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BETAC CORPORATION

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**FOREIGN DISASTER ASSISTANCE TRAINING AFTER ACTION REPORT
HURRICANE RICARDO**

DISASTER RESPONSE FOR MANAGERS:

**EXAMINING THE ISSUES
AND THE DECISION PROCESS**

Prepared by Betac Corporation for the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance under AID
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DISASTER RESPONSE FOR MANAGERS: ISSUES AND THE DECISION PROCESS

A. Acknowledgement

The Betac Corporation wishes to acknowledge with appreciation the cooperation it received from OFDA and the hospitality of the United States Embassies in Kingston, Bridgetown, and Port-au-Prince, without which the success of this disaster relief simulation exercise would have been impossible. It also wants to acknowledge the degree to which the exercise benefited from the vital prior efforts of OFDA, coordinated with those of CINCLANT and COMUSFORCARIB, to stimulate disaster preparedness consciousness and planning in the Caribbean. Finally, Betac extends sincere appreciation to those staff members of each post who rendered assistance to, and participated as members of, the exercise control team.

The apparent increased level and intensity of senior management interest at posts, resulting from the exercise, was a source of considerable satisfaction to the training team. Betac hopes that the exercise and this report will help to encourage practical and up-to-date post planning and provide issues for OFDA consideration in future reviews of Handbook 8 and interpretive OFDA comments supplementing the Handbook.

B. Contract Specification

Betac Corporation designed and implemented a series of training simulations to examine major disaster assistance policy issues and the management decisionmaking process in US Embassies/Agency for International Development (AID) Missions in three disaster-prone countries of the Caribbean basin. This training, aimed at strengthening the disaster readiness capabilities of the Missions, was conducted under AID contract PDC-000-C-00-3047-00, in accordance with Betac Proposal No. 83P189, as amended, for the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA). Embassies/AID Missions visited were in Kingston, Jamaica (June 6-9, 1983) Bridgetown, Barbados (June 9-14, 1983), and Port-au-Prince, Haiti (June 14-17, 1983).

C. Training Team Composition

The three man Betac team consisted of two Senior Technical Staff personnel and one Betac consultant, augmented by one representative each from OFDA, Washington, D.C, and the United States Forces Caribbean command, (USFORCARIB), Key West, Florida. Several Betac technical and administrative personnel and one additional Betac consultant also provided assistance in exercise development and report preparation. See Attachment One for contributing personnel.

D. Post Participants

Player teams at each post were chaired either by the Ambassador or Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM). Participants were actual embassy Emergency Action Committee (EAC) members, with EAC composition tailored to a disaster event by augmentation from post staff. In Bridgetown, Barbados, at the AID Mission Director's request, Betac's exercise control team informally framed an abbreviated scenario, as a sub-exercise within the exercise, for an additional group of participants drawn from Mission technical operations personnel.

In Kingston, a representative of the Jamaican Office of Disaster Coordination participated as a member of the controller team. In Port-au-Prince, the Secretary of State for Public Works, Transport, and Communications, the Under Secretary for Public Health, and the head of the Haitian disaster relief office sat with and observed the player team throughout the exercise. Interest was expressed in adapting the simulation to training of host-country personnel.

E. Exercise Description

The disaster assistance training was administered via the simulation exercise technique by a joint Betac, OFDA, DoD control group. Player participants assumed their own roles as post EAC members engaged in confronting a natural disaster and its aftermath on the host country, as portrayed in a hypothetical scenario. On the day prior to the actual exercise, Betac briefed the EAC on likely disasters in the area, elements of the four basic phases of disaster management (mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery), special needs and problems relating to disasters in developing countries and

insular locations, exercise methodology, and the flow of the training. A background handout detailing exercise methodology was distributed at that time (see Attachment Three).

Following the pre-briefing, participants were given a scenario background describing what was known about a tropical storm which could affect the country (see Attachment Four). They then were asked to prepare a simple verbal briefing "for the Ambassador" early the next morning, detailing post preparedness actions. In both Bridgetown and Port-au-Prince the actual Ambassador was present for all or part of the briefing. The questions in Attachment Five were used by the control team "ambassador" and were made available to the actual Chiefs of Mission for such use as they wished during the briefing.

The briefing was followed immediately by the exercise itself, using the following sequence and hypothetical dates and times indicated. Between each phase, appropriate background information was provided to permit continuity of the flow of play.

Phase I

- o D minus 13 hours (September 8, 1983, 8:00 a.m.): "Ambassador" briefed.
- o D-Day, H-Hour (September 8, 1983, 9:00 p.m.): Hurricane strikes.

Phase II

- o D+36 hours (September 10, 1983, 9:00 a.m.): Hurricane response scenario begins.

Phase III

- o D+7 days (September 15, 1983, approximately 10:00 a.m.): Continuing hurricane response efforts.

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- o D+7 days (September 15, 1983, approximately 3:00 p.m.): Large fire in a shantytown housing area is reported.
- o D+7 days (September 15, 1983, 8:30 p.m.): AID/Washington requests initial rundown on post plans for long range recovery/reconstruction/reconstitution/mitigation.

Post-exercise evaluation and discussion occupied up to two hours. The Chief of Mission took an active part in this session at each post. All members of the player and control team participated. In Port-au-Prince, host government disaster relief officials observed the debriefing.

The exercise structure thus permitted examination of posts' planned actions for preparedness (Phase I), response (Phase II), and recovery/mitigation (Phase III) for two different disasters - hurricane and fire - each with quite differing response requirements. The tables of content for the disaster scenarios for Kingston, Bridgetown, and Port-au-Prince are at Attachments Six, Seven, and Eight respectively, to illustrate the scenario content.

F. Training Objectives

The training objectives, which incorporated major policy issues of interest to the OFDA and served as the basis for exercise design, were selected and assembled essentially from four sources:

- o in-depth conversations and review of the exercise draft with OFDA officials;
- o research in OFDA archives and other repositories of data on past disasters;
- o Congressional hearings on past disaster relief situations;
- o Betac's experience in emergency action training at US Foreign Service posts abroad.

Training objectives were presented to the posts in each of the exercise pre-briefings (see Attachment Two). They focused primarily on the Mission response phase of the disaster itself (as opposed to the mitigation, preparedness, and recovery phases of the

disaster management cycle). However, preparedness and recovery were emphasized in other pre- and post-exercise training which focused intense player concentration on these aspects of the Mission's responsibilities. The importance of mitigation - of pre-disaster planning and organization, bringing in host country authorities and other donors - was implicitly and explicitly stressed throughout the simulation.

G. Comments on Objectives

For ease of handling, objectives are examined below in the same order in which they appear in Attachment Two. (In the attachment, objectives are keyed to the identifying numbers of the appropriate "implementers" - i.e., of the messages inserted into the exercise to attain specific training objectives). This does not necessarily reflect either OFDA or Betac assessment of the order of their importance. The comments have been abbreviated so as to keep the report to manageable size but can be amplified as required.

1. Control of Relief Goods

The importance of closely monitoring the flow of relief goods was widely recognized at the posts. However, the team stressed that advance planning with the host government, PVO's, international agencies and other potential donors would further encourage maximum effective delivery to targeted recipients and minimum diversion to unauthorized persons or into the black market. Posts recognized the importance of assuring "clean" and equitable distribution of US contributions, and of projecting a positive US image, both in the US and in-country, but the complexity of the physical and public relations aspects of the problem tended to be underestimated.

2. Contributions of Other Donors

Public and Congressional interest in having the burden of disaster assistance shared by the international community was accepted by all posts as a valid point. The exercise pointed up, again, the need to encourage close coordination between the host government and all donors and to take active steps to make clear to Washington and to the media the ongoing assistance and contributions from all sources, including the US.

3. Justification of Mission Requests

The exercise, although too brief to test Mission policies in depth, indicated a continued tendency to pass along host country requests for specific relief goods without, or with only minimum, analysis by the Mission. With emotions and good intentions running high this is understandable; however, partially considered requests tend to clog the channels with unnecessary items and slow delivery of real relief needs. See also paragraph G.6. below.

4. Fiscal Sobriety

As the exercise progressed there was a gradual escalation of both the degree of cost-consciousness on the part of the Missions and the awareness of the need to consider alternative sources of relief goods and services, viewed from a cost and availability basis. A continuing dialog between OFDA and the missions during the initial stages of the disaster seemed to stimulate this awareness of costs and alternate means.

5. Public Relations

This area of disaster management appears to be misunderstood and neglected. The exercise showed a distinct tendency to conduct public relations in a business-as-usual manner, with posts reacting to the media rather than taking the lead in ensuring that US and host country authorities and the general public are accurately and favorably informed of the US contribution to the total relief effort. The control team stressed that poor public relations can have political repercussions both in-country and in the US and eventually have a negative impact on relief flows.

6. Nature of Relief Goods

The exercise pointed up the need for close coordination between the post and OFDA in focusing the efforts of all donors on real relief needs. It became apparent that the posts lack broad and up to date knowledge of what items are available from stockpile and what items have been found from past experience to be most useful in given situations (e.g., plastic sheeting vs. tents).

7. Common Membership and Roles of Emergency Action Committee and Disaster Relief Committee

There is some confusion in the guidance in the EAM and Handbook 8 as to whether a single committee (the EAC), two committees (the EAC and the MDRC) or ad hoc groupings are foreseen as the primary post disaster management mechanism. This need not be a major issue, since the organization will be tailored by the Chief by Mission to the needs of the situation; however, clarification appears useful for planning purposes and to ensure instant responses. The training exposed misperceptions of who should comprise such a committee and pointed out the need for firmly establishing the organizational level, role, and responsibilities of the MDRO.

8. Permits and Agreements

The brevity of the exercise militated against a complete airing of the related issues of agreements and permits. However, assumptions of immediately securing import, overflight, and landing rights may have been too hasty. Posts were cautioned that some delays may be encountered and that some preliminary negotiations should be undertaken in the planning stage, preferably in the context of multi-donor planning.

9. Peace Corps

Participation by the Peace Corps was quite responsive and employment of Peace Corps Volunteers (PCVs) appeared well handled. The usefulness of this trained, knowledgeable resource was recognized and reinforced during the exercise.

