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PROCEEDINGS

EDUCATION SECTOR

IMPACT EVALUATION CONFERENCE

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prepared by
Joyce Leader
The Pragma Corporation

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Acknowledgments	
I. Executive Summary and Conference Recommendations	1
II. Introduction	9
A. Background to the Conference	9
B. Conference Purpose	11
C. Conference Organization and Process	12
III. The Evidence	16
A. Impact Evaluation Findings and Issues	16
B. Policy Perspectives	18
C. Evaluation Findings at Other Agencies:	20
D. Education and Development	23
E. Expanding the Data Base	27
IV. Analysis and Recommendations	28
V. Responses from Agency Officials	40
VI. Appendixes	
A. Participant List	46
B. Agenda	51
C. List of Conference Materials	53
D. Workgroup Reports	54
1. Host Country Institutional Capability and Commitment	
2. Sustainability of Projects and Programs	60
3. Appropriate Fit	70
4. Replicability	79
5. Design, implementation, evaluation and feedback	84

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Many people have contributed to the success of the Education Sector Impact Evaluation Conference. Most significant among them is Marion Kohashi Warren, Education Sector Coordinator in the Studies Division of the Office of Evaluation, Bureau of Policy and Program Coordination, at A.I.D. She was instrumental in organizing and managing the impact evaluation studies and the desk reviews of projects that became the basic data for examination during the conference. She also coordinated planning within A.I.D. for the conference itself including chairing an intra-agency working group, preparing the conference agenda, and identifying and collecting the numerous documents available as background material at the conference. Robert J. Berg, Associate Assistant Administrator for Evaluation, is to be commended for his key role in instituting the impact evaluations and for the leadership and direction he provided in the conference planning.

Many others, too numerous to mention by name, some in the Office of Evaluation and others engaged in education sector activities throughout the Agency had a hand in making the conference a success. However, deserving of special mention are those who served as Group Leaders during the conference and shouldered the responsibility for having their groups actually produce a paper within a 2-day time frame. Especially worthy of note are those who travelled from overseas A.I.D. missions over the weekend and plunged into the conference with this responsibility on Monday morning. Group Leaders were: Group I--Howard Steverson and Frank Method; Group II--David Sprague and Norman Rifkin; Group III--Graham Kerr and Stanley Handleman; Group IV--Twig Johnson and Janet Poley; Group V--Raga Elim and William L. Eilers. (See Participant List in Appendix A for titles.)

We would also like to thank the host government participants for their presence and contributions. Throughout the conference they were open and candid about their experiences, both positive and negative, with A.I.D. assistance. Their comments helped participants keep in focus the ultimate purpose of education assistance, namely the people of developing countries.

The Pragma Corporation, with its special interest in educational development, has been pleased to have facilitated this conference and to have had a role in bringing together this distinguished group of professionals to discuss and debate such important issues for the future of A.I.D.'s education sector assistance.

The Pragma Corporation
Falls Church, VA
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I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The Education Sector Impact Evaluation Conference, sponsored by the A.I.D. Bureau for Policy and Planning Coordination, Office of Evaluation (PPC/E), marked the culmination of 18 months of research into the effectiveness of A.I.D.'s assistance to education. The research data -- findings from impact evaluations of projects in eight countries and from desk reviews of projects in four others -- formed the basis for discussion at the Conference. The more than 60 Conference participants spent three days analyzing these evaluation findings to determine which A.I.D. education interventions had been effective, under what conditions, and why. The studies, conducted by PPC/E, examined the impact of projects with a primary, secondary, or nonformal education focus. The projects, some begun as long as 30 years ago, included experiences in Asia, Latin America, Africa, and the Near East. To this body of knowledge, participants added findings from their own experiences in the field.

What emerged from the discussions was a much clearer picture of what A.I.D.'s experience in the education sector has been and a much better understanding of what types of interventions have succeeded and why. The collective judgement of Conference participants was that A.I.D.'s early education interventions had been effective in achieving stated project goals and had had a positive impact on educational and socio-economic development in the countries and communities where implemented. Especially effective had been A.I.D.'s impact on the development of host country institutional capacity and on the training

of host country education officials. This decidedly positive pattern of the impact study findings challenges previous assumptions that A.I.D.'s assistance to education has had limited impact and has been replete with problems and failures.

The analysis of the impact evaluation findings focused primarily on specific programmatic aspects of the A.I.D. assistance process, aspects linked by the evidence to positive program impact. Some recurring themes did emerge from these discussions of the data and their implications. These themes, while still very much under discussion in the Agency, suggest possible future directions for education assistance.

A systems approach to education assistance

It is important to begin to view the education process in a developing country as a total system. Impact evaluation evidence suggests that projects targeting a single aspect of the education system for change were not as effective as projects targeting interrelated aspects of the system. Education encompasses not only formal schooling at the primary, secondary and higher levels, but also nonformal education for out-of-school youth and adults. It includes training for organizational development and training for management. The sense of the participants was that interventions which are a part of an integrated approach to improving the delivery of educational services in the host country may produce results with a greater impact on change than those narrowly focused on specific objectives.

The importance of basic education

Basic education is still very much a need in the developing countries. Many countries still consider universal education a worthy goal and a high priority. Recent studies by the World Bank and other development agencies support this position. They link increases in agricultural productivity with increases in literacy rates among farmers; they show high rates of economic return from investments in primary education; they demonstrate greater receptivity to changes in behaviors, such as health practices and fertility, among literate persons.

The A.I.D. impact evaluation findings show that A.I.D.'s interventions in primary and secondary schooling in the 1960's have had a positive impact on socio-economic changes in communities. However, A.I.D.'s assistance to basic education has dropped off sharply since 1977. The sense of the Conference participants was that consideration should be given to increasing A.I.D.'s interventions in basic education -- primary education and adult literacy -- especially in light of A.I.D.'s past successes and in light of evidence linking basic education with productivity increases, a current administration development goal.

Host country participation

Host country participation in the process of project development and implementation is critical to project success and impact. It enhances the chances that the project will be compatible with host

country culture, economy, political realities, and technological capabilities. It increases chances for continuation of the project once A.I.D.'s intervention is ended. It will increase the possibility that the country will feel 'ownership' of the project. In short, participation is crucial to establishing host country commitment to the assistance being supplied.

Project time frames

Conference participants urged the Agency to consider longer time frames for projects and to incorporate flexibility into the project design process to allow for adjustments during implementation. The analysis of A.I.D.'s experience showed that the length of time A.I.D. committed resources to a project was closely linked with the project's impact on institutional development, socio-economic change, and the likelihood that the project would continue following A.I.D.'s phase-out. The longer the commitment by A.I.D., the more likely the projects reviewed were to achieve stated goals. Adequate time is also necessary to ensure that innovative activities are appropriately phased into project plans in accordance with host country absorptive capacity.

Efficient use of resources

Participants were very conscious of the limited and shrinking financial resources available to support educational development activities. Project recurrent costs, and the difficulty of many host governments have assuming responsibility for them following A.I.D.'s

phase-out, surfaced as an issue again and again. What has to happen for this situation to be reversed? Should donors continue to pick up recurrent costs? What can be done to help local systems become more efficient so that funds will be available to initiate or absorb new activities? More questions than answers were raised. But there was a sense that education project planners would have to pay more attention to cost-effectiveness issues during the design process.

Learning from experience

A consensus developed among Conference participants that A.I.D. has the expertise to address complex education assistance problems and that A.I.D. possesses a comparative advantage in the education sector by virtue of its broad experience and knowledge of education in a wide range of development contexts. What is needed is an efficient system within the Agency for identifying and disseminating information about past projects or components of projects worthy of consideration for adaptation in other settings. While the sense was that A.I.D. should capitalize on its comparative advantage in education assistance, participants expressed a need to have more information about what works and why. The impact evaluation studies were viewed as a positive beginning but not as the end of A.I.D.'s self-education process.

* * *

These themes emerged during three days of intense exchange among the more than 60 conference participants, both in plenary sessions and in workgroups. Each of the five workgroups examined one issue in education assistance in relation to A.I.D.'s past experience in at

least a dozen countries. The issues for group focus were:

1. Host country institutional capability and commitment
2. Sustainability of projects and programs
3. Appropriate fit between host country socio-economic, cultural, political, and technological needs and realities, and planned project/program interventions
4. Replicability
5. Design, implementation, evaluation, and feedback

The product resulting from each group's deliberations was a written report that included policy recommendations for Agency consideration. The full report of each group can be found in Appendix D. An abbreviated version of the recommendations follows.

Institutional Development

1. Consider local institutional capacities in project design
2. Focus interventions on planning, administration and management, leadership training, research and development and materials production
3. Cooperate with other donors, especially toward providing assistance for basic education
4. Develop, with the host government, support for private sector institutions

Host Government Commitment

1. Examine implications of A.I.D. budget cycle incompatibility with host government budgeting process
2. Ensure host county 'ownership' of projects

Sustainability

1. Ensure adequate project time frames and design flexibility
2. Consider assisting recurrent cost financing for some projects following A.I.D. phase-out
3. Ensure training for a sufficient number of project personnel
4. Include institutionalization as a project start-up goal
5. Consider offering non-financial incentives to project personnel
6. Ensure adequate resources during phase-out

Appropriate fit between project and host country realities

1. Ensure host country participation in all phases of project development
2. Consider funding only projects that incorporate host country participation

Replicability

1. Charge one A.I.D. unit with responsibility for reviewing projects for potential replicability
2. Develop a better understanding of what worked and why
3. Improve information dissemination within the Agency
4. Conduct more research on cost-effective interventions, especially in basic education
5. Require review of past experience as part of project design

Design, implementation, evaluation and feedback

1. Analyze and address project constraints during project design

2. Develop long-term intervention strategies focused on host government priority areas in which A.I.D. has a comparative advantage
3. Ensure an adequate project time frame
4. Include plans for host government to assume recurrent costs in project designs
5. Design projects integral to host government education sector strategy
6. Ensure true participation of host country persons

These recommendations are necessarily limited in scope by the structure and focus of the conference and by the narrow range of intervention strategies considered in the impact evaluations. Nevertheless, these suggestions represent some of the most striking lessons to be learned from a close examination of available data on A.I.D.'s past experience in education assistance.

II. INTRODUCTION

A. Background to the Conference

The Education Sector Impact Evaluation Conference marked the culmination of 18 months of research into the effectiveness of A.I.D.'s assistance to education. During the year and a half preceeding the conference, A.I.D.'s Evaluation Office, Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination (PPC/E), conducted impact evaluations of eight education projects. The intent of these quick but probing in-country studies was to determine whether the projects had been successful and whether they had had any lasting social, economic, or institutional impact in the countries where they were implemented.

Projects, selected for study according to their geographic diversity, diversity of components, time lapsed since completion, and content focus, included:

- a rural nonformal vocational training project in Thailand
- a middle school project in Korea
- a retrospective of A.I.D.'s education assistance to Nepal
- a primary level programmed learning project in the Philippines
- a rural education program in Paraguay
- a radio correspondence teacher training project in Kenya
- a teacher training project in Nigeria
- a retrospective analysis of 30 years of A.I.D.'s education assistance to Jordan

The impact evaluation teams, consisting of A.I.D. personnel, host country personnel, and outside consultants, structured their three to four week investigations around the following questions:

- (1) Was the project/program effective? Did it achieve its stated objectives?
- (2) Who benefitted?
- (3) What was the social impact on the surrounding community?
- (4) What was the economic impact on the surrounding community?
- (5) What was the impact on host government institutional practices and procedures?
- (6) Are there lessons to be learned for application to future Agency projects?

