Service Delivery Channels for Selected Agricultural Services

Peter Leigh Taylor

May 16, 1984

done for PPC/E

Table of Contents

Service Delivery Channels for Selected Agricultural Services

I. Introduction

Since 1981, the Studies Division of the Office of Evaluation of the Policy and Planning Coordination Bureau has been conducting a series of impact evaluations within the Agricultural Services sector. Designed to provide the Agency with lessons learned from past experiences, these studies have addressed the dual issues of providing farmers with the inputs and marketing structures needed to increase food production. This paper is intended to complement that effort by identifying specific institutional approaches and strategies of AID agricultural services projects in the different regions (Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Near East) at different points in time. The experience with and relative effectiveness of different institutional channels--public, mixed public/private, and private (voluntary, cooperative, and for-profit organizations)--in the delivery of services will be assessed.

This analysis focuses on those projects promoting the timely provision of agricultural credit, inputs (eg. seeds, chemical inputs, and farm machinery) and marketing services. The projects examined are not representative of all agricultural production-related activities. Research, extension, and irrigation are examples of services excluded from specific consideration here.

A. Summary

Projects involving agricultural credit, input and marketing services were begun as early as 1952, increased substantially after 1973, peaked by 1978, and began to decrease in subsequent years. The bulk of projects has been carried out in Latin America and Africa, although the dollar volume of such investment was highest in the Asia bureau.

Most credit, input and marketing services projects have involved the provision of more than one service. It is not clear to what extent this is a function of the nature of farmer needs or of prior A.I.D. commitment to institutional channels set up for multiple activities. Both explanations probably carry a degree of validity.

Public and mixed public/private service delivery channels were most common in the 203 projects reviewed. The utilization of these two channels, however, has decreased since 1973 as the use of alternative channels (PVO, cooperative, and private-for-profit institutions) has increased.

Problems which have recurred in projects regardless of the service delivery channel include the institutional interface with AID requirements, basic incongruencies of institutional perspectives, and staffing difficulties. Overambitious project design was another common problem.

Experience with each approach has revealed a number of factors related to its strengths and weaknesses. The public channel carries the authority of official policy and may provide services not feasibly handled by the private sector. On the other hand, its operation is often relatively inefficient and even unequal in its allocation and distribution of resources. The public/private channel can combine the advantages of both the public and private sector and can encompass complex and varied activities. Maintenance of high levels of interinstitutional coordination is a problem, though, and the channel is still tied to public policy considerations. The PVO channel has proved to be flexible and capable of a competent, intensive approach. It is often not cost-effective, however. The cooperative channel may provide opportunities for direct service delivery with maximum beneficiary participation. At the same time, cooperatives are difficult to organize and maintain and tend to be plagued by administrative problems. The private-for-profit vehicle can perform more efficiently with market-oriented services and may prove sustainable where there is adequate incentive. On the other hand, segments of the population to which service provision is not cost-effective may be overlooked, at least in the short term.

B. Methodology

Prior to beginning this study, the Studies Division developed a list of completed or near-completed agricultural services projects in AID's regional bureaus. Key words were employed to access information from the Development Information Utilization Office's computerized data bases. Two hundred-three projects were identified as having a significant emphasis on agricultural credit, input and marketing services Many of these projects had significant research and/or extension components as well.

Africa	72
Asia	40
Latin America	70
Near East	21
Total	203

The data bases cover all projects that were active in October 1974 and all subsequent projects, including several beginning as early as 1952. Information on projects ending prior to 1974 is generally not found in the system and is difficult to obtain.

Authorization amounts and start dates were identified to chart general trends of agricultural credit, input and marketing projects over time. All available document abstracts for the 203 projects were examined to identify the service delivery channel/vehicle (The words are used interchangeably.) utilized in each case. Channel/vehicle is defined here as the institutional structure through which services are provided to the beneficiary population. It may or may not be equivalent to the entity or entities given project implementation responsibilities.

A reliable assessment of the character of the implementing agency is difficult to make on the basis of the documentation available, which usually does not alone contain sufficient consistent information on decision-making and authority patterns to make such a judgement. For example, a special autonomous Program Management Unit may have had implementing responsibilities, but used a public institutional channel, such as a Ministry of Agriculture extension service, to deliver marketing technical services to farmers.

To gain a more in-depth understanding of the problems and issues encountered with credit, input and marketing projects a smaller sample was selected using a random number table. Forty-four projects were selected, with the following distribution:

Africa	15
Asia	7
Latin America	15
Near East	7
Total:	44

All available documentation of these projects was examined, a total of 189 design and evaluation documents. A summary of the available information on each sample project is presented in

Appendix A. A list of projects drawn at random but rejected for the purposes of the analysis is provided in Appendix B.

After compiling initial data on overall project trends, interviews were carried out in each of the four regional bureaus with program and technical officers. During the interviews it became apparent that the patterns suggested in the data, particularly those relating to project investment, were influenced by multiple variables often difficult to treat adequately within the scope of this analysis.

II. Trend Analysis

A. Project Involvement Over Time

Agricultural credit, input and marketing services projects have occupied an important place in AID's portfolio since as early as the 1950s. Table 1 shows that the number of projects grew steadily in the 1960s and particularly during most of the following decade. The limitations of the data--the fact that a number of pertinent projects were surely begun and ended before 1974 and are not included in this universe--must qualify conclusions about the growth of these activities. However, the available information dovetails with the New Directions legislation of 1973 and the subsequently greater emphasis on reaching the rural poor majorities.

According to the 1978 Agricultural Development Policy

Paper, after 1976 a sharp reduction was made in input supply programs, leading to a downward trend in marketing, storage, inputs, rural industry, and credit activities. Table 1 shows that the total number of projects did drop significantly (26%), in the last five year period considered, 1978 to 1982. The largest decreases were experienced in the Asia and Latin America bureaus, 36% and 44% respectively. Africa remained stable, probably because the downward trend there was halted around 1979 and project activities in input and marketing services increased substantially. The number of Near East projects increased slightly.

Table 1
Distribution of Projects by Bureau and Start Date

Bureau	Before 1958	1959 to 1962	1963 to 1967	1968 to 1972	1973 to 1977	1978 to 1982	D.I.*	Total #	Total %
Africa	2		3	12	25	25	5	72	35
Asia			7	7	18	8		40	20
L.A.	1	3	9	15	27	15		70	35
N.E.	2		2	2	6	8	1	21	10
Total	5	3	21	36	76	56	6	203	100

*Data insufficient

Historically, the bulk of inputs and marketing services projects has been carried out in Latin America and Africa, each with 35% of the total projects. The Near East bureau appeared to have had the least number of projects, 10% of the total.

B. Inputs and Marketing Services Investment

The size of the investment in projects across the bureaus presents a slightly different picture. A reliable assessment of investment trends for projects before 1973 was not possible. Even for subsequent projects, the fact that many encompassed activities in addition to credit, input and marketing services must be kept in mind. Information was obtained on authorization amounts for 129 of the 132 projects begun since 1973 and is presented in Table 2. Total authorizations for the 129 projects amounted to just over 1.4 billion.

Table 2
Distribution of Projects by Bureau and Project Size
1973-1982

Bureau	# of Projects*	Total Project Authorizations(1000)	% of total	Average Project Size (1000)
Africa	50	385,462	27	7,709
Asia	23	620,350	43	26,972
Latin Am.	42	259,247	18	6,173
Near East	14	174,221	12	12,444
Total**	129	1,439,280	100	11,157

* Total of 132 projects begun since 1973
** Data insufficient: 3

Although the Asia bureau had only the third highest number of projects, at $620 million its total investment in these activities was the largest, 43% of total inputs and marketing services project authorizations. Its projects tended to be the largest, with an average size of $27 million. The heavy Asia bureau investment may reflect a number of large fertilizer and other commodity import projects. The Africa project authorizations represented the next largest investment, at 27% of the total. The Near East bureau showed the smallest investment, $174 million, 12% of the total. Its average project size though, $12.4 million, was larger than that of Africa or Latin America.

Neither the number of projects in a region nor the overall size of the investment necessarily reflect the emphasis placed on inputs and marketing services in a bureau. Unfortunately, an adequate calculation here of the investment priority was not possible for two reasons. First, the proportion of funds allocated to specific activities in each project must be established. Such a "breaking out" was beyond the scope of this study. It should be noted, however, that the Africa bureau is presently involved in just such a detailed analysis for projects begun since 1979.

Secondly, the total pertinent resources available to the bureau must be determined. Funding sources for these projects are often difficult to ascertain since in addition to the Development Assistance accounts, funds have been drawn on other accounts. Economic Support funds have been used in some cases in Asia and the Near East as well as in Africa, where the Sahel Development program has also provided some financing. In Latin America, agricultural services have been financed from a variety of accounts, depending on their specific purpose in relation to other functional subcategories.

C. Services Provided

A review of the 203 credit, input and marketing projects revealed that most involved the provision of two or more services. Fifty-two percent of the 203 projects were multiple service projects. (Table 3) This may reflect the nature of the sector as a whole, since the effective provision and utilization of one service often hinges on the timely availability of another. The small farmer's effective use of chemical inputs may depend not only on the availability of fertilizer but also of a credit institution to finance its purchase. Similarly, it is possible in some cases that a prior AID commitment to support multiple-service institutions may have encouraged an emphasis on multiple service activities. Agricultural sector loans, for example, were made in a number of cases to host government line ministries and central agencies. These institutions generally are given broad responsibilities in the sector and the activities they carry out must respond to a wide range of producer needs.

Of the projects with a single objective, institution-building was the most frequent, representing 13% of the total. These activities generally aimed primarily at improving the capacities of institutions serving the rural

Table 3
Credit, Input and Marketing Project Universe
Service Delivery Channel/Vehicle by Type Service

	Public		Public/Private		Private						Total	
					PVO		Cooperative		Private-for-Profit			
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
Credit	6	5	7	15			1	9			14	7
Seeds	12	11	1	2							13	7
Chemical Inputs	5	4	7	15	1	6			1	33	14	7
Farm Mach.	1	1	2	4							3	2
Marketing	12	11	4	9	2	13	3	27	1	33	22	12
Instit. Building	19	17	3	6	2	13	1	9			25	13
Multiple Services	58	51	23	49	10	68	6	55	1	33	99	52
Total	113	100	47	100	15	100	11	100	3	100	189	100

Data insufficient: 14

population, without the projects becoming directly involved in service delivery. They emphasized the improvement of organizational and administrative structures, and of sectoral analysis, planning, and evaluation capabilities. The projects are included in this universe because they served to strengthen institutions' capabilities to provide credit, input and marketing services.

