


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**COOPERATIVE AGREEMENT ON HUMAN SETTLEMENTS
AND NATURAL RESOURCE SYSTEMS ANALYSIS**

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
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REPORT ON THE TUNISIA MISSION
January 10-27, 1983

by

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February 7, 1983

AREA DEVELOPMENT COOPERATIVE AGREEMENT

Clark University/Institute for Development Anthropology/
Agency for International Development (S&T/MD)

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1. Scope of Work.

The consultants were asked to provide USAID/Tunis with their assessment of the GoT position on regional development and the relevance of that position to a proposed five-year strategy statement for AID participation in Tunisian development. The assessment involved considerations of the recently created Commissariat Général au Développement Régional (CGDR), established as "an integral part of our national planning organization...[that] will be endowed with necessary material and human means for improving and strengthening regional development planning... [T]he role of the Commissariat is to elaborate an overall strategy for regional development whose principal aspects will be described once data related to the Sixth Plan regionalization are presented" (VIth Plan for Economic and Social Development, 1982-1986, Vol. 1, p. 187). The consultants were asked also to review relationships between USAID/Tunis and the Office de Développement pour la Tunisie Centrale (ODTC), regarding the latter's effectiveness in contributing to the economic development of Central Tunisia. Finally, the consultants were asked to consider the potential contributions to regional planning and development of several other government and private sector organizations.

The mission consisted of the following activities:

1. Meetings with officials and staff members of ODTC, CGDR, CEGOS, CNEA, Office de Planification of the Ministry of Plan and Finance, Office de Planification of the Ministry of Agriculture, CERES, Office Silvo-Pastorale du Nord-Ouest (OSPNO), and Ecole Supérieure d'Agriculture de Kef (ESAK).
2. Discussions with USAID officers.
3. Field visits to dry land farms, privately irrigated farms, and publicly irrigated farms.
4. Examination of the relevant literature.

2. Narrative Report.

2.1 Meeting with M. Taoufik RABAH, President Directeur General of CEGOS-Tunisie (Société Arabo-Africaine de Management d'Organisation et de Formation), and M. Mohsen CHAARI. CEGOS-Tunisie is a private sector management consulting organization, which has been contracted to ODTC to provide training to the Evaluation and Planning Unit (EPU) on the utilization of the Apple II computer. M. Mohsen Chaari is the AID-funded senior consultant to EPU.

M. Rabah refers to himself as a "psycho-sociologue economiste" and management specialist. He feels that regional development will work only if it is predicated on specific local studies and analyses, which, presumably, he feels that CEGOS is in a position to undertake. "National planners have begun to learn," he said, "that the 'regional' must be liberated from the 'national'. Development efforts which may have been successful in one area cannot automatically be grafted onto some other area." The capacity to undertake these localized studies is not well developed in Tunisia, and the official recognition of their importance is not yet institutionalized. Rabah insisted that underdevelopment in Tunisia is not a function of a lack of finance; the donor organizations are quite prepared to supply the requisite funding. What is lacking is the analytic understanding of the local scene combined with poor management practice, both "gestion et administrative." He noted that in fact regional development has always been possible in principle, since the Governors already have the authority to act directly in the name of the President. That is, the Governors can act independently of the representatives of the Ministers within their gouvernorats. There are few instances, however, in which a Governor has taken the initiative to elaborate a development program for his gouvernorat, ostensibly because they do not have effective local capacities to identify and design such programs based on sound local information and analysis, or to implement and manage them.

2.2 Meeting with M. Mohamed GHANOUCI, Directeur de la Planification Générale au Ministère du Plan et des Finances, and M. Mohsen CHAARI. M. Ghanouchie outlined the objectives of the Sixth Plan (1982-1986):

(a) Employment generation. Tunisia has to create jobs to deal with the 325,000 persons currently underemployed plus the 170,000 persons that are entering the labor market each year. The situation is potentially aggravated by the recession in Europe, which is reducing and, in some places, ending the need for migrant labor. Approximately 350,000 Tunisians are currently employed in France. Although it is unlikely that they will have to leave France, the European labor market will not continue to absorb guest workers from Tunisia and other seemingly labor surplus countries. [Note that recent political events may also have a negative impact on European receptivity to labor migrants from North African and the Near East. Several Tunisians remarked to us on the recent visa requirements and stringent personal and baggage examinations at West European ports of entry.]

(b) Reinforcement of "au'o-développement", by:

- import substitution;
- ending Tunisia's dependence on external financial aid.

(c) Redistribution via regional development. While all previous Plans noted the importance of assuring a minimum income for every Tunisian, and indicated the desirability of evening out regional differences in income, production, and quality of life, with a rhetorical stress on avoiding an investment concentration in Tunis and along the Eastern Coastal region, the Sixth Plan specifically calls for efforts to coordinate the various rural and regional development activities (such as road construction, potable water delivery, rural electrification) to increase their effectiveness. The Sixth Plan has identified the Gouvernorats of the West and South, those which are most deprived, as having priority for the investment of public and private funds. It is

important, he said, to note that a good deal of progress has been made over the years. At the time of Independence, three-quarters of the Tunisian population was classified as poor. Today, only a fifth of the population is so classified.

M. Ghanouchi reiterated a point that had been made by M. Rabah, that Tunisia is a small country, and therefore the central government is fully cognizant of the problems of the interior. It is not entirely clear what the implications of this observation are. One possibility is that regional planning can be carried out in the absence of localized studies, since the peculiarities of the regions are already recognized at the center. This interpretation would seem to contradict, however, M. Rabah's insistence on local study and analysis as essential to effective regional planning and implementation. An alternative implication is that while "decentralization" calls for focusing investments in the more deprived regions, it does not necessarily call for local participation in the conceptualization and identification of priority intervention. Finally, M. Ghanouchi may be offering an opinion that decentralization should not require elaborate planning facilities at the regional level. This latter interpretation might reflect a concern for a potential diminution of jurisdiction for planning at the level of the Central Administration.

2.3 Meeting with M. Abdelmajid SLAMA, Directeur Général du Centre National des Etudes Agricoles (CNEA), M. ZGHIDI, a CNEA sociologist, and M. Mohsen CHAARI. According to M. Slama, ODTIC's problems stem from an unreasonable expectation that the Office would provide concrete results quickly. This derived from political rather than technical considerations. ODTIC was established in response to a perceived political situation; hence, the direction of the Office was assigned to a political specialist from Ministry of Plan rather than to a technical specialist from the Ministry of Agriculture. It would have been better for the Office had expectations been lowered and ODTIC been accorded sufficient time to get itself organized. I inter-

pret this to mean that while the substantive findings of the 1981 evaluation were not in error, there was inadequate appreciation of the political context and of the inevitable "growing pains" that any such new structure would have experienced. In other words, the evaluation was premature.

