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LESSONS LEARNED FROM AID PROGRAM EXPERIENCE IN FY 1984

A Review of the Year's Project Evaluation and Audit Reports, World-Wide



CENTER FOR DEVELOPMENT INFORMATION AND EVALUATION
BUREAU FOR PROGRAM AND POLICY COORDINATION

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LESSONS LEARNED FROM AID PROGRAM EXPERIENCE IN FY 1984

A Review of the Year's Project Evaluation and Audit Reports, Worldwide

Prepared by

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for

The U.S. Agency for International Development
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination
Center for Development Information and Evaluation

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FOREWORD

In 1983 and again in 1984, the Center for Development Information and Evaluation (CDIE) analyzed the quality of the evaluations prepared by and for AID's missions, offices, and bureaus. In 1985, building on this experience, CDIE undertook the first substantive review of the findings of all evaluations and project audits on which a report had been submitted during the course of one fiscal year. The results of this first annual review--covering evaluations and audits in FY 1984--are the subject of this report.

Altogether, 263 evaluations and 45 audits were reviewed. The analysis of this large and disparate body of materials focused on several key issues; some of these issues were defined before the review began, and others emerged from the review itself. The findings pertain only to the evaluations and audits reviewed; these "cases" are not a sample, and the findings are not necessarily representative of the entire portfolio of AID-supported projects and programs during the year. Nevertheless, the analysis uncovered several interesting patterns and themes in AID experience with development programs.

CDIE expects to continue this kind of review on an annual basis. To assist this effort and to help make future reports as useful as possible, readers are encouraged to send CDIE their comments on the report, as well as suggestions regarding issues on which future reviews might focus. We believe this report is instructive about AID programs and can help AID improve the quality of its development assistance.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This analysis of FY 1984's project evaluations has focused on five principal issues of special relevance to AID's efforts to manage its development resources effectively: (1) Projects' Compatibility with the Host Country Environment; (2) Projects' Effectiveness in the Institutionalization Process; (3) Projects' Adequacy in Design and Implementation; (4) Projects' Sustainability; and (5) Projects' Effectiveness in Technology Transfer.

The principal observations on each of these issues are discussed below.

1. The Compatibility Issue

Most projects reviewed appear to be responsive to host governments' needs, in support of their official development priorities and in furtherance of mutual U.S.-host country national interests. However, some projects are not substantively compatible with local and regional customs, and cultural and ethnic factors within host countries. In some cases the host governments, themselves, have little knowledge or appreciation of such intra-national cultural differences. The result is that projects, though national in scope, are not effective in important geo-cultural regions of the country. Reading the environment at the grass-roots level, especially in newly developing countries with a complex mix of divergent cultures and ethnic groups, remains difficult both for AID and host governments because so little of its true nature surfaces until it is too late.

2. The Institutional Development Issue

The evaluation reports suggest that most USAID program managers and technicians believe strongly that "institution building" is AID's most important task. The reports give evidence that AID personnel have become skilled in "institution building" and in its integral human resources development aspect, have developed useful doctrine and techniques related thereto, and are

committed to both the concepts and to refining the techniques. AID contract teams, with some exceptions, appear increasingly to share the conviction that institution building is the core process, and are improving their skills therein, in concert with their USAID direct-hire colleagues (again with some exceptions).

3. The Project Design and Implementation Issue

AID's project design and project monitoring systems, while highly professional and effective in many of their substantive aspects, are reported by the 1984 evaluations to be impeding full realization of AID's institution building skills. In addition they have frustrated the timely achievement of numbers of projects' stated goals. The evaluations also show that problems of management and administration from overall direction to logistics and finance were, at the time of evaluation, hampering realization of project objectives.

4. The Sustainability Issue

While sustainability is a goal implicit in the institution building process, the 1984 evaluation reports suggest that AID is not yet pursuing this goal with sufficient diligence, seriousness of purpose or skill.

5. The Technology Transfer Issue

a. Agriculture

The 1984 reports reveal that many agricultural development projects aimed at effecting the adoption and use by small farmers of more productive modern cultivation practices are falling short of their goals. The increases in local, regional and national productivity and income envisioned in these projects are not being realized, despite the fact that the required technologies are available. In most countries the reason for this is that the delivery systems for technologies inputs are inadequate in reaching

the great majority of rural farm families. In some countries there is another reason: the cultivator deliberately and after due consideration declines to adopt the new technologies, even though the required physical inputs, and an extension service to deliver them, are available. There is speculation among AID technicians and evaluators as to why such farmers do not adopt new technology but no clear consensus as to the answer.

b. Health Services

Among the projects reported on in 1984, the delivery capabilities, the acceptance of new health technologies in rural areas, and community participation were found to be greater than in agriculture. However, securing acceptance of illness prevention measures on an equal priority level with curative services is proving difficult to achieve. It was also noted that in each case where the installation of potable water systems was the project objective, successfully achieved, consumption of potable water did not increase.

c. Family Planning Services

While acceptance of family planning practices continues to vary among societies, the 1984 project reports suggest that family planning services in the rural areas of a number of countries are enjoying levels of acceptance and community participation similar to primary health services.

d. Energy Conservation

The fuel-efficient stove had not, by the time of the 1984 evaluation reports, achieved notable "adoption" success. Despite the technical superiority of these new designs over the traditional, and their contributions to energy conservation and home improvement, they have not been found acceptable by the people. This is particularly in evidence in the African countries.

e. Employment Creation

Some rural regional agro-industrial projects successfully met their increased productivity goals but the increases in employment anticipated as a result of such success did not occur.

Among the five areas of technology transfer noted above the most serious problem is that encountered in the field of agricultural development -- the small farmers' inability or reluctance to adopt modern cultivation practices.

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

A. Purpose of the Study

The purpose of this study has been to analyze 308 AID 1984 Project Evaluation and Audit Reports in order to identify common problems and trends, and successes and failures shared among AID Missions and Offices around the world; to chart their incidence and, if possible, to explore their apparent causes, especially common explanations.

Few in AID have the opportunity to view the full panorama of the Agency's global role and performance across all sectors and continents. Those few, basically, are the Administrator, his immediate staff, and his Program and P Previous Page Blank Staff. Even they receive the full picture piecemeal, like a om here and there and at different points in time and place, often not illuminating the fortunes of AID's field forces so much as obscuring them.

This study is an interim attempt to provide an overview of AID at work in the developing world, produced in large part by the Agency's Missions, Offices & Bureaus themselves, through their own FY 1984 project evaluations. AID's project evaluation reports for FY1984 were written, as they normally are, for internal consumption and use; sometimes brutally self-critical; seldom self-conscious; almost always honest; as analytical as feasible, and intended to be used to identify ways to improve Mission -- and host country -- performance. Taken together, they permit an examination of issues and patterns that might not be as clear from individual reports.

B. Study Methodology

1. The Cases

During FY1984 AID's Office of Evaluation received 238 completed Project Evaluation Reports from the USAID Missions in Africa, Asia, the Near East

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and Latin America and the Caribbean, and 25 from AID/W's Bureau's for Science and Technology, Program and Policy Coordination, and Food for Peace and Voluntary Assistance that are also focused on the problems and needs of AID's field missions. The data base for this study, then, is these 263 Project Evaluation Reports received in AID/W in 1984, plus an additional 45 Inspector General's Project Audit Reports, also issued in FY1984. These are listed in Appendix D.

2. Data Management

The research and analysis approach was developed, first, by incorporating in the research design the requirements set forth in the "scope of work," attached to this report as Appendix A. Second, the research design was drafted by the principal and senior analysts in consultation with PPC/CDIE. The result was a decision to focus on four key issues: (1) Compatability of the Project with the Host Country's Environment; (2) Effectiveness of the Institutionalization and Human Resource Development Processes; (3) Principal Project Implementation Problems on both USAID and Host Country sides; and (4) Degree of Sustainability of the project after AID's support systems have been removed. Included in Appendix C is the Notetaking Form used by the principal analyst while reading and analyzing each evaluation report, and an example of the notes recorded on the schedule.

In addition, the analyst determined which of the "4 pillars" of AID's approach to development are reflected in each project's goals, objectives, and implementation strategies, as reflected in the evaluation reports and noted in Table 1, Appendix B.

3. Third Issue Expanded

It was found necessary in the course of the analysis to add to the third issue the element of adequacy of project design. It had been assumed that the important aspects of project design would be reflected in "Compatibility with Host Country Environment," but this proved to be inaccurate. Too many technical design flaws and too much disregard in project design for the problems of managing development projects surfaced to ignore design as a

crucial element. Attention in project design to the art of the possible, the science of timing, and the wisdom of choosing realistic objectives, while also allowing plenty of time for their accomplishment and being concerned about sustainability, proved to be too important not to assess. These factors were, therefore, examined together with the issue of implementation problems.

In the course of the analysis, a fifth issue emerged which came to be regarded as the most crucial of all. This is the effective achievement of technology transfer to the intended beneficiaries. The technologies that AID seeks to transfer include modern farming practices; health and family planning practices and knowledge and skills leading to employability. The question is: Are AID's projects in the developing countries achieving "adoption," by the intended beneficiaries, of those practices that have been designed to lead them from poverty into the market economy as profit making participants, and from disease, ignorance, and early death, to an acceptable quality of life? The study revealed enough cases in which such technology transfer is not being adequately effected to warrant inclusion of this issue as a focus for the research and analysis. In this case an item, as such, was not added to the notetaking form but the subject is covered in the notes and the text of the report.

To assist the research and analysis, the analyst developed a checklist and a rough measure of the degree to which the project was encountering difficulties related to the issues. In Appendix B to this report is Table 1 listing each USAID Mission project evaluation reviewed by sector, region, and country and showing how each project was rated on the principal issues. Incidence of the use of the "4 pillars" is also noted plus such identifying data as whether the assistance was grant or loan, whether the evaluation was interim or final and who performed it.

4. The Study Team

As indicated on the page following the title page, the Development Associates' Study Team was composed of staff members of Development

Associates and one consultant. The consultant and six of the Development Associates' staff have had extensive experience in the administration and evaluation of international development programs. The seventh corporate member is specialized in evaluation. The international development program management experience of Development Associates' staff members on the study team totals more than 150 person-years of experience as Directors of AID Missions and the Peace Corps, Assistant and Deputy Assistant Administrators of AID, Assistant and Deputy Assistant Secretaries of State and as Chief of U.S. Diplomatic Missions in developing countries.

The reading and analysis of the project evaluations was carried out by the study team's principal analyst, a four-time USAID Mission Director, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State and Deputy Assistant Administrator of AID, in continuous consultation with Development Associates' Vice President for International Activities, a former AID Assistant Administrator; and periodically with the consultant, a former chief of AID's Project Evaluation Program. In addition, the principal analyst conferred frequently with the PPC/CIDE project officer to make sure that the data being gleaned from the evaluations were those needed by AID and were being treated and presented in ways useful to AID.

The Advisory Panel was called upon first to provide guidance to the principal analyst during the course of his readings, and again to review and comment on the draft report before its submittal to Development Associates' President and Chairman, and thence to AID.

5. Limitations of This Study

Only the evaluations and audits issued in FY1984 were reviewed. No additional or supplementary data other than the 1984 evaluations and audits were used in formulating observations. It is possible that other AID experiences as reported in earlier or later evaluations differ from those reviewed. Such differing experiences would either have to be taken into account prior to reaching any conclusions affecting AID actions, or be regarded as exceptions to the norm, depending on the evidence.

CDSSs and National Development Plans were not reviewed. The study team did not have at its disposal these overall national economic development frameworks for placing the projects being reviewed in perspective. It was not the purpose of this study to determine from the evidence in the reports the extent for which the projects involved were meeting the aims of their respective USAID strategies or national development plan. Such an analysis would require a different approach. The evaluations are, of course, far from devoid of information about the larger scene, but the data they contain are not complete.

6. Introducing the Report

The study thus focused on learning, from the 1984 evaluation and audit reports, what the reports themselves say about the issues. This information is of two general kinds: first, what the evaluators saw as results at the time of the evaluation; and, second, how the evaluators explained these results.

CHAPTER I. OVERVIEW OF PRINCIPAL OBSERVATIONS

A. Geographic and Sectoral Composition of the 1984 Cases

Of the total of 263 evaluations, 227 were from 52 AID Missions in Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, and the Near East. Eleven were evaluations of regional projects in these 4 geographic areas, and 25 were from AID/W Bureaus: 16 from S&T, evaluating essentially basic, development-problem oriented research projects; 3 from PPC; and 6 from FVA evaluating selected PL 480 and PVO projects.

As can be seen from Table 1, some of the evaluations are interim and some final. Some were conducted by external consultants commissioned by AID, some were done by USAID, AID/W, or AID/Regional staff, and some involved evaluators from several of these sources plus host country participants. Most evaluations consist of a basic report freely structured and prepared by a formally designated "evaluation team," whether in-house, external or a mix, and a USAID Mission-prepared "Project Evaluation Summary" which summarizes the basic reports' main points in accordance with a standard AID format and concludes with a delineation of actions to be taken by the Mission, pursuant to the reports' recommendations. Most of the 238 reports received from the field consisted of both an external report and a Mission Project Evaluation Summary (PES). Some, however, consisted only of the external report and a few of only the PES.

In terms of geographic spread, 69 evaluations were received from USAID Missions and offices in Africa ; 59 from Asia; 77 from Latin America and the Caribbean; and 33 from the Near East.

B. The Projects and the Five Issues Against Which They Were Reviewed

As indicated in the Introduction, the analysis of the evaluations began by focusing its attention on four critical issues:

1. Compatability of the project with the host country environment.

2. Demonstrated institutional and human resource development capabilities.

3. Project implementation; the scope of this issue was expanded to include. adequacy of project design, especially as to the reality of goal definitions, output and time schedule projections, grass-roots constraints to goals attainment and underestimation of the capability of internal USAID forces to frustrate expeditious project implementation.

4. The degree of sustainability being built into the project.

The study team concluded after the analysis began that an additional factor would have to be added.

5. Technology transfer effectiveness in securing the adoption by the intended beneficiaries of the modern technologies prescribed by the experts, and explanations for relative effectiveness, where known.

Issue 1. Compatability with the Host Country Environment

Most projects reviewed appeared to have been developed in response to the host government's needs and expressed desires and in support of their development priorities, as reflected in their official plans. They appeared also to be substantially consistent with AID's basic goals and were, where appropriate, reflective, as well, of mutual U.S.-host country national interests. In this sense -- compatibility with the host governments' development program -- the AID projects reviewed can be accorded high marks. On the other hand, some projects' compatibility with their environments were less than congenial because local and regional cultural deviations from the national norm were not adequately taken into account either by AID or the host countries' planners in the capital city.

This crucial aspect of compatibility has to do with not infrequent situations where a host country's leadership, of whatever political nature and for however long in power, may not be fully familiar with the complexities of its own national culture(s), or else is not concerned with whether or not a particular development project is "compatible." So many new countries in the developing world are such complex mixes of numbers of different ethnic, language and other cultural characteristics that it is difficult for a sitting national government either to please all factions, or avoid taking steps that are offensive to some cultural groups within the society. Some governments are modern, "western"

oriented and are involved in a continual clash of values with the country's traditionalists. They may not be aware of the cultural and socio-economic implications of introducing even the simplest of modern, western practices. This is illustrated especially in some of the African and Near East countries (less so in Asia and Latin America). AID has entered into projects in the common belief with the host government that such projects will have a congenial, constructive environment in which to work, only to find out as the projects develop that this belief was unfounded.

Some of the issues which have proven difficult for AID Missions include: the use of land for grazing -- that is, for livestock raising vs. crop cultivation where opposing forces in the country are contending for control of the same land and the USAID finds itself, too late, on the wrong side or in the middle; in any case a victim of having inadvertently taken sides, raising among other things highly sensitive land tenure issues. In other cases, host government leaders have insisted on promoting major investments in irrigation because it is the modern and glamorous thing to do, yet sometimes questionable from an economic point of view, and even more so from the point of view of how much good an equal investment directly in assisting small dry land farmers (which is what most of the rural families are) could have accomplished.

The evaluations suggest several specific reasons, but what emerges from the reports is inadequate appreciation by both host governments and AID of the requirements of small producers and their context. The evaluators have persuasively described small farmers who have proved to be reluctant to adopt modern practices. They are intelligent, however illiterate. They are not so much "conservative" as "minimizers of risk." They have learned to their satisfaction that minimizing risk is the soundest of the alternatives open to them as they develop their unwritten annual farm plans. This is a positive choice, not a negative holding back. If a farmer thought that the best way to minimize risk would be to adopt all or part of a modern technological package, he or she would do it. Farmers are well aware of the risks of the market as well as those closer to home. They do not buy the premise, held by some, that the expert who comes from the Ministry or the Bank possesses more knowledge than they and their fellow farmers do about their farms, and that those who

follow the experts' advice will invariably fare better than those who do not. They would like to share what they know with what the experts know about minimizing risk. They might even consider the concept of maximizing opportunity if they could be persuaded it was not too risky, taking equally into account what both they and the experts know.

Another set of explanations in the evaluation reports, closely related to insufficient background information about conditions in the policies area, is the undesirability of undertaking to help just one producer group in an "eco-system" having several delicately balanced producer groups. Pursuing the interests of one group alone, e.g., insisting on the reserving of extensive lands for grazing as the only means for feeding livestock at the expense of cultivators can lead, unnecessarily, to trouble. The interests of all in an "eco-system" should be respected. A related factor is that growth that yields income producing power and new wealth invariably brings with it a struggle among the participants for control over them.

Other examples of non-compatibility at the local level include the failure of program planners at the national level to understand the needs and preferences of people in the villages in the area of cooking and heating stove design and performance. No energy conservation project involving fuel-efficient stoves that was reviewed could report acceptance of the new designs developed at a national center or imported. Likewise, it was reported from Senegal that efforts to introduce solar fish dryers failed due to their non-acceptability to the intended users.

Still other examples of project design failing acceptance at the local level have been efforts to persuade villagers to grow stands of trees for fuel on the village outskirts, in lieu of growing fruit trees. Villagers prefer their fruit trees. Likewise, the introduction of "clean fallow" practices, in which just harvested plots are cleaned and let lie fallow, failed in three Near East-North Africa countries because the farmers prefer to leave the residue from the last crop for their animals. Two key points were overlooked here: (1) the farmers' animals are highly valued and carefully maintained; and (2)

buying feed equivalent to that destroyed in the "clean fallow" process would be prohibitively expensive. In other words, as the cultivator sees it, higher grain yields per se are not everything.

In the health field the 1984 evaluation reports show that a national primary health care program has to deal very sensitively with the issue of preventive versus curative care. Though the preventive health objectives may be deemed paramount, their pursuit may never be given a chance if curative care demands are rejected and the community responds by rejecting the whole program.

Issue 2. Institutional and Human Resources Development Capabilities

The substance of the reports reveals a strong and prevailing acceptance by AID of the central importance of "institution building." The unanimity of views expressed in the reports that the proper role of a USAID program is institution building and that project-related training is an integral part of the process, along with hands-on technical assistance, was impressive. AID contract teams appear to share the same conviction. It is clear also from the reports that host countries and institutions respond favorably to the institution building approach.

Morocco's Agronomic Institute, an institution of higher education in the agricultural and veterinary sciences, is a case in point. It is dedicated to becoming an institution of excellence by world standards. The University of Minnesota is equally dedicated to this end. It is providing technical assistance to the Institute in Morocco and is providing an intensive participant training program for Moroccan faculty, using other U.S. universities as well, with a view to the Institute becoming fully staffed by Moroccans and self-sustaining as soon as possible.

Another example is FOMSCU, the Faculty of Medicine of the Suez Canal University, which is performing in the Suez Canal area, in the field of health, the equivalent of the agricultural programs of the U.S. land grant universities -- training, research, and extension. Boston University is collaborating effectively in helping to make this faculty of medicine's health, training research and service program independently successful as soon as possible.

The 1984 evaluation reports identified several cases where U.S.-collaborating institutions were not as fully convinced that institution building (other than their own) should be the central goal, but they are clearly in the minority. Likewise, technical assistance entities other than universities appear to be increasingly convinced of the importance of, and adept at, institution building.

Issue 3. Project Design and Implementation Problems

a. Design

On the other hand, AID's project design and management systems appear to have evolved in ways that impede the full realization of the promise of AID's institution building convictions and skills. First, project designs do not allow the time necessary for successful institution building, whether what is involved is creating new structures, or additions, or the strengthening of existing institutions. From the 1984 reports, Missions appeared to feel that for projects proposed to last for say, six years, the Mission must demonstrate that this is not excessive. Less than six years is frequently too short a time to allow for successful completion of an institution building project of average size and complexity. Many of the evaluation reports, which on the average covered projects designed for four years, starting in 1980 to 1982, reflected the frustration of the time squeeze that so short an LOP period invokes.

The tendency to regard a project paper (PP) as inviolable once approved further impedes the institution-building process by making mid-course adjustments difficult. Numbers of the 1984 reports described situations where sensible proposals by the host country project staff to alter or add to a project were rejected by the Mission's top program managers because "it is not within the scope of the PP." There are instances where such proposed changes were not only constructive but were required by changing circumstances, yet could not be accommodated because of not being sanctionable under a PP-approved two to four years ago, and written two years prior to that based on data already then several years old. Such an approach is clearly counter-productive, judged by any reasonable standard of sound management.

The evaluation reports, including the accompanying USAID statement in the PES of actions to be taken based on the evaluation, suggest that premature closure of projects may accentuate and reinforce the tendency noted above to limit project life to too short a time span. In addition to the initial error of estimating that institution-building objective can be accomplished in a shorter time than is actually possible, evaluators noted strong feelings above the technician level in Mission management that PACD dates should be adhered to as rigidly as possible and, in fact, have a higher priority than the concept of finished work. While PACD's are often moved forward six months or possibly a year, this is normally done in recognition of the fact that the project actually became operational a year or more after the date specified in the PP with an extension required to complete such key aspects of the project as:

- Clearing the pipeline;
- Covering the tardy return home of participants; and
- Permitting the completion of scheduled in-country technical assistance and local training activities that had also had a late start. The flavor of these extensions according to the evaluators and as reflected in PESs seemed to be "let's give the project the minimum amount of time essential to its being closed out gracefully." Significant sentiment at the decision making level for considering the lengthening of expiring projects so that they might come closer to achieving the goals and purposes orginally sought was seldom noted.

An example of a project reflecting this position on PP modifications is that of the agricultural research and extension project in Zambia where, according to the evaluators, the USAID exercises tight control over contractors' (University of Illinois) activities invoking the PP to impede what the contractors and the host institution are seeing ever more clearly needs to be done: focus on the extension of new technologies to the small farm level. Another such illustration is the case of the Action Riz-Sorgho project in Mali where supplemental irrigation was identified in mid-project as an important addition to the project but was not supported by the USAID because it "was not in the scope of the project paper."

Related to the above is the disposition of some USAIDs to close projects abruptly at PACD, in order to express displeasure with host institution

performance. A fundamental aspect of the institution building process is that the performance of the institution being built can at times be disappointing. At such times the talents, skills and patience of USAID technical assistance teams are put to the test. It is true, of course, that sometimes the situation may turn so sour that to cut one's losses is the only thing to do. However, cutting back projects peremptorily because host performance has not, over the short run, measured up to the mark may be unproductive. As one external evaluator said under such circumstances: "weaknesses in developing country programs should be viewed by AID Missions as problem situations that they, the Missions, should set out to improve, not punish."

The 1984 evaluations suggest another area in which AID's project design capabilities might well be improved to good effect. The experiences described in the evaluation reports heighten what AID already knows but has apparently been slow to act upon -- social and physical scientists have to work together and the latter should listen to the former carefully if socio-economic and cultural pitfalls are to be avoided. Societies and cultures are so different and so internally complex that to try to design projects without sociologists or social anthropologists is foolhardy. AID's motto in these cases ought to be "don't leave home without one."

The above critical comments should not be so construed as to obscure the high quality, overall, of AID's project design capabilities. They are clearly of a high professional quality and improving. Nor should project designers be blamed for restrictions put upon them by the Congress regarding, for example, the length of projects. It has often happened, reading between the lines of the evaluation reports, that goals, inputs, outputs and EOP projections have been soundly designed initially from the viewpoint of <u>what</u> is needed to address the development problem or move the necessary machinery into action. However, a time limitation straightjacket is then imposed but the goals, inputs, outputs and EOP projections are not correspondingly changed. Why? Because, were such objectives cut back to what can practically be accomplished in the short time allowed, the question

could be raised as to whether so modest an attack on the problem would be worth it. Hence, it is desirable for projections and goals to remain, but the time allowed makes their accomplishment unrealistic.

b. Implementation

Administrative, legal and fiscal impediments to timely project implementation further aggravate the problem for projects' technical managers and staffs. Overall constraints on project length not only fail to take into account the nature of the institution building process. They also fail to recognize that the project implementation timetables set forth in the design, while theoretically feasible, do not reflect the almost universal AID experience with delays that affect implementation. While AID has taken recent steps to tackle the causes of some of these delays (e.g., delegation to the field of project approval, longer projects, and implementation training), the results were not yet evident from the 1984 evaluation reports reviewed. Thus, the reports noted the usual litany of delaying factors: (1) lengthy PP approval process; (2) protracted grant and loan agreement negotiations; (3) time required for grantees and borrowers to meet conditions precedent, sometimes due to AID imposed conditions that are unduly restrictive or otherwise inappropriate; (4) lengthy technical assistance contract negotiations; and (5) slow procurement of equipment, supplies and construction. Such delays can cut in half the actual "working time" available for an already too short project. While, when this happens, the PACD is often extended for long enough to utilize obligated funds, the damage to the professional and technical quality of the project has already been done.

Once conditions precedent have been met, the administrative and fiscal management staffs: executive office, procurement, contracts and controller, along with the concerned substantive technicians have their opportunity to advance the progress of the project. The PP and the log-frame have clearly laid out the steps to be taken and have provided a timetable. Most important are the consummation of technical assistance contracts, the setting in motion of the participant training program and the procurement of

equipment and supplies. Participant training activities should be begun as soon as there is an approved PID since normally one of the most important aspects of such training is the timely installation of returned participants to posts in the host institution as counterparts to the foreign technicians while they are still there, and ultimately as their replacements. Yet, the evaluation reports still noted cases where despite the customary slowness in contracting foreign technicians, all the technicians had gone home before many of the participants had returned from training abroad.

In general, both the contracting for technicians and the selection and sending of participants abroad fall behind schedule. The reports did not discuss the reasons, but the usual explanations included: it is difficult to persuade competent U.S. contracting institutions to come to final terms; and selecting the right participants requires special care and time, which is exacerbated by the need for some to study English before taking up their professional studies.

Delays in procurement were commonly reported. One mitigating factor is that much of the off-shore procurement is laid on for the start and early stages of the project, keyed to the arrival of the technicians who know how to use it -- so that if the technicians are late it does not matter so much that the equipment is also late. The damage, however, lies in that the two late arrivals together crowd the technicians and the project as a whole against a rigid PACD.