10. Mission Command, Control and Coordination

Posts generally demonstrated understanding of the need for centrally directed, Mission-wide involvement in disaster issues. It was apparent at the same time that posts may honor this concept more in the heat of a disaster situation and less in the planning and followup phases of the disaster cycle; these latter aspects cannot be delegated solely to one or two elements of the Mission if successful team performance is

a goal. The exercise stimulated post awareness of this problem and of the need to treat the mitigation - preparedness - response - recovery cycle as an integral whole for purposes of management planning. Regarding crisis operations themselves, the exercise revealed good internal cooperation among EAC elements at all posts.

11. Advanced Planning: Preparedness/Mitigation

OFDA has done much to promote host government attention around the world to the cause of advanced planning for disaster situations. The exercise appears to have raised the consciousness of Mission elements to the need for bilateral, multilateral, and regional attention to the problem and should increase OFDA/post cooperation in backing up OFDA's efforts.

12. Mission Reporting-Feedback

The exercise was too limited in time to permit full exercising of reporting requirements. It did indicate, however, that posts should be more attuned to Washington's need for structured information flow in order to ensure continuous Department, AID, OFDA, and post attention to all critical operational, political, economic, and public relations aspects of the emergency.

13. DAST

The Disaster Area Survey Team emerged as one of the more controversial aspects of the disaster assistance continuum. The US military, whose components normally are directly involved, has repeatedly proven its capability and readiness to respond promptly and effectively to calls for assessment of disaster damage and resultant relief needs. However, the cost to the US is considerable in budgetary terms. This and the desire of recipient countries to strengthen local capabilities underpin the OFDA objective of encouraging the shift of more of the assessment burden to non-US military sources and to more use of the in-country resources of governments, of international organizations, of representatives of potential donors, including PVO's, and of our own Foreign Service posts. The exercise indicated that time considerations, past successes, and an enthusiastic and supportive theater military command still tend to lead to an automatic request for a military DAST. If this tendency is to be overcome (or at

least placed in perspective in the context of other resource availabilities), there must be some focused pre-planning by each post, including an inventory of available in-country skills and equipment and the sketching out of a regularly-updated, host country led, survey team capability.

H. Other Issues Arising from the Exercise

1. Management Attention

OFDA is fully aware of the difficulty of focusing the attention of senior management at posts on disaster mitigation and preparedness. The exercises proved to be a unique device for involving top management, from the ambassador on down, in the intricacies of long term preparedness for disaster as well as in the actual handling of disaster relief and rehabilitation. As a result, it is hoped that posts will take action to update and strengthen their Mission Disaster Relief Plans (MDRPs) and to apply some of the lessons learned to their overall Emergency Action Plans (EAPs).

2. Communications

The exercises pointed up the importance of adequate, functioning communications equipment in managing the emergency and assuring personnel welfare. Decisions need to be made in advance as to where embassy communications equipment should be placed for maximum utility (host country disaster center, host country weather service, in offices of other disaster organizations such as PVO's, etc.) and how these stations can be made at least minimally compatible with the Mission's emergency circuits. The compatibility question also exists in some cases for intra-Mission communications. Thought should be given to use of all available nets, including E&E, ham radio, CB, commercial, etc. and all circuits and emergency generators must be tested regularly.

3. Transport

More detailed thought should be given to vehicle availability under crisis conditions, including host resources, and to ensuring that FSN drivers and mechanics, tire repair capabilities, and adequate fuel supplies will be at hand. Detailed planning is essential if this key response element is to function as seems to be assumed.

4. Treatment of FSN's

FSN employees will be key to many aspects of the post's ability to provide meaningful disaster assistance and to resume normal functions in the immediate post-disaster period. Adequate access to and consultation with key staff and assurance of assistance for their families may be vital to the employees' presence at their jobs in the immediate post-disaster period. The exercise showed a considerable range in the extent of post planning in this regard.

5. Pan-Caribbean Disaster Preparedness and Prevention Team

There was little knowledge at two of the posts of the role, composition and capabilities of the Antigua based team or of what triggers its deployment to a disaster scene.

6. Evacuation

There was some thought given by players to the evacuation of limited numbers of US dependent and non-essential personnel. This ordinarily will be neither necessary nor feasible; evacuation could, in fact, divert attention and resources from recovery and assistance operations. Planning already includes detailed instructions to all households on preparing for a disaster. Discussions at one post included actions to be taken to care for families that may find their houses uninhabitable as a result of the disaster.

7. Retention of Relief Equipment

The posts generally were aware of the problems that may be presented by host-country requests to retain ordinary items of relief equipment for permanent use by the host country after the relief and rehabilitation periods. The exercise drew attention both to that issue and the more complicated issue of requests to retain specialized military equipment. Some tendency was noted to give assurances of compliance with the host-country request. Post personnel were reminded of the requirement for consultation with State, AID, and/or the Defense Department before they comment on such requests.

8. Use of Coast Guard Capabilities

Betac understands that discussions with the US Coast Guard are under way to reach agreement on rules for the use of Coast Guard ships, personnel and equipment for disaster relief, reflecting the increased presence and visibility of the Coast Guard in the Caribbean. Relations between Coast Guard units and the posts were shown to be close and expectations to be considerable on both sides.

9. Use of COMUSFORCARIB Capabilities

The role of the military theater commander, in this case COMUSFORCARIB, is made quite clear in Handbook 8 and in the Command's operational concept plan. However, the exercise did point up some differences in understanding as to the depth of actions USFORCARIB would undertake within provisions of instructions which authorize immediate action by the local commanders, without further checking with OFDA, in cases where a life threatening situation is perceived.

10. Guidance Documents

In preparing for the exercise, Betac undertook a detailed examination of available policy and guidance documents issued by the Department of State, AID/OFDA, and the posts. While ample AID/OFDA formal guidance exists, and informal supplemental instructions have been drafted for future publication, the training indicated that AID Handbook 8 would benefit from some updating. This would include adding the latest guidance and lessons learned, clarifying certain of its provisions, and making changes in format for greater ease and speed of use.

Personnel at post who specifically are assigned Mission Disaster Relief Officer duties appeared well familiarized with AID/OFDA guidance and procedures. However, in most posts, other EAC members, while demonstrating proficiency in their own assigned duties, were not well acquainted with the tough basic disaster assistance issues designed into the training objectives. Also most participating post personnel did not appear well acquainted with the Department's Emergency Action Manual (EAM).

Recommendations

1. OFDA should examine the level of appointment of the MDRO and alternate. This could be the AID Country director, as in one post, or a subordinate. For consideration: the DCM and an alternate or the AID Country Director and an alternate.
2. Chiefs of Mission should stress the need for ongoing, pre-disaster coordination with host governments, PVO's, and international agencies on specific aspects of planning, communication in time of emergency, agreements and permits, etc.
3. OFDA and Chiefs of Mission should increase post knowledge of relief resources generally available from host country, PVO, international agency, third country, and OFDA stocks. Instructions formally supplementing Handbook 8 would be useful and a periodic OFDA newsletter outlining new items and considerations might be helpful.
4. OFDA should capitalize on the role of simulations in creating and maintaining disaster assistance interest. For consideration: could they be tied to the drafting or revising of a MDRP or EAP? To a local or regional preparedness seminar?
5. Chiefs of Mission should stress the vital role of the PAO and the impact that good public information management can have on the image of US relief efforts. The establishment of a rumor control and media relations center, as specified in the EAM, should be emphasized. OFDA may wish to consider action to have the post PAO included in the illustrative list of EAC members in the EAM.
6. OFDA should clarify as it becomes feasible the issue of DAST composition, be it US military, mixed US military and embassy/civilian, or mixed US, host country, and international agency. OFDA should emphasize the need for specificity in post requests for a DAST, Embassy evaluation of its own assessment capabilities, the provision of transportation and communications, etc.
7. Chiefs of Mission should emphasize that offers of assistance which are received directly by the post should be referred immediately to the OFDA.

8. OFDA should continue to stress the importance of fiscal sobriety and cost trade offs, e.g., local vs US procurement, field hospitals vs other treatment, sheet plastic vs tentage.

9. Chiefs of Mission should attempt to reach prior understandings with host governments, preferably within a multi-lateral framework, on such subjects as import and export permits, overflight and landing rights, and status of forces agreements. Such understandings would relate to humanitarian and disaster relief activities only, and be designed to reduce the burden of post-disaster requirements and to speed assistance.

10. The Peace Corp Country Director should maintain a PCV primary and secondary skills inventory to permit the post to access these capabilities quickly and easily. This also points toward a more deliberate and prominent role for the PC Country Director in the EAC.

11. Once a post agrees to host a disaster assistance simulation, it would be useful to take advantage of the senior level interest to insure that the training actually does result in focused, management-endorsed planning. The ideal situation occurred at one of the posts, where OFDA arranged to have a disaster planning expert join the simulation team and remain at post to help write the Mission Disaster Relief Plan. Other ways should be sought to multiply the effect of the simulation training. One such way might be to advertise the exercise, either in the original cable laying out its parameters or in a separate letter in the Chief of Mission, as a first step in bolstering a post's disaster management capabilities, to be reinforced immediately by an update of the post's MDRP.

12. Posts should be reminded of the spin-offs of lessons learned as a result of this training to other relevant elements of the broader post EAP.

13. OFDA may want to request that the Inspectors General of AID and the State Department include on their inspection agendas an inquiry as to the status and workability of the disaster relief plans, if this is not now the case.

14. Posts should identify, prior to the onset of disaster, sources of vehicle and specialized equipment which have all-or nearly all-terrain capabilities, such as truck and jeep-type four wheel drive vehicles, forklifts, and construction and earth moving equipment.

15. Plans should include rosters of key FSN employees and the latter should be informed in the planning stage of both what will be expected of them in an emergency and what the post is able to do to help the families of FSNs ride out or more quickly recover from the disaster.
16. Caribbean posts should be supplied adequate details on the role of the Antigua based Pan-Caribbean Disaster Preparedness and Prevention Team for factoring its capabilities and assistance into post preparedness, assessment, and relief planning.
17. OFDA may wish to clarify with COMUSFORCARIB actions which might be taken, under the life-preserving provisions of his instructions, prior to funding by OFDA.
18. Posts should be reminded of the requirement for EAC members to become familiar with basic Department, AID/OFDA, and post emergency action (including disaster assistance) guidance documents.
19. OFDA should consider publishing a revised and reformatted AID Handbook 8 in the near future, which might incorporate supplementing guidance and lessons-learned from previous disaster assistance efforts.
20. OFDA should consider submitting a revision to the Department's Emergency Action Manual to update and expand disaster assistance guidance in that document.
21. OFDA should consider clarifying the organizational structure suggested for the management of disaster assistance, in order to avoid confusion between the EAC and the disaster management group. The latter appears to duplicate most functions of the EAC and the separation tends to shift interest from the whole post to elements of the AID mission for this particular type of emergency.
22. Advance planning with the host government, PVO's, international agencies and other potential donors needs to be further encouraged to assure maximum effective delivery to targeted recipients and minimum diversion to unauthorized persons or into the black market.