Data collection techniques varied but generally included review of project documentation, discussions with host government officials, structured and unstructured interviews with project beneficiaries and if possible with project implementors. Qualitative judgement based on brief observations rather than quantitative analysis of statistics was the impact evaluation team's goal.

Acknowledged limitations to the impact evaluation methodology include both the speed with which the data were collected and the lack of scientific data collection techniques. Nevertheless, the findings represent considered judgements by knowledgeable people who asked basic questions about what worked, what did not work, and why.

In addition to the eight field-based impact evaluations, four

education projects were reviewed using archival material available in Washington. These desk reviews included:

- a rural nonformal education project in Ecuador
- a retrospective of A.I.D.'s education assistance to Colombia
- a retrospective of A.I.D.'s education assistance to Brazil
- an elementary and secondary education project in Afghanistan

B. Conference Purpose

Having gathered data on the impact of education assistance in 12 countries, A.I.D.'s Office of Evaluation in the Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination convened the three-day Impact Evaluation Conference on February 15-17, 1982. The purpose of this conference was to have the findings discussed and debated by development professionals. The task of the participants was to review the findings, validate or reject the data in light of their own experiences, enter new evidence into the record from their own experiences and, finally, to make policy recommendations based on conclusions drawn from this examination of past experience. Conference participants included A.I.D. personnel, both from Washington and from field missions, host government officials, international organization officials, and representatives of universities and consulting firms involved in education sector development assistance. (See Appendix A for a list of participants.)

As stated by conference organizers, the conference objectives were:

- A. To analyze A.I.D.'s past experience in the education sector.

Expand this data base with field experiences and research

knowledge of Conference participants, so that the focus is on how to improve the design and impact of education projects.

- B. To recommend to A.I.D., policy options and strategies for implementing policy options based on knowledge of A.I.D.'s past experience, field experiences of Conference participants, and the research literature.

Because the studies reviewed at the Conference examined a narrow range of intervention strategies, the recommendations for policy options were necessarily limited in scope. Likewise, the studies were confined to education sector interventions per se as opposed to education interventions in other sectors such as health and agriculture. Thus, the Conference did not attempt to address this large and growing area of A.I.D.'s education assistance activities.

C. Conference Organization and Process

To accomplish the conference objectives, the more than sixty conference participants were divided into five workgroups that discussed and debated issues throughout the three-day conference and produced a final product containing policy recommendations. Each workgroup was assigned a topic that established a framework for its examination of the data. The cross-cutting issues that formed the focus for workgroup discussions are as follows:

Group 1: Host country institutional capability and
commitment: What are the structural and
procedural factors within host country

institutions that bear on project/program implementation? In what ways should these factors determine the extent and character of AID involvement in education projects? Is there a role here for the private sector?*

Group 2:

Sustainability of projects and programs: In what ways should actual experiences of sustainability determine the extent and character of future AID involvement in education projects? What are the implications for financing, training, and maintenance? Is there a role here for the private sector?

Group 3:

Appropriate fit between host country socioeconomic, cultural, political, and technological needs and realities, and planned project/program interventions: Is participation a key factor in design and implementation? What can we do to strengthen social and economic impacts? Do actual impact results justify education investments as a prime development strategy?

* The questions presented with each topic were intended to stimulate but not to limit group discussion.

Group 4:

Replicability: What are the conditions which encourage (discourage) spread effects of projects/programs? Is there a realistic chance for expansion given world and national economic difficulties?

Group 5:

Design, implementation, evaluation, and feedback: What are the donor constraints which encourage (discourage) project/program effectiveness and impact? What should the purposes and goals of AID education projects be? By what criteria should these purposes and goals be identified? By what mechanisms can evaluation become a more useful tool in the design process?

While the workgroup activity served as the central focus of the Conference, there were several plenary sessions that provided common stimulation for the groups as well as informal peer presentations of current projects to small groups in the evenings. (See Appendix B for Conference Agenda.)

The workgroup products were short papers discussing the issues drawn from the case evidence relevant to the group's assigned topic and outlining the group's recommendations for future policy in the education sector. The draft product of each group was reviewed and critiqued by two other groups. Resulting comments were incorporated into the group product which was then presented in summary to the final plenary attended by top-level Agency officials. (See Appendix D for final workgroup reports.)

Each workgroup met for five sessions (or about 10 hours) to:

- (1) Discuss impact evaluation findings and field experiences bearing on the assigned topic;
- (2) Identify issues and develop a work plan, including assigning individual responsibilities for matching findings against issues;
- (3) Match findings against issues and begin workgroup reports;
- (4) Continue drafting reports; and
- (5) Complete draft reports.

The groups had a short concluding session to incorporate comments from two other groups into their final product and to prepare a presentation for the closing plenary.

III. THE EVIDENCE

A. Impact Evaluation Findings and Issues

Marion Kohashi Warren, Sector Coordinator for Education in the Office of Evaluation, presented a summary of the impact evaluation findings¹ to the initial plenary session. She reported the findings demonstrated that education sector activities had had a substantial impact especially in the areas of institutional development and participant training (training for host country persons outside their own country). Study results showed, she noted, that large and sustained programs had the most discernible and favorable socio-economic impacts. But, she said, the studies underlined the difficulty of isolating education sector activity impact and of modifying host country education activities without host country commitment to education policy changes. She said that given these findings the problem is not whether education projects have an impact, but how scarce resources for education assistance can best be allocated among diverse and competing demands within the education sector. In conclusion she called for a more systematic study of A.I.D.'s

¹ A paper entitled "PPC/E Education Sector Report: A Summary of Impact Evaluation Findings" by Marion Kohashi Warren is in draft form at this writing and should be available from A.I.D. soon.

education sector activities as a follow-up to the initial "probing" of the impact evaluations.

Ms. Warren detailed the following findings from the eight impact evaluations.

1. Effectiveness: All of the projects examined were effective in reaching the objectives outlined for them. Construction did take place and/or equipment was provided in all cases; technical expertise was provided to strengthen or train local personnel; local institutions were developed; curriculum reform was instituted in some cases; and increased efficiencies in the delivery of education were demonstrated.
2. Beneficiaries: The largest groups of beneficiaries of the projects examined were rural school children. Rural adults, teachers and administrators, and persons who received training outside their countries also benefitted. Overall, the projects increased access to education, especially for girls, and improved the quality of education through interventions in teacher training, curriculum reform, and materials development.
3. Socio-economic impact: Impact on the economic and social fabric of the country resulted from each of each of the projects. Education projects increased the attractiveness of target agricultural areas, improved the employability of youth and adults, and produced behavioral and attitudinal changes in project participants.
4. Institutional development: All projects examined left lasting institutions behind, most notably Korea's Educational Development Institute that has spearheaded educational reform in that country.

5. Spread effects: Ms. Warren judged as "modest" findings regarding project spread effects, citing cultural, political, and technical obstacles to adoption of innovation, particularly curriculum innovation.

6. Explanatory factors: As factors explaining the success or failure of education projects, Ms. Warren cited government stability or conversely civil strife, culture and commitment, economic conditions, and the financial, structural, and organizational constraints in the host country.

In discussion following Ms. Warren's presentation, a host government official cautioned A.I.D. to take into consideration host country technological absorptive capacity before recommending sophisticated technological equipment for a project. He also commented that the findings seemed to argue for expansion of educational opportunity as a goal of assistance over the goal of improved educational quality. He noted that the studies showed whole communities benefitting from educational expansion despite the lack of improved quality.

B. Policy Perspectives

Frank Method, Advisor on Education Policy in the Office of Program Development and Policy Review, discussed policy implications of trends in A.I.D.'s education assistance.² He asserted that the

² "A.I.D. Assistance to Education: A Retrospective Study" by Frank Method (February 1981) traces 20 years of the Agency's assistance to education and details support for the argument put forward to this Conference.

Agency's education mandate is less restrictive than education programmers have assumed and urged reconsideration of intervention strategies that have all but disappeared from the A.I.D. portfolio, such as assistance for basic education. He said that any intervention at any level of the education system that improved overall access to the system and its use of resources should not be considered proscribed by policy.

The question now, he said, was to determine what education interventions relate to current administration directives which require education projects to address: rural development, economic productivity, institutional development, development administration and private sector priorities. He argued against accepting without question the assumption that such program objectives limited interventions to manpower development and participant training projects. To the contrary, he argued, there is strong evidence that basic education--primary schooling and adult literacy training--is closely related to these program priorities. He cited results of recent studies finding high rates of return for basic education investments and close links between basic education and changes in other social behaviors, such as health practices, fertility rates, etc. He further argued that by addressing the quantitative objective, i.e., the expansion of basic education opportunities, other objectives such as quality, access, relevance, efficiency and cost effectiveness will "inevitably" be addressed. While he maintained that the expansion of schooling was probably more feasible than either A.I.D. or the countries believed, he acknowledged the "serious constraint" posed by the shortage of resources --financial, administrative, and

institutional-- their lack of mobilization and their inefficient use.

Method urged participants to think about the primary schooling problem as a systems problem in which all objectives are inter-dependent and to view the primary system as a subsystem of a larger system of education and training that includes nonformal education, secondary education and higher education. In conclusion, he challenged participants to think positively about education and to make proposals for projects instead of reacting to criticism. "We mustn't censor ourselves," he said. "I'm quite sure we can help our colleagues in developing countries to meet their goals" for universal education within the current program priorities. "We need to ask ourselves, 'What level of resources would be necessary to reach universal primary education at some time in the foreseeable future?'"

In the discussion following Method's presentation, overseas A.I.D. staff pointed out an apparent contradiction between his advocating submission of new education project proposals and reports that A.I.D. senior staff have been "cool" towards education projects in meetings with the mission directors. Method noted that until the education sector reached consensus on its own direction and made a forceful case for its approach, it could not expect to be taken seriously by Agency policy-makers.

C. Evaluation Findings at Other Agencies

A panel of experts from the World Bank, the United Nations

Development Program, and the U.S. National Institute of Education presented lessons from their agencies' assistance to education sector development.

UNDP official, Patrick Shima, echoed A.I.D.'s evaluation findings that successful education interventions required long-term commitments both by the donor agency and by the host government. However, contrary to A.I.D.'s finding that large projects tended to be more effective, Shima advocated scaling down education projects and focusing on specific components of assistance. He also urged that reform efforts be tied to on-going host country efforts rather than be initiated by donor agencies. He based these conclusions on findings of a UNDP-UNESCO evaluation study of 25 UN-assisted education projects implemented since 1970.³ Of the three categories of projects studied --integrated rural reform strategies, educational planning projects, and institutional modernization strategies-- he said findings indicated none had been very effective but that educational planning projects had been more successful than the others.

Charles Stalford of the U.S. National Institute of Education, emphasized the political nature of decision-making relating to public education, underlining A.I.D.'s own findings that political, economic

³ A full report of this study is expected to be published soon. A draft summary entitled "Evaluation Study on UN System Assisted Educational Innovation and Reform Projects" is currently being circulated.

and cultural conditions in a country were often critical in determining the success or failure of an education intervention. Because of the political nature of education, Stalford cautioned against using findings from any one project as the basis for decision-making, but urged aggregating results from many projects into a set of information useful to decision-makers. He stressed the value of formative evaluation --on-going feedback to project implementors--the importance of time in producing visible results in education projects, and the utility of experimenting with alternative approaches to evaluation.

