


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ARCHIPLAN

REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN HAITI

A Socio Institutional Profile *

by

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CONSULTANT REPORT
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+ Co team Leader

* Djénane L. MONTAS and Pierre-Richard COUPET provided technical support and general administrative assistance to the project.

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REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN HAITI

Briefing Paper

The Report is essentially made of 3 chapters. The first one covers the problem of regional development in Haiti. The second chapter reviews the literature on Community Development, Cooperatives and self help measures. The third chapter is an attempt at integrating the available information on the Cayes watershed. It must be read in conjunction with the set of maps developed on the basis of aerial photointerpretation.

CHAPTER ONE: THE REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT PROBLEM IN HAITI

This chapter is made of 3 parts:

- a. The Criteria of Regionalization
- b. Review of Previous Attempts at Regional Development
- c. The Ministry of Plan Strategy

a. The Criteria of Regionalization

This section reviews the literature in an effort to elucidate how various authors have proposed to regionalize the country. One of the main problems is the absence of objective criteria of regionalization. Haiti is largely an homogeneous country with no sharp regional division. Yet, by the same token, the primitive nature of agricultural production implies that natural conditions (soils, rainfall pattern, temperature) dictate the kind of agricultural organization that emerges. Thus the extreme poverty and the concomitant backwardness of agricultural production techniques give birth to a multitude of micro regions. In the traditional Department of the North, Wood identified 19 such regions. Obviously such fragmentation cannot serve as the linchpin to regional development. A second type of classification was proposed by Holdridge and improved upon by Capital Consult. This was based on the geomorphological and edaphic conditions of various types of soils. However, a given type, say humid mountains or irrigated plains, is not located only in one particular area. Such unit areas spread all over the country and thus may not legitimately serve as the basis for regional planning although there are fundamental to agricultural policy design. Another important type of regional classification scheme was proposed by Wolf Donner. His point of departure is the need to manage natural resources so as to protect the most vulnerable of Haiti's resources: arable land. For this purpose, the author identifies some thirty watersheds that are then regrouped in 7 agricultural regions. Donner then proposes that these watersheds serve as the basis for the administrative division of the country so as to allow a coherent policy approach to the single most important problem of the country: the management of scarce top soil resources. The last type of regionalization scheme

reviewed is the Ministry of Plan's division of the country in 4 regions. No apparent scientific criteria appeared to underlie the regionalization. In fact, the exact boundaries are left vague and unspecified.

b. Previous Attempts at Regional Development

The literature on the various projects of integrated rural development is reviewed in order to elucidate the locational basis of the investment decisions. No coherent one was found except administrative convenience and/or the fact that no other foreign aid donor was involved in the area. By and large the projects reviewed lacked a central focus: say productivity increase or income redistribution. All of them were comprehensive attempts in the sense that many separate activities linked to rural development were pursued: rural credit, road building, water supply, community development, extension activities. The administrative convenience of creating autonomous bodies tailored to each project area was found to be a debilitating process in the longer run. The central organs of the Ministries were weakened while the termination of foreign funding implied the disappearance of the regional development body.


c. The Ministry of Plan's Strategy

The Ministry of Plan's Strategy was found to be really a classic growth pole strategy anchored on one national capital, 3 regional centers (Cayes - Cap - Gonaives), 7 subregional centers and 25 secondary towns. All of those are supposed to be articulated in 4 regions. However, the precise economic logic underlying such choice is uncertain and so is the problem to be solved. It seems that the main issue is the need to stem the flow of rural migrants to

Port-au-Prince. It is unlikely that such a strategy will achieve that goal. The Ministry of Plan's approach is also ambiguous on many accounts. For example, the regions are split into subregional units called USD (Unité Spatiale de Développement) (Spatial Units of Development). The exact boundaries of these USDs are not delineated but they are clearly at variance with the limits of the watersheds. Moreover, implicitly the creation of both USDs and regions should have led to the dissolution of existing regional development bodies such as ODVA or ODN. On the opposite, new regional development bodies are created (ODNO-ODBFA) thus increasing confusion. Last, while an explicit ranking of the various USDs was presented, actual actions do not seem to follow such priority criteria as was established. For instance, the USDs of Jacmel, Port-de-Paix and Mirebalais were assigned secondary priority. Yet, effort to secure foreign funding for ODNO, ODBFA are given high priority. Similarly, the recent signing of a French bilateral regional development project for Jacmel is clearly in contradiction to the established priorities. Once again, actual policy decisions reflect more the perceived availability of foreign funds rather than firm GOH development priorities.

At an administrative level, the structure elaborated to manage such a program of regionalization is clearly top heavy and will most likely be too unwieldy to be effective. On the one hand, the existence of the CORCOPLAN at the regional level is not a guarantee that local level participation will be effective while at the same time the presence of political figures such as prefects and députés (assemblymen) may give precedence to political expediency over technical efficiency. The whole scheme is presented below:

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


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LIMITES ADMINISTRATIVES


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LEGENDE



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VILLES DE SUPPORT

○ Centres Sous Regionaux ou Villes moyennes

CHAPTER TWO: COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT AND THE PROBLEM OF SELF HELP

This chapter is made of 3 parts:

- a. Historical Antecedents and Current Status of the Organizations Involved in Community Development
- b. Structure and Performance of Community Action Councils
- c. The Cooperative Movement and Traditional Work Organizations.

a. Historical Antecedents and Current Status of the Organizations Involved in Community Development

This section shows that community development organizations were created in Haiti largely as the result of foreign aid programs (UNESCO, USOM). The primary objective was to create an effective channel for the base level diffusion of technical assistance program. Today the community development movement is found to still be heavily dependent on foreign resources (individual/organizations). By the same token, there are many signs that the public sector intends to exercise tighter controls. Most community development organizations are not involved directly in productive activities and local grass-roots level participation is at best an incidental result rather than an explicit objective.

b. Structure and Performance of Community Action Councils

Three main points are discussed in this section: The issue of democracy and participation, the issue of organizational autonomy and foreign aid and last, the continuing debate on the ultimate goal and purpose of Community Action Councils (CACs).

With respect to the first issue, it is found that indeed there is little democratic participation, both in conjunction with the internal structure of CACs and in conjunction with the relationship between CACs and the external organizations sponsoring them. The key point is whether or not CACs can be anything else, given the country's history, sociology and current level of political development. The problem of democratic participation is also linked to the heterogeneous membership of the CACs but it does not seem possible to exclude better off members of the community.

With respect to the second point, organizational autonomy, it may be said that for the foreseeable future CACs will be dependent on foreign ideas, initiatives and resources. A distinction must be drawn between foreign individual and foreign organizations. The debilitating impact of the foreign presence is a key feature stressed by most analysts but one does not see how the CAC movement will develop without it given the structural parameters at work.

Last, the continuing debate on the ultimate goals of CACs raise the question of possible alternatives. It is probably overambitious to expect CACs to be islands of democratic enthusiastic popular participation in a

country without any historical experience even remotely sympathetic to these objectives. CACs may and should serve as channels to transfer resources and to provide services to marginalized groups. Anything else ought to be perceived as a beneficial externality.

c. The Cooperative Movement and Traditional Work Organizations

The cooperative movement is not in great shape. This is the most common diagnosis of the situation, although some do disagree. Basically, it suffers from the same ills as the CACs: apathy, undemocratic procedures, heterogeneous membership, ambiguous goals and objectives, dominant foreign presence, public sector neglect. The only success stories (i.e. coffee cooperatives) are found where there is a strong foreign aid funded project. This does not imply that cooperatives should not be the object of continuous support. They should, but expectations should be kept low and patience and very long term perspectives are needed before results may be meaningfully assessed.

The second subsection reviews the combite and other work organizations in the countryside. The main conclusion is that the combite was not a community oriented organization because it did not involve reciprocity and, furthermore, the benefits or results of the collective work were privately appropriated. Additionally, the combite involved strong leisure aspects and reflected the structural characteristics of a labor short economy, thus its gradual fading and replacement by other work associations (escouades, colonnes, mazingas, chaînes). The latter involve strict reciprocity and the collective labor may be sold to third parties. These new forms are smaller, more stable form of

organizations. In fact, the comite was mainly an event. The issue of the future development of these forms into more advanced community organizations is difficult to assess, in part because their small size implies that they would be aggregated into local federations, regional ones and so forth. This in turn would increase the risk of bureaucratization.

CHAPTER THREE: THE SOUTH REGION AND THE LES CAYES WATERSHED

This chapter is just a description of the watershed that must be used in conjunction with the various analytical maps. The first part compares the South Region with the others mainly in terms of the demographic component. The second part describes the watershed and includes 3 subsections: Population; Land Use; Other Economic Activities. The third part presents a short sketch of the city of Cayes.

CHAPTER I: REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN HAITI

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CHAPTER I: THE REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT PROBLEM IN HAITI

It is difficult to discuss regionalization policy and economic decentralization in Haiti for many reasons. First the country's small size, around 10,000 square miles, does not make it an obvious candidate for regionalization. Furthermore the improvement in the road system and other technological improvements in communications (the development of an embryo of national telecommunications network) have both contributed to shrink the perceived distances between the various points of the national territory. Haiti is not only a small country but is also fundamentally an homogeneous one. The topography is extremely varied with steep mountains isolating most of the coastal plains and the Central Plateau. But one does not find the marked socio-economic contrasts embedded in given geographical locations that are found in some other countries: say for example the difference between the coastal areas of Peru and the mountainous highlands. Similarly one does not find in Haiti the equivalent of the Brazilian Northeast, that is a region which is sharply below national average in terms of economic development as measured by per capita income. Haiti's history has created an homogeneous population spread all over the country. Haiti thus does not suffer from the problems generated by a racially or culturally diverse population such as may be encountered in Central America (Guatemala or Honduras) or in the Andean Countries. This has been very well described by Wood (1963: 21-22):

"Nevertheless, Haiti differs from most other tropical areas in its history. Here, the effect of past events has been to suppress rather than to enhance local racial, social and cultural variations."

Nothing in the two decades since these words have been written has happened to invalidate them in a fundamental sense. That is not to say that the country has been socially immobile over the last twenty years. Indeed great changes have occurred but not on such a scale as to invalidate Wood's analysis. However, it must be acknowledged that the single greatest change taking place has been an acceleration of migration trends out of the countryside. One of the consequences has been the emergence of the metropolitan area of Port-au-Prince as the dominant pole of economic growth. This indeed may be, at least in an incipient way, quite a dramatic change that could give rise to a sharp geographical divide. The outgrowth of the capital city is indeed one of the main reasons why regional development issues have acquired some saliency since the mid 1970's. Fass (1978: 158) clearly depicts the contrast:

In 1976, Port-au-Prince contained 638,000 people - 14 percent of the nation's population and 58 percent of the total urban population. Once dominated by the rest of the country, the city is now the economic center. It accounts for 40 percent of gross domestic product, 85 percent of value added in industrial activity and 90 percent of industrial employment. It contains almost all modern business services and 90 percent of Haiti's tourist facilities and services. Sixty-five percent of international maritime traffic and all international air traffic passes through its harbor and airport. Government offices are almost exclusively located in the city. Its inhabitants consume 25 percent of agricultural production, and the growth of urban demand for food is rapidly becoming the key to agricultural progress."

Yet, despite of this stark description one wonders about the relative weight of Kingston in Jamaica or of Santo Domingo in the neighbouring Dominican Republic. That is to illustrate the point that by Latin American standards, Port-au-Prince may not dominate Haiti as much as the capital city

of some of the other countries (one needs just to think of the Mexico City metropolitan area with almost one third of the country's population or of Buenos Aires in Argentina).

A second reason why it is difficult to talk about regionalization or economic decentralization is that the concept is not a wholly unambiguous one. As put by Brinkerhoff et al (1981: 39):

"It may be helpful, before proceeding further, to note the several different aspects or dimensions of decentralization. The concept includes: a) administrative deconcentration; b) citizen participation (particularly at the local level) and c) wider territorial dispersion of economic and social development effort."

Rondinelli and his associates (1984:10) also distinguish 4 types of decentralization:

"This evident complexity makes it necessary to distinguish among the major types of decentralization that have been tried in developing countries. They can be categorized into four types: deconcentration, delegation, devolution and privatization."

As it is, within the public sector, the debate in Haiti today is about administrative deconcentration and wider territorial dispersion of economic activities. On the other hand, foreign aid donors, particularly USAID, do place very strong emphasis on the issues of citizen participation or privatization. Within the public sector, there seem to be contradictory impulses at work. While the Ministry of Planning is ostensibly pushing for decentralization in the sense of the wider territorial dispersion of economic activities, it is not much interested in administrative deconcentration while

it might be resisting privatization. As shown in the second chapter of this Report, there are some signs indicating that foreign private organizations involved in local level development will be increasingly subjected to control. At the same time existing local level development entities are not known to be particularly democratic institutions, so that local level citizen's participation is at best a moot point. With respect to administrative deconcentration (deconcentration and delegation) the definite orientation is still unclear. While there is a lot of work being done with respect to administrative reform the actual process of deconcentration has not at all started.

"Decentralization" and "Regionalization" are new concepts in economic policy making in Haiti. The first time spatial aspects of development policy were taken into account was in the elaboration of the 1976-1981 Five Year Plan. For the 1981-1986 one the concept became more central to the planning effort and it emerged as one of the three "options prioritaires" (priority option) together with administrative reform and science and technology issues. Indeed in November 1982 the "Loi sur l'Aménagement du Territoire" (Territorial Planning Law) was enacted to provide the legal framework for regional development. But of course regional development activities had been going on for a long time. Indeed, the first regional development organization was created in 1949. The ODVA (Organisation de Développement de la Vallée de l'Artibonite) was created to manage the building of the dam and associated irrigation and drainage networks in the Artibonite Valley. In the 1950's and 1960's the U.S. backed Haitian American Development Organization, HADO, provided strong support to the regional development organization in the Northern part of the country (Pôté Colé).

"Port-au-Prince s'impose évidemment en tête, mais alors qu'elle ne représentait même pas le double du Cap en 1890, elle cumule plus de dix fois son pointage en 1971. C'est le changement majeur de la centralisation."

(Anglade 1982: 22).

The important point raised by Anglade is that during the whole nineteenth century the administrative divisions of the country were not devoid of substance. Regions had a dynamic social, economic and political life. Indeed, competition for national power in Port-au-Prince more often than not started outside of the capital city. Roughly it may be said that the country was divided into three main regions: the North, the Center or the West and the South, each with an economy that was directly linked to the outside, each with a strong local oligarchy. In fact in the national folklore there has been some casual speculation as to the character of the inhabitants of each region. While Anglade puts the emergence of the centralized space at 1915 he is careful to note that the process was already at work since the late 1890's and that at worst the American Occupation provided the final boost to an already strong trend.

One of the key issues at this stage in the analysis is to determine why centralization occurred. The question is especially important because not only did one witness centralization in the sense of the increasing relative economic weight of Port-au-Prince but also in the sense of decreasing administrative deconcentration. Yet there is no logical link between the two phenomena. The question is also important because the answer to it might provide a guide to the policy measures designed to reverse the centralization trend. Unfortunately no such satisfactory answer exists as of now.

A) THE CRITERIA OF REGIONALIZATION

The design and implementation of a regional development policy should be based on the existence of regions. In its most basic sense a region should be an area endowed with common characteristics that clearly separate it from other areas. A region should therefore have some internal unity or coherence. This homogeneous area, at least in comparison with others, should then be the object of a specific development policy. As mentioned above, traditionally such regions existed in and of themselves and were thus easily identifiable by the policy makers. At the most aggregate level, one may think of the SAHEL region (extrême désertification), the Appalachian region in the United States, the Mezzogiorno in Southern Italy and Northeastern Brazil. It is important to point out that the region may be defined because of who the inhabitants are. For example they may be a racially or culturally different group which is located in a specific geographical zone (say French speaking people in Canada). Or a region might be defined by the nature of the predominant economic activity in the area. Obviously one example would be mining regions (say the African Copperbelt) or the Maracaibo area in Venezuela (where most of the oil production takes place). In the case of Haiti no such obvious regions exist on the strength of some explicit objective criteria. In that sense one could at best identify three such areas. One would be the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area with the characteristics described by Fass (1978), Prats (1978), Girault and Godard (1983) and the Three Volumes Study published in 1977: Plan de Développement de Port-au-Prince et de la Région Métropolitaine. A second area might be the Northwest where environmental degradation has gone the farthest and where impressionistic evidence would

suggest that the average income is the lowest. Zuvekas (1978:124-131) contains the only crude attempt at estimating regional income differences and he reported that the Northwest (defined to include the Gonaives area and Le Borgne) was indeed the poorest area. The last obvious region that could be defined is the Artibonite area where the country's most extensive irrigation and drainage system has provided the basis for a rather prosperous rice economy. The Artibonite project, managed since 1949 with varying success by the ODVA, is an excellent illustration of the fact that in Haiti regional development policy may create regional differences rather than reduce or eliminate them as has been the case for other countries (i.e. TVA).

In a curious way the absence of objectively identifiable regions has given birth to a chaotic process of administrative geographical divisions by the various national administrations. While in principle the country is divided into nine departments, each sector has divided the country according to its narrow needs. As put by the Ministry of Plan in the 1982-83 Annual Development Budget:

"De plus la diversité résultant du découpage des différents ministères, découpage adapté à leurs propres besoins, a des conséquences néfastes sur le système actuel de planification: le DARNDR compte 7 régions agricoles; le DSPP 6 régions; les Finances 8. C'est donc une obligation de chercher une harmonisation des unités spatiales d'interventions des entités administratives.

C'est à la lumière de ce constat que la SEP a proposé de restructurer le territoire national en des régions nouvelles pour une meilleure planification."

(Ministry of Plan 1983: 95-96).

The set of administrative maps that follows illustrates the point. Notice, however, that even the exact geographical boundaries of the 9 departments remained to be fixed. Furthermore the geographical department is not an operational unit except with respect to military organization:

"The main representatives of the central government are under the Department of the Interior, a very powerful ministry that also control the military. Its regional units consist of nine departments and twenty seven arrondissements. The first of these does not have great development significance, for the department is basically a military unit, and there exists no political or administrative office at this level that could supervise or coordinate the programs of the various technical ministries."

(Brinkerhoff et al 1981: 44-45).

As quoted in Chapter II (page II.31) an assessment performed in 1982 for the Canadian International Development Agency is much more severe in the evaluation of the development potential of the current administrative divisions. For that study the ultimate purpose is political control rather than economic development. Yet since alternative criteria have been proposed, the main ones ought to be examined.

A.1 Micro Regions, Homogeneity and Markets

In his 1961 classic Paul Moral provided one of the first attempt at describing the regional aspects of rural life in Haiti. He showed that the colonial pattern of administrative carving out has more or less endured through time and is not too dissimilar from the modern "départments, arrondissements et communes". He further stated that the basic administrative unit, the rural section, is an artificial construct:

"La section rurale, taillée après 1804 dans les paroisses du XVIIIème Siècle, au gré des circonstances diverses, apparaît, dans de nombreux cas, comme une entité artificielle, trop vaste et d'un dessin compliqué."

(Moral 1961: 124)

In fact, Moral thinks that the true geographical matrix of the peasant is the "habitation", an expression that relates to old French colonial plantations or to any sizeable tract of land that used to belong to a given owner.

More generally, Moral drew a significant distinction between the rising importance of Port-au-Prince, the decline of the main provincial towns linked to the shutting down of their ports to foreign trade on one hand and the survival of regionalism.

"En réalité, si dans le domaine des échanges extérieurs, la décadence des bords de mer secondaires se précise de jour en jour, depuis une vingtaine d'années, si, sur le plan social, les vieilles élites du Nord et du Sud perdent peu à peu leurs prérogatives locales et émigrent vers Port-au-Prince, la vie campagnarde conserve, elle, dans ses cadres traditionnels, esquissés par la nature et l'histoire, une incontestable originalité. La centralisation administrative et commerciale n'a pas encore affecté beaucoup la vitalité du régionalisme rural."

(Moral 1961: 123)

In other words, the growth of Port-au-Prince did not affect what was happening in the countryside, which was pretty much left isolated and neglected as it was during the country's history. Moral then asserted that the country can be divided in nine rural provinces:

- The plains and mountains of the North
- The Central Basin and its periphery
- The Lower Artibonite
- The Port-au-Prince area
- The Jacmel watershed
- The area of Fonds des Nègres and L'Asile
- The Cantons of La Grande Anse
- The Region of Les Cayes

Basically Moral's divisions reflected the interplay of 2 main types of factors: natural ones on one hand and historical ones on the other:

"D'une façon générale d'ailleurs, le découpage administratif de l'époque coloniale se retrouve assez aisément dans les limites actuelles des départements, arrondissements et communes. Avec le cloisonnement du relief et la division du pays en provinces climatiques il peut servir à définir les neuf provinces rurales d'aujourd'hui.

(Moral 1961: 125)

Moral's objective is to provide a clear description of each of the nine rural provinces. His focus is how the historical experience of a free peasantry was shaped by its increasing number and natural factors beyond its control (topography, rainfall pattern, soil types and so forth). Indeed there is an underlying tension in Moral's argument because very often he vividly describes the sharp contrast that exists within each of these regions, thus denying the very existence of the region's presumed homogeneity. Thus the existence of those "micro terroirs aux aptitudes variés". The following quotes will illustrate the point. Speaking of the Northwest and immediately following a statement on the region's poverty Moral writes:

"Le contraste y est vif entre des étendues très arides et quelques cantons verdoyants aux cultures serrées. Dans la traversée du Haut Moustique, de la Vallée des Trois Rivières au bassin de Jean Rabel, l'opposition se manifeste déjà entre les vastes savanes dénudées et les rares secteurs exigus où la polyculture se replie."

(Moral 1961: 125-126).

Similarly about the North

"Trois domaines bien distincts se partagent la région du Nord: la zone aride de Fort Liberté, les plaines du Cap et les massifs montagneux."

(Moral 1961: 127)

Of course, here and there one finds an attempt at providing valid generalizations. One of the main themes is the opposition between the North dominated by an "aristocratie terrienne" and exhibiting a more hierarchical social structure and the south characterized by a more egalitarian structure anchored by a fragmented land holding pattern.

"Mais surtout, la société rurale des plaines du Cap-Haitien a gardé, par l'intermédiaire de l'autoritarisme de la royauté de Christophe et de l'ère des généraux-planteurs, une structure hiérarchisée qui l'oppose notamment aux collectivités de petits domaniers du Sud. En dépit des partages successoraux, une aristocratie de hobereaux noirs se rencontre encore dans les sections de Genipailier, Morne Pelé, Bas de l'Acul, Roucou, Bas de l'Anse, Camp Louise ou Garde Champêtre."

(Moral 1961: 129)

By contrast in the South the situation is different:

"La société et la vie paysannes y présentent les caractères à peu près communs à toute la presqu'île: une paysannerie nombreuse de petits propriétaires, disséminés dans le secteur

vivrier et caféier; des sections rurales vivantes sans aucun centre de groupement; des marchés où s'effectuent les menues transactions locales; bref, un milieu rural relativement homogène en dépit de sa dispersion."

(Moral 1961:153).

These quotes are very suggestive of some research agenda but they ought not be taken at face value. Indeed there is imply no serious empirical data to support the assertion that the land holding patterns, and concomittant social structure, are significantly different from one area to the other. Additionally Moral did not try to show how these presumed differences affect the composition of output or the income distribution profile within each region. Last, Moral himself has documented the existence of marked intra-regional differences. Not surprisingly, at the end of his discussion Moral somewhat reluctantly falls back to the position that, after all, the homogeneity of rural Haiti might be its most striking aspect:

"... dans le Nord comme dans le Sud, on retrouve partout le petit paysan, adaptant tant bien que mal ses productions et ses genres de vie aux facteurs naturels, à la pression démographique, aux conditions des échanges, ainsi qu'aux influences urbaines; tout à fait misérable, plus ou moins pauvre, ou relativement aisé, selon des contingences locales qui lui imposent leur loi. Dans des cadre exigus et divers, "les travaux et les jours" de "l'nabitant" naitien présentent aujourd'hui un grand nombre de traits communs."

