


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PEASANTS AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT:
AN INQUIRY INTO THE ROLE OF PEASANTS
AND THEIR COMMUNITIES IN RURAL DEVELOPMENT EFFORTS

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1. Introduction

In this paper I will report on a study of the conditions for the adoption and successful implementation of rural development projects and efforts.(1) I will also try to inquire into the role of local residents in the adoption and implementation of rural development efforts.(2) In the following I will report the results of an inquiry of pairs of Turkish villages, some of which were able to initiate and/or implement highly successful rural development efforts, where others failed at some point of the effort. More specifically, I will also try to probe into why some rural development efforts have been successful in raising the standard of living in the communities in which they were carried, while similar efforts failed in others.

In the following I will firstly explicate the research design of the study, and the method by which the cases had been selected. Secondly, I will briefly describe the rural development projects and the village environment in which they were launched. Thirdly, I will report my empirical findings. Finally, I will try to evaluate the findings and draw some conclusions.

2. The Design of the Study and the Selection of the Cases

When this study was designed, after some inquiry we discovered, and later assumed, that in most Turkish villages some sort of rural development project had been initiated at one time or another since World War II. Hence, we were confident that by simply selecting pairs of villages to study, we would

encounter some successful and some not so successful rural development efforts. To ensure that our inquiry could not be hampered by not controlling for the differences between the villages that emerge from the differences in their resource potentials we selected villages of similar size. In other words, by controlling for size we were able to eliminate the differences that may arise from the scale of economic and/or financial resources available in villages of different size. It is more likely for a village of 2000 inhabitants to have more economic resources, and attract more governmental attention for development projects like school, dispensary, road, water depot, etc., construction, than a village of 250 inhabitants.

Secondly, we decided to select our villages such that they would be faced with the same kinds of natural hardships. Thus, both villages would either be located in a wooded area, on arable or arid land, on a plateau, or in the plains, and under similar climatic conditions. Therefore, we decided to select villages that were close to each other, and in fact, each of our pairs of villages is administratively connected with the same subprovincial capital. This decision also rendered our data collection efforts manageable. Next, we tried to control for the accessibility of the villages to and from the center, i.e., the subprovincial capital. In other words, either both of the selected villages were connected with the subprovincial capital by a common or a similar road, or both were not. Finally, we used level of economic development (which we defined operationally as the variety of economic activities that existed in a village and the number and variety of agricultural equipment and vehicles that the peasants owned) as our last criterion of selection. In sum, we selected our pairs of villages so that they will be of similar size, located in similar natural environments and share the same habitat, with similar accessibility to the center of the society, yet one of the villages is

economically more developed than the other. In each village we were able to observe numerous rural development efforts and/or projects that were initiated. In the following I will first try to describe some of these efforts in some detail. (For data collection procedures see Kalaycioglu and Turan, note in the Appendix.)

3. A Description of the Projects

The projects I would like to focus on differ in their levels of organization, the source of initiation, the length of successful performance, and the scope of participation they were able to attract. I will not attempt to classify them before I give a brief description of each project, and the village within which they were or had been implemented.

3.i: Donerdere's Cooperative

Donerdere is a recent settlement by most criteria, and a remarkable one. It is connected to the nearby provincial capital 'O' with an 18 km. gravel road, which is dusty during summer and muddy in winter. A number of characteristics catch the eye as soon as one approaches the village. Right by the side of the road and at the entrance of the village there is a volleyball field, a sport which is much less popular than soccer in Turkey. The houses of the village have tin roofs and are situated in the middle of a yard, usually decorated with flowers and corn, and all the houses are cleanly whitewashed. In fact, there are even two-story houses, which is a rare sight in villages of eastern Turkey. In addition, a mosque with a tall and well-built minaret also attracts one's attention. A greater surprise awaits the visitor in the houses,

most of them have indoor plumbing, so far a rare convenience in Turkish villages. A brief stay and chat with the villagers reveals even greater wonders. The village has its own electric generator, which they installed ten years ago, with their own resources. Thus they have electricity, which other neighboring villages lack. The generator is operated with greater skill than that of the subprovincial capital of '0.'

Another striking characteristic of the village is that there is no coffee (or tea) house in it. In Turkey, a large village without a coffee house is rare. There is a water reservoir, which was built again by them to provide drinking water to the settlement, when the initial drinking water fountain failed to be sufficient. There is a "bull station" as the villagers call it, which has been built partly by them and partly by the agricultural extension service ten years ago to raise a better breed of cattle, and has been in successful operation ever since. In 1980 they were able to prompt government action for an artificial lake for irrigation purposes. It was nearing completion when we visited the village in the summer of 1980.

Finally, grandest of all, they have a cooperative that works with great efficiency. Among all the villages we have included in this study, this is the only fully-operative cooperative we were able to locate. It processes dairy products, and markets the produce, which consists of 3 tons of butter, and 18 tons of cheese in the national market, often selling them to wholesalers in Istanbul and Ankara. In 1978, when we first visited the village the cooperative also had what they called a "store," which offered great bargains in consumer goods for the members of the cooperative (who incidentally are all the inhabitants of the village beyond a certain age). The store was closed in the summer of 1980 because the rate of inflation required that the cooperative provide about 3 million Turkish Liras worth of operating

capital (about 50 thousand dollars at the time), a sum which was beyond their capability.

It is obvious, even from the above mentioned brief summary, that Donerdere hosts a number of rural development projects, most of which are highly successful. The cooperative is the most complicated, organized and interesting one. I will briefly describe this project in greater detail. Rural cooperatives, especially in the Turkish context, are probably the most complicated form of rural development projects that require local impetus and participation. Not only do they need the donation of time, energy and local economic resources for a common purpose, they also require regular bookkeeping, annual meetings, and almost continuous attention of its members to be successful. Thus, it is hardly a matter of amazement that we have not found many cooperatives, let alone successful ones, among our sample of villages. Donerdere's cooperative was established in 1966, about two years after the village was established. However, not all of the flood and soil erosion victims of their old village wanted to be relocated, and some of them, who were not too much affected by the natural calamities, stayed in their Northern Anatolian location. They still have contact with their old neighbors. In fact, we met some of them visiting Donerdere, when we were there in 1980.

Donerdere was founded on land that belonged to the State Treasury. Each household of the new community was given enough and almost equal amounts of land (130-145 decars, and 57 decars was designated as being enough to sustain a family of five at that time by the government) during the time of the settlement. Their houses were built by the state. However, they claim now that most of them rebuilt those houses because of major defects in their original structure. They received food and clothing from the state for a brief period. Soon after they settled they discovered that their resources were not enough

for each of them to thrive, even though they might not have a serious problem of survival. The neighboring villages, which have been located there for as long as anyone can remember, immediately launched a hostility campaign against them, which occasionally resulted in armed struggle. Their cattle and sheep were plundered soon after they settled by the neighboring villages, which the peasants of Donerdere promptly reacted by confiscating a flock of sheep they could find across the Iranian border, where they were told that their flock was taken. Their access to their own fields was occasionally blocked or threatened by the neighboring villagers, who felt that the same plot of Treasury land could be allocated among them without the undesired intrusion of these Northern Anatolian peasants. Thus, the native villagers considered the settlers temporary and tried to make life as miserable for the settlers as possible so that they would go back, and the neighboring villagers would split the land among themselves.

Both the scarcity of financial resources and the continual hostility of the environment prompted the initial practices of cooperation among the inhabitants of Donerdere. They joined in groups of approximately twenty (mostly, but not exclusively, of extended family members and old neighbors) to chip in and purchase tractors, and then plowed their land by taking turns. Because the hostile neighbors blocked access to their fields, and even impounded their crops or forcefully occupied their land, and could only be driven out by force, used either by the settlers or by the gendarmes, they decided to plow and till land collectively, so that the protection of the land would be easier. Thus, they ignored the division of land among them, and for two years they plowed collectively those fields which they could reach and protect. Their will to survive being convincingly demonstrated, the hopes of the neighboring villagers that the newcomers would eventually go back,

somewhat subsided. Meanwhile, the civil engineer who supervised the construction work which continued during the first year or so of the settlement suggested a full-fledged cooperative. Since the villagers were already cooperating in the plowing and protection of the land, the idea was immediately adopted and promptly implemented after a short period of preparation. The person who led the drive does not reside in the village any longer. He has a small transportation business in a Northern Anatolian town. The first accountant of the cooperative has moved to a Western Anatolian town. In 1970 the administration of the cooperative changed again, and the previous executive of the coop left to become a contractor in Istanbul. The administration changed hands again in the late seventies. In spite of all the changes in the administrative personnel, the efficiency and productivity of the cooperative has not changed, except for the better.

The annual meetings of the members of the cooperative are not occasions for rubber-stamping the actions of the executive body but an occasion for debate about the course for the future of the cooperative and the village community. In the numerous proceedings of the annual meetings of the members and from the activities of the executive body of the cooperative, we found that the numerous executive committees contemplated launching numerous projects and some were, in fact, implemented.

Two of the main tasks of the cooperative are to oversee the production of cheese and butter, which is an important source of income for the settlers, and to be involved in the marketing of the wheat production, the major source of income for the village. In sum, the cooperative is the source of economic planning and development in this small Anatolian village. I will focus on it later as a major rural development project in this paper.

3.ii: Dagdeviren's Cooperative

Dagdeviren's "Cooperative" is a misnomer, or a fiction, because Dagdeviren never had a cooperative, and it seems unlikely to have one in the near future. The closest they have come to the idea was when some of them contemplated joining another cooperative. However, they could never convince themselves of the trustworthiness of others to the point of contributing a part of their financial resources to this end.

Dagdeviren, a neighboring village of Donerdere, is also administratively connected to 'O.' It is 3 km. down the road from Donerdere. It is a tremendous contrast to Donerdere. In Dagdeviren each house includes a shanty attachment to the house which functions as a shelter for the animals, sheep and/or cattle. Livestock has a greater importance for the economy of Dagdeviren than agriculture. Dagdeviren's houses are built from clay, wood and hay, which provide a great insulation against the harsh weather conditions of the area. Its mosque can only be described as an oversized hut when compared with that of the Donerdere's mosque. It has an elementary school building and a water fountain in the middle of the village, both of which were constructed by the state with a minimum amount of help from the peasants. There are a few tractors and other farm machinery in the village. When they need a harvesting machine they hire it from elsewhere. In contrast, Donerdere has more than sufficient agricultural machinery and occasionally leases them outside the village to gain additional income.

Two other pieces of information are also important for a comparison of the communities in question. Dagdeviren is divided in two, not only physically but also socially, by a creek that runs through the village. Two different groups of extended families have settled on the two sides of the creek, and

they have not been without occasional disagreements throughout the history of the village. In fact, when we first visited the village in 1978, we were told not to go to the other side of the creek since those people would not know much, and they were a bunch of fools. Later on, we discovered that in the previous year's local elections, the headmanship of the village changed hands between the two sides, and one of the first actions of the new headman had been to move the drinking water fountain to his side of the creek. However, by 1980 they appeared to have settled their differences. In spite of their occasional disagreements the intra-village level of conflict never rose to a point of civil war, or to a point that one side would be forced to leave the village and take refuge elsewhere.

Between 1965 and 1967, during the settlement of the nearby Donerdere, Dagdeviren also received food and clothing aid from the state, and nearby land owned by the State Treasury was distributed among the inhabitants. Thus every member of the community who was married at the time received a piece of land that his household could survive on. So the distribution of land and income was corrected to be more equitable in Dagdeviren. With respect to the distribution of land and the assistance of the state, Dagdeviren and Donerdere considerably resembled each other in 1965 and 1966. However, as the above mentioned brief descriptions may suggest one has achieved a great amount of rural development through the organization and implementation of village (self)-designed rural development projects, and the other has reverted to its old structure in the fifteen years since both had received similar impetus for development from the government. Why is it that Donerdere was able to come up with a stunningly successful rural development project, whereas Dagdeviren failed to come up with a similar rural development project of its own even though they accept the desirability of the Donerdere's experience with the

cooperative and admire them in their accomplishment, and initially had similar if not more financial and economic resources?

3.iii: Damarasi's "Union"

What comes close to the above mentioned experience but differs from it in important respects are the water reservoir construction and the "Union" at Damarasi. Damarasi is a Western Anatolian village located very near a major highway that connects the southern resort areas to Izmir and the rest of the country. Even though the highway was built in the last three decades the village was not far from the old highway that connected the Western and Southern parts of Anatolia. The standard of living in this village is comparable with Donerdere, and perhaps even higher. Damarasi relied upon tobacco production, and later on cotton as its major sources of income. However, in the late seventies neither tobacco nor cotton provided much of their income. Instead, many villagers grow green pepper now. It is this switch that I would like to focus on first.

The first characteristic of the above mentioned switch is that the state had no role in prompting such a change. It was wholesalers of metropolitan areas operating through local intermediaries who encouraged the switch and supported it to make it possible and profitable. Furthermore, tobacco and cotton are bought by both the private wholesalers and the State Enterprises. As a result of price support policies of government, which the latter associates with the rural support at the polls, tobacco and cotton production have come to involve little marketing risk in contrast to the green pepper production where no government support has been available. In fact, not every peasant has switched to green pepper production, but those who possessed

enough land did. Switching to green pepper production was not a total novelty because the villagers had already observed green pepper production in at least two neighboring communities. One important aspect of the switch was to find a reliable buyer. Aside from the price difference between tobacco and cotton on the one hand, and green pepper on the other, the marketability of the former two gave them quite an edge over the latter. Hence, the "Union" (Birlik) was established by the peasants with the aid of the wholesalers so that the marketability of this product be comparable to tobacco and cotton. In other words, only after the peasants began to believe that if they switched to green pepper, they would sell it with a profit, that the switch was made possible.

