


CORNELL UNIVERSITY

RURAL DEVELOPMENT COMMITTEE



*Special Series on Local Institutional Development No. 7*

**Strategies for Supporting  
Local Institutional Development**

by

**Gerard Finin  
Norman Uphoff  
Suzanne Wallen**

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SPECIAL SERIES ON LOCAL INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT -- No. 7

**STRATEGIES FOR SUPPORTING  
LOCAL INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT**

A report prepared by Gerard Finin, Norman Uphoff and Suzanne Wallen  
for the Rural Development Committee, Cornell University,  
with the support of the Office of Rural and Institutional  
Development, Bureau of Science and Technology,  
U. S. Agency for International Development

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## PREFACE TO SPECIAL SERIES ON LOCAL INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT

This series of reports presents the findings of a year-long study by our working group on Local Institutional Development (LID). It was sponsored by the Rural Development Committee at Cornell University and was funded by the Office of Rural and Institutional Development in USAID's Bureau of Science and Technology.

Our initial concern was whether local institutional development could be adequately provided for by approaching it on a sector-by-sector basis, or whether it represents something needing and warranting attention across sectors. As with most "either-or" questions, there turned out to be some merit in both views. Certain issues and provisions are particularly relevant for developing local institutional capacity for certain sectors. At the same time, individual sector-specific initiatives are likely to lead to neglect of more broadly-based capacities, which themselves are important for sector-specific kinds of LID.

Our analysis offers a firmer conceptual base for the often but ambiguously used terms "local" and "institution." It analyzes what kinds of LID are likely to be most appropriate for the different activities frequently initiated in rural areas. Finally, it examines how local institutional capacity can be strengthened by national and donor agency efforts.

Throughout the analysis, we draw on the experiences with LID which emerged from a review of the literature. Cases which proved particularly instructive are reported in annexes at the end of the reports. Not all readers will be interested in all the activity areas covered by our study, so we have organized the presentation of findings accordingly.

Five of the eight reports (Numbers 2 through 6) are sector-specific, and readers may have particular interest in just one or two of them. We trust that all readers will find the introductory report (Number 1) useful, as well as the observations and suggestions contained in the concluding reports (Numbers 7 and 8) which are relevant across sectors. The full series is listed on page ix.

In condensing our observations and conclusions into these reports, we have not been able to include all of the case material and literature references which were covered in our study. We now know how broad and complex is the subject of local institutional development. Our discussions in this series present only what appear to be the most tenable and salient conclusions. We plan to integrate these analyses into a

book-length presentation of the subject for readers wishing a single continuous treatment of LID.

Though this project involved an extensive literature search and review on our part, it must still be considered more exploratory than definitive. Few of the available materials addressed LID issues analytically or even very explicitly. We thus cannot and do not attempt to provide "recipes" for local institutional development. This is an initial mapping of some important terrain not previously surveyed systematically. We welcome any and all efforts by others to contribute to the understanding and practice of local institutional development by adding to a more thorough knowledge base.

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## **SPECIAL SERIES ON LOCAL INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT**

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- No. 8 MOBILIZING AND MANAGING ECONOMIC RESOURCES FOR  
LOCAL INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT  
Rebecca Miles Doan, Gregory Schmidt and Norman Uphoff

## STRATEGIES FOR SUPPORTING LOCAL INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT

### 1.0 MODES OF SUPPORT

Once the value of having more extended local institutional capacity is recognized, getting such capacity established requires not only time and resources but also appropriate strategies and concepts. Demand for local institutional development will not create its own supply any more than supply as a rule creates its own demand. Results in local institutional development (LID) are more likely to depend on how support is given than on how much. This is an area of development activity where qualitative considerations commonly loom larger than quantitative ones, since support given in ways that create dependency or that alienate people is often worse than giving none at all.

We need to know how existing and emergent institutions can be strengthened within their social, political and economic contexts. Rarely do local institutions (LIs) exist as a single entity. Rather they operate as part of local and regional systems which support various functions and roles. We have found that strengthening these systems and integrating LIs into horizontal and vertical networks is as important as strengthening individual institutions. Thus our focus is cross-sectoral and encompasses a range of levels.

As stated briefly in the first report, we found strategies for support of local institutional development corresponding generally to three different modes: Assistance, Facilitation, and Promotion. These represent different degrees of outside involvement in local institutional affairs but also differ in the kind of relationships established. We begin by considering these three modes, and then examine how a "learning process" approach is likely to be the most effective strategy for donor and government investments in LID.

#### 1.1 PROMOTION, FACILITATION AND ASSISTANCE

What will be the most appropriate mode for efforts to strengthen LI capacity will depend on (a) what capabilities already exist, and (b) where the initiative for changes in the status quo comes from.

- (i) Where some local institutions such as local governments, private enterprises, or cooperatives exist and are able to identify needs and problems, to develop plans for dealing with these, and to determine what outside aid would be helpful, the mode for LID can be one of ASSISTANCE.
- (ii) In some situations, local institutions will be less extensive or less experienced, and thus less able to initiate activities, at least at the outset. In such cases a larger role for outside agencies may be appropriate in helping to create greater local capacity at the same time particular needs and problems are addressed, in which case the LID mode is one of FACILITATION.
- (iii) In still other circumstances, there may be some urgent problem or need which an outside agency wishes to deal with, but local institutions are underdeveloped, at least with regard to that problem or need. The approach will be one of trying to use existing or new institutions to further program objectives, developing local capacities mostly to further these goals. This LID mode is characterized as PROMOTION.

In comparing these modes, as one moves from Assistance to Promotion, the extent of existing local capabilities declines and the amount of outside initiative relative to local initiative increases. Although such a comparison might appear to suggest some value judgment, which mode is most appropriate always depends on the problems to be addressed and on the extent of existing capabilities. Even if one prefers that outside agencies be responding to initiatives of local institutions, there will be circumstances where urgent problems are encountered and local institutions are weak or non-existent, unable to identify a problem, agree on a solution, or even to seek assistance. When faced with rapid deforestation or a cattle disease epidemic, arguments for a Promotion approach appear in a different light.

These two examples could be addressed without much concern for local institutional development, yet achieving even the immediate objective of stemming the loss of trees or cattle would usually require at least some strengthening of the capabilities of a forestry or livestock department at the local level, which requires some effort in a Promotion mode. To go beyond this and to protect reforested areas or bring about disease control measures, more LID would be needed, such as by augmenting the local government's capacity or starting user groups to obtain and sustain local awareness and cooperation.

A Promotion mode is not necessarily dictatorial or unilateral. It is distinctive for its external source of initiative and it establishes or strengthens local institutions to achieve a particular programmatic goal, rather than increasing capacity for the sake of some more general purposes. A Facilitation mode is more flexible and accommodating

since decisions about goals and methods at the local level are to be arrived at more collaboratively. A specific activity such as irrigation improvement may constitute the focus of effort in a Facilitation mode, but the outside agency may also be helping localities, communities and groups to develop capacities to address numerous other problems identified for action. In the Assistance Mode, the outside agency would essentially be receiving requests for technical advice, training, loans or other kinds of aid as identified by members of a local group or community. As we have noted, sufficient local institutional capacity for this mode simply may not exist.<sup>1/</sup>

Obviously these three modes constitute a continuum more than a rigid typology. In what may be formally an Assistance mode, the outside agency may be helping local institutions to formulate requests, which represents a degree of Facilitation. Or a Promotion effort may have spillover effects for other local institutions which become strengthened, which amounts also to Facilitation. A self-styled Facilitation program could operate in such a directive manner that it becomes Promotion, or if there is an active community response it could become Assistance.

The identification of these three modes analytically should serve to help the practitioner focus on the source of initiative and the existing local capability as important considerations. Some of the more interesting cases we found will illustrate the ambiguity that may be found in practice. In India, the Kottar Social Service Society (discussed in Annex, pages 67-69) made it a practice never to go into a community with its health, agricultural or employment activities unless it was asked, which suggests Assistance. But once working with farmers, mothers, fishermen, potters or others, it sought to establish cooperatives so that it operated in a Facilitation mode as "an organization which organizes" (Field, 1980).

The Government of Botswana with USAID assistance embarked on a program to establish communal cattle ranches, offering individuals or groups exclusive rights to use of land. This promotion effort failed because the scheme was presented to people as a package and did not fit the ecologically-based land use practices (as discussed in Report No. 2). A more careful examination of what collective action already existed revealed

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<sup>1/</sup> A study by the World Bank's Transportation Department of its project experience identified only two cases where it had been able to work in what we would call an Assistance mode, with municipal (locality) governments in Brazil and with Saemaul Undong community organizations in South Korea (Beenhakker et al., 1984: 58-59). To be sure, there may have been other opportunities to work in this mode to which Bank staff and central government officials were not attuned.

a broad range of existing farmer and community groups operating in the communal (traditional land tenure) areas.<sup>2/</sup> These organizations however involved only a part of the farming community. The extension service undertook to promote more group action particularly through Farmer Committees. This often required extension workers to try to create an awareness of the advantages and potentialities of collective action as a problem-solving mechanism. Responsibility for decisions and actions was to remain with the groups, implying this was more of a Facilitation than a Promotion mode. In fact, the best results came when the government operated essentially in an Assistance rather than even a Facilitation mode.<sup>3/</sup>

The kind of support to be given to local institutions by outside agencies can and often should change over time. The capabilities of local institutions in a certain area can become greater relative to the problems encountered, justifying an Assistance role for outside agencies. Alternatively, the problems may become greater so that Promotion is warranted. To the extent that mutual confidence has been built up, outside efforts are more likely to meet with acceptance and cooperation. A good example of a changing role is the Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC), established after that country's independence. Initially it worked in a Promotion mode, providing relief services "for" the people. As it gained experience it began working to establish local organizations that encouraged rural people's participation which eventually transformed BRAC's role to one of support for LO initiatives in an Assistance mode (Korten, 1980; Ahmed, 1980).

Assessing the modes is made more complicated by the fact that they can occur differently at different levels of action. Often local institutional development is being furthered by an intermediary organization, such as BRAC, which seeks to foster local capacity.<sup>4/</sup> Outside agencies may in turn work with the intermediary organization in an Assistance or Facilitation mode, at the same time that the intermediary organization is interacting with communities and groups in a Promotion mode, for example, providing

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<sup>2/</sup> These were involved in dam construction, tick control, borehole drilling, crop storage, marketing, vegetable production, range fencing, etc. (see Willett, 1981, and Brown et al., 1982; also Annex on drift fence groups in Report No. 5).

<sup>3/</sup> In a case study of the Mmankodi Farmers Association, Kloppenburg (1983) shows the potential when a local institution started at farmer initiative, with encouragement from the government was able to move into the Assistance mode by soliciting and obtaining a grant from the small self-help fund of the American Embassy for construction of a cattle dipping tank.

<sup>4/</sup> The most extensive analysis of intermediary organizations we have found is by Hellinger and associates (1981), in the summary of a research project done for Appropriate Technology International.

and advocating primary health care. Conversely, the intermediary could be the object of Promotion efforts from outside while it is assisting or facilitating the local institutional efforts of rural people. Intermediary organizations of this sort are not "local" institutions but are rather trying to boost local institutions. It is important to make this distinction when evaluating LID efforts (Olson et al., 1984).

The purpose of identifying these modes analytically, as we have said, is to underscore the importance of assessing existing local capabilities and being clear about the source of initiative. Any LID strategy needs to proceed from a realistic recognition of these two variables, examined in relation to the problems with which governments or donors are concerned. Some of these concerns are sector-specific while others pertain to more generalized institutional capacity. Appreciating the differences among these modes constitutes a good starting point for thinking about LID strategy.

## 1.2 LEARNING PROCESS APPROACH

The last five years have seen an evolution in thinking about planning and implementing development projects. The previously dominant conception could be characterized as essentially a "blueprint" approach. This assumes that needs or problems can be identified and agreed upon sufficiently that precise interventions can be specified and carried out. This view is entirely sequential, with "experts" first doing the planning and then less qualified persons doing the implementation. Usually some technology is recommended to raise productivity, and the project provides resources -- financial, human and material -- to apply the technology. In support of this effort, some new or better institutions are likely to be needed, and they may also be designed and implemented in a "blueprinted" manner.<sup>5/</sup>

This approach failed on numerous grounds. First, it required or assumed a degree of knowledge and consensus on both ends and means that was unattainable. Even if the goal is clear and agreed upon, what needs to be done to reach it can hardly be known in much detail in advance, if only because situations are themselves always changing.<sup>6/</sup>

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<sup>5/</sup> Shortcomings of this approach and the doctrine of "planning" from which it derives are well documented and analyzed in Rondinelli (1982) and (1984:23-50). Earlier critiques of the "blueprint" approach were offered in Morss et al. (1976) and Sweet and Weisel (1979).

<sup>6/</sup> Few institutional arrangements have had as much deliberate and intelligent "upfront" planning as the Kenya Tea Development Authority, discussed in Report No. 5 (Section 4.0 and Annex). Farmers committees constitute one of the four divisions of

Second, even if a design is well-informed and well-conceived, it is unlikely to be applicable to the wide variety of circumstances in the real world, which is necessarily abstracted in the project design process. The inapplicability of a standard organizational model, is the rule rather than an exception, as King (1975) showed for cooperative credit and marketing societies in Northern Nigeria. Modification and adaptation are invariably needed. Third, because improvisation and innovation as well as innumerable skills are required during the implementation phase, it is a misconception to assume that implementors do not need to be as capable and imaginative as designers, that there can be a dichotomy between the "thinkers" and the "doers." This is true for projects but even more so for the institutional development that goes along with them.

What has emerged as an alternative to the "blueprint" approach is what Korten (1980) describes as the "learning process" approach, sometimes referred to more generally as the "process" approach.<sup>7/</sup> Support for this alternative grew out of a great deal of practical experience. Lazaro, Taylor and Wickham find from their review of irrigation management in Asia that an adaptive, inductive approach is more promising than a fixed plan to be implemented on a national scale:

a strategy tailoring water-user associations to local needs and initiating them on a phased basis, beginning with the situations in which the chances of success are greatest, may be more productive in the long run than the commonly advocated attempts in some countries for widespread and immediate introduction of associations. (1979:7)

The previously cited Kottar Social Service Society developed during the 1970s adopted a flexible approach to working with communities which Field characterizes as the "art of guiding incremental change" (1980:161). Botswana experience during this same period

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this parastatal organization, with farmer participation ranging from divisional up to district, provincial and national levels and some remarkable results in terms of productivity, quality and income. The dominant theme in KTDA's experience, however, has been organizational flexibility, according to Lamb and Mueller. "Despite considerable background work and deliberation, the planners did not know enough in advance to set up a 'perfect' organization immediately, nor could they anticipate all the changes which would affect it over the years. It would have been unrealistic to expect otherwise." (1982:49)

<sup>7/</sup> We have characterized the alternative as "inductive planning" (Esman and Uphoff, 1984:262-265). It emphasizes the formulation of hypotheses of "what will work," with continual assessment and revision of strategy. Like Rondinelli (1984), it considers all development initiatives as real-world experiments.

showed a similar orientation to learning from initial mistakes and formulating a national program that builds on these and on encouraging cases such as the Mmankgodi Farmers' Association (Kloppenburg, 1983). The San Martin Jilotepeque cooperative in Guatemala, described in the Annex to Report No. 5, is another good example of how proceeding inductively can produce remarkable results. Learning process does not avoid engaging in action because knowledge is less than perfect but neither does it leap farther than necessary in a pre-judged direction (Dunn, 1971:156).

Unfortunately the search for "success" in rural development often propels agencies to seek short-cuts, to be overly enthused by any visible gains, and to accelerate or expand activities beyond the knowledge base or the supply of seasoned and committed staff, with results the opposite of what was intended.<sup>8/</sup> Developmental change takes time, and outcomes may be different from what was initially concluded. "Successes" can collapse and "failures" may turn out to be successful (Smith et al., 1982). The rush for success, not taking time to experiment, evaluate and develop the human resources needed, can itself impede achieving objectives, or can displace them.

Two of the best examples of large national programs proceeding in a learning process mode are the self-help water supply program in Malawi and Saemaul Undong (New Community Movement) in South Korea.<sup>9/</sup> The Malawi program started with a pilot project sponsored by the Department of Community Development to show how water could be brought from springs in the hill region to villages needing water on the plains. From the outset, community representatives were involved in the planning and design decisions and they in turn mobilized the local labor contributions to build the system. Representatives from other communities were brought to observe the pilot scheme, and to launch similar efforts elsewhere. At all stages there was time taken for consultations and negotiation leading to an understanding of mutual expectations. The communities themselves selected members to be given technical training so that both construction and maintenance could be handled with minimal supervision and input from

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<sup>8/</sup> Morss and associates say that this approach leads usually to failure, where implementors working under time pressure and with mostly outside resources attempt to impose "a new system on a local area rather than go through the time-consuming process of working with local people and their leaders. In short, there is a 'balloon effect': once the external money stops and the foreigners pull out, the system or network made possible by the external funding collapses."

<sup>9/</sup> These cases among others are discussed in the Annex, page 73. The Malawi experience was presented in an Annex to Report No. 3 on rural infrastructure, but it has sufficiently broad lessons about LID in general that further consideration is warranted.

the Department. Technical and organizational mistakes in the early stages were openly acknowledged and rectified. This gave the program greater strength and momentum, always developing within the limits of its own competence and capabilities (Glennie, 1982; Liebenow, 1981).

Neither this program nor Saemaul Undong articulated the theory of "learning process" but they demonstrated its elements. Saemaul was much more complex but similarly experimental. During its initial phases,

the national government offered all villages a limited amount of building materials with which to launch small self-help projects. The experience of both successful and less successful communities was analyzed to determine how they organized self-help activities, how they identified and selected leaders, what forms of cooperation they used, and what kinds of government support would be needed to promote self-help projects requiring more extensive cooperation among villagers. (Rondinelli, 1984:92)

The program leadership classified villages into three categories, which received assistance on different terms, roughly corresponding to the three modes we have described already.

Actually, the Saemaul program began according to a "blueprint," but as experience accumulated, the program's terms were revised accordingly. The acknowledgment of mistakes is never easy, especially in government programs. But Korten identifies being willing to "embrace error" as an essential element of a learning process approach. This was one of the most significant features of the small farmer program of the Academy for Rural Development at Comilla in Bangladesh which has been widely approved as a "success story."<sup>10/</sup> The principle of programmatic self-criticism stressed by the head of the Comilla Academy, Akhter Hameed Khan, is of course valid for any program and it is essential for a learning process approach. The fact that the trials and errors at Comilla were documented and shared has helped to encourage a variety of successor programs to learn from and avoid some of Comilla's mistakes.

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<sup>10/</sup> "The system was developed through a series of trials and errors which involved gathering as much information from the villagers as possible." (Choldin, 1969:485). For an assessment of Comilla, see for example, Mosher (1969:37-40). When the program started receiving major government funding and was expended into a national program, it unfortunately lost much of the discipline and quality that had been built into it by the Comilla Academy. This case is discussed in the Annex of Report No. 5. See also Blair (1982).