TRAINING TEAM COMPOSITION

Mr. Richard A. Halsaver, Betac Senior Technical Staff, Team Leader

Mr. Lawrence C. Jaffe, Betac Senior Technical Staff

Mr. Robert L. Yost, (American Ambassador, Retired), Betac Consultant

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**ATTACHMENT TWO
TRAINING OBJECTIVES**

Phase I D-Day	Phase II D+36 Hours	Phase III D+7 Days	Training Objectives
	18/22 24	34/35 37/46 52	1. Control of Relief Goods. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> o Relief not getting to the people. o Monitoring PVO's. o Corruption, US image. o Return of nonconsumables.
	19/22 24/28	36/51	2. Contribution of Other Donors. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> o Coordination. o Burden-sharing (US fair share). o US/EEC-PAHO (slug cables Geneva pass to UNDRO).
	20/28	45/47 48/49	3. Justification of Mission Requests. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> o Requests for field hospitals, water purification units, inflatable boats (availability, costs, disengagement, return, real needs). o Help OFDA to help.
	19	39/47 49/50	4. Costs. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> o Funding for major catastrophe is always short. o Military often costs more than civilian. o Local purchase.
	13	35/37	5. Public Relations. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> o Positive US image. o Handling negative media - accusations (too little, too late), military use, black market. o Host country sensitivities.

Phase I D-Day	Phase II D+36 Hours	Phase III D+7 Days	Training Objectives
	22/24 28	45/46 47/52	<p>6. Nature of Relief Goods.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> o What advice does the mission give to relatives, private organizations on what to send. o Floodlights in stockpile. o What will host country allow in and out. o Uneven application of assistance/resources. o Plastic better than tents.
03/04	17/31 32/34 38	40/41 42/44	<p>7. Common Roles and Makeup of EAC and DRC.</p>
	15/18 32	39	<p>8. Permits and Agreements.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> o Overflight. o Import and export. o Status of forces - immunities (arrange beforehand).
03/04	14		<p>9. Peace Corps.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> o Use in disaster assessment. o P/C skills inventory. o Skills inventory of local community.
02	11/15 18/21 25/26 27/33 34	40/43 44/48 50/51	<p>10. Mission Command, Control and Communications.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> o Appropriate authority for actions taken. o Disconnects. o Is quick fix integrated in long term solution.
	03/04 26/33	52	<p>11. Prevention/Mitigation.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> o US position and policy.

Phase I D-Day	Phase II D+36 Hours	Phase III D+7 Days	Training Objectives
04/05 06/09	16/27 31/33 10/12 18/23 25/26 27/30 33	40/41 42/43 48	12. Mission Reporting, Feedback. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> o Internal. o External. 13. DAST <ul style="list-style-type: none"> o US policy. o Coordination (DOS, DoD, local government). o DAST composition.

**ATTACHMENT THREE
EXERCISE BACKGROUND**

AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
OFFICE OF FOREIGN DISASTER ASSISTANCE (OFDA)
AND
BETAC CORPORATION

DISASTER ASSISTANCE
SIMULATION EXERCISE

"What course do we want events to take?"
"Do we have the power to bring it about?"¹

¹ Attributed to Averell Harriman by Roger Hilsman, To Move A Nation, Garden City, New York, Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1967.

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DISASTER ASSISTANCE TRAINING

1. INTRODUCTION

a. The skill of crisis management cannot be acquired solely through reading or lectures; to be effective it must actually be experienced and absorbed through action and reinforcement. The would-be manager must be involved both physically and emotionally to take in the implications of the decisions he or she must make in such areas as: how and where to gather information; how and in what detail to plan ahead; how to evaluate and adjust to changing crisis situations; and, how to organize essential coordination, planning, decision-making, execution and feedback during and following the crisis.

b. The disaster assistance simulation in which you are about to participate was developed in response to needs made clear through continuing analysis by the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance of the handling of sudden disaster situations to which overseas personnel have been exposed in the past several years. The simulation presents a renewed focus on the interrelationship of planning, coordination, training and preparedness. It was designed as a learning tool which would expose players, first-hand, to highly compressed, realistic events taxing their skills, experience and reasoning processes.

c. OFDA, taking the lead in providing this simulation, has found that those who have undergone such training before disaster strikes do more accurate planning and are far better prepared to make the decisions and cope with the rigors and stresses that develop.

2. PURPOSE

a. The disaster assistance simulation is designed to exercise and refine cognitive skills associated with the U.S. response to a foreign disaster within a "crisis management" situation. Participants are required to perform crisis-related duty functions, understand increased crisis reporting requirements, and make reasoned judgements and decisions under time constraints. They will be presented with an intense, dynamic environment in which to meet the following individual performance goals:

1. To actively participate in crisis decision and management.
2. To successfully interact with Emergency Action Committee (EAC) members, AID mission personnel (if present), higher and adjacent government departments, host country activities, private voluntary organizations (PVOs), and international agencies.
3. To exercise procedures contained in post plans and in the Department of State Emergency Action Manual (EAM), AID Handbook 8, and other relevant directives under the pressures of constrained time and often tragic conditions.
4. To understand the need for disaster preparedness planning and to appreciate the complexities of plans implementation and coordination.
5. To gain experience in applying analytic and systems techniques in crisis situations.

b. Throughout the training session participants will be required to interact with fellow EAC members as well as a variety of outside agencies, activities and other influencing factors. The concept is to generate a pressure-cooker environment where the press of events severely limits the time available to plan and act. When a highly placed, elected government official was recently asked what was the hallmark of crisis, he responded "I think it's very simple. All other things considered, you have a crisis when normal staffing, planning and decision making procedures are beginning to prove inadequate. When they don't work fast enough, that's when you shift into a crisis mode."² This disaster assistance training, then, becomes the vehicle which helps shift participants into that emergency mode.

c. This training is not intended as an all inclusive study of disaster assistance management. The focus of effort is rather on the pragmatic aspects of decisionmaking, disaster assistance planning and execution, policy formulation and coordination, and the implementation of responsive, fiscally responsible emergency relief measures.

² From speech by LTG Samuel Wilson (USA, Retired), at 1982 Unconventional Warfare Conference, Headquarters United States European Command, 25 February 1982.

3. METHODOLOGY

a. This disaster assistance training will simulate a sequence of events leading to and including the implementation of both the Mission Disaster Relief Plan (MDRP) and provisions of the Department's Emergency Action Manual (EAM) by participating players. The sequence of events consists of a structured scenario keyed to a range of teaching points covering such issues as hazard and vulnerability analysis, preparedness, prediction and warning, assessment, welfare and whereabouts of U.S. citizens, "action forcing" resulting from media coverage, requirements analysis, resource analysis, emergency assistance, rehabilitation, and reconstruction. Posts will form their Emergency Action Committee and assemble necessary plans, procedures, manuals, and other "tools". From this "mission operations center" players respond to and request actions of exercise controllers who represent the department, outside activities and agencies, the host government, and private citizens. The players interface with controllers via telecommunications cables (simulated), telephone, hand carried notes, and personal visits.

b. The structured scenario insures that teaching points will be addressed and reinforced if required. Exercise events are designed to satisfy training objectives by focusing on emergency management thought processes, procedures, and decisions. Events are specifically configured to stimulate standard mission and country team functions involving the disaster universe (Attachment 1). If the group dynamics within the EAC appear to be heading off track to the detriment of the exercise play, selected implementers will be introduced to set participants in an appropriate direction and emphasize the importance and requirements of EAC interplay. The scenario retains sufficient flexibility, however, to accommodate free play and stimulate participation. Participants are allowed a measure of freedom (within the constraints of exercise objectives and performance goals) to impose their collective efforts in determining outcomes. There is no book solution that brings the exercise to its conclusion. Instead, there are a variety of outcomes which are possible, depending on the participants' actions involving situational problems presented during the exercise and the controllers' judgements concerning the satisfaction of teaching points.

4. EVALUATION

a. Training evaluation is directed toward two audiences. The first is the Chief of Mission who needs to impartially measure overall success or failure of the EAC in terms of training objectives and performance goals in providing responsive, yet prudent, disaster assistance, during which he/she would have major responsibilities for U.S. government response. Additionally, the training should evoke feedback that permits subsequent post emergency planning modification and enhancement. The second audience, composed of the participating players, need to assess their performance in their roles within the Emergency Action Committee. Controller insights involving opportunities missed by players are useful, as are laudatory comments for those portions well done. Both purposes of the evaluation serve as meaningful training tools and provide participants with a relative sense of accomplishment, capability, and preparedness.

b. Exercise evaluation is a responsibility of the controllers. Their assessments will be made periodically throughout scenario implementation and will be based on perceptions and opinions; very little objective or hard, quantitative data will be available to "grade" participants. The evaluation, then, is sensitive to controller experience, background and knowledge of departmental procedures and policies within the crisis management and disaster assistance arenas.

c. The exercise is conducted as "no fault". This means mistakes made and observations rendered will remain at post for post and personal improvement only. There is no formal written report as to specific post performance. Aggregate, general observations of this and several other training sessions will be made to the OFDA. This fosters, and is meant to encourage, participants to work the problems through without regard to seeking a textbook or graded solution when time may be more critical to the risk at hand.