The climate is now favorable for a restart of the CTDA project. It should remain modest, emphasizing its experimental nature, and should avoid large or global planning. The optimal role for USAID is not to support design work--especially as the World Bank is doing that--but to finance small pilot projects and training.

M. Zghidi noted that it is perhaps more opportune now for a U.S. research institution or university to participate in planning for regional development because the CGDR constitutes a counterpart organization, in which the bulk of the work would be carried out by Tunisians. Part of the problem with the University of Wisconsin effort was that there was no institutional structure on the Tunisian side which could effectively collaborate with the expatriates. Hence, the work was viewed as alien, as unresponsive to the genuine needs for Tunisian regional development. With the new Commissariat Général au Développement Régional being charged with the responsibility for regional planning, modest technical assistance from the United States would be appreciatively received on a collegial rather than hierarchical basis.

M. Chaari added that there is a risk of competition between the Ministry of the Interior and the CGDR, and the CGDR might yet abort if it doesn't take appropriate account of the realities of the GoT administrative organization [and, we might add, political structure]. Nonetheless, it does provide the official and appropriate arena for planning for regional development, and hence M. Chaari was reinforcing M. Zghidi's suggestions for collaboration with a U.S. institution.

2.4 Meeting with M. Mondher GARGOURI, Commissaire Général du CGDR, and with M. Mohsen CHAARI. [Note: see also Dorothy Young's memorandum on the January 6, 1983 meetings with Mr. Phippard, M. Gargouri, and herself, January 7, 1983.]

M. Gargouri noted that the CGDR was created in August 1981, and its first activity was to work on the Sixth Plan. Despite the emphasis on regional development, only 9 percent of public investment (other than in agriculture) specified in the 6th Plan is targeted at rural areas. Regional planning has always suffered from a series of weaknesses in addition to under-financing:

(a) There is no coordination among projects, resulting in a lack of coherence. Roads, water, electrification activities are implemented without any attempt to determine how they might optimally support each other.

(b) Planning has been an annual activity, responding to administrative perception of immediate problems, rather than a long-term exercise attempting to meet clearly specified long-term goals. In recent years, planners' attention has been devoted to such immediate issues as:

- ° creating employment for persons who have fled from Libya;
- ° responding to drought;
- ° responding to floods.

(c) Infrastructural projects--like potable water, roads, rural electrification--have been implemented without consideration of their contribution to productivity and to the income of the rural population.

The new approach which CGDR is taking is to elaborate regional development plans which respond to long-term objectives. Three regions have been targeted for attention:

- the Northwest;
- the Center-West (including Kasserine); and
- the South.

These plans will start from analyses of the obstacles to development, that is, from analyses of why these regions have remained deprived despite the overall economic improvements in Tunisia over the past 20 years. Out of these analyses CGDR will elaborate specific development proposals.

M. Gargouri was specifically sensitive to the kinds of policy reforms that are needed to support economic improvements in the deprived regions. He noted the desirability for a slow but steady improvement in the prices paid for agricultural produce as a means of providing more revenue to the rural sectors and to end the farmers' subsidy of the urban sector.

USAID, he noted, could assist the CGDR in achieving its objectives by providing technical assistance--experts--with the requisite methodological and sectoral expertise.

2.5 Meeting with M. Mohsen BOUJBEL, Directeur de la Planification au Ministère de l'Agriculture; M. Bedoui CHEBIL, Direction du Plan, Ministère de l'Agriculture; M. Badr BEN AMAR, Sous Directeur de la Planification, Ministère de l'Agriculture; and M. Mohsen CHAARI. M. Boujbel began the discussion by noting that any development activity must start from and be consistent with the Sixth Plan. He distributed copies of the Ministry of Agriculture's contribution to the formulation of that Plan, which is the responsibility of his office. He then raised what were, to him, the two essential questions:

Will the USAID/Tunisia program continue?

At what level of funding?

We indicated that we had no privileged insights into those questions, which are issues to be worked out between USAID/Tunisia, AID/W, the United States Congress, and the

GoT. M. Ben Amar indicated that there are two areas in which USAID could be particularly helpful to their Planning Office in the Ministry of Agriculture:

(a) They need advanced training in computer science. They have two Apple II computers and plenty of software. But M. Ben Amar feels that they are not getting optimum benefit from the installation because of their limited familiarity with the system. [Note that both the machines are in operation. At least one of the Apples had been down for quite a while, but they have identified a local dealer who was able to put it back into service.]

[Note: Please see Appendix I to this report, our memorandum of 21 January 1983, entitled "Micro-Computers".]

(b) They need technical assistance in Regional Planning. They have been assigned responsibility in this area, yet it is one for which the Ministry of Agriculture has no capacity.

M. Boujbel seconded these suggestions, and added a third:

(c) They need some consulting assistance in how to undertake project evaluation, especially how to do social impact and beneficiary analysis.

We then asked M. Boujbel whether they can draw on the expertise of CNEA. He responded rather obliquely, pointing out that CNEA deals with project "factibility". M. Boujbel considers CNEA as if they were a private research organization, like any other research group. The fact that they are also under the umbrella of the Ministry of Agriculture does not accord them any inherent advantage over any other organization. They are welcome to submit proposals to undertake work for the Planning Office, but we had no sense that the latter would turn to CNEA for assistance.

Commenting on the Evaluation and Planning Unit of ODTC, M. Boujbel said that it is too early to make any judgments about them. The region is a difficult one to attract talented personnel; people don't want to work there.

Finally, he said that USAID does not appreciate how thinly staffed his office is, and therefore how difficult it is for them, having only five officers responsible for some 100 projects, to deal with all the details required by AID.

2.6 Meeting with M. Rachid BOUGATEF, PDG of ODTC, at the ODTC headquarters in Kasserine; Ms. Dorothy YOUNG, M. Chedli Zarg el-AYOUN; and M. Mohsen CHAARI. This was a cautious, correct, and formal introductory meeting. M. Bougatef provided a brief history and overview of the project, and gave us copies of the relevant legislation establishing the Office and a listing of the senior staff. He said that the methodology applied by the University of Wisconsin was inappropriate to the problems of Central Tunisian development, and did not correspond to "our more realistic methodology". The Office has been studying what are the development potentials of the various Delegations within the project region. There have been certain "reticences" about cooperating with the ODTC on the part of local officials, but, he said, we have been patient, and now have good relationships with the local authorities.

M. Bougatef declined to offer any suggestions or guidance for the consultants' mission, saying that he would defer commenting until the debriefing session in several weeks. We assured him that our work was not evaluative, but would focus on identifying areas for potential future collaboration between the Office and USAID.

