


DROUGHT SITUATION REPORT-NIGER



OCTOBER 1984

PN-AAR-220

US Mission/Niger

Drought Coordination

Chairman, Drought Policy Committee: Ambassador William P. Casey, Jr.

Members: DCM, Michael Southwick; Director/USAID, Peter Benedict
Dep. Director/USAID, Jesse L. Snyder; Director/USIS, Chris Filostru

Drought Response Action Unit

Coordinator: Dep. Director/USAID, Jesse L. Snyder

Members: MDRO/GDO: Dayton Maxwell
A/MDRO/PROG: Abbe Fessenden
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Special acknowledgement for the timely
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DROUGHT SITUATION REPORT

Niger
1984

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I SITUATION SUMMARY AND ACTION RECOMMENDATIONS

SITUATION SUMMARY AND ACTION RECOMMENDATIONS

Sporadic and inadequate rainfall (about 52% of the 30-year average) throughout Niger from June through October (see tables, Section II, Climate Assessment), may have produced a drought impact of crisis proportions--a human disaster that may well eventually involve at least 500,000 persons in rural zones over the next ten months. In terms of crop and pasture failure, many Nigeriens declare it the worst situation in fifty-years--and far worse than the cumulative drought in 1973/74

Indicators of this disaster include:

- A massive extraordinary southward migration of herders and sedentary farmers--perhaps as much as 60% of the normal population of the northern livestock zone--has taken place. Animal herd losses of up to 60-65% for cattle, 20-30% for sheep/goats, 15-20% for donkeys and 5-10% for camels are being reported by herders. There is no pastoral forage in the northern zone--there has been none this year and there will be none until after the next rains in mid-June, 1985. Niger's livestock zone is, for the most part, devastated.
- A displaced population estimated at more than 20,000 persons has concentrated around Niger's major towns in search of food and other assistance. It is estimated that some 50,000 additional persons are dispersed within the same urban areas. This population is growing daily despite official Nigerien government efforts to provide both relief and off-season farming support in place. OFDA disaster assessment estimates project from 100,000 to 300,000 may be in camp-like situations by April or May of 1985. (See Annex A, draft OFDA team report.)
- Severely malnourished children and adults are now being observed among some herder populations in areas previously affected by drought in 1983.
- Food production in 1984 is only 44% of 1983's total harvest and an estimated 330,000 MT of cereals alone are projected to be required to meet consumption needs. (See Annex E, Sitrep No. 4.)

Responding to the growing crisis, the GON, beginning in those limited areas affected by the 1983 rainfall deficit (Agadez-Tanout littoral) has undertaken subsidized sale and free distribution of its cereal stocks--to date, the government has drawn down over 110,000 MT (including 5,000 MT of U.S. P.L. 480 Title II from 1982) of the over 182,000 MT of reserves on hand in November of 1983.

Since mid-July, the GON, the U.S. and other donors have closely monitored deteriorating overall agro-pastoral conditions. In recognition of the potential severity of the food deficit and human need, the GON has formed interministerial coordinating committees to deal with both relief and with self-help measures. (See Section VI, Organizations.)

To assist the GON in its efforts to aid the stricken population, bilateral donors and international organizations have taken a number of initial actions which include commitments of food, seed, transport and cash grants totaling an estimated \$11.0 million to date. (See VII, Other Donors/PVOs.)

In response to the government's appeal and based on early on-site assessment of the critical situation by USAID/Niger agricultural specialists, the USG has agreed to immediately provide 15,000 MT of sorghum for free relief distribution. To support internal transport costs--a crucial need given Niger's weak economic position--the USG has also provided a grant of \$1.78 million. The fund will be used to pay for truck fuel, spare parts, shipment contracts, and logistics/training needs to assure delivery of food to affected zones.

The course and eventual magnitude of the disaster in Niger is difficult to project. Nevertheless, the dry season in Niger has already begun and the Mission believes that as a result of the deteriorated agropastoral conditions, sustained life in the livestock and more marginal farming zones to the north will be nearly impossible for the next six to seven months. Despite commendable GON efforts to the contrary, including the "contreaison" vegetable production, there will be, from now through April, 1985, a continued migration of herders and subsistence farmers in increasingly poor nutrition and health state, who have lost or used up their last resources, into the country's urban areas. In May, 1985, some return of these farmers to their fields to cultivate next year's crop can be anticipated--providing they have seed (a major effect of this year's drought has been to force farmers to either eat or plant all of their remaining seed stock)--if it rains effectively and a system is in place to provide food and other support during the cultivation period through mid-September, Niger may produce a harvest in October, 1985 sufficient once again to maintain normal life. If the rains are favorable, it is also expected that herders will begin their return to their traditional life in the livestock zone and efforts to reconstitute this year's herd losses will get underway.

The growing requirements of this affected population in this scenario will rapidly strain GON capacity and resources. Emergency assistance to the GON and this population must be timely, well-coordinated and significant. To that end, the Mission has the following immediate action recommendations:

-- AID/W--FVA/FFP

In order to assure smooth and effective movement of U.S. food shipments to Niger, AID/W should:

- (1) approve/schedule allocation of 100,000 MT of sorghum to Niger, of which not less than 50,000 MT arrives prior to April, 1985;
- (2) establish, via UN/WFP-OSRO/Rome or similar vehicle, an inter-donor information exchange and scheduling mechanism for coordination of West African food shipments;
- (3) authorize internal transport financing for second shipment of 15,000 MT.


- REDSO/WCA-FFPO
AmEmbassy/Niamey Determine feasibility of scheduling U.S. grain shipments via Apapa, Lagos and Algiers/Oran, trans-Sahara.
- AID/W - AA/AFR
AFR/EMS; AFR/SWA Authorize additional position in Mission ceiling for one-tour USDH Disaster Coordinator/FFPO. (See Annex E, Niamey 06095.)
- OFDA In line with OFDA Assessment Team Recommendations (see Annex A), authorize funding contingent on Mission review of specific plans to permit immediate consideration of the following for Niger disaster assistance:
- (1) Herder Crisis Intervention Team Support (estimated \$175,000);
 - (2) CARE/Niger targeted feeding/emergency assistance program - Tanout/Niger (estimated \$ 650,000);
 - (3) establishment of PVO Emergency Intervention fund available to Niger Association of Private Organizations (see Annex VII) to permit appropriate/emergency action by U.S./indigenous PVOs (\$500,000);
 - (4) emergency procurement/support of two 4-WD Toyota Land-Cruisers for use of U.S. Mission and GON Relief Coordinating Unit/Situation and Food Monitoring; equipment to be retained by GON/OPVN on termination of emergency operations (estimate \$40,000);
 - (5) funding for Disaster Coordinator (12 months) PSC (\$120,000);
 - (6) GON administration/institutional support (\$75,000).
- OFDA/CDC authorize field nutrition survey to establish immediate specialized feeding/health care requirements in target areas.

MOVEMENT OF
DISPLACED PERSONS

NISER 1984
(as of 10/15)

Key

- Ⓢ Number of displaced
- △ camps outside city - population
- ⊖ inhabitants (displaced) inside town
- flow of displaced



MOVEMENT / CAMPS

Agadez 70,000 people in Agadez - 1/3 is new (25,000 + within cit
Scattered huts around city 200 X 5 = 1,000 people housed around the
perimeters
Much movement south into Tahoua, Maradi, Zinder

Zinder 7,000-11,000 in Tanout - air observation: over 50% villages appeared
abandoned

3,800 Goure (integrated) also Kelle and Kazoe

One month ago, 40,000 had left Department

Zinder to Tanout - saw 35 families X 8 = 280 people moving south
with possessions

Miria - 1,200 inside town - most moved south

Guildimouni - 1,000 outlying area - most have gone further south

Zinder - 17,191 displaced persons registered with Prefet.
Most from Tanout - 2,000 fed twice each day by Major and AFN
Chef d'Etat Majeur said 34,000 in Zinder

Matame = 5,000

Great movement south

Maradi Dakoro - 2,000 in camp

Movement south

Tahoua 125 families from Tabarak - unique this year

Great movement into Dosso

Niamey Nothing concrete, although residents say it is filled with refugees

Much movement south

Diffa No concentration, movement into Nigeria

NIGER DROUGHT AFFECTED POPULATION

1984-1985

	1984 rainfall as % of 30-yr average	% of 1983 production expected	normal population 1984	Population suspected as having left the Department due to drought	Potential population still at risk in zone, i.e. food recipients
Niamey	46%	40%	1,462,000	5,000	440,000 - 50,000 = 390,000
Dosso	60%	55%	821,000	75,000	330,000 - 50,000 = 280,000
Tahoua	51%	34%	1,158,000	100,000	440,000 + 50,000 = 490,000
Maradi	52%	55%	1,149,000	75,000	418,000
Zinder	37%	37%	1,211,000	100,000	440,000 + 50,000 = 490,000
Diffa	49%	20%	191,000	100,000	66,000
Agadez	02%	60%	182,000	90,000	66,000

Calculation made on the basis of total estimated grain need by USAID (330,000T) : 150 kg per person per 9-month period :
2,200,000 persons to served : % of population in each Department + variables (see next page)

VARIABLES BY DEPARTMENT

The following are judgment factors which influence the increase or decrease of the dependent population.

Niamey - 50,000

- Large city population used to food purchase
- Fair harvest, late rains
- Possible imports from Nigeria through Dosso

Dosso - 50,000

- Fair harvest
- Borders with Nigeria, considerable possibility of grain impl

Tohoua - Plus 50,000

- Very poor harvest
- Considerable number of vacated farmers' villages
- Much of nomad population in South or other depts.


Zinder - Plus 50,000

- Very poor harvest for several years
- Many vacated villages in marginal areas
- Many herders in South and Nigeria
- Most of the nomadic population is probably in Nigeria
- Several years of poor harvest
- Most of the population nomadic

LIBYA

ALGERIA

AGADEZ
DEPARTMENT



Key Information

- totally nomadic population except for "triangle utile" of Tesseroukane - Ingal - Agadez where
- 20,000 displaced persons at Agadez - most absorbed by the city.
- 80% loss of animals - 20% went south to Maradi Zinder Tahoua

Key


- ⊖ decimated herds
- movement of herders
- △ contre saison projects
- valleys with high water table
- ⊙ wells
- ⊖ displaced persons

11

MARADI DEPARTMENT

Key Information

- Dakoro - 2000 person camp
- Large flow of cereals from Nigeria
- 52% reduction of the normal rainfall.
- no good pasture - herds moving into Nigeria
- Government encouragement of cereal trade




Zinder Department

Key

- △ Centre Sésion projects
- ⊞ displaced persons
- () % deficit crop projected
- ⇒ flow of displaced persons
- ⇒⇒ flow of grain

Zinder Department




Key Information

- Several years of poor harvest
- grave lack of pasture
- signs of considerable southward migration
- health problems - malnutrition
- displaced persons settled in towns - not visible except for Tanout

Key

- () production deficit in grain
- ⇒ flow of herders, farmers
- number of displaced persons
- ⇒⇒ grain flow

DOSSO DEPARTMENT




Key Information

- rainfall between 50-75% of average
- 60-65% of crop expected
- Increasing influx of grain from Nigeria
- 10,000 head + moved from Tahoua more expected.

Key

- ⇒ movement of herders and farmers
- ▨ Dalo Basso overbed, dry most of year
- ⊙ fair to good pasture
- ⇐ movement of grain from Nigeria

TAHOUA DEPARTMENT



Key Information


- rain deficit 30-50% of last year
- 50% of fields have never been seeded due to poor rains
- government policy "viderle potorage" great movement of herds and farmers south
- increasing movement of grain from Nigeria - Government encouraging trade
- Government aiding the trucking of animals into Dasso.

Key

- ⊘ animal concentrations
- ⊗ concentrations of dying animals
- ⇒⇒ imports of grain from Nigeria
- - - - northern limit for agriculture
- ⇒ movement of herders and farmers
- △ centre season projects

DIFFA DEPARTMENT

Agadez Dept




Key Information

- 11% of national territory; 32% of population
- almost totally nomadic population
- Lake Chad has dried so much it scarcely vests in Niger
- rainfall 50% below average approx 154mm = not enough rain to support either crops or savannah grass
- The area has suffered almost 10 years of poor rains and shows signs of considerable desertification

Key

- ~ sand dunes
- △ contre saison projects
- ⇒ migration of herds south
- ⇐ grain imports from Nigeria

NIAMEY DEPARTMENT



Key Information

- approximately 50% of normal rainfall - very scattered rains
- no noticeable influx from Mali
- farmers awaiting late rains - many seeded 3-5 times
- little grassland in north, flow of herds south.

Key

- ☉ Fair to good pasture
- ⇒ movement of herds
- ⇒ movement of grain from Niamey
- △ counter season projects

II AGRO-PASTORAL ASSESSMENT

AGROPASTORAL ASSESSMENT SUMMARYA. Agriculture

With the exception of particular locations, such as valleys and depressions, there has been a generalized adverse production impact from insufficient and inappropriately timed rainfall everywhere in Niger including, especially, the Sudano-Sahelian agricultural zone on which the country is dependent for its basic cereal crops.

In Western Niger, the rains in the month of May permitted an initial planting, but the drought which followed halted vegetative development. New plantings were undertaken beginning in early July and in those cases, growth was subject to drought stress at a crucial, high rainfall-need stage.

In Eastern Niger, the beginning of the rainy season was very late and planting did not begin until the middle of July and were also subject to severe drought stress.

Paradoxically, it was the latest plantings which suffered the least drought damage since growth had not yet achieved the crucial stalk/heading stage during the severe rain deficit period.

Because of late planting, there is a limited possibility of relatively normal late production in one small section in the south of the Department of Maradi if rainfall proceeded normally during early October.

In the North-East of the agricultural zone (in the districts of Tanout and Goure) in the Department of Zinder, planting did not begin until the middle of September since the rains until that time had totally failed to arrive. Even with the short growth cycle varieties planted, there is little likelihood of any significant harvest from this zone.

With respect to the production of Millet and Sorghum, the situation is clearly disastrous; even a favorable final period of rainfall cannot salvage this situation - only cowpeas, which have a later growth cycle, could produce a favorable harvest.

The situation in the Department of Agadez is considered somewhat of an exception to the above description since nearly all of the cultivation in that region (aside from pasture) is done by irrigation.

The total absence of rainfall has two important consequences:

- a reduction in the alluvial water table brings about a general reduction in the quantity of available water and thereby a reduction in the surface area which can be cultivated;
- an absence of pasturage which, among other things, affects support of draft animals for irrigated agriculture purposes.

The agricultural situation in the vegetable gardens of the Air Mountains has been severely affected.

In the zones most affected by the drought, where any hope of obtaining production has been lost, people have begun to abandon their villages, moving to towns or to other zones where they can undertake "contre-saison" (irrigated agricultural production -- primarily vegetables) cultivation.

B. Pastoral Situation

With the exception of two pockets in the Department of Tahoua in the neighborhood of Tillia and Ablak, the pasture is minimal to non-existent throughout the pastoral zone.

The thin herbaceous cover is explained by the insufficiency of rainfall which, in most respects has not permitted the growth of annual grasses. Where it has initially, later drought stress damaged young growth beyond redemption. These effects, in turn, reduced the amount of seed retained in the soil and will make the ultimate reconstitution of the pasturage very difficult.

In the pastoral zone, the spatial or temporal irregularity of the rain, and the amount, along with herd movement, generally account for offsetting variations in the distribution of available pasture.

In a year such as this, the absolute rainfall deficit is so generalized, that mechanism cannot function.

Herders have/had traditionally different types of reactions to stress periods:

They leave pastoral zone, moving south to Nigeria or neighboring countries where it is hoped they will find sufficient pasturage or where they can hope to limit their losses.

They try to maintain their herds in the pastoral zone, in the traditional areas, when the pasture permits.

The losses are therefore equally limited, but the herders in the present situation run major risks:

That the concentration of large numbers of animals will be so great that the limited pasture quickly disappears and, when they find it necessary to leave, the animals are so weak they are incapable of long movement and will have great difficulty in reaching zones where pasture is adequate.

Herders from Tanout and Goure who have tried to move to the Ablak region in Tahoua have found themselves in this situation in particular. Similarly, many moving south from the livestock zone have found themselves in the same difficulty and have lost many animals.

At the end of the summer, many totally unorganized movements were observed, some moving again toward the north, while at the same time, other were leaving for the south -- witness to the gravity of the situation in which pasture could be found in no direction within the zone.

The situation is further complicated at this time by the continued closure of Nigerian border which precludes herders utilizing traditional dry-season pasture areas in the northern reaches of that country.


The final blow to the herder is that, on reaching a market with any animals at all, only one in four remaining is in any condition to fetch a price that will permit him either to buy sufficient cereals for his own food (cereal prices having skyrocketed meanwhile), animal food, or to earn enough to perhaps reconstitute his herd the following season.

2. SITUATION AGRICOLE


FARMING SITUATION

REGIONAL SITUATION MILLET AND SORGHUM
AS AT 9/20

2.1. SITUATION REGIONALE DES CULTURES DE MIL ET DE SORGHU au 20 Septembre 1984



DEVELOPPEMENT SATISFAISANT DES CULTURES
 DEVELOPPEMENT MOYENNEMENT
 SATISFAISANT DES CULTURES
 MAUVAIS ETAT DES CULTURES ET PATURAGES



SOURCE: CILSS/PNUD/IGMM
 PROGRAMME AGRHYMET
 Bulletin Agronômico-météorologique
 décadaire régional

23


REPUBLIQUE DU NIGER

2.2. CARTE DE SITUATION
DES CULTURES FIN AOÛT 1984

MAP OF CROP SITUATION AS AT END AUGUST 1984

-  Zone sinistrée
Disaster area
-  Récolte faible à très faible
Low to very low harvest
-  Récolte médiocre
Mediocre harvest
-  Récolte fonction des pluies
reçues en fin d'hivernage
Harvest from end Winter
season rains

Ech = 1/500,000°



24

III CLIMATIC ASSESSMENT

CLIMATIC ASSESSMENT SUMMARY

Rainfall in Niger has been below normal in every department in the country. In some areas, i.e. the Air Mountain zone above Agadez, there has been no rainfall at all through the 20th of September.

The normal rainfall season in Niger ranges from mid-May through late September - early October.

Over half the agricultural zone and in nearly all of the pastoral zone, the rainfall deficit was roughly 50% of normal.

During the months of July and August - key growth periods for Niger - the rains were badly deficit and far below requirements everywhere. The most crucial deficits were registered in the Departments of Niamey, Dosso, Tahoua and in the north-east region of Zinder Department.

From the standpoint of the quantity of rainfall, the situation is worse than that of 1973 (the year of the lowest recorded rainfall for the period from 1951-1980) in the Departments of Niamey, Zinder, Diffa and Agadez.

The charts which follow, detail the specific record of this climatic crisis.

1. PLUVIOMETRIE

RAINFALL

1.1. SITUATION COMPARATIVE DES PLUVIOMETRIES CUMULEES

A LA FIN DE LA 2^{ème} DECADE DE SEPTEMBRE

=====

COMPARATIVE STATUS OF ACCUMULATED RAINFALL AT THE
END OF THE 2ND TEN-DAY PERIOD OF SEPTEMBER

VILLES	NORMALE CUMULEE N. *	CUMUL. FIN 2 ^{ème} DECADE DE SEPTEMBRE				C/N. % 1973	C/NC % 1984
		C 1973	C 1982	C 1983	C 1984		
NIAMEY-AERO	566,2	384,8	359,6	587,0	271,9	68	48
TILLABERY	451,9	322,7	255,8	321,5	164,6	71	36
TERA	437,0	428,5	314,4	291,4	164,4	98	38
FILINGUE	431,4	215,7	207,7	310,4	210,3	50	49
DOSSO	597,0	568,2	517,1	-	375,8	95	63
GATA	785,2	456,0	627,3	579,5	466,2	58	59
TABOBA	393,7	323,4	194,0	209,1	238,9	82	61
BIHNI N'KONNI	536,9	280,4	326,1	386,1	354,8	52	66
T. TABARADEN	214,1	110,8	323,9	233,1	113,0	52	53
MARADI-AERO	541,0	545,4	294,5	306,1	266,9	100	49
DAKORO	359,8	117,0	239,1	249,0	138,4	34	41
MAYAH	423,2	208,6	360,3	295,9	212,8	49	50
ZINDER-AERO	462,9	297,5	462,6	304,3	278,6	64	60
AGADEZ	145,2	70,3	142,2	92,5	1,7	53	1
TANOUT	278,6	202,0	151,3	72,4	52,0	72	19
GOURE	334,5	118,3	292,5	222,2	76,4	35	23
DIEBA	298,6	138,8	267,8	133,6	154,5	46	51
MAINE SOROA	341,9	262,4	264,1	226,1	190,3	77	56

* NC - Normale cumulee etablie sur la période 1971-1980

CUMULATIVE RAINFALL IN mm
in Major Crop Producing Areas
As of 10/10/1984

Department Stations	Normal Cumulation 10/10 for 30 years Average	1973 as of 10/10	1984 as of 10/10	1973 as % of 30 years average	1984 as % of 30 years average	Difference 1984 - 1973
<u>Niamey</u>						
Ayorou	321.5	223.0	180.6	69	56	- 13
Tillabery	473.7	336.6	381.1	71	80	+ 9
Filingué	444.6	215.7	230.8	48	51	+ 3
Niamey	593.4	370.7	316.9	62	53	- 9
Say	628.7	420.1	292.1	66	46	- 20
<u>Dosso</u>						
Dosso	622.4	566.0	385.3	90	61	- 29
Gaya	830.4	476.1	515.5	57	62	+ 5
<u>Tahoua</u>						
Birni N'Konni	557.8	241.0	374.4	43	67	+ 24
Bouza	443.4	194.8	231.1	43	52	+ 9
Keita	462.5	206.6	144.8	44	31	- 13
Tahoua	408.1	244.9	297.4	60	72	+ 8
<u>Maradi</u>						
Maradi	560.6	349.7	284.1	62	50	- 12
<u>Zinder</u>						
Magaria	609.2	258.5	286.2	42	46	+ 4
Zinder	479.3	297.5	283.0	62	59	- 3
Tanout	285.9	201.0	52.0	70	18	- 52
Goure	343.2	130.3	80.9	37	23	- 14

1973 Average: 57.87 percent of 30 year normal

1984 Average: 51.68 percent of 30 year normal

1.7. CARTES DE PUVIOMETRIE CUMULEE 1984-1973


MAPS OF ACCUMULATED RAINFALL 1984-1973

REPUBLIQUE DU NIGER

PLUVIOMETRIE CUMULEE EN MM
Année 1984
du début de la saison au 20/09


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-  + de 200 mm
-  + de 300 mm

ACCUMULATED RAINFALL IN MM
1984 - BEGINNING SEASON
THROUGH 9/20




REPUBLIQUE DU NIGER

PLUVIOMETRIE CUMULEE EN MM
Année 1973


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-  + de 200 mm
-  + de 300 mm

ACCUMULATED RAINFALL
1973




CARTE POINTEE LE 12-SEP-84

CILSS/OMM/PNUD
CENTRE AGRHYMET
NIAMEY (NIGER)



FLUV. ECART A NORM. CUMUL. [%]
PREMIERE DECADE DE SEPTEMBRE 1984.

CUMULATIVE RAINFALL DEFICIT FROM NORMAL SEASON TOTAL
AS OF 12 SEPTEMBER in %



UMULEE CMMO
DECEDE DE SEPTEMBRE

CUMULATIVE RAINFALL DEFICIT FROM NORMAL SEASON TOTAL
AS OF 12-SEPTEMBER (mm)

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IV FOOD BALANCE

Estimated Food Balance Sheet in Niger, October, 1984

The following tables, present the best estimates of USAID/Niamey of production of millet and sorghum in Niger in 1984 and of the food supply and demand situation. Table 1 is broken down by department, and the population is further broken down by urban and pastoral (U & P) and agropastoral. These population estimates are based upon the 1980 agricultural census adjusted to 1984 at the rate of growth of 2.77% per year.

Columns B and C present two estimates of cereal food needs. The first is based on the GON estimates of 200 kg/year/person for urban and pastoral and 250 kg/year/person for agropastoral. The second is based on the recent document, PL 480 Food Aid Needs Assessment for Niger (AID, Washington, D>C>, June, 1984) which recommends 175 kg/year/person for urban and pastoral and 205 kg/year/person for agropastoral. The former estimate is 233,617 MT greater than the latter nationwide.

Column D is the reported gross production of millet and sorghum in 1983 as reported by the Service Departmental Agricole de Niamey. These were actually broken down by arrondissement. Based upon personal observations and input from a number of sources we estimated this year's production by arrondissement as a percentage of the 1983 reported gross production. The weighted average by department is presented in column E, and the national weighted average is 44%. In other words, on a nationwide basis we estimate that this year's gross production of millet and sorghum will be about 44% of last years production, or about 741,000 MT. Column F shows how these estimates vary by

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Department. Columns G and H show the gross production deficit based on the difference between estimated production (column F) and the two estimates of cereal food needs (columns B and C).

Table 2 presents a balance sheet of cereals availability and needs. Beginning with total estimated production from Table 1, 15% is deducted for seeds and losses. Then all other sources of available cereals are added to come up with a total cereals availability of 869,453 MT.

OPVN storage on hand and OPVN purchases were reported by OPVN, the official government cereals marketing authority. Estimates of on farm storage and commercial imports are much more speculative. Most observers have reported that on farm stocks have been depleted, but we are estimating that in those areas that had good harvests last year there remains roughly 10,000 MT in storage. It should be noted that this is probably a high estimate and is location specific to those higher production areas.

Our estimates of commercial purchases is based upon observations in Maradi and Zinder of cereals purchased in Nigeria and other areas by the private sector. There is an extensive interest by the private sector in purchasing red and yellow sorghum and corn from the U.S. and European sources. The full extent of these purchases is hard to evaluate at this time but we have observed that the EON policy of elimination of import taxes and the unrestricted issuance of import licences for cereals (except rice) has greatly stimulated cereals imports. Although the border is still officially closed by Nigeria and there remains a great deal of uncertainty for future imports, there are daily

35

shipments of millet, sorghum and other food products across the border which could total 100,000 MT within the next eight months. The donor aid reflects those donor commitments expected to arrive within the next three to six months.

Our estimates of donor aid reflect donor commitments expected to arrive within the next three to six months. These, of course, could change as new requests are made by the GON and the donors respond accordingly.

The final food balance (deficit) is based upon the two estimates of cereal food needs from Table 1. If the GON estimates are used the resulting deficit is about 564,000 MT while if the AID/W estimates are used the deficit is about 330,000 MT. LB:

TABLE 1: FOOD SITUATION IN NIGER AS OF OCTOBER 12, 1984

DEPT.	" Pop (1984 est)	" Cereal Food Needs* 200/250	C Cereal Food Needs** 175/205	D 1983 Reported Gross Production	E 1984 Est. as % of '83	F 1984 Estimated Production (D+E)	G 1984 Food* Balance (F-B)	H 1984 Food** Balance (F-C)
Niamey								
U & P	1223991	244798	214198	338502 M				
Agropas	238426	59607	48877	31952 S				
total	1462417	304405	263076	370454 T	40%	148182	-156223	-114024
Dosso								
U & P	81188	16238	14208	269172 M				
Agropas	739944	184986	151689	22742 S				
total	821132	201224	165896	291914 T	55%	160553	-40671	-5348
Tahoua								
U & P	242537	48507	42444	184138 M				
Agropas	915681	228920	187715	123017 S				
total	1158418	277428	230159	307155 T	34%	104433	-173995	-125726
Maradi								
U & P	165460	33092	28956	267205 M				
Agropas	983509	245877	201619	85328 S				
total	1148969	278969	230575	352533 T	55%	193893	-85076	-36682
Zinder								
U & P	238426	47685	41725	259492 M				
Agropas	972204	243051	199302	96602 S				
total	1210631	290736	241026	356094 T	37%	131755	-158981	-109272
Diffa								
U & P	78105	15621	13668	6441 M				
Agropas	113047	28262	23175	1271 S				
total	191152	43883	36843	7712 T	20%	1542	-42340	-32301
Agadez								
U & P	181903	36381	31833	0 M				
Agropas	0	0	0	1170 S				
total	181903	36381	31833	1170 T	60%	702	-35679	-31171
TOTAL	6174622	1433025	1199408	1687032	44%	741057	-691965	-450154

* - Based upon 200kg/yr/person for Urban and Pastoralists and 250kg/yr/person for Agropastoralists, GON estimates

** - Based upon 175kg/yr/person for Urban and Pastoralists and 205kg/yr/person for Agropastoralists, AID/W estimate

Sources: col. A, Recensement Agricole au Niger, 1980 (adjusted to 1984)
col. D. Service Departmental Agricole de Niamey
col. E. USAID/Niamey estimates weighted by arrondissement

Best Available Document

TABLE 2: 1984 Food Balance Sheet in Niger (metric tonnes)

		MT	Balance
1984 estimated gross production:		741059	741059
less: 15% for seeds and losses		111139	629900
plus:	OPVN storage on hand 10/10/84:	61000	690900
	OPVN Purchases	25000	715900
	On farm storage	10000	725900
	Commercial imports (including Nigeria, etc.)	100000	825900
	Donor Aid		
	CEE	4450	
	USAID	15000	
	PAM	6603	
	Canada	0	
	RFA	5000	
	France food	2500	
	seeds	1000	
	Belgium		
	Netherlands	10000	
	others		
	<hr/> Total donor aids	44553	
<hr/> Total Food Available (less 1000 seeds)			869453
<hr/> Cereal Food Needs based upon 200/250 kg:		1433025	
Food Balance (deficit)			163572
<hr/> Cereal Food Needs based upon 175/205 kg:		1199408	
Food Balance (deficit)			-329955

MT (000)




Table 1
NIGER CEREAL PRODUCTION TRENDS
(1965 - 1984)

29

PER CAPITA CEREAL PRODUCTION
(Millet Sorghum) 1965 - 1984

Kilos/Per Capita

400

350

300

250

200

150

100

50

Target Per Capita Consumption

6

7

8

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

80


1

2

3

4

50



Niger 1983 Cereal Production and Needs

<u>Department</u>	<u>T o n n e</u>		
	<u>Production</u>	<u>Needs</u>	
Biffa	7,700	1,6,000	- 38,300
Zinder	302,679	286,295	16,384
Agadez	1,000		-
Tahoua	258,912	281,536	- 22,624
Karadi	299,653	277,715	21,938
Kiamey	314,886	33,783	- 18,897
Dosso	248,127	206,717	41,410
Total	1,684,480		
Available	1,431,808	1,462,601	- 30,793

1982

Total	1,651,895
Available	1,393,394

* GON Figures. Le Sahel, week of October 17-24, 1983

Table 3
Per Capita Subsistence Food Production Chart
(Millet / Sorghum) 1964 - 1982

Year	Population	M.T. Millet	Sorghum	Total (M + S)	Kgs. Per Capita Production	
1964	3,590,000	1,013,000	315,000	1,328,000	370	
1965	3,690,000	790,000	266,000	1,065,000	289	
1966	3,790,000	849,000	277,000	1,126,000	297	
1967	3,890,000	1,000,000	342,000	1,342,000	345	
1968	4,000,000	733,000	301,000	1,034,000	259	
1969	4,100,000	1,035,000	388,000	1,423,000	347	
1970	4,220,000	871,000	230,000	1,101,000	261	
1971	4,330,000	958,000	267,000	1,223,000	283	
1972	4,450,000	919,000	208,000	1,127,000	253	
1973	4,570,000	627,000	126,000	753,000	165	
1974	4,700,000	883,000	219,000	1,102,000	235	
1975	4,830,000	581,000	254,000	835,000	173	
1976	4,960,000	1,019,000	286,000	1,305,000	269	
1977	5,098,427	1,130,000	334,000	1,464,000	287	
1978	5,239,600	1,091,000	361,000	1,452,000	277	
1979	5,354,737	1,246,000	346,000	1,592,000	296	
1980	5,533,294	1,369,000	380,000	1,749,000	316	
1981	5,663,309			1,321,000*	232	
Est. (AID)	1982	5,636,759	980,000	227,000	1,207,000*	207
(GON)	1983	5,994,350			1,476,000	246 (1,404,000
	1983	6,147,269			1,431,308	234 Available)

*USAID/Niger Crop Production Estimates

1984 FOOD PRICES

	MILLET	SORGHO	RICE	MAIZE	Remarks
Agadez	22,000 (9/1) 20,000 (10/1)	19,600 (9/1)	26,300 (9/1)	17,000 (9.1)	No wheat, which is very popular
Niamey	12,500 (10/1)				
Filingue	15,000 (10/1)				
Dosso	15,000 (10/5) 16,500 (9/20) 18,000 (10/7)	12,500	21,000	26,000	
Gaya	14,700 (4/20)			13,000 (10/5)	
Boureni	15,000 (10/5)				
Zinder	18,000 (10/5) 15,000 (10/1)				
Goure	15,000 (10/5)				
Tanout	18,000 (10/1) 20,000 (9/15) 26,000 (8/15)	none (9/15)	22,500 (9/15) G 25,000 (10/5)	Z 14,500 (10/5) G 15,000 (10/5)	
Maradi	13,000 (10/1) 10,000 (10/15) 18,900 (9/1) 15,000 (10/5)	none (10/1) 13,000 (10/15) 16,000 (9/1) 13,000 (10/10)	25,000 (10/15) 21,400 (9/1)	14,000 (10/15) 17,200 (9/1) 15,000 (10/1)	
Tahoua	15,500 (9/1) 18-19,000 (9/27) 16,500 (10/2)		11,000 (9/27) 11,000 (10/2)(50T)	14-15,000 (9/27) 13,500 (10/2)	
Madawoua	20,000 (9/1)				
Bouza	32,500 (9/1)				
Konni	12,000 (10/5)				
Diffa	40,000 nothing in	12,900 nothing in			
N'Guigmi	mkt (10/15) 20,000 (10/5)	mkt (10/15) 17,000 (10/15)		18,000 (10/15)	

5/3

ANIMAL PRICES 1983-1984

<u>1984</u>	NIAMEY FILINGUE	DOSSO	DIFFA	AGADEV	TAHOVA	MARADI DAKORO	ZINDER	ABALAK Jan 1984	Countrywide 1981	% diff
Cattle				16,000	15,000- 20,000	41,600 D 34,000 M	10,000 Tanout 6,000 2M	45,000	90,000	55
Bull	F 5,000	71,000				26,600 D 40-45,000 M		80,000	92,500	86
Milk Cow		78,000				19,000 D 20-25,000 M		50,000	81,300	62
Sheep (male)(W)			5,000	3-4,000	8-10,000	6,300 D 8-8,500 M	7,000	15,000	20,000	73
Sheep (female)			6,000			9,000 D 8,700 M	6,000		13,000	54
Goat (male) F 1,000		5,750	2,5-3,000	1,5-2,000		1,600 D 2,100 M	1,500 Tanout 3,500 Zinder	10,000	8,300	120
Goat (female)	6,000						3,000	7,600		39
Camel		110,000		5-10,000 up to 20,000		31,600 D 30-35,000 M				

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<u>1983</u>	NIAMEY FILINGUE	DOSSO	DIFFA	AGADEZ	TAHOUA	MARADI DAKORO	ZINDER	ABALAK Jan 1984	Countrywide 1981	% diff
Cattle	40-45,000					85,000				
Bull	50,000					75,000				
Milk Cow						53,000				
Sheep (male)	10-15,000				18,000					
Sheep (female)						9,700				
Goat (male)	10,000					3,500				
Goat (female)					6,100					
Camel	100,000					61,000				

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4. PRIX DES CEREALES

CEREAL PRICES


4.1 PRIX MOYENS DES CEREALES A LA CONSOMMATION PAR DEPARTEMENT EN 1984

AVERAGE PRICE OF CEREALS TO THE CONSUMER BY DEPARTMENT IN 1984

	15/05		30/05		30/06		15/07		31/07		15/08		30/08	
	Mil	Mil	Sh.											
NIAMEY	110	120		120						135		185		185
DOSSO	110	110	110	115	110	120		130	115	180	130	150	145	
TAHOUA		130	125	135	125	160	140	170	160	200	155	255	210	
MARADI		120	105	115	110	135	125	140	125	165	160	195	160	
ZINDER				125	110			150	140	175	165	225	215	
DIFFA				135	120	135		140		145	130	175		
AGADEZ		135		145	135	160	140	160	140	200	180	240	240	

La hausse des prix est continue depuis le mois de Mai, elle est plus particulièrement importante dans les zones où l'hivernage a été le plus médiocre (Bouza, Kouta, Dakoro, Tanout, Gouré), le mil pouvant alors atteindre 300 FCFA le kilo.