The "Union" was established by a villager who had been involved in the small scale marketing of cotton, herbicide, etc. The founder of the "Union" led the organization for about two years and was replaced by another villager. In spite of the change, the "Union" went on functioning smoothly. It is a marketing institution. The "Union" buys the green pepper production from the peasants, simultaneously making the necessary connections in Istanbul, Bursa, Ankara, etc., by the help of a telephone that the village possesses (the village also has a post office, telegraph and telephone services, and electricity). Then, the "Union" ships the produce, by truck, to the above mentioned markets. The profit from the transaction is shared among the members of the "Union," who are the green pepper growers, after a percentage is deducted to meet the operating costs of the "Union." The green peppers, which grow earlier at Damarasi and its vicinity than almost anywhere else, receive a very high price in the big cities. The importance of the "Union" emerges from the fact that a large proportion of the green pepper production of the village must be sold in a very short period of time to maximize the profits from this enterprise. Individually, the peasants are not in a position

to accomplish the marketing of their green peppers in such a fashion. A marketing organization such as the "Union," performing a function comparable to that of a local wholesaler, appears to be an effective instrument through which income from peppers is maximized.

3.iv: Yolboyu's Tobacco Production

Yolboyu is another village down the road from Damarasi, and they are administratively connected to the same subprovincial capital 'C.' Not only are they close to each other, they are also close to 'C.' A hard-surface state highway connects all three locations. However, Yolboyu is closer to 'C.' Its land is less arable and less plentiful than Damarasi. Over the years the better pieces of land were sold to the inhabitants of 'C.' They have been involved in tobacco production as long as they can remember. Cotton is also produced in the village, but not as much as tobacco. However, they were among the last to experiment with cotton production in the area. Their main source of income has been tobacco. As mentioned earlier, tobacco production does not have any marketing problems. However, it is a time and energy consuming process. Good quality tobacco is hard to grow. Fortunately the agricultural policies of governments enable the peasant to sell almost any quality of tobacco to the state, although at different prices.

Even though, there is some inclination among the peasants of Yolboyu to find alternative ways of living, the number of children attending high school from this village is about one third of the same number for Damarasi. They are fully aware of the accomplishments of the nearby villages, yet they do not seem to consider experimenting with any other sort of cash crop. Interestingly, one bureaucrat mentioned that "the headman of Yolboyu only

conveys wishes and complaints of his constituency to us. He never demands services like drinking water, irrigation, roads, etc. from us." He also noted that the peasants of Yolboyu were equally docile. They will listen with great patience and always concur. Thus, in Yolboyu, participation in communal action for local or state guided rural development projects seems to be woefully lacking. Why is it that in Damarasi a rural development project like experimenting with a new cash crop and a market organization can be possible, while in the neighboring village of Yolboyu no similar project can be launched?

3.v: Ayas's Tourism Effort

Ayas is located in Southern Turkey by the Mediterranean shore. Its major source of income is derived from citrus fruit and vegetable production. However, this village consists of recently settled nomads, who used to pass winters by the sea and go up to the high country during the hot and humid summer. Even now most of the village (all of the women and most of the children) migrate to their mountain summer location, where they grow wheat and barley, and graze their cattle, goat and sheep. However, neither wheat and barley nor livestock constitutes an important source of income for the peasants; they are produced for domestic consumption.

The settlement of this community may be, in and of itself, considered a major rural development project. As far as we know, there was no major role of the state bureaucracy in initiating the process. Those who were directly involved in the settlement are either very old or dead by now. Those still living argued convincingly that their settlement was prompted by economic concerns. One maintained that when he discovered that 1 kg. of tomatoes was

priced at 80 kurus, at a time when he could sell a full grown two-year old goat for barely as much, he decided to join those who were building houses and cultivating tomatoes at their winter refuge.

Settling itself was a formidable task. Not only did they have to change their life style completely, but they also had to work against a hostile environment. The terrain surrounding the village is a set of rocky hills and valleys. To grow lemon and oranges they had to level off the rocks. Then they carried over sand from the seashore and laid it on top of the leveled off rocks. Then, they carried truckloads of soil from their summer refuge and put it on top of the sand, and began to plant their lemon and orange trees, as well as their vegetables. All of this required considerable amount of sacrifice. They had to sell some or all of their livestock to develop their fields, and had to survive on what small land they had by the new village for a while. Probably, by this time moving back and forth as nomads was also becoming cumbersome, and they felt the urge to settle and elected the milder climate as their main place of settlement. The vegetables they raised on their small plots generated enough income for them to survive.

Once their lemon and orange trees began to yield, Ayas began to prosper. Houses with more than one story are a common sight today. A beautiful state highway goes through the village, and it has a thriving tourist industry. Imagine nomads, in three decades (in a man's lifetime) first becoming somewhat settled, highly successful in agriculture, and then, being involved in touristic investment and catering. The change has not been painless. A peasant renting one of his rooms for the summer complained in the following words. "I am longing for my old life [style]. Then we never thought of tomorrow. Now I worry about my loan payments, or that my son is going to pay 900 Liras for Esem Inter, (a sports shoe). I would put my 'carik' (a type of foot cover made

out of untreated animal skin) on, and herd the flock. [Then] we had no information about the world. Our minds were at rest, and we were happy. Now, we hear that 9 people were killed [by the terrorists], or the U.S. declined to give any aid [to Turkey]. Now we even worry about these things. In the old times we would only think of our families. Now we think [about] the whole Turkey, and even the World. One becomes quite uncomfortable." However, the transition is complete, and there is no going back. If they were given a choice they would like to have the luxuries of today with the psychological ease of their old times. It is the tourism effort of Ayas I would like to explicate a little further.

The idea of leasing rooms of their empty houses during the period between May and October was first suggested to them by the German and other European tourists who either were looking for an inexpensive place to stay, or were there to work in the nearby archeological sightes. The first attempts were made on an exploratory basis by one or two of them. They put a couple of beds in one or two rooms of their houses and tried to lease the rooms to the foreign tourists who would like to pass a simple, or even primitive, vacation by the unpolluted sea. This practice began in 1967. Now some of them rent every room of their two or three story houses. Since more rooms meant more money, all the houses used for tourist purposes have as many rooms as possible. In 1967 the village was not electrified. Now all of the houses have electricity, which encouraged more business. However, most or almost all of the vacationers were Turks when we last visited them. The state of the political affairs in Turkey during the summer of 1980 discouraged most foreign tourists from coming to Turkey.

In the first couple of years the room owners also toured the neighboring villages and collected carpets, rugs, sacks, etc. and tried to sell them to

the vacationers. However, this attempt was not successful. It failed completely with the departure of the foreign tourists. Those who initiated receiving tourists in homes ran into resistance from among the villagers. Some even accused them of demeaning the moral bases of the community and their own families. However, no drastic consequences seemed to have ensued from such accusations. Furthermore, those with less land began to participate in the practice by 1974-1975. Now, except for those who have enough land and/or livestock, all the houses near the sea have rooms for lease during the summer months. Furthermore, many are trying to get loans from the Ministry of Tourism and are keeping regular accounts of their business activity.

3.vi: Tirtar's Irrigation Project

Tirtar is a couple of miles from Ayas and both are located in the same administrative district. Tirtar is also located on the same state highway that links Ayas to the subprovincial capital of 'E.' Tirtar's population also consists of ex-nomads who began to settle after World War II. They too seasonally migrate to a summer place in the mountains and grow citrus fruit and vegetables in the seaside village, wheat and barley in the mountains. Each owns a couple of goats and/or sheep, but only a very few are dependent on their livestock as their main source of income. In contrast to Ayas, they have greater difficulty in finding water for their gardens. As their arable land increased, so mounted their problem of irrigation. Since some of the fields are above a hill, soon they realized that they would need more than animal power to water their produce. Being aided by the suggestions of the outsiders who had been using fuel operated water pumps before them, they began to invest in these pumps. Now there are about 100 such pumps between 10 and 100 hp. The

first pump they could get was used to deliver water from the old village well. Some even contended that this first engine was converted to a water pump after an outsider brought it to the village as part of a mill to grind their wheat and barley. Yet they maintained that they lacked the necessary mechanical skills and understanding to repair the pump or even change its oil filter when they first acquired it. One interesting point is that even at that point the pump belonged not to the village but to a certain and better to do peasant. In recent years, they have begun to receive loans for new pumps from banks, and thus it has become less and less difficult for them to purchase new pumps. Furthermore, they have developed the understanding and skills necessary to keep the pumps running. However, the fuel price hikes make it less and less easy for the peasants to operate them as much as they like to. Now they would like to convert the pumps from fuel operated engines to electrically operated ones. Unfortunately, they are not in a position to make the conversion themselves. State aid is absolutely required for such a project. From 1978 to 1980 fuel prices skyrocketed in Turkey, and there has been no collaborative effort on the part of the villagers of Tirtar to pressure the state bureaucracy to make the above mentioned conversion. Their only reaction to the increases in the fuel prices was to try to cut down the use and complain about the lack of support from the state bureaucracy.

In Ayas and Tirtar we have examples of communities where individualism is rampant. However, in Tirtar peasants are more inclined not to be involved in communal projects and try to solve their problems with their own resources. Ayas, has experienced occasions where the majority of inhabitants have participated in a single project for the benefit of the community as well as their own. They seek assistance for their tourism industry by pressuring the local political authorities for financial support, tax relief, sanitation

problems for the houses, such as eradication of the common fly. They once formed a cooperative to launch an irrigation project by the help of which they bought two huge water pumps and operated them as village community. However, the coop dissolved right after the water pumps were brought to Ayas. Why is it that in communities that resemble each other in so many ways, one community is able to launch more rural development projects, and even very innovative ones such as Ayas's tourism effort, while the other can only do less and stagnate?

3.vii: Growing Sunflower in Ballihisar

Ballihisar is located about 18 km. from the subprovincial capital of 'S' in mid-Anatolia. It is connected to 'S' with a gravel road. The importance of this village is not immediately apparent. However, the peasants hastily mention that a Belgian archeological team spent a few years in the village and unearthed an ancient Anatolian city which predates the Roman influence. They have had some experience with the outside world through the road that connects them to 'S,' and through their contact with the Belgians. However, Ballihisar's higher standard of living derives from the wheat and barley it produces. The beer companies pay an excellent price for their barley, and the national prices of wheat have been more than fair to them.

Their production methods have changed over the years. They could buy tractors and numerous harvesting machines on easy credit terms until very recently, when the galloping inflation rate has made it very difficult even for the State Enterprises to offer farm machinery at low prices and with low interest rates. Wheat and barley are their traditional crops which they have been raising for centuries. What is interesting for us to observe was their experiment to switch gradually to sunflower production.

Aside from the seed they were given by the state for free and later for a low price, and the support prices which were retained high over the years to induce sunflower production, the State had no role in the gradual increase in Ballihisar's sunflower production. The first attempts were made by people who observed sunflower fields in other parts of the country. When they discovered that some neighboring villages had been already involved in the production of sunflower, two peasants decided to try it. Meanwhile one other development took place. They discovered that they could utilize underground water supplies by the help of artesian wells. Hence, they had enough water to grow sunflowers. Furthermore, sunflowers require less care than the other major exclusive cash crop of the area, the sugar beet. They did not seek the aid of the state agricultural experts in planting or raising sunflowers. Because they could sell their produce back to the state at a high price, they did not have any major input or marketing problems. However, they are now overwhelmed by a parasitic weed problem neither they nor the state agricultural experts can cure. Yet, some still try to continue growing sunflowers.

3.viii: Istiklalbag's Merino Project

Istiklalbag is closer to 'S' than Ballihisar. It is not as prosperous as Ballihisar. The main reason seems to be the amount of village land that Istiklalbag owns. One eventually notices that the number of Istiklalbag residents working as lower level bureaucrats, school teachers, janitors, etc., in the nearby 'S' and elsewhere is quite high. Aside from wheat and barley, the traditional crops of the area, the economy of the village depends upon its sheep. In 1970, the state veterinarian encouraged the peasants of Istiklalbag to launch an artificial insemination project. Up to that time they had no

knowledge of what a Merino sheep was. Their flock had consisted of pure native Karaman, which has a huge fatty tail. Its wool is harsh and it does not weigh much. Its milk and meat yield is about one-third to one-fifth of Merino, depending on who one believes. Nevertheless, even those who opposed the project among the villagers admit that Merino has much superior meat and milk yield. Furthermore, Merino has a small tail compared to Karaman. Finally, not only do the Merinos yield more wool, but also their wool is of much higher quality and value.

The owners of two flocks who were sharing the chores of looking after their sheep (gubaslik) started with the artificial inseminations in 1970. They soon discovered that artificial insemination requires systematic work. Even though the yield of the Merinos is more than the Karaman, it needs to be fed much better, especially when it is young. Karaman siblings can survive with little food and under harsh weather conditions, but the young Merinos often do not. After four years of nonrigorous implementation, the project was aborted in 1974. They decided not to put all the effort and allocate a lot of resources for a high profit, but to profit much less without going through all the costs and efforts of raising Merinos. Furthermore, neither the very big, nor the very small flock owners participated in this project.

