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**Organizational Dialectics of
Animal Management**

**Constance M. McCorkle
Department of Anthropology
Stanford University
Stanford, California 94305**

**With the Assistance of
Lidia Jimenez-Zamalloa
Department of Rural Sociology
University of Missouri-Columbia**

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Department of Rural Sociology
University of Missouri-Columbia
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RESUMEN

Este informe es parte de una serie de publicaciones sobre el agropastoreo en una comunidad andina de indígenas. El presente trabajo trata de la organización socioeconómica del pastoreo, y enfoca el problema de cómo el indio obtiene y organiza la mano de obra necesaria para el cuidado diario de sus rebaños. Dada una familia de estructura nuclear, más la enorme cantidad de labor manual requerida por la agricultura preindustrial, y la gran variedad de animales que cada familia intenta mantener dentro de una ecología vertical, el problema es agudo. Pero gracias a las asociaciones socioeconómicas acá descritas por primera vez, la familia indígena logra explotar el pastoreo — modo de producción tan importante a su supervivencia como la agricultura.

Consolidando los rebaños de dos o más entidades económicas, las asociaciones pastorales disminuyen los conflictos laborales implícitos en cualquier adaptación agropastoral paleotécnica. Las asociaciones aquí detalladas varían en antecedentes históricos, relaciones sociales entre integrantes, funciones secundarias, bases de reciprocidad, y otros factores. Pero son todas de pequeña escala y de tipo "dyadic contract." Como consecuencia de la informalidad de estos contratos, a veces surgen graves tensiones y hasta rupturas asociacionales. Estas se manifiestan principalmente en denuncias de hurto de animales y sus subproductos. El informe también analiza el problema del abigeato y cómo éste afecta la organización socioeconómica del pastoreo.

Terminamos con sugerir algunas consecuencias prácticas de los datos aquí presentados para proyectos de desarrollo rural del pastoreo, más unas nuevas direcciones para estudios teóricos en otras sociedades agropastorales.

PREFACE

The following is one of a series of reports which are a product of five months of intensive fieldwork in the community of Usi (Peru) during 1980. The research was done by Constance McCorkle with the assistance of Lidia Jimenez Zamalloa.

In collecting the data reported here, McCorkle and Jimenez relied on both qualitative and quantitative methods. Formal interviews were conducted with a sample of village residents and then were supplemented by participant observation and informal conversations. Only a small portion of the data collected is reported here. Interested readers may request other reports which discuss other aspects of the investigation.

The study of Usi was carried out as a part of the Title XII Small Ruminant Collaborative Research Support Program under Grant No. AID/DSAN/XII-G-0049 in collaboration with the Instituto Nacional de Investigacion y Promocion Agraria. Additional support was provided by the University of Missouri.

Michael F. Nolan
Principal Investigator, SR-CRSP
University of Missouri-Columbia

INTRODUCTION

Complementing a companion report which examines the technology of animal management, this publication describes and analyzes the socio-organizational dialectics of pre-industrial agropastoralism —specifically, the problem of recruiting daily labor for herding. The labor problems facing Andean agropastoralists are highlighted by comparison with "pure" pastoralists. The latter may herd only two closely related species (llama and alpaca) and cultivate nothing more than a few varieties of bitter potatoe. Further, these pastoralists typically live in permanent extended families and/or relatively tightly organized and durable, cooperating patrilocal households or compounds, often approximating small localized patrilineages.¹

The agropastoralists of Usi, however, do not enjoy access to the rich labor resources of permanent extended households or elaborate kin structures. Rather, theirs is a system of neolocal nuclear families and bilateral kinship. As noted earlier, unlike agropastoralists in other parts of the world, neither do Usinos have recourse to herding specialists. Nor do they enter into largescale, formal herding contracts like, e.g., the various alp associations of traditional Swiss peasants or the Galician beceira or ronda, a village-wide system of aggregating herds and rotating grazing duties.

Instead, Usinos turn to small, usually informal herding associations. These seldom reach a cooperative level greater than three households. Such

¹Only within the last ten to fifteen years has the existence of indigenous "pure" pastoralism in the New World been recognized. However, recent study of Andean pastoralists has produced ample evidence of patrilocal and patrilineally extended household structures: (Custred 1977b:130, Flores 1977:37, Inamura 1981:68, Orlove 1973:92, and Palacios 1977.)

associations may be kin, fictive-kin, or nonkin based. They largely comprise community-internal but nuclear-family-external reciprocal relations involving an assortment of labor exchange, labor procurement, and animal caretaker devices. And, a single household may often have recourse to several such associations to meet its multiple-species herding needs.

Although these small scale associations do, to varying degrees, lighten the load of pastoral labor upon the individual household, they hardly approach the integrative ideal of reducing to a minimum the dialectical tensions (here, labor conflicts) in preindustrial agropastoralism. Such tensions are better met through large scale organizations which free a maximum amount of labor from herding.

Part of the answer to why Usinos fail to organize herding at higher levels lies in their fear of carelessness and theft on the part of extra household caretakers. In particular, theft is a real threat in a number of the associations to be examined here. Due to factors such as the spatial separation and isolation of many grazing areas, the ease with which ill-gotten gains can be disposed of the "dyadic contract" (Foster 1961) nature of herding associations in Usi and still others, "rustling" is often remarkably simple and tempting. As a further element in the organizational dialectics of peasant agropastoralism in the Andes, theft is therefore also treated in this chapter.

In sum, this report first describes the herding strategies Usinos do employ. Then, following an examination of theft, it asks why, unlike agropastoralists elsewhere in the world, Usinos don't organize pastoral labor into more efficient, large scale associations. Finally, the implications of this fact for development and future research are explored.

LABOR ORGANIZATION STRATEGIES

Heretofore, no study has addressed the organizational dialectics of Andean peasant pastoralism. In contrast, the social organization of highland agriculture has been more than amply documented at both the communal (e.g. Guillet 1976, 1981) and subcommunal levels (Adams 1968, Brush, 1977, Fuenzalida 1976, Guillet 1980, Mayer 1974, Stein 1961, and many more). Cooperative forms of labor recruitment in agriculture have received special attention. As Guillet notes, "There is virtually no paper or monograph that does not mention, when dealing with socioeconomic aspects of Andean peasants, such practices" (1980:151). Yet equivalent structures in pastoralism have been ignored. As one astute student of the area observes, "Ethnographies focused upon agrarian communities...have overlooked the degree to which herding may be a key enterprise and influence upon social structure" (Webster 1973:117).

In dialectical terms, this oversight is particularly disturbing because recruitment, allocation, and synchronization of sufficient competent and trustworthy pastoral labor pose one of the greatest challenges to the integration of cultivation and herding — or for that matter, to peasants' very existence — in the Andes. In a time-honored highland tradition, each Usino household strives to raise the maximal variety of plant and animal domesticates that can survive within the community's territory — because given the present level of technology, no single altitudinal zone is even potentially capable of supporting the entire population for any length of time. And, a major constraint of verticality on household production strategies is the necessity of producing a mix of crops and livestock in each of the locally relevant ecological zones.

In order to do so, of course, the peasant household ideally must have access to land in every zone. Ideally, too, it must itself have adequate labor to meet its needs, since this self-sufficient subsistence strategy necessarily entails a very complicated and heavy schedule of simultaneous agricultural and pastoral duties — not to mention crafting, marketing, daily domestic chores, and the pull of schools and occasional migratory wage labor. But, with their nuclear family structure, few Andean agropastoral households achieve this ideal. For them, access to labor is even more problematic than access to land. This is especially true in pastoralism, since grazing grounds are communally held and free to all.

Naturally, too, household labor problems are further exacerbated by multiple-species management in a vertical ecology. Herds ideally should be subdivided, even if only by groupings of species (i.e. alpaca, llama and/or sheep, cattle/horses/burros), to provide the forage best suited and available to each at differing altitudes and times of the year. But this technique potentially doubles or even triples a household's pastoral labor requirements — and proportionately reduces its agricultural labor supply.

Conflicts in allocating labor to cultivation versus herding become even more acute at key points in the agricultural cycle — notably the harvest time "labor crunch." In the Andes, harvesting demands day and night attention from practically the entire working population — as people sleep out in the fields to protect the ripening crops from nocturnal theft, then hurry to collect their produce before the first dry-season frosts, and transport and process it for storage.

Yet because a pre-industrial adaptation (with its lack of cultivated fodder, stabling, and fencing) dictates range-stock operation, animals

continue to require constant daily care as well. The lack of herding specialists in Usi, plus seasonal spatial disjunctions between the two modes of production, mean that without supra-household associations, some family member(s) would have to be daily withdrawn from agriculture to oversee livestock. This is a particularly inefficient deployment of scarce nuclear family labor when small (by village standards, 1-25) numbers of different-species animals are involved.

The obvious solution to such organizational disjunctions lies in aggregating household herds, thereby allowing a maximum number of animals to be handled at minimal labor expense. Although Usinos' smallscale pastoral associations hardly achieve this "minimax" ideal (see summary remarks), they do spread the burden of animal care more broadly, thus freeing more labor for agriculture.

