

**Integrating  
Women:  
An Evaluation  
of the Women's  
Socioeconomic  
Participation  
Project**

Prepared for the Bureau for Science and Technology/  
Office of Rural and Institutional Development and the  
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination/Office of  
Women in Development under contract no. PDC-0000-I-11-  
3078-00

Judith Helzner  
Chris Krueger  
with Susan Goldmark

September 1984



Development Alternatives, Inc. 624 Ninth Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20001

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY . . . . .	v
CHAPTER ONE	
BACKGROUND . . . . .	1
PROJECT DESCRIPTION . . . . .	1
AN OVERVIEW OF TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE ACTIVITIES . . . . .	4
EVALUATION SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY . . . . .	6
REPORT OVERVIEW . . . . .	7
CHAPTER TWO	
IMPACT OF WSPP ON WASHINGTON-BASED INSTITUTIONS AND THE DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY . . . . .	11
OVERVIEW . . . . .	11
Budget and Staff . . . . .	12
Personnel Continuity . . . . .	14
Senior-level Staff . . . . .	15
WSPP-related Use of Funds and Personnel . . . . .	16
WSPP Management Effectiveness . . . . .	19
WSPP Impact on ICRW . . . . .	21
Marketing . . . . .	24
Other Organizational Development Issues . . . . .	25
PROJECT MANAGEMENT AND IMPACT ON AID/W . . . . .	26
Project Management by AID/W . . . . .	26
WSPP Impact on AID/W . . . . .	29
IMPACT ON THE GENERAL DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY . . . . .	30
Information Dissemination Efforts . . . . .	30
Impact on the WID Field . . . . .	33
Contribution to WID Knowledge . . . . .	34
CONCLUSIONS . . . . .	35
Project Management by ICRW . . . . .	35
Impact on ICRW . . . . .	36
Project Management by AID/W . . . . .	37
Impact on AID/W . . . . .	37
Impact on General Development Community . . . . .	37
NOTES . . . . .	38

<b>CHAPTER THREE</b>	
<b>IMPACT OF WSPP IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES. . . . .</b>	<b>40</b>
<b>OVERVIEW . . . . .</b>	<b>40</b>
<b>IMPACT ON AID MISSIONS. . . . .</b>	<b>40</b>
<b>Mission Objectives in Requesting ICRW Services. . . . .</b>	<b>43</b>
<b>Selection Criteria for Response to Mission Requests . . . . .</b>	<b>46</b>
<b>Factors Important in Effective Technical Assistance</b>	
<b>Delivery to Missions. . . . .</b>	<b>48</b>
<b>Factors Important in Follow-up to Technical Assistance</b>	
<b>by Missions . . . . .</b>	<b>50</b>
<b>Issues for Missions: Policy Climate and Policy</b>	
<b>Capability . . . . .</b>	<b>52</b>
<b>IMPLEMENTING INSTITUTIONS . . . . .</b>	<b>56</b>
<b>Overview . . . . .</b>	<b>56</b>
<b>Dominican Republic and Ecuador Case Findings. . . . .</b>	<b>56</b>
<b>WSPP IMPACT ON LOW-INCOME WOMEN IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES . . . . .</b>	<b>60</b>
<b>CONCLUSIONS . . . . .</b>	<b>64</b>
<b>AID Missions. . . . .</b>	<b>65</b>
<b>Implementing Institutions . . . . .</b>	<b>65</b>
<b>Low-Income Women. . . . .</b>	<b>65</b>
<b>NOTES . . . . .</b>	<b>65</b>

**CHAPTER FOUR**  
**RECOMMENDATIONS. . . . . 67**

<b>RECOMMENDATIONS FOR AID/W . . . . .</b>	<b>68</b>
<b>RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ICRW . . . . .</b>	<b>71</b>
<b>Affecting AID Missions. . . . .</b>	<b>73</b>
<b>Affecting the Field Level . . . . .</b>	<b>74</b>
<b>Affecting Policymakers and the State of WID Knowledge . . . . .</b>	<b>75</b>

<b>APPENDIX A: METHODOLOGY . . . . .</b>	<b>A-1</b>
<b>APPENDIX B: PERSONS INTERVIEWED. . . . .</b>	<b>B-1</b>
<b>APPENDIX C: QUESTIONNAIRE FOR TELEPHONE INTERVIEW WITH</b>	
<b>MISSIONS THAT RECEIVED TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE</b>	
<b>VISITS FROM ICRW . . . . .</b>	<b>C-1</b>
<b>APPENDIX D: CABLES RELATING TO WSPP PROJECT. . . . .</b>	<b>D-1</b>
<b>APPENDIX E: ECUADOR CASE STUDY . . . . .</b>	<b>E-1</b>
<b>APPENDIX F: DOMINICAN REPUBLIC CASE STUDY . . . . .</b>	<b>F-1</b>
<b>APPENDIX G: TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE BY COUNTRY. . . . .</b>	<b>G-1</b>

## LIST OF TABLES

<u>Tables</u>	<u>Page</u>	
1	Summary of Technical Assistance Visits By Region, Country, and Year . . . . .	5
2	ICRW Budget and Staff, FY1980-FY1984. . . . .	13
3	Distribution of Funding, FY1981-1984. . . . .	16
4	Distribution of ICRW Staff Time Under WSPP. . .	17
5	Use of Funds as Reported, As of Third Quarter, FY84 . . . . .	18
6	Professional Staff Time Devoted To Technical Assistance. . . . .	18
7	Summary of ICRW Technical Assistance Delivery .	41
8	Summary of Potential Technical Assistance Functions . . . . .	69
9	ICRW Strategy . . . . .	72

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In October 1980 AID contracted with the International Center for Research on Women (ICRW) to provide technical assistance to U.S. Agency for International Development missions through the Women's Socioeconomic Participation Project (WSPP). The goal of the two-year, centrally funded contract was to help improve economic opportunities for poor women in developing countries. When the project was extended through fiscal year 1983-1984, the Women and Development office joined the office of Rural and Institutional Development as co-managers.

Over the life of the project, ICRW made 28 technical-assistance visits to missions in 17 countries. These trips were short, usually ranging from four to eight person-weeks. In addition, ICRW in Washington, D.C., disseminated information. AID commissioned Development Alternatives, Inc. (DAI) to assess the implementation and the impact of WSPP.

## FINDINGS

### Achievement of Project Goal and Purpose

The impact of WSPP is assessed at two levels, developing countries and Washington. At the field level, this evaluation found that, although ICRW usually delivered high-quality technical assistance, impact on AID missions and especially on low-income women was low. Instead, this evaluation concluded that:

- AID missions did not expect field-level results from the technical assistance in most cases;
- Lack of follow-up to the technical assistance delivered stemmed from two structural factors, in particular:
  - The one- or two-shot nature of technical assistance requested by missions, and
  - The low priority with which most missions treated the involvement of women in development (WID); and
- The assumption that short-term, often one-shot, technical assistance would lead to significant impact in the field was incorrect, given the above findings.

WSPP did have significant effects, however, on other beneficiary groups -- two in the field and three in Washington.

AID missions in 17 countries were the direct field-level beneficiaries of ICRW technical assistance in most cases.

Officials in several missions served by ICRW reported that technical assistance specialized in productive activities for women was not otherwise readily available. Through WSPP, the capabilities of mission staff to conceptualize problems and propose solutions related to employment and income generation for women were improved. In some cases, specific projects were analyzed; in others, data bases were refined to make gender-specific analysis and planning possible. Some of the technical assistance involved outlining strategies to incorporate poor women into mainstream development projects. In a few instances ICRW made institutional assessments of private voluntary organization (PVO) capabilities in employment and income generation for poor women.

ICRW provided technical assistance directly to three PVOs and two host country organizations. In one country, a seminar was organized for PVOs engaged in WID activities. In another, credit extension workers from a host country organization were trained at reaching and working with women loan applicants for small enterprise development.

In Washington, WSPP contributed significantly to the institutional development of ICRW and the consolidation of its technical assistance capability and experience. Four years of continuous funding helped ICRW achieve financial and intellectual stability. Opportunities for action-oriented work in the field helped reorient ICRW from a research institution to one that is experienced and competent at providing technical assistance. Nevertheless, opportunities to work directly on employment and income-generation issues, to enter into longer-term field relationships, and to be involved during the project implementation stage fell short of the expectations of ICRW and AID/Washington (AID/W).

Some AID/W officials benefited from ICRW's debriefing sessions and policy round tables on the subject of integrating women into mainstream employment and income-generation programs. ICRW contributed significantly to the formulation of AID's 1982 Policy Paper on Women in Development. ICRW's high-quality substantive and technical work has helped bring about a professional WID image in AID/W and in the missions.

Members of the broader development community have benefited indirectly from ICRW's policy round tables and Resource Center. Round tables have been used to disseminate information drawn from WSPP activities. The Resource Center has doubled its collection to become the most complete available on women's productive roles and development, largely because of documents obtained for WSPP purposes and through WSPP activities.

## ASSESSMENT OF THE ICRW AND AID/W PROJECT MANAGEMENT

ICRW's management of WSPP and use of funds were efficient and appropriate. Targets regarding the number of missions to be served each year were met. In general, high-quality technical assistance was delivered in a timely fashion; reports were complete, useful, and with two exceptions, timely. However, more involvement by senior staff in building collaboration with AID/W project management and with key AID/W officials might have improved project implementation.

AID/W's project management was somewhat constrained by the mission-driven nature of WSPP, whose activities were ultimately determined by the missions. However, a key to the success of centrally funded projects to assist missions is the promotional role played by managers who use formal and informal processes to enlist interest and support from missions and within AID/W. For various reasons, neither of the two AID/W offices with management responsibilities served WSPP in this promotional capacity.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

AID/W Policy Formulation and Programming Efforts in the Area of Integration of Women into Employment and Income Generation

During WSPP, technical assistance was limited almost completely to the project design stage, and even then was partial in nature. Centrally funded technical assistance aimed at improving policy implementation should be planned and delivered in a more holistic manner. It should be regarded as a set of activities to be carried out before, during, and after the life of a project with different purposes at different project stages.

Besides adopting a more holistic approach to technical assistance, AID/W should take steps to help improve the context in which centrally funded technical assistance is delivered. This action by AID/W can help address mission-based problems identified in this evaluation, for example, lack of technical skill and resource commitment needed to move attention to poor women, from the problem-recognition to the problem-solution stage.

To help meet preconditions for more effective use of technical assistance, the Program and Policy Coordination Bureau and the office of Women in Development (IPC/WID) should use a multicomponent strategy. This strategy should combine availability of specialized technical assistance with complementary activities to collect, process, and disseminate WID-related information and to train select AID/W and mission staff members in developing strategies to identify and find solutions for WID-related problems.

Special efforts should be made to incorporate attention to women into the Science and Technology (S&T) Bureau projects, particularly those that have an economic focus. Specialized technical assistance and complementary information dissemination and training should be provided to those S&T offices that are most strongly involved in the design and implementation of employment and income-generation projects.

Finally, if ICRW (or any other source) is contracted to provide further technical assistance to create and expand economic opportunities for women, a technical, multisectoral project committee should be formed in AID/W. This committee should help identify opportunities to link technical assistance with mainstream activities in various development sectors and to ensure relevant technical assistance and critical learning.

ICRW Technical Assistance Efforts to Provide Greater Economic Opportunities to Women from Developing Countries

ICRW should formulate a strategy for technical assistance that builds from experience acquired under WSPP. This strategy might begin with more careful definition of objectives and selection of beneficiaries. For example, ICRW should distinguish the kind of impact that might be made at various levels -- on AID missions, on implementing institutions, and on the development community and the WID field in general. At the same time, ICRW should specify the roles it might assume at the respective levels. Although ICRW must develop its own strategy, taking specific resources and interests into account, the findings of this evaluation suggest that ICRW might best pursue the following types of technical assistance activities:

- With AID missions -- educate mission staffs through special events such as seminars and by working alongside project officers and technicians on a regular basis during project implementation; one- or two-shot technical assistance should be provided only when conditions promise that it will be well utilized.
- With implementing institutions -- provide technical assistance on a recurring basis throughout the design and implementation stages of projects and actually participate in the implementation of selected showcase projects.

Finally, ICRW should continue to use its technical assistance activities to contribute to knowledge building and information dissemination in the WID field.

**CHAPTER ONE****BACKGROUND****PROJECT DESCRIPTION**

In 1980 the International Center for Research on Women (ICRW) presented AID/Washington (AID/W) with an unsolicited proposal for the Women's Socioeconomic Participation Project (WSPP) -- a centrally funded technical assistance program to help AID missions increase economic opportunities for poor women.

Founded in 1976, ICRW quickly distinguished itself for its work in documenting and analyzing the productive roles of women in developing countries and the impact of development programs on those women. ICRW argued that sustained economic development required that women's productive roles should be taken into full account in the design and implementation of development programs and projects.

Committed to bridging the gap between research and action, ICRW also provided technical assistance to national and international organizations, including AID. By 1980 ICRW had provided short-term technical assistance in Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Morocco, and Indonesia. In 1979-1980 ICRW provided technical assistance to several offices in the Development Support Bureau.

In fiscal year 1981-1982, ICRW was awarded a \$528,629 contract under the management of the Office of Rural Development of the Science and Technology Bureau (S&T/RD; now S&T/RUID). Through WSPP, ICRW proposed to provide technical assistance to 10 AID missions during fiscal year 1981-1982. ICRW technical assistance was to increase productive employment and generate income indirectly through such activities as labor force analyses, project and portfolio reviews, assessments of institutional capabilities, and participation in project design and evaluation.

The goal and the purpose of WSPP were to:

- Ensure that AID country development projects and programs were designed to provide women in developing countries with meaningful economic opportunities outside the home; and
- Provide USAID missions with short-term technical assistance related to productive employment and income generation for low-income women.

WSPP aimed at improving mission capacity in two key areas: integrating low-income women into mainstream development initiatives and generating employment and income as bases for sustained development. These objectives were particularly appropriate in light of the 1973 Percy Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act, which required that bilateral aid

be administered so as to give particular attention to those programs, projects, and activities which tend to integrate women into the national economies of foreign countries, thus improving their status and assisting the total development effort.

When WSPP's contract was extended through fiscal year 1983-1984, total funding was increased to \$1,055,620. The Program and Policy Coordination Bureau and the office of Women in Development (PPC/WID) supplied \$240,000 of that total and assumed project management responsibilities with S&T/RUID. Technical assistance remained WSPP's primary focus with the nine missions that were to receive technical assistance in fiscal year 1983-1984. In addition, ICRW was asked to provide consulting services to PPC/WID and, in the final year of the project, to

undertake extensive review and analysis of the experience derived from four years of technical assistance in the field in order to identify key policy and program concerns in formulating development interventions that effectively improve women's economic opportunities. (Statement of Work, FY83-84, #DSAN-C-0269)

The new statement of work also placed emphasis on information dissemination activities, mostly policy round tables, to review and assess the "cumulative experience of the program and promoting a dialogue with other development institutions in the private and public sectors." (Ibid.)

In December 1980 a worldwide cable announced WSPP to missions and solicited their responses. (See Appendix D.) Thirty-four of 48 missions responded; 10 missions indicated no need for the technical assistance offered, while 24 responded positively. Many of the responses, however, were vague about the type of technical assistance sought. Several did not share the focus on employment and income generation that had been defined in the outgoing cable. (See Appendix D for a summary of mission responses.)

In January 1981 a second cable invited more specific responses from missions. At the same time, AID/W officials and ICRW representatives outlined the following selection criteria to choose the missions eligible for technical assistance through WSPP:

- Specific request for technical assistance;
- The request's relevance to the stated project objective, that is, employment and income-generation alternatives for low-income women; and
- Regional representation.

As work proceeded, attempts were made to identify those factors that would be most useful in anticipating the success or failure of field assistance. The selection criteria became more sharply defined to include:

- Explicit support of senior-level mission staff and program offices for the request for technical assistance;

- Likelihood that technical assistance would have a direct impact on actual projects and programs related to employment, income generation, and/or access to productive resources.

In January 1982 another worldwide cable consulted missions about the possible extension of the project and again invited them to indicate their needs. This time, 21 missions responded, seven of which had received technical assistance during the previous two years.

During the four-year life of the project, ICRW has made 28 visits to 17 missions. This evaluation focuses primarily on the quality of the technical assistance provided in those visits and their resulting impact. This evaluation also examines technical assistance provided by ICRW in Ecuador through a separate contract, because it grew out of ICRW's WSPP work and provides a case study of longer-term assistance.

#### AN OVERVIEW OF TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE ACTIVITIES

Table 1 offers an overview of missions that received technical assistance under WSPP. A total of 100 person-weeks of in-country technical assistance was provided during the life of the project. Barbados, Tanzania, and Zaire received initial one-week, stopover visits to define further work, which later did not materialize. Seven missions received three to five person-weeks of in-country technical assistance; four missions received seven person-weeks; and Peru, India, and the Dominican Republic received 11, 12, and 17 person-weeks, respectively.

An annotated summary of technical assistance (see Appendix G) indicates that ICRW conducted:

- 9 project-specific design and evaluation activities;
- 4 portfolio reviews;
- 11 problem- or sector-specific scopes of work;

TABLE 1

SUMMARY OF TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE VISITS BY REGION,  
COUNTRY, AND YEAR

	FY1981	FY1982	FY1983	FY1984
<b>Africa</b>				
Kenya		1		
Tanzania		1		
Zaire		1		
<b>Asia</b>				
India			1	
Indonesia	1			
Nepal			1	1
Thailand	1			
<b>Near East</b>				
Egypt				1
Jordan		1		1
<b>Latin America &amp; Caribbean</b>				
Barbados		1		
Costa Rica	2			
Dominican Rep.	1	1	1	
Ecuador	1	2		
Honduras	2			
Jamaica		1		
Panama	1		1	
Peru			1	2
<b>Total Visits</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>Total Missions Served</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>4</b>

- 4 institutional assessments;
- 1 short-term training program (for a local implementing institution); and
- 1 week-long seminar for local private voluntary organizations (PVOs) and host government agencies.

#### EVALUATION SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY

AID/W decided to extend WSPP for a second two-year period without conducting a written analysis of the project's progress or impact during its initial two years. Project managers extended the contract and inserted additional funding because they believed that:

- Mission interest was strong;
- More time was needed to compensate for delays early in project implementation; and
- More time was required before the effect of ICRW technical assistance could be felt.

This evaluation covers the entire four-year WSPP period. Its objectives are to:

- Assess and establish the extent to which the project goal and purpose have been achieved;
- Assess and establish ICRW's project management capability and performance;
- Recommend ways in which ICRW may improve its technical assistance efforts to provide greater economic opportunities to women in development activities;
- Assess, insofar as is reasonably and economically feasible, the extent to which the project has or is likely to affect employment and income generation for women; and
- Assess AID/W's management of the project and recommend ways in which AID missions and AID/W may improve their policy formulation and programming efforts in the area of employment and income generatic

The evaluation team from Development Alternatives, Inc. (DAI) reviewed WSPP activities with project managers from S&T/RUID, PPC/WID, and ICRW to design an appropriate evaluation methodology. All agreed that it would be most cost-effective for the team to visit only those missions that had received substantial ICRW technical assistance. The Dominican Republic and Ecuador were selected for field evaluation since these were the only countries in which WSPP technical assistance had led to projects that were being implemented. The evaluation team and AID/W agreed that information on other missions could be gained through telephone interviews and cables. Missions were divided into three groups:

- 15 that had received technical assistance from ICRW (besides Ecuador and the Dominican Republic);
- 17 that had requested technical assistance, but had not received it; and
- 10 that had indicated no need for WSPP technical assistance. These missions were included to provide a basis for comparison.

All missions that had received WSPP technical assistance were contacted by the evaluation team. Several missions that had not received assistance were also contacted to provide an alternative perspective on the project. In addition, the evaluators sought the opinions of AID/W officials familiar with WSPP, of ICRW staff and board members, and of other individuals who had some involvement with WSPP. (See Appendix A for a fuller description of evaluation methodology and Appendix B for interview schedules.)

#### REPORT OVERVIEW

This report presents findings at two levels -- Washington and the field. In Washington, WSPP aimed at strengthening the technical assistance capacity of ICRW and at using its analytic skills to draw lessons from technical assistance activities and

share them with the development community. In the field, WSPP aimed at improving the ability of mission staff and/or local implementing institutions to design and carry out programs that would increase employment and income-generation opportunities for low-income women.

Three categories of WSPP actors and beneficiaries are discussed at each level. In Washington, the evaluation examines the management roles of ICRW and AID/W in WSPP and the impact of the project on these two organizations. It also includes a discussion of the broader development community that participated in WSPP information dissemination or in other ICRW work that drew upon WSPP technical assistance.

Washington-related findings are discussed in Chapter Two, in three parts:

- ICRW project management and WSPP impact on ICRW;
- AID/W project management and WSPP impact on AID/W; and
- WSPP impact on policymakers and the field of women in development (WID) through information dissemination and other activities.

Findings related to WSPP's effect on the populations of developing countries is found in Chapter Three. Potential field-level beneficiaries include:

- AID missions in the 17 countries that had received WSPP technical assistance;
- Implementing institutions in 5 countries; and
- Low-income women in countries receiving WSPP assistance.

Each of the six sections on findings contains corresponding conclusions. The final chapter of this report provides recommendations.

The appendixes include the evaluation methodology and interview schedules, relevant cables and summaries of cable traffic regarding the project, information describing ICRW, and two brief case reports on ICRW work in the Dominican Republic and Ecuador.

**CHAPTER TWO****IMPACT OF WSPP ON WASHINGTON-BASED INSTITUTIONS  
AND THE DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY****OVERVIEW**

The goal and the purpose of WSPP focused on AID missions and poor women in developing countries, but important project activities have also taken place in Washington, D.C. The project was managed from Washington by ICRW and by S&T/RUID and PPC/WID. During the fiscal year 1983-1984 extension of the project, more emphasis was placed on knowledge-building and information-dissemination activities that were Washington based.

**ICRW PROJECT MANAGEMENT AND PROJECT IMPACT ON ICRW**

In this section, the evaluation addresses two questions:

- How well did ICRW manage WSPP?
- How has project involvement influenced ICRW's institutional growth and development?

This evaluation found that ICRW's management of the project effectively provided timely, high-quality technical assistance in response to mission requests. Nevertheless, ICRW might have been more aggressive in marketing this project to AID missions and in discovering ways to develop longer-term, more substantive relationships with field missions and AID/W.

The impact of WSPP on ICRW has been positive and relatively strong. Had the project been more successful at fulfilling its goal and purpose in the field, the benefits to ICRW would have been greater.

