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**AGENCY FOR  
INTERNATIONAL  
DEVELOPMENT**



**GUINEA-BISSAU**

**COUNTRY DEVELOPMENT  
STRATEGY STATEMENT**

**FY 83**

**Small Program Statement**

January 1981

BEST AVAILABLE

UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION AGENCY  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20523

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GUINEA-BISSAU  
SMALL PROGRAM STATEMENT  
AN A.I.D. STRATEGY FOR THE YEARS 1982/83 TO 1987

JANUARY 1981

*National liberation, the struggle against colonialism, the construction of peace and progress--all these are empty things which have no meaning for the people if they are not translated into real improvement in living conditions.*

*--Amilcar Cabral*

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\* (Revised)

## INTRODUCTION

On November 14 a military coup displaced the administration of President Luiz Cabral, which had governed Guinea-Bissau since independence in 1974. A Revolutionary Council, headed by former Prime Minister Joao Bernardo Vieira took power. The Revolutionary Council has stated that national socio-economic development objectives, as well as relations with the external donors, will remain essentially unchanged. Thus we are basing this SPSS on the basic priorities, policies and practices established by the previous Government for pursuing the socio-economic development of Guinea-Bissau.

Country Commitment. Amilcar Cabral, the national hero and founder of the PAIGC, stressed that liberation from colonialism must bring real improvement in the lives of the people, especially the rural poor majority who bore a major share of the burden of the war for independence. The ruling PAIGC has been guided by this precept and in every aspect of public life has continued to enunciate development goals which emphasize increased popular participation (the political mechanism exists at the local community level for active participation of the poor in development planning that affects them; see page 10), decentralization, and balanced growth with economic and social justice for all. Joao Bernardo Vieira in his recent address to the nation reaffirmed the Government's unequivocal commitment to egalitarian development.

Although the Government's philosophical commitment to growth through equity is unquestionably high, and a number of reforms have been initiated,

the country has sorely lacked the financial and human resources to carry out programs necessary to realize adequately its goals. Guinea-Bissau began its independence with an impoverished economy and the world's lowest Physical Quality of Life Index. Six years have been very little time to register any appreciable change in conditions for the poor majority. Furthermore, during two of the last six years Guinea-Bissau experienced severe drought which adversely affected agricultural production, exports, and generally thwarted the overall reconstruction/development effort.

While the Government of Guinea-Bissau is still in the process of formulating its first National Development Plan, it has indicated Agriculture, Education and Health as the priority development sectors. The number one, most immediate priority continues to be the attainment of food self-sufficiency by improving the productive capacity of the country's small farmer majority.

Despite its tremendous resource deficiencies, the GOGB has undertaken a number of measures aimed at promoting equitable development.

1. Education receives about 20 percent of the GOGB's annual budget resources. The introduction of a universal free primary education system has increased enrollment from 15,000 at independence to over 80,000 in 1980. The major portion of this increase has taken place in the rural areas. (See pages 21, 22 and 26.)

2. In the Health sector, GOGB per capita health expenditures (\$5.51 in 1980) are higher than most other developing countries, and underscore the GOGB's priority to improve and provide basic health

services to all citizens. Mother/Child Health Care Centers and clinics have been established throughout the country. Unfortunately, there are no statistics available to measure the impact of GOGB's efforts in this sector to date. (See pages 18, 19 and 27.)

3. While the GOGB has directed a great deal of foreign assistance into the agriculture sector, and has undertaken active programs in land reclamation (with subsequent free distribution of reclaimed land to small farmers), seed multiplication and free distribution of improved seeds, etc., total available resources fall far short of actual needs. Large portions of the development budget are absorbed by basic infrastructure (e.g., roads, transport facilities) which are vital for linking the rural area to the national market place. Sufficient funds have not been available for agricultural credit, fertilizers and other production inputs.

4. The GOGB is concerned about the degradation of its forests and the subsequent adverse effects on the food, fuel and fodder requirements of its rural poor majority. Recently it has established a Forestry Services Division as a first step to deal with deforestation and accompanying creeping desertification that is taking place. (See pages 32 and 33.)

5. The GOGB has actively promoted the equality and the role of women in the national development effort. A National Women's Commission was formed following independence to ensure more active participation of women at all levels in Guinean society. (See page 41 for further comments.)

6. Although accurate population growth rate figures do not exist, it is generally believed that a population problem does not yet exist in Guinea-Bissau. Absorbed by its overwhelming reconstruction and development requirements, the GOGB has not assigned any priority to population study and family planning. (See pages 20 and 21.)

Guinea-Bissau is at a critical juncture in its development. It is a country still trying to consolidate six years of political independence after a long and economically devastating liberation struggle. The U.S. assistance program has a vital role to play in helping Guinea-Bissau through the present difficult post-independence period and in creating the conditions for long-term economic growth with equity in the Guinean society. The following analysis of the development situation in Guinea-Bissau forms the basis of our AID Program over the period FY 1982/83 to FY 1987. This year's Small Program Strategy Statement also contains an analytical description of how the USAID/Bissau Program will be implemented (Section X) in an efficient manner without an increase in the AID USDH staff.

USAID/Bissau has offered to finance an agriculture sector assessment similar to the one for Cape Verde executed by the General Research Corporation under contract with AID. However, the GOGB has opted to defer such an offer for the time being and continues to stress its policy of food self-sufficiency and the use of foreign aid for quick-yielding, productive projects. We hope that during

the coming year the GOGB will accept AID's assistance in undertaking an assessment of the agriculture sector, after which time the USAID/Bissau Program will be confirmed and/or modified, as appropriate.

One final note: Statistics in Guinea-Bissau are scarce, (baseline statistics are not available in some sectors and subsectors) and often unreliable. They should be viewed as trends rather than considered as absolutes.

I. U.S. INTEREST

While basic U.S. interests in Guinea-Bissau are limited, we do have political and humanitarian interests. We have a commitment to assist the world's poorest nations, such as Guinea-Bissau, to meet basic human needs. We also should encourage the country's established policy of non-alignment in international affairs.

The Government of Guinea-Bissau assigns high priority to development with equity and increased participation of all Guineans in the national development process. The U.S. fully endorses and supports this policy with an AID program aimed at improving agricultural production/productivity and standard of living of Guinea-Bissau's rural poor majority.

Initially, immediately following independence, the AID Program was solely a humanitarian effort. U.S. interest over the long term is to assist the Government of Guinea-Bissau to develop the country's human and physical resources to bring it closer to economic self-sufficiency. Guinea-Bissau will require large amounts of external assistance for the foreseeable future. The U.S. will continue to be counted upon as a donor country for both developmental aid and emergency food assistance.

