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**Refugee  
Settlement  
in Somalia:  
A Discussion  
and A Report**

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The accompanying report is very much a team effort: Chapter One was written by myself; Chapter Two by Carol Kerven, John Blumgart, Johathan Greenham and myself; Chapter Three by Greenham, Charles Busch, Clarence Miller, and Kerven; Chapter Four involved the whole team; Chapter Five was the work of Kerven and Allan Hoben who, because of a previous teaching commitment, could only stay for just over two weeks; and the final chapter was written by Blumgart, Kerven and myself. Charles Sweet was here for three weeks to "point us in the right direction." The production of this report in Mogadishu was very capably handled by Carol Kulski and her temporary assistant, Rosamund Labor.

Our hope is that this report will stimulate some more serious thought and discussion about the refugees in Somalia and ways in which settlement, broadly defined, can be encouraged. The views expressed here are those of the team and we gladly accept full responsibility for them.

David Gow  
Team Leader  
October 3, 1984  
Mogadishu

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

A nine person project design team was assembled by USAID/Somalia in the summer of 1984 as a follow up to the approval by AID/Washington of a Project Identification Document entitled "Somalia Refugee Settlement." The team worked in Somalia from August 16-October 4. By mid-September it became apparent that differing USAID/design team concepts on the content of a viable project design as well as policy differences with the GSDR on impinging refugee issues would make the preparation of a project paper unproductive. It was therefore agreed that the team's product should be in the form of a report to USAID -- a report which presented the information it had gathered, identified the issues it considered to be important, and suggested the steps USAID might wish to take to further address the refugee problem. What follows then is a summary of the team's report.

The report leads off with an introductory discussion on the reasons which led to agreement to produce a report, rather than a project design, and outlines the content of report. Chapter Two analyzes the five major refugee policy issues the team identified during the course of its work and recommends ways of addressing them.

First, the availability of suitable land is obviously a critical issue if refugees are to be settled at locations outside the camps. Yet the availability of "unused" arable land at sites large enough to settle a significant number of refugees appears to be very problematic. Areas alleged to be available are often already being used for one purpose or another, or are subject to claims of varying strength and intent by potential users or other interested parties.

The land situation has become more difficult and complex in recent years for two major reasons: first, the growth in value of land and a trend toward "preemptive acquisition" and second, the disjuncture between legal land acquisition procedures and customary practices for settling conflicting claims which has led to a chaotic system of political brokering. And such a system places weaker groups such as refugees at a strong disadvantage.

If land suitable for agriculture but not already cultivated can be identified, its transfer to refugees must be achieved through a process of negotiation with whichever groups use the land and, in many instances, this negotiation will involve trade-offs between the interested parties. In addition, it must be recognized that the government may not be able in all cases to designate land for refuge settlement merely on technical and economic criteria. Other criteria of a social and political nature will have to be taken into account by the government and, once again, trade-offs made between the interests of various groups.

The second policy issue concerns the major differences with the GSDR as to how settlement programs should be approached and structured. The GSDR favors a directive, capital and management intensive model similar to earlier schemes for drought victims. USAID and the team believe that "assisted self-settlement," involving major self-help by the settlers, is more likely to be successful and less costly.

Third, the GSDR has vested institutional authority for refugee matters with the National Refugee Commission, an autonomous body with ministerial status. Consequently, any settlement project will have to deal with the leadership, organization and point of view of the NRC whose record to date has, to say the least, been uninspiring. The U.N., with U.S. support, has established a settlement Steering Committee and Technical Unit, but the extent to which these bodies will provide a broader context for the review of settlement projects or facilitate their implementation is problematic. The team proposed a refugee-inclusive area development project to be implemented by the Ministry of Interior, but this approach was faulted because of uncertainty as to its impact on inducing refugees to leave the camps.

Fourth, a better understanding of settler participation and motivation is considered to be critical to the planning and success of settlement programs. Objectives are to provide adequate incentives to induce refugees to accept the inherent risks of participation, helping them make the transition, and making adequate provision for the equitable treatment of the local population.

Finally, the current refugee food policy of the donor community is considered to be an important disincentive to settlement. In addition to providing excess food to certain categories of recipients who support the status quo, the system discriminates against disadvantaged ethnic and political groups. A procedure for undertaking reform is recommended although strenuous GSDR resistance can be anticipated.

Chapter Three contains a summary description of the areas visited by the team in Lower Shabelli and the northwest as well as an account of significant interviews conducted in Mogadishu. In regard to the field visits, particular attention is paid to the soil, topographic, agricultural and natural resource characteristics of the areas, status and needs of infrastructure, as well as economic features, and rural enterprise activities. Conversations with officials in Mogadishu explored institutional aspects of a possible project.

The final section of this chapter suggests a phased approach of data gathering, analysis and policy dialogue, preliminary to undertaking further project design work. The approach includes the following stages:

Stage One: A national land resource review, using existing data, to identify potential area development/refugee settlement sites and, in consultation with the GSDR, to prioritize them.

Stage Two: Concurrently with Stage One, USAID initiates discussions with the GSDR on the policy issues discussed in Chapter Two. GSDR endorses the sites selected in Stage One.

Stage Three: Rapid assessments of the areas selected in order to identify which have the greatest potential and are socially feasible. On the basis of the results presented, agreement with the GSDR on available and viable sites.

Stage Four: A design team, in collaboration with the GSDR, prepares a settlement project paper related to the selected sites.

Chapter Four presents a description of refugee-related development activities which appear to have considerable promise for involving both refugees and the local population in the areas visited by the team. They may be summarized as follows:

Agriculture: in the northwest, irrigated horticulture, improved dryland farming model, tree nurseries, establishment of input supply and marketing structure, pre-implementation study of vegetable marketing to Djibouti. In the Lower Shabelli, identification of potential areas for dryland settlement, study of lessons learned by PVO and World Bank agricultural projects.

Small Scale Enterprise: chicken/egg production, goats and sheep for wool, beekeeping, vegetable production and processing, improved stoves, donkey carts, tool making, leatherwork, and weaving.

Small Scale Industry: the creation of a small dairy unit which would involve primarily women, both refugee and local.

Infrastructure: road rehabilitation in the northwest and irrigation efficiency studies in Lower Shabelli.

Chapter Five deals in greater depth and detail with resource management issues with emphasis on their effect on refugee settlement. After a section on the economic and social system of the northwest, the current land and resource tenure situation is described and analyzed together with illustrations as to how land disputes involving refugees have actually been settled.

Chapter Six discusses various institutional alternatives for project implementation. They may be summarized as follows:

Institution Building Model: The model assumes an area development approach and suggests building the rural development planning and implementing capacity of the Ministry of Interior at the Mogadishu, regional, and district levels. The role of technical assistance and of local development funds is discussed.

District Level Model: This option proposes a District Project Support Office at the district level in areas targeted for settlement. It would provide technical services to both refugees and the local population who seek to participate in sub-project activities and would facilitate the access of such groups to the local technical and administrative bodies of government.

Planning Umbrella Model: The third model involves working through the Ministry of Planning to design an area plan and the provision of resources to implement this plan through line ministries and PVO's.

**CHAPTER ONE**  
**REFUGEE SETTLEMENT AND**  
**PROJECT DESIGN IN SOMALIA**

**INTRODUCTION**

In the summer of 1984 Development Alternatives, Inc. (DAI) and the Institute for Development Anthropology (IDA) were invited by USAID/Somalia to field a nine-person team to work on the design of a pilot refugee settlement project for Somalia. The underlying objective was to design settlement activities in at least two regions of the country which could, if successful, be later replicated in other regions. The team of consultants duly arrived, talked with USAID, the line ministries, the PVO's and then went to the field to visit two regions which had been identified by USAID as potentially prime areas for such pilot settlement activities.

Three weeks after arrival, the team put together a discussion paper laying out the proposed development strategy, development activities, and institutional arrangements for implementation. This paper was then presented to USAID -- to the director, the deputy director, and the staff of the Refugee Affairs/Rural Development Division who will be responsible for the project once implementation begins. During the ensuing discussion, it became painfully apparent that there were some fundamental differences between the development approach espoused by USAID and that of the DAI/IDA design team.

During the days that followed, further differences emerged until it became apparent that the time was not ripe for producing a project paper. After mutual discussion, it was decided that the best contribution the design team could make would be in the form of this report, which describes both what the team learned and what further steps are required in order to produce a worthwhile project paper. The remainder of this chapter will describe the process by which USAID and the design team arrived at this decision.

### The Process Approach

The basic approach practiced in this design effort was that of the process approach, i.e., the acceptance of the fact that a design team can never have complete information -- if that were the goal then projects would never get designed, given the scanty data base that exists in most developing countries. The underlying premise of this approach is that a team gathers a certain minimum amount of information required to identify development potentials, designs certain activities based on this information, fully accepting that during implementation a project must continue to gather additional information in order to ascertain which activities are feasible and which are not. As the knowledge base improves, so do the activities implemented: those which are feasible are encouraged, those which are not are dropped. In this approach, flexibility and the willingness to learn from experience and to modify activities accordingly are key.

### Area Development Strategy

The process approach to project design was placed within the broader context of an area development strategy: that specific activities should be coordinated in a logical fashion that implies the need for some realistic development planning. For example, it does not make sense to encourage an activity that will increase agricultural productivity if there is little or no demand for the increased production. Likewise, it is foolhardy to propose installing new wells without first asking what effect they may have upon the local environment. The area development approach is distinguished from the integrated rural development approach on two counts: first, it is broader in scope, and second, it is less management intensive.

The key to this strategy is rapid assessments or reconnaissance surveys which identify the resource base, the current development activities, and the most critical constraints to increasing production in a specific geographic area. On the basis of this, potential development interventions can be identified in consultation with the local population, government officials, and line ministry personnel.[1]

### The Institutional Approach

In many developing countries, existing government institutions are weak and the tendency for donors is often to bypass them and support the creation of semi-autonomous project management units (PMU's). This approach avoids many of the problems

associated with working directly with the government -- as well as providing the donor with a lot more control over project activities. This approach is extremely shortsighted since many PMU's, once donor assistance terminates, die a hasty death -- resulting from the lack of durable institutional support.

The approach taken by the design team was to work through existing institutions to the extent possible, while fully realizing and accepting that some of these institutions may leave a lot to be desired as potential hosts for the project. Nevertheless, only by so doing can the project hope to build a process that will be sustainable once donor assistance decreases or terminates. Hence, while the basic objective of the project is to improve the well being of refugees and non-refugees within an area development context, one of the ways in which this can be achieved is by increasing the capacity of existing institutions to provide the necessary goods and services.

In the context of this particular project, however, the question centers around which institution could play the key role in implementation. For a variety of well substantiated reasons, AID had decided that the National Refugee Commission (NRC) should not play this role: AID's experience with NRC had led to a well deserved disinclination to give it the lead role in settlement. From the perspective of the design team, it was felt that the Ministry of the Interior, which had recently absorbed the Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development, could play a key role, together with the Ministries of Planning and Agriculture.

Various discussions were held with representatives of these ministries, who listened politely, but refused to make any commitment. Meetings were also held with NRC to discuss the design team's perspectives on refugee settlement and area development, perspectives which differed significantly from those of the NRC. As of this writing, there has been no official response from potential institutional hosts and it is obvious that a prolonged series of negotiations are just beginning. Under such conditions, producing a project paper detailing institutional and implementation arrangements that had yet to be agreed upon was considered to be premature.

### The Settlement Approach

The concept of settlement can cover a wide spectrum, from that of a tightly controlled, capital intensive enclave where everything is provided to one where potential settlers, encouraged by the prospect of new opportunities, are provided with little or nothing -- the difference between "planned" and "spontaneous" settlement. Nevertheless, this latter form is a misnomer since there is nothing spontaneous about the process: settlers and their families plan their moves with great care, based on firsthand experience of new opportunities. In the context of this design effort, it would be fair to say that the points of view of three of the major actors straddle this planned/spontaneous spectrum: NRC at one extreme (highly planned), State/AID in the center, and the design team at the other (spontaneous).

The design team's perspective on settlement was based on two factors: first, the impression that AID was as much, if not more, interested in beginning a process of area rural development in Somalia than in refugee settlement per se; and, second, the fact that field trips indicated that the potential for settlement in two regions was extremely limited while in the third the government was only interested in conventional settlement schemes, which have a dismal track record in Somalia.

Based on this, the area development strategy presented in the discussion paper did not include a "significant refugee settlement component." In fact, the discussion paper referred to earlier was clear but cautious in this respect:

While this project will not solve the refugee problem, it will provide the opportunity for some to work towards self-sufficiency and for others to perhaps achieve economic integration[2].

This became an area of major disagreement: AID subsequently wanted a significant refugee settlement component which the design team felt unable to deliver without doing violence to their consciences. This is one of the major reasons why there is no project paper at this time.

With the benefit of hindsight and on the basis of available information, this third region of Lower Shabelli is the only one of the three where "settlement through area development" might be feasible -- were the government prepared to make the necessary policy changes and AID to modify its opposition to the possibility of some camps evolving into permanent settlements.

## The Design Effort

In the best of all possible project design worlds, AID and the host government have usually reached preliminary agreement on certain basics before the design team arrives, e.g., the geographic location of the project, the types of activities to be implemented, and the lead institution to do the implementing. In the case of this particular design effort, all three of these pre-conditions were lacking. Hence, much effort was expended visiting project areas, proposing specific development activities, and trying to tempt various government institutions to become involved in the process. And this had to be done three times for three distinct geographic areas.

While the design team argued strongly for more geographical concentration, AID argued that this would be politically unacceptable. Thus, the team's efforts were spread thin and there was barely enough information generated by the brief field visits to justify three distinct, district level projects. This was perhaps the final reason why there is no project paper at the present time.

## Structure of the Present Report

The report which follows has two objectives: first, to summarize what the design team learned during its stay in Somalia and, second, to outline what has to be done in order to prepare an acceptable project paper. Chapter Two places the project in the overall context of the refugee problem in Somalia and lays

out certain key policy issues that must be addressed and resolved before proceeding with any additional design work. Chapter Three deals with assessments: what the team did and proposals for future assessments. The following chapter provides information on the activities proposed for agriculture, livestock, infrastructure, and small scale enterprise. In the next chapter, the crucial topic of land tenure and the social context in which it is imbedded are dealt with in detail. The final chapter describes and justifies several institutional alternatives for implementing this approach.

#### FOOTNOTES

1. A concise description of this process is provided in the following document: USAID/Somalia, Assistance to Refugee Settlement in Somalia: A Project Briefing Paper Mogadishu: Refugee Affairs/Rural Development Office, 1984.
2. DAI/IDA, The Refugee Area Development Project: A Discussion Paper, Mogadishu, September 1984, p.3.

## CHAPTER TWO

### REFUGEE AND SETTLEMENT POLICY ISSUES

#### INTRODUCTION

A viable refugee settlement policy can only be designed in the context of the overall refugee problem which presently prevails in Somalia. Hence, a brief historical summary of the events leading up to the present situation is in order. But the refugee problem is not only historical: it is also social, economic, and -- above all -- political. As such, it is not the sort of problem that will quickly disappear nor be quickly resolved through the implementation of a viable refugee settlement policy. Refugee settlement is designed to assist the process but, before it can, certain key policy issues have to be addressed and resolved at the national level. This chapter will describe what these issues are and suggest possible ways in which the interested parties can begin to address them. In the process, the differing agendas of the key actors in Somalia's refugee settlement policy will also be discussed.

#### The Refugee Problem in Historical Perspective

The Ogaden, a vast lowland area in southeastern Ethiopia, is predominantly inhabited by ethnic Somalis. Since the late 19th century, when Britain recognized Ethiopian sovereignty over the region, Somalia has claimed the Ogaden as an integral part of Greater Somalia. As a result, of these claims, there have been periodic conflicts between Ethiopia and Somalia, the most recent

being that of 1977-1978. In the wake of the latter, thousands of ethnic Somalis and Dromos sought refuge in northern and southern Somalia. Their numbers increased from an estimated 130,000 in early 1978 to 1,300,000 in February 1981, when the tide began to ebb.

To cope with this influx, the Somali government (GSDR) established 35 refugee camps in the Lower Shabelli, Hiran, Gedo, and Northwest regions. Many of these were located near the Somali/Ethiopian frontier. A refugee office was established in the Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development in 1979. As the crisis worsened, an autonomous National Refugee Commission (NRC) was formed in 1981 to deal with refugee problems and to coordinate external offers of assistance.

As early as 1977, the influx of refugees into Somalia had attracted international concern. As the situation deteriorated, a branch office of the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) was opened in 1979, marking the beginning of a massive emergency relief operation financed by UNHCR, the World Food Program (WFP) and the international donor community. Operationally, the Somali authorities and UNHCR were assisted from the beginning by foreign voluntary agencies. As the influx of refugees mounted, the number of such agencies grew to nearly 40, with most concentrating on such vital life support services as food, water, and medical attention.

The initial phases of this effort were chaotic as Somali authorities and external agencies tried to cope with seemingly endless daily crises. A turning point, leading to a gradual improvement in nutritional and health standards in the camps, was reached in 1981 with: first, the establishment by CARE of an integrated food delivery system, and second, the success of the Refugee Health Unit in providing health care services. It was only then that sights could begin to be raised from meeting emergency tasks to that of starting to address the longer run needs and problems of the refugees.

What had been hoped would be a temporary crisis -- after which the refugees could return to their homelands -- was evolving into a more protracted problem caused by continuing Somali/Ethiopian enmity. These circumstances led to an evolution in Somali and donor agency policies. The period 1981-1983 saw the initiation of "medium term" approaches. Attention began to turn to actions that might be taken over a period of up to three years, which would permit the refugees to become more productive, acquire new skills, and reduce environmental degradation in the vicinity of the camps.

Although the GSDR remained firmly committed to the goal of voluntary repatriation, it began to acknowledge the value of taking interim "self-reliance" measures. It announced that refugees could cultivate individual plots near the camps, could keep the proceeds of their output and could participate in GSDR development projects. At the international level the GSDR

solicited donor financing for five medium term refugee assistance activities through the International Conference on Assistance to Refugees in Africa (ICARA I).

Donor agencies also became increasingly supportive of this approach, including positive recommendations by a State/AID policy team in January 1982. Beginning in 1982, UNHCR began budgeting for "self reliance" activities in its annual plan of operations and later that year AID financed two "self reliance" projects in forestry, agriculture and other productive activities. American PVO's, many of which were already established in Somalia, were called upon to assist in implementation. On the other hand, with the end of the emergency, a number of PVO's wound up their work in Somalia and the total PVO presence fell from 39 organizations in mid-1981 to 21 by the end of 1983.

Meanwhile, the nature and extent of the refugee situation has been changing. Many thousands of refugees have left the camps to seek alternative livelihoods, some to return to their homelands, others to try their luck in the towns and cities, on the farms and rangelands, or even in the Gulf states. A much smaller number has been conscripted into the Somali armed forces. Although there have been occasional influxes of new refugees, there has been a major decline in the total camp population. Although the GSDR claims that 700,000 refugees remain in the camps, the donors currently use a figure of 530,000 or less. The resulting decline in per capita rations provides a disincentive to perpetuating the present situation. On the other hand, since the food distribution system is based on such an inflated camp

population a large percentage of the inflow filters into the general economy and represents a major resource transfer of benefit to more than just the refugees.

By early 1983 there was growing recognition that more than interim activities were required and that long term alternatives to voluntary repatriation were needed. On the Somali side it was announced that the GSDR would permit refugees to settle indefinitely in Somali, if they so desired. Settlement costs would, however, require major donor financing. From the perspective of the international agencies and donors, there was a growing belief that the long term approach to the refugee situation could best be pursued within the broader context of the country's overall development, with programs that would benefit local Somalis along with refugees.

#### Refugee Settlement Policy: The Somali Perspective

The GSDR's concept of settlement, as subsequently enunciated by the NRC, is that of establishing fixed, delineated communities, preferably adjacent to or near existing camps. In exceptional cases, new or unused land would be sought. The process envisages a highly organized and planned transfer of people which would be accompanied by the provision of settlement facilities such as water, education, health, land preparation, roads, and housing which would permit farming, livestock and small enterprise activities. It assumes major external financing for site selection, site preparation, infrastructure and annual operating costs -- pending settlement self-sufficiency. The

Somali office of UNHCR apparently supports this approach and is considering financing an \$8,000,000 semi-mechanized dryland farming scheme to settle 560 families at Furjano in the Lower Shabelli region.

UNHCR has also been instrumental in establishing institutional arrangements for the preparation and review of settlement projects. A Steering Committee has been set up, comprising representatives of the NRC, Ministry of Planning, UNHCR, and UNDP, to deal with policy issues. In addition, a Technical Unit of expatriate specialists recruited and funded by UNHCR has recently been activated to provide expertise in preparation and analysis of settlement projects. The composition of these two bodies will help to assure a broader approach to settlement problems, at least in theory.

A broader approach was also reflected in preparations for the Second International Conference on Assistance to Refugees in Africa (ICARA II) held in July 1984. The work of the U.N. technical team preparing the Somali presentation was "geared to the provision of infrastructure likely to enhance the refugees' attainment of self reliance as a condition of their eventual integration into the general Somali economy and society." In the event, 14 Somali projects totaling \$79,900,000 were presented at the conference. Donor response to date has not been over-enthusiastic, though the Finns have agreed to fund a food storage project and the Italians at least one hospital.

At first sight, the GSDR choice of settlement model may appear somewhat paradoxical, given the government's only previous experience with refugee settlement, which dates from the 1974 drought. At that time, an estimated 120,000 refugees were selected to be settled in three fishing cooperatives and three agricultural settlements. In two of the agricultural settlements, Kurtunwarey and Sablaale, the population has dwindled to a little more than half the original number. In the third, Dujuma, agricultural activities have stopped since the land was found to be too saline. Many of the original settlers now work as seasonal day laborers on large plantations[1].

In Kurtunwarey and Sablaale, the settlement model chosen has been highly capital intensive and authoritarian, with the settlers being provided with everything from housing and education to land preparation and technical assistance. Not surprisingly, recurrent costs in these settlements still far exceed income. Originally established as state farms with the settlers providing the labor, the implementing agency -- the Settlement Development Authority (SDA) attached to the Ministry of Agriculture (MOA) -- began moving towards a family operated system of tenant farming in 1981. More recently, the World Bank has been supporting the SDA in the establishment of semi-mechanized rainfed agriculture. Under this system, which remains very management intensive and technologically sophisticated, the major decisions are all taken by the SDA and the tenant is responsible only for weeding, harvesting, and marketing. A

capital intensive system, whose economic viability is as yet unproven, this is the settlement model being proposed for the latest scheme at Furjano[2].

The paradox of supporting an apparent loser is easily explained when the government's, and particularly NRC's, agenda for refugee settlement is more clearly understood. The refugee problem fulfills two important objectives: the first economic and the second political. The government is virtually bankrupt and the refugee problem continues to attract scarce resources to Somalia.

Politically, there is still an expressed desire to see the Ogaden freed from Ethiopian domination and aligned with or incorporated into Somalia. In return for this, the government can rely on Ogadeni support to counteract internal opposition within Somalia. Hence, it is important that the refugees maintain a high profile which can be easily controlled by the central government or the NRC. Camps are the ideal solution, but settlement enclaves are a viable alternative. As the Extraordinary Commissioner for Refugee Affairs expressed it in an interview, the refugees have the right not only to attain self-sufficiency, but also to preserve their social and cultural identity. This latter objective is easily achieved -- at least in the short run -- in a settlement enclave.

## Refugee Settlement Policy: The American Perspective

Historically, the U.S. has played a leading role among the donors on refugee matters. It responded quickly to the U.N.'s call for emergency assistance when the crisis first struck. It is the major donor in terms of providing resources -- about 25 percent of the costs of the refugee feeding program and nearly 50 percent of UNHCR's annual budget for Somalia. It has supplemented these contributions with bilateral programs, funded by the Refugee Programs Bureau of the State Department and funds made available to AID. A Refugee Affairs Office has been established within USAID/Somalia and refugee food assistance is a major preoccupation of the Mission's Food for Peace Office. In addition, U.S. agencies are prominently engaged in program implementation tasks, with CARE managing the logistics of food distribution and several U.S. voluntary agencies helping to carry out self-reliance and forestry projects.

Thus, it is not surprising that the U.S. is playing an influential role in the donor response to Somalia's settlement policy. It supported the new institutional arrangements proposed by UNHCR in the hope that they would give a greater development focus to settlement projects. It has argued against structured, capital intensive settlement schemes with their dismal history, in favor of generating economic incentives and opportunities for refugees outside of the camps. Most recently, it has initiated consideration of a settlement proposal that would help identify

which refugee-impacted areas have the best prospects for development and how opportunities away from the camps could be optimized for both refugees and the local population.

As in the case of the GSDR, AID also has its own agenda for refugee settlement, one economic and the other political. The first objective is most clearly spelled out in the PID for this Somalia Refugee Settlement Project -- to decrease the dependency of the refugees on the camps and the goods and services provided therein:

Growing numbers of Somali officials and donor organizations are coming to realize that the present "refugee camps" are short on resources to support permanent settlement and perhaps, more importantly, they do not offer sufficient incentives for the refugees to accept more responsibility for their own lives[3].

The second objective is implicit -- the U.S. would like to see the camps disappear since they are viewed as a political liability, a potential threat, a Somali version of the Palestinian problem. While the camps continue to exist, the potential for internal political problems will continue as will the potential for continuing problems with Ethiopia. Because of Somalia's strategic importance at the Horn of Africa, it is in America's interests to support internal political stability in Somalia. One way this can be maintained is by accelerating the process by which the refugees are dispersed and integrated into Somali society. This strategy is, of course, diametrically opposed to that of the GSDR which wants to keep the refugees concentrated in specific geographic areas.

### Underlying Assumptions

To implement this policy, AID has made several important assumptions, including the following:

- o There are refugees who are willing to settle;
- o Local communities are willing to accept settlers;
- o There is sufficient land available to settle refugees;
- o The Ministry of Agriculture will be willing to give rights to land to potential settlers; and
- o Finally, settlement policy will be further defined by the GSDR in conjunction with donor agencies, institutions, and the people in areas to be affected[4].

While all of these assumptions are critical, some depend on policy decisions by the GSDR at the central level -- particularly the latter three. Without such decisions, both AID and any design team are courting disaster -- a possibility recognized earlier in the PID:

It is the issue of interpretation which is the most critical in the evolution of refugee policy in Somalia. Following this premise, it has long been our contention that Somalia's refugee policy will evolve as specific projects are identified...In some instances our assumptions about the refugee settlement may be in conflict with NRC's paper and the ICARA II proposal. We believe, however, that as points of new conflict arise a negotiated solution can be achieved[5].

What this particular design effort has shown is that it is premature to design settlement projects based on assumptions which are not shared by the host country government. How can settlement projects be designed before the government has

indicated that land will be made available? How can they be designed when the participation of those institutions most closely involved with settlement (the NRC, the Steering Committee, and the Technical Unit) and rural development (The Ministries of Interior, Planning, and Agriculture) has not yet been clearly defined with regards to implementation? In fact, at one time the strong impression was given that the proposed refugee settlement strategy might virtually bypass the NRC and the Steering Committee[6]. For these reasons, it is strongly recommended that AID move from assumptions to realistic discussions with the government on the following crucial issues:

- o Land: availability, access to, and security of lease for potential settlers;
- o Settlement models;
- o Institutional arrangements -- particularly the role of the NRC, the Steering Committee, and the Technical Unit;
- o Settler participation and motivation; and
- o Food policy in the camps.

Each of these issues will be dealt with in detail below.

#### LAND AVAILABILITY, ACCESS TO, AND SECURITY OF TENURE

##### Refugee Settlement: The Policy Issues Regarding Land

The principle of allowing extensive refugee settlement on land outside the camps has been unambiguously stated by the Government of Somalia, and is supported by the donor agencies involved in refugee assistance[7]. The following extract from the GSDR position paper outlines this principle:

"...in addition to voluntary repatriation as a durable solution, the government agrees to allow refugees to settle in Somalia if they so wish. The explicit objective of this new policy is to bring about a better quality of life and a sense of community for the refugees"[8].

In order to implement this policy, land for refugee settlement must be found, somewhere and by some process. What type of land is sought will depend upon the purposes intended for its use. How such land is to be identified is an issue requiring policy decisions. The purpose for which the land will be used is likewise an issue demanding policy decisions. It is these policy issues and the underlying implications for the process of land selection and refugee settlement that this discussion addresses.

There appear to be three alternative approaches to the issue of refugee access to land. These can be succinctly outlined as follows:

- o State appropriation of an area of land to be designated for refugee settlement en masse from the camps. This is the model currently favored by the government, in particular the NRC.
- o State designation of sites where refugees can settle on an individual or group basis, with some assistance to be provided by the state and donor agencies, and security of land guaranteed to refugee settlers.
- o State support for spontaneous refugee settlement at sites selected by refugees, with inputs and services provided to settlers, but with no assurance of land tenure.

The choice of any one of these three approaches carries with it assumptions about land availability, access to and security of tenure, not only on the part of refugee settlers, but also on the part of local Somali citizens who reside in or around the proposed refugee settlement sites.

The first approach, as presently described by the NRC, is based on several premises and precedents. Refugees will be resettled on "new and unused land," with "suitable inputs and expert supervision there is rapid material gain," "refugees should not be relocated outside their respective regions where they are already used to the environment, unless there are compelling reasons," "the Government will propose different suitable sites" and these sites will be fully developed and serviced by refugee labor under the supervision of a state-appointed management structure.

The precedents for this approach consist of the state settlement schemes established for drought-affected pastoralists described earlier in this chapter. Two critical premises about land underlie this present approach: that new and unused land can be found and appropriated by the state and that current refugees should be resettled within their respective regions, i.e., in the same region as their present camp.

The second approach, whereby the state designates land for refugee settlement, on an individual or group basis, with guaranteed security of tenure to spontaneous settlers has apparently no precedent in Somalia, as far as refugee settlement is

concerned. Nevertheless, there are many precedents in the cooperative and group farm system as well as in the private registration of land. All of these have proceeded with full state support and encouragement, in which security of tenure is upheld, both in law and practice, by the state.