**Previous Page Blank**

### Budget and Staff

ICRW's growth and development from 1980 to 1984 are positive examples of multidonor funding. The indication that ICRW's proposal would be funded by AID stimulated the Ford Foundation to award ICRW a \$100,000 core support grant for fiscal year 1981-1982 and later to renew it for the fiscal years 1983-1985. Much of the institutional development that has taken place during the WSPP period must be attributed to support from both AID and Ford. The nature and the direction of that development were strongly influenced by ICRW's activities in WSPP.

In fiscal years 1981 and 1982, WSPP funds accounted for 60 and 69 percent, respectively, of total ICRW funding. In fiscal years 1983 and 1984, the relative importance of WSPP funding fell to 48 and 46 percent as ICRW attracted more funds from other AID sources and private sources other than the Ford Foundation. (See Table 2.)

Between 1980 and 1984 the ICRW staff grew from 7 to 12 full-time employees -- 8 professionals and 4 support staff. Professional staff members include the senior-level director and six associates plus a librarian. Program areas for which professional staff are responsible include research, technical assistance, and public education and public information. The 4-person support staff includes an administrative manager, 2 secretaries, and a bookkeeper.

Some of the qualitative issues behind these quantitative indicators include personnel continuity in general and specifically under WSPP, role of senior staff, ICRW's use of funds and personnel under WSPP, and impact of WSPP on ICRW as an organization.

TABLE 2

## ICRW BUDGET AND STAFF, FY80-FY84

SOURCE OF FUNDS	FY80	FY81	FY82	FY83	FY84
AID WSPP		\$187,882	\$291,087	\$275,102	\$266,189
other	\$131,504	22,224	37,583	171,839	188,499
Internat'l Agencies	20,081	16,693	13,767	29,903	6,049
Ford	4,596	78,498	68,488	61,936	72,098
Private Grants	571	2,343	7,477	20,682	39,182
Other	458	7,032	5,295	7,310	3,700
TOTAL BUDGET	\$157,210	\$314,672	\$423,697	\$566,772	\$575,717
<u>STAFF</u>					
Senior Associate	2	2	2	2	1
Librarian	4	4	4	5	6
Ass't Librarian*		1	1	1	1
Admin/Management Sec'y/Account'g	1	1	2	3	3
TOTAL	7	9	10	13	13
<u>CONSULTANTS</u>					
Field Technical Assistance		4	2	4	2
Data Analysis		2		2	1
Field Research Services	1	6	4	5	2
		2	2	2	1
TOTAL	1	14	8	13	6

\*part-time

Source: International Center for Research on Women

### Personnel Continuity

Doubling the size of the staff was mostly due to the increase in technical assistance activities undertaken by ICRW under WSPP. The core group of ICRW staff involved in WSPP has remained the same throughout the life of the project. In addition to the project coordinator, the staff members include a social psychologist specializing in labor force analyses and women's roles in rural development, an anthropologist specializing in health and nutrition as well as general development, and an economist specializing in urban development and small enterprises. More recently, a second economist has been added to the ICRW staff, also specializing in small-scale enterprise development.

The notable exception to personnel stability is the position of project director; ICRW had three project directors during fiscal year 1983-1984. In 1983, a few months after the project was extended, the director took a job with UNICEF. Her prestige had been a key factor in ICRW's growth, and her departure (although she continues to be a member of the ICRW board) led to efforts to recruit another senior-level person who would continue to build ICRW's reputation for excellence. Her replacement, a specialist in management and organizational development, was hired as project manager in March 1983 but left after nine months. In November 1983 an ICRW staff economist replaced him as project director.

Changes in project director have been offset largely by the continuity of the position of the project coordinator, who has been responsible for the daily administration of WSPP throughout the entire project. Thus turnover in project management does not appear to have lessened the quality or quantity of work done by ICRW under WSPP. It may, however, have contributed to ICRW's weakness in marketing and in developing stronger relations with AID missions.

ICRW has had several male consultants in the field, but the staff has been all female with the exception of the second WSPP director. This fact leads some people to perceive it as a WID organization rather than as one of competent technicians who specialize in integrating low-income women into economic development processes. Although ICRW's work under WSPP has contributed to an improved WID image among some AID officials and in the broader development community, ICRW staff have had to labor against the negative or indifferent views that many AID officials still have about WID issues.

### Senior-level Staff

Changes in the position of ICRW's project director left the center with only one senior-level staff person, the general director, who is one of ICRW's founders. Two mid-level staff members remained as project directors. The original contract with AID noted that ICRW would supply senior-level persons as technical assistants for AID missions. Judging from the quality of technical assistance provided to missions, the presence or absence of a senior person has not been a problem. ICRW is now content that its reputation is sound and does not require more senior-level staff. However, two issues should also be considered in this regard.

First, limited understanding and low commitment to implementing WID policy in many AID missions have been a major factor in limiting the impact made under WSPP. A continued ICRW technical assistance program, insofar as success might depend on educating and convincing top mission officials, might be helped by using senior staff to establish relationships with missions and to coordinate follow-up work by mid-level and junior staff members. Second, the presence of additional senior staff members might help ICRW address marketing weaknesses.

WSPP-related Use of Funds and Personnel

The distribution of funds across management, documentation and analysis, in-field technical assistance, and preparation and follow-up (see Table 3) shows that in different years from 57 to 75 percent of total project effort was used in country-related technical assistance (in-field technical assistance plus preparation and follow-up).

As expected in the first year of the project, more time was required for management; in the last year, more time has been allocated to analyzing and to preparing reports. More intensive use of ICRW administrative and support staff for report preparation and project evaluation during the final year is reflected in the larger number of person-months used for WSPP in fiscal year 1984. (See Table 4.)

TABLE 3

## DISTRIBUTION OF FUNDING, FY1981-1984

ACTIVITY	<u>Percent of Monies Used In</u>			
	FY81	FY82	FY83	FY84
Management	30	17	12	12
Documentation- Analysis	13	13	13	22
In-field TA	41	47	50	46
Preparation- Follow-up	16	23	25	20
TOTAL AID AMOUNT	\$187,882	\$291,087	\$275,102	\$266,189
% Life Of Project Expenditures Thru FY84*	18.4	28.5	27.0	26.1

\*Total = \$1,020,260; approximately \$35,000 from AID-WSPP monies will be carried over to FY85.

TABLE 4  
DISTRIBUTION OF ICRW STAFF TIME UNDER WSPP

	FY83		FY84	
	person- months	%	days	%
<b>Research and Technical Assistance</b>				
Senior/Research Director	4.2	35		
Senior/Director	4.2	35	90	35
Staff Economist	6.0	50	130	50
Staff Economist			130	50
Staff Anthropologist	6.0	50	90	35
Staff Social Scientist			26	10
Sector Studies Coordinator	4.2	35		
Technical Assistance Coordinator	6.0	50	195	75
Resource Coordinator	8.4	70	100	38
<b>Administration and Support</b>				
Office Manager	6.0	50	90	35
Secretary/Typist	11.0	90	230	90
Research Editor			60	25
Copy Editor			90	35
<b>Total</b>	<b>56.0</b>		<b>1231</b>	
<b>Total Person-Months</b>	<b>56.0</b>		<b>56.8</b>	

---

Source: International Center for Research on Women

---

Data reported in Tables 5 and 6 provide some general life-of-project cost estimates. Using the \$1,063,260 figure for total project cost and a total of 331 person-weeks of technical assistance (including in-country and Washington-based work), the average cost per person-week for technical assistance was \$3,213. Excluding \$156,563 for documentation and analysis, the cost per person-week for technical assistance was \$2,739 -- a figure that would be further reduced if those management costs directly related only to delivering technical assistance and follow-up were included.

TABLE 5

## USE OF FUNDS AS REPORTED, AS OF THIRD QUARTER, FY84

CATEGORY	Thru FY83	3rd Qtr FY84	%(a+b)	Balance	TOTAL
Staff	\$325,539	\$115,149	43.9	\$26,000	
Fringe	50,559	33,347	8.4	7,800	
Consultant	31,143	9,275	4.0		
Travel & Per Diem	66,125	21,302	8.7	4,000	
Other Direct Costs	46,005	12,749	5.8	5,000	
Overhead	237,811	55,684	29.2	15,772	
<b>TOTAL COST</b>	<b>\$757,182</b>	<b>\$247,506</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>\$58,572</b>	<b>\$1,063,260</b>
AID	\$754,138	\$242,550		\$58,572	\$1,055,260
ICRW	\$ 3,044	\$ 4,956			\$ 8,000

---

Source: International Center for Research on Women

---

TABLE 6

## PROFESSIONAL STAFF TIME DEVOTED TO TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

Person/Weeks

	In-Country	Washington	Total
FY81	20	57	77
FY82	27	68	95
FY83	30	59	89
FY84	23	47	70
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>231</b>	<b>331</b>

---

Source: International Center for Research on Women

---

In fiscal year 1983-1984, ICRW provided \$8,000 toward the total cost of the project. This contribution was made by co-funding some WSPP information dissemination with other ICRW monies and by generating small amounts of monies from miscellaneous services (mostly copying and distribution).

Throughout the project, ICRW was able to leverage \$46,790 from missions as contributions to technical assistance activities. However, \$20,000 of this total was lost to the project through delays by AID/W in meeting fiscal deadlines.

#### WSPP Management Effectiveness

Indicators of management effectiveness reviewed here include the:

- Timeliness in delivering technical assistance and in reporting to missions;
- Quality of technical assistance provided; and
- Quality and timeliness in ICRW's reporting to AID/W.

Apart from difficulties encountered in defining scopes of work adequately, all but two of the missions interviewed considered that technical assistance provided by ICRW was timely. A review of cable traffic related to mission requests for technical assistance from ICRW showed that difficulty in arriving at precise, mutually understood scopes of work for technical assistance activities was usually a problem stemming from the mission's failure to request technical assistance that came within WSPP's focus, namely, the improvement of women's economic opportunities outside the home. In most cases, mutually acceptable scopes of work were eventually defined. In a few cases, however, technical assistance requests were not met because they were considered outside WSPP's purpose.

To compensate for difficulties in using cables to determine mission needs and situations, ICRW tried, whenever feasible, to make stopover visits to missions to obtain firsthand information about technical assistance needs and opportunities. During fiscal year 1983-1984, ICRW adopted a more aggressive management style, which included screening requests for technical assistance not only on the basis of relevance and clarity but also with regard to the commitment shown by the requesting mission and the likelihood that technical assistance would be followed by project implementation.

In Nepal and Thailand ICRW reports to missions were not promptly submitted in keeping with mission needs. In both cases, ICRW staff found it necessary to invest considerable time revising reports prepared by field teams. In Thailand initial work was done by a consultant suggested by AID/W but whose work did not meet ICRW standards. This was one of the instances that led ICRW to resolve not to use consultants, except in teams with ICRW staff. In Nepal work was done by this type of team, but the work of the ICRW staff person proved inadequate as it did in at least one other case (Panama). In Nepal the need to rework the report, which was done at ICRW's expense, resulted in missed deadlines and duplicated efforts by the mission to meet the deadline for submission of a project identification document. The staff member in question is no longer at ICRW.

The quality of project management may also be judged by the quality of technical assistance provided. Establishing and assessing this quality is the focus of findings on project impact, which is discussed in another section. Briefly, that quality was regarded as highly satisfactory by all but three of the missions consulted. In these three, lack of satisfaction was expressed with particular individuals rather than with the field team as a whole or with ICRW. The overall quality of technical assistance provided reflects positively on ICRW project management.

ICRW diligently prepared and submitted regular, comprehensive reports on WSPP activities to AID/W. In addition to quarterly reports, ICRW also prepared a special report after the first year of the project and a fiscal year 1983 end-of-year report, which provided a more in-depth analysis of WSPP-related activities and issues. AID/W project managers believed that these reports met all contractual obligations. Although these reports have served as a ready source of information for this evaluation, they have not been used for any substantive management purpose. Reports submitted by ICRW to AID/W received no feedback. Thus they could not serve as a catalyst for a monitoring-learning process between AID/W and ICRW project managers.

#### WSPP Impact on ICRW

When WSPP began, ICRW was a very small organization with only six permanent staff members and a \$150,000 annual budget, including the first \$50,000 in core support funds awarded by the Ford Foundation. Nevertheless, ICRW members had carried out several major studies on women's productive roles, had made important contributions to the literature on women and development, and had begun to take a role in technical assistance. According to the ICRW director, the initiation of WSPP in 1980 marked the third phase in ICRW's growth and development.

During the first phase (1977-1978), ICRW's work focused on documenting the negative impact of many development projects on poor women and advocating equitable treatment of those women in future development efforts. By 1979, in the context of increased attention to world poverty and the re-focusing on development efforts to meet the needs of the poor majority, ICRW turned to research and documentation of women's poverty and the development potential of women's productive roles. While some technical assistance was provided during this second phase, WSPP technical

assistance activities became ICRW's primary focus. Documentation and analysis, and research activities, fed into and grew out of these technical assistance activities whenever possible.

The S&T/RUID project manager originally saw ICRW as a welcome source of technical assistance to help integrate concern for poor women into AID's merging emphases on private enterprise and on generating employment and income. This focus coincided with ICRW's strategy of promoting attention to women across all development initiatives rather than through projects specific to women. Yet according to the S&T/RUID project manager, there was also some concern about whether ICRW, with more experience in research than in delivering technical assistance, would prove an effective source for technical assistance.

Available documentation shows that WSPP absorbed more than one-half (52-62 percent in various years) of total ICRW staff time. A breakdown of professional staff time shows that about one-half was devoted to technical assistance activities in the field and in Washington. Thus technical assistance activities may be viewed as representing about one quarter of ICRW's total personnel time, with an equal amount of time dedicated to other WSPP activities, such as public education and information dissemination (including the requisite documentation and analysis).

ICRW staff members interviewed regarded technical assistance involvement through WSPP as a source of enrichment for ICRW. Nevertheless, the evaluation team believes that technical assistance activities did not meet their full potential to contribute to analyzing and synthesizing lessons learned and to making greater substantive contributions to knowledge building.

A proposal submitted to the Ford Foundation in January 1983 suggested that ICRW sought more of a balance between technical assistance and research. The proportion of staff time to be

spent in technical assistance was reduced from 58 percent in fiscal year 1983, to 40 percent in fiscal year 1984, and 35 percent in fiscal year 1985. Simultaneously, time allocated for research was projected to increase from 16 to 35 percent. These figures should be viewed as indicators of ICRW's desired organizational balance rather than as an intention to reduce the amount of technical assistance involvement. In that sense, the following observation seems valid.

Although ICRW staff appear to have had enough time to devote to research and documentation and analysis to fulfill institutional objectives in those areas, the nature of the technical assistance limited the extent to which those objectives were fulfilled. The one- or two-shot, short-term nature of technical assistance limited the potential for systematic in-depth learning, which is one of ICRW's primary goals. Similarly, involvement in scattered technical assistance activities with lower than expected learning potential meant that ICRW staff who contributed to both technical assistance and research documentation and analysis efforts found their time fragmented across both roles, except in a few cases in which technical assistance assignments yielded valuable material for analysis.

Had technical assistance activities involved opportunities for more substantive field work (as in the Solanda project in Ecuador), ICRW's contribution to knowledge building through research documentation and analysis would undoubtedly have been greater and the use of personnel time more efficient and effective. Thus, while the impact of WSP on ICRW as a whole has been positive, the institutional growth and development that did take place and the overall contribution that ICRW was able to make were limited by the nature of the technical assistance requested by the missions.

## Marketing

Although ICRW marketing is primarily a problem of broader institutional growth and management, it is relevant to WSPP. Weaknesses in achieving goals and in AID/W project management might have been overcome if ICRW had been more effective at marketing.

As an institutional development matter, marketing involves discovering potential resources and securing them for purposes of continued institutional development and goal achievement. The capability to implement ongoing activities effectively and to generate new opportunities, thereby extending the organization's horizon beyond immediate activities, is an indicator of organizational maturity.

Currently, ICRW appears to rely on proposal-writing and funding cycles, basically a low-key research organization approach to funding. As a result, it is now dependent on large amounts of money from one or two major sources for one or two years at a time.

From the standpoint of organizational development, dependence on short-term funds requires developing a strategy to offset ever-present financial instability. One approach is to recognize the necessity of marketing and to create a permanent organizational role and strategy for it. A second approach is one that the ICRW board is already considering -- a more aggressive role in fund raising by board members. ICRW needs to seek longer-term funding to provide the institutional security necessary for continued effectiveness and development.

### Other Organizational Development Issues

With monies from its Ford Foundation core support grant, an expanding ICRW hired professional consultants to analyze its information system needs. Since 1982, that system has been fully installed and has contributed greatly to organizational order and efficiency.

Finally, one of ICRW's major developmental steps has been the expansion and reorientation of its board. Although not directly a concern of WSPP, this reorientation is discussed here briefly because of its importance to ICRW's general institutional development.

During its first years, 1977-1980, ICRW had what was known as a working board, for example, members who pitched in to help with various administrative and financial matters. With funds from the Ford grant, ICRW hired needed staff and expanded its board membership, while changing the role of the board to an advisory one. The current board has 14 members and meets twice annually.

Comments by one board member indicate that the current board is contemplating further change and a more active role. At the most recent meeting of the board in April 1984, members discussed the need to be more aggressive in finding long-term financial support for ICRW to relieve its dependence on short-term funding. As a step in this direction and to improve ICRW's prestige, board members also agreed that their number should include more outstanding professional women.

This evaluation strongly endorses the board's recommendations. An expanded, more active board might also address the issue of whether to hire additional senior-level staff members to raise ICRW's profile and effectiveness. More important, an expanded board could help redistribute ICRW management

responsibilities, which are now centered in one person whose time as a researcher and provider of high-quality technical assistance is also valuable to ICRW and its clients.

#### PROJECT MANAGEMENT AND IMPACT ON AID/W

##### Project Management by AID/W

This evaluation attempted to determine:

- Whether AID/W project management was carried out as intended; and
- The degree to which it contributed to the overall positive implementation of the project and the accomplishment of its goals.

For various reasons, AID/W project management does not appear as effective as it might have been. In a few instances AID/W may have impeded the realization of WSPP objectives.

WSPP originated from an unsolicited proposal that ICRW presented to AID/W in mid-1980. After positive reviews by the parties consulted, it was determined that the appropriate place to house WSPP was S&T/RUID (then DS/RAD). Although the choice of S&T/RUID was appropriate according to the substantive nature of WSPP, comments written by individuals who reviewed the proposal suggested that other bureaus and offices should be involved in guiding WSPP activities.

Similarly, the statement of work attached to the original ICRW contract stipulated that the Inter-Agency Working Group on Employment Generation, which was superseded by the Employment and Small Enterprise Office (ESE) of S&T/RUID, would provide guidance in selecting countries for ICRW work. Specific requests for technical assistance would be made after consultation with AID field missions, DS/RAD (now S&T/RUID), and other relevant AID/W offices, including the regional bureaus.

In practice and as stipulated in the contract, only S&T/RUID/ESE was involved in project management during the first two years. There was some initial collaboration with officials from three PPC offices and one Latin America bureau office to review the mission requests for technical assistance and set selection criteria, but no continued coordination with other offices occurred as the project developed. Documentation shows that PPC/WID had to request that it be included on the circulation list for project-related information and reports.

For the first two years of the project, PPC/WID played only a marginal role, which reflected its situation as a non-implementing bureau and its own personnel turnover in 1981. However, by mid-1982 new PPC/WID officials expressed interest in WSPP and provided \$232,000 of the \$532,000 budgeted for fiscal year 1983-1984.

Since that time, the project has been managed by both offices. However, philosophical differences between them over the value of the project and further turnover in the PPC/WID office meant that neither office took an active management role. In the process, formal participation by or coordination with the activities of other bureaus ceased altogether.

When the project was extended through fiscal year 1983-1984, WID officers from the four regional bureaus were invited to establish a project committee. The attempt to form a committee comprised entirely of WID officials reveals that WSPP was treated as a WID project by AID/W rather than as a project to generate employment and income. Had the latter been the case, a project committee made up of representatives from relevant technical offices might have been formed.

In any case, even the committee made up of WID officials did not function. Only two of the four regional bureau WID officers interviewed had some knowledge of ICRW activities under WSPP.

Only one (from Latin America and the Caribbean) had participated in related meetings and then only near the beginning of the project. Recent knowledge of WSPP by WID and other AID/W officials interviewed for this evaluation did not come from information communicated through project managers but was based on their own contacts with missions and their participation in ICRW round tables.

Neither PPC/WID nor S&T/RUID appears to have served as a strong voice for ICRW in AID/W or to have helped develop regular channels for communication between ICRW and other parts of AID/W. The lack of close coordination among relevant AID/W offices and between them and ICRW made it difficult for ICRW to compensate for what some staff members described as being outsiders, that is, without access to information that might have been helpful in building a stronger technical assistance program.

A major question is whether WSPP's mission-driven strategy -- defining the technical assistance program on the basis of requests made by missions -- did not place severe constraints on both goal achievement and AID/W management. S&T/RUID concluded early in the project that cable traffic was not an adequate means of defining appropriate scopes of work for focused short-term technical assistance. Nonetheless, it did not adopt a different strategy, perhaps fearing that a more AID/W-driven approach might be regarded as interference by missions. This dilemma is not new in centrally funded activities.

In fiscal year 1983-1984 the introduction of WID funding created renewed interest in WSPP. However, the weak position of the WID office regarding other AID offices continued to limit its contribution to project management.

WSPP Impact on AID/W

In February 1982 ICRW organized a seminar for AID/W on technical assistance under WSPP and on lessons learned to date. In fiscal year 1983-1984, AID/W became an intended beneficiary of WSPP when information dissemination was included in the project purpose. Since that time ICRW has held five specialized seminars treating the integration of women into mainstream development activities in general and in specific sectors or programs such as housing, small enterprise development, and credit. Attendance at these seminars has averaged 30-35 persons, more than one-half from AID/W. Several AID/W individuals interviewed for this evaluation had attended one or more of these seminars, and all agreed that they were technically good and professionally stimulating. Yet they could not give specific examples of how they had applied information or ideas from the seminars in their own work.

In 1982 PPC/WID consulted with ICRW during the preparation of an AID policy paper on women in development. The position taken in that paper coincides strongly with that advocated for some time by ICRW. This view recognizes women's productive as well as reproductive roles and emphasizes the integration of poor women into mainstream development initiatives in all sectors, especially those with employment and income-generation objectives. This policy paper reflected a shift in AID's approach away from projects focused exclusively on the WID field.

