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CROSS-CUTTING ISSUES
EMERGING FROM THE ARUSHA REGIONAL PLANNING EXERCISE

by

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INTRODUCTION

AP/VDP regional planning activities have now been underway for 11 months. Much has happened during this period. Data have been collected; training sessions have been held; and at last count, 42 papers^{1/} have been written that relate directly to the regional planning component of the project. It is time to start asking what, if anything, the planning activities can contribute to the achievement of regional objectives.

In what follows, an attempt is made to synthesize the points coming out of the planning papers that have the greatest policy relevance for the Region, districts, and villages. If the planning activities are to justify their costs, the points presented below will sooner or later have to start impacting on policy-making at all levels.

The following pages do not include a complete listing of findings and recommendations from the planning papers. Rather, the approach is to summarize the major recurring themes and recommendations that seemingly have the greatest policy relevance.

^{1/} See Annex A for a list of these papers.

This does not mean specific findings and recommendations not covered in this paper are not of great importance, and these will be covered elsewhere.^{1/} The paper starts by summarizing the important findings of the planning paper concerning the setting in which development of the Arusha Region will take place. Following an elaboration of these points, specific constraints to development are summarized. The paper offers several future scenarios for the Region. It concludes with the suggestions that the region's future will depend largely on what actions are taken concerning the recommendations included in this paper.

THE SETTING

Several critical points are repeatedly emphasized in the planning papers concerning the overall setting for development of the Region. These will be discussed under the following headings:

- Population Growth;
- Pressures on the Land;
- Financial Constraints; and
- Incentives.

All these points are related, as will be seen; however, they will be introduced in sequence so that the reader can obtain a concrete

^{1/} See the sector and issue abstracts.

understanding of each. One point that is not a main focus of the paper but is important to the Region concerns its relationship with other countries, particularly Kenya. This issue is also briefly discussed.

Population Growth

Johnston has conservatively estimated that sometime between 1995 and 2000 the population of every district in the Region will double. The estimate is conservative, because no allowance is made for in-migration, a factor that is likely to be significant. The population of the Region is now growing at a 3.8 percent average annual rate; there are few regions of the world that are growing at such a rapid rate; and this entails heavy costs. For example, it is estimated that as a result of this growth, the school-age population of the Region will double within a decade. This means that expenditures for education will have to increase significantly if the rapid improvements in educational attainment that have been achieved in recent years are not to be lost. Of course, this rapid rate of population growth has costly implications for other government services.

Arusha Region is currently a food surplus area. Sargent estimates that the Region produces 413,563 tons of food annually, yielding a surplus after consumption of 161,294 tons, or about 40 percent. A doubling of the population will require 180,000 tons additional for consumption, an amount that exceeds the current food surplus by almost 20,000 tons.

Other costs of rapid population growth can be seen from the following example. Assume that the Region's gross domestic product (GDP) -- which was roughly TSh 1.7 billion, or TSh 1,811 per capita in 1980 -- were to grow at a 6 percent annual rate over the next 20 years.^{1/} If population continues to grow at 3.8 percent annually, per capita income in 2000 will be TSh 2,753. If, on the other hand, the population growth rate were to fall by one percentage point to 2.8 percent annually, per capita income would be TSh 3,342. In short, the difference of one percentage point will make a difference in per capita incomes in 2000 of TSh 589, or roughly 20 percent. There are serious questions as to whether any given percentage increase in GDP can be sustained, and this issue is the subject of the following section.

Recommendation 1: The Region and districts should develop programs to reduce population growth rates.

Pressures on the Land

There are four primary uses of land in the Arusha Region -- agriculture, livestock, wildlife and forests -- and each makes an important contribution. Sargent estimates that agriculture and livestock activities each contribute TSh 650 million annually, or roughly 40 percent (80 percent combined) to the Region's GDP. Wildlife is important for the tourism industry, which contributes roughly five percent to the Region's GDP. The forests are

^{1/} Six percent is the recommended target growth rate for national income for the Long-term Prospective Plan (1981-2000).

important as an energy source and are perhaps equally important in providing critical watersheds. While accurate estimates of actual land use by activity are difficult, livestock, wildlife and forests use far more land than agriculture, which uses only five percent of the Region's land area.

As is well-known and documented in the planning papers (e.g., Fosbrooke and Peterson/Peterson), there has been continual friction among these land users, with agriculture gradually moving into the lands used by the others. But the planning documents go on to point out two new important facts: these land encroachments are reducing the productivity in each activity and equally if not of greater importance, this growing pressure on the land is destroying the land. The encroachment of agriculture into pastoral areas is breaking up the traditional livestock production systems; conversely, agricultural yields are falling because of incursion by livestock and wildlife; and similarly, forests are being destroyed to provide energy sources to the growing population and the accompanying economic activities (e.g., see Humpal, Jacobs et al, Peterson/Peterson and Synott). The environmental destruction accompanying this buildup in activity is well documented in Bryan's paper. The seriousness of this environmental destruction cannot be over-emphasized. The history of various countries, such as Haiti, provide vivid examples of what can result from such pressures on the land.

There are, of course, many examples of countries with far greater population densities than Arusha Region that have been

able to maintain yields and preserve the quality of their natural environments -- one only has to refer to the industrialized countries of Europe, to Japan, and to many developing countries in Asia. However, there is a critical difference between those countries and the Arusha Region: in all of those countries, specific land use policies are in operation and major initiatives are on-going to preserve the environment.

In short, the planning papers emphasize that with the growing population and concomitant economic activity, land is becoming a scarce and a valuable asset. More ominously, the papers indicate, with vivid examples, that land can be overused, and destroyed, and that this process is underway in the Arusha Region.

Recommendation 2: The Region and districts should engage in separate exercises to identify the most serious implications of the doubling of the population and the resultant pressures on the land that will occur by the year 2000. The results of this exercise should be actions to adapt to these pressures.

Financial Constraints

Development is constrained by available resources and how they are used. As applied to the Arusha Region, the questions then become:

- What land is available for development?
- What amount and quality of labor is available for development?
- What capital stock does the region possess, both physically and organizationally?

- How might the above "inputs" be more effectively combined? and
- What potential is there for attracting additional resources for development?

Concerns on the first question have been expressed above. The next two questions will be addressed in the constraints section. As regards the latter two questions, the following conclusions from the Morss Financial Resources paper warrant some elaboration:

- There is probably greater development potential to be gained from making more effective and efficient use of resources already present in the Region than can be expected from the purchase and application of the limited additional resources that can be afforded; and
- However limited financial resources from the Central Government may be in the next few years, development will occur more rapidly if the share of operating and maintenance expenditures in total expenditures is increased.

Financial Resources

Looking into the future, it is most useful to consider potential financial resources under the following major headings:

- The Central Government budget, excluding foreign assistance:
- Foreign assistance;
- Parastatals;
- Revenues of regional and lower level governments;
- Borrowings by regional and lower level entities; and
- Private investment.

Traditionally, the Central Government budget has been seen as a major source of financial resources for the Region. Indeed, the annual budget cycle, which constitutes a tremendous drain on government manpower, is an action directed primarily at obtaining monies from this source. Morss (op. cit.) concludes that because of the war effort and the rapid run-up in the price of oil, the Region cannot expect additional financial resources in real terms from this source over the foreseeable future.