2.7 Meeting with staff members of Direction Technique Agricole, ODTC: M. Hamadi HASSEN, Chief; M. Beshir KHELIFI, Extension Officer; M. Ahmed ABBES, in charge of Irrigated Perimeter Program; Dr. Robert SMITH, Oregon State University Extension Consultant; M. Mohsen CHAARI, M. Chedli Zarg el-AYOUN. M. Hassen led off the session with a discussion of why Central Tunisia is poor. There are two main groups of causes:

(a) Climatic factors, especially the long, cold winter and the very hot summer.

(b) Human factors--the population is relatively less well-educated than those in other areas; they are remote from the cities; and they are transhumant herders, who need to be sedentarized.

Why, we asked, is sedentarization necessarily beneficial? M. Hassen remarked that financial credits cannot be given to people who are not settled. [He may be referring to the requirement that titled land ownership be demonstrated before a farmer is eligible for certain kinds of financial assistance.] M. el-Ayoun added that since Independence, sedentarization of nomads has been the formal policy of the GoT, and is not a matter for local option.

The discussion then shifted to the paucity of knowledge of the local farmers and local farming systems. Extension agents are trained only to convey information and instructions to the farmers, particularly on the irrigated perimeters. They do not serve as two-way conduits, providing information and understandings derived from the farmers back to the technical services. M. Khelifi asked how extension agents might be sensitized to local needs and rendered more effective thereby. We outlined a simple on-the-job training program which would have extension agents select several farms and undertake written descriptions of what they see: what does the house look like, what does the farm look like, what kinds of tools are employed, who does what, when is labor beyond the household mobilized for work on the farm, etc? These reports would then be read and the extension agents would be encouraged to provide further information and analysis. Both M. Khelifi and Dr. Smith seemed enthusiastic about this approach, and they asked for additional details. These are provided in Section 3A, Recommendations for the ODTC.

2.8 Meeting with staff members of the Evaluation and Planning Unit (EPU), ODTC: M. Mohamed SAKRI, Chief; M. Mokdad MISSAOUI; Mme. M'della BOUAZIZI; M. Mounir BOURAOU; Mr. Russ MORRISON, ex-PCV; M. Mohsen CHAARI, Senior Consultant; and M. Chedli Zarg el-AYOUN. The discussion immediately concentrated on the need for a sociological/social anthropological capacity in the EPU. All of the personnel identify themselves as "economist-statisticians," although Mounir Bouraoui specifically requested additional training in sociology and social anthropology for himself. There was general agreement that the EPU is unable to assure that development efforts in the ODTC are firmly based on the social and ecological realities of the region. They felt that they tend to operate at a high level of abstraction or generalization, and that they need to link their efforts more closely to the farmers, for two reasons: first, they need to understand what are the production objectives of individual farmers; secondly, they need to be able to capture innovative solutions to production problems that emerge from the farmers themselves. To do this, they need to expand their staff either by training current personnel in social analysis, or by appointing Tunisian (preferably) or expatriate social analyst(s), and/or by entering into an institutional relationship with a U.S. organization capable of providing the relevant training and analysis. Our recommendations in response to this discussion are also listed in Section 3A.

2.9 Field visits in Sidi Bou Zid with M. Said N'SIRI, Directeur Régional de l'ODTC and Mayor of Sidi Bou Zid; M. DAOUD, Service Planification et Etudes; M. BOUALEM, Service Administrative et Financier; M. CHEBBI, Puits de Surface; M. ZAGHDAN, Projet ODTC; M. AMRI, Amélioration d'Elevage, M. Mohamed SAKRI, EPU; and M. Chedli Zarg el-AYOUN. We first had a brief discussion at the ODTC subdivision office, mainly concerned with the subsidized costs of water on the public

perimeters. Although there is an intention to gradually reduce the subsidy by increasing the farmers' costs by 2/milleme/m³ annually, the current true cost is at least 300 percent greater than the price charged to users. The true cost--exclusive of the costs of installation and administration--are about 40 milleme/m³, with the farmer paying less than 10 m/m³. According to the recent IBRD Appraisal Mission, 10 of the 12 perimeters in the Sidi Bou Zid delegation are potentially profitable at the full cost (they recommended dropping the other two). M. Sakri feels that the irrigated farms would be more profitable if the farmers would produce tomatoes, potatoes and peppers, rather than carrots, which are a glut on the market. He did not know why farmers resisted cultivating these supposedly more profitable crops. Everyone noted that there are a number of private irrigated farms operating at a profit in which the farmers sustain all the costs of production. (This is not quite true, since the GoT heavily subsidizes the installation of the irrigation infrastructure on private farms.)

We then visited both a public perimeter, in which a farmer had 12.5 hectares under irrigation, primarily in fruit and nut trees (olive, pistachio, pear, apple), and a private perimeter. The latter, run by three brothers, is obviously a show piece. The farmers were prepared for the visit with a set of posters displaying the costs and the sources of funding for the operation. The total costs were considerable, distributed as follows for the borehole, pump, and conduits:

14,000 Dinars from their own resources
8,000 Dinars subsidy
<u>39,000</u> Dinars loan
61,400 Dinars (ca. \$100,000).

The well is 186 meters deep, equipped with a large electric pump delivering 30 liters/second. Irrigation is by pipe, in which the pipe lengths readily snap apart to deliver water precisely where it is needed. This contrasts with the public irrigation perimeter, in which the water is carried by fixed concrete canals. Flooding under this latter

system would seem to be less precise and more wasteful. We did not, however, see any evidence of intentional destruction or sabotage of the canals, which we had been alerted to in Tunis. The farmers on this private field had installed three plastic quonset-type greenhouses, which were used for tomato production in the cold season.

From this farm we went to Djilma where we picked up the Delegue, and then visited another large farm whose proprietor laid on a splendid lunch. This farmer has considerable holdings, several tractors, and at least two pickup trucks. He told us that he owns over a thousand sheep. The lunch, with all the officials as guests, was a classic instance of wasta in action. It is obvious that there are some very affluent farmers in Central Tunisia, who have the capital, labor, and influence to run successful operations. To what extent are ODTC funds and effort expended in support of the already affluent? Is the scale of these operations such that they are less efficient, less employment-generating, than smaller operations, in which public investment might receive a higher return? It seems clear that ODTC has not begun to ask these questions, let alone begun to answer them, and use these answers to generate policy.