When we visited them again in 1980, we discovered that a good many of them were reconsidering the resumption of the artificial insemination project. The main reason behind the change of attitude is that the price difference between the native sheep and Merino increased over the years on the one hand, and with the aid of recently acquired farm equipment the amount of land they used to graze their sheep began to shrink on the other hand. Hence, they now have to care for their Karaman almost in the same way they must care for the Merinos. Hence, the cost of the project, for which the veterinarian does not

charge anything, has decreased while the benefits that may accrue from it have increased considerably. However, there are still some flock owners who do not want to switch and prefer to continue with their old practices. Since the grazing land has shrunk, this means that they occasionally end up grazing their flock on the cultivated fields of their fellow peasants. The headman complained during our interview that "some do not care whether others' fields, crops or trees are totally destroyed. For them the only important thing is that they graze their sheep, perhaps for only one [additional] day, [without making any spending]".

It is interesting to note that we were not able to find any distinct inclination for a rural development project among the inhabitants of the more prosperous Ballihisar, even though they can, and occasionally do, act collectively. At least, they systematically and deliberately vote for one political party. Since that political party has recently been more in power than any other political party, they have benefited considerably from their voting behavior. In other words, they traded their votes in the primary and national elections for services and received them. However, this was not replicated in their economic behavior, a contrast to the poorer Istiklalbag which exhibits a considerable amount of commitment to development projects. I will try to inquire into why a more developed community fails to organize itself around a collective endeavour, while a less developed community can?

3.vii: Gundas's Artesian Well

Gundas is located in Southeastern Turkey, a couple of miles from the border. A gravel road connects it with the border town and the subprovincial capital of 'A.' When we first arrived in the village in 1978 a field of

vegetables and plentiful water supply attracted our attention. In fact in an area known for its scarce water resources and not noted for its vegetable production, Gundas provided quite a contrast. Soon we discovered that water was coming out of an artesian well dug by the headman and the landlord of the village, who took great pride in offering cups of water from his well, which is often closely watched by him and his men against outside encroachment. It was doubtful that even the other villagers, except for the members of his extended family, could use the water as well. The headman, later on, revealed that he makes more money from his vegetables than his wheat, which is the main source of income for most villages of the area.

The village consists of five separate settlements, and most of them are inhabited by people somewhat related to the headman and their servants. Most peasants who are related to the headman are hired hands who reside in the village for a couple of years as hired hands. Some of the villagers indicated that they pass the winter in the village and go to the Cukurova region to pick cotton and to work at odd jobs during the summer. The village has a primary school and a health center, both of which were built by the state, without any voluntary help from the villagers. The headman had installed a generator which provided his needs. Publicly provided electricity is available in the area now, but it is used exclusively to operate the recently installed water pumps. In other words, recently, the state has started providing the water needed for irrigation. In this village, we were not able to find traces of any rural development project that was undertaken or even contemplated by the local residents, except by the headman. The artesian well and the water that pours out of it symbolize, by its location next to the headman's house, by being closely watched, and by being used only for the vegetable production in the field to the other side of the headman's house, the very nature of the

village, and the role and power of the headman in the village affairs..

3.x: Guneren's Irrigation Problems

Guneren is also a couple of miles from the border and is connected with the nearby town of 'A' by a gravel road. It also consists of four settlements. There is no single strongman in this village. However, the settlement pattern is determined by land disputes. The families who think that their land may be encroached by other villagers settle closer to their land to keep an eye on their crops. In 1978 when we first visited the village they were all wheat growers. Some of them were landless, and they went to Cukurova to pick cotton in the summer and lived in the village only during winters.

By 1980, when we last visited them a major change occurred in the village. A multi-billion dollar project has been under way in that part of Turkey. When completed this project will provide abundant water supply to this region. However, the location of Guneren is such that some parts of it cannot benefit from this irrigation project. In 1979, another state funded project was implemented and 33 artesian wells had been dug. Each well has an electric water pump, which is operated and maintained by a state agency. By the help of this project more than half of the agricultural land of the village receives sufficient water. However, the rest of the village farmland will neither receive any water from the former nor the latter project. Most of the land that is excluded from the irrigation projects is owned by the headman and his relatives and neighbors, who had been wealthier than the rest of the peasants in the village. Now this difference seem to be shrinking, and even tilting toward the owners of the newly irrigated land. A few minutes of chat with the headman and his neighbors is enough to indicate the soreness and tension in

the village. They have two mosques, which were built prior to the conflict, and they seem to attract different masses. The drinking water fountain has also dried up in the headman's part of the village, which causes them to go to the other side to get water. This, we were told, is a task of some difficulty. Yet, they seem to suffice with complaining or writing up a petition and submitting it to the subprovincial governor. They seem to lack the ability to exert further pressure or formulate demands to procure the necessary funds from the state bureaucracy. Furthermore their reaction to the irrigation project had not been any more than their reaction to the drinking water situation.

Both Gundas and Guneren lack any rural development project that requires communal action or widespread local support. Some of the reasons are explicitly or implicitly suggested by the above descriptions. In the following I will try to further inquire into the conditions and determinants of local participation in rural development projects in Gundas and Guneren, as well as the previously described cases.

[Table 1 about here]

3.xi: A Classification of the Rural Development Projects

I shall now attempt to classify the above mentioned projects and try to account for their success or failure in providing economic development to rural communities. The villages where there has not been any major rural development projects are nonetheless incorporated in the following classification and used in the analysis.

In Table 2 the descriptions of the projects discussed above are

Table 1: A Summary of the General Characteristics of the ten Villages

Name of the Village	Population	Number of Households	Road to Town	Public Facilities	Agricultural Machinery	Savings in the Town	Agricultural Loans	Number of Socio-Political Organizational Affiliations						Total	S	r ²	s
								Local Mass	Local Influentials	Some	One	Two	Three				
Kathalabag	773	135	Gravel (11 km)	Primary School, Mosque, Guest Room, Camp, Building, Laundry, Coffee House	25 tractors 3 harvesters 26 other	79,762.- T.L. 16 households Mode- 3,355 T.L. (Dec. 31, 1978)	1,744,331.- T.L. 316 payments	Local Mass	51.7	24.2	7.8	0.0	100.0	52	r ² = 0.09	s = 0.04	
Kallthiar	617	120	Gravel (11 km)	Primary and Secondary Schools, Water Fountain, Flood Prevention Dam, Health Center, Mosque, Post Office (Telephone), Laundry, Imam's and Teacher's House	30 tractors 7 harvesters 31 other	115,256.- T.L. 16 households Mode- 1,599.- T.L.	1,218,738 208 payments	Local Mass	90.2	8.2	1.6	0.0	100.0	41	r ² = 1.49	s = 0.13	
Dagdervim	664	84	Gravel (25 km)	Primary School, Water Fountain, Mosque	5 tractors 1 other	None	324,618.- T.L. 60 payments	Local Mass	94.4	5.6	0.0	0.0	100.0	18	r ² = 0.52	s = 1.0	
Bumardera	729 (1975) 307 (1965)	98 (1975) 85 (1965)	Gravel (18 km)	Primary School, Mosque, Cooperative Building, Creamery, Electric Generator, Coop's Storage Building	25 tractors 2 harvesters	55,773.- T.L. 9 households Mode- 14,737 T.L. (Dec. 31, 1978)	1,57,370.- 28 payments	Local Mass	25.6	53.5	14.0	3.5	100.0	43	r ² = 1.6	s = 0.16	
Gandaa	421	87	Gravel (15 km)	Primary School, Health Center, Water Fountain, Mosque, Electric Generator (belongs to headman)	3 tractors	None	156,421.- T.L. 25 payments	Local Mass	74.5	17.6	5.9	0.0	100.0	17	r ² = 1.24	s = 0.33	
Gomara	373	39	Gravel (12 km)	Primary School, Health Center, Water Fountain	3 tractors 2 others	None	109,473.- T.L. 36 payments	Local Mass	100.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	100.0	13	r ² = 1.01	s = 0.19	
Virtar	1307	260	Asphalt (5 km)	Primary School, Mosque, Imam's House, Water Fountain	15 tractors 15 other	80,843.- T.L. 5 households Mode- 17,631.- T.L.	2,117,048.- T.L. 281 payments	Local Mass	54.2	25.0	4.2	16.7	100.0	24	r ² = 0.67	s = 0.28	
Ayaa	1451	296	Asphalt (8 km)	Primary School, Water Pump, Electricity, Secondary School, Coffee House, Mosque	8 tractors 4 others	228,226.- T.L. (in borrowing) 87 households Mode- 5958.- T.L. No saving accounts	1,781,877.- T.L. 225 payments	Local Mass	37.3	31.3	25.0	6.3	100.0	16	r ² = 4.18	s = 0.36	
Talbaya	604	120	Asphalt (1 km)	Primary School, Mosque, Guest Room, Coffee House	18 tractors 4 others	65,756.- T.L. 4 households Mode- 6,664.- T.L.	2,108,511.- T.L. 157 payments	Local Mass	40.0	33.3	20.0	6.7	100.0	15	r ² = 1.74	s = 0.43	
Dumarsal	577	100	Asphalt (13 km)	Primary School, Mosque, Imam's House, Guest Room, Water Reservoir, Teacher's Quarters, Post Office, Telephone	30 tractors	43,118.- T.L. 10 households Mode-77,551.- T.L.	604,430.- T.L. 130 payments	Local Mass	92.9	17.6	17.6	11.8	100.0	17	r ² = 9.85	s = 0.24	

Table 2: Some Major Characteristics of the Rural Development Efforts Considered in this Paper

	<u>Donerdere</u>	<u>Dagdeviren</u>	<u>Balihisar</u>	<u>Istiklalbag</u>	<u>Damarasi</u>	<u>Yolboyu</u>	<u>Ayas</u>	<u>Tirtar</u>	<u>Gundas</u>	<u>Guneren</u>
1. Initiation (Who Initiated the effort?)	Outside suggestion Local Residents	No major or sizable project or effort has been launched	Local Residents	State Veterinarian	Outside Suggestion and help Local Res.	No major or sizable project or effort has recently been launched	Local Residents	Local Resid.	Landlord	State
2. Scope (Who Participated)	85% in favor at the initiation. All Participate Later		Those with the necessary resources (water, land)	Those with the necessary resources (sheep)	Those with the necessary resources (water, land)		Those near the sea	All with land	A Few	None
3. Contributions										
a. Time	All required		All required	Some	All required		None	All req.	Some	None
b. Material	600 TL in the begin. All required later		Sizable investment	No material cost (immediate)	Sizable investment		Some	Sizable Investment	Sizable Invest.	None
c. Skills	As required, all necessary		Not much required	None is necessary	No new skills necessary		Dealing with the city folks	Some	None	None
4. Complexity	Hi level of organization Book-keeping contact w/gov. etc.		Simple	Simple	Simple		Book-keeping, dealing with gov. and customers	Simple	Simple	Irrelevant
5. Benefits										
a. Who Benefit	The Community		The participants	The particip.	The particip.		The Parti. and village customers	The Parti. Material	Landlord Material	Some Material
b. Type	Mostly material		Material	Material	Material		Material	Material		
6. Prior Experience	None		None/Some	None	None/Some		None	Some	None	None
7. Dist. of Power	Equitable	Deteriorating	Not-Equitable	Not-Equitable	Not-Equitable	Not-Equitable	Not-Equitable	Not-Equitable	Pyramidal	Not-Equitable
8. Perception of Govern.	Government Benevolent	Ambivalent	Ambivalent	Ambivalent	Ambivalent	Ambivalent	Ambivalent	Ambivalent	Ambivalent	Ambivalent
9. Environment	Hostile	Favorable	Favorable	Favorable	Favorable		Favorable	Favorable	Favorable	Favorable

summarized. Nine basic characteristics of the projects are included in Table 2. Even though all of the nine characteristics of the projects may be alluded to from time to time, for classificatory purposes I will focus on two of them: who initiated the projects, and how extensively they were accepted. In Table 3 a concise classification is presented.

TABLE 3: A Concise Classification of Rural Development Projects

The Extent to which the Project is Accepted

		Whole Village Community	Some Local Residents with the Necessary Resources (i.e. water)	Single Local Resident
		General Benefits(*)	Individual Benefits	Individual Benefits
State		School, Health Center, Dam(**)	Irrigation in Guneren, Artif. Insem. in Istiklalbag	No Example
	Private Outside Help or Suggestion	General/Individual Benefits	Individual Benefits	Individual Benefits
		Tourism in Ayas	"Union" in Damarasi	No Example
Local Resident		Individual Benefits	Individual Benefits	Individual Benefits
		Irrigation in Tirtar	Sunflower in Ballihisar	No Example
Locus of Initiation	Local Leader	General Benefits	Individual Benefits	Individual Benefits
		Road, Mosque(**)	Purchase of Agri. Equipment(**)	Artesian Well in Gundas
	Local Residents (Community)	General Benefits	Individual Benefits	Individual Benefits
		Coop. in Donerdere	Irrigation in Ayas	No Example

(*) The concepts that appear above the line in each cell indicate the type of benefit that emanated from the rural development effort in question. In one case it is indicated that both private and public good accrued from the development effort in question. E.g., in Ayas, the tourism effort contributed to the electrification of the village.

(**) Examples of these projects or actions exist in all of the villages, including Dagdeviren and Yolboyu, the names of which do not appear in our classification.

