum, and Casamance Regions. This Human Resources plan may best be discussed under four headings: (1) training activities in support of extension and service-oriented state agencies (first track); (2) assistance to community-based organizations in support of the producer (second track); (3) aid to national training institutions which directly support both these categories; and (4) regional programs.

There are two comments to make before beginning this discussion. First, as this outline suggests, we will not repeat here an account of training to be accomplished in connection with the health program, in particular that of village health workers and health committees, already outlined in the preceding section. Second, also in the interests of economy of space, we will not at each step make special mention of the USAID's abiding interest in the ways in which each AID-financed project can serve to improve the condition of Senegalese women.

Based upon special studies of women's roles already or soon-to-be financed by the USAID within the Fleuve, Peanut Basin, and Casamance, the USAID will assist women in all three geographic zones in essentially

three ways: with the special training of women, with the generation of revenue-producing activities for women, and by making available to women labor and fuel saving devices, especially those associated with food preparation, which pay for themselves. The Mission aims through these dealings to increase the status and well-being of rural women, commensurate with their actual importance to food production and family health in Senegal.

In one sense, it is true that every project the Mission undertakes is a training project; that is, each involves a technical transfer. Our purpose in what follows, however, is not to recount details of the entire agriculture sector plan (FY 1983 CDSS) and Project Portfolio (FY 1983 ABS). Our aim is rather to accent the means which will be used to train the producer in better production methods and to assist



Category One: Training Support for Extension and Service Oriented State Agencies.

But, within the present structure, the RDA's represent an indispensable means of reaching the farmer. While wishing to place limitations on U.S. support to the RDA's, the USAID believes that there may now be significant opportunities for improving them as extension agencies.

The grounds for this belief are Senegal's introduction in 1981 of the performance contract (contrat plan) arrangement, with the first contracts now in the course of being negotiated between the Government and the para-statais. Each contract sets out in detail both the tasks and objectives of the respective Agency, as well as the level of support which the Government agrees to provide. The performance contracts represent Government's prime instrument under the Economic Reform Plan for improving the efficiency of the RDA's and, at the same time, for defining the responsibility of local producer organizations. In a related but separate action, the Government is preparing to introduce a new system of rural credit that will also entail greater responsibility for the individual farmer.

Government and SODEVA anticipate final signature of their contrat-plan in June, 1982. The document is currently in the final approval process and is expected to go forward unchanged. Under the terms of this agreement, spanning the three budget years 1981/1982-1983/1984, SODEVA undertakes to break with its traditional extension method of working primarily through model farmers and accepts, instead, to work primarily through village groups. SODEVA's new emphasis on the village group is in clear accord with two major objectives of Government's Reform Plan. First, SODEVA's work will serve the overhaul of Senegal's cooperatives, beginning with the "sections villageoises". Second,

SODEVA's new approach coincides with the principal thrust of the new credit policy, which the Government and donors (including AID) are now drawing up. If the trails of the new approach prove successful in Thiès and Matam, and if the new policy is generally accepted, rural credit will apply not at the cooperative level, grouping 8-10 villages, as it has until now, but at the level of the village group itself. The bank will establish a direct line of credit ultimately with the individual group member.

Towards the gradual specializing of SODEVA's activities, the RDA agrees in the performance contract to begin or continue four main actions:

- a) The setting up of the village sections, grouping 20-30 producers each. This action is to be followed by the training of members in essential aspects of cooperatives: the meaning of documents, the credit process, marketing and seed management. Under this contract, the village sections are to receive major responsibility for storing seed.
- b) The teaching of functional literacy, called the "necessary condition" for transferring knowledge to rural areas. Training shall begin with the secretary and administrative councillors of each audited village section, and shall be related to the training prescribed above.
- c) The fuller integration of women into farming (here, AID's Cereals II project is cited specifically).
- d) The creation of a rural artisanry at village level capable of maintaining farm-related equipment and of managing their own enterprises. The document points here to a pilot scheme for this purpose in the Sine Saloum undertaken by the World Bank and Caisse Centrale.

The USAID intends to participate fully, through present and future projects, in assisting SODEVA, and to the degree their contracts are generally similar, SAED and SOMIVAC, in fulfilling these four contractual obligations.

SODEVA's performance contract lists several steps the RDA will take in support of these actions. To undertake work with the village sections, SODEVA will train its basic extension workers in the techniques of community development. This is an important development, for if it is successful, it will eliminate the need for a separate "animation" service provided by Promotion Humaine, with the conflicts and costs generated by the coexistence of extension and animation services. Also, SODEVA agrees under the contract that for work with the village sections the RDA will train its basic extension personnel in the use of audio-visuals, including rural radio. As a further step, the performance contract states that the Government will draw up precise protocols with the various other development organizations at work in the Groundnut Basin. These groups are specifically taken to include the Animation Service, the CER's (Rural Expansion Centers), and the non-Governmental Organizations such as CARITAS. SODEVA's present protocol with the Bambe Research Station, drawn up as a condition precedent to AID's Cereals II project, is an example of how effective such protocols can be. A final step included in the SODEVA's performance contract is the agreement that SODEVA's work will be regularly evaluated by a separate agency, and that these evaluations shall include the views of the farmers themselves concerning the services they receive.

Under Phase II of the Cereals Production Project (685-0235), the USAID is in an excellent position to assist SODEVA in meeting these terms of its contract. The USAID is already heavily engaged in the training and upgrading of SODEVA extension workers, including the founding of a special women's extension unit. Under Phase II, AID is establishing the audio-visual section of SODEVA's extension training center and is financing long- and short-term technical services in the training area as a whole. Through a Phase III of the Cereals project, beginning in FY 1985, the Mission will continue to assist SODEVA to revise and make fully effective the extension training program. The present and successor USAID projects will help to revive Senegal's rural radio program (Radio Disso) in connection with the work of village groups in the Peanut Basin. These projects will also provide funds to train SODEVA trainers in functional literacy through a combination of services provided by Senegal's national literacy service, a branch of Promotion Humaine, and the cooperative literacy training division of Senegal's National School of Applied Economics (ENEA). To permit SODEVA's work in this regard to go forward, the project will fund the salaries and travel of these literacy and cooperative trainers as they assist village sections in the areas of AID's geographic emphases. Finally, the USAID has agreed to provide SODEVA with an advisory team to collaborate on a Master Plan for the Peanut Basin. The terms of SODEVA's next performance contract, and of AID's Phase III assistance, will depend in part upon this team's recommendations.

These activities with SODEVA are an example of similar undertakings the USAID intends to support with SAED in the Fleuve and SOMIVAC in the Casamance. While SOMIVAC's performance contract is not yet negotiated,

literacy training as an essential aspect of the formation of village sections is already underway within the Casamance Regional Development Project (685-0205). This work, utilizing the services of ENEA's functional literacy department, began in 1981 and has made encouraging progress.

Although SAED's contract was signed in July, 1981 and specifically aims at turning over significant responsibility to farmer groups, AID's plans for support to SAED in this regard are only now being formulated as part of the design of the OMVS Integrated Development Project (625-0621). This project, as it pertains to Senegal, will follow the general lines of the Mission's FY 1983 CDSS, including the supplement here presented. A more detailed plan for work with SAED, however, will be presented in the summer of 1982, as part of an OMVS strategy statement.