Another effect of WSPP on at least some individuals in AID/W has been a clearer understanding of the substantive reasons, beyond equity, for striving to incorporate women into development processes. At the same time, ICRW's own work in the field has demonstrated some strategies that can be used to accomplish this goal. A side effect has been progress in overcoming the somewhat negative image that the WID field had developed within AID

earlier when WID officials tended to criticize lack of attention to women without offering concrete strategies for overcoming this deficiency.

#### IMPACT ON THE GENERAL DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY

ICRW in general, and the WSPP contract in particular, have affected the international development community by disseminating information to policymakers, helping legitimate the WID field, and contributing to knowledge of the field by being at the forefront of analysis of women's roles in development. The evaluation team found that these are valuable achievements that are closely linked to AID support under WSPP.

#### Information Dissemination Efforts

Information dissemination is a term that encompasses two discrete but related ICRW activities -- public information and public education. Public information services are offered by ICRW's Resource Center, which is staffed by a professional librarian (who has been with the organization since early 1981) and a part-time assistant. A substantial portion of the librarian's time and all of the assistant's are covered by WSPP funds.

Experts in the WID field told the evaluators that the Resource Center is probably the best that exists anywhere. Since documents that are not distributed through formal channels make up a large part of the WID literature, at least one U.S.-based organization should make a conscientious effort to collect these hard-to-obtain resources.

Since 1980, the collection has been expanded from 3,000 to 7,500 documents. Most acquisitions have come through exchanges with other information centers and documents collected by ICRW in technical assistance background and delivery activities; some have been purchased with Ford funds. All are referenced in an

up-to-date and user-friendly manual access system. According to the Resource Center librarian, the collection continues to grow at an accelerating rate. Reflecting ICRW's work under WSPP, the collection is especially strong for countries in which AID missions have requested technical assistance.

The use of the Resource Center, other than by ICRW staff members, averaged 7 persons per month from April to June 1983 and 18 per month from April to June 1984. Since June 1982, when the center began keeping records, more than 300 individuals have visited the Resource Center. A few have been AID personnel, usually at the recommendation of the WID office's Documentation Center. AID personnel apparently are not familiar with what is available through ICRW's Resource Center or can find little time to use it. ICRW has made some efforts to coordinate and share information with AID through the Development Information Unit (DIU), a logical contact point between the ICRW and the AID information system.

In the past, the WID office at AID copied selected ICRW publications in large numbers and distributed them without charge. Because of budget cuts, however, this distribution is no longer possible. Instead, ICRW responds to requests for its own publications. Most of the requests, especially from AID missions and developing countries, have been filled free of charge in the past, although recently ICRW has begun charging copying and postage costs in some cases.

In addition, ICRW has sometimes performed information search and copying services for AID and its contractors. For example, an Africa Bureau staff member requested the names of Africans interested in women in agriculture for a conference to be held in Cameroon. ICRW prepared a list of appropriate names and addresses. Occasionally, DIU gets requests for information from missions and refers them to ICRW's Resource Center.

Public education activities partially supported under the WSPP contract have been primarily round table discussions and seminars. Many of these meetings have been linked specifically to WSPP work. In February 1982 the session "Strategies for Technical Assistance: Toward Employment and Income Generation for Women" brought together a diverse group of participants from AID and other Washington-based development agencies. One month later, ICRW held a similar briefing for AID alone, organized by S&T in Rosslyn, Virginia. These sessions served as an informal midpoint evaluation and contributed to the decision to extend the project for an additional two years, fiscal years 1983 and 1984.

Seminars that highlighted specific countries' experiences were initiated later in the contract period. For example, two sessions concerning housing were held in October 1983 -- one in English, covering technical assistance work in Ecuador and Panama, and the other in Spanish, on only the Ecuador case. Two staff members of the implementing agency in Ecuador participated. In June 1984 a workshop on women and credit in Peru reported on the recent effort by ICRW and the Banco Industrial del Peru to design a new strategy for reaching and monitoring women microentrepreneurs with loans.

One criticism of information dissemination efforts was that ICRW often preaches to the converted. This is a matter of interpretation, since an examination of lists of invitees or participants at ICRW seminars indicated attendance by far more than the usual WID regulars. Another concern was that was information disseminated almost entirely in the United States, with no strategy to reach policymakers in the developing world, whether host-country officials or expatriate development practitioners. In general, however, ICRW was viewed as providing unique services through its Resource Center, round tables, and seminars.

### Impact on the WID Field

A major effect of the WSPP contract has been on the WID field. Technical assistance efforts by ICRW have contributed significantly to existing knowledge on WID efforts and the legitimacy of viewing women as productive development resources.

Resistance by development practitioners and policymakers to women's issues is understandable and justifiable when women in development is seen as marginal, specific to women, equity- or welfare-oriented, and normative. In contrast, ICRW has promoted integrating women into mainstream, economically oriented development. This approach coincides with what has emerged as AID's WID policy.

The PPC/WID office's 1982 policy paper, drafted with assistance from ICRW, is a break from the past because it distributed responsibility for incorporating women into productive programming throughout the agency. Highlighting five technical sectors, the paper stressed that WID is not a sector in itself but a concern that cuts across many areas.

Nevertheless, WSPP evaluations indicated that, despite nearly two years of effort to implement the WID policy as an across-the-board concern, there has been little change in mission programs. When mission staff members were asked whether there was any WID strategy, and how it had changed in recent years, responses varied. Most AID mission staff members stated that only lip service had been paid to the idea of involving women and that little was being done in practice. A few insisted that WID is not a fad any longer but an integral part of development. Some respondents felt AID/W pushed too hard on the issue, while others regarded the push from PPC/WID as helpful.

On the positive side, mission staff members had definite opinions about WID. That awareness represents a major change from the situation in 1980, when the equity approach was often the main argument in favor of attention to women and when AID itself had paid little attention to women in its own programs.[1]

S&T's management of the WSPF contract and its insistence on employment and income generation helped set the context in which ICRW could work on mainstream socioeconomic rather than marginal activities specifically focused on WID. AID staff noted with little variation that ICRW staff, consultants, and reports have met high professional and technical standards. The fact that WID specialists and their work were judged as contributing valuable information to mainstream development activities represents a step toward maturity for the WID field.

#### Contributions to WID Knowledge

For those familiar with the WID field, ICRW is a source of intellectual leadership. Its work has been at the forefront of the field, and its scholarship is acknowledged as excellent. One foundation representative said that ICRW's ground-breaking work on households headed by women in the late 1970s had pinpointed a widespread phenomenon that had gone virtually unnoticed and compared the breakthrough to one currently taking hold in the United States -- the concept of the feminization of poverty.

ICRW's capacity as intellectual leader in the WID field is relevant to AID for two reasons. First, breaking down the myths about women is a useful contribution to AID itself and other development organizations. As expressed by one respondent, the role of an outside research organization such as ICRW should not be solely to provide technical assistance on discrete tasks but also to help AID staff members shake up their thinking and beliefs.

Second, two of the three sector papers being prepared by ICRW for PPC/WID draw directly on the empirical experiences provided by WSPP activity. "Low-Income Housing: A Women's Perspective" (April 1984) draws on technical assistance missions to Ecuador and Panama, giving specific recommendations about a technical field that previously failed to take into account women's special needs and capabilities. "Projects for Women in the Third World: Explaining Their Misbehavior" (April 1984) articulates basic paradigms for understanding women's roles in and their impact on development processes. The paper has been distributed widely by the Ford Foundation, which views ICRW as one of a relatively small number of institutions capable of combining research and action with policy-relevant results.

The third sector paper, a review of the literature on women's access to agriculture extension services (currently in production), is not drawn from WSPP experience. However, the topic was chosen because of its importance to AID missions and because it is an area in which ICRW might focus future technical assistance efforts.

### CONCLUSIONS

The major conclusions regarding the management of the project and its effect on Washington-based institutions and the development community follow.

#### Project Management by ICRW

- A core group of ICRW staff has maintained continuity during the life of the project, and changes in project director have largely been offset by the continuity of the same coordinator of the project throughout its life.
- Missions receiving technical assistance reported (with two exceptions) that ICRW staff and consultants were technically skilled, were able to work well with those who received technical assistance, and had an adequate understanding of mission situations and procedures.

- Project targets were met, and with few exceptions missions reported that the quality of the technical assistance delivered was good to excellent.
- Technical assistance reports were delivered to missions in a timely fashion, with two exceptions. The quality of reports was rated as very good, both technically and in form of presentation (with two exceptions). Reports to AID/W were submitted on a regular basis and were regarded as adequate by AID/W project managers.
- Funds were generally used as budgeted. During fiscal year 1983-1984, ICRW shared project costs through an \$8,000 contribution. A total of \$46,790 was leveraged by ICRW from five missions and PPC/WID for WSPP.
- The average cost per person-week of technical assistance delivered under WSPP, using in-field, Washington-based, and management expenses, was about \$2,700, less if management costs were broken down more specifically.
- ICRW received little effective support from AID/W project managers, but stronger ICRW project management (including marketing) might have compensated for this situation.

#### Impact on ICRW

- Four years of continuous support under WSPP enabled ICRW to consolidate its own institutional development and technical assistance orientation. However, at the moment, ICRW remains dependent on relatively short-term contracts, largely from AID.
- WSPP has been a vehicle through which ICRW has made a transition from an organization that is focused primarily on research to one that is experienced and competent at providing technical assistance as well.
- WSPP involvement enabled ICRW to make some links among technical assistance, research and documentation-analysis, and information dissemination. Nevertheless, built-in limitations stemming from the technical assistance delivery model used in WSPP and from the nature of mission requests prevented ICRW from having as much impact as it might have had at the field level and through complementary analysis and information dissemination.

### Project Management By AID/W

- While WSPP aimed at working multisectorally and in all AID regions, AID/W did not encourage enough multisectoral and inter-regional collaboration at the management level.
- The project's mission-driven strategy limited the options open to AID/W project managers.
- WSPP focused on two areas that were not well established in AID programming, that is, WID and generating employment and income. Although this focus may have contributed to the high level of mission interest in the project, it also contributed to implementation difficulties.
- S&T/RUID participation in project management complemented the ICRW focus on economic opportunities for women and contributed to the acceptance of WID-related technical assistance as a mainstream development activity.
- Personnel turnover in PPC/WID because of administrative changes resulted in more interest and goal compatibility between that office and ICRW. However, turnover in PPC/WID also limited the development of intra-AID collaboration.

### Impact on AID/W

- ICRW played a role in the development of the current AID/WID policy paper, which coincides with ICRW's own integrationist strategy. Both that policy paper and ICRW have contributed to a more positive, technically competent image of WID among some members of AID/W.
- The impact on AID/W has been mostly informal, through ICRW policy round tables and publications.

### Impact on General Development Community

- The Resource Center and public education activities are valuable, but additional effort is needed to reach those who are not aware of what ICRW offers.
- ICRW is performing an important function by speaking to mainstream development people in their own terms.
- ICRW is increasing the legitimacy of the WID field.

- Some AID staff (and the broader development community) show improvement in awareness and understanding of WID issues. However, many remain uneducated, and the ICRW role of challenging myths about women and offering alternatives is an important one.

#### NOTES

- 1 Blair, Patricia. "Women's Issues in U.S. AID Administration: Implementation of the Percy Amendment." 1983. Equity Policy Center.

## CHAPTER THREE

## IMPACT OF WSPP IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

## OVERVIEW

Intended beneficiaries of ICRW technical assistance in developing countries were:

- AID missions;
- Local implementing organizations (generally a PVO); and
- Low-income women of the countries visited.

The main findings are that the quality of the technical assistance was high and that the overall technical assistance effort served some important educational purposes for missions and implementing agencies. AID/W and ICRW did not agree about the relationship between the work with AID missions and implementing agencies and the impact on low-income women. Nor was there consistency about the priority that should be placed on helping low-income women. As a result, ICRW's field-level work was dispersed among policy, implementation, and research activities. WSPP's impact on job and income opportunities for women, therefore, was slight or nonexistent.

## IMPACT ON AID MISSIONS

As shown in Table 7, ICRW will have made 28 visits to 17 countries under this contract by the end of its four-year period of operation. Despite high-quality and numerous technical assistance assignments, change at AID missions was minimal.

An examination of missions' motivations for requesting ICRW technical assistance, the selection criteria used to decide which assignments would be undertaken, the factors involved in

**Previous Page Blank**

TABLE 7

## SUMMARY OF ICRW TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE DELIVERY

Country	Visit Dates(s)	No. People	Time in Country (# person-weeks)	Time In D.C.*	Type of TA Assignment (see key)
Ecuador**	1/1981	1	1.5	7	INST. ASS'T.
	1/1982	1	2.5	8	PROJ.-SPEC.
	5/1982	1	1	2	PROJ.-SPEC.
Dominican Republic	1/1981	2	6	16	PROJ.-SPEC.
	1/1982	2	3	3	PROJ.-SPEC.
	5/1983	3	8	12	PROJ.-SPEC.
Costa Rica	4/1981 &	1	Total:	Total:	PROJ.-SPEC.
	6/1981	1	4 wks.	8 wks.	PROJ.-SPEC.
Thailand	3/1981	1	3	12	PORT. REVIEW
Indonesia	6/1981	2	4	6	PORT. REVIEW
Honduras	6/1981	1	1	1	DEF. S.O.W.
	9/1981	2	6	14	EMPLT. STRAT.
Panama	9/1981	1	1	2	EMPLT. STRAT.
	11/1982	2	6	16	PROJ.-SPEC.
Kenya	11/1981	2	5	10	INST. ASS'T.
Zaire	12/1981	1	1	2	DEF. S.O.W.
Tanzania	11/1981	1	1	10***	DEF. S.O.W.
Jamaica	6/1982	2	5	7	PROJ.-SPEC.
Jordan	9/1982	1	2	5	PROJ.-SPEC.
	11/1983	2	5	4	PROJ.-SPEC.
Barbados	9/1982	1	1	1	DEF. S.O.W.
Peru	5/1983	1	2	5	PORT. REV.
	2/1984	3	7	16	PROJ.-SPEC.
	10/1984*****		2	1	PROJ.-SPEC.
Nepal	8/1983	1	1	3	DEF. S.O.W.
	11/1983	2	6	14	PROJ.-SPEC.
India	7/1983	3	12	16	INST. ASS'T.

TABLE 7 (continued)

Country	Visit Dates(s)	No. People	Time in Country (# person-weeks)	Time in D.C.*	Type of TA Assignment (see key)
Egypt	4/1984	1	3	6	EMPT. STRAT.
Other		—	—	<u>24</u>	
<b>TOTALS:</b>					
	17	28	100	231	

\* Professional time only: for preparing and writing reports and for follow-up.

\*\* The Ecuador technical assistance was begun under the WSPP contract that is the subject of this evaluation. A separate mission contract was signed with ICRW in 1982, under which a number of technical assistance visits took place. This list does not include those visits, but they are listed in Appendix E, which describes the Ecuador case.

\*\*\* The Tanzania situation involved two postponements of a scheduled trip by an ICRW consultant to deliver technical assistance and then a cancellation of the trip altogether. This explains the high ratio of home office to field time; the preparation was done, but only the scope-of-work visit took place, not the comprehensive work.

\*\*\*\* Anticipated visit. (Contract to be extended at no additional cost to allow this and other phase-out activities.)

KEY TO ABBREVIATIONS FOR TYPE OF ASSIGNMENT      TOTAL # VISITS  
IN CATEGORY

DEF. S.O.W.	= Definition of Scope of Work	5
PORT. REVIEW	= Portfolio Review	3
EMPT. STRAT.	= Employment Strategy	3
INST. ASS'T.	= Institutional Assessment	3
PROJ.-SPEC.	= Project-specific	<u>14</u>
	<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>28</b>

delivering technical assistance effectively to missions, and the critical factors in mission follow-up of ICRW's work indicate that:

- The goals of ICRW's technical assistance to missions were not clearly understood by them at the outset of WSPP, leading to some vagueness about ICRW's preferred role;
- The requests from missions were generally rather modest in scope -- for example, for activities that were not part of an overall strategy to incorporate women into productive activities;
- The centrally funded nature of the contract meant that AID/W and ICRW had to be responsive to what the missions wanted, rather than having the opportunity to shape the technical assistance as they might have wished; and
- The work with missions, in particular, the follow-up of that work, was affected by many factors beyond the control of AID/W or ICRW.

#### Mission Objectives in Requesting ICRW Services

Many mission responses to the December 1980 cable announcing WSPP did not mention specific tasks, although most missions seemed to understand the project's emphasis on women and employment and wanted to take advantage of the opportunity to get expert help in formulating programs that could use women as productive resources. Since they had little experience in this field, most missions assumed the posture of interested novices rather than as thoughtful proponents of the value of integrating women into activities. Early requests were modest, sometimes vague, and usually for a one-shot visit to the mission. They revealed little evidence of overall strategy on the subject.

Requests for technical assistance were initiated by a wide range of mission staff members, from mission directors to host-country national WID officers. Of the 24 indications of interest received in response to the 1980 announcement cable, the most specific request named the task, the dates of the trip, and

the qualifications desirable for team members. The most general expressions of interest asked for additional information about whether language and sector capability were available from the contractor. The cables reflected such diverse interests as expanding mission activities, assisting or reorienting local PVOs, sensitizing mission staff to women's potential contributions, and simple curiosity about a local nontraditional women's project.

Interviews determined that in most cases WID officers or other mid-level mission staff were responsible for technical assistance requests. Of the 12 countries called or visited for this evaluation, technical assistance requests were made by two mission directors and two deputy directors. In the one country, the mission director seems to have been sincerely interested in the issue of women's participation in development; in the other, the principal goal was merely to prime a rapidly growing mission with all available resources.

Other requests were made by WID officers. Some host-country national AID employees wanted the extra assistance and clout that a team of outsiders could provide. One WID officer, who did not have the time or expertise to cover all the sector areas for which she was responsible, realized that ICRW technical assistance could be used to help design a new project. Another WID officer hoped that the ICRW's visit would help the mission regard her input as more valuable. Low status was a particular problem for WID officers who were host-country nationals. In some missions, U.S. national WID officers were responsible for requests for ICRW technical assistance. These included examining a specific PVO's capability to implement a productive project for women, reviewing selected mission projects, and analyzing their potential to include women as participants and beneficiaries.

Other requests came for different reasons. In one country, a female housing officer wanted information about a local women's group involved in nontraditional housing construction. She proposed doing the investigation herself but was told she could not afford the time from her usual duties. (Ironically, she estimates that the time needed to get the ICRW team into the field -- at least a week, all told, over a six-month period--was longer than it would have taken her to do the investigation.)

Some missions wanted to take advantage of the free technical assistance offered but were not sure how. Substantial cable traffic was necessary for ICRW and AID/W to decide whether to accept or reject each request. In some cases, stopover visits were the only way that ICRW could determine whether work in the country was worth pursuing. For example, Zaire cabled that it wanted to "explore WID opportunities and ICRW's capacity to assist." On a stopover visit after an assignment in another African country, the ICRW staff member and the mission agreed that the country was not a good choice for more ICRW technical assistance. Nonetheless, the Zaire mission felt that the one-week assignment had been useful and was able to find other sources for assistance. For the most part, technical assistance requests were exploratory and only loosely connected to field-level activities.

What was expected from technical assistance by missions? Interviews uncovered a broad spectrum of responses. Most missions hoped to receive a document, such as a section for a country development strategy statement, and an opportunity to learn more about the WID field. The WID officer in a very large mission wanted an assessment of selected past projects, and ideas for the future in certain sectors -- a conscientious decision, made in conjunction with ICRW, not to try to influence the entire mission program. The inquisitive housing specialist mentioned

above wanted a simple description of the nontraditional employment experience she had seen and an unsophisticated assessment of the potential to replicate that experience.

In general, missions' hopes were to get some needed expertise that could help answer a question about women's participation in productive activities. Most requests were first steps that, in the mission's view, might or might not require additional follow-up. Thanks to the (sometimes prolonged) negotiations on scopes of work, missions did seem to understand the project's emphasis on women's productive activities and on integrating a concern for women into large development programs. However, missions did not seem to expect that the initial technical assistance visit would lead directly to creating jobs or to generating new income opportunities for low-income women.

#### Selection Criteria for Response to Mission Requests

Because the initial number of requests for ICRW technical assistance was far greater than could be accommodated under the project, ICRW and AID/W had to define selection criteria. Since the contract was centrally funded, Washington could try to educate and influence missions about the importance of women's productive contributions, but it was the missions that ultimately decided whether to use the technical assistance. Rather than define the role that ICRW would prefer to play, the original cable stressed the substantive focus of the work -- women and employment -- not WID in general.

At first, the selection criteria were based primarily on the degree to which the mission seemed to have understood and accepted this substantive focus. During the first two years of activity, the importance of other factors, such as support from a mission's senior staff and a project-specific focus, became clear.

Even these criteria were not sufficient. In a relatively difficult area such as WID, and especially in the field of women's productive activities, it is important to have as much information as possible before deciding whether to invest scarce technical assistance resources to change the status quo. Although ICRW tried informally to gather information about missions, those efforts proved insufficient. As an alternative, increased use was made of stopover visits to gain a better appreciation of the cultural, economic, and host-government climate as well as of the degree of real mission interest and support. The Zaire case illustrated the usefulness of such a visit for both ICRW and the mission. Short, early visits in Ecuador led to more work later, another example of the value of a get-acquainted strategy.

The ICRW contract has differed from other technical assistance arrangements (for example, the Overseas Education Fund's Women in Development Project) in that its primary function has been to assist AID missions. In a few cases the technical assistance reached the local implementing agencies, but in no case did it reach directly the low-income women of the country. Technical assistance was actually more effective in policy implementation than in actual changes in the field, which raises the issue of whether ICRW's work increased the AID mission's capability to implement policy. The minimal follow-up to technical assistance and the few positive examples of the incorporation of women into mainstream projects, especially productive ones, suggest that the capability remained weak. The further issue is whether this capability should be built into AID missions or whether outsiders such as ICRW might better play that role.

In the future, selection criteria for technical assistance assignments should include an assessment of the climate and needed skills within missions and of the objectives to transfer skills.

Factors Important in Effective Technical Assistance Delivery to Missions

Technical assistance assignments were regarded as most effective by those interviewed when several factors were present:

- The scope of work for the assignment was well-defined;
- There was high-level support in the mission for the subject of the work;
- The mission perceived itself as having control over the assignment;
- The task fit into some high-priority mission program; and
- ICRW's performance was satisfactory.

Deriving a scope of work for ICRW technical assistance that both responded to mission needs and fit WSP selection criteria was a key factor in effective work with missions under this project. Staff members at several missions mentioned that ICRW helped to define the scope of work. But it was clear that most missions wanted to ensure that they -- not AID/W or ICRW -- were the final arbiters of what work would be done.