Foreign assistance is a somewhat different matter. Tanzania remains popular with foreign donors, and the Arusha Region is particularly attractive to these donors. While additional resources can be expected here, it is critical that the Region incorporate these resources more effectively into its own development planning than has been the case in the past. As a point of reference, it is worth noting that development expenditures financed from foreign assistance amount to slightly more than 60 percent of the region's development budget.

Parastatals make a significant contribution of financial resources to the region. While a specific breakdown for the Region is unfortunately not available, it was estimated in last year's Budget Speech that for the nation, parastatal recurrent expenditures would be about TSh 15 billion and parastatal development expenditures would be TSh 3.4 billion. This compares with Central Government budget figures of TSh 7.5 billion and TSh 7.2 billion, respectively.

Given the magnitude of parastatal expenditures, the fact that a regional breakdown is not available suggests a woeful inadequacy in the information available for regional planning.

Currently, lower level government collections of fees and charges constitute an insignificant portion of government finances. There should be a real potential for additional monies from these sources, particularly in the form of user charges to cover the operating and maintenance costs of certain government services. At present, this is an area of considerable confusion that involves certain national policies that are not being implemented. For example, it is an announced national policy that villages should pay the operating costs of potable water systems. The policy is not being implemented, and there is some uncertainty as to where such monies, if collected, should go. This area needs careful study.

Another potential source of financial resources for the Region are borrowings. There are various national credit agencies that hold considerable amounts of undisbursed foreign assistance monies. It should be possible to find ways to tap into these monies. In light of these large holdings, arguments that Arusha Region is receiving its fair share of disbursed monies are not particularly convincing. In addition to pressing for more of these monies, efforts should be made to use existing institutions such as district development corporations to secure financial resources. Before this is done the structures and mode of operation of these existing institutions should be evaluated.

There are no estimates of private investments by outsiders into the Region. It appears that most of these investments are negotiated by the Central Government. Again the fact that information on these investments is not available seriously limits the ability of the Region to engage in comprehensive planning.

Recommendation 3: The Region should establish mechanisms that increase its ability to mobilize financial resources. Consideration should be given to the expanded application of user charges and to new borrowing mechanisms.

Operating and Maintenance Expenditures

There are numerous indications that a larger allocation is going to development expenditures relative to operation and maintenance outlays than efficiency considerations would warrant. Dispensaries are being built but there are inadequate dispensary supplies and attendants (Yoder). Land rovers are in abundance but there are shortages of spare parts and fuel (Morrison). Perhaps most notably, a number of consultant studies suggest the country is losing ground on the 1991 objective of supplying potable water to the entire population. It appears that pump breakdowns, coupled with the population growth rate, is causing the share of population having access to potable water to fall more rapidly than the gain resulting from new installations (Gadek).

Table 1 indicated recurrent expenditures' share of total expenditures is falling. Since operating and maintenance expenditures are traditionally financed out of the recurrent budget, it can be expected that these expenditures will fall even further behind what they should be in future years. The effect is likely

to be even more pronounced inasmuch as recurrent expenditures, in real terms, are projected to fall over the next few years as a result of the economic crisis facing the nation. As this happens, government wage and salary payments will increase its share of recurrent expenditures since it is unlikely the government will be willing to dismiss workers.

Table 1

TREND IN THE RELATIVE IMPORTANCE
OF RECURRENT GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES

	<u>1977/78</u> <u>Actuals</u>	1978/79 <u>Provisional</u> <u>Actuals</u>	1979/80 <u>Revised</u> <u>Estimates</u>	1980/81 <u>Estimates</u>	1981/82 <u>Estimates</u>
Recurrent Expenditures as a Percent of Total Expenditures					
-Regional Budget	80	80	80	75	74
-Total Government Budget	61	66	55	54	53

Source: Tanzania Budget Documents and data prepared by the Central Bureau of Statistics.

It might be argued that foreign donors prefer to finance the development budget, not the recurrent budget, and that consequently, in light of the financial crisis the country faces, there is nothing that can be done to redress the falling share of operating and maintenance expenditures. This argument requires further testing. By now the foreign donors have to be impressed by the evidence that rapid depreciation is wiping out many development gains. It is certainly worth making the case that overall development would be accelerated by increasing the relative share of operating and maintenance expenditures.

Recommendation 4: The Region should appeal to both the Central Government and foreign donors for increased funds to finance operational and maintenance needs, even if these funds come at the expense of development monies.

Incentives

No overview of the setting of the Arusha Region would be complete without mention of two systems of incentives that markedly impede development initiatives. One concerns the tremendous importance given to the annual budget cycle; the second has to do with national policies relating to the pricing and marketing of agricultural products.

The Budget Cycle

At present...planning is not institutionalized -- only the budget is institutionalized. (quote by E.B. Waide cited in IDS paper.)

Several important inferences might be drawn from this assertion. Firstly if the budget cycle is the focus of attention, it can be inferred that the emphasis is on the initiation of new projects rather than on the implementation of projects for which money has been already approved. Secondly, if the budget submission is seen as a mechanism to obtain monies, it is reasonable to assume that the submission will not be particularly critical of on-going projects. A further hypothesis is suggested: if the Region and district governments have been reasonably successful at obtaining funds with budget submissions that are not thoroughly thought through and well documented, there is little external

incentive to make the greater effort required for proposals that are technically, economically and socially sound. There is some evidence to support this hypothesis. Quoting from the summary of last summer's seminar on Data Analysis and Development Planning:

It was jokingly suggested that the training program may be a solution without a problem. Participants indicated that although they were interested in learning how to prepare better project proposals there was little incentive for them to change their old practices. Subsequent discussions with other participants confirmed a general feeling that the project approval system is unlikely to reward efforts to improve proposals. Most functional managers at district and regional levels are currently getting funding for their higher priority projects without worrying about the issues discussed in the seminar. Until the parties reviewing the proposals become more demanding in terms of quality and content, there will be little incentive to use the material presented in the seminar. Looking to the future, explicit attention should be given to creating a demand or need for training before the training is offered.

The above assertions, if correct, are fundamental. If there is no incentive for well-designed projects, if there is no incentive for imaginative time and effort going into implementation, then any attempt to increase the planning and implementation capacity at Region and district levels will come to naught.

This is not an issue that can be resolved by expatriates. Also, it is unlikely that the Central Government will reform its approval practices in the foreseeable future. Rather, it is an issue that will have to be faced squarely by regional and district officials. Perhaps the continued frustrations of recur-

curing project failures will serve as a spur to greater efforts in sound project preparation and implementation. Perhaps also, a demonstration that sound project planning and implementation will lead to project successes will help.