The categories of Table 3, about which we have no examples in our study of Turkish villages, will naturally not be discussed in this paper. I will not spend too much time on four other categories, which I believe are not very interesting, in the sense that they are too well known, they exist in almost all cultures, they do not carry a great importance from our perspective, because the inputs of the villagers or villages are and can be minimal, and/or they are only indirectly related to economic change. Furthermore, three of these categories consist of projects or efforts of rural development which exist in all of our ten villages, and thus they exhibit no variance. Dams, schools, health centers, etc. are built by the state agencies exclusively or by minimal aid of the villages. If the project is beyond a certain scale, such as a major irrigation project would be, it is nationally planned and implemented, almost without the aid of any local residents. There is some competition among almost every group of neighboring villages to have an elementary school, or even a secondary school, built near or in their own village, so that their children will not have to walk for long hours in the winter. However, almost all the efforts are expected from the relevant state agencies in question. Besides, the local bureaucrats can easily ward off these pressures, if one of these villages is not closely connected with a legislator. Village roads are also built according to a nationally designed plan, on which the influence of the villages seem to be about the priorities. Again, contacting of the local influentials at the provincial level and their legislators at the national level are the major forms of action employed by the peasants in their fight for priorities. From the standpoint of political participation, inquiring into these contacts would be fascinating. However, in

this paper I will try to focus on those efforts that are more directly associated with rural economic change, the examples of which I have in abundance.

Two kinds of rural development efforts which we found to be often initiated by a local leader (or local influential) that with almost no resistance eventually get adopted were mosque building and the spread of farm machinery, herbicide, insecticide, chemical fertilizers, in sum, modern agricultural inputs. Even in our most conflict ridden villages we have found out that mosques were built with collaborative efforts of the local community. Unless one wants to risk considerable social pressure, he cannot avoid contributing to such a project. Raising funds for it is not a very difficult task. Outside help is almost always necessary and easily attainable, especially for the construction of the minaret. It seems as if mosque building is the one subject on which all the members of the community can agree, or fail to challenge the deeds of the others. In a sense, the mosque becomes the very indicator of the existence of a community. Mosque building efforts of the villages are cases of collective action. However, the relationship of this action to rural development projects is not obvious. Collaboration for mosque building has occurred in nine of our ten villages, without necessarily creating a habit of collaborative or collective action which may be extended to the realm of rural development. In other words, the collaborative effort of mosque building does not seem to be correlated with the initiation, adoption or implementation of rural development projects.

So far as the diffusion of novel inputs such as chemical fertilizers, herbicides, insecticides, tractors, etc. are concerned, we do not have enough variance in our sample to warrant an extensive analysis. Those who had enough land to make the use of these inputs possible and enough financial means to

purchase them are already reaping their benefits. However, so far as attitudes toward using modern agricultural inputs are concerned, we have a sample who overwhelmingly acknowledges the benefits of employing the above mentioned inputs (see Table 4). In fact, elite or mass status of our respondents or the level of economic development of the villages seem to have no influence on the above mentioned attitudes (see Table 4).

The overwhelming acceptance of the above mentioned inputs by the members of our sample may require brief explanation. The peasants of our sample, through three decades of trial and error, and observation of the use of modern agricultural inputs in and around their villages by others, began to believe that there is a close association between the use of modern agricultural inputs and crop yields. The spread of modern agricultural equipment has occurred as a result of a long process of diffusion through experimentation, which was initially undertaken by those who had enough land and resources to afford the negative impacts of the experiment in question. Once their experiments, which were closely observed by the other members of the village community, were successful, those who could afford the expenditure began to adopt the experiment. In the initial stages the state agricultural experts performed demonstrations in the village to show the superior influences of the above mentioned inputs on the crop yields. They had to try hard to get the first member of the community (who is always a peasant with enough land holdings to afford the experiment, but not necessarily the richest member of the community) to permit them to use his land and/or livestock for the demonstration. By now the use of such inputs is common in our ten villages.

4. The Role of Local Residents and Communities in Rural Development

Table 4: Practice of and Attitudes toward Using Modern Technology in Agriculture

	Actual Use of Chemical Fertilizers			Desired Use of Chemical Fertilizers				Actual Use of Chemical Fertilizers			Desired Use of Chemical Fertilizers				
	Does not Use	Uses	Total	Does not Want	Wants	Total		Does not Use	Uses	Total	Does not Want	Wants	Total		
Local Mass	15.7	84.3	100.0	0.6	99.4	100.0	Less Developed	17.1	82.9	100.0	0.9	99.1	100.0		
Local Influentials	12.1	87.9	100.0	0.6	99.4	100.0	More Developed	11.5	88.5	100.0	0.6	99.4	100.0		
	$\chi^2 = 1.20$; $N = 566$ $s = 0.27$			$\chi^2 = 0.04$; $N = 546$ $s = 0.83$				$\chi^2 = 6.45$; $N = 566$ $s = .91$			$\chi^2 = 0.12$; $N = 546$ $s = 0.77$				
	Actual Use of Artificial Insemination of Livestock			Desired Use of Artificial Insemination of Livestock				Actual Use of Artificial Insemination of Livestock			Desired Use of Artificial Insemination of Livestock				
	Does not Use	Uses	Total	Does not Want	Wants	Total		Does not Use	Uses	Total	Does not Want	Wants	Total		
Local Mass	60.7	39.3	100.0	18.7	81.3	100.0	Less Developed	64.7	35.3	100.0	12.6	87.4	100.0		
Local Influentials	58.2	41.8	100.0	11.5	88.5	100.0	More Developed	56.8	43.2	100.0	19.0	81.0	100.0		
	$\chi^2 = 6.27$; $N = 505$ $s = 0.60$			$\chi^2 = 3.37$; $N = 435$ $s = 0.66$				$\chi^2 = 3.16$; $N = 505$ $s = 0.68$			$\chi^2 = 3.10$; $N = 435$ $s = 0.68$				
	Type of Instrument Used in Tilling Land							Type of Instrument Used in Tilling Land							
	Does not own Land	Human Power	Wooden Plow	Metal Plow	Tractor	Total		Does not own Land	Human Power	Wooden Plow	Metal Plow	Tractor	Total		
Local Mass	5.5	21.5	13.0	6.5	54.7	100.0	Less Developed	7.6	22.3	10.0	5.2	55.0	100.0		
Local Influential	3.0	16.0	15.6	4.8	59.9	100.0	More Developed	2.7	17.8	16.9	4.2	58.5	100.0		
	$\chi^2 = 3.72$; $N = 586$ $s = 0.64$							$\chi^2 = 14.3$; $N = 566$ $s = 0.606$							
	Desired Type of Instrument in Tilling Land								Desired Type of Instrument in Tilling Land						
	Human Power	Wooden Plow	Metal Plow	Tractor	Harvester	The Newest Invention	Total		Human Power	Wooden Plow	Metal Plow	Tractor	Harvester	The Newest Invention	Total
Local Mass	1.4	2.1	2.1	71.4	3.5	19.5	100.0	Less Developed	1.2	1.8	2.4	72.7	4.8	17.0	100.0
Local Influential	0.8	0.0	0.0	76.8	2.4	20.0	100.0	More Developed	1.2	1.2	0.8	73.3	2.0	21.5	100.0
	$\chi^2 = 6.16$; $N = 412$ $s = .29$								$\chi^2 = 5.54$; $N = 412$ $s = 0.35$						
	Actual Use of Herbicides			Desired Use of Herbicides				Actual Use of Herbicides			Desired Use of Herbicides				
	Does not Use	Uses	Total	Does not Want	Wants	Total		Does not Use	Uses	Total	Does not Want	Wants	Total		
Local Mass	20.5	79.5	100.0	2.8	97.2	100.0	Less Developed	21.0	79.0	100.0	3.1	96.9	100.0		
Local Influentials	14.6	85.4	100.0	0.6	99.4	100.0	More Developed	17.1	82.9	100.0	1.6	98.4	100.0		
	$\chi^2 = 2.58$; $N = 560$ $s = 0.11$			$\chi^2 = 2.64$; $N = 549$ $s = 0.10$				$\chi^2 = 1.36$; $N = 560$ $s = 0.24$			$\chi^2 = 1.39$; $N = 549$ $s = 0.23$				

Here I will focus on some of the major cases of success and failure in the remaining categories of my typology. In so doing, I will start from the most complex, organized, and extensively adopted projects, such as Donerdere's cooperative, and work my way down to the less complex, less organized and less extensively influential efforts. More specifically, I will, first of all, focus on the 'success' stories of Donerdere's cooperative versus the failure of Dagdeviren, and secondly Damarasi's "Union" versus the Yolboyu's failure to come up with a successful rural development project. Thirdly, I will focus on Ayas's experience with its small tourism industry and compare it with Tirtar's orientation to its irrigation problems. Fourthly, I will focus on Guneren's irrigation and Istiklalbag's Merinos projects as examples of state initiated and/or implemented rural development projects. Fifthly, I only intend to give scant attention to Ballihisar's experience with sunflower, only to the extent of underscoring the influence of abundant resources on rural development efforts. Finally, I will discuss the artesian well of Gundas, as an example of a rural development effort initiated and implemented by a local influential in a patriarchal authority structure.

4.i: Donerdere and Dagdeviren: Local Success versus Stagnation

I will define success or failure of a rural development project or effort in terms of its long term influence on the standard of living and the integration of the community within which it is implemented. Specifically, I am willing to call a rural development effort successful if it enhances the standard of living of the community within which it is implemented without endangering its integration, i.e., without contributing to intra-village conflict. If the project in question can satisfy both of these criteria over a

relatively long period of time, such as a decade or more, without any major setbacks, it should be considered a highly successful project. It is in this sense that Donerdere's cooperative is a highly successful project, and Damarasi's 'Union' or Ayas's experience with leasing rooms to vacationers are successful projects.

Donerdere's cooperative not only lives up to my definition of success, but it also functions as a source of further development efforts, which in turn tremendously contribute to the standard of living as well as to the integration of the community (see Figure 1). There are numerous factors which contributed to the success of this rural development project. First of all, virtually everyone in the village, even the children take part in the activities of the cooperative. It attracts widespread participation. Secondly, the cooperative has a significant impact on the prosperity of the village and the individual members of the community. An average member of the Donerdere community is favorably disposed toward the cooperative, and perceives a close association between his self-interests, the prosperity of his community and the performance of the cooperative. In fact, the cooperative is not only a marketing, product processing, profit-maximizing, chore-sharing device. It also provides those with ideas and imagination with a chance to propose and launch new development projects. These projects ranged from the installation of an electricity generator to the maintenance of bulls to upgrade the quality of their livestock. Furthermore, Donerdere did not have a similar organization or experience before they moved to their present location which encourages me to view the environmental factors as the major causes of their successful enterprise.

It was noted earlier that as soon as the peasants of Donerdere arrived at their present location they encountered a tremendous amount of hostility from

the neighboring villages. The hostility of their social environment was expressed by the theft of their livestock, confiscation and plunder of their land and crops, denial of passage to their newly acquired fields by their neighbors, etc. Moreover, the peasants of Donerdere were not accustomed to their new natural environment. Where they came from, they were living in a forested area. In their present location there are hardly any trees. They were used to growing corn, now the climate forced them to grow wheat and animal feed. The hostility of their social and natural environments presented them with two alternatives (Ince, p.6). One was to pack up and leave. This would mean going back to their forest village, where they lost their houses after soil erosion and flood, and try to make ends meet there. Theoretically each could have moved to a big city and tried to find a job there. However, now they adamantly argue that they did not seriously consider this move then. If they chose either of these options, they would have to be on their own, and without any resources these options were hardly appealing to any member of the community. Their second alternative was to stay. Here, their houses were built by the state. Furthermore, the state was ready to support them for some time, until they could survive on their own. Each was given enough land to cultivate and survive on. It may have been difficult to adapt to the new conditions, but they could try.

There was one way to cope with the hostile challenges of their environment, to unite and pool their resources and energies. And, unite they did. Thus, Donerdere became highly united under the influence of a considerably hostile social and natural environment before the cooperative was established. In fact, the cooperative was only a small but significant step in the organization of their already concerted actions, which provided them with an improved and durable mechanism to cope with the challenges of the

environment. Hence Donerdere's cooperative is an institutionalized problem-solving device, which can cope with the social, economic, and political problems, mobilize people for the defense of the community, for the implementation of a project, i.e., to make the necessary contacts with the state bureaucracy and to raise funds. It is very hard to see how such a mechanism could be devised without a high level of prior integration of the community, which in this case was prompted by a intensely hostile environment threatening a culturally homogenous group.

Under the above mentioned circumstances Donerdere had to make some drastic changes in its internal social organization. It does not have a coffee or tea house as I mentioned earlier. This is because in such places people play cards or backgammon, and even gamble, all of which are causes of resentment and soreness against opponents, who happen to be fellow-villagers. Besides, men spend a certain amount of time in coffee houses, socializing and gossiping about each other. Hence, coffee houses provide the bases for intra-village conflict, a condition that they can hardly afford. From the start the inhabitants of Donerdere realized that they had to minimize internal conflict and/or maximize the solidarity of their community. However, this orientation has not totally eroded internal competition for communal service, from which they take considerable pride.(3) Hence, the annual meetings of the cooperative members is full of vigorous discussion, which mostly revolve around how successfully the funds have been handled, and how they should be handled in the future.(4) This brings us to another cause of success.

Donerdere has a large pool of potential leaders, who not only have the necessary skills to run the business of the cooperative, but they also have the support and trust of their fellow-villagers, a commodity which does not exist in the neighboring communities.(5) For example, there is no one person

the inhabitants of Dagdeviren could name, other than the headman, who may lead such an organization, and the trust they have in him is pretty shallow. The headman of Dagdeviren himself argued that he could depend upon the word of the peasants of Donerdere in economic and financial transactions, but he would not believe in his own fellow-villagers.

