PERU:

AN EVALUATION OF P.L. 480 TITLE II FOOD ASSISTANCE

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PREFACE

Peru has increasingly come to depend upon food imports of various sorts to meet its basic needs. In this context, P.L. 480 resources in the form of Title I and II inputs have gained important status in the country as a source of development program support. Both Titles I and II reinforce the work of numerous projects administered by the Peruvian government and private voluntary organizations (PVOs). The ensuing discussion centers on the work of the four PVOs: CARITAS (operational counterpart of Catholic Relief Service), OFASA (that of Seventh Day Adventist World Service) SEPAS (Church World Service) and CARE. Reference also is made to the National Office of Nutritional Support (ONAA), a Peruvian government agency which distributes food for the CARE/PIBA and SEPAS/PRAA projects. Financial and management details, however, concern the first four PVOs, ONAA per se being outside the domain of the evaluation.

Through these avenues, the regular Title II program in 1982 alone directly reached over 5 percent of the total population of Peru. During 1982-1983, overall United States food assistance, including the Title I, Title II, and disaster relief programs, reached an estimated 2.4 million persons, or 14 percent of all Peruvians. Since its low point in the early 1970s, when most U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) activities in Peru reached a nadir, total Food for Peace support has risen eightfold, amounting to 50 percent of the economic and military assistance to Peru by 1981. That year, the U.S. commitment to P.L. 480 programs in Peru (both Titles I and II) constituted 70.5 percent of our total economic assistance package to the country. Title II was the major share of that. Seen in long term perspective, P.L. 480 assistance amounted to 39 percent of the total economic assistance to Peru from 1948 through 1981. This makes Peru the principal Latin American recipient of such support and the third largest program worldwide today.

Having thus been the beneficiary of such relatively massive and consistent Food for Peace aid for 35 years, what has been the impact of this addition to the Peruvian economy and household, and to the well-being of individuals and communities? Aside from simply providing supplementary food for people to eat, Title II programs developed the concept of using the food to achieve additional ends, such as promoting educational and training skills and encouraging communities to build needed infrastructure. Other programs sought to "target" especially needy persons--nursing mothers and small children, for example--so as to improve chances for healthy maturation. In all

of these activities the hope has been that the impact of food aid would be more than momentary and that beneficiaries would gain more effective and productive control over their lives as a result of it.

OUTLINE AND ORIENTATION OF THE REPORT

The evaluation team worked within this context to see whether the PVO programs were successfully contributing to Peruvian life in the ways anticipated and in the most effective manner. A detailed discussion of methods employed in this evaluation are found in Appendix 2. The working hypotheses and "assumptions" which served as the basis of our field studies of PVO operations and their impact on beneficiaries also orient the relative emphasis placed on the different topics treated in this evaluation. Derived from the various PVO and USAID statements about the programs as well as our understanding of them, the premises to be examined, which guided the formulation of our questions (see Appendix 2) and the analysis which follows, are that:

(1) Title II foods constitute an important addition to the customary diet;

(2) by learning to utilize the foods effectively as the result of nutrition instruction provided by the PVOs, general dietary status is improved;

(3) the foods reach the needy populations in general and the most vulnerable individuals within these populations, especially lactating mothers and children under five years;

(4) the national and regional patterns of food distribution as organized and executed by the PVOs reach the areas and populations with the greatest developmental needs and those who are most disadvantaged;

(5) the work performed in Food for Work (FFW) programs is not so great as to negate the caloric value of the food received;

(6) the rations of food supplied per person and per family are being received in adequate quantity and regularity for sufficient time to fulfill the assumptions above;

(7) the FFW projects achieve a developmental impact by which the recipients' capabilities are enhanced by the construction of infrastructure, augmenting resources and improving socioeconomic organization;

(8) the training and education programs conducted yield measurable improvements for individuals and communities leading to improvement in levels of living;

(9) the PVO personnel, equipment, and skills are adequate for project execution;

(10) all the above are cost-effective and yield results that merit continuation of the programs.

The position of the beneficiaries with respect to Title II projects was uppermost in the evaluation: improving their status is the *raison d'être* for the program. How this improvement is achieved, and with what other impact, are questions which activate the working hypotheses outlined in the discussions that follow. Also stemming from the assumptions listed above are a series of queries about the PVO operations themselves in relation to Title II. Obviously, each of these areas relates to the other in a variety of ways. Because of this intertwining of action and effect, the difference between the objectives of the PVOS and the avowed purposes of the programs, we cannot expect the results to fall neatly into predetermined categories. To order the tangle of field interviews and observations, administrative materials, and many levels of conclusions, the discussion and analysis in succeeding chapters runs as follows:

Chapter 1: An overview of the contemporary Peruvian situation as relevant for Title II program operations, including socioeconomic conditions and food production;

Chapter 2: A comparative consideration of the formal and financial dimensions of PVO Title II work in Peru and costs per beneficiary;

Chapter 3: A review of the PVO operations in and of themselves in terms of areas of work and administrative performance;

Chapter 4: An in-depth review of all nutrition and health-maintenance targeted projects in terms of the assumptions raised;

Chapter 5: An in-depth review of all FFW projects in terms of the assumptions of the PVOs and Title II goals;

Chapter 6: Summary conclusions, and recommendations.

Each chapter contains its own introduction to the topical contents and a summary statement with conclusions. These are collectively reordered in Chapter 6, which can be read alone.

CHAPTER I

PERU: THE NATIONAL CONTEXT OF TITLE II PROGRAMS

Peru's vast and rugged terrain straddles the high central Andean ranges from its narrow desert coast to the Amazonian wilderness. It is the fifth largest Latin American country in both area and population. As the inheritors of a 20,000-year cultural history, modern Peru still carries the lingering influence of the Incas and other pre-columbian societies as well as the nearly three centuries of Spanish colonial rule.

The recent history of the Peruvian republic has been one of political changes and experimentation. Various governments have attempted to conquer and manage long-standing issues of provincial development, agrarian reform, industrialization, phenomenal urban growth, and administrative reorganization with mixed success for the past 25 years. The population of the country since 1961 has increased from 9,906,000 to about 18,200,000 in 1983, an average yearly increment of nearly 3.3 percent. A good deal of this growth has been achieved through rapidly declining death rates over this period while birth rates remained high.

The Peruvian population is ethnically complex and culturally dynamic. Once considered a predominantly "Indian" country, most Peruvians would not so identify themselves today, as 70 percent of the people speak Spanish and about 45 percent speak one of the 56 native languages (many persons are bilingual). Quechua, the principal native language family, is spoken by about 7.5 million persons, while some 740 thousand speak Aymara.

Urban Growth and the Primacy of Lima

During the past three decades, the structure of the society has been sharply altered by a highly patterned migratory stream from the highland to the coastal urban areas. Principal targets for the migrants have been the cities of Lima, Arequipa, Trujillo and Chimbote. However, Lima has been and remains the major destination, a pattern which conforms to a long history of that city's dominance over the social, economic and political life of the nation (Doughty 1976; Dietz 1978).

In the last decade, the concentration of wealth, industrial activity, decision-making, education, medical resources, and all other modern measures of the "good life" in Lima made other areas pale by comparison. While this trend began in early colonial times, its fruition has occurred in the twentieth century, particularly since 1950. With almost 30 percent of the nation's total population, Lima enjoys far more than its proportional "share" of the national resources: its inhabitants are paid over 70 percent of the industrial wages; constitute about 60 percent of those entitled to social security and pensions; use well over 70 percent of the electricity; own over 50 percent of all household appliances, and enjoy the services of over 50 percent of all medical doctors, engineers, and even agronomists. Lima enjoys educational institutions that are disproportionate in quantity and quality to those found elsewhere in Peru. Finally, because of Peru's historically centralized market system, it sometimes occurs that provincially-produced traditional foodstuffs are more readily available in Lima than in the areas from which they come. The prices of manufactured goods are less in Lima than elsewhere.

The coup de grace in this scenario is the fact that the small farmers of Peru have never earned a wage equal to their importance in the economy (they produce 80 percent of the domestic food supply). According to limited World

Bank figures, Peru's poorest 20 percent earn but 1.9 percent of the household income -- the lowest of any nation recorded (World Bank 1982:158). In the years from 1966 to 1973, peasant farmers constituting 30.6 percent of the labor force earned but 10.3 percent of the income. In light of this, the attraction of the city for wages, education, health and better living conditions is indisputable. As a socio-cultural event, the migration to Lima therefore represents a decision on the part of hundreds of thousands of Peruvians to seek greater participation in national life and access to the nation's wealth (Dobyns and Vasquez 1963; Martinez 1980b). To date, there has been little to deter this movement but much to promote it, however unwittingly (Doughty 1976).

As was pointed out by Turner (1965) and Mangin (1967), the barriadas, or squatter settlements, were the solution to a major problem in urban growth: housing. In the Peruvian case the barriadas were also the setting for self-initiated, internally governed and responsive community organizations to develop, even in the face of traditional, autocratic government traditions (cf. Palmer 1980). Seen politically, this was a plum for the picking, and successive governments struggled to establish "control" over squatters through the institution of innumerable programs of "support." By the mid-1970s there were no less than 25 different public and private agencies vying for such influence among these new Limeans, a veritable "invasion of the invaders." Among them were three of the organizations studied in this report.

This is ironic since one of the primary characteristics noted by studies of the squatter settlements is that these places handle their affairs efficiently and are very well organized. Actions of government-inspired agencies often have been to "co-opt" or covertly encourage such proclivities as a "safety valve" for rural discontent and desire for socio-economic improvement (cf. Collier 1976). In other words, by "acquiescing" to the burgeoning provincial

movement to stake out its claim to urban (modernized) levels of life, Peru's well-defined upper class interests (Gilbert 1977; Malpica 1966) continued to hold off any real challenge to its dominant role. By investing in urban development, the governing interests could gain major political allies.

Squatter Settlements to "Young Towns"

The immediate consequence of this was the unremitting growth of squatter settlements throughout the Lima area, which have come to be one of the city's most distinguishing characteristics (Matos 1961; Mangin 1970; Collier 1976; Lloyd 1980). The existence and affairs of these settlements have dominated many a Peruvian politician's waking moments, and at their inception they are targeted for appropriate action. Maria Delgado, wife of the former dictator, Manuel Odria (1948-56), earned a reputation as the benefactor of the squatters, a role which has continued to be that of presidents' wives in Peru.

With the official change in name from the somewhat deprecatory term barriadas to pueblos jóvenes, or "Young Towns," in the early 1970s, Lima's squatter settlements gained legitimacy that previously had been denied. The change meant that full and open government attention could be paid these heretofore "clandestine urbanizations." A 1980 survey by the Ministry of Housing and Construction showed a total of 432 officially recognized "Young Towns" scattered throughout greater Lima (including Callao) with over 1.6 million residents, about 35 percent of the metropolitan population. In their initial phases of development 35 years ago, the barriadas were seen by traditional Lima as a dire threat, being comprised of impoverished, disorganized and disorderly highland "Indians" and other "less desirable" urban elements.

They were in fact nothing of the kind. Comprised of ambitious, socially mobile, bilingual highlanders, the squatters went straight about their

business, working to gain a "house of my own" (Lobo 1982), and to climb up in the Peruvian socio-economic hierarchy from "peasants to professionals" (Osterling 1980).

The "megacephalic" growth of Lima did not go unnoticed by the champions of provincial causes who struggled to move their interests to the forefront with occasional success. Several governments, beginning with the second Leguia regime (1919-1930), attempted provincial and rural development. Frequent calls for national decentralization of power, resources and opportunity characterized political dialogue and debate, sometimes producing reformist action. From 1963 until his overthrow in 1968, Fernando Belaunde sought to stimulate such change through ambitious district-level infrastructure programs (Cooperación Popular), encouraging Peace Corps work, road building, and a variety of other approaches directed toward assisting the "forgotten provincianos." His military successors, the "Armed Forces Revolutionary Government" brought sweeping changes through land tenure reform, community development and cooperative production projects, and a plethora of programs aimed at producing modernization in the most rapid manner possible.

In the end, neither the first Belaúnde administration nor the military revolutionaries attained what they announced. Despite rhetoric to the contrary, Belaúnde managed to spend most of the available development funds in greater Lima building vast public housing domains and improving urban infrastructure. The military period produced only small changes in this pattern as the primate city continued its rapid growth unabated.

Rural Development

Peru has consistently pursued this urban course in one way or another for three decades. The net result is that rural development has not occupied

a priority position in national policy despite innumerable claims that this was needed to "stem the tide" of rural to urban migration. Despite sporadic thrusts at rural development, the picture has not altered significantly during this time.

During much of this century, whatever development which took place in highland Peru depended heavily, and in many instances entirely, upon local resources and initiatives. Vehicular roads were first constructed under the impulse of Leguia's Ley de Conscripción Vial -- the "Highway Conscription Law" -- in the 1920s. Often called "work for the republic" or republica, this obliged all able males between 18 and 60 to work from six to 12 days per year on road-building projects. The road networks constructed under this program facilitated the movement of people and goods between various regions of the country.

Of course, Peruvian communities already had strong public work traditions, having maintained virtually all public trails, bridges and irrigation canals since prehistory. Similarly, highlanders have been engaged in the construction of local public buildings such as churches, schools, municipal offices, and even ambitious electrification projects for many years. The record of these achievements constitutes a great source of local pride as well as serving important felt needs (cf. Doughty 1968; Adams 1959; Isbell 1978). The strength of such local capacity to organize, work and sacrifice is widespread throughout the Andean area and well-documented (Dobyns 1970; Ritter 1965; USAID/Cooperación Popular 1964).

Indeed, it was on this basis of such "free labor" that both the Leguia and, recently, Belaúnde's administrations laid their rural development plans. The latter in fact derived the name of his political party Acción Popular from local characterizations of public work. Historically, the highlanders have

been told that if they are to enjoy progress, they must complement the traditionally small governmental contribution with "matching funds" in the form of labor, tools, and local resources such as trees or land. The extensive lobbying, conniving, and struggle to obtain even modest financial support for rural development is a wearying chore for unpaid community leaders. The question at the provincial, district and community level often arises, "Why should we continue to struggle when one can get it all just being in Lima?" Thus, to the surprise of many Peruvians, urban growth assumed even greater prominence after the onset of agrarian reform measures, although as a reaction to the opening up of an impoverished and stagnant rural society this was predictable (cf. Alers et al. 1965; Carter 1972:12). Because of these factors, migration constitutes a serious drain on the human resources of rural areas because the best prepared, most highly educated, and most socially mobile persons are the ones who leave.

The spectacular shift of the Peruvian population from being 35 percent urban in 1940 to over 65 percent in 1981 is better understood when the change is viewed as a massive departure from the food-producing highlands to the urban coast. The highland population fell from 62 percent of the national total in 1940 to 39 percent in 1981. Even though the absolute numbers of highlanders grew by a modest two percent per year in this period, the increase is accounted for entirely by the growth of a few highland cities such as Arequipa, Huancayo, Juliaca and Cuzco. At the agricultural village level, there were widespread population declines in many districts throughout the highlands among those persons engaged in agricultural pursuits between 1961 and 1982, although the total population employed in agriculture increased in absolute numbers over the same period. Nevertheless, the farm population of the country declined from about 40 percent of the national labor force to

37 percent in 1981 (Peru 1964, 1974, 1983). Although this might be regarded as a progressive development in an industrialized country, in Peru its meaning is different.

Except in the coastal valleys and very few places in the highlands, there has been little mechanization of agriculture which would promote such a displacement of agricultural workers. Indeed, Peru's subsistence agricultural economy is as dependent upon intensive manual labor now as it was 50 years ago. The loss of farm workers and operators to urban migration thus has an inevitable and indirect impact on production of basic staples.

What Peru has suffered from over the years to quote Fitzgerald (1976:73) has been:

> ...the absence of any agricultural policy except in the very short term -- this being to keep prices down. A medium-term policy would require that peasant farm productivity be raised, and in turn both food supplies and the incomes of the rural poor increased. This would require more inputs and greater retention of the surplus -- either in the form of credits or higher prices. In other words, a transfer of surplus from either the state or the urban consumer. To this would have to be added consistent production planning, marketing facilities (e.g. storage, transport) and extension services. In the longer term, however, the problem is the classical one of the relative weight to be given to agriculture and industry, and in consequence the spatial balance of incomes and population. It will probably require that both the arable land area be increased and peasant production reorganized. The former is foreseen in the large coastal irrigation projects, but the second is a far more complex matter.

Translated into measured effects, despite the fact that roughly 35 percent of the labor force in this period was producing about 80 percent of the food requirements for the country, opportunity for agrarian improvement remained low. Only 13.3 percent of the available credit distributed between 1966 and 1973 went to support agricultural development (Fitzgerald 1976: 72-73). In the eleven years from 1970-81, according to USAID figures, per capita agricultural production dropped 2.3 percent. Peru is now in the unenviable position of having the twelfth lowest per capita index of

agricultural production in the world out of 125 countries (World Bank 1982:110).

Food and Food Policy in Peru

PL 480, Title II food assistance to Peru thus occurs in the context of declining or stagnating agricultural production throughout the highland region of the country that traditionally has been the major provider of food staples. The conditions responsible for this also constrain the developmental and nutritional impact of food assistance programs. An understanding of these conditions is necessary in order to appreciate both the limitations of such programs and the ways in which food assistance needs to be targeted if meaningful developmental and nutritional benefits are to result.

Peru has treated agriculture as a support service for industrial and urban growth for most of the 20th century, and the policy has been explicit since the establishment of its Ministry of Agriculture in 1943. This policy has encouraged the growth of industry and industrial export agriculture in and around coastal urban centers, and it has attempted to promote the production of inexpensive foodstuffs for the populations in these areas. Unfortunately no corresponding emphasis has been placed on supporting the price received by rural producers or on improving living standards in the highlands, the source of the bulk of Peru's traditional staples.

The results of this policy have included declining productivity in the area of traditional staples, growing dependency upon imported foodstuffs, and the massive rural-urban migration discussed above. The decline in the productivity of traditional staples frequently has meant a decline in per capita availability that has been compensated for through increased imports. For example, the production per person of potatoes, sweet potatoes, and taro (papa japonesa) dropped from 218 kilograms in 1948 to 129 kilograms in 1979.

During the same period the supply of wheat and rice increased from 50 kilograms per person to 82.5 kilograms per person. Most of the growth of the cereal supply was the result of increased imports, as domestic producers accounted for about 60 percent of available cereals in 1948 and for only about 33 percent of the cereals available in 1979 (Villanueva Novoa 1980:48).

When it assumed power in 1968, the military government of Velasco Alvarado inherited an agricultural policy that emphasized producing cash crops for export and selected foodstuffs for urban consumption (Ferroni 1980). The major cash crops were cotton, sugar cane, and coffee, while foodstuffs for urban consumption included beans, rice, beef, poultry, milk, and corn. Traditional food staples, produced primarily in the highland region of Peru by small-scale peasant enterprises, included wheat, barley, mutton, and potatoes. Because of ecological constraints, foodstuffs for urban consumption do not generally grow well in the highland region of the country. Because of this, governments neglected highland agricultural development and sought to satisfy Peru's food needs through imports and the creation of new arable areas where foodstuffs for urban consumption could be grown successfully (see Table 1-1).

The military agrarian reform program initially had three major goals: to take measures that would revitalize agricultural production, to integrate the rural population into the national economy as food producers, and to accomodate agricultural policy to the government's industrialization plan. However, these goals were self-contradictory. A serious effort to revitalize agricultural production generally would have required major investments in rural development and forced a slowing of industrialization efforts. Investment in agriculture continued to be directed at export crops and foodstuffs for urban consumption, but no significant development effort was aimed at highland small-holders. Peasant integration was viewed only in terms of their ability

Table 1-1

Mean Annual Growth Rate of Peruvian Agricultural Production by Product Type and by Decade, 1950-1976. *

Type of Product	1950-59	1960-69	1970-76
	Percent	Percent	Percent
Prod. of Foodstuffs for Urban Consumption[1]	3.2	3.6	4.5
Prod. of Traditional Staples[2]	0.4	1.1	-1.1
Prod. of Export Crops[3]	5.7	-0.1	-1.3

1 Includes rice, beans, beef, pork, poultry, milk, and corn

2 Includes wheat, barley, sweet manioc, mutton, and potatoes.

3 Includes cotton, sugar cane, coffee.

*Adapted from Alvarez (1980:20)

to provide cheap labor and small quantities of food, or in terms of the problems they caused when large numbers of them made their way to the cities (Alvarez 1980).

In the allocation of resources for agriculture, the Peruvian military emphasized expropriating large estates and bringing new lands under production. Those aspects of the agrarian reform directed at smallholding peasant communities were only beginning to be enacted in the mid-1970s, when the government of Morales Bermudez (which took power in 1975) began to dismantle the agencies charged with implementing them.

Emphasis was placed on the expropriation of the large estates in spite of the fact that, in the highlands, where the bulk of traditional Peruvian food staples are produced, most agricultural resources are controlled by people who own less than five hectares of land (Caballero 1981:96-109). At the beginning of the agrarian reform, highland smallholders controlled 50 percent of the irrigated croplands and 42 percent of the non-irrigated croplands. These small producers owned 58.2 percent of the cattle, 52.8 percent of the sheep, and 53.2 percent of the camelids in the highlands. The large estates that were expropriated owned only 13.1 percent of the cattle, 25.9 percent of the sheep, and 30.5 percent of the camelids in the region (Alvarez 1980:36). Clearly, if the goal was to revitalize the agricultural economy, state efforts were directed at the wrong sector.

The government's purpose in emphasizing the expropriation of large, privately-owned estates and their conversion into state-run cooperatives was to establish a state presence in the production of export crops, in order to increase the revenues received from that sector, and in the production of food for urban consumption, in order to try to direct a greater part of the country's agricultural activity toward feeding the rapidly expanding cities.

However, the organizational structures of the expropriated estates were extremely diverse, ranging from highly productive coastal plantations that had been operating as capitalist enterprises for a hundred years or more to highland haciendas that operated according to a feudal sharecropping system. Furthermore, problems of overly centralized planning, insufficient financial resources, and simple ignorance concerning social, economic, and geographic conditions combined to frustrate the high hopes many held for the state-run enterprises (Martinez 1980a).

In addition to emphasizing the expropriation of the large estates, recent agricultural policy has directed a large portion of Peru's financial resources to the creation of new arable lands. In 1978, for example, the state budget for agricultural development was 157 million US dollars, of which 83 percent, or 130 million US dollars, was spent on creating new arable lands, while only 14 percent was earmarked for improving existing production facilities. Of the 130 million US dollars spent on creating new arable lands, 64 percent, or over 83 million US dollars, went into a single project, the massive Majes desert irrigation scheme (Eguren 1980:41) in Southern Peru.

Extending over four provinces of the department of Arequipa, the Majes project involves the damming and channeling of three major rivers to create a vast system of interconnected irrigation works. The dams are to provide hydroelectric power for the region. Peasants are being resettled along the irrigation works, where they are to be small-scale capitalist producers of foodstuffs for urban consumption. The plan also calls for the construction of two new cities that are projected to have respective populations of 80,000 and 120,000 people by 1995 (Peru Reports 1976).

Majes exemplifies more general problems associated with agricultural development expenditures in Peru, particularly the tendency to invest large

amounts of capital in relatively small areas. Although the achievements of such efforts may be impressive, they do not address the problems that make large agricultural development expenditures necessary in the first place, such as economic conditions in rural areas that are more depressed than in the country as a whole, declines in the production of traditional food staples, and a high rate of rural-urban migration that simultaneously adds to urban food demands and diminishes the productive capacity of labor intensive agriculture in rural areas. Insofar as agricultural development efforts in Peru perpetuate this pattern, the problems noted above will be exacerbated rather than reduced.

The problems of small-scale agriculturalists were deepened by the Velasco government, when, in a dramatic gesture to secure the political support of Peru's urban population, it placed price controls on foodstuffs, in effect subsidizing urban growth at the expense of rural populations. Throughout the century Peru had encouraged low urban food prices at the expense of producers, and price controls had the effect of depressing the prices paid to producers even further. However, these efforts to control food prices were never more than partially successful. During the economic crisis between 1976 and 1978 for example, low-income populations suffered a higher rate of inflation (137.2 percent) than did higher income strata (114.5 percent), due to the larger percentage of income that poor people must spend on food. In spite of efforts to control prices, food costs were among the fastest rising of any area of the economy (Portocarrero 1980:60-62).

Many smallholders retreated into producing food for subsistence only, and the general decline in rural living standards that resulted provided an additional stimulus to rural-urban migration (Appleby 1979, 1982a, 1982b; Painter 1981). Large private investors became unwilling to risk money in

agriculture without substantial state and/or international support (Maletta and Foronda 1980; Painter 1983). The organizational and bureaucratic difficulties of the state-run enterprises created from expropriated estates were compounded by low prices that made it difficult for any domestic food-producing enterprise to show a profit.

The combination of neglecting to develop and improve existing food production capacity, particularly that of small-scale producers, and a general policy of favoring urban consumers at the expense of rural producers resulted in a stagnation of domestic food production, especially in the area of traditional staples such as barley and potatoes (Alvarez 1980). In fact, during many years, per capita food production declined (Figure 1-1). Governments sought to offset this trend through increased emphasis on food imports (Table 1-2) and through further increases in expenditures to bring new land under production by means of large-scale irrigation of the coastal desert and tropical forest clearing (Painter 1983b).

It has long been hoped that production from newly arable lands ultimately would reduce Peru's dependence on imported food. However, three factors have prevented this from happening. First, even during periods when the country has shown substantial increases in food production, urban population growth, primarily due to migration, has tended to outstrip those increases. For example, between 1969 and 1976, domestic production of urban staples rose at a mean rate of 4.5 percent per year; however, between 1961 and 1972, the mean annual rate of urban population increase was 9.3 percent (see Table 1-3). Secondly, many of the increases in food production that Peru has shown over the years have been of short duration, because they have been the result of shifts from export crop production to food in response to short-term fluctuations in relative prices rather than as the result of a significant



FIGURE 1-1. Relative Changes in Total and Per Capita Output of Foodcrops
Adapted from Thorp and Bertram (1978:279)

Table 1-2

Percentage of Peruvian Food Supply derived from Imported Foodstuffs

	1943	1960	1965	1970	1975
	Percent	Percent	Percent	Percent	Percent
Wheat	49	70	76	84	86
Corn-Sorghum	-	-	0	1	52
Oil Crops	4	35	34	100[1]	100[1]
Milk Products	3	22	22	35	41
Red Meats	2	4	12	28	11
Rice	10	10	32	0	12
Barley	2	6	10	10	32

[1]The imported percentage is probably smaller than 100 percent, as the figure does not include domestically produced cotton seed oil.

From Alvarez (1980:27).

increase in food productivity. For example, the increase in food crop output noted for the the mid-1960s in Figure 1-1 was the result of land being reallocated from cotton to food in response to relative price changes (Thorp and Bertram 1978:278-279).

Thirdly, the production of those food industries that did show substantial gains tended to be exported during much of the 1970s. Peru's reliance on food imports contributed to a substantial and increasingly serious trade deficit. As had previous administrations, the military government responded to this problem by increasing exports. These included traditional export crops such as oil, copper, fishmeal, and iron. The state also took measures to encourage the export of products that traditionally had not been exported. The combination of increased volume of exports and rising world commodity prices did stimulate the Peruvian economy (Portocarrero 1980:100-101). Unfortunately, among the most dynamic non-traditional exports were included pork, chicken, wheat flour, noodles, eggs, cheese, and butter. These are the products of precisely those agricultural industries the government had been supporting in order to increase the domestic supply of urban foodstuffs (Eguren 1980)

Food Marketing

The production problems noted above are compounded by an inadequate food marketing system. Throughout this century Peruvian governments have promoted the growth of industrialized urban centers; however, they have not attended to the provisioning of those centers. The state took no role in helping to foster competition among purveyors of foodstuffs that would benefit producers by providing them with alternative markets for their products and consumers by providing alternative sources. Out of what was essentially a lack of state policy in the area of food commercialization, the provisioning of major

Table 1-3

Peru: Comparison of Growth in Agricultural Production with Population Growth (percentages)

Products	Average Percentage Increase/Year [3]	Annual Percentage of Population Growth [4]	
Prod. of Foodstuffs for Urban Consumption[1]	4.5	Urban	9.3
Prod. of Traditional Staples[2]	-1.1	Rural	1.4
Mean Annual Growth rates of Food Production	1.7	Nation	3.3

[1]Adapted from Alvarez (1980:21).

[2]Based on Censo Nacional de Poblacion 1961 and 1972, adapted from Dobyns and Doughty (1976:298-302).

[3]Period 1969-1976

[4]Period 1961-1972

urban centers came to be dominated by a small group of bulkers and shippers (Esculies Larrabure et al. 1977).

For producers of traditional staples, oligopsonistic control of marketing facilities combined with state policies to maintain low food prices for urban consumers to further reduce the revenue-earning potential of food production. For urban consumers, it meant being subject to widespread market abuses ranging from selling horse meat as beef (El Diario de Marka 1980a) to over-charging for items subject to state price controls (La Cronica 1980b) to creating shortages of food stuffs in order to force a price increase (El Diario de Marka 1980b). Although legislation exists that makes such marketing practices illegal, prosecution is rare, in part because the people victimized rarely protest to the authorities (La Cronica 1980a). The problems posed by the food marketing system are recognized officially in the new Peruvian constitution, which became effective with the inauguration of President Belaúnde, on July 28, 1980. The constitution specifically forbids the monopolistic or oligopolistic control of staple foodstuffs. However, the state has not shown itself to be capable of enforcing this provision of the law (El Diario de Marka 1980b).

Many have expressed fear of tampering with the food marketing system out of concern for the impact on the urban population. Because of the large number of unemployed and underemployed people in urban areas who depend upon low prices for survival, it is widely believed that any move to increase prices to producers would mean disaster for consumers. Figueroa (1980) however, argues that, largely because of the oligopolistic control exercised over the market system by a small group, the relationship between the price paid to producers and the price paid by consumers is not strong. He estimates that a 50 percent increase in the price paid to producers would result in

approximately an 18 percent increase in consumer prices. Figueroa argues that in the long run the interests of producers and consumers would be served by state efforts to promote greater participation and competition in the bulking and shipping of food.

Peru's food production problems are the result of an approach to development that has emphasized rapid growth and partial industrialization of existing urban centers, most of which are located on the coast. These areas receive a disproportionate share of the nation's development budget, and even projects that ostensibly are for improving agricultural production have as their goal increasing the food supply to these urban centers rather than rural development. The concentration of resources in coastal urban centers creates conditions that draw people to them at the same time that the lack of investment in most rural areas tends to depress economic conditions there and encourages people to leave. The massive migratory flow that has resulted constantly exerts pressure on Peru to allocate even greater resources to the coastal urban centers, so that the cycle has become self-perpetuating. Insofar as food assistance programs duplicate national patterns of spending, they contribute to Peru's agricultural dilemma. Title II food assistance needs to be targeted to rural areas through projects that will result in improved productive infrastructure, income generating capacity, and health and nutrition.

The Lima and Provincial Contexts of PVO Work

The field upon which Title II programs unfold is as widely differentiated as any in the world from the primate city on the desert coast to remote high altitude mountain hamlets. Programs in Lima and the highland regions of the departments of Cajamarca and Ancash were designated to be part of our evaluation (see Appendix I). In the three weeks (of five in total) designated for field

work, our time was divided equally between these places, each with its own special conditions and prospects.

Greater Lima

The city of Lima poses its own peculiar working conditions for anyone seeking to develop activities in the Young Towns. These both encircle and penetrate the core of greater Lima which comprises over 30 separate political districts, each with its own democratically elected mayor and council and administrative facilities. The majority of districts have squatter settlements, and indeed, some of the settlements themselves have become self-governing districts in the short time since their founding, such as San Martin de Porres, Comas, and Villa María del Triunfo. In addition to presenting a complicated administrative picture, the Young Towns are widely dispersed geographically, covering kilometers of desert periphery of the old city. From the administrative perspective, planners have seen fit to divide the Young Towns into four cardinal sectors, called the north, south, east, and west "cones."

Although assigning each of the 432 Young Towns to a cone imposes some order, finding a particular place required detailed information beyond municipal street numbers, because the thoroughfares are usually unmarked and many of the streets are new. To enter the sprawling district of Comas, for example, instructions invariably tell the traveler to turn off Tupac Amaru Avenue at kilometer 14 and then proceed with an unpredictable number of twists and turns. In consequence, any program administering its activities in these areas is faced with significant transportation factors of distance, traffic congestion, and time.

Occupying what was once considered as undesirable desert land at the edge of the Andean foothills, the squatter settlements cover all the flat areas and climb the usually rocky hillsides, at times reaching "impossible" locations.

Land posession is the important factor here, not suitability for planned urban development. Despite these problems, the settlements are laid out in grid-pattern streets. The bamboo mat invasion huts are supplanted by brick and concrete houses as the owners dig in. Few streets are paved, and only a handful of three-story structures rise above the dusty scene; here and there a tree or shrub struggles for existence, assiduously tended by an interested home owner. In many sectors there is no potable water or other urban service of note. In others, running water is supplied for two to three hours every day or is delivered and purchased by the barrel from local entrepreneurs.

In all, life in the newer Young Towns is a form of urban homesteading permitted and even encouraged by the central government. The local elected district governments are under-staffed, under-financed and under-equipped to meet the municipal needs of an expanding and dynamic population. The Young Towns are politically sensitive areas and the central government responds to their needs accordingly. Ministerial programs here vie for operational space and allegiances as do various other interest groups, from political parties and religions to PVOs. The district municipal governments have difficulty in coordinating, much less controlling, these many independently developed actions. What any of these activities may have to do with squatter settlement residents' needs and wants may be coincidental (see Lobo 1982). Nevertheless, the Young Towns are internally structured in a variety of ways, but often reflect political block organizations each with its own leadership. The power, representativeness and effectiveness of these organizations varies widely, of course, but may be important factors in PVO projects.

Cajamarca and Ancash

The provincial regions where PVOs operate mark striking contrasts with Lima. The highland areas of Ancash and Cajamarca, the two departments selected

as evaluation sites, are both in the northern half of the country. Cajamarca has the third largest population in Peru (after Lima and Piura) and is the most rural department in the entire country. It also is ranked as the poorest region in the nation; its overwhelmingly rural and small town population is isolated by the lack of vehicular roads and enjoys few services such as electricity and potable water. The departmental capital, Cajamarca, is surrounded by typical Andean uplands full of small villages, sloping farmlands, and high-altitude grasslands used largely for pasture.

Ancash, although closer to Lima, is scarcely less underdeveloped. The region is still recovering from the vast devastation of the 1970 earthquake. After this event, millions of dollars of national and foreign assistance poured into the region, resulting in such infrastructural developments as the paved road from the coast (finished in 1976-7) and reconstruction of the capital city of Huaraz located in the Callejón de Huaylas. In this subregion, electricity is widely distributed among the districts although other developmental increments remain largely a planner's promise. Ancash also has a substantial coastal urban population in the cities of Chimbote and Casma and three other major highland subregions more remote than the Callejón de Huaylas. The outstanding geographic feature of the department of Ancash is the dominating presence of the cordillera blanca range of the Andes mountains with its spectacular snowpeaks.

Both Cajamarca and Ancash economies are based largely upon traditional agricultural production undertaken by smallholders (less than five hectares of land) or by one of the agricultural cooperative organizations established or strengthened by the agrarian reform. Cooperative organizations are more common in parts of Ancash than in Cajamarca and smallholders abound in both departments. The areas visited by the team in Ancash were bilingual in

Spanish and Quechua, whereas in the area of Cajamarca where the work was concentrated, nearly all were Spanish-speaking.

In contrast to greater Lima, the highlands present fewer puzzles in locating communities, but many more difficulties in transportation. There are few roads, and many villages are not connected by passable vehicular byways. On the other hand, as we noted above, highland communities have long labored to develop such facilities. Despite incomes which do not reach $425 per year for most workers, villagers continue to invest their labor and materials in the improvement of their houses and communities with little if any assistance from the "outside." Villages are organized in a variety of ways and most have some sort of traditional public labor system employed to repair and build roads and bridges, clean irrigation canals, and construct schools.

Much of the rural area in both departments is still trying to cope with the wide-ranging effects of land reform promulgated in the early 1970s. On the other hand, support services in agriculture, health and development are irregular in both appearance and quality. Both department capitals feature the concentration of governmental facilities and are the centers of administrative activity, duplicating in miniature the primate city functions of Lima. The sense of being "neglected" and "forgotten" is commonly expressed by highland villagers.

Summary and Conclusions

There are several threads of interest which emerge here and will be traced in succeeding chapters. The "background" aspects of Peruvian life that have been described are the prologue to any program which purports to make some impact on the conditions of poverty and the well-being of the rural and urban lower classes. The themes developed here concern the vast social movement

away from highland and agricultural regions towards the urban coast, especiallv greater Lima, and the related drop in basic agricultural production.

The patterns which concern us in the context of this evaluation of Titl II programs revolve around these issues. Peru's difficulties, not only in the past few years, but for several decades, have grown from a tradition at once city-centered and uninterested in provincial, particularly rural, development. The low cultural and social value placed on agricultural pursuits and provincial life were reflected in the national policies which did not place significant investments in those realms. The resulting flow of migration toward the primate city of Lima, which has held most of the wealth, power and opportunity in recent times, has been further encouraged by several events. The land reforms, focus on industrialization, and continued concentration of investment in Lima and to a lesser degree elsewhere on the coast whette appetites of those seeking to change their life opportunities.

At the same time, despite several attempts to alter the course of events, agricultural interests suffered due to policies formed from narrow political needs or mistaken assumptions about development priorities. Low prices for basic traditional farm products, lack of an effective extension system, and environmental setbacks such as droughts, floods and earthquakes during the last 15 years served to augment the migratory flow. The resulting and significant drop in farm production is reflected in demographic facts which directly touch an agricultural system based upon intensive hand labor.

The challenge this presents to Title II programs as the largest portion of U.S. foreigh assistance to Peru is very great. Where is the best place and what are the best programs to be endowed with these resources? In what types of projects can Title II achieve the greatest impact on these fundamental national Peruvian problems? Is the present system of working through PVO

agencies as "surrogates" for AID and the Peruvian government useful and how could the configuration be improved? Indeed, what impact are the present operations of Title II programs having on Peru's fundamental needs for increasing productive employment situations that can be sustained? Finally, we ask whether Peru's dependence upon this form of foreign assistance can or should be modified in the near future.

The ensuing chapters will address these issues in the specific context of the conditions noted here and will return to them in conclusion. The scenes of our evaluation in the squatter settlements of Lima and in the rural highland areas of the resplendent Callejón de Huaylas in Ancash and the province of Cajamarca represent archetypical regions where the background problems may be seen. The newly-arrived highland migrants clustered hopefully in the ever-expanding Young Towns evince the aspirations to gain and urban home, employment, and level of living. The highlands of Ancash have long been a top contributor of migrants to Lima, and its agriculture is centered in the work of small farmers and struggling community cooperatives. Cajamarca shows a similar rural situation but it is more isolated, further from Lima, and is the poorest, most illiterate and least developed highland region. It also has the largest and most dense rural population in Peru.

CHAPTER II

TITLE II PROGRAM BUDGETS AND COSTS

We now turn to consider how the Title II programs fit into the contemporary Peruvian socio-economic context, and contribute to the well-being and development of the country. The formal aspects of PVO operations examined in this chapter relate to the integration of their sources of finance, budgets, costs, and other management issues

We examined budgets and costs of the Title II program from a number of perspectives, including the effectiveness of program management, the adequacy of the budget for providing appropriate personnel, equipment, and project supervision, and the effectiveness of the programs in reaching targeted beneficiaries. The results reveal a number of areas in which different PVOs excel, and they raise some questions that AID and the PVOs need to address. Although all of the PVO programs receive support under Title II and from Title I, we found considerable variation in their organizational structure, the conditions under which they operate, and the results obtained by the respective PVOs.

During the Peace Corps era in Peru (1962-73) a substantial proportion of volunteers, at times amounting to 50 percent of the total, were the field administrators and supervisors of the nation-wide school feeding programs. Today, school feeding is no longer a component of the Title II program (Figure 2-1), having been partially taken over by the Ministry of Health.

The total amounts of foodstuffs, their dollar value and the numbers of recipients calculated has fluctuated by about 10 percent between 1980 and 1984 with other variations occurring in individual PVO operations. In the course of a current budget year moreover, changes take place in food shipments,

emergency allotments and other contingencies, making exact accounting problematic. Consequently, the evaluation team could not be sure of th final 1983 or 1984 totals, and has based the cost analysis on figures from 1982, the most recent year for which all the data were available at the time of the evaluation. Based on the most recently available figures, we conclude that some important changes will be occuring in Title II arrangements as there is an overall drop of 8.2 percent in the metric tonnage of the food commodities made available from 1983 to 1984. At the same time, the calculated value of this lesser amount is 2.6 percent more than the 1983 allotment, and the estimated number of recipients is 5.8 percent less in 1984 than in 1983. The material presented in Figure 2-1 represents the up-dated version of program resource distributions.

The principal change during the 1980 to 1984 period has been the termination of Title II support for the school feeding program, which accounted for about 40 percent of all recipients. Allowing for some fluctuations in the total amounts of foodstuffs distributed, OFASA and CWS are distributing slightly more food in 1984 than they did in 1980, while projecting that they will reach the same number of beneficiaries. CARITAS' portion per beneficiary, already the lowest among the four PVO's, would be further reduced, as the 1984 figures show the metric tonnage of its allotment declining more than the projected number of beneficiaries in its program. The per capita allotment for CARE beneficiaries also shows a decline.

Figure 2-1

PL 480 Title II in Peru

1980
SUMMARY
Commodity Volume: 42,107 M.T.
Value: $21.1 million US
Recipients: 1,125,400



1981
SUMMARY
Commodity Volume: 57,300 M.T.
Value: $28.8 million US
Recipients: 1,186,500



1982
SUMMARY
Commodity Volume: 48,217 M.T.
Value: $21.6 million US
Recipients: 1,178,500



Figure 2-1 (cont.)

PL 480 Title II in Peru



The Title II operations are administered by private voluntary organizations (PVOs) which handle the various mechanisms of the grant program, including shipping, storage and distribution of food, as well as the direction and supervision of supplemental feeding and food for work programs. USAID/Lima maintains an overall supervisory and advisory role in the administration of these activities and its Lima office has a full-time staff of four people who manage PL 480. Their work is focused primarily on coordinating and reviewing the functions of the four PVOs and, indirectly, the Oficina Nacional de Apayo Alimentario (ONAA), which handles food and storage and some transport and performs nutrition education functions on behalf of SEPAS and CARE.

The context of the programs evaluated should be seen as a complex network of institutions, both public and private (see Figure 2-2). The structure of Food for Peace operations in Peru contains five levels of administration spread among international offices abroad, Lima-based headquarters, and regional/local-level centers. Title II foods are thus distributed among 17 separate programs administered by six Peruvian national and PVO agencies.

The closely-related, if not identical, functions of many of these activi. are organizationally distinguishable at the management level; however, at the community level they often overlap and may compete in terms of the populations and areas they serve. Thus in the Young Towns of Lima, the evaluation team discovered projects of CARITAS, CARE, OFASA and ONAA in adjacent blocks or even involving next-door neighbors -- one household in an OFASA program, the next involved with CARE or CARITAS. In the highland areas visited, several communities were multiple beneficiaries of food support programs of different agencies. In Unanca, Cajamarca for example, the community center had three storerooms with Title II food, one each for the programs of ONAA, PRAA/SEPAS and the World Food Program.



FIGURE 2-2. ORGANIZATION of PVO ACTIVITY in PERU

Thus, despite the apparent complexity of the organization chart for Title II programs, in the end, at the village and neighborhood level, the food looks pretty much the same. For the PVOs who ultimately manage the Title II field program, their organizational features and functions also are similar since these involve international freight (handled by the U.S. counterpart PVO), warehousing, repackaging, regional shipping, and delivery to consumers. In addition to these operations, each PVO has other departments dedicated to the execution of its particular projects, which, despite apparent dissimilarities, fall into two catagories: Food for Work (FFW) projects, and feeding and nutrition projects (MCH, pre-school and specialized meal programs). This is true for both Lima and provincial areas. Consequently, the analysis and discussion of the operations, problems, and impacts of the projects on beneficiaries and communities in the following chapters is divided accordingly.

While there are similarities of operations and functions, these do not extend to the use of comparable budget categories by the PVOs. Not only are the budget and expense categories different from one PVO to another, but also their sources of support, coordination with the Peruvian government, utilization of AID OPG funds, personnel and supervisory staffs, and other details stand in sharp contrast to one another. As a result, comparative study of the PVOs from a management perspective is difficult. In terms of the net effects of the programs among beneficiaries and communities and overall operations, however, pertinent conclusions may be reached.

PVO Budget Resources

With the possible exception of one OFASA program (OPG No. 527-0247), all of the PVO activities in Peru apparently receive support aside from that

provided by USAID/Lima. Working from data supplied by the different parties, the material in Table 2-1 and 2-2 reveals a number of inconsistencies concerning the USAID/Lima financial conception of PVO programs and the same picture as seen in the PVO documents themselves. Thus for example, while USAID/Lima's estimate of the CARITAS budget for program 527-0196 is $992,000, the CARITAS records show $1,684,000 in that program budget. Part of this difference is due to the fact that CARITAS attempts to estimate the value of community labor and treats the amount as part of the budgeted resource. The other PVOs do not do this.

For its current programs CARITAS shows only 17.82 percent of its operating funds coming from USAID/Lima; SEPAS receives 30.55 percent of its funds from USAID/Lima; CARE receives 21.53 percent. Only the present OFASA projects received all of their financing from USAID/Lima sources, although this was not true with its previous ones. Why the data supplied by AID should differ so greatly from those of the agencies themselves we are not sure, but it seems important because these differences effect both the rate and kinds of expenditures made. They also make exact accounting of the costs, benefits, and functions of the projects virtually impossible.

While aspects of this situation are not presently subject to exact analysis, it is evident that the conduct of Title II programs is highly dependent upon sources of funding outside of direct USAID/Lima channels. One of the most important ways in which this develops is through the use of large amounts of money from the Peruvian government, obtained through the sale of Title I foods (Johnson et al. 1983:30-40, Appendix E). Seen as an "innovative" use of Title I funds, the PVOs are, in varying degrees, dependent upon this input at their present level of operations. All of the PVOs receive major Title I operating funds from the Peruvian government, a fact which was not

Table 2-1

Number of Beneficiaries, Tons of Food Distributed, Value of Food Distributed, and Estimated Budgets

r PL 480, Title II, Since 1978 (Dollars)

PVO/OPG No. & Duration	No. of Beneficiaries per Fiscal Year (000)	Metric Tons of food Distributed per Fiscal Year	Dollar Value of food per Fiscal Year (000)	Project Budget: Estimated AID Contribution (000) Dollars /%	Estimated Counterpart Title I Contribution (000) Dollars /%	Other Sources (000) Dollars /%	Totals (100%)
CARITAS/ 527-0180/ March 1978- December 1979	1979:413.1 1980:473.0 1981:473.0 1982:473.0	1979:19,263 1980:21,125 1981:22,222 1982:21,507	1979:7,391.1 1980:10,900.0 1981:11,100.0 1982:9,800.0				
CARITAS/527-0196/ September 1980- December 1983				460.0 / 13%	1,692.0 / 46%	1,506.4 / 41%	3,658.4
OFASA/527-0205/ September 1978- August 1980	1979:133.0 1980:133.0 1981:143.0 1982:143.0	1979:13,667 1980:14,658 1981:14,743 1982:12,008	1979:5,227.0 1980:7,100.0 1981:7,500.0 1982:5,200.0				
OFASA/527-0121/ May 1980- December 1982							
OFASA/527-0247/ January 1983- January 1986				1,458.0 / 49%	921.9 / 31%	604.4 / 20%	2,984.3
SEPAS/527-0206/ March 1979- March 1982	1979:15.3 1980:20.4 1981:25.5 1982:26.4	1979:1,303 1980:2,446 1981:3,092 1982:3,062	1979:579.0 1980:1,300.0 1981:1,600.0 1982:1,200.0				
SEPAS/527-0231/ March 1982- March 1985				1,240.0 / 49%	1,248.5 / 50%	30.0 / 1%	2,518.5
CARE/527-0186/ 1980- December 1983	1981:45.0 1982:35.1	1981: 5,643 1982: 3,630	1981:2,500.0 1982:1,700.0	730.0 / 25%	2,276.0 / 73%	67.0 / 2%	3,136.0
Total	2,126.1	158,369	73,097.0	3,951.0 / 32%	6,138.4 / 50%	2,207.8 / 18%	12,297.2

Source: USAID Trimestral Report, March 1983 and before

Table 2-2

Quantity and Value of P.L. 480, Title II Food Aid and Number of Beneficiaries each Fiscal Year

F.Y.	1979			1980			1981 A	B	C	1982 A	B	C	TOTALS		
PVO	Metric Tons of Food	Value (000) US	Beneficiaries (000)	Metric Tons of Food	Value (000) US	Beneficiaries (000)	Metric Tons of Food	Value (000) US	Beneficiaries (000)	Metric Tons of Food	Value (000) US	Beneficiaries (000)	Metric Tons of Food	Value (000) US	Beneficiaries (000)
CRS CARITAS	19,263	7,341	413.1	21,125	10,900	473.0	22,222	11,100	473.0	21,507	9,800	473.2	84,117	39,191	1,832.1
SAWS OFASA	13,667	5,227	133.0	14,658	7,100	133.0	14,743	7,500	143.0	12,008	5,200	143.0	55,076	25,027	552.0
CWS SEPAS	1,503	579	15.3	2,446	1,300	20.4	3,092	1,600	25.5	3,062	1,200	26.4	10,103	4,679	87.6
CARE	—	—	—	—	—	—	5,643	2,500	45.0	3,630	1,700	35.1	9,273	4,200	80.1
TOTAL 1	34,433	13,197	561.4	38,229	19,300	626.4	45,700	22,700	686.5	40,207	11,900	677.5	158,569	73,097	2,551.1
SCHOOL FEEDING *	N/D	N/D	N/D	3,878	1,900	300.0	11,600	6,100	500.0	8,010	3,600	500.0	23,488	11,600	1,500.0
TOTAL 2	34,433	13,197	561.4	42,107	21,200	1,126.4	57,300	23,000	1,186.5	48,217	21,600	1,177.5	182,057	84,697	4,051.8

*Discontinued by 1983

1.67

originally reported fully by either USAID sources or the PVOs because of unclear accounting noted below. OFASA and CARITAS have significant financial support from their respective religious sponsors and participants, non-U.S.-government sources, a fact which enters into any consideration of their Title II activity. At this point it suffices to note that there is an important mix of inputs into the Title II activities.

Title II Projects and Their Outreach

From 1978 to the present there have been a total of eight PVO programs funded by AID OPG funds and supported by PL 480 resources in Peru, four of which are in force in the current fiscal year (see Table 2-1).

