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BIBLIOGRAPHY, ABSTRACTS, AND RESEARCHERS ON THE YAR

A Report Prepared for the U.S. Agency for International Development

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INTRODUCTION

This report on the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR) is the fifth of a series that includes others on Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia. Each report focuses on socio-cultural and political-economic aspects of development and consists of a bibliography, abstracts, a list of researchers, and recommendations about which bibliographic sources might be distributed to USAID offices.

The bibliography in the current report includes 87 articles, 35 books, 17 dissertation-theses, 1 government document, 19 projects, and 6 other sources. There are a total of 165 entries: 116 of them are in English, 38 in French, and 11 in Arabic. Twelve of the total were produced before 1970; 153 since then.

The abstracts were made from sources selected according to four criteria. The contract for this project stipulates that sources chosen should be "of high quality," "empirically based," and "relevant to development." The first of these criteria was taken to concern formal considerations (such as consistency and comprehensiveness); the second, substantive considerations (such as testing hypotheses or at least clearly relating claims to data); and the third, addressing "basic needs." To these interpretations was added the criterion of balance, both in topics and in perspectives, so that all twenty sources selected would not concern a single subject area or viewpoint. Sources chosen for abstracting, then, were judged according to these four criteria and rater highly on all or most of them. For this reason we recommend that, funds permitting, all of them be duplicated and distributed to relevant USAID offices.

The list of researchers was composed from the authors of sources in the bibliography. Information about their addresses, topics of research, and language competences were compiled from eight directories, biographical data in their publications, and personal networks.

FCH
Project Director

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Key Words to Organize Bibliographic Entries on Socio-Economic Development

Country

- Egypt
- Jordan
- Morocco
- Tunisia
- Yemen

Source of Information

- article
- book
- dissertation/thesis
- document (host government)
- project (other than host government)
- other

Subjects

- General Development
  - ideology
  - informal processes
  - intranational political economy
  - international political economy
  - social organization and structure (kinship/family organization/neighborhood/networks)
  - other

Science

- applied (eg. technology)
- natural (eg. fisheries, forests, etc.)
- social
- other

Health

- maternal and child care
- nutrition
- preventive care
- socio-cultural factors
- water supply and sewers
- other

Population

- family planning
- migration
- other

Education

- instructional materials
- literacy and other basic
- pre-school, elementary, secondary
- professional and higher
- technical and vocational
- other

Urbanism

- housing and construction
- sanitation and streets
- other

Communication

- libraries and storage
- media
- impacts
- other

Agriculture

- irrigation and water management
- extension and advice
- crops
- livestock and products
- credit and mechanization
- land
- markets and food subsidies
- other

Industry

- energy
- transport
- trade and commerce
- labor
- management
- banking and finance
- tourism
- small scale
- other

Public Administration

- foreign aid and investment
- community welfare

taxes and grants

bureaucracy and decentralization

planning

other

Basic Human Needs

status of women

rural

urban

other

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The goal of this article is to analyze employment, at present and over the next generation, in the six countries listed. Birks and Sinclair first provide a brief social and economic background for all six; then they sketch the current economic position of each; next they propose a new system for classifying the types and distributions of employment in the whole group of countries; and finally they project employment growth in the six to 1990, emphasizing that planners need to pay more attention to the informal sector. Four tables and several notes supplement the discussion.

Syria, Jordan, Sudan, the PDRY, Egypt, and the YAR are "the six poorest countries of the Arab region": the average GNP per capita in them was $350 in 1976, and their situation is likely to worsen over the rest of this century. This poverty results from relatively rapid population growth but slow economic development, itself the product of wars, inflation, loss of trained personnel through labor migration, etc. The authors sketch each country in turn by order of descending GNP per capita in 1976. At that time the YAR was at the bottom of the bottom: GNP per capita was $250 (as compared, for example, with Syria's $780). YAR development efforts were focused on agriculture, infrastructure, and social services (especially education). The country's economy manifested a strange blend of affluence and underdevelopment: large amounts of foreign aid were

coming in, but port congestion and unskilled labor limited the effects of such aid; foreign exchange was prevalent and widely distributed, but opportunities for domestic investment were so restrained that prices for land and consumer goods were inflating rapidly. The bonanza resulting from foreign aid and labor migration had been a blessing, but hardly an unmixed one.

Birks and Sinclair seek to analyze the type and distribution of employment in the YAR, as in the other five poorest countries, by classifying work forces according to a new system. They utilize economic sector, rather than economic status (employer, employee, self-employed, etc.) or economic activity (agriculture, mining, manufacturing, etc.). By economic sectors they do not mean the widely used "primary-secondary-tertiary" categories but rather the following: traditional, modern, informal, international migration, and unemployed. Such a classificatory system, they claim, enables one to do two things: "first, to look at employment structures from a development perspective; second, to obtain some idea of the level and distribution of income of the working population." For example, the "traditional sector" includes 52 per cent of workers in the six countries, 55.1 per cent in the YAR. (Most of these in both cases are in agriculture, but no explicit criteria are given for differentiating traditional from modern in the economic activity.) Conversely, the "modern sector" combines three subsectors--the government, the military, and a modern private sector--which in the six countries together account for "31 per cent of all employment, with half the total comprising the Army or government." The YAR no doubt has a small modern sector, but the data provided by Birks and Sinclair are unclear about it. (They say that government employment accounts for 2.6 per cent of the YAR's modern workers,

the "modern private sector" for 3.7 per cent more, but for the military they say "n.a." This apparently means "not available," in which case the percentages given for the other sectors are inaccurate because they are not based on all workers.) The "informal sector" seems essentially a residual category; here the authors say it is "roughly defined as being easy to enter, reliant on indigenous resources, organized on a small scale and often family basis, and is labor intensive, using locally adapted technology and skills acquired informally." They add that it can be found in rural or urban areas, usually near concentrations of modern sector jobs. While no official figures exist for employment in the informal sector, Birks and Sinclair estimate that 7 per cent of jobs in the six countries (13.8 per cent in the YAR) are in this category. They also claim that international migration has added many workers to it. One way this has occurred is that migrants typically move in a "series of steps"--village to town, town to city, city to foreign--with a "residue" of persons left at each of the steps. Also, when migrants return with skills useful in urban settings, they often reside there rather than in their native villages. (Gerholm 1977, abstracted in this collection, gives supporting and contrasting examples of both these patterns in the YAR.) Furthermore, rapid and extreme shifts in the international demand for migrant labor have imbalanced many of the poorer countries' efforts at planned development. Such shifts draw off skilled labor in boom times, provide it with capital that is remitted home and spent in ways over which home governments often have little control, then send the migrants back when the boom has softened. Accordingly, potential migrants find the informal sector a temporary haven before and between jobs abroad, while persons remaining in the home country can work in the informal sector to provide construction and other services for migrant remittances.

Birks and Sinclair estimate that only 5.1 per cent of the six countries' workers are in the "international migration sector," but most of these would be in the modern private sector back home. Thus the heaviest impact of migration may be depriving the poorer countries of their most able work force. (Interestingly, the YAR seems a converse case: a much higher proportion of its workers is abroad--20.3 per cent--but most of them are unskilled. See also Cohen and Lewis 1979 for a different assessment of the percentage of YAR workers abroad.) Finally, the "unemployed sector" accounts for only 5 per cent of the work force in the whole sample, 4.5 per cent in the YAR. However, these figures probably are only the most visible portion of a larger phenomenon: "less obvious and nearly as unfortunate are those in hidden unemployment or working unsuccessfully in the informal sector."

Birks and Sinclair combine these categories with population growth to project plausible employment patterns for the six countries in 1990. They hypothecize that the international migration sector will remain constant or decline slightly, and the traditional one will decline at a yearly rate of 1 per cent (as modernization replaces labor-intensive agricultural practices with others less so and as increasing numbers of cultivators move to cities). Conversely, the other sectors will expand: military and government, at an annual rate of 3 per cent; the modern private sector, at a perhaps optimistic 5 per cent; and the informal and unemployment sectors will increase at 9 per cent annually to become 29 per cent of the total work force in 1990. (The last two categories are combined as "the residual balance between the growth in the work force and the expansion or contraction of other types of employment.") The authors conclude that "these figures provide ample support for the recent shift of emphasis in development studies away from the modern sector and

towards less organized sectors of Third World economies." Accordingly, they call for further research on such sectors so that policies may be proposed and enacted to develop them.

This article presents a plausible sketch of the background, current position, and possible evolution of employment in the countries concerned. The system for classifying workers constitutes a first step toward conceptualizing the informal sector and its relation to others, with the remarks linking international migration patterns to the informal sector being particularly useful. More work needs to be done, however, in discriminating the categories: problems relating to the "traditional" and "modern" sectors were mentioned above; the "informal" one is a particularly slippery concept. For instance, much prostitution would fit the "rough definition" for informal sector employment, yet in other ways the activity might better be conceived as "traditional" or "modern." Furthermore, informal sector does not necessarily entail poverty: much criminal activity is quite lucurative yet still "informal." And finally, persons working in informal employment often combine several jobs, some perhaps in the modern or traditional sectors--government officers making more from tips and bribes than from their salaries are an example. (Gerholm 1977 has a good discussion of this for the YAR.)

Chelhod, J., "L'Organisation Sociale au Yemen," L'Ethnographie, vol. 64, pp. 61-86, 1970. YEMEN ARTICLE GENERAL DEVELOPMENT SOCIAL ORGANIZATION AND STRUCTURE

Chelhod seeks to provide a systematic study of social organization among the Hashid confederation in the highland plateau region of the YAR. He ways that such social organization has been influenced by three major factors: tribal segmentation, division of labor, and Zaydi religion. His discussion is based on three months of field research in and around the northern town of Khamr in 1969; several notes and an appendix listing component tribes of the YAR's two largest confederations (Hashid and Bakil) supplement the discussion.

The author perceives the local situation largely in terms of earlier work on Bedouins: "what most strikes the observer who studies the populations of the Yemeni highlands is to find, alongside a village system and among rural people who have been sedentarized for a long time, structures hardly different from those of the Bedouins." For example, Bedouin origins may be why Yemenis lack a tern to denote a level of organization englobing related tribes (like the English word confederation) and use instead the name of the purported founding ancestor for those tribes (e.g., Hashid). A confederation would imply the existence of "a permanent authority who presides over the destiny of all its members," but such an authority does not exist above the tribal level. Chelhod recognizes that the Hashid have a paramount sheik, but he claims that the office is essentially honorific: "the one who holds it is never assured of making himself heard by those who have freely chosen him." Furthermore, the office was abolished by a rival confederation (the Bakil) "without a change resulting from it in their organization." Another example traceable to

Bedouin origins is the "great confusion" Chelhod finds when considering the terms used to label subgroups within Yemeni tribes: different labels have overlapping or even identical designations. He finally settles on the following hierarchy (from top down): qabila ("tribe"), batn or fakhd ("fraction"), lahma ("clan"), badana or 'asaba ("lineage"), and 'usra ("extended family"). The terminological confusion results from two related factors: a vestigial remnant of the Bedouin capacity allowing subgroups within a tribe to fuse together or fission apart, often in response to environmental conditions, so that "one is not always sure what type of grouping one is dealing with"; and second, tribal organization (based on a genealogical model) is not always consistent with the relatively fixed agricultural lands (based on a territorial model) occupied by the Yemeni groups. Accordingly, subgroups like the Bani Soraym have begun to "disaggregate," but the majority of the Hashid remain solidary. Contributing to this solidarity have been ongoing contacts with present Bedouin groups and local resistance to centralizing policies of the national government (such as replacing customary law by the Shari').

Tribal organization is thus one major influence on Hashid social organization; the division of labor is another. However, the manifestations of this second influence are more indirect, mediated by a complex set of social categories. The population of Khamr town is divided into two major categories, the fellahin ("peasants") and the baya' ("sellers"), between whom there is a marriage bar. Fellahin, in turn, are subdivided into a majority of tribesmen (discussed above) and a minority of qodat ("judges" or "men well versed in religious law"). Conversely, baya' are subdivided into four categories (in order of descending prestige): merchants, craftsmen, 'anadil (performers of "defiling" tasks, like butchers or barbers), and 'akhdam

("servants"). Four men (two from the tribesmen and one each from the qodat and baya') act as liasons between their respective subgroups of the population and the town's two leaders. For example, a butcher links the baya' to the tribal sheik and the agent of the national government, and them to the baya'. Accordingly, Chelhod sees the interrelations of social categories as essentially a division of labor: "in this rural milieu, on a tribal foundation, work is thus the basis of social differentiation."

The author focuses particular attention on the dawshan, one of the 'anadil who acts as a combination herald, praise-singer, and jester. The dawshan is a paradoxical figure: he plays a key role at many important events (that of announcer-master of ceremonies), yet he is generally regarded with disdain; he must have accurate information and keen insight to perform his role well, yet he generally lives on the margins of the society he serves; "he is, in all respects, a man of everywhere and nowhere." Consistent with the emphasis on Bedouing origins, Chelhod sees the dawshan as a vestige of the nomadic oral poets of the Jahiliya period who will disappear as his former tribe becomes ever more sedentarized and integrated into national society.

The third and final major factor influencing Hashid social organization is the Zaydi religion. Chelhod recalls the Imamate and notes its similarity to earlier Sabean forms of government; he also mentions that the YAR currently is attempting to suppress the religious discrimination (Zaydi over Shaf'i) associated with the Imamate. However, Chelhod emphasizes that the social hierarchy (as opposed to the political one) still gives precedence to religious ranks: descendants of the Prophet outrank qodat, who outrank tribal leaders, who are above ordinary tribesmen, etc. This

system of ranking is related to the notion of hijra ("sanctuary"), which attaches to persons (e.g., descendants of the Prophet) as well as to places (e.g., shrines). For example, the town of Khamr is considered a hijra by all members of the Hashid: persons who have committed crimes can attend the market at Khamr without fear of vengeance, for retribution there would be a sacrilege. Similarly, a person who is hijra has special status: while respected in word and deed, he is separate from the group which accords him that status; placed above the melee, the hijra can nonetheless "step between the combatants to restore peace." Thus relgious authority as manifested in the hijra can perform a function (control of conflict) necessary to the establishment and maintenance of Hashid social organization.

Chelhod notes in closing that the social organization he has described bears similarities to a "regime of castes," in that a person's social rank is determined at birth by his/her father's rank (usually associated with his occupation). However, he notes also that no Yemeni is considered so low as to be "untouchable" by members of superior ranks, and the marriage bars permit "one-way traffic, going from high to low." (Of course, they control flow by gender as well as rank, since men can marry "down" and raise the status of their wives, but women cannot do similarly with their husbands.)

This article has the strengths of presenting the earliest (Western?) view of Yemeni social organization as a combination of tribe, market, and mosque (see also Gerholm 1977 and Stevenson 1981, both abstracted in this collection) and relating the analysis to earlier, Orientalist literature on Yemen and the Arab World. Its major weakness is an over-concentration on origins to the detriment of modern functions and context. For example, the article claims

that the paramount sheik of the Hashid had only an "honorific" role, while at the time of research he was the primary military and political force backing the YAR in the civil war, and later he went on to become a major maker and unmaker of governments (see Peterson 1982 and Halliday 1975, both abstracted in this collection).

Cohen, J. and D. Lewis, "Capital-Surplus, Labor-Short Economies: Yemen as a Challenge to Rural Development Strategies," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, vol. 61, pp. 523-28, 1979. YEMEN ARTICLE AGRICULTURE OTHER GENERAL DEVELOPMENT INTRANATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY

In this article Cohen and Lewis consider a major model of development, profile conditions in the YAR both before and since 1972, and show how the received formulation of the model does not apply to the present YAR. A brief list of references cited supplements the discussion.

The authors first discuss the dialectical role of paradigms in science, a la Kuhn. A paradigm is a "fundamental image" establishing general expectations about topics to be studied, how to study them, what kinds of answers such study should generate, and what kinds of policies should be based on them. As scientists investigate reality by employing paradigms, they over time encounter anomalies which "cannot be explained or dealt with" in terms specified by such paradigms. Accordingly, scientists reformulate them so that the problems can be resolved or, if this effort proves unsuccessful, seek new paradigms.

During the twenty years following World War II, many (especially American) development programs sought to implement an "industry-led, capital investment-based strategy" of the sort described by Rostow and generally followed under the Marshall Plan. As this effort was not particularly successful at fostering development in Third World countries, a new paradigm has emerged to form "the conceptual basis for much of the contemporary work" by (mostly Western) development experts. Agriculture is emphasized, rather than industry: efforts are made to increase food production,

which leads to improved incomes of rural people (the majority population in many countries), which "generates increased demand for domestic industrial products," which in turn benefits food production, etc. This shift toward strategies based on a rural development paradigm was accelerated by combinations of new high-yielding grains and techniques which came to be known as the "Green Revolution." The authors claim that these combinations have proven effective on both small and large landholdings but, after an initial period, "many governments and international agencies now seek to raise yields through small farm strategies." The success of such strategies seems dependent on a "progressive" agrarian political economy where much of the growth "is a private sector response to the stimuli resulting from increased rural income" but where also the government must "follow land, tax, pricing, and monetary policies supportive of economic growth with equity."

Noting that the YAR "is composed of areas that vary greatly with regard to their ecological, agricultural, and societal characteristics," Cohen and Lewis describe historical factors that have led to the "limited authority" (and power) of the central government in the hinterland. (See also Peterson 1982 and Halliday 1975, abstracted in this collection.) In the early 1970's almost 90 per cent of Yemen's approximately five million people were agriculturalists living on small landholdings: in the highlands they grew mostly temperate crops such as sorghum, wheat, barley, and potatoes; in the foothills, cereals or corn and, in wetter areas, sugar cane and tropical fruits; on the coastal plain, dates, tobacco, cotton, and sorghum; and both around the former areas and in more arid ones livestock were raised. Cereals constituted some 90 per cent of crop production; coffee was the major export; and agriculture produced 70 per cent of GNP.

While "most farmers are still limited to dry farming practices," irrigation has increased since the civil war, and Yemeni cultivators have long employed sophisticated techniques for managing rain runoffs. The country still has little industry; its mineral resources are "largely untapped"; and the people have a long tradition of labor migration (for the last point, see Gerholm 1977 and Swanson 1978, both abstracted in this collection).

In 1972 the YAR ranked low on many statistical indicators: per capita income was $80 per year; 90 per cent of the population was illiterate; and diseases like tuberculosis and malaria were pervasive, keeping average life expectancy at 36 years. Although there was little infrastructure and few trained personnel, potentials for agricultural development were good: the country had "some of the most fertile land on the Arabian peninsula," water from spring and summer monsoons, and a "hard-working, energetic, and entreprenurial" population. Accordingly, in 1972 the YAR had what seemed a capital-short, labor-surplus economy like many others, conditions indicating that application of the rural development model described above would be beneficial.

Since 1972 conditions have changed. Petrodollar wealth and ambitious development programs have attracted "roughly 40 per cent" of Yemeni labor to Saudi Arabia, where even unskilled workers "typically earn wages four times the presently prevailing levels in Yemen." By 1977, remittances from these labor migrants had multiplied the per capita income by more than six times, the money supply by more than twelve times. (See the Swiss Technical Cooperation Service 1978, abstracted in this collection, for a detailed assessment of emigrant population.) Other effects included women replacing men in Yemeni agriculture, new skills brought back by returning migrants, and changes in consumption patterns and levels.

(See Swanson 1978, abstracted in this collection, for further details on effects of emigration.) In short, the YAR economy has reversed its prior characteristics and become a capital-suplus, labor-short one.

Concerns have been raised about situations which could turn this boom into bust: workers from other countries are increasingly important competitors in the Saudi labor market; Yemeni workers (mostly unskilled) will become more vulnerable as Saudi Arabia shifts from the construction to operation phases of development; and "a change in the world energy supply structure or in relations between Saudi Arabia and Yemen" could close out jobs abruptly. (In fact, slumping oil prices may be causing such effects as this abstract is written.) Accordingly, Yemeni planners are seeking to build "rural institutions and infrastructure" before the benefits of labor migration disappear.

However, Cohen and Lewis question the applicability of the rural development paradigm to the YAR for two sets of reasons. First, "the capital surplus/labor shortage situation appears to fall outside the accepted assumptions of the paradigm": it posits widespread rural poverty, but much of the Yemeni rural population has money; the paradigm posits strong fiscal control by the government, but in the YAR more than two-thirds of the money supply is held as cash, little subject to government controls like taxes or banking regulations; the paradigm posits widespread rural unemployment, but in the YAR there is a shortage of agricultural labor; and so on. Second, "some of the functional relationships implied by the strategy do not seem to be borne out" by recent Yemeni experience. For example, it seems reasonable that remittances from abroad could substitute, at least temporarily, for higher rural incomes resulting from increased food production. In the Yemeni case, however, they are undercutting agricultural production: imported food (grain, fruit, chickens) can be sold at lower cost than that produced domestically. In sum, although rural development seems both

possible and desireable in the YAR, "the contemporary model may not be helpful in offering effective policies or strategies," so either the paradigm should be reformulated or a new one tried.

This article, while not constituting a rigorous empirical test of hypotheses derived from the rural development paradigm now dominant in Western programs, nonetheless does raise significant questions about it. Also the article provides a good sketch of the agrarian political economy in the YAR both before and during the current development boom in oil-producing states. However, weaknesses also are exhibited. For example, the article glosses over rural demands for roads and water systems to focus instead on lack of demand for credit or other government development programs; and it considers the growth of qat production a "luxury" without investigating why it is "important to culture" (e.g., as part of a social system supplying "welfare" benefits when persons are unemployed, sick, or old) or without analyzing how it has cut export earnings by displacing coffee.

Gerholm, T., Market, Mosque, and Mafraj: Social Inequality in a Yemeni Town, University of Stockholm, Stockholm, 1977.
YEMEN BOOK GENERAL DEVELOPMENT INTRANATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY SOCIAL ORGANIZATION AND STRUCTURE IDEOLOGY

Gerholm seeks to show "the nature of the social hierarchy" and "the prerequisites of its reproduction" in Manakha, capital of Haraz province and a town of some 3000 midway between San'a and the major port at Hudayda. His discussion is based mainly on participant-observation during fifteen months of local residence in 1974-75. More systematic methods of field research (a household census, an examination of tax records, an essay contest where students described their town, and an exercise where informants ranked occupations by prestige) also were attempted, with varying success. The discussion is illustrated by many interesting case examples, photographs, and figures, and is supplemented by notes, a glossary of Arabic terms, a useful bibliography, and an index.

Following acknowledgements and a brief statement of the argument, Gerholm describes his interests in studying stratification in Yemen, how he began research there, and some of the major persons and methods involved. The chronological dimension of the ethnographic setting is presented as the author sketches Manakha's history over the last 200 years. Two factors are emphasized: first, the town's commercial role in trade between the highland plateau and coastal lowlands (until it was bypassed by a paved highway in the 1960's); and second, the town's political role as a fortress in a zone contested by different parties, some local (Zaydis, Shaf'is, two sects of Isma'ilis) and some foreign (Turks). Then the spatial dimension of the setting is presented via a description of the sights, sounds, tastes, and smells one might encounter while travelling from San'a to Manakha and walking around the town.

Gerholm next considers economic structure in Manakha and the surrounding countryside by examining divisions of labor in them, effects of labor migration from them, and patterns of local "big man" careers. Lacking detailed and reliable quantitative information, he makes various estimates of local cultivation devoted to different crops, structure of landownership, and occupational structure. (Curiously, given his own difficulties in securing adequate housing and later remarks about the strategic importance of having a mafraj, he does not examine the structure of building ownership and use.) He concludes that Manakha has declined economically since the highway was shifted. Furthermore, wealth is unequally distributed both in the town and the surrounding countryside, but local stratification is not structured into corresponding "haves" versus "have-nots" for three sets of reasons. First, unequal access to internal resources (such as cash crops) is obscured by complex relations of production (for example, a given cultivator may own and work some land, assign other land to persons as tenants, and work as a tenant on land which those persons own). Second, unequal access to external resources (such as government subsidies) is seen as gains by some local people without cost to others, part of an ongoing struggle against outside encroachment on local autonomy. And third, another model (based on inequalities of status) is available to "explain" local stratification to local people.

Gerholm reviews how other researchers have interpreted social inequality in Yemen sometimes as a matter of "caste," sometimes as "class." He feels a more productive analysis would focus on the interlocking of three key institutions--the tribe, the sanctuary, and the market. Each of these traditionally was associated with a collection of people (tribesmen, religious specialists, traders and

craftsmen) who exchanged goods and services. For example, the tribesmen, or al-Qubail, constituted the majority population (at least in Zaydi-controlled areas), were organized into groups of villages under the leadership of sheiks, and provided both agricultural surplus and armed protection for others. The religious specialists, or al-Sada, had authority by virtue of their supposed descent from the Prophet and their literacy; they provided religious and political (especially conflict-resolution) services to others. And the third category, al-Naggas, provided market goods and services and were divided into ranked subcategories according to their supposed ancestries and economic specializations. They also had low prestige because they served others and/or handled defiling material (like blood or sewage), but lacked both religious authority and armed strength.

Social change has today blurred this traditional organization: some former Qubail work in the market, others in government service; some Sada act and dress like tribesmen, while others have taken market occupations. Thus, some people exhibit ambiguous characteristics, apparently belonging to overlapping (or liminal) categories of the population. The "oldest and largest of them" (al-'arab) is constituted by former tribesmen who are today more than two-thirds of Manakha's population. The others seem to have originated more recently and are not yet labeled, but all contribute to complexity and innovation in local social organization by emphasizing now one, now another aspect of their identities.

There are three main arenas where such identities are acted out: the mafraj, the market, and the mosque. The mafraj is a large reception room in some houses where men meet to relax, socialize, and chew qat. Social stratification is displayed there by seating order (the most important guests sit on mattresses next to the host, the least

important among the shoes near the door), amount of seating space allocated to participants, paraphenalia brought by participants, and by participant behavior (prestigious ones whisper and politely exchange qat with each other, joke and throw qat to less prestigious ones, who joke roughly among themselves and wait on their "betters"). Social stratification is also enacted in the market, although less obviously: al-Naqqas do the physical work, merchants "socialize" with their fellows and customers, and "elite" stroll about greeting each other and catching up on the news. Finally the mosque, consistent with a religious ideology stressing piety as the only important ranking among believers, is the least obvious arena for displaying social hierarchy. Gerholm notes that there seems to be no organized policy for ordering believers socially, but neither is there one specifically for breaking up the order established outside the mosque. (However, he recognizes that his information about what happens in local mosques is indirect, and perhaps skewed, since he never entered one.)

Thus stratification is Manakha is based on inequalities of status: it is established and reproduced by the ways people think about local social categories, use those categories to guide and interpret behavior in strategic arenas, and organize their social groups. Nonetheless, the basis for such stratification could shift, Gerholm says. First, if conflict increases between local parties of different wealth (rather than among factions uniting rich and poor or between locals and outsiders), then local people may increasingly see stratification related more to inequalities of wealth than to those of status. Second, if a change occurs in local ideology (such as rising religious fundamentalism or reinterpretation of government actions as promotion of a common heritage rather than

domination from the capital), then local inequalities of wealth could become more visible and socially relevant. Or third, persons with a view beyond the local (such as students or workers returned from labor migration) might illuminate alternative paths for others to follow. However, Gerholm is not optimistic about such possibilities, given the local economic decline.

This book is useful for several reasons, including its rich but very readable descriptions, attention to historical and regional variation, and focus on processes producing social organization. For a reader interested in development, there are three particularly good insights. One is an illustration of how different crops can contribute to very different social organizations: coffee fosters the development of a highly centralized, capital-intensive system to dry, store, and ship the product; while qat favors a relatively decentralized, "shoestring" system. Another insight is the indication of potential clashes between development projects seeking to eliminate middlemen in a social system where middlemen insulate producers from the stigma of working in the market. And the third insight is that development efforts channeled through agencies dominated by local "big men" often reconfirm or even aggravate their control of local society.

In addition to strengths, the book also has weaknesses. Gerholm recognizes some of them (never entering a mosque, lack of reliable quantitative information, omission of information on stratification by gender and age). An additional and important one concerns the figures on page 157, which were intended to summarize and clarify the argument. Figure 5 is entitled "The Structure of Yemeni Society"; it in fact shows how Gerholm believes three key institutions (tribe, sanctuary, and market) functioned traditionally. However, the figure omits the status and roles of yet another

institution important both traditionally and today--the state; thus it is inconsistent both with Gerholm's broader discussion and earlier figures. Also, Figure 7 ("Liminal Social Categories") presents a picture where no more than two social categories overlap, but perhaps the most intriguing personage described--"sheik" Hamid Hajar--seems to enact aspects of all three (successful merchant, tribal peacemaker, and righteous protector of the faith).

Halliday, F., Arabia without Sultans: A Political Survey of Instability in the Arab World, Random House, New York, 1975. YEMEN BOOK GENERAL DEVELOPMENT INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY INTRANATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY

Halliday's intent is "to provide a comprehensive analysis of the contemporary Arabian peninsula by presenting and intrepreting information that has, until now, been dispersed or inaccessible." His "anti-capitalist approach" is exemplified by a general introduction to the society and history of the region, a consideration of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states, and more detailed examinations of North Yemen, South Yemen, and Oman. Beginning and concluding chapters relating this focus to the "oil crisis" and Western foreign policies of the mid-1970's also are included. The book is based on limited library research (as manifested by the discussion and sources cited in chapter notes) and on two periods of field research in South Yemen (PDRY) and Oman (Dhofar). The discussion is supplemented by notes, photographs, extensive maps and tables, and several appendices.

The sections of the analysis concentrating on North Yemen look first at conditions under the Imamate. Halliday describes the nature and historical origins of this form of government, as well as the precapitalist economy and society which developed within it; then he examines rule by the Hamid al-Din family and opposition to it from 1918-62. He notes that Zaydi (Shi'a) Muslims supposedly established the Imamate soon after entering Yemen from Iraq in the late ninth century A.D. Since that time Zaydis have predominated in the northern and eastern mountains, while Shaf'i (Sunni) Muslims have been the majority in the west, south, and in many cities. Recognizing that Zaydi-Shaf'i differences have often "constituted the ideological level at

which Yemeni politics was fought out" and that this religious division has had "its own intrinsic dynamic," Halliday also indicates two underlying divisions. The first was social: tribal organization in both Zaydi and Shaf'i areas contributed to constant competition for dominance both within and between them. The second was economic: "the mountain tribes had poorer lands and often relied on raiding the Shafei towns and coastal areas." The Hamid al-Din Imams attempted to control such raiding and competition by centralizing power and authority within their own family (converting the Imamate into a hereditary monarchy, as Peterson 1982 indicates elsewhere in this collection). The regular army was a major agency by which they executed this policy; yet in strengthening it with new weapons and organization, the Hamid al-Din developed an institution ultimately beyond their personal control. In 1962 it turned against them.

Although a small group of army officers under 'Abd Allah Sallal staged the coup, they received backing from tribes and cities in the country, from Yemenis abroad, and from foreign governments. The Yemen Arab Republic (YAR) was established, naming Sallal president and passing several reforms. Halliday divides the coalition supporting the republic into five groups: Sallal and his personal following, pro-Nasser army officers and bureaucrats, merchants and reformers (who later became known as the "Third Force"), some tribes (especially from the Hashid confederation), and a small "left-wing" group (including Communists, Ba'athists, and members of the Movement of Arab Nationalists). Opposing them were the Imam, his family, and tribes they controlled (especially from the Bakil confederation). Both sides also had foreign support: the royalists, from Saudi Arabia (and, at greater remove, from Western powers); the republicans, from Egypt (and, at greater remove, from Eastern powers).

Halliday is particularly insightful in analyzing the paradoxical effects of Egyptian involvement. Rapid and massive Egyptian support sustained the republic in its early days, but the "manipulative and bureaucratic" manner many Egyptians adopted toward Yemenis--excluding them from key decisions and essentially taking control of the war and government--ultimately alienated many republicans. Increasingly those Yemenis who favored Egyptian involvement (like Sallal and the Nasserists) became discredited and lost local support; the Egyptians responded by building up "friendly" tribes and relying on them instead. Thus, when Egypt was defeated by Israel in 1967 and repatriated troops from Yemen in exchange for Saudi subsidies, republican supporters had dwindled to the Third Force, strengthened tribes, and leftists. Royalist forces then besieged the capital; the republicans organized popular militias under leftist leadership and obtained arms via Soviet airlift. The siege was broken after three months, and the royalists withdrew to areas they had controlled previously. Then the republican coalition split over whether a new army should be formed, integrating the militias and instituting other reforms. Third Force and tribal supporters united under General Hassan al-'Amri said no, and over the next year, crushed the leftists. The remaining republican leadership then negotiated with royalist opponents, splitting the Imam and his family from their tribal supporters. Under Saudi patronage an agreement was reached to end the war in 1970, and former royalists (minus the Imam) were integrated into the republican government. Thus the Egyptian support which at first protected the republic ended by transforming it: that support discredited Sallal and the Nasserists, while it enabled the tribes and Third Force to become dominant and find common ground with tribes and foreign governments formerly backing the Imam.

In the period between 1970 and 1975 (when the book was published), the YAR increasingly became a Saudi satellite. Politically this was manifested by Saudi support for various leaders competing to control the Yemeni government and for "anti-communist exiles based in the North" opposing the PDRY. Economically it was shown by subsidies to cover operating expenses of the Yemeni government (plus covert payments to tribal and other leaders) and by the large number of Yemenis allowed to work in Saudi Arabia: probably "the net flow of capital was from the Saudis to the Yemenis in return for definite political benefits and for the future political and economic 'stability' that these promised." Conversely, YAR relations with Communist countries suffered: until 1970 three-fourths of all aid had come from the USSR and China; since then, Soviet commitments to the PDRY have had priority.

Thus the 1962 coup, establishment of the republic, and subsequent civil war can be seen as aspects of a "revolution." Externally, they had consequences Halliday sees as positive: they stimulated anti-imperialist movements in the rest of the Arabian peninsula and partially discredited Nasserism. Internally, they had mixed consequences: they destroyed the former political leadership and opened the country to capitalist transformations; but they also established a coalition of merchants, sheiks, and army officers in power and increased Yemen's dependence on Saudi Arabia. Socio-economic change, intra-elite competition, and recurrent calls for pan-Yemeni unity (including formal promises by the governments of the YAR and PDRY) indicate that this "revolution" may be only part of an ongoing process.

It is difficult to assess the strengths and weaknesses of this book, since its intent surpasses the scope of the present collection. Generally speaking, its greatest strengths are its insights--such as the ones into the

paradoxical role of Egyptian intervention, into how stratification increased both within and between tribes through contacts offering guns and money, or in another context, into how English policies were attacked in South Yemen. (Another strength lying outside the scope of this collection is that the book offers one of very few accounts based on field research in the PDRY and Dhofar.) Conversely, one weakness of the book is the conflicting information it presents. For instance, on page 94 Halliday says that North Yemen has "an area of 75,000 square miles and a population estimated at four million"; on page 98 he says "possibly one million--i.e., 11 per cent--of the whole population" had emigrated; and in Appendix 2 he says that in 1972 North Yemen's area was 74,000 square miles and its population 4,500,000. Perhaps more importantly, he also makes conflicting claims about agriculture in North Yemen. On page 47 he implies no rain-fed agriculture exists there; but on page 147, while speaking directly about North Yemen's agriculture, he says "according to one estimate only 40 per cent of the cultivable 500,000 hectares was being farmed in 1972, <u>and of this only 4 per cent was under irrigation</u>" (underlining <u>not</u> in the original). Given the importance of how water is provided to agriculture, and of agriculture to Yemen's mainly subsistence economy and tribal society, this conflict cripples Halliday's analysis. (See also Swanson 1978 and Swiss Technical Cooperation Service 1978, both abstracted in this collection.) At times, too, he judges before understanding (e.g., his discussion of <u>qat</u> use pays no attention either to participant views or to its functions in local societies) and sometimes his discussion is frankly ethnocentric (e.g., speaking of nomadic and sedentary societies as "stagnant" ones for whom "the advent of capitalism was a progressive development," describing peasants as "sunk in a mire of tribal and religious mysti-

fication," or characterizing 1962 Yemen as "a very horrible place"). Still other criticisms could be made, but they should not obscure the usefulness of this provocative and often penetrating book.

Labaune, P., "Republique Arabe du Yemen et Analyse Systemique ou les Carences d'une Methodologie Confrontee a une Etude de Cas," L'Afrique et l'Asie Modernes, no. 110, pp. 39-49, 1976. YEMEN ARTICLE GENERAL DEVELOPMENT INTRANATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY

Labaune wants to critique an established theoretical model and mode of analysis in political science: "our objective, within the limits of the publication and starting from the systemic theoretical framework offered by David Easton, will be to reveal deficiencies, excesses, or insufficiencies that such an analysis produces when confronted with the specific characteristics" of the YAR. Several notes, references, and a diagram accompany his discussion.

The author first sketches Easton's model, saying it "considers political life like a system, constituted by a particular set of relations, which is in communication with its 'intra- or extra-societal environment' through the mechanism of 'inputs' and 'outputs.'" He presents a diagram by Easton to show how "requirements and supports" from the environment (inputs) are channeled into the political system, where they are transformed into a global reaction (outputs), which both responds to the inputs and feeds back into the environment shaping them. Two important characteristics inhere in this model, Labaune says. One is that the political system is "open" to communication with all other systems, influencing and being influenced by them; and the other is that the system must "have the capacity of reacting to perturbations and thereby adapt itself to the conditions in which it is located."

Then Easton's model is confronted with the empirical case of political life in the YAR. Four problems become apparent: a tendency toward abstraction and generalization, an ethnocentric definition of the political system, a dearth

of communication between that system and the rest of society, and a feeble conception of political changes.

First, while calling the effort to construct general typologies "certainly praiseworthy," Labaune feels this effort is often done without sufficient or critical care being paid to data collection. For example, many systemic analysts "tend to emphasize that which unites a society to the detriment of that which divides it"; in the YAR, data on diversity and conflict--tribal struggles, religous tensions, ongoing battles between royalists and republicans, wars with the PDRY, etc.--are more apparent than data on unity and consensus. Accordingly, theoretical models oriented more toward explaining conflict seem better suited to explaining the Yemeni case.

Second, there are problems with the definition of the political system. Systemic theorists hold, Labaune says, that "the first characteristic of a 'political system' is its capacity to formulate and execute decisions which constrain behavior because they are authoritative." However, the political system in Yemen has at best a partial authority over the society (e.g., the state's legal institutions are little respected by many Yemenis, who prefer customary law); and social systems outside the political one (e.g., lineages, religious brotherhoods, or tribal customs) are often more constraining to Yemeni behavior. In both of these examples, the political system is identified with the formal institutions specialized for politics, such as branches of government or political parties, but Labaune emphasizes that structures not formally part of that system nonetheless do perform political functions. It is the emphasis on an integrative, legitimate, and formally organized "political system" which Labaune finds inappropriate to the Yemeni context and, therefore, ethnocentric.

Third, there is the problem of communication between the

political system and the rest of Yemeni society. While the Easton model posits flows of communication (and other exchanges) between that system and its environment, in Yemen communication between the political system (defined as above) and other social structures and processes is generally limited and sometimes completely lacking.

Fourth, Labaune feels that the systemic model has an extremely limited concept of political change: "the feeble emphasis Easton puts on conflicts destructive to the political system tends...to reduce them to simple tensions to which the political system can bring a remedy." However, political life in Yemen has been replete with struggle, wars, and coups far beyond simple tensions: the YAR has been forced into major transformations on several occasions.

Thus, Labaune finds the systemic approach inappropriate to account for the diversity and decentralization of contemporary Yemen. As an alternative, he suggests "an empirical approach" employing anthropological methods and theoretical concepts from the "pluralist and/or dualist school." though he calls as well for independent verification of its appropriateness for each case.

One strength of this paper is that it follows accepted scientific procedure by confronting a theoretical model with an empirical case. While not a systematic and comprehensive test of all aspects or uses of the model, the effort does call attention to diversity and conflict in Yemeni political life and to difficulties which the systemic model has in dealing with them. Another strength of particular relevance to development is that the paper indicates the importance of an informal sector in Yemeni politics, as others have shown one in Yemeni economy (e.g., see Birks and Sinclair 1982, abstracted in this collection). Perhaps the paper's major weakness lies in not pushing its critique even further: it does a good job in showing how a narrow version of the model (political system equals formal insti-

tutions specialized for politics) is inappropriate for explaining the Yemeni case. However, another horn could be added to the systemic dilemma: if the model were more broadly defined (political system includes formal institutions specialized for politics plus all other structures or processes with political functions), then it could still be faulted because it would not specify in advance what those other structures or processes are in the Yemeni case. If such specification is not made, then the model becomes too general, ad hoc, and ultimately unfalsifiable--therefore unscientific. (A minor criticism of the paper is that Labaune misquotes Chelhod, whose remarks on page 45 actually pertain to the Imam's attempts to impose the Shari'.)

Makhlouf, C., and G. Obermeyer, "Women and Social Change in Urban North Yemen," in Women's Status and Fertility in the Muslim World, ed. J. Allman, pp. 333-47, Praeger, New York, 1978. YEMEN ARTICLE BASIC HUMAN NEEDS STATUS OF WOMEN

In this article the authors consider "both the objective and subjective aspects" of social change concerning women in San'a. They first discuss methods employed to investigate this issue; then provide a very brief historical background to social change in Yemen; and finally examine how the women studied perceive, conceive, and behave toward modernization occurring since 1962. Several tables and notes accompany the discussion.

The main part of the research occurred in summer 1974 in San'a, "which is considered--both by Yemenis and outsiders--as the most traditional urban center in the country." Makhlouf and Obermeyer collected data on two levels (personal and institutional) through participant-observation of female social networks and through "interaction" with women "occupying posts in, and interacting with, modern institutions" like schools and hospitals. Then systematic (and sometimes repeated) interviews were conducted with a sample of forty women, including four who acted as "key informants" by providing special help. "Most" of the forty were in the city's "upper and middle social strata" (which are not defined). The authors recognize this non-random sample cannot be used directly to generalize about women in the YAR, or even in San'a, but they claim it still provides useful information: it is composed of the women who "have been most exposed to change" and whose "behavior is likely to be emulated by others."

As background, Makhlouf and Obermeyer sketch the twentieth-century history of Yemen, emphasizing the country's

isolation. This, in turn, they trace to the disinterest of Western powers and the policies of Imams Yahya and Ahmed. Despite thse factors outside contacts increased, mainly through commerce, importation of modern weapons and military organization, and (in the 1950's) foreign assistance for development programs. Although all governments since the revolution have advocated socio-economic development, much remains to be done: in 1973 two-thirds of the population of San'a were illiterate; and in the whole country there were just 265 physicians, 31 hospitals, and 13 dispensaries. (These numbers take special significance when one realizes that 30 per cent of the physicians, 16 per cent of the hospitals, and 70 per cent of the dispensaries were in the national capital, which in 1975 contained less than 3 per cent of the national population. See Swiss Technical Cooperation Service 1978, abstracted in this collection.)

To investigate how women perceived and conceived of social change, the authors asked a number of them what major changes had occurred in the country since the revolution. Less educated women tended to answer in terms of material things, "facilities and new objects to use within the home"; more educated women responded in terms of broader changes in the society, particularly in sectors like education, health, and the mass media. Makhlouf and Obermeyer then examined these sectors to learn how women were affected by new institutions in them, such as schools, hospitals and clinics, and (though they were not directly involved with the sectors mentioned) a textile factory and commercial firms employing women. All these institutions share important common characteristics: "they are situated outside the home; they are not defined by kinship criteria; and therefore, the woman's role is not a mere reflection of her father's or husband's status." For example, in Yemen's sexually segregated schools women meet persons from outside their kin

groups: they often establish social relationships based on friendship with their classmates, and they sometimes deal with male teachers on a professional basis. Thus, within shools opportunities have been created for different social relationships both among women and between women and men. Also, students may have contact with foreigners, since about one of every five teachers is not a Yemeni. These new opportunities are often signalled by the ways Yemeni women dress and especially by how they use the veil: generally speaking veil use is both declining and becoming more individualized, as women employ different fabrics (some thick, some sheer) and decide where, when, and with whom they will wear them. For instance, one schoolgirl did not veil in class because she saw the teacher as "like her brother." Such changes have not received universal support, of course: rumors have been spread, allegedly by groups like the Muslim Brothers, linking girls' schooling with sexual permissiveness, and some parents still force daughters to leave school before they want to.

Makhlouf and Obermeyer choose not interpret these changes as access to a "public" sphere of activities hiterto closed to Yemeni women: first, because women traditionally entered the public sphere to visit each other; and second, because access to the new institutions is stratified, so "middle and upper strata" have more chance to use emerging opportunities than women (or men) in other strata do.

Such emerging opportunities for (some) women are correlated with changes in traditional patterns. Cleavages are developing within women's housework and visiting networks: the educated tend to interact more with each other than with the uneducated; the younger, more with each other than with the older. Furthermore, as women become increasingly involved with modern institutions, they participate both less and less often in traditional activities. For women working in schools, medical facilities, or companies, the

domestic sphere becomes a part of their lives over which outside employment sometimes takes precedence. The traditional emphasis on kinship unity across skill and age levels is increasingly undermined, while the experience of family and social life formerly shared across broad categories of women becomes ever more differentiated and specialized.

A major strength of this article is its insightful consideration of the emerging opportunities that have been created by new institutions (especially those providing education and health care) and of the consequent divisions growing among Yemeni women, both within their traditional organizations and between the traditional and modern ones. Also, the authors' clear discussion of methods employed in the study is useful. Conversely, more information should have been provided about San'a as the setting for study. For example, one wonders how much of the town's "traditional" reputation is due to its status as a predominantly Shaf'i town in a predominantly Zaydi region, but no data whatsoever are presented about women's religious affiliations. Also, perhaps following from its current role as national capital, many of the new institutions are concentrated in San'a, and this concentration in itself is plausibly a factor influencing the trends. Finally, the remarks predicting that "the emergence of role-specific relations <u>is bound to make</u> it/i.e., veiling/ lose its importance" (underlining <u>not</u> in the original) should be reconsidered. Veiling seems a complex "signal" produced by many factors, not simply by role specificity, as is shown by the resurgence of veiling and new attention to "Islamic dress" which have accompanied modernization in several Arab countries.

Peterson, J., Yemen--The Search for a Modern State, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, MD, 1982. YEMEN BOOK GENERAL DEVELOPMENT INTRANATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY

The goal of this book is to analyze political changes and continuities in twentieth-century Yemen. Peterson's method is to describe, compare, and contrast two major periods in Yemeni history--the rule of the Hamid al-Din dynasty (especially after 1918) and the development of the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR) since the revolution in 1962. The book is based on research conducted during six months of residence in the YAR, a "slightly shorter period" in the United Kingdom, and several visits to other (unnamed) Middle Eastern states. The discussion is supplemented by many notes and tables, a glossary of Arabic terms, a chronology of major events (1918-81), a partially annotated bibliography of useful sources, and an index.

The author first sketches a background for the discussion by describing Yemeni geography and the economic, social, and political organizations which have been associated with it. From coastal plains, Yemen first rises to central highlands, then recedes into interior deserts. The intersection of this topography with climate produces moisture sufficient for cultivation mainly in an L-shaped mountainous region from 'Asir in the north to 'Ibb in the south to Hadramaut in the east. The highest and most rugged of these mountains lie within the YAR; there 87 per cent of the population reside in communities numbering under 1000 inhabitants. The majority grow mostly subsistence crops, though coffee has been an important export and qat and food for market are becoming increasingly so. These cultivators generally have been organized into autonomous sets of villages led by sheiks, who in turn allied themselves into "tribal confederations." (In areas more subject to outside influences, such as along the coast and in the south, stratification by

wealth is more pronounced, with sheiks large landowners and ordinary tribesmen their tenants.) Only six towns number more than 10,000 inhabitants, and the modern commercial and industrial sector is concentrated within the triangle of paved roads linking Hudayda, San'a, and Ta'izz (major port, capital, and second largest city, respectively).

The YAR's dispersed settlements and terraced mountains also foster religious diversity: Zaydi Muslims predominate in the north and east, Shaf'is in the west and south, and Isma'ilis are located in the western mountains and along the northern border. Until 1948 a minority community of Jews also lived in the country.

A traditional polity associated with this socio-economic base was the Zaydi Imamate, established when northern tribes invited a Sayyid (pl. Sada, "descendants of the Prophet") to reside among them and mediate their disputes at the end of the ninth century A.D. Imams following were elected from among the Sada by Zaydi religious authorities and acted both as religious leaders and heads of state. The latter role, however, was limited within the Zaydi community to mediation among the tribes: "their strongest claim to political authority came only in leading the tribes in jihad or holy war against non-Zaydis, and physical control of non-Zaydi territory ultimately rested on the Imamate's power of coercion." (One can argue, accordingly, that Imams had a political interest in continuing religious conflict: either they led the state against non-Zaydis or their political role was reduced.)

When Yahya Hamid al-Din became the Imam, the Zaydi state controlled only the northern highlands of the present YAR. Its major opponents included the Ottoman Turks, who controlled the central and western areas, and the British, who influenced large areas of the south from their base at Aden. In 1911 the Turks were forced to conclude a treaty

with the Imam, recognizing a Zaydi state and accepting his authority over co-religionaries residing in Turkish-controlled areas. In 1918, Yahya's authority and power were enhanced still further, as the Turks withdrew and named the Imamate legitimate inheritor of the regions and institutions they had governed. From then until 1934, the Imam followed two major policies: externally he sought to unite all Yemenis under Zaydi leadership; internally he sought to transform the Imamate into a hereditary monarchy. His external policy encountered initial success but later containment. By 1934 expansion to the south was halted by border skirmishes and a treaty generally extending the Ottoman-British demarcation line into the desert. To the north, a war was lost in the same year to the emergent Saudi Arabia; a treaty was signed fixing the border south of 'Asir and Najran. Conversely, Yahya's internal policy culminated in success: he gained increasing control of the state by installing his family as heads of institutions like the army and administration, by vigorously suppressing opponents, and by attempting to isolate Yemen from foreign contacts. Despite stiff opposition, Zaydi religious authorities were forced to accept the principle of hereditary succession to the office of Imam by the late 1930's. When Yahya was killed in 1948 during a coup by a coalition of modernist and relgious opponents, his son Ahmed became Imam and reconquered the capital with tribal support. From then until his own death in 1962, he generally followed his father's example by concentrating power under his personal authority. There were some changes of degree: foreign contacts increased (as evidenced by American, Chinese, and Soviet development projects); supportive Sada were incorporated into higher levels of the administration; and the army was strengthened. Ultimately, however, these policies were insufficient: one week after Ahmed's son Badr inherited

the office of Imam, the army rose, abolished the Imamate, and established a republic under the leadership of former Air Commander Sallal.

Badr escaped the attempt on his life, rallied royalist support among the tribes in the north, and sought Saudi aid. The republicans enacted some reforms (e.g., abolition of slavery and confiscation of Hamid al-Din property) and kept control of the capital, the south, and the coast with Egyptian help. As the civil war developed, both sides fragmented into "moderate" and "radical" factions, lost effective presence on the local level in the areas they "controlled," and increasingly became proxies of their respective foreign patrons. To the south, British forces occupying the Aden Protectorate came under mounting pressure from national liberation movements based along the YAR border.

In 1967 Egypt was badly defeated by Israel; at Khartoum the following fall, it agreed to withdraw all forces from Yemen in exchange for Saudi subsidies to cover revenues lost by closure of the Suez Canal. After the withdrawal, President Sallal was replaced by a republican governing council. To the south, the last British forces left Aden and a People's Republic of South Yemen was established. In the YAR royalist forces mounted a seige of the capital. After it was broken they withdrew, and "moderates" on both sides maneuvered to marginalize "radicals." In 1970 a conference in Saudi Arabia laid the ground rules for an end to hostilities; two months later "moderate" royalists were included in the YAR government headed by "moderate" republican 'Abd al-Rahman al-Iryani.

The formal reconciliation, of course, did not resolve all problems. Externally, relations with South Yemen deteriorated: the government there changed its name to the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY), and each government supported guerilla movements against the other. In 1972

their armies became involved, leading to fighting ended only by an Arab summit. At another meeting two months later, the two governments promised to work toward unification but the promise was not kept. Internally, the position of the YAR state relative to the tribes had weakened. Sheiks, whether allied nominally to royalists or republicans, had avoided control by a strong central government for several years. Some were still receiving subsidies from outside powers (especially Saudi Arabia), and most did not wish to surrender their enhanced autonomy. Conversely, increasing numbers of technocrats entered the national government, seeking to strengthen political institutions and promote basic socio-economic changes. Struggles developed within the Iryani government between sheiks and technocrats, between "traditionalists" and "modernists," with the army acting as final arbiter.

In 1974 this de facto situation was made explicit by a military coup which named Colonel Ibrahim al-Hamdi as head of state. Peterson generally speaks well of Hamdi, stressing his clever maneuvers to eliminate rivals for national power and his support for various aspects of socio-economic development. For example, he says that Hamdi strongly supported the Local Development Associations both before and after he took power. At least one of these associations dates back to the 1950's but most began during the republic, with a big surge occurring in the early 1970's. Modeled on traditional charitable societies, LDAs are autonomous bodies, locally or regionally based, which function as intermediaries between the population and the government. They often coordinate local efforts to build access roads, establish water systems, or construct educational and health facilities. They secure financing for such programs either from the government or from their own budgets, which are funded by local taxes and a share of national customs duties.

LDAs also function as parapolitical bodies, as when they mediate local disputes. They are organized into a national confederation (Hamdi became its president in 1973), but individual member associations tend to go their own way. In part this results from their heterogeneous patterns of formation and operation: some LDAs are "grass-roots cooperatives"; others function more as vehicles for the advancement of their officers. (Gerholm 1977, abstracted in this collection, discusses briefly an LDA dominated by local "big men"--sheiks and would-be sheiks.) Hamdi's support for the national confederation cooled in 1975, after his slate of candidates did not succeed in dominating the organization. Another sign of Hamdi's support of development efforts was his backing of technocrats in the national government, especially those in the Central Planning Organization. Under his patronage, a Five-Year Plan (1975/76-1980/81) was promulgated, stressing four areas: education and vocational training, expansion of the physical infrastructure, development of productive sectors in agriculture and industry, and fiscal reform. Here too, however, Hamdi's support was conditional to the broader political context. He antagonized technocrats by shifting their unofficial leader from the Ministry of Development to that of Education. This in turn antagonized "traditionalists" opposed to the new Minister's "modernist" reforms in curricula. In addition to such internal matters, Hamdi's overtures to the PDRY concerned the Saudi government. In October 1977 Hamdi and his brother were assassinated in San'a and a former ally, Ahmed al-Ghashmi, assumed control.

This new change of government contributed little: "the few short months of the Ghashmi regime were characterized by a growing conservative trend, emphasis on day-to-day survival, and the abrupt grinding to a halt of the development process." One lingering effect of the regime was

the appointment of a People's Constitutent Assembly which elected Ghashmi president of the YAR, thus legitimating the military fait accompli. However, Ghashmi was blown up eight months after taking power under circumstances still not fully clear: at the time he was receiving a messenger from the president of the PDRY, himself overthrown and executed two days later.

In the YAR, the Assembly chose Lt. Col. 'Ali 'Abd Allah Salih as new president. Internal dissent and border frictions culminated in new fighting with the PDRY in 1979. After two months in which YAR forces got the worse of it, another truce was arranged: the YAR was to make internal changes and both governments would again work toward unification. Nonetheless, Salih ignored some of the changes called for and "balanced" others by making additional ones favoring the "traditionalists." Also, as with similar promises in 1972, little unity developed between the YAR and PDRY. Salih's maneuvers proved successful for the short run; however, he has yet to deal "with the more substantial and, in the long run, far more important issues of legitimacy and development, both in political and socioeconomic terms."

Peterson concludes his account by listing "dilemmas for the 1980's": obstacles to national cohesion and YAR responses to them. The obstacles may be grouped into those concerning the state itself (such as financial constraints, institutional underdevelopment, discontinuous leadership resulting from political rivalries and violence) and those concerning the internal and external contexts of the state (continuing tribal power, "radicalization" of the southern regions, opposition both to particular governments and to the system of government, and foreign pressures). The responses have included military government, an alliance between officers and technocrats, glorification of personal charisma, and a politics of manipulation and balance. With these

conditions, "only the resilience and adaptability of the Yemeni people" give Peterson a "cautious optimism" about the future of the YAR.

This book provides a good overview of recent Yemeni history, especially by identifying important personalities and relating political structures to their contexts. However, it might have more closely approached its goal had it ended with a summary comparing and contrasting the two periods on which discussion was focused. That is, instead of outlining obstacles and responses, Peterson might have emphasized similarities and differences between the Hamid al-Din Imamate and the YAR. Among the similarities, for example, is that the two polities existed on only part of what most Yemenis feel to be Yemen. Another similarity is that in both cases politics occurred primarily among fragmented elites, with few legitimate institutions and with the economy and society largely outside their control. The major difference, on the other hand, is that the YAR seems to have made some progress toward fostering legitimate institutions (such as Local Development Associations) and promoting socio-economic development (such as educational and fiscal reforms). While other criticisms might be raised (e.g., inexplicit criteria for categorizing persons as "'reasonably' apolitical"), the lack of a summary systematically relating the discussion to its original goal is the most important one.

Stevenson, T., Kinship, Stratification, and Mobility: Social Change in a Yemeni Highlands Town, Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Wayne State University, 1981. YEMEN DISSERTATION-THESIS GENERAL DEVELOPMENT INTRANATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY SOCIAL ORGANIZATION AND STRUCTURE

The goal of this dissertation is to study changes in the social organization of 'Amran, a rapidly growing town of some 6000 north of San'a. The author first describes a typical day in the community and indicates how local people view their history. Then he compares how they talk about local social organization with how they actually behave toward each other, concluding that major gaps between the "ideal model" and "social reality" both result from and permit social change. And finally, he considers how local people reconcile the ideal and the reality by employing variable standards, linking his remarks particularly to results of an election for the advisory council of a development association. The discussion is based on nineteen months of field research in 1978-79, when the author was accompanied by his wife, herself an anthropologist studying women. Supplementing the discussion are several tables and charts, two maps, a glossary of Arabic terms, a bibliography, and an autobiographical statement.

Social order in 'Amran, Stevenson says, traditionally was conceived in terms of a "formal ascriptive model" linking three institutions--the tribe, the market, and the sanctuary or "sacred enclave." Associated with these institutions were endogamous social categories of local people (tribesmen, market people, and religious specialists, respectively) who were "ranked not in terms of wealth but descent." According to the model, tribesmen provided protection in exchange for the religious and political services of Sada ("descendants of the Prophet"), who were

treated with respect, and in exchange for the economic goods and services of walad al-suq ("children of the market"), who were treated with disdain. Among the market people, in turn, were ranked endogamous subcategories associated with various occupations, suchaas merchants, craftsmen, etc. (See also Chelhod 1970 and Gerholm 1977, abstracted in this collection.)

