



## THE ROLE OF LOCAL INSTITUTIONS IN COMMUNAL AREA DEVELOPMENT



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Applied Research Unit  
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## LOCAL INSTITUTIONS RESEARCH REPORTS

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The Role of Local Institutions in Communal  
Area Development: A Summary Report

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ACDO	Assistant Community Development Officer
AD	Agricultural Demonstrator
BCW	Botswana Council of Women
DET	District Extension Team
PTA	Parent Teachers Association
SCDO	Senior Community Development Officer
VDC	Village Development Committee
VET	Village Extension Team
YWCA	Young Womens Christian Association

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## CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION

"You do not achieve development by forcing people in directions they do not want to go for reasons they do not understand."  
Sir Seretse Khama (Botswana Democratic Party, 1969:11).

"Most institutions in villages and other small settlements are vitally important in the promotion of development and productive activities, and their role as a forum of Consultation on those issues can not be over-emphasised."  
Government Paper No. 1 of 1981 "Local Government Structure in Botswana".

In November 1980 the Rural Development Council recommended the establishment of Communal First Development Areas. (CFDA's). It was felt that while Government had been successful in establishing social infrastructure and social services in the communal areas, as a whole they still lagged behind in terms of self-sustaining development. The lack of productive employment and investment opportunities was of particular concern. The core of the CFDA programme was to intensify development efforts in the communal areas by focussing existing resources on a single area in each District, the CFDA.

Part of the intended strategy was to involve local institutions (that is the Kgotla, the chieftainship, the ward system, VDC, PTA and other organisations), as much as possible in the planning and implementation of development efforts. However, the knowledge about such institutions was insufficient to allow policy implementation to proceed. For this reason, the Rural Development Unit, Ministry of Finance and Development Planning, requested the Applied Research Unit to undertake research on local institutions in response to request by Districts as a support service for CFDA implementation. In response to this critical national policy concern, Research on the Role and Strengthening of Local Institutions in Communal Areas Resource Management and Land Use Planning (hereafter referred to as the Local Institutions Research Project) was established. In response to District requests, research was undertaken in seven Districts in 34 villages or land areas as detailed in Table 1.

This report provides a summary of the findings of the Local Institutions Research Project and a review of the findings of related research. It is not a complete literature review since much of the literature is repetitive and/or of poor quality. A few sources which are not cited in the text are

Table 1. Local Institutions Survey Sites

<u>District</u>	<u>Village</u>	<u>Date of Research</u>
Southern	Cvaanyaneng	May - August 1981
	Kgoro	
	Malokaganyane	
	Mokgomane	
	Phitsane-Molopo	
Kgatleng	Bokaa	May - August 1981
	Mathubudukwane	
	Oodi	
	Sikwane	
Central	Kgagodi	(May - August 1981
	Maape	(December 1981
	Moshopa	
	Sajwe Lands	
	Kedia	May - August 1982
	Khumo	
	Mopipi	
Kweneng	Seribotsane Lands	October 1982 - August 1983
	Mannoko Lands	
North-East	Jackalasi II	(December 1981
	Matniloje	(May - August 1982
	Siviya	
	Themashanga	
	Tshesebe	
Ghanzi	West Hanahai	December 1981 - February 1982
	Xade	
	Bere	
	Kagcae	
Ngamiland	Etsha 1	March - June 1982
	Etsha 6	
	Etsha 13	
	Gomare	
	Habu	
	Nokaneng	
	Tubu	

nonetheless listed in bibliography for the convenience of the interested reader.

The purpose of this report is to provide an overview of the issues involved in the participation of local institutions in communal area development in Botswana. It provides a picture of what local institutions have been, what they are now and what they might become. More detailed findings on specific villages can be found in the reports listed in Appendix A. Many of the insights in this report are due to the insights of the authors of those reports.

Some of the research findings have been formally submitted to Government as policy recommendations. Recommendations on extension were approved by the Rural Development Council and referred to the Rural Extension Coordinating Committee for implementation. A second set of recommendations are currently being considered by the Ministry of Local Government and Lands for submission to the Rural Development Council. These recommendations are identified in the text by the initials (RECC) or (MLGL) affixed after the recommendation. The involvement of local institutions is considered here in terms of five aspects of rural development efforts in which they might potentially be involved:

1. Problem identification; determining what are the impediments to development, what difficulties need to be solved. These might include sick children, availability of water, low crop yields or shortage of grazing, to mention only a few.
2. Identification of interventions to solve the problem. Any problem can be approached in a number of different ways. Shortage of grazing might be remedied by decreasing demand (such as through destocking) or by increasing supply (taking the livestock to new grazing, bringing the forage to them, or creating additional grazing through improved pasture management.)
3. Deciding what to do. One or more approach chosen and the specifics of implementation must be carefully worked out - who must do what, when, how, at what cost?
4. Implementation. This may involve spreading information, mobilising labour

and funds, construction and so on.

5. Evaluation. As a project is being implemented, it is necessary to determine whether it is meeting its objectives, if the resources committed were sufficient, what detrimental side effects there were and so on.

The state of local institutions varies considerably from place to place. An institution which is weak in one place may be strong elsewhere. Functions which are undertaken by the VDC in one village may be performed by the PTA in another and by the Farmer's Committee in yet another. Closely knit communities operate differently from those split by factions. Detailed descriptions of specific communities are provided in the reports listed in Appendix A. But even those will become less accurate with time. The observations in this and the other reports can be used to guide policy and action in involving local institutions in rural development. But this broad understanding must be complemented by detailed knowledge and understanding of the particular community where policy is being implemented at a given time. Specific actions in a specific village or lands area [LUSI] be based on a careful analysis of the state of institutions in that place. The inconvenience of being unable to act uniformly across the board, will be more than amply repaid by the effectiveness of actions based on such an approach.

For the purposes of this report local institutions have been divided into three categories - traditional institutions, that is, those institutions stemming from tribal authority and organisation which existed prior to Independence; Village Development Committees; and other modern institutions - organisations other than the VDC, most of which have been formed since Independence. The research findings showed clearly that Government involvement is one of the major factors affecting the performance of local institutions. For this reason, government involvement is considered separately. Finally, some special issues - self help, the role of women, the role of migrants and resource management are considered.

## CHAPTER II TRADITIONAL INSTITUTIONS

".... in other words the system of Tribal Government is fundamentally a social system of Government. It has rightly been described as an unbroken chain of responsibility extending from the Chief to the Headman of the Ward, from the ward headman to the lineage group headman and on to the individual. No one lives for himself but all live for the welfare of their community." Tshekedi Khama (1935? S,423/14)

By and large, traditional institutions are the best known and best understood local level institutions. The Kgotla is among other things, a place, visible to villagers in their daily lives. The chieftainship is part of well-known history and is generally associated with one person for reasonably long periods of time. Even the ward system is tangible to the extent that it is associated with known localities. Although their roles are changing, all of these institutions function to a greater or lesser degree in most villages.

Since the history of Botswana is filled with accounts of tribal schisms and other manifestations of unhappiness with tribal leadership, it is unlikely that there was ever a continuous Golden Age of traditional authority. Tshekedi Khama's description, however, refers to an ideal which still holds currency for many when they speak of traditional institutions. This chapter briefly traces some historical changes in these institutions and examines their present day roles.

The most prolific writer on the subject of traditional institutions is, of course, Isaac Schapera. His work is not cited here in full for two reasons. First the length of the report would be doubled. Second, his reports describe institutions as they were forty or fifty years ago. When these descriptions are useful for identifying the beginning of a trend still observed today, they are cited. Otherwise, the reader is referred to Schapera for her/his own edification.

### Chiefs and Headmen<sup>1</sup>

"Chieftainship is the power in a community which keeps it together against internal and external problems. This power is represented by the chief who is the leader of the people." Smith Mosesane (Kiyaga-

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1. Much of the historical data presented here refers to the so-called "Paramount" chiefs. The contemporary data refers to the heads of smaller villages who are interchangeably referred to as chiefs or headmen.

Mulindwa, 1980:71).

"The chief is like an empty chair; and the important thing about an empty chair is that you can sit on it .... or you can move it outside."

(old man quoted in Camaroff, 1973:480).

"Kgosi ke Kgosi ka batho"

While chiefs in the pre-colonial period had considerable power in theory, such powers were in fact circumscribed by their lack of anything more than a purely ad hoc administrative staff (Gunderson, 1971:76) and by the people's ability to resist him by circumspect reproach (see Comaroff, 1975 or Kooijman, 1978:6) or passive non-cooperation or by moving away, or, occasionally, by more active methods such as assassination. Hence, the saying, the chief is chief by the grace of the people.

In one sense the colonial era strengthened the hand of the chief by placing behind them the administrative staff and power of the colonial administration. Chiefs Bathoen I and Seepapitso of the BaNgvaketse ordered whole age regiments to work into the mines of South Africa (Schapera, 1947: 153-154), actions justified on the basis of the need to pay colonial hut tax. Schapera (1947: 7) noted that contact with Europeans had tended to enhance the chief's importance as spokesman and representatives of the tribe.

However, colonialism, for the most part, eroded and circumscribed the powers of the chiefs. In places such as North East District (then Tati District), the confirmation of Tati Company control over area resources broke a vital link between the chief and his people (Thema, 1972:39, Werbner, 1969 and 1971). In other cases, legislative and administrative actions were taken which were directly intended to curtail the power of the chiefs (Kuper, 1970:69-70; Kuper and Gillett, 1970:172; Gunderson, 1971:135; Schapera, 1943a:27-28; Vengroff, 1972:118-124).

Since Independence the authority of the chiefs and headmen has been further reduced. The Matimela Act of 1968 removed their control over matimela cattle. The Tribal Land Act restricted the role of chiefs and headmen in land allocation to signing a no-objection certificate and even then his decision may not necessarily stand. (See Gillett, 1975:105 for a more complete

list). Recent studies have found the influence and power of the Chief/Headman to be subject to a number of factors. Kuper and Gillett (1970:172, 181) found the headman subject to the strains of the sometimes conflicting roles of both representing the Government to the people and the people to the Government. They predicted that headmen would evolve into a judge and figurehead. Kuper (1970:77) felt that the headman's major source of strength was that he<sup>2</sup> symbolised the unity of the village community. Vengroff (1972:138-140) found that chiefs were the best communication link with Government and that their refusal to participate in projects could bring such projects to a halt by denying them legitimacy. Kooijman (1978:20-22) noted the high standing the chieftainship still carried as manifested by the election of people of royal blood to government office (also noted by Solway, 1980:10) and found that the decline of the chieftainship was a cause of confusion and bitterness among older people. Even among the young fear of the chief persisted. Comaroff (1975:144) found that the chief was expected to seek the advice of his people so that his decisions would reflect the opinion of the majority of the tribe. Odell (1982:11) found the headman was the best known and most involved of all leaders in the village including extension workers, MPs, and Councillors. Werbner (1977) found the headmanship to be the focus of intra-village politics. Wynn (1982:64) commented "there is very little chance that a headman will lose his job primarily because no one else would want it."

The Local Institutions Research findings reveal the somewhat contradictory situation of an apparently declining institution which continues to have considerable effect. Perhaps the most simple example of the continuing emotive power of chieftainship was found in a Basarwa community. Many of the people said they wanted a chief (which was quite alien to their traditional structure) and that they would know a good chief if they got one.

A sense of feelings about the changing role of the chieftainship can be found in the following statement by a poor old man interviewed by L. Motsvogole in Jackalasi II:

"The headman nowadays is not doing anything profitable to society. During his early ages, the headman was the father of the people and friend of the poor. Those who were poor or travelling were

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2. While there have been female regents in Botswana, they represent a minute fraction of all traditional leaders. Therefore the masculine pronoun is used throughout this section.

taken care of by the headman. But this is not the case today. Today the headman is just like anybody else, the only difference is that he has the role of hearing and judging cases."

The activities of the headman or chief in 20 villages can be seen in Table 2. Forty five percent of headmen were hereditary leaders; 30 percent were chosen by the village in one way or another and 25 percent were chosen by some authority, generally an outsider. (Some of these latter category faced difficulties because they were considered "foreigners".) Many of the non-hereditary leaders were also of royal blood. Eight of the twenty (40 percent) were said not to fulfill their duties.<sup>3</sup> Most of the others were primarily involved in judicial duties.

However, no matter what their feelings are about the incumbent (and one was so terrible that his whipping in the Kgotla was ordered by the Paramount Chief), people continue to respect the office. When an incumbent is unsatisfactory, he is like Comaroff's empty chair, put aside for all practical purposes. But the office remains and the potential of that office is enormous. In one case, the confirmation of a chosen headman in the post led to what was nearly a transformation of the village. Seemingly overnight a formerly apathetic village was mobilised to undertake self-help projects. The highest turn-out for all three kinds of institutions occurred in this village.

However, a strong headman is no guarantee of community development (although a weak headman generally means a weak Kgotla). Some communities have organised despite opposition from the headman. Similarly, a dedicated headman who is not accepted by the people may fail utterly in his attempt to mobilise them. But a strong headman can be a valuable addition to development efforts. Equally consistent with Vengroff's findings, a headman can, through his power of negative sanction, prevent a project from taking place.

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3. The chief or headman should sign passport applications and no objection certificates, hear cases, and call Kgotla meetings. He has no formal development duties. Some duties such as calling Kgotla meetings are a bit nebulous. How often should he call Kgotla meetings and for whom? It could be said with all justification that few of the chiefs were community mobilizers or leaders.

Table 2 Role of Village Headman/Chief

<u>Village</u>	<u>Nature of Headmanship</u>	<u>Performance</u>
1.	Hereditary	Rarely in village
2.	Hereditary	No development participation. Runs Kgotla meetings.
3.	Hereditary	Consulted on disputes. No development activities.
4.	Elected	Lives outside village - comes twice weekly. Considered a good adviser although does not perform duties.
5.	Hereditary	Judicial duties only.
6.	Hereditary	Busy with personal affairs. Neglects official duties.
7.	Appointed	Works regular Government hours. Not considered a leader.
8.	Hereditary	Neglects his duties - seldom at Kgotla.
9.	Appointed	Spends little time on official duties.
10.	Appointed by previous Headman	Judicial duties predominate - active in VDC and PTA.
11.	Elected	Judicial duties predominate. Accusations of bias.
12.	"Chosen" to succeed elected father.	Not respected by villagers - no judicial functions - no development functions.
13.	Chosen by village on hereditary basis.	Active in mobilizing development projects.
14.	Elected	Doesn't know much about the village or traditional proceedings.

Table 2 continued

<u>Village</u>	<u>Nature of Headmanship</u>	<u>Performance</u>
15.	Nominated by Tribal Authority	Judicial duties only
	Hereditary	Key Leader. Consulted on all community matters. Gives example in community work. Well respected. Judicial duties.
16.	Hereditary	Refers all judicial cases to another authority - calls Kgotla meetings. Not respected.
17.	Hereditary	Acting chief - Judicial duties predominate. Community affairs. No development activities.
18.	Elected	Judicial duties only. Manipulated by informal leaders.
19.	Nominated by Tribal Authority	Well respected. Tends to centralise power. Suspicious of new institutions and innovations. Actively fulfills role.
20.	Nominated by Tribal Authority	Judicial duties predominate. Accused of ethnic biases.

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Based on data from Central, Kgatleng, Southern and North-East Districts

Not all headmen are paid, which raises the problem of negative example. One would be hardpressed to urge an unpaid headman to work hard when around him are paid government officials who do not work. In one village, people were quite sympathetic with the failure of their unpaid headman to do his duty - he has to earn his living, they said. A salary does not necessarily guarantee productivity. However, paying (which means gazetting) all village headmen would serve the interests of equity and provide some incentive for action.<sup>4</sup> The Local Government Structure Commission (1979, Vol. 1:40) also recommended that the Ministry of Local Government and Lands consider "increasing the number of warranted courts and paid headmen."

#### Strengthening the Role of the Chief/Headman in Development

Headmen can and do play important development roles as outlined in Chapter I.

Problem Identification: To begin with, a good headman will know many of the problems his community faces. He also can call his community to Kgotla meetings to discuss these problems with government officials. These are roles which many headmen already play.

Identification of Interventions: This is also a step which requires dissemination of information and eliciting opinions, again a function which the headman through the Kgotla is well suited to undertake.

Deciding What to Do: Actual decision-making still tends to reside further up the governmental ladder. While some headmen because of illiteracy, senility or other forms of personal incompetence may not be able to contribute meaningfully to such decisions, they must be kept fully informed and involved so that they will be willing to be involved in the next step. (See Flood, 1974: 35, 197 on this point).

Implementation: Although the chief can no longer legally call out the regiments, he can have an enormous mobilizing effect. During the research in Kgatleng, Chief Linchwe mobilized the regiments even in the outlying villages to build a new kgotla shelter in Mochudi (Leobo). In an earlier instance in

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4. The disadvantage of paying headmen is that it changes their role from leader of the village to also representing Government in the village. This conflict of roles was noted in several villages and lessened respect for the headman. (See Kuper 1970.)

North-East, Chief Ramokate mobilized some 400 people in a two day effort to repair a community dam. In contrast, headmen in Southern District survey sites were preventing action through simple negative authority. As will be discussed in Chapter VI, people can and do ignore even the headman's call to labour. But the potential is there.

Evaluation: Again this requires communication and solicitation of views that the chief through the Kgotla might undertake.

While it has been shown that there is ample potential for the headman's active participation in development activities, it has often been shown that few of them are actually involved. In part this reflects traditionally village politics. It is not uncommon to find the traditional anti-chief/headman faction aligned with the VDC, thus reducing the likelihood of the chief/headman's involvement in its activities.