Including the four projects which have now terminated, the total value of the foodstuffs delivered (and scheduled) was $84,697,000 according to USAID/Lima sources. Distributed to an estimated 4,051,800 persons (including school feeding programs) over this five-year period, the food was worth $20.95 per capita. This totaled 182,057 metric tons or 44.93 kilograms per beneficiary per year from 1978-1982. On a yearly basis, this amounts to an overall average of 18.7 kilograms per family of five per month. Of course these amounts were received over much shorter periods of time conforming to the length of a particular project. The wide dispersion and distribution of the foodstuffs to over 800,000 persons per year (including school feeding programs) is impressive, although as we shall review in detail in subsequent chapters, the nature of the food distribution process in both the project context and within the family often "dilutes" the amount of food actually consumed by any group of beneficiaries. In 1982 for example, the average kilogram amount delivered for the year per beneficiary was 40.9 for all programs taken together, but the range of per capita distribution by PVO

program varied from a yearly 16.02 kilograms per participant in school feeding programs (discontinued in 1983), to 115.9 kilograms per year to each beneficiary in SEPAS reforestation projects (see Table 3-13).

Differences also arise from the fact that different projects, even those sponsored by the same PVO, may vary widely. The quantities of food that one can receive, and even the conditions that must be met in order to receive food at all differ by PVO and by region. CARITAS, which handles the most Title II food, provides relatively little per capita through its numerous nationwide projects. OFASA, SEPAS and CARE respectively provide 84.7 percent, 155.1 percent and 127.4 percent more food per capita than CARITAS. CARITAS functions on the philosophy that it should reach a maximum number of needy persons with a basic minimum of food available, and its rations per capita therefore are by design smaller than those of the other PVOs.[1] In the words of Mon. Dammert, Bishop of Cajamarca and head of the CARITAS program there, "It is our obligation to see that everyone who needs food can get some, we do not refuse many." Indeed, the larger number of persons receiving food through CARITAS auspices is testimony to that philosophy. If CARITAS were to provide rations of food equal to those of OFASA it would reach 45 percent fewer beneficiaries.

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[1] At this point it may be noted that despite this great difference in the average amount of food distributed, we did not encounter any patterned reaction to this among beneficiaries unless the individual had participated in another program where more was received. What was found instead, was that recipients generally -- irrespective of program -- registered complain about the food actually received because of delays in shipments or other peculiarities of distribution. These problems will be explored in the succeeding chapters.

Program Costs and their Correlates

The great differences in the amounts of food delivered per capita by the PVOs necessarily raise the issue of their relative efficiency and success. The data presented in Table 2-3 summarizes the program costs and leads to several conclusions. The first is that PVOs differ sharply from one another in virtually all categories, from the amount of food received, its value and its freight costs, to the forms and amounts of participation in each PVO by various funding sources. On a cost per beneficiary basis (using PVO data for beneficiaries), the salient feature of all programs is that the value of the food and the international freight expense together constitute the largest program expense; 65 percent of the total costs per beneficiary of the Title II program. In other words, the food value itself and the shipment to Peru are the primary expenses of the program.

However, the PVOs are quite different from one another in how they manage this food resource. Taking 1982 as our sample year, CARITAS is by far the least expensive program in its total costs, spending $29.26 per capita, while CARE spends the most, $88.98 per recipient (Line 7, Table 2-3) This difference holds when administrative costs per capita and per kilogram delivered are compared as well (Lines 9 and 10, Table 2-3). CARITAS and OFASA have programs which are significantly less expensive on a per capita basis than those of SEPAS and CARE.

There are several components which figure in this variation. Between them, CARITAS and OFASA are the two largest programs, handling almost 70 percent of the total tonnage of food received in Peru. In this aspect an "economy of scale" factor may assist in producing the general lower costs of these two programs as compared to the others, although we note that SEPAS paid slightly less per capita in freight than did OFASA.

Table 2-3

Title II Programs According to Funding and Food Value

Per PVO in Terms of Total Costs and Costs per Beneficiary (Dollars) Calculated for 1982*

Funding Source	CARITAS Amount	CARITAS Cost per Beneficiary	OFASA Amount	OFASA Cost per Beneficiary	SEPAS Amount	SEPAS Cost per Beneficiary	CARE Amount	CARE Cost per Beneficiary	TOTAL Amount	TOTAL Cost per Beneficiary
1. PVO International Freight	3,036,800	6.42	1,818,700	12.72	325,700	12.34	586,800	16.72	5,768,000	8.51
(Percent)	(53)		(31)		(6)		(10)		(100)	
2. AID (OPG)	90.000	.19	186,206	1.30	228,602	8.66	211,466	6.02	716,274	1.06
(Percent)	(13)		(26)		(32)		(29)		(100)	
3. GOP (Title I)	500,000	1.06	250,000	1.75	183,600	6.95	606,933	17.29	1,540533	2.27
(Percent)	(33)		(16)		(12)		(39)		(100)	
4. PVO Contribution	303,150	.64	100,833	.71	2,499	.09	17,866	.51	424,348	.63
(Percent)	(71)		(24)		(1)		(4)		(100)	
5. Other Support	112,050	.24	—	—	—	—	—	—	112,050	.24
(Percent)	(100)								(100)	
6. Value of Food	9,800,000	20.72	5,200,000	36.36	1,200,000	45.45	1,700,000	48.43	17,900,000	26.42
(Percent)	(55)		(29)		(7)		(9)		(100)	
7. TOTAL PROGRAM COST	13,842,000	29.26	7,555,739	52.84	1,940,401	73.50	3,123,065	88.98	26,146,979	38.59
(Percent)	(52)		(29)		(7)		(12)		(100)	
8. No. Beneficiaries Reported	473,000		143,000		26,400		35,100		677,500	
(Percent)	(70.0)		(21.1)		(3.8)		(5.1)		(100)	
9. TOTAL ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS (1-5)	4,042,000	8.54	2,355,733	16.47	1,146,671	43.43	1,423,065	40.54	8,967,469	13.23
(Percent)	(45)		(26)		(13)		(16)		(100)	
10. Total Administrative Cost per Kilo	.19		.20		.37		.39		.22	

*Does not include school feeding program

Viewing the different sources of funding (Tables 2-1, 2-3, 2-4) for each PVO reveals their unique qualities in almost every category. Nevertheless there is a broad pattern in these distributions which separates the CARITAS and OFASA programs from SEPAS and CARE. Using our most recent sample year, 1982, this division develops as follows:

CARITAS and OFASA	91.1% of beneficiaries
	39.0% of OPG funds
	49.0% of Peru/Title I funds
	87.0% of non government support
	$10.38 average cost per beneficiary
CARE and SEPAS	8.9% of beneficiaries
	61.0% of OPG funds
	51.0% of Peru/Title I funds
	13.0% of non government support
	$41.78 average cost per beneficiary

There are several reasons for such striking differences in the programs. The CARE and SEPAS programs are directly associated with formal Peruvian government projects involving heavy technological and material investments, particularly the former (see Table 2-4). The CARE program which is concentrated entirely in Lima squatter settlements thus represents a major urban investment for USAID PL 480 funds and is the principal use of these funds. By contrast, both CARITAS and OFASA have relatively small amounts of support for material and infrastructural investments. Because CARITAS is by far the largest rural program (the OFASA Title II program is entirely urban), its relatively small portion of such OPG and Title I funds underlines the urban focus which characterizes the PL 480 efforts in Peru as outlined in other chapters and at the end of this one.

In other respects, both CARITAS and OFASA enjoy strong contributions from their religious sponsors and supporters, whereas SEPAS and CARE have far

Table 2-4

Title I Counterpart Funds as Proportioned To

PVOs and Programs, 1982, 1983, 1984 (Dollars)*

PVO and Program	Funds (000)	Percent	Amt. per Benefic.	Funds (000)	Percent	Amt. per Benefic.	Funds (000)	Percent	Amt. per Benefic.
CARE / PIBA	606.9	43.7	$ 12.29	1,994.2	78.0	$ 56.80	3,995.6	70.0	$ 113.83
ONAA				277.0			567.2		
INFOR				108.3			29.8		
Health				388.9			815.8		
Education				700.0			1,099.4		
COOPOP				520.0			4,450.3		
CARITAS	500.0	36.0	$ 1.05	355.0	13.8	$ .75	1,200.0	21.2	$ 2.76
SEPAS / PRAA	29.3	2.1	$ 1.10	111.0	4.3	$ 4.20	260.0	4.6	$ 8.99
SEPAS (Health)				83.3			150.0		
ONAA				27.7			60.0		
INFOR				--			50.0		
OFASA	250.0	18.0	$ 1.74	94.4	3.6	$ .66	187.9	3.3	$ 1.89
Totals	1,386.3	100.0		2,554.6	100.0		5,643.5	100.0	

*Figures for 1983-84 provided by Gerald Foucher, Food for Peace Officer, USAID/Lima in letter to Jose Rodriguez, Bureau for Food for Peace and Voluntary Assistance, dated January 27, 1984.

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smaller per capita investments from their base sponsors. Thus, those programs which rely most heavily upon Peruvian and U.S. government support and which receive less input from private sponsors are the most costly operations on a per capita basis. There are several reasons for this. The program operations which are supported by government activity tend to resemble the style and form of those other agencies. Their relationship is a collaborative-competitive one in that their organizations must match well enough for there to be a "fit" in terms of budget and operational categories. Part of this "fit" involves salaries, travel monies and other aspects of equipment and logistic components; for the SEPAS and CARE programs to run well in the context of collaborating government agencies, they will have to be "competitive" in these terms. When one examines the salary structures of the four PVOs, this is what emerges albeit in limited fashion (see Table 2-5). CARITAS and OFASA pay their people less money all around and, as we shall see in Chapter III, they rely a good deal upon the good will and dedication of their employees in making things work. Both also have significantly more local leadership and community participation than the others. We should hasten to add that SEPAS and CARE also enjoy support of this type, but as far as we could determine, it did not reach the level of input characteristic of the other two PVOs. In terms of these programs, we conclude that perhaps the religious motivation of CARITAS and OFASA workers to serve other people made an important contribution to lowering program costs.

The operational costs for CARITAS and OFASA are also at variance with the others in view of the fact that they take charge of their own warehousing. SEPAS and CARE utilize the warehouse facilities of ONAA whose operations that we were able to observe were elaborate in both physical and bureaucratic terms (App. VII, Plate 1), in contrast to the rather spartan arrangements of CARITAS

Table 2-5

Summary of PVO Employees and Monthly Salaries, in Soles and Dollars as of March 1983.

	Nº of Administrators	Nº of Support Staff	Nº of Field Workers	Total Employees	Mean Admin. Salary Sales/ Dollars	Mean Support Staff Salary Sales/ Dollars	Mean Field Worker Salary Sales/ Dollars	Mean Salary for all Categories Sales/ Dollars	Total Salary Funds in Program Budget
OFASA Dollars	14	6	12	32	230,014 186.66	215,500 174.42	217,333 175.91	222,800 180.33	7,129,600 5770.62
CARE (1) Dollars	3	4	3	10	361,060 292.24	316,282 255.10	523,467 423.69	356,246 288.34	3,918,710 3,171.76
CARITAS (2) Dollars	-	-	3	3	- -	- -	100,000 80.94	100,000 80.94	300,000 242.82
SEPAS Dollars	4	-	11	15	248,275 200.95	- -	391,600 316.96	353,380 286.02	5,300,700 4,290.83
TOTAL.	21	10	29	60[3]	252,613 204.46	255,813 207.05	302,965 245.22	277,483 224.59	16,649,010 13,475.52

(1) Does not include salary of Director of CARE/Peru.

(2) There are 27 people that work for CARITAS who earn a mean monthly salary of Sl.200,000 paid with non-Title II funds.

(3) Of the 60 employees, 13 divide their time between Title II and other programs, while 47 work exclusively with Title II.

and OFASA. By the same token, CARITAS and OFASA require that recipients assist in the transport of food to the distribution sites, thereby cutting yet another cost, although as we later discuss, this may constitute something of a hardship on the beneficiary.

The question which we raise here and to which some answer will be given as we analyze the specifics of program operations is this: to what extent are the more expensive programs better managed bureaucratically on the one hand, and to what degree are they more successful in carrying out their projects in the field? Indeed, are the projects which cost more per capita to operate "better" than the less expensive ones? The answers to these questions, however, are not definitive. The goals of each PVO differ as much as the purposes of each of their Title II programs. We found that each PVO performed amazingly well in managing its program in order to meet its particular goals. It would be accurate to characterize all of these operations as quite limited in resources; CARITAS and OFASA in material resources and all four PVOs in matters of field personnel. When one looks to the magnitude of problems each deals with in light of the broad goals of improving nutrition and encouraging development in Peru, then it is a fair conclusion that all the programs are underfunded. The questions then must turn to raise issues of priorities for nutrition and development, and to that problem we address our final comments.

Budget Management

Despite the fact that the PVOs all use Title II foodstuffs for nutrition and FFW programs that are similar at least in their broad outlines, each uses a different accounting system to record and report its activities to USAID/Lima. This, coupled with the different OPG starting dates, fiscal and budget years contributes to grave problems in account management and records, despite the

fact that under Peruvian law, uniform sets of accounts, the details of which are specified in a national plan contable, must be maintained. The net result is that the records and experience of the PVOs are not readily comparable. For the purposes of AID's evaluation of project performance and results, they are useful only idiosyncratically, and then, with difficulty.

Even when one is interested in only a single PVO, there are difficulties in tracing the course of budgetary action. For example, CARITAS' two programs during the five year period were reported to USAID/Lima in non-comparable categories (see Table 2-6). The first program, now terminated, recorded its OPG capital flows in eleven account categories, whereas the second program, now in force, reports OPG budget items in but five categories. OFASA, CARE, and SEPAS similarly showed variations in account reporting between the programs which were finished and their successors (Tables 2-7, 2-8, 2-9).

On the matter of "office expenses," we find that SEPAS and OFASA report nothing whereas CARE and CARITAS do, with strikingly different results when considered on a cost per beneficiary basis; $3.18 per capita for CARE and $0.12 for CARITAS. Obviously, these budget figures are partial, since we do not know how non-USAID sources of income for each PVO are distributed and used. CARITAS' office and management costs are absorbed in various ways which may differ from one regional office to another. These include non-USAID accountable sources of income, the sale of bags and boxes in which foodstuffs are shipped, and the use of existent office facilities of each diocese. The other organizations, however, must rent space and do not enjoy use of extant organizational and physical infrastructure which accrue to the Catholic Church as the official state religion in Peru. One must assume that this makes a significant difference in the structure of budget activity, but the extent is not known.

Table 2-6

CARITAS OPG Budgets and Expenditures for

Past and Present Title II Programs (US Dollars)

A. Past Title II Programs/OPG 527-0180/March 1978-December 1979

Budget Category	Budget	Expenditure
1. Freightage	98,461.00	98,461.00
2. External Supervision	21,700.00	21,700.00
3. Supervision by CARITAS	3,077.00	3,077.00
4. Storage (insurance)	2,308.00	2,308.00
5. Unloading	8,846.00	8,846.00
6. Operating Costs	5,769.00	5,654.00
7. Office Materials	2,308.00	2,308.00
8. Re-packaging	3,846.00	3,846.00
9. Vehicles	9,000.00	10,300.00
10. Nutrition, Health & Education Programs	3,500.00	3,500.00
11. Contingencies	1,185.00	
Total	160,000.00	160,000.00

B. Present Title II Programs/OPG 527-0196/September 1980-December 1983

Budget Category	Budget	Expenditure
1. Program Supervision	139,000.00	72,938.27
2. Central Office Expenses	4,200.00	5,873.22
3. Office Materials and Supplies	10,000.00	16,209.77
4. Office Equipment	43,800.00	12,097.00
5. Nutrition, Health & Education Programs	103,000.00	51,416.33
Total	300,000.00	158,534.59 (as of 4/83)

Table 2-7 A

OFASA OPG Budgets and Expenditures for

Past and Present Title II Programs

A. Part Title II Programs/OPG 527-0205 and 527-0212/September 1978-August 1980 and May 1980-December 1982

Budget Category	527-0205		527-0212	
	Budget	Expenditure	Budget	Expenditure
1. Salaries and other Personnel costs	60,232.00	75,239.08	160,227.00	185,227.14
2. Food Transport	64,214.00	49,095.83	71,204.00	89,549.90
3. Customs	12,000.00	3,049.68	17,875.00	4,835.51
4. Two Vehicles for SAWS/OFASA officials*	16,400.00			
5. Two Trucks*	76,000.00			
6. Education Program Materials	10,000.00	4,825.79	55,583.00	18,943.94
7. Materials for Pilot Project	20,350.00	17,388.79	38,600.00	
8. Rental of Additional Warehouse space	3,900.00	7,762.51	50,906.00	66,466.28
9. Vehicle Maintenance	14,300.00	26,731.18	30,405.00	53,320.27
10. Contingencies	10,544.00	10,846.62	25,200.00	870.01
Subtotal	-	194,939.48		419,213.05
Vehicles	-	92,400.00	Not Specified	30,786.95
TOTAL	288,000.00**	287,339.50**	450,000.00	450.000.00

*Vehicles are not included among expenditures because they were imported from the US. The actual cost of procurement was $92,400.00

**There appear to be computational errors here. The total budget listed for OPG 527-0205 adds up to $287,940.00, and the total expoenditure is $287,339.48.

Table 2-7 B

B. Present Title II Programs/OPG 527-0247/January 1983-January 1986

Budget Category	Budget	Expenditures
1. Salaries and Other Personnel Expenses	285,000.00	
2. Food Transport	90,000.00	
3. Customs and Insurance Expenses	29,000.00	
4. Nutrition, Health, Education and Medical Service	28,000.00	
5. Construction Materials	26,000.00	
6. Storage and Re-packaging	90,000.00	
7. Vehicle Purchases	30,000.00	
8. Vehicle Maintenance	103,000.00	
9. Contingencies	44,000.00	
TOTAL	720,000.00	
Total for FY 1983	235,000.00	47,721.00 (as of 4/83)

Table 2-8 A

SEPAS OPG Budgets and Expenditures for

Past and Present Title II Programs

A. Past Title II Programs/OPG 527-0206/March 1979-March 1982

Budget Category		Budget	Expenditure
1.	Project Evaluation	4,777.00	4,231.45
2.	Personnel	91,360.00	116,618.48
3.	Program Promotion and Supervision	22,512.00	10,661.82
4.	Personnel Training	2,777.00	5,216.49
5.	Materials and Equipment	1,497.00	6,357.51
6.	Communications	2,840.00	3,336.86
7.	Customs Procedures	5,217.00	329.98
8.	Contingencies	15,000.00	369.40
9.	Tools and Equipment	204,316.00	202,089.97
10.	Administrative Costs	20,092.00	25,911.72
11.	Vehicle Maintenance and Fuel	115,618.00	81,956.34
12.	Travel Expenses and Transport	7,245.00	8,128.39
	TOTAL	493,251.00	465,208.41
			8,003.56
	Total Expenses with Deductions by AID		457,204.85
	Unspecified		32,795.15
			490,000.00

Table 2-8 B

SEPAS OPG Budgets and Expenditures for

Past and Present Title II Programs

3. Present Title II Program/OPG 527-0231/May 1982-May 1985

Budget Category		Budget	Expenditure
1.	Personnel	255,000.00	56,007.92
2.	Program Supervision and Promotion	18,600.00	8,020.29
3.	Material and Equipment	19,900.00	2,054.27
4.	Communications	6,300.00	1,767.49
5.	Technical Assistance	25,000.00	3,744.40
6.	Tools and Equipment	179,000.00	96,763.29
7.	Fuel and Maintenance	133,000.00	24,469.53
8.	ONAA Travel Funds	31,800.00	2,146.33
9.	Project Evaluation	10,500.00	8,037.64
10.	Personnel Training	7,700.00	2,060.17
11.	ONAA Coordinator Expenses	13,200.00	737.49
12.	Seeds	19,200.00	
13.	Contingencies	30,800.00	
	TOTAL	750,000.00	205,808.82
			643.86
	Total Expenses with Deductions by AID		205,164.96 (as of 3/83

Table 2-9

CARE OPG Budget Expenditures for Present Title II Program

Budget Category	Budg	Expenditure
1. Program Administration	307,634.00	320,014.42
2. Office Expenses	111,880.00	63,070.00
3. Office Maintenance	42,830.00	48,476.81
4. Contingencies	6,100.00	1,453.64
5. Warehouse Equipment	15,730.00	17,756.57
6. Maintenance of ONAA Vehicles	112,026.00	115,946.20
7. CARE Overhead	46,800.00	
TOTAL	660,000.00*	566,717.64 (as of 3/83)

*There appears to be a computational error here. The budget figures total $643,000, not $660,000.00. $643,000.00 is the figure CARE has cited elsewhere as the amount of support it receives from AID. Both $660,000.00 and $643,000.00 are substantially less than the $793,000.00 that AID records as its contribution to CARE (Table 2-1). In addition, AID later stated that CARE only had use of $543,000.00 of the initial amount (Joanne Jones, USAID/Lima, personal communication).

to provide some idea as to the comparative structures of budget and expenditures for each project, however, Figures 2-3 and 2-4 graphically represent the categories in uniform global manner. Evident of course is the fact that the greatest budget and expense categories for each operation differ, despite the commonalities of their programs. Also complicating this picture is the fact that the PVOs are utilizing their other sources of funding (Tables 2-1 and 2-3) to defray costs of operation, which are not reported as such to USAID. Thus, OFASA reports warehousing costs wh- CARITAS, which has a far larger program and warehouse, does not directly report it.

Personnel

The same pattern is seen in the material on the personnel compositio- of the different programs number from a total of three low-level employees in the CARITAS budget, to OFASA, which supports 32 persons at all levels of its program. Table 2-5 provides an accounting of this as far as is possible in terms of USAID-derived funding. From that breakdown we see those funds supporting 60 employees in the four PVOs, of whom 48 percent are classified as field staff, 16 percent as supervisory, and 35 percent as administrative. In our discussion of the individual programs as they operate in the field (Chapter III), the nature of the field personnel and their conditions will become evident. However, in view of the large numbers of beneficiaries and broad geographic distribution of the programs, all suffer from a lack of field personnel when it comes to executing aspects of the programs which go beyond the mere delivery of foodstuffs, such as education, technical assistance and social promotion. The USAID contribution to program personnel in the PVOs is presented proportionally in Figure 2-5, indicating the greater importance of this source of budget support to OFASA and SEPAS than to the CARE and CARITAS.

FIGURE 2-3 Relative OPG Budget Allocations by PVOs for Title II Programs, 1979-1985.



*See note Table 2-9

FIGURE 2-4 Relative Expenditures for Title II Programs by PVOs 1979-1985



FIGURE 2-5 Number of PVO Employees with Title II Funds by Occupational Category (as of May 1983)



Equipment

One of the critical areas for project execution is the availability and condition of equipment and, as discussed in later sections, the quality and supply of suitable "hardware" differs from one PVO to the next. For the five year period covered, the largest program, CARITAS, reports only 1.9 percent of its OPG budget being used for vehicle or field equipment; CARE reports 14.6 percent for vehicle maintenance (for ONAA vehicles); SEPAS shows a budget amounting to 33.4 percent for vehicle maintenance, gasoline and field tools, and OFASA budgeted 27.7 percent of its OPG funds for vehicle purchase and maintenance.

As far as we can determine from the material available, only SEPAS recorded the budget and expenditure for field equipment other than vehicles and their maintenance. Because all programs engage in FFW projects among people of lower socio-economic class who are extremely "tool-poor," this aspect of the budget is surprising. Regardless of whether or not other budget resources outside of OPG funds are utilized for this purpose, more could be invested in this area. In the discussion of PVO field operations in the next chapter this topic will be explored further. For the moment in terms of management we note that OFASA has considerably exceeded its vehicle maintenance budget in the past (by 130 percent). CARE and CARITAS exceeded their budgeted amounts slightly, and SEPAS spent slightly less in this category than was budgeted. Given the high costs of vehicle maintenance in Peru, especially in the poorer provincial areas, it is not surprising that there should be high costs in this area. In view of what we were told in the field and what we observed in action, however, the OPG equipment budgets do not reflect the true cost of maintaining program vehicles because such

expenses are often covered by exchanges of services among agencies in the field and the loan of mechanic services.

Promotion, Education and Training

The OPG budgets for these areas of Title II programs show some striking contrasts as well. This category of activity includes the training of field personnel in technical matters so that they can undertake project-related promotional tasks and conduct educational sessions with the beneficiaries regarding nutrition, general health, or facets of the FFW projects. Reviewing the past and current budgets we find that SEPAS destined about four percent of its OPG total to this and spent only 63 percent of the amount budgeted. OFASA budgeted 9.6 percent of its OPG funds, and CARITAS budgeted over 23 percent. CARE does no work in these areas and has no OPG budget item in this category, the work being handled by ONAA. Because of the importance of promotional and educational activity in conjunction with both nutrition and FFW projects, we feel that a greater use of OPG funds in these categories is warranted and necessary, as will be evident when we discuss field operations.

Expenditure

Finally, the attempt to regularize the budgetary materials in light of average monthly expenditures is relflected in Figure 2-6. The pace of budget activity, once again, is highly varied. The largest program in Title II, CARITAS spends considerably less per month from its USAID funds than the others. In view of the scope of its program, it is clear that CARITAS derives considerable assistance from its other funds whose impact in the nutrition and FFW projects cannot be estimated. Thus, the smallest USAID-supported programs, CARE and SEPAS, spend more per month than the larger programs.

FIGURE 2-6 Rhythm of Mean Monthly Expenditures of Title II Programs



FIGURE 2-6 Cont.



All of this points to the need, from USAID's viewpoint and interest, to have greater informational control over the activities of the programs it supports, for the purposes of providing adequate consultation, for future planning, and for proper evaluation of the management functions involved in such programs. USAID does not now enjoy an adequate grasp of this in accounting terms. While each PVO is a private organization with its own discrete goals (which should not be confused with those of USAID), if AID is to continue to utilize the services of these groups to advance its objectives, then it needs to acquire a more accurate picture of where USAID fits into the PVO structure, as well as the other way around.

Summary

One of the problems discovered in this review of the financial aspects of the PVO Title II programs is that USAID's managerial control of the program is compromised by a series of differences in what USAID/Lima perceived as the operating resources of each organization and what the agencies themselves presented, in all cases more than what USAID calculated. This problem is exacerbated by the non-standardized reporting of OPG budgets to USAID and makes any comparative analysis difficult at best. It was not possible to give an exact accounting for either past or present PVO operations because there is no standardized accounting system required by AID. This is a great need for both program management and future evaluations from AID's viewpoint.

Given these internal limitations, however, we do not see any area in which the overall per capita costs of $38.59 (not including the administrative costs of AID itself) in 1982 can be reduced under the present arrangement of Title II programs. It should be borne in mind that the costs per capita varv

widely from one PVO to the next, from $29.26 in the case of CARITAS to $88.98 in the case of CARE. Thus, CARITAS, with a program that reaches more beneficiaries than the other three PVOs combined and the lowest per capita costs, is largely responsible for the low overall per capita cost of Title II in Peru.

Clearly, on a cost per beneficiary basis, CARITAS and OFASA ($52.84 per beneficiary) are the most effective programs. However, both of these progra rely heavily upon dedicated, low-salaried personnel and volunteers. In addition, neither CARITAS nor OFASA coordinate their programs to any significant degree with the activities of other PVOs or with Peruvian government agencies. In contrast, both SEPAS and CARE work closely with Peruvian government agencies, and consider their respective coordinating roles to be a central part of their operations. The much higher cost per beneficiary associated with SEPA and CARE appears to be the cost of such coordination and may be regarded as an attempt to invest in Peruvian government institutions.

Within the limitations noted, we conclude that as a percent of the total OPG funds, field operations are not adequately budgeted from an overall perspective, and not well-balanced among the PVOs since OPG funding dramatically favors the smaller programs. OPG budgeting for field supervisory and training personnel, tools and other relevant equipment, and perhaps for transportation also appears weak. By the same token, Peruvian Title I counterpart funds are not proportionate to the distribution of beneficiaries among programs.

CHAPTER III

THE TITLE II PRIVATE VOLUNTARY ORGANIZATIONS

Introduction

The private voluntary organizations (PVOs) charged with the management of Title II resources are the Peruvian counterparts of U.S. and international agencies involved world-wide in relief, welfare, and development work. The projects they undertake in food-for-work or nutrition and health maintenance, examined at the community and beneficiary level, are considered in the succeeding chapters.

Because the four PVOs have long experience in international relief and development work, their present collaboration with AID and the Peruvian government raises interesting questions regarding this relationship and how it affects traditional PVO strategies. PVO approaches to development, the ways in which agencies conceive of their respective purposes, arrange their organizational structure, and the kinds of activities undertaken are discussed in terms of the "articles of faith" that have structured PVO work in the past (Tendler 1982). Tendler notes that PVO agencies are assumed to:

(1) reach the poor because they are experienced at doing so;

(2) involve the poor in decision-making more often than do government-sponsored programs;

(3) be as concerned with process as much as outcome, of helping the poor gain "control of their own lives;"

(4) work on a "people to people" basis, not as one government bureaucracy to another;

(5) be more flexible and experimental because they are not under the same administrative pressures as governments;

(6) work better to strengthen local private institutions;

(7) work for less cost than public sector.

These points form the basis for our comparison of the PVO programs with one another and they help us to indicate the effects which the public sector exerts over them through Title II OPG agreements. As a result we raise a two-edged question: is Title II good for the PVOs, and, are the PVOs good for Title II?

In the previous chapter dealing with the formal and financial aspects of activity, we found that the heterogeneity of the agencies produced widely varied results in cost, benefits and structure. Here, these themes are again discussed for each PVO. The agencies are viewed in terms of their productivity, nature of their projects, operational organization and use of equipment. In particular we are concerned about the kind of "fit" PVO programs have with related works of other public and private agencies and of course with the needs of the population.

Our information is based upon program documents from each organization, recorded interviews with respective officials and community persons, and the evaluation team's observations and notes. To better contrast the programs, the nation-wide programs of CARITAS and SEPAS are taken in tandem, as are the Lima-centered operations of CARE and OFASA.

Greater Lima

The agencies which expend virtually all of their combined energies in Lima are CARE and OFASA. Although only about 22 percent of the beneficiaries served by CARITAS live in Lima, it is the largest of the three programs in the city. For this reason the evaluation team felt that it was important to enlarge the Scope of Work to assure appropriate representation of these

activities in the report. Of the total of 240,360 beneficiaries in greater Lima. CARITAS, OFASA and CARE serve 43, 42 and 15 percent respectively.

A. CARE

The Cooperative for American Relief Everywhere (CARE) limits its current Title II work to Greater Lima with the multisectorial infrastructure projects of the Peruvian government. In the recent past, CARE has maintained field offices in some provincial areas such as Huaraz and Chimbote where it has engaged in water supply projects among other activities in cooperation with Peruvian government agencies (cf. Haratani et al. 1981).

As a result of its participation in the Programa de Infraestructura Básica En Pueblos Jóvenes de Lima y Callao (PIBA), managed by an inter-agency council of the Peruvian government, CARE maintains the widest degree of contact of any PVO with official Peruvian institutions. By coordinating with the member organizations, CARE works with the Ministries of Agriculture (urban forestation projects), Housing (streets and sidewalks), Cooperación Popular (various building programs) and the Oficina Nacional de Apoyo Alimentario (ONAA -- for food storage, delivery and nutrition education)

The CARE program is summarized below in Table 3-1:

Table 3-

CARE Title II Programs, Yearly Averages 1981-1982

Average amount of food distributed annually	4,636.5 M. tons
Percent of total Title II, 1982	7.5
Total OPG 1981-1982 (Budget)	$ 793,000.00
Counterpart (Title I) Funds, 1982	$ 606,933.00
Average number of beneficiaries	40,050
1982 Program cost per capita	$ 88.98
Average yearly ration/1982	103.4 kilograms
Total projects 1981-1982	287

CARE operations consist of aiding the coordination, planning, promotion, supervision and logistics activities in connection with work designed in cooperation with the PIBA program. To handle this, CARE maintains an office in San Isidro (Lima) with a total staff of 10 persons, only three of whom could be considered "field" personnel (see Table 2-6). The work of the CARE staff is dedicated to facilitating communication between the interested parties, making sure that supplies flow properly, and in general assuring project integration. According the the CARE director, the PVO works closely with the wife of President Belaúnde, Sra Violeta Correa de Belaúnde, who plays a dynamic role in focusing project activity and in project development in the Young Towns. A case example of the sharp political edge such projects might have was provided the team as it visited a newly constructed clinic in the district of Comas whose current elected mayor is a member of the opposition "United Left" party.

> We located a clinic at the presumed address and began interviewing the staff and waiting patients. Immediately it became clear that this was the "old" clinic, staffed by Health Ministry personnel but badly in need of repairs and improvements. The people hastened to tell us that they had organized a request to this effect to the Ministry and to ONAA with the support of the municipal government since this was the original clinic in the area.
>
> As things worked out, however, a new clinic was built four blocks away, under different (PIBA) sponsorship and with the local Acción Popular party (the President's party) leaders claiming credit. The former staff at the old clinic was either dismissed or transferred to the new one and other persons assigned. When the new clinic was inaugurated a few months before our visit, Sra. Violeta de Belaúnde and the then Prime Minister were named by local Acción Popular leaders as <u>padrinos</u> (sponsors) for the traditional ceremony, although neither came. The result of this enterprise was two virtually adjacent clinics potentially competing for the same clientele.

The potentially high political content of such projects is obvious. In view of the fact that the Young Town areas of Lima are the exclusive target of CARE-PIBA projects, it appears that this Title II program can become

easily enmeshed in local politics of the sort described, particularly when tied to a president's pet agency or program such as Cooperacion Popular This should not be construed as recommending no Title II participation in such work, but that Title II agencies should be careful to protect their political impartiality as much as possible so as to be able to work effectively with the local interests -- government and people -- whoever is in power

The physical needs of squatter settlements are legion and thus a rich arena for urban services development. Depending upon the specific place and the age of the settlement, the Young Towns generally lack paved streets, sidewalks, public buildings, recreational facilities, and often water. Tl people want these things -- that is why they came to Lima. In consequence, CARE-PIBA projects are addressed to the physical needs of the settlements. These infrastructural shortcomings of the settlements are handled at their least technical level through small projects in which FFW can be employed as a stimulus. Table 3-2 indicates the projects in which CARE plans to be involved during 1983.

According to CARE's statement of purpose:

> This program directly addresses several aspects of the complex of the problems of poverty that confront the residents of pueblos jóvenes (urban slum fringe areas) of Metropolitan Lima, through the creation of high priority infrastructure and through the provision of food (1) for unskilled laborers who work on the infrastructure projects, and (2) through them for their family members (CARE 1983).

The programs are developed through various field contacts, either directly with CARE or through one of the collaborating agencies of PIBA. In each instance, and organized group of squatter settlement citizens -- possibly school parents association, or block organization -- formally signs an agreement with CARE-PIBA and one or another of the other agencies to undertake the specified task. Here all the mutual obligations are set forth and the

Table 3-2

CARE-PIBA PROJECTS BY TYPE, UNIT AND VALUE,

ACCORDING TO COUNTERPART AGENCY 1983

Agency	Type of Project	Units	Millions of Soles	Percent
ONAA	Foodstuffs Storage and Delivery to Bene.	(4000.3 MT)	312	09
Min. Health	Construction of Health Centers;	9		
	Equipment	14	936	29
Min. Education	Classroom Construction	160	819	26
Min. Agriculture	Urban Forestation %	250 ha	195	06
	Maintenance	350 ha		
Cooperación Popular	Street Leveling	36 km.	936	29
	Sidewalk Construction	100,000 sq. meters		
TOTAL			3,198	99

procedures clarified. CARE provides technical and other support and supervision, ONAA delivers the food to the site, the people agree to work on the project, keep records, and assist in the distribution of food. Because the content of the PIBA program is pre-established, there seems to be little flexibility in project choices; a group can choose to build clinics and school rooms, clean streets, pave sidewalks, or plan and maintain tre Materials and tools are provided as needed through PIBA agencies

In exchange for their labor, the people receive the product of their efforts, nutritional instruction and, of course, the foodstuffs. Nutritional instruction is provided through ONAA auspices and presumably reaches the recipient at some point during the course of the project, which may last anywhere from one month to six or eight. The number of workers and/or the number of work-days required is usually so indicated in the agreement. The number of people engaged in the projects may vary considerably but averaged about 56 persons for each over a two-year period.

For FY 1983, there are three different projections of CARE's number of beneficiaries, one by CARE and two by USAID. The former estimates that its 1983 program will reach 421,080 persons with 4,000.3 metric tons of food (CARE Operational Plan). AID on the other hand sees the provision of 4,131.7 metric tons of foodstuffs which will be delivered to either 35,100 or 100,000 beneficiaries (USAID 1982b).[1] This is not the miracle of the "loaves and fishes" once again, but rather the result of projections made to satisfy advance budget requests. How is it possible to obtain such different visions of impact? What CARE did was as follows: given the amount of food,

---

[1]Further confusion about CARE beneficiaries occurs in the report on PL 480 Title I (Johnson et al 1983:E-3) which claimed that CARE had 184,000 beneficiaries in 1982 using 4,000 metric tons of food.

4,000,300 kilograms, and the average monthly food ration of 47.5 kilograms per worker; and an average of five persons per family; 4,000,300 kilograms was divided by 47.5 kilograms. The result was divided by twelve months, equaling 7,018 beneficiaries per month, and 7,018 times five persons per family is 35,000, which times twelve months equals 421,080 beneficiaries a year. But this would mean that CARE increased the number of beneficiaries served by 1100 percent from one year to the next with a ten percent increase in foodstuffs! If on the other hand the projection is made on the basis of performance (see Table 3-3), we see that the smae amount of food distributed at CARE's average per capita for the past year (1982) yields: 4,000,300 divided by 103.41 kilograms/year/per capita equals 38,683 beneficiaries a year. This represents an increase of 10.2 percent in the beneficiaries which is in line with the projected increase in foodstuffs available to CARE. CARE's projection would be correct if the beneficiaries each month were different persons. Actually they are the same individuals working on projects over many months.

Underlining this entire issue, however, is the problem of family size as reckoned by CARE as well as all other PVOs who use five persons as the average. As indicated, our research shows the average lower class family to be approximately seven persons in both the Young Towns and in the rural highlands. This figure is close to the mean family size calculated in a number of studies of poor Peruvians. This means that all PVO estimates of beneficiaries are too conservative.

Calculations on the basis of such global figures invariably distort actual circumstances. Thus, for example, there is substantial variation in the amount of food to be received by project types. One "tree-tending" project for example rewarded a participant with 28.5 kilograms of food per

Table 3-3

CARE PIBA PROJECTS IN LIMA AS DISTRIBUTED BY AREA.

ACCORDING TO FOODSTUFFS DELIVERED. 1980-82.

Cone Area	Finished	Projects in Progress	Planned	Kilograms of Food Delivered
North	38	16	15	536,575
South	32	20	6	439,401
East	46	20	15	783,771
West	53	19	7	669,262
Totals	169	75	43	2,429,016

month for twelve days of work caring for 35 trees. A communal center construction project, on the other hand, provided its workers with almost 48 kilograms per month for five days of labor per week. Both gave the participant 2.4 kilograms per day.

The CARE role as intermediary among the PIBA agencies is a challenging one, sometimes having an "ombudsman" dimension, and at other times as a vigilant watchman of resources and equipment. CARE depends upon the cooperating agency personnel for program execution (direction) and is at pains to see that the counterpart institutions fulfill their portions of the PIBA agreement. Consequently, CARE is, as it were, "once removed" from the field of direct action, a fact which permits it to maintain a small field staff.

PIBA projects are widely distributed throughout greater Lima, and cover some 39 percent of the officially classified Young Towns. They represent a formidable supervisory task, due to the dispersion of the residential area and complicated traffic. Nevertheless, project control is achieved through the formal agreement entered into and signed by all agency representatives and the members of the community chosen to lead the work, and through formal visits to project sites at which times food distribution forms are checked and other data referent to project operations and completion are obtained. The compilation of such data, as in all the PVO agencies, largely serves the function of providing the formal documentation required by the various agreements between the parties involved, and little analysis is made of such material.

CARE officials indicated that the work aspects of their programs are proceeding normally. However, they stated that the regular and timely distribution of foodstuffs has been interrupted often during the past six

months because of the lack of adequate supplies of food in the ONAA warehouse due to international shipping problems, although many persons believe it is due to the extraordinary demands caused by the emergency flood conditions in Piura.

In reviewing CARE programs in both northern and southern "cones" of the city, we found that these activities were confused by recipients with other programs of similar nature, especially the street leveling and urban forestry projects, operated by OFASA, CARITAS and INFOR. At one recently completed clinic, had the CARE name not appeared on the construction sign still atop the building, we would not have known of its association with that clinic. Questions in the clinic itself and the neighborhood produced no recognition of this involvement although the clinic director thought that someone from CARE had been present at the inauguration.

A factor in the low level of identification of CARE projects may be the relatively small size of its program as compared to the other Lima PVOs whose projects are ubiquitous. We had some difficulty in locating CARE projects in part because of this. Being directed entirely at simple infrastructural improvements with little community development emphasis and with the limited nutritional instruction being delegated to ONAA, there was little to be seen. It should be noted that the "low profile" that CARE has adopted is an effective strategy in local development. Viewed in their totality, CARE's programs are striking in their differences from the other PVO operations, however, in that virtually none of its activities carry explicit community development or training components beyond some limited nutritional orientation provided by ONAA. Although there may be some carry-over in organizational skills among those who learn to guide the projects and complete the various forms required, this depends upon individual interest. The nature of the

construction projects places most of them in a category that includes urban sidewalks, trees, street cleaning, and the construction of public buildings. Clinics, school rooms, and communal centers are obviously useful and wanted by some residents, but they do not have an inherent positive developmental impact. This depends upon the circumstances surrounding their establishment and the role they play in a community upon their completion. However, CARE is not involved in either of these areas.

During the coming years, the CARE portion of the Title II program is scheduled to expand somewhat to form a larger share both relatively and absolutely (see Table 2-4, Figure 2-1). Ironically in interviews, CARE officials stressed that their share of the foodstuffs was relatively small in relation to the other urban PVOs and that the support received "from Peruvian and Canadian sources" is large. CARE's position also varies from the others because of its various PIBA connections, especially through the wife of the President. It enjoys the use of the largest OPG budget, according to AID figures, of any of the programs and also receives the greatest counterpart income (Title I) from the Peruvian government (see Tables 2-1, 2-3).

B. SAWS-OFASA

As in the case of CARE, the operations of OFASA are centered in Lima. although as noted in Chapter II a small portion of their activities are developed outside Lima. The actions of the Seventh Day Adventist World Service (SAWS), through its Peruvian arm OFASA, are almost three times those of CARE. OFASA states its objectives to be the stimulation of improvements in socio-economic conditions among the most needy persons in metropolitan Lima by reducing the unemployment problem through skill-building educational programs and food. FFW programs are a major dimension of the program as well. The general picture of OFASA projects and outreach is summarized in Table 3-4 below:

Table 3-4

OFASA Title II Programs in Lima, 1982

Average yearly amount of food, 1979-1982	13,375.0	metric tons
Percent of total Title II, 1982	24.9	
OPG for 1982	$ 183,600.00	
Counterpart (Title I) Funds, 1982	$ 250,000.00	
Average beneficiaries per year, 1981-1982	143,000	
1983 program cost per capita	$ 52.84	
Average yearly per capita ration	83.97	kilograms
Total projects, 1982	438	

During the fiscal year 1982, OFASA had difficulty in meeting its goals because of the termination of personnel contracts and the failure to renew its employees promptly. There was also a lapse in the agreement with USAID itself. Nevertheless, OFASA began the new year working in some 266 project with 11,842 participants. Over the course of 1982-1983, their work was extensive, as shown for a twelve-month period in Table 3-4.

By and large, OFASA's activities have changed little from previous reports (1978-1979) and their operating conditions conform to those described in their more recent self-audit (Jensen 1981), so there is little need to repeat them here. OFASA utilizes two offices in Lima, one being in Miraflores and the other in Surquillo, where leadership orientation and nutrition training are carried out. OFASA both rents warehouse facilities and relies to some extent on the loan of space from ONAA. Like CARITAS, however, OFASA manages its own food distribution, not relying upon ONAA as do SEPAS and CARE. Control of the foodstuffs from shipment from the U.S. to the consumer is a feature of OFASA/SAWS operations.

The OFASA staff consists of 32 persons supported with OPG monies, upon which they are heavily dependent for Title II operations. Of this total staff, however, only four persons act as field supervisors, one in each of

the four "cones" of the city. During our field study, we encountered the supervisors in both the northern and southern cones, and in each case found the man dashing frantically from one project to another, with little time to spend visiting any one project. In Villa Salvador, the supervisor left a group which had come together especially to see him in the dusty wake of his car; he was already late for another project visit. As can be seen in Table 3-5, both of the supervisors we saw had more than 100 projects to control, an impossible task. In consequence, supervisors spend their ti... managing problems and not providing community organization assistance or other aid with any regularity. Given OFASA's community development and training aspirations, this does not bode well for success as a "person to person" program.

Nevertheless OFASA does manage to conduct its affairs in an orderly and efficient manner. It can do so because it relies upon a legion of local leaders who receive special orientation at the Surquillo center and are given considerable responsibility for the management of projects. In this respect, the program does seem to develop certain leadership capacities in the settlements. These persons, as was the case to a lesser degree with CARE, are in charge of a local work committee, supervise the storehouse where the food is kept before distribution, and fill out the beneficiary records and other forms necessary for the project agreement which all have signed.

On appointed days once a month, project leaders or their surrogates go to Surquillo (at their own cost) to arrange food shipments and present their papers. The persons interviewed by the team felt this to be a matter of some importance and clearly acquired some social status as a result of the responsibility. On the other hand, the role of these largely self-selected local leaders has the appearance of a "crew leader." Leaders are "developed"

Table 3-5

OFASA PROJECTS IN LIMA BY TYPE OF PROJECT

ACCORDING TO CONE AREA, 1982-1983

Cone Area	East	South	North	West		
Type of Activity	Number				Total	%
Public Buildings	4	6	10	9	29	7
Street Improvements	13	28	25	17	83	19
Cementery	3	-	-	-	3	00.0
Street Cleaning	19	20	15	17	71	16.4
Forestry & Plants	3	15	14	11	43	10
Promotor Training (Health)	1	-	-	-	1	00
School Materials	1	-	-	1	2	00
*Sewing, Knitting, Dressmaking Classes	10	22	10	7	92	21
Literacy	-	25	30	43	98	22
Other	-	4	2	10	16	4
TOTAL	54	120	106	115	438	100
Mother/Infant & Preschool Programs:						
No. of Mothers	355	27	641	193		
No. of Children	1,218	363	2,824	732		

by the system in the context of social units in the settlements. Thus a particular leader or committee can acquire "its" people who follow their lead from one project to another. Successive projects are therefore organized by the same people for their "following" who will sign up for the next commitment. We encountered several instances in which street cleaning work had been continuously conducted by the same persons and leaders for up to two years in a series of FFW projects despite the fact that this is not condoned by OFASA. In one place, the people were not even from the area where they were working. Because OFASA requires each work group to have 50 persons, there is some preoccupation to enlist this number. Thus leaders with a "following" can guarantee full work rosters for OFASA and a continuing flow of food for their clients. The almost classic "patron-client" ties seen in some of these instances serve to underscore the dangers of dependency relationships which can develop if supervisory capacities are as weak as these appear to be.

Projects managed by OFASA are more varied than those of CARE. Table 3-5 provides some idea of the range of activities sponsored. In addition to the ornato público type activities which are intended to improve the appearance of the public areas, and which comprise about 52 percent of the total, at least 34 percent of the remainder are devoted to training and skill development. OFASA also devotes some attention to nutrition programs in the form of MCH and pre-school meals, and, to training a constant stream of community-level nutritionists at the center in Surquillo. On paper at least, such educational programs promise developmental dividends in the future. At the moment, however, we cannot say whether or not they have measurable immediate effects.

In several instances we observed and interviewed women engaged in neighborhood-level training and education for both nutrition and manual skills.

These were obviously popular activities as the buildings which these same groups had previously constructed in FFW projects overflowed. In one sector of Villa Maria del Triunfo we could see what might be considered an "ideal" progression of events in which the women who had gained experience working together and had developed and organization were able to advance in the complexity of their activities through the use of food support. They began by completing two or three street cleaning projects of three months each, then embarked on a community center construction project which took about six months to finish (without the roof).

How many other such instances there were we do not know, and we were pointed in the direction of this one by the cone supervisor. Nevertheless it is a pattern which deserves emulation. How much depends upon lucky coincidences of leadership and compatibility and how much on OFASA-provided community development inputs is unclear, but given OFASA's limited field supervisory capabilities, we suspect the former. Nevertheless, such potentially valuable community building activities can and should be an important dimension of these programs.

As a self-contained program, OFASA undertakes few (if any) projects in collaboration with other agencies, government or private. By the same token there was no visible coordination with other similar PVO activities. Its "institution-building" contributions to Peru (in contrast to CARE) must be measured in terms of its ability to develop and nourish local organizations and leadership which continue to exist after FFW projects and food support are no longer available. Unfortunately, time did not permit us to explore such possibilities. Judging by what we saw, however, our estimation is that carry-over is likely in many instances, but that this is a point which would merit special study.

As in the cases of the other PVOs. OFASA collected a large quantity of community and individual information in the process of managing its program. Aside from providing immediate project control data, little if anything is done with the accumulation. This raw data could, however, prove a valuable resource should thorough and detailed impact studies be initiated to follow through on such a suggestion as the one above.

C. CARITAS CRS

The American and Peruvian branches of the Catholic Church welfare and social development program share quarters in a large complex in Callao. CRS (Catholic Relief Services) has a small staff whose primary responsibilities are the broad review of CARITAS/Peru programs and serving as consultant to those and related programs. When visited, three Americans and their secretarial staff comprised this group. CRS has had an office in Peru since 1958, from which time it has been either directly or indirectly responsible for food distribution programs as well as other charitable activity. Today CRS sees its task as providing supervision and evaluation services to CARITAS and following through on the meaning of the social doctrines of the Church. The use of food and other forms of material assistance is seen as a stimulus to several different types of developmental programs to which CRS mav also provide some types of financial aid as well.

CRS urges the implementation of programs which derive from the expressed needs and interests of recipient populations, and which include the wide participation of the beneficiary population in the execution of work. They also promote the integration of programs as their actions relate to wider networks of socio-economic development. Proper planning, appropriateness, self-sufficiency of projects, social education and training, community organization and "cultural sensitivity" are regarded as ideal principles

upon which projects should unfold. On the other hand, CRS explicitly hopes to avoid perpetuation of disadvantageous socio-economic relationships stemming from exploitative dependency either at a personal or community level. Target groups should be the most impoverished and needy, whose "consciousness and ability to solve their own problems" are to be raised and enhanced.

Under this general operating philosophy, CRS has a formal agreement with CARITAS/Peru for the delivery of foodstuffs obtained under Title II to be delivered by that agency to beneficiaries through its projects throughout Peru. Like the other American PVOs, CRS provides the linkage between the AID Title II resources and the Peruvian institution, handling paperwork and other trans-shipment processes.