Single service marketing projects comprised 12% of the total. The activities of these projects reflected a wide range of concerns with the producer's access to markets. A number of projects were undertaken to influence national market conditions, promoting policy reform in the areas of imports, exports, and pricing to bolster production incentives. Activities commonly included the development of storage and grading programs, as well as the construction and improvement of national, regional, and local processing and marketing facilities. Non-traditional marketing processes were introduced involving cooperatives and other innovative associations. A number of projects which included the construction or rehabilitation of road networks linking producers to markets are represented as multiple service projects. Single service road projects were not included in the 203 credit, input and marketing projects.

In most cases involving production credit, activities were undertaken in conjunction with the provision of inputs such as fertilizer or seeds. Credit projects without an accompanying production package made up 7% of the total. Normally they involved the provision of credit for food production, although in some instances special cash crops, such as coffee, were financed. Some activities were undertaken in support of large commercial farmers, particularly during the 1960s. During the early 1970s more emphasis was placed on improving the access of medium and small farmers to production credit. Since 1980, however, AID involvement in credit activities has been greatly reduced.

Single service seeds projects made up 7% of the total. These projects concentrated mainly on the delivery of improved seeds to the producers. The activities usually involved the development or improvement of seed processing facilities, reliable classification systems, and incentive programs for the utilization of improved seeds. Although such projects commonly contained a component of research to identify and adapt appropriate varieties, projects with a predominately research focus were not included.

Projects involving the provision of chemical inputs made up 7% of the total. These projects usually involved fertilizer although a small number included pesticides and herbicides. A major emphasis was the reform of public policies creating disincentives to effective and equitable distribution of fertilizer. Fertilizer projects often tried to broaden the participation of private-for-profit agents while encouraging the government to assume regulatory responsibilities. A number

Table 4
Service Delivery Channel/Vehicle Use Among Bureaus

	Africa				Asia				Latin America				Near East				Subtotals				Total	
	Pre-1973		Post 1973		Pre-1973		Post 1973		Pre-1973		Post-1973		Pre-1973		Post 1973		Pre-1973		Post 1973			
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
Public	10	71	26	54	8	62	13	57	20	80	19	46	4	67	8	57	42	72	66	52	108	59
Public/Private	4	29	13	27	5	38	6	26	3	12	10	24	2	33	4	29	14	24	33	26	47	25
Private																						
PVO			9	19			2	9			4	10			1	7	0	0	15	12	15	8
Cooperative							1	4	2	8	7	17			1	7	2	4	9	7	11	6
Private-for Profit							1	4			1	3					0	0	3	3	3	2
Total	14	100	48	100	13	100	23	100	25	100	41	100	6	100	14	100	58	100	126	100	184	100

Insufficient data: 19

of projects, however, involved the large-scale importation of fertilizer to respond to urgent short term needs in the absence of adequate domestic fertilizer production.

Farm machinery was a single service activity in only three projects. Most efforts at encouraging mechanization, whether via traditional or innovative equipment approaches, were accompanied by other/services, such as credit to finance equipment purchase or technical services to facilitate its adoption.

III. Service Delivery Channels/Vehicles

Three major delivery channels were identified: public, mixed public/private, and private, with the latter subdivided into three categories; voluntary organization, cooperative, and private-for-profit. The distinctions made between these channels are broad and do not alone adequately represent the variety of institutional arrangements contained in each. For statistical purposes they have been left in a general form in Tables 3 and 4, but will be disaggregated further in the review of the experience with each channel.

A. Utilization Trends

Utilization of public and public/private channels in implementation of AID projects has decreased since 1973, while use of private sector channels (PVO, cooperative, and for-profit institutions) has increased. Africa has shown the most frequent use of PVOs as primary channels. Latin America has most often favored cooperative vehicles. Almost without exception, projects have tended to provide multiple rather than single services. Institution-building has been the second most frequent project thrust.

B. Problems and issues

To supplement examination of document abstracts of the 203 projects, design and evaluation documents for the 44 randomly selected projects were read for issues relating to the service delivery mechanisms. The distribution of the sample among public, public/private and private channels was as follows:

	#	%
Public	22	50
Public/private	15	34
Private		
PVO	2	5
Cooperative	3	7
Private-for-profit	1	2
Total	43*	100

*One project could not be identified as to channel

Several problems seemed to recurr regardless of the channel. The most common administrative problem observed involved the institutional interface with AID requirements. Most projects experienced at least some delays with commodity procurement procedures. Some had difficulty satisfying reporting requirements were frequently major problems, especially where PVOs, cooperatives, and recently-created organizations were involved.

Another common difficulty stemmed from the basic incongruency of institutional perspectives. Participating institutions often had priorities that did not mesh completely with those assumed by a project's design. Recognizing and resolving these differences required time and occasionally contributed to delays or failure to achieve objectives.

Evaluators in a number of cases remarked that projects were over-ambitious in their design, especially in terms of the capabilities of participating institutions and the time frame involved. The problems of initial information-gathering, analysis, planning, and testing were often underestimated. Also, expectations of impact on small producers were frequently too high. Evaluators of the Guatemala Rural Development project, for instance, observed that the expectations of significant impact on participating small farmers in less than 5 years or on indirect beneficiaries in less than 10 years, were unrealistic.

Staffing problems (shortages of qualified local personnel, salary disparities, and political instability) were particularly difficult problems with public and public/private institutions. Participant trainees frequently failed to return or to be used effectively in the activities for which they were prepared.

1. Public channel

Services provided through a public channel are delivered through a host-country institutional structure wholly-controlled by the government. Activities are generally designed to fit within overall public policy. A variety ofpublic institutional arrangements were used for the delivery of credit, input and marketing services. In many cases a single institution provided services while in others several agencies collaborated, often through a special coordinating committee. The following institutional arrangements were observed:

Line ministries	30
Specialized public agencies	27
Combination line ministries, Special public agencies, banks	25
Provincial level governments	2
Public sector banks	8
Unspecified public	21
Total	113

A public channel was used in 59% of the projects. The overall number increased significantly in the 1970s, as well as in three of the four Bureaus. (Table 4) Only in Latin America was a slight decrease observed. However, the public channel's percentage share of total projects, which is probably a more useful indicator, decreased from 72% to 52%. Alternative approaches began to be utilized more frequently.

Table 3 shows that the public channel was most often used where projects provided for multiple services. At least two reasons for a multiple service emphasis appear likely. A public channel may have been chosen to provide several services needed simultaneously. On the other hand, a prior commitment to support public channel institutions may have encouraged emphasis on multiple service projects, for which the agencies are often structured. Such a commitment might best account for the second most frequent public channel activity, institution-building.

Part of the rationale behind the involvement of the public sector in agricultural services is that it assumes responsibility for services that the private sector is unable or unwilling to assume because of the high costs or "externalities" involved. (Externalities refer to activities where competitors can imitate or benefit from investment without bearing the relatively high costs of being first.) Primary infrastructure, agricultural extension and technology transfer, research and development, and commodity price stabilization are services traditionally dominated by the public sector.

The public sector has engaged in the provision of other services as well, including credit, fertilizer, and other agricultural inputs and marketing services. Such services are often handled through public channels because the private sector is only partially-developed. However, evaluators of the Ashuganj Fertilizer project in Bangladesh remarked on the powerful influence of the attitude that poverty produces shortages and requires government intervention. Also, the political importance attached to resource transfer often encourages a government's reluctance to liberalize allocation mechanisms and broaden participation in the delivery of services.

Providing services through a public channel may afford an opportunity for a holistic consideration of and approach to development problems. The Indonesia Assistance to Agricultural Planning project, for example, contributed to numerous new development activities, the expansion of rice storage programs, and a flexible fertilizer pricing system. The Korean Rural Policy Planning and Survey project helped improve the GOK planning and policy-making capabilities and its ability to implement larger, more effective programs. The Agriculture Advisory Services project in Ethiopia helped establish an economics-oriented development guidance unit, thus helping tro ensure more effective project planning. Activities with improved seeds and fertilizer in the Afghanistan National Development Agricultural Services project were credited with contributing to an increase in national wheat production.

Despite positive experiences such as these, a number of significant disadvantages of public channels for agricultural credit, input and marketing services were noted by evaluators. Members of an impact evaluation team to Bangladesh in 1982 observed that government agencies tend to do an inadequate job of generating, mobilizing, and allocating indigenous resources. Rather, publically-managed services tend to operate within relatively inflexible bureacratic constraints. Evaluators of the Korean Rural Policy Planning and Survey project remarked that little time was allowed planners for on-going education and technical growth amid pressures to achieve targets. Government funding systems in Costa Rica were found to be too cumbersome for the Rural Development Program to respond appropriately to small scale decentralized operations assumed in the project design. Similarly, the Tunisian Small Farmer Supervised Credit project found the National Banks's procedures too unwieldy for most farmers' needs. These and similar systems are established for social and political reasons and are intended for maximum control rather than economic efficiency. On the other hand, the Assistance to Agricultural Planning project found the Indonesian Department of Agriculture sufficiently flexible to respond quickly to project needs, even where they deviated from implementation plans.

A serious obstacle to the effectiveness of public agricultural service channels has been the difficulties in establishing adequate information systems. Too little is known about farmers' problems--their needs for credit, inputs, and marketing assistance. Both the Arusha Planning and Village Development project in Tanzania and the Rural Development Program in Costa Rica reported they were unable to establish on-going data collection systems. The high costs of information generation, analysis and pilot testing are often hard for LDC public institutions to accept. Results of their development efforts are the basis for judgement by their peers and by the populace. Planners may be obliged to proceed with a project while lacking adequate information rather than face consequences of long delays.