A second factor is that chiefs/headmen's duties have not been explicitly defined as involving development. To remedy this, the following recommendations have been made:

- 1) It is recommended that MLGL include in the job description of gazetted headmen specific development duties. (MLGL).
- 2) It is recommended that the District Commissioner meet regularly with both gazetted and non-gazetted headmen and discuss with them development duties and cooperation with VDC's. (MLGL)
- 3) It is recommended that all VDC training include chiefs and headmen.(MLGL)

### The Kgotla

"Kgotla is what the Chief makes of it". Lawry (1982:350)

The chief or headman in council in the Kgotla still serves a major role in many villages. It is the main point of contact between outsiders and villagers. It is the place where disputes are settled. It is a place where the affairs of the village are informally discussed.

The prominence and procedures of the Kgotla have changed since Independence. Politicking and informal discussions are as likely to take place at beer parties (particularly for those whose status in the Kgotla is low). (Gulbrandsen, 1980:84-86; Werbner, 1977:28). And now women participate, a

phenomenon which was less common in most places prior to Independence. (See for example, Morton, 1982: 64<sup>5</sup>; Kuper, 1970:106-107, 129). But in most places the two traditional Kgotla functions are still carried out to a greater or lesser degree: judicial and communication.

### Judicial Functions

Traditionally an essential Kgotla function was hearing cases. In 1979 Egner (p22) estimated that 80 percent of all Botswana's civil and criminal trials still took place in Kgotlas. Data on the kinds of cases heard in Kgotla over nearly a sixty year period are presented in Table 3.

Table 3 Court Cases Heard in Kgotla 1916-1975

Type of Case	National Survey <sup>1</sup> (Schapera, 1947:31)	Kgalagadi Kuper, (1970:101)	Kweneng <sup>2</sup> (Vengroff 1972:130)	Ngamiland <sup>3</sup> (Lebang, 1970:31)
Private Delicts	39%	74%	35%	46%
Public Delicts	19%	10%	7%	16%
Family Law	18%	9%	9%	11%
Contracts	14%	5%	-	2%
Property	10%	2%	7%	18%
Other	-	-	42%	7%
Total Number of Cases	1591	209	43	401

1. Ngwaketse 1910-1916, 1928-1934, 1936-1940; Kgatla 1935-1939; Kvena 1935-1938; Ngwato 1937-1938; Tavana 1935-1939

Percentages based on 1866 issues raised in 1591 cases.

2. Sample only.

3. 1952-1953, 1955-1956, 1960-1961, 1965, 1970, 1974-1975.

While the data are by no means strictly comparable, in all cases, some sort of individual and basically personal wrong-doing is involved. This reflects the functioning of the customary court and is consistent with Comaroff's comment that chiefs were more mediators than judges (1980:97). Solway

5. A photograph in the Phuthadikobo Museum taken in the '50's shows women in the Kgotla contrary to the information provided by Morton's informant. (Personal Communication, Sandy Grant 3/4/83).

(1980:9-10) found that many disputes were settled at a lower level (ward, subward or family) than Kgotla. Lebang (1978:33-39) found that unrelated disputants accounted for 65 percent of cases heard in Kgotla since these cases were less likely to be settled at home. Wynn (1978:1,4) points out that the customary court no longer has the enforcement power it had when it could call out the regiments. This lack of enforcement power further enforces the restriction of its role to mediation.

While this judicial function may not seem directly related to development, it is in fact very important for it provides a local and immediately available mechanism of community integration and conflict resolution. As can be seen in Table 4, five of twenty sample villages had an active customary court.<sup>6</sup>

Questions of customary law and the procedures of trying cases in kgotla were beyond the scope of this research. Those who wish to know more on the subject should consult Simon Roberts (1979).

#### Communication Functions

As can be seen in Table 4, the central role of most Kgotlas today is that of communication, both among community members themselves and between the outside and the community. Most Government staff who worked with or communicated with the community, initiated their contact through the Kgotla. [Excluding meetings of political parties, Government officials attended 28 meetings in seven villages in North-East and Central Districts over a three month period in 1982. Of these, 19 (or 67 percent) were Kgotla meetings. (See Appendix C, Table C-1). The Kgotla is also the site of electing members of other organisations and the means by which these organisations communicate with the village at large. In this way, the Kgotla legitimises the activities of other less known institutions. Finally, the Kgotla sometimes serves to coordinate the activities of other organisations.

#### Strengthening the Role of the Kgotla in Development

The roles identified in Chapter I which can be played by the Kgotla are

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6. Where the headman does not have a court warrant, he can at best play a mediating role. The necessity of travelling to another village to have one's case heard is the source of inconvenience and annoyance to many villagers.

Table 4 Characteristics of the Kgotla in Institutions Study Villages

<u>Village</u>	<u>Frequency of Meetings</u>	<u>Participation</u>	<u>Functions</u>
1	Rare	Low	Symbolic - used for announcements.
2	Fortnightly	30+ average	Eastern side of village only - used for announcements.
3	Irregular	Very low	Communications only.
4	Irregular	Less than 50	Used for communication and discussion.
5	Twice a week	Low	Communication. Coordination.
6	Depends on time of year	Varies, often low	Communication. Coordination. Election of other local organisations.
7	2 - 3 per month	Low	Election of other organisations. Communication.
8	Irregular Perhaps monthly	25 - 35 average	Used for communication. Election of other local organisations.
9	Perhaps fortnightly	8 - 40	Customary court used to organise activity. Election of other organisations.
10	Weekly	41 average	Communication.
11	Fortnightly Plus court cases	76 average	Active customary court. Coordinates and supports modern organisations.
12	Fortnightly	22 average	Communications only.
13	Fortnightly	64 average	Communication. Mobilization. Minor court cases.
14	Fortnightly	49 average	Communication. Election of other organizations.

Table 4 Cont.

<u>Village</u>	<u>Frequency of Meetings</u>	<u>Participation</u>	<u>Functions</u>
15	Once a week	20+ average	Announcements. Communication. Consultation. Election. Organisation of community activities.
16	Irregular	Generally 8 average Contentious issues as high as 286 and 350	Communication. Consultation. Community decisions and activities.
17	Irregular	15+ average	Consultation. Decisions. Community organisation.
18	Fortnightly	30+ average	Active customary court. Communication. Coordination.
19	Daily	10+ average	Court cases. Communication. Coordination.
20	Irregular	10+ average	Consultation. Communication. Community organisation.

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Based on data from Central, Kgatleng, North-East and Southern Districts.

are essentially the same as those for the chief/headman as it is the chief who summons the Kgotla.

Problem Identification: The Kgotla has traditionally been the place where villagers could speak their mind freely and at length. This is the obvious forum for at least the initial stages of problem identification.

Identification of Interventions: Again the Kgotla provides a forum for discussions of options.

Deciding What to Do: While some sifting of options and discussions of strategy may need to be done by a smaller group, the ultimate decision must be thoroughly discussed and ratified by the community as a whole. This can only be done in Kgotla.

Implementation: Announcements concerning implementation can most readily be made in Kgotla. The Kgotla is not, however, suited to assuming executive functions.

Evaluation: Discussion of how the endeavour has fared can be carried out in Kgotla.

Various factors can interfere with the Kgotla's performance of these roles.

#### The Performance of the Headman

CODEC (1973) echoed the complaints heard during this research about headmen who refused to call meetings. In the CODEC case some headmen were being paid off by large cattle buyers and thus did not call the meetings which were against their interest; others had received so many requests for meetings from officials that they had given up under the flood; and yet others failed to carry out their duties because they were not paid. Recommendations for headmen have been made in the previous section.

#### Status

Although anyone may speak in Kgotla, not everyone is taken seriously. Henderson (1974:79) found that those who were listened to were "respected because of their wealth and the sense of their deliberations. Those without wealth and lacking in experience were of little consequence. (In this regard it is important to note that it is the experience of the common man which forms the backbone of Botswana democracy.) Gunderson (1971:98) also notes this inequality, but points out the "symbolic attitude of Community" which is associated with the Kgotla. Noppen (1982:133) argues that decisions taken at Kgotla reflect the views of older men from the "superior" sections

of the village.

The findings of this research also revealed that the kgotla was sometimes captured by one village faction or another. Women, youth and Basarwa were less often heeded than older men. As can be seen in Table 5, women were less likely to speak in Kgotla meetings than in any other organisation.

As noted above these prejudices have served to shift some activity away from the Kgotla - to beer parties for younger men for example. They also result in excluding considerable talent from decision making councils. Some of these attitudes will eventually literally die out. In the interim, they can be combatted by the conspicuous inclusion of traditionally low status persons such as women, youth and Basarwa in high and public positions.

#### Attendance and Participation

Gunderson (1971:71) reported that traditionally the Kgotla met weekly. Kuper (1980:82-83) found that 11 citizens made 77 percent of all the contributions to the debates and that "most men in the village attended meetings from time to time, few men came to all or even the majority of meetings." (Vengroff (1972:134n) found that the largest Kgotla meeting in a 12 month period in Molepolole (population 38,000) was 150. (This would have been roughly two percent of the adult population). Comaroff (1980: 92, 96) reported that the scattered population of the Barolong "participated rarely and always reluctantly in communal affairs" and that "attendance at general public meetings seems seldom to have exceeded one percent of the population at most." Kooijman (1978:19) found that an average of 30 to 40 people (out of a population of nearly 2,000) attended kgotla meetings.

Odell (forthcoming 107,116) argues that the Kgotla is a strong institution. He found that 91 percent of the people in six villages said they attended Kgotla meetings and 68 percent said they attended them frequently. These figures are important for indicating the potential scope of contact of the Kgotla. However, his statement "more people attend and participate in Kgotla meetings in a single day than are involved in more "modern" institutions in an entire year" is simply nonsense. His own figures show that 203 of his respondents attend Kgotla frequently while 92 frequently attend VDC alone. Data from this research also contradicts Odell's statement. As can be seen in Tables 6, 7 and 11, data for seven

Table 5 Percent of People Attending Meetings who Speak

<u>Village</u>	<u>KGOTLA</u>		<u>VDC</u>		<u>OTHER MODERN ORGANISATIONS</u>	
	<u>Men</u>	<u>Women</u>	<u>Men</u>	<u>Women</u>	<u>Men</u>	<u>Women</u>
1	35	0	-	-	56	43
2	14	13	88	33	73	19
3	21	7	92	82	64	31
4	47	16	100	50	-	-
5	36	26	-	-	96	94
6	27	13	40	20	37	22
7	23	21	63	7	100	59
Average	27	16	55	22	54	30

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Data from Central and North-East Districts

villages in Central and North East District show that on average a total of 438 people attended Kgotla meetings in those villages on a single day while a total average of 310 attended meetings of modern organisations on a single day. It is hard to imagine that in the course of a year, the difference of 128 would not be made up.

The institutions research findings confirmed the generally low state of the Kgotla in other ways. As can be seen in Table 4 in twelve of twenty study villages Kgotla meetings were held fortnightly or more frequently. In the remaining eight they were generally irregularly held. In most villages the attendance was low both in terms of absolute numbers and in the percent of population which they represented.

Detailed information on attendance as shown in Table 6 was available for seven villages in North-East and Central Districts. Turnout averaged from 22 to 143 people, constituting 7 to 28 percent of the adult village population. The total range was from 2 to 32 percent of the adult village population in attendance at a single meeting. Thus not even a third of the adult population turned up at the best attended meeting. In general those who attended were characterized as the old, particularly the old men.

Table 6 Kgotla Meetings in Study Villages During Twelve Week Observation Period

	<u>Village 1</u>	<u>Village 2</u>	<u>Village 3</u>	<u>Village 4</u>	<u>Village 5</u>	<u>Village 6</u>	<u>Village 7</u>
Kgotla Meetings	1	2	6	7	10	7	5
Average Attendance	43	143	49	22	41	76	64
Average % Population <sup>b</sup>	14%	28%	7%	7%	12%	13%	16%
Range % Population <sup>b</sup>	14%	27-29%	4-17%	2-12%	4 - 25%	2 - 30%	8 - 32%
% Attended by:							
Headman	100%	100%	100%	71%	60%	100%	100%
AD	100%	0	33%	0	0	0	20%
ACDO	0	100%	50%	14%	30%	0	20%
FWE	100%	100%	100%	0	60%	71%	20%
Headteacher	0	0	50%	57%	20%	28%	0
Councillor	0	0	50%	43%	80%	71%	20%
Outsiders	0	0	83%	71%	60%	28%	60%

a. North East and Central Districts

b. Assumes population is one-third adults

Young economically active men and women were conspicuous by their absence. Women comprised between 24 and 53 percent of the average Kgotla attendance in the seven villages. These turn-out figures, although they are low in absolute terms, should be considered quite respectable for a civic institution particularly since it meets during hours when people are generally engaged in other more economically essential activities. Further, Odell's figures would seem to indicate that when people consider an issue being discussed in Kgotla as vital, they attend.

Attendance does not, however, necessarily mean active participation. Most people attend Kgotla meetings to listen. As shown in Table 5 on average 27 percent of the men and 16 percent of the women attending Kgotla meetings in seven villages in North-East and Central District spoke. The village averages ranged from 14 to 47 percent of the men and from zero to 26 percent of women. Most people who attend Kgotla meetings don't speak even though this is the seat of democratic participation, where a person is free to speak at length even if only to echo the views of a previous speaker.

A first step towards strengthening the Kgotla would be a more careful use of Kgotla meetings by Government officials. One reason why attendance at Kgotla meetings is low is that they often are a complete waste of everyone's time. When an issue which has direct economic effect is discussed, attendance soars. If government workers would coordinate their visits (as well as their messages!) the number of Kgotla meetings could be reduced. And government officials might try to use techniques which encourage discussion. This would involve considerable alteration in the way most government officials approach villagers.

Finally, there should be a direct relationship between what government does and what happens in Kgotla. If government officials wish to use the Kgotla as a forum for consultation, there should be a relationship between what they hear and what they do. If they choose another course of action, the reasons should be explained in Kgotla by the person who made the decision. A great deal of ill-feelings arose from an ostensible consultation exercise during the 1982 drought. Having asked villagers what they wanted as labour intensive work projects, the Drought Relief Committee in one District rejected some projects out of hand despite strong (and apparently valid) counter-arguments by villages and substituted projects it felt

appropriate. Kooijman (1978:19) also felt that although people express opinions, they do not feel "they have any weight in decision making." One of the major sources of weakness of the kgotla system is that everyone wants to use it, but no one wants to be accountable to it. Without accountability, it will remain the place of essentially empty words spoken by a few.

In order to counter these problems the following recommendations were made:

1) Subject to RECC approval both the handbook for Facilitators, Re a Tlhaloganyana, and the short handbook on working with local level institutions be distributed to all local authorities and extension workers through the DETs and that both be used in teaching at BAC, IAE and IDM.(MLGL)

This should help government officials be more effective in eliciting opinions about and involvement in rural development.

2) A regular schedule of Kgotla meetings be established by the DDC in consultation with DET and that Government officials adhere strictly to this schedule by attending these meetings together. (MLGL)

This should reduce the number of useless meetings and encourage inter-ministerial cooperation and coordination.

3) The RDC advise MLGL in cooperation with other Ministries to present guidelines for central and district government officers for incorporation of reporting back to villages in annual plan consultations, VDC conferences, and project planning as a revised section of the District Planning Handbook. (MLGL)

#### The Ward System

The ward system in many places is in decline. This is a process which has been going on for some long time. Schapera (1947:172) reported that it was "Fairly common to find ward heads who are not the senior representatives of their line. The true heir, the man who should be ruling the ward, is away at work...." At that time the ward still played a crucial role as most court cases were heard at the ward level first until issues were clarified (Schapera, 1943: 38-39). Among the Bakgatla disputes between people from different wards would be heard by the two ward heads together who would then present the case to the chief for judgement (Morton, 1982:21). Ward headmen could also call out the members of any specific regiment which belonged to

their ward to perform duties for that ward. (Gunderson, 1971:80). Vengroff (1972:136) found that ward headmen were fined for not performing their traditional roles but could neglect government demands with impunity. Uhlenbeck and Kocken (1980:77-81) found that sub-wards were active when the kin group was strong and that the judicial role of the ward was the most important function. Rarely did a headman summon a meeting for non-judicial reasons. They also found that the activeness of ward headmen depended on their relationship with the chief. Both Machacha (1981:333-335) and Mathuba (1982:123-124) found that Land Board operations were hampered by headmen's failing to visit sites before signing the no objection form, a failure which was attributed to their not being paid. The Interministerial Committee on Land Board Operations (1978:7-15) recommended in this regard that "all registered Ward Heads and Representatives should be compensated for subsistence and incidental expenses incurred in performing their duties". Gulbrandsen (1983:6), it should be noted, found that some ward heads lay claim "most parts of the prior trusteeship (that is, prior to the Tribal Land Act) as their private holding." In this case, ward heads lack present power but have converted their former power to their own private gain. The general decline of the ward system can be seen in many ways. Lands areas are no longer necessarily associated with a specific ward. Even in the village ward members may no longer live in a single area. In some places, the name of the ward simply has geographic significance, nothing more. Where wards are in swift decline or have disappeared altogether, there is not point in trying to resurrect them. If they still had a function, they would have survived. Nostalgia will not change the realities of the present.

On the other hand, in some places the ward system, albeit diminished, is still alive and well, a case in point being Mochudi.<sup>7</sup> There cases are regularly heard at the ward level and punishments meted out. Both drought relief in the 1960's and Bokyuere in the 1980's were organised on a ward basis. Some rainmaking ceremonies are the responsibility of and performed by a given ward. At least one ward keeps the Kgotla fire alive through the night.

It could be argued that the strength of the ward system in Mochudi is due to the strength of Chief Linchwe. It may also be that in a major village,

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7. The following information was provided by Sandy Grant, Phuthadikobo Museum, Mochudi.

wards are more important because they are a more accessible scale of human organisation than the village as a whole. Whatever the explanation, the Mochudi example does show that in some places, the ward system is still a vital and salient organisation.