- Attachments:
1. Disaster Universe
 2. General Guidance for Participants
 3. Post Specific Guidance for Participants
(to be provided separately)

Disaster Universe

ORGANIZATIONS

GOVERNMENT

Disaster Center
 Chief of State
 Ministries:
 Social Affairs
 Defense
 Home Affairs
 Education
 External Affairs
 Agriculture
 Finance
 Health
 Planning
 Communications
 Transportation
 Public Works
 Water Resources
 Housing
 Labor

Scientific Agencies
 Legislature

PRIVATE SECTOR

Red Cross
 Voluntary Agencies
 Scientific Institutions
 Commercial Enterprises

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

UNDRO	WHO
UNDP	FAO
UNEP	WMO
UNHCR	ESCAP
IGI'	ASEAN
ITU	LORCS
IBRD	ICRC

BILATERAL DEVELOPMENT

REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

DISASTER TYPES

METEOROLOGICAL

Cyclone
 Storm Surge
 Tornado
 Storm
 Heat Wave

GEOLOGICAL

Earthquake
 Landslide
 Avalanche
 Volcano

MAN-MADE

Civil Strife
 Fire
 Accidents
 Famine

HYDROLOGICAL

Drought
 Flood
 Flash Flood

EPIDEMIC

ENVIRONMENTAL

Deforestation
 Blight
 Pollution



TECHNOLOGY

Satellites	Information Systems	Food/Water
Aircraft Reconnaissance	Transportation	Packaging
Earth Stations	Medical Systems	Storage
Ground Sensors	Delivery Systems	"Appropriate"
Communications	Shelter	

DISCIPLINES

PHYSICAL SCIENCES


GEOGRAPHY
 Macrozonning
 Microzonning
 Cartography
 Demography
GEOLOGY
 Seismology
 Volcanology
 Geomorphology

HYDROLOGY
 Ground Water
 Flood Control
METEOROLOGY
 Climatology
 Weather Modification
OCEANOGRAPHY

APPLIED SCIENCES

ARCHITECTURE
ENGINEERING
 Seismic
 Construction
REMOTE SENSING
MANAGEMENT
 Budgeting
 Accounting
 Personnel
 Information Mgmt.
ANTHROPOLOGY
EDUCATION
 Training
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER
ECONOMICS
POLITICAL SCIENCE

CIVIL SYSTEMS
 Search & Rescue
 Fire
COMMUNICATIONS
LOGISTICS
 Transportation
 Packaging
 Distribution
HEALTH
 Epidemiology
 Medicine
 Nutrition
 Pharmacology
 Sanitation
AGRICULTURE
 Crops
 Livestock



GEOGRAPHIC CONCERNS

PHASES OF THE DISASTER CYCLE

PHASE	RESPONSIBILITY AREA	FUNCTIONS
HAZARD ANALYSIS	Scientific Community	Analysis of mechanics of natural and man-made disaster in terms of causes and effects and with reference to temporal and areal probability of incidence.
VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS	Geographic Communities Scientific	Estimation of where and when natural hazards will strike populations.
PREPAREDNESS	Disaster Planners Civil Defense Scientific Community Legislators Institutions/Media	Mitigation Programs Organizational Development Physical Adjustments Education and Training Legislation Logistics and Communications
PREDICTION AND WARNING	Government Officials Scientific Community Disaster Managers Communications/Media Civil Defense	Monitor Precursor Events Recognize Dangerous Phenomena Analyze Potential Threat Assess Political Consequences Alert Public
MOBILIZATION	Disaster Managers	Alert Responsible Officials Activate Funding Mechanisms Requisition Emergency Resources Manage Relief Organization

ASSESSMENT	Disaster Managers Scientific Community Military/Civil Defense Red Cross	Determine Damage Determine Causes/ Effects Determine Resource Deficits
REQUIREMENTS ANALYSIS	Disaster Managers	Estimate Resources In Community Estimate Outstanding Needs Identify Unmet Requirements Priorities Require- ments
RESOURCE ANALYSIS	Disaster Managers Procurement Specialist Logistics Specialists	Define Requirements Determine Least Time/ Least Cost Source
RESCUE AND EVACUATION	Civil Authorities Military Red Cross	Insure Survivors Safety
EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE	Disaster Managers Civil Authorities Military Red Cross Private Sector Other Donors	Monitor Situation Analyze Continuing Needs Requisition and Procure Transport and Deliver Provide Life- Sustenance, Health and Comfort
REHABILITATION	Disaster Managers Civil Authorities Military	Bring Stricken Community to State of Normality
RECONSTRUCTION	Development Experts Disaster Managers Scientific Community Private Sector	Bring About Higher Quality of Life/ Security against Disasters

GENERAL GUIDANCE FOR PARTICIPANTS

Objective

The objective of the exercise is to expose you to problems which are representative of those you may be expected to encounter during a disaster situation at an overseas mission. Although the decisions which will be required may not be those which may confront you in an emergency at your particular post, it is the process of arriving at those decisions, the requisite coordination involved, and the necessary Emergency Action Committee (EAC) teamwork that are the targets of this approach.

Scenario

The simulation scenario relates fictitious events selected as having some likelihood of occurrence at your post under current or projected circumstances. These events, however, are based on real world problems and many actual past occurrences. Participants will assume roles of the EAC as it is planned to be formed, organized, and directed at your post. As would be expected, there is a great deal of coordination required with the Department, the host government, private voluntary organizations, international agencies, American, local national, and third country citizens, and the US military.

Exercise Methodology

The exercise scenario will unfold via simulated telegrams and other written material, telephone calls, or visits by Controllers pretending to be, for example, a member of the Embassy staff outside the command post occupied by the EAC. The Controllers will be the outside world for all communications from the EAC, e.g., the Department, third country Embassies, Ministries, local officials, or private organizations. Should the post phone the Department, another Embassy, or a local firm, for example, a Controller will play the part of the person or agency called. Telegrams to the Department or to other posts will be passed to the Controllers, who will send the response to the players as an "incoming" cable.

There is no prescribed outcome to the play. While a basic scenario theme exists to guide the Controllers, the direction of play also depends on the players and the manner in which they can influence developments by their decisions and initiatives.

Neither the post nor the participants will be "graded" on performance in the exercise. However, on conclusion of the exercise there will be a post-mortem evaluation period with the Controllers to review play and perceived outcomes.

**ATTACHMENT FOUR
HURRICANE PATHS**

HURRICANE RICARDO: JAMAICA

Hurricane News

The morning weather broadcasts on Sunday, August 28 over JBC and JBC/TV reported the development of a tropical depression in the doldrums area of the Atlantic, 10 degrees north of the Equator, and 30 degrees west, off the Cape Verde Islands. Satellite photographs show a suspicious disturbance developing into a tropical depression. NOAA's Hurricane Hunter reconnaissance is reported to have verified that a developing storm exists.

By Tuesday, the tropical depression has moved west and its winds increased to 50 mph. As a tropical storm it was eligible for a name--Ricardo. Ricardo has traveled over 350 miles each day, with an average forward speed of 20 mph. It was well away from any land mass, and storm forecasters say it is too soon to predict any landfall.

By Thursday, September 1, Ricardo has veered west and picked up speed. Hurricane Hunter reports winds near 70 mph in center; further intensification is expected. By afternoon, the tropical storm has become a hurricane. Before the day ends, Ricardo's winds reach 80 mph near the storm center. Hurricane warnings are issued for the Windward Islands. Small craft cautionary messages are upgraded to small-craft warnings.

While the hurricane's movement is unpredictable, as always, and its speed a bit faster than normal at about 20 mph, national forecasters are beginning to speak of the possibility that Ricardo could strike across the central Caribbean. As yet there are no official warnings, but residents are being advised that they should pay attention to weather bulletins.

By Friday, an official hurricane watch is issued for the Windward Islands. (Gale warnings are added, covering areas for several hundred miles around Ricardo's eye.) Hurricane Hunter reports describe winds of 95 mph at center. Small craft warnings are joined by warnings of high storm tides on the Island's coasts.

Far to the west in the Jamaican resorts, merchants are getting ready for a busy weekend and looking forward to a good following week. The weather is fine with blue skies and daytime temperatures in the 80s. At night, the temperature drops to the mid-60s giving visitors and permanent residents the kind of weather that has made Jamaica such a popular resort area. The summer pleasure-boat population around the island coast has also reached a non-weekend peak.

The commercial fishermen have been out to sea for nearly three hours, having cursed their way out of the clogged harbor. Kingston itself is quiet with the normal activity of a Monday morning. Police and firemen are gathering at their stations to talk about their weekend duty and get ready for the next week's routine.

Day 1 - Sunday, September 4

Ricardo, which has reached the intensity of a Class II hurricane, hits the Leeward Islands. Since it appears to be headed north, people in the Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico brace themselves for a direct hit. Gale warnings are added for the Dominican Republic's southeastern coast.

Day 2 - Monday, September 5

As the work week begins, Ricardo moves due west, heading into the Caribbean Sea and sparing the Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico from its full fury. It is a blessing, for Ricardo is a monster: winds around the storm center have reached 140 mph, and gale-force winds cover tens of thousands of square miles.

What may be a blessing for Puerto Rico is sounding a tocsin for Jamaica. Almost two thousand miles away in Jamaica's resorts the weather is still fine. People are getting ready for another day at the beach and the sport fishermen are setting out in their boats. Later in the day satellite photographs, ship reports, and reconnaissance aircraft indicate Ricardo is growing more intense. A small-craft caution note is added to advisories. Jamaican officials are also beginning to speak of a possible hurricane but, at this point, it is merely banter around the coffee urn rather than prompting any specific planning or action. Some of the merchants listening to the weather broadcasts are starting to think that the coming week could be very poor for business. Tourists will be frightened away and those who do arrive will probably not come out to the restaurants

and attractions in the evenings. Those who only had tentative plans to come to Jamaica that week would probably cancel.

Day 3 - Tuesday, September 6

Ricardo has moved south as well as west, staying out in the open of the Caribbean Sea. Although that path has given a respite to the anxious islands, it has allowed Ricardo to intensify. The warm waters of the Caribbean have added fuel and fury to the hurricane, which has reached Class III intensity. Emergency Services officials and many others in the Dominican Republic, Haiti, and Jamaica are watching closely the moves of Hurricane Ricardo.

In Jamaica it is not yet clear whether or where the island will experience winds and seas of hurricane intensity. Nevertheless, some residents of Kingston have taken the precaution of boarding up windows and securing loose outdoor furniture and other lightweight objects. Others, who did not want first-hand experience with hurricanes or severe storms, have simply packed up and left. The roads and streets are beginning to show very heavy traffic for mid-week.