Category Two: Assistance to Community-Based Organizations

The first part of our strategy, just described, was to improve the RDA's as extension agencies, and to help them in their declared effort to turn rural management and service functions over to appropriate local level organizations, including the private sector. The second, complementary arm of this strategy is to help build local organizations and to encourage rural enterprises in the three geographic emphasis areas, using a variety of means.

The most important of these means will be Private Voluntary Organizations (PVO). The Government itself has begun to place increasing emphasis on the importance of small projects, carried out by non-governmental agencies and community groups. The outstanding advantages of PVO's in Senegal have been their comparatively low overhead and

delivery costs and their ability to direct their efforts towards specific ends, without assuming broader responsibilities within the governmental structure. PVO's, both Senegalese and foreign, can select where and with whom they will work. Their object is not to become, in their turn, quasi-official structures with replication in every part of Senegal. Their task, rather, is to select areas and institutions of unusual promise and to help them to realize their full potential.

From this perspective, the USAID beginning in the spring 1982 will design a PVO Sector Grant program (685-0260), for initial obligation in FY 1983. This activity will seek to attract PVO's, both Senegalese and foreign, with proven commitment and with management capabilities for grassroots work, especially training. The PVO Sector Grant will lay down geographic guidelines (the Fleuve, Sine Saloum, and Casamance Regions). It will encourage activities in food production and in resource regeneration. The grant will carry with it a condition that, in order to be eligible, PVO's must serve the building up of village sections and other local groups, capable of taking on increasing responsibility for community affairs. The grant, finally, will provide for the close monitoring and evaluation of these activities, to identify those with greatest promise, either in organizations or in technical inputs, for replication elsewhere in Senegal.

Of enduring interest in this regard are Senegal's rural councils which the Government has phased in, region by region, beginning in 1972. Sine Saloum, with 76 councils, was among the first to receive councils (1974); the Casamance, with 68 councils, followed later (1978); and the Fleuve, with only 28, is the most recent (1980). Each council, composed of 12-21 elected representatives, is endowed with its own budget, based

upon receipts from a rural tax, to be used for local development purposes. Standing by at the arrondissement level to assist the rural councils to plan and implement their projects are the Centres d'Expansion Rurale (CER's). These CER's bring together agents from several or all of the chief government departments, including agriculture, livestock, water and forests, health, and cooperatives. Each CER, in principle, serves three or four Rural Councils. The CER's in recent years, however, have been virtually paralyzed for want of transport and operational funds. They have also suffered from poor coordination with the Regional Development Agencies, which have tended to concentrate on the production of cash crops.

As part of the contract with SODEVA, discussed above, the Government has declared its intent to draw up protocols with the other development organizations in the Peanut Basin, in order to clarify their respective roles vis à vis SODEVA. The CER's are specifically designated among these organizations. SAED's performance contract also makes provisions for protocols, but does not mention the CER's. Presumably SOMIVAC's contract will contain a similar clause. In the context of the Casamance Project, AID will require that a protocol be signed with the agriculture research station at Djibelor. To the extent that the other development agencies, like the CER's, may complement, and not conflict with, the RDA's in their work to build up village groups, rural councils, and other responsible community organizations, the USAID will welcome proposals from PVO's wishing to channel assistance to those with records of good leadership and strong motivation.

Now, as the Government of Senegal is showing evidence of following through on its policy to decentralize, the rural councils present a particularly attractive opportunity, unique among Sahelian countries. If the councils are to become effective, however, significant numbers of councillors need to become functionally literate and numerate. This training should go together with the training in functional literacy offered to those village sections where councillors reside. The councils may be assisted by the CER's in carrying out the development projects which the councils decide upon and pay for. This agreement must be clearly spelled out, however, under the Government protocols.

According to a recent Government estimate, it would require \$650,000 to put the CER's into shape in the Sine Saloum (where there are 20), the Casamance (19), and the Fleuve (11). This sum is needed to provide one vehicle, three mopylettes, fuel, and office equipment for each of the 50 CER's. In addition, ENEA estimates that each CER requires about \$45,000 per year, minimum, for operating costs.

In 1974, as a post-drought measure, AID provided a vehicle to each of the CER's, but these vehicles are no longer operational. Rather than fund these centers again on an across-the-board basis, the USAID favors a selective approach. The Mission will invite PVO's to make a selection of Rural Councils together with the CER's adjacent to them. These Councils (and CER's) must be situated within AID's three emphasis regions and should form part of on-going or planned AID project zones. Possibly with help from Peace Corps Volunteers, the PVO's will then organize literacy and other training for the councils and provide monitoring. Dollar costs for foreign PVO's will be budgeted under the PVO Sector Grant. USAID's non-project activities, especially the Agriculture Sector Grant, will

cover local costs for Senegalese PVO's and for training councillors and equipping CER's. These local funds will also ensure continuing evaluation by ENEA, which has been usefully involved already in reporting on the status of the Rural Councils and which has trained many CER directors.

There are a variety of ways in which PVO's may go about the task of assisting to build up community organizations. The USAID will review each proposal on its merits. One promising method is to channel funds through the PVO's to selected Rural Councils. These funds could allow the councils to enter into contracts with their respective CER's or other nearby organizations, such as a Rural Professional Training Center, for specific services. In return, the council or councils would provide payment sufficient to cover a portion of the material and operational costs which the CER's or other organizations may require. This approach would help to establish the practice of user-fees to cover partial costs of local support agencies. Because the councils belong to Rural Communes, which are legal entities with legal rights, the councils are authorized to receive funds directly without the funds having to pass through central government structures. Council budgets, however, are subject to review at departmental and regional levels.

Another approach, which is focused more on projects than upon the local councils, has been proposed by the American ORT Federation together with PADEC, a Senegalese PVO. This plan is to provide training and funds specifically for those land regeneration activities which various villages, selected for their varieties of environment, themselves have elected to

carry out. The USAID will fund this activity over three years beginning in FY 1982, through an Operational Program Grant (625-0251) together with local currency supplied under the Agriculture Sector Grant.

A third approach to training local organizations is contained in a proposal drawn up by the Overseas Education Fund (OEF), together with Maisons Familiales Rurales of Senegal. Maisons Familiales is a successful non-governmental organization that currently runs 50 community training centers (largely for women and youth) throughout rural Senegal. Under the proposal, which the USAID expects to fund from the PVO Sector Grant, the OEF would strengthen the central training program of Maisons Familiales and would also ensure field applications of this revised training in two selected Sine Saloum villages.

CARITAS, a Swiss-based PVO, has established a highly successful training farm in the southern Thiès area, adjacent to the Sine Saloum. With past help from AID and others, the CARITAS center takes young farmers who have been selected by their own villages in the area and offers them on a learn-by-doing basis, improved farming methods in techniques for seeds, poultry, livestock, and trees which have already proven successful on the training farm. The CARITAS program is structured to provide short training sessions interspersed with the return to the villages. With income from the training farm, the program is largely self-financing. The young farmers trained in this way have proven themselves effective, setting an example for others, at promoting greater productivity in their home villages. The USAID will consider a CARITAS request to establish a similar center, with start-up costs estimated at \$250,000, in the Fleuve, Casamance, and/or Sine Saloum Regions.