Another variable critical to effective work with missions was the strength and level of mission support and interest. One country in which the mission director had a strong interest actually paid a substantial portion of the technical assistance costs. The WID officer interviewed stated that "since the mission director wanted the technical assistance, it went forward, no matter where funding had to come from. If support had not been there from the top, the trip would not have taken place."

The majority of the comments about the quality of ICRW's team members and their work were positive, with a few dissenting views. Comments from missions generally indicated that the teams were excellent, knew AID procedures, and had a good approach. AID/W interviewees consistently referred to ICRW as professional,

competent, responsible, and well regarded in the development community. ICRW's integrationist approach to WID was generally regarded as appropriate and useful.

On the negative side, one mission felt that it had received "only half a team -- one person was excellent; the other did not listen to what we wanted." A concern that this second person would be sent again was a factor in the mission's decision not to ask for a follow-up visit. When the interviewee learned that the person was no longer associated with ICRW, she expressed interest in reinitiating ICRW technical assistance.

In a different country, technical assistance by the same person provoked a similar response. In this case, the technical assistance request had been for contributions to project design, but the ICRW team produced a justification for why the project should take place. This mistake elicited a negative review by the mission of ICRW's work and seems to have been a contributing factor in the termination of this individual's association with WSPP activities.

One criticism was the research orientation of the WSPP. When asked to compare ICRW services with other technical assistance services, several mission people replied that the comparison would not be fair unless it was between one research organization and another. One person stated, "Most technical assistance is action-oriented; why would you call in a research group (such as ICRW) to write the project paper?" In that person's opinion, ICRW's value to AID was in promoting new learning. Although ICRW might not be called on to write a project paper, the respondent valued the role of helping to shake up some of AID's beliefs about women, "breaking down myths about women so that new assumptions and strategies can be put into practice."

AID/W also believed that ICRW was sometimes overly oriented toward research -- which was seen as a useful approach for clarifying issues but not for making practical recommendations

concerning implementation. A variation of this comment was that ICRW could not quite figure out what it wanted to be: research- or action-oriented, identified as an American center, or one that identified more with the developing world.

More than just interview data are available to assess ICRW's performance. Cables from missions following the technical assistance visit often made some assessment of the team's work. These cables were generally laudatory, with one or two exceptions when a report was late or some other difficulty had arisen.

#### Factors Important in Follow-Up to Technical Assistance by Missions

The results of short-term technical assistance can only be as good as the follow-up done once the visits are over and the reports have been presented. ICRW's performance does not seem to be a key factor in follow-up: Despite the good work done by ICRW, there was relatively little concrete follow-up and therefore little real impact on missions, implementing institutions, and low-income women. Two primary structural factors seem to explain the low level of follow-up by missions:

- The one-shot and ad hoc nature of the technical assistance; and
- The low priority assigned by missions to the subject of women's involvement in development.

These two factors are interrelated. Most missions had modest expectations about the results of ICRW technical assistance. Few missions had job creation as a direct objective of the technical assistance. One short visit would not have been enough to achieve job-creation objectives in any case. Still, several missions would like to have had more follow-up. The main reasons why there was little follow-up include:

- Problems of staff time, interest, and turnover in missions;
- Mission policy changes; and
- Political changes in the host country.

When ICRW was in-country, some staff members at busy field missions viewed technical assistance as a burden and did not have time for follow-up once the team departed. The degree of staff interest, and the level at which it existed, were also important. Most WID officers, especially host country nationals, were powerless to implement ICRW recommendations. Conversely, AID staff members did not want to push for a nonpriority issue. Only a few countries that received technical assistance had high-level support for WID among mission staff members.

Another important factor was mission staff turnover. In some cases, the transfer of an interested person to another mission meant that follow-up activities ceased.

Yet staff time, interest, and turnover need not have been decisive. The difficulty was that there were no countervailing pressures to offset the dispersion of mission staff members' energies. No contract existed for ICRW to return to a country after a preliminary visit, so there were no deadlines by which a given next step had to be accomplished. AID/W exerted little or no pressure once the technical assistance ended, and ICRW had no authority to promote follow-up. Had creating jobs for women been a high-priority issue for AID, there would have been incentives and rewards for following up. By most reports, however, there was no pressure to follow up.

In a few countries macroeconomic or political factors caused follow-up problems. In Honduras, where the mission director's support was strongest, the intention to incorporate ICRW's work into the forthcoming process for a country development strategy statement was frustrated when political factors resulted in its

suspension altogether. Tanzania's debt situation halted all new AID project efforts just as an ICRW consultant was about to begin an assignment. In Costa Rica, balance-of-payments concerns have diverted AID funding away from the small-scale projects that had focused on women as beneficiaries.

The examination of a women's self-help housing project in Panama (not funded by AID, but of interest to the housing officer as a possible model program) concluded that more women could be trained to perform the technical skills that were being handled well by the group studied. To date, no use has been made of this job-creation strategy.

The evaluation team asked missions whether there were any unintended or unexpected outcomes of the technical assistance. One country responded that ICRW had identified local human resources and some data on women and had also helped train the WID officers and others in the mission about the right questions to ask. In another country, both serendipity and a WID officer's perseverance played a role: By chance, the ICRW team was in-country while a university-based team was carrying out a study on rural financial markets in preparation for an agricultural credit program. The university team's questionnaire was designed for and about men and, as it stood, was of no use in collecting data about rural women's use of credit. The WID officer had to exert substantial influence to have the questionnaire changed but was successful in doing so. Although this was only a minor victory, it shows that perseverance is necessary for technical assistance to have an impact.

Issues for Missions: Policy Climate and Policy Capability

Two general issues in the analysis of what has been done to date are important if WID-related technical assistance to missions is to be continued. One is the policy for projects

involving women as full participants and beneficiaries in development. The other is whether missions should implement WID policy directly or rely on groups such as ICRW.

### Policy Context

WID is a difficult concept that is not well understood. Overseas development practitioners often pay lip service to its principles, but do not take action to implement them. Persistence is necessary to achieve results in this situation. Although it would have been desirable to effect some changes for low-income women, targeting AID itself under WSPP was probably a necessary step to take in an unsympathetic policy environment.

WID is not an issue only for AID. Substantial documentation exists to show that women have often been hurt, rather than helped, by development efforts of various donors. Evidence is mounting to show that development programs are more likely to reach their objectives when women's potential roles and contributions are explicitly taken into account.

Originally, many development practitioners viewed WID as an equity issue, justified by a comparison between men's and women's opportunities. Later, WID was promoted as a poverty issue. Only recently has the focus changed to regard women as productive resources who can assist economic growth policies. Some persist in viewing WID as a welfare-oriented or social question rather than an economic one, and most continue to consider it a sector in itself rather than a concern that cuts across technical sectors.

Another source of debate is the question of women-specific versus integrationist approaches. Following an integrationist approach (as ICRW and PPC/WID currently do) does not necessarily imply that women-specific projects are always inappropriate. Indeed, they may be necessary at times. ICRW has argued in

several of its WSPP reports that women in developing countries are often at different starting points than men and may need different strategies. Separate, often marginal, women-specific projects simply do not recognize the contributions of women in agriculture, small enterprise, and other productive activities. The integrationist approach is a reaction against the long-held view that women-specific programs are the sole means of focusing on women.

Building the Capacity for WID Policy Implementation Within AID

Ideally, to affect job opportunities for women, AID and other major donors should train all staff members to perceive the differential impact of programs on women and to take steps to correct this problem. To date, selected AID staff have participated in two training sessions using business-school-type case studies prepared by a team from the Harvard Institute for International Development. Two additional workshops are planned for Washington in late 1984. In early 1985, this WID training methodology will be used overseas for the first time. This is an excellent start at educating and training AID employees, but these sessions cannot be used for everyone. Decisions will need to be made about how many staff members can be reached this way, at which points in their careers (initial training versus mid-career), at which levels (senior Washington and/or mission staff, or mid-level individuals), and in which sectors. If scarce resources and the political climate limit the time and money for staff training, other options should be considered.

Building policy analysis and policy implementation capability in developing countries may be pursued either through an internal capacity approach, in which staff members themselves learn the skills needed to make policy in a particular sector, or through a process-capacity approach, in which staff members hire others to do the work and then use their results. A recent paper on this choice highlights the built-in turnover of AID mission

staff, compares it to the staff discontinuity found in government ministries, and points out that AID missions rely on the process-capacity approach in many instances.[1] Defining the scope of work, asking some outside (non-AID) organization to fulfill the assignment, and then feeding the results back into AID procedures and programs can be used for a number of areas. One specific example cited by the paper is the increasing use of management consulting firms to support AID's shift toward the private sector.

In the area of WID policy implementation, some clearer understanding must be reached with respect to ICRW's main task in providing technical assistance. Is the goal to sensitize and educate AID mission personnel about WID issues and to transfer the information and skills they will need to incorporate women into mission programming? If so, this strategy is severely limited by the time available to mission staff members, the interest they have in the subject, and the priority assigned to WID by AID.

Or is the goal for ICRW itself to carry out data gathering (for example, about women's participation in a country's labor force), to analyze the overlap between women's situations and AID programming, and to make recommendations? If so, AID mission personnel may use the results if the incentives are there, but they will not learn the skills needed to carry out a similar analysis for another project or in another country. This second scenario, however, is less time consuming for AID staff and does not depend on the interest and training of busy, specialized bureaucrats.

## IMPLEMENTING INSTITUTIONS

### Overview

Three main issues are addressed in this section.

- The extent to which ICRW should be involved in field-level implementation;
- The most appropriate implementing institutions for a field-level focus; and
- The conditions under which a field-level focus should be carried out.

The WSPP centrally funded project was designed to provide services in response to requests from field missions. The WSPP contract announcement cable of December 1980 listed six possible uses of the ICRW's technical assistance. Only one of these specifically mentioned organizations other than AID, suggesting contact with "host-government officials, academics, and voluntary associations." No specific objectives were set.

Eight of the 17 countries visited did request work that related to local implementing institutions in some way. ICRW assessed local PVO capabilities in three countries; helped design a project proposal for one PVO; held an in-country seminar for a group of PVOs and other interested parties; and provided in-depth work with local implementing institutions in the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, and Peru. (Case studies of ICRW's work in the Dominican Republic and Ecuador may be found in Appendixes E and F.)

### Dominican Republic and Ecuador Case Findings

Evaluation findings indicate that ICRW technical assistance in both countries was good and was more substantive than in most other countries. Yet in neither case has objectives for low-income women been fulfilled as intended.

In the Dominican Republic, ICRW helped a PVO's vocational training and job placement project at three stages: the base-line survey, the project design, and the midpoint evaluation. The PVO had received an operational program grant (OPG) to carry out the program. The hope was that it could become a model project, offering women real economic opportunities through vocational training in nontraditional areas as well as the support they needed to put the skills to use in viable enterprises. This was an ambitious plan for a two-year period. From the perspective of ICRW's technical assistance, the project fell short of desired goals. While the human development training, which was also a part of the program, flourished and the women participants certainly have gained new attitudes about themselves and their roles, few women have received skills that could lead to significant income generation or job placement.

The implementing agency in the Dominican Republic has had broad experience with educational programs, but it has never before tried to implement a grassroots action project. Six months after project implementation began, the PVO director contacted the ICRW staff member who had helped with the base-line survey and the project's design. The PVO requested that the same ICRW staff member make another visit to help ensure that the project was on track. However, since this person was about to leave ICRW and the PVO did not want a substitute, no ICRW visit was made until the midpoint evaluation. That evaluation pointed out implementation weaknesses, and the PVO director, judging that the criticisms were too severe, sought no further relationship with ICRW.

In Ecuador, ICRW began its work under the WSPP contract and then received its own OPG to continue providing technical assistance to a local PVO engaged in a large housing program. Delays in construction were far greater than expected, and to date no houses have been completed and no owners selected from

the applicant pool. Thus it is too early to know how households headed by women will benefit from the project. ICRW's technical assistance was valued by the local PVO, which needed help in research methods (questionnaire, coding, and sampling designs) and was interested in the results of ICRW's study of female heads of households and their ability to afford the down payments or the monthly installments for the housing.

An analysis of these two cases yields useful conclusions about the issues involved in providing technical assistance on a recurring basis. First, in both the Dominican Republic and Ecuador, top-level PVO officials requested technical assistance for their projects, but it was mid-level staff who actually worked with ICRW teams. In both cases, difficulties were encountered in achieving positive working relationships. In the Dominican Republic, the efforts were not successful. In Ecuador, where the technical assistance relationship covered a 17-month period, a positive, productive relationship was established in difficult circumstances. One way to achieve good working relationships more rapidly would be for ICRW to use preliminary visits to gain the trust and confidence of the PVO technicians and hear their views about the work needed.

The second issue is the structure of the program of technical assistance visits. The ICRW OPG awarded by the Ecuador mission made it possible to plan a series of technical assistance visits and to maintain continuity. In Ecuador, the local organization knew that ICRW would be returning on a regular basis. In the Dominican Republic, however, no such continuity existed. ICRW made three visits there, but each was discrete, with no plans for follow-up.

The Ecuador model is a better basis for future ICRW technical assistance work. Longer-term involvement is necessary if technical assistance is to have a sustained impact on missions, local implementing institutions, and low-income women. If a mission or local agency wants to receive ICRW assistance,

then the mission or agency should take some responsibility for ensuring a return on the technical assistance investment. The selection criteria for countries and organizations that might receive future technical assistance ought to include a demonstrated willingness to be ICRW's partner in the effort to incorporate women as productive resources into programming. The optimal number and duration of visits are impossible to define without knowing the specific technical assistance objectives. Some people in Ecuador believed that each visit should have been longer, to provide better guidance to the local technicians who were to implement the suggestions.

One issue raised by WSPP is the extent to which ICRW should be involved in the implementation of projects. At one extreme is the option of ICRW's returning for example, once a year, to check with an organization about its progress or even evaluate it formally, as in the Dominican Republic. At the other end of the spectrum is the option of ICRW's providing one or more full-time staff persons to help implement and monitor projects.

Some AID staff and ICRW board members have suggested that ICRW become far more involved in implementation in the future. Increased ICRW participation in implementation is an option to be carefully considered if a new technical assistance project is funded. ICRW is not now structured to give home-office support to long-term staff overseas; a careful allocation of ICRW resources among field-level, policy-level, and information dissemination activities is needed.

A second issue is whether ICRW should provide technical assistance to missions, government agencies, or local PVOs. This is worth specific attention by AID/W and ICRW. In the Dominican Republic, ICRW involvement was too limited to prevent a technically oriented project from degenerating into a more welfare-oriented one -- a classic case of the misbehavior of a project, as described in an ICRW 1984 sector paper. Interviewees in the Dominican Republic believed that it might have been more

efficient to use ICRW staff to influence large mission projects rather than investing their efforts in a somewhat marginal PVO effort.

In Ecuador, a key AID mission staff member is optimistic about the upcoming involvement of ICRW in the implementation of an AITEC credit program for microentrepreneurs. No ICRW staff member will be based in Ecuador, but a locally hired person will serve as a full-time liaison to ICRW. This arrangement should provide a good opportunity for ICRW to obtain some experience in supporting project implementation. This experience should help determine whether further involvement in project implementation is appropriate or necessary.

If ICRW chooses to become more directly involved in project implementation, projects should be very carefully selected. Whether projects are AID, with governments, or PVOs, the important criterion is that the appropriate conditions exist for input to be meaningful and to produce tangible results.

In summary, AID and ICRW need to assess the extent to which ICRW should be involved in implementation. Determining whether missions, host-government agencies, or PVOs are to be the target of efforts should depend primarily on avoiding marginal projects in which the lessons of even excellent technical assistance results might be wasted. Finally, establishing the optimal conditions for successful technical assistance depends on the quality of the relationship with the implementing organization, the continuity of ICRW visits, and the opportunity to work on a longer-term basis than has been the case under WSPP.

#### WSPP IMPACT ON LOW-INCOME WOMEN IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

The technical assistance provided by ICRW under the WSPP contract appears to have had little impact on employment and income opportunities of low-income women in those developing

countries that received technical assistance. The main reasons for this conclusion are that:

- The gap between technical assistance provision and change in field-level reality was too great; and
- WSPP provided technical assistance in areas that were new to many AID personnel, and the technical assistance role was relatively new to ICRW.

The project goal and purpose imply that short-term technical assistance delivered by ICRW can link AID development programs with the welfare of low-income women in developing countries. The assumption behind the project goal was that short-term technical assistance is an input sufficient to make a difference in AID efforts and women's future opportunities. Evaluation findings indicate that this assumption was false for WSPP.

If the project was intended to affect low-income women, then it was too ambitious given the nature and scope of technical assistance activities. Trips were very short (two to four weeks, in most cases); in many countries, only one visit and one report resulted from ICRW's work. No matter how skillful the observation, analysis, and writing, such limited interventions could not have resulted in actual change in the field. This is especially true because WID issues were not a high priority for AID missions during 1980-1984.

Portfolio reviews may be worthwhile in raising the awareness of mission staffs, but they do not automatically move resources to programs reaching women. Designing projects through project implementation documents or even project papers may be important, but without other input, proposed projects do not become reality. Even when a project is actually implemented, success in creating employment or income for participants depends on a variety of factors besides the quality of project design. Thus it was incorrect to assume that WSPP as implemented could have had direct impact on a target population.

In a high-priority area, staff time is made available, as are resources, additional technical advisers, etc. In a low-priority area, which women's involvement has been at AID, these critical contributions are usually not available.

Failure by missions to make better use of technical assistance may be due to the newness of the WSPP focus. In 1980 WSPP brought together variations on standard development wisdom in three ways. First, ICRW's focus on viable, productive projects was different from much WID work. Until that time, much of the work on WID had been theoretical or research oriented, had emphasized social and organizational rather than productive goals, and had been implemented primarily in the form of projects specific to women. If these projects for women had any economic focus at all, they were generally so heavily subsidized that they lacked any independent financial viability.

Second, a focus on women was new to the field of small-scale enterprise (SSE) in 1980. Although SSE programs had been going on for some time, women had not often been a target or beneficiary of these efforts.[2] In addition, women appear mostly in the informal rather than the formal sector, and by 1980 few efforts had reached microentrepreneurs. The PISCES program, in operation for about a year, was still in its first (study) phase. Recognizing that women are key actors in the microenterprise sector is a new focus.[3]

Finally, ICRW was changing its focus in 1980 from a poverty-oriented approach to an economic-growth approach. Thus WSPP began when the productive focus was new to WID, the focus on women was new to productive development sectors, and the economic-growth focus was new to ICRW. It takes time and experience to fine-tune a new approach. When these three new approaches were being tried at once, the work was likely to meet far more resistance and simple lack of understanding than it would have in some more standard type of assistance.

The field visits to two countries provided information about the impact that WSPP had on low-income women there. In Ecuador, the focus of the technical assistance was data collection, processing, and analysis. The objective was to ensure that women heads of households would be included among the population selected to occupy the new housing being built. An ICRW study on the financial situation of households headed by women led to a change in the down-payment regulations for all applicants. This change enabled more women heads of households to be eligible for this housing. However, delays in construction and the resulting increased costs have led to the likelihood that the final price of housing will be so high that many of these women will be excluded.

In the Dominican Republic, the major success of the local PVO's project was the human development training. This component represents the objective of raising awareness among women about their potential roles. Implementing agencies throughout the world have long seen this social or organizational focus as an important dimension of projects specific to women. However, evidence indicates that an alternative focus on economic viability is more important as a first priority. In the Dominican Republic, there was some vocational training, but few trainees have been placed in jobs. Some attempt has been made to help individual women obtain small loans to expand or establish their own businesses, but to date, there has been no follow-up, that is, management training, quality control advice, or marketing assistance, for loan recipients. Women who did not qualify for loans have been left to themselves, without raw materials or working capital and with no assistance to organize collectively around productive goals.

## CONCLUSIONS

### AID Missions

- Most missions were highly satisfied with ICRW's work. However, they reported little evidence of impact on low-income women that could be attributed to technical assistance by ICRW.
- Missions did not usually expect technical assistance to have a direct impact at the field level. Requests usually involved discrete activities that were not directly related to project implementation.
- Even so, impact might have been greater had such things as the low priority given by most missions to WID concerns and lack of time and turnover by staff not precluded better use and follow-up of technical assistance.
- Most AID missions do not offer contexts that translate in- to short-term to WID-related technical assistance at the field level.

### Implementing Institutions

- ICRW's work with implementing institutions was also in the context of discrete activities not usually related to project implementation, and it resulted in little impact on low-income women.
- Longer-term relationships between ICRW and implementing institutions did occur in the Dominican Republic and in Ecuador. In both cases, greater investments were made in building relationships and working jointly with institutional staff. In the Dominican Republic, however, disagreements over project objectives led to discontinuing ICRW involvement. In Ecuador, where work was much more intensive, good relationships were developed, but because of project implementation delays, the ICRW contract ended before project implementation began in full.

### Low-Income Women

- There is little evidence of impact on low-income women as a result of WSPP activities.

- If future WID-related technical assistance is aimed at the field level, a different project design and model for technical assistance involvement will be required.

NOTES

- 1 Bremer, Jennifer. "Sustainability without Staff: Building Policy Analysis Capability in Developing Countries." 1984. IRD Working Paper no. 11, Development Alternatives, Inc., Washington, D.C.
- 2 Pezzullo, Susan. "An Assessment of Five National Development Foundations: A Description of Their Credit Programs and Their Level of Assistance to Women." 1983. Pan American Development Foundation, Washington, D.C.
- 3 Reichmann, Rebecca. "Women's Participation in ADEMI: The Association for the Development of Microenterprises, Inc." 1984. AITEC/Accion International, Boston, Massachusetts.

## CHAPTER FOUR

### RECOMMENDATIONS

The conclusions of the WSPP evaluation lead to suggestions for improving future technical assistance efforts aimed at helping AID incorporate women into productive sectors. Recommendations for AID and ICRW include ideas about the conceptual framework for technical assistance and specific thoughts about its execution.

Recommendations are made in two broad areas defined in the scope of work for this evaluation:

- Ways in which AID/W may improve policy formulation and programming efforts in generating income for women by integrating them into the work force; and
- Ways in which ICRW may improve its technical assistance efforts to provide greater economic opportunities to WID activities.

A common basis for recommendations to both ICRW and AID/W is the need to match a strategy for technical assistance with its context and purpose. Technical assistance alone, no matter what the strategy, cannot produce results. The objectives of those who receive and provide the technical assistance should match, and the technical assistance should be introduced in the context in which it is likely to be used.