As in Andean agriculture, the preferred form of pastoral labor organization in Usi is that known variously as "cooperative," "reciprocal," or "exchange" — in which labor is traded for labor (as in the following associations of tinkikuy, joint herding, and species specialization). More rarely, villagers resort to "contractual" labor, defined as exchange of labor for the equivalent in cash or kind. In fact, though, cash never directly figures in such transactions between Usinos. Instead, payments are made in agricultural and/or pastoral products or, in some forms of child labor recruitment, in goods as well. Additionally, certain "social costs" are entailed in almost all cases of reciprocal, and some forms of contractual, labor exchange.

Recourse to contractual labor, as in short-term "rent-a-child," may be necessitated when a household is temporarily bereft of its normal exchange

network. A family may also opt for contractual associations when it is so labor poor that it cannot return reciprocal labor on a regular basis enough to care for its multiple-or even single-species holdings. If the labor shortage is expected to be more or less permanent and pervasive — as for an elderly couple — then long-term "rent-a-child" or wardship may be preferred as a way of assuring a stable labor supply. If the problem is one of multiple-species management, boarding may prove a more economical strategy than totally foregoing the benefits of substantial stockowning. However, to the degree that agricultural products slated for household subsistence must be "paid out" to support pastoralism, such associations create new disjunctions between cultivation and herding. In contrast, contractual associations like absentee caretaking or dar en partir — in which animals are exchanged for animal care, as it were — do not engender such conflicts between sectors.

The following discussion of Usino pastoral labor organization is broadly organized in keeping with the general preference for reciprocal over contractual labor. Hence the most common strategies are described first. Less widespread associations, responding to more idiosyncratic household and/or herd needs, follow. This approach also produces a rough associational continuum moving from informal to more formal. While these continua are very approximate,³ they do furnish a useful framework for discussion. Wherever possible, I label each association with the term (whether Spanish or Quechua) most often employed among Usinos themselves. In most instances, however, no such term was discovered, either because I failed to inquire (see below) or because none exists. There I perforce coin my own.

The following material was collected in open-ended interviews and lends itself well to presentation in straightforward prose or in "mini case

studies." These data represent an indirect outgrowth of research that, predictably enough, was primarily designed to investigate ecological, technological, and more purely economic, rather than sociostructural, aspects of Andean peasant pastoralism. This focus was largely dictated by project limitations. Certainly, none of the formal protocols coded for data on labor organization. However, it was also easy to overlook this issue because a month's extensive review of the regional literature by a team of social scientists, including myself, before departing for the field gave no hint of the associations described here (with the exception of dar en partir).

In short, I did not become aware either of the fact or significance of smallscale herding associations until late in the research schedule, when they began to surface in marginal notations on the interview sheets, and in participant observation and more causal questioning and conversation. Thereafter, I returned to interview as many of the sample households as time permitted. The resulting data are consequently fewer, more anecdotal, and somewhat less systematic than those collected in other phases of research. Yet even so, they give eloquent testimony to the pervasive organizational dialectics of peasant agropastoralism.

T'inkikuy

Predictably, this organizational strategy has gone totally unstudied. Yet without it, few village families would be able to pursue herding at all. Indeed, it is by far the most prevalent pastoral association in Usi. Almost every stockowning household practices t'inkikuy at one time or another in the course of a year -e.g., of course, at harvest time; or when school is in session (May to December) and child labor for herding is in short supply.

Also referred to as t'inkikamuyku, the term is almost certainly a derivation of t'inka. Although a precise translation is impossible, it carries the connotation of "offering aid," but denotes a strict, reciprocal exchange of labor for daily grazing. Essentially, t'inkikuy is the precise equivalent in animal husbandry to agriculture's ayni — service performed in return for exactly the same service, figured on a per day/per person basis, and kept in perfectly strict accounts. One difference, however, is that while the term ayni may be applied to various activities (plowing, seeding, hoeing, weeding), t'inkikuy refers solely to taking out to pasture and overseeing another's herds for relatively short periods of up to a few days. Labor exchanged on this symmetrical and balanced basis in any other pastoral pursuits, e.g. shearing, is again called ayni. This term also applies to one further "reciprocal" arrangement, llama ayni or aynirse de llama. It is interesting that this association — in fact, a borrowing-exchange of llama between people — is instead conceptualized and verbalized as an exchange of labor between llama.

T'inkikuy arrangements are made informally by mutual and friendly consent between two or more households, almost always in the same neighborhood. The cooperating households may or not be related by real or fictive kinship. Women typically initiate the association since they have primary responsibility for daily pasturing. However, the full membership of each participating household — men as well as children — is implicated in the agreement and their labor may be called upon to help meet it. The understanding is that caretaker services are always potentially "on tap," but for each specific occasion prior plans must be made convenient to all concerned. Where the need for these mutual services is regular and predictable, however, a longstanding schedule for periodic or rotating labor

exchange may be established. Payment is always rendered in return service , not in cash or goods (with the exception of customary meals for child herders; see below). However, ancillary exchanges of small gifts and aid naturally may come about as expressions of continuing goodwill among t'inkikuy partners.

In Usi, quite strict accounts are kept (albeit without the aid of writing), at least among nonkin, of such exchanges. Of course, exchange equivalency and a high degree of trust, plus confidence in the other's caretaker competencies, are all necessary to the establishment and stability of t'inkikuy and other herding associations. If one household "falls behind" or proves often unwilling to assume its reciprocal obligations, or if herders become lax or dishonest in the overseer task, the relationship will almost certainly be terminated.

Several case examples of t'inkikuy follow.

(1)

Senora Modesta is typical of those who most often and regularly engage in t'inkikuy. She and her husband Mariano, both still in early adulthood, reside neolocally with their young children — one aged two, the other seven months. The family is fortunate in owning a healthy and diversified herd of 21 sheep, eight llama, one taqsa, and three head of cattle. Yet this very variety of species places quite a strain on their minimal nuclear-family labor resources. However, they cope with this problem by taking advantage of two herding associations.

One is a permanent caretaking arrangement, to be described later, by which Mariano boards their cattle and camelids year round at his half brother's puna estancia. Since his wife sees to the family sheep, Mariano is thereby largely freed to attend to the many agricultural duties necessary to the household's minimal subsistence.

Modesta personally discharges her grazing responsibilities as often as possible, leaving the children at her mother's house during the day. However, occasionally Modesta must make a trip to the valley floor or to Quiquijana or Cuzco, prepare ayni meals, work with her husband in the fields, garden, and so forth. At such times, if Mariano is unavailable to tend the sheep, she contracts to "do t'inkikuy" with her friend and neighbor who lives a few meters away.

This non-kinswoman or one of her two herding-aged children merely collects Modesta's sheep on the way to the grazing grounds in the morning. If one of the children is herding that day, Modesta is expected to provide him/her with a bit of breakfast, plus a "box lunch" (cocabi). The neighbor lady finds this an agreeable arrangement because, when the school year begins, she in turn is short on herding labor. Then Modesta will repay the service on days when the neighbor is similarly unable to attend to her flock personally.

An exact account of the days of t'inkikuy each household gives and receives is always kept. But the high degree of liking and trust between the two women is evidenced in the longevity (at least two years now) of the relationship, in the delayed nature of the exchange, and in other mutual aids and favors — for example, as when Modesta solicited a gift of cash from the anthropologist on behalf of the neighbor lady so the latter might purchase medicine for her ailing husband.

(2)

One man explains his more complex t'inkikuy association with two neighboring, non-kin households. The three have a long-standing arrangement by which their flocks of 20, 10, and 5 sheep are regularly grazed together.

The animals are merely united every morning and separated at night in the canchon of the family with 20 sheep. Varying members of each household may assume the day's pasturing duties. In one family, it may be the wife, husband, or ten year old son; in the other, wife, husband, or eleven year old daughter. Most often, though, it is the children. In the third, since their progeny are still infants, wife or husband must reciprocate.

As usual, careful count is kept of the number of days each household furnishes the labor. Exactly which family will do so, and for what number of consecutive days (one to four), must be periodically programmed among the three according to who is available. Again, no stipulated goods or payments change hands in this association, other than meals for child herders. However, the three families often do ayni together, help each other in cargo obligations, trade small favors and friendly advice, and so forth.

In sum, these families' t'inkikuy association is highly satisfactory to all concerned. Moreover, it represents a permanent yet conveniently flexible response to the organizational dialectics of agropastoralism. Through herd aggregation, it daily frees two additional person days from pastoralism — labor which peasant households sorely need to attend to other subsistence tasks. Particularly in the families with only ten and five sheep, this labor would be relatively illspent in caring for such tiny flocks, since one shepherd can just as well manage 35 as 5 animals. (Usinos say anyone can easily oversee 60-80 sheep; and more experienced adults can and do handle mixed-species herds of some 150.)

(3)

Finally, in contrast to the more regularized arrangements described above, households with larger herds, plus normally ample supplies of labor, engage in t'inkikuy only periodically. From such households' point of view, apparently the increased social costs and potential tensions of such associations offset the benefits of systematically aggregating already sizeable herds.

Senora Bautista, for example, tells how she utilizes this organizational strategy solely to acquire "emergency" herding services. She and her husband own one of the largest herds in Usi (71 sheep and 6 llama). Usually, their rich family labor resources are adequate for daily supervision of the animals. On rare occasions, however, all members of the household are occupied with other tasks.