By funding and then (with PVO's and Peace Corps) monitoring and evaluating approaches to producer training, in complementarity to its work through the RDA's, the USAID may conceivably be able to discern one or two approaches which succeed above all others and which appear to provide models for a more uniform action. Until the lines of such a scheme emerge, however, the USAID will review proposals for action on a pragmatic basis. The Mission will accept for funding those proposals which promise to render farmers in the three regions most productive and best able to manage their own affairs.

Category Three: National Training Institutions

To backstop the USAID's program for training the rural producer, both through the three RDA extension services and the community-based groups, the Mission will also consider funding for several national institutions.

The first of ~~these is~~ ENEA, the National School for Applied Economics. ENEA is Senegal's training institution with prime responsibility for the preparation of middle- and low-level rural development officers, including cooperative agents, CER directors, community organizers, planners, vocational trainers, and statisticians. Because ENEA has been charged since the early 1960's with training Senegal's Promotion Humaine (community development) staff, the direction and faculty of the school are imbued with a practical, field-oriented approach to grassroots development. Thanks to this shared perspective, the USAID has enjoyed a close relationship with ENEA. In the last two years alone, ENEA has performed four beneficiary impact surveys in association with the USAID/Senegal Government Joint Assessment, and has organized and hosted a two week

AID-funded nutrition workshop. Local funds equivalent to \$1,324,000 generated under the Title III program have so far been allocated to the reconditioning of ENEA's classrooms and offices, located in the outskirts of Dakar.

Under the \$3.0 million five year Rural Management project (685-0256), scheduled to begin in FY 1982, the USAID will establish within ENEA a capability for training all of its students in project management techniques (project identification, design, implementation, and evaluation). The USAID believes that this training will meet an important need as increasing funds become available for small projects at the local level. If the Government's policy of decentralization is to succeed, rural councils, cooperatives, and CER's (for which ENEA is the prime training institution) -- in addition to local voluntary agencies, the Maisons Familiales, and local producers groups as they emerge -- will require practiced project know-how. Under the Rural Management Project, ENEA will also establish an intensive short course for representatives of three groups not enrolled in the regular two year diploma course. The USAID will provide funding in various of its projects to allow Senegalese to attend ENEA's project management program.

The USAID will give thorough consideration to local cost funding, in the course of the Planning Period, for equipping and refurbishing several of Senegal's other key rural training institutions, where required. These institutions may include the Ecoles d'Agents Techniques for livestock (Saint Louis) and forestry (Ziguinchor), the National School for Rural Officials (ENCR) at Bambey, already the recent recipient of a \$400,000 Title III grant but almost certainly requiring

further improvements, and possibly others. The Mission's purpose here is to continue efforts to integrate the findings from agriculture research, funded elsewhere in the USAID program, into the training of field personnel, just as the improvement of SODEVA's extension training center under the Cereals II project will do for low level extension workers. Before approving any further funding, however, the Mission must satisfy itself that AID would be contributing to the development of an efficient national training system, rather than merely serving to perpetuate an unnecessarily decentralized string of schools. To this end, the USAID expects to assist the Minister of Higher Education in his effort to redefine the roles and functions of university-level institutions in Senegal.

In the same spirit, the USAID will carefully consider joining with the World Bank and France in financing the National Institute for Rural Development (INDR). This institution, which will offer a university degree in agriculture, is now under construction near Thiès with the opening set for October, 1982. The Government and other principal donors have strongly requested U.S. participation, particularly with the practice-farm and various areas of the curriculum. Despite the obvious negative implications of such an institution for Senegal's budget at a time of extreme austerity, the imperative of achieving strong bonds between research and agriculture management in Senegal may still make a persuasive case for AID participation in the INDR, beginning in FY 1984. But the USAID would have to be satisfied beforehand that the RDA's and the Government were progressing satisfactorily with the program of decentralization in rural areas. Without much stronger farmer participation, through councils and village sections, the Mission believes that no

amount of university training by itself will have the desired effect on national production.

Other national training institutions the USAID will consider, in support of its approach to the rural producer, are the central literacy program, rural radio (as previously discussed), and the education planning component of the Ministry of National Education. The national literacy office, which employs a small staff of considerable competence, requires modest funding (in the \$100,000 range) for the training of literacy trainers, for the production of literacy materials, and for the evaluation of literacy work, which form part of AID's production and village health programs. An investigation must be carried out to determine in what way the design and production of these materials could be matched to literacy work through the RDA's and voluntary organizations in AID's emphasis zones. AID projects will then be designed to contain funding to ensure the services of the central literacy office, as required.

Next, a thorough evaluation should be made, as SODEVA's audio-visual work begins to progress, of the overall requirement for resuscitating Radio Senegal's rural program, Radio Disso. The use of village listener groups, as village sections become organized, and the practice of listener participation has been used to great effect elsewhere, for agriculture, health, and primary education purposes. Rural radio would appear to be a useful, if not essential, accompaniment to decentralization and diversification in the rural sector.

Finally, because it will be important to monitor events in the formal education sector, the USAID will consider support, mostly of a training nature, to Senegal's education planning office, INEADE. This office was created as part of the IBRD's Third Education Project.

INEADE's mandate covers the introduction of teaching in the national languages, research into effective methods of teaching and evaluation, and the planning of closer relationships between formal and non-formal education. INEADE includes three Senegalese trained under Ford Foundation auspices in North America.

Category Four: Regional Programs

Three training programs with a regional reach may complement the work outlined above. These are the Sahel Manpower Development Program, which will be evaluated and redesigned in FY 1982; the proposed Sahel Regional Financial and Program Management project, scheduled for design in FY 1982; and, somewhat less sure, Senegal's Graduate School for Business Management, which is to become a regional institution in several years. A fourth project, Food Crop Protection (625-0928), with a regional training center in Dakar, is likely to continue, although the management structure is not finally settled. Two, and perhaps all three, of these activities may be brought to bear on (but not limited to) the stimulation of Senegal's private sector.

The Sahel Manpower Development Program (625-0929) will continue to answer two important needs. The first is for training to supplement that provided in actual, or planned, bilateral projects. The second need is for training for key positions or disciplines not provided under USAID projects. The USAID plans to continue to use the SMDP for public management training (e.g., the two-month course in French offered by the University of Pittsburgh) and for environment/energy, public health, cooperatives, and other professions directly related to the USAID program. In addition, the Mission will use the SMDP to prepare for activities in

which the USAID may become involved: education planning, for example, discussed in the preceding section, or the preparation of selected faculty at the National Institute for Rural Development (INDR). As a new departure, the USAID will also seek to employ the SMDP for training related to Senegal's private sector. This could involve Master's Degrees in Business Administration, or in other suitable courses, for key staff members of three new government institutions (SONEPI, SOFISEDIT, and SONAGA) whose assignment is to help small enterprises with credit, management, and technical problems. SMDP may also serve to train faculty for Senegal's Graduate School for Business Management (ESGE).