The sustainability of publically-channeled activities once donor support ends has been a concern. The priorities and agendas of public sector agencies may ultimately be at odds with project priorities. The Small Farmer Development Project in Colombia encountered difficulties when it became apparent that the methodology it required was in conflict with the traditional approach of the participating public agency. Costa Rican Ministry of Agriculture personnel involved in the Rural Development Program were said to neither fully-understand or support what was to be done. Even when project staff are cognizant of and in agreement with the project's approach, insufficient on-going support from central authorities may result in a project's having little lasting effect once outside pressure is removed.

The inefficiency of the public channel relative to the private sector was an observation of evaluators of the Ashuganj Fertilizer plant in Bangladesh. Inadequate performance by government officials was said to be the result of distorted incentives created by price and distribution controls and lack of training. The evaluators suggested that similar efforts should be in the hands of the private sector which possesses more motivation to finish construction quickly and operate more efficiently.

AID has turned to the public sector in a number of efforts to encourage reform of policies that discourage agricultural production. Export tariffs and taxes on coffee in Haiti, for example, were the highest in the world in 1980. Fertilizer subsidies in Bangladesh and Pakistan discourage private sector involvement and distort distribution. Interest rates for production credit are regulated in many countries and often discourage savings. Government farm commodity price freezes in Senegal were said to encourage farmers to export their crops rather than market them domestically.

Results from policy reform efforts have been mixed. Despite a number of project efforts aimed at altering fertilizer pricing and subsidy policies in Bangladesh, the government found it difficult to carry through reforms. The National Agricultural Development project in Afghanistan likewise had little success in a similar situation, but made progress toward convincing public officials that the importation and sales of inputs can be handled by the private sector. In Pakistan, the licensing of retail fertilizer dealers was simplified, private sector access to imported phosphates was expanded, marketing margins were increased, and geographic restrictions on allocations were lifted.

2. Public/Private Channel

Services provided through mixed public/private channels are delivered through a structure composed of at least one public institution and of non-governmental institutions or elements from the private sector, foreign entities, and/or beneficiary population. Use of this approach has sought to combine the advantages of public and private institutions and often involves innovations not traditionally found within wholly-public programs. Again, a variety of institutional arrangements were observed:

Public institutions, universities, PVOs, cooperatives	24
Public institutions, private-for-profit sector	8
Government-controlled corporate-like bodies (parastatals)	9
International public/private organizations	6
Total	47

Table 4 indicates that public/private channels were used in 25% of the projects surveyed. Overall, the percentage of public/private agency projects increased slightly after 1973 as the frequency increased. This overall percentage increase was due to more use of the channel in Latin America, where it grew from 12% to

24%. Use of the public/private service delivery mode dropped in the other bureaus as alternative nonpublic vehicles came to be relied upon increasingly.

As with their counterparts in the public sector, public/private vehicles were used most often to provide multiple services. The variety of resources available through the collaboration of several organizations probably lends itself to a multiple service approach. However, single service activities providing credit and chemical inputs were the next most frequent. A credit delivery structure involving public financial institutions and regional or local non-public associations was often utilized. Similarly, fertilizer projects frequently involved sales to farmers through private retailers, while the government retained control over initial stages of importation and distribution.

CIP

Three major public/private channel types were identified: ad hoc collaboration of public and non-public agencies for the purposes of a project, parastatals, and regional international organizations.

a. Ad hoc combinations

Several motives were found for the utilization of an ad hoc combination of public and non-public entities for service delivery. A complex project with multiple components and objectives may require the collaboration of government, university, PVO, and private-for-profit institutional elements. A channel may be sought that involves organizations with a mandate or demonstrated past performance for serving the beneficiaries. The Jordan Valley Farmers Association project was such an effort. Other projects emphasize the broadening of participation, working through rural self-help organizations, as did the Haiti Small Farmer Development project or by eliciting direct beneficiary input into public policy-making, as with the Arusha Planning and Village Development project in Tanzania. Finally, a motive may be to improve the efficiency of service delivery by bringing in private-for-profit particiption, as was an aim of the National Agricultural Development project in Afghanistan.

Ad hoc combination channels have been effective in achieving progress toward certain objectives. The Haiti Small Farmer Development project, despite some significant problems, was able to test an experimental group-lending concept involving farmer associations. Similarly, the Arusha project in Tanzania reported that its process approach to planning resulted in projects reflecting Tanzanian attitudes and decisions. The Kenya Agricultural Sector Loan I helped improve the implementation capacities of participating cooperatives. Other projects in Costa Rica, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Kenya made progress in involving private-for-profit elements in input distribution.

Certain problems have been experienced with ad hoc combination channels. Evaluators of complex projects in several cases observed that the design was overambitious. The design of the Honduras Agricultural Sector Loan II was said to be "fraught with flaws and erroneous assumptions", in large part due to its complexity. The design of the Entente Food Production project failed to make adequate plans for the financing of subprojects after project completion.

Where several distinct institutions have been involved in service delivery, coordination problems have arisen. The project design often provided little or unclear guidance about the way in which decisions were to be arrived at and implemented and what the input of each participant was to be into the process. The Tanzanian Livestock Marketing Development project suffered from unclear design and poor coordination. Jurisdictional disputes between institutions participating in the Jordan Valley Farmers Association Credit project slowed progress. Project documents for the Honduras Agricultural Sector II project failed to specify the roles of the different planning institutions involved.

Although participation may be broadened with the use of the ad hoc combination approach, an effective beneficiary input into decision-making does not necessarily follow. Agricultural credit societies were a crucial component of the Haiti Small Farmer marketing project, but the actual beneficiary participation in cooperative organization was reported to be inadequate. The Jordan Valley Farmers Association project experienced similar problems, but evaluators observed that there, the one farmer-one voice concept was caught up in the "reality of the tribal elite environment". Nonetheless, when beneficiary organizations carry the responsibility for credit repayment and are unable to participate effectively in the consideration of loan applications, their viability is undercut. A similiar problem was a major reason for the ineffectiveness of local credit societies in the Tunisia Small Farmer Supervised Credit project.

A problem characteristic of many ad hoc public/private combinations is that new organizations are often created to coordinate service delivery. Longer time frames are often necessary to work out initial organizational problems. Frequently, too much is expected too soon, as occurred with the Jordan Valley Credit project. Technical assistance was said to be more appropriate for mature institutions rather than for one newly-created and struggling. Similarly, immediate project impact was focussed on to the detriment of institutional development in the Small Farmer Development project in Haiti. One evaluator expected beneficiary impact to be consequently short-lived. In Tunisia, local credit societies were said to be ineffective because they were perceived as an artificial construct on the public sector bank involved. The societies failed to generate the expected peer pressure as farmers felt they owed it no allegiance.

The sustainability of activities once outside support is withdrawn is an issue. Aside from the obvious difficulty of maintaining subsidized services such as small farmer credit, maintaining the high levels of institutional management and coordination required is a problem. The coffee cooperative committee of the Haiti Small Farmer Marketing project was reported to be inactive due to its members' lack of interest. Even more difficult is the maintenance of agricultural cooperatives and other farmer associations as viable economic and administrative contributors to service activities.

b. Parastatals

A parastatal is a government-controlled institution set up and operated along corporate lines. It is intended to combine many of the advantages of both public and private sector institutions. Such entities carry the backing and authority of government policy yet often function more efficiently than most public agencies. Many of the semi-autonomous public agencies involved in ad hoc public/private channels might be described as parastatals. However, of the sample projects, two clearly involved parastatals to deliver services.

Evaluators of the Afghan Fertilizer Company found improvement in fertilizer distribution resulting from the parastatal's early operation. The company was said to operate more efficiently than other government institutions. The

Tanzanian Livestock Marketing Company and other livestock parastatals involved in the Livestock Marketing project showed progress in establishing and utilizing markets, weigh stations and holding and watering grounds.

However, parastatal use has inherent difficulties. Beneficiary participation is not easily incorporated. Also, as a government entity, its autonomy is limited. Disadvantageous public policies can circumscribe its effectiveness. Tanzanian government marketing regulations and price fixing resulted in purchasing inefficiencies and high transport costs for livestock parastatals. The Afghan Fertilizer Company operated amidst pressures to revert to traditional operating modes. It also relied heavily on outside technical advisors.

c. International regional organizations

International regional organizations have been categorized as public/private channels because of their public, yet supra-national nature. Services delivered through this vehicle are provided through organizations funded at least partially from public sources in member countries. Operations are usually heavily influenced by public sector representatives from participating nations. Two sample cases involved this approach

The international regional channel has shown several advantages. Both the Entente Food Production project in Africa and the Asian Development Center allowed a regional coordination of strategies to reduce constraints to production. Greater access was possible to expertise within member nations. A more effective regional policy dialogue was facilitated through information exchanges and studies. Also, the potential for wide disemmination of research results, recommendations and improved inputs was enhanced.

However a number of significant problems were encountered with these two projects. Because the Asian Vegetable Center received funding from several countries as well as AID, varying fiscal practices between donor nations posed obstacles to effective planning. International political tensions between member nations were another persistent problem. The Entente project received inadequate support from participating governments, a problem compounded when much of its decision-making authority was taken away. The project also suffered from faulty assumptions about local conditions and from weak subproject design in some cases.

3. Private Channel

In the late 1970s and early 1980s more emphasis began to be placed on providing agricultural credit, input and marketing services through the private, rather than the public sector. There have been several motives for the change in approach. A wider range of human, material, and economic resources may be tapped. Use of a private structure can allow a more flexible, intensive mode of operations that allows activities to respond more appropriately to local conditions. More direct participation in service provision may be facilitated for beneficiaries. Operations may be more efficient as appropriate incentives encourage a more effective sustained effort. Finally, private sector participation may ultimately permit an expanded, more equal distribution of benefits than commonly possible with public sector involvement. This study identified three major subdivisions within the private sector institutional channel: PVO, cooperative, and private-for-profit.

a. Private Voluntary Organization channel (PVOs)

A PVO channel provides services through a non-governmental, non-profit organization, often with international linkages, which relies to a significant degree on private grants and contributions for revenue and draws on volunteers to carry out programs. PVOs are a heterogeneous group and may be religious or secular, large or small, be based in the U.S. or in the host-country and may provide a number of services, both humanitarian and/or material.