CARITAS/Peru on the other hand executes the programs which are developed at each diocese throughout the country. As seen in Chapter II, CARITAS programs are the largest users of Title II resources in Peru. The program is summarized in Table 3-6:

Table 3-6

CARITAS Title II Programs, Yearly Averages, 1982

Average amount of food, 1981-1982	21,864.5	metric tons
Percent of total Title II, 1982	44.6	
Total OPG, 1982	$ 90,000.00	
Counterpart (Title I) Funds, 1982	$ 500,000.00	
Average number of beneficiaries, 1982	473,000	
Program cost per capita, 1982	$ 29.26	
Average yearly per capita ration	45.4	kilograms
Total projects: Greater Lima	274	
Other regions	2,195	

Because of the large number of CARITAS projects, their broad geographic distribution, and the prominent position of CARITAS in overall Title II operations, a wide array of CARITAS projects were examined in the three

field study regions. The distribution of CARITAS programs is illustrated in Table 3-7.

Although CARITAS activities are dispersed throughout the nation, there are several regions where their programs seem to cluster. Lima, Ancash, and Cajamarca appear to contain high concentrations, having 27.7 percent of the total number of CARITAS projects. Although the most populous highland department, as well as being one of the poorest, Cajamarca nevertheless received less than its "share" of these resources (4.2 percent of programs). Ancash, which ranked among the lower half of Peru's departments in terms of poverty, had 12.2 percent of CARITAS programs. Similar distributional variations occur with respect to other departmental operations. The Lima Callao area, ranked as the second wealthiest nationally, received 11 percent of CARITAS projects while serving 22 percent of CARITAS' beneficiaries.

CARITAS' organization differs from the other PVOs in that it engages directly in large-scale warehousing activities in Lima-Callao and its many regional facilities. The far-flung network of CARITAS was called "a sort of confederation of dioces and each diocese is a confederation in turn, of parishes." At the diocese level, the program runs under the broad direction of the bishop and is administered by a secretary-general. Staff distributions vary from region to region with Lima-Callao claiming the largest number of full-time staff. OPG monies pay but three of CARITAS' personnel. In Lima, CARITAS conducts its affairs from office and warehouse in Callao which is rather remote from most Young Towns, although Callao has its share.

Administration falls principally to the parish organizations which form the focal points of activity in each cone area. The same tends to be true as well for the highland areas. The regional offices of Huaráz and Cajamarca contrast in some respects in the area of lower level staff. The Huaráz

Table 3-7

DISTRIBUTION OF CARITAS PROJECTS ACCORDING TO REGION AND TYPE OF PROGRAM, 1982.

Numbers of Programs

Region/Department	MCH Centers	Other Child	Day-Care Centers	Food-For Work	Total	Percent	Poverty Strata***
Lima*	49	66	35	55	205	8.3	V
Callao**	20	6	4	39	69	2.7	V
Ancash (Huaráz)*	4	4	30	68	106	4.2	II-III
Ancash (Huari)**	26	-	-	-	88	3.5	II
Ancash (Chimbote)**	5	1	-	106	112	4.5	IV
Cajamarca*	49 (37.3%)	7 (18.6%)	4 (62.9%)	45 (23.6%)	105 (27.7%)	4.2	I-II
Other Areas**	254	533	43	1013	784	72.2	
Totals	410	617	116	1326	469		
Percent	16.6	24.9	4.6	53.7	100	99.7	

*Programs visited. **Included for analysis only. ***Based on MAPA DE POBREZA DEL PERU. Poorest I, to Wealthiest, V.

office was far more structured, had a more formally organized administration reflected in its more conspicuous equipment and spatial organization than its Cajamarca counterpart. In contrast to Huaráz, Cajamarca operations center in a complex of older, downtown buildings of the dioces just off the main plaza. Country people crowd the offices and the small patio within, interacting freely with CARITAS staff members, with whom there is open access and apparently familiar relationship. The Huaráz office on the other hand appeared more highly bureaucratized, with formal waiting areas and physical barriers to free movement within the offices. People tended to wait outside rather than inside.

Financed by the sale of Title II food sacks, tins and boxes, both highland offices had small full-time staffs for project coordination and training programs. The Lima field staff was spread extremely thinly and the FFW projects were coordinated by full-time male employees in each case. Huaraz had a total staff of eight, including two nutritionists, one social worker, and one work supervisor. The other four, including the secretary-general, administer the programs. In Cajamarca the structure was similar with the addition of two bakers, who made bread at the diocese office for local MCH and child programs. These paid staff members are complemented by a system of volunteers who support the MCH and child-oriented projects. The volunteers in Huaráz, we were told, receive "a small gratification" for their efforts which consist of cash, plus some food rations. In Huaráz and Cajamarca, these persons were all women, some of whom were trained in social work and nutrition skills. The Huaráz group made regular trips to visit the MCH child centers and to conduct programs in the region, even remaining overnight on the sites. Nevertheless the range of activity was concentrated in the province of Huaraz where they conducted some 51 percent of their visits

and dealt with 57 percent of the beneficiaries in training-education programs. The explanation for this situation is that, as volunteers living in the city of Huaraz, they are not free to spend more time outside the immediate area and there are no volunteers in other provincial capitals in the valley.

The CARITAS/Cajamarca program also tends to concentrate activities in the department capital; 41 percent of its FFW programs and 99 percent of MCH programs are in the province of Cajamarca. The distribution of programs in both highland areas, as seen in Tables 3-8 and 3-9, tends to favor centralization of affairs around the department capital and the nearest adjacent areas of easy access. This is not surprising since both programs operate under transport and personnel handicaps that greatly curtail their ability to reach outlying regions with regularity.

The distribution of CARITAS programs by the types of projects attempted varied between the highlands and Lima. In the latter, 34 percent of CARITAS activities involved FFW in 1982 while 66 percent were different types of nutrition projects (comedores, MCH, pre-school, etc). In contrast, the Callejón de Huaylas of Ancash (Huaráz) registered 64 percent FFW projects and 36 percent nutrition-centered projects. Cajamarca differed again with 43 percent of its activities being FFW and the remaining 57 percent of its projects involving nutrition. Tables 3-8 through 3-12 illustrate the distribution of CARITAS programs in these regions and in terms of levels of beneficiary participation.

CARITAS staff members in both highland departments concurred in the fact that rural development needs were of high priority, especially in infrastructure improvements -- roads, canals, buildings -- but that local emergency requirements often took precedence. In Ancash and Cajamarca, where considerable crop losses were reported by CARITAS personnel and confirmed

Table 3-8

CARITAS MATERNAL-CHILD CENTERS AND PRE-SCHOOL PROGRAMS

BY PROVINCE AND TYPE, 1983. ANCASH-HUARAZ

Program Type***	Aija		Bolognesi		Carhauz		Huaraz		Huaylas		Recuay*		Yungay*		Total	Percent
	No.	Pers.	No.	Pers.	No.	Pers.	No.	Pers.	No.	Pers.	No.	Pers.	No.	Pers.		
Beginning Education	4	130	-	-	10	375	13	675	8	219			-	-	1390	33.4
Pronoei	17	346	1	25	-	-	28	890	10	220			-	-	1481	35.6
Kindergarten	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	120	1	20	-	-	-	-	140	3.3
Other**	-	-	1	180	-	-	1	30	-	-	-	-	-	-	210	5.0
Mother/Child Center	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	490	-	-	-	-	3	440	930	22.4
Total (n=99)	21	476	2	205	10	375	44	2205	19	450	-	-	3	440	4151	
	20.3	11.4	1.9	4.9	9.7	9.0	42.7	53.1	18.4	10.8	-	-	2.9	10.5	-	99.7

*In previous years both provinces reported the presence of other programs. **Includes refactories and special education support. ***No programs for Day Care Centers this year.

Table 3-9

CARITAS NUTRITION TRAINING PROGRAMS CONDUCTED BY PROVINCE, 1982-83

ANCASH

Province	No. Programs		No. Beneficiaries	
Aija	5	2.5%	323	3.7%
Bolognesi	3	1.5	75	.08
Carhuaz	28	14.2	551	6.3
Huaráz	02	51.7	4955	57.2
Huaylas	22	11.1	1151	13.3
Recuay	7	3.5	246	2.8
Yungay	30	15.2	1349	15.5
TOTAL	197	99.7 %	8650	98.8 %

Table 3-10

FOOD FOR WORK COMPLETED PROJECTS OF CARITAS, BY PROJECT TYPE, 1979-83

ANCASH REGIONAL OFFICE

Type Project	1979		1980		1981		1982		1983		Total		Percent of Total Projects	Percent of Total Value
	No.	Value*	No.	Value	No.	Value	No.	Value	No.	Value	No.	Value	No.	Value
Education-Schools	24	25.2	21	21.6	35	148.8	31	194.9	8	76.9	119	467.4	45.5	36.4
Agriculture	15	28.3	14	19.9	28	134.4	22	176.5	5	58.9	84	398.1	32.0	31.0
Transportation	9	7.7	4	31.2	2	4.0	5	86.2	3	73.9	23	203.0	9.	15.8
Health	0		2	3.4	1	9.3	1	8.7	1	18.1	5	39.5	2.	3.0
Housing	7	23.6	0		1	23.7	0		1	15.2	9	62.5	3.4	4.8
Other	6	8.0	5	7.3	3	16.8	4	41.4	3	16.3	21	89.8	8.0	7.0
Totals	61	93.0	46	83.7	70	337.4	63	507.8	21	259.5	261	1281.4	99.9	98.0

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Table 3-11

CARITAS FOOD FOR WORK PROGRAMS BY PROVINCE

AND NUMBERS OF WORKERS "EMPLOYED" MONTHLY, 1979-83

ANCASH

Province	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983*	Totals	Percent	Percent of Total Pop.**
Aija	150	170	200	50	540	1110	7.5	4.6
Bolognesi	-	50	40	120	160	370	2.5	11.3
Carhuaz	470	323	540	563	340	2236	15.3	11.6
Huaráz	1210	890	1365	985	1159	5609	38.3	35.2
Huaylas	150	220	260	320	160	1110	7.5	14.8
Yungay	740	470	915	838	820	3533	24.1	14.2
Recuay	40	150	180	250	20	640	4.3	7.8
Totals	2760	2273	3500	3126	2949	14608	99.5	99.5

*For programs in progress during first semester.
**Total population for 1981 national census in these provinces was 276,442.

The distribution roughly conforms to the general population spread in these provinces with the populations of Bolognesi, Huaylas and Recuay being "underrepresented" as beneficiaries, Huaraz being about "correct," and Aija, Carhuaz, and Yungay being "overrepresented."

Table 3-12

CAJAMARCA CARITAS FOOD FOR WORK PROGRAMS

BY PROJECT TYPE, 1983

Project Type	No. Projects	Budget Value 000	Percent
Schools	9	40.9	30
Agriculture	7	21.7	16
Roads and Bridges	11	52.3	38
Public Buildings and Sports Fields	12	22.0	16
Total	39	136.9	100

by farmers with whom we spoke, feeding programs for mothers and small children continued to receive strong emphasis. The provinces of Aija, and other areas of the Cordillera Negra of Ancash, and Contumaza in Cajamarca were noted as being particularly needy by CARITAS officials.

CARITAS regards the food provided as a "food supplement" and not as a wage for services rendered, and its rations are much smaller than those of other PVOs. (See discussion of Food Rations in Chapter VI.) According to Monsignor Dammert of Cajamarca, "People enter our programs because they are hungry and want the food." For this reason he thought the majority of beneficiaries today do not attempt to sell their rations, although he felt that the exchange of foodstuffs is fairly common. All told, the Cajamarca staff thought the food programs are but a "small droplet" in the face of that department's large needs, a sentiment echoed in Huaraz as well. Because of this, program personnel felt that little could be earned through the sale of the food rations and that the question of "dependency" was muted because of the small size of the portions distributed. On the other hand Cajamarca officials remarked that, should someone want more food, they could migrate to the coast -- Trujillo, Chimbote or Lima -- and easily receive more. We note that despite all of this, CARITAS programs do not want for participants even with the fact that the ration is but half of that provided by OFASA. Although we heard a few envidious comparisons about this in Lima, the juxtaposition of projects with SEPAS in the highlands did not appear to produce conflicts of choice. In Lima, however, such differences raise questions among neighboring recipients involved in different PVO programs. Just how potential beneficiaries elect to associate with either CARITAS, OFASA or CARE is not known.

Both provincial programs expressed a need for more supervisory personnel

and better communications with the more distant project areas. With respect to working relations with beneficiaries we noted a high degree of involvement and concern of the staff for their projects, in that there was good rapport evident on those occasions when we visited sites in the company of the works supervisor even in the cases of outlying projects with which the staff had limited contact. In all, CARITAS is reaching a broad range of communities which meet criteria of need and poverty in rural areas. In Lima, we found that CARITAS programs were ubiquitous in the two cones visited. The participants there were uniformly of lower socio-economic status judging by residential and neighborhood characteristics.

In the execution of its programs CARITAS often depends heavily upon the local parish structure, both for the selection of projects as well as for the local management of them. This is true for both Lima and the highlands. The clustering of projects in certain areas (Marcará, Yungay) reflects this fact. The interest and ability of local parish priests and lay persons to develop projects definitely enhances their chance for success. The demand for CARITAS project support is high in both Cajamarca and Ancash, but there is a big difference in the chance a given project proposal has of being accepted. According to officials, in Ancash some 40 percent of applications for project support were accepted, whereas in Cajamarca, 80 percent were said to be. Nevertheless, it should be noted that, while Ancash department is served by three CARITAS programs, which blanket the major areas of the department, the much larger and poorer population of Cajamarca is served by one diocese CARITAS center, which reaches few areas outside the province of Cajamarca itself.

D. SEPAS

The program of the Servicio Evangélico Peruano de Acción Social (SEPAS), counterpart of Church World Service (CWS), is carried out in conjunction with

USAID/Lima under terms somewhat different than those of the other PVO organizations. Presently a continuation of programs begun in 1980, the program unites three organizations into a special unit for the purpose of reforesting eight highland departments: Cajamarca, Ancash, Junin, Ayacucho, Huancavelica, Cuzco, Apurimac, and Puno. The program is designed to utilize the Food-for-Work approach in the development of seedlings at nurseries and in the planting and maintenance of the saplings. The program also aims to develop a "forestry consciousness" among the farm population, improve their levels of food consumption and nutrition, and involve farm women actively in forestry and in nutritional training. Finally, SEPAS seeks to make a contribution toward generating sources of employment for those involved in the projects.

To achieve these ends, SEPAS is united with the government's Instituto Nacional Forestal y de Fauna (INFOR) and with the Oficina Nacional de Apoyo Alimentario (ONAA) by agreement with USAID which provides the Title II foodstuffs. The joint program is called PRAA (Proyecto de Reforestación con Apoyo Alimentario). Under its terms, INFOR (through its regional offices in the departments, called CENFOR) assumes the responsibility for reforesting work in all technical aspects, trains technicians, transports materials and the foodstuffs to project sites. ONAA receives the food at the port, stores and transports it to regional program headquarters and dispatches it to CENFOR for distribution. ONAA also provides at least one nutritionist per department to work with beneficiaries.

SEPAS, in turn, coordinates activities at all levels, supervises and inspects food storage and shipments, and provides USAID documentation of food distributions after repackaging. In the field, the SEPAS representatives are to undertake a broad range of appropriate community development actions which

could affect the project, including public health, agricultural production and commercialization work, and education. The SEPAS representative also is to advise on training procedures, assist the nutritionists and to contract additional personnel as needed to carry the program forward. To complete the organizational domain, a national committee meets to coordinate and evaluate projects (CONACE PRAA) and a local committee of participating agencies coordinates the program at the departmental level (CODA PRAA).

In terms of the technical purposes of the program, SEPAS was expected to plant some 10,800 hectares per year in the eight departments with Ancash and Cajamarca planting 2,200 hectares each, between 1982 and 1984. To accomplish this, 1,910 landless farm workers would be employed in both Ancash and Cajamarca on a yearly basis (12,500 nationally) according to the USAID agreement with SEPAS of May 27, 1982. These persons would be beneficiaries of 2,400 metric tons of foodstuffs under the Title II program valued at 1.2 million dollars, or $2.00 per kilo. Each project beneficiary was scheduled to receive 9.6 kilos per month as a temporary dietary supplement in addition to the other perquisites of participation. A family of five would thus receive 48 kilograms a month for one member's 25 days of work on the project. Table 3-13 summarizes SEPAS' 1982 operations.

Table 3-13

SEPAS Title II Programs, Yearly Averages, 1982

Average amount of food, 1981-1982	3,077	M. tons
Percent of total Title II, 1982	7.5	
Total OPG 1982	$ 228,602	
Counterpart (Title I) Funds, 1982	$ 183,600	
Average number of beneficiaries	26,400	
1982 Program cost per capita	$ 73.50	
Average yearly per capita ration	115.9	kilograms
Total projects 1982: Ancash	61	
Cajamarca (groups)	47	
Cajamarca (individuals)	105	

The SEPAS program is administered from modest offices in Lima and in the departmental capitals of Huaráz and Cajamarca, where regional offices are integrated with those of INFOR. The Huaráz PRAA operation is headed by a forestry engineer who also directs the entire CENFOR office, the Inter-American Development Bank reforestation program, and who serves on coordinating committees for the Ancash Development Program (CORDEANCASH). Housed in the imposing Ministry of Agriculture building in Huaráz and surrounded by a chain-link fence, PRAA's headquarters occupies a complex of large rooms in the rear. Their staff, excluding the field director, consists of 18 full-time persons of whom ten are full-time field personnel. The organizational structure of the Huaráz operation seems complex since employees sometimes are "borrowed" back and forth between agency programs and several employees were not sure for whom they were working! In addition to this group, the SEPAS coordinator also works from this office and is the lone representative of that program. The ONAA nutritionist assigned part-time to the program is housed in the neighboring edifice of that institution. The ONAA headquarters is even more formidably guarded by fencing and gatekeepers, and penetration of its confines is difficult as lines of waiting clients testified.

In Cajamarca, the PRAA office is found at the edge of town. Consisting of a small, one-story building, PRAA occupies five rooms. The rest is shared with the Central de Empresas Campesinas de Cajamarca. A repair shop sits behind the building, and to the north is the imposing headquarters of ONAA which, as in Huaráz, is surrounded by a high fence with posted guardians and gatekeepers. PRAA's modest equipment features four vehicles, one being a five-ton truck used for food and material delivery. Another vehicle is on long-term loan from the Cajamarca Development Corporation (CORDECAJ). In Cajamarca, unlike Huaráz, the CENFOR PRAA engineer is only in charge of that

portion of the program and does not direct other CENFOR operations or have formal ties to CORDECAJ. PRAA's Cajamarca personnel number 72 persons, including 52 laborers and foremen, two forestry engineers, and the SEPAS and ONAA supervisors. The PRAA professional staff in Cajamarca seems to be a closely knit group with considerable pride in their accomplishments. The SEPAS, CENFOR and ONAA representatives were able to amicably discuss their work together as social and professional "equals."

This contrasts with the Huaráz situation, where the ONAA and CENFOR representatives were engaged in a running conflict over which program was to distribute foodstuffs. In Huaráz the SEPAS representative, while being effective at the community level, did not enjoy sufficient peer status among the other program directors to be as effective as he should be, for example, in resoving the dispute between ONAA and CENFOR. The interruption of the flow of foodstuffs as a result of that disagreement has meant that no deliveries of food rations have been made for over two months, and as was reported to us at two places, nursery personnel turnover and labor recruitment difficulties were jeopardizing the seedlings: the people had become desconfiados at the absence of food deliveries.

Program problems in both sites centered around the paucity of transport at critical moments, poor vehicle maintenance capability, and a lack of adequate coordination with programs outside the PRAA structure. Indeed, in Huaraz, they have all they can do to coordinate the agencies in the program, a fact which is especially frustrating for the SEPAS representative and ONAA nutritionist (as opposed to the ONAA director), both of whom appeared to be good community level workers. According to the latter, it is difficult for her to conduct good nutrition education courses in more than two to four places during the year, yet PRAA has 46 community projects in the Callejón

de Huaylas. While the same sort of problem also exists in Cajamarca regarding the ability of the ONAA and SEPAS coordinators to visit more than a mere handful of places during the course of the year (they estimate six to eight places), the Cajamarca program enjoys better program integration. The ONAA and PRAA people have developed a small pilot program in Cajamarca called PROSATCOPRAA (Proyecto de Seguridad Alimentaria con Trabajo Comunal PRAA), aimed at solving some of the low agricultural production problems of the area, based on the "agricultural clubs" in the villages. Shortages in budget for gasoline purchases, travel money for workers (especially the field technicians) and rigid national-level bureaucracy (INFOR), were complaints echoed in both places.

According to program personnel, it is more cost-effective to work with organized cooperative communities (CAP, Comunidad Campesina and SAIS) than with individuals or neighborhood groups because the community units "take care" of much of the organizing activity through their own leadership structures. This means less investment of time for PRAA staff. In Ancash, work is entirely with such community units, but in Cajamarca these constitute a minority of projects and less than half of the hectares planted. Thus, the Cajamarca staff has to strike agreements with a far wider variety of land-holders and deal with a greater number of persons in executing its programs. This situation is caused by the fact that there are fewer viable community organizations in Cajamarca. With respect to the distribution of projects within the two departments, there is an understandable tendency to concentrate efforts along the lines of easiest communication. In Cajamarca, 76 percent of the hectares planted are in that province, amounting to 62 percent of the individual projects. In Ancash, the pattern shows that Huaráz has but ten percent of the hectares in plantations, but these

constitute 36 percent of the projects. When taken with those projects in the adjacent province (connected by paved road) of Carhuaz, this jumps to 39 percent of the hectares planted and 58 percent of the projects. The spread of Ancash programs to distant provinces of Pomabamba (three projects with 42 percent of the hectares planted) provides another node of concentratio unattained in Cajamarca. Despite this, the problem of both PRAA programs in reaching areas outside conveniently accessible places is notable and undoubtedly due to the equipment, management and personnel difficulties noted above, exacerbated by poor vehicular roads and long travel times. The net result of these difficulties means that significant segments of the rural poor, as well as areas in need of reforestation, are not reached.

In contrast to the USAID concept and description of the SEPAS program as providing food and work to "landless farm workers" (USAID March 1982), the PRAA program works exclusively with farmers who are either smallholders or members of cooperative communities. One must wonder how and where the trees would be planted were this not the case. In any event, PRAA reaches a typical population of farm operators in the rural areas of Ancash and Cajamarca. Although OPG funds are very important to this program and broadly used for field needs, there are obvious lacunae in project operations. While OPG funds have been used to fortify the technical dimensions of forest management, they could also be applied to bolstering the extremely limited efforts in the socio-economic sphere. One SEPAS staff person per department simply does not begin to meet project needs in community development matters. As previously recommended by USAID's environmental officer (McCaffrey 1983), more attention needs to be paid immediately to marketing and commercialization. This point will be pursued in detail in Chapter V.

Summary and Conclusions

The organizations which administer Title II programs in Peru are, despite superficial appearances, rather different in their styles of operation, structure, and size. All profess the objective of reaching the neediest populations with effective food and material assistance designed to aid them in improving their levels of living. We find that all the programs do indeed reach poor lower-class Peruvians in both urban and rural areas visited. The question we have after this review, however, is whether or not the present pattern is the best distribution and use of Title II resources.

We return to our working hypotheses and to Tendler's "articles of faith" regarding PVO actions to explore this issue.

(1) PVOs are effective in reaching the poor. We found that they all achieved this goal of operations. In no instance did we discover or hear of "undeserving" persons benefitting from the programs.

(2) The poor participate broadly in PVO operations. Here we found that there was some variation due to the bureaucratic structuring of programs. The CARITAS beneficiaries have the greatest opportunity to choose their projects and develop them under local leadership. CARE and OFASA offer opportunity for local initiatives but restrict projects to specific areas designated by PVO and government planners. Decision-making by local participants is highly focused and managed by the organizations. SEPAS projects offer the least amount of local decision-making because the program deals specifically with forestation and its secondary needs. Decisions about tree planting and nurseries are technical ones, decided by the forestry engineers. In the area of future use of the trees there is considerable opportunity for local participation in decision-making. Communities and

individuals require considerable guidance in this if advantage is to be made of the program in direct monetary terms.

(3) Concern with the "process" of work as much as with the outcomes does not seem to be the hallmark of these programs, although all express interest in helping the poor gain better control over their life situations. All the PVOs emphasized the quantitative aspects of their activities, such as the number of beneficiaries reached or the amount of food distributed, a preoccupation that reflects the concerns of the USAID and Peruvian government counterparts which provide resources. CARITAS projects were variable in this regard; in some the "human" concerns seemed central to action, in others not as much. OFASA projects seemed preoccupied with fulfilling contract obligations, having 50-member work units in due order, and lining things up for the next project. Still there was considerable opportunity for development of personal skills and this was encouraged. SEPAS and CARE showed strong goal accomplishment orientations of getting the trees planted and the sidewalks laid.

(4) Traditional PVO strengths in "people to people" frames of work seemed muted in most of these programs due to weak and scarce field personnel and lack of field logistic support. CARITAS' personnel relationships with recipients was stretched thin and rested largely upon the effectiveness of parish priests and their lay workers. While the field supervisors seemed to "know" everyone, as the lone FFW operatives they were greatly disadvantaged. CARITAS nutrition workers were very effective in several instances, particularly in Cajamarca. OFASA did not have much direct contact with the bulk of beneficiaries, but its ties were much closer with emergent leaders and those with the initiative to enter other training programs. Both CARE and SEPAS operated in formal ways with recipients and only key local leaders

enjoyed much person-to-person contact with PVO personnel.

(5) The flexibility of PVO operations stood in direct relationship to size and governmental connections. The larger the program, the greater the project choices and opportunities. The closer the PVO is tied to government agencies (both U.S. and Peruvian) the less flexibility. Thus CARITAS, OFASA, CARE and SEPAS ranged (in that order) in terms of opportunity for choice, initiative and general flexibility in project development.

(6) Whether or not PVOs strengthen local institutions in some ways is a matter of definition. Working independently of government, both CARITAS and OFASA dealt directly with a variety of local leaders and groups. Insofar as they consciously tried to fortify such groups with their assistance both programs undoubtedly had important effects, but we did not gain the conviction that community-level institution-building <u>per se</u> was central to the majority of their projects, although we found some good examples of such which will be discussed in later sections. CARE and SEPAS work could be said to largely strengthen <u>government agency</u> work at the local level. This is important as most ministerial programs in Peru have poor outreach capabilities. In SEPAS projects, however, we discovered some potentially negative impacts on community structure resulting from the introduction of new resources (trees) whose ownership and use were in doubt, a point to be considered in Chapter V.

(7) That PVOs can do the work for less money than public agencies seems confirmed by our data. CARITAS and OFASA which have the least governmental ties and support, show the lowest costs per beneficiary by far. Because of their (presumably) more highly motivated or dedicated personnel who are willing to work for less and their use of volunteers, costs are considerably lower. They also rely less upon technical personnel and equipment because of this, which may limit their capacity to tackle more complex tasks.

Reviewing Tendler's seven articles of PVO operations then, we find that CARITAS conforms most closely to that stereotype of operations followed by OFASA and the other two in equal fashion. We do not see this as being either "good" or "bad," since the PVOs working with governmental agencies operate under different constraints. What is important is whether or not the PVOs in question can bring the positive aspects of traditional PVO performance to bear in this context. In other words, how do the PVOs affect the ministerial programs? Because of the extremely small number of PVO representatives actively in contact with government agency field operations, we judge this impact to be negligible. Were there more PVO-hired field staff persons working with government agency operations, opportunities for positively affecting government programs would be increased. In other respects, the function of the PVOs is to keep government programs "on track," which they seem to do effectively.

Education and training dimensions of PVO operations were uneven in their frequency, content and outreach. Apart from teaching limited technical skills in relation to project completion in the cases of CARE and SEPAS, there was little attempt to expand these contacts for further training. OFASA, on the other hand, had several training and education activities which accompanied the FFW projects and existed as separate projects in their own right. These were devoted to developing manual skills for personal and family betterment. CARITAS also had a variety of training programs of uneven quality, ranging from excellent to poor. Both programs could clearly use up-grading in these respects, but require more personnel with more advanced preparation to accomplish this. They also need appropriate teaching materials, a point to be discussed in Chapter IV.

Distribution of projects reflects a pronounced urban bias, with 50

percent of all beneficiaries living in coastal cities. Although the provincial programs of CARITAS and SEPAS did reach rural areas extensively, we found that these tended to cluster near the departmental capitals. The planned increases in CARE and OFASA shares of the Title II resources, and the reduction of CARITAS' allotment of foodstuffs in the forthcoming year will further increase the Lima and urban aspects of the program.

Developmental impact of the different PVO projects is sharply divided. The majority of projects undertaken in greater Lima (OFASA, CARE and CARITAS) are not designed to be capital-producing investments. In rural areas, productive FFW projects were in the majority, although CARITAS supported a significant number of activities with no clear production or income-generating implications. In overall terms, of the 1,227 FFW projects we recorded in the tables included here, 62 percent involved ornato público work, most of which was focused in greater Lima. In view of the opportunities for FFW programs in rural areas, this division of activity is striking.

Chapter IV

Title II and Nutrition

Introduction

Title II foods have been utilized in Peru since the 1950s, in rural and urban areas and in the context of school feeding, work, and other programs. Despite this fact, the impact of this food on Peruvian nutrition is little-known. There are to our knowledge no thorough, holistic studies of the long-term impacts of nutritional supplements provided under PL 480 in Peru. Consequently, in making this evaluation of Title II activities, there are few findings against which we can truly evaluate the impact of the current projects on the nutritional status of the recipient population.

Nevertheless, partial studies and attempts to estimate the nature of this impact conducted independently in recent years provide a useful background, as do the detailed researches on nutrition and health conducted in other Third World contexts. This chapter addresses the question of impact, utilizing such comparative data in combination with those materials which could be obtained in Peru and with what the evaluation team was able to observe and measure in the field research portions of its work. Despite the problems posed by the lack of baseline data, a number of concrete assessments could be made and specific recommendations advanced.

At the onset, several working hypotheses were set forth to orient our questions concerning nutrition. These were:

(1) that Title II foods constitute an important addition to the diet in terms of calories and protein ingested;

(2) that the foods reached the neediest populations, especially pregnant and lactating mothers and children under 5 years of age;

(3) that the rations supplied were adequate and regular enough to make a solid contribution to the diet.

Our work is aimed at these hypotheses and their corollaries arising from the investigation.

Nutrition in Children and Adults

The nutritional status of a child is affected even before birth by the nutritional status of the mother. If she was chronically malnourished as a child and her physical growth was stunted, her offspring will be more likely to be born with a low birth weight (Martorell 1975). Low birth weight children in Third World countries often have heavy loads of enteric parasites (Mata 1977) and a depression of the immune system (Leightic and Klein 1978) which may cause frequent morbidity, weight loss, or wasting. With proper dietary treatment, early wasting can be overcome and the child can attain reference weight for height (Waterlow and Rutishauser n.d.). If the low birth weight child is born into a family whose ability to either produce or purchase food is limited, or the child otherwise does not receive the necessary medical and dietary treatment in order to recover, however, chronic and successive bouts of wasting may cause his or her height to become stunted permanently. Most stunting in children is complete and irreversible by the age of seven (Martorell 1975).

It is not only height and weight that are affected by this stunting. Mental capacity and the immune system are affected as well. Children who are stunted continue to have more frequent, ill-defined morbidity (Viteri and Tatum 1980) and do more poorly on tests of cognition (Martorell 1975)

than children who are not. Stunting begun in childhood is the major cause of stunting in adults.

There is, then, a cyclical side to chronic malnutrition: low birth weight children born to stunted adults may suffer frequent bouts of infection which cause them to become stunted adults who in turn have children who begin their lives with low birth weights. There is also an insidious and hidden side to chronic malnutrition: as height stunting is the body's adaptation to an insufficient nutrient supply, stunted individuals generally appear to be small but still healthy. Thus, stunting is not an obvious form of malnutrition and so is not dramatic enough to catch the attention of those who might do something to help.

Malnutrition in Peru

Anthropometrics, or measures of height, length, weight and age, are direct measures of the nutritional status of a population (Jelliffe 1966). Children under five or six years of age, and pregnant and lactating women are generally considered to be the populations of highest risk.

The most recent anthropometric survey of the nutritional status or children under six years of age in Peru was carried out in 1972 (ENCA). At that time, 44 percent of children under six were malnourished according to measurements of weight for age. Of these, 31 percent were grade one (10-25 percent below reference weight for age), eleven percent were grade two (25-50 percent below reference measures), and two percent were severely malnourished or grade three (under 50 percent of reference weight).

When compared with twenty other Latin American countries, Peru rated thirteenth in the proportion of its children with some degree of malnutrition. When only grade three or severe malnutrition was considered, however, Peru's

standing rose to sixth.

According to this same study, the northern highlands and the lower selva were the regions with the highest percentage of malnutrition. In the northern highlands, a focus of this evaluation, 65 percent of children under six years of age were found to be malnourished. Of these, four percent were severely affected. In metropolitan Lima, another focus of this evaluation. nineteen percent of children under six were malnourished, none of them severely.

In both highland and urban areas, low economic status was found to be related to high rates of malnutrition. In metropolitan Lima, the percentage of malnourished children under six years of age rose from an average of 19 percent when all economic groups were considered together, to 25 percent among children of the poor. In the highlands, the average was 65 percent while 71 percent of children among the poorest strata were malnourished. This percentage was only exceeded by the poor of the selva, 75 percent of whose children had some degree of malnutrition. When the poor of all regions were considered together, 50 percent of Peruvian children under six years of age were found to have some degree of malnutrition (Amat and Dante 1981).

There have been no systematic national level studies of nutritional status in Peru since 1972. Because a family's ability either to purchase or produce food is linked to the well-being of its members, however, a look at national production and price index trends since 1972 may give us some indication of the present situation.

From 1972 to 1980, national production of dietary staples -- wheat, potatoes, rice and corn -- dropped 35.8 percent, 19.5 percent, 12.8 percent and 29.5 percent, respectively. This information was substantiated by highland farmers interviewed during this evaluation who said that local

yields have consistently decreased over recent years. Periodic droughts and intemperate rain have meant additional annual losses of up to 80 percent of local yields. At the time of this evaluation, families in the Cajamarca area and in the Puno drought area were reportedly consuming the grain and potatoes normally reserved for next year's seed. At the same time, the cost of producing food has increased, as has the cost of purchasing food in the marketplace. Peru's annual rate of inflation from 1970 to 1980 was 30.7 percent (USAID n.d.).

The increase in food prices and decrease in food production seem to have affected consumption. A study published by the Ministry of Agriculture and Food found low- and middle-income populations of Lima to have been consuming 84 percent of required calories and 89 percent of required protein in 1972. By 1979 the same economic strata's consumption had dropped to percent of caloric requirements and 79 percent of protein needs. A 1983 consumption level study in the Young Towns of Lima reported low-income groups to be covering only 61 percent of caloric and 63 percent of protein requirements, a further drop in both calorie and protein consumption (IPC 1983).

Title II Maternal-Child Health Programs in Peru

Maternal-Child Health (MCH) programs comprised 18 percent of Title II projects (see Table 4-1). While highly varied in format, in general they could be divided into two types, those which prepared the ration on site and those which gave out food in dry form for preparation at home.

A. MCH Programs with On-Site Feeding

We observed MCH with on-site food preparation and consumption in the settings, refactorios (literally, places where a light meal or refreshment is eaten) and comedores populares (popular dining halls). The refactorios

Table 4-1

Number of Title II Programs by PVO and Type, 1982

PVO	Program Types FFW	DCF	MCH	Total
CARITAS	,326	733	410	,469
CARE	287	---	---	287
OFASA	229	16	193	438
SEPAS/ PRAA	213	---	---	213
Total (%)	2,055 (60.2%)	749 (21.9%)	603 (17.6%)	ɔ,407 (99.7%)

which were observed in Cajamarca, were the only on-site feeding programs in the highlands. Usually, they appeared to arise through local initiative, as a group of pregnant or lactating women with children under five years of age decided to establish a program. Most of these women either had seen a similar program functioning in a neighboring village or had received information through other channels that CARITAS would sponsor such a group. Once organized, the group elected two or three promotoras (promoters or representatives) who attended a CARITAS training center to learn about nutrition, food preparation, sewing, knitting, hygiene, child care, and how to plant and tend a home vegetable garden. The training program brought together women from different villages and created a setting in which the discussion of women's issues was strongly encouraged. Upon completion of this training, the promotoras returned home to teach what they had learned to other women in their communities. Working together in the communities, the women would establish a vegetable garden, the produce from which was used in preparing refactorio meals. Title II food was received monthly from CARITAS in Cajamarca and prepared once a day, either in the morning or around mid-day and consumed on site. The refactorio was held in the home of one of the group members, and women took turns arriving early to prepare food for the rest of the group.

It was especially interesting to see the way in which the women as a group controlled membership. Because they were from the village themselves, they knew the economic conditions of each of their neighbors and took care to include the neediest families in the group. Many of the women were single mothers and heads of households. They also knew who was pregnant, what children's ages were, and who was lactating. Women who were not pregnant or lactating, and older children, were not allowed to participate in the meal.

That the promotoras actually were teaching the groups what they had learned was evident from the flourishing home gardens at the refactorio sites, and the children's clothes that the group members had made and brought out to show us.

The comodores populares were observed in the northern cone area of the Young Towns, and also received monthly food rations from CARITAS. Meals wei prepared from one to three times daily by project participants, who, in contrast to the refactorio participants, were required to contribute a sum of money to the comedor each month. This money was used to buy foodstuffs that were prepared in combination with the Title II rations, so that the latter comprised only a small part of the total food prepared daily. Title II food was used as an organizing tool in the formation of the comedores, and then supplemented heavily with the foods purchased by the group.

Because the comedor participants came from the area themselves, they knew who the poorest families were and tried to get them involved in the comedor. Most participants were low-income families and the monthly monetary contribution to the group was small, but there were still occasions when a family had to drop out of the comedor because it could not afford to pay. This disturbed the comedor leaders because those who dropped out were among the poorest. Some of these poorest families were given food from the comedor occasionally or for a short period of time even though they could not pay to join.

Like the refactorios, each comedor group chose two representatives who then attended area-wide meetings where they received education from PVO staff and learned to coordinate their group's activities with other comedor groups in their area.

B. MCH Programs Providing Dry Food for Home Preparation

MCH programs which gave out food in dry form included Mothers' Clubs and MCH programs attached to health centers. The Mothers' Clubs were similar to the refactorios and comedores populares in that they too included an educational component which involved sewing, preparation of food, knitting, and literacy. Teaching was done in this case not by promotoras but by PVO staff or women in the group who already knew more about a particular subject than the other women did. In one case, the women came in groups to the Catholic parish to learn from the nuns. Food was distributed on a monthly basis.

In MCH programs attached to health centers, pregnant and lactating women made regular monthly visits to the health center where they received food and medical care. During prenatal visits they were tracked and given regular prenatal care. In the postpartum period, the newborn child was entered into the medical record and given regular well-child checkups until the age of five. In some programs growth measurements were taken. These programs were reminiscent of the WIC (Women, Infants and Children) programs in the U.S in that they drew pregnant mothers who often had no prenatal care into the medical system through food support. Any education received was one-to-one in the clinic setting.

C. Other Child Feeding Programs

Other Child Feeding (OCF) programs comprised 22 percent of Title II programs in 1982 (see Table 4-1). All prepared food on-site and were generally attached to local schools in the following way: children to five years of age enrolled in kindergarten or preschool received Title II food one to three times daily, either as a snack or as a part of regular meals. Admission to the school was often determined by some measure of family need.

In one instance a school social worker continued to work with the child's family by assigning parents to tasks designed to solve family problems. In most cases children received education as a part of the general curriculum. One exception to this model was a CARITAS program in Marcara, Ancash, which brought the poorest children from the local school to a separate lunchroom where they received Title II foods at mid-day. There was no educational component to this other than that provided by the school in town.

Program Impact on Nutritional Status

It would be difficult or impossible to calculate the precise impact of Title II food on participant family and individual nutritional status without baseline data and a systematic, longitudinal study of family nutrition status, food consumption patterns, and economic patterns. The information available during this study did not allow us to make comparisons or inferences of that kind. The data gathered can, however, be discussed in more general terms.

Programs can be compared based on the direct maximum impact of the food ration on the individual if we assume that beneficiaries receive and consume the full ration allotted to them. Major barriers to this maximum impact can then be discussed, giving us an idea of the range of direct nutritional impact probable. We can also discuss the possible indirect nutritional impact accruing from income substitution effect and the hypothetical long-term nutritional impacts of the FFW projects themselves.

Because a particular program design and program elements have much to do with the degree to which barriers to maximum consumption, income substitution and long-term benefits affect beneficiaries, program types can be compared on the basis of program elements, and recommendations can be made for improving the nutrition impact of Title II programs in Peru.

Direct Maximum Impact of the Ration

The size of the full monthly ration varies by program type. MCH programs figure the ration for three individuals -- a mother, an infant, and one child between one and five years of age. The maximum ration in these programs, then, is 3.5 kilograms per person. OCF programs also plan 3.5 kilograms for infants, but increase the older child's ration to 5.5 kilograms per month. FFW rations are calculated on the basis of a five-member family and full household rations vary widely from 22.5 kilograms to 48 kilograms per month. This is a per capita ration which ranges from 4.5 kilograms -- smaller than that planned for older children in OCF programs -- to 9.6 kilograms per month.

When the calorie and protein values of the maximum rations of all programs are compared to the monthly requirements of each of the high risk populations (see Tables 4-2,4-3,4-4), we can see that the maximum monthly impact of MCH and OCF programs is 18 to 20 percent of calories required and 22 to 25 percent of protein required monthly by pregnant and lactating women; 63 percent of the calories required and 83 percent of the protein required for infants; and 58 percent of calories required and 94 percent of protein required by children from one to five years of age.

Maximum intake for each of these risk groups is even higher in the FFW ration. Caloric impact ranges from 45 percent to 154 percent of monthly requirements, while protein impact ranges from 68 to 244 percent.

Middle and low income groups in Peru are fulfilling 63 percent of caloric and 71 percent of protein requirements from the basic diet (ENCA 1972; Amat and Dante 1981). If the basic diet was indeed supplemented by these maximum Title II rations, both calorie and protein sufficiencies would improve dramatically.

TABLE 4-2

Food Ration per Month by Agency -- FFW

Per Capita	CSM 1	SF Bulger	SF Flour	Rice	Veg. Oil	SF Cornmeal	SF Oats	WSB	Food Per Capita	Household Total
SEPAS										
Kilograms	--	2.2	2.2	--	0.5	2.2	2.5	--	9.6	48.0
Calories	--	7,700	7,854	--	4,420	8,624	4,375	--	37,973	189,865
Protein (grams)	--	374	352	--	--	286	525	--	1,537	7,685
CARITAS										
Kilograms	--	1.0	1.0	1.0	0.5	1.0	--	--	4.5	22.5
Calories	--	3,500	3,570	3,630	4,420	3,920	--	--	19,040	95,200
Protein (grams)	--	173	160	67	--	130	--	--	530	2,650
OFASA										
Kilograms	1.6	1.6	1.6	--	0.5	1.6	1.6	0.9	9.4	47.0
Calories	6,080	5,600	5,712	--	4,420	6,272	600	3,240	37,320	186,620
Protein (grams)	320	277	256	--	--	208	336	180	1,577	7,885
CARE										
Kilograms	--	--	2.5	--	0.5	2.5	2.0	2.0	9.5	47.5
Calories	--	--	8,925	--	4,420	9,800	7,500	7,200	37,845	189,225
Protein (grams)	--	--	400	--	--	325	420	400	1,545	7,925

TABLE 4-3

Food Ration per Month -- Maternal Child Health and Other Child Programs -- CARITAS

	Wheat Flour	Oats	Cracked Wheat	Vegetable Oil	Corn Soya Mix (CSM)	Total
I. MCH Programs (for three individuals)						
Kilograms	1.5	1.5	3.0	1.5	3.0	10.5
Calories	5,355	5,625	10,620	13,26(	1,400	46,260
Protein	240	315	336	--	600	1,491
II. Other Child Feeding Programs						
A. Children (1-5 years)						
Kilograms	2.0	1.0	1.0	0.5	1.0	5.5
Calories	7,14(	3,750	3,540	4,420	3,800	22,650
Protein	320	210	1,102	--	200	842
B. Infants						
Kilograms	1.0	0.5	0.5	0.5	1.0	3.5
Calories	3,570	1,875	1,770	4,420	3,800	15,435
Protein	160	105	56	--	200	521

TABLE 4-4

Maximum Direct Nutritional Impact per Capita Per Month

	Per Capita* Monthly Requirements		Maximum per Capita, MCH and Other Child Feedings		Maximum per Capita FFW Ration		Maximum MCH and Other Child Rations as Percentage of Requirement		Maximum Per Capita FFW as Percentage of Requirement	
	Calories	Grams Protein	Calories	Grams Protein	Calories	Grams Protein	Calories	Protein	Calories	Protein
Pregnant Women										
Coast	76,550	2,010	15,420	497	37,973	1,537	20.1	24.7	49.6	76.5
Highlands	78,410**	2,010	15,420	497	37,973	1,537	19.7	24.7	48.4	76.5
Lactating Women										
Coast	82,500	2,250	15,420	497	37,973	1,537	18.7	22.1	46.0	68.3
Highlands	84,360**	2,250	15,420	497	37,973	1,537	18.3	22.1	45.0	68.3
Infants	24,600	630	15,435	521	37,973	1,537	63.9	83.0	154.3	244.0
Children	39,000	900	22,650	842	37,973	1,537	58.1	93.6	97.4	170.7

* Based on daily requirements from FAO

** Increase in daily requirement due to altitude

Maximum rations in MCH and OCF programs would bring infant and child's consumption levels to far above 100 percent of required, and women's protein consumption to 96 percent. Only women's calorie consumption would lag behind at 83 percent of required.

Even the minimum FFW ration, on the other hand, would raise calorie and protein consumption levels of all risk groups to above 100 percent of required. It is clearly the case, then, that beneficiaries who do receive and consume the maximum ration allotted to them experience a dramatic improvement in consumption levels, and as a result, significant improvement in nutritional status is possible.

Barriers to the Maximum Ration

While the potential maximum nutritional impact of Title II foodstuffs is very high, barriers exist at the program, community, and household levels which prevent this potential from being realized (see Figure 4-1). Without careful monitoring of Title II beneficiaries, it is not possible to make a quantitative statement regarding the degree to which these barriers diminish the impact of specific programs or program types. However, we feel that our observations permit us to state qualitatively that their impact is considerable.

A. Program Level Barriers

Quantity and Composition. Approximately fifty percent of the programs visited reported receiving incomplete shipments of food more than twice a year. Oats and vegetable oil were the items most frequently cited as lacking in food shipments as well as the items most desired by beneficiaries. According to the PVOs, oats were dropped from the program due to lack of supply in the U.S., and oil is often lost or spoiled during shipment. Thus,

Figure 4-1

Barriers to Maximum Potential Nutritional Impact of Title II Food

Barrier Level		
PVO	Barrier I	- composition and quantity of food ration - condition of food upon delivery - delivery days
COMMUNITY	Barrier II	- number of participants in program
HOUSEHOLD	Barrier III	- whether or not food consumed by household - household size - intra-familiar distribution - beliefs regarding food use - diet and infection

ration shortages may originate before the shipment reaches Peru. On the other hand, some shortages may be due to warehousing or other problems in-country.

Delivery Delays. Approximately 30 percent of the programs visited reported delays in shipments of food of two to five months. The community was told that the food had not arrived from Lima, that the warehouse was not open, or that their paperwork was incomplete. In many instances, beneficiaries had to pay for a truck to make repeated trips to the warehouse, a major expense particularly for remote rural villages. Incredibly, given the hard work involved in some of the FFW projects, many beneficiaries had continued to work for months without food from the PVO because they were afraid that if they quit work the supervisor would arrive and find them not working and they would never be given the food they were due.

Undoubtedly, few project supervisors are as unfeeling as some participant comments portray them to be. Nonetheless, project participants felt they were caught in a no-win situation and continued to work in order to show their dedication to the project and insure food rations whenever they appeared.

According to PVO comments, delay in shipment may have been due to late shipments from the U.S. or poor weather conditions in the rural areas which tended to prevent or delay delivery. Sometimes, too, local project participants apparently misunderstood instructions regarding food pick-up and made needless trips to the warehouse.

Condition of Food Upon Delivery. Approximately 14 percent of programs reported receiving food that was inedible more than twice a year. Food arrived with weevils in it; grain was sometimes in hard rock-like balls or rotted. This food apparently was not checked before it left the warehouse. In some cases it was distributed by the community project leaders to the

families, who then gave it to the animals. In some cases it was burned. Generally, only two or three sacks out of the shipment were in this condition at one time.

B. Community Level Barriers

Number of Participants in the Program. FFW programs figure the number of rations distributed to a community on the basis of the number of people and the number of days it should take to complete the particular works project. For instance, in a reforestation project it may be calculated that it will take 1,000 person-days to plant a determined number of trees. If 50 people work, each will receive 200 days worth of rations for the duration of the project. The nature of the community work structure in Andean communities into which the FFW projects are placed, however, often makes it necessary for all families in the community to participate in any work activity. The community may be made up of only 50 families, or of two or three or even twenty times that number. According to community expectations, a representative from each family must work even if that means only working and receiving a food ration one day a year. If a family chooses not to participate, it may be fined by the community and not permitted to reap the benefits accruing from the project.

This dilution of the ration happens, too, on a smaller scale in MCH and OCF programs which prepare food in refactorios, comedores populares, and schools. It is not uncommon for there to be more beneficiaries participating than are officially recorded. This may be because schools need more students to cover expenses, or due to a philanthropic desire on the part of participants to give at least some food to everyone who needs it. In the highlands, 33 percent of all programs visited reported this dilution of the ration.

C. Household Level Barriers

This is the point at which many known barriers to food consumption come

into play. Is the food consumed or not? If it is consumed, how does family size affect distribution within the family? How do food beliefs and infection interact with consumption patterns? Let us look at each of these in turn.

Patterns of Food Consumption. If food is distributed in cooked form to high risk children and mothers, it is certain to be consumed because it is eaten on-site. When food is distributed in dry form to be prepared and consumed at home, there is more chance of it being sold or given to the animals and not being consumed. In the course of this evaluation, however, we found that nearly 100 percent of the edible food was consumed even when taken home dry. People explained that the harvest had been ruined and there was no work, nor was the ration large enough to sell for any significant return. Participants reported giving food to the animals only when it was unfit for human consumption. This was reported to be an occasional occurrence in 14 percent of the programs visited.

Household Size. FFW ration size is based on a family size of five people. This is less than the mean household size in Peru. Mean household size is 5.8 in the rural areas and 6.1 in small towns (Amat and Leon 1983), while average family size in the Young Towns of Lima is 7.2 (ONAA 1981). The mean household size recorded in our non-probablistic sample was 7 in the Young Towns and in the highlands. If the Title II ration in FFW programs is based on a family size of five but the actual size is seven, the ration is divided among more people than planned. This is another source of ration dilution.