## II. GEOGRAPHY AND THE PEOPLE

The Republic of Guinea-Bissau is situated on the west coast of Africa wedged between Senegal to the north and the Republic of Guinea (formerly French Guinea) to the east and south. It covers an area of approximately 14,000 square miles (twice the size of New Jersey), much of which is low coastal plain that rises gradually toward a savannah in the east.

The main physical characteristics of Guinea-Bissau are its meandering rivers and wide estuaries, where it is difficult to distinguish mud, mangrove and water from solid land. More than half of the country resembles an archipelago that places most of the population within 20 kilometers of navigable water. Much of the country's soil is alluvial and fertile.

The country's climate is tropical. Maritime and Sahelian influences are felt. Extreme variations in the country's climate, especially between the north and south, influence the agriculture production base. In the past, rainfall was usually abundant (2,000 to 2,500 m/m per year) along the low coastal plains where there is an abundance of palms, mangrove thickets and rice fields. To the north and inland, however, the average rainfall dropped to 1,300 m/m and the land is covered with tree-dotted grasslands. There are two seasons; a wet season, usually from June to November, and a dry season lasting from December through May. Periodic shortages of rainfall affect the country, especially the northeast. In recent years,

however, rainfalls have been inadequate. The harvest in 1980 has been the worst in recent memory.

The population is ethnically diverse. Before independence the main ethnic divisions were as follows: the non-African community of mainly Portuguese civil servants and Syrian and Lebanese traders, a colony of Cape Verdeans (mestizos) and the Africans (indigenous) whose main tribal groups are : Balanta, 30 percent; Fulani, 20 percent; Manjaca, 14 percent; Mandinga, 13 percent; Papel, 7 percent; Bijagos, 4 percent; Felupe, 4 percent and Nalus, 3 percent. (In all, 21 ethnic groups exist in Guinea-Bissau.) Following independence the number of resident whites has declined substantially.

Approximately 65 percent of the population is animist, 32 percent Muslim and 3 percent Christian. Although Portuguese is the official language, a Guinean crioulo is the lingua franca and numerous African languages prevail.

### III. POLITICAL SITUATION

As a consequence of the November 14 coup, the country is currently governed by a provisional government under the authority of a nine-man Revolutionary Council led by Commandante "Nino" Vieira. In 1981 it is expected that a new government will be installed and a new constitution promulgated. There will probably not be major changes from the past system when the African Party for the Independence of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde (PAIGC), founded in 1956 by Amilcar Cabral, the national hero, was the sole legal political party. The democratic process was said to be insured through the operation of the PAIGC itself, which was defined as "the supreme expression of the sovereign will of the people."

According to the theory of "democratic centralism," every citizen over the age of 15 could be involved in popular democracy by participation in the election of PAIGC candidates for the National Assembly. The National Assembly, the highest organ of the state, was elected for a period of up to three years and met at least once a year.

The 15-member Council of State was elected for a three-year term from among the members of the National Assembly. The Council of State chose a President who was Chief of State and Commander of the Armed Forces. The respective powers of the Presidency, the Prime Minister and the rest of the Cabinet are now under review by the Revolutionary Council.

The country is divided into eight political Regions. Officials elected to Regional Councils are empowered to preserve public order, provide local administration and promote economic and social development in the Regions.

The Government has also fostered the creation of local committees from among the local tabancas to act as organs of grass-roots political, and more recently, socio-economic direction. (A tabanca is a cluster of dwellings having a certain geographical, familial and functional unity. It is the traditional unit of daily life in Guinea-Bissau.)

Guinea-Bissau has proclaimed a policy of non-alignment, reflecting a combination of close ties with most Communist states and good relations with a number of other nations, notably Sweden, Holland, France, Portugal, Brazil, Algeria, Senegal, the United States, and the Arab republics. Although its representation abroad is limited, Guinea-Bissau takes an active interest in international relations, especially African and Arab affairs.

Guinea-Bissau was the first Portuguese African territory to achieve independence, and the Government is proud of its reputation as a leader in the struggle for African liberation. The common heritage and struggle against Portuguese colonialism provides an affinity with other African continental Lusophone countries.

#### IV. DEVELOPMENT OVERVIEW AND CURRENT ECONOMIC SITUATION

The economy of Guinea-Bissau is only six years old. This relatively brief period has been dedicated to trying to make a start at rebuilding and repairing the heavy damage of over a decade of fighting for independence. For five hundred years this was a colonial exploitative economy, subject to great measures of benign neglect. Six years has been wholly insufficient time in which to begin any significant recovery after five centuries of such abuse and neglect.

The economy is predominantly rural and small farmers practicing traditional methods of agriculture constitute more than 85 percent of the workforce. Their efforts make up about 65 percent of GDP. Rice is the principal food crop grown, practically all of it rainfed, generally produced from polder agriculture. In a year of good rainfall, millet, sorghum and maize might equal half the tonnage of the rice crop (approximately 100,000 tons a year prior to the war which destroyed much of the polder infrastructure). However, in recent years, due initially to the long liberation struggle and dearth of trained technicians and modern agricultural inputs, and more recently due to the increasingly poor rainfall, per capita production has declined and the country can no longer feed itself. Food imports now constitute a formidable drain on scarce foreign currency reserves.

Groundnuts are grown in the interior and are the principal export crop; production reached 16,000 tons in 1978. This doubled the prior two year harvests, but still fell short of pre-war production. The 1980 crop is estimated to be well below 1978 levels, however. Eighty percent

of Guinea-Bissau's foreign exchange comes from the export of agricultural products; groundnuts account for 60 percent of exports. Palm oil accounts for another 12 percent and cashew nuts and cotton for an equal amount. The balance of exports is made up of fish and timber.

The industrial sector is dwarfed by agriculture, accounting for only about 5 percent of GDP. Manufacturing is almost all government controlled. The few vegetable oil mills and other small factories operate well below capacity, due primarily to the lack of raw materials and small internal and export markets.

The public sector dominates the money economy with 15,000 employees. The largest trading activities in the economy are engaged in groundnut exports and the importation and distribution of rice. These functions are carried out by two government-controlled firms, although reforms to encourage more private participation are under consideration.

In addition to chronic food shortfalls, the most serious constraints to the country's development over the next decade are likely to be shortages of trained manpower and inadequate physical infrastructures. Few efforts were made during the colonial period to develop human resources. As a result, in each GOGB Commissariat the number of trained and experienced individuals is extremely modest, even in relation to other West African countries. This has slowed the planning and implementation of development programs. Infrastructure problems include poor roads and port facilities, limited communications and electrical power outside of Bissau, etc. Physical constraints on the transportation side have retarded production of export

crops and the dissemination of improved cultivation techniques.

Incomplete data indicate that during the last several years Guinea-Bissau received, on average, about \$50-60 million annually in foreign grant and loan commitments. The volume of aid flowing to Guinea-Bissau, at about \$50 per capita per annum, or 20-30 percent of GNP, is high. The country depends heavily on foreign assistance from a wide range of donors, not only for its capital investment, but also for financing recurrent expenditures.