Overall, PVOS were used as a primary channel in 8% of the projects. In their early years, PVOs were involved mainly with relief, disaster assistance and food distribution. More recently, they have moved toward alleviating the causes of poverty and the improvement of the quality of human life in the Third World. Although PVOS formed part of delivery structures in public/private combinations prior to 1973 (Table 4), little emphasis was placed on their use as principle delivery channels. After 1973 they were utilized as principal vehicles more frequently, in 12% of the cases. Almost one-fifth of the Africa projects after 1973 provided services through a PVO channel, more than in any other region.

In the projects examined, PVOs most often provided multiple services, 68% of the projects involving them as primary channels. The PVOs tended to be involved in intensive, rather than extensive activities, working with relatively small groups of beneficiaries in limited geographic areas. Their emphasis on multiple services is probably related as well to the fact that PVOs often work with isolated fringe groups often overlooked by other institutions operating on a more cost-effective basis. PVOs provided a single service in only five cases, two projects involving marketing and two involving institution-building services, and one providing fertilizer. No PVOs were used as a primary delivery mechanisms for single service credit, seeds, or farm machinery, perhaps because of the relatively high costs of large scale operation in those areas.

The PVO, considered an independent development agency in its own right, has been used to extend AID's own effectiveness to community level involvement, complementing the role of the public sector. In 1981 the U.S. Congress directed AID to make available to PVOs at least twelve and up to sixteen percent of its development and disaster assistance funding.*

A 1982 Policy Paper stated that PVOs embody the "traditional humanitarian ideals of the American people." Their orientation toward service makes them especially appropriate for situations in which the potential for profit is small. PVOs as a rule differ widely in philosophies, approaches and objectives. Their heterogeneity may be a source of innovation as they are able to interface with Mission priorities.

PVOs often have international linkages and access to technical, financial, and human resources that other non-public agencies do not. The International Voluntary Service, for example, provided technical advisors to the Agricultural Rehabilitation Development project in the Sudan. CARE was able in Chad to provide technical training to local farmers to sustain project activities.

A strong argument made for the PVO channel is its relative effectiveness with an intensive operating mode. Inputs and services are often more likely to be adapted to local needs and conditions. The seven PVOs funded through the Ghana Farmer Association and Agribusiness Development project were reported to be generally effective in the provision of inputs and the

* <u>AID Partnership in International Development with Private and Voluntary Organizations</u>, AID Policy Paper, Sept. 1982.

introduction of technical innovation. Replication of successful activities often followed "spontaneously." Similarly, the Acacia Albida Expansion project in Chad was able to achieve most of its innovation transfer objectives. Several of the Ghanian PVOs proved capable of extensive operations as well, but without the same emphasis on innovation.

Because of their relatively small scale intensive operations, PVOs have usually been able to operate with less bureacratic constraints and are more capable of experimenting. than other institutions. The Ghanian project found that PVOs were responsive to evaluations and were able to adjust operations accordingly. One PVO, Technoserve, altered its objectives entirely to emphasize technical assistance to other participating PVOs.

Despite the usefulness of the PVO approach, several problems qualify its advantages. While their heterogeneity can be a source of innovation, it may imply a diffuse and problematic implementation. Clear precedents and policy guidelines were lacking to govern PVO dealings with AID with its multiplicity of aspects. PVOs often had considerable difficulty meeting AID registration, commodity procurement, accounting, reporting, and monitoring requirements. The Ghanian project evaluators reported that a great deal of AID Mission time was required to work out such problems.

Although PVOs often afforded AID funds a wide impact for a relatively small cost, in general they were not found to be cost-effective. Many PVOs with international linkages are supported mainly through private revenue. However, indigenous PVOs are frequently completely dependent on AID for finances. Those involved in the Ghana project were said to be dismayed by AID's unwillingness to pay overhead for general support costs, a complaint the Mission considered to be valid.

Administrative and financial management capabilities were deficient in several cases. Evaluators of the Ghana project recommended that subsequent grants be given to a single U.S.-based PVO, which could then register and assist indigenous PVOS in obtaining and implementing grants.

The participation of beneficiaries in PVO operations was an issue observed by evaluators. PVOs have often excelled at facilitating beneficiary participation in project activities. However, in reality, beneficiaries frequently lacked effective input into decision-making. Also, as the CARE Acacia Albida project learned, field contacts with farmers may be best carried out with national, rather than foreign personnel.

Differing institutional priorities and agendas have at times proved a significant consideration in AID's use of the PVO channel. The 1982 Policy Paper recognized these differences, observing that the Agency is accountable to Congress and the PVOS to their contributors. It stated that "the motivations, interests and responsibilities of these development agencies are not, and should not be identical." Rather, the collaboration of the Agency and PVOs in the delivery of services is one arising from the convergence of complementary programmatic interests and objectives.

b. Cooperative channel

The cooperative channel provides services through a non-governmental host-country institution set up along cooperative principles of voluntarism, business purpose, democratic control and equitable sharing of benefits, which in an ideal state govern its organizational structure and operations*. The above definition of the cooperative channel has at least two important implications for this study. A number of cooperative organizations, particularly in areas of Africa and Asia, are in reality operated as government institutions and for the purposes of this analysis are categorized as public channels. Also, the degree to which the international principles of cooperativism just described actually govern a cooperative's operation varies from situation to situation.

Cooperatives were the primary delivery channel in 6% of the projects. The Latin American bureau was the only one to utilize cooperatives as a principle vehicle prior to 1973. According to Table 4, the use of the cooperative mechanism channels increased across the board after 1973, especially in Latin America.

* Policy on AID-U.S. Cooperative Organization Relationships March 30, 1980.

However, these figures do not adequately reflect the emphasis placed on the organization and development of cooperatives in the 1960s and 1970s, especially in Latin America. In those years a prodigous growth in credit unions, for example, in that region and a steady increase in Africa were observed.

Cooperatives were used as principle service delivery channels most often for the provision of multiple services, 55% of the cases. (Table 3) As with PVOs, cooperatives would seem to operate frequently in a intensive rather than extensive mode. Single service marketing activities were channeled exclusively through cooperatives in just under a third of the cases. Agricultural credit as a single service was provided in this manner in only one case.

Cooperatives are service-oriented and potentially provide an effective vehicle for the maximum participation of beneficiaries as members contribute their own resources and time. Consequently, cooperatives have often been considered as best-suited for the direct provision of services to rural areas, particularly where small farmers are concerned.

The Small Farmer Development and Marketing Services Cooperatives projects in Paraguay contributed to the development of viable farm supply and marketing activities through a central cooperative and financially self-sufficient member coops. The Rural Cooperative Upgrading project in Chile provided financial and technical assistance through a central cooperative to create development opportunities for small farmer members.

However, most of the inputs and marketing projects involving cooperatives have used them in combination with public and other private institutions. Twenty-two of the projects using a mixed public/private channel involved the use of cooperative associations. Credit services in Haiti, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Korea, Ghana, Kenya, and Jordan were provided to farmers through cooperative associations coordinating with public agencies. Improved seeds were distributed through cooperatives in Kenya, Paraguay, and Bolivia. Cooperative marketing service activities were carried out in other projects in Costa Rica, Haiti, Guatemala, and Liberia. At least one project in Ghana made fertilizer available through cooperatives.

The difficulties associated with the effective organization of cooperatives have probably precluded their use more frequently as primary delivery channels. Effective cooperative development was found to require a full-time commitment in the Bolivia Cereals Development project. The Guatemala Rural Development project reported that agricultural cooperatives were particularly difficult to organize and maintain as viable economic entities. The Accelerated Impact project in Guinea-Bissau discovered that the establishment of an irrigation cooperative and a farmer credit union was probably a unrealistic objective given its time frame. Also, restrictive government regulations often made effective cooperative activities difficult, as in many countries in Africa. Or, as was the experience of the Jordan Valley Farmers Association, the cooperative concept may not be easily workable given traditional patterns of authority.

An effective and responsible member participation has been at times an elusive goal to achieve. Farmers may not feel that the benefits of participation in cooperative activities will justify the commitment of scarce time and resources. Their margin for failure is usually slim. Evaluators of the Haiti Small Farmer Development project discovered that farmers believed that their coffee income could be best increased through better fertilizer use and skillful pruning, rather than with cooperative marketing and other project activities. Farmer interest in cooperatives has been discouraged where cooperatives are dominated by outside business elements. Or, where essential public sector support is to be forthcoming, a government's lack of credibility may prove an obstacle.

Cooperatives have evoked most effective participation where they have been indigenous organizations, as was the case with Haiti's agricultural credit societies. The Tunisia Supervised Credit project's credit societies were ineffective largely because they were perceived as artificial constructs of the National Bank. Participants in the Guinea-Bissau project, according to evaluators, were likely to be little motivated to form cooperatives since project services were provided them free of charge.

Cooperative institutions in many areas have been in existence for a relatively short period of time and remain in a rudimentary stage of development. The Jordan Valley Farmer Credit project evaluators reported that progress suffered because technical assistance provided was inappropriate for an immature organization. More emphasis was needed on working out basic administrative and organizational problems. New cooperatives sometimes have been overloaded, either because they attempt to take on too much too soon, as did IFICOOP in Chile, or are assigned too many responsibilities by the government or donor, as occurred with the Jordan projects.