(Moral 1961: 167)

It must be noticed that Moral never, implicitly or explicitly, suggested that the regions that he identified be used as instrument of regional planning of for development policy purposes.

His purpose was purely academic and the main objective was to present as careful a description of rural life as possible. That is why the analytic basis of the book is weak even if it obviously remains a classic in the literature on Haiti's development.

As mentioned above, Moral's work is pervaded by the tension between the need to identify broad regional units on one hand and the profound similarity of the peasant's fate wherever he might be in the country. By the same token the country may be perceived as a real mosaic of small individual micro regions, the latter defined by the type of economic (agricultural) activity. How does one reconcile the apparent paradox of diversity within homogeneity? The answer is that the level of technology is extremely primitive so that natural conditions literally dictate the kind of economic activity that takes place. In other words soil conditions, rainfall pattern, constitute binding constraints within which peasant economic activity takes place. As modern capitalist agricultural enterprises are few, the Haitian landscape reflects the interaction of natural elements with a growing agricultural labor force that usually owns the land it works. This is obviously not to deny the existence of large scale land holdings in some of the coastal plains. But, the pattern that emerges is extraordinarily complex as it reflects the ingenuity of the small peasant and its very complexity prevents the emergence of broad regular features on a regional basis. Thus, Wood, in his study of the Northern Department identified nineteen geographic regions. Of those, eight were identified according to many criteria while climate is the main factor in identifying three regions. The remaining eight were distinguished from the others because of landform and structure (Wood 1963:74). Yet, the author could not carve out economic units.

"In making this subdivision, it is not possible to isolate areas which function as economic units. Such areas scarcely exist in the Department because of the prevailing system of land tenure. The economics of the most dissimilar areas are bound together by the activities of the thousand of farmers whose land holdings are fragmented and widely scattered. True functional boundaries, therefore, cannot be drawn."

(Wood 1963: 65).

Wood thus directs attention to one of the most ubiquitous aspects of rural life in Haiti: commercial activities organized around market places. Anglade shows that there are around 40 regional markets drawing more than 2,500 people on market days in the country (Anglade 1983: 43). He also proposes an alternative interpretation of Haitian national space based on the structuring role of markets seen both as instrument of social domination/resistance and economic/fiscal appropriation. Lundahl (1984: 161) describes the vertical nature of trade between the various types of Haitian markets and thus provides additional evidence of the structuring functions of markets within the Haitian geographical space.

Obviously this tremendous presence of markets implies that prices and transactions do play a significant role in rural life. There is a strong body of evidence that suggests that Haitian peasants are extremely sensitive to relative price shifts and adjust output decisions accordingly. Indeed, within the framework of a relatively constant technology, the composition of agricultural output has changed often dramatically: the cotton boom of the thirties, the banana boom of the forties, the sisal boom of the early fifties, the spectacular increase in rice output in the seventies provide testimony to this flexibility. This, however, does not weaken the argument presented above

because all of these spectacular booms were localized in specific areas: cotton in the Central Plateau, sisal in the dryer areas of the northeast and along the coast between Port-au-Prince and Duvalier-Ville, rice in the areas with irrigation or very high rainfall. Many of these booms also followed strong public sector intervention in the form of technical assistance, credit, extension and so forth. But, aside from those specific instances the social neglect of the peasant has meant that, he had to do alone in the face of an eroding resource base. Thus a particular type of agricultural practice was developed based upon risk avoidance and high labor intensity. Many observers such as de Young (1958) or Anglade in some of his writings have noted that given the existing technology (or stock of knowledge) peasants in Haiti have developed remarkable production habits.

"Peasant production methods are based on personal knowledge of small gardens by individual farmers. The farmer refers to "vein" of land which "give" such and such a crop, and from his detailed knowledge appears almost to carry a map of varying soil conditions in his head."

(de Young 1958: 47).

Indeed de Young speaks of horticulture rather than agriculture in Haiti's case. And Anglade (1983) has picked up the concept and extended it to the "bourg-jardin" as the basic social reality of the countryside. But ultimately ecological conditions dominate, although their influence may be qualified by economic factors (shift in relative prices, availability of markets).

A.2 The Ecological Regions of Haiti

The foregoing analysis suggests that natural factors are at the center of any explanation of agricultural economic activity. Many efforts have been expended to present the main aspects of the country's natural resources base. Donner's (1982) is the most recent attempt at linking the country's development potential to the natural resource base. And indeed this question is at the heart of development policy in Haiti given that rapid population growth was inducing an extension of the land areas subjected to active agricultural production while natural constraints (geology, topography, climate) severely limit the acreage that is suitable for agricultural activities. That question spurred the attempt of L.R. Holdridge to define the ecological zones of Haiti. Since the original Holdridge map was not made public, the analysis of its content must be based on the modified version of it that was published by the OAS (OEA) as part of the comprehensive Mission d'Assistance Technique Intégrée (1972). The author's objective was to delineate the various ecosystems that make up Haiti and to see how they interact with human activity to create biological zones:

"Le système de classification développé par l'auteur se base sur des paramètres de biotempérature et de précipitation afin de déterminer les limites définissant les unités supérieures de végétation ou écosystèmes qui, en s'associant à tous les organismes vivants, y compris l'activité humaine, prennent la dénomination de zones biologiques."

(OEA 1972: 558).

Holdridge thus took into account the average temperature, the altitude and the pattern of rainfall. From the combination of those elements 9 ecological zones of varying relative importance were thus defined. Donner (1982: 176) provides a synoptic table of those zones and it is reproduced here for analysis:

- i) the most important zone is the humid forest of the subtropical zone. It represents half the total area of the country with 14,039 square kilometers. This zone usually has an altitude of 800 meters and 1,200 to 1,800 millimeters of rain per year. Economically viable crops include coffee, cocoa, grains, plantain, pineapple, coconut.
- ii) the dry forest of the subtropical zone is the second largest unit with 5,212 square kilometers which is about 19% of the total area. Average altitude is 400 meters, with a temperature of 19 to 34°C and around 800 to 1,000 millimeters of rain. Economically viable crops are mangoes, limes, cotton, tobacco, sisal, sugar cane, plantain.
- iii) the very humid forest of the subtropical zone covers 4,091 square kilometers, about 15% of the total. Altitude is between 400 and 800 meters, temperature is between 14 and 30°C and 2,250 millimeters of rainfall. Economically viable crops are: coffee, guava, construction wood.
- iv) the humid forest of low altitude mountains represent 1,851 square kilometers and 6.6% of the total. The altitude is between 800 and 1,800 meters, the temperature varies from 7 to 18°C and the area receives around 2,000 millimeters of rain. On this area mostly coniferous species will prosper.
- v) the very humid forest of low altitude mountains cover 1,374 square kilometers which is around 5% of the country's area. Altitude is between 800 and 1,800 meters, temperature varies between 14 and 26°C and rainfall is 1,000 to 2,000 millimeters per year. Economically viable crops include grains roots, flowers, vegetables.

The four other areas are really of inconsequential size and collectively they account for less than one percent of the total area. It is obvious that this classification is of tremendous importance both in explaining actual cropping patterns but also in guiding policy interventions. It must be used for land use planning. However, it may not be used for regional planning purposes because the ecological units are not geographically contiguous. Additionally the important imbalance in relative sizes would create serious organizational problems.

Capital Consult (1982) took the Holdridge system as a point of departure and presented a national land use classification that included 5 main categories:

- a) Humid Mountains: 207,500 hectares. More than 80% of this area is used by coffee in association with beans, corn, some fruits and cattle raising. This is the optimal area for coffee growing. This area accounts for 15% of cultivated area, has deep soils, receives 1,600 to 2,000 millimeters of rain per year. The slopes are usually average and the population density is 200 inhabitants per square kilometers.

- b) Dry Mountains: 350,000 hectares. More than 80% of the area is used for corn, millet production. In the southern part vetiver is also grown on these mountains. They represent 25% of the cultivated areas, they have steep slopes, are vulnerable to erosion and receive 800 to 1,500 millimeters of rain. Population density is the lowest ranging from 39 to 100 inhabitants per square kilometers.
- c) Arid plains: 650,000 hectares, 45% of the cultivated acreage. Crops grown on these plains are corn, millet, beans (pois congo). They have gentle slopes and receive 600 to 1,400 millimeters of rain yearly. Soil substance is variable and so is the water capability. Population density ranges from 77 to 200 inhabitants per square kilometers.
- d) Humid plains: 137,500 hectares, 10% of cultivated area. Very gentle slopes. These plains have deep soils and receive 1,600 to 2,000 millimeters of rain per year. Population density is around 3 to 400 inhabitants per square kilometers. Crops grown include sugar cane, banana, rice, fruit trees.
- e) Finally we have the irrigated plains which represent 5% of the cultivated acreage with their 85,000 hectares. These plains have good deep soils and receive 1,200 to 1,800 millimeters of rain per year. Because of weak slopes, drainage can be a problem. The highest population density is found in these areas: 650. Rice occupies a major part of this acreage and so do beans, plantain, beans and vegetables.

The classification presented by Capital Consult represents a significant improvement over Holdridge's classification mostly because some explicit attention is devoted to economic factors (population density, type of crops). It is thus a valuable planning instrument that points out the main problem: now to reallocate some crops away from fragile mountain slopes. The concomitant consideration is that the intensity of land use in the plains could be raised. But this depends on the proper management of water resources. This focus is provided by the watershed approach. It must be said that however valuable it is, the Capital Consult classification scheme may not serve as the basis for regional planning because of the same limitations mentioned for the Holdridge one: units are not contiguous and are of unequal size. Clearly the dry mountains which represent 45% of the total would require a lot of attention since they are particularly vulnerable. But this should be done on a centralized basis since dry mountains are found all over the country. The problem of managing the physical infrastructure located in the irrigated plains raises the same kind of problems: a measure of administrative deconcentration is doubtless required but a national approach is needed if only because the funding requirements probably go beyond local resources.

A.3 The Watershed Approach

"A watershed is formed by all those lands that shed water into a stream; it can be a few acres that shed water into a ravine or creek; or it can be millions of acres that drain into rivers, such as the Nile and Mississippi. Watershed Management is the management of the lands, animals and people of a watershed so as to achieve the maximum benefits to man, while conserving the soil, forests, range and the water itself."

(USAID/Haiti - DARNDR 1962: 1)

This concise definition was provided in conjunction with an historical overview of the Haitian-American Watershed Management Project that was created in the wake of an agreement signed on June 4, 1959 between the Governments of Haiti and the United States. That first attempt at watershed management was located around the Peligre Réservoir which supplies water to the Artibonite irrigation system and also power the largest electricity generation plant of the country. The wisdom of the approach is confirmed by the fact that by the late 1970's erosion had led to such a degree of siltation that the useful life expectancy of the dam has been reduced. Zuvekas (1978: 190) quotes Ewel to assert that the efficiency of the Peligre dam has been reduced by 40 percent. Zuvekas added that others think that the reduction is more on the order of 60%. According to IDB (1982: 10) the Canadian consulting firm LGL (Lalande Girouard Letendre) has performed sedimentological balance tests that have revealed that as of 1979 the reservoir has lost 22% of its storage capacity. Thus only two out of the three installed turbines can work at any given time while during the dry season serious power shortages do occur. As important, as of the year 2006 irrigation water will decline at a rate of 800 hectares per year (IDB 1982: 10), a catastrophic prospect given that the Artibonite Valley is the main rice producing area of the country and that very important investments in the physical infrastructure has been made.

More generally, the country's rugged topography means that, in general, the problem of soil conservation and erosion control is of critical importance. A little more than half the country's area has slopes of above 40 percent so that the acreage that is suitable to agricultural production is rather limited. Yet population pressures and the lack of alternative employment opportunities have induced an undesirable extension of the land area put under cultivation. Some examples may illustrate the magnitude of the problem:

(Zuvekas 1978:191)

In the l'Acul watershed, which is a subwatershed of the larger Cayes watershed, the USDA soil conservation experts found that while only 24 percent of the area is suited to continuous cultivation with some soil conservation practices, currently 62 percent is now under active agriculture (USDA - SCS 1983:21). A predictable consequence is widespread erosion which not only reduces the available land resources up the mountain's slopes but also reduces the productivity of the lands in the flat areas because of the siltation of irrigation works, increased flooding and unstable water flows. Proper natural resource management is thus of critical importance.

But, natural resource management implies that many separate elements (soil, soil fertility, vegetation, hydrology, climate) must be considered in an integrated fashion. In actual fact these elements interact with one

another within the framework of a watershed or hydrological basin. Obviously this was realized a long time ago within the context of development policy in Haiti and the above mentioned Haitian American Watershed Management Program was designed precisely as a pilot experiment to be repeated all over the country. Unfortunately the project failed and the experience was not repeated. More recently Wolf Donner (1975, 1977, 1982) has strongly recommended that watersheds be considered as the focal unit of agricultural policy and as the geographical basis for planning purposes:

"In Haiti, however, the geomorphological relief immediately suggests a watershed approach when we discuss regionalization in the light of agricultural planning: only when using the watershed approach are we in a position to fulfill the objectives mentioned above as far as the physical development of agriculture is concerned. For the rest, that is the organization of production, local government and employment, the watershed is likewise a logical and promising framework."

(Donner 1975: 44-45)

Donner thus insists that watersheds should be the matrix within which agricultural output would be raised, soil conservation and water management would take place while decision making would be decentralized and grass roots rural participation would be promoted.

The central fact is then to determine the physical areas within which water and topography interact. The 1972 OAS study asserted that Haiti is endowed with more than one hundred hydrological basins whose size ranges from 6,828 to a few square kilometers for the smaller coastal streams or ravines (OEA 1972: 490). Obviously it is not practical to break the country into one hundred or more planning units. The OAS then proceeded to regroup the smaller catchment areas and present a list of the main ones and groups of smaller ones. The result is listed in Table I.1.

Using the OAS grouping as a point of departure, Wolf Donner then proposed a regionalization scheme that would regroup the 30 basins in seven agricultural development regions.

"Theoreticians of regional planning have worked out a number of criteria for the delimitation and the development of regions. Some of these criteria are valid only for developed (industrialized) countries, and most are based upon the reduction of distances between the regions of a country in terms of production, income, and so forth. Under Haitian conditions, while these criteria must be kept in mind, the more critical approach, however, is that of the best use of natural resources in a protective way, in other words: each region should be carefully studied as to its potential with due consideration to the future, and it should be developed accordingly ... The different physiographic regions of Haiti show different potential and different constraints, and one criterion of the regional subdivision should, therefore, be the selection of areas with a certain homogeneity to permit one or more technical approaches more or less valid for the whole region.


(Donner 1975: 48-49)

The key operating principle is thus the considerations of one whole catchment area as an entity for the protective and productive use of the natural resources. Thus Donner is led to select extensive watershed areas such as the Artibonite as a region or to consider the main coastal plains together with the adjacent slopes as the main units. The seven regions are the following: (see sketch next page).

- a) North Region: 2,690 sq. km. - total population 513,165 (1971) - density 119 inhabitants/sq. km. The region has high rainfall (2,400 millimeters in the west, 2,000 in the east and centre of the Massif du Nord).

FIG. 5

BASSINS ET ZONES
HYDROGRAPHIQUES
D'HAÏTI



 LIMITE DES BASSINS ET ZONES




Table I.1

HYDROLOGICAL ZONES OF HAITI

<u>BASIN</u>	<u>AREA</u> <u>(Sq. km.)</u>
1.- Môle St. Nicolas - Moustiques	987
2.- Bombardopolis - Gonaives	1,147
3.- Trois Rivières	897
4.- Port-de-Paix - Port Margot	543
5.- La Quinte	690
6.- Limbé	312
7.- Cap-Haitien	312
8.- Grande Rivière du Nord	699
9.- Limonade - Ouanaminthe	1,065
10.- Estère	834
11.- Artibonite	6,268
12.- St. Marc - Duvalier Ville	1,090
13.- Cul-de-Sac	1,580
14.- Fond Verrettes	190
15.- Cayes-Jacmel - Anse à Pitres	1,219
16.- Léogâne - Carrefour	651
17.- Grande Rivière de Jacmel	535
18.- Côte de Fer - Bainet	1,060
19.- P. R. de Nippes - Gd. Goâve	661
20.- St. Louis du Sud - Aquin	706
21.- Gde. Rivière de Nippes	459
22.- Cavailion	380
23.- Corail - Anse à Veau	877
24.- Cayes	634
25.- Roseaux - Voldroque	540
26.- Grand'Anse	556
27.- Jérémie - Les Irois	364
28.- Thouron - St. Jean	660
29.- Ile de la Tortue	179
30.- Ile de la Gonâve	680
TOTAL	<u>26,775</u> km ²


Source: OAS - Mission d'Assistance Technique Intégrée 1972: 491

- b) Northwest Region: 4,460 sq. km - total population 500,004 (1971) - density 112 inhabitants/sq. km. The region is somewhat arid and has low rainfall (400 to 600 millimeters).
- c) Artibonite Region: 7,180 sq. km - total population 812,845 (1971) - density 113 inhabitants/sq. km. The region has adequate rainfall (1,000 to 2,400 millimeters).
- d) Port-au-Prince Region: 4,710 sq. km - total population 1,164,528 - density 247 inhabitants/sq. km. Rainfall varies from 600 millimeters (Cul-de-Sac) to 2,000 (Massif de la Selle).
- e) Southeast Region: 2,490 sq. km. - total population 322,015 (1971) - density 129 inhabitants/sq. km. Rainfall varies from 1,000 to 1,200 millimeters in the mountains and 600 on the coast.
- f) South Region: 4,040 sq/km - total population 699,275 (1971) - density 173 inhabitants/sq. km. High rainfall in the mountains 3,000 millimeters.
- g) Grande Anse Region: 2,130 sq. km - total population 302,796 (1971) - density 142 inhabitants/sq. km. Region with highest average rainfall: 3,600 millimeters in the mountains and 1,400 on the coast.

FIG. 7


REGIONALISATION AGRICOLE
D'HAITI

BASEE SUR LES ZONES
ET BASSINS HYDROGRAPHIQUES
ADAPTEE AUX ARRONDISSEMENTS




- FRONTIERE NATIONALE
- LIMITE REGIONALE
- LIMITE D'ARRONDISSEMENT

7. REGION DE LA GRANDE-ANSE



2. REGION DU NORD-OUEST



1. REGION DU NORD

3. REGION DE L'ARTIBONITE

4. REGION DE PORT-AU-PRINCE

6. REGION DU SUD

5. REGION DU SUD-EST

It is apparant that Donner tried to create regions of relatively manageable size while making due allowance for infrastructural constraints. He (Donner 1975: 50) says for instance that in reality the last two regions are really the same unit but that the difficulty of access to one from the other warrants their separation. Should the communication constraints be waived, then no reasons prevent their merger into one region. At another level, Donner is careful to delineate the boundaries of the regions as closely as possible to the limits of the Arrondissements. Of course the latter is only vaguely known so that their definitive specification may be altered to reflect the proposed regionalization approach. Absolute priority is thus accorded to physiographic criteria and the hope is that administrative limits would then be made to conform to the former. However, the Law of August 1976 that clarified the administrative split of the country constituted a serious disappointment.

"En réalité, comme les découpages administratifs précédents, celui-ci, coupe des bassins versants arbitrairement et ne respecte pas du tout les unités écologiques du pays."

(Donner 1977:7)

Yet, it must be conceded that Donner's perspective is the proper one because, as was discussed previously, administrative units reflects much more the pattern of the colonial "quartiers" and "paroisses" rather than anything else.

A second interesting aspect of Donner's proposal is that it separates the requirements of regional management for natural resources protection from the

issue of administrative deconcentration. Donner quite correctly, recognizes that the country is very small so that distances are not of tremendous importance when the road network is developed and that the pool of available (planning) talent is restricted. Thus,

This indicates that, in contrast to larger countries, Haiti does not necessarily need a strong decentralization of administration to manage regional development plans, since much of the work could easily be done centrally in the capital"

(Donner 1975: 70).

Furthermore severe financial and technical constraints mean that:

"It would, therefore, be unrealistic to propose the establishment of seven regional planning bodies, each fully equipped administratively; and with trained, experienced staff to prepare, execute and control regional plans."

(Donner 1975: 71).

It will be shown in the last section of this chapter that such a measure of realism is sorely lacking from the Ministry of Plan perspective. Donner, it must be emphasized, is not at all opposed to local, popular participation in the process. He even proposes the creation of Regional Development Committees to provide some inputs. Be that as it may, the centralization of the process may be defended on the ground that in fact the strategic problem is the same (protective and productive use of natural resources) within all regions and that only some of the tactical aspects are really different (ie, what kind of crops given rainfall or irrigation possibilities). This implies that watershed management in each region will involve the same kind of activities--that is, soil conservation, range management, flood control, irrigation, livestock management and reforestation measures. All of these

activities will be geared towards the elimination of the ironical paradox that prevails in the country's land use: the under-utilization of the better lands (flat, coastal ones) and the over utilization of the poorer ones (slopes on hills and mountains). It is likely that this would involve an important shift in the cropping pattern so that more of the country's food supply will be coming from the flat lands while the output of the steeper slopes will be tree crops mostly for export. Finally, it is apparent, from the sketchy evidence available, that social factors, say land tenure, are also more or less the same in all areas. For instance larger land holdings are concentrated in the flat lands while the hills and mountains are dominated by fragmented smaller holdings. All of these factors then do provide some reasonable justification for a centrally managed regional policy anchored on watersheds. An important implication is that more deconcentration might be needed at the execution level to integrate some of the tactical aspects. Similarly popular participation will be required to explain the need for some of the disruptive changes and to involve the grass roots so as to lessen friction and avoid pitfalls.

B) THE EXPERIENCE OF PAST REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS

The creation of ODVA (Organisation de Développement de la Vallée de l'Artibonite) in 1949 represents the first attempt at inducing economic development through the mechanism of regional integrated development projects (RIDP). While many substantive or organizational variations may be observed, for instance HACHO was largely the result of private initiative, all of these attempts had one salient characteristic: the involvement of sizeable amount of foreign resources. In fact, these regional integrated development projects have gradually become the privileged way of channeling foreign aid funds. As put by USAID Food and Agricultural Sector Strategy for Haiti (1982: 193): "These organizations exist primarily as vehicles for donor-sponsored programs". An important implication of this situation has been the gradual loss of initiative on the Haitian Government's part and the virtual dominance of donor agencies in the process. Projects are more often than not conceived by foreign aid organizations and more or less imposed on the local authorities who find it difficult to resist the attraction of increased financial flows. Consequently, the whole country is carved up into areas where different donors operate. This is becoming an area of increasing concern.

"Such an approach, in theory at least, would tend to reduce the degree of "Balkanization" of the country which has characterized international assistance to Haiti over the last decade".

(USAID 1982: 176)

Other observers such as Anglade are more severe in their judgement and express deep preoccupation with what is perceived as a de facto occupation:

"J'ai procédé (en 1972 et 1974) à une tournée de toutes les administrations locales et l'on m'a partout présenté, à deux exceptions près, des initiatives venues d'ailleurs et auxquelles on essayait tant bien que mal de prêter main forte. Cinq ans après, la tendance s'est encore renforcée au point qu'il faille y reconnaître une tutelle et une occupation de fait".

(Anglade 1982:68)

But beyond the issue of the erosion of national sovereignty or autonomy in the formulation of development policy, the massive presence of the foreign agencies does raise critical problems. For instance, it is important to ascertain on what grounds the locational basis of most of these projects is determined. It seems that decisions reflect implicit narrow organizational goals that are quite unrelated to any spatial concern. Anglade (1982:68) speaks of "des contours arbitraires qui se surimposent aux trames locales." Only the ODVA case reflects a selection decision that may be said to be related to some "objective" factor. The area represented both the largest potentially irrigable zone of the country while providing the biggest hydro-electrical potential. Among the other projects HACHO started as an effort to provide relief and health services to the Northwest areas, and then its activities were expanded to cover other functional fields (community development, road building, agriculture). In a way, ODVA and HACHO illustrate the polar opposite criteria that could conceptually be used. On one hand the key variable could be what are the areas of greater potential, that is, areas where one dollar of public investment would generate the most improvement in productivity. Alternatively, one may want to intervene in areas with the greatest needs, i.e. areas that are relatively more deprived. ODVA would clearly fit the former while HACHO illustrates the latter case.