For 1980, national income receipts are estimated to be 946,465,431 Pesos Guinenses, or U.S. \$28,680,771 (U.S. \$1.00 = 33 P.G.), matched against anticipated recurrent expenditures of 1,620,234,928 P.G. (U.S. \$49,098,027). In other words, national receipts in 1980 are projected to be sufficient to cover only 58 percent of the Government's operating costs, not including any major capital investment programs. The 1980 deficit of 673,769,497 P.G. (U.S. \$20,417,257) will be the latest in a series of substantial operating budget deficits which extend back to the country's first years of independence. The continuing need for foreign assistance is quite clear. In past years, certain foreign governments, particularly Sweden and the Netherlands, have given grants not tied to specific programs for the purpose of meeting at least a portion of the recurrent cost shortfall.

The greater part of capital investment in Guinea-Bissau is financed through external sources. According to a draft report on economic indicators prepared by the Commissariat for Economic Coordination and Planning, dated February, 1980, from 1976 through 1978

this investment assistance totalled over U.S. \$109 million (actual expenditures). In 1979 foreign aid commitments amounted to U.S. \$60 million.

With respect to development programming, Guinea-Bissau has undertaken a relatively active capital investment program in an attempt to expand its severely limited infrastructure. In 1979 its investment program was estimated to be about 3.3 billion P.G. (U.S. \$100 million). For 1980 the investment program is projected to include over 400 separate projects, totalling approximately 5.5 billion P.G. (U.S. \$166 million). While these figures represent the level of planned investment, the country's lack of infrastructure and trained manpower severely limit its capacity to absorb this capital. As a result, only about 50 percent of planned investment in Guinea-Bissau is actually realized.

Since independence Guinea-Bissau has had serious and chronic balance-of-trade deficits. This deficit was projected to be over \$25 million for 1979. The overall deficit in the balance-of-payments increased from \$5.3 million to \$5.9 million in 1979. Foreign assistance helps the country's immediate foreign exchange shortage by providing needed foreign produced goods. However, because of the scarcity of products produced or available in Guinea-Bissau, to date only about 3 percent of external assistance funds were actually spent within Guinea-Bissau. The remainder was spent on goods, training, or technical assistance produced or brought in from outside the country.

Foreign assistance, therefore, does little to directly stimulate the Guinean economy or to increase the GOGB's access to much-needed foreign exchange.

Short-term prospects for the Guinea-Bissau economy are for moderate growth in exports, continuing balance-of-payments shortfalls, and budget deficits financed by foreign aid. Foreign aid will probably remain stable at a relatively high level over the next few years, but with a continuing shift away from budget support toward project specific assistance.

The GOGB's short-term strategy is to use foreign aid for quick yielding, productive projects and balance-of-payments support. Projects generating foreign exchange and boosting agricultural output will continue to receive preference.

Development potential over the medium-term focuses on fisheries and timber resources. Fisheries studies have already been undertaken by foreign aid agencies and several bilateral fisheries projects--including the AID Small Scale Artesanal Fisheries project--are underway. Timber resources are not yet fully surveyed but appear promising. Present exports of about 5,000 tons of lumber could be substantially increased with better equipment and management.

Guinea-Bissau's long-term prospects hinge upon the development of agriculture, i.e., production increases and diversification of export crops, as well as a reduction of food imports through increased rice production. With the introduction of new varieties, herbicides, fertilizers, improved planting practices and irrigation, plus drainage infrastructure, production of cereal grains could be increased greatly.

V. SOCIO-ECCNOMIC PROFILE OF THE POOR MAJORITY TARGET GROUP

Reliable social and economic statistical data for post-independence Guinea-Bissau, especially for the rural sector, are poor at best and serve to highlight the need for adequate reporting systems. Since upwards of 85 percent of the country's inhabitants reside in the rural sector, all below-cited national statistics and estimates apply to describe the rural poor majority's situation, which is considerably worse than his brethren citizens of Bissau, the nation's capital and only major urban center.

The poor state of Guinea-Bissau's economy is largely a consequence of colonial neglect and abuse, compounded by the long war for independence. Agriculture is the mainstay of the economy; it has always been an entirely African activity, since there were essentially no permanent European settlers. Colonial rule did nothing to upgrade the predominantly peasant economy of Guinea-Bissau. To the contrary, colonial administration considered education and any technological change adapted by the population as a potential threat to colonial authority. Six years of independence has barely put a dent in Guinea-Bissau's debilitating level of poverty. Annual per capita income still hovers around \$120. Actual cash income is considerably lower among the rural population. The country's Physical Quality of Life Index (PQLI), a composite of life expectancy, infant mortality and illiteracy, remains among the lowest in the world.

A) Agriculture Sector

The country's large rural sector is comprised almost exclusively of subsistence farmers and, to a lesser extent, small scale fishermen. As such, the agriculture sector is expected to provide the major source of employment and foreign exchange. The principal crops of Guinea-Bissau are rice, other cereal grains, peanuts, palm oil and cashews.

The agricultural potential of the country must be rated as excellent in terms of soil fertility/arable land ratio, and, until the recent drought, abundance of water, etc. However, overall agricultural productivity would have to be categorized as poor and under-exploited. The extremely low level of agricultural technology in practice and the inability to extend known knowledge are primary constraints to improved small farmer production/productivity. The bulk of production is subsistence agriculture which never reaches the market. Consequently, agriculture's current contribution to the GDP is falling far short of its real potential.

To date, little of importance has been achieved in the area of livestock and poultry raising. Native cattle are generally mature at about a lean 400 pounds and provide small amounts of meat and insignificant quantities of milk. Virtually all of Guinea-Bissau's dairy needs must be met through imports. Another problem created by the small size of cattle is that very few of these animals are large enough for draft. This, coupled with an almost universal lack of farm machinery, results in no relief to the back-breaking labors of the

field, and retards increased production.

More than 80 percent of Guinea-Bissau's population reside within 20 kilometers of water rich in fish, which is the preferred source of animal protein in the Guinea-Bissau diet. Although there are currently no developed artesanal fisheries industries of commercial significance, the income, employment, and nutritional potential of such small-scale fisheries must be rated high. However, fishing practices are archaic. Furthermore, an almost total lack of basic supplies and transport services have precluded development of viable fisheries production by small fishermen.

B) Health Sector

Standard health indicators show the health status of Guineans to be one of the lowest in the world. Largely due to infectious diseases, the infant mortality rate has been estimated to be 280-300, and the child mortality rate (ages 0-5) 40 per 1,000, among the highest in the world. Because of the high child mortality, life expectancy at birth is only 35 years. The estimated maternal mortality rate is also extremely high, 7.2 per 1,000.