Cooperative effectiveness has been hindered by a lack of financial management and administrative capacities. Agricultural produce cooperatives in Liberia were reported to lose money through poor business practices--paying too much for produce, inadequate loan collection, and excessive trust in employees. IFICOOP, the central cooperative involved in the Chilean Rural Cooperative Upgrading project, overextended itself through unsound loans to worker cooperatives and entered into bankruptcy. IFICOOP was able to renegotiate its debts and reorganize to continue operation. On the other hand, assistance to UNIPACO, a Paraguayan central cooperative, had to be terminated in 1975 when the organization was found to be "grossly incompetent".

c. Private-for-Profit

Services provided through a private-for-profit channel are delivered through a profit-oriented entity, either wholly host-country or with international linkages, which provides goods and services for the market and in which the means of production are privately-owned. Included in this group are not only the manufacturers, processors, and marketers of produce and consumer goods (including credit and other inputs), but the farmers themselves. These "profit-makers" also include that part of the U.S. private sector that can be encouraged to invest in LDCs, impart their managerial skills and philosophies, and transfer their technologies toward improving the host-country agricultural systems. This definition excludes PVOs that produce market products or services, non-profit-oriented or public-owned cooperatives, and parastatals, since these organizations tend to respond to motives in addition to or in place of the profit motive.*

The figures in Tables 3 and 4 by themselves can present a misleading picture of the role of the private-for-profit institution in credit, input and marketing services projects. Part of the reason for this may lie in the methodology of the study which identified primary service delivery channels through available documentation. Prior to the 1980s less emphasis was placed on articulating the private-for-profit

* AID, Agriculture, and the Private Sector, Albert Brown. LAC/DR/RD, 1981.

entity as a distinct agent of development with a distinct role to play in project implementation and service delivery. Consequently, it is often difficult to discern from documentation abstracts the actual role that private-for-profit elements played. It is possible that in a number of public/private combinations, the public institution was used mainly to receive donor funds and guarantee exchange while the private-for-profit agent played a greater role in channeling services.

Three projects were identified as clearly involving the principal use of this channel in service delivery: two in Latin America, and one in Asia. However, work was done involving private-for-profit entities in the 1960s and 1970s, particularly with commercial farming, agribusiness ventures, and other rural entrepreneurial efforts. In Latin America, substantial support was given to host-country private financial institutions, financieras, through which rural industry and agriculture-related activities were often funded. Also, an examination of projects with more recent start dates than considered here would reflect a more substantial direct role of this vehicle in project activities.

The 1982 Policy Paper on Private Enterprise Development states that a "greater reliance on private enterprise in Third World development is essential to the effective and efficient achievement of AID's central objective--to assist recipient countries to meet the basic human needs of their poor majorities through sustained, broadly-based economic growth". Much of the poor performance of LDC countries, it continues, can be attributed to incentive-inhibiting public sector activities. Its involvement in lower-than cost production and services in itself makes the public sector a formidable competitor. Scarce capital and management skills are often appropriated that might otherwise be utilized in the private sector.

Public policies discourage private-for-profit provision of agricultural services in a number of ways. Commodity price controls are often counter-productive when costs rise without an increase in revenue. Subsidies often prevent private involvement in input importation anddistribution. Unfavorable taxes and tariffs limit production for export which could earn exchange. Restrictive marketing regulations hinder efficient and cost-effective operations.

Several qualities of the private-for-profit approach account for its consideration for the provision of inputs and marketing services. The human, material, and financial resources available to private-for-profit agents exceed those of the State. The private sector as a whole in many LDC countries is considered to be relatively underdeveloped. However, individual farmers form the largest group of private-for-profit productive units and although their resources are usually dispersed, they constitute a great potential for resource generation and mobilization. One Latin

American private-for-profit institution, the Latin American Agribusiness Development Corporation, has been involved in stimulating the tapping of these diverse resources by supporting rural industries.

The private-for-profit sector channel has often proven to be more efficient than the public sector approach in the provision of certain services. The private Fauji Agrico Fertilizer factory in Pakistan was given good marks for construction and operating efficiency. Evaluators of the public Ashuganj Fertilizer plant in Bangladesh suggested that such operations were better handled by the private sector. Many of the technology transfer achievements of the Honduran Export Promotion project were acredited to the astute management of the private-for-profit personnel involved.

The free play of appropriate incentives has been shown to be an important factor in efficient and effective operations. The private retailers involved in fertilizer distribution in Pakistan and Afghanistan, it was observed, had a strong profit incentive to expand sales outlets as widely and efficiently as possible. Also, the private-for-profit channel may be more likely to offer the producer concrete incentive to utilize services, rather than simply calling on him to cooperate for the good of the country.

Experience has shown that a wider, ultimately more equitable distribution of services may be possible through a private-for-profit channel. A common view of these agents holds that their activities are dominated by greed and unfair profiteering and that benefits will accrue mainly to those who need them the least. However, in Bangladesh, it was discovered that public services without private participation reach only a small proportion of farmers, for the most part the wealthier. The public sector was found to be too bureacratic to effectively expand beneficiaries to include individual marginal farmers and sharecroppers. Likewise, in Afghanistan, evaluators reported that the public sector was unable to adequately handle large scale distribution of agricultural inputs. Where fertilizer and improved seeds were available through private sales outlets, however, their purchase and timely utilization within a five to ten mile radius rose to 60% of farmers, as opposed to a national average of 7%.

Services provided through a private-for-profit channel may ultimately prove more sustainable once project support ends. Prices charged for services that reflect their true costs can create less dependencies on outside support. Also, adequate profit incentives can motivate continued provision of services.

The use of private-for-profit agents, however, has not been without problems. They tend to be conservative about entering into certain high risk activities. The Guatemala Rural Development project experience, for example, was that the private sector is slow in building crop storage and handling facilities. It tends to wait cautiously for market trends to prove themselves to be permanent. In Afghanistan, National

Development Agricultural Services project personnel emphasizing the long term profitability of private input marketing encountered only limited success in stimulating private participation in fertilizer and seed distribution.

An effective beneficiary participation in the private-for-profit channel decision-making process has been difficult to develop. Evaluators of the Honduras Agro-Industrial Export Development project remarked that the main private-for-profit firm involved was unlikely to allow a peasant-controlled organization to participate in the marketing process. In that project another deterrent to beneficiary participation was the lack of credibility of a second processing firm, which was felt to be unsympathetic to farmer needs. The firm's poor relationship with the farmers was aggravated by its unwillingness to pay the going price for produce and by its frequent late payments.

Another consideration of the private-for-profit channel is that it may, because of its emphasis on cost-effectiveness, exclude segments of the population which are for one reason or another marginal. Although the allocation of resources through competitive markets is said to be almost invariably fairer and more equitable over time than public allocation, in the short term, marginal areas may be bypassed.

IV. Conclusion

Projects with publically-channeled services have reported progress or success in attaining certain objectives. Nonetheless, the direct provision of production credit, input and marketing services through public channels has not always been felt to be the most effective and appropriate way to improve farmers' welfare. Emphasis on use of the public sector in service delivery has thus been reduced in recent years. Phasing out government involvement is difficult, however, even where there is recognition of a need to do so. Policies of control and subsidization both discourage private participation and create constituencies with vested interests in continued public sector involvement.

The mixed public/private approach has sought to combine the institutional strengths of both the public and private sectors. The channel has served to broaden private participation in service delivery but the high levels of institutional coordination required are often difficult to sustain. Also, unfavorable public policies continue to impact on the channel's effectiveness. Use of this institutional approach has decreased in recent years as alternatives have been relied upon increasingly.

In recent years, more emphasis began to be placed on discouragiong public involvement in credit, input and marketing activities and on encouraging private sector participation.

The private sector participation aims at tapping a wider range of resources and eliminating some of the inefficiencies and counter-incentives often inherent in public sector involvement. Within the private sector, three major subcategories were identified.

Private voluntary organizations have often excelled at providing intensive multiple services to populations often overlooked by other institutions. Their access to diverse human, economic, and material resources has been a strong point, as has their flexibility. PVOs have often not been cost-effective and frequently have difficulty meeting AID implementation requirements. Differences in philosophies have at times complicated their relations with AID. However, the PVO channel has shown itself to be a viable alternative to be considered in strategies seeking to complement traditional ways of delivering services.

The use of cooperatives as primary delivery channels increased after 1973, and usually involved the provision of multiple services. Considerable efforts, however, had long been dedicated to their development. Cooperative involvement in service delivery has most often taken place in combination with public and other private institutions. On the other hand, cooperatives have shown themselves to be difficult to organize and maintain as viable economic and administrative entities. But although participation has often proved to be an elusive goal, cooperatives may be the channel with the most potential for beneficiary participation.

Experiences with the private-for-profit channel have demonstrated a number of possible advantages with the approach. Potentially greater resources may be accessible. The private-for-profit vehicle may be more efficient in service delivery where a free play of appropriate incentives is present. A wider, more equitable distribution of services may be possible and activities may prove more sustainable. However, these institutions may be reluctant to enter certain high-risk activities. Its cost-effective approach may exclude marginal populations. Finally, an effective beneficiary participation in service-delivery can be difficult to develop.

The provision of agricultural credit, input and marketing services in most countries has been dominated by the public sector, often with unfavorable results. In a number of countries, project activites have involved the expansion of the private sector participation. Experience has shown that the public sector can take responsibility for goods and services not feasibly provided by the private sector The latter is in a better position to provide other market-oriented services more efficiently and effectively, while the public sector performs regulatory functions.

Appendix A
Sample Project Summaries

Project Summary

Region: Africa Country Afr. Regional Proj #: 698041002
Proj Title: Rice Production Accelerated Impact-Guinea-Bissau
Amount Oblig: 13,149 Amount Expended: 8,972
Year Start: 1976 Year End: 1986
Documents: SPE; FR; PES
Strategy: Resource/Capacity building
Channel: D.I.
Focus: Seeds, Fertilizer, Farm Machinery, Credit

Implementation Assessment, Inputs/Outputs: Target of enrolling 150 families was surpassed. Inputs, commodities, technical assistance supplied.

Implementation Assessment, Purpose/Goal: Project a relative success by socio-economic standards. Rice outputs of participating farmers increased through use of selected seeds, fertilizer, dry-season irrigation. Per capita rice yields higher, per capita consumption up. Participants achieved approximate food self-sufficiency. Peasant assocation lacks financial responsibility for project costs. Neither agricultural coops or credit revolving fund created.

Problems/Issues: (1) Initial approval process for project activities difficult. (2) Lack financial accountability for project costs by peasant producers. (3) Lack real technical and management responsibility on part of producer associations. (4) Lack significant improvement in women's economic status. (5) Inadequate land for families desiring to participate. (6) Decline in production of sorghum because rice is more attractive, with cheaper inputs available. (7) Potential conflict between short term objective of farmer self-sufficiency and long term goal of eliminating rice imports. Farmers prefer to spread risks among variety of crops rather than becoming rice monoculturalists.