Mats Hultin of the World Bank's Education Department noted a trend in the Bank toward more assistance for formal education and less assistance for adult basic nonformal education, which now claims about one-third of the Bank's education expenditures. In support of this shift he cited the lack of host government commitment to nonformal education projects, the Bank's inability to provide adequate supervision for such projects and the tendency of such projects to change from nonformal to formal projects over time. He also said the Bank had overestimated the need for adult basic education by confusing assessed need with effective demand: Bank nonformal programs are only about one-third utilized by the potential client population, he said. Hultin argued that countries can afford formal education and can achieve universal primary education depending on the efficiency with which they allocate their resources. He cited the example of China which has a per capita income of \$250 and achieves 93% primary school

enrollment using 3.2% of its GNP. This compares, he said, with other low per capita income countries which spend as much as 3.9% of their GNP but enroll only 50-60% of the eligible primary school population. Key to China's success, he said, are the involvement of the local community and school fees. He said teacher salaries are based on what each community can pay and implied that low salaries are compensated for by high community esteem for teachers.

D. Education and Development

Ruth Zagorin, Deputy Assistant Administrator and Director for Human Resources at A.I.D., posed several provocative questions to the group about issues she regards as fundamental to the future directions of A.I.D.'s human resource development assistance. What difference, she asked, would it make to the development process if A.I.D. withdrew entirely from the education sector? Have we made a case for the relationship of education to agriculture, productivity, health, the status of women, population issues? Does the U.S. have a comparative advantage in education assistance? What can a small country do over 10 years with \$10 million toward building its human resource capacity? Where should our priorities be in Africa, for example, where we can point to the lack of a communication infrastructure, the lack of institutional infrastructure, and the lack of trained manpower? In participant training with its high costs? In institution building? At what level?

Participants responded with equally provocative observations and comments about the importance of education for the development process:

-E. Malie
Lesotho

When you ask if there would be a loss if there were no aid, in my own imagination, I'm thinking of somebody watching a person who is sinking in the river and standing on the other side with a rope...who says, "Well, let him sink," and that would be really the effect of dumping aid as far as we from Africa are concerned...The United States has got to take up the challenge and be champion of giving assistance to the other countries...

-B. Jacobs
Consultant

It seems to me that the difficulties and frustrations that surround both your questions and attempts to answer them comes from strictures that somehow the Agency has created. Somehow or other we have to think in terms of boundaries and sectors rather than in terms of the development

process...We have never learned to use the systems approach in the development process. You can eliminate education as a sector, but you will not eliminate it from the development process. You will not eliminate it from A.I.D. program...

-G. Corinaldi
USAID/Morocco

I think essentially the people in A.I.D. consider themselves to be economic development specialists...The people who control the money and the policy in this Agency come from...a very powerful discipline...(with) powerful quantitative tools to analyze issues. That's why the Administrator...wants us to make judgments on the basis of economic development criteria. I'm not saying this is entirely wrong. But I'm not saying its entirely right...Yes, we're able to argue our case --as educators-- but oftentimes many of us are not equipped to argue our case in terms of economic criteria. But economic criteria are used to make judgments about what we do...If the educator cannot speak in terms of rates of return ...we're sometimes at a disadvantage.

-N. Rifkin
USAID/Mali

I submit that, at least in Sahalean West Africa, the largest private sector consists of the farmers themselves. And that the extent to which we can educate them...we will further the goal of developing this vast private sector and at the same time further the goal of economic development because the future of these states is in agricultural development.

-J. Singletary
A.I.D./W

I would suggest we need to take a careful look at the purpose of development...I submit self-sustained development is what we ought to be looking at...If you're going to have development, you're going to have changes in the way people think, the way people act, their knowledge base...The way you get from a fetus to a judge or an agriculturalist is through the education process. So if A.I.D. wants as its goal...helping countries become self-sustaining, there is no question but that there's a role for education.

E. Expanding the data base

Projects currently in progress became the focus for informal evening sessions both nights of the conference. The first evening focused on projects in specific countries. Host country participants and field mission personnel teamed to lead discussions about a manpower training project underway in Zaire and a programmed learning project being implemented in Liberia. Another group discussed a rural training project in Tanzania while another discussed a non-formal education project in Lesotho. In each case, the presenter gave an overview of the project and the group raised questions relevant to the issues under consideration by the workgroups. Informal groups on the second evening looked at broader programmatic issues. One group heard presentations on the use of communications technology in various A.I.D. projects: a satellite project; a radio math project in Nicaragua; and a health project that uses radio in Honduras. Another group discussed participant training issues, while a third talked about the organization of the education sector in A.I.D. missions overseas.

IV. ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. Group I: Host Country Institutional Capability and Commitment

Group I made several generalizations and recommendations as a result of discussions relating impact evaluation findings and personal experiences to issues of host country institutional capability and commitment. The analytical framework that the group devised for examining the data used the structural organization encountered by A.I.D. in a country as a way of operationalizing the notion of institutional capability. Impact evaluation findings were thus discussed in terms of: 1) vertical institutions (national, regional, local); 2) horizontal interministerial relations; 3) host country-other donor relations; and 4) the role of private sector and private voluntary organizations. The analytical framework used procedural issues, primarily those relating to funding, as a way of operationalizing the notion of commitment. This discussion focused on: 1) approval and allocation mechanisms; 2) intra-governmental, PVO/Private sector, and donor processes; 3) budget and project cycles; and 4) project identification, implementation, and evaluation.

The group discussed at length the tensions that often exist in the host country among national, local, and regional institutions; among ministries; among donor agencies and the host government; and between the government and the private sector. They noted that such tensions--sometimes positive, sometimes negative--can be exacerbated by outside interventions. The group concluded that A.I.D. strategies for developing institutional capability needed to address these

tensions. (See the Group I report in Appendix D.1.)

In presenting a summary of its deliberations to the final plenary session, Group I highlighted the fundamental importance of training in institution-building but urged the Agency to go beyond the simple act of training individuals to include organizational development assistance as part of its intervention strategies.

The group offered several recommendations emerging from its analysis of the structural evidence in the impact evaluations:

1. A.I.D. policy should emphasize the need to take into account interests, roles, and capacities of a wide range of local institutions in project design, implementation, and evaluation.
2. Where A.I.D. perceives weaknesses in key institutions which impede the ability of governments to make decisions, assess needs, manage and implement its own education program, A.I.D. should be willing to assist in strengthening these capacities.

We should provide interventions to strengthen

- planning capabilities
- administration and management capabilities
- leadership capabilities
- research and development capabilities
- materials production capabilities

(The group noted that such interventions might lead to new patterns of interaction and coordination among ministerial levels.)

3. A.I.D. should be willing to participate in discussions with other donors in an effort to create possibilities for sharing projects. A.I.D. should increase its collaboration with other donors to build basic education systems.
4. A.I.D. should pay increased attention to and work with host government institutions in development and support of private sector institutions participating in education programs.

The group did not feel ready to put forward specific recommendations about the commitment issue but did offer some generalizations based on its analysis of procedural issues in the impact evaluations.

1. A.I.D. procedures for project approval and financial allocations may be incompatible or poorly coordinated with relevant mechanisms in the host government. This has real implications for host country planning and is a problem we need to address.
2. Regardless of who initiates a project, the critical task is ensuring that, as it develops, it becomes "owned" by local government and institutionalized as part of the local system. This occurred successfully in the projects in Korea and Kenya, but was unsuccessful in the Philippines.

B. Group II: Sustainability of Projects and Programs

Group II drew several policy implications from evidence presented in the impact evaluation studies about sustainability. The group

defined "sustainability" as the ability of a project to continue on its own after A.I.D.'s intervention had ended. In developing this definition, the group noted that sustainability was going to depend, at least initially, on the usefulness of the project to those persons benefitting from it, i.e., the project staff, the institutions, and the beneficiaries. Proceeding from this "given," the group elaborated and described eight factors impacting on project sustainability:

1. importance of long-term A.I.D. involvement
2. host country ability to finance recurring costs
3. adequacy of manpower available to continue the project
4. the extent of host country demonstrated commitment to the project
5. institutionalization of the project
6. adequacy of reward structure to project personnel
7. political stability
8. effectiveness of phase-out process

Each group member reviewed one of the impact studies for data relevant to each of these factors. The findings were then shared with the group and a determination was made about the extent to which each factor played a role in the sustainability of the projects reviewed. One group member was responsible for recording comments about each of the factors during the sharing session and subsequently wrote a summary paragraph on that factor for the group product. (See the Group II report in Appendix D.2.)

Group II found, in relating the factors listed above to the data in the impact studies, that host country commitment, availability of adequate manpower to sustain the activity, institutionalization of the project, and political stability were factors present to a large extent in most of the projects under review. However, the case of Kenya demonstrates that, despite the presence of most of the factors favoring sustainability, Kenya's lack of ability to finance recurring costs and A.I.D.'s lack of an adequate time horizon for involvement resulted in the near disappearance of the project following the end of A.I.D.'s intervention. (See chart in group report, Appendix D.2.)

Based on their discussions, Group II made the following policy recommendations for achieving project sustainability where desirable:

1. A.I.D. should carefully consider project objectives in terms of realistic implementation time frames and allow for flexibility with regard to the life of the project.
2. A.I.D. should consider whether the long-term benefits of education projects in countries unable to sustain recurrent costs merit external assistance to finance recurrent costs beyond the life of the project.
3. A policy should be established to ensure that projects are designed to include adequate training components to provide an adequate number of qualified personnel.
4. As host country commitment is a necessary prerequisite to successful project implementation and sustainability... commitments should be an integral aspect of project implementation.

5. Institutionalization of project efforts must be a foremost consideration from design through implementation with proper checkpoints built into the project process.
6. A.I.D. should encourage and, when feasible, make possible special incentives for selected project personnel.
7. A.I.D. should assure, as part of phasing out, that adequate human and financial resources remain to bridge the gap between relative financial dependency and autonomous sustainability.

C. Group III: Appropriate fit between host country socioeconomic, cultural, political, and technological needs and realities, and planned project/program interventions.

Group III generated several recommendations and numerous sub-recommendations as a result of discussions about the "fit" between host country and A.I.D. needs and realities. The group tackled this broad topic by examining findings from impact evaluations and personal experience to determine whether there was any evidence to suggest a relationship between socioeconomic, cultural, and technological fit of a project and a project's impact in the country. To do this, each group member examined one of the impact studies and one or two personal examples using a group-prepared form for recording data. Members then shared their findings and discussed at length whether project success or failure was related to project "fit." Out of this discussion came a number of generalizations regarding each aspect of "fit." These generalizations and supporting evidence are detailed in Group III's report. (See Appendix D.3.)

In summarizing the group's findings for the final plenary session, group leaders outlined examples of some projects where appropriate fit was related to positive impact and others where inappropriate fit was associated with negative impact. Liberia's Improved Efficiency of Learning project was cited as an example where careful consideration of host country socioeconomic and cultural conditions enabled A.I.D. to replicate successfully a programmed learning approach originally tested in the Philippines. Key to the Liberian success was the formation of a local committee to adapt the project to Liberia and the willingness of A.I.D. to use traditional teacher training structures to implement a highly innovative project. Assistance to elementary and secondary school development in Afghanistan demonstrates a positive relationship between cultural "fit" and impact. There, educational materials were produced in two languages to accommodate two different linguistic groups within the country. At the same time, however, efforts to address Afghan history in the materials failed to acknowledge that each of these groups had its own view of the country's history, thereby diminishing the value of the materials nationwide. In Ecuador a successful project in one province failed to be adopted in other provinces, primarily because it lacked support at the national ministry level, thus demonstrating the importance of political "fit" for success and impact. Kenya and Korea had projects where radio was successfully used as a medium of instruction in ways appropriate to the needs of the countries and associated with project success. On the other hand, television used

as a supplemental delivery system in Nigeria, all but disappeared from the project once A.I.D.'s involvement ended.