There is another dimension to the budget cycle worth noting. It is not really a budget cycle, but a set of competitive budget exercises. That is, each ministry makes an annual budget request, as does every parastatal organization and every region. To the extent that these submissions are viewed as competitive by those submitting, i.e., competing for a fixed amount of resources, competitive behavior should be expected. One aspect of competitive behavior is an unwillingness to share information and cooperate. In this regard, it is interesting that one of the major shortcomings of planning activities as seen from the Arusha Region's vantage point, is the lack of information on the planned activities of other government agencies and the parastatals. In summary, insofar as budget submissions are viewed as competitive exercises by those making submissions, it is unlikely that much information sharing and cooperation will result from exhortations to that end. Nevertheless, the following recommendation is made.

Recommendation 5: The Region should request detailed information on the future development plans of the Central Government and the parastatals. The Region should insist on its right to accept, reject, or modify these initiatives, depending on their congruence with the Region's development plans. The Region should insist on its right to be fully involved in discussions with all foreign donors interested in funding development initiatives in the Arusha Region.

Pricing and Marketing Policies

All the papers written on the agriculture sector (Humpal, Walton, Sargent) are critical of national policies governing producer prices paid farmers. With virtually no crop excepted, it has been strongly recommended that producer prices be raised. Several arguments have been offered to support these recommendations. Firstly, it appears that in nearly all instances the official prices (in real terms) have fallen in recent years. This in itself creates a disincentive for increased production and investments in improved agricultural practices. This finding is particularly true as it relates to the cash crops the country depends upon for foreign exchange. Furthermore, Sargent offers convincing evidence that when producer prices are increased (in real terms), production responds quickly and impressively (e.g., maize and pigeon peas).

Secondly, there is ample evidence that artificially low producer prices have forced Tanzanians into significant amounts of illegal trading. Any government action that forces the citizens to engage in illegal activities is questionable on its face; in this case, the result is that the country loses control over the foreign exchange that results when crops are sold illegally to foreigners.

A related issue concerns national government policy that gives certain parastatals monopoly control in the marketing and distribution of agricultural produce. It is clear that these

parastatals do not have the resources to carry out their responsibilities in these areas; it is also clear that these parastatals are pursuing inefficient and cumbersome methods to fulfill on their mandates. Two options appear possible. The first is to increase the resources and efficiency of the parastatals; the second is to license other entities to engage in marketing and distribution activities.

These issues are too important not to mention in this Setting section. They will be discussed in greater detail in the Constraints section.

International Relations

No description of the development setting would be complete without at least a brief mention of the fact that the border between Tanzania and Kenya was closed in 1976. The planning papers have not analyzed the effect of this closing in detail, but the Morss Tourism paper did suggest that from the standpoint of the tourism industry -- especially as regards its development in the Arusha Region -- the border should remain closed.

The fact that the border issue has not been analyzed in detail in the planning papers should not be taken to suggest that the issue is not tremendously important to the development of the region. For example, there has been some discussion of establishing a duty-free zone in the Arusha Region; there also appear to be plans going ahead for the construction of a 500-unit hotel

with an accompanying conference center in the Region.^{1/} The appropriateness of such initiatives would certainly be influenced by developments in the border situation.

MAJOR CONSTRAINTS TO DEVELOPMENT

In the previous section, four characteristics of the setting for development in the Arusha Region were described. These included population growth, the resulting pressure on the land, financial resources and incentives. It was concluded that very little can be done about the population growth projections for the next two decades and the Central Government will not be able to afford increased real expenditures in the region in the foreseeable future. However, it did appear that steps could be taken so that the negative characteristics of the other points mentioned could at least be ameliorated. In this section, these issues will be discussed in greater depth. Other issues that constrain development in the Region will also be addressed. In reviewing the constraints, it is useful to distinguish between those that the Region can deal with directly and those that will require policy changes at the national level.

^{1/} One has to wonder whether these plans allow for the impact of this new hotel complex on existing hotels in Arusha (currently running at an average annual occupancy rate of 30 percent) and on the Arusha International Conference Centre (currently operating at a 10 percent utilization rate).

National Level Issues

Producer Prices and Devaluation

Low producer prices were singled out as a critical deterrent to higher production in the Arusha Region. In addition, they have spurred black market activities which have resulted in the country losing control over foreign exchange earned by exports. It is important to discuss the devaluation here, because it ties very closely into this problem. The marketing of export crops is handled by marketing boards, and these boards base the price they pay producers largely on cash flow considerations. That is, producers will rarely be offered a price that the board projects will cause it to run a deficit. Without offering a judgement on the appropriateness of this criterion, it should be noted that a devaluation of the currency would have immediately positive effects on the board's ability to pay producers higher prices.

Tanzania is not important enough in the overall market for any crop it exports such that it can effect the foreign exchange price it receives. This means that if the country were to devalue, it would receive the same amount of foreign exchange as it did prior to devaluation. The difference, and it is an important one in light of the way marketing boards determine producer prices, would be that after devaluation, the Central Bank would pay the marketing board more Tanzanian shillings for the foreign exchange it received than would have

been the case prior to the devaluation. This means that as a result of a devaluation, the marketing board could afford to pay the producer more for his crop than would have been possible before the devaluation.

A second positive by-product of a devaluation is that it would reduce incentives to engage in black market activities with other countries. This is because today, a major reason for selling illegally to other countries is to obtain foreign currencies which can be either used to buy foreign goods or be sold in Tanzania for Tanzanian shillings. If Tanzania were to devalue, the amount of Tanzanian shillings an exporter would receive through legal markets would increase, thereby reducing the advantage of illegal sales.

There is a third important reason a devaluation would benefit Arusha Region. Tourism is an important industry to the Arusha Region, particularly when measured by the amount of land reserved for wildlife. A devaluation would increase the attractiveness of tourism in Arusha relative to Kenya and the rest of the world. To the extent that tours were purchased locally, their cost would fall by the amount of the devaluation. Concomitantly, a devaluation would increase the attractiveness of local crafts to foreigners by reducing their costs.

Recommendation 6: The Region should urge the Central Government to increase producer prices.

Summarizing, every paper that has been written for the plan that relates to agriculture has urged an increase in the prices paid producers of nearly every crop in the Region. It appears that a devaluation would facilitate such price increases, and there are other reasons for a devaluation. It follows that the Region should make a well-documented case to the national government for both producer price increases and a devaluation of the currency.

Recommendation 7: The Region should urge the Central Government to devalue the Tanzanian Shilling.

Parastatal Reform

As was mentioned in the above section, several papers have alluded to the incapacity of certain parastatals to fulfill on their marketing and distribution responsibilities. Often, this has meant crops have spoiled while waiting for parastatals to pick them up. At other times the parastatals have not been able to pay for crops because of financial difficulties. Such happenings impose severe constraints on the Region's development prospects. In the first place, farmers lose income; this will discourage them, with the consequence that they will produce less in future years and/or they will find other means, sometime illegal, to sell their produce.

In a number of papers, there have been suggestions that a main reason for the financial problems with the parastatals stems from their own inefficiencies in operation. There is

evidence that the marketing boards are withholding an increasing portion of revenues from sales for their own operations; in other instances, the routes of the parastatals seem questionable (for example, why should candy made and packaged in Moshi have to be transported all the way to Dar before being sold in Arusha shops?) .

In short, it appears that the financial problems and inefficiencies of the parastatals responsible for the marketing and distribution of agricultural produce are seriously curtailing the prospects for agricultural developments in the Arusha Region. The Region should make this point in strongest terms to the Central Government. Further, the Region should investigate what it might do directly to improve parastatal services to the Region.