ESGE opened in October, 1981 in a Dakar office building, but expects to move to its new World Bank-funded facility in October, 1982. ESGE will offer a two-year MBA program designed along North American lines, as well as short courses and consulting services for the Senegalese business community. The CEAO has requested, and AID/W has agreed, that AID consider providing help to regionalize ESGE beginning in perhaps three years. With AID assistance, and continued help from the IBRD, French, and Canadians, ESGE would expand to take in business students from the CEAO member states -- Ivory Coast, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, and Upper Volta, as well as Senegal. The USAID recommends that AID carefully study this possibility; meanwhile, the Mission will monitor the school's progress and help, if requested, through the SMDP to prepare ESGE faculty.

The third regional AID activity which should provide useful training support for the Mission program is the proposed Sahel Regional Financial and Program Management Project (RFPM) (625-0948). Scheduled for design in FY 1982, the RFPM will provide short-term training in financial

management techniques to representatives of all major recipients of USAID funding. The USAID will encourage the long-term institutionalization of the most helpful portions of this training within the project management program which the Mission will help install at Senegal's National School for Applied Economics (ENEA), discussed in a previous section. The Mission will also explore any carry-over benefits this financial management training could have for Senegal's private sector.

THE EVALUATION PLAN

The two preceding chapters treating health and training complete the Mission's food self-sufficiency strategy as set forth in the FY 1983 CDSS. This concluding section presents a plan for evaluating the USAID program in the Planning Period (FY 1983-1987) and for reviewing the strategy itself. But because we believe that the prospects for achieving any measure of food self-sufficiency in Senegal depend upon the success of the Government's Economic Reform, which the AID strategy is designed to support, the Mission evaluation plan will also take account of the Government's progress in implementing its Plan de Redressement. Given the close relation of the USAID strategy and the Government's Reform Plan, we will seek to continue in modified form the U.S. - Senegalese Joint Assessment process, effectively used in 1980. The Mission believes this process is the best means of assuring that the USAID program remains properly adjusted to Senegalese realities.

The following plan outlines the combination of monitoring and evaluation measures which the Mission proposes to take in order to track the progress of the USAID program and determine its impact. The Mission will attempt to set the timing of reports to meet anticipated decision points, such as the Annual Budget Submission each May, and quarterly and annual joint project reviews with the Government of Senegal. The evaluation plan will apply at (a) the national level, (b) sector and regional levels, and (c) the project level.

A. The National Level

The USAID believes that it will be essential to monitor Senegal's general economic state of health, as well as the Government's progress in implementing the Reform Plan. Among the most interesting of the policy reforms are those

pertaining to farm producer prices, subsidies, and rural commerce. The extent of investment in agriculture production, scheduled to increase under Senegal's new Sixth Development Plan, is important. Equally significant are institutional reforms to decentralize authority and resources to regional and local levels, and to stimulate the development of the private sector.

The encouragement of the private sector is related to the success of Government efforts to stabilize the economy in the next several years and to the pace of administrative reforms. An environment of economic stability and growth, and the relaxation of government controls, will do much to assist private sector development and will thus help to contribute to overall economic growth.

Given the relationship between USAID strategy on the one hand, and Government reforms and the pace of their implementation on the other hand, the Mission will address the following broad questions:

1. To what extent does the pace of Government reforms support or limit the achievement of USAID program purposes and goals?
2. Conversely, to what extent does the USAID program directly support or handicap implementation of Government reforms?

These questions, or reformulations of them, can be asked at several levels. They are perhaps most relevant to an assessment of the overall national context within which USAID strategy is developed and refined. But these questions can also be asked to test assumptions at the sector level, in this case the two sectors that form the core of USAID's program support -- agriculture and health. They can equally well be refined as evaluation criteria at the level of project and non-project activities designed to implement the strategy.

As we have seen in the Introduction, the USAID is preparing to engage the Government constructively in dialogue about policy matters. These preparations include the monitoring of economic developments. The joint economic/commercial unit, which the Embassy and USAID intend to establish by May 1, 1982, will have this as one of their principal tasks. Following the recommendations of the recent Louis Berger, Inc. Report (December, 1981), the USAID will organize internally to ensure that the Mission maintains an overall view of Government reforms, including those affecting the agriculture and health areas. Together with the related resources that will be available through the Princeton economic policy studies and the Agricultural Research and Planning project (Michigan State University), USAID will have the capability to undertake, on a continuing basis, analysis pertaining to the short-term Government stabilization program, to longer-term growth trends, and to the Government's progressive implementation of its reform program.

The USAID will assess the effectiveness of its non-project assistance -- expected to represent a majority of the bilateral aid portfolio -- in the context of the above analysis. The Mission plans to use three types of non-project assistance: PL 480 Title III, the Agricultural Sector Grant, and the Economic Support Fund. We do not expect to be able to trace and measure a specific set of results for macroeconomic or policy changes which can be attributable to either dollar or local currency funds generated by non-project assistance. The USAID will, however, employ several indicators for assessing whether:

- Government policy reforms are being implemented as planned; and
- non-project assistance is being directed to priority uses closely related to USAID strategy and to the assumptions on which this strategy is based.

The assignment of non-project assistance to specific policy goals and sector uses is illustrated in the following table:

<u>Non-Project Assistance Vehicle</u>	<u>Direction of Policy Impact</u>	<u>Direction of Local Currency Use</u>
PL 480, Title III	National Agriculture Strategy Cereals Price Policy & Marketing Decentralization of Agriculture Research	Cereals Production Vegetable Production Reforestation PVO Support Coop Storage & Marketing Ag Training Institutions
Agricultural Sector Grant	Decentralization of Regional Development Agencies Support for RDA <u>Contrat-Plans</u> Rural Private Sector Reform	Rural Private Enterprises Market Links (Rural Roads) Ag. Credit Local Institutional Development (esp. training) Nutrition
Economic Support Fund	Plan de Redressement (IMF Standby) (IBRD Structural Readjustement Loans)	National Storage & Marketing Irrig. Perimeter Devel. Market Links (Rural Roads)

Two kinds of indicators will be used for the assessment. The first is the implementation of Government reforms according to the Government's plan of action. These intended actions will be used essentially as a set of performance indicators. A preliminary list of these actions is presented in the Annex, although there will likely be modifications and refinements according to priorities and subsequent agreements (e.g., with IMF). In addition, some macroeconomic indicators will be employed to assess the contribution of non-project assistance to short-term stabilization requirements. One such indicator

would be the percentage of the annual current account deficit which the dollar component of the non-project assistance represents. Another is the rate of actual commodity imports under the Title III program and the Agricultural Sector Grant, and the rapidity with which local currency generation is achieved.

A second set of indicators relate to the direction of local currency uses. These uses will be monitored according to: 1) their function in easing bottlenecks in critical operations of ongoing projects, as, for example, reducing the transport costs of key farm inputs; and 2) their application to agreed-upon priorities in the rural sector. Activities supported by local currency funds will be evaluated in conjunction with evaluations of the programs with which they are most closely associated (see Section D).

Of the macroeconomic trends that will be monitored, shifts in investment and in budget resources from urban to rural areas and an increase in rural income will be those most directly indicative of a change in the dual economic structure of Senegal. That Senegal's urban centers consume more of what is produced in Senegal's rural areas, and produce more for them, is identified in the CDSS as a condition for achieving food self-sufficiency in the long-term. While it will not be feasible to trace and attribute directly to a given set of assistance vehicles the presence or absence of macroeconomic changes, or the implementation of specific GOS reforms, clearly the absence of positive change would warrant a re-examination of USAID strategy.