In conclusion, the group presented recommendations regarding host country participation in A.I.D. projects.

1. Benefits will result from increased participation of local institutions at all levels in which a project is involved. Therefore, existing A.I.D. policy regarding participation should be more carefully followed so that design, implementation and evaluation involve host country institutions.
2. Consideration should be given to NOT funding projects where there is no evidence of participation in the earliest design stages.

D. Group IV: Replicability

Group IV proposed several concrete recommendations to the Agency for enhancing the replicability and spread of projects. Initially the group defined and distinguished between the concepts of replicability and spread.

Replicability: A conscious, directed effort to apply effective approaches to new projects in other countries, sectors and disciplines confronting similar problems.

Spread: Extension and dissemination within the same country or contiguous area.

The group then focused on the question: What can A.I.D. do to replicate positive aspects of its experience and not to replicate negative aspects?

A considerable amount of time was spent generating a list of conditions that favor or militate against replicability. The list, which became the framework for analysis of the impact evaluation findings, included:

1. host country demand/energy/commitment
2. cost effectiveness
3. knowledge about what worked and why
4. information dissemination/communication

Following close examination of the impact evaluation findings and personal experiences in light of the conditions for and against replicability, the group concluded that little concrete evidence was available to them. Their analysis led to a list of concerns and subsequently to a set of recommendations for the Agency. (See Group IV's report in Appendix D.4.)

Group IV presented the following policy recommendations to the final plenary session:

1. Some unit in A.I.D. (possibly Sector Councils) should be charged with reviewing projects for potential replication and disseminating this throughout the agency.
2. A.I.D. must have an understanding of what has worked and why.
 - a. Document implementation with real formative evaluation.
 - b. Enforce requirement for thorough quarterly implementation reviews at Mission level.

- c. Consider rolling designs, i.e., shorter general implementation plans for project papers with more detailed and specific plans at project start-up and periodic revision during implementation.
3. Conscious, serious attention must be given to the Agency's information dissemination system...to get useful, tailored, relevant, down to earth information to users. Information flows should be vertical, lateral (across sectors), and external (including other donors).
4. A.I.D. should give more attention to research on strategies for more cost effective approaches especially in basic education.
5. A.I.D. design procedures should require a review of past experience (state of the art) and the explicit identification of lessons learned (what works, what does not work).

E. Group V: Design, implementation, evaluation, and feedback

Group V, whose topic covered the entire project development process, touched on a number of issues raised by other groups in its discussion and final recommendations. The group chose for its analytical framework the guidance questions suggested for the topic by Conference organizers:

- What are the donor constraints which encourage (discourage) project/program effectiveness and impact?
- What should the purposes and goals of A.I.D. education projects be?

-By what criteria should these purposes and goals be identified?

-By what mechanisms can evaluation become a more useful tool in the design process?

Four teams or subgroups then examined individual impact studies in light of these questions and shared their findings with the whole group. The group identified, based on this discussion, major issues in project design and generated a list of education project goals. The teams then wrote recommendations for policy derived from their discussion of the evidence.

Due to time constraints, the group discussion centered on project design issues. This discussion underlined the importance to project design of host country commitment, institutional development, project cost effectiveness, and socioeconomic fit of projects. Although the Conference focus was limited to education projects per se, Group V dwelled at considerable length on implications for the project design process of educational activities in other sectors. The group suggested that perhaps the education sector should be redefined in terms of education activities rather than education programs. (See the Group V report in Appendix D.5.)

In the final plenary session, Group V made the following policy recommendations for Agency consideration.

1. Host government policy and funding and structural constraints, must be systematically analyzed during the project design process, to enable project design to address such constraints.

2. A.I.D. should develop a long-term human resource development strategy, especially in countries where A.I.D. has limited funding and personnel, and focus efforts in government priority areas where A.I.D. has a comparative advantage.
3. Project design should allow sufficient time for a project to achieve its stated objectives, especially in the case of innovative projects.
4. Projects should be designed to be cost-effective, with plans built in for the host government to assume recurrent costs once A.I.D.'s intervention has ended.
5. Education projects should be designed to be an integral part of the country's education sector strategy and of its development process.
6. Project design and implementation should involve true participation of host government officials, project implementors, and beneficiaries.

V. RESPONSES FROM AGENCY OFFICIALS

Following the workgroup reports, two senior A.I.D. officials offered reactions and comments. First, Bradford Langmaid, Deputy Assistant Administrator of the Bureau for Near East, commented on the workgroup recommendations. Finally, Joseph Wheeler, Deputy Administrator of the Agency, responded to questions from the participants.

Langmaid expressed his concern for two issues not addressed in workgroup recommendations and underlined the importance of building a political and economic constituency for a project to secure host country commitment. He said he was disappointed not to hear a demand that A.I.D. do something about restoring to its project portfolio traditional education programs which the evidence shows had had significant impact in several areas, from developing basic ministerial capacities to the design of curriculum and educational services. He noted that education ministries in developing countries were probably better equipped, had more resources, and thus a better opportunity to have an influence than the ministries of health, agriculture, and defense. This, he said, was a valid point favoring education assistance and a point that deserved to be made.

Langmaid said that the recommendations had failed to address budgetary concerns which are important to building a case for education assistance. He said A.I.D.'s concern over how projects relate to host country programs and objectives called for an examination of host country budget capacity and an analysis of how and

why they spend their money as they do. He noted that despite the high costs of education, A.I.D. had failed to explore fully ways of mobilizing resources at the local level to support costs of teachers, books materials, buildings and maintenance. He also pointed out that most governments are unaware of what it costs for them to produce a literate student, usually a revealing figure in relation to efficiency goals.

In conclusion, Langmaid addressed the issue of host government commitment and sustainability. He said that continuation of a project after A.I.D.'s intervention had ended required a private demand for the project. Therefore, it was incumbent upon A.I.D. to build into the project both a public and a private commitment for the project and its continuation. There was a need, he said, to develop in the government political and economic constituencies with vested interests in the continuation of the project. "I'm not sure we spend enough time building that kind of a constituency," he said.

In responding to participant questions, Wheeler addressed several issues that had been central to group deliberations throughout the conference and urged the educators to present a forceful argument for education assistance to the senior Agency staff.

Agency policy
in general:

This administration's policy includes
continuing concern for basic human needs,

with food, better health, education, concern for the distribution of benefits, coupled with tactical concerns for how you get there the most effective way. There is strong emphasis on production, and strong emphasis on utilization of every individual's talents and abilities, including entrepreneurial abilities. The continuum is there.

Agency policy
in education:

There is a need in this administration for an articulation of education policy, what it is we would like to be doing, to what extent Mission Directors are encouraged to develop education projects...The Administrator is open to discussion about education. I would encourage boldness in this discussion...We do need a methodical review of experience, what succeeded, what failed, to buttress the arguments. That material is here. Now it needs to be presented to the executive staff...

Funding for
education projects:

This administration has spoken (about education) in the form of budget. And it's a difficult situation. In terms of the

development assistance budget, education is holding its own or going down. There is a continuing priority given to agriculture...to population; we're urged to do more in energy. Then there are the residuals, health and education...which includes a number of project areas I would not necessarily classify as education, such as labor and participant training. The real funding for education is only a piece of a functional portion of the budget.

Basic education:

There's a good chance that you'll get a hearing if you make a good case for basic education, providing it's well grounded in a set of arguments...The dilemma is that we probably don't have the resources for basic education. But I still think A.I.D. can help a government put together a funding package to do a worthy project.

Project size:

Project scale is politically important. Large projects can have impact. In the planning stages it is important to mobilize high level political support, to involve ministries such

as finance and planning...Education is not going anywhere...unless there's a political interest and a political will. It needs to be articulated and it needs to go beyond the ministry of education, into the ministry of planning, into the political system.

Systems approach:

The systems approach is important. We've got to help the government take a long term look at the education system. We've got to build on what they have.

Project time frame:

Most bureaucrats can't see much farther than seven years...But we have to be realistic about how long it takes to institutionalize things, about the time needed for effective technological transfer, and to accomplish goals. Lay out a 20 year project time frame with five or six or eight year segments and program in periodic reviews. Recognize that changes will be necessary over time as situations change.

Agency Staffing:

I'm not ready to accept reduced staff.

* * *

The Impact Evaluation Conference ended, but the discussion of the issues raised will continue. A draft policy for the education sector is scheduled for presentation to the Administrator in mid-April with a sector strategy to be developed soon thereafter.

APPENDIX A

PARTICIPANT LIST
A.I.D EDUCATION SECTOR
IMPACT EVALUATION CONFERENCE

Cheikh Aw Office of Research and Planning Ministry of Education Dakar, Senegal	Rudi Chizungu Advisor to the Prime Minister for Higher Education Kinshasa, Zaire
John Bean Human Resources Dev. Officer Office of Development Resources Bureau for Africa A.I.D. Washington	Raymond Copson African Affairs Analyst Congressional Research Service Library of Congress Washington, D.C. 20540
Robert J. Berg Associate Assistant Administrator for Evaluation Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination A.I.D. Washington	George V. Corinaldi, Jr. Human Resources Development Officer USAID/Morocco
Clifford Block Associate Director for Development Communications Office of Education Bureau for Science and Technology A.I.D. Washington	Mary Ann Cusack Education Officer Office of Human Resources Bureau for Africa A.I.D. Washington
Cameron S. Bonner Human Resources Development Officer USAID/Tanzania	Andre L. Daniere Associate Professor of Economics Boston College Chestnut Hill, MA 02167
Jerry Brown Region Education Sector Specialist Africa Region, Peace Corps 806 Connecticut Ave., N.W. Washington, D.C. 20525	Jean DuRette Human Resources Development Officer USAID/Mali
Joseph Carney Human Resources Development Officer USAID/Lesotho	Williams L. Eilers Deputy Director Office of Energy Bureau for Science and Technology A.I.D. Washington

Raga Elim
Evaluation Coordinator
Office of International Training
Bureau for Science and Technology
A.I.D. Washington

Stanley Handleman
Human Resources Development
Officer
USAID/Cameroon

Donald Foster-Gross
International Education
Specialist
Office of Education
Bureau for Science and Technology
A.I.D. Washington

Andra Herriott
Chief, Career Development Branch
Officer of Training and
Development
Bureau for Management
A.I.D. Washington

Larry Frymire
Development Communications
Specialist
Office of Education
Bureau for Science and Technology
A.I.D. Washington

Barry Heyman, Chief
Education Division
Office of Technical Support
Bureau for Near East
A.I.D. Washington

Jon Gant
Human Resources Development
Officer
USAID/Botswana

Edward Hirabayashi, Chief
Human Resources Development
Office
USAID/Zaire

Captain E. Othello Gongar
Deputy Minister of Education
Monrovia, Liberia

Susan Hoben
Research Associate
African Studies Center
Boston University
Boston, Massachusetts 02215

Stephen Grant
Regional Human Resources
Development Advisor
REDSO/WA
Abidjan, Ivory Coast

James Hoxeng
Associate Director for Education
Office of Education
Bureau for Science and Technology
A.I.D. Washington