Some of Stevenson's most interesting comments focus on the internal structure and political functions of tribal segments. For instance, he says that "minimal agnatic groups" (asra, like Chelhod's 'usra) ally with others to form a habl ("cord"), which functions corporately as a political action agoup. Thus it exacts vengeance for a crime perpetrated on any member and is jointly responsible for any crimes a member commits. The leader of the habl generally is "the senior male of the wealthiest minimal group." When such groups are related patrilineally to each other, the habl is a kin-based group much like a lineage; when they are unrelated, it is a contract-based group. (Thus, the term habl has a dual reference, much like the term 'asaba in Ibn Khaldun's usage.) Whichever its basis, a habl may unite with others to form coalitions, with the most powerful among them acting as core and its leader functioning as head of the whole. Even within tribal structure, then, mechanisms exist to incorporate unrelated groups. Whereas relationships are established and maintained between tribesmen and nontribal groups by exchanges of protection for services, relationships within the tribe may be so by mutual exchanges of political support. Thus, similar processes produces very different relationships, depending upon what resources local people exchange (or are allowed to exchange).

The traditional model of 'Amrani social organization ascribed occupations on the basis of social status. Stevenson

presents a table listing various ranks within the market people (where divisions, from itinerant "messenger" to "merchant," apparently were most specialized and rigid), tribesmen (subdivided essentially by wealth within their common status as warrior/cultivators), and religious specialists (who included two achieved statuses--"learned man" and "legal expert"--among subdivisions essentially emphasizing wealth). Within such status divisions, then, wealth was a significant defining feature. With job opportunities opening in Saudi Arabia from the late 1960's on, and severe droughts in the early and middle 1970's, many 'Amranis left traditional occupations for work abroad. Agriculture was particularly hard hit (see also Gerholm 1977 and Swanson 1978, abstracted in this collection). Having accumulated new capital, skills, and attitudes, returning migrants often bought rental property and/or established shops. A key operation in this process was the redefinition of market affiliation: no longer was association itself defiling; now the manner of association determined one's status. Stevenson was told that "it was not really shameful to be in the suq, that the difference between tribesmen and walad al-suq centered on their attitudes toward money": the tribesman "simply took his share," getting a fair payment for his work, but market people "charged high prices because of a love of money." Accordingly, economic changes associated with labor migration and expansion of imports reinforced some aspects of the traditional system (e.g., stratification by wealth) but transformed others (e.g., stigma of market association).

Related transformations occurred in relationships within more purely social domains, like kinship and marriage. Stratum endogamy is still the rule, but emigrant remittances have exploded bridewealth. From the 25-40 MT that it generally took to get married "in the time of the Imam," payments climbed to 1000 Yemeni Riyals by 1967. Young

'Amrani men then formed an organization that pressured the government successfully, and bridewealth was "guaranteed" at 400 YR for several years. Later it was allowed to rise to 600 YR; then regulations fining violators were enforced less and less. In 1976, payments had reached 8-10,000 YR; when Stevenson began fieldwork in 1978, the going rate was 30,000 YR; and by the time he left in July 1979, it had reached 50-60,000 YR. Whereas bridewealth traditionally came primarily from the groom's family, now most of the responsibility is on his shoulders. Those who do not migrate to Saudi Arabia have increasing difficulty in finding spouses. As with economic specializations, parts of the traditional system (e.g., stratum endogamy) have been maintained, while others (e.g., bridewealth) have been transformed.

Translating these continuities and changes into effects on social organization, Stevenson considers how 'Amranis now measure each other's status. He says they "tend to apply one of the following three variables: wealth, ancestry, or affiliations." The criterion they emphasize "is related to the desire, put simply, to make themselves look good": a poor tribesman will rank a wealthy merchant by ancestry, while the merchant will place the tribesman by wealth. An alternative way to capture how such variables are employed by a broad spectrum of 'Amranis, Stevenson feels, is to analyze the election held in 1978 for the district's cooperative development board. Between one and two thousand men met in the town to elect 'Amran's 24 representatives. The procedure involved calling for nominations from the crowd and countring the show of hands for each candidate. The 24 men with the most votes were elected. Stevenson presents a table listing unofficial results "gathered from informants and the <u>qadi</u> who presided." (He was not permitted to copy the official totals.) Eleven men were chosen "unanimously," and the lowest successful candidates

received 94 votes apiece. Their average age was only 33, but "they maintain a low-key, hard-working image"; two-thirds of them were tribesmen, a quarter were merchants, and only one was a Sayyid; and slightly over a third had "obvious, although sometimes limited, connections with central government ministries." In terms of these results, then, it seems that social standing is based on a combination of factors: traditional social status remains significant; behavior associated with higher traditional statuses, also; "however, wealth, connections with influential outsiders, education, and a certain kind of worldliness have become important."

This work is useful in providing another perspective on how the interaction of tribe, market, and hijra are changing today. Stevenson's insights into processes of tribal organization are interesting and suggest ways of combining explanations of stratification and kinship. Also, the wealth of detail presented gives a rich account of everyday life in a town that is truly _'amran_. Conversely, perhaps the greatest problem with the work is Stevenson's accounts of local views. He provides examples of what some local people say about a matter, then his own view of what they do. He does not generate hypotheses about local views which are then tested in an explicit and replicable manner. Accordingly, it is not clear whether, or how much, what Stevenson says local people think is in fact "their model," nor how such models might vary across social categories in the community.

Swanson, J., Emigration and Economic Development: The Case of the Yemen Arab Republic, Westview Press, Boulder, CO, 1979. YEMEN BOOK GENERAL DEVELOPMENT INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY POPULATION MIGRATION

Based on nineteen months of fieldwork in 1973-74, this book explores "the consequences of massive labor export" from rural areas by comparing current models of emigration against data from three villages in the southern highlands and from information available on the YAR more generally. Swanson surveys the literature on emigration; sketches the geography, climate, and history of Yemen; considers Yemeni agriculture; describes the history and patterns of migration from the region; analyzes consequences of present labor migration for development in the YAR; and speculates about alternative actions which might improve the situation. His discussion is supplemented by several figures, a list of references, an index, an outline map of the research area, and an appendix contrasting the author's fieldwork strategies with more traditional ones in anthropology.

Within the literature of emigration, Swanson focuses on studies considering effects of labor migration on "sending societies." Such studies may be divided into "theoretical" ones (mostly by economists) and "empirical" ones (by a variety of social scientists). Theoretical studies have considered the process generally, indicating that it often improves standards of living for migrants and their families but may have positive, neutral, or negative consequences for long-term development of sending societies. Empirical studies, conversely, have focused on data from specific countries and sorted consequences for sending societies into four categories. The first is labor loss, which in turn may produce benefits (like lowered unemployment) or deficits (like lower production or lower skill levels in

the workforce remaining). Second is repatriated earnings (remittances) from labor migrants, which generally are used to raise levels of consumption (food, clothing, housing, etc.) for the migrants' families, although some funds also may be invested in more specifically productive activities. Third are repatriated ideas and/or attitudes which the migrants transmit or bring back home, which again may have mixed results for societal development. And fourth are repatriated skills, as when returned migrants employ at home the skills they learned abroad.

Before applying these categories to migration from Yemen, the author provides background information about the region. He indicates that modern Yemen is divided among three countries--Saudi Arabia, the YAR, and the PDRY. In the YAR (where the study is focused), central highlands receive moisture sufficient for cultivation from summer monsoons but are bracketed by arid zones on the east and west. The rugged terrain of the highlands has fostered local autonomy by sustaining marginal agriculture and by reducing central government control often to arbitrating between neighboring groups (as was the case during much of the Imamate). Furthermore, the area's geographic isolation and relative paucity of resources helped to discourage its domination by outsiders, though Ottoman Turks invaded and held parts of the country twice, and the British exerted important influence (especially economic) from their base at Aden. Following abolition of the Imamate, a civil war ensued in which Egyptians and Saudis backed opposing sides. Ultimately the Egyptians withdrew, commercial and tribal interests were integrated into the republican government, and efforts have been made to develop the country under the de facto suzerainty of Saudi Arabia.

Several of these development efforts have been oriented toward agriculture. Traditional Yemeni agriculture was

mostly for subsistence, a mixed regime of animal raising and grain cultivation. Cattle were the animals most prized, followed by goats and sheep, but today there are fewer herds because little labor is available to guard them. Sorghum has been and remains the favored grain because it provides a dependable crop and fodder; corn (maize) often provides more crop and fodder but is also more sensitive to drought; barley and wheat are grown but provide no fodder. Both sorghum and corn may be made into 'asid, the traditional midday dish, and cereals provide almost three-quarters of the calories and protein in the average daily diet. This diet apparently creates serious deficiencies in children and contributes to a high number of infant deaths, which "averaged 73 per cent" for children under two years. A few cash crops also are grown under irrigation in the area where Swanson did fieldwork. Leeks and radishes are cultivated for humans, alfalfa for animals. And then there is qat. Swanson effectively sketches the manner of consumption, psycho-chemical effects, and social functions of the plant, but he emphasizes its economic characteristics. "Qat is an extremely desireable crop for a variety of reasons": first, it provides high profit; second, it demands minimal labor; and third, its price appreciates rapidly with inflation in other costs. There are only two drawbacks for growers: qat requires irrigation to flourish and it is extremely sensitive to frost.

Accordingly, "micro-ecological differences in the envronmentally diverse highlands" play a key role in cultivation of qat and, to a lesser degree, other crops. For instance, the three villages Swanson studied intensively are populated mainly by "middle peasants," who own privately the land they (sometimes) work. However, the villages differ appreciably in ecology: village A is at an altitude of 7-8000 feet among terraces which receive abundant rain and which support mostly

sorghum or corn but little qat because of frequent frosts; village B is lower at 6500 feet, among terraces receiving less rain and having less soil, so sorghum and corn are intercropped while some qat is cultivated on marginal land; and village C is in a broad valley with plentiful soil and irrigation water plus protection from frost, allowing intercropping of sorghum and corn and extensive cultivation of qat.

Agriculture thus has been and continues to be important in rural Yemen; however, labor migration also has a long history there and recently it has taken massive proportions, sometimes even exceeding agriculture as major source of income. Swanson first considers two theories of ancient migration which emphasize "push" factors (limited land plus growing population, major climatic change in the region) to the neglect of "pulls" (e.g., the attraction of better opportunities). Then he examines modern labor migration from the region in terms of two phases--one dating from the establishment of Western outposts, first at Aden and later at Djibouti, and going all over the world until the early 1970's; and the other starting in the late 1960's and still going to Saudi Arabia and the Gulf. Both these phases involved mostly men, "sojurners" who spend much of "their lives abroad but maintain their orientation toward their home country" by sending back remittances, preserving ties, and planning to return permanently. The two phases have differed in the numbers of people involved as well as in their destinations and durations: the former amounted to a trickle; the latter, a flood. Citing a reference not listed in his bibliography, Swanson claims that 19 per cent of the total population of the YAR in 1975 was working abroad. (However, according to the Swiss Technical Cooperation Service 1978, abstracted in this collection, a more accurate but still enormous figure would be 13 per cent of the total population.)

Both the earlier and present phases of modern migration have been highly patterned. For instance, much of it has

been "chain" migration, where men follow others from their family, village, or region to a specific location where the predecessors can provide support. Also, the wakil mughtaribin ("emigrants' agent") has played an important role linking those abroad with those back home: the agent uses a wide network of social relations to arrange economic, political, and social matters for emigrants on a fee-for-service basis. This pivotal role may be abused, and agents are seen with a mixture of suspicion and envy as "necessary evils" much like "the Western attitude toward lawyers." Finally, migrants have tended to follow a strategy of "work hard, keep quiet, and save" while abroad, minimizing expenses so they can spend at home. One indication of this strategy was a more than fourfold increase in currency remitted to the YAR within three years--from the equivalent of $124.7 million in 1972 to $522.8 million in 1975.

As a result of such remittances, imports have zoomed and the country's balance of payments has a large surplus, while exports of goods have increased only minimally at best. However, when examined closely, the effects of this boom are decidedly mixed. For example, at the time of study Yemenis seemed to be eating better, dressing better, and building better housing; and the population was rising in response to better health and nutrition. In rural areas, costs of production inputs (labor, land. etc.) were increasing rapidly, but returns for agricultural goods (except qat) were increasing only modestly. Contrary to economic models of emigration's effects on sending societies, labor loss was not leading to consolidation of landholdings or, in most cases, to mechanization of production. Because land had symbolic as well as production value to them, owners were using remittances to maintain unprofitable holdings and to press legal suits contesting sales in which they had interests. Furthermore, the technology available for mechanization (mainly tractors and irrigation equipment) was not appropriate for

most terraces in villages A and B; only in village C could such capital-intensive equipment be put to good use, especially for growing qat. Accordingly, costs were escalating faster than returns, land was falling out of production, and foreign food imports were skyrocketing. (An interesting correlation to this process concerned sharecroppers, who were able to demand both larger shares and better land for their work, thereby tending to level economic differences within the village societies where they lived.) Emigrant remittances, given limited investment possibilities in rural (and urban) areas plus technology inappropriate for the ecological diversity of local agriculture, were driving Yemeni society to higher levels of consumption while undercutting local production and making the country ever more dependent on foreign goods as well as on foreign jobs. Banks and government institutions, instead of counteracting this trend, were caught up in it: 71 per cent of the loans from the Central Bank of Yemen went to finance imports and exports; 3 per cent to support industrialization, and the rest to "contractors, transport, and services." Furthermore, the government had a vested (short-term) interest in the trend, since over 80 per cent of its revenues "are derived from indirect taxes of which the largest share comes from import duties."

In conclusion, Swanson's predictions about the YAR's future are as grim as his assessment of its present: "Yemen's only hope of breaking out of this trap is to restrict imports, promote local industrialization, and limit emigration." Recognizing that such a program would not be popular nor even "economically rational" in the short run, he sees only a worse alternative: "to do nothing, however, is to resign Yemen to continued underdevelopment and increasing dependency, for as agricultural production declines, population increases, and Saudi labor demands level off, conditions in Yemen will begin to deteriorate, leaving the country no better off than

before the great migration boom."

This book is a trenchantly-written, insightful assessment of the effects of labor migration on development in the YAR. It considers various aspects of the situation (theoretical models, geographic and historical background, Yemeni agriculture and emigration, and the current result of their interaction) generally at a national level, though it illustrates points by relevant local cases: both in fieldwork methodology and in the book resulting from it, Swanson seems to address economists and developers more than other anthropologists. All this is not to say that the book is without problems. Aside from those mentioned previously (citing sources not listed in the bibliography, inaccurate figures for total population and emigrants), there seem to be two major weaknesses, both of which may be linked to a lack of information in depth on the local level. First is that Swanson conceives of improvements in standards of living mainly as increases in consumption (leading to better health, higher population, etc.). However, these improvements also have a crucial social consequence--namely, establishing and reinforcing networks of social ties which supply "welfare" benefits when persons are unemployed, sick, or old. Thus, emigrants are strengthening their traditional "safety net" by supporting increased consumption. (An interesting index of this function might have been furnished by the record of bridewealth payments over the period of emigration boom; see also Cohen and Lewis 1979, abstracted in this collection, for similar remarks.) Second, Swanson sees Yemen's future in very restricted terms: either establishing a strong central government and industrial development or doing nothing. Neither of these alternatives seems realistic or prudent: Yemeni historical experience with earlier attempts to create a strong central government led to painful consequences, and the difficulties of the PDRY (economic deficiencies, political opposition) probably will not be tempting either. Furthermore,

an emphasis on industrialization would neglect Yemen's potential comparative advantages in agriculture. Swanson correctly analyzes the problems in rural development: Yemen has had a mainly labor-intensive agriculture and is encountering difficulties in shifting toward a more capital-intensive one, mostly because of insufficient investment opportunities and inappropriate technology. Yet his discussion suggests many alternatives: Yemenis prefer locally-raised meat, so why not attempt a capital-intensive meat production system like feedlots; some areas are well watered but subject to frost and erosion, so why not convert them to raising animal feed or forests; etc. In short, Swanson's diagnosis of emigration ills is persuasive, but the cure he recommends is not.

Swiss Technical Cooperation Service, Final Report on the Airphoto Interpretation Project of the Swiss Technical Cooperation Service, The Servie, Zurich, 1978. YEMEN PROJECT URBANISM HOUSING AND CONSTRUCTION POPULATION OTHER

In February 1975, the government of the YAR conducted the country's first population and housing census; in autumn of the same year it signed an agreement with the Swiss government concerning an "Airphoto Interpretation Project" to complement that census. The project had two major concentrations. it was to check the accuracy of the census through making field surveys and interpreting airphotos of selected districts; and it was to process the census data by tabulating final totals, making various maps and charts, and publishing a final report to summarize project results. This final report is organized in two sections: one presents countrywide findings, and one describes the field surveys undertaken in four different regions of the country. The discussion is extensively supplemented by maps, photographs, tables, drawings and diagrams, a glossary of abbreviations used in the text, an explanation of the Arabic-English transliteration system employed, and a bibliography of sources for further information.

To check the census, three per cent of the questionnaires from each province and the three largest cities (San'a, Ta'izz, and Hudayda) were chosen randomly from the total, processed completely, and their results were projected for each province and city. Then field surveys were undertaken in three districts --one each in the southern highlands, northern highlands, and coastal plain. When the actual counts of these surveys were compared with the projections from random samples, census results proved to be only two to five per cent below the actual counts. Because of this high level of accuracy, the YAR

government used the random samples as a database for constructing the 1975/76-1980/81 development plan while processing and final tabulation was occurring for the remaining questionnaires. (Ten additional field surveys were done by the Swiss team in the eastern midlands and desert, where no census enumeration had taken place but the government had estimated the population.)

The countrywide findings of the project are organized by physical settings and cultural patterns. Sections on physical settings, for example, detail the geology, climate, vegetation, and hydrography of Yemen's tropical coast, tropical to semitropical western midlands, temperate highlands, and semitropical eastern midlands and desert. Cultural patterns, conversely, are discussed in terms of agriculture, formal administrative hierarchies, demography, labor force, education, housing, and residential patterns. For example, the total population is the YAR in 1975 was found to be 4,705,336; while approximately 385,000 short-term, and an estimated 250,000 long-term, emigrants were working abroad. (Both total population and emigrants had earlier been estimated much higher, even by the YAR Central Planning Organization: see Swanson 1978, abstracted in this collection.) Within the country, 73 per cent of the labor force was in agriculture and fishing, 8 per cent in construction and industry, and 19 per cent in commerce, transport, government, and other services. Seventy-four per cent of the males and ninety-eight per cent of the females were illiterate. Housing types varied appreciably by region, but emigrant remittances had produced a construction boom across the country and soaring rents in the cities. Finally, settlements were highly dispersed: 11 per cent of the population lived in cities (defined as settlements having 2000 or more inhabitants); 75 per cent, in communities of 500 or less.

One of the strengths of this book is its understanding

of the implications of population dispersal for development in the YAR: the authors share the government's concern about constraints imposed by a population widely distributed across a rugged and variable landscape; however, they balance the concern by recognizing that dispersal has spared the YAR problems of uncontrolled urbanization often found in developing countries--bad water, no sewers, poor housing, etc. Yemen's mainly rural communities have achieved impressive attainments, in agriculture and architecture especially, and local development associations may provide a means toward further social change by and for local people. But the government has a role, too: "only a thoroughly balanced development of the densely populated rural areas and a decentralization of the forthcoming small industries can avoid an increased exodus of population from the rural settlements to the few cities."

Conversely, one of the weaknesses of the book is the lack of information on religious and/or stratificational categories: nowhere is information on population or housing organized by such categories, and the only data on them at all is presented indirectly (e.g., by information about the _'akhdam_ on the coastal plain). Also the book provides no information whatsoever on levels or distributions of income and/or wealth. Although these topics may be divisive and politically sensitve, they are certainly relevant to population and housing. Despite these weaknesses, however, the book is valuable both as a handbook of basic data on population, housing, and related matters and as a source of descriptions which can be use to guide future research.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY, ABSTRACTS, AND RESEARCHERS ON TUNISIA

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INTRODUCTION

This report on Tunisia is the fourth of a series that includes others on Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and Yemen (San'a). Each report focuses on socio-cultural and political-economic aspects of development and consists of a bibliography, abstracts, a list of researchers, and recommendations about which bibliographic sources might be distributed to USAID offices.

The bibliography in the current report includes 124 articles, 28 books, 74 dissertation-theses, 11 host-government documents, 23 projects, and 9 other sources. There are a total of 269 entries: 163 of them are in English, 101 in French, and 5 in Arabic. Thirty-five of the total were produced before 1970; 234 since then.

The twenty abstracts were made from sources selected according to four criteria. The contract for this project stipulates that sources chosen should be "of high quality," "empirically based," and "relevant to development." The first of these criteria was taken to concern formal considerations (such as consistency and comprehensiveness); the second, substantive considerations (such as testing hypotheses or at least clearly relating claims to data); and the third, addressing "basic needs." To these interpretations was added the criterion of balance, both in topics and in perspectives, so that all twenty sources selected would not concern a single subject area or viewpoint. Sources chosen for abstracting, then, were judged according to these four criteria and rated highly on all or most of them. For this reason we recommend that, funds permitting, all twenty be duplicated and distributed to relevant USAID offices. (The unpublished paper by Stambouli may be requested from the author.)

The list of researchers was composed from the authors of sources in the bibliography. Information about their addresses, topics of research, and language competences were compiled from eight directories, biographical data in their publications, and personal networks.

FCH
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Key Words to Organize Bibliographic Entries on Socio-Economic Development

Country

- Egypt
- Jordan
- Morocco
- Tunisia
- Yemen

Source of Information

- article
- book
- dissertation/thesis
- document (host government)
- project (other than host government)
- other

Subjects

- General Development
  - ideology
  - informal processes
  - intranational political economy
  - international political economy
  - social organization and structure (kinship/family organization/neighborhood/networks)
  - other

Science

- applied (eg. technology)
- natural (eg. fisheries, forests, etc.)
- social
- other

Health

- maternal and child care
- nutrition
- preventive care
- socio-cultural factors
- water supply and sewers
- other

Population

- family planning
- migration
- other

Education

- instructional materials
- literacy and other basic
- pre-school, elementary, secondary
- professional and higher
- technical and vocational
- other

Urbanism

- housing and construction
- sanitation and streets
- other

Communication

- libraries and storage
- media
- impacts
- other

Agriculture

- irrigation and water management
- extension and advice
- crops
- livestock and products
- credit and mechanization
- land
- markets and food subsidies
- other

Industry

- energy
- transport
- trade and commerce
- labor
- management
- banking and finance
- tourism
- small scale
- other

Public Administration

- foreign aid and investment
- community welfare

taxes and grants

bureaucracy and decentralization

planning

other

Basic Human Needs

status of women

rural

urban

other

A. GENERAL DEVELOPMENT

1. IDEOLOGY

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Following discussion of analogies between anthropology and comparative urban studies, Abu-Lughod calls for an approach to the study of urban change which will "steer a more careful course between the Scylla of grand theory and the Charbydis of the pristine case study." Her alternative is the "semi-controlled experiment": she compares three urban areas (Cairo, Tunis, and Rabat-Sale) to show important similarities and differences; then she attempts to explain underlying processes which helped produce them.

Abu-Lughod looks for significant similarities to establish that these cities form a "set" of related phenomena "within which it is legitimate to make comparisons." She takes three variables to be "roughly constant" among them: climatic zone, political role, and "cultural-legal normative system." All three cities have a semi-tropical "Mediterranean" climate, which is coolest/wettest for Rabat-Sale and hottest/driest for Cairo. All three are national capitals. And all three were established as Muslim cities, developed in conjunction with Islamic laws.

Significant differences among Cairo, Tunis, and Rabat-Sale include size, internal structure, and economic base. In size, Cairo is the largest, with some seven million people at the time of writing; and it is the most important city in Egypt and perhaps even in all the Middle East and Africa. Tunis is again intermediate, with a population of about a million and a primary position among Tunisian cities. (Since publication of the article, of course, the headquarters of the Arab League have moved to Tunis, raising its importance on the regional level.) And Rabat-Sale has a population of about half a million, ranking it far behind Casablanca among Moroccan cities.

Regarding internal structure, Abu-Lughod says that Cairo shows the greatest integration between quarters and "the smallest range of variance between zones of highest and lowest status as measured by quality of housing and characteristics of residents." Tunis, conversely, has three distinct areas: the traditional core(or medina), the European addition between the "Sea Gate" and the lake, and suburbs. While religious-ethnic differences between the traditional core and its additions have blurred since independence, the stratificational ones have sharpened, with the Arab bourgeoisie leaving the medina and rural

immigrants crowding into it and some suburbs. But in Rabat-Sale the situation is striking: segregation occurs according to both stratificational and ethno-religious boundaries, so the traditional core, European additions, and squatter settlements "coexist with a remarkably small degree of interpenetration and transactional frequency."

In regard to economic base, Tunis is the most diversified. Although all three urban areas began as ports, only Tunis has remained an important one. In addition, it is the most important marketing and manufacturing center in the country, as well as the national capital. Cairo's main economic base is in industries processing food and fibers and in government. Rabat-Sale contains some industry, but its concentration on government parallels that of Washington, DC.

Accordingly, these three urban areas exhibit important contrasts; how may they be explained? Abu-Lughod's explanation emphasizes physical geography and political economy. She says that societies in Morocco and Egypt have been oriented primarily in a north-south direction: natural barriers (mountains in Morocco, deserts in Egypt) have bounded significant economic and political links of both. Even after the Islamic conquests, major influences on the two areas have conformed to this pattern, as is shown by dominant architectural styles--"Hispano-Maurish" in Moroccan cities and "Anatolian" in Egyptian ones. On the other hand, Tunisia has tended to be more a crossroads than a naturally bounded area, and its architecture blends influences from all points of the compass. Immediately prior to European colonization, Egypt and Tunisia were nominally parts of the Ottoman Empire; both were affected by modernizing efforts from Istanbul and from autonomous local leaders. All Ottoman control stopped with Algeria, however, so Morocco followed an independent course. Even European control came later there, for France was able to establish a Protectorate over most of the country only in 1912, some thirty years after Tunisia and Egypt similarly were "protected." Under colonial rule, the three urban areas evolved quite differently, although "European-style" additions were constructed beside each one. In Cairo, the the "colonial city" depended on the traditional one for services and labor fromthe beginning, and Egyptians always constituted at least half of the residents. In Tunis, foreigners constituted a much larger proportion of the total population and were sufficiently diverse "to maintain an almost self-contained and self-sufficient city outside the original town." In Rabat-Sale, the French avowed a policy of "apartheid" and made concerted efforts to separate colonial and native populations both structurally and functionally. However, these efforts were ultimately undone, at first marginally by groups given special status for supporting French policy, and then massively by rural immigration.

In 1956 a watershed occurred in the development of all three cities: both Tunisia and Morocco gained independence, and Egypt survived the British-French-Israeli invasion of Suez. Subsequently the population of each city became more ethnically and religiously uniform, and changes since (like the construction of elite suburbs) have made them still more similar.

This article is clearly conceived and presented at a fairly general level of investigation. It provides an insightful, though essentially unquantified, account of how some significant similarities and differences have developed among the urban areas concerned. It also suggests other questions which might be answered by more ambitious and detailed studies. For example, Abu-Lughod mentions that "municipal institutions and urban officers" might be compared for signs that Byzantine administration affected Egypt but not the Maghrib--a claim that seems unlikely, given the 114-year Byzantine occupation of Tunisia. Or again, Tunis is the only one of the three whose name has been extended to the whole country; does this reflect a greater primacy viz-a-viz its hinterland? Or finally, has the more diverse economic base of Tunis produced a significantly different structural and functional patterns for the suburbs that have grown up around it? By suggesting such questions, Abu-Lughad's essentially programmatic article may presage more substantial comparisons.

Abu-Zahara. N., "Inequality of Descent and Egalitarianism of the New National Organizations in a Tunisian Village," in Rural Politics and Social Change in the Middle East, ed. R. Antoun and I. Harik, pp. 267-286, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, IN (1972). TUNISIA ARTICLE GENERAL DEVELOPMENT INTRANATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY

This article is based on fifteen months of anthropological field research in 1965-66. Its goal is "to record the reactions of Tunisian villagers in a peasant community" to consequences of government action after 1956 and to show the significance of these consequences "from the villagers' perspective."

Abu-Zahara studied a community in the Tunisian Sahel near Sousse. This community, which she calls Sidi Mateur, is today composed of two major factions. One of these is the Zawya people, who number about 250 and are widely thought to be descendants of the holy man who founded the town and for whom it is named. The other faction is the Ramada people, who number about 2000 and are widely thought to be descendants of different groups who originally came to work as agricultural laborers on the lands of the Zawya. The factions live in distinct sections of town divided by a main road; the religious shrine for Sidi Mateur and the only public bath are located in the Zawya section.

During the Beylical and Protectorate periods of Tunisian history, the Zawya people dominated the community. As descendants of Sidi Mateur, their ancestors had owned all the land, and the Zawya continued to manage the habous (property endowed to Sidi Mateur, his shrine, and/or the brotherhood connected to it) and received gifts offered to Sidi Mateur by supplicants fulfilling their vows. Also, their supposed descent made them "custodians of the ceremonial life of the community": Zawya members performed both at individual rites (like curing people from illness or conducting circumcisions) and at community rites (like the annual festival for the village founder). Purported patrilineal descent from Sidi Mateur, then, legitimated Zawya hegemony within the community: it underlay their access to wealth and religious offices; in turn, control of these assets enabled them to monopolize political offices and to seclude and veil their women, who worked at home and visited only within their own section.

In contrast, Ramada men did manual work and Ramada women often had to work outside their homes--either in the field or, for a few, as maids in Zawya households. However, this division of labor had economic benefits for the Ramada in the long term. According to the major tenure agreement then in force

(mulk shattara), landowners and tenants shared the risks and profits of producing olives, the main crop. Generally, the owner supplied the land and the tenant the work until the trees began producing. Then the tenant took either two-thirds of the trees (if he supplied the olive seedlings as well as labor) or one-third of them (if he supplied the draft animals as well as labor). Accordingly, trees could be acquired through labor as well as by purchase. This form of tenure, when combined with the environmental hazards of olive production by dry farming and the economic consequences of inheritance laws for Maliki Islam, tended to redistribute wealth among the villagers: by 1956, some Ramada people had become rich, some Zawya people poor.

This tendency was reinforced by actions of the independent national government. Habous properties were "liquidated," and the government campaigned against religious brotherhoods and customs associated with them. Both these factors reduced Zawya incomes, forcing many men and women to seek employment outside their homes and even their village. In contrast, government actions provided new opportunities for Ramada people in construction and education: in 1966, almost forty per cent of the men were self-employed or salaried employees.

Agencies of national organizations also gained importance on the local level after independence. The Destourian Socialist Party was at first dominated by the Ramada but, during the 1960's, came to include a mixture of people from both factions. Similar situations existed in the Municipal Council (established in 1966) and the agricultural and commercial cooperatives (established as parts of the Ten-Year Plan, sponsored by Ben Salah). Interestingly, the cooperatives caused the growth of a cross-factional, pan-village opposition to development policies then propounded by the national government. In agriculture, villagers resisted attempts to replace olives by other tree crops; in commerce, shopkeepers resented being "treated as employees on their own property," while customers feared the cooperative stores would upset their customs of buying on credit and using shops as centers for socializing.

Abu Zahara, however, emphasizes divisive aspects of government policies: "the introduction of the national organizations in the village intensified the struggle for power between the two factions; kinship continues to play a prominent role in the political contests of the village." She illustrates these claims by describing two strategies, one emphasizing the Zawya and the other the Ramada. For the former, she recounts how the Zawya shaykh of the village managed to maintain his office, despite Ramada opposition, during the national transition from French Protectorate to independent state. One tactic

was to manipulate divisions among the opposing faction: the Ramada man challenging the shaykh was influential locally and nationally, he also had offended so many people that members of his own faction ultimately did not support his actions. In addition, the shaykh was supported by an influential relative of his wife and by the Delegate of Sousse, a personal acquaintance.

The second strategy concerned how the Ramada have weakened Zawya privileges by diminishing their spatial and social exclusiveness. For example, the old school (in the Zawya section) was replaced by a new one (in the Ramada section) under the influence of the local party branch (headed by a Ramada man). Thus Zawya children had to cross to the Ramada section for schooling, reversing the traditional pattern. Or when a new road was constructed through the village, requiring destruction of some Zawya houses, the same party leader tried to have replacement housing built in the Ramada section; ultimately a compromise was reached, and the new houses went up in a "neutral" area. Another tactic was to question Zawya ancestry: "when they try to deny Sidi Mateur's descendants their privileges, they do this not by denying the validity of saints but by raising doubts about their claim of descent." Still other tactics are pursued especially by wealthy people: a few Ramada men have married Zawya women; others have emulated Zawya attitudes and behavior by secluding and veiling the women of their families, by making conspicuous displays of wealth at weddings and circumcisions, etc.

Abu-Zahra ends the article by drawing three conclusions: first, the Ramada have become more "conservative" (i.e., more willing to seclude and veil their women) than the Zawya; second, the Ramada generally are becoming more equal in status to the Zawya; and third, conflict between the two groups, "although accentuated by government interference in the village," would have occurred even without it "due to changes in the economic positions of the two groups."

This article is valuable for the extensive empirical data it presents, for its interrelation of national and local events, and for its relevance to development. However, there are problems in the ways data are analyzed. First, Abu-Zahara sought to present "the villagers' perspective" as though there were just one, while the bulk of her discussion details how two major groups (and subdivisions within each of them) differ in attitudes and behaviors. Second, Abu-Zahara emphasizes that conflict between local parties was exacerbated by national organizations, although her discussion shows that consensus also was generated. And finally, while dwelling on factional competition, her discussion indicates only briefly that gender differences (in the case of interfactional marriage) and class differences (in the case of conspicuous consumption, among others) also seem to be emerging in Sidi Mateur.

Allman, J., Social Mobility, Education and Development in Tunisia, E.J. Brill, Leiden (1979). TUNISIA BOOK GENERAL DEVELOPMENT INTRANATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY

The goal of this book is "to analyze the relationships between social mobility and education within the context of efforts at national development" in a country which has greatly expanded education since 1956. After an introductory discussion of relevant theoretical issues, Allman considers the historical transformations of Tunisian society from the Arab and Berber empires through modern independence. Then he moves from the societal level to examine processes of social mobility, education, and development in three communities from the late 1960's to the early 1970's. He tests three hypotheses about the interrelation of these processes, compares them with those of other societies, and draws condusions for Tunisian development. Many tables and figures supplement his discussion, and a bibliography of relevant sources (mostly published before 1975 in French or English) is appended.

A crucial contrast in the argument is between social stratification ("who gets what, why, when, and how this is viewed in a given society") and social mobility ("the movement of individuals from positions possessing a certain rank to positions higher or lower in the social system"). For instance, social mobility was relatively high during the Arab and Berber empires, the author says, following Ibn Khaldoun's theory of cyclic interchange between tribes and states (discussed also in Hermassi 1972, abstracted in this collection). From the sixteenth through the eighteenth centuries, Turkish intervention in North Africa divided the state (city-based and oriented toward maritime commerce) from the hinterland (relatively autonomous and self-sufficient). By the nineteenth century, Western navies had forced the state to concentrate on controlling an increasingly sedentary population, often by means which fostered European influence over the state. In 1881, the French occupied Tunisia from Algeria. For the first fifteen years they increased state control of the hinterland by establishing an administration that kept forms of the Bey's government while transferring most powers to the French. From the turn of the century until 1920. they built a colonial political economy based on mechanized agriculture and extractive industries. From 1920 onward, however, they were opposed by a growing national movement which ultimately was taken over by the Neo-Destour party. This party was founded and led by men from the Sahel region who had received modern educations, like Habib Bourguiba. Allman sees their takeover in terms which foreshadow his later remarks about social mobility, education, and development in Tunisia today: "As opportunities for social mobility were restricted by the French government in the 1930's, Sahelians returning from French universities and schools found themselves marginal men in the modern sector of Tunisian society. They soon began political activity and organization, and the leadership needed to free

Tunisia from French domination took shape."

Following independence, there was great social mobility in the country. In Table 2.3, Allman show shifts in the distribution of the Tunisian labor force: by 1966 primary sector employment had declined 20.5 per cent from its level in 1956, while employment in the secondary and tertiary sectors had increased 62.1 per cent and 89.1 per cent, respectively. However, the total number employed in 1966 increased only 4.4 per cent, and 57 per cent of that total were still in the primary sector. This information, when combined with a projection that "the 1980 occupational distribution is unlikely to be very different from that of 1966," meant that the mobility which followed independence was a temporary phenomenon. In terms of Allman's earlier distinctions, social stratification patterns remained relatively fixed in 1956-66, but social mobility took place within them as Tunisians replaced Europeans.

Education in independent Tunisia changed greatly. In 1958 a bilingual national education system was established, with the goal of providing primary education universally and vocational, secondary, and higher education for able students. By 1975 this system was enrolling four times the primary, and five times the secondary, students that were in school in 1956. Actually 1972, when educational expenses accounted from 34.5 per cent of the national budget, was the peak in growth. After that time a certain retrenchment set in, accompanied by changes in programs and a general decentralization policy. Accordingly, at least 25 per cent of eligible children are not now attending primary schools, and appreciable differences in access to education exist between urban and rural, wealthy and poor, categories of the population. Measured as probabilities to attend a university, in the early 1960's the child of a merchant had 5.2 times less chance than the child of a high-level administrator, the child of a worker 18 times less, and the son of a farmer or fisherman 19 times less. A model of pupils entering the system in 1958-59 shows that "over 50 per cent leave Ministry schools without a primary certificate" and over 80 per cent leave with "no more than a '9th grade' education." Thus, serious problems of economic and social integration, as well as of social equity, have plagued the national education system.

Moving from national to local levels, and from historical to descriptive analysis, Allman examines the relationships between social mobility, education, and development in three Tunisian communities. The first, Tadjerouine, is a delegation ("county") capital of some 7000 persons in a relatively poor area near Algeria. In the community there are six large landowners who grow unirrigated cereals, many "subsistence farmers" with small landholdings, and many day-laborers: the town has been a source of labor migrants since the 1930's. The second community, Djebel Djelloud, is a "lower-class" suburb southeast of Tunis with a population of over 10,000. Originally established as a residence for Italian skilled workers, it became the home of many rural immigrants, and today has an occupational structure of 45 per cent

day-laborers or unemployed, 30 per cent skilled workers, 20 per cent shopkeepers and employees, and 5 per cent clerical and government employees. The third community, La Goulette, is a "middle-class" suburb across the lake from Tunis. Long serving as a port for the capital, La Goulette had a mainly European and Jewish (both foreign and local) population until independence. Then, as the French, Italians, and Jews left, two groups of Tunisians moved in. One was constituted by people from the southern coastal region who generally had skills or professions; the other, by rural immigrants from the northwest who generally did not. (Allman believes that Tadjerouine, Djebel Djelloud, and La Goulette "represent the kinds of communities where the bulk of Tunisians live." However, he offers no systematic support for this belief--e.g., by reference to census records--and he admits both that they probably provide "greater educational opportunities" than most and that several community types--e.g., wealthy suburban ones, mid-level rural ones, or poor semi-nomadic ones--are not represented among them. Accordingly, it seems preferable to consider the three communities a diverse sample, though not necessarily one representative of Tunisia generally.)

A survey was conducted in these communities in 1966 to gather information on how "mass education" (i.e., one to nine years of instruction in Ministry schools) was related to the subsequent lives of young people. "Reasonably representative" districts were mapped out in each community, and all houses there visited. Those households with persons 14-19 years old were interviewed in Tunisian Arabic, with responses recorded in French for 766 boys and girls and their families. Among them were "155 boys who had received from 0 to 9 years of schooling" but had no further chances for formal education. This subgroup was surveyed again in 1969 (and checked in years following) regarding their "further training and social and economic activity."

On the basis of the two surveys, then, young people in the three communities had different levels of educational attainment: half the sample in La Goulette reached high school; less than a quarter did in Tadjerouine; and less than a fifth did in Djebel Djelloud. In all three communities, however, sons attained appreciably ghigher levels than their fathers had. When family background was examined, the total family income and social variables like the presence of electricity or running water in the home "are the most highly correlated with an adolescent's educational attainment." Thus, young people's years of schooling were most influenced by where they grew up and what kind of family they came from.

Among the 155 boys who had left school permanently, many (especially in La Goulette) entered vocational training. In all three communities, however, these programs were of little benefit, either for job opportunities or increased income. A quarter of the boys served as apprentices, where hard work was expected for very low pay, but where also jobs were gained at the end of apprenticeship. By the age of twenty, three-quarters of the group were employed in Tunisia: those with 0-4 years of schooling were mostly unskilled laborers; those with 6-9 years, mostly skilled or office

workers; and those between were scattered across the job spectrum. For these youths "there does, in short, seem to be a fairly direct relationship between education and jobs." Finally, another nine per cent of the group(generally with five or more years of schooling) migrated to Europe. Allman is not optimistic about the jobs provided by migration: "the role of migration to Europe in easing Tunisian unemployment is dependent on the capacity and willingness of European countries to welcome more Tunisian workers. If this capacity does not greatly increase and industrialization continues at its present slow pace, severe unemployment problems for school leavers seem certain." (However, this analysis disregards inter-Arab migration, which was significant at the time Allman wrote and probably has increased since Tunis became the headquarters of the Arab League. See Bouhdiba 1979, abstracted in this collection, for further remarks.)

From this description of how "community context, age, and family background" influence educational attainment and subsequent activity, Allman infers three hypotheses: first, "men with higher levels of education get better jobs and earn higher salaries than those with less education"; second, "sons with higher levels of education than their fathers get better jobs"; and third, "family background characteristics...directly influence a young man's level of education and, because of the hypothecized relationship between education and jobs, his occupational status and income."

He tests these hypotheses by three major methods--comparisons, correlations, and a path model. First is a series of comparisons to indicate generally how occupations and incomes are distributed. He classifies job status into four levels (unemployed, unskilled, skilled, and office), and he subdivides the boys who had left school permanently into those 16-19 (who had not yet completed military service) and those 20 or older. Then he compares the two groups' occupational statuses and incomes against their fathers'. Almost half of the youths in both age groups had the same occupational statuses as their fathers; however, more than forty per cent of the younger group experienced downward mobility, and 29 per cent of the older group went up while 22 per cent went down. When this information is combined with the sons' educations (discussed earlier), the second hypothesis seems disconfirmed. That is, despite their much higher levels of education, many sons "have either not experienced any kind of mobility or been downwardly mobile."

The second major method, correlational analysis, provides a more specific test of the three hypotheses. A zero-order correlation matrix was established for the incomes and educations of youths and their fathers, plus youths' first jobs and fathers' jobs in 1969. Youths' incomes were moderately correlated with their educations (.55) and first jobs (.54), with both variables significant at the .01 level. Their fathers' incomes were weakly correlated with their own job statuses (.44) and educations (.35), again at the .01 level. For both sons and fathers, then, the first hypothesis was supported. Furthermore, when the education-income correlations for sons and fathers are compared, the higher

level of the former (.55 versus .35) "suggests a possible heightening in the importance of education in determining income over time." It therefore could support the second hypothesis somewhat, in opposition to the results of the comparison test discussed above. Finally, the third hypothesis is supported very weakly by correlations of sons' first jobs with fathers' incomes and sons' educations with fathers' job statuses and educations. Sons' incomes, conversely, seem "influenced only indirectly" by these background variables connected to their fathers (i.e.. fathers may help sons get educations and first jobs but do not directly determine their sons' incomes).

The third testing method, a path model, appears to confirm the results of the correlation analysis. Sons' incomes were most directly influenced by their own first jobs and educations, which in turn were influenced by their fathers' incomes, educations, and occupations.

While stressing that his analysis is "tentative and suggestive," Allman reconciles the conflicting results of his tests in the following way: "First, dramatic occupational mobility has not accompanied dramatic educational mobility in Tunisia. The role of the schools in producing social mobility is probably slight. That is, the schools cannot generate or create mobility; it must come through structural changes in the economy. ...Second, education appears to be becoming the most important channel for what occupational mobility there is in Tunisian society." This is a plausible reconcilation if one accepts the tests as they stand. However, there is good reason to believe that all three of them are flawed by a methodological error: although Allman discussed the social mobility following independence in some detail, he did not control for it in his tests. To make a relevant comparison between fathers' and sons' occupations and incomes, one should distinguish those fathers who profited from the one-time social mobility, as opposed to those who did not, and then compare. Otherwise, this transient factor may distort the picture of how education really relates to social mobility and development. (If Allman's surveys did not specify fathers' occupational histories sufficiently to permit such distinctions, comparisons might be made between La Goulette, where much mobility occurred following European exodus, and Tadjerouine, where apparently it did not, or a similar indirect method.) Accordingly, Allman's first hypothesis seems moderately supported; the third, very weakly supported; and the second, now indeterminate.

The author concludes by emphasizing the increasing importance of education within a framework established by the political economy of Tunisia and calls for several structural changes. He advocates a shift of investments and programs toward rural development, a reduction of inequalities in distribution of income, a continued population policy, and educational reforms in curriculum and in correspondence or other supplemental programs.

The main stregth of this book is its generally thorough and clear examination of historical interpretation, government documentation, and survey data to critique what is widely regarded as a major Tunisian achievement, the national education system. The book's main weaknesses are its insufficient account of labor migration and its failure to control for fathers' social mobility in the tests of hypotheses.

Belhassen, S., "L'Islam Contestataire en Tunisie," Jeune Afrique, vol. 949, 950, 951, pp. 81-84, 65-69, 89-92 (1979).
TUNISIA ARTICLE GENERAL DEVELOPMENT IDEOLOGY

This series of articles describes the nature and effects of the Movement for Islamic Renewal in Tunisia as of 1979. The series begins with a sketch of the ancillary organizations of the movement, then analyzes its internal structure, and finally discusses its ideology and the allies or opposition it had produced to that date.

In the first article, the author describes occasions when anyone in Tunisia might encounter the Movement for Islamic Renewal. For example, he recalls two recent weddings of well-to-do people: instead of conspicuous displays of wealth controlled by the families of the bride and groom, ceremonies were exceedingly simple (a common meal with male friends and religious songs for the groom; religious songs, a caftan without jewelry or makeup, and no belly dances for the bride). "A parallel society" is developing, Belhassen says, with its own customs and organizations. Its members refuse to speak French to each other and practice strong sexual segregation. Islamic theater troupes and musical groups have been formed. Football teams and scouting groups are associated with neighborhood mosques. A book store, a publishing company, and a journal also are operating. However, the most effective means of communication are cassette tapes of sermons by well known figures, and small groups of "messengers" who put up posters and pass information by word of mouth. Accordingly, in factories and offices, in ministries and schools, there is a "return to the faith" associated, at least in part, with the Movement for Islamic Renewal.

The second article shows that movement has a structure and a dynamism of its own. Members of the movement reject the label of "Muslim Brothers," claiming it was applied to them by the Destourian Socialist Party for propaganda purposes. Furthermore, they see themselves as "Islamic" rather than merely "Muslim" because they desire to do more than simply follow religious rules. Speakers for the movement trace its origins to the "crisis of 1969," when the Tunisian government moved from the cooperativization policies of Ahmed Ben Saleh toward a more "laissez-faire" economy. The atmosphere of experimentation then prevalent enabled the founding of an Association for the Protection of the Qur'an. Simultaneously, groups of students and teachers at Ez-Zitouna Faculty of Theology or the Faculty of Law began to organize a movement which ultimately became the Movement for Islamic Renewal. Prominent leaders connected with this group have included Sheiks Mohamed

Salah Neifer, Abdelfatah Moro, and Hassen Ghodbani. Sheik Neifer left Tunisia in 1960, in opposition to President Bourguiba's proclamation that fighting for development was a struggle which justified not fasting during Ramadan (one of the five "pillars" of the Islamic faith). Now back home, he is seen as an "elder statesman" of the movement as he works to influence the government towards policies consistent with his view of Islam. Sheik Moro is a 38 year-old lawyer and the imam (prayer leader) of the Bey M'Hammad mosque in the Halfaouine section of Tunis. He was one of the lawyers for the defense in the trial of former union members after the general strike of 26 January 1978, and he travels often to Saudi Arabia. Sheik Ghodbani is 29 years old, also a lawyer, and imam of Sidi Mahrez mosque in the Tunis medina. Having been a Marxist and travelled to the Soviet Union, he became a "born-again" believer while a student at the Faculty of Law and today is seen by his followers as "the strongest of the Muslim militants." As imams, Sheiks Moro and Ghodbani draw large audiences to their respective mosques, especially for the Friday prayers, and often give sermons whose tone "is that of a political speech, generally critical with regard to the authorities and to social inequalities."

In the third article, the ideology behind these sermons and the men who give them is discussed in detail. Criticism of the government essentially is based on the belief that even its achievements--such as the cooperatives and the national system of education--"were bound to fail" because they were not based on Islamic principles. Furthermore, one of the goals of the movement is to liberate those principles from what are seen as false interpretations given them in the past. Opposing both the "folkloric Islam" (such as veneration of the tombs of holy persons) and the "old turban-wearers of the Zitouna" mosque, members of the Movement for Islamic Renewal respect only the Qur'an and the Sunna (i.e., precepts accepted as legally binding by most Muslims). This reduction of economics and politics to religion, and religion to the Qur'an and the Sunna, reverses a hierarchy of loyalties that was widespread in the Arab World, if not in Tunisia, during Nasser's time--the priority of "Arabism" over religion. Today members of the Movement for Islamic Renewal associate "Arabism" with a "feeling of failure," while they see "the widespread consciousness of Islam" growing stronger every day. The leaders of the movement agree that cultural and educational efforts should be given priority to develop this consciousness, especially among young people. Leaders differ, however, on whether a liberalization of politics, "an experience of democracy in the Western manner," will favor their cause. Sheik Moro says yes, because it will enable different political groups to express themselves

and put their theories to the test; Sheik Ghodbani says no, pointing out that "the Prophet governed, neither according to his own wishes nor by consulting the people, but by following the Qur'an." Ambiguous (or even divided) as it thus may seem, the movement has nonetheless gained apparent allies from among former leaders of the Destourian Socialist Party (e.g., Mohamed Masmoudi); its opposition at the time of writing was centered among "progressives" and "intellectuals," with the government officially reserving judgment. (Later, however, during July 1981 the authorities moved strongly against the movement following several incidents during Ramadan. Although they protested innocence from wrongdoing, movement leaders were imprisoned, their journal was suspended, and women were forbidden by law from wearing the hijab, a special veil characteristic of female members of the movement.)

The major strength of this series of articles is the information it presents on a "fundamentalist" religiously-based social movement in Tunisia; the major weakness, its short and often merely descriptive discussion of that movement and its context. Recent years have witnessed the increasing strength and importance of such social movements in the Middle East (from Iran through Saudi Arabia to Egypt), so information on the growth (and repression) of the Movement for Islamic Renewal in Tunisia is valuable to indicate a trend perhaps significant for both national and regional development.

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Bouhdiba, A., "Arab Migrations," in Arab Industrialization and Economic Integration, ed. R. Aliboni, pp. 134-188, St. Martin's, New York (1979). TUNISIA ARTICLE POPULATION MIGRATION

This study begins by distinguishing among kinds of migration: first, internal migration within an Arab state, like pastoral nomadism or the "rural exodus"; second, Euro-Arab migration, where Arabs (mostly from the Maghrib) travel to work in Europe; and third, inter-Arab migration, where Arabs (mostly from the Mashriq but increasingly also from the Maghrib) travel to work in other Arab countries. The article's goal is "to clarify the essential features of inter-Arab and Euro-Arab migration whilst at the same time identifying structural or other links between the two phenomena." Bouhdiba approaches this goal by indicating the main trends of these two kinds of migration, establishing correlations between them, and then asking who benefits in what ways from each. For the Euro-Arab part of the study, good statistical data were easily accessible; for the inter-Arab part, the author was forced to combine several sources of varying quality, leading to an overall product which can "enable us at least to establish the premises for argument even if not to give a full answer to the questions we posed earlier." Thirty-three tables and several notes are used to support the discussion.

Euro-Arab migration is a relatively recent phenomenon. Although some migrants have gone to work in Western Europe since the end of World War II, "it was only after Algerian independence that emigration from the Maghreb began on a large scale." By 1974, there were approximately 720,000 Maghribi workers in the European Economic Community, constituting 11.2 per cent of the foreign workers there. Sixty-two per cent of the Maghribi workers came from Algeria, but important contributions came also from Morocco (26 per cent) and Tunisia (13 per cent). The large majority of Maghribis (89 per cent) worked in France, where they constituted 34.1 per cent of the foreign workers, but sizeable numbers were employed also in Belgium and the German Federal Republic.

From the end of World War II until the early 1960's, Arab migrants mainly held jobs on a short-term basis in agriculture and construction. After that period, however, they increasingly tended to occupy jobs indicating a more long-term, structural adjustment to European labor markets. A bipolar distribution of migrants developed: a minority were doctors, professors, and other professionals who participated in the "brain drain" from the Third to the First World; the large majority were manual workers. By 1976, for example, 37 per cent of Algerian migrants in France were in the manufacturing sector, while 39 per cent were in construction and public works.

Euro-Arab migration thus helped Europeans to resolve labor shortages originating from losses in World War II and increased by falling bith rates: "with decolonization and the fear of nationalization it has proved easier to import labor than to export capital. Europe has abandoned its colonies. At the same time a kind of 'reverse colonial system' has been adopted, consisting of large-scale imports by the metropolis of docile, unskilled, cheap foreign labor." In fact, a double labor market has been created: "on the one hand there is a market for nationals who receive clear privileges in terms of real and monetary wages, promotion, and social services; on the other a more backward market for immigrant workers where wages are generally lower and job security slight."

Given such conditions, one could wonder why foreigners choose to work in Europe. For Maghribis, there are two main reasons: needs for jobs and for foreign exchange. Bouhdiba indicates that population growth and the rural exodus in all three Maghribi countries are likely to maintain an unemployment rate of at least 7.6 per cent until the 1990's. Furthermore, emigrant remittances are important to all three economies: they constitute 1/4 of Morocco's foreign exchange earnings, 1/5 of Algeria's, and 1/10 of Tunisia's. (These figures, of course, concern only legal transfers; including private, informal transfers might raise the totals significantly.) Accordingly a relationship, complementary "at least to some extent," has been established between European demand for labor and Maghribi supply of it. What should be stressed about this relationship is that "migration is no longer a short-term economic trend but rather a structural phenomenon rooted in the financial, economic, social and technological structures of the two regions."

Of course, not all Arab migration has gone to Europe, even from the Maghrib. For example, from 1956 to 1970 18.8 per cent of officially registered emigrants from Tunisia went to Libya, as compared to 76.5 per cent who went to France and Germany. Boudiba feels that inter-Arab migration is "to some extent more natural" than Euro-Arab migration: "linguistic and religious similarities and similarities in customs are of great importance" in allowing migrants to identify with, and be accepted by, the communities where they work. In duration, inter-Arab migration on a mass scale began after World War II with the development of oil production, and it was accelerated by OPEC price rises in the early 1970's. By 1972-73 there were 630,000 Arab migrants working in the oil-producing states, constituting 75 per cent of the foreign labor there. Egypt, Syria, and Palestine were the major labor suppliers, with each contributing about 14 per cent of all Arab workers.

One half of these migrants worked in Saudi Arabia; 30 per cent in the Gulf countries; and 16.5 per cent in Libya. (In Libya, Egyptians were 60 per cent, Tunisians 18 per cent, of the foreign Arab workers.)

Labor shortages among oil producers occurred not because of war or falling birth rates--the Gulf states have among the highest rates of natural population growth in the world--but because some of the largest oil reserves lie in countries with small populations. (Saudi Arabia is a good example of this rule; Iraq and Algeria are obvious exceptions.) Furthermore, such countries generally are lacking in infrastructure, from running water and surfaced roads to health care and education. Foreign labor helps create that infrastructure in exchange for sharing in the petrodollar wealth. Wage differentials between countries supplying labor and those demanding it can be extreme: "workers with similar levels of skill employed in the same sector may earn nominal incomes from three to five times higher in Libya than in Tunisia." Even higher differentials may exist between Libya and Egypt or between Yemen and Saudi Arabia.

By economic sector, Arab migrants were a majority in fishing, mining, and manufacturing for Saudi Arabia and several Gulf states; in building for Libya and several Gulf states; and in all sectors save transport and services for Kuwait. Also, these workers came with a variety of skill levels, from laborers through technicians and clerks to professionals, rather than the bipolar distribution of skill levels among Euro-Arab migrants. Even more than in Europe, then, foreign Arab workers have essential economic roles in most of the major oil-producing states.

Nonetheless, several similarities exist between Euro-Arab and inter-Arab migrations. The two have had nearly the same duration and in 1974 involved similar numbers of migrants. Political tensions between countries supplying labor and those demanding it have sometimes led to brusque actions, even reprisals on migrant workers, in both regions. Factors like proximity and transport connections have favored Maghribi migration to Europe, Mashriqi migration to Arab oil producers, but increasingly the two regions demanding labor have drawn on a common supply. Regardless of religious or ethnic motivations guiding the behavior of some migrants, "the shape of the labor market as a whole is determined by economic conditions and primarily by economic conditions having to do with the Western world."

One might characterize some of those economic conditions in the following way. Europe has technology and capital but needs energy and labor. The Arab oil producers

have energy and capital but need technology and labor. Other Arab countries have labor but need technology and capital (and, in some cases, energy). Accordingly, once the three parties rid themselves of "outdated ideas," of the "thousand and one forms taken by dependency relations," they should recognize a "basic complementarity" among what each has and what each needs. Bouhdiba gives an example for triangular cooperation: in television and telecommunications France supplies technology, Saudi Arabia capital, and Tunisia labor. What is needed is the courage and commitment to carry such cooperation to other areas and levels in order to produce truly interdependent and complementary relationships among the parties concerned.

The major strength of this study is its description of Euro-Arab and inter-Arab migration within the same analytical framework. The article integrates statistical data from international (ILO, IBRD, OECD), national (different Central Banks), and academic sources to provide a macro-level "big picture" which supplements the account by Birks and Sinclair (see Birks and Sinclair 1980, abstracted in the Jordan report) both in time and in area. The major weakness of the study is its lack of qualitative data. Bouhdiba indicates that the international labor market is determined by Western economic conditions and that wage differentials are important motivations to migrate. He also mentions that religious and nationalistic motivations may guide some migration toward Arab oil producers. However, he does not provide information on the migrants' views of the process--how much importance economic motivations have as compared to others, what factors make migration a "success," etc. He also says little about what consequences migration has on the lives of those abroad and on conditions back home (except as a reduction of unemployment and an increase in foreign exchange). Nonetheless, such micro-data are essential to an adequate account of migration, both to understand why workers choose to migrate and to complement the "big picture."

Boukraa, R. "La Problematique de la Communaute Rurale au Maghreb: Quelques Observations sur le Changement Social dans la Communante Villageoise de Hammamet," Revue Tunisienne de Sciences Sociales, vol. 45, pp. 11-48 (1976).
TUNISIA ARTICLE GENERAL DEVELOPMENT INTRANATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY INDUSTRY TOURISM

This article seeks to develop a sociological concept of "rural community" and to apply that concept to the study of a society in the Maghreb. First the author considers how rural communities have been discussed in the relevant literature; then he shows how the concept he develops can illuminate continuities and changes in Hammamet, a locality on the east coast of Tunisia.