Intra-Familial Distribution. Virtually 100 percent of the beneficiaries interviewed reported that the entire family consumed the food when it was prepared at home. Our evaluation showed that the Title II food has been well adapted into the normal diet of the Peruvian families. Title II

distributes wheat flour, corn flour, bulgur, wheat, a corn-soy mixture, oats, rice, and oil. Table 4-5 shows the percentage contribution of similar foods in the diet of well-nourished and malnourished families in Lima and in the rural areas (Amat and Dante 1981). It is interesting to note that, with the exception of wheat flour, all the foods given by Title II that are similar to the basic diet form a larger percentage of the diet in families that are well-nourished than in families that are malnourished. This may be an indication of high price or desirability of these foods. Wheat flour in the form of bread, on the other hand, forms a larger part of the diet of malnourished families. There is no data on oats, though they are a favorite food in both rural and urban areas. Soya is not a part of the normal diet but something that has been introduced through Title II.

Because of this similarity to or compatibility with the normal diet, each food has been incorporated well into the local cuisine. CSM was most commonly made in soups, drinks, puddings or mazamorras; bulgur was made into soups, stews, desserts and most commonly treated as if it were rice; wheat flour was made into sweet breads, soups, porridge, and used in egg mixtures; cornmeal was made into soups and porridge; and oats were mixed with water and fruit.

Beliefs. In many cultures, beliefs regarding infant feeding and weaning have an impact on infant and child dietary patterns. In the Young Towns of Lima (IPC 1983), food is introduced into the Peruvian infant's diet from three to six months of age. Soups and broths are among the first acceptable foods. This would mean that Title II foods generally made into soups are acceptable foods for infants. By the time the child is six to eleven months old, broths made with cornmeal and bread may be given. At a little more than one year of age, the child is able to eat fully from the adult diet.

Table 4-5

Percentage Contribution of Foods Similar to Title II to the Diet of Well-Nourished and Malnourished Families in Peru

Food	Lima	Rural	Lima	Rural
Wheat Flour	6.7	2.5	8.8	4.4
Corn Flour	---	6.5	---	3.7
Bulgur	---	2.4	---	2.1
Wheat	---	2.4	---	2.1
Soy	---	---	---	---
Oats	?	?	?	?
Rice	7.9	3.8	6.1	3.3
Oil	1.9	0.6	1.3	0.5
TOTAL	16.5	18.2	16.2	16.1

Infection. There commonly are also restrictions on the diet of a child sick with diarrhea. In Lima's Young Towns, 66 percent of the people interviewed by ONAA (1981) reported not giving foods to children with diarrhea. Most said they withheld food for one to three days. Approximately 30 percent of families interviewed during this evaluation also said they did not give food to children when they were sick with diarrhea. As diarrhea and respiratory infections are the two most important sources of morbidity in Peru, and rates are particularly high among young children, it can be assumed that some of the time children under five years of age do not receive program food because they are sick.

These, then, are some of the principal barriers to optimal nutritional impact from the maximum ration. Without further study there is no way of knowing precisely what effect these have on the individuals receiving Title II food, but it is clear that the maximum ration does not always reflect actual calorie and protein intake. If many of the barriers come into play at the same time, the amount of food received may be small indeed.

Indirect Impact on Nutritional Status

A. Economic Impact of the Ration

Using the official figures provided by the PVOs for the full monthly ration that a household can receive under the various food support programs and the current retail prices of these foodstuffs in the local markets, the potential economic contribution of Title II food assistance to beneficiary households can be discussed. Table 4-6 indicates the monetary value of the full monthly ration received by households in the various FFW programs. Table 4-7 indicates the monetary value of the complete monthly rations received in MCH and OCF programs.

Table 4-6

Monetary Value of Food Assistance per Household (FFW)

Market Price of Food		Quantity Received Monthly per Household and Market Value							
		SEPAS		CARITAS		OFASA		CARE	
Bulgur	S/.1,000 Kg.	(11 Kgs.)	S/.11,000	(5 Kgs.)	S/.5,000	(8 Kgs.)	S/.8,000	--	--
Flour	S/.700 Kg.	(11 Kgs)	.7,700	(5 Kgs.)	.3,500	(12.5 Kgs)*	.8,750	(22.5 Kgs.)*	S/.15,750
Cornmeal	S/.1,000 Kg.	(11 Kgs.)	.11,000	(5 Kgs.)	.5,000	(8 Kgs.)	.8,000	(12.5 Kgs.)	.12,500
Oats	S/.1,500 Kg.	(12.5 Kgs.)	.18,750	--	--	(8 Kgs.)	.12,000	(10.0 Kgs.)	.15,000
Rice	S/.400 Kg.	--	--	(5 Kgs.)	.2,000	--	--	--	--
Oil	S/.1,600 Kg.	(2.5 Kgs.)	.4,000	(2.5 Kgs.)	.4,000	(2.5 Kgs.)	.4,000	(2.5 Kgs.)	.4,000
C-S-M	S/.1,000 Kgs.	--	--	--	--	(8 Kgs.)	.8,000	--	--
Total/Month		(48.0 Kgs.)	S/.52,400	(22.5 Kgs.)	S/.19,500	(47.0 Kgs.)	S/.48750	(47.5 Kgs.)	S/.47,250

* Includes WSB, treated as flour by beneficiaries.

TABLE 4-7

Monetary Value of Food Assistance per Household MCH and Other Child Feeding Programs (CARITAS)

Market Price of Food		Quantity Received Monthly per Household and Market Value					
Flour	S/.1,000 Kg.	(1.5 Kgs.)	S/.1,050	(2 Kgs.)	S/.1,400	(1 Kg.)	S/.700
Oats	S/.1,500 Kg.	(1.5 Kgs)	.2,250	(1 Kg.)	.1,500	(.5 Kgs.)	.750
Bulgur	S/.1,000 Kg.	(3 Kgs.)	.3,000	(1 Kg.)	.1,000	(.5 Kgs.)	.500
C-S-M	S/.1,000 Kg.	(3 Kgs.)	.3,000	(1 Kg.)	.1,000	(1 Kgs.)	.1,000
Oil	S/.1,600 Kg.	(1.5 Kgs.)	.2,400	(.5 Kgs.)	.800	(.5 Kgs.)	.800
Total/Month		(10.5 Kgs.	S/.11,700	(5.5 Kgs.)	S/.5,700	(3.5 Kg.)	S/.3,750

* Assumes mother plus two children.

Several caveats should be kept in mind when using these figures to assess the economic contribution of Title II food support to beneficiary households. First, as is described above, barriers exist which may keep households from receiving the complete monthly ration, even when they theoretically are entitled to do so. Secondly, because of spot shortages of individual commodities, it often is necessary for sponsoring agencies to substitute one food for another in order to provide the quantity of food they have prescribed. This can change the monetary value of the ration significantly. For example, at the time of our evaluation, oatmeal was in short supply. If we use the SEPAS monthly FFW ration, we see that replacing the 12.5 kilogram allotment of oatmeal with an equal quantity of other cereals would lower the retail value of the ration anywhere from 12 to 20 percent, depending upon the relative quantities of flour, cornmeal and bulgur used to replace the oatmeal. Finally, the time constraints on the conduct of the evaluation precluded gathering the detailed information on beneficiary households that would indicate how the food supplements affect household resource allocation and spending patterns.

FFW Programs. In spite of these limitations, however, it is possible to make some general statements about the economic significance of the food supplements. The Salario Minimo Vital in Peru, upon which actual minimum wage is calculated, is S/.60,000 per month. Using this as a base, the government decreed salary increases, which bring the legal minimum wage to S/.96,000 per month as of July 1983. Thus, in the case of FFW projects, the monetary value of the monthly food rations ranges from 20 percent in the case of CARITAS, to 55 percent in the case of SEPAS, of the current minimum wage in Peru (see Table 4-8).

If we assume that a full-time worker earning minimum wage in Peru works 25 days per month, the daily wage rate is S/.3,840. The complete monthly

Table 4-8

Monetary Value of Monthly FFW Ration

as a Percentage of Minimum Wage

Program	Monthly Value of Ration	Percentage of minimum wage
SEPAS	S/.52,450	55
OFASA	S/.48,750	51
CARE	S/.47,250	49
CARITAS	S/.19,500	20

rations or the FFW programs are calculated by the PVOs on the basis of twenty days of work per month. Insofar as this is the case, the monetary value of the food support per day of work is illustrated in Table 4-9.

However, beneficiaries of the SEPAS and CARITAS FFW programs reported that they, in fact, work 25 days per month to receive their full monthly ration. In situations where this is the case, the monetary value of the food per day of work declines to S/.2,098, or 56 percent of the daily rate of someone earning minimum wage.

In contrast, the FFW programs sponsored by OFASA usually require four days of participation per week, two half-days of work and two half-days of some type of training. Each day involves four hours of participation, which means that beneficiaries work eight full days per month, including the time they are receiving education. Calculated on this basis, the monetary value of the food earned per day of work in the OFASA FFW programs is S/.6,094, or 159 percent of the daily rate of someone earning minimum wage.

MCH and OCF Programs. In the case of the MCH and OCF programs, there are diverse program formats and participation requirements which make it difficult to compare the monetary value of the food received to minimum wage on the basis of a daily rate. However, it is possible to look at the monetary value of the food received as a percentage of the minimum monthly wage of S/.96,000 as a measure of its economic importance. This is illustrated in Table 4-10.

B. Income Substitution Effect of the Food Supplement

Clearly, the monetary value of the full ration can represent a large economic contribution to beneficiary households. For an unemployed urban worker or a single mother, for example, a quantity of food with a value of 6 percent of the minimum wage given to one or more of their children could

Table 4-9

Monetary Value of Food per Day of Work

Based on 20 Days of Work per Month

Program	Monetary Value Food/Day of Work	% of Daily Minimum Wage (S/.3,840)
SEPAS	S/.2,623	68
OFASA	S/.2,438	63
CARE	S/,2,363	62
CARITAS	S/.975	25

Table 4-10

Monetary Value of MCH and Other Child Feeding Programs (CARITAS): Rations as a Percentage of Minimum Wage

Program	Monthly Value of Ration	Percentage of Minimum Wage (S/.96,000)
Mother-Ch	S/.11,700	12
Child	S/.5,700	6
Infant	S/.3,750	4

be important indeed. However, at the present time it is not possible to translate the high monetary value of the food rations into concrete statements about the economic impact within beneficiary households. Converting the rations into monetary equivalents establishes a point of comparison with a determined level of household income, the current minimum wage. Because Title II food is consumed by recipients rather than sold, however, the economic contribution of the food is a function of the degree to which it frees household income that otherwise would be spent on obtaining sufficient calories to be spent on improving the nutritional quality of the diet, or on improving some other aspect of life such as housing or clothing.

In general, the types of food provided under Title II food support -- grains and cereals -- are the types of foods that make up the bulk of the diet of non-professional populations in Lima. Together with tubers, they also make up the bulk of the diet of non-profession populations in rural areas. When these populations experience an increase in income, their general response is first to improve the quality of their diet through a limited increase in their consumption of fruits, grains and meats. Then, insofar as they are able they turn their attention to housing and clothing (Amat and Dante 1981).

We can assume that the provisioning of grains and cereals under Title II programs has an impact similar to an income increase. It provides part of the dietary base, thus freeing income for consumption of other products. However, we do not know what the true impact is because we lack information in two areas: (1) the precise economic situation of the beneficiary households, and (2) the degree to which the barriers discussed above prevent households from receiving a full monthly ration upon which the figures presented earlier in this section are based.

Factors which are related to the economic situation of beneficiary households and which influence the income substitution impact of food supplements and the forms that impact takes include:

(1) household income in cash and in kind, the sources of that income, and the relative importance of cash and kind;

(2) the size and composition of beneficiary households, particularly regarding the age and sex of

(3) household strategies for maximizing the utility of their income and mitigating risk.

Systematic longitudinal study of both the household factors noted above and the barriers discussed previously is required if the economic significance of the food supplements to households is to be more clearly established.

The high monetary value of the food rations supplied by some of the programs in comparison with the minimum wage indicates that there is at a theoretical possibility of the food programs competing with local money-earning activities, particularly those with a rate of remuneration less than the minimum wage. In Ancash and Cajamarca, this would include almost all of the employment opportunities available to rural dwellers. If the food programs draw people away from less remunerative activities for years at a time, a form of dependency on the programs certainly is created. However, during the limited time we were in the field we could find no concrete, empirical evidence that in fact this was occurring. The question of whether or not economic dependency relationships are being created could be answered by a systematic study comparing the opportunity cost of participation with other employment activities in a representative sample of rural and urban areas throughout Peru.

Some of the FFW and MCH sewing programs also have an income substitutio

dimension. Teaching the women elementary sewing skills allows them to mend and make their children's clothing. Family gardens serve the same income substitution function, by allowing people to grow vegetables they would normally buy in the market.

C. Income Generation

Some of the FFW and MCH women's groups also make crafts which in some cases are sold and generate small amounts of income. For example, in the Young Towns of Villa María del Triunfo in Lima, we observed a women's group that was making change purses from leather. The women reported a net income of S/.500 to S/.3,000 for the small and large purses respectively. These took 8 to 16 hours to make, yielding the equivalent of 10 to 30 percent of minimum wage per hour.

D. Long-Term Indirect Nutrition Impact

The long-term indirect impact of some of the FFW programs on nutritional status could also be substantial. Of particular importance are those projects which improve a family's economic status, access to Western medicine, or agricultural productive capacity. Projects with income-generating potential seen during the evaluation included all SEPAS reforestation projects, a CARITAS bee-keeping project, and one in which participants were making and selling bricks. Many FFW projects also included the construction of health posts in remote areas. As long as the health posts are eventually staffed, they should decrease morbidity in the area as they improve access to medical care. Other FFW projects were aimed at improving agricultural production. In Cajamarca, ONAA has developed an interesting program which provided chemical fertilizer, seeds and technical aid to small farmers. Other FFW projects, including construction of sports fields, improvement of roads, and new housing projects, had less obvious foreseeable impact on improving nutritional status of beneficiaries.

Program Design

The focus and structure of each Title II program determines the importance that barriers to consumption, income substitution effect and long-term impact have for the individual participant. Eight program components have been identified which influence the nutritional impact of the program. These are: (1) ration size; (2) preparation and consumption of ration on site; (3) targeting of food to pregnant and lactating women; (4) targeting of food to children under five years of age; (5) nutrition education; (6) health care; (7) monitoring of growth; and (8) long-term focus on the causes of malnutrition.

A. Ration Size

The larger the individual ration size, the greater the theoretical impact on individual consumption levels and income substitution. Increased daily consumption and improvement of diet due to income substitution effect should improve individual nutritional status.

B. Targeting

Targeting of the ration to high-risk groups such as pregnant and lactating women and children under five means directing the ration towards certain members of the family rather than to the family as a whole. Improving the consumption levels of these individuals should reduce the risk of low-birth-weight children, help reduce childhood morbidity rates, and prevent stunting during the early growing years. Food can be even more effectively targeted if pre-program participation measurements of weight and height are taken on potential participants. Those individuals among the high-risk groups which are particularly low-weight for height or show other signs and symptoms of malnutrition should receive special attention from the project.

C. Nutrition Education

As malnutrition is linked in some cases to negative food and illness beliefs, all projects should include an educational component aimed at reducing the impact of these barriers on consumption. Especially important is education addressing the prevention of infection including hygiene and boiling of water, and the early treatment of dehydration in the home. There are excellent programs worldwide which teach simple oral rehydration solution preparation in the home, or provide World Health Organization Oral Rehydration Solution packets to project participants.

D. Health Care

Some Title II projects include health care as a part of their program Those which do not would do well to develop even an informal relationship with a nearby health post if one is available. All types of projects could require project participants to make periodic visits to a medical provider as a requisite for receiving the ration, for example. Where this is impossible, perhaps medical staff could be asked to visit project participants periodically. Any control or monitoring of participant health status would help reduce the risk of malnutrition from infectious disease, especially respiratory and enteric seasonal illnesses.

E. Growth Monitoring

Growth measurements of height and weight should be taken periodically on all children participating in Title II programs. Ideally, measurements would be taken as the child enters into the program, every two or three months during program participation, and when the child finishes the program. These measures are relatively simple to take and would allow project staff to monitor and evaluate the growth patterns of participating children, and to target special rations to those children who are not growing at the optimal rate.

F. Long-term Impact

Along with the amelioration of malnutrition through food supplements, a forward-looking nutrition program should consider addressing some of the causes of malnutrition with an eye toward prevention. Obviously every project cannot do everything, however it was clear from this evaluation that some Title II projects did address long-term solutions to malnutrition.

G. On-Site Feeding

This is especially important in the targeting of food to high-risk members of the family. When Title II food is given to recipients in dry form and taken home for preparation, it is consumed by all members of the family. Thus, though it may have been intended as a ration for three high-risk individuals, it ends up being consumed by five persons or more and so the ration is diluted. The ration is further diluted if the food is subject to intra-familial distribution customs that reduce the food intake of high-risk individuals. When Title II food is prepared on-site and eaten by the targeted participants while they are there, on the other hand, it is not subject to this family-level dilution; high-risk individuals are sure to be receiving the ration intended for them alone.

This focus raises several more issues, however: (1) does on-site feeding of the ration result in a family-level substitution of food? That is to say, are those individuals receiving the on-site cooked ration being given less of the family food at home because they have already eaten food elsewhere? (2) would it not entail great costs and reorganization on the part of the PVOs to institute on-site feeding in place of dry food distribution? Let us take each of these issues in turn.

From the participant interviews conducted during this evaluation, there was ample evidence to indicate that the ration that is prepared at home

is consumed by the entire family. Since the ration is often planned for three to five individuals and the average Peruvian family size is closer to seven, there is a high probability of ration dilution on the family-level.

If on-site feeding activities coincide with or occur immediately prior to household meal times, it is possible that a program participant would consume less food at home as a result of their participation -- if for no other reason than that a person who has just eaten at a Title II program is likely not to be as hungry as other family members sitting down for a meal. However, our own observations and our interviews with informants indicated that all family members are allowed equal access to meals in the home, regardless of what they may have had to eat outside.

Studies of intra-household food consumption patterns in rural Peru support our observations. Collins (1981), based upon data she collected in Puno department, reports that the major factor causing deviation from the norm of equal access to food is a belief that those who work more are entitled to eat more. All family members are subject to expectations regarding what their contribution to household maintenance should be. These expectations are primarily a function of size and strength. As long as individuals are perceived to be contributing their "fair share," they are entitled to equal access to available food. Collins states that children are given smaller portions than adults in the expectation that they will want less because they are smaller, and that they are never begged to eat. However, children are given as many refills as they request (pp. 138-139). Thomas (1972: 65-69) also found that, in Cuzco department, while there are expectations about how much a person is likely to want to eat, this does not translate into differential access. He reports that the portions given to older, less active people were smaller, but that they could have as much as they wanted. In

the settings described by Collins and Thomas, the amount of food consumed elsewhere is not a relevant factor for the access one enjoys to food at home.

While we are aware that the use of on-site feeding programs as a substitute for meals consumed at home has been reported in some areas of the world, we did not find evidence of this in Peru. In addition, studies which have looked at intra-household resource allocation in detail do not provide evidence that would cause us to suspect this "substitution effect" to be a problem. While we do not discount the possibility that this might occur, we feel that the advantages offered by on-site feeding in reaching particularly vulnerable segments of the population warrant experimentation with a greater number of on-site feeding programs.

There is some concern on the part of the PVOs that the costs to the agency of on-site feeding outweigh the benefits. On-site feeding, at first glance, seems to mean purchasing kitchen equipment and supplies, finding a place to feed everyone and cook the food, someone to supervise and cook, not to mention the costs of fuel, condiments and eating utensils. Many Title II programs are run on small budgets and could not afford such expenditures.

On-site feeding does not have to function in that way, however, nor does it have to cost much. Let us consider Title II programs already doing on-site feeding in Peru as examples. In the MCH Program category, CARITAS comedores populares and refactorios are the best examples. Comedores populares are more expensive to the participants (not to the agency) than are the refactorios because participants add money in order to purchase other foods which they add to Title II food. The refactorio participants also buy or bring some other foods and condiments to add to the Title II food, but the amounts they buy are very small. In general, however, both programs are organized along the same lines and cost their agency very little. Here is

how they solved the problems:

(1) Kitchen. The community group chose a place to cook the food. This was generally someone's house in the community.

(2) Kitchen equipment and cooking utensils. The group used the kitchen equipment available in the house (an area to cook in using wood as fuel) or put on some sort of fund-raising activity (sold food or had a raffle) to buy a gas stove and the pots and pans they needed. Any other kitchen implements were brought from their homes by the women in charge of cooking that day.

(3) Someone to cook. The women made a schedule among themselves or two women who would come each day and prepare the food for the others. This job was rotated among the group members.

(4) Condiments and fuel (if wood). The two women whose turn it was to cook that day had to bring condiments with them from their homes. This included sugar, salt, cinnamon and other spices, and the wood needed to cook that particular meal only. In some groups, the women put their money together at the beginning of each month and bought the major condiments they would need that month in bulk, and left them in the kitchen for the cooks to use.

(5) Eating utensils. Each group participant had to bring their own bowl, spoon and cup form their house. Those in charge of cooking that day had to clean up the kitchen area and the cooking utensils, so that the owner of the kitchen would not be left with a mess. Each program participant washed their own eating utensils.

(6) Transportation of food. When the food is prepared on-site in a village or Young Town it must be transported to the site from the warehouse. In these programs, the groups themselves arranged and paid for transportation.

Total cost to the agency for on-site feeding in these programs was nothing or next to nothing. All of the costs were absorbed by the participants themselves. The benefits, on the other hand, were tremendous. Not only was the Title II food truly targeted, but the women in the groups learned how to organize themselves and take responsibility for their own program.

Comparison of Programs

These program elements do not eliminate barriers on the PVO level, nor do they deal effectively with barrier level II, the community level dilutions of the ration. We assume here, however, that the program which combines all of these components would be more likely to have a positive impact on the nutritional status of program participants than a program which has only one or two of these components in place. Tables 4-11 and 4-12 compare program elements described above by type of project. No Title II program was found to combine all of these elements; however, MCH and OCF programs contained many more of them than did FFW programs.

A. Highland Programs

According to the criteria outlined in Table 4-11, the largest assumed impact on nutritional status in the highlands is through the refactorios. The ration is given only to the high-risk population -- pregnant and lactating women and children under five -- and the food is certain to be consumed by only that group because it is prepared and consumed on the spot. This is combined with nutrition education, teaching in hygiene, cooking, and planting of a home garden. The stated MCH ration of 10.5 kilograms per month is planned for three individuals -- a mother and two children. This averages out to 3.5 kilograms per person, a ration which is equal to the stated ration for infants, and lower than the 5.5 kilograms planned for children between

TABLE 4-11

Nutrition Impact, MCH and OCF and FFW Programs -- Highlands

Programs	Ration (Kg)	Program Components: On-Site Feeding	Targeting: Pregnant & Lactating Women	Targeting: Children Under Five	Health Care	Growth Monitoring	Nutrition Education	Long-Term Impact
MCH								
Refectorios	[illegible]0.5	X	X	X			X	
Mothers' Clubs	[illegible]0.5						X	
MCH in a Clinic	10.5		X	X	X	X		
OCF								
Preschools	5.5	X		X			X	
Kindergarten	5.5	X		X			X	
Student Dining Hall	5.5	X		X				
FFW	48.0							

TABLE 4-12

[illegible]ion Impact of MCH and OCF and FFW Programs -- Lima, Pueblos Jovenes

Programs	Ration (Kg)	Program Components: On-Site Feeding	Targeting: Pregnant & Lactating Women	Targeting: Children Under Five	Health Care	Growth Monitoring	Nutrition Education	Long-Term Impact
CARITAS								
MCH in a Clinic	10.5		X	X	X	X		
Comedor Popular	10.5	X					X	
OFASA								
OCF -- Preschool	5.5	X		[illegible]			X	
FFW	47.0							X
CARE								
FFW	47.5							X

one and five years of age in Other Child feeding programs. Since many of the children in the MCH programs are over one and under five years of age, it follows that the ration should be adjusted to reflect the children's actual ages. The dining hall groups also should be linked to prenatal, postpartum tracking, and well-child care through the local health post. This regular tracking could be made a part of the requirement for receiving food and forming a group.

The next highest rated programs for nutritional impact are Other Child Feeding programs. The ration of 5.5 kilograms per month is higher than that of the dining halls and, because the food is prepared on the spot, it is sure to go to the children. Where these are combined with health care and immunizations, assumed impact would be even greater. In some of the programs, anthropometric measures are taken but not used for anything. They should be used for medical referral, impact evaluation, targeting of households for special attention, or increasing individual rations. Nutrition education for the parents of the children is minimal. Thus, the children return to homes at the end of the day where the conditions that are the causes of malnutrition have not changed.

The next level of assumed nutritional impact are the Maternal-Child programs attached to health clinics. As nutritional status is closely linked to health, the on-going prenatal, postpartum, and well-child care offered by these programs may have indirect impact on the nutritional status of participants. These share problems with the other programs which give out food in dry form for preparation at home, however. When the 10.5 kilogram ration planned for three persons is taken home and consumed by all family members, actual per capita rations are considerably reduced, and the direct nutritional impact of the food diluted. The only education given in the

Maternal-Child programs in the clinic setting is one-on-one medical counseling Ideally, this kind of health care would go along with group education and food would be prepared on-site for women and children only.

The Mothers' Clubs have the least impact on the nutritional status of their members. The ration is larger than that of the dining halls or other child feeding programs, but the food is taken home dry and divided among all family members. Assuming a family size of six, this reduces the ration to 1.7 kilograms per person. There is no health care component to the programs. However, the educational component of these programs often includes the planting of gardens, hygiene, and child care, all of which are important elements in indirectly improving nutrition status. Again, food should be prepared on-site and targeted only to pregnant and lactating women and children under five, and a health care monitoring component should be added to the program.

B. Urban Programs

The program with elements which indicate a high level of impact is the comedor infantil program of OFASA. In this program, children from poor families are specifically targeted and food is consumed on site rather thar taken home in dry form. The health care component of this program is minimal, consisting mainly in referral to a health center, but care is taken to make sure children are immunized.

The MCH program run by CARITAS in the clinics also rates high in assumed nutritional impact. Because food is taken home in dry form and eaten by many family members rather than only by the high-risk individuals, we cannot say that the food has been targeted to pregnant and lactating women and young children. The prenatal care, postpartum care, and well-child care, however, are very important and could improve the nutritional status of the individual consuming food on-site.

The program in Lima with the least nutritional impact is the comedor popular program run by CARITAS. Although food is prepared and consumed on site, the food has less nutritional impact because it is not targeted to high-risk individuals other than the moderately poor family in general. The entire family participates in the comedor. This program could be strengthened by including regular monitoring of health status and regular health care. The great value of the comedor popular lies primarily in education, and in community organization.

Summary and Discussion of Title II Nutritional Impact

A. Direct Impact

If the full ration is received by Food for Peace beneficiaries, direct impact on individual consumption levels can be substantial. Title II monthly ration can constitute almost 50 percent of the calorie and 70 percent of total monthly protein requirements of pregnant and lactating women, and over 100 percent of the protein and calorie requirements of infants and children.

Many barriers exist, however, to the full ration actually being consumed. On the PVO level, barriers involve the composition and quantity of the ration, condition of food upon delivery and delivery delays. On the community level, projects often involve more than the planned-for number of participants. The most dramatic example of this was a highland works project involving the communal labor of 950 persons, each of whom worked less than two days per year and received only six kilograms of food. If we assume a family size of six for each of the 950 workers, the total yearly calorie and protein support per capita from Title II for each family member is about one kilogram per year -- nowhere near the full ration. This may be an extreme example; however, this same kind of ration reduction was clearly happening in many instances.

The daily ration in the Centros de Educación Inicial observed, for instance, was approximately 16 ounces of soup or oatmeal and one roll. According to maximum impact calculations from the planned ration, the ration should equal 58 percent of the daily calorie requirements and 94 percent of the protein requirements for each child. This obviously was not the case.

Barriers are also operative on the family level. Food that is given out in dry form is generally consumed by all family members, not only those that are high-risk. MCH programs figure the ration on the basis of three persons, and FFW programs figure the ration on the basis of five, whereas recent studies have shown family size to be seven. A combination of beliefs and infection may also limit intake, especially among children under five years of age.

It was the opinion of most recipients interviewed during this evaluation that the food they received came in small quantities not significant enough to either sell or contribute to the weight of their children. Of course, it is impossible to accurately discuss the impact these barriers have on actual consumption without a controlled and detailed study of individual cases, but the difference between the planned impact of the full ration in both nutritional and monetary terms and the reported perceptions of the recipients themselves can only be explained if the barriers which exist are in fact substantial.

B. Indirect Impact

If received, the full ration can also have an indirect impact on well-being by serving an income substitution function. The full FFW ration may represent as much as 68 percent of minimum wage per month, while MCH and OCF rations represent as much as 12 percent. In some programs, crafts projects may generate small amounts of income or skills learned such as gardening and

sewing may save family money in the marketplace. The money saved may in turn be spent on other foods which improve the family diet or for other expenses such as housing and clothing.

Indirect impact may also come in the form of projects which improve family economic status, access to Western medicine or agricultural productivity. These projects focus on the prevention of some of the causes of malnutrition rather than provision of the direct food ration itself.

It was clear from a discussion of program elements that those programs which maximize participant chances of receiving the full ration are those which prepare food on site. Projects which target food to high-risk groups and include health care, growth monitoring and nutrition education are more likely to have a direct impact on individual's nutritional status than those which do not. Some MCH and OCF programs were found to combine many of these elements and so were considered to be most effective in reducing malnutritio directly. FFW programs, on the other hand, were projects which focused on the causes and so were considered to be the most effective in reducing malnutrition in the long run.

C. Recommendations

We recommend that the various PVOs be urged to consider the barriers to consumption on levels I and II. Careful program planning on the community level will eliminate many of the barriers to consumption on level III, however, delays in food shipments, spoilage of food, and diminished rations must be eliminated first at the warehouse level. The PVO must also find ways to make sure that the number of rations corresponds to the number of actual participants in both MCH and OCF projects. Number of participants in FFW projects is more difficult to limit given the communal work structure in highland communities; however, FFW focus on long-range rather than immediate

impact on malnutrition makes participant number, on-site feeding, and other nutrition program elements in these projects less important.

We also recommend that at least one of each kind of project be placed in each target community: (a) an MCH and/or OCF project designed to include all of the elements of a good nutrition program including on-site feeding of high-risk groups, health care, growth monitoring and nutrition education -- a project directed at reducing the immediate incidence of malnutrition in the village, and (b) an FFW project designed to improve the economic status of beneficiary families, agricultural productivity or access to Western medicine -- a project directed at reducing some of the basic causes of malnutrition and eventually freeing participants from dependence upon food from abroad.

Educational Impact of MCH and Other Child Programs

In the same way that program components can be used to make inferences about the nutritional impact of MCH and Other Child feeding programs, program components relating to education can be used to discuss assumed educational impact of programs.

The following education elements, present in each program in varying degrees, can be used to measure educational impact: (1) presence or absence of any education at all; (2) high level of beneficiary participation and control; (3) whether or not topics addressed reflect the "felt needs" of the group and their own reality; (4) whether or not teaching methods and materials are appropriate for the group's level of literacy and cultural or ethnic group; and (5) whether or not the programs create a forum for organization, group unity and mutual support for members. Table 4-13 summarizes our rating of the educational component of highland programs.

Table 4-13

ucation Impact - MCH and Other Child Feeding Programs - Highlands

Programs	Program Components				
	Some Education	High Participation and Control	Felt Needs	Appropriate	Unity and Organization
MCH Dining Halls (refectorios)	x	x	x	x	x
Mothers' Clubs	x		x	x	x
MCH In The Clinic	x			x	
Other Child Feeding Student Dining Halls					
Pre-schools	x			x	
Kindergartens	x			x	

A. Highland Programs

As with their nutrition programs, the education programs of the refactorios are the strongest we saw in the highlands. They combine a high level of beneficiary participation through the promotera system, with education which includes open discussions about the problems the women have in their community and in their lives. As the women are primarily illiterate, there are few visual aids used. Rather, things are taught through participation and doing, not reading about doing. The sewing projects, the knitting projects, and the home gardens all contribute to reducing expenditures on family food and children's clothing. Virtually all of the women interviewed from these groups said that they enjoyed working and learning together with other women, that they were learning things they wanted to learn and felt they could use, and that they felt the education to be as important to them as the food.

Second in assumed effectiveness are the Mothers' Clubs. These, too, were highly appreciated by the women because they taught things the women felt were useful to them. Educational methods were also appropriate in that they were based on participatory learning and used few if any written materials. Education in literacy was also a part of these groups, and something that was highly valued by the women. The Mothers' Clubs also served an organizational and unifying role among women in the community. The primary difference between the educational component of the Mothers' Clubs and the refactorios was in the level of beneficiary participation and control. Refactorios maximize participation and control through the use of promoteras who receive special training and then take that training back to their groups. The Mothers' Clubs, on the other hand, do not use promoteras. Classes are taught by outsiders, or women within the group who know a bit more teach the others. This limits both the depth and extension of the educational component. It

also limits the women's participation to that of recipients, rather than showing them that they are capable of taking control and teaching others.

Third in assumed educational impact are the pre-schools and kindergartens. These include early educational stimulation to children who would otherwise be unlikely to receive preschool education. The preschools we visited were clean with cheerful atmospheres in which children learn about interpersonal interaction, coloring, manual dexterity, and some preliminary letters and numbers. These preschool programs also free local mothers for at least part of the day, allowing them to seek work and contribute to family income. The level of children's control over activities is minimal. The organizational value of these programs in the community is also minimal. If more education was done with the parents of the children, some organizational benefits might be realized for the community.

The last in educational impact are the clinic-based Maternal-Child programs. The only education they receive is limited to one-on-one counseling given to the mother by the medical attendant or the person distributing food. The educational component of these programs should be increased through the incorporation of elements similar to those of the refactorios and Mothers' Clubs.

There is no education given by the feeding program to the children in the student dining halls. It is assumed that education for these children is being taken care of in the school setting itself.

B. Lima Programs

Using the same criteria, Table 4-14 rates the educational component of the Young Towns of Lima. CARITAS comedores populares can be assumed to have the greatest educational impact because of their use of promotora leadership system. These women represent their local group in a central meeting of

Table 4-14

Educational Impact of MCH and Other Child Feeding Programs - Lima, Pueblos Jovenes

Programs	Program Elements				
	Some Education	High Participation and Control	Felt Needs	Appropriate	Unity & Organization
CARITAS					
MCH					
t.b. program	x		x	x	
MCH program in a clinic	x		x	x	
Comedor Popular	x	x	x	x	x
OFASA					
Other Child Feeding					
Comedor Infantil	x		x	x	

representatives from different comedores populares in order to choose topics they will study, learn and take back or teach to their local group. The central group also works with local groups to choose projects in which all groups will perticipate. Both education and projects reflect the felt needs of the program participants, and are planned and implemented by the members themselves. Comedores populares have served as a community organizing focus for the Young Towns in Lima. One measure of the high degree of member participation and control in the comedores is that Title II food actuall forms only a small portion of the food prepared for the daily meals. Members contribute money in order to pay the costs of food purchase, preparation and transportation.

All the other MCH and Other Child feeding programs evaluated in Lima could be considered to have similar educational impact. The tuberculosis program, the MCH programs in the clinics, and the comedores infantiles all provide some education. In the first two programs, education is one-on-one and deals almost exclusively with those topics related to tuberculosis or prenatal and child care. In the comedor infantil, education is done in a preschool setting and covers preschool subjects. The program participants do not choose the educational topics, nor does the education contribute to group unity or community organization. The subjects covered in the educational component of these programs certainly reflects the needs of the participants when seen from a medical perspective and child development perspective. They may or may not be needs perceived by the program participants themselves.

Development Impact of Maternal Child and Other Child Programs

MCH and Other Child programs contribute to development in three ways: (1) through medical care and nutritional monitoring which allow the individual

to lead a healthier life; (2) through education; and (3) by acting as a catalyst in the formation fo groups which develop unity and organization in the community. They contribute, then, to both individual and community development. The assumed development impact of other child feeding and MCH programs can be seen as a result of the combination of educational and nutritional program components discussed in previous sections.

A. Highland Programs

When programs in the highlands are compared on assumed development impact, we can readily see that no program combines all three elements described above. Some combine education and group formation in the community, while others combine health care and monitoring with education. It is our opinion that, although health care, nutritional supplements and monitoring are important for the individual's potential as an active member of the community and for individual growth, the formation of groups and group unity are more important for both community and individual development. One may be in good health, but continue to follow the same life patterns without sharing the strength that group unity can offer. The development impact of highlands programs is in Table 4-15.

Refactorios and Mothers' Clubs would score highest in assumed development impact. The refactorios score highest because of their emphasis on participant involvement, group organization, and learning combined with strong targeting of food to high-risk individuals. Mothers' Clubs score a little lower because the food is not as well targeted, and the education has less chance of developing the capacities of the individual for self-reliance.

The MCH programs attached to clinics and the preschool programs have the second greatest impact. Both combine health care, monitoring and education. In both cases, the education is appropriate to the particular group. It would

Table 4-15

Development Impact - MCH and Other Child Programs - Highlands

	Program Components		
	Nutrition and Health Care Monitoring	Education	Group Organization
MCH			
Dining Halls (Refectorios)		x	x
Mothers' Clubs		x	x
MCH in a clinic	x	x	x
Other Child Reading Student Dining Hall		x	
Pre-school	x	x	
Kindergarten		x	

be difficult to compare the long-range impact of prenatal or preschool education on individual potential for development. The health care and monitoring of the MCH programs in the clinics is more tightly controlled and specific than that of the preschools and so may have more impact on the health of program participants.

Lowest in assumed development impact are the rest of the Other Child feeding programs because they include only education. These could be strengthened by including health care and nutrition status monitoring of children, and education with the parents or the formation of parent-teacher groups.

B. Urban Programs

In the Young Towns of Lima, the situation was much the same in that no MCH or Other Child feeding program combined all three elements of health care and nutrition monitoring, education, and group organization. Considered along the scale we have established, the urban programs are rated in Table 4-16.

Comedores Populares have the greatest development impact because of their excellent community and group organization capabilities. The use of group representatives and a central committee made up of these representatives widens the organizational impact even further. The representatives and their group learn that they can speak for themselves, and learn from each other.

The rest of the Lima programs seen during this evaluation combine nutrition and health care with education. Again, it would be difficult to compare the long-term impact of tuberculosis education, prenatal education, and preschool education, and for this reason, impossible to compare assumed development impact.

Table 4-16

Development Impact - MCH and Other Child Programs - Lima

	Program Components		
	Nutrition and Health Car Monitoring	Education	Group Organization
CARITAS			
MCH			
Tuberculosis Program	x	x	
MCH in a clinic	x	x	
Comedor Popular		x	x
OFASA			
Other Child			
Kindergarten	x	x	

Conclusions

Education and either individual or community development are not considered to be primary goals of Title II MCH and Other Child programs. Almost all of the programs considered during this evaluation, however, included some form of education in their program, and all had some degree of impact on either individual or community development.

In both the highlands and Lima, MCH and Other Child feeding programs were discovered which were providing excellent models for community education, addressing all of the components of a successful education program. Programs also were found to be contributing to individual and community development by means of education, the formation of community groups and promotion of community organization, and the provision of medical care and monitoring of health status. Considering that education and development are not a part of the primary goal of these programs, they should be congratulated for the comprehensiveness of their work.

CHAPTER V

FOOD FOR WORK

Introduction

This chapter summarizes the evaluation team's findings regarding FFW in Peru. It is divided into two major sections, one treating FFW in the highlands and one discussing FFW projects evaluated in Greater Lima. Each of these sections is further divided in order to discuss the operations of the PVOs individually. Thus, the section dealing with the highlands discusses SEPAS' Reforestation Project with Food Assistance (PRAA) as well as CARITAS' FFW operations, while the section treating Lima discusses the FFW efforts of CARE and OFASA. Finally a brief summary statement concludes both major sections, and major themes and recommendations are reviewed at the conclusion of the chapter.

We have tried to make this chapter descriptive as well as analytical. That is, we have included brief case studies in order to illustrate specific points of our findings and to impart a sense of how FFW projects look "on the ground." At the same time, we have attempted to include ample data in tabular form in order that readers may see how the more detailed examples "fit" into the overall picture of site visits and interviews.

We have organized our discussions of each PVO as follows:

1) An overview of what we found to be the major successes and distinguishing characteristics of each PVO.
2) A discussion of FFW impacts upon community development. Community development is herein understood to mean improvement in the ability of a community to generate income, or to provide for itself goods and services that it previously could not, in order to free a portion

of local income to be spent on other goods and services, so that the economic position of the community relative to the rest of the national society is improved.

(3) A discussion of the degree to which FFW works to strengthen local social organization. This refers to how well FFW increases the number of local people involved in leadership and decision-making positions and contributes to the creation of community organizations and institutions that are capable of managing community business and representing the economic and political interests of the community in its relations with state agencies and private enterprises from outside the community.

(4) An assessment of the contribution of FFW to creating infrastructure. We limit the definition of infrastructure so that it includes only those physical features and facilities that can be shown to generate income, increase the production of a good, or enhance the productivity of the population it is supposed to serve. Readers of this chapter may find our use of the term to be overly restrictive; however, we have restricted the definition in reaction to a widespread assumption we found among PVO officials that anything built in poor areas is a contribution to infrastructure.

(5) An evaluation of the educational component of FFW programs. In three of the four PVOs discussed, this refers to whether or not they are providing the nutrition education that is supposed to accompany all FFW projects. In the fourth case, OFASA, there is a more general educational component that we also discuss.

Food For Work in the Highlands

A. Introduction

The evaluation team visited 35 FFW projects in 29 field sites in Ancash and Cajamarca. Of these, 16 were part of the PRAA reforestation program and 19 were CARITAS projects. Table 5-1 summarizes the projects by type and location. In making these site visits we interviewed 118 people in the highlands concerning their participation in FFW and their views concerning the projects with which they had experience. Table 5-2 indicates the number of interviews conducted in each department and the number of interviews conducted with people affiliated with projects run by each PVO.

As was the case for all of the Title II projects visited, the selection of sites represented a compromise between those suggested by the PVO offices as potentially being of particular interest and our desire to visit as many projects of different types as possible within the time constraints set forth in the scope of work. Thus, the sites and projects visited represent an opportunistic rather than a probablistic sample, and it is not possible to make statistical inferences regarding their representativeness of FFW projects as a whole. However, based upon our discussions with personnel in the Food for Peace and Voluntary Assistance office of AID/Washington, the Food for Peac office of USAID/Peru, and the administrative officers of the PVOs operating in Peru, we feel that the projects visited do encompass well the range of problems and potentials of FFW in the Peruvian highlands.

B. Descriptive Evaluation of PRAA

Overview of program successes. PRAA has met its seedling production and plantation establishment goals for the period 1979-1981. Seedling production was 43,760,000 plants, exceeding the goal of 42,150,000; 26,177 hectares of

Table 5-1

Tabulation of Sierra FFW Projects Visited

PRAA	Ancash	Cajamarca	Total
Plantations	4	7	11
Tree farms	4	1	5
OTAL	8	8	16
CARITAS			
Health Post	3		3
Road	3	1	4
School	2		2
Housing	1		1
Civic Center	1		1
Beekeeping	1		1
Brickmaking	1		1
Market	1		1
Irrigation Canal	1	1	2
Water Canal (drinking		1	1
Well		1	1
Soccer Field	—	1	1
OTAL	14	5	19

163.91

Table 5-2

Breakdown of Highland FFW Interviews Conducted by

PVO, Location, and Interviewee Status

	PVO Officials and FFW Project Leaders			FFW Beneficiaries		
	Ancash	Cajamarca	Total	Ancash	Cajamarca	Total
PRAA	18	16	34	31	11	42
CARITAS	19	3	22	18	3	21
TOTAL	37	19	56	49	14	63

27,000 hectares (McCaffrey 1983:2). The PRAA officials with whom we spoke were unanimous in making confident predictions that seedling production and plantation establishment goals would be met or exceeded in a similar fashion during 1981-1983. Survival rates were reported to be considerably higher than 80 percent on nine of the eleven plantations we visited and beneficiaries generally expressed confidence that the trees would make a long-term contribution to the development of their communities. The varieties being planted include eucalyptus (80 percent), pine (15 percent), and a number of native varieties (5 percent).

The problem of deforestation in the Andes is long-standing; however, it has become particularly acute since World War II, as the economic and demographic trends discussed in Chapter I that have adversely affected highland agriculture also have taken a toll in the area of natural resource management. The declining profitability of agriculture and herding in the highlands has made small-scale agriculturists less interested in producing surpluses for sale or exchange, and less willing to invest scarce capital resources in land conservation. Likewise, the declining rural population in some areas implies a decrease in the absolute availability of labor for traditional labor-intensive soil conservation measures such as terrace building and maintenance.

Factors such as these which inhibit local highland populations from undertaking conservation measures on their own underscore the important role that the PRAA reforestation program can play in helping to maintain the highland environment. The trees aid in erosion control on steep and denuded hillsides, and in those areas where pines and native species are planted (about 15-20 percent of the area being reforested) they contribute to creating soil conditions that will result in improved pasture. The food provided

under the Title II program is an incentive for people to invest their labor in conservation activities. For these reasons we concur fully with McCaffrey's comment, "INFOR's sense of pride and accomplishment is justified in having met project goals of seedling production and plantation establishment. This function of the project should be continued" (McCaffrey 1983:3).

However, in addition to the importance of the tree-planting effort itself, recognizing that deforestation in the highlands is a manifestation of a larger process of impoverishment of the countryside also underscores the importance of the developmental and nutritional goals associated with PRAA. Thus, the overall program goal of the PRAA reforestation program is said to be "to increase income and food production of the rural poor" (USAID/Peru 1980b:Appendix A). Unfortunately, while we found project officials at all levels to be aware of and in sympathy with the stated program goal, they generally did not have a clear idea of how the program goal might be achieved or how they would know if it were. This is not surprising because the program documents are characterized by success indicators that are not measurable and a program goal based on faulty assumptions.

For example, a 10 percent increase in income and food production among the sierra rural poor is cited as the objectively verifiable indicator that the program goal cited above has been achieved. Increases in income and food production are to be documented by GOP reports on income. Achievement of the program goal is predicated on the assumptions that (1) "continued priority will be given by the GOP to the needs of the rural poor," and that (2) "program accomplishments will not be eroded by inflation or other economic considerations." However, there are no GOP reports on income that will permit the incomes of beneficiary households to be compared for the ten-year period specified in order to document changes in income, nor could we find evidence that such

income studies are being planned. In addition, both of the assumptions to which achievement of the program goal have been linked are questionable. As discussed in Chapter I, the needs of the rural poor have not constituted a priority concern for governments in Peru for some time. In the second place, Peru has been in an inflationary spiral since the mid-1970s. During 1981-1982 inflation was officially calculated to be 73 percent and it reached 30 percent during the first four months of 1983 (Quijano 1983:5). There is no reason to assume that project gains will not be eroded by inflation.

USAID/Peru is also vague regarding how the specific project purposes and outputs cited for the PRAA project are related to the program goal of increasing income and food production among the rural poor. Project purposes include:

(1) Assist SEPAS to increase its food distribution program through reforestation activities;

(2) Provide a greatly needed food supplement to the rural poor;

(3) Prevent soil erosion through reforestation; and

(4) Increase employment opportunities for the rural poor (USAID/Peru 1980b:Appendix A).

While we found that the nutritional status of the rural poor is low enough in many areas to warrant a food supplement, there is no indication that providing such a supplement contributes in any way to an increase in food production. Nor is there any way to determine how much if any improvement in nutritional status results from the food supplement since there is no baseline nutritional information on the participants in the PRAA program; nor is there any monitoring of nutritional status. Likewise, while the PRAA program does contribute to rural employment opportunities, employing approximately 20,000 workers in reforestation activities between 1979 and

1981, these jobs are temporary, so it is difficult to see how they will contribute to a 10 percent increase in income for the program beneficiaries, much less for the rural poor in general referred to in the program goal. It is also unclear how any increase in rural income will result in increased food production. As noted previously, the declining profitability of small-scale agriculture in the highlands makes people reluctant to invest capital in this area, so it is unlikely that any additional income will be channelle into increasing production.

Thus, we were able to verify immediate project success in two areas: food is being handed out, and trees are being planted. In these areas the project may be considered quite successful. However, regarding the community development and nutritional goals specified by USAID/Peru, these are either assumed without any means of verification, or hoped for with no clear understanding of how the tree-planting and food-distributing activities contribute to their achievement. This does not mean that there are no impacts or potential impacts in these areas associated with the PRAA program. It does mean that the measures for verifying or measuring such impacts are not included in the present program. and that in focusing upon these areas in its evaluation, we have found it necessary to rely heavily upon qualitative indicators of impact.

Food distribution and nutrition. The PRAA food ration of 48 kilograms per benficiary per month is the largest of all the FFW programs in Peru that receive Title II support. Whether one chooses to consider the mean household size of five people used by the PVOs or the mean household size of 6.8 people that we found among the highland beneficiaries interviewed as more representative, the ration constitutes a potentially significant contribution to the household larder. In the case of a household of five people, the PRAA ration potentially represents an additional 9.6 kilograms of cereals and grains per person during

each month of participation in the program; while, in the case of the larger household, PRAA potentially provides an additional seven kilograms of cereals and grains per person for each month of participation in the program.

At the time of the evaluation, the market value of the monthly PRAA food ration was S/.52,540. As noted in Chapter IV, this represents a value equivalent to 55 percent of the national minimum wage of S/.96,000 per month. Beneficiaries reported, however, that the wage currently being paid in the highlands varies between S/.2,000 and S/.2,800 per day, so that workers receive between S/.50,000 and S/.70,000 monthly, if they can find employment that allows them to work 25 days per month. Thus, in the case of a person working full-time in the highlands, the monthly PRAA food ration has a market value equivalent to between 75 and 105 percent of their monthly salary.

In spite of the high market value of the food ration offered by the PRAA program, we could find little evidence that it is being sold or exchanged by beneficiaries. Of the 34 PRAA officials interviewed, 30 stated flatly that the food is consumed by the beneficiary households and is neither sold nor exchanged for other products. The responses of the PRAA officials are summarized in Table 5-3 below. Among beneficiaries, the response was even more emphatic, as only two of the 42 PRAA beneficiaries interviewed even admitted to having "heard rumors" that people sell or exchange food.

