FOOD FOR WORK

An Analysis of Current Experience and Recommendations for Future Performance

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

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This paper reviews the performance of Food for Work (FFW) programs supported by U.S. Public Law 480 food commodities, provided to U.S. private voluntary agencies (PVOs). The paper is based primarily on USAID sponsored evaluations of FFW programs in 12 countries and less rigorous descriptions of programs in 6 other countries. Its purpose is to analyze past experience and recommend changes in policy and design of FFW programs that would improve performance.

In 1984, the U.S. provided commodities worth $93.5 million to support FFW programs at approximately 50,000 project sites in 49 countries. Of that total, 5 percent went to Middle Eastern countries, 7 percent to Africa, 19 percent to Latin America and 69 percent to Asia. The review of experience demonstrated many successful programs, but also many recurring problems in managing complex, highly decentralized programs that require major logistical skills in moving and storing food commodities. The evidence of success and the importance of FFW in creating assets at the village level which can stimulate local development provide adequate reason to assess how FFW programs may be better managed in the future. This, combined with the fact that food aid and therefore FFW programs will undoubtedly become more important in the current situation where financial aid levels are being reviewed and may decline, makes it particularly important to take all possible steps to improve the performance of FFW programs. This paper examines both steps USAID can take to improve the policies that structure the environment in which FFW programs take place and ways in which the PVOs might improve the design and management of FFW programs.

Proposed policy changes for improved food for work performance

The analysis of FFW evaluations pointed up a number of recurrent problems in FFW programs that could be alleviated by changes in the policies that govern the use of commodities for FFW. The paper recommends that USAID make a number of such changes:

1. Establish clear priorities for FFW programs. At present there is some ambiguity as to whether FFW programs are for humanitarian purposes or are to promote development. To achieve maximum impact, FFW programs must be directed clearly toward long term, self-sustaining development through the labor intensive creation of community assets.

2. Fund complementary, non-food inputs. FFW projects are labor intensive, but any project requires some inputs other than unskilled labor -- basic tools, materials, and skilled labor -- to be effective. It is therefore conservatively suggested that at least 25 percent of the total value of any FFW program be available in cash for non-wage goods.

3. Redirect USAID's incentives to the PVOs. Currently USAID puts great emphasis on commodity management. The use and disposal of each commodity is audited regularly, and programs may be cut off if the logistics are not well managed. However, eva ations that ascertain whether programs are accomplishing development goals are only carried out occasionally and usually are not the basis for continuing or discontinuing a program. If FFW is to become a real resource for development, the incentive structure must be changed to put priority on the development goals.

4. Improve FFW programs that evolve from emergency relief. Many FFW programs have their origins in emergency situations. FFW can play an important role in the transition from relief to development, but only if programs are carefully tailored to expedite that transition. This has not always been true in the past. The paper makes a series of specific recommendations as to how programs might be established to be more effective in making the relief to development transition.

5. Reconsider the role of self-help. Self-help in the form of labor contributions generally defeat a major purpose of FFW programs, to provide

income supplements to the lowest income groups. Such self-help is a most regressive form of taxation. If there are to be local contributions, they should be in the form of donations of material goods or possible skilled labor. Most desirable would be user charges paid by those who benefit from the assets created.

6. Assess the impact on food production. FFW food imports are relatively small compared to the magnitude of other forms of food aid. However one would have to question the advisability of food aid imports to a food surplus country. More important, however, FFW commodities which are often high prestige commodities like wheat, corn, rice, butter, oil and dry milk may be preferred to locally produced items such as sorghum or millet. FFW commodities should not be allowed to create a taste and demand for high cost imported goods. To prevent an adverse impact on local food production, USAID country missions should be required to investigate and certify that disincentives to production or consumption of local commodities will not result from the import of FFW commodities to any region.

7. Insure that commodity wages are high enough to benefit the poor. Wages are crucial. They must provide an incentive to do hard physical labor. They also determine the level of benefits to the workers who are primary beneficiaries of a FFW program. The paper recommends that workers receive at least two and preferably three kilos of grain per day as a wage. It also recommends that men's and women's wages be the same.

If USAID will follow these recommendations they will create a climate in which it will be possible for FFW programs to become much more effective instruments of development.

Designing improved FFW programs

Policy changes that USAID can make will provide a climate in which more effective FFW programs may take place. However, to achieve that, better program design is needed. This is something the PVOs must do. The evidence of the program evaluations suggests that too many programs are

established in an ad hoc manner rather than in accordance with a coordinated strategy. This paper recommends an approach to design which starts by analyzing the program environment, which gives rise to a specific strategy, which in turn suggests an appropriate structure.

Environment - A FFW program must be designed on the basis of full knowledge of the environment. The paper suggests a range of important elements that must be considered. These elements which will have an important bearing on program performance include traditions of community action, the macro policy environment, the distribution of assets in the community and the physical, social and economic characteristics of the community. The paper establishes seven scenarios, based on prototypical physical environments and suggests that important correlations exist between physical and social conditions of the environment and the program's goals and characteristics.

Strategy - Every program must have a strategy growing out of the analysis of the environment. The key element in strategy is a clear definition and priority among program goals. Too many FFW programs have had multiple and overlapping goals so that program priorities were unclear. Specific projects were done on an ad hoc basis resulting in little cumulative impact and sometimes specific problems such as roads in one community which don't link with those of their neighbor because of the failure to plan. A strategy linking goals and environment in a specific plan of action will solve many of these problems.

Structure - A specific management structure must be designed to carry out the strategy in the particular environment. Such a structure should not be uniform across countries and regions but specifically tailored to fulfill a particular strategy in a given local environment. The existing local institutions will have a great deal to do with determining what is the appropriate structure. Unless the implementation structure is consistent with the local environment, the chances of achieving the goals is limited.

Future Issues for Food for Work

As we learn from experience and world conditions change, new issues arise that are important for the future relevance of FFW. Among these are:

1. Effectiveness in the African setting. FFW is an activity that is based on a model that was developed in Asia. Conditions are very different in Africa. Yet Africa's declining per capita food production and repeated food shortages suggest that priority should be given to Africa. The paper examines African conditions and suggests that with a series of changes FFW programs can be effective and make an important contribution to the solution of Africa's problems.

2. Monitoring and evaluation. If emphasis is to shift from auditing commodity management to assessing development impact, then FFW programs will need internal monitoring systems and more frequent outside evaluations. The paper suggests some models for monitoring systems. It also points out that evaluations will be more valuable if there is greater consistency between them, so that comparative analysis can be done and some universal guidelines established. The paper suggests a number of types of data that should be collected in all future evaluations.

3. Integration with other programs. FFW programs have generally been implemented as independent programs without specific reference to other programs. This substantially diminishes their effectiveness. Ways must be found to integrate them in larger activities. In this way, their impact could be substantially enhanced.

4. Innovative uses of FFW. Relatively little effort has been made to find new and innovative uses for FFW. Training is one area in which FFW could be used much more extensively than it now is. Other innovations frequently evolve in the field. Agencies sponsoring FFW programs should specifically encourage and reward innovations in the field.

Conclusions

FFW is a potentially important instrument of development, and as levels of financial assistance decline could become even more so. It is currently not performing to its full potential. To do so, the starting

point is for all involved, whether in the U.S. or foreign governments or in private agencies to accept the fact that food is a real resource and that FFW is an impcrtant development program. If that is to happen, USAID must take the lead. PVOs respond to USAID's initiatives and incentives. It cannot be otherwise since USAID supplies the resources that drive these programs. USAID must initiate the process by providing a clear signal that it is interested in development impact. It can do that be making some of the policy changes suggested in this paper. The PVOs must follow this initiative by making substantial changes in their own thinking and procedures. They have the ability to do this. If USAID will initiate the process, the PVOs are likely to follow this lead.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Any paper that attempts to review the current state of knowledge of an activity like Food for Work must draw very substantially on the work of others. I would like to acknowledge my debt to the authors of the many country evaluation reports that I have used as a resource. These reports provided information about specific country experiences, and their approaches helped to shape my thinking.

Both present and former staff members of several voluntary agencies were generous in sharing with me their views and experiences. Current and former USAID staff members with field experience, as well as friends and colleagues with a wide range of experience in the field of international development, enhanced my knowledge by offering perspectives different from my own.

My own work for voluntary agencies in a number of capacities and my studies of employment-creating public works programs that were supported by Harvard, the World Bank and USAID provided the background and understanding I brought to this work.

Data are critical to a study of this type. Data are also difficult to get and confusing to interpret. Jeanne Markunas and Herb Smith of AID were very helpful in assisting me in obtaining and interpreting the data on Food for Work.

I am grateful to Christopher M. Harris who assisted me in this work. He read many of the country evaluations and participated in some of the interviews. I received useful comments on earlier drafts from Judy Bryson, David Sahn, and Michael Painter. Their contributions are much appreciated.

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Appendix

I. Introduction

The idea of using plentiful labor to construct public works is as old as the Pyramids, the Taj Mahal, or India's Grand Trunk Highway. History suggests the great potential of labor-intensive methods for building public facilities. More recently, the underemployed labor of the developing nations has been recognized as not merely an obstacle to development, but also as an important resource. Out of this vision came the concept of Food for Work programs.

Food for Work (FFW) is a compelling idea. The rural and urban areas of the developing nations have millions who are poor, underemployed and seeking work. Their neighborhoods are poor in part because they lack economic infrastructure, such as roads and markets; social facilities, such as wells, schools and clinics; and agricultural facilities, such as irrigation canals, drainage systems, cattle dips, and leveled land. All of these assets can be created by the underutilized labor available in the immediate communities, given a resource to compensate the underemployed for undertaking this work. Title II of the U.S. Food for Peace Act (PL 480) provides just such a resource. Under Title II, USAID supplies food commodities through U.S. voluntary agencies and the United Nations World Food Program (WFP) to be used to compensate workers employed in building assets needed for the advancement of their community. Such programs are underway in 49 countries around the world.*

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* Programs supported by the WFP without using U.S. food commodities are underway in an additional nine countries.

The reality of performance and achievement, however, does not measure up to the theory. Food is a difficult resource to manage. Planning and implementing programs in remote areas with very limited management resources and logistic capacity is extremely difficult. Many staff members of voluntary agencies and USAID, responsible for managing FFW programs, are openly critical of program operations and skeptical about their contribution to development. But the gap between theory and reality, between the potential and the actual, is not as wide as these critics believe. This paper examines the evidence from experience and suggests ways that gap can be narrowed.

The U.S. Agency for International Development, which has been charged with directing the implementation of PL 480 since its inception in 1954, has had long experience with Food for Work programs. As part of this responsibility, it has commissioned evaluations in more than a dozen countries in the last five years. This accumulated knowledge, supplemented by various reports of the World Food Program, gives us considerable country-specific knowledge about FFW programs. However, none of these studies and reports compare and consolidate that knowledge to enable us to generalize about these programs, nor provide guidance for AID policy on how best to promote effective FFW programs. In its present form, the literature provides only limited lessons and guidelines for new programs on the basis of past experience. To fill that gap, this paper has been commissioned by USAID's Bureau of Food for Peace and Voluntary Cooperation to help it review the lessons of past programs and consider how these lessons can be used to improve future performance. The paper is addressed to officials of USAID and the voluntary agencies concerned with the operation of FFW programs. It is based on the assumption that FFW programs will continue. It uses 18

country evaluations and reports augmented by interviews with practitioners to suggest ways to make future programs more effective.

It is important to define at the outset the information base on which this paper rests and some inherent limitations in that base. The 18 reports on which the analysis is based represent approximately one third of the programs currently operating and do not constitute a random sample. Programs that have encountered major problems are generally redesigned rather than evaluated. Other factors, such as civil conflict, might also preclude an evaluation. The reports of evaluations that are completed vary widely, using different criteria and containing a wide range of data that are frequently not comparable. Many are detailed and of high quality while others are either summaries of field reports* or the sponsoring agency's internal evaluation.

The reader should bear in mind that though this report speaks of FFW programs as though they were a standard type of program, FFW is in fact a generic term for a wide range of development activities which have the one common characteristic that they pay workers with food commodities. While all Title II school feeding programs and maternal and child health programs work through roughly similar established institutions and share the same goals, FFW programs differ widely from one another. Catholic Relief Services' FFW program in India, for example, focuses almost exclusively on improving agricultural facilities such as wells or canals, while CARE's FFW program in Peru is concentrated in Lima and emphasizes the improvement of community facilities, the construction of houses in low income areas, and the enhancement of social

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* The author had available only a few WFP documents, so the data base is primarily U.S. voluntary agency sponsored FFW programs.

infrastructure. In Honduras, the World Food Program runs a FFW Program that concentrates exclusively on forestry development through the training of foresters, the management of forests, and the production of forest products.