An in-depth assessment of the health status of the population is virtually impossible using currently available statistics. Except for reported transmissible diseases, there is virtually no specific data collected in Guinea-Bissau. It is generally assumed, although no data is available to corroborate the impression, that the five most significant causes of death are in order of frequency: malaria, respiratory infection, gastroenteritis, parasitic infection, and malnutrition.

Despite the fact that per capita health expenditures by the GOGB (approximately \$5.51 in 1980) are higher than most other developing countries, it must be realized that no modern private health sector exists in this socialist country. Whereas in other countries governmental expenditures represent a portion of all national health expenditures, the GOGB's health expenditures represent nearly the totality of national health expenditures in Guinea-Bissau.

Foreign assistance in Guinea-Bissau's health sector is both substantial and diverse. Foreign donor contributions, in fact, exceed the GOGB health commissariat's own annual budget. Numerous donor countries have provided everything from scholarships to drugs, supplies and full complements of physicians and equipment to staff regional hospitals, such as the USSR in Bafata and the Chinese in Cantchungo. Of the 77 physicians working in Guinea-Bissau, 66 are foreigners, or cooperantes. In addition to providing personnel, a number of multilateral and bilateral donors have participated in capital investment programs in Guinea-Bissau's health sector. During the period 1976-1978 approximately \$3.7 million in foreign financing was directed into the health sector. Presently, the African Development Bank is completing a pre-investment study for major investment in Guinea-Bissau's health sector infrastructure.

The GOGB's health commissariat seems to be very resourceful in getting foreign agencies and professionals to help finance, plan and run its health programs. Because of the substantial and growing number

of other donors, as well as the intent of the small USAID/Bissau Country Development Office to maintain a compact, high-impact program of as few management units as possible, we do not plan to venture into the health sector during the period of this SPSS.

C) Population

The national census taken during the first half of 1979 indicated a total population of 777,000. The only other census taken during the last 30 years was in 1950. However, because of the war coming in between, no accurate conclusions can be drawn from the data and there is disagreement over the actual population growth figure. The official figures given are 1.4 percent, 2 percent, or 2.1 percent. The birth rate is estimated at 42/1,000 and the death rate at 29/1,000, so the 1.4 percent figure would apparently seem more accurate, if the birth and death rate estimates are correct.

Guinea-Bissau has a favorable balance between population and the amount of actual and potentially available arable land. The population is well disbursed and the obvious population pressures of countries such as Cape Verde are not evident. Nevertheless, latent population problems do exist. Like many developing countries with a population skewed toward youth, 42 percent of the people are under the age of 15. As this group moves into productive ages, it will spur an increase in population growth. If at the same time mortality rates are decreased as a result of the initiation of successful preventive health measures, the problem will be exacerbated further. Therefore, even though an overpopulation dilemma does not currently exist, the precursors do.

Given its immense reconstruction problems, the GOGB does not assign any priority to population and family planning. While FP services and information are available, on request, at some Government clinics, the GOGB makes no attempt to promote them. While USAID/Bissau stands ready to attend any official GOGB request for assistance in studying the implications of population growth and recommend remedial actions, we do not at this time hold out any prospects for AID involvement in population and FP in the near future.

D) Education Sector

The educational status of the country's inhabitants highlights the neglect of basic needs by the colonialists. During five centuries of rule, the Portuguese produced a total of 14 university graduates in all of Guinea-Bissau. Under colonialism, education, even at the primary level, received generally inadequate support. For example, in 1965 at the outset of the war, there were only 13 colonial government schools with an approximate total enrollment of 2,000 students. Furthermore, the curriculum adapted was that used in Portugal with little, if any, relevance to life in the colony.

During the war for independence the PAIGC, as part of its liberation program, established a national education system which by independence had grown to 156 schools. The teachers in these schools were PAIGC loyalists who had no formal teacher training. Many of these "professores combatentes," as they are called, are still bearing a large part of the teaching load. Since independence, GOGB activities are consistently

programmed to sensitize both adults and children to the need for schooling. The structure of formal education has been reorganized and new curriculum and methods of instruction are being introduced. Non-formal education focussing primarily on literacy programs is being expanded, though slowly, throughout the country. The number of primary schools has increased considerably as a result of the explicit GOGB policy of making free primary education available on a universal basis. At independence there were approximately 15,000 primary school students; almost 80,000 were in attendance during 1979. However, half the country's students are in the first grade. Unfortunately, 50 percent of the first grade students do not pass the first time. This is due partially to the lack of properly trained teachers and the fact that the medium of instruction is Portuguese, which for the majority of the population is a second, or even third language.

E) Other

Travelling throughout the countryside of Guinea-Bissau one immediately realizes the lack of attention paid by the colonialists to basic infrastructure. Endemic malaria and other tropical diseases rendered the country unsuitable for settlement by a colonial plantation class which would have demanded comfortable levels of living and requisite supporting infrastructure. As a result, there exists a mere 2,200 miles of roads connecting the majority of the country's dispersed rural populace; only 265 miles are paved. Moreover, missing road segments and bridges and ferries--largely a result of the war--make transportation very difficult and slow, especially during the rainy season and, in particular, in the heavy rice-producing southern portion of the country.

Electrical power is a serious problem. The old, rundown, diesel generator plant in Bissau has a total capacity of only 12,000 KWH. The capacity throughout the rest of the country amounts to 1,800 KWH and is virtually non-existent in rural areas.

Likewise, telephone and telegraphic communications are not accessible to the rural population. There are only about 2,000 telephones in the entire country, almost all in the capital city.

VI. GOGB DEVELOPMENT PHILOSOPHY/STRATEGY

Organizations created during the war by the PAIGC encouraged self-reliance among the people while promoting their participation in the struggle for independence. Once political independence was achieved, these same organizations have served as bridges upon which the GOGB began to trace the course for the country's social and economic development

Absorbed by the country's numerous and profound deficiencies, the GOGB has yet to elaborate its first formal national development plan. An explicit development strategy does exist, however, and includes objectives and priorities defined for investment and development. This strategy was presented during the PAIGC's third Congress in November 1977. Commandante "Nino" Vieira, in his January address to the nation, reaffirmed the development strategy of the previous administration.

A major emphasis of the development strategy is to promote and organize the participation of the country's rural poor majority in the development of the country's available resources. A central characteristic of the PAIGC's party value system is commitment to open dialogue at all levels, including (and especially) at the local tabanca level. It is through this mechanism that the GOGB strives to involve the rural population in defining and resolving local and regional development problems. At the same time, the PAIGC is able to mobilize political involvement in the GOGB.

The GOGB has assigned highest priorities to agricultural (including fisheries) development, formal and non-formal education, and health/nutrition. The most immediate national development priority is achievement of food self-sufficiency.