As a first step, ICRW should review its experience under WSPP and choose technical assistance methods that will most likely make significant improvements in economic opportunities for poor women. WSPP has shown that one- or two-shot technical assistance in friendly contexts but where resource commitment is lacking may yield insights into the complexities of AID missions and host-country development processes, but does not result in improved economic opportunities for poor women.

**Previous Page Blank**

Similarly, if AID/W continues to provide centrally funded technical assistance to help missions integrate women into employment and income-generation projects, it should structure this assistance more strictly. A lesson learned through WSPP is that country selection criteria should go beyond mission interest and willingness to participate in the centrally funded program. Serious mission-AID/W-ICRW collaboration is fundamental if technical assistance is to become an integral part of a larger development process rather than remain a discrete activity.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS FOR AID/W

During WSPP, ICRW technical assistance was limited almost entirely to defining problems, reporting activities, and disseminating information derived from preproject design and implementation activities. The nature of ICRW technical assistance interventions and their separation from actual project implementation is a major reason why WSPP had little impact on poor women.

To improve and ensure policy implementation, technical assistance should be related to program and project implementation. To do so, it must be targeted at specific programs and projects and be regarded as a set of activities to be carried out in an integrated manner before, during, and after the life of those programs and projects. Such an integrated approach to technical assistance may be viewed as having different functions appropriate to project design and implementation phases. (See Table 8 for a summary of potential technical assistance functions.)

This evaluation recommends that technical assistance efforts to improve policy and program implementation should include all the technical assistance functions and stages mentioned above. Concomitantly, a technical assistance program should be long enough to allow it to continue throughout the design and implementation phases of specific projects.

TABLE 8

## SUMMARY OF POTENTIAL TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE FUNCTIONS

FUNCTION	PROJECT PHASE
Problem Identification	Project Identification Document -- define and characterize the nature of women's involvement in a particular development sector or as part of a particular target population.
Strategy Formulation	Project Paper -- examine alternative strategies and help formulate problem- and project-specific strategies.
Documentation and Evaluation	Project Implementation -- keep a record of the project implementation process and make periodic evaluations to extract policy and program learnings that can contribute to improved implementation of the specific project as well as to the design of new projects.
Reporting and Dissemination	During and after project implementation: to project implementers, policymakers, and the broader development community.

Besides adopting a strategy that integrates technical assistance for policy implementation purposes into the life of specific projects, AID/W should formulate a complementary strategy aimed at creating positive conditions for technical assistance delivery and follow-up. Both PPC and S&T should develop strategies for implementing WID policy throughout their own bureaus and within missions.

The PPC/WID office should implement a multicomponent strategy that not only makes specialized technical assistance available but also helps make technical assistance effective by improving and supporting the context in which it is delivered. Technical assistance delivery can be supported through special efforts at information collection, processing, and dissemination

on behalf of collaborating missions. Similarly, in-house training might be provided to targeted missions and appropriate AID/W offices.

Since PPC/WID has expressed interest in continuing to work with ICRW to provide centrally funded technical assistance to missions, a few specific recommendations are in order.

First, this evaluation found that ICRW is indeed a competent source of specialized technical assistance that coincides with the objectives of AID's WID policy. Therefore, it recommends that collaboration with ICRW should be continued but that care be taken to design and support technical assistance delivery to make it more effective at producing field-level results.

Second, alternative forms for AID/W-ICRW inter-institutional relationships should be considered. Implementation-oriented, life-of-project technical assistance implies that a four- or five-year agreement is needed. Similarly, the complementary and concerted activities needed to strengthen an area of policy implementation call for close, positive collaboration.

Third, before finalizing the nature of a new AID/W-ICRW agreement, other centrally funded technical assistance programs should be examined that might yield insights for better program design. In particular, special provisions for continuous and consistent technical assistance have reportedly been built into S&T's Africa initiative, and DAI has examined technical assistance delivery linked to integrated rural development. Perhaps ICRW could be contracted to review centrally funded technical assistance programs and draw conclusions and recommendations from these reviews as well as from its own experience.

## RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ICRW

The four years of experience provided by WSPP have laid the foundation for continuing technical assistance. However, the lessons from the past must be used to guide future efforts.

The most important recommendation based on this evaluation is that ICRW and AID should share the same objectives in future technical assistance efforts. ICRW should distinguish the desired impacts with regard to different potential beneficiaries. At the same time, it is important for ICRW to specify the roles it might assume at each level.

Table 9 identifies some of the various combinations of beneficiaries and technical assistance strategies available to ICRW as options for the future. It specifies three levels or types of beneficiaries:

- AID missions;
- Implementing institutions (and low-income women); and
- Policymakers and the state of WID knowledge.

Each potential target audience calls for different objectives and different emphases by ICRW staff. Given limited resources, some choices must be made if an impact is to be hoped for at any given level.

Once the level of impact has been chosen, the question of the most appropriate strategy remains. ICRW needs one work plan to teach development planners to understand and implement WID concepts and another plan to carry out the tasks. Each of the nine options outlined in the chart is described briefly below, with the evaluators' recommendations on the relative importance of each.

TABLE 9

## ICRW STRATEGY

	Educate and Train Insiders	Temporarily Participate for Specific Purposes	Serve as Outsiders who Do the Work
<b>Level of Effort:</b>			
	<u>Option 1</u>	<u>Option 2</u>	<u>Option 3</u>
Affect AID Missions	-training for mission staff (seminars)  -work alongside project officer technicians on a regular basis to affect a mission's project	-1 ICRW person as part of PID, PP, eval. team  -ICRW collaboration with other AID contractors in a given sector	-WSPP plan-- ICRW does research, analysis, and recommendations for missions; effective only if they follow up
	<u>Option 4</u>	<u>Option 5</u>	<u>Option 6</u>
Affect Field Level  (Implementing Institutions and Eventually Low-Income Women)	-long-term (multi-shot) technical assistance to PVOs or government agencies  (the APEC/DR model, but with contractual agreement)	-assist in implementation of showcase projects  (the AITEC/ Ecuador model; no ICRW staff)	-actual involvement in project implementation  (would require major adjustments by ICRW)
	<u>Option 7</u>	<u>Option 8</u>	<u>Option 9</u>
Affect Policy-makers and The State of WID Knowledge	-seminars for AID/W (and other D.C. policymakers)  -info. dissemination through the Development Information Unit, newsletters, other AID channels	-use process documenters to collect data, guiding and analyzing results to answer key questions about WID	-provide services of ICRW Resource Center to AID/W  -do sector papers

### Affecting AID Missions

- Option 1: Educate and train mission staff

Holding training sessions for mission staff members and working closely with selected missions' technical project officers as they monitor project implementation seem to be effective ways for ICRW to influence missions and to garner knowledge about particular sectors. However, any ICRW effort in the training area should be carefully coordinated with the planned HIID case study training sessions, so that activities are complementary rather than duplicative. In addition, a contractual agreement indicating a commitment by the mission to have ICRW technical assistance over a period of several years is a prerequisite for this option.

- Option 2: Participate in temporary teams

ICRW participation in project identification document, project paper, or evaluation teams can help further integrate WID concerns into AID programming and would help avoid the often meaningless stock phrases made about women by these teams. ICRW would need to improve the marketing of its services, and AID/W would assist with promotion if this option were to be feasible. To generate demand for ICRW services, the organization may need to emphasize other functional specialties, such as agricultural economics or financial analysis, rather than its WID specialty. These specialists would be able to provide a WID perspective implicitly rather than explicitly in field assignments.

- Option 3: Serve as outsiders who do the work for missions

This was the strategy used under the WSPP contract. It is not recommended as a means of having lasting impact on AID missions unless certain conditions are met, such as high-level

support within the mission and an agreement that more than short, one-shot assistance will be supplied.

### Affecting the Field Level

- Option 4: Educate and train implementing institutions

Either long-term work with missions or long-term work with implementing institutions is recommended. One condition in either case is an early agreement that ICRW return at regular intervals, since the ad hoc nature of intermittent technical assistance is not conducive to real partnership or lasting results.

- Option 5: Assist in implementation of showcase projects

ICRW collaboration with another development agency on a particular project -- such as the planned joint AITEC/ICRW credit program in Ecuador -- is a promising new direction for ICRW. Visits under a centrally funded technical assistance contract might be used to identify possible ICRW match-ups with showcase projects. In this option, ICRW would play a role in the project -- through its own staff or direct hire arrangements -- without being responsible for full project implementation.

- Option 6: ICRW staff involvement in project implementation

Long-term technical assistance using ICRW is another project option. Currently, this option does not seem feasible for ICRW given its structure and priorities. Substantial home office administrative capability and a commitment by staff to live in the field for several years are required. This option represents one of the most effective means of reaching low-income women. If neither this involvement nor assisting in showcase projects is

included in a new technical assistance contract, then the objective of improving the job or income situations of low-income women probably should not be promised or implied by AID or ICRW.

Affecting Policymakers and the State of WID Knowledge

- Option 7: Affect policymakers at AID and other agencies

The evaluation found information dissemination to be an important result of the WSPP contract and worthy of continuation. Given limited resources, however, objectives should be carefully set and monitored in this area. Conducting seminars and briefings that target particular sectors and audiences and coordinating with the Development Information Unit at AID seem the most worthwhile pursuits.

- Option 8: Experiment with WID data gathering and analysis

ICRW has the expertise both to identify key unanswered questions about how to incorporate women into specific development sectors and to serve as a central base for collecting and analyzing data aimed at answering those questions. Hiring process documenters to monitor (on a part-time basis) women's involvement in selected projects is one strategy recommended by this evaluation. Although this direction would be a new one for ICRW, it recognizes the organization's comparative advantage and would provide a valuable contribution to information dissemination efforts.

- Option 9: Emphasize consolidating WID learning

Pulling together the lessons of the technical assistance experiences is an important return on the WSPP investment. One of the most valuable results of the WSPP contract was serving as the basis for three sector papers funded under a small, separate contract from PPC/WID. In addition to budgeting time for

thinking and writing, ICRW can promote learning by continuing to offer the services of its excellent Resource Center to AID/W and others.

In summary, ICRW needs to determine what proportion of its efforts and its resources will go into AID missions, field-level implementing institutions, and information dissemination. Its decisions should take advantage of the lessons learned during WSPF and of its strengths as an institution.

**APPENDIX A**  
**METHODOLOGY**

## APPENDIX A

## METHODOLOGY

Data sources identified for this evaluation included project-related documentation held by ICRW and AID/W; interviews with ICRW and AID/W staff and other individuals familiar with the WSPP, such as ICRW board members and consultants; and USAID Missions which had been involved in the WSPP.

For evaluation purposes, Missions were initially grouped into three categories--a) 17 Missions which had received TA-related visits by ICRW; b) 17 Missions which had requested TA under the WSPP, but had not received it; and c) 10 Missions which indicated they were not interested in the WSPP. It was hoped that comparison of responses from these three groups regarding Mission initiatives to incorporate poor women into projects with employment and income generation objectives would yield insights about the impact of ICRW's work and about the general state of WID policy implementation at the field level.

In designing the statement of work for this evaluation, AID/W, ICRW and DAI agreed that field visits would be made only to Ecuador and the Dominican Republic where ICRW had played a stronger TA role. After the evaluation was begun, it was decided to add Peru to the list because recent innovative work had been done there and a trip to Peru might be conveniently added to the Ecuador trip. In the end, however, the Mission determined that an evaluation visit to Peru would be in vain given the absence of key informants during the time when the visit could be scheduled.

The other 15 Missions where ICRW had worked were notified about the evaluation and introduced to evaluation questions through cables from S&T/RUID. The outgoing cable requested interviews with both WID officers and Program Officers who had knowledge of ICRW activities in the Missions. Most of the 15 Missions responded quickly with names of interviewees and preferred times for telephone calls. In a few cases, informed individuals were no longer at the Mission. However, at least one person was interviewed in-country by telephone in Barbados, Costa Rica, Egypt, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, and Jordan. Individuals knowledgeable about experiences in the Dominican Republic, Kenya, Nepal, and Panama were interviewed in Washington, D.C. A second official from Panama was interviewed during the field visit to Ecuador. The AID official interviewed by telephone in Indonesia provided information about ICRW work in Tanzania. Calls to Peru and Thailand were scheduled to be made after the field visit, but were finally dropped as the effort to meet the deadline for report submission took priority.

Cables requesting information about possible interviews with Missions which had indicated interest in the WSPP, but had not received TA from ICRW elicited responses from Botswana, Sri

10

Lanka, Sudan, Tunisia, Upper Volta and Zaire. Relevant information was noted and it was decided that followup calls were unlikely to produce significant additional information. The limited responses from this second group of cables together with time constraints and the finding that followup had been weak in most Missions where ICRW TA had been received were key factors in the decision not to attempt to ascertain general information about WID policy implementation in other Missions.

Field visits were made to Ecuador and the Dominican Republic. The four-day visit to Ecuador proved disappointing in that the Mission had failed to set up appointments with staff at the Fundacion Mariana de Jesus. The last minute declaration of a national holiday cut useable in-country time to only three days and made it necessary to contact FMJ staff by telephone after returning to the U.S. In the Dominican Republic, five full days were spent interviewing AID and Asociacion para the Promocion de la Educacion y Cultura (APEC) and visiting project sites.

In summary, information for this evaluation was obtained from or about 23 out of a total of 48 AID Missions.

In addition to the above Mission-related work, four weeks were spent in Washington, D.C. designing questionnaires, preparing cables for Missions, interviewing key informants personally and by telephone (some were located elsewhere in the U.S.), and reviewing extensive project-related documentation at ICRW and AID/W.

In spite of efforts made, not all of the individuals whom evaluators hoped to interview could be reached given the workload and the time available. The evaluators believe, however, that those omissions, while unfortunate, do not significantly affect the accuracy of the findings reported.

Names of individuals interviewed and interview schedules used are attached in the following pages.

**APPENDIX B**  
**PERSONS INTERVIEWED**

**APPENDIX B**

**PERSONS INTERVIEWED**

**I. International Center for Research on Women**

**A. Staff members**

Mayra Buvinic, ICRW Director  
Margaret Lycette, WSPP Director  
Janet Self, WSPP Coordinator  
Isabel Nieves, Staff Social Scientist  
Karen White, Resource Center Librarian

**B. Board members**

Nadia Youssef  
Constantina Safilios-Rothschild  
Thomas Merrick

**II. AID/Washington**

Office of PPC/WID: Nadine Horenstein, Maria Otero  
Office of S&T/RD: Lou Faoro, Michele Foster  
Regional Bureau WID officers: Gloria Steele, Mona Hammam  
Arthur Silver  
Former Regional WID officer: Roma Knee  
Other: Ann Van Dusen, Alan Broehl, David Ollinger

Current or former Mission staff interviewed in Washington:  
Kenya: Ned Greeley  
Panama: Tom Chapman  
Nepal: Janet Ballantyne

**III. AID Missions**

**A. In-person interviews during field visits**

**Dominican Republic:**

Mission staff: Rose Veith, Program Officer  
Carl Buck, Deputy Director  
Tom Nicastro, Education Officer

APEC: Jacqueline Malagon, Director  
Teofilo Barreiro, Consultant  
Ada Santana, Project Coordinator

Other: Lynn Snuffer  
Daysi Mejia

Visits to two training centers (CENADARTE and Escuela de la Fuerzas Armadas y Policia Nacional)

**Ecuador:**

**Mission staff:** Earl Kessler, Housing Officer  
Ron Carlson, Technical Advisor  
Carlos Luzuriaga, former WID officer  
Patricio Maldonado, Program Officer

**FMJ:** Ing. Crespo, Director  
Carlos Proano, Chief of Social Research

**Other:** Hilda de Jaramillo  
Laura Lindskog, OEF Representative

Julie Otterbein, Panama housing officer,  
was interviewed in Ecuador

**B. Telephone interviews**

**Indonesia:** Lanna Lubis, WID officer  
Marge Bonner, Deputy Program Officer

**India:** Zarina Bhatti, WID officer

**Egypt:** Bernard Wilder, Assoc. Dir. for Human Resources  
Nenat (Minouche) Shafik, Acting Evaluation Officer  
and WID Officer  
John Swanson, Project officer, Agriculture

**Honduras:** Cindy Giusti, WID Officer

**Costa Rica:** Flora Ruiz, WID Officer

**Jamaica:** Joyce Burton, WID Officer

**Jordan:** Nancy Carmichael, WID Officer and Program Officer

**Haiti:** Socra Gregoire, WID officer

**Barbados:** Donald Soules, Assistant Program Officer and  
WID Officer

**IV. Other interviews**

Katherine McKee, Ford Foundation  
Irene Tinker, Equity Policy Center  
Cressida McKean, ILO/Trinidad (former PPC/WID office staff)  
Elizabeth Dore, former ICRW consultant  
Rebecca Reichmann, former ICRW consultant

V. Additional USAID Missions contacted by cable about WSPP

Tanzania, Zaire - received scope of work visit

Tunisia, Sudan - substantial cable traffic with ICRW, no  
visit

Bangladesh, Upper Volta, Botswana, Liberia, Sri Lanka -  
did not receive ICRW TA

13

**APPENDIX C**

**QUESTIONNAIRE FOR TELEPHONE INTERVIEW WITH MISSIONS  
THAT RECEIVED TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE VISITS FROM ICRW**

84

APPENDIX C

QUESTIONNAIRE FOR TELEPHONE INTERVIEW WITH MISSIONS THAT RECEIVED T.A. VISITS FROM ICRW

Date: \_\_\_\_\_  
Time: \_\_\_\_\_  
Interviewer: \_\_\_\_\_

Country: \_\_\_\_\_  
Interviewee(s)

No. 1: Name \_\_\_\_\_ Position \_\_\_\_\_  
No. 2: Name \_\_\_\_\_ Position \_\_\_\_\_

Introduction by interviewer:

--DAI team hired to do external evaluation of ICRW contract w/ S&T. (Mention: there is talk of the WID office's funding an extension of the contract, so comments obtained could have an effect on future services that would be available.)

-- WID and employment generation are both continuing interests of AID Washington.

-- phone calls being made to all Missions that received TA

-- no comment made by an interviewee will be directly attributed or identifiable in the final report; frankness desired

Question 1. Were you in the country at the time of the TA visit(s)? (If yes, what was your role? If no, how familiar are you with the work they did?)

Question 2. What outcomes did the Mission expect from the TA?

Question 3. Re the substance of ICRW TA work in the country.

- Can you comment on the following aspects of ICRW's work:
  - background preparation
  - choice of team members
  - reports/recommendations provided

- How do the ICRW's services compare with other TA services?

- Would you prefer longer-term TA availability?

- Do you have any other comments specifically on the TA?

Question 4. What kind of follow-up, if any, was there to the ICRW's work?

IF FOLLOW UP OCCURRED:

Are you satisfied with the point reached to date?

(If "no", what else could help the work go further?)

IF NO FOLLOW UP OCCURRED: What were some of the

obstacles/constraints involved in the Mission's inability to follow up?

Question 5. How did/does this ICRW TA (and its follow up, if any) fit into the Mission's overall employment generation strategy?

Question 6. How did/does this ICRW TA (and its follow up, if any) fit into the Mission's overall WID strategy?

- Has the Mission's overall WID strategy changed since 1980, when this TA program was begun?

- Are changes projected for the future (next 1-3 years)?

- Does the Mission have any women-specific projects?

Question 7. Can you make any general comment about having this TA centrally funded?

-- Have relationships with AID/W been a factor? If so, how? (For example, has the cable exchange about this project been too detailed? Not detailed enough to get you the TA you wanted?)

Question 8. Questioning broadened to discuss the goal and purpose of the WSPP, and to ask about other strategies that might be useful.

Question 9. Question about ICRW's information dissemination.

Question 10. Is there anything I haven't asked about that you would like to comment on?

THANK YOU FOR YOUR ASSISTANCE.

INTERVIEW SCHEDULE FOR AID/W PERSONNEL (Abridged version)

(Description of project and evaluation)

1. How well informed are you about ICRW?
2. What is your experience with WID policy issues and project implementation within AID?
3. Mention the specific involvement iwth ICRW you have had in the course of this project (September 1980-present).
4. Are you familiar with any other sources of WID-related
  - technical assistance
  - information dissemination

Technical Assistance

(If interviewee has knowledge of specific ICRW technical assistance, note where, when)

5. What is your impression of the quality of technical assistance provided by ICRW?
  - Were ICRW staff/consultants well-prepared?
  - Was technical assistance relevant and timely?
  - Did the technical assistance result in useful products (reports, debriefing, followup plans?)
  - Did technical assistance result in tangible steps towards improvement or expansion of economic opportunities for poor women? (Was there some followup activity? Was technical assistance offered directly to an ongoing project?)
6. Was technical assistance provided by ICRW appropriate to the specific market/production focus central to AID's WID policy?
7. Would some other type of technical assistance have been more appropriate, in either content or mode of delivery?
8. How would you describe ICRW's contribution to the implementation of AID's WID policy?
9. Would you say that ICRW is most effective at
  - providing technical assistance
  - information/data-gathering
  - information/learning dissemination
10. Would you like to see ICRW continue to offer technical assistance to AID Missions?
11. If so, what two suggestions would you ake to ICRW to improve its technical assistance capability?

87

## Information Dissemination

12. With what ICRW information dissemination activities are you familiar?
13. How would you rate the quality of ICRW
- Publications  
(Which have you found most useful?)
  - Roundtables  
(What has been particularly useful about these?)
  - Other
14. Have you ever used ICRW's library/resource center?
15. Would you like to see ICRW continue information dissemination activities on behalf of
- AID/W
  - Missions
  - PVO's
  - Other
16. What two suggestions would you make to ICRW to improve its information dissemination to
- AID/W
  - Missions
  - PVO's
  - Other
17. What two suggestions would you make to AID/W and the Missions in order for them to better obtain and utilize information from ICRW?
18. Apart from ICRW's role, do you think significant progress has been made since 1980 in the implementation of WID priorities?