Obviously, this does not mean that beneficiaries do not exchange or sell food; it simply means that we could find little evidence of it. Both beneficiaries and program officials have an interest in evaluators not finding evidence of such activities. However, we were satisfied that, while there may be more trafficking in Title II foodstuffs than our interviews revealed, it is not a widespread phenomenon in the PRAA program. The single case where we found strong evidence to suggest that some food was being sold or

Table 5-3

Use of Food Ration By PRAA Beneficiaries According to Program Officials

Response	Number of Responses		
	Ancash	Cajamarca	Total
Consume and neither sell nor consume	16	14	30
Give to animals*	1	1	2
Might sell, but there is no economic advantage	-	1	1
No response	1	-	1
Total	18	16	34

*In one case, respondent was referring to spoiled food, while in the other, the respondent indicated that people did this prior to receiving nutrition education.

exchanged was in Cajamarca. There we observed one case in which five members of a household of ten people were receiving food rations from PRAA, with the total monthly allotment amounting to 195 kilograms of food. Because there were no facilities in evidence where the household might store the food for an extended period, we could only conclude that it was being used for other purposes than consumption, probably sale or trade.

Our interviews with beneficiaries did not yield evidence to indicate that the PRAA program draws people away from other wage labor activities. Of the 42 highland beneficiaries interviewed, 13 volunteered at some point during the interview that they would rather work for wages than for food. In response to a question concerning what they would be doing if not participating in the PRAA program, only one indicated that he was participating instead of seeking employment elsewhere. All of the other beneficiaries indicated that PRAA is an activity that they undertake at home in addition to their normal agricultural activities

An interesting aspect of the PRAA program related to food distribution and nutrition is the fact that 34 of the 42 PRAA beneficiaries interviewed characterized the ration as too small. We identified several factors that contribute to this perception. In the first place, most beneficiaries begin receiving food in September or October, when the tree-planting season begins, and stop receiving it in March, when the season ends, so that they receive food assistance for only six months. Even if they are involved in multiple cycles of tree planting over several years, the on-again-off-again nature of the assistance diminishes its long-term impact. In addition, several beneficiaries expressed the view that, in the wake of this year's crop failure, they would like to receive food aid now (June-July). The prospect of receiving even 48 kilograms per month beginning in September did not appear

to them to be much help with the immediate problem. Clearly, disaster relief is not part of PRAA's mandate; however, the seasonal fluctuations in distribution dilute the impact of the food and make it difficult for households to fall back on the assistance in times of crisis.

Secondly, in many cases the number of people who work on a tree-planting project is greater than the number of people for whom PRAA has allocated food. PRAA calculates the number of beneficiaries for a project on the basis of the amount of uncommitted food it has and an estimate of the amount of labor required to plant a determined area. However, in most highland communities, once the decision has been made to participate in a project such as tree-planting, every household with able-bodied members is obligated to contribute a worker, and every household that does so is entitled to share equally in any reward. Community leaders do not, as a rule, have the authority to designate who can work on a project and who is to be excluded. Of the 42 PRAA beneficiaries interviewed, 38 stated that everyone in their community who was physically able was obligated to work and had the right to share equally in any food that was distributed. The four respondents who did not state that this was the case were all individual landowners who used the food to hire people to work on their plantations. We found that in seven of the eleven plantations visited, more people worked than were listed on project roles as beneficiaries. In the most extreme example, the community of Unanca (Cajamarca), 950 households were participating in a project for which 68 beneficiaries were listed in January 1983. Thus, instead of receiving 48 kilograms of food for 25 days of work, each beneficiary received three kilograms of food for having worked about 1.8 days during January 1983. We did not feel this was necessarily a bad situation. In the case of Unanca, people were generally satisfied with the project; they were working together as a community, and cited the food as a

stimulus; the trees were being planted and cared for; and there was obviously no dependence upon the food ration. However, in Unanca and the six other communities in which we observed similar situations, the nutritional contribution of the food is minimal.

A third factor reducing the impact of PRAA's monthly ration, and contributing to the response by beneficiaries that the ration is small is the coordination of the transfer of food from ONAA to the communities. This is a particularly severe problem in Ancash, where beneficiaries and officials in all eight of the projects visited reported frequent delays of two months or more in securing the release of food for which work already had been done. In one community (Matacoto), those responsible for watering the trees stopped working after food was delayed for two months, and most of a plantation of 10,000 pine trees was lost. The delays were in part the result of a change in leadership in the departmental office of ONAA, which resulted in the office's refusal to release any food until an audit had been conducted. A second factor that also was mentioned was the bureaucratic rivalry between ONAA and CENFOR, as both sought to assert their authority over when food would be released. In contrast to Ancash, the coordination of food releases between CENFOR and ONAA in general appeared to go smoothly in Cajamarca. Only one project site (SAIS Atahualpa) reported difficulties in securing its food allotment from ONAA.

Significance for development. PRAA officials in Lima and in the departmental offices accept the ecological benefits to be derived from reforestation as sufficient justification for the program, and they report this as the major developmental benefit. However, they concede that the ecological benefits do not provide sufficient incentive for communities to become involved in the program. According to program officials, the benefits that motivate community participation in PRAA are the food rations themselves, the potential income

from lumber sales, and firewood and building materials the trees will provide (see Table 5-4). In general, the responses of beneficiaries were similar to those of the program officials (see Table 5-5).

Clearly, the prospect of income from tree sales and the food rations themselves are the major advantages perceived by beneficiaries of the PRAA program, and official responses reflect an accurate perception of beneficiary attitudes. PRAA officials do appear to assign more importance to the use of the trees as a source of firewood and building materials than do the beneficiaries. In many areas the provision of firewood and building materials will be an important function because the denuded hillsides yield only ichu grass, maguey and small amounts of scrub bush for cooking fires. Communities in these areas also must purchase timber for houses from communities that have trees, a major expense that certainly inhibits construction projects. However, we feel that the small number of beneficiaries who cited firewood and building materials as a benefit confirms our view that this application of the trees has few developmental implications, and that its primary importance is in making it marginally easier for beneficiaries to continue living as they have been.

As noted earlier, we regard any developmental impact that a project mi have to derive from the degree to which it creates conditions that allow beneficiary populations to improve their disadvantaged socio-economic position vis à vis the rest of Peruvian regional and national society. That is, development contributes to the elimination of structural barriers in societies that prevent populations from enjoying equal access to resources. For this reason, while not denying the utility of firewood and building materials to beneficiary communities; we do not regard these applications of the trees as a developmentally significant aspect of the PRAA program. The PRAA program

Table 5-4

Benefits that Motivate Community Participation in PRAA

According to Program Officials

Benefit	Number of times cited*		
	Ancash	Cajamarca	Total
Food ration itself	16	16	32
Money from tree sales	9	13	22
Firewood/building materials	13	3	16

*Number of times cited in interviews with 34 officials.

Table 5-5

Major Benefits of PRAA Program According to Beneficiaries

Benefit	Number of times cited*		
	Ancash	Cajamarca	Total
Money from tree sales	30	2	32
Food ration itself	27	2	29
Firewood/building materials	0	3	3
No benefits, participation a mistake	1	2	3
Don't know	0	1	1

*Number of times cited in interviews with 42 beneficiaries.

has the potential of contributing to community development in two ways: the financial stimulus promised through tree sales, and through its contribution to community organization.

The interviews we conducted with PRAA officials and beneficiaries showed clearly that the commercial potential of the trees is a major "selling point" to communities participating in the program. Members of PRAA's departmental staff repeatedly told us that communities could expect to earn between S/.30,000 and S/.40,000 ($19.00-$26.00 U.S.) per tree, and when they accompanied us to visit beneficiaries there frequently was considerable banter about how in a few years the peasants would be rich and forestry engineers would be paupers by comparison. One community leader explained, "The trees will be like a mine upon which our children can draw (for wealth)." However, despite this universal optimism regarding the commercial potential of the trees, we could find no one who had specific knowledge or information on how this potential might be realized.

If the trees are to be commercialized successfully, several basic questions must be answered:

(1) What are the potential markets for the trees, how big are they, where are they located, and what sorts of processing facilities are needed if the trees produced in the PRAA program are to satisfy the demand potential markets might generate? Of the eleven plantation sites we visited, only one had a clear idea of where and how the trees would be commercialized. In that case, officials of SAIS Atahualpa (Cajamarca) reported that they already had signed a contract with the Paramonga Industrial Cooperative, which had agreed to purchase the trees at a guaranteed price.[1] In the other ten plantations,

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[1]We found the arrangement of this contract by SAIS officials highly laudatory. However, we were puzzled about why the Paramonga Industrial Cooperative would sign such a contract with a Cajamarca enterprise when forestry projects

respondents stated either that they had not thought about the matter, or that they assumed the PRAA program would handle the commercialization for them. Unfortunately, while PRAA officials are aware of the lack of knowledge about how the trees would be commercialized, and even cited it as a potential problem, they have not made any effort to acquire or disseminate the necessary information. The high expectations based upon no specific information that PRAA and other tree-planting projects have created was illustrated in Cajamarca, where we encountered a widespread rumor claiming that a paper mill has been slated for construction in the departmental capital, and that this will absorb most local production. However, those reporting this disagreed among themselves about the specific site on which the mill is to be built, the construction timetable, and about whether the project is being sponsored by the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, USAID, or some other agency. An equal number of people denied that plans for such a project existed. In any case, there is no information indicating what, if any, market exists for the trees, and no research or planning is being done to clarify the issue.

(2) Assuming that the potential exists for the trees to become an important income service for the beneficiary populations, what sorts of linkages need to be developed if they are to realize this potential? While the profitability of the trees over the long run has not been established, isolated stands of trees are being commercialized. However, a number of obstacles such as lack of market contacts and poor access to transport facilities prevents producers from fully realizing the economic potential that presently exists. For example, when CAP El Triunfo (Cajamarca) decided to sell a stand

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in Ancash are much closer, more easily accessible, and when Ancash producers already have strong socio-economic ties to Paramonga through past seasonal labor contracts. Unfortunately, we found no one who could provide the answer.

of trees. it dealt through a middleman, an ex-forestry engineer, who had th trees cut, and transported them to Chicalyo for sale. The price paid to th CAP was reported to be between S/.2.5 and 3 million, while the price received by the middleman in Chicalyo was reportedly between S/.18 and 20 million. If producers are to realize the full economic potential of their trees, they need assistance in gaining direct access to the markets. Sales such as the one made by CAP El Triunfo do bring a certain amount of money to producers, but they do nothing to improve the traditionally disadvantageous position they occupy vis à vis the regional marketing structure. The lack of access to markets for rural products has been one of the major causes of stagnating agricultural production and an important obstacle to the economic development of Peruvian highland communities, as numerous studies report (cf. Esculies Larrabure et al. 1977; Figueroa 1980). If the issue of marketing is not addressed promptly, the lack of market access by producers will undoubtedly thwart the development objectives of PRAA and heighten the underlying sense of alienation already evident throughout highland districts.

(3) What physical facilities need to be constructed or improved for plantations to be made accessible to harvesting operations? A large number of the plantations are located in relatively remote areas far from dirt "all weather" highways. Obviously this presents formidable difficulties for getting equipment in and trees out. For example, the plantations in communities of Cruz de Mayo, Tahuantinsuyo and Huaypán (Ancash) as well as those in Porcón Alto, Peña Blanca, and Unanca (Cajamarca) were chosen for visits by the evaluation team in part because of their relative accessibility. However, all are located on roads that proved challenging in good weather even for four-wheel-drive pick-up trucks. At the present time, they would prove difficult or even impassable to trucks large enough to carry out large logs.

The necessary work includes not only improving the principal roads themselves but reinforcing or replacing a large number of small inadequate bridges. Many of the plantations are located at considerable distances from existing roads and can be reached only on foot.

The developmental impact of PRAA could be greater if this aspect of the project was given more importance relative to the goal of planting the maximum number of trees. For example, in the Callejón de Huaylas (Ancash), communities on the side of the cordillera blanca tend to be considerably more prosperous than communities west of the Santa River on the side of the cordillera negra due to the availability of water. The greater abundance of water on the cordillera blanca also makes it easier to establish plantations quickly, and this is, in fact, where 71 percent of PRAA's plantations in the Callejón de Huaylas are located. Because of the more complex problems involved in providing trees planted on the slopes of the cordillera negra with adequate water, PRAA has tended to shy away from working there. However, the communities along the cordillera negra are those that would benefit the most from the firewood the reforestation project would provide, the erosion and water maintenance effects it would achieve, as well as from any increase in revenue that might result from the sale of trees. In addition, if PRAA provided assistance in establishing an adequate water system for the trees it also would yield "secondary" benefits in terms of greater agricultural production. Therefore, we feel that PRAA should consider giving greater priority to those communities that are located in presently unfavorable ecological areas such as the cordillera negra, even if this means reducing annual tree planting goals in order to realize longer term ecological and developmental gains.

Impact on social organization. The community organization impact of FFW

projects was emphasized heavily in the scope of work of the evaluation (see Appendix I). It is hoped that the groups formed around specific work projects will develop into organizations capable of promoting broader community interests. We found that the emphasis on community organization was not manifested in PRAA projects. Tables 5-4 and 5-5 indicate that improved community organization was not cited as a benefit of the project by either officials or beneficiaries.

We felt that, insofar as the PRAA projects provide an occasion upon which existing community organization structures are used, they may have a positive effect. However, the responses to our questions intended to elicit information on community organization do not constitute a ringing endorsement of this observation. When asked if the food aid received under the PRAA program had resulted in an increase, a decrease, or no change in the number of work projects undertaken, only seven of 34 officials interviewed felt that the number of projects had increased (see Table 5-6).

It also is unclear in what way PRAA contributes to the level of community participation. Of the eleven plantations visited, seven were community projects, two were projects of cooperative enterprises created during the agrarian reform (SAIS Atahualpa and CAP El Triunfo, in Cajamarca), and two were owned by groups of individual landowners. Beneficiaries at ten of the eleven plantations reported that they were persuaded to participate by presentations PRAA officials had made to them, the one exception being an individual landowner who had invited PRAA to talk to a group of neighbors after seeing a plantation elsewhere. In all eleven plantations, respondents stated that the project was directed by PRAA officials rather than by local leaders. We emphasize that PRAA was not forcing communities or individuals to plant trees, nor was it doing anything to stifle or undermine community leadership. However, we

Table 5-6

Impact of PRAA on the Number of Community Work Projects According to PRAA Officials

Response	Number of Responses		
	Ancash	Cajamarca	Total
More community projects	4	3	7
Same number of community projects	6	10	16
Fewer community projects	0	0	0
No response/don't know	8	3	11
	18	16	34

found no indications that PRAA is doing anything to promote community participation, so it certainly cannot be termed a success in that regard.

We identified two areas in which the PRAA program has the potential to have a very negative impact upon community organization: in those projects involving peasant communities (comunidades campesinas as opposed to SAIS Atahualpa and CAP El Triunfo), and in those involving individual landowners. If the commercialization of the trees becomes a reality, the issue of how the revenues are to be distributed may seriously damage community organization if the SEPAS social promoter does not help beneficiaries address it.

In some of the comunidades campesinas disagreements are developing over how the revenues from the plantations will be distributed. For example, the community of Cruz de Mayo (Ancash) has been working with the PRAA program for several years. The community is divided into 20 sectors of unequal resources, size, and population. Some of these sectors are helping to plant trees in other sectors which have large amounts of land available for the purpose. A number of the persons working in this fashion expect to share in any revenues resulting from their contribution to the other sectors, and they argue that these revenues are for the community as a whole. With their eyes on the great "mine" of future wealth, however, representatives of the larger sectors respond that the others were paid for their work with the food rations received under the PRAA program, and that any future revenues rightly belong to the sector of the community where the trees are harvested. Thus far, the community leadership has been unable to resolve the issue. The lines of disagreement were more clearly drawn in Cruz de Mayo than in any of the other seven comunidades campesinas we visited. However, in all of the comunidades campesinas, there was uncertainty and disagreement concerning the distribution of profits resulting from the PRAA projects.

Because of the historically-weak community structure in much of Cajamarca, the PRAA program there frequently has been obliged to work with individual property holders rather than with communities as a whole. In Cajamarca, 12.6 percent of the 1,325.2 hectares planted by PRAA is in the hands of individuals. This creates an additional administrative burden for PRAA by increasing the number of contracts it has to negotiate and administer. Usually in these cases. PRAA seeks to bring together groups of landowners whose fields are adjacent and work with them as a single association.

When working with individual landowners we feel that it is important for PRAA in general and the SEPAS social promoter in particular to be aware of the conflicts that can result from this practice. Individual landowners receive food that they use as wages to hire their neighbors to work for them. According to the landowners, the food rations constitute a jornal, or daily wage, and the people who receive them are peones. If everyone took turns working for everyone else, as happens in traditional patterns of labor exchange, this would not present a problem. However, based upon our conversations with beneficiaries in Porcón Alto and Peña Blanca, it appears that PRAA has created a situation where those landowners who, for whatever reason, do participate in the program can consistently employ those landowners who, for whatever reason, do not participate. Particularly if the trees do begin to produce significant revenues, there is a possibility of exacerbating or creating permanent inequalities in wealth distribution in these areas that can lead to highly conflictive social relations.

This possibility apparently has occurred to at least some of the participants in the PRAA program. On two separate occasions, when discussing their precautions against fire, beneficiaries mentioned fires started by envious neighbors as an area of concern. One beneficiary who had lost ten hectares of seedlings in a

fire speculated that envidia, or "envy," might have been the cause. In areas where PRAA is working with private landowners, the SEPAS social promoter as well as the field technicians need to pay particular attention to the relationships between beneficiaries and their neighbors who do not participate in the program. Such unwitting promotion of petty jealousies in resource-scarce environments will result in loss of the community cohesion that FFW projects are supposed to promote.

Contribution to infrastructure. PRAA does not at present make a substantial contribution to the creation of productive infrastructure in the areas it serves because it has given the tree-planting aspect of its operations the greatest priority. While the trees will undoubtedly have positive ecological effects, there is no necessary relationship between trees and increased productive and income-generating capabilities in the benefitted areas. Should PRAA choose to seriously pursue the stated goal of increasing income and food production among the rural poor, its impact could be considerable. For example, the upgrading and expanding of vehicular roads in order to permit logging operations also would undoubtedly provide an economic stimulus to many communities by improving their access to urban markets and to social services such as hospitals. An effective effort to help beneficiaries successfully commercialize their trees under favorable market conditions could provide beneficiaries with a source of revenue that would allow them to initiate infrastructural projects, if it were accompanied by an equally effective effort to help them resolve disputes about how the resulting revenues are to be distributed and invested.

Training and education. The PRAA program provides training in tree-planting and care, and in nutrition and food preparation. In the plantations, the tree-planting and care component revolves around the proper spacing and watering

of seedlings, and, in some cases, the construction of firebreaks. In the tree farms, training also involves seed selection, raising seedlings from trees, and replanting. Beneficiaries indicated that project officials had, in fact, reached almost everyone with their training efforts. In several sites, beneficiaries noted that they had tended to plant trees too close together in order to get more trees in a given area, and that the technicians had showed them how the value of their stands of trees would be enhanced with a broader spacing of trees. Obviously, this component of the education program is very important if the plantations are to be commercially viable; however, it does not have readily apparent utility beyond the immediate program.

Nutrition education is supposed to be an integral part of the PRAA program, through which beneficiaries receive instruction in the preparation of Title II foodstuffs and in general nutrition. As indicated in Table 5-7, most beneficiaries indicated that they had received some nutrition-related education under the PRAA program; however, only 2 of the 42 beneficiaries interviewed indicated that the education program they had received consisted of more than a demonstration of how to prepare the foodstuffs distributed in the program. These findings indicate that the ONAA nutritionists are mananging to visit most of the communities participating in PRAA, although we do not feel that the impact of these visits is very great. As noted in Chapter III, the nutritionists with whom we spoke stated that each one can be effective working in a maximum of six to eight sites per year, and the results of our interviews with beneficiaries indicated their estimate to be accurate.

C. Descriptive Evaluation of CARITAS

Overview of program successes. As noted in Chapters II and III, CARITAS is the PVO with the greatest amount of activity in the rural areas of Peru, both as a percentage of the total program and in terms of the absolute number

Table 5-7

Number of PRAA Beneficiaries Reporting that they Received Nutrition Education

Response	Ancash	Cajamarca	Total
Did receive	26	6	32
Did not receive	3	4	7
No response	2	1	3
Total	31	11	42

of beneficiaries. Both at the national and departmental levels, CARITAS officials showed a greater awareness of the larger political and economic context in which its programs operate than did the officials of the other PVOs. At the national level, program documents (CRS/CARITAS 1982) take explicit note of the fact that the per capita production of food staples has declined in recent years and that the 23,225 tons of Title II food provided by CARITAS can have little impact in alleviating the problems of food scarcity in Peru. By directing the bulk of its resources to the rural areas of the country, CARITAS is directing its resources to the area where economic conditions must be improved if Peru is to succeed in increasing its ability to feed itself and in reducing the flow of migrants to its urban centers. In terms of achieving its goal of reaching "the very lowest income groups" and "the most neglected sectors of Peruvian society" (CRS/CARITAS 1982:11), CARITAS is aiming its programs in the right direction.

In both Ancash and Cajamarca, officials stated that they try to emphasize projects that contribute to increasing food production, generating income, or improving health by reducing morbidity and mortality rates. The constraints upon these projects were said to include inadequate personnel, both in terms of numbers of people and training, to properly evaluate project proposals and supervise their execution at the level of the departmental offices, and a lack of concensus among the priests and nuns of the different parishes about the way FFW can or should fit into their activities. We concur in their assessment of the constraints under which CARITAS must operate. However, we feel that there are areas in which the FFW projects in the highlands can be improved which will allow them to serve their beneficiary populations more effectively while operating within those constraints. We shall try to point out those areas in the course of the discussion that follows.

In spite of their limitations, the scale of CARITAS FFW operations in the highlands is impressive. For example, CARITAS/Huaraz concluded 240 FFW projects in the seven provinces of Ancash for which it is responsible from 1979 through 1982. These projects involved some 11,659 beneficiaries, who received 4,131,920 kilograms of food. As of May 31, 1983, CARITAS/Huaraz had 57 FFW projects in progress which involved the participation of 3,169 beneficiaries. This workload is handled by eight central staff members, at least three of whom are volunteers who do not receive a regular salary. This same staff is also responsible for CARITAS/Huaráz's MCH and other feeding programs. These figures illustrate well the large impact the CARITAS FFW programs in the highlands have had with only modest human resources. They also indicate the limits of CARITAS' capacity to supervise and monitor the projects it undertakes.

Food distribution and nutrition. With its complete monthly food ration of 22.5 kilograms per beneficiary household, CARITAS provides its FFW beneficiaries with a smaller amount of food than any of the other three PVOs. Interviews with program officials revealed two reasons why they generally feel it is a good policy. First, the smaller ration reduces the possibility that it will become more than a food supplement for beneficiary households and helps insure that they do not become dependent on it. Secondly, the smaller ration is in keeping with the general CARITAS practice of trying to reach as many people as possible through its programs; the smaller ration means that the food can be divided among more people.

Thus, it appears that the CARITAS food ration has less nutritional and economic impact upon beneficiary households than does the ration provided by SEPAS under the PRAA program. If we accept the mean household size of five people upon which the PVOs base their calculations, the CARITAS ration

represents an additional 4.5 kilograms of cereals and grains per person during each month of participation in a CARITAS project. If on the other hand, we accept our mean household size of 6.8 people calculated on the basis of an opportunistic sample of beneficiaries as being more characteristic of the socio-economic strata at which Title II food assistance is aimed, then the CARITAS ration represents only an additional 3.3 kilograms of food per person during each month of participation in a project.

At the time of the evaluation, the market value of the monthly CARITAS food ration was S/.19,500. Thus, expressed in terms of kilograms, CARITAS ration is 47 percent as large as the ration provided by SEPAS through the PRAA program; however, compared in terms of market value, the CARITAS monthly ration is worth only 37 percent as much as the SEPAS monthly ration (S/.52,450; see discussion of PRAA above). This is because, in addition to being smaller, the CARITAS ration is more heavily weighted toward the less expensive commodities provided by Title II. Based upon the market value of S/.19,500, the CARITAS ration represents a value equivalent to between 28 and 39 percent of the monthly salary of highlanders who manage to find a job that approaches full-time employment.

As in the case of PRAA, we could find no evidence of CARITAS foodstuffs being sold or exchanged by beneficiaries. The 21 beneficiaries interviewed all stated that they consume the food at home, and that they knew nothing of other beneficiaries exchanging food for other goods. A number of beneficiaries stated that, because of the market value of the ration and the small number of people who would be able to buy food anyway, this would be a "poor business" in which to become involved. Responses by CARITAS officials echoed those of beneficiaries, and these are summarized in Table 5-8.

We could not find evidence that the CARITAS FFW projects compete with

Table 5-8

Use of Food Ration by CARITAS Beneficiaries According to Program Officials

Response	Number of Response		
	Incash	Cajamarca	Total
Sell and exchange	0	1	1
Consume and neither sell nor exchange	7	2	9
Give to animals*	3	0	3
Might sell, but there is no economic advantage	9	0	9
No response	0	0	0
Totals	19	3	21

*All three responses refer to cases where food had spoiled.

wage labor opportunities. As noted earlier, one of the purposes of the small ration size is to make sure that this does not occur, and many beneficiaries noted that the food ration is offered to them as a stimulus rather than as a form of wages in kind. CARITAS differs in this respect from PRAA, whose beneficiaries frequently (and unfavorably) compared their food ration to a wage.

CARITAS and PRAA projects frequently operate in close proximity to one another -- in some cases the same community -- so that beneficiaries are aware of FFW projects that offer larger rations than CARITAS. However, this does not adversely affect participation in the CARITAS program. In part, this may reflect the current economic and harvest crisis in that the people are compelled to accept help from where they can get it without the luxury of choosing among programs. Had this been the major explanation, we would have expected to have heard complaints about CARITAS. However, we did not hear any such complaints, even when we tried to provoke them. In fact, CARITAS beneficiaries differed from PRAA beneficiaries in that the majority of CARITAS beneficiaries characterized the food ration as adequate (34 of 42 PRAA beneficiaries said the ration is too small; see discussion of PRAA above). Their responses are summarized in Table 5-9.

The explanation for this appears to be that, in CARITAS programs, beneficiaries view food assistance as an incentive to work together on a project that they themselves would like to do. CARITAS selects the projects it supports from proposals submitted by communities, whereas ten of the eleven plantations visited were established in response to presentations by PRAA officials that "sold" communities on the idea. Under these circumstances, CARITAS beneficiaries appear less likely than their PRAA counterparts to regard the food ration as compensation for working at the behest of someone else.

In spite of the apparent contrast in how beneficiaries perceive the food

Table 5-9

Responses of CARITAS Beneficiaries
Regarding Adequacy of Food Ration

Response	Number of Responses		
	Ancash	Cajamarc	Total
Ration is adequate	9	2	11
Ration is too small	6	0	6
Don't know/no response	4	1	5
Total	19	3	22

ration, we found that one of the factors that diminished the potential impact of the food received by PRAA beneficiaries also is at work in the case of CARITAS.[1] Like PRAA, CARITAS does not allocate food to a project on the basis of how many people in a community actually will participate. Rather, it does so on the basis of its own estimate of the labor requirements of the project and its calculation of how much food is available. Of the 22 CARITAS beneficiaries interviewed, 19 indicated that every household with able-bodied adult members is expected to participate in a community work project. As in the case of PRAA, more people are working than project rosters indicate because community leaders do not have the authority to call upon some households to work and not upon others. Thus, the already small ration is diluted. As discussed earlier, if the project is being completed and the community is working well together, this may not be a bad situation from the point of view of community organization and development; however, any claims about the nutritional impact of FFW clearly are misplaced under such circumstances.

We were disturbed by how arbitrary the calculation of labor requirements and, hence, food allotments can be. For example, in the district of Jangas (Ancash), we visited four CARITAS FFW projects: two road-building projects, a health post construction project, and a school construction project. In all four, there were more people working than indicated on the project rosters, and, in all four, beneficiaries reported that they were going to have their food allotment reduced because the local priest had decided that there was a "surplus of labor," a position that had left people visibly upset. We did not have the opportunity to discuss the beneficiaries' concerns with the priest.

[1] As has already been discussed, the potential impact of the food itself is less in the case of CARITAS than in the case of PRAA because the ration is so much smaller. This discussion refers to additional dilution of the impact of food provided by CARITAS.

So, we did not confirm the degree to which they were based in fact, nor did we find out what motivation the priest might have had for reducing the food allotment, if indeed that was his plan. We were concerned because changes apparently were being made in projects without consulting the communities, and without clearly communicating the reasons for the changes. This sort of action threatens the high level of community participation that is one of the strengths of CARITAS FFW projects.

Significance for development. In general, CARITAS officials and beneficiaries agree on the benefits associated with FFW that motivate community participation. The two benefits cited most frequently in the interviews we conducted are the structures built through FFW and the food incentive to participate (see Tables 5-10 and 5-11). We found that these responses reflect a general attitude that a structure -- any structure -- is a good thing in and of itself, and that neither beneficiaries nor CARITAS officials give much thought to what specific benefits will derive from a particular structure after it is complete. Thus, when communities plan projects and when CARITAS decides which projects it will support, there is a tendency to consider only the prospects that the community has of completing the construction itself and to neglect considering which projects offer the greatest potential for contributing to community development.

Two factors appear to lie behind this tendency. One is the need felt by CARITAS officials to use the FFW program as a vehicle for distributing food to the poor rather than as a vehicle for promoting development. That is, the development merits of a project frequently appear to take second place to "neediness" as defined by CARITAS officials at the departmental level. Thus, if a community is needy and if it appears to have a reasonably good chance of completing the project it proposes successfully, CARITAS tends to be as

Table 5-10

Benefits that Motivate Community Participation in CARITAS FFW According to Program Officials

Benefit	Number of Times Cited*		
	Ancash	Cajamarca	Total
Structure being built	9	1	10
Food supplement	5	3	8
Greater productivity	3	0	3
No benefits	2	0	2
Improved community organization	0	1	1

*Number of times cited in interviews with 22 officials.

Table 5-11

Major Benefits of CARITAS FFW According to Beneficiaries

Benefit	Number of times cited		
	Ancash	Cajamarca	Total
Structure being built	14	2	16
Food supplement	11	2	13
Improved community organization	1	0	1

*Number of times cited in interviews with 21 beneficiaries.

favorably disposed as its food stores will allow. Little emphasis is placed on comparing the project proposals of different communities and evaluating them in terms of the development implications, or in assisting communities to plan and implement projects that thave the potential of directly improving their ability to provide for their own material needs. We had the opportunity to visit several FFW projects that were making substantial contributions to community development, but these appeared to result as much from the community members already sharing a common vision of what was needed to be done as from any promotion of development by CARITAS.

A second factor underlying the tendency to regard the completion of any structure as development is community reaction to CARITAS' practice of focusing upon neediness and the chances that the community will simply complete the project. Communities tend to propose projects that are "safe," that is, projects in which they have lots of experience and that do not tax either their technical or their organizational skills. The result is that a large number of projects involve the construction of roads, health posts, and school buildings that do not have clear development implications. We emphasize that we are not "against" roads, schools, or health posts; however, insofar as community development is a goal, these may not be the best kinds of projects to receive CARITAS' limited resources.

In the first place, communities have been doing precisely these sorts of projects since long before food assistance programs were instituted. A community development survey conducted in the early 1960s found that most rural communities regularly undertook these projects with no outside assistance (Dobyns, Doughty, and Holmberg 1965). If the food is to be a stimulus to development, then it should stimulate people to undertake projects that they have not been able to undertake before, and the role of CARITAS should be to

provide the technical and organizational support necessary to help them succeed. There undoubtedly are cases in which, for a variety of reasons, a community has not been able to undertake a school, road, or health post without assistance, and in these cases FFW support may be just the incentive needed. However, we suspect that a large number of the CARITAS-supported projects of this type may simply represent both the community and the PVO following the path of least resistance.

A second problem with some CARITAS projects, particularly the schools and health posts, is that the PVO did not demonstrate the organizational capacity to make them work. As was discussed in Chapter III, in contrast to CARE and SEPAS, CARITAS support of a school building or health post project does not mean that, upon completion, these edifices will be staffed and equipped. For example, we visited a school construction project in the community of Atupa (Ancash). Two school buildings already had been constructed, one of which contained virtually no students' desks and appeared to function primarily as an office for the community's one teacher and as a storage room. The people with whom we spoke said they hoped the third building would enable them to have a second teacher assigned to the community, but they had no assurance that this would happen. Staffing and equipment problems such as these are not CARITAS' fault; rather they are "givens" that any project in Peru must treat. However, we feel that, because its resources are limited, CARITAS should limit its support of projects such as schools and health posts to those cases in which either it can insure that staff and equipment will be provided, or that the community making a request for support can demonstrate that it has made the necessary arrangements.

The contrasting cases of Marcará (Ancash) and Porcon Bajo (Cajamarca) illustrate well the positive developmental impact that CARITAS FFW can have

when projects are planned with community development in mind, as well as the lack of impact they can have when food distribution and the successful completion of construction are permitted to become ends in themselves. Marcará is a district located in the Callejón de Huaylas approximately 30 kilometers north of the departmental capital of Huaráz. Locally, it has a long-standing reputation as one of the most backward and socially repressive places in the area. Prior to the agrarian reform it was the site of several haciendas that operated in the classic Andean manorial tradition. The social distinctions between "whites," "mestizos," and "Indians" were vigorously enforced. Even after the agrarian reform had abolished the hacienda system, the people residing on the former estates were subject to abuses such as being forced to sell their produce to members of the elite in the district capital at less-than-market prices, or being coerced into performing domestic service duties in their homes. As might be expected in such an environment, feuding factions and intense interpersonal rivalries were rife, and Marcará was notable for the lack of development efforts it initiated. The district capital -- also called Marcará -- was the last town in the region to establish electric service, for example.

However, in the late 1970s or early 1980s, a young, energetic priest arrived. Over time he was able to convince the local population that there was more to gain by working together than by internal competition for extremely scarce resources. The priest, the mayor of Marcará, and several other local leaders have used CARITAS FFW projects to enhance the ability of the district to take charge of its own development strategy.

When we visited Marcará we saw several CARITAS FFW projects which had been operating for various periods of time. These included a brick yard, located in one of the rural communities outside of the town, a marketplace construction

project, and a bee-keeping operation. CARITAS also was helping to sponsor a program that provides subsidized lunches to 40 of the district's poorest school children. A number of other projects that did not receive FFW support from CARITAS also were in progress. These included a street-paving project and an irrigation canal project in which two communities from Marcará were working with communities from a neighboring district (the latter project was reported to be receiving support from CARE). In addition, concrete plans had been laid for undertaking a number of other projects, including a civic center, a new building to house the school lunch program, improvements on school buildings, and an auto repair center. Marcará also was playing host to a Dutch agronomist and an anthropologist who were conducting research on ways to improve hillside agriculture. Despite the abysmal economic situation of Peru and the crop failure experienced in the region, everyone in Marcará with whom we spoke exuded excitement and optimism.

Community leaders had planned the CARITAS FFW projects so that these would accomplish several purposes:

(1) increase the capacity of the community to generate the resources needed to initiate and sustain development efforts;

(2) be mutually reinforcing in terms of the resources each project would make available for other projects; and

(3) improve the organizational capacity of the district by drawing upon increasingly large numbers of people to perform increasingly complex tasks.

For example, the brickyard, which is a "completed" project no longer receiving CARITAS support, supplies the brick for the construction of the marketplace in the district capital at no charge, in return for which the community with the brickyard will get preferential access to market stalls. The marketplace will

benefit the entire district by reducing the distance people from Marcará currently must travel to attend a market by generating revenues for the district through market fees, and by allowing people to spend money within their home district rather than elsewhere. It may actually attract revenues from other areas if people from neighboring districts find Marcará a convenient place to go to market.

The bee-keeping project has similar spin-off effects which have significance extending beyond the project itself. In the first place, the people managing the hives received proper training from experts from the National Agrarian University, La Molina, so they are now able to instruct members of the local population who want to start private beehives as a way of diversifying their small farm production systems. We were informed that this aspect of the project has generated widespread interest throughout the Callejón De Huaylas. In addition, the revenues generated by honey sales are added to district funds used to buy foodstuffs that supplement CARITAS' contribution to the school lunch program, buy building materials for the market, street paving and church expansion projects, and pay the salaries of specialists hired to supervise the construction projects.

In Marcará, the CARITAS projects are near the center of an ever-expanding circle of efforts in which households from every community of the district participate. As the projects have grown in number and complexity, so too has grown the confidence of the population in its own ability to undertake projects unassisted. We asked the project officials and beneficiaries with whom we spoke about whether or not they had received outside support for the projects they plan to begin in the near future. We were told that support has been requested from CARITAS as well as from Peruvian government agencies, but that nothing was difinite. "It will be good if we receive help," the mayor told us, "because knowing that someone else is interested in what happens to you is a powerful

stimulus in itself. But, by now we know what needs to be done and we will find a way to do it."

The contrast between what has been accomplished with the help of CARITAS FFW in Marcara and what has been accomplished in the Cajamarca community of Porcón Bajo could hardly be greater. Like Marcara, Porcon Bajo has earned local notoriety as a particularly poor and backward place. Unlike Marcará, however, there is nothing happening in Porcón Bajo that portends a change in that reputation.

Porcón Bajo is also different from Marcará with regard to the source of its reputation. Until about 30 years ago, the present-day community formed part of a large estate, Porcón, which was owned by the Beneficient Society of Cajamarca. The rents extracted from the resident peasant population were used by the society to support charitable institutions such as hospitals and orphanages. Sometime around the early 1950s, Porcón was purchased by an organization interested in commercial livestock production. The upper and lower halves of the estate, Porcón Alto and Porcón Bajo, respectively, were divided. Porcón Alto shipped wool and other animal products to the coast and abroad, while Porcón Bajo, which had previously pastured livestock in the upper half of the estate and earned income by performing trading and weaving services of the people there, found itself cut off from these resources. Local trade and exchange declined and Porcón Bajo became poorer and poorer.

CARITAS in Cajamarca cited Porcón Bajo as an example of the many poverty-stricken areas that CARITAS seeks to assist through its projects. When we visited the community, we found that CARITAS had sponsored a number of FFW projects there, including the construction of a soccer field, drinking water canal, a road, and two wells. There also was a CARITAS MCH project in the community.

Yet, in spite of the concentration of projects in a single community -- as compared to an entire district in the case of Marcará -- we were hard-pressed to find any way in which Porcón Bajo could be said to have developed as a result. The water supply remained woefully inadequate, and the community was engaged in a reservoir construction project -- with food assistance from ONAA -- on the day of our visit. The water situation appeared to be a particularly unhappy example of wasted effort due to the time and energy that had been expended on the construction of a canal as a CARITAS FFW project. The canal extends approximately 18 kilometers to a spring above the community, is 30-40 centimeters deep, and about 20 centimeters wide, and its construction required the labor of teams ranging from 50 to 70 people, working six days a week for approximately a year and a half. Yet, after all this effort, only a desultory trickle of foul-smelling, polluted water reached Porcón Bajo. Most of the water leaving the spring was lost due to seepage into the ground, evaporation, and consumption by people and animals above the community, as the canal was unlined and uncovered. The flow of water into Porcón Bajo was so small that the community had a schedule specifying when each household could remove water from the canal, and as we followed the canal upward we observed it being polluted with animal waste and garbage

The situation of the other projects was little better. When we asked about the road construction project, which according to beneficiaries occupied 30 people, working six days a week for six months, we were told that it "really does not go anywhere," and that its primary purpose was to make it easier for the local teachers to reach the school. We found the soccer field lacking about 20 meters of width and 30 meters of length for completion. After the community had received food support for five months of work on the field, the food stopped and so did the work. Community leaders explained that Porcón Bajo is too poor

to continue working on a project without outside assistance. Interestingly, no one knew why they had stopped receiving food and no one had gone to CARITAS to find out, although from what we could piece together, it appeared that the original work plan filed with CARITAS had been for five months and the community had failed to have it extended or renewed.

In contrast to Marcará, the atmosphere in Porcón Bajo bordered on desperation. Beneficiaries stated that the community has been suffering from a long-term decline in agricultural productivity and that this year's crop failure had left them critically short of food. They were actively soliciting ideas for FFW and other food assistance projects, although they stated a preference for agencies other than CARITAS that would provide larger food rations. The projects they already had completed had not produced any benefit that helped Porcón Bajo deal with the crisis in which we found it. The comparison of Marcará and Porcón Bajo illustrates several points very well:

(1) Successfully completing a construction project or even a lot of construction projects does not mean that a community has developed in any way. What is important in developmental terms is what happens after the project has been completed. In this regard, a successful FFW project should make a material contribution to the resource base of a community that can be channelled into other activities, as the brickyard facilitates the construction of the market in Marcara, for example. It also should contribute to community organizational capacity, not by involving large groups of people in work projects of the same sort that they have been involved in for years, but by taking communities through an increasingly complex series of activities that foster cooperation and dependence upon one another rather than on outside resources.

(2) Promoting development in this way requires planning and leadership. Marcará is fortunate to have local people who provide those things. Why, after

so many years of doing very little for itself, the district coalesced around this particular group of people is a fascinating question that deserves study; however, we were unable to address it in the limited time available. Unhappily, most areas do not share the good fortune of Marcará. For CARITAS, this means that if development is to be more than a serendipitous event, it must either seek out communities that are similarly well-endowed with local leaders as is Marcará and concentrate its efforts there, or it must equip itself to provide the necessary planning and leadership services to communities that are not as fortunate as Marcará.

(3) CARITAS as an institution needs to decide if the purpose of FFW is to be a welfare program or a development program. We do not feel that CARITAS FFW is an appropriate vehicle for a welfare program intended to provide food supplements to hungry people. As indicated earlier, our opinion is that the food ration is too small to be effective for this purpose, particularly given the way in which distribution patterns reduce the amount of food that a given individual is likely to receive. If FFW is to function as a development program, then project selection needs to be based on how a particular project will contribute to development, rather than primarily on impressions of neediness and how likely a community is to complete construction activities. We stress that this does not mean that CARITAS should abandon its purpose of helping the neediest sectors of Peru's population. In every project we visited, the beneficiary populations were needy. But, CARITAS does not have the resources to attend to all of Peru's needy people, and it already makes choices about whom it will help and whom it will not. CARITAS/Huaraz accepts about 40 percent of the proposals it receives, and CARITAS/Cajamarca accepts about 80 percent. Given the level of poverty in rural Peru in general and in Ancash and Cajamarca in particular, CARITAS can assume that most communities are truly needy by any

measure that one would care to use. It also can assume that most communities have the capacity to follow through on the construction of any project they propose to undertake, because the long tradition of community work projects undertaken without food aid has given the communities experience in this are and because the existence of a formal agreement in which a community agrees to perform a specified task in return for assistance is in itself a powerful incentive to complete the work. Of the 19 CARITAS FFW projects we visited in the highlands, there was only one, the soccer field in Porcon Bajo, in which there appeared to be a question of a community failing to do what it said it would in a specified time, or failing to appropriately amend the original agreement. What CARITAS cannot assume is that the existence of a project is a contribution to development. The development contribution comes after the work has been completed, and it depends on the quality of leadership, whether provided locally or by CARITAS, and whether there is a material benefit that will encourage people to try other, more ambitious projects -- something that an empty school building or an inadequately-constructed water system do not provide.

Impact on social organization. As shown in Tables 5-10 and 5-11, improved community organization is a benefit that was cited only once in interviews with 22 CARITAS officials in Ancash and Cajamarca, and only once in interviews with CARITAS beneficiaries in those departments. Whether this is because departmental and local officials and beneficiaries are concerned with more immediate aspects of project implementation and management and do not articulate the issue in this way, or whether this is an accurate reflection of a feeling that CARITAS FFW does not contribute much to social organization, we are unsure.

The CARITAS FFW officials with whom we spoke seemed considerably more certain than their PRAA counterparts that the number of community work projects

undertaken has increased as a result of their efforts. Of the 22 officials interviewed, 17 said the number of community work projects has increased as a result of CARITAS FFW (see Table 5-12). If we assume that the officials' assessment is accurate, and accept that an increase in the number of projects that a community undertakes indicates a corresponding increase in organizational skills, then CARITAS may be having a greater impact than the responses regarding program benefits would indicate.

Certainly some of the CARITAS projects do make a positive contribution to improving the organizational abilities of beneficiaries. In the case of Marcará, discussed above, this contribution was the result of the increasing number and complexity of the projects undertaken. Not only were increasingly large numbers of people from the different communities being called upon to work together with greater frequency, but the number of people performing leadership roles in the various projects also appeared to be growing as the initial core of community leaders found it necessary to delegate authority.

Another CARITAS FFW project which appeared to be contributing to community organization was the large irrigation project of Huaypish. Extending a distance of 27 kilometers, the project involves the labor of 13 communities who will use the project upon its completion. FFW provided a stimulus that helped bring the communities together to work on the project, and the management of the project, upon completion and coordinating such activities as water allocation and maintenance, promises to provide a mechanism that will keep the communities working together.

Our finding regarding the contribution of CARITAS FFW to social organization parallels our finding regarding community development. The FFW projects can provide an important positive stimulus; however, at the present time, CARITAS is not systematically doing anything to foster this aspect of the program, and

Table 5-12

Impact of CARITAS on the Number of Community Work Projects

According to CARITAS Officials

Response	Number of Responses		
	Anchash	Cajamarca	Total
More community projects	10	1	17
Same number of Community projects	2	0	2
Fewer community projects	0	0	0
No response/don't know	1	2	3
Total	19	3	22

whether improvements in social organization occur or not as a result of FFW is largely a product of fortuitous circumstances.

Contribution to infrastructure. As one might suspect from the preceding discussion, CARITAS' contribution to rural infrastructure is highly variable. CARITAS appears to work from the position that anything that is successfully constructed under FFW is a contribution to infrastructure. This is closely related to the way we have described its approach to community development and social organization. Thus, a project is successful if, at the conclusion of a determined time period an appropriate structure has been erected and food has been distributed with no major problem. Approaching FFW in this fashion means that there are very few failures. It also means that there is no way for CARITAS to learn from its experience and improve upon the services it offers because the evaluation criteria are internal to each project. A project to dig a canal to bring drinking water to a community is successful even if, because of inadequate design and construction, the water arriving in the community is polluted and insufficient in quantity. Furthermore, it is just as successful as a brickyard that supplies high-quality building materials to other community construction projects. In both cases, the structure that the beneficiaries said would be there is there, and the food CARITAS said it would distribute was distributed.

Regarding infrastructure, we repeat what we already have said with reference to community development and social organization. FFW projects can make a contribution to improving rural infrastructure, in terms of the structures that are created under the projects themselves and in terms of the works that may "spin off" from those projects. For example, in the hamlet of Jahua (Ancash), CARITAS FFW has provided the stimulus that allowed the population to complete the construction of a road connecting it with the district capital, a project

that previously had been considered too difficult. The first use of the road will be to allow trucks to haul in building materials needed for the constructio of several other projects within Jahua.

However, CARITAS has no capacity to learn from its successful experiences in order to apply this knowledge elsewhere. This is an important capacity to develop because there is no list of "right" projects. As we noted earlier, for example, rural communities in Peru have a long tradition of building roads without food assistance. Therefore, in general, we are skeptical of using FFW for road building. However, in the case of Jahua, for whatever reason a needed road had not been built, and its completion with FFW support has stimulated a flurry of community activity. This contrasts sharply with th road-building project in Porcón Bajo, which, in our opinion, was clearly a "make-work" effort.

Thus, we regard CARITAS' contribution to infrastructure through FFW as spotty. The number of structures completed under its sponsorship is impressive; but the value of those structures to the different beneficiary populations varies tremendously. The successes are more the result of serendipity than design, reflecting the lack of a needed capacity to plan and evaluate projects.

Training and education. The only explicit and systematic training component of CARITAS FFW in the highlands is in the area of nutrition education, although in some projects, a number of beneficiaries are obtaining skills in community development. This was most clearly the case in Marcará, where the expanding network of projects was causing a growing number of people to assume leadership positions. Likewise, beneficiaries are learning construction skills in many of the projects, although it is not clear how many would not have learned these anyway in the normal course of events without FFW. The teaching of community development and organization or construction skills is not part of the CARITAS

FFW program, but depends upon a combination of luck, osmosis, and local initiative.

Nutrition education, however, is an explicit part of the program, and CARITAS nutritionists, many of whom are unpaid volunteers, attempt to deliver the component to all FFW projects. The nutritionists appear to be successful in reaching most beneficiaries. Of the 22 beneficiaries interviewed, 19 reported that they had received some nutrition education as part of their participation in CARITAS FFW (see Table 5-13).

Unfortunately, we were not able to evaluate how this component is carried out in the field. The nutritionists interviewed stated that the classes are intended to increase the general awareness of the population of problems relating to health and nutrition over which beneficiaries can exert some control. They also stated that they attempt to emphasize how the food supplied through FFW can be used to supplement locally-produced staples in order to introduce more variety into the diet, and they stressed that they consider an important part of this work to consist of promoting local foodstuffs. However, we could not confirm that this content is in fact imparted through our interview with beneficiaries. Although the nutritionists try to visit each beneficiary community three times per year, inadequate staff and transportation make this more of a goal than a reality. They simply are not able to spend enough time with beneficiaries to make a very large impression.

D. Summary and Conclusions Regarding FFW in the Highlands

Both the PRAA program and CARITAS FFW are succeeding in fulfilling major aspects of their stated goals. PRAA is reforesting land at an impressive rate and providing a large food ration to program participants. CARITAS is using food as a stimulus for the construction of numerous buildings, roads, and other structures. Both programs are staffed by many able and dedicated people who, within the constraints imposed upon them, do their jobs well. Both programs

Table 5-13

Number of CARITAS Beneficiaries Reporting That They Received Nutrition Education

Response	Number of Responses		
	Ancash	Cajamarca	Total
Did receive	16	3	19
Did not receive	2	0	2
No response	1	0	1
Total	19	3	22

illustrate that FFW can be an effective means of organizing grass roots efforts at community development, the strengthening of social organization, and the creation of productive infrastructure.

In the case of PRAA, the potential for FFW in these areas remains largely unrealized. This is in large part because the major contributions of the project, including the ecological contributions, must await the maturation of the trees, the first of which were planted in 1979. However, we could not detect any serious effort by PRAA at the program level to capitalize upon the potential it has created. Planting the maximum possible extensions of trees has tended to monopolize attention so that basic questions about how those trees will benefit the people on whose land they are planted have not been answered.

A vast market is assumed to exist for the trees that have been planted, and extravagant claims are made regarding the wealth that will accrue to beneficiaries through lumber rates. Indeed, this is the basis upon which the PRAA program has been "sold" to many of its beneficiaries. But, factors such as the location, size, and any special requirements this market may in terms of tree varieties or processing facilities have not been identified and, in fact, the very existence of the market has not been established. No plans have been made to assist beneficiaries in the commercialization of their trees, in spite of the fact that they lack the means of transporting them, that there presently are no processing facilities such as saw mills, and that disadvantageous access to markets has long been recognized as an obstacle to the economic improvement of the lives of rural dwellers. There has been no effort to improve rural infrastructure, specifically as this regards roads and bridges capable of supporting logging trucks. Most of the plantations we visited are not presently accessible by such vehicles.