By and large however the selection of one area appears to be a rather unstructured process where perhaps the greatest concern is to identify an area where no one else is intervening. It might be a worthwhile concept to avoid duplication of efforts within a given area but there is also something to be said in favor of a coordinated intervention of various agencies within a given area. The above mentioned Food and Agriculture Sector Strategy contains a plea for moving into the latter direction. Yet, the same document proposes setting up a regional integrated development project in the South without really exploring the alternatives (passing mention is made of the Northwest, the Central Plateau or the Northeast) or without providing a coherent rationale to justify its choice. Ironically on the other hand, FAO spent more than two millions dollars on the preparatory phase of the Trois Rivières Project but the resources were wasted because no other agency would commit its resources on the basis of someone else's studies. More importantly, at no time is the question of the Haitian Government own priority taken into account. The implicit assumption appears to be that an offer of financing a project in any area will be welcomed. Even if correct, this assumption carries dangerous implications

One of the most important ones is what happens once foreign funds are no longer available. In a way the dominant presence of foreign donor agencies means that once their direct involvement is over there is little commitment to keep the organization going. The withdrawal of external aid from HACHO or DRIIP has meant the virtual snuffing down of these projects. Of course, other factors do come into play. For example from 1964 to 1971 the ODVA project

ceased to function for many reasons unrelated to the absence of foreign aid. Indeed it was reopened wholly on the basis of national resources without any foreign funds.

The organizational structure created to manage and implement these projects does not contribute to their becoming self sustaining. Preoccupied with immediate administrative efficiency, the foreign donors have usually insisted on creating separate organizational structures through which foreign funds will be channeled. This is a reflection of the concern for accountability and proper financial performance which in turn is linked to the underlying distrust often generated by corruption within the Haitian public service. Thus, new structures, separated from the traditional functional divisions of the central ministries are created and staffed by people on detail from the ministries. The project personnel usually receives salary supplements that make them much better off than their counterparts that remained in the Ministries. This of course breeds jealousy and resentment. But more importantly the system does not contribute to the long term improvement of the central Ministries's administrative capabilities. Thus, once the supply of foreign funds dries up, the Central Ministries are not in a better position to maintain the level of activity irrespective of narrow financial constraints. Furthermore there is a process of "cannibalization" with respect to the best technical people. They tend to move from projects to projects, often before the completion of their task within a given project.

A last point to be mentioned is that the separate organizational structures do not provide any guarantee that administrative performance will

be substantially improved. USAID (1982:193) correctly stresses that the absorptive capacity of these organizations may not be significantly higher than for the public sector as a whole. Thus, even when the availability of financial resources is not at issue, the actual performance is not significantly better. For instance both the World Bank finance ODN I project and the Inter American Development Bank financed ODVA (phase one) projects suffered serious delays and had to be redesigned to a certain extent. Even worse, the failure of the Canadian Aid agency with the DRIPP experience is a spectacular evidence that the corruption problem may not be solved by the creation of a separate organization.

At the policy level, a serious problem with the regional integrated development efforts has been the lack of a central focus. The overall goal is generally to improve the standard of living of an area's inhabitants. Thus a multiplicity of specific activities are funded: health, water supply, some irrigation, some credit, some extension, road building and so forth. The project scope of intervention is traditionally wide and comprehensive. But it cannot be said that this kind of comprehensive approach constitute an integrated one. In other words there is no specific, overriding policy objective from which a specific course of actions is logically derived. In a way this is because the improvement of productivity is not explicitly put at the center of the project's concern. Consequently no meaningful improvement in agricultural output is usually observed as a result of these various projects. Only ODVA provides an exception to this general assessment because the original program's focus was on the construction of an irrigation and drainage network associated with the building of the Peligre dam and the

construction of an hydroelectricity facility. The improved control of water resources was thus linked to a program of extension of rice production. Then, the trend in relative agricultural product prices made rice production one of the most lucrative agricultural endeavours in Haiti. Therefore, the incentive was there for the farmers to expand rice production and this in turn justified continuous public sector involvement to maintain and repair the existing infrastructure. In an interesting way, it is quite possible that the decisive factor in ODVA's success was unrelated to the project itself but rather to general trends at work in the economy at large, namely the spectacular increase in food prices especially since 1971.

B.1. The ODVA Experience

As mentioned above, this project started in 1949 and the original focus was the building of the Peligre Dam. It is a dual capacity dam supporting the production of hydroelectricity and allowing better use of the Valley's agricultural potential through flood control, irrigation and drainage. It is important to notice that from the beginning the project was conceived on a stage by stage basis. Probably this reflected the uncertainty that might have surrounded the financing package. The project was originally financed by a loan from Eximbank. Originally \$4 millions were advanced by Eximbank but the amount was later raised to \$14 millions in 1951. Further increases in the project cost raised the total amount borrowed to around \$40 millions. By the late fifties most of the civil engineering work was completed but it would not be before 1969 that the electrical generating equipment would be installed. The latter was financed by supplier's credit from the Italian manufacturer.

Up to the early 1960's ODVA was not considered a success by many. (Moral for instance). Yet from the vantage point of the mid 1980's the picture look brighter. While in 1952 the agricultural district of St. Marc estimated that the volume of rice sent out of the area amounted to 3300 tons (Moral 1961:327), for 1981 it is estimated that the Artibonite produced more than 150,000 tons of paddy rice. Rice production is widespread in the whole area and the rice economy is a relatively prosperous one. The area has been able to productively accomodate significant population growth and it is, with Port-au-Prince, one of the few areas experiencing net in migration.

If ODVA is to be considered a relative success, it is important to identify the reasons. The most important one was probably the clarity and simplicity of the central objective: the building of an important network of civil engineering works: dam, irrigation canals, drains and so forth. The availability of foreign financing and organizational ability meant that the original project could be completed in a relatively expeditious manner. This physical infrastructure could then support the development of activities dictated by the overall economic environment given that farmers are quick to take advantage of opportunities. The crop with the highest return in Haiti, at least since the 1970's, is rice which is also somewhat insensitive to most of the structural impediments besetting agricultural development in Haiti. As shown by Delatour and Duret (1984) rice production is not constrained by small scale (or small average farm size) nor by the mode of land tenure. Under these circumstances even if ODVA did nothing but maintain the physical infrastructure that would be good enough.

But more was done. In particular ODVA's activity has had a rice focus, aside from the civil engineering aspect. Successful introduction of new varieties has taken place and the extension system should be perceived as relatively efficient (partly because it deals with one crop in a relatively homogeneous zone). ODVA has also benefitted from continuous support and assistance, except for the 6-7 years ending in 1971 when it was closed. This has meant a relative degree of financial stability coupled with a rather explicit work program (as specified in the IDB loan agreements) with a heavy emphasis on maintenance and repair of the physical infrastructure. The second phase of the IDB financed project is more complex because aside from the engineering aspect, it involves rural promotion and extension on some 5,400 hectares (IDB 1982:34) and also a subprogram to increase the production of improved seeds. The last aspect is the continuing cadastral survey. It is important to notice that the program anticipates continuing technical assistance and institutional building to strengthen the institution and allow it to carry out expanded responsibilities.

While ODVA's objectives are relatively precise, the administrative framework has also been simple. First there is a Board of Directors made of the representatives of 3 Ministries: Agriculture, TPIC (Public Works) and Finance which advise the General Director who is appointed by the President. Second, ODVA itself is made of 4 divisions and one office: Administration, Agriculture, Engineering, Rural Development and the Land Registration Office. The total number of personnel amounts to 370 people of whom: 16% are professional, 7% technical, 9% office personnel and 68% services. Aside from this there is the separate ODVA/IDB project office which has 90 people.

This office was set up to manage the first phase of the IDB loan and it will be integrated in the general ODVA structure in the second phase which envisions a total reorganization of the institutional framework.

B.2 The Case of DRIPP

This project, Développement Rural Intégré Petit-Goâve-Petit Trou de Nippes, was born as a result of the bilateral agreement that was signed in July 1973 between the Haitian and Canadian Governments. The project area covered some 1,200 sq. kilometers and was inhabited by some 300,000 people of whom 10% lived in cities. Some \$20 million were to be spent over a period of four years. The most striking aspect of the program is that the objectives were not defined in economic terms. The objective was to stimulate local participation in the development process:

"Le programme a pour but de susciter la participation active de la population à la création des infrastructures et des institutions de développement socio-économique de la région, afin, ultimement, par la création de pôles de croissance en milieu rural, d'améliorer le niveau socio-économique des habitants de la région Goâve-Nippes."

(Dripp 1978: 3)

Almost everyone would surely agree with the underlying philosophy expressed by the statement. The problem is whether it could serve as an operational policy objective for a project. But of course, there are doubts as to whether or not DRIPP was a project rather than an amorphous set of activities. In any event, there is an implicit assumption that popular

participation may be served with the help of localized intervention divorced from the influence and impact of national constraints related to politics or sociology (Chapter II contains a further discussion of this point). A second problem is whether or not the time frame was a realistic one. Is it reasonable to assume that in 4 or 5 years one may overturn two centuries of social practice?

Not surprisingly the list of activities that were anticipated did not contain any logical sequence because the program aimed at covering everything at once:

"Le programme de développement régional intégré couvrira les secteurs et sous-secteurs suivants: pédologie, hydrologie, érosion, culture, élevage, pêche, santé, éducation, transport, industrie, commercialisation, crédit, coopérative, entreposage, communication, artisanat, tenure des terres."

(DRIPP 1978: 3)

This is certainly a comprehensive list. Unfortunately it does not provide for any ways to establish priorities in the face of limited resources. By the same token, even if \$20 million is not a trivial amount, to cover this whole range of activities over 1,200 sq. kilometers would certainly imply a thin spread of the available resources. Even if this kind of approach could be defended on some grounds, the issue of the adequacy of resources and of the time frame would certainly spell trouble from the beginning. As put by the former Canadian Minister of External Affairs in the context of a Parliamentary investigation of the DRIPP failure:

"You see, the view that some of us have coming away from our examination of that project is that it was too grandiose, too ambitious a project in the beginning. The scale of it was too massive, and it would have taken 25 years to accomplish what people thought might be accomplished in five years; 25 years, if then."

(Miss Mc. Donald in House of Commons, CANADA'S RELATIONS WITH LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN Issue No. 6, 11-2-1982; 16:11)

The official CIDA response was that poverty was so acute that a massive, saturation approach was needed.

"Essentially the proposition was based on Marshall Plan thinking, but adjusted to deal with a saturation of the poorest rural areas in countries. The saturation hypothesis itself depends upon a fairly large scale approach. In other words, if you accept the hypothesis that rural development is the imperative that five years ago it was felt to be - and which I think we all would agree is still an imperative - the approach to this if you want success in some reasonable time frame, had to involve a major effort with as many inputs as could be managed over as broad an area as could be managed."

(K. Bezanson in House of Commons: CANADA'S RELATIONS WITH LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN. Issue 17, 16-2-1982; 17:10)

In other words a big push approach ought to be adopted over a given area. But how should the area itself be delineated? At this point it might be better to step back and look at the history of how the area was chosen. Initially three areas were under consideration by the Canadians: The Central Plateau, Limbé and Petit Goâve. The Central Plateau was felt to be the area of greatest potential but the cost of infrastructure was deemed to be too high. Limbé was smaller, more accessible but other agencies were already involved in the watershed. Thus Petit-Goâve was almost chosen by default. The next step was then to precisely delineate the exact geographical size of the project area. At first the "commune" of Petit-Goâve was chosen, purely on the

basis of its administrative limits. But then it was thought better to consider a larger "economic unit" extending to Barradères. Ironically the disastrous lack of communications within the area itself would later emerge as an impediment and lead to the splitting of the project area in two. Thus one wonders on what grounds the area was defined as an economic unit.

As it is, from a locational point of view there is no justification for the program's physical setting. Traditional administrative limits (arrondissement or commune) were not respected. No attempt was made to respect the natural boundaries created by the watersheds of Grande Rivière de Nippes and Petite Rivière de Nippes - Grand Goâve. There was thus no obvious spatial criteria to shape the program's strategy in an operational way. All that existed was the desire to promote self sustaining development by some sort of a "Rostowan" formula: Capital plus Technology plus Technical Assistance equals Take Off.

The lack of an explicit, coherent strategy resulted in a constant shifting of the program's objectives. By 1977, that is in the middle of the program's third phase, there was a belated recognition that the geographical basis was not properly defined. The project area was therefore divided in two subregions: "A" centered on the Commune of Petit Goâve and "B" centered on the Commune de Nippes. It was then decided to concentrate activities on the "A" subregion while analysis and information gathering were carried out for subregion "B". But then, even subregion "A" was found to be too big an area.

"La sous-région "A" est formée par la commune de Petit-Goâve avec plus de 50,000 hectares et 130,000 habitants. Avec ses systèmes écologiques complètement hétérogènes représentés par des régions de plaines, de plateaux et de montagnes, elle est beaucoup trop vaste et trop peu connue pour être considérée comme unité de base aux fins d'études, de planification et d'interagents de transformation - sont tellement importants qu'ils dépassent la capacité du Programme, si l'on tenait à assurer le développement de toute la région en même temps."

(DRIPP 1977: 1)

In other words the existence of the micro regions discussed in the preceding section is perceived as a factor that destroys the subregion's homogeneity and thus make it unsuitable as a unit. It was thus decided to further shrink the project area, particularly for agricultural development policy. The latter would be focussed on the ZIC (Zone d'Interventions Complexes - Zone of Complex Interventions). The first ZIC was located on the perimeter of the Petit-Goâve Bay and measured around 17 square kilometers; that is less than 5% of the region theoretically encompassing the project. Additionally, and parallel to the down sizing of the project area, there was a scaling down of the over all scope of intervention. Agricultural interventions was more narrowly focussed on food production.

"Quant à au plan de l'agriculture lui-même, il est orienté vers la production vivrière répondant ainsi aux besoins d'alimentation du paysan et aux grandes orientations du Plan Quinquennal de la République."

(DRIPP 1977: 89)

What started as an ambitious program of popular mobilization for self sustaining growth ends up being a food production program centered on less than 2,000 hectares on the main rationale that such a course of action met the peasant's need for food and was consistent with the National Plan's emphasis

on food self sufficiency. This was the result of conceptual ambiguity and of the failure to precisely define a coherent strategy that would encompass the whole area in its physical heterogeneity. This failure is rather puzzling because Thai Cong Tung correctly perceived that the improvement in land productivity was contingent upon a radical shift in land use that would concentrate on growing food on the flat lands while mountain slopes would be used for tree growing.

Les plaines sont essentiellement à vocation vivrière alors que la vocation des mornes est d'abord arbustive. Or, dans la réalité, c'est l'inverse qui se produit: on plante tellement d'arbres, - même le caféier - dans les plaines et on fait des cultures vivrières annuelles dans les mornes."

(THAI CONG TUNG 1978: 34).

This should have been the central focus of the program and everything else should have been articulated around that concept. As it was the lack of conceptual clarity led to dispersion of efforts.

While there was a shift in focus and a narrowing down of the agricultural component of the project the other components, say health or education, were not redefined. Partly this was the result of the population's pressing demands for these services. There was thus an imbalance in DRIPP activities that was in contradiction with the underlying "big push" approach that resulted in the program's original emphasis.

At another level DRIPP was confronted with another dilemma because originally the project was not conceived as having any implementation functions. It was really a program. The original planners intended to use

the existing services of the Central Ministries to deliver services to the marginalized populations. Thus the regional branches of the various ministries, health or public works, were reinforced and salary supplements were paid to the staff operating within the project area. This generated frictions and/or jealousy because the lower rank field levels in Petit-Goâve now had at their disposal more important resources than their bosses in Port-au-Prince. This did not augur well for the post project phase administrative capabilities within the project area. First even if the whole effort had succeeded the institutional framework would not have survived the ending of foreign funding. Second if the project had indeed been successful one of its effects would have been to attract many people from outside the original boundaries, thus placing added pressures on the existing institutional pressures. And, indeed there was ample evidence that this was the case especially with respect to the health sector.

The willingness to work through the existing institutional framework also confronted DRIPP with the difficulty of inducing cooperation among the various national entities. The frustration was well expressed by a former Canadian civil servant, Mr. J. F. Templeman before the House of Commons.

He was aware that to be able to get agriculture, education, the Ministry of Planning and the Ministry of Health working together in Haiti so that they could coordinate their efforts with the Canadian Government in an area as large as that of the DRIPP area, with 300,000 people, would be asking the Haitian Government to do something they have never done before. They do not coordinate."

(John Templeman in House of Commons: CANADA'S RELATIONS WITH LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN. Issue 16, 11-2-1982; 16:27)

Templeman even identify this problem as the single most important element in explaining the ultimate failure of DRIPP.

"What we tried do to was to make four Haitian Government department work together when they had never worked together before. That is what I mean when I say the seeds of failure were in the project. The purpose of it is perfectly laudable; it just could not work in Haiti."

(Templeman ibid 16: 28)

It would have been encouraging to be able to list the reasons why this assessment is no longer valid.

With respect to the agricultural sector proper, it appears to have suffered from an excessive technological bias. While it is proper and desirable to put emphasis on increasing productivity, the issue is how to do it. DRIPP choose to rely on the demonstration effects of specific parcels that were to be cultivated with the state of the art technology. These "pilot parcels" were to be anchored in two other programs: a system of experimental farms directly managed by DRIPP that would screen out varieties, make tests with various modern inputs given the technical constraints (soil type, water availability and so forth) so as to minimize the risks for the "pilot parcels" in order to avoid the possible backlash that would result from peasant's loss of confidence. The second supporting program was the development of grass-roots organizations that would contribute to the spreading of the new technological packages. For instance, credit would be channeled through farmer's associations. Collective storage facilities were also to be financed as well as supply stores for inputs. Finally an intervention at the marketing level was also anticipated.

There is obviously nothing wrong with these activities in and of themselves. The only problem is that they do not address the central issue raised before that is the shift in land use pattern as between plains and hills which might involve much more than just the demonstration effect. For instance most tree crops do have fairly long gestation periods so that even if willing to shift out of annual food crops, the peasant might still be unable to do so because he is unable to wait out the transition period. Alternatively, it might have been important to identify in which precise manner does the prevailing land tenure pattern affects the possibility of actually shifting the land use pattern. The ultimate failure of DRIPP was indeed a foregone conclusion that would not be modified by the list, however impressive, of specific achievements.

B.3 The Case of ODN

ODN was conceived as a single mechanism that would plan and coordinate the actions of the central administrative units of the Government in the North. However, ODN has gradually replaced these units, ministries or other agencies, and has therefore developed fullfledged executing capabilities. It was granted financial autonomy in April 1982 and is the official regional development agency for Region 1 defined by the Law of Regionalization (World Bank 1983: 7).

The first phase of the Project involved expenditures of \$13.4 millions while the total cost for the second phase would amount to \$29.2 millions.

As the first phase covered only the Arrondissement du Cap, it implied expenditures of \$60 per capita given that the area covered 500 square kilometers and involved 220,000 people (World Bank 1976: 6). By comparison the second phase covers the whole North (4,180 square kilometers and 775,000 people). Expenditures would thus amount to around \$38 per capita. While the area of the project's first phase was relatively compact a wide variety of specific activities were contemplated:

The project would be carried out over a four year period and would rehabilitate and expand irrigation systems, provide credit to mostly small farmers, carry out agricultural trials and seed multiplication, improve technical assistance, set up an animal health service, rehabilitate two municipal markets and an abattoir, repair and construct feeder and access roads and improve rural water supply."

(World Bank 1976: 8)

Once again it is obvious that there is no explicit conceptual focus that provides coherence to these activities even if it is stated that "the project would concentrate on removing key constraints to development not presently covered by other programs" (World Bank 1976:8). Indeed, there is a fragmented and selective attempt at improving crop production and marketing conditions (feeder roads, rehabilitation of markets) while also providing a better social infrastructure (rural water supply). These are certainly worthwhile objectives. But do they address the main aspect of agricultural development in the area? As put by the project document for the second phase:

Practically all the crops are rainfed. Some 10% of the plain is in fallow or not cultivated for a number of reasons (floods, drought, absentee ownership, collective family ownership.) While the hillsides, where a large segment of the population settled for historical reasons, are often over cultivated."

(World Bank 1983:8)

In other words agricultural output in the project area is heavily dependent on an irregular rainfall pattern. Given the low level of technology this implies that the level of output may vary in a random fashion, thus inducing farmers to behave in a more conservative fashion (risk aversion). The project paper further reported that:

"More recent records from the sugar mill in the region indicate however a gradual decrease in precipitation during the last ten years period (2,451 mm in 1970 to 670 mm in 1975), which has caused severe reductions in yields of sugar cane and other crops."

(World Bank 1976: Annex 1: 2)

It would have been reasonable to try to address this problem in a more direct manner which would have included perhaps a shift to different crops or more attention to the irrigation/drainage component. As it is, the irrigation component was the least successful one and the irrigated area had to be reduced from 4,900 hectares to 460 (World Bank 1983:5).

At a different level, although the perennial problem of overuse of the hillsides and under utilization of the plains is mentioned, no specific policy measure was suggested to address that question. As mentioned previously, this might be the single most important question confronting Haitian agricultural development and the failure to address it implies that any project's success, in other areas, is likely to be of marginal importance. A related aspect of the problem is the Bank's decision not to get involved in that area. It is laudable to try to avoid duplication of efforts but it remains to be proven whether or not, given the magnitude of soil destruction in the country, additional commitment of resources would be socially unwarranted.

Furtnermore, the WFP/FAO project was localized in the Limbé watershed so that other areas might have been selected for soil conservation measures within the framework of a change in land use patterns.

The second phase of the project envisions a big increase in the project area which will then cover the whole Region 1 as defined by the Ministry of Planning. No justification was provided for the expansion of the project area. However, it must be pointed out that "agricultural programs would focus on small scale farmers in zones with adequate potential for improvement of output" (World Bank 1983:9). Seven such zones, covering 9,000 hectares have been selected. They include rainfed areas, irrigated areas, some of the hill sides of Grande Rivière du Nord and 1,400 hectares located in the Northeast. Project activities include irrigation, agricultural development, credit, road building, water supply, a rural development fund to support small-scale initiatives by local communities. Thus the second phase includes both geographical and functional dispersion of activities.

As with the first phase, the second one will still focus on rainfed agriculture since only 920 hectares out of the 9,000 hectares that are involved will be irrigated. The problem that was raised above in the context of the first phase thus remains unsolved. The expectation of higher agricultural output, and therefore of higher farmer's income, then depends entirely on the adoption of a new technological package that is centered on new varieties of the same crops that are part of the traditional crop mixes.

"Those increases in production are largely supported by institutional efforts (research and extension) as compared with the use of high technology inputs. In fact, on farm costs are relatively low as only improved seeds, limited use of fertilizer and improved practices are the main on farm inputs."

In other words the over all success of the agricultural program will ultimately depend upon what has traditionally been the weakest point of Haitian development efforts: good organizational or institutional performance. The second phase thus properly emphasizes institutional development and training. However, a potential problem would be that ODN would have to rely on the line agencies to carry out some project activities. Thus while research and development activities (farming systems work, farm surveys, on farm trials) and seed production will be under the direct operational control of ODN, the regional office of the Ministry of Agriculture would keep "line responsibility for water management, operation and maintenance of irrigation, as well as extension." (World Bank 1983: 25). The Bank appears to have been acutely aware of the problem of interagency coordination in Haiti because it insisted that bilateral agreements be signed between ODN and each of the four line agencies Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Public Works, BCA, SNEP (National authority for potable water outside of Port-au-Prince. Furthermore, the Bank insisted that the Government and ODN enter into a formal agreement designating ODN as the project executing agency. An interesting feature of the bilateral agreement between the Ministry of Agriculture and ODN is that if the former fails to carry out its responsibilities, the latter will assume them. It is obviously premature to evaluate the efficacy of these measures but they deserve close scrutiny because they might provide a solution to the nagging problem of interagency coordination by making prior formal agreement on the issue a condition of loan effectiveness.