At such times, Bautista does t'inkikuy with a kinswoman whom she trusts. Since this relative lives some distance away, the two women meet to unite their herds on a convenient pampa slightly above the village on the morning of the day agreed upon. The kinswoman then continues upwards to the grazing grounds with all the stock. In the evening, Bautista returns to the pampa, or perhaps meets her kinswoman on the path leading back down to the village, in order to collect her animals and drive them home. She will repay the t'inkikuy in the same fashion when her relative has need of it.

Joint Herding

This simple and highly informal organizational strategy merits at least brief mention because, like t'inkikuy, it is almost universal in Usi. Also like t'inkikuy, it makes for more efficient utilization of pastoral labor, albeit in a different way. "Joint herding" merely consists of what the label assigned it implies. Groups of herders — mainly women, adolescents, or children — will often either by happenstance or by prior agreement graze their animals together on the same day in the same area. Indeed, they may reach an understanding that this will be the general plan.

The advantages to such associations are both social and economic. Women may while away a part of the long grazing day in conversation and gossip, thus reinforcing ties of kinship and/or friendship. Adolescents may do

the same, additionally sharing a bit of quena (flute) music or, more likely, teasing and flirting with the opposite sex. Children enjoy games and general play. The economic advantage of joint herding is that companions can be trusted to keep an eye on each others' animals while taking turns at supplementary gathering activities — collecting firewood or uch'a (dung) for the cookstove; grasses and leaves for cuy (guinea pig) or cattle feed; ich'u for thatch, kindling, etc.; magical and medicinal herbs; and so forth.

One disadvantage to joint herding, say villagers, is that adolescents and youngsters may grow so engrossed in their teasing and play that they become careless of their pastoral duties, and so lose animals to predation, accident, straying, and/or opportunistic theft. Sometimes, too, girls become pregnant as a result of overly enthusiastic "joint" herding activities.

Finally, households that are labor poor and whose members are unable or perhaps unwilling to return t'inkikuy may occasionally find themselves obliged to send their five or six year olds out to herd. In such cases, parents usually arrange for the child to accompany a known and trusted older individual, whether kin or non-kin, who is also going to pasture that day. No fees or standardized exchanges are incurred in any instance of joint herding. This organizational strategy is clearly one of generalized, as versus t'inkikuy's balanced, reciprocity.

Species Specialization

This refers to yet another mechanism for dealing with nuclear family labor shortages, plus the problems of multiple-species ownership. This strategy also eases pressure on corral resources for differing species. Quite simply, two household, each possessing smallish numbers of different-species

animals, merge their same-species herds and divide the responsibility for their care by household.

(4)

Senor Eustaquio owns seven sheep and four head of cattle. His son Rosendo, who lives a few houses away, owns 21 sheep and one cow. In a spirit of true integrativeness Eustaquio's wife daily herds their son's one bovine with her four, while Rosendo takes permanent charge of his parents' seven ovines for them. The sheep all remain together in Rosendo's corral at night, as do the cattle in Eustaquio's.

There is no stipulated or expected exchange of commodities in this relationship. Each household apparently feels they are "even-Stephen." As Eustaquio phrases it. "My sheep are so few that my son doesn't mind. And anyway, we take care of his cow for him."

The advantages to such "divide and conquer" associations are both manifest and manifold. First, they involve no payments of any kind. Second, if the two households described above did not cooperate as they do, in order to reap the benefits of dividing herds by species a total of four rather than two herders would be required. This would give rise to the obviously absurd situation of one of these four herders overseeing a single cow while another pastures a mere seven sheep. Similarly for corrals, i.e. four rather than two would be required to meet the community ideal of quartering large and small ruminants separately.

Furthermore, this strategy presumably allows for some specialization of pastoral knowledge. An individual who deals solely and daily with only one species may well come to learn more about its preferred forages, idiosyncratic illnesses, social behavior, and etc. This may be an especially important consideration for cattle owners in Usi. While bovines are by far the most valuable of all herd animals, they are understandably also the most rare; and few people have extensive knowledge of their needs and habits. Moreover, like sheep, cattle are only imperfectly adapted to the harsh

Andean environment. Specialization of labor in, and separation of, bovines may therefore constitute a highly rational means of protecting this major, but risky, investment.

Since I learned of no other households practicing species specialization, I cannot say whether it occurs between unrelated or distantly related families as well. However, given a high degree of trust and mutual confidence in caretaker capacities, there seems little reason why other households might not also take advantage of this integrative strategy. It is a particularly apt management technique in that it simultaneously aggregates animals yet provides for important herd divisions.

Boarding

Boarding offers an alternative organizational "out" for households that are short on labor yet own two or more species of herd animals ideally requiring different and typically dispersed forage locales, i.e. cattle, sheep, llama, and alpaca. Most often, camelids are boarded at the puna estancia of a relative. Cattle and sheep may also be boarded out during harvest time.

Boarding associations may be made on a permanent, a semiannual (e.g. only during harvest), or a relatively temporary basis (e.g. when a stockowner is absent from the village for a few weeks, or seeks improved pasturage for certain animals). Payment for such services is fairly standardized. According to all informants queried, it consists of a q'ipirinafull (some fifteen pounds plus) of aviu (foodstuffs and supplies) delivered roughly once monthly to the ranch personnel. On occasion, too, the person receiving the boarding service may be required to take a turn herding at the estancia or repairing its

structures. Finally, all instances of boarding I learned of were among kin — albeit sometimes quite distant, fictive, or affinal kin.

Several, somewhat divergent, examples of boarding follow.

(5)

Senor Mariano (of case study No. 1) keeps all his cattle and camelids permanently at the puna estancia of his elder half-brother, Santos. Other neolocal nuclear families related to Santos also share this facility — a son and a son-in-law, on an aperiodic and a permanent basis, respectively. The ranch is run by the owner's youngest son, sixteen year-old Leoncio, who lives there essentially year round.

At this point in its domestic cycle, Mariano's household is very labor poor. As noted earlier, his children are both too small to herd. Even though he and his wife are still young, they enjoy considerable pastoral wealth by Usino standards: nine camelids, three bovines, and 21 ovines. While his wife takes charge of the sheep, Mariano still must cope with the needs of the former two species in a way that leaves him free to attend to agriculture. Hence his boarding association with Santos. And, when exceptional duties occupy both spouses — such as the harvest or an important trip — Mariano leaves his sheep at the estancia, too.

In exchange, Mariano and the other families utilizing the ranch must make the usual once-monthly payments (including such expensive items as salt and Kerosene) to Santos for provisioning the ranch personnel. Also, they must aid in the upkeep of estancia structures and, on rare occasions when no one from the owner's labor-rich household is available, in the daily herding. More rarely still, they must sometimes substitute for a member of Leoncio's family to hike up to the ranch and accompany him at night. (Recall "Pasturing Patterns" in Chapter V.) Finally, as both boarders and kinsmen, it is expected that Mariano and the others will freely and willingly aid Senor Santos in other, non-pastoral activities as well, e.g. in ayni, cargo service, etc.

(6)

Senor Cipriano and his adult niece have arrived at a rather different arrangement in which the roles of ranch-owner and boarder are seemingly reversed. Cipriano and his wife, both in their late fifties and childless, are among the few people in Usi who own alpaca. They boast a herd of eight suri, which they keep at their own puna estancia. However, because they must attend both to their chacras and to their herd of ten llama and 25 sheep "down below," they cannot themselves oversee their treasured pakucha, which must remain in the alturas to survive.

Instead, Cipriano's niece lives year round at the ranch and there cares for his alpaca, along with her own flock of some 20 sheep. In return for her labor, Cipriano must take her the usual monthly stipend of supplies and help maintain the facility.

This has proved a highly satisfactory association to all concerned. Since the niece prefers to keep her sheep in the reputedly richer puna pastures, she finds the use of ready-made corrals and cabana, plus the monthly aviu, a real bonus. And, Cipriano is thereby able to invest in a very valuable species which his limited household labor resources would otherwise preclude him from owning.

(7)

Finally, Senora Igida explains how she sometimes utilizes boarding associations for reasons other than paucity of labor —for her household is rich in people as well as sheep and llama.

Occasionally, however, Igida decides that some of her llama require the greater nutritional benefits Usinos associate with year round puna pasturage - - e.g. so an urqu anjuta will grow up large and powerful for his transport work; when a china is having trouble conceiving; or when an aged or convalescent llama needs a more strengthening diet.

In such instances, owners may seek to board their llama with a fellow villager who maintains a puna estancia. Two years ago, Igida did just that. She made the standard arrangements with a compadre, entrusting to him one aged llama and a china ankuta which had so far proved barren.

Contrasting cases like the foregoing furnish considerable insight into the organizational dialectics of peasant pastoralism. For example, the differing direction of payments in (4) and (5) clearly indicates that, like the other associations discussed here, boarding primarily serves to supply pastoral labor, rather than facilitate it. Aviu must be paid to the household or person responsible for the herding, regardless of who owns the ranch. At the same time, cases (5) and (6) highlight the flexibility in timing and function of such arrangements.