Comments: PURPOSE: (1) Increase rice output of peasants using selected seeds, fertilizer, dry-season irrigation, to become self-sufficient. (2) Create coops with financial responsibility for irrigated perimeters. Establish farmer credit union. NOTE: Project is said to be only example of intensive dry season irrigated freshwater rice cultivation. Project does not focus on higher production to increase marketing, but to help SF satisfy local consumption. LESSONS: (1) No heavy indebtedness is important incentive for participation--low risk. (2) Project's small organizational structure is key to successful operation--less logistical, communications, managerial problems. Information moves quickly from top to bottom and vice versa. (3) Credit union objective was unrealistic within time frame.

Project Summary

Region: Africa Country Area Dev Office Proj #: 6260203
Proj Title: Entente Food Production
Amount Oblig: 18,180 Amount Expended: 15,352
Year Start: 1976 Year End: 1984
Documents: Design Abst; Aud. Rep; SPE; PES
Strategy: Resource/Capacity building
Channel: Public/private: EF, with reps from member nations
Focus: Credit, marketing, farm machinery

Implementation Assessment, Inputs/Outputs: Fifteen food subprojects implemented in 5 EF nations by 1982, including activities in staple food production, marketing, transportation, credit. Managers trained for each subproject. Participant training performed well.

Implementation Assessment, Purpose/Goal: Five ministers of agriculture of EF countries met in 1981 to discuss production incentive problems. 1981 evaluation noted that project failed to develop plan to finance subprojects after project completed.

Problems/Issues: (1) Serious problems in overall and subproject planning and management. (2) Potential beneficiary impact will be obscured by lack of baseline data. (3) Subprojects delayed because AID technical assistance not provided on timely basis. Host government lacked capital funds and sound financial management procedures. (4) Lower than expected economic returns. (5) EF's responsibility for coordination taken from it by Entente Council. (6) EF failure to comply with AID reporting, monitoring requirements. (7) Inadequate participation of target beneficiaries in design of some subprojects. (8) Procurement delays. (9) Not enough thought given to credit component in some subprojects.

Comments: GOAL: Increase per capita production of staple food crops for domestic consumption. PURPOSE: Assist Entente countries to make necessary adjustments in agricultural sector policies to enable them to implement assistance strategy to SF and to evalate efficacy as means for increasing food production. NOTE: Evaluators felt that EF was a cost-effective channel for AID funds.

Project Summary

Region: Africa   Country C.A.R.   Proj #: 6760001
Proj Title: C.A.R. Seed Production Center
Amount Oblig: 272   Amount Expended: 272
Year Start: 1976   Year End: 1980
Documents: Design Abst; SPE
Strategy: Resource/Capacity building
Channel: Public: GOCAR Grimari Agricultural Center
Focus: Seeds

Implementation Assessment, Inputs/Outputs: Grimari station and facilities observed to be almost complete in 1979 evaluation. 1978 rice seed production on target at 30 tons. Peanut seed production off target by 25%. Personnel training in seed production practices was unstructured and of negligible impact.

Implementation Assessment, Purpose/Goal: Faulty assumptions regarding agriculture production constraints affected purpose and goal achievements. Under conditions observed in 1979 evaluation, project had little chance of suceeding on time, would probably deteriorate after withdrawal of expatriate personnel.

Problems/Issues: (1) Fau

Project Summary

Region: Africa Country Chad Proj #: 6770008
Proj Title: OPG Acacia Albida Expansion Proj.
Amount Oblig: 1,110 Amount Expended: 1,110
Year Start: 1978 Year End: 1979
Documents: OPG Prp; PES
Strategy: Resource/Capacity building
Channel: PVO: Care, Inc.
Focus: Fertilizer (Acacia trees as fertilizer)

Implementation Assessment, Inputs/Outputs: Most of inputs/outputs achieved. Seven of eight planned seedling nurseries established. 1600 of 1750 planned farmers participating. 400,000 seedlings planted on 3,500 hectares with 400,000 trees of 450,000 planned.

Implementation Assessment, Purpose/Goal: Degree of acceptance by farmers of Acacia Albia trees as low-cost way to increase yield is unclear. Farmer participation in protecting the new trees was difficult to motivate. Farmers expressed most interest in firewood and fruit trees.

Problems/Issues: (1) Farmer participation below expectation. (2) Farmers more interested in planting trees for firewood and fruit production. (3) Only 40% of seedlings survived irregular rainfall and grazing animals, necessitating plans to plant 3x more seedlings.

Comments: PURPOSE: Establish use of Acacia Albia tree as recognized, low-cost way to increase grain yield for subsistence farmers. NOTE: CARE to manage project and train Ministry of Forestry personnel to ultimately take over the effort. LESSON: Field operations and contact with farmers must be carried out entirely by Chadians.

Project Summary

Region: Africa   Country Ethiopia   Proj #: 6630172
Proj Title: Agricultural Sector Planning
Amount Oblig: 477   Amount Expended: 477
Year Start: 1973   Year End: 1978
Documents: Design Abst; PAR(2)
Strategy: Policy/Planning
Channel: Public: Central Ministries, agencies
Focus: Institution-building

Implementation Assessment, Inputs/Outputs: Activities up to 1974 were said to be devoted mainly to ad hoc assigments. Small grain structure analysis prepared with advisors' assistance. Agricultural development projects prepared. Evaluation manuals for budget, ministry operations developed. Major crop surveys completed. Long-term, short-term participant trainees trained. Planning Department played a key role in first two project years in preparation of agricultural development strategy for GOE 5 year plan. MOA budget system streamlined and standardized.

Implementation Assessment, Purpose/Goal: 1974 evaluation stated that Planning Department served no functional role in coordination of MOA development strategy, although was designed as a major contributor. By 1977, Planning Department was depleted of most technical assistance personnel; programming activities were shifted away to MOA.

Problems/Issues: (1) Insufficient ministerial support. (2) Political unrest, GOE staff changes. (3) Disparate salary levels between MOA agencies. (4) Need for improvement of return and efficient utilization of participant trainees. (5) AID manager unable to devote sufficient time to project due to drought relief and rehabilitation matters. (6) Effective evaluation undermined without complete, up-to-date logical framework. (7) AID and other donor roles ill-defined. (8) Second interim PROP prepared by AID limiting assistance through 1975

Comments: GOAL: Assist IEG in planning, implementation, evaluation of rural and agricultural development program and projects during fourth 5 year plan. PURPOSE: Assist IEG Central Ministries and agencies engaged in planning Ethiopia's agricultural and integrated rural development efforts, with particular reference to programming management and evaluation, as well as manpower development LESSONS: Institutional viability of implementing agencies should be examined, particularly the relationship with central planning commissions and the level of government comittment to the project.

Project Summary

Region: Africa Country Ethiopia Proj #: 6630111
Proj Title: Agricultural Advisory Services
Amount Oblig: 2,947 Amount Expended: 2,947
Year Start: 1964 Year End: 1976
Documents: PROP; Aud Rep; PAR(3)
Strategy: Policy/Planning
Channel: Public: Ministry of Agriculture
Focus: Institution-building, Marketing

Implementation Assessment, Inputs/Outputs: Assistance in development of Agricultural Ministry organizational structure given. 1969 audit noted agro-industrial survey approved. Third 5 year development plan devised. Fourth 5 year plan development hampered by GOE staff changes. Sidamo province markets reestablished. BS, MS-trained technicians preparing project proposals by 1973. Grain marketing studies completed. Commodity index time series in effect in country.

Implementation Assessment, Purpose/Goal: 1969 audit reported AID technicians improved efficiency of Ethiopian agricultural methodology. Some progress made in establishing economic-oriented planning unit within MOA to provide development guidance. Marketing operations of meat, grain, livestock improved. Additional progress in technical, administrative capabilities of MOA reported in 1973.

Problems/Issues: (1) Budget restrictions delayed establishment of economics/statistics unit until 1972. (2) Insufficient ministerial support. (3) Political unrest, lack of GOE staff continuity (4) Salary disparities contributed to turnover. (5) Ill-defined goals. (6) AID aid limited in second interim PROP after 1975.

Comments: PURPOSE: Improve overall policy, planning, administration, development of all phases of agriculture and agro-industry in Ethiopia.

Project Summary

Region: Africa   Country Ghana   Proj #: 6410067
Proj Title: Managed Input and Agricultural Services
Amount Oblig: 12,969   Amount Expended: 12,942
Year Start: 1976   Year End: 1982
Documents: Design Abst; Prg Rpt; PES; Final Rpt
Strategy: Resource/Capacity building
Channel: Public
Focus: Fertilizer, Machinery, credit, seeds, marketing

Implementation Assessment, Inputs/Outputs: By 1979, seed processing centers planned. Surveys and topographical maps completed. Seed marketing unit farms producing foundation seeds. In-country and US participant training provided. 1979 evaluation stated that project failed to provide inputs--fertilizer, seeds, credit, technical services to small farmers as planned. Commodity orders filled, but delayed. Technical services for seed and credit components delivered satisfactorily, but delayed for research component.

Implementation Assessment, Purpose/Goal: Moderate progress observed in 1983 final report in regard to strengthening of delivery capability of implementing agencies.

Problems/Issues: (1) Three year drought lowered overall agricultural production. (2) Satisfaction of conditions precedent to disbursement of loan funds occurred 20 months after first obligation of grant funds, losing desired simultaneity of funding. (3) Lack of materials resulted in 1/3 completion of construction. (4) Deterioration of economy caused rapid decapitalization of credit capital and scarcity of foreign exchange for fertilizer and pesticides.

Comments: GOAL: Increase agricultural production on small holdings leading to higher levels of income and welfare of small farmer in Ghana. PURPOSES: Develop institutionalized, coordinated system to provide improved agricultural inputs and services to small farmer on timely basis, particularly in areas served by Agricultural Development Bank's new farm loan office. LESSONS: (1) Similar projects should focus on strengthening existing institutions rather than creating new ones. (2) Thorough appraisal of economic and political constraints should be made at outset. (3) Special evaluation /redesign efforts should be initiated for rapidly changing social and economic environment.