The abundance of the above mentioned skills in Donerdere may be explained by their previous experiences, which they had before they came to settle in their present location. The resources of their previous village compelled them to seek supplementary sources of income. Thus a good number of them had to work in the big cities some months of the year, and some went abroad to find employment. Their experiences and skills became assets for their new community. Thus they developed an understanding for the ways of the city folks. They are able to communicate with them and the bureaucrats very easily. They can formulate or derive demands from their complaints, grievances, wishes, and dreams about the future of their community. We were told by the local bureaucrats that, on numerous occasions, they questioned and scrutinized Ministers of various governments who were paying visits to the district, a type of action quite unorthodox for villagers.

George M. Foster convincingly argued that "[t]he members of every society share a common cognitive orientation which is, in effect, an un verbalized, implicit expression of their understanding of the 'rules of the games' of living imposed upon them by their social, natural, and supernatural universes.... All normative behavior of the members of a group is a function of their particular way of looking at their total environment, their conscious acceptance of the 'rules of the game' implicit in their cognitive orientation." (1967: p.300). When the initiator of rural development efforts in the rural communities happens to be the state agencies, the cognitive

orientations of the peasants toward the "state" begins to assume great importance. It is the perceptions of the role of the state or the center in the lives of the inhabitants of Donerdere and Dagdeviren I would like to turn to now.

For an inhabitant of Donerdere, government is perceived to be benevolent. It is their source of funds and services. If properly approached it can be used to the ends of the village. For an inhabitant of Dagdeviren, government and/or state is something to be avoided. The arrival of its agents often signifies trouble, either it needs men for the army, or more taxes, or the implementation of some project the end value of which is uncertain for him. Government is a source of obligations, which should be treated with respect and avoided as much as possible. We were told over and over again that they are willing to accept and adopt any project the results of which is demonstrated to be beneficial to each and every one of them. However, the state agronomist who performed some successful demonstrations in Dagdeviren, none of which were adopted, told us that the peasants told him "Of course your demonstrations were successful. You are the government. We are peasants. If we do it, it will fail." The only source from which they are likely to imitate or adopt a novelty is the neighboring communities, or fellow-villagers, which is often noted as a successful method of diffusing novelties in "identifiable neighborhoods." (Lionberger and Hassinger, Cf. Bertrand, 1958: p. 375). This was how tractors have come to be owned by some of the villagers. However, it is not very clear what owning a tractor means to the inhabitants of Dagdeviren. I am quite certain that it is more than farm equipment. It is at least a symbol of prestige and wealth, and a vehicle used for transportation purposes. Thus, it is not very clear how some other type of novelty may be adopted by this community. Obviously, making it a prestige and

power symbol will not hurt.

In brief, Donerdere has greater skill and ability to deal with the outside world, including the government, than Dagdeviren. Its members are also more favorably predisposed toward the political authorities than are the members of Dagdeviren. Thus, Donerdere is able to receive more funds and services from the state agencies because of their abilities and skills in precipitating governmental action for rural development. F. G. Bailey's observations for some Indian villages, on the other hand, are quite appropriate for Dagdeviren. "Within the moral community the peasant understands the range of possible action, within limits, he knows what his opponent will do, because he and his opponent... share certain basic values... But outside of the moral community none of these controls apply: Official action is unpredictable" (Bailey, 1971, p.308). The opposite of the latter claim seems to be true for Donerdere.

Furthermore, Dagdeviren has always had a certain amount of internal conflict, which from time to time flared to a level that made amicable interactions among the members of the community highly difficult. Trust in fellow villagers in economic and financial transactions, and skills in raising and managing funds, which are necessary for the implementation of a project like the cooperative, have been woefully lacking in Dagdeviren.

In Figure 1 I summarize the process of sustained economic growth that has taken place in Donerdere.

Hostile Environment	Community Solidarity	Village Cooperative	Locally Initiated and Successfully Implemented Rural Development Projects
(During 1965-1980)	Communal Cultivation and Sharing Land and Crop (During 1965-1966)	(Established 1966) Skills ----- 1.Leadership 2.Management of Resources 3.Ability to Contact the Outside World (National Market, State Bureaucracy)	1.Building of the Creamery(1968) 2.Wheat Mill(1969) 3.Electric Generator(1972) 4.Land Improvement(1973) 5.A Course in Carpet Weaving* (1973) 6.Establishment of a store to sell Consumer Products to the Members of Coop.* (1973) 7.Project to Upgrade the Quality of the Livestock(1974) 8.The Re-building of the Creamery(1974) 9.Electrified Flour Mill(1977) 10.Improvement of the Water Distribution System(1978)

(*) These were implemented for a brief period of time and were aborted. The first one could not attract enough participants from among the women, because they carry a huge load of household and field chores. They simply did not have the extra time and energy to learn how to weave carpets. The second project ran into financial difficulties when the prices of the consumer goods they carried began to require an operating capital of about 3 million Turkish Liras, which they happened not to have. The store was closed down.

Figure 1: A Schematic Presentation of the Causes of Rural Economic Change in Donerdere

Since no similar developments occurred in Dagdeviren, I will not try to replicate a similar configuration to summarize my earlier arguments about Dagdeviren. However, I would like to repeat the fact that Dagdeviren almost has the reverse of all of the conditions and characteristics mentioned in

Figure 1.

In sum, we have some evidence which indicates that lack of internal conflict, and the presence of a multitude of members who possess skills in contacting the outside world and the political authorities, and in managing financial resources contribute to economic development in rural communities, whereas lack of communal solidarity and the absence of the above mentioned skills in a rural community of similar size is likely to be detrimental to sustained economic change.

4.ii: Damarasi's "Union": The Convergence of Self-Interests

Damarasi's "Union" has not emerged out of a similar environment to Donerdere's cooperative. However, Damarasi is also noted for its lack of internal conflict. It has no major social cleavages. First of all, it is a rich community. Its tobacco is of good quality, and green pepper production has considerably contributed to the high standard of living of its inhabitants. One main characteristic of the village is its being located by the roadside. They have always had a great amount of interaction with the outside world. In fact, for a long while, intercity busses stopped very near the village. The villagers could easily reach the nearby town or the provincial capital and even the nearby metropolitan Izmir. Their interactions with the city-dwellers have contributed to their skills and ability to contact and deal with them, with whom they have an ongoing commercial contact. Besides, the road has led to their fairly early integration with the national economy. They could be easily reached by the wholesalers of the big cities. In addition, being located in a province which elected a prime minister who served for ten years eased their access to the funds and services of the

center.

The "Union" has the support of the wholesalers in large cities, who almost guarantee the purchase of their early season green pepper production. The "Union" can hire someone, generally a member who regularly searches for reliable customers for their green peppers. Thus, the "Union," in a sense, broadens the market for their green peppers, and increases the chance of getting a better price for the members than they can otherwise get through their individual efforts. It is a situation in which all who participate in the "Union" benefit, without taking any more risk than going it alone. If they cannot make a sales connection through the "Union," they would still not lose everything, although they would need to market their products themselves, which is what they would have had to do without the "Union" anyway. Union or not they could lose if their product, because there were no buyers, were returned to them or left to rot. Fortunately for the peasants of Damarasi, this is something that has not happened yet. One should consider the fact that a wholesaler will not gain from such a situation either. Moreover, peasants can easily switch to another product, like peanuts, with which they have recently been experimenting. Furthermore, they are rich enough to absorb the loss and the cost of the switch. Some even hinted that they may even go ahead with the switch, if the relative prices of green pepper as opposed to peanuts began to show signs of deterioration.

Throughout the time we stayed in the village they were eagerly watching the TV news for some hints about the agricultural support prices. Once they were announced by the government spokesman, remarks of approval or disapproval and some discussion followed in every gathering at which we happened to be listening to the news. The future production plans for the peasants of Damarasi seemed to be closely associated with the current prices for their

agricultural goods, as well as the marketability of the goods in question. The experiences of the villagers with the outside world, their ease of access to the outside world, thanks to the funds of the state, by the help of which they received their telephone, telegram and post office, as well as electricity. I should also note the fact that they do not lack potential leaders. In fact, as I already mentioned, the "Union" had survived a change in leadership without any setbacks.

Thus, the "Union" of Damarasi is a project that evolves out of the concerted individual interests of the mid and large size landowners of the community. However, in a previous occasion the village expressed a greater potential for collaboration. In an earlier water project, the village had challenged the center and proceeded to restore a drinking water storage facility, laying pipes to the village, and connecting running water to each house in a matter of a few days. They take pride in mentioning their accomplishment. That was a project in which the political authorities were forcing them to share a drinking water system with other villages in which they believed an undue burden was being placed on them. Hence, they designed and successfully executed a drinking water storage project before the political authorities had enough time to react. The burdens were shared equitably by all. It seems as if this water project cleared the way for further collaboration to follow. Success seems to contribute to future accomplishments. If this conclusion is valid, we should expect to find that if one rural development project is successfully implemented by the participation of the local residents, others are likely to follow. Thus, the sense of "self-accomplishment" seems to be a critical factor. However, we should be cautious in making inferences from this observation.

Self-accomplishment and the communal action which led to it are likely to

be highly influenced by the lack of severe intra-village conflict.(6) In a social setting rigged with severe conflict, a communal project which requires the contribution of all or even the majority of the members is likely to encounter considerable resistance. In a conflict ridden community one may expect to find the potential benefits that may accrue from collaboration to be weighed against the cost of collaboration, i.e., hatred or dislike of the others. The proposal to collaborate may run the risk of being perceived as a trick to change the tide of events in favor of the party to the conflict which proposes it.(7) Thus, I would like to hypothesize that the more cash related the proposal, the higher the chance of it being perceived as a device to transfer funds from one party of the conflict to the other. Because the severity of conflict increases the distrust of the sides in each other, the cost of losing heavily to the other party of the conflict may soon outweigh the benefits that are to accrue from a collaborative enterprise. Hence, in the presence of severe intra-village conflict, communal action is hard to accomplish. However, certain types of communal action are more likely to happen than others. Mosque building can be a communal project in a conflict ridden community, where the cost of losing in such a project is almost nil. On the other hand, a village cooperative, in which the raising and the management of funds is central to the enterprise, has a much less chance of proving attractive to local residents in a conflict ridden community. Thus, the "Union," which handles cash flow into the village could not have taken off from the ground in a conflict ridden village. And, it is the lack of severe intra-village conflict, especially the lack of conflict among the mid and large size landowners, which contributed to the success of the "Union," as well as to the construction of the drinking water system.

Yet not all types of success are likely to breed further success. Yolboyu

has also been rewarded by the environment. They are not as rich as their neighboring Damarasi. However, their tobacco and cotton have not failed to contribute to their standard of living. Their success with switching to growing tobacco, and later partly to cotton from herding camels has not made them venturesome. They seem to be pretty content with their way of living. Except for the mosque, they have not pooled their resources and collectively launched a project. I should also note that Yolboyu has been under the dominating influence of the nearby town of 'C.' Its better quality land had been bought by the inhabitants of 'C.' Its resources are more limited than Damarasi. They are almost totally dependent on their tobacco and cotton production. They do not and cannot grow wheat at the same time. Thus, they are at the mercy of the national economy. One implication of these observations is that the cost of losing in an economic venture is much higher for the peasants of Yolboyu. Besides, they have crops, the sale of which is virtually ensured. So long as the state continues to give a good price for their tobacco and cotton, Yolboyu will not have any reason or motive to switch to an alternative cash crop, or different way of life.

4.iii : Ayas and Tirtar: The Leap of a Century in two Decades

Finally, the project of Ayas is another example where the intrusion of the outside world precipitated an initial change which, with a lag of time, received the approval of the members of a community. As a result of leasing their empty rooms in the summer the standard of living of the community, as well as their life style, i.e., their dress, their diet, and the span of activities they consider "possible" for "peasants like them" has changed. Moreover, all this change has not caused a major rift in the community, which

exhibits a considerable amount of solidarity. In this case, the state has had no major positive effect. On the contrary, bookkeeping requirements, tax liability, sanitation codes, etc., have made the transition more complex than they anticipated. The initiative was provided by some outside stimulus, which was recognized by a villager, who was in contact with a German archeological team, the members of which helped him to make up his mind. He had a close friend or relative who imitated him soon after he leased a room to foreign tourists.

As I mentioned earlier, it took the majority of the village eight years to adopt this innovation. They had the resources. In other words, all had the empty rooms in summer. They also had enough beds and bedsheets to allocate to this end. The profit they were likely to make was nothing to be ignored. In addition, the results of the switch were readily apparent. However, they were only nomads yesterday. It was not easy for a nomad to tolerate the way of life and/or the values of the city folks (for the rift between "little" and "great cultures" in Turkey see Mardin, 1973, pp.178-179), let alone watch them "naked," while bathing in the sea. They cautioned those who started to lease their rooms to vacationers in the sixties that their sons, and especially daughters "would turn like them." However, they tolerated or perhaps experimented with the first two or three villagers who were leasing their rooms. Since it was quite clear in about a decade that no evil but money followed from this enterprise, they began to adopt the practice themselves. The economic crisis of the seventies seemed to have helped them make up their minds in a hurry. It may not be a mere coincidence that the practice suddenly diffused in 1975-1976, when the annual inflation rate began to gallop. Among the middle aged or older generation almost no one has ever swum in the sea. I guess that would have been too much to ask from old nomads.