Boukraa begins by analyzing how "two grand currents" of sociological thought have conceived of rural communities. On one hand is the "structural-functional" orientation, which defines a community in terms of the personal relations among its members, who live in the same locality and share a "common system of attitudes and values." Boukraa feels this orientation is insufficient, since it defines the community "independent of history and of the social relations of production." On the other hand, the "Marxist" orientation sees the rural community as a precapitalist organization of families, who are fixed to the soil and have collective and private goods as well as a system for allocating and enforcing responsibilities among themselves. Boukraa feels this orientation also is insufficient, since it restricts the rural community to a single stage of history and predicts dissolution of the community as the capitalist mode of production becomes dominant. Accordingly, he attempts to compensate both orientations by rereading, "in the light of these two theories," monographs on four African societies to develop a more adequte concept of rural community in the Maghreb.

The first two monographs (Berque's on the Seksawa in Morocco and Althabe's on Malgache villages in Madagascar) illustrate what Boukraa takes to be a critical feature of rural communities: each is "defined as a socio-cultural system ruled by a logic which is relatively autonomous and irreducible to the larger system which envelops it." From the third monograph (Cuisenier's on Djebel Lansarine) Boukraa draws an economic aspect of this autonomy: the cultural unity of a rural community "is established on an economic base which is autonomous with respect to the global system" of which the community is part. That is, the community has a "dual economy": relations within it are based on a subsistence economy; relations outside it are based on the market. And the fourth monograph (a collective

work on the Ouled Sidi Ali Ben Aoun in the central steppes of Tunisia) shows Boukraa two things: first, rural communities may perserve a social structure based on kinship and on a subsistence economy even after the capitalist mode of production has become dominant within them; and second, the maintenance of these social sturctures may facilitate their articulation with the broader systems in which they are encapsulated (e.g., by providing welfare and other services among community members when they are notin the labor market).

Thus Boukraa's concept of "rural community" has three main features: cultural autonomy, dual economy, and an articulation to larger social systems which may, at least transitionally, accommodate the persistance of prior social structures. This concept is then used to study continuities and changes in Hammamet.

Although historical records mention fortifications on the site as early as the 12th century A.D., the community took recognizable form only following French conquest in 1881. With security against Bedouin tribes supplied by the colonial administration, local people began to settle beyond the vicinity of the ramparts. A tripartite social hierarchy linked to place of residence resulted: Bled ("city") families lived within the ramparts, considered themselves the original inhabitants of the locality, worshipped at a Malekite mosque, and monopolized literacy and local political posts; Haouanet (plural of hanout, "shop") families lived near but outside the ramparts along the road to the district capital, supposedly issued from marriages between Turks and local women, worshipped at a Hanefite mosque, and did not intermarry with the Bled; and Souani (which Boukraa translates as "garden") families lived dispersed among the crops and constituted the lowest social category. With respect to economic organization, there was little differentiation: almost all families practiced intensive agriculture on irrigated plots of vegetables, fruits, and trees. Such plots were generally owned by the family which worked them and, during the Protectorate, they increasingly were devoted to citris production. In addition, some families of the Bled were fishermen, and the women of most families produced embroidery at home.

By the end of the Protectorate, then, the community of Hammamet had been influenced by two major developments--one primarily economic, the other primarily political. First, citris production had developed such that the community was an important supplier for outside markets without changing much in "the structures of subsistence economy, which continued to constitute the fundamental

base for the processes of the domestic economy." The resulting "dual economy" did provide, however, the means for a minority of young men to become educated and enter public administration. Second, a movement for national independence had developed broad support across the country. Locally the champions of this movement were members of the Haouanet families, while the Bled remained quiet or collaborated with French authorities. With independence, the Haouanet became politically dominant: they led the local party cell and, soon afterward, the municipality. Their rise in the social hierarchy indicated the (perhaps transient) replacement of a ranking system based on religious values by a system based on nationalist ones.

Both economically and politically, then, Hammamet was changing. However, this "opening of the village to the exterior world neither diminished the basis of community identity nor made it lose its autonomy from the point of view of economic operations." Regarding the latter, growing for outside markets did not cause the community to lose control of its means of subsistence or "the family solidarity on which the economic functioning of the village was founded." Thus Hammamet remained a rural community by Boukraa's definition.

The development of tourism has put this organization to a rigorous test during two periods since independence. From 1960-69 the Tunisian government made tourism a "deposit for capital" fleeing the policies of coopertivization in agriculture, commerce, and industry: various local (particularly Bled families), national (particularly people from Kairouan), and international parties invested in different tourist establishments in Hammamet. The Tunisian government fostered this development by expropriating land along the beach at prices Boukraa calls "derisory" and stifling isolated protests from the community. However, later state efforts to cooperativize local agriculture galvanized citizens into sharp collective reactions (including the prospect of armed resistence). Boukraa interprets this difference in reactions as a difference in perceived threats to the local community: villagers accommodated themselves as best they could to tourism (and some even benefitted handsomely), but coopertivization struck at the very basis of family production without providing sufficient alternatives for workers who left the land nor accounting for the cultural and economic autonomy of rural communities.

From 1970 to 1976 (when the article was published), new economic policies of the national government favored

agricultural development and the tourist sector demanded more agricultural products. Accordingly, meat production expanded greatly around Hammamet, and landholdings became increasingly concentrated. Family production was progressively replaced by wage labor and mechanization or by a specialization within families so that some members continued working in agriculture while others went into tourism or related activities. Divisions within the community also grew. That part of local population which invested profits from the export of citris into tourism now also gained control of local commerce, went into meat production and construction, and reorganized the embroidery business. Political control again shifted hands: the new tourist era favored the Bled because of its emphasis on economics rather than national struggle, and members of the Bled were able to capture the municipality from the Haouanet.

Overall, then, the development of tourism had these impacts: a major shift of the labor force from agriculture into tourism, so that 6000 of the 13000 local inhabitants now work in tourist-related jobs; an 18 percent decline in the amount of land in citris production; stimulation of the production of embroidery and meat; increased construction, from villas for the wealthy to shanties for immigrant workers; and the progressive dissolution of traditional social control from a declining sense of community and from exposure to tourist styles of life.

Accordingly, Hammamet is currently in a transitional state. It no longer is a rural community because tourism has overturned both its cultural autonomy and economic base; yet it also is not a city, for much of its economy is still tied directly to agriculture. A new social order will emerge, Boukraa implies, from a class conflict between an extant bourgeoisie which control much of the local political economy and an as yet latent proletariat of culturally and economically impoverished local people.

The main strengths of this article are its thoughtful analysis and application of the concept of rural community and its critique of the roles of tourism and agriculture in development. The use of history indicates a close knowledge of Hammamet, yet only secondary sources are cited. The style of writing is vivid, but it loses organization toward the end of the article. However, the main problem is quantitative: there are few statistics to document the changes and continuities described, leaving unanswered the question of how closely the explanation fits the empirical case. One may also question some of the interpretations; for example, the stiff collective reactions to cooperativization may have resulted from local assessment about the ineffectiveness of earlier isolated protests against government policies as well as from the perceived threat of one of them.

Bouziane, B. and A. Zghal, "La Protection Sociale et les Besoins Sociaux des Familles, Revue Tunisienne de Sciences Sociales, vol. 28-29, pp. 203-236 (1972). TUNISIA ARTICLE PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION COMMUNITY WELFARE BASIC HUMAN NEEDS OTHER

The objective of this article is to study "the relations between institutuions of social protection and the members of those families engaged in an effort of adaptation to new conditions of life under the pressure of a process of rapid urbanization linked to a very intense movement of emigration by peasants without land and without work. . . ." The authors first define social protection (loosely speaking, "welfare") in the context of Tunisian efforts toward modernization; then they discuss urbanization and rural emigration as aspects of modernization; and finally they compare a rural community with an urban one to analyze links between families seeking social protection and institutuions providing it.

The concept of social protection is relatively new in Tunisia, even though most of the functions, and some of the institutions filling them, have existed for a long time. Although defined by the second Tunisian plan for socio-economic development as "supporting and protecting elements of the population" (like orphans or the mentally retarded), the concept was extended by the third plan (1969-72) to mean "the social education of families and collectivities to help them deal with the modernization process." The major reason for this extension was a recognition of differences between industrialized and developing countries with regard to the intended recipients of social protection. In industrialized countries such recipients are minorities, either "social" (e.g., persons whose standard of living is below that of the majority) or "psychological" (e.g., persons whose behavior is considered deviant by majority values). In countries like Tunisia, however, the situation is more complicated: added to these minorities is the peasant majority of the population, whose style of life is seen as inadequate "not only by the urban minority but even by many peasants who remain attached to traditional models only because they lack, at least in the short term, other possibilities." A result is that situations labelled "social cases" are more often manifestations of problems characterizing "the disadvantaged majority (the peasantry)" than of social or psychological minorities. Since the institutions of social protection are supposed to deal with such problems, they should test, adapt, and apply methods that address the Tunisian reality. An inventory of such institutuions at present shows mixed results. While their overall number has almost doubled since independence, most are of recent creation. Their personnel at the local level are well trained, but "the training of regional officials

generally does not correspond to the types of action they are expected to provide." And while the absolute number of persons receiving benefits from social protection is higher in urban areas, another measure (persons benefiting over total population per governorate) indicates that benefits are relatively more available in some rural areas.

In part two of the article, the authors focus on urbanization and rural emigration as among "the most spectacular manifestations" of modernization. Sociologists have been studying these manifestations (particularly with regard to the ways they produced slum-suburbs around Tunis) since the end of World War II. However, all the prior investigations"were oriented toward the study of the slums as an urban condition," while the authors want to examine "the two poles of the rural exodus: the departure point of the immigrants, that is, the peasant communities most affected by this phenomenon; and their arrival point in Tunis, that is, the semi-urban quarters of the capital." The linkage between rural emigration and urbanization is illustrated by spurts in population growth of Tunis during 1936-46 and 1956-66. During both periods an explanation for the spurts can be found in the countryside: in the former, peasants (and particularly those in the Tell region of northern Tunisia) were pushed off the land both by their growing numbers and by the decreasing resource base under their control; in the latter, government cooperativization efforts had a similar though smaller result. Peasant responses in either case were to move to the city. This in turn has led to a type of urbanization which the authors call "ruralization of the capital," characterized by rural building styles in the slum-suburbs and by subdivisions of the big houses of the old medina into one-room apartments sharing a courtyard and sanitary facilities.

The largest and oldest slum-suburb of Tunis is Djebel Lahmar (see Stambouli 1978, abstracted in this collection); it was chosen as the "arrival point." And since most of the immigrants to the slum-suburbs come from the Tell, "five new villages constructed by the administration" in Ben Bachir circumscription of Djendouba governorate were selected as the "departure point." Both Djebel Lahmar and Ben Bachir are "settings in which peasant families try to adapt themselves to a new semi-urban milieu with the aid, among others, of the institutuions of social protection." Accordingly, the two authors feel, the two "communities" may be compared in terms of the following model: (1) families of each community deal with the institutions of social protection to satisfy certain needs; (2) for purposes of the study, one can focus on family needs and institutional activities in three sectors--work and professional life, housing and health care, and education and leisure; (3) members of the families and members of the institutions often act as "liason agents" for their respective groups; (4) sometimes the two types of liason agents communicate

only through "intermediary groups" (either individuals without formal status or others with that specific function); and (5) difficulties in communication between the liason agents occur largely because families follow kinship norms while institutions follow bureaucratic ones.

Part three of the article compares family-institution relations in Ben Bachir and in Djebel Lahmar. The major difference between the two places is that in the former, the institutions of social protection must take the initiative to contact families, while in the latter, families take the initiative. Accordingly, the personnel and equipment of the institutions are relatively under-used in Ben Bachir. This difference cannot be explained by reference to a greater attachment to peasant traditions among the families there. Actually, families in both localities are detached from the land, and attitudes toward work are often similar: in both places most respondents felt the best way to reduce unemployment was to industrialize the country, and the best way to obtain stable employment was to develop professional qualifications. Rather, the major difference results from the composition and functions of "intermediary groups" and from the hierarchy of family needs in the two locations.

In Ben Bachir "the orientation committee of the center for social development" is the intermediary group between families and institutions. This committee is composed of "local notables, chosen by the administration"; its members "feel themselves much closer to the administration than to the peasant families" who, in turn, do not recognize the committee as their representatives. In Djebel Lahmar, conversely, the local cells of the Destourian Socialist Party often facilitate contacts between institutions and families. The executive committee directing each cell is elected by its members, though successful candidates depend "as much on their relations with local and regional authorities as on the votes of party members." Accordingly, such party leaders have obligations both to local citizens and to government administrators: even if they don't constantly act as intermediaries, "everybody knows that they are there and they they can play that role."

The second cause for difference is the fit between the hierarchy of family needs and the activities of the institutions of social protection in the two localities. In Ben Bachir families feel their greatest need is for jobs: the population "is polarized by the employment problem to the point of being almost insensible to the difficulties it encounters in the other sectors of social life." However, the institutions of social protection began there as centers

aiding women and children and still today do not focus on employment: "the activities of the centers of social development (education for sanitation, literacy, sewing, etc.) appear, for the majority of peasant families, as not only secondary but even absurd before the difficulties that they encounter to find work and to satisfy their most elementary needs." In Djebel Lahmar, conversely, jobs are more available and can be found via formal or informal channels. Accordingly, families focus much more attention on getting modern health care and education for their children, which are among the activities of the institutions for social protection.

With regard, then, to effective intermediary groups and to a fit between family needs and institutional activities, Djebel Lahmar is favored but Ben Bachir is not. Accordingly, any investment in the institutions of social protection at Djebel Lahmar (and areas like it) is "immediately productive," while such investment at Ben Bachir (and areas like it) is productive only in the long-term sense of integrating its population more fully into national society.

The strengths of this article are its insightful analysis of similarities and differences among recipients of social protection in industrialized and developing countries generally, and in two Tunisian localities particularly. The authors' emphasis on elections as a means of establishing legitimacy at the local level is consistent with the research by Moore (see Moore 1963, abstracted in the collection), and the attention given to the hierarchy of family needs echoes the remarks by Stambouli (see Stambouli 1978). The major weakness in the article is the choice of Ben Bachir as representative of the "departure point" for rural emigrants. This "community" was formed by government action; its population are immigrants "regrouped" by the administration (though we are not told specifically from where). By that fact alone, one may doubt that Ben Bachir is representative of the communities which have furnished the bulk of immigrants to the semi-urban areas of Tunis. Also, the consideration of urbanization and rural emigration in part two suffers from two (apparently typographical) errors which are important enough to complicate understanding: the "1946-1956" on page 218 should read 1956-1966, and the "1936-1956" on page 219 should be 1946-1956.

Entelis, J., "Ideological Change and an Emerging Counter-Culture in Tunisian Politics," Journal of Modern African Studies, vol. 12, pp. 543-568 (1974). TUNISIA ARTICLE GENERAL DEVELOPMENT IDEOLOGY

The goal of this article is, primarily, to investigate Tunisian attitudes about the persons, policies, and general political culture of the elite governing the country in 1972, and secondarily, to show how the ideological opposition revealed may affect Tunisian development. Analysis of responses to a 24-item, "closed-ended" questionnaire, plus consideration of relevant literature and of unstructured interviews and conversations, constituted the method used to approach this goal.

Following an introduction contrasting his findings with "western 'orthodox' scholarship" published earlier, Entelis explains how he chose two samples of Tunisian university students (from whom future leaders would presumably emerge). The first was a "general sample" of male Muslims at the Faculty of Letters and Human Sciences and the Faculty of Law and Economic and Political Sciences in Tunis (n=147) and at the Université de Paris in France (n=65). The second was an "ideological sample" of similar students in Tunis (n=50) and Paris (n=46) who were chosen, "irrespective of academic specialization or country of study," to represent "all major ideological orientations (formal or informal, legal or illegal) currently in evidence in Tunisian political life, including political 'apathetics' or 'unaffiliates.'" These samples were chosen so that the second would provide a kind of "check" on the first. That is, if it were true that the student groups contain all or most future leaders, then it could be argued that -- whatever the views of the general sample -- even a small number of persons sharing the attitudes of the ruling elite (i.e., Destourians) could become future leaders "and thereby act as the guarantors of the existing system" To cover this possibility, Entelis sought to compare the responses of persons with known positions (and especially Destourians) against those of the general sample, even though a rigorous contrast of the samples was precluded by the different manners in which they were chosen.

In regard to evaluations of the current regime, 60 per cent of the general sample, and 63 per cent of the ideological one (including 50 percent of the Destourians), believed that comtemporary Tunisian society was facing "many problems." Employment opportunities in the country for university graduates (though the questions says "university students") were considered to be "poor" or worse by 86 per cent of the general sample and 96 per cent of the ideological one. Political leaders were seen as

"content in keeping things as they are," "indifferent," or "corrupt" by 83 per cent of the general and 64 per cent of the ideological samples. And two students with equal degrees but "different socio-economic backgrounds (upper and lower class)" were seen not to have equal chances for employment in Tunisia by 83 per cent of the general and 90 per cent of the ideological samples. (However, Entelis' discussion of this result is marred. He says, "ninety per cent of the total ideological sample, for instance, did not feel it possible for a qualified university graduate of lower or middle class origin to be able to compete successfully against students of upper class background." There are three problems here: first, only "upper and lower class" are mentioned in the questions, not middle class; second, the respondents felt there was an unequal chance for employment, rather than an inability to compete successfully; and third, "different socio-economic background" is such a vague definition of "class" that it is difficult to know what respondents, or even Entelis, had in mind when considering the questions.)

In regard to perceptions of the distribution of power and influence in Tunisian, 84 per cent of the general and 99 per cent of the ideological samples felt there had been "little change" or "no change at all" since independence; however, 58 per cent of the former and 73 per cent of the latter agreed that in the future "the political influence held by certain groups will change hands." Free expression of opinions did not exist in Tunisia, according to 78 per cent of the general sample and 63 per cent of the ideological one (including almost a third of the Destourians). And Tunisia's current political leadership did not inspire "respect and confidence among the masses" in the view of 87 per cent of the general and 77 per cent of the ideological samples.

With respect to "culture, language, and religion," 72 per cent of the general sample and 82 per cent of the ideological one (including over 84 per cent of the Destourians) identified most with a Tunisian culture, which emphasized an "Arabic component" rather than a "Mediterranean, non-Arabic" one. (Entelis expresses some surprise at this result--expecially from the Destourians--apparently on the basis of post-independence rhetoric and behavior of the elite. However, during the struggle for independence Bourguiba often rallied support by appealing to ethnic and religious sentiments, so elite culture may not be so "synthetic" of French and other non-Arab elements as Entelis expected.) Consistent with their choice of "culture," 60 per cent of the general and 66 per cent of the ideological samples believed that "Arabic only" should be the "official

language of instruction in Tunsia's education system (primary through university)." (Claiming that the official government policy of equal use of French and Arabic has the "long-term objective" of favoring French, Entelis also criticizes what he sees as other effects of the policy: "by pursuing a bilingual policy in a monocultural society, without concurrent extra-educational and environmental circumstances favoring bilingualism. . . the regime fostered the development of 'educated illiterates' or an 'intellectual proletariat,' linguistically comfortable in neither a totally French nor totally Arabic intellectual milieu." There are several problems with this statement, of which two are: first, among extensive "extra-educational" circumstances favoring bilingualism in Tunisia are newspapers, books. magazines, movies, television, plays, speeches by officials, and tourism; and second, it seems strange that, given the importance language choice has for Entelis, he does not specify the language in which his questionnaire was written nor how he communicated with Tunisians.) A more surprising result concerns the responses to a question on religion: 63 per cent of the general and 72 per cent of the ideological samples believed that religion should play "a minor role" or "no role at all" in Tunisian politics. This orientation paralleled that of the elite, which by that time had already retreated from more extreme positions taken earlier, such as fasting during Ramadan or favoring sale of wine to Tunisians. (One wonders whether the movements for Islamic reform now active in Tunisia were not so in 1972, or whether Entelis' manner of selecting his samples simply did not include them.)

In regard to evaluation of institutions and policies, 66 per cent of the general sample and 52 per cent of the ideological one (including half of the Destourians) believed that a "two-party" or "multi-party" system would best serve the country. Immediately post-Bourguiba, Tunisia's political institutions and social structures would "become precarious" or disintegrate, according to 61 per cent of the general and 60 per cent of the ideological samples. However, the overall agreement between the two samples lessened for the next three questions. "Parliamentary democracy" was seen as the political system which best serves the values of 61 per cent of the general group, but only 32 per cent of the ideological one (including about a third of the Destourians). A division also occurred about the approach Tunisia should take toward modernization: 51 per cent of the general sample favored "gradualism" or "pragmatic evolutionism" (like Bourguiba's approach), while 51 per cent of the ideological group (including over 45 per cent of the Destourians) favored "revolutionism from below." And 62 per cent of the general sample felt that "radical-reform socialism" was the best economic system to satisfy the country's needs; only 37 per cent of the ideological sample agreed with them, while another 34 per cent (including more than three-fifths of the Destourians)

chose Destourian Socialism instead.

With respect to foreign policy, two questions drew responses from Destourians which differed both from other members of the ideological sample and from the general one. For instance, 50 per cent of the general and 55 per cent of the ideological samples opted for a "Pan Arab" orientation favoring ties with both the western and eastern parts of the Arab World, while 40 per cent of the Destourians preferred a "Pro-Western (American)" orientation. Towards Israel, the gap was even larger; 72 per cent of the general and 63 per cent of the ideological samples favored, "greater hostility," but 75 per cent of the Destourians preferred the present government policy of "moderate hostility." Toward the Palestinian movements, however, there was almost unanimity of attitudes: 90 per cent of the general sample, and 97 per cent of the ideological one (including 91 per cent of the Destourians) extended "complete, unequivocal support."

Thus, Entelis believes that both his samples "revealed a widespread sense of disaffection among Tunisian youth towards the system's ethical and judgemental norms, institutional arrangements, political practices, and elitist behavior" and thereby stand in sharp contrast to earlier student samples taken by other investigators. Such disaffections, he says, may spill over into other sectors of Tunisian society and/or be translated into a "viable counter-culture" depending on the degree to which the present students' attitudes change over the next five to ten years, the degree to which alternative political structures develop, and "the character of elite responses to the challenges posed by the counter-elite."

The major strengths of this article are the wide familiarity with relevant literature it demonstrates and the systematic consideration of political disagreements between the ruling elite and (some of) its opponents. The major weaknesses lie within two domains -- administration of the questionnaire and interpretation of results. With regard to the former, both the manner of choosing samples and the timing of the survey are questionable. (Entelis conducted research about one year after some Destourians apparently interfered blatantly in elections for the students' union and only six weeks after the government had broken a major student strike.) With regard to the latter, interpretations of the questions on class, cultural identity, language, and religion were critiqued in the discussion above; in addition, the absence of significance tests for distribution of responses either within or between samples is an important lack. Despite these essentially methodological problems, however, the article takes indirect support from another source: government actions since 1978, and

especially since Dr. Mzalli became Prime Minister, have systematically addressed the problems Entelis discusses -- from freer expression of opinions, through greater emphasis on Arabic identity and language, to steps toward multi-party parliamentary democracy. Accordingly, the article may provide a valuable "key" to how important members of the current elite conceive of Tunisia's political problems.

Hay, M., "A Structural Equation Model of Migration in Tunisia," Economic Development and Cultural Change, vol. 28, pp. 345-358 (1980). TUNISIA ARTICLE POPULATION MIGRATION

Hay begins this article by discussing some problems with prior studies of labor migration. He notes that such studies are often based on data expressed as regional averages or other aggregate measures which are difficult to relate to individual migration decisions. When such studies are based on survey data, they can give more detailed information; but most surveys so far have not been explicitly linked to theoretical models of migration, and they do not "isolate statistically the individual and joint effects" of factors influencing an individual's probability to migrate. In contrast, Hay seeks to "outline a simple micro-economic, human-capital model of rural-urban migration and provide an empirical test of the model based on individual survey data gathered in a rural area of Tunisia."

Data for the article were furnished by a survey conducted near Testour, the town studied by Nicholas Hopkins (see Hopkins 1977, abstracted in this collection). The social structure of agricultural production in this area is composed of a few large, mechanized cereal farms (either private or cooperative), many small "family farms" using mostly "traditional methods of cultivation," and many landless workers employed at least part-time on one or both kinds of farms. Hay's method for sampling this population is not detailed in the article (his dissertation is referenced for further discussion), but he apparently did the following. Using information collected by the national population census in 1966 on 254 households in the area, Hay selected a sample of "migrant and nonmigrant households" with the help of village leaders. From this sample, "usable data were obtained for 295 nonmigrant men and 144 men who left Testour between 1966 and the survey in 1972." Women, children under 15, and men outside the labor force were excluded from further study. That is, for Hay's survey no random samples were taken (either of migrants or nonmigrants), and information about migrants was obtained indirectly (by questioning people still remaining in the area) while information on nonmigrants was obtained directly (by questioning the nonmigrants).

Results of the survey showed that there were important variations in rural income among individuals in the sample. This is particularly significant because the basic hypothesis of the study is that "migration from Testour is largely in response to economic incentives": probability to migrate

is determined by comparing a man's expected urban income with his expected rural income. (The article does not discuss rural-rural migration.)

Assuming that the costs of moving and the possibilities of developing other types of income are "the same for all potential migrants" (and, therefore, not useful in discriminating among them), Hay drops these factors from further consideration. He then presents three equations to model how migration is linked to urban and rural incomes. The first equation states that the probability a person will migrate is directly related to his expected urban income but inversely related to his expected rural income. Expected incomes, in turn, are determined by various factors, and the effects of each may be examined while the others are held constant. For example, the second equation expresses expected urban income as the sum of the following: education (i.e., years of formal schooling or training completed), skill ("an occupational skill transferable to the urban economy"), age (computed as the person's age minus years of secondary education minus 15, when Hay expects youths not in school to enter the labor force), influence (e.g., a contact who can provide information and/or other help concerning opportunities), plus all other relevant conditions. The third equation, then, expresses expected rural income as the sum of education, skill, and age (all computed as before), plus the size of farm operated in the Tentour area (as measured "per active man" per household) and all other relevant conditions. Inserting values obtained by his survey for the above factors, Hay regressed coefficients for each factor by the least-squares method. In the calculations presented as examples, all coefficients except two were significant at the .05 level on a one-tailed T-test. The two exceptions were the influence coefficient (significant only at the .17 level) and the skill coefficient for rural income (significant only at the .12 level). (Also, figures for farm size apparently were omitted during printing of the rural income example.) Despite the generally significant coefficient values, however, Hay's equations gave only poor fits to the survey data. For urban income, the factors mentioned could account for only 20 per cent of the variation (r^2=.20); for rural incomes, only 28 per cent (r^2=.28). Therefore, two of the three equations constituting Hay's model have only weak predictive power, since 72-80 per cent of income variation must be accounted for by factors (or ways of interrelating them) other than the ones he projected. (No correlation figures are given for the first equation but, since it is based on the other two, similar remarks could apply there.)

Hay does not discuss these problems with his model; instead he notes that "adequate data were not available from the survey to construct reliable individual measures of expected urban incomes." Accordingly, he manipulates the three equations algebraically, reducing them to a single equation where expected urban income is expressed implicitly. This partially reduced form of the model, however, may produce simultaneous equation bias, since "all other relevant conditions" here probably include factors affecting both expected incomes but in different ways. To preclude this possibility, Hay reduces the equation still further, so that rural income also is expressed implicitly. Then he employs variants of probit analysis to estimate coefficients for the various factors, first in the partially reduced form of his model and then in its fully reduced form. Although highly significant, consistent, and detailed results are obtained for each of the factors examined, no measure is provided of how well they are correlated. Since this was a major weakness of his model as analyzed by the least-squares method, the omission is serious, leaving open the question of how well either reduced form of the model actually fits the survey data.

Hay concludes the article by summarizing the discussion and indicating how his model could provide "useful insights for both rural development policy and future migration research." For example, he feels his study has shown to what extent migration is responsive to change: increasing rural incomes will least affect migration decisions by persons on either extreme--those least likely to migrate (older, uneducated men) or those most likely to migrate (younger, relatively well educated men); within a given age/education group, the effect of changes in rural income will depend on the prior incomes of group members. But the most important aspect of the article, he says, is that it presents a practical model, "both conceptually and statistically," for dealing with various factors influencing migration.

There are two major strengths in this article: first, it is based on survey data; and second, it follows established scientific procedures by testing a hypothetical model derived from migration theories against empirical data from the survey. Hay's attempt to draw recommendations from the study for policy-makers also is commendable. However, there also are three major weaknesses in the article. First, the survey was poorly done: the indirect method used to learn about migrants was insufficient to provide reliable data. (Perhaps one reason why the influence factor was not very significant is that people living in the country have incomplete information about a migrant's

network of contacts and sources of information.) Second, the original (three equation) form of model provided only poor fits to the survey data despite the generally high levels of significance obtained for factor coefficients. One may conclude that these factors are insufficient to explain many decisions to migrate and would need to be supplemented by others--for example, type (as well as size) of farm in accounting for rural income. Third and finally, no correlation measures at all were given for the reduced forms of the model, leaving unclear their usefulness in accounting for migration decisions.

Hopkins, N., "The Emergence of Class in a Tunisian Town," International Journal of Middle East Studies, vol. 8, pp. 452-481 (1977). TUNISIA ARTICLE GENERAL DEVELOPMENT INTRANATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY

This article, based on repeated field research during the early 1970's, examines changes in the economic, social, and political structures of Testour, a town in the northern, cereal-growing region of Tunisia. The author explains his concept of "class," shows how local stratification has evolved from a system of "rank" to one of "class" over approximately the last generation, and sketches the implications of his method for social analysis generally and for Tunisian society particularly.

Following Meillassoux, Hopkins adopts a Marxist view of class: "members of the society have differential access to the instruments of production and thus emerge in groups (usually two, though sometimes more) whose differential relationship to the mode of production sets them in political opposition." Generally, dominating and dominated classes emerge dialectically, with the former controlling most factors of production and the latter only its labor. As members of these groups become conscious of their shared interests, they can organize to promote them more effectively. Accordingly, Hopkins' method of analysis is to document changes in the organization of work and technology, then to seek evidence for emerging consciousness of membership in either class and indications of organizations promoting class interests.

As background, he sketches how social scientists have presented the growing integration of Middle Eastern communities into national economies and polities. Within this general area, Palestine and North Africa have been affected somewhat specially by influxes of settler colonists. In Tunisia the process began in the 1880's: under colonial rule, European settlers expropriated much of the land and a "relatively egalitarian population of farmers and semi-nomads. . . was largely transformed into a proletariat divided between wage labor on the new estates and migration to wage labor situations in the cities." Testour, however, was more resistant to this process, mainly because of the cohesion of local society. The "precapitalist mode of production" in it was based on relatively simple technologies in agriculture, crafts and commerce, and on various forms of tenure which concentrated access to land in the hands of local notables. The basic production unit was the household, within which labor was allocated by gender:

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men produced basic commodities (like wheat or wool) and women processed them into useable goods (like bread or cloth). Since the technology was simple, households with control over large amounts of land could not work them directly and had to employ others to do so, generally under sharecropping arrangements. Such arrangements promoted a "traditional" ideology of thiqa ("trust") between landowner and land-worker because they did not require much supervision from owners, while providing workers with both an incentive to work and some autonomy in how hard and/or how often they worked. As with agriculture, so with crafts and commerce: journeymen tailors were paid at piece rates and workers at olive presses received shares of gross revenues for their labor.

This mode of production supported a system of stratification based on "intimate mutual knowledge" among persons forming the community. That is, the processes and resultant structures which gave everyone a share in the community, by defining its boundaries and affirming relations of respect and trust among its members, also established a hierarchical system of ranking among them. The criteria for rank in this system have been "social wealth" (i.e., wealth as defined by local standards about its nature and proper use), "ancestry" (i.e., patrilineal and affinal links), and "behavior in public" (especially modesty of women). Thus, local notables ranked high in the system because they had more wealth to distribute through various sharing arrangements and charitable donations, because they descended from and married into "good families," and because they lived outwardly pious, modest lives. Hopkins feels it inappropriate "to refer to this system as a class system, despite the inequalities involved and the concentration of power and resources, because the political opposition tends to be between those who are approximately equal in status and who occupy the same position relative to the mode of production."

Although much of this ranking system is still operative, a new mode of production has emerged in Testour since independence in 1956. Essentially this new mode expands the one European settlers had developed around the town during the interwar period: capital-intensive grain production "based on machinery and wage labor organized by an owner-operator." Most of the wage labor on such colonial farms had been furnished, not by local people, but by other Tunisians who took up residence on the farms or on the outskirts of the town. As Testouri farmers became the owner-operators of trucks, tractors, and combines, then, they employed the "immigrants" as day-laborers. Furthermore, farmers adapted the new techniques to a different area: motor pumps and movable piping allowed them to diversify and enlarge irrigation systems and thereby to shift from subsistence to market production

of fruits and vegetables. Roads were improved so that some truckers make four trips daily to the Tunis market. Forms of collective tenure were mostly converted into freehold title, and "the former colonial farmland either passed under local control through direct sale or confiscation" or it was grouped into cooperatives and state farms under national government control. Accordingly, the new mode of production has involved a group of farmers, who increasingly become rural capitalists hiring labor and producing for a market, and a group of landless workers, who earn wages as closely supervised day-laborers. However, this new mode is at most embryonic in other sectors of the local economy.

In Testour today, then, Hopkins argues that two classes exist "objectively" (i.e., in terms of their opposed roles and interests in production). There is also evidence that members of these groups are becoming conscious of their collective differences. In the work relationship itself, bosses complain that workers are inept, overpaid, and must be constantly supervised; workers are dissatisfied with their wages and complain that constant supervision leaves them no autonomy on the job. Beyond the work relationship, two incidents have indicated rising class consciousness. One concerned the insecure tenure workers have on housing. To reinforce the stability of the quarter where many of them live, workers tried to get government funding to build a mosque there. Government officials referred the matter to the local cell of the ruling Destourian Socialist Party. The cell, whose activities are directed by members of the farmer-employer class, required that money be collected from quarter residents to show their support for the project. Quarter leaders felt this would impose financial difficulties, so they requested that the cell provide materials from which residents could build the mosque themselves. The party cell refused and "there the matter rested." The second incident concerned a distribution of sacrifices from the festival for Testour's "patron saint." Although organizers of the festival had decided to distribute meat to all the town, it "ran out" when the turn of the workers' quarter came.

In both these incidents, local institutions provided organizational structures for farmer-employers to oppose workers; however, a third incident shows the beginning of more overt political competition. Following a disastrous flood in 1973, the party cell petitioned for government help in restoring Testour's fruit and vegetable gardens. Workers were worried about more immediate needs for food and clothing, so they bypassed the cell and sent a petition directly to the regional governor. This made local party members furious; one of them even threatened to expell workers to their "native" areas if the action were repeated.

Thus Hopkins employs two independent variables--the adoption of mechanized agriculture and national political events like independence and abolition of some forms of land tenure--to explain the development of production and a shift in stratification patterns in Testour. While recognizing that this explanation is insufficient to account for all of Tunisia, he does advance four predictions about how class structure will develop locally. First, class consciousness and political opposition will increasingly polarize the population. Second, power and wealth will be concentrated within the farmer-employer class as the more successful "crowd out" the less so. Third, an as yet nascent interest in a particularistic, local identity will grow and reinforce those elements of traditional ideology still operative, particularly among "shopkeepers, craftsmen, small farmers, and so on." And fourth, the integration of the town into the nation will shift from vertical "essentially clientelist" links between "unlikes" (carried over from the precapitalist era) to horizontal links between "likes," as employers ally with employers, and workers with workers, in other areas of the country.

The strengths of this article stem from Hopkins' rich qualitative data, his sensitive yet rigorous use of Marxist theory, and his wide familiarity with the historical and social scientific literature on the Middle East and North Africa. However, there are two main weaknesses. First, there are no quantitative data. If classes are "emerging," it is necessary to know how much so; if a new mode of production is "becoming dominant," the implied comparison could be specified as percent of total production, total revenues, total jobs, or the like. (This problem is compounded by Hopkins' alternation between past and present tenses in discussing aspects of the "traditional" mode of production and ideology.) Second, the prediction that national integration will shift from "vertical" links to "horizontal" ones does not admit the possibility that class ties may supplement, rather than replace, clientelist ties. Indeed, Hopkins' own example of workers directly petitioning the governor for aid may indicate an attempt by this emerging class to establish such ties. These weaknesses are significant, yet they do not vitiate the importance of the article.

Hermassi, E., Leadership and National Development in North Africa: A Comparative Study, University of California Press, Berkeley, CA (1972). TUNISIA BOOK GENERAL DEVELOPMENT INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY

Hermassi proposes to study national development in the Third World by focusing on the nation-state as a unit of analysis. He examines the histories of Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco from before European colonialism until 1970 to reveal their patterns of national integration, institution-building, economic development, and social justice. Many tables supplement the discussion; a selected bibliography is also appended, containing books and articles in Arabic, English, and French on national development, the Maghrib as a whole, and the three countries examined.

The discussion begins with a critique of "modernization theory" as articulated by those "evolutionists, functionalists, and Marxists alike" who feel that less industrialized countries must follow developmental tracks established by countries now more industrialized. Hermassi finds this approach inadequate: it is ethnocentric; it conflates non-European societies, despite their differences, into a residual category called "traditional"; it assumes that all aspects of development necessarily co-occur; it emphasizes internal dynamics of social change, even to the exclusion of external contexts within which change occurs; and it concentrates on the direction and goals of social change, even to the neglect of means by which such change is effected. In contrast, Hermassi says, an approach based on historical analysis is the best way to understand variations in national development, to avoid excessive reliance on either internal processes or external contexts, and to address underlying problems faced by all societies.

Accordingly, Hermassi turns to Ibn Khaldun for a discussion of the medieval Maghribi state, whose social structure he depicts as three concentric circles. At the hub was the central government, the cities it controlled and the tribes who provided military means for control; next came the subject tribes, who provided most tax revenues; and farthest out were the dissident tribes, who refused to pay taxes or provide soldiers. When the central government weakened, through corruption and/or diminished 'asabiya ("solidary feeling and organization"), dissident tribes with strong 'asabiya would push into the center and establish a new government; in time this new government also would weaken and be replaced in a similar manner, leading to a cyclic rise and fall of successive regimes.

From the sixteenth century onward, however, more sophisticated technology enabled governments increasingly to control the markets on which all tribes depended; thus, governments tended to become more stable and tribes less autonomous. By the mid-nineteenth century, for example, the government in Tunisia had established a strong central administration with a high level of political legitimacy (enhanced by the Arab World's first constitution in 1861) among a relatively homogeneous population. In contrast, both Morocco and (even more) Algeria had highly heterogeneous populations and relatively weak central governments, although the Alawite dynasty ruling the former was legitimated by varied forms of religious authority.

Colonization came to Algeria in 1831, to Tunisia in 1881, and to Morocco in 1912. Hermassi analyzes political aspects of this process in terms of the major agents of colonial domination, the administrative practices of the colonizers, and the development of nation-states among the colonized. In Algeria, for example, the military was the major agent of colonization; it sought to destroy prior patterns of social organization by annexation of territory and direct administration of populations living there. In both Tunisia and Morocco, however, colonial rule was more indirect, taking the form of "Protectorates." For Tunisia, civil bureaucrats (like Jacques Ferry) were the major agents of control, and association of the Bey's government to the colonial project caused it increasingly to lose legitmacy among the population. In Morocco, ethnologists (like Robert Montagne) were major agents for controlling the population, but the Alawite monarchy increasingly gained legitimacy as it struggled to protect its leadership of the whole society.

Economic aspects of colonial domination took place within the developing nation-state frameworks. Noting that the initial purpose for French colonization was to reduce demographic surplus in Europe, Hermassi discusses European percentages of the total population, territory, and income in 1955. In Algeria, for example, Europeans constituted 10 per cent of the population but had 40 per cent of the cultivable land and 47 per cent of the gross income. In Tunisia, they were 7 per cent of the population, holding 18 per cent of cultivable land, but they had 43 per cent of gross income. And in Morocco, the 3.5 per cent of the population which was European had 12 per cent of cultivable land and 33 per cent of gross income. With the establishment of each subsequent colony, then, French policies became more "efficient," as they required less Europeans and land to control sizeable amounts of income. However, a major social consequence of these policies was the creation of ever larger numbers of <u>paysans deracines</u>

("peasants whose roots have been amputated") among local populations in Algeria and Tunisia (and, to a lesser extent, in Morocco too). Some of these people, no longer peasants but not yet proletarians, were able to piece together livelihoods on the margins of colonial farms; others in increasing numbers migrated to the cities or even abroad.

The period of colonial domination in Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco was thus a time of profound social change and the "development of underdevelopment"; yet it was also a time for the progressive emergence of national leaders. In Tunisia this process occurred in two stages: from 1920 to 1934, the national liberation movement was led by the Destour ("Constitution") party, which had a bourgeois elite based mainly in Tunis with a "scripturalist" ideology emphasizing defense of the Arabic language and Muslim traditions; from 1934 on, the movement was taken over by the Neo-Destour party, which had a petit-bourgeois elite based mainly in the Sahel and a "liberal-gradualist" ideology emphasizing alliances with the labor unions and, later, "nationalists" in the upper class. The struggle for Tunisian independence thus involved establishing an increasingly sophisticated party which ultimately became a countersystem opposing the French Protectorate. In Morocco and Algeria national leadership evolved differently: in the former, the Istiqlal ("Independence") party was unable to develop a rural base and the monarchy increasingly dominated the independence movement; in the latter, movements with at least three different ideological tendencies and organizational bases were united only by opposition to the French, allowing the army to take over leadership of the struggle and ultimately, the independent government resulting from it.

Internal struggles marked a transitional period in all three countries of the Maghrib. In Tunisia they occurred from 1954-56, as the secretary of the Neo-Destour (Ben Youssef) disputed with the party's president (Bourguiba) about provisions of the agreements that ultimately led to full independence. In Morocco and Algeria the transitional period occurred after independence: in the former, the monarchy maneuvered to present itself as the paramount symbol for national unity and as the arbiter between groups competing for power and authority from 1956-59; in the latter, intraelite conflicts were manifested as rural rebellions or factional alignments in the national assembly until an army coup deposed Ben Bella in 1965. Thus, in each country a transitional period around independence was a time when struggles concerned who would control the state, not whether the state should exist. Even when competition took the form of rural or regional rebellions, Hermassi says, the rebels were using traditional means (such as mobilizing ethnic identities or kin organization) to attain modern goals (such as prodding the government into providing the services they desired in education, employment, health care, and so forth). Accordingly, Hermassi sees this competition as a confirmation for the existence of each nation-state.

Following the transitional periods, the substantive contents of the nation-states were transformed by policies for institution-building, economic development, and social justice. In Tunisia, the Neo-Destour party was the dominant political institution. Already the oldest continually functioning party in Africa and the Arab World, the Neo-Destour by 1970 had a wide membership (33 per cent of Tunisian adult males, according to Hermassi) and a highly developed organization (including regional and professional branches, and alliances with the General Confederation of Tunisian Workers, the National Union of Tunisian Women, and other national organizations). Following independence, however, party strategies for leadership vacillated between "reconciliatory" (when it attempted to reconcile all elements of society into a grand consensus, as during 1956-62 and again after 1969) and "mobilizational" (as when it tried to rebuild the society according to various development plans from 1962-69). In Algeria and Morocco, no party played such an important role: in the former, the army was the dominant institution and it attempted to build popular support through technical management of the economy rather than through political consensus; in the latter, the monarchy was the dominant institution and it attempted to build a political consensus from 1956-60, then fostered the growth of new elites to counter the political parties from 1960-65, and finally ran the country by martial law from 1965-70.

These various institutional strategies intersected with policies for development, for in each society political legitimacy was linked to economic achievement. The case of Tunisia is instructive in this regard. From independence to 1962, the government followed a "liberal" economic policy while promoting educational and social reforms. From 1962-69 it shifted toward the central planning policies favored by Minister Ben Salah and sought to raise capital by several methods. Half of investment needs were to come from agricultural cooperatives (grouped around formerly colonial farms, especially in the north) which used modern production methods to free labor for industrial projects and to provide a living to those still cultivating the land. The other half of investments were to come from foreign sources. However, rigidities in centralized planning contributed to increasing financial strain and mounting political dissent. When the plans began to affect sectors of the population with more power than the peasants and workers, dissent grew to bounds where the government was forced to change policies, repudiate Ben Salah, and return to a more "laissez-faire" system under Prime Minister Nouira (see Boukraa 1976 and Larson 1975, abstracted in this collection, for further details). In Algeria, the first policy attempts toward economic development also encountered difficulties. Following the lead of workers and peasants who occupied and ran the formerly colonial farms, the government launched "autogestion" reforms,

supposedly to place agricultural production in the hands of producers. In fact, the bureaucracy established to support autogestion finished by controlling it, as output failed to keep pace with growing demand. In 1967 the government shifted policies more toward development of heavy industries based on oil and gas, and the agricultural sector increasingly stagnated. In Morocco, plans for economic development were less ambitious, favoring growth of extractive entreprises (especially phosphate mining), some industrial production to substitute for imports, and minimal land reform.

Thus Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco share many similarities but have developed differently since before French colonization. Examined comparatively in 1970, Tunisia had strong political institutions but only mid-level productive capacity and social welfare policies; Algeria had weak political institutions, strong productive capacity, and weak social welfare policies; while Morocco had mid-level political institutions but weak productive capacity and social welfare policies. In all three countries, however, there was a high degree of national integration: regimes could come or go, depending on their performances, but the nation-states were solidly established.

This book has several strengths: a clear exposition of historical sequences in national development in the Maghrib; a plausible explanation for "reactivation of traditionalism" as a result of competition by traditional means (mobilization of kin or other solidarities) within modern frameworks (nation-states) for modern goals (state services); and a useful guide for further social research. The book also has some weaknesses. One concerns balance in coverage of the four policy areas discussed: over 75 per cent of the book concerns national integration; about 10 per cent discusses institution-building; and the remaining 15 per cent is subdivided between economic development and social justice. The discussion of social segmentation and 'asabiya raises many questions, and no sources are cited for the statistics on land ownership in the three countries or membership in the Neo-Destour party. Also, Hermassi never substantiates the claim (in Section 4 and on page 208) that "Maghribi societies are presently equal in national cohesion to any European society"; he may be correct, but no analysis of national cohesion in Europe or explicit comparison between Europe and the Maghrib are presented. Finally, the book was published in 1972; accordingly, it says little about the Nouira period in Tunisia and nothing about the Green March in Morocco or the Algerian-Polariso-Morocco conflict in the Sahara. Nonetheless, on balance this book provides probably the best overall framework for understanding national development in the Maghrib until 1970.

Larson, B., The Impact of National Government on Local Life and Politics in a Tunisian Village, Unpublished PhD Dissertation, Columbia University (1975). TUNISIA DISSERTATION/ THESIS GENERAL DEVELOPMENT INTRANATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY

The central thesis of this dissertation is that by 1969 the centralized, single-party government of Tunisia had created a "bureaucratic society," where all citizens were tightly integrated into the national economy and polity and where political life in some communities had become "passive, ritualistic, retreatist, and often characterized by a displacement of goals." Larson begins by describing the community where her analysis was focused; then she discusses the national government's impact on local life generally, and local politics particularly; and finally she contrasts conclusions from her study with situations elsewhere in Africa. Several figures, tables, and a bibliography also are included.

The community of study, which Larson calls el-Qarya (literally, "the village"), consists of about 1500 people in an intermontane valley between Kef and Jendouba in northwest Tunisia. This village is spatially divided into upper (hillside) and lower (plain) halves, with an area between them containing most service facilities. Agriculture (grains and orchards) and mining (since the Protectorate) have been important there, but today they are surpassed by administration and chantier (government public works) as major sectors of employment. All citizens are Sunni Muslims and divide space and labor by gender.

Local social organization, Larson says, can be described in terms of "lines of cleavage" and "forces of unity." For instance, vertical cleavages are exemplified by community households (about two-thirds of which are nuclear, with the remainder joint and extended), "lineages" (i.e., groups based on supposed partilineal descent from a common ancestor), and the residential halves of the village. However, neither "lineages" nor residential halves function as corporate groups: the great majority of land and other resources are owned by individuals; marriages show only a light tendency toward endogamy within the "lineage" or (somewhat stronger) the residential half; and conflict resolution is controlled by the police and state institutions. Horizontal cleavages (as shown by varying amounts of land owned or standards of living) exist but are "not rigidly differentiated or institutionalized." Furthermore, there has been "a fair amount of mobility, both upward and downward" within the community. One of the forces of unity is germane to this point: Larson claims that ideas about status and prestige are shared among local people, so they

agree about who has what rank and why. Their rankings imply that social wealth (i.e., wealth gained and manifested in socially appropriate ways) and political influence are the most significant criteria, with proper moral character and religious learning also important. (Accordingly, there are interesting similarities and differences between this system of stratification and the "precapitalist ranking system" of Testour described in Hopkins 1977, abstracted in this collection.) Other unitary forces are the local service institutions (mosque, school, weekly market, etc.), the formal and informal religious traditions, and the priority given to kinship networks in social interaction.

This social organization has developed historically within three national frameworks. Beylical Tunisia was a relatively centralized state whose regions were administered by caids personally appointed by the Bey. Caids in turn appointed sheiks to collect taxes, help conscription, and maintain order on the local level. In Protectorate Tunisia, the French essentially maintained this system but allocated French overseers for each official. With independence, control of the economy and polity returned to Tunisian hands. However, the trends toward centralization of power and authority, and penetration of local communities by national organizations, were augmented to help in the "battle against underdevelopment." Thus, linkage between village and the outside world existed under the Beys, increased under the French, and vastly intensified under the Tunisian government in two stages.

The first stage involved essentially political and administrative actions. Building on the infrastructure it had established during the independence struggle, the Neo-Destour centralized and interlocked the national party organization and the state administration. Bourguiba became president of both state and party; the ministers of state were selected mainly from the party's Political Bureau; and the state-appointed regional governors were made presidents of the regional party organizations. Beneath these officials the interlocking memberships ended, however; local party branches elected their leaders, while the state appointed district officers (delegues) and local sheiks (later called omdas and elected by local citizens). The state also established institutions at the local level for education and social welfare, and it encouraged popular participation in several organizations linked to the party branches (e.g., student and youth groups, the women's federations, labor and agricultural unions).

From 1961 on, however, government-party actions entered a second stage. Under the obligation of maintaining the industries, services, and farms taken over from the French, and seeking to promote social and economic development,

the government began a program of state capitalism organized as cumpulsory "cooperatives" for production and distribution. For example, to the nucleus of nationalized farms was added other land, starting with parcels too small to profit from mechanization and similar capital investments. Although owners retained title to parcels, control over their use was shifted to the cooperatives (in fact, to the state administrators who directed them). Also, not all owners were allowed to become working members, and returns were distributed only after the sale of the harvest (minus certain operating costs of the cooperatives). Similar concentrations of functions, personnel, and materiel occurred with distribution cooperatives. In el-Qarya these changes meant that by 1969 "virtually the whole of the local economy had been brought under government control." But this economic penetration of the village was coordinated with increasing administrative integration as well. El-Qarya was made into a district capital (delegation): a district officer was located in the village, and a number of national organizations (e.g., the cooperative office, and the employment bureau) opened local offices. Correspondingly, local citizens had more, and more direct, contacts with the government than before, as the community became "fully integrated" into the nation.

The effect of this integration on local-level politics was stultifying. In the formal part of the political system, citizens had to deal with administrators whose modes of recruitment, styles of action, and future careers made them more representatives of the government to the people than vice-versa. In the informal part of the system, citizens were able to influence only local notables and lower-level officials in the administration and national organizations by establishing personal relations with them. This limitation on informal contacts was made all the more constraining by the lack of persons from the locality with important jobs in the national government. For most people, then, local-level politics became an exercise in "Uncle Tom" behaviors: attending ceremonial visits by officials or sending congratulatory telegrams to the capital in order to protect one's own from negative effects of national policies and to achieve private goals.

Such behaviors, Larson says, "are related to the centralized and pervasive character of the national government on the one hand and the lack of significant local power, influence or autonomy on the other, and in these respects mirror exactly the kinds of behaviors which have been associated with bureaucratic organizations in which all power is concentrated at the top." That is, not all bureaucracies produce "bureaucratic behavior" on the local level, but highly centralized ones do. Conversely, "in bureaucratic systems where a greater degree of autonomy is allocated to the lower levels of the organization, or where individuals

on the lower echelons can carve out a sphere of authority and power for themselves within the organization, we would expect bureaucratic behavior to be less pronounced." With this proviso in mind, Larson contrasts the case of el-Qarya with villages in two other "mobilizing, one-party" African states. In the case of an Egyptian village, government actions fostered autonomy, so local politics were vitalized and invigorated rather than marginalized and constrained. In the case of a Malian village, local political traditions and organizations were so strong that citizens could impede and obstruct those policies not in accord with their own goals and methods. In Egypt, then, the government fostered autonomous local politics; in Mali, local citizens imposed them; but in el-Qarya, neither case occurred.

The main strengths of this dissertation are its clear writing, extensive detail, and incisive analysis. The alternations between village ethnography and theoretical discussions are well integrated and contribute to supporting the central thesis. However, there are also problems. One of these is Larson's description of el-Qarya's integration into the state. While recognizing that integration is probably better conceptualized as a continuous than as a discrete variable, she nonetheless follows the usage of some anthropologists in seeing the village as "fully integrated." One of her reasons for doing so is that "the cultural and structural discontinuities between local and national communities were no longer great enough to require the services of a cultural broker"; however, her ethnography shows that there indeed was a discontinuity between the two communities (one monopolized power and authority so much that the other adopted "bureaucratic behavior"). Accordingly, rather than "full integration," the situation of el-Qarya might better be described as "high integration, lack of alternatives." A related problem is that Larson at times does not clearly differentiate between the formal and informal aspects of political organization. For example, she discusses conditions when a local community might "be able to influence or affect the policies of the bureaucracy in which it is incorporated": first, if it is of crucial economic importance to the nation; second, if it is of crucial political importance; and third, if there are "personal ties between community leaders and members of the national elite." Larson recognizes that the third condition may exist in villages of the Sahel (like Hammam Sousse, discussed by Moore 1963 and abstracted in this collection). What she apparently does not recognize is that, first, these ties may be systematically organized, and second, that such ties might link any local people (not just community leaders) to others who, in turn, have such ties to members of the national elite. Again, it apparently was the

misfortune of the people of el-Qarya to lack such personal ties in 1969. This relates to a final point: it would be extremely useful for Larson, or someone else, to do a follow-up study, since the Tunisian government retreated from the centralism she describes (first, in economy and then in politics) during the 1970's. One wonders what effects these changes have had on el-Qarya.

Micaud, C., "Bilingualism in North Africa: Cultural and Sociopolitical Implications," Western Political Science Quarterly, vol. 27, no. 1, pp. 92-103 (1974). TUNISIA ARTICLE GENERAL DEVELOPMENT OTHER

Micaud considers a matter which has been studied from varying points of view--language use and its implications for development. He mentions that "Arabic is the official language and Islam the state religion" in the Maghreb, but French is still widely used and bilingual systems of education exist in each of the countries there. Using mostly Tunisian data, Micaud examines the historical bases of this bilingualism, the ways it was evolving in 1974, and the consequences it may have for future cultural and political life in the region. (An assumption pervasive through the article is that choice of language implies choice of identity, which may be true often but is not so necessarily.) Before independence, French was imposed on Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia as part of the "civilizing mission" of the colonizer. Those colonized had differing attitudes toward the language. Some saw it as "the language of rationality and modernity, the best road to social promotion." Others (like the faculty and students of Zituna Mosque University) resisted French and clung to Classical Arabic as the vehicle for traditional values of Moslem Arabic culture, an antagonistic approach to Western civilization, religious apologetics, and a Pan-Arab sense of identity." In Tunisia, still others were able to obtain a "bilingual and bicultural education of a high caliber and modernist character" at Sadiki College. President Bourguiba was among them and many co-alumni followed him into the Neo-Destour party.

Following independence, this cadre became the political elite of the country. They used the model of Sadiki College to establish a national system of bilingual instruction, where "French became the dominant language of education at the secondary and university levels," especially in mathematics and sciences. Originally proposed as a transitional step toward total Arabization, this bilingual system has been maintained and strengthened until the present. Micaud takes this policy as evidence that the government ranks "modernization" over "national identity and self-assertion" among the goals it pursues. (Similar priorities and policies, he says, have been adopted in Algeria and Morocco.)

These historical bases, then, have led to a rapidly evolving and innovative linguistic situation. In Tunisia today, four variants of Arabic co-exist with a French-Arabic mixture and French. The Arabic variants can be

classified according to their internal structures and patterns of use. Classical Arabic, "the only pure form of the language," has the most complex structure; also it is used for the most formal functions, such as religious discourse and much literary creation. Modern Standard Arabic has a simpler syntax and is widely used as the language of the mass media. Following Dr. Maamouri at the University of Tunis, Micaud calls a third variant "Educated Arabic": its syntax and morphology are simpler than those of Modern Standard Arabic, while its lexicon comes half from there and half from Tunisian Colloquial Arabic. Educated Arabic is thus an intermediate form, favored by the government and widely used by educated people to write or speak, which draws both on the formal variants mentioned above and on the informal, dialectal one. This fourth variant, Tunisian Colloquial Arabic, is the least systematic in structure and least formal in use; it is learned audiolingually at home by most Tunisians (whereas the three other variants are learned in schools or similar contexts) and it is the commonest form used for speaking. Among educated Tunisians probably the next most common tongue is the French-Arabic hybrid, "where the speaker uses alternately groups of French words that form correct grammatical constructions followed by an equally correct group of words in dialect, and vice versa." Shifts between tongues occur "in response to lexical difficulties, a change of context, or simply a playful reflex," with the first factor being the most important. Finally, French may be learned at home and/or school, but "in secondary schools the number of hours of teaching in French is much larger than its equivalent in Arabic" and students use French more extensively outside class for writing letters, reading newspapers, etc. In college 75 per cent of the students say they now prefer to use French, although 58 per cent would like Educated Arabic to become the national language. (This corresponds roughly to the relevant questionnaire responses discussed in Entelis 1974, abstracted in this collection.) Also, university students use French or the French-Arabic hybrid most often outside class.

Thus the current linguistic situation is complex. Among the variants of Arabic, Educated Arabic is gaining importance as more people become literate and employ it for speaking and writing. French is seen by most as a foreign language to be learned and used for the access it provides to more "modern" lifestyles and forms of organization. This fairly pragmatic and instrumental bilingualism, however, is associated with some emotional ambivalence about where the national identity lies.

According to Micaud, this question of identity involves two choices: a cultural one (identification with "the Arab-Muslim tradition," Western-style "modernity," or some synthesis of the two) and a political one (working toward Pan-Arab unity, a "local" nationalism, or some synthesis

of the two). However, Micaud's analysis of the present linguistic situation has revealed a somewhat different picture. A kind of synthesis is emerging there, as Educated Arabic grows in usage and co-exists with the French-Arabic hybrid and French in a bilingual environment. Rather than the product of a clear-cut choice, this bilingualism has resulted from a period of experimentation, when the "co-habitation" of foreign, hybrid, and local variants was seen as "comfortable and enriching, rather than traumatic." Similarly, evolution toward cultural and political synthesis "is dependent on the absence of a serious political crisis" that could polarize Tunisians toward different affiliations and require some traumatic "choice" among them. But Tunisia has not been spared such crises. In the late 1960s and early 1970s the country shifted from state capitalism toward a more laissez-faire economy and attempts to liberalize the political system were repressed. Increasingly voices called for Arabization of education and culture as a means of unifying the country and enabling it to deal with problems in a more "authentic" way. If the regime is unresponsive to such calls, and to the underlying critique of educational, economic, and political policies they imply, it will in time encounter opposition expressed as defense of Arabic language and culture, Micaud claimed in 1974. Events subsequent to the writing of the aticle--such as the growth of the Movement for Islamic Renewal (discussed in Belhassen 1979, abstracted in this collection)--proved him right.