An overall conclusion is that so far, i.e. at the end of the first phase, ODN can hardly be considered a success. The project has been plagued with many problems and some redefinition of programs and objectives had to be performed. Similarly no significant increase in output or in productivity has been noticed. Yet the Bank decided to go ahead with a second phase. Paradoxically, this might be the reasonable attitude because it is unrealistic to expect any meaningful gains over 4 - 5 years. A much longer perspective is needed and so the fact that the ground works for ODN III are being laid may also be considered a positive sign. What is needed, however, is a clearer, sharper focus to the program. As it stands today, it is much more a series of loosely connected activities being implemented in the same general area. Yet, the potential is there to transform ODN into a truly regional planning authority. The basic requirement to ensure that such potential not be wasted is that foreign resources ought not to be withdrawn prematurely.

C. The Regionalization Strategy of the Ministry of Plan

Since the mid 1970's, the Division de l'Aménagement du Territoire et de la Protection de l'Environnement (DAIPE) of the Ministry of Plan has been involved in an ambitious attempt at formulating a coherent development policy that would be anchored in the twin concepts of regionalization and administrative decentralization. Much more emphasis has been put on the former aspect as compared with the latter. The first result of this effort has been the increasing saliency of regional development issues in the various official documents of the Ministry of Plan. Thus, "L'Aménagement du territoire" is one of the three "options prioritaires" of the 1981-1986 Five-Year Plan. More concretely, the Law of November 1982 was enacted to provide the basic framework for regional policy by specifying the geographical composition of the four main economic regions and by creating the four main institutions to be involved in regional policy.

C.1 Regionalization with Urban Focus

The strategic objective is thus to achieve a greater degree of decentralization. But why decentralize? It is possible to identify two main threads in the Ministry of Plan's analysis. The first one relates to a dissatisfaction with the socio-economic performance of the 1970's. It was perceived that problems had worsened in the wake of the relative growth experienced during the 1970's.

"Le fait le plus important à signaler, et qui se trouve au coeur de la problématique du développement du pays, c'est que la croissance économique, au cours de ces années 1970, s'est accompagnée d'une inégale distribution des revenus, et du renforcement des déséquilibres et disparités entre régions et entre secteurs."

(Ministère du Plan 1981 (b) Volume I: 3)

The second one is the growing concern about the magnitude of urban growth and the inability of the cities to productively absorb the growing flows of migrants without the dislocations associated with marginality and urban decay.

"L'urbanisation s'inscrit comme à la fois cause et conséquence de l'apparition et du maintien d'un certain nombre de goulets d'étranglement."

(Ministère du Plan 1981 (b) Volume I: 43)

More precisely, the problem is not really urban growth per se, but rather its concentration on the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area. Excessive concentration of economic activities in Port-au-Prince is perceived as threatening the economic viability of the other areas:

"L'objectif de l'Aménagement du territoire est la redistribution rationnelle de la population et des activités économiques et sociales exclusif à travers l'espace national. La centralisation, au bénéfice quasi-exclusif de Port-au-Prince, du capital social du pays, est en effet de nature à asphyxier des régions à fortes potentialités, dont la contribution au processus de développement du pays pourrait être fondamentale."

(Ministère du Plan 1981 (b) Volume I: 95)

The main policy problem is thus perceived to be the need to reduce the flow of migrants to Port-au-Prince by narrowing the gap between the latter and the other cities. The Haitian urban network should then be organized as a hierarchical order with cities at each level performing a different functions. Originally, (Ministère du Plan 1976 (a) Volume I: 32) it was planned that four levels would be created:

- a capital city: Port-au-Prince
- three "centres d'équilibre régionaux": Cap-Haitien, Gonaives, Cayes

- seven subregional centers: Jacmel, Jérémie, Hinche, Petit-Goâve, Miragoane, St-Marc, Port-de-Raix
- twenty-five secondary cities.

However, in the process of further elaboration of the concept, the hierarchy was refined and divided in seven categories. Two criteria were used in the classification: population and function. The seven levels may be briefly described as follows (Gouvernement d'Haiti 1981: 136-139).

- Level 0 center: rural village having 100 to 500 inhabitants - No significant level of infrastructures.
- Level 1 center: village with at least 500 people - by the year 2006, the country should have 1,920 level 1 centers primarily located in mountain areas.
- Level 2 center: village having 500 to 2,000 inhabitants - By the year 2006 there will be 3 to 500 level 2 centers in the country.
- Level 3 center: small town of 2 to 10,000 inhabitants. By the year 2006, 93 such towns exist in the country and they benefit from electricity 24 hours a day, potable water, sewage system, primary schools etc.
- Level 4 center: city of 10 to 50,000 inhabitants. In 2006, 27 of them exist in the country.

- Level 5 center: subregional capital with a population of 50 to 100,000 inhabitants. There would be 5 such centers: Port de Paix, St-Marc, Jacmel, Hinche, Petit-Gouave. St-Marc with more than 100,000 inhabitants could be a level 6 center but is not so classified because of its functions (not specified).

- Level 6 center: four of them exist by the year 2006: Port-au-Prince, Cap, Gonaives, Cayes. Each of these centers is endowed with sophisticated urban infrastructures: water, sewage, electricity, telex and telephones, industries, banks, theaters and one university or a very high level technical school. These are regional capitals and all of them basically offer the same social infrastructure as the capital city. It is thus implicitly hoped the attractiveness of Port-au-Prince will decline relatively over time.

Brinkernoff et al. wrote:

"But the regionalization scheme is designed not only to spread economic and social development more widely, but also more specifically to promote the growth of Cap-Haitien, Les Cayes and Gonaives as poles of development counter magnets."

(Brinkernoff et al. 1981: 79)

The World Bank provided a remarkably similar assessment:

"The decentralization process is shaped along the growth pole and related theories and assigns specific functions to communities of different hierarchical levels. Conceptually, this is the usual approach to a rational distribution of economic activities and infrastructural facilities over a given territory."

(World Bank 1979: 14)

A direct implication of this analysis is that agricultural or rural

development may not be the real first priority of the regionalization effort. The real emphasis is to endow the three regional centers with infrastructures that will be similar to those available in the capital city. Yet, at the same time, the traditional emphasis on agricultural development had to be preserved, if only because most of the population is still engaged in agricultural production. An elegant way was found to link the urban emphasis to the agricultural sector with the creation of the Unité Spatiale de Développement (Spatial Unit of Development).

"En donnant à la fonction polarisatrice des espaces et aux potentialités agricoles une certaine prépondérance, il a été ainsi possible d'identifier quinze Unités Spatiales de Développement."



(Gouvernement d'Haiti 1981: 134).

The 15 USDs are:

- Cap-Haitien, Vallières, Fort Liberté
- Limbé
- Jean Rabel
- Gonaives
- Artibonite
- St Raphael, St Michel
- Mirebalais, Lascahobas
- Baptiste, Savanette
- Port-au-Prince
- Thiotte
- Jacmel
- Petit-Goave, Petit Trou de Nippes
- Cayes
- Jeremie


UNITES SPATIALES DE DEVELOPPEMENT

LEGENDE

-  USD de priorité 1
-  Zones d'influence
-  USD de priorité 2
-  Zones d'influence
-  USD de priorité 3
-  Zones d'influence

VILLES DE SUPPORT

-  Centres régionaux
-  Centres locaux régionaux ou villes principales
-  Villes secondaires ou petites villes



Localisation of Les Cayes "USD"

The fifteen USDs were compared among themselves, then 3 levels of priorities were defined. The USD with the biggest potential were:

- Cap-Haitien, Limbé
- Artibonite, Gonaives
- Port-au-Prince
- Cayes.

These four areas were thus selected as the ones having priority in terms of claim to resources. Essentially, the USD may be considered as a metropolitan area and its hinterland. Such an approach is not unreasonable if one agrees with the Ministry of Plan that resources are limited so that they must be carefully managed. Financial resources must therefore be committed where they will have the greatest impact or where they would alleviate poverty the most. But on what criteria are the USDs delineated and how should they be evaluated with respect to one another is not at all clear.

Cependant, les ressources financières et humaines disponibles étant très limitées, les actions de développement ne pourront être réalisées sur l'ensemble de la superficie des quatre régions. Il faudra délimiter à l'intérieur de ces ensembles régionaux des unités spatiales de développement, USD, ou zones prioritaires d'intervention à l'intérieur desquelles les actions de développement se concentreraient de façon à avoir un effet d'entraînement dans un deuxième temps. Leur taille ne doit être ni trop vaste, ni trop restreinte afin de permettre aux actions d'envergure qui seront engagées, d'avoir un impact sur la région... le choix de ces unités spatiales de développement doit obéir à certains critères:

1. infrastructure de base
2. Potentialités économiques
3. dynamisme de la population
4. volonté de dynamiser une agglomération urbaine ou une zone à fortes potentialités
5. existence d'organismes de développement

A coherent textual interpretation of this quote is not easy because some of the criteria are either redundant (2 and 4) or are meaningless (3). More important, such an approach would make sense only if the information basis was a reliable one at the regional or local level. This is not the case, and nobody can really compare the economic potential of Thiote with that of St Raphael--St Michel for example. This was explicitly recognized by the Ministry of Plan itself in 1980:

"Une allocation des ressources par région et par domaine rural urbain s'avère un peu difficile présentement en Haïti, étant donné la rareté d'informations précises sur la base économique des différentes régions."

(Ministère du Plan 1980: 121)

Similarly, the World Bank (1979: 14) wrote:

"However, the approach outlined in the plan requires more concrete and clearer definitions of goals, objectives and regional priorities and of specific policy measures. This presupposes more complete information and a better understanding than is now available of the regional development problems in general and of urban and rural poverty in particular."

The experience of trying to collect the available informations for the Cayes watershed (see Chapter three) clearly indicates that both assessments of the weakness of the information base are still correct today. This implies that the ranking of the USDS reflects nothing more than the a-priori subjective evaluation of the DAIRPE staff. Additionally, there is a total lack of coherence between what is written in the documents and actual policy actions. For example, while according to its own documents, the Ministry of Plan considers Fort de Paix and Jean Rabel of secondary importance (priority 2 and 3), it then turns around and create a regional development organism called ODNO (Organisme de Développement du Nord-Ouest) and uses it to try to mobilize

foreign aid resources for investment in an area that was previously considered as being of secondary importance. The same applies to ODBFA.

While attempting to implement a spatially oriented development strategy, the Ministry of Plan should have been more careful in the geographical delineation of the various regional unit's boundaries. In fact a promising start was taken when the Ministry had formulated the intention of using watersheds as the basic geographical unit (Ministère du Plan, 1976). Yet, a few months later, watersheds were no longer in favor and had been replaced by "îlots de développement" an idea that did not last either. Today the situation reflects a somewhat arbitrary choice that does not have any serious empirical foundations.

C.2. The Institutional Framework

The Regionalization Law of November 1982 did two things at once. On the one hand, 4 regions were created, essentially on the basis of the traditional administrative boundaries. Given the discussion of section "A" above, the four regions are therefore arbitrary creations reflecting much more the vagaries of historical development rather than any other objective criteria. It would have been much more legitimate to assert that the objective is to create four regions rather than to pretend "recognizing" them as objective facts.

A second aspect of the Law was that four institutions were also created because the Ministry's strategy is to pursue simultaneously three aspects of

decentralization: spatial relocation of economic activity, administrative deconcentration and greater citizen's participation. Administrative deconcentration is also the stated objective pursued through the work of the "Commission Administrative" as part of its efforts to improve the public sector's efficiency and modernize its procedures. The goal of administrative decentralization is not only to provide decision making powers to the field staff of the ministries, it is to allow them to formulate and implement Regional Development Plans. Together, the regional representatives of the various ministries constitute the regional system of planning. This is indeed an ambitious and far reaching objective.

In fact, the relevant question is whether or not such a system can work. Given the difficulties encountered at the national level by the planning process, there are strong doubts that such a system can indeed function in the foreseeable future in Haiti. For one thing, this planning, implementing and monitoring capability at the regional level would place additional strains on the relatively thin pool of available talent. In the preceding section of this chapter, it was shown that Donner was so acutely aware of this constraint that he felt that such a regional planning capability was out of the realms of the possible for the foreseeable future. There is an additional conceptual difficulty with the stated willingness to have regional planning. The implicit assumption is that the development problems confronting each region are so different from one to the other that each should be treated separately. This is an unrealistic assumption because at this stage of its development, Haiti presents a remarkable homogeneity with respect to the basic problems: illiteracy, malnutrition, erosion, underutilization of the best


natural lands and so forth. These key issues should be treated by national policies, even if their implementation is decentralized. In fact the perusal of the Ministry of Plan documents reveal very little differences in what is proposed to be done in each region. In other words, one does not find a differentiated approach simply because the problem is fundamentally the same across all regions.

But there is another problem with the institutional framework created by the November 1982 Law. The Third Chapter created a "Commission Régionale de Coordination et de Planification" (CORCOPLAN) which is made of all the central ministries regional directors, of the region's prefects and of the "députés" (representatives). This body is supposed to participate in the process of regional planning. It is to be feared that such a mechanism will prove to be unwieldy and cumbersome. Indeed it might be the rock on which the regionalization policy will flounder. Part of the problem is the tug of war between the Ministry of Plan which has a more developmental approach and the Ministry of Interior which is much more interested in political control. The situation is at a political stalemate but the end result is ambiguity and confusion. For instance, it is not clear how the responsibilities of the DATPE (Plan) differs from those of "Administration Territoriale" (Interior).

The National Planning System

The November 1982 Law on territorial ordering divided the country into four subnational spaces called regions. The main objective pursued by the Ministry of Plan was the promotion of urban growth in Cap-Haitien, Gonaives

and Les Cayes and the decentralization of Port-au-Prince, as shown sooner in C.1. A national planning system then was designed in order to implement the regionalization scheme. This system (SRN) consists in a vast information and decision network going from the grass-roots to the state ministries.



The Social Agents

CXC: is the Communal Council Committee. It will provide grass-roots information with reference to the elaboration of development plans. This committee is constituted with members of the communal commission, of representatives of the CAC's federation, of socio-professional groups in rural sections and of technicians from the various agencies at the commune level.

CORCOPLAN: is the regional planning and coordinating commission. Its task is to conceive the regional development strategy and to elaborate regional plans and programs. It is constituted with the regional directors of the public administrations, of congressmen and of prefects. The regional director of the Ministry of Plan is the coordinator of the commission.

CORDES: is the regional committee on socio-economic development. It facilitates the participation and concerted policies of private sectors in the identification of needs and priorities of the region. CORDES is composed of members from the commercial, agricultural, industrial and professional groups. Membership is honorary.

CONAT: is the national commission on territorial ordering. It is constituted with the Ministers of Interior, Plan, Public Works, Finance and Industry, commerce, Education, Public Health and Justice. CONAT's coordinator is the Minister of Plan.

THE PLANNING PROCESS

1. The members of CCC will identify in assembly meetings basic problems of their area and elaborate a document ranking the different programs and projects needed according to their priority. This document goes to CORCOPLAN and will serve to identify real needs of the grass-roots.
2. The members of CORDES will meet in assembly and elaborate a document concerning the economic potentialities of the area and promote the measures to be adopted in order to improve agricultural and industrial production and commerce.
3. CORCOPLAN will examine the different projects and programs proposed by CCC and CORDES. CORCOPLAN's major task will be to conciliate conflicting interests between both documents and to elaborate the regional strategy and the preliminary plan. This plan will be sent back to CCC and CORDES for adjustment and to CONAT for approval.
4. CONAT will review the proposed plan and ascertain that the regional plan harmonizes with the National Plan. In the later case, CONAT will approve the plan and submit it to the legislative body.
5. If the plan is adopted, the congressmen will vote a regional budget to implement it at the regional level.
6. The CORCOPLAN will actualize the plan and the various agencies of the

government, the private organizations and the CACs will implement the projects and programs.

7. CONCOPLAN will supervise and evaluate the plan and the process.

This process shows that the flow of informations comes from the grass-roots level. It supposes that CACs, cooperatives and other popular organizations are democratic bodies. This would allow the debate on priorities and real needs. Moreover, this approach suggest the existence of well trained technicians and animators able to concretize into real projects the desires of the CAC's members. It supposes also a well trained pool of talents able to investigate and elaborate coherent projects and programs for the region.

At another level, the national planning system will work only if the budget is regionalized and if power is delegated from the national level to the regional authorities. And last but not the least, the planning system supposes a strict control over administrative corruption, the practice whereby some public money is illicitly diverted for private gain.

"According to much of the data examined covering countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, corruption has a deleterious, often devastating effect on administrative performance and economic and political development, for example, corroding public confidence, perverting institution's processes and even goals, favoring the privileged and powerful few, and stimulating illegal capital export or use of non rational criteria in public decisions."

(Gould D. J. 1983: iii)

The DRIPP case is the best illustration of it.

C.3. OVERALL ASSESSMENT

The need to decentralize Port-au-Prince and to spread economic activities all over the country has led the decision makers to introduce regional planning as a mean to equilibrate the capital and its hinterland development. However, the absence of objectively identifiable regions resulted in a chaotic process of administrative geographical divisions. For the coordination of the various regional actions of public agencies, the Ministry of Plan enacted a law dividing the country into 4 regions; these regions will be managed by local planning institutions. The regionalization policy will then achieve spatial decentralization while the new local institutions (CORCOPLAN) will benefit from administrative deconcentration.

Along this report, we have stressed the factors arguing against the spatial decentralization approach; small size of the country, technological improvement in communication network, urban scale economy, the homogeneity of the population... and so forth and so on. It has been also said that the country is a mosaic of small individual micro regions interacting with a growing population of micro owners equipped with extremely primitive level of technology. This led us to think about the extreme dependance of Haitian farmers on the soils conditions and rainfall, and that ultimately, ecological conditions dominate. Consequently, agriculture in Haiti is based on risk avoidance and high labor intensity.

If natural factors are the dominant ones and contribute to the limitation of cultivated acreage and the decline of land productivity, any economic

strategy should base their policies on ecological units. Holdridge, Donner and Capital Consults elaborated tables of biological zones. This classification is useless in Regional Planning because the units are not geographically contiguous.

The major problem was then to find a spatial matrix of intervention where the protective and productive use of natural resources could be combined. Donner proposed the watershed approach. He divided Haiti into 30 watersheds where agricultural output would be raised and soil conservation and water management would take place. He did not propose a regional management for each watershed because the problem is the same everywhere: protective and productive use of natural resources. All the policies at the watersheds level would tend to eliminate the paradoxal under utilization of better lands while poorer ones are overused.

This watershed approach dictates a centrally managed regional policy. Master plans are required for the thirty watersheds in order to be implemented by operational private or public agencies. At the watershed level, some degree of administrative deconcentration and popular participation will be needed in order to integrate tactical aspects.

The clarity and the simplicity of the objective of this watershed approach makes it a viable spatial unit to work with. The experience of ODVA shows that it can work. The next steps should then be the design of institutions at the watershed and the national level able to be self sustaining when foreign funds are not available anymore.

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CHAPTER II: COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT AND THE PROBLEM OF SELF HELP

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If geographic dispersion is not conducive to the emergence of a community, it is not the only reason why Haiti is such a group-weak society. A central feature must be found in the fierce individualism, of the farmer who is an active member in a market and monetary economy. Given the widespread ownership of land, the integration in the market economy means that most farmers are independent operators who must mobilize labor, secure inputs and sell the output in the numerous markets scattered all over the country. The economic well being of the household is thus largely dependent on individual decision making by the head of the household. Of course, this does not mean that there are no structural impediments lying beyond the immediate purview of the individual farmer. But, as demonstrated by the various writings of Lundani (1979 and 1983), the Haitian peasant largely operates within markets that are reasonably competitive. And indeed the changing composition of agricultural output over the years is a powerful testimony to the acute sensitivity of peasants to shifting relative prices in the product markets. Be that as it may, agricultural development in the recent past has been characterized by stagnation in output and productivity, if not by actual decline, so that peasant's welfare has deteriorated. Thus, the perceived need to introduce and foster change in the countryside. In that context, the elimination of the peasant's isolation and the emergence of secondary groups with a strong sense of community acquire tremendous importance so that community development may be considered a legitimate goal in and of itself.

That goal may be considered especially important given the traditional neglect with which the countryside has been treated. Peasants are isolated not only in terms of the physical habitat but also, and more importantly, in terms of social marginality within the larger national community. That is why the integration of the marginalized groups is often considered the main

objective of community development. In that sense, the concept of authentic participation at the grass roots level becomes the key element in assessing the success or failure of a given community development program.

However, the acute poverty and the extreme material distress in which most Haitians live mean that the provision of basic services to the lowest income groups is also of tremendous importance. And so is the need to raise output and productivity. In that context, community development may be considered the means through which the services will be delivered to a target population. Alternatively community development may serve as the channel for technology transfer or for technical assistance so as to improve peasant's productivity. In that sense, efficiency criteria would be of paramount importance while grass-roots level participation becomes of secondary concern.

Today, community development in Haiti is perceived to be both the goal and the means. In fact, within the planning process, there is a functional sector denominated "Community Development" in the same way that there is an agricultural sector or an educational sector. Indeed, the sector "Community Development" is conceived as a temporary stop gap measure and is thus narrowly defined in terms of time. It is limited in timing because it is just substituting for the other functional sectors such as education or public health until the latter develop the administrative and technical capabilities that will allow them to effectively cover the whole country. This is explicitly asserted in the 1981-1986 Five-Year Plan:

"Les institutions du secteur Développement Communautaire sont donc menées provisoirement à fournir aux populations concernées

une aide technique relevant de la compétence de différents secteurs, en attendant le développement à long terme de la capacité opérationnelle de ces derniers dans les milieux non encore desservis."

(Ministère du Plan, 1981 (b), Volume II, 357-358)

Curiously, since the sector "Développement Communautaire" is just temporarily replacing the functional sectors, there is no limitation in terms of its scope of activity. Anything can be the legitimate concern of that sector provided that the functional sector is not involved in that area. Thus community development involves non productive activities such as health, education, family planning, nutrition, physical infrastructure as well as directly productive ones. Furthermore community development activities are not restricted to the countryside. They may, and do indeed, take place in urban areas, including Port-au-Prince. (Cité Simone - Industry)

Interestingly enough, despite the explicit definition of community development as a temporary channel to furnish services to marginal groups, there is still a lot of emphasis on participation and popular mobilization. In fact, participation and popular mobilization are perceived as the key element in the success of the actions to be carried out. In the agricultural sector, for instance, there is a program entitled: "Organisation et Promotion de la Vie Rurale", which is conceived as "the basis" for agricultural development.

"Ce programme est à la base du plan de développement du secteur. Le paysan doit être le sujet et l'objet du développement rural, c'est-à-dire l'artisan principal et le bénéficiaire prioritaire; il doit être organisé, formé et conscientisé dans cette perspective. Le seul moyen connu pour le moment est de le porter à s'associer en coopératives, sociétés agricoles de crédit, caisses populaires, associations

de planteurs, d'éleveurs, etc... afin d'assurer sa participation réelle et efficace aux programmes d'investissements prévus, d'augmenter son pouvoir de négociation et sa capacité de prise en charge et de gestion des infrastructures d'intérêt collectif construites par l'effort national."

(Ministère du Plan, 1981 (b), Volume II: 35)

There is then a need to mobilize marginalized group. But this is conceived as process that should be, if not controlled, guided by the public sector. Clearly then community development is seen as a legitimate activity or endeavour of the public sector. And for that purpose, a rather elaborate institutional mechanism has been developed to promote and control community development.

For many reasons, it is not easy to provide a complete quantitative evaluation of all the activities that can be put under the label "Community Development". According to the World Bank's May 1982 Economic Memorandum on Haiti, for the 5 years 1976-1981 about \$50 million were spent for the sector labeled "Community Development". This represented 8 percent of the total disbursements of the Development Budget. The bulk of these resources is of foreign origin. For the first three years of the 1976-1981, 5 years Development Plan, 92 percent of the funds actually disbursed were external aid resources. For the 1981-1986 Five-Year Plan, funds of national origins were not expected to account more than 8 percent of the total: \$5.2 millions out of a total of \$65 millions (Ministère du Plan 1981 (b), Volume II: 372).