Norman Green
Education Officer
Officer of Regional Affairs
Bureau for Africa
A.I.D. Washington

Mats Hultin
Deputy Director
Office of Education
Room D-1132
World Bank
1818 H Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20433

Robert Jacobs
Education Consultant
P.O. Box 431
Murphysboro, Illinois 62966

K.M. Masogo
Permanent Secretary
Ministry of Education
Gaborone, Botswana

Twig Johnson
Deputy Chief, Studies Division
Office of Evaluation
Bureau for Program and Policy
Coordination
A.I.D. Washington

John McCollum, President
Social Educational Research
and Development, Inc.
5454 Wisconsin Avenue, N.W.
Suite 715
Washington, D.C. 20015

Graham B. Kerr
Rural Development Officer
Office of Technical Support
Bureau for Near East
A.I.D. Washington

Frank Method
Education Policy Advisor
Office of Policy Development and
Program Review
Bureau for Program and Policy
Coordination
A.I.D. Washington

Bradford Langmaid
Deputy Assistant Administrator
Bureau for Near East
A.I.D. Washington

Anthony J. Meyer
International Education Specialist
Office of Education
Bureau for Science and Technology
A.I.D. Washington

E. Malie
Chief Education Officer
Ministry of Education
Maseru, Lesotho

Mercedese Miller
Senior Coordinator for Special
Projects
Office of Evaluation
Bureau for Program and Policy
Coordination
A.I.D. Washington

Frank Mann
Human Resources Development
Officer
Office of Technical Resources
Bureau for Asia
A.I.D. Washington

Stephen Moseley
Executive Vice President
Academy for Educational
Development
1414 22nd Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20037

Nick Mariani
Program Officer
USAID/Somalia

Ken Martin, Chief
Education and Human Resources
Office of Development Resources
Bureau for Latin America
and the Caribbean
A.I.D. Washington

Julie Owen
Education Officer
USAID/Senegal

Janet Poley
Project Advisor
Training for Rural Development
USAID/Tanzania

Jonathan Silverstone
Office of the General Counsel
A.I.D. Washington

Lewis P. Reade
Director, Office of Technical
Support
Bureau for Near East
A.I.D. Washington

James D. Singletary
Education Advisor
Office of Development Resources
Bureau for Latin America
and the Caribbean
A.I.D. Washington

Henry Reynolds
Education Officer
USAID/Liberia

David Sprague
Acting Director
Office of Education
Bureau for Science and Technology
A.I.D. Washington

Norman Rifkin
Regional Human Resources
Development Officer
Sahel Development Planning Team
USAID/Mali

Charles Stalford
Evaluation Team Leader
Testing, Assessment and
Evaluation Division
National Institute of Education
1200 19th Street, N.W., Room 822
Washington, D.C. 20208

Raymond A. San Giovanni
Education Officer
Office of Education
Bureau for Science and Technology
A.I.D. Washington

Howard L. Steverson
Director, Education and Human
Resources
Office of Development Resources
Bureau for Africa
A.I.D. Washington

R.F. Schenkkan
Communication Planning Specialist
Office of Education
Bureau for Science and Technology
A.I.D. Washington

Nan Sussman
Director of International Training
International Council on Education
for Teaching
1 DuPont Circle
Suite 616
Washington, D.C. 20036

Margaret G. Shaw
Human Resources Officer
Office of Development Resources
Bureau for Africa
A.I.D. Washington

Patrick Shima
Evaluation Officer
United Nation Development
Program
One United Nations Plaza
New York, New York 10017

John Swallow
Human Resources Development
Officer
Office of Human Resources
Bureau for Africa
A.I.D. Washington

Robert Taylor
Program and Training Officer
NANEAP
Peace Corps
806 Connecticut Ave., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20525

Margaret Tolbert
Director
The Carver Research Foundation of
Tuskegee Institute
Tuskegee, Alabama 36088

Marion Kohashi Warren
Education Sector Coordinator
Studies Division
Office of Evaluation
Bureau for Program and Policy
Coordination
A.I.D. Washington

James Washington
Human Resources Development
Officer
USAID/Ghana

Joseph Wheeler
Deputy Administrator
A.I.D. Washington

William T. White, Jr., Director
Office of International Training
Bureau for Science and Technology
A.I.D. Washington

William Whitten
Education Officer
Office of Personnel
A.I.D. Washington

Ruth K. Zagorin
Agency Director for Human
Resources
Bureau for Science and Technology
A.I.D. Washington

Robert Zigler
Human Resources Development
Office of Human Resources
Bureau for Africa
A.I.D. Washington

AID Washington Address
Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20523

USAID Overseas Address
Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520

APPENDIX B

AGENDA
EDUCATION SECTOR
IMPACT EVALUATION CONFERENCE
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
Marriottsville, Maryland, U.S.A.
February 15-17, 1982

DAY 1

- 8:00 Bus leaves State Department (21st Street Entrance)
- 9:30 Registration at Marriottsville
- 10:30 Conference Opening
- Welcome: Bob Berg
--Conference Background, Purpose and Overview: Twig Johnson
- 11:00 Impact Evaluation Findings and Issues: Marion Kohashi
Warren
- 12:15 Lunch
- 1:30 Workgroups: Session I - Discussion of Impact
Evaluation Findings and Field Experiences that
Bear on Assigned Topic
- 2:30 Policy Issues: Frank Method
- 3:30 Break
- 3:45 Workgroups: Session II - Identify Issues and Develop Work
Plan Including Responsibilities for Matching
Findings Against Issues.
- 6:00 Dinner
- 7:00 Expanding The Data Base: Presentations of Additional Cases
and Issues
- 9:00 Wine and Cheese - Compliments of the Pragma Corp.
- 9:30 Workgroup Coordinators Meet

DAY II

- 8:15 Breakfast

9:00 Panel: Latest Evaluation Findings and Research Agenda
 --Charles Stalford, (U.S.) National Institute of Education
 --Mats Hultin, World Bank
 --Patrick Shima, UNPD

10:15 Break

10:30 Workgroups: Session III - Match Findings Against Issues and Begin Drafting Recommendations

12:15 Lunch

1:30 Workgroups: Session IV - Continue Drafting Workgroup Report

3:30 Break

3:45 Workgroups: Session V - Complete Draft Report

5:30 All Draft Reports to Pragma Conference Office

6:00 Dinner

8:00 Education and Development: Ruth Zagorin

9:00 Expanding the Data Base: Informal Sessions

DAY III

8:15 Breakfast

9:15 Workgroups: Session VI - Critique Other Workgroup Reports

10:45 Break

11:00 Workgroups: Session VII - Revise Reports in Light of
 of Comments; Finalize Presentation to Plenary

12:15 Lunch

1:30 Plenary Session: Conference Summary and Presentation of
 Workgroup Recommendations

3:00 Break

3:15 Response: Mr. Joseph Wheeler, Deputy Administrator, A.I.D.
 Final Discussion

4:45 Bus Leaves for State Department

APPENDIX C

CONFERENCE MATERIALS
EDUCATION SECTOR IMPACT EVALUATION CONFERENCE
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

GENERAL

- "PPC/E Education Sector Report: A Summary of Impact Evaluation Findings," Marion Kohashi Warren. (February 1982)
- "A.I.D. Assistance to Education: A Retrospective Study," Francis J. Method. (February 1981)
- "Investments in Education in Developing Countries: The Role for A.I.D.," Donald Foster-Gross. (May 1980)
- "DS/ED Nonformal Education: A Retrospective Study, 1970-1980," Chris Krueger and Jeanne Moulton. (May 1981)

IMPACT EVALUATIONS

- "Thailand: Rural Nonformal Education - The Mobile Trade Training Schools." (October 1981)
- "Korea Elementary - Middle School Pilot Project." (October 1981)
- "Northern Nigeria Teacher Education Project." (September 1981)
- "U.S. Aid to Education in Nepal: A 20-year Beginning," (May 1981)
- "Radio Correspondence Education in Kenya."
- "Jordan Education Sector Impact Evaluation."
- "U.S. Aid to Education in Paraguay: Education Development Program."
- "Philippines Project IMPACT: An Assessment of a Low Cost Alternative for Universal Primary Education."

DESK REVIEWS

- "Nonformal Education in Rural Ecuador."
- "Elementary and Secondary Education Project in Afghanistan."
- "Sector Loans and Education Development in Colombia."
- "Sector Loans and Education Development in Brazil."

APPENDIX D.1

GROUP I

HOST COUNTRY INSTITUTIONAL CAPABILITY AND COMMITMENT

INTRODUCTION

The problem of the host country institutional capability and commitment needs to be considered within the specific areas of structure, procedure and implementation.

The eight reports under consideration are important insofar as they help us have an understanding and an appreciation of the need for continuous and harmonious collaboration by all parties concerned in A.I.D. programs.

In this summary we shall specifically deal with the situation from the point of view of the host country and the donors, indicating the key findings based on research, personal experiences of the participants, and other relevant issues. Drawing from these findings we will make a statement of policy and suggest possible recommendations.

STRUCTURAL

1. Vertical institutions (National, Regional, Local)
2. Horizontal Interministerial Relations
3. H.C. - Other Donor Relations
4. Role of PVO and Private Sector

PROCEDURAL

1. Approval and Allocation Mechanisms (Processes)
2. Intra-Governmental, PVO/Private Sector, Donor
3. Budget/Project Cycle
4. Project Process of Identification, Implementation, Evaluation

The first aspect to look at is the structure of institutions that can be identified at these levels--national, regional and local. In projects in which two or more of these levels are involved, there is often tension between them which requires resolution. The main reasons for tensions are identified as:

- a) lack of communication
- b) bureaucratic jealousy
- c) actual or perceived incompetence between levels
- d) lack of coordination
- e) changes in attitudes

These tensions are a normal fact of life. However, the group noted that the start of a new project often introduces new tensions or sharpens existing tensions. These tensions cannot usually be completely avoided. The issue for program development is whether they can be made creative.

Evidence of these tensions can be found in the case studies for reasons (b) and (c) in the Radio Correspondence Project (Kenya) and for reason (e) in the Philippines Impact Study. The NNTEP project in Nigeria represents a special case where the tensions were partly between two of the U.S. institutions involved and partly new tensions between institutional and bureaucratic elements as Nigeria

restructured its government during the project period. Similarly, Jordan illustrates the difficulty of planning assistance where the ministry had not yet developed its own planning capacity. This resulted in periods of disagreement over program priorities. Jordan developed its own institutions and worked through several periods of turbulence in the period during which A.I.D. assistance was provided. The Korea case appears to represent a case of successful vertical coordination.

The above tensions are mainly vertical tensions among hierarchical elements. Other tensions exist horizontally among elements at any level. Most importantly, tensions exist at the inter-ministerial level. The non-existence of meaningful interactions at the inter-ministerial level often leads to a lack of coordinated project implementation. The coordination required for effective implementation of the assistance project often forces ministerial elements to interact in ways which are not normally required for operation of their own programs. In some cases the most lasting impact of the education assistance project may be to bring about new patterns of interaction and coordination among ministerial elements. Among the types of projects which often have this effect are nonformal functional skills training project, vocational training projects in fields such as agriculture, and advanced training projects which include a manpower planning and assessment activity. Examples where the failure to adequately anticipate and resolve problems of horizontal coordination affected project success include the Nepal

program, Thailand and Colombia. A common problem is the failure to bring ministries of finance and economic planning into the process at an early stage of project development and planning.