INTERVIEW SCHEDULE FOR ICRW STAFF, BOARD MEMBERS AND FORMER CONSULTANTS (Abridged version)

(Brief description of WSPP and evaluation)

1. How have you been involved with ICRW and its work under the WSPP?
2. Have you had any other experience related to the implementation of AID WID policy and projects?
3. Are you familiar with any other AID-sponsored sources of WID-related
  - technical assistance
  - information dissemination

INSTITUTIONAL GROWTH

4. During the WSPP, ICRW has considerably expanded its staff and its operating budget. Do you see ICRW continuing to grow or do you think its has reached an optimum?
5. What do you think have been ICRW's most important internal achievements in the last four years?
6. What have been the most important internal difficulties?
7. What do you see as the positive impact of the AID grant on ICRW?
8. What do you see as negative?
9. Has this grant from AID changed ICRW's focus in any way?
10. Has personnel turnover been a problem for ICRW in meeting the objectives of this project?
11. Has the smallness of ICRW staff or, conversely, the use of consultants to provide technical assistance had a negative impact on the quantity or the quality of ICRW's work under the grant?
12. If ICRW is to continue to provide technical assistance to AID Missions, do you think that some further institutional development might be necessary?
  - Management
  - Staff
  - Content of TA
  - Mode of delivery
  - Other

84

13. During the course of the WSPP, have satisfactory organizational relationships been developed between ICRW and AID/W? What have the positive features been? The negative?
14. Same question with regard to organizational relationships between ICRW and AID Missions.
15. Do you think ICRW's institutional capability is strongest in
  - Research and data gathering
  - Technical Assistance
  - Information Dissemination
16. Any other comments regarding institutional growth?

#### Technical Assistance

(If interviewee was associated with any particular TA assignments, note where, when)

17. Does ICRW now have an established methodology for providing technical assistance to AID missions? Describe.
18. Some people have said that a key limitation on the technical assistance provided by ICRW has been the nature of the requests made by the AID Missions? Do you think what has been the strongest factor shaping technical assistance under the WSPP?
19. What might ICRW do to overcome that limitation or to minimize it in the future?
20. What can ICRW do to improve its own ability to provide technical assistance to AID more effectively?

#### Information Dissemination

21. With what ICRW information dissemination activities are you familiar?
22. How would you rate the quality of
  - Publications (which have you found most useful)
  - Roundtables (what has been particularly useful?)
  - Other
23. Should ICRW expand its information dissemination activities?

**APPENDIX D**

**CABLES RELATING TO WSPP PROJECT**

Department of State

OUTGOING TELEGRAM

PAGE 01 STATE 305039

020057 AIDJ9J2

STATE 305039

020057 #10351

ORIGIN AID-35

ORIGIN OFFICE DSRO-02

INFO AAAP-01 AFEM-03 AFEA-03 AFSA-03 AFFW-04 AFCW-03 AFOP-02
AFOR-06 AFCA-03 AAHJ-01 ASEM-01 ACPT-02 ASBI-02
ASPB-02 ASSM-02 LAEM-02 LACE-03 LACA-03 CHG-01 HETC-04
NEEI-03 NENA-03 NEJL-03 NEEM-01 PPCC-01 PUPR-01 PPPB-01
PPEA-01 STA-10 PPIA-02 IOCA-01 FM-02 MID-01 ASPO-03
ASTR-01 AADS-01 CMGT-02 CTR-02 CNA-01 ES-01 RELO-01
ASSP-02 LACA-03 NP-01 AFDH-01 /107 A3 2

INFO: OCT-00 /035 R

DRAFTED BY AID/OS/RAD:LFAORO:PCB

APPROVED BY AID/OS/RAD:JFRENCH

AID/LAC/DR:THORNE (SUBS)

AID/HE/TECH:PBENEDICT (SUBS)

AID/AFR/DR:WHEATON (SUBS)

FA AID/PPC/PDPR/AD:ESIMMONS (SUBS)

-AID/ASIA/TR:THORMAN

D/SER/MP/TWO:F.O.ALLEN (INFO)

AID/ASIA/DR:PTHORMAN (SUBS)

DESIRABLE DISTRIBUTION

ORIGIN DSRO CM 6 CM 8 INFO AAAP AFEM AFEA AFSA AFFW AFCA AFCW AFOP
AFOR AFOR AADS ASEM ASPT ASSP ASBI ASOP AALA LACA LAEM LACE LASA
DESIRABLE DISTRIBUTION LADR AAME NEOP NEPD HETC NEEI NENA
NEJL NEEM PPIA PPEA PPCC PDPR PPPB IOCA NP MID FM AADS CMGT
CTR STA JH-00 END

-----007952 151021Z /34

P 151024Z NOV 88 ZEX

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AID PRIM POSTSY PRIORITY

USMISSION GENEVA

EMBASSY LAGOS

EMBASSY PARIS

EMBASSY ROME

UNCLAS STATE 305039

ADM AID - GUATEMALA FOR USAID & ROCAF; PARIS FOR UNESCO &

E.O. 12065: N/A

ASB:

SUBJECT NEW OS/RAD WOMEN'S SOCIOECONOMIC PARTICIPATION PROJECT (936-9319)

U-002B; KARAC'I FOR AMG AND IIS, NAIROBI FOR USAID & REBDO/EA; BOME FOALSO FOR AID OFFICE FRIULI

3. THE PURPOSE OF THIS CABLE IS TO INFORM MISSIONS OF A NEW CENTRALLY FUNDED PROJECT ON WOMEN'S SOCIOECONOMIC PARTICIPATION WHICH WAS APPROVED AND OBLIGATED AT THE END OF FY 88. THIS PROJECT WILL PROVIDE UP TO TEN USAIDS WITH TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE IN WOMEN'S SOCIOECONOMIC PARTICIPATION. EMPHASIS WILL BE ON PRODUCTIVE EMPLOYMENT GENERATION. THE PROJECT IS CONTRACTED WITH THE INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR RESEARCH ON WOMEN (ICRW), WASHINGTON, D.C., AND IS BASED ON AN UNSOLICITED TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROPOSAL.

2. ALLOCATION OF SERVICES WILL BE BASED ON EXPRESSED DEMAND FROM USAIDS. THE PROJECT IS EXPECTED TO PROVIDE SHORT-TERM CONSULTING SERVICES FROM THE CONTRACTOR--TO BE SUPPLEMENTED IF NECESSARY TO TOP SERVICE FROM THE AID/W PROJECT MANAGER. THE FOLLOWING ICRW SERVICES ARE AVAILABLE

A) ASSISTANCE TO USAIDS ON SPECIFIC PROJECT IDENTIFICATION AND DESIGN TASKS TO STIMULATE MAXIMUM PARTICIPATION BY OR BENEFIT TO WOMEN THROUGH GAINFUL EMPLOYMENT; B) ASSISTANCE TO USAIDS IN REVIEW OF EXISTING PROJECT PORTFOLIO TO IDENTIFY MODIFICATIONS OR EXPANSIONS WHICH MIGHT YIELD

MORE IMPACT ON EMPLOYMENT NEEDS OF WOMEN; C) EXAMINATION OF THE STATE OF WOMEN'S EMPLOYMENT IN THE HOST COUNTRY THROUGH CONTACT WITH HQ OFFICIALS, ACADEMICS, VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATION AND IDENTIFICATION OF LOCALLY-AVAILABLE EXPERTS FOR THE USAID; D) ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT OF BRIEFINGS FOR MISSION STAFFS, PROJECT TEAMS AND HOST GOVERNMENT COUNTERPARTS WITH LOCAL AND OUTSIDE EXPERTS ON THE ISSUES RELATED TO WOMEN AND EMPLOYMENT, AND EXCHANGES BETWEEN THESE ISSUES AND FERTILITY BEHAVIOR; E) ORGANIZATION OF BROADER-BASED IN-COUNTRY SEMINARS ON IMPROVING ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITIES FOR WOMEN; F) RELATED ACTIVITIES SUCH AS PROJECT EVALUATION AS REQUESTED BY USAIDS.

3. THIS PROJECT IS MANAGED BY OS/RAD AND IS PART OF THE SECU PROPOSED PROJECT PACKAGE MENTIONED IN REF. A. THIS PROJECT WAS NOT INCLUDED IN TOUCHED MATERIALS, HOWEVER, SINCE IT HAD NOT YET BEEN OBLIGATED.

4. A KEY QUESTION TO BE RESOLVED BY USAID RESPONSES TO THIS CABLE IS WHETHER IT IS BEST TO HAVE SEVERAL COUNTRIES COVERED BY SHORT-TERM CONSULTANCIES, OR TO HAVE IN-DEPTH COUNTRY RELATIONSHIPS WITH SPECIFIC USAIDS HAVING GREAT PERCEIVED SERVICE NEED.

5. ICRW IS A NON-PROFIT RESEARCH, POLICY, AND EDUCATIONAL ORGANIZATION OPERATED BY WOMEN. IT IS ABLE TO FIELD CONSULTANTS IN A WIDE-RANGE OF AREAS RELATING TO WOMEN'S SOCIOECONOMIC PARTICIPATION, WITH APPROPRIATE LANGUAGE SKILLS, AND FIELD EXPERIENCE. IT HAS BEEN ACTIVE IN THIS AREA SINCE 1976. ITS CURRENT RESEARCH, TRAINING AND INFORMATION DISSEMINATION PROGRAMS--AS WELL AS TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE--EMPHASIZE THE PRODUCTIVE ROLES OF WOMEN AND, ESPECIALLY, THE ECONOMIC CONDITION OF LANDLESS WOMEN IN RURAL AREAS AND LOW-INCOME WOMEN IN RURAL TOWNS. THE KEY PERSONS FROM ICRW ON THIS PROJECT ARE DR. MIRIA BUWENIC, THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE CENTER, AND DR. NADIA YOUSSEF, THE CENTER'S RESEARCH DIRECTOR. A CONSULTANT ROSTER WILL BE AVAILABLE SHORTLY. ANY CONSULTANT CHOSEN TO CARRY OUT FIELD SUPPORT UNDER THE PROJECT WILL, OF COURSE, BE SUBJECT TO USAID CLEARANCE. IN THOSE REGIONS WHERE LOCAL EXPERTS ARE KNOWN AND AVAILABLE, AND WHERE THIS IS THE USAID'S PREFERENCE, NON-U.S. NATIONAL CONSULTANTS CAN BE FIELDDED.

6. OS/RAD WISHES TO STRESS THAT THIS IS A PROJECT TO DO WITH WOMEN AND EMPLOYMENT. IT IS NOT A BASKET "MID" PROJECT TO PROVIDE SUPPORT TO USAIDS IN ANY AREA THAT MAY BE CONSTRUED AS HAVING A POTENTIAL IMPACT ON WOMEN. OS/RAD WISHES TO MAKE SERVICES UNDER THIS PROJECT AS TECHNICALLY SOUND AND SOPHISTICATED AS THE STATE OF THE ART WILL ALLOW AND WILL ULTIMATELY MEASURE THE EFFECT OF THE PROJECT ON THE BASIS OF ITS DEMONSTRATED IMPACT ON STIMULATING PRODUCTIVE EMPLOYMENT.

7. PLEASE RESPOND INDICATING A) MISSION INTEREST; B) PRIORITY AREAS FOR FIELD SUPPORT PER PARA. 2; C) PROBABLE DURATION AND TIMING OF NEED FOR SUBJECT FIELD SUPPORT; D) ADDITIONAL DETAILS IF PRESENTLY AVAILABLE; AND E) GENERAL GUIDANCE OR COMMENTS USAIDS CONSIDER USEFUL FOR PLANNING PURPOSES. RESPONSES WILL BE REVIEWED UPON RECEIPT AND FORWARDED TO THE PROJECT COMMITTEE FOR DISCUSSION AND COUNTRY SELECTION. IF POSSIBLE, PLEASE RESPOND BY DECEMBER 1. MUSKIE

UNCLASSIFIED

92

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : DS/RAD, Louis Faoro

DATE: January 14, 1981

FROM : DS/RAD, Wendy Wilson *Wle*

SUBJECT: Analysis of Responses to World Wide Cable: DS/RAD Women's Socioeconomic Participation Project (Women and Employment)

Of 34 responses received only 10 indicated that they had no particular need for the services offered through this project. Of the 24 remaining six responses (¼ of positive responses received) indicated very specific needs, with reference either to short-term consultant aid or very focused input corresponding to projects or concepts either already close to implementation or already under-way. These countries were Morocco, Philippines, Indonesia, Nicaragua, Niger, and Kenya. Of the 14 countries who responded negatively, the majority indicated that other existing A.I.D. projects were already under-way that addressed issues presently in the "Women and Employment" cable. Of the 24 countries which responded positively, 9 explicitly stated specific interest in project identification and design. These are Barbados, Dominican Republic; Caribbean; Costa Rica, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras and Nicaragua in South America; Kenya in Sub Saharan Africa, and Yemen and Jordan in the Middle East. Four countries indicated interest in on-going, in-depth involvement with the proposed project objectives and ICRW.

ICRW was mentioned with enthusiasm in the cable responses and several included specific requests for Dr. Nadiaa Youssef and Dr. Myra Buvanic in particular.

Attachment:

a|s

cc: DS|RAD, Dr. Alice Morton  
ICRW, Dr. Nadia Youssef  
ICRW, Dr. Myra Buvanic  
DS|RAD, Jeanne North



Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

*Wle*

CABLE RESPONSES TO WOMEN AND EMPLOYMENT WORLD-WIDE CABLE

REGION:	NO	YES	MISSION	ACTION	DS/RAD
<b>CARRIBEAN</b>					
Haiti		X	Detailed answer to cable being prepared		
Jamaica *		X	Expected to send DS/RAD suggested dates for services required & tentative scope of work		
Barbados •		X	Requests input June 1981 (2-3 person months)		
Dominican Republic +			req: 2 people, 5 days from Jan. 27	Confirmed availability of Dr. Nadia Youssef and Ms. Ramon Daubon: 1/27/81	
<b>CENTRAL &amp; SOUTH AMERICA</b>					
Costa Rica •		X			
Guatemala •		X	Wants to be advised ASAP whether TA available to supplement		
Guyana •		X	Waiting for advise re: input into agri sector project design		

94

Ecuador +	X	Response needed. Want to help test communal enterprise/RED concept off-farm employment interest	
Honduras •	X	Wants specific and RN project identification welcomes Youssef & Buvinic short term	
Bolivia	X	Request 1-1½ p/m Requests PP	Reply needed
Panama	X	Expected to send DS/RAD timing suggestion and detailed scope of work	
Nicaragua •	X		Keep USAID informed
Peru	X		
<hr/>			
<u>SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA</u>			
Senegal	X	Prefers in-depth country relationship. Will send additional cable/info soon	
Sudan	X	Requests long-term analyses dissertation type study	ICRW should send materials ASAP
Tanzania	X	Expected to send DS/RAD confirmation of timing and scope of work ASAP	
Niger *	X	Declines major consultancy interested in exploratory IDY	
Kenya *•	X	USAID will advise of possibilities	



Botswana	X		
Lesotho	X		Does not need services at this time but wants information
Liberia	X		
Guinea	X		
Ghana	X		Send Project Paper Att: WID Coordinator

---

NORTH AFRICA & MIDDLE EAST

Yemen o		X	Requests Dr. Youssef and assistance in incorporating women in on-going projects. Want in-depth relationship 4-6 weeks late spring	
Jordan o		X	Wants names of ICRM consultants requisite arabic	Reply needed from DS/RAD
Morocco *		X	Integrate services into existing EHR portfolio	
Tunisia	X			
Syria	X			

---

ASIA

Thailand		X		Request specific request including suggested dates, scope of work and USAID consultant requirements
----------	--	---	--	---

D-7

4/4

Pakistan		X	Request TA and project resources in future
Philippines *		X	Maybe early spring for 3-4 weeks immediate demand project ID and design
Indonesia *		X	
India	X		
Sri Lanka	X		

**KEY:**

- \* - short term consultancy request; maybe
- o - specific requests for aid in project development and design
- ♦ - long term involvement requested

197

UNCLASSIFIED  
D-9  
Department of State

OUTGOING  
TELEGRAM

PAGE 01 STATE 004404 050974 A105410  
ORIGIN AID-03

STATE 004404 050974 A105410  
A COST-SAVING OR ADD-ON MODE OF IMPLEMENTATION TO SECURE  
IN-DEPTH PROJECT SERVICES.

ORIGIN OFFICE OSRO-02  
INFO AAOF-01 AFEA-03 AFSA-03 AFRA-03 AFFM-01 AFCA-03 AFCA-03 AFCA-03  
AFOR-06 AFCA-03 AAAS-01 ASEM-01 ASPT-02 ACBI-02 ASPH-02  
ASDP-02 AALA-01 LACC-03 LAGA-03 LADR-03 NAME-01 NEOP-02  
NETC-03 NEEL-03 NEHA-03 NEJL-03 PPCE-01 POPR-01 PPPB-03  
GC-01 GCAF-01 PPEA-01 GCAS-01 GCLA-01 GCFL-01 GCNE-01  
STA-10 POC-02 WIO-01 ASPD-03 ASTR-01 AAOB-01 OLAB-02  
AAID-01 ACSP-02 LACA-03 MP-01 AFDA-01 /107 44 7

5. RAPID USAID RESPONSES AND LEVEL OF INTEREST REFLECTED  
IN THIS PROJECT INDICATE THAT FOCUS ON EMPLOYMENT GENERA-  
TION FOR WOMEN AS OBJECTIVE OF PROJECT RATHER THAN PRODUCTION  
OF WOMEN-RELATED RESEARCH DATA THROUGH STUDIES OR  
SURVEYS IS WHAT FIELD MISSIONS DESIRE AT THIS TIME.

6. OS/RAD RESPONSES TO USAIDS REQUESTING SPECIFIC PROJECT  
SERVICES ARE BEING PREPARED IN THE ORDER OF URGENCY EXPRES-  
SED BY USAIDS. ALL USAIDS SHOULD RECEIVE OS/RAD RESPONSES  
ASAP. MUSKIE

INFO OCT-00 /035 R

DRAFTED BY AID/OS/RAD:LFACRO:MO  
APPROVED BY AID/OS/RAD:AKOATHEK  
AID/OS/RAD:JHARBESON  
AID/SER/MP:FALLEN (PHONE)

DESIRED DISTRIBUTION  
ORIGIN OSRO INFO CH R/S AFRA AFDA AFOR ASEM ASDP AALA LADR NEOP NEPD  
NETC PPEA PPCE POPR PPPD GC GCAF GCAS GCLA GCFL GCNE ASPD POC  
ASTR AAOB OLAB STA SM-00 EMO

-----090237 080846Z /34

P 080931Z JAN 81 ZEX  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO AID PRIM POSTSV PRIORITY  
USMISSION GENEVA  
AMEMBASSY LAGOS  
AMEMBASSY PARIS  
AMEMBASSY ROME  
AMEMBASSY GALISJURY

UNCLAS STATE 004404

ACM AID

E.O. 12958: 1/A

TAGS:

SUBJECT: WOMEN AND EMPLOYMENT OS/RAD WOMEN'S SOCIO-ECON-  
OMIC PARTICIPATION PROJECT)

REF: (A) STATE 305039

1. THIS IS ADDRESSED TO ALL USAIDS WHO RESPONDED TO THE REFERENCED CABLE. PURPOSE OF THIS CABLE IS TO ACKNOWLEDGE USAID RESPONSE AND TO SUMMARIZE OS/RAD AND ICGENERAL CONCLUSIONS BASED ON REVIEW OF ALL RESPONSES. PLEASE NOTE SEPARATE CABLE IS IN PREPARATION FOR EACH USAID WHICH REQUESTED SPECIFIC SERVICES FROM SUBJECT PROJECT.
2. USAID RESPONSES TO REFERENCED CABLE WERE IMMEDIATE AND POSITIVE. THIRTY SIX USAIDS RESPONDED, 23 OF WHICH (64 PERCENT) REQUESTED PROJECT SERVICES. MOST OF THESE 23 PROVIDED SPECIFIC DESCRIPTIONS OF THE SERVICES NEEDED AND REQUESTED SPECIFIC TIMING.
3. RESULTS DESCRIBED ABOVE INDICATE THE SUBJECT MEET GENERAL AND GENERAL USAID NEEDS. OS/RAD IS OBVIOUSLY PLEASED AT THIS AND WILL CONTINUE ITS EFFORTS TO PROVIDE QUALITY AND HIGH-IMPACT SERVICES THROUGH THIS PROJECT.
4. IT IS CLEAR FROM USAID RESPONSES THAT DEMANDS ON PROJECT RESOURCES WILL BE HEAVY. INITIAL PROJECT SERVICES THEREFORE WILL BE PROGRAMMED TO MEET THE MOST URGENT REQUESTS WHERE POSSIBLE. CONSEQUENTLY, IN-DEPTH RELATIONSHIPS WITH USAIDS WILL LIKELY BE DIFFICULT TO ESTABLISH DURING THE FIRST YEAR OF PROJECT LIFE. MISSIONS HAVING GREAT NEED FOR SERVICES MAY UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES WISH TO EVENTUALLY ESTABLISH

UNCLASSIFIED  
Department of State

OUTGOING  
TELEGRAM

PAGE 01 STATE 018506 3540 001370 A105831  
ORIGIN AID-20

STATE 018506 3540 001370 A105831

ORIGIN OFFICE STAR-02  
INFO AAAF-01 AFEA-03 AFSA-03 AFFW-04 AFGV-03 AFDP-02 AFUR-05  
AFCA-03 AAAS-01 ACPT-02 ASPH-02 AALA-01 LACE-03 LACA-03  
LADP-03 LADR-03 AAHE-01 HFEI-03 HEHA-03 HEJL-03 PKCE-01  
PDR-01 PPPB-03 FH-02 MID-01 ASTR-01 AAST-01 AFDA-01  
RELQ-01 ASSP-02 LACA-03 MP-01 ASBI-03 7N-00 /076 AD

INFO OCT-00 /020 R

DRAFTED BY AID/ST/RAD:LFAORO:ETJ  
APPROVED BY AID/ST/RAD:JFRLNCH  
AID/AFR/OR/ARD:GSTEEL (PHONE)  
AID/ASIA/TR:GARGENTO (PHONE)  
AID/NE/SPRD:JLEWIS (PHONE)  
AID/LAS/DR:RCASTRO (PHONE)

-----377147 2316532 /30

R 230639Z JAN 82 ZEX  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO AID WOPLOWIDE  
USMISSION GENEVA  
AMBASSY PARIS  
AMEMBASSY NOME  
ACCRA POUCH  
LAGOS POUCH

UNCLAS STATE 018506

ADM AID

E.O. 12863: N/A

TAGS:

SUBJECT: PROGRESS AND IMPACT OF ST/RAD'S WOMENS SOCIO-  
EDUCATIC PARTICIPATION PROJECT.

REF: STATE 385030

1. THIS CABLE IS TO INFORM USAID MISSIONS OF THE OVERALL  
PROGRESS AND IMPACT OF THE ST/RAD WOMEN'S SOCIOECONOMIC  
PARTICIPATION PROJECT AND TO SOLICIT GUIDANCE FROM MISSIONS  
IN THIS AREA FOR FY 82 AND BEYOND. THIS CENTRALLY FUNDED  
PROJECT IS IMPLEMENTED BY THE INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR  
RESEARCH ON WOMEN (ICRW).