A. Historical Antecedents and Current Status of the Organizations involved in Community Development.

The available evidence suggests that community development efforts started in the late 1930's in Haiti. According to Elie Vernet, the first cooperative was created in October 1937 in the North, at Port-à-Piment (Vernet 1969: 145). The first law regulating community development activities was promulgated April 22, 1939 (Laroche 1969 and Vernet 1969). The first article specified that in each rural section shall be constituted societies (sociétés) denominated "Coopératives Agricoles de Production" whose membership would be open to all residents and non residents of a rural section if the latter owned property in the section (Vernet 1969: 147). From there on, there was a lapse and community development activities would not resume until almost a decade later, this time under totally different auspices. The new beginning was linked to the technical cooperation programs involving foreign aid agencies.

The first such program was associated with the UNESCO sponsored Marbial project. Located in the southeastern part of the country, not far from Jacmel, the project was based on the principle of learning by doing and involved literacy, public health, home economics, improved agricultural practices and the first steps in community organization (see Métraux A. 1951, Métraux R. 1951 for descriptions of the area, the program etc. A critical review is provided by Moral 1961: 331-334). When the foreign technicians associated with the project left in 1952, the responsibility to keep it going was assumed by the Division of Community Development in the Ministry of Labor. The intention was to use the methods developed in conjunction with the

Marbial project and the technicians trained, on the job and outside, to spread the concept of community development beyond Marbial to an ever larger number of areas. During the mid fifties, responsibility for community development programs shifted to the Ministry of Commerce, then back to the Ministry of Labor; and then to the Ministry of Agriculture (Schaedel 1969: 93). In the meantime, an important bilateral program was developed between the Haitian and American Governments. This bilateral program was to have profound and lasting influences on the evolution of community development programs.

In order to achieve greater efficiency in its technical cooperation efforts, the predecessor agency to USAID began to emphasize a community development approach. As put by Schaedel (1969: 94-95):

"In the mid 50's the binational foreign assistance program of the United States began to devote attention to making its programs 'impact' felt at village level, and community development methods and personnel were added to the Rural Education Division of the Point IV mission."

Indeed, the main function of community development was perceived to be to function as a channel for technical assistance programs. Daniel Russel, Communities Activities specialist of the USOM to Haiti stated as the first purpose of community organization: "to make more effective the work of all the technical assistance programs." The second purpose was "to act as a connecting link between the technicians and the peasant farmer" (Russel 1954: 1). Moral (1961: 334) bluntly asserted that "the doctrine of community education is notoriously of northamerican inspiration".

The bilateral U.S. programs were carried out by SCIPA (Service Coopératif Interaméricain de Production Agricole) by SCHAER (Service Coopératif Haitiano-Américain d'Education Rurale) and by the "Poté Colé" program in the north. The success of these endeavours was dubious at best. Primarily the problem was that none of the attempts proved to be the first step in a self sustained effort. The withdrawal of the foreign personnel usually caused what Schaedel aptly described as a "shrivelling effect". In other words, none of the projects had the much hoped for demonstration effect in inspiring autonomous self help initiatives. This is even more noticeable because the bilateral program appeared to have developed a larger scale base: Schaedel reports having attended a gathering of nearly 100 ad hoc community councils in Cap-Haitien (Schaedel 1969: 89). He also reports the high expectations of a high Haitian official involved in community development:

"On another occasion, I talked confidentially about the future implications for rural self-government of community development programs with one of the outstanding leaders of the community development movement in Haiti. He stated confidently that over the long term this was the goal of the program."

This quote is remarkable for two reasons: the first is that obviously a quarter of a century or so after the conversation the goal of rural self-government is as remote as it was then. The second is that it illustrates the evolution of the objectives assigned to community development. It went from a mere channel of technical cooperation to the royal path to rural self-government. What is more remarkable is that this tremendous shift in emphasis occurred despite the lack of success of the community development programs in achieving its first stated goals.

In 1961 the Haitian Government created the "Office Nationale d'Education Communautaire". The objective was apparently a double one. On the one hand, the creation of an autonomous body was to symbolize the high level priority given to both the fight against illiteracy and the programs of community education/development. The second objective was both to placate foreign pressures and to create another set of programs suitable for foreign aid financing. Unfortunately, political events overtook these developments and the organization went into lethargy given the cut off of most foreign aid programs in 1962-63. It must be pointed out that even if ONEC was created as an autonomous agency, the Ministry of Agriculture still protected its involvement in community development by retaining a "Service d'Animation Rurale" (SAR) whose objectives and functions substantially overlap those of ONEC. This situation still exist today despite the fact that in 1969 a new entity was created, the "Office National d'Alphabétisation et d'Action Communautaire", ONAAC.

ONAAC has expanded responsibilities and is empowered both to manage the national literacy campaigns and to formulate and implement national policy with respect to community development. In particular ONAAC should coordinate, monitor and control the activities of all actors involved in this area, be they public or private, lay or religious, national or foreign. Furthermore, ONAAC should promote the creation of Community Action Councils (CAC). The latter's official existence is contingent upon ONAAC recognition. ONAAC in 1980-81 had some 6,000 employees, including 5,000 "moniteurs d'alpnabétisation". The number of "moniteurs" seems to vary with the availability of external support. For instance, with the phasing out of the

PAM project, their number dwindled from 6,000 in 1976-77 to 1,500 in 1979-80. As mentioned above, besides ONAAC, the Ministry of Agriculture's SAR is still in existence and its domain of intervention encompasses that of ONAAC. SAR has around 200 employees including 100 community development agents. Brinkerhoff and his Associates (1981: 47) seem to think that there is room for both entities, and that indeed they might complement one another. The Ministry of Plan 1981 study of community development asserts exactly the opposite (Ministère du Plan 1981 (a): 32) and list the lack of coordination between ONAAC and SAR as one of the weaknesses of the actual institutional set up.^{1/}

The problem of coordinating public sector intervention is exacerbated by some recent institutional developments. First, since 1977-78 there exist an "entity" called CONAJEC "Conseil National d'Action Jean-Claudiste". While initially created as a political body to further the aims of the Jean-Claudiste Phase of the Revolution, CONAJEC has become rather active in the field of community development partly with the furnishing of services (water, sanitation, schools) and partly as a channel of popular mobilization. Despite repeated and sustained attempts, we have been unable to locate the exact law that defines CONAJEC's specific areas of responsibility. Second, since April 1981, there has been a new body affiliated to the Ministry of the Presidency in charge of controlling and evaluating CACs. The new entity is CONACOS (Conseil National de Contrôle et de Supervision des Conseils d'Action Communautaire). Members of CONACOS are appointed by a Presidential decree.

^{1/} Zuvekas (1978: 244) also advocated the merging of this two agencies.

It is uncertain what "kind of control" CONACOS is supposed to exert beyond that provided by ONAAC. The possibility that the former's creation reflects a political decision to further reduce the autonomy of CACs should not be dismissed.

Indeed, this need for tighter government control over the various programs involving community development stems from the uneasy ambiguity that exist between the public sector entities discussed above and another class of very important actors that play a critical role in community development programs. That class of actors is made of the various Private Voluntary Organizations (PVOs). These PVOs, most of them foreign, play a critical and important role by providing financial resources, technical assistance, training abroad, and general back up services. More important, they constitute an alternative source of resources, beyond the control of the public sector. In principle, the latter provides some guidance and modicum of control but in fact PVOs have had pretty much a free reign. This situation is causing uneasiness in some quarters and the need for greater monitoring, at least to begin with, is increasingly emphasized. There may be some legitimate reasons to do so, if only because of the sheer volume of resources collectively controlled by the PVOs. The latter's growing importance represents a sharp departure from the situation existing in the fifties. Then, substantial resources were also provided by foreign sources but through an official bilateral channel that provided more of a sense of control on the Haitian side. Today the "privatization" of the foreign resources has meant the decline of local official control if only because of the number of entities involved. One source mentions that there are between 250 and 400 such organizations in Haiti (ACDI-CIDA 1982: 49).

It is difficult to provide a comprehensive survey of PVOs' activities in Haiti. The UNDP office in Port-au-Prince has put their number at 124. For organizations based in the United States a periodic survey is carried out by the American Council of Voluntary Agencies for Foreign Service through the Technical Assistance Information Clearing House (TAICH). According to the various TAICH Reports in 1974, there were 44 American PVOs involved in 11 different fields of activities. Twenty two of these organizations reported that they were providing \$4.6 millions in financial assistance. By 1981, 66 American PVOs were involved in 16 different areas. Of those, 55 reported that they were providing \$23.9 millions in financial assistance to the country (TAICH, various issues). (TABLE II-1) provides a summary of the functional areas in which American PVOs were operating. It appears that the greatest number is involved in providing services in the medical and educational areas. While in 1974 two thirds of American PVOs were involved in medicine and public health, the percentage rose to close to three fourth in 1981. On the other hand, involvement in what could be called "directly productive" activities (food production and agriculture, industrial development) appears to be rising. In 1974, about a third of U.S. PVOs were involved in these activities, with the proportion increasing to more than half by 1981. The relatively small number of entities involved in the field of community development is instructive because it would suggest that the promotion of popular participation or the mobilization of people at the grass roots is not the primary focus of American organizations. The latter may happen incidentally but it would seem that the main focus is on providing services to a given targeted population. This should be kept in mind when discussing the success or failure of the CACs.

TABLE II.1SUMMARY OF U.S PVOs ACTIVITY IN HAITI (1)

(Number of PVOs per functional area)

	<u>1974</u>	<u>1976</u>	<u>1981</u>
Medicine and Public Health	29	39	48
Education	20	21	37
Community Development	10	9	17
Food production Agric.	13	14	27
Industrial Development	3	4	10
Total number of PVOs	44	56	66

(1) : Summing the numbers in the columns will not add up to the total number of PVOs because any given one may be involved in more than one field

SOURCE: TAICH Country Report Haiti, various issues

Comparable information is not available for PVOs based in other countries. However, a recent evaluation by the Canadian Aid Agency (ACDI-CIDA 1982) shows that from 1968 to 1982 some 400 projects, involving 70 Canadian organizations were financed at a total cost of some \$8 millions to CIDA. Considering that the contributions by the PVOs themselves match CIDA's contribution, it is likely that the total resource flow involved amounted to between twice and three times the official contribution. It must be noticed that CIDA started its involvement in Haiti through the PVOs and that since the DRIPP project was closed, CIDA's involvement is done importantly through PVOs. Based on the results of the evaluation study (ACDI-CIDA 1982: 2-3), it appears that Canadian PVOs intervene in more or less the same areas as American ones. However, the relative importance of the functional areas is slightly different. More than one fourth of CIDA's funds went to health and population projects. Close to one third went to community development while education received barely 10 percent of the total.

While the role of ONAAC, SAR and PVOs is important in the community development programs, the backbone of the effort is made of the "Conseil d'Action Communautaire" (Community Action Councils) CACs. Indeed, one of the main functions of ONAAC is to promote the development of these CACs. By the same token, most PVOs operate through some CACs. No systematic data appears to have been collected on CACs and even ONAAC, the official monitoring agency, is at a loss. Impressionistic evidence and subjective judgements suggest that the number of CACs has gone up significantly over the recent past. Clerismé (1978: 10) asserts that there were more than a thousand CACs all over the country. On the Annual Development Plan 1978-79 (page 367) the Ministry of

Plan puts the number at 1,044 with a total membership of 105,200. The geographical distribution of these 1,044 CACs was given as follows: North 111, Northwest, 215, Centre 102, Artibonite 164, West 228, Grande Anse 70. For the 1981-86 Five-Year Plan, the Ministry of Plan puts the number of officially recognized CACs at 1,653 (they were made of 6,000 Groupements Communautaires) (Ministère du Plan 1981 (b) Volume II: 359).

The uncertainty and confusion that surround the issue is well illustrated by ONAAC data. In 1980, with the technical assistance of the International Labor Office (ILO) and UNESCO, an exhaustive survey of ONAAC files was done. It was then estimated that 1,300 officially recognized CACs were in existence, while the non recognized ONGs numbered 2,500 to 3,000 (Département de l'Éducation Nationale 1980). Closer reading of the document reveals, however, that there were only 1,008 CACs (number obtained by tabulating the number of CACs in each geographic region) (see Table II-2). Confusion is compounded by the fact that, from July 15 to October 15, 1982, an exhaustive field survey using ONAAC field personnel was conducted. According to that survey 460 CACs existed in 1982 and their membership numbered 158,400. Table II.2 compares the geographical distribution of the CACs. In both cases the West Department has the greater share of CACs, more than one fourth in one case (ONAAC). This is a rather surprising finding given that Port-au-Prince is included in the West and that a priori one would have expected the CACs to be located much more in the relatively more deprived areas. Table II.3 is in that sense a far better indicator. It compares CACs' membership with the rural population. Nationally, it would seem that only 4.1 percent of the total population belongs to CACs. More importantly if only households were considered and the

TABLE II.2NUMBER OF CACs AND GEOGRAPHICAL LOCATION

	<u>BEAS</u>		<u>ONAAC</u>	
Total Number	460	(100%)	1.008	(100%)
West	87	(18.9%)	267	(26.4%)
South	50	(10.8%)	201	(19.9%)
North	40	(8.6%)	115	(11.4%)
Northwest	62	(13.4%)	110	(10.9%)
Artibonite	65	(14.1%)	90	(8.9%)
Grande Anse	36	(7.8%)	70	(6.9%)
Southeast	56	(12.1%)	63	(6.2%)
Centre	44	(9.5%)	50	(4.9%)
Northeast	20	(4.3%)	42	(4.1%)

Source: BEAS (1983) and Departement de l'Education Nationale (1980)

TABLE II.3CAC MEMBERSHIP AS % OF RURAL POPULATION

<u>DEPARTMENT</u>	<u>RURAL POPULATION</u>	<u>CAC MEMBERSHIP</u>	<u>CAC MEMBERS AS % OF POPULATION</u>
West	789.232	20.240	2.5%
South	443.838	14.929	3.3%
North	444.844	15.313	3.4%
Northwest	260.332	20.893	8.0%
Artibonite	618.549	30.433	4.9%
Grande-Anse	438.265	16.378	3.7%
Southeast	341.499	17.303	5.0%
Centre	322.679	18.147	5.6%
Northeast	155.012	4.767	3.0%
TOTAL	3.814.250	158.400	4.1%

Source: BEAS (1983) and IHSI for Rural Population

household was made of five people on average, about 20 percent of the rural population belonged to CACs (assuming that only the head of household participated in CACs). Table II.3 confirms that the Northwest has the highest rate of membership relative to rural population while the West has the lowest.

The data from Table II.2 and II.3 reveals that the average community council has a membership of more than 300 members. That is a fairly numerous membership and this certainly implies problems both at the level of effective participation at the grass-roots and at the level of effective management. The Ministry of Plan data quoted above suggest an average of 100 members per CAC. In the Artibonite it was found that the average number was 174 (ODVA-IICA 1980: 94). This is a far lower number than what is indicated by Table II.2 and II.3 (468). Of course, there is the problem of active versus nominal members that will be discussed in the next section. Notice that the former is always substantially below the latter. The ODVA-IICA study mentioned an average of 71 active members.

B. Structure and Performance of Community Action Councils

ONAAC (n.d: 1) defines a CAC as:

"Une institution autonome qui fonctionne comme un mini-gouvernement local selon des principes bien établis de démocratie, équité et égalité..."

Michel Laquerre (1977: 60) also shares the conception of the CAC as a mini government in the rural section providing services to the local population. In principle, there should be one CAC per rural section. However, if distances are too great or if the total population is too large, many CACs could operate in a rural section. In such a case, all of them would merge in a "Federation" of CACs. An alternative is that, in a given area, there may be smaller community action groups called "Groupements d'Action Communautaire" (GAC). Many GACs would then form a CAC. Internally, a CAC is managed by a committee that includes a president, a vice president and many advisers. The management appears to be top heavy and the situation in many CACs reminds one of A. Métraux's (1951: 62) comment: "Le goût des paysans pour les hiérarchies compliqués et les titres sonores se donne libre cours dans le cadre des sociétés". In principle, and in fact, a GAC may subdivide itself in many different subgroups with functional areas of concern (health, education and so forth).

B.1. Democracy and Participation

ONAAC's definition of the CAC as a mini government functioning according to the well known principle of democracy, equity and equality raises important issues. The first one is obviously whether or not this is indeed the case. But, as important, it should be asked whether or not this can be the case, given the structural elements at work in Haitian society at large. Indeed, despite the cautious "democratization" process recently undertaken with the recent municipal and legislative elections, there are not many, if indeed any, social groups functioning with these characteristics in the country. Political parties are non-existent, labor unions are few and tightly controlled, few professional associations function in a truly autonomous manner and there are no student unions or associations worthy of the name. The country's history is a long succession of authoritarian regimes, the degree of societal control being at times somewhat looser than at other times. Under these historical/sociological conditions, the existence of truly democratic, egalitarian and equitable social groups on a large scale basis would indeed constitute nothing short of a miracle. This is not to deny that, here and there, one may indeed find such groups. What is at issue is whether or not it is legitimate to expect community action councils to have these characteristics as a structural feature of their operations on a large scale basis nationwide.

In fact, and not surprisingly, a consistent criticism of the CAC movement is that it is not democratic, equitable or egalitarian. Representative sample of this may be found in the writing of Lundahl (1983: 223), Maguire (1979:

5,28, Lowenthal (1978), Dryade-Ecorurale (1982: 59, 72), Gow (1977, a, b). The problem of the absence of democracy implies that the leadership in the CACs has objectives or interests that are different from those of the general membership. Because of this, the level of participation by the members is minimal: they do not identify with the goal of the organization, they are not consulted with respect to what ought to be done and there is no sense of the pursuit of a common goal. The lack of democratic process is thus a reflection of the heterogeneity of the membership within CACs. In other words, the internal composition of the CAC's membership merely reproduces the overall national social structure. As put by D. Gow (1977 b: 18):

"The members of the community are usually better educated and economically better off than rank on file members. The average family income of all council members is \$431, while that of committee members is more than double this. Thus the community councils tend to be dominated by the Gros Nèg, a pattern found elsewhere in Haiti."

Along the same vein, the Snuckers (1980: 72) wrote:

"The membership in council is dominated for the most part by relatively more powerful and economically better off area residents. While the membership itself varies a great deal in terms of the class question, the tendency is for leadership to reflect the larger landed families."

Ginette Cantave (1978) found the same kind of phenomenon in Bellevue-Chardonnières. D. Woodson (Locher et al 1983: V. 12) provides an instance where, in Chambellan, the traditional elite has been among the chief beneficiaries of a project. Similarly the ODVA-IICA study on community development in the Artibonite specifies that to be eligible to the leadership of a CAC, one must own land in the area and live there. In fact, only Laguerre (1977) provides a contrary assessment with his description of the

Laborde community council as an homogeneous brotherly organization made of humble peasants of similar socio-economic status. In their 1982 assessment of the agricultural sector for CIDA, Dryade Ecorurale (1982:69) is even more scathing, implying that the government, foreign aid agencies and the Church have helped the traditional elite subvert the CAC movement to its own benefit:

"S'inspirant de toute évidence des nombreuses formes associatives de travail développées par les paysans, les élites rurales (paysans moyens et aisés, spéculateurs, chef de section etc...) appuyées en cela par le gouvernement de Francois Duvalier et soutenues sur le plan technique par les animateurs ruraux de l'ONAAC, ont voulu donner naissance à des formes plus modernes d'organisation paysanne. Les églises et les organisations de coopération internationale (USAID en tête) ont suivi..."

In other works, the internal structure of the CACs emerges as one of the chief impediment to one of the most important of its objectives, popular participation within its own ranks.

However, the problem of inequality has another twist. For some observers, regardless of what happens inside the CAC, the latter is perceived to be itself an undemocratic institution because of who all the members are. Some authors indeed consider that the poorest of the pors do not participate at all in the CAC movement. Gow (1977) for instance wrote that the most destitute members of the area he visited did not participate in any CAC. The average family income of non members was \$261 compared with \$431 for members. BEAS (1982:29) also indicated that most CAC members were landowners that were relatively privileged as compared with others (share croppers, landless peasants and so forth). The same survey indicated that 66 percent of all CAC members nationally were owners, while share croppers represented around 9

percent, renters 13.5 percent and others around 12 percent. Ginette Cantave (1977: 188) also found that 72 percent of the CAC members owned properties measuring at least half a carreau (.64 hectares). How should this be interpreted? For some authors the fact that landless peasants do not participate in CACs implies that the latter is not fulfilling one of its function in a wider sense: that of integrating society's marginals. However, it is likely that such judgement might be premature and too harsh. First, the land owning status question is a tricky one because a given individual may be a landowner and a sharecropper at the same time. Second, it is not obvious that some of the smaller landowners are economically that much better off than landless peasants. Third, since most of the CAC's projects are of a social, rather than economic nature, everybody would benefit from the services regardless of social status. In other words, delivery of health services, availability of drinking water do not exclude lower income peasants. It is obviously in the case of directly productive projects that the exclusion of some may be of importance. By the same token, it is also true that the payment of a membership fee is an unnecessary exclusion criteria; however small the fee given the level of poverty. (On the other hand, the CACs do have legitimate financial needs to face).

B.2 Organizational Autonomy and Foreign Aid

The Problem of the nature of the CACs leadership and the internal functioning of these councils may be approached from another angle. According to the somewhat idealistic vision of ONAAC, CAC are born out of the autonomous decisions of the peasants themselves after a preliminary work by the ONAAC

agents. But in fact, it seems that the process is quite different. First the ONAAC agent's first objective is to identify the "true" leaders of a given community, to work with them and to sensitize them to the community's needs. An effort is then made to show the possible benefit of a community program. Second, once the potential leadership has been identified, the ONAAC agent calls on the population at large to form the CAC and to select, through open and free election, the members of the executive committee. The motivating function of the ONAAC agent is thus of paramount importance and through weekly sessions he should keep on trying to develop the spirit of community development.

Such an approach is obviously ambiguous. For one thing, the process is clearly from top to bottom. But more importantly the identification of the "true" leaders may end up confusing the holders of powerful social positions with the real leaders in a popular sense. This then leads back to the problems discussed in the preceding sub-section, lack of democratic participation, apathy and the diversion of the organization's goals towards the narrow selfish interests of the few.

However, the problem of apathy may be linked to the fact that the CAC is created as a result of an impulse coming from private organizations from outside the community. Specifically, one of the numerous foreign funded PVOs may wish to develop a program in a given area. Again, the CAC does not emerge out of the spontaneous collective will of the people. It is more or less imposed from the outside. As put by Lowenthal, (1978: 33) "the formation and growth of councils is essentially stimulated from outside". With respect to

the Northwest, the Snuckers wrote: "The earliest wave of council organization in the region was a channel for food relief at a time of drought and famine" (1980: 73). In fact, this is well in the framework developed in the first section of this chapter when it was shown that originally the community development organizations were developed as a channel for foreign aided programs.

As community development is created from the outside the role of local people in managing, deciding and so forth has been limited. Thus, the heavy involvement of foreigners (both to the region and the country) is thought to be a stultifying element that would prevent the emergence of true participation at the grass roots. The membership and the community at large would thus be passive recipients. It is, however, fair to say that many analysts disagree with this assessment. For them the very polarized nature of rural society means that only an impartial actor, a true outsider with no ties to the community can effectively be neutral and thereby develop farmer's confidence. Schaedel (1969: 98) for instance wrote:

"The other elements in the environment that seemed to favor a higher threshold of receptivity in a given community were: historical (a previous record of self-successful help projects) and the role of the promoters of outside agent."

Marian McClure (1983: 17) has expressed the point more forcefully and she should be quoted at length:

"In a situation of group weakness, emotional polarization and a negligent elite that was distrusted and feared, development work that would re-distribute the flow of economic benefits and the

distribution and uses of power required that someone gain the poor majority's trust, listen to what they wanted and needed, provide catalysts and forums and legitimacy for groups to begin, and provide protection and security for the groups as they sought to make meaningful changes. I would argue that an outsider was needed for that, an outsider willing to enter into an intensive relationship with the community and who had the appropriate personal and material resources. A catholic priest backed by his institution and by PVOs is a good fit for the task."