Naturally, owners and non-owners of ranches alike benefit from boarding associations. However, few families in Usi operate estancias today (see "Theft"). Villagers say the time and effort necessary to staff and maintain them are generally prohibitive unless one is quite wealthy in both livestock and household labor —like Senor Santos, who owns more than a hundred animals and currently has five adults under his roof — or unless, like

Cipriano, one is determined to raise alpaca. Even ranch owners like Santos appreciate the input of labor and goods from boarders, for it significantly defrays both the human and material costs of an otherwise "expensive" enterprise. Owners like Cipriano, and non-owners like Mariano, profit by the opportunity to invest in more, more different, and more valuable livestock. Given acute labor shortages in their own households, they could not otherwise adequately manage this mix of species. And, by affording ailing animals the improved nutrition of puna forages, people like Igida can better protect their investment in the more costly camelid.

Recruitment of Child Labor

Under this rubric I have grouped three identifiably distinct yet related organizational strategies. They are distinct in that standard yet differing forms of "payment" for each are verbalized and accepted by the community at large. They are clearly related in that all concern recruitment of extrahousehold child labor for daily herding.

Households select among, and generate "real" variants of, these "ideal" forms of child labor recruitment according to numerous factors: the physical and socio-structural distance between contracting households, their stage in the domestic life cycle, the amount and timing of labor required, "extra" sources of income in the "client" household, and perhaps also lines of inheritance — to name but a few. In consequence, recruitment of child labor may be long- or short-term. Real, fictive, or non-kin may be involved. Payments may be informal or formal, and may or not include transmission of goods to parents as well as children. All or only part of the child's labor may be leased. And so forth. Indeed, the three organizational strategies

presented here form something of a continuum running from balanced to generalized reciprocity.

Quite simply, a family that is labor poor, whether for a brief or a protracted period, may solicit the use of a "surplus" child from another household. As Thomas (1973) convincingly argues, children are the preferred source of herding labor in the Andes because they are energetically the most efficient.⁹ In essence, the following associations help to equalize the distribution of this crucial pastoral labor resource across the community. At the same time, they ease subsistence strains on households with more than the average number of mouths to feed.

Short-term "Rent-A-Child." This label aptly describes the simple association to be detailed. It consists of outright hiring a child — often from fictive or nonkin — to do one's herding on a very brief and a periodic basis. Payments must be made both to the child, in customary meals, and to the parents, in small amounts of aviu.

Short-term "rent-a-child" seems to be a "last ditch" method of acquiring pastoral labor in emergencies. As noted earlier, reciprocal is usually preferred to contractual labor. This is particularly true when it comes to caring for the less valuable ovine. However, when a family's normal network of kin and friends temporarily fails them, they may turn to "rent-a-child." The family may be so labor poor vis-a-vis its multiple-species herding and other chores that it is difficult for them to return t'inkikuy. Or, they may be unwilling to assume the increased social costs of initiating new t'inkikuy relations. In such circumstances, despite the material outlays it entails, short-term "rent-a-child" may offer the most attractive solution.

(8)

The elderly Senor Quintin and his wife live alone with a four-year-old grandson (see "Wardship" below). The senor tells how sometimes his regular arrangements with his son's family for overseeing the elderly couple's tiny flock of sheep go awry. Quintin's wife is already occupied full-time with weaving, pasturing the family's cattle, attending to the grandson, and so forth. And since Quintin himself has the usual manifold agricultural duties, he must seek assistance elsewhere. He therefore quite literally "hires" the young daughter of one of his godchildren.

The payment involves the usual breakfast and lunch for the child on each day she pastures Quintin's sheep along with those of her own family. But additionally he must give an unkuna-ful (about five lbs.) of aviu (in this case, just tubers) to her parents for every two to three days she assumes this task.

Quintin opts for this arrangement because, given the differing forage needs of cattle and sheep, plus his household's acute paucity of labor, he and his wife are in a very poor position to return t'inkikuy.

(9)

Senora Eusebia remarks that, on very rare occasions, she too must hire a child herder. Normally, the arrangement is only for one day since Eusebia usually has access to rich nuclear-family labor resources. The senora provides the child with the usual meals and, at the end of the day, with a bit of ch'unu (freeze-dried potatoes) and a handful or two of wool to take to its parents by way of aviu.

Long-term "Rent-A-Child." Usinos may opt for this organizational strategy as a way of ensuring a stable supply of pastoral labor when the family shortage is apt to last for several years. This is a common situation among young married and elderly couples. In long-term "rent-a-child," the herds of two households are daily pooled, to be overseen by the child of one. The association is differentiated from the others described in this chapter by its formalized annual "payments" of stipulated items of clothing to the child - along with the usual daily meals, of course. Additionally, it is informally understood that the "client" household will occasionally aid the shepherd/ess' parents in various tasks. As with the contractual association of boarding,

households utilizing this association apparently calculate that despite its costs, both material and social, it is preferable to foregoing stockraising altogether.

(10)

Senora Hipolita and her husband, both in their 70's, live alone. However, they have an agreement with the senora's sister whereby the latter's ten-year-old daughter grazes their tiny flock of nine sheep along with that of her parents. The girl normally pastures her aunt's flock five days out of the week. This leaves Hipolita more free time to do her weaving. As one of the three best artisans in Usi, she earns considerable income in both cash and kind by "taking in" weaving from fellow villagers.

Payments for the shepherdess' services are fairly formalized. Hipolita naturally provides the girl with breakfast, lunch, and dinner on the days she tends her aunt's flock. Once a year Hipolita also gives her niece a lixlla (shawl), a pair of ojotas (sandals), and one fleece's worth of wool. The latter item is appropriated by the girl's parents. Additionally, Hipolita's husband is occasionally obliged to help his brother-in-law in his agricultural and other labors.

While these payments are somewhat substantial, Hipolita apparently feels they are more than offset by the income she is freed to earn from weaving. Her sister, too, is quite content with the relationship since it helps defray both the subsistence and cash costs of maintaining one child — a child who, in any event, does daily herding and can easily handle nine "extra" sheep.

(11)

Senora Epifania, age 25, has a somewhat similar arrangement with her parental household whereby an adolescent sister pastures Epifania's three llama along with the parents' camelids on a permanent basis. Indeed, the animals remain in and are bedded with the parental herd.

In exchange, Epifania must buy clothing for her sister; and Epifania's husband is expected to willingly aid his parents-in-law in occasional tasks. Of course, the couple must also contribute goods to the annual llama t'inka, which they hold jointly with the parents.

This association is somewhat similar to species specialization, described earlier. It has the same advantages of aggregating and dividing herds by species and corralling them separately. Epifania's own, neolocal nuclear household cannot itself provide such benefits yet. While her seven year old son sees to the family flock of 24 sheep, her two other children — age five and two — are still too young to take separate charge of the family's camelids. And, her house boasts only a single, tiny corral. The association differs from species specialization in that Epifania returns goods instead of reciprocal labor, i.e. taking in the other household's flock of sheep.

(12)

A slightly different case is that of Senora Asunta. She has a one- and an eight year old daughter. However, the latter greatly fears the foxes that infest Usi's pasturelands and hence dislikes herding. So Asunta has made arrangements for an adolescent niece to care for the household herds, along with those of the girl's own family.

The niece takes permanent charge of Asunta's animals during the busiest half of the year (January through July) but she helps out frequently during the other months as well. In return, Asunta must annually purchase a hat, shirt, and sandals for her niece and give her dyed bayeta 'homespun' for a skirt. Asunta must also aid the girl's mother in providing and cooking food for ayni, cargo, and other occasions.

(13)

A "borderline" case lying between long-term "rent-a-child" and wardship is that of Senora Honorata, a widow aged 65. She employs a ten year old granddaughter (her eldest daughter's daughter) for herding nearly year round. Usually only during the potatoe harvest (May-June) is the girl recalled to aid her nuclear family, although they have also retained rights to her aperiodic services if these seem imperative on any given day.

This agreement has been in effect for a year now and will probably continue for a few years yet. Honorata's household is somewhat pressed for labor. The senora's youngest daughter, Victoria (age 18), resides there with her husband and their eleven month old baby. Both Victoria and her husband help out in the herding when they can, but the former is kept very busy with their ailing infant and is already pregnant again. The latter has the usual manifold agricultural tasks to attend to. However, they, too, profit from this arrangement since their five sheep are herded along with Honorata's eight.

Honorata's arrangement resembles long-term "rent-a-child" in its formalized payment structure. It is understood that she will provide all the shepherdess' meals while herding, of course. Additionally, Honorata must annually purchase her a hat and weave her a lixlla (shawl) and a pollera (skirt).

In two ways, however, this association also resembles wardship. First, the girl "lives in" with her grandmother. Second, instead of aggregating two household herds, the shepherdess attends solely to those of her grandmother's household. Finally, there seems to be the understanding that all products of the girl's gathering activities while pasturing Honorata's flock (firewood, dung, herbs, fodders, etc.) fall to the grandmother.

It is unlikely that the girl of her mother will inherit much of Honorata's estate. It is a rule in the Andes that the youngest child (here, Victoria) remain at home with the parents to aid them in their twilight years. In recompense the youngest receives an extra portion of the inheritance.