The major strengths of this article are its clear presentation of linguistic research done by others and its prescient analysis of conditions fostering an opposition whose members refuse to speak French to each other and who call for a return to authentic national and religious values while criticizing social inequalities and moral corruption in present-day Tunisia. A weakness of the article is its very "Tuniso-centric" view of the Maghreb, which reduces to a footnote the situation of the larger Berber-speaking populations of Algeria and Morocco. Also, several changes have occurred in Tunisian political and economic policies, as well as in the personalities implementing them. Since the article was written, Tunis has become the headquarters of the Arab League; labor migration coupled with aid and investment have linked the country more tightly to other Arab oil producers; and cultural exchanges (including a greater emphasis on common religious bonds) also have identified the Tunisian government more with "Arab-Muslim traditions," even as it continues its efforts toward "modernization."

Moore, C., "Politics in a Tunisian Village," Middle East Journal, vol. 17, no. 5, pp. 527-540 (1963). TUNISIA ARTICLE GENERAL DEVELOPMENT INTRANATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY

In this article Moore addresses the question of how democracy might be achieved through single-party rule in the "emergent nations" of the Middle East and Africa. Some politicians, he says, have claimed that one-party politics accords better with their indigenous traditions of "harmonious discussion and spontaneous agreement" than open electoral competition does. Feeling such a politics is implausible at the national level, Moore seeks it locally: he examines the political history of a village in Tunisia to determine whether (and if so, how) "the representative forces of the village were actually conciliated. . . despite the absence of an organized opposition."

Hammam Sousse is a village in the Tunisian Sahel, a region running along the Mediterranean from north of Sousse to south of Mahdia. This densely populated region has been taken as a model for developing the rest of the country because of its traditions of stable village life, economic enterprise, and political activism. According to Moore, "Hammam Sousse is a typical though not quite average Sahel village." It seems to be of relatively recent origin (while others around it date to Roman or even Punic times); its economy emphasizes vegetable production and wage work in the nearby city of Sousse (while other Sahel villages are based more on olive production); and its politics are not dominated by family-based factions (while many other villages are riven by them).

During the Protectorate, there was a "dual polity" in Hammam Sousse, as in the Sahel generally. The legal authority on the village level, the sheik, in practice was named by the French colonial adminstration. From at least 1930 onward, however, local notables opposed the sheik. Over time the Neo-Destour (forerunner of the Destourian Socialist Party) channeled this opposition into a "parallel administration": from its headquarters in a religious sanctuary near the main square, the party cell gained control of the scouts, a student organization, and an association for secondary school graduates. (There are strong similarities between this organizational strategy and that of the Movement for Islamic Renewal; see Belhassen 1979, abstracted in this collection.) The symbiosis between local opposition and the Neo-Destour was illustrated by the successful establishment of an independent Qur'anic school in 1945 by village notables with clandestine financing and political

support from the party. Taken by surprise, colonial authorities allowed the school to function, and within three years it had doubled in size. By the early 1950's, then, the Neo-Destour was solidly based in Hammam Sousse. When it was driven underground by French repression in 1952, "some fifty village militants actively participated in the party's terrorist network, and the Neo-Destour assassinated three 'collaborationist' villagers."

Under party leadership, independence was achieved in 1956. Thus, national leaders and at least some local ones "shared a common political outlook and more than two decades of struggle in a common cause," so the "dual polity" seemed a thing of the past. The following year citizens of Hammam Sousse were allowed to elect a municipal council. The Neo-Destour drew up a list of candidates which included local notables, party activists, and even a "notorious" ex-terrorist; opposing them was an Independent list of "the remaining educated residents." The party campaigned openly in cafes and rallies, arguing that those who "had brought independence should govern the village." The opposition campaigned mostly from house to house, enlisting women to persuade other women (this being the first time they could vote), and promising responsible local government without patronage obligations to the party faithful.

The opposition achieved a two-to-one majority. This surprising result--defeat of the party which had led the independence struggle and was at the peak of its popularity nationally--occurred in only three of the ninety communities choosing municipal councils. (Moore traces the loss to complacency on the part of the "clique" guiding the local party cell; another plausible explanation could be a community solidarity which preceded, and was allied only temporarily to, the Neo-Destour.) In the case of Hammam Sousse, the result was undermined by the party cell and higher authorities within three months, and village affairs were administered by a delegate of the governor of Sousse.

In 1960 another election for municipal council was held. This time (and every election thereafter until 1980) only the Neo-Destour list of candidates was allowed to run. This new list omitted some of the more unpopular party personages but included as leader Hadi Bakkouch, recently returned from university study in France, and another young man. Bakkouch's strategy of combining older leaders with young, new ones continued the following year in the election for the executive committee of the party. Contests there differed from the other Tunisian elections by having at least twice as many candidates as the positions to be filled. Thus, a kind of "democratic centralism" resulted: the arena for real

choice (as contrasted with simple ratification) shifted from municipal (and national) elections, where all citizens could vote, to elections within the party, where only party members could vote.

"The 1957 debacle in Hammam Sousse suggested the dangers of the artificial division of a village into opposing electoral camps" on the model of Western democracy: it could produce an autonomous council while almost all Tunisian leaders were calling for centralized coordination and discipline in the "battle against underdevelopment." Within the party, however, members shared a broad consensus about what needed to be done and how to do it; a gifted leader judged the popular will, eliminated candidates found objectionable, and integrated new "representative forces, including the youth," into local party institutions. Thus, the party provided procedures that "helped Hammam Sousse--and many similar villages--to resolve local differences, canalize youthful energies, and progress into the modern world in intimate association with the new nation."

The main strengths of this article are its clarity of argument and supporting detail and its attention to political dynamics on both local and national levels over the historical period discussed. There are also two major weaknesses. First, since Hammam Sousse was among the tiny minority of communities which voted for non-party municipal councils when elections were open, one wonders just how "typical" an example it provides of Sahel villages. And second, the "political engineering" which Moore praises actually was a response to the situation created by subversion of the expressed wishes of the village majority, a response which co-opted some local opposition while satisfying national authorities and local supporters of the Neo-Destour. Perhaps this kind of "democratic centralism" led to the popular dissatisfaction and "conter-culture" which Entelis found among Tunisian students later (see Entelis 1974, abstracted in this collection).

Poncet, J., "Les Structures Actuelles de l'Agriculture Tunisienne," in Les Problemes Agraires au Maghreb, ed. B. Etienne, pp. 45-56, Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, Paris (1977). TUNISIA ARTICLE AGRICULTURE OTHER

This article examines the development of Tunisian agriculture in 1970-75. After a short introduction, Poncet discusses state actions following the demise of efforts toward total cooperativization. Then he contrasts the successful technical results of these state actions with their apparent lack of social results and draws two conclusions. Several tables and notes are used to supplement the discussion.

Poncet recalls that agricultural policies during this period were oriented toward developing and conserving water and soil, raising the technical level of cultivators, delimiting and distributing public land, and reorienting investments toward private enterprise by means of credit policies and professional organizations. Major efforts concerning water and soil often were aided by foreign and international bodies, but more modest efforts like extension of irrigation networks or repair of retention dams also were undertaken. The overall effect of all these policies, Poncet says, was to favor a minority of privileged cultivators, recalling "models of action and intervention developed during the epoch of the French Protectorate." (Of course, the minority then was Tunisian, while before it had been mostly European.)

A statistical survey based on samples drawn from the Regional Centers for Agricultural Development and from organizations under public control was made of northern Tunisia in 1975. This region contains the most productive land in the country, as well as two-thirds of the total cultivated nationally. Tractor use was increasing rapidly in this region: half the cultivators there used them in 1975. Ninety per cent of these users rented the machines (the rest were owners); and more than half the tractors were less then five years old. Also, use of chemical fertilizers was increasing: more than 90,000 tons of superphosphates were consumed in 1974-75; during the 1950's the average annual consumption was 40-50,000 tons.

These increases in production inputs resulted in significant changes in areas cultivated: except for cereals and tree crops, the surface cultivated annually was "four

or five times greater than twenty years before." That is, in 1975 truck farms occupied more than 50,000 hectares (against 15-20,000 in the 1950's); legumes, more than 90,000 hectares (against 50-60,000 in the prior period); and fodder crops, more than 200,000 hectares (against a "practically negligible" amount earlier). Areas devoted to cereal production, in contrast, remained relatively stable in recognition of a "necessity affirmed since independence across all the programs of rural development"--namely, to minimize mechanized dry farming of poor quality soils. All these cultivation patterns, in turn, were linked to strong growth in gross revenues: "in 1974-75, if we are to believe these agricultural researchers, the gross revenue only from areas cultivated in the north could have represented some 130-140 million dinars against less than 120 million dinars average annual gross revenue for all of Tunisia from 1965 to 1969."

Poncet, however, counsels prudence in projecting this growth over the long term. In addition to factors like confidence limits of sample surveys or annual variations of climate, he calls attention to agrarian social structures and, particularly, to the structure of land ownership. Comparing the results of the 1975 survey with an agricultural census taken in 1961-62 ("therefore before the recovery of all lands belonging to colonizers and before the formation of cooperatives"), Poncet notes the "extraordinary stability of agrarian structures." He presents two tables: one contains information from the 1975 survey; and the second compares results from the 1962 census with the survey. However, there are several discrepancies between the two tables. For example, the first one indicates that in 1975 30,450 of the cultivating units had two hectares or less, for a global area of 26,060 hectares; but the second table says that in the same year 70,000 units had two hectares or less, for a global area of 295,000 hectares. Similarly, one table says that in 1975 59,720 cultivating units covered between two and ten hectares, for a global area of 294,500 hectares; while the second table says 100,000 units, for a global area of 320,000 hectares. (Less important discrepancies concern unsystematic rounding of figures and collapsing of categories in the second table.)

What Poncet apparently is trying to do might be captured in the following way:

(See chart on following page.)

unit size (in hectares)	% cultivating units 1962	1975	(1975 less*)	% global area 1962	1975	(1975 less*)
under 2*	?	24.	(---)	?	1.2	(---)
2-10 (small)	65.	46.9	(62)	13.	13.6	(14)
10-50 (medium)	29.	24.4	(32)	31.	28.2	(29)
over 50 (large)	5.5	4.7	(6)	56.	57.	(57)
N=	97.4 (thousands of units)	127.1	(96.7)	1950 (thousands of hectares)	2165	(2139)

That is, if one excludes from consideration those units under two hectares (as Poncet infers the 1962 census did), then the relative numbers and global areas of the small, medium, and large units in 1975 (as shown above within parentheses) would remain much as they had been in 1962. For instance, small units would be 62 per cent of all units in 1975 (versus 65 per cent in 1962) and would contain 14 per cent of all cultivated land (versus 13 per cent in 1962); similarly, for medium and large units. (Poncet does note that perhaps 300,000 hectares held by large units were in cooperatives or other parts of the public domain in 1975.)

However, one may question an exclusion which eliminates almost one-quarter of the units from consideration. Poncet infers that this exclusion was due to "insufficiencies in the 1962 census, which must not have taken into account the tenures constituted by domains under one or two hectares and only with difficulty conceived of as real units." Despite his labelling the exclusion an "insufficiency," he seems to agree with it in other parts of the article, and it is necessary to his claim about the stability of agrarian structures. However, it is plausible that the large number of units containing under two hectares of land are linked to the increase of areas cultivated as truck farms. (This point would be even stronger if the technology for plastic greenhouses was operational in Tunisia in 1975, a matter not discussed in the article.) Accordingly, Poncet's manner of comparing the 1975 survey with the 1962 census seems highly questionable (as does the claim about social structures, which is based on the comparison).

Poncet draws two conclusions from the analysis of social structure. First, the rural exodus since 1961-62 "does not at all express an abandonment of the land by the working peasantry, but the departure of people without work or land." That is, the "stability" of agrarian structures from 1962 to 1975 indicates that land ownership is not

becoming more concentrated, so categories of the population other than landowners must be the source of rural emigration. (Of course, this conclusion is dependent upon the "stability" claim; also, one may question the sufficiency of land ownership as an indicator of propensity to migrate.) Second, "the dualism which has reappeared or been maintained between the diverse sectors of this peasantry, despite some progress realized through state actions and foreign 'aid,' makes necessary more than ever the public actions projected in all the key sectors of rural development." That is, "technical" changes have been achieved in inputs (such as increased use of tractors and chemical fertilizers) and outputs (such as increases in areas cultivated and gross revenues); but they have not diminished the inequalities between a small number of large cultivators possessing great means, on one hand, and "a numerous peasantry insufficiently provided for in all respects," on the other.

The major strengths of this article are its use of a historical perspective to illuminate changes in Tunisian agriculture and its attempt to differentiate the impacts of those changes on different categories of cultivators. Poncet also addresses a key question of rural development: how well do "technical" indicators (like increased mechanization or gross revenues) correlate with changes in the social infrastructure of agriculture (like changes in land ownership). Conversely, the article's major weakness is its questionable interpretation of the comparison between the 1975 survey and the 1962 census.

Smaoui, A., "Tourism and Employment in Tunisia," in Tourism: Passport to Development?, ed. E. de Kadt, pp. 101-110, Oxford University Press, New York (1979). TUNISIA ARTICLE INDUSTRY TOURISM

This article has the goal of assessing the economic returns of international tourism, and of making an "objective evaluation of its advantages and disadvantages," for Tunisia. Smaoui is with the Tunisian National Tourism Office, and he uses tables and short discussions to present data from two surveys undertaken by the Office. One was a published study of the overall profitability of tourism and returns on state aid to that sector; the other was an unpublished study of the composition of tourism employment.

Smaoui begins by outlining several effects of tourism on Tunisian economy and society. The benefits of tourism are mainly economic: the sector is a large earner of foreign currency (the largest, at time of writing) and it creates new jobs. Tourism also has stimulated social change--for example, through the expansion of education and vocational training to provide services to the sector or through the introduction of new styles of social behavior. Some of these changes have become problems, as when tourists and citizens have competed for limited goods and services available in local communities. Accordingly, Smaoui feels that any general assessment of the effects of tourism on Tunisia should be based on a careful examination of the pros and cons.

He says that tourism has created jobs in Tunisia in two different ways. First, it has created them directly by requiring people to staff hotels and restaurants, to provide international and domestic transportation, to handle governmental formalities, and to make and sell handicrafts. All together, these functions produce between .88 and 1.12 jobs per hotel bed per year (given an average occupancy rate between 40 and 56 per cent). Second, tourism has created jobs indirectly, either by activities that help to supply enterprises (e.g., providing food to tourist restaurants) or by activities establishing and renovating the basic infrastructure for tourism (e.g., constructing hotels or making furniture for them). Supply activities generate between .59 and .78 jobs per hotel bed per year, Smaoui says, while infrastructure activities generate 2.7 jobs per bed per the average investment life of 25 years for a resort hotel. To make the figures for infrastructure activities comparable to those for supply activities and direct operations, it is necessary to sum "the person years of employment during the life of the investment": the result is that for every job created within hotels, between 3.6 and 4.3 jobs are generated outside them.

The survey on the composition of these jobs showed that the average annual wage for a hotel worker was about $1200 in 1974, which is less than wages in food processing or mining but more than those in agriculture or construction. "Regular personnel" or "service staff" accounted for more than 70 per cent of jobs in hotels and more than 50 per cent of them in other direct operations. Hotel personnel typically were young (33 per cent under 23 years old), male (84 per cent), mobile (29 per cent change employers within three years), and unionized. The 16 per cent female jobholders work mostly in hotels, travel agencies, and administrative services, where job tenure is relatively more stable. Employees in tourism generally tended to have little education: 66 per cent had only some primary schooling or less. Until 1970 employees were generally trained on the job; eight hotel schools and an institute for management were functioning by 1978; and currently refresher courses and advanced vocational programs enable employees to be promoted from within organizations.

Smaoui next discusses three social impacts of employment in tourism. One is the increasing concentration of Tunisian population on the coasts, in part because of labor migration to jobs at beach resorts, the "basic attraction of tourism" in the country. Second is the competition between citizens and the tourism industry for goods and services, particularly on the local level. "In Hammamet, for example, a sewerage system is being installed in the tourist zone without taking account of the needs of the old town, which is still using cesspools or discharging its effluents into the sea, obviously endangering health conditions in the entire area." (One can imagine that citizen resentment could be as important a problem as health conditions in this case.) And third, tourism in Tunisia is creating and strengthening "a clearly defined class of entrepreneurs." With state aid and credits, former "merchants, farmers, or owners of small handicraft factories" have initiated tourism projects, prospered, and reinvested their profits back into tourism.

The main strength of this article is the contrast it supplies to the Boukraa study (abstracted in this report). Both authors note many of the same developments--especially regarding the growth of tourism and the social impacts it engenders--and both use Hammamet for examples. However, their manners of presentation and interpretation are strikingly different: Smaoui is quantitative, Boukraa qualitative; Smaoui is generally positive, Boukraa negative. Having two such analyses is a definite plus in assessing the broad and complex picture of the development of Tunisia's major source of foreign exchange.

The main weakness of the Smaoui study lies in some of its short discussions. It is difficult to reduce long, complicated calculations to simple statements, but the explanation of employment generated by indirect supply activities is clearly inadequate. For example, dividing the total agricultural wages by the average wage gives the number of wages (and, by implication, workers)--not the number of wages generated specifically by tourism. Also, none of the discussions shows clearly the net gain or loss (if any) in overall employment, for that would require a comparison of jobs gained from tourism (directly or indirectly) with those lost as people shift occupations and those gained as people leave unemployment.

Stambouli, F., Populations Neo-Citadins et Besoins Humains Fondamentaux: Le Cas de Djebel Lahmar en Tunisie, Unpublished paper, University of Tunis (1978). TUNISIA OTHER BASIC HUMAN NEEDS URBAN

This paper seeks to analyze "the interaction and communication between populations and institutions in the process of satisfying basic human needs" in the oldest and largest slum-suburb ("bidonville") of Tunis. The author draws on studies made at different times to describe changes in the domains of housing, employment, and health care and to recommend future policies for two of those domains.

Djebel Lahmar ("the red mountain") is located on a hill to the northwest of Tunis. Before the establishment of the French Protectorate, the hill often served as a convenient stop for Bedouins bypassing the city on their way to and from the wheat lands of the Madjerda Valley. From the end of the 19th century, however, a sedentary population began to form there, often cutting shelters directly into the clay slopes. Much of this population originated from the north, having been pushed from their lands by colonial agricultural policies and pulled toward the city by "unlimited illusions" about the life they might lead there.

A sociological study effected in Djebel Lahmar in 1950 showed a community of some 15,000 which was only weakly integrated into the life of the capital: more than 70 per cent of the workforce were day-laborers or unemployed; 80 per cent of the housing was gourbis (earth-walled shacks, generally of one room) without land titles or water, sewers, or electricity; only traditional schools teaching reading, writing, and rudimentary arithmetic existed in the community; and only traditional health care was available, since no clinics were present and modern medicine was seen as "a repressive instrument symbolizing the foreign power that had to be combatted." In turn, the population was viewed by colonial administrators with apprehension: for "reasons of public health and social order" authorities recommended expelling the population to their places of origin, police surveillance and recurrent raids, destruction of gourbis, etc.

Following independence, the Tunisian government adopted more progressive social policies, as was shown by a second sociological study in 1970: then 43 per cent of the working population were day-laborers or unemployed, 38 per cent were workers or public employees, and 19 per cent were small merchants or artisans; 73 per cent of the housing was permanent (generally concrete blocks or stucco-covered

bricks); primary schools held 88 per cent of the boys and 78 per cent of the girls, while secondary schools had half of the eligible boys and a third of the girls. These trends continued into 1978, according to the third study: total population had grown to 50,000 (more than eight times the total in 1946), and important improvements had occurred in housing, employment, and services.

In housing, the government has adopted an essentially "technocratic" approach since 1970. Djebel Lahmar was divided into ten zones, each with a committee to study it, diagnose its problems, and to effect aid. Based on the work of these committees, Djebel Lahmar was seen to consist of an "improved" area and a "gourbi" area. The former (containing 80 per cent of all housing) was to be provided with clear land titles and services, while the latter (containing the remainder) was to be destroyed after new housing had been provided. The articulation of these policies involved repeated and enthusiastic meetings with local people through the agency of the local cell of the Destourian Socialist Party. However, implementation of the policies was another matter. The new housing made available to gourbi residents was priced beyond the means of many of them, according to Stambouli, so "only about 800 families of more than 3000 were rehoused"in the Cite Ibn Khaldoun. (Other dwellings in the cite went to better-off persons from quarters outside Djebel Lahmar.) A more reasonable approach, Stambouli says, would extend the policies applied in the "improved area" to all the community -- i.e., it would grant land titles to the housing already present, provide necessary services, and aid residents to develop housing on their own initiative. Such policies would also accord with the priorities of the present community, for whom "employment, education for children, and health care seem much more important."

Employment, in fact, is considered "a central need" by the population of Djebel Lahmar. Appreciable achievements have already been accomplished in this domain, but problems remain in the "informal sector" (i.e., "the traditional artisanal activities as well as various types of production and services"). Thirty-six per cent of the workforce is employed in this sector. The most acute problem concerns adolescent school-leavers: 85 per cent of them work in the informal sector, generally obtaining their jobs through family, friendship, or neighborhood connections. Such work is often unsteady: 73 per cent of school-leavers aged 15 to 19 had already held four or more jobs. The responses of government officials to this were, first, "to work so that future youth placements will be effected through the national employment office," and second, "to

encourage co-operation treaties with neighboring and friendly countries to the end that our excess of qualified labor be exported." Stambouli says that the youth of Djebel Lahmar also desire to emigrate to improve their situations. Nonetheless, he warns that present "bureaucratic" responses to this problem (e.g., encouraging emigration) are linking younger workers into "the dominant international system" more than integrating them into the national political economy, which could have profound implications for Tunisia's future development.

With regard to health care, a brighter picture emerges. While both attitudes and behavior were opposed to modern medical services during the Protectorate, today the clinic in Djebel Lahmar has a frequency of use three times that of Tunis generally. Thirty per cent of women practice birth control, and three-fourths of them are favorable to family planning. Half of all births are now in hospitals, and two-thirds of all women say they use no traditional medical care at all. Such changes in attitudes and behavior about health care, Stambouli says, may be traced to several causes. A major one in Djebel Lahmar has been the creation of organizations which intermediate effectively between branches of national institutions and the local population. For example, social workers with the national Office of Family Planning contact families through committees of the local party cell, who reside in the community and have good contact with the population. So enthusiastic is the popular support achieved by such means that the personnel and equipment of health care delivery systems often must function above their natural capacity. Accordingly, Stambouli feels that "all new investment in this sector is in our opinion highly desirable and directly productive."

A major strength of this paper is its comparison of information collected at different times: it shows that the evolution of Tunis' oldest and largest slum-suburb has involved strong trends toward upward mobility in employment, health care, and education. Furthermore, it shows that links between populations and national institutions are strongest when policies are in accord with local priorities (which did <u>not</u> occur in housing) and when locally respected intermediaries foster interaction and communication between officials and citizens. However, a major problem in the paper is the lack of consistency between information given in its different sections. For instance, on page 18 Stambouli says that 20 per cent of Djebel Lahmar's 50,000 people live in gourbis. Multiplying these figures together and dividing by the average family size (not provided for this community but 5.4 for Tunis governorate in the last census) indicates that about

1850 families were eligible to move from Djebel Lahmar. However, on page 29 Stambouli says "more than 3000" were eligible, and he uses this figure to support his critique of housing policies. Another matter necessary to consider is school-leavers. While it is plausible to consider their employment situation a problem, knowing what their family status was (and especially, how much they are supported by relatives), and what percentage of total youth they constituted, are crucial to understanding the degree of this problem.

Stickley, T., The Agricultural Credit System in Tunisia: Some Observations and Recommendations, Department of Agriculture and Applied Economics, University of Minnesota (1976). TUNISIA PROJECTS AGRICULTURE CREDIT AND MECHANIZATION

This report is based on two years of work while the author was part of the University of Minnesota project in Tunisia. It examines major characteristics of Tunisian agriculture and the agricultural credit system there; then it recommends two main changes to improve the credit system. Several tables and a bibliography are included in the report.

Stickley says that Tunisian agriculture is characterized by a high proportion of small farms. (He also assumes that the number of farms equals the number of farmers, which may be correct but should be verified.) Citing Ministry of Agriculture sources, he presents a table showing the distribution of land by size of farms in 1974: 63 per cent of them represented only 16 per cent of the total land farmed and contained less then 10 hectares (25 acres) each. These small farmers use relatively few inputs they must purchase, such as chemical fertilizers and pesticides or high-yield seeds. They benefit little from the Agricultural Extension Service because there are not enough trained and well-motivated field technicians and because support services for these technicians are insufficient. Small farmers in Tunisia, as elsewhere, work on a relatively narrow margin, facing uncertainties about water, prices, technical support, etc. Citing a University of Minnesota study, Stickley says these small farmers get a respectable return on investments, but their returns could be raised appreciably by greater access to agricultural credit. And finally, Tunisian farmers are subject to price controls (both on their production and on many inputs for production) which are aimed toward establishing low consumer prices for current products rather than toward providing more nutritious food, toward producing crops for which Tunisia has a comparative advantage in the world market, or toward other goals.

The performance of the agricultural credit system is a politically sensitive topic in Tunisia, according to Stickley. On the basis of existing accounts, compiled by both Tunisian and international agencies, he estimates that the official credit system now does service about 50,000 of the approximately 325,000 total farmers. That is, some 15 per cent of Tunisian farmers get credit from official institutions, averaging loans of 300 Dinars

(about $750.00 at the time of writing) per year. However, Stickley hypothesizes what the credit system could service by reference to two sets of criteria: one is a set of social and economic objectives, such as increasing total production, employment, and median rural income while reducing emigration to the cities; the other is the principle that "an agricultural credit system should be treated as a channel for administering sound loans more than social welfare programs."

Regarding the objective of increasing total production, Stickley notes that commercial banks are practically absent from agriculture because interest-rate ceilings make it difficult to cover the costs of lending to farmers. Government-connected loans are available but tend to be poorly distributed in terms of the crops and regions funded and in the discontinuity of lending programs.

Maldistribution of loans also affects other social and economic objectives. On the basis of a random sample of loan records at the Banque Nationale Tunisienne, Stickley finds that the smallest farms (41 per cent of the total) got 20 per cent of the loans, while the largest farms (4 per cent) got 27 per cent. Since all farmers (and all Tunisians) are taxed to fund the government, but small farmers get a relatively smaller percentage of government-connected loans, current policies function so that small farmers (and other Tunisians) subsidize large ones. Besides not receiving "their equitable share of the credit," small farms also are specially subject to other problems: real costs of borrowing (many of which are fixed costs, regardless of loan size), relatively long periods for loan approval, lack of coordination among agencies dealing with agriculture, and restrictive policies regulating how loans may be spent and what repayment guarantees must be made.

The current agricultural credit system also is weakened by high real costs of lending, especially in two respects. Costs of administration are excessive because there are many bank employees for relatively few borrowers and because vehicles, office space, and job duties are unproductively allocated among employees. Also, there apparently is a high rate of delinquency in repayment: drawing on FAO reports and on studies he had made in Turkey and Sudan, Stickley concludes that loan delinquency in Tunisia may be higher than now believed. A major reason for such delinquency is that repayment guarantees "are ineffective in motivating borrowers to repay."

To address these concerns, he makes two general recommendations. First, to improve the information available about agricultural credit, he recommends that a single agency be established to record, store, and make available data on loan amounts and numbers of borrowers and on some measure of borrowers' income levels (to facilitate a more equitable distribution of credit). Second, to improve the overall effectiveness of the credit system, he recommends that both government and commercial loans be made available to large farmers, while small farmers should be served by a new program. This program would involve recruiting and licensing "multi-purpose agents" from among those people already acting unofficially (and often illegally) as money-lenders, sellers of inputs, buyers of products, and technical advisors on the village level. Such persons (Stickley calls for a minimum of five per village to minimize the "danger of exploitation through collusive action") should be natives of the villages where they work, would operate with a minimum of support services (a small truck, perhaps a storeroom), and could be compensated by commissions on the loans they have collected. Agents might be allowed to vary interest rates ("within specified limits") according to the repayment behavior of borrowers. Even though such rates would be higher than those currently advertized by official lenders, they would be lower than what (Stickley speculates) small farmers now are paying to unofficial money lenders. Another potential advantage is that other terms of loans (e.g., repayment guarantees or approval procedures) would be more flexible, essentially at the discretion of agents within limits set by higher banking officials. The roles of such officials, then, would be to provide training and overall supervision to agents, as well as to process applications for loans beyond limits authorized for agents. A final advantage of this new program is that it could be initiated on a small scale and expanded later if successful.

A major strength of this short, unpretentiously written report is that it clearly integrates information from various sources (including the Tunisian government, international agencies, personal experiences, and the author's own research both in country and abroad) to analyze agriculture and the agricultural credit system. The recommendation to improve data on credit seems worthwhile and realistic. However, the recommendation about village agents is more problematic. Any such program would require careful consideration and sensitive implementation so as not to create just one more level of administrative hierarchy and/or reinforce the power and authority of some local people over others. Establishing a minimum of five

agents per village would probably be counterproductive: a more careful melding of the program with individual village social structures would increase the local relationships allowing borrowers to influence agents, and agents borrowers, which Stickley apparently intends. In this direction, more attention probably should be devoted to distinctions among borrowers: Stickley's "large farmers" and "small farmers" does not differentiate farmers from peasants, nor private from cooperative sectors, though such distinctions involve social, political, and economic factors of the sort which are necessary to the success of his second recommendation.

Tessler, M., J. Rogers, and D. Schneider, "Women's Emancipation in Tunisia," in Women in the Muslim World, ed. N. Keddie and L. Beck. pp. 141-159, Harvard University Press, Cambridge (1978). TUNISIA ARTICLE BASIC HUMAN NEEDS STATUS OF WOMEN

In this article the authors first provide background on social change which has affected Tunisian women in important ways since independence. Then they discuss how attitudes about Tunisian women have changed between 1967 and 1973, basing their comments on surveys conducted during those two years. Next they draw three general conclusions about women's statuses and roles in the country. And finally, in an appendix they outline the research methods used to conduct the two surveys.

Tessler et al. first trace changes affecting Tunisian women since independence to two kinds of factors -- "official" and "unplanned." Official factors are generally government policies focused directly on promoting women's rights, duties, and functions. The Code of Personal Status passed in 1956 is an example: it forbade polygamy ("making Tunisia the first, and so far the only," Arab country to do so explicitly); it made marriage, divorce, and inheritance civil (rather than religious) matters; and it changed relations between parents and children so that, for example, children had more choice in deciding whether, and with whom, they would marry. Other official factors included actions by the Destourian Socialist Party (such as discussing women's statuses and roles or promoting women as candidates for local and national elections), establishment of the National Union for Tunisian Women (UNFT), and creation of regional centers providing professional training and self-improvement courses for women. In contrast, "unplanned" factors included the growing urbanization of Tunisian society (which fosters new residence patterns and increases women's professional opportunities), radio programs presenting new ideas and styles of life, labor migration by husbands, and greater access to formal education. (While recognizing that these factors probably have affected women's live in important ways although they were not focused directly on that goal, it seems inappropriate to call them "unplanned": anyone who has listened to a Tunisian broadcast or attended a Tunisian classroom will know they are hardly unplanned.)

During the period since independence, then, women's statuses and roles have been influenced by factors directly focused on them and by factors impacting but not directly

focused there. However, the two kinds of factors have not always operated contemporaneously: both generated much social change during the first ten to fifteen years after independence; then, with President Bourguiba's recurrent illnesses and a struggle between various factions to control the party and government, "official" factors declined in number and importance. By 1974 Bourguiba had recovered sufficiently to support Prime Minister Nouira's "conservative economic policies and far less concern for planned social change." During this period of interregnum and subsequent restoration, nonetheless, factors not directly focused on women's statuses and roles continued to operate. Some (such as access to formal education) became more attenuated, while others (such as urbanization and labor migration) accelerated. The net result of all these factors is unclear, leading Tessler et al. to raise a question about "whether economic development and unplanned social change have continued to promote women's emancipation in the absence of a strong official ideological commitment and in view of the significant reduction in government programs of cultural reform and resocialization."

To address this question, the authors present and compare results from surveys where "men and women in Tunis and men in smaller towns were asked a series of questions about women's emancipation" both in 1967 and 1973. (Respondent samples and research methodology will be discussed later in this abstract.) The authors wish to distinguish between "the extent and nature of changing attitudes toward women" and "resultant shifts in the distribution of support and opposition to women's emancipation." In their discussion, however, the distinction is blurred, since "the extent and nature" of attitudes are measured by the support which they are furnished. Accordingly, it seems clearer to discuss results in terms of a between-groups comparison (respondents favoring versus those opposing women's liberation) and a within-group comparison (subdivisions of those favoring women's liberation).

Comparisons between supporters and opponents show three main differences between results of the two surveys. First, "total support for women's emancipation declined markedly between 1967 and 1973," among both women and men and among residents both of the capital and of smaller towns. For instance, the number of people "believing Muslim women should have the right to marry non-Muslim men declined" from 39 per cent to 27 per cent. Second, support declined differently among the various categories of respondents. By gender, it declined most among men in smaller towns, least among women in Tunis. By educational category, support declined most among poorly educated men

and among well educated women in Tunis, while support in smaller towns did not differ much by educational categories. And third, "support for women's emancipation did not decline to the same extent on the three substantive issues examined." Support diminished most for women's professional advancement among both men and women in Tunis, but "acceptance of women marrying outside the faith" declined most among men in smaller towns.

Comparisons within supporters of women's liberation show differences in terms of gender, residence, and education. First, "though women were more in favor of it than men in 1967, the difference between the sexes is much greater in 1973" because support declined more among men. Second, "while in 1967 there was generally more support for women's emancipation among men in smaller towns than among men in Tunis, the tendency was in the opposite direction in 1973." And third, in 1967 support for women's liberation was positively related with education, so that well educated men and women were both strongly favorable to it; in 1973, support remained high among well educated men, but it dropped among well educated women. As a result, "the diversity of opinion among men was greater in 1973 than in 1967, whereas attitudinal differences among women were smaller."

On the basis of these findings, Tessler et al. draw three general conclusions. First, since support for women's liberation declined between 1967 and 1973, "it is reasonable to conclude that, in general, official efforts to promote cultural change are necessary." Second, the Tunisian population generally became more divided in attitudes about women: "differences between men and women, between residents of Tunis and smaller towns, and, among men in Tunis, between well educated and poorly educated persons increased during this period." Of these differences, the authors feel the most important is that between women and men. However, "differences between well educated men and women are only slightly greater than in the past," indicating that gender differences may be attenuated by the cross-cutting tie of education. And third, "the future for women's liberation is not encouraging," since popular support for it has declined and may go still lower, given continuation of economic and cultural policies current when the article was written.

As an appendix, the authors discuss ways they collected and analyzed survey data underlying the second and third parts of the article. The 1967 survey involved a quota (i.e., non-random) sample of 283 Tunisians of varying educations, incomes, and residences stratified so that "all

empirically existing combinations of these variables were included." (However, further in the discussion the authors mention that, "owing to problems of access, only a few women from smaller towns were surveyed.") In 1973 a sample of 349 Tunisians was "drawn from a wide range of social categories." To measure changes in attitudes over time, "individuals from the 1967 survey were matched to those from the 1973 survey," on the basis of same sex and "highly similar" ages, education levels, income categories, and places of residence. A total of 211 matched pairs (75 per cent of the 1967 sample) was formed, "and comparisons between subsets and the larger samples for each year show that the former are highly representative of the latter."

The set of questions asked both in 1967 and 1973 "contained a large number of items dealing with women's emancipation"; items for the present study were selected on the basis of parsimony, clarity and representation of "all major tendencies discernible in the data." In all, only three items were chosen, including the following: "Muslim women should have the same rights as Muslim men to marry foreigners" (respondent agrees or disagrees). Apparently the authors refer to this statement when discussing "women marrying outside the faith" or having "the right to marry non-Muslim men." However, the survey statement says "foreigner," not "non-Muslim"; and Tessler et al. never say what language (or even if there was just one) was used to elicit responses. They do say that the procedures used in 1967 (discussed in sources referenced at the article's end) "were generally used again in 1973, the only important difference being that a questionnaire rather than an interview methodology was favored." And finally, responses to the survey items were analyzed according to respondents' educations, sexes, and places of residence so that "the percentage of persons favoring women's emancipation in 1967, the percentage favoring it in 1973, and the difference between the two percentages were determined for the three items."

To summarize procedures, then, responses to only three items were used; one of those items contains an apparently ambiguous word; some respondents were questioned by interview, others by questionnaire; and no significance tests were made of response distributions in either year or between years. Thus, although the authors discuss the survey and its results in an apparently rigorous and precise manner, in fact they employed several subjective procedures to talk a lot about a little.

The main strength of this article is its plausible discussion of major factors affecting women's liberation since independence. The article's major weakness lies in the ways in which survey data were collected and interpreted.

Zghal, A. "The Reactivation of Tradition in a Post-Traditional Society," Daedalus, vol. 102, pp. 225-237 (1973).
TUNISIA ARTICLE GENERAL DEVELOPMENT INTRANATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY

Zghal addresses the question of why "modernist elites" in comtemporary Tunisia appeal to ideas and employ behaviors characteristic of the "traditional" period in their soceity's development. First he traces the growth of the Tunisian national movement during the colonial period. Next he discusses the independent government's enactment of a code of personal status and its reform of the education system as parts of an overall development strategy. Then he explains effects of another part of that strategy, the cooperativization program. Finally he relates the weakening of this program to reappearance of a "traditional movement" in Tunisia, and he considers the likely future of that movement.

Prior to the colonial period, Zghal says, Tunisia lacked a nationalist ideology: "its intellectuals had not been trained by an educational system that weaned them from traditional values, and local communities and traditional institutions still controlled or protected a large majority of the Tunisian population." However, the French Protectorate changed that. At first, some members of the elite trained at French universities and attempted to influence the colonial system toward "modernizing" Tunisia, while others trained at Ez-Zitouna university and totally opposed the colonial system in defense of Islam and the Arabic language. After World War I, more profound changes occurred: the mechanization of farms and the development of industries increasingly turned tribesmen and peasants into workers and middle classes, both rural and urban; the same changes progressively undermined the economic bases of the traditional elite. Accordingly, during the 1930's the Tunisian middle classes in general, and those of the Sahel in particular, were able to take control of the nationalist movement: "the Neo-Destourian Party controlled the country not by armed force, as in Algeria, nor by the former caids, as in Morocco, but by a broad coalition forged from the urban and peasant /sic/ middle class, the working class, and the youth."

The leaders of this coalition were "modernist" intellectuals who sought "a renewal of Arab-Moslem values," not a radical break with them. For example, the code of

personal status passed in 1956 was proposed "as a new reading, a modern reading, of religious texts," even though it put most of the laws regulating marriage, divorce, and inheritance on a secular base. The new code established minimum ages for both spouses, required their mutual consent and formal registration of the marriage contract, put divorce and settlement under jurisdiction of civil courts, and banned polygamy. A major effect of this code, and corollary development of an elaborate and widespread program for family planning and birth control, was a marked strengthening of the legal and social statuses of women. Another example of reform with major social implications was the establishment of a national education system oriented toward schooling all children so they "would not be cut off from technology and modern values." The results of this reform have been impressive: between independence and 1970-71 (the latest statistics then available), the average annual increase of children in school was 27 per cent, so that (at time of writing) almost one Tunisian in every four was a student. Of course, inequalities still existed according to region, class, and gender; but they were being addressed and the overall situation had profoundly improved since the colonial period.

As with the liberation of women and the spread of education, so with economic development: the program of compulsory cooperatives was presented as a means to defend Islam and perpetuate Arab civilization. However, the various constituencies in the Neo-Destour coalition were affected differently by this program: students were major beneficiaries, since they had the training to fill new positions created by the expansion of governmental and national organizations; the middle classes were threatened by loss of control over production and distribution; and workers were hurt by wage freezes during a period of rising costs. (A discussion of such changes in one locality is presented in Larson 1975, abstracted in this collection.) Growing discontent with coopertivization thus threatened to split supporters of the Neo-Destour, ultimately leading Bourguiba to intervene personally against the program. Its defeat in 1969 "revealed both the limitations of authoritarian planning and the need, in all sectors of the population, for a widening of democracy."

In the period which followed, former party militants began to express dissent that had been repressed earlier: they denounced a "debasement of manners and morals" which they attributed to the code of personal status and an educational system that placed more emphasis on French and science than on Arabic and religion. Zghal says that some party leaders who had been actively involved in the overall development strategy now showed "exuberant" support for

tradition "with the sole aim of gaining the votes of the old militants and the peasants." He spectulates that their intentions were to control spontaneous expressions of popular sentiment; however, their actions also "recalled certain classic aspects of political life in Arab-Moslem society before the colonial conquest." Succession to head of state in such societies often was irregular and "fostered traditions of coalition and competition quite similar to those at the base of tribal social organization." Similarly, Zghal claims, "the formation of factions within the ruling class since the last change of regime were not precipitated primarily by debate over development strategy for the coming decade or foreign policy" but by "the problem of succession to the office of President of the Republic." In fact, the rapid shifts of attitudes and actions about that potential succession suggest to Zghal that the Tunisian ruling class are being manipulated by their traditional heritage rather than the reverse. He draws an analogy between "the rules of the game" for Bedouin politics and the "spontaneous" strategy adopted by Neo-Destour leaders: in Bedouin society "coalitions between different factions are contingent, unstable, and shift constantly depending upon the issues in question"; in Tunisian society one leader (Ben Salah) tried to monopolize power, so the others united against him, then splintered into antagonistic factions after his defeat. However, his elimination enabled groups which had been threatened by cooperativization to become "the arbiter" of this factional competition, and the modernist intellectuals of the ruling class "ended by assuming the very aspects of pre-colonial tradition which they themselves had most criticized."

Zghal feels this "traditional" current will probably strengthen in Tunisia. For example, he predicts government encouragement for construction of mosques, and more (and more obvious) participation by members of the ruling class in religious ceremonies. In part, then, "reactivation of tradition" will occur as a response "by those elements most endangered by the process of modernization (peasants, artisans, small businessmen, former militants)"; however, it also will result from "certain elements of the elite educated in French universities who, to conserve and even strengthen their position, play the card of tradition with the goal of gaining an audience."

The major strength of this article is its overview of changes and continuities in the political economy of Tunisia since before the Protectorate. Zghal's analysis of social impacts resulting from early reforms of the independent government is insightful, as are his remarks about factional competition within the Neo-Destour. However, the analogy between Bedouin factions and those operating in contemporary Tunisia is overstated: significant differences between them exist, at least in patterns of recruitment and expressions of unity. According to much of the anthropological

literature, Bedouins consider their factions as organizations of kin groups, whose reciprocal rights and duties are expressed in terms of a genealogical charter. No evidence is offered that contemporary Tunisians consider their factions so organized or expressed; rather, their factions might better be seen as new organizations formed within a nation-state by elements of old strategies (see Hermassi 1972, abstracted in this collection, for similar remarks). In addition, Zghal's analysis does not presage the important political roles played after 1972 by workers and the confederation of trade unions (also adversely affected by the coopertivization program) or by President Bourguiba (ill at time of writing but since recovered sufficiently to control Tunisian politics). Nonetheless, these criticisms do not invalidate the contributions of this useful article.

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INTRODUCTION

This report on Morocco is the third of a series that includes others on Egypt, Jordan, Tunisia, and Yemen (San'a). Each report focuses on socio-cultural and political-economic aspects of development and consists of a bibliography, abstracts, a list of researchers, and recommendations about which bibliographic sources might be distributed to USAID offices.

The bibliography in the current report includes 121 articles, 42 books, 45 dissertation-theses, 5 host-government documents, 4 projects, and 4 other sources. There are a total of 221 entries: 134 of them are in English, 87 in French, and one in Arabic. Thirteen of the total were produced before 1970; 208 since then.

The twenty abstracts were made from sources selected according to four criteria. The contract for this project stipulates that sources chosen should be "of high quality," "empirically based," and "relevant to development." The first of these criteria was taken to concern formal considerations (such as consistency and comprehensiveness); the second, substantive considerations (such as testing hypotheses or at least clearly relating claims to data); and the third, addressing "basic needs." To these interpretations was added the criterion of balance, both in topics and in perspectives, so that all twenty sources selected would not concern a single subject area or viewpoint. Sources chosen for abstracting, then, were judged according to these four criteria and rated highly on all or most of them. For this reason we recommend that, funds permitting, all twenty be duplicated and distributed to relevant USAID offices.

The list of researchers was composed from the authors of sources in the bibliography. Information about their addresses, topics of research, and language competences were compiled from eight directories, biographical data in their publications, and personal networks.

FCH
Project Director

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Key Words to Organize Bibliographic Entries on Socio-Economic Development

Country

- Egypt
- Jordan
- Morocco
- Tunisia
- Yemen

Source of Information

- article
- book
- dissertation/thesis
- document (host government)
- project (other than host government)
- other

Subjects

- General Development
  - ideology
  - informal processes
  - intranational political economy
  - international political economy
  - social organization and structure (kinship/family organization/neighborhood/networks)

other

Science

applied (eg. technology)

natural (eg. fisheries, forests, etc.)

social

other

Health

maternal and child care

nutrition

preventive care

socio-cultural factors

water supply and sewers

other

Population

family planning

migration

other

Education

instructional materials

literacy and other basic

pre-school, elementary, secondary

professional and higher

technical and vocational

other

Urbanism

housing and construction

sanitation and streets

other

Communication

libraries and storage

media

impacts

other

Agriculture

irrigation and water management

extension and advice

crops

livestock and products

credit and mechanization

land

markets and food subsidies

other

Industry

energy

transport

trade and commerce

labor

management

banking and finance

tourism

small scale

other

Public Administration

- foreign aid and investment
- community welfare
- taxes and grants
- bureaucracy and decentralization
- planning
- other

Basic Human Needs

- status of women
- rural
- urban
- other

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Abu-Lughod, J., Rabat: Urban Apartheid in Morocco, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ (1980). MOROCCO BOOK GENERAL DEVELOPMENT INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY INTRANATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY URBANISM OTHER

Abu-Lughod traces the history of Rabat from its pre-colonial past to the present. Her main goal is to show how old Rabat, characterized by a lack of rigid class segregation, changed when the French established a system of ethnic segregation similar to caste systems. With the departure of the French, these "caste" cleavages were transmuted into class divisions.

Pre-colonial Morocco was characterized historically by two sets of factors. First, it was relatively isolated from the rest of the Arab world and more linked to both Spain and Africa south of the Sahara. Second, nomadism was the dominant susistence pattern, which implied that society was organized along kin lines, that the political system was based on shifting alliances of fictive kin groups, and the economic system on communal land ownership.

Rabat's importance grew in the 17th century when trade routes shifted westward to the Atlantic. The Spanish expulsion edicts of the early 17th century brought waves of immigrants who settled in around Rabat as well as in two other agglomerations. The polynucleation of the urban region into three centers persisted well into the present century--though not with the initial ethnic composition.

The capture of the estuary of Bou Regreg in 1666 brought Rabat under the rule of the sultan, and piracy--a hitherto private and successful entreprise--became a governmental business. When the foreign powers retaliated militarily, the sultan was forced into treaties that granted large commercial concessions to Westerners, thus paving the way for increased subjugation of Rabat and Morocco by Europe.

The progressive integration of Morocco's economy into the orbit of European colonialism in the 19th century produced a modern capitalist sector in the urban areas. Urban capitalism eroded the hinterland

economy by causing the first wave of migration out of the countryside to the coastal towns, the emergence of a compradore urban bourgeoisie, and shifts from the production of raw material to services and from processing and crafts to imported goods. This transformation of the economy led to a skyrocketing foreign debt which, in turn, prepared the way for full economic conquest.

The French Protectorate was declared in 1912 and Marechal Lyautey made Rabat his capital. The three general principles governing his city planning were: first, to leave the original Arab quarters untouched and for the Arab population; second, to create a cordon sanitaire around the medina with a greenbelt of open land (something he could not do in Rabat); and third, to build a modern, efficient, and elegant European city.

This philosophy actually meant that full municipal services were available in the new city while Moroccan areas were neglected under the guise of respecting their cultural integrity. Moreover, to accomodate a European population that never exceeded one-third of the total, an area ten times larger than the medina was blocked out. No new areas were allocated to accomodate a Moroccan population that was destined to grow tenfold in the next few decades. This population growth was the direct result of migration from the countryside, which reduced the livelihood of peasants and transhumants. The main "pull" factor was the construction boom in the port cities, which demanded manual and menial labor.

By the 1920's Rabat was a caste-like society. Abu-Lughod uses the term caste in a broad sense "as indicating a tight association between an ascriptive status (in this instance, nationality and religion) and a preordained position in the class structure." The author argues that French urban policies fostered the emergence of a four-tiered stratificational system with a "caste" line dividing the highest two strata from the bottom two. At the top, the French entrepreneurs and civil servants lived in the new city, while European skilled workers were in the colonial quarters of Ocean. Below them, the ruling Moroccan class, urban

bourgeoisie, and urban artisans occupied the medina, while imigrants unskilled workers lived in the bidonvilles (i.e., shanty towns) around Rabat.

The de-facto separation of the European and native populations was not enforced through laws, as in South Africa for instance, but through a system of municipal government which excluded Moroccans from the decision-making process. Building permits, zoning, and street construction enabled the French to maintain apartheid, to develop the European city, and to ignore the medina. A rigid division of labor and stratification based on ethnicity reinforced this apartheid.

With independence, Morocco inherited problems that originated under the Protectorate: heavy reliance on export of unprocessed commodities and on import of capital and consumer goods, resulting in a disturbing trade deficit; and regional imbalances in economic development, compounded by cultural differences. To these problems were added new ones resulting first from the flight of capital and then from the reimposition of colonialism through external "assistance."

Four national trends in particular had an impact on Rabat-Salé: economic involution and high unemployment (except for the public and tertiary sectors which, for a while, absorbed the unemployed); rapid population growth; acute housing shortages which resulted in unsuccessful public projects and spreading bidonvilles; and increased residential segregation of Moroccans by class. The classes are mainly defined in terms of income, occupation, and education.

Abu-Lughod devotes a large portion of her book to demonstrating this segregation through statistical and topographical data. She shows how the upper class has moved into the area vacated by the French elite, while the lower-middle and working classes, involved in the "modern" sector, are found in districts previously occupied by less afluent foreigners. The medina sections of Rabat and Salé differ from the lower-middle-class modern areas only in terms of their larger share of atypical households (single male, or female heads of household). Finally, one-third

of the population of Rabat-Salé lives in bidonvilles:

> They represent residuals from the conventional housing market, consumers who cannot (or will not) "demand" dwellings in the profit-making market of the "housing as a capital good produced for exchange."

She also notes that the bidonvilles will disappear when their inhabitants will become economically integrated. Meanwhile, she recommends that subsidies be directed toward

> providing objects of "collective consumption" (the term is Castells') such as streets, sewers, water taps, and so on, as well as technical assistance to make more effective use of the contributed labor of the poor (self-subsidy).

Since 1971, Moroccan planners trained by the French have devised a Master Plan for Rabat-Salé. Abu-Lughod evaluates it negatively because she thinks that it will perpetuate class segregation and also because it does not effectively create an economic base for Rabat.

This book is very valuable in offering the history of the city within the framework of the history of Morocco. Abu-Lughod carefully points out when Rabat is a divergent case and when it is representative of the rest of the country. Thus this is as much a study of Morocco as it is a study of Rabat. This macro approach avoids the trap of explaining urban society as the product of urbanism; instead, it explains both society and urbanization in terms of political and economic forces. However, Abu-Lughod does not effectively describe the social organization in pre-colonial times, nor does she adequately explain how the French were instrumental in creating the new system of stratification. This weakness is due to a static definition of class--as a conglomerate of characteristics--which does not allow the author to analyze the process of class formation. All in all, nonetheless, this is a very good study--well documented and pleasantly written.

Davies, S., "The Politics of Phosphates," Banker, vol.127, pp.37-38 (1977). MOROCCO ARTICLE GENERAL DEVELOPMENT INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY

Morocco provides nearly 40 per cent of all phosphate exports and has 60 per cent of the world's total known reserve. Two other substantial reserves are in the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R., but both countries consume what they produce. It has been estimated that if the world population grows at an annual rate of 2 per cent over the next ten years, and if agriculture production increases accordingly, the need for phosphates should increase by 5 to 7 per cent a year.

Morocco is attempting to exploit and further increase its share of the world market by following two strategies: territorial expansion and price increase. The Spanish Sahara is important to Morocco because it contains the largest reserve of phosphates in the world. When added to Morocco's reserve it will mean that Morocco will control most of the future supplies of phosphates.

Secondly, Morocco has tried to increase its profits by raising the price of phosphate. The price increase held up in 1973 and 1974; then it declined, following a drop in demand. Despite this setback it is estimated that Morocco has tripled its long-term real income.

Morocco projects that the world's need for grains will double the demand for phosphate by 1982, and the country is investing heavily in refineries and auxiliary chemical industry to face this projected demand.

This paper is interesting for its rare overview of the Moroccan industry of phosphates.

Forst, R., Labor and Traditional Politics in Morocco, Unpublished Ph.D Dissertation, The University of Texas at Austin (1970). MOROCCO DISSERTATION-THESIS GENERAL DEVELOPMENT INTRANATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY INDUSTRY LABOUR

This dissertation discusses the union movement in Morocco within the broader context of the political system. It focuses specifically on the Union Marocaine du Travail (UMT) and is based on fieldwork carried out from November 1968 to January 1970 in the city and province of Kenitra.

Contrary to most developing countries, the union movement in Morocco has succeeded in preserving its organizational integrity and in resisting subordination to governmental authority. Its relative independence is due to historical and structural causes.

Historically, the union movement developed both independently and in cooperation with other nationalist groups, and it has taken care to safeguard its identity. In addition, it has suceeded in obtaining legislation from the king to consolidate its position as head of the labor movement. This means that the Moroccan government has had to treat with the union as a separate entity and to consult with it. The first part of the book examines minutely the growth and development of the movement from its inception to 1967. It describes the union's flexible attitude toward the king despite labor's ideological hostility to a monarchical state, and it recounts the shifting alliances of labor with both rightist and leftist political parties.

The second part of the book focuses on the structural reason for the union's independence. The strength of the movement lies in its distinctive power base, the urban work force. The union's privileged access to the urban workers has afforded it a degree of manoeuvrability. The parties have courted it to gain access to the work force; the government has tried to weaken it to prevent a close party-union alliance. Forst analyzes the organization of the UMT, the membership's political participation, gaps between leaders and grass-roots, the role of the union in local elections,

and the resolution of grievances, strikes, and collective bargaining. The analysis of local-level politics is always placed within the context of national political processes.

The author concludes that the labor movement is a very important mechanism for channeling discontent of the grass-roots membership while stabilizing the society through the union leadership's commitment to the status quo.

The main value of the book lies in the richness of its historical data and its success in describing the union movement in the context of Morocco's history. The conclusion is insightful and offers a good base from which to formulate policies. However, the book could go farther in analyzing and synthesizing its empirical data.

Kjellstrom, S., The Impact of Tourism on Economic Development in Morocco, (Volumes I and II), Unpublished Ph.D Dissertation, University of Michigan-Ann Arbor (1974). MOROCCO DISSERTATION-THESIS INDUSTRY TOURISM GENERAL DEVELOPMENT INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY

This is a study of the impact of international tourism on the Moroccan economy in 1971. The statistical data is analyzed within an input-output framework and more than a hundred tables.

Major international tourism started in Morocco in 1945. During the 1961-1972 period, tourist arrivals grew sevenfold, from 151,000 to 1,061,894. Morocco experienced a rapid growth in gross receipts and hotel accomodations as well, but compared to its main competitors (especially Tunisia) it did not do exceptionally well. The author offers specific policy recommendations, such as indirect taxation of tourists and a sounder development of the hotel infrastructure, to help it do better.

Tourism was made a priority in the 1965-1967 plan, but it remains a very small sector in the economy. Since 1969 it is the biggest source of foreign exchange earnings, but as of 1971 gross receipts from tourists amounted to only 4.0 per cent of the Gross Domestic Product. Tourism contributed to 0.4 per cent of the GNP. Of the total gain, 53 per cent went to the public sector. Of the remainder which went to the private sector, 60 per cent went to various forms of unskilled labor (including artisans), 23 per cent went to different kinds of capital invested in the production and sale of handicrafts, and the rest (or 7 per cent) ended up in the hands of bank employees who divert money in exchange procedures. In sum, the public sector, unskilled labor, capital in handicrafts, and bank employees are the beneficiaries, in decreasing order, of the net gains generated by tourism.

Compared to other activities, the ratio of capital investment per job for tourism (3.08) shows that this activity is not the highest. Thus tourism is on the whole an attractive economic activity despite its seasonality and instability which have, according to the author, a minimal impact.

Finally, the author examines the non-economic aspects of tourism. He argues that it has a positive political impact in contributing toward greater equality between regions and maintaining peace and order in the formerly troublesome areas of the periphery. The social impact of tourism is harder to assess: "Depending upon one's value system, tourism can constitute a welcomed modernizing influence or the devil in disguise who is destroying traditional values and replacing them by coarse materialism as a mindless mimcry of the West."

This study offers a wealth of statistical data that is thoroughly analyzed. The best part of the dissertation consists in the analysis of the contribution of tourism to the GDP, the private and public sectors, returns on capital, the balance of payments, employment, and seasonality of demand. The weakest parts are the superficial discussion of the social and political aspects of tourism and the incomplete comparison of tourism with other activities. The study would also have benefited from more synthesis.

Maher, V., Women and Property in Morocco: Their Changing Relations to the Process of Social Stratification in the Middle Atlas, Cambridge University Press, New York (1974). MOROCCO BOOK GENERAL DEVELOPMENT INTRANATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY BASIC HUMAN NEEDS STATUS OF WOMEN RURAL

This book analyzes the roles of women in the context of the Moroccan economic system and compares their situation in three different social milieux: the proletariat, the salaried and small merchant class, and the urban elite. The study is based on fieldwork carried out in 1969-1971 in the Akhdar region of the Middle Atlas.

The author begins with a brief history in which she emphasizes the main consequence of French colonization: the establishment of a dual economy, with one sector based on market relations and the other on membership in kin group and in patron-client coalitions. The spread of the market economy forced men into the modern sector, while the women's world still is organized according to traditional principles of stratification and exchange relations. There are basically two kinds of extra-market relations: obligation of mutual help within the lineage and the tribe, and patron-client relations in which the patron provides goods in exchange for services. Most women belong to several kin and patron-client cooperative networks.

Uterine kinship bonds have two major functions. First, the spread of the market economy has increased migration and a dispersal of lineage members, so the women act as "agents of lineage cohesion" by maintaining strong links of cooperation with their female kin. Second, these bonds provide a "safety-net" for women. However, they also constitute "a threat to the arrangements made according to the principle of agnation, of which virilocal marriage and control of property and services by men are the most important."