Muneera Salem-Murdock, who spent time with the women on the various farms, noted that on the first farm visited, the 12.5 hectare publicly irrigated perimeter, most of the labor was provided by the women of the household (the farmer's wife, sisters, and daughters). On the large private farm where we had lunch, the women claim not to do any field labor. What is the point at which women cease to constitute a source of field labor? Are there Islamic values in keeping women out of the fields, as soon as it becomes economically feasible to do so?

2.10 Field visits to Rouhia with M. M. BELGACEM, in charge of irrigated perimeters, and to Rouhia with M. Hani SALAH, sub-division director. In Rouhia we visited the site of a proposed 120 hectare perimeter, where two boreholes are in

construction tapping a deep (ca. 180 meter) aquifer. Because the first borehole is producing saline water, the output from the two boreholes will be mixed in a reservoir before distribution. We examined an initial listing of the properties currently on the proposed perimeter, some 180 holdings (although not necessarily 180 distinct owners). The listing also indicates the presence of a house, stable or well on the land and its supposed surface area. These seem clearly to be inaccurate, done without any cadastral survey. We were told that a more detailed and, ostensibly, more accurate survey will be made by Reforme Agraire before the actual reallocation of land on the perimeter. The stated objective is 60 two-hectare plots under irrigation. However, the engineer said that there probably will not be sufficient water to irrigate more than 100 hectares, so any farmers who elect not to participate will in fact be benefiting the others, by allowing them to have more water on less land.

We visited one of the farmers who has elected not to participate. He said his holding was approximately three hectares--"we don't actually measure our lands," he said--and was irrigated from a shallow (ca. 15 meter) well by a small pump at the upper end of the fields, and then gravity fed down the slope. Labor is provided by himself, his wife and two daughters. He said that he has no need to join in the scheme, since his own well provides enough water throughout the year. Why, he said, should he then purchase water from ODTC? The engineer told us that the boreholes will draw down all the surface wells by depleting the shallow aquifer. The 13 farmers on the perimeter who own their own wells will actually lose their autonomy, but if they do not join up from the beginning, they will not necessarily be able to participate later, since there may not be sufficient water from the new boreholes.

Several questions come to mind from this situation:

(a) Are those farmers with their own wells adequately aware of the consequences of the propose perimeter on their abilities to continue irrigation?

(b) If the new system threatens the viability of small, independent holdings on which enterprising farmers have invested capital and labor on improving the land and its productivity (constructing the well, installing the pump, building the distribution system), is that "good development"?

(c) Will net productivity increase under the new system? According to studies by Dr. Attiya, the small farms irrigated from shallow wells are more productive and more cost effective than those on the public irrigated perimeters.

We discussed some of these issues with M. Salah. He agreed with the above observations, and pointed out that the peasant farmers are also reluctant to participate in marketing cooperatives proposed by the ODTC. Noting that the marketing centers constructed by ODTC are not being used, he said that the farmers are hesitant to join cooperatives because of the bad experiences they recall from Ben Salah's forced cooperative movement of the late 1960s. [For additional insight into this period, see R. M. Fraenkel, "The Collectivization Experience in Tunisia," June 1975.]

Returning to Tunis, we noticed some dozen or so animal traction teams (one horse plows, two horse plows, a horse-mule team, and a pair of yoked oxen) working in a single field. The farmer explained that normally he rents a tractor to prepare the field for planting. This year, however, because of the heavy rains, the fields are too water-logged to permit preparation by a heavy tractor (an observation we later confirmed by seeing three tractors bogged down in a field just south of Tunis). Fortunately, he said, his neighbors still owned animal-drawn plows, and they have joined together to prepare the field. He said "fortunately," because he had already sown the field, and if the ground were not opened up he would risk loss of the entire season. Some other farmers, he noted, will not get a crop in this year, since the availability of animal-drawn equipment has declined markedly with the emergence of a network of tractor rental and maintenance stations.

2.11 Meeting in Beja with M. HARZALLA, Director of the Office Silvo-Pastorale du Nord-Ouest; Mr. James SUTTIE, FAO rangelands consultant; and M. Chedli Zarg el-AYOUN. M. Harzalla began with an outline of the purpose, scope and methodology of the Office. The underlying rationale for the Office is environmental rather than directly developmental, an attempt to limit and, if possible, reverse the siltation of the reservoir behind the dam.

The region is divided into two main ecological zones:

(a) The northern zone, with 1000 mm/year rainfall, mountainous, forested, and densely populated (ca. 50 persons/km²). This region suffers from heavy erosion; low production (and therefore low revenue and poor quality of life for the rural population); poorly adapted cereals production and poorly adapted extensive herding; water shortages in the summer dry season, despite the high winter rainfall; and over-cutting of fuelwood both for home consumption and for sale as charcoal.

(b) The southern zones, averaging about 450 mm/year rainfall.

The major objectives of the Office are:

- (a) antierosion;
- (b) intensification of agriculture;
- (c) improved earnings and quality of life.

The region emphasizes monocultivation of cereals and extensive herding. The project is attempting to change agricultural practices to those which are better adapted to the environment, namely the intensification of herding through the establishment of permanent pastures, and the intensification of agriculture via orchards (which also protect the soil), industrial production of tobacco, and vegetable production, especially potatoes where microirrigation is possible. All these will lead to improved earnings by the rural producers.

M. Harzalla made a specific point of distinguishing their method of intervention from that of the ODTG. The OSPNO approach is to divide the region into "micro-zones" of approximately 5,000 hectares each. These zones are then analyzed both environmentally and socially. The study team is composed of the following specializations:

Sociologist - M. Mejri
Ecologist/soil scientist - FAO consultant
Pastoral specialist - Mr. J. Suttie, FAO consultant
Forester
Veterinarian - a French Père Blanc
Zootechnician.

(M. Harzalla regrets that the team does not include an economist, "which we need badly".) The study team produces a monograph on the microzone, describing its physical and social characteristics, with an emphasis on local organization and land tenure. They then try to organize the peasants at the level of the douar (a spatial and kin-based grouping composed of about 20 extended family households or gourbi). Note that the douar has no official standing in the Tunisian administrative system, in which the smallest recognized unit is the village led by a State-appointed 'omda). Within each microzone, the Office establishes a Centre d'Intervention, including access to veterinary medicine, genetic improvement, fertilizer, and marketing. They have been in operation for one year in nine microzones, and plan to add six microzones annually.

M. Harzalla had to leave the meeting due to a previous unmovable commitment (we arrived quite a bit later than the scheduled time), and the remainder of the discussions were held with the FAO consultant James Suttie, a British rangelands specialist with a good deal of East African experience. He noted the irony in being labelled a "pastoraliste", since there is almost no true pasture, i.e., rangeland--in the region. Almost all of the herding is on cropped fields. According to Mr. Suttie, a

major contributor to soil erosion is the use of heavy tractor-drawn equipment which are poorly adapted to the steep slopes. Drivers will not plow across the slope for fear of overturning the tractors. Hence plowing is done vertically, parallel to the slope, which creates steep trenches that accelerate soil loss in the rainy season. The best solution, he indicated, would be a return to animal traction, but it is not politically feasible to argue against mechanical traction. SONAM enjoys a good deal of powerful support.