An examination of the available evidence has led this author to conclude that, problematic as they are, FFW programs are a valuable instrument of development and should be strengthened. The gap between actual and potential performance is often unnecessarily large. That in an era of declining levels of financial aid there are clear indications that food aid will continue at current or higher levels makes the case for improving the use of food aid as a real resource for development all the more compelling. Notwithstanding the stated goal of the Food for Peace Act that FFW programs be clearly developmental, many practitioners have assumed that since food has attributes different from those of financial resources, it can be dealt with under different standards. This has been reinforced by policies and practices that emphasize commodity management rather than development impact. The result has been FFW programs that are less effective than they could be. This paper recommends important changes in attitude, policy and program procedures to make FFW programs a more important instrument for development.

This paper is comprised of six sections. Section I is an introduction. Drawing on information about the 18 programs for which field information -- ranging from brief descriptive summaries to excellent evaluations -- is available, Section II examines the attributes of FFW programs and provides a comparative analysis which identifies some clear patterns of performance. Section III uses this analysis to propose a set of changes in the policies under which FFW programs operate that would improve their developmental impact. It also reviews the existing organizational arrangements for implementing programs

through multiple public and private organizations in the U.S. and the recipient countries to see how much change is realistic. Section IV focuses on how to improve FFW operations in the field. Specifically, it establishes guidelines for improving the design of future FFW programs. Section V examines some issues that will be important in the future for FFW programs. The conclusions are contained in Section VI.

Food for Work, like any development strategy, is difficult to put into practice, its outome always in doubt until the end. This paper suggests improvements in design, management, policies, and incentives. These must be matched by selection of appropriate people to carry out the tasks: attributes such as entrepreneurship, leadership, and risk taking are essential to the success of thousands of FFW projects all over the world. The name of the Caritas participant in the evaluation of the FFW program in the Dominican Republic was Indiana Jones de Rincon. Perhaps what is needed are more third-world Indiana Joneses!

II. An Analysis of Current Programs

A. Magnitudes and Purposes

In the USAID annual Congressional presentation, Food for Peace is represented as an integral part of U.S. international assistance strategy. The Food for Peace Act (PL 480) has three subtitles authorizing different types of food assistance. Under Title II of this Act, the U.S. donates food, through the U.S. private voluntary organizations (PVOs) and the World Food Program, for humanitarian and development purposes.* In fiscal year 1984, the FFW component of Title II amounted to approximately 238,500 metric tons of commodities valued at $93.5 million. FFW programs were implemented at approximately 50,000 project sites in 49 countries, the number varying from 700 in Burkina Faso to 14,000 in India, where FFW commodities reached almost 700,000 recipients in 1984. The

TABLE 1

Food for Work: Value and Quantity of Commodities Approved 1979-1984

	Value in $ Millions	Metric tons of Commodities
1979	106.7	483,045
1980	69.2	291,546
1981	110.2	426,056
1982	76.6	317,886
1983	79.6	403,467
1984	93.5	425,618

Source: USAID Congressional Presentations 1979 through 1982. 1983 and 1984 data provided by USAID Bureau of Food for Peace and Voluntary Assistance.

* In this section data for: 1) U.S. PVOs; 2) the WFP's total (U.S. and non-U.S. contributions) program and; 3) the U.S. total contribution to FFW through PVOs and its share of WFP totals, are cited. The reader should note carefully which data are used.

value of resources allocated, which in recent years has varied between $75 and $100 million annually, and the dispersion of activity over so many communities makes FFW programs a potentially important activity for local level development.

These food commodities are distributed by either the WFP or U.S. private voluntary agencies. The WFP receives contributions from member nations annually in the form of commodities and money for the FFW programs it sponsors. The U.S. is its largest contributor: Table 2 shows that 44% of the U.S.' 1984 contribution of commodities for FFW went to the WFP. Table 3 shows how U.S. PVOs and the WFP allocated commodities among regions in 1984 and the number of countries in each region in which programs were carried out. From these tables some interesting facts emerge. In 1984 the value of the WFP's FFW programs was $188 million (including a U.S. contribution valued at approximately $41 million), almost four times as large as the U.S. PVOs', whose programs were valued at $53 million. The WFP had a little more than twice as many country programs, an indication that WFP country programs were about twice as large as PVOs'

Both the U.S. PVOs and the WFP concentrated more than half their programs in Asia. There is good reason for this: traditionally Asian countries have been the location of large scale unemployment. These countries also have traditions of labor intensive local construction and relatively more homogeneous populations than do the other regions. It was in India, China, and Bangladesh that large scale public works and FFW programs got their start. These countries are today the location of the largest FFW programs, receiving 58% of WFP's total and 69% of the PVOs' FFW commodities.* Next on the WFP's priority list comes Africa

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* The program in the Peoples Republic of China is supported by the WFP. It does not use U.S. donated commodities for this program. The U.S. PVOs have no FFW program there. Both WFP and PVOs have large programs in India and Bangladesh.

TABLE 2

Value of U.S.-contributed FFW Commodities by Region and Agency
(1984)

REGION	PVOs	WFP	TOTAL
Near East	$ 3,318,800	$ 513,000	$ 3,831,800
Latin America	14,566,900	6,390,000	20,795,900
Africa	4,866,900	15,163,300	20,030,200
Asia	30,048,000	18,818,000	48,866,000
	$52,800,600	$40,723,300	$93,523,900

Source: Data provided by USAID, Office of Food for Peace and Voluntary Cooperation.

TABLE 3
Comparison of U.S. PVOs' and WFP's Allocation of FFW Resources Between Regions*
(by Quantity of Commodities)
(1984)

REGION	PVOs			WFP		
	Metric Tons Approved	Percent	Country Programs	Metric Tons Approved	Percent	Country Programs
Near East	11,636	5%	2	102,839	12%	8
Latin America	45,481	19%	7	43,115	5%	13
Africa	16,589	7%	12	215,840	25%	27
Asia	164,791	69%	3	487,576	58%	9
Total	238,497		24	849,410		57

Source: PVO data provided by USAID, Office of Food for Peace and Voluntary Cooperation. WFP data from telex dated 9/4/85 from Charles Paolillo of WFP to Judith Gilmore, USAID.

which receives 25% of the FFW allocations. The Near East follows with 12%, then Latin America with 5%. In contrast, the PVOs send 19% of their program resources to Latin America, 7% to Africa and 5% to the Near East. This may change, however, in 1985. Although official figures are not yet available, it is clear that the needs of Africa are receiving higher priority from both the WFP and the U.S. PVOs.

While almost all parties agree that FFW recipient figures function as estimates at best, a cursory glance suggests some general patterns. Of the 11.5 million people employed annually on US commodity supported FFW projects over the period 1979-1984 (see Table 4), more than 75% were in Asia, concentrated in Bangladesh, India, and Indonesia. While the number of FFW recipients in the Near East declined from over one million in 1979 to approximately 400,000 in 1983 and the figures for Latin America and Africa remained largely unchanged, Asia showed a rise of one million--an 8% increase during the five-year period. Asia currently has more FFW recipients than the rest of the world combined. These figures raise questions as to how the PVOs allocate FFW resources. Africa, the continent experiencing the most serious food shortages and the only one with declining food production per capita, received only 7% of U.S. PVO FFW resources. The fact that the location of programs correlates more closely with existing PVO programs than with development needs tends to suggest that existing operations and targets of opportunity are the basis for allocating resources rather than a larger development strategy. It will be interesting to see how much this has changed in 1985.

The ten countries that received the largest amounts of FFW food commodities as determined by the commodity value in dollars are ranked in Table 5. Here again, the figures raise important questions. The average value of the commodity

TABLE 4

Recipients of US Supplied Commodities on Food for Work Programs by Region 1979-1984*

	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984
NEAR EAST						
FFW Recipients	1,195,000	769,400	534,100	547,800	376,100	244,100
Region as a % of total FFW	8%	5%	4%	4%	3%	2%
LATIN AMERICA						
FFW Recipients	1,945,500	1,669,100	1,779,500	1,958,100	1,531,200	1,791,600
Region as a % of total FFW	14%	12%	12%	14%	11%	15%
AFRICA						
FFW Recipients	1,292,800	1,474,000	1,475,700	1,167,700	1,232,300	1,161,000
Region as a % of total FFW	9%	10%	10%	8%	9%	10%
ASIA						
FFW Recipients	9,717,800	10,626,300	11,181,800	10,638,600	10,745,700	8,401,200
Region as a % of total FFW	69%	73%	75%	74%	77%	73%
GRAND TOTAL	14,152,050	14,539,600	14,971,100	14,312,200	13,885,300	11,597,900

Source: Data provided by USAID, Bureau of Food for Peace and Voluntary Assistance

* Includes both private voluntary organizations and WFP programs supported by U.S. commodities.

Table 5

Comparison of Ten Largest Food for Work Programs

By Commodity Value, Recipients, and Value per Recipient

(FY 1984)

COUNTRY	COMMODITY VALUE	RECIPIENTS	VALUE PER RECIPIENT (in US $)
1. India	13,882,400	691,000	20.09
2. Bangladesh	13,055,600	*5,000,000	2.61*
3. Peru	8,323,200	408,100	20.45
4. Indonesia	3,110,000	134,100	23.02
5. Morocco	2,910,300	100,000	29.10
6. Bolivia	2,801,100	80,000	35.01
7. Lesotho	1,981,800	57,000	34.77
8. Haiti	1,250,700	77,500	16.14
9. Dominican Republic	923,000	72,000	12.82
10. Ruanda	868,200	22,500	38.59

Source: Data provided by USAID, Bureau of Food for Peace and Voluntary Assistance

*The recipient figures for Bangladesh appear to be inaccurate (making the value per recipient figures inaccurate as well). This same pattern existing in official 1983 figures as well. (Figures for years prior to 1983 were not examined.)

wages received by a worker on a FFW project is $7.75 per year. If the suspect figures for Bangladesh are excluded, the average value worldwide rises to $20.93. In India, the largest program, the average annual wage was $20.09 per recipient; in Bangladesh, the second largest, a mere $2.61 per recipient per year (an official but highly suspect figure). In Ruanda workers received the highest annual wage of $38.59. While Bangladesh received five times the value of commodities received by Bolivia, the sixth largest program and another of the poorest nations, the PVOs in Bangladesh provided for 63 times the number of people as did the PVOs in Bolivia. However, those who did work in Bolivia received $35 annually as opposed to $2.50 in Bangladesh. These figures raise the question of when should the number of people benefitting be maximized and when should income for the poor be the objective? The resolution of this issue seems to depend more on the implementing PVO than on the country situation.*

While these figures show that FFW earnings can be a supplemental source of income for participants, the variations in income revealed in Table 5 raise important questions about worker productivity and about the levels of recipients' welfare. What is the minimum annual income supplement necessary to improve the welfare of a worker, particularly if he or she has a family?

B. Characteristics of FFW Programs

An effective assessment of FFW programs requires an understanding of a number of underlying facts about the nature of these programs. Disagreement and controversy surround them. There are some very vague concepts about the nature of the resources and activities involved. This section defines the nature of these programs and rectifies some of the confusion or misconceptions that arise from them.

*The differences in the value of annual commodity wages per worker range from $3.02 annually per participant in one agency's FFW program to $35.26 annually in another agency's. Details are provided in Table 4 of the Appendix.

First, it should be recognized that the food commodities allocated to FFW programs are a real resource that should not be dismissed, as some critics do, as surplus disposal that benefits the US government. Whatever the source, food has an established market value that can be used to accomplish real developmental goals or can be wasted. The only difference between Title II food commodities and cash is that cash is more easily traded. For purposes of U.S. agricultural policy, food commodities are purchased. What happens to those commodities subsequently does not affect that policy. FFW programs can put to productive use to support development activities a resource that might otherwise not be available.

FFW programs exist because these food commodities are available. Unless they have a negative impact, such as creating dependence on outside resources, creating an agricultural disincentive, or doing physical damage like creating waterlogging or promoting erosion (issues to be addressed specifically at a later point), FFW programs must be considered a positive contribution to development.* On this basis it can be stated that if low income workers do get paid, if community assets do get created, the FFW program is a net contribution to development.

Second, FFW programs adhere to no single model or pattern. Aside from the common characteristic that they use food as a resource, the programs vary enormously. What follows is an attempt to define the range of programs called FFW, to suggest the diversity of such programs and to point to the difficulty of drawing extensive conclusions and generalizations on a comparative basis. While this flexibility enhances the potential of FFW programs by allowing them to vary

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* It is important to recognize that the complementary resources for transporting, storing, and managing food do have an important opportunity cost equal to the value of development funds in the country concerned.

to meet local needs and conditions, it also makes the analyst's job more difficult.