Indeed, the role of religious leaders has been critical in the development of many community action programs. Yet, the preceding quote is in absolute contradiction with the Dryade-Ecorurale one presented previously (in the preceding section) which asserted that the religious orders were squarely on the side of the powerful elites.

As it is, the situation is not a clear one, perhaps because in fact there are no reasons why outsiders should automatically side with the status quo. And there are many actual cases that illustrates that they dont. (see for instance the case of the Oblate Fathers in the South during the past thirty years). Furthermore, a certain amount of accomodation with the status quo may be required at least at the beginning let the effort be destroyed by the systematic opposition of the elite. As put by the IDRC review of the DRIPP Program:

"The review team recognized that the work of the animateur could lead to community participation. The major preoccupation felt by the review team was that he was working with the relatively rich people of the region, entailing the risk that later action projects might be controlled by these people for their own benefit. It is recognized, however, that within the Haitian context it may be the best way to initiate community participation."

(IDRC 1975: 10)

The presence of the foreign national may have the additional benefit of shielding the local personnel from undue pressure from local authorities or elites (ACDI-CIDA, 1982: 19).

At this point one must establish a distinction between foreign individuals (say a priest) and foreign organizations (say a FVO). The reason is that there are many peculiar problems linked to the operations of foreign agencies. First, quite often, they hire Haitians to be their local level agent within a given community. This agent is more likely to be drawn into the main stream of local politics and to ally himself with the members of the established elite. It is true that the monthly salary received by such agents puts them in an income bracket that is closer to the higher groups in a rural community than to the underprivileged. Maguire (1979:29) quotes instances where such agents would actually buy land in the community and rent it to those with whom they are supposed to work. Thus, the agent becomes a fully integrated part of the status quo and his behaviour induces legitimate suspicions and hostility. Although they are not necessarily part of the local social structure to begin with, such agents are thus more likely to be drawn into the local social matrix as active actors than would be the case for a foreign national. The latter might be less susceptible to join into local politics and thus remain more neutral.

A second problem is that many agencies may be involved in a given area, giving birth to a situation of interagency competition. A corollary of this is that the perceived availability of foreign resources, say Food for Work Programs, will induce the constitution of CACs specifically oriented towards

obtaining a part of those resources, irrespective of the real validity of the project. The notorious "Konsey mangé" described by Smucker and other is the perfect illustration of the phenomenon.

A third problem is that the selection of the projects to be executed often reflects more the agency's priority rather than the felt needs of the population or of the existing CACs. In other words both the CAC and the people at large are reduced to mere beneficiaries and as such do not really get to practice learning by doing. The goal of motivation and participation is thus never really achieved. A consequence of the situation is that there is a tendency for CACs not to survive the withdrawal of the sponsoring agency or the termination of the project. This pernicious effect is especially strong when the relief aspect of the FVOs interrelation is important.

To quote the Smuckers (1980: 73):

"Where relief goods are distributed in the context of organizing community councils, the goal of self-sustained local organizations is consistently sabotaged."

Furthermore,

"Given the fact that the very existence of councils is predicated on the flow of projects, it is not anticipated that they would have a self-sustained capacity in the absence of agency goods and services."

(Smuckers 1980: 75)

In a sense, this problem reflects the same uncertainty that surround the active role of foreign individuals such as catholic priests within community organizations that they have helped to emerge. Can the organizations survive the departure of such key people? While the answer and the record are at best

uncertain, it should be pointed out that many such actors are acutely aware of the dangers and do try to phase themselves out gradually. One may cite the attempt by someone like father Holly in the Chardonnière area.

A last effect of the massive material presence of the FVOs is that it is making the CACs an even more tempting target to control by the public sector. The latter is unlikely to passively witness the channeling of rising volume of resources to these grass-roots entities without feeling tempted to control them more closely. At the same time, to the extent that nothing in the historical experience of the country is conducive to the long term survival of truly autonomous base level organization, the higher visibility of CACs is inducing the emergence of ominous trends regarding tighter political control. The role of CONAJEC at the moulding stage of CACs development is one such sign (see Smucker in Locher et al 1983: II.53) and so is the September 3 Decree creating CONACOS.

B.3 The Continuing Debate on the Ultimate Goals and Function of CACs

As was shown by the foregoing analysis CACs are at the center of some controversy. According to some criteria, the whole process has been a failure. A classic Statement of the position is provided by Lowenthal (1978: 41):

"The classic community council with a heterogeneous, unorganized and individualized membership is found to be an inadequate vehicle for the initial motivation and education necessary to the formation of both active participants and capable leaders in community affairs."

For Maguire (1979) the main reason for the failure of CACs is that they do not place enough emphasis on changing the social environment and thus fail to take account of the peasant's highest concern: justice, rights and the need to gain control and ownership of land. Many other observers (Gow, Cantave, Dryade-Ecorurale) also think that the lack of good leadership or the ambiguous aims of CACs have contributed to their failure. Dryade-Ecorurale also is a representative of the trend that relates the failure of CACs to their excessive concentration of projects on non productive fields. In fact CIDA's evaluation of the canadian PVOs drew attention to the paradox of an improvement in human resources due to health and education projects sponsored by PVOs while the overall economic situation was deteriorating (ACDI-CIDA 1982:17). By and large it should be noticed that for the authors mentioned so far the CACs' lack of success is ascribed to causes internal to the CACs: poor leadership, heterogeneous membership, focus on the wrong kind of projects.

However, other critics see the cause of failure at the level of national constraints. In other works, even under the best of circumstances, CACs would fail because of the constraints existing at the national level, beyond the effective reach of grass-roots organizations. Schaedel, Moral, Lundahl, Dryade-Ecorurale are representative of this line of analysis. In the blunt words of the latter (Dryade-Ecorurale 1982: 42):

"Cette brève description de la structure administrative du pays montre à quel point elle est peu adaptée aux exigences d'un développement rural harmonisé, et plus particulièrement d'une participation de la population aux décisions, qui la concernent. Du délégué des Force Armées au niveau départemental jusqu'au policier qui assume les fonctions de chef de section rurale, cette structure est l'expression d'une volonté politique

de contrôler par tous les moyens les faits et gestes d'une paysannerie dépossédée et non de soutenir des efforts de développement."

According to Lundahl (1983: 233):

"A necessary condition for the success of this type of program is that it must at least be tolerated by those in power. It is possible that isolated efforts may be tolerated, if not supported, but should this kind of cooperative (in a wide sense) effort begin to spread, the chances are that the tolerance will come to an abrupt end... On the contrary, a genuinely cooperative mass movement in Haiti would have to come into existence not with the aid of government but in opposition to it."

It should be pointed out that one may find echos to these arguments in official Government of Haiti publications. A representative example is provided by the Official Report submitted by Haiti to the November 1981 Paris meeting of Least Developed Countries. In discussing the constraints to a successful community action programs, the Document listed financial constraints and administrative rigidities, political influence within CACs, lack of qualified personal and so forth. Zuvekas (1978) also mentions inadequate financial resources, morale problems and the lack of cooperative tradition in the country.

Indeed, in the whole literature survey that was conducted, only one author, Laguerre (1977) found CACs to be well functioning entities. Laguerre is the only author to end up with a positive overall assessment.

It should be pointed out that the criteria for failure is the inability to generate genuine mass mobilization and popular participation. In that sense, the critics might be too harsh because given Haiti's existing socio-political realities, such a result should have been expected. That is why one of the

alternative proposed by the critics whose arguments are anchored in the internal weakness of CACs is unlikely to be a much more successful. For authors such as Lowenthal, Maguire, Locher et al, the pitfalls of the large, unwieldy, heterogeneous CACs can be avoided by working with smaller entities called "groupements". The latter are smaller organizations of 15 to 20 members generally sharing a similar socio-economic background. They have a more open structure, are internally more cohesive and have a much more motivated membership. The best known "groupements" are to be found in Papaye in the Central Plateau, in Gros Morne, Bayonnais and some other attempts associated with IDEA in the North. A recent evaluation (Locher et al 1983) seems to feel that these organizations should become self-sustaining in the short medium run. While too recent a creation to be definitely judged, these smaller entities nonetheless constitute a hopeful development. However, a nagging question remains at what point would national constraints start to limit or damage the growth of these "groupements".

In a sense, the Smuckers assessment of the whole CAC effort might be the most balanced one. Their point of departure is that CACs should not be evaluated in terms of the ability to trigger popular participation. More modestly they should be analyzed in terms of the capability to deliver some services in neglected areas. In other words, these entities should be viewed in the original context in which they were created in the early to mid fifties (Russel 1954) and not judged against the standard of self sustained, autonomous democratic grass-roots organizations. At a minimum one would think that such a standard would be unattainable as long as the bulk of the rural population is illiterate.

C. THE COOPERATIVE MOVEMENT AND TRADITIONAL WORK ORGANIZATIONS

"It is hard to characterize the modern cooperative movement in Haiti as anything other than a failure. At any rate cooperatives based on modern principles have not been able to supersede the traditional structures. The disappearance of these structures is rather a result of marked economic changes which have made adaptation a necessary evil. Would it then not be possible to build on some of the traditional cooperative structures when attempting to introduce modern cooperative ideas as well."

Lundahl 1982: 227.

This quote from Lundahl beautifully synthesizes the general assessment of the cooperative movement. Started in 1937, the cooperative movement was thought to have in Haiti an excellent environment to grow and prosper. Vernet (1969: 143) for instance mentions that Haiti, as a country of small property owners, was uniquely suited for the development of the cooperative system. Today, in the rural development strategy, the public sector theoretically gives an important role to cooperatives as economic agents mainly involved in marketing and distribution. There is an implicit division of labor between cooperatives and CACs with the latter having much more a social content (furnishing of services to deprived population, popular mobilization) while the former would have a much more economic focus (raising income and productivity through joint, self help efforts). Cooperatives would thus be the advanced organizational phase of popular participation in the development process. Community development and community action councils are perceived as the first stage, the initiation phase to the participation process. Cooperatives on the other hand are seen as ultimate, the culmination of the same process with its two main components:

- a. an economic aspect since cooperatives would by definition be involved in production, marketing and distribution.
- b. a social aspect since cooperatives are based on sharing, joint effort, participation by members.

It is because cooperatives involve joint effort and collective participation that it is perceived to belong naturally to the many local traditions of collective work. In other words cooperatives are not perceived to be social organizations that are alien to the historical experience of the Haitian peasant. Indeed, Vernet (1969: 146) wrote that: "Son point d'appui est le Combite traditionnel, basé sur le principe du self help". More recently Jamnik (1979: 44) has asserted that:

"L'existence d'une longue tradition de travail collectif dans les associations traditionnelles a généralement laissé croire que la coopérative (au sens idéologique et technique moderne) est "innée" dans la population rurale Haïtienne."

This perception of the natural lineage between traditional work associations has naturally induced many observers to propose the systematic development of cooperatives out of the traditional work associations. Rhoda Métraux was writing already in 1951 (1951: 104):

"During the past ten years or so, there has been a campaign in the Haitian press for the formation of cooperatives based upon the combite system of work."

C.1. The Combite and Other Forms of Collective Work Efforts

The most famous form of traditional work organization in the Haitian countryside is the combite. Strictly speaking it is not an organization since it does not have any stable structure. As insightfully described by a shrewd analyst of Haitian rural life:

"Le combite n'est pas un groupe, mais un événement communautaire, comme un bal ou une veillée à laquelle assistent ceux qui le désirent."

(Murray 1973: 12)

Indeed, the combite is an event in rural life. The purpose of the event is for a group of people working together to accomplish at once (say a day or half a day) a given task (say clearing of a field or harvesting). People in an area are simply invited to participate in the event. In return for their labor, they will be rewarded with food, alcohol, singing and chanting, music. The combite combines two aspects. First it is a device to mobilize relatively small number of people to perform a specific task. Second, the combite is also an event that embodies significant consumption aspects by providing also leisure to the countryside. This second aspect has been often overlooked by analysts. The festive part of combite and of other "sociétés" has been emphasized by Lundahl (1979: 117, 1983: 225). A. Métraux (1951: 63) wrote:

"Ce serait méconnaître l'esprit et la nature de ces sociétés que de mettre uniquement en relief leur côté utilitaire. Un de leurs objectifs est aussi de procurer à leurs membres des divertissements et l'occasion de satisfaire leur goût de la pompe et de la mise en scène."

As a device to mobilize labor for specific tasks, it must be reminded that combites appeared in the country at the time when there was a shortage of labor relative to land in the Haitian economy. The existence of large unused tract of land implied that a man could always move some where else with his family and start working for himself. The relative price of labor must have been high in a context of general social homogeneity in the countryside (of course this does not mean that every one was at the same income level).

In other words there was no pool of readily available excess labor supply in the form of landless peasants. Yet, the technical constraints of agricultural activity meant that at given moment in the crop cycle more labor was needed than could be mobilized within the household. It might then be argued that the combite was the social mechanism that emerged as an answer to the problem. It is important to notice that as relative factor availability shifted, that is as labor became relatively cheaper there was a concomitant decline in the occurrence of combites. Alfred and Rhoda Métraux both pointed out that it was largely disappearing in the Marbial Vallée, an assessment shared by Erasmus (1952). Lundanl (1979 and 1983) also singles out the disappearance of combites as evidence of the long term fall in rural income.

The preceding analysis is buttressed by the fact that in a way the combite was a second best solution in terms of the quality of labor. It is fair to say that there is no unanimity on this. Laguerre (1975: 26-27), Murray (1973:13) are among those that believe that the combite is a cheaper way to perform a given agricultural task. It would do so at half the cost. But on the other hand, there is no strict control on the guest's performance and laxity cannot be sanctioned. As put by Erasmus:

"Generally, the farmer's attitude is that the combite is inefficient, that members cannot be relied upon to show up for work, and that an excess of food may be prepared at no small expense in anticipation of a larger number of workers than actually materializes... Certainly the most common complain against the combite, voiced by both "rich" and poor Haitian farmers, was the high cost of the fiesta and the inferior quality of the work as compared to that of hired labor."

(Erasmus 1952: 22)

In other words, while the combite was the only option available when the economy had a relative shortage of labor, with the incipient excess labor situation the flaws of the system became more salient and thus gradually contributed to its demise and replacement by the informal labor groups (escouade, colonne, chaine, mazingas).

Before turning to the discussion of the latter, it is important to clarify in which way the combite should not be properly conceived as cooperative mechanism. First there is no strict reciprocity involved. Participation in someone's combite is rewarded by the food, alcohol and "ambiance" that was created. There is no obligation to reciprocate by participating in a guest's own combite. Second, and more important, the fruit or the benefit of the collective work effort is individually appropriated. Rhoda Métraux provides the best summary of the situation (1951: 110-111):

"It has sometimes been said that the combite is a form of cooperative work, through some writers stress that its purpose is 'mutual self-help' or 'mutual aid and fellowship' so that the area of cooperation is at least implicitly defined. In fact, one would do better not to use the term 'cooperative' in connection with work in Marbial. For, while the men work together at a task, the goal in each case is an individual, not a shared one. The aim of each participant may be a personal one to earn a fee, and the end for which this group work is a wholly individual one--to dual one--to prepare the fields, to sow or cultivate or harvest the crop belonging to a single household."

Métraux then went on to say that "group work is entirely consonant with the idea of individual ownership in the single household and with the relations of households of kin and neighbors to one another.". For these reasons then, it is doubtful that the combite ought to be considered as embodying the principles of shared work, common purpose and democratic popular

participation. Indeed, when a "big shot" is giving a combite subtle pressures would induce everyone to participate while the more grandiose the affair the more the person's prestige is enhanced. This reinforces the point made at the beginning of this chapter regarding the individualism of the Haitian farmer and the associated group weakness of Haitian society. There is no "innate" tradition of cooperative work association in Haiti. In fact it should be noted that in the Nineteenth Century the performance of the collectively oriented tasks (say road maintenance) required recourse to coercion. While the combite involved the voluntary participation of individuals, the latter had to be coerced by threat of force to participate in the "corvée" (forced labor). The last time the "corvée" was used was during the American Occupation and it triggered violent troubles. (There is some confusion between combite and "corvée" because in the south of the country the combite is also known as "kové". However, they are two different social mechanisms. "Corvée" describes involuntary participation in events that have a collective or social goal while combite is voluntary participation in an event geared towards private goals).

Be that as it may, the combite has gradually faded to be replaced by various forms of voluntary work associations. The latter's existence is fundamentally related to the emergence of an excess supply of labor and the increasing fragmentation of land holdings. These work associations "escouade", "colonne", "chaine", "mazinga" are based on totally different principles than the combite. First, they involve strict reciprocity and if a member is unable to participate temporarily, he must either provide a replacement or send the money to hire one. Second, the collective labor may be sold to third parties

for monetary rewards. Indeed if a member does not have land, when it is his turn to benefit from the group's work, the latter will be sold to a third party and the proceeds allocated to the landless individual (Turcan 1975: 9). Third, the *escouade* is a more stable organization of a small number of peasants (5 to 15) operating along fairly egalitarian principle. Murray (1973: 13) asserts that there is no formal leadership but this is not absolutely clear. Finally, the "*escouade*" involves a greater degree of true solidarity and genuine self help in a context which appears more threatening to vulnerable peasant groups. As put by Turcan: "Elle est l'expression d'une certaine solidarité face aux aléas de l'existence". That is why in the case of some projects (Gros Morne, Bayonnais) the more successful "groupments" have mobilized with some success these new forms of work association. In Gros Morne for instance, certain groups use the "*mazingas*" to exchange work among "groupmans" or to sell the work to people outside of the latter. Smucker (1983 Part II: 59) mentions the case where the same group of people functions alternatively as a "groupman" or as "*mazinga*".

The problem is whether or not these new forms of work association may serve as the basis for other kind of more advanced self help organizations. A difficulty is related to the fact that their small size would dictate that they be organized in federations, along some pyramidal form. However, this would necessarily entail the increased risk of bureaucratization. Second, they are in fact labor selling to the extent that more and more they will be incorporating landless peasants. As put by a recent analysis done in the context of the ODVA:

"Malgré le fait d'être une forme stable d'organisation, son caractère est fondamentalement déterminé par la recherche d'emploi et de salaire. Ainsi, elle remplit le rôle d'organisation de gestion à travers laquelle elle augmente la capacité de négociation des semi-salariés."

ODVA-IICA 1980: 93

The challenge thus is whether or not these organizations may be used for some other larger purpose.

C.2. The Cooperative Movement in Haiti

The Cooperative Movement started in 1937 but it remained dormant until the mid-fifties. In 1953, the law creating the Conseil National de la Coopération (CNC) was enacted. As part of its duties, CNC was to provide official recognition to cooperatives created in the country. Since 1974, CNC has been affiliated to the Ministry of Plan. Unfortunately, despite the lip services paid to cooperatives, they have not really received full government support except for projects backed with foreign assistance. The scale of the latter has not been trivial, especially with respect to technical cooperation. Graindorge (1981) and ILO expert asserted that as of July 31, 1981, multilateral (Mainly U.N. associated) agencies had provided 15 years and 8 months worth of man/months equivalent of technical cooperation. Additionally, about a quarter of a million of dollars was given in material during 1978-1981. Similarly many bilateral aid programs, through FVOs, have channeled resources to the cooperative movement. For example UNICORS (Union des Coopérationes de la Région du Sud) is a spectacular case of the commitment of foreign resources to a cooperative. It has received assistance from FAO, the World Food Program, ILO, UNDP (See Flores 1980 for example). As of now,

CIDA is ready to commit substantial amount of financial resources to UNICORS (around \$4 millions). AID itself has been involved with the PCC project to help coffee cooperatives in general. What have been the results?

In a way, an evaluation of the cooperative movement in Haiti is hampered by the same problems facing the analyst dealing with CACs. The data base is weak and inconsistent and the evaluation criterias are not made explicit. For instance, should one consider the economic performance criteria or should one only pay attention to the social role of cooperatives (the learning and the participation aspects)? Or what should be the proper relationship between the State and cooperatives?

With respect to the actual number of cooperatives, there is a great deal of uncertainty. According to CNC:

"Sur les 142 coopératives inscrites sur le registre officiel avant la publication de Décret du 5 Février 1974, l'inventaire effectué durant les années 1975-1976 n'a pu dénombrer qu'une vingtaine encore en activité."

(1982: 29)

The newly revamped CNC has officially recognized 22 cooperatives: 12 involved in coffee, 6 "Caisses Populaires", one each in housing, handicraft, milk collection and one "Union" (CNC 1982: 29). On the other hand, Graindorge (1981:19) puts the number at 115. In 1977, FAO estimated the number of cooperatives at 63 with the following breakdown: 11 involved in coffee marketing with 5,122 members, 22 "caisses populaires" with 13,144 members, 15 irrigation cooperatives with 2,000 members and 16 cooperatives involved in

buying and storing grains and agricultural inputs with 1,500 members (FAO 1977: 59). Graindorge (1981: 19) puts the total number of people involved in cooperatives at 43,900 including 18,000 in "Caisses Populaires", 16,000 in coffee. Narquin (1982) thinks that there are around 60 cooperatives with 3,000 members while for Ponce de Leon 35,000 families are involved in the cooperative movement. Clearly, a serious survey is needed to determine the number of cooperatives, their field of activities, their geographic location and the social capital involved.

It seems clear that coffee cooperatives account for a dominant part of the cooperative sector. For Ponce de Leon, in 1981, coffee cooperatives represented 40 percent of the \$2.7 millions of cooperative business. For Graindorge, coffee marketing cooperatives represents 55% of the total of \$ 3.9 millions. Wolf and Jean-Julien (1978) think that the coffee market offers good opportunities while the need to avoid the exploitative "spéculateurs en denrées" provided the impetus to create coffee cooperatives. St-Martin (1977) asserts that:

" The cooperative provides a counter to the exploitation of the individual by the middleman in that they offer the small farmer an outlet for his products at a fair price which the cooperative obtains from the negotiating from the strength of the pooled resources of its members. "

Unfortunately, there are many reasons to doubt the empirical validity of this line of argument. Recent research confirms the fierce competitiveness of the coffee export business so that it is an unproven assumption that there has been monopsonistic rents created by the ability of middlemen to pay less than fair prices. (see the paper written for AID by Capitol Consult). In reality, it appears that one of the main reasons why there have been so many coffee cooperatives is simply that, as in so many other instances in Haiti, foreign funds were available for the purpose. AID for example committed more than \$3 million to the RUC project.

A sober assessment of the coffee cooperative operations reveals that in fact there was little economic rent to be captured. Girault (1982: 239-244) provides an acerbic criticism of coffee cooperatives. Despite the substantial volume of foreign resources committed, one is not aware of any "speculateur" that has been put out of business by cooperatives. As a matter of fact, cooperatives do not pay higher price for coffee than do "Spéculateurs". It would then appear that coffee cooperatives are just one additional actor in an already competitive market and that they are bearing the brunt of the aggressive practices of the traditional middlemen (Wolf and Jean-Julien 1978: 116; Flores Alvarado 1980: 29, 30, 32).

Besides coffee cooperatives, another group of important cooperatives is made of the savings cooperatives "caisses populaires". According to Moral (1961: 338) they were introduced in Haiti in 1946 by the Oblates Fathers in the South. In 1982, CNC indicated that the "caisse populaire" of Les Cayes has 5,000 members. By and large the problem of credit has played an important

role in the creation of cooperatives. Many supervised credit programs are channeled through cooperatives or pre-cooperatives groups. Among the latter, the most important ones were the SCA (Société Agricole de Crédit) which are made of 7 to 15 members. Here again their emergence was largely due to foreign financed programs. Jamnik (1979: 60) counted 1,315 SACs that were officially recognized by BCA between 1966 and 1977. almost two third of them were created in two years (1976 and 1977) reflecting probably the influence of the AID backed BCA project. Ponce de Leon (1982) found that most credit cooperatives had excess liquidity amounting to 60 percent of total resources evaluated at 1.7 million Gourdes.