2.12 Meeting with Dr. Mohamed BEN SAANYA, Director, Ecole Supérieure d'Agriculture du Kef (ESAK), and M. Chedli Zarg el-AYOUN. Dr. Ben Saanya, young, enthusiastic, and innovative, has just assumed the direction of the ESAK, and is presiding over its shift from a two-year junior college type agriculture program to a full four-year undergraduate college. ESAK has been involved in short-term annually-funded research activities, but he feels that it would be more productive were the school to engage in longer term programmatic activities to allow for longitudinal exploration of a number of important issues. He noted that his own administrative experience has been in Planning, and that he was part of the initial push toward genuine regional development. He is especially interested in linking the social and agricultural sciences, and thinks that ESAK will constitute an excellent arena within which such linkages could be carried out. He made a number of points, of which the following are outstanding:

(a) We do not have an analytic understanding of the Tunisian farmer. We do not know what are his incentives and what are his production objectives. The Fifth Plan was the first to even consider the farmer, perhaps because that Plan had input from American-trained agricultural economists. Agricultural research in Tunisia is entirely from the top down. There is no interaction between the researchers and the farmers. Dr. Ben Saanya would like to have a farming systems unit at ESAK.

(b) We need to do research on low energy technology, especially animal traction. If he could find expert technical assistance, he would hire the necessary support staff, and devote a 20 hectare plot to experimentation. [I mentioned that the real experts on animal traction and low energy farming were the Amish, but that there are also others specializing in this approach to production, such as Wendell Berry, and the New Farmer group.]

(c) We are organizing a conference for agricultural extension workers, in which the conference leader will be a farmer. (The participants have not been informed of this. Dr. Ben Saanya did not know that ODTG was organizing an appropriate technology for rural development conference in May, 1983.)

2.13 Meeting at Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (CERES) with Professor Abdelwahab BOUHDIBA, Director. I asked Professor Bouhdiba if CERES were interested in participating in development activities by providing social science expertise. I used the specific example of providing intermittent sociological backstopping to the ODTG extension unit. He expressed surprise that I should even pose the question, since CERES has a number of geographers and sociologists who are ready to work in Central Tunisia. He mentioned two persons who could be made available to the Extension Unit: M. Zammiti, a sociologist, and M. Labalied, a geographer. Arrangements could be made directly with the individuals involved, rather than with the CERES, if one wanted to avoid the bureaucratic complications of having to deal with the Ministry of Higher Education.

We then talked more generally about the perception of the social sciences in Tunisian development and higher education. The Director noted that social science does not enjoy a priority status within the country, since there is a preference for investing in the hard sciences, engineering, and the like. No Tunisian student of sociology has received a government scholarship for overseas study for a number of

years, a reflection of shifting priorities within the Ministry of Higher Education. Thus, many who are able to study overseas on their own resources do not return to Tunisia, since there is no clear career pattern for them.

CERES was initially supported by the Ford Foundation, and now receives assistance from the Konrad Adenauer Foundation. Much of their activity is focused on publications--particularly cultural, historical, and philological monographs and symposia--and on running conferences.

2.14 Field visit with M. Abdelmalik M'NASSRI, Director, ODTC subdivision at Sbeitla, and John Van Dusen LEWIS, AID/W. M. M'nassri is widely considered to be among the most effective and energetic of the ODTC subdivision directors. The first part of the meeting took place in his office; the remainder in the field.

M. M'nassri indicated a number of problems with the PPI system. The minimal stable holding for an irrigated farm should be three hectares, but the average holding on the PPI is only two hectares. Furthermore, there are a number of inadequacies on the perimeters:

- inadequate water for irrigation;
- inadequate water management;
- inadequate fertilization;
- inadequate crop variation.

We have introduced Dutch milk cows, he said, but they are not doing well. Summers are too hot for them, and there is not enough forage. We would be better off to try cross-breeding to improve local types, rather than to import exotics.

There have been no soil studies in the region, so that we do not know what the correct mixture or quantity of fertilizer might be. (Note that the next day we observed instruments for measuring soil moisture, to provide data on correct frequency and quantity of watering.)

The most important thing, said M. M'nassri, is to understand the farmers on a case by case basis. "Il faut ne pas généraliser!" Extension agents are not adequately prepared on a cross-disciplinary (i.e., polyvalent") basis. The agents do not have sufficient knowledge of the local scene. "It is the farmer who should train the agent, and not the agent who should train the farmer."

We then visited a large private irrigated farm run by a "progressive farmer," with 12 hectares under irrigation. He is putting in a large number of fruit trees, and has several greenhouses with tomatoes and peppers. Labor is provided by his young sons, whom he "hires" (30 millenies/day) after school. He plows by camel, muzzling the beast to keep it from browsing his olive trees. He recognizes that tractor plowing is faster, but, he said, it is not good for the soil. He composts manure, and buys manure from herding families. There was a short exchange between M. M'nassri and the farmer, in which M'nassri criticized the spacing of the rows. Quickly and calmly, the farmer explained and demonstrated why his way of doing it was better. (Unfortunately, the ODTC has no institutionalized means of capturing that kind of knowledge, and of testing it. Extension agents will continue to advocate methods that the more knowledgeable farmer will ignore, and yet they have no systematic way of learning from him.)

On another farm we chanced across a man digging his own surface well. He claimed to have no idea that with a title of ownership he would be entitled to public participation and reimbursement for some of the costs. (Later, when we brought this case up with M. Bougatef, he replied that there are lots of public meetings explaining these benefits, but some farmers either don't attend or don't understand what they hear. [Is it also possible that some people are "ethnic" strangers--i.e., members of stranger "tribes"--and are therefore either not privy to information or not encouraged to pursue their rights?])

3. Recommendations.

The emphasis on regional planning and regional development in the Sixth Plan constitutes an opportunity for the United States, with its special expertise, to make a substantial contribution (at moderate cost) to Tunisian development focused on involving the private sector (including small-scale agricultural producers) in enhancing the productive capacities and revenues of the deprived interior regions of the country. The institutional mechanisms for such an approach are already in place. There is a need and manifest receptivity for U.S. technical assistance to support these institutions in carrying out their mandated tasks. In this section of our report we identify the institutions and outline our recommendations for USAID participation in Tunisian rural development. This listing is not meant to be exhaustive or to comprise a global strategy. It represents only those opportunities that emerged in the course of the consultants' mission.