In addition to the tensions and coordination problems among institutional elements of the local government, tensions often exist between the local government and the donor community. These tensions exist partly because of differences in perception between the donors and the recipient government as to the definition of the problem, priorities among the problems and views of how to proceed in solving the problems. There are often differences in views of how to proceed. In many cases, the government may change or change its priorities during the life of a project, necessitating adjustments on both sides to the new situation. Afghanistan is a case in point. The donor may have a predetermined favorite solution which, if it attempts to proceed without full agreement or understanding in the local government will lead to conflicts and problems in implementation. The radio correspondence course in Kenya represented a donor judgment that this approach could be developed without capital or institution-building elements. This was incorrect and another donor had to provide the capital inputs, without which the project could not function. Ultimately the project confronted problems of recurrent teacher salaries which could have been anticipated by better collaboration and forward planning at the initial stages.

The group noted the need for attention to coordination among the donors, but did not have cases on which to base recommendations for such coordination. A particularly delicate set of tensions arise when

the donors attempt to use the assistance to leverage or bring about what they consider to be needed reforms. The group discussed this at length and reached consensus that it was appropriate, and often necessary, for the donor to take steps to bring about needed coordination and to obtain decisions affecting project implementation. However, where the donor exceeds this role to the point of attempting to make decisions for the local institutions or to force decisions in predetermined directions, it is considered an unwarranted and inappropriate intrusion on local decision making and often leads to the increase of tensions rather than the cooperation needed to insure effective project implementation. The A.I.D. role in accelerating the pace of education planning in Jordan appears to have been an example of an appropriate, though strong, role in bringing about coordination and decision at a critical point.

There was agreement that the institutions relevant to education include many in the private sector and the role of community level organizations. While the group stressed the importance of involving community organizations it noted the case of Kenya in which the accelerated development of community schools under the Harambee movement created a problem of supplying teachers rapidly enough and of maintaining the recurrent costs of these schools. The need to find a solution to the problem of large numbers of poorly trained teachers forced the Kenya government to look for an alternative means of in-service training. The result was the Radio Correspondence program. Eventually, the failure to find a solution to the other problem, the costs of employing these teachers at the salaries appropriate for their upgraded status, became prohibitive and led to the collapse of

the in-service training scheme. This case illustrates a tension between the objective of involving more elements in education decision making and the ministry's need to maintain sufficient control to ensure effective project implementation.

Both A.I.D. and the local government have an interest in finding ways to relate education effectively and channel assistance to the local communities. The government has need to develop new mechanisms and A.I.D. may have to assist in developing these mechanisms.

Additional structural/procedural issues which the group discussed but did not fully resolve include:

- Budget and project cycles may be incompatible
- Time frame for project implementation and impact may be inadequate
- A.I.D. procedure for project approval and financial allocation may be incompatible or poorly coordinated with the relevant mechanisms in the local government
- Regardless of who initiates the project, the critical task is insuring that as it develops it becomes 'owned' by the local government and institutionalized as part of the local system. The Philippines examples appear to have been instances in which this was not accomplished. Korea and Kenya appear to be successful examples.
- Need for periodic consultation, particularly on manpower and budgeting matters, and for full local participation in project monitoring and evaluation.

APPENDIX D.2

GROUP II

SUSTAINABILITY OF PROJECTS AND PROGRAMS

Sustainability of any educational project will depend upon the extent to which it is perceived as being useful by both project beneficiaries and host country officials. We identified from the impact studies and other relevant experiences the critical criteria that determine continuance of education efforts after A.I.D. involvement has ceased. After listing the criteria, we analyzed each case study. The criteria and our conclusions follow:

ISSUE 1: Whether the sustainability of a project is linked to A.I.D.'s having committed itself to an adequate time horizon over the life of the project.

An examination of A.I.D.'s project impact evaluations reveals that A.I.D.'s involvement must be sufficiently long term to allow for the development of an institutionalized infrastructure and a qualified professional cadre for continuous implementation. A.I.D.'s involvement in Nepal, Jordan, Paraguay and Korea gives evidence of sufficiently long-term development assistance that permitted the creation or re-enforcement of key educational institutions and their staff over a period of 20-35 years.

On the other hand, and in all fairness, perhaps for reasons beyond A.I.D.'s control, our involvement in education sector projects in Thailand, Kenya, and the Philippines was not sufficiently long term to allow for the full institutionalization of all projects in terms of acceptability to both beneficiaries and to the governments concerned.

Recommendation: A.I.D. carefully consider project objectives in terms of realistic implementation time frames, and, depending upon the complexity of the project, allow for flexibility with regard to the life of the project.

ISSUE 2: Whether economic environment is an important element of sustainability; whether given commitment, the host country can effectively handle recurring costs whether through internal budget support or foreign assistance.

Thailand, Korea, Nigeria, Jordan and Paraguay all enjoyed rapid economic growth, which made it possible for the host countries to handle their contributions and to meet recurrent costs. Nepal's economy has shown modest improvement, but its capacity to meet costs depends on external support, which has been adequate but may not continue to be. The Philippines project depended on external contributions and is struggling to survive. In Kenya, the shock to the economy by the oil crisis caused retrenchment from planned levels of operation.

The success of educational programs depends on economic possibilities for graduates. This, in turn, is affected by the amount and quality of economic growth. The availability of overseas job opportunities and the remittance-fed economy of Jordan solved a

growing unemployment problem which in the mid-60s threatened the sustainability of an effective educational system. In Nigeria, oil revenues permitted the country to handle demand for secondary education created by the project.

But economic growth can create problems. In Jordan and Paraguay, growing economies are providing job opportunities that compete with and drain the educational system. In the Philippines, the availability of outside resources for traditional educational approaches (through the World Bank) undermined incentives for the low-cost education pilot project.

Conclusion: The economic environment, in any given country, can significantly affect whether a government is able to sustain the recurrent costs of education projects. A.I.D. should consider, in these cases, whether the long-term benefits of such projects merit external (A.I.D. and other donors) financing of recurrent costs beyond the normal life of project.

ISSUE 3: Whether an adequate number of qualified personnel are available to sustain the project.

The issue addresses the question of numbers of personnel trained both technically and in management areas, their presence in the system after project is terminated, and the adequacy of the numbers and their areas of specialty.

In all of the impact evaluations reviewed--Thailand, Ecuador, Paraguay, Pakistan, Kenya, Jordan, Korea, Philippines, and Nepal--the

training program was significant and introduced enough trained technicians to ensure the sustainability of the project after A.I.D. withdrawal. There were no examples of adverse effects of training manpower or cases in which training was inadequate or not done in sufficient volume to cover the needs.

Recommendation: A policy should be established to assure that projects are designed to include adequate training components to provide an adequate number of qualified personnel.

ISSUE 4: Whether the degree to which the host country has demonstrated a commitment to the project, by supplying essential financial and qualified human resources, impacts upon the sustainability of the project.

Host country commitment is defined here as the timely provision of necessary project inputs. It includes contributions "in kind" (an environment of "legitimacy" with support from appropriate national, regional, and local prestige figures and necessary legislation to permit the project to function; available facilities, equipment, and supplies; and adequate numbers of host country personnel with at least minimum professional qualifications). It also includes direct contributions of financial resources to supplement donor contributions.

Almost all of the projects reviewed in these impact evaluations seemed to contain a high level of host country commitment during the life of the project and most are being sustained with local resources. While political and economic constraints may negatively affect the continuance of projects, a high level of host country commitment will often sustain projects.

Policy and Strategy Recommendations: Host country commitment

is a necessary prerequisite to successful project implementation and sustainability. A.I.D. policy should provide for early involvement of the host country in planning, management, and evaluation to help ensure adequate provision of host country resources during the life of the project and beyond. Host country commitments should be stated as specifically as possible in project documents, and regular monitoring of the provision of these commitments should be an integral aspect of project implementation.

ISSUE 5: Whether the project is effectively institutionalized (integrated) with indigenous organizations.

The evidence from the projects/programs studied, as well as other examples cited, shows that successful institutionalization of A.I.D.'s efforts is a positive, even necessary, contributor toward sustainability. Some projects, like those in Korea, Paraguay and Nepal, fit at the outset, or soon thereafter, into established institutional frameworks. Others, for example those in Nigeria, Thailand and Kenya, were able through implementation to establish themselves institutionally, leading to their having sustained effects. That is not to say that institutional changes did not take place where institutional fit was achieved. Indeed, in most instances significant changes did occur, but where these reforms took hold and were sustained, they succeeded as a result of their integration within the institutional setting.

Conclusion: Sustainability, the evidence indicates, derives from the successful institutionalization (systemic internalization) of project/program activities. The policy implication for A.I.D. is that the theme of institutionalizing project efforts must be a foremost consideration from design through implementation, with proper checkpoints built into the project process to measure successful movement toward this objective.

ISSUE 6: Whether sufficient reward structures exist to encourage participation of essential personnel.

In all projects staff were paid and presumably received fringe benefits consistent with their positions. There is no evidence that any (staff) received special incentives for leaving secure positions or agreeing to work in hardship posts.

In at least one case (Thailand, for example), project staff received sufficient psychological rewards to make for little job turnover. In Nigeria, because in a real sense the project "created" a school system, many participants experienced considerable job mobility. In most countries, teachers and other staff who received professional training (Paraguay, Nepal, Ecuador, Thailand, Nepal) were satisfied with the training and in at least one case (Nigeria) trainees were very positive about the training.

Overall, of the 10 projects reviewed, three were rated "high" and four were rated "adequate" in terms of this issue. Two were rated "N/A" (not known or not appropriate). This suggests the reward structure is a key issue which should receive attention. (See chart following report.)

The problem with incentives is what happens when the project is completed or becomes institutionalized and or stabilized. The answer is: incentives should stress good management, recognition, training, and psychological rewards rather than money.

Recommendation: A.I.D. should encourage and, when feasible, make possible special incentives for selected project personnel.

ISSUE 7: Whether political stability is an essential element in project sustainability.

Political stability is always helpful in promoting project sustainability. In the Philippines, Kenya, Thailand, Korea, and Paraguay, stability contributed to a predictable decision-making environment that significantly facilitated project implementation and followup.

Elsewhere, instability hampered sustainability primarily when it brought a regime to power which was unfriendly to the United States. Thus, projects may be sustained when instability takes the form of coups or civil war. Nigeria's commitment to education meant that the Northern Nigeria Education Project had sustained effects despite a prolonged civil war, and a new military regime in Ecuador has seen no reason to discontinue U.S. aid.

The policy implications of this variable are limited. Policy-makers will often not wish to discontinue aid in unstable or potentially unstable countries. Indeed, there will be strong pressure for increases in aid in many such instances. Perhaps the principal implication is that expectations of aid in these circumstances should not be over-anticipated or over-sold.

ISSUE 8: Whether A.I.D.'s method of phasing out project affects sustainability.

The data were mixed here and often there was not a great depth of information about this process. In Jordan, Korea, Kenya, and Nepal, there was a readiness to end involvement with the contractor and the process appears to have been done reasonably well. In each case, it was done gradually, with counterparts assuming full responsibility. The extent to which the process was a product of a clearly articulated plan is unclear. In Afghanistan, Paraguay, and Ecuador, abrupt project endings were due to sudden political interventions, and there is no opportunity to assess the impact of a phase-out plan in any normal sense. In Nigeria the civil war led A.I.D. to rethink its involvement and to end the project at a time that coincided with the originally planned "life of project;" this should probably be added to the list of premature endings due to political intervention. In Thailand, the project phased out because A.I.D. felt that it had done all it could; the host country, however, wanted continued funding. Here, in fact, the program has continued and grown. It was felt that there was no adequate description of the Philippines project phase-out plan, but questions were raised about the role of the MOE in funding inputs after assistance ended.