Recommendation 8: The Region should press for parastatal reform in marketing, distribution, and overall efficiency of operation. Until such reforms occur, the Region should licence other agents to perform marketing and distribution functions.

Top-Down Direction

Despite rhetoric to the contrary, vestiges of top-down planning and project implementation are widespread. In a recent paper written by a representative of the Ministry of Planning and Economic Affairs, the following was stated: "Under decentralization, the primary responsibility for planning and implementing development programmes at the regional level has been assigned

to the regions and districts so that they can decide on their own priorities and methods of implementation."^{1/} But he then goes on to say: "The decentralization decision also implied that the capacity of the Sectoral Ministries to plan and monitor the overall development of their sectors would be strengthened and enhanced." It is not altogether clear why the decentralization decision implies anything about enhancing the capacity of Sectoral Ministries if the primary responsibility for planning and implementing development programmes within the regions has been assigned to region and district level governments. The reality of the situation appears to be that the Region's share of the development budget remains at about 10 percent,^{2/} and probably more resources have gone into enhancing planning capabilities at the national level than at lower levels of government. The same situation holds as regards the parastatals. Significant resources have gone into increasing their planning capabilities, and their budgets dwarf the budget of the Region.

It would be one thing if the Region was informed of new initiatives as they were thought up, but frequently, the Region hears of them only shortly before project implementation

^{1/} N. N. Kitomari, "The Role of Sectoral Planning in the National Planning and Control Process."

^{2/} This, despite the fact that under the decentralization policy announced in 1972, 40 percent of the development budget was supposed to be controlled by regions.

commences. It would be one thing if line ministry and parastatal development projects were well-conceived and had a high success rate. Unfortunately, this is not the case. Leaving the success rate issue aside, it is not possible for the Region to engage in meaningful planning activities without having a clear understanding of what these other agencies are planning for the Region. This is a particularly serious problem inasmuch as the Region's development budget amounts to only about 8 percent of total government and parastatal development expenditures in the Region.^{1/} Given the national policy decision to make a large resource commitment to upgrade the planning capabilities of the regions, it follows that the regions should have early information on the development plans of other agencies and the power to change, approve or disapprove these outside development initiatives. Of course, such fundamental changes in authority will not take place overnight, but the Region should start now to request earlier and more complete information on the development plans of the line ministries and the parastatals.

While a comprehensive review of line ministry and parastatal projects has not been undertaken by the Region, certain

^{1/} 1980/81 regional development expenditures are TSh 51.2 million. Central Government expenditures in the Region are estimated at TSh 460.0 million. From the Budget Speech last year it appears that the ratio of parastatal development expenditures to central government development expenditures is .47. Using this ratio one can estimate parastatal development expenditures in Arusha Region to be TSh 216.6 billion. Dividing regional development expenditures by the sum of estimated parastatal and central government development expenditures yields 7.57 percent.

generalizations are provided by the Region's planning papers. Morrison, in his study of the operation of Comworks, indicates that regional activities are frequently disrupted by equipment being unexpectedly pulled off to work on national roads. Yoder has indicated that expensive health facilities are constructed and are then underutilized because personnel and supplies are not available. Gadek finds that potable water projects frequently fail shortly after construction because inadequate attention and resources are available for operation and maintenance. In all three of these cases, the problems sprung from pressures to realize a national target by means of approaches that make little sense in light of the availability of resources.

The planning papers have raised serious questions concerning other nationally initiated projects. Take, for example, the Canadian-financed wheat program in Hanang. While it undoubtedly raises wheat production in the short run, there are several reasons to be worried. In the first place, the capital intensive methods being used mean that under 20 people are needed to fully run the operation per 10,000 acres under cultivation. One has to ask whether the loss in employment and livelihood opportunities for thousands of Tanzanians (the scheme now occupies 24,000 acres that smallholders could be cultivating; the plan is to expand to 70,000 acres) is justified in terms of the higher wheat yields. On top of this, Bryan warns that the cultivation practices may well result in an environmentally disastrous "dust bowl" reminiscent of what happened in Western Canada when similar methods were employed.

These comments, along with the conclusions drawn in the first section of this paper, suggest that if the most critical issues in the development of the Arusha Region are to be addressed, projects and programs that cross sectoral lines are needed. Unfortunately, there is little evidence to suggest that the national government is thinking in terms of programs that cut across sectors. It might be thought that the Ministry of Planning and Economic Affairs might assume such a role, but it does not appear the Ministry sees itself as an initiator of project ideas:

Devplan's role ... is that of managing the national planning and control system by ... reviewing and co-ordinating, on behalf of the Economic Committee of the Cabinet, the development programmes and control reports produced or recommended by the Sectoral Ministries and Regions as part and parcel of the ^{1/} annual development planning and control process.^{1/}

The purpose of these comments is not to be critical of centrally directed projects. Rather, it is to document that problems are associated with them. Because the people of Arusha Region are to be directly benefitted or hurt by their outcomes, the Regional Government should be involved both in their planning and implementation to a greater extent than is the case now.

^{1/} N. N. Kitomari, op. cit.

Just how this might be accomplished needs to be examined carefully. Regional and Central Government officials are already quite busy with their own "budget cycles," and there will be reluctance to take on a further "communication and coordination" responsibility. By the same token, it is essential for this to happen if the Region is to play the planning role envisaged for it.

Recommendation 9: The Region should request a larger portion of the Development Budget than its current 10 percent share.

Recommendation 10: The Region should sit with parastatals and line ministries early in each budget cycle to review and coordinate upcoming development initiatives. In preparation for these meetings, the Region should conduct its own assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of ongoing parastatal and line ministry development projects.

In summary of this section, the planning papers have identified a set of national policy issues that constrain the development of the Region. These include producer pricing policies, the overvalued Tanzanian Shilling, parastatal inadequacies in marketing and distribution, and the continuation of a top-down planning mentality that leaves the Regional authorities with little opportunity to engage in comprehensive planning for the development of the Region. On all of the issues, action is needed.

Regional Policies and Actions

To this point, this paper has summarized the overall setting for development of the Region and has indicated national policies that constrain development. From here on, the focus will be on what the Region can itself do to accelerate development.

Thinking Globally, Acting Locally

The theme of a recent international conference,^{1/} was that people must start "thinking globally and acting locally." This theme has much relevance to the Arusha Region. It appears essential that the Region recognize and act on the global points discussed above: to do otherwise would be irresponsible. By the same token, some of these global constraints to development must be taken as given, e.g., the population projections for the year 2000 and the financial crisis facing the nation. In short, the Region must be aware of these global constraints and do what it can to eliminate them. By the same token the Region must "think locally" and ask what it can do on its own -- in recognition of these constraints -- to foster development. In some fundamental sense, the essence of successful regional planning is to think globally and act locally. The Region must understand the global setting and constraints under which it operates. But understanding is not enough: by itself it is an academic exercise. The Region must go a step further to the

^{1/} The First Global Conference on the Future, held in Toronto in July, 1980.

formulation and implementation of action plans based upon an understanding of the setting and the constraints.