Certain characteristics do set FFW programs apart from other Title II development programs. The most important of these are listed below.

i. Objectives: The presence of multiple objectives--often within a single project--makes it particularly difficult to evaluate the performance of FFW programs. Priorities among objectives are not always explicit and sometimes change over time. With multiple participants holding different objectives, this ambiguity may at times be necessary to hold together the coalition that cooperates in a FFW program. The range of objectives most commonly articulated are the following:

- Emergency disaster relief
- Employment creation
- Community asset or infrastructure creation
- Resource conservation and management
- Provision of nutritional assistance
- Buffering policy changes such as increases in food prices
- Promotion of agricultural development
- Political pacification and mobilization, particularly in urban areas
- Creation of community organizations

Most programs have one of the first three as a principal objective. Many programs start as emergency relief efforts but later change their objectives to emphasize employment creation and eventually asset creation. The establishment of explicit goals and priorities is crucial to the effective operation of programs. Section IV offers suggestions as to how to weigh the importance of alternative objectives.

ii. Duration: In thinking about duration it is important to distinguish between FFW country programs and location-specific projects carried out under those programs. FFW projects tend to be short term (1-2 years) in a single village or location. Resources are used to deal with an emergency or to create assets; rarely are they used for maintenance. FFW programs in a country may continue for much longer periods. There is little evidence that thought is given in designing FFW programs to issues of duration.

iii. Activities: FFW programs focus on labor-intensive activities. In the 18 countries whose experience provided the data for this assessment, FFW projects were undertaken in ten different sectors: agriculture, education, energy, health, housing and community services, natural resource conservation, resettlement, small enterprise, transportation, and water supply and sanitation. Most numerous were projects in road construction, irrigation, building construction and reforestation, in that order. The wide range of activities suggests the flexibility offered by FFW programs--but such diversity also carries dangers.

iv. Distribution of Benefits: One of the strengths of FFW programs is that they are self-targeting in the construction phase. Since unskilled manual labor is hard and the wages relatively low, only those who are very poor and needy (whether temporarily or more permanently) will accept such employment. If wages are set at reasonable rates, the benefits of FFW projects thus tend to flow to the poorest people during the construction phase. However, once assets (such as roads or irrigation or electrical systems) are created, they tend to benefit disproportionately those who already hold assets in the form of land and capital. Influencing the flow of benefits is an important element of FFW project design.

v. Participation: FFW programs are initiated and frequently designed outside the community in which the work is done, while specific projects are often planned and managed in large measure by the community. The use of local communities' knowledge and resources can be a real asset in the design and implementation of FFW programs.

vi. Public or private? FFW program resources, both food and logistic support, come from public sources, but the initiative and program design come from private voluntary agencies usually working through local private agencies or local governments which implement the programs. Perhaps more important than whether the FFW sponsor is public or private is the nature of the assets created in a specific FFW program, since whether those assets are public or private determines who receives the primary benefits of the program. A rural road is clearly a public good, while an irrigation channel or certain types of reforestation on private land are private goods.

These characteristics distinguish FFW programs from other Title II programs. They also represent important variables that will influence how they perform and who benefits.

C. Analysis of Experience

An analysis of FFW program evaluations provides extensive evidence of the value of such programs in promoting local level development. The variations in the nature of the contributions are great, but the positive contributions are widespread. Most FFW programs mobilize communities to build local infrastructure, to develop village organizations, or to create agricultural assets that enhance rural incomes. In India, there has been widespread improvement of agricultural infrastructure for small farmers, and in Peru, significant gains in rural road construction and reforestation in inaccessible

Andean communities. In Lesotho, rural tracks have been built and impoverished villages given incomes through employment. Dominican villages have been brought together to build community facilities and have formed local organizations that created new opportunities for agricultural credit and extension services. The evidence of the important development benefits of FFW programs contained in these evaluations is sufficient to justify the continuation of FFW programs. It also suggests steps that might be taken to further improve their performance.

THE QUESTION OF PRIORITIES. An analysis of FFW programs reveals a continuing ambivalence at USAID and in the implementing agencies about priorities among the objectives of FFW programs, demonstrated in the agencies' lack of clearly stated priorities and in the evaluations of their programs. The central question is: Should FFW programs give priority to short-term, quick acting programs intended to alleviate the worst inequities and sustain low-income groups until more adequate measures can be taken, or should they be designed as long-term development programs which create assets that generate increased income over time? Presumably, the trick is to discover how to combine these in the right mix for a particular situation. This uncertainty about objectives is reflected in the statements of senior State Department officials who must approve any change in policy or objectives of FFW programs. They tend to classify all Title II programs as "humanitarian" and insist that the primary purpose is to help the needy more than to promote development. This view reflects the language of PL 480, which states that commodities may be used "to combat malnutrition, especially in children, to promote economic and community development in friendly developing areas and for needy persons . . ." (p. 455).*

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*United States Congress, Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954 as Amended (P.L. 480) (1981).

The Act further specifies that "assistance to needy persons under this title shall be directed, insofar as practicable, toward community and other self help activities designed to alleviate the causes of and need for such assistance, "and that "priority shall be given to the extent feasible to those who are suffering from malnutrition by using means such as (A) giving priority within food programs for pre-school children to malnourished children and (B) giving priority to the poorest regions of countries" (pp. 456-7).*

It is clear from these excerpts that those who emphasize the "humanitarian" nature of the FFW programs, who urge that priority be given to emergency assistance and feeding the neediest, can find strong justification for their position in the legislation. However, this focus on the "assistance to needy persons" at times comes in conflict with the legislative mandate to support activities designed "to alleviate the causes of need for such assistance." Given this ambivalence, even evaluators are uncertain as to how to weigh objectives. For example, evaluations of FFW programs in Indonesia and Lesotho give comparatively more attention to the direct employment aspects of FFW programs; those for Peru, Bangladesh and the Dominican Republic put more emphasis on the creation of community benefits.

AD HOCISM: THE ABSENCE OF STRATEGY. As already indicated, many programs have their origins in relief programs or in situations in which short-run action is called for. This has been true in India, Bangladesh, Peru and Haiti, where programs began in response to specific emergencies or short-term priorities. Usually programs expand from this base in response to new needs and opportunities.

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*United States Congress, Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954 as Amended (P.L. 480)(1981).

Most programs do, nevertheless, appear to have a basic focus or thrust, although, interestingly, this focus is almost never articulated. A listing of types of projects carried out in individual countries shows that in fact many countries' FFW programs have had a dominant theme. These themes are listed in Table 6. The important point is that these themes are more a result of circumstance than of planning. The Peru evaluation effectively states what appears to be a much more universal problem:

> Our finding here is, first that FFW on many occasions is inefficiently used as a means of feeding the hungry rather than formulating community development. Thus, the ultimate value of the work to be done in a particular project may not even be considered in the decision to initiate it.
>
> Second, PVOs tend to view projects individually as they come up, rather than in the context of a community or region. .
>
> A large percentage of the FFW projects, given local conditions, do not address issues of basic importance to actual development criteria. (Peru Executive Summary, pp. 6-7)

In other words, the availability of the food resources to feed needy people is the motivating factor; projects are undertaken ad hoc, even though they tend to cluster in certain sectors. What is lacking is a strategy that links activities together to achieve a larger impact on the community.

Until the issue of basic strategy is resolved, the ambiguities that currently surround FFW programs will continue. The evidence from observers and evaluations suggests it will not be possible to use the food resource effectively until the choice between feeding the poor and providing for longer-term development is resolved. There is compelling documentation that emergency relief programs help people survive in the short run but do little to prevent the recurrence of emergency needs (as the current food crisis in Africa illustrates so well). More lasting solutions to the problems of the neediest may well come through assistance that promotes food production and development

in the long term. The evidence from Peru and elsewhere suggests that the benefits of FFW programs that focus on feeding can be very transitory. Such FFW programs are doing good, but they are not doing development and thus as they stand are not meeting their potential.

TABLE 6

General Themes of FFW Programs

1. Bangladesh - Off-season employment and rural roads and embankments
2. Dominican Republic - Wide range of agricultural activities including work groups, fencing, weeding, rabbit raising, land clearing, peanut and tomato growing
3. Ethiopia - Heavily focused on conservation, erosion control, reforestation
4. Guatemala - Rural community development emphasis on community buildings and facilities
5. Honduras - Forestry development
6. India - Agriculture
7. Indonesia - Agriculture and Resettlement
8. Kenya - Heavily focused in semi-arid areas -- settlement of nomads, water supply and community facilities in these areas
9. Lesotho - Heavy emphasis on conservation, rural roads, paths, in remote areas
10. Peru - About equally urban and rural. Urban programs emphasize construction, housing, community building. Rural programs focus on road construction, reforestation

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LOW PRODUCTIVITY. The evaluations of FFW programs give ample evidence of valuable projects completed, and of contributions to community welfare. However, it is less clear that they are done as efficiently as possible. One issue that is of particular salience is that of labor productivity. Although the opportunity cost of labor used in FFW programs is quite low, the almost

universally low labor productivity in FFW programs is still a cause for concern since it is attributable to factors that can and should be rectified:

+ The frequent assumption that FFW programs are temporary and are intended only to reach those who can get no other employment results in the setting of wage rates below current market rates for the communities in which the programs are located.

+ Workers on FFW projects are often malnourished and thus lack the physical strength or the incentive to work hard.

+ In some projects, workers are recruited on a self-help basis and receive only a mid-day meal and the same problem of incentives exists.

+ Management skills are in very short supply in countries where FFW programs are implemented. Yet agencies generally rely on communities for project management. Evaluations reveal almost no efforts to train local managers or to provide them with any guidelines that would enhance their capacity to implement FFW programs. In the absence of such skills, labor productivity is inevitably low.

+ Non-food resources are often absent. The evaluations and other evidence suggest that no more than 75% of FFW expenditures represent labor costs, and that frequently the figure is closer to 60%. This means that unless arrangements are made to cover from other sources the costs of other inputs--cement, culvert pipes, stone, wood or numerous other materials--such inputs may be foregone. This means that workers do not have necessary tools and equipment. In some cases tools are obtained through local contributions, but that is often a matter of luck. People with needed technical skills may not be available because skilled workers will not work for food wages. Thus surveying

is not done, and carpentry or masonry work is performed by the untrained. The result is always poorly constructed facilities.

+ Worker turnover is very high. A worker who earns only a few dollars a year on a FFW project (as the data reveal is often the case) cannot be working more than a day or two. One has to ask about the level of worker productivity on projects where the turnover is so high. While it is clearly not desirable to have a fixed long-term labor crew on FFW programs, too much turnover can also be bad.

LACK OF MAINTENANCE. As troubling as the questions about labor productivity are the many examples of low returns resulting from inattention to the need for maintenance of completed FFW projects. Judging from the evaluations, FFW programs are generally viewed as construction programs and provisions for maintenance are therefore rarely included. Instances of FFW facilities falling into disrepair and becoming useless abound. The exclusion of provisions for maintenance is inappropriate, given that it is generally more labor intensive than construction. Provision for maintenance would ensure continued incomes to the project for FFW communities and the continued productivity of the assets created. The main reason for this shortcoming may be that the organizations managing programs do not expect to have a continuing presence in the community over time. However, making provision for maintenance in the program design would both promote the employment objective and make the assets created more productive.

PVOS AND THE WFP COMPARED. A series of initial comparisons between the FFW operations of the PVOs and the WFP have been undertaken. The partial evidence available suggests some interesting differences. The WFP as a U.N. agency may have greater access to complementary resources and stronger links to govern-

ments. It also appears to put considerable emphasis on macro planning and country program design. The PVOs are small private agencies collaborating with other private agencies. They have much weaker links to governments, and less capacity for national level planning. On the other hand, their links to local agencies and communities give them greater access to community level organizations, which should make information on local conditions and mobilization of participants easier to achieve. It would be interesting to pursue this comparison to see if these really represent comparative advantages. If so, what is the impact of these factors on FFW program performance? Such a comparison is beyond the scope of this study but might provide a useful basis for further study.

III. Proposed Policy Changes for Improved Food for Work Performance

Policies established by USAID provide the framework within which FFW programs function. To the degree that they provide direction or incentives, such policies influence the performance of FFW programs. Following Section II's examination of the current performance of FFW programs, this paper turns to a consideration of policy changes that might make FFW programs more effective.

i. Establish FFW priorities. The most important step needed to strengthen the performance of FFW programs is to establish clearly and at the highest level priorities among the various goals. This may require Congressional action to remove the ambivalence between humanitarian and developmental goals. To achieve maximum impact, FFW programs must be directed clearly toward long term self-sustaining development through the labor intensive creation of community assets. This will not mean that the humanitarian goals of improved welfare for needy people will not be met. On the contrary, in most cases the goal of human welfare will be better met in both the short and long term if programs are focused on self-sustaining development and not just on short term assistance.