It may be said that "learning process" is nothing very new, that governments and donor agencies have often had "rolling plans" or have undertaken mid-project reviews to make mid-course corrections. There is however a distinction to be made between a rolling plan and a learning process approach. As Friedmann has noted:

Clearly the (rolling) plan could not evolve as rapidly as the actions themselves, for it would then become coterminous with them, and the idea is that the plan would somehow stay ahead. Planning was to be a form of decision making in advance. So constituted, a (rolling) plan was understood to be a formal document, and its preparation was regarded as a task for skilled professionals... (1976:2)

Learning process does not maintain that there are strictly observable project stages as the idea of a rolling plan implies. Activities of planning, implementation and evaluation are overlapping rather than sequential. Moreover, learning process contends that intended beneficiaries have much to contribute to planning, implementation and evaluation activities along with professionals, and the rolling plan concept does not provide for this.

Development professionals often acknowledge that projects do not follow the original plans closely. Reasons for alterations may range from admitting that certain assumptions did not prove correct, to accommodating changes in the political environment that occurred while waiting for final approval of the project. Yet the new or altered documents which serve as "shadow plans" are more likely to represent administrative expedience than a self-conscious assessment of experience, which learning process requires. Introducing mid-project evaluations and corrections is better than not having any. But they only convert projects from being like unguided rockets, which once launched cannot have any change in course, to permitting some reprogramming during the trajectory. Learning process aims to make projects like guided rockets. Unfortunately, donor agency efforts to improve project performance in recent years have resulted in the adoption of "more complex and rigid requirements and procedures for identifying, preparing, appraising and implementing projects" at the same time the need for more flexibility has been increasingly evident (Rondinelli, 1984:47).

Ironically, the introduction of more systematic efforts to carry out evaluation of projects may have contributed to more rigidity by giving implementors more reason to adhere to (usually inadequate) project designs. Deviation from the design require not

only protracted bureaucratic hassles but have to be justified later on to evaluators. If one could be certain that a particular modification would produce better results, these would protect one from criticism. But there are more ways for an innovation to go wrong than to succeed. And making adjustments involves personal risk on the part of implementors. Since bureaucratic systems, penalize "failure" much more readily than they reward "success," most incentives in government and donor agencies work against a learning process approach. Moreover, incentives are further reduced when it is known that evaluation will be undertaken with a "blueprint" orientation.

This discussion of "learning process" applies to more than LID. But as seen from contrasting the more and less successful experiences in pursuing local institutional development, the "blueprint" approach is seldom effective and often counterproductive. The "process" approach is itself a method of LID which should apply to each of the three modes analyzed above. We now have quite a number of rich experiences to learn from, though the very notion of a learning process implies that each new experience must be treated as different.

## 2.0 DEVELOPING HUMAN CAPACITIES

Although the term "institutional development" seems to refer to things, to structures, procedures, and abstract performance capabilities, more appropriately, it should call to mind a concern with people, with their skills, motivation, and personal efficacy. In practical terms, when one thinks of building or strengthening institutions, it is necessary to figure out how talents and energies in the relevant population can be enlisted, upgraded and committed on a regular basis to these institutions' operation and improvement. Thus an analysis of supporting LID should begin with consideration of the human aspects of institutional capacity.<sup>11/</sup>

### 2.1 NEW APPROACHES TO TRAINING

Over the years an inordinate amount of faith has been placed in "training," as if the imparting of knowledge and skills through structured programs will substantially improve people's motivation and ability to carry out organizational tasks. Training centers have been built for many programs, practically as an act of faith, and a budget item for "training" has often been treated as a substitute for a thought-out strategy for institutional development. That training has not by itself created strong institutions has led to some disaffection, yet the self-evident need for it continues to win at least some provision in project designs. In our review of LID experience, we looked for ways in which training efforts might be made more fruitful.

The first suggestion is that training be more dispersed than concentrated. There has been a tendency for programs to recruit one person from each community to attend conventional training courses, expecting him or her to go back and relay the knowledge gained to the rest. This is the way the "training and visit" system works, having a "contact farmer" for each group of farmers in the program. These groups are often more nominal than real.

A concentrated approach is likely to create both monopolies and vulnerabilities in local institutions. When only one person has information, this can be manipulated to

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<sup>11/</sup> The revival of interest in institutional development within USAID in recent years can be attributed in part to the work of the ad hoc Technical Program Committee for Agriculture. Coupled with the TPCA's concern for institutional development was a co-equal and correct expression of support for "human resource development." See USAID (1981).

acquire power and advantage, whereas when others share it from the outset the incentives as well as opportunities for diffusion are greater. Moreover, if only one person has the more intensive training and leaves the community (which becomes more likely if training has been concentrated in him or her), the institution receives a setback. This is why the Comilla program, discussed already, had at least two persons from each of its associated cooperative societies participate in the programs at its thana (sub-district) training center.

There are problems of logistics and resources when undertaking training in rural areas. Many of the more successful local institutional programs have, therefore, tried to make their training simpler and less expensive so as to reach broader numbers directly.<sup>12/</sup> As soon as possible, local people should assume responsibility for the training, as agents of the institution, rather than of the outside program. This is exemplified by the Comas Women's Academy in Peru, documented by Hirschman (1984: 16-18) and discussed in the Annex (pages 74-75).

The BRAC program discussed already is a good example of a program which follows a highly diversified strategy of training to increase human capacities in many roles -- vocational training for women, organizational training for local leaders, specialized training for paramedics, literacy training for almost everyone -- which makes the local institutions stronger (Korten, 1980; Ahmed, 1980). In her review of health, nutrition and population programs for the World Bank, Fonaroff (1981) makes the point that there should be training for both consumers and health professionals to participate together in their respective roles. Complementary training of this sort can make both sets of actors more effective. The training programs in the Aceh, Indonesia case reported in the Annex (pages 69-70) brought in middle-level officials with villagers to good advantage.<sup>13/</sup>

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<sup>12/</sup> Little quantitative analysis has been done on this question, but Charlick (1984) in his study of animation rurale programs in Francophone West Africa and Haiti found a significant correlation between programs' performance and their training of rank-and-file members rather than only leaders.

<sup>13/</sup> One of the most novel findings of a previous Rural Development Committee study on rural development training and research pointed to the advantages of conducting training programs with and for persons having different roles and statuses within institutional arenas (RDC, 1974). The usual assumption that training is best given to "homogeneous" groups is quite possibly wrong for rural development, since a large part of the behavioral change sought is getting people in different roles, often with different status, working together. Training programs that bring such persons together can start new patterns of cooperation rather than reinforce by segregated training courses the insularity between levels which plagues development efforts.

Where not all persons can be trained directly and some members or leaders are to be selected to become knowledge brokers it is very important that the selection of such persons be left to -- indeed be required of -- the local institution as was done in Malawi for the technicians guiding the self-help water supply program. Because of this, the persons selected were accountable to the community and were more highly motivated both in the training and in the field activities (Glennie, 1982). A problem has been reported for the Sarvodaya Shramadana movement in Sri Lanka when the selection of persons to be trained and to operate as community workers was controlled by previous Sarvodaya workers and the local village leadership. The worker had too little sense of responsibility to the people of the village since they had no real voice in the selection process (Moore, 1981).

In general, the choice of persons for any specialized training is best left to people at the local level. Agencies involved in training should, to be sure, undertake to spread information locally about what kind of training will be given, and for what kind of roles, so that local people can attempt to get the best fit between candidates for training and the course requirements and subsequent responsibilities. If the selection grows out of local discussions about needs which the training will attempt to meet, so much the better. There can be abuses as we saw ourselves in a Bourkina Fasso (Upper Volta) case, where chiefs dominated the selection of women paraprofessionals (Stohr, 1981). But this risk is worth taking in order to encourage closer bonds between those who are getting the training and those others in the community who are to benefit from it as such responsibility is a stimulus for institutionalization as well as for results.<sup>14/</sup>

Many common methods of training need to be revised for working in rural settings. There is a place in LID efforts for numerous kinds of formal training, but in general, informal or nonformal methods appear more promising, such as the "evening sittings" used to build a base of understanding and acceptance for the Banki water supply project in India, described in the Annex to Report No. 3. Rather than approach training in the uni-directional, "deposit-making," vertical maneuver implied by most formal methods, more bi-directional, participatory and horizontal processes need to be

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<sup>14/</sup> As noted in Report No. 5, one of the weaknesses of the T&V system of agricultural extension is the neglect of such sociological factors in the selection and subsequent accountability of "contact farmers" to other farmers. This crucial link in the chain of T&V communication is now starting to get some serious consideration (Cernea et al., 1982:150-152). Where it is feared that elites will distort the selection, the community should nominate several persons, from whom the agency would select "the best qualified" for training.

established. This means that the "trainers" must themselves be willing and able to learn from "trainees." The object of training is to bring about more self-confident, self-directed, self-sustaining efforts within local institutions. The role of trainer becomes more that of facilitator than teacher. Local institutions need strong problem-solving capabilities, and trainers should be building these up by some combination of sharing knowledge, reinforcing positive attitudes, developing skills, and promoting strategic thinking. Techniques like role-playing and group problem-solving are more useful for this than didactic lectures or recitations. The concept animating the program should be one of "developing" people rather than of "training" them (Coombs, 1981:52).

There is also value in promoting what rural people can learn from each other by means of exchanges. The work which Hatch has done among Bolivian peasants is a good example of how training for agricultural development can be facilitated by a program of learning from farmers themselves, as just discussed, and then by getting people together to exchange knowledge and experience (Hatch, 1981).<sup>15/</sup> Engaging rural residents in programs to help each other learn is a sign of respect for what they know and an encouragement for them to be more self-reliant. Moreover, it can provide more relevant information to those who have direct responsibility for making local institutions effective, as shown in the Malawi water supply case where visits between communities were a major means of training as well as building support (Glennie, 1982). Strengthening horizontal linkages is discussed as a separate strategy for LID, but it should be reinforced by a strategy for training which provides horizontal and not just vertical flows of knowledge.

The content of training has to be tailored to the needs of the institution and the persons involved. "Canned courses" or modules seem to be less effective than professional trainers ordinarily like to think. As Early (1984:4) says on the basis of surveying training for irrigation management in India, "The major conclusion was that most good training materials are developed for specific purposes and specific programs. A demand for training materials is often heard from the local level, but one of the best ways of developing local capabilities and of encouraging consideration and consensus on what the needs and goals of the institution are, is to involve local people in planning and designing their training. Ideas about format and content can come from "examples" developed for not too dissimilar institutions elsewhere, which outside agencies can

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<sup>15/</sup> Hatch has taken the process a step further by compiling and publishing in Spanish the local knowledge of agriculture, health and other practices, thereby making this available to a broader audience than the campesinos involved in the project.

make available as a service in support of LID. But the idea is for participants in the local institution to work out their own training program, which itself is valuable training. The role of the outside "trainer" is basically that of a training consultant or facilitator.

In many circumstances, part of the effort of human resource development to undergird LID involves literacy and numeracy training. Such training is more likely to be effective when it is tied in to the substantive programs of the institution, as Hirschman points out with a case from Colombia (1984:6-11). Where the operating procedures for an institution are complex, requiring a fairly high order of education, it is worth trying to simplify the operations rather than train persons up to a particularly high standard.<sup>16/</sup> The general level of reading, writing and arithmetic skills should be raised but not as a prerequisite for operating the institution. The requirement of literacy is commonly overestimated as discussed in Section 6.1 of Report No. 5.

Most of the best training will not be in structured settings but rather in two kinds of activity usually regarded as different from training. Supervision can provide significant opportunities for training which are seldom seen as such. Studies of the use of paraprofessionals in rural development have found that the field visits of program supervisors to health workers, agricultural assistants and community organizers are often the most valuable instruction they obtain (Esman et al., 1981; Esman, 1983). Formal pre-service training is necessary before undertaking responsibilities, but when dealing with actual problems in the field there is more opportunity for elaborating relevant principles of analysis and action. Supervisory visits can be used not just to work with staff or officers of institutions but also with rank-and-file if visits are so planned.

Similarly, evaluation activities can include a training component which makes them much more useful for LID. A good example is the Small Farmers Development Program in Nepal, where group leaders meet periodically with program staff to assess progress. The format developed was to spend the first day reporting on and talking about "problems," their sources, and how they may be resolved, with discussion of "progress" reserved for the second day. This underscores the positive value attached by

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<sup>16/</sup> The study of cooperatives in Northern Nigeria by King (1975) found that they were supposed to maintain 14 sets of books, and when this proved too difficult for local people, the government took over the accounting function, leading to a whole set of abuses from collusion with buying agents which members could not check because they had no control over their own books. King notes that simplified accounting schemes for cooperatives across the border in Niger allowed illiterates to manage their co-ops satisfactorily. The training needed would be different and much easier in the latter case than in Nigeria because of institutional design factors.

the program's leadership to "embracing error" as part of a learning process. It also orients the local institutions to a problem-solving approach, recognizing at the same time that one can often learn more from failings than from presumed successes.

Much more could be said about training efforts in support of LID, but these observations cover the main lines of innovation in training initiatives which we could identify from our review of field experience.

## 2.2 LEADERSHIP DEVELOPMENT

Leadership talents cannot be developed in the abstract. They are the quintessence of skills which must be embodied in persons. Yet they should not be identified just with individuals. Leadership should be viewed as function which all local institutions need performed, not as a matter of personalities and idiosyncratic factors. All institutions need leadership, to propose and get agreement on goals, devise strategies, motivate others, resolve conflicts, oversee implementation, and so forth. But these tasks can be carried out successfully by a wide variety of persons. Some societies may have cultural stereotypes that influence effectiveness in leadership roles. For example, it is said that in Latin cultures, the image of the lider is to be very dominant and decisive, not consultative or reconciling. Yet even in an historical experience as freighted with cultural influences and with high stakes of conflict as the Mexican revolution, quite divergent leadership styles could be successful at different times. Machismo was less significant for winning and maintaining the public's support than steadfastness and loyalty to the public's interests which inspired its confidence (Womack, 1968).

Many kinds of talent get associated with leadership, and effective leaders have different combinations of qualities and skills, even proving successful in similar situations. The abilities associated with leadership appear to be distributed fairly widely within populations, almost like mechanical or musical talent. Whether they emerge and develop to others' benefit depends on opportunities to demonstrate them and to gain good experience and reputation for leadership.

Attempts to develop leadership as an individual capability miss the fact that leadership depends on the attitudes and actions of "followers" as much as on "leaders." It is thus a collective phenomenon rather than just an individual characteristic. Leadership amounts to taking or accepting responsibility, and this is something in which a number of persons can share.

There are differences between persons in their disposition to take or accept responsibility. Some are reluctant to share responsibility for the understandable reason that they would not want to be held accountable for what others who are also "responsible" have done. For less commendable reasons, others may resist any diffusion of responsibility since credit and other rewards for leadership then must also be shared.

A situation where responsibilities are quite advantageously shared is found in many of the *zanjera* schemes in the Northern Philippines which select two leaders, each having a separate sphere of responsibility. The "external" leader, often a teacher serves as the key link for dealing with government officials or other tasks which require formal education. The "internal" leader (*panglakayen*) carries the heaviest load in terms of dealing with the myriad day-to-day managerial tasks (Siy 1982). This same division of responsibility is found in one of the Senegalese women's garden groups described in the Annex to Report No. 5.

In the preceding section, we noted the importance of having trainees selected by the community so there is a greater bond of accountability. Community members who understand the objectives of the institution should be in a better position to identify the persons who would make good use of training for the advancement of others. Biases can come into local selection processes but it is more likely that persons who have positively impressed their friends and neighbors will perform better for the local institution than those who have only impressed "outsiders." One of the lessons from the Saemaul Undong movement in South Korea was that selection of leaders should be left to the community if the persons given training and responsibility under the program are to exercise influence and accomplish results.<sup>17/</sup>

Every locality has some pool of potential leaders, unless it has been affected by substantial outmigration. Even this is likely to deplete only the male leadership ranks or certain age groups, in which case one LID strategy is to look harder for leadership talent in non-migrant categories. It appears that relatively fewer leaders will come

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<sup>17/</sup> "Anybody over 20 years old, regardless of education, income, or social status, who was chosen by his neighbors, could become a Saemaul leader," reports Rondinelli (1984:101). "The success of Korea's Saemaul Undong can be attributed largely to the dedication of Saemaul leaders, who were chosen by villagers and who served without pay. They organized and prodded villagers to cooperate in self-help projects and mobilized resources within the community. Their effectiveness was due not only to their own leadership traits, but also to their selection by villagers, the training provided by the Saemaul Leaders Training Institute, and the competitive approach used by the government to stimulate village development." See also Goldsmith (1981) and Annex, pages 75-76.

from the poorer strata of rural society because of various biases and burdens (Ralston et al., 1983:22-24). Yet we have found some good examples of leadership being mobilized from poorer sections by outside catalysts, e.g. the Ayni Ruway case in Bolivia (see Annex of Report No. 6), the Mae Klong integrated rural development project in Thailand (see Annex in Report No. 5) and the Aceh community-based program in Indonesia (see Annex in this report, pages 69-70). Still, rather than emphasize the social origins of local leaders, we would focus on the mechanisms for accountability of leaders to their constituencies. There is no guarantee that persons from a humble background will work for or persist in advancing the interests of the disadvantaged, and one can find numerous examples of persons who grew up in privileged circumstances who are willing to promote the interest of the poor. The key issue is how fully and freely the persons speaking and acting on behalf of rural local institutions are accepted in those roles by their constituencies. This is in large part a matter of how the institutions are designed or operated and for what purpose.

Provisions can and generally should be made for replacement of leaders who no longer enjoy the confidence of a majority within the local council, co-op or association. The more explicit these procedures are, the more of a deterrent they are to misconduct and the more easily they can be utilized when needed. Like all techniques, they can be abused, but the alternative of having no rules or ones that are not clearly understood or widely known is less desirable.

Another measure for promoting accountability is to provide for rotation of officers or staff in their positions, so no personal monopolies of authority or access to information and contacts can be maintained. This has the added advantage of spreading experience more widely within the community and of reducing the dependence of institutions on a very few persons. If rotation is applied rigidly, however, it can be disruptive of programmatic efforts and can reduce people's sense of responsibility for their institutions by taking control out of their hands. Thus, an LID strategy may suggest rotation as a possible rule, for acceptance and implementation by the institution in question if those responsible for it think this is desirable. There may also be provision for exceptions if the persons involved determine this is in the best interests of promoting local institutional effectiveness and building capacity.

When trying to attract leaders, the question of rewards must be addressed (Ralston et al., 1983:54-56). It is observed that leaders who serve without pay can claim certain legitimacy for their motivation of public service, and this can enhance their claim on others for their cooperation. However, not all local institutions can be

developed entirely on a volunteer basis. Certainly local administration must operate on a paid, professional basis, and businesses need to pay their employees and return a profit. Many voluntary organizations also find that they need to provide some salary or emoluments, e.g., use of a small piece of land as provided to irrigation group leaders traditionally in Sri Lanka and still now by the *zanjeras* in the Philippines, or exemption from certain responsibilities to compensate for the time devoted to organizational tasks. Even the Yachiho village health organization which receives a huge amount of contributed time gives its health instructors and health officers some stipend (see Annex, pages 70-72).<sup>18/</sup>

The subject of leadership is inherently difficult to encompass theoretically, though this does not diminish its importance for local institutional development. It includes leadership in local units of the bureaucracy and the business sector while applying most directly to persons heading local government and other participatory institutions. The central thrust of strategy is to encourage initiative with accountability of local leadership which is elected, and to have innovation guided by a sense of responsibility from that which is not. There needs to be more attention to methods of selection, to prescriptions like rotation, and to the range of rewards that go beyond conventional material ones.