Town officials are putting final touches on emergency plans and are beginning to brief their employees on what needs to be done. Temporary employees are given special instructions and asked to assist in providing first aid and emergency assistance. Plans to prepare and staff the Nuttall Hospital as a central aid station are reviewed for rapid implementation and all hospitals alerted.

Island officials are constantly monitoring weather broadcasts, waiting for the forecasters to clarify the picture for them locally. Visitors continue to leave in moderate numbers. Many merchants and residents begin to purchase plywood to put over their store windows and almost everyone is prepared for the fact they have a few unpleasant days ahead, although perhaps not a hurricane.

By the afternoon, the lifeguards are asking swimmers to get out of the water because of the increasing undertow and higher waves. The Jamaican Coast Guard is monitoring the harbor traffic to pressure boaters not to go out in defiance of the small craft warnings.

Day 4 - Wednesday, September 7

Ricardo continues to move west, but also veers slightly north, which causes officials in Haiti and Jamaica to be especially anxious. Those in the Dominican Republic begin to relax slightly as the day wears on--assuming they will be spared a direct hit by Ricardo.

In mid-afternoon, scattered showers are occurring over Jamaica. The television and radio stations are broadcasting the hurricane warning as well as the official notice that everyone should evacuate the low-lying areas. Several police cruisers equipped with loudspeakers begin to patrol the town directing all residents to take shelter. Police are spreading out through the danger areas of Kingston urging residents to move to safer places. Similar warnings are given to the owners and managers of beachfront stores and office buildings.

By nightfall residents are advised to fill bathtubs or any available storage containers with water as well as take other precautions in their homes. The water system is shut down at 3 p.m. to maintain the supply in the higher lying tanks. Merchants continue to make preparations by boarding up their windows, many late believers scrambling to find suitable materials to do so.

Day 5 - Thursday, September 8

By continuing its northwesterly path, Ricardo heads directly toward the southeastern shore of Jamaica. A full alert goes out to all residents of the island.

People who can are leaving Kingston by all routes. The roads are totally clogged. The traffic conditions are made more severe by a small stream of boat, home, and store owners coming into Kingston as well as curiosity seekers coming in "for the action". As many as possible are turned away by the police. Many boats and vehicles are temporarily abandoned; stalled vehicles are pushed off the roadway at several points. Winds sometime exceed 50 mph now and panic is beginning to set in. Police and fire officials assisting with the evacuation have problems managing the crowds of vehicles. Almost the entire fire and police staff is engaged in traffic control (or is bogged down in traffic congestion), leaving relatively few officers to patrol residential areas and advise

residents to leave or go to higher areas and secure buildings. One official expresses his frustrations when he says, "If they don't know they should leave by now, our telling them once more isn't going to help."

The US Mission has been following the course of Ricardo closely. The MDRO has reviewed the MDRP and been in touch with local authorities. At 4 p.m. on Wednesday, the DCM receives a memorandum from the ambassador asking for a briefing on Mission preparedness. (Attached)

HURRICANE RICARDO: BARBADOS

Day 1 - Sunday, September 4, 1983

The morning weather broadcasts over the Barbados radio stations and CBC/TV are reporting a developing tropical depression in the doldrums area of the Atlantic, 10 degrees north of the Equator, and 30 degrees west, off the Cape Verde Islands. Satellite photographs show a suspicious disturbance and NOAA's Hurricane Hunter reconnaissance is reported to have verified that a developing storm exists.

Two thousand miles to the west in Bridgetown, the merchants are in the midst of a busy weekend and looking forward to a good following week. The weather is fine with blue skies and daytime temperatures in the 80s. At night, the temperature drops to the mid-60s giving visitors and permanent residents the kind of weather that has made Barbados such a popular resort area. The summer pleasure-boat population around the island coast has also reached a non-weekend peak. The commercial fishermen have been out to sea for nearly three hours, having cursed their way out of the clogged harbor. Bridgetown itself is quiet with the normal activity of a Sunday morning. Police and firemen are gathering at their stations to talk about their weekend duty and get ready for the next week's routine.

Day 2 - Monday, September 5, 1983

The tropical depression is moving west and its winds have increased to 50 mph, making it a tropical storm and thus eligible for a name. The one that has been assigned is Ricardo. Ricardo has moved over 350 miles in the past day and has a forward speed of 15 mph which is gradually increasing. It is edging to the north, well away of any land mass; storm forecasters say it is too soon to predict where the storm might touch land or indeed if there would be any landfall at all.

Some fifteen hundred miles away in the Barbados resorts the weather is still fine. People are getting ready for another day at the beach and the sport fishermen are setting out in their boats. Later in the day satellite photographs, ship reports, and reconnaissance aircraft indicate Ricardo is growing more intense. A small-craft caution note is added to advisories.

Day 3 - Tuesday, September 6, 1983

Ricardo is now veering directly west and picking up speed. Hurricane Hunter reports winds near 70 mph in the center; and further intensification is expected. By afternoon, the tropical storm has become a hurricane and is moving rapidly toward the Windward Islands. Before the day ends, Ricardo's winds reach 80 mph near the storm center. Hurricane warnings are issued for the Windwards. Small craft cautionary messages are upgraded to small craft warnings.

The storm is still more than a thousand miles from Barbados but it has begun to influence the weather. While its movement is unpredictable as always, national forecasters are beginning to speak of the possibility that Ricardo could strike directly across the island before heading into the Caribbean. As yet, there are no warnings and residents are merely being advised that they should be sure to pay attention to the weather bulletins.

Barbados officials are also beginning to talk about the possibility of a real blow this time. Now it is largely banter around the coffee urn rather than prompting any specific planning for action as there have been many false alarms in the past. However, some of the merchants listening to the weather broadcasts are starting to think that the coming week could be very poor for business. Tourists will be frightened away and those who do arrive will probably not come out to the restaurants and attractions in the evenings. Those who only had tentative plans to come to Barbados would probably cancel.

Later in the day, winds around the island begin gusting around 25-30 mph. Small craft warnings are flying from the marinas and the Coast Guard station. The fishing boats have come in, although some trawlers are still out since they are easily able to handle this kind of weather. A number of small boat owners, with boats that could be placed on trailers, are already worried enough to haul their boats out of the water.

Those with the larger boats are concerned because there are no safer harbors within easy sailing distance.

There is not much alarm at this point in Barbados - the hurricane is too far away and its course too uncertain. A few people who just did not want to take the chance on spending rainy days at the beach or sightseeing have packed up and gone home, but there are still several thousands of tourists around the island. And, of course, there are some who hope they will be able to "enjoy" the excitement of a "real hurricane".

Day 4 - Wednesday, September 7, 1983

Hurricane warnings continue for the Windward Islands. Gale warnings are added covering areas for several hundred miles around Ricardo's eye. Hurricane Hunter reports describe winds of 95 mph at the center. Small craft warnings are joined by warnings of high storm tides on the Islands' coasts.

In Barbados it is clear that the island could be in for some seas of hurricane intensity. Officials are putting final touches on emergency plans and are beginning to brief their employees on what needs to be done. Temporary employees are given special instructions and asked to assist in providing first aid and emergency assistance. Plans to prepare and staff the Queen Elizabeth Hospital as a central aid station are reviewed for rapid implementation and all hospitals are alerted.

Island officials are constantly monitoring weather broadcasts, anxiously following Ricardo's course. Scattered showers are occurring over the island. The television and radio stations are broadcasting the hurricane warning as well as the official notice that everyone should evacuate the low-lying areas. The disaster operations center at police headquarters is manned and operating. Several police cruisers, equipped with loudspeakers, begin to patrol the town, directing all residents to take shelter. Police are spreading out through the danger areas, urging and prodding residents to move to safer buildings. Similar warnings are given to the owners and managers of beachfront stores and office buildings.

Residents are advised to fill bathtubs or any available storage containers with water as well as take other precautions in their homes. The water system is shut down at 3 p.m. to maintain the supply in the higher lying tanks. Merchants continue to make

preparations by boarding up their windows, with many late believers scrambling to find suitable materials to do so.

People who can are leaving Bridgetown by any route to higher ground. The roads are clogged. The traffic conditions are made more severe by a small stream of boat, home, and store owners coming into Bridgetown as well as curiosity seekers coming in "for the action". As many as possible are turned away by the police. Many boats and vehicles are temporarily abandoned; stalled vehicles are pushed off the roadway at several points. Winds sometime exceed 50 mph now and panic is beginning to set in. Police and fire officials assisting with the evacuation have problems managing the crowds of vehicles. Almost the entire fire and police staff is engaged in traffic control (or is bogged down in traffic congestion), leaving relatively few officers to patrol residential areas, and advise residents to leave or go to higher areas and secure buildings. One official expresses his frustrations when he says, "If they don't know they should leave by now, our telling them once more isn't going to help."

The US Mission has been following the course of the hurricane closely. The MDRO has reviewed the MDRP and been in touch with local authorities. At 4 p.m. on Wednesday, the DCM receives a memorandum from the ambassador asking for a briefing on Mission preparedness. (Attached)

HURRICANE RICARDO: HAITI

Hurricane News

The August 29th morning weather broadcasts over the Haitian radio stations and Tele Haiti reported the development of a tropical depression in the doldrums area of the Atlantic, 10 degrees north of the Equator, and 30 degrees west, off the Cape Verde Islands. Satellite photographs show a suspicious disturbance developing into a tropical depression. NOAA's Hurricane Hunter reconnaissance verified a developing storm.

Three thousand miles to the west in Port-au-Prince, the merchants are getting over a busy weekend and looking forward to a good following week. The weather is fine, with blue skies and daytime temperatures in the 80s. At night, the temperature drops to the mid-70s, giving visitors and permanent residents the kind of weather that has helped to make Haiti an attraction for its visitors.

In the south, the commercial fishermen have been out to sea for nearly three hours; at Port-au-Prince, the little fishing boats dot the glassy bay. Port-au-Prince itself is quiet with the normal activity of a Monday morning. Police and firemen are gathering at their stations to talk about their weekend duty and get ready for the next week's routine. The Army and VNB are quietly pursuing their daily routine.

In the subsequent four days, news broadcasts continue regarding the tropical depression moving west. When its winds increased to 50 mph, it was called a tropical storm and became eligible for a name--Ricardo. Ricardo was moving at a rate of 350 to 400 miles per day, with a gradually increasing forward speed. It remained well away from any land mass; so storm forecasters could not yet predict any landfall.