There are certain tasks which most development efforts require - contacting individual households to provide information or to solicit comments, cash, or labour; organising groups for collecting materials, construction and/or maintenance. Where wards are still strong, they could be used as the organisational base whenever a group is needed. This has a number of advantages. Each wardhead is responsible for the performance of his own ward. A discrete unit such as a ward pinpoints the identity of people who do or don't show up. A strong sense of ward identity can be used to encourage competition (and theoretically, greater productivity) among wards.

#### The Potential Development Role of Traditional Institutions

The great strength of traditional institutions is their familiarity. They are best able to communicate messages and facilitate mobilisation of people on an ad hoc basis. They are the channels through which outsiders can best communicate with the people. They are not, on the other hand, set up to undertake administrative or executive tasks.<sup>8</sup> They should be involved in those tasks which involve soliciting opinions, providing information and ad hoc mobilisation of labour. It is important that they be carefully involved from the outset because their capacity to bestow or withhold legitimacy can often make or break a project. It is also important that they not be forced into roles or actions. For example, as will be seen below, committees are often elected in Kgotla mostly out of politeness of the participants. Those who wish to use the Kgotla in this fashion should grant it the right to refuse to be used.

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8. H. Hulela points out that traditionally the decision to undertake a project was taken in Kgotla but the technicalities of management were left to regiment leaders (personal communication).

## CHAPTER III VILLAGE DEVELOPMENT COMMITTEES

"The VDC is doing good work and should buildg schools, clinics, and roads and all those necessary things." VDC member quoted in Kerven (1977:382).

"Functions of the Village Development Committee

1. To identify and discuss local needs.
2. To formulate proposals for the development of the village it represents.
3. To determine the extent to which people are willing and able to develop their village on a self help basis.
4. To determine a plan of development for their village.
5. To elicit the help of the District Commissioner and other development agencies in their improvements.
6. To provide a medium of contact between the headman, the Councillor, the people and the District Council and by this means to make the members of the District better informed as to the needs of certain areas and thereby help in the District Council's responsibilities to produce projected District plans of development." Community Development Handbook 1970.

VDCs were established by Presidential Directive in 1968 as the primary institution for promoting development. (Reilly, 1981:38). VDCs are non-statutory, non-political voluntary committees of villagers without legally enforceable powers to raise funds or to invoke sanctions. They are supposed to be elected by the Kgotla every two years. Their results have been mixed.

#### Participation

Henderson (1974:279) found that the VDC attracted those who were "concerned with promoting changes within the village". Vengroff's study of Molepolole (1972:47) found that the VDC was controlled by the Councillor on a political basis and that traditional leaders played a dominant role. The VDC in Vengroff's study was so politicized, that when the opposition succeeded in gaining control of it, the "Committee was summarily dismissed and a new election called for by the M.P." (p.48). Flood (1974:35) found that a sympathetic chief was able to mobilize wide community participation and support. Chambers and Feldman (1973:191) reported dominance of local organisations by wealthier members of the community, remarking

"We were alarmed by the not untypical attitude of a member of a Tribal Land Board, himself a large cattle owner, who said that he welcomed the idea of setting aside communal land for the "small men" (who were also referenced to as "small boys") as this would keep them in an area where

they could'suffer together."

Kocijman (1978:37, 96) found that women were more active than men in the VDC and that attendance was generally low. Kidd (1974:13) found in 102 villages in Central District that VDC meetings were held once or twice a month with an average attendance of eight or nine. One fifth of the problems VDC members mentioned involved poor attendance. Councillors attended about one meeting in three and community development staff two meetings in five. Most members were male, forty years old or older, and had an average of five years of education. On the other hand, thirty percent of the secretaries were women, generally under the age of 39 with more than six years of schooling. Gulbrandsen and Wiig (1977:9) found that an average one third of VDC members were women. Odell (1982:10) found that 43 percent of his sample attended VDC meetings and 31 percent attended them frequently. Tau (1978:Tables 2 and 40) found that in seven of ten villages in North East District failure of VDC members to attend meetings was a problem and that all the people he interviewed said that either VDC did not have regular meetings or that it never met.

Rollings (1974:14) found that the Totome VDC had found it necessary to institute a system of fines for non-attendance. The Local Government Structure Commission recommended that VDC members receiving a sitting allowance and that any member who failed to attend more than two-thirds of the meetings should automatically lose his/her seat (1979:64 recommendations 7.12 and 7.13)

Average attendance at VDC meetings in seven villages over a three month observation period of the institutions research in Central and North-East Districts can be seen in Table 7. Average attendance in seven villages ranged from between 2 and 15 percent of the adult population with actual attendance varying between 1 and 27 percent. While this means that only a small percent of the adult population are actually involved with the VDC, this is not an unreasonable turnout for this sort of organisation.

This research also found that in Southern District villages the VDC was generally known and perceived as being responsible for village development. In Kgatleng District most people knew the VDC was supposed to exist and that it was supposed to lead village development. In Central (Tswapong) District 40 percent of a sample of villagers in one village and 18 percent

in a second village did not know the role of the VDC.<sup>1</sup> In five villages in North-East District all of which had a VDC, 12 percent of a random sample of villagers said either there was no VDC or they did not know if there was one or not. Twenty nine percent did not know what it did. Seven percent of the villagers and seven percent of the leaders gave incorrect descriptions of VDC functions. Sixty three percent of the villagers said they had been consulted by the VDC and sixty seven percent said they had been asked to participate in a VDC project. Fifty one percent of the villagers and seventy seven percent of the leaders could correctly identify VDC projects. The common wisdom is that the village elite belong to the VDC (who else has the time?) and this tends to be true although there are occasional exceptions to the rule. The average age and education of the officers for five VDCs were calculated. The average age ranged from 35 to 50. The average education ranged from four to six years. It is interesting to note however, that local business people rarely participate in any local organisations including the VDC.

Those who attend VDC meetings are more likely to be active participants than those who attend Kgotla meetings. On average 55 percent of the men and 22 percent of the women attending VDC meetings spoke (see Table 5).

### Projects

On the whole, according to previous studies, projects undertaken by VDC's have involved the construction of social infrastructure as can be seen in Table 8. The most common projects were toilets, fencing, classrooms and teacher's quarters in that order. Including fencing schools or teachers quarters over a third (36 percent) of the projects centred around the school. The figure would be even higher if school toilets were included. Only a few projects (the storeroom, the slaughterslab, the Youth Training Centre and possible the water projects) could be said to be directly production related.

Of 25 VDCs studied in this project, 80 had completed at least one project; 64 percent had projects in progress; and 36 percent had new projects planned. (See Table 9). As can be seen in Table 10, of 75 completed projects, only eight had any immediately economic relevance. The rest were social

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1. Such responses may indicate contempt for the organisation rather than actual ignorance on the part of the respondent.

Table 7 VDC Meetings in Study Villages During 12 Week Observation Period

	<u>Village 1</u>	<u>Village 2</u>	<u>Village 3</u>	<u>Village 4</u>	<u>Village 5</u>	<u>Village 6</u>	<u>Village 7</u>
Number of Meetings	None	1	7	2	None	5	2
Average Attendance	-	11	10	16	-	66	59
Average % Population <sup>c</sup>	-	2%	1%	5%	-	11%	15%
Range % Population <sup>c</sup>	-	2%	1-2%	4-6%	-	2-23%	3-27%
% Attended by:							
Headman	-	100%	28%	50%	-	100%	50%
AD	-	100%	28%	0	-	20%	50%
ACDO	-	100%	71%	0	-	20%	0
FWE	-	0	100%	0	-	80%	50%
Headteacher	-	0	57%	50%	-	60%	50%
Councillor	-	0	28%	100%	-	40%	0
Outsiders	-	0	14%	0	-	0	50%

a. North-East and Central Districts

b. Includes joint VDC meetings with other organisations

c. Assumes village population is one-third adults.

Table 8 VDC Projects Identified in Other Studies

	Flood (1974)	Tau (1978)	Isaksen et al (1980:31)	Gulbrandsen & Wiig (1977:63-64)	Total	
Toilets		7	24	75	106	(36%)
School Kitchen			10		10	( 3%)
Storerooms/Kitchens			5		5	( 2%)
Teachers Quarters		5	10	15	30	(10%)
Fences	1	8	5	42	56	(19%)
Revenue House			)	)		
Kgotla		1	)	)		
Guest House			)	)		
Airstrip			)	)		
Standpipe			)	)		
Road Clearing		1	)	)		
Tribal Office			)	16 10 <sup>a</sup> )	35	(12%)
Completion and maintenance of small public structures			)	)		
Storeroom			)	)		
Slaughterslab			)	)		
Mini Healthpost		1	)	6 <sup>b</sup> )		
Meeting Room			)	)		
Training			2		2	1%
Community Centre			4		4	1%
Youth Training Centre			1		1	<1%
Day Care Centre			1		1	<1%
Classrooms		8		24	32	11%
Clinics	1	1		1	2	<1%
Dam	4				4	1%
Other water projects	2	1			2	<1%
Senior Nurses House	1				1	<1%
Clear Football grounds		2			2	<1%
					<hr/> 293	

a. Category is "offices"

b. Category is "health post"

Table 9 Characteristics of VDC's in Study Villages

<u>Village</u>	<u>Number of Members</u>	<u>By-Laws</u>	<u>Minutes</u>	<u>Financial Records</u>	<u>Completed Projects</u>	<u>Projects in Process</u>	<u>Proposed Projects</u>	<u>Frequency of Meetings</u>
1	11	No	Yes	None	None	None	Village toilet Garden	Weekly
2	10	No	Yes	Rough Notes	Store Room Unused Toilet	None	None	Ad hoc
3	9	No	Some-times	Receipts Rough balance	Teachers Quarters Classroom	Renovating Teachers Quarters New Teachers Quarters	None	Frequent
4	10	No	No	None	School teachers houses Bricks for school Transporting school children to sports	Renovating teachers quarters	None	None for seven months
5	2	No	Yes	Bank account	Fencing Teachers Quarters	Building school kitchen	None	Rarely

Table 9 2

<u>Village</u>	<u>Number of Members</u>	<u>By-Laws</u>	<u>Minutes</u>	<u>Financial Records</u>	<u>Completed Projects</u>	<u>Projects in Process</u>	<u>Proposed Projects</u>	<u>Frequency of Meetings</u>
6	20	No	Irregularly taken	Savings account Receipt book Records poorly kept	Construct school Constructed Teachers Quarters Debused School Grounds Built Kgotla	Building new Teachers Quarters Maintaining Teachers Quarters	None	Ad hoc frequent
7	11	No	Yes	Bank account No proper records Receipt book newly started	Building Residences local Police and Court Clerk	Building School Kitchen	None	Ad hoc
8	11	No	Yes Poor	Poor	None	None	None	Sporadic
9	9	Yes	Some-times	Good bank account	Built Primary School	Storeroom	Health Post	Every two months
10	11	No	Poor	Poor	Upgraded dam Built storeroom Built Kgotla Applied for graveyard	None	Tribal House Dam de-silting Kgotla toilets	Sporadic

Table 9 3

<u>Village</u>	<u>Number of Members</u>	<u>By-Laws</u>	<u>Minutes</u>	<u>Financial Records</u>	<u>Completed Projects</u>	<u>Projects in Process</u>	<u>Proposed Projects</u>	<u>Frequency of Meetings</u>
11	5+	No	Yes	Very poor	None	Construct Teachers Quarters		Once per fortnight
12	4+	Yes	Yes	Very poor	None	Build Community Hall	None	Weekly
13	5+	-	Yes poor	Yes poor	Built Clinic, Community Centre, Tribal Office, Three Teachers Quarters, ACDO's House, Four Classrooms, Two Dams, Village borehole, Youth Training and Community Centre (YTCC)	YTCC	None	Sporadic
14	9	Yes	Yes	Yes	Raised funds for Post Office Opening, Built Classrooms	Kgotla Toilet	None	Sporadic
15	3	-	Yes	Yes	Built four class rooms, Kgotla Toilet Labour for school renovation	Building House for Court Clerk for four years	None	Rarely

Table 9 4

<u>Village</u>	<u>Number of Members</u>	<u>By-Laws</u>	<u>Minutes</u>	<u>Financial Records</u>	<u>Completed Projects</u>	<u>Projects in Process</u>	<u>Proposed Projects</u>	<u>Frequency of Meetings</u>
16	8	-	Yes	Yes Bank Account	Built eight houses, Two Classrooms, 15 Toilets  Organised Postal Bag  Dug Garden	None	Building Community Hall  Planting Garden	Sporadic
17	10	Yes	Yes	Yes	Contributed to building School - cash and labour  Two rondavels for AD	None	Kgotla Toilets  VDC Offices	Sporadic
18	9	-	-	Yes	Built five Rondavels, Cement House with Kitchen, School Toilets, Kgotla Toilets.  Opened Postal Agency	None	None Eight basic needs identified for Council action	Once per fortnight

Table 9 5

<u>Village</u>	<u>Number of Members</u>	<u>By-Lawe</u>	<u>Minutes</u>	<u>Financial Records</u>	<u>Completed projects</u>	<u>Projects in Process</u>	<u>Proposed Projects</u>	<u>Frequency of Meetings</u>
19	11	-	Yes	Yes	Built Guest House, Classroom Block, Market Building, Kraal at Kgotla, Fenced water taps, Encouraged digging of Rubbish Pits Persuaded Botswana-craft to purchase locally, Formation of Agricultural Show Committee, Establishment of Post Office	Request for Police Bank Branch, Camp BAMB Depot, Breeding camp. Coordinates other village committees		Once per fortnight
20	10	-	Yes	Yes	None	Health Post	None	Once per fortnight
21	11	-	Yes Very poor	No	Built Health Post (not used - too dark)	None	None	Sporadic
22	13	-	Yes	Yes	Built Tribal Administration Office, Two Tirelo Sechaba houses, Kgotla Kraal	Fencing Village Taps	Kgotla Toilet	Monthly

Table 9 6

<u>Village</u>	<u>Number of Members</u>	<u>By-Laws</u>	<u>Minutes</u>	<u>Financial Records</u>	<u>Completed Projects</u>	<u>Projects in Process</u>	<u>Proposed Projects</u>	<u>Frequency of Meetings</u>
23	12	-	Some-times	No	Built Health Post, House for FWE, Tirelo Sechaba House	None	None	Monthly
24	9	-	Yes	No	Built Kgotla Kraal, Butchery, Kgotla Toilet, Three Guest Houses, Teachers Quarters, School Kitchen, Healthpost Waiting Room, Market Shelter, Fenced School, Moulded Bricks, Re-fenced Kgotla Kraal, Re-roofed School Kitchen, Fenced Water Taps		Village Garden	Once per fortnight
25	10	-	Some-times	No	Established Private School, Built three Teachers Quarters	Building Storeroom for Market	None	Monthly

Based on data from Central, Kgatleng, Ngamiland, North-East and Southern Districts

Table 10 VDC Projects in Study Villages by Ministry

<u>Project Status</u>	<u>Office of President</u>	<u>Agric-ulture</u>	<u>Health</u>	<u>Educ-ation</u>	<u>Commerce</u>	<u>MLGL</u>	<u>Productive Relevance</u>
Completed <sup>b</sup>	2	9	14	29	10	10	8
In Progress	-	2	3	8	4	2	3
Proposed	-	4	5	-	-	4	4
Total	2 (2%)	15 (14%)	22 (21%)	37 (35%)	14 (13%)	16 (15%)	15 (14%)

a. Projects were not necessarily initiated by the Ministry in question, but are related to its work.

b. One project, moulding bricks, could not be assigned to any particular Ministry. Thus only 74 projects are accounted for.

infrastructure such as teachers' quarters, classrooms, toilets and so on. Of 19 projects in progress, three have immediate economic relevance. Of 13 projects planned, four have immediate economic relevance. The early emphasis on social infrastructure brought the first schools to many villages and provided the VDC with experience in planning and implementation. By now the need for social infrastructure has been minimally satisfied in most villages except for the very remote. Now the need in villages would seem to be for resource management plans and for income generating activities if the increasing economic problems are to be dealt with.

### Problems

The problems experienced by the VDC are the same as those experienced by village organisations in general. Thus, the discussion here should be taken as applying to other modern organisations and, to some extent, to traditional institutions as well.

### Inappropriate Organisational Structures

There are three inter-related issues here: organisational structures and procedures, leadership structures, and the nature of functions which organisations are permitted to perform.

### Organisational Structures and Procedures

In the 1974 VDC Conferences in Central District some of the delegates were unable to do the planned exercises because they were illiterate (Kidd, 1974: 32). This is only one of many examples of the problems encountered in modern organisations. Almost without exception modern organisations have been initiated by outsiders, who have followed a Western organisational model. Such groups are supposed to have a written constitution, keep written records (minutes and financial accounts), follow formal meeting procedures, and elect a full slate of officers.

There are two negative aspects to this approach. The first is that few rural residents understand these forms or understand how to make them work. The result is a pro forma implementation of what they have been told to do. Thus villagers obediently elect a full slate of no less than six officers in a village of 600 people. It is hard to imagine what a vice-secretary, for example, does in such a situation.<sup>2</sup> Minutes are duly taken (sometimes in English!) which are unintelligible to everyone with the possible exception of the person who took them. Instead of being a tool for getting things done, these procedures impede activity.

The second negative feature of these forms is that they often become the focus of attention rather than the substance of what the organisation is supposed to do. Form for form's sake becomes the order of the day. Thus a would-be fencing group cannot get AEL0 funds unless they have a written constitution which they will never use in the short period of their existence.

A far better approach would be to utilise forms with which people are familiar. Sometimes this may involve beginning with a consensus-based, loose organisation similar to the Kgotla. In other cases, people may be familiar with more formal organisational structures such as church groups, burial societies, or football clubs. Such forms may be strengthened and adapted to take on duties which are necessary to accomplish new tasks. But to impose an elaborate and alien system for its own sake only causes confusion.