At this point we are departing from the earlier examples of rural development projects. In this case we do not have a preplanned, organized and complex task being implemented. However, here we have a set of individual actions, which originate from self-interest, that are later emulated by others to create a social action, which not only raises the standard of living in the community, but also changes the life style of its members, without endangering communal solidarity. In fact, the owners of the rooms were dressed in such a fashion that it was hard for us to distinguish them at first sight. They seemed to have quite regular interactions with the vacationers. They were occasionally consuming the same food, and even listening to the same "pop" music (and a couple teenagers from the village indicated that they even liked that kind of music). There does not seem to be any evidence of internal conflict in the village. If we are to believe what we are told by different peasants in different locations, there was no serious tension even when some objected to the idea of renting rooms to the outsiders during the summer. There was even some general benefit that accrued from the project. It seems as if their economic venture has helped them to get electricity for the entire village. Again, I am going to maintain that if it were not for the lack of internal conflict, such an economic venture would not have been possible. If there had been serious internal rifts, one party to the conflict would have been adamantly opposed to the project and might have attempted to damage it, at least by harassing the vacationers. If the change had disturbed the internal solidarity of the village, it would still have been threatened by the actions of those who would have felt left out or left behind by the development. No signs of such tension were observed.

In Tirtar there is a certain amount of internal conflict. None of the villagers tried successfully to rent his place during the summer, and hence,

no comparison with Ayas is possible. However, they have shown great disinclination to unite behind a rural development project. Their water pumps may be compared with the tourism venture of Ayas. They procured those water pumps in a similar fashion to the diffusion of the practice of renting rooms. However, now that the fuel prices have gone up, and running water pumps on an individual basis has become very costly, they would either have to join and buy bigger pumps, as did the peasants of Ayas, or convert them to electrical pumps. The first alternative requires collective action. Since they are divided on the basis of family lines, which were recently reinforced by divisions on the basis of national political alliances being reflected at the village level, a communal project of the sort is unlikely. The latter choice requires that state funds and technical know how be used. This requires that some peasants be intensely involved in string-pulling activities at the provincial capital, perhaps even in Ankara. Such activity requires time and effort, both of which are precious for the peasant in his daily activities during the spring and the summer months. If only some volunteers were to put in the time and the effort, not only they, but the entire village would benefit, some receiving benefits without having made an investment. Those involved in the procurement of funds and services would, on the other hand, run the risk of damaging their crops and losing money. This leaves behind two alternatives. One is to complain and occasionally turn in written petitions. The other is to use as little water as possible, without damaging the crops, and try to sell their lemons and oranges at as high a price as possible, which is almost impossible. In other words, it is very unlikely that a single or even a few peasants can raise the price of their product and hope to sell it at the higher price. In addition, the peasants borrow heavily from the wholesalers during the winter months, which enable the latter to almost

dictate the price they will pay for the product. Hence, when we visited them in the village in the summer of 1980, the villagers were trying to cut back their water consumption and hoped that orange and lemon prices would reach a high level. Predictably, we also listened to a lot of complaints about the bureaucratic difficulties in the electrification of the pumps.

In the case of Tirtar we have the diffusion of an innovation through the self-interested actions of the peasants, which does not lead to a beneficial result in the long run. The peasants of Tirtar seem to act as if "no one will further the interest of the group or community except as it is to his private advantage to do so." (Banfield, 1958: pp.83-84). Here, the initial rise in the standard of living which derived from the acquisition of the water pumps and the increase in the water supply for the fields may come to a halt in the future. The investments are already made, and no feasible alternative, other than the state action, can improve the situation. As the cost of fuel increases (a regularity in recent years), the costs of growing lemons and oranges will also increase. It appears that the result of action based on the short-term self-interests of the individual members of the community often help to precipitate the diffusion of an innovation and/or the adoption of rural development projects. However, the social benefit accruing from this process is not necessarily greater than the costs that are incurred from it in the long or even in the short run. Thus, if the case of Tirtar permits us at all to make an inference, the diffusion of an innovation through the actions of the self-interested actors is not likely to be sufficient for the success of a rural development project in a conflict ridden village community.

4.iv: Ballihisar: Partial Switch to Cash Crops

Ballihisar is also another example of self-interested actions creating a chain reaction, which in turn yields a partial switch from wheat to a more valuable cash crop. It is not a total switch from a subsistence crop to cash crop however. The surplus of wheat is already sold to the state at a good price. Besides, sunflower has been grown in only those fields with a sufficient supply of water. The switch has occurred with minimum influence by the state. In other words, it was not an end result of a pre-designed elaborate project. However, seeds were provided by the state, and the purchase of the product was also guaranteed at a certain price. This and the experiences of the neighboring villages was enough for some to begin growing sunflower on a trial basis. Once they were successful, others followed suit. However, Ballihisar is not dependent on sunflower. It has not replaced wheat and barley production, upon which the economy of the village depends. Those who began switching to sunflower did not need to allocate their whole fields to this end. They still had enough land to grow wheat and/or barley. Thus, the switch did not involve tremendous risk. The losses which would have been incurred from this venture would not have endangered the material well-being of the growers. This prediction was, in fact, borne out when a parasitic weed, for which the agricultural experts did not know of any cure, destroyed their crops. The village was not affected significantly by this failure (see Table 5). It is

[Table 5 about here]

evident from this finding that the abundance of resources in this village

Table 5: Recent Changes in the Material Well-Being of Peasants and their Village Community (Ballihisar)

Improvement in the Personal Material Well-Being of Peasants

		<u>Changed for the Worse</u>	<u>Has not Changed</u>	<u>Changed to Improve</u>	<u>N</u>
Local Mass	(%)	6.8	9.6	83.6	73
Local Influentials	(%)	0.0	0.0	100.0	12
$\chi^2 = 2.296$ $s = 0.31$					

Improvement in the Material Well-Being of the Village Community

		<u>Changed for the Worse</u>	<u>Has not Changed</u>	<u>Changed to Improve</u>	<u>N</u>
Local Mass	(%)	5.4	10.8	83.8	74
Local Influentials	(%)	0.0	0.0	100.0	12
$\chi^2 = 2.26$ $s = 0.32$					

enables the landowners to experiment with new crops. Furthermore, the influence of their environment, specifically the price governments and merchants pay for wheat and barley is such that they are much beyond subsistence production, and the much noted "safety first principle" or the "subsistence ethic" (Scott, 1979, pp.20-24) does not seem to be operative in this community. Neither is there any sign of landlord-tenant relationship, which assumes some notoriety in the economics literature on innovation. (Griffin, 1974, pp.24-26, and pp.48-51). The worst possible outcome of a loss in Ballihisar, as was repeatedly pointed out to us, would have been deferring payments on loans and halting the experiment. Thus, for the peasants of Ballihisar the major decision in cash crop production is related to profit maximization, rather than to the minimization of risk. Obviously, starvation is hardly an issue in this context.

However, the resource abundance in Ballihisar is a fairly new event in the recent history of the village. In fact, the economic conditions of the village began to improve only since the late fifties. Members of the older generation still recall the years of hardship. More specifically, the time when they had to use more primitive techniques of tillage and harvesting is not yet a part of the immemorable past of the village. It was not rare at that time to find oneself in a situation in which even drudgery was not a sufficient motive to bear the burdens of harvesting by one's own resources. Since almost all of them were in a similar situation, they either had to unite and work their fields together or unite in starvation. Thus, they often worked their fields collectively, calling this practice "gubaslik." Upon the call of a neighbor and/or relative the members of the community would gather and work in his field until the work is done. This, obviously, would put the burden of reciprocity on the shoulders of the person who called for help.

Thus, next time, and it would not be long, when someone else called for help he would be expected to show up. I was told that this practice is still alive. When I asked how, I was told that they plow their respective fields side by side "with their tractors." The modern inputs, which are not scarce in the village, (e.g., there are about 40 tractors in the village) have made the chores of plowing and harvesting their own fields by themselves manageable. Thus, collaborative harvesting is not a regular practice now. Even if not totally dead, "gubaslik" has changed its meaning. The modern agricultural inputs and higher wheat and barley prices seem to have contributed to individualistic tendencies in the village, almost to the point of doing away with all tendencies for collaboration. Since they were able to prosper working by themselves, and sustain, if not improve their well-being by acting on the basis of self-interest alone, they do not seem to find any reason for collaborating with others to reach an economic goal. Thus, the growing abundance of resources seems to have a negative correlation with the tendencies to collaborate. If this finding is true, both severe scarcity (Foster, 1967, p.300ff; Scott, 1979, p.20ff; Banfield, 1958:passim; Ortiz, 1971, p.328ff) and abundance of resources seem to contribute to egotistical (or individualistic) orientations in peasant communities. Hence, we may hypothesize that the relationship between the abundance/scarcity of resources and a community of egotistical actors or "amoral individualists or amoral familists" is curvilinear.

In sum, the abundance of resources, in terms of land, water, and cash as well as profitability of growing sunflower seems to have precipitated its cultivation. In this case the diffusion of novelty or acceptance of a project through the self-interest propelled actions of the peasants is not likely to cause any major influence on the standard of living or integration of the

society. However, Ballihsar being blessed by the changes in its environment, which caused its traditional crops of wheat and barley to receive a high value is a special case among the cases I have selected to discuss here.

When we turn to the cases of Guneren and Istiklalbag, we confront a somewhat different picture. In both cases a state initiated program was started. In the former case the state provided the water wells and the electrical pumps and continues to run and maintain them. In the latter case, the state veterinarian was involved in a project of artificial insemination by which the native flock of one village would be converted into a better species of sheep. The projects differ in some ways and resemble each other in others. In the former case the state has had an investment and must be involved in maintaining the water pumps and keeping the water running for as long as it takes. In the latter case after a period of eight or ten years the involvement of the veterinarian is not necessary, and nature will take its course. However, both projects can be successful if the peasants go along with them.

4.v: Guneren and Istiklalbag: State-Initiated Rural Decay and Development

First I will focus on Guneren. As I mentioned earlier the irrigation project was designed without any social results being considered by the state bureaucracy. Those parts of the village that do not receive any benefits from the project not only fail to care about the project, but resent it. If properly used, this project is likely to yield a significant increase in the annual income of those members of the community whose fields can benefit from it. Since the annual income of the others, who cannot benefit from the project, will not change, the distribution of income will be disturbed. More specifically, the relative wealth of those who benefit from the project will

increase. Since wealth is closely associated with power in the village, the balance of power between the two sides of the village will also be disturbed. It was the perception of this threat that was causing all the tension, soreness, and complaints by those who cannot benefit from the project in the village. Guneren is a case where a state-initiated project has not contributed to the integration of the village but helped to deepen further its social cleavages. The economic and financial conditions of many have improved without any other member of the community being absolutely deprived. However, the relative social status, wealth, and power positions are seriously threatened or unremediably disturbed. It is very hard to expect this community to keep calm for long unless some major changes begin to occur. As a matter of fact, we were repeatedly told by the bureaucrats involved in the maintenance of the irrigation project that they can barely keep up with the repair work, some of which is related to misuse and some of which to sabotage.

However, I must admit that the effects of the project was not as severe as would be suspected from the above explication. The one process that works in favor of stability of the village consists of the actions of the beneficiaries. The peasants of Guneren have always been involved in growing wheat and picking cotton elsewhere. They do not have enough or necessary knowledge of how to use their water supply properly. Some of them watered their cotton too much and damaged it. Some even ran the electrical pumps for over 24 hours without interruption and damaged the engines. Some planted the cotton so that part of it got too much and part of it not enough water and thus failed to grow properly. Hence, they complained that water was not doing the "trick" they expected from it. The process I mentioned in the previous paragraph should take a longer period of time to fully unfold. However, the threat of the possible developments are already felt by the two sides, which

had their earlier differences to start with. Regardless of how much participation such a project attracts from its beneficiaries, its chance of being successful is very low, especially in the way I have defined success in this paper.

Istiklalg's artificial insemination project provides a somewhat different picture. Here, the artificial insemination project was first adopted more than ten years ago. Even though the end result was satisfactory, the peasants did not want to bear the material costs of the program. Now, the benefits that may accrue from the execution of the project are more, and the costs, including the alternative cost of keeping a flock of native breed sheep, are higher than they can tolerate. Thus, there is a considerable inclination among most of the middle size flock owners to participate in the project. However, those with large flocks can still cut their costs low by sending their sheep to other grazing areas. As a result, they have been less than enthusiastic about the project. Some still believe that they can graze their sheep in or near the village, even though the sheep occasionally wander into the vegetable and barley fields of their fellow villagers. Cost minimization, instead of benefit maximization, seems to be the greater concern for these people. Besides, they have fewer sheep to feed on feebler resources than most. The poorer portion of the flock owners are also not highly inclined to participate in the artificial insemination project, though they are not very much opposed to it either. The majority of the village population are middle size owners, and the project is likely to be successful for them. In fact, the poorer sheep owners may even join them once the project starts. They have experienced a similar project before. They know that the project is not going to cost them much. They will lose some time and energy, both of which are quite abundant. No immediate threat of material loss is evident. However,

the poorer peasants do not feel like taking risks when they are more likely to suffer heavy losses if the project fails. They are willing to observe those who can tolerate more losses with greater ease to conduct the experiment first. Only after the success of the project is demonstrated through these earlier experiences are they going to participate in the project, if they participate at all.