The third approach, that of state-supplied inputs and services to spontaneous refugee settlers but with no assurance of land tenure, is the present approach, followed since 1980 when refugees in camps were permitted to start farming in the immediate vicinity, with assistance from the Refugee Agricultural Unit (RAU) and PVO's in the form of agricultural inputs and advice. An evaluation of the successes and failures of this approach is given in Chapter Five. The general conclusion reached is that small groups of refugees seeking access to supposedly "unclaimed" land have often met with fierce resistance from the local populace, who present competing claims. In other cases, the land they have registered and developed has been expropriated by local elites and officials. Security of tenure by refugees has rarely been enforced by the appropriate government authorities. At the same time, hostility and tension between locals and refugees have been created when well-intentioned PVO's have tried to get land designated for refugee settlement against the wishes of local community members, who feel their rights have been infringed upon.

For each of these approaches, questions of equity are at stake. In the first approach, land has in the past typically been appropriated by the state with little or no regard for the customary land use rights of local Somalis, a point to be discussed in more detail below. In this case, refugee settlers are favored at the possible expense of local people. The second approach, which has not yet been applied, would grant equal security of tenure to refugees and citizens. Presently, only citizens receive full state protection of their right to occupy and use land registered by a group, cooperative, or private individual. In this case, citizens are accorded much more protection than refugees.

In the third approach, both the land rights of citizens and refugees may be threatened, due to the lack of a clear policy regarding the process by which refugees can occupy land and to confusion and malpractice in the application of land registration laws. Given this situation, if questions of equity are a concern, it would appear that the second approach to refugee settlement is the most desirable.

#### Some Attitudes and Assumptions about "Unused and Available Land"

The state settlement projects undertaken by the government on behalf of drought-affected pastoralists in the 1970's are viewed by the government as a model for refugee settlement projects in the future[9]. It is instructive to examine these past settlement schemes and proposed similar schemes from the aspect of land availability and equity of access.

The agricultural settlements in Lower Shabelli Region, those of Kurtunwarey, Sablaale and Dujana, were set up on land appropriated by the state. Local inhabitants using the site area were not compensated for the land absorbed into the new settlement. The proposed Furgano project site, situated adjacent to Sablaale, is described in the project proposal as "16,000 hectares of virgin, unoccupied land"[10]. However, later in this same proposal, under the discussion of vegetation at the site, it is noted that "There were many indications of human and livestock activities...It is apparent that the natural vegetation offers good browsing and grazing as well as a supply of lumber for construction and firewood...Goats and cattle were found in the project site." Later on, the paper states that "Pastoralists, however, frequently visited during the dry season to utilize the riverine grazing"[11]. Clearly, the notion of "virgin, unoccupied land" refers here only to an absence of settled agricultural activities, while pastoralists are assumed not to be "occupying" the land.

Likewise, under the proposed new scheme for semi-mechanized agriculture on a 30,000 ha. site in Lower Shabelli region, the traditional rights of pastoralists who use the proposed site area for seasonal grazing are "not considered an issue or an impediment." A consultant's reconnaissance study of refugee settlement sites around Qorioley notes only in passing that the proposed settlement site is used for livestock grazing by local farmers and nomadic settlers: "During the drier parts of the year parts

of the study area are also used by nomadic herds. The extent of livestock utilization of the area has not been studied, but is believed to be on a low scale"[12].

The assumptions made here are three-fold: first, that customary grazing access to land is not a form of land use; second, that these customary rights of grazing access neither need to be respected nor taken account of; and, finally, that the people who normally use the land for grazing will not object when this land is appropriated by the state and settled by farmers, whether refugees or not. Each of these assumptions is highly questionable not only on equity grounds but also on practical grounds, since it is likely that livestock keepers denied access to their grazing and water points will resent intrusion of new settlers and may create difficulties for them.

The attitude that land not physically settled by agriculturalists is "unoccupied and unused" is quite prevalent at some official government levels. The team encountered several senior officials who suggested that certain local areas could be used for refugee settlement, as "only nomads are there." There is also a prevailing attitude among some urban elites that the nomadic pastoral system is unproductive and that nomads should be sedentarized and taught to become agriculturalists. It was this philosophy in part that motivated the settlement schemes of the 1970's, under which nomads who had lost their stock in the drought were to learn to settle down and become more "productive." The experience of these settlement projects has been that many former nomads returned to their pastoral economy

once they had accumulated enough resources to restock their herds[13]. Presumably these returnees considered the pastoral system to be at least as productive as settled cultivation, and proceeded to vote with their feet.

### The Civil and Customary Basis of Land Tenure and Use

Whatever policy decision is reached regarding refugee settlement on the land will, of necessity, have to take into account both the legal statutes of land tenure and the customary practices of land use. These two systems are explained in Chapter Five, which points out some of the discrepancies that arise in practice between customary views of land use and the officially-sanctioned and administered land tenure laws. Conflicts over land and the means by which these are resolved suggest that customary and legal systems of land tenure and land use have yet to be reconciled.

This lack of reconciliation has critical implications for implementation of any refugee settlement policy, because past events have shown that refugees may be a particularly vulnerable group in such conflicts. Acquisition of secure claim to grazing or farm land may depend on one or more of the following factors: acknowledged membership in a local kin group; local political influence; ability to formally register land claims with the Ministry of Agriculture (this applies, however, only to farm land and not to range land, with certain important exceptions); effective occupancy; and lastly, financial resources to exert influence. Refugees are at a disadvantage in obtaining secure

access to land since they are not in most cases well-connected by means of kinship or political influence with local groups, they may not have many financial resources, they may not be informed about the process of land registration, they cannot claim effective occupancy and finally, they cannot appeal to traditional local leaders to intercede on their behalf.

Whether or not land may be "available" for refugee settlement in particular areas depends in large measure on the successful reconciliation of the customary and civil systems of land tenure in each case. In other words, land which is not already legally claimed through registration may be allocated for use by refugees, if appropriately negotiated through customary channels and subsequently endorsed by the civil law, i.e., by being registered with the Ministry of Agriculture.

If the model of state land appropriation is not selected, this procedure will need to be followed to avoid future conflicts over land tenure in which refugee settlers are most likely to be shortchanged. The real question is not whether "unused and available" land can be identified. It can safely be assumed that all productive land is being used by someone, sometimes, that the present users will be moved to present claims to the land if a threat to future access is perceived. Rather, the question is whether certain areas of land intended to be more intensively used by refugee farmers can be obtained by offering something in return to those who currently use that land less intensively. This would appear to be the only equitable and practical solu-

tion, since current users are being asked to relinquish their use of a resource in order to permit new users to develop that resource for their own benefit.

### Issues of Land Tenure and Use in the Northwest

The following excerpts from the 1982 SOGREAH study of land ownership systems in the northwest present some of the points that need to be considered if a refugee settlement project is to be designed for that region:

The fact that the state has used its overall right to land to set up some experimental farms run by the Ministry of Agriculture does not seem to have posed many problems; these farms are small, and this has not given the local communities the impression of being deprived of a major asset. The local inhabitants stated that expropriation of this kind in the public interest was perfectly acceptable, provided that the land acquired in this way was grazing land, not too extensive and obviously developed as a result (clearing, irrigation).

In contrast, if experimental farms were to be set up on land already cultivated by families, there would be much greater opposition. This is one of the main fears of the local inhabitants with respect to the Northwest Development Project[14]. Most inhabitants feel that the project will lead to the setting up of pilot farms and they are afraid that these will be installed on existing farms, resulting in expulsion of the present farmers. They believe that if this were the case, no financial settlement could compensate for the loss of their farms, as the money paid on expropriation would not enable them to continue in agriculture, since it is impossible to buy land in the region.

The setting up and in particular the expansion of the Tug Wajale State Farm during the seventies made the local inhabitants very suspicious of the government's agrarian policy. However, over the past few years they have been gratified to note that the Farm has been obliged to reduce its cultivated land to practically nothing. Nomads and semi-nomads have taken advantage of the situation to reoccupy the abandoned land immediately.

A much greater cause of resentment has been the prohibition of grazing on tens of thousands of hectares of land granted to the LDA (Livestock Development Agency). It is not that the nomads are unaware of the advantages of this type of measure, but that in this case the aim is to provide fodder for animals destined for export, and these animals belong to a few traders who pay the LDA for the right to graze their animals on the land. The stock-breeders who used to graze their animals on this land feel that the state has not prevented them from using it for reasons of public interest, but to cater for private interests.

However, by far the most important problem caused by the conflict between state and tribal authority concerns new grants of farming land.

The state has granted concessions to certain farmers who are anxious to start irrigated agriculture...When these people are natives of the region and they can find a site on the land which traditionally belonged to their clan where irrigation is possible, they can set up a farm without any difficulty. If they come from another region, however, or if they dig a well in land belonging to a reer (family group) other than their own, they meet with violent opposition from the local inhabitants. Certain people have nevertheless gone ahead once they have obtained official authorisation from the state. Although they are perfectly within their rights according to the law, they are guilty of infringing traditional customs and there are examples of situations where there is considerable hostility between people of this kind and their neighbours.

Hiring a watchman is not always enough to prevent acts of vandalism, and sometimes it is necessary to have good relations with influential officials in order to combat the hostility of the local inhabitants.

In the case of rainfed agriculture, the conflict between state and tribal authority has resulted in paralysis in many villages.

In all the villages where investigations were carried out, the answer to the question "Would it be possible to extend the area of land cultivated if you were provided with the technical means to do so (such as tractors, teams of animals, etc.)?" was "No" without any exception.

In many cases, the reason given was that it was physically impossible, that there was no more cultivable land available in the area around the village. In certain cases, it was also stated that all the land remaining was grazing land. This seems to imply that there is a balance between stock-breeding and agriculture which the inhabitants do not wish to call into question.

However, on further enquiry, it was sometimes asserted that all the land belonging to anybody was already cultivated, and that it was not possible to use grazing land because of the government, even though there is apparently no specific government policy to prevent the extension of cultivated land in order to preserve grazing land.

In addition, it would also seem that in view of the population increase the areas cultivated at present are beginning to appear too small. When the villagers say that over the past few years (some even say since the new government took over) they have not increased the amount of land they cultivate, it is not because they do not wish to do so, but because they cannot.

It would appear that the reason for this is as follows (leaving aside cases where it is physically impossible, i.e., in certain villages where there really is no more land available:

In the past, when the increase in population made it necessary to extend the areas under cultivation, the reer decided collectively what agricultural land was to be granted to young couples or to families which had expanded considerably. Today, the inhabitants know that the authority of the reer is no longer enough to ensure them the right to exploit the land. They are therefore afraid to begin land clearance without obtaining legal rights beforehand.

However, at the same time, they are afraid to take the necessary steps to obtain this authorization. In order to legalize an old right to land occupation, it is simply necessary to prove that one cultivated the land before the 1975 act was passed. But on the other hand, no-one can be certain of obtaining a new lease and undertaking the necessary proceedings to obtain such land might draw the authority's attention to the fact that there was still land left for cultivation around the village, and in such circumstances who could guarantee that the government would grant the land to the person making the application and not someone from outside the reer, whose presence would thus be imposed from outside, as so often happens in irrigated agricultural areas?

Thus, in this example, the existence of two types of law, official and common, has led to a paralysing confrontation with neither able to overcome the other.

However, these two legal systems are not necessarily contradictory and it is possible to reconcile them.

An initial step in this direction would be for the state to avoid systematically granting concessions to exploit land which before nationalization belonged to a particular reer to individuals from outside the reer.

Another example of possible reconciliation is to be found in the Group Farms. Here the structure of local society is bending to conform with institutional patterns set up by the state: each of the 17 Group Farms in fact covers a traditional reer (and this has come about spontaneously). The main reason why the local communities have taken on the form of a cooperative is certainly the need to extend the areas of land which they cultivate. By applying as a cooperatiava for a new lease, the community was sure that this would be granted and that the state would even finance the necessary land clearance works[15].

### Policy Implications

First, prior to the design of a specific settlement project, these crucial land-related issues must be clarified. A major step towards resolving these issues would be for the government to create enabling mechanisms to assist refugees and locals in establishing secure access to the landed resources they use or intend to use. Such enabling mechanisms should include a clear definition of refugees' rights and restrictions with regards to registering land. Once settlement sites for refugees have been identified, active state support must be given to refugees who wish to claim and register land, provided this land is not already claimed or registered by others. The government's law and policy on land must be made known to refugees who may wish to settle. Equal protection under the law should be granted to local citizens, to avoid their being excluded from land they customarily use and to avoid future resentment towards refugee settlers on the part of locals.

Second, the process of identifying specific settlement sites should be guided by the suggestions set out in Chapter Three "Assessment Studies -- National Land Resources Review and Site Assessment Studies."

Third, if a particular local community is receptive to having refugees settle in or near land customarily used by locals, the settlement project should include provision of tangible benefits to the local community to compensate them for loss of their resources and to promote better relations between locals and refugee settlers. Such benefits could include basic infrastructure such as wells, irrigation pumps, upgrading of roads, social amenities such as schools, health posts, employment opportunities on the settlement project, increased services such as veterinary supplies and advice, and lastly, opportunities to participate in new economic activities developed for refugees.

Finally, if the settlement approach is to be based on an assisted spontaneous settlement model, there will be a need for potential refugee settlers to have access to a community relations adviser or ombudsman. The role of the CRA/Ombudsman should be one of advocacy on behalf of refugees and liaison with local authorities and leaders to assist refugees in securing claims to land. The CRA/Ombudsman should be well-informed on both customary and civil procedures relating to land registration and land dispute resolution. The CRA/Ombudsman should have the authority to negotiate and mediate between refugee settlers and local leaders in establishing refugee settlers' land claims or to

seek the intercession of other appropriate mediators, such as government officials and community elders. The objective of the CRA/Ombudsman should be to promote the interest of refugee settlers by creating sound community relations with members of the local population. (See Chapter Six).

#### SETTLEMENT MODELS

Prior to choosing and developing a strategy to deal with the refugees in Somalia, and a strategy aimed at their successful integration, decisions have to be made regarding objectives. Issues which need resolution include deciding whether the goal is a short term solution or whether a long term approach with less immediate impact is more useful and whether the refugees will be dealt with directly or indirectly. These are not academic considerations as they have a role in deciding which activities can be considered as contributing to refugee integration. For example, at one end of the spectrum could be direct intervention of various kinds aimed specifically at helping refugees change their status quickly. At the other end could be longer term policy adjustments at the government level, perhaps combined with activities directed towards overall area development. In an ideal world both processes would be occurring concurrently.

An essential part of the strategy to integrate refugees into Somali society is the decision on what mix of refugees and nationals should be involved. A number of the schemes which have been proposed to deal with refugees involve large investments in

small numbers of refugees. Adopting one of these tactics will involve resolving the issues of equity, local resentment, total costs and replicability.

Another area of equally daunting complexity is the number and nature of the refugee populations themselves. They can not be dealt with as a homogeneous unit with equal aspirations, skills, opportunities and restraints. Subdivision has to be attempted before meaningful planning can occur.

### Settlement Models

Some theoretical possibilities for settlement are listed below:

- o Existing spontaneous settlement, completely spontaneous settlement, or assisted self settlement can all be encouraged.
- o Urban settlement and integration can be encouraged.
- o A return to pastoralism can be encouraged.
- o A traditional settlement approach with heavy investments in infrastructure can be taken, i.e., a fully organized settlement. The settlement model proposed for Furjano is basically a variation on this theme.
- o An area development approach can be adopted.

The first four options could be specifically directed at refugees while the last would, by definition, include both Somalis and refugees. The options are not mutually exclusive. In Somalia, family income typically comes from several sources: crop production, livestock, wages, and business income, local or overseas. Because of this and the consequent reduction in risk, a multi sectoral approach may be the best. Within each option,

agriculture, livestock and business could be combined. Within the agricultural sector the involvement could be in either dry-land agriculture, irrigated agriculture, or both; and in subsistence production, commercial production, or both. The private sector businesses in Somalia are dynamic, whilst state owned enterprises are notably inefficient. Income generating activities should, therefore, involve the private sector.

### Economic Considerations

There is a wide range of settlement models that could be discussed, so a few will be listed as typical examples. It must be kept in mind, as the models are discussed, that not only agricultural schemes are included in the models. Fishing schemes, wage employment, and all types of business or labor that result in the generation of income, are all included. Production of food by family members for their own consumption is also included.

- o Completely Spontaneous Settlement. If refugees decide to leave the camps, they will have the same settlement options as any other Somali citizen. All costs of movement and settlement are borne entirely by the refugee, so this is the cheapest alternative as far as government intervention is concerned. If rations in the camps are reduced significantly, spontaneous settlement could increase substantially.
- o Government Assisted Self-Settlement. If settlement is spontaneous, it will be followed by a public demand from those areas with population increases for employment generation, infrastructure, and social services. This settlement strategy might hold government expenditure on behalf of the refugees to a minimum. The goal would be to spread government investment over many families, keeping settlement costs per family low. Support services would only be provided to the extent necessary to enable the refugees to complete their own

settlement arrangements. The cost of roads, clinics, schools, and advisory staff has been calculated at \$1800 per family in the Furjano area, a very low development cost for a five year period.

- o Fully Organized Settlement. This model has in the past been a favorite choice of the government, and has been typical of designs favored by the UNHCR. This results, at high cost, in an organized settlement where the village locations, facilities and layout are thoroughly planned, and thorough provision is made for social services and infrastructure. The cost of development for a plan of this nature at Furjano is estimated to be \$13,710 per family. Development of potential irrigation may double the development cost per hectare. Under the proposed farming system for Furjano, for instance, the role of the settlers is restricted to weeding, dealing with predators, and harvesting, threshing and selling the crops. The latest budget for Furjano appears unduly optimistic, even with the stated ratio of costs to families.

### Technical Considerations

A strategy to settle refugees in Somalia based partly or wholly on crop agriculture can only use a limited number of production strategies. These include:

- o Irrigated agriculture;
- o Recession agriculture;
- o Existing dryland agriculture;
- o Improved dryland agriculture; and
- o Semi-mechanized controlled fallow agriculture.

Each of these will be discussed below.

### Irrigated Agriculture

Irrigated agriculture has a lead time of two to three years, is expensive at \$15-20,000 per hectare, and frequently suffers from management problems. The indications are that very little

unused capacity occurs in the Shabelli river flows and that, outside of the Didbrawein valley, there are only very small scale opportunities in the northwest. The performance of the existing irrigation schemes in Somalia is poor and, if rehabilitation is considered, redistribution of irrigated land to refugees is problematic. The high value of the land and the potential returns make development of irrigation very attractive to speculators.

In the interriverine zone, where salinity needs consideration, irrigation schemes will require good drainage and adequate water flows. The associated health risks of malaria and bilharzia also need inclusion in any discussion of settlement based on irrigation. Given the scarcity of water, the high capital costs, and the unavailability of large areas available for development, controlled irrigated agriculture is unlikely to be a viable tactic for intergrating large numbers of refugees. Some limited possibility appears to exist for the employment of refugees as laborers on new or rehabilitated schemes.

### Recession Agriculture

An alternative to controlled irrigation is recession agriculture or uncontrolled irrigation. Once again the scope for this type of activity appears limited, due to the constraints of available water and suitable land. The seasonal swampland in the interriverine area is used heavily as a source of dry season fodder for stock in the region.

### Dryland Agriculture

Dryland agriculture, as practiced in Somalia on 80 percent of the cultivated land, is typically high risk with crop failures in two seasons out of every five. As a result, it is usually linked with livestock. The areas along the Shabelli river are presently infested with tsetse and stock maintained in the area during the wet season has 15 to 20 percent levels of infection with trypanosomiasis. An approach based on dryland agriculture would require a restocking of the refugee herds to ensure self sufficiency, which would be both expensive and against implicit NRC policies.

A typical dryland farm in Somalia is about nine hectares with one to three hectares cropped. Assuming 300,000 refugees with six members per family, the settlement of only 50 percent of them in dryland agriculture would require an additional 225,000 ha. This figure assumes that the available land would have the same productive capacity as the existing cultivated dryland, an assumption which is unreasonable. Any land which becomes freely available for refugee settlement is likely to be marginal and high risk, from the point of view of dryland agriculture.

### Improved Dryland Farming

The experience of research in Somalia suggests that few of the improvements suggested for dryland agriculture have had any major impact. Dramatic increases in yields or reduction of risk are unlikely. Animal traction is often advocated, though ox

plowing is found mainly in the northwest. Many of the soils in Somalia have a high clay content, requiring careful handling. A system is also required to maintain the oxen in good condition during the dry season. Another assumption that has to be tested is whether the constraint on cropped area is land preparation per se, or weeding.

### Semi-mechanized Controlled Fallow

A final model is semi-mechanized, controlled fallow agriculture, under consideration by the World Bank for extension between the pilot projects of Sablaale and Kurtenwarey, and also by the UNHCR for development at Furjano.

This model has government and NRC backing and is based on sophisticated machinery and management. The total capital development cost is unclear but falls in the region of \$15,000 per family. A figure of \$9,000 per family is given for the World Bank scheme at Sablaale, but this figure excludes various items such as surveys, planning, and housing. The scheme is based on five years of expatriate technical assistance with the underlying assumption that management and recurrent costs will be dealt with by the Somali government after that time. Dryland agriculture of this type assumes the ready availability of capital, capable management, and good service and maintenance support. It requires inputs which are often in short supply, such as fuel, spares, and good managers. It raises questions of ownership and management which need resolution. Its expansion on a large scale

would, by necessity, be into the drier interriverine areas that are presently used for grazing, as discussed in the previous section.

It has the advantages of base data which could theoretically be used to modify and adopt the system. One suggestion has been to shift from a high capital/high management approach to a low capital/high labor approach, with perhaps a shift to cooperative management. The controlled fallow system succeeds technically now because of the strict control of fallow and planting times, and because the area cropped is large enough to provide a return in bad years.

The system provides mechanized land preparation, planting and fallow maintenance. It is currently based on 12 hectares of land per family with nine arable and three left for woodlots. Each family works three hectares per season. The size of the farm units, 140 families on 1,764 hectares, is based on technical considerations, not social ones. Local resentment and lack of local participation need to be addressed.

### Indigenous Settlement Models

There is an extensive tradition of sedentarization in the Somali cultural experience, in which individuals and groups from a background of pastoralism begin to cultivate crops on a full or part-time basis. The mobility essential for livestock rearing in this environment is not necessarily curtailed in these instances. Instead, an agricultural component is added to the family's

economic system, while livestock may continue to provide a major means of livelihood and to be herded under a nomadic regime by family members.

In the southern interriverine areas of Somalia, there has been a long process of partial sedentarization of this type. Small groups of individual families have split off from more nomadically-based clans and sought incorporation into the established agro-pastoral settlements, either on a client basis or by invoking clan and lineage affiliation with the members of the settled communities[16]. Gradually, the new members have become absorbed, often by renouncing their previous clan affiliation and by giving allegiance to the dominant clan in the locality. These relationships may then be cemented by intermarriage. The new members are allocated farming land and continue to engage in pastoralism, thus adopting the mixed economic system practiced by most people in the southern interriverine areas.

There is some evidence that this method of sedentarization by incorporation with local groups has occurred among refugees, though to what extent this has happened is not known. However, this pattern is recorded in the Lower Shabelli region, around the refugee camps of Qoricley and in the Northwest region around Boroma, where the refugees are members of the same clan as the local inhabitants[17]. At the same camps in Gedo and Hiran region, there is reportedly economic intergration occurring

between refugees and locals, but whether this includes full-scale incorporation and allocation of land to refugees is not mentioned[18].

An indigenous settlement pattern with important implications for any formal refugee settlement program is that of the religious-agricultural community centered around a sheik. These communities are quite common in Somalia's rural areas. Sheiks are typically charismatic leaders, who may be learned in Islamic law and religious matters, leaders of a religious sect, or persons believed to have spiritual power. They attract followers and establish separate new communities organized on religious principles, often with a strong emphasis on community discipline and self-help. These communities are known as tariga ("the way").

In many cases, sheiks are also enterprising innovators, who seek to improve agricultural production methods in their communities. They frequently have accumulated capital resources by means of contributions from followers and from the proceeds of religious instruction given at Koranic schools. With these assets, sheiks are able to invest in capital equipment for agricultural technology such as tractors, bulldozers, and graders. They may obtain improved seeds from research stations, and through their influence are able to get some extension assistance from government agents. The community members are encouraged to experiment with new types of crops and to adopt new methods of farming and livestock-keeping; for example, applying fertilizers,

growing fodder crops, reserving grazing areas. Community discipline and adherence to the injunctions of the sheik may be quite strictly enforced.

Several examples of successful tariga may be cited; a sheik's community in the Bay Region is renowned throughout the area, and loans its heavy equipment out to other group farms as well as providing advice on new farming methods. In the Northwest, the community of Ceel Bardaale was established in 1961, and attracted many nomads who were taught farming by the sheik and his followers. The sheik began by experimenting with different crops, eventually growing citrus and gat on a large scale until recently, when gat cultivation was banned by the government and the community could no longer afford diesel for the irrigation pumps. This community received much assistance from USAID, in the form of a resident agricultural adviser who assisted in building diversion canals from a river. Some 30 refugee families who apparently joined the community after 1977, have been successfully integrated.

Another illustrative example concerns a sheik at Furjano, in the Lower Shabelli region. This man, an Ogadeni, is said to have set up his camp near to the settlement project at Sablaale, gathered a number of followers around him from the Ogadeni refugee population at Qorioley, and actively lobbied for material assistance to help establish a farming settlement. The incipient community has been in existence for some five years, and has already cleared some land for farming. The sheik now is seeking support through the NRC and UNHCR for massive development aid.

While the economic feasibility of his requests may be in doubt, in the words of one agricultural adviser in the government, "There is a good human base there which could benefit from technological inputs."

One final example of the catalytic role of sheiks may be cited. This occurred in Gedo region, where a refugee sheik from one of the camps was able to get a group of farms registered for his refugee followers. Subsequently, however, the refugee group encountered resistance from local residents who claimed the land was theirs. Nevertheless, these examples indicate the strong positive force for agricultural settlement and innovation that certain sheiks offer. In the future this indigenous settlement model could be built upon with appropriate assistance, as one method of achieving spontaneous refugee settlement and self-reliance that has the great advantage of being already tested, familiar, and in keeping with cultural traditions.

#### SUMMARY

USAID needs to determine its refugee policy and then work with the GSDR to achieve it. The settlement in Somalia of large numbers of refugees will present technical, political, social, and economic problems. Given the nature of these problems, it is not realistic to expect a quick, easy or complete solution. It is suggested that priority should be given to resolution of policy and an area development approach which encourages spontaneous settlement, particularly settlement based on indigenous models.

## INSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

The major institutions working on refugee matters in Somalia are the NRC, a government agency, and, for the donors, the UNHCR and the WFP. The NRC has official jurisdiction over refugee affairs on behalf of the GSDR. UNHCR is the U.N. agency responsible for soliciting and coordinating donor support for assistance to the refugees and for their legal protection. WFP is the U.N. agency responsible for coordinating the provision of food supplies for refugee care and maintenance in Somalia. In addition, several of the donors have played important roles in Somali refugee matters.

### The National Refugee Commission

The NRC was established in its present form in 1981. It has ministerial status and is headed by an Extraordinary Commissioner of cabinet rank who reports directly to the President. In organization and staffing it has not changed much from the structure described in the 1982 Refugee Self Reliance project paper for USAID.

One significant change has been the spinning off of those technical units which provide specialized services to the refugee areas. These include the Refugee Health Unit (RHU), the Refugee Agricultural Unit (RAU), the Refugee Water Supply Division (RWSD) and the Institute for In-Service Teacher Training (IITT). Originally part of NRC, they are now organizationally located in relevant ministries or have become semi-autonomous. Although

they continue to receive some technical assistance, these units operate with varying degrees of effectiveness. Clearly, development programs involving refugee problems in those functional fields will need to consider the participation of such units.

Many of the administrative problems noted in the 1982 report persist. These include lack of lateral communications among the departments of the NRC and extremely poor communication and reporting between the field offices and headquarters. The organization also suffers from excessive concentration of decision making within the offices of the Extraordinary Commissioner and the Commissioner, the result being long delays in taking action or signing program documents.

AID's relationship with the NRC has changed significantly over the past few years. Considerable assistance was provided during the period of crisis, either directly or through the UNHCR. Later, AID was in the forefront of support for "self-reliance" activities and made \$12,000,000 available for that purpose, including \$6,000,000 for programs to be implemented through the NRC itself.

AID and PVO experience with the NRC has resulted in a downward revision of earlier hopes and expectations. Of particular concern have been the following:

- o NRC's poor use of two expatriate advisers funded under the above project, one of whom recently resigned;
- o Difficulties PVO's have experienced with NRC in Mogadishu and the field in attempting to implement projects;

- o NRC's opposition to any serious efforts to gather data or undertake analysis of refugee problems and thereby provide a basis for better planning;
- o Finally, NRC's position on food policy has been a continuing source of frustration.

On the plus side has been the more successful attempt in management training for the NRC field staff, after a six month delay, although efforts to train the Mogadishu staff remain in abeyance. Given its poor track record with "self-reliance" programs, the NRC is perceived as an inefficient and non-cooperative agency, ill equipped to handle the even more demanding tasks of settlement.

The dilemma of the NRC is that it plays a dual role. From the donors' perspective, it is a badly managed, politically motivated institution which has a monopoly on refugee affairs and an institutional bias toward its own perpetuation. From the perspective of the government and many refugees, the NRC is the guardian of strong national interests, particularly the welfare of the country's persecuted brethren from the Ogaden. So long as there is a significant refugee population, Somalia has a strong claim on donor help and an added justification for the return of "Western Somalia".

The experience of the design team has highlighted the issue of NRC's role. Donors must be prepared to deal with and through the NRC if they wish to support settlement schemes which call for the organized transfer of refugees from one place to another. So long as the primary policy making and supervisory roles of NRC

are acknowledged, implementation may be delegated to others such as PVO's. Experience with the self reliance project is not reassuring regarding the success of that approach or even of the willingness of PVO's to participate. On the other hand, area development programs which are not refugee specific, would not require NRC participation. As a result, benefits to refugees would be more uncertain, given their disadvantaged status and possible discriminatory treatment. Efforts to find a compromise between these approaches do not appear encouraging. It is extremely unlikely that NRC would settle for a token role in a rural development project that included refugees. A shared role with another agency, even if acceptable, would create serious coordination problems. These, then, appear to be among the difficult choices and trade offs that confront donors wishing to find sustainable "project" solutions to the refugee question.