Finally, assuming that these problems are overcome, no preparations have been made to help beneficiaries deal with the problems that will arise from a sudden in-flow of money. Basically, there are two problems which, if the commercialization of trees generates the revenues that beneficiaries have been told it will, threaten to negate the benefits that PRAA might bring to communities. The first has to do with how peasant communities will invest the funds so that all members benefit, and the second with how revenues can be kept from creating or exacerbating inequities in the distribution of resources. Overcoming these problems is a function of more effective social promotion and, as indicated in Chapter II, PRAA has been spending less than half the money budgeted for social promotion for that purpose.

PRAA has proven that FFW can be used effectively to plant trees. If PRAA is to succeed as a development program, it must direct attention and resources to insuring that the beneficiary populations are able to realize the economic benefits that have been promised. We recommend that the program be required to spend monies earmarked for social promotion for that purpose. We further recommend that the portion of OPG funds allocated for social promotion be increased, even if this means reducing support to other areas and forcing a slowing of tree-planting activities. Social promotion funds need to be spent on locating markets for wood products, assisting communities in gaining access to those markets, making the necessary improvements in roads and bridges for logging operations to occur, and assisting areas in planning how they will spend revenues resulting from lumber sales.

The strength of the CARITAS FFW program is that it stimulates a very large number of work projects with small food rations. The program illustrates that food can be used to stimulate useful projects without providing large rations that may discourage local food production and compete with local employment

opportunities. CARITAS appears to be able to stimulate participation with small ration sizes because most of the projects arise from local initiatives.

The major problem with the CARITAS program is that it appears to have a very haphazard approach to which projects it elects to support and which it turns down. This appears to result from "institutional schizophrenia" regarding whether FFW is supposed to be a mechanism for stimulating development or a means of dispensing food to the needy. Thus, while we saw projects that made significant contributions to community development, social organization, and the creation of infrastructure, we also saw others that did not hold much promise of contributing in any of these areas. We recommend that CARITAS stop trying to use FFW as a dispensation of charity because the small ration size and the difficulties in targeting food to the most nutritionally at-risk members of the population will always prevent such efforts from being more than a token gesture. We are aware that in the present context of crop failure and economic crisis the pressure to provide food in any way possible to hungry people is enormous. But, for the reasons discussed in Chapter IV and in the discussion of the nutritional impact of CARITAS FFW in this chapter, we do not feel that FFW accomplishes this task very well. We recommend that the supplemental food programs discussed in Chapter IV be used for aiding the hungry.

CARITAS can improve the developmental impact of FFW in two ways. First, it can increase its own institutional capacity to assist beneficiaries in planning and implementing the projects they propose. Such a capacity would help communities such as Porcón Bajo to avoid spending large amounts of time and effort on a project only to find their expectations frustrated because of inadequate planning and construction. Secondly, CARITAS can target its support to those areas that show themselves to have dynamic, capable local leadership, such as in Marcará, rather than attempting to scatter its programs as broadly

as possible across the countryside, as it presently does. These two approaches are not mutually exclusive, but insofar as CARITAS finds that it cannot increase its planning and monitoring capabilities, following the second approach becomes more important, because with encouragement, local leaders can fill the planning and monitoring role that CARITAS does not.

Food For Work in Lima

A. Introduction

We evaluated 14 FFW projects in Lima, including four operated by CARE and ten by OFASA. As was the case in the highlands, the sample was opportunistic. It represented a compromise between sites suggested by officials in the Lima offices of CARE and OFASA and sites that we found we could reach within the time constraints imposed by the need to visit CARITAS MCH projects as well a the FFW projects of CARE and OFASA.

The four CARE projects included two health posts constructed under the auspices of the PIBA program and two tree-planting projects. The ten OFASA projects involved a number of construction projects, all of which were accompanied by a training component in addition to nutrition education. The FFW projects visited in Lima are summarized in Table 5-14. While visiting these projects, we interviewed 69 people, 53 of whom were beneficiaries and 16 of whom were associated with the projects in an official capacity. Table 5-15 breaks down the interviews conducted by PVO and by whether the interviewees were beneficiaries or officials.

The mean household size among the beneficiaries interviewed in Lima was seven people. This is similar to the mean household size of 6.8 people recorded for the highlands. In contrast to the highlands, however, 94 percent of the FFW beneficiaries interviewed were women (97 percent of the highland beneficiaries

Table 5-14

Tabulation of Lima FFW Projects Visited

PVO	Project Type	Number Visited
CARE	Health center	2
	Tree planting	2
	Total CARE Projects	4
OFASA		4
		2
		1
		1
		1
		1
	Total OFASA Projects	10
	TOTAL FFW PROJECTS VISITED IN LIMA	14

Table 5-15

Lima FFW Interviews by PVO and by Interview Type

PVO	No. of Beneficiary Interviews	No. of Official Interviews	Total
CARE	8	8	16
OFASA	45	9	54
Total	53	17	70

interviewed were men). This reflects a major difference between FFW in the highlands and in Lima. In the capital city, men tend to leave the Young Towns during the day, either to work or to search for work. Their participation in community projects is largely limited to weekends and holidays, so their regular involvement in FFW activities is low. Women, on the other hand, tend to be confined to their neighborhoods in the Young Towns for a number of reasons, including the need to care for children and protect family property, as well as by the grim reality that, however dismal the employment situation may be for men, it is even worse for women.

For purposes of conducting interviews we assumed the FFW projects to be similar throughout the Young Towns of Lima. On that basis we decided to visit only the northern and southern cone areas. Members of the team had more personal familiarity with the northern and southern cones then with those east and west of the city, so we could orient ourselves and find the sites we had selected for interviews more easily than would have been possible in the eastern and western cones. In addition, limiting ourselves to two cones allowed us to spend more time with project beneficiaries and officials than would have been the case otherwise.

B. Descriptive Evaluation of CARE

Overview of program successes. The major success of CARE in its FFW activities is that it does seem to catalyze coordinated activity on the part of the various government ministries and agencies with which it works. In the cases we observed, these included the Ministry of Agriculture, for the urban tree-planting projects; Cooperación Popular, for building projects such as health posts; and the National Office of Food Support (ONAA), which handles food storage and delivery as well as nutrition education. It also works closely with the Ministry of Housing in projects involving the construction of streets

and sidewalks, and with the Ministry of Education in classroom construction. CARE's coordinating role appears to involve considerable unofficial prodding as well as official collaboration with GOP ministries and agencies, as it tries to make sure that facilities are staffed and maintained once they have been constructed.

CARE fills this coordinating role well. During 1983, for example, the PVO was involved in constructing and/or equipping 23 helath centers, building 160 classrooms, leveling and improving 36 kilometers of streets, creating or maintaining 600 hectares of forested urban areas, and distributing over 40,000 metric tons of food to participants in these projects (see Tables 3-1 and 3-2).

The ability of CARE to coordinate the tasks of the various GOP ministries and agencies is doubtless due in part to the patronage it enjoys from Peru's First Lady, Sra. Violeta Correa de Belaúnde. CARE wields this influence to convince its GOP counterparts that it is in their best interests to work together harmoniously. We saw two potentially serious problems arising from CARE's style of operation, both of which were brought up during an interview with the PVO's leaders. However, they did not appear to share our concerns.

The first potential problem is that CARE's influence with GOP ministries and agencies derives from the personal interest shown in its activities by the First Lady. This serves CARE well as long as the present administration remains in power; however, since CARE's influence does not derive from institutional strength, a change in administrations -- via elections or otherwise -- could render the PVO impotent to continue its ombudsman role.

Secondly, CARE emphasized that its role is one of facilitating the creation of infrastructure, a task that it views as essentially apolitical. CARE official told us that they do not attempt to undertake community development activities, strongly implying that they regard these activites as too political. However,

because of its association with the First Lady, CARE was involved in the most consummately political project of any that we had occasion to see. This was the construction of a new health clinic in an area where an existing clinic was allowed to languish in an effort clearly intended to show the beneficience of Acción Popular while discrediting local leaders belonging to another political party (see Chapter III, pp. 67-68). While CARE does use its relationship with the First Lady to "get things done," it also is vulnerable to being used, and any protestations that it is not involved in politics are unconvincing.

Food distribution and nutrition. With a ration size of 47.5 kilograms of food per beneficiary household for each complete month worked, CARE ranks third in food distributed among the PVOs evaluated. If one uses the official figure of five as the mean household size among beneficiaries, the CARE ration theoretically provides every household member with a food supplement amounting to 9.5 kilograms of food for each month of participation in FFW. If one uses the mean household size of seven people that we calculated for Lima, the amount of additional food theoretically provided each person drops to about 6.8 kilograms for each complete month of participation in the program.

The CARE ration also ranks third among the PVOs in terms of its monetary value. The complete monthly ration of CARE had a retail value of S/.47,250 at the time of the evaluation, a figure equivalent to 49 percent of the minimum wage. In theory, this is sufficient to have an important nutritional impact by freeing household income to purchase foods such as fruits and vegetables and improving the quality of the diet. However, we were not able to obtain what we considered reliable income estimates for the CARE beneficiaries interviewed, so it was difficult to assess nutritional and economic significance in more precise terms.

In general, we found that the CARE food ration was being consumed by

project beneficiaries and their families. However, distribution within the family appeared to extend beyond the immediate household. Two of the eight beneficiaries interviewed stated that they share their food ration with relatives living in other households that do not receive any form of food assistance. In one case, these relatives living outside the beneficiary household were aging parents unable to continue working, and in the other, they were elder offspring with young children attempting to start a new household. CARE officials indicated that this is a common occurrence, as five of the eight officials interviewed stated that beneficiaries frequently give Title II food to relatives outside their own households.

When beneficiaries distributed food in this manner after receiving it from a program, calculations about the nutritional and economic impact of the supplement become meaningless. Whether the mean household size of beneficiaries is five people or seven people, household boundaries do not mark the limits of food distribution among the beneficiaries. We were not able to determine reliably what the effective limits of distribution are in such cases; however, they do not have to go far beyond the boundaries of a single household before the nutritional and economic contributions of the food ration are reduced greatly.

Beneficiaries and officials involved with both of the tree-planting projects visited stated that there have been several problems in food distribution. These included receiving foodstuffs infested with worms and weevils, delays in receiving food for work performed, and unexplained reductions in the amounts of food received. Receipt of spoiled foodstuffs was reported in both tree-planting sites (La Libertad, in Comas, and in Sector 3 of Villa El Salvador). Worm or weevil infestations were reported to be particularly bad in the corn meal, and on one occasion beneficiaries reported that they had to feed it to their chickens. Less severe infestations were reported regarding the flour ration. Beneficiaries

and officials in both tree-planting projects reported delays of up to two months in receiving their food allotments between March and June 1983. In Villa El Salvador, the president of the group of women caring for trees reported that each worker had received 2.375 kilograms of food in early May for the work they had performed in April. This represented a 94 percent cut in the full monthly ration of 37.5 kilograms reported by CARE, and a 92 percent cut from the 28.5 kilograms per month that project officials in Comas and Villa El Salvador reported they were actually receiving.[1]

In the tree-planting projects, an additional factor prevents some beneficiaries from receiving a full monthly ration. Once planted, the trees are inspected monthly by a Ministry of Agriculture official. Each beneficiary is responsible for a specified number of trees, reported to be 35 in Comas and 50 in Villa El Salvador. If during the inspection the Ministry of Agriculture official finds that a beneficiary has allowed a tree to die or be stolen, her food ration is reduced. Initially, beneficiaries are not charged by the Ministry of Agriculture for any replacement trees they may need. However, as the project progresses, beneficiaries are expected to bear the expense of replacing trees themselves. We were not able to determine how many beneficiaries have their food rations cut or are forced to buy replacement trees. Our impression was that the number is not large; however, this provision is an additional element that is built into the program that must be accounted for if one is to determine with security the nutritional and economic impacts of the CARE FFW effort.

Community development, social organization, and education. Because CARE does not involve itself in any of these aspects of FFW, they are not emphasized

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[1]In both cases, we were shown the work plan documents, which indicated a complete monthly allotment to consist of 28.5 kilograms for the projects. We were unable to determine why this figure was discrepant from the officially reported allotment.

at the level of the individual projects. This means that the contribution of CARE FFW to overall community development, improved social organization, and the education of beneficiaries is small. Whereas we feel that a separate discussion of each of these topics is appropriate in the case of the other PVOs, our findings regarding CARE FFW can be summarized in a single discussion.

CARE officials stated their belief that the works accomplished under their FFW program represented community development in and of themselves, and they indicated that CARE regards any activity at the project level that goes beyond the completion of the specified work as "too political" for involvement by the PVO.

CARE central office officials appeared disinterested in the relationship of projects to local social organization. In only one of the projects visited were signs of a contribution to community organization discernible. In La Libertad (Comas), a woman who was one of the first invaders of the area had organized a group of her neighbors to participate in a tree-planting project. Most of the members of the group were more recent arrivals. In contrast to the group leader, whose home faced onto one of the small plazas or parks and was made of stucco with a sheet metal roof, their homes were of less substantial materials such as scrap wood, stucco mats, and cardboard, and they were located farther away from the main streets. The group leader, who served as president of the project steering community, repeatedly spoke to us and her charges about how well organized the invaders of her area had been. She recalled gleefully how they had invaded the area under cover of darkness. The next morning, the police arrived to find a functioning community where streets were laid out and hundreds of families were building homes, each beneath a Peruvian flag they had raised. It was being well-organized that had given them a chance for better lives, she stressed.

Unfortunately, the women in this group found themselves frustrated. They had organized themselves for the purpose of planting trees, and at the time of our visit, they expected to receive food support for only one more month. The problem was that they had nothing to move on to that would allow the group to grow in complexity or the bulk of the women in it to participate more actively. The president of the steering committee expressed frustration at this situation. Noting that about three blocks away OFASA was operating several FFW projects, all of which had an adult education component, the steering committee decided to propose a project to OFASA in the hope that the combination of work and education would provide opportunities for strengthening their organization.

Participants in FFW projects sponsored by CARE receive nutrition education from ONAA. All eight of the beneficiaries with whom we spoke reported that they had in fact received this education. Apparently, this education component serves a useful purpose in that two of the women interviewed said they would not have known how to prepare the food they receive in the FFW program had they not attended the classes. However, all eight of the project beneficiaries as well as six project officials who had participated in the nutrition orientation stated that this food preparation component had been the only topic discussed at length. Five women said that hygiene also had been discussed, but for less time and they could not recall specific details.

Participants in the tree-planting projects also receive instruction from Ministry of Agriculture personnel on the planting and care of tree seedlings. Participants in the tree-planting projects agreed that this instruction did help them reduce mortality among the trees for which they were responsible, an important consideration since beneficiaries are liable to have their rations reduced as punishment for allowing trees to die.

In summary, we found that individual CARE FFW projects may contribute to community development and local social organization. However, CARE does not stress these as its goals and positive results appear to be sporadic. In cases such as the tree-planting project, which did provide a vehicle for creating a community organization, there are no arrangements for sustaining or increasing the capabilities of such a group once it is formed. Beneficiaries are receiving nutrition education from personnel of ONAA, although its major content appears to be instruction in how to prepare food provided under the program. Other elements such as hygiene or more general nutritional topics apparently are treated in some instances, but the preparation of foods provided under the FFW program is the only theme treated consistently.

Contribution to infrastructure. The construction of infrastructure is the major thrust of CARE's work in the Young Towns. This goal is pursued on two levels: the building of the various structures as a goal in itself, and the coordination of government agencies concerned with providing infrastructure in order to improve their ability to carry out this function. We came to feel that the structures themselves are the less valuable products of the projects. The tree-planting projects do hold the promise of making the Young Towns generally more pleasant places to live, although the limited areas of open ground mean that many trees are planted on relatively inaccessible hillsides, particularly in the northern cone area. One wonders how well the trees will be maintained after people cease receiving food for tending them. The health post constructed in Carmen Alto, which, as discussed earlier, was the result of efforts to discredit local political leaders who opposed the government, duplicated services already being provided. On the other hand, the health post visited in Collique was the only facility of its kind in the area.

CARE's contribution to the development of infrastructure may be much

greater as a result of its efforts to coordinate the work of relevant government agencies. The lack of coordination in projects is a constant problem in the resource-scarce Peruvian bureaucracy. Even agencies with the will to cooperate find it difficult to coordinate such things as availability of or purchases of gasoline for their vehicles. When, to these day-to-day problems is added the inter-agency competition aimed at insuring that each secures its "share" of the national budget, the incentives for cooperation often disappear completely.

CARE provides material and, at the present time, political incentives for cooperation. Its staff spends most of its time making sure that people and materials are where they need to be. Thus for example, CARE spends an average of $3,220.73 US per month assisting ONAA with the maintenance of its vehicles, in order to make sure that food arrives as it should. It also spends an average of $8,889.23 US per month in program administration, much of which goes to "filling in cracks" that government agencies do not have the resources or the will to fill (see Figure 2-7). For example, during our interview with officials in CARE's central office, a case arose in which Cooperación Popular was to provide cement for a construction project sponsored by a government agency. Neither the government agency nor Cooperación Popular was able to assume responsibility for transporting the cement from the warehouse to the construction site, so those arrangements fell to CARE.

CARE does appear to be effectively promoting the integration of GOP activities in the area of infrastructural development at the present time. CARE appears to be more effective in doing this than SEPAS is in its arena of highland reforestation because promoting inter-agency cooperation is the primary responsibility of CARE officials. That is, CARE treats this as a full-time job, while SEPAS divides its energies between promoting bureaucratic cooperation and promoting community-level development. The result is that CARE, as an

organization, has virtually no presence at the community level in Lima, whereas SEPAS has people such as the social promoter working out of Huaraz with excellent relationships with community members, but no influence whatsoever over his GOP counterparts.

CARE's ability to use the Title II program as a means of improving the ability of GOP agencies to serve Peru's population consistently and over the long term bears close watching. If it is successful, in our opinion it will be an achievement that overshadows the importance of the building projects themselves. As indicated above, the kinds of projects undertaken with CARE support did not particularly impress us; however, the specific projects can be improved if the GOP agencies have the ability to consistently bring the appropriate people and materials together.

C. Descriptive Evaluation of OFASA

Overview of program successes. OFASA FFW efforts distinguish themselves from those of other PVOs in that they include a systematic effort to provide an educational program for all project beneficiaries. As one might expect, given the large number of OFASA FFW projects in Lima -- 438 in 1982/83 -- and the inadequate supervisory staff discussed in Chapter III, what this educational program actually looks like "on the ground" varies. However, whether the individual educational projects work well or not at the program level, they do represent an attempt by OFASA to insure that FFW is not simply a welfare program that hands out food to poor people. The education component also reflects a recognition that goals such as community development do not result automatically from having an FFW program in a community.

The OFASA FFW program also suffers from several weaknesses, which will be discussed at length in the pages that follow. In our judgement, the most serious is the lack of direct contact between OFASA central office staff and

project beneficiaries. As noted in Chapter III, OFASA relies heavily upon unpaid local leaders to supervise work, distribute food, and keep records. Most of the direct contact between OFASA and its individual projects is through these people. As a result, we found a number of situations in which the benefits of the project to participants were unclear and the work itself appeared ill-conceived. In addition, we found that OFASA's method of organizing projects provides local leaders with both an incentive and the means to take unfair advantage of project participants.

Food distribution and nutrition. The OFASA food ration of 47 kilograms provides beneficiary households with a mean monthly food supplement of 9.4 kilograms per person if one assumes the figure of five to be an accurate mean household size. If the mean household size of seven, as calculated by the team from its non-random sample, is used, the average monthly food supplement per person drops to 6.7 kilograms.

As discussed in Chapter IV, the OFASA food ration had a retail value of S/.48,750 at the time of evaluation. This amounts to 51 percent of minimum wage, indicating a potentially significant income substitution effect. In fact, most beneficiaries did report that they were spending part of the household food budget on fruits, vegetables, and manufactured or processed food products to serve as ingredients in or supplements to the dishes they were preparing from their Title II rations.

Several factors tend to make the nutritional impact of the OFASA food ration less than the discussion above would indicate that it might be. Three of the ten projects visited reported that there had been delays as much as two months in receiving food for work already performed, and in one of these

three, beneficiaries stated that such delays were frequent.[1] In addition, beneficiaries at two other project sites reported that they had received food so badly infested with worms and/or weevils that they had fed large parts of their ration to their animals.

As in the highlands, we could not find evidence that Title II foods were being sold or traded for other goods by beneficiaries. However, four of the 45 beneficiaries interviewed stated that they do regularly share their food ration with relatives living in other households. Two of these cases involved elderly relatives unable to work, one involved a man who was temporarily unable to work because he was undergoing treatment for tuberculosis, and one involved a recently married couple that was attempting to establish a new household.

On the other hand, some factors that tend to diminish the nutritional impact of FFW rations appear to be less of a problem in OFASA's Lima program. For example, OFASA beneficiaries appear to participate in projects on a steadier, more long-term basis than do their highland counterparts. Beneficiaries of the PRAA program receive food support only for about six months of every year they are involved in the program, and only a small percentage of CARITAS projects are for more than a few months duration. However, many OFASA beneficiaries reported having participated in a succession of FFW projects for two years or more.

In addition, the Young Towns are different from the highland communities in that all members of a neighborhood are not obligated to participate. Thus,

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[1] "Delays during 1983 were mainly due to late deliveries from the U.S. and a need to fumigate some of the food during the unusually hot and humid summer. There is also a problem with OFASA's work groups themselves delaying in submitting their requests for food (generally waiting until OFASA has a full ration -- especially vegoil, which tends to suffer losses in shipment, arriving damaged due to poor packaging which does not withstand pressure and the handling during shipping)." (Joanne Jones, USAID/Lima: personal communication).

OFASA work parties that are organized to include 50 people really have only 50 participants. As shall be discussed presently, recruitment procedures used by local leaders may have a negative impact upon the program goal of improving social organization. However, in the OFASA program the food rations do not appear to be divided among large numbers of people who are not enrolled in the program.

We did find one factor that may diminish the amount of food beneficiaries receive which may be unique to Lima, and indeed to certain OFASA projects. In as far as we could determine, OFASA does not provide any tools for people working on its projects. As a result, a local leader of a street improvement project in Collique reported, a project may find it necessary to trade part of its food allotment for tools. In the case of Collique, the project trades one kilogram of every kind of food in the ration in order to receive the use of a tool (such as a pick, shovel, or pry bar) for 20 days. We could not determine how significantly such practices diminish the amount of food received by beneficiaries, but we did note that the major complaint voiced by beneficiaries in all four of the street improvement projects visited was that OFASA does not provide tools.

Project beneficiaries stated overwhelmingly that the food ration received from OFASA is small and inadequate compensation for the work being performed (see Table 5-16). This indicates that many beneficiaries do not see the work projects as holding direct benefits for them. The reasons why beneficiaries may not see themselves being benefitted by the work undertaken through OFASA FFW will be discussed in the following pages.

Developmental significance. The OFASA FFW program is impressive, both in terms of the large number of projects undertaken (438 in Greater Lima during 1982/83) and in terms of the scale of the individual projects undertaken. For

Table 5-16

Responses of OFASA Beneficiaries
Regarding Adequacy of Food Ration

Response	Number of Responses
Ration is adequate	11
Ration is too small	30
Don't know/no response	4
Total	45

example, in Collique we visited a project involving 49 women and one man who were digging away at the face of a vertical earth and rock formation in order to widen the road leading to their neighborhood so that trucks carrying drinking water could pass. In another instance, we arrived at Jirón Tacna (Km. 13, Zone 3) in Comas, which ends at the crest of a steep slope, and from where one could see no fewer than five OFASA FFW projects in progress. These included a street improvement project, a community center construction project, and a project to grade a slope up to an area where a community park had been constructed.

Many of these tasks were important to the well-being of the neighborhoods involved. The street improvement project in Comas was being conducted so that ELECTROPERU could get its equipment through and bring electrical service to the neighborhood; the street improvement project in Collique would allow tank trucks to reach a neighborhood from where, at the time of the evaluation, women had to carry buckets several hundred yards each way to get water to their homes. However, we question the development significnace of the OFASA FFW effort on several grounds.

First, several of the projects offer no goal or achievement that can be pointed to upon completion. This was particularly true in cases of the neighborhood clean-up projects, of which we saw two in operation: the cleaning of streets surrounding the Centro Familiar Tahuantinsuyo in the Independenicia area of Comas, and a park-cleaning project in the La Libertad area of Comas. In neither case was there any argument that clean streets were not important; however, the women in both areas were recruited by local leaders with no additional effort to involve the community in the project. As a result, the women performed labors reminiscent of Sisyphus, spending two or three days a week cleaning up their assigned area only to return the following week to find it as covered with debris as before (the women around the Tahuantinsuyo center

worked three days a week and attended class one, while the women of La Libertad worked and attended class two days each). The women of La Libertad were particularly frustrated as a number of them had participated in a previous project to clean up and plant trees in the park (this was apparently a CARE project run through the PIBA program). They said that the park had returned almost immediately to its former state as the rest of the neighborhood had little interest in it. Paper and debris were strewn about (there had been no provision in the project for litter receptacles), a number of the trees planted were stolen, and the remainder were uprooted by drunks who frequently congregated there. The women said that, if they ever got the park clean enough to plant trees, they expected that the process would be repeated. To make matters worse, the women in La Libertad had been working for more than two months and had not yet received any food.

Secondly, it was not clear that the tasks being performed were projects that would not have been undertaken anyway, either by the neighborhoods themselves or under other auspices. For example, the women of La Libertad said that the people of their area already were paying the municipality for trash collection and street cleaning services, although they were not yet receiving them. They felt that OFASA could play a more useful role if it would help them get the municipality to provide these services instead of sponsoring clean-up projects. Also, a number of women said they felt the work was degrading and that they were embarrassed to be seen picking up the neighborhood's trash by their neighbors. One woman said she was in the project because her family needed the food (although they still had not received any), but that she kept her participation a secret from her husband who worked all day in Lima because "he would die of shame" if he found out what she did to earn the food ration One interviewee explained, "It's not that we think we're too good to pick up

trash. But, we pay to have this service provided and the men who are supposed to do the work receive a wage. There's dignity in earning a wage, whatever the work might be. We do the same work in order to receive a handout of food." Interviews with five local project leaders and the northern and southern cone coordinators reinforced our suspicion that many FFW projects duplicate community efforts that took place in the past without food aid. Of these seven people, four said that the number of community projects is "about the same" as before the arrival of OFASA FFW, while three felt that the number of community projects has declined. All seven agreed that, in contrast with earlier years, people in the Young Towns now are reluctant to undertake community projects for which they do not receive food assistance. Thus, it does not appear to us that OFASA FFW is stimulating much new activity in the area of community development.

Finally, we found that the OFASA work projects do not always make good use of the human resources upon which they draw, and the projects frequently reflect the cheapness of labor power in the Young Towns while doing nothing to enhance its value. For example, in the road-widening project in Collique, 50 women were working for three (and probably six) months to chip away at an obstacle that only a few people with proper equipment could have removed in a matter of days. As it was, the project was trading food to non-participants for the few tools that were in use, and the women, several of whom were pregnant, were moving and breaking up boulders by hand. In addition, most of the women had pre-school children that, for lack of day-care facilities, they had to bring with them to the work site. When we visited the site, several of these children were constantly wandering into the area where boulders would land upon being pried loose from the cliff face. Sometimes the children were simply careless as they played about the site and sometimes they wished to be near their mothers. Thus, we found the heavy labor to be inappropriate for the pregnant women among

the participants, and the working conditions were unsafe for the women and children alike. No one argues the desirability of widening the road; as noted earlier, the purpose of the project was to allow water trucks to reach a neighborhood where previously they had not been able to go. However, carried out under the conditions we observed, we had to question the value of the effort. The road improvement project in the Kilometer 13, Zone 3 areas of Comas, which was mentioned above, also involved unsafe working conditions resulting from large numbers of inadequately equipped, unskilled workers performing heavy labor on and around extremely sheer slopes. The clean-up projects brought women into contact with the same refuse and waste materials that they were cautioned to avoid in some of their hygiene discussions on days they met to receive the educational component of the FFW project (the irony of this was pointed out to us by the women working on the park clean-up in the La Libertad area of Comas). The implication that beneficiaries draw from this is that if labor power is cheap enough that people are willing to do dirty or dangerous work for a food handout, then those constitute acceptable terms under which to conduct a project.

That beneficiaries do not share a sense that development of their neighborhoods is a major impact of OFASA FFW is reflected in their answers when asked about why they chose to participate. The food ration was cited as the major motivating factor for their participation 40 percent more often than the value of the work itself to the community, which was the second most frequent response (see Table 5-17). Taken together with the responses recorded in Table 5-16, which show that only 11 of the 45 people interviewed felt that the food ration adequately compensated them for the work they were doing, it seems clear that most respondents did not view the projects as serving their community development interests.

Table 5-17

Major Benefits of OFASA FFW According to Beneficiaries

Benefit	Number of times cited *
Food	23
Work itself	14
Skills/training	3
Community organization	1
Don't know/No response	7

* Number of times cited in interviews with 45 OFASA FFW beneficiaries.

In summary, we did not feel that most of the OFASA FFW projects were contributing directly to community development. The projects provided little that would help communities earn resources to generate their own projects in the future. Some of the projects were tied to material improvements in living standards, such as the preparatory work for electrification or the road that would allow water trucks to reach a new neighborhood. However, even these projects do not produce opportunities that will permit some beneficiaries to stop participating in FFW. Of the 45 beneficiaries interviewed, only five said that they had learned skills or received training that would allow them to stop participating in FFW projects (see Table 5-18), and of these five, three were beneficiaries of a single project. Insofar as community development occurs, it will be more as a "spin-off" from the community development and educational components of the program than from the works themselves.

Impact on social organization. We visited two OFASA sites where we found FFW projects that appeared to be strengthening local social organization. One of the two sites is located in Villa El Salvador (Sector 3, Group 21) and the other is the area of Comas around Jirón Tacna known as Nuestro Señor de los Milagros (Km. 13, Zone 3), where the street-improvement project that would allow ELECTROPERU to bring in its equipment and install the electrical service mentioned above was being conducted. In both sites, FFW does appear to be helping to strengthen and expand local social organization, although the ways in which this is being accomplished differ. A comparison of the two sites yields instructive examples of how this aspect of FFW may be improved.

In Villa María del Triumfo, we visited a family education center that had been constructed under the auspices of OFASA FFW. This is a project to which visitors are (apparently) often directed to see the impact of FFW, as we subsequently met four other persons from AID who had also visited it as an

Table 5-18

Beneficiary Responses Regarding Their Plans upon Completion of the OFASA FFW Project in Which They Were Participating

Response	Number of Beneficiaries Responding
Look for another FFW proje	27
Don't know/No response	13
Will seek to earn income outside FFW	5
	45

example of what might be accomplished. Because of this, however, we conclude that it is rather atypical of the FFW genre. The project consists of a group of 120 women who use the center where they receive instruction in craft production -- primarily coin purses -- and meet to make these items for sale. This was their current FFW activity. The financial returns on this activity were low. For example, we were told that a small change purse requires eight hours to complete. The materials to make it cost S/.500 ($.33 US), and the coin purses were sold for S/.1,000 ($.65 US) each. Thus, if we do not count the women's labor as a cost of production, the profit on each coin purse was about S/.500. Calculated on an hourly basis, we see that each woman was earning about S/.63 (or $.12 US) for each hour worked. As a point of comparison, the wheat rolls consumed by poor and working-class Peruvians cost S/.30 apiece at the time of the evaluation.

Based on these figures, it is difficult to recommend the project as a "money maker" that will contribute directly to the economic development of the neighborhood. On the other hand, the women themselves had selected this project, they said they were learning useful skills, and they obviously enjoyed meeting together. Issues such as the provision of municipal services, neighborhood relations with police and government officials, and national politics were among the topics reported to be discussed at the work sessions. In addition, the women shared information among themselves on topics such as caring for sick children, prices of household food staples, and birth control. The group appeared to be well on the way to becoming an organization through which the neighborhood could address these and other issues of concern. Nevertheless, persons outside the OFASA-sponsored group expressed resentment over the fact that they were often kept out of this building on the grounds that it was the property of the group and not a community institution.

The family education center in Villa Maria del Triunfo and the craft production program taking place inside represented the latest in a progression of activities undertaken through OFASA FFW. The process began about two years before our evaluation with several smaller groups of 40-50 women who cleaned neighborhood streets. They came together around the clean-up of a site for the family education center and the construction project itself. As the beneficiaries expressed it, the craft-making project was a reward for their past good performance in FFW. As the series of work projects progressed, the division of labor become more complex, involving an expanding number of people in positions of responsibility. We could not determine to what degree the progression of activities we saw was part of a plan by OFASA officials and to what degree it was serendipitous. Based upon our experience of watching OFASA's northern and southern cone coordinators dash madly from project to project, we suspect that the latter played a major role. While the "possessiveness" of the FFW group towards "its" building is very understandable in the larger frame of reference, the potential conflict of such success may produce needs to be handled.

The Comas site appeared to be achieving similar results by somewhat different means, although the overall level of organizational structure and group cohesion did not appear to be as strong in Comas as in Villa María del Triunfo. As described earlier, at the Comas site we found a number of projec functioning simultaneously and we interviewed beneficiaries and leaders of three of these, including a road improvement project, a community center construction project, and a project involving the construction of a park and the grading of the slope leading up to it. There were additional projects going on in the area which the northern cone coordinator for OFASA said were also sponsored by that PVO; however, we did not talk to the people working

in them or learn how closely they were coordinated with the activities that we did visit.

Unlike the project in Villa María del Triunfo, these individual projects did not appear to be moving toward a common conclusion that would bring the different groups together. The only common theme appeared to be a general desire to make the community a more pleasant place to live. In the Comas case, the various FFW projects we saw were reported by beneficiaries to have arisen from the efforts of an OFASA-sponsored club de madres to enlarge their activities. Placing several different kinds of projects in a small area appears to have catalyzed an organization-building process. Households decided among themselves who would participate in which project and who the leaders of each project would be. As the projects proliferated, so did the number of people in the neighborhood who occupied leadership positions. The level of cooperation appeared quite high, and we observed people from one group going to help people in another perform a particularly burdensome task. One beneficiary told us, "Before the projects got started I knew very few of my neighbors, and so I was suspicious and a little afraid of them. Now we talk and help one another and we make friends."

The two approaches to improving local social organization represented by the Villa María del Triunfo and Comas cases offer different advantages and disadvantages. In Villa María del Triunfo, the project can be directed toward much more specific goals. For example, the organization emerging from the activities at the family education center could easily form the basis for a community enterprise that would produce craft items on a truly commercial scale or engage in some other activity intended to generate revenues. However considerable participation by the cone coordinator is necessary to insure that the progression of projects seen in Villa María del Triunfo is repeated

with any regularity. Otherwise, the chances are that the women who participate in FFW will simply go from one menial labor activity to another.

On the other hand, the situation described in Comas appears to be administratively easier to handle in that it requires less involvement by the cone coordinator in the internal dynamics of each work group as he attempts to lead them toward a common goal. In Comas, the improvements in local social organization emerge in a "messier," more disorganized way, but they do emerge. For example, since they began to participate in the OFASA FFW activities, households in the neighborhood have organized a financial support group in order to help one another bear the funeral expenses when a family member dies. The major disadvantage to the approach represented by the Comas case is that the improvements in social organization are more diffuse and generalized. There is no single organization that could serve as the focal point for an over-arching enterprise or activity. One undoubtedly could be formed relatively easily; but once again this would involve more intense participation by the cone coordinator than he presently is able to give.

Thus, OFASA has two alternative models for improving the impact of FFW upon local social organization. One is to increase the participation of the cone coordinator in individual projects on order to introduce a series of increasingly complex tasks culminating in a "reward" project that formalizes a relationship among formerly small, separate work groups. The other is to target several different kinds of projects into a single area, providing beneficiaries with a range of projects from which to choose, allowing them to assign themselves to specific projects and form their own organizational arrangements more or less spontaneously.

Given the resource constraints under which OFASA and Title II operate, we feel that the lower administrative requirements make the second approach

preferable. To implement it, however, will require that OFASA change its present practice of distributing FFW as broadly as possible through the Young Towns and focus them in a few selected areas. This is the only way that they can be concentrated in order to have the catalytic effect we observed in Comas, and it is the only way of allowing the present staff of cone coordinators to increase the amount of time they spend with project beneficiaries and local leaders.

Contribution to infrastructure. The OFASA FFW projects we visited that involved the construction of facilities held the promise of making the neighborhoods in which they were located more pleasant places to live. This does not mean that they constitute infrastructure if we understand the term to mean physical structures that enhance productive capacity. Some of the projects such as improving roads and streets may have that effect, particularly if they are a prelude to the provisioning of services such as electricity. The community and family education centers also may enhance productive capacity by serving as a site for other projects; however, if the crafts production work we observed in Villa María del Triunfo is indicative, the material contribution of such production to the neighborhoods may be minimal. We found that the street and park cleaning projects we observed made no contribution to infrastructure. With the exception of the Villa María del Triunfo example where the cleaning activities led to a family education center and a very popular crafts project, these were a perpetual source of frustration to participants, combining demeaning work with a goal that proved to be perpetually elusive, i.e., keeping their neighborhood streets clean.

Education and training. As noted at the beginning or our discussion of OFASA, this PVO is the only one that systematically attempts to include a training and education component in FFW that goes beyond rather perfunctory

nutrition and food preparation orientations. In addition to offering a larger educational component, OFASA appears to do a better job of reaching beneficiaries with it than do the other PVOs. Of the 45 OFASA FFW beneficiaries interviewed, only one claimed that she had not been offered nutrition orientation as well as training in some other area.

Adult literacy training, sewing, knitting, embroidery, crochet, and macrame were the areas of instruction being received by the beneficiaries we interviewed. With the exception of the adult literacy training, we initially tended to view these educational offerings with some skepticism, in part because they appeared to represent the imposition of an outside notion of "women's work." The second reservation was particularly strong because of what we regarded as the irony in having women break rocks and haul dirt, as they did in a number of projects, in order to earn the privilege of doing women's work.

These reservations were partially dispelled. Regarding the utility of the skills, we found a large number of young women did not know how to sew or knit. Many cited the migratory history of their families as the reason they had not learned these skills. Most of the older women knew how to sew, crochet, embroider, and knit; however, they did not know macrame, and they appreciated the opportunity to learn new techniques in the other areas. When we asked about the economic utility of these skills, only six women said they planned to produce goods for sale. The rest explained that clothing is a major household expenditure, and that they hoped to stretch their small budgets by making and repairing more of their own clothing.

We found that the sewing and knitting activities were not imposed upon the women. Rather, these were the kinds of classes they said they wanted. Seven women did indicate that they would like to continue beyond sewing and knitting and receive vocational training. A woman involved in cleaning streets around

the Tahuantinsuyo family center said she already was studying baking, and that she hoped that she could begin baking goods for sale.

Beneficiaries indicated that they considered the quality of instruction in the sewing and knitting classes to be good. They felt that the literacy courses were less well-taught. This is not surprising considering the high time requirements and teacher skill levels necessary to teach adults to read and write.

We found two aspects of OFASA's education and training efforts noteworthy in a way that went beyond the subject matter itself. First, it indicates OFASA's recognition that the FFW work is not simply a welfare activity that provides a setting for handing out food. Education represents an investment in the Young Towns population that the other PVOs have not made. Secondly, regardless of how good the teachers are or how useful is the subject matter, the educational component brings people together in a setting where they can discuss common problems and learn that they share concrete economic interests with their neighbors. This "consciousness raising" function should not be underestimated for it may be the most lasting contribution of FFW to the Young Towns.

D. Summary and Conclusions Regarding Food For Work in Lima

CARE and OFASA both are succeeding in using food to stimulate community- or neighborhood-based work activities. Both provide a substantial food ration to project beneficiaries, but it is not clear that this significantly improves their nutritional status. While no one questions the utility of most of the work activities, it appears that both PVOs are handing out food to people for undertaking activities that, in many cases, they would have undertaken anyway. As a result of the food incentive, projects may be completed more quickly than they would have been without FFW, but the OFASA project leaders and cone

coordinators agree that people also are becoming increasingly reluctant to undertake work projects without food support. To what degree this constitutes the creation of a "welfare system" where people are made to depend upon assistance, and to what degree it is a manifestation of a generally deteriorating economic environment in which people have become unable to afford to do work without immediate compensation, we could not determine.

The strong point of CARE's program is that it does work successfully with government agencies to get things done. On the other hand, the value of its projects to community infrastructural development is spotty, and the contribution of the program to community development, strengthening of local social organization, and education and training are very small. OFASA excells in its education efforts. It also enjoys major successes in helping to build local social organization. Unfortunately, it lacks the capacity to repeat these successes with any regularity because it has inadequate staff for coordinating project activities. OFASA shares CARE's uneven success record in the areas of community and infrastructural development.

Summary and Conclusions Regarding Food For Work

A. Food Distribution and Nutrition

Three of the four PVOs provide rations of sufficient size that improvements in nutritional levels and income substitution effects appear probable, at least on paper. The exception is CARITAS, which provides a much smaller ration in order to emphasize that the food is a stimulus to self-help rather than a wage. A number of factors tend to reduce the nutritional and income substitution effects of the food ration. Some of these are particular to the ways individual PVOs conduct their programs, while others are characteristic of FFW in general. Some of the major factors limiting the nutritional and income substitution

impacts of FFW are summarized below

(1) The mean household size of beneficiary households is more than the PVOs calculate. PVO calculations assume a mean household size of five people; however, we found the mean household size to be 6.8 people among highland households, and seven people among Lima households. Obviously, these figures cannot be regarded as representative of the FFW beneficiary population as a whole because our sample was opportunistic rather than probablistic. However, FFW is aimed at the poorest strata of society and households in the poorest strata are larger than the national mean.

(2) Food is divided equally among beneficiary household members rather than being targeted to high-risk individuals, in particular, children under six and pregnant and lactating women.

(3) More people draw from FFW rations than the numbers of beneficiary households listed on PVO work plans indicate. In the highlands, this results from the obligation of all households to participate in a community project and the right of all households to receive any benefits deriving from that participation. We did not find this to be a factor in Lima; however, we did see a large enough number of cases where beneficiaries were sharing FFW food with relatives outside of their households to feel that this occurs with some frequency. In addition, OFASA projects were seen where food was being traded for the tools necessary to do the work project.

(4) Food distribution is too unstable to permit the hoped-for nutritional and income substitution effects to occur. In the highlands most people are not involved in FFW but for a few months per year, if that much. Thus, they do not receive the supplement over a sufficiently long enough period to alter their basic food procurement problems. In Lima, households appear to have more stable long-term participation in FFW projects if for no other reason

than there are more projects available. Throughout the FFW program, however, there is instability in distribution which is a cumulative result of shipment delays caused by bureaucratic obstacles, spoilage of food, and petty pilfering. None of these problems are of major proportions taken in isolation; however, the cumulative effect is to introduce an element of insecurity into the system that makes it difficult for households to plan their consumption of the food ration in order to derive the maximum benefit from it.

In our opinion, these factors make FFW as presently organized a poor vehicle for attempting to achieve nutritional goals. We do not feel that increasing the ration size would make it more effective. This would, on paper, allow the FFW program to compensate for the above-national-average family size of the beneficiary population. However, the investment in administrative capability that would allow for more precise targeting and more efficient distribution would be costly, and Title II officials have indicated a reluctance to allocate large amounts of money for that purpose. In addition, attempts to change household distribution patterns would doubtless be regarded as an intrusion by beneficiary households, and would reduce substantially the attractiveness of the program to them.

We recommend that PVOs cease attempting to use FFW as a vehicle for responding to hunger and poor nutrition. These problems need to be addressed through feeding programs targeted toward at-risk members of local populations (see Chapter IV). FFW can be used for community development, strengthening social organization, or providing infrastructure which may help a population find long-term means of alleviating hunger; but it is not an effective means of getting nutritional assistance to the members of a population that need it the most. To attempt to use it in this way converts FFW from a development program to a welfare program, and leads to projects that have little utility

beyond being an excuse to hand out food.

Title II officials may want to consider reducing the FFW ration in some cases. In the highlands, CARITAS had no trouble attracting participation with its small ration, and reducing the FFW ration would free food to be use in feeding projects in areas suffering severe nutritional problems. This may be less practical in Lima, where households do not produce part of their own food. But insofar as improving nutritional levels is a Title II goal, experimenting with reduced FFW rations in order to allow food to be used in targeted nutrition projects certainly would be warranted.

B. Community Development, Social Organization, and Infrastructure

Although these aspects of FFW were treated individually in the body of this chapter in order to highlight the strong and weak points of particular projects, they are interrelated in that all are directed toward materially improving local productive capacity and the ability of communities to defend their own economic and political interests. All four PVOs appear to have successes or potential successes in one or another of these areas; however, they are not consistently successful for several reasons:

(1) They frequently use FFW as a vehicle for feeding the hungry rather than for fomenting community development. As already discussed, FFW is not an efficient vehicle for this, and the result of attempting to use it as a feeding program is that the value of the work to be done under a particular project may not even be considered in the decision to initiate it.

(2) PVOs tend to view projects individually as they come up, rather than in the context of the community in which it is to be conducted. Thus, they are likely not to notice that Community A has had several FFW drinking water projects and still is without an adequate supply of drinking water, or that Community B is building its third FFW-sponsored school building even

though it has no prospect of securing teachers to staff them, or that a group of women in Community C has been performing menial labor for three years under the same leader.

(3) Although the PVOs have acquired vast experience, they have no institutionalized means of learning from it. Thus, they are not able to "weed out" projects that are consistently unsuccessful, or to try to duplicate projects that function well.

(4) The PVOs do not have sufficient <u>field</u> personnel to help communities take the "extra step" needed to plan a project that is more complex than a building or road or to coordinate separate projects around a common goal. These things do happen, but when they do it is a product of good organization already existing in communities and/or good luck. PVO contributions in this area are more fortuitous than planned.

The obvious solution is to provide enough field personnel trained in social promotion and community development so that each is responsible for, and intimately involved in, a relatively small group of projects. Equally obvious is the fact that resource constraints make this impractical. However, there are several things that PVOs can do within existing resource constraints that would enhance their ability to operate FFW projects that consistently contribute to community development, social organization, and infrastructure:

(1) Collect socio-economic data on beneficiary communities and use the data they already are collecting. Beneficiary communities already must submit a detailed work plan and list of project participants. It would be a small matter for them to include a physical inventory checklist that provided basic data about the communtity along with the other documentation. A form similar to the one used in this evaluation (Appendix II, Addendum 3) would be easy to fill out and provide the PVOs with this kind of information. Likewise,

PVOs already have information on illiteracy rates among beneficiaries because illiterates "sign" work plans with a finger print. Illiteracy also can be used as a rough index of socioeconomic status because illiteracy rates are higher in poor communities than in less poor ones. Such information would provide a means of comparing communities with one another when projects are being awarded. They also would provide an index of change in a community when collected regularly over time, thus providing a basis for measuring FFW impact.

(2) Organize PVO files by beneficiary communities rather than simply in chronological order. Presently, work plans are simply filed chronologically. This means that the information gathered is only available for presenting aggregated figures regarding how many projects serving how many beneficiaries are functioning during a particular period. Isolating the FFW history for a particular community would allow PVO staff to evaluate projects in the context of particular communities and facilitate them over time.

(3) Target projects into particular areas rather than scattering them about the landscape. This increases the possibility of generating "spin-off" or "multiplier" effects such as were described in several cases. This may mean reaching fewer people, but we do not see the utility of reaching a lot of people with projects that have little impact. A partial solution would be to focus on particular areas for a specified period -- one or two years -- and then move on to different areas. Long-term projects deemed worthwhile by the PVO could continue to be assisted if necessary after the main focus of FFW moved elsewhere. In addition, beneficiaries would be less likely to become dependent upon a project if their activity were directed toward achieving particular goals prior to a firm, specified cut-off date. Finally, such targeting would afford scarce field personnel greater opportunities for becoming acquainted with the problem of particular areas.

CHAPTER VI

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The Peruvian Context of Title II Programs

The Peru PL 480 program is currently the largest of its kind in Latin America, and one of the largest in the world. Title II activities in monetary value constitute over 39 percent of the total USAID/Peru program, and, taken together with the Title I program, PL 480 amounts to over 70 percent of AID's total economic assistance to that country. In 1982, Title II programs handled 48,217 metric tons of foodstuffs valued at $21,600,000 and delivered them to a reported 1,177,500 beneficiaries, or about 6.5 percent of all Peruvians.

'ood assistance programs in one form or another have operated in Peru since 1948 in the dramatic and demanding context of a nation experiencing all manner of rapid social, cultural, economic, and political changes. Among the principal themes of change is the vast movement of population away from the subsistence agricultural highland regions, the traditional bastions of the economy and the center of the population since prehistory. The population change toward the urbanizing coastal valleys and especially the capital, Lima, which now holds almost 30 percent of the national population, has been dramatic. Today, Lima ranks eighth among 134 nations in urban primacy, dominating the use and consumption of the nation's resources. During this same post-World War II period the production of basic foods has declined sharply, so that presently, out of 125 nations, Peru has the twelfth lowest per capita index of agricultural production in the world. National policy in Peru has been to provide food supports for urban populations while seeking to industrialize. The state has invested relatively little in rural, provincial development in

the past three and one-half decades, and attempts at wide-ranging land reform in the early 1970s have produced mixed, and often negative, results.

Except in selected places in the highlands and in the irrigated coastal valleys, there has been little mechanization of agriculture, and most of that is dedicated to the production of export crops rather than domestic food. Food production in Peru remains primarily the specialty of small farm producers and "cooperative" community farms, and is characterized by intensive manual labor techniques employing hand tools, often in short supply. This type of agriculture is deeply affected by the migration of able-bodied adults to the urban centers, where capital investments in coastal regions and the primate city of Lima still strongly encourage the migration of people from highland regions.

Program Organization and Administratic

In recent years, AID has sought to emphasize rural and agricultural development in its programs. Because the poorest and most needy population is that in the rural provincial areas, some 68 percent of the general USAID program has gone to these sectors in the past three years. Nevertheless, an important finding of this study is that approximately 50 percent of all Title II beneficiaries are found in coastal cities, with 34 percent being in Lima.

From 1980 through 1983, the total metric tonnage of food supplied under Title II dropped somewhat. During this period, there were small fluctuations in the distribution of resources among the PVOs. Nevertheless. CARITAS remained the largest PVO food distributor.

The Title II programs operate through the aegis of four private voluntary organizations that have considerable experience in Peru and have their own well-established procedures and goals. PVO levels of program activity in 1982

were as follows:

CARITAS: 44.6 percent of total program, with 2,469 projects nationwide; 43 percent of the 473,000 beneficiaries in coastal urban areas. Its 21,864 metric tons of foodstuffs were delivered in average per capita rations of 45.4 kilograms per year at a cost of $29.26 per beneficiary.

OFASA: 24.9 percent of total program, with 438 projects nationwide; 87 percent of the 143,000 beneficiaries in coastal urban areas. It delivered 13,375 metric tons of food in yearly per capita rations of 83.97 kilograms at a cost of $52.84 per beneficiary.

CARE: 7.5 percent of total program, with 287 projects, all centered in Greater Lima, where it reported 40.050 beneficiaries. It delivered 4,636 metric tons of food, in yearly per capita rations amounting to 103.4 kilograms at a cost of $88.98 per beneficiary.