The degree of this threat, and how it is met, vary according to the social class of the husband and the nature of the marriage payment. A village woman may expect relations with her established networks to

continue because, in this particular social milieu, inheritance of land is common and entails service obligations to kin. The divorce rate in this class is high, in part because such kin obligations often conflict with allegiance to the conjugal unit. The town bride of a salaried man or a small merchant often loses touch with her relatives because the husband wants to reduce the risk of claims on his modest resources by poorer affines. In this case he must be able to provide entirely for his wife during pregnancy and nursing. Divorce in this group is less frequent than in the first one because, on the one hand, the woman has lost contact with her kin and, on the other hand, divorce places a heavy financial burden on the man. Finally, marriage among the elite involves saleable capital, on the one hand, and the bride and groom are part of the same social network, on the other hand. Therefore, conflicts of interest between spouses are lessened and the marriages are more stable.

In sum, the largest category of people in the Middle Atlas, the peasants, are engaged in traditional relations of production and reproduction which lead to

> a deterioration of their situation vis-a-vis the more wealthy groups who are engaged in a more purposeful manipulation of market forces. Not least among their assets is the possibility of using marriage to effect and reinforce economic alliances.

This book is valuable in offering detailed ethnographic data on many social and economic aspects of women's roles. The author's hypothesis linking property and women's status is cogently demonstrated and empirically grounded. The book, however, suffers from a lack of transitions between chapters which would have enabled the reader to understand more clearly how the argument is developed.

Marais, O., "Elites Intermediaires, Pouvoir et Legitimite dans le Maroc Independent," in Elites, Pouvoirs et Legitimite au Maghreb, ed. M. Teitler, pp. 183-206, Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, Paris (1973). MOROCCO ARTICLE GENERAL DEVELOPMENT INFORMAL PROCESSES INTRANATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY

This paper analyzes the administrative and institutional organization of the Moroccan rural areas, specifically focusing on the relationship of the local administrative elite with the elected municipal council members. The author shows unintended consequences of the political system for local and national politics and for economic development.

Marais starts with a brief historical outline to show how the present areal division of power originated in the French system of government. During the Protectorate, rural areas were ruled indirectly through local notables who controlled the hinterland for the French and levied taxes.

After independence, the king instituted a system of municipal government and encouraged the emergence of a new local elite favorable to his rule. However, because the nationalist party was also trying to control rural areas, the king re-created a complementary administrative network of caids to check the elected councilmen's power. Today, caids are not assigned to their home district and they are rotated every few years. They are not in direct contact with the population which prefers to deal with the caids' administrative assistants--the sheikhs and muqqadameen--who are part of the traditional elite and are chosen in consultation with local clans.

Caids rely heavily on the sheikhs and muqqadameen to implement policies and to keep them informed about the political, economic, and social situation. Thus, the administrative network operating during the Protectorate has been revitalized and, Marais observes, this has served to avert rural rebellions. Instead of encouraging revolts, local elites warn the government and try to negociate and to compromise with the population.

These officials compete for resources with the elected councilmen. Administrative laws have effectively reduced municipal councils to consultative bodies that meet two to three times a year. Most councilmen have protested the hyper-centralization of the Moroccan political system and demanded drastic reforms. To palliate their powerlessness, they have acted as local sponsors of national politicians during elections and thereby created important links with the national parties, where they hold important positions.

Thus, the government initially wanted to depoliticize the municipal council; instead it is faced with highly politicized councilmen. The government intended to use the administrative network of caids to implement agricultural reforms; instead the sheikh and muqqadameen effectively blocked all structural agricultural reforms that endanger their personal economic situations.

This is an interesting paper because it analytically compares the formal institutional framework with informal processes, and the planned goals in the creation of specific institutional arrangements with the unintended consequences.

Mernissi, F., "Obstacles to Family Planning Practice in Urban Morocco," Studies in Family Planning, Vol.6, N°12, pp.418-25 (1975). MOROCCO ARTICLE POPULATION FAMILY PLANNING

This paper criticizes the view that failure of family planning is caused by women's illiteracy, lack of motivations, or superstitious religious beliefs. Instead, Mernissi argues that modern medicine is psychologically costly for some women, who rationally choose traditional alternatives. The study is based on anthropological fieldwork in Maadid, a bidonville (i.e., shanty town) in Rabat. Research methods included participant observation and nondirected, in-depth interviews with 60 mothers.

First, Mernissi discusses the socio-economic factors that affect attitudes about control of fertility. She found that the husbands' employment status is crucial: in contrast to the wives of steadily employed men, those whose husbands are unemployed or holding unstable jobs feel powerless and lack control over their lives; accordingly, they are not interested in controlling their fertility.

The transition from rural to urban living has led to disintegration of the extended family, the dissolution of networks for economic and emotional support, and women's increasing economic dependence on their husbands. In turn, these changes have led to preferences for smaller families. Yet, despite these strong motivations, family planning has not been widely adopted. The second part of Mernissi's paper discusses this gap between motivations and practices.

She points out that birth control becomes an issue after the first child. Nursing is used as a natural method of birth control but, when it fails, women may resort to self-induced abortions. Mernissi observes that illiterate women are not impressed by formal religious or legal codes which prohibit abortion: "Family planning officials apparantly make a mistake if they ascribe too much importance to religious and legal authority in the formation of women's attitudes toward fertility control."

Mernissi also discusses the contraceptive methods used by women, who are very eclectic. They employ traditional methods (such as magic ceremonies, herbs, or amulets), sometimes in conjunction with modern ones. Health information is spread orally in the community through a network of women; the radio, which fails to provide adequate programming for women's needs, is not listened to.

The choice a women makes between methods of birth control is determined by her evaluation of their relative psychological costs. Women will avoid modern methods for two main reasons. First, while appreciating what modern medicine can do, some women criticize it as being too impersonal and too quick to label someone sick. In contrast, traditional medicine distinguishes gradations of health and remedies. Secondly, going to the hospital tends to be the last resort as a direct result of women's experiences. They complain of long waits, degrading and dehumanizing treatment, and the high cost of medicines.

This study is valuable for its many insights and discussion of the gap between strong motivations for family planning but the failure to practice it. The paper, however, only discusses women's attitudes and behavior; it would have been useful to discuss those of men as well.

Organization for Economic Cooperation in Development, Migration and Transfer of Technology, Case tudies: Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia and France, Organization for Economic Cooperation in Development, Paris (1975). MOROCCO OTHER GENERAL DEVELOPMENT INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY POPULATION MIGRATION

This document is based on a survey organized by OECD in conjunction with a group of students from the French "Ecole Nationale d'Administration." The work analyzes the structure, causes, and effects of the migration of Moroccan, Algerian, and Tunisian workers to France. This abstract will summarize the data on Morocco.

A total of 280,000 Moroccans lived in France in 1974. It is estimated that 48.7 per cent were between the ages of 19 and 25; 7 per cent had settled with their families (though more than half were married); and 30.26 per cent were employed in construction and public work. The authors estimate that as many as one-third of the workers had stayed abroad for more than five years.

The causes of emigration are many but the main factor is the difference between an urban, industrial pattern of society with jobs and a rural society which, because of its overpopulation, suffers from underemployment and cannot initiate its own development.

The effects of migration on Morocco are mixed. Emigration relieves unemployment but at the same time it creates gaps in job structure. For instance, the departure of seasonal agricultural workers creates shortages at harvest time.

Moroccan planners have relied on emigration to mitigate unemployment but have found that emigration is not as high as they had wished. In terms of its contribution to development, emigration limits the expenditure on infrastructure and on import of consumer goods, so it frees resources for investment to create jobs. However, in the long run emigration only delays the time when the country will have to rely on its own productive capability.

Remittances from emigrants contribute positively to the balance of payments since they constitute the largest source of external income (24.7 per cent). However, in the long run the transfer of money involves changes in work and consumption patterns which can become very costly to a developing country.

So far no economic and social policy has been introduced to monitor emigration, and the authors conclude by making specific policy recommendations. First, they recommend the selective return of those workers whose skills are likely to make a significant contribution to development. Second, they recommend the transfer of some European industrial plants to Morocco. This would lead migrant workers to return and start a chain of activities (especially for subcontracting and services). Third, they suggest that migration questions be raised in the course of negotiating contracts for industrial cooperation with European countries. They specifically advise the use of migration as training for workers who would be sent for a specific time, to a specific factory, to acquire a specific experience. Once the training is completed, the workers would be sent home and replaced by a new contingent.

Other policy recommendations include the concerted arrangements for annual quotas, European coordination, measures to put an end to illicit movement and employment, etc.

The document succeeds in contrasting positive, short-term aspects of migration with negative, long-term effects on development. The policy recommendations regarding transfer of technology and industrialization are imaginative but have not been thoroughly worked out. The statistical data on which the work is based is not very refined and too often the document relies on estimates.

Population Council, "Morocco: Family Planning Knowledge, Attitudes and Practice in the Rural Areas," Studies in Family Planning, vol. 58, pp.1-10 (1970). MOROCCO ARTICLE POPULATION FAMILY PLANNING BASIC HUMAN NEEDS RURAL GENERAL DEVELOPMENT INTRANATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY

This paper discusses attitudes, knowledge, and practices of family planning. The data were collected through a survey of 106 villages. Interviews were held with 1,428 women under 50, 665 husbands of women under 50, and 266 women over 50. The sample was stratified geographically (Zone I containing a more developed public health infrastructure than Zone II) and by type of township. (These were distinguished in terms of relance and non-relance townships, with the former being those selected by the government for special development activities.)

An investigation of attitudes shows that family planning is favored by half of the rural and urban populations. Rural women favor it slightly less frequently than urban women do, while urban and rural men do not differ. For rural men, ideal family size is smaller (4.1) than it is for rural women (4.6); for urban men it is 3.1, and for urban women 3.3.

Consistent with these conceptions about family size, desire for more children is not very high: 41 per cent of rural women and 36 per cent of rural men do not want more children, and half of rural men and women are interested in contraception. However, only 36 per cent of women and half the men know that pregnancy can be avoided. Interestingly, more than half the women are aware of at least one modern method of birth control. Finally, only one-sixth of rural women and one-tenth of rural men are aware of government family programs.

This paper is valuable for the quantitative data it presents. However, it does not fully analyze differences between men and women or discrepencies between motivations, knowledge, and practice of family planning. It offers little in terms of specific policy recommendations beyond stating the need for additional educational and service activities.

Radi, A., "L'Adaptation de la Famille au Changement Social dans le Maroc Urbain," Bulletin Economique et Social du Maroc, vol. 135, pp.1-36, (1977). MOROCCO ARTICLE GENERAL DEVELOPMENT SOCIAL ORGANIZATION AND STRUCTURE URBANISM OTHER

This paper describes the adaptation of the urban Moroccan family to social and economic changes, relying mainly on observations and on a few government surveys.

The author first points out that the Moroccan family has resisted changes affecting the society as a whole longer than all other institutions. But the "underground acculturation" at work since the establishment of the Protectorate finally became evident after independence. Before expansion of the state and insertion of Morocco into the modern economic system, the family was a pivotal economic and social unit; today the family's survival is dependent on other institutions. The main factors of change have been the extension of wages, the expanded role of the state, the fast rate of urbanization, an increased geographical mobility, the impact of the mass media and schooling, and the ideology of the nationalist movement.

Radi focuses on two aspects of the changes undergone by the family concerning its structure and functions. A survey of the big coastal towns shows that family structure has changed radically: before, the extended patriarchal family predominated; today, the conjugal family does (55 per cent). The tendency is for young couples to establish separate residences and to manage separate budgets while maintaining very close links with the husband's parental group.

Secondly, Radi examines the economic and socializing functions of the family. Traditionally the family was the production unit. Each member's economic role was determined by his sex and age, and all were ranked according to their roles in this economic unit. This aspect of the family is regressing rapidly in urban centers, except in the handicraft sector. Radi links this change to the introduction of capitalism and the extension of wages.

The socializing function of the family has also changed. Today education consists in acquiring the technical and cultural tools of a "foreign civilization." These tools allow the individual to work in the modern economic sector. The family has had to rely on schools to ensure this foreign education and has therefore lost, to a certain extent, its control over socialization. This is especially true for lower and middle class families.

The author concludes by emphasizing that change has proceeded at different speeds in different regions and social classes. These disparities have been costly in both material and human terms.

This article presents an informative comparison between families in the past and today. The surveys used are helpful but not very refined. It provides a basic introduction to family structure and function in Morocco.

Rhazaoui, A., Private Foreign Investments and Development in Morocco, Unpublished Ph.D Dissertation, New York University (1976). MOROCCO DISSERTATION-THESIS GENERAL DEVELOPMENT INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY

This study examines the impact of private foreign investments on the Moroccan economy during the past twenty years. After a review of dependency and conventional theories, the author focuses on the performance of the Moroccan economy with a particular emphasis on planning strategies and on the role of private foreign investments.

The first twelve years after independence are analyzed in terms of gross domestic product, savings, private consumption, and employment; the political and economic problems at the origin of the riots in the mid-1960's and the subsequent austerity measures also are discussed. The analysis reveals the poor performance of the economy, with its sluggish and at times stagnant growth rate.

The author identifies three sets of reasons for the economic stagnation of Morocco. First, technical obstacles--such as flight of foreign capital, inadequacy of administrative framework, colonial legacies of a dual economy, and an infrastructure which integrated the Moroccan economy to that of France--all contributed to this stagnation. Second, the departure of French capitalists left a void which could not be filled by Moroccans. The new elites were either absorbed by the bureaucracy and the armed forces, or they joined traditional elites in an investment behavior determined by minimal risks and/or quick profits. The majority of capital has gone into real estate, commerce, and housing construction. Third, the economic difficulties of the first decade were also partly due to the political divisions and rivalries, which led to incoherent planning and implementation of policies.

Planning in Morocco during the first twelve years went through two phases. The first one saw the elaboration of the 1960-1964 plan by the left wing of the Istiqlal party (independence party). This plan was

intended to reduce Morocco's dependence on Europe by implementing a program of agrarian reform and industrialization. It was never implemented; instead, it was followed in 1960 by a return to the market economy. The new plan was characterized by a conservative fiscal and monetary approach, a concern with balancing the budget, and a stress on technocratic (instead of social and political) solutions to development problems. Domestic policies neglected the rural economy, developed the consumer and tourist industries, and encouraged private foreign investments. External policies continued the dependency relations in trade, aid, and investments with the EEC countries and, after the riots of the mid-1960's, with the United States and the World Bank:

> Inevitably, the relative rapid increase in Morocco's indebtedness combined with the lack of any headway in economic development led to a narrowing down of the difference between received aid and repayment of previous loans to a trickle.

The recent preformance of the economy (1968-1973) is mixed. Three factors resulted in a good rate: good weather increased agricultural production; strong demand for phosphates, fruits, and vegetables in Europe, as well as tourism and remittances from migrant workers, provided the country with foreign exchange. Yet no noticeable improvment could be seen in the underdeveloped character of the Moroccan society and economy:

> The inequalities continued their rise, and the standard of living of the majority its decline. The government's policy options remained unchanged with industrialization and traditional agriculture at the bottom of the list of priorities. The same neglect characterized social welfare, education, and health care.

The 1973-1977 plan is similar to the previous one in its objectives, priorities, and mode of financing, which relies on increased dependence on foreign investment (DH 1,250 million).

On the whole private foreign investment has played a minor role in the Moroccan economy; however, it has controlled key sectors, such as banking and industry. Preliminary studies indicate that the volume of foreign investment remains below the expectations of the government; actually the

capital outflow to foreigners is rising. The low volume of foreign investment is due to the size of the country, its relative lack of industrialization, the uncertain political climate, and the fluctuations of foreign economies.

The third part of this study is devoted to a detailed analysis of U.S. private investments. Data collection techniques included questionnaires, interviews, and company documents made available to the author. All types of American investments are surveyed, though the focus is on manufacturing industries. The impact of American investments on the Moroccan economy is discussed in terms of the following indicators: degree of integration, national income effects, balance of payments effects, technological effects, and labor effects. The results indicate that these investments have been negative, especially on the balance of payments, "with subsequent repercussions on indebtedness, national income, and ultimately national product." In addition, foreign investments have had an impact on the social structure by reinforcing and increasing hierarchical differentiation.

A look at the prospects for Moroccan development in the near future suggests that the situation will remain the same. The only important shift in policy is a stress on export-oriented foreign investments, which may have devastating effects. Fortunately, argues the author, this shift in policy has failed to attract many investors.

This study is extremely informative and well argued. The author's theoretical goal is to assess the accuracy of dependency and conventional theories in light of empirical data. He concludes by arguing that dependency theory is more accurate in its assessment of the negative effects of foreign investments on developing countries. The reader is left wondering if the author indeed had a "clean slate" before he started collecting his data.

Rosen, L., "Rural Political Process and National Political Structure in Morocco," in Rural Politics and Social Change in the Middle East, ed. R. Antoun and I. Harik, pp. 214-36, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, IN (1972). MOROCCO ARTICLE GENERAL DEVELOPMENT INTRANATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY

This paper analyzes the 1966 election for representative to the Chamber of Agriculture in the province of Fez. The author argues that this event "can be taken as a summary statement about many aspects of the overall social and cultural life of the community."

An official elected to the provincial Chamber of Agriculture is important for his formal role in the production and marketing of agricultural goods and for his informal power in securing "favors" for others (and for himself) by virtue of connections with national politicians, the bureaucracy, and the major national parties.

The contest was a challenge by three Berbers--all of them rural residents and of modest means--to the candidacy of the incumbant--a wealthy urban Arab who possessed large local landholdings and good connections with national figures. The three Berbers concentrated their efforts into expanding and solidifying their kin and non-kin networks through a variety of means such as

> the ties of economic indebtedness, the mutual aid patterns of close kinsmen and neighbors, the implications of the supernaturally sanctioned 'ar, the moral bonds of common membership in a religious brotherhood, and so on.

It is important to note that there was virtually no reference to agricultural policies of the major parties nor any claim of partisan affiliations. The heart of politics centers around the ability of individuals, rather than groups, to tap connections and build bonds of dominance and dependence. The main political goal is not the office itself but the recognition that the victorious candidate is the leader of a coalition of people depending on his "favors."

The election brought defeat to the incumbant who, with the support of the palace, challenged its validity. The king's concern with this minor

election was actually symptomatic of his desire to ensure the result of the next parliamentary election. Since every local leader can turn over his constituency to candidates in national elections, the king wanted a re-election of the incumbant, who was more favorable to a parliamentary candidate close to the palace.

Rosen's major observation is that political support is based on ties of patronage rather than on shared membership in a corporate group. The ties of patronage linking local followers to an official are strengthened by ties the official forges with members of the national government. These ties are established through the political parties or by direct personal connections through the bureaucracy.

This paper is a good example of an ethnography linking national and local politics and focusing on the analysis of interpersonal relationships. The microsociological aspect of the analysis effectively reaveals aspects of the wider political system. The author, however, seems to emphasize excessively the personal and shifting nature of patronage ties while not paying enough attention to the more enduring forms of solidarity--kinship, religious membership, and class--which provide the context for these ties of patronage.

Santucci, J. and J.Regnier, "Armee, Pouvoir et Legitimite au Maroc," in Elites, Pouvoir et Legitimite au Maghreb, ed. M. Teitler, pp. 141-82, Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, Paris (1973). MOROCCO ARTICLE GENERAL DEVELOPMENT INTRANATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY

This paper discusses the role of the armed forces in providing legitimacy to the regime. Legitimacy is defined as "the capacity of the regime to allocate, at a minimum cost to itself, (material and symbolic) resources, and to use to a minimum coercive force, in order to be accepted as it is." The armed forces in Morocco fulfill three functions: they represent a powerful means for coercion; they are an important element in the distribution of material resources; and they represent symbolically the traditional values of the monarchy and Islam as well as those of modernization. Because they can play this triple role, the armed forces act as the main umpire of Moroccan political life.

The paper analyzes first the military and coercive use of the armed forces. The armed forces are used mainly: first, to defend the frontiers of the nation; second, to guard the state against internal revolts; and third, to protect the king from things like assassination plots. The threat of force, however, is insufficient to quell dissidance, a matter requiring the distribution of resources as well.

The armed forces collect some resources and distribute others. The resources collected come from a variety of foreign sources (France, U.S.A., U.S.S.R.,etc), in the form of education and material, and from the Moroccan state, in the form of an operating budget. In turn, the armed forces distribute some resources: development of the armed forces has had a positive impact on the construction industry and, around the army bases, on local handicrafts and small commerce. The armed forces have also played an active role in the economic development of the country by participating, for instance, in the construction of roads or the education of civil servants. However, the authors note that the armed forces' extensive means and the country's pressing needs might have

produced a more active military role in the development of the country. If the armed forces have not played such a role, it is because the government does not have a coherent, long-term development plan.

Along with the use of coercive force and the allocation of material resources, the armed forces also distribute symbolic and non-material resources. They have played a crucial role in the political construction of the Moroccan state and, since 1956, have allied themselves with the king: "The armed forces and the throne are one, and the throne and the people are one; it follows from this double 'symbiosis' that the armed forces cannot be involved politically." The armed forces, like the king, pride themselves on being apolitical, above parties and factions. Accordingly, as with the king, the parties will contest and debate the armed forces' powers only prudently.

To legitimate the king's rule the armed forces convey three basic messages: their role in the economic progress of the country; their loyalty to traditional values of Islam and the monarchy; and the idea that the armed forces and the people are one. These messages are mainly directed to the rural population (7/10 of the total) who, according to the authors, have not been sufficiently controlled by the rural elite. The armed forces' presence in rural areas, their allocation of resources, and their use of force palliate these deficiencies.

This paper, written before the attempted coup d'etat in 1971, presents valuable insights, especially in its analysis of the symbolic basis of legitimacy. The authors argue that when the armed forces become invested in the major symbols of legitimacy, they may want to bridge the gap between the mythical image of the state they represent and the actual reality of government. This, according to the authors, explains the frequency of military coups d'etat in developing countries.

Shuster, J., "Bureaucratic Transition in Morocco," Human Organization vol. 24, N°1, pp. 53-58, (1965). MOROCCO ARTICLE PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION BUREAUCRACY

This paper examines two aspects of bureaucracy in Morocco: the importance of bureaucracy in development, and the problem of Moroccanization. First, the article analyzes attributes of Moroccan bureaucracy and its place in the political structure. After independence, the state decided to foster a major change in values held by many Moroccans, promoting national unity over tribalism. The bureaucracy played a large role in implementing this shift. Its crucial role was possible because the bureaucracy possessed the following four attributes: control, continuity, cohesion, and comprehensiveness.

Control originated in the seven years following independence, when there was no elected body of representatives, so the bureaucracy enjoyed a monopoly of power. Today, it is seen as the executive arm of the monarchy, and it is not subordinated to the legislature. Continuity stems from the fact that the bureaucracy has been the sole permanent element of the political system from the years of the Protectorate to the present. Moreover, the bureaucracy forms a cohesive body with an esprit de corps stemming from its formal structure and organization and the pride the employees take in leading major social change. Finally, the bureaucracy possesses the attribute of comprehensiveness in that "(it) crosscuts all factions--political, ethnic, religious, regional--as well as all functions--planning, direction, and execution." This comprehensiveness is unique in the Moroccan political system, and the combination of these four attributes allows the bureaucracy to play such an important role in the development of Morocco.

The second part of this article analyzes the Moroccanization, or institutionalization, of the bureaucracy. This process has had two aspects--

independence from France, and recruitment and training. The bureaucracy succeeded only partially in severing its ties with the French. Independence brought extensive personnel change; but the structure, procedure, ideas, and training are essentially the same as those of the French bureaucracy during the Protectorate. Moreover, certain highly skilled jobs (e.g. physicians or agricultural engineers) are still filled by French or other foreign personnel.

Recruitment and training present another set of problems. The higher echelons of the bureaucracy have been filled by well-trained Moroccans, and the lower echelons have been quickly filled by low-skilled personnel. However, the middle range is understaffed and most of the foreigners can be found here. Moreover, the stepped-up Moroccanization has meant the downgrading of most jobs.

This article offers an interesting historical overview of the main problems faced by the bureaucracy during the first years of independence. The responses to these problems have, in turn, generated other problems that face the Moroccan state today. For instance, the article by Waterbury (see Waterbury 1973, abstracted in this collection) specifically links the downgrading in recruitment and promotion standards to bureaucratic corruption.

Troin, J., Les Souks Marocains, Edisud, Aix-en-Provence (1975).
MOROCCO BOOK AGRICULTURE MARKETS AND FOOD SUBSIDIES

This study analyzes the organization, structure, and history of the rural markets in north Morocco. Data collection techniques included visiting 384 markets, use of a formal questionnaire, and comprehensive collection of 28,000 data points. Though the author is a geographer, his approach is more that of an economist or sociologist.

The first part of the study emphasizes that, far from being historical relics, markets are vital institutions in Moroccan rural life. They constitute a place of exchange between peasants, on the one hand, and merchants and artisans, on the other. Far from being unorganized and unstructured, they are integrated into regional commercial circuits, convene regularly, and are structured hierarchically in terms of their participants' financial means.

The second part of the book deals with the structure of markets. The author observes that, on the average, markets are skewed: the food sector is disproportionately important; the sector of household goods is undeveloped; and, in terms of actual needs, the service sector is hyperdeveloped. Variations in the structure of markets are determined by the regional economies of which they are part.

There are basically three types of activities in the market: distribution, services, and collection. The circuits of distribution (processed food, clothing) originate in the cities, and the professions associated with it are structured hierarchically, with grocers at the bottom and cloth merchants at the top. The service activities (repair, restaurants, handicraft) constitute the poorest of all sectors despite (or perhaps, because of) the fact that they have grown drastically. Since the service sector involves a modest investment, it has become an outlet for the urban and rural unemployed.

Finally, there are two collection circuits in Morocco: a modern one based on cooperatives and silos, and the more important traditional or private circuit. Troin notes that the private circuit of agricultural goods makes peasants extremely dependent on merchants. Since peasants cannot stock, they have to sell their crop fast and in small quantities at prices that are subject to speculation as well as to daily, or even hourly, fluctuations. The market, instead of representing a place for the peasant to realize a profit, is a place where he risks his financial situation every time. The dependence of peasants on merchants is compounded by the fact that the merchants sell processed goods back to the peasants at a premium price. Troin also criticizes the length of commercial circuits between town and country, which multuplies middlemen and speculators, and he calls for a stricter regulation of markets and their circuits.

Troin also notes that the markets closer to urban centers have a false appearance of modernity because they sell modern goods; actually they are skewed toward consumption of second-hand and superfluous articles as well as toward "activities of survival" (e.g., story-telling)--two characteristics of underdeveloping economies.

The third part of this book analyzes the recent history of Moroccan markets and the factors that determine market sites. Examples of environmental factors are the proximity of water, a suitable flat terrain, and so on; examples of social factors are population density and the vicinity of a religious shrine or an important notable who will provide protection.

Troin then outlines the recent history of Moroccan markets, especially during and after the Protectorate. He emphasizes that the French were quick to realize the strategic importance of markets. In order to control them they ordered settlement of the itinerary ones, consolidation of smaller markets (in blad al-siba*) into bigger ones, and placement of certain markets closer to military posts. Therefore the protectorate

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* In the history of Morocco much is made of a distinction between blad al-siba, or land of dissidance, and blad al-makhzan, or land controlled by the central authority.

was instrumental in establishing the modern network of markets. After independence, two processes were at work: the atomisation of certain markets and the expansion of others (due to an improved road network). Today the most important factor affecting the presence and vitality of a market is its distance from a city--the more dynamic ones being farther from urban centers.

The fourth part of the study focuses on the regional organization of markets. Troin notes that changes introduced by the French have also produced distortions in regional organization: some centers compete unsuccessfully with others that are too close; while some other markets need to be revitalized. As a result of French policies, the markets are unequally distributed in the country despite the expanded road network.

The fifth part of the study is devoted to the dynamic role of markets in creating urban and rural centers. The most important factor in the evolution of a market into a village is the nearby presence of a center of employment--such as a military post, a modern farm employing day-laborers, or a factory. Regular salaries attract merchants, who constitute a nucleus; they, in turn, often attract a transient population of unemployed, peddlers, journey-men, etc. The construction of a school, a public bath, or a restaurant--or even more importantly, a road or the creation of an administrative post--will increase the importance of the center. Thus, markets can be the origins of villages. However, cities sometimes push markets to the periphery of urban centers to protect their down-town commerce. According to Troin, these expulsions are often detrimental to both market and down-town and may lead to the weakening and geographical dispersal of both.

Briefly stated, the more an area is urbanized the less successful is the combination of market and settled commerce; the less a region is urbanized the more complementary and flourishing is such a combination. Thus, markets in Morocco are well anchored in rural life and benefit from its economic vitality.

Troin concludes with an outline of the problems facing Moroccan markets which are linked to underdevelopment. First, in underdeveloped

countries there is little savings and capital formation, and most investments are in commerce, so markets tend to react quickly and reflect immediately economic crises affecting regions or sectors. Second, since underdevelopment often means increased urbanization and decreased agricultural production, markets tend to become skewed toward the distribution of urban, rather than rural, goods. This only increases the domination of cities over country.

This book represents a very impressive and rich empirical study. The main text--which is accompanied by an atlas of 28 colored maps--offers vital data on most aspects of markets in north Morocco. Since it does not deal with the role of markets beyond the region, however, this study should be read in conjunction with Villeneuve (see Villeneuve 1971, abstracted in this collection).

Villeneuve, M., La Situation de l'Agriculture et son Avenir dans l'Economie Marocaine, R. Pichon and R. Durant-Auzias, Paris (1971). MOROCCO BOOK AGRICULTURE GENERAL DEVELOPMENT INTRANATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY

This is a comprehensive study of the structure, role, and future of agriculture in Morocco as revealed by an analysis of government documents and statistics.

The first part of the book provides an overview of agriculture in Morocco. The author discusses difficulties the government faces in implementing policies of development despite favorable environmental conditions. The main objectives of the government are: to meet the country's need in food, to increase the contribution of the agricultural sector to the balance of payments, and to raise the rural standard of living.

The main constraints in fulfilling these objectives have been high demographic rates and small average farms. First, extreme population growth burdens the whole economy. In terms of the agricultural sector, it increases the need for foodstuffs to the point where grain will soon have to be imported. In addition, the population increase may start a process of involution (i.e. a decline in per capita output) through land fragmentation and underemployment.

Second, several factors produce a lack of incentive to modernize. The average farm size is too small and supports too many people; therefore, little capital formation for investment in new technologies is possible. In addition, farmers are generally illiterate and ill-trained in modern techniques. Finally, farms are not well integrated into the modern sector of the economy since they constitute production-consumption units.

The second part of the book examines the agricultural sector in terms of its relations with other economic sectors and its contribution to the overall economy. A statistical analysis of exchange relations between

sectors shows that agriculture "seems to be added to, rather than integrated into, the general economy." A few percentages express the isolation of agriculture: 70 per cent of the population is rural, yet it contributes only to a third of the total production, of the added value, and of household expenditure. Grain is grown on 80 to 90 per cent of all cultivated land, yet only 10 per cent of the crops reach the urban markets. In terms of the general economy, the agricultural sector (especially tomatoes and citrus fruits) makes a strong and positive contribution to the balance of payments--57.9 per cent of all exports in 1968.

In brief, Moroccan agriculture is characterized by the coexistence of two sectors: a traditional, isolated, and poor sector which includes the majority of farms; and a modern, smaller, and prosperous sector that is well integrated into the world economy through exports.

The third part of the book focuses on the future of the agricultural sector and provides policy recommendations about it. From past experience the government has learned to stay away from ambitious development plans; it now favors specific and detailed feasibility studies, designed with the help of local authorities and integrated into a national plan. The author points out that this procedure presents certain disadvantages; for instance, there is a tendency for projects to focus on technical feasibility rather than on contribution to overall economic growth. However, the author finds this procedure generally an improvement over previous ones. In addition, Villeneuve looks favorably upon the 1968-1972 plan's vigorous program for irrigation, but he also criticizes the plan for increasing disparities in growth rate between the poorer regions of the center and the richer one on the periphery.

Villeneuve concludes his study with one major policy recommendation --intensification by means of irrigation, better seeds and fertilizers, faster crop rotation, and expansion of cash crops for export (instead of focusing on filling the country's food needs). To achieve this goal he

recommends careful use of investments: on the one hand, the rate of demographic increase decreases the positive contribution of the agricultural sector to the national economy; on the other hand, sluggish growth rates in agriculture minimize the impact of investments in agricultural production on the growth rate of the economy overall.

Practically speaking, this means that when choosing among agricultural projects the government should adopt (in decreasing order of priorities): (1) the one that will increase production the fastest (even if it is also the most costly); (2) the one that requires the least capital investment; (3) the one that encourages labor-intensive and capital-saving techniques; and finally, (4) the one that will increase the volume of exports.

This book is an all too rare account of Moroccan agriculture. It is valuable for its comprehensive data but suffers from the lack of an explicit theoretical framework. In particular, the author does not clearly interrelate the first two parts of the book. It took careful reading to realize that the coexistence of modern and traditional agricultural sectors was reflected in a paradox: Moroccan agriculture is relatively isolated from other economic sectors while at the same time it contributes to the balance of payments. In addition, the author neglects to analyze the articulation between modern and traditional sectors and the links between the processes of modernization and underdevelopment.

Finally, his policy recommendations are built on the model of "trickle-down effect" and the principle of successful investments. Such policies may lead to the pauperization of more than half the population, who must wait wretchedly for expansion of the modern sector. The author is fully aware of this negative aspect of his policies and counts on the strength of the Moroccan family to take care of its own. This, in turn, ignores the social and economic pressures leading to changes in family structures and the risk of political explosions resulting from economic misery.

Waterbury, J., The Commander of the Faithful: The Moroccan Political Elite, Columbia University Press, New York (1970). MOROCCO BOOK GENERAL DEVELOPMENT INTRANATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY IDEOLOGY SOCIAL ORGANIZATION AND STRUCTURE INFORMAL PROCESSES

The main objective of this book is to analyze the dynamics of national politics in Morocco since 1956. Its principal conclusion is that Morocco is a stalemated society whose immobilism is due to intra-elite conflicts that prevent any faction from emerging as a leader and initiating social change. The analytical framework is functional and historical, and the book is primarly concerned with Moroccan attitudes toward power and authority. It focuses on political behavior, which is seen as a product of social structure and as an expression of political culture.

The first part of the book analyzes the roots of political immobilism in the pre-Protectorate and Protectorate times. Previous to French penetration, politics was characterized by shifting alliances between groups which principally maintained the status quo by forming balanced but opposing coalitions. In such a context, retention of power by the sultan or by any group was precarious and ephemeral.

French colonization introduced major economic and political changes. The central elements of the traditional system--the sultan, the murabitin, and the tribes--assumed a secondary role. But after World War II, a growing nationalist movement took on increased importance. The sultan used Istiqlal (the independence party) as a source of support in his effort to protect the integrity of the monarchy, and Istiqlal used the sultan as a national symbol that could evoke a mass response. The emergence of groups holding divergent opinions, both inside and outside Istiqlal, allowed the king to become the only true symbol of national unity, and his manipulation of political groups has ensured his position ever since.

The second part of the book analyzes the nature and behavior of elites in the Moroccan context. Waterbury emphasizes the segmentary nature of Moroccan society. Following Evans-Pritchard, he observes that tension and hostility are often essential mechanisms for group cohesion: shifts in the balance of power are quickly cancelled by counter-shifts, and the

segmentary system tends overall toward maintenance of an equilibrium through shifting alliances. The principal types of segmental factions are: first, those founded on primordial attachments (e.g. tribes, religion, cities, city quarters, etc); second, those displaying a blend of objective goals and primordial sentiments (e.g. clienteles); and third, those primarly defined by objective interests (e.g. parties, unions, etc). Waterbury argues that the factions are not class-based even though "most factions, regardless of their nature, are recruited from the materially well-off."

For over a decade, a socially homogeneous group of 1000 men has controlled the Moroccan political system. Waterbury follows Raymond Aron's definition of elites as minorities placed at strategic points in society. In Morocco, it consists of three main elements: the administrative elite, the commercial urban bourgeoisie, and the rural notability. The elite's homogeneity is backed by endogamous social relations and the same economic goal--the quest for wealth.

Members of the elite are constantly involved in building alliances through obligation, debts, and patronage. To maintain their clienteles, various elite factions must have access to the king: "In turn the palace arbitrates, adjudicates and defines the rules for the competition for the goods that it distributes;" and the smallness, introversion, and factionalism of the elite are crucial to the king's survival and manoeuvrability. Waterbury illustrates the dynamics of elite segmentary behavior, and the king's manipulation of it, by describing some of the important episodes of the independence period--the splitting of Istiqlal, the fragmentation and resultant paralysis of the left, the formation and eventual split of the Mouvement Populaire, and the FDIC experiment. These events demonstrate what the first decade of independence was all about: the unequivocal assertion of the king's control through restructuring and reorienting Morocco's segmentary system.

The specific tactics used by the king include threat of military force, appointment to public office, extensive deliberation with elite

members, and control of a few key institutions:

> Through the administration the king is able to maintain the inner conflicts of the elite and to reaffirm the primacy of the throne in the allocation of goods and power. Through the Ministry of Interior and the army he is able to supervise the competition among factions, change the rules of the game, eliminate certain players, and if need be, simply defend himself.

Waterbury points out that the king himself seems to have "no other long term strategy than to hope that his short term tactics continue to pay off." The king's preoccupation with the maintenance of the status quo is responsible for the economic stalemate.

The author concludes by emphasizing the problem inherent in the small absorptive capacity of the elite. Since Morocco suffers from economic stagnation, it cannot fulfill the aspirations and expectations of the younger, educated generation "who have already begun to form a dangerous 'intellectual proletariat'."

Waterbury avoids making specific predictions about the future beyond saying that the political and economic stalemate cannot continue much longer. He points out, however, that in the final analysis "whether or not the incumbent elite adjusts to the changed situation, or is displaced for its failure to do so, may not be as important as the political behavior and style adopted by future elites."

This book offers a perceptive view of Moroccan politics and is characterized by the clarity of its argument and richness of its empirical base, especially in describing recent political developments. However, the book suffers from a schematic description of the segmentary system before the Protectorate and from a simplistic view of history. Specifically, the author seems to argue that, since the segmentary principle was at work in the past, it is no surprise to find it at work today. In order to explain its revival at independence Waterbury reverts to a functionalist argument: the segmentary system was revitalized by the king to consolidate

his power. This seems to be too small a cause for such a big effect. Thus, the main weakness of the book is to view the king as the central factor in Moroccan politics, and history as the unfolding of events provoked by great men. A more cogent argument would have centered on the reasons for Morocco's economic stagnation, which in turn is the main culprit for the political stalemate. In addition, the book suffers from a view of Morocco in isolation, as if the king and the country were independent of outside economic or political pressures. Despite these shortcomings, however, the book remains very informative and insightful.

Waterbury, J., "Endemic and Planned Corruption in a Monarchical Regime," World Politics, vol. 25, N°4, pp. 533-55 (1973). MOROCCO ARTICLE GENERAL DEVELOPMENT INFORMAL PROCESSES INTRANATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY

This paper focuses on corruption in Morocco. It seeks to demonstrate that corruption is not an unwanted consequence of the Moroccan political system but a planned and vital element in assuring the survival of the regime. In addition, the paper criticizes functionalist views of corruption which look at this phenomenon in terms of its benefits to the political and economic system rather than in terms of its costs.

The first part of this article provides a conceptual clarification of the notion of corruption and seeks to show how the process is an essential part of the political system in Morocco. Waterbury defines corruption as any "abuse of political power and influence for private ends." He sees the Moroccan regime as patrimonial in that the king and the bureaucracy work continuously to make all sectors of society dependent by means of administrative prebends. These ties of patronage may be, according to Waterbury, corrupt..ve in that "when a patron occupies a public position or extracts favors from those in public positions, patronage and corruption overlap."

Such ties of patronage are part of all political systems but they become prevasive in developing countries, where scarcity of resources and vulnerability of the poor promote their prevalence. Waterbury points out that in such a context increasing the scope of the state accordingly increases the scope of corruption.

The ties of dependence between the bureaucracy and the masses are paralleled by the ties of dependence between the king and the bureaucrats. The king ensures his political survival by increasing the elite's dependence on his person. Meritocracy in the armed forces and bureaucracy is systematically avoided as the king distributes reward and promotions arbitrarily.

In the second part of the paper the author criticizes some functionalist views of corruption which present it as promoting capital formation, administrative flexibility, and national integration. First, Waterbury takes issue with the functionalist argument that corruption may have a positive effect on capital formation because the best capitalist musters the highest bribe. The author argues cogently that this view is much too simplistic since brokers often secure bribes between capitalists and bureaucrats, thus diverting money from reinvestment. Moreover, bribes do not promote more efficient capitalism because most entreprises are branch operations and the market and industries are protected. In addition, Waterbury points out that corruption cannot foster capital formation because it actually is a negative transaction: it means that the administration "offers not to apply discriminatory practices." Finally, since the system is based on ties of dependence to the palace, no entrepreneur can risk becoming too successful. Through discriminatory practices these men may be "broken" or "domesticated." The focus is thus on short-term gains and a rapid turn-over.

Secondly, Waterbury criticizes the view that corruption promotes administrative flexibility. The author points out that any benefit gained by corruption (such as attracting talented personnel despite low salaries) is offset by the following three costs. Low salaries for civil servants and budget austerity are intended to free state resources for productive investment. Instead, a parallel system of civil-servant promotion based on patronage wastes time because personnel become unduly preoccupied by a game of manipulation. Finally, seen in terms of relations between the citizenry and civil servants, corruption actually decreases administrative flexibility by increasing red tape.

Thirdly, Waterbury criticizes the functionalist view that patronage and corruption mitigate ethnic and class conflict by diverting attention to the spoils system. The author observes that corruption takes place in a socially closed circuit and "may have contributed to the stratification of resources within a particularistic bourgeois elite."

This paper is valuable in describing aspects of the bureaucracy and the monarchy in Morocco while at the same time analyzing the problems brought about by corruption. Waterbury's analysis, however, would have been strengthened by a discussion of more long-term negative effects of corruption instead of only the short-term consequences.

Zghal, A., "Nation-building in the Maghreb," International Social Science Journal, Vol. 23, pp. 435-51 (1971). MOROCCO ARTICLE GENERAL DEVELOPMENT INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY

This paper analyzes the social and historical foundations for nation-building in the Maghreb (Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco). The author starts by reviewing the literature concerned with national "stagnation" in North Africa. He distinguishes two schools of thought--the classical Orientalist and the anti-colonial Marxist--and he notes that both were prefigured by the fourteenth century Maghrebian sociologist Ibn Khaldun, who saw the tension between nomadic life and city life as the main force for change in North Africa.

E. F. Gautier, the most representative of the Orientalists, argued that nation-building is the result of cooperation between the peasantry and the towns. This cooperation was delayed when the Hilali nomads of upper Egypt invaded the Maghreb in the middle of the 11th century and prevented attempts by settled Berber communities to establish a state based on an alliance between town and country.

Marxist historians reject this view. They place the Maghreb in its Mediterranean context by emphasizing long distance trade. According to this perspective, the Maghreb lost its pivotal role in exchange when the trade routes between Europe and the rest of the world shifted during the 14th century. Moreover, a feudal mode of production inhibited the use of profits from economic activities for nation-building in the Maghreb.

Zghal disputes the view that Maghrebian society was feudal, since it actually was characterized by weak and unstable central authorities from medieval times to the colonial conquest. He shifts attention from economic structures to cultural and social aspects, for he claims that nation-states are based on social and cultural homogeneity. He notes that, beyond some differences, Arabs and Berbers share a pattern of family structure and organization--a predominence of patrilineal agnatic groups--and a political system, based on the segmentary organization of family

groups. In such an organization, authority is difused and Evans-Pritchard's description applies: "Political leadership is limited to situation in which a tribe or a segment of its acts corporately."

Independence fostered the "reactivation" of segmentary structures, and Zghal notes that in Morocco this seems "to be blocking the functioning of the institutions and preparing the way for an explosive situation in the medium-term or the distant future." The author concludes by noting that, contrary to appearances, nationalism is not a very deep-rooted ideology in the Maghreb: "What can be said is that, between reactivation of regionalist sentiment (at the local level) and pan-Arabism, there still exists a number of intermediate choices."

This article provides an interesting overview of some of the political, social, and cultural aspects of North Africa. However, its focus on cultural homogeneity as the basis of the nation-state is narrow and hampers the author's ability to deal effectively with the process of nation-building.

Zghal, A., "Pourquoi la Reforme Agraire ne Mobilise-t-elle pas les Paysans du Maghreb ?," in Les Problemes Agraires au Maghreb, ed. B. Etienne, pp.295-312, Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, Paris (1977). MOROCCO ARTICLE GENERAL DEVELOPMENT INTRANATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY

The main objective of this paper is to analyze the failure of agrarian reform in mobilizing North African peasants. The analytical framework, derived from Barrington Moore and Gramsci, focuses on class alliances and ideology.

Given elite determination to reform agriculture, the alliance of peasants and governing elites in the Maghreb should have been successful; instead, it has failed. The central bureaucracy has not allowed the peasants to manage their cooperatives, and policies of increased mechanization have further minimized the peasants' role in production. As a result, landless peasants still have the same status (wage earner) as before, with the added disadvantage that they are controlled by absentee bureaucrats and do not have the job security they were accustomed to when working on colonial farms.

It is no surprise then to find that conflicts between landless peasants and local government representatives are more frequent than those opposing poor landowners to the rich ones. Peasants express their disagreement with government policies through their votes in the co-peratives as well as through emigration to the cities or abroad.

Peasant mobilization is further prevented by the elite's paternalistic and condescending attitudes toward the peasants, who are seen as ignorant, with a narrow vision of the world. In short, the elites have started a process of "de-peasantization." The author concludes by wondering whether the process has worked and if it has not already caused peasants to lack interest in agrarian reforms.

This is an insightful analysis of the structural and ideological aspects of rural reforms. Its main asset is the use of an analytical

framework which allows careful consideration of specific historical conditions. It does not, however, analyze all aspects of peasant mobilization or agrarian reform nor does it offer a very profound conclusion.

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115.	J. Pegunier (address unknown)	Sociology	(unknown)
116.	C. Petonnet (address unknown)	Anthropology	(unknown)
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118.	E. Pingand-Assiden (address unknown)	Political Science	(unknown)
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128.	M. Saadi (address unknown)	(unknown)	(unknown)
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130.	D. Sauvard (address unknown)	(unknown)	(unknown)
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132.	S. Schaar (address unknown)	(unknown)	(unknown)
133.	Dr. S. Schaefer-Davis (address unknown)	Anthropology	Arabic English French
134.	H. Sebbar (address unknown)	Tourism	(unknown)
135.	Dr. D. Seddon (address unknown)	Anthropology	Berber English French Spanish
136.	Dr. E. Sharma (address unknown)	Family Planning	(unknown)
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143.	Dr. M. Teitler (address unknown)	Political Science	(unknown)
144.	W. Tewell (address unknown)	Economics	(unknown)
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146.	Dr. J. Troin (address unknown)	Geography	(unknown)
147.	H. Turner (address unknown)	(unknown)	(unknown)
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149.	M. Villeneuve (address unknown)	Agriculture	(unknown)
150.	T. Vu Van (address unknown)	Transportation	(unknown)
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152.	Dr. J. Waterbury Department of Political Science Princeton University Princeton, NJ 08540	Political Science	Arabic English French
153.	Dr. N. Youssef (address unknown)	Economics Feminism	Arabic English Spanish
154.	Dr. I.W. Zartman Department of International Politics Johns Hopkins University Washington, DC 20036	Political Science	Arabic English French
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30 April 1982

INTRODUCTION

This report on Jordan is the first of a series which will include others on Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, and Yemen (San'a). Each report will focus on socio-cultural and political-economic aspects of development and will consist of a bibliography, abstracts, a list of researchers, and recommendations about which bibliographic sources might be distributed to USAID offices.

The bibliography in the current report includes articles, books and monographs, dissertations and theses, project-related papers, Jordanian government documents, and a few other sources. The majority of them are in English, but a small number are in Arabic. Almost all have been produced since 1970.

The twenty abstracts were made from sources selected according to four criteria. The contract for this project stipulates that sources chosen should be "of high quality," "empirically based," and "relevant to development." The first of these criteria was taken to concern formal considerations (such as consistency and comprehensiveness); the second, substantive considerations (such as testing hypotheses or at least clearly relating claims to data); and the third, addressing "basic needs." To these interpretations was added the criterion of balance, both in topics and in perspectives, so that all twenty sources selected would not concern a single subject area or viewpoint. Sources chosen for abstracting, then, were judged according to these four criteria and rated highly on all or most of them. For this reason we recommend that, funds permitting, all twenty be duplicated and distributed to relevant USAID offices.

The list of researchers was composed from the authors of the sources in the bibliography. Information about their addresses, topics of research, and language competence were compiled from seven directories, biographical data in their publications, and personal networks.

FCH
Project Director

A

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Abu-Jaber, K., "Development and its Effects on Jordan's Society," Orient (Hamburg), pp. 19-32 (1978). JORDAN ARTICLE GENERAL DEVELOPMENT INTRANATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY

ABSTRACT

This paper was prepared for the Sixth International Conference on the Unity of Sciences, held in San Francisco on November 25-27, 1977. It discusses three main influences on Jordan's development: external factors, the government's role, and internal factors.

The first and most important influence has been Arab society's contacts with the West. Since the early nineteenth century, the militarily and technologically superior West has dealt with Arab society as an inferior adversary. "Western intrusion and its Zionist manifestation into Arab society, politically, militarily, economically, and culturally" have thrust Jordan into the complex events of the Palestine problem. This external factor was beyond the country's means to master. The resulting Palestinian exodus into Jordan has had negative and positive effects on its socio-economic and political life. While thousands of destitute refugees strained an already weak economy, this vast array of human resources nontheless played a positive role in Jordan's development. Unlike countries whose existence and stability were unquestioned, the political reality of living with an aggressive and menacing neighbor forced Jordan to jump from "semiprimitive" subsistence in the early 1940's to a consumer and services society today, bypassing

the industrial and agricultural revolutions.

The second main influence has been the government's deliberate role in promoting development. To counter Western intrusion, Arab leaders from Mohamed Ali's time have acquired military skills, espoused social reforms, supported nationalist and socialist ideals, and pursued comprehensive planning. In Jordan such planning has consisted of socio-economic and political reforms. Economically, the government has encouraged private enterprises, initiated projects, and shared investment in large local companies throughout various National Plans since 1964. Socially, it has improved education, health, and welfare. Legally, it has replaced the Tribal law with formal authority. However, rapid modernization by the government has caused an uneven and incomplete process of growth at the high price of social stability. Only the shock of the Zionist challenge, Abu Jaber argues, has made this price seem appropriate.

The third, or indigenous, influence on development has been the Jordanian people's acceptance of social mobility and change as two tenets of Islamic society and tradition. In contrast to the Western experience--where the breakdown of the feudal system and the rise of new cities, new modes of production, and new ideologies and classes brought about changes in spite of ruling elites--developing countries like Jordan have initiated change <u>from above</u>, and the new social classes have come as products rather than initiators of change. Also, in Jordan a "shame culture" requires people to "save face" by outwardly denying their inadequacies and inwardly imposing constraints. Thus, while change has been justified as part of Arab heritage and culture, an awareness of the old Jordan's inability to survive in the twentieth century has promoted development. Moreover, the government's prudent use of local resources and foreign aid, and "humane treatment of political opponents," were due to "an aware population" and "a moderate leadership."

Although the effects of development on Jordan are hard to measure, they have been qualitatively and quantitatively drastic. Abu Jaber provides a table on socio-economic indicators from 1952 to 1975. Changes are also shown by urbanization, dress styles, consumer habits, food consumption patterns, and caloric intake. Psychologically, the family, kin, and tribal loyalties are slowly

being "replaced by" those to labor unions and professional associations. Modernization, urbanization, and industrialization have caused old landed and other elite classes to make way for rising new ones: the middle class, the intelligentsia, the bureaucrats, the army officers, and the urban labor classes. The benefits of development, however, are unevenly distributed among them. Socio-economic disparities between urban, village, and Bedouin sectors (and among various urban neighborhoods) are obvious, although class consciousness has not yet fully developed. In conclusion, the author emphasizes that it may still be too soon to assess these changes properly, which are in process and whose final outcome is unforeseen.

Abu Jaber's article echoes the official stance on Jordan's changes. It reflects attempts to take account of, and to justify, social contradictions which have yet to be resolved, but which arise from processes of uneven development.

Antoun, R., Arab Village: A Social Structural Study of a Transjordanian Peasant Community, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, IN (1972). JORDAN BOOK GENERAL DEVELOPMENT SOCIAL ORGANIZATION AND STRUCTURE

ABSTRACT

This is an anthropological study of the social structure of Kufr al-Ma, a village in northern Jordan which "probably shares many cultural traits with other Arab villages located on the rim of the desert and other Sunni villages." Antoun collected his data in 1959-60 while working in this community of 2,000 as a participant observer. Following a Malinowskian path, the book addresses four main issues: the coincidence of kinship and proximity in agricultural communities, their relationship to the actual behavior of the villagers, the effects of social change on kinship norms, and the nature of the village as a "community."

In this village, unpredictable ecological and climactic conditions, and the resulting two-crop agricultural regime, prevented concentration of economic wealth. These limits on differentiation supported an egalitarian Islamic social ethic which persisted despite basic political, economic and social changes. These included the lessening of district authority through government centralization in 1922; the increased social mobility of peasants, forced by diminishing amounts of arable land into nonagricultural jobs outside the village; and the destruction of corporate landholding with the abolition of the Musha (communal land tenure) system in 1939. Accordingly, Antoun analyzes the recruitment, composition, spatial relations, ideology, and social relations of patrilineal descent groups in the village using maps, tables, diagrams, photographs, and genealogies for documentation. He also provides case studies to illustrate the significant functions of such groups in village life. Given the heritage of propinquity in the subdistrict, neighborliness remains an important support for social, economic, and political cooperation. Patrilineality is the unifying principle at four levels of society: 1) the Household (a consumption unit with a common purse), 2) the Luzum (a close consultation group of households for political, marital, and land issues), 3) the Lineage (groups of luzum aligned in village politics), and 4) the Clan (groups of lineages whose elders exercised social control on other members). Clan elders, in turn, are grouped into alliances, each headed by a mukhtar, who is jointly the elder of his clan and a local official linking the village and the government. The mukhtar counsels, mediates, registers vital statistics, and applies administrative policies, but he has no ritual functions. Thus patrilineality permeates local organization yet is flexible enough to accommodate groups or individuals who otherwise would not qualify for membership or authority in the village. It is a continuum rather than a set of discrete units, which accounts for its diversity and flexibility.

A village "community" as such is a specific focus of kinship ties and a unit of social control with ideological, economic, and ecological sanctions. Reinforcing the community of kinship are matrilineal ties, interpreted symbolically as blood kinship. The modes of marriage also reinforce kinship ties. In particular, the effects of patrilineal cousin marriages on close kinsmen is to soften economic differentiation, maintain land

ownership, reinforce agnatic alliances, and provide a basis for division as well as for intensification of ties. Despite social change, then, village and clan continue to function as frameworks for political rivalry, social status, social control, and as the loci of kinship and land ownership.

The main relevance of Antoun's analysis of descent, kinship, and proximity in a Jordanian village pertains to their role in economic and political development, particularly when such ties are used to obtain services from the central government. The main weakness of the study lies in Antoun's choice of village: Kufr al-Ma may not be representative of other Jordanian villages because of its heritage of strong communal political action and economic control, which were shown by its participation in the area's intense rebellion against centralization. Antoun's static approach and the date of this study may further limit its utility.

Antoun, Richard F., Low Key Politics: Local Level Leadership and Change in the Middle East, SUNY Press, Albany, New York (1979). JORDAN BOOK GENERAL DEVELOPMENT INTRANATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY

ABSTRACT

This study of local-level or "practical" politics in the Jordanian village of Kufr al-Ma has four intertwined aims: first, "to provide a detailed case study;" second, "to identify and document...low-key politics;" third, to test a conceptual framework for the anthropological study of politics; and fourth, "to refine that framework by focusing on certain key concepts, reworking them, and evaluating their worth." Antoun had done research in this village in 1959-60; he returned in 1965, 1966, and 1967 to analyze its political process, defined as a competition for scarce ends (power, honor, purity) through various means of combining scarce resources.

Before discussing his analysis, some introduction to basic concepts seems useful. Antoun feels that F. G. Bailey's view of "competition" (rivalry according to certain rules) characterizes local politics in Kafr al-Ma better than does the concept of a "fight"(unregulated hostility). Such competition occurs in an "arena" (e.g., the village or government bureaus outside it) between coalitions, each composed of a leader and his supporters. The supporters themselves may be divided into a "core" group and an associated "following" according to their ties to the leader and to each other. Such coalitions may be classified along a spectrum going from "movements" (relatively stable collections of people linked by loyalty, habit, and a sense of the rightness of their cause) to "machines" (relatively unstable collections of people linked by their calculations of limited mutual advantage). Competition between coalitions generally takes place in three sequential phases: "subversion," where at least one competitor tries to neutralize or capture another's support; "confrontation," where at least one competitor communicates about support s/he can command; and "encounter," where a climax occurs and some resolution is reached.

Recalling the social structure of Kufr al-Ma (discussed more fully in his Arab Village; see the abstract in this collection), Antoun says that one coalition (Yasin) acts as a movement. Its leader is a mukhtar (which Antoun translates as "mayor") who is paid primarily by yearly donations from members of his own clan to dispense services and hospitality in a traditional manner. The core of his supporters are patrilineal kinsmen, but he also has a following from other lineages. The second coalition (Dumi-'amr) shifts between acting as a movement or as a machine, with a growing tendency toward the latter. Its leader is the village's second mukhtar, and he is paid primarily by charging fees for the services he provides. The core of his supporters are members of his own clan and an allied one; he also has a following of other villagers, including (for a short period) a lineage generally part of the first coalition's core. Mainly in response to national government policies (such as establishing village councils and revising the basis for remunerating a mukhtar), machine politics have been increasing in frequency and importance. The tendency, however, is limited by ecological, social, and political factors which attenuate competition. "Low-key" politics (characterized by muted subversion,

confrontation *in absentia*, and "encounter-through-mediation"), therefore, continue to predominate in Kufr al-Ma, a "transitional" society where old and new politics often coexist but are not (yet?) resolved into a coherent system.

This study is significant theoretically and substantively: it tests and modifies Bailey's concepts of politics while discussing a wide range of other analyses; it concerns data collected on repeated occasions over a relatively long period. No other source in this collection so systematically views change from the local level (as seen by a keen and sympathetic, although foreign, observer). However, the book's very strength's may become liabilities for some readers: it requires some familiarity with issues and positions discussed in the literature of political anthropology; the detail of the points presented may obscure the overall pattern of argument. The book is sometimes slow going, but it is worth the effort for its contributions to an understanding of Jordan and of politics.