Honorata states that, despite its costs, she much prefers this arrangement to doing t'inkikuy, particularly with non-relatives. Apparently, she has had some bad experiences with past t'inkikuy partners. She says such individuals are careless and untrustworthy with another's animals.

Wardship

While there is an enormous literature for other areas of the world on child labor recruitment through wardship, adoption, and other such mechanisms, in Hispanic America the topic has been little studied, if at all. There is presumably some treatment of extracommunity wardship of godchildren in asymmetric patron-client compadrazgo ties between Indians and mestizos. However, I have discovered only a single reference to anything even remotely approximating such arrangements for acquiring pastoral (or any other sort of) labor within indigenous communities.

Writing for Espinar province, Orlove (1974) briefly describes a certain internado relationship — a formal, highly asymmetric, non-kin association in which debtor gives a child over to a wealthy stockowning creditor. The child "works off" the parent's debt by herding for the creditor for a period of years. The latter has total authority over the child and recognizes no responsibilities towards it other than minimal room and board. In other words, the internado relationship is one in which people "pay with" children, as it were, rather than "pay for" them.

In Usi, however, wardship is a very different, indeed essentially opposite, proposition and one which in many ways resembles adoption. The asymmetry of the relationship runs counter to that between adult internado participants, if it exists at all. Further, wardship in Usi appears to involve only kinfolk — primarily elderly guardians (see below). Also, guardians provide for all the child's needs — not just room and board but also, e.g.,

clothing and medical expenses. Yet parents retain ultimate authority over the children

Like most of the organizational strategies detailed in this report, wardship responds to household labor shortages for both single- and multiple-species herding. Unlike the others, however, wardship meets this need not by aggregating household herds but by shifting labor from one household to another. The association also differs in that it supplies labor for a host of chores other than just daily herding — e.g. fetching water from distant springs, processing and preparing food, carding and spinning, delivering messages, washing clothes, gathering fuel, feeding barnyard animals, and so on ad infinitum. Wardship is therefore an especially apt form of labor recruitment for elderly couples or individuals who, due to advancing years or other handicaps, require more help in more varied activities than other labor-poor families. Finally, this association appears to entail no expressly stipulated "payments." It therefore differs from the foregoing "rent-a-child" arrangements in its more generalized reciprocity.

(14)

As noted in case study No. 8, the elderly Senor Quintin and his wife Basilia have a four year old grandson under apparently permanent wardship. The boy is the child of Basilia's son Aparicio, by her (his?) former marriage. Aparicio's first wife died. He now resides neolocally with another woman and prefers to leave the youngster with its grandmother. His other son by his first marriage is twelve and seemingly sufficient to Aparicio's own household herding needs.

When the four year old grows a bit older, the elderly couple say they will have someone to help them in their old age and will no longer need to "rent" children on the aperiodic basis described earlier. No payments to the boy's father are made at this point.

(15)

The middle-aged Cipriano and Sabina — the childless alpaca owners of case study No. 5 — also maintain a healthy herd of ten llama and 25 sheep.

Although as noted earlier, the alpaca are boarded out in the punas, the couple must still contend with overseeing the other animals "down below." This is a difficult matter given the press of normal domestic and agricultural duties and the couple's utter lack of other household labor resources.

To offset this lack, they have permanently "taken in" the eight year old daughter of Cipriano's niece to pasture their sheep. (Cipriano himself sees to the llama by daily driving them out to graze unattended and collecting them in the evening.)

Since the niece has several other children of herding age, this loan of a child works little hardship on her. Indeed, it is an asset since the middle-aged couple assumes total responsibility for their grandniece's care — feeding, clothing, doctoring, whatever — and clearly dote on the girl besides.

Relations all around are warm and trusting. In fact, the niece herself was also raised by Cipriano and Sabina. Essentially, she and her children constitute the couple's surrogate child and grandchildren, respectively. Since neither Cipriano nor Sabina have any other living relatives in Usi, and no relatives elsewhere who could legitimately lay claim to their lands or goods, the niece is their most likely heir. Doubtless this is an important factor in maintaining their various complex and longstanding pastoral associations. The likelihood of inheritance may also explain why no formal payments to the child's parents are stipulated in exchange for the girl's services.

(16)

I learned of one further wardship-like arrangement which merits at least brief mention because it suggests the importance of such associations in equalizing "child support" as well as child labor. This example again involves the niece of Senor Cipriano. Her nuclear family is almost embarrassingly rich in progeny. In addition to the eight year old girl who lives with her granduncle and aunt, the niece has a twelve year old son and three daughters aged ten, four and two.

The family deploys the ten year old for their own pastoral needs. However, they have "lent out" the son to herd for his widowed paternal grandfather on a permanent basis. Although I lack the details of this association, the grandfather is clearly fond of the boy and very appreciative of his services. He recently endowed his grandson with the gift of a ewe in nawinchasqa. And, the boy's family are likely to inherit much of the old man's estate.

As in every other instance of child labor recruitment I recorded, doubtless some exchange of food is called for here, too. Such subsistence inputs are almost certainly non-trivial for a young nuclear family with seven mouths to feed. Children of large families who are "farmed out" to affectionate guardians may well eat better than they could at home — and conceivably even better than the "average" village child

To conclude, it is tempting to speculate on the role that lines of inheritance may play in opting for one or another form of child labor recruitment. The contrasting data of long-term "rent-a-child" and wardship suggest that when "child givers" are unlikely to inherit from "child takers" the association is more formalized and balanced. If, however, as in cases 15 and 16 above, inheritance is a real possibility, the more generalized reciprocity of wardship may result. Indeed, it is my suspicion that child givers are willing to surrender essentially all the child's labor in wardship only if they estimate that the child takers will eventually recompense them and/or the child substantially. If future endowments or inheritances are covert aim (e.g. an extra share of the funeral herd), what better way to win parental favor than providing a helpful and companionable grandchild? As an informant pragmatically observes. "Always they (elderly parents) give more to the son or daughter who helps them most. Always there is a favorite."

Although I did not research such issues, they indicate an important direction for future investigations. Both wardship and "rent-a-child" require systematic study and comparison with similar patterns of "child keeping," "child dispersal," adoption, and related forms of child labor recruitment in other cultures.

Absentee Caretaking

This refers to recruitment of pastoral labor while stockowners are absent from the fillage from some time (five months or more). Such absences may occur when, for example, a family plans a lengthy visit with relatives elsewhere, or when a young couple goes to do wage labor in a distant region. Almost always, they will give their animals into a kins-person's care for the

duration. However, informants claimed the herd could also be left with a friend.

As in the following association of dar en partir, absentee caretaking services are always paid for with livestock.¹⁰ But the precise numbers, age, and species of animals to be paid vary in complicated ways according to three dimensions: the social distance between caretaker and "client" (both in kinship and social status), the length of the client's absence, and the size and composition of the herd being cared for. One informant described payments in the following way.

Table 1: "PAY" SCALE FOR ABSENTEE CARETAKER SERVICES

Length of Owner's Absence	One Year		Two Years	
	Sheep	Llama	Sheep	Llama
Animals to Be Paid				
For a hypothetical herd of 25 sheep and 5 llama.				
To Class I caretaker	1 ewe	1 una	1 ewe, 1 ram	1 china
To Class II caretaker	2 ewes	1 una	2 ewes, 1 ram	1 china
For a hypothetical herd of 70 sheep and 15 llama.				
To Class I caretaker	2 ewes	1 china	2 ewes, 1 ram	1 china
To Class II caretaker	3 ewes	1 china	3 ewes, 1 ram	1 china

Class I caretakers = siblings (whether older or younger), parents, parents-in-law

Class II caretakers = cousins, uncles/aunts, compadres, friends

This informant also stated that, up to five or six months, any kinsperson who agrees to oversee one's livestock need not be recompensed with animals. But if one is absent longer than that, or if the caretaker is a non-relative, then some is absent longer than that, or if the caretaker is a non-relative, then some "gift" of an animal(s) is only "decent". Herds may be left with a caretaker related to either husband or wife. As Table 1 indicates, payments increase along with owner's absence and the social distance between caretaker and owner, as well as, of course, with the numbers of animals involved.

That these long-term caretaker associations are possible and take a fairly standardized form is important to the economy both of the household and the community. They free people to earn significant cash income in the national sector without foregoing the income and benefits of pastoralism. Cash is always in short supply in Usi. And fresh infusions, even on a small scale, are necessary for occasional restocking, for purchasing the few commodities and ritual and replacement items Usinos require, and for meeting the cash demands of superordinate ethnic groups.

Dar En Partir

Literally 'to give in sharing,' this association is known in other parts of Peru as a mitas. The latter term, and the reality, doubtless both derive from the traditional Spanish institution of herding a medias or a mitades 'by halves. Dar en partir is a highly balanced, formal, and long-term arrangement common throughout the Andes and other areas of the world as well. An individual simply gives animals into another's care with the agreement that each will share equally in the herd's growth over time.

In Usi, shareherding follows the rule that half of all young birthed in a year below to the owner and the other half falls to the caretaker as payment for his/her services. If an uneven number of young are produced, one of the contractants claims the odd animal and the other waits until the next birthing period to even things up. Also, when the association is terminated accounts are strictly equalized. If there is a "leftover" juvenile, one partner retains it and pays the other half its value. Alternatively, the contractants may sell or butcher an adult male from the shareherd and divide the cash or meat to equalize one's retention of the "extra" animals. Such contingencies aptly illustrate the highly balanced and formal nature of this association.