Price increases have continued since May, it is greater in areas where the Winter Season was worst (Bouza ...) where millet could reach 300 FCFA/Kilo.



OFFICE DES PRODUITS
VIVRIERS DU NIGER
BP 474 - NIAMEY -

SITUATION DES STOCKS DE STABILISATION

AU 10/10/1984

STATUS OF STABILIZATION STOCKS AS AT 10.10.84

	MIL	SORGHUM	RIZ 50 KG	RIZ KOW.	RIZ JAP.	RIZ 90	MAIS LOCAL	MAIS PAM	MAIS BL.	TOTAL
	MILLET	SORGHUM	RICE 50KG	RICE Kow.	RICE Jap	RICE 90	LOCAL MAIZE	PAM MAIZE	CORN-FLOWER	
AMT	2.240.868	1.129.906	120.340		300	1.976.690			300	5.068.494
TSO	699.000	1.820.932	1.432.200					18.050		3.970.182
NCUA	744.650	1.118.065	64.250		451.260	217.719	1.100	19.745		2.516.729
RADI	1.543.900	847.800	555.400	4.600		967.448				3.919.148
FDTR	1.430.536	1.552.973	745.024					360		3.728.893
TPA	152.892	277.470	206.043							636.393
ADT	214.100	2.993.515	73.950	9.600	1.900	444.300		9.360		3.746.715
	7.025.936	9.740.661	3.197.207	14.200	453.460	3.606.157	1.100	47.515	300	24.086.536

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OFFICE DES PRODUITS
VIVRIERS DU NIGER
BP 474 - NIAMEY -

SITUATION RECAPITULATIVE DES STOCKS

AU 10/10/1984

SUMMARY OF STOCK SITUATION AS AT 10.10.84

	MIL	SORGHU	RIZ	MAIS	SEMOLLE DE BLE	BISCUITS	POUDRE LAIT EN Poudre	DE BLE	TOTAL
	MILLET	SORGHUM	RICE	MAIZE	CORN	BISCUITS	POWDERED MILK	CORN- FLOUR	
STOCK STABILISATION STABILIZATION STOCK	7.025.936	9.740.661	7.271.024	48.615				300	24.086.536
• AIDES AID STOCK			2.068.032		87.988	139.910	148.765		2.414.895
• RESERVE RESERVE STOCK	129.363.588	1.379.100							30.742.688
	136.389.524	111.119.761	9.339.056	48.615	87.988	139.910	148.765	300	37.273.919

OPVN

1. STOCK AS AT 1/31/84

Millet	84,500 T	(local and regional sources,
Sorghum	74,000 T	(of which 35,000 of mediocre quality imported from Brazil)
Rice	8,300 T	
Maize	10,000 T	(French and PAM food aid)
Corn	5,600 T	(French and Canadian aid)

TOTAL STOCK AS AT 1/31/84

182,000 TONS

2. SALES TO DONORS DESTINED FOR NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES
(carried out between January and July)

EEC	18,210 T	of which 6,900 destined for Chad (14,000 expected) 4,910 destined for Mali 6,400 destined for Burkina Faso
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FRG	9,200 T	of which 6,200 destined for Mali 3,200 destined for Burkina Faso
-----	---------	---

PAM	4,080 T	destined for Burkina Faso
-----	---------	---------------------------

ONG	2,300 T	destined for Ghana
-----	---------	--------------------

TOTAL SALES TO DONORS DESTINED FOR NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES

33,790 TONS

3. FREE DISTRIBUTION OF CEREALS SET UP BETWEEN MARCH AND AUGUST

EEC	5,880 T	millet and sorghum (emergency aid)
France	5,186 T	millet and sorghum (counterpart funds)
US	4,600 T	sorghum (food aid initially intended for sale)
Canada	3,000 T	corn
PAM	4,300 T	sorghum
FRG	1,750 T	millet and sorghum

TOTAL OF CEREALS DISTRIBUTED FREE BETWEEN MARCH AND AUGUST

24,716 TONS

Source: EEC Agro-pastoral assessment, Niger 1984



OPVN DISTRIBUTION

Agades 3-400T each month - free - last 3 months
600T each month - sold - Army assists with distribution
5, 10 ton trucks - 3 work, private transport used
7 sales centers - 2 being constructed

Tahoua May = 353/45 June = 1133/400 July = 1908/2280

August = 878/1320 September 15th = 173/400

3 trucks/all work 10-15T
13 principal centers (2T/day), 6 sales points Tahoua

Maradi June = 2,500, July 2,000, August = 2,000, September = 1,500 sold

800T free for entire period

3 trucks @ 10 ton

Diffa 2 trucks 10 ton

Zinder 3 principal and 10 secondary centers
8 all terrain trucks 10 ton, 4 work

HISTORICAL RECORD

EMERGENCY FOOD AID TO NIGER SINCE FY 1973

Since FY 1973 the United States has provided 193,885 metric tons of PL 480 emergency food aid to Niger in response to poor harvests or crop failures due to drought. The bulk of this food assistance was comprised of coarse grains, usually red sorghum.

<u>Year</u>	<u>Commodity</u>	<u>Volume (Metric Tons)</u>	<u>Commodity Cost</u>	<u>Delivery Cost</u>	<u>Annual Subtotal</u>
1973	red sorghum	10,000	\$ 868,000	\$ 725,500	\$ 1,593,500
	yellow corn	1,000			
	corn meal	2,000			
1974	red sorghum	96,350	11,572,000	5,000,000	16,572,000
	soy-fortified sorghum grits	2,277			
1975	red sorghum	24,758	4,852,404	1,773,180	6,625,584
	soy-fortified sorghum grits	2,500			
1976	red sorghum	30,000	3,510,000	2,915,000	6,425,000
1978	red sorghum	10,000	1,030,000	2,375,000	3,405,000
1982	red sorghum	15,000	2,070,000	2,415,000	4,485,000
1984 to date	red sorghum	15,000	n/a	n/a	Est. 2,175,000
Totals		208,885	\$23,902,404	\$15,203,680	\$41,281,084

As shown by the above figures, most of this food assistance was delivered during FY 1974 when Niger was particularly hard hit by the Sahelian drought. The average annual PL 480 food aid shipment during the ten-year period 1973-82 was 19,389 tons. Emergency food aid requirements dropped during the late-1970's, totalling only 25,000 tons during the five year period 1978-82, or an average annual shipment of 5,000 tons.

V TRANSPORTATION/LOGISTICS

A. Inland Transportation

The primary ports for the import-export traffic for Niger are Cotonou, Lomé, and Lagos, in order of importance. Cotonou and Lomé are both less than 900 miles from Niamey and serve western Niger. Lagos, 900 miles from Zinder and Maradi is ideally located to serve the eastern part of the country. However, since the border between Niger and Nigeria has been closed for several months now, Niger must rely exclusively on Cotonou and Lomé for its vital imports, including food aid. These latter ports, designed primarily for the relatively small trade needs of themselves, as well as transit traffic for Niger and Upper Volta, are not well suited to receive and forward shipments like food aid, which are unexpected and a burden on a system in a delicate balance. However, in a coordinated effort, both Cotonou and Lomé can handle and forward 16,000 tons to Niger of food aid on a monthly basis. The critical factor which affects this offtake rate is the availability of either railwagons or trucks, or both.

An alternative to pushing the Lomé and Cotonou transit routes to their limits is using the Lagos/Apapa port which is designed to handle massive quantities relative to the needs of Niger and which is at present under-capacity due to reduced imports for Nigeria.

B. In-Country Transport and Storage Capacity

The internal transport network in Niger is good and most major towns are connected by paved roads. Storage capacity is adequate throughout the country (official government storage through OPVN is over 125,000 MT according to last year's estimate).


C. Other Donors and GON Food Imports

The GON has already begun to import 10,000 MT of sorghum, with 15,000 MT of sorghum and maize to arrive in November and December. Food aid from other donors includes 22,500 MT of cereals for which firm commitments have been made. Another 10,000 tons are likely but not yet committed. Local purchases now underway in neighboring countries accounts for about 5,800 MT of maize.

Food Import Schedule

<u>Firm Commitment:</u>	<u>Donor</u>	<u>Commodity</u>	<u>Tonnage</u>	<u>ETA</u>
	FED	sorghum/maize	8,000	Dec.-Jan.
		maize	5,800	Oct.
	France	wheat	4,500	Dec.-Jan.
	Holland	sorghum	5,000	N/A
		maize	5,000	N/A
Total:			<u>28,300</u>	
<u>Possible Commitment:</u>	Germany	sorghum	5,000	Jan.-Feb.
	WFP		5,000	
Total:			<u>10,000</u>	

Primary Transit Ports
and Routes for Niger,
Burkina and Mali, 1984



7

**Niger Transportation Network and
OPVN Storage Capacities for
Respective Departments**


OPVN = Office des Produits
Vivriers du Niger

Legend

- (5.1) OPVN storage capacity throughout Department (\$000 metric tons)
- Department Capital
- Major town
- Primary road (all paved except Zinder-Agadez)

Important Distances (miles)

Niamey-Dosso	85
-Tahoua	335
-Agadez	585
-Diffa	775
Zinder-Maradi	145
-Diffa	211
-Agadez	277
-Niamey	562



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PRIMARY TRANSIT PORTS FOR NIGER

<u>Port</u> ^{a/}	<u>Storage Capacity</u> — metric tons —	<u>Monthly Offtake</u> ^{b/}	<u>Miles to Niamey</u>	<u>Round-Trip Transit Time</u>	<u>Other Destinations Served</u>
Lagos (Nigeria)	50,000	25,000	1,400	7 days (by road) 14 days (by rail/road)	Zinder --- (900 miles) Maradi --- (900 miles) Agadez --- (1,175 miles)
Cotonou (Benin)	10,000	5,000-8,000 with direct trucking)	660	10 days (by rail/road). 7 days (by road)	Maradi --- (1,075 miles) Zinder --- (1,320 miles) Agadez --- (1,246 miles)
Lomé (Togo)	10,000	8,000	825	7 days (by road)	Tahoua --- (1,160 miles) Agadez --- (1,410 miles)
Algiers (Algeria)	N/A	N.A	2,305	20 days (by road to Agadez)	Agadez --- (1,719 miles)

a. Except for Algiers, these are the primary ports which serve Niger for its regular commercial imports and exports.

b. This is an estimate of the tonnage rate at which food aid can be hauled from the port to inland destinations in Niger, over and above essential commercial traffic for Niger and other landlocked countries. The estimate assumes good coordination and cooperation among donors, the Government of Niger, and neighboring countries.

VI ORGANIZATION

US MISSION/NIGER
DROUGHT COORDINATION

AMBASSADOR

DROUGHT POLICY COMMITTEE

Chairman: Ambassador
Members: DCM, AID Director,
AID Deputy Director,
Director, USIS

DROUGHT RESPONSE ACTION UNIT


Coordinator: Deputy Director AID
Members: Mission Disaster Relief Officer
Asst. Mission Disaster Relief Officer
Health Officer
Mission Engineer
Agricultural Development Officer

DROUGHT RELIEF DIVISION

Chief: Disaster Relief/FFP Coordinator
Food Relief Monitors(2)

DROUGHT COORDINATION

(GON)



VII OTHER DONORS/PVO'S

DONOR COMMITMENTS

AS OF 10/15/84

<u>DONOR</u>	<u>ITEM</u>	<u>ESTIMATED VALUE</u>
CANADA	Undefined request	
DUTCH	Sorghum (5,000 MT) (late Nov)	1,250,000
	Maize (5,000 MT) (late Nov)	750,000
	Milk powder (2,000 MT) (some via Caritas)	300,000
	40 - 50 trucks	500,000
	Warehouses; POL/T.A./Parts	500,000
EEC	300,000 ECU for 3,000 MT local sorghum purchase West Africa	375,000
	1,450 MT Maize (requested)	200,000
	Grant: 150 million CFA	326,000
	FED 500-800 MT seed	
	(Note: EEC has formally noted they will make a total of 50,000 MT available in CY 85)	
FRANCE	Seeds (1,000 MT: 15 MT potato, 14 MT wheat. 5 MT maize; 98,000 packets of vegetable seeds + 600 MT other seed)	150,000
	Wheat 2,500 MT	375,000
GERMANY	Sorghum (5,000 MT) (CY 84)	625,000
USG	AMB Fund (1) Grant - 2/84 - for TANOUT	25,000
	AMB Fund (2) Grant - 9/84 - gen. support	25,000
	Red sorghum 15,000 MT (jaa delivery)	2,175,000
	Transport grand 9/30/84	1,780,000
WFP	Sorghum (6,462 MT)	1,615,000
	NFDM (141 MT)	50,000
WORLD BANK	Emergency transport grant	200,000
	TOTAL	11,220,500

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VOLUNTARY ORGANIZATIONS

NIGER

US

AFRICARE (Dorothy Garrison)

CARE (Judith Collins)

Church World Service (R.

Evangelical Baptist Mission (Steve Nunemaker

Lutheran World Relief (Frank Conlon)

Peace Corps (Lee Yellot)

Non-US

CARITAS/Niger (Gerard Seydou)

EUROACTION

OXFAM/England (Ouagadougou based)

Red Cross/Niger (Ali Bandiaré)

Tapis Vert (Daouda Idrissa)

Volunteers for Progress (France) (Jean-Paul Meyer)
(Assn. Francaise des Volontaires de la Paix, Operation d'Urgence 1984)

U.S. PVO COMMITMENTS

Planned as of Oct. 16, 1984)

(Includes Peace Corps)

1. Africare

- a. Illela - Agriculture/Nutrition - New project
- b. Diffa - Planning similar project in Diffa zone

CARE

- a. Provided \$10,000 for transport of seed donated by French
- b. Submitted FFW proposal for Bouza activity to PAM
- c. Proposed to assist in logistics support of U.S. emergency assistance program

3. Lutheran World Relief (LWR)

- a. Pledged \$100,000, not yet earmarked
- b. Will provide blankets, quilts, soap, children's kits, as needs are identified
- c. GON has requested acceleration of garden project activities in Madaoua area (300 wells) - response being studied
- d. Anticipate German Lutheran Churches may make significant contribution

4. Church World Services (CWS)

- a. Received \$10,000
- b. Will provide 10,000 blankets, small amounts of corn, rice, other food stuffs (i.e. 50T), as part of regular program
- c. Exploring gardening activity in Dosso
- d. CWS contributions in U.S. have recently been depleted due to heavy worldwide needs

5. Sudan Interior Mission (SIM)

- a. Expect to provide food support to 25 villages in Maradi area to continue agriculture activities
- b. 40 T of grain purchased recently from OPVN
- c. May move in to providing medical care - have hospital in Galmi

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6. Peace Corps (although not geared to disaster assistance, will be as responsive through program activities as possible)

a. Have \$95,000 available from AID in Small Project Assistance funds to develop small agriculture production projects

b. Nutritionists distribute seeds

PRIVATE AID GROUP

(Summary of projects submitted by the Micro-Agriculture Development Cell,
Ministry of Plan)*

Department	No. of projects	Amount (\$m)
Agadez	1	2.1
Diffa	6	0.6
Dosso	20	0.8
Maradi	14	0.9
Niamey	23	1.3
Tahoua	9	0.7
Zinder	10	1.3
	—	—
TOTAL	89	1.6
	==	==

* Includes on-going projects with financing available

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Réunion de l'Assemblée du GAP
(Groupement des Aides Privées)

Examen financement Projets
des Départements.

Département	Projet	Montant	Financement retenue ou probable
<u>Agadez</u>	1 - Egandewel Tafadck Ingall Tchintabiskinc-Ingall-Torguit A		
2	- Aborak (1) (Tchirozérinc)	294.000.000	<u>BIREME</u>
3	- Projet développement Talak (Arilit)	74.300.000	<u>MISEROR</u>
4	- Déviation eaux 2è forage Bilma	48.000.000	<u>instance</u>
5	- Développement Rural Tabelet (Bilma)	160.000.000	<u>OVPB</u>
6	- Maîtrise eaux puits maraichers (Aïr)	150.000.000	<u>voir FED</u>
7	- Boutiques coopératives - Iliyan Bagazan - Atri - Didinet Tiliak Anou Makeron. (Bilma)	24.500.000	<u>en instance</u>
	- Développement intégré vallée Tamazalak (Agadez)	182.950.000	<u>Association Tamazalak</u>
	(contre partie Niger 23.750.000)		

BIREME (1)

Montant 3 projets : 99.000.000

Travaux communautaires : 65 millions X 3 195.000.000 -

DEPARTEMENT

Projet

Montant
recherché

Financement
retenu ou
probable

NIGERY

		Montant recherché	Financement retenu ou probable
1	1		
	1	38.572.180	LWR P.A. fait
	2	2.881.780	AFVP
	3	ND pas dossier	AFRICARE
	4	ND pas dossier	Africare-AFVP
	5	6.193.000	en instance
	6	9.439.063	en instance
	7	79.364.233	en instance
	8	3.936.212	en instance
	9	3.131.326	en étude
	10	5.409.362	
	11	12.567.500	en instance
	12	4.603.500	en instance
	13	11.697.696	en instance
	14	47.602.000	UNICEF
	15	159.676.735	FED-AFVP
	16	38.572.180	LWR
	17	11.966.500	LWR P.A. fait
			en instance

EP

NLLEY (suite)

18	Plantation arbres ville Ouallam	8.457.562	en instance
19	Reboisement 15 ha Département Niamey	5.356.000	en instance
20	Réprises de classes et logements scolaires Arrondissement Ouallam	8.867.000	en instance
21	Semences populations (riverains fleuve)	ND dossier Plan	LNR
22	Programmes urgence Ouallam (pas dossier)	30.000.000	UNICEF-IFVP
23	Petits projets Gay (pas dossier)	20.000.000	Misérér-IFVP
24	Petits projets Gothèye - Baleyara (pas dossier)	4.000.000	AFN-IFVP
25	Aides aux Maraîchers Sanam (Filingué)	86.429.707	en instance
26	Programme actions extension projet Tapis- Vert Waccu (Filingué)	22.222.312	en instance

Département	Projet	Montant recherché	Financement retenu ou probable
<u>TAHOUA</u>			
1	- 7 magasins coopératifs (shintabaraden)	19.300.000	en instance
2	- Piste Barmou-Tahoua Bambéye Tahoua	61.200.000	en instance
3	- 8 Paras vaccination (Tchintabaraden)	20.700.000	en instance
4	- Reboisement Mare Tabalak	20.500.000	COE-PA fait
5	- Programme urgence Tahoua (complément)	18.130.000	en instance
6	- Cultures contre-saison Guidan Mambaki (Madagoua)	97.137.495	LWR P.A. fait
7	Puits maraichers (Kofte)	Nb dossier en cours	en cours
8	Cultures maraichères vallée Songa (Kouza)	45.000.000	FAC-LEVE LWR en étude P.A. 6
9	Cultures fruitières Guidan Iddar (Konni)	15.026.970	LWR P.A. fait
10	Puits villageois (Madagoua)	36.742.371	LWR P.A. fait

DEPARTEMENT	Projet	Montant recherché	Financement retenu ou probable
<u>DOSSO</u>			
-	<u>Aménagement Mares (Cultures maraichères)</u>		
1	- Kourcuroubé (Doutchi)	7.200.000	en instance
2	- Soukougoutane (Doutchi)	32.250.000	en instance
3	- Fadama (Doutchi)	11.250.000	"
4	- Birni Lokoya (Doutchi)	57.000.000	Caritas attend
5	- Gargagui-Deytagui-Djibo Roy (Loga)	6.600.000	ASSICR
6	- Bas-fonds Souley Gorou (Dosso)	7.200.000	AFVP
7	- Niabéré (Boboye)	21.613.000	CWS
8	- Karma (Boboye)	21.830.418	en instance
9	- Salney (Boboye)	27.521.038	"
10	+ Développement cultures maraichères Kargui Bangou (Dosso)	13.094.000	"
11	- Aménagement Mari Doyon Doutchi	21.666.140	"
12	- Amélioration système exhaure (Doutchi)	600.000	"
13	- Aménagement Mare Badjé Koura (Dosso)	13.273.700	"
14	- Aviculture fermière Niakoye Tounga (Gaya)	3.000.000	"
15	- Brise-vent dans les bas-fonds Dallol (Maori) (Gaya)	2.861.100	"
16	- Construction puits Arrondissement Dosso	47.799.990	"
17	- Plantation d'ombrages ville Dosso	16.659.000	"
18	- Infrastructure scolaires Dosso	45.983.000	"

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Suite Dc39C

- 19 - Réparations bâtiments scolaires
(Gaya) 2.901.500
- 20 - Infrastructures scolaires
(Boboye) 17.677.900
- 21 - Maraichage Gaya m

en instance
en instance
Africard
attend
Cossier

NV

DEPARTMENT	Projet	Montant recherché	Financement retenu ou probable
<u>DISSA</u>			
1	- Programme micro-réalisations (8 volets)	153.544.740	en étude EAA-Africare
2	- Petites opérations Développement Village Garawa (Mainé-Soré)		
	- village N'Guabayni (Mainé-Soré)	10.000.000	en instance
	- village Foulatari	18.000.000	en instance
	- village Foulatari	24.000.000	en instance
3	- Relance cultures vivrières Lac Tchad Berges Komadougou Ouette Mainé	84.400.000	en étude EAA Caritas-APVP
4	- Construction 2 magasins Diéfa	5.500.000	en instance
5	- Construction 2 magasins N'guigai	5.500.000	en instance
6	- Construction 4 magasins Mainé-Soré	11.000.000	en instance

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DEPARTEMENT

Projet

Montant
recherché

Financement
retenu ou
probable

AFVFP :

1	- Mare de Sahar (Tessanua)	37.137.437	LWR
2	- Cuvette de Tchola Sankori (Tessanua)	10.900.000	P.A. fait
3	- Cuvette de Malam Madi Romaza (Tessanua)	23.214.464	LWR en étude
4	- 3 magasins coopératifs (Tessanua)	8.250.000	LWR (P.A fait)
5	- Brigades mécanisées entretien puits construction (Mayahi)	203.500.000	en instance
6	- Soutien populations zones défavorisées - 50 puits (Mayahi)	ND	UNICEF-AFVP
7	- Construction 9 magasins coopératifs (Mayahi)	24.750.000	Dossier en préparation AFVP
8	- Extension mouvements coopératifs Nord Dakoro - 6 boutiques	24.000.000	en instance
9	- Opérations vallée Tarka et Goulbi Kaba 93 puits (Dakoro)	ND	FED-AFVP
10	- Construction 7 magasins coopératifs (Dakoro)	19.250.000	FED-AFVP
11	- Construction 4 magasins coop. Aguié	11.000.000	en instance
12	- Auto-assistance Aguié 35 puits	16.300.000	en instance
13	- Construction 5 magasins coop. (Madarounfa)	13.750.000	LWR en étude
14	- Cultures contre-saison Aguié	12.000.000	en instance
15	- Mare Akadane (Dakoro)	10.900.000	AFVP-CCCE
16	- Mare Magaria (Tessanua)	6.272.501	AFVP-FED
			LWR en étude

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Departement	Projet	Montant recherché	financement retenu ou probable
<u>ZINDER</u>			
1	- Cuvettes Damergou (Tanout)	77.100.000	ACDI-PAC
2	- Construction 4 magasins co p. (Tanout)	11.000.000	FED
3	- Construction 2 magasins coop. Hirriah	5.500.000	en instance
4	- Aménagement piste Gazaza (Tanout)	100.000.000	instance
5	- Mise en valeur cuvette Tchao Wazak Gouré	44.500.000	UNICEF
6	- Aménagement Mare Daungou (Matamora)	2.000.000	Document en étude au CWS
7	- 2 magasins coop. Ka Daoutcha Kazoué (Gouré)	5.500.000	UNICEF
8	- Jares Takoukout et Goubiben (Tanout)	18.400.000	FED
9	- Vallée Tassa (Tanout)	48.800.000	UNICEF
10	- Construction 4 magasins coopératifs (Tanout)	11.000.000	FED

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VIII SPECIAL CONCERNS

GON ADAPTIVE STRATEGIES

The GON has developed a strategy of population stabilization with the specific objectives in the agriculture zone of:

- a. Providing food for sale to people in their own administrative unit. Currently food is not being distributed to people out of their own department.
- b. Promoting the use of all available land for irrigation, including both large and small perimeters, small parcels of land irrigated by manual labor, and land cultivated on receding water both near rivers and ponds.
- c. Encouraging off-season gardens.
France has been requested to provide 1 000 tons of seeds. To date 34 tons of potatoes, wheat and corn seeds have been donated along with 98 000 packages of vegetable garden seeds.
- d. Planning for a series of small off-season projects implemented through private voluntary and governmental organizations. The Government has developed proposals for "mini projects" that are being presented to PVO's and donors. On September 28, 1984 the Government of Niger established an interministerial committee to oversee the development, implementation and evaluation of the small projects.

In the livestock zone the major activities at this time are also aimed at population stabilization and include:

1. Moving of cattle to neighboring countries. GON encourages herders to move younger cattle south and families to remain in the zone to cultivate off-season crops.
2. Destocking program. The GON's objective is to decrease cattle number through sales to the commercial sector and through a slaughter/dry meat program.

Regarding stored cereals the Government's strategy is to:

- a. Maintain a minimum level of 30,000 tons of security stock for as long as possible for use in areas where the greatest emergencies exist.
- b. Sell the remaining 31,000 tons of reserve stock in larger villages at as slow a pace as possible; thus, encouraging farmers to use on-farm stocks and recently harvested crops before GON reserves. It is hoped that the current harvest and stocks will supply the population until January, 1985.

- c. Import 30,000 tons of cereals through commercial channels to be distributed by OPVN (Government marketing agency). The first 10,000 tons of red sorghum have been ordered but have not yet arrived.

USAID CORE PROJECT RESPONSE TO THE DROUGHT

USAID is examining all of its current port-folio in light of current Drought Impact with these objectives in mind:

- a) To determine the viability and extent of feasible project implementation and necessary modification;
- b) To determine rational modifications supportive of GON short-term needs but not disruptive of essential and primary project purpose/objectives.

The Minister of Rural Development indicated to USAID in a meeting on October 3rd that he has requested each major project in his Ministry to present a proposal for adaptive strategies to the drought.

USAID in consonance with its review noted above has worked with project counterparts to develop within established project goals and objectives possible preliminary responses to the drought. These proposals will evolve as discussions continue over the next few weeks. Possibilities include:

1. NDD II (683-240) - Drought Responses

The NDD project could respond to the emergency drought conditions in the context of its Local Organizations Component. The objective of the component is to support the initiation implementation of revenue generating socio-economic activities which are managed by local organization structures. The project is already assisting several village councils in their efforts to launch off-season gardening activities. These efforts could be expanded, especially in the Ouallam and Balleyara areas, which are most conducive to dry-season vegetable production with minimal infrastructure investment. A Rural Development Fund has been established for this component in order to provide start-up capital where necessary. To the extent possible, inputs could be furnished on a cost reimbursable plus interest basis.

2. ILP (683-242) Drought Strategy

The 1984 rainy season was extremely deficient in precipitation and the ILP project zone is suffering from a severe drought. The severe shortage of pasture and surface water has forced the migration of some of the zone's inhabitants and their herds and flocks to the south of Niger and in many cases, to Nigeria in search of feed. As the condition of livestock decreases, the animal market price decreases accordingly and, due to the drought, cereal prices will increase. To address this situation, the project has outlined the following objectives:

1. Facilitate herders' movement and inform them on conditions outside the zone;
2. Help in the delivery of emergency assistance to herders;
3. Establish an accounting mechanism for food and other relief distributions;
4. Provide incentive for the herder to destock his weak animals;
5. Establish capital savings as an alternative to animals in bad years;
6. Maintain continuous contact with the herders.

Proposed solutions:

Creation of "crisis intervention teams" within a pastoral center and each team composed of 3 people (a driver, a technical agent and a food/savings accountant). This team will coordinate the distribution of food, veterinary intervention and savings scheme. The team will also disseminate information to the herders in regards to forage, water, and market situations.

To facilitate this, each head of family will have a passbook where all the transactions are noted. The teams will have food stocks on market sites where they meet with herders. Each team will go to 3 to 4 markets once a week.

The team will also administer short surveys on mortality rates, future plans of the herders, feed and food received, family members, amount of money deposited or withdrawn.

They will train vet and human health auxiliaries in drought-specific problems.

To be able to implement these activities, there is a need to establish a temporary pastoral center (i.e. Maradi) in the South.

The Pastoral Center Strategy is fully compatible with project objectives and GON strategies for combatting the drought in the long term.

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3. National Cereals Research (683-0225)

Emergency drought activities to be undertaken by the National Cereals Program would be limited to seed production and acquisition. Within the project already, immediately available for seed acquisition, are 24 million FCFA. In areas where production has occurred, the money would be used to buy seeds at a price slightly higher than the prevailing market price. This would ensure that the project attracts available grain for seed use. An additional 75 million FCFA would be available for seed acquisition from USAID Counterpart Funds, within a short time. The program has 5 dryland seed production farms producing M2 seeds which are then given to Contract Farmers who produce M3 seed, which is processed and sold as improved seed across Niger. At the beginning of the 1984 growing season, 800 tons of improved seed were available to Nigerian farmers, the project halted all seed sales when the seed stocks had reached 80 tons at the seed centers. These 80 tons will be earmarked for the 1985 growing season. This year's expected seed acquisition from M3 contract growers and the 5 seed centers will be approximately 70 to 80 tons of seed, compared to the 390 ton production of 1983. The project will concentrate on irrigated seed production. Two crops are anticipated on 74 hectares of irrigated land at Lossa, with an expected minimum yield of 1 ton per hectare per harvest. This production will be carried out on land owned by the Agriculture Production Support Project (30 hectares) and INRAN (34 hectares). These two co-operating projects are part of the National Cereals Program. The Project will also try to acquire from 50 to 100 hectares or irrigated land for contract seed production with small farmers. A reasonable expectation from this area can be 100 to 200 tons of seed. The project is also working with ICRISAT to develop a 16 hectares irrigated seed producing farm. If developed, 32 tons of seed can be expected.