Some critics charge that FFW programs create dependency. When they are *ad hoc* and focused strictly on feeding people, they may indeed. If, on the other hand, their objective is to create facilities that generate new incomes, they will be a means for creating independence from poverty and outside assistance.

The strength of FFW programs is that they can provide food and incomes for the needy while they are creating assets that can generate continued income flows. The initial report of a study still underway of the impact of FFW in one village in Kenya concludes that, "The major beneficiaries were the lowest income groups of the communities. As can be expected, all low income families did not

participate in FFW. Most of those who did 'escaped' from the lowest income groupings . . . Because food aid relaxes capital constraints of farm producers, it can contribute directly to capital formation and permanently higher incomes of the poorest households which have a land base for production" (Deaton, p. 11). However, when programs are operated for the short term feeding goal without concern for productive, efficient use of the food resource as an investment toward development, the potential for long term development is lost.

A focus on long term development also requires that the view that some hold of food as surplus to be disposed of be abandoned and that in its place be adopted a view of food as a resource to be used as efficiently as financial resources. The changes in policy that are recommended in this section will have their full impact--FFW can meet its full potential--only if such a clarification of purpose exists in everyone's minds.

ii. Fund complementary inputs. FFW projects are labor intensive, but almost any project requires some inputs other than unskilled labor--basic tools, materials, and skilled personnel--to be effective. Labor productivity can be greatly enhanced by the use of basic tools, whether the task be earth moving or building construction. When workers cannot provide their own tools, the ability of the project to provide them is crucial. Material inputs are also inevitably needed: cement, bricks, culvert or other pipe, reinforcing bars, roofing materials, and so forth, are part of any project. And skilled personnel, such as surveyors, bricklayers/masons, or carpenters, are required; the demand for their skills is substantial, and they are not likely to agree to work for food wages. Many program evaluations (such as those from Lesotho and India) suggest that FFW programs are weakened or inefficiently run because food commodities may

only be used for wages, leaving no funds for tools, equipment, materials, or technical skills needed for the projects.

The WFP programs all provide for other funding to supplement the food resource. In many PVO programs, the assumption is that tools, materials and skilled workers will be provided through local contributions, but such contributions are often unavailable. Recipient communities are poor, it is frequently impossible to obtain the necessary complementary inputs through contributions, and local revenues are scarce. Local councils are rarely granted taxing or money-raising powers to do more than fund their own responsibilities. When local communities are expected to provide complementary inputs for FFW programs, they almost always fail to meet the full requirement. When such inputs are not available, productivity usually falls and shortcuts are taken--road sites are not surveyed, inadequate cement is used, or masonry work is carried out by workers who lack the proper training. The result is the low productivity that is often criticized in evaluations of FFW programs.

Given the necessity for complementary inputs and the inability of most communities to provide them through local contributions, another source must be found. Estimates of the potential labor input for various types of projects are contained in Table 7. These figures are based on wage payments as a percentage of total rural works programs expenditures in 15 programs worldwide (Thomas and Hook, Table III-5, p 34). These figures show that the maximum expenditure for labor was 75%, and the average was 52%. The recent evaluation of the Haiti FFW program found that in the 17 projects examined, the non-food costs ranged from 0% to 88% and in the average were 77% of project costs. (Haiti p. IV-19). In the same report, the author recommended that in the future 50% of wages be paid in cash. (p. V-1) Since a standard figure is needed for policy purposes, <u>it is</u>

conservatively suggested that at least 25% of the total value of the program be available in cash for non-wage goods. One of three options is recommended to achieve this: i) that USAID make available support funds equal to 25% of the total value of the food commodities; ii) that such a percentage be taken from host government contribution; or iii) that 25% of the commodities be sold commercially in the recipient country to obtain funds to purchase complementary inputs.

Alternative iii) seems the most desirable: It has the advantage that it cuts the cost of transportation from the port to the FFW project site and allows commodities to be sold in urban areas where they are much less likely to affect local food preferences. Under such a policy proceeds from food sales equal to 25% of the cost of the project should then be established as a project fund in support of any activities undertaken.

iii. Redirect USAID's Incentives to PVOs. One of this author's initial assumptions, growing out of many years' familiarity with rural development and rural employment programs, was that the complexities of food commodity transportation, storage and distribution would pose serious problems in FFW program management, calling on scarce items, such as railroad wagons and warehouses, and overtaxing the countries' capacities and facilities, particularly in the rural areas where FFW programs are frequently implemented. My presumption was that this problem would be so serious that the only solution would be to monetize the program. Surprisingly, the evidence from almost all the evaluations was that food commodities were managed very well: In most countries, they arrived in the right place at the right time and with losses kept within reasonable limits. Commodity management has proven to be stronger than program management.

The explanation for this is that as the FFW system is currently structured, USAID's incentives, both positive and negative, to the implementing PVOs have placed priority on control and management of commodities rather than on program output. Both reports to USAID and U.S. government audits focus far more often on commodity management than on program evaluations. As a result, PVOs perceive that full accounting to the U.S. government for commodities, more than program performance, is what will determine their continuing access to Title II commodities. Other regulations, such as the obliteration of markings on containers after commodity use, similarly emphasize the priority given to commodity control. If FFW is to become a real resource for development, the incentive structure must be changed to strengthen the development aspect of the work.

The first step in that process is for USAID to establish a clear order of priority between maximizing long-term development and short-term employment and relief. The two are not mutually exclusive, but the present ambivalence must be eliminated. If development is to be the priority—as I argue it should be--USAID should discontinue programs that undermine the development effectiveness of FFW (such as programs in which the primary justification is political) as well as many of the emergency relief programs that have little development impact. The agency should incorporate FFW programs into Country Development Strategy Statements and make them a regular part of Mission activities, with the Missions according them the same importance as other programs and collaborating much more closely with planning and implementing agencies. USAID oversight should shift from commodity management to program effectiveness, and rewards should be provided for good performance. A comprehensive review of food aid policies should be undertaken and policy

changes made along the lines suggested in this paper, such as allowing the sale of food commodities to finance the sale of complementary resources.

iv. Improve FFW programs that evolve from emergency relief. The fact that many FFW programs have their origins in emergency relief situations has sometimes led to serious problems in the ensuing FFW programs. In an emergency, food commodities are distributed as charitable relief to all in need, without requiring any prior work and not as a form of compensation. The result is that the recipient community views the commodities as free goods. If the rules are changed to require work in exchange for food, the recipients quite understandably feel aggrieved that they now have to work for what they had been receiving free. This establishes a psychology which encourages people to do as little as possible in return for the food, and it certainly does not engender the kind of attitude that provides an incentive to work at project activities for the community good.

The administrative arrangements for emergency programs are usually made in haste; the goal is to get food to the disaster site and to those in need as quickly as possible. Relief is, by definition, externally planned and implemented without local participation. Accounting, development, and even rehabilitation give way to the higher priority goal of saving lives. This is a laudable and essential function; unless people survive emergencies, one cannot talk of development. But relief and development are two different things, and relief is generally not a good foundation for a constructive development program.

FFW is nevertheless a unique instrument for helping people make the transition from a disaster back to long-term development. It is quickly available, it brings food to an area where there is a food shortage, and it

provides the resources needed to allow people to reconstruct and return to their old or perhaps improved patterns of livelihood. It may therefore be useful to consider how FFW programs might be used productively in the wake of emergency situations.

The following suggestions proceed from the assumption that most emergency situations are characterized by food shortage which in turn leads to more widespread loss of incomes in service and marketing activities that depend on agricultural production. This is particularly true of drought and famine situations. The first set of proposals deals with the mechanics of program implementation, the second with innovative activities that might be carried out:

MECHANICS OF PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION. If there has been some type of relief feeding, it is imperative that the FFW program be completely disassociated from that activity if possible.

+ First, and most important, a set of work norms should be established that insures that the program is actually producing needed assets and that labor productivity is high.

+ Second, the location should be different from the location of relief feeding sites. This can be a real advantage. If the affected population has fled to camps, a FFW program located in its home community provides an incentive to return to the land and an economic means to make that viable.

+ Third, program planning and decision-making should be as thoroughly rooted in the community as possible, to help insure that priority needs are met and to help reestablish the functioning community.

+ Fourth, there must be a credible assurance to the community that the program will last. Only in this way can it serve to attract people back to locations and occupations that were abandoned when they could no longer support

acceptable life standards. Working through local communities can help accomplish this, for if community leaders are involved along with outside agencies in making assurances of longer duration, the promise will carry more credibility.

+ Fifth, there might be at least 50% monetization and cash payment of wages, to enable workers to pay for goods and services, and therefore to help reestablish the economic life of the community. The cash infusion in a local economy that has stagnated will have an important multiplier effect and will stimulate the supply of local goods annd services.

INNOVATIVE ACTIVITIES. Another series of activities that are outside the realm of typical existing FFW activities might also be particularly effective.

+ First, the FFW program could provide tools which workers could then take to their farms to use there. In a drought or natural disaster many farmers lose all tools and animals needed for farming. If these could be replaced by the FFW program the benefits would be great.

+ Second, the FFW program could provide some payment in seed grain and thus allow farmers to replant. Seed stocks are almost invariably lost in droughts; replenishing them would allow productive agriculture to resume.

+ Third, FFW could be extended to cover service activities--to pay blacksmiths or traders or to reestablish transport, all of which are essential services to agriculture--and thereby make a major contribution to reestablishing the economy. The use of partially cash wages will also contribute to this, but innovative project design that goes beyond the standard payment for unskilled workers (as WFP projects have sometimes done) would contribute in important ways to the rehabilitation of disaster areas.

+ Fourth, the establishment of food banks with FFW resources might be a further hedge against the recurrence of disaster. A FFW program might build up the initial deposits of such a bank by contributing food grains as a deposit for each worker. The actual storage facility could also be constructed under FFW auspices.

This is only a partial list of innovative activities that might be undertaken with FFW resources in emergency situations. The critical thing is that imaginative steps must be taken to implement FFW programs in the wake of emergencies so that they do not become give-away programs but realize their potential as effective long term rehabilitation programs.

v. Reconsider the place of self-help in FFW. Without self-help, effective development is not possible. Development can never be "given" solely by government or by outside aid. External assistance can provide a stimulus to local activities and remove bottlenecks, but to be effective it must release the energies and resources of the people concerned. The recognition of this fact has made self-help an important and eminently appropriate principle of development.

Aid agencies should, however, reconsider the ways self-help has been applied, for the principle as applied to FFW has come under attack from two quite different directions. Some critics have focused on the fact that self-help has been applied more often to community projects targeting the very poor than to industrial development projects or large infrastructure projects such as dams, highways, and ports, even though these poor communities are those least able to contribute to their own development. To compound the felony, requirements for self-help contributions from a village generally take the form of labor contributions imposed on the development project workers. This amounts

to a form of regressive taxation because the poorest members of the village are those who are required to make the contribution. Their incomes are so low that any income supplements they receive in exchange for hard physical labor must be used to pay for daily necessities.

Village-level projects should provide communities with the resources with which to begin a production cycle that will break the grip of poverty and make it possible to generate income and new resources at the local level. In such circumstances, self-help requirements are likely to obstruct rather than foster progress toward this end. If there must be local contributions, these should instead take the form of user charges paid by those who benefit from the assets created by the FFW program. Only those whose incomes are enhanced by the project are in a position to repay part of the costs.

A quite different concern expressed by other critics is that FFW programs undermine traditional systems of community action based on the voluntary work of community members; if an FFW program pays people to do what they have done voluntarily, they believe, it may destroy local initiative and defeat the spirit of self-help. Such traditions should not conflict with FFW programs. Community action meets certain needs for community facilities, but it is neither a way to assist low income groups (in fact in most cases it calls on the lowest income groups to create facilities that benefit the better off elements) nor the basis for developing local infrastructure. The latter is too large a job to be done by voluntary labor. In the process of modernization, local infrastructure must be created by paid labor on a regular and systematic basis.

vi. Assess the impact on food production. A major concern about food aid programs in general has been that the availability of low-cost food aid will

drive down the price of locally produced products, thus keeping consumer prices low but producing a powerful disincentive effect on domestic production. While this may occur with large-scale PL 480 imports, the small size of FFW programs generally militates against the likelihood that they will have this type of macro impact on prices. In countries with FFW programs, a comparison of national food production with the amount of FFW imports suggests that FFW will provide no macro disincentives.