The possibilities of accomplishing considerable improvements through mobilization of local leadership have been seen in an irrigation rehabilitation project in Sri Lanka, where water user associations have been introduced (Uphoff, 1984). Two rather simple methodologies appear to have helped in getting committed and energetic leaders. First, farmer-representatives are selected only after extended discussion of what qualities members of the field channel groups want to have (or avoid) in their representative, and after the groups had carried out some work on an informal basis which showed who among them could make group action effective. Second, the choice of a representative is by consensus rather than by vote. The preceding discussion narrows the field of candidates by implicitly (and diplomatically) screening out undesirable candidates. Also important, whoever is finally agreed upon knows explicitly

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<sup>18/</sup> The Saemaul program, it should be noted, provides a number of benefits that substitute in part for cash payment -- transportation discounts, scholarship opportunities for leaders' children, and social recognition (Goldsmith, 1981). Leaders are kept in check by the expectation that successors will be chosen within five years. The possibility that a community will extend the term of a leader who is unusually effective creates an additional status reward for good leaders. There is also competition between the Saemaul leaders and the traditional village headmen which seems to enhance the performance of both.

what is expected of him or her. Further, all members by publicly assenting to the representative acting on their behalf are implicitly committed to cooperate. If several persons are qualified and supported, the responsibility can be shared or rotated by mutual agreement.

These representatives are not paid, and appear to get considerable satisfaction from their roles of responsibility in a popular program.<sup>19/</sup> Similar mobilization of local talent is seen in the Malawi self-help water supply scheme, the Small Farmer Development Program in Nepal, and the Ayni Ruway program in Bolivia (described in Annexes of Reports No. 2, 5 and 6). Understanding more about this kind of local leadership and its potential contribution to increased local institutional capacity would be quite valuable. So far the literature provides only fragmentary information on the mechanisms of recruiting and rewarding good leadership. The only systematic data are occasional detailed tables of "background data" on persons in local leadership positions which tell us little about how and why they come forward to mobilize and manage resources on behalf of their communities and their peers.

Our consideration of LID experience points to a two-pronged strategy for human resource development. The first is directed toward upgrading generally the knowledge, skills and confidence of rural people, whose understanding and commitment must provide the motivating force behind local institutions. The other prong is aimed at strengthening the hands and wills of those in leadership positions who can call forth, channel, coordinate and conciliate the energies of rural people in development activities. There are many innovative endeavors currently underway, initiated by outside agencies and by rural people themselves, in this area of strategy. We turn to consideration of more "structural" features of LID, but these "human" aspects are basic to successful programs. One of the most commonly cited constraints on rural development is "lack of management capacity" for carrying out programs. In fact there is substantial capability already at local levels for managing a wide variety of development undertakings, as Calavan (1984:217-221) shows with examples from rural Thailand. Efforts to upgrade rural people's skills and to encourage local leadership to take responsibility more generally could help accomplish much more in all sectors.

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<sup>19/</sup> In October 1984, the 300 representatives organized a rally to get more political support for the program. They raised 13,000 rupees from members and invited three ministers to attend. About 2,000 farmers attended the rally to indicate to the ministers their support for the program's continuation and expansion elsewhere.

### 3.0 STRENGTHENING INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITIES

The structures of local institutions differ enough that there is little point in trying to propose general strategies for making certain structural improvements in institutions. When it comes to modifying sanctions and incentives, for example, one cannot equate the relationships between businesses and customers, service organizations and clients, cooperatives and members, local governments and constituents, or bureaucratic agencies and citizens. Even the same persons are functioning in these various roles, each kind of institution needs to operate somewhat differently.

We have gone into many variations in our sector-specific discussions, and will not try to elaborate them in a summary manner here. Instead we focus on considerations of strategy that bear on LID initiatives generally with regard to strengthening local institutions. As already noted, institutions should not be treated in isolation, thus we turn our attention accordingly to questions of "linkage" among institutions in the following section (4.0).

#### 3.1 WORKING WITH PRE-EXISTING INSTITUTIONS

It is common to talk about "traditional" institutions or roles in developing countries, and to pose a choice between working with them or with "modern" ones. Contrasting "indigenous" and "introduced" institutions would offer a distinction less burdened with discredited theory.<sup>20/</sup> Yet the notion of "indigenous" institutions itself suggests something primordial and even unchanging, so we prefer to use the simpler term "pre-existing." We find that such institutions can have various "modern" characteristics, like having formal-legal status or operating according to achievement rather than ascriptive norms. They may be rather recent in origin. They are often dynamic and innovative compared to many introduced "modern" institutions, which can be quite conservative and rigid. So gross classifications generally give little guidance for decision-making.

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<sup>20/</sup> The critiques by Bendix (1967) and Portes (1973) are among the most persuasive that the distinction between "tradition" and "modernity" has little theoretical, i.e., predictive or explanatory, power, and no more than descriptive value at best.

When administrators complain about "local institutions not working," they are usually talking about introduced institutions.<sup>21/</sup> Pre-existing institutions for all of their faults, and one can identify many, have the advantage of being familiar and of having accumulated some legitimacy, support and commitment over time. We understand that when USAID's policy paper on local organizations (1984) was considered, its most controversial aspect was the favorable nod toward working with or through pre-existing ("indigenous") local institutions. Some persons objected to this on the ground that such institutions often embody certain socio-economic or anti-modernization biases. Any such biases surely need to be looked for and where they raise serious obstacles, strategy should steer toward alternative institutional channels. But any efforts to institute new channels must reckon with the fact that existing institutions will be competing for people's resources, time and loyalties and usually begin with a head start in any competition.

The alternatives are: (a) to oppose and to try to undermine existing institutions, (b) to ignore and work around them, (c) to try to use and work through them, or (d) to try to work with and build on them. The last two options generally make more sense, though there is more difference between them than may be evident on the face of it.

The third alternative corresponds to a Promotion mode, where persons in traditional institutions or roles are coopted to work on activities essentially defined and determined from outside. A community health program in Ghana which recruited "indigenous" healers proceeded in this mode with considerable tact and sensitivity and had some progress to show for the effort, as seen in the Annex to Report No. 4. The healers, as well as their patients, apparently were willing to accept certain aspects of Western medicine as complementary to traditional practices when no choice between them was forced.

Many primary health care programs have trained traditional birth attendants (TBAs) in simple modern practices. Some programs like that in Burma, described in Report No. 4, have produced positive results by encouraging newly trained midwives to work supportively with TBAs, while others like the Sine Saloum project in Senegal have encountered difficulties in involving traditional midwives.<sup>22/</sup> Outside the health area,

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<sup>21/</sup> This point was made by our colleague Walter Coward at the LID workshop in May 1984.

<sup>22/</sup> This case was also covered in the Annex to Report No. 4. The method of cash payment introduced was at variance with traditional practice and led to a reduction in the use of the midwives' services (Hall, 1981). Since then the project has been greatly changed. In particular, village health committees have been given clear responsibility for the "health huts" and more flexible arrangements for payment have been introduced, as reported by Bloom (1984).

we found some impressive examples of what might be considered as "cooptation" of traditional leaders. The Malawi self-help water scheme was a good case where chiefs were engaged in the decision-making process (see Annex, page 73). An evaluation of the Lilongwe integrated rural development project funded by the World Bank in the same country indicated that

the primary factor contributing to (its) progress...was its ability to involve both tribal units and their chiefs in the project's operations, encouraging the chiefs to serve as members of the land board overseeing implementation of one of the project's vital activities. (Ruddle and Rondinelli, 1983:82)

Hence there are examples of where a Promotion approach coopting existing institutions can be successful, provided that the activities are clearly desirable and the pace and manner of implementation are not forced.

Some of the most impressive cases of LID involve cooperation with persons in traditional roles but no strategy of cooptation. Rather than try to convert existing institutions to new activities and purposes, new ones are established that build on the patterns of organization already familiar and accepted. This strategy was proposed by March and Taqqu (1982) with regard to women's informal associations but it appears to have broader validity. Most of the examples of this we found in Africa, where so-called "traditional" institutions and leadership remain stronger. A very impressive case is documented in Cameroon where informal "rotating credit" associations were used as a basis for developing a network of formal credit unions.<sup>23/</sup> Within twelve years this system had grown to more than 181 credit unions with 26,000 members and capital assets of 400 million CFA francs (see Annex of Report No. 8). In Nigeria, traditional savings societies (called bams) among the Tiv ethnic group were taken as a base for establishing a regional system of farmers associations that contributed to a 72 percent increase in income over 10 years (also discussed in the Annex, pages 73-74). The Pikine primary health care project in Senegal, described in the Annex of Report No. 4, patterned its health committees after the elders' committees which already existed, and the Sine Saloum health project in the same country appears to be regaining lost ground now by adopting a similar approach (Bloom, 1984).

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<sup>23/</sup> On rotating credit associations as "existing" institutions, see March and Taqqu (1982:63-77) and Ralston et al. (1983:108-113).

These are encouraging cases, but all that can be said is that they establish a presumption that one should try to work with or build on existing institutions and roles. Evaluation of their capacity and appropriateness obviously is needed on a case by case basis. Sometimes there are no pre-existing institutions with which to work as for example in the Gal Oya irrigation re-settlement scheme in Sri Lanka (Uphoff, 1984). Where they exist, some initial experimentation may indicate they are not suitable channels for promoting collective action for a particular activity, as discovered in the Orangi Pilot Project in Pakistan directed by Akhter Hameed Khan, the founder of the Comilla experiment in Bangladesh.<sup>24/</sup> In the rural development project in Aceh, Indonesia, traditional leaders at first dominated the newly established locality-level committees. However, their influence gradually diminished as community and group level activities took root which brought forth new leadership. The older leaders were gently moved into an advisory rather than an authoritative role because the "action" was occurring at a lower level (see Annex, pages 69-70).

There is always a question whether existing institutions and leaders can be involved in development projects without losing the legitimacy which made them effective in the first place (Fonaroff, 1981; March and Taqqu, 1982:39-52). Much depends on whether they are seen as maintaining some independence of action. The cooperation and compliance which traditional institutions and leaders can elicit derives in large part from their working within common understandings of what is or is not legitimate and from their mechanisms for maintaining accountability, often by quite subtle means. If these understandings and mechanisms are undermined by their annexation to government programs, their value will be greatly reduced (Coward, 1979).

Hunter (1980) suggests that traditional institutions in any event make important social and psychological contributions and thus deserve acceptance as a necessary and helpful part of village society's network of local institutions, even if they appear irrelevant to development activities. This is stating the weakest case for working with existing institutions, but it is worth noting since Hunter has previously written more negatively about such institutions (Hunter and Jiggins, 1977). Our conclusion is closer to the view of Cernea (1982) that it is almost always worth thinking through and experimenting with a cooperative approach toward existing institutions.

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<sup>24/</sup> This case was reviewed in the Annex to Report No. 3. Khan worked with the elected councillors of the existing local government and with Islamic religious leaders in the mosques, but these prominent figures failed to provide the expected leadership on behalf of the people of Orangi. Fortunately, the neighborhood groups set up under the project did accomplish a great deal (Khan, 1983).

### 3.2 CATALYTIC APPROACHES

Where local institutional capacities already exist and need only to be strengthened, LID tasks are easier, though not necessarily assured of success. Prompting or promoting such capacities where they are negligible will present outside agencies, whether governmental or non-governmental, with special challenges. There is growing support in the literature for what might be called "catalytic" approaches. These involve recruitment, training and deployment of persons who specialize in community organization and are given responsibilities for getting institutional processes started. Even where the Assistance mode is being followed, there could be a role for such persons -- to work with and strengthen local governments, cooperatives, or private businesses, to help them to make better use of outside resources and their own. Where the mode of support is Facilitation or Promotion, the role for such specialists is more evident.

The designations for such persons are various, some of them paralleling our typology of LID support modes. The terms Promoter, Facilitator and Community or Development Assistant can be found in different situations.<sup>25/</sup> "Change agent" as a designation has been used for persons seeking to achieve behavioral change of individuals (for some predetermined objective), not for something as interactive as institutional development. We have used the term "Promoter" as a generic designation (Esman and Uphoff, 1984:253-258), but the term "Catalyst" is probably more neutral and more descriptive, implying that the person initiates a change process but is not absorbed by it (Lassen, 1980).

A number of the most successful LID experiences in South and Southeast Asia have used "catalysts,"<sup>26/</sup> and Hirschman (1984) in his survey of "grassroots" programs in

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<sup>25/</sup> Hirschman (1984:78-79) objects to the terms "intermediary" and "broker" as having somewhat derogatory or condescending connotations and he dislikes the term "facilitator" on esthetic grounds. "Promoter" he also considers to have derogatory connotations, so he concludes in favor of the term "social activist." In the French tradition of animation rurale, one can speak of animateurs (Charlick, 1984), and in Spanish, the term promotores is often used (Sharpe, 1977).

<sup>26/</sup> A partial listing includes the "social organizers" in the Orangi Pilot Project in Pakistan (Khan, 1983), the "group organizers" of the Small Farmer Development Programme in Nepal (Ghai and Rahman, 1981), the "institutional organizers" for the Gal Oya irrigation rehabilitation project in Sri Lanka (Uphoff, 1984), the "community organizers" of the National Irrigation Administration in the Philippines (F. Korten, 1982), the local organizers of the Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (Ahmed, 1980) and the Thai Khadi Research Institute in Thailand (Rabibhadana, 1983), the health workers of the Kottar Social Service Society (Field, 1980) and the cooperative organizers for the NDDB dairy scheme also in India (Paul, 1982).

Latin America finds many good examples of such catalytic efforts. The Plan Puebla in Mexico is a good example from that part of the world (see Annex of Report No. 5). Interestingly, we have not come across any similar frequency of such approaches in Africa or the Middle East. Since no systematic study of this phenomenon was possible, we can only speculate whether this is due to cultural factors, to a smaller pool of educated persons, or some other reasons.

One can ask whether such catalytic (promotional or facilitational) efforts cannot be done without setting up a special cadre, with its own recruitment, doctrine, supervision, career paths, etc. The establishment of the Saemaul Undong program in South Korea, for example, proceeded through government channels, though the program did develop its own staff. The same is true for the Kenya Tea Development Authority. A profoundly different rural health program based on village health committees and federations was introduced in Panama by Ministry of Health personnel between 1969 and 1973. This was accomplished without catalysts under unusual circumstances. Ministries of Health are usually among the most conservative government agencies, however this particular ministry was put under extreme pressure to serve the health committees by its Minister and the President (LaForgia, 1984, see Annex to Report No. 4).

More typical may be the commendable but vulnerable progress of promotores of cooperatives in the Dominican Republic (Sharpe, 1977). Unless government agencies have gone through a process of what we term "bureaucratic reorientation" (Korten and Uphoff, 1981), it is unlikely that official staff will be able to act effectively as "catalysts" given their lack of appropriate attitudes and skills (see Section 5.3). The situation is often aggravated by a legacy of distrust, resentment or fear on the part of the rural people whose participation in these new or refurbished institutions is desired.

There are a number of variables in formulating a "catalyst" role.

- (1) Should the person be someone from "outside" the community or locality, or an "insider" recruited locally and given special training and status? Opinions differ on this, with Flavier (1972) and Hunter (1980), for example, strongly favoring the former. 27/

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27/ One interesting compromise in the National Community Development Service of Bolivia has been to recruit local leaders who have demonstrated CD skills and to assign them to other communities within their locality, or to localities within their region so they are only partially "outsiders" (Savino, 1985). Savino reports the problem, which Colburn (1981) also notes with health committee organizers, that "locals" may be regarded as "prophets without honor in their own country." Still, there are arguments in favor of having locals -- quicker orientation, less cost, likely to remain longer in the community.

- (2) Should the person be a paid professional or a volunteer? For the same reason that unpaid leaders have some special credibility and legitimacy, the latter may also be attractive for its budgetary implications. However, there is less control over the persons, and turnover is likely to be high. Also there is something to be said for "professionalism," so long as "burnout" (a real danger in this kind of work) can be avoided.
- (3) Should the person begin by working on a particular, often technical, task around which people can be mobilized, or should the organizer emphasize building up local institutional capabilities first? There are proponents of the more technical approach which emphasizes tangible benefits as an incentive for organization, and others who stress the need for developing group and individual skills.
- (4) Should the approach be one of compromise and reconciliation, or confrontation and conflict? There are advocates of a Freirian methodology who find commitment to group effort stimulated only by the latter (Freire, 1970). Certain social science analyses (e.g. Coser, 1956) support this approach less emphatically. Yet in many circumstances it may be untenable or counterproductive.

There are many other questions, such as what kind of training and supervision are best, how should catalysts be deployed, does gender make a difference, where should they live, should they attempt to support institutions directly or by concentrating on training local people to do this?

This approach is gaining support in many quarters as the limitations of working through conventional bureaucratic or technocratic channels became more apparent. NGOs and PVOs often operate in a manner quite similar to government, so they too may need to think in terms of establishing such specialized cadres who are delegated the task of working with local people to strengthen whatever local institutions are designated for Assistance, Facilitation or Promotion. This is an important area for more systematic analysis and evaluation.

### 3.3 ALTERNATIVE ORGANIZATIONS

Most development programs of governments and donor agencies have as one of their objectives to improve the productivity and well-being of the disadvantaged and the less well-endowed. While there may be less talk about aiding "the poorest of the poor," the practical and ethical problems which their continued presence and needs present have not diminished. The Foreign Assistance Act under which USAID operates has not been amended in this regard, and helping the rural poor to become more self-sufficient and secure remains high on the agenda in most countries. There is renewed concern with the problems and dangers if the numbers of rural poor keep on growing inexorably (Clausen, 1984; World Bank, 1984). While directly-targeted population programs and policies are clearly an important part of the solution, the most effective remedy lies in their economic and social development.

There has been much concern in the literature that promoting development through local institutions, where rural elites can exercise greater influence than the rural poor, will be to the advantage of the former and to the disadvantage of the latter. (e.g. Blair, 1978; Holmquist, 1979). In particular there is apprehension that cooperatives operate in this manner (Münkner, 1976; ICA, 1978; Lele, 1981), but local administration and local government, not to mention local merchants, are also widely seen as contributing to inegalitarian outcomes. There are some contrary examples which show benefits reaching the poor in rural communities through cooperatives, e.g. Meehan (1978) on Ecuador, Tendler (1983) on Bolivia, and Nicholson (1984) on "green revolution" in the Indian Punjab. The analysis by Montgomery (1972) of land reform implementation found that devolution of authority to local governments or membership organizations produced more benefits than a centralized approach. If the latter approach worked exactly as intended, with strong egalitarian internal leadership it might be more beneficial to the poor, but this approach is if anything more liable to manipulation by educated and influential rural elites, since local institutions are at least physically and socially more accessible to the poor.

Given considerations such as we discuss in Report No. 8, there is likely to be little alternative to pursuing local institutional approaches in the future. Central governments are simply not going to have enough resources to continue with top-down development activities as undertaken in the past. The question becomes whether to emphasize special or separate institutional channels for the poorer sectors -- "alternative" institutions which exclude the more advantaged sectors (Leonard, 1983) --

or to try to make the regular, more inclusive institutions better serve the poor, possibly through special programs.