2. PROJECT PURPOSE IS TO PROVIDE USAID MISSIONS WITH  
SHORT-TERM TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE RELATED TO PRODUCTIVE  
EMPLOYMENT AND INCOME GENERATION FOR LOW-INCOME WOMEN  
ALLOCATION OF SERVICES IS BASED ON EXPRESSED DEMAND FROM  
MISSIONS.

3. IN THE FIRST PROJECT YEAR 27 REQUESTS WERE RECEIVED,  
VISITS BY ICRW WERE MADE TO TEN COUNTRIES AND WORK WAS  
UNDERTAKEN IN ECUADOR, COSTA RICA, THAILAND, KENYA,  
HONDURAS, INDONESIA AND THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC. EXAMPLES  
OF ICRW'S WORK UNDER THIS PROJECT INCLUDE:

- (1) PROJECT PORTFOLIO ASSESSMENT IN TERMS OF EMPLOYMENT  
AND INCOME GENERATION ALTERNATIVES FOR LOW-INCOME WOMEN.
- (2) LABOR FORCE AND EMPLOYMENT STRATEGY REVIEW TO INCOR-  
PORATE LOW INCOME WOMEN INTO AID AND NATIONAL PROGRAMS.
- (3) ACTIVITIES RELATED TO IDENTIFICATION, DESIGN, IMPL-  
EMENTATION AND EVALUATION OF PROJECTS TO ENHANCE PARTICI-  
PATION OF WOMEN IN SPECIFIC INTEGRATED AND SECTORAL PROJ-  
ECTS, AND

(4) INSTITUTIONAL ASSESSMENT TO STRENGTHEN CAPABILI-  
TIES OF PVO'S, AID, AND/OR NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS TO UNDER-  
TAKE EMPLOYMENT AND INCOME GENERATION ACTIVITIES RELATED  
TO WOMEN.

4. SHORT TERM IMPACT OF THIS ASSISTANCE HAS INCLUDED: A)  
REVISION OF MISSION PROCEDURES FOR PROJECT REVIEW, B)  
REDIRECTION OF APPROACH AND STRENGTHENING POSITION OF  
COMMITTEE AND/OR OFFICE RESPONSIBLE FOR QUOTE WOMEN UN-  
QUOTE IN THE MISSION, C) REDESIGN OF PROJECTS TO INCREASE  
FOCUS ON EMPLOYMENT AND INCOME GENERATION FOR WOMEN, AND  
D) INCLUSION OF EMPLOYMENT AND INCOME CONCERNS OF WOMEN  
IN IMPLEMENTATION OF RURAL AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS.

5. ICRW TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE HAS BEEN MOST SUCCESSFUL  
WHEN A) NATURE AND SCOPE OF WORK IS CLEARLY DEFINED AND  
AGREED UPON IN ADVANCE BY MISSION AND ICRW, B) ASSISTANCE  
REQUESTED IMPACTS DIRECTLY OR CLOSELY ON ACTUAL PROJECTS  
RELATED TO EMPLOYMENT, RESOURCE ACCESS AND/OR INCOME GEN-  
ERATION AND C) GENUINE MISSION INTEREST EXISTS IN PROJECT  
OBJECTIVES I.E., PRODUCTIVE EMPLOYMENT AND INCOME GENERA-  
TION FOR WOMEN IS SUPPORTED BY PROGRAM OFFICE AND OTHER  
APPROPRIATE SENIOR MISSION STAFF.

6. A NUMBER OF MISSIONS HAVE DEMONSTRATED SUPPORT FOR  
WORK BY A) FUNDING LONGER TERM FOLLOW UP WORK BY ICRW,  
B) FUNDING ADDITIONAL TECHNICAL SUPPORT AND/OR PROJECT  
COMPONENTS TO IMPLEMENT ICRW RECOMMENDATIONS, C) FUNDING  
AND ARRANGING SEMINAR TO COORDINATE ACTIVITIES RELATED TO  
EMPLOYMENT AND INCOME GENERATION FOR WOMEN, AND D) PRO-  
VIDING SUPPORT AND INCENTIVES TO MISSION STAFF FOR UNDER-  
TAKING EFFORTS TO ENHANCE PROJECT IMPACT ON WOMEN'S  
EMPLOYMENT AND INCOME GENERATION.

7. A MID-TERM REPORT OF ACTIVITIES AND FINDINGS OF THIS  
PROJECT IS CURRENTLY UNDER PREPARATION AND WILL BE  
POUCHED TO USAIDS BY END FEBRUARY.

8. IN ORDER THAT PROJECT SUCCESSFULLY MEETS MISSION  
NEEDS, MISSIONS ARE REQUESTED TO RESPOND INDICATING A)  
INTEREST AND PRIORITIES FOR PROJECT ASSISTANCE INCLUDING  
DURATION AND TIMING FOR FIELD SUPPORT, AND C) GENERAL  
GUIDANCE AND/OR COMMENTS CONSIDERED USEFUL FOR CURRENT  
PLANNING PURPOSES. IF POSSIBLE PLEASE REPLY BY EARLY  
FEBRUARY. HAIG

UNCLASSIFIED

FILE

99

UNCLASSIFIED

AID/ST/RD/ESE:MFOSTER:KC  
7-02-84 EXT:235-9572  
AID/ST/RD:JO'DONNELL

AID/ASIA/ISDA/I:SSINGER {INFO}  
AID/PPC/WID:NHORENSTEIN {PHONE}  
AID/ST/RD/ESE:LFAORO

PRIORITY JAKARTA

*SAMPLE CABLE  
SENT 7/84  
TO MISSIONS  
VISITED BY  
ICRW FOR  
TA*

ADM/AID

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS:

SUBJECT: END OF PROJECT EVALUATION: WOMEN'S SOCIO-ECONOMIC PARTICIPATION PROJECT {936-5319}

JO'D  
MF  
MF  
LF

1. THREE PERSON DEVELOPMENT ALTERNATIVES, INC. {DAI} TEAM HAS BEGUN WORK ON SUBJECT EVALUATION, JOINTLY FUNDED BY ST/RD, PPC/WID AND PPC/E. MAJOR OBJECTIVES OF EVALUATION ARE TO EXAMINE THE IMPACT OF THIS FOUR YEAR {OCT 80 - SEPT 84} PROJECT, ASSESS PERFORMANCE OF PROJECT CONTRACTOR, INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR RESEARCH ON WOMEN {ICRW} AND MAKE SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVING FUTURE WOMEN'S EMPLOYMENT AND INCOME GENERATION PROJECTS. EVALUATION METHODOLOGY INCLUDES TELEPHONE SURVEY BY DAI OF EACH MISSION WHICH RECEIVED ICRW TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE UNDER SUBJECT PROJECT.

2. ICRW PROVIDED TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE IN INDONESIA DURING JUNE 81 IN A PROJECT PORTFOLIO REVIEW FOCUSED ON EMPLOYMENT AND INCOME GENERATION OPPORTUNITIES FOR RURAL WOMEN.

3. DAI EVALUATION TEAM PLANS TO CONDUCT TELEPHONE SURVEY JULY 2-13. PREFERRED METHODOLOGY INVOLVES CONVERSATIONS WITH TWO PEOPLE IN EACH MISSION; INCLUDING 1) WID OFFICER AND/OR PERSON WHO WAS PRIMARY ICRW MISSION CONTACT, AND

UNCLASSIFIED

101

COUNTRY	REQUEST					INSTITUTION			
	Project specific SOW	Follow-on to Current work	Project SOW to be Defined	Probable Request in near future	Possible Request in the future	PVO	National Government/ Organization	AID	Other/ Unknown
<u>Near East</u>									
✓ Jordan	*		*			*			*
✓ Tunisia	*					*	*	*	
<u>Asia</u>									
Bangladesh					*				*
India			*	*					*
Nepal	*					*	*		
Philippines				*	*				*
Sri Lanka			*	*					*
Thailand					*				*
<u>LAC</u>									
✓ Barbados	*					*			
Dom. Republic		*		*		*		*	
✓ Ecuador	*	*	*			*	*	*	
✓ Haiti	*					*	*	*	
✓ Honduras	*	*				*	*	*	
✓ Jamaica	*					*	*	*	
Panama	*	*				*		*	
✓ Peru			*			*		*	
<u>Africa</u>									
Botswana				*				*	
✓ Kenya		*				*			*
Sierre Leone			*				*		*
Sudan					*			*	*
✓ Tanzania	*						*		

UNCLASSIFIED

2

3: DEPUTY MISSION DIRECTOR AND/OR PROGRAM OFFICER WITH OVERVIEW OF MISSION PRIORITIES, INCLUDING WID STRATEGY AND SMALL SCALE ENTERPRISE PROGRAMMING. INFORMATION RECEIVED DURING THESE INTERVIEWS WILL BE AGGREGATED IN DATA ANALYSIS FOR FINAL EVALUATION REPORT AND WILL NOT BE ATTRIBUTED TO SPECIFIC INDIVIDUALS.

4. DURING TELEPHONE CONVERSATIONS THE RESPONDENTS ARE REQUESTED TO BE PREPARED TO DISCUSS TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE, THE FOLLOWING SUBJECTS:

- ...A} DESCRIPTION OF ICRW WORK INCOUNTRY.
- ...B} RELATIONSHIP OF ICRW WORK TO USAID'S OVERALL WID AND/OR EMPLOYMENT GENERATION PROGRAMMING STRATEGIES.
- ...C} QUALITY AND RELEVANCE OF ASSISTANCE.
- ...D} USEFULNESS OF ICRW'S ACTIVITIES TO INDIGENOUS ORGANIZATIONS.
- ...E} IMPACT OF ICRW'S ASSISTANCE ON THE POLICIES, PROGRAMS AND PROJECTS OF THESE LOCAL ORGANIZATIONS.
- ...F} BENEFICIARIES OF ICRW'S WORK AND OVERALL IMPACT OF ASSISTANCE.
- ...G} CURRENT USAID WID STRATEGY AND IMPACT OF ICRW'S WORK ON DEVELOPMENT OF THIS STRATEGY.
- ...H} FOLLOW UP ACTIVITIES DEVELOPED AS A RESULT OF ICRW ASSISTANCE.
- ...I} FACTORS INFLUENCING USAID USE OF ICRW ASSISTANCE.

5. REQUEST CABLE RESPONSE SOONEST WITH NAMES OF APPROPRIATE INDIVIDUALS TO BE CONTACTED DURING TELEPHONE SURVEY. PLEASE ALSO ADVISE IF MISSION HAS PREFERENCE FOR TIMING OF DAI PHONE CALLS. APPRECIATE MISSION ASSISTANCE. ST/RD CONTACT IS MICHELE FOSTER {703} 235-9572. 44

UNCLASSIFIED

10/2

**FILE**

UNCLASSIFIED

AID/ST/RD/ESE:MFOSTER:ETJ  
7/13/84 EXT 235-8881

AID/ST/RD:JO'DONNELL

AID/LAC/CAR:EPADILLA (PHONE)

SAMPLE SENT  
CABLE SENT  
7/84 TO  
12 MISSIONS  
WHERE ICRW  
DID NOT  
DELIVER TA

PRIORITY

PORT AU PRINCE

ADM AID

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS:

SUBJECT: END OF PROJECT EVALUATION: WOMEN'S SOCIO-ECONOMIC PARTICIPATION PROJECT {936-5319}

JO'D  
MFO  
LF  
MF *Reg*

REFS: {A} 80 STATE 305039, {B} 82 STATE 018506, {C} 82 PORT AU PRINCE 1707, {D} 82 PORT AU PRINCE 0888, {E} 81 STATE 004404, {F} 81 PORT AU PRINCE 0268

1. THREE-PERSON DEVELOPMENT ALTERNATIVES, INC. {DAI} TEAM HAS BEGUN WORK ON SUBJECT EVALUATION, JOINTLY FUNDED BY ST/RD, PPC/WID AND PPC/E. MAJOR OBJECTIVES OF EVALUATION ARE TO EXAMINE THE IMPACT OF THIS FOUR YEAR {OCT. 80 - SEPT. 84} PROJECT, ASSESS PERFORMANCE OF PROJECT CONTRACTOR, INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR RESEARCH ON WOMEN {ICRW}, AND MAKE SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVING FUTURE WOMEN'S EMPLOYMENT AND INCOME GENERATION PROJECTS.

2. EVALUATION METHODOLOGY INCLUDES TELEPHONE SURVEY BY DAI OF EACH MISSION WHICH RECEIVED ICRW TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE UNDER SUBJECT PROJECT. IN ADDITION, DAI EVALUATION TEAM WILL CONTACT A) MISSIONS WHICH REQUESTED TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE BUT RECEIVED ONLY ONE PRELIMINARY VISIT, B) MISSIONS THAT EXPRESSED INTEREST IN ICRW

103

UNCLASSIFIED

2

SERVICES BUT NEVER RECEIVED A VISIT, AND C) SELECTED MISSIONS THAT INDICATED THEY DID NOT REQUIRE TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE UNDER THIS PROJECT.

3. DAI EVALUATION TEAM PLANS TO CONDUCT TELEPHONE SURVEY ~~JULY 13-17 THROUGH AUGUST-3~~ AUGUST-2. PREFERRED METHODOLOGY INVOLVES CONVERSATIONS WITH WID OFFICER AND/OR PERSON MOST INVOLVED IN CONTACTS WITH ICRW AND/OR PROGRAM OFFICER WITH OVERVIEW OF MISSION PRIORITIES, INCLUDING WID STRATEGY AND SMALL-SCALE ENTERPRISE PROGRAMMING. INFORMATION RECEIVED DURING THESE PHONE INTERVIEWS WILL BE AGGREGATED IN DATA ANALYSIS FOR FINAL EVALUATION REPORT AND WILL NOT BE ATTRIBUTED TO SPECIFIC INDIVIDUALS.

4. DURING TELEPHONE CONVERSATIONS THE RESPONDENTS ARE REQUESTED TO BE PREPARED TO DISCUSS TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE THE FOLLOWING SUBJECTS:

{1} REASONS FOR DECISION ABOUT REQUESTING ICRW TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE (TA) IN EARLIER CABLES (RESPONSE TO 1988 ANNOUNCEMENT OF SUBJECT PROJECT CREF 30, 1988 ANNOUNCEMENT OF EXTENSION OF PROJECT CREF 30, ETC.).

{2} WHETHER AID/TA RESPONSES TO YOUR CABLES ABOUT ICRW TA WERE TIMELY AND APPROPRIATE.

{3} WHETHER THE TA NEED IDENTIFIED WAS FILLED BY OTHER SOURCES THAN ICRW (IF APPLICABLE); IF SO, HOW? IF NOT, DOES NEED STILL EXIST?

{4} ANY IMPRESSIONS OF ICRW'S WORK AND CAPACITIES (IF APPLICABLE).

{5} ANY IDEAS ABOUT ASSISTANCE IN AREA OF ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITIES FOR POOR WOMEN THAT COULD BE HELPFUL TO MISSION IN FUTURE (TA, TRAINING, OTHER RESOURCES).

5. REQUEST CABLE RESPONSE SOONEST WITH NAMES OF APPROPRIATE INDIVIDUAL(S) TO BE CONTACTED DURING TELEPHONE SURVEY. PLEASE ALSO ADVISE IF MISSION HAS PREFERENCE FOR TIMING OF DAI PHONE CALLS OR IF MISSION WOULD PREFER TO PROVIDE CABLE RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS PARA 4. APPRECIATE MISSION ASSISTANCE. ST/RO CONTACT IS MICHELE FOSTER (703)235-9572. YY

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

104

**APPENDIX E**  
**ECUADOR CASE STUDY**

105

## ICRW TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE IN ECUADOR

### Background

The International Center for Research on Women first provided technical assistance to the AID Mission in Ecuador through a Mission contract to develop "A Strategy for Women in Ecuador." That report was based on 12 days of field work which included a general portfolio review of Mission projects, especially the integrated rural and urban development projects, and an assessment of the capacity of the Government of Ecuador's newly created National Office for Women.

Further work with the Women's Office was precluded by political factors in Ecuador which reduced the Office's status and limited its activity. However, discussions between ICRW and the Ecuador Mission about project-related technical assistance continued.

In January 1982 under the WSPP, the Mission requested that ICRW assist the Fundacion Mariana de Jesus in the design of a questionnaire for applicants to the Solanda housing project. In 1971, FMJ, a private foundation, had donated land in southern Quito for the construction of some 6000 houses for low-income families. The Ecuadorian government agreed to construct and finance the houses. FMJ was responsible for selection of the resident population and the establishment of social programs, including day care, skills training and employment and income generation programs. Construction was not actually begun until the Ecuadorian government obtained a loan from AID in 1979. The assistance provided by ICRW in early 1982 helped improve questionnaire design in general and included a gender-specific item which made it possible to identify that 30 percent of the applicant population consisted of woman-headed households (WHHs).

Later in 1982, the Ecuador Mission invited both ICRW and the Overseas Education Fund, which had managed the successful Tarqui project in Ecuador, to present a joint proposal for women-oriented, project-specific TA. That invitation stemmed from the unexpected availability of OPG monies and the decision of the Mission director to try to "do something for women." Both ICRW and OEF identified the Solanda project as promising and worked with representatives of FMJ to develop action plans. The two organizations opted to present separate proposals reflecting the particular expertise of each. OEF presented a plan for skills training for Solanda's female residents. ICRW proposed to assist FMJ's social studies unit in the further design and analysis of a) questionnaire data; b) applicant selection criteria and processes; c) special programs for woman-headed households (WHH); and d) monitoring and evaluation plans which would track impact on WHHs.

## The ICRW-FMJ Experience

In October 1982, ICRW signed a one-year contract with FMJ for \$120,000. That contract was later extended through March 1984. According to the contract, ICRW would work directly with the FMJ social studies division. Workplans and incountry schedules would be determined jointly and the Mission would not approve any activities unless agreed to by FMJ.

When the contract was made, it was expected that housing construction would be completed within the year and the resident population selected from among applicants. Construction delays, however, pushed applicant selection back. Because much of the technical assistance which ICRW had initially proposed to offer depended on the identification of the real resident population, changes in the initial work plan were made by joint agreement with ICRW and FMJ and the contract was extended for five months in the hope that objectives regarding WHHs could be met. The contract terminated in March 1984 and by July 1984, housing was still not completed.

Both FMJ and Mission officials regarded work done by ICRW as positive. Given construction delays and their consequences, however, they felt that it had been unfortunately mistimed. Mission officials also feared that much of the value of the technical assistance would be lost to the project by the time the resident population was actually chosen and began to live on the site.

During the 17 month period, ICRW carried out the following in-country technical assistance activities with FMJ:

Dates	Activities
1982	
Nov 8-18	Codebook analysis; definition variables and categories for analysis of applicant questionnaire
	Assessment of data processing capability available in Quito
	Study definition of woman-headed households; 532 cases chosen for analysis; data summarized & feasibility study on downpayment capability of WHHs designed
1983	
Jan 11-22	Explore possible sources for financing and administration of a credit fund to assist WHHs to meet downpayment requirements
	Refine questionnaire for economic study of WHH and estimation of credit needs; 5 interviewers trained to use questionnaire in study of 50 selected WHHs; tested with 10 cases

Revise coding of socio-economic data to obtain better information re: economic activity

Define and select 50 case sample for financial analysis of WHH

Analysis of preliminary data on 532 cases WHH

Assess and improve coding manual prepared by FMJ

APR 11-14 Review of previous technical assistance and planning of future technical assistance with ICRW staff

JUN 13-23 Assessment of alternative data processing services in Quito; work with FMJ staff to judge proposals presented from various sources; written report

Work sessions to analyze and interpret research findings with FMJ and other technical assistance sources involved in specific program design

OCT Seminar on lessons from Solanda and implications for WHH's in other housing projects; in Washington, D.C., with two representatives from FMJ

1984

JAN 5 days consultancy in Quito to a) analyze frequency distributions and cross variables obtained by computer; b) define precise criteria for ranking candidates according to selection priorities

In addition to the above incountry activities, several person months work was done by ICRW in Washington, D.C. and FMJ in Quito to complete and complement work defined and undertaken jointly during ICRW's visits to Quito. In the process, both ICRW and FMJ staff reported that positive, productive working relationships were developed, although reaching that point had not been easy. The decision to enter into the contract with ICRW had been made by FMJ directors and, until rapport was developed, FMJ staff resisted "outside" intervention.

#### Summary of impacts

Impacts can be summarized in terms of four categories of beneficiaries: FMJ staff and other Ecuadorian institutions, USAID officials and programs, potential Solanda residents, the general development community.

FMJ staff and other Ecuadorian institutions. Solanda is the largest housing project in Ecuador's history and the first "integrated" one which will provide social programs as well as

housing. While the FMJ has had some experience in housing projects, Solanda is FMJ's first experience with low-income housing and with accompanying social programs. The three-person FMJ staff of three employed in the social studies division with which ICRW collaborated directly, had previously worked for the National Housing Board, but were not experienced researchers.

The division head reported that technical assistance provided by ICRW was strongly positive throughout the various stages of research design, data processing and analysis and especially in the establishment of a computerized data bank and applicant selection procedures. The head of the studies division was confident that he and his staff would be able to explain both general concepts and specific sampling and data collection design and analysis techniques to third parties. He said that this had been done only informally with some university students.

FMJ prides itself that the methodologies developed and the results produced are unprecedented in Ecuador and are confident that Solanda will become a model for other housing projects. It would appear that staff from some other Ecuadorian institutions, such as the National Housing Board and the Ecuadorian Housing Bank have benefitted indirectly from ICRW technical assistance. Both institutions are following the Solanda project closely. As a result of studies of the applicant population, and in particular of the woman-headed households, the Ecuadorian Housing Bank has adjusted its downpayment guidelines to accept as little as 5% instead of the 15% minimum usually required.

In the course of its work in Solanda, ICRW has also maintained informal relationships with the National Office for Women which has received copies of the Solanda studies on woman-headed households and their financial situations.

Impact on AID staff and programs. While Mission staff interviewed spoke highly of ICRW's work with FMJ and in the Mission, there was little evidence of impact in Mission programs. The only example of follow through on the earlier strategy paper prepared by ICRW for the mission has been ICRW's participation in the Solanda project. This is especially disappointing given ICRW's expectation that the Ecuador mission might become a model of how AID might integrate women specific concerns throughout its project portfolio.

One AID staff member said that from his viewpoint, it was unfortunate that ICRW had put "all its eggs in the Solanda basket," implying that other possible impact areas, e.g., in the integrated rural development project, were left unattended. AID officials interviewed in Ecuador agreed unanimously that there was no mission strategy with regard to incorporating women's concerns into specific projects, although "lip service" on the issue could be heard around the Mission.