The Niger Cereals Research continues in its development of drought tolerant grain varieties and shorter season varieties, but this is a long-term goal, not in response to 1984 conditions.

Other projects such as the CRSP's are doing research on water management, improved water use efficiency, but again these are long-term projects. The only action that our projects are taking in response to the drought is in increasing the seed production activity in anticipation of the tremendous seed shortages that will occur in 1985.

4. Rural Health Improvement Project (683-0208)

Given its function as a national primary health care program, RHIP will be in a position to orient some of its activities toward the emergency drought situation. Namely, these activities can include training of health care workers, provision of medicines and other supplies, nutritional and epidemiologic surveillance of the at-risk populations, and assistance with vaccination programs that may need to take place. The project will be discussing with the GON the possibility of setting aside funds to deal solely with drought oriented health activities. The GON has officially requested the assistance of CDC to do a rapid nutrition assessment of the drought stricken areas, and identify the most at-risk populations. A logistic infrastructure already exists within the project to respond reasonably quickly to certain needs. Once an assessment of the severity of the situation has been made, priority activities will be able to be defined and resources directed accordingly. Based on the recommendations of the CDC team, RHIP will be in a position over the next couple of months to assess clearly the specific activities it will be able to undertake within the context of the project, and those activities which may require outside sources of financing.

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GON DROUGHT POLICIES

Question: In what ways is GON policy toward the drought helping or hindering the drought assessment and relief efforts at this time, and what does USAID expect to do to rectify inappropriate policies?

Answer: We are generally highly pleased with the GON steps taken to date to prepare to redress the drought food deficits, and with complete official openness to provide available information, statistics and the abundant numbers of donor assessment visitors. We are also sensitive to the need for the government to be cautious in certain aspects of its policy toward the drought to avoid creating panic, to maintain its credibility, and to conform to its ability to move into a drought relief program at a realistic pace.

GON Steps to Address the Drought:

Rational management of existing stocks;

Temporary waiver of taxes on grain imports and facilitation of authorizing import licenses to encourage grain imports;

Establishment of a fund of CFA 300,000,000 to be available to the provinces for dry season production projects;

Direct government external purchase and import of 25,000 MT of cereals;

Public encouragement of dry season projection projects; providing documents to donors for funding of these projects; cutting administrative requirements for government approval of NGO project proposals;

High priority given to officials at highest levels to participate in internal GON assessments, planning activities and official missions;

GON response organization established with broad base of action;

Official requests for food assistance have been transmitted to donors; request for CDC health surveillance team readily submitted to USAID.

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Potentially Constraining GON Policies:

- Announcement of GON principle of commercialization of food imports is contrary to USAID policy of free food distribution during emergency;
- General instructions to require people to remain in their villages have been given to governors. Villagers are to receive food in central distribution points and return to their villages, or the GON will distribute food to the villages. This is not proving practical in destitute villages and for herders;
- Low priority is being given in some locations in free food distribution and medical attention. This is not a stated government policy, but an effect of the policy of conserving existing resources and the lack of a system of quick response in grain distribution to needs suddenly appearing;
- The lack of a clear policy on free food distribution is a function of GON efforts to instill the work ethic into all segments of the population

USAID Response

USAID has informed GON of our policy. GON does not consider this a problem and will accept U.S. food contributions for free distribution;

One province, Zinder, has not followed this instruction. We will praise the feeding program in the City of Zinder in our communications with the GON to encourage similar programs elsewhere. Detailed USAID assistance program will focus on displacement needs first;

Mission has formulated a Crisis Intervention Program for herders in conjunction with ILP activities. Also, Mission food assistance planning activities will continue to stress responding to the most needy in a timely manner;

Results of the various assessments will clarify the needs. We are confident that this policy can be developed with the government as needs unfold and donor commitments are secured.

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SELF-HELP FOOD ASSISTANCE

QUESTION

The deficit declared in Chad in 1982 was 209,000 MT, yet only 31,000 MT was imported under multidonor relief effort and no starvation resulted. This was due to a combination of commercially imported cereals and locally available foods (manioch, sweet potatoes, peanuts, wild plants, etc.). How much can this alleviate the food shortage pressures in Niger? How much will the exhortation to dry season production help?

ANSWER

We will continue to seek answers to these questions. Substantial production of some of these foods has been achieved in past years, and given similar conditions this production should increase given the government's stress on dry season production. The lack of rainfall this year, however, has already dropped water tables in some areas (e.g. Air mountains) and may affect other zones. Information such as contained below will be obtained to be included in our continuing drought analysis.

Commercial Imports: The GON has ordered the purchase and import of 25,000 MT. The Maradi Regional Development Council on October 11 authorized licenses for the import of 45,000 MT during the next 30-40 days, amid reports of an already significant amount of daily imports into the Maradi area. Thus imported grains are expected to be important this year. Farmers and herders who have lost everything, however, will be unable to purchase grain even if available.

- Non-grain Production: The following table will be completed as information becomes available:

<u>Product</u>	<u>1983 MT</u>	<u>1983 Ha</u>	<u>1984-5 MT (est.)</u>	<u>1984-5 Ha (est.)</u>
Peanuts	73,000			
Manioc	169,000			
Sweet Potato	73,000			
Sugar Cane	363,000			
Onion	97,000			
Potatoes	1,000			
Vegetables	1,000			
Tomatoes	11,000			

EARLY DISASTER PREPAREDNESS

Question: Why has the mission declared a disaster and moved so quickly to an assessment before final harvest figures and potential at-risk population can be reliably estimated?

Answer: Reports were received by the mission early that people were leaving traditional agriculture zones because of no pastures and no harvests. Dying cattle and moving people made it evident that a disaster was at hand. The only question would be of magnitude, and early assessments indicated it would be large. It became obvious that preparations should begin, and that immediate relief activity was called for in certain zones.

OFDA prefers as early an indication as possible of potential disasters. The PASA with NOAA/NESDIS/AISC is one step it has taken to provide it with information on rainfall deficits which lead to crop shortfalls. This information will not be exploited unless coupled with field mission immediate action to prepare for potential disastrous harvests.

The OFDA team is preparing a report based on potential scenarios. Although precise final numbers of affected population can not be determined at this time, orders of magnitude have been determined, and plans are developed for mission follow-through as information becomes complete. Early preparedness is far more prudent than waiting final assessments, particularly for a country which has not required significant food aid for several years and must develop a drought assistance effort from scratch.

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DRAFT OFDA REPORT

(Incomplete)

Robert Adams
Benton Hoskins
Mary Rubino

October 18, 1984

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As stated elsewhere in this report, the team believes that Niger is presently at an early stage of a disaster situation. The question remains: What form would a later stage of this disaster take? Given the situation that faced Niger in the late 60's and early 70's and given the experience of other African nations that have had to deal with drought emergencies, it would now be appropriate to describe two basic scenarios, one of which we believe Niger and USAID will have to confront in the coming months or years. The first assumes that the disaster will continue only through the coming year to be ameliorated by improved climatic conditions and a satisfactory harvest. Two possible sub-scenarios are presented with respect to this first scenario. A second scenario will be offered that assumes a poor harvest next year and possibly the year following. This would clearly increase the severity of the disaster, thus requiring a longer term, higher level response. We would emphasize, however, that a third possible scenario (that there is no disaster presently nor any likely to occur during the coming year) has been considered and rejected by the team as a result of its investigations and observations.

A. A Short Term Disaster

As mentioned above, this scenario refers to a disaster period extending only through to the next harvest during the August-September period of 1985 ending as a result of a satisfactory harvest and a return to general food self-sufficiency on the part of the Nigerien people or at least sufficient food that normal imports would suffice to make any remaining deficit manageable. However, this scenario could develop in either of two ways depending on the gravity of the situation in the early months of 1985. These two sub-scenarios are here briefly described along with the general requirements that might be expected from the US government in terms of support.

1) Moderate/Short term - In this sub-scenario, much, but far from all, of the food deficit experienced by Niger would be covered from three sources:

- a) farmer reserves that are "hidden" as a protection from the fear of possible government interference or commandeering;
- b) food imports, legal or illegal, from other areas, particularly northern Nigeria; and
- c) a reduction in demand, primarily by virtue of Nigerian emigration into neighboring nations.

Under these circumstances, large camps (10,000 inhabitants or more) would be unlikely to develop of their own accord. Most of the displaced and suffering, as seems to be the case presently, would be distributed among the towns and cities living with relatives or friends. Others would be placed in temporary housing in areas identified by the authorities at locations scattered about an urban area, as is currently the case in Tanout, Zinder Department.

Sporadically, camps of a few hundred might form of their own accord, but it is likely that they would be dispersed by the government and resettled in smaller temporary areas. In brief, this situation would be fundamentally an extension of the current situation at a higher level in terms of numbers affected and demands requiring formal attention. The total of displaced people receiving direct support in camps or government-identified temporary housing areas would not exceed (100,000?).

Under these circumstances, direct USG support for disaster relief could be expected to fall into two basic categories, described in much greater detail in Section III following:

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Assistance to Affected population - Approximately (75,000?)

metric tons of food aid, primarily grain and some edible oil, for distribution beginning in January and continuing to the next harvest would be required. A portion of the food would be directed to concentrations of displaced people, the rest provided through the normal OPVN network. This area would be the particular concern of the Mission's Food for Peace Officer as described in detail in the next section. Additional assistance for local concentrations of displaced people in the form of blankets, medical supplies, tents, etc. could be expected. Technical assistance to the GON and financial support to PVO's would be offered in support of "contre-saison" efforts.

Preparedness Planning - As described fully in the next section, the Disaster Relief Officer (DRO) would concentrate on undertaking planning exercises with various GON ministries and agencies to prepare them for disaster relief operations, when a future disaster is far more severe than the current one, and assisting these same Ministries and agencies in the planning and implementation of current efforts directed toward a "moderate" disaster scenario. The DRO would also closely monitor the activities of the GON, other international donors, non-governmental organizations, and any other interested parties in relation to the relief effort and report these findings periodically to USAID and the GON. Finally, the DRO would assist USAID in the coordination of its own efforts to deal with the disaster in the context of its ongoing developmental program.

2) Severe/Short Term - In this sub-scenario, the situation is considerably worse. Mitigating factors (hidden stores, legal/illegal imports, and emigration) are too insignificant to substantially alleviate the drought's effects. Under these circumstances, larger numbers of displaced people find themselves completely unable to deal with circumstances and gravitate toward camps and other concentrations of displaced people at first slowly and then at a much faster rate. Several camps of as many as 35-50,000 people each are created spontaneously and the CON is unable to stem their growth or relocate their residents in smaller groupings as in the moderate sub-scenario. Health and sanitation in the camps deteriorate rapidly; starvation and the threat of epidemics become widespread. Without preparedness planning, normal government institutions find themselves all but completely incapable of dealing efficiently and effectively with the situation through their normal structures. Civil disorder threatens in urban areas surrounded by camps and most national development activities cease completely or are severely neglected. Displaced people located in camps of all sizes or government-identified temporary housing areas could easily reach a total of 250-350,000, or about five percent of the total population.

The effect of this sub-scenario's development on USG assistance should be fairly obvious. Relief inputs would greatly increase and disaster preparedness planning, as described in the previous section, would rapidly become disaster relief implementation. However, this sub-scenario assumes, as did the previous example, that 1985 would see the arrival of improved climatic conditions and a sufficient harvest, thus limiting this sub-scenario to less than a full year.

Assistance to Affected Population - The amount of food aid required would increase to a range of (100-130,000) metric tons and would include increased amounts of items other than grain such as oil and powdered milk. Additional food supplies, beyond those mentioned in the moderate sub-scenario, would be almost entirely directed toward the camps. Vastly more camp supplies would be required, particularly medical supplies. Support for "contre-saison" projects would continue, but at a lower priority.

Disaster Preparedness Planning/Implementation - The activities briefly ascribed to the Development Relief Officer position in the previous sub-scenario would remain the same, with one fundamental exception. Planning activities with Ministries and other GON agencies would have to be greatly accelerated and actual implementation of preparedness plans would have to be undertaken, whether fully developed or not. The DRO's position would become crucial to the Mission given the magnitude of the relief effort that would be required.

It is the team's judgement, as expressed elsewhere in this report, that the first sub-scenario should be used as the basis for present USG assistance planning. However, adoption of this approach would allow a ready transition to the "severe" sub-scenario's activities if required.

B. A Long Term Disaster

In the event that 1985 represents another seriously deficient crop year, and should this occur yet a third time in 1986, the magnitude of the resulting disaster situations in Niger would be vastly increased, clearly threatening Niger's political stability and even its national identity. It is this potential reality that clearly underscores the need for thorough, exhaustive

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preparedness planning on the part of both the Government of Niger and the USAID Mission. As was graphically demonstrated during the period roughly from 1968 through 1974, it is extremely dangerous in the Sahel to assume that one bad crop year will not be followed by another.

This report will not attempt to describe a long term disaster scenario in any detail, but to avoid its mention would be unacceptable. Short term (one year or less) disaster relief efforts, while helpful, do not in themselves provide the basis for dealing with a long term crisis such as this. The team believes that it is absolutely crucial that the USG, particularly the USAID Mission, be prepared for the possibility of a long term crisis and thus give substantial support to the concept of long-term GON disaster preparedness planning. The Disaster Relief Officer's position, as described in the next section's recommendations, is a relatively inexpensive and modest effort to firmly meet this potentiality at an early enough stage to allow for a truly effective, timely response, should it be required. To over-emphasize short term food assistance at this time is of only short term value. To de-emphasize full preparedness planning leaves Niger and its people vulnerable to social and political upheaval and the loss of what gains have been made since the last great drought. Thus this report will continue to strongly emphasize long term planning in association with immediate food assistance.

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III. A Response from the USG - Recommendations

Given the observations of the team and the various disaster scenarios presented above, the team feels that an action program directed by the USAID Mission should follow an approach that assists in meeting the immediate needs of Niger while establishing coherent plans and planning systems within the CON to deal both with the current situation and possible future challenges.

With this in mind, the following are recommendations to OPDA and the USAID Mission for such a program. They are based on the assumption that the "Moderate/Short Term" sub-scenario presented in the preceding section will in fact continue. As also mentioned before, they are designed to allow for a increase in activity, should the situation so warrant.

A. Food Assistance

1) Amount and Timing - A total of 75,000 metric tons of grain are recommended for distribution to Niger. This includes both food for direct distribution to displaced people found in camps/groups and food for distribution through the OPVN network for purposes of general consumption and price stabilization.

It is assumed that 15,000 MT will be directed toward the displaced population over a nine month period. Based on a 200 kilogram requirement per person for one year, 15,000 MT will suffice to feed 100,000 people for those nine months. The remaining 60,000 MT would be distributed through the OPVN network, but a portion thereof could be redirected to support for displaced people, should that be necessary.

Currently, 15,000 MT will be committed by the USG for distribution through the normal OPVN network and another 15,000 MT are under consideration. It is recommended that arrival times for the various shipments of food assistance, including the above-mentioned, follow this schedule:

Suggested Schedule for
Receipt of Food for Peace Shipments
and Predicted Consumption Level

<u>Month (1985)</u>	<u>Amount (MT)</u>	<u>Consumption</u>
January.....	15,000	Low
February.....	15,000	Low
March.....	15,000	Medium
April.....	10,000	Medium
May.....	10,000	High
June.....	10,000	High
July.....	-----	High
August.....	-----	High
September.....	-----	Medium/High

Recommended delivery times precede anticipated consumption times by three months in order to take into account transport delays both from African coastal ports to point of entry and internally within Niger. Further, the team recommends that "points of entry" in Niger for shipments from the coastal ports be, if at all possible, at those Nigerien cities where departmental prefectures are located, rather than only to Niamey. This should reduce transport time significantly.

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3) Food for Peace Officer -The team strongly recommends the appointment of a full-time Food for Peace Officer to the USAID Mission in Niger for support and coordination of the food assistance program. This position could be filled by either a direct-hire Agency employee or a person hired under Personal Services Contract (PSC). The team recommends a direct-hire with in-depth experience in FFP programming and procedures. This would allow the Mission to immediately undertake required actions without delay. If unable to identify such a candidate, either a direct-hire or PSC with some Food for Peace background would be acceptable.

A suggested Scope of Work for the designated Food for Peace Officer should include the following:

- Consult with other donor representatives in Niamey to determine details regarding their food assistance, particularly amount, time of arrival, and point of entry, and coordinate USG assistance within this context;
- Prepare an implementation plan in conjunction with the GON covering all aspects of food assistance including, among other concerns, shipping documentation, port surveys, bagging arrangements, claims filing, overland transportation, storage and warehousing, ultimate distribution and allocation of food, appropriate accounting systems, and planning of different systems of distribution (e.g., Food for Work, free gifts, and sales);
- Prepare and implement a plan for food use monitoring utilizing the assistance of Food Aid Monitors; and
- Identify additional technical assistance required for implementation, such as mentioned in "5) Logistics Support" following.

4) Food Aid Monitors - In support of the Food for Peace Officer, the team believes at least two Food Aid Monitors are essential for program success. These Monitors, supplied with four-wheel drive vehicles, would be responsible for end-use checking of food assistance as well as providing administrative support to the FFP Officer.

A Scope of Work for these Monitors should include the following:

- maintain contact with local officials responsible for food distribution;
- assist the FFP Officer in developing methods for inspection and end-use checking; and
- undertake travel to the various warehouses and distribution points for the purpose of observing distribution procedures, inspecting provisions, and reporting back to USAID and the GON as to findings.

5) Logistics Support - One potential problem in food distribution that could significantly interfere with assistance and possibly undermine the entire program would be a collapse of the Army/OPVN distribution network by virtue of mechanical failure of the trucking fleets. As the food distribution program increases in intensity over the coming months, this problem is expected to increase in frequency of occurrence and, if unattended, in severity.

It is not currently clear as to the complete extent of other donor support in this area to the Army and OPVN. Although the Dutch government may possibly provide a number of new trucks for food distribution, it is not yet clear if their gift will include maintenance support. As a result, USAID should consider the possibility of hiring a mechanic under PSC, if needed.

in order to provide training to Nigerian mechanics as well as direct assistance to fleet maintenance.

Similarly, OPVN may require the technical assistance of a logistician to work with the OPVN's logistics officer in setting up and implementing a coherent logistics program for the distribution of both food and non-food assistance. Again, the Dutch have indicated possible support in this area which should be confirmed.

Action regarding both of these positions should await clarification from other donor agencies as to the specific nature and extent of their support to OPVN beyond simple provision of food supplies.

B. Non-food Assistance

Dealing with the growing crisis in Niger over the next few months will require considerably more than food assistance alone. The following sections suggest some of the materials and technical assistance that will be required for a comprehensive and effective response. Specific amounts of each supply category cannot usually be pre-determined under disaster circumstances such as a drought. Rough estimates will be provided where possible as a guide, but actual determination will have to await events. It also must be stressed that all the possible categories of assistance that might be required under different situations cannot possibly be known in advance, thus additional categories not mentioned in this list may well require attention before the drought and its effects are over. Determination of actual needs and identification of resources to meet them will require considerable time and effort. Thus, the position of Disaster Relief Officer and its relation to these concerns will be included in this section.

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1) Materiel Support

a) Camp Supplies - In the event that large camps of displaced people are formed, various supplies, such as tents, blankets, soap, and other items, will be required. At present, the team does not yet anticipate the need for OFDA to program these items as various American PVO's have expressed an interest in supplying these items on a scale sufficient to meet immediate needs and potentially larger future needs. As one example, Church World Service has already ordered 10,000 blankets and could request more. Lutheran World Relief has also indicated that it has ample supplies of blankets, quilts, soap, "children's kits", and other items available which may be called up. However, should the disaster become so severe as to surpass the PVOs' capabilities to provide support, the USAID Mission may have to request such supplies.

b) Health/Medical Supplies - The displaced population will, as a result of their malnourished, exhausted state upon arrival in towns or at camps, require special medical attention. Special foods (e.g., oil, powdered milk, etc.) will be required as well as other items such as intravenous fluids and equipment for treatment of the severely malnourished who are unable to eat. Currently these items are provided to the GON by the World Food Program (WFP). It is anticipated that WFP will increase its supply of such materiel in response to the drought disaster. Thus, the USC should not have to include this category in its disaster relief program. However, should WFP be unable to provide sufficient supplies, the USAID Mission should be ready to request these items in support of and in coordination with the WFP program.

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c) Water Supply - USAID should be prepared to seek assistance from AID/Washington projects such as Water and Sanitation for Health (WASH) for assessments of water needs and identification of potential sources of potable water for use in camps, should that be required. In the event of the formation of large camps, the creation of a permanent water system (e.g., digging large wells) would likely be prohibitive given the temporary nature of these camps, or at least the GON's desire that they be temporary. Trucking of water may be required, but this is difficult to assess at the moment, as is the need for USG support rather than that of another donor agency. This should clearly be a concern of the Mission requiring its observation, but the team does not recommend the planning of specific action at this time.

d) Computerization - Some discussions have been held with Mission personnel regarding the possibility of establishing a microcomputer system within the GON for tracking food assistance from arrival through storage to distribution. Although a reasonable idea theoretically, the team does not believe that such an effort should be undertaken until such time as a microcomputer specialist has visited Niger to determine the feasibility of developing such a system. In the team's opinion, this might best be seen as part of a longer term planning/preparedness effort that might be operable in time to assist the coming year's efforts. However, such assistance should not be assumed until it has been well established that a microcomputer system would be feasible. Thus, the team recommends that OFDA be prepared to provide funds to the USAID Mission in order to contract with a microcomputer consultant, following the appointment and under the guidance of the Disaster

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Relief Officer, or his/her equivalent failing the appointment of such an Officer.

e) Contre-Saison Supplies - As mentioned in the first section of this report, the GON has undertaken a sizeable number of dry season gardening projects at many different locations throughout Niger. These projects, in and of themselves, are unlikely, in the team's opinion, to have more than a limited effect on food availability initially. However, they are worthy of support as part of a long term GON strategy to increase food supplies and as a means of potentially increasing the availability of foods high in various vitamins and minerals otherwise difficult to obtain in the traditional diet. The team thus recommends that OFDA be prepared to provide funds to the Mission for a) short term consultants who can directly assist the GON in improving the productivity of these contre-saison projects and expanding their impact, and b) targeted fppd assistance for the population working on these projects until the harvest (probably in January/February).

As an alternative, the team recommends that the USAID Mission consider providing money through an OPG to an American private, voluntary organization, such as Lutheran World Relief, to provide expanded support to contre-saison projects. LWR currently supports a number of such gardening projects (as mentioned in the sub-section concerning PVO activities in the first section of this report). The team's observations in the field and the remarks made by local GON officials clearly indicate that LWR has been very successful in its efforts and is well-respected by Niger government officials.

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2. Preparedness Planning

It is clear that the situation in Niger has improved in many respects since the great drought of a decade ago. The internal transportation infrastructure is greatly improved and the GON has vastly increased its own network of services throughout the nation. However, the team has noted in discussions with responsible GON officials at all levels that, although the available human and physical resources have increased, the GON does not yet have a comprehensive plan prepared for implementation should the disaster become severe. This is particularly the case should large camps of tens of thousands of displaced people be created, spontaneously or by GON decision. The infrastructure which has been developed is directed toward a "normal" population distribution in "average" circumstances.

Large camps are not at all normal and require a completely different approach. They could easily grow very quickly from small, manageable groups to massive numbers of malnourished and desperate people. In this event, the GON will be required to respond immediately and effectively if the situation is not to get out of hand. To wait until such circumstances exist before preparing plans for a comprehensive response would all but guarantee initial failure and added trauma and confusion. In light of the history of recurring droughts in Niger, the GON can be expected to face a severe disaster scenario at some stage in the future, if not during the coming year.

The team therefore strongly recommends that OFDA provide funding to the USAID Mission for the selection and hiring of a Disaster Relief Officer (DRO) to be employed at the Mission for the express purpose of introducing a system for comprehensive disaster preparedness planning to the GON and, to a lesser

extent, the Mission itself. The contract should cover a period of twelve to eighteen months beginning as soon as possible. This position could be filled by either a direct hire or a contractor. However, the individual chosen should have extensive experience in planning in a sub-Saharan context and should be a fluent in spoken and written French. Although not essential, it would be helpful if the individual chosen had specific Niger or Sahelian experience and former involvement with disaster planning. Above all, the individual must be self-motivated and highly energetic, yet patient.

A Scope of Work for a Disaster Relief Officer should include the following:

- Direct assistance to individual Ministries (such as the Ministry of Health) and agencies (such as OPVN) in the formulation of comprehensive and specific action plans for implementation should a severe disaster situation exist. These plans would include, among other items,:

- identification of responsible officers within the agency with a detailed description of their roles during an emergency;

- in cooperation with the GON's inter-ministerial drought planning committee, a clear description of the inter-relationships to exist between various Ministries and agencies during the emergency;

- a day-by-day plan for dealing with both small and large camps of displaced people including the provision of food and medical supplies, support

for GON relief staff, camp administration, scheduling of activities such as food distribution, etc.; and

- technical assistance to the GON for final publication of individual agency plans and an overall, coordinated GON plan.

- Representation of the USG in coordination of activities with other donor agencies and non-governmental organizations with regular reporting to both the USAID Mission and the GON;

- Coordination within USAID of the Mission's activities specifically addressed to the disaster situation; and

- Compilation and analysis of information from all relevant sources regarding the disaster situation and reporting of such information to USAID and the GON.

In many respects, this position would be similar to that described on Page 2 of the Mission Disaster Relief Plan under the section concerning the Mission Disaster Relief Officer (MDRO). However, it should be noted that the two positions, while similar in some respects, are also different. Unlike the MDRO described in the Mission Plan, the DRO described above is a full-time position with a much wider mandate for action, particularly in regard to disaster preparedness planning with the GON. The team feels strongly that a part-time MDRO who would also have other program responsibilities simply would not have the time to undertake the activities expected of the DRO position as described in this report. However, upon completion of this special DRO contract, the designated Mission DRO should have a much improved GON preparedness planning system with which to work and thus be far more efficient and effective in his/her activities when facing a future disaster.

3. Support to the PVO Community

As mentioned elsewhere in this report, the American PVO community has begun some small activities in response to the drought or has altered on-going activities to meet drought needs. Team discussions with PVO representatives

indicate their interest in doing as much as possible to assist Niger during the disaster period. The team recommends to OFDA and USAID two approaches for providing assistance to the PVO community and increasing the effective impact of their valuable work.

Several PVOs, such as Lutheran World Relief, as mentioned in "1)e)" above, Church World Service, CARE, and the Sudan Interior Mission already provide assistance to projects ranging from dry season gardening to medical/health support services. Should a PVO be willing and demonstrate capability, the Mission ought to consider entering into a special OPG with that PVO (or through GAP, the local coordinating organization of all PVOs) for the provision of specific services, such as support to the GON contre-saison program or to OPVN should it need to greatly expand its distribution system. This could increase the impact of Mission assistance while not substantially increasing the workload of Mission personnel.

A second team recommendation to OFDA and the Mission would be the creation of a special PVO Assistance Fund under the direction of the Mission. This Fund of perhaps \$500,000 would be available to provide small grants to PVOs to expand or initiate small-scale projects designed to address disaster conditions (i.e., specially targeted feeding programs, special medical programs, etc.). The Fund could also provide "seed money" to a PVO to begin a specific activity immediately while the PVO waits for further financial assistance from its headquarters or other donors. In light of the rapidity with which a disaster situation can worsen and given the unique capabilities of PVOs to respond quickly, this Fund could provide the Mission with a flexible tool allowing immediate, specifically-targeted assistance to small scale disaster needs.

Checklist of USAID Actions & Estimated Timing

<u>Action</u>	<u>Estimated Timing</u>
Request for initial 15,000 MT from FFP	10/84*
Request for additional 15,000 MT	10/84*
Request for additional 45,000 MT with 50,000 MT of total requests in-country by 4/30/85	10/84*
Initiate CDC Nutritional Surveillance effort	11/84
Dry Season Gardening Specialist(s) in Niger or Grant provided to PVO for same	11/84
Selection/Hiring of FFP Officer	11/84
Selection/Hiring of Food Aid Monitors	11/84
Selection/Hiring of DR Officer	11/84
Establishment of PVO support mechanisms	11/84
Possible Hiring - Logistician/Mechanics	12/84
First Order for Health/Medical Supplies	12/84
Computer Specialist in-country	12/84
GON Preparedness Planning underway	12/84
Order for Camp Supplies if large camps are forming	1/85

* Actions already completed or underway by USAID at time of report preparation.

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September 27, 1984

ANNEX B

FFPO, AID/W: M. Kerst

Transport Assessment/Drought Coordination

DIR, USAID/Niger: P. Benedict

This memo provides basic information on the current transport situation in Niger related to the initial import of 15,000 MT of U.S. P.L. 480 Title II assistance for drought relief support. Comments on general drought relief coordination are appended along with the draft Transfer Agreement for the allocation of 15,000 MT of red sorghum.

PORT CAPACITIES/INLAND TRANSPORT

With emergency programs pending in Malian 6 and 7 regions, the Sahel ORD in Burkina Faso, and the nationwide problem in Niger compounded by the closing of Nigerian borders, serious logistic problems seem inevitable in channeling food aid to drought areas in 1985. The WFP emergency group lists the offtake rate from Lome port at 6,000 MT per month and from Cotonou at 3,000 MT. USAID experience under TA 2622 in 1982 indicates that 3,000 MT/month is about what one can expect from Cotonou. Local freight forwarders maintain that this slow rate is caused by lack of freight cars on the railroad. If these rates cannot quickly be increased, massive bottlenecks can be avoided only by very careful coordination. The WFP representative cites the forwarding rate from available ports as the most serious constraint facing any relief operation.

Transcap stated informally that 250-300 MT/day was a typical forwarding rate from Cotonou and 400 MT/day was average for Lome. Nitra gave rates of 500-600 MT/day from Cotonou, and the chef de transit from Intertrans (TEL 73-20-23) will have a forwarding rate and price estimate for Bob Adams on October 1.

INTERNAL TRANSPORTATION

National rates for trucks are based on metric tons carried per kilometer traveled. There two official rates in effect depending upon whether the road is paved or earthen. If the truck has no return cargo, the rate is 24.76 FCFA

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per kilometric ton over paved roads and 32.94 FCFA over earthen or laterite roads. If there is a return load, then the rate is between 16 and 18 FCFA over pavement and 21-23 FCFA over laterite. The negotiating range increases over sandy roads and desert tracks, going up to 60 FCFA in some areas. Also beyond Zinder toward Diffa on the main road, OPVN must normally use its own trucks, as certain sections of the pavement are so badly potholed that private trucks request too high a rate or refuse to go at all.

The OPVN uses the Syndicat des Transporteurs for some of its hauling. It sends a list of destinations and tonnages to the Syndicat which gets truckers to respond. Most of the sandy and desert roads, however, are handled by the OPVN fleet of 45 trucks, none of which are in very good shape.*

	Number of Trucks					Total Capacity
	10MT	15MT	20MT	25MT	30MT	
OPVN	24	0	0	21	0	765M
Army	not available					
Syndicat				200		incomplete

In Niamey, gasoline is 225 FCFA per liter and diesel fuel is 170 FCFA the liter. The price increases as you get further from Niamey (!), but fuel is generally available up country. It is illegal to carry filled fuel drums on the back of trucks with cargo.

DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM

The Bureau des Aides in the Defence Ministry is responsible for determining the final distribution points and making an overall repartition of emergency supplies. Donors seem to respect the competence of the current chief of this bureau and have confidence in his ability to organize the GON response to the drought. The Bureau maintains close relations with OPVN, as it currently depends upon OPVN to transport food assistance to a given distribution point. OPVN is reimbursed for the cost of hauling upon presentation of a bill.

A local committee composed of advisors, administrators, and the village chief actually conducts the distribution, targeting the beneficiaries and determining the size of the ration. Prospective recipients must present their carte de famille in order to be eligible for emergency food.

As reported by WFP and FED, the GON has proposed a three tier strategy for the relief effort. South of the main East-West road, the OPVN will close its doors and leave the grain market to the private sector. In the more Sahelian

*OPVN Truck Fleet: Includes trucks obtained as far back as 1977. At least 11 of the 45 trucks are in the repair shop--problems with obtaining spare parts for Hino trucks, as none available here and orders take three to six months to fill. One truck has put 250,000 km on since May 1982 and all are in constant use, frequently over the worst roads. Director cites motor and transmission problems as most frequent, although wear and tear of washboard roads and potholes keeps solder man busy 12 hours per day.

zone north of the road, the OPVN will sell grain in its regular fashion. Finally, in the northern desert/extreme Sahel, the army will distribute free of charge.