There is no question that there are major social, political and economic obstacles which keep the rural poor from full participation in the planning and the benefits of rural development programs. (These are well-reviewed in Ralston et al., 1983:16-26). A strategy which focused on "alternative" LID would include the following:

- (a) special agencies or offices of local administration which deal exclusively with poor clientele,
- (b) "exclusive" membership organizations (Leonard, 1982) including only the poor in cooperatives, tenant unions, women's associations, etc.,
- (c) service organizations assisting only the poor, and
- (d) special enterprise promotion, aimed at establishing or strengthening petty manufacturing and commerce (often referred to as "the informal sector") which generates employment, income and capital for the poor.

Local government is usually by definition "inclusive" since its jurisdiction is defined territorially. One step in the direction of "alternative" institutions which has been tried in South Asian countries is to reserve a certain number of seats on panchayat for local government representatives of the poorer castes and tribes. This is not generally regarded as having done much for the poor. More important is the influence such groups are gaining, however slowly, through the regular electoral processes for local government.<sup>28/</sup>

"Alternative" membership organizations may make a real contribution to the advancement of the poor. For example, there are several impressive cases from the Philippines where the power of rural elites, often in league with local administration, has been great but was curtailed by mobilizing the less advantaged (Hollnsteiner et al., 1979; Paul and Dias, 1980). The Small Farmer Development Program in Nepal excludes from membership in its groups, and therefore from credit and technical assistance, any person with landholdings over a certain maximum, in a way that targets benefits to the poor (Ghai and Rahman, 1981). There is no special agency working with small farmers,

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<sup>28/</sup> "There are indications that newer and younger faces have been recruited to sit in panchayats in all states where elections have recently been held, and there is also evidence that some groups and castes have increased their representation. Such changes, however, must still be described as slow-paced and incremental...(It will be) a minimum of another two or three decades before power could pass to the most disadvantaged rural groups." (Franda, 1979:146)

but the Agricultural Development Bank of Nepal has a special staff assigned to work with SFDP groups in a Facilitation mode. Loans are applied for and given through the regular banking institutions, backed by program guarantees. (Repayment may be greater because there is not a "special" bank making the loans.)

Service organizations (SOs) have traditionally "targeted" the poor, a good example being the Kottar Social Service Society in India (Field, 1980; see Annex, pages 67-69). There is little that a government or donor agency can do to create SOs, however. It can encourage them through its tax laws or can give them subsidies and contracts. There is considerable evidence that such organizations can work more effectively with the poor (e.g. Hyden, 1983; Hirschman, 1984). However any major role at government instigation begins changing their nature and effectiveness, if only because of influences of larger scale. Promoting small-scale private enterprises for the poor is getting more attention these days with some promising results when often quite small amounts of capital and technical assistance are made available (Farbman, 1981; Soares, 1983).

While there is scope for LID of "alternative" institutions, these are not to be seen as the sole solution. The danger is always that institutions with weak client groups will themselves be weak (Tendler, 1982). The tradeoff with regard to local administration is between the poor having strong claims on weak agencies, or weaker claims on stronger ones. If there is some clear political support from above for aiding the poor, the latter is a more promising approach. If there are functioning cooperatives, membership and service organizations that speak for the interests of the poor, and they have some representation in local government, the chances of local administration being responsive to the needs of the poor will be considerably enhanced. This is another example of how local institutional networks are more important than the structure and program of any individual institutional channel.

A combination of "alternative" channels and "regular" ones is likely to be optimal, recognizing that the latter are always prone to discriminatory or disadvantaging performance vis-a-vis the poor. There can be bureaucracies that defend the interests of the poor in their performance of duties. The Kenya Tea Development Authority is an interesting example where the staff have upheld reasonably well the ceiling on tea plantings, when richer members wanted to evade or change.<sup>29/</sup> Efficient private local

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<sup>29/</sup> This was found by Steeves (1984), whose thesis on KTDA is the most detailed analysis available and who did follow-up fieldwork in Kenya in 1979 on this subject. Richer farmers do engage in some subterfuge to circumvent the ceiling, but it has been preserved better than Steeves expected, given that country's policy favoring a more capitalistic development path (see Annex in Report No. 5).

enterprises operating with good infrastructure and sufficient competition can also benefit the poor. So one should not assume that only alternative institutions can help.

Another option to "alternative institutions" is "alternative programs." These are activities and investments which are of most value to the poor because richer persons cannot or do not want to benefit from them. They can be carried out through regular institutional channels with less fear of monopolization or diversion.<sup>30/</sup> There will practically always be some bias in the spread of benefits. In general, this will be less in the case of services compared to goods (Hunter, 1981), though the bias in provision of extension services in favor of larger and more advantaged farmers is frequently documented (Ralston et al., 1983:25-26).

Where providing goods or services which are intended for both the better and the poorly endowed persons in rural areas, it is important that the executing agency be oriented to reaching and benefiting the poor, otherwise the latter are unlikely to get much. Agencies which have not had this orientation are not likely to change very readily, though a process of bureaucratic reorientation can and should be undertaken (see Section 5.3). With this must go substantial effort directed toward training and leadership development that enhances the human resources of the poor, as discussed in Sections 2.1 and 2.2.

One program approach which has been of limited help to the poor, despite declarations to the contrary, is subsidization of goods and services on the ground that the poor cannot afford to pay market prices. This has a certain plausibility to it, but experience shows that when such "windfalls" of benefit become available, the richer and more powerful will often find ways of reaping them, if necessary by subterfuge or force. There is an increasing concern in development circles that subsidies present more problems than benefits for the poor (e.g. Adams, et al., 1984). As suggested in

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<sup>30/</sup> Benefits will be less vulnerable to being diverted away from the poor for whom they are intended if: (i) they are indivisible, rather than being separately available to individuals or families, e.g. public sanitation compared to bank loans; (ii) getting the benefits is linked to use of a resource the poor have in abundance, such as labor-intensive public works; (iii) they relate to problems or opportunities more relevant to the poor, such as improving cassava or sorghum production; (iv) their quality cannot be upgraded at the expense of quantity; (v) they are provided actively rather than passively (only upon demand); (vi) supply exceeds demand, or is provided in units that exceed the demand of local elites, such as a primary school; (vii) the goods or services cannot be accumulated and sold for profit, such as vaccinations or primary education (Leonard, 1982).

Report No. 5, it can be quite difficult for local institutional channels to withstand much pressure for misallocation when large subsidies produce incentives for altering their distribution.<sup>31/</sup>

The difficulties associated with devising ways by which the weaker sections of rural communities will benefit are well known. Without local institutions, it is likely to be impossible. The question to be resolved in formulation of LID strategy is what kinds of institutions to support (promote, facilitate, assist), with what orientation and with what programs. Promoting a poverty-alleviating program such as the Employment Guarantee Scheme (EGS) in the Indian state of Maharashtra can be done through the "regular" institutional channels if there is political push from above and below. There have been demonstrable benefits for the poor from this. The program generates 200 million person-days of employment each year (Herring and Edwards, 1983). This is a short-term perspective, however. In the longer-run, it may not contribute to much improvement for the poor. The acceptability of the program may stem from the advantages it confers also on the advantaged, by providing income to a rural labor force during periods when not needed for agriculture. One reason why the benefits are less for the poor than might be expected is that EGS beneficiaries are unorganized and receive employment as a matter of official largesse. This reinforces political patronage networks from above. If there were beneficiary organizations, it would be possible to have more sustained impact on the terms of employment.

The poor are most in need of networks of institutional structures at local levels. The worst situation for them is where an institutional vacuum exists with neither horizontal nor vertical linkages. When there are no institutionalized opportunities for influence beyond the community, the poor who individually have few economic, social or political resources are at a great disadvantage, compared to their personally well-endowed neighbors who can make their way as individuals more easily, but who also more often engage in collective action to advance their interests. When working

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<sup>31/</sup> In a study of Bangladesh experience, Blair (1982a) found that when cheap agricultural credit was made available on a group basis to cooperatives patterned after "the Comilla model," some richer farmers, who were also moneylenders, joined and took loans (because no exclusionary criteria had been established). By defaulting they were then able to make all other (poorer) members uncreditworthy in the program's eyes, driving them back into the hands of the moneylenders. This is a good example of when "alternative" organizations may be needed, but it does not establish the case then for subsidization. Subsidized tubewells in Bangladesh were similarly diverted to the personal advantage of richer farmers. Fewer tubewells, and less resulting employment became available than if more realistic prices had prevailed.

collectively, the poor can give considerably more weight to their options of "exit, voice and loyalty" (Hirschman, 1970). Beyond this local institutions are important for providing individual opportunities for advancement (Hirshman, 1984) or to seek redress on their own terms. How LID can contribute to these several capacities for the poor should guide the design of strategies.

#### 4.0 INSTITUTIONAL NETWORKS AND SUPPORT BASES

The value of horizontal linkages among institutions and of their vertical linkage to higher and lower levels of organization is evident. The concept of "linkages" was introduced in the literature on "institution building" and then amplified in terms of horizontal and vertical linkages in Uphoff and Esman (1974). We concluded that while isolated instances of local institutional development could be impressive, their cumulative effect was negligible.

What count are systems or networks of organization, both vertically and horizontally, that make local development more than an enclave phenomenon. (1974:xi)

This line of analysis has been rather widely accepted and applied in strategy formulations for activity areas like natural resource management and primary health care.<sup>32/</sup> We are pleased to note that a recent USAID policy paper on local organizations endorses this concern with institutional linkages:

A.I.D. has determined to give explicit consideration to the strengths, weaknesses, and linkages among local organizations, as well as those between local and national organizations, before embarking on programs of development that explicitly or implicitly depend on local organizations for successful implementation. (1984:4) <sup>33/</sup>

Although the importance of strengthening linkages as a central part of LID strategy is now recognized, various impediments to achieving this need to be pointed out. Project design and implementation are usually conceived and carried out in

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<sup>32/</sup> In discussing natural resource management, for example, Ruddle and Rondinelli (1984:79-80) emphasize "appropriate institutions" that are "vertically linked into an organizational network, both to provide a 'hierarchy' of services and to increase the quality and reliability of service delivery." Hollnsteiner (1982) says that because primary health care involves so many activities (curative medicine, agriculture, water supply, etc.), a number of strong local institutions may be required before results can really be shown. A strong local institutional network with horizontal linkages is needed to address the underlying problems affecting people's health, she writes.

<sup>33/</sup> According to the policy paper, "the development literature is rife with examples of development projects that failed to achieve stated objectives because important linkages to essential organizations or institutions were never made." The paper offers many incisive and perceptive formulations which in our view offer appropriate policy guidance. In Report No. 1 we have attempted to clarify the use of the terms "organizations" and "institutions" which are, unfortunately, used interchangeably in the policy paper.

compartmentalized sectoral terms, despite recognition such as expressed in footnote 32 that this is counterproductive. It is difficult to work at strengthening systems or networks of institutions when agencies focus on tasks that are most clearly "theirs" within some fixed division of bureaucratic labor. It is not easy to have influence and to use resources across bureaucratic lines or at different political-administrative levels. However, this is what is required if links of communication and cooperation are to be forged, both horizontally and vertically.

This applies no matter which "mode" the outside agency is working in. Its responsibility for fostering linkages is greater with Promotion because it has taken the lead role, but one of the most important elements contributed from outside in an Assistance mode is the support (even instigation) of linkages to and from the institutions(s) being aided.

The impediments referred to above cannot be wished away. One method for dealing with the linkage problem in the Philippines when the National Irrigation Administration undertook to establish a network of water user associations was to create a formally-recognized Communal Irrigation Committee, with representation of the top ranks of NIA, the Ford Foundation which was providing technical assistance to the program, and several knowledge-building institutions that were helping with the training, monitoring (documentation) and evaluation (D. Korten, 1980; F. Korten, 1982). This committee had both knowledge of program development needs and status to take initiatives to foster horizontal or vertical linkages where deemed useful.

Such formal capacities may not always be feasible, if consensus on LID itself is still being fashioned. Informal "support groups" at various levels can be established by the initiative of a sponsoring agency or even a donor agency, with enough investment of time to get the appropriate persons interacting and creating a common stake in the program's success. The role of certain knowledge-building institutions, like the Asian Institute of Management or the Institute of Philippine Culture (of the Ateneo de Manila) which backstopped the NIA experiment, can be invaluable because they can be more independent in their judgments and initiatives. In addition, they are not burdened with the same kind of implementation responsibilities and have less stake in tussles over bureaucratic turf. The Cornell Rural Development Committee has played an informal "linkage-supporting" role in the AID Gal Oya project in Sri Lanka. It has been joined in this effort by the Agrarian Research and Training Institute, a Sri Lankan government institution assigned to manage the project's socio-economic activities.

The Philippine and Sri Lanka experiences, though both aimed at improving water management, have some instructive differences. The first program has been more closely linked at all levels to the irrigation agency involved; the latter program was only passively accepted by the Irrigation Department at the outset. On the other hand, the farmer groups have not developed as much horizontal or vertical linkage among themselves in the Philippines. In the Sri Lankan case, farmers themselves took initiative to join their field channel groups up to the locality level, engaging 75 to 100 group representatives in regular meetings with officials. Then the top administrative officer for the district invited these "area meetings" to send representatives to the monthly meetings of the District Agriculture Committee, with district heads of government departments, to get some authentic farmer "input" to planning and decision-making. Farmer groups have also cooperated with one another at the level of the distributary canal so horizontal and vertical linkages have evolved rather naturally, supported by the organizers (catalysts) in the field and by ARTI.

One of the early lessons from our Sri Lanka experience was that one could not expect to build up effective water user associations without linkages with the field staff of the Irrigation Department, but also other departments. An isolated LID effort with the farmers was doomed to failure (Uphoff, 1984). This made more real our observation in the literature that successful LID efforts, even when ostensibly taking a "sectoral" approach such as improving irrigation, involved linkage to other institutions having complementary functions.

Such linkages could be at the same level, as when an extension service works with farmers' association and other local institutions, or at different levels, such as when a local government works with specialized project committees and a district planning authority. We would describe briefly two examples that show such linkages in action.

In Costa Rica, we have seen how a program of agricultural research, carried out in a "farming systems" mode, could work when the extension service followed a local linkage strategy. Extension agents were asked to carry out field trials on cut fodder for cattle, with the technical backing of CATIE (the Inter-American Center for Tropical Agriculture). In one locality, they worked closely with the local school, the local dairy plant, the cooperative, and gave moral support to a newly-formed farmers' association.<sup>34/</sup> The school and the co-op, at different points in time, were

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<sup>34/</sup> These represent four different types of local institutions: local administration, private business, cooperative, and membership organization. This case was observed by Jorge de Alva and reported to Katy van Dusen who was doing field work in that region during 1982.

responsible for certain aspects of the project. Local people were hired to help (particularly high school students). When the CATIE project ended, the co-op took responsibility for promoting the extension program to disseminate the results of the research. As a consequence of the collaborative strategy, nearly all the farmers in the locality were switching to growing and using king grass as fodder for their cattle.

Another good example is the bridge building committees in Baglung district of Nepal, which made remarkable contributions to rural infrastructure under adverse conditions. These could not have functioned effectively without significant horizontal and vertical linkages. They were legitimated and assisted by the sponsorship of the village panchayat at the local level. Links up to the district panchayat and beyond that to the Local Development Department of the national government helped establish a five-year plan and gave them access to needed resources.<sup>35/</sup>

Vertical linkages are of two kinds: to higher-level bodies of the same organizational structure, as in a federation of cooperatives, in connections between wholesale and retail enterprises, or between different levels of the bureaucracy; or across kinds of channels, as when a local government gets grants and technical assistance from a national-level private voluntary organization, or a farmers' association has ties to the Ministry of Agriculture or to state banking institutions. Both kinds of linkage are obviously important, but any analysis of vertical linkages should keep distinct those which are "intra-channel" and "inter-channel."

One of the least examined areas of local institutional development concerns the formation and strengthening of federations of membership organizations or cooperatives. An evaluation of the health committees in Panama has found that one of the main reasons such committees (and the primary health care programs they support) have remained effective in certain districts of that country is the establishment and functioning of active federations of health committees (LaForgia, 1984; see Annex of Report No. 4). The health committees set up under the Pikine project in Senegal were similarly strengthened by their joining together in an Association for Health Promotion (Jancloes et al., 1981). Examples of such organization for agriculture would be the

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<sup>35/</sup> See Annex of Report No. 3 and Pradhan (1980). We have a considerable amount of information about this case study which was written up while Dr. Pradhan was a visiting Fulbright fellow with the Rural Development Committee in 1979. We have kept track of it since then and must report that the committees have not continued in existence after the planning and construction phases were completed. They thus have not become "institutions." Responsibility for maintenance of the bridges rests with the panchayats, which are institutions. This example indicates the importance of having multiple channels to carry out activities at the local level.

DESEC centers in Bolivia which numbered 200 at the base, grouped in eight regional bodies and one national body, and the Tiv farmers associations in Nigeria which grew into a four-tiered structure with village, district and divisional bodies and a regional council at the apex (Morss et al., 1976; see Annex, pages 73-74).

Such multiple level institutions have various functional or technical contributions to make, but they can also provide the political support base needed to sustain development programs. This is documented in the Panama primary health care case noted above, and a similar experience is reported from the Philippines for sustaining a community-oriented nutrition program.<sup>36/</sup>

National leaders may welcome these or be averse. Their acceptance of local institutional capacities may well be a function of how much economic and political resource mobilization these channels can manage consistent with national regime objectives. To the extent that these institutions produce satisfaction with the pace, scope and direction of local development efforts, there is political profit for any regime that promotes, facilitates or assists them. Further, where local institutions permit greater mobilization of financial or material resources and more efficient use thereof, there are economic incentives to tolerate, even support such linkage. Better economic performance is likely in turn to contribute to political satisfaction and support.

The subject of mobilizing and managing economic resources is important and specialized enough that we have prepared a separate report on it (Report No. 8). We move from consideration here of how linkages and networks can contribute to LID to a discussion of how national institutions can become more effective in support of local institutional development.

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<sup>36/</sup> A national nutrition program there might have disappeared but for political support mobilized through a National Coordinating Committee on Food and Nutrition which was established in 1960. It brought together representatives of a wide variety of organizations in what Montgomery (1977) characterizes as a "semi-government operation working through community leadership, and embodying private as well as public leadership and funding." Village and provincial support for the nutrition programs the Committee sponsored made it a wise political move for national leaders to continue funding them.

## 5.0 RESTRUCTURING AND REORIENTING NATIONAL-LEVEL INSTITUTIONS

Our focus thus far has been on local-level institutions -- how they can be assisted and strengthened -- with the presumption that there are national institutions, public and private, which are willing and able to support such local institutional development. (International-level institutions are considered in the concluding section.) We have not addressed in great detail the structure and performance of institutions between the local and national levels because the sampling frame for our literature review was LID experience. Thus we have examined national institutional variables more from a "mole's eye" than a "bird's eye" perspective. We were able to discern a number of practical steps that higher-level institutions could take to significantly increase the prospects for LID. But most often the literature suggested what higher-level institutions should not do or should avoid when making efforts directed towards LID. Our discussion here will be less extensive than the subject deserves. We start with the question of "willingness" on the part of national institutions (Section 5.1) and then address how they can improve their "ability" to support LID (Sections 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4).