Dar en partir is almost never practiced between Usinos for the simple reason that they have access to other, equivalent strategies (boarding, absentee caretaking, species specialization) which are much less costly. Instead, dar en partir contracts are made between a village caretaker and an outsider owner. According to informants, most such "outsiders" come from the environs of Sangarara and Muqurasi/Qulqa. Often the parties make their acquaintance, and later agreement, at the dominical market of Quiquijana. Informants add that sheep and llama are only rarely given en partir, and certainly never horses or burros. Rather, the animals involved are almost invariably cattle.

Dar en partir is highly advantageous to both parties. It provides a profitable investment option for outsider-owners who could not otherwise keep cattle — e.g. young marrieds or elderly couples who have no children of herding age; or schoolteachers and other misti functionaries who work in or near small villages but reside elsewhere (e.g. in cities, where there are few pasture possibilities). Other reasons for outsiders' initiating dar en partir are: 1) a long trip, coupled

with a lack of anyone else to care for the stock; 2) shortage of grazing lands in the owners' region; 3) belief that pastures in the caretaker's area are richer; and relatedly, 4) hope that the stock will bear more young in a better or different climate.

For Usino caretakers, the benefits of dar en partir are perhaps even greater than for outsider owners. Such contracts provide an excellent opportunity to acquire the most expensive and prized herd (and draft) animals of all without any outlay in cash or agricultural produce.

THEFT

Usinos view theft as an ever-present risk in their pastoralism. And well they might, for opportunities are ample. Many grazing grounds are remote and lonely areas. Herds are often tended by a single individual, typically a woman or child. Sheep are notorious for straying. The temptations to theft are equally great. Certainly, there are economic motivations. Relatedly, as a levelling mechanism, rustling can assuage feelings of envidia. Or it can serve as a surreptitious way to right perceived wrongs done one by co-villagers. Finally, the deed is easy to conceal and hard to prove. Hence thieves generally go formally unpunished and their crime unredressed.

In Usi, theft may take various forms, which I here classify into four types. The first two have been well described by Orlove (1973), whose terms I borrow. The second two have not been addressed in the literature and, since villagers offered no specific terms for them, I devise my own, descriptive labels. As indicated in Table 2 below, all four can be largely characterized by a triumvirate of contrasting dimensions: violent/non-violent, premeditated/unpremeditated, external/internal – referring, respectively, to the amount of violence involved in the act, the degree of planning, and whether the theft is committed by community outsiders or insiders.

TABLE 2 – DISTINGUISHING FEATURES OF THEFT TYPES

TYPE OF THEFT	FEATURES		
	Violent	Premeditated	External
I <u>Asalto</u>	+	+	+
II <u>Pakaylla</u>	-	+	+ and/or -
III <u>Oppportunistic</u>	-	-	+ or -
IV <u>Associational</u>	-	- or +	-

Type I above is almost unknown in Usi today. In the other three, the feature "internal" makes for the greatest concern among villagers — and for the greatest social and associational tensions, as we shall see. Type IV is of particular interest because of the constraints it places on pastoral labor organization strategies. As before, the following material was collected in open-ended interviews and is presented in descriptive and/or "mini case study" form.

Several general observations concerning theft are in order. First, sheep are the most easily and frequently "rustled" species in all four types. Second, purloined sheep are always slaughtered as soon as possible and their meat sold, or hidden away for furtive household consumption. They are never incorporated into other flocks. In community-internal robberies, the almost certain danger of their identification precludes this. And outsiders are hardly tempted to rustle Usi's sickly and scrawny criollos for replacement or breeding stock. Finally, in contrast, llama are seldom the victims of external thefts, for a number of reasons. Unlike the allelomimetic ovine, llama have a strong dominance hierarchy. If the normal lead animal(s) is lacking, the herd is hard to drive. Further, say Usinos, llama are strong, feisty, half-wild creatures who respond poorly to any but their own masters. Equally important, villagers point out that llama are difficult to steal, and keep stolen, because they make every effort to escape and return to their home territory and corrals.

Asalto

Asalto, from the Spanish 'assault,' refers to a violent, premeditated open attack by a band of rustlers. Such attacks can occur by day or night,

with the animals grazing in the open or shut in their corrals. Informants say the band of raiders typically numbers ten to fifteen men. Bands may be composed of one or more groups of "professional" rustlers, each with a clearly ordered and longstanding internal organization. Alternatively, they may consist of malcontents from an adjacent community who, often in response to a dispute over grazing rights and boundaries, pool forces to raid their enemy village's herds. Informants report that both types of bands — particularly professional ones from Sangarara province — have attacked Usinos in past.

In either case, the modus operandi is the same. In a surprise rush, the raiders overwhelm and subdue the shepherd and any watchdogs. If the victim offers resistance, he may suffer bodily injury or even death. Informants recount how, during one asalto some twenty years ago, an Usino who made a stand in the door of his cabana and attempted to fight off the marauders was killed. Normally, however, the rustlers tie or lock up the shepherd while assembling the herd and making good their escape.

Twenty or thirty years ago, such asaltos were reportedly quite frequent in Usi, especially in remote puna estancias. It would require a very bold band indeed to raid the nucleated settlement itself. Isolated ranches furnish much easier and richer targets. There, the chance of discovery or interference is small, the size and quality of herds greater, and the escape route swifter and more difficult to track (to Sangarara, down the rocky scarp of the range fronting the village).

Indeed, a number of informants connect the general abandonment of puna estancias with this earlier spate of asaltos, as people began to fear not only for their herds' but also their own safety. Today, however, asaltos are

very rare. Some villagers opine that the estancia exodus itself has led to lessened raiding. However, Orlove writes that the large, professional rustler bands of the past are no more. With the advent of agrarian reform and the smashing of the haciends system, these groups began to dissolve for want of sufficient, profitable victims. With their passing, asalto has largely given way to a different form of largescale, premeditated theft — pakaylla.

Pakaylla

From Quechua 'to hide," pakaylla is the term Orlove employs for "un robo furtivo cometido de noche sin llamar la atencion de nadie. Se echa pan pedazos de carne a los perros para que no ladren y el ganado es arreado en silencio" (1973:70). In addition to Orlove's "furtive" and "nocturnal" criteria, Usinos stipulate that such rustling is both premeditated and nearly always internally abetted. Quite a number of informants, including the bankrupted protagonist himself, recounted the following, rather dramatic instance of pakaylla which took place in August of 1979.

(17)

On the evening in question, Senor Toribio and his family all went out to enjoy the annual festivities of the Virgen de Asunta, patron saint of Usi. However, they did not depart without first assuring themselves that their sheep were safely corraled for the night and a relative, the elderly Senor Benigno, installed in the house to "sleep over" and keep watch on the flock.

Since almost everyone in Usi wants to attend the patronal fiesta — the finest and most important one of the year — Toribio counted himself fortunate to find someone willing to serve as a guardian. The elderly Benigno simply united his flock of ten sheep with Toribio's forty in the latter's corral and then settled down for the night.

Unfortunately, Benigno had done his fiesta-ing early, and he soon drifted off into a soundly drunken sleep. At some point during the night, a

group of men stole into the corral and — in a silence broken only by the contented snores of Benigno — led away every last one of the fifty sheep.

Toribio discovered the theft when he returned home at dawn. He and a group of kinsmen immediately set out after the robbers even though pursuit was likely too belated. Nevertheless, they found the tracks of several men, along with those of the purloined sheep, going up from the village mill towards Sangarara. They followed the spoor until it disappeared on the rocky scarp near the village's 5000 meter boundary. None of the animals was recovered.

To this day, Benigno naturally is rather "sheepish" about the whole affair. Toribio, who still remains "sheep-less," now spends three months or more out of the year doing wage labor on the coca plantations in Quillabamba, in hopes of amassing enough cash to start his flock anew.

Along with Orlove, Usinos say pakaylla is most often perpetrated during major fiestas, when many strangers visit the village. These celebrations provide an excellent "cover" for thieves and, given that ritual drunkenness is enjoined in the Andes, plenty of opportunity for their nefarious purposes. However, while "outsiders" perform the actual theft, villagers believe an "insider" informant is usually involved. Illustrating with the foregoing case, Usinos argue "How else would the thieves know that only one drunken old man guarded the sheep while the rest of the family was out dancing and drinking? And how would they know which was the house?" In exchange for his help, say villagers, the local confederate receives a cash payment, usually after the stolen stock have been butchered and sold.

Opportunistic Theft

Although much more dramatic, both asalto and pakaylla are relatively rare compared to the next two, predominant forms of rustling in Usi. "Opportunistic" theft normally results from negligence which presents a situation "too good to pass up," as it were. Both villagers and non-villagers

may take advantage of such opportunities. Usinos recount one incident of external opportunistic theft which occurred in 1976.