3.1 ODTC.

3.1.1 We recommend a continuing USAID support of the ODTC through the Central Tunisia Rural Development (CTRD) Project for the following reasons (no particular priority is implied in the ordering):

(a) Central Tunisia has been identified both by the GoT and USAID as a region for priority investment to overcome its relative backwardness due partially to a historical emphasis on the Northeastern and Eastern Coastal areas of the country. (We say "partially," because we do not underestimate the climatic and geomorphologic factors in the underdevelopment of the Tunisian interior.) The ODTC is the mandated instrument for development in Central Tunisia, and has been identified by the GoT as a model for regional planning and regional development.

(b) USAID has accumulated a good deal of knowledge about the region in a relatively short period of time, and, with a modest amount of external expertise, can participate effectively in the identification, design, and implementation of development actions in Central Tunisia. Furthermore, USAID enjoys excellent access to ODTIC personnel at all levels. Despite some awkward periods in the past, with occasional misunderstandings, ODTIC seems to accord considerable credibility to USAID personnel involved; this is in no small degree due to the conscientiousness of the USAID project officer and her associate.

(c) While a number of issues remain that were noted in the December 1981 Issues Paper as soon to be resolved (such as appointment of a Deputy Director, appointment of a Sociologist in the EPU, regular staff meetings), it would be unwise and unjust not to recognize the progress that has been achieved, and not to recognize the growing pains that any new organization in the Tunisian governmental bureaucracy would have endured. The technocratic staff is young and enthusiastic, and, particularly in the Extension and Evaluation and Planning Units, receptive to new ideas. They--and the hardworking, innovative farmers of Central Tunisia--are the primary resources on which to build a viable development structure in the region. As stated in the draft rural development section for the current Tunisia CDSS, that structure should:

encourage and assist the GOT to design and test cost-effective and replicable delivery systems for goods and services; encourage and assist the GOT to address the problems of the majority of poor dryland farmers; promote local participation in decision-making; encourage the participation of other donors; and encourage and assist the GOT in its effort to achieve better integration of rural development interventions.

(d) Finally, were USAID to abandon the ODTIC while improvements were being made, it would be interpreted as a gratuitous insult, and would foreclose the possibility that the investments already made will have a positive and significant impact on improving productivity and income in Central Tunisia.

3.1.2 We recommend that technical assistance be made available to the Extension and Outreach Unit and to the Evaluation and Planning Unit to enhance their abilities to understand the farmers and the farming production systems of Central Tunisia.

3.1.2.1. Extension and Outreach: There are two major problems to be faced by this unit. First, and self-evident, is the need for a clear technical package to extend to the farmers. While a good deal of work has been going on to create such a package on the irrigated perimeters, a good deal remains to be accomplished, both on the perimeters and, especially, in the dryland or rainfed areas. It is to the second problem, however, that we wish to speak, that is, the need to sensitize the extension agents to the complexities of the region's farming systems.

An understanding of the variety of farming systems is necessary if the interventions recommended by the technical staff are to be firmly based on social and ecological realities. A persistent theme in our discussions with Tunisian officials was how little was known about the farmers and how inappropriate were some of the recommended interventions in terms of the farmers' capacities and objectives. Yet everybody recognized that there is no typical Central Tunisian farmer. Farmers differ on the quality of their land, the availability and quality of water, their ability to mobilize labor at different points in the agricultural cycle, their incentives and production objectives. A specific action could be a consequence of an attempt to optimize income, or labor, or to conserve soil or water. It could be an attempt to satisfy household consumptive requirements or to attempt to enter the market when the demand for a particular crop is highest. It could be an aesthetic act, for example, were a farmer to plant trees whose flowering he or she particularly appreciated. It could be an attempt to meet short-term (vegetable, cereals production) or long-term (planting olive trees) economic needs. It could be the consequence of a decision to

control the means of production (i.e., using animal traction) or to put the largest possible amount of land in production at one time (i.e., using machine traction). Farmers differ on their willingness to use women's and school age children's labor in the fields.

The other reason to sensitize extension workers to the complexity of the region's farming systems is to enable them to understand and capture the innovative solutions which farmers elaborate for their own problems. Central Tunisian farmers, like small farmers all over the world, operate in open-ended systems, in which they are constantly carrying out experiments designed to improve their ability to meet their production objectives. Many of these solutions are specific to the micro-ecological conditions of the particular farm. Some of them have more general applicability, and an extension agent who recognized them will be able to ventilate their suitability elsewhere.

We are not recommending formal training of extension agents in rural sociology, social anthropology, and farming systems research. Rather, we are suggesting on-the-job training to provide them with sufficient understandings of the diversity of local systems more effectively to accomplish their work. We propose an institutional relationship between a U.S.-based social research organization and the ODTIC Evaluation and Outreach Unit to provide professional technical assistance on an intermittent basis, to design the on-the-job training materials, and to be available as a backstop when necessary. One approach that might be taken is to assign several farm operations to each extension agent, and instruct the agent on preparing brief but regular reports designed to reveal the organization of production on the farm and the production objectives of the farmer and his household. It would be helpful also to involve a Tunisian social scientist or organization with a social science research capacity (such as CNEA or CERES), to work with the U.S. institution and the staff of the

Extension and Outreach Unit on a more regular basis, to read and comment on the agents' reports, and to participate in periodic field workshops. Finally, we recommend that a member of the Extension and Outreach Unit, such as M. Beshire Khelifi, be invited to spend a few weeks at a U.S. institution in an intensive seminar on social analysis and farming systems research as relevant to agricultural extension.

3.1.2.2 Evaluation and Planning: Since much of the justification for understanding the diversity of Central Tunisian farming systems is the same for the EPU as for the Evaluation and Outreach Unit, we will not repeat it here. The EPU must learn to assess the differences among subregions and to evaluate the significance of these differences for project design and implementation. The EPU needs to know what kinds of information it should seek and why. The approach to achieving this understanding is somewhat different from that of the Extension Unit however, for it involves both an institutional relationship between EPU and a U.S.-based social science research organization and the appointment of a full-time social scientist (a social anthropologist, rural sociologist, cultural geographer) staff member of the EPU. The necessity for making such an appointment was noted several years ago, and the December 1981 USAID Issues Paper dealing with the CTRD indicates that the position was to be filled shortly. Unfortunately, this has not yet happened, and the EPU staff, comprised of economist-statisticians, are having to take on work for which they are inadequately prepared. Since the information we received from the Director of CERES is that the supply of Tunisian social scientists exceeds the demand, it should be possible to identify a number of suitable candidates in a relatively short period of time. In the meantime, however, it would be possible to provide short-term training, either in Tunisia or abroad, to upgrade the social analytic competence of one or more of the current EPU staff members. Providing such training could be readily arranged by the U.S. social science research institution as recommended above. We

recommend that M. Mohamed Sakri and/or M. Mounir Bouraoui be selected for such training.