During the last day of August, Ricardo veered directly west and picked up speed. Hurricane Hunter reported winds near 70 mph in the center, with further intensification expected. By afternoon, the tropical storm had become a hurricane. Before the day ended Ricardo's winds reach 80 mph near the storm center, and hurricane warnings were issued for the Windward Islands.

While the hurricane's movement was unpredictable, as always, and its speed only 20 mph, national forecasters began to speak of the possibility that Ricardo could strike across the northern Caribbean. As yet, no warnings were issued; residents were advised to pay attention to weather bulletins.

Haitian officials began to speak of a possible hurricane, but at this point it was merely banter around the coffee urn rather than any specific planning or action. Some of the merchants listening to the weather broadcasts were thinking that the coming week could be very poor for business. Tourists will be frightened away and those who do arrive will probably not come out to the restaurants and attractions in the evenings. Those who had tentative plans to come to the Caribbean that week would probably cancel.

By September 3rd, a hurricane watch was in effect for the Windward Islands. Gale warnings were issued for the areas within several hundred miles around Ricardo's eye. Hurricane Hunter reports describe winds of 95 mph at center. Small craft warnings and warnings of high storm tides on the Islands' coasts.

Haitian officials were constantly monitoring weather broadcasts, waiting for the forecasters to clarify the picture for them locally. Some visitors decide to leave and cut short their vacations. Some merchants and residents begin to purchase plywood to put over their store windows, and many begin to prepare for the fact they may have a few unpleasant days ahead, if not a hurricane.

Day 1 - Sunday, September 4

Ricardo, which is now a Class II intensity hurricane, hits the Windwards shortly after midnight, directly impacting Barbados. The small islands of St. Lucia and St. Vincent are braced for the worst. Hurricane warnings are issued for the Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico. Gale warnings are added for the Dominican Republic's southeastern coast. As the day drew to a close Ricardo moves west and slightly north.

Day 2 - Monday, September 5

Hurricane Ricardo travels a path between St. Lucia and St. Vincent, wreaking severe damage on both small islands as well as their neighbors.

In Haiti, some residents of Port-au-Prince and other coastal towns have taken the precaution of boarding up windows and securing loose outdoor furniture and other lightweight objects. Others, who did not want first-hand experience with hurricanes or severe storms, have simply packed up and left. The roads and streets of the capital are beginning to show very heavy traffic for mid-week.

Ricardo continued its north westerly path, thereby sparing the Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico from its full fury. It is a blessing, for Ricardo is a monster: winds around the storm center have reached 140 mph; gale-force winds cover tens of thousands of square miles.

Day 3 - Tuesday, September 6

Fortunately, Ricardo remains in the Caribbean Sea, where it does no additional direct harm to any islands. While crossing the Sea, in a west, north-westerly direction, it gathers additional energy from the warm waters and builds to a Class III hurricane.

In Port-au-Prince town officials are reviewing their emergency plans and are beginning to brief their employees on what needs to be done. Temporary employees are given special instructions and asked to assist in providing first aid and emergency assistance. Plans to prepare and staff the General Hospital in Morne A Tuf as a central aid station are reviewed for rapid implementation. All hospitals are alerted.

People are advised to stay out of the water because of the increasing undertow and higher waves. The Coast Guard is monitoring the harbor traffic to keep boaters from going out in defiance of the small craft warnings. A few bold but naive young surfers on the south coast think that this could give them the chance to work with some especially high waves. (Later it was reported that one surfer drowned.) Heavy rains and winds prevail throughout the day and into the night as Hurricane Ricardo dominates the weather in the area.

Day 4 - Wednesday, September 7

Scattered showers are occurring in Port-au-Prince and environs. The television and radio stations are broadcasting the hurricane watch as well as the official notice that everyone should evacuate the low-lying areas. Police cars equipped with loudspeakers

begin to patrol the city directing all residents to take shelter. Police are spreading out through the most dangerous areas of Port-au-Prince urging residents to move to safer places. Similar warnings are given to the owners and managers of waterfront buildings.

Day 5 - Wednesday, September 8

Residents are advised to fill bathtubs or any available storage containers with water as well as take other health and safety precautions in their homes. The water system is shut down at 3 p.m. to maintain the supply in the higher lying tanks. Merchants continue to make preparations by boarding up their windows, many late believers scrambling to find suitable materials to do so.

As winds around the island begin gusting around 25-30 mph, small craft warnings are issued by the Coast Guard station. Most of the small boats are in, although some fishing trawlers are still out south of the island since they are easily able to handle this kind of weather. Elsewhere on the island a handful of pleasure boat owners, with boats that could be placed on trailers, are already worried enough to haul their boats out of the water. The scattering of larger boats snug up to whatever shelter they can find.

People who can are leaving Port-au-Prince for higher ground. The roads are totally clogged. The traffic conditions are made more severe by a small stream of boat, home, and store owners coming into Port-au-Prince as well as curiosity seekers coming in "for the action". As many as possible are turned away by the police. As the day goes on, many boats and vehicles are temporarily abandoned; stalled vehicles are pushed off the roadway at several points. Winds sometime exceed 50 mph now, and the fighting reality of the power of a hurricane has impressed the watchful citizens. Police and fire officials assisting with the evacuation have problems managing the traffic. Almost the entire fire and police staff is engaged in traffic control (or is bogged down in traffic congestion), leaving relatively few officers to patrol residential areas, advising residents to leave or go to higher areas and secure buildings. One official expresses his frustrations when he says, "If they don't know they should leave by now, our telling them once more isn't going to help."

The US Mission has been following the course of the hurricane closely. The MDRO has reviewed the MDRP and been in touch with local authorities. At 4 p.m. on Wednesday, the DCM receives a memorandum from the ambassador asking for a briefing on Mission preparedness. (Attached as H03).

**ATTACHMENT FIVE
POST PREPAREDNESS QUESTIONS
FOR AMBASSADOR USE**

Questions for Use by the Ambassador

1. Do we have any special obligation to our local national employees? If we require some of them to report to work after a disaster, should we be doing something about their families?
2. Have we updated our F-77 report? Shouldn't we let Washington know how many AMCITs are in country now?
3. Can we get the military to take air photos after the hurricane passes? (Perhaps on a training mission so it won't cost us anything?) How soon can I get a copy of the photos? Can I give a copy of the pictures to the local government?
4. How is the PAO going to set up our post rumor control center as required by the Emergency Action Manual?
5. How can we best use our Peace Corps folks? Relief operations? Assessments? How do we communicate with the PCVs in the field?
6. Since we may be at this task for some days, how are we going to staff the committee for 24 hour operations? I don't want the entire first string on duty during the same shift.
7. Have we stored our vehicle and generator fuel so we can get to it?
8. Have we considered all the implications, particularly in communications, of running split operations from our primary and alternate command posts?
9. What do we do about American tourists? Have they been notified about the impending hurricane conditions? Should we advise them to leave? What if they need money? What are the implications if we advise them to leave and the hurricane misses us? Has anybody looked at a Phase One evacuation?

10. Should we relocate or destroy any of our classified material? Can we still destroy it if it gets wet?

11. Can we handle 24 hour shifts in the communications center without problems? Is our fuel for emergency power adequate? Can any of our generators flood out or get wet?

**ATTACHMENT SIX
KINGSTON DISASTER SCENARIO
TABLE OF CONTENTS**

Disaster Assistance Simulation Exercise

Scenario Table of Contents

Pre-Exercise (September 3-7)

Information.
(J01) September 3-7, Background, Hurricane Ricardo.

Information.
(J02) September 6, 0600 hours, Cable, TO: AMEMB, FM: SECSTATE, Subject: Hurricane Advisory

Post Action Required.
(J03) September 7, Memorandum, TO: DCM, FM: AMB, Subject: Request for Briefing.

Phase I, D-Day (September 8, Thursday)

Post Action Required.
(J04) 0900 hours, Post Briefing Conducted.

Information.
(J05) Cable, TO: SECSTATE FM: AMEMB, Subject: Hurricane Ricardo: Situation as of 1600 hours Thursday, September 8.

Information.
(J06) 1100 hours, Cable, TO: SECSTATE, FM: AMEMB. Subject: Hurricane Ricardo, Mission Preparedness.

Information.
(J07) 2300 hours, News Broadcast, NBC.

D + 1 Day (September 9, Friday)

Information.
(J08) 1100 hours, News Dispatch, TO: AP, FM: Correspondent, Kingston, Subject: Shock Sets in After Hurricane Ricardo.

Information.
(J09) 1500 hours, Cable, TO: SECSTATE FM: AMEMB Subject: Hurricane Ricardo SITREP No. 1.

Phase II D + 36 Hours (September 10, Saturday)

Information. (J10)	0700 hours, Cable, TO: SECSTATE, FM: AMEMB, Subject: Hurricane Ricardo: Request for Disaster Help.
Post Action Required.	0715 hours, Embassy Intercom, TO: DCM, FM: AMBASS, Subject: Jamaican Request for Disaster Help.
Information. (J12)	0845 hours, Cable, TO: COMUSFORCABIB, FM: USMLO JAMAICA, Subject: Disaster-Relief Operations.
Post Action Required. (J13)	0910 hours, Cable, TO: USIS Kingston, FM: USIA, Subject: US Media On-Site Coverage.
Post Action Required. (J14)	0915 hours, Cable TO: AMEMB, FM: Peace Corps, Subject: Welfare of PCV's.
Post Action Required. (J15)	0920 hours, Message (hand delivered), TO: EAC, FM: ODP, Subject: Urgent Need for Vehicles.
Post Action Required. (J16)	0925 hours, Telephone Call, TO: EAC, FM: OFDA, Subject: Regarding generators.
Post Action Required. (J17)	0930 hours, Visit, TO: EAC, FM: Freddy McBurger, Subject: AMCIT Tale of Woe.
Post Action Required. (J18)	1000 hours, Cable, TO: AMEMB, FM: COMUSFORCARIB, Subject: Disaster-Relief Operations.
Post Action Required. (J19)	1020 hours, Telephone Call, TO: EAC, FM: Sunset State Fruit, Subject: Offer.
Post Action Required. (J20)	1032 hours, Memo, TO: MDRO, FM: ODP, Subject: Request for Inflatable Boats
Post Action Required. (J21)	1045 hours, Radio Call, TO: EAC, FM: Ham Radio Operator, Subject: Ham Operator Receiving Calls.