#### The Steering Committee and The Technical Unit

The introduction of the Steering Committee and the Technical Unit into the Somali refugee situation does not appear to affect significantly the foregoing situation. Both bodies were established in late 1983 on the initiative of UNHCR, as a follow up to the Somali decision to permit refugee settlement and the findings of a UNHCR "technical team" that there was adequate land in Somalia for settling at least 260,000 refugees. As noted in a UNHCR document, the possibility for "large scale settlement programmes," suggests a need to "include development activities not only within the refugee settlements but possibly in the

regions where settlements are to be located." Therefore, the Ministry of National Planning, technical ministries and UNDP should also be involved in the process.

Accordingly, the Steering Committee is made up of representatives of NRC, UNHCR, Ministry of National Planning, and UNDP. It is responsible for defining policy, project identification and project approval of settlement projects formulated by the Technical Unit. The latter is composed of four specialists funded by UNHCR with expertise in rural settlement, physical planning, hydrology and agronomy. Its functions include project formulation, inter-ministerial coordination, data collection and reports, and program evaluation. It reports to the Steering Committee. Implementation, to be carried out by PVD's, contractors, and UN agencies, will be monitored by the functional ministries.

The Steering Committee has met perhaps three times since its creation and the Technical Unit began to function in July with the arrival of three of its members. Both have been occupied with the Furjano project proposal. Aside from a small salt production project in the north and the possible AID project, no other settlement schemes are being proposed. Therefore, it is difficult to see how the Technical Unit will keep itself occupied.

The introduction of these organizational arrangements, which the U.S. has endorsed, are not likely to produce significant changes in the present refugee institutional set up. NRC, as

chairman of the Steering Committee, will continue to play the decisive role on the Somali side. It had been hoped that the Technical Unit would provide a more rigorous, multi-disciplinary perspective to the review and monitoring of the Furgano project. But such has not proved to be the case. The proposal drafted by the Technical Unit is unduly optimistic, fails to address the key issues of technical, economic, and social feasibility, and relies on secondary sources for 95 percent of the information presented.

#### SETTLER PARTICIPATION AND MOTIVATION

The refugee population in Somalia is not a homogeneous group; not only are refugees ethnically diverse, but they originate from different environments and thus have a variety of skills, experience, and aspirations. (See the tables at the end of this section). Most refugees have for some time had access to a higher level of social services and food security than many national Somalis in the rural areas. There is accumulating evidence that some proportion of refugees nevertheless aspires to become economically independent, and a considerable number has already either partially or fully achieved this goal, as is currently being documented by the "Invisible Refugee Project" sponsored by the NRC and being undertaken by the Somali National Academy. A considerable degree of refugee dispersal from the camps can also be inferred from the acknowledged reduction in camp populations since the initial influx of 1977-1978.

### Specific Policy Issues

Given this background, a number of policy issues are raised in the context of designing a refugee settlement program. Assuming that suitable agricultural land for settlement can be identified and is allocated by the GSDR, the following four issues arise with respect to refugee motivation and participation:

- o If a certain number of refugees are to be forcibly relocated to new settlement sites, rather than attracted by the prospect of a better livelihood, the resulting level of motivation is likely to be low and to affect success of the settlement. Previous experience with the drought-affected nomads, who were settled into agricultural and fishing communities after the 1975 drought, would indicate the unsuitability of this approach.
- o If new settlement sites are intended to induce spontaneous refugee settlers to leave the camps, but are situated too far from present camps to permit settlers continued access to food aid and social services, a comparable level of services and food security will need to be provided in the new settlements. Provision of food aid and social services, however, may be an unacceptable policy, for several reasons. First, the financial costs of such support would be very high; second, it would be difficult and probably unacceptable to segregate refugee settlers from local inhabitants who wish to settle in the same site and take advantage of the support provided; and finally, little would be achieved towards promoting refugee intergration and self-sufficiency by continuing food and service support in new settlements.
- o If a settlement policy was to be based on reduction of food aid and services to refugee camp populations, in an effort to discourage continued dependency on the camp system, then a decision must be made on whether welfare aid would be reduced across the board to all camp members or whether only selected refugee families would have their rations reduced or discontinued. Either action has potentially serious drawbacks; in the

first case, some refugee families may not have any other means of support apart from rations, while in the second case, the question arises of whether equitable criteria can be drawn up and applied in deciding which families will continue receiving support and which will be denied support.

- o If the process of refugee settlement is not going to rely on either coercive relocation, provision of food aid and welfare services, or negative coercion through reduction of food/welfare aid to camps, but rather upon the inherent attractiveness of higher economic returns to settlers than they can otherwise expect by remaining in camps, these higher economic returns will need to be demonstrated before spontaneous settlement takes place. Otherwise, potential refugee settlers will have little motivation to participate in the new settlement programs.

Each of the settlement approaches outlined above presents certain drawbacks and advantages, depending on the perspective of the concerned parties: the refugees, the local populace, the GSDR, and the donor/implementing agencies. Inevitably, some compromise between each of the possible approaches will probably be reached, avoiding the pitfalls of some approaches while incorporating the advantages of the others. In each case, however, certain policy decisions need to be made prior to the detailed design of a settlement program, if implementation is to have a reasonable chance of success.

#### A Compromise Approach

From the perspective of refugee motivation and participation, the following compromise approach is suggested. The refugee settlement policy should be broadly defined as facilitating the economic integration of refugees through encouragement of initiatives for both local Somalis and refugees.

A range of economic opportunities should be developed to take advantage of the various backgrounds, skills and interests of the refugee population rather than depending on major agricultural settlement schemes to solve the problem.

For those refugees who are able and wish to curtail their dependent status, the settlement program should open up new economic avenues, which will simultaneously allow some refugees to make a significant contribution to the Somali economy and to achieve economic independence on their own behalf. However, there also is a sizeable proportion of refugees whose family members have already become absorbed into the economy, through wage employment, a return to pastoralism or other economic activities. For this group, the continued residence of some family members in a refugee camp represents a strategy of risk aversion and income diversification. This strategy is only a new variant of a long-established pattern among the nomadic and semi-nomadic people of the entire region. For members of this group, additional income and economic opportunities offered by a settlement project will likely be perceived as supplementary rather than essential, as their basic subsistence needs are already being met through refugee food aid and the income from family members already integrated into the economy.

#### Assisting a Significant Number of Refugee Settlers

Given this situation, the settlement program should be aimed in the short-term at those refugees who are currently seeking to become economically independent, as well as those who aspire to

be so. These individuals and their families may be characterized as "pioneers", who have not yet been successful in reaching their goals, for one reason or another. To encourage these pioneers, the new opportunities offered must be more socially and economically attractive than current camp conditions.

Therefore, the underlying assumption upon which a policy of refugee integration must rest is that economic incentives will be matched by a consistent but humane policy of applying disincentives to remaining in refugee camps. The rationale of a settlement policy is based on this assumption, and that over the longer term a sizeable proportion of the refugee camp residents will follow the lead taken by refugee pioneers. Only in this way can any proposed project include a significant refugee settlement component, based on the refugee's right to make his or her own personal choice regarding incentives and disincentives for settlement.

At the same time, there is likely to remain a residual group of refugees who are unable to become economically active -- the aged, the infirm and the very young. Provision will need to be made for members of this group. Some can be expected to be eventually incorporated into their larger kin groups, once these latter are sufficiently well-established to take on more dependents. Others may not be so fortunate. Therefore, it must be accepted that a dependent population of refugees is likely to remain, once all other avenues of dispersal -- repatriation, economic integration or attachment to kinfolk outside the camps -- have been exhausted.

In summary, in designing a refugee settlement project for Somalia, four policy issues remain outstanding with respect to refugee motivation and participation in the project. These issues are:

- o Coercive versus spontaneous settlement of refugees;
- o Extent to which food aid and social welfare services are to be provided at new settlements;
- o Reduction or curtailment of food aid to all or some refugee camp members; and
- o Whether settlement schemes will start as pilot projects to determine economic feasibility, or will be implemented on a full-scale basis from the start.

A suggested approach to reconciling some of these conflicting policy decisions would be to proceed initially with small-scale pilot projects using experience gained from other refugee and non-refugee development projects in Somalia. If and when these prove to be economically attractive to spontaneous refugee settlers, their rations should gradually be reduced. Minimal social services should be provided at any settlement site, and these should be available also to the local population. Overall, a refugee settlement program should promote the long-term economic integration of refugees into Somalia, by supporting a wide range of economic activities which will attract both refugees and non-refugees and thus narrow the gap that presently exists between these two groups.

Table 1 : Refugees' Area of Origin in Ethiopia, by Camp Location

Percentage Distribution by Area of Origin

Camp	Kellafo (Southern Ogaden)	Goddere (Southern Ogaden)	Wadheere (Southern Ogaden)	Kabri- dahare (N.Ogaden)	Degabur (N.Ogaden)	Jigjiga (Harar Prov.)	Harar (Harar Prov.)	Bale (S.E. Ethiopia)	Sidamo (S.E. Ethiopia)	Negelle (S.E. Ethiopia)	Row %	% Oromo
<u>Gedo:</u>												
Horseed	2	9	-	-	2	-	3	13	2	63	100	22
Halba II	1	10	6	-	-	-	3	65	-	9	100	7
Maganey	3	35	-	1	1	-	1	29	7	24	100	16
Suriye	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	37	61	100	48
Marka Hidday	-	3	-	3	-	-	-	17	47	25	100	30
												15
<u>Hiran:</u>												
Bo'oo I & II	47	22	20	7	1	-	1	-	-	-	100	1
Sigalow	79	7	2	9	-	2	-	-	-	-	100	0
Muuq Jellow	43	4	-	52	-	-	1	-	-	-	100	0
<u>North West:</u>												
Dare Ma'aan	-	-	-	-	-	86	15	-	-	-	100	0
Dam	-	1	-	10	32	34	17	-	-	-	100	5
Cadi Caddeys	-	-	2	3	34	33	23	-	-	-	100	0
Saba'aad	-	3	3	7	31	34	20	-	2	-	100	0
											Total % Oromo =	11%

Source: UNHCR, Socio-Economic Survey of the Refugee Population in Somalia, Mogadishu: UNHCR, 1982

(Information on camps in Lower Shabelle not available)

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Table 2: Age-Sex Structure of Refugee Population

Age Group	% Males	% Females	Sex Ratio	Row %
Under 15 yrs.	62	54	107 : 100	58
15 - 49 yrs.	31	39	75 : 100	35
50 yrs. +	7	6	100 : 100	7
Column %	100	100	-	100

Mean household size = 6.25 persons

Modal household size = 5 persons

Source : UNHCR, 1982

Table 3: Refugees' Previous Major Occupation and Crops Grown  
Percentage Distribution of Major Occupation

Crops Grown	Farmers	Pastoralists	Towndwellers	Row %
Grain only	47	85	60	64
Grains & Veg.	40	12	26	27
Grain and/or Veg.+ Coffee	14	3	14	9
Column %	100	100	100	100

57% of pastoralists also farmed.

73% of crop-producing households actively participated in market sales.

57% of all households claimed to be primarily pastoralists; 10% of all households were towndwellers

Source: UNHCR, 1982

Table 4 : Composition of Refugees' Previous Herds

<u>Type of Livestock</u>	<u>% Livestock-owning households</u>
Camels, Cattle, Sheep and Goats	48
Camels and Cattle	8
Cattle, Goats and Sheep	22
Camels, Goats and Sheep	9
Cattle only	9
Goats and Sheep only	3
88% of all households previously owned livestock	

Source: UNHCR, 1982

## REFUGEE FOOD POLICY

The refugee food policy issue is extremely complex and difficult, combining as it does logistic, humanitarian, equity, and political considerations. It is further complicated by the fact that refugee feeding is a multi-donor operation, in which the U.S. is providing 25-30 percent of the donated food. Two U.N. organizations, WFP and UNHCR, serve as intermediaries between the donors and the Somalis. These circumstances tend to limit the amount of influence the U.S. can bring to bear on the situation although, as the largest single donor, the U.S. does exercise a leading role in donor deliberations.

Background

The job of establishing annual targets for refugee food donations and for seeking pledges from the donors to fulfill them is a function of WFP. Upon receiving donor pledges, WFP has the further function of trying to schedule the arrival of shipments so that supply and demand can be maintained in a rough equilibrium over the year.

Since 1981 refugee food distribution within Somalia has been the responsibility of the Emergency Logistics Unit of the NRC, which is managed by CARE (ELU/CARE). ELU/CARE assumes custody of the food upon arrival at the port, warehouses it, transports it by truck to regional and local storage points, and oversees its distribution at the camps. Efficiency of distribution has been greatly improved by the gradual introduction of a ration shop

system in which heads of families receive ration cards entitling them and family members to rations every 10 days. These rations consist of a "basket" of foodstuffs, including grains, dried milk, vegetable oil and other items, equal to approximately 575 grams per refugee per day, the equivalent of about 2,300 calories. Although refugees in camps receive other benefits such as health care, schooling, and potable water, the major camp benefit, and the one that has portable value, is the 10 day ration.

### Food Distribution

The above system, the result of much effort, planning and expenses, is a major international achievement and has kept hundreds of thousands of people alive. Its main imperfections are first, that it assumes a refugee population far greater than the number of people actually in camps, and second, that it has not prevented discrimination against certain groups within the camps. Thus a key dilemma of food policy is that global cutbacks to bring supplies down toward the estimated actual population would exacerbate the deprivation of those already at risk[19].

The inflation of refugee numbers has been a major bone of contention between the Somali authorities and the donors for a number of years. A negotiated figure of 700,000 was finally agreed upon in 1981, after an attempted census of the refugee population was thwarted by refugee and NRC deception. This remains the "official" estimate though many observers believe that the actual population has meanwhile dropped to perhaps half

of that number. Since the ration card system itself is based on the official figure, there may be nearly twice as many rations as there are refugees, with the excess going to multiple beneficiaries or to non-refugees. Moreover, the distribution of ration cards was based on lists supplied by NRC officials, not on an actual count. This system, plus the interplay of groups within the camps and the authority of camp commanders, has skewed benefits away from certain ethnic groups, such as the Dromo and others in political disfavor.

#### Problems of the System

Over the past year the WFP and UNHCR offices in Mogadishu have tended to side with the Somali authorities in negotiations on refugee numbers and food quantities, appearing to serve as NRC's representatives to the donors rather than serving as a neutral voice. This has tended to undermine their credibility with the donors and to make reform of the system more difficult.

After several years of bickering about the camp population, a US/GSDR agreement was reached earlier this year to shelve for a while the population issue and to focus discussion on food quantities. An annual figure of 120,000 metric tons was agreed upon for 1984 which would, at a daily ration of 575 grams, feed about 570,000 people. If actual shipments only total 100,000 tons, they would still provide an equivalent ration for 480,000. Both totals are probably far in excess of the number of refugees actually in the camps.

The difficulty is that without more accurate knowledge of camp populations, ethnic makeup and internal distribution patterns, the donor community is largely operating on the basis of anecdotal information, rumors and ad hoc observations. An effort to quantify the situation -- through camp censuses or sample surveys -- appears to be the only way to adjust global quantities to entitled recipients or to moderate inequities at the camp level.

In practice, another census effort might be futile and could suffer the same fate as the earlier UNHCR census. If so, it would be discredited by the donor agencies and yield no useful results. Nevertheless, if the government is serious about refugee resettlement, then some time in the process it must allow valid socio-economic surveys to take place in the camps -- if only to determine how many genuine refugees actually do want to settle. As a first step in this direction, the U.S. might assemble one or two specialists -- for example, a sample survey expert and a social scientist with previous Somali experience -- to outline a scope, methodology, and schedule for camp sample surveys and to prepare a proposal on the subject.

#### Issues of Policy Reform

Perpetuating the current arrangement has two major drawbacks. First, it involves a substantial misuse of resources and second, it serves as a strong incentive for risk avoidance on the

part of refugees. Settlement schemes or repatriation efforts will have an extra hurdle to clear if they are to induce camp inmates to leave.

Given the resistance that Somali authorities are likely to display towards any proposal to gather information directly in the camps, the U.S. should be prepared in advance to expend considerable political capital on the subject. Mobilizing the support of the other donors and bringing in WFP would be important preparatory steps. With such backing and a well developed proposal, it is quite likely that some progress on refugee food policy can be gained along the lines discussed above. And it can be argued that such policy reform is an important precondition for the success of future attempts at settlement projects.

#### FOOTNOTES

1. R. Hitchcock, Settlement in Somalia: An Overview. Mogadishu: NRC, 1984.
2. Technical Unit, Project for the Settlement and Achievement of Self-Reliance through Agriculture, of Refugee Families from Qoryoley Refugee Camps. Mogadishu: NRC/UNHCR, 1984.
3. USAID/Somalia, PID: Somalia Refugee Settlement Project. Mogadishu: USAID, 1984, p.1.
4. These are all clearly stated in the following document. USAID/Somalia, Assistance to Refugee Settlement in Somalia: A Project Briefing Paper. Mogadishu: Refugee Affairs/Rural Development Office, August 6, 1984, p.4.
5. See the PID, p.3
6. For example, see the letter addressed to Hashi Abdalla Farah, Director General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, by the Mission Director, dated July 2, 1984.

7. For example, see the following: NRC, Refugee Settlement Program in Somalia, Mogadishu: NRC, 1984; UNHCR, Possibilities and Options for the Settlement of Refugees in Somalia. Geneva: UNHCR, 1983; and also Footnote Four.
8. NRC, op. cit., p. 2.
9. Technical Unit, op. cit..
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12. GTZ, Reconnaissance Survey of Potential Settlement Areas for Refugee Settlement in the Lower Shebelli Region of Somalia. Frankfurt: German Agency for Technical Cooperation, 1984.
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19. It should be noted that the same result occurs when there is an increase in the refugee population, as recently occurred in the north, unless there is a corresponding increase in global amount of food supplied.

## CHAPTER THREE

### ASSESSMENT IN PRACTICE

#### INTRODUCTION

When discussing development potential in Somalia, the word assessment invariably plays an important role, so important sometimes that one wonders if perhaps the assessments are more important than the development itself. While there is a key role for assessment to play in any refugee settlement/area development project, it is important to clearly specify what the objectives of such an assessment should be. Assessments can range along a wide spectrum: from quick and dirty reconnaissance surveys/fishing expeditions which try to identify possible development initiatives to long-term, in-depth studies which may take several years to complete and be of more use to academics than to development practitioners.

While the design team fully accepts the importance of assessments, we also believe that if they are to be of any practical use they should be short-term, clearly focussed, with a set of clearly defined objectives to be met. The chapter that follows is divided into three sections. The first describes "quick and dirty" assessments in practice -- specifically the design team's activities in Lower Shabelli, the northwest, and Mogadishu. It is, of necessity, highly selective since, to faithfully record all the conversations, interviews, and visits,

would take several tomes. The second section specifies what additional assessments are required, and the final section details the scopes of work for such assessments.

## ASSESSMENT IN PRACTICE: LOWER SHABELLI

### General Description

The Lower Shabelli region has been developed over the last 50 years, particularly in irrigated agriculture. The most developed part of the area is the northeast around Genale - Kurtunwarey. The source of the irrigation water, the Shebelli river, rises in Ethiopia and flows southeast towards Mogadishu. It then turns and flows parallel to the coast, from Afgoi via Genale and Haaway, until it dissipates itself in seasonal swamps northeast of its intermittent junction with the Juba river. Its channel capacity is low and flooding occurs upstream of the main irrigated area, while downstream flows enter the swampy area between Arbowcheerow and Haaway. Further agricultural expansion on the Shabelli river is constrained by a shortage of irrigation water. The peak flows are May and September, with February the low month. A good surfaced road runs along the coast, parallel to the river, from Mogadishu to Jilib.

The area is an alluvial plain with very gradual slopes. The climate is arid to semiarid. Rainfall is bimodal and a limiting factor for production. The main rains occur April-June (Gu), the subsidiary rains in October-December (Der). There is an increase in rainfall moving from 300mm along the coast to 400-500mm along

the river. The storms are often intense and are irregularly distributed in space and time. The soils are vertisols, cracking when dry, with low infiltration rates when wet. They have been classified mainly into classes II and III land suitability, downgraded mainly due to the rainfall of less than 500mm.

Wildlife is common in the area, with warthog, baboon, and dikdik. Birds seen include vulturine guinea fowl, partridge, bustards and quelea. The main dryland crops are maize and sorghum, the latter in areas where quelea is not a problem. Sesame is grown during the Der season. The main irrigated crops are banana and maize.

The coastal strip is dunes, often active, with occasional coral limestone outcrops associated with Acacia circummarginata. Inland, on the alluvial flood plain, the predominant vegetation is dry thorn bush. Tseste is found in the interriverine zone. As a result, the area along the coast is grazed during the spring rains, whilst the flood plain is grazed during the dry season.

### Agriculture

The team left for a two day visit to the Lower Shabelli region, leaving Mogadishu for Shalaambood. Driving down through an area of heavily grazed xerophilus Acacia scrub, a large number of donkey carts carrying fodder for the urban stock population were seen. The land was flat, with maize, sesame, and bariana the main crops.

The hotel vegetable garden was growing pawpaw, citrus and tomatoes, and the citrus was both deficient and defoliated. Some signs of salinity were seen. The whole area of Bulo Mareenta-Genale is irrigated from the Shabelli river, growing mainly maize and bananas with some vegetables. The 70,000 ha. area has been declared an irrigation rehabilitation area and funding for the rehabilitation is being considered by the World Bank. Some of the canals have been recently maintained, but overall the use of the irrigated land is variable. Tractors are apparent in and around the area. Possible options to explore which presented themselves included vegetable production for Mogadishu, papain production for export, and a contribution to the irrigation management.

Moving on to Qoricoley a lot of commercial activity was apparent. In the camp itself charcoal and firewood were on sale, as were bananas, maize, pawpaw, tomatoes, shallots, snake gourds, onions, cherry tomatoes, peppers, pumpkin, chillies, mango, lettuce, basil, soursop, sugarcane, limes, sweet potatoes, milk, ghee, eggplants, okra, carrot and cabbage.

We visited the proposed SCF farm sites, a proposed irrigated area of 320 ha. off the Awairie Canal, and an area of 900 ha. of dryland. In the proposed irrigated area, dryland farming was going on, on 0.1 ha. plots. The proposed dryland area was thick thorn scrub, often with secondary regrowth, and a major tree every 10-20m, and unauthorized clearing was going on northwest of the old river bed. The area was being cut for firewood and was

intensively grazed with animal dung everywhere. The squatters were burning out stumps and had been growing maize and sesame in small quantities. The soils were variable silts in the main.

We then drove through the acacia shrub to the reservoir at the end of the Libaan canal, which had been recently bulldozed. It was not clear why the canal had not been used for irrigation on its upper reaches. Returning to the SCF irrigated area, we saw the work done by the Italian contractor. The land now requires leveling and redistributing and the diversion needs completing.

Moving on to the SCF forestry nursery, eggplant, onion, pepper, tomato, guava, pawpaw, sweet potato, potato, tobacco, roma tomatoes, pumpkin, leeks, and lettuce were seen growing in small gardens. At the planting site cassia, acacia, eucalyptus, casuarina and pawpaw were seen planted on around 20 ha., which had been cleared and laid out for irrigation. We were told it cost ScSh 900 per hectare to clear.

The next day we drove southwest to Sablaale, passing via large scale irrigated bananas, maize, citrus, pawpaw, and coconut. The road was good and a lot of tractors and stock were seen. Leaving the irrigated areas, we entered a drier area with occasional sesame and sorghum grown, a heavily grazed area. On the southeast side of the road we observed the occasional coral limestone outcrops with the associated red soils and flat topped acacia, *Acacia circummarginata*. Occasional limited areas of cultivation are supposed to occur on the fan soils at the bases

of these outcrops. These were not seen, but the few villages we saw tended to be associated with the coralline limestone. The cultivation probably would include millet, cucurbits, and roselle, since rainfall is limited.

Numerous warthog were seen in the area between the turnoff to Arbowcheerow and the town of Baraawe. There were occasional attempts at cultivation by the roadside, very poor stands, droughted and limited in extent. Maize was the principal crop, suggesting quelea was a problem in the area. The land began to roll and became drier with the scrub thickening. At the turning for Sablaale, the soils were sandier and an occasional Adansonia was seen. A good crop of sesame was seen in this area. The road west to Sablaale went through some drier bush with limited tree cover. It was not determined whether this was due to clearing, soil or rainfall. The road returned to heavier soils with thicker acacia shrub. Large flocks of quelea were seen. On the outskirts of the settlement, maize and sunflower were growing on the John Bingle scheme.

At Sablaale visits were made to the District Commissioner, the SDA authorities, Euro-Action Accord, the John Bingle technician, and a member of the Dutch housing project. We learned that salinity caused by the high water table had been a problem. The yields of irrigated maize were below the dryland maize. There was a suggestion that the Arab Fund might finance a drainage project on the irrigated area. We learned a little about the administration of the SDA settlement, its isolation from the local population, and its problems.

A visit was then made to Furjano, passing the areas of cooperatively farmed land on the southeast side of the road owned by some Brava businessmen. Furjano is a sheik-based settlement of approximately 100 families started in 1981. The community has received a lot of support: from the SDA which issues rations; from the NRC which donated a Mercedes truck; and now from UNHCR which is contemplating spending \$8,000,000 to settle 450 more families there and develop dryland farming.

At present the area is farmed under irrigation. Since the main supply canal was overgrown, supply was by means of a 75 hp pump on the river. Maize was the main crop, but some sesame was also being grown. Chillies, pumpkin, cowpea, and cherry tomatoes were being intercropped with the maize. Some small pure stands of onion and tomato were seen. The soil was a calcereous sandy loam in the immediate vicinity of the village, possibly a channel remnant.

Finally, the John Bingle, semi-mechanized dryland farming scheme was visited. The area had been cleared, chiselled, disked and planted to maize and sunflower which was growing well. The technical details are dealt with elsewhere.

### Infrastructure

The most evident, most outstanding element in all our observations of infrastructure was the low level of maintenance. Most roads, other than those recently rehabilitated, show the result of inadequate attention. Typical is the road to Sablaale from

the Brava junction at Modum. Dry season traffic travels in the ditches because they are smoother than the elevated road surface. One road grader, blading the surface monthly, could do much to maintain a rut-free feeder road.

Similarly, the irrigation canal system in the vicinity of Genale shows the results of chronic inattention. Diversion structures, small bridges and culverts, in fact entire tertiary canal sections are either in need of repair or completely non-functional. There was, however, evidence of some repair efforts. Short sections were seen where silt and weeds had recently been removed. These demonstrated the capability for well-executed maintenance by recreating a uniform canal cross section capable of handling required rates of flow. However, the maintenance efforts appeared to be few and far between.

The Sablaale settlement, constructed with World Bank assistance, appears to be well endowed with infrastructure but awaiting direction, inspiration and further funding to become the thriving center in a plan of surrounding satellite villages, farms, and grazing lands. The settlement has four boreholes, each capable of producing about 15 cubic meters per hour. The water is of good quality with an electrical conductivity reported as 1,400 micromhos per cm. Pipelines connect the boreholes to concrete reservoirs located in various parts of town.

Sablaale settlement buildings offer space for education, health services, and business activities. The Sablaale school system contains six elementary/intermediate schools and three

secondary schools offering agricultural, technical, and general academic training. A new hospital was recently completed and a physician with trained health assistants is posted in the settlement. Warehouses for storage, workshop facilities and machinery sheds are evident. Unfortunately the Sablaale settlement appears on the brink of becoming a ghost town unless appropriate interventions can come to the rescue.

### Meetings with Officials

Members of the team met with the Goriolley District Commissioner, the Mayor and the Chairman of the District Council, to discuss opportunities for refugee settlement in the district. These officials were quite optimistic about the potential for refugees to become more involved in agriculture. They noted that many refugees from the Goriolley camps had already started farming on land belonging to local residents. This land was said to have been given to refugees by local farmers as "a free gift because it's our culture." Newly-irrigated land had been brought under production by local farmers and refugees, by hand-digging small feeder canals off large new canals developed by the government. All three officials felt there was sufficient irrigable land to support more refugee farmers, but when asked how refugees would go about claiming and registering this land for themselves, they replied that refugees could not claim land, as they were refugees.

In a more general discussion of agriculture in the Lower Shabelli region, the officials stressed that most farmers also keep livestock, "as each depends on the other." In their opinion, the most critical inputs needed to expand agricultural production for local farmers as well as refugees were heavy equipment -- tractors, bulldozers, backhoes, and graders -- spare parts for existing heavy equipment and, lastly, technical advice in the form of mechanics to maintain equipment. These inputs were needed both to expand the area under irrigation and to maintain old canals. Two reasons were given as to why heavy equipment was necessary: first, it was said that "nobody can work like before (handlabor) because now there is new technology" and second, because of the labor shortage in the region.

Team members also toured the Kurtunwarey settlement site established for drought-affected nomads in 1975. Discussions were held with the farm manager for the project, the Kurtunwarey District Commissioner, and the professional staff of the project, all Somali. According to the farm manager, there were still 15,000 settlers residing at Kurtunwarey, of whom 1,400 families had been allocated one hectare plots of irrigated land. The project started distributing farm plots in 1981, following a long "training program" to persuade the former nomads to attempt farming. Apparently, many of the settled nomads wished to take wage jobs elsewhere.

The project is run on mechanized lines, with all operations except weeding and harvesting done by the project equipment and

staff. This year, the farmers are expected to contribute 25 percent of their harvest towards the costs of machinery and diesel used for equipment and irrigation pumps. In following years they will be expected to contribute a larger proportion of their yield to the project.