SEPAS: 6.3 percent of total program, with 26,400 beneficiaries, all of whom are in rural highland areas. Reforestation projects covered 10,800 hectares; 3,077 metric tons of food in average yearly per capita rations of 115.9 kilograms were delivered at a cost of $73.50 per beneficiary.

A review of PVO organization revealed important differences in reporting between all PVOs and the USAID records, due principally to the fact that there is no common standard for budget categories among them or with AID. Thus, all PVOs recorded more program resources than USAID accounts indicated.

Nonetheless, the wide difference in per capita program costs among agencies is striking. On this basis, the two largest programs, CARITAS and OFASA, are the most "efficient," both relying heavily upon dedicated, low-salaried

personnel and volunteers at the community level. Neither works extensively with Peruvian government agencies in direct fashion. On the other hand, both SEPAS and CARE have to meet specific goals in promoting government programs. In contrast to the first pair, the latter PVOs engage in very limited ranges of activity: rural reforestation and urban infrastructure construction, respectively. The much higher costs of these programs are seen as a function of the integration of PVO activity with government institutions and the technological demands of their activity. Both programs also receive higher shares than the others of OPG support and Peruvian government Title I derived monies. From an overall perspective, and especially in light of the per capita variations in OPG budgeting, funding of field supervisory activities, personnel training, and equipment is weak, especially in those PVOs with lower costs per beneficiary.

We found that all the PVOs were indeed reaching needy populations with food and material assistance, much of which was designed to improve levels of living, although sometimes indirectly. In no instance did we find a pattern of "undeserving" persons benefitting from the programs.

Secondly, while the poor do participate in PVO operations, there was considerable variation in the extent to which their inputs were important to project selection of management. CARITAS beneficiaries have the widest range of opportunity for participation and control of project activity. CARE and OFASA offer opportunity for local initiative, but restrict projects to specific activities selected by PVO and government planners. Decision-making by local participants is limited and managed by the PVOs. SEPAS projects offer the least amount of local decision-making because the reforestation projects are at present centered largely on technical matters alone.

Although PVO agencies traditionally show as much interest in how work is

done as in how things come out in terms of specific project tasks, this attitude does not always characterize Title II PVO operations in Peru. Although all PVOs expressed interest in helping the poor gain better control over their life situations, all showed a high concern for the quantitative aspects of their activities, such as the numbers of persons reached, and so forth. The strong goal-accomplishment orientation of the organizations, while commendable, nevertheless tends to place more emphasis on laying sidewalks or planting trees than on developing the community organization capability that will maintain these investments.

Traditional PVO strengths in "people-to-people" frames of work seem muted in most of these programs, due to weak and scarce field personnel and unpredictable logistical support. CARITAS' personnel relationships with recipients was stretched thin and rested largely upon the effectiveness of parish priests and their lay workers, which is quite variable. Although field supervisors seemed to have good relationships with many beneficiaries, as the lone FFW operatives, they were swamped by the work load. The same is true for the nutrition workers. OFASA personnel did not have much direct contact with of the beneficiaries in the field, but its ties were much closer with emergent leaders and trainees in the nutrition programs. Both CARE and SEPAS operated in such ways that few recipients, and only key local leaders, enjoyed much contact with PVO personnel

The educational and training dimensions of PVO operations showed uneven results. Apart from teaching limited technical skills in relation to project completion in the case of CARE and SEPAS, there was little attempt to expand these activities. OFASA, on the other hand, had several training and education programs accompanying FFW projects. CARITAS also had a number of training programs, but of uneven quality that ranged from poor to excellent.

Nutritional Results Through MCH and FFW Programs

The principal finding regarding nutritional value of the foods provided is that PL 480 commodities reach a broad range of recipients and constitute a potentially important addition to their diets. Nevertheless, the relative amounts people receive varies greatly, depending on the programs. There is no doubt that for many persons, particularly those in MCH projects, the food provided is an important element in the diet, with the average size of ration per family ranging from 20 to 48 kilograms per month.

Delivery of the foods to the different levels of administration for distribution tends to be unpredictable. There are instances where bureaucratic uncertainty delays delivery to beneficiaries, where vehicles are unavailable, and where there are shortages of certain types of food in the "package." In some cases, spoilage also occurs. In spite of such annoyances, programs move forward, and there were instances where even with food deliveries five months in arrears, people continued to work on FFW projects.

The food staples being utilized generally fit into customary food categories and, with few exceptions, are readily used. The training provided to some of the recipients was effective but limited in scope and quality. The MCH projects reach appropriate populations, but their effectiveness and quality are highly variable. With specific reference to nutrition projects such as MCH, child care, and mothers' clubs, we felt there to be a potential for a positive impact on beneficiary diets; however, we were unable to measure actual results because of the lack of appropriate pre-project baseline study of the recipient population.

Our findings signal several barriers to Title II food assistance achieving as high a nutritional impact as an examination of ration size alone might lead one to expect:

(1) The number of beneficiaries is undoubtedly considerably higher -- perhaps as much as 40 percent higher -- than calculated in reports. The average lower-class family size is about seven persons, not the five considered by all programs in estimating food rations. This means that when the food is brought home, it is spread among more persons and the individual share is significantly reduced. This barrier affects all FFW programs and those MCH programs where dry rations are given to beneficiaries for preparation at home.

(2) Because most highland communities require that all members participate in FFW as well as in other community projects, more people work than are recorded on PVO beneficiary rosters. Since the PVOs allocate food in accordance with the number of people listed on the beneficiary rosters, and the communities divide it on the basis of the number of people who actually work, many families receive less than the ideal ration.

(3) The character of the work undertaken through FFW may in some instances diminish the food value received. Where tasks involve heavy manual labor at high altitudes or the manual removal of rocks as city streets are widened, the caloric contribution per worker may be substantially lower than in FFW projects where the labor requirements are not as heavy.

The FFW programs are permeated with instability in distribution, a cumulative result of shipment delays caused by bureaucratic obstacles, spoilage, and petty theft. None of these alone constitutes a major problem, but together they introduce an element of inconsistency into the system that makes it difficult for participants to plan effectively and thus derive the maximum potential nutritional and economic benefits.

In the highlands, program benefits are further reduced by the fact that most people are involved with FFW work for only a few weeks or months a year. Lima households appear to have a more stable, long-term relationship with FFW,

if for no other reason than that more projects in which they potentially can become involved exist in a relatively small area.

Despite these limitations, we found that FFW can be effectively used to stimulate local-level development initiatives, to strengthen local community organization, and to provide infrastructure that may assist the population in finding long-term resolution to some of its group needs. To attempt to use it as an agent of nutritional assistance converts FFW into a form of welfare program and leads to projects that have little utility beyond being an excuse for handing out food.

FFW Program Impact on Development

The issues of community development, social organization, and infrastructure as dimensions of project activity and impact are discussed at length in Chapter V, which highlights the interrelationships between them because all directly concern the improvement of local productive capacity. All PVOs have successes or potential ones in these areas, but consistency is lacking for several reasons.

First, FFW on many occasions is inefficiently used as a means of feeding the hungry rather than for fomenting community development. Thus, the ultimate value of the work to be done in a particular project may not even be considered in the decision to initiate it.

Second, PVOs tend to view projects individually as they come up, rather than in context of the community or region. Thus, they are likely not to notice that community "A" has had several FFW drinking-water projects and still is without an adequate supply of drinking water; or that community "B" is building its third FFW-sponsored school even though it has uncertain prospect of securing teachers to staff it; or that a group of women in community "C" has been performing menial labor for three years under the same leader.

Finally, a large percentage of the FFW projects, given local conditions, do not address issues of basic importance to actual development criteria. Rather than focusing on key road, canal, or potable water improvements, fo example, work is lavished on public buildings of various types or other structures that we label as in the realm of "ornato público" (public adornment). Most projects of this type are undertaken in Lima, although a significant portion occurs in the highlands as well. While such projects have a place -- and a important one in some cases -- our review of PVO records indicated that as many as half of the FFW projects may involve building public adornment structures. Given the urgent need to enhance income-generating opportunities in poor areas, we feel the emphasis here is excessive.

Our survey of projects showed that PVOs do not have sufficient field personnel to help communities take the "extra step" required to plan a project that is more complex than a building or road, or to coordinate separate projects around a common goal. When these things do happen, it is an isolated event of good fortune caused by the coincidence of effective local leadership and PVO contributions. Project impacts in this area are fortuitous rather than planned.

General Recommendations

A. For AID Operations

(1) Because broad social and economic changes have characterized recent Peruvian history, it is incumbent upon development agencies to address the issues that arise from these changes. While the needs of new urban dwellers have much immediacy, the fundamental problems of the rural areas remain a top developmental priority. The Title II program should follow the pattern of other aspects of the USAID program by concentrating its efforts in the rural

highlands and provincial urban areas. To better achieve this goal, we recommend that the present delineation of PVO activity be changed and a significant portion be relocated in provincial, and especially highland, areas.

(2) The PVO accounting procedures should be regularized as soon as possible so as to permit a proper comparative review of performance. AID should develop the format needed for program analysis and evaluation in this regard and implement it as soon as possible

(3) With a standardized accounting system in place, budget allotments for equipment, maintenance of vehicles, and related field personnel requirements need to be specifically reviewed. The programs all appeared to suffer from critical lacks in these areas, inhibiting program success.

(4) To achieve better operational control over program impact and to provide appropriate feedback for field operations per se, we recommend that AID develop standardized requirements for reporting PVO program activity in the context of PVO field projects.

(5) To help in this endeavor, AID needs to work with PVOs in developing specific operational definitions of such concepts as "community development," "basic needs," and "development infrastructures." Such terms presently have no precision and render unlikely compatible evaluation by concerned parties.

(6) Efforts to concretize operational concepts and enhance project effec and management must include the gathering of baseline data about recipient populations at the onset of projects, on a sample basis, as well as maintaining a monitoring system during the course of programs. Such data would form the foundation for effective "research and development" procedures currently missing from mission activities and would provide the basis for effective post-project evaluation.

(7) The USAID mission office should develop and maintain an archive of

its past development projects and their respective evaluations. The lack of any such "institutional memory" because of personnel changes is aggravated by the absence of well-organized background material for effective planning or evaluation. To assist in building an institutional memory, USAID should make better use of its "local hire" personnel, upgrading their consultive and decision-involvement roles.

(8) The regular use of local-hire, professional consultants would also provide a continuing view of the program, which is not presently available. Such local professional social scientists can be given the task of analyzing beneficiary characteristics and other program operation patterns as part of regular and frequent spot project evaluations that should be used to upgrade operations.

B. For Overall PVO Operations

(1) The primary recommendation is this area concerns the improvement of PVO field personnel capabilities. All of the agencies appeared to suffer from a lack of suitably trained and supported personnel who were in contact with recipients in training contexts. This should involve upgrading of personnel through training, adding new staff, and providing better logistical and equipment support in the field. In many cases, supervisory activities were minimal at best, and few attempts were made at systematic, ongoing analysis of operations that could serve to correct problems or generally enhance impacts.

(2) The training and educational capabilities of programs need to be improved in order to foster local capacity to handle problems. The skill-building efforts presently found in PVO program activity are satisfactory, but very limited. In this regard, the OFASA and CARITAS operations had several strong points, but there is ample room for improvement and expansion of this form of PVO work.

Recommendations in Nutrition

(1) We recommend that FFW programs that regularly involve pregnant and lactating women and women with small children better reflect the special requirements of these groups. For example, they should not be performing heavy labor in precarious places where falling debris poses a constant danger. This is primarily a problem in Lima, and we feel that it can be solved through greater emphasis on projects that provide vocational and technical training.

(2) In both urban-coast and highland areas, budgets for nutrition education, training, and project monitoring are inadequate in most program contexts, and need to be augmented to provide for personnel, materials, transportation, and related costs in filling out the program.

(3) We recommend that the general thrust of nutrition programs remain the same as at present, but at the same time directly target pregnant and lactating women, as well as children under six, through the delivery of prepared food to be consumed "on site" as far as possible. Coupled with this, there should be growth and health monitoring. If resources do not permit monitoring of all beneficiaries, then a scientific sample should be selected and tracked.

(4) Training in nutrition not only needs to take into account the cultural and literacy status of the beneficiaries, but also needs to use the educational opportunity to address the felt needs of the people and increase the general knowledge level of the participants, most of whom are women whose educational level on the whole is less than that of men in the same socioeconomic class.

Recommendations for FFW

(1) We recommend that PVOs and USAID not attempt to think of FFW as a vehicle for responding to hunger and poor nutrition per se. These needs should be addressed through programs designed to achieve such ends in an effective manner. FFW projects should be designed specifically as community development projects, aimed at achieving well-considered purposes in this realm.

(2) Insofar as improving nutritional levels is a Title II goal, experimenting with reduced FFW rations in order to free more food for use in targeted nutrition projects certainly would be warranted. The experience of CARITAS projects in the highlands indicates that large rations are not always necessary for inspiring FFW activity.

(3) Because beneficiary communities already must supply details of their work plans, it would be a small additional step for them to provide basic community status data such as an inventory of existing institutions and needs. These data can and should be used in the "research and development" mode to plan and execute more effective projects in order to monitor, adjust, and evaluate programs and results.

(4) To improve their ability to consider community conditions in project planning, PVOs should arrange their files according to each beneficiary community or region rather than simply in chronological order as most are now. By isolating FFW history by place, the PVO staff can gain a more systematic understanding of their impact as well as of community needs.

(5) FFW projects need to be targeted at particular areas rather than scattered about the landscape. Project concentration and coordination of this kind increases the possibility of generating "spin-off" or multiplier effects as described in several cases. By focusing project activity to achieve

interrelated goals, greater developmental impact can be gained. This sort of targeting should also permit field personnel to perform with more success.

(6) Finally, we recommend that as soon as possible, PVOs seek to phase out the maximum feasible number of their FFW projects dealing with nonproductive "ornato público" infrastructure. In their place, projects should be sought that have positive productive consequences and that contribute more directly to community well-being and enhanced community control over needs and problems. This recommendation also rests on the fact that half the beneficiaries are found in Lima other coastal cities, where FFW projects of limited productive utility are numerous. By reducing such activity on the one hand, and seeking to build more systematic, development-oriented projects in the highlands on the other, the Title II FFW effort will have a far more significant impact on Peru's basic needs. It will also address and support the issue and action suggested in the first recommendation.

Specific PVO Recommendations

A. SEPAS/PRAA

(1) A salient feature of these products is the ambiguous future of the timber resources. To correct this, the program should conduct a market study to determine the size and nature (lumber for housing, wood pulp for paper, etc.) of the potential market for forest products. The study also should ascertain if the current mix of tree varieties being planted will satisfy the market requirements. If a large part of the potential market is for building materials for homes, for example, should the amount of pine relative to the amount of eucalyptus be increased? The study also should investigate the feasibility of creating new markets for wood products. For example, if the wood were converted to charcoal by peasant communities, would this be a product that

could be sold in large quantities to households or to the Peruvian steel industry?

(2) Expand the range of FFW projects conducted under the program in order to create the facilities needed to operate a lumber industry. At present, all FFW resources are directed toward planting trees and carrying out nursery activities. FFW also should be used to construct or improve roads and bridges so that the plantations can be reached by vehicles capable of hauling out lumber. Additionally, FFW may be used to involve communities in the construction of processing facilities if the market study recommended above indicates that this is warranted. For example, FFW could be used to create sawmill and wood-curing facilities so that these activities can be carried out by the communities producing the trees. Several desirable results could accrue from this:

(a) On-site processing of lumber or charcoal would alleviate some of the transport problems occasioned by the shipment of logs. If charcoal production was found to be a viable option, this product could be transported with only modest improvement of existing facilities.

(b) The creation of processing facilities in the producing communities would improve their current disadvantageous position vis-à-vis the commercialization of the trees. Each step of processing done in the rural areas would add value to the product that would translate into greater revenues to those areas. This would enhance the impact of FFW as a generator of rural employment opportunities.

(c) It would not be practical to place sawmills in every community that has a plantation. However, strategically placing sawmills so that they serve a number of communities would be possible, and organizing groups of communities to use this resource together would have potential

spin-off effects in terms of strengthening regional economic institutions, both private and public.

(d) In areas like Cajamarca, where much of the forestation effort has, by necessity, been with associations of individual landowners rather than with communities, projects aimed at improving roads and bridges and creating processing facilities should be used to involve households that have not participated in tree planting. This would increase the number of people reached by PRAA, and it would help avert potential conflicts between landowners who were able to participate and those who were not. Based on our data, it appears that those who do not participate are the poorer rural people who do not have land that they can dedicate exclusively to tree production. Providing them with other opportunities to participate in the PRAA program would minimize the impact of the program in terms of exacerbating existing inequalities in wealth distribution.

(3) The social promotion activities of PRAA need to be increased in several ways. First, social promotion activities should be conducted year-round rather than only during the tree-planting season. Second, there should be at least two and preferably three social promoters in each department. It would be advisable that the additional promoters be stationed in provincial capitals rather than only in the departmental capital, so that they can reach more distant plantations with greater frequency. Third, the forestry technicians who work with INFOR should receive community development training so that they can better deal with conflicts concerning how the trees and any revenues derived from them are to be used, should such conflicts arise. Fourth, the SEPAS social promoters should be vested with the power to determine when communities and producers' associations have complied with the terms of their agreements with PRAA and

are entitled to receive their food ration, and also to insure that food is released expenditiously.

(4) At present, social promotion activities revolve around soliciting community involvement in plantation projects. Now that the programs have achieved fairly widespread acceptance, social promotion should focus on the following areas:

(a) assisting communities to explore the commercial possibilities offered by their plantations;

(b) assisting communities in working out the details of how revenues resulting from the commercialization of trees are to be utilized by and distributed among the various sectors of the community;

(c) organizing participation in FFW activities designed to improve or create facilities for commercializing and processing the trees.

This would include assuring that people unable to participate in plantation projects (in areas where efforts focused upon associations of individual landowners) have the opportunity to participate in these other projects. It also would include organizing groups of communities to operate processing facilities such as sawmills. Finally, it would include making the necessary arrangements for community members to receive the relevant technical training in such areas as charcoal production, operation and maintenance of sawmill equipment, and accounting and bookkeeping. The last are important for the successful operation of any small business, and is especially important if the communities are to use the revenues generated effectively.

(5) The contrasting situations of Huaráz and Cajamarca illustrated to the evaluation team how programs that look the same on paper can be very different in their "on the ground" manifestations. Site visits should be

made to the other PRAA locations in order to see how well our findings reflect the realities in these other areas. A two-part overall development plan for PRAA should be designed. The first part should address general issues that characterize the programs throughout the country, and the second should address issues specific to each departmental PRAA program.

B. OPASA

(1) FFW and MCH projects should be targeted to specific areas of the Young Towns for specified periods of time and then moved to other areas, rather than seeking to achieve the broadest possible spread, as is currently done. This will accomplish three goals:

(a) It will allow cone supervisors to spend more time with each project and less time traveling from one project to another. This, in turn, will enable the supervisors to have more contact with beneficiarie and to orient the projects so that they have greater development and organization-building impacts.

(b) It will increase the chances that projects will interact synergistically with one another, catalyzing processes of community development and organizational strengthening what will continue independently.

(c) It will allow for a definite cutoff of projects that do not appear to be having results, and avoid the problems associated with large groups of people performing meaningless and menial tasks simply because they have become accustomed to receiving the food rations.

(2) The number of cone supervisors should be doubled or, preferably, tripled, so that there are two or three supervisors for each of the four cones of the Young Towns. Attention should be given to providing opportunities for the cone supervisors to improve their community development skills, either

by providing training through OFASA, or by arranging for them to take relev social science courses offered by Peruvian universities.

(3) Once their numbers have been increased and their skills improved, the cone supervisors should be encouraged to work with community groups participating in OFASA projects to design a progression of activities of increasing complexity and income-generating potential. Successful completion of a simple activity would lead to a group being invited to participate in a more complex one, while it would be made clear to communities that failure to complete an activity successfully would result in termination of the program. This would help eliminate the involvement of large numbers of people in a series of "dead end" projects for long periods, free resources to reach new beneficiary populations, and increase the possibilities of OFASA projects having significant impacts in the areas of community development and improved social organization which will help beneficiaries to better defend their own interest on completion of a planned progression of activities.

(4) The above recommendations would improve the functioning of the OFASA program as it presently exists. However, we also recommend that OFASA shift its efforts away from Lima and toward Peru's provincial areas, both urban and rural. Such a shift should not be sudden, since participation in OFASA programs is a major source of food for a large number of Lima household Rather, it should be accomplished gradually: as projects in Lima terminate, resources can be shifted to other areas rather than used to start new ones in the capital. OFASA has considerable experience in promoting improved agricultural and livestock production in rural areas, and FFW could be an effective way of expanding those efforts. Again, refocusing the existing program with the changes recommended above would reach more people, poorer people, and have relatively greater development potential if conducted in provincial cities rather than in Lima.

C. CARITAS

(1) CARITAS should clarify its goals as to whether it is seeking to provide food to hungry people or whether it is attempting to promote community development. FFW is not an effective instrument for achieving nutritional goals. While providing food to the needy is the motivation for establishing a Title II program, it should be established as a supplemental feeding program targeted specifically to the most at-risk groups: pregnant and lactating women, and children under six. CARITAS should establish explicit community development criteria and then award, monitor, and evaluate projects according to their ability to meet those criteria.

(2) CARITAS should increase the number of field personnel and better focus their areas of responsibility. The low per-beneficiary cost of the CARITAS program indicates that this could be done by using the OPG and Peruvian government contributions it receives to hire salaried personnel who could supplement the large number of volunteers on whom it currently relies for this purpose.

(3) The efforts of the field personnel should be focused in two areas: nutrition education and community development. In the case of nutrition education, less emphasis should be placed on telling people how to prepare a "balanced meal," as this is superfluous in areas where the major problem is insufficient caloric intake. Greater emphasis should be placed on educating people regarding how to avoid gastro-intestinal parasites and other causes of dehydrating diarrhea, and on providing extension services aimed at assisting households to incorporate new cultivars into their cropping systems, both for sale and for household consumption. For example, in some highland areas, communities have begun growing tomatoes and other nontraditional vegetables as a supplement for school lunches and household consumption, and they have

found that these are crops that can be marketed more profitably than traditional staples. Thus, educational efforts in this area have resulted in both improved nutrition and higher household incomes. Community development efforts need to focus on identifying and encouraging projects that enhance the income-generating capabilities of rural communities and contribute to the growth of social institutions. These institutions should be able to survive independently of food aid programs and become vehicles through which communities defend their own interests more effectively than in the past.

(4) CARITAS should cease trying to achieve as broad a geographic distribution of its products as is possible and instead concentrate on targeting programs into specific areas. This will offer several advantages:

(a) It will reduce the amount of time that CARITAS personnel must spend on the road and increase the amount of time they can spend with particular projects.

(b) Less traveling will reduce wear and tear on vehicles, freeing funds to be used for hiring more field personnel.

(c) It will increase the chances that projects will have significant development and organizational impacts, because it will allow beneficiaries and CARITAS personnel to devote more time to planning and designing projects.

(d) It will facilitate the planning and implementation of projects that build upon one another, and help reduce the continuing replication of unsuccessful projects.

(5) CARITAS needs to develop criteria for selecting which projects it will support and which it will not. These should be bases on the prospects of a particular project's resulting in improved community organization and enhanced income-generating capability. This does not mean drawing up a list

of particular projects that CARITAS will or will not support. The beneficiary communities are quite diverse, and a very good project for one community might not be well suited to another. For example, a school construction project might constitute a big step for one community, while in another it would replicate projects that the community already has carried out without FFW.

(6) CARITAS needs to monitor the projects it sponsors in order to identify communities that have difficulties in successfully completing projects and help them discover and address the relevant problems. It should also weed out projects that consistently prove to be unsuccessful or to have relatively little impact compared to other projects. Good professional social science consultants are available locally and can be hired to provide assistance in these matters.

D. CARE

(1) CARE needs to expand its role in the area of social promotion. While it is very good at providing the technical assistance and institutional coordination necessary to build a wide variety of structures, there is virtual no community participation in planning or organizing projects. CARE may want to consider creating a "social promoter" position similar to that in SEPAS/PRAA. Such a person would help communities plan projects that are more responsive to local felt needs and help to generate community support for the projects. A social promoter also would coordinate projects for an area so that they would have greater development impact by enhancing or creating income-generating opportunities, and by acting as a stimulus to strengthen community social organization.

(2) CARE should emphasize its strong institutional ties with Peruvian government agencies and avoid linking itself to the political agendas of particular parties or individuals.

(3) CARE should consider a phased reduction of its Title II projects in Lima. Its considerable expertise in urban community development would be put to the service of a needier population, and its programs would have greater impact if CARE's activities were directed toward Peru's secondary and tertiary cities rather than Lima.

Conclusion

The Title II program in Peru is impressive in terms of its size as well as the scope of activities that it encompasses. It has been successful in reaching large amounts of poor Peruvians with food assistance and in using that assistance to stimulate a large number of community-based, self-help initiatives. In general, the PVOs that conduct the Title II effort purvey the food allotments effeciently and are imaginative in overcoming the chronic lack of resources.

The major weakness of the program is that the acts of distributing food and establishing large numbers of projects tend to become ends in themselves, rather than the means by which beneficiary populations improve the conditions in which they live. This is due to a lack of operational definitions of what constitutes nutritional impact, organization-building, and development that would permit AID/Washington, USAID/Lima, the PVOs, and the beneficiary populations to share an understanding of what Title II projects are supposed to accomplish. In addition, the lack of any monitoring capacity within the Title II structure precludes the parties involved from learning from their vast experience and applying this knowledge to a shared understanding of how the program might be improved.

As a result, distributing food and running projects become too easily equated with development. Once this occurs, it becomes difficult for the

people involved to critically review what they are doing. The benefits are presumed to be self-evident, and negative consequences of the program become difficult to perceive from within.

APPENDIX I

Scope of Work

I. BACKGROUND

The Peru Title II program is currently at a commodity value of $11.5 million, the largest in Latin America. It has been a model for other countries, notably for its integration with Mission strategies and resources and for the high degree of host country cooperation and support.

Most of the food is distributed by four voluntary agencies, CRS, SAWS, CARE and OWS. An important source of support to Title II in Peru is direct GOP support to these programs through Title I local currency sales. In addition, Mission OPGs have helped PVOs to improve program implementation and expand their outreach.

While the initial impetus behind the OPGs was to provide immediate assistance during the economic crisis experienced in 1979, and still continuing today, the focus of the program has progressed from a relief mode to a significant development intervention. A major purpose of this evaluation will be to examine how this evolution occurred and how successful it actually has been in achieving development results.

II. PURPOSE

The objectives of the evaluation will be to:

(1) Assess the design and operations of the Title II program to determine the extent the program is meeting specified objectives (also appropriateness and feasiblity of these objectives).

(2) Assess the multiple impacts of the Title II program over the past 3-4 years on beneficiaries and their communities with particular attention

to the relative contribution of food commodities and its integration with other project components.

(3) Determine important determinants of project success/failure and recommend criteria for improved program design and implementation.

(4) Recommend how the developmental and nutritional impact of the Title II program can be enhanced, including requirements for technical assistance, training and other resources.

(5) Provide guidance of the future direction of the Title II program with specific reference to institutional capability and evantual phase over to the GOP.

III. SCOPE OF WORK AND METHODOLOGY

This evaluation has been constructed to look at key issues/impacts/costs across PVO programs and PL 480 Title II categories. This approach should provide USAID, PVOs and GOP with sufficient information to determine, in relation to specific objectives, how resources could best be allocated and where particular activities need to be strengthened.

A. Program Effectiveness. Through a review of program documentation, interviews with involved parties and field validation, the team will examine the program operations of the Title II programs (FFW and MCH) with particular attention to:

(1) Program accomplishments -- a description of program accomplishments to date. If the program's original goals have not been achieved, explain why not, with specific references to the appropriateness of the objectives and the contextual factors affecting performance.

(2) Target group -- a description of the target group actually being served by the program (which geographic areas, which communities, relevant beneficiary characteristics, such as sex, age, socio-economic status) and an assessment of the relative importance of each one to the achievement of program goals.

(3) Institutional capability -- a description and analytic review of program functions (by agency and program category):

(a) technical assistance - examine technical quality of advice provided and effectiveness of delivery;

(b) nutrition education - determine the effectiveness of individual contacts, food preparation demonstrations and nutrition education sessions, and community outreach;

(c) training - assess the content and methods of the social promotion and vocational skills activities;

(d) provision of personnel, materials, equipment and transportation - verify the timely delivery of inputs and coordination of resources among various participating entities, including mobilization of local contributions;

(e) management - evaluate the adequacy of supervision of the delivery of services to beneficiaries;

(f) data collection, monitoring and reporting, including growth surveillance systems - examine the effectiveness of the existing system in assessing project outputs and/or in detecting and following up malnourished children;

(g) food rations - determine the composition, size and acceptability of the rations, their nutritional value and their local market value relative to purchasing power and minimum wage;

(h) coverage/continuity - review the criteria for program eligibility and graduating recipients from the program; estimate average length of time in program;

(i) project selection - define the criteria used to approve FFW projects and determine priority between social service and productive infrastructure activities;

(j) institutionalization - describe the relationships between PVOs and host government institutions, specifically the degree of collaboration in program design and implementation and coordination of resources.

(4) Cost analysis -- review total program costs provided by USAID, PVOs, GOP, and beneficiaries; calculate cost per beneficiary and cost per type of FFW project; provide budget breakdown by program component (technical assistance, nutrition education, training, materials, supervision, monitoring).

B. Program Impact. The pre-evaluation team identified seven major areas of potential impact on project participants given the mix of program components in the USAID/Peru Title II activities. The team will determine appropriate indicators for each of the major impact areas. As an illustration, such a list might include but not be limited to such measures as:

(1) use of infrastructure facilities -- community use; maintenance; staffing and equipment;

(2) nutrition awareness and behaviors -- awareness of food value, child feeding practices; ration acceptance; harmful foods perceptions; hygiene;

(3) community development -- aspirations for children; interest in/or participation in community activities, participation in non-FFP activities;

4) income generation -- level of technical skills; literacy; new income sources.

(5) reforestation -- survival rates; acreage planted;

(6) consumption levels -- frequence of foods consumed by type, food expenditure as percent of income;

(7) nutritional status -- height/weight by age for children 0-5 year arm circumference of women; recidivism rate of nutrition recuperation.

Because of the extensive scope and program variation in the Peruvian Title II program and because of the data constraints, including lack of baseline or tracking data on the impact measures, a highly detailed survey questionnaire is not advisable. The team will develop project profiles based on structured interviews with project participants and community level personnel in selected communities. This approach will provide an in-depth understanding of how various program components are associated with specific program impacts.

In order to undertake this comparative analysis, similar projects with differences in key program components should be identified: for example, new vs. on-going or completed skills training projects or feeding projects with and without food assistance might be profiled and compared. It is also important to identify ways to assure comparability of the beneficiary com-

munities, e.g. the distance of two FFW projects from the capital or similar rank of communities in a socio-economic index like INADUR's of 1979. When these comparisons are not possible, it is recommended that the team try to interview non-participants as well as project participants.

The preliminary site selection will be carried out by USAID/Peru in conjunction with the PVOs, based on the recommendations of the pre-evaluation team. (See site selection criteria attached.) The team will visit urban projects (MCH-OFASA and FFW-CARE) in the "Pueblos Jovenes" of Lima and Ica (MCH-OFASA) and rural projects (FFW-SEPAS, FFW and MCH-CARITAS) in the Departments of Cajamarca and Ancash.

In developing the interview plan for the profiles, the team should relate its information to the 1979 evaluations of the OPGs as well as ONAA's 1983 survey questionnaire in the "Pueblos Jovenes". Where possible, the team should analyze both quality and quantity of food consumption, in real terms or by approximation, and their relationship to the feeding programs' effectiveness

The team will analyze the incidence of recidivism in OFASA's overall MCH program based on a review of the monthly and trimestral field reports submitted to the SAWS Director. In the case of OFASA's MCH project profiles, the team should not only analyze the projects' impact on recidivism rates but also review the supporting data available such as growth charts and public health records in order to determine the value of further analysis that may contribute to the nutrition sector strategy.

C. Follow-up Actions. Prepare a follow-up action plan with specific recommendations for improving program effectiveness and impact. For the immediate future, this should include recommendations regarding the education components, improvement of management capability, and available financial resources. The team should give particular attention to criteria for sub-project selection and ways of improving data collection, monitoring and reporting of program effects. When addressing future program directions, consideration should be given to methods for increasing GOP logistic and personnel support, eventual replacement of imported commodities, and program levels sustainable by GOP resources.

IV. IMPLEMENTATION SCHEDULE

The evaluation team will be in Peru for a minimum of four weeks with an additional week to write the draft report. The schedule of the evaluation is as follows:

Pre-evaluation:

Site selection; collection of cost data and tabulation of ONAA survey responses; contracting local anthropologists/interviewers.

First week:

Review of materials; briefings by USAID; GOP, PVOs; design of project profiles; confirmation of itinerary; formation and training of interview te:

Second and third weeks:

Field data collection and preliminary analysis.

Fourth week:

Data analysis and formulation of conclusions and recommendations in conjunction with USAID, GOP, and PVOs. Draft of follow-up action plan.

Fifth week:

Draft report.

Sixth week:

Translation of draft report.

TEAM COMPOSITION: QUALIFICATIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES

The evaluation team will consist of the following members to be contracted and funded by AID/W (FVA/PPE). All members must speak fluent Spanish and have worked previously in Peru or other similar Latin American country.

A. Team Leader with strong background in FFP programs, extensive design evaluation and training skills, and excellent writing skills. The team leader will be responsible for coordinating all aspects of the evaluation with specific duties to include: cost analysis, review of PVO and AID monitoring systems, overall institutional assessments, and formulation of a follow-up action plan.

B. Anthropologist with experience in rural and urban Peru or other Andean country. The anthropologist will be in charge of the design, data collection and analysis related to the community profiles and the assessment of social promotion activity. He/she will have principal responsibility for working with the local anthropologist and field interviewers.

C. Nutrition Education Specialist with sound understanding of anthropometric data, dietary analysis and measurement of income and consumption. The nutrition educator will have chief responsibility for assessing the nutrition education promotion activities and the consumption and nutritional impacts.

D. The Latin American Bureau Regional Environmentalist will participate as part of the evaluation team. He will assess the technical aspects of the reforestation project and the institutional capability of INFOR.

E. Local contractors to be hired and financed by USAID:

(1) Economist to collect and analyze cost data and assist with the tabulation of ONAA questionnaire (CARE sites only). Suggested candidate: Jorge Oroso. Two weeks (before arrival of evaluation team) and one week with team.

(2) Anthropologist to assist evaluation team with the design and analysis of community profiles and the recruitment and training of three field interviewers. Suggested candidates: Carlos Aramburu, Carmen Masias or Marcela Chueca (Universidad Catolica). Five weeks.

(3) Three field interviewers: one with knowledge of Pueblos Jovenes (preferably female) and the other two with experience in rural areas. Fluency in Quechua is a requirement for the two rural interviewers. Three weeks each.

F. The participation of PVOS and GOP collaborating institutions on site visits should be arranged by team leader in consultation with USAID.

VI. REPORTS

The team will submit a report containing the assessment of program impact (with supporting data) and the analysis of program elements contributing to project success/failure. On the basis of the data and analysis presented, the team will make detailed recommendations to sharpen program focus, improve program effectiveness and developmental impact.

Suggested Report Outline: Executive summary; description of Title II program in Peru (objectives, design, operations, costs and accomplishments); impact of Title II program; analysis of variations in impact in relation with program components and environmental factors; conclusions and recommendations; follow-up action plan.

Before leaving Peru the team will provide USAID with a draft report which will be translated in Spanish for distribution to GOP and PVOs. The final report will be prepared in English and Spanish after receiving comments from all participating organizations.

VII. RELATIONSHIP AND RESPONSIBILITIES

The contractor will report to Judith W. Gilmore, FVA/PPE, Roome 205 SA-8, telephone 235-1593, in the U.S. and Peru.

VIII. TERM OF PERFORMANCE

The desired starting date is 5 June 1983 and completion date is September 30, 1983.

IX. AID PROPOSED BUDGET

(Attached.)

Attachments:

Site Selection Criteria
Resumes
Budget

SITE SELECTION CRITERIA

A. Pueblos Jovenes in Lima (CARE-FFW)

(1) Selection criteria (6-8 communities)

(a) Representative of types of infrastructure.

(b) Projects; coincidence with ONAA survey 1983

(c) Control group: 0-3 months with FFP.

(d) Experimental group: 1-2 years with FFP.

(2) Comparability:

(a) Similar rankings on INADUR's.

(b) 1979 quality of life index.

(3) Indicators to measure (A. 1, 2, 3,

B. Pueblos Jovenes in Lima (OFASA-FFW)

(1) Selection criteria (4 training and 4 literacy projects)

(a) Representative of different "cones".

(b) Control group: current 9-24 months participation in project.

(c) Experimental group: graduates

(2) Comparability test

(a) Size of group, age of participants.

(3) Indicators to measure: 2, 3, 4, 6.

C. Pueblos Jovenes in Lima (OFASA-MCH)

(1) Selection criteria (3 projects)

(a) Longest duration of project in the same community

(b) Control group: lowest recidivism rate.

(c) Experimental group: highest recidivism rate.

(2) Comparability test

(a) Similar size of group.

(3) Indicators to measure: 2, 3, 6,

D Pueblos Jovenes in Ica (OFASA-MCH)

(1) Selection criteria (2 projects)

(a) Greater than one year of program effort.

(b) Control group: health service zone (1 or 3) with no MCH feeding.

(c) Experimental group: health service zone (2) with OFASA/MCH feeding.

(2) Indicators to measure: 2, 3, 6, 7.

Reforestation Areas (SEPAS-FFW)

(1) Selection criteria (4 per department).

(a) One year participation in program.

(b) Control group: low priority for social promotion.

(c) Experimental group: high priority for social promoti

(2) Comparability test

(a) Distance from departmental capital.

(3) Indicators to measure: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6.

F. Other Rural Areas (CARITAS-MCH-FFW)

(1) Selection criteria

(a) Representative mix of MCH skills training and FFW infrastructure production.

(b) Control group: non-participants.

(c) Experimental group: participants.

(2) Indicators to measure: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6.

APPENDIX II: EVALUATION METHODOLOGY

I. SCOPE OF WORK AND PROBL...

The general plan and content of the evaluation research was outlined in detail in the Scope of Work (SOW) provided by AID/Washington and included here as Appendix I. The problem posed by the Scope of Work was to ascertain whether P.L. 480 Title II programs undertaken in Peru by the four private voluntary organizations were fulfilling the terms of their agreements with regard to their management operations, and whether they were achieving desired impacts with the food. These impacts were hoped to include reaching the neediest persons in rural and urban Peru with food supplements in order to promote better levels of nutrition, well-being and socio-economic development among them.

II. ASSUMPTIONS

To explore the problem in program context, the SOW suggested that field studies among the beneficiary population be conducted as well as a general review be made of PVO management and administration. To do this, the evaluation procedures were refined by delineation of the particular factors whose analysis would permit some conclusions as to the relative achievement of the goals indicated. Designers of the Title II programs in Peru made two basic assumptions as to the consequences of supplying P.L. 480 foodstuffs to the Peruvian people under the aegis of the PVOs. First, they assumed that by distributing the quantities and mix of foods recommended that nutritional levels and subsequently general well-being would improve. Secondly, they assumed that by supplying varying amounts of food in exchange for work performed on approved projects, that there would be a developmental impact.

Evaluation of the designers' assumptions about program effects is possible once working "definitions" are provided. In the first instance, "improvement in nutritional levels" and "improved well-being" in terms of these particular programs were defined by the evaluation team as follows:

(1) the foods constitute an important addition to the customary diet in terms of calories ingested;

(2) by learning to utilize the foods effectively as the result of nutrition instruction provided by the PVOs, project beneficiaries will permanently improve their general dieteray status;

(3) the foods are reaching the needy population in general, and in the family context, the most vulnerable, particularly lactating and pregnant mothers and children under five years of age;

(4) the national and regional patterns of food distribution as organized and executed by the PVOs reach the areas of greatest need and the people who were most disadvantaged;

(5) the work performed in FFW programs is not so much as to negate the caloric value of the food provided;

(6) the rations of food allocated per person and per family actually are received, and are adequate for the average family unit;

(7) recipients receive these food supplements for sufficient time and with sufficient frequency for nutritional impact to occur;

8) FFW projects achieve a "developmental" impact either by directly improving project beneficiaries productive capacity or by creating or improving their socio-economic organization and ability to assume greater control over their own affairs than before.

The basic question then for the evaluation team was whether or not the program assumptions as operationally defined were correct when the position of the beneficiaries was examined.

III. PLAN OF WORK AND METHODOLOGY

The SOW requested that the evaluation of the programs be carried out in Greater Lima, and the highland portions of the departments of Ancash and Cajamarca in the northern half of the country. While this encompassed most of the Title II work undertaken by CARE AND OFASA, it only covered a small portion of the total area served by the other CARITAS and SEPAS, which are nationwide in scope of action. It also was suggested that the evaluation team examine two MCH programs in Ica, a coastal city to the south of Lima. Because of time constraints this was not attempted.

Evaluation work was thus divided regionally and subsequently by program type, agency, and evaluation task according to the time allotted (approximately five and a half weeks). The evaluation schedule was as follows

June 5-6	Washington Evaluation Office consultation	1 day
June 7-11	Lima AID and PVO office consultation and interviews	5 days
June 13-17	Field study of projects in north and south cones of Lima	5 days
June 19-24	Travel to Callejon de Huaylas, Ancash and field study of PVO projects	6 days
June 25-30	Travel to Cajamarca and field study of projects there.	6 days
July 1-12	Return to Lima, data analysis and writing of first draft of report. Presentation of preliminary findings on July 1, 11, 12.	12 days
July 13-6	First portion of team report to AID Washington and continued analysis of field data, Lima.	1/2 day 4 days
July 18	Presentation of preliminary draft to Washington AID office	1/2 day

The evaluation process was designed to receive input from all levels of program operations, including USAID/Peru officials, PVO management personnel in Lima and in the regional offices of Ancash and Cajamarca, and the field supervisory personnel of the PVOs. In these interviews we sought to understand the programs from a "management" viewpoint; how they envisioned the program's purposes and the impact and outreach of individual projects, what they considered to be their achievements, problems and needs. At the same time, the evaluation team sought to appraise each program and its projects in relation to the working definitions regarding program effectiveness outlined above. To accomplish this, the team interviewed a broad spectrum of project beneficiaries and participants in their homes and at the actual project sites in all of the areas.

In conducting interviews with officials and beneficiaries "question guides" were utilized instead of formal questionnaires so that the field interviews could remain flexible and open ended, while at the same time, assuring that key issues were discussed with all informants (see Addenda 1 and 2). This technique was adopted because of high overall time limitations and the subsequent impossibility of drawing appropriate probablistic samples at the field sites. Our choice of interviews among the beneficiaries was an opportunistic one; they were participants who were avialable at the time we could be at each site. While this does not constitute a probabilistic sample and undoubtedly contains some patterns of bias, (were those with the team's past experience in Peruvian communities who were unavailable a particular sort of individual?), we were satisfied that those to whom we talked were "typical" members of local populations.

IV INTERVIEWS AND DISCUSSIONS CONDUCTED

	Totals
Lima AID staff	10
Lima PVO officials	17
PVO regional staff	19
Total	46
Community and project leaders and beneficiaries	159

We expected that preliminary site selection would be completed by USAID/Peru prior to our arrival in Lima as specified in the SOW. However USAID/Peru had not undertaken this task. Therefore, we selected the sites to be visited in consultation with PVO officials in Lima and the relevant regional PVO staffs. In doing this, we attempted to select sites that would provide as broad a view of Title II activities as possible without forcing evaluation team members to spend large amounts of limited research time traveling from one site to another. This approach worked reasonably well in terms of allowing us to gather data on most of the areas of concern specified in the SOW. However, the necessity of selecting research sites ourselves increased the time we had to spend in the field and reduced the time available for data analysis and report writing in Peru.

In order to establish the character of the community in which a project was located, a brief check list of the physical and social features was completed for each place (Addendum 3) and was used as background for our analysis of program outreach patterns and as a check on our on site impressions and observations. In similar fashion, beneficiary levels of living and housing characteristics were established through the use of another check list (Addendum 4). This allowed us to assess the relative socio-economic position of the people interviewed and acted as a check on our other observations. Having such "formal" checks on these qualities is of special value

particularly in light of the speed which the general study was conducted, where impressions may be melted together in a panoramic blur.

Our initial plan of research called for the use of control communities and respondents to aid in the evaluation of program impacts. Ideally, we would have selected community and neighborhood locations which were similar to those of project sites but which had not received Food for Peace program assistance in order to estimate the nature of socio-economic status and developmental changes occurring there. This would have provided comparative information and background against which the recipient populations' position and changes could be judged. By the same token, baseline data from each recipient population would have provided a measure in terms of nutrition, health status and community development for any impact of Food for Peace projects.

Unfortunately no such baseline data were available for evaluation team use in measuring impacts more exactly. While PVOs did collect some material from recipient populations, none of this was systematically maintained or organized to permit effective use in the time available for the evaluation research. Because of this and because of the time lost in selecting research sites, the use of control communities as a means of comparing the relative progress of project populations was not possible.

In the future, we recommend that data from project sites be gathered at the onset of project activity (using check lists similar to ours) in order to make available baseline data that would permit measurement of project impact at (a) the project site itself, and (b) in comparison to control communities where the same baseline data could be gathered simultaneously.

The economic and management phases of program evaluation were undertaken by the team economic analyst who began his work prior to the arrival of

the full team and continued his work throughout the period of research. Materials provided by USAID-Lima and the separate PVO organizations were organized and analyzed to the degree possible in an attempt to discover program costs, performance levels and financial conditions of the PVOs relative to the Food for Peace program, and various specific components such as personnel movement and costs, equipment and other management dimensions of the PVO operations As discussed in Chapter II, numerous shortcomings were discovered in the manner in which records were and are organized which prevented a complete and comprehensive review of these program aspects. Again, with more time and/or personnel it might have been possible to reorganize the materials. The need to unscramble this material in Lima limited the ability of the team to enlarge the scope of its management analysis to encompass the regional PVO office operations. In future management analyses it is recommended that additional formal attention be paid to the regional contexts of PVO staff activity per se in terms of regional budgets, personnel, equipment and formal management characteristics. This would require that the economic-management analyst visit each provincial operations site, something which was not possible on this occasion.

V. THE EVALUATION TEAM AND RESEARCH PROCESS

The team was comprised of eight members, three U.S. citizens and five Peruvians. Only one of the team had not had experience in Peru before, although all spoke fluent Spanish and had extensive relevant field experience in similar research situations.

Team Leader and Senior Development Analyst:

Paul L. Doughty, Ph.D., Applied Anthropology and Rural Sociology; Prior development, research and evaluation work in Peru (eight years) Mexico, El Salvador, Guatemala, Costa Rica.

Community and Rural Development Analyst:

Michael Painter, Ph.D. Economic Anthropology: prior research experience on food production and agricultural policy in Peru (two years).

Nutritional and Health Analyst:

Elizabeth Burleigh, Ph.D. candidate in Nutritional Anthropology; related experience in MCH programs in New Mexico and Guatemala (six years).

Urban Program Analyst:

Hector Martinez, Ph.D. Applied Anthropology and Development Program Management; previous work in Peru and Bolivia for 30 years.

Program Economic Analyst:

Jorge Oroza, Ph.D., Economist and Specialist in Food Economics; previous work on Peruvian food economics and program management (two years).

Field Interviewers:

Maria Soledad de la Cadena, M.A., Social Anthropology; prior evaluation work in Peru with AID and other agencies;

Norma Adams, B.A., Social Anthropology, previous research in Peruvian squatter settlements and rural villages with other agencies;

Hernan Serra, M.A., Psychology, prior field research experience in squatter settlements in Peru.

Regarding the present problem, the team as a whole brought to bear many years of applied field research experience in both urban and rural contexts in Peru as well as from other Latin American contexts. The group was experienced in rural and urban development projects and research, migration, nutrition, economic, social stratification, agricultural and program management studies, all of which were pertinent to the present case.

The three U.S. team members assumed the overall responsibility for the generation of the final draft of the report in addition to participating fully in gathering interviews and field data with the others. Martinez and Oroza were responsible for preparation of some portions of the report as indicated below. All team members conducted interviews, wrote up field notes and made analytical contributions. Doughty was responsible for the overall

organization of the field work, analysis and preparation and editing of the final report. Painter focused upon FFW program analysis, while Burleigh concentrated on nutritional programs and impact.

While Oroza worked exclusively with AID and PVO staffs, the rest of the team participated in project level research conducting interviews with beneficiaries in the communities. The original plan was to divide the team into two units to do this, but various transport and coordination conditions led us to choose a single team approach. This also permitted all members to discuss and benefit from feedback drawn from each other's daily experience and findings. The team visited research sites utilizing USAID vehicles and on some occasions taxis or PVO program vehicles. Although organized as a single field unit, on site interviews were conducted in various ways, depending upon circumstances. At times two or three sub-groups were formed so that more projects could be visited in a single "sweep" of a geographic sector. At times interviews were conducted (ideally) in a "one on one" context, but on other occasions, one interviewer might have to interview a panel of persons such as a work group which could not be "disaggregated" because of field situations. At other times, two interviewers might find themselves questioning a single respondent. In such circumstances, one person asked the questions while the other wrote down the responses. On several occasions, interviews were conducted at "sessions" of community leaders.

Despite this, and perhaps because of these highly varied field conditions, the team developed a strong sense of program variety and informant situations. As experienced, anthropologically trained interviewers such diverse conditions were not found distracting but rather tended to enrich the information. Panel interviews for example, although at times difficult to "control" provide

a fertile context for exploring contervailing opinions among members of a group or for filling out responses to broad factual questions ("How many other community projects have you carried out here in the past five years?"), where one person might not have the complete answer.

Throughout our research in Lima, Ancash, and Cajamarca, the uniform response to our inquiries was a positive one. Rapport with individual beneficiaries, program officials, and community leaders was excellent. We encountered little suspicion of our motives, identities or purposes. Indeed, while USAID/Peru provided us with individual letters of identification only three members of the entire team ever were asked to produce them. Although the beneficiaries were open, friendly, informative, and even generous in their hospitality, the agency officials were, as one might anticipate, more formal in response. In contrast to beneficiaries, we visited them in their offices and places of work, rather than in their homes and communities. While the beneficiaries proved always ready to make time for us (stopping their plowing, weaving, kitchen work) program staff, awaited formal appointments. The field staffs of PVOs had been advised in advance of our forthcoming visit. In Huaraz CARITAS personnel had prepared some material to give us, while the ONAA director "escaped" to Lima and we never saw him. In Cajamarca, the PRAA staff had mistakenly expected our arrival a week early.

The evaluation team encountered some unanticipated situations in its relations with USAID/Peru because of other simultaneous program evaluations and planning activities. We were asked to collaborate with: Sigma I's nutritional appraisal for Peru, and, the emergency food program for Piura flood and Puno drought victims being planned by Tony Jackson. Team members met with these project leaders and USAID/Peru officials in those contexts at least six times. Ironically, this was more than we were able to meet formally with these same officials in the context of our own evaluation.