Eight head of cattle, owned by various families, were grazing on the pampas of Aquya — an uninhabited part of the community but one which borders a major traffic route to the Vilcantoa valley floor used by travellers of all kinds. The tethered animals were unattended and their owners foolishly left them out all night. The next day, not one was to be found — only their tracks, along with those of mounted horses, leading down the mountainside. Usinos recall this event vividly, for eight head of cattle represent a current (1980) value of S/320,000-400,000 — not to mention the loss to the village as a whole in available draft animals.

More commonly, however, opportunistic theft involves strayed sheep. Different degrees of deliberateness characterize such robberies. Strays may be actively rounded up whenever a safe and easy opportunity presents itself; or the meat from a fortuitously discovered carcass may be secretly salvaged. However, lost and frightened sheep occasionally manage to reunite themselves with a different flock. Often, too, a sheep gets mixed in with another flock in the close quarters of stubble pasturing, or on the principal paths leading down from muyuy and puna. Indeed, sometimes the "robber" does not even notice the "extra" animal until reaching the canchon, when a final count is always taken as the flock pushes through the corral door. In these situations, a more passive form of opportunistic theft results. If the owner or shepherd fails to claim the stray en route, the worse luck his. In any case, the robber household slaughters the sheep in the dark of night, hides away the meat and pelt, and buries the remainder. The general attitude behind such thefts seems to be one common throughout Latin America, i.e. people who are careless with their possessions deserve to lose them.

While opportunistic theft of strays may be either external or internal, Usinos complain most bitterly about the latter. Whenever a sheep is missed,

a hunt for it or its carcass is promptly instituted. If neither is found, accusations begin to fly. Naturally, the first suspects are one's longstanding village enemies. People whose flocks were pasturing nearby that day, or returned by the same route and hour, are also considered likely culprits. Accusations increase in strength and certainty if a powerful shaman has been consulted as to the animal's whereabouts and/or the thief's identity.

Villagers say both accusations and incidents of opportunistic theft are frequent. They add, however, that seldom is any effective redressive action possible, e.g. through formal complaints to the village assembly or through juridical or police procedures. Unlike other major sources of community tension over pastoralism (e.g. animals' invasions of fields), internal theft leaves behind little concrete evidence. The injured party therefore has only punitive recourse — through open verbal abuse, gossip and witchcraft. (He/she can always hire a paqu to hex the family, crops, or more likely the herds, of the suspected thief.) The result is often an escalating cycle of accusations and counter-accusations of theft and witchcraft. These ripple distrust and factionalism throughout the accusers' social networks, and on through the community at large.

Associational Theft

A great deal of distrust and factionalism also arises over suspected dishonesty (and carelessness) in pastoral associations. An individual charged with the care of another's animals may take advantage of his/her position to garner extra fiber, meat and/or cash illicitly. While such problems can occur in both short- and long-term associations, the cases reported to me in detail all concern some form of boarding, usually at puna estancias — where the

temptations to and opportunities for thievery are much greater. Frequently, camelids are the victims, since they are the species most often boarded out. Finally, here, too, owner negligence can be a contributing factor. At least, say informants, owners who fail to check on their animals regularly, or who fall behind in aviu payments, are more prone to such losses.

Such robberies are simple enough. The malefactor may covertly sell off an animal. Alternatively, he/she may slaughter it and sell or secretly retain the products. Associational theft may also consist of wrongly appropriating salvage flesh. Finally, illicit shearing may be at issue — a slightly different matter, since such "thefts" are rather difficult to conceal.

In all but the last case, the dishonest caretaker must invent an explanation to present upon the owner's next visit — hopefully weeks or months later. The story possibilities are fairly limited, however. 1) The animal strayed away and no sign of it was anywhere to be found. Therefore, 2) it was likely a victim of predation or opportunistic theft. Or 3) it wandered off to die of disease or misfortune in the campo, and its carcass was discovered so late that all the meat was putrefied. (In the latter case, however, the caretaker is expected to hand over the hide in evidence.) But no matter how plausible the tale, any individual who fails to report an animal's loss promptly is suspected wrongdoing. Suspicion usually becomes certainty if he/she can produce no remains.

As with internal opportunistic theft, however, proof and redress of associational dishonesty is nearly impossible. In part this is due to the dyadic-contract nature of Usi's smallscale pastoral associations. As Foster explains, "These contracts are informal, or implicit, since they lack ritual or legal basis. They are not based on any idea of law and they are unenforceable

through authority; they exist only at the pleasure of the contractants" (1961:1174). This is not to say there is no standardized, community-wide consensus as to what form these contracts should take. It is to say, however, that there is no formal, agreed upon procedure for reparation of pastoral losses — whether deliberate or inadvertent — while livestock is under another's care. When problems arise in an association — as when animals are repeatedly injured or "lost" — the relationship may simply break down, leaving one household pastorally poorer, and any number of others angry, embittered, and mistrustful.

Several reports of suspected associational theft follow.

(19)

Senor Cipriano (of cases 6 and 15) bitterly recalls the malfeasance of a previous boarding partner. During the six years prior to his niece's taking charge of his treasured pakucha, her mother-in-law instead cared for the animals. Apparently, Cipriano activated this quite distant relationship because he and his wife have no relatives in Usi other than the niece. And, with several small children to look after, she was at that time unable to oversee her uncle's estancia.

Of course, problems and distrust often increase along with social distance. Under the mother-in-law management, a distressing number of alpaca began to disappear with no hint as to their fate. Cipriano became convinced that the animals were being sold off surreptitiously. Although he had no way to prove his suspicions and seek redress, he signalled his distrust by decreasing aviu payments to once every two months. Ultimately, under a cloud of recriminations, he broke off the association with the mother-in-law entirely and substituted the niece instead.

(20)

Senora Igida, of case study No. 7, also encountered serious problems in her herding association. Recall that she boarded a china ankuta and one machu at a compadre's puna estancia. This arrangement worked well until the elderly animal died — most likely, admits Igida, from sheer old age and through no fault of its caretaker.

However, her compadre concocted a different story and produced neither flesh nor hide. Igida is certain that he kept them for his own use. Since she

had no way to prove his thievery, through, Igida could obtain no redress. But needless to say, with her confidence in her compadre destroyed, she promptly terminated the association and fetched home the remaining llama. She has had no dealings with the man since, and has spread the tale of his untrustworthiness throughout the community.

The next case of associational theft is rather different and more complex. It concerns illicit shearing. This deed is essentially impossible to conceal. And, its definition as "theft" is somewhat subjective. Such cases seem to arise from sociostructural, as well as economic, considerations which make for differing interpretations of associational rights and even of animal ownership.

(21)

Upon his first marriage, Senor Basilio's parents-in-law generously endowed their daughter with an urqu and a china ankuta. Over time, the llama reproduced to a current total of six. All the animals remained in the parental herd even after Basilio and his wife established neolocal residence. This is a common arrangement in Usi, since young couples are typically too pressed for labor to do all their own herding fulltime — particularly when they own more than one species.

Sadly, a few years after their marriage, Basilio's wife died. She left him with two infant sons, whom he gave into the care of his parents. Basilio's parents-in-law continued to look after the endowed llama. However, shortly after Basilio's recent marriage, these relatives sheared all the animals without informing him and refused to turn over any of the clip.

Basilio is understandably very angry and upset over this incident. He plans to collect the llama at the next annual llama t'inka — the customary occasion for formal transfer of endowed animals. Normally, such transfers must be accompanied by certain ritual payments (special foods and considerable drink). These goods constitute both a symbolic and a material "thank you" for interim herding services. However, Basilio angrily vows he will not give his parents-in-law a morsel of food or a drop of drink. The "stolen" fiber, he says, is recompense enough. In fact, though, even if Basilio proffers the full ritual payment, it is uncertain whether his relatives would release the animals.

The problem lies in the definition of this event as "theft." While Basilio clearly deems it such, his parents-in-law apparently consider the shearing well enough within their rights as to argue the matter. There is likely right on both sides, for the situation is a complicated one involving issues of

endowment. These were still unresolved upon my departure. How it will all end, I cannot say. Perhaps some compromise will be struck. Clearly, however, the matter will continue to be a source of strife and distrust for some time to come.

SUMMARY REMARKS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR DEVELOPMENT

Summarizing briefly, pastoralism is a crucial part of subsistence in Usi. But, as the dialectical model predicts, at the self-sufficient household level it engenders serious organizational disjunctions with agriculture — notably, in securing daily labor for herding. These disjunctions are heightened by the ideal of multiple-species stockraising in a vertical ecology. Usinos respond to this disintegrative challenge with a variety of smallscale, suprahousehold associations apparently derived eclectically from both Spanish (e.g. dar en partir) and Incaic (e.g. t'inkikuy) tradition. Indeed, without such organizational strategies, few families would be able to pursue pastoralism at all.

As noted, these associations offer many and varied benefits, not only in pastoralism per se but also in other economic and social spheres. By pooling herds, of course, they free more labor for agricultural and other subsistence activities. Alternatively, some arrangements, e.g. joint herding, make for a more efficient use of pasturing time. Herd aggregation may also facilitate provision of specialized care and forages for different species. Relatedly, certain associations ease multiple-species pressure on household corral resources. Others work to equalize the distribution of valuable child labor for herding — and with it, children's subsistence costs — across households. Such contracts may also furnish elderly folk with much needed general help and companionship, while providing younger families with viable strategies for strengthening social ties and investments. Various arrangements allow individuals to initiate or increase their herds by "earning" livestock, and at the same time free other individuals to earn cash. And so forth.