### 5.1 NATIONAL LEVEL ORIENTATION

To the extent that the national leadership of a country is opposed to or unsupportive of LID, the prospects for developing local capacities on any widespread basis are poor. There can be pockets of initiative and self-reliance, sometimes given impetus by the neglect or the negative orientation of the center. But their sustainability and spread will be in doubt. On the other hand, the presumption that strong and consistent central support is a sufficient condition for LID is not correct. There will need to be at least tolerance of local capacity building, but outside support should aim to be optimal, not maximal, as the quality of support is generally more important than the quantity.

Some national governments may feel threatened by an increase in local institutional capacity (Ralston et al., 1983:52-53) and thus may undermine, or at least not promote, LID efforts. On the other hand, there are some incentives for national governments, including relatively closed ones, to accept and even promote local capacity (Esman and Uphoff, 1984:34-40). While the general policy orientation of the government will affect the climate for LID, it is usually not a variable on which to base

decisions because central governments are seldom monolithic. Within a government, various agencies and leaders may have significantly differing attitudes and motivations. We would discount the possibilities for LID only in extremely unfavorable situations, such as in parts of Central America currently. Even in Guatemala and pre-1979 Nicaragua we found efforts were made to develop village health committees with the acceptance of the government, though the degree of institutionalization is not clear.<sup>52/</sup> One of the most impressive countries for local institutional development is Taiwan, which has had a relatively authoritarian regime. There Farmers Associations and Irrigation Associations carry out wide-ranging responsibilities, including hiring and supervising their own technical staff and mobilizing and managing substantial amounts of resources (Stavis, 1983).

The central consideration is whether the objectives of the national government are at variance with those of the majority of rural people. "Power" is not necessarily a zero-sum phenomenon. It represents the ability to achieve goals, despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which that ability (or probability, to use Max Weber's formulation) rests. When goals are in conflict, assessments of power turn on which party prevails. To the extent that national institutions desire for rural people what they want for themselves, building up local capacity helps both the center and the periphery to advance their respective objectives.

One needs to look at the compatibility of local and national goals in order to evaluate the acceptability of LID to national institutions. If the center is trying to extract resources from agriculture to pay for industrial investment or urban consumption an effort to promote LID is likely to produce some conflict as communities and localities become better able to represent their interests at higher levels. LID can proceed, however, even where the government is not fully supportive of economic and social gains for the peripheral population, if they conclude that they have more to gain from pursuing a self-reliant path, than from continuing in a dependent posture. The scope for LID will be narrower in this context than if there is clear support from the center but is not entirely precluded.

Support could be measured in terms of financial resources provided to underwrite local institutional activities, but as we have noted already, quality rather than quantity is crucial for LID. It is clear that "commitment to LID" should not be measured in

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<sup>52/</sup> See Colburn (1981) on such LID efforts in Guatemala. Dr. James Sarn, currently Agency Director for Health and Population in the Bureau of Science and Technology, USAID, has reported on quite promising VHCs started during the Somoza years in Nicaragua and still continuing, with different designation, to be sure (personal communication).

terms of the amount of funds channelled to and through local institutions. The decentralization of authority and of personnel and organizational structure deserves to be considered as a special topic (section 5.3 below), as is the reorientation of staff toward working more constructively with local institutions (section 5.4).

Apart from providing economic resources and authority to local institutions, through budgetary and legal provisions (discussed next), LID will be helped by national leadership showing respect for what these various institutions can and do accomplish, and also by directly or indirectly endorsing their legitimacy to encourage others' acceptance of them as institutions. Such status and legitimacy are important resources for local institutions to enjoy, though in the final analysis they are needed from local populations more than from national leaders. Leaders' conveying status and legitimacy should encourage other persons to do the same. Actually, even a neutral stance by national leaders toward local institutions which are meeting local needs may be enough to allow these institutions to take root and expand, provided there is no opposition from above. But more active signs of support are usually helpful.

The literature is full of analyses which identify "political will" as crucial for local institutions to develop. But as we have said, the amount of support is probably not that significant.<sup>53/</sup> Rather it is the way in which support is given -- how reliably, how tactfully, how flexibly -- which makes a difference. Because we are talking about local institutions, there is no substitute for commitment of local resources and sense of responsibility, and outside efforts may displace this as readily as they encourage it. Our conclusion departs somewhat from the predominant opinion in the literature which emphasizes "political will" at the center as a requisite for LID. National opposition can stifle or sabotage LID, but conversely, national support is at most a necessary, and not a sufficient condition.

National leadership may not be entirely convinced about LID in advance. Even where they would welcome LID in principle, there have been enough misconceived and failed experiences with local institutional development that a considerable amount of skepticism is understandable. The issue is whether enough scope and support will be given for LID experiments and for "learning" to proceed. Governments are usually quite

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<sup>53/</sup> In our analysis of the performance of local organizations we found essentially no correlation (-0.02) between extent of "political support" and LOs' performance (Esman and Uphoff, 1984:122-123). This could be explained by the frequency with which a great deal of government support smothered local initiative or was aimed at establishing organizational performances which members had no particular interest in.

differentiated internally. If some ministries or departments are willing and able to take LID initiatives, possibly with donor assistance, it is up to them to show some results which can win greater support from national leaders.

The argument can even be made that it is not advantageous to begin an LID effort with full backing from on high, where everything has been formally agreed in advance. A "show-me" attitude on the part of top leaders may well be a spur to more energetic and innovative performance by government or PVO personnel. As important, the personnel will have less temptation to be imposing certain structures or formulas on local people. They will have to seriously solicit cooperation, and to be open to local ideas and criticisms in the process of developing new or better local capabilities.

Indeed, strong national support may encourage a "blueprint" approach in practice even when it has been foresworn in principle. With such support there is also often strong pressure for "quick" results that is inimical to LID success, such as seen during the "villagization" period of ujamaa in Tanzania (Fortmann, 1982). Local institutional development involves not just local people learning new patterns of expectation and performance, but also such learning on the part of national leaders and personnel. The support which is sought for LID should be not for a specific program so much as for a learning process which takes place at all of the levels depicted in section 6.0 of Report No. 1. With each gain in local institutional development, there should be some changes in the way in which work is planned and carried out at virtually all levels, from the individual up to international institutions.

## 5.2 LEGAL FRAMEWORK

One of the elements of support that needs to be considered is the legal framework for LID, which can only be provided from the national center. The desirability of having appropriate laws is commented on in the literature for activities as diverse as forest management and women's small-scale enterprises (GAO, 1982; Jules-Rosette, 1982). There is a note of caution in the literature concerning the need for care when formulating new legislation, to take adequate account of existing beneficial but uncodified practices, for example in the area of land tenure (Noronha and Lethem, 1983). There is also a need to understand that even mandatory legislation is more a matter of authorizing than establishing. Even if new institutions or practices are required by law, they are not likely to become fact without a great deal of investment

by authorities in communication, education and enforcement. There needs to be political support which goes beyond the enactment of a law and helps the agencies and communities to redefine their relationships and roles, as shown by Nellis (1981) in his analysis of decentralization experience in North Africa.

One debate in the literature is the extent to which the legal initiatives should precede LID efforts, setting forth the new relationships and giving them sanction in law, or should follow some experimentation, consolidating in law the relationships that are evolved. Sometimes the very legalistic context in which governments operate makes it difficult to take the latter approach, in which case there is no choice. But where possible, the latter approach seems preferable, in keeping with a "learning process" strategy of LID.<sup>54/</sup> A contrasting experience in Thailand is reported by Calavan (1984) where the government undertook to "modernize" existing irrigation systems by upgrading the physical structures and imposing a uniform system of local irrigators' associations, with standard bylaws, centrally sanctioned personnel, etc. These existing systems had been developed and operated over the generations by farmers, however, through their own local irrigation societies which were not uniform.

Each has its own approach to selection of leaders, organization of maintenance tasks, regulation of water use, punishment of cheaters, flood protection, etc. If notions of bureaucratic 'efficiency' dictate that all such associations be reorganized to fit some externally designed template, there is grave danger that local skills will be blunted and irrigation water used less efficiently....Any decision that imposes ex post local uniformity (e.g. by threatening to cut off resources) should be supported by evidence that local efficiency and production will be enhanced, and not by unspoken, aesthetic judgments regarding bureaucratic order. (Calavan, 1984:221-222)

There is a common disposition when formulating legislation to establish uniformity which is neither efficient nor necessary, but which primarily serves bureaucratic

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<sup>54/</sup> In Report No. 1, we suggested an analogy with the task of laying out sidewalks to go with new construction. Architects can try to anticipate and plan all pedestrian movement, laying out all walkways in advance. But some inconvenient or unnecessary sidewalks are bound to be put in if there is no test of use based on actual practice, and some useful ones are bound to be overlooked by planners. Alternatively, planners can put in only the obvious or necessary ones and let subsequent foot traffic indicate what additional sidewalks are needed. Only where "shortcuts" are damaging might traffic be constrained physically. We suspect that many laws, like sidewalks, are put in not because of functional reasons but because of planners' particular penchants about how people "ought" to behave or how something "ought" to look.

convenience and desire for control. One of our clearest conclusions is that while "legal frameworks" are important, they are at most enabling, and are more often than not, disabling. As with other aspects of outside support for LID, how they are provided is more significant than whether they are established, or how elaborate and extensive they are. In our experience of facilitating irrigation water users associations in Sri Lanka, there is good reason to defer enacting legislation until some experience has been gained with what kind of structures farmers can and will make operational (Uphoff, 1982).

### 5.3 DECENTRALIZATION STRATEGIES

Local institutional development is itself a strategy of decentralization, by creating capacities at several local levels for handling authority and responsibility. But for LID to proceed very far it requires a degree of decentralization within the government structure so that official decision-making is brought closer to the local levels.<sup>55/</sup> In this section, we consider a range of decentralization strategies, and then specifically what the government can do in this direction itself. We begin by emphasizing that "decentralization" is a heterogeneous category. It is useful to distinguish between "deconcentration" and "devolution," the two major kinds of decentralization discussed in the literature. Devolution in turn needs further disaggregation as can be done with our LID framework of analysis. The initial distinctions to be considered are:

- (a) whether the decision-makers in question are located centrally or "de-centrally" -- whether the political authorities or administrators are physically in the capital or in provincial, regional, district or other centers?
- (b) whether the decision-makers in question are accountable to authorities at the center or to publics in the provinces, regions, districts, localities, etc.?

When considering these two variables together, they produce four major combinations of circumstances as suggested by the matrix shown on the next page:

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<sup>55/</sup> We are using "decentralization" in the way that Leonard (1982:4) defines it, as the process through which government agencies or local organizations obtain the resources and authority for timely adaptation to locally-specific conditions in the field. This is a broad but suitable definition.

**DECISION-MAKERS LOCATED:**

DECISION-MAKERS ACCOUNTABLE:	CENTRALLY	DE-CENTRALLY
CENTRALLY	(I) CENTRALIZATION	(II) DECONCENTRATION
DE-CENTRALLY	(IV) DEMOCRATIZATION	(III) DEVOLUTION

As suggested by this matrix, we are dealing here with departures from the "norm" of centralization (I), a situation where decisions are made centrally by persons who are accountable to central authorities. To the extent that the decision-makers are physically re-located in dispersed offices, "closer" to the activities and persons for which they are responsible, or to the extent that authority for making decisions is transferred from persons who are located at the center to persons within the bureaucratic structure who are located in dispersed centers, there is deconcentration (II), a kind of decentralization. To the extent that authority is handed over to persons or institutions at regional, district or lower levels who are accountable to the publics in these locations, one has devolution (III). This is a more profound form of decentralization though deconcentration should not be dismissed, because it can represent a great improvement for LID. If devolution goes down to one or more of the "local" levels, this actually represents a form of LID. But where devolution of authority at least reaches the provincial or district level, the institutions at those levels are in a better position (and more likely) to facilitate the performance of what we are regarding as "local" institutions.<sup>56/</sup>

Deconcentration and devolution may be undertaken only as far as provincial, regional, district or other authorities, or they may be taken all the way to local levels. When the highly centralized Egyptian government concluded that there were great inefficiencies in maintaining so much decision-making authority in the central ministries in Cairo, and delegated a good deal of authority to the executives and administrative personnel at the governorate level, this represented a major step toward

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<sup>56/</sup> The fourth possibility, that decision-makers located centrally become more accountable to local populations, is best characterized as "democratization." This is not conventionally classified as a mode of decentralization though when put in this analytical framework, its common ground with the two major forms of decentralization becomes clear. All three represent different kinds of departures from "centralization" of government such as originated in monarchial, military or colonial rule.

deconcentration. In the process, the village (locality) councils which had been rather moribund found it easier to take initiatives and get certain problems acted upon (Mayfield, 1974). The decision-makers whose approval was needed for so many things were now physically more accessible than before, no longer shielded by geographic and social distance as they were when hidden away in the massive agency headquarters in the capital. This process has been taken further now with the Basic Village Services project, discussed in the Annex of Report No. 3, which has both devolution and deconcentration elements to strengthen the capacity of village councils for economic and infrastructural activity.

If deconcentration and devolution are taken to the locality or community level as a matter of policy, LID is directly increased rather than having greater governmental capacity to assist LID. With deconcentration to the local level, there is an increase in the potential capacity of local administration (LA) to undertake development activities because the number, quality and authority of the local administrative cadre will be boosted. This cadre includes technical personnel such as veterinary officers and public health inspectors as well as administrative staff like sub-district officers or more empowered village headmen. They remain accountable to central authorities but they have more resources to work with and more authority to exercise in the name of the center.

Devolution offers a number of possibilities. The standard mode is to devolve authority to a local government (LG) body which is accountable to the public under its jurisdiction, exercising powers prescribed by law and having the backing of the state behind its actions. However, there are other kinds of devolution which deserve consideration, because they involve the other kinds of local institutions besides LA (deconcentration) and LG (classic devolution).

Intermediation involves an institutionalized role for membership organizations like cooperatives, farmers organizations, health committees, etc. to play a larger role in development activities, such as described in Esman and Uphoff (1984). These local organizations may even be given some limited authority in certain areas (such as health committees being authorized to make inspections of the sanitary conditions in homes), or some economic resources (subsidies for operating a grain storage warehouse). These organizations act on behalf of members, providing services which might otherwise be undertaken by government agencies or local government bodies, but also possibly lobbying with the authorities for favorable policies or acting as a watchdog vis-a-vis the bureaucracy to get better performance from it. Much of this kind of devolution may be

tacit, resulting from favorable policies (stated or unstated) toward a larger role for local organizations, rather than through formal legislation.

Philanthropization occurs where the state allows private voluntary organizations to channel resources to the local level and work with local institutions directly, particularly with service organizations which are the counterpart at the local level of PVOs at higher levels (up to and including the international level). Marketization is a form of devolution where services to the local level are provided through private enterprises, responding directly to local "demand." This private sector alternative to undertaking activities through public sector channels is not usually seen as devolution, but this is what it amounts to as the decision-makers are then local, and locally accountable.<sup>57/</sup>

These four forms of devolution can be related to one another in a further matrix, formed by the two variables:

- (a) the extent to which the activities are "collective" or "private," and
- (b) the extent to which the activities are done for and to other persons, possibly in a "paternalistic" manner, or are more in the tradition of "self-help."

Compared along these two dimensions, we get the devolution alternatives arrayed as shown below, with the respective types of local institution shown in parentheses. LA is associated with deconcentration.

<u>MODE OF ORGANIZATION</u>	<u>MODE OF ACTION</u>	
	COLLECTIVE	PRIVATE
FOR OTHERS	(I) Classic Devolution (LG)	(III) Philanthropization (PVOs and SOs)
SELF-HELP	(II) Intermediation (MOs and Coops)	(IV) Marketization (Private Businesses)

The purpose of this analytical representation is to show what the different modes of devolution at the local level have in common with each other and in what ways they are different.

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<sup>57/</sup> These distinctions are an application of the analysis in Leonard (1982) and which he suggested in our April 1984 workshop on LID.

There is an additional kind of deconcentration which should be mentioned, that Leonard calls delegation, where the government hands over responsibility (authority and finances) to a government corporation or parastatal enterprise operating outside the formal structure and control of government. An example would be the commodity corporation CFDT which promotes cotton production in Francophone West Africa, or the Kenya Tea Development Authority which was featured in Report No. 5. Such institutions are seldom "local," but they can work with farmer groups which are local and may promote LID, as KTDA has done rather effectively in Kenya (Lamb and Mueller, 1982).

It has been observed that donor agencies are often more enthusiastic about decentralization efforts than are national governments (Ralston et al., 1983:12-13). However, governments are going to find it ever more difficult to pursue their preference for centralized control as fiscal constraints grow more severe. Moreover, their effort to get all credit for government actions makes them liable to be blamed for all failures.<sup>58/</sup> The extent to which a government "loses" power by decentralization measures depends, as we pointed out above, on how congruent its objectives are with those of the public. A process of decentralization does not mean the elimination or even necessarily a substantial weakening of the central government, since as Leonard says with regard to Kenya:

In a decentralized administrative structure, the center needs to be every bit as strong as in a centralized one, but the reorientation required is one of technical services rather than of hierarchical control. (1977:213)

Decentralization is essentially a matter of degree as well as kind, cumulating several kinds of reallocations of authority, finances, information and other resources. The experience with devolution of authority to state and local governments in Nigeria, cited at the beginning of Section 4.0 in Report No. 8, shows how a very far-reaching decentralization could touch most sectors of rural economy and administration. The Malawi self-help water program we have referred to frequently represents a much narrower decentralization, focused on planning, constructing and operating village water systems. For this, authority was decentralized to regional engineers and user committees, a combination of deconcentration and devolution (Glennie, 1982).

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<sup>58/</sup> Ralston et al. cite Mawhood's argument with regard to Africa that "the ruling elites ought in their own interests to be abandoning the attempt to monopolize all available resources."

Many decentralization measures are symbolic rather than substantive. There are many instances such as Fortmann (1982) reviews in Botswana where the forms of local governance are set up without governing powers over the issues and resources that most concern them. Effective decentralization requires some combination of authority, finances, information, personnel, equipment and facilities, etc. The lack of any one of these can make the others ineffective, like having budget to hire technical staff but lacking approval from the Civil Service Commission or having staff to work with rural committees but no vehicles and fuel to give them mobility.

One possible difficulty with decentralization efforts in support of LID is that the intermediate-level institutions to which authority and control over other resources might be delegated are often not very well-disposed toward passing these on to local-level institutions. In Latin America, for example, regional development organizations and second-tier local governments tend to be dominated by urban-based elites and middle sectors (Gall, Corbett and Padilla, 1976), while agencies at the block and district levels in India are so tied to bureaucratic structures at the state and national levels that their decision-making does not pass down to lower levels (Nicholson, 1973; Reddy, 1982).