The main crops grown at the project were maize and sesame, on the irrigated land, and sunflower, safflower and sorghum on the dryland portion of the project. It was said that settlers resisted growing sunflower and safflower because they found the oils unpalatable and preferred sesame oil. A camel-powered sesame oil grinder was observed in the settlement village.

A discussion was held with the District Commissioner about possibilities for refugee settlement in the district. He referred us to the 35,000 ha. site to be developed by the World Bank, south of the Shabelli river, and thought that was ample dryland farming potential in that location. When asked how refugees might be assisted in registering title to this land or any other land in his district, there was no answer.

In a meeting held at the same time with the governor of Lower Shabelli and the party secretary for the region, the following potential activities were identified for both the local population and for refugees:

- o Stimulation of pottery manufacture;
- o Stimulation of cloth weaving -- building on the weaving cooperative established in Merca with Oxfam assistance;
- o Manufacture of construction materials, such as bricks, to replace wood;

- o Introduction of small mills to press oilseeds; and
- o The introduction of windmills for power generation.

### Second Trip to Lower Shabelli

The first trip to Lower Shabelli had been somewhat abortive for three reasons. First, SCF was actively involved in the refugee camps, helping some families to become a little more self-sufficient, albeit on a very small scale. It would have been unacceptable to impose another project on top of the SCF endeavor, partly because AID settlement policy precludes transforming refugee camps into permanent settlements. Second, while Lower Shabelli may well be the bread-basket of Somali, the indications are that all the high potential land, if not already claimed, is in the process of being registered. Finally, where there is land available, for example in the Sablaale/Kurtunwarey area, the government favors the capital intensive model of refugee settlement, in this case for semi-mechanized rainfed agriculture.. This may well be the only way to attract refugees to live permanently in areas which receive only intermittent rainfall.

For this second visit, attention was focussed on the city of Merca and its immediate surroundings -- in the hope that, as in the case of the northwest, development activities could be identified that might attract potential settlers from the camps. The objectives of the visit were to assess the possibilities of the proposed Genale rehabilitation scheme, to look at the dune reclamation at Merca, and the potential for income generating

activities in and around Merca. The dune area both northeast and southwest of the town was walked over, the reclamation area was visited, and local inhabitants were consulted. The dune area is heavily grazed by local cattle and is unsuitable for most types of crop production, given the soil and water constraints. One local was growing millet, snake gourd and melon on a very small scale, but the millet was being devoured by birds. The dune reclamation area was successfully stabilizing the dunes. It consisted of lines of brushwood across the direction of wind movement, limited planting of acacia and casuarina, and subsequent natural regeneration.

A number of local businesses were visited in Merca, including an enterprise producing tobacco rope with tobacco grown in Kismayo. On the foreshore area seaweed was being collected, apparently for use in lining the underground storage pits for grain. An area of enclosed land on the coastal side of the dunes was claimed by locals to be the site of a milkweed farm, producing seeds with pappus attached for stuffing mattresses.

A visit to Genale and talks with World Bank officials in Mogadishu indicated that there would be little or no role for the refugees in the proposed rehabilitation. From an area development perspective, however, there will be a need for technical assistance with the operation and management of the rehabilitated scheme.

In terms of basic infrastructure Merca is relatively well supplied. The German aid program has recently completed a new borehole in the Shebelli River Valley as well as the pipeline to the city over the intervening sand dunes. The city also uses a number of its older private and public wells. However, salt water intrusion has claimed some of those nearest the sea. The road system in town is adequately maintained. The 12 kilometer paved road from Shalambood has generally at least one lane open in the few short sections where shifting sands and water borne silt continually threaten its existence. Electric generating facilities supply power as needed by businesses and more affluent residents.

A long interview with the mayor, a distinguished gentleman from a well known, well established local family, indicated that he was in favor of technical assistance for agriculture -- particularly pumps for irrigation, bulldozers for clearing the land, and tractors for working the land. In terms of business opportunities, he would like to see some additional assistance provided to the El Ahmed Fishing Cooperative located south of Merca and set up in the seventies to assist the drought victims, all nomads from the north. The design team dutifully visited El Ahmed, dutifully inspected the bat-infested drying facilities, and quickly concluded that the other donors were quite capable of continuing to support this very shaky enterprise.

The mayor was, however, most interested in the possibility that the project might try and work through the district authorities such as the DC and himself. From his perspective, if such an approach were to be effective, any resources provided should come directly to the district. In his experience, any donor resources destined for the hinterland that have to pass through official channels in Mogadishu rarely reach their intended source.

#### ASSESSMENT IN PRACTICE:

##### THE NORTHWEST

#### General Description

The main agricultural areas in the Northwest/Adwal regions are the plateau region between Hargeisa and Boroma and scattered dryland and irrigated farms in the mountains, along the tugs and valleys. The plateau area between Hargeisa and Boroma has an average rainfall of between 300-500 mm with two peaks, the Gu in April/May and the Der in August/September. The average rainfall increases moving from the northwest to the Adwal region along the plateau area and decreases moving southwards across the plateau towards the Ogaden. November to January is the cold period with average temperatures of 20 degrees centigrade, and March to September the hot months with temperatures averaging 25 degrees centigrade.

Boroma is located at an altitude of 5,300 feet above sea level and Hargeisa at 4,400 feet. A number of ranges run northwest-southwest, separating the high plateau area from the coastal plain. The soils are alluvial and occasionally alkaline. Entisols are found on the recent sediments in the tugs and are low in organic matter, exchange capacity, and waterholding capacity. The mollisols in the plateau area are also low in organic matter and liable to crusting and compaction.

The road from Hargeisa to Boroma is paved for half the distance. Most of the other roads in the plateau region are unimproved tracks. The two main urban centers are Boroma and Hargeisa and a new regional capital has been proposed for Adwal at Baki.

The main crops grown are sorghum and maize and the most extensive area of cultivation is around Gebiley. Crops are sown from April to July and harvested from August to November. The crops are often localized in the lower areas of the micro relief on the heavier soils and shallower slopes. The plateau region is ploughed either by oxen or tractor, and planting is by hand. Stands seen were very variable, probably due in part to the very poor rains this year. Smuts and stemborers are reported to be a problem. Although the rainfall at Boroma is reported to be greater, more reliable and spread out in a greater number of actual rain events, the range appears to be more degraded. (More information on the northwest is provided in Chapter Five).

### First Night Session in Hargeisa

At the suggestion of the Refugee Affairs Representative in the northwest, a meeting was organized with key representatives of the major institutions working there. These included the following: the NRC, the UNHCR, the WFP, CARE, World Bank, the Mennonite Central Committee (MCC), and Action Aid. The purpose of the meeting was to learn about the various experiences of these institutions in the northwest, their experience with refugees, and their recommendations for potential development sites.

While the team did gather information on these three areas of interest, it was evident that some of the participants, particularly the representatives from WFP and CARE, were more interested in talking about issues of more pressing concern to them: in this case the continuing influx of new refugees into Hargeisa. A problem that had been growing for several months, the food representatives wanted to know when it was going to be resolved. During the team's stay, the Extraordinary Commissioner for Refugee Affairs visited the Northwest and resolved the problem by creating a tenth camp and appealing to the international community for additional assistance.

As a result of this meeting, several possible sites were selected for visits, including the following: Boroma/Daray Maan, Ceel Bardale, the Baki area, and Tug Wajale. Three of these sites were visited over the next couple of days. The fourth, Tug Wajale, was dropped partly because of the scarcity of water in

the region and partly because it appeared politically foolhardy to recommend settlement right on the border, in an area which has already been bombed more than once.

### Agriculture

Areas suggested as having potential for irrigated agriculture included the area west of Saylac (rejected due to time constraints), the area northeast of Rugi (visited), Gabri Baxar (not visited), and Humboweine (visited). Areas suggested for dryland agriculture development were the plateau between Gebiley and Boroma (visited) and possibly the Didbrawein valley (visited). The dryland area around Tug Wajale was rejected for security reasons and a lack of water resources. As the whole area has had very little rain this year, the drought made assessment of the existing agricultural activities difficult. The two trips made to Boroma region are described below. On the first trip, Baki and Daray Maan were visited. On the return trip the team looked more closely at the Didbrawein valley, the refugee camp, and the activities in the district capital of Boroma.

Leaving Hargeisa one enters a rolling alluvial plain with banded areas. The crops, maize and sorghum, were droughted. Slope was an important parameter in the success of the bunding. Some of the interbund areas showed a concentration of crop growth on the upslope side of the bund, with poor growth on the down-slope side. On the steeper slopes, the crop immediately adjacent to the upslope side of the bund had failed. It was possible to

see unbunded areas with crop stands as good as the banded areas. Occasionally an old qat field was seen. In the Arabsiyo market citrus, mango, and guava were on sale. Localized gully erosion was occurring in the area.

Leaving Arabsiyo, the road enters a large flat area, with many signs of farming activities. Women were weeding crops and men were ploughing with oxen. At Gebiley the terrain becomes more dissected with more acacia shrub. At Dilla, bananas, citrus, sorghum, shallots, green peppers, tomato and garlic were on sale in the market. Leaving Dilla for Boroma, less agriculture was seen and signs of bird scaring activity were evident in the planted areas. Approaching Boroma the land became more rocky, leaving the plateau silt and clays behind. At Boroma itself, tomatoes, potatoes, green onions, shallots, eggplants, and bananas were seen in the market.

On the road to Baki from Boroma, one passes Ahmed School farm, an irrigated area growing tomatoes, onion, and pawpaw but which suffers from severe erosion. The road passes over rocky ridges with dry acacia shrub frequented by baboons. In the valleys the alluvium supports more tree growth. Arriving at the sandy plain of Didbrawein, some residual agriculture was observed. Isolated due to a very poor road, the area is grazed heavily by camels and goats and firewood is also cut to some extent. Game was common, particularly buck, dikdik, rabbit,

baboon. A five mile hike was made up a tug to see a permanent spring, which turned out to have a low flow rate. Time did not allow further exploration or a more detailed survey.

The next morning Daray Maan refugee camp was visited and a tour made of the irrigated gardens. The land available along the tug was severely limited. Irrigation was provided by hand dug wells, using either buckets or rower pumps. The area has had very little rain and was underutilized at the time of the visit, probably as a result of water constraints. Crops growing included chillies, sweet potatoes, carrots, tomatoes, eggplants, beets, lettuce, leeks, watermelons, sugar cane, tobacco, pawpaws, oranges, limes, guavas and pomegranates. Some simple leveling and redesign would increase the land use efficiency. A visit was made to a proposed small chicken house, though the white leghorns introduced to the camp had suffered from predators and been unwilling to brood.

On returning to Hargeisa, the irrigated area around Humboweine was visited. This area has been developed to some extent with the help of the World Bank. The water was 20-25 feet down in the hand dug wells and occasionally saline. Pumps were used to flood irrigate the basins. The farms were large and privately owned, growing citrus, mango, guava, pawpaw, custard apple, onions, sweet peppers, Roma tomatoes, and water melons. Labor was hired at SoSh 100 per day. Diesel at SoSh 35 per litre was a constraint to production. Seed was bought in Hargeisa and originated in Italy, America, or Saudi Arabia. Manure was being

used, particularly in producing tomato transplants. Extension advice was said to be unavailable and a number of farmers approached the design team for information on specific pest problems. The area was said to contain around 500 farms along the tugs. Little unclaimed land was seen.

A return trip was made to Boroma to look at the possibility of extending irrigated agriculture along the tugs, dryland agriculture in the Didberwain valley, and income generating activities in and around Boroma. En route a farm was visited which was being developed by a private farmer for citrus and tomato production. He was using a hired rig to drill boreholes, pumping via electric submersibles powered by his own generator. The investment was on the order of a few million shillings and included an abandoned 200 foot hand dug well which put the diamond mine at Kimberley to shame.

The next morning the tug extending from the refugee camp towards the Didbrawain valley was explored for potential irrigation sites. Leaving the camp, small bulldozed areas of a half to one hectare were seen on bends in the tug where peppers, cabbage, okra, tomato, watermelon, leeks, beets, onion, guava, citrus, and pawpaw were growing. They were at various stages of development, from watering by hand to pumps, from minimal land development to an ex-gat farm with beautiful ridges, terraces, and basins. The terraces had been hand built and a coffee nursery was in progress as a replacement crop. Water was 15-25 feet down.

Traveling on through the mountains two or three other small, unused sites were seen. Leaving the tug and climbing up over the ridges, many camels and goats were seen. Arriving at the Didbrawain valley, large flocks of sheep were observed. The valley area is extensive, from 30-50 square miles, with variable soils ranging from alluvial silts to gravels. The area was dry and rainfall is probably influenced by the surrounding highlands. Very occasionally some cultivation was seen, particularly at the southeast end of the valley. Part of this area has been taken by the government for the regional capital at Baki. According to the authorities in Hargeisa, all this land has already been claimed. The area is used for grazing in the summer by nomads from the coastal plain.

Next morning breakfast was arranged with a farmer/trader from the valley. Over fried liver, he volunteered the following information about irrigated agriculture in the Didbrawain perennial tug. It is farmed using gravity irrigation for growing maize and sorghum. Only a few pumps are used, i.e. at Ceel Berdale and Rugi. All the land along the tug is claimed, with 1500 farms in the valley, average size five hectares, but ranging from one to 30 hectares. The area is ploughed using tractor or oxen, limited bunding has occurred, and transport is the major constraint.

The second day's activities included visits with the camp commandant, the AFSC volunteers, and local businessmen. In their opinion, a very limited area of land is actually available, and

its availability is a government decision. Limited irrigated land could possibly be found along the tugs. Integration by means of small businesses was perhaps the best strategy. The locals would also like to benefit from any refugee settlement program. A tour of the camp showed numerous commercial activities by both refugees and locals, and construction was underway for more businesses. Guavas, limes, sorghum, maize bananas, potatoes, garlic, spring onions, chillies, pumpkin, tomatoes, eggplants, and shallots were on sale in the camp market.

#### Small Enterprises in Daray Maar

Two volunteers with the American Friends Service Committee (AFSC) are presently working in the camp. Among the various activities they have started is a supervised credit program for small businessmen and women. Some general observations on this program follow.

Self-sufficiency: Each project is planned to financially help one or more refugee families. If the project could also help locals that would be even better.

Outside contacts: Nearly all refugees regularly go outside the camp for one or more reasons. Some of the men are away herding. Some camp residents work in Boroma, so they go to town daily.

Financial responsibility: AFSC insists that each small businessman or woman who is helped must contribute in cash or in

kind to his or her new business. Ideally, the honor of the refugee becomes involved with any loan that is granted, so that the recipient feels repayment is obligatory.

Assistance needed: Refugees that ask for help want to work, but often they do not know how to find either the work for which they are trained or the supplies and markets for the businesses they wish to establish. The assistance program at the camp usually builds on the skills the refugee already has.

Rejections: Not all applications are considered. Types of business that are automatically rejected include the following: buying and selling operations, bigger projects that would use more capital than has been planned, and projects proposed by those who neither do the necessary work nor make the necessary decisions.

Rules: One group receiving credit has finally written rules for itself. Experience shows that the initiative for this must come from the members.

Termination of program: After one more year, the program may be altered or terminated. Consequently, management is already trying to decide how to sustain the program. Possible ways of effecting the turnover might be one of the following:

- o An independent committee of government officials and private businessmen could be formed to manage the activity;
- o Continued direction by a line ministry and continued Quaker funding;

- o Sponsorship by another donor, i.e., UNICEF, ILO, or Partners for Productivity; or
- o A continued expatriate presence.

### Infrastructure

In the company of the regional engineer for Awdal, we traveled from Boroma to the area of Upper Baki, then on to the Didbrawain valley, which is sometimes referred to as the Lower Baki area. The village of Abukar Adawe was the most distant point we visited. Baki is to be the site of the new regional capital and technicians are presently doing the land survey from which plans of the regional capital can be drawn. At present, the area is sparsely populated with only a single road for access.

The road from Boroma to the military checkpoint at Upper Baki is 21 kilometers long and most of it runs perpendicular to the watershed drainage, crossing ten or more small washes and the intervening ridges. The condition of the road can be judged from the fact that it required 55 minutes driving time to cover the 21 kilometers. The Upper Baki area is small, perhaps two kilometers wide and four kilometers long. Judging from the verdant tree growth along the stream channel, there should be ample water available.

The road between Upper and Lower Baki traverses six kilometers of fairly smooth plain and then descends to the Togga Bira stream bed for the last two kilometers. This latter portion of the road could well profit from relocation since it is nearly

impassable, even when dry. The topographic map for the area (NC-38-63 BOWN) suggests that a possible alternative route may exist in a smaller streambed, which parallels the Togga Bira some two to three kilometers further west towards Ruqi. The final 12 kilometer leg of our journey to Abukar Adawe, across the Lower Baki area, was generally on a smooth non-eroded land surface.

The agricultural potential of the Lower Baki area has been referred to earlier. Situated south of the river, it appears to be 16 kilometers long and averages six kilometers in width. The soils are predominantly of medium texture, the slopes are usually less than five percent (appropriate for bunding), and only a small portion of the plain has been cleared for dryland agriculture. Native vegetation and stubble remaining on the few cropped patches indicate the potential for dryland agriculture, but perhaps only during the major rainy season.

The lands adjacent to the streambed of the Didbrawain are in irrigated agriculture. Both gravity diversions and low lift pumps were seen. But even the irrigated area is not fully developed, in part due to the sparse year-round local population.

Nevertheless, most reliable sources maintain that all available lands there are already claimed. The importance of the Dibraweine valley as a potential site for refugee agricultural employment is its proximity to the Daray Maan refugee camp and Boroma. The camp, less than half a day's walk away, could provide backstop support during the initial phases of agricultural development by refugee labor.

### Visit to Ceel Bardale

The basic objective of the visit was to investigate the possibility that the sheik of Ceel Bardale might be willing to settle refugees in return for some technical assistance with his cooperative's irrigation system, horticulture -- primarily citrus trees, and agriculture -- particularly the introduction of some substitute for qat. While the sheik received the design team very graciously, he also made it very clear that he was not at all interested in settling any refugees on his territory, though he would accept some as neighbors. In addition, the team later learned, the sheik belonged to a different clan from that of many of the refugees living in the nearest camp. Furthermore, the sheik's political fortunes had recently taken a downturn and he was not viewed favorably by the central government, at least at this time[1].

### Visits to Dam Camp, Sabaad Camp, and Arabsio

Dam camp is located nine kilometers outside Hargeisa and was visited in order to talk with refugee entrepreneurs within the camp, owners of small general stores as well a number of tailors. Those talked to expressed great interest in obtaining access to short-term credit for restocking their stores -- for which they were quite prepared to pay market rates of interest. At present, they rely on friends to lend them money on a regular basis, which is repayable interest-free on a fixed date, an arrangement they did not like. There is a refugee farm organized by the RAU. While there is a lot of interest in expanding agricultural

activities, the potential is limited until a local dam is repaired -- a distinct possibility now that the Transcentury contract has been signed.

What was striking about the camp was not only the amount of business actually going on within it -- a small market complete with butcher's shops, tea shops, and general stores, but also the fact that there is a regular bus service between the camp and Hargeisa. Some of the busses are owned by Hargeisa residents, but others are owned by camp residents. As the design team left the camp late in the afternoon, the commuters were descending from the buses -- an indication of the symbiotic links connecting camp and city.

Sabaad camp is located 35 km. from Hargeisa. The RAU has been working there since 1980 on an 18 ha. farm where 163 refugee families have been growing vegetables and also some papaya. A site visit revealed that most of these plots were not being cultivated, however. In addition, there are 726 families with garden plots beside their houses.

For the past two months, two MCC volunteers have been working in the camp, organizing a supervised credit program involving groups of farmers, blacksmiths, and shoemakers -- a total of 43 individuals. Credit is provided in the form of tools and material, no interest is charged, and each group has a guarantor who is responsible for chasing up those who fail to make their monthly payments.

The trip to Arabsiyo, also located about 35 km. from Hargeisa, was arranged through the regional chairperson of the Somali Women's Democratic Organization (SWDO). The SWDO had received a 100 ha. tract of land from the government, part of which they proposed to develop for the use of refugee women from Arabsio camp. A well has been dug, with water at about 15 feet. The assistance was to be provided through the Overseas Education Fund (OEF), financed by the CDA Forestry project. As this was the first time anyone in the northwest had mentioned this project, the design team decided it was worth a visit. The land does exist, there appears to be good potential for water, and the SWDO is patiently waiting further news of possible OEF assistance. No contact -- by either OEF or SWDO -- had yet been made with local refugee women concerning project possibilities.

#### Meetings in Hargeisa

Four types of meetings were organized in Hargeisa: those with the technical ministries, those with the local authorities, those with the local business community, and those with the refugee women's organization. The purpose of meeting with the Ministry of Agriculture, the Refugee Agricultural Unit, the National Construction Agency, ONAT, and UNICEF, was to discuss ongoing activities and development potential, particularly the availability of unoccupied or only sparsely populated lands. As a result of these meetings, visits were paid to several sites described earlier.

The meetings with the governor's office, the District Commissioner and the party secretary, and finally the mayor were designed to elicit a better understanding of how the present system of decision making functions at various levels, particularly as it relates to development activities. The information collected differed significantly from that available in the Claxton report and it is obvious that a lot more investigation is required here, a point made earlier by Meyers[2].

A second objective was to discuss possible implementation arrangements for an area development project in which the Ministry of the Interior might play an important role. At the district level, these discussions did not progress very far, primarily because the party secretary had very fixed ideas, not only about what donors should be doing with their money but also what sorts of activities should be implemented at the district level -- primarily small public works.

The meetings with local businessmen were more successful: they claimed they already employed some refugees, albeit at below prevailing wage rates at times, that they had capital available, and that what they would like from a project would be the identification of good business opportunities and the provision of technical "know how." Some of them thought it possible to have the local authorities play a lead role in implementation, but others were skeptical -- pointing out that officials at the district level were often poorly educated, were not interested in

development beyond the narrow scope of public works, and were often prone to corruption. If AID and the project were to implement activities through the local authorities, it would require the presence of an expatriate to monitor the flow of cash and the implementation of these activities.

Finally, meetings were held with the Women's Unit of the Western Somalia Liberation Front, an organization well represented in the refugee camps in this area. From these meetings came the idea for the establishment of a small scale industry, in this case a dairy, discussed in Chapter Four.

#### ASSESSMENT IN PRACTICE:

##### MOGADISHU

A multitude of meetings were held in Mogadishu with USAID, line ministries, PVO's, and other interested parties. Only the most important and the most interesting will be referred to here.

##### Meetings With the Ministry of Interior

On August 28 and September 9 two important meetings were held with Interior. At the first, the Somalis explained that they could not react to the team's ideas on a rural development project in areas with large refugee populations. The ministry's status and authority on such matters were not yet clear as the implementing regulations had not been issued. They agreed about the importance of refugee settlement and the burden the refugees had placed on the country. They noted that many small rural development projects were already being carried out in the

regions and districts through local initiatives and self help, but that larger projects required participation by other ministries. USAID help would be welcome in both instances. They noted that the NRC had its own ideas and format on refugee settlement but that district commissioners must be consulted on programs in their districts. The new regulations might change the respective jurisdictions of both Interior and the NRC.

At the second meeting, the minister himself was present. USAID and the design team explained the approach and content of the proposed project, the regions in which it would initially operate, and how it would be implemented through Interior at the regional and district levels. The minister asked what kind of projects would be carried out. After the team responded, he asked whether the project would operate in other areas and was told it might do so in subsequent phases. He then asked how much money was involved and was informed that USAID was requesting \$15,800,000 plus local currency. The minister said the ministry was "ready to help" and "ready to get involved," but that it must first check with the Ministry of Planning and the NRC. It would then give USAID an answer.

#### Last Meeting with the NRC

At this meeting, the team outlined the program and the points of agreement reached with the NRC at previous meetings and summarized the results of the northwest trip and project possibilities there. The role of the Technical Unit was discussed. The NRC pointed out that the Technical Unit reported

to the Steering Committee, not to UNHCR. Turning to the proposed project, the NRC noted that the team was putting all of its eggs in Interior's basket and doubted the capability of the local authorities to plan and implement a program of the kind described. It was pointed out that NRC was working on a sectoral basis in health, agriculture, potable water, and education and that the proposed project represented another approach. The team agreed that it was an area specific and not a function specific approach. NRC noted this basic difference and said it would be discussed with the Extraordinary Commissioner.

Another NRC participant pointed out the difference between the team's approach, that of an area program that would include refugees, and the understanding reached between the Extraordinary Commissioner and the previous American ambassador, for refugee programs that would include local Somalis. The NRC emphasized that the NRC approach did not exclude participation by other ministries. Nevertheless, resolving whether the project would be a rural development or a refugee project would have to be left to the "big bosses". Benefits to the refugees under the team's approach would only be incidental.

#### Last Meeting with the UNHCR

The project being recommended by the team was outlined. The UNHCR agreed with the approach but wondered how refugees would be incorporated into a program carried out by technical ministries. It was explained that the project would include special arrangements for refugee participation. The UNHCR representative

thought such an approach would benefit Somalia and permit the rural areas to absorb more refugees. He thought local NRC officials would work with the governors on such an approach. The Technical Unit could be of assistance in developing proposals for settlement. The team observed that the Technical Unit could help Interior and the NRC with project development. USAID suggested that the Somali regional authorities should be able to utilize the Technical Unit for special studies. The UNHCR noted that this idea was not included in their present mandate and would have to be discussed with the GSDR and UNHCR headquarters in Geneva.

#### Meeting with the PVO's

On September 4 a meeting was held with representatives of eight PVO's presently working in Somalia. The following is a summary of major comments by representatives of some of the above agencies during the course of the meeting in which the proposed project was outlined:

OXFAM: Lower Shabelli has the greatest potential for absorbing refugees. The northwest is the most difficult because land is mostly spoken for and there is a shortage of water. Since the environment is deteriorating, the great potential for the northwest is in the cities which have an abundance of cash and where many refugees have friends and relatives. There are also traditional divisions based on clan differences. He suggested programs which would encourage spontaneous assimilation through skills training. He questioned whether it was realistic

to count on local government to run such a program, given its frailties in Somalia. He thought PVD's would have difficulty in such circumstances, given the top down character of Somali administration.

World Concern: The northwest was so fragile that maybe it should not be developed further. He wondered how the refugee program could be reshaped so that it was not a numbers game or a money making machine for the NRC. How does the program tie in with GSDR national plans? He indicated that ministries were the appropriate place for planning and identifying priorities but that emphasis should be placed on capacity building at the village level. PVD's can work at the local level but national structures will often not support such efforts.

## ADDITIONAL ASSESSMENTS

### Introduction

If future assessments are to be performed, it is of cardinal importance that their purpose be clearly specified as well as the role that the information so generated will play in the eventual preparation of a viable project paper. On the basis of the quick assessments described in the previous pages, together with the policy issues highlighted in the previous chapter, it is strongly recommended that any future site assessments at this time be confined to those areas where land is available for area development with a significant refugee settlement component.

How can this be done most effectively? The following stages for achieving this goal are recommended:

- o Stage One: A national land resource review, using existing data sources on Somalia, to identify potential area development/refugee settlement areas and in consultation with the GSDR, to prioritize them.
- o Stage Two: Concurrently with Stage One, USAID starts discussing the crucial policy issues elaborated in Chapter Two with the GSDR. During these discussions, GSDR endorsement of the sites selected in Stage One will be sought.
- o Stage Three: Rapid assessments of the areas in question are performed in order to identify those with the most potential. On the basis of the results presented, agreement is reached with the GSDR on which areas are viable and available for the proposed project.
- o Stage Four: A design team assesses the areas in question in close collaboration with USAID and the GSDR. Together they produce a project paper.

These stages will be discussed in detail below:

#### Stage One: National Land Resource Review

Land is the key to any realistic refugee settlement policy. If a commitment is made by the GSDR that refugee settlement will be based on economic viability, technical feasibility and integration with local Somalis, the process of selecting settlement sites based on these principles will naturally follow. Once this stage is reached, a first step should consist of a national land resource review using existing data sources on Somalia. This review will provide an initial screen of potential settlement sites from both a physical and and economic standpoint.

The primary data upon which this review process would depend already exist for virtually all areas of Somalia and for many of

the variables to be assessed. In particular, the recent studies undertaken by Resource Management and Research cover the Northern, Central, Bay and Southern areas of Somalia. These surveys provide much data on land use, based on ground-truthed aerial surveys and mapping. Numerous other technical studies on soils, stocking rates, agricultural and rainfall patterns have been carried out in the past few years, and can be consulted in order to draw up a national land resource review.

It is recommended that a researcher be hired to undertake this review. This researcher would start by compiling a comprehensive bibliography of all materials containing data on the list which follows. The researcher should also compile a complete set of maps covering all areas of Somalia.

Using the existing data base, each area can be described in terms of the following:

- o Climate;
- o Soils;
- o Relief;
- o Water use;
- o Land use;
- o Economic activities; and
- o Infrastructure.

More specifically, however, available studies should be scrutinized for any information they may provide on the following factors:

- o Rainfall patterns;
- o Soil conditions and suitability for different types of agriculture;
- o Current land use patterns;
- o Evidence of land pressure, overgrazing, soil exhaustion, and human competition for land;
- o Stocking rates;
- o Types of crops if any currently grown;
- o Available and potential water resources for humans and livestock;
- o Distance and accessibility to markets;
- o Potential for irrigated agriculture;
- o Presence of social services, health, and schooling; and
- o Access to urban wage markets.

There will inevitably be information gaps for some parts of the country as well as on some of the variables to be reviewed, i.e., potential water resources, evidence of land pressure. These gaps in information should be indicated in the review process, and taken account of in the process stage of site selection.

Once the review is completed, potential settlement sites can be narrowed down with the assistance of a land use planner who will determine limiting conditions for settlement on the basis of the following criteria:

- o High enough rainfall to support dryland agriculture;
- o Suitable for irrigated agriculture;
- o Suitable soils for agriculture;

- o No evidence of moderate or severe land pressure, overgrazing, soil exhaustion, or human competition for land;
- o Available or potential water resources; and
- o Low stocking rates.

The identified areas which meet these criteria can then be ranked as follows, providing the necessary information is available.

- o Accessibility to markets;
- o Presence of social services; and
- o Access to urban wage markets.