Aresvik, Oddvar, *The Agricultural Development of Jordan*, Praeger Publishers, New York (1976). JORDAN BOOK AGRICULTURE AGRI-OTHER

ABSTRACT

This book presents a detailed and accurate analysis of the structure and development of the agricultural sector in Jordan between 1954 and 1973, with main emphasis on recent years and prospects for future development. The book and the proposed strategies are intended to serve as references for those interested in the economic aspects of development and in the role of well-developed, high yielding agricultural technology in Jordan, the Near East, and other poor countries. Aresvik has worked extensively in the Middle East and has served as Agricultural Economics Advisor to the government of Jordan. For data, he uses readily available published materials,

information collected during travels in rural areas, and personal interviews.

Following a brief historical background and a description of Jordan's geography, population, and infrastructure, Aresvik reviews the growth of agriculture within the Kingdom's general socio-economic development from 1954-1966 and from 1967-1973. During the first period, the economy (on the East and West Banks) made "impressive progress": G.N.P. grew at 11 percent, and agricultural output roughly doubled. This growth was due partly to higher yields generally, but more specifically to rapid increases in vegetable, fruit, livestock, and poultry production. The expansion of fruit and vegetable production, as compared to field crops, resulted mainly from the extension of irrigation (especially in the East Jordan Valley), the introduction of improved technology, and the growth of export markets. The 1967 war and the loss of the West Bank disrupted this progress. Thereafter G.N.P. grew at 5 percent, and the economy, with continued foreign aid, became more service-oriented. The aftermath of the war, Israeli raids on the East Ghor Canal, and the military confrontation with the commandos in 1970 (with consequent border closures for exports) rendered farming stagnant. Overall, the agricultural sector of Jordan witnessed a rapid growth of agricultural production up to 1969, averaging 8 percent a year. This growth "was heavily influenced by infrastructure development, such as construction of main roads and village roads, construction of dams and canals for the purpose of irrigation, and rapid population growth, urbanization, and a rapidly growing domestic market."

Given the limited land and water resources of the East Bank, the total area under cultivation cannot be increased. The relatively small share (less than one-third in 1973) of the total labor force employed in agriculture reflected such limited resources rather than the advancement of the industrial or service sectors. However, a potential for rapid increases of agricultural production can be realized, mainly through more efficient use of resources already available. Constraints on agricultural development in Jordan have included: a majority of small and fragmented farms, and an unsatisfactory land-tenure situation; the risk of low and erratic rainfall for unirrigated agriculture; and a lack of credits and inputs on reasonable terms for the majority of farmers. These factors have slowed the adoption

of improved technology. Other constraints are the shortage of well-trained production specialists and extension staff for the introduction of modern techniques; a low educational level among farmers; a traditional marketing system which keeps the farmer dependent on middlemen for credits and supplies; nonintegration of crop and livestock production; lack of proper coordination among the various agencies involved in agricultural development; and a lack of strong and efficient farm organizations.

Aresvik makes several recommendations which comply with government views for the improvement of agriculture. The prospects for increased yields depend on the provision of the complete "package" of tested and well-adapted technologies. The technical factors, which must be manipulated simultaneously, included the following: "(1)good seed of high-yielding fertilizer-responsive varieties; (2) improvements in soil fertility (fertilizer); (3) improvements in cultural practices (such as land leveling, seed-bed preparation, planting time, and planting depth); (4) improvements in water management (proper irrigation methods under irrigation, proper moisture conservation under rainfed conditions); (5) improvements in weed control; and (6) improvements in harvesting, grading, storage, and marketing methods." Long-range prospects for livestock productivity depend on the introduction of improved animal husbandry practices, especially in the control of diseases and parasites, and in feeding and management. Technical, financial, and management assistance is needed in poultry, fish, and cattle production. Proposals for strengthening and coordinating agencies involved in agricultural development include the following: forming a High Council for Agricultural Production; establishing a number of specialized boards such as the Wheat Production Board; organizing and decentralizing the Ministry of Agriculture; and facilitating participation by forming village committees composed of farmers and the extension and cooperative agents in each village. Furthermore, there is a need to expand and strengthen the existing agricultural research system to bridge gaps between the level of technology available, its adaptation at research stations, and its subsequent introduction among farmers.

The author views prospects for increased agricultural production and yields as realistic and optimistic. Through optimal implementation of

programs like those mentioned above, especially for certain fruits and vegetables, Jordan can supply a major part of domestic requirements and increase exports.

This study is valuable for its thorough analysis supported by extensive tables. Aresvik's careful examination of constraints considers the harsh physical and political conditions that have shaped Jordan's development more realistically than do other studies deriving from loose comparisons with Israel.

Aruri, Naseer, Jordan: A Study in Political Development (1924-1965), Martinos Nijhoff, The Hague (1972). JORDAN BOOK GENERAL DEVELOPMENT INTRANATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY

ABSTRACT

This book gives a comprehensive assessment of the development of Jordan until 1965, with emphasis on interactions between domestic and international politics. Aruri provides a case to show "that Middle Eastern rulers, in spite of their rhetoric, and high-flown aspirations about sovereignty and independence, have never been free agents in shaping the destiny of their nations." The study is based on documentaries, memoirs, books, articles, newspapers and magazines, as well as on personal interviews with Jordanian officials, intellectuals, and citizens during a research trip in 1965. The author uses several structural-functionalist concepts of political development to contrast "state-building" (essentially, improving government institutions) with "nation-building" (essentially, fostering "cultural and psychological" norms).

The first part of the analysis discusses historical, economic, demographic, and communal factors in the country's political development. Aruri explains how, after World War I, "the raison d'etre of the principality of Transjordan was that of British strategic interests in combination with

Abdullah's desire of a throne." In return for his loyalty, and prevention of nationalist incursions into French-mandated Syria, Britain reconized the Hashimite prince in Transjordan: they provided subsides to set up a civil administration and a security force; they helped supress local tribal and nationalist opposition; and they supervised the newly created state apparatus. The army performed the function of state-building; it became "an agent of political socialization" by recruiting Bedouin tribesmen and instilling them with "blind obedience" to the monarch as their "supertribal leader." Thus a centralized state was created, but the population remained subjects, as opposed to "participant-citizens." The problem of building a nation was accentutated with the merger of the East and West Banks. This merger "superimposed a comparatively literate and urban society on a predominantly rural one," and added regionalism to other disintegrative factors in the country's political development. Communalism (along with ethnic, religious, and national divisions), was perpetuated by the forms of constitutional representation, and it increased political fragmentation. Moreover, Jordan had many economic problems: shortages in capital and resources, dense population on arable land, chronic balance of payment deficits, dependence on unstable foreign aid, and influx to the cities and resulting unemployment. All these factors made it difficult for the government to achieve stability.

The second part of the book analyzes the structural changes in the society from a patriarchal oligarchy to a "constitutional monarchy." Throughout the Mandate period, state power was held by an Anglo-Hashimite oligarchy. This formal structure of government, with little connection to the indigenous population, strained social cohesion. In 1928, a constitution which gave "a semblance of legitimacy to an indigenous government dominated by the executive branch" was created. While it enabled Britain to undermine Abdullah's sovereignty, it also enabled him and his bureaucracy to undermine the legislature. Parochial, kinship, and tribal loyalties impeded the growth of a mass nationalist party with organizational programs. After the first legislative council was dissolved (as punishment for opposing Anglo-Hashimite hegemony), subsequent legislatures accepted that a genuine parlimentary democracy was never intended and acted as advisory councils. The proclamation of independence in 1946 did not change this situation. However, the annexation of

the West Bank in 1948, and the assassination of Abdullah in 1951, contributed to an initial democratization of the political system. A new constitution was established (with legislative checks on the executive), and power was transferred from a single king to a group of palace politicians headed by Tawfiq Abul-Huda. On the popular level, several political parties emerged and contested the legislative seats. There were "ideological" parties (Ba'ath, National Socialist, Communist, Muslim Brethren, and Al-Tahrir) which opposed the government, and "bloc" parties (Arab Constitutional, and Community Party) which supported it. Although the Palestinian middle class effected constitutional revision and legislative ascendency, the new system failed to create a pattern of orderly change, and the demands of nation-building were handled diffusely and intermittently.

The third part of the book examines the relationship between international relations and domestic politics. Between 1954 and 1957, encounters between conservatives loyal to King Hussein and the nationalist opposition centered on the objectives of foreign policy. Disagreement on non-alignment and Arab cooperation led the nationalists to apply pressures through riots and demonstrations. This eventually led to the rejection of the Baghdad Pact (a British-sponsored multilateral defense treaty against "Soviet Aggression"), the expulsion of General Glubb (the British Chief of Staff of the army), the termination of the Anglo-Jordanian treaty of 1948, and to Jordan's joining the Unified Arab Cammand with Syria and Egypt. Furthermore, when a nationalist pro-Egyptian government was elected in late 1956, it took measures to make Jordan part of a larger Arab nation. Fearing that he might be overthrown, King Hussein (with support from the conservatives, a loyal army, and fellow Arab monarchs) reimposed his authority. The U.S. replaced Britain as the Hashimite sponsor via a $10 million grant. A "reign of terror" ensued under martial law until 1958. American involvement through the Eisenhower Doctrine broadened the internal conflict into a Cold-War polarization. A U.S.-backed Arab Union between Jordan and Iraq failed following the military coup in Iraq. A Soviet backed United Arab Republic of Egypt and Syria gave its support to the nationalists inside Jordan. The 1958 crisis in Lebanon, and the landing of U.S. Marines there, also highlighted the regional struggle. British paratroops landed in Jordan to protect the king.

When combined with Israeli threats to occupy Jordan in the event of a change in regime, Nasser's desire to avoid such a confrontation, and a U.N. resolution on Arab nonintervention, this was sufficient to restore internal stability. Military and foreign aid thus became an integral part of a "challenge and response" pattern which prevented real political development. Between 1959 and 1965, King Hussein "conscious of the depletion of monarchial power in the region, and of the tendency of the Kennedy Administration to come to erms with the 'revolutionary' Arab states," consolidated his unofficial alliance with the West and called for a "new way of life" internally. A youthful Cabinet was commisioned, and a seven-year plan was inaugurated in 1962 to achieve economic development and political reform. However, when challenged in 1963, the monarchy again unleashed the army to maintain itself: "Jordan stands out as a state by virtue of its monopoly of the instruments of violence, it power to settle disputes, and allocates [sic] goods, services and values. But it is not a nation since this power has never been a consensual one."

Aruri's book is a valuable background to 1965 for the present political structure in Jordan and for the delicate system of "checks and balances" it has developed over the years--both internally and externally. Through the analysis presented, one can better appreciate the role of the army and various pressure groups affecting the larger development of Jordan; however, the book's age makes it less valuable for understanding more recent social transformations, such as the Palestinian-Jordanian civil war of 1970-71.

at-Tall, S., 'At-Tawziy' 'al-'agliymi 'al-Mushariy' 'al-'asukan fi 'al-Mamlakat 'al-'urduniyat 'al-Hashimiya (The Regional Distribution of Housing Projects in the Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan), Irbid Urban Regional Planning Group, Irbid, Jordan (1979). JORDAN GOV. DOCUMENTS URBANISM HOUSING AND CONSTRUCTION

ABSTRACT

This is an occasional paper by the chief of the Irbid Urban Regional Planning Group--one of five agencies responsible for Jordan's regional development. The study aims to show the past achievements of two main government institutions in the housing sector: the Housing Corporation and the Housing Bank. Using available figures, the report examines the distribution of activity in Jordan between 1969-1978.

During this period, the Housing Corporation constructed 5762 units in the East Bank with a total area of 433,000 square meters costing JD 19.4 million. Given the means available to the Corporation at the time, these are considered good achievements by at-Tall. However, this activity has been unevenly distributed in favor of the Amman-Balqa Region. Over 60 percent of the amount spent (JD 11.8 million), the houses built (3550 units), and the areas constructed (278,503 square meters) were located in this Region. Similarly, while the Housing Bank has granted 11,063 loans at a total cost of JD 80.5 million between 1974-1978, more than 70 percent of the loans (7963) and over 80 percent of the amounts spent (JD 67 million) were in the Amman-Balqa Region.

While noting that a defined Regional Development Policy was lacking during this period, at-Tall says this concentration "is contradictory to the Five-Year Development Plan, which emphasized the necessity of stopping the rural migration to urban areas." Moreover, it is contrary to H.R.H. Crown Prince Hassan's statements on the need for "an equitable and social development distribution." Hence, the continuation of this housing trend could mean the continued immigration of people to Amman to an extent that it would be impossible to supply them even with drinking water. Therefore at-Tall questions the correctness of four large housing projects planned for the Amman-Balqa Region (Abu-Naseir New City, Marj El-Hammam Project, Sahab City Housing Site, and Queen Aliya Airport Housing Project); he also questions whether the government's budget can afford to provide as well for the badly needed Yarmouk University and urban expansion projects in the Irbid Region. The pressing need for such projects is seen in the large numbers of people who work in the university and commute daily from Amman.

Although the Housing Bank accepts applications for loans regardless of the region from which they come, the tables indicate that 72

percent of those successful came from Amman. This, at-Tall concludes, necessitates the need to "create more human opportunities in all regions which enable people to apply for the Housing Bank in order to have residential shelter." Five suggestions are put forward to improve conditions.

First, the allocation of funds for housing projects should be evenly distributed to enable each region to meet its housing demands. Second, sites in Amman should be provided with services only, leaving construction to the private sector. Third, the construction of housing projects should be financed jointly by the two agencies in the regions where lower income groups cannot borrow from the Housing Bank alone, in order to create an incentive for people to remain in their native regions. Fourth, some housing projects in the regions should be considered vital and subsidized by the government. Fifth, a Reconstruction Corporation should be established in Irbid, as in the case in Amman, with input from the Housing Bank, the Industrial Development Bank, and the Housing Corporation to promote their investment outside Amman.

The value of this report is mainly its organization of scattered data for presentation in comparative regional terms. The report also reflects the pressing need to change the pattern of development felt by those who see it closely and are taking the initiative to induce awareness.

Birks, J. S. and C. A. Sinclair, International Migration and Development in the Arab Region, International Labor Organization, Geneva (1980). JORDAN BOOK POPULATION MIGRATION

ABSTRACT

This book, based on a study for the ILO's Migration for Employment project, examines the dimensions and patterns of labor migration in the Arab world during the 1970's, and evaluates the impacts of

this migration upon countries of origin and countries of employment. The authors assume two propositions: first, "that the international migration of labour in the Arab region occurs as a result of an economic demand for labour which is not or cannot be met locally," and second, "that labour from within the region as well as from outside would meet this demand in so far as it was available quantitatively." Taking this "demand" and "supply" approach, the analysis divides the countries into "capital-rich" (Kuwait, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Saudia Arabia, and Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), and "capital-poor" (Tunisia, Sudan, Egypt, Jordan, Syrian Arab Republic, Yemen, and Oman)--essentially, into major oil producers and others. Based on available statistical data and intensive interviewing, the manpower resources of each Arab state are described, and a regional perspective is provided. Also, an extensive and detailed series of tables is appended to the study.

Manpower is the key determinant to further economic development in the Arab world. However, the uneven distribution of education, wealth, and population among these countries have caused marked variations in incomes (GNP per head, and wage rates) and strikingly divergent paths of development. Thus, differential rewards have determined the fundamentals of international labor migration in the Middle East. This migration was moderate in size and flow until 1972. Since the oil price rises of 1973, however, the oil-endowed states have financed large-scale development plans, and rapid transfers of labor have enabled high degrees of economic development. By 1975, the number of migrant Arab workers reached 1.3 million but still demands increased, with the development plans entering their labor-intensive stages. Since the countries of origin had reached their demographic, economic, and political limits for labor export, the rich states turned to Asian and Far-Eastern sources of labor. This change in labor migration was also

associated with a preference for single males (to decrease the cost of providing for dependents) and for Oriental labor because of its efficiency, speed, and lower costs in "enclave" projects of development.

Viewed superficially, this dynamic system of international migration has been essentially advantageous to all parties. Labor movements have allowed capital-rich countries to embark upon a period of rapid growth and diversification by increasing their small national labor forces both numerically and in terms of skills. Yet the form of economic development is considerably dependent, not only on expatriate Arab labor, but more and more on Asian and Far-Eastern workers. While the capital-poor countries receive remittances from their migrants, and have reduced their pressing problem of unemployment, their own progress is being stunted by three factors: the depletion of labor sources, the use of remittances for conspicuous consumption (adding to domestic inflation), and the problem of reabsorbing of the migrants.

A variety of issues will influence policy planners in the 1980's. Clandestine movements of unskilled labor to rich states is one cause of concern which has prompted official bilateral labor agreements. The inequality of the benefits to the poor countries has spurred debates about possible means of compensations. Replacement migration (labor filling vacancies created by emigration) overcomes absolute manpower shortages; however, especially in agriculture, it often lowers productivity. Furthermore, the unstable nature of the migration system inhibits using a "cost-benefit" analysis to guide policy controls or planning to harness remittances.

In conclusion, the authors feel that this manpower crisis will widen the gap between rich and poor Arab nations, which could eventually lead to political and economic instability in the 1980's.

The policy options open to the Arab labour suppliers are: to maximize the immediate economic and social benefits derived from migration; to give high priority to domestic policies which attempt to create growth by encouraging investment expenditure; and to stem inflation. The best long-term policy is to encourage cooperation in regional manpower coordination. The high levels of unemployment which could result from large-scale reduction in demands for Arab labor "ought to underlie the attitudes of the capital-poor States towards negotiations over the migration system."

Jordan is one country of origin that has responded successfully to the international demand for labor. By 1975 it ranked highest among Arab countries in terms of the proportion of work force employed abroad. Two factors are responsible: first, the high level of educational attainment; and second, the lack of job opportunities. The immigrant community of Jordanians and Palestinians in Kuwait totalled 172,770 and 31,400 in 1975, or 39 percent of total immigrant workers. Other countries of employment included Saudi Arabia and Qatar. Because of their size, cohesion, technical skills, and Arab origin, these workers formed influential groups in the oil-rich states. Moreover, because of the largely professional nature of this work force, (whose contracts and conditions of work included dwellings for their families), it had a participation rate of 31 percent. A trend toward settling in the countries of employment is growing. Remittances from workers contribute significantly to Jordan's economy. However, the adverse impacts of this migration has been lowered productivity due to the Egyptian, Pakistani and Indian replacement labor; skill shortages in some sectors; and rural and unskilled labor shortages from the upward mobility of local labor. Jordan's Prince Hassan has addressed the problem of remittances by calling for an "International Labour Compensatory Facility" at the ILO conference in 1977. As do other labor-exporting countries,

Jordan faces the threat of considerable unemployemnt for returning migrants in the event that demand for labor drops.

Dajani, Jarir and Muneera Murdock, "Assessing Basic Human Needs in Rural Jordan," Project No. 278-322, Agency for International Development, Amman, Jordan (September 1978).
JORDAN PROJECTS BASIC HUMAN NEEDS RURAL

ABSTRACT

This study seeks two main goals: (1) to determine the basic needs of people in rural Jordan (defined as that 40 percent of the national population living in communities under 20,000) and (2) to recommend what policies and priorities should be adopted for addressing those needs. Nine villages representing different geographic, environmental, economic, and administrative contexts across the nation are examined via an approach "based on the premise that a study of human needs must address the question from the perspective of the villagers themselves, on the one hand, and on the mechanisms available for the satisfaction of the needs of these villagers, on the other."

Dajani and Murdock combine statistical indicators, in-depth studies by "competent professionals," and villagers' views to develop the following hierarchy of human needs: (1) basic material needs (nutrition, water, housing, etc.), (2) health, (3) education, (4) income and economic opportunity, and (5) personal adjustment and social participation.* (Curiously, the authors include child care and family planning as part of the last need, rather than as part of health.) The level of need satisfaction in a given community may be measured along two dimensions: an average (e.g., average income) and a distribution (e.g., the share of total village income some subgroup has, relative to the others). These "measures of system performance" may be changed by policy inputs from outside the village (e.g., by governmental funding for street construction), depending on the nature of the inputs and the local community's abilities to obtain and to use them.

Considering their nine villages (and others described in earlier studies) in terms of these basic needs and the services now provided by the Jordanian government (as shown by official statistics and an unreferenced CARE survey), the authors come to six general conclusions and recommendations. First, a centralized data base should be established for information on the demographic, economic, social, and physical structures of the villages, and this data base should be linked to one on transportation networks among villages and cities. Second, policy makers should use the hierarchy of basic needs to guide both the nature of services provided and order of their provision--i.e., first material needs, then health, etc.* (Accordingly, the authors accept the CARE survey data and give highest priority to providing potable water systems even though their own sample of villages showed seven of nine already had such service.) Priority in services should also "be given to communities with the potential for developing a viable economic base," as determined by "an explicit decision which is deemed to be in the best national interest." Third, incomes should be increased and employment generated by establishing and/or strengthening agricultural cooperatives, by granting more loans to small producers, and by creating small industries in rural areas. The national government also should develop intermediate-sized cities, so they will absorb more people leaving rural areas and lessen the migration pressure on larger cities. Fourth, while clinics are relatively accessible to villagers, there are problems in staffing them. Accordingly, the focus of health care should shift from curative to preventive; more local people (and especially traditional healers) should be trained and employed in this effort; and an extensive nutritional survey should be undertaken. Fifth, while schools are present in most villages, their curricula should be better adapted to rural needs. Local people could be employed to teach more applied skills (such as sewing or carpentry), and school buildings may be converted into comprehensive community development centers. And sixth, the Jordanian government should undertake a broader approach toward the provision of services, by funding programs for training personnel and for operating facilities (as well as for establishing them), and by organizing outreach teams which will provide and collect information while coordinating the delivery of services by different agencies.

The report contains a bibliography of sources

consulted and three appendices (nine village profiles, a proposal for a new funding institution, and a town and village index).

The strengths of this report are its serious and generally well-conceived attempt to implement the USAID mandate of addressing basic human needs and its informed use of statistical indicators to show regional differences in the types and amounts of services provided.* (The sample of villages chosen for profiles also is useful: it includes Kufr al-Ma, about which Richard Antoun has published extensively, and indicates both how accurate and how representative Antoun's information is.) The main problem in the report concerns the implementation of its desire to include a village perspective. If the recommendations to prioritize services were followed literally, the satisfaction of needs one through four would produce a village society like a well-run prison--where people are fed, housed, healed, educated, and employed, but have no say over how they are "developed." The recommendation that services be prioritized according to potential for "a viable economic base" and the "best national interest" sounds ominous in this context. In addition to these more theoretical concerns, a substantive one may be raised about the authors' use of local preferences for new services, as given in the appendix on village profiles. The desire for paved roads was the most common preference (six of eight villages), and it was also the highest preference of those mentioned more than once. Following this preference would impact desirably on other needs as well: it would enable faster sale of crops and herds, easier transport to and from clinics and schools, and creation of local construction and repair jobs.

Accordingly, this report is a worthy and impressive piece of work somewhat marred in the execution of its aims.

El-Haddad, Y., Social Change and the Process of Modernization in Jordan: A Case of a Developing Country, Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, University of Missouri (1974). JORDAN DISSERTATION GENERAL DEVELOPMENT INTRANATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY

ABSTRACT

This sociological study focuses on the process of modernization in developing countries. It has three main aims: first, to re-examine critically current sociological views of development; second, to analyze the process of modernization and social change, taking Jordan as a case study; and third, "to design an alternative perspective with an accompanying strategy for investigation." The author uses already published materials to provide data on these topics.

Following a critique of several current approaches to studying modernization, El-Haddad calls for an alternative which, first, is sensitive to the differences between earlier and later paths toward modernization, and second, recognizes the specificity of each society's development. As a step toward such an approach, he examines several recent changes in the demographic, economic, and social structures of Jordanian society. The country's rapid urbanization, which preceded industrialization, was "a consequence of special cultural and geophysical circumstances rather than an indicator of development." The growth of Amman was mainly due to immigration and the dynamism of the city's population. Population movements have included the "normal" rural-urban pattern, the "abnormal" mass movement of Palestinians, and the emigration of Jordanian workers abroad. Although industrialization is still at an early stage, it has contributed to the country's development effort and is bringing about changes in social structures (labor unions, employment of women, social security, etc.). Rural change is marked by out-migration as a result of "push" and "pull" factors. Measures to stabilize the rural population by improving conditions have included agrarian reform (especially in the East Ghor Canal Project), agricultural extension, community development, and the establishment of cooperatives. However, the author says, these measures have been "palliative in nature and do not represent parts of comprehensive rural development policies." The structure and function of the family in Jordan have shown resistence to change. Despite the effects of rural exodus, some degree of women's emancipation, and gradual modernization of some rural areas, extended families remain the most prevalent structural type. Finally, although established family groups still maintain

influence, Jordan has witnessed some changes in power structure at the national and local levels.

The author then discusses historical changes in Middle Eastern stratification patterns before returning to the case of Jordan. He sees the process of modernization there in terms of shifts in "group" and "class" relations over time. He says that the "Jordanian-Islamic" class structure has consisted of three main categories. The ruling class was generally composed of the king, the families of the reigning dynasty, tribal nobility, big landlords, religious leaders, and the military elite. More recently an indigenous economic "aristocracy" and landless rentier elites have joined the upper class. The traditional middle classes, whose elements have controlled and benefited from the traditional educational system, included the bureaucratic, bourgeois, and clerical clases with similar power positions. The lower classes consisted of workers, peasants, and nomads. Two new classes have appeared in the second half of the twentieth century--namely, the industrial working class and the professional middle class. This class structure has been knit together in constant movement by "networks of power relationships which possess profound plasticity due to the balancing nature of the tensions among classes." This "web system" has served to distribute and fracture concentrations of threatening power, and permitted a great deal of controlled change and movement as personalities are allowed to advance and circulate. Moreover, the pattern of class relationships in Jordan has been characterized by reciprocal but permanently imbalanced power patterns. Thus, while individuals and groups from various classes may change positions, the classes themselves remain in general hierarchy. The power flow is consistently from upper to lower classes (who remain in a disadvantaged position). However, group linkages, which pervade the class relationships into which they are woven, blur contradictions and reduce conflicts. Two interrelated principles explain this pattern: "(1) the overlapping membership that characterizes interclass groups; and (2) the high rate of personal mobility that occurs between classes." These patterns, whereby groups interact together in balanced fluidity, have buttressed and strengthened class relationships.

The Hashimite political system has also been dominated by power networks preserved by "reciprocity and stabilizing conflict." Conflicts arose

when new forces, including new classes, challenged traditional relationships. Intelligentsia in the new salaried middle class have constituted one such class. The members of Jordanian intelligentsia are characterized by the following: a refusal to accept traditional power relationships; more education; power positions derived from skill and talent; exposure to outside philosophies, thoughts, and ideas; and freedom from rigid religious dogmatism or the "blind worship of past history." There are four subgroups, each maintaining a different relationship in regard to conflicting power patterns, within the intelligentsia. These are: "uprooters," or initiators of transformation; "technocrats," concerned with carrying out tasks; "maneuverers," or defenders of the traditional power network; and "followers," who float in the safest and smoothest direction. These groups overlap and interlock, and individuals shift from one group to another.

The author identifies primary variables of modernization and suggests a paradigm for their study. A country's process of modernization must be perceived historically according to "its own subjective perception of its status of non-modernity and modernity in comparison to other societies." For example, feelings about the degree of citizens' relative deprivation should be taken as a crucial variable with regard to change in the country, in the roles of its modernizing agents, and in the ideologies and strategies it employs to modernize. The talents and initiatives of the elites are primal in the process of measuring this relative deprivation. Finally, the degree of acceptance or rejection of societal change by various social units relates to the structure of power and influence and the extent and nature of contact and communication within the units and between them.

In conclusion, the author stresses two parameters which effect a country's process of modernization: first, international and national patterns of social stratification; and second, the country's modernization goals and strategies.

The value of this study is its detailed analysis of the classes and groups in Jordanian society. The description of the interaction of the class structure with the political system is also valuable for understanding the country's dynamic internal "stability." The theoretical aspects of the study are less valuable, given the

more recent and clearer articulations of development and underdevelopment by the Dependency School.

Farrag, A., "The WASTAH among Jordanian Villagers," in Patrons and Clients, ed. E. Gellner and J. Waterbury, pp. 224-238, Duckworth, London (1977). JORDAN ARTICLE GENERAL DEVELOPMENT INFORMAL PROCESSES

ABSTRACT

The goal of this article is to show how wastah (loosely speaking, an intermediary or the process of acting as one) "is both a mechanism for ensuring conformity and at the same time a threat to the existence of the very status quo which it is supposed to protect." The study is based on an analysis of five cases where wastah was used or considered and on a narrative account of one village's history, as recalled by (some sample of) its population.

This village of 5000 people lies in the hill region north of Amman. During Ottoman times villagers mostly cultivated grapes, olives, and onions or worked in cottage industries to process cheese or raisins and to weave mats. Today, however, the working population consists of "those who work in the service of the regime" (50-55 percent, mainly in the army), those who have "deliberately opted out of the army," and those who still cultivate (mostly people who could not find other work).

To indicate how the use of wastah developed among these villagers, Farrag sketches the evolution of the "tribal, political, and administrative system" from the Ottoman period, through the reign of the Emir Abdullah, to the present. She says that the community today, as in the past, is structured along a segmentary model, where the total population is subdivided into successively less inclusive patrilineal groups from the ashira ("tribe"), through the hamula ("clan"), down through intervening groups to the extended

patrilocal family.

In Ottoman times the largest group with political functions was the clan. Each of them chose an elder "as mediator and go-between" who was partly supported by contributions from other members. The head of the largest clan became a Pasha when he also "was chosen by the Turkish authorities to mediate on their behalf." The Pasha was the local tax farmer, although he had to consult with the other elders regarding village matters like resolving conflicts between members of different clans. Thus, the Pasha was considered a representative of the Ottoman state; the other elders, as representatives of the village. All the elders together chose two mukhtars ("clerks"), each of whom actually collected taxes, conscripted soldiers, and registered vital statistics for the clans under his authority on a service-for-fee basis. Formal interactions with all these local dignitaries (as well as with outsiders, or even with members of other clans) were arranged indirectly by "going through channels"--i.e., by working through intermediaries according to the segmentary model of social structure. Thus, a son had to work through his father and intervening groups to speak to the elder of their clan; he could not directly request help from elders of other clans or outsiders.

During the reign of the Emir Abdullah, the village became more integrated into the state. Some village leaders (e.g., the Pasha's son) were included in the government. Other elders continued to settle disputes within the community; however, they were no longer seen as its representatives in opposition to the state, and they were decreasingly supported by contributions from other clan members. The role of mukhtar broadened: his post was taken more fully into the government; his duties increased; and he was paid a salary as well as fees for services rendered. Correspondingly, villagers sought to use the mukhtar as an intermediary, although they still could appeal only to the one with authority over their respective clans. Young men increasingly sought employment in the army, which gave them income and connections to intermediaries outside their fathers' control.

During the reign of King Hussein, the village has become a municipality, with an elected council headed by a mayor. This administrative change illustrates the still greater integration of the

locality into the state: candidates for office must be approved by the Ministry of Interior; the council has authority over local affairs and access to government funding and services; the role of mukhtar has been reduced to registering vital statistics; the elders act only to settle disputes and are seen somewhat as relics. Within this context, wastah "applies to both village and town" to help people get almost all jobs. Furthermore, now an individual does not necessarily have to follow the segmentary model of social structure even within the village; in theory, he may go directly to the mayor or outside his clan to request intermediation; in practice, "the responses vary according to which category the wastah-seeker belongs to." A person "in service of the regime" can approach the mayor directly and be accepted; a peasant or an "opter-out" can not, as is shown by Farrag's first three case examples. The fourth case demonstrates that having an intermediary is crucial to obtaining a job in a field even as technical as engineering. And the fifth case illustrates how intermediaries may be linked to form a long and complex chain of personal obligations.

Thus Farrag's account of the evolution of wastah use has two main themes: the growing economic and political integration of the village into the state and the concomitant changes in paths for intermediation. Use of wastah, then, supports the state by constraining personal loyalties and relationships to channels over which the state has some control; however, it also weakens the state by dividing its citizens into those who follow these channels and those who "opt out."

The main strength of this article is its concentration on a major, perhaps the major, process by which people in Jordan build and use networks of personal ties to satisfy their needs--to find a job, to get married, to settle a dispute, etc. Farrag presents five case examples which clearly illustrate how the process works, and her chronological account of the evolution of village-state relations gives a useful background for the focus on wastah. Furthermore, her remarks help to contextualize Antoun's studies of another village which is in the same region but which is smaller and still more traditionally organized. The main weakness of the article is its lack of a clearly articulated theory to integrate the cases, oral history, and analysis into a more coherent and comprehensive explanation. One aspect of this

problem is that Farrag never defines what wastah is: in the first paragraph of the article she identifies it with "go-between"; later she uses "mediator and go-between" to describe intermediaries during Ottoman and Emirate times, while wastah occurs at present, etc. Furthermore, she repeatedly emphasizes state interests in fostering wastah, but she nowhere considers how local people might see it as legitimate, as well as expedient. And finally, although she emphasizes that some local people have "opted out" of supporting the regime and the processes it (somewhat) controls, a careful reading shows that these people have also opted out of cultivation and still more traditional forms of village organization.

Accordingly, Farrag's article is one of the too rare studies of wastah; as such, it provides useful information despite its limitations.

Fikry, Mona, "The Maqarin Dam and the East Jordan Valley. Social Soundness Analysis for the Maqarin Dam Project," Contract No. AID/afr-c-1132, Agency for International Development, Amman, Jordan (1979). JORDAN PROJECTS AGRICULTURE IRRIGATION AND WATER MANAGEMENT

ABSTRACT

The aim of this paper is to discuss the impacts on the East Jordan Valley and its inhabitants resulting from the increased availability of water through the Maqarin Dam Project. Dr. Fikry relates her analysis to earlier changes in the Valley resulting from construction of the East Ghor Canal and from agricultural development programs in progress. The author's data comes mainly from existing studies, personal contacts, and a brief visit in 1978.

Although the East Jordan Valley has been settled and cultivated for the past ten thousand years, its modern development began only recently. After 1948, two distinct social groups emerged: the original tribes, and the Palestinian refugees. Both groups, totaling nearly 82,000 in 1979, still

valued tribal, clan and family ties for social stability, cohesiveness, and economic access. However, several changes followed the initiation of the East Ghor Canal Project. One aspect of the program was land reform which, in theory, intended "to encourage the emergence of owner-operated small family holdings; to enable easier settlements for new owners; to minimize hardships of old landowners with large holdings; and to diminish the power of landowners who had the Valley subdivided among them." Although some successful land distribution took place in the northern Valley, elsewhere "the reins of power remained unchanged." One major change was an increase in the number of sharecroppers, which was positive for agricultural productivity in the Valley. The incentives for this arrangement were the availability of water, landless refugee-farmers, expertise, and the desire of landowners to retain their power, prestige, and profits. Thus the economic impact of water from the Canal reshaped the traditional social structure without destroying it, and added new social classes of owners, commission agents, sharecroppers, and laborers. Underemployment of Jordanians continued in the Valley due to several factors: first, a lack of mobility because of family and clan ties; second, a rise in salary expectations and standards of living, especially among the youth; third, an influx of foreign laborers accepting lower wages; and fourth, a biased educational system which did not encourage farmers' children to work the land.

Given the new dimensions of agricultural development, and especially the increased costs of new techniques, the sharecroppers' future depends on their securing improved education, financial incentives, and tenure rights. Otherwise, Fikry warns, the sharecropping system could lead to a "feudal" society. Economic incentives have attracted "a new breed" of sharecroppers and cash-rent tenants to the Valley--namely, agricultural engineers who work in the government bureaucracy. This trend may have positive impacts on the social respectability and efficiency of agricultural practices. Another trend has been the increased employment of women in the agricultural labor force due to the exodus of men working outside the Valley. However, greater education (when combined with traditional values) may make it difficult for women to continue working as laborers. Finally, although increased irrigation and improved agricultural techniques have brought about changes in the socio-economic structure,

labor force, land utilization, and people's food consumption in the Jordan Valley, many constraints have created imbalances in benefits. Poor marketing conditions, high costs (of supplies, credit, and labor), lack of an efficient distribution system of inputs and information, and the replacement of animals by costlier tractors were some of these constraints.

Several supports have been provided as part of the social development of the Valley. The first is in housing. New housing was to encourage settlement, attract new inhabitants, and upgrade living conditions of the poor. Yet the majority of farmers have rejected the new houses because of their inadequate space and privacy and because local people lack information on loans and interest payments. The real beneficiaries, according to Fikry, will be the "petite bourgeois" class of the different villages. The proximity of the houses may bring about a new sense of community living, but a serious reconsideration of farmers' needs is required for future physical planning. Schools have been another infrastructural addition which will "provide the deepest and most long term impact on all levels of the society of the Ghors." Nevertheless, the type of education itself, not the school buildings, will determine future benefits. Community centers are another needed asset for adult education, cultural functions, and the encouragement of grass-roots participation. A third support has been in agricultural development. One form of assistance is extension workers, whose role is to disseminate information and make facilities available to farmers. Yet these workers lack the training, facilities, transportation, and coordination to do their jobs effectively. The attitudinal problems of both extension workers and farmers towards each other are "very deep and embedded in social, economic and psychological factors." This attitude, characterized by mutual lack of trust, needs to be addressed. Another support is the Jordan Valley Farmers Association, whose objectives are to centralize the marketing system, to set standards in production, and to support the farmers directly in order to eliminate the "commissionjiyyah" (middlemen). However, the benefits have not yet been seen: the large landowners' control of land, income, and decision-making in the Association still exists; the middlemen still control the markets; and the small farmers' requests are dealt with after the large owners'. The complexity of the socio-psychological problems, and their

intertwining with various political divisions, require an "anthropological/social worker/researcher" in the Jordan Valley Farmers Association to establish trust and mutual understanding. The person would act as a liaison between the people and the Association, analyze and project farmers' needs and complaints, and monitor the political competition with the institution.

The paper concludes with a review of the physical, agricultural, social, and economic changes that have taken place in the Valley. Recommendations based on this review indicate how a more equitable social situation might be linked to the completion of the Maqarin Dam. These recommendations include: the improvement of agricultural education, a readaptation of the role of extension worker; initiation of agricultural research in drip versus sprinkler irrigation and in other areas; a reappraisal of the size, distribution, and type of housing construction; encouragement of small industries and grass-roots organizations; and more research to define better the expected impact of development programs.

The study is valuable in offering a review of the effects of the East Ghor Canal project, and in highlighting the potential social contradictions which threaten the future of the Valley and the benefits from the Maqarin Dam. The proposal for a researcher position is an innovation beyond the typical recommendations to ameliorate class contradictions in the Jordan Valley.

Gubser, Michael P., Politics and Change in Al-Karak, Jordan, Oxford Press, London, New York (1973). JORDAN BOOK GENERAL DEVELOPMENT INTRANATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY

ABSTRACT

This is a political study of the town and district of Al-Karak in south Jordan which has the following aims: first, "to describe the structure, function, and dynamics of the political society";

second, "to discuss the persistence of traditional forces,"; and third, "to indicate the change within the political system." The book is based on nine months of field research in 1968, on memoirs, on records of the town's municipal council, and on Foreign and Colonial Office reports.

The town of Al-Karak, numbering 7,422 in 1961, sits in the center of Al-Karak district, which has a population of 44,901. The town and the district have an integral relationship; the people share the same history, political traditions, economy, and come from the same tribes. Prior to 1893, Al-Karak was an independent unit with local power and authority; since then, it has become part of a larger political system--first, the Ottoman Empire and then the Kingdom of Jordan. While Al-Karak remained on the periphery of Transjordan during the Amirate period, by 1950 a new political balance had emerged with the Kingdom. With the development of Nasserism, Arab Nationalism, and local political parties, the politics of big towns and cities became a constant challenge to King Hussein. During this period, the Karakis, headed by the Majaly tribe, were among the King's staunchest supporters. Since 1948 the central government has penetrated many aspects of local life: schools were opened, communication became available, and some local political functions were taken over. These elements have helped to change Al-Karak's political system.

To indicate this continuity and change in political life, Gubser first describes the fabric and dynamics of the traditional society, then those of the contemporary one. Many elements that have persisted into the contemporary system have evolved slightly from their traditional forms. The tribe (a corporate territorial group) remains the most important social and political unit in Al-Karak, commanding an individual's primary loyalty, but "other political groups, the village, the educated middle stratum, and the Kingdom of Jordan compete for his loyalty and are partially successful." Changes in tribal residential patterns have also taken place; state security has replaced the tribes' traditional functions in important disputes; and in employment, credit, welfare, and services, the tribe has lost its primacy. Major tribal alliances (long-standing political agreements between equals) or even minor alliances (between unequal tribes) have retained their significance. This is reflected in representative bodies like municipal councils.

Moreover, while the traditional system of self help and balanced opposition continued to be upheld by much of the population, new concepts of legitimacy, authority, and power have become partially acceptable. New forms of leadership based on a more flexible meaning of status (stressing achievement) and "a new differentiation between traditional and modern outlooks" were added to the traditional patterns.

Villages in the traditional period were non-corporate territorial groups, but with sedentarization, government economic development programs, and the formation of village councils, a sense of corporateness has been created. These changes, however, have also created opposing groups; for example, the new agricultural cooperatives have challenged the financial and political positions of the more traditional tribal leaders who are also usurers.

Although Christians formed a more cohesive political group than Muslims did (because of their minority status and their church organization), the pattern of mutual respect and tolerance between the two groups continued in political relations.

With regard to other minority groups, several changes have taken place. First, most of the Armenians left the district for better economic opportunities elsewhere. Second, a number of people originally from Damascus and Hebron emigrated after 1948 due to the influx of merchants and artisans from Gaza who took over the suq (market-place) from them. Third, Palestinian peasants and Bedouins settled in rural areas. Conversely, minorities like the Ghawarna (dark-complexioned people of the Jordan Valley), former slaves, blacksmiths, and Gypsies remained in the district. All of these minority groups have been largely unintegrated into the pyramidal segmentary political structure.

While in the traditional political system, socio-economic strata were of minor importance, they have taken on a greater significance in the contemporary period. There are four distinct strata: the lower stratum (peasants and labourers), the traditional middle stratum (middle-sized landowners, and traditional leaders). The educated middle stratum (teachers, civil servants, and professionals), and the upper stratum (major landowners and traditional leaders). The educated

middle stratum is the only one to have formed a "definite mutual identity and a measure of corporateness through a few formal and informal subgroups." This stratum, which differs from the rest by its education, occupations, and new views of political and social relationships, has contributed the most to creating a new division in Karaki society. Moreover, this group is especially important with respect to change and social communication because its members staff the expanded bureaucracy and translate the government's work and development programs into reality for the people.

The expansion of formal government brought new institutions, aims, and arenas for political competition. It balanced tradition and change, allowing some disputes to be settled through Shari'a (Islamic law) and 'urf (customary law), while other disputes were reserved to government courts using contemporary codes.

Political parties were a new addition to Al-Karak. During their active period in the 1950's they influenced the society by offering new socio-political views which challenged the power of the traditional local leadership and helped to bring Al-Karak into the mainstream of Arab events.

All these changes, Gubser concludes, have caused cleavages in the socio-political system of Al-Karak: "the increasing distance between the educated and uneducated, the more rapid development of the town in contrast to the rural area, the distinction between modern and traditional outlooks or approaches to life, and the growing division between ruler and ruled." Although the government is using various mechanisms to close these gaps and to integrate citizens into a new political structure, much of the population continues to use traditional methods in their daily living.

The value of Gubser's book is its ability to relate the traditional patterns of political action to the present. Particularly, it explains the persistent importance of the Majaly family in Al-Karak and in Jordanian political history, and it stresses the role of the educated middle stratum in the emerging political system.

Halcrow Fox and Associates and Jouzy and Partners, Jordan Urban Project, Interim Reports, Amman, Jordan (May and July 1979). JORDAN PROJECTS URBANISM URB-OTHER

ABSTRACT

This is the first interim report submitted by the World Bank to assist the Jordanian government's Urban Project: "Each section of the report seeks to express the nature and importance of the various issues involved, the options available for their resolution, an analysis of the options, and the consultants' outline of recommendations." The study summarizes several sector reports which were based on social surveys, field studies, financial analyses, technical designs, and institutional frameworks involved in implementation. There are four parts (supported by illustrations, tables, and graphs) in the report.

Part I reviews the current situation of housing at the national, urban and low-income levels. A discussion of population, employment, income distribution, and housing needs (due to population growth and deterioration of dwellings) concludes that "a programme of over 8,000 new units per annum for households earning less than JD 200 a month can be justified, together with the need to upgrade the slums in which some 7000 families live." Neither the formal institutions providing housing and services (such as the government-backed Housing Bank, the Housing Corporation, and the Amman Water and Sewage Authority) nor the private sector are directing their efforts to the lowest income groups. Accordingly, there is an oversupply of housing in the market for the highest income levels, but an undersupply for the lower ones. Moreover, the high prices for urban land are beyond the means of the poor, given the nonexistence of land assistance programs. Following a review of the situation, services available, and direction of development in low income areas of Amman and Zerqa (including UNRWA camps, squatter areas, low-income suburbs, and peripheral villages), it is clear that "highly crowded conditions prevail throughout the wide variety of housing forms occupied by some 4-500,000 people in lower income families." Rents range between JD 40-50 per month, in most areas. Although wide variations in conditions both within and between

areas existed, surveys of squatter and non-squatter areas show high occupancy rates (4-5 persons per room), lack of legal land tenure and social services, low family incomes (between JD 40-90 per month), and preference of most dwellers to remain and improve conditions *in situ*.

Part II is concerned with selecting seven to nine thousand new plots in and around Amman and Zerqa and with choosing slum areas for upgrading in the cities. Sixteen possible sites for new schemes, each with distinct characteristics, were listed in three groups: urban and infill areas, peripheral expansion zones, and free-standing developments close to new employment centers. Several criteria were used for selection; proximity to employment; possible beneficiaries; access to social, commercial, and transportation services; physical characteristics; infrastructure; other possible uses; and ease of acquisition. Alternative sites were compared according to land values, size, and location; then five major sites were recommended for land aquisition. In addition, nine areas which contained most squatter and slum housing were defined. Using household incomes, service availability, dwelling conditions, overcrowding, and community interests as the major criteria, these were considered to need either a "policy" response (in essence legalizing land tenure) or a "project" response (execution of basic work essential to upgrading the area). The report advocates that the government acquire land in advance for the new schemes, legalize tenure and make loans available to the designated slums, freeze land prices, and carry on other projects in selected areas.

Part III discusses design standards and affordability of the project. It aims to determine the most cost-effective mixture of critical elements--land, structures, and services--and to set standards for providing social facilities. Given that the target population can pay up to 25 percent of its income on housing, loans at 8.5 percent annual interest over a 20 year period seem justified. For new housing, evaluation of alternatives and their costs showed that "for most families, a median to low level of land prices, a 54 square meter plot, water and electricity connection, an aqua-privy system for sanitation, a sanitary core and one room were all that could be afforded initially." Even considering the minimum acceptable level of shelter and services, the land was unaffordable by most people. Similar results

were found for upgrading schemes. The danger of market reactions to government housing policies prompted recommendations to allow cross subsidies and the sharing of land price burdens between sites.

Part IV considers major issues in the successful realization of the project's proposals. These include the need for establishing clear institutional responsibilities, a housing policy unit at the level of a ministry, a project agency for the program, and project units for on-site implementation. The project responsibilities are considered in relation to the power, resources, and policies of various existing ministries and agencies (such as Amman Municipality, the Housing Corporation, and utility agencies). A series of measures for cost recovery and funding (which will also depend on the institutional proposals ultimately adopted) were outlined. Urban land cost, legislation, acquisition, expropriation, codes, and related government policy issues also were discussed in relation to cost recovery. Moreover, the authors reviewed proposals to include social services (such as education, religious facilities, and recreation) and components for economic, community, and social development in the project. Finally, possible approaches to implementation and scheduling examined potentially delaying factors, such as obtaining necessary information, forms of contracting, and technical assistance.

The ambitious scale of this project is captured by the report. Its major importance is in bringing together data resulting from extensive studies on the housing situation in low-income areas. However, the tentative nature of the project's interpretations of these data, and the future plans it has based on them, limit the project's overall value.

Jordan Development Council, Amman Region and its Weight in Jordan's Economy, Amman, Jordan (1976). JORDAN GOV. DOCUMENTS URBANISM URB-OTHER

ABSTRACT

This paper was presented at a Jordan Development Conference in 1976; it focuses on the primacy of Amman in shaping the country's economy, the problems this has created, and ways to alleviate them. The discussion is supported by maps, tables, and appendices.

Like many developing countries, Jordan has urbanized rapidly in the past few decades. This pattern was dominated by the growth of the Amman Region (including the capital, thirteen municipalities, and surrounding unincorporated areas). Such growth resulted from a reciprocal interaction between, on the one hand, a concentration of activities (economic and governmental) and of services (educational, social and cultural), and on the other, the availability of labor and communications facilities. Accordingly, the natural rate of increase per year in the Region was 3.5 percent from 1961 to 1975. When this natural rate of increase was combined with rural-urban migration and the influx of displaced persons after 1967, however, an overall growth rate of 11 percent per year has resulted over the past decade.

The paper states that "Jordan's economy is shaped by the activities in the Region;" the tables in the paper show that 93 percent of economic establishments and 95 percent of the labor force (outside of agricultural or governmental employment) are located in this Region. Given that 88 percent of Gross Domestic Product in 1975 came from here as well, the study concludes that "Jordan's economy is the economy of the Amman Region." Furthermore, social indicators reflect a higher standard of living there than in the rest of the country. In 1973, for every 1000 people in the Region there were 30.6 cars and 15 telephones; outside it the figures were 9.8 and 4, respectively. In 1975, 71 percent of all hospitals, 73 percent of pharmacies, and 70 percent of doctors were in the Amman Region. Although this distribution of goods and services reflects the population concentration, it has created many problems: crowding, traffic congestion, housing, power, water, sanitation, conflicting land use, slums, insufficient social services, escalating land prices, and inadequate revenues. Lack of planning and coordination is recognized, and plans have been made to address all these problems.

Four alternatives are presented and discussed. First, the uncertainty of the Middle East political climate might "justify" leaving this

situation unabated. A risk would be the possible collapse of the whole system of services under increased population pressures. Second, encouraging further concentration in the Region, while advantageous for better distribution of services and training of labor, would overstrain resources and underutilize rural lands. Third, promoting limited diversification would concentrate services and employment in five regional development centers and thereby encourage the rural population to move to them. Fourth, a more radical alternative would involve decentralization of governmental activities and services to cover all of Jordan. This would foster the development of the countryside and maintain its food production capacities. The Conference preferred the fourth proposal. The success of this alternative, however, depends on "a coherent and comprehensive legal framework outlining the objectives and policies that ought to be followed."

Appendix 1 lists the Amman Region's population by municipalities; appendix 2 reviews government policies and actions to deal with urban problems. For example, the Three Year Plan aimed at decentralizing the country and taking pressure off Amman. Housing projects were constructed in or outside other cities to provide comprehensive social, economic, and community facilities. The Ministry of Municipal and Rural Affairs integrated policies and projects to decrease rural-urban disparities. And the Jordan Valley Development Plan sought to improve socio-economic standards in the Valley. The following Five Year Plan aimed to balance urban growth by extending public services to all areas, balancing population distribution, promoting regional development, and coordinating projects within cities and other communities. A summary of these projects and others is presented, along with costs and sources of financing.

The value of this paper is that it outlines clearly the immense problems which have resulted from Amman's primacy and the severe implications this city-state has for the future of Jordan.

Madanat, S., The Jordan Housing Corporation, Master's Thesis in Public Administration, American University of Beirut (1977). JORDAN DISSERTATION-THESIS URBANISM HOUSING AND CONSTRUCTION

ABSTRACT

"The aim of this thesis is to examine the structural-functional characteristics of the Jordan Housing Corporation in the light of the prevailing social and economic conditions. Then evaluate its performance and the extent to which it has been able to meet its goals." This is a comprehensive work by a Jordanian social planner who, at the time, was among the J.H.C.'s staff.

The main causes of the housing problem in Jordan are rapid population growth, rural-urban migration, and the influx of Palestinian refugees. Jordan has limited resources and a chronic trade deficit; it relies on rainfall for its agriculturer; and requires extensive foreign aid. While housing was a major domestic expenditure, it remained exclusively in private hands until 1966. The high costs of building, rising rents, and lack of lending facilities were causing housing shortages even for middle-income civil servants. The poverty, unemployment, and land and rent speculation compelled most people to live in undesirable, unhygienic, and congested conditions.

In response to these considerations, the government established the Jordan Housing Corporation in 1966. Its functions were to acquire and develop land for housing; design, and rent or sell houses for limited-income people; grant loans; and prepare urban housing policies. Its financial support reached JD 1,513,000 in 1968 derived from loans and grants (by local, other Arab, or foreign organizations, or by the Government), from the sale of bonds, and from private lending funds. Its organizational structure included a Board of Directors with governmental and nongovernmental members headed by the Director General, and lower managerial divisions for policy, technical affairs, construction, administration, and legal affairs. The Corporation has been run de facto by the Director General, who makes all important decisions with no delegation of authority. The U.N.D.P. (Special Fund) assisted the Corporation

in 1968-73 to develop policies, new building materials, and construction industries, to train personnel, and to build pilot housing projects.

By 1972, the J.H.C. had invested JD 2,604,000 for the construction of 1284 units in the form of individual loans to civil servants (509 units, JD 1,116,000), low income housing projects (660 units, JD 1,207,000), and loans for cooperative societies (115 units, JD 281,000). Another achievement was acquiring land for housing projects. The Three Year Plan (1973-1975) was to build a further 6,000 units. However, Madanat warned that unless housing were integrated into long range socio-economic developments, these short-range measures would remain inadequate.

The author then reviewed several limitations that reduced the Corporation to the role of a designer-contractor. For instance, long-term financing programs and reliable sources of funding were unavailable but could be established by developing a private savings and loan industry. Administrative problems required trained personnel, technical experts, efficient clerks, and clear job responsibilities. Excessive centralization, lack of internal communications, and line-and-staff disorganization have also been big obstacles. Policy limitations could be overcome by establishing a 20-25 year national housing policy as a "continuous chain of interrelated actions." This would require collecting census data on basic housing, migration, and building costs. It would also require prioritizing among rural versus urban housing and rehabilitation versus new construction, as well as establishing a system of coordination and communication among agencies involved with housing. Reduction of construction costs, an easier credit system, and carefully planned subsidies could offset the economic problems of high cost of housing. New housing should be constructed to balance the urban primacy of the capital. The land problems included lack of information on prices and ownership, and low taxes on land. The author, while acknowledging the political forces against land price regulations, suggested raising property taxes on vacant lots, price regulations, and bulk buying by central or local governments to help address the situation.

In conclusion, Madanat argues that the Corporation cannot be blamed for its limitations because of its lack of funds and trained personnel. These limitations have caused it to adopt,

not a coherent policy, but an ad-hoc one which has limited its projects to middle and moderate income groups; accordingly most, if not all, of the low-income groups and all the squatters and slum dwellers cannot qualify for Jordan Housing Corporation Housing.

Mazur, Michael P., Economic Growth and Devlopment in Jordan, Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado (1979). JORDAN BOOK GENERAL DEVELOPMENT INTRANATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY

ABSTRACT

The goal of this book is to present a comprehensive description and analysis of the economic development of Jordan in three historical phases: 1954-1959, 1959-1967, and 1967-1975. Mazur, who teaches economics at Dartmouth College, collected his data in the Middle East in 1969 and 1976. Using available statistics, he developed time series for measuring the growth and sectoral composition of the economy, as well as for sources of financing it. Beginning with a historical outline of the area prior to the creation of Jordan, the analysis then proceeds in three parts.

Part One of the book is a quantitative assessment of the pre-1967 economic structure and performance: "for Jordan, the 1950's were years of adjustment to the establishment of Israel, the annexation of the West Bank, and the influx of refugees." The construction sector grew rapidly due to additions in infrastructure, such as housing for refugees and a transport network adjusted to the new political boundaries. From 1959 to 1966, a period of relative political stability for which reliable data exist, Mazur gives statistical evidence to explain the "success story" of Jordan's prewar growth. The country's rapid growth in output, as compared to other "Less Developed Countries," was due to an effective use of investment and increases in capital and labor combined. The concentration of activity in the services sector is explained quantitatively by a

relatively large import surplus, a heavy defense budget, comparative advantages in tourism, and a "structural disequilibrium in manufacturing."

Part Two surveys the pattern of the post-1967 economy. Due to the lack of statistical information (on population, labor, and employment) and shocks to the economy (Israeli occupation of the West Bank, closure of the Suez Canal and borders with neighboring states, Israeli shelling of the East Ghor Canal, and the 1970-71 civil conflict) the analysis is limited. However, in the mid-1970's the pattern of industrial production and exports, plus the overall dominance of services, were broadly similar to the situation in the 1960's. The differences were a "higher aid level in the later years and, partly as a consequence, the greater relative size of total domestic investment, government spending, and military employment." In contrast, employment in agriculture decreased.

Part Three is a general survey of development policies and experiences in agriculture, industry, and planning. While Jordan's pre-1967 agricultural production increased greatly due to irrigation and livestock production, it remained stagnant between 1967-1975 due to military and civil conflicts. Dry land crop production remained stable despite government efforts to promote new technologies in the mid-1970's. Irrigated agriculture increased in the Jordan Valley. The industrial sector (which increased significantly between 1959 and 1966 from phosphate exports, domestic demands, and import substitution) grew little after the war. The government promoted industry through protection, regulation, and incentive measures. Despite controls on investments, imports, exports, foreign exchange, commodity prices, the government believes in "free enterprise," as is shown by the large aid receipts it has funneled to support it. Development planning in Jordan began with the Seven Year Plan of 1964-1970 which was "fundamentally a long-term government investment budget." After a postwar hiatus, the Three Year Plan for 1973-1975 did not achieve many of its objectives but helped in "restoring a systematic approach to development policy." The succeeding Five Year Plan for 1976-1980 adopted a high-investment, big-project strategy predicated on large foreign aid receipts. The expected growth rates, Mazur indicates, were overoptimistic. Problems in plan execution included an overly centralized management, a lack

of connection between development plans and government budgets, and weak budget analysis and controls.

The study concludes with a review of Jordan's development experience and speculations on its economic future with or without a Middle East peace settlement.

The main strength of the book is the author's effort to include a wide range of published and unpublished statistics and to present them systematically in various tables. However, Mazur's conclusions remain conjectural. A main weakness of the book is its ommission of definitions for terms like development, "Less Developed Countries," growth, efficiency, etc. Such terms can no longer be taken for granted after two decades of failure in alleviating poverty in the Third World. A critical discussion of income distribution is also lacking in Mazur's book.

Mitchell, R., Equitable Access to Basic Necessities in the Balqa-Amman Region: Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, United States Agency for International Development, Washington (1979). JORDAN PROJECTS BASIC HUMAN NEEDS BASIC-OTHER

ABSTRACT

This paper was submitted to the Amman Urban Region Planning Group as a draft chapter in the comprehensive plan for the Balqa-Amman Region. The chapter, one of fourteen, addressed the problems of providing "social justice for the regional poor" by insuring "an adequate and decent state of health and well-being for every Jordanian citizen, family and neighborhood." The analysis uses existing data and surveys to approximate people's health and well-being in Jordan and to indicate the existence and magnitude of problems or opportunities within these two major areas.