Information. (J22)	1140 hours, Cable, TO: AMEMB, FM: SECSTATE, Subject: Hurricane Ricardo: Offer of Relief Goods Through Senator Dole.
Post Action Required. (J23)	1145 hours, Note, TO: AMBASS, FM: Minister of Foreign Affairs, Subject: Confirming Request.
Post Action Required. (J24)	1150 hours, Telephone Call, TO: EAC, FM: Monongahela Crystal Pure Water Corp., Subject: Offer.
Information. (J25)	1150 hours, Cable, TO: COMUSFORCARIB, FM: COMUSFORCARIB REP, R.R., Subject: Disaster Assistance Survey Team.
Post Action Required. (J26)	1200 hours, Cable, TO: AMEMB, FM: SECSTATE, Subject: US Disaster Relief Operations.
Post Action Required. (J27)	1330 hours, Letter, TO: Prime Minister, FM: AMBASS, Subject: Formation of Assessment Team.
Post Action Required. (J28)	1500 hours, Letter, TO: AMBASS, FM: Med Officer, University of the West Indies Hospital, Subject: Urgent Need for Medicines.
Information. (J29)	1600 hours, Note, TO: AMB, FM: Prime Minister, Subject: Composition of Assessment Team.
Post Action Required. (J30)	1600 hours, (Attachment to Note) Memo TO: Prime Minister, FM: Waverson, Subject: Disaster Assessment Team.
Post Action Required. (J31)	1610 hours, Telephone Call, TO: AMEMB, FM: Milford Bokes, Subject: Welfare and Whereabouts.
Post Action Required. (J32)	1630 hours, Message (hand delivered), TO: EAC, FM: ODP, Subject: Accident to Mission Vehicle.
Information. (J33)	1530 hours, Press Dispatch: UPI, FM: Gordon Kingsworthy. Subject: Hurricane Ricardo Aftermath.

Information.
(J34)

1600 hours, Cable, TO: SECSTATE, FM: AMEMB,
Subject: Hurricane Ricardo, SITREP as of 1600 hours,
Wednesday, September 14.

Phase III D + 7 Days (September 15, Thursday)

Post Action Required.
(J35)

0955 hours, Telephone Call, TO: PAO, FM: Director
of USIA/AR, Subject: Article in Times.

Post Action Required.
(J36)

1020 hours, Cable, TO: SECSTATE, FM: AMEMB,
Subject: Hurricane Ricardo: Comparative Relief
Efforts.

Post Action Required.
(J37)

1030 hours, Telephone Call, TO: DCM, FM: Deputy
Foreign Minister, Subject: New York Times Article.

Post Action Required.
(J38)

1115 hours, Telephone Call, TO: AMEMB, FM: Dr.
Theodore Yankel, Subject: Welfare and Whereabouts.

Post Action Required.
(J39)

Telephone Call TO: DATT, FM: Executive Assistant
MOD, Subject: Request for Military Equipment.

Post Action Required.
(J40)

1452 hours, Broadcast, JBC, Subject: Fire.

Post Action Required.
(J41)

1457 hours, Telephone Call, TO: Economic Counselor,
FM: Robert Petrow, Esso, Subject: Fire.

Post Action Required.
(J42)

1535 hours, Telephone Call, TO: PAO, FM: Local
Reporter, Subject; Fire.

Post Action Required.
(J43)

1545 hours, Cable, TO: AMEMB, FM: SECSTATE,
Subject: Kingston Fire Disaster Assistance From
National Association of Fire Chiefs.

Post Action Required.
(J44)

1605 hours, Telephone Call, TO: EAC, FM: Disaster
Control Center, Subject: Request for Fire Control
Assistance.

Post Action Required.
(J45)

1613 hours, Telephone Call, TO: DATT, FM:
Executive Asst to MOD, Subject: Request for Fuel

Post Action Required.
(J46)

1635 hours, Telephone Call, TO: AMEMB, FM: OFDA, S subject: Emergency Drug Supplies.

Post Action Required.
(J47)

1645 hours, Cable, TO: SECSTATE, FM: AMEMB, Subject: Request for Fire Assistance.

Post Action Required.
(J48)

1700 hours, Telephone Call, TO: MDRO, FM: MED Officer, Subject: Plea for Assistance.

Post Action Required.
(J49)

1710 hours Telephone Call, TO: DCM, FM: Prime Minister's Office, Subject: Request for Fuel Bladders

Post Action Required.
(J50)

2000 hours, Cable, TO: AMEMB, FM: SECSTATE, Subject: Kingston Fire Disaster Relief.

Post Action Required.
(J51)

2025 hours, Note, TO: EAC, FM: Local Traveler, Subject; Offer to Help.

Post Action Required.
(J52)

2030 hours, Cable, TO: AMEMB, FM: AID/W, Subject: Focus of Relief Effort.

**ATTACHMENT SEVEN
BRIDGETOWN DISASTER SCENARIO
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Disaster Assistance Simulation Exercise

Scenario Table of Contents

Pre-Exercise (September 3-7)

Information.
(B01) September 3-7, Background, Hurricane Ricardo.

Information.
(B02) September 6, 0600 hours, Cable, TO: AMEMB, FM: SECSTATE, Subject: Hurricane Advisory

Post Action Required.
(B03) September 7, Memorandum, TO: DCM, FM: AAMB, Subject: Request for Briefing.

Phase I, D-Day (September 8, Thursday)

Post Action Required.
(B04) 0900 hours, Post Briefing Conducted.

Information.
(B05) Cable, TO: SECSTATE FM: AMEMB, Subject: Hurricane Ricardo: Situation as of 1600 hours Thursday, September 8.

Information.
(B06) 1100 hours, Cable, TO: SECSTATE, FM: AMEMB. Subject: Hurricane Ricardo, Mission Preparedness.

Information.
(B07) 2300 hours, News Broadcast, NBC.

D + 1 Day (September 9, Friday)

Information.
(B08) 1100 hours, News Dispatch, TO: AP, FM: Correspondent, Bridgetown Subject: Shock Sets in After Hurricane Ricardo.

Information.
(B09) 1500 hours, Cable, TO: SECSTATE FM: AMEMB Subject: Hurricane Ricardo SITREP No. 1.

Phase II D + 36 Hours (September 10, Saturday)

Information. (B10)	0700 hours, Cable, TO: SECSTATE, FM: AMEMB, Subject: Hurricane Ricardo: Request for Disaster Help.
Post Action Required. (B11)	0715 hours, Embassy Intercom, TO: DCM, FM: AMEMBASSY, Subject: PM's Request for Disaster Help.
Information. (B12)	0845 hours, Cable, TO: DCM, FM: POLITICAL COUNSELOR, Subject: Disaster-Relief Operations.
Post Action Required. (B13)	0910 hours, Cable, TO: USIS Bridgetown FM: USIS, Subject: US Media On-Site Coverage.
Post Action Required. (B14)	0915 hours, Cable TO: AMEMB, FM: Peace Corps, Subject: Welfare of PCV's.
Post Action Required. (B15)	0920 hours, Message (hand delivered), TO: EAC, FM: CERO, Subject: Urgent Need for Vehicles.
Post Action Required. (B16)	0925 hours, Telephone Call, TO: EAC, FM: OFDA, Subject: Regarding generators.
Post Action Required. (B17)	0930 hours, Visit, TO: EAC, FM: Freddy McBurger, Subject: AMCIT Tale of Woe.
Post Action Required. (B18)	1000 hours, Cable, TO: AMEMB, FM: COMUSFORCARIB, Subject: Disaster-Relief Operations.
Post Action Required. (B19)	1020 hours, Telephone Call, TO: EAC, FM: Sunset State Fruit, Subject: Offer.
Post Action Required. (B20)	1032 hours, Memo, TO: MDRO, FM: MSG, Subject: Request for Inflatable Boats
Post Action Required. (B21)	1045 hours, Radio Call, TO: EAC, FM: Ham Radio Operator, Subject: Ham Operator Receiving Calls.

Information. (B22)	1140 hours, Cable, TO: AMEMB, FM: SECSTATE, Subject: Hurricane Ricardo: Offer of Relief Goods Through Senator Dole.
Post Action Required. (B23)	1145 hours, Note, TO: AMEMBASSY FM: Minister of External Affairs, Subject: Confirming Request.
Post Action Required. (B24)	1150 hours, Telephone Call, TO: EAC, FM: Monongahela Crystal Pure Water Corp., Subject: Offer.
Information. (B25)	1150 hours, Cable, TO: COMUSFORCARIB, FM: COMUSFORCARIB REP, R.R., Subject: Disaster Assistance Survey Team.
Post Action Required. (B26)	1200 hours, Cable, TO: AMEMB, FM: SECSTATE, Subject: US Disaster Relief Operations.
Post Action Required. (B27)	1330 hours, Letter, TO: Prime Minister, FM: AMEMBASSY Subject: Formation of Assessment Team.
Post Action Required. (B28)	1500 hours, Letter, TO: AMEMBASSY, FM: Med Officer, St. Elizabeth Hospital, Subject: Urgent Need for Medicines.
Information. (B29)	1530 hours, Press Dispatch: UPI, FM: Gordon Kingsworthy, Subject: Hurricane Ricardo Aftermath.
Information. (B30)	1600 hours, Note, TO: AMB, FM: Prime Minister, Subject: Composition of Assessment Team.
Post Action Required. (B31)	1600 hours, (Attachment to Note) Memo, TO: Prime Minister, FM: Waverson, Subject: Disaster Assessment Team.
Information. (B32)	1600 hours, Cable, TO: SECSTATE, FM: AMEMB, Subject: Hurricane Ricardo, SITREP as of 1600 hours, Wednesday, September 14.
Post Action Required. (B33)	1610 hours, Telephone Call, TO: EAC, FM: Milford Bokes, Subject: Welfare and Whereabouts.

Post Action Required.
(B34)

1630 hours, Message (hand delivered), TO: EAC, FM: CERO Subject: Accident to Mission Vehicle.

Phase III D + 7 Days (September 15, Thursday)

Post Action Required.
(B35)

0955 hours, Telephone Call, TO: PAO, FM: Director of USIA/AR, Subject: Article in Times.

Post Action Required.
(B36)

1020 hours, Cable, TO: SECSTATE, FM: AMEMB, Subject: Hurricane Ricardo: Comparative Relief Efforts.