If the project is successful, in the sense that a new breed of sheep with higher meat, milk and wool yield begin to appear, the friction between the sheep owners and farmers may be eased in the village as well. The peasants seem to have the understanding that the new breed need to be fed better, which means with commercial feed rather than the grass of the countryside. They are feeding even their native breed with better feed now. Once they have greater ability, they are more likely to continue this practice. However, it is unwarranted to assume that the above mentioned conflict will suddenly dissipate. In due time, it is likely to subside or cease to exist. Besides, the conflict between the sheep owners and the farmers exists without, or independent of, the project in question. It is unlikely that the results of the project will further it. We should also consider the fact that the owners will increase the risk of losing their sheep if they do not properly feed them, and they were fully aware of it.

In these last two cases we have state-initiated projects which attract the attention of the local beneficiaries and boost their participation by the help of their self-interested (oriented) actions. The immediate beneficiaries of the projects are those with the necessary resources that the projects require. In both locations there has been some conflict in the community. In the former case the state-initiated project helped to exacerbate the conflict, in the latter it will either have no visible effect on it or it will help to

resolve it. The success of the former project is unlikely, unless the changes in the environment work in a way to ease its social effects or counter them.

4.v: Gundas: The Awe of Tradition

Gundas is our last case. Here, we have a social structure that totally deviates from all the others, which can be best depicted as what Weber called patriarchal form of domination.(Bendix, p.330-334). This village is owned and run by one single man and his extended family. There is no way that any rural development project can be initiated without his consent. The views, attitudes and behavior of the other villagers are of little or no importance and are almost totally dominated by the landlord-headman. All the rural development projects that may be launched, and those that have been implemented, benefit him and his relatives more than any other member of the community. Even what are usually considered as public services, such as the water fountain, road, health center, etc., are used more by him and the members of his extended family than anyone else. In some cases, such as the water fountain, or the artesian well, the other members are not permitted to use these "public" investments. They are told to find and use other sources for such needs. Besides, since the poor do not own their land, they can only use some of these "public" investments on the landlord's property to further his self-interest, rather than theirs. Such a social structure is highly hostile to projects that are likely to create major changes in it. Those changes that do not affect the social structure itself but cause a rise in the standard of living of the patriarch and his extended family can hardly be called economic development of a "village" community. Besides, in such a social structure, the actions of the average villager are likely to be based on the actual or

anticipated wishes and desires of the master than his own. Thus, in this context it is more proper to allude to the mobilization of the masses, rather than their participation in rural development projects or in the political system.

5: Conclusion: An Evaluation of the Empirical Findings

Here I will try to extract some conclusions from my earlier empirical analysis and observations. To extract some inferences from my previous observations, I intend to make a distinction between self-initiated and state-initiated rural development efforts. The initiation and implementation of the latter can be and often is beyond the control of the village community. However, the former efforts, regardless of who suggests the idea, are implemented by the village community.

The successful implementation of self-initiated projects seem to be primarily enhanced by the relative lack of intra-village conflict. The most important example of the lack of intra-village conflict engendering a complex rural development project being successfully implemented is the case of Donerdere. In this case, village solidarity guaranteed a stable and persisting interest and participation in the project. Once the economic benefits from the project began to accrue, the cooperative evolved into an inseparable part of the village life. Lack of severe intra-village conflict, especially among the mid-size or large-size landowners in Damarasi made the "Union" possible. Lack of intra-village conflict helped to sustain and diffuse the practice of leasing rooms in Ayas. In sum, I was able to discover cases where villages which lack severe internal conflict have spectacular success with rural development projects of highly complex nature, yet I was not able to find a

case of where a village with severe internal conflict demonstrating an ability to sustain or even initiate less complex rural development projects. As Guneren clearly indicates, a simple project like getting an alternative source for a drinking water fountain can be difficult to accomplish in a conflict ridden environment.

As the complexity and scope (by the latter I refer to the number of local residents being influenced by the efforts in question) of a project increases, the collaboration of the village community becomes essential. The complexity of the project often requires certain skills, such as bookkeeping, contacting with the state bureaucracy, the ability to accommodate differences among the members of the village community, etc., and an abundance of potential leaders. Especially, a project like a village cooperative requires that there be potential leaders who can replace a group that controls the cooperative. If the cooperative management is in the hands of a single person (or group) whose actions cannot be understood and checked by others in the community, the road to abuses will be open. The power of such a group of unaccountable leaders tends to become absolute and corrupt in a short period of time. The success of Donerdere's cooperative and Damarasi's "Union" emerges partly from the existence of potential opponents to the managers of these organizations among the villagers. Besides, most villagers are able to follow the events and actions of the managers in question. This is not only because the members of the cooperative share the above mentioned skills with their leaders, but also that the distribution of power in these villages is such that no single individual or extended family controls the community. If the initial success of Donerdere's cooperative, and Damarasi's "Union" was because of the lack of internal conflict, the sustenance of their success is attributable to the distribution of power, skills, and the relative abundance of potential leaders

in the two communities, which made it possible for them to check the deeds of the managers of the organizations in question.

State-initiated projects operate under similar circumstances. The implementation and the continuation of the project is enhanced by the lack of internal conflict in the community. Thus, it is very important for a state-initiated project not to contribute to the internal conflict of the community within which the project is implemented. On most occasions, this is possible with a little care. Again, Guneren is a good example. It should have been obvious to the initiators of the project that providing an agricultural input to some of the villagers, while depriving the others is likely to create or contribute to intra-village conflict. However, in Istiklalbag I was able to find a state-initiated project which is likely to have no adverse effect on the internal conflict of the village. The only problem with the latter project was its length of time, a factor which worked against it the first time it was implemented. Even though the results of the project were satisfactory, the cost of feeding the new breed went beyond what the peasants expected. However, since it is the re-implementation of the same project that they are up against now, they are in a better position to assess its long-term costs. Anyhow, both of these projects are simple, in comparison to Donerdere's cooperative, and do not require extensive effort on the part of the beneficiaries. Furthermore, both projects depend upon the assumption that the peasants will define their individual benefits (self-interests) that will accrue from the project such that these will outweigh the costs of the project. There is some evidence that they in fact behave in the expected fashion.

It has been argued earlier that if peasants equate or identify their self-interests with that of the end results of a rural development effort, the chances of its acceptance are enhanced. In fact, self-interests of individual

peasants is a reliable way of diffusing an innovation. Tractors, herbicides, chemical fertilizers, etc., have been diffused and come into greater use in the Turkish villages, through the above mentioned way. However, more complex and/or extensive projects are not likely to meet success through a similar process. Besides, this method of grafting an innovation into a village community does not seem to increase the chances of more complex and extensive efforts of collaboration to materialize. In Tirtar, self-interested actions of the peasants helped them settle and launch an irrigation effort with success, yet when conversion to a larger project became a necessity, the self-interested orientations of the members of the community worked to halt any further effort. The internal conflict of the community in question does not permit a concerted effort to emerge from the self-interested actions of its members. The social benefit that may accrue from the unconcerted and self-interested actions of the members of the community does not always guarantee that the community meet the challenges of the environment with success. Besides, if Donerdere tried this method of organization, it is very doubtful that they would either have their cooperative, and a spectacular rural development effort, or even their village. In fact, Tirtar's way of organization is quite durable and successful so long as the mode of production and the influence of the environment remains the same. However, if the challenges of the environment require some form of collaboration, as they did for Donerdere, self-interested actions of the peasants provide no answer. Thus, it either ceases to exist as a community, or the organization of the community changes to include rules of conduct which would permit collaborative efforts among the inhabitants of that community.

However, a peasant society which assigns great importance to self-interested actions of its members does not hinder the emergence of

collaboration for rural development. The practice of renting rooms in Ayas diffused through the self-interested actions of its members, and Ayas can show enough ability to collaborate and carry out rural development projects. One example was their attempt to form a cooperative to purchase water pumps for the "village," which was successfully carried out. However, at the completion of the project the cooperative was dissolved. Hence, Ayas has an inclination toward the same type of social organization as Tirtar, yet it demonstrated the ability to unite. The difference seems to be attributable to the lack of a severe internal conflict in Ayas and the existence of a somewhat more severe conflict in Tirtar. The comparison with Ayas indicates that even though collaboration may be difficult in a social structure like Tirtar, in the absence of severe internal conflict, it is possible. If rural development efforts solely depend upon diffusion of an innovation through the self-interested actions of the peasants the benefits of which can be concretely and easily demonstrated, they have a fair chance of success even in communities with severe conflict. However, the above mentioned method does not engender any future success for a different type of rural development effort, one that requires the collaboration of the members of the community, if the community in question is conflict ridden. In sum, I intend to hypothesize that in the absence of severe internal conflict, self-interested actors can and do collaborate in projects which are likely to produce some type of public benefit.

However, not in every type of community structure is intra-village conflict a major determinant of rural development efforts. In a community which has an authority structure close to what Weber described as patriarchal form of domination, the lack of intra-village conflict does not engender participation. In such an environment only mobilization is likely to occur.

Power is concentrated in the hands of one man, and he rules through the services of his extended family members. The villager is his servant and can only act as the master wishes and approves, not by his own volition. In such an environment any outside initiated rural development project other than one that would undermine the above mentioned authority relationship, is likely to be perceived as aid to the master or his household, not public investment per se. Thus, a traditional social structure is an impediment to participation in rural development projects and an impetus to mobilized socioeconomic and political behavior.

In short, assuming that the village authority structure is not patriarchal and that the distribution of power is somewhat equitable, the absence of severe intra-village conflict promotes local participation in rural development efforts and contributes to their successful implementation.

To assume power to be somewhat equally distributed is to assume that wealth and resources of the village community are fairly well distributed among the peasants in the Turkish villages. By and of itself the distribution of resources, wealth and power is not important. In fact, when the resources and wealth were somewhat redistributed in Dagdeviren, no visible consequence followed. The severity of social conflict was almost left untouched. As a matter of fact, in a decade the village was again in the middle of a severely conflictual situation when we first visited it.(8) The implication of this finding is rather bizarre: The redistribution of resources does not seem to influence social conflict or kindle rural development. It seems as if the relationships run in the opposite direction. The elimination of social conflict, and subsequent redistribution of resources without rekindling the abated conflict is likely to engender economic development.

Thus, if a rural development project is intended to be successful, it is

not only important that intra-village conflict does not exist or is abated at the initiation and adoption of the project, but it is also important that the project does not contribute to or create new grounds for intra-village conflict.

Finally, a case like the Donerdere's cooperative may be of great interest in distinguishing the role of self-interested actions in the village life. On the basis of what we have seen and heard about Donerdere in, as well as out of it (from inhabitants of Donerdere, Dagdeviren, and provincial and subprovincial bureaucrats who had been involved with these two villages during the last two decades), it is very hard to conclude that Donerdere could be described as a community composed of a collection of exclusively self-interested peasants, acting and interacting to promote the interests of their own households at the expense of the others and without respect to their environment. The peasants might have been acting only on the basis of self-interest before they settled in Donerdere. Even if they were, they do not behave so any longer. The hostility of their environment seems to have helped to create a community, the existence and prosperity of which is deemed as worthwhile as the short-term prosperity of one's household by the members of the community. In the height of a crisis which left one woman from a neighboring settlement dead after a gun battle, nobody left the village. If they were only moved by their individual self-interests, they would have left the village, at least one by one. Among those who did not move are a good number of middle aged and elderly men some of whom even own apartment buildings in other provinces.(9) The survival and the prosperity of the community has a value, and is often put to the test and proven to be superior to the egotistical inclinations of the individual. In sum, I would like to note, once more, that Donerdere provides a formidable challenge to the widely

accepted notion of self-interested and/or household-oriented peasants and peasant community. It provides an example where self-interested and/or community oriented actions can be employed by peasants without overwhelming or undermining each other, or the performance and the solidarity of their village community.

Thus, the drastic effects of the environment, which are dramatically presented by Colin Turnbull when he examined the Ik in Eastern Africa (1972, p.133-289), need not always and necessarily engender the terrible experiences the Ik had to go through: In Turnbull's words "Ik were not always as they are, and they once possessed in full measure those values that we all hold to be basic to humanity, indispensable for both survival and sanity, then what the Ik are telling us is that these qualities are not inherent in humanity at all, they are not a necessary part of human nature. Those values which we cherish so highly and which some use to point to our infinite superiority over other forms of animal life may indeed be basic to human society, but not to humanity, and that means that the Ik clearly show that society is not indispensable for man's survival"(1972, p.289). Donerdere's experience seems to run counter to this claim. Similarly drastic influences of the social and natural environment can and did create a viable and vigorous social organization from a group of previously self-interested and household-oriented actors. In the case of the existence of Donerdere, society was indispensable for the survival, and more so for the prosperity, of the individual members.

NOTES

1. I chose to use the term 'rural development effort' rather than 'rural development project,' because the latter assumes that there is a pre-designed effort by those who initiate a process which leads to a higher level of standard of living for the community in question. Whether it is intended or not, project connotes that some private or state agency is necessarily involved in the process. I employed the term effort to avoid such a bias. Any effort from the purchase of a novel agricultural input to the adoption of a formal organization, i.e., a cooperative, is a part of the universe of events I would like to consider for inquiry in this paper.

2. Although I borrowed the term 'local residents' from John M. Cohen and Norman T. Uphoff (1980, p.222) I intend to use this term to include all the inhabitants of my villages. In cases where a need to refer to the locally more powerful individuals arises I will use the term 'local influentials.' I preferred this usage because the latter term does not necessarily impute a leadership role on the more powerful members of the community.