The final recommendation in this section should go without the saying: expatriate technical assistance to the ODTC (or to any other Tunisian organization) must be fluent in spoken and written French and/or Arabic.

3.2 CGDR

3.2.1 The Commissariat Général au Développement Régional was created in August 1981 out of the former Direction de la Planification Regionale in the Ministry of Plan and Finance. The task of the Commissariat "is to elaborate on overall strategy for regional development..." (6th Plan, p. 187). The Plan recognizes the innovativeness--and the risks--in approaching development from a regional perspective:

This attempt to regionalize the Plan is a daring one, for it reveals problems that were often concealed in order to avoid "regional rivalries" and not to stir up tribal reflexes. The attempt was made, however, on the conviction that when a problem is openly set out, it is almost solved, and it becomes a factor in mobilizing people and strengthening national unity in so far as the rightful aspirations of all social categories are taken into consideration. (Ibid.:193).

There are clearly risks in identifying USAID with the CGDR. In the first place, the CGDR has not been welcomed by all in the GoT, and it is reported that the Ministry of the Interior in particular is concerned that CGDR not move onto its own turf. In any reorganizations of the GoT, CGDR might be vulnerable. It is expected that CGDR is sensitive to the issue, and will act to reassure other governmental organisms that it is not exceeding its mandate. On the other hand, what the implications of its mandate are have not unambiguously been spelled out. The second risk is that the specific persons involved--who would appear to be superbly qualified for the task--depend for their positions on personal relations with the current Minister. Again, it is possible that a governmental reorganization would result in a new cast of senior characters, even if the Commissariat itself were to survive.

3.2.2 Despite these risks, we recommend a firm commitment on the part of USAID to the CGDR, for the following reasons:

(a) CGDR is the Tunisian instrument for planning for regional development, and regional development is the centerpiece of the current five year plan. Thus, working with the CGDR is both compatible with USAID development objectives and with the 5-year planning frame for USAID activities in Tunisia.

(b) CGDR is receptive to recommendations dealing with integrated development, employment generation, environmental issues, and policy reform--all of which are basic to AID development objectives.

(c) CGDR is in a formative period, during which relatively modest investments of technical assistance and training could have enduring pay-offs in institutionalizing a sound multidisciplinary approach to regional planning and development.

(d) CGDR has specifically requested assistance in regional planning; the Commissar, an American-educated Ph.D. in Economics, is well aware of U.S. strengths in this field.

3.2.3 We recommend that USAID provide the CGDR with technical assistance in regional development and planning, particularly by providing expertise in areas other than in economics, such as in social anthropology, regional sociology, ecological systems analysis, and spatial analysis and planning. This technical assistance would focus on creating a Rural and Regional Development Information System for the CGDR, which would have the purpose of targeting and evaluating regional development actions predicated on sound information and analysis of spatial economies, sectoral linkages, enterprise promotion, and income and employment generation. The product would be an information system--in part computerized and in part qualitative--to highlight the differential impact of development investments among the

various ecological and administrative regions, such that planning guidance can be fed more effectively back to the regional offices, improving their capacity to identify, implement, and monitor projects.

As a first step in this activity, we recommend the undertaking of a Social and Institutional Profile of Tunisia jointly by the CGDR and an American institution experienced in such work. It is likely that participation of other Tunisian organizations, such as CERES and CNEA, would be sought in this activity. The SIP would identify and justify the utilization of the analytic categories to constitute the structure of the Rural and Regional Development Information System. After the SIP has been completed, a short-term consultancy--such as that outlined for the Bureau of the Census in Appendix I--could be undertaken to set up the computerized system.

By assisting CGDR in achieving its mandate, USAID will be participating in the creation of a powerful lobby at the heart of the GoT that will advocate support for the Tunisian rural sector. While the major Tunisian urban centers and the Northern and Eastern Coastal regions may have "graduated" from the need for continued external economic assistance, the country as a whole will remain underdeveloped until the vast rural areas of the Northwest, the Center, and the South improve their production and their earnings. CGDR has been created to accomplish that objective, and USAID has an enviable opportunity to help it come about.

3.3 Planning Office, Ministry of Agriculture and ESAK.

While CGDR and ODTIC should constitute the centerpieces of USAID involvement with Tunisian rural and regional development, we recommend continued support for ESAK and a very modest technical assistance for the Planning Office in the Ministry of Agriculture.

3.3.1 ESAK. Since we had only a brief meeting with the Director of ESAK, it is premature to spell out precisely what would be entailed in additional technical assistance (beyond the existing Oregon State University project) with the agricultural college at Le Kef. The Director, Dr. Mohamed Ben Saanya, recognizes that a critical failing of agricultural research and training in Tunisia has been its almost total ignorance of Tunisian farmers and farming systems. He would like to have ESAK begin to redress that ignorance, and the progression of the school from a two-year junior college to a full four-year undergraduate program provides an arena for the inclusion of studies and research in farming systems and rural sociology, as well as in agricultural economics. We therefore recommend that USAID contract for a brief consultancy to meet with the Director and faculty members of ESAK, and ascertain what are the appropriate means for rectifying these lacunae in their program. We also recommend that the consultancy consider ways in which ESAK might become a center for research and application in low energy and capital savings technology as related to small farming systems in semi-arid Tunisia.

3.3.2 Direction de la Planification, Ministère de l'Agriculture. The Planning Office at the Ministry of Agriculture has indicated two areas in which it would welcome technical assistance from USAID: advanced training in micro-computers and regional planning. Our recommendations for the former are outlined in Appendix I of this report. As for the latter, we believe that the Planning Office does have an important role to play in regional planning, especially as much of the investment in the less developed areas of the country will necessarily be devoted to improving agricultural production. We are not entirely clear, however, precisely what form that technical assistance might take, since we have not reviewed the education and qualifications of the Planning Office's existing staff. Such a review

could also be accomplished during the brief consultancy recommended in Section 3.3.1. Indeed, both of these might be included in the Terms of Reference for a consultancy to pin down precisely how to proceed with the actions recommended for USAID in relation to the CGDR.