The data for the above assessments will be obtained from Government of Senegal, World Bank, and IMF reports, as well as from the monitoring and reporting systems set up for implementing non-project aid.

B. Assessment at the Sector and Regional Levels

As described in the FY 1983 CDSS, USAID assistance will focus primarily on agriculture and health. Closely related to agricultural growth are activities designed to address problems in natural resource management, land degradation, and energy. In addition to this program focus, assistance will be concentrated in three geographical regions: Casamance, Sine Saloum, and Fleuve. This combination of program and geographical focus provides an excellent context for thorough evaluation and data collection efforts. The Mission plans to take advantage of this opportunity in several ways.

First, in the agricultural program, USAID will assist Senegalese agencies to provide coordinated information on change at the farm level, on an annual basis. To date, efforts to measure interim or ultimate impacts of USAID-supported interventions have been frustrated by the lack of representative data on production and economic returns to the farm under the varying conditions of input costs, crop prices, the availability and use of technical advice, and weather. The USAID will extend the capabilities already existing in the three relevant Regional Development Agencies to collect and analyze data for both monitoring and evaluation purposes. From several possible options for data collection, one has been initially identified for further preparatory work in 1982. This approach would combine the returns from ongoing monitoring systems with annual farm management surveys. Availability of this information, together with the results from other studies, will considerably strengthen the ability of the Government and USAID (as well as other donors) to measure and attribute change, and to identify much more clearly the effects of various programs in areas of mutual concern.

Second, the USAID will concentrate several projects in the Sine Saloum region. These projects will mature at different rates, and each project poses distinctive questions for evaluation. Nevertheless, the Mission will attempt to group evaluations with the expectation that the findings may yield a picture of the overall regional impact of these activities, as well as a view of common constraints and problems. A summary review of evaluations is, therefore, included in the Plan. In addition, the USAID will investigate the possibility of a limited integration of the health status surveys with farm management surveys in the region. If such an integration proves to be feasible, the Mission and the Government will have a powerful tool for understanding the relationship between health status and nutrition on the one hand, and the economy of the farm household on the other.

In using these possibilities for both comparative and summary studies, USAID will attempt to obtain answers to the following questions:

- To what extent are the regions of USAID concentration either 1) ceasing to be net food importers, or 2) becoming net food exporters?
- To what extent are AID projects leading to an increase in and diversification of agricultural production and trade?
- Is farm income increasing (or is it less vulnerable to weather variation), and how is this increase distributed?
- To what extent is an increase in farm production and/or income attributable to technological inputs? To crop prices?
- Is health status improving in the Sine Saloum region? What is the relationship between changes in health and nutritional status and changes in farm production and income?

Information from farm and health surveys during the period of the Plan will provide some answers to these questions. In addition, information

verifying or qualifying survey results will be obtained from selected beneficiary surveys. As they become available, both types of information will form an empirical base for some of the studies to be undertaken by Princeton University.

USAID believes that even partial answers to the above questions will yield evidence of the extent to which farm-level beneficiaries are profiting from USAID-supported interventions, and some suggestions about the relationship between farmers and the providers of farm inputs and technical services. The latter relationship will also be examined more directly. The strategy outlined in the CDSS envisions, as we have seen, a double barreled approach of strengthening the Regional Development Authority extension services, and a parallel strengthening of producer groups and the rural private sector. This approach directly supports the broader aim of institutional reform and decentralization. Assessment at the sector and regional levels, therefore, also addresses the following questions about the RDA's:

- Is the quality of extension services improving? (Do small farmers value and adopt technical advice?)
- Is the coverage of extension services expanding? (Are more farmers being contacted more often by rural extension agents?)
- Are RDA's better able to monitor and evaluate their programs?

The CDSS describes the development of private producers' groups and cooperatives as the principal route for central government withdrawal from direct intervention in and control over the rural economy. Measures of the strengthening of these local groups will be included in evaluations of the relevant projects. At the sector level, the main questions have to do with the changing relationship between public institutions (RDA's) and

the private sector (including producers' groups and cooperatives). These include, for example, the questions:

- Do the staff of the RDA's concentrate more on training and extension services, and less on functions of input delivery, crop marketing, and control over decisions at the farm level?
- Do RDA's solicit and use recommendations from local groups?
- Do local groups have access to resources (e.g., farm credit) and at what cost? Are the RDA's regularly informed about amounts and costs of farm inputs being supplied to producer groups through the private sector?

Both Princeton and Michigan State, from different perspectives, will seek answers to these and other questions bearing on the changing relationships between the RDA's and producer groups. Indicative information will also be derived in the summary reviews of evaluations, particularly in the Sine Saloum region.

With the phasing out of individual actions related to the role of women in development and the introduction of a specific women's orientation or component in production and health projects, an assessment of the extent to which USAID support is benefiting women will cut across several projects. Special attention will continue to be given to significant individual experiments (e.g., women's extension unit in SODEVA). Two additional cross-cutting issues will warrant assessment above the level of specific projects: the effect of project interventions on nutritional status, and the relationship of rural literacy/numeracy to local institutional development.

C. Assessment at the Project Level: Evaluation and Monitoring

As pointed out in the CDSS analysis, development investments have too often not touched the poor majority in ways that enable them to use these investments productively. Through a closer monitoring of the projects it

supports, together with a selected number of in-depth evaluations, USAID will continue the effort begun in the Country Assessment to observe in quantitative and qualitative ways the access of rural peoples to technologies, goods and services intended for them; the uses made of these benefits; and the result on beneficiaries. Observations of local change (or the lack of change over time), and the feeding back of this information to Senegalese agencies and project managers, is a necessary test of the USAID strategy.

This evaluation effort meshes well with the new responsibilities of the RDA's to monitor and evaluate their performance against requirements set forth in their respective performance contracts (contrats-plans). In full appreciation of the effort that these new responsibilities will entail, USAID will support the RDA's with which it cooperates to build effective management information systems, and to undertake data collection and analysis.

At the project level, USAID defines monitoring as the gathering of relevant information on project inputs and outputs, and the timely feedback of this information to project managers for decision-making. Monitoring enables managers to take corrective action enabling the project to achieve its objectives. Given the greater flexibility in resource use afforded by non-project assistance, improved monitoring is necessary to permit judgments about specific needs for additional resources, which in turn are incentives for further improvements. As projects mature, monitoring will extend to include interim indicators of impact, enabling project managers to draw tentative conclusions about the pace of project performance relative to the purpose set forth in the project.

For the purposes of this evaluation plan, the USAID defines evaluation as both the measurement of change in the achievement of project purposes and the broader impact of projects, as well as the attribution of these changes to project interventions. Evaluation entails the analysis of information gathered through both monitoring systems and additional investigations to verify or expand the analysis. In general, monitoring observes performance up to the point of the delivery of technology, management systems, goods and services from the point of view of the provider; evaluation observes the uses to which these are put by beneficiaries and their resulting impact. Evaluation also takes into account exogenous variables including, for example, government pricing policies, subsidies, marketing services, and environmental conditions.

The questions to be asked at the project level have to do with the aims of the individual projects and the hypotheses on which they are based. Since projects are among the means with which USAID promotes its strategy, these questions will also relate to broader issues at the sector, regional and national levels.