A) Agricultural and Fisheries Development:

Development activities in agriculture follow the PAIGC's precedence established during the war to improve the productive capacity of peasant farmers. Preference is for low capital, labor-intensive projects that promote increased and diversified agricultural production. Given the country's fertile soil and relatively abundant sources of water, agricultural development is the GOGB's favored development alternative.

The major short-term goal is to achieve self-sufficiency in rice production so that scarce foreign exchange presently being used for food imports can be directed to other pressing development needs. Moreover, the country has great potential to export rice, especially to neighboring countries importing rice from as far away as the Philippines.

Both foreign and national assistance in agriculture is primarily concerned with assisting subsistence farming, since it provides the livelihood for the majority of the population. This assistance includes distribution of seeds, insecticides and technical support. The GOGB has also initiated a number of monetary incentives (e.g., the price for peanuts has been raised 420 percent, and for rice has been doubled).

Subsistence farmers also benefit from assistance directed to state farms where both traditional and new crops are being studied for their improvement and adaption to Guinea-Bissau. The state farm run by technical directors appointed by the Government is staffed by salaried workers recruited locally. The plan is to operate one state farm in each of the country's eight Regions.

The GOGB's keen interest in fisheries development is reflected both in terms of Government priorities and expenditures. Fisheries is second only to agriculture development (rice self-sufficiency), and in last year's development investment budget actually received more money (21.3 percent). Within the fisheries subsector, the GOGB places high priority on increasing and providing for domestic consumption through artisanal fishing.

B) Formal and Non-Formal Education

Until 1961, when the Portuguese repealed the Indigenous Status, 99.7 percent of Guinea-Bissau's population was denied access to the colonial system of education. To combat the deprived state of instruction among the rural populace, the PAIGC formed a system of village schools which has served since independence as the basis for the introduction of a new education system.

Education and its development absorbs one-fifth of the country's expenditures. Two objectives underline the GOGB's educational policy: (1) the provision of universal primary education; and (2) the introduction of new curriculum and methods of instruction that are better

suiting to the country's values and development needs. The academic year 1975-76 was the first for a new decentralized administration. The following academic year the structure of formal education was reorganized. Non-formal education centers primarily on literacy programs. A National Commission for Literacy Coordination was formed to promote literacy and make recommendations for program improvement and expansion.

C) Health and Nutrition

Public health policy underscores the GOGB's priority to improve and provide basic health services to all citizens. The basic principle defined by the Commissariat of Health is to apply a policy of decentralized service. Initial concern is for the renovation and operation of existing health posts and hospitals. Future efforts will be to reinforce a decentralized system of basic health care delivery.

Under the decentralized health systems, each Region is to have a hospital with a minimum of 100-bed capacity and will be able to ensure essential medical health. In addition, hospitals are to be located in the more populated sectors. Health posts are to be located in both the more populated and less accessible villages. Each Region is to be equipped with a health brigade which will use a mobile dispensary unit to support vaccination campaigns, health and nutrition education and services to the least accessible areas of the country.

## VII. AID ASSISTANCE STRATEGY

### A) Development Program

The AID program has progressed from an initial, solely humanitarian effort immediately following independence to one of concentration in priority areas of importance to Guinea-Bissau's longer term development. AID strategy focuses on the rural poor masses and institutional development required to attend to their basic needs. In direct support of the GOGB's most immediate development priority, AID is concentrating on improving agricultural production/productivity by small farmers and, to a lesser extent, the promotion and development of small scale fisheries. AID is also actively involved in developing Guinea-Bissau's human resources to provide much needed across-the-board expertise, but especially as relates to development in the rural sector.

#### 1. Increasing Food Production and Attainment of Food Self-Sufficiency

AID's support for this development objective includes activities in rice production, land reclamation, forestry management/soils conservation and small scale artisanal fisheries development.

The successful AIP rice project at Contuboe1 is being greatly expanded under the new Rice Production project (0009) which aims to make the chronically food deficient Geba River Easin area self-sufficient in cereal grains. Future AID efforts in rice production (and land reclamation) will focus on the southwest coastal area. The rationale is as follows:

Rice is the staple food in Guinea-Bissau which has one of the highest per capita rice consumption figures in West Africa, estimated

at 125 kilos per head for the entire population, and higher for the Bissau area. To satisfy its total consumption needs the country requires approximately 90,000 mt of rice per year. Prior to the war for independence Guinea-Bissau was self-sufficient in rice and even produced surpluses for export. On the basis of available export figures, in 1960 Guinea-Bissau exported surplus production of 30,000 mt. Once the PAIGC began open hostilities with Portugal, rice production started to decline and imports were necessary to meet internal consumption requirements. At first the drop in production was attributed to the fact that in the areas controlled by the PAIGC the population was urged to produce only enough for their own consumption. Later in the war, larger deficits resulted from the fact that dikes and paddy fields were heavily bombed, destroying large portions of the country's best rice fields. More recently, deficits are the combined result of still ruined rice field infrastructure and irregular rainfall. (Rice imports since 1962 when the war began to the present time are provided below.)

Rice Imports 1962 - 1980

(in mts)

<u>Year</u>	<u>Amount</u>
1962	2,000
1963	3,000
1964	8,000
1965	9,000
1966	6,000
1967	12,000
1968	4,000
1969	23,000
1970	13,000
1971	29,000
1972	20,000
1973	30,000
1974*	31,000
1975	14,000
1976	11,000
1977	13,000
1978**	49,000
1979	20,000
1980	44,000 (estimated)

\* Independence

\*\* 1977 harvest hit by drought

About 90 percent of total rice production is of the mangrove (bolanha) type in which polders are constructed to prevent incursion of salt water. This type of cultivation is practiced primarily by the Balanta tribe (30 percent of total population) inhabiting the southwestern coastal area. The soils of the bolanhas are composed of halomorphic alluvial sediment capable of sustaining continued high yields of rice over long periods. These soils are subject to the influence of the sea, having a high salt content. They must be leached and salt water intrusion controlled through a system of drainage dikes.

Guinea-Bissau can be divided into two main production zones: the southwest (coast) which is the main rice growing area, and the northeast (interior) which is the main peanut production zone. Bolanha rice accounts for 77 percent of the southwest zone's rice production which in total represents upwards of 80 percent of Guinea-Bissau's rice production. During the war many of the best southwest coast rice areas were strongholds of the PAIGC liberation forces. In an attempt to deprive them of their food supply base, the colonial troops bombed and destroyed the dams and most of the dike system. Sea water invaded the paddy fields, forcing a large number of farmers to leave areas where dike maintenance had become dangerous and futile. After independence reconstruction of the dike infrastructure commenced and about half the former rice growing area is under cultivation again. The remainder requires major land reclamation work, including the construction of some of the area's larger dams.

In addition to land reclamation work in the southwestern coastal area, the AID program will help introduce the use of fertilizers (currently not used) and improved rice seed varieties (such as ROK-5) which are more resistant to salt water intrusion, irregular rains, etc. The development effort will require physical infrastructure rehabilitation and improvement of agricultural practices and inputs through strengthening extension and other agricultural support.