#### Stage Two: Policy Dialogue and Selection of Potential Sites

The explicit assumption being made throughout this report, based on the design team's experience and perceptions, is that policy dialogue with the GSDR must precede any further design work on the proposed refugee settlement project. Concurrent with the activities described in Stage One, USAID should begin seriously discussing the policy issues discussed in some detail in Chapter Two, starting with the two most important -- the availability of land and the type of settlement to be proposed. The whole rationale for Stage One is to provide the GSDR with enough information to make a decision on this issue, if it is so inclined.

The list of identified areas, which have been ranked according to their potential for settlement, is then discussed with the appropriate government institutions. In particular, the Technical Unit of the UNHCR should participate in these discus-

sions, as should the Refugee Agricultural Unit in the Ministry of Agriculture. Those government authorities empowered to designate land for refugee settlement may then indicate which of the identified areas could in fact be officially registered for this purpose. At this stage, a list of potential refugee settlement sites will have been selected on the basis of physical and economic criteria as well as government agreement in principle that such sites could be allocated for refugee settlement. Stage Three should not begin until such government concordance has been obtained, which must be a precondition for the on-site assessment exercise recommended as the next stage.

### Stage Three: Rapid Assessments of Potential Settlement Sites

During this stage, an assessment team would visit as many of the most promising selected sites as possible in order to "ground truth" the technical data summarized in Stage One. At this point, discussions should be held between the assessment team, local leaders and government representatives as to the acceptability of settling refugees at that particular site. A crucial factor to be considered at this stage is the receptivity of the local community and its leaders to having refugees settle in their locality.

Detailed in-depth land evaluations are both expensive and time-consuming. The approach proposed here would:

- o Rank identified areas in terms of their general suitability for agriculture and/or livestock; and

- o Focus on the most promising sites for more detailed assessments with a more specified purpose, followed by project design for one or more designated areas (Stage Four).

Land evaluation is an assessment of land performance when utilized for a specified purpose in a specified manner. An appropriate land use is defined relative to the current land use and by contrasting alternative uses. The assessment should determine the current land use, look at the feasibility of the proposed changes, specify the inputs and outputs associated with the changes, and detail possible consequences of the specified land use.

The work done during Stage One should delineate and rank areas primarily on technical grounds. This stage should take an interdisciplinary approach and consider the specified use within the physical, economic, and social context of the site. Since all evaluations are relative, the more sites looked at in Stage One and the more defined the proposed uses are for this stage, the more effective will be the assessment process. For example, Stage One could rank 20 to 30 sites under broad suitability classes for rangeland, dryland agriculture, or irrigated agriculture. This stage could rank the most promising dryland agriculture sites in terms of their suitability for mechanized maize production versus smallholder production of sorghum and cowpeas.

The objective of these rapid assessments is to narrow down the list of viable settlement sites. This list of identified sites would then be discussed with the GSDR and a decision taken

on which sites will be available for implementation of one or more refugee settlement/area development projects. Then, and only then, should the design team be called in.

#### Stage Four: Producing a Project Paper

The design team, in close collaboration with USAID and the relevant line ministries, would perform in-depth assessments in each of the designated areas and together they would produce a project paper. During this design process great care must be taken to assure that proposed activities -- both resettlement and developmental -- are acceptable to local authorities, local leaders, and community members in each proposed area.

### SKILLS REQUIRED AND SCOPES OF WORK

#### Skills Required

Technical assistance will be required with three of the stages outlined: the land resource review, the rapid assessments, and the project paper. Ideally, there would be some continuity in the personnel provided, i.e., the person performing the resource review would also participate in the other two stages and some of the people performing the rapid assessments would also participate in the final design effort.

### Land Resource Review

The person responsible should have a background in one or more of the following: the social sciences, rural development, agricultural development, and/or resource management. Ideally this person should have formal training to the M.A. level in one of the following: physical geography, land use planning, or environmental studies. More important than technical specialization, however, is experience of similar types of work and proven ability to do documentary research, summarize the findings, and present the results in a clear, concise, and straightforward manner.

In addition, the services of a more experienced land use planner, perhaps the REDSO environmental officer, could be useful at the end of the review period to assist with the selection of limiting conditions on criteria. Alternatively, USAID could commission the Environmental Advisory Committee at the Somali University to participate and assist the researcher during this first phase.

In essence, this person would have the following scope of work:

- o To review the existing documentation and produce a national land resource review;
- o On the basis of the available information, prioritize potential settlement areas; and
- o In conjunction with USAID, initiate the necessary dialogue with the GSDR in order to obtain their official approval for further investigation at designated sites.

### Rapid Assessments

These assessments can best be performed by a three-person team consisting of an anthropologist, an agriculturalist, and a land use planner. The anthropologist should have experience working among nomadic pastoralists or agro-pastoralists under open range conditions in Africa, and should have a background in land tenure issues. Previous field work in Somalia is preferable. The agriculturalist should have a farming systems background in semi-arid areas, have worked on rapid assessment studies previously, and have a knowledge of livestock production systems. The land use planner should have experience in carrying out settlement feasibility studies, background in resource management, regional planning, and economic analysis. Previous experience in semi-arid areas of Africa essential.

For their scope of work, they would be expected to gather information on the following:

- o Availability of land for refugee settlement;
- o Agricultural potential of that land;
- o Livestock potential of area;
- o Distance and accessibility to markets;
- o Presence of social services;
- o Access to urban wage markets;
- o Receptivity of local community to possibility of refugee settlement in their area; and
- o Types of development activities and assistance local community would like to see -- if area designated for project.

### The Project Design Effort

At this stage in the proceedings, it would be presumptuous to elaborate scopes of work for those responsible for the final project design effort. But two important points should be made. First, it would be highly desirable to have some or all of those involved in the previous two stages participate in this effort. Second, the role of potential refugee settlers will also have to be examined. This will depend very much on which settlement model or models the GSDR ultimately selects and how it proposes to initiate a process of refugee selection and motivation. If the proposed settlement sites are located within relatively close proximity to existing refugee camps, then the role of the potential refugee settlers can be identified simultaneously with the other elements in the design effort. But if the proposed project areas are located a long way from the camps, then careful consideration will have to be given to ways in which potential settlers can be persuaded to try some of the development initiatives proposed under the project design.


## FOOTNOTES

1. This particular sheik had received some assistance from AID back in the mid-sixties and a recent study comments favorably on the progress made by the religious cooperative over the intervening years. One of the important factors in this success is said to be the "effective management hierarchy." See D.I. Steinberg, C. Clapp-Wincek, and A.G. Turner, Irrigation and AID's Experience: A Consideration Based on Evaluations. AID Program Evaluation Report No. 8. Washington, D.C.: USAID, 1983, pp. 162-165. (This sheik is also discussed in Chapter Two of this Report).
2. See A.E. Claxton, An Institutional Analysis of Local Government in the Somali Democratic Republic. Mogadishu: USAID, 1983 and L.R. Meyers, Toward a Rural Development Strategy for USAID/Somalia. Washington, D.C.: USAID, 1983.

# REFUGEE CENTERS

Map 1:

## IN SOMALI DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC



Refugee center

**NORTH WEST REGION**  
Camps Km to Hargeisa

Agabar	53 N
Adi Addeys	82 E
Ayabsio	35 W
Daray	125 NW
Dam	9 E
Darbi Hore	217 NW
Las dhure	42 N
Saba'ad	35 NE
Tug Wajale	80 W

**GEDO REGION**  
Camps Km to LUUQ

Ali Matan	9 S
Ban Mandule	5 S
Dorianley	10 S
Halba I	15 N
Halba II	15 N
Halgan	8 SW
Horseed	2 W
Maganey	12 SW

**Camps - Kms to GarabHare**

Bur' Dhubo	48 SE
Hilo Mareer	57 E
Malika Hiday	63 E
Suriye	60 E

**HIRAN REGION**  
Camps - Kms to Belet Uen

Amalo	20 S
Bo'0 I	59 S
Bo'0 II	57 S
Lebowl	15 N
Luuq yellow	25 S
Qooqane	18 N
Sigalow	2 N

**LOWER SHABELLE REGION**  
Camps - Kms to Mogadishu

Qoryoley I	139 SW
Qoryoley II	136 SW
Qoryoley III	136 SW

**IS FROM MOGADISHU TO**


Belet Uen	344
Qoryoley	132
Jalalaqsi	166
Hargeisa	1628
Luuq	425
Arka Haro	496

**Camps - Kms to Mogadishu**

Jalalaqsi I	166 N
Jalalaqsi II	171 N
Jalalaqsi III	166 N
Jalalaqsi IV	166 N

Map 2:


# Refugee Camps in LOWER SHABELLE REGION



DIST. to Mogadishu

1 QORYOLEY I	139 Kms
2 QORYOLEY II	136 Kms
3 QORYOLEY III	136 Kms

# NORTH WEST REGION



Dist: to Hargeisa

AGABAR	53 KMS
ADI ADDEYS	82 KMS
ARABSTO	35 KMS
DARAY MA'AN	125 KMS
DAM	8 KMS
DARBI HORE	217 KMS
LAS DHURE	42 KMS
SABA'AD	35 KMS
TUG KAJALE	80 KMS

BERBERA

**CHAPTER 4**  
**POTENTIAL ACTIVITIES INVOLVING REFUGEES**  
**AND THE LOCAL POPULATION**

**INTRODUCTION**

Chapter Four presents a description of refugee-related development activities which appear to contain considerable promise for involving both refugees and the local population in the northwest and Lower Shabelli regions. Since they are based on relatively short visits to a number of locales, the list is suggestive rather than definitive and each mentioned activity would require further analysis regarding economic and technical soundness. The consensus of the team, on the basis of the visits, is that the potential for agriculture in both areas is extremely limited due to limitations in land and surface water availability and unfavorable rainfall conditions. On the other hand, there appears to be an interesting variety of rural and urban small scale and artisanal enterprise possibilities which are worthy of further investigation. Finally, the importance of road linkages as a means of creating or stimulating economic activity in the northwest is emphasized. Though not in the mainstream of the team's mandate, the development impact of improved roads in Somalia has historically been remarkable and improvement in the northwest is also likely to provide secondary and tertiary income and employment benefits for refugees and local people alike.

## AGRICULTURE

Background to Activities in the Northwest/Adwal Regions

Land suitable for any kind of agriculture is scarce, and most or all of the potential agricultural land is either used or at least claimed. There are no large unutilized areas which can be readily exploited and there are no obvious ways in which farmers can greatly increase production, given the resources of land, labour and capital available to them. The land suitable for irrigated horticulture, i.e. with a good water supply, suitable soil, and access to markets and inputs, is in very short supply.

Agriculture in the northwest is high risk, because of the nature of the climate, the incidence of diseases and pests, the uncertainty of input supply, and the logistical problems of marketing. Rainfall is unreliable. The rains are variable in amount, erratic in their incidence, both temporally and spatially, and often arrive in large amounts over a short period of time, leading to runoff and underutilization.

Commercial supplies of farm inputs are generally in short supply. There is a general lack of technical expertise and the costs and returns to agriculture need clarifying. Inputs of seed, chemicals, and pumps are expensive and may not be economic given the present market prices for some crops. The type, nature and extent of the market for any increases in agricultural

production remain undetermined. Vegetable consumption is low in the rural populations. Tomatoes and onions seem to be the most popular crops in the urban areas.

The large numbers of refugees have affected the labour market, possibly depressing or at least maintaining low daily wage rates. Two areas of possible interest are the use of Dromos as horticulturists, either as managers or laborers, and vocational training to allow unskilled labor to enter the more lucrative skilled labor market. It will be necessary to determine the nature and size of the predicted demand for the various classes of skilled labor.

There are more refugees in the northwest than in Lower Shabelli and the problem of integrating them is more critical. In addition, agriculture is more problematic. Overall, there is need for an integrated development program in both areas. Given the relative lack of projects in the northwest, it will probably be easier to implement a rational coordinated approach there.

The new region and the proposed new regional capital at Baki will affect the development of the area. At present the land of that region is largely undeveloped and, if the infrastructure and development proposed go ahead, it would be useful to be involved in the planning process. The impact of AID assistance could be reinforced by parallel development in the region.

A large amount of the private development in the northwest is funded from overseas earnings. What possibilities does this

situation offer? What are the likely consequences of major changes, such as devaluation, fewer employment possibilities overseas, and local vocational training? These issues need to be addressed.

The regions are not uniform and the target population will need identifying. Does AID want to work with the small villages, the urban centers, or the refugee camps? The diversity of the refugee population needs consideration. What are the possibilities for implementation? What is the preferred mix of private sector, governmental activities, and PVO's?

The four main watersheds in the area are the Waaheen, Durdur, Biji and Silul. Some sites for possible development suggested by local authorities were the Waheen -- coastal area, Bangeeriyad, the Biji valley - Humboweine, the Durdur valley - Didbrawein, and Boroma.

The plateau area of Xaraf-Gebiley-Borama is the existing agricultural area. The main crops grown are sorghum (60%) and maize (40%). The most extensive area of cultivation is in the central area around Gebiley. To the southwest is the Tug Wajale plain, mainly used for grazing. It is a water hardship area and during the dry season livestock herds from a wide area collect at the few available water points. Over 50 drillings in the area have produced only three successful wells.

The major activity in dryland farming over the last 20 years has been bunding and 31,000 ha. have been bunded by the World Bank project. At present this project is concentrating on

priority erosion areas, working with self selected farmers. Bunds are an attempt to contain the rainfall, reduce runoff, and thus increase the available water for the crop. The farm is surveyed, its borders determined, and bunds are then placed on the contour at 30m intervals using bulldozers. It is clear that the impact of the bunding has been variable; it has been expensive and has often lacked technical supervision.

The problems include: waterlogging at certain seasons, as at present the interbund area is not graded; bunds have been put in without good site surveys; flat land is being bunded; top soil is being used to form the bunds, depressing subsequent yields and leaving the soil more subject to compaction; the total land area available for cropping is reduced by 0.15 ha. per hectare due to the bunds. The effect on yields has thus been variable. It has probably been mainly useful in terms of enabling farmers to lay claim to land. It may be possible to learn from the mistakes of the World Bank project and build on their experience.

Due to the risk involved in dryland agriculture, irrigated horticulture appears to be an attractive possibility. Because of the apparent lack of technical expertise some form of training and/or extension of technical information would seem to be useful. The objective would be to intensify and increase the production on the existing irrigated area. At the present time alternative crops to qat are required. The interest and capital seem to be available. It remains to be determined whether more

intensive horticulture is a viable option, whether constraints of labor and/or marketing will appear, and whether the crops exist to replace qat.

On the basis of a quick visit it was not possible to determine the reasons why intensive horticulture was not commonly practiced. The percentage of farmers practicing irrigated horticulture is low, development of this sector of the economy would be expensive, but the problems appear to be solvable. It is reasonable to suppose that farmers were acting rationally and, given the general spirit of entrepreneurship in the region, it is likely that one or more major impediments to intensification exist. These should be clearly determined before a project is implemented.

Forestry of one form or another is a desirable activity in the northwest. The areas around the refugee camps are under heavy pressure, supplying wood for houses, fuel and the market. It may be difficult to justify large scale wood lots as a sustainable economic proposition. It may be preferable to explore the possibility of setting up nurseries at suitable sites to produce seedlings for sale.

Grafted fruit trees and possibly coffee may find a limited market. At this point a lot of land previously used for qat is being replanted. It would be necessary to choose a site which was close enough to the irrigated areas where demand exists and transportation is not a problem. Another portion of the nursery

could be producing amenity trees for sale to private individuals. Both in the urban and rural areas appreciation for trees in the immediate vicinity of the house is clearly shown. Seedlings of a few popular species sold to individuals have a better chance of reaching maturity than mass plantings. The size of this demand would be price dependent and remains to be determined.

A third possible area of tree sales is for use in the water catchment areas as hedges and retainers on terraces. This component will only develop if the farmers themselves perceive that the activity is valuable. Perhaps some of the larger, more enterprising farmers could be the leaders in demonstrating the value of trees for hedges, erosion control and windbreaks.

Given the lack of inputs and the apparent unavailability of foreign currency, the possibility of some export crop production needs consideration. One area of possible development is the expanded collection and utilization of indigenous plant materials. The refugees have a wide experience of traditional plant uses. A quick survey could explore the potential for the development of both small scale collection activities and the utilization of local plant products in the industrial, pharmaceutical, and food markets overseas. Items such as essential oils, spices, enzymes, dyes, drugs, and polymers are often high value/low weight and suitable for development by small scale businesses.

### Potential Activities in the Northwest

The government should be encouraged to identify land available for refugees, and thereby facilitate the process by which refugees can acquire land. In addition, the preparation of a regional summary of existing data relevant to agricultural development would be desirable.

In Hargeisa district, the following potential activities were identified:

- o Technical assistance to an irrigated horticulture project, working with the Ministry of Agriculture on the land at Dam camp with refugees and local farmers, on both production and marketing.
- o Technical assistance to the Ministry of Agriculture to improve the World Bank's dryland farming model and attempt to produce a dryland farming package, working mainly with locals.
- o Establishment of a facility to provide inputs for agriculture through the private sector.

For Boroma district, the following were identified:

- o Technical assistance through the NRA to establish tree nurseries producing amenity and fruit trees for sale.
- o Establishment of an input supply and marketing structure operating through Djibouti and the private sector.
- o Supply technical training for small business activities.
- o Pre-implementation study of vegetable marketing to Djibouti.

### Background to Activities in the Lower Shabelli Region

The GSDR five year development plan notes that the Shabelli river valley has 35,000 ha. of controlled irrigation or 70

percent of the total controlled irrigation in Somalia. The extension of this irrigated area is limited by the seasonal availability of water in the Shabelli river during June/July, and the fact that the region has little new land available for irrigation development. Any irrigated land which did become available, perhaps through rehabilitation of the existing schemes, combined with increased irrigation efficiencies and improved management, would almost certainly go to local Somalis. High value irrigated land, if it became available, would probably be monopolized by the local population. The cost of establishing new irrigated land is high, requiring large inputs of capital and technical expertise. The long term management costs of irrigated land are also high. For these reasons a refugee settlement strategy which is predicated on irrigated agriculture is unrealistic.

At present a plan is underway to rehabilitate the existing Genale-Bulo-Mareerta scheme which is operating well below capacity. It has been suggested that this will provide new land and opportunities for refugees. The reality is that all the land in the immediate area of the scheme is claimed and currently farmed. There is potential for refugees being employed as day labourers as some of the existing dryland farming becomes irrigated and as the existing irrigated land becomes farmed more intensively. Also the existing shortage of agricultural labor in the area, combined with an increase in the irrigated area, would provide employment opportunities for refugees.

Dryland farming in the lower Shabelli region is found on the edges of the irrigated areas and in a strip between the Shabelli river and the coastal dune area running southwest-northeast from Sablaale to Kurtunwarey. The rainfall in this area is highly variable in space and time, the yearly variation is at least 50 percent of the mean annual value, and the wet season consists of a small number of wet days separated by long periods without rain. The rainfall, when it does arrive, is intense and the predictability of the first rains is low. The area is generally very flat with alluvial silt and clay soils, so runoff and water erosion are not as big a problem as in other areas. Evapotranspiration exceeds precipitation and there is a water deficit for long periods of the year. The area has a variable incidence of tsetse, quelea, and wild animals. In the dry season the area is grazed by nomads.

The existing dryland farming schemes of Sablaale, Furjano and Kurtunwarey are based on a capital intensive, management intensive approach. This approach is being put forward for expansion in the area between Sablaale and Kurtunwarey. It is heavily dependent on expatriate management; has high recurrent costs; has very little input, participation or contribution from the settlers; is growing crops not presently consumed to any large extent in Somalia, e.g., safflower and sunflower; requires inputs not easily available in Somalia; and is based on a unit size selected on technical criteria alone. The schemes are expensive and estimates of capital costs range from \$10-15,000 per family. The area or parts of it are infested with tsetse fly.

Assuming that suitable land is available to duplicate the model, the cost of settling the total refugee population of Lower Shabelli, which presently stands at 8,000 families, would be \$40-60,000,000. It will be recollected that one of the objectives enunciated in the PID was to settle this number of refugee families.

### Potential Activities

If even part of this dryland area is to become available for refugee settlement, the following activities are recommended. A coordinator will be required:

- o To work closely with the NRC, Ministry of Interior, and the Ministry of Agriculture to identify potential areas for dryland settlement;
- o To develop a technical plan for the settlement of that area; and
- o To encourage the participation of the refugees in utilization of that land.

On the basis of a limited survey of the area, the following points appear worthy of consideration. Any area with tseste automatically becomes high risk because the opportunity for generating income from livestock is reduced. There is a limit to the area which one family can prepare, sow, weed, and harvest by hand. Given the unpredictability of rainfall in the area and the likelihood of crop failures every few years, the prospects for unassisted dryland, self-sufficient farming are bleak. Possibly there is the potential for developing the capability of ONAT or private equipment owners in the area for supplying plowing

services and working out a modified input supply program and limited interventions for the dryland area. It is likely that only a small percent of refugees will be prepared to become involved in dryland farming. Their participation and interest could, of course, be gained by producing an attractive option which minimized their input and participation. Long term success is more likely to be assured through a program which selects only highly motivated settlers by offering minimum inputs such as guaranteed land tenure.

Given the lack of easily identifiable "winners" in agriculture, it would be useful to evaluate the agricultural success of the ongoing projects prior to project design, particularly the SCF and World Bank pilot schemes, attempting to identify the successes and failures, and the reasons for them.

In summary, it is suggested that an evaluation of ongoing projects and further study of the dryland area be conducted prior to project design. A PVO, such as World Concern, could be brought in to plan, assist, and work towards settling a few refugees on land as it became available. Possibly SCF could fill this role in the Lower Shabelli area. Finally, two technical people would be needed if such a program was to be started: an irrigation specialist who would work mainly on the existing irrigated areas improving management and irrigation techniques and also providing input to the SCF irrigated farm if necessary. This person's role would be primarily regional development. A second dryland agriculturist could be brought in to provide input into any dryland settlement which became possible.

## RURAL AND URBAN ENTERPRISES

The objectives of such activities would be: first, to assist private initiative among local Somali and refugee populations and thereby facilitate the economic integration of the refugees into local communities; and second, to discover new income-generating opportunities in both urban and rural areas of Somalia, for both refugees and local inhabitants.

Skills Commonly Found Among Refugees

Poultry	Animal Husbandry/Dairy Products	Beekeeping
Breadmaking	Food Processing/Snacks	Leatherwork
Tailoring	Iron Smithy/Tools	Rope Making
Mat Weaving	Woodworking/Carpentry	Cloth Weaving
Retailing	Tea Shops/Restaurants	Mason/Mud Brick Making

Based on visits to the proposed project areas, interviews with local officials, businessmen and farmers, and information obtained from PVO's and published reports, the following family and small business enterprises are suggested for inclusion. Some selections are closely related to the family model and the support of family labor. Others are more closely related to occupational skills which may be practiced away from home. All appear to have good local market potential.

### Chicken/Egg Production

A number of urban and village families now have small flocks of chickens, often reduced through disease and predators. A large number of families could be encouraged to keep small flocks of 10-20 laying hens. If all eggs produced are sold, the family would receive a net profit of SoSh 2200 per month.

### Exotic Goats/Sheep

The production of milk, wool or hair is done with only indifferent success by Somali breeds of sheep and goats. There are undoubtedly locations in the country where long haired or long woolled breeds would survive the climatic stress well. An experimental introduction of a heavy-wooled breed of sheep could be the basis for a wool cloth industry. To aim at improved milk production, ILU has experimentally introduced Arabian long haired goats.

### Beekeeping

Somalia has a high potential for honey production, especially along the Shabelli and Juba Rivers, in the northern mountain areas, and where there are masses of weeds, shrubs and legumes flowering at the end of the dry season. Traditional methods of beekeeping and honey collection often destroy the bees and result in a poor quality of honey. Somali African bees are noted for their hardiness and aggressiveness, and can be managed through methods discovered by Brazilians many years ago. There

is a very good market for honey in Somalia, both for domestic consumption and for medicinal purposes. In addition, the beeswax which is now lost has a very good export market.

### Vegetable Production

A very small piece of land, even the home lot if there is space in the camp, may be used to grow vegetables which can be either consumed or sold. Unorthodox methods often may be used to provide some water to the plants when the ground becomes dry. It has been proposed to have special gardening plots at both Qoriorley and Jalalaqsi, with recommended vegetables including onions, chillies, cabbage, cauliflower, cucumber, carrot, and potatoes. AFSC at Daray Maan has also had experience with vegetable plots.

### Vegetable Processing

Solar driers should be used for drying surplus chillies and onions. Chillies and other spices could be ground and mixed for the high quality market demand. Other vegetables can be dried for family consumption.

### Improved Stoves

Several stoves of new design are now being manufactured and sold in various locations. Made of cheap local materials, including ceramic or mud brick parts, some stoves operate so efficiently that the owner can reduce present fuel consumption by as much as 50 percent. Average wood consumption per person per

day in a survey done for VITA in December 1983 was 1.17 kg for refugees and 1.19 kg for non-refugees. With increasing scarcity and high prices for any type of fuel, there should be a continuing demand for the new generation of stoves.

### Donkey Carts

The donkey cart designed and built under the auspices of International Development Enterprises has proven very useful in Merca and Doriolley for the normal movement of goods on a small scale. The cart, when completed, is worth over SoSh 9,000 and it generates a monthly income of SoSh 1,000 for the driver and SoSh 6,000 for the cart owner. Its use in refugee camps, for example, is very popular and IDE is planning a major expansion of its training and manufacturing facilities. It is recommended that a new design for a cart appropriate to mountainous terrain be developed and that manufacturing/training facilities be set up in both Boroma and Hargeisa. Boroma could absorb five per week and Hargeisa ten.

### Leatherwork

Ethnic Somali pastoralists and refugee Dromo livestock herders have traditional skills in leatherwork. Many articles for domestic use are made from leather, although most hides and skins that reach commercial channels are exported. There are commercial tanning facilities at Kismayo. It is recommended that high quality leather handicraft manufacture be planned to take

advantage of the high quality leather that should be available. This scheme is being initiated in a small way at Luq Jello, where ERDGS is training leatherworkers and blacksmiths.

Close cooperation with the government Hides and Skins Cooperative would be essential if the necessary quality and quantity of skins and leather are to be assured. Identification of domestic and foreign markets for a list of leather products could be done while the first group of trainees is learning the trade. Local merchants would find a place to invest some surplus capital, and the industry would benefit because of the higher valued products that would be offered for sale after training is completed. A large number of leather workers should find employment.

#### Handicraft Weaving: Mats and Blankets

The weaving of fibers, reeds, and grasses into baskets, mats, blankets and other handicraft items is difficult to summarize since there are a great variety of products and methods. Although many of these products are woven by the family for its own use, the market for products to sell commercially would appear large.

At Jalalaqsi camp, an early activity was the manufacture of mats from palm leaves, purchased from the women at SoSh 40 per mat. Mats are of several types: plaited palm leaf mats with colored patterns, commonly available in most markets and costing from SoSh 60-120; highly decorated mats with very fine quality

patterns; mats with finished top and tassels used for door hangings; a slatted style for sleeping mats; and colorful mats made of sisal fiber, cotton threads and strips of rags.

A fine specimen of weaving may take as long as three months for a woman to complete, and be worth thousands of shillings. One woman who has taken up weaving in Daray Maan on a part time basis would probably earn a net of over SoSh 1,000 per month if she worked full time.

#### Cottage Industry Training

One successful program in the camps has been the Family Life Education Centers. They were set up to be centers of health education and training in traditional and non-traditional handicrafts. For instance, the former included embroidery, mat weaving and basketry and the latter included sewing, on machines made available at the centers. Several hundred "assistant teachers" have been recruited and trained in a three month course to staff the centers.

#### Summary

With successive droughts and the lack of free, good quality land in the vicinity of the refugee camps, there is a great need for economic activities of an income-producing nature. Luckily, most refugees have one or more skills on which to build. While the per capita income in Somalia is notably low, there often appears to be a market for food and non-food products and services that the refugees could provide. The refugee who plans

well will have money in livestock, in crop production and in some non-farm enterprise, when he or she is again financially able to do so. Handicrafts and small industry, of which some of the most promising alternatives have been discussed above, offer many choices for the new settler.

### SMALL SCALE INDUSTRY

#### Justification

In and around the refugee camps, many families keep small and large stock. In the camps themselves, refugee families have been able to acquire small herds of sheep and goats. Additionally, it is thought that some male refugees absent from their families in the camps are managing family livestock on the rangelands. Therefore, some refugee families have direct or indirect access to milk from their herds. In both Lower Shabelli and the Northwest Region, some of the refugee camps are located in areas where the local Somali population keep livestock and have seasonally-available excess milk for sale.

Among both the ethnic Somali and Dromo livestock-keepers, processing and marketing of milk and dairy products is a highly-developed skill. Traditionally, milk-processing, and to a large extent marketing, are carried out by female family members. This economic activity is a significant source of cash income for livestock-keeping families in Somalia. There is a high demand among Somalis, both urban and rural, for milk and ghee, both of

which fetch a good price, particularly in the dry seasons when milk is less available. Urban dairy herds are commonly found in Somalia.

A recent study in the Northwest region noted that:

Milk and milk products may...be not only a potentially major income source for livestock raisers provided that better preservation and organized marketing structure are introduced...it is also an underexploited nutritional source. There are several indications that large quantities of milk are literally spilt during times of plenty, i.e., the rainy season, while at the same time large quantities of powdered milk are imported...via Djibouti, not to mention the "surplus supplies" of dried skim milk that find their way to the markets from the refugee camps. Nestle alone is estimated to sell the equivalent of 3 million litres of milk in Hargesya town[1].

During the team's visit to the Northwest Region, discussions were held with the Refugee Womens' organization, representing most of the refugee camps in the region. The representatives of this organization were asked to suggest economic activities which they thought would be profitable and could be undertaken by groups of refugee women if they received some assistance. Dairy processing was mentioned as one activity in which many refugee women had considerable knowledge and experience. Those interviewed said that some women had thought of trying to produce and sell dairy products but lacked sufficient livestock.