D. Evaluation Work (1982-1987)

USAID will undertake a selected number of evaluations during the 1983-1987 period. This approach is based on the following assumptions:

- that the development of farm and health survey data during the period encourages USAID to concentrate evaluation resources and staff on a selected number of in-depth evaluations.
- that strengthened monitoring systems within projects (using the project logical framework and survey data) will support fuller reporting on project achievements, culminating each year in annual reviews with counterparts.

- that the use of counterpart funds generated by non-project assistance to promote specific activities related to USAID strategy, as well as the program and geographical focus of the program, encourages USAID to undertake multi-project evaluations.

Within an overall approach to evaluation, the USAID plans to:

- prepare annual assessments of non-project assistance in the context of macroeconomic developments and Government of Senegal reform.
- before the design of follow-on agricultural and rural health services projects, prepare reports summarizing one of the following: 1) the findings of an in-depth evaluation of the earlier phase; or 2) the results of monitoring to date, using interim indicators of project impact.
- intensively evaluate pilot activities that are expected to be substantially expanded or replicated according to the results of the evaluation. Two such activities are the Rural Private Sector Development project (when it is funded) and the agricultural credit activity to be supported under the Agricultural Sector Grant.

The attached plan framework (Annex) is built on the above conditions. USAID will review this framework annually with GOS to reaffirm or revise both the evaluation work planned, and to refine the specific questions to be addressed in each evaluation. These questions will be incorporated into the respective scopes of work. Evaluations may be added to this basic framework to meet special information needs as they arise.

Annex (A) which follows outlines the provisional evaluation plan. Annex (B) cites, as one example of a monitoring plan, the calendar of the IBRD structural adjustment loan/credit. Finally, Annex (C) offers an initial scheme for monitoring the status of the changes called for under the Government of Senegal's Plan de Redressement.

Much detailed work remains to be done, in conjunction with the Government of Senegal, to establish common standards of evaluation, to set up

joint procedures with the RDA's and other agencies, and to specify the resources and training required. With the continued assistance of AID/Washington, the Mission expects to complete these tasks with the Government in the third and fourth quarters of FY 1982.

ANNEX A

EVALUATION PLANNING FRAMEWORK

	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987
<u>NON-PROJECT ASSISTANCE:</u>						
PL 480 Title I/III	A	A	A	A	A	A
Agricultural Sector Grant (ASG)		A(R)	A(R)	A(R)	A(R)	A(R)
ESF (Economic Support Fund)		A(R)	A(R)	A(R)	A(R)	A(R)
<u>PROJECT ASSISTANCE & ACTIVITIES:</u>						
<u>AGRICULTURE/RURAL DEVELOPMENT</u>						
Casamance Rural Development		(R)	(R)	M	(R)	(R)
Cereals II		(E)	(R)	(R)	(R)	(E)
(Fleuve Irrigated Perimeters)		(R)	(R)	(R)	(R)	(R)
Agricultural Research & Planning		(R)	(R)	(R)	(E)	(R)
PL 480 Activities:						
Agricultural Policy Studies		(R)	(R)	(R)	(R)	(R)
Decentralization of Research		(R)	(R)	(R)	(R)	(R)
Local Coop Storage		(R)	(R)	(R)	(R)	(R)
Rural Development Fund		(R)	(R)	(R)	(R)	(R)
ASG Activities:						
Rural Credit		(R)	(R)	(R)	(R)	(R)
Rural Roads		(R)	(R)	(R)	(R)	(R)
SODESP Livestock	M					

→ actual or anticipated projects

----- potential project

KEY: (E) : Evaluation

M : Summary Monitoring Report

A : Assessment

(R) : Annual Review with Counterparts

HEALTH

Rural Health Services

Family Health

Casamance R.D. Health Component

Fleuve Irrigated Perimeters Health Component

RESOURCE MANAGEMENT

Fuelwood Production

National Planning of Land Use

Renewable Energy

Millet Processing

OPG Land Regeneration (ORT)

PL 480 Activities:

Reforestation & Dune Fixation

PVO Grant:

Land Resource Regeneration

LOCAL INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Rural Management Training (ENEA)

Cooperative Development (PVO Grant)

Rural Private Sector Development

ASG Activities:

Rural Private Sector Development

PL 480 Activities:

Rural Technical Schools


Rural Development Fund


RESOURCES: DATA AND ANALYSIS

Farm Management Surveys:

Purposeful (Casamance)

Random Sample (Casamance, Sine Saloum, Fleuve)





Farm Systems Research (MSU)

Health Status Surveys

(OMVS Vector Surveillance)

Princeton Studies

ENEA Beneficiary Surveys

Agricultural Policy Research (MSU)

Macroeconomic Monitoring (USAID economist)

ANNEX B

SENEGAL'S STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT LOAN AND DEVELOPMENT CREDIT: IMPLEMENTATION PLAN
FROM DEC. 31, 1980 TO MARCH 31, 1981

Topic	Final date of Implementation	Monitoring by the World Bank
1. Fertilizer Recommendations on Grades and Quantities	Dec. 31, 1980	Consultation
2. Update Cereals Storage Study	Dec. 31, 1980	Terms of Reference
3. Study on Marketing and Pricing of Food Crops	Dec. 31, 1980	Decision on Terms of Reference
4. Organizational Structure of SONAR	Dec. 31, 1980	Decision
5. Substance of Program Contract (Contract Plan) for SAED and Lettre de Mission for SODEVA	Dec. 31, 1980	Submission for Bank Review
6. Investment Program	Dec. 31, 1980	Sectoral Consultation
7. Technical Assistance Project	Jan. 31, 1981	First Supervision
8. General progress under the Program related to 2nd tranche release (followed by annual reviews); implementation of specific conditions:		Final list of projects
a. Investment Program for 6th Plan,		Actual Implementation
b. Basic import duties at 15% and export premiums for test products at 10% of FOB value		
9. Reorganization of Ag. Agencies	March 31, 1981	Discussions
10. Final Reorganization of CPSP	March 31, 1981	Discussion of Results
11. Methodology and calendar for Auditing of Cooperatives' Accounts	March 31, 1981	Discussions
12. Study on Relative Agricultural Prices	March 31, 1981	Submission of Study
13. Determination of farm gate prices for 1981/82 crop year	March 31, 1981	Consultation
14. New Fertilizer Formulas and Prices for 1982/83 crop year	March 31, 1981	Consultation
15. Evaluation of Current Marketing and Pricing System of Traditional Cereals (especially millet)	March 31, 1981	Discussions

ANNEX C

GOS INSTITUTIONAL REFORM AND ECONOMIC POLICY
CHANGES: IMPLEMENTATION PLAN (1980 FORWARD)

<u>Policy Goals</u>	<u>Key Indicators</u>	<u>Date or Tentative Date of Completion or Achievement (if blank, no date indicated)</u>	<u>Means or Observations</u>
I PUBLIC FINANCE			
1. Reduction in the rate of growth of current GOS expenditures	. Kept below current revenues	1980 - 1983	
2. Reduction in GOS Personnel expenditures	. Reduced progressively from 57% level of 1980/81 budget	1980 - 1983	
3. Reduction in Supply expenditures	. Remain constant in real terms	1980 - 1983	
4. GOS arrears to Private Sector liquidated	. A total of 12 billion cfa liquidated	June of 1981	Resources from France, STABEX, and IMF.
5. Public sector savings rising	. Raised from 15% of public investment planned for 1980/81 to 25%	By 1985	To date only SAED has obtained the status of National Corporation (Société Nationale); SODEVA is under consideration.
6. Value Added Tax (VAT) established in budget	. Proceeds deposited regularly in a separate account in Central Bank	Each year	
7. Disengagement of GOS and reduction of role of Public institutions in the Economy.	. Contract plans and terms of reference (<u>ordres de mission</u>) established for public bodies and mixed-economy corporations.		
II MONEY AND CREDIT			
1. Continuing restrictive credit measure	. Advance authorization applied to request for credit of or above 70 millions cfa (reduced from current ceiling of 100 millions cfa).	From October 1, 1980 onwards.	
2. Reduction of ratio of money supply to GDP.	. Ratio reduced to below 1979 level.		