Forestry management forms a crucial part of AID's strategy to help Guinea-Bissau attain food self-sufficiency. Guinea-Bissau's forests, which cover an area of about one million hectares, provide wood--the basic cooking fuel for the country's rural poor majority. More importantly, these forests help preserve valuable agricultural lands by holding down flooding, recharging underground water supplies, reducing soil erosion, etc. The country is, however, in danger of losing its valuable forestry resources due to uncontrolled exploitation, indiscriminate cutting of young trees for firewood, slash-and-burn farming practices, etc. It is estimated that between 30,000 to 35,000 hectares of fertile, forested lands are destroyed annually in Guinea-Bissau. This in turn constrains the agricultural productivity of these and adjacent lands (where staple grains, e.g., sorghum and maize, are grown) which often are abandoned because of erosion, lack of ground water and silting. It also further exposes the countryside to desertification which is a growing threat to Guinea-Bissau. Unless

positive actions are taken soon, the country's forests could be demolished within 25 years. The effects on soil and climate would be catastrophic for agricultural production in Guinea-Bissau. The deforestation that is currently taking place impedes attainment of food self-sufficiency. There is no way the country's land reclamation program could recoup hectareage of productive lands comparable to that lost each year as a result of deforestation. The GOGB is keenly aware of the effects of unchecked deforestation on the country's future food and energy supplies and recently established a new Forestry Services division within its Natural Resources Commissariat. However, the Forestry Service is inexperienced and grossly understaffed and underfinanced.

The AID Forestry Management project proposed for FY-81 initiation would, inter alia, strengthen the GOGB's Forestry Services division by providing it with the necessary human and physical resources necessary to implement a viable reforestation/forestry management program. The overall goal of the project is to improve the sustained production capability of Guinea-Bissau's forests' agricultural and animal resource base for better meeting the fuel, fodder, food and fiber needs of the country's people. Sustained production implies the maintenance, if not the enhancement, of ecological integrity.

Although there are no developed artesanal fisheries industries of commercial significance in Guinea-Bissau, small-scale,

artesanial fisheries development offers great potential for improving not only the nutritional level, but also employment and incomes of the rural poor. GOGB interest in the fisheries sector has continued to grow and a new sense of urgency has been expressed as the Government learns more about its realistic options. Just looking at the map tells part of the story. From the islands of the Bijagos Archipelago, to the indented coastline of bays and estuaries, to the deep penetrations of navigable rivers, one sees almost as much water as land (a 1,500 km coastline). Indeed, 80 percent of the population lives within 20 km of navigable waters.

Fish is the preferred source of protein in the Guinean diet. Local demand far exceeds current market availability; a large increase in production could be absorbed easily. Another reason for GOGB interest is the increased understanding of the wealth of this marine resource. Research carried out during the last 10 years revealed that the section of coast between Guinea-Bissau and the Gambia is among the richest in fish in West Africa. Guinea-Bissau's coastal stocks, protected under Guinea-Bissau law from exploitation by the large-scale, offshore, deep-sea fleets (mostly foreign) offer a great potential for development, both in terms of fin fisheries and shrimp.

As a result of its growing interest in fisheries development potential, the GOGB now apportions a substantial share (upwards of 20 percent) of its investment budget to the fisheries sector.

Moreover, the GOGB has placed high priority on increasing and providing for domestic consumption through artisanal fishing. The Government wants to develop a strong fishery tradition to bring its artisanal fishermen from archaic practices to modern technology. It recognizes the magnitude of the problem that encompasses every aspect of fisheries. There is, however, an almost total lack of Government know-how, of basic supplies, transport services and the like, which has thus far prevented rational development.

With the exception of the Cacheu region (site of USAID/Bissau's Small Scale Fisheries pilot project) and the Bijagos Archipelago, there are no data available upon which to develop a rational artisanal fisheries program. During his visit to Guinea-Bissau in November 1980, an AID/W Fisheries Economist recommended undertaking an ecological techno-economic and socio-cultural study of the artisanal fisheries of Guinea-Bissau, based upon on-site visits to all significant fishing groups. The general structure of the inquiry would include the following:

- a) a typology and assessment of the various resource bases of Guinea-Bissau's artisanal fishery.
- b) a typology and assessment of potentially productive but currently unexploited fishery zones.
- c) a typology and assessment of the current technological inventory of the Guinean fishery, including the organization, production, distribution and exchange associated with each modality of production.

d) a typology and assessment of alternative technologies, including the implications for the organization of production, distribution and exchange.

e) a typology and assessment of the artisanal fishing people of Guinea-Bissau including their location, ethnicity, family and community organization, and the structure of incentives under which various types of individuals and groups operate.

f) an analysis of the principal constraints to artisanal fisheries development including access to: fishing zones, material inputs, markets, capital, credit, consumer goods, infrastructures and public services.

g) an analysis of national and local government policies and procedures as they affect the development of artisanal fisheries.

h) an analysis of the current and required institutional capacity required to develop artisanal fishing over time.

i) an analysis of the current and planned activities of the Government and other donors which may impact on artisanal fisheries development.

USAID/Bissau will be requesting PD&S funds to undertake the above study either in late FY-81 or early FY-82. It is expected that the Small Scale Fisheries pilot project at Cacheu will provide a successful model for replication of additional artisanal fisheries development projects. However, due to excessive delays in recruitment of contractor technical assistance, implementation of the project at Cacheu has slipped

by 18 months. Therefore, we would not expect to initiate any new artisanal fisheries project activity before FY-84.

## 2. Human Resources Development

The socio-economic development of the rural poor majority in Guinea-Bissau is seriously constrained by acute shortages of trained personnel at every level in government ministries directly and indirectly responsible for development in the rural sector. Improved small farmer productivity/production and attainment of food self-sufficiency cannot be realized within an acceptable time frame unless the country greatly augments its core of trained agronomists, plant, soil and animal scientists, extensionists and supporting staff. The country is also sorely deficient in trained local economists and development planners and administrators.

Guinea-Bissau, perhaps even more so than its former sister Portuguese colonies in Africa, was ignored from the point of view of any preparation for eventual self-government. At independence the country was left with almost no trained personnel in any field. Today, six years later, the situation has improved little, considering the enormous task of reconstructing an impoverished economy. The country continues to be critically deficient in trained technicians. The general level of education is very low. Even those who find themselves in charge of Government development programs are woefully limited in the skills needed to plan and manage. There presently exists a scant number of qualified and experienced personnel at upper levels; their effectiveness is further limited because there is virtually no

experienced supporting staff adequately trained in technical and managerial skills. In agriculture there are less than a dozen technicians with any training at the university level upon which the burden of development in the sector falls.