The PVO community is obviously concerned about the impending food crisis and is ready to help in any emergency program. CARE has indicated willingness to consider a food aid request which it would help distribute and/or parcel out to smaller PVO programs which could be carefully targeted to needy beneficiaries. Given GON problems in managing, targeting, and reporting past emergency food aid programs, PVOs should play an important role in helping the GON reach its goals. However, according to several donors, the GON may not relish the idea of outside assistance in implementing food distributions. The current government came to power in the midst of a drought and is very sensitive to its responsibilities in helping the population and is aware of the consequences if it proves to be ineffective. Consequently, efforts will be needed to bring the GON on board for any large scale involvement of PVOs in the feeding effort.

Internal Estimated Transport Costs
Initial USG Contribution

Niamey	2,000 MT	paved road	138 km x 24.76	6,833,360
Agadez	2,000 MT	paved road	945 km x 24.76	46,796,400
Diffa	2,000 MT	paved road	907 km x 24.76	44,914,640
		dirt road	450 km x 32.94	29,646,000
Dosso	2,000 MT	paved road	0	0
Maradi	2,000 MT	paved road	670 km x 24.76	33,178,400
Tahoua	2,000 MT	paved road	542 km x 24.76	26,839,840
Zinder	3,000 MT	paved road	907 km x 24.76	67,321,960
TOTAL				354,404,000

200 km x 15,000 x 32.94

REPORTING AND CONTROL

The OPVN receives food aid at national entry points and transports and stores according to the agreed upon distribution plan. It is responsible for documentation and reporting up to the point where the Bureau des Aides and the local committees take over. All of these reports are late, inconsistent, and inaccurate. A strong follow up of any bilateral program is a must to assure accountability for Title II commodities. Equally important is an explanation of how USAID information needs differ from the data provided by existing reporting systems. It might be advisable to prepare a simple instruction sheet with highlights of targeting and reporting requirements explained. These sheets could then be distributed by the GON, food monitors, PVOs, or even sent out with food trucks to the distribution sites. Most of the donors seemed to feel that given the military involvement anticipated in the actual distribution and the presidential concern with the military's performance, there will be a greater responsiveness this year in examining discrepancies than in the past.

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Food Import Schedule

<u>Source</u>	<u>Commodity</u>	<u>MT</u>	<u>Discharge Port</u>	<u>ETA</u>	<u>Observations</u>
OPVN	sorghum/corn	25,000		Oct. 84	
France	wheat	2,500 (pledge)			
West Germany	sorghum	5,000			Is this local purchase?
Holand	wheat	10,000 (request)			
EEC	sorghum	5,000			

HH
 OFFICE DES PRODUITS
 VIVRIERS DU NIGER
 BP. 474 - NIAMEY-

CAPACITE TOTALE DE STOCKAGE DES PRODUITS DE L'O.P.V.N.
EN TONNES AU 31 AOUT 1984

D E P A R T E M E N T	S T A B I L I S A T I O N	S T O C K R E S E R V E	B A C H E S P Y R A M I D A L E S	S I L O S	T O T A U X			E N S E
					M A G A S I N S	B A C H E S	S I L O S	
AGADEZ	5.500	1.500	-	-	7.000	-	-	7
DIFFA	6.800	1.500	-	-	8.300	-	-	8
DOSSO	8.500	6.500	3.000	-	15.000	3.000	-	18
MARADI	11.000	8.000	10.800	-	19.000	10.800	-	29
NIAMEY	21.500	11.000	6.600	-	32.500	6.600	-	39
TAHOA	13.100	6.000	6.000	-	19.100	6.000	-	25
ZINDER	15.200	9.500	3.000	-	24.700	3.000	-	27
	81.600	44.000	29.400	28.500	125.600	29.400	28.500	155

INFRASTRUCTURES DEFINITIVES - 125.600
 BACHES PYRAMIDALES - 29.400 (600 x 49)
 SILOS (REPARTITION NON PRECISE) 28.500 (500 x 57)

DEPARTEMENTS	NOMBRE DES MAGASINS					CAPACITE DE STOCKAGE ((t))		
	1 500 T	1 000 T	500 T	300 T	TOTAL	OPVM	RESERVE	TOTAL
AGADES	2	1	6	-	9	5 500	1 500	7 000
DOSSO	2	5	14	-	21	8 500	6 500	15 000
DIFFA	3	-	7	1	11	6 800	1 500	8 300
MARADI	4	3	20	-	27	11 000	8 000	19 000
NIAMEY	5	11	22	10	48	21 500	11 000	32 500
TANOUA	4	4	17	2	27	13 100	6 000	19 100
ZINDER	3	9	20	4	36	15 200	9 500	24 700
TOTAL	23	33	106	17	179	81 600	44 000	125 600

VII

OPVN

There is division in the donor community on this one. Most donors feel that OPVN is doing a fairly good job of moving and storing local grain and food aid. They are quite willing to overlook late reports and soft accounting-- which they characterize as better than average for the Sahel. Two donors characterized OPVN as one of the best marketing organizations in the Sahel. Late reports and poor accounting are, unfortunately, facts of life in West Africa, but constant efforts are needed to improve and I sense that neither donors nor OPVN is willing to make that effort in Niger.

USAID

The USAID will face increased management needs to deal with the emergency program. In addition to Andre, I would recommend a full-time (1 year) coordinator and an ex-pat (9 months--January-August) monitor. If supplementary activities are envisioned, then another monitor should be added. Mission direct hire and contract personnel should be assigned as expertise warrants.

The regular meetings with PVOs and interested USAID personnel are an excellent idea. Regular exchanges with other donors, Peace Corps, and Embassy personnel, and project contractors give the USAID a detailed view of what is happening throughout the country. It might be helpful once you have brought on board a drought coordinator to have him organize data on an arrondissement by arrondissement basis. Part of his coordinating function would be to gather and validate data from all sources, including government reports, PCV accounts, travel reports (verbal or written), and any other accounts brought back by American or other donor personnel in the course of field visits. Andre could summarize highlights or data needing further examination for the donor/PVO meetings, so that at-risk areas would get quick attention.

WFP

Under a recently approved grab-bag FFW-type program. WFP will work with local cooperatives and pre-cooperatives using food aid to help set up local security stocks or grain banks. How fast can WFP get started on this? Can it expand faster than anticipated? Are any PVOs interested? Food for the Hungry will have a representative in Ouagadougou covering Mali, Burkina Fasso, Niger. They have expressed tentative interest in local grain banks.

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GENERAL ON DROUGHT

My feeling on emergency programs is that in order to be effective, they must be integrated activities covering not only food, but nutrition, health, hygiene/water, agriculture, livestock, soil/water conservation, road maintenance, and income generating activities. Relief should progress imperceptibly into rehabilitation, and those who are first to identify a disaster situation should supplement a basic food aid program with activities which complement or at least limit damage to their on-going programs. These activities should be geared to the organization's in-country experience, personnel, and programmatic/strategy interests. The success of the CDC nutrition sampling in Mauritania was due not only to timely CDC input but also to USAID's relation with the mobile vaccination teams and their director, to the availability and interest of two USAID employees with nutrition expertise, and to very good relations with the GIRM Ministry of Health. A well formulated disaster response will take advantage of such program and personnel strengths to increase the effectiveness of the relief effort and to complement in-country rehabilitation and development activities.

PVOs

CARE and/or CWS (I did not get a chance to talk to CWS to determine their interest) should prepare and submit emergency food requests ASAP. These requests should indicate what other PVOs they will be collaborating with and give an idea of how much food will be needed for each collaborating PVO. The closer they can come to ration times beneficiaries in a given area equals food needed the less likely are AID/W hold ups for program clarification. FFW activities for counterseason production, road maintenance, tree planting, water retention dams, and well digging have to start ASAP, and even with quick program approval, food will not be here until January.

CARE/CWS should make its own approach to GON, offering help through its own channels and explaining conditions attached to its assistance. USAID should support the request(s) if PVOs ask, but one would hope that given the magnitude of the task ahead and the management burden of FFW programming, the GON will welcome PVO help.

Other donors indicate that pressure to channel all free food aid through PVOs would be rebuffed and should be avoided in favor of direct pressure on the GON to provide the required reports/follow up. The GON is justifiably proud of its record of self-reliance, so that any efforts to provide help outside GON channels could be particularly delicate.

Red Cross is also interested in targeting vulnerable groups and may put forward a proposal through the Red Cross League in Geneva. FFW has provided food for these activities in the past, and if the proposal were acceptable to the Mission, would do so here as well. Whatever the final USAID response, the PVO community in Niger is by far the strongest I have seen in my travels (Mali, Burkina Fasso, Ghana) and it should have an important role in the disaster relief effort.

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NIAMEY 5523/J1

WITH GON OFFICIALS THAT SPECIFIES RESPONSIBILITIES AND IDENTIFIES RESPONSIBLE PERSONS AND ENTITIES (PUBLIC OR PRIVATE) FOR EACH TASK RELATED TO MANAGEMENT OF THIS FOOD AID. THE TASKS TO BE IDENTIFIED AND COVERED BY THIS IMPLEMENTATION PLAN SHALL INCLUDE BUT NOT BE LIMITED TO THE FOLLOWING:

- 1- VERIFICATION THAT SHIPPING DOCUMENTS ARE RECEIVED BY THE PARTY RESPONSIBLE FOR TAKING DELIVERY OF CARGO.
- 2- SURVEYS OF CARGO AT PORT OF DISCHARGE, UPON ARRIVAL AT ANY INTERMEDIARY POINT OF UNLOADING (E.G. PARAKOU, OUAGADOUGOU), AND UPON ARRIVAL AT NIAMEY OR OTHER NIGER POINT OF ENTRY.
- 3- PACKING ARRANGEMENTS (IF APPLICABLE) AND STORAGE ARRANGEMENTS AT PORT OF DISCHARGE PENDING EVACUATION OF CARGO.
- 4- PROCEDURES AT THE PORT OF DISCHARGE FOR CLAIMS FILING IN EVENT OF DAMAGE OR LOSS AND FOR DISPOSITION OF SWYPPINGS OR OF FOOD OTHERWISE UNFIT FOR HUMAN CONSUMPTION, WHETHER AT THE PORT OF DISCHARGE OR IN TRANSIT TO NIGER.
- 5- OVERLAND TRANSPORTATION ARRANGEMENTS FROM PORT OF DISCHARGE TO POINT OF ENTRY IN NIGER. THIS SHOULD INCLUDE ARRANGEMENTS WITH THE TRANSIT AGENT TO CABLE USAID OR GON DATA ON EACH TRUCKLOAD OR WAGONLOAD DISPATCHED FROM THE PORT OF DISCHARGE OR ANY INTERMEDIARY TRANSIT POINT.
- 6- RECEPTION OF CARGO IN NIGER INCLUDING GON SUBMISSION OF RECEIVING REPORT DETAILING QUANTITY AND QUALITY OF CARGO RECEIVED AT POINT OF ENTRY.
- 7- STORAGE/WAREHOUSING PLANS BOTH FOR STORAGE UPON ARRIVAL AT NIGER POINT OF ENTRY AND FOR STORAGE AT DISTRIBUTION POINTS FOR OTHER CENTRAL STORAGE AREAS.
- 8- DISTRIBUTION/ALLOCATION PLANS FOR USAID FOOD AID FROM DISCHARGE AT NIGER POINT OF ENTRY TO POINT OF END-USE IN NIGER.

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NIAMEY 5523/J1

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MIAM:Y 0093/01 / 808 6-1

VZCZCNMI *
RR RUEFAB RUTABO RUEHJL RUTAOU RUTAAA RUEHOS
RUEHPC RUTAND RUEHOB RUEHOC RUEHPR RUEHC
DE RUEFHM #5683/01 264 **
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 201742Z SEP 84
FM AMEMBASSY NIAMEY
TO RUEFAB / AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN 7728
RUTABO / AMEMBASSY BAMAHO 4666
RUEHJL / AMEMBASSY BANJUL 0998
RUTAOU / AMEMBASSY COTONOU 3708
RUTAAA / AMCONSUL ADUNA 0533
RUEHOS / AMEMBASSY LAGOS 0106
RUEHPC / AMEMBASSY LOME 0402
RUTAND / AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA 0536
RUEHOB / AMEMBASSY NOUAKHOTT 1752
RUEHOC / AMEMBASSY OUAGADOUGOU 8364
RUEHPR / AMEMBASSY PRAIA 0603
INFO RUEHC / SECSTATE WASHDC 7251
BT
UNCLAS NIAMEY 05683

CLASS: UNCLASSIFIED
CHRG: AID 9/17/84
APPRV: IN:PEENEDICT
DATE: S/O:FLONOVAN/RFF
DODSON:IG
CLEAR: PROG:GROBERTSON
ADO:TOLSON
ADO:LJEPSON
D/DIR:JSNYDER
ISTR: AMB DCM AID CHRON

BT

AIDAC

ABIDJAN FOR REDSO/WCA

E.O. 12356: N/A

SUBJECT: NIGER - EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY IN EMERGENCY
- FOOD MANAGEMENT FOR PERSONAL SERVICES
- CONTRACTORS

1. USAID/N URGENTLY INTERESTED IN OBTAINING THE PSC SERVICES O/A OCTOBER 84 OF A FOOD RELIEF SPECIALIST AND SEVERAL FOOD MONITORS IN ANTICIPATION OF A REQUEST FOR EMERGENCY FOOD ASSISTANCE FROM THE GOVERNMENT OF NIGER. APPROPRIATE ADDRESSEES ALERTING POTENTIAL CONTRACTORS AND ADVISING NIAMEY OF ANY CANDIDATES.

2. SCOPES OF WORK FOR THESE POSITIONS ARE AS FOLLOWS:

- A. FOOD RELIEF SPECIALIST IN COORDINATION WITH THE REGIONAL FPPO AND UNDER THE DIRECTION OF USAID/NIAMEY WILL:

- 1) PRIOR TO ARRIVAL OF P.L. 480 FOOD:

- A) CONSULT WITH DONOR REPRESENTATIVES IN NIAMEY AND OTHER SOURCES TO ASCERTAIN PORTS OF DISCHARGE, ETA'S, TONNAGES, DONORS, VESSEL NAMES AND TYPES OF COMMODITIES, DESTINED FOR NIGER AND COMPILE SAME DATA INTO MULTI-DONOR REPORT UPDATED WEEKLY TO PUT USAID'S P.L. 480 FOOD SHIPMENTS INTO CONTEXT WITH THOSE OF OTHER DONORS AND TO ASSIST USAID IN DETERMINING DELIVERY DATE(S) AND PORT(S) OF DISCHARGE IF THIS HAS NOT BEEN ALREADY DETERMINED. THIS RESPONSIBILITY WILL END WITH THE ARRIVAL OF THE LAST OF P.L. 480 FOOD AT ITS DISCHARGE PORT.

- B) PREPARE AN IMPLEMENTATION PLAN IN COORDINATION

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STAT# 280314

4. DUE TO EXTREMELY TIGHT AND SOMEWHAT UNCERTAIN BOOKINGS, IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO BRING THE TEAM IN BEFORE THE END OF SEPTEMBER. ETA MIAMI IS 12:45 AM 9/30 ON UTA 838.

5. PLEASE ADVISE CONCURRENCE BY IMMEDIATE CABLE. WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR RESERVING SWB FOR ALL THREE AT THE GAYBY HOTEL, AND ARRANGE FOR THEM TO BE MET AT AIRPORT. PLEASE CONFIRM.

SEULTZ

BT

#0314

NNNN

UNCLASSIFIED

STAT# 280314

116

UNCLASSIFIED

STATE 282314

800 6-1

ACTION: AID INFO: AME DCM CHRON

WLGQVXVZCZCNM0399
OO RUEHNM
DE RUEHC #0314 2650310
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O R 210302Z SEP 84
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHNM/AMEMBASSY NIAMEY IMMEDIATE 9490
INFO RUEHAB/AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN 7609
BT
UNCLAS STATE 282314

LOC: 91 493
21 SEP 84 0313
CN: 10907
CHRG: AID
DIST: AID

ACTION: CDO
INFO: IIR
IB
ADO
PROG
CHRON
BT

ACTION DATE: 9-21-84

AIDAC ABIDJAN FOR REDSO/SWA

F.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: N/A

SUBJECT: OFDA TDY ASSISTANCE TO NIGER EMERGENCY

REFS: (A) NIAMEY 554J, (B) STATE 266077

1. OFDA PLEASED MISSION IS READY TO RECEIVE FIELD ASSISTANCE PER REF. A.

2. THE OBJECTIVES OF THE TEAM VISIT ARE: (A) TO ASSIST THE MISSION IN A FOOD NEEDS ASSESSMENT, TO DETERMINE THE SIZE AND LOCATION OF POPULATIONS AT RISK, TO EVALUATE THE CAPACITY OF THE TRANSPORT AND DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS, TO SEE WHAT OTHER DONORS ARE DOING AS IT RELATES TO ADDRESSING THE OVERALL NEED AND TO RECOMMEND THE APPROPRIATE US SHARE TO THE PROJECTED EMERGENCY IN NIGER, AND TO COME UP WITH A WORKABLE ACTION PLAN; (B) TO COLLABORATE WITH USAID/NIAMEY TO COMPLETE AND UPDATE THE MISSION'S DISASTER PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE PLAN AS OUTLINED IN AID HANDBOOK 2, SE.

3. MAKE-UP OF TEAM: TO ADDRESS THE OBJECTIVES LISTED IN 2 (A), ROBERT ADAMS WILL TAKE THE LEAD (FIELD SKECH IN REF. B). HE WILL BE ASSISTED BY BEN ROSKINS WHO WORKS WITH PRIVATE AND VOLUNTARY ORGANIZATIONS IN TOGO

AND THE CAMERON AND WORK AS A PEACE CORPS VOLUNTEER AND PC STAFF DIRECTOR WILL BE USEFUL HUMAN RESOURCE SKILLS. HE IS FLUENT IN FRENCH AND HAS AN M.A. DEGREE IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS. TO ACCOMPLISH THE OBJECTIVE OF 2 (B)--A FULLY DEVELOPED MISSION DISASTER RELIEF PLAN--OFDA PROPOSES MARY RUBINO WHO HAS WORKED WITH US FOR 3 YEARS IN DEVELOPING OFDA'S COUNTRY PROFILE AND OTHER INFORMATION SYSTEMS. SHE HAS CONDUCTED FIELD WORK FOR US IN JAMAICA AND HAITI. SHE HAS A B.A. IN INTERNATIONAL STUDIES AND SPEAKS FRENCH FLUENTLY. ALL THREE WILL COLLABORATE AND SUPPORT ONE ANOTHER IN AREAS OF OVERLAP. WE ANTICIPATE THAT THIS WILL BE A MOST PRODUCTIVE COLLABORATION. FYI: MRS. RUBINO HAS A SECRET CLEARANCE FOR OFDA USE AND A TOP SECRET STATE DEPARTMENT CLEARANCE. WE HAVE APPLIED FOR SECURITY CLEARANCES FOR MESSRS. ADAMS AND ROSKINS. END FYI.

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UNCLASSIFIED

STATE 294157

800 6-1

ACTION: AID INFO: AMB DCM CIRON

VZCZCNM0977
 OO RUEHNM
 DL RUEHC #4157 269060
 ZNR UUUUU ZZH
 O 250328Z SEP 84
 YM SECSTATE WASHDC
 TO RUEHNM/AMEMBASSY NIAMEY IMMEDIATE 9522
 INFO RUEHAB/AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN IMMEDIATE 7710
 RUPHGV/USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE 4456
 RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE 4414
 BT
 UNCLAS STATE 294157

LOC: 84 510
 25 SEP 84 0848
 CN: 11302
 CHRG: AID
 DIST: AID

ACTION: DD
 INFO: DIR
 ADO
 PROG
 GDO
 CIRON
 RP

AIDAC ABIDJAN FOR REDSO/WSA, GENEVA FOR M. DWYRE, PASS TO U

ACTION DUE: 9-26-84

E.O. 12358: N/A

TAGS: N/A

SUBJECT: NIGER DROUGHT DISASTER DECLARATION

ROME FOR FODAG, PETER STRONG

REF: NIAMEY 5707

1. AID/OFDA ACKNOWLEDGES AMBASSADOR'S DROUGHT DISASTER DECLARATION OF SEPT. 21, 1984.

2. IF REQUESTED, OFDA CAN MAKE AVAILABLE UP TO 25,000 DOLS IMMEDIATELY TO PROVIDE FOR A VARIETY OF RELIEF NEEDS AS THE SITUATION MAY DICTATE. (SEE AID HANDBOOK FOR USE OF AMBASSADOR'S AUTHORITY AND REPORTING REQUIREMENTS). IF NEEDS EXIST, PLEASE CABLE FOR OFDA TO RESPOND BEFORE END OF FISCAL YEAR, AND INDICATE WHAT FUNDS ARE INTENDED FOR.

3. REQUIREMENTS IN EXCESS OF 25,000 NEED TO BE PROPOSED TO OFDA IN DETAIL. WE EXPECT THE OFDA TEAM (ADAMS/HOSKINS/RUBINO) WILL ADDRESS THE IMMEDIATE AND LONG-TERM NEEDS AS THEY RELATE TO WHAT OTHER COUNTRIES ARE DOING AND THE APPROPRIATE US SHARE. FYI: TEAM WILL MEET WITH FAO/OSRO AND/OR WFP IN ROME ENROUTE TO NIAMEY. END FYI.

4. PER REFTEL PARA 5, WE LOOK FORWARD TO LEARNING WHAT INDICATORS SUGGEST TO YOUR DISASTER RELIEF POLICY TEAM FREE DISTRIBUTION RATHER THAN MONETIZATION AS ADVOCATED BY THE CON.

5. IN ADDITION TO OTHER ADDRESSEES, PLEASE SLUG ALL DROUGHT RELATED CABLES TO OFDA.

6. FOR ROME: TFAM WILL TELEPHONE UPON ARRIVAL AT DA VINCI ON FRIDAY SEPT. 29 TO CONFIRM APPOINTMENT(S). DAM

BT
#4157

NNNN

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NIAMFY 5922

800 6-1

VZCZCNMI
 OO RUEHC RUEHAB RUEHRO
 DE RUFRNM #5922 277 **
 ZNR UUUUU 72R
 O 031031Z OCT 84
 FM AMEMBASSY NIAMFY
 TO RUEHC / SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7392
 INFO RUEHAB / AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN 7791
 RUEHRO / AMEMBASSY ROME 1179
 BT
 UNCLAS NIAMFY 05922

CLASS: UNCLASSIFIED
 CHRG: AID 10/03/84
 APPRV: DIR:PEENEDICT
 DRFTD: D/D:JSNYDER:LC
 CLEAR: AME:WRCASEY
 GDO(DRAFT)
 ADO(DRAFT)
 ,RCG((NNC)
 DISTR: AME DCM AID CHRO:

AIDAC

AID/W FOR AFR/SWA, GRAF, NIGER WORKING GROUP; FVA/WFP;
 - OFDA
 PASS TO DEPT FOR A:/W
 ABIDJAN FOR REDSO/SCA/WFP
 ROME FOR FODAG, PASS WFP

F.O. 12356: N/A
 SUBJECT: RE UEST FOR EMERGENCY P.L. 480 TITLE II

REF: A) NIAMFY 5674, B) GRAF/SNYDER TELCON 10/02/84

1. REPTEL A PROVIDED DETAILS DIRECT APPEAL FROM GON FOR 15,000 MT RED SORGHUM AGAINST GON ESTIMATED DEFICIT OF SOME 350,000 MT.
2. PURPOSE OF THIS CABLE IS TO FORMALLY REQUEST AID/W ACTION ALLOCATING/AUTHORIZING SHIPMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH GON REQUEST FOR ARRIVAL IN COUNTRY BY THE END OF CY 84. WFP MICHAEL HERST DEVELOPED REQUIRED TA BACKUP DURING 9/27-30 NIGER TRY AND WILL BE IN AID/W WITH DRAFT ON 10/25/84.
3. FYI: USAID/ADO IS CURRENTLY UNDERTAKING FOURTH MISSION AGRO/PASTORAL ASSESSMENT WITH IMMEDIATE COUNTER-PART PERSONNEL AND ANTICIPATE DETAILED SITUATION REPORT EARLY WEEK 10/08. ADDITIONALLY, FAO/WFP-OS40 MM WILL UNDERTAKE OFFICIAL 3 WEEK SITUATION ASSESSMENT OF FINAL HARVEST PERIOD BEGINNING O/A 10/05/84. BASED ON THESE TWO EFFORTS, ANTICIPATE THAT A MORE DEFINITIVE WORKING DEFICIT FIGURE/PROJECTED DONOR RESPONSE WILL BE FORTH-COMING AND PERMIT DEVELOPMENT OF MORE COMPREHENSIVE FOOD AID REQUEST FOR FY 85. END FYI.

4. ADVISE.
 CASEY
 BT
 #5922

NNNN

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NIAMFY 5922

UNCLASSIFIED

NIAMEY 609

WEEK. THIS SPAR WOULD INCLUDE RESPONSIBILITIES BROADER THAN NORMALLY REQUIRED OF MISSION FFPO. THIS INDIVIDUAL WOULD REPORT DIRECTLY TO THE D/DIR. THIS ACTION WOULD REQUIRE AID/W AUTHORIZATION OF ONE ADDITIONAL POSITION.

5. IN ANTICIPATION OF AID/W CONCURRENCE FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A ONE-TOUR POSITION AS DESCRIBED TO PERMIT US TO DEAL WITH THIS EXTRAORDINARY MANAGEMENT LOAD, USAID WOULD LIKE TO REQUEST IMMEDIATE CONSIDERATION OF THOMAS M. AERST, FFPO/FFV/FFP FOR THAT POSITION. AERST HAS AN EXCELLENT REQUIRED SPECIFIC FFP AND GENERAL DROUGHT COORDINATION BACKGROUND BASED ON HIS WORK IN MAURITANIA, CHAD AND WITH FFP.

6. REQUEST AID/W CONSIDERATION OF THIS REQUEST AND DETERMINATION/ACTION TO SECURE EARLIEST POSSIBLE DATE OF ASSIGNMENT. ADVISE.

CASEY

BT

#6090

NNNN

UNCLASSIFIED

NIAMEY 608

120

132

VZCZCNMI
 RF FURAC
 DE RUFHNM #0605 285 **
 ZNR UUUUU ZZF
 R 111457Z OCT 84
 FM AMEMBASSY NIAMEY
 TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7514
 BT
 UNCLAS NIAMEY 0605

CLASS: UNCLASSIFIED
 CHG#: AID 10/10/84
 APPRV: DIR:PEP/FDICT
 DRFTD: D/D:JSNYDEF:IG
 CLEAR: NO:LGURIFY
 GDO:DMAXWELL (SUFS)
 DISTR: AMF LCM AID CERON

RF

AIDAC

FOR AFR/EMS:MCGRAW; AFR/SWA:CEANDLER; AFR/APP:HELMAN

P.O. 12356: N/A
 SUBJECT: NIGER DROUGHT EMERGENCY STAFFING

1. MISSION HAS PROVIDED SEPTFL ONGOING ASSESSMENTS OF GROWING DROUGHT PROBLEMS IN NIGER WHICH WILL CULMINATE IN MAJOR USG FOOD AND RELIEF ASSISTANCE PROGRAM ENCOMPASSING THE MANAGEMENT OF A MASSIVE P.L. 480 TITLE II EFFORT, CONTINUING FOOD AND HUMAN SITUATION MONITORING AND THE COORDINATION OF USG EMERGENCY RESPONSES, BOTH BILATERAL AND VIA PVO AND U.N./OR OTHER THIRD PARTIES. THE MAGNITUDE OF THIS EFFORT IS NOT ONLY SIGNIFICANT BUT GIVEN THE CURRENT AND PROJECTED CIRCUMSTANCES IT WILL HAVE TO CONTINUE FOR NOT LESS THAN 12 TO 18 MONTHS, PARTICULARLY IN SHORT-TERM POST-RELIEF ACTIONS ARE CONSIDERED CRITICAL, THERE IS ANOTHER SEVERE DROUGHT IN 1985.

2. AS AID/EMS STAFF, OFDA ASSESSMENT TEAM IS CURRENTLY ANALYZING THE COUNTRY SITUATION AND DEVELOPING RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SPECIFIC USG RESPONSE. BASED ON CURRENT SCHEDULE OFDA TEAM REPORT SHOULD BE READY O/A OCTOBER 15/84. PART OF THAT REPORT WILL DEAL WITH ORGANIZATIONAL REQUIREMENTS OF BOTH THE GON AND USAID TO DEAL WITH THE EMERGENCY WHICH WILL ENTAIL ERCAD USG RESPONSE BEYOND IMMEDIATE FOOD AID.

3. BASED ON USAID TEAM DISCUSSIONS TO DATE, WE ANTICIPATE THAT MANAGEMENT UNIT OF NOT LESS THAN THREE INDIVIDUALS REPORTING DIRECTLY TO THE D/DIR WILL BE NEEDED TO SUPPORT THE LEVEL OF ASSISTANCE COORDINATION/MONITORING/REPORTING REQUIRED. WE SEE TWO OF THESE POSITIONS AS BEING PRIMARILY P.L. 480 DISTRIBUTION MONITORING AND IND-USE CHECKING PLUS ONGOING FIELD ASSESSMENT/REPORTING. THE THIRD POSITION WOULD BE THAT OF OVERALL COORDINATOR OF THE EMERGENCY PROGRAM FOR THE MISSION COMPRISING BOTH THE P.L. 480 RELIEF FOOD DISTRIBUTION, NUTRITION, MEDICAL AND OTHER SUPPORT FOR DISPLACED PERSONS AND COORDINATION OF USG ASSISTANCE VIA PVO/U.N. AGENCIES.

4. MISSION HAS ALREADY CIRCULATED PE SCOPES FOR PSC FOOD MONITORING POSITIONS (SEE REF NIAMEY 0505), AND WILL BE PREPARING SPAR TO ESTABLISH A POSITION FOR A USEE SENIOR PEP/DISASTER COORDINATOR POSITION THIS

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6. OTHER DONOR INFORMATION

ALL THE INFORMATION WE HAVE CONCERNING DONOR AID IS CONTAINED IN TABLE 2. THIS REFLECTS DONOR COMMITMENTS EXPECTED TO ARRIVE WITHIN THE NEXT THREE TO SIX MONTHS.

7. COMMERCIAL PURCHASES/OTHER INPUTS

OUR ESTIMATE OF COMMERCIAL PURCHASES IS 100,000 MT. OF CEREALS CROPS (NOT INCLUDING RICE). OPVN IS SCHEDULED TO PURCHASE AN ESTIMATED 25,000 MT. OF CEREALS. THIS IS BASED UPON OBSERVATIONS IN MARADI AND ZINDER OF CEREALS PURCHASED IN NIGERIA AND BY THE PRIVATE SECTOR FROM ALL SOURCES. THERE HAS BEEN EXTENSIVE INTEREST BY THE PRIVATE SECTOR IN PURCHASING RED AND YELLOW SORGHUM AND CORN FROM U.S. AND EUROPEAN SOURCES. THE FULL EXTENT OF THESE PURCHASES IS HARD TO EVALUATE AT THIS TIME BUT MISSION HAS OBSERVED THAT THE GON POLICY OF ELIMINATION OF IMPORT TAXES AND THE UNRESTRICTED ISSUANCE OF IMPORT LICENCES FOR CEREALS (EXCEPT RICE) HAS GREATLY STIMULATED CEREALS IMPORTS. ALTHOUGH THE BORDER IS STILL OFFICIALLY CLOSED BY NIGERIA AND THERE REMAINS A GREAT DEAL OF UNCERTAINTY FOR FUTURE IMPORTS, THERE ARE DAILY SHIPMENTS OF MILLET, SORGHUM AND OTHER FOOD PRODUCTS ACROSS THE BORDER WHICH COULD TOTAL 100,000 MT WITHIN THE NEXT EIGHT MONTHS.

8. CONCLUSION

TOTAL FOOD AVAILABLE IS ESTIMATED AT 869,403 MT. USING AN ESTIMATE OF 250/200 KGS/PERSON/YEAR, THE DEMAND FOR FOOD WOULD BE 1,433,000 MT FOR A DEFICIT OF ABOUT 563,600 MT. USING AN ESTIMATE OF 175/205 KGS/PERSON/YEAR, THE DEMAND FOR FOOD WOULD BE 1,199,000 MT FOR A DEFICIT OF ABOUT 330,000 MT.

9. POST COMMENT: IN LINE WITH TRADITIONAL USG FOOD ASSISTANCE PRACTICES, NIAMEY'S DISASTER RELIEF POLICY TEAM RECOMMENDS THAT THE USG CONTRIBUTE A MINIMUM OF 25% OF THIS DEFICIT, OR 85,000 TONS OF GRAIN. THIS IS IN ADDITION TO THE 15,000 TONS ALREADY COMMITTED. WE WISH TO SENSITIZE WASHINGTON THAT FFP SHOULD USE A MINIMUM ASSISTANCE FIGURE FOR NIGER IN THE AMOUNT OF 100,000 TONS.