Another mitigating factor in the off-shore procurement of supplies and equipment, noted in the evaluations, is that when the USAID has, itself, been accorded procurement responsibility, undue delays are not so often experienced. The serious problems occur when the grantee or borrower has procurement action and has to effect such action following the rules and regulations of two governments, which are sometimes contradictory. This applies both to the purchase of things and to the procurement of construction. In both cases, but particularly the latter, host governments sometimes have serious difficulties in meeting USAID requirements for disbursement of project funds. USAIDs reimburse, normally, after the fact.

The host government incurs the expense, pays the bills and submits its documentation for reimbursement to USAID's Controllers who do not always readily find the documentation adequate. This natural though frustrating situation has been eased (that is, reimbursement speeded) where USAID Controllers have undertaken to provide technical assistance in documentation preparation to host institutions.

Issue 4. Sustainability

Although ultimate self-perpetuation of the program begun with AID assistance is one of the elements of AID's institution building concept, the weight of the evidence from the 238 Mission evaluation reports suggest that this goal is not yet being pursued with adequate diligence, seriousness of purpose or by means of clear enough criteria, neither while projects are in progress or close to termination.

Specific examples from the evaluation reports of projects whose sustainability is in doubt include: (78) Bicol Integrated Health Nutrition and Population in the Philippines; (4) Rural Blindness Prevention, Kenya; (222) Small Rural Water Systems, Yemen; (131) Health Sector Loans, Dominican Republic; (144) Integrated Rural Health Delivery Systems, Ecuador; (161) Health and Nutrition Systems, Guatemala; (148) Rural Water and Sanitation, Honduras; (188) Potable Water, Bolivia; (206) Basic Village Services, Egypt; (216) Development Decentralization I, Egypt; (219) Urban Development, Egypt; (232) Community Based R.D., Tunisia; (43) Renewable Energy, Senegal; (18) Renewable Energy, Lesotho; (226) Center for Renewable Energy Development, Morocco; (118), (123) (122) Far Western Hills Road, Nepal; (150) Rural Trails and Access Roads, Honduras; (209) Alliance for Engineering Cooperation, Egypt; (29) Rural Information Systems, Liberia; (14) Rural Human Resources Development, Niger: (119) the Magazine Show, Nepal; (137) Education Sector Loan, Dominican Republic; (129) Human Resources Development, Dominican Republic; (177) Manpower Planning, Training and Employment, Jamaica; (162) Community Education, Guatemala.

AID's ability to build institutions and to ensure that its projects may achieve permanence and grow stronger after external assistance ends is hampered by a special family of management problems that were highlighted by many of the evaluations. The first of these is the "turnover" family of factors.

Changes, in USAID project managers, chiefs of party and national project directors are, of course, natural over time and are normally effected with such concern for the project's welfare that, on balance, they are a part of the constructive institutional growth process. On the other hand, too rapid or untimely changes in mission directors, deputy mission directors and supervisory sector chiefs, generally for reasons unrelated to a specific project, can sometimes profoundly affect a project's health and its progress toward sustainability for better or for worse. Also, turnover at analogous levels on the host country side: Ministers, Deputy Ministers and Sector Chiefs can similarly affect the fate of a project. When ministers and mission directors, and to a lesser extent the other principals noted, change, the priorities in the development programs, individual projects may change. As a result, some projects that had had high hopes of achieving sustainability when they were among the then ministers and/or the director's top priorities may sometimes be weakened and their sustainability threatened by the lesser interest of their replacements. USAID mission directors by definition, and normally, ministers as well, have great latitude to conceptualize, design and construct their own programs so that the chances of there being changes in priorities are substantial, with the inevitable result that some projects in the USAID portfolio are bound to suffer, while others will gain. If changes in mission and ministry direction are too frequent, and they often are, the effect will be not simply one of some projects gaining at the expense of others, but a net negative effect on development program (projects in the aggregate) institution building and sustainability.

Other related factors reported on in the evaluations that affect both the institutionalization process and ultimate sustainability include: the degree to which the USAID Project Manager and his program and capital

assistance colleagues effectively monitor the project. Practice in this respect varies widely, from close supervision to hands-off. Almost all evaluations touched on this issue, and a strong consensus emerged to the effect that close USAID collaboration on a positive, constructive basis is strongly preferable to a hands-off posture. In fact, the difficulties of some projects in trouble were attributed by the evaluators directly to inadequate USAID attention, involvement, and assistance.

Another problem that the evaluations reflected and that warrants further study is the method for selecting and monitoring the work of the contractor's "chief of party." In a number of cases, the selection and subsequent performance of this key individual was crucial to project performance which ran the gamut from excellent to poor. It has often taken months to select a chief of party satisfactory to the host country, AID and the contractor. Then, too often, this first selectee has been found within the first year to be inadequately qualified, either professionally or by temperament, and has had to be replaced. In one case, the entire project, a research and training center, was closed down completely for two months because of a clash between the chief of party and the host country's project director.

The evaluation reports, themselves, do not focus sufficiently on the issue of sustainability. In final evaluations, input, output, and EOP projections are usually compared with the actual results, which generally fall short of original estimates but may be judged as sufficient to pronounce the project a success, suggesting that the original goals were unrealistic. In interim evaluations, progress toward project independence in maturity is infrequently addressed. There is always the implicit assumption that something both new and permanent is being added, but what this means and what it would require to gauge sustainability while there is still time to act decisively are not systematically studied in these reports.

Issue 5. Technology Transfer

The effectiveness of technology transfer was not initially selected as a key issue. Once into its review of the evaluation reports, however, the study

team found that the issue was inescapable given the patterns emerging from the reading. Specifically, agricultural technicians are still having difficulty in securing acceptance of, and use by, small farmers of proven modern technological practices, notably those relating to increased basic grains production. The problem was a particularly serious one in the project evaluations in Africa and the Near East, in the countries of South America with large Indian populations, and in Central America. Another way of stating the problem is that many among AID's principal target population in the countries covered by the reports, namely, the poor rural families who farm as sharecroppers or are cultivators of their own tiny plots, are not adopting the available modern packages of technology that could substantially increase their productivity and incomes. These rural families typically constitute 60%-75% of these countries' total population, and are defined as the project's chief beneficiaries not only for increased food and fibre production, but also for health, nutrition, education and family planning programs.

Of the two principal clusters of technologies intended for "transfer" -- (1) those in agriculture; and (2) those in health, nutrition and family planning -- the problems of transfer failure were reported to be more serious in agriculture than in the health-related fields. In the case of the latter, in fact, there emerged a pattern among the regions of new methods acceptance, built around the primary health care approach. Such acceptance and adoption of modern practices is attributed in the evaluation reports to several key factors: one is the acceptance and use by host institutions of the health care worker (HCW) at the village level as the linch-pin of the program. Closely related is the adoption and use of the community or village health committee (CHC) to whom the HCW "reports." Thousands of HCWs are employed, full and part-time, in the health care activities. Some are volunteers, some are paid by the community and some by the host government. All are trained to do basic health work and, by and large, are warmly supported by the members of the community who participate through their local committees. One area of weakness, however, that appears to be a widespread problem within a pattern of success is the difficulty that HCWs and thus CHCs are having in getting people to give sufficient recognition to

preventive health measures. In principal, theory, and logic, prevention should have higher priority than curative activities, and it does in the programs' manuals. But among the people, the demand for curative services -- even at the expense of preventive programs -- remains very strong. In a word, the people as a whole value the HCW more for their ability to deal with illness through the medicines available to them than for their preventive health capabilities. Some program managers severely decry this, urging that HCWs be strictly limited to prevention activities. Wiser program administrators, however, suggest that HCWs be permitted to respond, within reason, to the public demand for curative services in order to build good will toward the longer-term effectiveness of environmental and preventive health measures.

There are two other areas related to health where technology transfer may be facing obstacles. One is the mystery of why potable water consumption did not increase, in the two projects reviewed for this report, when new safe water supply systems were installed. The only explanation given in the two evaluation reports was that perhaps the habit of using drinkable water frugally has become so ingrained that it has carried over, despite an entirely new supply side to the demand supply equation. The second area where a health-related effort has encountered obstacles to technology transfer is the fuel-efficient cooking stove. Several countries represented in the 1984 evaluations have programs to replace the traditional stove with an efficient, healthful one. None in this group, however, had yet achieved acceptance of the newly designed stoves.

In agriculture, the gap between available technologies and their acceptance and use by small farmers is one of seriously large proportions and difficult to understand. The several aspects of the problem that are clear do not yet add up to explanations or solutions. For example, the most importantly needed technologies are available for adaptation to given country situations and the necessary adaptive research techniques are also readily available. The most important cluster of agricultural technologies involved are those having to do with the cultivation of basic grains in dry land farming, rain-fed situations, which is that of most of AID's targeted populations.

The International Agricultural Research Centers have, in the basic grains area, built their successful programs for developing high yield varieties around the needs of the dry land, rain-fed basic grains farms. Thus, there can thus be no question as to the quality, appropriateness or applicability of the "technological packages" available.

From the information in the 1984 evaluations, however, there appear to be two, possibly three, basic categories of circumstances in which such technological packages are not being put to use. They are: first, the category of farmers who know that higher yielding varieties are available, requiring new cultivation practices and new investment formulae while promising higher income. After due consideration, however, they choose not to adopt the new technology. They opt instead to continue with traditional inputs and methods.

Second, is the category of farmers who also are aware of the newly available high-yielding varieties and who would like to try them but cannot because the technical assistance (extension services) they need in order to learn how to use the new varieties is not available. In some cases, even where the technical assistance <u>is</u> available the needed physical inputs -- seeds, fertilizer, insecticides, pesticides, and credit -- are not. There may be a third category of farmers who are as yet unaware of the availability of the new technologies. The evaluations suggest that this may be the case in the Indian highlands of some South American countries and in some African countries.

In the case of the first category the blockage to technology transfer appears to be an intellectual impasse that the modern technologists have not yet discovered how to overcome. The farmers concerned are deliberate risk minimizers and nothing the modern technologists have demonstrated is sufficient to satisfy them that the extra investment required to modernize is worth the risk.

In the case of the second category, the problem is in part a bureaucratic and budgetary one -- not enough funds to finance an adequate "extension

service." Note the difference here between the willingness of the health "system" to finance Health Care Workers (health extension agents) and the unwillingness of the agriculture "system" to finance enough extensionists in the agriculture field. Nothing like the community cooperation and participation that has occurred in health programs has occurred in agriculture.

In this connection there would appear, from the information in the evaluation reports, to be at least two special North American contributions to the ineffectiveness and inadequacy of the extension services needed to make the transfer of agricultural technologies work. The first is that the U.S. extension service system has been represented as, or has been permitted to be represented as, a model for the developing countries. Those countries that have tried it have found it too expensive a model, assuming too much endemic small farmer sophistication, and also assuming the existence of media infrastructures that do not exist in the developing countries. It has not taken long for the countries that have tried the U.S. extension service model to realize that its costs are prohibitive, but they have not as yet developed viable alternatives.

A second North American contribution to frustrating the application of proven research results is the proclivity of the principal players, U.S. agricultural experts, to move the venue of the research-extension jurisdictional dispute to the developing world. Cases in the 1984 evaluation reports illustrate that the turf battle between research and extension is being transferred abroad. For example, evaluators in Cameroon admonished their clients not to let research scientists become involved in extending the results of their research "too far" into the farm community because "extension of research results" is the rightful province of the extension service.

The International Agricultural Research Centers have long practiced the principle that researchers should conduct their research in concert with small farmers and both teach them, and learn from them, in the process. In essence, their view is that research, extension and experimentation

involving researchers, farmers, and extensionists should constitute a continuum whose end product is both improved varieties and sophisticated farmers well versed in the uses of modern practices. This is brought out clearly in the evaluation of the Four Wheat Production Projects (237) in the Near East and North Africa.

In practice, however, no project in the 1984 group evidenced a trend in this direction in any specific country situation. Thus, the impasse persists: the technology is there but is not getting across, either for bureaucratic reasons or failure of the scientists to have convinced the practitioners to adopt appropriate modern technologies.

There are two exceptions to the above. One is those cases in which the research teams have conducted usually adaptive research in cooperation with groups of small farmers on their farms. They have found that the cooperating farmers, once personally involved, readily converted to the new varieties and methods and became active, positive participants in the search for still greater yields using their own knowledge as inputs additional to those of the scientists. The problem here, however, is that the outreach capabilities of such research teams are severely limited.

The other exception is those instances where PVOs are the projects' sponsors. PVOs tend to secure "adoptions" of new technologies by farmers within the purview of their relatively small projects, they say, because they have been able to gain the confidence of their clientele through close personal contact. The evaluations of the PVO projects tend to bear this out, suggesting that PVOs can effectively introduce and gain acceptance of new technologies among those with whom they work directly. Two good examples of this are the Save the Children Federation project, the "Community-Based Integrated Rural Development" in Nepal and the Pan American Development Foundation project, "Agroforestry Outreach," in Haiti. However these exceptions while interesting are not particularly helpful either since no way has yet been found to multiply a PVO project's success beyond its own immediate scope of the particular PVO project.

C. Incidence of "Pillars" Addressed among the 1984 Project Evaluations

For each project evaluation reviewed, a check was made of the AID "pillars" it addressed, providing an indication for whether or not one or more aspects of the four pillars were directly or indirectly addressed. The resulting "score" is posted in Table 1. It essentially shows what would be expected: (1) almost all projects have technology transfer and institution building goals, (2) a lesser number addressed the private sector, and (3) few projects reflected a policy dialogue approach.

With respect to "policy dialogue," it was not (and probably should not be) anticipated that such evidence would be reflected in the evaluation reports. These reports are more worms' than birds' eye views of the project about which they are reporting. Even ministers of substantive technical ministries may not be expected to engage individually and independently in discussions regarding overall national development policy with external aid agencies or foreign governments. They may, however, serve as advisers to principal policy spokesmen who are normally the prime minister and the Ministers of Finance and Planning (and/or their equivalents). By the same token, the role of the Mission director in the initiation and guidance of projects is not revealed in these evaluation reports. In short, a Mission's policy dialogue with the host government, in terms of AID projects' relation to and place within the framework of the country development program, may well have been lively, continuous and effective, but this is not likely to be reflected in the project evaluation reports.

D. National, Regional and Other Differences

Thus far in this report the discussion has focused on five selected issues of AID program management, applied in common to 238 projects in 52 countries. Implicit in this approach has been the assumption that generalizations can be made about such selected issues even though the 52 countries involved differ widely in many respects. This assumption has, in the opinion of the study team, been shown to be sound. Justifiable observations were made on sectoral and technological bases, across the full spectrum of the 52 countries and 4

regions. Conducting the study on an essentially sectoral basis was instrumental in making this possible.

On the other hand, the study has also provided an opportunity to identify national and regional differences which, while not a focus of the study, revealed themselves in the reading of the full sweep of the field reports. In some cases the differences noted were interesting. In other cases they were of significant importance especially in terms of AID's need to understand what differing country situations and unique regional characteristics may require in the way of different approaches to country program planning at national, sectoral and specific project levels. Most of all, the differences encountered in the study should help AID program designers to understand better what can be expected, and what should not be expected of particular host countries and their institutions.

Seen from a sectoral viewpoint, there are two fundamental distinctions among the 52 country programs, one reflecting regional differences and the other differences in stages of development. To an important extent these categories of differences are significantly correlated, but of the two, the latter may well be the more significant. For example, Yemen emerged more like Bolivia, Honduras or Haiti than like any other Near East country, in relation to its capability to absorb new technologies.

On the other hand, Morocco, Tunisia, Turkey, Egypt and Jordan have in common a relatively advanced level of development, with Jordan and Morocco somewhat less advanced. The Asian countries have uniformly achieved high levels of development in recent years, the number of AID graduates in Asia being one reflection of this. Except for the Philippines, those Asian nations still receiving U.S. aid appear to be no less developed than the "graduates" but remain in a cooperative relationship with the U.S. because, in each case, they have had to deal with one or more uniquely typical and hopefully short-term problems that, added to the normal press of development demands on resources, has made it difficult for the country both to deal with these problems and at the same time maintain a desirable pace of development. Thailand and its burdens of refugee care and border insecurities is an example. Indonesia

remains an AID-assisted country not because its level of socio-economic development capabilities is inferior to its neighbors but because its problems are so huge -- the population and its growth rate so high and the resource potential so great that local resources alone cannot yet cover all the capital or intellectual costs of development.

The African countries tend to be among the least developed. They are, in fact, preponderantly so. Yet there are exceptions that make some African countries more like Latin American nations, from a development perspective than like other African countries. AID functions only in the poorer Latin American/ Caribbean countries, placing these countries' progress somewhere between the advanced Asian countries and the poorer countries of Africa in terms of their stage of development.

Thus, it is possible to make several joint geographic-stage-of-development summary generalizations as follows:

1. The Asian countries, by and large, are advanced institutionally and in terms of human resources capabilities. AID programs with any Asian country, with the possible exception of the Philippines, need to take into account the strong institutional and human resources bases that already exist there. This reality gave rise to many comments in the evaluation reports as to the importance of AID's sending to Asia technical assistance specialists whose professional qualifications are at least as good as those of the local technicians, implying that this is not always easy.

2. The North African and some of the Near Eastern countries, notably Egypt, resemble at a somewhat lower level the advanced Asian countries in the growing adequacy of their institutional and human resources for development. The evaluation reports also noted a special factor in the case of Egypt, but perhaps applicable elsewhere. It is the widely-held Egyptian view that its own scientists and technologists are sufficient in quantity and quality to render minimal Egypt's needs for external technical assistance. The Egyptian evaluation reports suggest that AID's evaluators were not necessarily in disagreement with this assessment.

3. AID projects in Africa tend to reflect the early stages of development at which most of these countries are at present. Such projects have several interesting characteristics. One is that they resemble earlier AID projects in the Near East, Asia, and Latin America when these regions were at earlier stages of development. Another is that AID projects tend to be well received and elicit ready collaborators making up in cooperative attitude what they may lack in skills. A third is that as is to be expected, first step technology African projects tend to achieve visible results sooner than do the more sophisticated projects in Asia. The very active projects in primary health care and in family planning, especially the success of home visits by VHCs and family planning staff are good examples of these characteristics of African projects.

Africa is also the region most in need of its own green revolution -- in basic grains productivity -- probably trying the hardest and yet not thus far succeeding in securing adoption of the technologies whose effective use could alleviate the world's most severe food shortage crises.

Projects in Africa also reflect the influence of many of the countries transformation from colonial status to independence. While institutional heritages have been found normally to be a plus, providing foundations on which to build development projects, the extent to which expatriates are still being relied upon to operate public sector institutions has proven to be a problem that has had to be made the object of special human resources development projects. Expatriates are retiring or leaving faster than adequate replacements can be trained. Hence, the special use being made of the OPEX system whereby third country nationals are employed by the host country, using a mix of their own and USAID funds to fill jobs essential to development, while their own personnel are sent abroad for appropriate training preparatory to taking over from the expatriates. This system has been especially useful in the three former British Protectorates: Botswana, Swaziland and Lesotho.

If one were to try to identify, from the information in the 1984 evaluations, which African countries appear to warrant special recognition

for having moved impressively up the development ladder, they would probably be: Kenya, Senegal, Zambia, Cameroon and the former British Protectorates: Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland.

Judging by the incidence of countries represented among the 1984 cases studied, Latin America, while unique for many reasons, conforms more closely to the Asian pattern than to those of the other two regions. First is the significance of the number of countries not included among AID's country programs. As in Asia, most South American countries are AID graduates.

The only South American countries reported in the 1984 reports, and the only countries of South America in which AID has programs are Peru, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Paraguay. The main characteristic that the first three of these countries hold in common, along with Guatemala, is that their indigenous Indians' populations are an undigested majority of the national population. The Indian culture has not been assimilated and they live on the fringes of the money economy. They also form the bulk of each nation's cultivators of basic grains. They are, therefore, both for this reason, and because of their ethnic ostracism, the literal "critically poor majority" in each of the three countries. On the other hand, two of the three countries, Peru and Ecuador, have superimposed modern urban societies and economies as sophisticated as those of their middle-income neighbors. It is clear that they would be fully middle income countries, too, if they did not have this common overwhelming problem that they cannot solve without temporary assistance from external sources.

Thus, in dealing with these South American countries, it appears that AID is viewing its relationship with the sophisticated governments and institutions of Peru and Ecuador, as it was suggested earlier, they have come to view the AID relationship with the advanced Asian countries. For example, in Ecuador two 1984 regional agricultural development projects were reviewed which, while focused on technology transfer at the point where the project meets the former, had AID and its contract staff helping more with the institutionalization of the process. The goal was to experiment in several regions, the experiment headed by the national agency responsible for ultimate country-wide coverage. Here, too, securing adoption of modern practices by the campesinos was an

elusive problem but the Ecuadorians believed that they might, themselves, with their own excellent technicians who also know the peculiar Indian cultures, do a better job. They were therefore relying on AID and its contract experts to help build the "system" -- looking toward national coverage and the ultimate achievement of national food production goals.

Bolivia remains the poorest and least technically advanced country in Spanish America. In Paraguay AID's assistance effort is limited to small farm technology experiments and a grants program supportive of human rights. The other countries in the LAC region represented in the 1984 evaluation reports are all the Caribbean and Central American countries except Nicaragua. These reports reflect that among these countries Costa Rica, Panama and the Dominican Republic are the more advanced, having substantially complex and ambitious development programs. They appear comparable in level of development to Peru and Ecuador and to the median level of rapidly developing countries in Asia and the Near East.

The Caribbean countries (minus the Dominican Republic), and the balance of the Central American countries appear from the nature of the projects reported, to be at stages of development comparable with the more advanced African countries and the lesser advanced countries of the Near East and North Africa.

It has been noted that working with the more advanced developing countries appears to call for different kinds of USAID projects than were once the general standard and still are in countries at the early stages of economic and social growth. The Asian, Near Eastern, North African, and Latin American projects reviewed were, by and large, less directly grass-roots oriented and more related to infrastructure institution building and to development process strengthening, involving networks of institutions. One particularly noteworthy trend in this connection has been the increasing involvement of AID in the management of development programs rather than in their substantive technologies. The Asian and Mediterranean countries, for example, some of whom believe they already have enough pure professional and scientific personnel, still readily recognize their shortcomings in management skills. Thus, in some countries, Egypt being one, the principal central host country interest in,

say, agriculture, is not so much in the technologies thereof, but in how to run an efficient Ministry of Agriculture -- and the other key institutions there that are well staffed professionally, but poorly managed.

Another related trend with respect to the more rapidly developing countries is the shared proclivity of the host country and the USAID to focus the project on key infrastructure institutions, especially educational institutions such as universities and their major schools and departments, and on both basic and applied research that can, in the long run, free the country from excessive dependence on: (1) the use of educational and training facilities abroad; (2) the use of imported technical consultants, and (3) the importation of research results and researchers.

One consequence of these changing AID relationships with more advanced host countries is that AID will in these countries be likely to be progressively further removed from projects involving direct contact with one of its principal target groups: the small subsistance farm family. It will thus be increasingly difficult, in these countries, to measure the impact of AID's efforts on the incomes and living standards of this targeted group. This is not a criticism nor is it to suggest that the situation ought to be otherwise. AID's impact, however obscure to the naked eye, can be all the greater. AID programs in the more advanced countries appear to be moving toward a new kind of macro approach that, assuming the technologies at the grass-roots level are successfully being made effective, can greatly increase the speed with which absolute poverty can be eradicated and relative poverty significantly mitigated. Evidence of this from the 1984 evaluation reports is substantial. Of 75 projects reviewed in the agricultural sector 18 were focused on increasing the productivity of small cultivators of basic grains. These were, of course, highly important project evaluations since they revealed a blockage in technology transfer at the most crucial point in the process. A related fact of some significance is that, with one exception, the incidence of these 18 grass-roots level projects was entirely among the poorest, least developed countries, mostly African but including also two Near East countries and one in Latin America. The 57 remaining AID projects in agriculture were one or more steps removed from the problem of seeking directly to persuade and to help small farmers to adopt modern practices.

This is not to say that in the countries represented among these 57 projects the basic technology transfer problem has been solved. The available evidence permits only the observation that in these primarily more advanced countries AID has been asked to do other things, instead, in agriculture. These countries either believe they have the problem in hand, or are using other external assistance resources to deal with it; or have other priorities in agriculture that preclude special attention to the subsistence farmer.

CHAPTER II. SECTOR OBSERVATIONS

A. Introduction

1. Sector Designations

The analyst was pragmatic in defining a "sector" as a technical subject matter area about which generalizations and comparisons can be made. "Agriculture" is a subject matter area in which the focus is on the application of the agricultural sciences to development where like projects can be compared. "Local and Regional Development," and "Integrated Rural Development" are separate "sectors" in this sense, unless the hard core of a particular such project is agriculture. On the other hand, "Rural Development," a rubric that could cover all three, was not considered a "sector."

Thus, in this report, agriculture is a sector and local and regional development is a separate sector. This is spelled out in the breakdown of subjects in the table of contents which was composed, literally, by putting the evaluation reports on like projects in separate piles and giving each pile the appropriate "sector" heading. In contrast to agriculture, which has had to stand alone, health, nutrition and family planning were normally so interrelated in actual developing country practice that they form, for this report, one sector category with the sub-sectoral differences among the three duly noted in the text. For similarly pragmatic reasons, projects in education and participant training, where the participant training function is the sole focus of the project, and like human resource development projects, are included in one sector category: "Human Resources Development."

2. Limitations on the Observations

It is obvious that this breakdown of projects into "sectors" is not likely to correspond with AID's overall program by subject area, or the mix of projects of any particular mission, since the projects being reported on are only those for which evaluations were received in 1984. Some USAID

Mission's major thrust may not have been reflected in the 1984 reports, and this was probably also true of the four geographic regions as well as the overall worldwide AID sector emphases and experiences.

Hence, the principal analyst, in analyzing the data, has not drawn conclusions nor made judgments as to the Agency's performance in the sectors designated. He has, rather, made observations warranted by the data that he believed should be called to AID's attention either because they reflect unusual success that can be further capitalized upon, or because they represent issues or raise concerns that warrant the special attention of AID at its highest levels in both Washington and the field.

B. Agriculture

Seventy-five evaluation reports covering projects in the narrowly defined field of agricultural development were submitted in 1984. These included agro-forestry and fisheries projects and integrated rural development projects where agriculture is the base and activities other than growing crops and livestock are adjuncts rather than principal activities. Treated separately are other rural, regional and community development projects with a more spatial than a crop production focus (even though agriculture may be one of the elements in the project).

While developing countries can define and organize the elements of their agricultural development programs in a variety of ways, three of the most important results sought by the 1984 projects reviewed were: (a) that the country become self-sufficient in food; (b) that food and fibre production and agro-industries make a maximum contribution to a growing national economy, including employment creation; and (c) that agricultural and agro-industrial experts make a maximum contribution to the increase of external trade and to the earning of foreign exchange.

The 1984 evaluation reports raise a question as to the extent to which available appropriate agricultural technologies are actually being adapted and

used in a number of the developing countries. What the data most clearly suggest is that poor small farmers -- AID's principal target group -- do not yet have access to or may not be receiving the modern technologies relevant to their needs, or if they do have access, they are declining to accept and use them.