As mentioned above, the evaluation of the movement is not easy and reflects the same ambiguity that surrounds the evaluation of CACs. For instance the issue of dependency on foreign help (or outside agency) is often mentioned. Wolf and Jean-Julien (1978:94) wrote:

"A lack of resources in most communities make it difficult for the cooperative to achieve financial and administrative independence. In many cases, the cooperative were started with foreign ideas, capital and management inputs without which they would have never existed. The need for high level management skills and contact with external markets and organizations gives rise to different patterns of dependency on outsiders and/or outside organizations."

Lundahl (1979: 617) is as blunt:

"The cooperative movement has failed, largely because the cooperatives have been introduced from above, without paying due attention to the needs and wishes of the peasants."

Yet, individual cases of autonomous cooperatives are found: Tulou (1974) mentioned the interesting case of an electricity cooperative that was

functionning since the early 1960's in Maissade without any loan or gift from the outside. Furthermore, given the overall constraints under which cooperatives are likely to operate, it is uncertain whether the movement can indeed function at all without continuous and sustained external assistance. In fact, observers such as Jamnik (1979) or Zuvekas (1978) tend to criticize the Government for not providing enough support. It is difficult no to agree with Zuvekas (1978: 219):

"Without continued assistance for a number of years, many cooperatives--perhaps most--probably would not survive."

Even Wolf and Jean-Julien recognize the catalytic role performed by these foreigners (individuals or agencies). Flores Alvarado (1980: 4) explicitly stresses:

"L'importance et l'efficacité de l'action de formation des prêtres missionnaires Oblats qui sont parmi les vrais pionniers du mouvement coopératif en Haiti."

It is true that almost 40 years after the Oblats begun to foster cooperatives in the South, the movement is still weak and unlikely to survive the withdrawal of external support. This is just added testimony to the difficulties beseting the movement. One should not allow a short sighted perspective to minimize the difficulties. In fact, even in the West it took a long time before cooperatives really took off on their own. The movement should get continuous support with the clear and lucid understanding that it will take a long, long time before foreign aid could be stopped.

Another bone of contention is the openness and democratic nature of cooperatives in Haiti. While in the UNICORS area there are virtually no

entrance fees or other requirements, that is not always the case. In 'thiotte, there is a notorious cooperative which requires one to be a land owner as a condition of membership. Wolf and Jean-Julien (1978: 96) encountered the same phenomenon in Dondon where the social part required amounted to \$10. Only St-Martin (1977: 2) reports having witnessed "an excellent record of attendance at meetings and educational sessions." By and large observers report apathy (BIT 1978: 4). with respect to coffee cooperatives, Girault (1982: 240-41) noted that, while the number of nominal members was high, actual participation was low. Flores Alvarado (1980) reports the same thing for the UNICORS region. As in the case of CACs, apathy is often thought to result from the heterogeneity of the cooperative movement. Yet, it is not certain if some other criteria might not be as important such as the financial viability of the cooperatives. Important level of foreign aid has not helped cooperatives achieve a high level of business (the DAI evaluation team has found otherwise in their evaluation of AID's RCC project. The final document was not available at the time of writing).

As a concluding word, it might be pointed out that patience and a longer run perspective are needed because the shortcomings of the cooperative movement are very much the reflection of structural parameters at work in the society at large. Expectations should not be too high in the medium run to avoid unnecessary disappointments.

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CHAPTER III: THE SOUTH REGION AND THE LES CAYES WATERSHED

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THE SOUTH REGION AND THE LES CAYES WATERSHED

As was discussed in the first Chapter, the Regional Development Strategy has created four main regions in the country. Furthermore, the constraint imposed by limited financial and human resources has dictated that certain priority areas be defined so that resources might be allocated in a more selective fashion. As a result, fifteen "Unité Spatiale de Développement" (USD) were created and ranked according to priority. It is not clear what criteria were used in the ranking process but it would seem that economic potential was implicitly regarded as of key importance. The USD are anchored around urban centers or around a smaller nucleus within a given "arrondissement". As the exact geographical delineation of the USD has not yet been performed, it is difficult to perceive to what they actually refer. Similarly, there has been no administrative unit created to manage the USD, therefore, there is some ambiguity as to how a project based on the USD could be managed. Yet, the fact that USDs appear to constitute a logical and reasonable way to approach regional development problems in Haiti is a powerful incentive to try to give them actual operational content. In the specific case that is of concern to this project, that of Les Cayes, the rough delineation of the USD does not seem to be too much different from that of the watershed. In the context of an actual project design, it may well be worth while to insist on the exact coincidence of the USD with the Les Cayes watershed. This would have the advantage of putting together both the regional development unit and the natural resources unit and thus simplify the administrative structure.

This chapter will describe the Les Cayes watershed. But, to the extent that it is part of the Region 4, the "region Sud", we will first describe the latter in a comparative fashion. Furthermore, to the extent that the regional development strategy is really anchored in a regional growth pole concept, we will then also present a sketch of the city of Les Cayes.

A. THE SOUTH REGION (REGION 4)

This region is made of two Departments: South and Grande Anse. Basically, it covers the area of the old South Department. Its exact area is not determined with precision. In the 1981 GOH presentation to the LDC conference, the area was put at 6,170 square kilometers (GOH 1981: 133). A more recent Ministry of Plan's document (DATPE 1983: IV, 1) puts it at 5,776 square kilometers. This latter figure will be used in this chapter. With 21.5 percent of the country's total area, the Region contained in 1982 992,581 inhabitants--that is, 19.6 percent of the total population. Of all the Regions, the South is the one with the lowest percentage of urban population. And it can be deduced from Table III.1 that urbanization has been proceeding in the South at a lower pace than in the rest of the country. In fact, a 1983 document of the Ministry of Plan asserts that the region has the least developed industrial infrastructure of the 4 regions (DATPE 1983: IV, 7). This obviously implies that the agricultural sector must be the main source of employment. Circumstantial evidence suggests that it is less and less able to do so because the South region is the main source of migrants to the Port-au-Prince area. About half of all migrants in the latter come from the South. An implication of this has been that while in 1950 the South accounted for 24 percent of the country's population, this share fell to 19.6 percent in 1982.

It is not easy to explain why the region is such a source of heavy out migration. Indeed, this question ought to receive a very high priority.

Obviously, it might be more relevant to look at the data from the

TABLE III.1% OF RURAL POPULATION IN THE FOUR REGIONS

	<u>1950</u>	<u>1971</u>	<u>1982</u>
North	85.8%	83.7%	79.6%
Transversal	91.9%	88.4%	86.5%
West	81.3%	65.1%	58.9%
South	92.4%	91.0%	88.8%

SOURCE: Calculated from data in IHSI 1983

rity in any agenda of applied social sciences research related to Haïti. As shown by Table III.2 the Region does not have the highest density per squared kilometer. In fact between 1950 and 1982, population density in the South grew the least among the four regions. But of course this may just be the consequences of out migration.

TABLE III.2POPULATION DENSITY IN THE FOUR REGIONS

(inhabitants per squared kilometer)

	<u>1950</u>	<u>1971</u>	<u>1982</u>
North	136.8	178.4	196.7
Transversale	81.6	103.6	129.3
West	137.5	223.8	275.8
South	128.0	169.0	172.0

perspective of the cultivated area. To do this, two elements were taken into account. First, the number of people in the rural population as provided by IHSI (1983). Second, the area under cultivation in each region was considered. The former was then divided by the latter. It then appears that the South has 441.7 rural inhabitants per square kilometer of cultivated land. The ratio was 438 for the Transversal Region, 463.2 for the North and 520.3 for the West. Thus it is obvious that population pressure per unit of cultivated land is not significantly higher in the South; in fact, it is among the lowest in the country. By the same token, even if the percentage of the total land area that is actually cultivated is the highest in the South, the difference with the other regions is not really significant with the exception of the "Région Transversale". By and large these structural parameters tend to buttress a point made in Chapter One, mainly that one of the main characteristics of the Haitian economy is the relative homogeneity of the situation and the remarkable adaptation of the peasant population to local micro-climatic conditions.

In an important respect, however, the South appears to be slightly worse off than the rest of the country. The nature of the physical infrastructure in the area seems to be relatively underdeveloped. For instance, aside from the National Road, 200 km from Port-au-Prince to Les Cayes, there are no paved roads in the Region. And some of the section of the road network are in rather bad condition. With respect to agriculture, only 20 percent of the irrigable areas are actually irrigated. This is comparable to the North (19 percent) but is far below the West (63 percent) and the transversal Region (56 percent). In fact, in the latter is concentrated more than half of the

irrigated areas of the country. This reflects the tremendous importance of the Artibonite irrigation network. An implication of this is that for equity reasons, ceteris paribus, the South and the North should have priority with respect to the extension of irrigation networks. Table III.3 shows that 28 percent of the 98,520 hectares to be irrigated are in the South. Additionally, existing systems might need extensive repairs.

TABLE III.3STATUS AND GEOGRAPHICAL LOCATION OF IRRIGATION

(Hectares)

	<u>POTENTIALLY IRRIGABLE</u>	<u>ACTUALLY IRRIGATED</u>	<u>TO BE IRRIGATED</u>
Haiti total	188,420	89,900	98,520
North	18,500	3,500	14,920
Transversal	82,240	45,840	36,400
West	53,130	33,400	19,690
South	34,550	7,040	27,510


Source: Elaborated from data in DATPE (1983)

HYDROGRAPHIE

RESEAU ROUTIER

BASSIN VERSANT DES CAYES

CROQUIS PHOTOGRAPHIQUE



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
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B. THE LES CAYES WATERSHED

The Cayes watershed includes part of the "communes" of Les Cayes, Port-Salut, Camp-Perrin, Port-à-Piment, Chardonnières, Coteaux, Arniquet and Maniche. It includes the whole of the "commune" of Forbeck and Chantal. It is a perfect illustration of the problem raised in Chapter One related to the lack of congruence between the administrative divisions of the country and other form of regional groupings. The total area covered by the watershed is 615.45 square kilometers. This is 2.2 percent of the country's area and 10.6 percent of the Region South's area. The area covered by the watershed represents two third of the one of the "Arrondissement des Cayes". The watershed is defined by a line that follows the ridge line of the hills overlooking the ponds of Lachaux, Laborde and Drouet to the village of Mazolière. To the East, the watershed boundary follows the ridge line of the hills and small mountains linking Mazolière to the Caribbean Sea. To the South the watershed is bounded by the Caribbean Sea. On the West, the watershed is limited by a line running from the Caribbean Sea to the Village of Moreau to the Macaya Peak through the mornes (hills) Brioux, Douyon, Lasarre, Suzanne and Cavalier.

MORPHOLOGIE



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Best Available Document

This delineation of the Cayes watershed is somewhat different from that of the Ministry of Plan since the latter includes both the karst relief to the North and the town of Camp-Perrin to the Northeast. It should be pointed out that the geographical delineation proposed here is based on aerial photointerpretation while the Ministry of Plan's one was established on the basis of maps. The difference in terms of area is not important since the watershed delineated by the Ministry measures 624.5 square kilometers.

The analysis of the morphological map, and the measurement with an electronic planimeter have resulted in a fairly precise geographical definition of the area and of its main components. As shown by Table III.4, the plain area represents 36.7 percent of the watershed areas. Valleys account for 9.1 percent; hills, for 33.2 percent; mountains, for 12.1 percent; plateaux, for 7.2 percent. Other areas (cities, ponds, rivers, etc.) represent less than 1.5 percent of the total.

Depending on the altitude, the plains have been separated in eight different categories. These plains are generally made of quaternary alluvions and are generally fertile except for some of the rocky areas constituted by the displacement of the riverbeds. We may distinguish the maritime plain (160 hectares), the low plains accounting for 6,008 hectares have an elevation of 20 to 100 meters. They generally have good soils, heavier to the west and somewhat dryer to the east. The well drained soils of the high plains (above 100 meters) cover 2,847 hectares. Hills and mountains represent 45.6 percent of the area and are generally fertile (limestone) when not affected by erosion. To the west and east of the watershed we have hills whose altitude

TABLE III.4TOPOGRAPHY OF LES CAYES WATERSHED

	<u>AREA</u>	<u>% TOTAL</u>
Plain	22,625.50 ha	36.76
Valleys	5,630.0	9.16
Hills	20,487.0	33.28
Mountains	7,282.5	12.16
Plateaus	4,472.5	7.27
Others	847.5	1.3

Source: Topographical Map

It should be pointed out that to the west of the watershed there is a hilly basaltic area which is particularly vulnerable to erosion.

The watershed is crisscrossed by many rivers, all of them flowing in a general northwest to southeast direction. The most important river is La Grande Ravine du Sud which split the flat lands in two: 70% to the west (Torbeck Plain) and 30% to the east (Les Cayes Plain). The second important river is l'Acul which borders the Torbeck Plain to the west. Both rivers have rather irregular flows: during the rainy season they are torrent in spate while the flow diminishes in the dry season. Less important but with more regular flows, we have the river l'Islet to the east and Torbeck in the

.../...

does not go above 500 meters. To the north are located the massive structures of La Hotte, with altitude ranging from 500 meters to more than 2,000 meters (Macaya). According to the Ministry of Plan's soil classification with respect to erosion, 44.5 percent of the watershed is not much sensitive to erosion, while 36.7 percent of the area is "somewhat" sensitive to erosion (aires de tendance moyenne). Fourteen percent of the area is strongly affected by erosion while 4.5 percent is totally eroded.

It should be pointed out that, to the west of the watershed, there is a hilly basaltic area which is particularly vulnerable to erosion.

The watershed is crisscrossed by many rivers, all of them flowing in a general northwest to southeast direction. The most important river is La Grande Ravine du Sud, which splits the flat lands in two: 70 percent to the west (Torbeck Plain) and 30 percent to the east (Les Cayes Plain). The second important river is l'Acul, which borders the Torbeck Plain to the west. Both rivers have rather irregular flows: during the rainy season, they are torrent in spate while the flow diminishes in the dry season. Less important but with more regular flows, we have the river l'Islet to the east and Torbeck in the center of the plain. In the lower plains there are many smaller rivers (Bazile, Bondonne, Muscadin, Houck, Desrodières, des Anquilles, Lagaudray, Picot, St-Thomas, des Mornes and so forth). Some of them are fed from underground water tables.

There are two main irrigation systems: The d'Avezac system fed by the Ravine du Sud upstream from Camp-Perrin and the Dubreuil system fed by the

Acui upstream from Ducis. There are also numerous small systems often constructed by autonomous local community groups with foreign aid funds. Many problems plague the working of these systems:

1. obstruction of the canals by alluvions during the rainy season, making it necessary to undertake costly dedging.
2. excessive land fragmentation that induce the building of a very dense network of canal with clay or loam bottom, which increases the loss of water via infiltration.
3. poor management of the water resource.

B. 1. Population

The estimates presented in this subsection are based on aerial photointerpretation. In 1956, the watershed had some 14,781 dwellings while in 1978, the number was 19,194. These numbers do not include the metropolitan area of Les Cayes because the housing pattern was too dense for the photo's scale. The various population estimates given in the censuses (1950, 1971 and 1982) for the city of Les Cayes will thus be used. Assuming that a family of 5 members uses each dwelling, the population of the watershed, including Les Cayes, rose from 87,905 in 1956 to 124,970 in 1978--that is, by an average of 1.6 percent a year. The city of Les Cayes grew by 3.4 percent on average while for the rest of the watershed the number was 1.2 percent. This type analysis is evidently subject to error and in their photoanalysis for the

DENSITE DE L'HABITAT

BASSIN VERSANT DES CAYES

CHOCUIS



LEGENDA

LEGENDA

Ministry of Plan, the french consulting firm BDPA noted the following sources of distortions (1) units that are not visible because of forest cover and the nature of the construction (i.e.atched house); (2) it is uncertain whether or not in rural Haiti one dwelling corresponds uniquely to one family; (3) often it is easy to miscount dwellings especially when they are grouped in linear pattern along roads. This may be complicated by the presence of trees (especially arbre à pain in Haiti).

It is difficult to check the accuracy of the count because the other data sources, such as the various censuses, have been collected on a different basis--namely, the administrative divisions (communes, arrondissements). In fact, if the census data available for all of the "communes" involved in the watershed is used, the results show that the former contain more than twice the number estimated for the watershed.

Be that as it may, some trends emerge from the apparent figures. First, the growth rate of the population within the watershed is not very high (1.6 percent on yearly average). This is linked without doubts to the issue of out migration that affects the whole South Region. Second, population density in the watershed went from 143 inhabitants per square kilometer in 1956 to 203 in 1978. This implies that it is higher than in the South region as a whole or than in most of the country as a whole (see Table III.2). Third, the population is not uniformly distributed inside the watershed. It is rather concentrated in privileged areas. For example, significantly higher densities may be observed along roads, rivers, mountain ridges and around towns and cities. Similarly, the flat lands have significantly higher

population densities. In the Cayes Plain it rose from 295 in 1956 to 400 in 1978. Indeed, the superimposition of the population map on the one for the hydrography shows an almost perfect correlation between the location of roads and rivers and the highest linear population densities. Conversely, areas of zero density usually correspond to riverbeds or to the most remote areas of the high mountains located to the north of the watershed.

B. 2. Agricultural Production and Land Use

As mentioned before, the original intention behind this effort was to establish a methodology for the comparative analysis of watersheds in Haiti. For that purpose, the methodology was to collect data using two main sources. On the one hand, an inventory of all available information was to be conducted while on the other the main analytic framework was to be provided by the analytic comparison of the interpretation of the 1956 and 1978 aerial photos. Unfortunately, serious deficiencies appeared from the beginning and induced a downsizing of the analytical scope. On the one hand no valid regional data base exist. Furthermore, the existing fragmented information was not collected on the basis of the watershed but rather on the basis of some other geographical unit (say the "district agricole" or the "arrondissement"). On the other hand, the widespread use of dense intercropping that characterizes peasant agriculture in Haiti and the small average size of the basic production unit makes it difficult to present an exhaustive analysis of land use. It was virtually impossible to present an analysis for each single crop. It was then necessary to conceive a classification scheme that was more general (dense polyculture or traditional annual crops), but that paid more

attention to specific crops that were known to be important in the area (sugar cane, vetiver, rice). Additionally, given the time constraint only for the 1956 photoset, was it possible to do a complete, detailed analysis? For 1978 a sample representing 20 percent of the watershed was selected to provide a comparison. Furthermore, some general inferences could be drawn from the Ministry of Plan's photointerpretation of the 1978 set (although caution was to be exerted because the Ministry of Plan's analysis was done at a scale of 1/100,000 compared to a scale of 1/40,000 for this analysis).

In 1956 Les Cayes watershed area was devoted to the following crops:

1. Pure sugar cane (not associated with any other crop)	6,200 hectares	10.1% of total
2. Sugar cane dominant crop in association with polyculture (polyculture: corn, millet, beans, sweet potato, vegetables, banana)	4,400 hectares	7.1% of total
3. Polyculture dominant associated with sugar cane	4,800 hectares	7.8% of total
4. Polyculture	4,600 hectares	7.5% of total
5. Rice	1,200 hectares	1.9% of total
6. Traditional annual crops (corn millet, without irrigation)	11,500 hectares	18.7% of total
7. Traditional annual crops associated with vetiver	6,500 hectares	10.6% of total
8. Wooded land	12,000 hectares	19.5% of total
9. others	10,345 hectares	16.8% of total

From a geographic perspective, it may be said that the low bottom lands are dominated by rice production often in association with roots crops such as "mazombèle or "malanga". To the west of the Ravine du Sud, which splits the

area in two, polyculture often associated with cane dominates while the eastern part is dominated by somewhat larger scale cane growing. The cane area represents around 45 percent of the Cayes Plain. To the north of the watershed, the mountainous areas still have an important forest cover.

Among the "traditional Polyculture" or the "traditional annual crops" corn is the dominant crop followed by millet. Other crops such as potatoes, other roots or vegetables, represented much more secondary sources of income. Generally speaking, in 1956 around 65 percent of the watershed was under active cultivation, a percentage that is much higher than in the South Region in general. This implies a considerable pressure on the land resources given the topography of the area. Indeed, in 1956 already important areas were affected by erosion.

Between 1956 and 1978, it is possible to observe significant changes in the land use pattern within the watershed. An important factor has been the shrinking of the area devoted to cane. This decline has been to the order of one fourth of the area devoted to cane in 1956. The key factor in explaining this shift is in the impact of relative prices movement on the profitability of the respective crops. Table III.5 reproduced from a FDAI internal document shows clearly that cane is not competitive with corn (maize) beans or rice, especially when irrigation is available. Part of the higher profitability of these products reflects the fact that, in a year, two or three crops can be obtained, as compared to one for cane. An important element to be noted related to the fact that smaller size farms were much more likely to shift out of cane as compared to larger ones (see L. Delatour 1983: p).

TABLE III.5

TABLEAU RETURNS/HA OF LAND IN THE DUBREUIL AREA (1982 PRICES)

<u>CROP</u>	<u>Irrigated land and high technology</u>			<u>Irrigated land and low technology</u>		
	<u>\$ Profit/ha</u>	<u>Profit full year or 2(crop)</u>	<u>Average return /ha farmed/year</u>	<u>Profit /ha</u>	<u>Profit full year or 2(crop)</u>	<u>Average return /ha farmed/year</u>
Maiz	493 (1)	986	256	197 (1)	384	102
Beans	713 (1)	1.426	356	228 (1)	456	114
Rice	807	1.614	32	255	510	10
Tobacco	1.338	2.676	268	-	-	-
Sweet potato cassava	1.428	1.428	228	643	643	103
Sugar cane	500 (2)	500	10	250 (2)	250	5

SOURCES: PDAI 1982 Mimeo

(1) : includes adjustment for yields obtained from maiz and beans grown in association

(2) : estimated

If the cane area has been significantly reduced, the area covered by vetiver appears to show a relative stability (3 to 3,500 hectares) although there is evidence of some decline after 1978. The vetiver situation has been thoroughly investigated by Delatour (1983: a) and D. Kermel-Torres (1983). On the other hand, the rice area has expanded significantly and by 1978 almost all of the humid plains (around 2,000 hectares). However, one of the most significant changes has been the increase in erosion particularly in the basaltic areas located on the hills located to the west of the watershed. It should be noted that this is an area dominated by traditional annual crops (corn, millet). Similarly a significant reduction in the wooded area to the north of the watershed has also been noted.

B. 3. Other Economic Activities in the Watershed

As was mentioned in the introduction to this Chapter, the industrial sector is the weakest in the South Region as compared with the other regions. Industrial production in the watershed is associated with a few large scale agro-industrial units (the sugar factory, some alcohol making factories and IDAI's butter factory), and a host of small scale enterprises. With respect to the latter, an informal survey carried in 1982 by the Ministry of Plan reveals the existence of around 600 small enterprises in the communes that are part of the watershed. The most important ones in numbers were breadmaking (266), woodworking (138), small sugar cane mills (133), rice and cereals mills (34).

The largest industrial concern of the watershed is the Dessalines Sugar Factory. Constructed in 1953, it has a nominal capacity of 2,500 tons a day but has never performed up to that level. During the peak season, it employs some 600 workers, with the number dwindling to half in the off season. In 1980, the factory produced 13,307 tons of sugar; 8,389 in 1981 and 12,108 in 1983. A more complete analysis of the sugar sector is in Delatour's (1983: b).

The extraction of essential oils is another important industrial activity in the area. Around a dozen factories are involved, producing vetiver and lime oil. After a boom in 1975-1979, output has considerably slowed down in the recent years as a result of misguided pricing and marketing decisions by the Government Agency in charge of regulating the sector (Delatour, 1983: a).

C. A SKETCH OF THE CITY OF LES CAYES



Facing the Caribbean Sea, the City of Les Cayes is located in the southern edge of the Southern Peninsula. It is located at the south-eastern limit of the Cayes watershed. The city is a port that lies between the estuary of two rivers: la "Rivière de l'Islet" to the east and "La Ravine du Sud" to the west. It is built on flat land with a very small slope, about 2 percent, and this creates serious problems of drainage for rain water.