Something similar is reported in Kenya with a program for natural resource management and agricultural development (Meyers, 1981). Even when a degree of decentralization to the district level was achieved, as noted in Report No. 2, decisions were still not being made flexibly and quickly enough to achieve the results intended on the ground. The Kenyan government has now embarked on a "district focus" strategy for rural development which has considerable merit compared to its previously centralized approach. But it makes almost no provision for LID, concentrating attention on strengthening institutions and processes at the district level, despite the fact that according to its own plan, the identification and initial approval of projects is to come from the locality or community levels.<sup>59/</sup>

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<sup>59/</sup> "The identification of projects is a continuous process; it goes on all year around. The initial idea for a project should come from the area that will benefit from its implementation (village, sub-location or location). After being discussed and agreed upon locally, the project suggestion is forwarded to the Divisional Development Committee (which discusses and ranks all such suggestions from localities and then forwards them to the District Development Committee)." (Republic of Kenya, 1983:8) The District Development Committee includes chairmen and clerks of local authorities (LG) as well as chairmen of the Divisional Development Councils, but this is the only mention of these bodies in the document establishing "district focus." No provisions are suggested in the document for strengthening sub-district institutions.

With decentralization there is the common problem of getting coordination of activities at the various levels. Formal committees are generally without authority to control the work of participating agencies. If binding decisions are to be made, agency heads commonly send subordinates to meetings to be able to avoid firm commitments. We noted in Report No. 4, the plaintive observation of an official Indonesian document on primary health care experience in that country, that coordination has been mostly ineffective, as each agency finds ways to resist others having any influence on its program. Commenting on experience with health programs in the Philippines and elsewhere, Hollnsteiner (1982) notes that linkages between agencies and between the national health service and local organizations cannot be fostered without some alteration in the "turf protection" orientation of technical and administrative personnel. (This points toward the subject of "bureaucratic reorientation" discussed in the next section.)

It is likely that if any avenues of coordination are effective, they will be informal ones. These are more likely to develop where:

- (a) the offices of various LA units are geographically close, e.g. in the same market town, and even in the same building or compound, as was done in Bangladesh as part of the Comilla program;
- (b) local administrators have extensive informal contacts; e.g., if there are social clubs where people can interact outside of work, these will facilitate cooperation;
- (c) local administrators have sufficient discretion to be able to accommodate one another and their clientele; and
- (d) local organizations serve as catalysts for coordination from below by demanding integration of services.

This last consideration is crucial in our view. If there are lapses in coordination and conscientiousness on the part of intermediate-level institutions, it will be local persons who know this best. If higher-level institutions can be made accountable in some way to localities and communities through local institutions, the prospects for improved performance at higher levels should be improved. We recognize that this presents a troublesome circularity. While some degree of decentralization is useful for supporting effective LID, at the same time some amount of LID contributes to making decentralization work better. This is well shown in the Korean Saemaul Undong case, discussed in the Annex, pages 75-76.

The foregoing points to the fact that LID is not something that can be promoted in neat sequential fashion. Capacity to support LID through decentralization and other measures should be strengthened concurrently with direct efforts to create local capacities, as the work at different levels should be made mutually reinforcing.<sup>60/</sup> Increased capacity of intermediate-level institutions is to be welcomed, so long as they do not stifle local institutions below them. The objectives of development are best served by having a full range of institutional capacities from the group on up to the national level. The limitations and lack of linkage observed for local institutions have prompted our concern with LID, since if they represent the base of a national institutional "pyramid," it has a very insubstantial foundation in most LDCs. This contrasts markedly with that found in economically more advanced countries which are also institutionally better grounded.

#### 5.4 BUREAUCRATIC REORIENTATION

Too prominent or paternalistic a government role can defeat the assumption of local responsibility, even in the private sector. We have stressed the quality rather than the quantity of official interaction with local institutions.<sup>61/</sup> Too often the kind of relationship which government personnel presently have with local institutions is more of a deterrent than encouragement for LID, making necessary what we have called "bureaucratic reorientation" (BRO, as defined in Korten and Uphoff, 1981; see also Bryant and White, 1984:50-58).

This rather general concept has some very specific implications, though its application must be different and tailored in each situation. Even within a single country, somewhat different approaches would be necessary for agriculture compared

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<sup>60/</sup> This may suggest an LID equivalent of the "balanced growth" strategy proposed for economic development in the 1950s. But in concept and spirit it is closer to Hirschman's proposal for "unbalanced growth." One is best advised to proceed incrementally, doing those things which give the process the biggest boost through forward and backward linkages, rather than try to plan and put in place all pieces of the process at the same time.

<sup>61/</sup> In our analysis of local organization experience, we found a negative correlation between LO performance and the amount of government "linkage" (Esman and Uphoff, 1984:153-155). On the other hand, a relationship of strict "autonomy" was not the most productive one for local development, as some degree of linkage less than "direction" was positive in its outcome.

with public works, for example.<sup>62/</sup> BRO encompasses some combination of changes in the structure of organization, the procedures of operation, and the doctrine of a bureaucracy, as well as in the career paths, the criteria of promotion and reward, and in the attitudes and values acted upon by personnel. There are thus structural and behavioral, objective and normative aspects of BRO.

For many years, the emphasis in development administration has been on planning rather than on implementation, in much the same way that economists were concerned most with "getting the prices right." It was assumed that a proper design could and would be implemented satisfactorily.<sup>63/</sup> The realization that "blueprint" approaches are inappropriate (Sweet and Weisel, 1979; D. Korten, 1980; Rondinelli, 1982) has helped to refocus attention on implementation, going along with increasing acceptance of a "learning process" approach. In Report No. 5 (Section 6.3) we discussed a case experience in Ethiopia where the implementation of an agricultural credit program had not been monitored and was skewed in favor of large farmers. Once this bias was identified, it was rather quickly changed by setting new program criteria, so that the pattern of lending was sharply reversed to favor small farmers and tenants.

Getting administrative and technical staff to work more respectfully and cooperatively with local public and private institutions involves a number of changes. The conventional prescription of training and indoctrination to change attitudes and values is not very promising unless coupled with various structural and career-related changes. A simple but interesting example of a BRO measure that cost very little but which elicited improved performance from rural schoolteachers and principals in Kenya (and which narrowed differentials between more and less advantaged areas) was the practice of publishing average examination results for each district, and also for each

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<sup>62/</sup> An engineer's competence and performance are much more ascertainable in the design and construction of a bridge than can be determined for an agriculturalist who is developing and promoting an improved crop variety for adoption by farmers. Many more extraneous factors beyond the professional's control will affect the latter outcome than the former. Peer judgments and pressures would accordingly be less of an influence for agriculturalists than engineers and thus the avenues for improving performance would be different. Because of the different relationships within the two sets of professionals, one would expect "user" input and influence to be relatively more useful for getting better performance from agriculturalists than from engineers, quite apart from how much local knowledge is relevant to the technical tasks in the two instances (designing a bridge vs. extending a new crop).

<sup>63/</sup> Some would say that the real objective of design efforts was to justify and to capture funds for the bureaucracy, but this underestimates the faith placed in "design" and the derogation of "implementation" as something almost anybody could do if he or she just followed the plan.

school. This gave parents and pupils a better idea of how well the latter were performing on a comparative basis and consequently how well the teachers and school were doing their job. This ran the risk of heightening exam-centered pedagogy, but schools were already oriented to the exams, only often the teaching was not very thoughtful or energetic. At both the district and community level, low ranking in exam results was a spur to parents and teachers, as well as principals and supervisors to "catch up." Teachers who had been neglecting their work in favor of private activities were brought around to refocus on their duties. Without hiring more school inspectors or introducing heavy penalties for absenteeism from the classroom, performance was upgraded within a few years' time, as community efforts were enlisted in the improvement of education simply by giving out information.<sup>64/</sup>

Building up local capacities is bound to be seen by many staff as threatening to their prestige and power if not their material interests. There need to be some concrete rewards for working in a new mode with local institutions, since such work is likely to be in the most difficult areas. Cleaves writes that:

national leaders and policy makers must change their frame of reference as to the definition of personal and policy success and (must) reward policy implementors accordingly...administrators who undertake these assignments must be recompensed, in terms of remuneration and prestige, for handling small budgets, working in difficult terrains, and accomplishing small, gradual and continuous change. While appeals to altruism are legitimate ways to build motivation they cannot completely substitute for direct compensation especially when implementors sense that they are bearing the brunt of responsibility for national development. (1980:296)

Along with individual incentives, there often needs to be some structural reorganization, creating collective incentives for the bureaucracy in question to reorient its efforts to serving the needs of local institutions. One of the clearest examples of such a shift is reported in Mexico. As part of the PIDER rural development project, a special directorate was set up within the public works ministry, the Directorate for Labor-Intensive Works (DCMO), which had little access to heavy machinery. For it to accomplish its assigned goals of rural road building, it had to work closely and cooperatively with local communities. These would provide the labor

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<sup>64/</sup> This discussion draws on a 1981 paper for the World Bank prepared by Tony Somerset, Institute of Development Studies, Sussex.

needed to build roads only if their members were satisfied with the proposed feeder road, its design and the schedule of work. When satisfied, progress could be quite quick, as community road committees took responsibility for the mobilization and management of labor. The road network in the project area went from 25,000 to 100,000 kilometers in six years' time by this method (see Annex of Report No. 3).

A significant change resulting from setting up a separate program, not a special division, has been documented in the Philippines, there the National Irrigation Administration (NIA) started a new program for improving small-scale communal schemes, in which farmers who were to benefit from the proposed permanent irrigation structures were expected to repay the capital cost. To negotiate on improvements from the farmers' side, to mobilize labor and materials to defray the costs of construction, and to be responsible for repayment, Irrigators Service Associations were set up with the facilitation of organizers sent out by NIA (catalysts as discussed in Section 3.2). Engineers who were assigned to work on communal schemes had to be responsive to farmer suggestions and interests, because farmers through their ISA could refuse to accept improvements that they were expected to pay for. Engineers who did not work in harmony with the farmers' groups would have nothing to show for their efforts because new schemes would not get approved and built. This bureaucratic sanction helped to change the way technical personnel related to rural people (D. Korten, 1980; F. Korten, 1982).

To have such changes in a bureaucracy's organization or program means that its clientele also changes. These are the persons who can give approval and support for sustaining the agency's claim on budget and other resources. One reason why bureaucracies may resist reorientation toward serving the poor is that this undercuts their support base, as Tendler (1982) points out. Ministries of Agriculture accustomed to working with and for larger farmers may well balk at serving only small farmers in a reoriented program. This may not be due to personal aversion so much as to the political fact that the latter offer a Ministry a less influential support base, unless they are well organized and mobilized politically, which is possible with membership organizations or local government. Here is where having achieved some LID can make bureaucratic reorientation more feasible and this in turn can make subsequent LID more attainable.

The basic requirement for BRO is that the bureaucracy become more client-oriented, reflecting many of the operating features which Peters and Waterman (1982)

identified as central to the success of the best American corporations.<sup>65/</sup> One of the recurring themes in their analysis is the importance of "commitment." Interestingly, a study of the development of cooperatives in the U.S. has concluded that staff who are "technically incompetent but dedicated" are more effective than those with reverse qualities, competent but not supportive on normative grounds (Marshall and Godwin, 1971:88, cited in Leonard, 1982a:204). Training can compensate for lack of skills but not so readily for deficient motivation. BRO needs to increase both skills and motivation for working with local institutions. But enhanced commitment, whether achieved through persuasion or incentives, is the more essential task in bureaucratic reorientation. It is the more difficult to promote, but the theory of "cognitive dissonance" gives some encouragement. To the extent that reward structures encourage performance in support of LID, attitudes and values are likely to accommodate and become more favorable toward local institutions.

Positive results from local institutional performance can in turn reinforce such an orientation as we have observed in our Sri Lanka water management work. Our initial presumption was that water users would not change their attitudes and behavior (which were in large part a consequence of the way the irrigation system was poorly managed) unless and until the engineers changed their attitudes and behavior. The concept of "BRO" was formulated in response to a specific project task, setting up farmer organizations where the bureaucracy that worked with them was basically unsympathetic.

There was no opportunity to defer organizing work with farmers because the project design required such work right away in order that farmers could make some input to plans for rehabilitation. Organizers were recruited, trained and fielded by the Agrarian Research and Training Institute under sub-contract to the Irrigation Department. (The "blueprint" fortuitously forced a quick move into an action mode, consistent with Peters and Waterman's first rule). In fact, farmers' progress in improving water management in tangible ways helped to change the orientation of the technical staff, which in turn encouraged further LID. As engineers found themselves

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<sup>65/</sup> Included in their listing were: staying close to and learning from the people they serve; encouraging autonomy and entrepreneurship on the part of staff; recognizing that productivity comes through people and their ideas; having a strong normative orientation which is broadly shared and which gives the organization direction and cohesion (to compensate for the autonomy noted above). Structurally there is considerable decentralization matched by active central leadership which is "hands-on, value driven."

interacting in new ways with farmers, they became more supportive of this change, especially as it produced some good results and in this way raised their self-esteem (Uphoff, 1984).

In this case, the actual LID work was carried on by organizers who cooperated with the engineers but who operated outside the formal structure in a "catalyst" mode. The advantages of working through intermediaries also corresponds to U.S. experience in the War on Poverty (Finney, 1975, cited in Leonard, 1983a:206). Whether working from inside or outside the bureaucracy, there is need to consolidate support for LID within the relevant agency which can make operations more effective or ineffective by its actions (or inaction). The Saemaul Undong experience in Korea is one of the best examples of reorientation within a bureaucracy noted for excessive centralization and unresponsiveness to local needs. Within a few years, as discussed in the Annex (pages 75-76), there were recognizable changes in the way staff related to communities. On a less grand scale but still within a very large irrigation scheme in India, engineers began spending more time with farmers and working more responsively once irrigation committees had been set up and so long as the top administrative leadership set an example (Singh, 1984). Similar experience is reported by an engineer, now head of the Mahaweli Engineering and Construction Authority in Sri Lanka, when he introduced farmer organization in the Minipe irrigation scheme in Sri Lanka (de Silva, 1981). The experience in Panama in introducing village health committees along with primary health care showed how rapidly major BRO could be accomplished with firm ministerial leadership (see LaForgia, 1984 and Annex of Report No. 4). So although reorientation of bureaucracies for supporting LID is a difficult undertaking there are numerous examples now that it can be accomplished.

## 6.0 DONOR AGENCY CONTRIBUTIONS

There are many ways in which donor agencies can support processes of local institutional development in specific situations. They will as a rule not work directly with local institutions, instead cooperating through national public or private sector agencies that themselves operate in an Assistance, Facilitation or Promotion mode. The donor support will itself usually be in an Assistance, Facilitation or Promotion mode with the intermediary institution that is seeking to strengthen local capacities. Sometimes the donor aid may even be more indirect by channeling it through an international agency or a private voluntary agency which itself operates as an intermediary.

The "learning process" approach discussed in Section 1.2 is not something which most national or intermediary institutions already understand and accept. Most operate according to "blueprint" ideas and procedures. A donor agency which recognizes the value of a more inductive alternative can encourage those institutions which are more directly involved in planning and implementation to revise their approach, by providing training and financial support to bolster new kinds of development work. Visits by agency personnel to countries and programs that have made the "learning process" effective may be one of the more valuable forms of donor assistance, and fairly easily approved by funding agencies.

As suggested in the previous section, donor agencies need to engage in their own kind of "bureaucratic reorientation." The prevailing methods of donor operation and the usual reward structure for staff commonly work against a realistic approach to LID. Until such constraints can be changed, donor efforts to promote LID with and through national and intermediary institutions will ring hollow.

Chief among the biases which works against LID is the preoccupation (some would say pathology) of "moving money." This comes from assuming that the amount of money equals the amount of "development" achieved (Korten and Uphoff, 1981). It takes very little reflection to recognize that this equation between expenditure and results is fallacious. Yet it dominates so much of the thinking and activity of donors and national governments that "moving money" becomes a source of distortion and sabotage of LID efforts. Writing on efforts to strengthen municipal government capacity in Latin America, Gall observes:

In those instances where funding has been provided for municipal development, many observers find that decentralization has been hampered by the pressure to produce a given number of subprojects. Donor loans have been made for short time periods (three to five years) and thus pressure exists to place subloans as quickly as possible to meet pre-established disbursement projections. This then produces a situation in which the following things happen:

- Rapid start-up of lending activity is necessary, so pre-planning of priority areas of lending either does not occur or is ignored; and
- The institution-building and technical assistance activity (which is by its nature slow and gradual) takes second place.

This overtakes the need to reform municipal personnel and tax laws, to define a clear role for local government in the overall scheme of development, to build linkages with regional plans, and to upgrade the quality of local development plans and service delivery. In short, the capacity-building which would make decentralization effective is bulldozed aside by the pressure to disburse funds for works. (1982:11)

Actually, the notion that investment in and through local institutions must always be slower than other kinds of development expenditure is mistaken. The Basic Village Services project in Egypt, to which USAID has contributed over \$230 million, has shown that small-scale investments made in and through village councils can proceed more expeditiously than other kinds of projects as this huge project has managed to keep ahead of schedule in its disbursements (see Report No. 3 Annex; also Mayfield, 1984).

This only indicates, however, that LID-oriented projects can "move money" reasonably productively, not that a rapid pace of expenditure is necessarily a good or optimal procedure. For LID even more than for other activities, the amount of "development" achieved is not necessarily equivalent to the funds expended. Donors need to be devising new and better indicators of development, including LID, so that they can get away from the misleading equation of expenditure with development.

A second way in which donors can prepare themselves to be more effective in supporting LID is to take a longer time perspective. "Institutionalization" as a process almost by definition requires time. Valuations of an organization and its performance need to become widely shared and strongly held, and this does not happen quickly. A three or four year life-of-project is unlikely to suffice for getting changes in the bedrock acceptance of an institution. Fortunately, donors appear to be lengthening

their time horizon on projects, though they still are often fixated on quick finite results.<sup>66/</sup>

The concern with precise planning targets itself contributes to a displacement of LID effort, focusing attention more often on superficial or spurious "outputs" than on sustainable processes and capacities. Rondinelli correctly observes that:

The insistence of funding organizations -- whether they be international aid agencies or central government ministries -- on precise and detailed statements of objectives at the outset in order to facilitate systematic planning, management and control often leads to game-playing, phony precision and inaccurate reporting that create severe administrative problems later on. (1984:81-82)<sup>67/</sup>

More emphasis should be placed on signs of progress toward institutionalization, which include performance measures attributable to the institutions in question as well as indicators of acceptance and support from the persons on which they depend for sustained activity. The number of farmers who have "joined" water user associations is less significant from a developmental viewpoint than declines in the number of water disputes reported or increased satisfaction with water delivery.

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<sup>66/</sup> In the work previously referred to on water management in Sri Lanka, the government and USAID agreed on an unusual but reasonable 20-year time horizon for effecting improvements, including establishing a system of farmer organization. The Gal Oya project was to be the first in a series of project and was initially planned for eight years. Bureaucratic considerations, however, caused this to be reduced to four, which among other things meant that the master planning envisioned had to be done concurrently with the rehabilitation work.

The project itself "quantified" farmer organization goals in an unrealistic way, specifying that all 19,000 farmers in the project area would be "organized" by the end of year 4. (The actual number of farmers in the area turned out to be almost twice as many.) In the haste to promise results, little thought was given to how organizations so rapidly established would become permanent, sustainable institutions (to make the distinction between organizations and institutions we have made). In water management particularly, one does not want organizations that lose their effectiveness subsequently.