The continuing need for trained manpower far exceeds the GOGB's training capacities and is too large for any one donor to assume. During FY-81 USAID/Bissau plans to undertake a Manpower Training Needs Survey which will attempt to priority rank Guinea-Bissau's training requirements over the next 5 years and form the basis for future training support from all donors. USAID/Bissau had originally requested its own bilateral training project to provide selected development training. Subsequently, a special provision was provided under Phase II of the African Manpower Development Project (698-0384) earmarking 30 B.S. Degree level training slots per year for Portuguese-speaking Africans. Under this provision USAID/Bissau plans to provide academic training for 15 to 20 Guineans per year during the period FY-82 to FY-86. Areas of training and technical specializations will be identified in the Manpower Training Needs Survey.

B) PL-480 Title II Assistance

USAID/Bissau's strategy has been to remain flexible with respect to food assistance. However, the opportunities appear quite limited for application of traditional PL-480 Title II programs as a development resource in responding to the nutritional needs of the poor majority in Guinea-Bissau. The Government of Guinea-Bissau has stated repeatedly that it is not interested in Food-for-Work type feeding operations. Nor is it inclined to view favorably dole-type feeding programs. Even in times of emergency needs, the Government has shown a clear preference for selling donated foods.

Emergency Feeding

Guinea-Bissau continues to suffer from regional and local food shortages. Some food is bought to meet shortfalls, which have ranged from 10,000 to 50,000 mt annually since independence. However, the Government looks to the international community to meet most of its food import needs. As a result of the 1977 drought, import food needs for 1978 were approximately 49,000 mt. The international community responded with donations of 40,000 mt; the Government had to purchase the remainder to meet the shortfall. The food deficit for 1979 was estimated at 20,000 mt, most of which was covered by donor contributions. For the third time in the last 10 years, Guinea-Bissau has experienced a major crop failure. In 1979, due to irregular and inadequate rainfall, the Government estimated a basic shortfall for 1980 of 44,000 mt. For 1980, pledges of food donations have

been made by Sweden, the EEC, the Netherlands and the U.S. As of December 1980, 4,500 mt of PL-480 Title II commodities were committed. The 1980 rainy season got off to a very slow start and terminated early in many sections of the country. It appears that the damage to the rice harvest has been severe, and that Guinea-Bissau will require large amounts of basic food imports during 1981. The Government will undoubtedly continue to look to the donor community, including AID, to meet the most of these food import needs. In view of a projected large food deficit, the paucity of foreign exchange resources and the decline in export earnings due to a fall in the production of commercial crops, it is essential that Guinea-Bissau receive food aid and grants on a timely basis. As in the past, any future PL-480 Title II Transfer Authorizations will stipulate that the proceeds of U.S. food donations sold by the GOGB are to be earmarked for financing the country's agricultural development.

#### World Food Program

PL-480 Title II foods are programmed through the WFP in Guinea-Bissau. WFP operates a small program consisting primarily of Maternal/Child Health Feeding and limited Food-for-Work activities. Considering Guinea-Bissau's food needs, AID/Bissau endorses the WFP program and encourages its expansion. However, the lack of adequate local storage/transportation infrastructure and GOGB administrative capability constrain expansion of WFP operation. These constraints are likely to continue into the foreseeable future.

There are no Vol Ags operating feeding programs in Guinea-Bissau. Furthermore, even if the GOGB were to reverse its position in favor of traditional PL-480 Title II feeding programs, it does not have the financial/managerial resources, or the infrastructure (storage/transportation) to implement a multi-year food assistance program. For the present, the U.S. is limited to food support through the WFP and to responding with PL-480 Title II donations in circumstances requiring emergency food.

C) The Role of Women in USAID's Strategy

The Government of Guinea-Bissau is committed to egalitarianism. Women played a substantial and publicly-acknowledged role in the war for independence, and they now have representation in the upper levels of the PAIGC and Government. At the local tabanca level, the PAIGC has set up locally-comprised political committees of five members for groups of no less than 50 persons. As a point of national policy, each tabanca committee has three male and two female members.

While none of the AID projects will deal exclusively with the promotion of the status of women in Guinean society a number of them, nevertheless, will advance the role of women in the national development process.

Women are involved almost exclusively in the planting and processing of rice, as they are with the local marketing of rice, fish and other produce. AID's Rice Production project will introduce simple labor-saving machinery (decordicators) which will ease

the demands on the time women spend hulling rice and simple nut-cracking devices which will alleviate a part of their arduous, time-consuming task of palm oil extraction. This will permit them to increase their output and incomes. The foregoing also represent examples of how USAID/Bissau infuses appropriate technology considerations in its programs.

Presently, there are no female extension agents working in rice, even though women have been traditionally the most familiar with rice cultivation. Encouraging women at the local level to become extension agents is one way to integrate them more fully into the development process. Under the Rice Production project provision has been made for selection of local village women to be trained and employed as extension agent trainees. They will receive the same compensation and training as male trainees.

Under AID's special training program (AMDP, Phase II) for Portuguese-speaking Africa, special encouragement will be given to include women as participants from Guinea-Bissau.

VIII. PLANNING LEVELS FOR USAID/GUINEA-BISSAU

The following table shows the proposed areas, magnitudes of funding and timing of the USAID's program strategy outlined above. The illustrative program levels are considered to be within the ability of the GOGB to absorb in terms of counterparts and financial contributions. Initiation of the proposed new project activities in Rice Production/Land Reclamation and Fisheries according to the illustrative planning schedule will be conditional upon the rate of implementation of the ongoing program pipeline.

Planning Levels for USAID/Guinea-Bissau  
( \$ 000 )

<u>Sector Activities</u>	<u>FY-81</u>	<u>FY-82</u>	<u>FY-83</u>	<u>FY-84</u>	<u>FY-85</u>	<u>FY-86</u>	<u>FY-87</u>	<u>FY-83 to FY-87</u>
<u>Agriculture, Rural Development and Nutrition</u>								
Agriculture Development (0002)	Prior Years Fully-Funded		-	-	-	-	-	-
Food Crop Protection (0007)	403	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Rice Production (Geba) (0009)	1,400	1,500	1,200	-	-	-	-	1,200
Small Scale Fisheries (0006)	Prior Years Fully-Funded		-	-	-	-	-	-
Forestry Management (0005)	500	500	500	800	700	-	-	2,000
Fisheries Expansion	-	-	-	500	800	1,000	1,000	3,300
Rice Production/Land Reclamation (South Coast)	-	-	500	1,000	1,000	1,500	1,500	5,500
<u>Education and Human Resources</u>								
Primary Teacher Training (0003)	Prior Years Fully-Funded		-	-	-	-	-	-
*Selected Development Training		*(500)	*(500)	*(500)	*(500)	*(500)	-	*(2,000)
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>2,303</b>	<b>2,000</b>	<b>2,200</b>	<b>2,300</b>	<b>2,500</b>	<b>2,500</b>	<b>2,500</b>	<b>12,000</b>

\*(non-add)

USAID/Bissau initially intended to address Guinea-Bissau's manpower training needs through its proposed Selected Development Project (657-0008). However, we expect much of this training will now be provided through a special provision for Portuguese-speaking Africa under an extension (FY-82 to 86) of the Africa Manpower Training Project (698-0384).