Conclusion: When a project is allowed to come to its natural maturity, A.I.D. should assure, as part of phasing out, that adequate human and financial resources remain to bridge the gap between relative financial dependency and autonomous

sustainability. Since some contractors may resist handing over control and some countries may not want to give up A.I.D. money, it probably makes sense to include criteria for disengagement in the original project plan, as well as some indication of the steps to take in phasing out the project.

Is there a role for the private sector?

In implementing projects, private sector firms are more responsive and flexible than universities and USAID's have more control. Following A.I.D. phase out, a private firm and/or contractor may continue to make its services available at a reduced level at cost, given their commitment to program sustainability. The private sector abroad represents a considerable resource that has yet to be tapped. University expertise (research capabilities) and on-the-job training (once the basic 3Rs are taught) appear to be a better use of resources than vocational school training. Educational equipment, such as that for teacher training schools and/or vocational education provide, limited opportunities for the private sector, especially when such equipment is easily maintained and/or usable at village level.

PROJECT SUSTAINABILITY

	Thailand	Ecuador	Paraguay	Afghanistan	Kenya	Nepal	Jordan	Nigeria	Philippines	Korea
1. Adequate time horizon for AID involvement	X	✓	✓	N/A	0	✓	✓	✓	0	✓
2. Economic growth/ability to finance recurring costs	0	✓	0	✓	0	0	✓	✓	✓	✓
3. Adequate manpower to sustain activity	✓	✓	0	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
4. HC commitment	✓	0	✓	N/A	✓	✓	✓	✓	X	✓
5. Institutionalization	✓	0	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	0	✓
6. Adequate reward structures	✓	N/A	0	N/A	✓	0	0	0	X	✓
7. Political stability	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	0	0	✓	✓
8. Effective process of phasing out	X	0	N/A	N/A	✓	✓	✓	N/A	X	✓

✓ = High

0 = Medium

X = Low

N/A = Not known or not appropriate

APPENDIX D.3

GROUP III

"FIT" BETWEEN HOST COUNTRY AND AID NEEDS AND REALITIES

INTRODUCTION

To begin with, our overall purpose in this report was to re-examine homilies and cliché's about cultural, political, economic and technological factors as predictors of project success or failure.

Very few people in A.I.D. deny that, if our projects fail to respond to these kinds of realities, we run the risk of fulfilling our own prophecies in public but fooling ourselves in private because our host-countries really don't want what we're selling.

To achieve this, we reviewed the evidence in the impact evaluation reports and our experience, which indicates that there is a relationship between impact and the correspondence between project activities and host country social, economic, cultural, political and technological needs and realities--"fit" matters.

Considerable evidence was discussed which shows close correspondence leads to positive impacts and that poor fit produces no or negative impacts. The evidence is presented in support of recommendations about how we can improve the "fit" of projects and their ability to achieve project purposes.

SOCIO-ECONOMIC FIT

To improve the socio-economic fit of A.I.D. projects with host country needs and realities, A.I.D. should:

1. Continue efforts to tie purposes of A.I.D. projects to priority economic plans and objectives of host country.

Evidence: A.I.D. primary teacher training project responded directly to development priorities of Northern Nigeria Government. Similar data can be found in the Afghanistan Primary and Secondary Education Report, and the Nepal, Jordan and Korea Reports.

2. Obtain assurance of host country financial commitment in recurrent and capital budget.

Evidence: Zaire Management Institute Project, positive example: Funds have been set aside by Zairian government for capital and recurrent costs.

3. Recognize the possibility of differing perceptions (between A.I.D. and host country and within the host country) of socio-economic needs and negotiate to a shared view.

Evidence: In Liberia, the host government requested a traditional inservice teacher training. Original A.I.D. preference was for programmed learning such as Project IMPACT in the Philippines. The IMPACT model, with serious adaptations to Liberian needs, was adopted. In Jordan and Nepal, national objectives regarding vocational education were not congruent with local aspirations--enrollments were low. In Thailand, the Hill tribes found the national literacy program irrelevant to their opium growing industry.

4. Be assured of realistic incentive systems for project beneficiaries.

Evidence: During the Kenya Radio Correspondence Education Project teachers were motivated by professional promotion and salary increase they would receive upon successfully completing the course. The National budget however could not support the salary increase of several thousand teachers who participated in the project.

CULTURAL FIT

The data indicate that:

1. Cultural factors make a difference to the success or failure of projects.
2. These cultural factors are identifiable.
 - Religious factors (in Afghanistan, inclusion of Moslem elements in the curriculum was important);
 - Language differences (an important element in the Afghanistan program was the use of two local languages; the Paraguay program successfully introduced elementary education in Guarani);
 - Sex and age roles (Thailand Mobile Trade Training Units notably successful in reaching youth and rural women);
 - Differences in prestige and rank;
 - Cultural values.

Lessons learned are:

1. In project design, set up joint host country-donor committees for project development and implementation to ensure that cultural factors are respected throughout the life of the project.

Evidence: In Liberia a committee redesigned the Improved Efficiency of Learning Project to be acceptable to rural people. In Cameroon, a committee ensured that education programs were conducted in both national languages.

2. Make sure educational achievement is rewarded by recognized credentials. Tie educational innovations into the formal education system.

Evidence: Project IMPACT provides an example of the lack of good recognition of educational achievement. In the Kenya radio distance teaching project, on the other hand, teachers received step increases and pay raises.

3. Make sure any change in the role of teachers and students is well understood and acceptable to teachers and the community served.

Evidence: Students transferred out of Project IMPACT because its innovations were not well accepted.

4. Recognize that cultural patterns can vary at national, regional, and local levels.

Evidence: A literacy program that worked successfully in the Thai lowlands had poor enrollments and high dropout in hill areas. The Thailand Mobile Training Unit program was designed to dovetail with traditional work patterns of women, rural children, and small farmers.

5. Use local host country social scientists and institutions in project design, implementation, and evaluation.

Evidence: Rural curriculum development in Cameroon was designed and tested by local social scientists. Project IMPACT lacked this kind of planning and evaluation. Radio Farm Forum in Nigeria (1967) successfully used culturally recognizable situations, local languages and local actors to teach educational concepts. Educational television programming in Ivory Coast was done entirely in Ivory Coast by the evaluation unit created with the Ministry of Primary Education and Educational Television.

POLITICAL FIT

Evidence from several studies (e.g., Kenya, Korea, Nepal, Paraguay, Thailand, Ivory Coast) indicates that positive impacts are produced by projects that take political concerns into account. Evidence from three studies (Afghanistan, Ecuador, Cameroon) show that negative results followed a lack of political awareness.

The evidence suggests that:

- a. There are political barriers to development,
- b. Education is inherently political in nature.

Thus, our project strategy should:

1. Ensure that project purposes and goals agree with national aspirations by developing broad bases of political support in national, regional, and local groups and by involving participants as early as possible in making decisions about the project. In Korea the curriculum objectives were

validated by comparing them with the constitution of Korea. In Nepal, project goals were taken from two national policy documents. In Afghanistan, the evaluation suggests that the Faculty of Education, established at the Kabul University by TCCU, was disbanded because the project did not take into account political interests in the Ministry of Education and Kabul University.

2. Establish an information network to inform participants and other interested parties about project activities--USAID may be the hub of a network at the beginning of a project. In an African country, a relevant central government office was surprised to discover an interesting rural development project two years after it had started. In Afghanistan, the USAID mission did little to involve or inform the government about planning the Afghan Demographic Studies and the contractor had to travel to Kabul to explain the project to Ministry of Planning officials.

TECHNOLOGICAL FIT

Appropriate educational technologies include both hardware technologies, such as radio and print, and "technologies of instruction," such as instructional systems design (Korea), programmed teaching (Philippines Project Impact) and distance teaching (Kenya and Korea).

1. The way technological considerations are optimally treated depends on the newness of the technology in the society. If new, a period of preparation of intended users is very desirable, to generate familiarity with, and mastery of, the technology and its particular use. If, instead, it is a modification in the educational use of current technologies, the reeducation process is inherently different, but even more complex.

In Korea, the five-year development process, using numerous demonstration classrooms throughout the country, served to demystify the new set of technologies. In Zaire, a sophisticated technology was rapidly introduced, and collapsed for lack of a maintenance capability.

The effort to re-popularize radio, as a major instructional tool, illustrates the second point. Wider adoption of the break-throughs in instructional radio in recent years (e.g., Nicaragua and Thailand "radio math", Honduras and Gambia rural health instruction) face the barrier of earlier patterns of ineffectual or trivial use of radio.

2. In feasibility analysis, improved data must be developed on the recurrent costs of technological elements, including replacement and maintenance after the donor has left, and the affordability of replication. In Ivory Coast's ETV project, the rapid introduction into rural areas required the use of high-cost battery power; the result was an overall recurrent cost beyond easy affordability. Mobile vans are parked around the world for lack of gasoline and spare parts.

3. Success in maintaining an educational technology is often dependent on how central its educational function has been designed to be; ancillary, supplementary functions rarely induce effective use and maintenance. On the other hand, the central though not exclusive use of radio and programmed instruction in Korea ensured their use and maintenance.

4. The introduction of new technology for instruction requires adequate adaptation, demonstration, and information diffusion within a country to promote its acceptance and use. The difficulties in sustaining local acceptance faced by Project Impact may be traced in part to insufficient adaptation to local values about the character of schooling. A subsequent, related project in Liberia has made fundamental adaptations based on local values (teachers are used, not peer instructors; the project training will operate in existing national institutions, the teacher training colleges).

5. The educational technology that is selected certainly depends on available local infrastructure. Kenya's radio correspondence project took advantage of the very good postal and radio broadcasting capabilities in the country.

6. Technology will play a rapidly increasing role in education, and major commitments must be made as sensibly as possible. Nations, therefore, need to obtain good independent advice on the viability of technological options in their own environment, to be less dependent on industrial salesmen and technological experience from developed countries. In such analyses, there must be a recognition of the multiple criteria appropriately used by developing country decision-makers: technological, socio-economic, political, and cultural--all impacting on technological choice.

A.I.D. agencies have a responsibility to encourage such host country expertise and leadership. They can also provide the specialized expertise needed to analyze new technological options. Such advice should be provided whether or not associated with specific foreign assistance projects, given the growing importance of technology. Korea illustrates both sides. KEDI's failure with a very new technology, the tethered balloon, can be traced to inadequate analysis of its compatibility with local climatic conditions. On the other hand, within their areas of competence, both KEDI and the Korean Institute for Science and Technology ("KIST") provided capability for Korea itself to make reasoned educational decisions in a wide range of development projects. This is the surest way to ensure a technological fit in an ever-changing world.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The the existing A.I.D. policy regarding participation should be followed more religiously so that design, implementation and evaluation involve host country institutions.
2. That projects not be funded unless there is evidence of participation in the earliest design stages.
3. That funds be provided to pay for participation of local nationals at appropriate stages of project development.

APPENDIX D.4

GROUP IV

WORKSHOP ON REPLICABILITY AND SPREAD

The Question: What can A.I.D. do to replicate positive aspects of its experience and not replicate negative aspects of its experience?

Introduction

In distinguishing between replicability and spread, the group defined replicability as a more conscious directed effort to apply effective approaches to new projects in other countries, sectors and disciplines. Spread refers to extension or dissemination within the same country or contiguous area.