Another problem is potentially serious, however. FFW commodities tend to be high value, high prestige commodities such as wheat, corn, rice, butter, oil, and dry milk, which in some FFW project locations are not part of the local diet and are not produced locally. There is already a tendency in much of Africa to devalue locally grown crops (sorghum, millet, yams, etc.) which can be produced domestically at a reasonable price in favor of prestige foods which can only be produced domestically at high cost or imported. This trend has very serious implications for African agriculture. Unfortunately, of the evaluations of FFW programs, only the Ethiopia report addresses this issue, so it is difficult to determine whether it is a problem that occurs with any frequency.

Designers of FFW programs must be certain that by importing prestige foods into areas where local commodities have formed the basis of the diet, the trend to high cost food commodities will not be accelerated. In the communities where FFW programs are carried out, the availability of these commodities may both drive down the price of local commodities and accelerate the demand for prestige foods. This would be a very negative side effect of a FFW program.

This is not a problem in many of the countries with FFW programs, but precautions need to be taken to safeguard against it by having USAID missions

certify that it will not occur in any area proposed for a FFW program before approving a new program.

vii. Determine the commodity content of wages. The importance of wage rates is clear: they establish both the incentive to do difficult physical labor and determine the magnitude of benefit flows that go to the poor who are the workers and beneficiaries in FFW programs. Setting the commodity content of FFW wages is a complex process. First, there must be an assurance that a proposed commodity is acceptable to the local taste; otherwise it will be resold in local markets at a price far below its commercial value. Second, a decision must be made as to whether commodity wages are to be established at market wage rates or below, taking into account, when appropriate, local traditions of wages for community projects (as in Indonesia or Peru). Third, the nutritional needs of workers must be calculated. Nutritional studies in India and Bangladesh suggest that an adult male engaged in hard physical activity requires 3,000 to 3,500 calories per day. Cereals, both wheat and rice, provide about 100 calories per ounce. As a result, a worker needs roughly one kilogram of cereals per day. However, it is obviously necessary to pay workers more than just the food they consume, both to provide a work incentive and to improve the nutritional standards of the entire family.* As a result, two to three kilos of foodgrain per worker per day has become an international standard. Some programs have paid less to women than to men for equal amounts of work, a practice that should be stopped. Estimates from Bangladesh, for example, suggest that while women can move only about two-thirds as much earth per day as male workers, their caloric requirements when doing hard labor are close to those of men. This is

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* L.C. Chen, "An Analysis of Per Capita Food Grain Availability in Bangladesh: A Systematic Approach to Food Planning," Bangladesh Development Review, April, 1975.

partly because many women of working age are breastfeeding their children. Opportunity costs for women workers may also be higher since many of their work responsibilities, such as child care, food preparation, and home maintenance, are not seasonal. It is strongly recommended that the same wages be paid to male and female workers in FFW programs. This recommendation is also contained in several evaluation reports.

By altering policies and changing the climate of incentives to FFW program sponsors, USAID can do a great deal to transform FFW programs into effective development mechanisms.

viii. Recognize Organizational Limits on Changes in Food for Work. The purpose of this study of FFW programs is to improve their performance through changes in policy, design and management. The drive to effect such improvements must be tempered, however, by a recognition of the limits imposed by the complicated organizational setting needed to implement FFW programs. Many organizations with differing goals and from very different cultural environments collaborate in the FFW implementation process. In the southern Bihar State of India, for instance, the form the FFW program took was shaped by the collective objectives of a U.S. Congresswoman, a USAID Washington staff member, New York members of CRS, CRS and USAID representatives in New Delhi, Indian government officers in Delhi and Bihar and, in the project location, a village priest, a landlord and the recipients themselves (India evaluation).* These combinations of interests in programs are one of such programs' strengths; many diverse actors share an interest and a willingness to collaborate in the successful carrying

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* Further discussion of these problems can be found in almost every FFW evaluation report. See, for example, Indonesia, pp. 18-27; Philippines, p. 6; Upper Volta, pp. 63-5; Peru, Chapter III, etc.

out of FFW programs. At the same time, however, the delicate weaving of these interests into a working consensus limits the freedom of any one participant to change the system. In order to better understand this, it is useful to note that all of the following organizations play important roles in the implementation of FFW programs:

- US Department of Agriculture
- US Agency for International Development
- USAID Missions abroad
- US Voluntary Agencies (PVOs)
- PVO offices abroad
- Host country governments
- Foreign voluntary agencies
- Community institutions in areas implementing FFW programs

The need to integrate the very different objectives and capacities of all of these agencies in FFW programs suggests the complexity of the implementation process. Each has different reasons for participating, each has very different capabilities and, most important, all are participating voluntarily so that none has real control over any other.

In these circumstances, <u>change can be brought about only by negotiation or bargaining among actors in the process</u>. Given the number of participants and the complexity of their relationship, substantial and immediate change is not possible. Proposing sweeping changes or more complex systems at the local level to improve the quality of these programs thus makes little sense. It is easy to sit in Washington or Boston and prescribe changes that would be theoretically desirable, but any such suggestions must meet the test of what is realistically

possible in the actual operating environment of FFW programs in developing countries. Pressman and Wildavsky's cautionary note seems appropriate guidance in this situation. They comment:

> Separation from local politics and administration gives policy makers in the federal government a license to formulate ideal objectives; it may also give them license to formulate innovative ones, for the political and administrative costs of the innovations they conceive will be borne locally. They are free, much freer than local officials, to stand publicly for progress and high principle. But after formulating high principles, federal authors have to depend on local actors for implementation. (J. Pressman and A. Wildavsky, Implementation, p. 142.)

Similarly, recommendations in this study and policy directives from USAID-Washington will mean little if they are not in the interests and within the capabilities of local actors in other countries who will bear the responsibility for implementing programs and directives proposed here. For that reason, this paper tries to focus its suggestions on the initial program design formulated by U.S. PVOs, on limiting restrictions that curtail the capacity of local organizations, and on providing incentives through the FFW policy framework that are likely to improve the prospects for success.

When viewed in the light of multiple actors with differing interests, FFW programs are in fact remarkably efficient, for they are designed and implemented with a minimum of new management or accounting staff. Few development programs exist that do not create substantial new organizational structures with appropriate personnel. Those structures come at high cost in terms of financial and human resources and of program flexibility over time. That FFW programs do not create such structures is one of their great assets. But it also places substantial limits on the capacity to alter program performance.

Program design is one area where clear guidelines should help improve program performance. Therefore, we next look at what steps to take and what guidelines to establish in order to improve performance.

IV. Designing Improved Food for Work Programs*

The design of FFW programs has been left too much to chance: programs have been designed in an ad hoc manner rather than in accordance with a coordinated strategy. AID Missions have rarely played a role. PVO staff members have little or no specific training from which to guide such a process (it is encouraging to see CARE's guidelines for FFW which begin to fill this gap). The same is true for the staff of local agencies which bear primary responsibility for the implementation of programs. The positive element is that local councils and organizations have a great deal of detailed knowledge about the local situation which is often not included in development program plans, and which can be of great importance in the design of a successful program.

This section therefore suggests an approach to designing future FFW programs based on the lessons of experience. The starting point is to think about the three elements of a good program design: environment, or pre-existing economic, physical, social, political and other conditions; strategy, an overall plan that allows a program to achieve specific goals within a particular environment; and structure, which provides the organization and the process to carry out the strategy. Each of these is dealt with in turn.

A. ENVIRONMENT. A FFW program must be designed on the basis of full knowledge of conditions in the program area. Does substantial unemployment exist? Is it seasonal? What are the local wage rates? What is the economic

* This section generally focuses on the FFW programs of PVOs. This is because equivalent material on WFP procedures was not available to the author at the time this paper was written.

profile of the population? Is there a need for community infrastructure that will promote development? What organizational resources are available to implement the program? Are physical conditions appropriate for labor intensive construction? Who will gain the benefits of assets that can be created? Factors such as these in the program environment will affect performance in important ways, and the FFW program will in turn affect the environment.

+ The evidence from evaluations suggests that the existence of traditions of community action is one the most important preconditions for a successful FFW program. Such traditions harmonize well with the objectives of PVOs which tend to emphasize local initiative and community participation. There is a high correlation between traditional systems of community action, work, and compensation and successful FFW programs. FFW programs should be designed, therefore, to take maximum advantage of such traditions. Unlike development projects that have a very specific goal such as building a highway or feeding school children, or those such as MCH projects which work through homogeneous institutions (basically adaptations of a western model), FFW programs are successful (or not) in significant measure to the degree to which they are integrated with local traditions of community action. While this makes the task of project design more difficult, requiring planners to have a good knowledge of the program environment, it also increases the potential to build on and strengthen local institutions and community organizations.

The FFW programs in India have been far more successful than many because of a long tradition of active local governments and of having local governments organize infrastructure development works with community labor. Food work relief has a history that goes back to the beginning of the century. Employment programs, such as the national government's FFW program or the

Drought Prone Areas Program, which continue to be a basic part of the Government's development efforts, are built on foundations that go back long before independence. Similar traditions in Bangladesh provide that country with an institutional base that makes FFW programs part of a continuing tradition of community action and local labor-intensive works.

Examples of local traditions that affect the performance of FFW programs are numerous. In Indonesia, the FFW program incorporates the traditions of gotong royong (community self-help) and uses the related imbalan--a small incentive wage paid to participants in gotong royong projects which allows poorer members of the community to cover their family needs while they participate in gotong royong--and upah--a traditionally established wage rate for unskilled labor. The skillful use of these traditions is key to the success of the FFW program in Indonesia (see Indonesia, pp. 36-37, for a fuller explanation).

In the Dominican Republic, the integration of the FFW program with the convite traditional system of voluntary shared farm labor in return for food has been basic to much of the success of that program in strengthening local community organizations (Dominican Republic pp. 26-28). And in Peru, the tradition of republicas requires everyone to provide 6 to 12 days work annually on roads, while among the Aymara and Quechua populations in the Andes there is a long tradition of community self help (Peru, p. 6). In Kenya, the FFW program worked best where it was integrated with the harambee (literally "All pull together") village self-help programs (Kenya V-15, 27).

Where these traditions exist and can be incorporated into FFW programs, the latter are likely to be much more easily accepted and to function more effectively. The success of FFW programs that have incorporated such traditions

suggests, too, that FFW may be an especially effective instrument for putting local traditions to work in the service of development, a powerful and frequently unused force.

Not all local traditions are a positive force, of course. Many local traditions have their origins in patron-client systems, which are inherently inequitable. Part B of this section suggests ways to resolve these inequities.

Once the program designer has explored the potential of traditional systems of community work and compensation to participants, there are three other categories of environmental information that are essential:

+ the macro policy environment. The FFW program designer must be aware of the macro policy environment and consider whether it is consistent with the purposes of a FFW program. If the macro policies clearly do not support employment creation, but instead promote capital intensive modernization; if the opportunities for agricultural employment are preempted by policies that encourage agricultural mechanization; or if rapid urbanization is being encouraged by urban food subsidies and urban facilities; then creating rural employment through FFW can no more than a relief measure. For example, the FFW program in Peru that is about 50% urban reinforces that country's urban bias reflected in the policy to hold urban food prices low. This does not result from FFW imports but is a case of FFW being used to support an existing policy (Peru, pp. 9-12). The existence of FFW imports will not affect this policy, but a donor may want to consider whether the policy does not vitiate the underlying goals of FFW and whether that donor wants to be seen as working in support of such a policy.

In aid circles there is an important concern about macroeconomic policies. It is recognized that micro level programs like FFW are valuable only if they

are linked to policies supporting the same goals, and, conversely, that macro policies are much more valuable if they are supported by consistent micro level programs. FFW programs should therefore be seen as part of a coordinated approach to development. This will require coordination between those engaged in policy dialogue and those sponsoring FFW programs.

An example of FFW being used to promote changes in policy is that of Cape Verde. In an unusual case of a government-to-government Title II program, FFW was used to buffer changes in agricultural prices, policies, and programs. The Cape Verdian government, in cooperation with the U.S. government, agreed to make these changes in return for an assured program of Title II imports that would promote agricultural development while the policy changes were taking place. In Lesotho, as well, the government recognizes the importance of FFW and has altered policies to support these goals.

Whether FFW is used as a specific element in policy changes or whether FFW program designers simply insure that they are not starting a program in a country where policies will negate the benefits of the FFW program, it is clear that in the future, one must look beyond the program to policy as one factor that will determine whether the program can have the intended impact. A closely related issue is the integration of FFW with other programs that have an impact on the same environment. This is addressed in Section V.