#### Description of Proposed Activity

It is proposed that a small-scale dairy unit be established in selected urban or peri-urban sites, close to present refugee camps. Individual women or small groups of women would be provided with assistance in setting up small dairy herds of

goats, sheep, and cattle. They would receive assistance in establishing a small-scale milk processing industry based on the sale of milk, ghee and possibly cheese -- for which there is a limited demand or manufacturing experience, at present. Women would use their current skills in manufacturing and marketing milk and ghee, and could be trained in simple cheese production, if a market for cheese is identified.

The milk supply would depend on both seasonally-available surplus milk from refugee and local livestock-keepers, and on the small dairy herd attached to the manufacturing site. Project participants and other refugee families might also be given cash loans to allow them to purchase a few milch animals to be managed apart from the dairy herds. In these cases, loan recipients would be expected to supply a portion of their herd's milk to the milk-processing operation.

#### Required Project Inputs

Since the traditional method of ghee production uses soured milk, refrigeration would not be necessary; milk and ghee containers are made locally by Somali women, for domestic use and for sale. Loans for building a small plant would be required. Some assistance in identifying new markets for cheese may be necessary. The major project input would be assistance in setting up the dairy unit. Veterinary inputs from the Ministry of Livestock, Range and Forestry will also be necessary. The project should also provide minimal para-veterinary training and

veterinary drugs to project participants. Supplementary animal nutrition supplies will also be necessary, on a loan and/or subsidy basis. A livestock water supply is essential.

### Benefits and Costs

Project participants would gain income through the sale of milk and dairy products. Dairy processing would provide an outlet for surplus milk from the herds of refugees and those of local inhabitants. Families would be expected to consume some of the milk they produce. First year costs for the 450 cows amount to \$249,300. For a 10-year period, the Internal Rate of Return (IRR) for the full project is calculated at 43.25 percent. Sensitivity calculations found that an increase of 10 percent in costs would result in reduction of the IRR to 28.18 percent, and a 10 percent reduction of income would result in a reduction of the IRR to 26.83 percent. Costed items of note are: purchase of cows, supplies of veterinary drugs and of supplementary feed, veterinary services, management training, and watering costs. (See the following table.)

### Associated Fodder Production Farm

As part of the dairy project, a small-scale irrigated fodder farm would be encouraged. Both dairy unit participants and non-participants would be assisted in setting up and managing a farm which would produce supplementary feed for the dairy herd, and fodder required during the dry seasons when local pastures are

Table 5: Costs and Returns from Sales

Year	Males	Females	Milk/Ghee	Total Income (\$)	Costs	Net Cash Flow (\$)
1	-	-	170,829	170,829	249,300	- 78,471
2	-	-	170,829	170,829	142,660	28,169
3	-	-	170,829	170,829	142,660	28,169
4	13,187	-	214,286	227,473	142,660	84,813
5	26,374	-	254,745	281,119	142,660	138,459
6	42,707	-	310,939	353,646	142,660	210,986
7	112,388	52,650	365,634	530,672	142,660	388,012
8	78,671	-	254,745	333,416	142,660	190,756
9	103,396	-	334,166	437,562	142,660	294,902
10	184,316	52,650	382,118	619,084	142,660	476,424

Costs for First Year in Dollars

Purchase 450 cows	78,670
Drugs	4,500
Supplementary feed	108,000
Training	6,000
Cheese survey	3,000
Watering cows	6,380
Advisory services	1,200
Contingency (20%)	<u>41,550</u>
<b>Total</b>	<b>249,300</b>

exhausted. Non-dairy unit participants would sell their fodder to the dairy unit, while participants would use their fodder to feed their own livestock in the group dairy herd.

#### Timing of Activity

This activity could begin any time after the project gets underway in each district but should only be initiated after interested participants are identified, and some assurance is given of their commitment. It would begin with one dairy unit in one district and if successful, extend to other project districts.

### INFRASTRUCTURE

#### Road Rehabilitation

A meeting with the Director of Planning of the Ministry of Public Works revealed that road construction planned in the northwest is limited to one probable and one possible activity. Probable construction is the World Bank's plan to invest in improving a portion of the Hargeisa -- Burao road. Possible construction is the EEC's interest in funding the existing design for improving the Berbera -- Djibouti highway. The planning director said the World Bank effort might not be implemented before 1989 and the EEC's interest depended on donors in the European Community.

With the near completion of the Hargeisa -- Nabadeed highway segment, no further improvement in the Hargeisa-Boroma-Djibouti road is under current consideration. One reported reason for not continuing road improvement through to Boroma is the security risk involved in construction activities near the Ethiopian border. Therefore plans for improving the 62 km. of road between Nabadeed and Boroma must assume improved diplomatic relations between the two countries.

One major advantage in considering road improvement to Boroma is the existing "shelf" of engineering, economic and environmental studies. The design studies, including detailed drawings and special technical specifications, have been prepared for the project by Renardet - Sauti Consulting Engineers of Rome and reviewed and revised by Dorsch Consult of Munich.

The following basic design revisions are necessary to meet budget limitations and reduce costs per kilometer from \$215,000 for the current 14 km. contract to about \$48,000 per kilometer:

- o Change from an all bituminous surface course to an unpaved surface (compacted natural mix of gravel, sand, and fine material as specified).
- o Apply the minimum standards of the Somali national road system, i.e., build with a 50 cm. sub-base course and a 20 cm. base course (surface course) with a roadway width of six meters and embankment width of eight meters.

A major justification for road improvement is the reduction in vehicle operating costs. In Somalia's case costs such as depreciation, fuel, tires, and spare parts represent a drain on

the country's foreign exchange. Additional road improvement benefits can accrue, such as reduction in accidents, reduction in personal travel time, and reduced deterioration of plant and animal produce. Louis Berger International expects the economic returns of road maintenance improvement to be very high. Based on road studies in Uganda the annual rates of return (road user savings divided by road maintenance costs, excluding initial capital costs) were between 90 and 120 percent.

In terms of assisting refugees settlement, or at least in finding employment outside the camps, the improved road would expedite travel to the major agricultural development area between Hargeisa and Boroma, namely the area of intense land clearing and bunding in the 40 km. between Nabadeed and Gorayacowl.

The Nabadeed-Boroma road improvement could proceed under a CIPL and/or dollar funding on force account by the MPW. Presently the Mission is undertaking a similar gravel road construction project to connect Bur Dhubo and Garbaharey in the Gedo Region and it appears that all construction costs can be met with counterpart funds.

Prior to sub-project implementation the technical assistance of a highway engineer is recommended for two months to assist the MPW Civil Engineering Department in the recalculation of earth-work quantities and minor structural design changes necessary for the downgrading of the road to minimum national standards.

During construction, based on previous UNHCR experience, technical supervision would be needed to confirm work accomplished for payment purposes. This task could be accomplished by the Mission or the REDSO engineering office. However, should the settlement project require engineering technical assistance for other approved sub-projects that engineer could also monitor construction progress and provide some on-site control advice.

Traffic flow on the Nabadeed-Boroma portion of the Boroma-Hargeisa highway is estimated as 300 vehicles per day, according to the SOGREAH study. The road improvement will likely increase average daily traffic, allowing a greater flow of people and produce both to and from the region. Direct benefit to the refugees would be increased reliability of the ration trucks, i.e., fewer breakdowns and more arrivals on schedule. Settlement potential along the highway in the small villages would increase and also the opportunities for small business enterprises. Transportation to and from the agriculturally developing areas would make employment or settlement more feasible.

Approximate cost for the project is \$48,000 per kilometer. The basis for this cost estimate is the ratio of current estimated cost to the original appraised cost for the entire road, \$42,000,000 and \$26,400,000 million respectively, multiplied by the 1983 estimate from REDSO/Engineering.

Actual construction is expected to take 10 months, perhaps a year, based on MPW performance for a UNHCR sponsored road construction project. The time required for contract negotiations,

future equipment availability, and required mobilization time make the pre-construction time period difficult to estimate.

Environmental impacts of the highway rehabilitation are considered to be minimal at both the primary and secondary levels. Erosion, because of the improved road surface and drainage, should be lessened. Population build-up along the route outside the small villages has little reason to change, given the present low population density characteristic of semi-arid regions.

#### Irrigation Efficiency Studies

In the World Bank project briefing reports for the Genale Irrigation System rehabilitation, the irrigation efficiency has been estimated as 20 percent. With irrigation system rehabilitation and improved management a rise in efficiency to 45 percent (60 percent field efficiency and 75 percent conveyance efficiency) is anticipated. The proposed rehabilitation project includes repair of the river diversions and various canal structures, adaptive agricultural research, and other items to improve agricultural output. One million dollars has been advanced for rehabilitation feasibility studies.

However, the limitations of time and the wealth of details involved in an irrigation rehabilitation feasibility study preclude more than cursory attention to irrigation efficiencies.

Irrigation efficiency studies provide the core of physical understanding in an irrigation system evaluation. They also

provide a springboard for investigating some of the irrigation-related social, economic, and management issues involved in rehabilitation. In the specific case of Genale, irrigation efficiency figures based on systematic field measurements, before and after rehabilitation, would provide a more accurate assessment of:

- o The existing water use situation before irrigation system rehabilitation and some idea as to the causes of low efficiencies (a factual baseline).
- o The extent to which irrigation system rehabilitation has improved efficiency with suggestions of possible avenues for furthering and sustaining improvement.

Even without a rehabilitation project the irrigation efficiency study will suggest methods for improved management and provide insight for operating personnel and consequently reduce excessive water use.

Measurement of the flow of water is the central activity of an irrigation efficiency study. For example, the ratio of the measured flow into and out of a canal section determines the conveyance efficiency. Field efficiency determinations are only slightly more complex.

A wide and relatively inexpensive variety of devices is available for measuring flow rates. The simplest, perhaps, is the float method, employing metric measuring tape and stop watch. Slightly more expensive is a water current meter. Finally, calibrated canal cross sections can be permanently or temporarily installed for flow measurement.

The water measurement process for irrigation canals is simple. Local irrigation personnel, who are both literate and numerate, can easily be taught to take and record flow readings. Irrigation personnel from the Ministry of Agriculture can be instructed in data analysis, interpretation and follow-up.

The technical assistance component needed to start the irrigation efficiency study would be about six months of an irrigation engineers' time, if all the required equipment was on hand. This would document baseline conditions for the Genale Irrigation System. Then after rehabilitation is completed, a return of the irrigation engineer is needed to review the study, analyze the results, and make suggestions for improving the irrigation system operation.

Environmental assessment is not at issue because this activity is only a study. However, any factual evaluation of this sort can only benefit the environment by demonstrating where over-irrigation is likely to cause problems of drainage or erosion or extend the habitat for water-borne disease vectors.

### Somali Capabilities

Somali capabilities to provide infrastructure services for future settlement activities are being strengthened through two current projects. The AID-funded Comprehensive Groundwater Development project (CGDP) is providing technical and material support to the Water Development Agency (WDA), an autonomous agency within the Ministry of Mines and Water Resources. WDA is

responsible for all water development programs, in the country, both surface and ground water, with the exception of the major metropolitan centers. The project has recently been extended to June 1986. In addition to WDA, a few private well drilling firms operate in the country and privately constructed cement water catchments are in growing use.

The second project, recently initiated, involves World Bank financed assistance to the Transport Division of the MPW for road maintenance planning and implementation. Thus a strengthened MPW is a possibility for settlement road construction. Another possibility, given serious current deficiencies in the MPW, is the National Construction Agency, a parastatal supervised by the MPW. Little road construction capability appears to exist in the private sector.

#### FOOTNOTE

1. J.M. Haakonsen, A Preliminary Situation Analysis of the Northwest Region, Report presented at the UNICEF Preview Meeting. Mogadishu: UNICEF, 1983, p. 12.

**CHAPTER FIVE**  
**THE SOCIAL CONTEXT OF PRODUCTIVE**  
**SYSTEMS AND RESOURCE TENURE**

**INTRODUCTION**

In Chapter Five, the activities discussed in the previous chapter are placed in their social, political, and economic context. This chapter also fleshes out some of the policy issues discussed in Chapter Two, particularly the land question. Hence, it is divided into the following two sections:

- o Social and productive systems in the northwest; and
- o Resource tenure issues.

The first section deals primarily with social and economic conditions in the northwest, particularly as they affect both the local population and refugees. In the second section, which draws much of its material from the south, access to and control over resources, but particularly land, are discussed in some detail. This is an extremely important part of the report since it questions the basic premise on which the proposed refugee settlement policy is based, i.e., the availability of suitable land for settlement.

SOCIAL AND PRODUCTIVE SYSTEMS  
IN THE NORTHWEST

Historical Background

The northwest region of Somalia, until recently administered as one unit termed Woqooyi Galbeed or North West Region, has long been part of the larger cultural and geographic unit extending into what is now the Harar Province of Ethiopia, the Ogaden. In the 10th century immigrant Arabs established themselves at the ancient port of Zeila in the extreme northwest, which by the 15th century had become the center of the Muslim and Somali state of Awdal -- from which the newly-created region of Awdal derives its name. The center of power shifted to the town of Harar, from which the Muslim leader Imaan Ahmad ibn Ibrahim al-Ghaazi (the "Left Handed") conquered the Christian state of Abyssinia in the 15th century, with support from several Somali clans in the region.

By the 16th century, Awdal's influence has declined with the resurgence of Abyssinian power in the region, but Harar remained "a traditional seat of [Somali] Muslim culture [which even] today under Ethiopian rule [enjoys] a reputation throughout Somaliland as a centre of Muslim scholarship and learning"[1]. Harar's role as a political, cultural and religious focal point for north-western Somalia is vividly portayed by Richard Burton, in his account of a journey from Zeila to Harar in the 1850's, in his First Footsteps in East Africa.

From the 19th Century onwards, the northwest region, particularly the coastal zone, came under various foreign influence, including Mecca, Oman, Egypt, France, Britain, Italy and until independence in 1960, Britain again. This latter influence period of British administration was the most lengthy, beginning with the establishment of a livestock supply point at Berbera to provision the garrison at Aden, cemented by treaties with the major clans in the area, and culminating in the imposition of British Protectorate administration over the entire northern zone at the end of the 19th century.


Competition between the European imperial powers, in the latter part of the 19th century, for control over Ethiopia resulted in an agreement between Britain and the Ethiopian Emperor Menelik, which was to have far-reaching repercussions for the Somali people. This was the recognition of Ethiopian sovereignty over the Ogaden, following Menelik's conquest of Harar. The Ogaden area contained the main grazing area of clans based in British Somaliland, as well as being the traditional home of the Ogaden clan itself, a numerous and important division of one of the five major Somali clan families, the Darod. (See Map 4 and Figure 1). This agreement was never recognized by Somalis on either side of the "provisional administrative boundary" demarcating the Ogaden from the British and Italian borders of Somalia.

During the first part of this century, a protracted struggle to reunify Somali grazing lands and drive out both British and Ethiopian rule was waged under the leadership of Sayyid Mohamed



Map 4: Map of Somalia

Figure 1: Somali Clan Families: Major Clans and Sub-Clans in the Northwest and Ogaden



Abdille Hassan, an Ogaderi, and a Somali cultural hero. Ethiopian jurisdiction over the Ogaden was not formally recognized until 1954, but the recovery of the area, known by Somalis as "Western Somaliland," has remained a national issue. This was most recently expressed in the 1977-1978 wars between Ethiopia and Somalia which resulted in the massive influx of refugees from Ethiopia. The vast majority of refugees now in the northwest are ethnic Somalis from Harar area and the Ogaden. (See Table 6).

#### Socio-Political Organization

The peoples of the Northwest Region and their neighboring fellow Somalis in Harar Province belong to several different clan-family groups which traditionally controlled and often fought over the land. The area included in the northwest regions of Somalia is inhabited by members of the Gadabursi, Isaac, and Esa clans who claim descent through from the major clan-family known as Dir. However, the grazing lands of the Isaac clans extend far into the Haud zone, a part of northern Ogaden Harar Province. The Haud is described by Lewis as follows: "Although it lacks permanent water, this region is perhaps the most important pasture-land of the north"[2].

The Gadabursi occupy the relatively higher rainfall area of the west, around Boroma, extending into the Ethiopian-ruled areas of Jiggiga. A 1945 British report notes that "when the boundaries of British Somaliland were fixed with Ethiopia the best grazing lands of this tribe came within the Ethiopian sphere

Table 6: Refugees' Area of Origin in EthiopiaPercentage Distribution by Area of Origin

Camp	Jigjiga	Harar	Dagabur	Other Ogaden	Bale or Sidamo	Percent Oromo	Total
Dare Maa'an	86	15	-	-	-	-	100
Dam Camp	34	17	32	17	-	(5)	100
Cadi Cadeys	33	23	33	11	-	-	100
Gaba'aad	34	20	31	13	2	(2)	100

Source: UNHCR, 1982

of influence....." The Esa likewise are split between national boundaries, in this case Djibouti, Ethiopia and the extreme west of northern Somalia. They share a common ancestor with the Gadabursi, their neighbours to the east.

To the south, within Harar Province, the Ogaden clan predominates. This is a major branch of the Darod clan-family, as distinct from the Dir clan-family, to whom the Isaac, Esa and Gadabursi clans are affiliated. The Darod are the largest and most widely-distributed clan family, extending into northeastern Kenya, represented by the Ogaden, and subdivided into several major sub-groups dominating northeastern Somalia.

Estimates of clan populations in the 1950's indicate that in the northwest, the Isaac clan members considerably outnumber the Gadabursi and Esa clans; sub-clans of the Isaac, Habr Awal, Habr Yunis, Habr Tojalla, and Eidagalla occupy Hargeisa and Berbera districts, while relying on the Haud wet-season grazing zones in northern Ethiopia. The Gadabursi are located in the districts of Gebiley, Boroma and Lughaya, until recently part of the Northwest Region, while the Esa are found in Seyla (Zeila) District. It is believed that the new Awdal Region will incorporate the districts of Gebiley, Boroma, Lughaya, and Seyla.

One would be mistaken in assuming that, either now or in the past, these various clans exercised formal or even strict control over land. As one modern anthropologist has remarked, with reference to the northwest:

Although the mentioning of clan names has long been outlawed by the present government, clan identification continues to be of crucial importance to most individuals, perhaps more so in the north than in the south. Traditional clan-conflicts over a range of issues ranging from grazing rights to disputes between two individuals from different clans are still to a large extent settled through negotiations between clans, and the tribal elders still play an essential role, at times leading to friction between themselves and political leaders and government officials. The great difference between them is that while a government administrator's authority is limited to a specific geographic location, e.g. a region or a district, the clan leader's authority on certain issues may extend across districts or regions, or even across national boundaries if his clan is settled on both sides of for instance the Somali-Ethiopian border"[3].

To a large degree, effective control over grazing land was in the past determined by lineage or clan numerical superiority rather than by negotiation, as described by the anthropologist I.M. Lewis:

In general there are no political units whose membership reflects territorial allegiances... In conformity with [the] shifting system of movement and lack of absolute ties to locality, lineages are not based primarily on land-holding... In Somali lineage politics the assumption that might is right has overwhelming authority..... Political status is thus maintained by feud and war.... With this political philosophy it is hardly surprising that fighting in northern Somaliland is a political institution of everyday life"[4].

The institution of national government following independence and the revolution of 1969 have curtailed intensive clan/lineage belligerence as a means of resolving disputes over land, water and property. Mediation and negotiation, involving not only respected clan elders but also government-appointed officials, are now the accepted methods of solving disputes. Access to land can no longer be claimed and protected by a lineage or clan. Nevertheless, the twin principles of effective

occupancy and rights based on customary usage remain as entrenched in the northwest as they do in other parts of Somalia.

### Economic Systems

The systems of production in the northwest area consist of nomadic pastoralism, sedentary agro-pastoralism and irrigated agriculture. Two other economic activities of considerable importance are small and large scale trading in the towns and labor migration to the Gulf states. The regional economy is based on livestock production for both domestic and export purposes, remittances from labor migrants and lastly trading. Exact statistics on the relative contribution that each of these activities makes to the regional economy as a whole are not generally available. Even if they were, they would probably not be very reliable, since much trading and remittance activity operates outside of official channels. Informed reports indicate that livestock raising is still the major source of income for perhaps the majority of people. It is suggested that irrigated horticulture/agriculture is currently a "boom" activity and that trading and remittances provide an increasingly significant source of income in the region.

In discussing each of these activities, it should be emphasized that the Somali extended family unit typically is involved in several activities at the same time, though the location of each of these activities may be widely distanced from each other. This is an adaptive strategy that permits different family members to exploit a variety of economic niches in an

effort to minimize risk. In the process, most families depend on several income sources by participating in several activities. Thus through the extended kinship system, town dwellers obtain income from livestock kept by their rural kin; nomadic families maintain urban connections by marketing their livestock and occasionally engaging in wage employment, including migration to the Gulf states. Farmers also keep livestock and livestock-keepers are involved in farming in good rainfall years. The refugee population appears to be no exception to this rule, to the extent that refugee families have been able to participate in the economy. Bereft of much of their herds, and unable often to gain access to farm land, refugees have taken up trading, urban wage employment which includes migration to the Gulf, and agricultural employment, in a diversified income-generating strategy.

The region's principle economic activity, pastoralism, is organized around the seasonal exploitation of different eco-zones in a transhumance system. Herds of sheep, goats and camels are moved between the coastal zone (Guban) up into the central highlands (Ogo) and far into the Haud plains in Ethiopia, according to the seasonal availability of pastures and water. In the dry seasons, herders and their livestock concentrate around the permanent "home wells" of the highlands, dispersing south into the Haud with the spring rains. On the coastal plains, herds are moved up into the Ogo highlands with the spring rains, to occupy the areas temporarily vacated by the movement from the highlands into the Haud. (See Figure 2).

Figure 2 Seasonal, Social and Geographical Patterns of Livestock Production, Northwest Region

Month	Season	Climate	Productive Activities	Movements between zones	Social Groups
April	jilaal/gu	hot period	watering livestock ceases, animals start moving to southern pastures	Ogo to N. Haud	Families move from highlands to southern plains, young men herd camels, women, children and older men tend smallstock ( <u>adi</u> ).
May	gu	main rains in Haud and highlands	herds graze on fresh pastures, water in surface pools	1) northern to southern Haud 2) Guban to Ogo	Temporary settlements around Haud oases, coastal groups move north to Ogo highlands.
June	gu	rains tailing off, S.W. Monsoon rising	herds grazing, watering from tanks and trucks	1) Haud 2) Ogo	
July	gu/hagaa	very hot, dry	camels graze far out in Haud, smallstock around waterpoints	1) Haud 2) Ogo	
August	hagaa	rain on high plateau, dry elsewhere	All small stock start to move back north to dry-season wells; camels stay far out	Haud to Ogo	central and southern-based clans mingle with coastal groups, still on Ogo
Sept.	hagaa	hot, sporadic showers on highland	crops harvested	1) Ogo 2) Ogo to Guban	coastal-based groups in Ogo move back to coast.

Month	Season	Climate	Productive Activities	Movements between zones	Social Groups
Oct.	hagaa/dayr	N.E.Monsoon, rain heaviest on coast	Livestock move away from wells to Haud and to coast	1) Ogo to Haud 2) Ogo to Guban	
Nov.	dayr	rain ceases	livestock grazing away from wells	1) Haud 2) Guban	
Dec.	dayr/ jilaal	dry season begins, some showers on coast	camels watered from trucks and tanks in Haud smallstock watered from homewells	1) Ogo 2) Guban	central groups concentrated on highlands, using "home wells". Young men herding camels in Haud
Jan.	jilaal	1) dry, harsh conditions on highlands: 2) main rains on coast	Livestock herds most widely disbursed; camels still south, smallstock in north	1) Ogo 2) Guban	coastal groups concentrated at coast
Feb.	jilaal	dry	as above	1) Ogo 2) Guban	young men still with camels in Haud
March	jilaal	dry, hot	most livestock close to wells	1) Ogo 2) Guban	People and stock concentrated around homewells

Water sources for livestock vary within each topographical zone. On the coastal plains, shallow sand-wells are dug into the tug and, being easily maintained, exclusive rights of use are rarely upheld. In the Ogo highlands, water is obtained in the dry seasons from deeper wells which, requiring more labor to develop, are usually claimed by specific groups. Within the Haud, livestock are watered in the rainy season from surface pools and when these dry up, from cement-lined reservoirs (birked) or with water trucked in from the northern areas. Water tanks and trucks are often owned by large livestock traders, which permits them to concentrate livestock at accessible points for movement to the ports.

Although the livestock sector in the northwest is highly commercialized, it also provides subsistence income to pastoralists, principally in the form of milk. The livestock industry is vertically integrated and controlled by a small group of livestock exporters (ganacsatada). These exporters depend for their livestock supply upon small-scale local traders (gedisley or bayac mushtar) who purchase animals from producers and resell them to their agents. Livestock are then exported live from the port of Berbera to the Gulf states, mainly Saudi Arabia.

In 1983, the last year for which figures are available, a total of over one million sheep and goats, 30,000 cattle, and 3,300 camels were exported from Berbera, earning an estimated \$80,000,000 in foreign exchange[5]. Saudi bans on the import of Somali cattle, sheep, and goats, introduced that same year,

drastically reduced livestock exports from this region. However, current and planned improvements in veterinary services are expected to meet Saudi Arabian animal health requirements and revitalize the export market. (USAID's new Livestock Marketing and Health Project will include this region).

Dryland farming is practiced in the higher rainfall areas of the southwest part of the region, which is ecologically and culturally linked to the Harar-Jigjiga upland agricultural area of Ethiopia. The use of plows is widespread, in contrast with other agricultural areas of Somalia where the hoe is used. Bunding on sloped ground, in order to conserve rainfall and prevent erosion, has been practiced for some time and is being promoted by the World Bank North West Agricultural Project. The principal crops grown are sorghum and maize. Until 1983, qat, a mild stimulant, was grown as a cash crop. Its cultivation, however, has been banned by the government, with obvious consequences for farm family income. Farming families also typically hold livestock such as cattle, sheep, goats, and camels. Larger herds are tended by kin as part of the trans-humance cycle previously described, while small milch herds are kept close to the farmlands, fed on grain stubble, chaff, and local pasture.

Irrigated farming and horticulture have become increasingly popular in the last decade. Three factors may account for this trend which began in the mid 1970's: first, availability of capital acquired by migration to the Gulf states, which expanded during the 1970's due to the lifting of government restrictions;

second, the 1975 changes in the agrarian land law, which introduced land registration under a lease arrangement and thus encouraged capital investment on the land, since security of tenure was guaranteed by the state; and third, the influx of refugees from the Ethiopian highlands who brought with them skills and experience in irrigated horticulture, and could be hired as laborers or farm managers.

The irrigated farms are usually located along semi-annual river valleys or tugs and draw their water from pumped wells, that cost from between SoSh 30,000--200,000 to install. Crops grown include citrus, papaya, guava, tomatoes, cabbage and melons. The farms are usually owned by prosperous local traders and businessmen, some of whom regard the venture as speculative but who nevertheless have excess capital which they are willing to risk.

Trading, whether legal or illegal, is a major source of income in the region. Trading activities range from small-scale marketing of agricultural and livestock produce such as vegetables and milk, to the profitable but often illegal import-export business, which includes but is by no means limited to livestock trading. A lively trade exists between the region and neighboring Djibouti, as well as with the Gulf states. Imported goods are available in the Hargeisa market place which are rarely found in Mogadishu. Haakonsen has noted that trading is "to a

large extent controlled by women. This applies not only to petty market trade, but also to the lucrative long-distance trade that may involve millions of shillings per transaction"[6].

Finally, labor migration to the Gulf states has become an important source of income for inhabitants of the region. According to the SOGREAH survey, more than one quarter of family income comes from wages earned abroad. Remittances may account for as much as \$53,000,000 annually in this region and a number of observers refer to the northwest as a "remittance economy"[7]. The peoples of this region have long been part of what has been described as "a vast, monetarized trading network connecting Ethiopia and the Arabian peninsula"[8]. In the 1950's, the same author remarked how nomads who had worked for years overseas would "return to invest their savings in larger flocks of sheep and goats, and larger herds of camels"[9]. Investment of remittances has expanded to include business, irrigated farms, speculative urban house construction, restaurants and development of water tanks. Refugees, as well as locals, are involved in labor migration. It is said to be relatively easy for refugee men to obtain the necessary Somali passport required for a visa to the Gulf states. The extent to which refugees have sought employment abroad is, however, impossible to gauge.

In summary, both local and refugee populations in the northwest participate in a variety of economic sectors and activities. The SOGREAH study suggests that only 11.5 percent of families in the northwest region derive their income solely from livestock; 20 percent of families depend on combined nomadic

livestock rearing, town-based activities and/or small-scale agriculture; 38 percent of families gain their income primarily from urban employment; and 28 percent of families depend solely upon migration remittances. Among the refugee population living in camps, there is a similar pattern of mixed activities, though on a much smaller scale and involving fewer families, as Tables 7 through 10 indicate. The extent of economic participation by refugees is undoubtedly underestimated in these data, but until further results are obtained from the NRC "Invisible Refugee Study" which includes Hargeisa, there is little information available on refugee economic activities in the northwest region.

#### SUMMARY DATA ON REFUGEE CAMP POPULATIONS

##### NORTHWEST REGION

#### Introduction

These data are derived from the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) report entitled Socio-Economic Survey of the Refugee Population in Somalia, 1982, Mogadishu. This was a stratified sample survey of approximately 6,500 refugee households distributed in the refugee camps of the four regions where camps have been established. The results of this survey were not widely distributed, perhaps because the survey sample size was based on the 1981 estimated number of refugees in camps, which was later revised downwards to 700,000. However, the compilers of the survey noted in regard to the discrepancy between their higher population estimate and the subsequent agreed-upon camp

Table 7 : Refugees' Previous Major Occupation and Livestock Ownership\*

Camp	<u>Major Occupation</u>			% Owned Livestock	% Farm
	% Farmers	% Pastoralists	% Towndwellers		
Dare Maa'an	79	16	5	100	97
Dam Camp	42	43	15	50	82
Cadi Caddeys	47	47	7	80	67
Saba'aad	48	46	6	69	75

Source: UNHCR, 1982

\* The distinction between "farmer", "pastoralist" and "towndweller" is not always clear, as many families are agro-pastoralists and urban families also may own livestock and practice farming. This overlap is indicated by the data on livestock ownership whether farmed, (last 2 columns above). As the UNHCR report comments on the question asked regarding occupation by sector: "This proved to be more complex than was anticipated. The pastoralists settled as farmers during certain periods and then moved on with their livestock during others. The hardcore farmers and towndwellers .... also moved at times to look after their stocks themselves". (UNHCR 1982, p.26).