For example, although the health status of Jordan has improved remarkably over the years,

there are clear disparities between the poor and non-poor, educated and non-educated, and rural and urban populations with the Region. Jordan's crude death rate has declined from 21.1 per 1000 in 1955-59 to 14.5 per 1000 in 1970-74; however, infant mortality rates are 80 percent higher for illiterate mothers than for literate ones, 70 percent higher for the lowest income categories than for the highest ones, and 23 percent higher for non-urban residents than for urban ones. Morbidities are also class-patterned: there are higher rates of disorders for the urban poor than for the non-poor, and these morbidities have adversely affected poor students' academic work. Furthermore, malnutrition is especially evident among poor infants and mothers, and has the same spatial and class patterning as infant mortality.

For another example, education and literacy are also increasing in the Kingdom, and the elementary and preparatory schools are qualitatively well-developed in the Region. The benefits, however, are unequally shared: "the urban poor, rural residents, and females benefited least."

A third example is employment. "Jordan's unemployment rates dropped from 8 percent in 1971 to 2 percent in 1975," but serious problems remain. Women's participation in the paid labor force is low (3.9 percent compared to 34 percent for men); bad economic conditions have forced villagers to emigrate and leave farming to their wives; a dearth of skills among the urban poor inhibits their social mobility; high rates of unemployment and insecure employment remain in many neighborhoods; and the possible re-migration of workers threatens to exacerbate the conditions of the poor.

A fourth example is given by changes in Jordanian social structure and social relations. First, adolescents have become a sizeable group but they are characterized by "indecision, suffering, indirection, and a lack of enthusiasm for being of service to their country." Second, there is a trend towards greater freedom of choice in marriage and divorce. Fianlly, there is a lack of civic involvement among people generally, and among low-income persons especially.

The first set of factors influencing these conditions is individual and family resources and family size. The improvements in Jordan's material well-being have been unequally

distributed. Estimates have shown that "the richest 20 percent of households earn 45 percent of the total incomes," and "the average incomes of the richest 10 percent is 13 times that of the poorest 10 percent." In Amman around 30 percent of the population are poor, barely able to meet food, water and shelter costs; when they are forced to save on essentials like health and nutrition, the consequences are serious. Households in Jordan are relatively large; urban families are larger than rural ones; and large families are found most frequently among the urban poor. "In addition to the implication these large families have for the per-capita consumption patterns and well-being of family members, large families and high fertility have seriously adverse effects on mothers and infants." Cumulatively, these are referred to as the "maternal depletion syndrome." A 1972 national fertility study found that the average number of live births per woman was over seven. According to a C.A.R.E. survey, problems related to food and nutrition were found among 85 percent of rural mothers in Jordan. The combined effects of high fertility, large families, and poverty are deleterious on health and well-being.

Environmental stresses and resources are the second set of factors influencing health and well-being. Water is Jordan's scarcest resource. The poor in the Amman Region receive insufficient amounts of low quality, expensive water. However, water systems are more developed than sanitary arrangements: Amman's sewage system serves only 21 percent of the population, while 71 percent receive water. Along with solid waste disposal, human waste is an especially serious health hazard in slum areas. Shelter is another factor that effects health and well-being. The average urban house in the Region has 2.7 rooms, while houses in slums have an average of 1.3 rooms. Housing costs vary according to location, tenure, and age of structure. Even in relatively deprived low-income areas, there is a diversity of occupancy conditions and attitudes of families among neighborhoods which requires a variety of institutional responses. However, the main challenge is to make "definite political and economic commitments" to addressing housing and other problems of the poor.

The study next reviews the delivery systems for the various services, the problems they face, and their impact on the poor. (Tables indicating rural and urban access to particular government facilities and services are appended.) Proposals

for the strategies that will enhance health and well-being among the poor are given.

In health, the author first recommends developing a national and regional health policy that would reallocate existing resources, and develop new ones, for high-risk populations (mothers and children, low-income persons in urban and rural areas). Second, health sector programs should be coordinated with those of other sectors to provide a comprehensive approach, including a preventive health strategy, community clinics, and mass media campaigns to inform people. Third, the use of clinics should be improved through better location, scheduling, and integration of services in community-based health facilites.

In education, the author recommends increasing school enrollment and reducing the drop-out rates among low and moderate income urban and rural children, and increasing the access of young workers and drop-outs to vocational training.

In water and sanitation, credit and other means are recommended so the poor can connect to the water and sewage systems at reasonable costs. Also, a comprehensive environmental health strategy should be developed which will address problems in unserviced areas, be linked to community development programs, and will educate people about the use of water and sanitary facilities.

In shelter, a national housing policy (with the organization necessary for implementing it) is needed.

In the sector of income enhancement, a strategy to address the needs of the poor should reform food programs, review government salaries and subsidized food stores, assess "costs and benefits of alternative welfare and subsidy programs," and create a small-enterprise program linked to neighborhood-development strategy.

In citizenship and neighborhood development, resources and encouragement should be provided to neighborhoods (to enhance self-reliance) and to governmental ministries and municipal agencies (to coordinate planning efforts).

The major strength of this study is its well-documented analysis of the social injustice prevailing in the Amman-Balqa Region. The author, by recognizing the adverse implications of social

distinctions, proposes concrete strategies which could avoid class conflicts. The major weakness of the study lies in Mitchell's inability to contextualize these imbalances within Jordan's greater chronic problem--the limited opportunities for citizen initiatives. This could explain such problems as adolescent apathy and lack of self-help programs in the slums.

Othman, I., 'Al-Bina' 'al-'usari 'al-Mutaghayr fi Hadar 'al-'urdun (Changing Family Structure in Urban Jordan), Kuwait University, Kuwait (1976). JORDAN OTHER GENERAL DEVELOPMENT SOCIAL ORGANIZATION AND STRUCTURE

ABSTRACT

This paper, presented during a U.N.E.S.C.O. conference at Kuwait University in 1976, discusses the effects of social change on urban families in Jordan during the past 25 years. Taking a "traditional" versus "modern" model to explain social developments, Dr. Othman first gives a general quantitative account of developments; then he examines family adaptations to them, using a survey of 200 families in Amman conducted by the Department of Sociology at Jordan University.

Jordan is modernizing rapidly; at the same time, it is seeking a national identity. The two processes are not always compatible. The modern trend is dominant, but traditional values often appear to be in conflict with it. This is reflected in various social groupings and institutions. Another conflict concerns material and nonmaterial values: although a family has all the modern material goods, it may still maintain a traditional outlook. Hence, change is a complex phenomenon hard to gauge.

In Jordan, several changes have taken place since 1948. The first, and most drastic, is the influx of Palestinian refugees due to the wars in 1948 and 1967. This has contributed not only to the rapid increase in the populations; it has also had a socio-cultural impact. Palestinians were

more educated, urbanized, and contributed to the modernization and industrialization of Jordan. Moreover, their pressure helped loosen traditional ties and create new social groupings based on neighborhoods. Urbanization is the second major change that has taken place in Jordan. In addition to the refugee influx, rural-urban migration (due in part to population pressure on the land) caused this rapid urbanization. By 1972, Amman's population was five times that of 1952. However, this urban concentration was not accompanied by a complete change in social relations and values. The cities of Jordan may be viewed as "conglomerations of various social groupings" mostly maintaining traditional outlooks. The refugees, for example, created close-knit groupings with similar traditional patterns, thus creating protective barriers against change.

Among other changes has been an increase in communications. The expanded network of roads has enhanced people's mobility and the government's ability to provide services. Radio and television have played an equally important role in transforming the society. For example, television has replaced traditional visiting and socializing activities.

Changes have also occurred in employment. The rate of participation of workers to total population has decreased from 23 percent in 1961 to around 20 percent in 1971. Conversely, employment of women has increased. This was mainly in agriculture, and was correlated with expanded cultivable lands due to irrigation. However, when agriculture becomes more mechanized, a decline occurs in the employment of women. The main change in the sectoral labor distribution has been from civil servants towards technical jobs and increased respectability for manual and handicraft labor. Although not many opportunities are open to women (except in nursing and teaching), new jobs are appearing in the security and engineering fields. Also, jobs are appearing due to male labor migration. This in turn has affected the family structure, giving the mother increased duties, which she often retains when the father returns.

Education has been a fifth area of change. The illiteracy rate dropped from 67.6 percent in 1961 to 41 percent in 1971. While increased education has lessened rural/urban and male/female gaps, the spatial distribution of the schools

still favors urban areas. (The poorest rates of school attendance were among the nomads.) Nevertheless, education is considered the main cause of social change in Jordan. Secular education, in particular, has helped to replace the traditional sources of power, authority, and ability. Whereas age was the main determinant within a family, youth are today able to challenge this view, with increased opportunities due to education. Moreover, education has opened up new possibilities for women. On the whole education is the main factor influencing social mobility in Jordanian society.

Changes have also occured in health: expanded preventive and curative services, abolition of some epidemics due to vaccinations, expansion of hospitals and physicians, and more Maternal and Child Care Clinics. The improved health status has decreased mortality rates and, with continued high fertility rates, led to population growth.

While traditionally resistant to change because of the importance religion gave to this institution, the family in Jordan today is experiencing slight changes--in size, in type, in the roles of its members, in the status of women, in age required for marriage, and in other aspects. Despite these changes, however, the family is still an essential unit in traditional kinship patterns. The main cause for these changes in the family have come from education, as opposed to urbanization or industrialization. Education has increased demands for higher standards of living, which has often led individuals to decrease their family commitments because of the lack of jobs in the country. Some have forsaken traditions regarding marriage age, duties towards relatives, and family size to live according to new and more comfortable standards. This is partially seen in the rise of nuclear families, especially among the educated youth, in contrast to the majority of extended families in rural and urban areas.

The results of the family survey were presented for three main areas: marriage, fertility, and women's status. Marriages within the patrilineal family were predominant, although the institution was still considered a union of two families. Pre-marital dating and socializing was acceptable for males only. All respondents agreed that a longer engagement period should be allowed for the better acquaintance of couples, and

marriage at a later age was preferred.

In fertility, while children were still considered important for family well-being, most respondents expressed the need for fewer children. At least one method of birth control (traditional or modern) was known by most women. The traditional preference for male children was evident.

As for the status of women, attitudes allowing women to work and receive an education were helped by economic necessity. Freedom for women was "acceptable" if it was not one's wife or daughter. The central role of women in the family was recognized, especially that of mothers.

The paper is appendixed with a review of recent references on the topics discussed.

Othman's paper is valuable in giving a view of the changes in family structure in Jordan and in providing a sense of the attitudes still prevailing in urban areas. It is, however, limited in scope and its conclusions are tentative.

United Nations, Jordan Report of Mission on Needs Assessment for Population Assistance, United Nations Fund for Population Activities, New York (July 1979). JORDAN PROJECTS POPULATION POP-OTHER

ABSTRACT

This report provides an overview of the shifting demographic characteristics of Jordan and a good sketch of the country's overall development. It is part of the U.N.F.P.A./Jordan bilateral agreement (which expired in December 1979) to outline the government's needs for aid in developing self-reliant population policies and programs. Given the country's insufficient natural resources, the political and economic impacts of the Palestinian problem, and present manpower fluxes, the need to stabilize Jordan's "greatest resource"--its population--is crucial for maintaining a "dynamic balance between

development opportunities and manpower utilization."

The present high rate of 3.5 percent population growth is due to two factors: first, the repeated influx of Palestinian refugees (over 350,000 in 1948, and a further 40,000 in 1967), and second, improved health conditions which produced lower death rates (from 21/1000 in 1952 to 12/1000 in 1976) and high fertility rates (48/1000 in 1979). This growth and continuing rural exodus have caused rapid urbanization, intensified urban density, concentrated 87 percent of the 2.78 million people (1977 U.N. estimate) in less than one-eighth of the area, and accentuated pressures on the land. Another consequence of high population growth is that over half of the population is under 15 years of age. This age distribution, the outmigration of skilled labor, and low participation of women in the paid labor force, have resulted in a participation rate of only 19.6 percent of the population. Full employment, shortages in some sectors, and inflated wage rates have also attracted foreign labor (60,000 in 1977). Although Jordan has no population control policy, its economy has evolved, in part, in response to the population and manpower supply. The Five Year Development Plan of 1976-80 emphasized education, established a Family Planning and Protection Association, and encouraged employment of women; it also provided social security, unemployment and old age benefits as incentives for Jordanian labor to remain in the country. The next plan (1981-85) is expected to shift from a project-oriented approach to one which emphasizes integrated regional development. In order to formulate and implement population policies and programs, Jordan needs international assistance of the following types: first, establishment of an administrative framework for collecting and encouraging the free flow of basic population data; second, evaluation of the current situation and recommendations for the National Planning Council on the population aspects of the 1981-85 Plan; third, strengthening of existing institutions and organizations involved in population programming (the National Planning Council, the University of Jordan, and others); fourth, assistance in curricula planning and training in the field of social statistics, maternal and child health, family planning, health education, and population education (in schools, outside them, and especially at the Jordan University); and fifth, assistance in planning for multisectoral

projects and field programs involving women, which the 1981-85 plan gives high priorities.

Ware, John Alex, Housing for Low Income Rural Families in Less Developed Countries: A Case Study, Jordan, Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, Syracuse University (1978). JORDAN DISSERTATION URBANISM HOUSING AND CONSTRUCTION

ABSTRACT

This study of the East Jordan Valley housing problem has two objectives: first "to formulate housing policies to assist low income rural families obtain satisfactory housing, with minimum direct government participation and financial subsidies"; and second, "to determine a suitable house construction system which could enable low income rural families to provide themselves with adequate shelter to satisfy their minimal aspirations within their economic means."

The overriding problems in valley housing have been, first, generally small household incomes, and second, the lack of alternative means of financing a plot of land and/or construction of a permanent house. Valley population increases, due to high birth rates and immigration, have outstripped the financial, technical, and administrative resources of the nation. Neither government agencies nor the private housing industry were able to provide well constructed, permanent, affordable housing for people living at a subsistence level. In 1977, the majority of the 75,000 people living in the valley were landless sharecroppers squatting in overcrowded, insanitary, temporary mud huts. Compounding the problems of rural poverty--seasonal unemployment, low productivity, and low wages--were the lack of a national housing policy to assist low income groups, the shortage of financing for rural housing, an ineffective housing delivery system, and unrealistically high planning and housing standards. The self-built squatter settlements (representing considerable investments in time, money, materials, and labor) were the poor

farmers' only housing choice.

To address these problems, Ware examined the physical, historical, political, social, and economic aspects of the valley environment. Development and housing policies were reviewed and prior government and private agency programs were evaluated. Valley housing construction systems, along with similar systems used in arid regions, were analyzed to determine the most suitable and economical among them. Although the valley is the most important agricultural region in Jordan, the government authority responsible for its overall development has given low priority to housing. The shortage of trained technical and administrative personnel, and the inability to organize viable assistance programs using low interest international loans, have contributed to the agency's ineffectiveness in housing. The agency also obstructed the one successful "aided self-help" project in housing.

The author, who worked as a consultant for the Jordanian government during his research, used a field survey to determine community development priorities, housing needs and aspirations, and major socio-economic problems of valley living. The results and analysis of the survey are presented in tables, and gross housing needs and the effective demand (based on ability to pay) of various socio-economic groups are presented graphically.

Based on this study, the author proposes six recommendations. First, housing requires a comprehensive national policy which outlines objectives and priorities, resource allocations, responsibilities and contributions of all related institutions, and clarifies the role of housing in socio-economic development. Popular self-help methods are probably the most feasible way to construct affordable housing, but an advisory service providing free advice and assistance could facilitate the process. Second, land policies should include tenancy agreements to protect sharecroppers' rights, provisions to control speculation and secure essential utilities, and regulations to prevent building on prime agricultural land and to establish safe and hygenic standards. Third, construction policies should reduce costs of government-built housing, promote sites and services and "squatter-upgrading" schemes, and provide material and technical assistance to self-builders. Fourth, construction policies

should train local craftsmen to counter the shortage of skilled construction workers and foster a technology using valley building materials to reduce transport costs. Fifth, financing policies for low income rural groups should be amended with respect to eligibility criteria, security requirements, and mortgage loan terms. The Jordan Housing Bank should provide minimum quotas of funding for the rural poor. And sixth, the appropriateness of stated housing policy objectives, and the methods used to implement them, should be reevaluated.

As a step toward partial fulfillment of these recommendations, Ware proposes a simple system for constructing permanent housing, using materials readily available in the valley, to enable low income people to build their own homes.

This ambitious work is valuable for covering most aspects of the Jordan Valley housing problem, filling a gap in writings on landless Arab sharecroppers, and having some general applicability to housing rural families in less developed countries. Its major theoretical weakness, typical of many housing studies, is the view that the question is completely solvable within the structural limitations of the free market and consequent class stratification. As such, the socio-economic and political aspects are dealt with as "givens" on which the policies and house recommendations are based.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY, ABSTRACTS, AND RESEARCHERS ON EGYPT

A Report Prepared for the U.S. Agency for International Development

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27 September 1982

INTRODUCTION

This report on Egypt is the second of a series that includes others on Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia, and Yemen (San'a). Each report focuses on socio-cultural and political-economic aspects of development and consists of a bibliography, abstracts, a list of researchers, and recommendations about which bibliographic sources might be distributed to USAID offices.

The bibliography in the current report includes articles, books and monographs, dissertations and theses, project-related papers, Egyptian government documents, and a few other sources. There are 237 sources in all: 217 are in English, 13 in French, and 7 in Arabic. All except three have been produced since 1970.

The twenty abstracts were made from sources selected according to four criteria. The contract for this project stipulates that sources chosen should be "of high quality," "empirically based," and "relevant to development." The first of these criteria was taken to concern formal considerations (such as consistency and comprehensiveness); the second, substantive considerations (such as testing hypotheses or at least clearly relating claims to data); and the third, addressing "basic needs." To these interpretations was added the criterion of balance, both in topics and in perspectives, so that all twenty sources selected would not concern a single subject area or viewpoint. Sources chosen for abstracting, then, were judged according to these four criteria and rated highly on all or most of them. For this reason we recommend that, funds permitting, all twenty be duplicated and distributed to relevant USAID offices.

The list of researchers was composed from the authors of sources in the bibliography. Information about their addresses, topics of research, and language competences were compiled from eight directories, biographical data in their publications, and personal networks.

FCH
Project Director

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1

Key Words to Organize Bibliographic Entries on
Socio-Economic Development

Country

- Egypt
- Jordan
- Morocco
- Tunisia
- Yemen

Source of Information

- article
- book
- dissertation/thesis
- document (host government)
- project (other than host government)
- other

Subjects

- General Development
  - ideology
  - informal processes
  - intranational political economy
  - international political economy
  - social organization and structure (kinship/family organization/neighborhood/networks)

other

Science

applied (eg. technology)

natural (eg. fisheries, forests, etc.)

social

other

Health

maternal and child care

nutrition

preventive care

socio-cultural factors

water supply and sewers

other

Population

family planning

migration

other

Education

instructional materials

literacy and other basic

pre-school, elementary, secondary

professional and higher

technical and vocational

other

Urbanism

housing and construction

sanitation and streets

other

Communication

libraries and storage

media

impacts

other

Agriculture

irrigation and water management

extension and advice

crops

livestock and products

credit and mechanization

land

markets and food subsidies

other

Industry

energy

transport

trade and commerce

labor

management

banking and finance

tourism

small scale

other

Public Administration

- foreign aid and investment
- community welfare
- taxes and grants
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- planning
- other

Basic Human Needs

- status of women
- rural
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Abdel-Fadil, M., Development Income Distribution and Social Change in Rural Egypt 1952-1970: A Study of the Political Economy of Agrarian Transition, Cambridge University Press, New York (1975). Egypt Book General Development Intranational Political Economy.

The present book is an analysis of the Egyptian agrarian system from 1952 to 1970. This historical period was chosen because major agrarian transformations were undertaken, while little has been written about their multidimensional repercussions. The author investigates the economic relations of production and their impact on the social organisation of various sections of the Egyptian peasantry, the processes by which income distribution was transformed, and the effects of shifts in patterns of property and power.

The era before the revolution in 1952 had a particular landholding system; two of its major characteristics were a heavy concentration of landownership and an increasing number of small landowners with increasingly smaller land. Concentration of landownership is shown by correlating the number of owners with the amount of land held: large landowners were less than .1 per cent of all owners but held 7 per cent of all cultivated land; medium landowners, 7 per cent and 55 per cent, respectively; and small landowners, 92.9 per cent and 25 per cent. In the period 1900-1952, the number of medium-sized landowners remained fairly constant; both the number of small landholders and the total amount of available land increased, but the size of landholdings decreased by 40 per cent. Also, landless families increased from 24 to 44 per cent of the total rural family population. According to the author, this trend indicates an increasingly unequal distribution of land which prompted an imminent crisis. This crisis seemed to be quite obvious to the post-revolution regime, which came up with agrarian programs within one month after the revolution.

The traditional agricultural system was organised in the following manner. Land and water resources were monopolised by large landowners and, consequently, rents became very high and unaffordable for the small peasant. Credits (at short or medium term) also were monopolised by big landowners. Small farmers relied on the traditional channels for loans, but these methods were so costly that the small farmers often ended up selling their land and joining the landless peasantry. Moreover, landowners found it more advantageous to rent out their land than to farm it themselves because land productivity was already at maximum capacity. As a consequence of this "economic" infrastructure, a new social group emerged as middlemen or brokers who would rent land from owners in an auction system and then divide it into small plots which were leased to the sharecroppers and tenants who actually farmed them. Hence, a piece of land had

to "produce" three times its value, because a multilevel system of land tenure encroached on that productivity. This deadlocked situation in the rural world combined with little outlet in the industrial labor force (because industry was almost non-existant) to create vast unrest among the peasant population.

Aware of the social implications of an economic system based on an extremely unequal distribution of wealth, the new government proposed agrarian transformations with short- and long-term effects. The objective was to break the power of the agrarian oligarchy, redistribute the land more equitably, and transform the social and economic relations in the rural areas. However, "the reform was, in principle and practice, more akin to the liberal ideal of a regime of small peasant properties rather than to any collectivist or socialistic ideals." It increased landownership among small peasants; however, medium peasants (who owned between 5 and 10 feddans) now acquired substantial amounts of land and consequently replaced the old oligarchy in wealth, power, and political control. While 671,000 feddans were transferred to small landowners between 1952-1965, a greater amount of land was sold by large estates and landowners (who feared further government restrictions). The medium peasants were able to benefit from these sales, keeping the land or dividing it and reselling. This group (who now owned up to 50 feddans) carried around 1/3 of the total farm land, while constituting only 5.2 per cent of the total landowner population.

After 1952, the Egyptian agrarian society underwent transformations which affected its social structure and relations to the means of production. The author uses three economic indicators to explain the processes that caused these changes in class structure. The first is the magnitude of wage employment. The extent to which land size is correlated to wage employment is an indication of class stratification in rural Egypt. For instance, 71 per cent of the permanent wage labourers in 1961 were hired on middle to large farms (5 feddans and above); while small landholders relied mostly on unpaid family labour. Draft animals, conversely, tend to be owned and shared by middle and poor peasants. The water buffalo and cow perform multiple functions in the agrarian economy. Besides being assets for farm work (ploughing services, use of dung as cheap fertiliser), they provide food for peasants in times of crisis. Although these animals are important, their costs of maintenance sometimes force peasants to sell them or share them with others.

Another cause for class differentiation is farm mechanisation. Again the larger the land size, the more mechanisation in farming and irrigation procedures. The "rich" peasants (20 to 50 feddans) owned water pumps, tractors, and other equipment right after the revolution and were still ahead with mechanisation in 1961. Medium peasants also steadily increased mechanisation. Besides the amount of land owned, the main factor determining use of mechanisation is of financial nature; only farmers with investible surpluses can afford the process of mechanisation.

The last indicator used for class differentiation is the type of crops grown. Ninety-eight per cent of Egyptian agriculture consists of field crops, with fruits and vegetables the remainder. In the 1960's the production of fruits and vegetables doubled, absolutely, but its percentage of the overall production remained the same. While cotton was the main cash crop, sugar cane and rice became competitively as important. Wheat, maize, and millet were grown as subsistence crops and constituted the basic diet of peasants. In this shift from subsistance to cash crops, "poor" and "small" peasants kept relying on subsistence farming. The clear class differentiation between the "newrich" landowners and the poor peasants along the three variables used - wage/employment, farm mechanisation, type of crops - shows that the small to medium peasant, who already had financial assets when the revolution occured, was able to increase them and as a consequence gained more power.

A significant percentage of the total peasant population is landless in Egypt. While in 1950 this group amounted to 44 per cent of the total rural population, it decreased to 28 per cent during the 1960's, then rose again to 33 per cent in the early 1970's. The author explains this increase in terms of the overall population growth, the pressure that growth put on land, and the freeze in agrarian reforms. It is interesting and somewhat significant to note that no official statistics are available on the number of landless peasant families, so the author replaced them by calculations based on the age and occupation of the rural population. Also interesting is that, within the growth of total population, the number of poor and landless peasants increased even at a time of agrarian reforms.

Landless peasantry is divided into two groups - - permanent wage labourers and casual farm labourers. While the prior group works on large landholdings and is subdivided into various skill groups (tractor drivers, water pump supervisors,

etc), the latter group is considered the poorest of the rural population. This group is constituted by unskilled labourers who are hired for short periods of time and transported to various farming areas Moreover, this group is exposed to usury and employer exploitation: usually labour contractors take up to 12 per cent of wages as commissions and labourers work extra unpaid days on the contractor's account in "exchange" for inevitable indebtness contracted during slack seasons, illness, etc. Although the government has been trying to combat these contractors by hiring large numbers of "tarahil" labourers, they illustrate the acuteness of the crisis in going from feudalism to capitalism in modern Egypt; for this growing mass of labourers, while separated from their principal means of production (land), are unable as yet to find regular wage employment in the developing capitalist sector of the economy. In other words, these "free" landless peasants are prevented from becoming a proletariat in the modern sense, and are thus compelled to fall back upon semi-feudal modes of exploitation based on a bonded labour-hire system.

After presenting the main socio-economic transformations which the agrarian reform has generated in rural Egypt, the author looks at the effects of income redistribution among various social strata. This analytical orientation is used to show how various social groups - rural labourers, tenant farmers and land owners - are interconnected by the dynamics of the economic system in the society at large. A rise in the purchasing power of various strata of the rural population resulted from a reduction in income disparities; in turn, this enlarged the market for consumer goods and services. Moreover, the "medium" and "rich" peasantry, who had replaced the old oligarchy, also increased the demands for manufactured goods - - tractors, machinery, chemical fertilisers. Thus, the expansion of rural home consumption and the growth of multifaceted transactions for the pruposes of agricultural production contributed to the expansion of the national economy. Similarly, cooperativisation of rural areas was geared towards the same goals of national development: "Egyptian policy makers placed great emphasis on the restructuring of landholdings into efficient-sized units backed by cooperative organisation where scale effects made it desirable. While farmers continued to retain both ownership and the responsibility for cultivating their own plots, they were required to follow a number of practices: crop consolidation, triennial rotation, and cooperation in certain activities, such as fumigation of crops and pests controls."

Meanwhile, cooperativisation also provided the government with a significant surplus through various contracts and taxes on the peasant. This surplus was used by the central government for export and for expansion of urban employment. However, as the author notes, these are "limits to the efficacy of the intersectoral terms of trade as an instrument for increasing state revenues, because of the possible disincentive effects which become operative after certain critical level of unfavourable terms of trade to agriculture."

Finally, a political assessement of the government agrarian reforms shows that the overall conditions of the Egyptian rural population have improved. However, a new rural elite has replaced the old landed oligarchy, developed significant influence on rural politics, and established new relations with urban elites.

Abdel-Fadil, M., The Political Economy of Nasserism: A Study in Employment and Income Distribution Policies in Urban Egypt, 1952-1972, Cambridge University Press, New York (1980). Egypt Book General Development Intranational Political Economy.

In this book the author primarily surveys the ideological influence of the post-revolution Egyptian regime on economic policies and processes of decision-making.

As did many Third World nations stepping into national independence, Egypt chose socialism, under the leadership of Nasser. Socialism meant various things, from rapid growth and economic independence to social justice. While the ideals of socialism were appealing to Nasser, the socio-economic reality of Egypt after the revolution was such that the new government had, first, to balance the budget. It pursued this priority by encouraging investments from the private and foreign sectors. However, very little was invested perhaps because of the nation listic aspect of the revolution. Accordingly, in 1956 Nasser decided to nationalise the Suez Canal, and a new orientation was articulated for the political economy of Egypt. The public sector became the main investor in industry, although private businesses were not nationalised until 1962. Following nationalisation of production, the new regime was busy with substantial transformations in employment, income distribution, and consequently social organisation.

An important indicator of economic development and planning is the nature of formal employment in the urban sector - its structure, direction and expansion. The main providers of formal employment in the Egyptian urban sector were the manufacturing, construction (both housing and service sectors), and the government. While the agricultural sector had been the main national employer, efforts towards urban development reversed this trend. The manufacturing and mining industries increased employment by 11 per cent between 1950 and the early 1960's. However, the largest urban employers were the construction industry and the government bureaucracy. Government efforts in industry did not create a stable skilled labour force. For instance, most imported technology emphasised assembly rather than vertically integrated production. The construction sector, however, was very active during the period, particularly with the construction of the Aswan High Dam. The limited industrialisation, combined with the natural urban growth and migration of populations meant that the labour force was absorbed by the construction sector mainly, and the informal labour market generally.

The author categorises service employment into three categories to show employment growth and its direction in relation to total labour force available. First is employment in basic and infrastructural services related to material production, such as public utilities, transport and communications, or commerce and financial services. Second is employment in public administration and government services, which may well reflect a social need to absorb certain grades of labour which would otherwise be redundant. And third is employment in the "informal sector," where the bulk of unskilled labourers in excess supply create their own employment opportunities.

The author starts out by describing the informal sector as "economic activities which largely escape recognition, enumeration an regulation by the government." The bulk of people working in that sector are identified as migrants and the urban poor. "This type of employment results - in developing countries - - from the failure of capital and of most complemetary means of production to increase at the same rate as the supply of labourer in secondary and tertiary activities." The informal sector usually fluctuates in size and in the types of services it provides. Abdel-Fadil categorises it into small-scale manufacturing activites (radio mechanics, car repair, etc), handicraft activites (self-employed carpenters, masons, masons, tailors), personal services (shoe polishing, selling newspapers, car washing), and lastly undefined activities outside of legal regulations (like prostitution or drug smuggling). The government doesn't have any statistics for the above categories; in other words, very little is known about the "real" wages of significant sections of the population.

As the formal sector is unable to provide enough jobs for an increasing population, (let alone the influx of rural migrants), the informal sector has widened by providing small domestic services. The author implies that the increase of the informal sector is an indication of unemployment in general; that is, rural unemployment is transferred into urban unemployment. Moreover, there is little movement from the informal to formal sectors, although people in the prior one usually hope to move to the latter. Urban workersin the formal sector contribute to national income; however, "in a closed economy the rate of employment creation in the informal sector will depend on the growth of demand for 'informal services' as income rises in towns, which is in turn a function of the rate of expansion of productive employment in the commodity sectors and the socially necessary services." Thus, during the 1960's both the socialist ideology and the efforts of the government towards industrialisation provided a

better standard of living for skilled labourers and larger access to commodities and financial remuneration comparable to the white collar group.

One measure taken by the government in order to reduce disparity of incomes has been the nationalisation and sequestration of wealth (commercial interests); however, by the late 60's a large disparity of income was viewed as a result of a "relaxation" of the nationalisation laws. While trying to assess the distribution of incomes during the 1950's and 1960's, the author faces the problem that statistics collected from tax documents on national income distribution overlook two particular brackets; first, high incomes earned through self-employment often evade taxes; and second, incomes below taxable limit are also not included in the statistics. In effect, there is an informal system connecting the high incomes and the low ones through petty services, bribery, and charity payments, which are not subject to taxation. The rise of a new "bourgeois urban middle class" working in the military, administration, or bureaucracies rapidly inceased the need for consumption goods directly influencing the development of an "industrial output mix" based on consumption goods. Furthermore, the "growing size of Egypt's middle class throughout the 1960's has contributed to increase the general propensity to consume, thus reducing the level of domestic savings, and adding to the difficultires of the balance of payments In 1962, Egypt's National Charter contained a number of directions, mainly to raise both the consumption and investment. This had partially been solved in 1956 by Nasser's success in securing vast amounts of aid. However, Egypt became rapidly burdened by a strong deficit in the balance of payments; it resulted in a reduction of foreign loans and aids. Moreover, the government had already created a climate in which there was no possibility to fall back on the people's or the government's own ability to save: "Egypt therefore, had no choice but to cut her rate of investment to bring it to a level with the country's ability to save."

Looking at the organisation ofthe Egyptian tax system, three main elements are clearly shown. First, during the 1950's and 1960's, revenues from indirect taxation were the major portion of tax revenues. Second, taxes on personal incomes were very low and restricted to a small portion of the population. On the one hand, incomes generated by the higher brackets systematically evaded taxetion and individuals who paid taxes gave only a portion of what was owed. Thus, tax evasion generated informal incomes which paralleled formal ones. Third,

inefficiency in the administrative and tax enforcement laws seriously hampered any equity in taxation. For instance, the author illustrates his case by showing that "the total tax arrears accumulated for taxes on income and property were estimated to be about LE 191 million towards the end of 1968, of which LE 127 million represent the arrears accumulated for taxes on the incomes and property of the private sector and LE 100 million represent the arrears for taxes on business profits."

Nasser's new socio-economic policies -- nationalisation and centralisation -- profoundly affected the social structure or urban Egypt. The author looks at the restructuring of various social categories as a result of social and economic transformations by examining statistical data from the Labour Force Sample Surveys. He remarks that there has been a movement from self-employment to wage labour during the 1950's and 1960's. Large government labour projects must have absorbed this part of the population; moreover, popular hopes for stability through wage labour accounted for the shift as well. One difficulty in trying to come up with a typology of social structure on the basis of economic and social criteria is that there is a continuous interlap between formal and informal categories of employment and between multiple layers of employment. For instance, while a large portion of workers are concentrated in large industries, a substantial number of people work in industries that are very small in scale (between 2 to 19 people), and that are considered marginal. During the 1960's the decline of these small-scale industries was reduced.

The categorisation of social class in Egypt is based on socio-economic criteria. The bourgeoisie basically is formed of the higher ranking officers of military and bureaucracy, capitalist entrepreneurs and contractors, and members of the liberal professions. The petty bourgeoisie represent a portion of the urban population possessing a small amount of capital, property, special skills, and training. In that category we find self-employed artisans, traders, shopkeepers, skilled labourers in "modern" industries, and what the author calls non-manual technocrats (like middle ranking civil servants, school teachers, enlisted ranks of the military). The final category includes the sub-proletariat of "an urban disinherited mass which is deprived of all material resources and access to regular work, and many of whom are recruited for all kinds of shady or illegal activities."

The conclusion of the book reviews moves during Nasser's era towards economic independence and social justice. This ideology required changes in the organisation and control over the means of production and the reallocation of the economic surplus in the society. Increase of jobs, redistribution of wealth, and economic investment were all implemented through the public sector instead of through a "market-force" system. In other words there was an increasing interaction and alliance between the middle class and state capitalism. This type of regime has lately been very much investigated in the Marxist literature and is perceived as a prevalent socio-economic and political process in Third World nations. While economically these regimes follow capitalist market systems, they curtail them with restrictions of a nature that would ensure "social justice." In retrospect, after the revolution Nasser attracted to himself the urban nationalist bourgeoisie and the rural middle class in order to upset the old social order, the landed oligarchy and the aristocracy. Based on this broad pattern of support, Nasser was able to generate social reforms and economic programs; however, the programs never went beyond what those alliances permitted.

Abu-Lughod, J., Cairo: 1001 Years of the City Victorious, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ (1971). Egypt Book Urbanism Urb-Other

The present book is a study of the development and expansion of the city of Cairo; the author uses socio-political events as interconnecting elements in the physical structuring and development of the city. The book is divided into three parts covering political and historical eras critical to various stages in the city's expansion: the Islamic epoch, the period from 1800 to the turn of the century, and the modern era and emergence of the metropolis.

Islamic Cairo was characterised by three ecological patterns which had long-lasting influence on its organisation. First, distribution of population followed ethnic and religious lines rather than socio-economic and class divisions. Second, land was used for a mixture of both residential and commercial purposes--hence, the selfsufficient aspect of the quarter in terms of distances, transportation, and small-scale industries. And finally, the architecture of the quarters' streets, "tortuous and intricate," reflects the two prior factors, thus reinforcing the protection of a quarter from outsiders and assuring intra-commercial circulation. Similarly, "just as the physical city was an accretion of cells only loosely linked by walls and a common dependence upon a minimum number of central facilities, so the political community of the Islamic city was an accretion of groups -- organised on religious, occupational and proximity lines -- through whose representatives the directions of the state were channeled downward and the responses channeled upward." Islamic Cairo was organised by two administrative systems. At one level, the city was subdivided into harat ("neighbourhoods"), with one representative carrying authority within the hara as a link between the inhabitants and the police. The second administrative system was the occupational organisation: "Islamic trade organisations embraced virtually the entire working population of the cities whether engaged in commerce, crafts or services, legitimate or even illegitimate." In 1670, observers counted some 300 professional organisations in Cairo and its two port suburbs.

Another feature of Islamic Cairo was the precariousness of its public facilities. The city did not provide a public water system, municipal street cleaning, or waste disposal services; private enterprise or individuals did. The role of the awquaf ("religious foundations") was predominant in providing these services, in addition to the more traditional role they performed in managing family endowments: " in

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a family endowment, the owner of a property could relinquish his title to a religious foundation but continue to receive its profits personally during his lifetime." Awquaf administration of both private and public services seems to be at the root of Cairo's poor maintenance. Both corruption and inadequate, inefficient administration combined with the total disorganisation of municipal services to reduce Cairo to a "handicapped" city at the end of the eighteenth century.

During the first half of the nineteenth century Cairo did not change noticeably. The two major sources of influence upon the city were the brief French occupation (3 years) and the rule of Mohamed Ali. The French army reorganised street patterns in the city to control various sections which, organised as they were, had been impenetrable by troops and artillery. These new, enlarged arteries are still modern Cairo's main routes of traffic. The other change the French imposed was the reorganisation of the existing harat structure, of which there were 53 in the city, into 8 districts which have been kept under the same administrative system to the present. Mohamed Ali's economic venture in Egypt had little effect on Cairo's physionomy; however, his rule did deal with certain pressing urban problems, such as the organisation of a strong police (whose role was to restore order and security) amd changes in the organisation of justice (delegating increased authority to local officers rather than the one appointed by Constantinople). Again the physical changes of Cairo involved mainly constructing palaces, and roads leading to them, but forbidding their access to the public. Today these roads have become major thoroughfares of modern Cairo.

At the turn of the twentieth century, Cairo was a city divided both physically and culturally. To the west remained wealth, "modernity," and a significant foreign population, which under British rule "monopolised the important government posts and enjoyed privileges, exemptions and a style of life that made them the envy not only of Egyptians but of their countrymen at home as well." The eastern part of the city was still the pre-industrial area, paved with its old street structure, relying on the same old water delivery system, with no lights after dark, and with no gardens, parks, or macadamised streets. The construction of the Suez canal propelled Egypt onto the international scene.

The ruling Khedive (Ismail, in 1863) was personally concerned about the embellishment of urban Cairo; thus, not only public works but municipal utilities were implemented.

Modern Egypt in the 1920's and 1930's was the scene of industrial ventures, agricultural innovations, and intensification of production. There was also an unprecedented demographic explosion, caused by decreasing death rates and a constant increase in birth rates. More significant and striking is that during the last fifty years, "Cairo has been growing faster than Egypt and has been absorbing a larger and larger proportion of the country's rapidly multiplying inhabitants." Not only did immigrants from rural areas outnumber the old Cairene population, but the number of foreigners who migrated to Egypt -- mainly to Cairo-- kept increasing. The city, with its old technological order could not meet the necessary urban supply and demand requirements, especially in terms of the space needed for housing and facilities. Besides the physical problems of Cairo, maladministration contributed to its stagnation. Cairo had no local autonomy or representatives through which local projects and goals could be locally financed; also, "local institutions for financing private urban development on a modern scale" were lacking.

Modern Cairo, the metropolis, has had a least one main effect in the city's social organisation: it has contributed to increasing social homogeneity, blending "the cultural and technological worlds into which Cairo has been subdivided." However, a different type of differentiation, based on economic standards from the new industrial urbanism, will replace socio-cultural factors in regulating the distribution of population in Cairo.

The book ends with a question: the author wonders how two inevitably connected groups, representing opposed social processes, will be resolved. On the one hand, there are the "small identities, family and individual"; on the other, there are the "large identities of Cairene and Egyptian." Both compete through the web of religion, harat, small industries, and the multiple facets of social life in an ever-growing metropolis which itself is caught in the tentacular spread of industrialisation and economic growth amidst population explosion, political

transformation, and more. Almost philosophically Cairo, the City Victorious, is silently witnessing its perpetual survival.

The book is an excellent account of the development of Cairo, put in various national and international perspectives. It is definitely accessible to a specialist in urban planning, someone acquainted with the history of Egypt and Cairo, or someone alien to developments in Egyptian history or urban planning. The ability of the book to reach such a wide audience shows a quality and clarity not often found in academic publications.

Buttner, F., "Political Stability Without Stable Institutions: The Retraditionalisation of Egypt's Polity," Orient 20 (march): 53-67.(1979). Egypt Article General Development Ideology Informal Processes.

The goal of this article is to show how an "underdeveloped" country like Egypt, going through various periods of change, is still politically stable. The author approaches the issue by attempting to answer two questions. First, what are the processes accounting for the stability and continuity of the Egyptian political system since the 1952 revolution ? Second, how did the political system, in spite of weak institutions, initiate and sustain social and economic transformations?

Leonard Binder has claimed that traditional institutions could not uphold the political goals of both the Nasser and Sadat regimes, so state institutions became centers of political authority and decision-making. According to Buttner, Binder's argument doesn't hold. Egypt's process towards "modernisation" has been actively generated by the "retraditionalisation" of its political culture and, consequently, its whole socio-cultural system. By retraditionalisation is meant the use of local political structure to achieve "modernity": "It is an endavour to reduce dependency in all spheres: politically, economically, culturally and mentally." This concept doesn't mean religious fundamentalism and return to "tradition," but it allows the possibility of "modernisation" while retaining cultural identity.

In order to understand the political stability of Egypt, Buttner discusses the informal political system, based on networks of personal relations, rather than the institutional system. Buttner studies this particular form of political organisation because he believes it clarifies the structural organisation of the whole political system. Retraditionalisation is observed in terms of political decision-making and ideology.

Egypt represents an "unincorporated" society because informal networks of personal relations and clientelism have been much stronger in achieving political aims and economic changes, while institutionalised organisms and organised groups remained weak. Both systems may function similarly, but since 1952 two elite systems have developed. One was the core political group which led the revolution, which became a consolidated power elite where very little turnover occured over the years. The second group had a wider base though it was still organised by key

figures from the inner group. Thus the political elite drew together a wider range of officers, technocrats, etc., which functioned as a clientage network encompassing continuously shifting alliances between various factions and cliques. The core political group emited political directives and controlled their execution by the wider political group.

The new government never came up with a "radical" ideology. Nasser and Sadat did not rely on an ideology based on class struggle but rather on one emphasising cooperation of the masses. Nasser wanted to improve the situation of the masses, but the inner political elite around him was still made of military followers and technocrats he could trust. No masses were involved in the political decision-making process. As a consequence, independent organisations and movements did not take off, and the bureaucracy did not provide incentives for change.

The army's traditional structure did not initiate change, because it was more concerned with the protection of its constituency and members. Moreover, it was not ready to undergo radical structural changes in order to elicit mass mobilisation. Similarly, the state bureaucracy was controlled by the core elite; thus it was subject to political manipulation rather than functioning in an autonomous way. In addition it sollicited support for the regime through the extension of the old traditional clientage system.

The viability of this weak totalitarian system relied on the expansion of clientelism. The political leadership never allowed the development of autonomous organisations. Extensively using patron-client relations, it continuously reshuffled the political scene; thus Sadat's liberalisation after 1976 was nothing more than the reinforcement of his personal politics, consolidated by "brokerage" from the center to the periphery.

Nasser's ideology towards development and modernisation was sucessful -- at least in its expressive form -- because he emphasised local traditions and mores and the revival of local identity in the process of development. However, in the long run clientelism stifled attempts at development. Similarly, Sadat's policy was based on clientelism. While not offering any particular ideology, he did use traditional images to consolidate his power and to present a cult of

personality as an alternative to a national ideology. Thus he emphasised religious precepts and his peasant background, among other factors.

Buttner's article is an interesting atempt to explain political rationalisation and "stability" through informal political networks and systems, although he doesn't provide statistical data and evidence to substantiate his analysis. His presentation of the interaction and growing relationship between the formal and informal political elites is a consistent model that could be useful in cross-cultural analysis.

Clawsen, P., "Egypt's Industrialisation: A Critique of Dependency Theory," MERIP Reports, vol. 72, pp. 17-23 (1978). Egypt Article General Development International Political Economy Industry Indus-Other.

In the present article the author tests the applicability of the dependency theory to the process of industrialisation in Egypt from after World War I until the 1952 revolution.

Clawsen first presents the theory and its various interpretations. One current orientation claims that the integration of peripheral societies ("under-developed") to the world market is determined by the type of relations the periphery has towards the center economies ("developed"). While some claim that dependency is based on power relations between the periphery and the center, others (e.g., S. Amin) see the international division of labour as the key to changes in power relations between the petiphery and the center.

The theoretical orientation held by the author assumes that the dependency of Middle East economies on the West is rooted in the laws of accumulation of capital. Thus while dependency theory views the center as slowing the developmentof backward countries, Clawsen's alternative is that the center influences the development or non-development of the periphery, depending on which will more benefit its capital accumulation.

Egypt was integrated to the capitalist world market through its cotton economy. In the early twentieth century the European economy was booming and in need of raw material; thus it pushed Egypt into intensifying commercial agriculture, mainly the production of cotton. However, capitalist industry did not emerge in Egypt until after World War I, due to the preservation of more traditional modes of production structured by local and international class relations. The growing dependence on foreign capital, and consequent foreign control, impeded the transition to capitalism. Moreover, there were few low-priced locally manufactured goods in Egypt as a result of the destruction of the guilds in the 1880's.

Egyptian industrialisation has emerged as a result of capital accumulation in the center. Finance capital sought investments with high return in the colonies; thus Egypt provided a location for the development of industry in addition to being a market and provider of raw material. Industrial development was pushed by

foreign investment and not by a local bourgeoisie fighting imperialism in order to reach its own goals, as is often assumed. Marxist analysis usually supports arguments that national bourgeoisies -- i.e., small capitalists involved in industrial development and by extension in opposition to imperialist interests -- are the first to join nationalist movements, while the large bourgeoisie (or a "comprador" made of large absentee landowners and traders) is tied to foreign capital. Consequently, antagonism arises between those two segments of the population. Amin's counterargument is that the national bourgeoisie forces imperialism into a new division of labour with which the comprador cooperate: if a national bourgeoisie develops it rapidly becomes linked to imperialism and the center economies.

According to Clawsen the analytic distinction between the types of bourgeoisie doesn't exist in the political economy of Egypt. Many large landholders invested in industry, finance, and banking -- the economic sectors which in the 1920's and 1930's were involved in the Egyptian process of industrialisation. Moreover, the national bourgeoisie encouraged foreign capital. Thus opposition between the two types of bourgeoisie was not an important factor because industry was financed by banks relying on investments from the landlord class. Accordingly, the nationalist movement did not draw on the national bourgeoisie or landlords but on the petty bourgeoisie. This group did not have the means to recover their losses when industry failed unlike the national bourgeoisie who could fall back on their alliance with landlords.

The strength of this article is that it presents a convincing alternative to one version of dependency theory. However, adding socio-cultural and political contexts to the analysis (as the author acknowledges the need for it) would have clarified the processes by which certain events and developments occured.

Daoud-Agha, A., Military Elites, Military-Led Social Movements and the Social Structures in Developing Countries: A Comparative Study of Egypt and Syria, Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, University of California, Berkeley (1970). Egypt Dissertation-Thesis General Development International Political Economy.

This doctoral dissertation is an interesting attempt toward comparative analysis of two Middle Eastern nations, Egypt and Syria. Both have been ruled over decades by military elites; however, each has gone in different directions. In Egypt, the military elite has been in office since 1952 and has consolidated both power and legitimacy among its constituency to the present. In Syria, a number of military groups have succeeded each other since 1949 without a successful consolidation of power or legitimacy.

The author attempts structural analysis of each society to explain differences between the respective military elites' careers and outcomes. The main assumption guiding the research is that both nations share similar cultural backgrounds (citations are given to literature supporting this assumption). Consequently, to understand the different strategies and outcomes of each military elite, it is necessary to investigate social structure in each society. While the procedure and methodology used seem to be most appropriate, there is an inconsistency in the hypothesis presented. Although the Middle East as a whole shares some cultural background, each society generates particular features of social organisation coherent with its ecology, economics, politics, religion and belief systems. Accordingly, a "common cultural background" may vary in interpretation and content from one geographical region to another. That is, variations in the integration of shared cultural background with local realities produce special structures which vary in content and organisation among Middle Eastern societies.

Daoud-Agha investigates significant aspects of social structure in each country, such as population growth, migration, urbanisation, industry, labour, and the military elite. However, the conclusions he draws from this investigation is that the "difference between the careers and outcomes of the military-led movements in both countries is <u>not</u> due to the differences in the two countries' respective social structures." That is, Daoud-Agha feels he failed in attempting to understand the differences in terms of a structural analysis: while social structure ought to determine individual and group action, according to structural analysis, in fact "no successful attempt has been made to empirically prove the

validity of its deterministic assumption in everyday life situations or isolate the mechanisms through which social structure determines individual and group action in the ongoing social process."

To supplement this analysis, the author presents alternative explanations for the differences in careers and outcomes of the two military elites. He mainly supports symbolic interactionism as a guiding concept and method. As social structure is a product of social action, he says, the differences between the two military elites have to be assessed in terms of social structure. This can be "empirically" pursued through observation of the "empirical social actions" of the two milirary elites -- that is, through observation of processes of interaction and analysis of the "objects" and situations of interaction as social actors perceive them.

The contribution of this thesis is twofold: the author attempts to compare the different outcomes of similar social groups in two societies which by tradition (in social science and in the political rhetoric of their leaders) are part of one cultural area; he also critiques the validity of the theory and methodology used in his analysis. That type of "autocritique" is seldom seen and thus deserves mention. Finally, Daoud-Agha came to realise that a structuralist analysis is by nature static and thus limits the possibility of grasping variations and interpretations in cultural experience; hence, it remains for someone else to pursue the question of how these two military elites have reached differing careers and outcomes.

El-Guindi, F., "Veiling Infitah with Muslim Ethics: Egypt's Contemporary Islamic Movement," Social Problems, 28(4), pp. 465-85 (1981). Egypt Article Human Basic Needs Women.

The present article is a study of a particular Islamic movement in Egypt, the "Mitdayyinun (religieux/religieuses)". The author asserts that Islamic movements are socio-religious phenomena; hence, "the generality of this phenomenon clearly prohibits treating the Islamic movement as unusual, culture specific or rare." Two theoretical orientations may be used to understand the case study: the ideational, which brings analysis close to native thoughts, and the Marxist. For the purposes of this article, the ideational model is used.

The Islamic Movement in Egypt has particularly expanded following the implementation of the "open door policy." They have interpreted Infitah as a unilateral and undifferentiated orientation towards the West; the resulting economic policies encouraged consumerism and materialism, which have influenced the socio-moral levels of local lifestyles. Moreover, these policies have generated new forms of inequality -- e.g., the wealthy entrepreneur, not always educated, and the university graduate, educated but unemployed. Corruption and immorality are perceived as ramifications of this inequality. Hence, today "Infitah seems to go hand in hand with inhilal ("societal disintegration")." During the Nasser era premises for social transformations were generated, as mass education was introduced and women were incorporated into education and the job market. The traditionally male-dominated public space became a place of conflict and harassment for women, as men reminded them that this was not their "natural" setting and they were intruders.

Women wearing Islamic dress (a common characteristic of the Movement) today are seen in Egyptian universities, schools, and working places. The common interpretation given to such social behavior has been in terms of a return to tradition, an uncorrupted self, a rejection of the new political and economic orientations, and a safeguard of cultural identity. The author's perceptive counterargument states that some characteristics of the Movement (e.g., dress and sexual seggregation in public) are not a return to tradition, but on the contrary a process through which women may pursue their participation and contribution to all spheres of socio-economic and political life. Islamic dress and other symbolism some women physically and morally

adopt have a twofold function: on one hand, they allow women to appropriate religious ethics that were before the prerogatives of men; and on the other, they permit women to conquer public space without harassment or annoyance from males, and particularly without the blame for provoking harassment. This movement then is not a symbol of social protest, but an articulation of modernity with tradition, or the integration of religion and secular institutions: "so it is in the name of Islam and guided by Muslim Ethics that this new Egyptian woman is liberating herself, and her male kin, by choosing to 'veil' so as not to be molested or stopped when invading public space with full force, as she is certainly is."

The article is a refreshing alternative and a contribution to the increasing literature on religious movements as they relate to political transformations in developing nations. The theoretical orientation, unlike most structuralist analysis, gives a cogent and sensible explanation for a social process that is far more complex than the common explanation given it today. The ability of the author to present p oples' perceptions of development and change, and how such perceptions articulate with their daily experience in view of various dilemmas produced by social transformations, shows how individuals make consistent decisions about socio-political situations that are inconsistent. These inconsistencies are the result of the "clash" between individual values and socio-political realities.

El-Sabbagh, Z., An Analysis of the Political Changes on Labour Unions in Egypt, Unpublished PhD Dissertation, North Texas State University (1977). Egypt Dissertation-Thesis General Development Intranational Political Economy.

The present thesis is a historical study of political changes and labour unions in Egypt between 1960-67; the conclusion is that the interaction between politics and labour unions was not beneficial to the latter. In 1960 Egypt officially adopted a socialist orientation; only one political party was allowed (the Arab Socialist Union), and a number of laws were introduced by the government affecting labour union functions and organisation, and industrial relations more broadly.

El-Sabbagh surveys the development of labour unions and legislation, political transformations from 1960-67, the impact of socialist laws on economic development, and the relations between labour unions and the government. According to the author, the Egyptian government reinforced its internal political power by directly interfering in labour relations, labour unions, and labour legislation. However, political decisions were made independently of labour unions; thus unions were bypassed for political support. The Arab Socialist Union appointed its own representatives in control of union representatives, undermining the latters' functions and legitimacy. The socialist laws applied by the government did not take into account economic conditions, social traditions, or cultural norms in the society. For instance, laws were implemented for workers to share profits of the industry in which they worked. The results were disastrous because these sums of money were spent on buying basic necessities by families who already had low wages, thus reducing national savings badly needed for investments. Again the laws implemented did not take into account the existing types of industrial relations. Management did not trust workers and vice versa; hence, the laws were rarely implemented. Furthermore management, often having personal connections with the leadership of the Arab Socialist Union, "reinterpreted" laws to its own benefit. Finally, the hierarchy of representation in industry included workers' representatives, union leaders, and Arab Socialist Union leaders: "These tripartite representative structures appealed to the same constituency and competed with each other for power and influence; this in turn, caused conflict and tension. The losers were the workers who became dissatisfied and, consequently, less productive."

The attempts to generate a socialist government and society failed: the goals of the ideology were not clearly implemented at the beginning; thus they were open to interpretation and manipulation by individuals in various spheres of power. Social laws may have been inspired by ideals to achieve social justice and wide political participation. However, the analogy of the empty vessel (imposing plans and projects on social groups while ignoring their cultural organisation which is already providing models for various decision-making) seems to illustrate the point quite well, and to explicate the shortcomings of the socialist venture from 1960 to 1967. Implementing new laws, regulations, and ideals may lead to confrontation and rejection, as well as to incorporation and change. Moreover, social groups do not automatically accept change until it has been tested; and if political force (oppression) can coerce people to follow certain decisions, it also generate its opposite--i.e., resistance, conflict, and alternative strategies.

Faksh, M., "The Chimera of Education for Development in Egypt: The Socio-Economic Roles of University Graduates," Middle East Studies, vol. 13 (May), pp. 229-40 (1977). Egypt Article Education Professional and Higher.

Developing nations often perceive the expansion of education as a prerequisite for economic development and national prosperity. According to this view, literacy eradicates ignorance, which in turn stimulates individuals to improve their lot and to pursue social and economic progress for their society. Although the author agrees that education and literacy are necessary elements for national development, he concludes that the benefits of educational programmes in Egypt have been minimised because such programs did not ultimately serve the purposes they were expected to. To assess the results the author focuses on the distributive and absorptive capacity of the Egyptian economy to indicate development and social change. This methodological frame presents an overview of national development in the various economic, social, and political spheres of social organisation.

While Egypt is in a process of rapid "development," two factors both hasten and slow down this process: a fast-growing population and limited natural resources. Using Lerner's model for the interaction of education and modernisation in developing countries, Faksh finds that in Egypt from 1950 on "education among other things, instills in the individual the mobile personality - a high capacity for identification with new aspects of life." Furthermore, statistical surveys initiated among schoolgoers during the 50's and 60's indicate that they had increasing job expectations for themselves and their future spouses. In the same period the Egyptian government pushed for rapid industrialisation and increased the investment and control of the public sector at the expense of the private sector. Consequently, the government became the main job provider.

While the number of university graduates increased in total numbers, it actually outgrew the real capacity for job absorption in the various sectors of the economy. While the public sector was the only job provider, people also had high expectations in that sector: not only was the government a channel toward jobs and careers but it was the only one. Hence, the government was in a position where it had to create jobs to disguise unemployment, but the individuals in those jobs did not use the skills they assumingly had learned. Adding to

problems of high job expectations among the urban population was the continuous migration of rural population to the city, which overburdened the already crowded job market.

According to the author, education in the rural areas has had a considerable impact on the structural organisation of villages. With higher social and economic expectations in mind, people migrated to cities. Although it is plausible that education in villages has influenced cultural beliefs and socio-economic expectations, it seems that the precarious economic situation of the Egyptian countryside contributes more to the migratory trend. It would be interesting to survey the approximate number of migrants to large cities and to assess their age ranges, the level of education for each age group, and the proportion of migrants who enroll in educational programmes as compared to those who join the job market (and in which sector of the economy they join).

In view of the low ratio of jobs to university graduates, the author raises two problems. First, the bulk of graduates are in disciplines -- art, law, commerce -- for which there are not many jobs and thus become "improductive and destabilising unemployables." Second, there is an increasing need for graduate students in scientific disciplines -- mainly technicians. It is particularly in this area that the government failed most in providing what was necessary to all domains of the industrial sector. Most institutes are inadequately organised for the industrial needs of the country, and "no effective formal training programme for such personnel exists today."

Even more worrying is the general consensus concerning the low level of competence among most graduates. This criticism was addressed in an annual report by the Head of the Civil Service Commission which indicates that -- besides government inability to provide "real" jobs and to meet individuals' expectations at the structural level, the educational system and curricula are inadequate and dysfunctional. The author presents a few factors contributing to this particular discrepancy -- for instance, reliance on rote memory and presentation of facts with no attempt to make connections between them, overcrowding and understaffing of classes, etc. As for the first point, "rote memory" refers to reliance on discipline and compliance in the classroom and in the educational environment in general; this is not particular to the school or university setting but represents general cultural beliefs and expectations within the larger social organi-

sation, the family, and the working environment. As for the understaffing and overcrowding of classrooms, the root of the problem seems to be an inadequate use of resources, particularly in light of statistics showing that the field of education produces among the highest percentages of graduates in the country.