According to Moreau de St-Mery (1792: 1,303) the city was founded and built in 1726 according to a map drawn by Monsieur de la Lance, engineer in chief to the King of France. The city was made of 12 blocs of 240 square feet (probably old french measurement units) and divided in 8 sites of 60 feet by 120 feet. The boundaries of the city were the following: a pit to the north, a lagoon to the East, la Ravine du Sud to the West and the Caribbean Sea to the South. Outside of the city's gate, there were spots reserved for the barracks, the parsonage, butcher's shops and so forth. around 1780, the borough became the county town for the southern part of the colony and by 1783, the city of Cayes had military and administrative control of the south. The central position of Cayes with respect of the surrounding plain, the convenience of its port, the expansion of its population made it a natural choice for the establishment of a "comptoir d'échanges" (trading post) with the metropolis and many economic and commercial activities concentrated around the port.

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VILLE DES CAYES



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In 1789, the city had 702 houses. There was a marked geographical separation according to social status. The western part of the city, the most salubrious one, was inhabited by the whites and the housing pattern was characterized by permanent type units built with masonry or madrepora from the sea. The streets were generally wide and well maintained. The eastern part of the city was inhabited by the "people of colour" (gens de couleur) and looked much like a shanty town. That part of the city was called "Little Guinea" and the houses were located in the midst of foul swamps crisscrossed by shaky wooden bridges.

Today, with a population of 34,000 people, the city has kept the colonial pattern virtually intact. With the exception of the excrescences of "Les Gabions" the town is still bordered by "La Rue des Remparts" to the north, the lagoon planted in rice to the east, "La Ravine du Sud" to the west and the sea to the south. Today, as in colonial times, the western part of town is inhabited by people with higher income. There is a marked difference between the two parts of town with respect to the health environment, the dwelling's style and size and the street's state of repair. Between the two traditional parts of the city one finds people with average income. Houses are built with durable material (cement blocs) and are covered with sheet-iron. The population density is rather high there and the houses do not have many rooms given the number of occupants. This kind of pattern may also be found between the center and the northwestern part of town. To the east there are only the shanty-towns of the Lagoon and the fisherman's village. This area is totally void of urban equipment or of infrastructure. Houses are in very bad shape and population density is very high. Health conditions are very bad because of

the lack of drainage and the lack of latrines. There is no running water and most of the people suffer from malnutrition. A recent survey conducted by the Office Nationale du Logement (National Housing Office) ONL reveals that in the views of the inhabitants, the main problems are:

Lack of drainage resulting in flooding, mud, etc. (50%) .

Lack of water (45%)

Lack of sanitary equipment (latrines) (43%)

lack of collective equipment (schools dispensary) (41%)

Land insecurity (42%)

Bad overall environment (rats, filth, mosquitoes) (34%)

(ONL 1980: A 134)

The collective equipment available in the city may be described as follows:

Communications

1. Airport: unpaved runway measuring 1,200 meters in length with 400 meters width.
2. port: 123 meters by 18.7 meters. Reinforced concrete bridge built on reinforced concrete piles (30 by 60 centimeters) water depth 1.30 meters.
Embarcation by snip at 1,700 meters (snip's draught: 6 to 7 meters).

According to the World Bank, in 1977 the traffic amounted to 15,000 tons which is 4.4 percent of the total (World Bank 1981: 41). Passenger movement was even more insignificant.

3. Radio

Stations: There are three radio stations in Les Cayes. The telephone system has around 400 subscribers. The system has an exchange with a capacity of 10,000 lines. In 1982, 56 percent of subscribers were residential; 21.5 percent were administrative; 15.1 percent, services; 4.7 percent, commerce and 1.3 percent, industry (Ministère du Plan, 1983).


Water Supply and Drainage

There is no sewer system in the city so that rainwater flows on the street's surface, causing serious damages especially in non paved areas. The water distribution system was built in 1926 and improved in 1982. Water comes from underground water tables and is pumped. The reservoir's capacity is 378 cubic meters. The World Bank will be financing an expansion and modernization of the system. The criteria that were retained are the following:

Population	:	43,205 inhabitants
Water Requirements	:	5,357 cubic meters per day
Reservoir capacity	:	600 cubic meters
Number of fountains:		22
Number of plugs	:	990
Firehydrant	:	15
Distribution	:	pumping

INFRASTRUCTURES

VILLE DES CAYES



LEGENDE

TELEPHONE


— RESEAU
○ CENTRALE

EAU POTABLE

— RESEAU
● SOURCE D'INSPIRATION
● FONTAINE PUBLIQUE
■ RESERVOIR

ELECTRICITE

— RESEAU
▲ TRANSFORMATEUR
⊞ CAS APPORTEES



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INGENIEUR EN ARCHITECTURE
BOULEVARD DE LA LIBERTE
801 - CAYES
HAÏTI

Electricity Supply

The nominal capacity of the thermal plant is 1.4 Megawatts while the actual one is 1.0 Megawatt. The newly inaugurated hydro station was built with German assistance and has an installed capacity of 2.4 Megawatts. Power is distributed through 3 lines of average tension and one aerial network of low tension. The electric network covers two third of the city and furnishes electricity to 2,682 subscribers. Residential consumption represented 58 percent of the total; industrial consumption, 31 percent; street lighting 5, percent; Municipal users, 5 percent; others, 1 percent.

Population and Employment

Population expanded at an average annual growth rate of 3.4 percent between 1950 and 1982. Of the four main urban centers defined in the Ministry of Plan, Les Cayes had a percentage of urban population of 32.3 percent (South Region) compared with 32 percent for Gonaives, 89.6 percent for Port-au-Prince and 86 percent for Cap. The ONL survey showed that 70 percent of the population was involved in the informal sector, Median income amounted to \$33.2 per household per month. The lowest household income were found in the neighborhood of Chéri and La Savanne: \$24 per month, \$28 per month. Apparently, food expenditures accounted for 72 percent of the total with housing cost representing another 16 percent (ONL, 1980: 138). Based on the 1971 census data, the Ministry of Plan (DATPE 1984: 200) puts the economically active population at 31 percent of the total. Sixty eight and half percent of the total were engaged in the tertiary sector, 3 percent in the primary and

24 percent in the secondary sector. This confirms the predominance of the informal sector because one fourth of the tertiary activities are related to trade. With respect to industrial activities, half was accounted for by food processing and one fifth by the small scale apparel sector. Construction materials represented 5.3 percent of industry-related jobs (SCET 1980).

Education

In 1982, there were 21 public schools and 45 private ones in the city. The total school population was 14,548 pupils of which 52 percent attended public schools and 48 percent private ones. However, while only 30 percent of the pupils went to private schools at the primary level, at the secondary one 72 percent went to private schools. Vocational training is handled exclusively by the public sector, but at a rather low scale (70 students in 1982). There are no technical or professional schools in Les Cayes.

Health

The city has one hospital with 208 beds while for the health district of Les Cayes, there were 3 hospitals with 263 beds. On top of this, there was 2 health centers without beds in the city and 4 of them in the District as a whole. Thus, in the city, there is one doctor per 849 inhabitants while in the health district at large the ratio is one for 9,415.

According to the Ministry of Plan, by the year 2006, the city will have 125,000 inhabitants and will be the fourth urban center of the country.

Keeping population density at 70 persons per squared meter, the urban space needed will amount to close to 900 hectares as compared to around 200 today. In the next twenty years, the challenge is thus to absorb about 100,000 new inhabitants and to expand the city size fourfold.

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CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

Given that USAID has decided to go ahead with a regional development project in Les Cayes, what are the policy implications of the foregoing analysis and literature review? At a most general level, a very strong dose of circumspection is warranted because neither the experience of other countries nor the past history of this one provides support for too much optimism. Much effort and a lot of resources have been spent without any spectacular results. As put by Brinkerhoff and his associates:

"In other countries, including some much larger than Haiti, efforts to promote the growth of smaller cities and towns have had mixed results at best, and often have consumed substantial resources with little results"

(Brinkerhoff et al 1981: 79)

As shown in the first chapter, the review of the recent experience of decentralization policy in less developed countries conducted by Rondinelli and his colleagues for the World Bank, leads to a similarly sober assessment of any prospective regionalization attempt. Moreover, in the case at hand, not much more than \$20 million is being allocated to the project over a 3 to 4 year period (this is an informal "guesstimate"). Given that the Cayes watershed encompasses some 62,000 hectares, this implies that less than \$350 per hectare will be spent, as currently envisioned by the project. In other words, the amount of resources likely to be committed to the area is relatively modest, especially in view of the rudimentary status of the existing economic infrastructure. The small amount to be invested should properly keep expectations at an appropriately modest level.

At a second level the intervention should be designed within a rather long time frame. It is unlikely that any meaningful change will be observed over the course of the first four or five years. Indeed, during that period, practical operational difficulties are bound to upset the most carefully laid out plans. As discussed in the first chapter, there are no reasons to expect the absorptive capacity of the project to be significantly higher than in the rest of the public sector. Consequently, the relevant planning horizon should run from now to the year 2000 and the plan of action should be articulated accordingly. If custom, bureaucratic practices, political expediency or some other constraints do not allow this planning horizon to be explicitly integrated in the initial project formulation, the latter must, nonetheless, clearly state that the current endeavour constitutes only the first step in a longer process. This might be the best way to avoid wasting resources. Such a longer horizon will also allow for the proper nurturing of the local institutional framework which also requires time before it can become effective (more on this later).

As important as a long term approach, is the need to specify a clear and simple objective which shall provide the criteria to derive the specific project activities. The Cayes watershed perfectly illustrates the structural problem that besets Haitian agriculture in general because its mountain slopes are farmed intensively while the flat coastal plains could be subjected to more intensive agricultural use. The strategic objective is to reverse this pattern of land use. An immediate corollary is that population pressure on the hills must also be reduced, which means that alternative employment opportunities must be created as fast as possible in the plains.

A. A Rice Focus for the Watershed

The strategic aim may be formulated somewhat differently by stating that the productivity of the two factors involved in the Cayes watershed should be raised. Both the productivity of the land and the productivity of the labor must be significantly increased if social progress is to materialize in the area. To raise the productivity of the land immediately indicates that water resources must be adequately managed because no significant improvement in productivity levels is possible without proper control of water. In other words, irrigation and drainage systems should be receiving the highest priority in the investment budget after a thorough evaluation of the status of water resources has been conducted. Some part of the watershed receives relatively high rainfall and there is some evidence of abundant underground water supplies. The irrigation potential of the water supply should be carefully evaluated because the most profitable crop to grow in Haiti is rice which requires 12,500 cubic meters of water per hectare. As demonstrated by the Artibonite experience, and by recent trends in the Cayes area itself, once there are proper irrigation facilities, the natural impulse of the farmers is to switch to rice growing. This is to be encouraged for the following reasons:

- (a) rice is one of the most labor intensive crop in Haiti. It requires about 200 man days of labor per hectare per crop cycle. If it is assumed that 3 crops are grown during a calendar year, the demand for labor will be 600 man days per hectare per year. In Chapter 3 it was shown that the watershed contains some 22,000 hectares of plains. If it is assumed that, say, 15,000 hectares are put under rice

cultivation, the total demand for labor would be 9 million man days. Assuming that one full time job is equivalent to 250 man days, this would be equivalent to 36,000 jobs in rice production. But rice marketing is also very labor intensive in Haiti. It may be assumed that the marketing of three tons of paddy rice is the equivalent of one full time job. Assuming furthermore that average yield will be 3.3 tons per hectare per cycle, total output per calendar year will be 148,500 tons ($3.3 \times 3 \times 15,000$) which will require some 50,000 additional marketing jobs. In other words, if 15,000 hectares could be put under rice cultivation in the Cayes Watershed, this would create the demand for some 90,000 full time jobs. Obviously these figures are nothing but gross estimates provided only for illustrative purposes. If only 10,000 hectares were devoted to rice the demand for labor would be 57,000 full time jobs.

- (b) To a large extent, rice production is not too dependent on the size of parcels so that the fragmented land tenure pattern so prevalent in Haiti will not constitute a binding constraint. However, it might be necessary to regroup peasants into production units of a certain minimum size to insure that each such unit is endowed with both an irrigation canal and a drainage ditch in order to achieve optimal water use.
- c. To a large extent rice production is insensitive to the farmer's status as owner, renter or sharecropper. This is due to the fact that, once the irrigation and drainage component is in place, rice

production depends only on labor and other short lived inputs (fertilizer, seeds) so that the sharecropper need not invest or commit any long lived assets.

- (d) Rice production may be easily linked with other productive economic activities. For instance the rice bran can be used as cattle feed. Since cattle raising is an important activity in the watershed, rice growing and cattle raising might be integrated as one activity, by product would serve as input for the other. Furthermore, the processing of paddy rice into milled rice would also provide additional productive employment opportunities.
- (e) In Haiti, rice is a profitable cash crop because the bulk of the output is sold to markets. Rice growing would thus constitute an excellent way to raise farmers' cash income. By the same token, total national food supply would be raised and so would the population's nutrition status.

In other words, rice production might be an excellent way to increase the intensity of use of the plain's land resources while creating an important demand for labor. If the latter is drawn to the flat bottom lands from the mountain slopes, this would reduce population pressure on some of the hillsides vulnerable to erosion and would thus facilitate the efforts to reconstitute the vegetable cover. Serious soil conservation interventions are mandatory on the mountain slopes to preserve the infrastructure (irrigation canals) that are created in the flat lands and to insure that land

productivity in the plains is not impaired because of flooding, unstable water supply and so forth. A prerequisite of good conservation policy is to reduce population pressure on the slopes and to shift the pattern of land use away from annual crops (corn, millet) towards perennial trees (coffee, cocoa, fruits). Although this is likely to be a lengthy and costly process, it must be started now before irreparable damage is done to the physical environment.

If it is indeed technically feasible to significantly expand rice production in the flatter land of the Cayes watershed, the other specific activities that might be part of the project could logically be deduced. Aside from the irrigation/drainage network, the other technical inputs to rice production include improved seeds, fertilizer and the means to combat pests. Such inputs can be delivered by the extension arm of the project in an integrated manner or they might be contracted out to private parties that are already involved in such activities. This part of the project might be relatively easy to execute because only one crop would be involved and the project area would be relatively well defined. Additionally, the case of the Artibonite area could provide some relevant experience as well as opportunities to train personnel. Finally farmers could be induced to form associations or cooperatives by making access to the above mentioned inputs contingent upon membership in the appropriate secondary groups. Such groups could also serve as the basis for the constitution of primary production modules.

It is possible that technical factors may fail to support an extension of the rice acreage to most of the flat lands of the watershed. This might be

the case if there is not enough water on a regular basis throughout the year. Under such circumstances, the first option might be to have rice in rotation with some other crops. Failing this, a suitable cropping mix will have to be identified. Ideally such a mix should not be too different from known practices in the area. The only important criteria would be the labor intensity and the profitability of the crops: The optimum mix would be as labor intensive as possible in order to create more jobs and it should be as profitable as possible, given the structure of relative prices, to induce the farmers to adopt it. Tobacco might be an interesting alternative in that context even if it is also very demanding in terms of water.

With respect to the mountain slopes, it must be kept in mind that direct subsidy might be needed if only because most tree crops do have fairly long gestation periods. For example, the Cayes watershed is the center of the essential oils industry in Haiti. It might be rational to push the growing of lime trees in order to supply the essential oils factories. However, lime trees take four to five years to reach the production stage and optimal output is not reached before the tenth year. Farmers will still have to survive during that interim period. Similar conclusions will be reached in the case of cocoa, coffee or any of the fruit trees that might be considered in the area. This is a very difficult question that will have to be addressed in much greater detail than would be possible in the context of this report. However, planners must keep this in mind because it might be the linchpin to any attempt at inducing sustained reforestation efforts.

B. Education and Target Group Analysis

Raising the productivity of the flat lands is a necessary condition for the long term development of the Cayes watershed. It is not a sufficient one, however. Together with the improvement of the level of land productivity, the productivity of labor must also be raised. And it must be done to a significant degree. The spreading of education will thus assume a paramount importance in any serious development effort in Les Cayes. It might be one of the most effective way to redistribute assets in the Haitian countryside. The problem of education must be confronted at all levels even if during the first stages it might be wise to concentrate on the primary level. However, in the medium term, all levels should be expanded. As discussed previously (in the third section of the first chapter) the demand for educational services might be one of the most important determinants of migration. If, as it seems, the desire to reduce migration flows out of the area is one of the biggest, even if unstated, factor underlying the willingness to undertake that regional development project, then the educational sector must receive both a high priority and a commensurate share of resources.

Given the structure of the educational system in Haiti, this aspect might be the easiest one to implement. Indeed, an important part of the educational system is privately owned and operated. Therefore, with appropriate financial incentives, it might not be difficult to induce the private sector to provide more services to the watershed's population. Incentives might include subsidies to built or expand facilities, provide teacher training and technical assistance for curriculum design, or acquire books and other

educational material. During the first year of operation it might be worthwhile to subsidize the operational costs of some of these facilities, particularly those located outside of the city of Les Cayes. However, the principle of having parents pay for their children's education should not be violated in a blatant way. Haitian parents have usually displayed great willingness to invest in their children's education. On that basis even a symbolic fee might be requested from lower income parents and it must be explicitly stated that subsidies will be limited in time. The equity aspect is nonetheless an acute one as it involves families on the threshold of physical survival. For the members of the very poor groups education must probably be entirely subsidized over the whole education cycle. Appropriate mechanisms shall be devised to address that problem.

This foregoing discussion leads directly to the issue of the proper target group of AID's intervention. The stated intention is to reach the "poorest of the poor." This is a worthy objective in principle. It might, however, be very difficult to achieve in practice without also benefiting those who are already somewhat better off. As was discussed in chapter two there are national level constraints linked to history and politics that make it difficult for a foreign donor to reach directly the poorest of the poor. That is why many criticisms of foreign aid projects focus on the fact that project's beneficiaries are usually among the relatively better off social groups. The criticisms may not be warranted because even if the relatively better off groups benefit, with respect to absolute economic welfare criteria these groups could still properly be considered part of AID's target population. This is because, although they are better off, these groups are

still poor enough. Thus, the perceived degree of inequity among beneficiaries is not as serious as it is often asserted.

Furthermore, it is counterproductive in a fundamental political sense to exclusively attempt to reach the poorest of the poor without benefiting some of the other social groups because the latter are really the ones in a position to sabotage the whole effort. Concretely, this means that one should not, for example, design the irrigation network to systematically exclude the larger farms. Similarly, project financed educational facilities should be open and accessible to everyone. No social group is likely to remain idle and passive in the face of a concerted, foreign backed, attempt at significantly modifying the status quo. Neither AID, nor the project, should be perceived as an immediate threat by the relatively better off social classes because this would trigger attempts at blocking most initiatives. Even if they ultimately failed, such attempts would cause difficulties, create frictions and generate needless social polarization.

In that context, the treatment of private, non governmental organizations should be very careful. It is obvious that NGOs or PVOs may be used as channels to deliver services (say the sale of subsidized fertilizer or of improved seeds). They may also be used to organize farmers in associations for the most efficient design of irrigation "modules" that would regroup many small farms to endow the newly created unit with irrigation and drainage canals. And there exist in the area many groups, (the Oblat Father, for example) that may indeed provide valuable support services either on a contractual basis or merely as a channel. However, it would be a grave mistake to attempt work only with such organizations because that would induce greater government attempt to control these institutions. Indeed in chapter two it was shown that there were ominous trends towards tighter public sector control of NGOs. It is unwise to reinforce these trends by making the PVOs, NGOs and associated grassroots level organizations more tempting targets through the channeling of massive aid flows through them. Furthermore, these organizations are not equally well suited for the various tasks. Clearly, while it may be wise to use these organizations to maintain tertiary irrigation canals, primary or secondary ones will need to be managed in a more centralized fashion.

The project must therefore strive to maintain a proper balance and to avoid unnecessary problems. Attention should thus be paid to what can work within the existing framework and in that sense Zuvekas (1978: 262) words must be needed.

"Indeed, it makes a good deal of sense to begin rural development programs in those communities or among those

individuals in the targeted low income population who are most likely to be receptive. To begin where problems are the most intractable, is to court failure and to diminish the chances of expanding the scope of rural development programs to communities where change is more easily accomplished. If programs are started instead in the latter communities, there is a better chance that unforeseen obstacles can be overcome. A program that is successful in relatively prosperous (but still poor) communities then has a good chance of being extended to even poorer communities, either directly or indirectly through demonstration effects."

The Institutional Framework

The administrative framework contained in the regionalization scheme of the Ministry of Plan is not clear. In a way, it contains the seeds of an undesirable trend towards de facto concentration of decision making powers at the highest level, the CONAT (Commission Nationale à l'Aménagement du Territoire). This would be contrary to AID's volition to promote some measures of real administrative deconcentration.

To reach this objective, it would appear that the following step be taken:

- a. Effective management of the project shall be the responsibility of the USD (Unité Spatiale de Développement) Management Authority. It shall have the status of an autonomous body endowed with financial autonomy and responsible for the planning and execution of regional master plan for the area. Specifically, the project area shall be defined by the limits of the Cayes watershed. This is to reflect the paramount importance given to the interrelated protective and productive uses of the natural resource base. This does not imply that specific intervention shall not go beyond the watershed

boundaries. For example, the road Cayes-Camp Ferrin-Jeremie is of tremendous economic importance and may well be the object of the project's intervention, at least on the segment Cayes-Camp Ferrin.

- d. While the Management Authority is responsible for the planning and execution of a regional master plan, it shall not be involved in the actual implementation process. This will be done by resorting to contracts with other parties. The latter may be private or public. The option of entering into specific performance contracts with public sector parties is designed as a vehicle to induce effective decentralization of the central ministries. But, should such decentralization fail to take place, this will not compromise the project's performance because of the recourse to private sector alternatives. Thus, the project would serve as a vehicle for institutional building/strengthening that will involve both public and private sector entities.
- c. A basic assumption must be that AID should be intimately involved in the daily life of the project. Therefore, the Board of Directors of the Management Authority shall include the Minister of Finance, the Minister of Plan, the Minister of Agriculture and AID Representative. The Board would be the project's highest decision making authority and would therefore set overall development policy. The Board shall meet in Les Cayes at least three times a year or as required by circumstances. The inclusion of the Ministers of Plan and Agriculture is self evident given the nature of the project.

The inclusion of the Minister of Finance is justified by the need to avoid problems and delays associated with the erratic commitment and disbursement of counterpart funds. This is a problem that has plagued many regional development projects (ODN I or ODVA).

- d. The daily management of the project shall be the responsibility of an Executive directorate. It shall be made of two members: the director, a Haitian that will be appointed by the President upon recommendation of the Board. His appointment shall be renewable fixed term to insure a certain amount of institutional continuity. The fixed tenure is intended to shield the project management from the changes in cabinet in Port-au-Prince which, in the past, have often resulted in changes in the top management of regional development projects. ODN I, for instance, had three different directors in a two year period. The director may be a civil servant on detail from another administration or he might be a private person hired on contract. He need not be an agronomist: more attention should be given to general managerial capabilities and experience as compared with narrow technical backgrounds. The deputy director should not be a contractor because the idea is to signal that the Mission is so serious about regional development that it is willing to practice what it preaches. Furthermore, one of the main responsibilities of the deputy director will be to insure proper coordination with the Mission so that the person must be thoroughly familiar with AID's procedures. The deputy director also will have a key role to play in the channeling of technical assistance to the project.

- e. The power to engage the project's funds must be located in Les Cayes. This is an absolute prerequisite to meaningful deconcentration. In order to alleviate the difficulties, the office of financial control and internal audit shall be headed by an AID direct hire.
- f. The administration of the project shall include five functional offices besides the financial control one: Planning and Evaluation, Engineering, Agricultural Development Diffusion and Education and Human Resources Development. Again, the staffing of these units may be done with civil servants on detail or by private contractors. The central feature of this proposal is that these offices shall not be involved in actual implementation of project's activities. This will be done through contracts with private parties or government agencies. Through these specific contracts the local offices of the central ministries may develop the needed technical or administrative capabilities. Their failure to do so should not, however, compromise the execution of project's tasks.
- g. A similar logic applies to the role and function of CORCOPLAN. If it does emerge as a viable entity, its advisory functions may be extended and it might become more intimately associated with the project's operations. Conceivably it could even perform the function of planning and evaluation. Should it fail to become a serious advisory body, this will not impair the project's efficacy.