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2. IDENTIFICATION OF THE CROP YEAR

IN NIGER THE CROP YEAR FOR MILLET AND SORGHUM PARALLELS THE RAINY SEASON. PLANTING GENERALLY TAKES PLACE AFTER THE FIRST SUBSTANTIAL RAINS, USUALLY IN LATE MAY AND JUNE, AND HARVESTING TAKES PLACE ROUGHLY 80 TO 100 DAYS LATER IN SEPTEMBER AND OCTOBER. THIS YEAR, WITH THE LONG DRY PERIOD IN JUNE AND JULY MANY AREAS WERE RE-PLANTED UP TO FIVE TIMES WITH THE LATEST PLANTINGS REPORTED IN ZINDER AS LATE AS SEPTEMBER 9TH.

3. PRODUCTION ESTIMATES

AIID/NIAMEY AGRONOMISTS ESTIMATES FOR GROSS PRODUCTION FOR 1984 ARE PRESENTED IN TABLES 1 AND 2. THE DEPARTMENTAL ESTIMATES ARE BASED ON ESTIMATES FOR EACH ARRONDISSEMENT. THE NATIONAL PRODUCTION IS ESTIMATED TO BE 44 PERCENT OF LAST YEAR'S PRODUCTION, OR ABOUT 741,000MT. OF MILLET AND SORGHUM. IT IS VERY DIFFICULT TO ESTIMATE THE DIETARY IMPORTANCE OF NON-CEREAL FOODS WHICH CAN BE USED AS REPLACEMENT OF CEREALS. PEOPLE IN SEVERAL AREAS HAVE BEEN REPORTED EATING WILD PLANTS, BUT THIS IS NOT A DESIRABLE SUBSTITUTE FOR MILLET. THE GOVERNMENT IS STRONGLY ENCOURAGING OFF-SEASON PRODUCTION OF VEGETABLES, POTATOES AND MANIOC, BUT THERE ARE NO ESTIMATES OF THE EXTENT OF PRODUCTION POSSIBLE. MILLET MUST, OF COURSE, BE BALANCED IN THE DIET WITH FRUITS, MILK PRODUCTS, MEAT AND VEGETABLES, ALL OF WHICH ARE IN SHORT SUPPLY AT THIS TIME EXCEPT FOR MEAT.

4. GRAIN STOCKS

OFFICIAL OPVN STOCKS ON HAND AS OF 10/10 WERE 61,000 MT. WHICH INCLUDES 31,000 MT STABILIZATION STOCKS AND 30,000 MT OF RESERVE STOCKS. OUR ESTIMATE OF ON-FARM STORAGE IS VERY SPECULATIVE. IN MOST AREAS THE ON-FARM STOCKS HAVE ALREADY BEEN DEPLETED. WE ARE ESTIMATING THAT IN THOSE AREAS THAT HAD GOOD HARVESTS LAST YEAR THERE REMAINS ROUGHLY 10,000 MT BUT IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT THIS IS PROBABLY A HIGH ESTIMATE AND IS FOR THE HIGHER PRODUCTION AREAS.

5. LOGISTICS

SEE SEPTEL.

TABLE 2: 1984 FOOD BALANCE SHEET IN NIGER (METRIC TONNES)

	MT	BALANCE
1984 ESTIMATED GROSS PRODUCTION:	741000	741000
LESS: 15 PERCENT FOR SEEDS AND - LOSSES	111150	629850
PLUS: OPVN STORAGE ON HAND 10/10/84:	61000	690850
- OPVN PURCHASES	25000	751850
- ON FARM STORAGE	10000	725850
- COMMERCIAL IMPORTS (INCLUDING - NIGERIA, ETC.)	100000	825850
- DONOR AID		
- CEE	4450	
- USAID	15000	
- PAM	6603	
- CANADA	0	
- RFA	5000	
- FRANCE FOOD	2500	
- SEEDS	1000	
- BELGIUM	-	
- NETHERLANDS	10000	
- OTHERS		
TOTAL DONOR AID:	44553	
TOTAL FOOD AVAILABLE (LESS L*1000 SEEDS)		869403
CEREAL FOOD NEEDS BASED UPON 200/250 KG:		
-	1433000	
FOOD BALANCE (DEFICIT)		-563597
CEREAL FOOD NEEDS BASED UPON 175/205 KG:		
-	1199000	
FOOD BALANCE (DEFICIT)		-329597

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- A. POP (1984 EST) -UUU-;
- B. CEREAL FOOD NEEDS (000'S MT) BASED UPON GON ESTIMATES
- OF 200 KG/YR/PERSON FOR URBAN AND PASTORALISTS AND
- 250 KG/YR/PERSON FOR AGROPASTORALISTS;
- C. CEREAL FOOD NEEDS 175/205 (000MT) BASED UPON 175KG/
- YR/PERSON FOR URBAN AND PASTORALISTS AND 205KG/YR/
- PERSON FOR AGROPASTORALISTS, AID/W ESTIMATE;
- D. 1983 REPORTED GROSS PRODUCTION (000MT) M EQUAL
- MILLET; S EQUAL SORGHUM; T EQUAL TOTAL (MILLET AND
- SORGHUM);
- E. 1984 EST CEREALS PRODUCTION AS PERCENT OF 83
- PRODUCTION;
- F. 1984 ESTIMATED PRODUCTION (000MT);
- G. 1984 FOOD BALANCE (F-B) (000MT) BASED UPON 200/250
- H. 1984 FOOD BALANCE (F-C) (000MT) BASED UPON
- 175/205.

- SOURCES: COL. A, RECENSEMENT AGRICOLE AU NIGER, 1980
- (ADJUSTED TO 1984);
- COL. D, SERVICE DEPARTEMENTAL AGRICOLE
- DE NIAMEY;
- DOL. E, USAID/NIAMEY ESTIMATES WEIGHTED BY
- ARRONDISSEMENT.

TABLE 1: FOOD SITUATION IN NIGER AS OF OCTOBER 12, 1984

DEPT.	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H
NIAMEY								
U AND P	1,225	245	214	339	M			
AGROPAS	238	60	49	32	S			
TOTAL	1,462	304	263	370	T	40 PER	148	-156 -115
DOSSO								
U AND P	81	16	14	269	M			
AGROPAS	740	185	152	23	S			
TOTAL	821	201	166	292	T	55PER	161	- 41 - 5
TAHOUA								
U AND P	243	49	42	184	M			
AGROPAS	916	229	188	123	S			
TOTAL	1,158	277	230	307	T	34 PER	104	-173 -126
MARADI								
U AND P	165	33	29	267	M			
AGROPAS	984	246	202	85	S			
TOTAL	1,149	279	231	353	T	55 PER	194	- 85 - 37
ZINDER								
U AND P	238	48	42	259	M			
AGROPS*AS	972	243	199	97	S			
TOTAL	1,211	291	241	356	T	37 PER	132	-159 -109
DIFFA								
U AND P	78	16	14	6	M			
AGROPAS	113	28	23	1	S			
TOTAL	191	44	37	8	T	20 PER	2	- 42 - 35
AGADEV								
U AND P	182	36	32	0	M			
AGROPAS	0	0	0	1	S			
TOTAL	182	36	32	1	T	60 PER	1	- 36 - 31
COCA***								
TOTAL	6,175	1433	1199	1687		44 PER	741	-692 -45***
TOTAL	6,175	1433	1199	1687		44 PER	741	-692 -458

(U AND P MEANS URBAN AND PASTORALISTS.)

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POPULATION ESTIMATES ARE ADJUSTED FOR GROWTH AT THE RATE OF 2.77 PERCENT PER YEAR TO THE PRESENT. TWO ESTIMATES OF CEREAL FOOD NEEDS ARE PRESENTED, ONE BASED UPON THE GON ESTIMATES OF 250 AND 200 KG/PERSON/YEAR, AND THE OTHER BASED UPON REDC**RECOMMENDATION IN THE DOCUMENT, PL480 FOOD AID NEEDS ASSESSMENT FOR NIGER, JUNE 1984, AID/W. THIS REPORT RECOMMENDS 205 KG/PERSON/YEAR FOR AGROPASTORALISTS AND 175 KG/PERSON/YEAR FOR PASTORALISTS AND URBAN DWELLERS.

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 AID 10/16/84
 DIR:PBENEDICT
 ADO:TOLSON/APS:FRVIGIL:AS
 AMB DCM AID CHRON***
 ADO:LJEPSON, D/DIR:JSNYDER, DRO:DMAXWELL
 AMB DCM AID CHRON

AMEMBASSY NIAMEY
 SECSTATE WASHDC, IMMEDIATE
 AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN
 AMEMBASSY BAMAKO
 AMEMBASSY BANJUL
 AMEMBASSY DAKAR
 USMISSION GENEVA
 AMCONSUL KADUNA
 AMEMBASSY LOME
 AMEMBASSY LAGOS
 AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
 AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT
 AMEMBASSY OUAGADOUGOU
 AMEMBASSY PARIS
 AMEMBASSY PRAIA
 AMEMBASSY ROME

[Handwritten signature]
 DIR:PB
 ADO:TOJ
 APS:PBV
 ADO:*[Handwritten initials]*
 D/DIR:JS
 DRO:DM

AIDAC Niamey 0625J

AID/W FOR AF/AFR EDELMAN, AFR/SWA, AFR/DP, FVA/FFP;
 SECSTATE FOR OFDA, AF/W; ABIDJAN FOR REDSO/WCA;
 PARIS FOR SCHOONOVER AND CLUB/SLOCUM; GENEVA FOR DWYER/
 CARTWRIGHT; ROME FOR FODAG, PASS TO FAO/WFP.

E. O. 12356: N/A

SUBJECT: FOOD SITUATION REPORT NO. 4 AS OF OCTOBER 12,
 - 1984, FOOD PRODUCTION AND DEFICIT INFORMATION
 - FOR NIGER.

REF: (A) STATE 289716, (B) STATE 301802.

.. .. RESPONSE TO REFTEL (A) USAID/NIAMEY HAS PREPARED
 THE FOLLOWING TWO TABLES TO PRESENT OUR BEST ESTIMATES
 OF THE CURRENT FOOD SITUATION IN NIGER. OUR ESTIMATES
 OF PRODUCTION ARE BASED UPON ONS*-SITE VISITS; PROJECT
 OFFICER REPORTS, CONSULTANT REPORTS, INTERVIEWS WITH
 DEPARTMENTAL LEVEL AND MINISTRY LEVEL GON OFFICIALS AND
 OFFICIAL PRODUCTION RECORDS OF LAST YEAR'S PRODUCTION.

Annex D

Classified Cables

Niamey 5707

Niamey 5708 -- Deepening Effects of Drought

Niamey 6127 -- Request for Drought Impact in Northern Nigeria

THE IMPACT LIKELY TO SHOW UP IN 1985 IN THE ABSENCE OF FOOD AID. FOR THE LIVESTOCK SUBSECTOR, THE DROUGHT IMPACT IN TERMS OF RURAL INCOME COMES FROM THE TERMS OF TRADE AND THE LOSS OF ANIMALS THROUGH DEATHS. THE GUESSTIMATES OF THE EFFECT ON GDP DUE TO REDUCTION IN HERD SIZE RANGE FROM 20 TO 30 PERCENT OR ABOUT 24 to 30 BILLIONS CFA FRANCS. THE TOTAL EFFECT ON THE GDP IS PROJECTED TO BE 52 - 81 BILLIONS CFA FRANCS (OR ABOUT 8 - 12 PERCENTAGE POINTS OF 1983 GDP).

(B) INCOME DISTRIBUTION. THE INCREASE IN INCOME INEQUALITY IS DUE TO THE TWO FACTORS. FIRST, THE DROUGHT AFFECTS THE REGIONS IN THE COUNTRY DIFFERENTLY. SECOND, THE DIFFERENT EFFECTS OF DROUGHT ON THE PRICE OF LIVESTOCK AND GRAIN. THE TERMS OF TRADE (WITHIN THE SUBSISTENCE ECONOMY) OF LIVESTOCK VIS-A-VIS GRAIN, WILL ALSO DECLINE BECAUSE OF THE INCREASE IN GRAIN PRICE AND DECREASE IN LIVESTOCK PRICE. THE RELATIVELY FORTUNATE FARMERS WHO HAVE ANY SALEABLE SURPLUSES AND THE MERCHANTS INVOLVED IN THE TRADE WILL BENEFIT FROM THE GENERAL SHORTAGE, IF GRAIN PRICES IN NIAMEY AND OTHER CONSUMING CENTERS INCREASE; INCOME OF HERDERS WILL BE MOST AFFECTED BY THE DROUGHT IN RELATIVE TERMS.

LIBERALIZATION BECAUSE OF THE DROUGHT. HOWEVER, SINCE VERY LITTLE IS KNOWN ABOUT UNRECORDED TRADE, THE SITUATION DESCRIBED HERE IS AT BEST A PARTIAL PICTURE.

4. THE DECLINING LIVESTOCK EXPORT EARNINGS DUE TO THE DETERIORATION OF ITS TERMS OF TRADE WILL INCREASE ITS TRADE DEFICIT. BASED ON AVAILABLE DATA FOR THE FIRST NINE MONTHS, LIVESTOCK AND LIVESTOCK PRODUCTS EXPORTS FOR 1984 ARE PROJECTED TO BE ABOUT 15 BILLIONS CFA FRANCS. THIS REPRESENTS A REDUCTION OF ROUGHLY 6 BILLIONS CFA FRANCS IN EXPORT EARNINGS (OR 30 PERCENT OF LAST YEAR EXPORT EARNINGS FROM LIVESTOCK AND LIVESTOCK PRODUCTS). IF THE DROUGHT CONTINUES THE RATE OF DECLINING EXPORT EARNINGS FROM LIVESTOCK AND LIVESTOCK PRODUCTS WILL INCREASE AT AN INCREASING RATE AND THE DECLINE IN LIVESTOCK EXPORT EARNINGS WILL BE EVEN MORE PRONOUNCED DUE TO THE LOWER CAPITAL STOCK TO BEGIN WITH. ANOTHER AGRICULTURAL EXPORT ITEM WHICH IS AFFECTED BY THE DROUGHT IS COWPEAS. ITS CONTRIBUTION TO EXPORT EARNINGS IN 1983 WAS 4 BILLIONS CFA FRANCS. FROM CASUAL OBSERVATIONS, ESTIMATES OF 1984 COWPEA CROP RANGE FROM 50 TO 75 PERCENT OF 1983 PRODUCTION LEVEL. IF THE ESTIMATE OF 75 PERCENT IS USED AND ASSUMING NO CHANGE IN ITS EXPORT PRICE (WHICH IN SOME WAY COMPENSATE FOR THE HIGHER PRODUCTION ESTIMATE—75 INSTEAD OF 50 PERCENT), THE REDUCTION IN EXPORT EARNINGS FROM COWPEAS IS 1 BILLION CFA FRANCS. ON THE IMPORT SIDE, THE TRADE DEFICIT WILL BE LARGER BECAUSE OF THE INCREASE IN FOOD AID (OF ABOUT 150,000 TONS); BUT THIS WILL BE OFFSET BY THE EQUIVALENT INCREASE IN THE UNILATERAL TRANSFERS ACCOUNT AND HENCE NO EFFECT ON THE NET POSITION OF THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS. BECAUSE OF THE FINANCIAL CONSTRAINT, THE OFFICIAL IMPORTS OF GRAIN FOR WHICH THE GOVERNMENT HAS TO PAY IS NOT LIKELY TO BE HIGHER, ALTHOUGH OFFICIALLY UNRECORDED IMPORTS FROM NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES, PARTICULARLY FROM NIGERIA, THROUGH PARALLEL MARKETS ARE LIKELY TO BE LARGER. THE LATTER IS HOWEVER FINANCED BY PRIVATE SHORT-TERM CAPITAL FLOWS AND CONSEQUENTLY HAS NO EFFECT ON THE OVERALL BALANCE OF PAYMENTS SITUATION. BASED ON THE ABOVE ESTIMATES AND ANALYSIS, IT APPEARS THAT THE OVERALL BALANCE OF PAYMENTS DEFICIT WOULD BE APPROXIMATELY 7 BILLIONS CFA FRANCS (OR 15 MILLIONS DOLLARS) LARGER BECAUSE OF THE DROUGHT; AND IT IS MOSTLY DUE TO DECLINING EXPORT EARNINGS FROM THE DETERIORATION OF THE TERMS OF TRADE IN LIVESTOCK.

5. RURAL INCOME. THE DROUGHT WILL HAVE TWO EFFECTS ON RURAL INCOME. IN ADDITION TO THE OBVIOUS REDUCTION OF THE OVERALL LEVEL OF RURAL INCOME, IT WILL ALSO INCREASE INCOME INEQUALITY.

(A) LEVEL OF INCOME. IN TERMS OF CONVENTIONAL GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT (GDP), THE REDUCTION OF MILLET AND SORGHUM PRODUCTION BY 56 PERCENT (SEE REFS. B AND C) REPRESENTS A DECREASE BETWEEN 26 - 45 BILLION CFA FRANCS FROM THE 1983 LEVEL. THE RANGE DEPENDS ON IMPUTED VALUE (USUALLY SOME AVERAGES OF PRICES) OF MILLET AND SORGHUM. TWO PRICES WERE CHOSEN BASED ON OBSERVATIONS OF MARKET PRICES BETWEEN SEPTEMBER AND EARLY OCTOBER 1984. FOR MILLET THEY ARE 120 - 150 CFA FRANCS PER KILOGRAM; AND FOR SORGHUM 90 - 110 CFA FRANCS. THESE PRICES SHOULD BE LOWER AS THE NIGER GRAIN MARKETING BOARD (OPVN) RELEASES ITS GRAIN FROM RESERVES AND AS FOOD AID AND IMPORTS COME IN. THUS, THE DECREASE OF 45 BILLION CFA FRANCS IN GDP SHOULD BE CONSIDERED AS THE UPPER LIMIT. BECAUSE THE CROP YEAR IS DIFFERENT FROM THE CALENDAR YEAR WHICH IS USED FOR NATIONAL INCOME ACCOUNTS, THE EFFECT OF THE DROUGHT ON GDP WILL BE SPREAD BETWEEN THE LATTER HALF OF 1984 AND FIRST HALF OF 1985 WITH MOST OF

ANNEX C

SUBJECT: ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF DROUGHT IN NIGER

REF: (A) STATE 290879 (B) NIAMEY 6253 (C) NIAMEY 5481.

FOR: AFR/DP

1. THIS CABLE PROVIDES PRELIMINARY ESTIMATES OF THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF DROUGHT AS REQUESTED IN REF (A). THEY ARE BASED ON ESTIMATES GIVEN IN REFS. (B) AND (C). THE LIVESTOCK ESTIMATES ARE BASED ON CURRENTLY AVAILABLE STATISTICS COLLECTED BY THE GON. THESE ESTIMATES ARE BASED ON A SMALL SAMPLE AND SIMPLE PROJECTIONS. THEY SHOULD BE USED ONLY AS INDICATION OF GENERAL MAGNITUDE.
2. SAVINGS AND CAPITAL FORMATION. THE DROUGHT WILL CAUSE DISSAVINGS IN THE SUBSISTENCE ECONOMY BY DEPLETING THE GRAIN RESERVES AND THE HERD SIZE. OBSERVATIONS FROM FIELD TRIP REPORTS INDICATE THAT GRAIN STORED IN VILLAGES HAVE BEEN DRAWN DOWN, BUT IT IS NOT KNOWN HOW LOW THE RESERVES IN VILLAGES ARE. WITH THE DRASTIC DROP IN PRODUCTION, THERE WILL BE NO SAVINGS IN TERMS OF GRAIN STORED IN AT THE VILLAGE LEVEL. BASED ON AVAILABLE DATA FROM 1983 AND PRELIMINARY ESTIMATES OF THE FIRST NINE MONTHS IN 1984, THE PROJECTIONS FOR THE TURNOVERS OF LIVESTOCK WHICH ARE OFFICIALLY RECORDED ARE IN THE NEIGHBORHOOD OF 10 PERCENT OF HERD SIZE. ADDING TO THE OFFICIALLY RECORDED TURNOVERS, TURNOVERS WHICH ARE NOT OFFICIALLY RECORDED AND THE LOSS OF CATTLE THROUGH DEATH, THE ESTIMATES ARE IN THE NEIGHBORHOOD OF 20 - 30 PERCENT OF THE HERD SIZE. THIS MEANS THAT IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN THE SAME CAPITAL STOCK (I.E. HERD SIZE IN THIS CASE), THE RATE OF HERD RECONSTITUTION MUST ALSO BE APPROXIMATELY 20 - 30 PERCENT. SINCE IT TAKES TIME TO RECONSTITUTE THE HERD AND THE UNCERTAINTY OF HOW LONG THE DROUGHT WILL LAST, CAPITAL FORMATION IN THE SUBSISTENCE ECONOMY IN TERMS OF LIVESTOCK IS NEGATIVE THIS YEAR AND NET CAPITAL FORMATION IN THE FOLLOWING 1 - 2 YEARS IS ALSO LIKELY TO BE NEGATIVE.
3. TRADE AND BALANCE OF PAYMENTS. SINCE LIVESTOCK IS NIGER'S MAJOR EXPORTS (NEXT TO URANIUM), THE IMPACT OF DROUGHT ON LIVESTOCK AFFECTS NIGER'S EXPORT EARNINGS. PRELIMINARY DATA INDICATED THAT IN TERMS OF OFFICIALLY RECORDED EXPORTS, THE QUANTITY EXPORTED IS APPROXIMATELY 15 PERCENT HIGHER THAN LAST YEAR. THIS IS PARTLY DUE TO ACTIVE GOVERNMENT'S SUPPORT IN DESTOCKING THROUGH TRADE LIBERALIZATION AND PARTLY DUE TO POOR PASTORAL SITUATION SINCE LAST YEAR WHICH ENCOURAGES HERDERS TO SELL THEIR ANIMALS. THE INCREASE IN VOLUME IS HOWEVER MORE THAN OFFSET BY THE DETERIORATING TERMS OF TRADE RESULTING IN DECLINING EXPORT EARNINGS. THE PRICES OFFICIALLY RECORDED SHOW DECLINES RANGING FROM 15 TO 30 PERCENT—MORE IN THE CASE OF CATTLE THAN SMALL RUMINANTS. OBSERVATIONS OF MARKET PRICES IN THE PASTORAL ZONE WHERE THE IMPACT OF THE DROUGHT IS MORE SEVERE INDICATE THAT THE DECLINE IN PRICES ARE MUCH MORE SERIOUS (AS HIGH AS 100 PERCENT FOR CATTLE AND 40 PERCENT FOR GOATS AND SHEEP). THE RANGE OF PRICES IS RELATED TO THE CONDITIONS OF THE ANIMALS. THIS EXPLAINS WHY PRICES OF EXPORTED ANIMALS DECLINE LESS THAN PRICES OF ANIMALS OBSERVED DURING MISSION'S FIELD TRIPS. THE DECLINE IN PRICES OF EXPORTED ANIMALS (ALMOST ALL OF THEM WENT TO NIGERIA) IS DUE MORE TO THE TRADE

7. Amendment

The above terms may be amended upon the request of the GON, with the concurrence of USAID and with the cabled concurrence of AID/W.

Date

For the Government of the United States
of America

Request and acceptance: The assistance described in this Authorization is hereby requested and the terms and conditions of this agreement and of AID Regulation 11, 44 F. R. 34034-45, June 13, 1979, (attached and incorporated herein by reference), except as otherwise specifically provided herein, are hereby accepted.

Date

For the Government of Niger

29IX84

5. Shipping instructions:

- A. Delivery schedule: December 1984, 15,000 MT.
- B. Ports of Discharge: 7,500 MT at Lome, Togo
7,500 MT at Cotonou, Benin
- C. Consignee/Notify Party:
Office des Produits Vivriers du Niger (OPVN)
in the name of the Government of Niger
B.P. XXXXX
Niamey, Republique du Niger
- D. Points of Entry: Niamey for cargo unloaded at Lome,
Dosso for cargo unloaded at Cotonou
- E. Send copies of bills of lading to:
 - 1. One original, one copy, and phytosanitary certificate to consignee via air mail.
 - 2. One original and one copy to accompany cargo.
 - 3. One original, one copy, and phytosanitary certificate to Food for Peace Officer, Niamey (ID), Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.
 - 4. One original, one copy, and one phytosanitary certificate to Regional Food for Peace Officer, Abidjan (ID), Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.
 - 5. One original to AID Transportation Division, Office of Commodity Management, Washington, D.C. 20523, Attention: Ioanna Jackson.

6. Program Objectives, Use of Commodities, and Conditions of Transfer.

The commodity authorized herein is contributed by the United States Government (USG) to the Government of Niger to assist in alleviating the shortage of food caused by drought in Niger.

A. The commodity herein contributed is for free direct distribution to victims of the drought who are unable to purchase their food supplies in the commercial market. The rate of distribution is not to exceed the amount the recipient can consume during the period for which the distribution is made.

B. The USG will supply the commodity contributed herein at no cost to the GON, and the USG will pay for the ocean and inland freight costs to the above designated points of entry in Niger.

C. The GON will pay all internal storage, handling, transport, and distribution costs on the commodity herein provided.

D. The GON will exonerate the commodity from all import, statistical, or other taxes and duties.

E. The GON agrees to keep USAID fully informed concerning the status of commodity receipts and distribution and will provide USAID with reports as requested regarding the same and provide complete details as requested. The GON will permit the USG to audit and have access to all records pertaining to the use of the commodity which is provided under this Transfer Authorization. The GON further agrees to submit to USAID a quarterly report which will include the following:

- 1. Beginning stocks,
- 2. Arrivals,
- 3. Distributions,
- 4. Damaged stocks,
- 5. Ending stocks.

UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION AGENCY

AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

TRANSFER AUTHORIZATION

Program Classification: Trought
Emergency Food Assistance

Transfer Authorization:
AID No. XXX-XXX-000-XXXX

Executive Vice President
Commodity Credit Corporation
U.S. Department of Agriculture
Washington, D.C. 20250

Program Approval Dated:
October 1984

Program Title: Niger Emergency
Food Assistance

In accordance with the provisions of PL 480 Title II (as amended), section 1-201 of Executive Order 12220 and International Development Cooperation Agency Delegation of Authority No. 5 effective June 27, 1980, the Commodity Credit Corporation is hereby authorized to transfer and deliver agricultural commodity to the Government of Niger, hereinafter referred to as the GON, for an amount estimated at U.S. Dols. XXXXXXXXX pursuant to the following instructions.

1. FY 85 Quantity: Metric Tons Not to Exceed:

<u>Previous Total</u>	<u>Increase</u>	<u>Decrease</u>	<u>Total to Date</u>
0	15,000	0	15,000

2. Commodities to be Shipped:

<u>Code</u>	<u>Commodities</u>	<u>Amount (MT)</u>	<u>Estimated Value</u>
045.9015	Sorghum, bagged	15,000	\$2,175,000

3. Estimated Ocean and Inland Transportation Costs: U.S. Dols

All actual ocean and inland transportation expenditures under this program, regardless of the estimate shown above, are to be charged to the blanket freight (transfer authorization) no. An individual ocean freight transfer authorization will not be issued.

4. Specifications:

Sorghum, USDA specifications, U.S. Grade No. 2, in 100 pound bags.

UNCLAS NIAMEY 05053/02

-- 9- TRANSPORT ARRANGEMENTS WITHIN NIGER TO
DISTRIBUTE FOOD AID.

- 10- ACCOUNTING SYSTEM INCLUDING DESCRIPTION OF
DOCUMENTS TO VERIFY: INVENTORIES AT POINTS OF STORAGE,
LOADINGS ON TRUCKS OR OTHER MEANS OF TRANSPORT,
DISCHARGES OF TRUCKS OR OTHER MEANS OF TRANSPORT AT
CENTRAL LOCATIONS AND POINTS OF DISTRIBUTION, AND RECORDS
OF DISTRIBUTION.

- 11- IF COMMODITIES ARE TO BE SOLD: GON
PROCEDURES FOR SALES IN TERMS OF PRICING AND OTHER SALES
CONDITIONS, AND PROCEDURES FOR HANDLING OF PROCEEDS IN
TERMS OF ACCOUNTING, SUB-PROJECT SELECTION, DISBURSEMENT.

- 12- PLAN FOR FOOD MONITORING WITHIN NIGER BY FOOD
MONITORS, INCLUDING AREAS TO BE COVERED, METHODS OF
INSPECTION, COORDINATION WITH GON OFFICIALS BOTH IN NIAMEY
AND IN THE INTERIOR, TRANSPORTATION REQUIREMENTS OF
MONITORS, AND REPORTING TO BOTH USAID AND THE GON IN A WAY
THAT WILL PERMIT GON AND USAID AUTHORITIES TO DEAL WITH
IRREGULARITIES REPORTED BY MONITORS.

- 13- IDENTIFICATION OF ADDITIONAL TECHNICAL
ASSISTANCE REQUIRED TO IMPLEMENT ANY OF THE ABOVE TASKS.

- 2) UPON ARRIVAL OF FOOD, ASSIST GON OFFICIALS IN
IMPLEMENTING THE ABOVE PLAN. THIS SHALL INCLUDE
MONITORING EACH OF ACTIVITIES LISTED ABOVE, OBSERVING EACH
UNLOADING OF AID FOOD FOR NIGER AT PORTS OF DISCHARGE,
AND SUPERVISING FOOD MONITORS.

- 3) REPORTING: THE FOOD SPECIALIST WILL BE REQUIRED
TO PROVIDE FOLLOWING REPORTS/DOCUMENTS:

- A) MULTI-DONOR REPORT: AS SOON AS POSSIBLE UPON
ARRIVAL, WITH WEEKLY OR BIWEEKLY UPDATES. SUBMIT REPORTS
TO AID AND GON.

- B) IMPLEMENTATION PLAN: AS SOON AS POSSIBLE UPON
ARRIVAL SUBMITTED TO USAID, GON AND OTHER CONCERNED
PARTIES, (E.G. PORT OFFICIALS, TRANSIT AGENCIES).

- C) STATUS REPORTS: FIRST REPORT DUE UPON COMPLETION
OF UNLOADING OF FIRST FOOD ARRIVAL AT PORT OF DISCHARGE
WITH WEEKLY REPORTS THEREAFTER. STATUS REPORT SHOULD
INCLUDE INFORMATION ON ARRIVALS AND TRANSIT TO NIGER OF
USAID FOOD AND SIGNIFICANT FINDINGS OF FOOD MONITORING
MCHA.

- D) FINAL REPORT: DUE UPON COMPLETION OF DISTRIBUTION
AT END-USE POINT OF ALL USAID FOOD. THIS REPORT SHOULD
INCLUDE SUMMARY DATA ON THE AMOUNT OF FOOD SHIPPED, THE
AMOUNT RECEIVED, THE AMOUNT OF FOOD LOSSES/DAMAGES AND
CLAIMS OR OTHER ACTIONS TAKEN TO ACCOUNT FOR THESE LOSSES/
DAMAGES.

E. THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF FOOD MONITOR(S) WILL BE:

UNCLAS NIAMEY 05683/02

- 1) TO REPORT TO THE FOOD RELIEF SPECIALIST. THEY WILL RECEIVE INSTRUCTIONS FROM HIM REGARDING AREAS TO BE COVERED, METHODS OF INSPECTION, CONTACTS WITH LOCAL OFFICIALS, REPORTING PROCEDURES AND SCHEDULED TRIPS TO INTERIOR.

- 2) TO TRAVEL TO DISTRIBUTION POINTS AND WAREHOUSES IN NIGER TO OBSERVE, INSPECT, AND REPORT BACK TO THE FOOD RELIEF SPECIALIST, USAID AND THE GON THEIR FINDINGS ON INLAND TRANSPORT, STORAGE, DISTRIBUTION AND/OR SALES OF P.L. 480 FOOD. SPECIFIC RESPONSIBILITIES SHALL INCLUDE BUT NOT BE LIMITED TO:

UNCLAS NIAMEY 05683/02

UNCLAS NIAMEY 02693/03

SUBJECT: NIGER - EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY IN EMERGENCY

- A) OBTAINING COPIES OF WAREHOUSES RECORDS AT POINTS OF ENTRY IN NIGER.
- B) COMPARING SUCH RECORDS WITH ACTUAL DELIVERIES.
- C) VERIFYING DISTRIBUTION AT DISTRIBUTION CENTERS
- D) IF SALES ARE INVOLVED, CARRYING OUT SPOT CHECKS OF SALES OPERATIONS.
- E) INSPECTING WAREHOUSING/STORAGE FACILITIES FOR P.L. 480 FOOD.
- F) REPORTS: MONITORS WILL SUBMIT REPORTS UPON COMPLETION OF EACH TRIP TO THE INTERIOR OR, IF IN NIAMEY ONCE EVERY WEEK ADVISING THE FOOD RELIEF OFFICER TO THEIR FINDINGS.
- 3) TO TRAVEL OUTSIDE OF NIGER AS REQUIRED TO ASSIST FOOD RELIEF SPECIALIST.