Table 8 : Previous Agricultural Activities of Refugees\*  
Percentage Distribution

Camp	Grains only	Grains/Veg. only Veg.	Grain and/or veg. plus coffee	Total %	
Dare Maa'an	54	34	3	8	100
Dam Camp	55	24	-	20	100
Cadi Caddeys	59	32	-	8	100
Saba'aad	59	22	8	11	100

Source: UNHCR, 1982

\* In Dare Maa'an, 92 percent of households had farmed, in Dam 82 percent, in Cadi Caddeys 67 percent, and in Saba'aad 75 percent.

Table 9 : Current Economic Participation of Refugees

Camp	Males		Females	
	Cash earning	In-kind earning	Cash earning	In-kind earning
Dare Maa'an	20	15	9	9
Dam Camp	5	7	7	7
Cadi Caddeys	13	0	26	0
Saba'aad	2	0	1	0

Source: UNHCR, 1982

Table:10 Percentage Distribution of Refugees by Age and Sex.

<u>Camp</u>	<u>0-9 yrs</u>	<u>10-19 yrs</u>	<u>20-34 yrs</u>	<u>35-54 yrs</u>	<u>55+ yrs</u>	<u>Total</u>
Dare Maa'an						
% Males	37	29	9	17	9	100
% Females	30	23	18	22	7	100
Ratio of Male to female adults	= 65:100					
Dam' Camp						
% Males	39	37	12	7	5	100
% Females	38	32	14	11	5	100
Ratio of male to female adults	= 94:100					
Cadi Cadeys						
% Males	33	46	12	6	6	100
% Females	41	18	21	15	6	100
Ratio of male to female adults	= 68:100					
Sabaa'ad						
% Males	39	33	13	9	6	100
% Females	36	34	14	9	7	100
Ratio of male to female	= 93:100					

Source: UNHCR, Socio-Economic Survey of the Refugee Population in Somalia, Mogadishu, 1982

population that: "the impact of [the NRC refugee population figure] would be to inflate the size of the household sample to be interviewed and increase sampling precision." Since the survey methodology was based on a sampling fraction proportional to the assumed population of refugee camp residents, which was later found to be too high, the relative proportions may be reasonably assumed not to have been greatly affected. For this reason, no population numbers are presented in the summary data below, which give only percentage distributions.

Four refugee camps in the Northwest Region were selected by the sample. These are: Dare Maar, Dam, Cadi Caddeys and Saba'aad. Summarized below are some of the demographic and economic characteristics of these camp populations, disaggregated by each camp. The original data sets are presented in raw form, in the UNHCR report, Vol. III.

## RESOURCE TENURE ISSUES

### Introduction

The purpose of this section is to clarify the implications of contemporary natural resource tenure systems for rural and agricultural development in Somalia. The resources with which it is concerned include arable land, water, and pasture. Access to these natural resources is governed by both traditional (local) and modern (national) institutions. On many points these old and new institutions contradict one another. Conflicts generated by individual and group competition for access to resources and by

these institutional contradictions are resolved through a highly politicized process of mediation and negotiation within the administration, rather than by reference to custom or to law alone. Patterns of resource acquisition and accumulation and the ways they change in response to altering economic, political and demographic conditions must be understood in terms of these processes. The scope of analysis is thus unusually broad.

Information about resource tenure in contemporary Somalia is difficult to obtain. There has been no cadastral survey. The land registration process lacks integrity and records are unreliable. Few in-depth micro studies have been carried out in Somalia in comparison with other African nations and fewer still deal with resource tenure. Older Italian studies are useful but dated.

Gathering information about local tenure systems is difficult because it is illegal for Somalis to discuss their traditional clan organization on which these systems rest. Information about the process of land registration is sensitive because it is a political process, involving influential individuals and powerful interest groups, which does not always conform with law, policy or ideology.

This report is based on a review of the available literature and interviews with government officials, social scientists, members of the foreign assistance community, and private

citizens. Because of the time constraints it was not possible to cover all sources of information or all issues evenly. If further work is carried out on land tenure problems in Somalia it will be necessary to further clarify the role of the Ministry of the Interior, the Cooperatives Bureau, and the Ministry of Justice. Most importantly, there is an urgent need for interviews with district commissioners, regional governors, agricultural coordinators, and farmers.

In view of the above this analysis should be viewed as a preliminary attempt to identify resource tenure issues as they are likely to affect the course of rural development and in particular, refugee settlement in Somalia. Further clarification of these issues is needed if planners are to take realistic account of the way interest in land and water shape the incentives and investments of individuals and groups.

#### TRADITIONAL RESOURCE TENURE[10]

Regional variations in traditional resource tenure correspond quite closely with variations in the systems of production through which people gain their livelihood. For purposes of this analysis it is useful to distinguish three systems: pastoral, agro-pastoral, riverine. It should be remembered that in reality these systems merge into one another geographically and that both individuals and groups often participate in more than one system of production.

### Pastoral Systems of Production

Somali pastoral systems are based on the exploitation of widely scattered, sporadic pastures and access to natural and man-made water sources. They are utilized by kin-based households and closely related clusters of households. These "extended family" groups exploit their ephemeral pasture and water resources and minimize subsistence risk by dividing their herds of camels, sheep, and goats into several management units. Each unit is entrusted to individuals or small groups and is grazed and watered according to its species-specific requirements and the geographic availability of pasture, browse and water.

The pastoralists' ability to identify usable grazing resources spread over vast territories is impressive. More important, they have adopted forms of social organization well suited to their needs. Each "management unit" has considerable autonomy and responsibility and is required to respond quickly to environmental conditions. At the same time, the larger extended family serves to allocate resources to the smaller management units and provides for pooling of risks through some reallocation of herds and consumption in response to losses.

Extended families enjoy access to the natural resources they require in virtue of their membership in shallow patrilineal lineages which, in turn, are united with territorially adjacent lineages by written contract (heer). The corporation of associated lineages thus formed, referred to in the ethnographic literature as a dia-paying group, may comprise from 200 to 5,000

or more men. The dia-paying group is no longer sanctioned by civil law but nevertheless continues to function in rural areas.

Larger, territorially affiliated, political groups comprising perhaps 100,000 people are formed by contractual alliances between adjacent dia-paying groups. Intergroup relationships within and between these alliances are conceptualized in terms of patrilineal descent. This complex is usually referred to as the clan system. At the highest level six clan families are recognized. (See Figure 1).

The dia-paying group has several functions. The contract establishes the way the burden of paying compensation for homicide committed by a group member is distributed. The group also serves as a mutual aid mechanism in time of emergency. Under the guidance of the council of elders who govern it, the group can establish regulations and apply forceful sanctions if they are broken. From the perspective of this analysis the significance of the dia-paying group is that it was, and to some extent still is, the group that guarantees security and protects property for the individual.

While access to pasture is essential, access to range water is critical and, along with labor, is the limiting factor in livestock production. Hence is not surprising that, although political alliances were associated with particular territories, access to pasture land was -- in principle -- open to all Somalis. Watering points in the form of hand dug wells, by contrast, "belong" to the men who construct and maintain them.

The situation is more complex than this statement would imply, for a lineage's ownership or primary rights of access are not necessarily recognized by other groups. As Kaplan, relying on Lewis, succinctly notes:

There is a good deal of disagreement over the possession of the water sources, which are essential to the survival of the flocks. It has always been necessary for a lineage to be able to support its claims with real or potential force. Relations between groups and individuals are therefore suffused with the notion of relative power, defined largely in martial terms.

Armed conflict would probably have been constant if it had not been for the existence of dia-paying groups, which made peaceful settling of disputes possible in a competitive environment[11].

#### Agro-pastoral Systems of Production

Somalia's agro-pastoral production system is practiced mainly in the interriverine area between the Juba and Shabelle rivers by families who appear to have begun settling the region between the 11th and the 14th centuries[12]. The preferred extended family production system is agro-pastoral, characterized by a high degree of decentralized but well coordinated integration of cultivation and livestock production. Summarizing earlier investigations, Lewis writes:

Many of the clansmen in this area between the rivers practice a dual economy. Indeed the most fortunate not only possess several fields in different places which enable them to profit from the unequal seasonal distribution of rain, but also sheep and goats, and herds of camels and cattle. In these circumstances the head of the family often spends most of his time in his cultivating village where at least one of his wives is settled with her children, while another wife and her children live as nomads with the flocks and some camels and cattle. A third wife may move with the main cattle herd[13].

The farming members of kin groups live in permanent hamlets close to the land with the highest potential for cultivation[14]. In such areas the arable farming system is long established, stable, and well adapted to the agro-ecological environment.

Access to pastureland on the open range is available to all households. Wells and reservoirs (waro), which are more critical than pasture, are owned by the individual or family that constructs and maintains them. Herd owners can obtain the right to water their stock on a set schedule through an agreement with the well owner, which establishes the rate of payment according to the kinds and number of livestock involved. Access to wells can also be secured through agreements that give the well owner seasonal access to the herd-owner's farmland stubble for his own livestock.

A household's access to arable land in a particular locality may be held by virtue of its affiliation with the local lineage of their dia-paying group. These groups thus constitute a kind of corporation in which all members are shareholders, while the chiefs and elders serve as officers. Every clan member, in principle, has the right to cultivate some land, provided he fulfills his clan obligations. He is not, however, guaranteed access to an equal share of land in terms of either quality or location. Individuals hold demarcated parcels of land or fields. These individually held plots are inherited through the male line, though they may be worked jointly by the heirs.

But access to arable land can also be obtained more directly. There is mounting evidence to indicate that, although in theory illegal, arable land is increasingly being bought and sold in this interriverine area.

In the past, uncleared land with arable potential does not appear to have been scarce. Transfers of this type of land between clansmen seem to have been permissible. Land transfers to outsiders were permitted only if they were willing to become subordinate clients to the owning clan. Today sales of uncleared land are also increasing on a basis that is not clear.

Access to village wells and reservoirs is open to households that agree to contribute to their construction and maintenance. Each water users' association has a water committee, responsible for regulating water use and establishing a maintenance schedule. The committee also appoints water guards who enforce the rules and make sure that only association members use the water when it is scarce.

Formerly the clan-based system of dia-paying groups provided the widest framework for resource control and management. As in purely pastoral areas, individual households and extended families had rights of access to pasture, arable land and natural water sources in virtue of their membership in, or contractual arrangement with, a corporate dia-paying group. Their ability to exercise these rights was contingent on their acceptance of the obligations of membership, of which the most important were the

following: the obligation to participate in collective responsibility and blood payments for killing, the defence of the group's resources against other groups, and the contribution of labor to develop and maintain the group's dry season water ponds and wells. It is not clear to what extent the clan system is still intact.

### Riverine Systems of Production

The riverine peoples are to some extent distinct from one another and from other inhabitants of the area. Groups found along the lower portion of both rivers are the descendants of slaves brought from Kenya and Zanzibar prior to the suppression of slavery. Many of them speak Swahili and are less well integrated culturally, socially and religiously into the dominant Somali society than other groups. Groups found along the upper Shabelli are evidently of part Bantu and Galla origins, but they are linguistically and culturally closely allied with their ethnic Somali neighbors. Both groups have few livestock because of tsetse infestation and subsist largely on the cultivation of mixed crops raised on fields adjacent to their permanent settlements to which they bring the flood waters of the river through irrigation channels.

In the mid-19th century production in the lower Shabelli region was based on slave labor and partially oriented to the export of sesame, cotton, grains, and organic dyes[15]. In the present century much of the high quality land along the rivers, upwards of 35,000 ha., has been appropriated (as described

below). Further development in this region, including the settlement of additional refugees, will undoubtedly further affect the lives and opportunities of these groups.

#### CHANGES IN RESOURCE TENURE PRIOR TO 1975

##### Political, Economic, and Legal Changes

Changes in both the law and in the process through which resources are allocated must be understood against major political, economic, and technical changes that have taken place in Somalia since the turn of the century. Successive governments, colonial and independent, have attempted to substitute their central authority for the decentralized authority of the clan system. Both British and Italian administrators sought to modify the clan system to suit their needs and thereby reduce its influence and political control.

Even before independence Somali intellectuals educated in the Islamic tradition deplored the divisiveness of the clan system and demanded that relations between groups be based on universalistic Islamic principles. In 1956 the Legislative Assembly made it illegal for political parties to have the names of clans. In 1960, the assembly of the Trust Territory of Somaliland passed a law abolishing the status of client and guaranteeing each citizen the right to live and farm wherever he chose, regardless of clan affiliation.

After the 1969 revolution, the attack on the clan system was renewed by Somalia's socialist leaders who saw in it and other traditional divisions of society the bulwarks of social and economic inequality. The use of clan names was made illegal and an attempt was made to substitute the term jalle (comrade) for kin terms of address. In settled villages the government has asserted its right to appoint village chiefs, though in practice it is often expedient to appoint individuals with traditional legitimacy and influence.

At the same time that these political developments were eroding the clan system that regulated access to land and water, economic and technical changes were increasing the value of these natural resources. In the north, the livestock trade to the Gulf states increased exponentially. By the mid-1960's the enclosure of dry season pasture along commercial trekking routes was causing conflict. In response to these same economic opportunities, enterprising households in the north began to construct cement tank reservoirs that enabled them to increase and concentrate their livestock production. In spite of customary sentiments that water be shared with kinsmen, the sale of water to them soon became the norm.

From 1908 onward, irrigable land in the south along the Shabelli was appropriated for concessionary agricultural development to help pay the costs of Italian colonial administration. Large tracts of the best riverine land were acquired for the large scale, private production of bananas, citrus, and sugar.

In some cases clan elders of local land-using groups were given compensation. More recently it is reported that "compensation has only rarely been paid or sought, with the populace 'content' to profit from the labor opportunities and increased circulation of wealth which the projects offer"[16]. After the Second World War this trend continued. By 1965 there were 147 Somali owned and 200 Italian held banana plantations, averaging 308 hectares each of which 51 hectares were planted.

In the interriverine agro-pastoral zone the improvement of transport and commercialization of agriculture occurred more slowly. Nevertheless grain and livestock exports increased -- as did the sale of agricultural land.

### Legislation

After independence, legislation in the late 1960's gave district commissioners authority to grant 99 year leases to qualified applicants, a move which contributed to the enclosure movement in the northwest[17]. Law No. 40, passed in 1973, provided for the promotion of cooperatives and the development campaign of the early seventies called for the establishment of hundreds of cooperatives for both farmers and pastoralists. Administrative responsibility for transforming the traditional subsistence sector was initially under the Ministry of Agriculture (MOA) but was later shifted to a bureau in the ruling party. In 1975, the President announced that women were to have equal inheritance rights to land, triggering a protest by some conservative Islamic leaders.

## THE PRESENT SITUATION

The Land Tenure Law of 1975

The legal basis of land tenure in Somalia today is Law No 73 of 1975, as interpreted in the Interpretation of Law No 73: Agricultural Farms of October 16, 1976. The law, in keeping with the constitution, declares that all land is owned by the state and that the MDA has the responsibility for the administration of the land. In this capacity, the ministry has the authority to issue leases to cooperatives, state farms, private agencies, local governments, and private farmers. With the exception of cooperatives, all land owned prior to 1969 was supposed to be re-registered within six months.

Individual persons or families can register only one piece of land and their leases are for 50 years but are renewable. (Originally the lease was for only 10 years). In the case of cooperatives, state farms, independent agencies and local governments, however, leases are for an indefinite period.

Private holdings are limited to 30 ha. of irrigated or 60 ha. of non-irrigated land. Private banana plantations may extend up to 100 ha. Land in excess of this limit is to be nationalized after two years. The holdings of cooperatives, state farms, and private and public companies, however, are not subject to such limitations. At the discretion of the MDA they can be considerably larger.

The private leaseholder has the right to cultivate the land, build on it, keep livestock, receive extension services, get credit from state banks equivalent to the value of the land, and transfer profits to foreign banks if the State Bank gives permission. In addition, the leaseholder must develop the land within two years and pay taxes or the land will be confiscated and returned to the state. Most importantly, the leaseholder may not sell, rent, or subdivide the land or break any condition of the lease on penalty of losing it. The lease may be inherited by close kinsmen, provided that they notify the registry and cultivate the land.

Other sections of the Interpretation establish a schedule of land taxation, conditions under which private and national companies can obtain land, conditions under which land can be nationalized and re-distributed, and the process to be followed in registering land.

Perhaps the most striking feature of the Land Tenure Law is that it gives no recognition whatsoever to customary rules and procedures or to the indigenous institutions that still largely govern access to land and pasture. Pastoralists in particular are given no tenorial rights despite the fact that they constitute 60 percent of the population and generate nearly 90 percent of exports.

The provision that land revert to the state if uncultivated for more than two years reveals a policy bias towards permanent cultivation and, in the case of previously uncleared land,

towards mechanization since there is an endemic shortage of agricultural labor in Somalia. Furthermore, the law reveals an explicit bias against open range pastoralism in favor of permanent settlement of land. In effect, the pasture rights of the nomads conflict with the government policy of registering farm land for settled agriculture.

The law also favors cooperatives, state farms, parastatals and corporate agricultural enterprises over private individuals, in terms of the size of holdings permitted, the length of lease granted, and access to machinery and credit.

Finally, it is evident, in light of other countries' experience with land reform, that insufficient attention has been given to the problems of registration. Land registration is difficult at best. In the case of Somalia, where most land has been neither surveyed nor registered, the task is staggering. Yet the MOA was assigned the tasks of registration and land administration, with little attention to how these tasks might be carried out. The responsibilities assigned to the district level representative of the ministry were particularly problematic for it is at this level that the conflict between the new law and traditional tenure must be resolved.

#### The Process of Land Registration

Under the authority given to it, the MOA has established formal procedures for registering land. These are the same

regardless of whether the lease is being sought by a farmer who already cultivates the land by traditional right or someone seeking to obtain "unused" land.

According to the procedures the applicant must first file his application for a lease with the District Agricultural Coordinator (DAC). The DAC, together with someone from the district police, should go and view the land, measure it, determine whose lands adjoin it, assess its present use and agricultural potential, and find out from the community elders and headman whether anyone other than the applicant claims the land.

The DAC then prepares copies of a notice to be posted at four different places: in the village where the land is located, at the district police station, at the district governor's office, and at the DAC's own office. If no objections are lodged during a 30 day period, the DAC prepares four copies of the layout of the land as well as the accompanying documents. These must be circulated to the police superintendent and the district commissioner, each of whom must review them and prepare an endorsement of concurrence, which is then added to the file. Needless to say, this procedure discriminates heavily against those who are either illiterate, nomadic, or both.

The DAC files one set of documents and forwards the other three sets to the Regional Agricultural Coordinator (RAC). The latter checks with other regional authorities to make sure that there are no conflicting plans for the use of the land, registers the application, keeps one set and sends the others to the MDA in

Mogadishu. There the process is repeated once again to check for conflicting claims for the use of the land. If all is well, the Director of Lands checks the papers, signs them, and forwards them for approval to the minister himself. The signed original lease is returned to the successful applicant who must develop the land within two years. The ministry keeps the application file and maintains a list by district showing the name of the leaseholder and the amount, location and classification of the land. There is, however, no land map and no way of knowing how much land in a particular district has been leased.

In practice, there have been many problems in carrying out land registration. DAC's are poorly trained for their exacting work. The complex and time-consuming procedures required by registration are often bypassed and leases are issued on the basis of a "desk top" survey instead of a field investigation. It is generally accepted that personal connections and unofficial gratuities are essential for obtaining a lease.

Government officials say that manipulation of the registration process by traditional community leaders and merchants is commonplace. The land of families and larger groups is often registered under the name of an individual member who understands the procedures or has the right connections. "Ghost" cooperatives are registered by individuals or groups, in the hopes of obtaining government assistance in clearing and cultivating the land. In some regions it is common for individuals, or even whole villages, to file a lease application and pay the annual

fees, while hoping to secure their traditional rights without having to complete the costly process of obtaining a lease from the MOA in Mogadishu[13].

It is also generally believed that merchants and government officials are well placed for obtaining leases to tracts of uncultivated land, despite the fact that such land is often held by local kin groups who may use it for pasture or occasional cultivation.

Following the recent liberalization of economic policies, there has been a boom in "land banking" by the influential and the well connected, often through the formation of private companies which are not subject to limitations in size. This process is apparently proceeding most rapidly in two areas: first, where mechanized agriculture has become profitable and second, where major development initiatives have been slated. Such areas include the land around Hargeisa, the hinterland of Mogadishu, and much of the Lower Shabelli Region.

This lack of integrity in the land registration process poses a number of problems for agricultural development and settlement in Somalia. The clear policy objective of preventing the concentration of private ownership of undeveloped land is being defeated. The MOA is not equipped to prevent people from registering more than one block of land in different names or through various corporate or cooperative entities. Nor has it been able to enforce the requirement that new land be brought into cultivation within two years, or to prevent a vigorous and

speculative land market from developing -- despite the prohibition on land sales. At the same time the system creates strong pressures on public officials to divert equipment and agricultural services to the development of private land.

The lack of adequate land records presents difficulties for land use planning and generates conflicts which inhibit project implementation and rural development. In the absence of a cadastral survey and the adequate assessment of land potential, government officials have no way of knowing how much land has been registered, or what portion of the cultivated or arable land available it represents. Nor has it proven possible to avoid overlapping and duplicate claims to land, which often give rise to serious conflict. It is essential to understand the process by which these conflicting claims are resolved.

#### The Resolution of Land Disputes

The resolution of land disputes involves the consideration of a broad range of substantive issues rather than a narrow focus on the formal principles of the law. As such it entails mediation and negotiation rather than adjudication. Included among the issues are not only traditional notions of equity but also an assessment of the relative political influence of the interested parties.

If a conflict cannot be resolved by means of a directive from the DAC, the district commissioner or the police superintendent, a government hearing is held. In disputes which do not involve pastoralists, the proceedings are conducted by the

district commissioner, the DAC, the police superintendant and the local head of security. A representative of the MDA may also participate, particularly if the dispute has previously proven intractable. If the dispute involves pastoralists, the judge is included as well. Because of the ephemeral development of district government in some regions, hearings may be undertaken at the regional level under the chairship of the governor.

The hearing is said to be open and democratic in that all parties can express their views. The idiom of public discourse conforms both to the law and to customary administrative procedures. Cultivators base their claims on "use" and evidence of registration, rather than on traditional claims.

At the conclusion of the hearing the officials announce their decision which may support the claims of one party, suggest a compromise, direct government technicians to carry out investigations, or even order them to provide services to one party in return for his relinquishing part of his claim. This last strategy is exemplified by the practice of asking local farmers to give up their claims to undeveloped land which an outsider wishes to exploit. In return, they will be given free assistance in clearing and cultivating more of their remaining land.

The board's decision is not binding unless acceptable to both parties, for they can appeal their case to the governor, to the MDA, the minister himself and only after that to the court in Mogadishu. Appeals are not without cost, however, which creates increasing pressure to compromise. If the case entails the loss

of land to outside projects such as refugee settlement, the villagers may simply continue to prevent the outsiders from using the land by show of force. If it involves an influential claimant, he may try to overturn the decision of the board by presenting his claim to higher officials.

The resolution of a land dispute may thus involve a series of public hearings and behind-the-scenes negotiations held over a period of a year or more. During this process the parties and government officials can assess each other's political and economic resources, and reach a "realistic" settlement. This process of dispute settlement is not without precedent in traditional Somali political life. The outcomes of land disputes thus cannot be anticipated or understood in terms of the formal attributes of the law. Nor will better "enforcement" of existing law reduce the level of ambiguity and conflict.

It must be realized that the process of land allocation and accumulation in Somalia is a political process, and that development assistance introduces new resources into the areas in which it occurs. The way in which assistance is introduced will have a direct effect on the ability of competing interest groups to obtain and maintain access to land and other essential resources. This is particularly important when the interests of comparatively weak social groups such as refugees and riverine village communities are concerned. It is essential that projects affecting such groups give them the knowledge and the means to enjoy the rights which they are guaranteed by law.

## LAND TENURE ISSUES IN THE SETTLEMENT OF REFUGEES

Experience with agricultural land settlement in developing nations shows that land tenure is not only a critical determinant of technical efficiency, economic viability and the size and distribution of agricultural incomes, but that it also plays a key role in creating incentives to produce, adopt improved technologies and to invest. Tenurial arrangements must afford farmers reasonable security and give them the opportunity to participate in public decisions that affect their welfare. All of these objectives are usually best met by a land tenure system that promotes individually owned and operated farms, based on the issuance of freehold or long term leasehold titles[19].

It has also been found that in lower cost settlement efforts, where settlers' contributions are larger than those of government, that it is "both appropriate and necessary for incentive purposes to grant more extensive land rights to settlers"[20]. Tenure arrangements that fail to provide farmers with the opportunity for secure investment in their land are unlikely to attract and retain settlers.

Somalia's experience with refugee settlement is in keeping with these general findings. A brief review of this experience illuminates tenurial problems that have arisen in the past and points to ways they can be avoided in the future.

### Drought Settlements

Though the settlement of nomads has long been a government goal it was not until the drought of 1975 that large scale settlement occurred. A total of 280,000 drought-affected persons were settled in camps of whom an estimated 160,000 took up their pastoral life once again once the rains commenced. The remaining 120,000 refugees agreed to be settled in three fishing cooperatives and three agricultural settlements. The population of two of the agricultural settlements, Kurtunwary and Sablaale, has dwindled to a little more than half the original number and is predominantly composed of women and children. The third agricultural settlement, Dujuma, has stopped most agricultural operations because the land was found to be saline.

The agricultural settlements were established as state farms with the settlers providing the labor. Local inhabitants in the immediate area were not compensated for lands absorbed into the settlement. Later attempts were made to bring them project services, with some success reportedly achieved at Kurtunwary.

In a deliberate attempt to eradicate the vestiges of kin and clan ties, a socio-political system based on an arbitrary hierarchical division of the population into groups of 400, 200, 100, 50, and 10 families was imposed. All agricultural decisions were made by management.

With their food assured through rations and some social services guaranteed by the Settlement Development Authority

(SDA), men did not find the token additional wages they could obtain for agricultural labor attractive. Instead, they followed their traditional mixed income strategy, deploying women and children in the settlements, some members in urban areas, and still others overseas. Kinship ties undoubtedly played a vital role in this strategy. Based on an analysis of settler aspirations, school enrollments and camp demography, a recent study concluded that the settlements will serve as a conduit for their ex-nomad populations as they move from rural to urban settings[21].

#### War Refugees

In order to foster self reliance and food production for the war refugees of 1977-1978, the government has established more than 50 farms near the camps. Twenty-seven of these occupy land originally cleared by the Russians and later turned into police farms. Perhaps two dozen smaller farms were started on unused land. Other farms have been settled spontaneously and some of these have received assistance from the MDA's Refugee Agricultural Unit (RAU) and the PVO's.

While some of these refugee farms have operated without incident, the land tenure problems that have occurred on others are instructive. The following cases, which were gathered through interviews in Mogadishu, are undoubtedly incomplete and almost certainly are in error on some points. Nevertheless, they illustrate the process of settling land disputes and many of the problems entitled in refugee settlement.

The first case took place near one of the camps at Belet Weyn in Hiran Region. It illustrates the transactional, bargaining character of land disputes and the way that local farmers try, in this case with success, to protect their traditional rights no longer recognized by law.

In the summer of 1982 an expatriate PVO came to work in the camp with the object of starting a refugee farm in the area. The PVO identified a suitable piece of land and secured a lease from the MOA. When the refugees selected tried to start clearing the land, however, they were driven off by an angry group of farmers from a nearby community. The police were notified and they, in turn, told the villagers that the refugee group had a valid title to the land in question. The villagers remained intransigent and the refugees remained landless. The governor and the RAC also appealed to the villagers, but all to no avail.

Eventually, at the request of the PVO, the governor organized a hearing which included the district commissioner, the mayor of Belet Weyn, the RAC, the head of security, and an elder from a village not directly involved in the dispute. The members of the panel went by landrover to view the land and continued on to the village in question to conduct an open hearing under a tree. The villagers staked their claim on the dubious assertion that they had cultivated the land within the past two years, rather than by citing clan rights.

The panel of officials decided that the land should go to the refugees. The villagers protested volubly and were told by the governor that police would be sent if they interfered with the refugees and their land again. Nevertheless, when the refugees tried once again to clear the land they were forced off by an angry group of armed farmers. The governor was not in a position to take further action and he is reported to have changed his position and sided with the villagers.

Almost a year after coming to the camp, the representative of the PVD prevailed upon the MOA and the RAU to join with regional and district officials in yet another visit to the village. Again the case was decided in favor of the refugees and again the villagers prevented the refugees from clearing the land.

In the end the governor offered the PVD two alternative sites, neither of which seemed suitable for cultivation. A year and a half after coming to the region, the PVD abandoned the project altogether. By that time the villagers had produced a certificate of their own for the land, which they had obtained from the cooperative department. It bore a later date than the refugees' lease.

A similar case occurred near Afgoi. Eight educated, urban refugee males of diverse ethnic backgrounds persuaded the RAU and a PVD to help them start a pilot agricultural project. A lease

for 100 ha. of apparently undeveloped land was obtained and, after considerable effort, equipment and agricultural inputs were mobilized to help the refugees develop their farm.

When the PVO representative and the refugees went to plan the work of clearing the land, they were confronted by an angry group of men armed with sticks and knives. A fight broke out but no one was injured. The leader of the group shouted that they were trying to take his grandfather's land. The intruders beat a prudent retreat and notified the police who looked into the case and ordered the villagers to honor the refugees' lease as the villagers had none.