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2. The "vice-position" sometimes appears to be used as a sort of consolation prize. The winner gets the position and the loser is "the -vice".

The confusion may rapidly degenerate into cynicism when it is discovered that the organisation in fact has no functions to perform. An elaborate organisational structure is especially inappropriate when applied to seasonal or one-time problems. There is no particular reason why organisations should not seasonally emerge on an ad hoc basis, deal with the problem, and fade away again.

#### Leadership Structures

Sixty-two percent of the VDCs and thirty-nine percent of 62 other modern organisations in 21 villages were reported to have weak leaders. At least part of the problem is that people have been placed in leadership positions which they do not understand and which have no real functions in the village environment. Often officers are elected by villagers who, understanding neither the organisations nor the roles, use the elections for other purposes. Officers may be elected from the royal family to re-affirm the traditional leadership or because no other alternative is even thought imaginable. This has occurred in the recent VDC elections in Moshopa. Elections may be used to repay old debts or old grudges or to play an enormous joke by electing the least suitable person imaginable. Thus very inappropriate people may end up holding office. Even when officers are chosen for their honesty, sobriety and activeness, they are likely to be ill prepared to perform the necessary duties.

The process of elections is not very well understood,<sup>3</sup> the feeling sometimes being that a whole new slate of officers is required to be elected. This has the effect of eliminating cumulative learning among office holders. In other cases, once an election is held the event is never repeated and officers, seemingly trapped in the organisations for life, eventually become inactive.

Yet another problem is that the way villagers perceive qualities necessary for a "modern" leader may restrict the potential field. Richer and better educated people are most frequently chosen. Thus one finds that opinion leaders in the village may not necessarily hold office. There is considerable overlap in formally elected leaders. The average officer held more than one leadership position and was generally a member of other organisations as well.

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3. There is no word in Setswana which adequately expresses the rather narrow western view of nominations. Rather the word used means "to choose" - a broader connotation. Chris Brown brought this observation of John Camm's to my attention.

Thus no matter how qualified for the office they might be, their effectiveness is likely to be reduced because they are over-extended.

It is easy to see why leadership, in village organisations as a whole, despite a probably adequate pool of talent, is generally so poor. First, the incumbents generally do not understand what it is they should do. Second, those who could help them, the ACDOs, are often ill-informed themselves and in any event, the cadre as a whole is singularly ineffective. Third, there is no constituency for many organisations, particularly those which are supposed to have a village-wide function. Committees are elected in the kgotla because villagers are told to elect them. That act does not provide a constituency particularly since the villagers don't know what the officers should do either. Thus, unlike the situation described in Comaroff (1975), in regard to the Chieftainship, there is no one to remind an office how he/she should be behaving. Thus, the social pressure which operates in the traditional sphere is much less effective in the modern sphere.

There is a need to provide clear job definitions and reinforcement of those definitions, if village leadership is to improve. As it is, the problem of weak leaders and weak organisations can become a vicious cycle. Weak leaders are elected who create a weak organisation to which weak leaders might as well be elected.

#### Organisational Functions

The functions that the VDC and other organisations might perform overlap with those which have been assumed by various governmental bodies. As a result the spheres of village decision making have been steadily reduced or subject to conflict as government penetration of the rural areas has increased.

#### Resource Management

The ability of villages to plan and implement resource management has been limited in some spheres because Land Boards and Subordinate Land Boards control the allocation of land and man-made water points. In three sites there was open hostility between villagers and the Land Board whom the villagers saw as outsiders working for the interests of rich and influential people. In many other cases the Land Board was resented for being unreasonably slow to act. Since Land Board members are appointed, not elected by the

village constituency, they are not accountable to rural residents and both they and the rural residents know it. There is an appeal procedure but it is time-consuming and the local perception is that influential people will generally win. Other issues involved in village resource management will be discussed in Chapter VI.

#### Social Infrastructure

Originally many villages obtained infrastructure by undertaking it through the VDC on a self-help basis. This role has been largely taken over by District Councils. This has not only removed from villagers the need to mobilise for any other than minor infrastructure (such as Kgotla latrines), it has also removed from them the authority to do this. Thus, on occasion, villages have been told they must not build their own school as Council will do it, after which they settled down for a long wait during which Council, in fact, does not do it.

A related effect is that communities have no control over how such facilities are run. A head teacher may capriciously prevent a community from utilising school classrooms (even those built under self help). A staff nurse may behave in an abusive fashion to local residents. Teachers may be drunk in the classroom. The experience of those few communities brave enough to complain to Council is that their words go unheeded.

Delays and unexplained rejections significantly reduce the likelihood of any future community action. Often communities are asked to plan projects which must be approved at the District or National level. Such approval may be long in coming and rejections may occur for seemingly capricious reasons. (See Isaksen et al, 1980) and Flood (1974).

In the final analysis rural residents are being asked to set up governing forms without governing powers over issues that most concern them. Since most people in these areas have far too much to do as it is, they have no interest in playing governing games and they stay away. One result of this is the steady erosion of the concept of civic responsibility. This surely must be especially acute among the youth who often have no role model of civic responsibility to observe and emulate.

### Financial Fears

Flood (1974:35), Allen and Selwin (1978:19) and Isaksen et al (1980:121) all mention the problem of misappropriation of VDC funds.

Twenty-four percent of 21 VDCs and 16 percent of 62 other modern organisations in this study are reported to have suffered from misuse of funds. If only the organisations which actually had funds to be misused were considered, the percentage would be even higher. The result of misuse of funds is that people become increasingly less willing to contribute to or participate in activities which are seen as simply lining the pockets of others.

Some losses of funds are the work of con-men and thieves from outside. More often, funds are taken by organisation officers. One factor which permits such actions is the atrocious state of such financial records as exist (and often they do not exist at all). Sixty percent of the VDCs and twenty-one percent of other modern organisations were characterised as having poor records.<sup>4</sup> People who wish to steal from the average organisation need not do fancy manipulation of the books, as the books (if they exist) are usually so chaotic as to make it impossible to tell what money the organisation has or how it has been spent. All the would-be thief has to do is take what is there.

The terrible state of records in general results from several factors. One is innumeracy among villagers. Treasurers who are not frivolously elected may nonetheless be chosen for reasons (honesty, commitment) other than the ability to keep books. Second, in general, neither VDC members nor other villagers have any experience with written financial records and therefore fail to understand either their purpose or the possibilities for the uses to which they might be put. Third, those who should be helping villagers (generally the ACDOs) may not be all that good at accounts themselves. There is no particular reason to believe that extension staff are good at accounts. Accounts at higher levels of government often do not serve as

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4. In 1972, the Under Secretary (Rural) wrote to the District Commissioner as follows "It is quite clear that either the Treasurers of VDC's in North East are not up to scratch or no accounts are being kept. By copy of this Savingram, the Assistant Community Development Officer, North East District is requested to assist the Council Secretary by ensuring that proper accounts are kept by VDC's in his area in future". LG 19/3/7 (68).

particularly good models. In 1980 the Water Points Survey was unable to find a District Council which could say whether the fees it collected from cattle boreholes met the costs of operation. When pumper receipts could be found at all, they had generally been flung into a heap in a dusty store room. Is there any reason to expect better records at the village level? A fourth problem is that those who do try to set up accounting systems are often given inappropriate tools to work with. There is no single system adopted for use in villages. Some systems are quite admirable from the accounting standpoint but are needlessly elaborate and quite unmanageable from the village standpoint. There is a need to develop a single system for use by all village organisations. Accounting personnel must be restrained from adding elegant but unnecessary frills to this system. Training and follow-up can then be coordinated and so that once a person is trained, he/she can do the same job in other organisations. At present, VDC training courses do not provide adequate or useful information on bookkeeping.

A second factor which permits the theft of funds is that the thieves often go unprosecuted. Sometimes this is because the theft could not be proven according to the rules of evidence in courts of law. But sometimes when the thief is known and the evidence is there, still nothing is done. Sometimes fear is the key. If the thief is the headman or another member of the royal family, or if he/she is a member of government or related to financial or political influentials, fear of retribution may prevent action. Another factor is that no one may be willing to fight for the money of an organisation as they would fight for their own money. They simply refrain from contributing in the future. It is probably only government which can tackle this problem. This would require someone (perhaps the ACDO or some District level official) to audit accounts regularly and to bring malfeasors to justice regardless of who they are. Such audits could also serve a follow-up training function. It is unfortunately not clear that the capacity to institute such a service exists at the District level.

### Trust

Some organisations are crippled by a lack of trust among members or would-be members. The lack of trust may have its roots in negative factors - inter-ethnic conflict, the prevalence of witchcraft, or a history of misdeeds or personal tensions. In other cases there is no trust because nothing has occurred to develop it. Since the most successful organisations are those

characterised by trust and solidarity, it is worth considering the factors which promote this. Solidarity may have its roots in historical accident. Of all the villages studied, those with the highest solidarity were those which had been forced together in common conflict with some outsider. Thus a community which had struggled for its land against the Tati company and with the Government for official recognition retained a very high level of solidarity. Similarly some refugee communities were brought together through the process of building a new home. Similarly another extremely active community owes at least part of its solidarity to the fact that it was a small community of a minority ethnic group, surrounded by members of another powerful and dominant ethnic group. Such conditions are not, of course, subject to manipulation by would-be rural developers. However, rural development workers should be alert to these conditions, as these communities are likely to be more receptive to group work.

In the more typical community, solidarity is built up through the process of establishing mutual obligations and benefits. Neighbours help each other in times of sickness, accident, and death. Resources such as water points are jointly used and maintained. (See Roe and Fortmann, 1982; Mahoney, 1977). It is more likely that small groups of neighbours will be characterised by such solidarity than a whole community.

#### Relations between Traditional and Modern Village Leaders

The VDC is elected in the Kgotla and generally must work through it to communicate with the village at large. In theory, the VDC is an arm of the Kgotla, in practice, there is often tension between them. Syson (1972:63) reports having made announcements in the Kgotla which VDC members never heard. Chambers and Feldman (1973:187) found that where there was a split between the Councillor and headman, the former tended to use the VDC as a rural organisation which the headman then refused to attend. Finnigan (1976: 20) commented that a VDC which was opposed by the headman was "doomed to failure". Kidd (1974:22) quoted a headman as saying "They say that I'm maliciously opposing the project but I'm not. I just want to be consulted so that I can understand the changes thoroughly." Kooijman (1978:118) also noted these rivalries. Flood (1974:182) pointed out the necessity of making the headman feel involved and according him the proper respect in order to obtain his corporation. As Vengroff (1972:53) has pointed out many of these apparently political problems have their roots in factional disputes among

the traditional elites. Thus, we would expect to find the traditional anit-chief faction lining up behind the VDC chairman or councillor.

While such tensions may add to the general excitement of village life, they are often absolutely devastating to the process of rural development. The Kgocia does not have and is unlikely ever to have its own executive capacities. The VDC can not communicate effectively with villagers without the Kgotla. A first priority for strengthening the VDC must be to tie it more closely to the Kgotla.

#### Strengthening the Role of the VDC in Development

Problem Identification: The VDC could undertake the organisation of problem identification by, for example, organising a listening survey (see Rick and Stanley, 1982:78-83). Ultimately however, the VDC must rely upon the Kgotla to elicit discussion by the village at large.

Identification of Interventions Because is is a smaller, more manageable group of people, the VDC is better suited than the Kgotla to seeking out the advice of more technically qualified persons as a step toward identifying interventions. Again it must rely upon upon the Kgotla to communicate with the rest of the village.

Deciding What to Do VDC's already take this step, but often, it would appear, without adequate prior consultation and planning. If village development efforts are to succeed, it is crucial that these decisions be endorsed in Kgotla. The VDC may (indeed probably should) weigh the options and come to some sort of preliminary decision.

Implementation: The small size and structure of the VDC makes it more suitable for undertaking project implementation than the more amorphous Kgotla. For some simple one-shot projects, the VDC may wish simply to delegate, responsibilities for specific tasks to certain members. More complicated, longer term projects will require VDC members to master the use of financial and other written records. Odell(1982) might be consulted for a useful village information system. Within the VDC structure it should be easier to hold specific persons accountable for accomplishing certain tasks. They can also be sanctioned by being voted out of office, which is not possible with the Kgotla structure. It is within the realm of project implementation

that the necessity of the role of the VDC as the aim of the Kgotla becomes apparent.

Evaluation: The VDC may initiate the evaluation process - gathering facts, soliciting opinions. However in the end it must again turn to the Kgotla for public discussion.

In addition to those recommendations pertaining to headmen which will have the effect of strengthening the VDC through increased cooperation with the Kgotla, the following policy recommendations have been made to Government.

1) That the Rural Development Council expedite the implementation of LGSC recommendations 7.15, 7.16 and 7.22 by supporting MLGL's efforts to revise the job descriptions of ACDO's to emphasise VDC's with explicit duties thereto listed. (MLGL).

One reason for the weak state of extension support is that ACDO's are asked to do too many and too various things. Further, they do not know what it is they are supposed to do to help VDCs. This recommendation should help them focus their energies effectively.

2) It is recommended that MLGL expedite the implementation of LGSC recommendations 7.14 and 7.15 by revising the VDC handbook with appropriately detailed sections on structures, procedures, responsibilities - of personnel and bookkeeping and involvement of traditional authority. (MLGL)

This should provide additional structure to assist ACDOs in working with the VDCs.

3) RDC should advise RECC/MLGL to produce a single simplified bookkeeping system to be used by all local organisations and to institute a training/audit service for VDCs. (MLGL)

Prompt implementation and follow-up of this recommendation is crucial for resolving the very critical problem of financial accountability and credibility which most if not all modern organisations face.

4) It is recommended that District Councils and the appropriate Ministries expedite the delegation of authority to VDCs in the form of LG17 Block Grants. (MLGL).

LG17 is a first and important step in devolving authority to local organisations. Without such authority neither the members nor other villagers will take them seriously and they will fail to be effective.

5) It is recommended that the VDC as the principle sub-committee of the Kgotla be the local institution through which Government consultations are initiated and that the VDC be responsible for endorsing and coordinating village development projects. (MLGL).

This recommendation is intended to strengthen the ties between VDC and Kgotla, place the VDC in the position of acting as the executive arm of the Kgotla and to bring about coordination of development activities at the village level.

6) Government should involve local communities in the evaluation of the performance of extension workers (RECC).

It has been suggested that this can most effectively be done through the VDCs thus widening the scope of their authority.

## CHAPTER IV OTHER MODERN ORGANISATIONS

This category covers a great mixed bag of organisations from producers and consumer cooperatives to farmers committees to women's groups to the PTA. Some of these organisations have very old roots. PTAs, for instance, stem from the Tribal School Committees organised in 1931 which had major responsibilities for running local schools. (Dumbrell, 1933). PTA's have remained highly active in many areas. Hunnes (1980:106) found in Tsabong that 54 percent of those who participated in village development had been involved in a school-related activity. The PTA had built a library, dividing the village into two working groups for the task. Vengroff (1972:95-101) described a highly mobilised PTA which represented the concerns of parents to an unresponsive Council staff. He also found (p.223-224) statistically significant differences between the attitudes and behaviour of members of organisations and non-members. Organisation members were more likely than non-members to feel the Council and VDC did more to help the village than the chief or headman; to feel that village problems should be taken to the Council or VDC rather than the Chief or headman; to have worked on self help projects and to have done so to improve the village not just for the food; and to intend to work on self-help projects in the future. Cooperatives, VDC, BCW, PTA, YWCA and Burial Societies were the biggest organisations in that order. (p221). Kooijman (1978:118) remarked that football clubs and burial societies were the strongest organisations in Bokaa. Odell (1982:10) found between 4 and 22 percent of his sample attended meetings of such organisations frequently with the PTA drawing the most, and the YWCA the least people.

It is not uncommon to find modern organisations connected in some way to more traditional organisations. Uhlenbeck and Kocken (1980:109) found that burial societies are frequently based on regiments. Holm (1972:86) pointed out that royals were often elected to office. Henderson (1974:245-254) noted that borehole syndicates were often organised on a ward basis.

Willet (1981) has written exhaustively on the subject of agricultural groups. His report should be consulted for information on such groups.

The following mode. organisations were found in survey villages:

1. Parent-Teachers Associations - generally responsible for hiring and

paying the school cook, raising funds for transporting children to competition, building and/or maintaining classrooms, school kitchens, school fences and/or teachers quarters. Often but not always a strong organisation.

2. Farmers Committees - in theory a coordinating body for other agricultural groups but often without function.
3. Borehole Syndicates - associations of private individuals who operate and maintain a borehole generally for watering livestock.
4. Water Groups/Dam Groups - operate and maintain a water point which sometimes has been provided by the Government.
5. Dip Tank Groups - build, operate and maintain a dip tank often with Government help.
6. Spray Race Groups - build, operate and maintain a spray race, often with Government help.
7. Dosing Groups - cooperatively dose (generally) small stock against disease.
8. Smallstock Committee - organise materials for the care of small stock.
9. Fencing Groups - build drift fences.
10. 4-B - generally school children led by school teachers - undertake mostly gardening (apparently generally unsuccessful), crafts, and traditional dancing.
11. Bakery Group - group of individuals who were trying to establish a bakery.
12. Jotswana Council of Women - a national organisation with village branches. Generally undertakes home-making skills - cooking, knitting, sewing. Generally small or defunct.
13. Young Women's Christian Association - a national organisation with village branches. Generally undertaking home-making skills - cooking, knitting, sewing. Generally small or defunct. Where the YWCA and BCW are in the same village,

they seem to spend much of their energies fighting with each other.