Several reasons are given as to why readily available technologies appear not to be in use. One is that the country's "extension service," in contrast to that same country's research program, does not function adequately. That is, there are not enough, or good enough, extension agents to carry the message and the techniques effectively to the level of the individual farmer.

There is substantial evidence in the project evaluation reports that extension services in the developing countries are weak, that staff are inadequately trained and experienced, and are provided with but few resources for reaching the individual farm level. Vehicles are often not available or if they are, gasoline is not. Cadre appear not always to be fully staffed due in part to low salaries and in part to the low status of the job. Thus, researchers complain that their best research efforts, already tested and proven, go for naught for lack of an adequate delivery system. In some countries an effort has been made by the researchers to deal with this problem by going directly to the farmers themselves. These researchers include individual farmers, and groups of farmers, in their adaptive research activities with the result that the farmers, as participants, become familiar with new techniques, often suggesting useful elements of practical adaptation and in this process become sold on converting from traditional to modern techniques. This would appear on the face of it to be an ideal way in which to effect the technology transfer desired. It has been found, however, to have its problems. One is that for a researcher or a research team there is an absolute limit, and a severe one, as to how far they can "extend" themselves and still do research. In other words, this approach can reach only a small proportion of the relevant farm population.

The opposite approach, reflective of established U.S. practice which may not be relevant in the developing world today, does not work either. This is the formula whereby researchers research and turn their results over to the

extension service for "extension." That formula no doubt worked in the U.S. at one time, and it might also in the developing countries if there were extension services of comparable effectiveness. As noted earlier, the evaluation reports offer little evidence that there are.

American technical advisors, however, seem still to be fighting this jurisdictional battle between research and extension on foreign soil. In the case, for example, of National Cereals Research and Extension (54) in Cameroon, the team AID employed to conduct the evaluation found it necessary to admonish the host country's and AID's researchers not to go too far, implying they already had, in working directly with farmers, for fear of usurping the role of the extension service. This, despite strong evidence of an unusually successful adaptive research program with substantial farmer participation on the one hand and little evidence, on the other, of an effectively functioning extension service. In the case of Major Cereals (211) in Egypt, AID is helping the Ministry of Agriculture to create a combined research and extension service, integrating the two so that the delivery of research results moves from the laboratory to demonstration plot and on to the small farmer. According to the evaluation report, however, the project is in serious difficulties because of the problems it is encountering in establishing an effective, working extension service. This is discussed further below.

An inadequate technology delivery system is one thing. Reluctance to accept technology is something else, yet the latter appears to be the crucial factor affecting the transfer of agricultural technologies. Why do so many small farmers having the good fortune to be on the receiving end of presumably sound and useful technological packages, duly delivered by competent technicians, decline to adopt the practices recommended? Why do farmers who could gain access to new technologies that are relatively accessible, and are known to them, not seek them out? One answer given to both these questions is that they prefer not to alter their farming practices -- after due consideration. They choose not to change. Why? The evaluators reject the conventional wisdom that it is because they are unwittingly, stubbornly, conservative -- just set in their ways. They suggest rather that they are not unthinkingly reactionery at all, but rather, intelligent and skilled calculators of the odds. Their objective is risk minimization.

Twenty of the projects reviewed were designed to deliver new technologies directly to the subsistence producer on his farm. The farmers targeted by these projects in the 1984 set are producers of basic grains practicing dryland farming . The reports indicate that while research on drylands grains farming is well advanced, neither the host countries, AID nor other donors have yet succeeded in improving the means for delivering research results at the small farm level and putting them to work, especially in the poor African and Near East countries. In others, particularly Asia, the AID projects evaluated focused on indirect, long-term effects on agricultural production, but not on direct impact on subsistence farmers. Examples of this are AID's support for agricultural education at junior college and university levels; research; the institution building aspects of ministries of agriculture; agricultural export development; food storage and marketing systems; and water resources, agro-forestry, livestock, poultry, and fisheries. Thus, the evidence suggests that when the direct efforts have been made to reach subsistence farms, the results have been disappointing, and that they will go on being disappointing until new means are found to: (1) improve delivery systems and ; (2) persuade farmers that it is in their interest to adopt new, high return, but also high cost and high risk technologies.

The twenty of the 75 1984 agriculture project evaluation reports that describe special difficulties encountered in the delivery and adoption of advanced technologies at the small farm level are:

In Africa

1. Cameroon: National Cereals Research and Extension (54) and North Cameroon Livestock and Agricultural Development (55)

2. Senegal: Cereals Production II (41)

3. Zambia: Agricultural Development Research and Extension (45)

4. Botswana: Horticulture Development (27)

5. Niger: Niamey Department Development II (12)

6. Seychelles: Food Crops Research (69)

7. Regional: WARDA - West Africa Rice Develpoment Association (66); and CIMMYT Farming Systems Research (65)

Near East

8. Morocco: Increase in Cereals Production (224)

9. Jordan: Wheat Research and Production (229)

10. Egypt: Major Cereals (211)

11. Tunisia: Community Based Integrated Rural Development (232)

12. Regional: 4 Wheat Production Projects in Near East and North African Countries (237)

Latin America

13. Ecuador: Integrated Rural Development (139); Pilot Rural Development Projects (145).

Asia

14. The Philippines: Farming Systems Development (72); Small Farmer Irrigation Projects (73), (74), (75); and (c) Agricultural Research Development Project II (77).

15. Sri Lanka: On-Farm Water Management (92).

Egypt's Major Cereal Case

Egypt is putting together an institutional framework for national agricultural development building on Egypt's level of sophistication in science and technology and depth of related human resources. The major cereals project is an integral part of the effort, in this case, to create a functioning research and extension program for four basic grains -- corn, wheat, barley and sorghum. USAID has been joined by the Consortium for International Development and, through it, by New Mexico State University in providing technical assistance.

The evaluation report describes the major steps being taken to create a program to promote increased production for major cereals including the integration of research and extension and the planning of priority emphasis on delivering new cereals technologies to all of Egypt's farmers. The report describes encouraging progress in getting the institutional structures organized, notably the fusion of the research and extension organizations and staffs. It,

however, has little progress to report as to success in increasing the production, productivity, or the incomes of the hundreds of thousands of small farmers involved.

The report describes what the project expects to achieve. The goal is to assist, with new technologies, all of the farmers in an area encompasing one-half of Egypt's villages (2,025 villages). The evaluation also points out, however, seven constraints to the achievement of project objectives as inhibiting the effective functioning of the new research and extension service. These are:

1. Lack of transportation
2. Lack of visual aids equipment;
3. The problem of not being able to assure enough pre-service and in-service training;
4. Inadequate training facilities;
5. Lack of high quality seed;
6. Lack of qualified staff to be sent for advanced training abroad; and
7. Lack of extension technical knowledge on the part of the extension staff.

AID's relatively new Farming Systems Research projects recognize the difficulties agricultural programs have had in breaking away from the standard crops and commodities production approach in order to deal with small farmers on their terms, which embrace the operations of the whole farm. These projects seek to overcome farmers' reluctance to disturb established practices by making the analysis of their options more systematic and the combinations of best advantage to them more clear. The 1984 evaluations include a study of farming systems research projects in five African countries: Swaziland, Lesotho, Zimbabwe, Malawi and Zambia. These FSR projects have been assisted by CIMMYT, the principal conceptualizer of FSR. The basic conclusions from the analyses of these five projects is that the FSR approach does indeed add a useful dimension to the commodity technology elements. It helps the farmer analyze and decide what he wants to do. Again, however, the evaluations encountered the problem of inadequacy of extension capabilities. CIMMYT can train researchers in FSR technology to augment agronomic technologies but so far programs to create the extension capability to follow through are still lacking.

The 1984 evaluations include a special study of four wheat production projects begun in four Near East and North African countries in the 1960s: Turkey,

Tunisia, Jordan and Morocco; the latter two were also the subject of separate evaluation reports. Two of the projects, Tunisia and Turkey, were rated successful; the other two were assessed as having fallen substantially below their targeted goals. The "Conclusions and Lessons Learned" include the following points regarding technology delivery and acceptance:

1. Producer price policy by itself is unlikely to bring forth positive production responses from dryland cereal producers. The entire policy package must, on balance, be supportive of price policy inititiatives. What is important is the relation of producer prices to per unit costs of production. There must be available at the farm level an acceptable package of technology that makes it possible for farmers to move from a low input traditional technology to a more responsive production function.

2. The risk factor is important, and means of managing risks associated with the introduction of new technology appear essential. Risk is inversely correlated with the annual level of normal rainfall and directly related to the annual variation in rainfall. Thus, the higher the normal annual rainfall and the lower the variabilty in annual rainfall the less is risk management likely to be a deterrent to introduction of new technology. In making decisions about adoption of new technological packages, farmers calculate the probabilities of success or failure. Proposed new technological packages have a greater chance of being adopted if the package includes tools for managing risk.

3. A proposed package of practices is unlikely to be adopted in its entirety by farmers. Rather, improved practices are likely to be adopted one at a time or in sub-groups of practices which are interrelated. Technology packages should be structured so as to facilitate adoption of practices which individually or in groups can have a meaningful positive effect on yields.

4. While projects may quite legitimately have the objective of increasing output for one crop or animal, it is extremely important to consider the effect of proposed changes in farming practices on the entire farm operation. Within this context, it appears to be essential to give full consideration to the relationship between crop and livestock production.

The evidence is reasonably clear that in all four countries the rate of adoption of certain proposed practices was adversely affected because of the consequences for animal production. This does not suggest that a project needs to address the entire farm operation. It does strongly indicate that adoption of practices can be accelerated if production requirements for the entire farm operation are taken into account.

5. The successful adoption of new technology which will be effective over time by a wide spectrum of farmers is in large part dependent on the existence of an adequately functioning support system. This means that the necessary research and information functions must be institutionalized so they can identify and deal successfully with a continuous stream of physical, technological, social and economic problems and opportunities. It is also essential that effective input supply systems be operating that are capable of providing the technologically most effective supplies and equipment in a timely manner.

C. Energy, Natural Resources and Roads

Six energy project evaluations were included in the 1984 section: 4 in Africa; 1 in the Near East (Morocco); and 1 in LAC (Jamaica). There were two natural resources conservation projects, both in Central America (Costa Rica and Honduras). Five rural roads projects were included: 3 in Asia; 1 in Central America (Honduras); and 1 in the Caribbean (the Dominican Republic).

The analyst was struck by the small number of evaluations in these three sector categories. Given the important role of such projects in supporting agricultural and rural development, AID may wish to review its portfolio of active projects to determine whether these three areas are being adequately addressed.

Energy

One successful energy project in the Cape Verde Islands involves the use of a massive windmills program to create the national water supply. The USAID made a

modest initial contribution of $500,000 for 40 windmills on five islands, meeting the water needs of 10% of the country's rural population. The program that will see 500 windmills installed in the next 15 years will meet the water needs of all the people in this island country where "water is oil." The government of the Netherlands has indicated its willingness to assist with the financing of the balance of the program with the United States now bowing out to applause from both the Cape Verdians and the Dutch.

Projects in Senegal and Lesotho were less successful. In the Senegal case, project emphasis was narrowed to the design and dissemination of field-efficient cook stoves, charcoal and solar dryers. Cook stove production, programmed for some 500,000 rural and 250,000 urban households in five years reached a top of 59 households served, half of whom reported savings. The stove design and the technology involved proved unpopular with the intended beneficiaries, as was also true of the solar heater for drying fish. On the other hand, the charcoal project was a success. The Casamance kiln now produces 38% more charcoal in four days than it did previously in three weeks. This reduces the cost of charcoal relative to before, but it remains an expensive fuel in that setting.

In the case of Lesotho, similar problems were encountered in that the focus was narrowed to energy conservation and within that to metal stoves, stone cookers, and solar dryers, which have not yet "caught on." However, consideration is now being given to broadening the scope of the project to encompass alternate energy source development, a direction two other countries took from the start. In Morocco and Jamaica, AID has joined forces with the host country to institutionalize sweeping programs of all-out energy conservation and alternate sources development. There are few results to report yet, but both projects look promising.

In March 1984, an African Regional Study was made on energy systems in seven African countries. This study focused first on the energy problems the region faces:

- o overdependence on oil;
- o biomass depletion; and

- shortage of fuel for agriculture production (they need to use more animal and human power, wind, solar, hydro, and oil; use of imported oil for agriculture was strongly defended).

The study then identified what should be AID's principal program foci:

- reducing biomass depletion;
- increasing agricultural production; and
- improving home life.

The study concluded with comments on the status of the programs in the seven countries studied in relation to the above principles. These observations were made:

- instititonal bases for energy programs are weak;
- the public sector is a poor bet for effective programs; and
- industrialized society representatives do not understand the LDC man, or woman, especially when it comes to fuel efficient stoves.

The fuel efficient stoves designed thus far by Westerners appear not to be acceptable to Africans. They are worth continuing to experiment with, but are an inadequate focus for a country's or a Mission's energy program.

Natural Resources

Costa Rica and Honduras submitted evaluations of natural resources conservation projects in 1984. Both projects are top priority, well conceived, comprehensive and properly institutionalized, and have excellent chances for being permanently sustained. The Costa Rica project did not get off the ground for almost three years, due to delays caused both by AID and the GOCR; it had been operational for only 18 months when the "mid-term" evaluation was conducted. The Honduras project has had a similar history and status.

Rural Roads

All five 1984 rural roads projects reported upon have sound "development" goals focused on benefitting each country's rural poor majority. The program in Indonesia, however, was flawed by poor host country implementation causing AID

to cancel out at kilometer 126 on a kilometer 318 project. AID had, however, already disbursed 100% of its available funds. The project was completed by the GOI, on its own, in the process of which some institution building occured and two private contractors became seasoned road builders.

The project in Nepal had many technical and institutional development problems. In all, it took ten years (1969-79) to build, erode, and be rebuilt properly. In those years and since, however, its socioeconomic impact has been great. It has become the central economic factor in the life of the region (Far Western Hills). No institution building occurred and road maintenance capability is questionable; therefore, "sustainability" is open to question. Chances are, however, that socioeconomic forces will assure its continued performance and permanence whether it is well maintained or not.

Nepal's second "road" project is a number of "trail suspension bridges" for people and animals, not vehicles. There are 41 such foot bridges being built, linking a countryside trail network that is of substantial economic significance to the rural populations having access to trunk roads and to goods and services only via these trails.

The project has been successful and could be terminated by AID with assurance that it will be sustained. There is the point of view, however, that there are still many rivers to cross and this can be accomplished more quickly with a more rapid infusion of funds, including external aid. USAID's interest in these trail suspension bridges apparently goes back to 1958 -- an interest that appears not to have waned through the years.

Of the two rural roads projects in Latin America, the one in the Dominican Republic is a model in every respect rated 10 on a scale of 0-10 in all rated categories. This one project completes 10% "coverage" of rural Dominican Republic and is regarded as the first of a number of increasingly rapid steps toward 100% coverage. The Honduras project, with essentially the same objective of physically uniting the rural and urban economies of the country, is less successful primarily because it has been planned to cover only part of

the national need to be met over time. This has meant keen competition among regions for priority attention, featuring political pressures that have slowed the process and may have resulted in professionally questionable decisions, especially in terms of furthering the development of the most needful rural areas.

D. Health, Nutrition and Family Planning

The 1984 evaluations included 47 projects in these three interrelated areas: 35 in health and nutrition; 10 in family planning and 2 joint health-family planning projects. Of the 35 health and nutrition projects, 5 were safe water supply projects and 30 were essentially primary health care and nutrition projects. Geographically, 6 of the projects in this composite rubric were Near East projects; 13 were in Africa; 7 in Asia; and 21 in Latin America.

Latin American health projects are in the lead both in numbers and in complexity, size, and sophistication. There, in fact, appears to be definite evidence of a transfer of Latin American experience to the other regions, notably to Africa which has the second largest number of health projects. Reference here is to primary health care projects, not including family planning, although there may be population programs carryover, as well, since AID's Latin American program had a head start among the regions in all these areas. Particularly noteworthy, however, is the apparent transfer to Africa of Latin American USAID experiences in basic health services programs featuring the well-trained, village-level paramedic tied into a layered network of referral institutions of progressive professional capabilities.

AID's primary health care projects, as reflected in the 1984 evaluations, have been highly effective by various measures. Effectiveness, for example, is most clearly reflected in the high degree of rural community cooperation that AID projects have achieved. The same rural family that has been found reluctant to accept new agricultural technologies or to enter into community level efforts to further the adoption of new agricultural practices has been found, by and large, to be enthusiastic about cooperating in community-based efforts to

provide health services, including in many cases a willingness to pay the costs of the Village Health Worker (VHW). In some cases, VHWs are trained and supplied by the government and paid by it for a time, with their salaries and costs eventually taken up by the community. In other countries, the VHW is a trained volunteer. In all cases, a Village PHC Committee (VHC) of local citizens is the focal point for galvanizing community action and creating the necessary ambience for modern health practices to be adopted by each family, and each member.

As in most successful programs with momentum, however, an issue has arisen, highlighted in the evaluation reports, that has perhaps been blown out of proportion. It is that of whether or not the program at the local level -- specifically the duties of the VHW -- should be primarily curative or preventive. Prevention is, of course, the professionally preferable answer and should be the end objective. The popular demand, however, the evaluators report, is for curative services -- noting that appreciation of preventive measures is thus still a primary health education target. Doctrinaire denial of curative services in favor of concentration on preventive duties was thought by evaluators, however, to be counterproductive. Program managers, it was said, should see the value of doing enough curative work to gain and maintain entre and thus build status for the program that will then make possible unhindered pursuit of community adoption of basic environmental and preventive health technologies: environmental sanitation, safe water supply, nutrition, personal cleanliness habits and the heeding of early warning signs. However, in none of the reports has it been explained <u>why</u>, even in those parts of those countries where all of the above are known and accepted, dysentery continues to be the major cause of incapacitating illness and death among infants, children, and adults.

The family planning (FP) programs reviewed by the 1984 evaluations present an analagous anomaly. According to the evaluation reports, FP projects tend to be effective in gaining "acceptors." The transfer of technical "know-how" takes place and the acceptors use the technology in, usually, ever increasing numbers. Of the 12 FP projects included in this study, all can be regarded as successes in terms of numbers of acceptors. According to the reports, some

projects' outstanding success in these regards is attributable directly to the AID-host country project effort, some partly due to such effort, and some to other factors involving the momentum of social and economic modernization in the more developed of the developing countries.

Yet in only one of the 12 countries represented is there certainty that a decrease in the population growth rate or the crude birth rate can be attributed to the FP program AID is assisting. This country is Thailand, where the achievement of lowering the growth rate to below 1.5% is directly attributable to the joint AID-Thai FP program carried out over the past 15 years. On the other hand, there are countries where the growth rate is increasing in the 1980s even as the number of acceptors also increases. In El Salvador which has long had a strong record of accomplishment by all measures including growth rate, this rate has in the 1980s increased from 2.5% to 3.5%. In Panama where the USAID-GOP project is weak and relatively ineffective, "acceptors" are up and the crude birth and population growth rates are significantly declining. Here, the organized medical profession has, by law, taken control and contraceptives are now available, legally, only through licensed physicians. The conclusion to be drawn from these circumstances then is that FP services are readily available from the private medical profession, supported by an equally available and forthcoming private pharmaceutical sector.

Near East

In the Near East three of six health projects in the 1984 group are potable water projects; 1 in Yemen; and 2 in Tunisia; the latter 2 successful and effective, except for the rate of implementation. One project is a very successful population project in Morocco providing, according to its evaluation, two guides of general utility: (1) it pays to integrate FP services with other MOH services, including the MCH program; and (2) a widely heralded, national commitment to family planning as a way of life and as a condition precedent is not only unnecessary but can be counterproductive. In Morocco, a low-key approach has been helpful to the program.

Only one Near East project reviewed is a health services project, per se. It is an OPG to a PVO (Catholic Relief Services) for rural women on the West

Bank. This project, while not building or strengthening local institutions, is reaching large numbers of poor women, who badly need it, with an excellent MCH program. As a health education program, its substantive content appears to be so good that it might well be useful in other countries as well, especially if the evaluators' advice is followed which was to observe the KISS principle, as originated in Latin America, i.e., "Keep it Simple, Senora."

The most interesting "health" project in the Near East, despite its rear echelon nature in terms of development's front lines, is the FOMSCU project in Egypt. FOMSCU is the acronym for the "Faculty of Medicine, Suez Canal University," an incipient "Land Grant University" for Medicine and Health, dedicated, among other things, to the creation of a health research and extension program for the Suez Canal Region of Egypt. It has a model Rural Health Delivery System staffed by students, faculty, interns and government physicians in the region, and it is using this demonstration program to train the staff for the Ministry of Health-FOMSCU medical research extension program of the future. It will also be used to upgrade in-service health personnel. AID, with Boston University, has undertaken to provide technical assistance, participant training and capital assistance to the university and the Ministry of Health. This unique application of the land grant college principle to human, in place of agricultural, resources development, has captured the imagination and enthusiasm of the project's principal collaborators. AID should watch this pilot project closely, not only for possible emulation elsewhere but also because its resources are likely soon to be sufficiently replete in the main subject areas of local health delivery systems that difficult problems from around the developing world may be referred to it for special study. For example, why the persistence of deadly dysentery among presumably health educated people? FOMSCU could soon accommodate as one of its elements an International Health Research Center akin to the International Agricultural Research Centers with special emphasis on the completion of action-oriented technology transfer. It could also conduct experimental and empirical studies on such other health services problems as how to pay for an adequate program within a country's means.

Africa

In Africa, 6 of 13 projects focus on primary health care -- in the Sudan (2) the Congo, Zaire, Kenya and Mauritania. Two more are regional projects, one concerned with Sahel region demographic data, the other with combatting communicable childhood diseases. Both regional projects are outstandingly good, the latter in particular, representing a frontal attack on one of Africa's worst scourges; the incidence among children of polio, diptheria, tuberculosis, dysentery, yaws, yellow fever and malaria. In the Sahel, agricultural and natural resource shortages are one side of the coin; the other is the surplus of people. The demographic data collection project aims at illustrating for national and regional policymakers the relation between the two sides of the coin and the importance of dealing effectively with both.

The five remaining Africa projects are respectively, Blindness Prevention in Kenya; Health Planning and Management in Swaziland; Safe Water Supply in Malawi; a Care OPG in the Congo involving nutrition and health education programs; and Malaria Control in Zanzibar. The first four of these disparate projects were rated as quite successful by their evaluators; for the fifth, Zanzibar, no data were available -- only a PES facesheet.

The six primary health care projects referred to above provide, on balance, an excellent representation of how effective such programs at the village level in Africa can be. The four projects with Ministries of Health: Sudan (2), Mauritania, and Zaire are particularly good examples of both the effectiveness of the VHW (Village Health Worker), the VHC (Village Health Committee), the communities responsiveness to local health services, and the effectiveness of the health technology transfer process. The two OPG projects (CARE in the Congo, and AMREF in Kenya) while also reflective of the viability of the local health services approach with community involvement, are, however, exceptions to the observation made earlier that PVOs tend to be more effective than national public ministry programs. In these two cases, while the projects are meeting their goals, working relations are strained, local acceptance is less and the prospects for both expansion and sustainability uncertain. These two

projects suffer by comparison with what the host countries and AID have been able to do on a much larger scale in the four host government sponsored projects.

Asia

In Asia, of a total of 7 projects, one in the Philippines is a safe water project; one a malaria control project in Pakistan; and one an ORT project, also in Pakistan. Two are "Integrated Rural Health and Population" projects in India and the Philippines; one is a national research and training center for Sri Lanka's primary health care program and the seventh is the widely heralded Population Planning Project III in Thailand.

Conceptually, the two Integrated Rural Health and Population projects (India and the Philippines) are of special significance, not only for Asia, but worldwide. Their basic approach is holistic: to reduce both fertility and infant and child mortality; to achieve a balance among food, energy, and population; and to combine, into a single program, family planning, primary health care, and the combatting of childhood diseases. Although starting on a pilot basis, the end objective is national coverage. Both countries' programs appear, however, to be run more from the top down than those in Africa. They are the creation of the national (and state) governments and there is less evidence of local participation. Both are highly ambitious, expensive, and complex and are having growing pains. Among these are logistic and financial implementation problems involving restrictive AID project implementation practices. For example, to speed the Indian program, AID is withholding 25% of its payments for a state's project until after each such state's program becomes "operational," in order to pressure the state government to action. The state, however, has already received 100% of its intended allocation from GOI/New Delhi, hence the ex-post facto sanction misses its mark. AID construction reimbursement procedures appear also to have frustrated timely implementation in both countries.

Sri Lanka's National Institute for Health Sciences is, for the developing world, a truly pioneering model of how successfully to develop and sustain a primary health care program. Its basic role is research and teaching. Yet in

producing the country's health and population workers, its public health nurses, inspectors, medical officers for health and assistant medical practitioners (paramedics) it has defined the structure and the emphases of the national system for public health.

NIHS was founded in 1913 and has had the collaboration of the Rockefeller Foundation since 1926. Today the GOSL, whose Ministry of Health has launched a new national PHC program, is dependent on NIHS for pre and in-service training of the staff of this program. AID's role to date has been to share the costs of campus expansion and to assist with curriculum development. The program is one of high quality. There have, however, been problems in implementing the AID grant, especially in the financing of new campus construction, selection of contractor, site, late arrival of USAID inputs, etc.

Finally, there is the Thailand-USAID Population Planning Project II which is one of AID's most dramatic success stories. It is concerned directly with the literal reduction of the basic national birth and population growth rates. Thailand initiated the program with AID some 15 years ago and by the end of the current project (1987) the population growth rate will have dropped below target to under 1.5%. It is estimated to be at 1.5% now. PPP II as a project has had few implementation or technical problems, is moving smoothly to target, fine tuning as it goes. For example, special attention is now being given to those remote rural areas where educational and economic standards are below par and full effectiveness of the population planning program thus harder to achieve.

In Latin America and the Caribbean, the 1984 evaluations included 8 family planning projects; 7 comprehensive health sector programs; 3 OPGs, 2 regional training projects in the Eastern Caribbean, and 1 safe water project. The "spread" is itself interesting and needs no supplementary comment. So are the numbers: 44% of all health, nutrition and population projects in the world; twice as many population projects as in all three other regions combined; and 37% of all health services projects. Of special interest also is the nature of the health services projects. They tend to be "sector" projects, loans or grants, with a comprehensive sector orientation focused on the development of

whole national health services delivery systems. Such "sector" projects are not unlike the PHC programs in Africa and Asia but appear to be proceeding from a firmer, more advanced base. They tend to have progressed beyond the trial or pilot stage and the projects tend to contemplate relatively early consummation of a "national coverage" goal.

Another notable characteristic of the LAC group of projects revealed in the evaluation reports is that family planning projects stand alone. They may be in support of the same Ministries of Health as the "health services" projects, and often are integrated into MCH programs, but they are discrete at the AID end, and at the superstructure level of the Ministries.