+ <u>the distribution of assets in the community</u>. If land holding is concentrated and land ownership agglomerated, there is little that FFW can do that will not help the already affluent. Roads, irrigation, flood control and other rural assets will provide benefits primarily to those who are already well off. Conversely, if land and assets are divided with some equality, then the projects have the potential of helping the poorer elements of the community.

It may be assumed, however, that in most communities local elites will attempt to capture the benefits of FFW or any other locally managed development program (see Thomas in Edwards, 1974). PVOs claim to be uniquely skilled at working at the village level (see Tendler, 1982), but they should be alert to the need to design programs that will deal with local inequities, a task that calls for imagination and for a good knowledge of the local situation, requirements that PVOs seem eminently capable of meeting. This seems to have been accomplished in India, where most of the FFW projects are on the land of small farmers whose incomes put them below the poverty line (India, Chudy).

+ sector priorities. As cited above, in Peru, the government has placed a clear priority on the urban areas, with the result that FFW has been encouraged in cities but not in rural areas. PVOs which have countered this by establishing rural programs as well have had to work against government pressures. Will the government's priorities allow work to be done where it is needed, or must specific efforts be made to direct programs to areas where they can do the most good?

+ physical and social characteristics, including economic factors, which have a direct bearing on the programs' operational arrangements. These are shown in Table 7, which establishes seven alternative models of FFW programs which flow from various program priorities. Three of these are priorities on agriculture and rural infrastructure in different types of agriculture: irrigated or rainfed, relatively stable agriculture; semi-arid or dry land agriculture; and mountainous or forest agriculture. Additional models are based on other priorities: resettlement on new lands; eroded hill lands conservation; community organization and development; and urban development.

Under each type of program priority and physical characteristics is a set of social characteristics which are clearly correlated with the physical environment. The table, which suggests simple relationships between program design and environmental conditions, obviously cannot encompass all the varieties likely to be encountered. However, it does suggest prototypical elements of program design under various priorities.

To illustrate the use of the table and the scenarios it outlines, it may be useful to review one scenario in detail. Consider type 3, under Agriculture and Rural Infrastructure. The priority and the physical environment is mountainous or hilly with forests being rapidly cut for cropping land. Examples of this situation would be the Peruvian Andes, parts of the Dominican Republic, or Kenya. The land is fertile but fragile and subject to erosion when cleared. Because of population pressures and the need for fuel, the land is rapidly being cleared and is beginning to erode. The population is not dense because of the physical conditions, and there is little infrastructure, either physical or social. The vulnerable nature of agriculture and the remoteness of the area mean that incomes tend to be low and that the economy is still partly subsistence. In this environment, the population is dispersed and community institutions are weak. There are often traditions of community work, and the population tends to be a minority but to be homogenous. Often the area has been neglected in the allocation of national resources. The people in power tend to look down on the mountain people as backward.

In this situation, program goals and projects are clear. Conservation and the slowing of soil erosion are a top priority followed closely by agriculture or other income-generating activities, such as fuel wood sales or small enterprise based on forests. FFW projects follow from this description.

Table 7

Alternative Scenarios Indicating Relationship Between Environment and FFW Program Characteristics

Priority Sector:

Agriculture and Rural Infrastructure	Agriculture and Rural Infrastructure	Agriculture and Rural Infrastructure
Type 1 Irrigated and/or Rainfed Agriculture (stable) (Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Java)	Type 2 Semi-Arid/Dryland Agriculture (Kenya, marginal areas, Upper Volta)	Type 3 Hill/Mountain, Forest Agriculture (Dominican Republic, Peru [Andes])
Physical Characteristics: 1. Fertile land, potentially very productive crop production 2. Dense population 3. Moderately well-developed infra- 4. Market economy 5. Moderate incomes, disparity of wealth	Physical Characteristics: 1. Vulnerable agriculture, based on cattle mixed farming systems 2. Dispersed and shifting population 3. Little infrastructure 4. Subsistence economy 5. Low incomes, disparity of wealth	Physical Characteristics: 1. Fertile but vulnerable soil, subject to erosion when cropped; regular rainfall 2. Dispersed but stable population 3. Little infrastructure 4. Subsistence economy 5. Low incomes, equity in poverty
Social Characteristics: 1. Good community institutions, usually representative 2. Traditional institutions for community work 3. Culturally/socially homogeneous 4. Landless labor, seasonal	Social Characteristics: 1. Few community institutions, hierarchical tribal clan of group institutions 2. Traditional institutions focused on risk aversion 3. Tribe/ascriptive link more important than community 4. Disguised under employment, year-round occupations 5. Wealth in cattle	Social Characteristics: 1. Loose community structures 2. Limited traditions of community work 3. Socially homogeneous population 4. Underemployment, seasonal extremes

Table 7 (continued)

Ag. Type 1 (con't)	Ag. Type 2 (con't)	Ag. Type 3 (con't)
Program Goals: 1. Infrastructure assets to promote agricultural production 2. Seasonal employment creation	Program Goals: 1. Create infrastructure, agriculture to settle population 2. Increase incomes	Program Goals 1. Stop soil erosion while expanding agriculture 2. Establish productive forests 3. Increase incomes
Program Characteristics: 1. Seasonal work 2. Projects: roads, irrigation, land drainage, leveling, market development, small enterprise training 3. Large projects 4. Implemented by local organizations 5. Primarily private beneficiaries 6. Potential labor input to projects 65-75% 7. Vulnerable to drought, flood, storm	Program Characteristics: 1. Year-round work (labor camps) 2. Projects: roads, social infrastructure, irrigation, cattle dips 3. Small projects 4. Implemented by external organizations 5. Primarily public beneficiaries 6. Potential labor input to projects 40-50% 7. Vulnerable to drought	Program Characteristics: 1. Seasonal work 2. Projects: reforestation, nurseries, terraces, check dams, access roads, markets 3. Small projects 4. Implemented by local organizations 5. Primarily public beneficiaries 6. Potential labor input to projects 50-60% 7. Vulnerable to storm, earthquake

Table 7 (continued)

Priority Sector:		
Resettlement on New Lands (Indonesia-Outer Islands, Kenya)	Conservation, Watershed Management, Reforestation of Eroded Hill Land (Haiti, Ethiopia, Lesotho, Comoro Is.)	Urban Projects (Peru)
Physical Characteristics:	**Physical Characteristics:**	**Physical Characteristics:**
1. Fertile but uncleared land, need to establish agriculture	1. Low productivity agriculture, land depleted	1. Employment in urban micro-enterprises
2. Minimum infrastructure	2. Limited infrastructure	2. Some infrastructure, minimal amenities
3. Settlers insecure, little knowledge of environment	3. Dense population	3. Dense population
4. Low population density	4. Subsistence economy	4. Market economy
5. Market economy	5. Low incomes, large disparities	5. Low incomes
6. Potentially good incomes, equitable	6. High seasonal unemployment	6. Continuous unemployment
7. Little unemployment		
Social Characteristics:	**Social Characteristics:**	**Social Characteristics:**
1. No community institutions or community work traditions	1. Traditions of conscription ("self help") labor	1. No community institutions or community work traditions
2. Socially heterogeneous population	2. Hierarchical local government	2. Socially heterogeneous population
	3. Socially homogeneous population	
Program Goals:	**Program Goals:**	**Program Goals:**
1. Economic survival while community established	1. Conserve soil	1. Develop community institutions
2. Establish agriculture/income base	2. Create long-term incomes	2. Alleviate urban unrest through social amenities and housing
3. Establish infrastructure	3. Create short-term employment for the poor	3. Alleviate urban unemployment
Program Characteristics:	**Program Characteristics:**	**Program Characteristics:**
1. Operates year-round in early phases of settlement; later, seasonally	1. Year-round work	1. Year-round work
2. Projects: land clearing, leveling, roads, schools, drinking water	2. Projects: reforestation, nurseries, terraces, roads	2. Projects: housing, community buildings, water supply, social infrastructure
3. Implemented through external organizations	3. Implemented through local organizations	3. Implemented through external organizations
4. Medium-sized projects	4. Medium-sized projects	4. Small projects requiring skilled labor input
5. Private beneficiaries	5. Public beneficiaries	5. Private/public beneficiaries
6. Potential labor input 65-75%	6. Potential labor input 60-70%	6. Potential labor input 45-55%

Table 7 (continued)

Priority Sector

Community Organization and Development
(Guatemala, Dominican Republica)

Physical Characteristics:
1. Dispersed communities
2. Heterogeneous physical conditions

Social Characteristics:
1. Homogeneous communities, but variation between communities
2. Strong community institutions
3. Sometimes minority population groups

Program Goals:
1. Strengthen community organization
2. Emphasis on local initiative (felt needs)
3. Low priority on income generation

Program Characteristics:
1. May be seasonal or year-round
2. Projects: construction or roads, social infrastructure, community facilities (schools, clinics, parks, meeting halls)
3. Maximum use of local traditions
4. Use of voluntary labor at below market rates
5. Potential labor input 50%
6. May make payments through community meal to whole family

They would include terracing of cleared land, reforestation, establishing forest-related small enterprise and nurseries. Constructing access roads would be important, and with them market development.

The FFW operations in this environment should be seasonal. There is usually a pronounced rainy season and clear seasonality to agriculture, dictating a peak season and a slack season. Projects would be small because of the dispersed population. Considerable technical skills would be needed for planting terraces and reforestation. Local traditions and institutions would need to be incorporated into the program. Incomes would probably be reasonably equal, most commonly low, so distributional factors would not be major. Because of the technical nature of some projects, the labor component would be low, probably about 50%.

Table 7 does not provide any guidance on setting wage rates in different situations and this is a crucial design issue. It is not included in the Table because it is not something that varies with the environment. The principle by which wages should be established is easy, its application somewhat more difficult. In principle, wage rates should be set to approximate or be only slightly lower than the current seasonal market wage rate. This has to be translated into commodities. This should be done not at the current international price of the commodity but at its current value in the market of the community where the FFW program is being conducted. To pay anything lower is to defeat the income generating objectives of the program.

In some cases programs have paid slightly below market rates so that laborers will leave FFW employment as soon as any alternative job becomes available or their personal need diminishes for some reason. While this can be done, it seems unnecessary. FFW employment is hard, physically demanding work,

and workers prefer to be paid in cash rather than in commodities. It is therefore almost inevitable that workers will leave a FFW program when any alternative becomes available. As a result, it is strongly recommended that FFW programs pay their workers at market rates.

Like the example described above, each of the other six scenarios spells out typical FFW program goals and operational characteristics. The next question is, how can this be used? Although the table appears unwieldy because of its size, for the program designer it should be valuable, once the general program physical environment is established, in providing guidance on the following kinds of issues:

Goals

- The goals that might reasonably be achieved in this environment, both primary and secondary.

Labor policy

- The percentage of program costs that can be used for labor payments.
- Whether the program should be seasonal or year round, based on unemployment conditions.

Projects

- Types of projects feasible in the environment.
- Approximate size of projects that would be desirable.
- The public or private nature of the benefits of the assets created.

Organization

- The level at which the project should be organized--through local institutions or through those outside the community.
- What type of organization is likely to be available and effective in implementing programs.

Potential problem areas

- Potential problems. Allowance for these needs to be built into project design. Examples might be political and economic inequity at the local level or the need to build provision for maintenance into project design.

The Table's principal use is as a checklist for on-the-spot program design. It is not a substitute for detailed site reconnaissance. It is not meant for armchair program designers. Rather, in any particular environment it should guide designers in thinking about what information to gather and what questions to ask. The designer should ask why programs in similar environments may work very differently. Thus, Table 7 represents a tool and a guideline for the design process, not a blueprint.

B. STRATEGY. Every FFW program should have a strategy growing out of the analysis of the environment -- a way of achieving program goals in a particular environment. The importance of strategy has been emphasized throughout this paper. A list of projects and their benefits will not suffice. The strategy must indicate clearly the long-term development objectives of the program and the secondary supporting objectives. One of the problems identified in earlier sections was the multiplicity of goals proposed for many FFW programs. Clearcut priorities provide a criterion for project selection, establish a focus for program efforts, and keep goals from becoming a collection of side effects. A multiplicity of goals results in part from program proponents who, in their eagerness to get their program adopted and to publicize it, set out a lengthy list of potential accomplishments for FFW. It is for this reason that FFW programs have often been dismissed as "miracle" programs with little grounding in reality. One is reminded of the statement made about U.S. political processes:

> There is something about the process of politics which requires officials to overpromise, to promise more than can be delivered. The result is the creation of expectations which cannot be met, and a program which "fails" when implemented.*

Fewer goals will result in greater impact.