3. DESIRED REQUIREMENTS.

- A) FOR FOOD RELIEF SPECIALIST:
 - 1) LANGUAGE: FRENCH S3 R3, FSI RATED.
 - 2) 2 YEARS EXPERIENCE MANAGING EMERGENCY FOOD AID IS DESIRED; MINIMUM OF ONE YEAR.
 - 3) EXPERIENCE WITH TRANSPORTATION, WAREHOUSING, FOOD STORAGE/ACCOUNTING, AND/OR GRAIN DISTRIBUTION IS DESIRED.
 - 4) ACCOUNTING OR INVENTORY EXPERIENCE WOULD BE USEFUL.
- B) FOR FOOD MONITORS:
 - 1) LANGUAGE: FRENCH S3 R3, FSI RATED.
 - 2) 2 YEARS OF DEVELOPMENT EXPERIENCE IN WEST AFRICA IS DESIRED.
 - 3) EXPERIENCE IN TRANSPORTATION, WAREHOUSING, FOOD STORAGE/ACCOUNTING, AND/OR GRAIN DISTRIBUTION IS DESIRED.
 - 4) ACCOUNTING, INVENTORY EXPERIENCE WOULD BE USEFUL.

4. MISSION PRESENTLY PLANS TO EMPLOY ALL ABOVE POSITIONS UNDER A PERSONAL SERVICES CONTRACT ARRANGEMENT STARTING IN OCTOBER 84 AT SOONEST AND COVERING AN 12-MONTH PERIOD FOR THE FOOD RELIEF SPECIALIST AND A 12-MONTH PERIOD FOR MONITORS. DETAILED TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF CONTRACT WILL BE FORWARDED UPON SELECTION OF CANDIDATES.

UNCLAS NIAMFY 05693/03

5. MISSION WILL BE GLAD TO ANSWER ANY QUESTION FROM POTENTIAL CANDIDATES.

6. FOR USAID/NOVA/CROTT: PLEASE SEND HAND-CARRIED BY NEXT TRAVELER TO NIAMFY OR SEND BY POUCH THE LISTING OF CANDIDATES WHO RESPONDED TO A SIMILAR REQUEST LAST YEAR, OR FOOD MONITORING/MANAGEMENT OF EMERGENCY FOOD AID.

7. FOR REDSO/WCA/REFPO: REQUEST REFPO OR EQUIVALENT TRY LATE SEPTEMBER/EARLY OCTOBER FOR ONE WEEK TO CROSSOVER WITH OFLA REPRESENTATIVE TOY TO PERMIT JOINT ANALYSIS OF EMERGENCY SITUATION. PLEASE ADVISE.

CASEY

BT

#5693

NNNN

UNCLAS NIAMFY 05693/03

1739

UNCLASSIFIED

NIAMEY 05481

NOV 12

VZCZCNMI *
 RR RUEHC RUEHAB RUTABO RUEHJL RUTADS RUFHGV
 RUTAKA RUEHOS RUTAND RUFHOA RUFHOC RUFHFR
 RUFHPR RUEHRO
 DE RUEHNM #5481/01 : 257 **
 ZNR UUUUU ZZH
 R 131317Z SEP 84
 FM AMEMBASSY NIAMEY
 TO RUEHC / SECSTATE WASHDC 7108
 RUEHAB / AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN 7668
 RUTABO / AMEMBASSY BAMAKO 4541
 RUEHJL / AMEMBASSY BANJUL 0995
 RUTADS / AMEMBASSY DAKAR 5295
 RUFHGV / USMISSION GENEVA 1241
 RUTAKA / AMCONSUL ADUNA 0523
 RUEHOS / AMEMBASSY LAGOS 0094
 RUTAND / AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA 0519
 RUFHOA / AMEMBASSY NOUAKHOTT 1739
 RUFHOC / AMEMBASSY OUAGADOUGOU 8358
 RUFHFR / AMEMBASSY PARIS 5190
 RUFHPR / AMEMBASSY PRAIA 0594
 RUEHRO / AMEMBASSY ROME 1165
 BT
 UNCLAS NIAMEY 05481

CLASS: UNCLASSIFIED
 CHRG: AID 09/11/84
 APPRV: DIR: PLENEDICT
 DFTD: ASP/AEO: RYIGI/T
 N: OGD
 CLEAR: ADO: LJEPCON
 D/D: JSNYLFR
 DISTR: AME EUM AID CERO

AIDAC

AI/VW FOR AA/APR EDELMAN, AFR/SWA, AFR/UP, FVA/FPF;
 SECSTATE FOR OFDA; ABIDJAN FOR REDSO/WCA; PARIS FOR
 SCHOONOVER AND CLUE/SLOCUM; GENEVA FOR DWYER/CARTWRIGHT;
 ROME FOR FODAG, PASS TO FAO/WFP

E.O. 12356: N/A

SUBJECT: FOOD SITUATION REPORT NO. 3, AS OF AUGUST 20,
 1984, FOOD PRODUCTION AND DEFICIT INFORMATION

REF: A) NIAMEY 24309, B) NIAMEY 24740, C) STATE 242817,
 D) NIAMEY 04353, E) 53 NIAMEY 0534, F) STATE 203325

1. SUMMARY: AGRO-PASTORAL CONDITIONS IN NIGER AS OF
 AUGUST 20, 1984 CONTINUE TO DETERIORATE. CUMULATIVE
 RAINFALL THROUGH AUGUST 20 IS ABOUT 54 PERCENT OF THE
 THIRTY-YEAR AVERAGE FOR THE SAME TIME PERIOD IN THE
 MAJOR CROP PRODUCING AREAS. OUR MOST OPTIMISTIC ESTIMATE
 FOR CEREAL CROP PRODUCTION IF REMAINDER OF THE SEASON
 HAS OPTIMAL RAINFALL IS 50 PERCENT
 OF LAST YEAR'S PRODUCTION, OR 716,000 MT WHICH MEANS A
 CEREALS DEFICIT OF 745,000 MT. OUR LEAST OPTIMISTIC
 ESTIMATE FOR CEREAL CROP PRODUCTION IF SEASON CONTINUES
 TO LACK RAINFALL IS 15 PERCENT OF LAST YEAR'S PRODUCTION,
 OR 215,000 MT FOR A CEREALS DEFICIT OF 1,246,000 MT.
 PASTORAL CONDITIONS ARE EVEN MORE SERIOUS WITH LARGE
 NUMBERS OF LIVESTOCK AND SMALL RUMINANTS DEAD OR DYING
 AND PEOPLE MOVING SOUTH FROM THE PASTORAL ZONE TO ZINDER,
 MARADI, NIAMEY AND OTHER AREAS. FOOD STOCKS AT OPVN
 (THE NATIONAL FOOD AGENCY), AS OF AUGUST 20 WERE ABOUT
 30,000 METRIC TONS AND THEY ARE SELLING CEREALS AT THE
 RATE OF 20,000 MT PER MONTH. OPVN HAS LIMITED THE

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COMING OF GRAIN SOLD AT ITS CENTERS TO PAY FOR
 PRIMARY AND 2.5 MT/PAY FOR SECONDARY POINTS OF DISTRIBUTION.
 THE LIMIT PER FAMILY IS 5 MT/MT. ON SEPTEMBER 3
 THE GOV. IS EXPECTED TO CLOSE ALL OPEN DISTRIBUTION POINTS
 SOUTH OF THE NATIONAL HIGHWAY AND REDUCE MAXIMUM MONTHLY
 SALES TO 10,000 MT. THE GOV. CALLED A MEETING OF LEADERS
 ON SEPTEMBER 31 TO DISCUSS THE SITUATION AND INVITED
 THE LEADERS TO PRESENT ESTIMATES OF DEFICITS UPON WHICH TO
 MAKE REQUESTS FOR FOOD AID. FAC/NIAC ADVISED THAT
 GOULD REQUEST A MULTIMILION Pkg-500 TONS TO HAVE AN
 ASSESSMENT BY THE END OF SEPTEMBER. THE GOV'S OFFICIAL
 REQUEST FOR FOOD AID WILL FOLLOW THE REPORT OF THE MULTI-
 LEADER TEAM EXPECTED DURING THE FIRST HALF OF OCTOBER.
 ALTHOUGH THERE IS ALWAYS A POSSIBILITY THAT THE GOV. COULD
 MAKE INDIVIDUAL BILATERAL APPEALS IN AID OF THIS DATE.
 AND SUPPORT.

2. RAINFALL CONDITIONS: TABLE 1 PRESENTS CUMULATIVE
 RAINFALL DATA IN MILLIMETERS IN THE MAJOR CROPS PRODUCTION
 REGIONS. COLUMN 1 SHOWS THE CUMULATIVE RAINFALL IN MM
 THROUGH AUGUST 28 THIS YEAR. COLUMN 2 SHOWS THE THIRTY-
 YEAR AVERAGE (1953 TO 1982) THROUGH AUGUST 28 AND COLUMN
 3 SHOWS 1984 DATA AS A PERCENTAGE OF THE THIRTY-YEAR
 AVERAGE. TABLE 2 COMPARES THE RAINFALL FROM JUNE 1 TO
 AUGUST 29 FOR 1983 AND 1984. THIS TABLE GIVES AN IDEA OF
 THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE RAINFALL BECAUSE THE MAJORITY OF
 THE CROPS ARE PLANTED AFTER JUNE 1ST. THE 1983 SEASON
 WAS CHARACTERIZED BY ADEQUATE JUNE AND JULY RAINS WITH A
 DRY PERIOD DURING 1 AUGUST. IN spite of this the
 rains were heavy, resulting in only a 10% deficit in
 the region. THIS SHOWS THE IMPORTANCE OF JUNE AND JULY RAINS
 IN THIS REGION. THE LACK OF RAINFALL HAS BEEN OBSERVED
 IN THE INTENSITY OF THE STORMS AND THE PAGES DISTRI-
 BUTED. MOST STORMS HAVE BEEN IN THE 10-20 MM RANGE WITH
 ONLY ONE AS MUCH AS 15 MM OR ABOVE. CONSEQUENCE AS THIS
 OCCURRED IN THE TOP SURFACE OF THE SOIL IS THAT THE
 RAINS THAT ALLOWED THE MOISTURE INTO THE LOWER SOIL
 LAYER. SOAK FREQUENCY HAS ALSO BEEN VERY HIGH IN
 SEVERAL OTHER REGIONS OFTEN GOING UP TO 30 DAYS
 BETWEEN RAINS.

CUMULATIVE RAINFALL IN MM
 IN MAJOR CROPS PRODUCTION AREAS

TABLE 1

UNCLAS 02 OF * NIAMEY 05491

FILINGUE	151	231	55
NIAMEY	173	372	15
SAY	189	337	53
DCSSC			
DCSSC	157	344	37
SAYA	257	334	80
TAHOUA			
BIRNI N'KONNI	230	231	114
ECUZA	119	199	60
DEITA	94	242	39
TAHOUA	170	167	101
MA'ADI			
MA'RAFI	213	239	74

UNCLAS 02 OF * NIAMEY 05491

AID

SECRET FOR OFDA; AMEMB FOR GENEVA; PARIS FOR
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE; CLUB/SILOON; GENEVA FOR DWYER/CARTER/RIGHT;
ROME FOR FORAS, PASS TO CAO/WEP

F.O. 12356: N/A
SUBJECT: FOOD SITUATION REPORT NO. 5, AS OF AUGUST 22,

STATIONS 198 AS OF AUG. 20 FALL AS
PCT OF
30-YEAR
AVERAGE

VIA

STATION	198	AS OF AUG. 20	FALL AS PCT OF 30-YEAR AVERAGE
TILLAMOOK	115	225	63 PCT
SILINGUA	172	332	44
NIANBY		321	53
			64
			97
			59
			53
			77
			30
			32
			69
PARADI	243	394	62
ZINDA			
	143		53
	211		60
	17		3
	14		17

APPROX: 54 PERCENT
AS OF AUGUST 22, 1984/85

DEPARTMENTS/ STATIONS
JUNE 1-30, 1984
JUNE 1-30, 1984
1984 DATA
EXRESSED AS
PERCENTAGE
OF 1984 DATA

17 PCT

UNCLAS SECTION 23 OF * NIAMEY 05481

TOTAL 1431912 1461046 - 29234
(1) L^o SAREL, 24 OCTOBER 1983.

2/ GROSS PRODUCTION LESS 15 PCT FOR LOSS, SEEDS, ETC.

TABLE 4 1984 MOST OPTIMISTIC CEREALS PRODUCTION ESTIMATE
(50 PCT OF 1983 NET PRODUCTION)

DEPARTMENT	MOST OPTIMISTIC ESTIMATE	CEREALS NEEDS 1/	CEREALS BALANCE
DIFEA	3278	48000	- 42722
ZINDER	151340	255295	-134955
AGADEZ	500	29000	- 28500
TACHUA	129456	231036	-152580
MARADI	149527	277715	-127888
NIAMEY	157443	333783	-176340
DCSSC	121064	208717	- 82654

UNCLAS SECTION 23 OF * NIAMEY 05481

AIDAC

AID/W FOR AA/APR EDELMAN, A/R/SWA, APR/DP, FVA/FFJ;
 SECSTATE FOR OFDA; ABICJAN FOR MEDSO/WCA; PARIS FOR
 SCHOONOVER AND CLUB/SLOCUM; GENEVA FOR DWYER/CARTWRIGHT;
 RCME FOR YODAG; PASS TO FAC/FFP

E.O. 12356: N/A

SUBJECT: FOOD SITUATION REPORT NO. 3. AS OF AUGUST 24

ZINDER

MAGARIA	228	304	75
ZINDER	222	217	102
TANOUT	15	58	25
GOURE	41	194	21

AVERAGE: 64 PERCENT

3. CROP CONDITIONS: INFORMATION FROM ALL SOURCES BOTH FORMAL AND INFORMAL, INCLUDING STAAF AND CONTRACTOR VISITS IN THE RURAL AREAS, OTHER DONORS, AID PROJECT OFFICER SITE VISITS, RESEARCHERS WITH ON-FARM TRIALS AND GON SURVEY TEAMS, INDICATES A SERIOUS SHORTFALL IN MILLET AND SORGHUM PRODUCTION THIS YEAR. TABLE 3 SHOWS LAST YEAR'S NET PRODUCTION (GROSS PRODUCTION LESS 15 PERCENT FOR LOSS, SEEDS, ETC), THE FOOD NEEDS BASED ON POPULATION AND 250 AGS CEREALS FOR RURAL AND 230 AG CEREALS FOR URBAN AND NOMADS) AND THE FOOD BALANCE. THIS WAS TAKEN FROM THE OFFICIAL GON NEWSPAPER, LE SAHEL, FOR 24 OCTOBER, 1983, AND SHOWS A CEREALS DEFICIT LAST YEAR OF ABOUT 30,000 TONS. TABLE 4 IS OUR MOST OPTIMISTIC ESTIMATE FOR CEREAL CROP PRODUCTION IF THE REMAINDER OF THE SEASON HAS OPTIMAL RAINFALL. THIS IS FIFTY PERCENT OF LAST YEAR'S PRODUCTION. USING THE SAME FOOD NEEDS AS IN 1983, THE ESTIMATED CEREALS DEFICIT IS ABOUT 740,200 TONS. OUR LEAST OPTIMISTIC ESTIMATE IS SHOWN IN TABLE 5 AND ASSUMES 15 PERCENT OF LAST YEAR'S PRODUCTION WHICH MEANS A CEREALS DEFICIT OF 1,240,000 TONS. IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT THERE IS TREMENDOUS VARIATION IN PLANT SIZE AND DEVELOPMENT THROUGHOUT THE NATION, WITH SOME AREAS REPLANTED FOR THE THIRD OR FOURTH TIME AS LATE AS AUGUST 16TH WHILE THE PLANTS IN OTHER AREAS ARE HADDED OUT AND NEARLY MATURE, THOUGH STUNTED. UNDER THE BEST OF CONDITIONS FOR THE REST OF THE SEASON WE ESTIMATE ONLY 50 PERCENT OF LAST YEAR'S HARVEST.

TABLE 3 NIGER 1983 CEREALS PRODUCTION AND NEEDS 11

DEPARTMENT	1983 NET 2/ PRODUCTION	1983 CEREALS NEEDS	1983 CEREALS BALANCE
DIFFA	6555	46000	- 39445
ZINDER	302679	286295	16384
AGADEZ	1000	29000	- 28000
TAROUA	258912	281538	- 22624
MARADI	299653	277715	21933
NIAMEY	314826	333793	- 18897
DOSSO	248127	205717	41112

AIDAC .

AID/W FOR AA/AFR EDELMAN, AFR/SWA, AFR/DP, FVA/FFP;
 SECSTATE FOR OFDA; ABIDJAN FOR REDSO/WCA; PARIS FOR
 SCHOENOVER AND CLUB/SLOCUM; GENEVA FOR DWYER/CANTWRIGHT;
 ROME FOR FODAG, PASS TO FAO/WFP

E.O. 12356: N/A
 SUBJECT: FCOB SITUATION REPORT NO. 3, AS OF AUGUST 20,

TOTAL 715906 1461046 -745140

1/ SAME AS 1983 NEEDS. DOES NOT ACCOUNT FOR POPULATION
 GROWTH.

TABLE 5: 1984 LEAST OPTIMISTIC CEREALS PRODUCTION
 - ESTIMATE (15 PERCENT OF 1983 NET PRODUCTION)

DEPARTMENT	LEAST OPTIMISTIC ESTIMATE	CEREALS NEEDS 1/	1984 CEREALS BALANCE
DIYA	583	36000	-45017
ZINDER	45402	286295	-240893
AGADEZ	150	29000	-28850
TAHOUA	38837	281536	-242699
MARADI	44948	277715	-232767
NIAMEY	47233	333793	-286550
DOSSO	57219	206717	-169498
	0		
TOTAL	214772	1461046	-1246274

=
 1/
 - SAME AS 1983 NEEDS. DOES NOT ACCOUNT FOR POPULATION
 GROWTH.

4. LIVESTOCK CONDITIONS: BECAUSE OF THE DROUGHT IN THE
 EASTRAL ZONE LAST YEAR (HEATEL E) THIS IS PERHAPS THE
 HARDEST HIT AREA. WHILE CATTLE AND SMALL RUMINANTS HAVE
 BEEN SEEN DEAD BY THE ROAD, IT IS NEARLY IMPOSSIBLE TO
 ESTIMATE THE LOSS BY DEATH BECAUSE THERE HAS BEEN MUCH
 MIGRATION OF BOTH HERDER AND SEDENTARY POPULATIONS AND
 THEIR ANIMALS TO THE SOUTH AND DESTOCKING THROUGH SALES.
 ONE GOOD INDICATOR OF THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE SITUATION IS
 THE PRICES LIVE ANIMALS ARE FETCHING. IN THE TAHOUA AREA
 CATTLE ARE BEING SOLD FOR FCFA 1,500, CAMELS FOR 5,000 AND
 SHEEP FOR 500. THIS COMPARES WITH 1982-83 PRICES OF
 100,000 FCFA FOR CATTLE, 110,000 FCFA FOR CAMELS AND
 21,000 FCFA FOR SHEEP. AT THE SAME TIME A HUNDRED KILO-
 GRAM SACK OF MILLET COSTS FCFA 25,000. THIS MEANS IT
 TAKES OVER 16 CATTLE TO BUY ONE SACK OF MILLET THIS YEAR
 IN THE TAHOUA AREA. PRICES IN OTHER AREAS VARY BUT THE
 TREND IS THE SAME. ANOTHER INDICATOR IS THE MIGRATION OF
 SEDENTARY PEOPLE OUT OF THE AREA. GON/USAID STAFF OF THE
 LIVESTOCK PROJECT REPORT WHOLE VILLAGES IN THE PROJECT
 ZONE HAVE BEEN VACATED.

5. OPVN STOCKS: TABLE 6 SHOWS THE STOCK SITUATION

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UNCLAS SECTION 24 OF * NIAMEY 05481

REPORT BY CPVN AS OF AUGUST 20, 1991 BY DEPARTMENT.
THIS SHOWS STABILIZATION STOCKS AT 29,345 MT AND RESERVE
STOCKS (MILLET) AT 31,120 MT FOR A TOTAL OF NEARLY 60,000
METRIC TONS (ESTIMATE AS OF 9/2/84 AT 70,000 MT). THIS
COMPARES WITH A TOTAL OF 99,286 MT AS OF 31 JULY AND
REPORTS THAT OPVN IS SELLING THEIR STOCKS AT A RATE OF
ABOUT 20,000 METRIC TONS PER MONTH. CPVN REPORTS THAT IT
HOPE TO HOLD 60,000 METRIC TONS AT HARVEST TIME TO KEEP
IN RESERVE UNTIL THE NEW CROP RUNS OUT. TO DO THIS OPVN

UNCLAS SECTION 24 OF * NIAMEY 05481

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UNCLAS SECTION 45 OF * NIAMEY 05491

AIDAC

AID/W FOR AA/APR REELMAN, AIR/SWA, APR/DP, SVA/WFP;
SFCSTATE FOR OPDA; ABILJAN FOR REDSO/WCA; PARIS FOR
SCTOCNOVER AND CLU/SLOCUM; GENEVA FOR DWYSE/CARTWRIGHT;
FCMS FOR FODAS, PASS TO FAO/WFP

I.O. 12358: N/A

SUBJECT: FOOD SITUATION REPORT NO. 3, AS OF AUGUST 20,

HAS LIMITED THE QUANTITY OF GRAIN SOLD AT ITS CENTERS TO
- MT/DAY FOR PRIMARY AND 2.5 MT/DAY FOR SECONDARY POINTS
OF DISTRIBUTION. THE LIMIT PER FAMILY IS 5 KG/DAY. ON
AUGUST 9 THE GOV IS EXPECTED TO CLOSE ALL OPVN DISTRIBUTION
POINTS SCUPH ON THE NATIONAL HIGHWAY AND REDUCE
MAXIMUM MONTHLY SALES TO 10,000 MT.

TABLE 6 STOCK SITUATION AT OPVN AS OF AUGUST 20, 1984
(IN METRIC TONS)

DEPT.	(A) RESERVE STOCKS	STABILIZATION STOCKS (B)				(C)
	(MILLET)	(MILLET)	(SORGHUM)	(RICE)	(OTHER)	(TOTAL)
NIAMEY	2,200	4,942	3,274	1,030	4,305	15,952
BOUSS	3,595	1,161	2,844	2,162	939	10,701
BAROUA	1,242	753	2,314	350	2,694	8,173
BARADI	10,337	2,270	4,357	1,221	1,052	19,247
ZINDO	14,127	4,370	3,307	320	1	22,525
MOSSA	0	528	187	122	0	837
MOZ	0	142	3,550	52	129	3,873
TOTAL	31,100	14,215	20,118	5,097	9,727	80,746

TOTAL STABILIZATION STOCKS - 49,646

(A) RESERVE STOCKS ARE MILLET ONLY STORED FOR EMERGENCY
FOOD SHORTAGES.

(B) STABILIZATION STOCKS ARE VARIOUS FOOD PRODUCTS BOUGHT
AND SOLD BY OPVN TO REDUCE PRICE FLUCTUATIONS AND STABILIZE
THE PRICE.

(C) OTHER - IMPORTED RICE - 7,517
 - CORN - 415
 - WHEAT FLOUR - 1,296
 - WHEAT BRAN - 452
 - POWDERED MILK - 37

5. COOPERATION WITH DONORS: USAID CONTINUES TO LEAD
IN COORDINATING WITH THE OTHER DONORS. ON SEPTEMBER 5,
THE REGULAR TECHNICAL MEETING OF DONORS HELD BY USAID/ADC
FOCUSED ON THE CURRENT AGRICULTURAL SITUATION. THE
GENERAL CONCLUSIONS WERE CONSISTENT WITH THIS CALL.
USAID PLANS ANOTHER DONOR TECHNICAL-LEVEL MEETING
ON THE END OF SEPTEMBER TO SHARE INFORMATION AND
ESTIMATES OF PRODUCTION DEFICITS.

RESPONSE OF THE GOV: ON AUGUST 31 THE GOV CALLED

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UNCLAS SECTION 26 OF 06 NIAMEY 25441

AIDAC

AID/W FOR AA/AFR EDELMAN, AFR/SWA, AFR/DP, EVA/FFP;
SECSTATE FOR ONDA; ABIDJAN FOR REDSO/PCA; PARIS FOR
SCHOCNVER AND CLUB/SLOCUM; GENEVA FOR DWYER/CARTWRIGHT.
RCME FOR FODAC, PASS TO SAC/NEP

E.O. 12356: N/A

SUBJECT: FOOD SITUATION REPORT NO. 3, AS OF AUGUST 20

OCTOBER.

CASEY

UNCLAS SECTION 26 OF 06 NIAMEY 25441

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VZCZCNMI
 CC RUEEC RUEHAE RUTAFU ROTADS RUFHGV RUFHPC
 RUTAND RUFROU RUFHOC RUFHFK RUFHRO
 DE RUFHNM #05540701 255 **
 ZNR UUUUU ZZE
 C 141500Z SEP 84
 FM AMEMBASSY NIAMEY
 TC RUEEC / SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7131
 INFO RUEHAE / AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN 7573
 RUTAFU / AMEMBASSY BAKAHO 4649
 RUTALS / AMEMBASSY DAKAR 5507
 RUFHGV / USMISSION GENEVA 1248
 RUFHPC / AMEMBASSY LOME 5438
 ROTAND / AMEMBASSY NIJAMENA 0525
 RUFROU / AMEMBASSY NOUAKHOTT 1744
 RUFHOC / AMEMBASSY OUAGADOUGOU 8348
 RUFHFK / AMEMBASSY PARIS 8201
 RUFHRO / AMEMBASSY ROME 1171
 BT
 UNCLAS NIAMEY 05540

CLASS: UNCLASSIFIED
 CHANGE: 11/03/20/24
 APPROV: DIR: PEP/ELICA
 DRAFT: GDO: LMA/ELL/D/LIP: J
 SNIDER: CG
 CLEAR: ADC: IJEPSON
 PROG: ALESSPOLIN
 CROBERTSON
 LISTR: AME LOM AID CAROM

AILEC
 SECSTATE FOR OFDA: T.NIGHT, PVA/FFP; ABIDJAN FOR
 REDSC; GENEVA FOR DWYRE/CARTWRIGHT; ROME FOR FOFAG,
 PASS VFP/FAO; PARIS FOR OECD/FELL
 P.O. 12350: N/A

SUBJECT: OFDA ASSISTANCE TO NIGER EMERGENCY
 REF: A) STATE 256167, B) STATE 248123, C) NIAMEY 4853,
 - D) NIAMEY 5064, E) STATE 266077
 1. MISSION DEFINITELY APPRECIATES OFFER OUTLINED
 REFTEL (A) TO ASSESS DEFICITS AND DEVELOP RECOMMEN-
 DATIONS FOR U.S. ASSISTANCE FOR 1984-85 EMERGENCY IN
 ADDITION TO COMPLETING MISSION DISASTER RELIEF PLAN.
 MISSION DESIRES TEAM IMMEDIATELY. PLEASE ADVISE ETA
 ASAP SO THAT WE CAN CLEAR WITH GON AND ASSURE
 AVAILABILITY OF APPROPRIATE NIGERIAN PERSONNEL.
 2. SPECIALIST PROPOSED REFTEL (E) ROBERT L. ADAMS WILL BE
 WELCOME. WE REQUEST THAT HE BEGIN A THREE TO FOUR WEEK
 TLY O/A SEPTEMBER 24. WE EXPECT OFDA WILL PREPARE HIS
 SCOPE OF WORK, TO INCLUDE AT MINIMUM THE FOLLOWING:

- A. ADVISE MISSION ON ACTIONS TO TAKE TO PREPARE OUR
 - INFORMATION BASE AND STAFFING TO ACTIVELY
 - PARTICIPATE IN MAJOR MULTI-DONOR DROUGHT RELIEF
 - EFFORT.
- B. PREPARE PLAN OF ACTION FOR LOGISTICAL SUPPORT
 - FOR SHIPMENT AND IN-COUNTRY DISTRIBUTION OF
 - FOOD SUPPLIES, INCLUDING GRAIN AND OTHER FOOD
 - SUPPLIES REQUIRED TO MAINTAIN ADEQUATE NUTRITION
 - LEVELS.
- C. ADVISE AND PARTICIPATE WITH MISSION PERSONNEL IN
 - DISCUSSIONS WITH GON OFFICIALS REGARDING ESTA-
 - BLISHMENT OF A DROUGHT RELIEF ORGANIZATION (SEE
 - PARA 3 BELOW).

- D. DRAFT CABLES AND ADMINISTRATIVE DOCUMENTS AS APPROPRIATE TO OBTAIN NECESSARY INFORMATION AND TO INITIATE ACTIONS REQUIRED BY THE MISSION FOR A DROUGHT RELIEF PROGRAM, AND PROVIDE SPECIFIC ADVICE ON MISSION FOLLOW-UP ACTIONS.
 - E. WORK WITH GON OFFICIALS AS APPROPRIATE AND AS DIRECTED TO OBTAIN INFORMATION REQUIRED BY THE MISSION AND TO REVIEW PLANS FOR A DROUGHT RELIEF EFFORT.
 - F. OBTAIN NECESSARY INFORMATION IN CEFA/WASHINGTON REGARDING REGIONAL (WEST AFRICA) DROUGHT RELIEF EFFORT AND POSSIBLE CONSTRAINTS DUE TO LIMITED PORT FACILITIES RESULTING FROM MAJOR REGIONAL DROUGHT RELIEF PROGRAM, AND ADVISE MISSION OF ALTERNATIVE TRANSPORTATION ROUTES.
 - G. PARTICIPATE IN FOOD GRAIN DEFICIT ASSESSMENT ACTIVITY, AS APPROPRIATE.
 - H. ASSIST IN COORDINATION WITH OTHER DONORS REGARDING FOOD AID QUANTITIES AND LOGISTICAL SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS.
5. RE RETEL (A) PARA 3 QUESTION, MISSION BELIEVES THAT EVOLVING SITUATION WILL REQUIRE MORE THAN CURRENT CON AD-HOC RESPONSE. THEY MAY NEED TO ESTABLISH, IN FACT, AN EMERGENCY ORGANIZATION. TO DATE, GON HAS PREFERRED TO HANDLE FOOD RELIEF UNDER EXISTING SYSTEM. GIVEN POTENTIAL HEALTH/FEEDING REQUIREMENTS, IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO EXPLORE SCENARIOS WHICH COULD PROVIDE COORDINATED LEADERSHIP IF SUBSTANTIAL RELIEF EFFORTS ARE REQUIRED. WE WILL REQUEST SPECIFIC ADVICE FROM TEAM ON HOW TO RECOGNIZE DECISION POINTS ON LEVEL OF USAID/GON/OTHER DONOR STAFF EFFORT REQUIRED DURING ASSESSMENT PROCESS.
4. WE DO ANTICIPATE NEED FOR NEAR-TERM NUTRITION AND HEALTH ASSESSMENT WITH ASSISTANCE FROM CDC DESCRIBED RETEL (E). BELIEVE ONDA ASSESSMENT TEAM WILL BE USEFUL IN DETERMINING TIMING/COORDINATION REQUIREMENTS FOR CDC UNIT. WE ARE ALSO BEGINNING TO DISCUSS NUTRITION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS WITH MINISTRY OF HEALTH TO PREPARE FOR HEALTH ASSESSMENT PROGRAM.

UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 02 NIAMEY 00012

ALLAC

SECSTATE FOR CFDA: TANIGHT, FVA/FFP; ABIDJAN FOR
FEDSO; GENEVA FOR DWYER/CARTWRIGHT; ROME FOR POLG,
PASS #FF/FAC; PARIS FOR OECI/FELL
I.O. 12356: N/A

SUBJECT: CFDA ASSISTANCE TO NIGER EMERGENCY

5. MISSION ALSO WELCOMES PARTICIPATION OF INDIVIDUAL ON
TEAM TO UPDATE AND COMPLETE A MISSION DISASTER RELIEF
PLAN.
CASBY

UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 02 NIAMEY 00012

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UNCLASSIFIED
RE: NIGER / AMEMBASSY NIAMEY
TO: NIAMEY / AMEMBASSY NIAMEY 0301
INFO: NIAMEY / AMEMBASSY NIAMEY 0301
SUBJECT: NIGER / AMEMBASSY NIAMEY 0301
BT
UNCLAS CLASSY 0301

CLASS: UNCLASSIFIED
INFO: NIAMEY / AMEMBASSY NIAMEY 0301
AFF: NIAMEY / AMEMBASSY NIAMEY 0301
OFF: NIAMEY / AMEMBASSY NIAMEY 0301
CLEAR: NIAMEY / AMEMBASSY NIAMEY 0301
D/IN: NIAMEY / AMEMBASSY NIAMEY 0301
E/IN: NIAMEY / AMEMBASSY NIAMEY 0301
LIST: NIAMEY / AMEMBASSY NIAMEY 0301

AIDAC

FOR REDSC/WCA ABILJAN

E.O. 12858: N/A

SUBJECT: NIGER GRAIN SUPPLY

REF: NIAMEY 030292

1. NIGER DELAYED RESPONSE NIGER'S ABILITY TO PROVIDE EMERGENCY SORGHUM TO CHAD AND MALI WAS DUE PRIMARILY TO ITS HIGH LEVEL OF GRAIN STOCKS FROM EXTRAORDINARILY LARGE DOMESTIC GRAIN PURCHASES IN 1982/83. 1983'S HARVEST WAS FAIR, BUT NIGER STILL HAS A 52,000 MT DEFICIT IN TOTAL CEREALS PRODUCTION. COMPARED TO MOST OTHER COUNTRIES IN THE REGION, NIGER HAD RELATIVELY WELL DISTRIBUTED RAINS IN 1983, ALTHOUGH SOME AREAS IN THE PAST WERE HIT BY DROUGHT. NIGER WAS ABLE TO MAKE UP THE DEFICIT WITH ITS LARGE RESERVES.