In fact, the program officer reported that a criticism of the most recent CDSS by AID/W had been its lack of attention to

women. As a result, the local OEF representative was asked to participate in an effort to "fix" the CDSS by discussing various proposed activities with Mission officials and incorporating WID-specific statements in appropriate places throughout the document. While it can be said that the various statements reflect what the Mission is in fact doing (and the FY 1986 CDSS now shows far more attention to women than most CDSS's), the handling of the CDSS reflects the lack of conscience purposefulness in considering either the role of women in specific development areas or the impact of development initiatives on women's lives. Neither were there plans to attend to woman-headed households within the Mission's new integrated housing project to be implemented in several secondary cities. In the opinion of the Mission housing official, the only features of the new project attributable to Solanda influence were the downward adjustment of initial payment from 15 to 5 percent of cost and the computerization of selection techniques.

When ICRW first worked in Ecuador, the Mission director was supportive of efforts to integrate women into development initiatives. However, with the change of director, high level Mission support for such an approach diminished. The program officer remains concerned about the problem and looks forward to possible future collaboration with ICRW to recover some of the progress which had been made in recent years.

Impact on Poor Women. ICRW's technical assistance focussed on techniques for data collection, processing and analysis for the purpose of increasing project benefits to poor women, especially heads of households. ICRW work changed the eligibility criteria for housing so that more female heads of household would be included. The fact that occupants have not yet been selected from the applicant pool makes it impossible to know how many of these intended beneficiaries there will eventually be. However, there is currently reason to expect that shortfall will be great. As already mentioned, long delays in construction have precluded occupant selection and the design of special programs to fit the needs of that population. ICRW completed studies regarding credit, income and household finances for the applicant subpopulation of woman-headed households. The FMJ still subscribes verbally to its earlier resolve to attend the needs of WHHs. Nonetheless, other factors suggest that such programs may not only be delayed, but perhaps discarded altogether.

For example, in Ecuador's situation of inflation-devaluation, delays have meant substantially increased costs for housing. Even though actual costs have still not finally been determined, it looks as if many of the woman-headed households will not be excluded. As one FMJ official point out, wage raises will partially offset the increased price of housing. However, since women heads of households are most frequently employed in the informal sector, it is unlikely that they will benefit from increased wages.

Again, construction delays have desynchronized project components. Monies awarded to both ICRW and OEF for the design and implementation of special women-oriented programs, including income and employment generation, were exhausted before the intended activities could be carried out. As an alternative, two Ecuadorian government organizations will provide skills and small enterprise training. To date, no specific agreements have been signed, but it is questionable whether whether the public sector institutions charged with implementation of the project's social components indeed have the orientation and capacity necessary to attend to the needs of poor women, especially woman-headed households.

Although the ICRW-FMJ work agreement has ended, ICRW will continue working in Ecuador in collaboration with a credit for small enterprise fund established by AITECH. That program has already benefitted some of the Solanda applicants, although it is not specifically designed for them. ICRW has obtained financing from PPC/WID to increase the fund by \$50,000 and has negotiated with the Ecuadorian Development Foundation to hire one full-time person to work in the credit program, focussing particularly on women loan candidates, some of whom might belong to the Solanda population.

The development community and the WID field. The results of ICRW's work in Solanda have been and continue to be disseminated to the international development community and the WID field. In Ecuador, ICRW presented findings from Solanda on woman-headed households at a week-long seminar organized by FMJ. Those findings have also been included in the document to be presented by Ecuador at the International Conference on Women to be held in Nairobi in 1985.

ICRW publications which report and draw on the Solanda experience have been prepared and circulated among AID and World Bank officials and select members of the broader development community. In October 1982, ICRW organized a seminar on Low Income Women and Housing in Washington, D.C., which publicized work in both Ecuador and Panama.

#### Issues/Lessons Learned

For ICRW, the primary learnings from the Solanda experience have come from nature of the experience itself, i.e., that of a recurrent, ongoing relationship within the framework of a large scale development project. Throughout the 17 month relationship, it was possible to develop technical assistance activities and working relationships with FMJ staff and AID officials. Such continuity provided the opportunity to arrive at mutually agreed upon, interactive work plans and to provide inhouse training for both FMJ and ICRW. The technical assistance relationship which developed proved positive and productive. Nonetheless, the desired development outcomes remain tenuous.

The Solanda case demonstrates that even when the technical assistance relationship is relatively long term, there is no necessary direct relationship between it and the achievement of intended objectives and impact. The outlook at present is disappointing; mostly so, for precisely the low income women which ICRW intended to benefit.

A second lesson is that the probability that TA assistance will benefit a specific subpopulation among the intended beneficiaries is inversely related to the complexity of the project. Given the already indirect relationship between TA and project impact, should ICRW continue to target complex, large-scale projects as part its strategy to benefit low-income women?

Third, given the lack of positive, across-the-board WID policy implementation in AID, is technical assistance provided by ICRW automatically marginalized when it is limited to a specific project, complex or simple? Perhaps a sectoral or program focus is preferable.

Fourth, it appears that an integrationist strategy (addressing women's concerns within the overall context of a project) brings with it the risk that, especially if the project falls upon hard times, specific benefits to women will be lost.

Thus, while the Solanda experience demonstrates that ICRW can provide useful, recurrent, project-related technical assistance, it also raises some difficult questions about the kinds of projects and project settings which should be chosen in order to achieve the goal of integrating women into mainstream development activities.

**APPENDIX F**  
**DOMINICAN REPUBLIC**  
**CASE STUDY**

## APPENDIX F

## DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

## CASE STUDY

A field visit to the Dominican Republic from July 22-28 offered the evaluation team the opportunity to discuss the ICRW's technical assistance to APEC (Accion Pro-Educacion y Cultura). The specific program of APEC that was the ICRW's focus was originally called CENAM (Centro de Entrenamiento y Asesoria para la Mujer, or Women's Training and Advisory Services Center); the name was later changed to PROMAPEC (Promocion APEC de la Mujer, or APEC's Women's Promotion Project).

## WHAT WERE THE ORIGINS AND INTENTIONS OF THE PROJECT?

This project was an OPG, from AID/D.R. to APEC. It was eventually fully funded at a level of \$400,000. The first phase, approved in August, 1980, at a cost of \$81,000, was a baseline study of women's employment characteristics in urban Santo Domingo. Although a full proposal for an action project had been presented, AID decided that a first-stage study would be a wise investment. APEC selected a local social scientist (sociologist) to design and implement the study.

Once the study was completed and its results presented, a new project design was written based on the information obtained. The project was envisioned as a two-year pilot effort aimed at: (a) improving the socio-economic condition of low-income women and their families, and (b) assisting women in finding solutions to problems and obstacles that hinder their wider participation in social and economic life.

The project included three main components. As described by ICRW, these were:

- Income generation component providing occupational skills training and entrepreneurial development;
- Personal development component providing supportive therapy and courses in human development; and
- Referral services for employment and education related problems as well as legal advice.

It is worthy of note that this kind of project activity was new both to APEC and to AID. APEC is well known for its work in various aspects of education -- student loans, centers for "long distance education," sexual education programs, and even its own university. It has not carried out a sustained action program in a poor community before beginning this women's project.

For its part, the AID Mission acknowledges that it has not had an across-the-board strategy of trying to integrate women into the development process. (Indeed, the D.R. is not alone in this regard; many or even most Missions do not have such a strategy.) The negotiations for this OPG apparently began with a request by APEC to be included in a regional legal services program for women; when the Dominican Republic was not included among the selected countries, discussions began about this program as an alternative, and the funding for the baseline study was made available. Managing this separate "women in development" grant was thus as new an experience for AID as it was for APEC.

#### WHAT TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE WAS PROVIDED BY ICRW?

ICRW was involved in the APEC project at three stages: during the baseline study, for preparation of the final project design, and to carry out the mid-point evaluation. Their involvement in a fourth stage, the final project evaluation, was originally under consideration, but (as will be seen below) did not take place.

The Dominican Republic was the very first country to receive ICRW TA under the four-year contract with S&T/RD. The APEC OPG's first phase, the baseline study, had been approved in August, 1980. When the cable announcing the availability of ICRW TA was sent to all Missions in December, 1980, the Santo Domingo Mission responded with a very specific request. Describing the APEC survey, the Mission's cable states that "Technical assistance estimated at five work days will be required starting January 27, 1981, to review the operational plans for completeness and to advise on any additional technical assistance which may be needed for project implementation. Two persons with sociology and industrial psychology/labor problems background are needed for this initial assistance. Three to five days consultation with Mission staff, following assistance to APEC, to discuss ongoing and planned initiatives in the area of employment would also be useful." (S.D. 09384)

This specific request received a specific response: Nadia Youssef of the ICRW's staff and consultant Ramon Daubon traveled to the Dominican Republic in late January. Their report contained not only a review of the proposed APEC study design, but also an overview of women's participation in the labor force in the D.R. and suggestions as to how the AID Mission's policies and programs can better incorporate women. ("Recommendations for Expansion of Employment and Income Generation Opportunities for Women in the Dominican Republic," Youssef and Daubon with Hetler, March, 1981.)

Once the survey (covering over 17,000 women) was completed, the local sociologist wrote an eight-volume report on the results. In addition, the ICRW helped to prepare a short analysis of the results of the study, focusing on the points that would be most relevant to project design. ("Discussion of the

Preliminary Results of a Survey on the Socio-economic Condition of Barrio Women in the Dominican Republic," Kennedy and Hetler, Jan. 1982.)

A year after the first visit, in January 1982, Nadia Youssef returned to the D.R. and helped in the preparation of the "Project Design for the Women's Training and Placement Center." Also involved were Alan Broehl (seconded by AID), Janet Kennedy, and Daysi Mejia. The scope of work for this visit had been addressed as early as October, 1981, in a letter from the Director of APEC to Dr. Youssef. The APEC director wrote two letters praising the work of the team in general, and of Dr. Youssef in particular, in late January and mid-February. Even today, she describes the work done as very professional, and she makes note of the fact that all suggestions were discussed with her rather than imposed in any way. The APEC Director feels that APEC had requested the services of a particular person, Nadia Youssef, rather than those of an organization, the ICRW, and that the experience with that person was very positive. (Note that the cabled request from Santo Domingo made no reference to any specific people desired for the TA. Once Dr. Youssef came the first time, she was definitely the one invited back again; however, it is not clear that she was requested by name for the first visit, as the APEC Director remembers.)

Interestingly, the local sociologist who had been hired in late 1980 to design the baseline study for APEC does not concur with this positive assessment of ICRW's early TA. He had apparently not been consulted as to whether the T.A. would be helpful or welcome, and so when two "foreign experts" arrived to review his work, they were viewed as being imposed on him -- not the best possible situation for collegial work towards joint objectives. Suggestions made by the ICRW team that reviewed the study were seen by this researcher as indicating a "lack of confidence in the local people involved," "a lack of understanding of the level of local technological capacity (e.g., for processing data by computer), "a methodological rigidity that was not applicable under the local circumstances."

These comments contrast sharply with the pleased reaction of the APEC Director; in making suggestions for any future TA, the critical sociologist suggested that a preliminary, informal contact between local and outside personnel would be helpful in "lowering defense mechanisms," "creating mutual confidence," and "helping foreigners to understand the local situation." Thus, he acknowledged that the situation of quick in-and-out visits by providers of technical assistance involves constraints that must be dealt with by changing the structure and context in which such visits take place.

Once the final project design was approved by AID and the next stage of funding made available, implementation was to get underway. It is of note that the woman selected as the Project Director was offered, and took advantage of, the opportunity to spend three months in Washington as an ICRW "Fellow" in early

1982. The funding for the fellowship program did not come from AID, but Dr. Youssef felt that linking the APEC project to the resources of ICRW and Washington in general through the program would make sense as an investment in the project's future. Unfortunately, this Project Director was only in place for three months after her return to the D.R. At that time she was asked to leave the project, her position was eliminated and combined with the responsibilities of the APEC Director (who had many activities of APEC to monitor, not just this one program), and only the Project Coordinator was left as the main professional in the Capotillo barrio where the project was operating. This personnel situation changed somewhat after the midpoint evaluation of the project, which was the next time ICRW's technical assistance was used.

Reactions to the TA work which took place on the baseline survey and project design in 1981-82 have faded in memory to some extent, overshadowed by the work done in 1983 on the midpoint evaluation of the APEC project. This work was rather controversial -- praised by some as thorough and insightful, condemned by others as inappropriately focused and overly critical. A team of three people traveled to Santo Domingo in May, 1983, in the eleventh month of the scheduled two-year operating period of the project. The team leader was Robert Girling, ICRW staff member and at that time director of the technical assistance project. He was accompanied by two consultants, Elizabeth Dore and Rebecca Reichmann.

The AID Mission's Program Officer, who monitored the APEC OPG and provided liaison between APEC and ICRW, felt that (apart from a slight misunderstanding about one part of the scope of work) the report was one of the very best evaluations the Mission has had done. It is a hard-hitting catalogue of what had been accomplished in the first year of activities, and includes ten recommendations called "mid-course corrections" which indicate how to get the program "back on track" with respect to the original project design.

APEC was not pleased with this tough criticism of its program. Besides the substance of the report, they had not appreciated the style in which the evaluation had been carried out. One person said they felt that "the evaluation team was out to get the project" -- a very different relationship from the feeling of partnership and collegiality that had characterized the earlier visits from ICRW teams. Even the fact that the in-country debriefing covered some, but not all, of the final report's recommendations aroused comment from one quarter; why had the ICRW surprised APEC with its comments (perceived as very negative) in writing, instead of having had a frank, in-person discussion with APEC before leaving the D.R.? APEC sent two detailed letters to AID with its comments on the evaluation in mid-July, acknowledging the validity of some of the recommendations (and stating its plans to implement them) while criticizing a number of other points (both methodological and substantive) rather harshly.

Just as the APEC Director had felt that her relationship was with a person rather than an institution in the case of the very positive results from Nadia Youssef's work, so too in the case of this evaluation she saw the problem as with a person rather than with the ICRW as a whole. Nonetheless, when the time came for planning the final evaluation of the project after its two years of operation, she did not want to have ICRW involved, as had originally been planned. ICRW had not kept in touch with APEC between mid-1983 when the evaluation was done and mid-1984 when the final evaluation was to take place. There had thus been no opportunity to smooth over the ruffled feelings and keep APEC informed about changes of personnel at ICRW, lessons learned from similar projects in other countries, etc.

Perhaps, if the same (satisfactory) person had been involved from beginning to end of the D.R. TA experience, the ICRW would have had the chance to follow through at all four key stages of the project: baseline study, project design, midpoint evaluation and final evaluation. In fact, the APEC director stated that she thought the midpoint evaluation would have been done in a very different way if Dr. Youssef had been involved. (The files indicate that APEC wrote to ICRW asking for Dr. Youssef's services about six months into the action phase of the project, in November 1982, asking for assistance in identifying the differences between the original project design and the current state of activities. As Dr. Youssef was leaving the ICRW at the end of the year, she could not make the trip herself, and APEC decided not to pursue its request with anyone else from ICRW.) As it stands, the project does not seem to have fulfilled its original ambitious objectives; the extent to which ICRW technical assistance can be credited for what has been achieved, or blamed for what has not, is extremely difficult or impossible to determine. (The team that was to carry out the final evaluation was scheduled to arrive in the Dominican Republic the week after the DAI evaluation team members' departure. Whether they will take into account ICRW's technical assistance as a factor in the successes and faults of the program is unclear from their scope of work.)

#### WHAT LESSONS CAN BE LEARNED FROM THIS TA EXPERIENCE?

Among the lessons that can be drawn from this "case study" are the following.

- Support from the top of an AID Mission appears to be a key variable in determining the level of impact of ICRW's TA work. This is seen in two ways in this case. First, the OPG which proved to be the focus of ICRW's work was not the product of a desire on the part of AID to do a women's project; rather, it was a response to a series of events (coincidences?) which made funding available for an OPG at a particular time. This is very similar to the situation in the Ecuador case study, where chance rather than either WID or overall employment strategy seemed to govern the existence of the TA opportunity for ICRW.

118

Second, the original idea for using the ICRW in Santo Domingo was not only for assistance with the APEC OPG, but also to help the Mission review its overall programming with respect to women's participation. Instead of being one part of a multi-pronged effort, however, the APEC project became the sole focus of the ICRW -- even though a \$400,000 women-specific program cannot possibly have the kind of impact that influencing larger-scale development spending can.

- Having support only from the top of the PVO, rather than general agreement by all concerned that TA is needed, can hinder productivity and impact of the TA. In both the D.R. and Ecuador cases, it was a high-level official of the organization (in both cases, women) who arranged for and promoted the idea of having ICRW's assistance. In the D.R. case at least, the local sociologist with whom the first stage of TA was carried out was not particularly enthusiastic about either the idea or the fact of the help, seeing it as a threat and potential criticism. Since technical assistance involves the exchange of ideas among professionals, a negative feeling on the part of either side can seriously harm the collegial relationships necessary.

- The final evaluation of the OPG is being carried out by a team in the D.R. as this WSPP evaluation report is being written. It was not within the scope of work for the field visit to include a full assessment of the APEC project. However, observations in-country showed that the "human development" training component of the program seemed to have had excellent results, giving low-income women a new sense of opportunities open to them in life. On the other hand, the project appeared not to have given women viable economic skills and the means to use them for income gain in most cases. There was little or no follow up of the women once they were trained, no effort to help them band together in collective action or to give them control over the resources they would need to use their skills (raw materials, equipment). This appears to the evaluation team to have been a classic case of project "misbehavior" as defined in the April, 1984 paper on this phenomenon.

- Ad hoc decisions about each TA task and visit seem likely to be less effective than a contractual type agreement stating ICRW's responsibilities at the beginning of a program and covering the life of that program. Under the arrangement used in the D.R., neither APEC nor ICRW knew, once one TA assignment was completed, whether or when ICRW would be invited back. The disadvantages of this are that ICRW thus has no chance to play any monitoring role to examine on a regular basis how the implementation of its recommendations is going, and that there is no ongoing contact between ICRW personnel and key members of either the AID Mission or the PVO in question.

**APPENDIX G**  
**TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE BY COUNTRY**

## APPENDIX G

## TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE BY COUNTRY

## Latin America and Caribbean Region

BARBADOS Sept. 1982	Definition of scope of work concerning housing credit and agriculture sector projects.
COSTA RICA April 1981	INSTITUTIONAL ASSESSMENT of PVO ACTIVITIES for poor women; preparation of seminar to identify program alternatives for women's employment and income generation.
June 1981	SEMINAR and STRATEGY on productive programs for women for representatives of government offices, PVOs, and international agencies; establishment of coordinating committee of funding agencies, government offices, PVOs, and national researchers undertaking activities related to women's economic needs.
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC	
Jan. 1981	Design and analysis of PROJECT BASE-LINE SURVEY employment and vocational training needs of low-income urban women; review of mission EMPLOYMENT STRATEGY.
Jan. 1982	PROJECT DESIGN of vocational training center for barrio women.
May 1983	Midpoint PROJECT EVALUATION of vocational training center.
ECUADOR	
Jan. 1981	INSTITUTIONAL ASSESSMENT and preparation of a plan of action for National Women's Office; PROJECT REVIEW of integrated rural and urban development projects concerning economic alternatives for women.
Jan. 1982	Follow-up assistance with National Women's Office; review of four project alternatives for women-specific activities.
May 1982	Preliminary PROJECT DESIGN for component focused on economic needs of urban women and households headed by women for urban housing and integrated development project.

**HONDURAS**

June 1981

Definition of scope of work focused on employment and country development strategies.

Sept. 1981

EMPLOYMENT STRATEGY to enhance opportunities for rural and urban women; PROJECT PORTFOLIO REVIEW and recommendations to improve focus on women in project design and implementation.

**JAMAICA**

June 1982

Recommendations for PROJECT DESIGN of skills training, small manufacturing, agribusiness, and voluntary sector development projects.

**PANAMA**

Sept. 1981

REVIEW OF LABOR FORCE STRATEGY; review of preliminary design for vocational training project; definition of scope of work for follow-up.

Nov. 1982

EVALUATION of women's self-help housing project to identify income-generation potential of skills training and viability of project as model and design for cost-recovery alternatives.

**PERU**

May 1982

Definition of scope of work for women-focused component of small enterprise development project with Industrial Bank of Peru.

May 1983

Preliminary PORTFOLIO REVIEW to identify key areas to enhance the economic opportunities of low-income women within current AID program.

Feb. 1984

MONITOR AND EVALUATION DESIGN to assess women's participation in small enterprise development project and TRAINING credit extension agents to address credit needs of women small entrepreneurs.

**Africa Region****KENYA**

Nov. 1981

INSTITUTIONAL ASSESSMENT of local PVO activities concerning capacity to undertake employment and income-generation programs for women; recommendations to improve entrepreneurial credit project and draft proposal to establish loan guarantee fund for women entrepreneurs.

**TANZANIA**

Nov. 1981

Definition of scope of work on rural credit project concerning focus on credit needs of rural women.

122

**ZAIRE**

Dec. 1981

Definition of scope of work on integrated rural development project.

**Asian Region****INDIA**

July 1983

INSTITUTIONAL ASSESSMENT to identify training needs of organizations undertaking economic programs for poor women; MANAGEMENT TRAINING PLAN to enhance capacity of public and private organizations to address needs of women; preliminary development of STRATEGY to integrate economic focus on women into AID program in irrigation and social forestry.

**INDONESIA**

June 1981

PROJECT PORTFOLIO REVIEW to enhance focus on women's employment and income generation in agricultural production, agro-related, small-scale enterprises, and training activities.

**NEPAL**

Aug. 1983

Definition of scope of work for assistance.

Nov. 1983

PROJECT DESIGN for girls' education project and suggestions of interventions to increase girls' participation.

**THAILAND**

March 1981

PROJECT PORTFOLIO REVIEW focused on economic needs of rural women; recommendations of strategy to enhance mission activities concerning economic roles of rural women.

**Near East and North African Region****EGYPT**

Dec. 1983

Definition of scope of work for project design assistance.

March 1984

Assessment of women's access to economic resources in AID projects; STRATEGY TO INCREASE ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITIES of women in AID program.

**JORDAN**

Sept. 1982

PROJECT DESIGN AND PROPOSALS for a skills training project for rural women and for research center on women to enhance national development planning; project implementation and definition of work for follow-up.

Nov. 1983

PROJECT DESIGN REVIEW for agriculture, community development, and education projects; analysis of economic participation of women in Jordan.

Source: KRW