Project Summary

Region: Africa Country Ghana Proj #: 6410072
Proj Title: Farmer Association and Agribusiness Dev. PVO OPG
Amount Oblig: 3,252 Amount Expended: 3,248
Year Start: 1977 Year End: 1982
Documents: PP; PES; SPE; FR
Strategy: Resource/Capacity building
Channel: PVO
Focus: Credit, Marketing, Institution-building

Implementation Assessment, Inputs/Outputs: Generally effective in delivery of inputs. Implementation somewhat diffuse because of innovative character. Some of 7 participating PVOs exceeded targets. 41 rural development projects implemented in 26 districts, affecting 40,000 villagers. Crop associations, farmer service centers, small factories, poultry projects established.

Implementation Assessment, Purpose/Goal: PVO activities contributed to goal, but measurement not possible. Most subgrantees adhered to grant terms, achieved objectives, goals to fullest extent possible. Production of useful commodities through sub-projects led to increased income and employment. PVOs strengthened, organizational changes made. Several distinct approaches identified and compared. Project felt to be highly replicable.

Problems/Issues: (1) Much AID time required to develop guidelines. Project operated at times without clear precedents. (2) Commodity procurement problems. (3) Umbrella nature of project creates need for strong manager. (4) Lack of beneficiary representation in decision-making. (5) Difficult interface with AID requirements--procurement, accounting, registration. (6) Deterioration of economy contributed to degree of failure in all subprojects. (7) Complete PVO dependence on AID for finances. AID unwilling to pay overhead for general support costs; Mission saw it as valid complaint. (8) PVOs not cost-effective.

Comments: GOAL: Foster improved and more equitable distribution of incomes, expanded employment opportunities and increase well-being of rural farmer and non-farm rural people. PURPOSE: Supplement private and voluntary initiative and action in order to determine appropriate and/or optimal means of achieving wide-scale rural improvement through farmer associations and rural-based business enterprises. LESSONS: Model simplified government approval of projects, encouraged PVOs to work in sectors of AID strategic or program interest, opportunities for inter-PVO collaboration provided. PVOs demonstrated flexibility, respond positively to evaluation. Most have international linkages, access to technical, economic, human resources beyond Ghana. Activities relatively small-scale, easily controlled. Work in overlooked fringes. Recommend one grant to US PVO, to then register indigenous PVOs.

Project Summary

Region: Africa Country Kenya Proj #: 6150171
Proj Title: Agricultural Sector Loan I
Amount Oblig: 12,988 Amount Expended: 12,988
Year Start: 1975 Year End: 1980
Documents: CAP; PAR; SPE
Strategy: Resource/Capacity building
Channel: Public/private: GOK; Agri Finance Corp., Kenya Farmers Assoc., Coop Bank of Kenya
Focus: Credit

Implementation Assessment, Inputs/Outputs: Applications received, processed, and credit delivered to 8500 farmers. Accounting system established at 12 unions, 75 societies in program. Planning exercises delayed. Coop Bank failed to establish revolving marketing loan program. Coops showed reasonable progress in improving implementation capabilities. 12,000 SF selected and trained in training center in modern technology

Implementation Assessment, Purpose/Goal: Input delivery system created to distribute seed, fertilizer and other agricultural chemicals. Balance of Payments goal achievement hindered by drought, but magnitude of production decrease was lessened by project.

Problems/Issues: (1) Buying, selling practices were problems. (2) Some unions late in furnishing accounting info, delaying release loan funds, input delivery. (3) Delays in establishing standardized marketing procedures, because of unacceptable sales, storage areas in some unions. (4) Loan analysis procedures inefficient, slow. High delinquency. (5) Long-term viability predicated on loan revenues. Project works with SF with unproven creditworthiness. Loan recoveries extremely low.

Comments: GOAL: Long-term: Improve welfare of small farmer.
Short-term: Relieve BOP pressures, reducing wheat imports, increasing production of exportable maize surpluses.
PURPOSE: Long-term: Improve service infrastructure serving SF--coop credit, training, education, inputs supply, marketing, storage facilities.
Short-term: Increase food crop production

Project Summary

Region: Africa Country Liberia Proj #: 6690127
Proj Title: Agricultural Cooperative Development
Amount Oblig: 1,400 Amount Expended: 1,400
Year Start: 1977 Year End: 1982
Documents: SPE(2); PES
Strategy: Resource/Capacity building
Channel: Public/private: MOA Coop Division
Focus: Marketing

Implementation Assessment, Inputs/Outputs: Project said to have not achieved all projects but benefitted agricultural cooperatives. Efforts to improve quality of coffee, cacao by purchase according to grade met with little success. Two week seminar given for MOA auditors, Coop Division. 3 week training given to CD staff. Recordkeeping procedures devised for ACs, spot audits conducted. Technical assistance given to ACs and Liberian Federation of Cooperatives. Analyses done of issues basic to expansion, evaluation of coop system in Liberaia. Establishment of Coop division in MOA not successful. Coops provide collection points for produce. Training MOA officials to provide Coops with technical services was not successful.

Implementation Assessment, Purpose/Goal: Project provided tangible evidence that cooperatives provide benefits to small farmers. Growing acceptance of Agricultural Coops by farmers. 1976-1980 number increased from 18 to 26. Volume of produce sold through coops rose from 58% to 71% Sales up from $2.9 million to $19.7 million. More credit needs being met through coops.

Problems/Issues: (1) Money vanished from AC coffers. (2) ACs too often dominated by business sub-agents operating ACs for own benefit. (3) Inadequate accounting of loan fund by AC management. (4) Neglect of remote village members. (5) Government uncertainties, invalid assumptions that MOA would increase Coop Division budget to allow hiring of more personnel. (6) Lack of counterparts for all advisors.

Comments: GOAL: Increase agricultural production and economic benefits for rural householders involved in small scale agricultural production. PURPOSE: Increase small farmer production through development, financing sound coop system. LESSON: Need apex coop organization to develop AC supply system and give farmers a voice with Agricultural and Cooperative Development Bank. The establishment of effective Coop Division within MOA relatively unsuccessful.

61

Project Summary

Region: Africa   Country Mauritania   Proj #: 6820211
Proj Title: Rural Assessment Survey
Amount Oblig: 5,600   Amount Expended: 5,600
Year Start: 1978   Year End: 1981
Documents: Design Abst; SPE
Strategy: Policy/Planning
Channel: Public: Ministries of Planning, Rural Development,
Focus: Institution-building

Implementation Assessment, Inputs/Outputs: Phase I baseline, subsector, and functional studies seriously behind schedule, as noted in 1981 evaluation. Phase II option paper and studies' completion felt unrealistic in light of available time and staff.

Implementation Assessment, Purpose/Goal: 1981 evaluation noted failure to integrate and coordinate component studies adequately or to properly design surveys. Little progress observed in institutionalizing a data collection and analysis capacity within Mauritania government.

Problems/Issues: (1) Project design unrealistic and overambitious in light of short time frame and logistical difficulties in conducting research in Mauritania. (2) Staffing inadequate, inadequate experience of planners, consultants, in macro-economics. (3) Performance of contractors poor in terms of financial management, recruitment and assignment of personnel and conduct of research.

Comments: GOAL: Lay basis for long-term economic development with emphasis on rural sector. PURPOSE: (1) Develop information for decision-making and choice among alternative development paths and strategies in Mauritania. (2) Translate alternative development paths and strategies into specific programs and projects.

62

Project Summary

Region: Africa   Country Senegal   Proj #: 6850209
Proj Title: Senegal Grain Storage
Amount Oblig: 4,900   Amount Expended: 4,581
Year Start: 1977   Year End: 1982
Documents: CAP; SPE(2); PES
Strategy: Resource/Capacity building
Channel: Public: National Marketing Board (ONCAD)
Focus: Marketing

Implementation Assessment, Inputs/Outputs: Major quantifiable construction objectives fulfilled, but used inappropriate design criteria for local conditions; quality unacceptable. Trainee goals not met. Two of three participant trainees being utilized in project. In-country training course inappropriate for needs.

Implementation Assessment, Purpose/Goal: ONCAD dissolved 10/80. Functions transferred to CAA following ONCAD collapse. CAA's inability to effectively purchase, store, manage, market millet was major reason for cost-ineffectiveness of project in general. Key marketing verifiers not met. GOS failed to purchase promised amount of grain. Small rural millet farmers and consumers got zero benefits. Project may have stimulated indirect induced benefits through employment, knowledge gained by local population but failed to benefit economy and population as whole.

Problems/Issues: (1) GOS efforts to hold farmgate prices at 1975 levels possibly counterproductive. Farmer cost increase without revenue increase could lead to exports, shortages. (2) ONCAD lacked resources to handle subsistence and cash crops. (3) Project assumption of strong committment, capacity of ONCAD was invalid. (4) Lack of political will, committment to project. (5) Inadequate funding. (6) Lack timely regional marketing (price) data. (7) Inadequate transport, communications systems.

Comments: GOAL: Establish grain stock to serve as buffer to be used by ONCAD in price stabilization efforts and as security stock constituted in high production years and released in low years. PURPOSE: Increase capacity of ONCAD to store and market millet and sorghum, reduce grain losses. LESSONS: (1) Ensure warehouses are built to suit local climate and technologies. (2) Encourage use of local materials, labor of acceptable quality. (3) Withhold final acceptance of and payment for contractor labor until desired quality standards met. (4) Gear training toward executive management, those capable of affecting government policy. (5) Stress trade aspects of food self-sufficiency, shifting emphasis from import substitutes to diversified export promotion.

Project Summary

Region: Africa   Country Tanzania   Proj #: 6210143
Proj Title: Arusha Planning and Village Development
Amount Oblig: 14,591   Amount Expended: 13,699
Year Start: 1978   Year End: 1983
Documents: PP; PES; Audit Report
Strategy: Resource/Capacity building
Channel: Public/private: Office of Reg.Dev., village councils
Focus: Marketing (roads), institution-building

Implementation Assessment, Inputs/Outputs: Seventy-six village projects (51% locally-initiated) begun by 1981. Six district strategy papers done. Village land use plan made to help define problems and constraints. Eighty-five of 476 miles of road rehabilitated by 1981, but investment endangered by lack of integration into government maintenance. Training activities on target. Difficulties observed getting on-going data collection system functioning.