Added to benefits like the foregoing is one further, overarching advantage to Usi's smallscale associations: their intrinsic informality and consequent flexibility. These features contrast sharply with the formality and fixity of larger-scale pastoral organizations elsewhere. For example, many alp associations are characterized by restricted and often ascribed membership, annual meetings and written codes of procedure, careful delineation of pastoral rights and duties coupled with powerful social pressures for compliance, and so on.

However, the very informality and flexibility of Usino associations allow villagers to respond rapidly and rationally to their highly changeable physical and social environment. The Andean peasant family's labor needs and resources typically vary markedly, not only across the years (e.g. due to the periodic droughts and animal epidemics for which the region is notorious, dramatic shifts in household composition across the domestic life cycle, the natural increase and decrease of herds) but also within the space of a few months or weeks (thanks to, e.g., the fluctuating demands of multicrop agriculture in a tropical vertical ecology; the health and/or forage needs of different species, or even individual animals, at different altitudes and times of the year; family travel or crisis; loss of child labor during the academic year; etc.). Moreover, by initiating and terminating relationships as necessary, stockowners avoid the mounting material and social costs of more formal, permanent arrangements.

Yet, with its dyadic-contract underpinnings, this same informality/flexibility makes for substantial risks in Usino pastoral associations. Unrecoupable losses often result from partners' incompetence or dishonesty. As we have seen risks (as well as benefits) vary with the

organizational strategy. However, they will generally increase in proportion to the number, size, and perhaps duration of associations a stockowner enters into. In large part, these heightened risks account for the general household ideal of doing all its own herding whenever possible. But when family labor shortages dictate otherwise, Usinos turn to smallscale associations. In the absence of active and equitable police or other mechanisms, these limited partnerships likely afford peasants the most effective means of calculating and controlling associational risks. Participation in larger-scale, but still dyadic-contract-based, organizations would only increase both the costs and risks of pastoralism for the Usino stockowner, without a corresponding increase in benefits. Once again, within the constraints of their particular socioeconomic system, peasants are behaving in consummately rational ways.

Still in all, largescale associations have many absolute advantages. Of course, there are numerous ways in which broad-based cooperative effort can reduce pastoral costs and labor — to name but a few, in purchase, construction, and maintenance of supplies and equipment (e.g. medicaments; dips, runs, shelters, fences; pathways, watering facilities, licks; machinery for shearing, dairying, etc.); in performing seasonally time-constrained tasks such as docking, castrating, shearing and servicing; in processing and marketing pastoral harvests. However, a signal benefit of largescale associations is largescale herd aggregation. This means that animals can be efficiently managed in the appropriate species/sex/age/reproductive state/etc. divisions so important for the specialized feeding, health care, and breeding of each group. Pooling animals also reduces crop losses from livestock depredations, for it is easier to oversee a few large herds than a multitude of small ones. Through aggregation, too, communal grazing

grounds can be exploited more wisely by organized pasture rotation. With this technique, three major impediments to improved productivity can be controlled; parasitism, overgrazing, and plant poisoning (see companion report on "Management of Animal Health and Disease"). In an agropastoral adaptation, pasture rotation also redounds to the benefit of cultivation. It allows for systematic manuring and clearing of fallow fields. Furthermore, it promotes their systematic reseeding and trampling. Thus, by encouraging new plant growth while forestalling overgrazing, pasture rotation reduces losses to erosion. Finally, largescale pooling can release dramatic amounts of labor. According to Orlove, in the Andes a trained herder can manage up to 400 sheep or 1000 llamas or alpacas. Taking sheep in Usi as an example, if we allot a very modest number of animals to an "untrained" herder, say 200, and divide by Usi's average flock of 26.8, then a single individual could easily handle some seven households' ovines. (More, in fact, since many families own fewer than 25 sheep.) If this individual were "trained", fifteen others would be spared the chore of daily herding. And with camelids, even a single untrained guardian should be easily able to supervise the entire community's holdings.

Development workers and neofunctional analysts alike are quick to perceive these advantages. To the former's eye, a logical starting point for pastoral development projects in communities such as Usi might well seem the institution of largescale herding associations, or of trained herding specialists. Yet we have seen how, within the constraints of their current social and economic systems, Usinos are responding perfectly rationally with their smallscale associations. The real issue is not why do peasants such as

those described here fail to organize herding at higher levels. Rather, it is "How do peasants anywhere manage to do so?"

Unfortunately, yet predictably, the literature is largely silent on this point. Studies describe at length the cooperative structures and advantages of largescale pastoral organizations. But these roseate descriptions seldom include any mention of the strains inherent in such associations, much less of how problems are dealt with to the continuing satisfaction of the membership. Curiously, though, these same neofunctionalist works sometimes do report peasant resistance to largescale organization. For example, in his discussion of alpine associations, Friedl puzzles over the question, "why does the individual dairy operation still exist?" He writes that, in contrast to communal management, "Many readily apparent factors point to the individual alpine operation as a highly irrational system. For one thing, there is the duplication of effort unnecessarily spent on herding the animals individually when they could as easily be herded together" (1974: 52-53, italics mine). He continued with a host of other "negative attributes" (ibid.). Then, summarizing his own and other researchers' reports on Swiss peasantry, Friedl cites a variety of concerns potentially motivating such "irrational" behavior. Two of the more noteworthy of these are peasants' claim that it is too expensive to pay the necessary herding and dairying personnel, and stockowners' fear of having pastoral products stolen or underreported by extrahousehold caretakers. However, Friedl then trots out the worn peasants-are-nasty argument, with observations that the peasant often demonstrates a "lack of willingness to allow another person to 'interfere' in his economic life," an "inherent distrustfulness," a "deep-rooted obstinacy," and a refusal "to allow strangers to care for their animals." To

this he adds a laundry list of semi-psychological factors including courting customs, beliefs that it is healthier for women and children to spend their summers on the alp and that herding represents "the best days of one's life" (perhaps related to courting?), and the romanticization of herding in general (citations all from Friedl (1974:53)).

While certain of these rationales are more convincing than others, the real question has been "stood on its head." Again, it is not, as Friedl and others might have it, "Why do seemingly inefficient smallscale stock operations persist?" Rather, it is "What constellation of factors make possible and promote largescale pastoral associations or recourse to herding specialists in peasant societies?" This is a considerably more complex query and one which demands a "conflict" rather than a "consensus" or neofunctionalist approach. The answer will be correspondingly complex, primarily involving socio-economic and sociopolitical structures both within the community and without, at wider regional and national levels. A multitude of issues will require careful research and restudy, but to illustrate just a few:

What internal problem-solving mechanisms exist in successful largescale associations or herding-specialist contracts? Relatedly, what sorts of problems most often arise and why?

How do land tenure patterns relate to the presence/absence and structuring of largescale associations or use of herding specialists?

What is the nature of community-internal and external police and juridical organization, and how are the two related —i.e. is the peasant assured fair and lawful treatment of his pastoral complaints? Also, what markets exist for stolen pastoral produce and are they controlled or condoned?

What are the characteristics of herding specialists? What motivates them to become herders rather than independent agropastoralists

themselves or, say, members of an urban proletariat? How are they paid? What are their rights and position within both community and larger, national power structures?

Doubtless the reader can adduce still further, equally crucial areas for investigation. But again, the point is that instead of fruitless speculation on why peasant communities like Usi "irrationally" forego the many benefits of largescale associations and herding specialists, careful restudy of groups who "rationally" embrace such strategies is necessary.

Such research has immediate, practical implications for development. With the knowledge gained thereby, development workers can realistically assess the feasibility and usefulness of instituting largescale forms of pastoral organization in communities like Usi — whether in the Andes, the Alps, Africa, or elsewhere —before committing project resources to plans likely fated to be stymied by overarching sociopolitical power structures.

Naturally, any such assessments must also incorporate a thorough understanding of the smallscale associations already in place in the target community. These are important because they may well serve as both a communicative metaphor and a structural foundation for new forms of pastoral organization. To illustrate with one brief example from the Andean data presented here, transfer from the interfamilial to the community or moiety level of both the term and technique of an extant strategy such as t'inkikuy might furnish a viable way to introduce largescale herd aggregation.

Equally important when it comes to implementation is a grasp of the interlocking net of social and economic alliances and splits present in any community. Here, research into such conflict points like internal theft can prove very revealing. Development personnel are inevitably confronted with

the question of how best to organize and motivate this network toward project aims and filter necessary aid and information through it. To forestall difficulties in this regard, it is useful first to identify which persons or segments of the population would be most amenable to and/or influential in adopting and extending new practices — and conversely, which individuals or factions might arouse resistance, if only on the grounds of personal enmities. In the difficult task of identifying nodes of power and tension within the social network, research into relatively more simple matters such as real or suspected instances of internal theft can provide a valuable starting point.

The final admonition here is a simple one echoing that of the preceding reports. In addition to recognizing what constitutes "appropriate technology," development workers must also concern themselves with the "appropriate sociology" of proposed goals and implementation methods — both within the target community itself and in its relationships to larger social, economic, and political structures.