IX. DONOR COORDINATION

Presently, formal donor coordination in Guinea-Bissau leaves room for improvement. A good part of the problem stems from the fact that several donors do not maintain permanent representation in Guinea-Bissau. Furthermore, the GOGB has shown a clear preference for dealing one-on-one with the donors. This policy, coupled with an absence of a clearly-defined development plan, has led to overall donor proliferation of projects, some of questionable priority, which has overtaxed the GOGB's institutional absorptive capacity. The UNDP, which traditionally assumes a leadership role in other countries, does not do so in Guinea-Bissau.

Nevertheless, frequent and continual informal contacts among most western donors is the norm in this small post. USAID/Bissau maintains excellent working relationships with these donors, both at the administrative and technical levels. None of the AID projects duplicate or conflict in any way with other donor programs. We are essentially involved in select projects within the agriculture sector where other donor efforts are limited (but often complementary). Most of the large western donors, as well as the UNDP, take a "buckshot" approach in their development programs for Guinea-Bissau. They are involved simultaneously in many sectors and subsectors. Recently, there has been an inclination for these donors to better focus their resources on priority development problems. USAID encourages this trend which we perceive as an opportunity

for increasing other donor contributions for the achievement of AID program objectives. We will continue to promote close coordination with the major western donors within the FY-83-87 program.

The valuable contribution of the FAO-operated Seed Multiplication Program at Contuboe1 in terms of introducing improved seeds, proper pest and disease control methods, etc., helped assure the success of the AID AIP Rice Production project. We expect to continue this collaboration in connection with the ongoing Geba River Basin and proposed south coast Rice Production project activities. USAID/Bissau's land reclamation activities under the Agriculture Development project (0002) are being carried out in close coordination with Dutch engineering expertise. Since the job to be done under the proposed land reclamation/rice production project for the south coast rice-growing area is enormous, we will strive to develop our future land reclamation activities jointly with the Dutch Government program (assuming it is still operating in Guinea-Bissau) and/or other interested donors. The Dutch Government has already provided a considerable amount of earth-moving equipment which will be assigned to south coast land reclamation activities.

In the area of fisheries the EEC is assisting the GOGB with its contribution to the AID Small Scale Fisheries pilot project at Cacheu. We intend to tap further EEC collaboration in replicating this pilot project during the period of this SPSS.

X. USAID/BISSAU PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION AND STAFFING

USAID/Bissau's current USDH and FNDH ceilings are 5 and 2, respectively. We expect these staffing patterns, as detailed below, to remain constant during the period of this SPSS.

During FY-80 the Mission's USDH Budget and Accounting Officer position was filled. This position is crucial to managing the implementation of our program pipeline which has grown to over \$4 million, as well as assisting the GOGB in accounting for local currency proceeds of PL-480 Title II emergency food sales which are programmed for agricultural development. The USDH Agriculture Development Officer position, which we expect to fill shortly, is vital to the future survival of the USAID/Bissau program with its preponderance in the agriculture sector. The USDH CDO, Secretary and Program Officer positions are filled.

USAID/BISSAU USDH/FNDH STAFFS, FY-83 TO FY-87

<u>POSITION</u>	<u>FY-83</u>		<u>FY-84</u>		<u>FY-85</u>		<u>FY-86</u>		<u>FY-87</u>	
	<u>USDH</u>	<u>FNDH</u>								
Executive Direction										
Country Dev. Officer	1		1		1		1		1	
Secretary	1		1		1		1		1	
Program Planning										
Program Officer	1		1		1		1		1	
Project Implementation										
Ag. Dev. Officer	1		1		1		1		1	
Financial Management										
Budget/Acc't Officer	1		1		1		1		1	
Mission Support		2		2		2		2		2
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>2</b>								

The above indicated five USDH positions are in addition to a USDH GSO detail to the post's recently-initiated JAO. A full-time PASA technician from the USDA joined the USAID/Bissau staff during FY-81, to serve as project manager for the Food Crop Protection program (0007). USAID/Bissau has extended an invitation to a young IDI to join the staff during FY-81. Based on a previous IDI experience, we believe that our program provides excellent in-depth, across-the-board exposure/experience in every aspect of AID program operations, as well as opportunities for day-to-day contact with host country counterparts at every level.

The feasibility of managing a slightly larger program over the FY-83 to FY-87 period without an increase in the present USDH and FNDH staffs can be attributed to an implementation strategy mix consisting of the following:

A. Increased reliance on REDSO/WA support for project design/documentation (PIDs and PPs), as well as evaluation, and for contracting/procurement services.

B. Program concentration. Our projected program avoids proliferation of projects requiring numerous separate management units. (The program will focus on the agriculture sector, with emphasis on increased food production/availability.)

C. Use of Personal Services Contractors. USAID/Bissau has had poor experience with university and other institutional-type contractors. Undoubtedly, because of the relatively small size of the contracts involved in Guinea-Bissau, institutional contractors

have shown little interest. Much time has been lost in soliciting their interest (bids) and to date has not resulted in a single institutional contractor for Guinea-Bissau. As a result, some contractor positions have been vacant for years. Our only contractor experience to date has been with Personal Services Contractors (PSCs) who have done an excellent job. We would hope the PSC ceiling limitations will be lifted to allow for their further use in Guinea-Bissau for both project implementation and monitoring.

D. Geographic concentration. A large portion of the FY-83 to FY-87 program will focus on a few geographic areas, i.e., essentially the Geba River Basin and the southwest coast rice growing region. This geographic concentration will enhance efficiency of operation in terms of project logistical support and management.

E. Replication of projects. Replication of successful projects represents a considerable portion of the FY-83 to FY-87 program. Rice production in the Geba River Basin and southwest coast will build largely on the experiences obtained under the successful AIP Rice Production project at Contuboel. Proposed expansion of land reclamation on the southwest coast emanates from prior experience gained under the Agriculture Development project (0002). It is expected that the results of the Small Scale Fisheries pilot project (0006) at Cacheu will provide the basis for the proposed replication of similar projects in other areas.

Unfortunately for the foreseeable future in Guinea-Bissau we do not hold out great expectations for the utilization of the

Peace Corps or Private Voluntary Organizations as alternatives for management-efficient program implementation. The PC has not been invited into Guinea-Bissau. There are only a handful of religiously-oriented PVOs operating in Guinea-Bissau; they are very small-scale operations with little emphasis on economic development per se.