Two health sector programs in the Dominican Republic are aiming for early national coverage. There are, however, problems with the preventive health aspects of the program. Acceptance is not easy to gain without well-trained, well-supervised local health workers, who are still in short supply. Where they have adequate staff and supervision there is no problem, but the program is at that intermediate stage where they know how to operate better than they do.

The program in Ecuador has similar goals and methods. According to the evaluation, it has, however, been designed in its details, especially organizationally, by outsiders who did not understand Ecuador. The temporary result is a snarled administrative battleground of contesting forces between the Ministry of Health and the National Rural Development Authority. Two years of project time have been consumed by a turf battle between the two in which the USAID's project designers were unfortunately identified with and actively promoted one of the two sides. The project's future in its present form hangs in the balance and the program may have to be redesigned. Such is the demand, however, that it is believed there will be no stopping Ecuador's going ahead with the completion of its Integrated Rural Health Delivery System, probably with continued AID assistance, built into a new formula agreed upon this time by all parties in advance.

Health sector programs in Honduras, Haiti, Guatemala and El Salvador reflect various positive and negative aspects of moving toward the common goal of

universal basic health services. These are fully discussed in each evaluation report and are summarized, project-by-project, in the Project Notes appended to this report.

Similarly, the health management training and health manpower planning projects in the Eastern Carribean are covered in the Project Notes and by the evaluations themselves, as is the rural water supply project in Honduras; and the three OPGs:

- The Rural Community Health Centers of Radio HCJB, Quito, Ecuador;
- CARE's Potable Water Project in Bolivia; and
- PROALMAS' Breastfeeding Program in Honduras.

Family Planning Projects in Latin America and the Caribbean appear from the 1984 sample to be, on balance, mature and effective whether AID's principal partner in a country is the government or one or more private agencies. Of the eight population projects in the hemisphere that were reviewed, four were being carried out through private agencies, three directly through Ministries of Health; and in one, El Salvador, through both IPPF and the MOH. Of the four private programs, two are in Peru, financed by OPG's to the Instituto Marcelino and the Instituto Hipolito UNANUE. Both were one-shot grants, rated successful. Two additional private agency projects of longer-term are being carried out in cooperation with IPPF; one in Ecuador and the other in the Eastern Caribbean island countries. In both instances the projects enjoy a positive environment and IPPF is finding that its local "sub-grantees," also in the private sector, are able project implementers.

AID's population program in El Salvador is in support of both private agencies and the MOH. With IPPF collaboration, support is provided to the educational program of the Salvadoran Demographic Association, to a private sector sterilization program, and to the comprehensive programs of both the MOH and the Social Security Institute. All the "process data" since these projects began have success written all over them but the 1984 evaluation team cautions that, despite these data, there has not been a drop in the birth rate since 1968 (page 6). This is different from and perhaps a matter of greater concern

than the fact that since 1978, the population growth rate has climbed from 2.5% to 3.5%. The latter can be attributed in various ways to the country's now seven year old bitter involvement with a major communist guerilla insurgency. That insurgency, however, can have no relation to the 10 year period before it began. The birth rate data cited by the project evaluation also raise questions about the reports from the GOES and USAID El Salvador that indicated that during the early 1960s through the 1970s the population growth rate had dropped from 3.5% to 2.5%.

In Jamaica, Haiti and Panama, AID has major population programs with the host governments' Ministries of Health. In the first two countries mentioned, these are programs of long standing and substantially "successful" -- at least by "process data" standards. In the case of Panama, the MOH program is one of long standing but is presently moribund, according to the evaluators. Despite this, as has been noted earlier, birth and population growth rates in Panama continue to decline.

E. Human Resources Development

This category covers all projects reviewed in 1984 in the general field of education at all levels. It includes participant training projects whose principal purpose is participant training per se, across a broad spectrum of development subjects. It does not include, however, projects aimed at the improvement of national development planning, management and administration, cutting across all functional categories, since such projects normally include both technical assistance and participants in the same project design, the one interacting with the other, with national development program goals more fixed and specific than those of the participant training projects. Such cross-sectoral projects, focused on development planning and administration, are included in this report under the heading: Cross-Sectoral National Development Program Management Projects.

Twenty-nine Human Resources Development projects were included in the 1984 project evaluation reports. This is 12% of the 238 USAID Mission Reports submitted. Of the 29 projects, 14 were in the basic areas of primary and

literacy education. Of these, one was in the Near East (Yemen) with three in Asia (Nepal 2, and Papua), 4 in Latin America, (Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, and the Dominican Republic) and 6 in Africa; (Niger 3, Liberia 2, and Zimbabwe 1).

Worldwide, seven projects were in vocational and technical education: two in Egypt, three in Latin Ameria, lne in Liberia, and one inactive Asia regional project with the Colombo Plan countries.

There were six participant training projects of which four are in Africa: Botswana, 2, Lesotho and Swaziland one each. The remaining two participant training projects are in Egypt and the Dominican Republic.

The 28th and 29th projects in the education and human resources development area are in higher education. There is Egypt's University Linkages project aimed at strengthening Egyptian, and presumably U.S., universities too through professor exchanges and joint research projects, both short-term (Minilinks) and long-term (maxilinks) projects, involving both indepth single discipline and interdisciplinary R and D projects. Finally there is the satellite television program of the University of the South Pacific.

Near East

Four of the Near East region's five projects are in Egypt. None of them deal with the literacy problem or primary education. The Alliance for Engineering Cooperation is an exchange program among U.S. and Egyptian engineers. The Vehicle Maintenance Training Project is, according to its evaluators, a poorly designed, slow moving project, two years behind schedule at evaluation time, that does not address a top priority development problem. The University Linkages project is not popular in Egypt, the evaluators believe, because it is viewed as patronizing. Egyptian universities do not believe that U.S. universities have as much to teach them as the project design implies. This may be quite incorrect, and the evaluators imply that it is, but it is hard to explain this to the scholars of a country whose basic institutions were mature several thousand years before the U.S. came into existence. The Peace

Fellowship Program, on the other hand, has been an outstanding success. By the end of 1986 1,900 Egyptians will have received advanced degrees from U.S. universities at a cost to the U.S. of $54 million. The purpose of the project, which will have been achieved by 1986, has been "to strengthen and expand the pool of Egyptian manpower trained in development related fields."

The evaluation of the Yemen Basic Education Project rated its design as poor and its performance as seriously flawed in large part because of friction between U.S. contractors and the Yemeni.

Africa

Africa's 11 projects have sharper priorities. Six are rural literacy and primary education projects. Four are participant training projects and one is in vocational education. The six basic rural primary and literacy projects vary in effectiveness from Niger's highly rated Maternal Language Texts and Literacy Service Training Center Project, and Botswana's Primary Education Project to Liberia's Rural Information Systems project, rated 1 on a scale of 0-10. In between are: Niger's Rural Sector Human Resources Development project led by FAO-UNDP with nine other cooperating external donors; and Zimbabwe's OPG project in Adult Literacy.

AID is investing approximately $30 million in three companion participant training projects in Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland. The purpose is to train hundreds of top and mid-level civil servants needed by these countries to run their newly independent governments. Participant training is combined with an OPEX-type operation in which replacements for the participants are recruited for the period of their absence. In all three countries these projects rate high marks. AID is sponsoring a similar participant training project in Zimbabwe with similar success.

Finally, in contrast to Liberia's troubled Rural Information Systems project, there is in Monrovia a highly successful urban, PVO-sponsored, AID OPG vocational training program producing carpenters, masons, electricians, plumbers, mechanics and bookkeepers for the urban work force at a rate of approximately 100 per year.

Asia

In Asia, the Human Resources Development projects reviewed in 1984 make up in uniqueness what they lack in numbers. Leading the group is the program of university education offered via satellite by the University of the South Pacific. It serves a population of 1.5 million people living on islands that lie athwart the Pacific Ocean between 50 degrees of latitude and 27 degrees of longitude, and comprised of 3 cultures and 11 different nations. AID is not involved in the substance of the program. Its contribution has been to what had proved to be the weakest link in the system -- its hardware and the application of it to classroom situations, conferences, tutorials, and staff meetings, etc. Involved are signal strengths, adequate receiving equipment adapted to video tape and audio tape as well as live presentations, combined with slow scan and computer uses of the system. The ATS-1 is the presently used vehicle. The ill-fated ATS-6 was to have been added. The University is now anxiously awaiting ATS-6's successor.

Asia's three basic primary and literacy education programs are one in Papua, New Guinea, and two in Nepal. In Papua, support is being provided to the Summer Institute of Linguistics. AID has made $1.4 million available to the Institute to speed up its normally slower pace. According to the "in-house" evaluator who heads the project, the Institute's rank and file staff are less ready to make use of AID's funds than its leadership, giving rise to internal stresses. These strains, on top of the fact that anamist-cum-christian Papua is not the easiest place in the world to motivate people, have made the project a difficult one. For its leadership effort it rates high marks; its performance in terms of results, to date, however, has been disappointing. Only $400,000 of the $1.4 million grant had been spent after two years of the three-year project.

In Nepal, The Magazine Show is the non-formal segment of the MOE's radio education teacher training project. Specifically, it occupies the middle 20 minutes of an hour long daily radio class for teachers. Whether it is meant to be non-formal, for the teachers' entertainment, or to teach them non-formal education techniques is not clear, nor is the matter clarified by "The Magazine Show's" literal translation into Nepalese: which was until recently

"Miscellaneous Program." This title has now been changed to "Multi-Colored Flower." The best thing going for the project is that the MOE program of which it is a part occupies Radio Nepal's prime time and is not likely to be dislodged. The evaluators felt that the MOE, AID and its Contractor, Southern Illinois University, should be encouraged to make more of this opportunity.

A second Nepal basic education project is a highly rated PVO pilot literacy project sponsored by World Education, Inc. which is proving to be very successful. It is called NFEP (Non-Formal Education Program). There is no indication in the evaluation report, nor in the FY 1985-CP, that this is an AID-financed project, nor is there a project number. There is no PES.

Finally, AID's Asia program in education has in the past apparently been involved in providing financial assistance to the Colombo Plan Staff College (for technical education) located in Singapore. There is no evidence of a currently active AID project but in the Colombo Plan's own evaluation report to its member countries and donors, AID is identified as a sometime, and hopefully a future, donor. CPSC trains faculty for national technical schools in the 18 member countries. The evaluators' impression is that AID's interest in cooperating with the CPSC waxes and wanes over time depending on the interests of AID's current Colombo Plan project officer. AID's normally low interest level is also attributed by the evaluation to the fact that AID has no representation in Singapore.

Latin America and the Caribbean

In Latin America and the Caribbean, four of the eight projects reviewed are targeted on rural primary education and literacy; three on vocational education and one on participant training.

All of the four basic primary education evaluations report that the projects are either already successful or on their way to being so. All also have had difficulties but their initial design has either been sound or has been altered and they have momentum, priority recognition and substantially professional program management. In the four countries involved, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, and the Dominican Republic, the host government and AID

are grappling in earnest with the fundamental problem of reversing these nations' literacy and educational deficit situations and turning education into a positive force for development. In Ecuador the effort, off to a bad start and now 2-1/2 years behind schedule, is an ambitious non-formal education program, national in scope, designed to solve the country's illiteracy problem as soon as possible. It finally became effectively operational just two months before the evaluation, so that the evaluators had few results yet to report at the time of the evaluation.

Guatemala's evaluation included eight basic education projects (four active and four completed) all rated as successful with a promising future for continued progress toward adequate educational opportunity for all Guatemalans. Honduras' project is a massive program for training primary school teachers that is highly professional and well financed (for Latin America): 27 million total, $15 million U.S. Administratively, however, it has had serious problems.

The Dominican Republic's project is a complex and sophisticated one. It is aimed at eliminating the residual pockets, mainly rural, of unequal educational opportunity. It focuses on the technologies required for administering an effective national school system: research and planning, information systems, educational materials, school maintenance and "Project Administration."

LAC's one participant training (per se) project is also in the Dominican Republic with AID funds, $5 million, wholesaled to the national educational credit foundation (a common formula in Latin America). This project has had problems because, at AID's behest, gifted but poor applicants without hard collateral for educational loans were encouraged to compete for educational grants for technical training within and outside the country. This was not liked, however, by some of the grantee foundation's traditionalist board members who do not favor either unsecured loans or grants. This controversy has held up the project for two years.

In vocational education, there were three projects in total for the entire region. The one in Jamaica was rated by the evaluators as a substantial failure. The one in Ecuador is a small OPG supporting teacher training for

handicapped children. Haiti's project to train sub-professional personnel through a non-formal education program with emphasis on the needs of the rural work force targets a serious need. It may contribute to resolving the problem of the inutility of the arcane formal vocational education system the country now has. However, the project got off to a bad start involving a conflict between the head of the host institution and AID's contract party chief. The conflict held up initial action for almost two years and later had the training center closed once for three months. The project is now proceeding with 5 of 15 objectives abandoned, 7 behind schedule but gaining and expected to meet the PACD, and with 3 already accomplished. Evaluators deplored the conflict between the Ministry of Education's Training Center Director and the contractor's Chief of Party, indicating that the conflict might have been mitigated or avoided by closer USAID oversight.

F. Local and Regional Development

This report's definition of Local and Regional Development is limited; a number of projects that might have been put in this category are covered under Agriculture. All projects whose main economic focus is agriculture, whether a regional or a national effort, are covered under Agriculture. The validity of the regional approach is recognized and the importance of applying an integrated package of development activities to a defined region is equally recognized. If the central focus of such a project, however, is to increase agricultural productivity and income, it has been classified under Agriculture. Thus, for example, most projects in Africa that are focused on a region and are multi-disciplinary, are nevertheless classified under Agriculture because the end aim of these projects is to increase agricultural production.

On the other hand, there are in AID's portfolio, as reflected in the 1984 evaluations, projects that are more regional than agricultural in nature, though they do not necessarily exclude agriculture. The strategy of these projects involves a focus on development at governmental jurisdictional levels below the national level, and the emphasis is on "balanced" development, and decentralization of final decision making powers, across a wide spectrum, to political or economic (or both) "regions" within the country. They can be the

equivalent of states, counties, municipalities, or groupings of such into "development regions." The goal is to get the entire development process in motion and functioning at once within these jurisdictions, relieving the "Center" of the burden of centralized planning and control.

Near East

Five of eight such projects are in the Near East, three of them in Egypt alone. In Egypt the projects support decentralization of the management of mutually agreed-upon development programs to the governorates (states) and, through them, to the village level, with development planning originating at the village level and proceeding to district, governorate and center where the forward planning process culminates. After that, management's responsibility again devolves to the regional and local governments. The 1984 projects include a Basic Village Services Project to train village council members in local self-government and development, and to finance basic local infrastructrure development. A second project establishes a $30 million loan fund under which village councils make loans to private individuals and groups, including cooperatives, for small industry enterprises. A third project sets up a $100 million fund to finance water and sewerage projects to be carried out in and by three "intermediate" Egyptian cities. The first two projects have been successes. The third is faltering because of inadequate administration at the municipal level.

In Jordan, AID is helping with similar decentralized development efforts, the example reviewed in 1984 being a $28 million loan made to the Jordan Valley Authority for schools, health facilities, housing, government buildings, etc., in the valley and in the southern Ghors and the Wadi Araba. This project is rated a success.

In Tunisia one multi-sectoral regional development project in the 1984 evaluations was an OPG at the rural community level. The OPG ($1,317 million) was to PVO, Save the Children Federation (SCF), and it emphasized SCF training of Tunisians in CBIRD methodology. (CBIRD is Community-Based Integrated Rural Development). While the concept of training more skillful local participants in development was appreciated, the Tunisians did not react well to being made

"students" of and by SCF. The evaluation reported that SCF was soon to be replaced by a local PVO which would carry on the program, probably not using the CBIRD methodology developed by SCF.

Asia

Asia provided only one decentralized regional development project for evaluation in 1984. The 1984 Asian case is Thailand's "Decentralized Development Management Project," intended to make feasible the devolution of responsibility for major portions of the country's development program to townships and districts, by training the staffs of these governmental units in the design and implementation of local development projects and programs. This training is being carried out by a mixed technical assistance team of 17 technicians-trainers. The project is still too young to evaluate in terms of long-range effectiveness and it has had problems in getting started. The evaluators report that all seem agreed, however, that devolution of development project design and management to district and local government levels in Thailand is essential to the long-term success of Thailand's development program.

Latin America

In Latin America there are a number of regional integrated rural development projects focused on agriculture and so classified in this report. No within-country general "regional" development projects surfaced among the 1984 evaluations.

G. Cross-Sectoral Development Support and Management Projects

A new breed of development project appears to be emerging, in Asia and the Near East in particular, to meet the demands of development as the process matures. A growing number of USAID Missions are creating, with their host governments, projects dealing directly on a national jurisdiction-wide basis with the planning, management, financing and staffing of the nation's development program across all the key sectors. The central needs, as the developers of

these projects see them, are massive programs of participant training and technical assistance in the fields most relevant to development; not necessarily related to any specific ongoing projects.

There are eight projects in this category among the 1984 evaluations.

Bangladesh. In Bangladesh, AID has since 1978 sponsored a Technical Resources Project providing for technical assistance, studies, training, and project development, applicable to all the sectors. The goal of the project is to increase the Bangladesh Government's ability to respond to its development problems through improved: (1) policy research; (2) project development; (3) management; and (4) evaluation. The highest priority subjects are agriculture, rural development, energy and women's programs. The evaluation of the project suggests that it had not (in February 1984) lived up to its initial expectations, nor to its potential. However, continuation, revitalization and modification of the project were recommended, in recognition that the project has potential, despite weak host country performance thus far.

Thailand. The "Emerging Problems of Development" Project was established in 1980 as a follow-on to the Transfer of Technology and Management Skills Project (1976-80). Its purpose is to support and improve national socio-economic policy development, program planning and pre-project analysis in areas most urgent to the solution of national problems. The project was designed to provide rapid response to development initiatives with consultant services, participant training, research, pre-feasibilty studies, development seminars and workshops especially as related to policy reform and program intervention. The evaluation report stated that the project was remarkably successful especially in light of the short period of time it had had to function when evaluated.

Sri Lanka. The third-Asian all sectors development support project is in its seventh year of cross-sectoral support of the principal development subjects, using participant training and technical assistance as its tools. According to the evaluation, the participant element has been a major success, the technical assistance element less so because the specific TA activities undertaken were too diverse and not adequately related to basic national development goals.

Nevertheless, the logic of the "project" and its promise are sufficient that the evaluators recommend a major follow-on project with both the USAID and the GOSL giving substantially more attention to careful definitions of more precise goals and objectives and to resource allocation planning both as among projects and within the internal planning and management of each sub-project.

Morocco. Not all cross-sector needs are being met by massive doses of participant training and short-term technical assistance. Analogous but different are the approaches being taken by Morocco and Egypt. Morocco sees its principal need as a wide-ranging social and economic research program, for the lack of which Morocco's development planning is finding itself on uncertain grounds. Some 60 research-results needs have been identified to be met by Moroccan researchers. At evaluation time after three project years, 38 active research projects were in process. No technical assistance from abroad had been involved. Begun as a project of Mohamed V University the project languished until transferred to the National Center for Scientific Research which breathed life into it. The evaluators concluded that "the project at the 11th hour has become something more significant, promising and relevant than originally planned. It represents an immediate opportunity at minimal cost to make a significant contribution to applied research in Morocco." At the outset, the concepts had been sound -- then disappointment had set in because of bad luck in implementation. The project then was rescued, with USAID's help, and restored to its role as a data resource center for Moroccan development.

Egypt. Egypt, too, saw at an early stage the importance of an applied science and technology research effort. The project began in 1977 with Phase II continuing in 1980 and scheduled now to continue to 1987 with plans in mind for renewal after that. As of the end of 1983, $24.4 million had been provided by AID in support of the Egyptian Academy of Scientific Research and Technology. The project's purpose is: "to improve the institutional capacity of the Egyptian S&T community to develop and manage research programs to solve priority development problems." In this case the focus is on "in-country" rather than participant training and on very substantial U.S. external

technical assistance. The three U.S. agencies that are providing technical assistance include the National Academy of Sciences, the NIH, the University of Wisconsin, Georgia Tech, the National Bureau of Standards, and MIT. In addition, five American scientists serve on a 10-person Joint Consultative Committee which provides overall guidance to the project.

The evaluators reported that the project is highly regarded in Egypt as being, among the more important of its efforts to expand the country's intellectual foundations for development.

Only three similar type projects in the 1984 review group surfaced outside Asia and the Mediterranean in Jamaica, Portugal, and Sierra Leone.

Jamaica. Jamaica's Technical Consultants and Training Project (1981-85; $19.46 million) is a very substantial effort to use participant training and rapid action technical assistance on a crash basis to meet the urgent needs, across the boards, of a badly deteriorated private sector economy and an almost equally decimated public service sector. The project has proven to be very useful.

Portugal. While AID's Portugal program, 1975-83, was *sui generis*, it bears a strong resemblance, in many respects, to Jamaica's "Consultant and Training Project" combined with the concurrent ESF program in Jamaica. The Portugal program bears a resemblance, as well, to what Thailand, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Egypt and Morocco are trying to do with their cross-sectoral development support programs. In the case of Portugal, however, as in Jamaica, it was crisis assistance that was the essence of the project. The basic objectives were to salvage the economy from chaos and to keep it, once stabilized, on an even keel, and growing. The tools were first, balance of payments support; second, technical assistance across the sectors; and third, the financing of schools, housing, water, health, higher education and food for peace projects, all in one omnibus program designed to blanket the country's socio-economic needs.

Sierra Leone's "Increasing Revenues for Development" project is a standard AID-IRS tax reform and administration project that appears, from the evaluation

study made by the Sierra Leone Consulting Firm, Pannell, Kerr and Foster, to have been successful. The project cost $772,000, primarily for IRS Technical assistance, training, and commodities over the period 1978-83. It resulted in improving Sierra Leone's capabilities in tax administration, actually resulting in increased revenues during the worldwide recession of the early 1980s.

Sierra Leone is the only USAID Mission in the world that reported a "Revenues for Development" project in 1984.

H. Women in Development

In 1984, a total of six "Women in Development" projects were reported, four of them in Latin America. Kenya accounts for a fifth; and the South Pacific's Republic of Kiribati has the sixth. It is understood that roles for women are meant now to be built into all appropriate projects; that women constitute half the human resource pool of a nation, and a high percentage of its heads of household. As such, women should take part equally in all development processes. Hence, a simple enumeration of projects "for women only" would not be an accurate description of the many instances of AID's efforts in support of women's roles in mainstream development programs. It is not possible in this report, however, to identify what these myriad instances might be. Below in summary are the six specific WID projects from the 1984 evaluations that can be reported upon.

Kenya. AID made a grant of $125,000 in 1980 to Partnership for Productivity, (PFP), matched by $175,000 from other sources, to support a two-year program to strengthen PFP capacity to promote entrepreneurship among women and women's organizations. The objective was to increase the productivity, independence and profits of women entrepreneurs. The project was valued both as an end in itself -- institutionalizing PFP's capacity to reach and teach women, and as a model for emulation elsewhere. It achieved the first objective very well. Starting from scratch, the project ended with 11 staff members, 25 women's groups in intensive care and 50 additional outpatient groups being served. There is substantial evidence of replicabilty, though none of replication thus far.

Kiribati. (The Gilbert Islands) encompasses three million square miles of ocean, hundreds of islands, a land mass of 372 square miles and a population of 60,000. The project is Aia Mala Aine Kiribati (AMAK) or Women's Ring of Friendship. Its institutional components are the National Women's Federation, a new government-sponsored entity, a "ring" of Catholic church-sponsored women's clubs and another "ring" of Protestant-sponsored clubs. Both of the Church groups have long been established. When the government of Kiribati in 1980 invited the Foundation for the Peoples of the South Pacific (FSP) (200 W. 57th Street, New York, NY) to conduct a survey of potential development activities for women, the Foundation's team found this network of clubs already established, and if somewhat competitive and sometimes divisive, nevertheless, solidly cohesive when their attention was focused on their country's women's problems -- notably those of maternal and child health and water, health and sanitation in general. One datum characterizes the problem: the infant mortality rate is 87 per thousand, due to a combination of the high birth rate and water, food, hygiene, housing and soil deficiencies. AMAK was created to focus the several organized women's groups on the several essentially environmental health and nutrition problems.

USAID's grant of $252,000 to FSP was made in 1982, matched by local contributions to the project of $52,000. Project funds were used to cover the personnel, training, travel, equipment and space costs of workshops, staff training, water tanks, water seal latrines, pig and chicken, and bakeries and sewing projects. According to the FSP evaluator this on-going project has been highly successful. The response of the women, the clubs, and the communities has been unexpectedly warm and positive. Without a Project Evaluation Summary (PES) it has not been possible to determine what AID's evaluation of the evaluation is or what its plans are for continuing support. The project is, however, achieving its objectives of alleviating illness, disease, and malnutrition, and is contributing to the improvement of women's economic status as well as creating strong, activist women's institutions that, with resources, can become increasingly important. How they expect to carry on when U.S. assistance ends is not clear.

The Island of Hispaniola accounts for two of Latin America's four WID projects. The Dominican Republic project is a grant to El Centro de Entrenamiento y Asessoria para la Mujer (CENAM-Center for Training and Advisory Services for Women) focused on the needs of women in the urban slum areas of Santo Domingo. Specific training and advisory services are directed to vocational training and employment counseling on the one hand, and to health, nutrition, housing and transportation on the other. Also involved is an employment service for employers in the private sector. The objective is to integrate poor women into the labor market while providing support services that help them become permanently stable and productive workers. An objective recently added is that of providing entrepreneurial training, as well, for this same target group of poor urban women. An external evaluation in June 1983 found the project: (a) half off course, but remediable; (b) not significant thus far in terms of macro impact on the poverty and unemployment of poor urban women; but (c) on the other hand, highly effective in its micro effects on the limited number of women the project had reached. They had successfully penetrated the labor market, and improved the quality of their families' lives. The evaluation urged continuation and intensification of the project and special attention to entrepreneurship training.

Haiti On the Haiti side of Hispaniola is a project similar to that in Santo Domingo but more fully developed and more successful at this point. The OPG grantee, CHREPROF, is more fully involved in entrepreneur training, job placement, vocational training and in building its own capacity to expand from its original limited area of operation to other urban areas and also to rural areas. It actively seeks to assist increasing numbers of Haitian women throughout the country to breach the redoubts both of the urban and rural labor markets and the small business private sector as well. The evaluation report cites positive general program accomplishments marred by minor administrative problems but with the experience altogether auguring well for success on a significant scale.

Of the remaining projects, those in Guatemala and Paraguay -- the one in Guatemala is similar in objectives to those in Hispaniola but substantially less successful in operation. The grantee, the Rotary Club, proved not to have

adequate project implementation capabilities. The new private foundation intended to replace it as the permanent project implementer had not yet become operational by evaluation time.