14. Political Parties - are rarely found in the villages. Where they do exist, they place their efforts on fund raising.
15. Red Cross - cares for destitutes - often small or moribund.
16. Village Health Committee - home visits, encourages village sanitation - often small but occasionally vigorous.
17. Burial Societies - mutual funds to pay for burials - see below for more details.
18. Thrift and Loan Societies - savings associations.
19. Cooperative Marketing Societies - generally centred around livestock - suffer staffing problems.
20. Social Welfare Committee - responsible for destitutes - generally small or moribund.
21. Consumer Cooperative Societies - suffer staff problems.
22. Popular Theatre Committees - put on plays (intended to mobilise the populace) on request.
23. Youth Associations - general groups intended to involve youth in development.
24. Producers Association - rare
25. Churches and church groups - multitudinous, splintered and active

#### General Observations

It is very difficult to generalise about these organisations as their state varies considerably from place to place. An organisation which is non-existent or a joke in one place, is the strongest organisation in a village elsewhere. For details on any particular kind of organisation, the District reports

should be consulted. Even then, it would still be necessary to take a systematic look at the organisations in any specific village where work is contemplated.

With this warning a few generalisations can be made about these organisations.

1. A very small proportion of the population is involved in these organisations. Only four to eight percent of the adult village population attended the average meeting. However, it should be noted that these organisations are not necessarily geared towards large memberships. This does not include the churches which, although they are very active, are rarely involved in development activities. Some cooperatives are the sole exception to the low participation in these organisations. Forty percent of one village turned out for a cooperative meeting, the highest turnout of any meeting during the period May - August, 1982. (See Table 11).
2. Most villages suffer from modern organisational over-kill. When someone wants to do something in a village, starting a new organisation seems almost a knee-jerk reaction. Most villages are littered with the carcasses of moribund committees and organisations. A moratorium on new organisations might well be considered. Instead, the capacity of existing organisations to perform other roles should be examined. For example, instead of setting up a Social Welfare Committee, the ACDO could approach ward heads or churches. Instead of forming a new youth association every six months, interested students could work with the 4-B. Perhaps there could be an all-purpose Women's Club instead of a rival BCW and YWCA. National organisations could be gently persuaded to assist cooperation and development in the rural areas instead of fostering dissension and competition between groups.
3. The level of active participation is highest in these organisations. In North-East and Central District study villages, fifty-four percent of the men and thirty percent of the women attending these meetings spoke. Of course, it is in women's organisations that women are freest to participate. Further, people belong to these organisations because they want to for reasons of interest, prestige or other benefits.
4. Where someone is held accountable for their activity, these organisations can be very effective. The most spectacular organisational feat during the whole research involved the North East District Sports and Music Competitions.

Table 11 Meetings of Other Modern Organisations in Study Villages During Twelve Week Observation Period<sup>a</sup>

	<u>Village 1</u>	<u>Village 2</u>	<u>Village 3</u>	<u>Village 4</u>	<u>Village 5</u>	<u>Village 6</u>	<u>Village 7</u>
Number of Meetings	2	9	6	None	7	17	3
Average Attendance	23	33	25	-	14	41	12
Average % Population <sup>b</sup>	8%	6%	4%	-	4%	7%	3%
Range % Population <sup>b</sup>	6-10%	1-40%	1-5%	-	3-4%	1-19%	1-6%
% Attended by							
Headman	50%	11%	16%	-	50%	76%	33%
AD	100%	55%	16%	-	0%	0	0
ACDO	0	55%	66%	-	14%	11%	0
FWE	100%	33%	83%	-	86%	64%	100%
Headteacher	0	0	16%	-	86%	47%	33%
Councillor	0	0	33%	-	28%	64%	33%
Outsiders	0	0	0	-	0	29%	0

a. North East and Central Districts

b. Assumes population is one-third adults

(These competitions are held in each District.) Villagers all over the District organised money, chaperones, food and transport for hundreds of children to attend this event. The crucial factor was constant pressure and support from the Head Teachers whose image in front of colleagues was at stake. Apparently a good time is had by all, or parents would not duplicate this feat year after year. One wonders if ADs and ACDOs were subject to similar peer group pressure, the status of other village organisations might be different.

5. These organisations have a potential for reaching special interest groups. Agricultural projects would most sensibly be channelled through the Farmer's Committees; women's projects through the Women's Club. The VDC could play a coordinating function. (See Chapter III).

It is worth taking a special look at Burial Societies which are most prevalent in Kgatleng District, Members of these societies contribute to a pool of money which is used to pay for the burial of the member and selected family members. Members must attend the funerals of other members of the society. In contrast to most other organisations, these societies are characterised by a very high attendance rate (failure to attend is punished) and by an apparent absence of misuse of funds. The very same people who are members of these exemplary organisations are also the members of organisations characterised by apathy, disorder, and mis-use of funds. The explanation of the latter state of affairs thus is clearly not the character of the individuals involved as they behave quite differently in burial societies.

The answer seems to lie instead in the fact that burial societies create mutual obligations and mutual benefits. It is a mode of operation which is similar to the everyday acts of neighbourly assistance which characterises much of rural life. Indeed, burial societies were begun not by some outside extension worker, but by the people themselves to solve their own needs.<sup>1</sup> Some of the elements of Western organisation are found in burial societies. For example, society money is generally kept in a bank account and proper records kept. But these practices are tools to facilitate the goals of the society, not ends in themselves.

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1. It is this which is the most crucial factor. Burial societies begun by ACDOs in other Districts have failed miserably.

Some lessons can be learned from burial societies. First these groups control a resource which is clearly theirs - their own money. On occasion government has tried to put into the hands of a small group of people what is considered to be a communal resource. This is a surefire way of generating conflict. Second these groups are relatively small and membership is clearly defined. It is much easier to exercise social control in a small group than a large one. It is almost impossible to exercise social control when membership is ambiguous as in most ostensibly community-wide organisations in which one does not have to declare oneself 'in'. In such organisations the lines of responsibility and obligation are blurred. Third, mutual effort is necessary for the mutual benefit and that benefit is very important to the members. If people do not consider the benefit from group action important to them, their participation will be at best minimal. The classic example is the nearly universal disinterest in building Kgotla latrines. Further, people who can obtain the same benefit with the same or less effort on their own are unlikely to participate. Finally, because the benefit is important and obtainable only through mutual action, members see to it that other members fulfill their obligations. They themselves will lose if other members shirk their duties.

Other modern organisations can be expected to assist in most phases of small specialised projects. Farmers Committees have already been mentioned as groups through which problems and projects concerning agriculture can be and are identified. Similarly because these groups are small and therefore more easily mobilised, they might well be involved in project implementation.

The constant danger is that where these organisations are small and energetic, outsiders will find them more congenial to work with. This tendency could allow small mobilised groups of people to capture a disproportionate share of available resources. Another factor to beware of is that these groups sometimes represent various village factions. The unvary worker may end up trapped in the clutches of a single faction wondering why the rest of the village will not work with him/her. Yet another factor is that with the exception of the Farmers Committee, these organisations are village-based and village focused. Thus they are less functional during the ploughing season and permanent lands residents are rarely members. Projects for permanent residents at the lands will have to be made directly, through the Farmers Committee or occasionally through the Kgotla. Finally, it is frequently

only the elite who have the time or inclination to join these groups. The interests of the poor may be so compatible with the interest of the more affluent on some issues that these organisations can not be used. In such a case a new organisation may be called for.

Strengthening the Role of Other Modern Organisations in Development

The roles which these organisations can be expected to play are like those which the VDC might be expected to undertake except on a smaller, more particular scale. The major problem is to get these organisations to focus on specific issues in a constructive way. If the VDC, as recommended, undertakes a coordinating function, much overlap and squabbling may be reduced. It has also been recommended:

1) That any new programme or project calling for the establishment of permanent organisations at the village level be subject to approval and coordination by RECC. (MLGL)

This is not intended to discourage grass-roots initiatives. It is intended to prevent the proliferation of hollow organisations formed as often as not to simulate activity or to lighten an extension worker's work load.

2) With immediate effect, Social Welfare Committees and Village Health Committees where they exist be merged into a single Health and Welfare subcommittee of the VDC. (MLGL)

This will eliminate at least one point of overlap and friction.

## CHAPTER V GOVERNMENT INVOLVEMENT IN COMMUNAL DEVELOPMENT

"Some civil servants and politicians may from time to time lose touch with the real needs of the people..." Sir Seretse Khama (1971:14).

Despite wide ethnic and geographical variations, the state of local institutions across the country was remarkably similar. The factor which all areas had in common and which is probably the major source of this similarity is government intervention. Four factors are important here: the nature of governmental links, the imposition of priorities and organisational forms, the bureaucratization of action, and the lack of coordination within government.

#### Community-Governmental Links

As a general rule participation particularly in Kgotla meetings is largely passive. This is consistent with the prevalent style of government communication, generally a top-down lecturing approach which does not encourage questioning. Even those officers who are sincerely interested in participation by the people often do not have the skills to put people at their ease and elicit communication. There are two unfortunate results of this style. One is that government does not know what people are thinking. This lack of knowledge sometimes leads to inappropriate, unpopular and unsuccessful programmes. Second, villagers are often equally in the dark about what government officials are trying to tell them. All channels of communication seem subject to this difficulty. Sometimes a letter (generally in English) is sent to the headteacher to translate and read to the people. The resulting message is sometimes garbled. (Isaksen *et al.* 1980:62) noted how ineffective sending a letter is). Sometimes an officer who does not speak the local language addresses the people with the aid of an interpreter. Anyone who has done this knows the sinking feeling that comes from having a one minute explanation translated into three words. The confusion which arises from this method is nearly loundless. But even when a speaker of the local language deliver<sup>a</sup> the message, people can and do misunderstand. The concept may be difficult to understand and people afraid to ask the questions. Or, the officer may say too much at once, going into detail before the general principal is understood or accepted. People may interpret the message according to inappropriate expectations. If people do not like the message, they may also deliberately misunderstand. One way to reduce these situations is for government officers to master communication techniques which encourage and facilitate the active participation of villagers in

discussing the message.

However, Picard's (1977:426, 596-587) finding that most Government officials (both Council and District Administration) see their roles in terms of keeping the peace and maintenance administration, does not offer much hope that they will assume the more active, development-oriented roles suggested here. The problem is not only the way officials define their roles, but also the way they perceive villagers. In a recent meeting an official whom the very villagers he was talking about would have described as a "young boy", characterised villagers as being too irresponsible to be allowed the use of public buildings without a thorough prior investigation by Council employees. Here, of course, is a classic case of the clash between the traditional system of status based on age and the new system based, among other things, on education and wealth.

Vengroff (1972:95-100) describes a case of such attitudes in action. When the Council Education Secretary without prior notification and for no apparent reason, abruptly transferred 100 children in mid-term from one primary school to another more remote one, the parents protested actively through the PTA and their Councillors presenting seven objective and valid reasons for their objections. While one might expect this to be applauded as an example of responsible civic involvement, the Education Secretary told the parents they had no right to oppose the action and accused them of being "petty, ignorant, and argumentative." The issue eventually was taken up in a meeting attended by the MP's, and various Council employees. In a closed meeting held before the parents were allowed to enter, the Education Secretary convinced his colleagues that the parents were "ignorant" and did not understand "modern" ways and the parents' plea was rejected out of hand. One of the parents' major grievances was that the transfer would almost certainly ensure that their children would fail the all-important Standard VII exam. Education is considered a "modern" value. Hence, the decision on the part of Government officials is a clear indication of their propensity to ignore the facts and follow their prejudices. One of the results of this experience was to alienate the people from the Government.

In theory every village has two people whose duty it is to present their views to the government - the Member of Parliament and the Councillor. The MP who plays an active part in village life is the exception. Some villages

haven't seen their MP's for years. However, to be sure, there are MPs who have literally led development in their areas.

The behaviour of the more locally based Councillors is not much different. Of the 22 Councillors studied, five (possibly six) were actively involved in the village. (See Table 12). One actually led development efforts in his village. Since the activities of one councillor was almost consistently destructive, the most optimistic assessment is that 23 percent of the councillors actually represented these villages.<sup>1</sup> It should be noted that councillors represent more than one village which causes logistical problems. Of the 38 Kgotla meetings held in seven villages in North East and Central over a three months period, 20 were attended by Councillors. In seven of these meetings the Councillor was simply in the entourage of a senior government official or the MP. If these essentially ceremonial meetings are excluded, Councillors attended 41 percent of the Kgotla meetings. In three villages the Councillor attended no working Kgotla meetings at all in a three month period. Councillors attended six of the 17 VDC meetings (35 percent) held during this period.<sup>2</sup>

In short, upward channels of communication from rural residents to Government at both the District and national level function very poorly. At times the gap seems as large as it was between rural people and those who literally did not know their language or culture.

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1. In the North East District a BDP Councillor is nominated in every place an opposition councillor is elected (See Daily News 10 November 1969). This practice has caused considerable confusion and bitterness. Because of this double representation in North East, the 22 councillors actually represented only 18 villages. Thus, although only 22 percent of the councillors actually represented their constituency, 28 percent of the villages were represented by an active councillor. The Councillors can not be entirely faulted for their failure to act as advocates for their constituents. In the case of the school transfer cited above, the two councillors vigorously represented the valid complaints of their constituents "until it was made clear to them that further opposition on their party would be interpreted as an attack on the ruling party". (Vengroff 1972:100).
  2. It should be noted that unlike VDC members, Councillors are reasonably well paid. They receive a responsibility allowance of P3,000 per year, a ward allowance of P300 per year plus for each council meeting a sitting allowance of P10 per day, a subsistence allowance of P5 per day and a travel allowance at government rates.

Table 12 Participation of Councillors in Village AffairsVillage

- |    |  |
|----|--|
| 1  | No participation   |
| 2  | Comes four times a year  |
| 3  | No visit in 13 week observation period   |
| 4  | Visits only with MP  |
| 5  | Does not consult regularly. She has good relations with village women.                       |
| 6  | Seldom seen in the village   |
| 7  | Attends all Kgotla meetings but people complain he concentrates too much on his own village. |
| 8  | Fully participates - sometimes dominates - takes side of villagers.                          |
| 9  | Initiated "Central VDC"<br>No participation with VET   |
| 10 | No participation   |
| 11 | No participation<br>Seldom seen the village  |
| 12 | Visits only with dignitaries   |
| 13 | Little participation in village activities.<br>Little representation of village concerns.    |
| 14 | Elected - no participation   |
| 15 | Nominated - very active but possibly destructive   |
| 16 | Elected - very active - leads development activities   |
| 17 | Nominated - attends only political meetings  |
| 18 | Elected - no participation   |
| 19 | Nominated - little participation - generally negative  |
| 20 | Elected - no involvement   |
| 21 | Nominated - no involvement   |
| 22 | Elected - rarely attends any but political meetings<br>No consultation or feedback           |

### The Imposition of Priorities and Organisational Forms

Many of the modern organisations in the village are initiated by extension workers who are trained to set up Western style organisations. These forms are often inappropriate. Extension workers might be trained instead to nurture and adapt local organisational forms, helping them to learn new skills as necessary.

Government also imposes its own priorities for action on villages sometimes unintentionally. Use of the VDC Handbook as a catalogue of projects resulted in the construction of guest houses and Kgotla latrines in many places because it was assumed that was what VDCs were supposed to do. Government programmes often determine priorities because the money is available for the programme activity, not for something else or because the extension worker is pushing that activity. Sometimes Government may intentionally substitute its priorities for that of the village.

In one case in the 1982 drought, a village submitted an approved self-help project for funding under the drought relief labour intensive works programme. The project was rejected by the Drought Relief Committee from District Council in favour of another. The result was the complete abandonment of the village project and the implementation of the project Council desired. This point will be raised again in the discussion of the demise of self-help. The village could have continued the original project on a self-help basis, but dropped it in the face of funding for something else. Whether this was typical of the some 282 villages where projects were begun is unknown. It is, however a danger to be aware of.

Finally, the training of extension workers generally equips them with an agenda of priorities the villagers do not share, but which often get implemented if only momentarily. ACDOs for example, set up Social Welfare Committees to identify destitutes and distribute food and clothing to them. The establishment of these committees seem to reflect the priorities of the ACDOs and not the villagers for they generally fade from the scene in rather short order.

Sometimes the imposition of priorities results in a benefit to the village and sometimes such priorities are harmless. But the imposition of priorities does not develop a village capacity to set priorities or to act on the basis

of those priorities and it may instill a sense of helplessness. Conlin (1978: 5) found that Government sponsored institutions were perceived primarily in terms of services, and that people did not feel any sense of control over these institutions or that there were any opportunities for asserting themselves or taking the initiative. Isaksen et al. (1980:45-46) found that the high construction standards of Government projects had a negative effect on villagers' sense of worth and ability to undertake projects. They quoted one villager who said, "these shabby, small buildings are demonstrating the uselessness of our projects."

Finally, the establishment of such ephemeral organisations as the Social Welfare Committee adds to the store of cynicism about organisations in general.

On the whole, the infrastructure and services provided through government initiated action are of positive value. The serious question to be raised is whether in the long run the detrimental effects of undermining local initiatives and sense of self confidence will not have an even greater negative value.

#### The Bureaucratization of Action

Any organisation which moves large amounts of money and employs large numbers of people must adopt standardized ways of operating. These usually involve the keeping of written records, universal standards, formal set procedures, and, almost inevitably while the proceeding is underway, delay.

When governmental bodies control the money, rural residents must meet the bureaucratic standards if they are to benefit from such largesse. They must learn to estimate quantities and costs of materials, to fill in forms, to find an advocate for their case, and to wait. For communities used to consensus-based, more informal and sometimes more immediate forms of action, these requirements may involve considerable adjustment.

Bitterness can result when a community believes it has fulfilled all requirements and from some vast bureaucratic distance the answer "NO" comes back. In this process Government would do well to ensure that delays are

minimized,<sup>3</sup> that rejections are not capricious and that they are thoroughly explained at the village level by the officer who made the decision.