Development Planning Within the Region

A recurrent theme in the regional planning papers is that some of the most critical problems facing the Region cut across traditional sector boundaries. For example, the formulation of a land use policy that maximizes regional GDP, allows for equity considerations, while at the same time preserves the environment, requires the intense involvement of officials involved with agriculture, livestock, forestries and wildlife/tourism. Because any land use plan will affect the vital issues of villagers, they must also play an important role in such deliberations.

The formulation of a land use policy will require coming to grips with such questions as:

- What lands should be given attention first?
- What criteria should be used in determining appropriate land uses?
- How restrictive should any land use policy be in terms of allowing other uses of the land?

To answer such questions, information on the relative rates of return for various uses of the land should be at hand. Unfortunately, the regional planning exercise has not to date been able to come up with such information. However, a few suggestive observations can be made. Firstly, Sargent estimates that

regional income from agriculture and livestock are about the same (each being about TSh 650 million or 40 percent of regional income annually). It is estimated that agricultural activities take up less than 300,000 hectares, while livestock is conducted on roughly 5 million hectares. Clearly, the average return on a hectare of land in agriculture is significantly greater than on the average hectare of land in livestock. This, by itself, does not mean that overall income would go up if more land were allocated to agriculture (the critical question concerns marginal values), but it is certainly suggestive of that conclusion. Secondly, the portion of regional income coming from tourism is less than 5 percent annually. The amount of land devoted to wildlife should be considered in light of this; it would seem extremely likely that the return to the Region of switching wildlife areas either to agriculture or livestock would result in a significant increase in income.

Of course, determination of land use cannot be made on the basis of economic rate of return considerations alone, but these and other criteria will have to be developed and thoroughly discussed if effective land use plans are to be introduced.

Consider another example. Water is an extremely scarce and valuable commodity in many parts of the Region. It is needed for humans, agriculture, wildlife and livestock, and its availability depends importantly on forestry policies. This suggests that policies for potable water, irrigation and

livestock watering should be coordinated, and that representatives from MAJI, KILIMO, MIFUGO, Wildlife and the Forestry Departments, along with the villagers whose interests are vitally affected should be parties to the policy deliberations.

Finally, there is the transportation system, a system that is vital to every sector. Clearly, decisions on possible new roads and/or maintenance of existing ones is not something that should be decided in isolation from planned activities in other sectors. Before any decisions on roads are made, the Region should have data on future road demands coming from both within and outside the Region.

These three examples raise a fundamental question: are planning activities, as currently carried out, structured in such a way so that such cross-sectoral dialogues take place or are even possible? A cursory review of the 1980/81 Development Expenditure Estimates offers little evidence of such cross-sectoral planning, and yet discussions with representatives from the groups mentioned above indicates a clear awareness of the interdependencies involved.

In short, this would appear to be an area in which some reorganization of the planning process at Regional and District levels is required. The planning papers identify pressing needs for projects that cut across sectoral lines that also require the involvement of villagers. Right now, the only projects coming through the cycle appear to be sector specific.

Recommendation 11: The Region and Districts should engage in a set of planning exercises that cut across sectoral lines. These exercises should result in new policies and programs that will probably require outside funding.

Recommendation 12: The Region and Districts should immediately start working on land use plans. These plans should serve as the basis for proposals to increase returns on land use and conservation practices.

Getting Maximum Use Out of Limited Resources

There is ample evidence that manpower, equipment and even land for the development of the Region are in short supply. It also appears that these shortages are going to continue. The question then to be asked is whether the Region is getting maximum use out of the resources available to it. Putting the issue slightly differently: the Regional and District level governments are in the business of supplying certain goods and services to their citizens. The question is whether these goods and services are being delivered in the most efficient manner.

Consider first the manpower issue. Wily has documented that 23.5 percent of all established posts are vacant. However, she goes on to say:

That the shortage of staff in general in the Region is not a critical constraining factor; that undermanagement of existing staff is a key constraint ... (that this) constraint may be alleviated by measures which the Region itself, and only the Region, is in a position to take.

Wily indicates that a critical constraint involves trained middle-level technicians, who can be trained through short courses; she adds that many training requirements could be met through informal training programs. She also indicates that the absence of integrated teamwork is a critical element that contributes to the apparent manpower shortages. Concretely, this conclusion is borne out by the problems encountered with the team that has been put together to introduce shallow wells. The problem is not staffing; the problem is rather getting the individuals to work together as a team.

Of course, it would be nice to have a larger manpower complement. Unfortunately, it does not appear this will happen soon. Consequently, the Region and Districts will have to make better use of the manpower available to them: they will have to find ways to cheaply train and utilize para-professionals. The matter of using para-professionals warrants further comment. In many countries of the world, there is a growing recognition that jobs which were previously viewed as requiring a fully-trained professional can be broken up into specific tasks that persons with limited technical training can carry out. By employing this approach, one fully-trained professional can manage a large number of persons with limited technical training. There is a second reason to explore the para-professional approach. Evidence suggests that it is extremely difficult to keep a person with advanced training in the rural areas. This appears to be a reality to be accepted. This being the case,

it has proven useful to get villagers to select one of themselves for para-professional training with the understanding that the villager will return and work in his/or her village after the training.

Finally, experience with agricultural extension programs all over the world suggests that agriculture is now getting so technical that one person can hardly be expected to keep abreast of all the developments relating to the crops grown in a particular area. However, it has also been found that persons with little education can be used as effective communicators of information relating to a particular crop.

It is time to give some concentrated attention to the possibilities of making more use of para-professionals in Tanzania. This will call for a fundamental change in thinking of the sort illustrated by the following "dead end" quote:

At least each village needs one extension agent but it has been very far from reaching this goal. Lack of physical facilities for efficient extension like transport for visiting farmers in the villages is the biggest bottleneck for extension workers.^{1/}

Tanzania is not going to be able to afford an extension worker for each village for some time to come, if ever. But it might be able to use the existing cadre of extension workers to supervise a large number of para-professional extension workers that live and work in the same village.

^{1/} M.N. Polepole, "The Role and Future Direction of Research Extension in Tanzania."

Recommendation 13: The Region and Districts should review their manpower policies with the aim of making better use of existing manpower. Particular attention should be given to the increased use of para-professionals.

Equipment also appears to be in short supply in the Region. Once again, there are several dimensions to this problem. When one examines the matter closely, it appears that a primary reason for the shortage is that existing equipment is frequently out of service. Morrison has documented the fact that equipment breakdowns frequently occur because of equipment misuse. He is also extremely critical of maintenance procedures: equipment will inevitably break down if it is not adequately maintained. The absence of spare parts is frequently mentioned as a reason for breakdowns. There is evidence to suggest the demand for spare parts is excessive -- that parts frequently disappear without cause. In short, closer supervision and maintenance would appear to go a long way to reduce the equipment shortage.