The Paraguay project is a different story. The Paraguayan League of Women's Rights undertook in 1980 a comprehensive program of assistance to disadvantaged rural women covering the dissemination of information as to their legal, economic, social and civic rights; family planning and nutrition education; and legal services, per se. AID made a grant of $136,425 to which the league added $193,000 from Paraguyan resources, plus $290,000 of their own funds for building the League's offices, training facilities and for lodging and feeding poor rural women seeking league assistance in Asuncion. During three project years, 2177 participants attended 20 seminars, 450 community leaders were trained in family planning and nutrition, while another 208 leaders were oriented to extending their professional capabilities to the rural poor, pro bono. These included doctors, social workers, lawyers, judges, sociologists and other professionals. At the end of AID's support of the project 385 poor rural women had requested formal legal services with 110 cases resolved, 50 in progress, and the balance pending. The program will continue, and grow, without further AID assistance.

I. Urban Development and Urban Housing

This sector did not loom large in the 1984 set of evaluations. Only three projects, worldwide, were reported; one in Botswana whose urban housing problem is relative and is being successfully met; one in Sri Lanka where the volume of needs is substantially greater and is again being met successfully; and one in Honduras designed to deal with the urban housing problems of the capital city, Tegucigalpa, and the country's second largest city, San Pedro Sula.

The Botswana and Sri Lanka projects appear to be modest programs at a high quality level, and cost-effective. The Botswana program involved a total AID input of $1.1 million. The Sri Lanka evaluation does not mention investment levels, neither AIDs nor from Sri Lanka. It does, however, refer to some 40,000 urban-aided self-help units having been constructed between 1978 and

1983 at a unit cost of 20,000 R.S. The Honduras program consists of a $10 million HIG plus a $350,000 grant, of which less than $1.5 million had been expended between 1980 and the interim evaluation time, 1983.

These data are so meager as to provide little basis for conclusions or generalizations except to say that in 1984 urban development and housing projects were receiving little review attention by AID, and that in the case of the largest project, Honduras, housing construction was at the time of the evaluation seriously in arrears.

J. Private Sector Development

AID's 1984 Project Evaluations included only three projects designed to promote development in the private business and industry sector. Two of these projects -- in Panama and Costa Rica -- are among the most complex and sophisticated yet attempted by AID. While it is too early to assess results (there are few as yet to measure), these two projects are set down squarely in that arena of development that may become the most important as the 80's merge into the 90's. This arena is that of the semi-developed country endeavoring to make its way into the world economy through participation in world trade on a competitive basis, founded on new capacities to produce and to sell products of competitive quality at a profit. The emerging "Middle Income" countries now have nowhere else to go to sustain the economic growth they have achieved thus far, except into successful export programs. In some such countries, failing this, economic stagnation has already set in. Costa Rica is such a country. Panama is another.

Panama. The conceptual base for Panama's "Employment Planning and Generation Project" is as follows: economic stagnation has already resulted in massive urban unemployment which is recognized as the country's highest priority problem. Dealing with this problem requires a formula for economic growth that includes export product development of hi-tech, exotic, and other unique products, export promotion, and the technification of the labor force. The Panama project has three basic parallel thrusts involving all of the related elements of the ministries of the Government of Panama and of the private sector as well. These three thrusts are:

1. The creation by the Ministry of Commerce and Industry of a National Employment and Development Commission representing both private and public sectors, to formulate and promulgate policies and programs designed to stimulate export promotion and employment generation. This Commission is supported by a technical R&D staff charged with doing the research necessary to come up with the new programs needed.

2. A Manpower Information System in the Ministry of Labor, coordinating all national manpower information activities.

3. A Supervised Credit Program operated by the National Bank of Panama for making possible the creation of new and the modification and strengthening of existing industries aimed at breaking into new markets and expanding employment. Emphasis is on small industries since they tend to produce more jobs at a lower cost per job than does big industry.

The effect of these programs on Panama's aggregate performance in world markets is to be held under continuous scrutiny. This program is still too new for a results assessment.

Costa Rica. In Costa Rica the program established is similar to that in Panama with more emphasis on export promotion and less on employment generation, since economic stagnation in Costa Rica has not yet caused such serious unemployment as in Panama. Earlier second generation problems still hold Costa Rica's attention: the overall effects of stagnation on the monetary situation, on ability to pay the costs of a highly-developed public services sector, and on foreign exchange earnings and the current status of foreign exchange holdings in relation to external debt and to import needs. All these factors add up to a strong focus on export promotion which has led to the creation of two new institutional programs:

- A new bank to finance the creation and growth of export enterprises and provide technical assistance therewith; and

- An export trading company to "front for" Costa Rican industry in world markets and also provide technical assistance in marketing to Cost Rican firms seeking to compete in world trade.

While it is too early for judgments, the 1984 evaluation of this project rates both the bank and the trading company as falling short of their objectives thus far. The bank has turned out to be, for the present, very much a conservative bank where venture capital is the need. The trading company is undergoing reorganization, its beginnings also having been disappointing for lack of "drive" and knowledge of the territory.

Botswana. Botswana's "private sector" project is an OPG to Partnership for Productivity in the amount of $452,000 to enable the grantee to promote small industries in Old Naledi, the Georgetown of Botswana's new capital city, Gaberone. Old Naledi is a congested urban area on the fringe of Gaberone that is economically depressed by lack of skills, entrepreneurship and capital. PFP's project is to meet these needs and thereby raise incomes and increase employment.

However, the project, begun in 1982, is reaching PACD having achieved only a fraction of its original goals. These are now regarded as having been over ambitious as to volume, though sound as to purpose. The Mission is now seeking means to help Botswana countinue to work toward its goals of small business and industry development in more effective ways than have been employed up to now.

K. Social and Civic Development

Historically, this classification of AID projects stems from the enactment of Title IX of the Act for International Development in 1967. The passage of Title IX reflected the concern of the Congress that there be more popular participation in development and more self-help activities generated by the people themselves through private socio-economic and civic development organization. Special emphasis was placed on cooperatives and credit unions, on private sector national development foundations, on legal aid, and in general, on privately organized social service activities bearing on development. There are, of course, various other ways in which these types of projects could be categorized, especially in light of the 1973 amendments to the Act. The latter, while restating in still stronger terms the message of Title IX, so reduces the number and broadens the scope of the categories of aid as to make difficult their use for analytical purposes. Hence, the use in this report of the Title IX conception of private, essentially not-for-profit, socio-economic, and civic development projects.

There are among the 1984 Evaluations 15 reports on such projects, the fourth largest group in the study. Combined with Women in Development, which is

conceptually a part of the category, there are 23 such projects world-wide or almost as many as are in the third largest category, human resources development.

Three of the 15 projects are national development foundations; five are cooperatives and credit unions, and two are legal aid projects. Three are private social services or self-help community development projects. One is a project concerned with the resettlement of an indigenous (Indian) population group, and the 15th project, a rural housing program, is not entirely parallel but seemed more at home here than anywhere else.

Development Foundations

Two of the development foundation projects are in the Caribbean: one in Haiti and the other in Jamaica. Both are affiliated with the Pan American Development Foundation and each has as its basic objective the providing of credit and technical assistance to small business and industries in order to raise the incomes of such businesses and to create jobs. Both have been successful projects, have sought and received support beyond AID (IDB, PADF, local contributors, and other international contributors). The two USAIDs appear to be interested in continuing to help support these institutions until their sustainability as private sector entities is assured.

The third development foundation is the Yayasan Indonesia Sejahtera (Foundation for the Well-Being of Indonesia) - (YIS) sponsored jointly by AID and the Asia Foundation over the period September 1976 to June 1983. Gradually, over that period YIS not only gained many additional donors, but also established itself as a preeminently capable promotor of community-based development whose successes in Indonesia became known around the world among those concerned with community development, particularly in the areas of health, nutrition, grass-roots economic development through community action, population, and the integration of these discrete programs into programs of integrated community action. Within Indonesia, YIS cut a wide swath nationally, became an important collaborator in community programs with the various agencies of the GOI and

expanded from a 14-person staff in rented quarters in 1976 to a permanent headquarters and field work center with some 50 full-time staff including numbers of professionals who transferred from government service because they saw that they could enjoy more action and learn more, professionally, at YIS than with the government.

The Evaluation by the Asia Foundation in December 1983 at no point mentions the amounts of AID or TAF assistance, nor the plans of either, for the period after AID's project support ended in 1983.

Credit Unions and Cooperatives

All five of the credit unions and cooperatives projects are in Africa, perhaps reflecting the later arrival at the appropriate stage of development of the newly independent African nations. In Latin America, cooperatives and credit unions had begun early in the century. Among the Region's principal reactions to the "Alliance for Progress" in the early 1960s was a strong upsurge in such activities supported by AID from 1961 on, and given a still further boost by Title IX in the late 1960s. As in the case of health programs, there is evidence that there has been a carryover of Latin American experience to Africa via AID. The five African projects evaluated in 1984 included:

- Malawi's Union of Savings and Credit Cooperatives Project;
- The Gambia's Coop Training and Education Project;
- Cameroon's Credit Union Development Project;
- Lesotho's Credit Union Development Project; and
- The Regional ACOSCA Project (ACOSCA - African Cooperative Savings and Credit Association)

The last noted project, ACOSCA, lends perspective to the other four. It is an African-wide association of credit unions now numbering as members some 24 national credit union movements. Its purpose is to encourage the establishment of national credit union systems and to assist them to mature through training,

technical assistance and financial services. That 24 national credit union movements have been founded in Africa since this project began only in 1980, attests to its rapid early success. Problems have arisen, however, as to ACOSCA's longer term prospects for sustained self-support. It being an association of financial institutions rather than one itself, it is dependent on donations -- from its members and other donors. Some members are not paying their dues. Donors see no end, in this century, to their subsidizing financial role unless and until ACOSCA creates its own capacity to support its operations through the assured cooperation of its own members.

Three of the four country programs reviewed are credit union members of ACOSCA. They differ from development foundations and cooperatives in that they are essentially savings institutions dedicated to bringing about the growth of the domestic and household savings of lower and lower middle income families, with the resulting capital accumulation then utilized in turn to make loans to their "depositors" for agreed upon social and development family objectives. In other words they generate, through savings, the capital they lend to their saver-borrowers, whereas development foundations raise funds nationally and internationally to progressively increase their capitalization and to lend on terms advantageous to both lender and borrower. Cooperatives do some of both. In addition, agricultural cooperatives also perform a highly important marketing function, and provide related logistics services for their members as well.

Of the three national credit union programs, Malawi, Cameroon, and Lesotho, the first two are deemed to be highly successful. The Lesotho program has also been rated as having met its objectives though experiencing some early administrative difficulties. In the case of all three, as in the case of all credit unions, vigilance and diligence are required to assure the consistent application of sound business practices and of the principle of remaining within the bounds of financial self-sufficiency.

The Gambia's project is an Agricultural Cooperatives Training and Education program in which the Cooperative League of the USA (CLUSA) is the technical assistance agency and recipient of 85.5% of the USAID's grant. CLUSA's role has been to help organize and carry out a program for the training of members,

employees and officers of cooperatives in cooperatives operations and management. The training also encompasses the training of farmer members in basic agronomic practices and in literacy. Since the USAID project addresses only some of the training needs of the cooperatives program and is not concerned with the rest, there is no way that USAID Gambia can be credited or debited with the current status of the Gambian agricultural cooperatives movement, which is in flux. It can be said however, that the CLUSA training program has made a positive contribution toward a potentially favorable outcome for the cooperative movement.

Legal Aid

The two projects in this area are:

- o Paraguay: Legal to the Poor, and
- o Indonesia: Legal Aid Assistance Program

Paraguay. The very successful program in Paraguay consisted of AID's providing a small grant ($130,000) to enable the University of Asuncion School of Law to extend its legal services for the poor to the rural areas of the country. With this small donation, plus $200,000 in counterpart provided by the University, the School of Law did indeed establish itself as a major legal assistance force in rural Paraguay. After a slow start requiring extending the PACD one year, the program got underway and rapidly expended the available funds to accomplish the following: 3000 cases of legal service were undertaken, 1153 cases were resolved; 115 law professors, 1240 lawyers and 490 law students participated. Most important, the program is continuing on a permanent basis, fully funded by the University without USAID assistance.

Indonesia. The Indonesia Program is substantially larger and more complex. AID made grants in 1979 and 1982 totalling $699,000 to the Asia Foundation which in turn provided these funds to the Indonesian legal aid asistance program, known as the PPBHI (Program Penunjang Bantuan Hukum Indonesia).

PPBHI had been created to provide support to Indonesia's burgeoning legal aid and related human rights and justice movements. These efforts were developing

in the late 1970s in the universities and through legal aid societies and similar organizations supporting democratic development in Indonesia. In 1978, President Soeharto himself, in outlining his eight-path plan for development, described the eighth path as being "equal opportunity for access to justice." This pronouncement, contained both in the third 5-year plan and in his annual Presidential Message, was apparently instrumental in AID's decision to be of assistance, through the Asia Foundation. The cooperation of The Ford Foundation, using its own funds, was also enlisted.

Indonesia's legal system is highly sophisticated and complex as are education and training for the law. While project funds were used to support outright legal aid services, they were also, and to a greater extent, used to support legal aid research and training in the country's universities, and also "research" designed to lead to fuller development of Indonesian legal infrastructure in its totality. Another important aspect of the project was to involve in these activities, selected Regional Legal Training and Research Centers, plus a national center, focused on legal aid as an integral part of the nation's legal infrastructure.

In substance the project appears to have begun to accomplish what it set out to do. The process of sophisticating legal aid and the system of justice is in full swing. Administratively, the project was a nightmare, it appears, due to chronic friction among USAID/Jakarta, AID/W, TAF, PPBHI and the end-user grantees. Had there been less friction there might have been a follow-on project in view by the time of the evaluation. At that point, however, (December 1983), Indonesia was not inclined to request further assistance from the Asia Foundation, nor the Foundation from AID.

Self-Help Community Development Projects

The projects in this sub-category differ from those in Chapter II F. in that their grantees (or borrowers) are in the private sector. In Chapter II F., "Local and Regional Development" refer to local government. In this section, reference is to projects at the community level whose participants are

primarily private citizens or members of local voluntary organizations seeking various means of effecting civic improvements and strengthening the local economy.

Two of the three projects in this category reviewed in 1984 are direct USAID Mission operations. Most Missions have a $50,000 to $100,000 annual discretionary fund for the support of small but uniquely important community development projects where timely assistance can have a strong impact and enhance U.S. and AID goodwill in the community concerned and, in the aggregate, in the country as a whole.

In Peru, the Mission's "Special Development Activities Fund (SDF), as it is called, is focused on two kinds of small projects: (1) socially oriented community development activities with strong self-help elements; and (2) income-generating projects sponsored by community or private groups or individuals aimed at enhancing local economic activity with a strong capability to become quickly self-sustaining. The project has been funded at a $50,000 annual level, but the Mission had planned to double this in the year following the subject evaluation. The evaluators, two University of California, Berkeley graduate students found the project to be very effective in general with the socially oriented projects significantly more successful. They also found however, that the objective of "making points" for the U.S. in public relations terms is not being met well. While everyone they talked to (a 24 project sample) knew that AID was the donor, they did not know that AID is an agency of the United States.

The South Pacific Regional Project, known since its inception in 1978 as the "Accelerated Impact Program" had, up to mid-1984, provided funds for some 300 self-help community development projects, including some income generating projects. It has in this period disbursed a total of $1.26 million, or an average of more than $200,000 per year, most of it going to the communities of Fiji, Tonga and Western Samoa. AID funds were supplemented by technical help from numbers of Peace Corps volunteers. In fact, PCVs are highly important project identifiers and developers as well as implementation helpers in the conduct of this program.

The evaluators gave the project high marks on all counts including the engendering of "friendship and goodwill for the U.S." In addition, they came to a positive conclusion regarding the worth of income generating projects, which is at variance with the Peru evaluators' judgement regarding this type of project. Their stated view was that in the South Pacific, income generating projects appear promising and should be accorded a higher priority than they now have, focusing on the income to be derived from the increased sale of fish and other food products through "assistance providing the required tools of the trade."

A third private sector community development effort reviewed in 1984 is also located at Suva, Fiji. This is the AID OPG of the Fiji YMCA for a rural works project (local physical infrastructure) and a vocational training project whose relation to the work's project was not clarified in the evaluation. The vocational training program, budgeted at $17,675, covers out board motors, chainsaw operation and repair, motor mechanics, carpentry, and sewing machine repair. The nature of rural works was not specified beyond the information that $20,500 of the $45,000 budget had gone to employ, train, and equip three "rural workers," presumably project and community participation organizers.

The AID grant is part of a larger Fiji YMCA program budgeted at $660,000 involving other external and domestic donors. Implementation of the USAID portion of the Fiji YMCA project has been adversely affected by its involvement in the difficulties that the Fiji YMCA has had in general in administering its relatively large and complex overall program.

The Central Chaco and the Indians of Paraguay

The Central Chaco contains 70,000 square miles of scrub intermingled with grassy plains lying to the west of the Paraguayan River. This land mass constitutes 2/3 of all Paraguay and has for many centuries been the homeland of a dozen Indian tribes, who today make up some 2% of the country's population. These Indians are a very poor, disadvantaged minority whose quality of life has been progressively worsened by increasingly crowded conditions in existing Chaco agricultural communities caused by the high percentage of landless

families living with their few landowning relatives. In the 1920s to 1940s Mennonite groups settled into the midst of this situation, both geographically and socio-economically, and both as settlers and as missionaries. They founded Asociacion de Servicios de Cooperacion Indigena (Indian) Mennonita (ASLIM).

AID's project was to provide financial help through an OPG to ASLIM for the carrying out of a pilot resettlement project. It was projected that 40 landless families would be settled on their own land, provided with the basic agricultural equipment and infrastructure for a start, along with housing, education, health services, cooperatives, and a program to control tuberculosis in dogs.

The project started and ended on schedule with all input and output targets met. The lessons learned are being studied by some 30 communities with a view to emulation. How such emulation can take place without futher USAID help or the taking over of this financial burden by the GOP is not clear.

Rural Housing in Honduras

This project is a program of the Honduras National Housing Institute which is essentially concerned with urban low cost housing. The Institute, however, has established a Rural House Improvement Unit (RHIU) which has in turn inspired the creation of 12 private non-profit institutions to develop home improvement programs for the rural poor in their respective areas of the country. AID supports the RHIU through the National Institute. RHIU so far has been allocated $1.5 million to make loans to rural families to improve the houses they live in -- to build roofs, floors, walls, windows and doors, toilets, and to construct additional rooms. In the first two years of a four year project, over 1/3 of the total funds allocated were loaned to some 2109 families. The average loan was $245. At evaluation time the project was essentially on schedule in most respects, and is regarded as successful.

L. Disaster Relief Projects

Two such projects were evaluated in 1984. One is the "Displaced Persons Program" in El Salvador; the other is the "Drought Relief Program" in Bolivia.

El Salvador. By late 1981 almost one million persons had been displaced from their homes and home towns by the civil war in El Salvador. While most of these "desplazados" simply moved to the fringes of the capital city and to the "safer" intermediate size cities, rather than into refugee camps (about 20% did go to such camps), they all had to be provided jobs, food, and basic health services. With unemployment running at 40% nationally and higher in the cities, few of the displaced were employed other than in a special GOES Jobs program which provided steady employment for some 10,000 displaced persons per month. A unique aspect of this El Salvador "refugees" problem was that there was, in fact, a major difference in El Salvador at that time between El Salvador's displaced persons and generic "refugees." El Salvador's displaced persons were not "refugees" in the accepted sense. They were dislodged from their homes, some for reasons of extreme provocation (homes destroyed), others more from the fear than the reality of imminent danger. They were thus free to return home if and when the fortunes of the conflict made this possible. Many also had families to go to in other parts of El Salvador. Such families were themselves underemployed if not unemployed and inadequately housed with difficult access to health services. They had already been burdened by the crowding of families together before new relatives arrived. Yet there was the continued trickle out as well as in of these displaced families -- to jobs in nearby cities, back to their homes or nearer to them, and to the distant towns in the west where there was little fighting.

The AID "Displaced Persons Program," with the GOES, mounted a massive program of basic services for displaced persons consisting of a food program, preventive health services, medical care for the ill, injured and wounded, the Jobs Program, supplemental feeding programs for the serious malnutrition problem and a continuous program of urging the displaced to resettle and reorganize their lives while at the same time urging community groups in free areas throughout the country to help by absorbing displaced families.

The USAID and the GOES, in short, tried to do everything possible to alleviate the burdens of the displaced and to help end their status as displaced persons; with one very curious omission, according to the USAID Mission Report. In this report, covering AID's handling of the displaced persons crisis, no mention is

made of the deprivation of schooling suffered by the children of the displaced families. While it seems unlikely that displaced children's schooling needs were ignored by the USAID and the GOES, the Evaluation Report makes no mention of the subject.

Bolivia: December 1983 Evaluation Report on the Bolivian Drought, 1983-84. In 1983 Bolivia suffered a drought that caused severe harvest losses in connection with the April 1983 harvest and greatly reduced the planting potential for the 1984 harvest. Fourty-four percent (44%) of the country's farm families lost 60% to 80% of their 1983 crop and could plant less than half the normal amount for the April 1984 harvest. They also lost 30% to 50% of their livestock. The recovery period for these families is estimated to be 3 to 5 years. Another 8% lost 40% of their harvest, planted less than 60% of their 1984 crop and face a recovery period of 2 years. All these families also suffered gravely from malnutrition and inadequate drinking water, both humans and the surviving animals. The other 48% of the population, while not suffering crop or livestock losses directly would have also become victims of the drought-borne national food supply shortage, of famine proportions, had not AID stepped in with food aid.

The severity of the problem was aggravated by the prognosis that Bolivia's drought would extend on into 1984 and 1985 and possibly beyond.

To relieve the consequences of the 1983-84 crop and livestock losses, AID had made available by December 1983 $72 million in food and funds for relief and recovery as follows: $23 million in rice and wheat on a sales basis; $22 million in grains on a grant basis and $27 million in loan/grant funds for recapitalizing the affected rural areas' destroyed resources, primarily livestock.

The evaluation reviewed the uses being made, and those planned, of this $72 million program and made a series of 47 recommendations for changes in the practices that had been established earlier in 1983. The evaluators also outlined a medium term program for dealing with the recovery effort over the ensuing several years.

The most serious problem the evaluators found on arrival was that most PL 480 food sales had, up to December 1983, gone to urban families in cities outside the drought area, leaving the starving direct victims still starving. Grant food aid had been allocated to the affected rural areas, in principle, but was not arriving effectively due to logistics problems and to the insistence of the Bolivians that such free food be made available only on a food-for-work-basis--an impractical, doctrinaire position under the circumstances, in the view of the evaluators.

The evaluation was a special one requested by the Mission to plan the future utilization of food relief resources. The result was the evaluators 47 action recommendations which the Mission adopted and ordered implemented. They covered the following principle categories of recommendations:

- To expand the staff engaged in the disaster relief program;
- To create a data collection system to monitor the drought and its impact;
- To establish a program to recapitalize the farmers affected; and
- To refocus the distribution of food donations and rice sales to those rural areas most in need.

M. PL 480 Projects

There are 19 PL 480 country project evaluations listed among the 1984 reports, of which eighteen were available for review: none were from the Near East; four were from Africa, with seven from Asia, and eight from Latin America. The one evaluation report not available for review was one of four submitted by USAID/Bolivia.

In Africa, two of the projects were Title II projects; one Title I, and one Title III. In Asia, six were Title II and one Title III. In Latin America, five were Title II projects; two were Title III and one Title I. Worldwide, then, there were two Title I projects evaluated, thirteen Title II; and four Title III.

Africa

The two Africa Title II projects were from Zaire and Senegal.

Zaire. The purpose of the evaluation was to study the nutritional impact of feeding programs in the greater Kinshasa area, in seven zones in which 37% of the total population of Kinshasa live. Within these seven zones the evaluators studied the nutrition-related programs of the Catholic Archdiocese, CRS, Mama Yemo Hospital, The Salvation Army and CEPLANUT. Their findings included the following: (1) Kinshasa's four largest nutrition programs reach only 18% of all the city's children and only seven percent of the malnourished children; (2) general pre-school consultations were not found to have reduced malnutrition with or without take home food packages; (3) singling out malnourished children did improve their nutritional status (+4 for onsite feeding; and + 1 for take-home food package programs); and (4) no evidence was found that any type of program had an impact on the surrounding neighborhood.

Senegal. The Title II program in Senegal distributes annually some $10 million worth of food to over 100,000 children. The program is a joint operation of the USAID, CRS and the Government of Senegal. There are many more families who want to be included in the program than can be accommodated by the program at its present level. This in-depth evaluation, a joint USAID, GOS, CRS effort, makes observations and comes to conclusions significant not only for Senegal but for all developing countries, especially those in Africa. Of special importance among these observations and conclusions are the following:

1. It can be verified that where a soundly prescribed feeding program can be effectively administered, severe malnutrition can be mitigated. Senegal has 400 MCH centers which serve as the focal point for the nutrition program. Two-thirds are in rural areas, 25% in semi-urban and the rest in urban areas. These centers have effective programs but can reach only a small part of the population that needs the program. (Program coverage is 10.3% of all children under age 5 in Senegal.)

2. An important reason why the nutrition program is effective is that to take part children and their mothers have to go to the MCH Centers where they are also introduced to other health programs including vaccination, innoculation and health education, which in turn bear on nutrition.

3. The correlation between dysentery and malnutrition is very high with the incidence of diarrhea inexplicably no less high among nutrition program participants than among non-participants. The evaluation states "Diarrhea was mentioned by the Medecin-chef as one of the most common causes of death for children attending the centers. There were no differences in diarrhea prevalence between participant and non-participant children and a virtual complete lack of knowledge among mothers of both groups regarding its treatment. These findings must be considered extremely important for improving program impact because of the influence of this very common disease on both the nutritional status and mortality of these children." It will be recalled that the same conclusions were suggested by the information revealed by the health sector evaluations (Chapter II. D).

4. The lethal combination of malnutition and dysentery has its most devasting effects on children between the ages of 3 months and 3 years; thus, it is the children of this age group who need the program's attention most. However, the MOH is allowing a growing number of children age 3-5 to stay in the program, denying entry to those who need help more. The obvious theoretical solution is to vasty expand the program beyond the present 10.3% coverage. Some combination of project expansion and proportionately increasing the participatation of three months to 3-year olds is clearly essential.

Liberia. The Title I program in Liberia provided $50 million over a three-year period for two purposes: (1) to help Liberia meet its foreign exchange requirements; and (2) to generate local currency counterpart funds for use in financing priority agricultural and rural development projects. Along with other U.S. and other donor assistance, the project helped achieve the first purpose without having become a disincentive to local rice production. To achieve its second purpose, the $50 million worth of local currency realized from the sale of U.S. CCC rice was allocated to some 59 priority agricultural and rural development projects, via a series of six U.S.-GOL agreements from August 1980 to December 1982.