Finnegan (1976:27) noted that it could take up to a year and a half before funds were obtained by which time enthusiasm for a project had waned and/or new priorities had emerged. Isaksen et al. (1980:49, 54, 119, 121) devoted a great deal of attention to the effects of bureaucratic failure in their evaluation of LG17. They report, for instance, long delays and the loss of files. (They are not the first to wonder about the mysterious things registries do to files and in-coming mail). Similarly they found

"After long delays the villagers were informed that their applications were rejected, sometimes without any explanation, or because of "lack of funds". The latter can hardly be true, since underspending of funds, not the opposite, is the problem in most districts. Often applications were not responded to at all by the Council, leaving the villagers in confusion." (p. 54).

They also noted that occasionally there were abrupt shifts in policy on what projects might be funded which left villagers with their plans suddenly useless.

#### The Lack of Accountability

On the whole it must be said that neither central nor district government responds quickly or effectively to community development initiatives. There are no figures on the average delay experienced by villages. However, a few examples will provide a sense of the frustration and cynicism which characterises the relationship between government and many villages.

One VDC decided to build a school. It raised funds and organised self-help labour. Council then informed the village that this activity must stop as Council would build a school the following year. A year after the VDC had stopped at Council's instructions, there was no sign of a school and the

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3. Isaksen et al. (1980 55,115) recommended, for example, that the person responsible for processing LG17 forms have a "fixed time limit, not exceeding one month, in dealing with the applications and coordinating the input from other departments, before it is submitted for approval." The team found at least 30 applications in one district on which no action had been taken dating back to 1975!

rumours were that plans for their school had been cancelled. The community is currently very cynical about Council and its promises.

A second VDC initiated an AE10 project with total community support. The entire community undertook the first part of the project on a self-help basis. An application for government funds was made for materials to complete the project with self-help labour. District authorities approved the plan which, because the area was remote, had to be approved in Gaborone. In early January the request was hand-carried to Gaborone with the confident expectation on everyone's part that it would be immediately approved and the materials could immediately be sent to the community. The project was rejected. Everyone was stunned.

Generally the story would end here. But in this case the community had advocates in Gaborone. After long discussions and rewriting the proposal to clarify very minor points, the project was approved in August - eight months after the original submission. By December, most but not all of the necessary materials had arrived. By this point the community had become involved in drought relief work. The result was that a community initiative had been crushed by government prejudice, insensitivity and inertia.

The lack of accountability is never so clear as when individual officers are clearly remiss in their duties and cause problems for villages. One unfortunate example of this occurred when a Council officer toured villages telling villagers what to do for drought relief money. The villagers, who were in increasingly desperate straits, did as they were told. The instructions were, however, a result of the fact that the officer was drunk and were quite inaccurate. Some time later other Council officials told the villagers they were very sorry but it was quite probable that they could not be paid for their work as it was not authorised. The villagers, who felt they had been authorised by a Council officer who arrived in a Council truck driven by a Council driver, were quite angry. It should be noted that the officer responsible was not removed from the service, nor was he demoted, nor was he required to make an apology to the villagers. In no way was he held accountable for his actions. It is small wonder that villagers are suspicious of government as they are all too often the losers in the complexities of bureaucratic proceedings.

Why is the government response so poor? Sometimes the problem is the competence or dedication of the officers concerned. Often the problem is that many officers, particularly at the District Level are over-extended. (This problem is aggravated by the assumption that drought is an exceptional situation - an addition to the normal workload. The assumption should be that drought is the normal situation to be prepared for and that the extra time available in other years is a bonus.) The major problem, rhetoric to the contrary, is that responding to villages is at the bottom of everyone's priorities.

Why? For the simple reason that literally no one is accountable to villagers. Villagers hire, evaluate, promote, and fire no one. Failure to submit a plan, attend a meeting, write a report or meet a Minister's plane can have a negative effect on an officer's career. Failure to respond to a village cannot. Until someone is made accountable to villagers, no one will listen to them. The place to start is probably with the village-based extension cadres. If these people were accountable to villagers, they might use their links to government to advocate for the village. One would then hope for accountability from higher levels of government - the DETs, the RECC and so on.

Gunderson (1971:297-298) remarked that the failure of rural Botswana to understand present governing situations allowed officials "to make administrative decisions without having to bargain or compromise with" them. Isaksen et al (1980:60) noted the problems of frequent transfers which lead to lack of continuity and, it might be agreed, lack of accountability.

Korten and Uphoff (1981) feel that the "lack of commitment and imagination among the personnel of development agencies is more a consequence of bureaucratic systems which treat creative behaviour as dysfunctional than a reflection of any inherent qualities of their personnel." (p.11 underlining in the original). They suggest procedures by which a bureaucracy can re-orient itself to work more flexibly and effectively with its clientele. This involves field experimentation, evaluation of the experimentation under the assumption that "failures" are to be learned from, not used to assign blame, and the adaptation of solutions for large-scale use. The features which might be expected to characterise a bureaucracy which has gone through this process can be found in Appendix B.

### The Lack of Coordination Within Government

Most villagers see Government, be it District Administration, District Council, or the national Government as a great undifferentiated mass. Government is just Government. It is not difficult to imagine the confusion that ensues when many government officials arrive with as many sometimes conflicting messages. The wonder of it all is that villagers are as cooperative and tolerant as they are with an institution which appears to behave in such a mad fashion. Clearly if village institutions are to function effectively, the constituent parts of government must pull together and see to it that fewer and more consistent messages are delivered to the villages.

### Improving the Quality of Government Involvement in Communal Development

Elsewhere in this report recommendations have been made about the devolution of authority to local institutions and about changes in the manner with which Government officials interact with these institutions. However, the human face which the Government assumes on a daily basis for most villages is the local extension worker. The training, action and attitudes of these workers are critical to the success of communal development efforts. Detailed recommendations on these issues have been approved by the RDC and presented to the RECC for implementation. These can be found in "Towards Improving Extension Services in Botswana" RECC (1983).

## CHAPTER VI OTHER ISSUES

Self Help

The information on self help is presented chronologically to demonstrate the problems of low participation currently being experienced are by no means new.

Part of the war effort undertaken in the then-Protectorate in the 1940's was the system of "war lands" where extra grain was to be grown. It was rapidly discovered that it was necessary to have full time "watchers" over this land who were paid in kind. The correspondence on the subject is emphatic that they not be paid in cash lest such payments interfere with the custom of free tribal labour. (See Resident Commissioner to all D.C.'s 16/8/43 SA 298/4/1-6). In 1947 Schapera (p 171) noted the decline of the regimental system.

"It is generally true, that among the Tswana, people nowadays are often openly critical of the chiefs, and show comparatively little enthusiasm for regimental labour and other traditional obligations of tribal citizenship. Labour migration has contributed to this attitude especially by spreading the idea that people should be paid for their services. But this is by no means the only factor responsible. The personal character of the chief, and the political intrigues of his relatives have much to do with the degree of respect in which he is held."

In 1954 it was stated that the regimental system no longer operated. (S40R/10). In 1964 Kuper (1970:118-119) found that the lack of immediate material rewards reduced the turn-out for community projects. "... there was little support for fining absentees - this had been tried in the past and failed. Nor were the young men moved by the labours of the old. It was commonplace at the time to see three or four elderly men shifting the building materials without assistance." Interestingly enough, Kuper states that this problem was solved temporarily by the Ipelegeng (which he interprets as food for work!!) Programme but that it remained a major stumbling block. In one village he found that even the borehole was in poor repair because the villagers were unable to organise self help labour.

Vengroff (1972:93-94) reported that councillors from more remote areas resented the fact that residents of the major village could get projects without a self-help contribution.

In 1973 the minutes of a North East District DDC meeting noted the complaints of the Regional Agricultural officer:

"Although it is essential that people be willing to provide voluntary labour (if a significant amount of rural development is to take place) one often finds that little or no amount of this voluntary labour is forthcoming from some villages.

He referred specifically to the problems faced by the Dam Building Unit which has had to pay village people for all the unskilled labour that they have provided thus far; in spite of the fact that they had originally agreed to work for nothing.

"The Council Secretary stated that it was becoming exceedingly difficult for Council obtain a 25% self-help element in all projects as is currently being demanded by most aid donors". (CD/B II).

Flood (1974) described self-help activities across the country - most involving construction - schools, dams, teachers' quarters, fences. In many of his examples, there was a strong personality, a chief or councillor (male or female) or headman, responsible for turning people out. He pointed out the need for acknowledging the importance of traditional leaders even when others were responsible for the effort and organisation. He also (p 48) raised a rather interesting point, quoting a Council chairman who felt that the legacy of the regimental system is that people do not know how to act on their own initiatives. He (p 35) also describes the organisation of an on-going self help project on a ward basis by an energetic chief backed by an equally energetic CDA. "The seven wards in the village were each assigned one day in the week in which to be responsible for the garden, the chief's ward taking the first." These arrangements, however, broke down with the departure of the CDA and the eventual death of the chief.

Holm (1972:83) noted that

"The public now so associates food distribution with the community development officers that often when the Department proposes a project without the inducement of food, the project is viewed as exploitation by the villagers. In one district only one community development project was completed without Food for Work by 1971. In this case it turned out that the villagers assumed they would receive the food when the project was completed. They were very bitter when their reward did not arrive."

In 1978 Conlin (8) found that people who said they had worked on self help

had actually participated in food for work. In 1980 Uhlenbeck and Kocken (105) found it hard to identify recent communal projects. The same year Hunnes (106-107) found that 26 percent of his sample in Letlhakeng and 45 percent in Tutume said they did not know who should initiate village development.

However, Grant (1980:45) points out that

"it was non-governmental inspiration and effort which created the first libraries, the first cooperative society, the first community centres, the first dental clinics, the museums, paid for the first modern village water supply improvement project, created the Brigade movement, the first real afforestation schemes, assisted the disabled, opened the first book shops; the first publicly owned marketing agency for handicrafts and which first introduced applied technologies."

Not all these were totally or even partially self-help but they do offer a reminder that dependence on government has not been total even recently.

Isaksen et al (1980:20, 87) considered self-help in the context of LG17. Among their points is that centralised District planning and "plannedness" in general is "contrary to the impulsive character of self-help." The problem of bureaucratic delay discussed above similarly runs contrary to this characteristic of self-help. They also point out that it is perfectly legitimate to think in terms of "temporary infrastructure". For example, if a village has an immediate felt need for a clinic, there is no reason why they should not go ahead and build one even if a "proper" clinic is to be built under LG20 within a few years. Building such a clinic would meet the community need when it was felt and keep alive the spirit of self help. Once the proper clinic is built, the self help building could be converted to another purpose.

Today self help is still something people understand and by an large approve of. Sixty five percent of a sample of villagers in North East District, and fifty percent of the village leaders said there was nothing bad about self-help. Similarly Zufferey (1982:10) found that 76 percent and 84 percent of samples in two Tswapong villages considered self help to be important and 89 and 81 percent respectively were ready to participate in self-help activities.

However, over the years as noted above there has been a divergence between the definition of self-help by government officials and villagers' definition. Most government officials consider self-help to be projects to which villagers contribute their labour for free. Villagers would agree that working on their own projects constitutes self-help. However, increasingly they expect to get paid for it. As the literature indicates this divergence has its source in the increasing monetarization of the economy, in recent history of drought relief and in the behaviour of government officials in the village.

There has been as elsewhere an increasing trend towards monetarization of the Botswana economy at all levels which has involved the replacement of reciprocal rights and obligations with cash transactions. This has had a negative effect on the willingness to work for free.

Under the Food for Work Programme and the later Labour Intensive Drought Relief Programmes, villagers either received food or were paid nominal sums for undertaking public works. These projects were the same kind of work which had been done previously on a self-help basis. If there was a drought on, one was paid. If the rains were good, one did the same work for free. With each recurrence of drought, the definitional waters became a bit more muddied, until finally in the minds of many villagers food for work and self help became hopelessly intertangled. When people in five North East District villages were asked about self help projects, 34 percent of the villagers and 21 percent of the village leaders identified food for work projects as self-help. 15 percent of the villagers said that the good thing about self-help is that you receive mealie meal or pay. Even those who use the Government definition do not necessarily think it is just. 20 percent of the villagers and 29 percent of the leaders said that the bad thing about self help was that there was no pay (or low pay) or no individual benefit. Villagers are not unwilling to work, but increasingly they feel they should be paid for their efforts. This feeling cannot help but be increased when they see people in the towns and major villages receiving the same services with no physical effort on their part although they do, of course, pay rates.

A third factor which reinforces villagers' feelings that they should be paid for working is the number of government officials they see being paid for doing very little. Out of 21 villages in Southern, Kgatleng, Central and

North East only 7 were receiving effective services from an AD and only 5 from an ACDO. 14 were receiving effective services from an FWE. It must be acknowledged that a person can work very hard and still not be effective. However, drunkenness on duty is a very different matter. Confidentiality prevented detailed descriptions of the behaviour of individuals in the District reports. However it can be said here that not a single village escaped chronic alcoholism including drunkenness on duty from some government officer be it the headman, chief, extension worker, or a district official. In some places chronic alcoholism has reached the proportions of a public scandal. Villagers' complaints about this seem to fall on deaf ears. Such experiences cannot help but confirm them in their belief that they ought to be paid for doing the hard physical labour that most self-help entails.

There seems to be either a reluctance or an inability to remove chronically alcoholic officers from the government services. In part this seems to stem from the involved procedures required to prove such a charge. In part, compassion for the officer's family seems to be involved. Unfortunately no such compassion is shown to the villagers who sometimes suffer severely because of the performance (or non-performance) of such officers. There already exist in Botswana programmes and individual counsellors for people who have difficulty with alcohol. Both in the interests of the villagers and of the officers themselves, Government should make it a policy to provide this kind of help to officers who have these difficulties. As it is, their presence is one of the major stumbling blocks to rural development.

A fourth issue involved in self-help is the problem of free riders. In many villages it is said that anyone who does not participate in self help will be fined, but in practice this never happens. This issue came to ahead in one village, when a VDC tried to prevent a woman from using a health post built by self-help labour in which she refused to participate. Government health workers argued that the service was provided by the Government and all citizens had a right to use it. The VDC argued that unless they could eliminate free riders, no one would turn out for self-help projects.

A fifth issue is that the term Ipelegeng has been applied loosely to activities as diverse as food for work, AE10, LG17 and LG34.

Since self help is an important and integral part of Government policy which demonstrates an investment by rural people in development activities and establishes their ongoing commitment to them. However, the confusion and alienation described above presents a clear danger to this commitment and the present decline in self-help is likely to continue unless firm policy steps are taken to reverse it. To this end the following policy recommendations have been made:

- 1) That the term Ipelegeng or self-help be applied only to projects undertaken by people either with their own labour and capital or with their own labour and with some or all of the capital supplied by government. (MLGL).
- 2) That all levels of public officer avoid the use of Ipelegeng to describe drought relief and labour intensive public works which should be given their own distinctive Setswana programme titles and that this consolidation of policy be widely publicized. (MLGL).
- 3) The justification of low wage rates as a "self help contribution" be avoided and that a standard rate equal to that for labour intensive public works always be used in costing community labour inputs to calculate the 10 percent contribution. (MLGL)
- 4) RECC prepare standard costings by region for use in these calculations, to include such inputs as materials (grass, poles, bricks etc.) and transport. (MLGL)

#### Empty Villages

For much of the year the village is a state of mind rather than a place of human activity. Villages lose population with the seasonal migration to the lands and cattle posts, with periodic out-migration in response to drought.<sup>1</sup> and the regular out-migration of the most competent and economically active young men and women in search of wage employment. There are three important issues connected with these phenomena - the immediate effects of out-migration, the effects of returnees, and involvement of migrants in village development.

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1. Larger villages actually experience in-migration in the case of drought as they (with their more reliable supply of water) become the cattle post of the last resort.

### The Effects of Out-Migration

"If this is allowed to go on, the tribe will gradually die, because the men who should build up the tribe are spending more and more time in the mines." Chief Kgari 1936 (quoted in Schapera, 1947:168).

The most obvious effect of out-migration is that it removes the most vigorous, most ambitious and best educated members of the village. This leaves as village leaders old (and often illiterate) men, women who must struggle against traditional prejudices against their own sex and a small percentage of the young male community. The practical implication of this is that the leadership pool with the exception of the women is not necessarily the best the community has to offer and the development of leadership skills may take more time and effort than might otherwise be expected.

A second effect is the emergence of community fora based on the cash economy - the beer party.

Seasonal out-migration to the lands effectively empties the village of all but the landless, school age children and those left behind to care for them. At this time of year organisational activity declines. Some villages actually move Kgotla meetings to the lands during the agricultural season. This is a good time of year to undertake those activities which most properly concern groups of neighbours at the lands - discussions of drift fencing, maintenance of lands water points and so on. It is important that extension workers be trained to recognise that some tasks are best undertaken by these groups of neighbours. The current focus on the physical village rather than cooperating communities of people tends to obscure this point.

### Returns

It appears that most out-migrants eventually return to their village of origin, some after absences of many years. It is not uncommon to find these returnees participating in local organisations. The results of this are mixed. On the one hand, returnees may have experiences which can be utilised by villagers. They may have developed skills such as bookkeeping or masonry which are of practical value. If they have been employed by government, they may have experience which will be useful in planning village projects. They may be acquainted with officers and processes in government which they can use when the village must deal with outsiders.

They may have developed a sophistication or confidence which will allow them to advocate the village cause effectively to government officials. On the other hand, years of absence may mean that they no longer understand the villagers or their problems. They may not be adequately informed about the intricacies of customary law and procedure. In some villages there were strong complaints about returnee headmen who didn't know customary law and were unfamiliar with the traditional village organisations.

The returnees have always considered the village their place but both they and the places have changed in their absence sometimes causing considerable problems of mutual adjustment.

#### Involvement of Migrants

Not only do migrants consider the village their place, but villagers consider their absent sons and daughters to have an obligation to the place. Sometimes the two sets of interest coincide and all is well. Villages (generally through the VDC) may appeal to migrants for funds and receive a favourable reply. Migrants may organise to support a village project - raising funds and lobbying the appropriate agencies. But on other occasions these relationships are full of tension.