One of the recommendations of the author is to increase the technical training of graduates because this is where the need of the economy lies. If the economy provides real jobs, it will reduce the political instability resulting from individuals' rising expectations (Lerner's model) for status and security without opportunities to pursue these goals.

Hammam, M., Women Workers and the Practice of Freedom as Education: The Egyptian Experience, Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Kansas (1977). Egypt Dissertation-Thesis Basic Human Needs Status of Women.

The present study investigates education as the practice of freedom: using Paulo Freire's model, Hammam says that dominant themes mark particular epochs which are "characterised by a complex of ideas and concepts, hopes, and challenges in dialectical interaction with their opposites, striving towards plenitude." The epoch covered by the present research is marked by the theme of domination and its opposite, liberation. Hence, society is organised into oppressors and oppressed; and education becomes a process by which individuals develop a consciousness, leading to liberation. To achieve that consciousness, education must be political in its broader sense; that is, the "oppressed" should actively set the format and context of "learning." On another level, the author compares this kind of formal education process with informal, mass-based, social liberation movements.

Focusing on Egypt, the author attempts to localise manifestations of the themes of domination and liberation in terms of a transition from feudalism to industrial and agricultural capitalism. Mohamed Ali's era was the first transitional stage in the attempt to move from feudalism to modernity. In economic terms this meant a transition from feudal to industrial production; in political and social terms it meant the creation of a state apparatus and the centralisation of power, with the institution of secular education to train people to function in the state bureaucracy. The process of modernisation from 1816 -78 caused the development of middle and working classes. In that historical context women were transformed as well: they were already participating in commodity production in home industries; increasingly they were "drawn into fatory work by the state monopolies." Moreover, the modern school system (mainly nursing schools) drew in women. Similarly, the author states that slave women, who were emancipated during that epoch, could "choose" -- unlike women in other social categories -- to become wage earners.

Secular education provided various strata of the Egyptian society with themes to vocalise their liberation from feudalism and foreign oppression. While the bourgeoisie "struggled" for liberation from feudalism, it increasingly sought to establish its own forms of domination over others in socio-economic terms

revolutionised the instruments of production to increase the rate of exploitation of labour, which was its source of profit. An outgrowth of the liberation of the bourgeoisie was thus the development of a modern proletariat "stripped of all ownership of either the instruments or the products of their labour." Although each social group perceived the process of national liberation in terms of its respective socio-political realities, the overall theme of national liberation unified all towards that goal. The following years saw the reshaping of the oppressor/oppressed dichotomy within a national context.

For the bourgeoisie, liberation meant control over home markets and consequent ventures on the international one as a valid competitor to other bourgeoisies. Both goals were not attained because of international control over both national and international markets and economies. Similarly, the Egyptian proletariat failed in its venture towards liberation. While it had a history of honourable political consciousness and struggle, the movement was weakened by internal conflicts and problems of organisation; the Communist party, which normally represented the leadership of the proletariat, sought alliances with various political parties instead of "striking roots in the working class." The third social category involved in this process of liberation was women. They have been exposed to a dual type of domination by males -- one inherited "from the division of labour according to sex," and the other contained in Islamic laws. The concept of women's liberation had roots in the overall movement for national liberation; moreover, it was part of the cultural ideology of class transformation. Again there was heterogeneity in perceptions of liberation and socio-economic realities, as different goals and strategies were pursued by women in different class categories. In addition, speakers for women's liberation movements laid down goals that were cogent with the "transitional phase" of Egypt's entrance into a capitalist phase, both locally and internationally.

In light of these political transformations both at state and individual levels, the author explains when formal education not lead to the practice of freedom. As long as the state holds arbitrary power in a society divided

into oppressor/oppressed classes, and the proletariat has no access to power, freedom can occur only in the realm of subversion.

The present thesis uses a Marxist orientation to unravel fundamental dialectical problems and to articulate them in political and existential terms. However, the solutions advocated only add to the vast literature covering the subject of oppression and liberation. It is clear that unified action by various social groups with different interests may lead to national liberation, but once that stage is passed old modes of oppression reemerge. Identifying the nature and processes of oppression may initiate movement towards the generation of collective consciousness, but collective actions, in addition to political ideology, are needed to guide formal education toward a true practice of freedom.

Hinnebusch, R., "Egypt Under Sadat: Elites, Power Structure and Political Change in a Post-Populist State," Social Problems, vol.28 (Apr), pp. 442-64 (1981). Egypt Article General Development Intranational Political Economy

In this article the author intends to show the transformation of the political structure of Egypt from Nasser's authoritarian and national-populist state to Sadat's post-populist regime.

After the 1952 revolution, an emerging middle class seized the political power traditionally held by the upper class. This middle class became an active proponent for an independent modernising state, where power and wealth would be redistributed more evenly among the various classes of society. These ideals generated broad support from the lower classes; in reality, however, political power and authority rested in the hands of a "charismatic" leader and a military elite. Consequently, control was exerted through an authoritarian bureaucracy whose ramifications touched all aspects of socio-economic and political life. From 1971 on, Sadat's political venture -- mainly the "open door" policy and the orientation both politically and economically towards the West -- somewhat changed the "social structure of the society."

The author presents two theoretical concepts on political development which can help explain the political transformations in Egypt over the past decade. In a system characterized by pluralisation and absorption, the free rise of elites through competition for mass support is encouraged by the leadership; consequently, the absorptive and representative capacity of the political system expands and ultimately all the "various socio-political forces are incorporated into it as participants." The second model is based on conservatisation and exclusion. In that system "diffusion of power" is resisted, instead of encouraged, by the political elite. This elite tends to dissociate itself from the populist ideology it originally pursued and exclusively seeks its own interests. It shifts towards a conservative orientation: "a gradual social transformation of the elite, from a previously deprived 'new middle class' in conflict with the traditional establishment, into a new bourgeoisie of wealth and power defending the status quo from rising mass demand and advancing its interests through the reintegration into the world capitalist system."

While the new leadership had the same structural organisation as the old one -- the president as the only source of "major policy or ideological innovation" and of personalised power -- the content of Sadat's personalised power differed from Nasser's. Sadat stressed a "traditional, patriarchal" image of the nation state, thus linking his power into the values of authority and unilateral control. In other words, he tolerated liberalisation towards an elite which would accept his leadership; at the same time the traditional/patriarchal image curtailed a "significant opening up of the political system" to lower classes in the society. Transformations in society can result from a number of changes directly or indirectly encouraged by a political leader. In the present case this happened, first, as the military elite became more conservative -- its demilitarisation ideologically and socio-economically -- and second, as the bourgeoisie slowly dismissed originally nationalist ideologies and increasingly became lost in intra-elite conflicts, competing for the "subordination" of national to international capital. While Sadat relaxed his control over society, encouraging bourgeois involvement in the state, he nevertheless refrained from a true pluralisation of power (and thus mass support and mobilisation) by "creating" a multiparty system. This seeming liberalisation of the political scene was in fact a compromise in which relative political leverage was accorded to the bourgeoisie in return for legitimation of the leader without mass mobilisation. These types of rapport in the political sphere were best established through "uninstitutionalised" networks; consequently, it was very difficult to identify or oppose them systematically.

A final more general point made by the author is that this authoritarian/conservative and "pluralistic" political system is not particular to Egypt but manifested in many Third World nations. It is generated by interrelations between an emerging bourgeoisie and the leadership in power (usually led by the military), with the former aiming for increased integration of the national economy into the international system, and the latter concerned with legitimation of its power and authority, while the masses are kept subordinate.

Howard-Merriam, K., "Women, Education, and the Professions in Egypt," Comparative Education Review, vol. 23 (Jan), pp. 256-70 (1979). Egypt Article Education Ed-Other.

The present article is based on the theoretical assumption that education performs two roles. First, it is a process through which individuals "learn" to function appropriately in the "modern world" and, consequently, to change their attitudes about some traditional socio-cultural concepts (family, kinship, etc.). And second, education facilitates social mobility.

In the case of Egypt, education for women has been part of a wider program actively implemented by the government since 1952, especially in higher education. Concurrently, employment policies have sustained the effort to "feminize the professions and have launched a movement for social change in the activities of both men and women." While government policies have thus encouraged women's participation in national development, socio-cultural values and norms, in addition to economic practices, have often curtailed or slowed these policies and still influence decision-making about education and employment.

Before the 1952 revolution Egypt followed a restrictive education policy: "educate only those who can be absorbed easily by a government of limited resources, with due regard for the cultural prescriptions of the country." Since the revolution the primary goal has been to reduce social inequality between rich and poor, and between urban and rural areas, leading to an effort to universalise education. Thus, concern about women's education was not a primary goal as much as one aspect among others in the direction of social justice. This was further illustrated by granting women the right to vote in 1956 and legislating equal pay for equal work performed by either men or women.

Urban women were the first to benefit from efforts to broaden education; rural women have been more constrained by cultural norms. However, the massive construction of schools and universities in rural regions has helped increase the enrollment of both men and women, particularly that of women who would not move to urban areas for education because of cultural pressures. Between 1960 and 1974 women's enrollment increased from 9 to 28 per cent at the secondary level, and from 1.68 to 7.40 per cent at the higher (university/institute) level.

Significantly, women predominantly enroll in scientific fields; socio-cultural and economic factors are perceived as the major reasons for this trend. The ideology of the new regime emphasised scientific transformations of the social structure, so women who entered scientific fields stood a higher chance of benefiting from this ideology and increasing their economic opportunities.

Government educational programs have not always been systematically updated and followed. Priority has often gone to agricultural reforms and industrial investments; hence, understaffing, class overcrowding, and weakened curricula content have often burdened the achievement of educational legislation. In terms of occupational field, the author notes that the majority of women work in professional groups rather than administrative/executive groups. Usually women have top executive positions in jobs traditionally held by women (like education) or in new fields (like audio-visual communication), where male predominance has not yet been established. The low participation of women in executive positions of the government may be explained in terms of the structure and nature of the jobs, which apparently lack provisions for women with family priorities. Also, some jobs require regional movement as part of the promotion systems and, again, women who have family responsibilities are less able to move freely.

The present article has shown interconnections among various factors as they have influenced the education of women in Egypt. Political ideology and cultural values have often clashed; however, economic conditions have "forced" individuals to reconsider their cultural values against pressing realities. Moreover, the article shows shortcomings of educational policies in the global context of national priorities, which in turn puts women's issues in a wider perspective. A particularly interesting note is the distribution of women in professions: while they tend to work more in "traditional" areas than in others, in new fields they participate in full force with men. This indicates that women's increasing participation in new jobs may ultimately lead to their participation in a broader spectrum of professions.

Khalifa, A., "Rural-Urban Fertility Differences and Trends in Egypt, 1930-70," in Women's Status and Fertility in the Muslim World," ed. J. Allman, pp. 77-94, Praeger, New York (1978). Egypt Article Population Family Planning.

The standard demographic explanation of population growth postulates that a primary phase is characterised by declining death rates while birth rates remain high; then a phase follows when population growth decreases almost to the rate of deaths; and finally an "equilibrium" state is reached. The theoretical assumption underlying the present study is that social structure is the main cause for fertility differences between rural and urban areas. Consequently, changes in social structure must affect fertility trends. According to the author, one process of change in social structure is urbanisation: urban life affects individual belief systems, attitudes, and socio-economic priorities; in turn these experiential/existential changes affect perceptions and behavior about fertility. However, in the case of developing nations, "geographic mobility from the rural to the urban doesn't bring about any appreciable social mobility and the way of life of the new arrivals in the city remains 'rural' for a long time." Hence, urbanisation might not automatically entail a significant difference in fertility level.

The present study is divided into two major parts -- from the turn of the twentieth century to the mid 1940's, and from then until 1970. The period 1900-40 was characterised by higher birth rates in rural areas than in urban ones; this is assumed to be the result of the war (no explanation is given for this observation). Following World War II, urban fertility increased gradually, reaching a peak by 1955 and then starting a slight downward movement, while rural fertility remained near its prewar rate. Hence, very little differential is seen between rural and urban birth rates when using censuses of 1947 and 1960. The reason behind this situation is that a large proportion of the urban population had rural roots, and the urban milieu carried little influence on them. In contrast, from 1960 on the fertility rate slowly and persistently decreased in urban areas, widening the gap between them and rural areas. Although assessement of the fertility decline has not been made, the author infers that population policies and family planning probably contributed to this trend, along with "socio-economic changes" (not explained in the article) and the 1967 war. An analysis of fertility rates by age of mother shows that, again, rural rates are higher than urban ones: "urban fertility reaches its peak in the age group 25-29, whereas it peaks in the age group 30-34 in the rural areas."

While Egyptian data recording fertility trends go back quite far, a number of factors should be kept in mind about their validity. For instance, in the rural areas under-reporting of births occured in the early censuses because of a lack of clinics and medical facilities available to peasants. Registration of girls was not always observed, so the ratio of females to males is much higher in urban areas. Finally, infants who died right after birth are often not reported. Hence these omissions tend to change slightly the overall estimate of rural-urban differences in fertility. In the case of the data on urban fertility, some caution is also to be observed: for instance, with the increased migratory movement towards major cities, an increase in fertility rate is observed. However, many recent migrants tend to return to their villages to give birth, increasing rural birth percentages, while in fact they usually return to the city to live. On the other hand, infants born in large hospitals (which are located only in large cities) are automatically registered in the urban sector.

In conclusion, the author believes that, although population growth has been moderating only slowly, a trend has started in that direction, particularly in urban areas. Thus the development of an "urban mentality," combined with a high rate of rural migration, set the scene for a definite reduction of population fertility.

This short essay is interesting for its combination of statistical data and socio-cultural analysis. For instance, it clarifies trends in population increase or decrease by looking at aspects of migration and the effects they have on the validity of surveys.

Korany, B., Social Change, Charisma and International Behaviour: Toward a Theory of Foreign Policy-Making in the Third World, A.W. Sijthoff, Leiden (1976). Egypt Book General Development International Political Economy Science Social.

The present book focuses on the foreign policy of non-alignment in the Third World. Very little of a systematic nature has been written on the subject, whether by outsiders or members of the non-aligned movement nations. Hence, this study is a welcome addition to theories of international relations. The author contends that analysis of foreign policies of underdeveloped countries is still at the level of theory-building. Thus in the present research he uses two assumptions alternatively: the "interchangability" assumption (where all actors are interchangeable), and the "small-state-as-pawn" assumption (where big powers take advantage of smaller ones).

Egypt's non-alignment carries significant nationalistic overtones, indicative of this politico-historical context. Arab nationalism, on the one hand, and the local struggle for national independence, on the other, have affected attitudes the Egyptian leadership have had towards international conflicts: "Egyptian non-alignment... was waged as a continuation of the struggle for national liberation The exercise of positive neutralism was a nationalistic assertion of the right to self determination andfreedom of orientation during its difficult period of economic development and social modernization." The neutralist attitude has old political antecedents: at the turn of the century the slogan "Egypt for Egyptians" underscored the neutral role the nation's leaders wanted to assume during the Italian invasion of Libya. After the Second World War, Egypt was more concerned with issues such as national independence or the war in Palestine than with the ideological struggle generated by the Cold War. This displayed pragmatism and followed an evolutionary trend.

In a primary phase of its evolution Egypt's non-alignment was dependent on the West; later, starting in 1955, a "corrective" process took place in which Egypt initiated a "rapprochement" with the Eastern bloc. This trend was due to the deterioration of relations with France and Britain after the Suez attack, and a virtual American boycott under the aegis of Dulles. A third phase witnessed a relative relaxation of tension between Egypt and Western powers coinciding with the conflict, at the regional level, of Arab nationalism and Communism. After the 1967 war, Egypt's non-alignment took new directions. In terms of

international behaviour, it became conspicuously silent when Warsaw Pact troops entered Czechoslovakia. This was indicative of Egypt's growing alliance and dependence on the Soviet Union for its military apparatus. Nasser evoked "the dictates of necessity and the simple instinct of self-preservation to explain the evolution of his non-alignment after 1967."

Hence, Egyptian non-alignment was characterised by pragmatism and flexibility. Its main objective was to keep Egypt "diplomatically as free as possible from prior commitment to either East or West, so that all issues could be judged on their own merits, rather than as they fitted into one or other of the superpowers' schemes."

Mabro, R. and S. Radwan, The Industrialisation of Egypt 1939-1973: Policy and Performance, Oxford University Press, London (1976). Egypt Book Industry Indus-Other General Development Intranational Political Economy.

The purpose of the present book is to understand the reasons for Egypt's inability to build a stable industrial sector until the 1950's. To assess the various attempts at industrialisation, the authors take a historical perspective of Egypt's industrial development between 1838 and 1973. Economic and financial analysis is used to delineate historical periods and provide evidence explaining factors influencing industrial development and growth in particular directions.

The book is divided into four nonsequential parts. It starts with a survey of Mohamed Ali's era and early efforts towards industrialisation, including information on the state of the economy and policy implementations for industrial productivity during that particular period. Then the period 1 38-1970 is covered, focusing on economic performance. Third, production and demand in the Egyptian economy are dealt with in terms of labour, capital, techniques of production, and output. Finally, the last section of the book surveys the policies concerning import substitutions and import dependence; the last two sections cover the era starting after World War I to 1973.

The move towards industrialisation in Egypt under Mohamed Ali has been analysed in terms of financial gain and military goals. Although it is correct that Mohamed Ali encouraged military industry, he nonetheless intended to create a diversified and state-owned industrial sector, in an attempt to move Egypt towards independence and self-sufficiency. By encouraging local production of goods and manufactures otherwise imported, Mohamed Ali was complementing a military build-up which would ensure stability and independence for the country.

Numerous arguments have been put forward to explain the failure of this industrial venture. While certain industries were successful, others failed because they were unable to compete with imported products in quality and price. Natural resources available locally, labour shortages, and a corrupt administration also seriously hampered economic development. However, these factors were not sufficient to produce economic failure elsewhere, so the authors acknowledge that a combination of various socio-economic and political factors caused the

early industrial collapse. Mohamed Ali encouraged the development of state industry; however, he was unable to organise the state agencies necessary for the efficient functioning of the new economic order. As a result, strong reliance on foreign investments curtailed national independence and self-sufficiency at a time when foreign powers were at the height of their expansion. Moreover, the Anglo-Turkish Treaty (European privileges, and no state monopoly) was a further step towards Egypt's dependence on foreign powers.

During the period from 1850 until the end of World War I, Egypt became an export-oriented state whose economy was based on agriculture and whose developing industries derived only from the agricultural sector. Export profits were used for consumption goods, transferred abroad (most often to pay the public debt), or reinvested in similar industries and agricultural schemes. What is noteworthy is the pattern of ownership and investment of the local bourgeoisie: "neither government securities nor bank deposits can be regarded as real investment alternatives, and ...the real choice open to Egyptian investors was between rural land, urban property and company shares." According to the authors, Egyptian investors persisted in this pattern of investment for three reasons. First, from the 19th century on, the Egyptian bourgeoisie relied almost exclusively on landownership. Second, foreigners who invested in industry had privileged treatment and better connections with foreign sources of finance and technology. And third, particular policy implementations encouraged the production and export of cotton exclusively.

Starting in the late 1920's, Egypt's economic system relied on free entreprise, and policy frameworks reflected this direction. Tariffs and control over imports encouraged investment in local industries to replace imported products. By raising tariffs the government protected the already existing industries -- for sugar, coarse yarn, and rubber shoes, among others. Similarly, in the early 1950's before the revolution, tariffs were reduced or exempted on machinery to encourage investment in that direction. The authors examine patterns of ownership to assess the direction of investment and shifts in structure and organisation of industry. Before the revolution, the public sector was restrictied to a few industries, such as oil refineries or the government press; afterwards, the state increased its ownership particularly

during the early 1960's following the nationalisation of the private sector. While public ownership is predominant in industries employing 500 people or more, it considerably decreases in entreprises hiring 10-49 people. This variation in the structure of employment is also reflected in the types of manufactures predominant in each sector; hence, the private sector becomes a "residual sector" controlling small-scale industries not covered by the public sector. Since 1967 there has been an increasing interaction between the two sectors, particularly in the subcontracting area. This interaction, in which "a small capitalist sector endowed with monopoly power has been able to make very large profits from operations with public entreprise," has been criticised because it often has led to graft and corruption. Besides the structure of ownership, the organization of the industry is significant. Between the 1930's and 1967, the textile industry remained the major employer and "adder of value," even though attempts were made to shift towards industries not producing consumer goods.

As a part of their overall study of economic structure and development, the authors investigate the role and contributions of Egyptian small-scale manufacturing. The assumption is that large industry forms the essential component of the economy; around it revolve a whole series of smaller industries dependent on it in terms of raw material. The authors stress the importance of this smaller sector of the industry as a provider of employment, goods, and services in the wider economic system. However, as this sector is often private and on the "periphery" of core industries, very little statistical data or formal records are available for a real evaluation of the role and contribution of this type of industry.

Labour policies until 1930 were very flexible; for instance, children under the age of nine were hired in the textile industry, and women worked ten to fourteen hours a day. By 1938 laws were "reinforced," prohibiting child labour and fixing working hours for both women and men at nine to ten hours a day. After World War II the rate of labour productivity steadily increased until 1962, which can be explained by three factors: "considerable rises in capital intensity," the changes in industrial structure explained earlier, and the input of large amounts of skilled labour previously in the "allied military establishment." After 1962 the rate of labour productivity declined; both economic policies and socialist ideology were held responsible

for that trend. The reduction of working hours per week and limitations on overtime generated discontent among worker, who saw themselves deprived of a substantial complement to their salaries. Imports of raw material and other goods for industry became irregular after 1963, thus periods of stagnation (keeping labour on the payroll but not working) alternated with periods of over-production. Furthermore, the system of "erratic" importations and distribution led to labour-intensive processes: "if a conveyor belt is out of operation for six months because a spare part is missing, one solution is to use temporarily a gang of workers to perform the same task." While socialist ideology prompted the improvement of workers' conditions and rights, deterioration of "industrial discipline" (Arab Socialist Union tendencies to arbitrarily side with workers in complaints against management) affected labour productivity.

High tariffs and government controls were an attempt to encourage local manufacture of products usually imported. But the development of a particular type of local production may entail the import of "capital goods" and raw material. For instance, during the 1940's Egypt was self-sufficient in basic consumer goods while totally dependent on imports for intermediate industries (transport equipment). As for export policies, the Egyptian economy overall has not become more export-oriented: with the increase of manufactured goods, it replaced export of raw material with those of finished goods. For example, textiles replaced raw cotton as the textile industry became the predominant source of export.

In conclusion, what the authors attempted to show in the book is threefold: how attempts at industrialisation relate to the general state of underdevelopment in Egypt; how and if industrialisation contributed to any development; and finally, what the various types of economic system (and economic ideology) were at particular stages of industrial development. The analysis pursued is appropriate and significant because the authors include political and social elements as central processes determining development and industrialisation. However, those factors are merely presented or stated as such without much explanation for their particular orientation or how they articulate with particular historical contexts. Hence, when Egyptian economic performance is assessed, we get the impression that it was successful at some points and failed at others, but it could have been worse. While we acknowledge the breath of the research and the problems of collecting "accurate" and reliable data in a "developing" country, we do not see the need for an "apologetic" tone in the final analysis.

Richards, A., Egypt's Agricultural Development 1800-1980: Technical and Social Change, Westview Press, Boulder, CO (1982). Egypt Book General Development Intranational Political Economy Science Social.

The present book is an analysis of the Egyptian experience in agricultural development from 1800 to 1980. It emphasises the interrelations between government policies and implementations, on one hand, and social organisation and power relations in the countryside, on the other. Furthermore, it links local socio-economic and political processes to international power relations.

While agriculture was being modernised in Egypt during the nineteenth century, changes in the social structure of the countryside were undermining this process. The agricultural transformations included introduction of perennial irrigation (and resulting increases in production) and introduction of new crops. Following land reclamation, arable land "more than doubled," and a slow but regular population increase contributed to farm output. However, this process of development had severe repercussions for the social organisation of the countryside and, as the author rightly notes, "the creation of a landless class was an integral part of Egypt's incorporation into the world market as a cotton exporter." Measures such as increasing land taxes to finance various agricultural projects and meet foreign debt, plus rising rural private property, contributed to the creation of a landless peasant class. In the meanwhile, land formerly theirs circulated among rich landowners, moneylenders, and other rural notables. Even within this group, however, ownership and access to resources and financial assets were unequally distributed; for instance, moneylenders and rural notables owned land less frequently and in smaller amounts than absentee landlords did.

These social transformations contributed to political unrest and popular upheaval, especially in rural areas. The 'Urabi revolt of 1882 is an illustration of the types of relationship between events in rural and urban areas. Unrest in the villages became a topic for rhetorical comment among the group organising the revolt -- namely, members of the urban middle class and some rural notables. Their main grievance was towards the ruling class, predominantly Turkish/Egyptian, who controlled most key positions in the government and hindered social advancement for the native Egyptian bourgeoisie, whether in the army or the state bureaucracy. While the 'Urabi group drew on all these grievances, the landless peasantry did not actively participate in the 'Urabi movement; rather they organised in small

raiding groups covering their own villages or small regions.

By the late 1880's the land tenure system was predominantly organised in terms of ezbah (large estates hiring wage labourer) and smaller plots leased to small peasants (or intermediaries who in turn would rent the land to small peasants). Two types of agricultural technique developed: the three-year rotation, predominant in the ezbah (involving greater resources and knowledge, information about techniques, etc.); and the two-year rotation among small farmholders, who had an unequal access to resources because of their continuous indebtness. These two types of agricultural production sharpened distinctions between the two social classes. Technological transformations obviously increased both input and output for the large estates, while pushing small peasants into debt and ultimately land loss. A third category of small peasants were temporarily able to get by with the two-year rotation and without getting into debt; however, they were unable to sustain their socio-economic standard for long and during the early 1900's started to decline. Thus from the late 1880's until the 1920's a sharply unequal distribution of income among various strata of landowners took place, with the land tenure system and technological innovations -- as imposed by the British administration -- as prime factors contributing to this social "reshuffling" of the rural population. Similarly, the technological transformations also affected the productivity of land; while the rotation systems increased output, they also increased pests and reduced land fertility. The period 1928-1939 was mostly one in which "much of the investment in the agricultural sector... was necessary to repair damage already done to soil fertility."

The author describes the period 1920-1940 as being among the "grimmest" in the history of the Egyptian countryside. Efforts to increase output (through a better drainage system, imports of fertilisers, and increase of farm animals) did not restore the main damage, which was the decrease of land output or the production of high quality land. The only advantage of all the technical transformations was that they kept the demand for labour high enough to stay apace of regular population increase. In terms of distribution, the gap kept growing between, on the one hand, the landless/poor, and moneylenders (who fed on them) and rich peasants, on the other. Thus by 1940 rural Egypt was composed of two classes: the rich -- large landowners and moneylenders -- and the poor -- the small

peasants, the "ezbah workers and the tarahil labourers were mired in the 'swamps of poverty, or ignorance and of endemic disease' as the burden of declining or stagnant agricultural output per capita weighed heavily on their shoulders."

From 1950 on, and especially under the leadership of Nasser's revolution, new social and economic transformations took place in the countryside. On the social level, land was distributed equally to small and poor peasants, and large land holders were eliminated. However, the rich peasants and moneylenders kept strengthening their positions by manipulating state cooperatives for their own benefit, and the landless improved their situation only slightly, especially after the state increased public works to replace jobs lost through farm mechanisation. Furthermore, the continuous demand for labour outside agriculture during the 1970's was perceived as a "blessing" for the class of landless peasants. However, the author contends that this trend, in which excess rural labour is "absorbed" outside of the rural sector, is a result of the relation between the Egyptian rural political economy and the international economic order. Consequently, the current situation is a precarious one because it is not under local control.

Covering a span of almost two centuries in Egyptian agricultural development, the author presents four variables which are constant in the "problematic" of agricultural development: population growth, ecological difficulties, poverty, and inequality. At some points in Egyptian history some variables may have improved, as with the social efforts under Nasser's regime, or with the economic "liberalisation" under Sadat. However, similar to many Third World countries, the consequences of Egypt's attempts at agricultural development reflect the interconnectedness of both local and international factors. Social structure, economic transformation, and political decisions have been closely asssociated with the international economy. External political pressures have influenced some local political procedures; on the other hand, the nature of social relations in Egypt have pushed particular socio-economic directions, reflecting the nature and processes by which power relations are articulated. That is, local socio-political relations have affected the power positions of various social groups in terms of political and economic domination and oppression.

Sandbach, F., "Preventing Schistosomiasis: A Critical Assessement of Present Policy," Social Science and Medicine, vol. 9, No. 10 (October, 1975).
Egypt Article Health Preventive Care

The present article focuses on a major health problem in Egypt with serious socio-cultural and economic ramifications. Schistosomiasis is a parasitic disease which develops and spread through snails as intermediate aquatic hosts. The disease has plagued the Egyptian countryside for generations; its effect is quite debilitating and usually leads to death if not treated at an early stage. Schistosomiasis has spread more rapidly with economic development. The introduction of new agricultural schemes and large-scale irrigation projects allowed not only "an increase in permanent habitats for the intermediate snail host, but have also caused a great number of people employed in rural industries to come in contact with infected water and so maintain the transmission of the parasite." Moreover, working conditions have long been correlated to disease prevalence among various classes of the population. The poor, both men and women, who work in irrigated fields have a higher prevalence of the disease; among the middle class the disease occurence is higher among men, who participate more in the labour force, than among women; and finally, the well-to-do classes don't usually get the disease.

Various attempts at dealing with the disease have been somewhat successful. However, the author believes that schistosomiasis has not been dealt with properly because often it has been the realm of specialists who focused research and remedies on only one or two aspects of the problem. For instance, attempts have been made at great cost to eradicate the host snail, while the hygiene, health, and nutrition of the exposed population are still precarious. Also, medical treatments have been confined to curative procedures, rather than preventive ones. Unlike smallpox, where vaccines have been discovered and massively used, no specific antidote has been found for schitosomiasis, so a compound of drugs and intensive chemotherapy is used to treat the disease in its early stages.

Educating the population exposed to the disease is as important as educating the health care personnel in contact with the population. It is necessary to sensitise personnel about the socio-cultural beliefs and economic realities of the people at risk to realise effective projects for fighting the disease. Good intentions and large investments of money in projects are not

sufficient. Rather, health projects must include the human,environmental, and medical factors as active elements in the treatment procedure.

Springborg, R., "Professional Syndicates in Egyptian Politics, 1952-1970," International Journal of Middle East Studies, vol. 9, pp. 275-95 (1978).
Egypt Article General Development Social Organisation and Structure.

The goal of the present article is twofold. While the author studies professional syndicates, their role and structure within the post-revolution era, he deplores a methodological discrepancy often found in the analysis of Egyptian policy structures. Springborg notes that Egyptian politics are more often uninstitutionalised and unincorporated than otherwise; therefore, the use of an institutional analysis frame doesn't give an accurate account and explanation about the political reality.

The case presented to support the above argument deals with the professional syndicates between 1952 and 1970. Springborg explains that formal institutions provide opportunities for social mobility through informal personal relationships and networks. These networks are loose in terms of their organisation and the power shifts they generate or reflect. Hence, it is the informal processes which direct the orientations of formal institutions. The Egyptian professional syndicates are based on yearly elections: an assembly elects a board of directors whose policies and decision-making are apparently derived from the guidelines of this assembly. However, what has happened since 1952 is that the government has suppressed yearly meetings and elections, then appointed officials to syndicates without prior consultation with the general assemblies. Springborg claims that the use of unconstitutional direct control over the syndicates shows the new government was not ready to face criticism or divergence in opinions from what it considered to be the most articulate portion of the population. Moreover, during the first years of the post-revolution era, the government was establishing its legitimacy; therefore it was not in a position to provide alternatives and solutions to demands made by the syndicates. Why didn't the syndicates react to the obvious violation of the constitution? The informal structure of syndicates is generally composed of a "nuclear" group of political elite, whom over the years have developed strong personal networks among each other, and the "periphery" (members in provinces), who provide significant absentee support and in turn receive favors from the political core of the syndicates.

The Egyptian government oriented its revolutionary ideology towards the mobilisation of peasants and workers; Nasser disliked and distrusted professional syndicates because he associated them with the pre-revolution regime and bourgeoisie. However, the left st members of the mass organisation established by the government (the Arab Socialist Union) realised quite early that the leadership of the syndicates, with their strong networks, could be used to draw in a larger membership. Hence, the ASU attempted to reorient the political core of the syndicates within the framework of revolutionary ideology. Henceforth, not only did the government align itself with groups which at times represented a strong opposition, but also it undermined their power by merging the syndicates into the ASU, by opening membership to non-professionals, and by decentralisation.

The 1967 war and its aftermath generated discontent and distrust among the population towards major formal political institutions. Moreover, the continuous shifts in power relations among core political elites during Nasser's last few years and Sadat's early years of power consolidation decreased the pressure on the syndicates. However, this relative liberalisation in the Egyptian political scene did not produce a strengthening of the syndicates or a reorganisation of the bargaining power they carried.

Springborg's article is valuable because he shows how two formal institutions interacted (through various formal and informal processes) during the period of consolidation of the new regime on particular ideological bases. However, we are left with only one side of the picture: it seems that a cultural analysis of the formal and informal organisation of the Egyptian polity is necessary to give an accurate understanding of its functioning.

Tucker, J., "Egyptian Women in the Work Force: A Historical Survey," MERIP Reports, 50, pp. 3-10 (1976). Egypt Article Basic Human Needs Women

In the present article the author attempts to demonstrate two hypotheses. First, Tucker wants to show how industrialisation in Egypt under a capitalist system generated a vertical differentiation of work roles between males and females. Second, she demonstrates how industrialisation has deflated home production -- a predominantly female activity -- without shifting women into unskilled, cheap labour. This later point, for instance, was the case in Europe during the early stages of industrialisation. In contrast, the process in Egypt has kept women out of both "private" and "public" spheres of production, furthering their isolation.

In order to demonstrate her points, Tucker uses contemporary quantitative data on women's participation in both the rural and the urban labour forces of Egypt; then she looks at historical periods considered determinant to the industrial development of the country and assesses the roles and types of participation women have had in the labour force.

The use of statistical records on women in the labour force becomes quickly problematic. For instance, i the case of the agricultural sector, records show that 4 to 6 per cent of the total labour force consists of women. However, these figures are unreliable because most of the jobs women perform are not covered by Egyptian Labour records. In the industrial sector women are restricted to certain industries -- textiles, paper, and chemicals. More than half of the total female labour force in industry work outside the home; in areas where factories are sparse the percentage of women in home industry rises significantly. In the domestic fields and services most labour is female; there is a continuous migratory movement of rural women towards the cities. However, these services are temporary and transitory: the average age of migration is 12 to 16; at marriageable age they go back to the village.

Tucker acknowledges that the weak participation of women in the industrial labour force is partly due to social control. Hence the advantage of using a cultural analysis to show how economic development is not always correlated with women's participation in the labour force. However, a cultural explanation doesn't shed light on the complexity of the interrelations between the social and economic elements within the social structure. For instance, at different times of the history of Egypt, women have performed jobs which were incongruent

with local cultural expectations, norms, and standards. Accordingly, the author looks at their jobs during particular historical periods that were determinant in the industrial development of Egypt.

During the subsistence economy phase of the agricultural sector, differentiation of labour by gender was along horizontal lines, reflecting the type of economy. Families lived on small lots of land they they usually owned, and all members of families contributed to agricultural labour. In the non-agricultural sector, women mainly worked in the textile industry, weaving and spinning. They owned the machines they worked on, thus handling transactions involved in buying the raw material and selling the final product. This in turn gave them access to markets and trade.

During Mohamed Ali's era of statist industrialisation,,two elements contributed to the increased participation of women in the labour market both in agriculture and industry. The first was that men were drafted into the army and into public-works projects, so female labour was needed in agriculture. The second was the push for national independence and consequently the attempt towards a fast industrialisation of Egypt: "The formation of wage working class in this period included the transformation of female artisanal spinners into wage labourers, whether they remained at home or they worked in the newly established factories." In 1832 a midwivery school was opened in order to professionalise a traditional form of female labour. The European opposition to Mohamed Ali's attempts at industrial and economic independence undermined the participation of women in the wage labour market. For instance, patterns of landholding changed, and there seems to be a correlation of the introduction of large-scale landholding and cash crop agriculture with a decrease of women in agricultural production. Similarly in the industrial sector, with the decrease of craft industries, a considerable percentage of women had their productive labour reduced. In the newly created industries, men received training to work on machines, and women were relegated to traditional female jobs (like spinning) or to the least skilled operations.

From the 1920's on, nationalist movements encouraged industrialisation oriented to import substitution and a diversification of the Egyptian economy. However, in the agricultural sector high unemployment kept men as the main wage labour force. In industry, home production declined and, with it, female

labour. Mechanisation reduced the number of workers used, and men received most of the technical training.

This article shows that cultural tradition and beliefs kept women out of the labour force in Egypt and that these factors were combined with economic factors to perpetuate resistance to women's participation in the labour force.

Waterbury, J., Egypt: Burdens of the Past, Options for the Future, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, IN (1978). Egypt Book General Development International Political Economy.

The present book is a collection of essays written on Egypt from 1970 to 1977. The variety of subjects and issues is considerable -- economics, politics, population growth, food crisis, migration, transport, and more. The common thread connecting all the issues is the theoretical orientation used by the author to analyse situations and evaluate data. The basic assumption is that Egypt, a Third World country, exhibits certain typical features which characterise and influence processes of decision-making, planning, and policies. Like most "developing" nations Egypt is in a state of "disequilibrium," resulting from limited resources, overpopulation, dependence on the world economy, and conflicts between internal and external political decisions. It is in terms of these "disbalancing" situations that the author relates the various states and crises the country went through.

The book is divided into three parts. First, the political and military situation of Egypt from 1970 to 1973, and the effects of the October war on the local and international scenes, are presented. Then the second part deals with the various socio-economic problems the country has faced. The last section describes the alternatives decided after the 1973 war regarding social transformations, economic planning and reorientation, and political and ideological shifts.

Primarily Egypt is described as a land of "continuity." The word is intentionally used by the author to show that the political transition from Nasser to Sadat, and the consequent effects it had on the socio-economic and political course of Egyptian life, were nothing new from 1970-73. Political decisions made by Sadat were primarily influenced by the economic and political stalemate Egypt had been through since 1967. Already under Nasser a "rapprochement" with the West, and the United States in particular (Rogers Plan), had been initiated; there was an understanding that an alternative to the deadlock would come from this superpower rather than from the Soviet Union, which up to 1973 had persistently supplied Egypt with a defensive military apparatus only. Hence, Sadat's two major political initiatives in 1971 -- the reopening of the Suez Canal and the expulsion of almost all Soviet military supervisors -- were not in total contradiction with the prior initiatives. Domestically, the situation was perceived to be disastrous because of the army's monopoly over considerable portions of the national budget and the consequent paralysis of the economy.

Attempts were made to boost the economy through new plans and rates of investments in addition to investments by oil-rich states. Concurrently, Sadat had to establish his credibility in the national arena, especially between 1971-72, as a core political group led by "Communist" Ali Sabri (who carried considerable political leverage even within the army) opposed Sadat's policies. Sadat reinforced his legitimacy the same way Nasser did earlier: "a careful balancing of interests and pressure groups -- such as elements of the officers corps, civilian technocrats, left- and right-wing ideologues, etc. -- so that all had a share in power and (Sadat) could arbitrate among them." During that time characteristic unrest shook civilian life, as students rioted, workers manifested, and journalists and writers made new demands. What remains crucial to the period is that, regardless of the political orientations of the ruling group, or the ideological "skirmishes" among various groups of the population and the authorities, the real problem of economic policies, supplies, consumer goods, inflation, and more remained largely undealt with: neither state ventures nor Arab investments could effectively contribute anything in a country "paralysed" by a state of no war-no peace. The 1973 war and its consequences -- the use of oil by Arab states to negotiate lost land, the destruction of the myth of Israeli supremacy, uncovering the strong dependence of Israel on the United States (and consequently, the leverage the U.S. could have on Israel), and finally, the increasing dissociation of Western Europe and Japan from the U.S. in terms of the Middle East crisis -- strengthened Sadat's authority and legitimacy as a leader. Moreover Egypt, and the people, enjoyed a boost of confidence, solidarity, and belief in a "reconstruction" that had been paralysed for decades by real military confrontation and foreign occupation.

The main burden of Egypt is not its limited resources and socio-economic problems but its population explosion. The sheer number of people makes long-range policies a "luxury"; continuous priorities in terms of food supply or transportation, for example, monopolise the national budget. The other main problem generated by population explosion concerns the age structure of the society. The pool of individuals under fifteen years of age grows steadily, burdening the economy without contributing to production. In addition, education requires increasing sums from the national budget, contributing to low economic growth rates and "consequently to the inability of the economy to generate the jobs they need when they (the 15 year-olds)formally enter the work force." Similarly, the educational system has been unable to extend sufficient services to

the growing cohort at the primary level; thus the level of literacy has fallen behind national expectations. One solution for this population problem, as perceived by the local elites, was the encouragement of "rapid economic growth, perhaps accompanied by regional integration and population redistribution." However, rapid growth requires sufficient foreign currency to import primary resources: local industry and agriculture don't cover local demand; hence, the foreign currency available is channeled to buy food imports which, in turn, significantly hamper economic growth.

Efforts to reduce the burdens on Egypt have been the priority of planners since 1973. Although many of the recommendations date back to Nasser's period, particular implementations took place only after the 1973 war. The first main goal was to establish a "modus vivendi" with Israel, so that the defense budget would no continue to bleed the economy. Moreover, military dominance of the political scene inhibits and frightens the much-needed foreign investment. The second goal was to balance the country's foreign payments, using remittances from workers abroad, the Suez Canal, better export performance, oil, and tourism. Again, none of these improvements are achievable under the political climate of war. The final goal was the establishment of foundations for self-sustaining industrial growth based on the ability to "generate a steady flow of foreign exchange earnings." Under Nasser, attempts to pursue self-sustained growth and the accumulation of foreign exchange were reduced to "attempts" as a result of consecutive wars. Another element of an ideological nature was also responsible for the state of affairs: "the socialist experiment after 1961 was not applied by socialists but rather by opportunists in the regime who built a grossly inefficient state capitalist system and then milked it for their own private ends." Hence the necessity to reestablish "true" socialist principles. After 1973, the official ideologues blamed Nasser's socialism as the cause of Egypt's economic stalemate; recommendations for changes in economic procedures were a step towards similar transformations on the socio-cultural level. Ideally, state monopoly would maintain control over infrastructure and ventures the private sector would not be able to finance; it would continue to subsidise basic consumer goods, agricultural inputs, and building materials. The state would also continue to be in charge of importing basic foodstuffs unavailable in the country. Concurrently, the private sector would develop local industries and import-export trade and enter "into joint venture with foreign investors without restrictions." The liberalisation of the economy was perceived to

encourage foreign investments and large sums of aid from oil-rich countries.

To the present this has not materialised as Egypt's leaders had hoped. Foreign investments have remained in certain consumption sectors of the economy; the oil-rich countries don't perceive the Egyptian state as a guarantee for commercial returns on their investments. Also, the demography of the country is often thought of as a threat to the political stability of neighbouring countries if Egypt becomes too strong.

Finally, Egypt is moving towards a conservative economic system by increasing its dependency on world economy, and particularly by increasing the burden on the less endowed portion of its population. Cost-benefit analysis, an end to subsidies and administered prices, tighter credit and reduced money supply, and full convertibility of the pound are part of Egypt's new economic directions. In the long term it becomes more difficult to see how the masses will sustain such pressure without political upheaval.

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45.	Dr. Patrick Clawson Department of Economics Seton Hall University South Orange, NJ 07079	Economics	English French
46.	Dr. M. Cooper Department of Anthropology McMaster University Hamilton, Ont, Canada L8G4L9	Anthropology	(unknown)
47.	W. Cuddihy (address unknown)	Agriculture	(unknown)
48.	Dr. K. Dajani Department of Communication Chatham College Pittsburgh, PA 15232	Communications	Arabic English
49.	Dr. A. Daoud-Agha Department of Sociology California State University San Jose, CA 95192	Sociology	Arabic English French
50.	A. Dawisha (address unknown)	(unknown)	(unknown)
51.	Dr. N. Deeb P.O. Box 113 Hamra Air Mail Beirut, Lebanon	History	Arabic English French

52.	Dr. A. Dessouki Woodrow Wilson School Princeton University Princeton, NJ 08540	Sociology	Arabic English
53.	S. Dessouki (address unknown)	Agriculture	(unknown)
54.	Dr. J. Dethiers c/o UC Agricultural Development Systems Davis, CA 95616	Agricultural Economics	English
55.	Dr. A. De Janvry Department of Agricultural Economics University of California Berkeley, CA 94720	Economics	English French
56.	Dr. G. De Vos Department of Anthropology University of California Berkeley, CA 94720	Anthropology Psychology	English French
57.	A. Dia (address unknown)	(unknown)	(unknown)
58.	Dr. W. Dyer c/o UC Agricultural Development Systems University of California Davis, CA 95616	Agricultural Economics	English
59.	Dr. E. Early Department of Anthropology University of Notre Dame South Bend, IN 46624	Anthropology	Arabic English
60.	A. Eccel (address unknown)	Education	(unknown)
61.	Dr. R. Eckaus Planning Program Massachusetts Institute of Technology Cambridge, MA 02138	Economics	Arabic English
62.	Dr. R. El-Amir c/o UC Agricultural Development Systems University of California Davis, CA 95616	Agricultural Economics	Economics English
63.	R. El-Barawy (address unknown)	Economics	(unknown)

64.	A. El-Din (address unknown)	(unknown)	(unknown)
65.	A. El-Gamasy (address unknown)	(unknown)	(unknown)
66.	A. El-Ghazali (address unknown)	(unknown)	(unknown)
67.	Dr. F. El-Guindi Department of Anthropology University of California Los Angeles, CA 90024	Anthropology	Arabic English French
68.	A. El-Kesheri-Mahfouz (address unknown)	Political Science	(unknown)
69.	Dr. R. El-Mallakh 216 Economics Building University of Colorado Boulder, CO 80309	Economics	Arabic English French
70.	Dr. K. El-Menoufi Technology Adaptation Program Massachusetts Institute of Technology Cambridge, MA 02138	Political Science	Arabic English
71.	Dr. S. El-Messiri Department of Sociology American University in Cairo Cairo, Egypt	Sociology	Arabic English
72.	Dr. J. El-Musa Department of Government- Economics Suffolk University Boston, MA 02114	Political Science	Arabic English
73.	M. El-Rawi (address unknown)	(unknown)	(unknown)
74.	Dr. N. Saadawi (address unknown)	Public Health Feminism	Arabic English
75.	Dr. H. El-Saaty (address unknown)	Sociology	Arabic English
76.	Dr. Z. El-Sabbagh (address unknown)	Business Administration	Arabic English
77.	Dr. S. El-Sadek Department of Industrial Arts California State University Fresno, CA 93740	Housing	Arabic English

78.	Dr. S. El-Shawaff (address unknown)	Public Administration	(unknown)
79.	Dr. H. El-Tobgy Regional Agricultural Advisor Ford Foundation Beirut, Lebanon	Agricultural Economics	Arabic English
80.	Dr. H. Esfahani c/o UC Agricultural Development Systems Davis, CA 95616	Agricultural Economics	Arabic English
81.	Dr. H. Fahim (address unknown)	Anthropology	Arabic English French
82.	M. Faksh (address unknown)	(unknown)	(unknown)
83.	Dr. R. Farid (address unknown)	(unknown)	(unknown)
84.	Mr. H. Fathy (address unknown)	(unknown)	(unknown)
85.	Dr. K. Galal (address unknown)	(unknown)	(unknown)
86.	Dr. J. Garrison Department of Public Services Russel Sage Women's College Troy, NY 12180	Social Welfare	Arabic English
87.	Dr. M. Gilsenen Department of Anthropology University College-London London, England	Anthropology	Arabic English French
88.	Dr. B. Glassburner c/o UC Agricultural Development Systems Davis, CA 95616	Agricultural Economics	Arabic
89.	Mr. E. Goldberg Department of Political Science University of California Berkeley, CA 94720	Political Science	Arabic English French
90.	A. Goueli (address unknown)	(unknown)	(unknown)
91.	J. Gran (address unknown)	(unknown)	(unknown)

92.	R. Guillot (address unknown)	(unknown)	(unknown)
93.	N. Habashy (address unknown)	(unknown)	(unknown)
94.	Dr. N. Hafez (address unknown)	Sociology	Arabic English
95.	Dr. O. Hamed (address unknown)	Economics	Arabic English
96.	Dr. Nona Hammam 1601 18th St. Washington, DC 20052	Education Social Sciences	Arabic English
97.	M. Hanafi (address unknown)	(unknown)	(unknown)
98.	Dr. A. Hanafy Department of Marketing St. Cloud University St. Cloud, MN 56301	Economics	Arabic English
99.	Dr. B. Hansen Department of Economics University of California Berkeley, CA 94720	Economics	Arabic English
100.	Dr. I. Harik Department of Political Science Indiana University Bloomington, IN 47405	Political Science History	Arabic English French
101.	R. Harmon (address unknown)	(unknown)	(unknown)
102.	Dr. M. Hassouna 790 Fillmore Denver, CO 80206	Family Planning	English
103.	Dr. P. Hayek Department of International Business Pace University New York, NY 10038	International Business	English
104.	Dr. C. Head c/o UC Agricultural Development Systems Davis, CA 95616	Agricultural Economics	English
105.	Dr. F. Heiber (address unknown)	Urbanism	(unknown)

106.	Dr. E. Helmy (address unknown)	Sociology	Arabic English
107.	B. Herseley (address unknown)	Agricultural Economics	(unknown)
108.	Dr. M. Hihn c/o UC Agricultural Development Systems Davis, CA 95616	Agricultural Economics	English
109.	Dr. E. Hill Department of Economics and Political Science American University in Cairo Cairo, Egypt	Political Science	Arabic English
110.	Dr. R. Hinnebusch Department of Economics and Political Science American University in Cairo Cairo, Egypt	Political Science	Arabic English
111.	Dr. N. Hopkins Department of Anthropology American University in Cairo Cairo, Egypt	Anthropology	Arabic English French
112.	Dr. K. Howard-Merriam Department of Political Science Bowling Green State University Bowling Green, OH 43403	Political Science	Arabic English
113.	G. Hyde (address unknown)	Education	(unknown)
114.	Dr. M. Ibrahim (address unknown)	Political Science	Arabic English
115.	Dr. K. Ikram International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 1818 H Street, NW Washington, DC 20433	Economics	Arabic English
116.	Dr. C. Issawi Department of Near Eastern Studies Princeton University Princeton, NJ 08540	Economics History	Arabic English French
117.	Dr. J. Jankowski Department of History University of Colorado Boulder, CO 80302	History	Arabic English

118.	Dr. L. Joy Department of Political Science University of California Berkeley, CA 94720	Political Science	English
119.	Dr. F. Kalkas (address unknown)	Sociology	(unknown)
120.	Dr. E. Kanovsky Department of Economics Bar Ilan University Ramat Gan, Israel	Economics	English Hebrew
121.	Dr. E. Kedourie London School of Economics London, England	Political Science	Arabic English
122.	Dr. M. Kennedy Department of Sociology American University in Cairo Cairo, Egypt	Sociology	Arabic English
123.	M. Khaddim (address unknown)	(unknown)	(unknown)
124.	Dr. A. Khalifa Center for Criminological and Social Research Cairo, Egypt	Sociology	Arabic English
125.	Dr. M. Khattab (address unknown)	Economics	Arabic English
126.	Dr. B. Korany (address unknown)	Political Science	Arabic English French
127.	Dr. K. Korayem Department of Economics Al-Azhar University Cairo, Egypt	Economics	Arabic English
128.	Dr. M. Koriem (address unknown)	Education	Arabic English
129.	Dr. J. Lakah Department of Political Science Fashion Institute of Technology New York, NY 10001	Political Science	Arabic English
130.	Dr. S. Lane Department of Agricultural Economics University of California Davis, CA 95616	Agricultural Economics	English

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131.	Dr. H. Lemel c/o UC Agricultural Development Systems Davis, CA 95616	Agricultural Economics	English
132.	S. Loza (address unknown)	Family Planning	Arabic
133.	Dr. R. Mabro St. Anthony's College Oxford University Oxford, England	Economics	Arabic English French
134.	Dr. M. Mansour 1225 Sweet Briar Rd. Madison, WI 53705	Economics	Arabic English
135.	M. Martin (address unknown)	(unknown)	(unknown)
136.	Dr. P. Martin Department of Agricultural Economics University of California Davis, CA 95616	Agricultural Economics	English
137.	Dr. J. Mayfield Department of Political Science University of Utah Salt Lake City, UT 84112	Political Science	Arabic English
138.	Dr. J. McClain Department of Business-Public Administration Cornell University Ithaca, NY 14853	Public Administration	English
139.	R. McLaurin (address unknown)	Political Science	(unknown)
140.	Dr. W. Megahid c/o UC Agricultural Development Systems Davis, CA 95616	Economics	Arabic English
141.	Dr. S. Mehanna c/o UC Agricultural Development Stystems Davis, CA 95616	Anthropology	Arabic English
142.	S. Mobarek (address unknown)	Anthropology	(unknown)

143.	Dr. A. Mohamed Department of Biology Jackson State University Jackson, MS 39217	Plant Biology	Arabic English
144.	Z. Mokhlis (address unknown)	(unknown)	(unknown)
145.	Dr. S. Mokhtar (address unknown)	Sociology	Arabic English
146.	Dr. E. Monke Department of Agricultural Economics University of Arizona Tucson, AZ 85721	Agricultural Economics	English
147.	Dr. C. Moore School of Business Administration American University of Beirut Beirut, Lebanon	Political Science Business Administration	English French
148.	Dr. A. Moustafa Department of Public Health University of Massachusetts Amherst, MA 01002	Public Health	Arabic English
149.	Dr. M. Nagi Department of Sociology Bowling Green State University Bowling Green, OH 43403	Sociology	Arabic English
150.	Dr. M. Nashashibi (address unknown)	Economics	Arabic English
151.	Dr. S. Nassar c/o UC Agricultural Development Systems Davis, CA 95616	Agricultural Economics	Arabic English
152.	D. Niewiareski (address unknown)	Finance	(unknown)
153.	Dr. M. Noury Department of Sociology Westfield State College Westfield, MA 01085	Rural Sociology	Arabic English
154.	Mr. Richard Nyrop Foreign Area Studies American University Washington, DC 20016	Political Science	(unknown)

155.	Dr. P. O'Brien Department of Economics Pace University New York, NY 10038	Economics	(unknown)
156.	Dr. R. Owen Faculty of Social Studies St. Anthony's College Oxford, England	Economics	Arabic English French
157.	C. Parker (address unknown)	Agricultural Economics	(unknown)
158.	Dr. S. Pelletiere (address unknown)	Political Science	(unknown)
159.	Dr. S. Peterson 510 North Linden St. Northfield, MN 55057	Political Science	Arabic English
160.	Dr. T. Petzel Department of Food Research Stanford University Stanford, CA 94305	Agricultural Economics	English
161.	Dr. E. Pillsbury 18057 Coastline Dr. Malibu, CA 90265	Anthropology	Chinese English
162.	Dr. B. Poulson Department of Economics University of Colorado Boulder, CO 80309	Economics	English
163.	R. Pratt (address unknown)	Housing Finance	(unknown)
164.	E. Prewizur (address unknown)	Sociology	(unknown)
165.	Dr. S. Radwan Rural Employment Policies Branch International Labour Office Geneva, Switzerland	Economics	Arabic English French
166.	Dr. A. Richards Merrill College University of California Santa Cruz, CA 95064	Economics	Arabic English French
167.	M. Rizk (address unknown)	Agricultural Economics	Arabic English

168.	Dr. L. Ross Muir College University of California La Jolla, CA 92037	Anthropology	(unknown)
169.	Mr. D. Roy 5437 Smoke Rise Dr. Stone Mountain, GA 30083	Economics	English
170.	Dr. A. Rugh (address unknown)	Anthropology	Arabic English
171.	Dr. S. Sakr (address unknown)	Economics	Arabic English
172.	Dr. A. Sarris Department of Agricultural Economics University of California Berkeley, CA 94720	Agricultural Economics	English Greek
173.	Dr. Y. Sayegh Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development PO Box 21923, Kuwait	Economics	Arabic English
174.	A. Seireg (address unknown)	(unknown)	(unknown)
175.	G. Self (address unknown)	(unknown)	(unknown)
176.	S. Sevan (address unknown)	Economics	(unknown)
177.	Dr. M. Shaaban Department of Economics West Virginia Institute of Technology Montgomery, WV 25136	Economics	Arabic English
178.	A. Shawki (address unknown)	Sociology	Arabic
179.	Dr. H. Sherbiny (address unknown)	Agricultural Economics	Arabic English
180.	Dr. Y. Shimoni (address unknown)	(unknown)	(unknown)
181.	I. Shoukry (address unknown)	(unknown)	(unknown)
182.	Dr. I. Sidig (address unknown)	Demography	Arabic English

183.	Dr. R. Simmons c/o UC Agricultural Development Systems Davis, CA 95616	Agricultural Economics	English
184.	Dr. C. Sinclair Department of Economics University of Durham Durham, England	Economics	Arabic English
185.	Dr. R. Springborg Department of Political Science University of Pennsylvania Philadelphia, PA 19104	Political Science	Arabic English French
186.	Dr. C. Stevens Department of Economics Reed College Portland, OR 97202	Economics	English
187.	Dr. S. Sukkary Department of Anthropology California State University Sacramento, CA 95819	Anthropology	Arabic English
188.	Dr. R. Sutcliffe Department of Economic History Sheffield University Sheffield, England	Economics	English
189.	Dr. A. Tahoun (address unknown)	Economics	Arabic English
190.	T. Teodorovich (address unknown)	(unknown)	(unknown)
191.	F. Tomiche (address unknown)	Labor	(unknown)
192.	Dr. E. Trimberger (address unknown)	Political Science	(unknown)
193.	J. Tucker (address unknown)	Economics	Arabic English French
194.	Dr. J. Von Bran (address unknown)	Agricultural Economics	(unknown)
195.	S. Wahab (address unknown)	Tourism	(unknown)
196.	Dr. A Wahaib (address unknown)	Education Feminism	Arabic English

197.	A. Wallace (address unknown)	Agricultural Economics	(unknown)
198.	Dr. J. Waterbury Department of Political Science Princeton University Princeton, NJ 08540	Political Science	Arabic English French
199.	Dr. R. Wilson Department of Economics University of Texas Arlington, TX 76019	Economics	English
200.	D. Yawer (address unknown)	Industrialization	(unknown)
201.	Dr. N. Youssef (address unknown)	Economics Feminism	Arabic English Spanish
202.	Dr. S. Youssef Department of Management Western Illinois University Macomb, IL 61455	Economics	Arabic English
203.	Dr. M. Zaki Department of Economics Northern Michigan University Marquette, MI 49855	Economics	Arabic English
204.	A. Zaki-Ibrahim (address unknown)	Agricultural Economics	(unknown)
205.	Dr. A. Zeineldin (address unknown)	Economics	Arabic English