Another dimension to the evaluation process is the availability of pertinent information at the USAID/Peru mission office. Upon arrival the team faced a two and one half foot high mound of reports, previous partial evaluations, uncounted program-specific reports and documentation, agreements, letters, and array of miscellaneous papers. In addition there were all the specific PVO records at AID and in the agencies themselves. While there was a plethora of this type of bureaucratic archival material, there was a stunning paucity of organized background and research data. There was no USAID library or information coordination office which could readily supply us, for example, with basic agricultural production data for Peru. The persons we asked did not know where to find such information. In short, the lack of any local research office or organized library in AID-Lima meant that we were starting from scratch and unable to build upon much in the way of prior findings, even of a general nature. The need for an ongoing Research and Development office at the AID mission is quite clear. Our evaluation would have been greatly enhanced by such capability as indeed would the programs and project designs themselves.

Addendum 1

GUIA DE ENTREVISTA

IDA/AID(VI/83)

Officiales del Programa

1. ¿Cuantas familias viven aqui? ¿Este programa les está ayudando? Cómo?
2. ¿Cree Ud. que el programa esta contribuyendo al desarrollo de la comunidad? ¿Cómo contribuye?
3. ¿Cree Ud. que por su participación en este programa las personas están saliendo menos en búsqueda de trabajo?
4. ¿Según su experiencia, como se utilizan los alimentos repartidos a las familias beneficiarias?
5. ¿Cómo se han seleccionado los beneficiarios del programa que se está llevando a cabo aqui? ¿Cómo se ha seleccionado el programa?
6. Se ha comentado que algunas personas venden los alimentos que reciben del programa, o que los venden para comprar productos del lugar.. También se dice que algunos los usan para dar de comer a los animales. ¿Qué nos puede decir de esto?
7. ¿Aparte de éste programa hay proyectos o programas educacionales que se realizan con esfuerzo comunal? ¿Había en el pasado?
8. ¿Ahora que la población recibe alimentos de éste programa, la contidad de proyectos de trabajo o de educación basados en esfuerzo comunal ha aumentado, ha bajado o es igual?
9. ¿Cuántas familias participan en éste programa? ¿Qué alimentos reciben? ¿En qué cantidades? Cada cuánto? ¿En qué forma?
10. ¿Hay alguna familia que no participa en el programa? ¿Por qué será? Puede indicar cómo encontrarme con ellos?
11. ¿De cuántos programas se responsabiliza Ud.? ¿El tiempo que Ud. dedica a cada programa es suficiente o se necesita más personal?
12. ¿Cuáles son las funciones de Ud. en cuanto a éstos programas?
13. ¿Qué coordinación hay con otras entidades, por ejemplo el Ministerio de Agricultura?
14. ¿Aparte de éste programa, con anterioridad se han realizado otros aqui?
15. ¿Han pensado en realizar otras obras una vez que concluya esta?

16. ¿Qué otras instituciones publicas o privadas también están realizando obras en esta agrupación?

17. ¿Los programas incluyen enseñanza a los beneficiarios? ¿En qué forma (consejos individuales, en grupos)? ¿Dónde se dan las clases (en las casas de los beneficiarios, en algun centro o edificio, mientras que trabajan en el proyecto en la comunidad)? ¿Quienes son los que enseñan? ¿De qué temas trata la ensenanza? ¿Que materiales educativos usan? (Hay que verlos.)

Notas: ¿Quien contestó las preguntas? Sexo y edad estimados.
Otros detalles:

Addendum 2

GUIA DE ENTREVISTA IDA/AID(VI/83)

Beneficiarios y lideres de comunidades
Programas de Apoyo Alimentario

1. ¿Cuántas personas comen aqui? ¿Cuántas personas son menores de seis años? ¿La madre está embarazada o está dando pecho?

2. ¿Quienes son los miembros de la familia que más comen de los alimentos recibidos del programa? ¿Le parece que está mejorando su alimentación? (Nótese: Especialmente se necesitan informaciones sobre los niños menores de seis años y la mujer.)

3. ¿Siempre se pueden comer los alimentos recibidos del programa o hay veces cuando no se deben comer? ¿Cuando un niño está enfermo los puede comer?

4. ¿Cuales son los platos que se preparon de los alimentos recibidos del programa? ¿Le han enseñado preparar los alimentos?

5. ¿El programa incluye enseñanza para los participantes? . Cuales son los temas de ésta ensenanza? ¿Ha sido útil para Ud.? ¿Qué ha aprendido Ud.? ¿Hay oportunidades de expresar sus inquietudes?

6. ¿Mayormente son los hombres o las mujeres que participan en éste programa? ¿Cuando las mujeres trabajan qué hacen con los niños?

7. ¿Como llegó a existir el programa que se lleva a cabo aqui? ¿Quien dirige el programa? (Si es ingeniero o doctor Cuando viene?)

8. ¿Cómo se organizaron para presentar la solicitud pidiendo el programa? ¿Participo Ud.?

9. ¿Qué hace el programa acá en la comunidad? ¿Ayuda a Ud.?

10. ESCOJA LA PREGUNTA MAS APTA. ¿Aparte se ésta obra que está reslizándose mediante los alimentos, existen otras obras que se llevan a cabo solamente con el esfuerzo comunal? ¿Cuántos días al mes se dedican a éstas? ¿La gente aqui asisten a reuniones o clases donde no dan alimentos?

11. ¿De no haberse contado con alimentos, estaría Ud. participando en éste programa?

12. ¿Cree Ud. que la cantidad de alimentos que recibe compensa sus esfuerzos? ¿Qué estaría haciendo Ud. de no estar participando en éste programa?

13. ¿Nos han contado que algunas personas venden los alimentos que reciben y que otros los venden para comprar alimentos que más les gustan. También se dice que algunos los usan para dar de comer a los animales. ¿Occurenacá éstas cosas?

14. ¿Piensa ud. que las familias que reciben alimentos son las más necesitadas? Si no, ¿por que?

15. ¿Sabe Ud. donde se producen los alimentos?

16. ¿Llegan a tiempo los materiales para relizar los trabajos (o para seguir las actividaes del club, etc.)?

17. ¿Cómo mejoraría Ud. el proyecto? ¿Corregir los defiencias (problemas) que Ud. encuentra? (¿Cuáles son los problemas - si hay - que tiene el proyecto acá?)

18. ¿Qué piensa hacer Ud. cuando se termine éste programa?

Notas: Quien fué que contestó las preguntas? Sexo y edad estimados
Otro detalle:

Addendum 3

INVENTARIO FISICO DEL LUGAR IDA/AID(VI/83)

Entrevistador: _____

1, Nombre del lugar: _____

2. Categoria del lugar:

a) capital de distrito
b) capital de provincia
c) comunidad campesina
d) sector de comunidad campesina
e) CAP
f) pueblo joven
g) otro (¿cuál?) _____

3. Tipo de asentamiento:

a) nucleado
b) disperso
c) lineal
d) mixto

4. Servicios básicos:

a) agua potable
b) desague
c) pista asfaltada
d) veredas
e) corriente eléctrica
f) alumbramiento público
g) mercado (plaza)
todos los días _____
semanalmente _____
h) plaza de armas
i) número de tiendas _____
j) posta médica/sanataria
k) correo

5. Lengua dominante:

a) castellano
b) quechua
c) bilingüe

6. Distancia al poblado más importante: _____ kms
Nombre del lugar: _____
¿Cómo se llega?
a) carretera pavimentada
b) carreta afirmada
c) trocha
d) no tiene camino

7. Obras comunales (faenas) realizadas en los ultimos 5 anos:

Observaciones:

Addendum 4

INVENTARIO DE VIVIENDA IDA/AID VI83

Lugar y proyecto _____ Nombre _____

1. Aproximados metros cuadrados _____ m^2
2. Número de habitaciones _____
3. Material dominante de las paredes: _____esteras quincha; _____ adobe tapia
   _____material noble _____ otro
4. Techo de: _____ calamina; _____estera; _____aligerado;_____
   eternit; _____teja; _____paja; _____otro
5. Artifactos del hogar y muebles:

   _____televisión
   _____máquina de coser
   _____refrigeradora
   _____radio
   _____plancha
   _____otros

6. Agua: _____cañeria en casa
   _____pozo en casa
   acéquia
   _____cañeria en calle
   _____pozo, acéquia o manantial
   fuera de casa, tiene
   que llevar

7. Letrina o Desague: _____tiene en casa _____no tiene
8. Piso: _____tierra _____ladrillo o cemento; _____madero;_____otro
9. Electricidad: _____tiene en casa _____no tiene en casa
10. Cocina: _____leña o carbon; _____kerosene; _____gas; _____eléctrica
11. Condición de aparencia o mantenimiento en comparasion a otras de la vecinidad
    _____mejor _____igual _____inferior
12. ¿Hay negocio o trabajo especial que se lleva acabo en la casa (tienda, taller etc)?
    _____ sí _____no ¿qué cosa?_____

Otros comentarios:

Appendix III

Glossary of Acronyms and Spanish Terms

Accion Popular: Popular Action Party. Political party of President Fernando Belaunde Terry.

CAP: Cooperativa Agraria de Produccion. Agrarian Production Cooperative. An indivisible unit in which land, livestock, crops, equipment, and processing facilities are owned and exploited in common. The surpluses generated from the cultivation, processing, and sale of products are distributed on the basis of the amount and type of work performed by cooperative members. One of the cooperative land holding structures formed by the Velasco government as part of the agrarian reform.

CARE: Cooperative for American Relief Everywhere. International social service organization which uses PL 480, Title II food assistance to promote the construction of infrastructural facilities in Greater Lima.

CARITAS: Peruvian social service organization sponsored by Catholic Relief Services (CRS). Administers Title II FFW and MCH programs in the highlands and MCH programs in Lima.

CODA-PRAA: Comite Departamental de Agencias - PRAA. PRAA Departmental Agency Committee. Local committee of participating agencies that coordinates PRAA projects at the departmental level.

Comunidad Campesina: "peasant community." A legally recognized landholding unit. Basis for recognition created in Peruvian constitution of 1920, and first communities received recognized status in 1926. Recognition of rural communities was emphasized by the Velasco government as part of the agrarian reform. Comunidades campesinas are characterized by a prescribed administrative structure and inalienable land. Not all peasant communities have the legal status of comunidad campesina. In this report comunidad campesina is used to refer to the juridical entity, while "community" and "village" are used generically to refer to rural hamlets.

CONACE-PRAA: Comite Nacional de Evaluacion - PRAA. National PRAA Evaluation Committee. A national committee that meets to coordinate and evaluate PRAA projects.

Cooperacion Popular: Popular Cooperation. The civic action organization of Accion Popular.

CORDEANCASH: Corporacion para el Desarrollo de Ancash. Ancash Development Corporation. GOP regional development corporation for Ancash.

CORDECAJ: Corporacion para el Desarrello de Cajamarca. Cajamarca Development Corporation. GOP regional development corporation for Cajamarca.

FFW: Food for Work. Program which uses Title II food to stimulate participation in community-based work projects.

GOP: Government of Peru.

INFOR: Instituto Nacional Forestal y de Fauna. National Forest and Wildlife Institute. Agency of the Ministry of Agriculture. Participates in the PRAA program with SEPAS and ONAA. Departmental offices referred to as CENFOR.

MCH: Maternal Child Health programs.

OFASA: Organizacion Filan tropica de Assistencia Social Adventista. Adventist Philanthropic and Social Assistance Organization. Social service organization of the Seventh Day Adventist Church in Peru. Sponsored by Seventh Day Adventist World Service (SAWS). Administers Title II FFW and MCH programs in Lima.

ONAA: Oficina Nacional de Apoyo Alimentario. National Office of Food Support. Agnecy originally established as part of the Peruvian Ministry of Agriculture and Food. Now operates independenty, supplying Title II food to CARE and SEPAS (PRAA) FFW projects.

PIBA: Programa de Infraestructura Basica con Alimentos. Basic Infrastructure with Food Aid program. FFW program in Lima's pueblos jovenes in which CARE plays a coordinating role with the Peruvian Ministries of Agriculture and Housing, ONAA, and Cooperacion Popular.

PRAA: Programa de Reforestacion con Apoyo Alimentario. Reforestation with Food Aid Program. A FFW program that uses Title II food to stimulate community based reforestation projects. Sponsored by SEPAS working together with ONAA and INFOR.

PROSATCOPRAA: Proyecto de Seguridad Alimentaria con Trabajo Comunal PRAA. PRAA Food Security with Comunal Work Project. A small pilot project developed by ONAA and SPRAA in Cajamarca that hopes to form and use "agricultural clubs" in villages to try to address problems of low agricultural productivity.

Pueblo Jóven: "Young Town." A term introduced by the military government of Velasco to refer to the squatter settlements that have come to encircle Lima and other urban centers. The term replaced the somewhat deprecatory barriada, which had been applied to the squatter settlements previously.

PVO: Private Voluntary Organization.

SAIS: Sociedad Agricola de Interes Social. Agricultural Society of Social Interest. An indivisible unit of property and goods owned and exploited in common by members. Formed from one or more expropriated estates and the surrounding communities, SAIS includes a commercial component which is usually a service cooperative that seeks to integrate the economic interests of the former estate workers and the residents of the surrounding communities. The surrounding communities are represented in the SAIS general assembly and theorectically receive a share of any profits on the grounds that they had lands usurped by the former estate. However, profit sharing has been rare in fact. One of the cooperative land holding structures created by the Velsaco government as part of the Agrarian reform.

SAWS: Seventh Day Adventist World Service.

SEPAS: Servicio Evangelico Peruano de Accion Social. Peruvian Evangelical Social Action Service. Peruvian social service organization sponsored by Church World Service (CWS).

APPENDIX IV - Newspaper Clippings

A. Contemporary news articles concerning nutrition and food supply: private attempt to promote use of cereals and whole grain bread.

B. Cajamarca milk producers protest government policies favoring imported milk products to the detriment of Peruvian producers.

C. Director of the Rice Vendors Association gives public assurance that Lima has enough domestic (20 M.T.) and imported (30 M.T.) rice to meet needs until the end of the year, despite rumors to the contrary.

D. An analysis of the municipal government problems of the district of Comas, Lima, noting the conflict of political interest between the elected officials and government agencies like Cooperacion Popular which has not responded to requests for finishing clinics. It notes that Comenos have marched on the Palace since 1982 seeking government support for water and sewerage projects.

E. President Belaúnde inspects new high rise apartment units in Lima, destined for middle class occupation.

F. The Council of Ministers announces the winners of the "Gold Shovel," "Silver Shovel" and "Bronze Shovel" awards to the province, district and sector who have undertaken the most outstanding self-help projects during the past year. Referred to as the "Philanthropy of the poor" by the President, these projects are valued at 30 million soles.

G. People of the "Young Town" "El Pino" struggle to obtain light by working on Sundays. Celebrating their tenth year as a recognized settlement, they also plan to work on water and sewerage projects. The work is accompanied by a fiesta and delicious barbeque.

H. Women work to open a new road in Puno. Cooperacion Popular is supporting the work on this 15 kilometer road with half wages, half food and has also provided the tools for faster construction. Note that while the women work on the roadway, men in background are cultivating a field.

LA PRENSA

Lima, Martes 5 de Julio de 1983

Promueven el Pan de Mashica Por Ser Barato y Alimenticio

Cambiar radicalmente en el Perú el consumo del conocido pan blanco o francés, de escaso valor nutritivo por el pan "inca o mashica", mucho más alimenticio y barato, planteó ayer el ingeniero Pedro Tupiño. Asimismo ofreció revolucionar la alimentación popular del país en el plazo de 60 días si es nombrado Vice-Ministro de Agricultura.

Tupiño, próspero industrial natural de Yauyos, ha realizado investigaciones sobre nutrición durante 15 años tanto en el Perú como en Europa. Sus observaciones lo han llevado a emprender un proyecto sobre cómo "alimentarse mejor con menos dinero", que dará a conocer LA PRENSA en sus próximas ediciones.

El ex Director de la Sociedad Nacional de Industrias y miembro de la Comisión Tripartita de Distribución de Divisas Extranjeras durante el Gobierno de Bustamante y Rivero, ha cursado una carta al Ministro de Agricultura, Mirko Cuculiza donde le ofrece sus servicios ad-honorem.

En dicha misiva expone a Cuculiza que puede conseguir productos nutritivos, fáciles de elaborar en cualquier hogar, sin gastos para el Estado.

Entre estos artículos están el pan "inca", elaborado con trigo, el pan integral a mitad de precio del francés, alimento tipo avena a la cuarta parte del precio de la común, sopas de arroz y trigo integral y menestras especiales, entre otros.

Ing. Pedro Tupiño Agüero y su Pan

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Firme denuncia de FONGAL.

EL SIGLO DIARIO DE CAJAMARCA
30 junio 1983 p. 1,3

Gobierno contra leche peruana



El Presidente de FONGAL, señor Israel Pereda Vílez dijo que esperan una respuesta acertada y oportuna del gobierno a la preocupación de uno de los sectores más dinámicos de la producción cajamarquina.

Con un cuestionamiento directo a la política agraria del Actual Gobierno a la que califican de una "política anticonstitucional",que atenta de manera directa y definitiva y muy seriamente contra la ganadería lechera nacional,se pronunció los productores de la Cuenca de Leche de Cajamarca,agrupados en FONGAL-Cajamarca,y a nivel nacional,demandando al Gobierno una urgente rectificación de dicha política que "es totalmente equivocada".

En efecto,el principal vocero de los productores de leche de Cajamarca Israel Pereda Vilchez,al ser entrebistado por EL SIGLO,quien dijo que ratifica de cada uno de los puntos del comunicado nacional emitido por FONGAL-Cajamarca,publicado en este Diario,el 11 de junio último.

Tomando los principales párrafos del citado Comunicado,Pereda Vílchez manifestó que el reclamo de los productores lecheros a nivel nacional es que se dé una solución a este problema,el mismo que se ha visto agravado con las dificultades climatológicas,y que lejos de haber encontrado el apoyo de las autoridades de Gobierno, otorgando precios justos en función a los costos elevados,más bien se posterga motivando la grave crisis.

Pereda Vílchez sostiene que todo esto no es sino una política anticonstitusional del actual Gobierno que está atentando muy seriamente contra la ganadería lechera nacional,lo cual no ha progresado ,ainó más bien hoy se encuentre en un franco receso. Recuerda el representante de los productores lecheros de Cajamarca,que hace 60 días se planteó oficialmente ante el Ministerio de Agricultura,para que contemplara un reajuste al precio de la leche,pero desde esa fecha,con la indolencia más grande y el desinterés total,se ha postergado dándose razones de tipo político a un problema que es netamente técnico..

"Nuestra situación y sin querer dramatizar,expresa el señor Pereda Vílchez,la penosa situación en la que se encuentran los productores,por la actitud de la fábrica PERULAC que fija a su voluntad los volúmenes de recepción,originando graves pérdidas,que muchas veces se ven obligados a eliminar los excedentes rechazados,y lo que es más grave aún,se limita las posibilidades de incrementar la producción de la zona.

Sobre esta situación,el Presidente de FONGAL-Cajamarca Pereda Vílchez,lanza una advertencia al Gobierno Central,diciendo que no se provoque la promoción de la leche extranjera,a través de la cada vez mayor utilización de leche en polvo importada,la que en la actualidad.tiene preferencia en la recombinación que realiza las plantas industriales a nivel nacional,sobre ello dice Pereda Vílchez,que está bloqueando la producción lechera nacional..

Para hacer frente a esta desleal y mortal competencia que alienta en forma directa el Gobierno,se debe fomentar la producción nacional,fijando una política coherente de largo aliento que permita el desarrollo de la ganadería nacional,esto por constituir un patrimonio nacional.

Este llamado le hago,dice el señor Pereda Vílchez,también a los señores dirigentes porque de no tomarse un nuevo rumbo y de reordenamiento definitivo en este campo,definitivamente también avecinamos un colapso del cual será muy difícil y costoso recuperar la ganadería nacional.Dijo finalmente Pereda Vílchez.

-B-

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EL COMERCIO 4 julio 1983 p. 1

Ecasa señala que es ficticia la actual escasez de arroz

Abastecimiento asegurado hasta fin de año

El abastecimiento de arroz a la población está asegurado hasta fin de año, sostuvo ayer el presidente de Ecasa, tras recalcar que la escasez actual de ese producto es "ficticia" y que, para contrarrestarla, se ha decidido efectuar a partir de hoy su venta directa al público en los almacenes de Santa Anita.

En conferencia de prensa, que ofreció ayer en los almacenes de Empresa Comercializadora del Arroz, Oswaldo Vásquez Cerna manifestó que actualmente existe una existencia de veinte mil toneladas, las que, sumadas a las treinta mil toneladas importadas, permitirán seguir abasteciendo a la población.

"Aparte de esto, el gobierno, consciente de las necesidades que se pueda presentar en el futuro, ha autorizado la importación de ciento veinte mil toneladas más, cuya licitación estará a cargo de Ecasa", precisó.

Respecto a la escasez de ese producto en los mercados y bodegas limeñas, manifestó que al parecer algunos malos comerciantes han ocultado el arroz, con el fin de alarmar a la población y de aprovecharse de esa situación para obtener mayores beneficios, señaló.

Indicó que, sin embargo, esos mismos comerciantes corren el riesgo de perder su producto, pues éste, si es guardado por más de treinta días sin el tratamiento sanitario respectivo, se puede malograr, al ser atacado por el gorgojo.

VENTA DIRECTA AL PUBLICO

Vásquez Cerna manifestó que, a fin de contrarrestar la escasez ficticia, Ecasa ha decidido efectuar la venta directa de arroz en sus almacenes, a razón de una bolsa por familia, todos los días, inclusive sábado y domingo.

Indicó que, al mismo tiempo, ha creído conveniente vender, a partir de hoy, arroz en los mismos mercados a los comerciantes.

CONTROL DE LOS ACAPARADORES

De otro lado, informó que se ha coordinado con el prefecto de Lima, a fin de realizar una operación para detectar a los acaparadores y especuladores del arroz.

"Haremos un seguimiento del abastecimiento de este producto, desde el momento en que sale de los molinos y de los almacenes hasta el que llega a los puntos de venta", precisó.

Balance municipal

Comas: distrito pobre con múltiples problemas

En la parte sureste de la capital se ubica uno de los distritos más grandes y populosos de Lima. Es el distrito de Comas, cuya partida de nacimiento se extendió en 1954 por una invasión.

Desde aquella fecha Comas se convirtió en una especie de tierra prometida para un conglomerado humano mayoritariamente provinciano, sin techo que lo cobijara.

La vida en Comas es dura para el medio millón de habitantes; el 51 por ciento de la población no cuenta con agua y desagüe y el resto está con el servicio racionado, llegando en algunas zonas sólo una hora de agua cada dos días.

En opinión del alcalde del distrito, Arnulfo Medina, el agua que se consume en Comas está contaminada, porque el proceso que se inicia al transportarse en camiones cisterna y que termina cuando el poblador, al adquirirla, la almacena en cilindros de fierro a los que se les cubre con una resanada de cemento o brea para evitar su rápido deterioro.

A este problema se unen los del transporte, de energía eléctrica, el mal estado de los colegios, los cuales, en número de cien, imparten la educación a un 85 por ciento de la población escolar.

El promedio de la mortalidad infantil en Comas es de 120 por mil, principalmente por la falta de un hospital bien equipado y de postas médicas, que podrían combatir la desnutrición, la deshidratación y otras enfermedades.

El concejo no cuenta con una infraestructura apropiada, ni tiene las rentas que se requieren para satisfacer las demandas de la población. Sin embargo, en conjunto, el distrito es una de las zonas más limpias de la capital.

El alcalde Medina, un maestro primario que enseña a leer y escribir a niños de primer grado y que ha sido dirigente nacional del SUTEP durante varios años, considera que el pueblo comeño, con su propio impulso, ha conquistado importantes derechos.

LA GESTION MUNICIPAL

La gestión del alcalde de Comas, Arnulfo Medina, es distinta a la que tradicionalmente se ha efectuado en el país, según expresó a EL OBSERVADOR, siendo el principal objetivo el de contribuir a la organización y movilización política del pueblo, señalando la opción y alternativa de poder de la izquierda frente a los partidos de la derecha.

Medina afirmó que el segundo aspecto de su gestión es ganar experiencia como gobierno.

Un tercer objetivo es satisfacer las demandas del pueblo, como el mejoramiento del servicio de limpieza pública y contribuir decididamente a las obras de infraestructura.

Durante los 2 años y medio de la gestión de Medina, el concejo distrital ha tenido una relación directa con el vecindario, a través de la efectivización de un cabildo abierto y de 16 asambleas populares, en las que la comunidad informa, analiza y da solución a sus problemas.

Las acciones del municipio se basan en los acuerdos de las asambleas populares, en las que participan representantes de las organizaciones populares y vecinales del distrito. Allí se han aprobado diversas marchas emprendidas por el pueblo comeño a Palacio de Gobierno y a entidades estatales para que cumplan con sus promesas.

LAS DIFICULTADES

La falta de profesionales y técnicos en el personal del municipio, situación que se va remediando en los últimos tiempos, ha impedido una mejor administración del concejo, dijo Medina.

Considera que la izquierda debe tomar conciencia de la necesidad de formar equipos de gobierno que agrupen a los cuadros técnicos y que brinden el apoyo que requieren los municipios, superándose la situación actual de los alcaldes que tienen que afrontar solos problemas administrativos, recayendo sobre ellos una serie de críticas que no toman en cuenta este estado de cosas.

Medina planteó que el boicot a la gestión municipal por parte del gobierno central, al reducir al mínimo los presupuestos municipales y al no destinar los recursos sectoriales, como el de salud, transporte, educación, agricultura, entre otros, en la forma y de acuerdo a lo requerido en las zonas prioritarias, favoreciéndose a los distritos pudientes, es otra de las dificultades que ha tenido que sortear.

Tuvo frases duras contra Cooperación Popular, al considerar que viola la competencia y la autonomía municipal, que desarrolla funciones que competen a los concejos, aparte de que dispone de mayores recursos que todos los municipios juntos.

OVER- - - - - - - -

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En Comas, según Medina, Cooperación Popular rehúye firmar el compromiso para ayudar en la terminación de cuatro centros de salud; y en la población de El Carmen Alto los vecinos están cansados de esperar que esta entidad del gobierno apoye con la dirección técnica y aporte los materiales requeridos para construcción de las veredas, mientras 800 bolsas de cemento permanecen en las calles, malográndose ante la indignación del vecindario.

EL CONCEJO POR DENTRO

El alcalde Medina afirma que con los seis regidores de Izquierda Unida no tiene mayores problemas y que, cuando éstos se suscitan, se resuelven al interior de este frente político.

Manifiesta que el concejal pepecista es un buen colaborador de su administración, a diferencia de los cinco concejales populistas, que efectúan "una labor de zapa, de obstrucción, oponiéndose por oponerse y tratando en todo momento de usurpar funciones". En cuanto a los dos regidores apristas, considera que están más ligados a las opciones populistas.

LAS MARCHAS DE COMAS

Desde febrero de 1982 los comeños han efectuado diversas marchas a Palacio de Gobierno, a través de las cuales han logrado que se inicien los trabajos para el agua y desagüe, obra que está proyectada para 1984, aunque no llegará a Carabayllo.

Otros logros son la pavimentación de cuatro kilómetros de la avenida Revolución y los dos kilómetros del jirón Puno, además del compromiso de construcción de un servicio de emergencia en Collique.

Aún falta que Enatru-Perú implante un servicio de ómnibus para Comas para evitar que muchos de sus pobladores tengan que utilizar más de un carro para llegar al centro de Lima.

RECURSOS Y RENTAS

Medina explica que Comas es un distrito pobre, con un presupuesto limitado por concejo provincial a 1,259 millones de soles, por lo que tiene que abstenerse de realizar diversas obras. Gasta más del 50 por ciento de los ingresos en la limpieza pública.

Las rentas del distrito provienen del impuesto predial que pagan unos 40 mil vecinos y que alcanza la cifra de 106 millones, habiendo captado el concejo, durante el primer trimestre de este año, 103 millones. También los pagos por baja policía y espectáculos públicos constituyen rentas importantes.

El alcalde de Comas considera que los 32 policías municipales tiene que efectuar ardua labor y no se dan abasto para controlar los servicios. Dijo que Electrolima y Sedapal cobran por servicios deficientes o que no se prestan, por lo que el concejo ha multado a Electrolima con cinco millones de soles y a Sedapal con diez millones.

Finalmente, Medina dice que su distrito es limpio, aunque existen zonas críticas como el cruce de Micaela Bastidas con la avenida Universitaria, y la avenida Maestros, pero que "ya no se permiten los cerros de basura, lo cual constituye un avance".

En el mes de agosto el concejo distrital iniciará la campaña "Comas, el distrito más limpio de Lima", para lo cual se iniciarán los preparativos correspondientes.

Tal es el balance de lo que se ha hecho y está por hacer en Comas, a pocos meses de cumplirse el mandato de las actuales autoridades municipales.

Arnulfo Medina, alcalde de Comas, inspecciona las obras de tendido de redes del servicio de agua potable, el mayor problema de ese populoso distrito.

El Presidente Fernando Belaunde inspecciona uno de los departamentos de la parte alta del complejo habitacional "Santa Rosa", frente al Aeropuerto Internacional.

Diputado Zamalloa elogia unidad de Latinoamérica en la UNCTAD

El diputado Rodolfo Zamalloa Loayza dijo ayer que por encima de los resultados alcanzados en la UNCTAD se debe destacar la unión mostrada por los países latinoamericanos, la

Explicó el representante populista que los resultados, de acuerdo a las informaciones publicadas, eran previsibles en el orden económico, debido a que los países ricos no siempre

esto se puede plasmar en realidad intensificando acciones a través de los organismos existentes, como las Naciones Unidas y la Organización de Estados Americanos. También en los foros

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ibertador Simón Bolívar" Lima, Sábado 16 de Julio de 1983 No. 13159 32 PAGINAS S/. 500.00

EL PERUANO

Provincia de Huancayo ganó la "Lampa de Oro"

La de "Plata" premia a San Bartolomé de Huarochirí y la de "Bronce" se adjudica a Carmen Alto de Arequipa

El Consejo de Ministros aprobó ayer el Decreto Supremo, a propuesta del Sistema Nacional de Cooperación Popular otorgando el premio la "Lampa de Oro", a la provincia de Huancayo en su Concejo Provincial presidido por el Alcalde Carlessi. Dicho premio, establecido por la "Ley de Hermandad" se adjudica a la provincia cuyo pueblo haya aportado los mayores logros en materia de obras comunales con el Sistema que el Presidente Belaúnde ha definido como "la filantropía de los pobres". Además del símbolo, conlleva un aporte económico de alrededor de 30 millones de soles, en beneficio del respectivo Concejo Provincial.

En cuanto a la "Lampa de Plata", que se adjudica al Distrito más laborioso en los doce meses anteriores, ha correspondido esta vez a San Bartolomé, de la provincia de Huarochirí en el Valle del Rimac. Dicha comunidad se ha distinguido en la realización de sus obras públicas en el orden vial, en cuanto a riego y en lo que se refiere a educación pública. El aporte económico, en el caso distrital es del orden de los ocho millones de soles. La "Lampa de Bronce", a la vez, ha sido adjudicada al Anexo de Carmen Alto, Arequipa, con un premio que sobrepasa los cuatro millones de soles, por la notable labor desplegada en el orden urbano habiendo la comunidad pavimentado el camino que la conecta a la capital del Distrito.

La "Lampa de Oro", en reñida competencia con muchas provincias, ha sido adjudicada a Huancayo, pues, entre las muchas obras en las que ha participado Cooperación Popular destaca un decidido apoyo a la extensión del canal de riego de la margen izquierda de ese hermoso valle, obra para la cual 14 Comunidades han cooperado con la Corporación de Desarrollo y el Ministerio de Agricultura, poniendo 100 hombres—días y aportando, los martes y los jueves, 1,200 trabajadores que laboran desinteresadamente; pero, además, se ha hecho la electrificación rural de Cañipaco y la irrigación de Duraznopata Rimaccancha; se ha hecho 15 kms. de carretera en el camino Yuracyacu—Margarita de un total de 25. Se ha construído centros educativos en Chinchaysuyo y Zapallanga, etc. etc.

El ingeniero Jefe de Cooperación Popular en Huancayo es Alfredo Gutiérrez Montes de Oca.

El Comercio

Todos en el P. J. "El Pino" luchan para poder tener luz

Al lado de populares huaynos de la sierra centenares animosos habitantes del pueblo joven "Cerro El Pino" están trabajando dominicalmente en la preparación del terreno, para instalar el tan ansiado servicio eléctrico, cuyos primeros postes ya han sido colocados en el empinado cerro.

Pobladores pertenecientes a veintidos sectores distribuidos en el cerro están realizando dominicalmente agotadores trabajos de cooperación popular, rompiendo a pico y pala las rocas que no pueden ser destruidas con explosivos por medida de seguridad.

Estos trabajadores informaron ayer que la instalación del servicio eléctrico es la segunda obra que ejecutan pues anteriormente, lograron la apertura de una vía de acceso para vehículos hasta la parte más alta del cerro.

Una vez que concluyan la nueva obra procederán a realizar otra, consistente en la instalación de agua y desague. tan necesarios. para la comunidad, que carece de tales servicios.

El pueblo joven "Cerro El Pino" celebró ayer el décimo aniversario de su creación, lo que motivó una fiesta general, que se desarrolló al finalizar las jornadas de trabajo del día. Todos ellos gozaron de una fiesta costumbrista acompañada de una sabrosa pachamanca.

LIMA, LUNES 4 DE JULIO DE 1983

Deseosos de contar a corto plazo con alumbrado público, estos vecinos de cerro El Pino, realizan trabajos dominicales para preparar el terreno para la instalación de los postes y el tendido de cables para el suministro del fluido eléctrico.

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EL COMERCIO

LIMA, SABADO 2 DE JULIO DE 1983

Soportando el fuerte frío de la puna, este giupo de mujeres trabaja activamente en la apertura de una carretera, que unirá a cinco comunidades de la ribera del río Ramis en Puno. (Foto de nuestro enviado pecial Darío Médico Ugarte).

Mujeres ayudan en Puno a abrir ansiada carretera

Puno, 27.—(Por Víctor E. Rodríguez Olaechea, enviado especial).— Activas mujeres campesinas están trabajando al lado de sus esposos, hermanos e hijos, en la apertura de una carretera, que beneficiará a cinco parcialidades de la ribera del río Ramis.

Estas esforzadas mujeres, junto a los varones, están abriendo la tan ansiada red vial por el sistema de cooperación popular, mediante el trabajo por parcialidades, ya que todas ellas se han unido para tener la satisfacción de ver llegar algún día un vehículo a sus respectivas comunidades.

El tramo inicial de tan importante obra es de quince kilómetros, que unirá a las localidades de Taraco-Carapisco, Cariguita, Conexta y finalizará en el lago de Arapa.

Estos campesinos han dejado de lado por el momento la atención de sus hogares, chacras y ganado, para participar activamente en el trazado de la red vial.

Ellos están ganando jornales en efectivo y víveres en un cincuenta por ciento de cada uno, que les son entregados por la oficina de Cooperación Popular de Puno.

Esta misma institución ha dotado, a los improvisados trabajadores de la carretera, de palas, picos y carretillas, para el avance de la obra.

Las obras se están desarrollando por parcialidades, es decir, que cada comunidad ejecuta los trabajos en su respectiva jurisdicción, motivando con ello un rápido avance laboral.

APPENDIX V

DOCUMENTS OF AGREEMENTS BETWEEN PVO'S AND BENEFICIARIES
OFASA EXAMPLES

A. Statement of requisites for beneficiary community to participate in the FFW program.

B. Form for work description in OFASA FFW projects, with participant data and information requested regarding the food warehousing in the locality Form for calculating food requirements.

C. Legal agreement of beneficiary leaders to distribute the food according to prior understandings with OFASA.

Other PVO froms and agreements with beneficiaries follow similar formats

REQUISITOS PARA PROYECTOS DE DESARROLLO DE LA COMUNIDAD .

1.- Rellenar el formulario por triplicado (Entregado por OFASA DEL PERU), contestando las preguntas. El formulario deberá ser rellenado a Máquina, de lo contrario no se recibirá.

2.- Solicitud por DUPLICADO, dirigida al Director general de "OFASA DEL PERU'

3.- Copia del Acta de Elección e instalación de la Junta Directiva:
   a) Firmado por todos los asistentes, con número de libreta electoral (se constatará las firmas.)
   b) Deberá estar presente el Supervisor encargado de la Zona (de lo contrario no tendrá valor).

4.- Documento de compromiso legal, de haber dado a conocer el reglamento a todas las participantes del Proyecto, adjuntando un certificado domiciliario del Dueño' (a) del Deposito o Almacén.

5.- Plano o croquis de la obra, con el Vo.Bo. de las autoridades (Municipio, NEC, Transportes y Communicaciones, Vivienda, Salud y Secretario General).

6.- Presupuesto detallado de ln obra a ejecutares, realizado por una persona Competen te.

7.- Financiamiento total del presupresto:
   - 50 % efectivo o factura de compras.
   - 50 % en cuotas prometidas por los participantes del Proyecto, respaldadas por sus firmas en una nómina aparte, o compromisos de donación con entidades debida memte documentadas.
   NOTA: Si la financiación total pudiera ser cubierta, podrá dividirse el proyecto en etapas (No memos de tres meses) estas etapas deberán terminarse en el plazo fijado para continuar con las etapas restantes y recibir el Apoyo Alimenta rio.

8.- Nómima de los participantes por duplicado, de acuerdo al modelo (en orden Alfabetco) incluyendo la Directiva y el Dueño del Deposito.
   NOTA: Sólo podrá participar un miembro de cada familia.

9.- Constancia escrita del Dueño del Deposito:
   a) Comprometiendo a almacenar y cuidar de los Víveres gratuitamente por un tiempo no menor de 6 meses, sujetándose al reglamento.
   b) Estar dispuesto a que el almacén sea inspeccionado cuantas veces sea requerido por el Supervisor Oficial.
   NOTA: El depósito será de una persona ajena a la directiva.

10.- Adjuntar un croquis para poder llegar con facilidad al depósito, indicando la dirección correcta y algunos puntos de referencia como Banco, Farmacia, Iglesia, Parque. etcl
   RECOMENDACIONES:

1.- Recibidos los documentos transcurrirán, de 15 a 20 días para su estudio y aprobación.
2.- El Apoyo Alimentario se dará a partir de la fecha de aprobación del Proyecto, sin tener en cuenta los trabajos realizados con anterioridad.

3.- Los Envases y el Flete, serán pagados por los participantes del Proyecto.

4.- La Ración por 20 días de trabajo, 47 kilos de víveres varios como incentivo.

5.- La Directiva informará mensualmente incluyendo:

1.- Acta de Distribución.
2.- Planilla de Distribución.
3.- Inventario de Bodega.
4.- Avance de la obra.
5.- Balance del Movimienot Económico.

NOTA: Presentar la documentación en el orden de los requisitos, no se recibirá si la falta algún dato o documento.

"DESARROLLO DE LA COMUNIDAD ES EL PROCESO POR EL CUAL EL PROPIO PUEBLO PARTICIPA EN LA PLANIFICACION Y EN LA REALIZACION DE PROGRAMAS QUE SE DESTINAN A ELEVAR SU NIVEL DE VIDA. ESO IMPLICA LA COLABORACION INDISPENSABLE ENTRE LOS GOBIERNOS Y EL PUEBLO PARA HACER EFICACES ESQUEMAS DE DESARROLLO, VIABLES Y EQUILIBRADOS".

PROYECTOS ESPECIALES O.P.G. DE LOS PP.JJ.

O.F.A.S.A. DEL PERU

Obra Filantrópica de Asistencia Social Adventista

Proyecto Anterior No_

Of. Principal: Av. Angamos 770 Miraflores-Lima.
Teléfonos: 46-90-32; 45-82-97.

Atención Proyectos y Reclamos: Av. República de Panamá 4170-3er Piso-Surquillo

Nombre del Supervisor de la Zona: _____

F O R M U L A R I O

NOMBRE DEL LUGAR O DEL PUEBLO JOVEN _____

DISTRITO A QUE PERTENECE _____ PROVINCIA _____ DPTO _____

DIRECCION EXACTA DE UBICUCION DEL PROYECTO _____

_____

TIPO DE PROYECTO _____ _____ N _____ ___

DESCRIBA EL TRABAJO A REALIZARSE _____

_____

NOMBRE DE LA DIRECTIVA	D I R E C C I O N E S
PRESIDENTA(E) _____	_____
V. PRESIDENTA(E) _____	_____
SECRETARIA(O) _____	_____
TESORERA(O) _____	_____
ASISTENTA SOCIAL _____	_____

Nambres de 2 Participantes que recibirán clases de Orientación Nutricional
(Solieitar Formularios al Dpto. de Nutrición y Adjuntar constancia.)

PARTICIPANTE _____ PARTICIPANTE _____

TOTAL DE PERSONAS INSCRITAS _____

AUTHORIZACION DEL SECRETARIO GENERAL O

DE LA AUTORIDAD COMPETENTE DE LA ZONA: _____
(Firma y Sello)

Espacios que serán Llenados por el Supervisor:

DURACION DEL PROYECTO _____ PROM.DIARIO DE PART. _____

FECHA DE INICIO _____ FINALIZACION

RECOMMENDACIONES U OBSERVACIONES DEL SUPERVISOR _____

_____

EVALUACION FINAL DEL PROYECTO: _____

_____

DATOS DEL DEPOSITO O ALMACEN:

1.- Nombre del Dueño del Depósito. _____

2.- Dirección exacta del Depósito, indicando sigunos puntos de referencia:

_____

_____

3.- Presente un CROQUIS de Ubicación del Depósito, indicando Avenidas-Calies Lugares conocidos como son; Tiendas-Farmacias-Comisarias o cualquier lugar conocido por la Zona, para facilitar la llegada de los Viveres.

4.- Indicar las Dimensiones del Depósito: Largo_____ Ancho_____ Alto_____

DATOS QUE DEBEN SER LLENADOS SOLAMENTE POR EL SUPERVISOR:

Senor Supervisor Verifique Ud. el Depósito: Es Independiente?____ Amplio?____

Ventilado?_____ Cuántas Ventanas tiene?_____ Buen Piso? _____ Tiene Tarimas?_____

-. En que fecha verifico el Proyecto y su Almagén?_____

-. En qué fecha Inspecciono el Proyecto en Mareha? _____

-. Estuvo Ud. presente en la Eleceión de la Directiva?_____

_____ SUPERVISOR

_____ PRESIDENTA

_____ COORDINADOR

CALCULO DE ALIMENTOS Y ENVASES

Harina de Trigo .....

Harina de Maíz .....

Trigor .....

C.S.M. .....

W.S.B. .....

Avena .....

Aceite Vegetal .....

Leche en Polvo .....

TOTALES: .....

COMPROMISO LEGAL

Nosotros (as) los suscritos dirigentes del Proyecto Especial No.....
asprobado con fecha:.....con domicilio representativo de
la casa del presidente del Proyecto site en.....
del pueblo joven.....por medio del presente contrato
en merito del normal desenvolvimiento de nuestro programa, nos comprometemc

PRIMERO: Declararnos: a) Conocer perfectamente los artículos señalados en el REGLAMENTO.

b) El haber dado a conocer el presente reglamento a todos los integrantes de nuestro programma, y que luego de una asamblea con la participación de todos los miembros, manifestemos por unanimidad estar de acuerdo con cada uno de los artículos en referencia.

SEGUNDO: Nos comprometemos a administrar la entrega de dichos alimentos sólo a las personas que hayan cumplido con los requisitos de OFASA DEL PERU en las cantidades indicadas.

TERCERO: Las abajo firmantes se comprometen al fiel cumplimiento de lo esti pulado.

PRESIDENTE (A).....L.E.....

DOMICILIO:.....,.....

VICE-PRESIDENTE (A) .....L.E.....

DOMICILIO: .....

SECRETARIA: (O).....L.E.....

DOMICILIO:.....

TESORERA: (O) .....L.E.....

DOMICILIO.....

COORD. DE BIENESTAR SOCIAL: .....

DOMICILIO .....

F E C H A: .....

PRESIDENTS (a)

VICE-PRESIDENTE (a)

TESORERO (a)

SECRETARIO (a)

COORD. BIENESTAR SOCIAL

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APPENDIX VI

NUTRITION AND HEALTH LEAFLETS

A Diarrhea and its treatment in the home. A leaflet prepared in the Huaraz ONAA office and printed in the Ancash Development Corporation for distribution with the PRAA-SEPAS program. (1,000 copies)

B. Vegetables and nutrition leaflet prepared by the ONAA office in Cajamarca for distribution with the PRAA program (300 copies only).

Besides the difference in numbers printed for distribution, notice the marked contrast in quality of publication, design and artwork.

SECTOR COOPERACION POPULAR

OFICINA NACIONAL DE APOYO ALIMENTARIO

= = = = = = = =

TRATAMIENTO CASERO DE LA DIARREA

PROYECTO: REFORESTACION CON APOYO ALIMENTARIO

PRAA

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LA DIARREA CAUSA DESHIDRATACION Y LOS SIGNOS PARA RECONOCERLA SON LOS SI - GUIENTES :



1.- Poca ó ninguna orina:esta es ama - rrillo ó oscuro.
2.- Pérdida de elasticidad de la piel.
3.- Ojos húmedos y secos .
4.- Boca reseca .
5.- Pulso rápido y débil .
6.- Hundimiento de la fontanela en - los lactantes .

SI SU NIÑO PRESENTA ESTOS SINTO - MAS DARLE DE TOMAR EL SUERO CASERO QUE SE PREPARA DEL SIGUIENTE MODO :



A una taza de agua hervida se le - agrega una cucharada grande de - nzúcar mas una pizca de sal (que pueda levantar 3 dedos).

APPENDIX V

A

Luego dele una taza de puré de los siguientes productos :
Plátano, papaya ó tomate , para reponer la pérdida de minerales (especialmente el Potasio).



Al niño deshidratado dele traguitos de suero en cucharaditas para tomar cada 5 minutos, hasta que empiece a orinar normalmente . Un NIÑO CHIQUITO NECESITA DE 4 a 6 TAZAS AL DIA .

IMPRESO : EQUIPO DE IMPRESIONES
CORDE - ANCASH



Recuerde que un niño con DIARREA, es como una planta sin agua, debido a que los líquidos necesarios para mantener el cuerpo se estan perdiendo, siendo necesario su reemplazo inmediato con el SUERO CASERO.

OFICINA REGIONAL - III

DEPARTAMENTO DE CAPACITACION ALIMENTARIA

TIRAJE : 1,000 EJEMPLARES
FECHA : JUNIO 1982
BASADO EN LAS PUBLICACIONES DE LA O M S

SECTOR COOPERACION POPULAR
OFICINA NACIONAL DE APOYO ALIMENTARIO.

OFICINA CAJAMARCA

LAS VERDURAS

"VERDURAS PARA SU NIÑO"

PROPORCIONAN:



SALES MINERALES



VITAMINAS

PROYECTO DE REFORESTACION CON APOYO ALIMENTARIO (PRAA)

PARA QUE SIRVEN LAS VITAMINAS Y SALES MINERALES ?

- Para la Salud en general.

Para la visión normal

Para la salud de las encías.





Para favorecer el Crecimiento.

331

VERDURAS PARA SU NIÑO

CUANDO? Desde los tres meses de edad preferentemente a la hora de almuerzo.

CUALES? Zanahorias, zapallos, alverjitas, espinacas, acelgas.

CUANTO? Comenzar con una o dos verduras por vez, en pequeñas cantidades, e ir aumentándolas poco a poco según el apetito del niño.

COMO? Cocidas en caldos, sopas o purés con leche.

ººººººº
ººº
º

SOPA CREMA DE ZAPALLO

(7 personas)

INGREDIENTES:

- 1 Kg. de zapallo.
- 1/1 kg. de papas.
- Cebolla china.
- 3 cucharadas de aceite
- 2 tazas de leche.
- Pan cortado en cuadraditos.
- Sal, comino, pimienta.

PREPARACION:

1. En 6 tazas de agua sancochar el zapallo picado en cuadraditos lo mismo que las papas.
2. Una vez sancochadas, licuar o machucar con un tenedor en la misma agua de cocción.
3. Preparar un aderezo con aceite ajos, cebolla picada finito, sal, comino, pimienta al gusto.
4. Agregar al aderezo el zapallo licuado o machucado, la leche y dejar dar un hervor.
5. En una sartén freir el pan en cuadraditos, los que se agregarán a la crema al tiempo de servir.
6. Luego servir.

OFICINA REGIONAL I - CAJAMARCA
DEPARTAMENTO DE CAPACITACION ALIMENTARIA.

ENERO 1982

TIRAJE - 300

IAM/era.

APPENDIX VII

PHOTOGRAPHS

PLATE I

A. Women working on street leveling project, Carmen Alto, Comas. (OFASA)

B. Water truck making its rounds through Collique, Comas passing rocks which are being moved by women's street widening project. Evaluation team interviewer N. Adams with respondents, pauses to watch. (OFASA)

C. Small trees in the new "Young Town" square struggle for existence. Privately owned trees near houses fare better than the "urban forestation" attempt in Maria del Triumfo. (CARE)

D. Women and children working on a street cleaning and stair-building project, Carmen Alto, Comas. No tools are in evidence. (OFASA)

PLATE 2

A. Highland migrant woman from Corongo, Ancash spins as she watches the communal food pot in a neighborhood MCH kitchen, Comas. (CARITAS)

B. Women overflow the space in the communal center as they gather for a nutrition demonstration by neighborhood trainees, Carmen Alto, Comas (OFASA)

C. Children lined up to participate in a pre-school lunch program at a community center, Tahuantinsuyu, Comas. (CARITAS)

PLATE 3

A. Women and children bringing the new food shipment into the neighborhood MCH cooking shed, Chacra Cerro, Comas. (CARITAS)

B. Empty plates and children returning to afternoon activities at the community center in Tahuantinsuyu, Comas. (CARITAS)

C. Artisan training program in Maria del Triumfo, in the center completed by the women during a previous FFW project. (OFASA)

D. Completed Health Center in Senor de Los Milagros, Comas. (CARE)

PLATE 4

A. Peasant farmers cluster around the FFW dispatcher in Cajamarca to presen papers and receive allotments. (CARITAS)

B. Rural people gathered in patio of CARITAS headquarters as they await their turn to receive food allotments. Note the "informal" atmosphere in both A and B as contrasted to C and D.

C. Headquarters for the PRAA-SEPAS program in Cajamarca.

D. ONAA headquarters in Cajamarca. Note fencing and security in contrast to the CARITAS center.

PLATE 5

A. Reforestation site in the puna near Cajamarca. (SEPAS)

B. Unloading Title II food at CARITAS headquarters, Cajamarca.



A



B

C

D

PLATE 1

A

B

C

PLATE 2

A

B

PLATE 3

C



D

A

B

C

PLATE 4

D

PLATE 5

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