(Cont'd)

<u>Policy Goals</u>	<u>Key Indicators</u>	<u>Date or Tentative Date of Completion or Achievement</u> (if blank, no date indicated)	<u>Means or Observations</u>
III BALANCE OF PAYMENTS AND EXTERNAL DEBT			
A. Trade			
1. Reduction of current account deficit	Current account deficit shrinks to 6-7% of GDP		Assuming normal weather and absence of external shocks (e.g., increase in oil prices).
2. Reduction rate of growth of demand for imports	Rate of growth of imports below that of GDP at current prices	Through 1985	
3. Stimulation of exports of textiles, footwear, fertilizers, ag. equipment and canned fish	Export subsidy of 10% of FOB value	From Sept. 1980 onwards.	Revenues from the increase of customs duties: 1-2 billions cfa for 1980/81.
4. Extend export subsidies to all exports except phosphates and groundnuts	(Level of subsidy not specified)	End of June 1983	Pending favorable results on the first round of subsidies.
B. External Debt			
1. Limit yearly service on external public debt both direct and guaranteed by the State.	Limited to an amount of 15% of earnings from exports of goods and services.	Each year	Assuming a normal year.
2. Limit use of borrowings to direct productive projects	Amount of borrowings actually used for productive projects as opposed to non-productive projects.		
3. Restriction of commercial borrowings by public and para-public enterprises.	Related debt service financed from entity's own cash flow.		

(Cont'd)

<u>Policy Goals</u>	<u>Key Indicators</u>	<u>Date or Tentative Date of Completion or Achievement</u> (if blank, no date indicated)	<u>Means or Observations</u>
IV PRICES AND WAGES			
1. Deregulation of all prices of goods and services		As of the end of 1980	Except rice, bread, sugar and peanut oil, producer prices for certain crops and fertilizer.
2. Producer price of cotton and groundnuts set each year	Prices set at the highest level possible: ratio of producer price to world price		Price level compatible with anticipated export price and cost for collection and storage.
3. Wage control	Wage adjustment only once a year; adjustment based on 60% of rise in CPI since last adjustment + real rate of growth in GNP over the same period.	From end of January 1981 onwards	
V INVESTMENT POLICY			
1. Maintain a fixed investment within overall budget of 430 billion CFA	Just below 17% of GDP (in 1980 prices); 10% of GDP for public investment alone.	Over the 5 year period of 6th Plan	May exceed the ceiling by 10%.
2. Priority in Productive investments	Close to 55% of all investment expenditures.	During the first 2 years of the Plan	
3. Increase in Public Savings	From 15% of public investment to 25%.	By the end of Plan period.	

(Cont'd)

<u>Policy Goals</u>	<u>Key Indicators</u>	<u>Date or Tentative Date of Completion or Achievement (if blank, no date indicated)</u>	<u>Means or Observations</u>
<p>4. Define a set of criteria for the selection of productive projects for investment.</p>	<p>All projects costing more than 100 million CFA</p>		<p>Projects that will maximize benefits for balance-of-payments employment and making optimum use of concessional loans. Use of internal rate of return in accordance with standard rules.</p>
<p>VI. <u>ACTIONS IN THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR</u></p>			
<p>1. Increase domestic food production to increasingly meet Senegal's basic food needs: self-sufficiency</p>	<p>Decreasing percentage of food imports in total consumption; increasing percentage of food production in total consumption.</p>	<p>Overtime</p>	
<p>2. Diversification of ag. production</p>	<p>Promotion of other crops.</p>	<p>Overtime</p>	
<p>3. Increasing the value of ag. exports by further processing.</p>	<p>Ratio of value of processed ag. exports to value of processed and non-processed export products increasing</p>	<p>Overtime</p>	

(Cont'd)

<u>Policy Goals</u>	<u>Key Indicators</u>	<u>Date or Tentative Date of Completion or Achievement (if blank, no date indicated)</u>	<u>Means or Observations</u>
4. Responsibilization of local organizations to manage their own affairs.	. Increasing number of cooperatives and other village organizations actually established and functioning properly.	. Overtime	
5. Increasing the incomes of farm families and improving the quality of life in the country side.	. Rising farm incomes (in real terms)	. Overtime	
6. "Incentive prices" policy in agriculture.	. Producer prices of export products represent a large share of world prices; Cereals prices keeping in line with those of export products; ratio of export product price to food crop price.	. 1980/81 and 1981/82 crop years.	
7. Exhaustive evaluation of the way the present millet marketing system operates.	. Preliminary Discussion of this matter undertaken	. March 31, 1981	
8. Stabilization of seasonal food supply.	. 1.5 billion CFA (1980 francs to stock food.		

<u>Policy Goals</u>	<u>Key Indicators</u>	<u>Date or Tentative Date of Completion or Achievement (if blank, no date indicated)</u>	<u>Means or Observations</u>
<p>9. reduction of cost of intervention by agencies supplying inputs and marketing ag. products.</p>	<p>Actual quantities handled by private sector, especially by Cooperatives and village sections increasing.</p>	<p>Over time</p>	
<p>10. Reorganization of GOS rural development agencies.</p>	<p>Organization of 60 purchasing centers by oil mills.</p>		
<p>a. Groundnut marketing will be the responsibility of cooperatives which will deliver their products directly to oil mills.</p>	<p>Program contracts and ordres de mission actually established for all RDA's.</p>		
<p>b. More autonomy to RDA's for staff recruitment and management upon approval of ordres de mission and program contracts.</p>	<p>GOS presents a revised and approved statement of the debts of cooperatives and farmers.</p>	<p>By the end of 1982</p>	
<p>c. GOS will establish mechanisms to link the RDA's with preparation of orders and distribution of inputs.</p>	<p>Debts cannot exceed 25% of the value of production</p>		<p>. In a normal year</p>
<p>11. GOS will extend audits of accounts of cooperative members to the entire country.</p>			
<p>12. Ceiling on ag. credits.</p>			

(Cont'd)

<u>Policy Goals</u>	<u>Key Indicators</u>	<u>Date or Tentative Date of Completion or Achievement (if blank, no date indicated)</u>	<u>Means or Observations</u>
13. BNDS, SONAR and RDA's will establish precise methods of recording loans and repayments at the level of village sections; BNDS will establish regular audit procedures at the close of each crop season.			
14. Encouragement of private enterprise in marketing.	Increased participation of private trades in the marketing of rice under CPSP: ratio of value marketed by private traders to value marketed by CPSP increasing.	Over time	
15. Creation and development of villages sections within the cooperatives (sections villageoises) to provide a sounder basis for provision of credit, participation in marketing and other activities.	Amount of marketing rebates or payments for services rendered by cooperatives increasing.	Over time	
16. Establishment of a functional literacy program for cooperative representatives	Percentage of literacy of cooperative representatives increasing.	Over time	
17. Reorganization of Ag. Research Emphasis on studying constraints on small farmers through an interdisciplinary research program.	Research undertaken in each natural region; Fleuve region for irrigation, mixed crop and livestock pasture area for stockraising; groundnut basin for intensive rainfed agriculture and association of crop cultivation with livestock; Casamance: in intensive stockraising and farming system based on paddy rice.		

GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS

ACRONYM	FULL TITLE	EXPLANATION
ABEDA (BADEA)	Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa	
ADB (BAD)	African Development Bank	
ADF (FAD)	African Development Fund	
ASBEF	Association Sénégalaise pour le Bien-Etre Familial	Senegalese Association for Family Well-Being
BNDS	Banque Nationale de Développement du Sénégal	Senegal National Development Bank
CADA	Concerted Action for Development in Africa	Major bi-lateral donors
CANAS	Cellule d'Analyse Nutritionnelle et Alimentaire du Sénégal	Government's nutrition council
CCCE	Caisse Centrale de Coopération Economique	Official French loan Agency
CEAO (WAEC)	Communauté Economique de l'Afrique de l'Ouest	Francophone West African Common Market
CER	Centre d'Expansion Rurale	Rural Expansion Center
CFAF	Monetary Unit of Senegal	Approx. 300 CFAF=\$1.00 US
CIDA (ACDI)	Canadian International Development Agency	Canadian aid agency
CILSS	Comité Permanent Inter-Etats de Lutte contre la Sécheresse dans le Sahel	Sahel regional organization for drought relief
CONAPOF	Commission Nationale sur la Population	National population commission
EEC	European Economic Community	
EIB (BEI)	European Investment Bank	
EMP	Enseignement Moyen Pratique	Middle-level teaching
ENCR	Ecole Nationale des Cadres Ruraux	National school for rural officials
ENEA	Ecole Nationale d'Economie Appliquée	National School of Applied Economics
ESGE	Ecole Supérieure de Gestion d'Entreprises	Senegal's graduate school for business management
FAC	Fonds d'Aide et de Coopération	France's special appropriation for project assistance
FAO (OAA)	Food & Agriculture Organization of the UN	
FED (EDF)	Fonds Européen de Développement	Common Market Dev. Fund
IBRD (BIRD)	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development	World Bank
IDA	International Development Association	Soft loan window of IBRD
ILO	International Labor Organization	
IMF	International Monetary Fund	
INDR	Institut National de Développement Rural	National Institute for Rural Development
INEADE	Institut National d'Etude et d'Action pour le Développement de l'Education	Senegal's education planning office
ISRA	Institut Sénégalais de Recherches Agricoles	Senegal's agricultural research institute
ITA	Institut de Technologie Alimentaire	Food research center and laboratory
KFW	Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau	German aid agency


GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS (Cont'd)

ACRONYM	FULL TITLE	EXPLANATION
MCH (PMI)	Maternal Child Health Center	Pre-and post-natal clinic
MOH	Ministry of Health	
NAS	National Academy of Sciences	
OEF	Overseas Education Fund	
OMVG	Organisation pour la Mise en Valeur du Fleuve Gambie	Organization for Gambia River Development
OMVS	Organization pour la Mise en Valeur du Fleuve Sénégal	Regional organization for development of Senegal River Basin
OPEC	Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries	
ONCAD	Office National de la Coopération et de l'Association au Développement	Senegalese agricultural marketing agency
ORT	Organization for Rehabilitation through Training	Non-profit organization
PIDAC	Projet Intégré de Développement Agricole de la Casamance	Extension service in Casamance
PL 480		Legislation authorizing U.S. food aid program
PVO	Private and Voluntary Organization	
RAPID	Resources for the Awareness of Population Impacts on Development	
RDA	Regional Development Agency	
SAED	Société d'Aménagement et d'Exploitation des Terres du Delta	Regional dev. agency for Senegal River Valley
SDP	Sahel Development Program	
SERST	Secretariat of State for Scientific and Technical Research	Ministry for all research in Senegal
SISCOMA	Société Industrielle de Construction Mécanique & Matériel Agricole	Agriculture equipment manufacturer
SODAGRI	Société de Développement Agricole et Industriel du Sénégal	Senegal company for rice dev. in Casamance & Senegal Oriental
SODEFITEX	Société pour le Développement des Fibres Textiles	Regional dev. office for Eastern Senegal and Upper Casamance
SODESP	Société de Développement de l'Elevage dans la zone Sylvo-Pastorale	Office for Livestock dev. in the Sylvo-Pastoral zone of Northern Senegal
SODEVA	Société de Développement et de Vulgarisation Agricole	Regional agency for extension services and dev. in Peanut Basin
SOFISEDIT	Société Financière Sénégalaise pour le Développement de l'Industrie & du Tourisme	Financial institution
SOMIVAC	Société pour la Mise en Valeur de la Casamance	Regional agency for extension services and development in Peanut Basin

GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS (cont'd)

ACRONYM	FULL TITLE	EXPLANATION
SONAFOR	Société Nationale de Forage	Government well-drilling Co.
SONAGA	Société Nationale de Garantie et d'Assurances au Commerce	Car financing institution
SONEPI	Société Nationale d'Etudes et de Promotion Industrielle	Agency for small and medium sized business
STABEX	Export revenue stabilization arrangement	Under Lomé II convention with EEC
UNDP (PNUD)	U.N. Development Program	
UNESCO	U.N. Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization	
UNFPA (FNUAP)	U.N. Fund for Population	
WAMU (UMOA)	West African Monetary Union	
WHO	World Health Organization	

A.I.D. PROGRAMS IN SENEGAL



Project Names Corresponding to Numbers on Map

1. Casamance Regional Development
2. Bakel Small Irrigated Perimeters
3. Cereals Production Phase II
4. Senegal Range and Livestock Development
5. SODESP Livestock Production
6. Lowland Fisheries
7. Agricultural Research and Planning
8. National Plan for Land Use and Development
9. Millet Transformation
10. Grain Storage
11. Regional Food Crop Protection
12. Fuelwood Production
13. AFRICARE Reforestation
14. AFRICARE/Peace Corps Woodlot
15. Renewable Energy AIP
16. Rural Health
17. Family Health Care
18. SAED Training
19. YMCA ORT Youth Job Development
20. Sahel Manpower Development
21. Women in Development
22. Casamance Fishing
23. Food and Nutrition
24. Food for Work Program
25. Integrated Rural Development
26. Caritas Village Groups
27. Fisheries Resource Assessment
28. Management of Scientific and Technical Research
29. Title II
30. Title III
31. Data and Institutional Development
 - a. OMVS Fiscal Allocation and Responsibility
 - b. OMVS Groundwater Monitoring
32. OMVS Agricultural Research II
33. OMVS Integrated Development