3. The length of service for the executives of the Donerdere's cooperative is limited to a couple of years. Especially for those whose job is to make the business connections in the big cities and contact bureaucrats and legislators, the job is time consuming and very demanding. They may even suffer a loss of income if they cannot attend to their fields and animals properly. Thus, others in the community help them out by relieving them of this chore after a while. Furthermore, it is also possible to think that this is also an arrangement to avoid an embezzlement of funds by the executives or other similar corrupt practices. Finally, community and community service has a value for the peasants of Donerdere.

4. The discussion during the annual meetings of the cooperative are well reported in the statute book. We were not able to detect any cliques that either serve as the 'governing' or 'opposition' party in the cooperative. I also tried to check for alternating roles between the groups of people who were elected as executives and those who opposed them. Most discussions are about 'Liras and Kurus's' (dollars and cents). How the funds should be allocated and how they should have been allocated are the main topics of discussion. There is no indication that emotions run too deep on these issues. However, we were not able to observe an annual coop meeting.

5. The most important evidence that we have for the abundance of leadership skills in Donerdere is the number of peasants who had been elected to the executive board of the cooperative. They have changed three bookkeepers. About every six years the executive board of the cooperative is totally renewed. The civil servant who is in charge of the village cooperatives in the province for the last fifteen years argued that not in any of the nearby villages can he cite more than one person per community who can run a cooperative. He further noted that in most neighboring communities he cannot even cite a single potential cooperative executive. In almost all of these villages they tried to establish cooperatives in vain.

6. By intra-village conflict I refer to persisting non-amicable interactions between the sides of a social cleavage, i.e., two lineage groups, or two or

more linguistic groups, landless masses versus the landowners, etc., in the village. So the lack of severe intra-village conflict would mean lack of a social cleavage, and/or the absence of non-amicable interactions between two or more groups in the village. I do not intend to include dyadic situations of conflict, where one individual is in less than amicable terms with a fellow villager. Obviously, if such dyadic relationships were in abundance, I would still be willing to refer to such a community as a conflict ridden one.

7. One of the most alluded reasons for the failure of the cooperative establishment efforts by the local influentials, as well as the masses was the incompetence of those who led the way and their inclination for corruption.

A majority (68%) of the local masses, and all of the local influentials who responded to our question probing the reason of failure for their cooperative establishment effort, referred to the corruption and incompetence of those who were involved in the effort. The difference between the responses of the two groups is not statistically significant at the 0.05 level.

8. If for no other reason, by the influence of the Turkish inheritance laws and established practices, the land holdings of a village carry the seeds of maldistribution. Furthermore, other social and demographic factors seriously perturb the land distribution of the Turkish villages from time to time. Thus, in Dagdeviren and Donerdere the distribution of land began to change for the worse over the years.

9. Here I do not intend to imply that no one moved out of the village since they settled in Donerdere. They have. However, the number of the households in the village gradually increased. I do want to emphasize the fact that in the above mentioned period those who could have easily moved out of the village and settled in the big cities where they invested did not.

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APPENDIX

STUDYING TURKISH VILLAGES:

A NOTE ON RESEARCH

QUESTION AND RESEARCH DESIGN

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1. Introduction

Most of the developing world is rural. Until recent years, there was in fact a tendency to equate being rural with being underdeveloped. Although, it is appreciated nowadays that being urbanized does not automatically mean being developed, the association between achieving societal development and affecting socio-economic change in rural areas continues to be strong.

National governments have discovered that affecting change in the rural countryside is often more difficult than in more urban environments. Although some difficulties experienced by governments in their efforts to bring about change in the villages may be explained by the fact that they have a greater presence and a better organization in towns and cities than in the countryside, enabling them to be more effective in their policies directed toward the former, this may be a partial explanation. Many rural sociologists and anthropologists have suggested that the village and the town constitute two universes. Redfield, for example(1956) has conceptualized the difference in terms of culture and has proposed the dichotomy of "little" versus "great" cultures. Emphasizing the economic bases of the rural-urban differences, Galeski has pointed out that the peasants differ from the urban segments of the population(1972) in that they have household economy where the production and consumption functions are realized within the same

unit.

We concur with the judgements expressed by scholars such as Redfield and Galeski that in many societies in which there has existed a peasantry throughout history, the differences between the rural and the urban segments of the population may not be simply one of degree but also one of kind. Therefore, if our premise that rural-urban differences are not just quantitative but also qualitative is correct; then, it has significant implications for the formation and the implementation of policies by central governments.

It may be argued, for example, that policy-makers not cognizant of the rural-urban differences, may well design policies which are largely discordant with peasant cognitive maps. In such a case, the lack of cooperation or even peasant resistance may ensue. The end result may be a) The failure of a policy, i. e. the expanding of resources without eliciting a change in the direction desired; b) employment of coercion by the central government to implement policies which would not only add to the cost of implementation but also introduce other costs, such as loss of support for the political regime. Coercion, it should be noted, does not ensure success despite its high costs.

Whereas we may proceed with other examples, the above mentioned example is probably sufficient to illustrate our next and obvious point that an examination of rural development policies, why and under what conditions they have been successful and unsuccessful promises to be interesting both from a theoretical and a policy perspective. It is with these thoughts that we conducted a study of

six pairs of villages in Turkey.

Our study constitutes a part of a broader study on the "political conditions for effective small scale rural development projects." Although, the general title of the study might suggest that a government initiated or backed small scale rural development project would provide the ideal object unit of analysis, we preferred to adopt village as our object unit.

We were concerned that, had we adopted the development projects connected with government which had either been successes or failures, we would be introducing possible causes of disturbance to our research. Let us explain what we mean: If, for example, we had confined ourselves to government related projects we would have been treating the government as a constant, whereas whether a project is connected with a government or not may well constitute a major determinant of its chances of success.

Looking for successful projects or failures may also introduce biases deriving from the study of the atypical. Many rural development projects are neither glaring successes nor dismal failures. Rather, they achieve some of the aims intended when the project was launched, fail to achieve others and sometimes produce consequences never intended. Therefore, it may be better to focus on whatever projects may be found in a specific location, irrespective of their degree of success, and attempt to identify factors which contribute to their realization and functioning, and those which appear to perform a dysfunctional role.

Finally, it should be remembered that a project is carried out

in an environment which is the village. The village is a social system in which there exists interrelated and interactive subsystems, such as those based on age, lineage, kinship, landownership, and religious knowledge. Choosing the project as the unit of analysis may direct attention only to those variables which appear to bear directly and immediately on the success or the failure of projects. Yet, it is possible that variables which do not receive attention when a project is considered as the object unit of analysis but which may be recognized if the village constitutes the object unit of analysis, turn out to have significant powers in explaining whether rural development projects in a given community are successful or not.

2. The Research Design

Our main concern in this project has been to identify conditions which lead to rural economic change. We proceeded to define one type of economic change, namely economic development as sustained rise in the standard of living of the members of a community. In other words, we defined our task as the explanation of what accounted for sustained rise in the standard of living in a community? And, how?

To search for answers for these questions we selected a small number of villages which we could manage to inquire into the socio-economic structure of, in some detail. Initially we started with six pairs of villages. However, we had to drop a pair in the midst of increasing civil strife in Turkey. The pair of villages we dropped became a focus of national concern as the area they were located in eventually turned into a guerilla hideout. Thus, we will mainly report on the remaining five pairs.

2. i: The Selection of the Cases

Initially we decided to select a pair of villages from each of the seven geographic regions of the country, except one, the Marmara region in the midst of which Istanbul is located. The presence of Istanbul in this region caused the villages of the Marmara region to become highly developed and well-integrated into Istanbul.

Furthermore the Aegean and the Marmara regions have very similar socio-economic structures and levels of economic development. Thus, we decided to select only one pair of villages from the Aegean and none from the Marmara region. We proceeded to select a pair of villages from each of the remaining regions. Even though more sophisticated regional classifications are available, we used the traditional-geographic classification because we were interested not in a nationally representative sample but variance among the pair of villages we selected with respect to their social organization, major products raised and cultivated, and climatic conditions.

The State Planning Organization possesses detailed maps of communication patterns and frequencies which, among other things, indicate the population of each village according to the 1970 census and the distance between each village and the subprovincial capital with which it has the most intensive communication. Thus we randomly selected one province from the six regions. Then we focused on the hinterlands of communication frequencies of the villagers with the subprovincial capitals. Thus we tried to ensure that our villages are connected with the same subprovincial capital, and hence are in touch with the same set of civil servants, subject to similar opportunities to reach the services that may flow from the center. We further intended for our villages to have similar sizes. The number of public facilities a village can have varies closely with its size. Governments are more intent on building schools, health centers, station mid-wives, bring electricity to villages of larger size. Not only can they cater more people with greater efficiency or less cost

per member of the community, but they also hope to get more votes that way. Hence a comparison between a village of 1800 and a village of 250 inhabitants will definitely put the latter at a great disadvantage, and all that can be learned from such a comparison may turn out to be that the sizes of villages are important determinants of their level of economic development. Thus, it is absolutely necessary to select villages of similar size, by which one can control for their opportunities in receiving services from the center and in most occasions for the available resources, i.e. manpower, land etc. across the two communities. Hence, we selected villages of similar size.

We also tried to make sure that they have similar opportunities in contacting the center. Therefore, we selected our villages such that either both were easily accessible from the nearest subprovincial capital, or they were both not so easily accessible. Being located near each other, our pairs of villages share the same climatic conditions, and are often involved in the same type of agricultural activity.

Finally, we tried to make sure that one of the villages was economically less developed than the other. To measure their respective levels of economic development we used three measures. The first indicator of development we used was the number of vehicles and agricultural machinery in the village. This included all wheeled vehicles in the village, motor and/or animal driven, such as horse or ox carts, cars, jeeps, tractors, trucks, buses etc. The second measure we used was the number of public facilities in the village.

These included such establishments like a grocery store, a mosque, a barber shop, a coffee house, a school, a common laundry facility, village guest room, cooperative buildings, creamery, post office, etc. Third measure was the variety of public facilities a village had. We considered a village with three public facilities all of which were coffee houses as less developed than a village with three facilities which consisted of a grocery store, a common laundry facility and a mosque. However, we never had a case where the number of public facilities in our pair of villages were exactly the same. In all of our less developed villages public facilities are not only less in variety, but they are also less in number. However, we had cases where the number of vehicles in a less developed village exceeded the number of vehicles in the more developed one. In this case we compared the number and variety of public facilities of the villages to determine which village is more developed. In most of our villages the differences did run in the same direction across our three criteria of development.

We were also able to get additional information about our villages from the State Institute of Statistics. Whereas information on two of the twelve villages was absent, we were able to obtain information about ten of them. Thus, we knew which of the villages had been electrified, the type of road that connected them with the nearest town, whether they had a post office and phone service. We also learned in advance the type and number of professions in the village, which generally seemed to vary with the village size. Furthermore, from the State Institute of Statistics we were able to get more information about the villages, such as their use of chemical fertilizers,

production for commercial purposes, etc. However, we were promptly reminded that they were not reliable. Hence, we did not expand our original criteria of development.

Thus, we ended up with five pairs of villages. Members in each pair were of similar size, under similar climatic conditions, involved with similar agricultural activities, and had comparable accessibility by the center, yet one of them in each pair was economically more developed than the other. It is this difference that we will try to account for in papers which have and will emanate from this study.

We would, once more, like to emphasize that even though we selected our villages from different parts of the country we have no pretensions as to their representativeness of the 45,000 Turkish villages.

Our study consisted of two stages. In the first stage we conducted interviews with village samples. In the second stage we revisited the same villages, and spent some time in the villages, checking up on the earlier points we were able to discover. Further, we interviewed the bureaucrats, judges and gendarmerie at the subprovincial capital, and their superiors at the provincial level. During our stays in the villages, we re-interviewed the headman, local influentials, innovators, and other residents; we went through the village records kept by teachers, cooperatives, village government, etc. We also examined the records of the agricultural experts who conducted some demonstrations or initiated some rural development projects, like artificial insemination of sheep in Istiklalbag. We further tried to re-check the number and variety of public facilities and the vehicles in the village, which vary over time. It is on the bases

of our structured and unstructured interviews with the peasants, headmen, landlords, bureaucrats; and the examination of official documents, which run the gamut from annual reports of the village cooperatives to the bank accounts of the villagers; and unofficial reports, such as the autobiography of the accountant of the cooperative in Donerdere, teachers' notes about the villages, that we have tried to grapple with the above mentioned problem that promoted our inquiry.

2. iii: The Selection of the Intra-village Samples

We would like to explain briefly the selection of the intra-village samples during the first phase of our study. We drew representative samples of the adult male and female populations of the villages. The sampling procedure consisted of two stages. The first step included the drawing of a sample of households from the village, the size of which varied with the villages. If a village had less than 500 inhabitants, we randomly selected one out of every three households; if it has more than 500 but less than 1,000 inhabitants, we randomly selected one out of every four households, and if a village had more than 1,000 inhabitants, we randomly selected one man and a woman over 21 out of every five households and interviewed them.

In a number of cases it was necessary to deviate from the above mentioned sampling procedure. First of all, in cases where we could

not find the members of a household at home, or elsewhere in the village, we called on the adjacent residences, and in cases where this procedure failed, we tried to interview other villagers in the fields or in the coffee houses. Secondly, in three villages we could not interview any women, and in three others we could only interview some, mostly because of serious communication problems. Thirdly, the current resident populations of the villages deviated from the census figures, and the settlement patterns of some villages guided us to select cases from among those who could be reached in public places that they frequented. In addition, some men had left the village to find seasonal employment elsewhere and had not yet returned at the time of the interviews. Finally, we had to alter our sampling procedure according to the changes in the health situation and the number of our interviewers.

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