Shortly after these events the refugees returned with a bulldozer provided by their helpers. Again an angry group of men descended on them, this time threatening to kill the refugees and the bulldozer operator as well! An RAU official went to talk to the aggrieved parties, but the case has not yet been resolved.

A third case, which occurred at another camp at Belet Weyn, resulted in a mediated compromise. The difficulty began when a PVO found that the land it thought had been promised for a tree nursery was not available. The governor resolved the problem by directing them towards another block of land. When the PVO tried to use it, however, they were prevented by villagers who said it was their pastureland. Through the mediation of the governor, it was agreed that the PVO would settle for less than the 250 ha. to

which it was entitled as well as provide employment to the villagers in the nursery. It remains to be determined who will control the trees and the profits from their sale.

Three cases from another region illuminate the role of personal influence in determining outcomes and the vulnerability of refugees, particularly if they are not Somali. The region in question and many details have been omitted for reasons that should be evident.

In the first case an official with great personal influence obtained a lease for a block of over 200 ha. of high potential land, located near a source of water suitable for pump irrigation. Removed from office under a cloud, he was appointed to an equally influential post in the same region. With the assistance of government inputs and refugee tenants, the land is presently being worked as an irrigated farm.

In the second case an official, who was a friend of the official in the previous case, obtained a lease to a high potential piece of land, which had already been leased to refugees but not yet cleared. The refugees refused to recognize the claim. The claimant's influential friend immediately appealed to the ministry, while the PVO representing the refugees' interests did exactly the same. And there matters rest for the present.

The third case involved one of eight spontaneous refugee settlements on the Juba river. These communities were assisted in obtaining leases to their land and irrigation pumps by a PVO and the RAU. One of the communities is inhabited by members of the Dromo ethnic group, a group of cultivators with a tradition of animosity towards the Somalis.

Perhaps because of their apparent vulnerability, a man of moderate influence obtained a lease for the land occupied by this group and ordered them to leave it. They are said to have responded by threatening to throw him in the river. In any case, the matter has escalated to the ministerial level, once again with the PVO supporting the cause of the refugees against the claimant.

#### CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The belief that there is abundant unused land suitable for crop production in Somalia should be viewed with caution. Presently accepted figures are based on crude surveys and estimates which have become enshrined in planning documents through endless repetition. (See Table 11). Closer examination, in the Bay Region for example, has revealed great local variation in soil quality and rainfall. Nor is high potential land of value without water for human and animal consumption. Indeed water is the limiting factor in land exploitation in much of the interriverine area where cultivation is possible. In Somalia's harsh and variable climatic conditions, average rainfall and

Table 11: Estimated Land Usage by Category in Somalia

Land Usage Category	Area (000 ha)	Proportion (%)
Suitable for crops	8,000	12.5
Crops or fallow	650	1.0
o under controlled irrigation	34	<0.5
o under flood irrigation	66	<0.5
o dryland farming	550	0.9
Uncultivated but cultivable	7,350	11.5
Suitable for grazing	35,000	54.9
Forest	8,800	13.8
Other land (unsuited for either cultivation or grazing)	11,965.7	18.8
TOTAL	63,765.7	100.0 %

Source: Central Statistical Department, Ministry of National Planning, Government of the Somali Democratic Republic, Mogadishu, Somalia.

river levels are misleading. Avoiding risks of crop failure and drought, through storage and geographic mobility, are of paramount concern to cultivators. These risks must be taken into account by planners.

#### How Feasible is Refugee Settlement in Inhabited Areas?

These constraints on settling new lands can undoubtedly be overcome through careful studies, the provision of water and construction of roads. While all these activities are costly, the basic question is not one of cost. Rather it is the extent to which there is, in fact, suitable land available for refugee settlement. The scattered evidence to date indicates that when suitable land appears to be available, there are invariably potential claimants lurking on the sidelines, many of whom may have quite legitimate claims to the land in question. If such land is indeed available, then mechanisms must be established to defend the claims made by refugees, when such claims are legitimate.

Bearing this in mind, how feasible is the settlement of refugees in inhabited areas? Is there unused high potential land in these areas which is not already claimed by local inhabitants?

It can be taken as axiomatic that Somali agro-pastoralists and full time cultivators have accumulated a detailed knowledge of their local environment and its resource potential. They have occupied the lands best suited to their needs, given the current

ecological conditions, technological limitations and economic incentives. It is unlikely that there are large amounts of high potential land that can be brought under cultivation with traditional technologies. Windshield surveys have proven misleading on this point in the past[22].

There are no lands in Somalia where pastoralists or cultivators do not already have long established rights. It is evident from the cases cited earlier that, although the law does not recognize these rights, local people are prepared to defend them with vigor. It is also evident that district and regional governments must give *de facto* though not *de jure* recognition to these traditional claims. The degree of recognition varies with the strength of the traditional group in question. Marginal groups such as riverine villagers, refugees, and perhaps former clients fare less well in the dispute resolution process.

#### Does a Lease Guarantee Access to Land?

The answer to this question depends on the political and economic resources of the leaseholder relative to that of other claimants. A highly capitalized settlement project or private farm is unlikely to experience problems once land development has started. Marginal groups such as refugees run a greater risk of being challenged.

If land is to be secured for project related or settlement purposes, it is essential that the claims of local inhabitants be fully investigated and that resources be made available to them

to reach an equitable agreement. By the same token, however, legal advice and guarantees must be made available to refugee leaseholders.

### Is Technical Assistance Needed for the MDA?

Technical assistance can play a useful role in creating a resource tenure environment more conducive to rural development in Somalia. The MDA badly needs assistance to increase its capacity in land registration, land record keeping, and land use planning.

It would be unwise, however, to commence a cadastral survey before a number of contradictions and ambiguities in the law are addressed, the registration process itself is improved, and rural people made aware of their rights. The contradictions in the law are of two types and tend to rob it of its legitimacy. One is the disjunction between the law and customary practice. The other is between the law and the growth of capitalist agriculture. This pertains particularly to land sale and land rental, neither of which is legal, but both of which are on the increase. Changes in the law itself should therefore be considered.

As a first step in providing technical assistance to the MDA, AID should consider asking a team from the University of Wisconsin Land Tenure Center to make an assessment of the Ministry's needs. In addition, the team could also assist the MDA in resolving some of the policy issues discussed in Chapter

Two of this report. The team leader should be someone with extensive experience working on land tenure and land reform issues in African governmental settings.

#### What Should be Done at the Regional, District, and Local Levels?

A Refugee Settlement Project should include funding for technical assistance to achieve the following objectives:

- o To increase the capacity of district and regional agricultural coordinators to comply with existing registration procedures;
- o To educate local groups and refugee settlers about their rights and the procedures required to secure them; and
- o To increase the capacity of these groups to register their land and defend their rights.

The project should also provide funding and appropriate technical assistance for a study of land tenure issues in the districts and regions concerned. The objective of the study would be to clarify the way different kinds of individuals and groups obtain access to land, water, and other resources such as fuelwood; how their access is affected by developments within and beyond the project area; and how planners and administrators can best take account of local residents' needs and interests. The conceptual framework of the study should be grounded in the issues raised in this preliminary analysis. More detailed scopes of work should be prepared after project implementation sites have been selected.

The study should be based on a combination of in depth participant observer and survey methods. It is especially critical that these be designed so as to capture the far flung residential and income generating strategies typical of Somali households. The study should be moderate in cost, realistic in its approach, and centered on policy rather than disciplinary objectives. It should be undertaken in the initial phase of project implementation and should be designed to engage the active interest and participation of local government officials.

## FOOTNOTES

1. I.M. Lewis, A Pastoral Democracy, London: Oxford University Press, 1961.
2. Ibid., p.35
3. J.M. Haakonsen, A Preliminary Situation Analysis of the Northwest Region. Report presented at the UNICEF Preview Meeting. Mogadishu: UNICEF, 1983, p.18.
4. Lewis, op. cit., pp. 2-3.
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10. Portions of this section have been incorporated from A. Hoben et al., Somalia: A Social and Institutional Profile. A report prepared for USAID. Boston: African Studies Center, Boston University, 1983, Chapter 5.
11. I. Kaplan et al., Area Handbook for Somalia. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977, p. 66.

12. For further details on the systems of production in the northwest see the first part of this chapter.
13. FAO, Agricultural and Water Surveys: Somalia: Final Report. Six volumes. Rome: FAO, 1968, Vol. 6, pp. 11-12. A recent study in the Bay Region confirms that this dual household strategy still prevails. See R.H. Behnke and C. Kerven, Herd Management Strategies Among Agro-Pastoralists in the Bay Region, Somalia. A Report Prepared for the Bay Region Socio-Economic Baseline Study. Laramie: Department of Sociology, University of Wyoming, 1984.
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16. World Bank, Somalia Agricultural Sector Review. Three volumes. Report No. 2881a-SO. Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1981, Annex 4, p. 220.
17. Kaplan, op. cit., p. 246
18. This process is described in more detail in Chapter Two in the section dealing with availability of land.
19. World Bank, Agricultural Land Settlement. Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1978, pp. 35-36.
20. Ibid, p.35
21. T. Ragsdale and A. Seik, A Case Study of the Somalia Resettlement Program for Nomads. Report on file at the Settlement Development Agency, Mogadishu, Somalia, 1984.
22. Hoben, et al., op cit., Chapter 5.

## CHAPTER SIX

### INSTITUTIONAL ALTERNATIVES FOR IMPLEMENTATION

#### INTRODUCTION

Given the uncertainty presently surrounding institutional arrangements for implementation, Chapter Six presents three alternative models: the first places major emphasis at national and regional levels; the second concentrates on the district and implementation of activities at that level; and the third, attempts to combine the best of both these models. Each of the following models will be discussed in detail.

- o The institution building model: working through the Ministry of the Interior at national, regional and district levels to increase planning and implementation capacity.
- o The district level model: creation of a District Project Support Office, directly responsible to the District Commissioner, with emphasis on improving planning and implementation capacity at the district level.
- o The planning umbrella model: working through the Ministry of Planning to design a development plan for a specific geographic area and providing the necessary resources to implement the plan through line ministries and PVO's.

#### THE INSTITUTION BUILDING MODEL

Implementation arrangements are a function of the approach and objectives of a project. For refugee-oriented projects in Somalia, institutional arrangements have varied in accordance with the nature and aims of the activities being pursued. For example, the highly directive, capital and management intensive

settlement schemes introduced in the mid-1970's were implemented by a special institution, the Settlement Development Agency (SDA), established for this purpose within the Ministry of Agriculture. A similar arrangement has been proposed for implementing the Furgano project which has many of the same characteristics as the earlier ones. The National Refugee Commission (NRC) is the overall implementing agency for the Refugee Self Reliance project whose activities are largely restricted to areas in and about the existing camps. The National Range Agency (NRA), an autonomous body within the Ministry of Livestock, Forestry and Range, plays a similar role with respect to the CDA Forestry project which, while it has the refugees and their camps as an initial focus, sees the project as the first stage of a broader reforestation effort. Both of these latter projects look to PVO's as the means of undertaking specific activities on the ground. Thus, there were a number of institutional models or examples for the team to examine as it considered implementation arrangements appropriate for the design effort. However, it was made clear to the team early on that the NRC was not a preferred option for project implementation.

As indicated in Chapter One of this report, the team's work in Somalia has had a strong area and rural development emphasis. In reviewing previous refugee efforts and the current situation, there were compelling grounds to approach the refugee problem within the broader context of area development and to help refugees take advantage of opportunities for increased employment and productivity generated in the areas selected for project

emphasis. This implied an area specific approach in which the local population and refugees would both benefit through concentration on regions having substantial refugee populations. In accordance with USAID guidance, initial emphasis would be given to selected areas in the North and Lower Shebelle.

The foregoing approach was discussed with a considerable number of Somali officials and non-Somali observers. In the course of these discussions it became clear that three Somali agencies had important, or potentially important, rural and area development mandates. These were the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of National Planning and the Ministry of Interior. Further discussions led to a strong preference for the Ministry of Interior because of:

- o Its emphatic rural development and planning mandate;
- o Its strong field orientation and bottom-up approach, utilizing local institutions; and
- o Its added authority as a result of a recent government reorganization.

Moreover, the team's choice followed recent recommendations made by two consultants who were also examining how refugee programs might be addressed within a broader rural development context[1]. The following discussion of the ministry owes much to their observations and insights.

#### The Ministry of Interior

The newly formed Ministry of Interior, established in June 1984, includes the former Ministry of Local Government and Rural

Development (MLGRD) as well as the national police and prison services. Aside from the latter, the work of the ministry is carried out by six departments headed by directors and composed of several services. The Department of Rural Development and Planning is the department most concerned with development functions of local government institutions in Somalia.

The personnel situation at the Ministry of Interior is extremely uneven. At the Mogadishu level there is a paucity of well trained and highly qualified professional staff and the problem is compounded by a lack of clerical and administrative personnel to support the professionals. At the local level, the opposite problem prevails. Less than 200 professional staffers are charged with supervising more than 5,000 technical, financial, and clerical workers. And like the rest of the Somali government, the ministry's performance suffers from the effects of grossly inadequate pay scales and overstaffing in many categories.

The ministry is specifically entrusted with the promotion of economic growth and the organization of rural development activities in the regions. Those functions reflect deeply rooted Somali traditions of community participation, self-help, and rural development. Thus the ministry has inherited a strong development role and seeks to operate on a "bottom up" basis, an approach attributable to the ministry's unique local government mandate and apparatus.

The major administrative unit of local government is the region, of which there are 17, each headed by a governor who reports to the minister. Within each region are several districts, each headed by a District Commissioner (DC) reporting to the governor. The governor is also the chairman of the Regional Development Council (RDC), which includes the regional coordinators of the various government services and technical ministries, the DC's, and the heads of the Local People's Assemblies. RDC's mainly concentrate on reviewing district and regional requests as well as initiating development proposals to the ministry which are beyond the budget or technical capabilities of the region.

The administrative staff of the governor is small, and consists of a few financial and administrative semi-professionals and clerks. There are no planners, engineers, economists or other specialists. The technical personnel at the regional level are mainly the regional coordinators of the technical ministries who report to Mogadishu and over whom the governor has a theoretical authority which varies widely from region to region, depending on circumstances. Since most development activities originate within the ministries in Mogadishu, neither the governors nor the regional coordinators participate in their formulation and often do not know about them until they materialize on their doorsteps.

As a result of a 1980 law, the major focus of local administration and development has been shifted from the region to the district level. The same law established Local People's Assemblies (LPA's) headed by a Chairman or Mayor, a local person who is second only to the DC in terms of local authority. LPA's are made up of party members who are presented for election from a single party slate. They meet at least once every three months, usually more often, to transact public business in open meetings where the discussions can be long and vociferous. LPA's are the spark plug of local government. They raise and allocate local revenues, plan and implement projects, put forward local views to higher levels, manage and deliver local services, and mobilize support for development activities including gathering local contributions for self-help activities. Small projects undertaken at the district level are mostly public works such as shallow wells, water catchments, reservoirs, village roads, health clinics and primary schools.

At the village level function the several dozen Village Councils (VC's) in a district. VC members, who are often village elders, are elected by the village residents on the nomination of the party. VC's are free to take up any matter of local concern and to put their views on village needs and priorities before LPA's, DC's, RDC's and the governors. They often serve as catalysts and labor sources for self-help projects.

As a result of the recent reorganization, the party and civil structures in the regions, previously unified, have been

separated. Each region now has its own Regional Secretary and Governor. This separation of functions permits the Ministry of Interior officials at the regional level to concentrate exclusively on civil business and presumably to spend more time and energy on local development matters. The trade off, of course, is the possibility of tension or conflict between regional civil and party officials.

The ministry's Department of Rural Development and Planning is one of its most important. Led by a Director, the Department is composed of four services, i.e., Planning and Project Formulation, Monitoring and Evaluation, Administration and Liaison, and Training and Research. Its functions are to:

- o Identify economic needs and priorities at the regional level;
- o Backstop the implementation of rural development projects and assure the necessary financing; and
- o To monitor self-help projects and keep records on project plans and performance.

Staffing of the Department is grossly inadequate both in numbers and quality. Other than the Director, the Department had just eight professional staff as of late 1983, only five of whom were college graduates, and three of these were seconded from other ministries. For example, the Planning and Project Formulation Service was manned by one professional, yet it is charged with reviewing all of the projects which flow in from the districts and regions. Other services within the Department operate under similar constraints. Nor are funds or fuel usually available to carry out work in the field. Lack of staff, office

facilities and operating funds creates a major discrepancy between the ministry's mandate and its performance. Much the same problem applies to the work of its regional and district offices, where an undermanned professional staff tries to supervise a small army of petty officials.

#### Proposed Implementation Arrangements

The implementation arrangements for the proposed project sought to capitalize on the ministry's strong rural development mandate and its unique field organization. It also sought to address some of the ministry's staffing and program weaknesses noted above, especially in the three target districts -- Hargeisa, Boroma, and Merca -- and in the Department of Rural Development and Planning (RDP), which was to be the project's cutting edge at the Mogadishu level.

The RDP would be designated as the project's executing agency within the ministry and would be strengthened accordingly. Such strengthening would include additional planning and administrative staff persons to backstop the increased workload caused by the growth of development operations in the three target districts. It would include funding for supplies, equipment and operating costs. An expatriate senior adviser would be posted to serve as counterpart to the Director of the RDP and head of the contract advisory team (see below). That person would be assisted by an expatriate Management Adviser who

would be responsible for supervising the execution of all project-related logistic and administrative matters and for supporting field operations.

The strengthened RDP would be responsible for project planning, backstopping and monitoring area development activities at the Mogadishu level and for providing liaison with the NRC and technical ministries on project matters. It would serve as the contact point with USAID, the Steering Committee, the Technical Unit, PVO's and other donors. It would exercise general oversight responsibility for project funded development activities in the three target districts.

At the local level, the project would strengthen the planning and implementation capacity of the regional and district offices in the three target regions. This would include the recruitment of professional and administrative staff for the Governor's and District Commissioners' offices and provision of funds for office operations and equipment. They would assist the latter to review local development activities, elaborate regional plans, help to achieve priorities as articulated by the local government organs, and recommend how additional revenues made available through the project might further local initiatives or meet local needs. Local staff would be particularly alert to optimizing refugee participation in these programs.

Technical assistance and guidance for local development planning and program implementation would be provided by three expatriate advisers, one each positioned at the three regional

capitals. They would assist local authorities to establish priorities, identify development opportunities, train local staff and monitor the program. They would emphasize programs which are most likely to benefit camp inhabitants.

An expansion of regional development activities along the foregoing lines would be financed by District Development Funds established in the office of the governor in each of the target regions. They would be managed by district officials, including the chairmen of the LPA's, with the concurrence of the appropriate adviser. Local development activities would be executed by local authorities or under contract with private enterprises. Emphasis would be on arrangements favoring the employment of refugees. Larger projects, or projects involving all three regions on a common problem, would be implemented by PVD's.

To encourage participation in the program by the NRC and there by assure adequate refugee involvement, the project would provide staff and other support to the Planning and Monitoring Unit of the NRC in Mogadishu and to the Regional Commissioners' offices in the North and Lower Shabelli.

AID would award a contract to provide the technical services and administrative support called for in the project. The contractor would provide the resident advisers, plus short term specialists for particular assignments or studies. The senior adviser would lead the team and be responsible to AID and the

GSDR for contractor performance and reporting. AID would appoint a project manager to monitor and guide the project and to keep AID informed as to its progress and problems.

#### THE DISTRICT LEVEL MODEL

The institutional arrangements eventually chosen to implement a refugee settlement project will depend upon the overall objectives of the project. This report has outlined several different settlement models and has discussed a number of approaches to achieving refugee settlement. One of the approaches suggested would be to assist spontaneous refugee efforts to become economically integrated into the Somali economy. The objective of this approach, which is more fully described in Chapter Two, is to encourage initiatives by both local Somalis and refugees to undertake new economic activities and expand upon existing ones, within a framework of area economic development.

This approach is based on the assumption, for which some evidence has been presented in this report, that: first, there is potential for increasing both rural and urban economic opportunities in certain areas of Somalia; and second, that members of the refugee and local population are interested in exploiting these opportunities and have the skills, experience and sometimes the capital to succeed in new undertakings. It is suggested that this approach would have the advantage of facilitating the integration of refugees into local communities

by emphasizing area development in which local Somalis could also participate and benefit. Such an approach is justified both on equity grounds and in terms of stimulating regional economic growth.

#### Justification for a District Project Support Office

One proposed method for implementing the approach described above is to establish a District Project Support Office (DPSO) in the respective districts where the settlement project would be carried out. The proposed role of a DPSO would differ in several critical respects from that of the conventional Project Management Unit (PMU). Firstly, the DPSO would not be directly responsible for sub-project management which would, instead, be the responsibility of regional representatives of line ministries, in conjunction with members of the refugee and local community. Secondly, the primary purpose of the DPSO would be in the provision of support to both locals and refugees who seek to participate in sub-project activities, by offering technical and managerial advice and acting as a liaison between these individuals or groups, local government authorities and line ministries.

Thirdly, unlike a PMU, the DPSO would not have fiscal control over project funds, which would instead be administered through the District Commissioner's office, thus giving more autonomy to local government in determining area development priorities than is typically the case with a PMU structure. The role of the DPSO would rather be to monitor and guide the alloca-


tion of project funds to sub-projects, to ensure that these are used for creating economic opportunities for locals and refugees. The DPSO would thus act in an advisory capacity to local government authorities and line ministries responsible for implementing sub-projects, rather than operating as an independent agency.

Fourthly, the DPSO would effectively strengthen local institutional capacity to undertake development projects in the future, by involving line ministry staff who will be responsible for implementing sub-projects, and by helping district government authorities to design activities within an area development context. This process contrasts with the PMU approach which tends to leave a vacuum at the institutional level once project implementation is completed and the PMU dismantled, since local institutions have frequently not been directly concerned with design and implementation.

#### Proposed Organization of the DPSO (See Figure 3)

The DPSO would have a core staff which reports directly to the District Commissioner's office and through that office is linked vertically to the regional and national levels of the Ministry of Interior, as described earlier for the institution building model. The project development funds would be administered through his office, and allocated to sub-projects on the basis of consultation between the DPSO, the DC and representatives from the governor's office, Local Peoples' Assembly/Mayor's office, and the local refugee community. This group

Figure 3: Organization of District Project Support Office



would form an Area Development Committee which would be required to approve all sub-projects and contracts with implementing agencies. The responsibility for ensuring that project goals are met would lie with the DPSO manager and the DC, who would submit joint reports to the Project Manager in Mogadishu and the ministry delegated overall project responsibility.

Upon approval of sub-projects, the DPSO would be responsible for identifying the implementing agents, who will include line ministries, local business people and refugees. Contracts between the selected agents and the DC office to carry out sub-project activities will be negotiated under the auspices of the DSPD, acting in an advisory capacity. Such contracts would include "servicing contracts" with line ministries who would agree to second their personnel to assist sub-project implementation, in return for staff salary incentives and specified inputs given to the line ministries. The DSPD, in conjunction with the DC, would actively seek to encourage members of the local business community to provide capital and sites for various sub-projects in return for which they would receive technical advice from the DPSO and line ministry staff as well as imported commodities necessary for sub-project implementation. In this case, the businessperson would have to agree that a certain proportion of refugees would participate in the sub-project, whether as employees or co-managers. The DSPD and the DC would also identify members of the business community who could be contracted with to provide management, training, or technical advice in implementing sub-projects.

**Specific Functions of the DPSO:**

The DPSO would be expected to perform the following:

- o Assist the DC's office and local/refugee population in identifying new economic opportunities in the district.
- o Assess the technical, economic, and social feasibility of new economic opportunities when these are proposed by members of the local or refugee population, and report on the feasibility of proposed activities to the DC and Area Development Committee.
- o Provide technical and managerial advice in response to requests by locals/refugees who wish to receive support under project funding to undertake new economic activities.
- o Aid in obtaining technical assistance from line ministries and private business people in order to implement approved sub-project activities.
- o Provide advocacy and community relations services to less influential or more vulnerable locals/refugees who wish to participate in sub-projects.
- o Serve as an information center regarding other economic development activities in the area, whether government-sponsored or private, that may be of interest to locals/refugees wishing to participate.
- o Undertake small-scale experimental projects which may have economic potential, especially if initiative to undertake experimental activities comes from local/refugee population.
- o Encourage links between local business community and local/refugee population, in order to increase capital investment and wage employment opportunities.
- o Conduct technical, socio-economic assessments and impact studies on sub-project activities and use results of these studies to advise DC on designing new sub-projects.
- o Arrange for training courses to upgrade skills of sub-project participants, when participants express interest in receiving training.
- o Assist in commissioning short-term technical assistance from local and international sources when required for sub-project implementation.

- o Seek to expand successful sub-project activities, if additional resources, skills, and demand for these activities are found to exist in the area.

### DSPD Staffing

- o DSPD manager: local Somali/refugee, background in business or management, and a technical background in agriculture or livestock.
- o Agriculture/livestock adviser: local Somali or PVD expatriate could be recruited under long-term secondment from Ministry of Agriculture or Ministry of Livestock, Forestry and Range.
- o Business adviser: recruited from local business community.
- o Community relations officer/Ombudsman: PVD expatriate or an ex-refugee. Background in similar type of work would be preferable.
- o Secretary/clerical officer: Somali or ex-refugee.

The maximum number of professional staff per district office would be four, of whom no more than two should be expatriates. In Districts where refugee settlement activities might be more modest, a reduced staff of three might be more appropriate. In this case, no more than one staff member should be an expatriate. The DSPD would have a budget for core funding, recurrent and logistical costs, but not for project development costs. Support staff needed would consist of secretaries, drivers, and watchmen.

### THE PLANNING UMBRELLA MODEL

The institutional arrangements for implementation proposed in the PID have been referred to in the past, perhaps somewhat ungenerously, as personifying the umbrella approach, described as follows:

With the umbrella approach, participating institutions implement discrete activities which often bear little or no relationship to each other. This is most likely to occur when independent funding is readily available and interested parties are invited to submit proposals. Since no overall plan exists for the development of the area in question, a wide variety of unrelated activities can peacefully co-exist under the same umbrella. This is presently the case with several proposed activities in the northwest[2].

### Institutional Specifics in the PID

While the PID is intentionally vague on many of the proposed institutional arrangements, three specific proposals merit further discussion here: the role of the Ministry of Planning, the role of USAID, and the role of the PVO's[3]. Each of these will be discussed below.

### The Role of the Ministry of Planning

According to the PID, the Ministry of Planning will be the key GSDR unit responsible for coordinating the Refugee Settlement project with other Somali development programs. Yet earlier in the same document, this responsibility is given to the NRC which "will also take major coordination responsibility for the Refugee Settlement programs from its chair position on the Steering Committee." Evidence from development experiences elsewhere has shown that coordination is hard enough at the best of times -- but when there are two national-level institutions responsible for coordinating the same project, then the chances of success will be severely limited.

For this reason, the institution building model proposed at the beginning of this chapter gave this coordination responsibility to a single line ministry, in this case the Ministry of the Interior. This selection was based on three factors: first, Interior is the only ministry with a strong presence in rural areas; second, it has some experience with the funding, planning, and implementation of small public works projects; and finally, the indications are that there has been a significant amount of local participation in this process at the district level and below.

However, this does not necessarily mean that Interior is the best choice. Impressive as Interior may look on paper, particularly when compared with its peer institutions, very little is known about its inner workings, particularly at the district level. A recent report advised caution in working with this ministry -- for precisely that reason:

No direct USAID involvement at this level is recommended at this time. It seems unwise, given the lack of knowledge on district and regional procedures, to introduce interventions at this level until more information is available[4].

One of the major reasons why the Ministry of Planning was initially rejected was that first, it is generally regarded as one of the weaker ministries and, second, it has no presence outside Mogadishu and has a hard enough time maintaining an adequate presence in the various line ministries in Mogadishu. Nevertheless, such structures do not preclude Planning playing a major role should the first two alternatives proposed prove

unacceptable or unrealistic. Should this happen, the project could work through the Ministry of Planning to design a development plan for a specific geographic area of the country. The project could also provide the necessary resources to implement parts or all of the plan through the line ministries and the PVO's. Planning would be responsible for approving such proposals and monitoring specific activities once implementation got under way.

#### The Roles of USAID, Technical Assistance, and the PVO's

From the perspective of the PID, the institution which would have received the most technical assistance from this project would have been none other than USAID itself. But the underlying premise of this report, whichever institutional model is actually implemented, is that one of the principal objectives of any proposed project would be to increase the Somali capacity to plan and implement development activities. In the first model, the institution building one, the technical assistance is directed more at national and regional levels. In the second model, the technical assistance is focussed directly on where the action is -- at the district level. In the third model being proposed here, the technical assistance would be more evenly distributed between the national level and the geographic area where the project and its component activities are to be implemented.

Such a model would call for two distinct types of technical assistance: planning assistance to the Ministry of Planning at the national level and specific types of technical assistance

project activities being implemented at the area level. Certain PVO's with a proven track record in rural development would be expected to provide at least some of this technical assistance. There would be a fund available, jointly administered by Planning and USAID, to support implementation of specific development activities included under the plan as well as to finance technical assistance, where necessary. However, contracts for technical assistance -- whether awarded to PVO's, universities, or private contractors -- would contain two important provisions: first, the technicians to be provided are to work directly with a Somali institution, public or private and, second, these technicians are to function as advisers, whose main responsibility is to help train Somalis to do the job better.

#### Old Wine in New Bottles?

At first glance, this planning umbrella model may appear distressingly similar to the traditional umbrella approach. However, there are significant differences which should make this model more effective: first, there is a lead institution to coordinate the activities; second, any activities approved for funding and implementation must be part of the overall development plan for the area in question; and finally, the provision of technical assistance must be provided through a counterpart relationship with a local institution -- both in theory and, more importantly, in practice.

## FOOTNOTES

1. A.E. Claxton, An Institutional Analysis of Local Government in the Somalia Democratic Republic. Mogadishu: USAID, 1983 and L.R. Meyers, Toward a Rural Development Strategy for USAID/Somalia. Washington, D.C.: USAID, 1983.
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4. Meyers, op. cit., p.27