<sup>67/</sup> The absurdity of such target setting and performance reporting was documented in North Arcot District of Tamil Nadu, India when Cambridge University researchers found that the area actually planted with high-yielding varieties of rice in the district in 1975-76 was only one-third the area officially reported to and by the Ministry of Agriculture (Farmer et al., 1977:96).

We have noted frequently in these reports the importance for any particular local institutional channel of having a network of local institutions that mutually strengthen one another. Donors usually want to focus simply on assisting a single channel, but this is probably not even the best way to build up that channel. AID's policy paper on local organizations (institutions) takes note of the value of horizontal linkages and advises:

Providing support for new organizations outside the existing network of institutional linkages may thus be ineffective. Furthermore, offering outside assistance that enables or encourages existing local organizations to withdraw from this supporting network may over the long term be counterproductive. (1984:4)

We are not suggesting that donors must undertake the LID equivalent of "integrated rural development," investing in all kinds of local institutions simultaneously. Rather we are proposing that a broad focus rather than a narrow focus be adopted, that the linkages that extend beyond the institution receiving aid be recognized and supported. To disrupt these connections, and make the institution independent of all others, may be counterproductive, as the policy paper intimates, because this will enable or encourage it to withdraw from its supporting network. If there is no such network, its prospects for effectiveness are accordingly diminished.

The fact that assistance to local institutions can weaken them is reflected in the distinction Peterson (1982:118-119) makes between enfeebling assistance and supportive assistance. The former make the organization dependent on outside sources of support, smothering its independence and initiative, perhaps quite unintentionally. Supportive assistance, on the other hand, is characterized by its stimulating local commitment and initiative, through the kind of cost-sharing practices considered in Report No. 8 (Section 4.0). Peterson cites the government policy in Taiwan of contributing no more than 50% of construction costs, to ensure a substantial local contribution in part so that people regard the facility as "theirs."

A fuller consideration of donor contributions would entail a review of aid agency documentation comparable to our review of the available literature on LID. Our "sampling frame" for case data was not formulated to study donor requirements, so our observations are less systematic than for issues of local institutional development. Most of the discussion in the preceding sections of this report concerns things donor agencies can do to assist, facilitate or promote LID.

Donors should examine themselves to determine what they can do internally to begin reorienting their efforts toward more effective support of LID. One relatively

low cost reform would be to reduce the sequential and dichotomized approach to planning and implementation, where certain persons do the former and then others the latter. A "learning process" is hampered by discontinuities of personnel. The Ministry of Public Works in Venezuela has come to realize how costly for its performance is the segregation of roles. It now requires design engineers early in their careers to remain behind and manage (for at least two years) one of the irrigation schemes they have laid out on paper. Getting away from the practice of having design and management of projects handled by completely different teams would be a good first step. A second step would be to have longer tours of duty for staff in the field so that "institutional memory" can be improved. LID suffers greatly when those responsible for overseeing it change frequently, as is too often the case now.

To supplement donor inputs and to increase "institutional memory" as well as expertise in the management of social change, there is good reason for donors to acquire and contribute the services or knowledge-building institutions like the previously mentioned Asian Institute of Management or the Institute of Philippine Culture which bolstered the efforts of the National Irrigation Administration to introduce water user associations (D. Korten, 1980; F. Korten, 1982), or the Planning Research and Action Institute of Lucknow which spearheaded the UNICEF-backed water supply project in Banki, India (Misra, 1975). Where there is institutionally-perceptive leadership within a government agency as with the Kenya Tea Development Authority or the Malawi self-help water scheme, LID can proceed without such assistance. But even then there could usually have been some broader or quicker progress if a knowledge-building institution were involved as a partner in implementation and adaptation, if only because agency personnel are usually so overloaded with administrative tasks.

An additional change which is already started is to move away from "evaluation" as an end-of-project activity and to have evaluation and redesign done on a more frequent, periodic basis, so as to incorporate on-going learning into the project cycle. Since project designs are intended, as much as anything, to get resources allocated to a certain activity, they should be regarded more as a license than as a contract. Reassessments and reformulations are part of any complex management task. These activities, to be sure, should not be allowed to become all consuming. The first rule in Peters and Waterman's book (1982) is to be action-oriented. But action should be undertaken thoughtfully and self-critically, well-informed by feedback from one's clientele. The fact that circumstances always change and analyses are always fallible

or incomplete should make the revision of plans as more experience is gained an act of wisdom, not an indication of incompetence. If donor agencies can convey this perspective to national governments, PVOs and somewhat less urgently to businesses, many of which already know this, a real service will be done for LID and for development generally.

Development itself is the most demanding "learning process" there is. Individual learning is difficult enough, as expressed by the old saying which asks plaintively, why do we get so soon old and so late smart? The learning required for development is social learning, all the more complex and ambiguous because it must be collective learning, incorporated in the experience and actions of thousands and millions of people. Day-in, day-out, thousands and millions of people struggle to gain a better understanding of how they can make their lives more productive, satisfying and secure. The limits of individual action, the basis for all fundamental improvement as Hirschman (1984) reminds us, are reached fairly quickly and this realization leads to collective action at group, community and locality levels. These learning processes are unwieldy and diffuse, often not conclusive and certainly not identical.

The task of planners and implementors within higher-level institutions, from the international level of donor agencies on down through national, regional, district and sub-district levels, is to launch and sustain their own complementary "learning process" in support of what people at local levels are doing. This is a different vision of what donor agencies can and should do. Their role has previously been defined principally in terms of providing capital and expertise -- as "giving" productive capacity and "giving" answers. The function of outside resources should rather be to strengthen the development of local productive capacity and to help in identifying problems and finding solutions across a broad range of human needs. More effective local institutions are crucial for improving both productive and problem-solving capacities.

This perspective on development strategy represents the culmination of considerable experience over the last three decades. It is reflected in the current AID policy papers on institutional development (1983) and local organizations (1984). This view does not eliminate a concern with improvement of technology or with increasing investment of economic resources. It does recognize, as indicated in the introduction to Report No. 5 on agriculture, that there are diminishing returns to any effort which promotes technology or capital formation in the absence of supportive institutional development which can help (literally) to "capitalize" on such investments. This issue appears to be debated in two recent articles by Nicholson (1984) and Goodell (1984) in

Economic Development and Cultural Change. Nicholson's analysis of the "green revolution" in wheat production in India's Punjab starts by accepting Dantwala's argument that local institutions (meaning cooperatives in this case) were marginal contributors to the spread of new technology. High prices, fertilizer imports and distribution, rural electrification, and well-regulated markets were all judged by Dantwala to have been more important factors. Goodell, on the other hand, writing about the adoption and use of new rice technology in Southeast Asia emphasizes the need for local institutions to coordinate crop activities, channel inputs like credit and fertilizer, control pests, manage irrigation water, etc. In fact, Nicholson points to contributions which the co-ops made in Punjab, serving as procurement agents which guaranteed a floor price. This became important in the early 1970s when the first wave of success produced a glut of production; otherwise the "revolution" might have stalled.) Co-ops were also an integral part of the extension effort for getting fertilizer and seed packages adopted. Studies which show essentially no difference in fertilizer quality, weight, adequacy and timeliness between co-ops and private sector dealers miss the point that the latter's good performance is attributable partly to the existence and competition of the former. Nicholson also shows that even by Dantwala's own criteria, the cooperatives' role in getting credit extended to small farmers was a crucial contribution. So the case for institutions' necessary complementarity for technological diffusion and efficient returns on resource investments is made tangible by both articles.

Accordingly, investments in institutional development, local as well as national, should be part of any project plan which seeks broad-based and sustainable benefits. Where there is solid existing institutional capacity, emphasis can be placed on introducing new technology or accelerating rates of capital formation. But such a happy circumstance is rare in LDCs since institutional underdevelopment is more pronounced and profound in their domain, than deficiencies of technology or capital. If there are capable institutions, these lacks of technology and capital can be more easily overcome than in the reverse situation, where better technology and more capital give no comparable prospect that institutional gaps can ipso facto be remedied.

These concluding comments are not intended to set up a conflict between technology and economic resources, on one side, and institutions, on the other. Such thinking would signify a false dichotomy. The underlying reality is that all three are important for developmental progress, in the same way that land, labor and capital are all crucial for economic production. At a particular time or in a particular situation,

one factor may be more emphasized and valued because of relative scarcity, but all three are intrinsically necessary to any productive process.

By convention, when the supply and input of a scarce factor are increased, the increments in production are attributed to it. But this conception is artificial since all three are really contributing to the new outcome. In a similar way, the separate values of technology, resources and institutions are not ascertainable. But whichever is the scarcest constitutes a "bottleneck," holding back the productive potential of the other two factors.

In so many cases, as seen in the Annexes of Reports No. 2 through 6, we find that lack of local institutional development was the constraining factor. Introducing appropriate local institutions led directly to the spread of new agricultural technologies, improvements in health, construction of water supplies and bridges, protection of forests, more reliable and equitable distribution of irrigation water, etc. With such a realization by donor agencies, LID should assume greater salience in planning and investments. For donors to be effective promoters, facilitators or assistants of LID, however, they will need to change some of their own ways of working, in directions pointed out in this section. Any acceleration of progress toward local institutional development may, paradoxically, have to begin at the international level.

## ANNEX

To share with readers some of the most instructive LID experiences that we found in our review of the literature, we are presenting in these annexes some capsule descriptions of such experience, positive and negative. Readers are referred to the cited sources for fuller details.

### BOLIVIA: DESEC

The Center for Social and Economic Development (DESEC) began on a regional basis in 1963. Its founder, Juan DeMeare, has been a driving force behind this private service organization. Initially DESEC worked closely with Catholic parish churches and associated groups. But the emphasis given to economic activities and insistence on remaining clear of partisan politics led to a break with the church. For two years after this DESEC continued its efforts by holding meetings in rural schoolhouses and peasants' homes to encourage neighbors to consider forming a local association.

Two types of organizations were formed: community groups termed "centers," and functional activity groups called "committees." A center is a membership organization composed of peasants who live in the same village or community. They work to collectively resolve common problems and in most cases elect representatives who participate in a regional federation which in turn has a representative in the national-level ARADO federation.

Members who are interested in a particular activity such as milk, potato or rice production may join specialized "committees" which focus on improving production, marketing and so forth. These committees are organized into centrals, cooperatives and producers' associations. They have also established a chain of local stores and an outlet in Cochabamba for the sale of items produced by ten artisan committees. An indication of the linkages among this network of organizations is suggested by the fact that 52 committees participate in DESEC's adult literacy program.

Under the DESEC umbrella are four service organizations which have professionally trained staff (many of whom are from the region) to provide technical assistance to the peasant based "committee" and "center" organizations. These organizations work with DESEC sponsored activities but also have the autonomy to work with other programs involving housing, health, education and agriculture.

It is the intention of each service organization to become self-supporting. In the meantime, however, support from the German based foundation MISEREOR has been crucial. In addition, DESEC has worked to find funding from other international agencies for specific projects and have themselves taken on consulting work to help maintain their financial viability (Morss et al., 1975:G2-G13).

**LESSONS:** DESEC has involved many thousands of people in efforts to work collectively in improving their own lives. Its understanding of the need for a network of local institutions operating at several levels has helped to increase the incomes and confidence of rural households. Often beginning in the Promotion mode DESEC has shown itself capable of recognizing when and how to "pull back" as a local organization's capacities emerge. In practice DESEC is engaged in an amalgam of Assistance, Facilitation and Promotion modes as it seeks to create a stronger and wider

network of local institutions throughout Bolivia. By allowing individuals to join one, both or neither organization at the village level, involvement has been based on a genuine desire to participate, not feigned interest.

### **GUATEMALA: Penny Foundation**

The Penny Foundation (Fundacion de Centavo) is a private voluntary organization which began in 1963 by soliciting contributions from prominent citizens for use as a source of credit by marginal farmers. Since 1970 it has had some funding from USAID to expand its operations. Unlike other programs, the Foundation has insisted that all services, e.g. credit, fertilizer, and land purchases, be arranged through producers groups, some with as few as 20 members. The principle of group responsibility has guided the whole effort with some good but uneven results.

Sometimes the Foundation works in what we call a Facilitation role, encouraging the formation of groups, and in other instances it gives Assistance to groups that have emerged without foundation involvement, such as from the government's Rural Development Agency programs. Operating concurrently in both the Assistance and Facilitation modes is unusual and appears to be effective.

The Foundation's efforts to stimulate and support local organizations may be more valuable than the limited financial resources it can make available (Rusch et al., 1976). This is because the program's focus is on provision of group credit, and without repayment it cannot continue. By emphasizing group responsibility and self-reliance, the record of repayment has been better than in more conventional government programs.

To some extent, the Penny Foundation has been operating as an alternative to the system of "cooperatives" in Guatemala. It does not require the organizations it supports to become very formal. The government program for cooperatives has certain criteria for graduating organizations from "pre-cooperative" to "cooperative" status. Many of the Penny Foundation groups never qualify for the transition. This has been seen by some evaluators as a deficiency in the program, but "formalization" should not be equated with "institutionalization." To the extent that people's needs are being met through these organizations, they will become and remain "institutions" even if not legally constituted.

The Foundation does not try to ensure that all of the base-level groups survive. It tries to limit its support in the form of loans and technical assistance to no more than four years, though exceptions are made (Gow et al., 1979:127-139). "About one-third of the groups do not request further assistance; some groups become recognized as cooperatives; others find alternative funding sources; and some disband. The Fundacion does not have the resources to encourage dependency and thus allows the dissolution of weak local organizations." (Peterson, 1982:133)

Since the Foundation works in various locations in the country, its program varies in certain respects. In some regions, for example, it is able to collaborate closely with the Ministry of Agriculture on extension activities. In other areas, credit allocated for land purchases is not available. What does not vary, however, is the focus on producer groups with shared responsibility for loan repayments and self-reliance through social learning.

**LESSONS:** One of the most interesting aspects of this experience is the "non-paternalistic" approach. On the surface it appears not to support LID because the Foundation accepts, even expects, the disappearance of some, even many, of its affiliated groups. On the other hand, by stressing its own limited financial resources and by setting limits on the credit which a group can get from the Foundation, it discourages the kind of expectations which could build up a relation of "dependency."

There is little possessiveness toward the groups it supports. If they get absorbed into the regular cooperative system, good; if they find other sources of support, fine; if they can become fully self-sufficient, so much the better; if they disappear, that is unfortunate but that is their responsibility. This attitude may appear like indifference, but it is the kind of detachment which may in some situations be necessary to encourage independence. (There are similarities of approach here with that presented to communities in the Malawi self-help water supply scheme discussed below.) It is more likely to elicit local responsibility than an attitude which is more protective and anxious about groups' survival.

It is interesting that while many of the groups which have spurned entering the formal cooperative system and formal federations nevertheless moved to create their own "informal federations akin to cooperatives" (Rusch et al., 1976:78). This suggests that autonomous rural organizations fairly naturally find benefit in having horizontal and vertical linkages. That these are not formal-legal structures should not necessarily be judged unfortunate. The question for outside agencies is how to work with structures which rural people find intelligible and useful.

#### **INDIA: Kottar Social Service Society**

This supra-local service organization in the Kanyakumari District of Tamil Nadu State is an exceptionally interesting example for its support of multi-sectoral LID. KSSS is affiliated with the Catholic Church in the Diocese of Kottar, though its work is carried out on a non-sectarian basis. Through the use of P.L. 480 (Title II) food aid, together with human and other material resources, a wide variety of emerging local institutions have been fostered.

The district has a population of 1.3 million people within 645 square miles. Despite the high density there is only one major town in the district (so this makes it somewhat more like a "locality" despite the size). While KSSS is able to draw on the institutional infrastructure associated with 90 church parishes and 120 priests, the actual managerial cadre works out of two offices with a staff of less than 20 persons, three of whom are long-term residents of European origin.

The largest KSSS undertaking is the Community Health Development Project (CHDP) which began in 1972. Initially, mobile teams travelled from village to village visiting each once a fortnight with highly original, practical and interesting nutrition education lessons for mothers. As an incentive for the mothers to bring their children to the programs, P.L. 480 food and basic health care were provided after the lessons given in health and nutrition and after weighing the children each time.

Over five years, more than 550 young women were recruited and trained so that by July 1978, all mobile teams were converted into stationary teams working in village health cooperatives established under the CHDP. These gradually evolved local organizations could provide more sustained attention and work on health status and could cover all members of the participating families. By 1980, the program covered more than 38,000 preschool children in 124 villages.

In order to participate in the program, each village had to make a request to the KSSS to be included, had to provide space for the clinics, and had to permit some of its young women to be trained to function as part of the delivery system. Each family joining the cooperative is charged approximately \$2.85 a year for a broad range of health and nutrition services. This allowed the CHDP to become entirely self-supporting in its recurrent costs.

KSSS has undertaken to build local institutions for more than health care. Among the poorest individuals in the district that the KSSS worked with were local coastal fishermen. Most had to pay a large share of their catch as rent for the catamarans they borrowed for going out to sea. Most were also in debt to moneylenders, who were commonly the same persons who bought their catch at a low price.

In an effort to alter these circumstances, KSSS helped organize sangams (cooperatives) of young fishermen. Collective coordinated sales of fish by the sangams helped to raise the price they received. Setting aside in the bank a portion of their proceeds from each catch helped buy less fortunate members out of debt and also led to each member having some personal savings. In addition, several sangams with KSSS support took out loans to purchase mechanized fiberglass boats which enabled them to fish farther away from shore. Unfortunately, the boats became targets for sabotage and vandalism when not in use. The fishermen took to using smaller boats without motors, but continued to rely on fiberglass (instead of wood) to have lighter, more durable crafts. Despite threats by fish merchants to withhold financial contributions to the church in retaliation for KSSS support of the sangams, support was not curtailed.

As a spinoff of this activity, KSSS organized net-making centers in 13 coastal villages. With food aid serving as an enabling resource, over a thousand young women produce nets with newly introduced cotton and nylon materials. The higher quality nets are a boon to fishermen and the women earn needed income.

Another major effort involved organizing almost 10,000 small farmers (60 percent of whom had less than one-quarter of an acre) to improve irrigation. They constructed 40 kilometers of channels serving 1,600 acres. A large cooperative for potters was established so that they could have both a larger demand and better price for their wares than when sold individually. Other activities included organization for community water supply and for road and bridge repair using food aid. Of the 12 community development organizers employed by KSSS, half work in the sangam movement and half in agriculture and community health (Field, 1980).

**LESSONS:** Certain features of the Kottar experience may not be replicable (e.g. staff working in the same region for 40 years), but something can be learned about modes of operation for LID. Getting this network of local institutions launched has not required large numbers of people but rather a small core of very dedicated and culturally sophisticated workers. Rather than seek outside advice from short-term consultants, the staff in the field have improvised and experimented. The KSSS community organizers are also experienced and committed and only a small number are working among a huge population. Their effectiveness is seen in their ability to recruit and train local people to take responsibility for administering the village projects such as CHDP.

Outside financial and material resources have been solicited but only when they can be used to create or further develop capacities for collective advancement. Resources are never used as a substitute for local commitment, as seen by the charging of fees by CHDP to cover all recurrent costs, requiring compulsory savings of sangam

members, and insisting on attendance and quality work in infrastructure projects. This was found to be an important feature of membership organizations in the analysis of Esman and Uphoff (1984:155-158).