It is sometimes the case that villagers see migrants simply as sources of cash. They are expected to make their contributions and let the villagers get on with it. The problem arises when migrants wish to have a say in village affairs and the use of their cash. In one case a group of migrants after several clashes with the VDC have simply undertaken their own project in the village.

The problem of a satisfactory organisation of migrant contributions to and involvement in village affairs is likely to increase in the future. For one thing, since Independence the number of migrants who are government officials or highly educated has steadily increased. Such people often (sometimes rightly) think they have a better understanding of what sort of expenditure will most benefit the village. They are also likely to be loathe to contribute money without some financial accountability. Villagers, on the other hand, are likely to feel (often rightly) that those who have left no longer have a complete understanding of village problems, particularly the problems of the poor. There may also be suspicions (sometimes correct) that

migrants are attempting to manipulate the village to their own advantage. Most migrants, of course, are unable to participate in the village on a sustained basis. Many come home only at Christmas and Easter or a few other holidays. Students may be home for longer periods during their long vacations as well.

Migrants have much to contribute in the form of cash, contacts, experience and ideas. A structure for channeling these contributions into the villages which leaves both sides satisfied needs to be set up. In some areas organisations of migrants have sprung up. If on-going consultation between migrants and villagers can be established, mutual understanding and benefit may result. Such groups might function as a sub-committee of the VDC. Under no circumstances should they go it alone, for such actions create diversiveness. Certainly under no circumstances should government officials approve projects of such groups without community consent and participation. Such groups need to think long and hard about the problem of building community capacity and the long term commitments this involves. This is an area which should be considered in the training and job description of ACDOs.

#### Participation by Women

Historically women's public role has been restricted. We have already seen that their participation in Kgotla has been a post-Independence phenomenon. Gunderson (1971:81) reports women's regiments to have been involved historically in hut building and beer making. Similarly, Kuper (1970:118) found in the mid 60's that women were occasionally involved in self-help doing "female" jobs such as thatching<sup>2</sup> or hut building. In general, women still are essentially excluded from the politico-jural sphere (Kuper, 1970:106-107; Molenaar, 1980:21; Uhlenbeck and Kocken, 1980:68) generally depending on male relations to represent them when such need arises.

In other spheres, however, women's participation has risen. When a CODEC team toured North East District in 1973 to discuss forming cooperatives, 46 percent of those attending meetings were women even though they are not traditionally involved in cattle production. (The range in individual villages was from 0 to 76 percent). Isakesen et al. (1980:34) found that most self-help labour associated with LG 17 was done by women. Kooijman (1978:75) found in 1972 that the VDC chair in Bokaa was held by a women and that half the Committee

2. It should be noted that certain types of thatching are considered male jobs.

members were women. She noted that men in the village did not approve and attributed this state of affairs to the fact that women voted for each other and that there were many more women in the village than men". Many of the small committees in the village, she found, were also headed by women.

The figures in Table 13 are based on 3 months of field work in seven villages in Central and North East Districts. Three things should be noted. First, women formed a substantial percentage of the attendance and speakers even at the Kgotla when traditional norms and sanctions still serve to some extent to exclude and silence them. Second, their participation in organisations to which they must be elected by others, is also reasonably high. Third, their active participation (as measured, admittedly crudely, by their speaking) is greater in the modern organisations, particularly special interest organisations. Women were often found to be the mainstay of social welfare organisations as well as their own women's clubs. Women were less often found in positions of authority in the VDC or Farmers Committees although it was not unknown. FWE's are often active participants in village organisations and thus provide an example of women's abilities to assume these roles.

Although this participation is sometimes hampered by traditional notions that women must have her husband's permission for her every action, ultimately women must be the backbone of local institutions. It is they who are in the village on a more or less continuous basis. It is they who have the understanding and many of the skills which will keep these institutions functioning. A major role of the ACDO must be to provide them with any additional skills they may need.

### Resource Management<sup>3</sup>

Although formal control of resource allocation, management and use is vested outside the village, villages and villagers still undertake resource management. This occurs individually, through customary court and through group efforts.

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3. This topic will be covered in greater detail and depth in two forthcoming publications by Chris Brown.

Table 13 Women's Participation in Village Organisations

Village	KGOTLA		VDC		OTHER, MODERN ORGANISATIONS	
	Avg % Attendance	Avg % Speakers <sup>a</sup>	Avg % Attendance	Avg % Speakers	Avg % Attendance	Avg % Speakers
1	40 <sup>a</sup>	0 <sup>a</sup>	-	-	4	45
2	32	31	27 <sup>a</sup>	13 <sup>a</sup>	48	19
3	50	24	45	42	78	63
4	24	10	42(33) <sup>c</sup>	20 <sup>c</sup>	-	-
5	52	44	-	-	49	49
6	53	35	54	36	46(41) <sup>c</sup>	29
7	52	50	87 <sup>b</sup>	41	58	45

a. One meeting only

b. Two meetings; one to recruit women for hand stamping had an attendance of 99 women out of 107.

c. Number in parentheses is the percent of women attending those meetings for which the percentage of women who spoke is known.

Based on data from North-East and Central Districts.

Individual households take resource management decisions regularly in the course of the agricultural year. They decide whether to plough or not, when to move their livestock to better grazing and where, and so on. ("Where" is a decision which is bounded by sometimes historical circumstances which determine which areas may be grazed by which people.) Similarly they may move from water point to water point - saving one for later use. In many ways people's use is a form of management - the resource is used in a way that ensures that it can continue to be used. Individuals are not totally without influence vis a vis land boards. Individual requests may change the pattern of land use in an area. The land board may, for example, approve a series of requests for land which will cumulately transform a grazing area to a ploughing area. Self-allocations can have the same effect. While self-allocations are illegal, the poor quality of land board's record keeping and the relative infrequency of their field visits both causes and allows self-allocation to go on. This is a clear example of the limits of government penetration of the countryside.

In an area of transition the decision of the customary court over crop damage cases will indicate the community perception (or at least the perception of traditional leaders) of which way the land use balance is shifting. The jurisdiction of customary courts over such cases is another route of community influence over resource management and land use planning. If a field is in what is considered a grazing area, the onus is on the field owner to protect the crops against cattle damage - such protection generally taking the form of a stout fence.

Finally people may form themselves into groups which make decisions about resources. The three most common of such groups are fencing groups, dam groups, and borehole syndicates. The decision making powers of such groups are structures restricted by the allocation powers of land boards. For example, neither a borehole nor a drift fence can be constructed without land board's permission. Such groups are often successful in mobilising cash or labour for resource management activities. These groups have the greatest potential when they represent the entire community of users.

Resource management groups are often unsuccessful when they try to exclude other would-be users unless they have legitimate exclusive control over the resource in question. The attempt of government to

legislate or decree such control (as in the case of dam groups) has not been successful. Another weakness of such groups (and of entire communities which try to limit resources use) is their lack of enforcement powers and the lack of enforcement powers in the bodies above them - the Land Boards and the Agricultural Resource Board, are, in fact, toothless. Thus, those who wish to ride roughshod over resource management efforts can generally do so with impunity.

A final and major problem in community-based resource management is what might be called the "hollow middle". Under the traditional political and administrative system specific lands and grazing areas were attached to specific villages and even specific wards. The line of authority over these areas was, for the most part, clear. Today, however, lands and cattle post areas are occupied by people not just from different wards but from different villages, or in some cases, Districts. Since the entire politico-administrative system is village-based, there is no coherent line of authority over these areas of mixed inhabitants. While in theory Land Board has jurisdiction over the land use planning and management of such areas, and LUPAG has advisory powers, in practice they have no effective authority. Since resource management must often encompass a fairly large area in order to be effective, it is essential that the gap in supra-village administration be filled.

It is clear in this regard that inter-village links need to be strengthened. The only multi-village organisations we found were cooperatives. That is not to say that other cooperation does not occur. One of the most prevalent forms of such cooperation occurs with the construction of drift fences. Cooperation in such endeavours appears to be solicited in two ways. One is an ad hoc approach to the headman involved perhaps by the AD. Cooperation is requested and generally given for the particular project. In other cases, groups of neighbours on the line of fence cooperate in its construction as they do in other acts of neighbourliness regardless of their village of origin. In these cases, the inter-village neighbourhood, not the villages themselves are the important units.

The same principles for success apply to inter-village cooperation as apply to other group endeavours - mutual benefit, mutual obligation, a benefit of clear importance to all. Because of the seasonal reconstitution of

villages and groups of neighbours, there is probably no point in trying at present to formalise these links. Rather, the ad hoc approach of working directly with those concerned while observing the necessary formalities of consulting with headmen is probably the most fruitful. Once the habit of cooperating successfully has been established, more formal structures may be desirable. But to start with these structures is to establish just one more organisation without a function.

The factors which hinder inter-village cooperation should be considered. Historical factors are important. Some chiefs or headmen are considered by others to have imperial designs on their villages. There may be a history of squabbles or one village may have actually broken away from another. Ethnic differences may cause stress. The chances for cooperation are significantly reduced in resource-short situations. This involves both conflicting land use practices and conflicting land claims. The expansion of one village's lands area into the grazing area of another can cause endless conflict. Or as land becomes short and the residents of both villages claim the same lands area, great bitterness can result. Similar conflicts have arisen over the use of water points. Single legal control over land and water resources has been given to the Land Boards, they have the responsibility to arbitrate and settle such disputes. However, few Land Boards cope successfully with their normal workload, let alone the extra burden of arbitration. Even the intervention of such a person as the District Commissioner may be unsuccessful. It must be squarely faced that in some areas there is not enough land, and that no matter how successful the arbitration, someone is going to lose. In such cases, the only apparent solution is to create economic alternatives which do not require the resource under dispute. The Financial Assistance Programme is one step towards this.

Finally inter-village cooperation would be aided by a shift in government thinking and planning to an area basis. The obvious key to this is the extension worker. Many extension workers cover more than one village. If extension districts are redefined so that the same team of workers covers the same village, this team could begin to think on an area rather than a village basis. The establishment of area extension teams would not only cut down on repetitive meetings but might facilitate area wide thinking.

## CHAPTER VII SOME CONCLUDING THOUGHTS

The local level in Botswana is characterised by a great deal of organisational activity exhibiting varying degrees of formality, permanence and effectiveness. There is no question in the mind of this writer that there exists at the village level the skill and organisational capacity to allow local level institutions to assume a major role in bringing about self-sustaining development. There are, to be sure, areas in which such organisations need assistance and support - the use and maintenance of financial records being the most obvious. But the basic strength is there. In addition to the more specific recommendations made to Government, there are four more general areas of concern which should be considered.

Accountability and Authority

These are the sine qua non of effective local organisations. Without them the present low levels of activity which characterise many local institutions may be expected to continue or even worsen.

Accountability must operate both ways from local institutions. First they must be accountable to their members and their wider constituency in cases of representative organisations such as the VDC. Financial accountability and problems of criminal malfeasance are the most obvious and sorest points. Those who misuse public funds or public goods must be brought to justice.

Accountability on the part of these organisations also involves being somehow subject to social control by villagers. While, in theory, members of most organisations can be removed in elections, in practice this process is not very well understood. The roles of various institutions and their members need to be more clearly defined so that traditional methods of shaming and holding the officer bearer to account in Kgotla might be employed. At present this is rarely done, as few if any (including officer and bearers and organisation members) know that they should be doing in any event.

Thus, many organisations have, in effect, no constituency, having been elected as much out of politeness to some visiting government official as for any other reason. The lack of a constituency means these "leaders" have no followers. Hence they are unlikely to be effective in any of the traditional roles - bordering between village and government, communicating

upwards and downwards, mobilizing people, soliciting contributions and so on. It is probably not too much of an exaggeration to say that those leaders who truly have followers, the traditional leaders, have weak links to Government and those with strong links (Councillors, MPs) have few followers. Many VDC leaders are weak on both sets of links. Thus, the lack of constituencies can have serious detrimental effects.

The question of the accountability of higher levels of Government to these organisations is, of course, bound up with questions of authority. Most local institutions can only be described as powerless. To be sure, their opinion is asked on various issues and they may even make a decision or two. But (as demonstrated in the approval of drought relief or AElO projects among numerous other examples), the real decisions, the decisions that actually affect lives, are made at the higher levels of Government. Villagers manifest lack of enthusiasm for relatively trivial levels of decision making is understandable.

It is necessary to transfer real power to local level institutions which will necessitate providing such institutions with the legal power to raise revenue, incur expenditure and enforce their decisions. They will, of course, make some bad decisions. However, it seems pointless to reserve the right to make bad decisions to national and district levels of Government.

Second, national and district level institutions must become accountable to local level institutions for some of their actions and decisions. Anywhere, there will almost inevitably be conflict between local priorities and wishes and those of a central government which must allocate scarce resources among many often equally legitimate and important claimants. When this takes place in the context of the development process, the conflicts may be starker, more intense. Recognising the inevitability of such conflict, it is still necessary for higher levels of government to be more responsive to village concerns. Villages should have the right to say no to government projects and policies, to refuse to allow their local institutions including the Kgotla to be used or misused by Government officials, and to question the behaviour and demand the removal of Government officials whose behaviour and/or performance in their village is unacceptable or unsatisfactory. Further, Government officials should be required to explain to villagers decisions with which the latter are unhappy. Such a process

should result in increasing the amount of information available to villagers.

A good rule of thumb in these processes (which are bound to cause a certain amount of unhappiness on both sides) is that if a Government official attributes the villagers' opposition to their "backwardness" or "ignorance", there is a very good chance it is the official who is wrong.

#### The Endurance of Traditional Institutions

Despite the many laws and other actions of central Government which have reduced the authority of the chiefs and the Kgotla, traditional institutions continue to function. The old men continue to gather in the Kgotla even on cold winter mornings when fires are kept burning. The Kgotla (and in some cases ward Kgotlas) continue to be the tribunal of first resort for most disputes. It is to the Kgotla that outsiders come with their messages.

Thus, despite neglect and, in some instances, outright undermining, the Kgotla continues to survive. Its survival under these circumstances indicates an underlying strength which should be utilised not wasted. Unfortunately, the Kgotla has tended to be considered in two conflicting and equally unrealistic ways.

The first view is to assume the Kgotla is outmoded, unrepresentative, and of no use to development. While the Kgotla system is in some ways outmoded and unrepresentative, it remains the single local institution through which village wide communication can take place and the sole institution which can confer legitimacy on others. These are not qualities which should be tossed aside lightly whatever the other shortcomings of the institution. It should, of course, be noted that there are pressures for change (and there has already been change) within the system itself and that some of the resistance to this change will literally die out with the older generation.

The second, rather romantic view is linked to the myth of the Golden Age of Traditional Authority. Proponents of this view believe that the Kgotla can reassume its old functions as well as undertake new and complicated projects. There is no surer way to undermine the Kgotla than to heap on it projects it is not structurally equipped to undertake.

The endurance of traditional institutions should be recognised and recognised

as a positive factor in communal area development.

### The Question of Spatial Units and Human Communities

When local institutions are spoken of, many people automatically think of "the village" and then, sometimes, as an afterthought "and its lands and cattleposts." At least part of the problem of the development and functioning of local institutions flows from this restricted spatial focus.

To begin, a spatial unit is not necessarily identical with functioning human communities, thus kin groups undertake certain functions; wards, others; and groups of neighbours at the lands yet others. In some cases a spatial unit, say for example a village in the winter, is synonymous with a human community. But a lands area in the non-agricultural season is a spatial unit largely, if not entirely, lacking a human community.

It must be recognised that individuals and households may belong to several different communities in all of which they have certain rights and obligations. For example, the members of a single and integrated village ward may plough in a number of different lands areas where they and their neighbours in each place will each function as a small community for the agricultural season. Thus, the composition of the human community in a given spatial unit changes throughout the year as will the membership of a given individual in communities and institutions in different places over time.

If development of local institutions is to be effective, those who work with them must learn to identify these human communities, where they are, when they are there and what they do. In this way, the focus should shift from places to people.

### The Question of Politics

Many of the problems of authority and accountability described above are ultimately political problems. These are of two basic types - a lack of political will and the weakening of the political process.

The question of political will arises most vividly and most critically in the area of resource management. There is in the legislation of Botswana the authority for various bodies to undertake strict measures to manage resources

and conserve the environment. This authority has never been used. In every district there are ravaged areas of landscape which speak eloquently of the lack of political will to use the legislation which might have kept them as part of Botswana's productive resource base.

Resource management in a fragile semi-arid environment is a difficult technical matter under the best of circumstances. Some of the institutional structures (or lack of them) in the communal areas make the task even more difficult. But where communities have tried to undertake resource management on their own, they have not infrequently failed for lack of Government's will to help them enforce their decisions, particularly against large and influential cattle owners. This is clearly a situation which does not bode well for sustaining the natural resource base, since present policy works to the benefit of the wealthier parts of the cattle industry against the interests of the community as a whole.

The second problem lies in actions which in some places have made the political process and the political structure essentially meaningless. The problem of the lack of constituencies both for politicians and non-political organisations was mentioned above. This is serious because elected representatives should constitute an orderly channel through which the concerns of the people can be expressed to the Government.

Perhaps more serious than this vacuum is the situation in which people have expressed their concerns to the Government through a free and democratic political process and that expression has been subverted.

In November 1969, the Minister of Local Government and Lands spoke on the radio to the nation as follows:

"Government in order to strengthen a number of Councils decided to appoint more nominated Councillors than were appointed in 1966. In most cases these extra nominations do not affect control(sic) of the Council. In two cases they do...the Government recognises a clear duty to achieve its development objectives in the interests of Botswana as a whole. This means that we must prevent a situation arising in which the Francistown Town Council and the North East District Council are controlled by a Party, whose representatives have shown themselves barren of constructive proposals for improving our future... It is, of course, regrettable that we have been obliged to make a decision which falls short of the ideals we have set ourselves to achieve in promoting local democracy. The choice of Councillors made by the

voters in one area clashes with the expressed desire of the nation as a whole. In such a situation the national interest must prevail, and powers which are provided for by law duly exercised." Daily News 10 November, 1969

In the areas where it has taken place, this action has severely weakened the democratic process. The same issues of accountability and authority which were raised above must be applied here. Their lack has left a legacy of cynicism and bitterness where the political will of the people has been flouted.