The USAID Mission and the GOL had difficulty in actually holding, disbursing and accounting for rice sale proceeds and getting them applied to the 59 selected projects on a timely basis. This has resulted in a Mission determination to tighten its controls on the next Title I project (1984) particularly in the area of counterpart funding. The evaluation summary states that as an economic stabilization measure the project substantially achieved its objectives but that it was less successful in making effective use of counterpart funds to achieve long-term development objectives, which proved to be of secondary priority.

Sudan. The Title III project in the Sudan was initiated by a $100 million grant executed in December 1979, since augmented by three subsequent amendments totalling $80 million. The projects' purposes have been to assist the Sudan with its Economic Stabilization Reform Program while also assuring that the rural development program would not be reduced as a result of the stabilization reform effort. The evaluators, writing in November 1983, concluded that the project has been a substantial success. First, the utility of the capital assistance provided is obvious. Second, the Sudanese proved to be unusually capable in using PL 480 local currency proceeds to finance development projects effectively and in an accountable way. Third, the USAID's involvement, through the project, in the IMF stabilization Program" evolved into a major policy reform instrument in its own right." The evaluators concluded by recommending that the project be continued with emphasis on the USAID's involvement in policy reform and a new emphasis on devising more rapid disbursing techniques for projectized activities funded by Title III generated counterpart funds.

Asia

Asia's PL 480 project evaluations were submitted from Indonesia, (one Title II project); India, (two Title II projects); Bangladesh (one Title II and one Title III projects); and Sri Lanka (one Title II project).

Indonesia. Indonesia's Title II program is composed of two major parts: (1) the Food for Work Program; and (2) the Food and Nutrition program, both operated by CRS with a Jakarta staff of two Americans and seventeen local employees. In 1982, the value of CRS assistance exceeded $9 million reaching some 250,000 recipients in 15 of the country's 27 provinces.

CRS functions through local voluntary organizations, called counterparts, with their activities coordinated with the Government of Indonesia which also provides some financing through the Ministries of Health, Social Affairs, Agriculture, and Transmigration.

The Food for Work Program is intended to generate employment and create rural infrastructure. Projects are organized around villages' desires for needed projects, and workers are paid only in food (rice, corn, bulgar and milk). In monetary terms the "wages" paid are low, but most participants see its value in terms of its enhancing their community's capital investment in economic growth.

The Food and Nutrition Program is aimed at combatting malnutrition among poor children and their pregnant and lactating mothers. Children under five are included but an effort is being made to "graduate 3-year-olds in A condition" where possible. The evaluators made a number of constructive criticisms of both aspects of the Indonesia program, within the context of strongly endorsing it, overall, for its major contributions to Indonesian development. On the basis of their analysis of the program's strengths and weaknesses, the evaluation team proposed a redesigned multi-year program. The principal suggestions involved tighter CRS counterparts organization and working relations, a better designed national program framework, a strengthened Food for Work Program emphasizing more benefits for the poor, and more clearly defined end goals for the nutrition program. The evaluators endorsed a unique new aspect of this already unusual Title II program, namely, its credit and savings program for mothers. This program, already underway, can be developed, the evaluators pointed out, both to increase the rate of establishment of participating mothers' enterprises and to make it possible for this element of the project to contribute financially to the support of its clinical activities.

Finally, the evaluators recommended a new multi-year budget of $9-12 million over the next five years for a total of $62 million.

India. The School Feeding Program

School feeding (SF) is one of three phases of AID's Title II Program in India, the other two being FFW and maternal and child nutrition. Because questions had been raised as to the relative merits and thus priorities of the three uses of Title II, USAID/India requested the National Council for Education, Research and Training to conduct a study of the effects of SF on student enrollment and

student retention. The presumption apparently was that unless SF had a highly significant impact on school attendance PL 480 food resources could be better used in the FFW and nutrition programs. In fact, in FY 1982 CARE/India had begun to effect a 50% reduction in its SF beneficiary levels at AID's request.

The subject evaluation report dated 29 March 1984 was limited to SF and its relation to school attendance. Its findings, in brief, were that SF has a positive impact on school attendance and retention, recommending that AID also "consider examining the fertility implications of SF through follow-on studies in countries with substantial Title II- supported school feeding programs," the implication being that there may be found a correlation between education continued beyond the first several years and lower fertility.

India - Title II, Food for Work

The Food for Work program in India is administered through CRS. It is actually carried out by the local communities themselves who have "a genuine sense of project ownership." The communities are associated but not directed by the local Catholic diocese representatives. The evaluation was conducted in two parts; one an assessment of "asset stream" benefits -- the utility to the community of completed work projects; and second, an evaluation of "recipient stream" benefits reflecting the impact on the direct receivers of food for work payments. The assets study showed high impact in terms of improving the farming capabilities of small and marginal farmers through irrigation and land leveling works, etc. Almost all projects were for private individuals or groups, ownership of the improved facilies increasing the degree of care accorded each such project after completion. The evaluation also showed that the program has its greatest impact on the poorest rural families.

The "recipients" study showed primarily that it significantly increased total employment in the four affected areas. The program is providing, in the target areas, 71 days of employment per year, or 21% of total annual household employment. Average family income increased more than one-third. Seventy-eight percent of the recipients were members of "scheduled tribes, castes and other backward classes" who are by definition India's neediest.

The attempt to measure nutritional impact did not succeed in yielding any reliable conclusions . It will take more than a year and the help of the Institute of Nutrition to measure effectively such relevant matters as weight and height measurements of children reached by the program.

Bangladesh: Title III

The commodities provided are: wheat, rice, vegetable oils and cotton. The counterpart generated is the local currency (TAKA) quivalent of $65 million. The uses of the counterpart funds are to finance projects in the following areas: irrigation, related hydraulic resources projects, agricultural development projects and grain storage facilities.

The evaluation reports that the GOBD has effectively managed these projects. The program's use to moderate price increases has also been effective as as has USAID's leveraged ability to affect food policies, in general, including the setting of procurement prices at levels high enough to encourage farmers to invest in HYV technologies.

The evaluation concluded by recommending early approval of the follow-on program for the next year, at a continuing level of $65 million.

Bangladesh - Title II Food for Work Impact Study

The first goal of the project has been to provide short-term employment, nutritional and income supplements to the landless and nearlandless. The second goal has been the promotion of self-sustaining development through improvement of rural infrastructures whose benefits are intended to be targeted to the small, marginal farmers and landless farm laborers.

The first goal has been evaluated a number of times since the program started in 1975 and has been found to be meeting its objectives. Implemented by CARE with the Food Ministry, the program has distributed 750,000 metric tons of wheat since 1975, approximately 1/2 of the Bangladesh FFW program. The principal activity supported by the program is the so-called earthworks

projects, specifically roads built on embankments together with embankments themselves. In 1984, 2000 such projects were completed. The 1984 evaluation focused on the second goal -- long-term development impact of improved infrastructure. The evaluators found that the project "appears to be meeting its secondary goal of stimulating economic and social development throughout rural Bangladesh." Specifically, the following advances were identified: improved local communications, reduced travel time and transport costs, increased use of new farm technologies, increased commercial activity, increased access to health and family planning services, and increased primary school attendance. However, the project appears not to have had an impact on the problem of crop production levels at the small farm level.

The evaluators recommended continuation of the project with special attention to be given to: bridges and culverts, maintenance, locating roads in proximity to other development activities, and to the brick surfacing of roads in the high distress areas subject to recurrent flooding.

Sri Lanka - Title II School Feeding.

CARE/Sri Lanka administers a school feeding program designed to provide a ration of pre-baked biscuits and milk to a target of 1,250,000 primary school children, 40.2% of whom are malnourished, during 180 school days each year. In the evaluators' view, however, with the increasing recognition that supplemental feeding cannot materially affect or cause significant catch-up growth in the anthropomorphic measures of children over five years of age, and because school feeding occurs only half a year each year, it was determined that this evaluation of the school feeding program should focus on the program's effect on enrollment, attendance and retention.

The principal findings of the study were that enrollment and attendance in the lower grades "appear to be enhanced by SF." However, the evaluators had so many negative questions about the validity of the data on which this weak conclusion was based that their subsequent qualifications all but invalidated the basic conclusion. In the end, the report, by implication, concluded that

the data do not clearly show that SF contributes to school attendance or retention. The evaluators on the other hand gave special credence to the empirical views of the many school teachers with whom they talked and who "revealed consistent positive support of school feeding." They stated that: "Until a substantial body of quantitative evidence is developed to refute these local experts, their (positive) views should be given equal, if not greater, weight than the tenuous statistical results gathered to date."

Latin America and the Carribbean

Bolivia - Title III

The original agreement called for $75 million in wheat. Because of political instability in the country, shipments were reduced to approximately $50 million worth during the "project year."

According to the evaluation report, the principal aim of the project was to generate local currencies to finance agricultural development projects in Bolivia. The use of Title III to help meet serious economic, including foreign exchange problems, was not emphasized although it is clear that the program literally saved Bolivia $50 million in foreign exchange. The report primarily covers the use of the counterpart generated. An early problem in this connection was that as the Bolivars were devalued the local currency value of AID's imported wheat also fell because the GOB used its official rate (b.44 per dollar) to make local currency payments into the Title III trust fund, instead of using the floating exchange rate which reached b269 per dollar before this was stopped. Meanwhile, the counterpart financed development program had lost $15 million dollars in local currency in the process.

The local currency generated by Title III sales in Bolivia was used to finance thirteen categories of development projects as follows: (1) Wheat Collection Centers; (2) Cooperatives; (3) Colonization Roads; (4) Agricultural Service Centers; (5) Pesticide and Plant Quarantine; (6) Integrated Rural Development Projects; (7) Conservation Projects; (8) Irrigation; (9) Small Farmers Program; (10) Campesino Scholarship Fund; (11) Rural Development Planning Studies; (12) Communicable Disease Control; and (13) Nutrition Improvement.

Nine of the thirteen programs are reported as having progressed normally through the period of political unrest, the most successful projects being those sponsored by the Departmental (state) Development Corporations which have a degree of independence from the central government that enables them to act more expeditiously than the national ministries. The evaluation recommends continuation of the project (political tranquility having been restored for the moment) and makes a series of specific, detailed, recommendations as to the next steps in the development of the 13 development project categories.

Bolivia - Title III, Emergency Rice Sales

This evaluation report constitutes a close-out audit of an emergency $8 million rice sales program carried out by a Bolivian organization, ENA, on behalf of the U.S. Government. It is an audit rather than an evaluation. The auditors identified 78 specific "exceptions" which the USAID reports are being rectified to the extent possible. The auditors also proposed 16 ways for improving emergency Title II sales programs for the future, which the USAID indicates it intends to adopt. Neither the audit, which is in Spanish, nor the PES indicate what the purpose or goal of the project was.

Bolivia Title II, FHI (Food for the Hungry International Emergency Food Program)

FHI is a U.S.-based PVO with both paid regular and volunteer staff. It had been working without AID support in Bolivia since 1977. When the 1982 drought emergency struck, FHI was entrusted with a $5 million emergency food distribution program focused on the victims of the drought. Its basic program was FFW in the drought areas with the dual purpose of providing food relief and improving agricultural conditions in the affected areas by building roads, potable water systems and community improvement programs in general. FHI also, however, operated five nutrition centers in the Department of La Paz intended to feed the most undernourished children in this area. Food supplied through PL 480 included: vegetable oil, wheat, flour, milk and rice, plus lentils in both the FFW and nutrition programs.

FHI, thrown into an emergency situation, made mistakes and was also the victim of too late, too little support from the PL 480 and AID procurement systems. The organization, however, was rated in the Missions's evaluations as having performed creditably and as having demonstrated its ability to handle larger, longer-term responsibilities. Hence, it was recommended that FHI be included in USAID Bolivia's long-term Title II program.

Peru - Title II

Peru's PL 480 program is the largest of its kind in Latin America, constituting over 70% of AID's total economic assistance to that country. Thirty-nine percent is in the form of Title II, representing 48,217 MT of foodstuffs annually, valued at $72 million, delivered to 1,177,500 beneficiaries or 6.5% of all Peruvians.

The Title II program is conducted through four PVOs, two of which are engaged in both FFW and MCH and two only in FFW. CARITAS (CRS' counterpart) is the largest with 45% of the total program; OFASA has 25%. In contrast to CARITAS, OFASA works almost entirely in the urban coastal areas. CARE conducts an FFW program in Greater Lima and SEPAS has an FFW program emphasizing reforestation projects in the rural highlands.

The evaluators reached the following principal conclusions with attendant recommendations for change and improvement where the conclusions were negative. It was concluded that both nutrition and FFW projects substantially improved the diets of those of the nation's most needy people whom they reach. It was found also that the programs do successfully focus their efforts on the neediest. In FFW projects, however, the nutritional impact is lessened because food is rationed on the basis of families of five, maximum. The actual average family size is closer to seven; thus, the food distributed is consumed by considerably more people than the number officially reported.

On the other hand, the evaluators suggested that in any case FFW should not be used as a principal instrument for nutrition enhancement. Focus on the latter

should be reserved to programs for "lactating mothers and children under six." FFW should concentrate on the contributions that the employment it creates can make to economic and social development.

In this connection the evaluators indicated that the Peru FFW program is not at present an effective promoter of development. The four PVOs involved do not adequately plan and organize their FFW activities so as to relate them to needed infrastructure, schools, health facilities, etc. Not only do the FFW projects lack an adequately supportive relation to development, states the evaluation, too many are "ornato publico" or public adornment-type activities which contribute little to meeting communities' development needs.

Finally, the evaluators were critical of Peru's PL 480 program, Title II, in particular for its having been allowed to reach an incidence that is 50% urban (34% in Lima alone), in the face of the established national development (and USAID) priority of rural, agricultural development. Peru already has the twelfth lowest per capita index of agricultural production in the world, which is the basic reason for its economy's serious chronic debility. The evaluation concludes by recommending that USAID take the responsibilty with its associated PVOs, for correcting the weaknesses pointed out, and delineates the steps that need to be taken to accomplish this.

Honduras - Title II

The Honduras Title II program has until recently emphasized nutrition programs: school feeding, MCH, and other child feeding programs. FFW was included late in the program as a result of floods and a subsequent drought in two departments. Eighty percent of the Honduras Title II program is administered by CARE; 20% by CRS/CARITAS. SF is, of course, conducted in cooperation with the MOE while the other nutrition programs involve the MOH. The evaluation was done by the USAID's Food for Peace Officer on the basis of field visits and reports of post field visits plus consultations with CARE, CRS and CARITAS.

The program is a small one in relation to the need: less than $4 million annually, according the the PES. There has, however, been fortuitious special

assistance. CARE received a $1.3 million Outreach Grant in 1982; ESF generations amounting to $690,000 have also gone to CARE. In addition, Title I generations totalling $1.7 million have been allotted to buy local foods to continue FFW activities and the Mission is considering monetization of PL 480 commodities which could directly benefit Title II program implementation.

As in the case of most Title II evaluations, this one does not effectively assess the actual impact of feeding programs on the nutritional status of recipients, presumably because the data needed to do this are not available. There is confidence that school feeding and other nutrition programs for lactating mothers and children outside the SF program do positively affect nutritional status of the recipients, especially mothers and children under three. The issue of whether the feeding of children of school age can positively affect their nutritional status was not addressed in the evaluation except by its implied assumption that it can, or the Mission and the GOH would not be sponsoring an SF program.

The FFW program appears to be so new and so much a response to an emergency that the conception of it as a potential principal contributor to economic development has not yet fully developed.

Haiti - Title II An Evaluation of Maternal-Child Supplementary Food Programs

This evaluation covers only the MCH part of the Haiti Title II program. No quantitative data including budget information are available from the evaluation except the following: there are 519 distribution sites for MCH foods, 23% located in dispensaries, clinics, health centers and hospitals. "Nutrition Centers" make up 51% of the sites; and 20% are at "head start" school programs for five-year olds. The final 6% are a miscellaneous category of orphanages, churches and schools. These 519 distribution points are operated, in cooperation with the GOH Mininstry of Health (DSPP), by CARE, CRS, CWS, SAWS and the WFP. The GOH, through its DSPP, provides institutional support through supervisory personnel, and training and program materials from its Division of Nutrition.

Almost all recipients are children under the age of five. It is MCH program policy to target children 0-5 years old. The data collected for the "sample" of 39 distribution centers indicate that the largest age group actually is children between 1 and 2 years of age. The evaluation notes the program's strong points as being mothers' satisfaction, accessibilty to participants, staff training capabilities, and staff understanding of program objectives. The program is rated weak, however, in actual selection of the most appropriate beneficiaries, monitoring, turnover of participants, supervision resulting, for example, in questionable distribution practices allowing adults to divert and to eat the children's food, and impact on agricultural development programs.

Recommendations revolve around the need for tightening relationships between PVOs, USAID, and DSPP, and strengthening program supervision to minimize diversion of food toward two ends: (1) to stop the illegal consignment of foodstuffs to centers that exist only on paper, and (2) to mitigate the "sharing" that takes food out of the babies' mouths to benefit less needy older persons.

Finally the evaluation underscores the importance of shoring up the program's weaknesses by sounding the following ominous note: (p. 22) "After 25 years of Title II MCH progams in Haiti little if any improvement has been achieved in the nutritional status of its children. Faced with such a compelling challenge, those involved in food aid must devise new and innovative means to make the program meet its objectives. The alternative is to do away entirely with supplementary feeding."

Jamaica - Title I Program. An Impact Evaluation

The Title I program in Jamaica, from 1975-80, had two main objectives: (1) to contribute to Jamacia's faltering economic stability; and (2) to demonstrate U.S. friendship and support of the small, struggling countries of the Caribbean, thereby lessening Castro's appeal.

The impact evaluation study resulted in the following conclusions:

1. Title I food aid was too small to have had a discernible impact on the Jamaican economy. However, coupled with other U.S. and other donor aid the total aid package was significant and helped Jamaica alleviate the symptoms of economic crisis, but did not help to resolve the long-term (foreign exchange) crisis.

2. The concessional food imports involved, mainly corn, were probably not additional to what Jamacia would have imported anyway.

3. After 1975 Jamaican food export policy changed to stimulate domestic food production. The Title I food aid was associated with the overall food import policy in such a way that it helped stimulate domestic production thus avoiding having an indirect disincentive impact.

4. The project-generated-counterpart used in support of AID's and the GOJ's joint development program efforts worked well. One reason for this was that where PL 480 counterpart was programmed for particualr AID-GOJ development projects, it was considered important by the Jamaican authorities not to let these funds languish in the account to which they were deposited. Thus, project implementation was stimulated.

The evaluation report contains three principal observations or guides for future Title I projects:

1. Projects whose purpose is economic stabilization should tie the self-help measures requested and the local currency allocations involved directly to the support of those specific measures needed to achieve stabilty. The project under review had addressed an unduly broad range of both relevant and less relevant development issues. If in negotiating the next Title I agreement the host country can be persuaded to adopt strong, clear, policies bearing directly on the root causes of its problems, it does not matter so much that the amount of Title I assistance may not have macro-economic significance. Each dollar thereof will have played an important role in achieving the policies that make the difference, and it is firmly-implemented policy more than money, per se, that does make the difference.

2. Where a Title I program is based on long-range development (not economic crisis) objectives, the use of local currency funds should be addressed directly to the country's food sector, not spread around.

3. The feeding program components of the program were poorly designed and administered, should not have been included and should not be included in future similar Title I program efforts.

N. Commodity Import Programs

Two CIP evaluations were received in 1984, one from Somalia and one from Zimbabwe. Each is discussed on the following pages.

Somalia - CIP Evaluation

A first CIP agreement was reached in 1982 for the period 1982-83, in the amount of $18.5 million. A second agreement for 1983-84 was then negotiated in 1983 for an additional $16 million. The economic policies agreed to under the covenants of these two agreements call, in the first covenant, for phasing out public-enterprises, encouraging foreign and domestic private investment, supporting managerial and technical training and incentives, and for the formation of a consultative group. Under the second covenant, Somalia has undertaken to reduce government employment while providing incentives to keep technical personnel, to stimulate private savings and investment, to improve import procedures and, again, to phase out or privatize state enterprises.

The evaluation's conclusions were that performance under these two CIP agreements has been "superior" in two areas and "fully satisfactory" in a third. The superior performance rating was accorded implementation in terms of the allocation of the foreign exchange made available, purchase and shipment of commodities and their sale and utilization in the country. The second area of superior performance relates to the host governments' adherence to its policy undertakings under the two covenants. It has pursued them and carried them out in exemplary fashion, so much so that the evaluators suggest the Somalia CIP experience be used as a model for other countries. The third area, rated "fully satisfactory," is that of the utilization of the local currencies generated by the project. The implication is that this is the hardest part, especially in the beginning. Taking this into account, Somalia has done remarkably well. Specifically, while disbursements have been slow and thus less spectacular than the other aspects of the program, they involve an entirely new Somali Development Bank operation where the funds available, while not yet being disbursed rapidly, are fully programmed.

The evaluators suggested that for the period ahead, the Mission should monitor closely the allocation of imports between the public and private sectors and specifically in the case of agriculture help ensure a better break for small farmers and artisans. In the area of local currency uses for development, the

evaluators expressed the opinion that the Mission should promote rather than simply suggest the directing of these resources to the priority development project areas agreed upon, including helping the SDB to diversify its portfolio. Also recommended was that in the scheduling of local currency allocations, their macro-economic impact be considered.

Zimbabwe - CIP ($50 million)

The purposes of this CIP were twofold: (1) to finance the foreign exchange costs of the importation of commodities that would stimulate the Zimbabwe private sector to increase employment and output; and (2) to generate local currency to be used in support of reconstruction and development programs in rural areas. Both purposes were pursuant to the U.S. policy of helping newly independent Zimbabwe rebuild its civil war-torn economy. The usually exacted economic policy reforms normally associated with CIP's did not form a part of this Zimbabwe CIP. It was not a part of a macro-policy effort and there were no disbursement conditions related thereto.

However, the USAID was involved in allocating CIP local currency generations and through this process had considerable influence on the government's budget and domestic resource allocations as well as an important monitoring role in endeavoring to assure that CIP sales-generated local currencies were utilized primarily to help finance joint USAID-GOZ development projects.

The CIP proved to be of great importance to the dominant industrial sector. This leading sector had to have foreign exchange to buy equipment, raw materials, and spares for its consumer products production programs. The CIP was directly helpful here, and was at the same time instrumental in significantly reducing lay-offs.

AID did not attempt to monitor or control GOZ allocations of CIP funds for financing imports. The CIP was open to all on the basis of need. The evaluation team stated that this approach worked well, despite criticisms that some "inefficient" firms were financed, and not enough foreign exchange was made available to small farmers for tractors and pumps, etc. The program, in

fact, worked well because, as noted earlier, the sector that was both most needful and most nearly ready to use the foreign exchange was the industrial sector. Through this sector the CIP most quickly met its first objective, to help ameliorate the country's balance of payments crisis. And it did so efficiently; 88% was disbursed in the first 18 months and it was expected that all would be disbursed within 24 months.

Local currency generations were programmed jointly by AID and the GOZ, the principal guide being the USAID's CDSS. Normally, the capital costs of the projects jointly approved were financed from the CIP with recurring costs borne by the GOZ. The evaluators were of the opinion that the development projects programmed this way moved faster and more efficiently than the typical AID "DA" project. They estimated that the traditional approach would have taken two to three times longer with "only a minimum gain in project effectiveness." They suggested that AID consider using this approach to projectizing AID's development efforts in other countries as well.

O. Project Evaluation Reports Prepared by AID/W Functional Bureaus in FY 1984.

According to the Final List of FY 1984 Evaluations Received in PPC/CDIE, 40 evaluation reports were prepared by or for AID/Washington's three Functional Bureaus: 16 for the Bureau for Science and Technology; 8 for the Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination; and 16 for the Bureau for Food and Voluntary Assistance. The 238 project evaluations from the USAID's and other Agency field offices have already been discussed in this report. In this section selected reports from among those received from the AID/W Functional Bureaus, chosen for their relevance to USAID Missions direct concerns, are discussed.

The projects selected for review include all of those reports pertaining to a specific country program. In the case of PL 480 and the Bureau for Food and Voluntary Assistance, three of the projects on the FVA list have already been discussed under PL 480, Chapter II M. Four additional studies from this Bureau are reported on in this section as are three "Impact Evaluations" of specific country projects prepared by the Bureau for PPC. The more general studies of these two Bureaus, which primarily address issues to be resolved at the AID/W

level, have not been included in this report. The 16 studies of the Bureau for Science and Technology are all included, however, since they primarily address technical issues which while of general interest are also of special direct usefulness to USAID Missions.

Bureau for Food and Voluntary Assistance Project Evaluation Reports

Togo and Benin - Outreach Grants (CRS) Project Assessments

The purpose of this evaluation study was to determine in the case of each outreach grant the degree to which it had achieved the project's objectives and how these achievements affected Title II program effectiveness; the ability of CRS to support the programs; the phase-over options after outreach ends; and the roles and relationships between AID/W, USAID and CRS.

The evaluators concluded that in both Benin and Togo the achievements of the outreach grant, in each case, had been impressive despite shortfalls and delays. In Benin and Togo both, recipient target levels were not met and in Togo the project was delayed in starting by one year. However, in Benin the number of centers was increased from 26 to 82, and both logistics support and program quality were substantially improved. In Togo the principal achievements were relocating 55% of the centers in the north, and improving program quality through better supervision made possible by outreach-funded vehicles and staff.

In both countries cooperation with the government is good and host country commitment to sharing costs has been firmed. A problem in both countries is that the warehouses, in each case to be one of the main contributions of the outreach grants, have not been built due to delays in documentary approvals. In Benin the funds are there, just frozen. In Togo a supplement to the outreach grant may be necessary. In both cases the evaluators recommended that all pending amendments to the projects be approved including extending the completion dates. In the case of Togo more money is needed for transport, MCH center support and the warehouse.

The evaluators recommended that plans be made now to phase-over from outreach to a permanent funding structure for managing the Title II-CRS program in both countries. Various alternative financing sources were suggested, the most prominent being an increase in recipient contributions to 107 CFAs in Benin and to 150 CFAs in Togo. Otherwise, either the governments will have to increase their contributions, or CRS will have to find additional sources.

Finally, the evaluators recommended that the USAIDs be delegated responsibility for administering the outreach grants, both in these two countries and in general. This recommendation is based on the Togo-Benin experiences and on such realities as that Title II is on annual cycle and because of communications problems AER approvals are often delayed beyond the beginning of the year. Moreover, AERs are based on dollar amounts instead of commodity volume, resulting in fluctuating volume based on price. The evaluators recommended that AER levels be re-established on the basis of commodity ceilings.

International Eye Foundation - Bethesda, Md

This foundation has AID (FVA) financed activities in Honduras, Haiti, Puerto Rico, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Malasia and Egypt. Its purpose is blindness prevention, first, and treatment, second. Its method is training primary health care workers to use unique and innovative eye health care interventions that the foundation has devised. The IEF program in Honduras was studied, as a case example, from June to December 1983. This program was financed from 1979 to 1981 by an OPG of 212,000. In 1981 FVA made an MG of $600,000 for the six countries and Puerto Rico, noted above, from which the Honduras program has since been financed. Staff in Honduras consist of one professional who trains nurses, supervisors, and auxiliary nurses in basic opthomology and primary eye care, plus providing special training for opthomologists, and developing teaching materials to be used with primary health care workers.