KSSS has appeared to be guided by the "hiding hand" which Hirschman (1967) wrote about. It has engaged in action without a preconceived plan and even without full appreciation of the problems it would confront. But once engaged, it has been able to summon problem-solving capabilities it did not know it had, drawing on the talents of its organizers and the communities in addition to those of the core staff.

### **INDONESIA: Community-Based Institutional Development in Aceh**

In 1979, Save the Children Federation (SCF) undertook a \$2 million program in the Special Territory of Aceh, following a flexible approach stressing beneficiary participation in decision-making and local institutional development. The Tangse sub-district had little previous experience with outside development agencies. There was a strong tradition of community cooperation among the predominantly smallholder farmers, though there was also a tradition of centralized, relatively authoritarian village leadership.

SCF began in eight villages, seeking to foster collective action capabilities rather than emphasizing any particular issue. It believed that whatever local organization emerged would be able to choose successful project activities. Sub-district Community Development Committees (CDCs) were organized at what we consider the "locality" level. However these were dominated by more well-to-do members of the communities who did not think less educated members were competent to plan activities.

To involve a broader spectrum of the population, Village-Level Community Development Committees (VCDCs) were formed around groups working on projects including coffee grinding, orange tree planting and hat making. (Note that these organizations correspond to the community and group levels of activity.) These VCDCs gradually assumed greater operational authority and the role of the elite-dominated CDC changed from decision-maker to that of coordinator and guide. Thus the traditional leadership was not excluded but a significant number of previously by-passed individuals were now included in responsible initiating roles.

In the initial stages, gaining broad local participation was stressed over project quality or cost-effectiveness. Rather than attempting to get villages to concentrate on one or two activities, a diverse range of projects emerged with the expectation that a certain number of them would not be successful. Nonetheless there is an incentive for VCDCs to be effective in what they do since performance on previous projects is a major criterion for continuing SCF funding.

Investments by SCF were small and diverse with the CDC playing an important project screening role. Activities encompassed all three modes of agency intervention. Undertakings such as chicken raising involved Assistance where the activity was one in which many individuals were already engaged on a small scale. A coffee grinding project was facilitated by the provision of new equipment. Family planning activities, especially at the outset, tended to be promotional in nature.

Training activities were used for much more than imparting knowledge. Practical skills to increase the capabilities of the poor were given strong emphasis. Training was also designed to spread the project's underlying philosophy through discussion of the

practice of participatory management. Further, training was used to develop linkages with local government and local administration by inviting middle-level government employees to attend. However, their number was kept small enough that they did not dominate the workshops.

Strong efforts were made to spread project-related information. Written correspondence, for example, was widely distributed as evidenced by the number of ccs marked on letters and memoranda. More importantly, information about all expenditures, income receipts and accounts were routinely published, posted and made available to everyone.

"A major result of this openness was the willingness of the community to isolate and even remove corrupt leaders. The availability of information made clear what was not clear before -- that the community was being victimized by some of its leaders and representatives." (Van Sant and Weisel, 1979:18) Whereas previously, the majority accepted what their social superiors did, in this case, an accountant, one village chief and several committee members were removed for malpractices.

When it appeared that existing local institutions were suitable, i.e., benefits were not monopolized by local elites, SCF worked with these institutions rather than organize new ones. One such women's group emerged as the most promising in terms of effectively managing a broad range of projects including health and nutrition and cottage industry.

LESSONS: Providing skill and information as well as opportunities to participate in decision-making produced significant benefits. "That there has been a significant effect on the attitudes and behavior of the poor is widely acknowledged by both participants in and observers of the CBIRD process in Aceh." (Van Sant and Weisel, 1979:19)

The initial approach, which was basically one of Facilitation, worked quite well as a variety of community-supported specific activities were spun off as local organizational capacity grew. The early problem of elite domination was overcome in an evolutionary manner, as lower-level organizational capacity was developed around activities of interest to poorer members of the communities.

The cooperative (coopting) approach to government employees was useful as it facilitated vertical linkages to the various departments that could help the community-based groups. The strategy of supporting a wide variety of groups and activities, with the assumption that some would be winnowed out as unviable, is similar to that of the Penny Foundation in Guatemala discussed above. The remaining groups and activities were strengthened by horizontal linkages among themselves in the VCDCs and vertical linkages to the CDCs.

### **JAPAN: Yachiho Village Institutions**

A case study of Yachiho by Sharma (1984) provides a good understanding of what is possible with a strategy of what we call "assisted self-reliance." Yachiho is a village of just over 5,000 population in Central Japan. That it is less densely settled than average which reflects its somewhat lesser resource endowment. We cite from Sharma's study quite extensively because this is such a remarkable case of LID.

Beginning in 1959, with stimulation from a doctor who served Yachiho villagers who went to the sub-district hospital at Saku, a program was launched which evolved

into a comprehensive health care system, including school health and integrated with Saku Central Hospital, largely managed by voluntary workers. A council of public health supervises all activities. It is made up of 3 representatives of villagers at-large, 3 representatives of village organizations (2 from the village assembly and 1 from the agricultural cooperative), and 3 doctors (1 local and 2 from Saku Hospital). This structure formalizes horizontal and vertical linkages.

There are 13 voluntary health instructors nominated from the different hamlets (neighborhoods) within the village, who are trained in simple treatments and preventive care and who maintain health records on all persons in each hamlet. They monitor health conditions generally and for individual patients and provide feedback to the local health unit. They are appointed for four years and given a modest stipend.

In addition, each hamlet elects one or more health officers, depending on size of population, to maintain close liaison with the health instructor and carry out activities regarding public health and environmental sanitation with the help of hamlet people. Each officer gets a stipend as a "conveyance allowance." Close contact is maintained by medical personnel with the health officers and instructors. Health standards are higher in Yachiho than most neighboring communities, though expenditure per person on health services is only about two-thirds as much.

With the emergence of this health system, the village assembly, provided for in tradition and law, became more active. It is now engaged constantly in solving the problems of the community and adopting programs for development. Its executive and committees manage a wide range of activities from revenue collection to social services.

"The village assembly has sufficient functional and financial autonomy within the national and prefectural system to manage its functions at the local level almost independently for which it receives grants-in-aid from the national and prefectural governments to the extent of about 55 percent of its annual expenditure while the remaining amount is mobilized through taxes, village bonds, interest from loans, economic development projects, etc." (Sharma, 1984:79)

The budget is now nearly 2 billion yen a year. One quarter goes for public education and another quarter for support of agriculture, forestry, fishing and industry. (This is an exception to our observation in Report No. 5 that local governments are not extensively engaged in supporting agriculture.) Only about 13 percent goes to administration. Public services include water supply, sanitation, fire protection, a trunk dialing telephone system, and a well maintained road network with automatic signals.

"With a view to involving the maximum number of people in community functions, it has developed an elaborate system by establishing twenty-nine committees in which as many as 300 persons, which include non-assembly members, participate on a regular basis. This has helped the village assembly in carrying out its functions efficiently through voluntary action." (Ibid.) The older ("veteran") members of the assembly who played significant roles in organizing the community after 1959 are grooming younger members to continue the tradition of self-government.

Through the community's own efforts, two nursery schools, a primary and middle school have been built and equipped with modern facilities, despite financial constraints. "A number of cultural events and extracurricular activities are organized

through active support of the community, including the Parent-Teachers' Association (PTA)." The village has constructed a community hall for various social and educational functions, and since 1968 has organized a regular free education program open to the whole community under the name of Yachiho Summer College. (Sharma, 1984:53)

There is also an active agricultural cooperative society which "has been instrumental in bringing to an end the long history of subordination of farmers to other occupational interests. It has been able to develop a democratic force among farmers with strong bargaining capability." (Sharma, 1984:78) The main productive activity centers on rice which the co-op assists through inputs and marketing services, but it also "has separate branches to look after the interests of different farmers who engage in floriculture, vegetable farming, dairying and other subsidiary activities. It helps promote savings and loans for starting other activities and embarks on its own projects like the establishment of cold storage, provision of large-scale farming machinery, etc. which cater to the collective needs." (Sharma, 1984:81)

A good example of the community's capacity to identify and act on collective interests is the recent decision of the village, which is in a location with the potential for development of tourism, to lease buildable land to the residents of Fuchu town who wanted to construct summer resorts in the village. "As an easy alternative the assembly could have sold the land to a large company to develop the area and received an income from it. But then the village would have lost ownership and permanent interest in the land, and income would have accrued to the company. Therefore, the present decision shows the prudence and foresightedness of the village community growing out of a social capacity for development." (Sharma, 1984:55)

**LESSONS:** Sharma analyzes this case in terms of the significance of "social capability" which he traces in part to historical and cultural influences. At the same time, the "catalytic" role of the doctor from Saku and the remarkably strong and civic-minded village leadership deserve credit for working out a variety of organizations and structural arrangements that are mutually supportive.

The local institutional system that has evolved over a 20 year period is remarkably effective, combining volunteer and professional roles at the local level, involving a wide cross-section of the community -- old and young -- in responsible positions. Social and productive activities have been mutually reinforcing rather than competitive, with the village assembly balancing the various needs and interests. Government agencies have worked cooperatively and supportively with local institutions, but the relationship has been more beneficial to the extent that these local institutions have had a substantial degree of autonomy, legally and financially.

The major problem for the community, as for many others in Japan, is outmigration and potential dissolution. This "threat" is being dealt with through active efforts to develop inns, hotels, etc. to attract tourists and generate income for the community. Only about 106 households depend solely on agriculture now (compared to 838 25 years ago). But a wide variety of subsidiary agricultural (non-rice) plus non-agricultural activities have changed the economic structure of the village. A number of the village youth who have gone away for higher education have returned and the village assembly has a keen interest in developing local culture and opportunities, bringing young persons actively into the management of village affairs, so that the community will survive and prosper.

## **MALAWI: Community Water Program**

Malawi is considerably ahead of many other African nations in providing safe drinking water for its people. Much of the reason for this progress involves an impressive effort over more than ten years to concurrently develop local institutional capacities and gravity-flow water systems.

Beginning in the late 1960s the Ministry of Community Development and Social Welfare worked with some sixteen villages to tap springs and streams in nearby hills. Rather than trying to "give" water as a "present to peasants" the message conveyed was as follows:

"This is to be your project, not the government's. If you want to have better water, the government is prepared to work with you to get it. But the responsibility is yours, to manage as well as to build" (Liebenow, 1982)

Subsequently, the program was gradually expanded. "The pivot of the Malawian program is the District Development Committee. This is an administrative and political body chaired by the district commissioner and includes the district's members of parliament, the chairpersons of the ruling Malawi Congress Party, League of Malawi Women and League of Malawi Youth, the district medical officer and other technical personnel" (Chauhan 1983). All requests for a piped water scheme proceed through this committee. At the village level a special project committee is formed with branch committees for the various routes along which piping will be installed. Technical assistants are assigned to communities to serve as a link between higher-level project staff and local residents. They are selected for their practical experience and ability to work with people. After their initial training and placement, refresher courses are held annually. It is important to note, however, that the village committees and not the technical assistants decide such issues as where taps will be placed.

Numerous outside agencies have supported this program. Funding is channeled through local administration. To date some 900 miles of piping to serve 2,000 village taps and over 400,000 rural persons has been installed (Glennie, 1982).

**LESSONS:** This program has devised a decentralized multi-tiered system for encouraging LID. Often working in a Facilitation mode, support is effectively provided from "above" without stifling initiative and expertise at the village level. The composition of the District Development Committee suggests that numerous local institutions are contributing to the overall effort. Administrative, technical and political officers are linked through the committee structure. But bureaucratic inertia is avoided by devolving most day to day responsibilities to the village based technical assistants and village residents themselves.

## **NIGERIA: Tiv Farmers' Association**

In the early 1950s, Tiv leadership in the Southern part of Benue Plateau State designed the barn system to make larger amounts of credit available to farm families. This rotating credit and savings system was based on a traditional method of saving yams. It worked through elected leaders, a strict policy of loan repayment, and "reorganization" on an annual basis. The last element was designed to avoid the impression that permanent commitment was required.

With over a decade of impressive performance by these bams a local agricultural extension officer who was well acquainted with the region suggested to the senior tribal leadership that a farmers' association (MO) be developed to work closely with the extension service (LA). Initially a "senior council" was organized with 60 representatives from various Tiv areas. Following the growth of the association to some 1,000 members by 1968, it was decided to organize at the village level, drawing on the experience gained by the bams. Benefitting from strong traditional social structure and low stratification among the Tiv, village branches were established. Both agricultural extension officers and Farmers' Association leaders assisted in this effort to organize "permanent" membership associations.

Although considerable informal communication facilitated the process of organizing credit branches, the actual initiative usually came from the extension officer who would meet with the village chief and farmers to discuss the details of the Farmers' Association including the system of representation at district and division levels. Once operating, village associations meet on a monthly basis with the extension worker. In addition, the extension officer makes subsequent visits, usually three or four times per year. Within some six years the Tiv Farmers' Association had more than 33,000 members and a yearly operating budget from dues of \$64,680. The average on-farm income over a decade showed a 72 percent increase (Morss et al., 1975:F32-F41).

**LESSONS:** This case offers an impressive example of using traditional structures of authority and locally tested principles of organization, albeit with some slight modification, to initiate a new form of organization. By being sensitive to what already existed local administration, without the use of any donor funding, was able to make extension efforts aimed at encouraging innovation more effective. Even though LA provided some of the impetus for getting activities started, farmer control over decision making was not lost. Despite the fact that adult functional literacy was only around ten percent, the program does not appear to have been adversely affected by lack of "educated" leadership.

#### **PERU: Comas Women's Academy**

This is one of the most impressive cases of grassroots development reported by Hirschman (1984) based on its rapid devolution of responsibility to local women. This devolution came about because of the unfolding of activities which served to make the incipient institution more grounded in local needs, and because of the development of horizontal linkages with other women's organizations which led to an informal federation with supportive vertical linkages to promote members' interests.

Comas is a large squatter settlement outside Lima, with the usual lack of social facilities. The Catholic Church provides much of the rather limited civic core to this amorphous community. A group of women wishing to raise their families' incomes by making clothes got together and wanted instruction in sewing and working with patterns. They came into contact with a private service organization in Lima, the Centro de Estudios Sociales y Publicaciones which was assisting educational projects in slum areas with some financial support from Dutch and German agencies.

The Centro, according to Hirschman, "provided the requested assistance for clothesmaking, but quite soon other topics of instruction were developed in collaboration with the Comas women: classes on literacy, in the history of Peru, in female health and sexuality and so on -- until a whole curriculum took shape. After two

years of instruction by personnel supplied by the Centro, some topics of instruction were taken over by the Comas women who had graduated from the course and felt they could handle the materials themselves. Today the administration of the Academy and most of the teaching is handled by these women. Gradually, the women have developed contacts with other women's groups in Comas and a Comas-wide women's group which discusses feminist issues has been started." (1984:17)

One problem the program encountered was hostility from husbands, many of whom did not like their wives being away from home one evening a week during the academic year (April to December). "The Academy has attempted to assuage the husbands by drawing them into the activities -- organizing, for example, fiestas and common educational events." (1984:18) The community women have now begun to work on getting improvements in the water supply for the municipality through petitions and demonstrations.

LESSONS: The change in outside support from the Centro, from what we have called Assistance in the first stage, to Facilitation as the "Academy" was developed, and back to Assistance as the capacity of the Academy for initiating new activities grew. This is a good example of how an intermediary organization can work. The fact that the staff of the Centro took the women seriously helped them to take themselves seriously and to move from a very limited objective and capacity to an expanding and more effective institutional base. Non-members (men) have also been swept along by the energy channeled through the Academy.

#### **SOUTH KOREA: The Saemaul Undong Movement**

Saemaul Undong (SU), meaning New Community Movement, was initiated by President Park in the 1970s, reflecting his interest both in a strong agricultural base and rural political support. It was overseen by the Office of the President, with a special secretary in charge, and with consultative councils at each governmental tier representing the various ministries involved in supporting SU.

This structure was conceived and operated in a top-down manner, but it was matched by a vast spread of community organizations, whose leaders (chosen by the members) were invested with the authority to bargain for resources from the government to complement those of their communities. These leaders operated both as agents of the state and as "partisans" representing local interests. They were usually not the village headmen who occupied quasi-hereditary roles and were often older and less dynamic. The informal competition between SU leaders and village headmen was one of the elements energizing Saemaul (Goldsmith, 1981).

Among the most impressive aspects of this national program is the degree to which formerly listless local bureaucracies (LA) have been "reoriented" into agencies seriously working on rural development issues, frequently working closely with farmers for the first time. Bureaucrats and technicians who used to resort to coercive measures find they cannot rely on these any more. Pressure from above to show results means that balking communities can make officials look bad in superiors' eyes. Local leaders can also make complaints against government staff at their regular public meetings with higher officials (Aqua, 1981).

Pressure for performance also falls on Saemaul leaders, who can less easily blame "the government" for problems when it is actively trying to support community

improvement. Also, there are tangible rewards for their communities and themselves from active effort (Goldsmith, 1981).

The figures on infrastructure built or improved are almost staggering. By 1979, for example, 43,000 kilometers of village roads had been built and an equal length of farm feeder roads, 73,000 bridges, 37,000 water supply systems, and almost 11,000 irrigation systems (Lee, 1981:318-322). A great variety of income-producing activities on a group or community basis have been instigated -- mushroom growing, machine repair, etc. The sense of urgency which pervaded the movement from the start caused communities undertaking projects such as bridge construction or design of manufacturing enterprises to learn quickly what they needed to know through "hands-on" experimentation.

The way in which government support was channeled is also instructive. After two years of giving 35,000 villages the same level of material assistance (in the form of cement and steel reinforcing rods for construction), villages were classified into three categories: most responsive (self-standing), typical (self-helping), and least responsive ("basic"). The greatest assistance per village was given to the middle category, with enough to the first and third to provide some encouragement. The message to the latter category was to become more self-helping.

In 1973, about one-third of the villages were in the latter, but before long this number was negligible and two-thirds had "graduated" into the top (self-standing) category, needing only Assistance according to our classification of support modes. Villages accepted reclassification partly because of pride and partly because there were still benefits to be received from the program (Lee, 1981:151-153).

**LESSONS:** Some very impressive changes in the economic and social status of villages could be achieved by government investment through a well-conceived, evolving program with strong support from the highest echelons. Communities responded with major contributions of materials, labor, and management skills. The ability to plan and carry out infrastructure produced the most visible results, but the many thousands of agricultural and non-agricultural enterprises established under SU auspices have also made a significant contribution to rural well-being. The cost to government of getting these enterprises started has been a small part of the total expenditure.

A great deal of "bureaucratic reorientation" was accomplished in a relatively short period of time, with clear political signals from above and with organized pressure from below. Although the program began with a "blueprint" conception (one might say a "blueprint" mentality), it moved fairly quickly into a "learning process" mode as the first efforts were too uniform and mismatched to village needs and capabilities. Where the public sector and communities lacked certain technical skills, responsibilities were given to private firms, bringing in that "channel" for LID. The movement showed what a multi-channel, multi-tier undertaking could achieve by encouraging a great deal of initiative and responsibility from rural communities and groups (Lee, 1981).

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