As a guide to setting objectives, Table 8 provides a basis for assessing program benefits. The purpose is to force program designers to choose a limited number of goals and to consider the full nature of the program's impact. Before any program is operational the implementing agency should be able to indicate the anticipated benefits in each of these categories. A distinction is made between the construction phase, which is the actual work of the program, and the operating phase, during which the benefits flow from the assets created. It is also intended to show the program designer that for maximum impact, long-term growth benefits must be given priority.

After specifying the primary and secondary objectives, the strategy should propose projects and demonstrate the links between projects to achieve a cumulative impact. A good strategy statement will show how projects will be linked to other activities and how complementary inputs will be provided (e.g how teachers will be recruited and their salaries financed). It needs to demonstrate how the projects cumulatively will generate a long-term increased flow of income that will eventually make the FFW program unnecessary. It must also link the program to local traditions, and carefully consider who the beneficiaries will be and the pattern of income distribution.

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* Walter McCann, in a speech quoted in the Bulletin of the Harvard Graduate School of Education, June 1979.

Table 8

Checklist of FFW Program Goals and Benefits

Statement of Program Goals

1. Primary - (no more than two)
2. Secondary - (one only)

Projects Promoting Long Term Development

1. Type of Project
2. Nature and Magnitude of Anticipated Benefits
   (i.e. increased production, new incomes, etc.)
3. Beneficiaries of Projects
   (public, private -- above poverty line or below)

Employment Creation

1. Construction Phase (short term)
2. Operating Phase (long term)

The strategy should also integrate construction, operation, and maintenance to insure that the asset, once completed, will be as productive as possible. Finally, a strategy must consider the potential duration of the project. How long a time is needed to accomplish these goals given existing conditions?

This type of strategy statement and the careful planning that goes into it should be a prerequisite for all future FFW programs.

C. STRUCTURE. To implement a program strategy requires a structure to manage implementation. Such a structure should not be uniform across countries and regions, but specifically tailored to fulfill a particular strategy in a given local environment. .The structure will specify the organization(s) to implement the program. These may be a collaborative set of arrangments among voluntary agency and local institution, or a single organization. It is clear that simply turning over resources to local government, as occurred in Upper Volta, is an invitation to problems. The structure must provide local autonomy and discretion within guidelines, supervision and accountability to an external authority. The structure should incorporate local traditions of self help and payment and must have genuine legitimacy in the local community to provide it the capacity to mobilize the local population. Finally, the structure must take account of the distributional goals of the program. Assuming a commitment to equity in the distribution of benefits, the structure must make that possible. Program structure must provide for technical inputs and for the regular flow of commodities or resources and must set the supervisory arrangements and all the other details of the program. These details are important to the functioning of the program, for each provides an opportunity to shape the program toward fulfilling the strategy.

V. Future Issues for Food for Work

As FFW programs continue, as we learn from experience and world conditions, and as priorities change, new issues arise that are important for the future relevance of FFW. In this section, some of these issues are addressed.

A. Transfer to the Africa Setting

FFW programs have been strongly concentrated in Asia. As Table 3 shows, 57% of all FFW resources are used in Asian countries. There are good reasons for this. Historically, the problem of unemployment has been most acute in the populous and impoverished nations of Asia. The origins of FFW can be traced back to the test relief programs implemented in times of famine in India and many of the procedures used in current FFW programs in that country were encoded in the famine relief manuals written in 1905. More recently, Bangladesh has been the focus of FFW activity. Homogeneous physically and ethnically, characterized by large scale, seasonal unemployment, and faced with a great scarcity of local infrastructure, that country adopted FFW virtually as a prescription for development. As a result, many USAID Food for Peace officers and PVO personnel working on FFW have spent time in Asia and have an Asian model of FFW.

Now, however, the priority for FFW is shifting to Africa as a result of that continent's declining per capita production of food and its recurrent disasters. But the FFW experience in Asia cannot be transferred directly to Africa. To be effective, the basic Asian model must be adapted to conform to the quite different conditions in Africa. The most prominent of these adaptations would be:

+ Smaller scale. Africa is much more heterogeneous than Asia. Within many countries there are widely varying micro regions characterized by different physical and economic conditions. As a result, African programs will require more design resources to tailor FFW programs to specific project areas.

+ Different management requirements. The diversity in project design will require more management resources. However, management is a scarce resource in Africa. As a result, more outside help will be needed in the design and operation of FFW programs, along with the development of a greater reliance on local level management capacity. Fortunately, much of Africa has traditions of local self-help and there are untapped local management capacities that can be used to manage FFW.

+ Policy congruence. Because of the smaller scale of FFW programs in Africa, it will be more important that they work in harmony with macro policies (this issue is discussed in Section IV-A). Thus the cooperation of PVOs, USAID, and the local governments will be crucial to using FFW as a lever to secure policies that support employment creation and local development.

+ Program integration. Because the programs will be smaller, their impact may be less unless they are used carefully in conjunction with other programs, an issue discussed below at greater length. Linking training, and related activities such as conservation, agriculture, and infrastructure will be crucial.

+ Priorities on agriculture and conservation. Because agricultural production is the crucial issue in Africa today, followed closely by land and water conservation, and because these are activities that can be carried out effectively in FFW programs, they should receive priority attention in Africa.

FFW is an important resource to meet Africa's current needs. Because the Asian model has to be substantially adapted for Africa does not mean it will be less effective. FFW programs in Burundi and Lesotho have been effective over considerable periods of time and demonstrate that FFW can work in Africa. However, any sponsor must see that FFW programs are adapted for African conditions. If this is done, FFW can make an important contribution to meeting Africa's current needs.

B. Monitoring and Evaluation

Monitoring and evaluation have become an important part of most development programs. They are becoming an essential component of FFW programs, especially the larger ones. The two are often lumped together but serve very different functions, and a clear distinction should be made between them. Each will be defined and treated in order. One critical point which applies to both must be established at the outset: monitoring and evaluation are very expensive. Gathering and processing data consumes great quantities of scarce resources, both financial and human, and should therefore be kept to the absolutely essential minimum. Monitoring and evaluation are in vogue at the moment, and much more data and information are collected than are ever processed and used, at a great waste of resources.

Monitoring is the regular collection of data that provides information as to whether a program is functioning as planned, and is intended for internal management purposes. It is akin to a management information system. It is not intended to provide a demonstration of whether the program is achieving its long term goals; that is the function of evaluation. Since its purpose is to insure the efficient management of a program, certain characteristics are

essential. First, it must be quick. The manager cannot use data that are three months old. Second, it must focus on the critical information that the manager needs and can do something about. Third, it is internal to the program and not conducted by outsiders, a factor that should make it both quicker and, for the manager, more reliable.

What sort of information might a monitoring system gather? One element of information would be the progress of the planning system: What types of projects are being planned? Who is benefitting from them? Are the projects in the neediest or most appropriate areas? The movement of commodities -- information as to where and what the commodity is, whether it is arriving on time, whether there are serious losses, and whether storage is available -- are all important to the manager. A third area is progress of work. Are projects proceeding as scheduled or are they encountering unexpected bottlenecks? Are completed projects being maintained? These areas of information are merely suggestive and will have to be tailored to each particular country and by each program manager according to his or her needs. A very useful example of a monitoring system is the one that has been set up for the India FFW programs by William Drake, entitled An Emerging Monitoring and Evaluation System for PL 480 Title II Food for Work Programs in India. Any manager establishing a FFW system might want to review that before designing a system for another country.

Evaluation is not concerned with the type of operational data gathered by a monitoring system except as it affects the long term performance of the program. Evaluation is aimed at discovering whether the underlying purposes of the program are being achieved, of determining the impact on the target beneficiaries and the communities in which FFW projects are being implemented.

USAID's Bureau of Food for Peace and Voluntary Assistance sponsors regular evaluations of FFW programs. These are carried out by independent groups hired for the purpose by USAID. The strength of this system is that it brings new ideas and approaches to FFW evaluations. These are the basic materials on which this report is based. They are very valuable, but their value would be further enhanced if there were a few common series of data gathered in all of them that would allow for more effective comparative analysis. Such a basic set of data and information is suggested here.

+ Labor, wages, and incomes - Data on the number of workers, on the wages paid, and on how these wages compare to local market wage rates are essential. This may require information on seasonal wage rates. In addition, data on the percentage of wages paid in commodities and in cash should be obtained, as well as information and data on the relative economic status of workers.

+ Program costs - Data showing the wage and nonwage costs of the program are important. What were the complementary inputs and what percentage of total program costs did they represent? The cost of commodity management should be ascertained, as should the cost of project implementation. The relative value of the commodities and other program costs should be compared: How much of the total program costs were taken up by commodities and how much by logistics and other expenses?

+ Program and commodity management - There should be a brief description of the systems for each and note made of important problems or successes. This might include such questions as who manages? who accounts? and to whom are they accountable?

+ Project impact and cost effectiveness - An attempt should be made to measure project impact, either through a social cost-benefit analysis or through

a calculation of cost effectiveness. There must be some sort of qualitative assessment of the success of the program in meeting its goals. In the process, side effects and some judgment of the impact of FFW activities on the larger community in which they take place is needed.

If future evaluations include the information identified above, it will be possible to make comparative judgments about the performance of FFW programs. It will also make it possible over time to establish some international standards for assessing the performance of FFW programs. This would be a particularly valuable diagnostic tool to help pinpoint problems or inefficiencies in particular programs.

C. Integration with Other Programs

FFW programs have generally been conceived and implemented as independent programs, operating without specific reference to other programs. While this may be convenient from an administrative standpoint, it means that in many cases, FFW programs are not as effective as they could be. To achieve such integration will require changes in current operating procedures and some sacrifice of the autonomy that voluntary agencies now enjoy. While a measure of resistance to such changes is likely to be encountered, integration is an important step toward enhancing the impact of FFW programs. Particularly as African nations become increasingly the focus of FFW, the average program size will become smaller and the integration of programs thus more important.

The question of whether and how to integrate FFW with other programs must be considered carefully in designing programs. In large programs in countries such as India and Bangladesh, where FFW programs operate in a homogeneous environment doing work primarily in a single sector such as agriculture or infrastructure

creation, they may be most effective as independent programs. In other situations, however, the impact of a FFW program may be greatly enhanced if it is coordinated with, or even integrated with, another program. There are a few examples of such integration. In Ethiopia, a large scale reforestation is integrated with other watershed management and agricultural development programs, greatly enhancing the benefits of each. In Guatemala and Honduras, FFW programs are linked with other national forest management and training programs to produce an integrated forestry program. While results are not yet available, it seems clear that linking these FFW and non-FFW activities should result in a more effective program.

To achieve this, FFW program designers will have to work in coordination with government agencies and other aid agencies. They will have to give careful consideration to long term productivity issues and be prepared to sacrifice some of the sponsoring agency's identity in an integrated program. While this will necessitate short run changes in procedures it will result in long run gains in the development effectiveness of FFW programs. As a guide to integration, program designers should examine Table 7 and consider the links between various scenarios, such as hill agriculture and reforestation. They should also consider the importance of education and training in any FFW program.

D. Innovative Uses of FFW

PVOs have made relatively little effort to find new and innovative uses for FFW resources, at least as demonstrated through the evaluations. There are a number of possibilities that should be actively explored, because in addition to strengthening programs along the lines suggested in this paper, the range of activities could profitably be expanded.

One obvious area is that of training. In the future, most FFW programs should contain a training component. In each of the scenarios in Table 7, training could be added as a potential activity. For instance, trainees could be paid to attend a formal course of study and then required to work for a period in a technical or managerial role in a FFW program. Alternatively, apprenticeship training could be financed in ongoing FFW programs, or program workers could be trained for part of each day and work on projects for the remainder of the day. Whatever the mechanism, training should become a much more important part of FFW programs.

Other innovations should be tried. In one country, the WFP paid apprentice well drillers for six months with FFW commodities until they could establish themselves as independent private drillers. Innovations arise in the field. The point is that agencies should be encouraged to think more creatively about how FFW resources could be used to promote development.

VI. Conclusion

As this paper has made clear, FFW is a potentially important instrument of development, and as levels of financial assistance decline, FFW assistance could become even more important in the future. But FFW is an instrument that is not currently performing at its full potential, despite clear evidence of the contribution it can make. New and ongoing challenges must be met, such as Africa's urgent need for rehabilitation from severe drought and for agricultural development, tasks in which FFW can play an important role. FFW programs reach down to the village level and to the poorest where few other programs are capable of working effectively.