It has also been pointed out that certain types of equipment are better suited to Tanzanian circumstances than others. The Region's experience with equipment is now pretty thorough, and on that basis alone, it should be able to be relatively selective in the equipment it purchases. Given the fuel crisis, equipment selection should be reexamined. Given that fuel prices have increased more than ten times over the last ten years, it is unlikely that the equipment mix that was suitable ten years ago is suitable today. Specifically, escalating fuel costs

suggest the substitution of sun, water, gravity, wind, animal and human driven equipment for fuel-driven equipment. If the latter is preferred, attention should be given to the employment of user charges to pay for the fuel. To take another example, Land Rovers appear to be the most popular means of conveyance in the Region. Land Rovers are extremely expensive to purchase and are notorious fuel-guzzlers. It would seem appropriate to consider substituting a fleet of inexpensive Japanese vehicles for Land Rovers. Purchase price and operating costs are significantly lower, and because of their lightness they are a lot easier to get unstuck than Land Rovers. For use on extremely difficult roads, a Japanese vehicle equipped with a front-end winch is a combination that holds considerable appeal.

Again, an important question is whether the Region has the capacity to review the efficiency of use of manpower and equipment. At present, it does not appear to have this capacity. Consideration to creating such a capacity would seem warranted inasmuch as these problems cut across all sectors.

Recommendation 14: The Region and Districts should review their equipment policies. This review should cover the appropriateness of existing equipment; it should also cover equipment maintenance and deployment practices.

The points made above concerning better use of manpower and equipment can be considered somewhat more broadly. The more general question is whether the Region and Districts are making

the best uses of all their resources -- land, labor and capital -- in terms of their opportunity costs. The question really boils down to whether the Region and Districts are using appropriate technologies in delivering services to citizens and whether they are recommending that citizens use appropriate technologies in production.

It is no simple matter to determine what constitutes an appropriate technology for any given situation. Agricultural research stations have been set up all over the world to make such determinations for the farming sector, and it appears that their findings must be customized to local circumstances before they are useful. It is tempting to suggest that several appropriate technology centers be established in the Arusha Region to deal with different productive sectors. Unfortunately, the experience with appropriate technology centers is not all positive. There is a tendency for these centers to engage in research and avoid the critical questions of research applications.

Given that the Region has a need for more appropriate technologies, but given the problems with appropriate technology centers, what should the Region do? There is a tremendous amount the Region and Districts can learn from what is being tried elsewhere in Tanzania and in other countries. At this point in time, it would probably be more productive for those government officials responsible for the identification and promotion of new technologies to visit those locations, both

within Tanzania and other nations, that reportedly are using technologies that sound applicable within the Region than it would be to set up appropriate technology centers within the Region. Such visitations, if properly structured, have proven quite successful in facilitating the communication of operationally useful information.

Recommendation 15: Regional and District officials should visit locations, both within the country and outside, where technologies that sound appropriate to the Region are being applied.

A question that bears directly on the best use of available resources involves setting priorities among areas in the Region to receive services. From a political standpoint, the criteria of equal treatment for all the citizens in the Region is a desirable one. However, from an efficiency standpoint, it has a number of drawbacks. For many activities, such as road maintenance and the provision of potable water, it is most efficient to develop crews that travel around together. As Morrison has pointed out, the Region simply does not have the resources to do an effective job of maintaining all the roads under its authority. The question then becomes whether one does a relatively ineffective job of maintaining all roads, or concentrates on a set of roads that is in its capacity to maintain well. In the field of potable water and health, these are also important issues. Is there any point in using up all health funds to maximize the number of dispensaries built if this means there are no monies

left over to man and supply them? By the same token, should MAJI attempt to maximize new potable water sites if this means existing systems break down because no one has been trained and there are no spare parts to maintain them?

The point of these examples is to illustrate that there are often tradeoffs between adequacy of coverage and the comprehensiveness of coverage. While political pressures will always be in favor of maximum coverage, a limited coverage option is sometimes more appropriate. Of course, this does not mean that one group of citizens would suffer. It is frequently possible to balance the treatment (e.g., village A will get road maintenance this year, while village B will get a new potable water site). However, this balanced approach is not feasible until a realistic assessment has been made of the extent to which each directorate is or is not able to provide comprehensive service in the area of its responsibility.

Recommendation 16: Given limited resources, the Region and Districts should consider reducing service coverage in certain areas so that the quality of service can be increased.

The Arusha Region, with USAID support, is experimenting with a special type of bottom-up planning that is not tied directly into the annual budget cycle. Specifically, AP/VDP has set aside a sum of money for projects that are developed through a village dialogue. The projects funded out of this exercise need not be sector-specific, and they need not be

delayed just because the idea crystallized at the beginning of a budget cycle. If this experiment proves fruitful, the Region and Districts might want to carry it on even after USAID support ends. Two actions should be taken to allow for this possibility. Attention should be given to establishing a revolving credit fund for these activities that could be used to finance similar projects in future years. In addition, attention should be given to requesting a certain amount of blocked funds in the annual budget cycle to carry this activity on. If attention is not given to this matter now, the activity will die when USAID monies run out, whether or not the experiment proves worthwhile.

Recommendation 17: The Region should consider steps to institutionalize village development activities. Options include the establishment of revolving credit funds and "blocked" budgetary requests.

DEVELOPMENT GOALS

It is worth asking how the recommendations coming out of the planning papers^{1/} relate to the development goals of the Region. The goals are:

- Self-reliance;
- Equity;

^{1/} See Annex II for a summary of recommendations made in the regional planning papers.

- Maximum economic growth;
- Preservation of natural resources; and
- Regional integration.

Basically, the recommendations call for the Regional and District governments, with the support of villagers, to take certain actions to enhance self-reliance, economic growth and the preservation of natural resources. The recommendations stem from an attempt to identify crosscutting issues, and in their generality, do not really address issues of equity and regional integration. However, this is not to say that the ways in which the recommendations are implemented will not have profound equity and regional integration implications. Implementation of the recommendations will require sacrifices.^{1/} From an equity standpoint, it is critical to know who will be asked to make sacrifices. Take, for example, land use policies. Such policies call for the designation of certain lands for particular uses. Inevitably, this will call for the cessation of certain activities on certain lands. For example, if it concluded that livestock activities should be restricted in certain areas, how will these restrictions be implemented? Will those who are currently using these lands for grazing simply be told to stop, or will some assistance be offered in assisting them to adjust to the new circumstances?

^{1/} For a discussion of this issue see Elliott R. Morss, "Integrating Regional Development Objectives into the Regional Planning Process," paper prepared for AP/VDP.

Consider another example, the Canadian-financed wheat scheme in Hanang. In this case, both equity and regional integration issues are intimately involved. Does the increased wheat yields resulting from that effort warrant taking lands that might support thousands of citizens on smallholder plots for extensive wheat growing? Are the results warranted in light of the associated threat to the environment? While the nation might benefit from the foreign exchange savings that will result from this effort, is this the best possible way to use the land in terms of maximizing the foreign exchange and other regional objectives?

Of course, there is no mechanical way to factor the Region's objectives into all development policy decisions. Subjective judgements are necessarily involved. However, as policy decisions are considered, it is important to keep the objectives in mind, for they will serve as useful guideposts in the setting of development priorities.