IDA

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MEMORANDUM

DATE: 21 January 1983

TO: USAID/Tunis JPhippard

FROM: Michael M Horowitz *MMH*

SUBJECT: Micro-Computers

As I mentioned to you a few days ago, Mr. Badr Ben Amar, Deputy Director of Planification in the Ministry of Agriculture, suggested that AID could provide useful assistance to his office in two areas:

1. They need assistance in developing a capacity for Regional Planning, and in project follow-up ("suivie"), especially in beneficiary analysis.
2. They need more advanced training in computer science. They have a pair of Apple II computers and plenty of soft-ware. They feel, however, that they are not getting optimal benefit from the installation, because of their limited familiarity with the system. (They have found a local dealer with repair capacity, and both their machines are functioning properly.)

I appreciate your reluctance to make a commitment to technical assistance in Regional Planning before having a clearer idea of where GOT responsibilities in that area will lie. You might like to consider responding to the second suggestion. S&T/MD has, I believe, been directed to provide some kind of assistance to USAID missions seeking help with micro-computers. Perhaps your S&T officer can provide detailed information.

John Lewis suggests that the Bureau of the Census might well be able to offer the kind of advanced computer training sought, and I am attaching a copy of their memorandum of 14 January 1983 on a "Recommended Plan for Project Monitoring Assistance to Central Tunisia Rural Development." To me that appears a fruitful avenue, especially as they claim full French fluency of their professional personnel.

Finally, I suggest that you request copies of the PPC/E evaluation studies in agriculture and in rural development to be made available to Direction du Plan at MinAg. (Please ask them to include copies of my Sociology of Pastoralism and African Livestock Projects, which several people have requested. I have a French translation in typescript, and could make a copy of that for you if you like, but those who have asked for the monograph, like Ben Amar, are fluent in English.)

cc.: DYoung

enc. a/s



January 14, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: Marie M. Argana
Assistant Chief for Survey and Evaluation
International Statistical Programs Center

From: Michael J. Hartz *TJH*
Chief, Evaluative Studies Branch
International Statistical Programs Center

Subject: Recommended Plan for Project Monitoring Assistance to
Central Tunisia Rural Development

At the suggestion of John Lewis, AID/NE/TECH, I make the following recommendations on how we could proceed in providing assistance to Central Tunisia Rural Development. A brief outline of the potential scope of our assistance is contained in a December 2, 1982 memo written by Jim Gibbs (attached).

Specific Recommendations

1. Conduct background research on the CTDA implemented projects in Washington. These projects are Small Holder Irrigation, Potable Water Systems, Rural Potable Water, Rural Extension and Outreach, Rangeland Improvement, and Small Enterprise.
2. Conduct a 2-4 week TDY by a team composed of a French-speaking survey statistician, a rural sociologist, and a data processing expert. The object of this trip would be to assess and document current project monitoring plans and activities (if any) carried out by the CTDA and to evaluate CTDA capability to collect, process, store and use monitoring information. Other purposes would be to conduct an inventory of useful information available from host-government agencies and institutions; to assess the capabilities, and determine the uses of the existing CTDA data processing resources; and to comment specifically on how these facilities could be used for data entry, storage, retrieval and analysis. Any existing system for monitoring CTDA projects being implemented by other GOT agencies should also be investigated.

Through discussions with CTDA staff, we should determine the implementation status of individual projects and the primary information needs for monitoring and evaluation of each project as well as the program as a whole.

3. Develop preliminary plans for improving the monitoring and evaluation of selected CTRD projects and the overall program. These preliminary plans would list the key variables relating to output provision, output use and acceptance, and project goal and purpose achievement. The plans would also outline data needs, suggest appropriate data collection methodology including overall sampling plans for any surveys to be conducted, provide guidelines for processing that data collected, and include a schedule of activities for the monitoring and evaluation exercises. Work on the preliminary plans would begin in Tunisia in conjunction with the CTDA and would be continued in Washington.

In planning for the evaluation of project and program impacts, general specifications for baseline and follow-up surveys will be constructed. It is my opinion that the informant study conducted by Cornell University in 1979 does not provide sufficient information for evaluation of income, agricultural productivity, employment, health or other impacts. The informant survey does, however, provide some useful measures of the institutional characteristics of the 80 subdistricts surveyed. Depending on the major issues in the minds of the Mission and the GOT, an informant survey of this type could be used to measure certain institutional changes as part of the evaluation activities.

4. Provide guidelines for the development of scopes of work for implementing individual aspects of the monitoring and evaluation efforts. These scopes could be developed by the CTDA using these guidelines.

The level of detail of the preliminary plans (step 3) and the guidelines for developing scopes of work (step 4) would depend on the number of projects ready for monitoring and evaluation at this time. I estimate that in the four person-months allocated for these activities, we could develop 4-5 monitoring and evaluation plans which the CTDA could use to guide their work.

If further funding is made available, we could revise any scopes prepared by the CTDA and monitor performance of the contractors.

General Recommendations

The goals and purposes of the CTRD projects range from increased income and improved health to increased agricultural productivity, improved land use practices and increased employment. Through discussions with USAID and GOT staff the most important goals and purposes of projects and of the overall program must be listed in order of importance. These goals and purposes can then be expressed as key variables for evaluation and only those for which generally accepted and readily measurable indicators can be developed should be considered for study.

Evaluation activities will focus on goal and purpose achievement of individual projects. If it is decided that evaluation of project impacts is of major interest, it will probably be necessary to collect some baseline data in selected target areas which have not yet been affected by project outputs. As I have noted above, adequate baseline information was not provided by the Cornell study, but a thorough search for any acceptable information from other sources should be made before primary data collection is planned.

It is impossible to estimate the exact cost of a baseline survey until the issues and geographic areas of interest are specified, but the costs would be substantial. For this reason and because of the long maturation period usually required to realize project goals and purposes, I feel that the major emphasis of both CTRD and the Mission should be placed on project and program monitoring efforts. Monitoring should focus on output provision, and acceptance and use by target groups. Whenever possible, information gathering activities should be integrated into the project implementation and maintenance duties of the project staff. The time required to realize project output use and acceptance by target groups should not be underestimated by project monitors even if they may have

been by project planners. Therefore, the monitoring exercises should begin during implementation and continue for an undetermined length of time.

I recommend that the IDY team be composed of a French-speaking rural sociologist (Ph.D.), a French-speaking survey statistician with experience in planning for evaluation and monitoring of development projects, and a French-speaking data processor with exposure to the use of micro-computers in the developing country context.

Based on my experience in planning for monitoring and evaluation exercises, I feel that we would provide the CTRD program monitoring effort with a comprehensive mix of skills and experience which are not typically available in the Mission. These include expertise in data collection, assessment, processing and analysis. We have developed plans for monitoring projects and programs of similar nature in numerous instances and have broad experience in dealing with host-country project monitoring and evaluation. For these reasons, I recommend that we undertake the venture outlined above.