In the end, local institutions can only assume their proper role in undertaking communal area development if they trust and respect and are trusted and respected by Government.

APPENDIX A Local Institutions Research Reports

- C. Brown, V. Bontsi, K. Gobotswang, K. Kgabi, T. Selato, 1982. A Study of Local Institutions in Kgatleng District.
- A. Manzardo. 1982. Planning for Local Institutions Development in the CFDA's of Botswana.
- G. Childers, J. Stanley, K. Rick. 1982. Government Settlement or People's Community: A Study of Local Institutions in Ghanzi District.
- A. Rude, K. Gofamodimo, D. Keebine, O. Mobusa, W. Raditloaneng, G. Serebolo. 1982. Report on Local Institutions in Five Villages in the Southern District Communal First Development Area.
- G. Childers, R. Morgan, J. Stanley. 1982. Local Institutions in Ngamiland CFL.
- A. Rude. 1982. Agricultural Cooperatives in the Southern District CFDA.
- L. Fortmann. 1982 "Towards Improving Extension Services in Botswana". Working Paper Prepared for the Rural Extension Coordinating Committee.
- F.S. Zufferey. 1983. A Study of Local Institutions and Resource Management Inquiry in Eastern Central District.
- L. Fortmann, K.E. Gobotswang, U. Edzani, A. Magama, L. Motsvogole, T. Woto. 1983. Local Institutions and Resource Management in the North-East District CFDA.
- F.S. Zufferey. 1983. A Study of Local Institutions in Mopipi Communal First Development Area Central District.
- L. Fortmann. 1983. The Role of Local Institutions in Communal Area Development.
- C. Brown. Forthcoming. Resource Management in Kweneng District.
- C. Brown. Forthcoming. Issues in Communal Area Resource Management.

Appendix B Characteristics of a Bureaucracy which has gone through  
Bureaucratic Re-orientation (from Korten and Uphoff 1981)

- A. Strategic Management: Top management which views the role of the agency from a strategic perspective, continuously reassessing objectives in relation to the aspects of human well-being for which it has responsibility and initiating new learning processes toward further bureaucratic reorientation as circumstances dictate.
- B. Reward Structure: Reward systems relating to promotion, posting, increments, recognition, and opportunities that stress effectiveness in serving beneficiaries in ways that strengthen their competence to address their own needs.
- C. Planning Systems: Planning systems redesigned to provide flexibility and to use simplified analytical techniques with the specific intent of facilitating beneficiary input. Project activities would be more often small-scale and planned at local levels in collaboration with beneficiaries - perhaps as sub-projects of "larger" projects.
- D. Monitoring and Evaluation: Monitoring and evaluation oriented to measuring and assessing benefits received by beneficiary groups rather than funds expended or activities completed, with continuous rather than intermittent effort. Presumably beneficiaries would themselves have an active role in this process. Self-evaluation at all program levels would be stressed over external evaluations. Attention would be given to the process itself - the fact of beneficiary participation in monitoring and evaluation, and their successful contribution to building self-sustaining community capacities to plan and implement further development improvements.
- E. Applied Social Science: Internal agency capacity to gather and utilise on a routine basis, data crucial to improving its own operational decision processes. While the agency would probably also make use of external inputs from social science researchers and consultants, it would call on them for supplemental inputs rather than as its primary source of social data and analysis.
- F. Personnel Procedures: More stable postings of staff, who would have substantial expertise in social-organisational as well as in technical specialities, and who particularly at field levels would work in multi-disciplinary teams.
- G. Financial Management: Budget processes and cycles substantially revised to allow for more flexibility in making expenditures not only to meet priority needs as they are identified, but also to elicit matching contributions of effort and resources from communities. There would need to be fairly predictable and stable funding levels, flexibility in retaining funds earmarked for particular purposes but not obligated due to unexpected delays, and an opportunity to accumulate reasonable operating surpluses for future use. Each level of the organisation would need some discretionary funds subject only to post-expenditure audits to facilitate innovative activity. Public access to records and community-level accountability would serve as checks on corruption.

- H. Differential Structure: Specialised units and services are likely to be established to relate to distinct client groups, at least in instances where the agency served two or more groups with distinctly different or even competing needs. Specialisation for tasks that serve rural development needs may also be important.
- I. Training: Training for government personnel using case studies, role playing, and other participatory training methods to develop problem-solving and interaction skills, with particular emphasis on joint problem-solving with intended beneficiaries and/or their representatives. Attention would be given to both cognitive and affective aspects of learning. Persons working respectively as organisers and technicians would each receive some basic training in the other's specialities. It would be understood that the actions and attitudes of government staff could not be changed simply through training efforts, no matter how strenuous. Rather, the training would be supportive of structural change being introduced into the organisation.
- J. Doctrine: Clear and widely shared understandings throughout the organisation about its mission, how this can and should assist the poor majority and how they can and should be involved in this process.

Table C-1 Who attends Village Meetings

Village	Organization	Men	Women	% Pop <sup>a</sup>	AD	ACDO	FWE	Head Teacher	Headman	Councillor	Central/ Dist. Govt.
1	4-B	15	14	10%	X		X		X		
1	4-B	10	7	6%	X		X				
1	Kgotla	26	17	14%	X		X		X		
2	VDC	8	3	2%	X	X			X		
2	Fisheries Gp.	5	6	2%	X						
2	Fisheries Gp.	12	9	4%	X						Fisheries
2	BCW	1	6	1%		X					
2	BCW	1	7	2%		X	X				
2	BCW	0	9	2%		X	X				
2	Cooperative	~ 102	~ 102	40%	X	X	X		X		AEO
2	Fencing Gp.	12	-	2%	X						
2	Kgotla	102	47	29%		X	X		X		
2	Kgotla	92	46	27%		X	X		X		
2	Farmer's Comm.	9	1	2%							
2	Farmer's Comm.	11	4	3%	X	X					
3	Kgotla	22	24	7%	X		X	X	X		AEO
3	Kgotla	19	9	4%			X		X		
3	Kgotla	53	64	17%			X	X	X	X	DC CS Min MP
3	Kgotla	23	17	6%		X	X	X	X	X	RIO
3	Kgotla	15	18	5%		X	X		X		Labour Office
3	Kgotla	13	15	4%	X	X	X		X	X	

Table C-1 2

Village	Organization	Men	Women	% Pop <sup>a</sup>	AD	ACDO	FWE	Head Teacher	Headman	Councillor	Central/ Dist. Govt.
3	All Village Committees	11	12	3%	X	X	X	X			
3	VDC	5	5	1%		X	X				SCDO
3	VDC	5	2	1%			X				
3	VDC	5	5	1%	X	X	X	X			
3	VDC	3	4	1%			X				
3	VDC	8	5	2%		X	X	X	X	X	
3	SHC/VDC	7	8	2%		X	X	X			
3	SHC/VDC	7	4	2%	X	X	X	X	X	X	
3	BCW/YWCA	0	9	1%		X					
3	Lands Health <sup>b</sup> Post	6	26	5%			X				SCDO Nat. Official
3	Lands Health <sup>b</sup> Post	6	20	4%		X	X			X	
3	Consumer's Coop	5	31	5%			X				
4	Kgotla	11	-	4%					X		
4	Kgotla	21	2	7%					X		
4	Kgotla	5	2	2%				X			Road Co. Rep.
4	Kgotla	15	4	6%				X			
4	Kgotla	22	1	8%					X	X <sup>E&amp;A</sup>	Drought Relief Comm. Land Board DTRP

Table C-1 3

Village	Organization	Men	Women	% Pop <sup>a</sup>	AD	ACDO	FWE	Head Teacher	Headman	Councillor	Central/ Dist. Govt.
4	Kgotla	19	14	11%				X	X	X <sup>E&amp;A</sup>	MP <sup>A</sup>
4	Kgotla	21	14	12%		X		X	X	X	Elected MP
4	VDC/PTA	8	4	4%				X	X	X <sup>A</sup>	
4	VDC	10	9	6%						X	
5	Kgotla	12	20	9%			X		X	X <sup>A</sup>	Drought Relief Comm.
5	Kgotla	15	34	14%			X		X		
5	Kgotla	9	7	4%		X			X		
5	Kgotla	38	50	25%		X	X	X	X	X <sup>A</sup>	Appointed MP
5	Kgotla	18	12	9%			X		X	X	
5	Kgotla	19	10	8%						X	MP <sup>E</sup>
5	Kgotla	30	40	20%		X		X		X	DOD
5	Kgotla	20	15	10%					X	X	
5	Kgotla	30	16	13%			X			X	Labour Officers
5	Kgotla	9	15	7%			X			X	SCDO Nursing Sisters
5	PTA	7	8	4%			X	X		X	
5	PTA	9	7	4%		X	X	X			
5	PTA	8	7	4%			X	X	X		
5	PTA	8	5	3%			X	X		X	
5	PTA	6	9	4%			X	X	X		

Table C-1 4

Village	Organization	Men	Women	% Pop <sup>a</sup>	AD	ACDO	FWE	Head Teacher	Headman	Councillor	Central/ Dist. Govt.
5	PTA	5	5	3%			X	X	X		
5	PTA	5	6	3%							
6	Kgotla	67	113	30%			X	X	X	X <sup>E,A</sup>	
6	Kgotla	36	42	13%			X		X	X <sup>E</sup>	
6	Kgotla	12	-	2%					X	X <sup>E</sup>	
6	Kgotla	70	75	24%			X		X	X <sup>E, A</sup>	MP
6	Kgotla	32	20	9%			X		X	X <sup>E,A</sup>	RIO
6	Kgotla	19	12	5%			X	X	X		
6	Kgotla	15	16	5%					X		
6	Kgotla/VDC	22	18	7%				X	X	X <sup>E</sup>	
6	Kgotla/VDC	63	74	23%	X		X	X	X	X <sup>E</sup>	
6	Kgotla/VDC	28	25	9%			X	X	X		
6	VDC/SWA	6	4	2%		X	X		X		
6	VDC	34	57	15%			X		X		
6	Party A	42	30	12%				X	X	X	
6	Party A	54	61	19%			X	X	X	X	Natl Officer
6	Party B	39	37	12%			X	X	X	X	MP
6	Party B	38	28	11%			X	X	X	X	Assist. Min. MP Council Chair
6	PTA/Comm)	7	3	2%			X			X <sup>E,A</sup>	

Table C-1 5

Village	Organization	Men	Women	% Pop <sup>a</sup>	AD	ACDO	FWE	Head Teacher	Headman	Councillor	Central/ Dist. Govt.
6	PTA (Comm)	7	2	1%			X	X		X <sup>E</sup>	
6	PTA	16	30	8%		X	X	X	X	X <sup>E</sup>	
6	PTA	16	29	7%			X	X	X	X <sup>E</sup>	
6	PTA (Comm)	7	3	2%			X	X	X		
6	Cattle Sellers	23	22	7%		X			X		
6	VDC/PTA/SWA Farmers Assoc.	14	7	3%			X		X		Drought Relief Comm.
6	Farmers Assoc.	13	7	3%					X	X <sup>E</sup>	
6	Wood Carvers	21	1	4%							RIO
6	Church Elders	12	6	3%					X		
6	Youth Rally Ad-Hoc Comm	11	9	3%							
6	Youth Rally Ad-Hoc Comm	9	6	2%			X		X	X <sup>E</sup>	
6	Youth Rally Ad-Hoc Comm	13	7	3%					X	X <sup>E</sup>	
7	Kgotla	52	77	32%					X		
7	Kgotla	29	43	18%	X	X					
7	Kgotla	22	24	11%			X		X	X <sup>A</sup>	MP <sup>A</sup> SCDO
7	Kgotla	25	15	10%					X		MP <sup>E</sup>
7	Kgotla	25	8	8%					X		MFDP

Table C-1      6

Village	Organization	Men	Women	% Pop <sup>a</sup>	AD	ACDO	FWE	Head Teacher	Headman	Councillor	Central/ Dist. Govt.
7	VDC	8	99	27%							2 Council Officials
7	VDC	8	4	3%	X		X	X	X		
7	Youth Assoc.	4	1	1%			X				
7	Youth Assoc.	2	7	2%			X				
7	All Committees	10	13	6%			X	X	X	X <sup>A</sup>	

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a Assumes that one-third of the village population is comprised of adults

b Organizational base is one lands area only, thus this turnout is quite good

E = Elected,

A = Appointed

Based on data from Central and North-East Districts

Table C-2 Composition of Modern Organisations in Village 1

<u>Organisation</u>	<u>Recorded Total Membership</u>	<u>Officers</u>			<u>Other Members</u>		
		<u>Average Age</u>	<u>Average Education (years)</u>	<u>Women</u>	<u>Average Age</u>	<u>Average Education (years)</u>	<u>Women</u>
VDC	21	-	7	0	-	-	13%
PTA	13	-	-	50%	-	-	-
VHC	10	-	-	60%	-	-	80%
4-B	89	-	9	60%	-	-	-
Social Welfare Committee	12	-	-	20%	-	-	-
BCV	36	-	-	80%	25	6	94%
Coop	108	-	-	0	-	-	-
Jibui Fencing Group	60	-	-	0	-	-	-
Ruthuve Fencing Group	19	-	-	33%	-	-	-
Godika BH Syndicate	13	-	-	0	-	-	0
Livestock Management Group	6	-	-	0	-	-	25%

Table C-3 Composition of Modern Organisations in Village 2

<u>Organisation</u>	<u>Total Recorded Membership</u>	<u>Officers</u>			<u>Other Members</u>		
		<u>Average Age</u>	<u>Average Education (years)</u>	<u>Women</u>	<u>Average Age</u>	<u>Average Education (years)</u>	<u>Women</u>
VDC	10	48	5	0	63	0	0
VHC	11	-	-	-	44	2	36%
4-B	11	27	7	83%	16	7	60%
BCW	15	-	-	-	36	3	94%
Independence Committee	11	-	-	-	44	1	54%
New Fisheries	24	-	-	25%	-	-	-
Farmer's Committee	12	-	-	-	54	1	17%
Machana Fencing Group	53	46	3	0	-	-	-
Setato BH Syndicate	5	-	-	-	54	1	0

- Information not available

Table C-4 Composition of Modern Organisations in Village 3

<u>Organisation</u>	<u>Total Recorded Membership</u>	<u>Officers</u>			<u>Other Members</u>		
		<u>Average Age</u>	<u>Average Education (years)</u>	<u>Women</u>	<u>Average Age</u>	<u>Average Education (years)</u>	<u>Women</u>
VDC	9	50	4	43%	60	-	0
PTA	9	48	-	50%	48	-	60%
A Re Gateleng	12	35	-	33%	-	-	-
Social Health Committee	9	53	-	50%	-	-	60%
Marketing Society	88	-	-	13%	-	-	50%
Dip. Assoc.	40	58	6	0	-	-	-
Consumers Cooperative Society	183	46	-	78%	-	-	-

- Information not available

Table C-5 Composition of Modern Organisations in Village 4

<u>Organisation</u>	<u>Total Recorded Membership</u>	<u>Officers</u>			<u>Other Members</u>		
		<u>Average Age</u>	<u>Average Education (years)</u>	<u>Women</u>	<u>Average Age</u>	<u>Average Education (years)</u>	<u>Women</u>
VDC	10	35	6	0	45	6	37%
PTA	16	41	2	33%	33	9	54%
Health and <sup>+</sup> Social Welfare Comm.	7	-	5	60%	-	-	50%
External Advisory Committee	15	-	-	0	-	-	30%
BCW	21	-	-	-	46	3	86%
4-B	19	-	-	-	16	7	79%
Scripture Union	20	17	9	100%	18	8	65%

- Information not available

+ Defunct

Table C-6 Composition of Modern Organisations in Village 5

<u>Organisation</u>	<u>Total Recorded Membership</u>	<u>Officers</u>		<u>Women</u>	<u>Other Members</u>		<u>Women</u>
		<u>Average Age</u>	<u>Average Education (years)</u>		<u>Average Age</u>	<u>Average Education (years)</u>	
VDC	2	45	5	0		None	
PTA	4	45	8	0	38	9	0
Social <sup>+</sup> Welfare Committee	2	39	3	100%		None	
Women's <sup>+</sup> Club	3	56	2	100%		None	

- information not available

+ defunct

Table C-7 Composition of Modern Organisations in Village 6

<u>Organisation</u>	<u>Total Recorded Membership</u>	<u>Officers</u>		<u>Women</u>	<u>Other Members</u>		<u>Women</u>
		<u>Average Age</u>	<u>Average Education (years)</u>		<u>Average Age</u>	<u>Average Education (years)</u>	
VDC	19	-	-	60%	-	-	7%
PTA	13	-	-	20%	-	-	37%
Social Welfare Club	10	-	4	75%	-	-	83%
Farmer's Committee	10	-	-	20%	-	-	0

- information not available

Table C-8 Composition of Modern Organisations in Village 7

<u>Organisation</u>	<u>Total Recorded Membership</u>	<u>Average Age</u>	<u>Average Education (years)</u>	<u>Women</u>	<u>Average Age</u>	<u>Average Education (years)</u>	<u>Women</u>
VDC	11	41	4	75%	-	-	71%
PTA	9	49	-	25%	50	-	60%
SHC	7	-	-	-	-	-	100%
BCW - Women's Club +	11	-	-	-	-	-	100%
Youth Association	8	-	10+	66%	-	12+	40%

- information not available

+ defunct

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