ALTERNATIVE FUTURES

At this point, it is worth getting some perspective on the situation in which the Arusha Region finds itself. Starting with the bad news, the financial situation of the country is not good, and there is little prospect for it to improve in

the foreseeable future. There are also certain trends within the Region that are also quite troubling -- the rapid population growth and the resulting pressures on the land.

However, these factors are hardly reasons to despair -- the Region possesses a wealth of natural resources which hold great promise for the future if put to more effective use. Certainly, the escalating pressures on the Region's resources are reason for concern, but matters are far from hopeless. Consider for example, the Central Java Province of Indonesia. There are 25 million people in Central Java, the population density is $1020/\text{km}^2$, and per capita incomes are higher than in Arusha, where the population density is only $11/\text{km}^2$! Even after allowing for climatic and soil differences, these figures suggest that Arusha Region has not yet reached its full potential, and it still has time to make some necessary corrections. By the same token, it is not a time for complacency. One has only to think of a country like Haiti. There, the population density is ($171.4 \text{ persons}/\text{km}^2$) less than Central Java, but the environment has been destroyed. There are no trees left in Haiti, the soils have been stripped of essential nutrients, and the population lives in abject poverty.

What is the difference between Haiti and Central Java? Central Java has recognized that with such pressures on the environment, land use planning and conservation measures are essential and has instituted them. Efficient agricultural

practices are followed, and the livestock activities are confined to certain areas. Such actions have not been taken in Haiti, and now it is perhaps too late.

Arusha is at an earlier stage than either Haiti or Central Java. However, the worrying message that comes through the planning papers is that if current trends continue, the Region will drift into the Haitian situation. However, the papers are also saying that if certain actions are taken soon, the future of Arusha is far more promising than the current situation in Central Java. If population programs are initiated, the population will stabilize at a far lower density than is found in Central Java; if steps are taken to increase incentives for agriculture and livestock production with due regard for the environment, per capita income in Arusha could far exceed those of Central Java; and it would appear that all of this could happen even with the country facing a precarious financial future.

There is clearly no problem in choosing between these alternative scenarios, at least not until it comes to implementing the steps that will be required. Consider the seventeen recommendations made in this paper.^{1/} Implementation of these recommendations would go a long way to putting the Region on the appropriate development path. Gaining their acceptance will not be an easy task. Will the Central Government be willing to change

^{1/} The recommendations are summarized in Annex III.

its policies as has been recommended? Will the Region and District governments be willing to implement the actions that have been recommended for them? And most importantly, will it be possible to convey the messages set forth in the planning papers to the people in convincing fashion so that they will both understand, support and play active roles in the changes that are required?

The next few months will provide some interesting evidence on these issues, but it will not be conclusive. A good deal of patience, time and work will be required to effect the major changes recommended.

ANNEX A

DOCUMENTS PRODUCED BY AP/VDP

1. AP/VDP Discussion Paper: A Possible AP/VDP Strategy for Small Industries/Appropriate Technology Activity in Arusha Region. Hugh Allen, October 1979.
2. Planning Roads for the Arusha Region. Ed Holland, December 1979.
3. Population Survey. Alan Johnston.
4. Land Tenure and Land Use. Henry Fosbrooke
5. Farming Systems. Henry Fosbrooke
6. Urban Development and the Growth of Communications. Henry Fosbrooke.
7. Resource Conservation. Henry Fosbrooke.
8. Transportation in Arusha Region. Ed Holland, January 1980.
9. Population Final Report. Allan Johnston, January 1980.
10. Information Activities of the AP/VDP: Present and Future Potentials. Elliott Morss, March 1980.
11. Soil Degradation and Conservation in the Arusha Region. Rorke Bryan, March 1980.
12. Agro-Forestry and Its Relevance to the Arusha Region. Henry Fosbrooke, March 1980.
13. Maasai Motivation and Its Application. Henry Fosbrooke, March 1980.
14. Maasai Motivation and Its Application, Annexure II, The Maasai Gift Stock Scheme, 1940-1944. Henry Fosbrooke, March 1980.
15. Tsetse Clearing in Mbulu District, 1936-1953. Henry Fosbrooke, March 1980.
16. A Case for Regionally Integrated Planning. Elliott Morss, March 1980.
17. Evaluation of the Third Five Year Plan (1976-1981) Arusha Region. Institute of Development Studies, University of Dar es Salaam, April 1980.

18. The Village Profile Exercise: AP/VDP Background Information, Impressions and Perceptions. David Peterson and Thadd Peterson, June 1980.
19. Study of Formal and Informal Industries in Arusha Region. Institute of Development Studies, University of Dar es Salaam.
20. A Survey of the Health Services in Arusha Region. Edith Alger.
21. Fisheries in Arusha Region, Tanzania. Phoenix Development Services, Ltd.
22. Arusha Region Agricultural Sector Review. Donald S. Humpal.
23. Prefeasibility Assessment of Geothermal Resources in Northern Tanzania.
24. Financial Resources Available for the Development of the Arusha Region: A Look into the Future. Elliott Morss.
25. Integrating Regional Development Objectives into the Regional Planning Process. Elliott Morss.
26. Assessment of the Arusha Livestock Situation for Use in the Arusha Region 1980-1985 Livestock Plan. M. Jacob, Dr. J. Melewas, G. Sumari.
27. Sector Assessment of Tourism in the Arusha Region of Tanzania. Victoria Morss, May 1980.
28. Range Management in Arusha Region: Discussion Paper. Dave Peterson and Thadd Peterson, July 1980.
29. Forestry in Arusha Region. T. J. Synott, July 1980.
30. Information for Rural Land Planning in Arusha Region. Dunford, Mouat, Slaymaker.
31. Beekeeping in Arusha Region. Christopher Dunford, July 1980.
32. Regional Development Planning: A Critical Assessment of the Tanzanian Experience and Its Implications for the Arusha Planning Process. Elliott Morss, August 1979.
33. AP/VDP Health Component. Stan Yoder, September 1980.
34. Livestock, Wildlife and Land Use Survey: Final Report: Arusha Region, Tanzania. Vols. I & II. EcoSystems Ltd., September 1980.
35. The Status and Utilization of Wildlife in Arusha Region, Tanzania - Final Report. EcoSystems Ltd., September 1980.

36. Problems of Agricultural Transportation in Rural Areas (A Case Study of Seven Villages in Mbulu District). W. E. Maro, Economic Research Bureau, University of Dar es Salaam, September 1980.
37. Arusha Regional Transport Planning Project (Road Transport Infrastructure) Study. Dr. Benno J. Ndulu.
38. Seminar on Data Analysis and Development Planning Report. Lewis, Brandford, Jones, August 1980.
39. A Profile and Analysis and Development Manpower in Arusha Region. Liz Wily, October 1980.
40. Agricultural and Livestock Production in Arusha Region: An Agricultural Economic Perspective. Merritt Sargent, October 1980.
41. Regional Works Issues for Discussion. John Morrison, October 1980.
42. Assessment of Arusha Region Works Organization and Management. John Morrison, October 1980.