The numbers of persons trained exceeded expectations and the quality of training and training materials was rated high. Turnover, however, plus lack

of follow-up training, have dissipated much of the program's strength. Impact on incidence of blindness and on reductions in opthalmic morbidity cannot be determined for lack of baseline data. Basic conclusions reached by the evaluators as to problems to be resolved were:

- The purpose of programs and measures of programs are not adequately defined.
- Blindness prevention programs are not adequately promoted.
- Turnover plus lack of reinforcement, supervision and supply after training threaten to negate initial recruitment and training achievements.
- Training of rural auxiliary nurses is inadequate.

MFM/FFH - Meals for Millions/Freedom from Hunger Foundation Applied Nutrition Program in Honduras (ANP)

This evaluation was intended as a study of one case among a multi-country program of MFM/FFH with funding from an AID MG of $1.850 million supplemented by $4 million from other sources. The program is to be carried out in Honduras, Ecuador, Antigua, Sierra Leone, Thailand, Kenya, Nepal, and selected Caribbean countries. Between 1979 and 1983 the MFM/FFH's ANP in Honduras had been financed ($420,000) by a variety of sources (10% by AID). As the most mature of the foundation's ANP projects, the Honduras experience was studied over a 6 month period in 1983, for the foundation's future guidance.

The ANP (Applied Nutrition Program) approach of the foundation is a unique one. While focusing on nutrition it holds to the premise that nutritional advances can come only as general community development occurs. Especially important is local agricultural production. Thus, while there is a sharp nutritional focus on children under five, the formal program also includes health education, small scale agriculture, income generating projects, water systems, and agricultural credit plus still other related aspects of integrated community development. Finally, ANP confines and concentrates its program in a limited geographic area where its multi-activity approach will not be diluted by too high a ratio of people to scarce resources. In Honduras ANP functions in nine villages with a population of 4000.

While the ANP conducts all these related activities, it assiduously maintains its primary focus and role as the enemy of malnutrition. Since 1978 it has made anthropometric surveys annually. Its aim is not just to work in the field of nutrition and hope for the best without knowing whether measurable results are being achieved or not. ANP aims to reduce malnutrition and to demonstrate that it did. Thus, by 1983 the anthropometric studies showed that in their project area second and third degree malnutrition had been reduced by 24%, almost entirely attributable to the project. The ANP project attributes this success not just to feeding but to that plus health education for 85% of the mothers, growth and development clinics for pre-school children, 59 vegetable gardens, potable water systems in three villages, two of which show the largest decreases in malnutrition, the agricultural loan fund, family silos, inter-agency coordination, and the development of close ties between the community and the MOH health centers.

The evaluators called the program "very positive and exciting" with impressive improved nutritional status, community participation and improved local economic status of the area, attributable to the project.

Haiti:- Nutrition and Maternal/Child Health Seventh-Day Adventist World Service (SAWS).

The SAWS Matching Grant (MG) program in Haiti is similar to the MFM/FFH program in Honduras. Haiti is one of 17 countries included in the MG. The MG program in Haiti began in 1981, although SAWS had already been involved in PL 480 Title II projects for some years and had an earlier outreach grant. SAWS philosophy embraces the same total community, integrated development approach to malnutrition as MFM/FFH, including agriculture and income generating activities. In the case of Haiti, however, three regional communities were selected, instead of one. The same basic focus on measurably reducing malnutrition is contained in the Haiti program. The end goal, clearly, is significantly better nourished children, proven so by objective measure.

As in Honduras, the program was rated by the evaluators as having had substantial success thus far: "The major success of the program is in

nutritional recuperation and rehabilitation, rates of improvement surpassing other similar projects in Haiti." The evaluators principle conclusions are that:

1. The program is harmonious with AID policies on food supplementation, increased attention to MCH and pre-school feeding, and "growth surveillance" as a preventive health method.

2. The project is on target in terms of nutrition centers established, health workers trained, and kitchen gardens started. It is behind in self-help projects, numbers of children in program and number being weighed monthly.

3. Nutritional impact is substantial, saving many from death, achieving significant weight for age improvements, moving 71% of second degree children to first degree or normal and 69% from third to second or first, achieving absolute weight gains in 96% of third degree children. Most impressive is the project's success recorded with children under one and among that most difficult group of all -- those in the second year of life.

Bureau for Planning and Policy Coordination - Impact Evaluation Reports

Tunisia - The Wheat Development Program

The project has two purposes. First to adapt high yielding CIMMYT wheat varieties to the Tunisia environment. Second, to train Tunisians in agricultural research and extension, to the point of self-sufficiency. The evaluation points to the following positive results of the project:

- While impact has been slow 17 years after its inception, it can be said that the one single most important achievement was the training, especially to PhD level, of numbers of Tunisian agricultural scientists. In the three years before the impact evaluation, their weight began to be felt, especially in basic research capabilities. "The impact is being demonstrated in research results; in an effective extension program; in institutional capabilities in research, extension and education; and in farmers' increased acceptance of new varieties and improved technology, resulting in increased yields and production."

- An extension and farm demonstration system was developed outside the Ministry of Agriculture in the Office of Cereals, a parastatal entity, to extend results to farmers and feed problems back to the research scientists. The program is now staffed with returned participants.

- Cereal production increased in the 11-year period (1971-81) over the previous 11-year period by 5.302 million MT, an increase in annual per capita production from 104 kg to 160 kg.

- Tunisians consumed more cereals.

- The report states that: "While no national data were available to confirm the fact, there was evidence that farmers' income had improved and that subsistence farmers had been integrated into the money economy."

However, the following negative factors were also identified in this impact study:

- "Not all institutional goals have been achieved. Integration of research and extension has not been acted on. The planners sought flexibility by establishing the program in the parastatal Office of Cereals, an agency independent of the Ministry of Agriculture. The office was not impeded by bureaucratic constraints. At the same time, it did not play a role in providing technology to farmers. During the life of the program activities were integrated through personal cooperation of scientists who act across institutional lines. This system continues today."

- "The goal of self-sufficiency in food production has not been achieved."

Haiti - Hacho Rural Community Development (Management by CARE)

HACHO is the acronym for the Haitian American Community Help Organization. The project, sponsored by this organization, pertains to the northwest region of Haiti which was chosen as the site for a concerted integrated regional rural community development program. HACHO was founded by public spirited Haitian and American residents of Haiti as a community development program to begin in the Northwestern Province but later to be expanded to include the Provinces of the North and the Artibonite -- almost half the country in terms of geography. The expansion, however, never occurred.

The objectives of the project in the HACHO, or Northwest Region, were to promote the development of the communities of the region in the areas of health, education, nutrition, agriculture, and physical infrastructure (mainly roads) with the active participation of the people. CARE was asked to manage the program which began in 1966 with a grant to CARE for HACHO. CARE and HACHO carried on for 16 years until absorbed in 1982 by a new national community development program. In its 16 years as a private sector agency performing

public service functions, HACHO became the de facto public service authority in the region. While it continued to promote all five of its original purposes, its emphasis changed from time to time, in one era to meet emergency drought relief needs, in other periods to respond to pressure from AID for more of a focus on agriculture, and to other pressures for more health and nutrition programs. At one time the program was over 90% involved with health services.

Its evaluators came to the following conclusions:

- HACHO's major impact lay in the simple reality of having provided basic services where none existed before. HACHO provided health services, built roads, and organized community councils through which the region was also able to obtain potable water, irrigation projects, and similar services.

- HACHO's other principal impact was in disaster relief. During droughts, famine and hurricanes HACHO's ability to deliver assistance was crucial, since no governmental capability to do so existed.

Ultimately, however, HACHO's relief program elements clashed with its economic and social development-oriented elements rendering both less effective while confusing the community councils as to what their priorities should be. HACHO's insistence on having its headquarters in the capital city, with its centralized decision-making structure located there, also mitigated against effective program administration. In essence, HACHO became a poorly administered development program rising to levels of impressive usefulness primarily when there were disasters with which to be dealt. Meanwhile, planning, reporting, monitoring, and evaluation were said by the evaluators to be lacking, with the program's emphasis thus, by default, being placed on ad hoc inputs and not aimed at clear objectives or definable intended results.

In 1982 the GOH established a new governmental Organization for the Development of the Northwest (ODNO) and incorporated HACHO's functions into it. With this event, HACHO officially came to an end, though, as the evaluators said, "its 16-year legacy has been passed on to its successor."

Turkey - On-Farm Water Management in Aegean Turkey

This was a joint USAID-GOT project, 1968-74, for draining, levelling and improving land for the purpose of cultivating it on an irrigated basis.

Involved were assistance to local shops to manufacture and repair farm machinery, encouragement to private contractors to do customized work and the training of an ever-widening number of people to extend similar activities throughout the project area and, ultimately, to all of Turkey where the soils and water resources warranted irrigation.

The project area, near the Aegean and Mediterranean coasts of Turkey, has a temperate climate, alluvial soils, plenty of water from many streams and the Menderes River, ideal for irrigated farming. There are, however, constraints to irrigation to be overcome in some areas, sloping terrain, and hard pan being the two most important, both of which can be corrected by applying the right machinery to the problem. Levelling equipment is obvious; breaking hard pan below a seemingly harmless surface was more difficult but both yielded to the efforts of the project to devise machinery and train personnel to use it to prepare land for irrigated cultivation. The potential was enormous. Turkey had, at the time of the project, 5.5 million hectares of land suitable for irrigation with 360,000 hectares actually being irrigated.

The project area, the province of Aydin, was selected as the site for the demonstration intended to be replicable throughout Turkey, because it is Turkey's best agricultural area. This fact, plus the decisions of the GOT in the early 1970's to discontinue cost sharing and to transfer the credit function to the Agricultural Bank, made the project very timely. Farmers and entrepreneurs had to pursue their own profit at their own risk. Thus, as the evaluators pointed out, "the private sector maximized invitations to level land and manufacture machinery under this project."

The evaluation report repeats a number of times that the project was a success. Since it was a demonstration project, intended not only to "cover" the project area but also to be replicated, it is to be assumed that it was. However, where or how such replication has taken place since the project ended in 1974, is not made clear in the report. The report documents in detail how and why the project was a local success in Aydin Province, including describing the role of TOPRAKSU, the national agency that had the power to see to its replication in other parts of the country, but the subject is dropped before being addressed.

A description of the 16 S&T Bureau studies follows.

Agriculture Projects

CRSP-Bean and Cowpea

The purpose of this program is to determine how to increase production by dealing with 10 problem areas that are impeding adequate yield levels from, for example, diseases and pests, through nitrogen fixation, land seed characteristics, protein digestibility and processing methods to improved professional competence of the researchers working in this field. The CRSP External Review Panel, a different one for each CRSP, is composed of scientists mainly from U.S. universities. The "lead" terms of sites for U.S.-based research include Colorado, Cornell, MSV, California, Georgia, Nebraska, Puerto Rico, Wisconsin and Washington State. The host countries collaborating with the U.S. institutions include Mexico, Guatemala, Honduras, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Brazil, Kenya, Tanzania, Malawi, Senegal, Nigeria, Cameroon and Botswana. These institutions are now working on 18 subprojects.

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The basic conclusions of this evaluation are that the framework for doing significant work on beans and cowpeas has been erected and is working. Institutional structures in the host countries are in place, as they are in the U.S. The relationships being developed are constructive and are beginning to produce research results. Above all, the importance of beans and cowpeas to development is being increasingly recognized.

On the negative side, however, the evaluation reports as follows: "To date little progress has been made in extension or training activity or monetary or other incentives to gain farmer adoption of the available technology. Considerable technology in the way of germ plasm and cultural practices is available for local adoption, but little effort is being made to extend and capitalize on these available resources."

"The key factor to goal achievement is the adoption of this technology by host country farmers. This CRSP does not have that responsibility, and some form of

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training or incentives for farmers must be put in place to achieve this adoption. Adoption is not an automatic response as has been demonstrated many times over in many countries both developed and developing."

CRSP-Sorghum and Millet

The basic arrangement is the same as for the CRSP for beans and cowpeas. In the case of sorghum and millet, there are eight U.S. universities involved and 14 host countries. The evaluation reports very satisfactory progress in organizing the research in the U.S. universities on breeding, agronomic practices, insect and disease control, seed quality, food quality, storage, and stress characteristics. It is critical of the lack of progress in similarly organizing complementary research activities in the 14 cooperating countries. Only a few have been started.

The evaluators point, again, to the fundamental problem, that steps are not being taken to secure adoption of the results of the research. Each CRSP report states that this is not the responsibility of the CRSP program, but that something has to be done by someone or the CRSP will not be able to achieve its basic goals of increased productivity, production and income. The sorghum and millet report states: "Progress has been made in the two sub-goals (developing new technology and training local scientists), but this has not been translated into increased production due to lack of adoption by many farmers. While the CRSP does not have the responsibility for gaining farmer adoption, it must provide the training and motivation for research staff to work with their local extension divisions and assist in providing technology to farmers."

Seed Program and Industry Development

What is today one of AID's most effective institutional programs for agricultural development worldwide began in 1949 as the Southern Regional Research Laboratory of Mississippi State University to serve the needs of seed producers, suppliers, and farmers in the south. In 1956, USDA asked the Seed Technology Laboratory (STL) to train participants from developing countries. In 1958 AID and MSU entered into a contractual (now cooperative) agreement under which STL would provide research and technical assistance services to the

developing countries with which AID cooperates. The program is thus over 25 years old and has been among AID's most successful. There are many stages in the development and operation of a food production "system" where breakdowns can cause the system to fail or to work inefficiently. Among the key elements of such a system is the establishment and maintenance of facilities for producing the improved seed varieties resulting from research, in sufficient quantity, quality and with the right timing so as to meet demand. Mississippi State's STL has become the outstanding center in the world for seed production technology and dissemination. MSU/STL experts have worked in over 50 countries assisted by AID and have trained hundreds of LDC technical and scientific personnel.

Despite its accomplishments to date, much work remains to be done, especially in Africa where the capability of the countries to use STL is just now emerging. In the period under evaluation, 1979-83, STL contributed 41 person months to LDC programs in 11 countries. Since STL has a program considerably broader than its services to AID, has the support of the university and the state government, and is a southern regional institution of some standing, it maintains itself in top status, fully equipped and staffed at no cost to AID. AID and the LDC's are charged only direct costs, making AID's agreement with MSU one of the most cost effective operations in S&T's portfolio. The evaluation strongly recommends indefinite continuation of this cooperative agreement.

Commercial Seed Industry Development Project

Whereas the MSU Seed Program has focused on the technical aspects of seed production, whether the producers of the seeds for sale and distribution are public or private entities, this project is concerned with promoting private sector, commercial development of seed production and supply. Its genesis was in the Industry Council for Development which has sought to organize the resources of private seed companies and experts in developed countries to provide assistance toward development of the commercial seed industries of the LDCs.

The program, authorized in 1979, has been slow in getting started, priminarly due to the few requests for cooperation from LDCs and USAIDs, some of whom were not fully aware that the program is not, or need not be, competitive with that of MSU/STL. The evaluation reports, however, that as of now the "problem of inadequate field requests no longer exists." ICD has recently received a large number of mission requests which will utilize its grant funds, now that the project has been extended for two years.

Two problem areas remain, however. They are: (1) ICD has found it difficult to get U.S. seed companies to accept LDC seed experts as interms; and (2) ICD found at the start of the project that commercial seed industries in the LDCs tend not to exist. Thus, they changed their focus from trying to help non-existent industries to the promotion of government policy reform. Progress towards policies favoring establishment of commercial seed industries has been made, but work remains to be done in this problem area.

This evaluation also deals with the issue of inadequate farmer utilization of new technologies. It points out that an FAO study found that while 85% of the developing countries have improved varieties available, nearly all of these countries lack an adequate supply of seed at the farmer-user level.

Soil Management Support Service Project

The Soil Management Support Service (SMSS) of the Soil Conservation Service of the USDA was created by an agreement between AID and the SCS for the purpose of developing the pre-requisites for soil-based agrotechnical transfers to and among tropical and sub-tropical countries. This includes technical assistance in soil management technology and agrotechnology transfer methodology, plus improvement of soil taxonomy in those areas most applicable to the tropical and sub-tropical countries. The Soil Conservation Service created the Soil Management Support Service to carry out this program. In three years of operation (up to the time of this evaluation), SMSS provided 975 person days and work to 22 countries involving 50 consultants.

SMSS has an advisory panel of distinguished scientists. This panel was asked to review and evaluate the SMSS program to date. To do so, the panel met from November 30 to December 3, 1982, at Anaheim, California, submitting its panel sessions report as the evaluation. According to the PES, the review panel found that the project had had an excellent performance experience during its first three years. The panel made no suggestions for major modifications and no major problems were identified. In the text of the panel's report to AID on its proceedings, however, it included twelve highly technical constructive comments and recommendations on soil taxonomy, institutional development, and links to the agriculture research network.

Control of Vertebrate Pests

This project was carried out by the Denver Wildlife Research Center, Denver, CO (DWRC). The purpose of this project is to reduce human food supply losses, both pre- and post-harvest, by reducing losses to agriculture caused by bats, rats, other rodents and mammals and grain eating birds. Perhaps the project's most dramatic successes have been in eliminating rabies in livestock in Latin America. Livestock valued at $270 million are saved annually. Rice losses due to rats in the Philippines have been reduced to 1/7 their earlier incidence.

DWRC has worked in 28 countries, strongly emphasizing the building of local institutions to carry on the job of crop and animal protection from vertebrate pests. The requests for DWRC help are said to be rising. One reason for this is that new cultivations technologies tend to increase the need for crops and animal protection. Also, new methods of measuring need and assessing reduction in losses have been developed as a result of which many countries want DWRC's help in further improving their protection programs. The evaluation estimates that in 1982 alone the benefits in crop and animal values saved by the project were 29 times as great as the total cost to AID of DWRC's work in VPC from 1967-1982.

Physiology and Ecology of Ticks

This project was carried out by the International Centre of Insect Physiology and Ecology (ICIPE) located at Nairobi, Kenya. The purpose of the project was

to develop feasible control techniques for cattle ticks and tick-borne diseases. A series of physiology, ecology, and immunology studies were performed in a coordinated way to produce an immune reponse in cattle which reduces feeding ticks and arrests development of those reaching feeding stage.

As a result, an efficient tick control method is in sight. Antibody formation in the host induced by antigens from tick saliva, it was learned, helps develop resistance to brown ear ticks. In addition, methods were tested to evoke antibody formation in cattle by means of antigens from different parts of the ticks -- all this leading to the breeding of tick-resistant cattle. Together with promising vaccines and drugs against theileriosis, an integrated control of the tick as well as of transmitted disease "should now become practicable." A new successor five-year project of substantial promise for effective tick and tick disease-borne control in Africa began on September 1, 1983.

Health Projects

Water and Sanitation for Health (WASH)

The purpose of WASH is to mobilize and make available to LDCs and AID missions a broad variety of technical assistance and support services needed to design and implement effective water and sanitation programs. The project is carried out under a contract between AID and Camp, Dresser, and McKee (CDM).

CDM has four "associates" together called CDM Associates. The Associates are International Science and Technology Institute, Research Triangle Institute, University of North Carolina and Georgia Institute of Technology.

The evaluation was carried out by a six-member board of consultants assembled under the aegis of the American Public Health Association and headed by Ambassador John W. McDonald. It reviewed only the work done by WASH through its global contract with CDM Associates. While WASH also farms out work to other agenices, CDM Associates is the principal instrument, having expended $12.5 million during the review period in comparison with a total of $590,000 expended through nine other contractors.

The board of consultants concluded that the project is "extremely effective, especially in providing quality technical assistance in a timely manner" to developing countries. The project has provided technical assistance to projects in 40 countries; its Information Center (Clearinghouse) has responded to requests from 66 AID-assisted countries and has produced 15 sets of training manuals. In providing technical assistance, one of WASH's principal features has been its ability to respond to field requests immediately, usually within days, through the use of an experimental administrative technique, the Order of Technical Direction, or OTD, which in being considered by AID for use on other projects as well.

The evaluation panel identified three special areas of weakness in the program: the appropriate technology developmental aspect considered important at the start has not been developed sufficiently beyond the "Batelle" hand pump stage. The Information Services (Clearinghouse) function is not as professional as it could be. The coordination among the members of CDM Associates, and the relationship with Georgia Tech in particular, need strengthening.

Principal recommendations of the Evaluation Panel included:

- WASH should be regarded as the main U.S. instrument for meeting its pledge to the UN International Drinking Water Supply and Sanitation Decade.
- The WASH rapid response technical assistance model should be used more widely.
- WASH needs a permanent expert advisory board.
- WASH needs substantive reorientation to provide for more emphasis on sanitation, technology transfer, and urban projects.
- AID should be less directive and more collaborative in managing the WASH project. Such greater collaboration should apply both to the contractors and to the host countries, especially in the development of work orders.

Influence of Migration on Fertility Project

The purpose of this project is to study the relationships between rural to urban migration and fertility and to formulate a policy framework to help

governments better understand and plan for their growing urban populations. Studies of the subject were undertaken in Mexico, Korea, and Cameroon, of the data from the World Fertility Survey for these three countries. The evaluation was done by the National Science Foundation having four major outputs as the objective:

a. Development of a theoretical model based on hypotheses drawn from relevant literature;

b. Testing the model by fitting it to the WFS data on Korea, Mexico & Cameroon;

c. Adaptation of the model for use in a variety of developmental settings; and

d. Synthesizing the results into a significant scientific statement for use by development practitioners.

At the time of the evaluation, outputs a, b, and c had been achieved except for the Cameroon data, and the project was proceeding to output d, the synthesis. Findings thus far support the hypothesis that urban adaptation reduces fertility.

Malaria Immunity and Vaccination Project

This evaluation is a report on the results of a Malaria Strategy Workshop held in Columbia, Maryland, June 7-10, 1983. The workshop's membership consisted of ten scientists from WHO, PAHO, U.S. universities and the University of Tokyo. The workshop was sponsored and conducted by AID. The major conclusions of the workshop were as follows:

1. Malaria's role as a major deterrent to development is not, at present, sufficiently recognized. Malaria control had a higher priority in the past than now. This should be changed by AID's according malaria control programs a higher priority and urging other donors to do likewise.

2. Developing countries, however, should be assisted only if they fully commit themselves to a serious long-term effort.

3. The emerging PHC systems should be used as a principal vehicle for a new attack on malaria.

4. Research on malaria should be resumed and strongly supported by AID.

Community-Based Growth Monitoring Project

This is an evaluation of a pilot project in community-based growth monitoring and nutrition education in South Kordofan Province of Sudan. It was prepared by the Education Development Center, Inc., for the International Nutrition Communication Service. An INSC consultant who had assisted Sudan in 1981 helped set up the pilot project which began in 12 villages.

Two years later the consultant returned to evaluate the effectiveness of the program. It was found that in 10 of the 12 villages, illiterate primary health care workers were sucessfully weighing and measuring children and monitoring infant growth. In half the villages the PHC workers were combining nutritional assessment with education for mothers on what to feed their children if they were not growing properly. In the next stage, the program will be expanded to 30 more villages.

AID Participant Support Program

The purpose of this project was to evaluate the participant training support services provided AID through S&T/IT contracts with the National Association for Foreign Student Affairs (NAFSA), the National Council of International Visitors (NCIV), the American Language Institute, Georgetown Unversity (ALIGU), and the American Association of Collegiate Registrars and Admissions Officers (AACRAO). The evaluation's basic conclusion was that all four service organizations were performing well and their services warranted continuation. Specifically, the following recommendations for improvement were made:

NAFSA - More policy direction from AID.
NCIV - More direction needed from AID.
ALIGU - More students taking English to start should study English at the same school where they are later (to study their substantive subjects.)

AACRAO - It may become unnecessary to continue its services if the contract with Partners for International Education and Training develops as planned.

Small Enterprise Approaches to Development

This evaluation covers two related projects: (1) Program for Investment in the Small Capital Investment Sector (PISCES I); and (2) Housing and Employment. The purpose of PISCES I was to generate information about how to assist very small enterprises, to extract materials that could serve to develop replicable models, and to prepare designs for such programs in four places. Principal findings were:

- There are many more active assistance programs than is normally assumed.
- Characteristics vary with the conditions surrounding the projects.
- Positive benefits, both social and economic, are more usual than not.
- Good programs have common characteristics such as close attention to design, staffing, outreach, beneficary selection, credit, and management and marketing skills.
- Effective programs also have to have a favorable environment to prosper.
- Assistance is more effective when working with established than with new institutions.

The purpose of the Housing and Employment project is to conduct original research into the relation between housing construction and employment, and on this basis to produce a set of guidelines that AID and others could apply to optimize employment and income impacts in new construction programs. Five major generalizations emerged:

- Small scale contracting is a viable alternative.
- Rising construction wages will be matched by an equal decline in employment.
- Virtually all households make additions and improvements to their properties.
- Without home-based enterprises, many households can support little construction.
- Benefits from construction can be optimized by relating projects to the general transfers of all housing.

Land Use Planning and Control for the Intermediate City

This evaluation is a summary of AID activities in LUP (Land Use Planning), especially for intermediate cities, over an eight-year period involving a number of projects and studies. A state-of-the-art paper was written in 1974. Three field demonstrations followed. The paper and the demonstrations have influenced thinking around the world on urban development. The three demonstrations took place in Leon, Nicaragua, in Thailand and in Ghana. In February 1982 a second report and synthesis called Approaches to Planning for Secondary Cities in Developing Countries was prepared. It contains case studies of Brazil, Korea, Tunisia, Indonesia, and Kenya as well as a review of the three LUP field demonstrations. Altogether, this long-term, on-going AID/W effort has had direct impact on numbers of individual country projects. Many USAID missions in countries where inter- mediate city development has become an alternative to runaway growth of the capital city have been strongly influenced and helped by this project.

Scientists and Engineers in Development

This project, called SEED, was implemented through a PASA with the National Science Foundation. During the life of the project 229 grants were made to U.S. scientists and engineers to conduct development related research, or to teach (or both) in 50 countries. NSF and AID selected SEED grantees on the basis of the relevance of their proposals to development needs, plus evidence of local interest. At issue, among other things, was the thesis that U.S. scientists could influence LDC professors to take more interest in solving their own countries' development problems.

The evaluation of SEED, begun in 1980 and completed in 1983, gave a final accounting of inputs, outputs and goal achievement. It documented lessons learned and provided AID missions and bureaus with helpful information for future design of science and technology projects. Objective and subjective evaluation data were combined to obtain a composite evaluation of effectiveness

which was that the SEED program had achieved its objectives and that improvement of foreign research capabilities was one of the most important positive outcomes of the project.