Under current practices, however, they do not meet that potential. This paper has offered specific suggestions as to how their performance can be improved. To do so will first require general acceptance of the fact that food is a real and important resource for development. It will necessitate changes in the policies and regulations that govern FFW and a clear signal from USAID that it is interested in development impact and places that objective above accounting for commodities or any other concern. This will not be easy to accomplish, for such changes would involve the Departments of State and Agriculture and perhaps Congress, entities that might resist change since the existing programs are considered to be working acceptably. Internally within USAID and in the agency's dealings with PVOs, new procedures and systems will have to be established. Such changes are slow, painful, and costly and will require strongly committed leadership. Will the benefits be seen to justify the costs?

From the PVOs will be needed steps to strengthen the design and implementation of programs. They will have to coordinate their programs much more closely with those of other organizations and with host country governments, a process that will inevitably diminish their exclusive identity with particular projects and force them to sacrifice some of the autonomy which they have traditionally valued. Improvement will require PVOs to break away from the Asian model of FFW and design new types of programs for Africa, a move that may necessitate additional staff training and require establishing new procedures for designing, implementing, and managing FFW. PVOs will have to attach higher priority to FFW programs that require high levels of supervision, are widely dispersed in operation, and are often frustratingly messy to manage. A change will undoubtedly mean that instead of using resources provided through FFW to support their own country operations, they will have to make substantial contributions of their own funds for complementary resources. Like the actions required of the Government, such changes will be difficult and costly and will require a real commitment to improving the development impact of their programs.

The steps that both the Government and the PVOs must take are presented in detail in this paper. These steps are relatively clear and would, I believe, be agreed upon in general by all independent analysts of FFW. They will not be easy, however, and will require organizational changes on all sides, since both the Government and the PVOs have their established operating procedures. All organizations are highly resistant to change.

The issue, then, is clearcut: Which is more important to all parties involved--organizational prerogatives or effective promotion of development? Does the necessary commitment exist in all the organizations to bring about these improvements? The first step is up to the Government, since the PVOs work

closely with it and respond to the policies and incentives it provides. USAID takes the opportunity to establish policies that will make FFW more effective, the PVOs are likely to follow its lead.

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TABLE 1

1983 FFW COMMODITIES BY REGION

(000 lbs.)

	WHEAT	WHEAT FLOUR	BULGUR	CORN	CORN MEAL	GRAIN SORGHUM	CSM[1]	NFDM[2]	WSM[3]	VEGOIL[4]	RICE	OTHER
NEAR EAST												
WFP	55,235	12,884						6,973		922		1,433
VOLAGS	—	23,270	482	—	—	—	—	—	—	1,502	—	—
TOTAL	55,236	36,154	482	—	—	—	—	6,973	—	2,424	—	1,433
LATIN AMERICA												
WFP	8,697	10,616	437	20,437	298	—	549	4,210	1,216	4,859		110
VOLAGS	2,398	23,495	30,300	327	21,160	—	11,685	372	296	7,972	3,597	66
TOTAL	11,095	34,111	30,737	20,764	21,458	—	12,234	4,582	1,512	12,831	3,597	176
AFRICA												
WFP	1,323		10,009	2,099	27,026	15,018	511	7,235	154	4,886	8,118	14,093
VOLAGS	—	7,188	5,504	—	11,914	1,073	—	343	—	1,852	4,603	—
TOTAL	1,323	7,188	15,513	2,099	38,940	16,091	511	7,578	154	6,738	12,721	14,093
ASIA												
WFP	1,627,613	—	1,543		—	—	—	4,501	—	5,712	25,088	2,778
VOLAGS	220,855	—	20,868	1,114	—	—	—	—	—	3,628	3,590	—
TOTAL	1,848,468	—	22,411	1,114	—	—	—	4,501	—	9,340	28,678	2,778
GRAND TOTAL	1,916,122	77,453	69,143	23,977	60,398	32,182	12,745	23,634	1,666	31,333	44,996	18,480

1. Corn-soy-milk
2. Non-fat dry milk
3. Wheat-soy-milk
4. Vegetable oil

APPENDIX

TABLE 2

SIZE OF VOLUNTARY AGENCY PROGRAMS

BY NUMBER OF RECIPIENTS

(FY 1983)

Rank	Country	Vol. Ag.	Value $(000)	Recipients
1	Bangladesh	CARE	$ 7,341.3	8,602,000*
2	India	CRS	8,528.6	339,000
3	Peru	CRS	3212.6	280,000
		SAW	2928.8	99,000
		CARE	1061.3	35,100
		CWS	791.1	27,000
	Peru (Country Total)		7,993.8	441,000
4	Morocco	CRS	2,773.6	100,000
5	Haiti	CARE	925.0	51,300
		CRS	304.9	13,500
		SAW	286.2	12,000
		CWS	118.1	7,500
	Haiti (Country Total)		1,634.2	84,500
6	Indonesia	CRS	2445.3	86,000
		CWS	159.7	5,200
	Indonesia (Country Total)		2,605.0	95,600
7	Dominican Republic	CRS	791.2	72,000
		CWS	209.5	7,000
	Dominican R. (Country Total)		1,000.7	79,000
8	Lesotho	CRS	1,715.1	57,000
9	Bolivia	CRS	1,108.4	50,000
10	Upper Volta	CRS	213.3	27,000
11	Senegal	CRS	290.7	25,000
12	Honduras	CRS	284.2	18,000
13	West Bank	CARE	329.9	16,000
14	Burundi	CRS	260.8	16,000
15	Kenya	CRS	502.1	15,000
16	Guatemala	CARE	275.5	9,500
		CRS	83.3	6,500
	Guatemala (Country Total)		358.8	15,000
17	Rwanda	SAW	330.1	9,000
18	Sierra Leone	CRS	83.9	8,000
19	Ghana	CRS	123.5	5,000
20	Djibouti	CRS	116.1	4,800
21	Madagascar	CRS	29.3	3,000
22	Tanzania	CRS	76.5	3,000
23	Ecuador	CRS	45.4	2,500
24	Zaire	CRS	59.8	2,500

APPENDIX

TABLE 3

FY83 U.S. SUPPORTED COMPONENT OF WFP FFW PROGRAMS

BY NUMBER OF RECIPIENTS

Country	Commodity Value ($000)*		No. of Recipients
1. India	12,315	(1) **	1,084,900
2. Sri Lanka	732	(13)	238,000
3. Peru	1,560	(7)	235,000
4. Guatemala	1,052	(11)	214,300
5. Indonesia	3,624	(3)	183,000
6. Honduras	1,158	(10)	157,000
7. Pakistan	2,822	(4)	155,800
8. Angola	114	(32)	150,000
9. Egypt	1,945	(5)	130,000
10. Somalia	440	(18)	104,000
11. Mali	1,751	(6)	94,000
12. Turkey	33	(38)	86,000
13. Niger	311	(23)	84,000
14. Senegal	308	(25)	80,000
15. El Salvador	663	(15)	76,300
16. Sudan	14	(41)	70,000
17. Bolivia	112	(33)	63,000
18. Ghana	1,187	(9)	60,000
19. Cameroon	351	(22)	60,000
20. Tanzania	141	(30)	60,000
21. Ecuador	661	(16)	50,200
22. Morocco	3,994	(2)	44,000
23. Nepal	782	(12)	39,000
24. Rwanda	378	(21)	35,000
25. Uganda	246	(26)	32,500
26. Upper Volta	1,309	(8)	30,300
27. Mauritania	310	(24)	30,000
28. Lesotho	184	(28)	28,500
29. Haiti	93	(35)	25,000
30. Togo	655	(14)	24,000
31. Guinea Bissau	558	(17)	20,000
32. Benin	140	(31)	16,000
33. Comoro Islands	409	(20)	14,000
34. Panama	51	(36)	13,300
35. Burundi	108	(34)	13,000
36. Bhutan	420	(19)	12,600
37. Malawi	28	(40)	12,000
38. Chad	13	(42)	12,000
39. Central African Empire	204	(27)	11,500
40. Guinea	178	(29)	11,500
41. Paraguay	41	(37)	6,000
42. Libera	33	(39)	5,500

* Rounded to nearest thousand.

** Country ranking by commodity value.

TABLE 4

Average Value and Quantity of Food

Paid to Each FFW Worker Annually by Agency

(1984)

AGENCY	POUNDS PER PARTICIPANT	VALUE PER PARTICIPANT
CARE	42.5	$ 3.02
CRS	171.2	20.17
CWS	217.2	26.41
ADRA	245.6	35.26
WFP	42.2	4.16

APPENDIX

TABLE 5

Types of Projects Undertaken Under Auspices of Food for Work in Various Countries
(by sector)

1) Agriculture

Beekeeping (Dom. Rep., Peru)
Cattle Dips (Kenya)
Irrigation: (Bangladesh, India, Peru, Dom. Rep., Kenya, Philippines, Nigeria, Upper Volta, India)
- Wells
- Canals
- Land Leveling (India, Indonesia, Dom. Rep.)

Cereal Banks (Niger)
Drainage (Bangladesh, Upper Volta, India)
Water Catchment/Dams (Kenya)
Forestry (production of seedlings, forest mgmt.) (Honduras)
Reservoirs, Tanks (Bangladesh, Kenya, India, Kenya, Ethiopia)
Rabbit Raising (Dom. Rep.)
Production of Improved Seeds (Comoro Isl.*)
Agricultural Work Crew (Dom. Rep., Kenya, Philippines, Upper Volta, India)
Land Clearing (Dom. Rep., Kenya)
Fish Pond Construction (Indonesia, Lesotho, Upper Volta)
Pony Raising Project (Lesotho)
Fisheries Development (India)
Pasture and Forage Development (India)

2) Education

School Construction (Peru, Dom. Rep., Kenya, Philippines, Guatemala* Upper Volta, India)
Literacy Training (India)
Technical Training (Upper Volta, Niger*, Peru)
- Carpentry
- Brick-making
- Masonry

School Vegetable Garden (Guatemala*)
Training Community Leaders, Rural Workers (Guatemala*)
Training Agricultural Extension (Comoro Isl.*)
Training Fishermen (Niger*)
Training Foresters (Honduras*)

TABLE 5 (continued)

3) Energy

Rural Electrification (Guatemala*)
Telegraph lines (Guatemala)
Community Woodlots (Lesotho, Niger*, Upper Volta*)

4) Health

Clinic/Dispensaries (Peru, Kenya, Guatemala*, Upper Volta, India)
MCH Centers (Kenya)
Food Kitchen (Kenya)

5) Housing and Community Services

House Construction (Peru, Dom. Rep., Guatemala*, India)
Community Building (Peru, Philippines, Guatemala*)
Market Construction (Peru, Comoro Isl.*, Niger*, India, Bangladesh)
Athletic Fields (Peru, Kenya, Guatemala*)
Club Buildings or Social Centers (Dom. Rep., Guatemala*)
Village Warehouses for Food and Ag. Imports (Upper Volta*, India)
Assistance to Rural Youth Clubs (Upper Volta)
Staff Residences (Upper Volta)

6) Natural Resource Conservation

Reforestation (Dom. Rep., Kenya, Ethiopia, Lesotho, India, Comoro Isl., Honduras*, Upper Volta)
Nurseries (Dom. Rep., Peru, Kenya, Ethiopia, Niger*)
Terracing (Ethiopia, Dom. Rep., Lesotho, Comoro Isl.*, Honduras, Upper Volta)
Check Dams (Ethiopia, Dom. Rep., Lesotho)
Dikes (Bangladesh, Niger*, India)
Land Reclamation (from salt water) (Indonesia)
Drainage (Upper Volta)
Flood Control (Philippines)

7) Resettlement

Land Clearing (Indonesia, Kenya)
Settlement Infrastructure (Indonesia)
Income (Food ratios for settlers) (Upper Volta)

TABLE 5 (continued)

8) Small Enterprise

Cottage Industry (Peru)
Handicrafts (Kenya)
Food Processing (Lesotho)
Fish Processing (Niger*)
Forestry (Resin extraction, logging, sawing) (Honduras*)
Salary Supplements to New Well Digging Trainees (Upper Volta*)

9) Transportation

Road Construction (Including culverts, bridges, vehicular and foot, and maintenance)
(Bangladesh, Kenya, India, Dom. Rep., Peru, Indonesia,m Ethiopia, Lesotho, Philippines, Haiti, Guatemala*, Comoro Isl.*, Niger*, Honduras*, Upper Volta*, India Burundi)
Bridle Paths (Lesotho)
Rural Access Tracks (Comoro Isl.*)

10) Water Supply and Sanitation

Village Water Supply Wells, Canals, Storage (Dom. Rep., Kenya, Indonesia, Philippines, Guatemala, Comoro Isl. Upper Volta*, India)
Pipe Systems (Kenya)
Drainage (India)
Latrines (Guatemala)

Source: Country evaluation reports listed in bibliography. Country citations are partial because evaluations are not available on each country and many current evaluations do not provide a complete list of projects.

*WFP Projects