2. NIGER'S RELATIVE ABUNDANCE OF FOOD GRAIN EARLIER THIS YEAR WAS DUE TO SEVERAL FACTORS IN ADDITION TO RAINFALL PATTERNS. ALTHOUGH NIGER HAS LITTLE LAND SUITABLE FOR CROPEA PRODUCTION COMPARED WITH MOST SAHELIAN COUNTRIES, CON PRICING POLICIES ENCOURAGE CROPEA PRODUCTION. THE OFFICIAL PURCHASE PRICES FROM FARMERS ARE AMONG THE HIGHEST IN THE SAHEL FOR MILLET (CURRENTLY 22 FCFA/LG), PADDY RICE (25 FCFA/LG), UNSHELLED GROUNDNUTS (20 FCFA/LG), AND UNGINNED TOP GRADE COTTON (120 FCFA/LG). ALTHOUGH THE CON USUALLY DOES NOT DECLARE PRICES UNTIL HARVEST TIME THE HISTORY OF HIGH PRICES OFFERED IN RECENT YEARS DO ACT AS AN INCENTIVE TO FARMERS TO GROW AND SELL THEIR CROPS. THE HIGH PRICES ALSO ATTRACT NIGERIAN SORGHUM FROM THE SOUTH. (NIGER'S MILLET IS ALMOST NEVER EXPORTED). NIGER'S COWPEAS (NIEBE) ARE A MAJOR EXPORT TO NIGERIA AND ARE PART OF A SERIES OF WELL ESTABLISHED TRADE CIRCUITS THAT ALSO INVOLVE THE SHIPMENT OF LIVESTOCK SOUTH WITH GRAIN AND CONSUMER GOODS FLOWING NORTH. SINCE NIEBE AND MILLET ARE USUALLY INTERCROPPED IN THE SAME FIELDS AND COWPEAS ARE MORE EFFICIENT IN FIXING NITROGEN THAN PEANUTS, NIEBE AND MILLET ARE COMPLEMENTARY CROPS, RATHER THAN COMPETING FOR THE SAME LAND. THE COMBINATION OF COWPEA EXPORTS HAS THUS HAD THE RESULT OF

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NIAMEY 0109

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ENCOURAGING FOODGRAIN PRODUCTION.

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1. THE OFFICE DES PRODUITS VIVRIERS DU NIGER (OPVN) IS THE PARASTATAL IN CHARGE OF MAINTAINING A MINIMUM GRAIN STOCK RESERVE FOR NIGER. OPVN BUYS, SELLS, STORES AND DISTRIBUTES GRAIN. A LARGE PARALLEL PRIVATE GRAIN MARKET ALSO EXISTS. IN 1982/83 OPVN PURCHASED, AT HIGH PRICES, LARGE AMOUNTS OF MILLET AND SORGHUM. THE PRICE OFFERED BY OPVN WAS HIGHER THAN THE PARALLEL MARKET PRICE BY A CONSIDERABLE DEGREE AND ATTRACTED GRAIN FROM NIGERIA. WE HAVE NO STATISTICS ON THE AMOUNT OF NIGERIAN GRAIN IMPORTED FIRST INTO THE PARALLEL MARKET, BUT BELIEVE THAT IT WAS SUBSTANTIAL, AND IT ALSO PROBABLY REPRESENTED CONSIDERABLE DEALINGS ON THE PARALLEL FRANC/NAIRA EXCHANGE MARKET. THE END RESULT WAS THE OPVN OVERBOUGHT AND EXHAUSTED ITS FUNDS WHILE THERE WERE STILL SUBSTANTIAL QUANTITIES OF GRAIN AVAILABLE IN THE LOCAL MARKETS AND IN ON-FARM STORAGE.

4. THE URBAN CONSUMER PAYS A RELATIVELY HIGH PRICE FOR GRAIN. OPVN SELLS ITS GRAIN AT A FIXED PRICE (120 FCFA/AG AT PRESENT). THIS PRICE HAS GENERALLY BEEN HIGHER THAN THAT OF THE PARALLEL MARKET. IN A NORMAL YEAR, OPVN'S PRICES ARE THE SAME OR LOWER THAN THOSE OF THE PARALLEL MARKET FOR ONLY THREE OR FOUR MONTHS, DURING TIMES OF SCARCITY. IN 1983, DUE TO LARGE PRIVATELY HELD STOCKS, OPVN'S PRICES REMAINED HIGHER THAN THE PRIVATE SECTOR EVEN DURING THE SOUDURE. THIS CREATED A LARGE CARRY-OVER OF OPVN INTO THE 1983/84 CROP YEAR, SINCE OPVN SOLD RELATIVELY LITTLE GRAIN.

5. SOME OF OPVN'S CEREALS WERE IN STORAGE FOR TWO TO THREE YEARS AND OPVN DESIRED TO ROTATE ITS STOCKS. EMERGENCY FOOD SALES TO CHAD AND MALI HAD PROVIDED A GOOD MEANS OF MOVING GRAIN (SOMETIMES THAT HAD PAID SCRIPY DONORS) THAT HAD BEEN IN STORAGE FOR LONG PERIODS OF TIME. OPVN HAS A VERY HEAVY DEBT BURDEN, PARTIALLY CAUSED BY THE OVERBUYING, AND NEEDS THE CASH GENERATED FROM SALES. THE 1984 RAINS, HOWEVER, HAVE NOT BEEN WELL SPACED AND CONCERN IS RISING ABOUT THE CROP NOW IN THE GROUND.

6. WE ARE PURCHASING COPIES OF THE ELLIOT BERG ASSOCIATES CEREALS MARKETING STUDY AND ANNEX H TO THE AGRICULTURE

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SECTOR DEVELOPMENT GRANT (INSTITUTIONAL AND POLICY
CONSTRAINTS TO AGRICULTURE PRODUCTION IN NIGER)
SOUTHWEST
ET

UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 02 NIAMEY 05169

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VZCZCNMI
 OO RUEHC RUEHAB RUTABO RUEHJL RUTADS RUFHGV
 RUTAAA RUEHOS RUTAND RUFHOA RUFHOC RUEHRO
 DE RUEHNM #4853/01 229 **
 ZNR UUUUU 2ZE
 O 160827Z AUG 84
 FM AMEMBASSY NIAMEY
 TO RUEHC / SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6745
 INFO RUEHAB / AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN 7548
 RUTABO / AMEMBASSY BAMAKO 4597
 RUEHJL / AMEMBASSY BANJUL 0972
 RUTADS / AMEMBASSY DAKAR 5253
 RUFHGV / USMISSION GENEVA 1223
 RUTAAA / AMCONSUL NADUNA 0515
 RUEHOS / AMEMBASSY LAGOS 0073
 RUTAND / AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA 0487
 RUFHOA / AMEMBASSY NGAOUACHOTT 1719
 RUFHOC / AMEMBASSY OUAGADOUGOU 8295
 RUEHRO / AMEMBASSY ROME 1159

BT

UNCLAS NIAMEY 04853

AIDAC

AID/W FOR AFR/SWA, FVA/FFP
 SECSTATE FOR OFDA, PASS AF/W
 ABIDJAN FOR REDSO/WCA
 GENEVA FOR DWYER/CARTWRIGHT
 ROME FOR FODAG, PASS WFP/FAO

E.O. 12356: N/A

SUBJECT: POTENTIAL RELIEF AID EMERGENCY - NIGER

REF: A) NIAMEY 4390, B) NIAMEY 4740, C) NIAMEY 4735
 - NOTAL, D) NIAMEY 4731 (NOTAL)

1. THE PURPOSE OF THIS MESSAGE IS TO ALERT ADDRESSEES TO THE GROWING POTENTIAL FOR EMERGENCY RELIEF ASSISTANCE TO NIGER AS A RESULT OF CONTINUING UNSTABLE CLIMATIC CONDITIONS AND INABILITY TO UTILIZE TRADITIONAL SEASONAL MIGRATION MEASURES BECAUSE OF THE CONTINUING NIGERIAN BORDER CLOSURE. WE BELIEVE THAT SOME FORM OF BOTH FOOD AND NON-FOOD IS GOING TO BE REQUIRED.

2. REFTELS PROVIDE ADDRESSEES WITH NIGER'S 1984 AGRICULTURAL SEASON SITREPS AS OF JULY 7 AND JULY 24. THE SITUATION CONTINUES TO DETERIORATE WITH SPARSE BUT INSUFFICIENT RAINS THROUGHOUT MOST OF THE COUNTRY, ESPECIALLY IN THE PASTORAL ZONE. USAID/GON LIVESTOCK SPECIALISTS COUNTED IN EXCESS OF 138 DEAD ANIMALS (MOSTLY CATTLE) IN ONE 50-KILOMETER STRETCH IN TAGOUA LAST WEEK. IN ADDITION TO SITE VISITS NOTED REFTELS, CONTINUING REPORTS BY RESEARCHERS ON EXPERIMENTAL FARMS AND RESEARCH CENTERS ARE NOW ESTIMATING A 50 PERCENT REDUCTION IN YIELDS DUE TO LACK OF RAINS AND THIS UNDER CONTROLLED CONDITIONS WITH FERTILIZER AND MODERN CULTIVATION PRACTICE.

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CLASS: UNCLASSIFIED
 CHRG: AID 08/18/84
 APPRV: DIR:PEFNEDICT
 DATED: D/D:JSNYDER/ADO:TOI
 ON:LG
 CLEAR: DCM:EMSOUTHWICK
 PROG:AFESSENDTN (DFT)
 GDO:DMAXWYLL(DFT)
 DISTR: AMB DCM AID CHRON

3. WHILE CURRENT GON IN-COUNTRY CEREAL STOCK LEVELS TOTAL 92,000 MT, THEY ARE BEING DRAWN DOWN RAPIDLY WITH THE COMMENCEMENT IN JULY OF NATIONAL LEVEL FOOD SALES. ALL PREVIOUS DONOR STOCKS ON HAND (30,000 MT ESTIMATED) HAVE ALREADY BEEN DISTRIBUTED AND GIVEN PRESENT PROSPECTS, UP TO HALF OF BALANCE OF GON-OWNED COMMERCIAL STOCKS COULD BE DRAWN DOWN THROUGH SALE BY THE BEGINNING OF THE HARVEST SEASON, I.E., END OF SEPTEMBER - MID-OCTOBER. A SERIOUS HARVEST DEFICIT, COUPLED WITH DETERIORATING PASTURE CONDITIONS IN THE LIVESTOCK ZONE, ALONG WITH THE COUNTRY'S GENERALLY DIFFICULT ECONOMIC SITUATION, WILL CLEARLY MEAN THAT INTERNATIONAL DONOR FOOD AND OTHER RELIEF ASSISTANCE WILL BE INDISPENSABLE TO NIGER.

4. ASIDE FROM A SIGNIFICANT CEREAL PRODUCTION DEFICIT, THE COMPLICATING FACTOR IN NIGER AT THIS MOMENT IS THIS PASTORAL ZONE WHERE THERE IS VIRTUALLY NO RANGE GRASS TO THIS DATE. GRASS IS NORMALLY 6 TO 12 INCHES THROUGHOUT, EVEN IN POOR SOIL AREAS. THERE HAS BEEN A MAJOR EXTRAORDINARY MIGRATION SOUTHWARD, ESPECIALLY BY PEUL HERDERS, INTO THE SEDENTARY FARM ZONE WHERE BOTH LIVESTOCK FORAGE AND CEREALS ARE SOUGHT (HERDERS NORMALLY SUPPLEMENT THEIR DIET THIS SEASON WITH CEREALS USUALLY AVAILABLE BY TRADE IN ZONE). NORMAL MOVEMENT FOR MOST, OUTSIDE OF INTERNAL CIRCULATION FOR PASTURE, IS INTO NORTHERN NIGERIA DURING THIS SEASON -- THIS HAS TRADITIONALLY SERVED TO RELIEVE HUMAN AND ANIMAL PRESSURE ON THE ZONE; ANIMALS ARE TRADED NORMALLY FOR CEREAL. CONVERSELY, THIS YEAR, THAT OUTLET IS NOT AVAILABLE AND THE INTERNAL CONCENTRATION OF HERDERS INTO THE FEW ISOLATED GOOD PASTURE AREAS IS OF MAJOR CONSEQUENCE TO THE HERDERS AND OTHERS AND THE COMPETITION IN THE SEDENTARY ZONE IS POTENTIALLY EXPLOSIVE.

5. MISSION IS NOT ABLE AT THIS TIME TO PROVIDE VALID ESTIMATES EITHER OF POSSIBLE DEFICIT OR FOOD/OTHER AID REQUIREMENTS. AS NOTED REF(C), HOWEVER, MISSION HAS ESTABLISHED FOOD MONITORING UNIT TO BOTH COLLECT AND ANALYZE THAT INFORMATION AND TO INITIATE PLANNING FOR PROBABLE USAID COORDINATION OF AN EMERGENCY EFFORT IN CONCERT WITH OTHER DONORS. STEPS TAKEN INCLUDE:

A) BASED ON TARGETED FIELD TRAVEL FOR FIRST-HAND OBSERVATION, INTERCHANGE WITH INTERNATIONAL DONOR COMMUNITY AND GON, MISSION HAS INITIATED BI-WEEKLY

REPORTING ON THE AGRO-PASTORAL CONDITION. THESE REPORTS WILL INCLUDE (1) GENERAL LIVESTOCK AND CRCP SITUATION; (2) RAINFALL; (3) GON FOOD STOCK STATUS; (4) CEREAL AND LIVESTOCK PRICES.

B) A CLOSE, DAILY DIALOGUE WITH GON OFFICIALS, ESPECIALLY THOSE CHARGED WITH MONITORING THE FOOD SITUATION. FYI, THE GON HAS FIELDDED FIVE AGRO-PASTORAL ASSESSMENT TEAMS WHICH WILL BEGIN A NATIONAL SURVEY 8/16/84. AID WILL BE FURNISHED AN IMMEDIATE COPY OF THE RESULTS. END FYI.

C) ESTABLISHMENT OF GENERAL HEALTH AND NUTRITION MONITORING WITH MISSION DRO AND HEALTH OFFICER COORDINATING AVAILABLE DONOR, PVO AND GON DATA. FYI, REF(C) TO AMCONSUL IADUNA AND AMEMBASSY LAGOS FOR IITA, IBADAN, SEEAS INPUT TO THIS PROCESS. END FYI.

D) DONOR COORDINATION. MISSION HAS CALLED MONTHLY INTER-DONOR AGRICULTURAL TECHNICAL EXCHANGE AMONG INTERNATIONAL DONORS. WITH INPUT FAO IS BEING ENCOURAGED TO CONVOLVE GENERAL DONOR MEETING TO DISCUSS FOOD ISSUES. MISSION IS IN CLOSE CONTACT WITH WFP, UNDP AND MAJOR BILATERAL DONORS ON A DAILY BASIS. GON HAS BEEN ADVISED THAT ANY FUTURE USG FOOD RELIEF ASSISTANCE MUST BE COORDINATED WITH OTHER DONORS TO AVOID DUPLICATION.

E) MISSION DRO, FROM SYNTHESIS OS ABOVE INFORMATION, HAS BEGUN ASSESSING GENERAL HUMAN CONDITION, PARTICULARLY IN PASTORAL ZONE WHERE NEITHER PASTURE FOR ANIMALS NOR GENERAL FOOD SUPPORT IS AVAILABLE FOR HERDER POPULATION. BASED ON EVOLVING SITUATION, AND PROBABLE GON REQUEST, MISSION WILL BE PREPARED TO MAKE SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS TO AID/W OFDA AND FFP WITH RESPECT TO LEVEL/TYPES OF EMERGENCY AID AND EMERGENCY TITLE II REQUIREMENTS. NOTE: A MAJOR PROBLEM FOR THE GON IS SUPPORT FOR INTERNAL TRANSPORT AND DISTRIBUTION OF EMERGENCY FOOD AND SUPPLIES. ANY USG ASSISTANCE, EITHER FOOD OR OTHER SUPPLIES, MUST REPEAT MUST CONSIDER SUPPLEMENTARY FUNDS FOR FUEL/OTHER TRANSPORT COSTS.

6. ACTION REQUESTED: (1) MISSION NOW BELIEVES THAT SOME FORM OF BOTH FOOD AND NON-FOOD AID IS GOING TO BE REQUIRED IN NIGER. WE ARE MAKING A CONCERTED AND COORDINATED EFFORT TO DEFINE THAT REQUIREMENT. WE ARE ASKING THAT OFDA AND FFP/FFP IN PARTICULAR BE PREPARED TO CONSIDER AND RESPOND QUICKLY TO GON/MISSION REQUEST WHEN IT IS FORTHCOMING. (2) BY SEPTEL, MISSION HAS REQUESTED OFDA TEAM TO IMMEDIATELY ASSIST WITH FINALIZING MISSION DISASTER PLAN. THAT ASSISTANCE IN TERMS OF GUIDANCE TO BOTH MISSION AND GON WITH RESPECT TO ORGANIZATIONAL NEEDS WOULD BE MOST APPRECIATED AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE. MISSION WOULD LIKE TO RESERVE CALL FOR ANY DISASTER ASSESSMENT TEAM UNTIL A MORE APPROPRIATE MOMENT.

7. ADVISE.
SOUTHWICK
BT
#4853

VZCZCNMI
 RR RUEHC
 DE RUEHNM #4740/01 223 **
 ZNR UUUUU ZZH
 R 101012Z AUG 84
 FM AMEMBASSY NIAMEY
 TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6680
 PT
 UNCLAS NIAMEY 04740

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 CLASS: UNCLASSIFIED
 CHRG: AID 8/9/84
 APPRV: DIR: P BENEDICT
 DRFTD: ADO: TOLSON: AS
 CLEAR: D/DIR: JSNYDER
 ADO: LJPSON
 DISTR: AMB DCM AID CERON

ALDAC

E. O. 12356: N/A

RF

SUBJECT: FOOD SITUATION REPORT NO. 2

REF: NIAMEY 04309

1. SUMMARY: THE AGRO-PASTORAL CONDITIONS IN NIGER AS OF JULY 24TH CONTINUE TO DETERIORATE. A MULTINATIONAL/DONOR TEAM VISITED AREAS IN ZINDER, BAΔIN BIRJI AND MARADI ON JULY 23 AND 24 AND REPORTED LITTLE EVIDENCE OF RAINFALL RESULTING IN CRITICAL PLANT AND ANIMAL SITUATIONS AS WELL AS TRANSHUMANANCE AMONG GROUPS WHICH RARELY MIGRATE, I.E. THE TUAREGS, PUTTING EVEN MORE PRESSURE ON THE LANDS TO THE SOUTH. THE ADO OFFICE HAS ESTABLISHED A FOOD STATUS MONITORING UNIT TO GATHER AND ANALYZE DATA AND INFORMATION CONCERNING THE SUPPLY AND DEMAND OF FOOD AND THE AGRO-PASTORAL CONDITIONS IN GENERAL. RESULTS TO DATE SUGGEST THAT USAID/NIGER SHOULD START PREPARING FOR THE PROBABILITY THAT, AT MINIMUM, SUBSTANTIAL FOOD AID WILL BE NECESSARY IN THE TRADITIONAL PASTORAL AREAS AND THAT THE POTENTIAL EXISTS FOR A SERIOUS REDUCTION IN 1984 FOOD AVAILABILITY IN SELECTED AREAS OF THE COUNTRY IF THERE IS CONTINUED LACK OF RAIN.
 END SUMMARY.

2. A MULTINATIONAL/DONOR TEAM COMPOSED OF REPRESENTATIVES FROM USAID, THE CANADIAN DEVELOPMENT AGENCY AND THE CAISSE CENTRALE DE COOPERATION ECONOMIQUE (FRANCE) VISITED AREAS IN ZINDER, BAΔIN BIRJI AND MARADI ON JULY 23 AND 24, 1984 TO OBSERVE AGRO-PASTORAL CONDITIONS. THIS CABLE IS BASED ON THEIR REPORT.

3. ACCORDING TO THE TEAM THE OVERALL PICTURE OF NEW GROWTH IN THE PASTORAL ZONE WAS DESPAIRING. MOST OF THE GRAZING LAND WAS VOID OF ANY UNDERSTORY WITH THE EXCEPTION OF SMALL, GENERALLY UNPALATABLE SHRUBS. THE ONLY FODDER AVAILABLE ON THE RANGE WAS OF VERY POOR QUALITY, CONSISTING MOSTLY OF ANNUAL GRASSES (CENCHRUS) AND NOXIOUS WEED RARENTS. THE LIVESTOCK DEPARTMENT DIRECTOR IN ZINDER REPORTED THAT CATTLE, SHEEP AND GOATS HAVE MIGRATED INTO THE SOUTHERN SECTORS OF THE ZINDER DEPARTMENT IN LARGE NUMBERS, PUTTING TREMENDOUS PRESSURE ON PASTURE LANDS. MOST OF THE LIVESTOCK OBSERVED BY THE TEAM WERE IN POOR CONDITION AND AT LEAST TWO COWS WERE SEEN DYING AS A RESULT OF STARVATION AND FATIGUE. PASTURE CONDITIONS APPEARED TO BE A LITTLE MORE FAVORABLE

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1. THE IMMEDIATE MARALI AREA, BUT LIVESTOCK WERE ALL IN POOR CONDITION. THE PRICES OF LIVESTOCK ARE DEPRESSED AND EMERGENCY ANIMAL FEED RESERVES ARE EXHAUSTED.

4. AIR OBSERVATIONS FROM NIAMEY TO ZINDER INDICATE THAT ONLY A SMALL PERCENTAGE OF THE AGRICULTURE AREA HAVE ESTABLISHED MILLET OR SORGHUM STANDS ALTHOUGH EARLY JULY RAINS ALLOWED SEEDING TO TAKE PLACE OVER LARGE AREAS. THESE SEEDINGS ARE ONLY NOW EMERGING AND WILL REQUIRE REGULAR AND SUFFICIENT RAINFALL FROM NOW UNTIL THE END OF SEPTEMBER IF A GOOD CROP IS TO BE EXPECTED. THE NORTHERN PARTS OF NIGER'S CROPPING ZONES HAVE YET TO RECEIVE ENOUGH RAINFALL TO ALLOW PLANTING, ALTHOUGH SOME FARMERS HAVE PLANTED DRY SOILS IN HOPES OF RAIN. IN THE SOUTHERN CROPPING ZONES, THE GRAINERY OF NIGER, THE MAJORITY OF FIELDS ARE JUST NOW EMERGING OR HAVE EMERGED WITHIN THE PAST FEW WEEKS. THE TEAM ESTIMATES THAT LESS THAN 15 PERCENT OF THE CROPPING AREA HAS ESTABLISHED STANDS, BETWEEN 40 AND 50 PERCENT IS NEWLY PLANTED WITH CROPS EMERGING OR YET TO EMERGE AND 30 TO 40 PERCENT IS YET TO BE PLANTED.

5. THE TEAMS MOST DISCOURAGING OBSERVATIONS WERE AS FOLLOWS: A) THE HERDERS WERE SELLING THEIR STRONGEST AND HEALTHIEST ANIMALS, THUS DEPLETING THE GENETIC POOL, B) EVEN THE MARKETED ANIMALS WERE WEAK AND IN BAD CONDITION, C) THERE ARE REPORTS OF PEOPLE EATING WEEDS AND WILD PLANTS SUCH AS EUPHORBES AND BOSCHIA SENGALENSIS, A BRUSH SPECIES, D) THE CLOSING OF THE NIGERIAN BORDER HAS HAD AN ADVERSE EFFECT ON THE LIVESTOCK AND GRAIN MARKETS IN NIGER, AND E) MILLET PRICES IN THE NORTHERN CROPPING ZONE ARE HIGH AT 16,000FCFA PER 100 KG SACK, OR ABOUT US DOLS 38. GON PRICES ARE 12,000FCFA PER 100 KG BUT EVEN AT GON PRICES THE PEOPLE CANNOT AFFORD TO BUY GRAIN.

6. IN RESPONSE TO THE CRITICAL SITUATION THE ADO HAS ORGANIZED A FOOD STATUS MONITORING UNIT TO MORE CLOSELY FOLLOW THE AGRO-PASTORAL CONDITIONS AND FOOD NEEDS. THIS UNIT IS HEADED BY THE AGRICULTURAL ECONOMIST WITH THE PROJECT OFFICERS FOR THE LIVESTOCK PROJECT AND THE CEREALS PROJECT AS MEMBERS ALONG WITH ONE FSN MONITOR. THIS UNIT HAS IDENTIFIED SEVERAL KINDS OF DATA AND INFORMATION AS WELL AS SEVERAL FORMAL AND INFORMAL SOURCES OF

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 INFORMATION AND PLANS TO SUBMIT BIWEEKLY REPORTS TO THE MISSION AS EASES FOR THESE REPORTING CABLES.

7. IN ADDITION TO THE TEAM'S FINDINGS, THE DCM AND DEPUTY AID DIRECTOR MET WITH THE GON REP IN CHARGE OF EMERGENCY FOOD AID REQUIREMENTS WHO HAS JUST COMPLETED HIS SECOND NATION-WIDE INSPECTION. BASED ON HIS TWO-WEEK TRAVELS HE CONFIRMED THE TEAM'S VIEWS OUTLINED ABOVE. HE RELAYED GON PRESIDENT MOUNTCHE'S CONCERN OVER THE POOR RAIN CONDITIONS AND RAPIDLY DETERIORATING HUMAN AND ANIMAL CONDITIONS AMONG NOMADIC POPULATIONS. ACCORDING TO HIM THE GON HAS COMPLETED DISTRIBUTION OF ALL PREVIOUSLY DONATED GRAIN HELD IN RESERVE (ESTIMATED AT 30,000 MT) AND WILL NOW BE DISTRIBUTING COMMERCIALY PURCHASED STOCKS AS REQUIRED. THE GON HAS AN ESTIMATED 110,000 MT OF RESERVE AND STABILIZATION STOCKS OF MILLET, SORGHUM AND RICE ON HAND. HE URGED THE US AND OTHER DONORS TO BE AWARE OF THE PROBABLE NEED FOR ADDITIONAL EMERGENCY FOOD AID TO NIGER IF THE DROUGHT CONTINUES. FYI, THIS DIFFERS FROM FIGURES PUBLISHED IN THE SAHEL (142,000 MT) BUT IS CONSISTENT WITH DATA OBTAINED FROM THE DIRECTOR OF OPVN.

8. CURRENT CEREALS PRICES FOR MAY/JUNE SHOW AN INCREASING TREND AND ARE ALREADY 40 TO 50 PERCENT HIGHER THAN LAST YEAR'S PRICES. THESE PRICES ARE AS FOLLOWS:

- PRIX DES CEREALES SUR LES MARCHES
 - MAI 1984

	NIAMEY	DOSSO	TAH.	MARD.	ZIND.	DIR.	AGAD.
MIL OPVN 120F	120F	135F	-	130F	-	125F	
SORGHO CPVN 110F	110F	120F		120F			
MAIS OPVN 100F							80F
RIZ OPVN 170F, 175, 180F, 185F	200F	225F		225F		250F	

NISEE

- JUIN 1984

	NIAMEY	DOSSO	TAH.	MARD.	ZIND.	DIR.	AGAD.
MIL CPVN 120F	125F	125F		115F	150F	130F	150F
SORGHO CPVN 110F	125F			120F	140F	107F	
MAIS	130F			120F	-	100F	100F

UNCLAS NIAMEY 04740/02

OPVN 100F

RIZ
OPVN 170F,
175, 180F,
190F

200F 225F 200F 225F 167F 250F

NIFFE

275F.

SOUTHWICA
BT
#4740

NNNN

UNCLAS NIAMEY 04740/02

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NIAMEY 4309

VZCZCNMI

RR RUEHC RUEBAB RUTABO RUEHJL RUTADS RUEHOS
RUTAND RUEHOC RUEHOC RUEHFR RUEHPR RUEHRO
DE RUEHNM #4309/01. 201 **
ZNR UUUUU ZZR

AGP

R 191526Z JUL 84

FM AMEMBASSY NIAMEY

TO RUEHC / SECSTATE WASHDC 6421
RUEBAB / AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN 7449
RUTABO / AMEMBASSY BAMAKO 4565
RUEHJL / AMEMBASSY BANJUL 0958
RUTADS / AMEMBASSY DAKAR 5218
RUEHOS / AMEMBASSY LAGOS 0051
RUTAND / AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA 0459
RUEHOC / AMEMBASSY NOUAKHOTT 1705
RUEHOC / AMEMBASSY OUAGADOUGOU 8253
RUEHFR / AMEMBASSY PARIS 5715
RUEHPR / AMEMBASSY PRAIA 0574
RUEHRO / AMEMBASSY ROME 1158

CLASS: UNCLASSIFIED
CHRG: AID 07/19/84
APPRV: DIR: PLENNEDICT
DEFTD: AFS: FVIGIL: OLC
CLEAR: A/ADO: JLOWENTHAL;
DIR: JSNYDER
DISTR: AME DCM AIL CHRON

BT

UNCLAS NIAMEY 04309

AIDAC

AID/W FOR AFH/W AND OFDA; ABIDJAN FOR REDSO/WCA;
PARIS FOR SCHOONOVER AND CLUE/FELL; ROME FOR FODAG
PASS FAO/WFA

E.O. 12356: N/A

- SUBJECT: NIGER 1984 AGRICULTURAL SEASON: SITREP NO. 1
- AS OF JULY 7, 1984

1. SUMMARY. BASED ON USAID FIELD ASSESSMENT, THE 1984 CROPPING SEASON HAS THE POTENTIAL FOR BECOMING A DISASTROUS CROPPING YEAR FOR NIGER: BASED ON INTENSIVE THREE-DAY INSPECTION, MISSION AGRICULTURAL OFFICER REPORTS THAT MAJORITY OF THE NIGER ACREAGE HAS ONLY JUST BEEN PLANTED OR IS YET TO BE PLANTED. FAVORABLE MAY RAINS DID NOT CONTINUE INTO JUNE WHICH HAS DELAYED PLANTINGS AND SHORTENED THE 1984 CROPPING SEASON. CONTINUED RAINS FROM NOW THROUGH SEPTEMBER WILL BE NEEDED IF NIGER IS TO AVOID LARGE CEREALS DEFICITS. END SUMMARY.

2. GENERAL ASSESSMENT. USAID/NIGER ESTIMATES THAT BY JULY 7 ONLY ABOUT 10 PERCENT OF THE MILLET GROWING ACREAGE HAS ESTABLISHED STANDS. THE MAJORITY OF THE STANDS SHOWED DROUGHT STRESS, WITH EVIDENT LEAF CURLING. ISOLATED POCKETS IN THE WESTERN PART OF THE COUNTRY, PRIMARILY IN DOSSO DEPARTMENT, SHOWED NORMAL DEVELOPMENT AND GROWTH. VERY LITTLE PULSE CROP (PEANUTS AND COWPEAS) WAS OBSERVED.

THE EASTERN TWO THIRDS OF THE COUNTRY, WHICH INCLUDES NIGER'S TRADITIONAL GRAIN BASKET, HAS VIRTUALLY NO CROP GROWTH AT THIS TIME. RANGE AND ANIMAL CONDITIONS ARE EXTREMELY POOR WITH CATTLE SUFFERING THE MOST, FOLLOWED BY SHEEP AND GOATS. FORAGE RESOURCES ARE VIRTUALLY

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NOW EXISTENT AND THE ANIMAL POPULATION IS SURVIVING BY EATING BRUSH AND TREES.

3. RAINFALL. IN THE TABLE BELOW, COLUMN I REPRESENTS CUMULATIVE 1984 RAINFALL AMOUNTS REPORTED BY VARIOUS STATIONS THROUGH JUNE 30, 1984. COLUMN II REPRESENTS THE 30 YEAR AVERAGE FOR THE SAME PERIOD, COLUMN III REPRESENTS THE 1981-1983 AVERAGE AS OF JUNE 30 AND COLUMN IV REPRESENTS THIS YEAR'S PERCENTAGE OF THE 30 YEAR AVERAGE.