Small Decentralized Hydropower (SDH) Project

This evaluation was required as a pre-requisite to further AID funding of the project which is managed under a cooperative agreement between AID and NRECA. NRECA had been selected by AID in 1979 to be its "chosen instrument" for SDH technical assistance. NRECA activities in 1982-84 consisted of providing technical assistance to 15 countries, conducting one workshop, two study tours in the U.S. and a 2-day seminar on private sector participation. By summer 1983, NRECA had conducted three more workshops, completed 14 country resource assessments, site selections and design analyses in six countries, developed a library and conducted various tours and seminars.

In 1983 NRECA was asked by AID, via an amendment to the Cooperative Agreement, to place more emphasis on: (1) promoting the concept of the potential of SDH; (2) providing technical help to install hydropower projects; (3) strengthening LDC capabilities; (4) establishing information networks on SDH; and (5) encouraging the private sector role in SDH. The evaluation concludes that NRECA has basically responded well on the tasks assigned them, especially workshops. Front-end planning and resource assessment are strengths. NRECA has also established a good data base on SDH projects world-wide.

Areas of concern noted include slowness in preparing critical documents; lack of imagination regarding needed guidance books, slowness in recognizing that planning and inventory studies are no substitute for action projects, and slowness in seeking private sector participation. Joint NRECA-AID project implementation needs are pointed out: (1) more clear agreement on program objectives; (2) better NRECA-AID communication; and (3) stronger AID program management of the project.

P. Summary of 45 Inspector General Audit Reports, FY 1984

Introduction: The Inspector General (IG) Audit Reports for 1984 numbered 45 in all divided, by subject, as follows: -

Agriculture	-	22
Energy	-	2
Health	-	9
Human Resources	-	2
Private Sector	-	3
PL 480	-	2
CIP	-	1
Miscellaneous	-	4

A brief description of the principal findings of each of these audits, follows, in the order in which they are listed in Appendix D2.

Agricultural Development

1. Senegal - Casamance Regional Project

This project shows few tangible results after five years due to faulty design, delays in inputs, and ineffective use of technical assistance. Production increases sought have not been achieved because inadequate extension services are not getting new technologies to farmers.

2. Somalia - Agricultural Delivery Systems

The project has not proceeded according to plan. Little in the way of improved technologies has been transmitted to farmers, due to inappropriate extension methodology and a two year delay in signing the technical assistance contract. Failures and problems to date suggest the project be terminated.

3. Haiti - Agro-Forestry Project

This has been a very successful project in motivating farmers to plant trees although the survival rate of the trees has been lower than expected. The research component is behind schedule. Farmers are also maintaining substantial new numbers of trees.

4. Sudan - Agricultural Research Project

It is too early to assess results of the research still in progress and some remains yet to be begun; concerns are slowness of implementation and ability of the Sudan to finance the program once U.S. aid stops. Specific aspects being delayed include the planning unit, short-term training, recruitment of local staff, and procurement of materials from abroad.

5. The Sahel - Agricultural Credit Programs

IG audited seven projects in the Sahel region. They found "millions of dollars of AID funds misused and/or wasted due to failure to design and implement effective and efficient credit programs." The main reasons given for this were: overestimation of host country abilities and consequent under-estimation of technical assistance needs; weak financial viability of local credit institutions; inadequate accountability for funds and commodities; and inadequate AID oversight.

6. Sahel - Food Production Projects

Two of seven food production projects have failed and five have yielded little increase. Prospects for improvement are dim, with the principal reasons given as:

(a) Too much emphasis on long-term research results resulting in packages not appropriate for subsistence farmers;

(b) Inability of the countries' extension services to deliver and promote technical packages; consequent unwillingness of farmers to adopt. Moreover, "Few aspects of technical packages had been adopted by the local farmers;"

(c) Inability of the local governments to absorb recurring costs, to contract effectively, and to implement accounting and fund controls;

(d) Inadequate credit program capabilities;

(e) Projects too large and complex; and

(f) Inadequate USAID Mission staffing.

7. Indonesia - Integrated Rural Development of Central Java

The project is too encompassing in terms of objectives, variegated in components and decentralized in management for realistic implementation. It lacks a focal point of authority and responsibility; the funding structure, flowing from farm local sources, is too complex. The audit recommends that the project be redesigned and reorganized to meet these problems.

8. Cameroon - Livestock and Agricultural Development Project

The increased association of agriculture and livestock is a desireable goal but one that is difficult to achieve quickly. The project was too ambitious and too complex at the start. The present redesign simplifying the project raises new questions as to whether the reduced pilot zone size is sufficiently representative. Implementation is also slow; GURC has not met its training and counterpart responsibilities, U.S. technicians have been diverted to construction activities; two key technicians have left. Thus, IG recommends USAID and GURC redefine their goals and then redesign the project on that basis, or terminate it.

9. Thailand - Land Settlement

"The Thailand Land Settlement Project has made progress." In the area of water resource sites, however, there is room for improvement. This can be accomplished by more oversight from USAID engineers.

10. Indonesia - Flood Control and Irrigation in Central Java

Although the "Citanday I" project, after some delays, has completed almost all of the planned flood control and canal construction work contemplated, the project's long-term success is in doubt due to:

(1) The prospect that maintenance will be inadequate. Provision for such had not adequately been included in the program. The Government has, up to now, failed to provide funds and procedures to maintain the newly constructed facilities.

(2) The inability as yet to establish farmer organizations for the On-Farm Irrigation System's part of the project.

(3) The inability of the project office to use the equipment purchased for the project.

11. Indonesia - Agricultural Development: Planning and Administration Project

This program, designed to upgrade the planning and programming capabilities of the Ministry of Agriculture," is generally meeting its objectives."

12. Uganda - Food Production Support Project

The purpose of the project is to increase production by supplying implements and revitalizing the cooperative movement that provides services to small farmers. The IG reports that "the project is progressing well in an extremely difficult political and economic environment." Technical assistance, commodity, and training inputs have been complete, on time, and effective.

13. Burundi - Basic Food Crops

This is a 400 hectare seed multiplication farm sponsored by AID as part of a larger effort, aided by other donors, to improve high altitude food crops in Burundi. The audit brought seriously into question the long-range viability of the project by identifying problems not well understood when the project began but which now threaten it. They include poor soil conditions of the site selected resulting in no success yet in producing

seeds better than "what the farmers already have;" a two-year delay in setting up the extension service; a two-year delay in construction of facilities at the seed farm; and poor prospects for good Burundi management. Most serious, due mainly to the soils problem, is the prospect that the farm will never sell enough high quality seeds to become self-sustaining. Burundi has created an evaluation team to review these matters and come up with solutions, hopefully including the idea of moving to a site with better soil conditions.

14. Senegal - Livestock Program

This project is basically range-management to support by grazing, water, and veterinary care, defined and delimited livestock populations. Two ranges were selected: the Senegal, 220,000 hectares, and the Sodesp, half again as large. By December 1983 the Senegal range had reached 110,000 hectares in effective operation, the cattle population had increased little, water remained short and soils had deteriorated; only vet services had improved. Resources for Sodesp went for feeding and marketing livestock, not range improvement. By 1984 Sodesp had sold 283 cattle; the the objective was 6,250 cattle plus 5,000 small ruminants. The basic project activitiy was not carried out but the project funds were spent. IG attributes the project's failure to (1) unrealistic project design; (2) poor implementation; and (3) inadequate accounting.

15. West Africa - Pest Management

Since 1975 AID has made available to the countries of West Africa $44.7 million for crop and animal pest control; $20 million has been expended thus far. The program is in two parts: (a) RFCP (Regional Food Crop Protection) designed to create institutional pest control capabilities in each country, and IPM (Integrated Pest Management), a research program to develop technical packages of control technologies tailored to individual country needs. RFCP is dependent on IPM for the substance, the knowledge and the materials to disseminate, but IPM has "yet to develop the technical

packages adapted to the needs of each participating country." IG suggests that the best way to get the horse in front of the cart is, first, to consolidate the two projects and then establish sound priorities within the one project.

16. Tunisia - Small Farmer Supervised Credit

The project, effective in five of Tunisia's eighteen provinces, contemplates the use of agricultural credit agents to help farmers develop farm plans and secure lines of seasonal credit based thereon. AID has supplied $18.2 million and Tunisia $24 million. The program is reported to be working well; 7000 farmers are participating and cereal and meat production have increased. There are, however, administrative and housekeeping problems to be resolved.

17. El Salvador - Agrarian Reform

Phase I includes expropriation and redistribution of 200,000 hectares to 500,000 campesinos (including family members). Most campesinos are organized into cooperatives run by the government's land reform agency. The problem is that many of these cooperatives are not viable economic entities, giving rise to many problems. Phase I involved expropriation of land whose owners had in excess of 500 hectares, usually very profitably farmed. Cooperatives are not farming these same lands profitably and the government is having to make up the deficits. Phase II calls for expropriation of land holdings above 100 hectares (100 to 500 hectares). It has not been implemented due to a basic policy reversal by the government.

Phase III, the expropriation of rented lands which are then given to the renter, is in full implementation. About half of the eligible tenants have applied for "their" lands; most applications are approved. The IG evaluation is favorable and constructive.

18. Tanzania: Agricultural Research Project

The purpose of this project was to increase capacity to determine priorities and implement programs, improve varieties, produce breeder seed, and recommend suitable cultural practices to farmers. IG findings indicated that the project has failed to meet most objectives. The principal reasons given were:

- over-ambitious project design;
- inadequate contractor performance;
- lack of host government inputs; and
- absence of aggressive USAID monitorship in the initial phase, resulting in: inadequate knowledge or control over commodities and GOT contri- butions, participant training and technical assistance, the latter not being furnished adequately to Tanzanian staff

19. Panama: Integrated Rural Development: Sona

"The project is successfully building institutional capability, improving roads, and providing social services.... its successes are in many cases surprising...the eight agencies involved in the Sona project have been able to work together effectively... However, progress in making loans to farmers has been disappointing and little has been done to establish new businesses... Certain management controls should also be strengthened."

20. Egypt: Storage and Distribution of Grains, Tallow, Oils and Fat

This project provides $37 million toward constructing and equipping facilities for handling imported grains, tallow, oil and fats at the ports of Alexandria and Safaga. IG reports that:

- Two of the three projected facilities are completed and operational.
- The third, a grain silo at Sofaga, is still under construction but AID saved $5 million by negotiating a separate contract.
- The facilities in Alexandria, a bagging system and a TOF terminal, were late in being completed at a cost well over the budget. The cost overrun was from $3.8 million to $23.1 million; the time overrun from September 30, 1980, to September 30, 1983.

21. The Philippines: Bicol Integrated Area Development

This project is a combined land reform and irrigation development (pump irrigation) project covering 5680 acres dedicated to growing rice. The project design did not foresee economic changes which threaten the viability of the project. Important assumptions as to the probability of making the project self-sustaining are no longer valid. The selling price of rice has risen only 22.5% while costs of inputs have risen 35% to 40% and electricity to run the pumps is to increase by 100% next year. The ability of farmers to pay their costs of amortizing their investments as planned are now in serious doubt. A 1984 technical evaluation made recommendations as to increasing efficiency and cutting costs but they were not adopted. The IG report recommends numerous steps to "save" the project. USAID has agreed to implement them.

22. India - Rajasthan Irrigation Project

The target of the project was 15-20 irrigation systems for $38 million. After four years only eight systems were approved; none were completed nor will they be by PACD. The number of systems to be built has now been reduced to nine at a cost of $105 million with a new PACD 2-3 beyond the present one. IG states that the basic problems were faculty project design and inordinate delays in systems approvals as a result of which the project got caught up in an inflationary spiral it could have avoided.

Energy

23. Burundi - Peat II

The purpose of the project is to secure acceptance by the people of the use of peat in place of charcoal and wood for cooking and heating. Wood and charcoal resources were said to be within one decade of extinction. The problems in project execution inlcuded failure of the government to support peat adequately as an alternative energy source; failure to set up measures

to gauge forest depletion; and failure to achieve goal of making peat 60% of the domestic market. The latter goal proved to be unattainable. Peat marketing was not made a high priority by the responsible government agency which both produces and markets the product, nor would this agency assure availability of peat for the development of future markets.

24. Morocco - Renewable Energy Development

The objectives are to create an institution which will:

- o Manage applied research in renewable energy;
- o Adapt energy technologies to Morocco;
- o Integrate renewable energy forms into the national energy plan; and
- o Train a cadre of personnel in the application of renewable energy technologies to serve ultimately on a national basis. Budgeted were 9.2 million in AID funds and $5.6 million in Moroccan resources. After over 3 years, project disbursements totaled $1.9 million.

IG findings were that the project had made minimal progress due to prolonged administrative delays and the inability of the institution, the Center for Renewable Energy Development (CDER), to recruit staff. For these reasons the IG recommended that the project should either be redesigned or terminated.

Health

25. Burma - Primary Health Care

This project expands coverage and quality of care for infants, mothers and children primarily in 147 rural townships (countries). Its purpose is to reduce illness and death among the target population. IG reports that the project "has made progress in achieving its goals. "Training of primary health care workers, provision of technical assistance, evaluation programs, training trainers and nutrition education were all going well. Monitoring commodities and final accounting, however, need more attention.

26. Somalia - Rural Health Delivery System

The purpose of this project is to create institutional capability to provide primary health care to the rural poor and nomadic populations through trained PHC workers selected from the communities and tribes themselves. The IG report does not make a judgment as to whether or not the project is meeting its objectives. Its major "finding" is that the USAID has not determined if the GOS can support the project after U.S. assistance ends. This was supposed to have been addressed at the half-way point/30 months) but was not. The report indicates also the lack of an implementation plan and various control measures.

27. Guyana - Rural Health Centers System

"Under extremely difficult circumstances, USAID/Guyana has made a commendable effort to implement this project and has been successful in many areas." The project involved a nationwide health delivery system, training health workers to staff it, and tieing typing primary care facilities in to an interlocking, tiered supervisory referral structure. The training of health workers (the most important element) was completed satisfactorily and on schedule. Other aspects have lagged, such as construction, and making use of medical equipment. AID's concurrent close-out of the entire Guyana program, has made completing this project in an orderly fashion difficult.

28. Bangladesh - Family Planning Services

"The USAID has fashioned a well-balanced family planning program to implement the government's National Population Program."... $16.8 million have been provided since 1973. Reducing fertility is a top Mission (and Government) priority. Second priority is food grain production. Together the two programs are supposed to strike a balance favorable to economic growth. IG reports, however, that the FP project has problems: the logistics and storage systems have both physical and control problems, and the logistics staff is inadequately trained. It is not clear that AID PD-3 requirements on voluntary sterilization are being met.

The importance of this program would be difficult to overstate. At the present annual growth rate of 2.8% the population of Bangladesh will be increased to 150 million by the year 2000 -- or to almost 2800 persons per square mile. An effective FP program is essential to avoiding this. The implication of the report is that the present program provides a sound basis for this if all the necessary improvements are effected.

29. The Philippines - Barangay Water Project

"This project to build small water systems for rural communities has been successful in providing the water systems, but many user associations are on the verge of failure because of poor maintenance and inadequate billing practices. A water testing program was supposed to ensure the continued potability of the water, but the tests were not being made regularly and local officials did not know the results."

30. Honduras - Family Planning Association (ASHONPLAFA)

"In spite of management and control weaknesses, ASHONPLAFA's programs have achieved considerable success...it has increased the number of users to 40,900 a 58% increase, has performed 6620 sterilizations, an increase, of 76% over 1980." It is also distributing contraceptives through commercial outlets -- a low cost means of increasing use. However, IG finds that ASHONPLAFA'S programs have grown faster than have its managerial abilities. It does not have the management and financial controls needed by an organization of its size. These problems should be quickly remedied.

31. Swaziland - Rural Water Borne Disease Control

The project's purpose is to expand the capacity of the GOS to deliver effective preventive health services to combat diseases borne by water and caused by poor sanitition. The IG reported that the project was making satisfactory progress in some areas but not in all. Five recommendations are made to improve the project's chances for lasting success." They are: (1) GOS should define and establish leadership responsibilities for the

Health Education Unit; (2) GOS should make official all posting in the Health Education program; (3) USAID should have the next project evaluation focus on whether the project is going to achieve its goals; (4) USAID should assure that implementation plans are brought up to date and require the contractor to document output and target achievement claims.

32. LESOTHO - Rural Water and Sanitation Project.

The IG reports that the project, similar in objectives to the Swaziland project above, has been successful to date. The major remaining issue is will the GOL be able to meet recurrent costs. This question was raised from the start as it is a chronic problem of all projects in Lesotho, as in many other LDCs as well. The IG suggests that potable water projects could be supported, in part, by users fees and cites a GAO study of five cases where users' fee's were charged "with limited success." The USAID disagreed that users' fees are a feasible answer in Lesotho.

33. Zaire - Basic Rural Health Project

The goal of this project is to make primary health care services available to all the population by the year 2000 through a nation-wide system of community-supported health centers. The IG found that the project was a year behind schedule due to the contractor's late arrival and imposition of the Brooke Amendment. Hence, it was difficult to measure progress in the short time the project had been active, a difficulty compounded by the project's not yet having established procedures to measure number of nurses trained, acceptors, committess formed, latrines constructed, vaccination programs begun, etc. Other needs identified included improvement in cash management procedures and increased emphasis on participant training.

Education

34. Thailand - Non-Formal Vocational Education

This $500,000 grant project did not accomplish its objectives due to a lack of consensus as to the concept and the value of "non-formal" education. It was terminated by the USAID ahead of schedule. In selected land settlements in the northeast selected settlers were chosen for training at the RTG Northeast Regional Training Center in "vocational" pursuits, then returned to their homes to "teach" their neighbors, aided by "extension" agents and mobile teams with audiovisual aids. The Thais did not like the program and caused its demise by inaction because of : (1) reluctance to accept the concept of "non-formal" education; (2) lack of commitment to the project by the training center; (3) failure to use the mobile teams and (4) curriculum and tests too complex to be understood by the farmers.

35. Indonesia - Eastern Islands Agricultural Education Project

The objective of this project was to strengthen the network of Eastern Islands Universities' faculties of agriculture including by getting them to work together on joint projects. Ten institutions formed the Association of Eastern Islands Universities. The I.G. review led to the conclusion that the "project intent of establishing a viable association...to serve the needs of ten member institutions has not been and probably cannot be achieved." The main obstacle is a legal but real technicality. The Association is a "consortium" which, by law, has limited (that is, no) powers to accept GOI or external funding except through the established channels of the national university system, which is tortuous. The inability of the Association, as a consortium, to work directly as the hub of the project and counterpart to the USAID's project management caused it to be ineffective. IG recommended termination and the USAID agreed.

Private Sector Development

36. Egypt - Bakery Project

This project was for procurement of 39 bakery lines under an AID loan. The GOE awarded a fixed price contract of $18.1 million to the American Export Group (AEG) of Washington, D.C. AID agreed to make payments to AEG, to finance dollar costs, including the making of both advance payments and progress payments. IG concluded that USAID could not justify either advance or progress payments to AEG.

37. Egypt - Cement Plants

The first part of this project is a $100 million-two-step grant to the GOE for the Suez Cement Company in which the Suez Cement Company received $35.1 million as a grant and agreed to repay to the GOE, in local currency, the equivalent of $64.9 million for the Suez Cement Plant. The second part of the project is a $95 million AID loan to the GOE for the Quattamia Cement Plan of which the GOE reloaned $58.5 million to the Cement Company and granted the balance.

The Suez Plant was scheduled to begin operations in 1980 but had not yet done so at the time of the audit in 1984. Monthly interest charges and start-up costs are $1 million each month. Quattamia Cement Plant construction was also behind schedule. At audit time, the Suez Plant "penalty" charges exceeded $42 million and Quattamia Plant charges had reached $29 million. IG recommended that USAID/Egypt take the necessary steps to bring these to plants into production as rapidly as possible.

38. Egypt - Private Investment Encouragement Fund

This was a grant to the Ministry of Economy to establish a PIEF (Private Investment Encouragement Fund), together with other funds to provide medium to long-term financing to private enterprises in Egypt. Under the grant agreement AID provided $33 million, Egyptian Banks $45 million, and, the GOE, $200,000. The project never became operational. Over 4 years after

inception no equity or credit funds had been disbursed. The GOE did not provide staff for the PIEF and did not use USAID's contract advisory services. After four years, USAID deobligated $22.2 million. IG recommended that the balance of the AID grant also be deobligated.

Other Projects

39. Indonesia - CLUSA Cooperative Service Center Project

The Cooperative League of the United States of America (CLUSA) undertook to establish at Klaten, in central Java, a cooperative service center financed by $1.3 million of PL480 Title II wheat which it sold in Indonesia and transferred the proceeds, in dollars, to its account in Washington, D.C. USAID/Indonesia also made an OPG to CLUSA in the amount of $109,926 to support the project. IG's summary audit findings were that the project was not making progress toward its goal of creating a profitable, self-sustaining center by June, 1984 that could be a model for replication throughout Indonesia. The center had been losing money steadily from its inception with no change in trend in sight. Reasons given were disinterested management, too high salaries, delinquent accounts receivable, unprofitable dairy feed mill operations, and no monitoring of the project by AID. CLUSA reported expenditures of $648,000 on December 31, 1982 of which IG questioned $505,000. After the IG Audit, management of the CLUSA project was changed and the USAID reported that the new management was working effectively on all the problems that had "plagued" it.

40. Costa Rica - Urban Development

In 1978 and 1979 USAID/Costa Rica and the GOCR put together a $25 million program to provide employment, business and training opportunities, and to improve living conditions in San Jose and environs. IG reports that this has been a very successful project and steps should be taken to publicize United States Government sponsorship of this activity more widely.

41. Entente Fund (Benin, Ivory Coast, Niger, Togo and Upper Volta)

From 1975 through 1983, AID committed $27.5 million to the five Entente Fund countries, for 15 sub-projects in Rural Development. It provided another $19.3 million in support of small and medium sized enterprises. As of June 30, 1984, AID assistance through the Entente Fund ended. Following its review of the AID experience with the Fund, the Office of the Inspector General made the following observations:

(a) AID should ensure that the activities it initiated through the Fund receive appropriate attention in the future;

(b) AID's investments in the Fund should be protected by assisting Entente countries in deciding which rural development projects will be continued;

(c) More attention should be paid to the use of credit and revolving funds;

(d) Adequate accounting systems should be established for sub-projects;

(e) AID should take into account the lessons it has learned from its assistance to the Entente Fund, including:

  (a) Need for adequate personnel to monitor projects.
  (b) Need for host country institutional capability.
  (c) Need for timely technical assistance.
  (d) Need for clear understanding by all parties of their respective management responsibilities.
  (e) Need for more emphasis on sound project design.
  (f) Need to coordinate regional projects with individual AID Missions.

42. Guatemala - Loan Portfolio

A special study of the effect of adverse local circumstances on project performance. This was a special analysis of the Guatemala loan portfolio 1975-82 in relation to the impact on project execution of external factors and other reasons why AID's projects in this country seemed generally to have suffered significant implementation delays. Results indicate that conditions beyond Mission control were the cause of much of the problem -- security, government changes, cumbersome GOG procedures, depressed economic conditions, the 1976 earthquake, varying attitudes toward the poor, and

higher GOG priorities to other donor's projects were the principal external factors identified and these were recognized to be beyond the Mission's control. Other factors have been within Mission control -- specifically, faulty project design, planning, staffing, evaluation and monitoring.

43. Sudan - PL 480 Titles I and III

PL 480 Title I and III programs in Sudan from 1980 through 1983 totalled $130 million (50 million Title I and $80 million Title III), in wheat and wheat flour. The IG found the program, substantively, to be "relatively successful in providing needed commodities to assist a distressed economy." However, eight financial and accounting practices were found faulty and recommendation were made for their correction.

44. India - CRS Title II Program

CRS operates a large and important varied Title II program in India. It has five Regional Offices, 2000 consignees and 7500 distributors plus thousands of FFW sites all over the country. The program value for the 3-year period audited: $172 million serving 1.6 to 1.9 million beneficiaries. IG found that the same implementation, management, and monitoring problems, noted in earlier audits of the CRS/India program, persist.

45. Somalia - Commodity Impact Program (CIP)

This program has been successful in generating local currency but less so in making use of it. Programming of counterpart has been slow because USAID/Somalia has not pushed enough to projectize utilization of these idle funds. USAID needs to take aggressive action to accelerate the program. The IG report also comments on a number of specific accounting irregularities that require correction.

In sum the 45 1985 Inspection General Audit Reports make it clear that IG's principal concerns have been:

1. Realistic project design.

2. Problems of implementation with special regard to keeping projects on schedule.

3. The establishment of adequate fiscal and commodity accounting and control systems.

4. Adequacy of USAID attention to the host country's ability to continue to finance and manage a profit once AID assistance has ended.

5. Adequacy of attention to the capability of the host country to assure sound physical maintenance of construction projects, without which AID's initial capital investment can so easily be lost.

CONCLUSION

Both the USAID Mission evaluation reports and the IG reports generally focused on the same key problem issues. The IG reports' language is sharper and the problems are seen from a somewhat different angle, but essentially the same problems stand out in both sets of reports. Both are concerned with overly ambitious and in some cases inappropriate project design. Both are concerned with the compatability of projects with the environment in which they are set. Both are concerned with the slowness of project implementation. Both sets of reports deal with "sustainability," but each from a different angle. The IG reports express a direct and unqualified concern over whether the host country will or will not continue to pay the costs of sustaining the project after AID assistance ends. The USAID Mission reports tend not to deal squarely with this issue. When they do, it is to express concern that AID may be leaving the project too early both from the standpoint of the host country's capability to carry on substantively, and from that of continuing financial support without AID assistance. Those evaluations that do deal directly with the issue express concern that guarantees of sustainability are not clearly nor strongly enough built into project design and implementation plans.

USAID Mission reports deal thoroughly with the institutionalization process and its related human resources development aspects and are impressively analytical as to the issues involved. The IG reports simply state that the host institutions are or are not capable of staffing and managing the project and that the USAID Mission is or is not supplying adequate technical assistance under the circumstances.

The IG reports give more direct attention to the issue of the adequacy of both host country and Mission fiscal and commodity accounting controls. The USAID Mission reports tend to approach the same basic issue more from a project management point of view. Examples include the different angles from which each set of reports see the usage being made of PL 480 and CIP-generated counterpart. The IG reports focus on accuracy and comprehensiveness of amounts and fiscal control thereof, as well as on sufficiently rapid use of the counterpart. The USAID Mission reports reflect

AID's substantive concerns regarding the use of counterpart for maximum effect in furthering Mission and U.S. objectives in the host country through joint development projects and sound economic policies.

Finally, both sets of reports, plus the relevant Bureau for Science and Technology reports express the same substantial concern over the failure in a number of countries to effect the transfer of modern agricultural technologies to small farmers at the farm level. S&T's evaluation of two CRSP's -- Bean and Cowpea and Sorghum-Millet -- join the others in identifying this concern, pointing up the same two aspects of the problem seen earlier: either the delivery system does not function, or it does or could, but the small farmer declines to "adopt." S&T's CRSP conclusions, along with the evidence from the USAID Mission evaluation reports and the IG audit reports reported earlier, underscore the observation that this blockage of technology transfer in the cruical agriculture field ranks high among AID's current priority problem areas.