ANNEX B

SUMMARY OF SECTOR AND ISSUE PAPER RECOMMENDATIONS

A preliminary activity to the writing of this paper was to systematically analyze the recommendations that have appeared in the regional planning papers to date. The major findings of this analysis and comments thereon are presented in Table B-1 and the text that follows. The reader can see that these recommendations bear a close resemblance to the recommendations made in this paper. (See Annex C)

The recommendations are divided into six areas of concern: national policies, regional policies, support to existing programs, change to low-cost systems, additional research and new programs. Obviously, there are numerous recommendations made under each heading, and the reader is referred to the Sector and Issues Abstracts for detail. The purpose here is not to present an exhaustive list, but rather to highlight themes. But before discussing each of these categories it should be pointed out that this effort to recommend changes, particularly those involving new programs and project initiatives, was a level of generality to address needs, but preclude costing estimates. Clearly, before an action program for the Region is developed such costing figures will be required.

1. National Policies

The papers clearly document that certain national policies have impeded the development goals of the Region and the productivity of some sectors. The three national policy issues which seemed to be most pernicious were: the unsuitably low price ceiling of products and services, parastatal organization, administration and jurisdiction and top-down, uncoordinated policy directives, the last being the policy most frequently lambasted.

2. Regional Policies

Certain regional policies are also a hinderance to achieving the development goals. The deleterious effects of sector-specific planning led to recommendations in almost all papers for better coordination among sectors to reduce duplication, eliminate conflict and maximize impact. In the four most important sectors economically to the Region, i.e., livestock, agriculture, forestry and wildlife, this would involve the

TABLE B-1
OVERVIEW OF SECTORS ISSUES RECOMMENDATIONS

1. SECTORS	National Policy			Regional Policy				More Support Existing Programs		Change to lowest technical & service input system	Additional Research		New Program/Project Ideas
	Pricing	Parastatal Reform	Revision/Top Down Coordinated Direction	Policy Creation/Revision	Better Coordination of sectors	Revision Planning Process (bottom-up)	Relig-ment Autho- rity	Resou-ces	Train-ING		Applied	Data Collec- tion	
Livestock	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X		X	X	X
Agriculture	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X		X
Forestry	X		X	X	X			X			X	X	X
Wildlife			X	X	X		X	X				X	X
Water			X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X			X
Transport		X	X		X	X	X	X	X			X	X
Fisheries			X		X	X		X	X			X	X
Health			X	X	X		X	X	X	X		X	X
Beekeeping	X		X	X				X		X			X
Tourism	X	X	X	X	X			X	X				X
Small Industries	X	X		X	X		X	X	X	X			X
2. ISSUES													
Manpower	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X				
Population				X	X	X		X	X		X		
Implementation			X	X	X	X		X	X				
Financial				X	X	X	X			X	X		
Land use / Conservation			X	X	X	X	X					X	

development of a regional policy that addresses the issues of competition among these sectors for land use. In many other sectors it would involve revision of the planning process to give greater emphasis to bottom-up planning, i.e., village-level participation in planning programs and projects, and responsibility for their implementation.

3. Support to Existing Programs

This was the category that received the largest number of recommendations, for in every sector there were insufficient resources and trained staff to meet the objectives of the programs. For the most part these recommendations concerned additional investments for: a) staff and staff training; and b) physical and fiscal resources, e.g., better equipment and supplies, more transport, spare parts for maintenance and repairs, more credit, etc. However, in light of the financial constraints facing the nation, additional resources will be hard to realize unless the Region can mobilize funds from foreign donors or borrow money. Thus there is probably more to be gained by attempting to make better use of existing resources than through a general appeal for additional funds. In other words, the emphasis should be on deploying, managing and supporting existing manpower and resources more effectively.

4. Change to Low-Cost Technology and Services

Many sector activities have relied on urban-based, traditional western service delivery systems staffed by highly-skilled technicians. The sectors affected by these delivery systems, e.g., health, recommend decentralization to rural areas using more appropriate technologies and paraprofessionals in order to reach the majority of the needy clients.

Technologies employed should be designed to utilize local materials, traditional knowledge, be easily maintained, inexpensive and not be a drain on scarce foreign exchange.

5. Additional Research

Despite the large amount of research undertaken in the Region, the papers identify several areas in which additional information is needed before sound planning can occur. The first area concerns additional sector-specific research to insure that resources are productively allocated. The second involves applied research to determine the most cost-effective investments within and among sectors.

6. New Programs/Project Ideas

Each sector paper identified new programs and projects that would probably improve the efficiency and productivity of sector activities. However, at this stage the ideas were not prioritized nor fully developed as project proposals stipulating funding levels and sources, organizational affiliation, staff requirements, relationship to other activities, etc. In short, they represent a first step in the project proposal process.

ANNEX C

SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

- Recommendation 1: The Region and Districts should develop programs to reduce population growth rates.
- Recommendation 2: The Region and Districts should engage in separate exercises to identify the most serious implications of the doubling of the population and the resultant pressures on the land that will occur by the year 2000. The results of this exercise should be actions to adapt to these pressures.
- Recommendation 3: The Region should establish mechanisms that increase its ability to mobilize financial resources. Consideration should be given to the expanded application of user charges and to new borrowing mechanisms.
- Recommendation 4: The Region should appeal to both the Central Government and foreign donors for increased funds to finance operational and maintenance needs, even if these funds come at the expense of development monies.
- Recommendation 5: The Region should request detailed information on the future development plans of the Central Government and the Parastatals. The Region should insist on its right to accept, reject, or modify these initiatives, depending on their congruence with the Region's development plans. The Region should insist on its right to be fully involved in discussions with all foreign donors interested in funding development initiatives in the Arusha Region.
- Recommendation 6: The Region should urge the Central Government to increase producer prices.
- Recommendation 7: The Region should urge the Central Government to devalue the Tanzanian Shilling.

- Recommendation 8: The Region should press for Parastatal reform in marketing, distribution, and overall efficiency of operation. Until such reforms occur, the Region should license other agents to perform marketing and distribution functions.
- Recommendation 9: The Region should request a larger portion of the Development Budget than its current 10 percent share.
- Recommendation 10: The Region should sit with Parastatals and Line Ministries early in each budget cycle to review and coordinate upcoming development initiatives. In preparation for these meetings the Region should conduct its own assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of ongoing Parastatal and Line Ministry development projects.
- Recommendation 11: The Region and Districts should engage in a set of planning exercises that cut across sectoral lines. These exercises should result in new policies and programs that will probably require outside funding.
- Recommendation 12: The Region and District should immediately start working on land use plans. These plans should serve as the basis for proposals to increase returns on land use and conservation practices.
- Recommendation 13: The Region and Districts should review their manpower policies with the aim of making better use of existing manpower. Particular attention should be given to the increased use of para-professionals.
- Recommendation 14: The Region and Districts should review their equipment policies. This review should cover the appropriateness of existing equipment; it should also cover equipment maintenance and deployment practices.
- Recommendation 15: Regional and District officials should visit locations, both within the country and outside, where technologies that sound appropriate to the Region are being applied.

Recommendation 16: Given limited resources, the Region and Districts should consider reducing service coverage in certain areas so that the quality of service can be increased.

Recommendation 17: The Region should consider steps to institutionalize village development activities. Options include the establishment of revolving credit funds and "blocked" budgetary requests.