STATION	COLUMN I (MM)	COLUMN II (MM)	COLUMN III (MM)	COLUMN IV (PERCENT)
AGADEZ	1.5	21	35	7
FIRNI LONNI	171	109	101	157
DIFFA	3	32	21	9
GAYA	164	211	149	73
LCSSO	146	123	137	118
FILINGUE	50	84	50	59
MAGARIA	54	96	61	56
MARADI	40	98	59	41
N'GUIGMI	2	15	18	13
NIAMEY AIRPORT	111	119	159	93
NIAMEY VILIE	107	120	122	89
QUALLAM	74	87	68	85
TAHOUA	59	83	50	71
TILLABERY	56	96	49	58
ZINDER	17	69	48	24

ALTHOUGH THE DATA SHOWS A FEW STATIONS ARE ABOVE THEIR 30 YEAR AVERAGE IT DOES NOT SHOW THE DISTRIBUTION PATTERNS. EARLY RAINS CAME IN MAY 1984, BUT THERE WAS VIRTUALLY NO RAINFALL IN JUNE IN THE MAJORITY OF THE STATIONS. THE RAINS ENCOURAGED EARLY PLANTING BUT IN THE ABSENCE OF FOLLOW UP PRECIPITATION, PLANT GROWTH WAS NOT SUSTAINED. RAINFALL IN 1984 HAS ALSO BEEN LOCALIZED WITH FEW GENERAL RAINS. AS A RESULT EVEN WHEN REPORTING STATIONS SHOW ADEQUATE RAINFALL TOTALS, LITTLE OR NO RAIN COULD HAVE BEEN RECEIVED A FEW KM FROM THE STATION. RAINFALL DATA AS OF JUNE 30 FOR 1981-83, WHEN NIGER WAS VIRTUALLY GRAIN SELF-SUFFICIENT, DOES NOT SHOW SIGNIFICANT TOTAL RAINFALL DIFFERENCES, FROM 1984, IN MOST IMPORTANT GRAIN GROWING REGIONS. THE MAIN DIFFERENCES HAS BEEN THE

NON-EXISTING JUNE 1984 RAINS. IN ORDER FOR NIGER TO HAVE AN AVERAGE CROP YEAR, WIDELY DISPERSED RAINS WILL BE NEEDED ON A CONTINUAL BASIS FROM NOW UNTIL MID-SEPTEMBER, A SITUATION WHICH APPEARS UNLIKELY AT THIS TIME.

4. CROP CONDITIONS. TAHOUA, MARADI, ZINDER DEPARTMENTS: THESE DEPARTMENTS REPRESENT THE PRINCIPAL GRAIN GROWING REGIONS IN NIGER (SIXTY PERCENT OF NIGER'S 1983 CEREALS CROP). DURING THE FIRST WEEK OF JULY THESE DEPARTMENTS WERE TRAVERSED AND ONLY ISOLATED POCKETS OF MILLET WERE OBSERVED. AREAS UP TO ONE HUNDRED KM LONG DID NOT HAVE ANY MILLET OR ANY OTHER CROP GROWTH. THESE AREAS HAD YET TO BE PLANTED OR WERE JUST BEING PLANTED/REPLANTED. TRACKS OF EARLIER PLANTINGS OR FIELD WORK WERE NOT READILY EVIDENT. LOCALIZED RAINS WERE RECORDED JULY 5 THROUGH THE 7TH WHICH PERMITTED SEEDING/RESEEDING TO BEGIN IN LARGE AREAS. DUE TO THE LATENESS OF THE PLANTINGS, SEED OF SHORT SEASON VARIETIES ARE IN HIGH DEMAND.

NIAMEY DEPARTMENT: APPROXIMATELY 25 PERCENT OF CROPPING AREA PLANTED. CROP DEVELOPMENT IN PLANTED FIELDS SEVERAL WEEKS BEHIND THIS TIME LAST YEAR. THIS DEPARTMENT PRODUCED 22 PERCENT OF THE 1983 CEREALS CROP.

DOSSO DEPARTMENT: THE DOSSO DEPARTMENT IS THE ONLY REGION IN THE COUNTRY THAT NOW SHOWS A POTENTIAL FOR A NORMAL HARVEST. ITS 1983 PRODUCTION REPRESENTED 17 PERCENT OF THE NATION'S CEREALS CROP. MILLET FIELDS ARE VISIBLE FROM DOSSO EAST TO DOGON-DOUTCHI, A DISTANCE OF 100 KM. EVEN IN THIS AREA, FIELDS ARE JUST NOW BEING PLANTED. FIELDS SHOW SIGNS OF NORMAL PLANT GROWTH.

5. RANGE AND LIVESTOCK CONDITIONS.

(A) RANGE AND LIVESTOCK CONDITIONS ARE IN VERY POOR CONDITION. FORAGE RESOURCES ARE ALMOST NON-EXISTENT, WITH HERDS SUBSISTING ON SHRUBS AND TREES. PEOPLE WERE OBSERVED CUTTING BRANCHES TO BE USED AS LIVESTOCK FEED. CATTLE ARE SUFFERING THE MOST FROM LACK OF FEED FOLLOWED BY SHEEP AND GOATS. IT IS DOUBTFUL THAT ANY OF THE SPECIES, INCLUDING GOATS, ARE OBTAINING ENOUGH FEED TO MAINTAIN BODY WEIGHT. CATTLE WERE OBSERVED DYING FROM EXHAUSTION IN THE RANGE.

(B) LIVESTOCK PRICES IN THE COUNTRYSIDE WERE DETERMINED TO BE AS FOLLOWS:

- WELL FED CATTLE AT VILLAGE LEVEL, DOLS 11991.45;
- VILLAGE CATTLE NOT IN GOOD CONDITION, DOLS 70;
- RANGE CATTLE, DOLS 24-26;
- STARVING CATTLE, DOLS 4.75.

URBAN MARKET PRICES DO NOT REFLECT THE ABOVE PRICES.

6. AN AUGUST UPDATE ON NIGER'S CROPPING SITUATION WILL FOLLOW.
CASEY

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NIAMEY 2825

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ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 101549Z MAY 84
FM AMEMBASSY NIAMEY
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 056
BT
UNCLAS NIAMEY 02825

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CLASS: UNCLASSIFIED
CHRG: AID 20/10/84
APPRV: AMB:WRCASEY
DRFTD: DIR:PBENEDICT/I
ROBERTSON:LG
CLEAR: NONE
DISTR: AMB DCM AID CHI

AIDAC

E.O. 12356: N/A
SUBJECT: NIGER: PRESIDENT'S REQUEST FOR EMERGENCY
- FOOD RELIEF

REF: A) ROBERTSON/ΔPRST FVA/FFP TELCON 05/09/84,
- B) NIAMEY 1231, C) NIAMEY 2371

1. AMBASSADOR CASEY, DCM SOUTH AFRICA, AND USAID DIRECTOR BENEDICT MET WITH CHIEF OF STATE SEYNI AOUNTCHE ON TUESDAY, MAY 8, 1984. NEARLY 30 MINUTES OF THIS AUDIENCE WAS DEVOTED TO A DISCUSSION OF USG ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE OBJECTIVES. BENEDICT OUTLINED RESULTS OF RECENT PROGRAM REVIEW AND ELABORATED ON THREE MISSION OBJECTIVES TO BE UNDERTAKEN DURING NEXT TWO YEARS, NAMELY, FURTHER CONCENTRATION ON AGRICULTURAL AND LIVESTOCK PRODUCTION ACTIVITIES WITHIN PROGRAM, ADAPTATION OF A PART OF THE PROGRAM TOWARD OBJECTIVES OF RECENTLY ACCELERATED INSTALLATION OF DEVELOPMENT SOCIETY STRUCTURE AT LOCAL LEVEL, AND IMPROVEMENT IN QUALITY OF PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION. MEETING WENT VERY WELL ELICITING A NUMBER OF USEFUL SUGGESTIONS AND SUPPORTING COMMENTS FROM PRESIDENT AOUNTCHE.

2. DURING MEETING PRESIDENT AOUNTCHE REQUESTED MODEST AMOUNTS OF EMERGENCY SORGHUM. AT VARIOUS POINTS IN DISCUSSION QUANTITIES MENTIONED RANGED FROM 5,200 MT DOWN TO 2,000 MT. NO STRONG RATIONALE WAS PROVIDED. HOWEVER, HIS INTENTION WAS TO (A) DETERMINE IF USG WOULD JOIN LIMITED NUMBER OF OTHER DONORS IN A PUSH TO MAKE AVAILABLE SORGHUM TO DISTRESSED AREAS, (B) TO OBTAIN DONOR PLEDGES BEFORE HE WOULD RELEASE AMPLE EMERGENCY STOCKS TO THESE AFFECTED ZONES, AND (C) TO TARGET USG REQUESTED ASSISTANCE ON REGION OF TANOUT IN DEPARTMENT OF ZINDER.

3. COMMENTARY. SEVERAL MONTHS AGO, THE GON LAUNCHED AN APPEAL TO THE INTERNATIONAL DONOR COMMUNITY FOR ASSISTANCE IN ADDRESSING THE FOOD NEEDS OF THE COUNTRY'S DROUGHT-AFFECTED POPULATION. USG RESPONSE RESULTED IN AMBASSADOR CASEY PROVIDING DOLS. 25,000 TO THE GON TO COVER THE COSTS OF FOOD RELIEF EFFORTS, I.E. TRANSPORT, DISTRIBUTION, AND THE LOCAL PURCHASE OF MILA FOR DISTRIBUTION IN THE TANOUT REGION OF THE COUNTRY. (SEE REF B.)

OVER THE PAST SEVERAL WEEKS, THE GON HAS RELEASED ITS FIGURES REGARDING ITS FOOD RESERVE/SECURITY STOCKS (SEE REFS C). AS THESE LEVELS ARE EXTREMELY HIGH, THE

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MISSION DOES NOT BELIEVE OTHER DONOR COMMITMENTS OF EMERGENCY SORGHUM ASSISTANCE IS WARRANTED AT THIS TIME. MISSION WILL INFORM GON OF THIS OPINION BUT WILL CONTINUE TO WORK WITH OTHER DONORS TO ANALYZE STRUCTURAL DEFICIT IN CEREALS.

MISSION DOES BELIEVE, HOWEVER, THAT SERIOUS MILK DEFICITS EXIST IN THE COUNTRY'S DROUGHT-STRICKEN AREAS, SUCH AS TANOUT, AND THAT IT IS IMPORTANT TO CONTINUE OUR MONITORING OF THE SITUATION. IN THE MEANTIME, WE ARE EXPLORING THE IDEA OF PERHAPS PROVIDING ADDITIONAL MILK POWDER TO THE GON, AND, IN ORDER TO SIDE STEP THE MANAGERIAL BURDEN INVOLVED IN MONITORING THE PROGRAM, BRINGING IN A PVO TO IMPLEMENT IT. THE MILK POWDER ISSUE WAS RAISED DURING THE ROBERTSON/HERST TELCON AND MISSION AWAITS FURTHER GUIDANCE AND RECOMMENDATIONS BEFORE MAKING ANY FINAL DECISIONS. ALSO, FYI, REF (B) LEFT OPEN THE OPTION OF EMBASSY PURSUING FURTHER FUNDING UNDER OFDA IF NEED ARISES. END FYI.

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NIAMEY 1231/01

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 OO RUEHC RUEHFR RUEHAB RUTABO RUTADS RUEHRO
 DE RUEENM #1231/01' 059 **
 ZNR 00000 ZZB
 O 281412Z FEB 84
 FM AMEMBASSY NIAMEY
 TO RUEHC / SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4074
 INFO RUEHFR / AMEMBASSY PARIS 5494
 RUEEAB / AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN 6929
 RUTABO / AMEMBASSY BAMAKO 4358
 RUTADS / AMEMBASSY DAKAR 4999
 RUEHRO / AMEMBASSY ROME 1133
 BT
 UNCLAS NIAMEY 01231

CLASS: UNCLASSIFIED
 CHRG: AID 22/22/84
 APPRV: A/DIR:JSNYD:R
 DRFTD: PROG:AFSSSEN/ /
 R:JSNYDTR:DN
 CLEAR: GDO:MAXWELL
 CONT:WHIPPL
 ICM:SOUTHWIC
 AMB:RCASEY

DISTR: AID AME DCM
 CHRCV

AIDAC

SECSTATE FOR OFDA FROM AMBASSADOR CASEY, PASS AF/W
 PARIS FOR CLUF/FELL, ABIDJAN FOR REDSO/TA, BAMAKO FOR SEPT/
 DASH, NOME FOR JODAG, DAKAR FOR BENEDICT AND JOHNSON

E.O. 12356: N/A

SUBJECT: DROUGHT DISASTER DECLARATION - NIGER

REF: FOMS 200082

1. SUMMARY: THIS CABLE PROVIDES AMBASSADOR'S DISASTER
 DECLARATION, BACKGROUND AND PROVIDES ALERT TO POSSIBLE
 FUTURE USG SUPPORT IN LIGHT OF EMERGING RELIEF SUPPORT
 PROBLEMS IN SOUTH-EASTERN NIGER. END SUMMARY.

2. DISASTER DECLARATION: BASED ON MY CONTINUING
 ASSESSMENT OF CONDITIONS NOW DEVELOPING IN THE SOUTH-
 EASTERN REGION OF NIGER AS A RESULT OF THE SEVERE
 LOCALIZED EFFECTS OF THE CURRENT SAHELIAN DROUGHT AND
 IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF E.O. 12, CHAPTER 1,
 AND 2 OF APR 80, I HAVE DETERMINED THAT THERE IS AN
 EVOLVING HUMAN RELIEF SUPPORT SITUATION WHICH IS BEYOND
 THE CAPACITY OF THE GON TO DEAL WITH ADEQUATELY WITHOUT
 EXTERNAL ASSISTANCE, AND, AS SUCH, CONSTITUTES A
 SPECIFIC DISASTER WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE CITED
 REFERENCES. I HAVE ALSO DETERMINED THAT USG ASSISTANCE
 WILL BE WELCOME AND THAT IT WILL BE IN OUR INTEREST
 TO PROVIDE SUCH ASSISTANCE. ACCORDINGLY, I INTEND TO
 IMMEDIATELY OBLIGATE DOLS 25,000 WHICH WILL BE PROVIDED
 AS A CASH GRANT TO THE GON TO SUPPORT FOOD RELIEF
 TRANSPORT/DISTRIBUTION COSTS AND FOR LOCAL PURCHASE OF
 MILA FOR DISTRIBUTION TO THOSE AFFECTED.

3. BACKGROUND:

A. BY SEPTELS, MISSION HAS PROVIDED CONTINUING
 INFORMATION ON THE STATUS OF THE 1983/84 HARVEST, FOOD
 SECURITY STOCKS AND THE WEAAR MACRO-ECONOMIC SITUATION.
 TO RECAP, NIGER'S FOOD AVAILABILITY, PARTICULARLY IN GROSS
 AMOUNTS OF BASIC CEREALS, I.E., MILLT AND SOBBUM,
 IS GOOD. OVERALL PRODUCTION IN 1983/84 WAS NORMAL,
 THE COUNTRY SUFFERING DEFICITS OF APPROXIMATELY

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33,000 MT OVER ESTIMATED DEMAND IN THE SOUTHEASTERN AREAS OF THE COUNTRY LOCATED ROUGHLY FROM TANOUT TO DIFFA. OFFSETTING THIS DEFICIT WERE SECURITY AND STABILIZATION STOCKS OF SOMETHING OVER 140,000 MT IN CONTROL OF GCN, THE STATE CEREALS MARKETING ORGANIZATION. (NIGER NORMALLY ALSO REQUIRES COMMERCIAL IMPORTS OF ABOUT 20,000 MT OF RICE TO MEET TOTAL CONSUMPTION REQUIREMENTS.)

E. BASED ON AMBASSADOR'S PERSONAL ON-SITE CONSULTATION AND THAT OF SEPARATE AID P.L. 480 TEAM ASSESSMENT, THE SITUATION DEVELOPING IN SOUTHEASTERN NIGER APPEARS TO INVOLVE AN ESTIMATED 70,000 PERSONS CURRENTLY SURROUNDING THE TANOUT AREA WHOSE CROPS HAVE TOTALLY FAILED FOR TWO SUCCESSIVE SEASONS. THIS POPULATION IS NOW RECEIVING RELIEF FOOD DISTRIBUTION FROM THE GCN. TO DATE, 900 MT OF SORGHUM HAVE BEEN DISTRIBUTED TO THIS POPULATION (OF WHICH ALL WAS FROM US\$ 1952 P.L. 480 STOCKS WHICH MISSION HAD AUTHORIZED FOR EMERGENCY FREE DISTRIBUTION) AND 100 MT OF MILLET FROM GCN. DISTRIBUTION SO FAR HAS BEEN CONFINED TO VERY POPULATION ENTERS. THIS REQUIRES TRAVEL 20-30 KM BY THOSE WHO NEED FOOD; SOME -- PERHAPS 500 -- HAVE MOVED ON TO ZINDER WHERE THEY ARE SETTING UP TEMPORARY SHELTER OR MOVING IN WITH RELATIVES.

C. RESERVE GRAIN STOCKS AVAILABLE IN THE TANOUT AREA ARE CURRENTLY 1,000 MT. NEAREST MAJOR STOCKPILDS TO SUPPORT THE ZONE IS ZINLEH WHICH HAS AN ESTIMATED 9,100 MT ON HAND, ALSO DIFFA WITH 1,000 MT.

D. IN ADDITION TO PROBLEMS WITH THE SOUTHERN PASTORAL POPULATION CURRENTLY AFFECTED, THE DROUGHT ALSO DRAMATICALLY REDUCED PASTURE SUPPORT FOR HERD POPULATIONS FURTHER NORTH IN THE ZONE. TO ALLEVIATE THIS PROBLEM, THE GCN HAS ENCOURAGED AND PERMITTED IMMEDIATE DESTOCKING OF THE RANGE AND EXCESS ANIMALS ARE BEING MOVED/SOLD INTO NIGERIA. THE GCN HAS ALSO BEGUN AN EMERGENCY CATTLE-FEED SUPPORT OPERATION ON A LIMITED SCALE, AS WELL.

F. MISSION ASSESSMENT: THE GCN, WITH DONOR ASSISTANCE (INCLUDING USG AND ESPECIALLY EEC WHICH HAS JUST

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SUPPLIED GON WITH DOLS 409,000 FOR FOOD OPERATIONS AND TRANSPORT SUPPORT THROUGHOUT NIGER, BUT WITH EMPHASIS ON DEFICIT AREAS AND WFP -- SEE REPTEL) IS SO FAR DEALING EFFECTIVELY WITH CURRENT SITUATION: THERE IS NO ACTIVE OR IMMINENT STARVATION OR IMMEDIATE MEDICAL CRISIS. WITH THE STOCKS ON HAND NOTED PARA 3, AND A RELATIVELY ADEQUATE COMMERCIAL SUPPLY, NIGER IS NOT FACED WITH THE ABSOLUTE FOOD DEFICIT CRISIS ANNOUNCED BY OTHER SAHELIAN STATES.

AS NOTED PARA 3, HOWEVER, GON DISTRIBUTION IS CURRENTLY LIMITED TO MAJOR POPULATION CENTERS, NOTABLY FANOUC AND ZINDER. BECAUSE OF THE DIFFUSION OF THE AFFECTED POPULATION, AND THE HIGH COST OF TRANSPORT, NO EFFORT IS BEING MADE TO PROVIDE FOOD DIRECTLY TO OUTLYING AREAS. IF THE CURRENT SITUATION IS NOT TO BE EXACERBATED BY MAJOR SOCIAL DISLOCATION, OTHER ASSISTANCE IN ADDITION TO RELIEF FOOD MIGHT ALSO BE REQUIRED TO ASSIST AFFECTED POPULATION TO REMAIN IN PLACE AND UNDERTAKE PREPARATION OF NEXT HARVEST; SUCH ASSISTANCE COULD INCLUDE PROVISION OF SEEDS AND FERTILIZER.

THE IMMEDIATE GON PROBLEM IS FINANCIAL AND AS THE RELIEF FEEDING SITUATION GROWS DURING THE DRY SEASON, IT WILL GET INCREASINGLY MORE STRAINED. FOR EXAMPLE, THE RESERVE/STABILIZATION STOCK IS ENTIRELY MORTGAGED FOR MORE THAN ITS CURRENT VALUE -- THE GON IS MOVING IT WITH THE GREATEST DIFFICULTY: A PORTION OF THE 5,000 MT IN USG P.L. 480 TITLE II STOCKS TURNED OVER RECENTLY TO ASSIST WITH RELIEF FEEDING HAD TO BE SOLD TO SUPPORT TRANSPORT COSTS. THOSE COSTS ARE ROUGHLY 15-18 CENTS A TON/KILOMETER. THE GON IS MAKING EFFORTS TO MOVE EXCESS STOCKS, RECOVER STORAGE/TRANSPORT COSTS AND SIMULTANEOUSLY ASSIST OTHER SAHEL STATES TO MEET RELIEF FOOD REQUIREMENTS. TO DATE, NIGER HAS SOLD 3,000 MT TO MALI, 514 MT TO CHAD, AND AN ESTIMATED 5,000 MT TO CEAR (PAID FOR BY USG).

IT IS OUR ASSESSMENT THAT THE GON FINANCIAL SITUATION IS SUCH THAT MEETING A GROWING RELIEF SUPPORT REQUIREMENT WILL BECOME INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT AND WILL REQUIRE SOME DIVERSION FROM ALREADY MADE BUDGETS.

5. POSSIBLE FUTURE USG SUPPORT: MISSION CURRENTLY ESTIMATES POTENTIAL AT RISA POPULATION IN ZONE AT 400,000 ROUGHLY HALF MEN AND WOMEN WITH 15 PERCENT OF TOTAL UNDER 15 YEARS OF AGE. MDRO IN CONSULTATION WITH GON/DONOR COMMUNITY WILL DEVELOP A MORE INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT OF PROBABLE REQUIREMENTS FOR ASSISTANCE AND LIABLY OTHER DONOR SUPPORT OVER THE NEAR-TERM THROUGH OCTOBER HARVEST. THIS WOULD INCLUDE AN ESTIMATED BUDGET WHICH WOULD TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION SPECIFIC GAPS NOT ABLE TO BE MET BY GON AND UNADDRESSED BY GENERAL DONOR RESPONSE WHERE USG ASSISTANCE COULD BE MOST EFFECTIVE. THAT ASSESSMENT/BUDGET WILL BE FORWARDED SEPTEL FOR OEDA REVIEW/CONSIDERATION.

UNCLAS NIAMEY 01201/02

6. ADVISE FUND CITE FOR TRANSFER DOLS 25,000
AMBASSADOR'S DISASTER GRANT. PURPOSE OBLIGATION BY
IMPLE LETTER GRANT. CASEY
BT
#1201

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UNCLAS NIAMEY 01201/02

BEYOND DROUGHT ASSISTANCE - NIGER'S FOOD SELF RELIANCE

In the wake of the 1968-74 drought, one of Niger's major policy aims has been to ensure self-sufficiency in basic food stuffs, reflecting President Kountche's vow that no Nigerien will ever die of hunger again. The focus of this effort has been on increasing production of the basic food grains -- millet and sorghum in the areas of traditional rain-fed cropping, and rice in the relatively small areas under irrigated cultivation along the Niger River.

In the mid to late 1970s, with memories of widespread starvation still fresh, Government of Niger (GON) strategy and assistance from its donor partners were for the most part directed at achieving short-term increases in food grain production. The favored instrument for this policy direction was the series of regional productivity projects, one in each of Niger's six crop-producing administrative departments, which have developed an institutional framework for delivering the recommended package of improved technical inputs to farmers. Enhanced revenues from the world uranium boom permitted the GON to complement donor support to these projects with an important financial contribution (salaries, equipment, subsidies, etc.) of its own. These and other projects have made substantial progress towards developing institutional bases at both national and regional levels. The best gauge of the success of this strategy is the increase in staple grain production from 753,000 metric tons (MT) (165 kgs per capita) in 1973 to an estimated 1,461,000 MT (243 kgs per capita) in 1983.

Despite these successes over the past decade, there remains a set of constraints to further increases in per capita production of food grains. The most serious one is the physical environment. Rains are erratic everywhere, and inadequate for agriculture in 85% of the country. Soil resources are poor in quality. And, with one year-round water course, the Niger River, the potential for development of irrigated agriculture is also very limited compared to other Sahelian countries. Another constraint is the limited knowledge and availability of agricultural technology appropriate to the Nigerien environment. For example, the technical packages need to be made more specific for agricultural zones and the economic and technical viability of some portions of the technical packages being recommended by the productivity projects remains to be established. Niger's institutional capacity to support increased production is constrained by the low level of human resource development, as well as by the inappropriateness of the tasks assigned some of the institutions.

The general worldwide economic recession and the sharp decline in the uranium market in particular have brought the GON face-to-face with policy-level constraints to increased food grain production. These are in two areas: (1) marketing control that have limited the opportunity for private sector involvement, and (2) restrictive practices on both internal and external trade. In its former relative affluence, the GON was able to finesse those constraints by government subsidies and other interventions.

Under these economic conditions, the GON has adopted policy reform as a necessary and inexpensive means of increasing production. An important first step was the 1982 decision by the State Grain Marketing Board to offer producers no less than the prevailing free market price for their crops. The policy reform process was crystallized by a national conference organized in November 1982 by the Ministry of Rural Development for the purpose of reassessing agricultural priorities and policies. The conference and subsequent policy decisions by the Council of Ministers have emphasized increasing private sector participation, improvement of cooperative organizations and technology transfer, and strengthening of governmental organizations through divestiture of inappropriate activities.

The USG is continuing to assist the GON in its efforts to obtain maximum food grain production. A new thrust of our assistance explicit support to the sometimes painful process of policy discussion and reform. A Joint Program Assessment has funded a series of studies of areas of potential policy change, and the 1984 Agriculture Sector Development Grant will provide financial support to the implementation of these reforms in the areas of agriculture input distribution and subsidies, cereals marketing, agriculture credit, cross border trade and strengthening the role of the private sector and cooperatives. The ASDG also helps the GON to deal with the budgetary crisis by providing funds for continuing development activities in agriculture and livestock sectors. USG assistance granted through standard projects format also aims at both supporting reform (e.g. the privatization, under an Agricultural Production Support Project, of the agricultural input supply system) and the technical and institutional capacity to mobilize increased food grain production. These interventions include enhancing Niger's ability to research and develop improved strains of millet and sorghum through a Niger Cereals Research Project, extending improved production techniques to farmers through a Niamey Department Development Project, and an Agriculture Production Support Project.

The USG is not alone in sharing the GON concern for increasing food grain production. For the immediate post-drought period, all aid donors in Niger accorded their highest priority to rural development. Nearly one-third of all aid commitments over this period (75.52 billion CFA francs out of a total of 233.83 billion CFA francs) was programmed in this sector. In this period, only the World Bank (20.38 billion CFA francs) and West Germany (10.31 billion CFA francs) have programmed more resources in this area than A.I.D. (9.22 billion CFA francs). The World Bank is financing a productivity project in Maradi and Dosso, the European Development Fund - one in Zinder, and West Germany another in Tahoua. Another important concentration of donor assistance has been the development of irrigated agriculture in the Niger River Valley, in which the European Development Fund has taken the lead and in which the World Bank is proposing a new project. Although A.I.D.'s total annual contribution currently ranks fifth among major donors, our long-term impact, particularly in influencing agricultural policy, has been more significant than the dollar level of our assistance might imply.

FY 86 CP Economic and Social Data

Country: (683) Niger

Basic Data

Total population (Thousands, mid 1984) .. 6,284

Per capita GNP (Dollars, 1982) 310

Annual per capita real GNP growth rate (1960-82) -1.5%

Annual rate of inflation (1970-82) 12.1%

National income received by low 20% of pop. () %

Life expectancy at birth, in years

(1984) total	45.7	male	44.1	female	47.3
(1970) total	40.5	male	38.8	female	42.3

Adult literacy rate

(1980) total	10%	male	14%	female	6%
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Agriculture

Annual per capita agricultural production growth rate (1974-1983) 2.6%

Agricultural production as % of GDP (1981) 30%

Population density/sq. km of agricultural land (1981) 43

<u>Major crops</u>	<u>Arable land</u>	<u>Year</u>
millet, sorghum (subsistence)	25%	1983
peanuts, cowpeas (cash)	10%	1983

Major agricultural exports:(1983) Livestock, cowpeas

Major agricultural imports:(1983) Wheat, rice, raw sugar

Proportion of labor force in agriculture () %

Central Government Finances

Total revenues and grants (Dols. millions, U.S.)

(1978) 224 (79) 294 (80) 367

Total expenditures and net lending (Dols. millions, U.S.)

(1978) 280 (79) 351 (80) 487

Deficit (-) or surplus (Dols. millions, U.S.)

(1978) -56 (79) -57 (80) -120

Defense expenditures:

As percent of total expenditures

(1978) 4.3% (79) 4.5% (80) 3.6%

As percent of GNP

(1978) 1.0% (79) 1.0% (80) 1.0%

Official intl. reserves, gross holdings end of period,

(dols. millions, U.S.) (1980) 126 (81) 110 (82) 3

Equivalent to .7 months of imports (1982)

Foreign Trade

Major exports (1982): uranium, livestock, cowpeas

Exports to U.S.

(Dols. mill. U.S., FOB) (1980) 0 (1982) 1 (1983) 4

As percent of total exports (1979) 0 (1980) 0 (1982) 0

Major imports (1982). petroleum prod, primary material, machinery

Imports from U.S.

(Dols. mill U.S., CIF) (1981) 14 (1982) 11 (1983) 2

As percent of total imports (80) 5% (81) 3% (82) 3%

Trade balance (Dols. mill. U.S.) (1980) -22 (81) -47 (82) -68

Trading partners: France,

Nigeria

External public debt as percent of GNP (1981): 55.2%

Service payments on external public debt:

(Dols. millions, U.S.) (1982) 110

As percent of export earnings (debt service ratio) (82) 30.4%

Social Data

Population growth rate:

(1970) 2.9% (1978) 3.1% (1984) 3.3%

Population in urban areas: (1970) 8% (1984) 15%

Live births per 1,000 population: (1970) () (1984) 54

Married women aged 15-44 yrs. using contraception: () %

Population in age groups (1984):

(0-14 yrs.) 47.2% (15-64 yrs.) 50.3% (65 yrs.) 2.5%

Infant deaths in first year of life per 1,000 live births:

(1984) 137

People per physician: (1978) 38,791

Major causes of disease (1981): malaria, skin infections, intestinal infect.

Major causes of death (1964): meningitis, malaria, measles

Per capita calorie supply as a percent of requirements: (1977) 91%

Population with reasonable access to safe water supply: (1975) 27%

Total school enrollment as ratio of population in age group:

Primary: (1978) Total 21.5 Male 27.4 Female 15.7

Secondary: (1978) Total 3.8 Male 5.6 Female 2.1

Post Secondary: (1980) Total 0.2 Male 0.4 Female 0.1

Energy production as percent of consumption: (1982) () %


FIGURE ONE
Population, Area, Density by Administrative Division

<u>Department/District</u>	<u>Population (x 1,000)</u>			<u>Area (km²)</u>	<u>Density² (Pers./km²)</u>
	<u>1981*</u>	<u>1977*</u>	<u>1977**</u>		
<u>Niamey</u>	<u>1,334.9</u>	<u>1,171.7</u>	<u>1,094.0</u>	<u>90,293</u>	<u>12.1</u>
Niamey			293.8	8,299	35.4
Tera			294.0	12,444	19.6
Tillabery			123.2	7,975	15.4
Ouallam			154.5	20,497	7.5
Filingue			206.9	24,346	8.5
Say			71.6	16,732	4.3
<u>Dosso</u>	<u>761.7</u>	<u>692.8</u>	<u>657.0</u>	<u>31,002</u>	<u>21.2</u>
Dosso			147.0	7,800	19.0
Loga			72.1	3,691	16.8
Birni N'Gaoure			108.5	4,423	24.5
Dogondoutchi			230.0	11,044	20.8
Gaya			108.5	4,044	26.8
<u>Tahoua</u>	<u>1,080.7</u>	<u>994.5</u>	<u>1,042.0</u>	<u>106,677</u>	<u>9.8</u>
Tahoua			215.5	8,803	24.5
Tchin-Tabaraden			114.1	73,540	1.6
Iilela			127.5	6,719	19.0
Kelta			130.8	4,860	26.9
Bouza			116.4	3,589	32.4
Madaoua			174.5	4,503	38.7
Birni N'Konni			163.2	4,661	35.0
<u>Maradi</u>	<u>1,056.6</u>	<u>944.3</u>	<u>865.0</u>	<u>38,581</u>	<u>22.4</u>
Mararounfa			163.4	3,540	46.2
Guidan Roundji			133.6	4,505	29.7
Dakoro			151.2	16,213	9.3
Mayahi			142.2	6,424	22.1
Tessaoua			171.4	5,319	32.2
Agule			103.2	2,580	40.0
<u>Zinder</u>	<u>1,116.6</u>	<u>1,003.7</u>	<u>1,062.0</u>	<u>145,430</u>	<u>7.3</u>
Mirria			359.4	12,423	28.9
Matameye			104.2	2,109	49.4
Magaria			331.3	8,021	41.3
Tanout			154.1	33,947	4.5
Goure			113.0	88,930	1.3
<u>Diffa</u>	<u>179.3</u>	<u>166.7</u>	<u>154.0</u>	<u>140,216</u>	<u>1.1</u>
Diffa			50.0	6,979	7.2
N'Guigmi			30.0	118,126	0.3
Maïne-Soroa			74.0	15,111	4.9
<u>Agadez</u>	<u>157.4</u>	<u>124.7</u>	<u>98.0</u>	<u>714,801</u>	<u>0.14</u>
Agadez			74.4	164,118	0.14
Arilt			14.6	234,026	0.06
Bilma			9.0	316,657	0.03
TOTAL	5,687.2	5,098.4	4,972.0	1,267.00	3.90

* République du Niger 1982:31; ** Arizona 1980:65.

MAP 1

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