Post Action Required.
(B37)

1030 hours, Telephone Call, TO: DCM, FM: Deputy Minister of External Affairs, Subject: New York Times Article.

Post Action Required.
(B38)

1115 hours, Telephone Call, TO: EAC, FM: Dr. Theodore Yankel, Subject: Welfare and Whereabouts.

Post Action Required.
(B39)

Telephone Call, TO: DCM, FM: Executive Assistant to the Prime Minister, Subject: Request for Military Equipment.

Post Action Required.
(B40)

1452 hours, Broadcast, Radio Barbados, Subject: Fire.

Post Action Required.
(B41)

1457 hours, Telephone Call, TO: Mission Director, FM: Robert Petrow, Barbados Light and Power Company, Subject: Fire.

Post Action Required.
(B42)

1535 hours, Telephone Call, TO: PAO, FM: Local Reporter, Subject; Fire.

Post Action Required.
(B43)

1545 hours, Cable, TO: AMEMB, FM: SECSTATE, Subject: Bridgetown Fire Disaster Assistance From International Association of Fire Chiefs.

Post Action Required.
(B44)

1605 hours, Telephone Call, TO: EAC, FM: CERO, Subject: Request for Fire Control Assistance.

Post Action Required.
(B45)

1613 hours, Telephone Call, TO: CERO, FM: MDRO, Subject: Request for Fuel Bladders

Post Action Required.
(B46)

1635 hours, Telephone Call, TO: OFDA, FM: EAC,
Subject: Emergency Drug Supplies.

Post Action Required.
(B47)

1645 hours, Cable, TO: SECSTATE, FM: AMEMB,
Subject: Request for Fire Assistance.

Post Action Required.
(B48)

1700 hours, Telephone Call, TO: MDRO, FM: MED
Officer, Subject: Plea for Assistance.

Post Action Required.
(B49)

1710 hours, Telephone Call, TO: DCM, FM: Prime
Minister's Office, Subject: Request for Fuel Bladders

Post Action Required.
(B50)

2000 hours, Cable, TO: AMEMB, FM: SECSTATE,
Subject: Bridgetown Fire Disaster Relief.

Post Action Required.
(B51)

2025 hours, Note, TO: MSG, FM: Local Traveler,
Subject: Offer to Help.

Post Action Required.
(B52)

2030 hours, Cable, TO: AMEMB, FM: SECSTATE,
Subject: Focus of Relief Effort.

ATTACHMENT EIGHT
PORT-AU-PRINCE DISASTER SCENARIO
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Disaster Assistance Simulation Exercise

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Pre-Exercise (September 3-7)

- Information.
(H01) September 3-7, Background, Hurricane Ricardo.
- Information.
(H02) September 6, 0600 hours, Cable, TO: AMEMB, FM: SECSTATE, Subject: Hurricane Advisory
- Post Action Required.
(H03) September 7, Memorandum, TO: DCM, FM: AMB, Subject: Request for Briefing.

Phase I, D-Day (September 8, Thursday)

- Post Action Required.
(H04) 0900 hours, Post Briefing Conducted.
- Information.
(H05) Cable, TO: SECSTATE FM: AMEMB, Subject: Hurricane Ricardo: Situation as of 1600 hours Thursday, September 8.
- Information.
(H06) 1100 hours, Cable, TO: SECSTATE, FM: AMEMB. Subject: Hurricane Ricardo, Mission Preparedness.
- Information.
(H07) 2300 hours, News Broadcast, NBC.

D + 1 Day (September 9, Friday)

- Information.
(H08) 1100 hours, News Dispatch, TO: AP, FM: Correspondent, Kingston, Subject: Shock Sets in After Hurricane Ricardo.
- Information.
(H09) 1500 hours, Cable, TO: SECSTATE FM: AMEMB Subject: Hurricane Ricardo SITREP No. 1.

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Phase II D + 36 Hours (September 10, Saturday)

Information. (H10)	0700 hours, Cable, TO: SECSTATE, FM: AMEMB Subject: Hurricane Ricardo: Request for Disaster Help.
Post Action Required. (H11)	0715 hours, Embassy Intercom, TO: DCM, FM: AMBASS, Subject: Jamaican Request for Disaster Help.
Information. (H12)	0845 hours, Cable, TO: COMUSFORCABIB, FM: USMLO JAMAICA, Subject: Disaster-Relief Operations.
Post Action Required. (H13)	0910 hours, Cable, TO: USIS Kingston, FM: USIA, Subject: US Media On-Site Coverage.
Post Action Required. (H14)	0915 hours, Cable, TO: AMEMB, FM: Peace Corps, Subject: Welfare of PCV's.
Post Action Required. (H15)	0920 hours, Message (hand delivered), TO: EAC, FM: ODP Subject: Urgent Need for Vehicles.
Post Action Required. (H16)	0925 hours, Telephone Call, TO: EAC, FM: OFDA, Subject: Regarding generators.
Post Action Required. (H17)	0930 hours, Visit, TO: EAC, FM: Freddy McBurger, Subject: AMCIT Tale of Woe.
Post Action Required. (H18)	1000 hours, Cable, TO: AMEMB, FM: COMUSFORCARIB, Subject: Disaster-Relief Operations.
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Post Action Required. (H20)	1032 hours, Memo, TO: MDRO, FM: ODP, Subject: Request for Inflatable Boats
Post Action Required. (H21)	1045 hours, Radio Call, TO: EAC, FM: Ham Radio Operator, Subject: Ham Operator Receiving Calls.

Information.
(H22) 1140 hours, Cable, TO: AMEMB, FM: SECSTATE,
Subject: Hurricane Ricardo: Offer of Relief Goods
Through Senator Dole.

Post Action Required. 1145 hours, Note, TO: AMBASS, FM: Minister of
Foreign Affairs, Subject: Confirming Request.

Post Action Required.
(H24) 1150 hours, Telephone Call, TO: EAC, FM:
Monongahela Crystal Pure Water Corp., Subject:
Offer.

Information.
(H25) 1150 hours, Cable, TO: COMUSFORCARIB 3, FM:
COMUSFORCARIB REP, R.R., Subject: Disaster
Assistance Survey Team.

Post Action Required.
(H26) 1200 hours, Cable, TO: AMEMB, FM: SECSTATE,
Subject: US Disaster Relief Operations.

Post Action Required.
(H27) 1330 hours, Letter, TO: Prime Minister, FM:
AMBASS, Subject: Formation of Assessment Team.

Post Action Required.
(H28) 1500 hours, Letter, TO: AMBASS, FM: Med Officer,
University of the West Indies Hospital, Subject:
Urgent Need for Medicines.

Information.
(H29) 1600 hours, Note, TO: AMB, FM: Prime Minister,
Subject: Composition of Assessment Team.

Post Action Required.
(H30) 1600 hours, (Attachment to Note), Memo TO: Prime
Minister, FM: Etienne, Subject: Disaster Assessment
Team.

Post Action Required.
(H31) 1610 hours, Telephone Call, TO: AMEMB, FM:
Milford Bokes, Subject: Welfare and Whereabouts.

Post Action Required.
(H32) 1630 hours, Message (hand delivered), TO: EAC, FM:
ODP, Subject: Accident to Mission Vehicle.

Information.
(H33)

1530 hours, Press Dispatch: UPI, FM: Gordon Kingsworthy, Subject: Hurricane Ricardo Aftermath.

Information.
(H34)

1600 hours, Cable, TO: SECSTATE, FM: AMEMB, Subject: Hurricane Ricardo, SITREP as of 1600 hours, Wednesday, September 14.

Phase III D + 7 Days (September 15, Thursday)

Post Action Required.
(H35)

0955 hours, Telephone Call, TO: PAO FM: Director of USIA/AR, Subject: Article in Times.

Post Action Required.
(H36)

1020 hours, Cable, TO: SECSTATE, FM: AMEMB, Subject: Hurricane Ricardo: Comparative Relief Efforts.

Post Action Required.
(H37)

1030 hours, Telephone Call, TO: DCM, FM: Deputy Foreign Minister, Subject: New York Times Article.

Post Action Required.
(H38)

1115 hours, Telephone Call, TO: AMEMB, FM: Dr. Theodore Yankel, Subject: Welfare and Whereabouts.

Post Action Required.
(H39)

Telephone Call, TO: DATT, FM: Executive Assistant MOD, Subject: Request for Military Equipment.

Post Action Required.
(H40)

1452 hours, Broadcast, Radio Nationale, Subject: Fire.

Post Action Required.
(H41)

1457 hours, Telephone Call, TO: Economic Counselor, FM: Robert Petrow, Haytian American Sugar Company Subject: Fire.

Post Action Required.
(H42)

1535 hours, Telephone Call, TO: PAO, FM: Local Radio Buff, Subject; Fire.

Post Action Required.
(H43)

1545 hours, Cable, TO: AMEMB, FM: SECSTATE, Subject: Kingston Fire Disaster Assistance From National Association of Fire Chiefs.

Post Action Required.
(H44)

1605 hours, Telephone Call, TO: EAC, FM: Disaster Control Center, Subject: Request for Fire Control Assistance.

Post Action Required.
(H45)

1613 hours, Telephone Call, TO: DATT, FM: Executive Asst of MOD, Subject: Request for Fuel Bladders

Post Action Required.
(H46)

1635 hours, Telephone Call, TO: AMEMB, FM: OFDA, Subject: Emergency Drug Supplies.

Post Action Required.
(H47)

1645 hours, Cable, TO: SECSTATE, FM: AMEMB, Subject: Request for Fire Assistance.

Post Action Required.
(H48)

1700 hours, Telephone Call, TO: MDRO, FM: MED Officer, Subject: Plea for Assistance.

Post Action Required.
(H49)

1710 hours Telephone Call, TO: DCM, FM: Prime Minister's Office, Subject: Request for Fuel Bladders

Post Action Required.
(H50)

2000 hours, Cable, TO: AMEMB, FM: SECSTATE, Subject: Kingston Fire Disaster Relief.

Post Action Required.
(H51)

2025 hours, Note, TO: EAC, FM: Local Traveler, Subject; Offer to Help.

Post Action Required.
(H52)

2030 hours, Cable, TO: AMEMB, FM: AID/W, Subject: Focus of Relief Effort.

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