Some preliminary concerns of the group:

1. Replicability requires better analysis of previous experience than is usually available. Project components (e.g., technical packages, project processes, personnel, context) should be disaggregated and their role in achieving success or failure assessed as part of determining the replicability of an experience.

2. Most projects are replications of some type; i.e., replications of U.S. approaches or styles, some successful, some not. (The Afghanistan program was an example of a fairly straight transfer of U.S. experience which appears less successful than programs based

on U.S. experiences but adapted to local circumstances. Replication for replication's sake is not the point, but replication as a tool for improving effectiveness and efficiency requires much more attention than it has received to date.

3. While generating lots of talk and increased interest in a period of tight resources, replication of positive aspects of A.I.D. projects and programs seems to be no one's responsibility, nor is it effectively dealt with in design, evaluation or agency information system.

4. There was very little in the 12 documents reviewed that related directly to replication, the exception being Project Impact in the Philippines. The Nicaragua math project was also mentioned in subsequent group discussion. However, replication of both of these is just beginning and it is too soon to predict how they will work.

5. There was information in a number of the studies regarding spread. Project Impact was attempting to convince the World Bank to let them spend money on modules as opposed to text books leading to increased spread. The Thailand program now covers the entire country but recurrent costs are a problem. In Kenya the high number of teachers who became qualified and entitled to higher salaries created an unanticipated demand on government funds as the project spread.

Requirements to Effectively Disseminate Positive Experiences

In order for A.I.D. to replicate the positive aspects of its experience and not replicate negative aspects, A.I.D. needs to know

about what worked, what didn't work and why. Most A.I.D. evaluation documents and assessments provide inadequate documentation. In addition, the information that may have been recorded somewhere is not synthesized or easily accessible. There is even less information about why something worked than what worked. Too often the people dimensions of projects and programs (A.I.D. personnel, host country implementors, contractors) are not explicitly addressed even though people may have been the driving factor behind project success. This could affect a successful or unsuccessful replication elsewhere. Also, documentation of processes and project environment (including physical, social, cultural, institutional and economic) receive much less attention than the technical components. Assuming that A.I.D. can overcome this lack of knowledge of what worked and why, the next critical limiting factor becomes developing improved information dissemination and communication mechanisms. Information dissemination currently is generally ad hoc and informal; it is concentrated within sector specialties and within Regional Bureaus or parts of Regional Bureaus. A.I.D. needs to focus much more seriously on information dissemination within A.I.D., between donors, among contractors and among developing country decision-makers.

Policy Recommendations

1. The A.I.D. Sector Councils should have responsibility for identifying replicable experiences and disseminating this information.

2. A.I.D. needs to do what it says it is doing. Documenting the implementation process will require real formative evaluation. Creating real formative evaluation will, in many cases, require rolling design, more general implementation plans at the Project Paper stage, more extensive implementation plans at project start up, and then revisions on a regular basis. These elements become even more critical as longer time frames for projects are considered.

3. With regard to replication, conscious, serious attention must be addressed to the Agency's information dissemination system. Information flows will have to be vertical, lateral (across sectors), external (including other donors). S & T/DIU has made a useful start, but more must be done to get useful, tailored, relevant, down to earth information in the hands of people who need it. A.I.D. perhaps underestimates the importance of site visits and travel, informal interactions at meetings and focused workshops of practitioners, including contractors and host country counterparts. There is no substitute for direct contact among principals involved in program implementation.

4. A.I.D. needs to give more attention to strategies for more cost effective approaches (especially in basic education). Private sector (consulting firms, PVO's and universities) approaches to education and training should be examined.

5. A.I.D. design procedures should require a review of past experience and the explicit identification of lessons learned (what works and what does not).

Additional Ideas, Suggestions, Unresolved Issues, Comments

1. A.I.D. should carefully assess pilot project efforts so that, if successful, there will be resources (national, A.I.D., and other donors) available for replication and spread.

2. Projects that think about possible success and replicability at the beginning (e.g., Project Impact) of the effort stand a better chance of being replicated.

3. The greater the success, the greater the demand for spread and generally the greater the cost burdens to maintain programs. Korea and Nigeria cases where GNP rose differ from Kenya, Thailand and Jordan which put more stress on the country to keep the program working. While predicting the economic future is difficult, early consideration of recurrent cost issues should be a part of replication decisions.

APPENDIX D.5

GROUP V

DESIGN, IMPLEMENTATION, EVALUATION AND FEEDBACK

A major objective of the workshop, as stated in the guidelines is to suggest how the design and impact of A.I.D. education projects can be improved. Working Group Five's topic, therefore, is of particular significance if not the topic of primary concern. Each component of the topic has its own set of issues, but time and space limitations compelled the group to focus on project design, accepting the fact that plans for implementation, feedback and evaluation, which of necessity are incorporated in the project paper, constitute an integral part of project design. Accordingly, the group identified major issues related to project design and made an effort to indicate possible ways of dealing with them by drawing upon the findings of the impact studies and from the experience of its members. Drawing upon the above, policy and strategy recommendations were formulated.

Relevant issues include the following:

1. The U.S. may possess some comparative advantages to contribute to LDC education development, but there is little firm evidence to support this hypothesis.
2. Scope and Flexibility of Education Projects. Education projects should focus upon certain priority areas, using

criteria such as their impact upon health, agriculture, equity, productivity, host country needs and participation, etc.

3. Costs. The potential economic impact of education projects should be estimated. An effort should be made to determine how they can be made more cost-effective. A.I.D. must deal with host country fiscal constraints and recurrent project costs.
4. Institution Building. With funding limitations, A.I.D. should undertake long-term institution-building projects in education only when certain criteria are met. High among these criteria are impact upon development priorities, particularly infrastructure for growth of private enterprise.
5. Host Government Commitment to Educational Reform. A prerequisite to some A.I.D. education sector projects should require a prior host government undertaking for educational reform.

Education goals for A.I.D. projects should be derived from agreed-upon A.I.D. strategy and purposes in the education sector.

Some goals evident from analysis of the studies are:

1. Establishment of cost-effective education systems and networks consistent with the experience of other countries and earlier projects.

2. Improvement in the management and planning capacity of host countries to develop effective policy and programs.
3. Positive response to educational projects to the requirements of development in other sectors, e.g. agriculture, population, health, energy.
4. Strengthening of educational institutions and resources, e.g. libraries, translation of materials, laboratory equipment, etc.
5. Increased transfer of technology and improved levels of training in science and technology, management skills and vocational education.
6. Involvement of the resources, expertise and capital of the U.S. and host country private sector.
7. Expanded inclusion of women among beneficiaries of education.

Key Findings and Conclusions

The review of the 12 Impact Evaluations and desk studies revealed instances where successes or failures appeared to be related to design and implementation approaches and procedures. The following are cited as examples.

Projects planned for sufficient duration were more successful than those terminated too soon. Where innovation is involved, the process seems to call for extended time and continuous assessment to assure the final product serves perceived needs.

Attention is needed to economic productivity and cost effectiveness, a design specification not included when many of the

projects appraised were initiated. Inputs could be measured against outputs in order that host governments and A.I.D. could calculate a rate of return on the investment. Designs sometimes overlooked recurrent costs. In particular, thought should be given in project design to ways in which host governments could meet these costs as A.I.D. assistance was phased out.

The assumption is usually made that projects are designed within the context of national development plans to which they are intended to contribute. Designers might consider making specific reference to development plans and education sector policies and programs in particular. It has seemed easy to overlook potential and desirable linkages with indigenous institutions already active in the particular education field addressed by the project. Ways in which the project could serve as a catalyst in developing local initiative, participation and financial support would be useful to cite as guidance for those administering the project.

A factor in project success appeared to be the identification of very specific target groups and beneficiaries. Broader participation of host country governments and institutions as well as A.I.D. contractors and other foreign participants in the project design process was considered beneficial, even though the limitations of such involvement are recognized.

Designs which were prepared in great detail were thought to lead to inflexibility in implementing the project in some instances. Feedback mechanisms incorporated in designs would have helped project manager and contractors undertake mid-course adjustments. The use of A.I.D. leverage to help institute reforms in the educational system was evident in some projects and it was felt desirable if designers gave consideration to this issue in all education projects.

In some countries, such as the Primary and Secondary School Project conducted over a 23-year period in Afghanistan, more attention to recruiting or providing advisors with extensive knowledge of the socio-cultural setting and local languages would have been desirable and strengthened project impact. Textbooks and other educational materials for projects that transplanted American models were deemed less successful than those adapted to suit the indigenous society and culture. Host country and A.I.D. barriers were thought to impede contractor management and implementation of projects.

Host countries raised the issue of "education for what?" when it was not clear in the project design that there was linkage with development activities in other sectors.

There would be value in devising means to integrate the various kinds of evaluations that were conducted on projects, including, for example, annual mission project evaluations, management reviews of contractor performance, consultant studies, audits, etc. Mid-course evaluations and management review were not used in all cases to adjust project implementation or modify the project design where appropriate. If the project design had provided for use of control groups not associated with the program, evaluation of innovative or experimental projects might have been strengthened.

Policy Implications and Recommendations

During the project design process host country policy, funding and structural constraints must be systematically analyzed. This will permit the project to be designed to overcome or reduce the effect of the constraints. Alternatively, through other actions, steps can be planned to ease the constraints.

In countries where A.I.D. has limited funding and personnel, priority should be assigned to formulation of a long-term strategy for development requirements. Education projects should be carefully selected from the range of those requested by host governments in order to assure optimum flexibility and long-term impact. For example, if a country's high priority is to raise the quality of rural life, an increased allocation of resources may be required which promises improvement in rural education and training.

Education project design should provide sufficient time to achieve stated objectives, but retain flexibility to adjust activities to meet the changing needs of a country. Projects involving innovation should especially be funded for longer periods to assure success of the final product.

Projects should be shaped to be cost-effective, paying due attention to the requirement for recurring costs and planning for the host government to finance the activity when A.I.D. support is terminated.

Design of education projects should consider their function as well as their components of the education sector strategy for that country as well as their contribution in the development process. Linkages to local institutions already involved in that field should be expressly provided for as should means through which they can be integrated into the educational system.

Beneficiaries and target groups are usually identified in project design, but often are not involved in it. Those to be involved in implementing the project should, if possible participate in the project design, e.g. contractor personnel, Peace Corps volunteers, host country institutions.

Design of education projects should avoid great detail, particularly with reference to tasks to be performed and contractor requirements, since this may lead to inflexibility or scattering of effort. Where appropriate, consideration should be given to ways in which the project can exert leverage for educational reforms.

Adjustments in implementation of projects can be made more systematically if feedback mechanisms are built into project design.

A.I.D. should design activities in a way to assure that contractor personnel will have knowledge of the socio-cultural setting and local languages. Caution should be exercised not to transplant American institutions, textbook models and curriculum without adapting them to indigenous society and culture.

In formulating goals and purposes, criteria should include consideration of the cultural and social setting, local economy, host country educational system and strategy, overall A.I.D. policy and strategy, sector policy guidance, the capabilities and limitations of local institutions, the potential that a project can overcome constraints, etc.

In designing and implementing education projects, A.I.D. should seek linkages with development activities in other sectors. A.I.D. education specialists should play a more active and central role in designing the educational and training components of projects in other sectors. This may mean that the Agency must have available specialists in education who have the technical competence to provide such advice.

Efforts should be made to correlate the findings and recommendations of all evaluations.