Implementation Assessment, Purpose/Goal: Long term regional development plan devised, well-integrated with GOT support at regional and district levels. Regional planning capacities improved. Organizational dependency on technical assistance a problem. Long term development priorities and strategies emerging reflect Tanzanian decisions. Improvement of ag. production not realized because of external factors.

Problems/Issues: (1) External macro-economic problems, war with Uganda and drought. (2) Insufficient recurrent funds and government staff. (3) GOT policies unfavorable in regard to input supply, marketing, taxation, pricing. (4) Assumption of sufficient project-generated revenues invalid. (5) Unusual time and resources expended preparing projects, although expected to result in relatively trouble-free implementation. (6) Understanding of purposes and procedures difficult when large numbers of people involved in implementation. (7) Management differences between contractors and AID. (8) Difficulties meeting AID statutory and other requirements.

Comments: GOAL: Improve production, imcome, well-being of rural people of Arusha district. PURPOSES: (1) Strengthen capabilities of region, three districts and villages to identify, plan, implement and evaluate development activities within framework of policies and priorities of GOT. (2) Prepare long-range development plan. LESSON: (1) More important to generate projects addressing critical constraints than only those initiated by villagers. Key is not that villagers initiate, but that they approve and are fully involved in project development and are committed to success. (2) "Facilitator" approach given up for consultative one; because of Tanzanian socio-economic situation, unnecessary to bypass village leaders (3) Difficult to stimulate pure self-reliance through participation because villagers too conscious of donor's resources. (4) Cost of plan development less than producing other plans.

Project Summary

Region: Africa   Country Tanzania   Proj #: 6210122
Proj Title: Livestock Marketing Development
Amount Oblig: 4,427   Amount Expended: 4,289
Year Start: 1973   Year End: 1982
Documents: Design Abst; SPE(2); Aud Rep; Final Rep
Strategy: Resource/capacity building
Channel: Public/private: Tanzania Livestock Marketing Co, TanGov
Focus: Marketing

Implementation Assessment, Inputs/Outputs: 1977 SPE stated institutional aims not achieved; inputs used ineffectively. 1979 SPE noted establishment of Tanzania Livestock Marketing Co with Tanzanians holding key positions. Over 79 livestock markets constructed or remodeled. 15 Ujama Coop ranches formed. 3 District Development Corporations formed. 12 National Ranching Co ranches started. 1980 evaluation observed progress in establishment of markets, weigh stations, holding and watering grounds. 1982 Report noted 80% of planned 37 ranges established, eight of which used appropriate range management technologies. Water Development less successful. Training inadequate.

Implementation Assessment, Purpose/Goal: Difficulties noted in 1977 in subsector analysis and financial/management operations. Staff recruiting suspension and redesign of project recommended. Delays in reinitiating recruitment contributed to failure to meet original goals. However, 1980 evaluators felt project had excellent chance to provide inputs to increase sector productivity and profitability. 1982 report stated that project fell short of objectives. Trekers continued to use traditional routes because of inadequacy of new ones.

Problems/Issues: (1) Unfavorable TanGov policies, regulations, resulted in inefficient, high-cost transport. (2) Poor communications between parastatal and advisors. (3) Advisors had limited operation roles--not assigned suitable counterparts. (4) Slow start, design problems hinder achievement of objectives. (5) Inadequate government support. (6) Unclear goals, design. (7) Inadequate staffing, poor planning and coordination.

Comments: GOAL: Help TanGov achieve self-sufficiency and exportable surplus in livestock subsector and directly benefit 125,000 traditional and small producer families through improved earnings and more than 1,500,000 consumers, through adequate beef supply at equitable prices. PURPOSES: (1) Establish effective and efficient livestock marketing system in Tanzania. (2) Implement range management and water development aspects of International Development Association's livestock Development Project Phase II. (3) Improve financial, accounting, and management operation of Tanzanian Livestock Development Authority. (4) Provide comprehensive livestock subsector analysis.

Project Summary

Region: Africa Country Zaire Proj #: 6600050
Proj Title: Planning and Management Services
Amount Oblig: 1,117 Amount Expended: 1,117
Year Start: 1972 Year End: 1978
Documents: NCAP; PAR
Strategy: Policy/Planning
Channel: Public: Department of Agriculture
Focus: Institution-building, marketing

Implementation Assessment, Inputs/Outputs: Progress made by shifting project focus from operational one to technical assistance, training, and institution-building. Commodity delivery delays serious.

Implementation Assessment, Purpose/Goal: Department of Agriculture planning capability improved. DOA budget tripled between 1975-76. Empirical foundation laid for modern agricultural programming.

Problems/Issues: (1) Assigned GOZ staff was inadequate. (2) Commodity procurement delays. (3) Salary disparities a problem in comparison to other GOZ agencies.

Comments: GOAL: Contribute to Zaire's economic development by assisting in restoration and development of its extensive transport system and by increasing agricultural production. PURPOSE: Furnish key advisory personnel to assist GOZ officials in planning and allocation of resources.

Project Summary

Region: Asia   Country Bangladesh   Proj #: 3880016
Proj Title: Ashuganj Fertilizer Plant
Amount Oblig: 53,000   Amount Expended: 52,976
Year Start: 1975   Year End: 1982
Documents: Aud Rep; PES(2); SPE(3); CAP; IE; Misc
Strategy: Resource/Capacity-building
Channel: Public: GOB plant
Focus: Fertilizer

Implementation Assessment, Inputs/Outputs: Management resources were inadequate to implement project. AFEC had little capacity for productive supervision, decision-making, leadership. Operational authority not structured to ensure decisive, effective project implementation.

Implementation Assessment, Purpose/Goal: Use of inputs by farmers less than planned. Farmers see considerable risk under present conditions. Food production increases in general favorable, but below rate of increase of population. Food availability per capita worsening.

Problems/Issues: (1) Government control of distribution process hinders effective distribution.(2) Scope of work beyond capacity of certain participants (3) Accounting, procurement problems of construction (4) Poor cost estimates, cost-overruns, inflation (5) Inadequate supply of local technicians, inadequate pay scales (6) Poor weather (7) Government inputs delayed, lengthy contracting procedures (8) Lack timely, effective decision-making

Comments: GOAL: Improve quality of life, nutritional intake of people. PURPOSE: Increase agricultural yield by increasing fertilizer production. LESSONS: (1) Efforts of this nature should be in hands of private sector which has motivation to complete construction quickly and operate most efficiently. (2) Government idea that poverty produces shortages and requires government intervention is primary obstacle to dealing effectively with resource availability through market processes, the political dimension.

Project Summary

Region: Asia Country Korea Proj #: 4890688
Proj Title: Agricultural Credit
Amount Oblig: 14,000 Amount Expended: 14,000
Year Start: 1971 Year End: 1975
Documents: Prg Rep; CAP
Strategy: Resource/Capacity-building
Channel: Public: Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, National Agricultural Cooperative Federation (government-controlled)
Focus: Credit

Implementation Assessment, Inputs/Outputs: All loan objectives met, eligible items utilized, available credit for equipment extended. All covenants fulfilled. Principal and interest payments made--loan committee considered project loan a success. Commodity accounting system established and maintained.

Implementation Assessment, Purpose/Goal: Fertilizer usage increased as result of loan. Data otherwise insufficient for assessment.

Problems/Issues: Data insufficient

Comments: PURPOSE: Provide agricultural credit for mechanization and improved storage, thereby increasing food production.

Project Summary

Region: Asia   Country Korea   Proj #: 4890594
Proj Title: Rural Policy Planning and Survey
Amount Oblig: 6,000   Amount Expended: 6,000
Year Start: 1963   Year End: 1974
Documents: PROP, PAR(2) Prg Rep; EOT(4)
Strategy: Policy/planning
Channel: Public: Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, National Agricultural Coop Federation, Agriculture and Fisheries Development Corporation
Focus: Institution-building

Implementation Assessment, Inputs/Outputs: GOK implementing ability better than anticipated. Most targets achieved with no serious lags. Agribusiness management, marketing studies completed. Qualified technical advisors provided. Suitable participant training conducted. Commodities procured and used effectively.

Implementation Assessment, Purpose/Goal: Food production between 1964 and 1970 up 30%. Rural income up. Increased use of fertilizer and credit observed. But inputs of project not major determinant of farm production and income. Assistance did not make major contribution to sector growth. Development planning, policy formulation capability of ROKG strengthened. Project influenced ROKG attitudes, legislative policy.

Problems/Issues: (1) Some targets were over-optimistic. (2) Planning problems, little flexibility to deal with education for change within staff. (3) Not enough attention given to providing concrete profit incentives for farmers as well as adequate capital, supplies, technical guidance, and stable market. (4) Equal exchange of old for new seeds in seed programs resulted in distrust of farmer, little value placed on improved seeds.

Comments: PURPOSE: Assist ROKG to make most productive use of agricultural resources in order to maintain steady and rapid rural sector growth.

Project Summary

Region: Asia   Country Indonesia   Proj #: 4970189
Proj Title: Assistance to Agricultural Planning
Amount Oblig: 2,683   Amount Expended: 2,677
Year Start: 1973   Year End: 1981
Documents: Design Abst; PAR(2); PES
Strategy: Resource/Capacity building
Channel: Public: Department of Agriculture
Focus: Institution-building, Marketing, Credit, Seeds, fertilizer, pesticides

Implementation Assessment, Inputs/Outputs: 1978 PES observed participant training on schedule. Successful land use planning course for Ministry officials given, with result that additional courses to be funded independently of project. Total of 156 participant trainees prepared by 1978.

Implementation Assessment, Purpose/Goal: 1978 evaluation stated that studies, training, programs, symposium contributed directly and indirectly to increasing production and income for small producers. Gap bridged between grant and loan-funded projects. Project contributed to numerous new projects and GOI policy directives. Project inputs led to expansion in GOI rice storage program, flexible pricing system for fertilizer, expanded fertilizer production and several agricultural research programs.

Problems/Issues: (1) Procurement problems, GOI restrictions on importation of vehicles (2) Late start: delayed PP approval (3) Improved coordination between AID and participating GOI agencies could improve effectiveness. (4) High GOI priority given to project--an important factor in its effectiveness.

Comments: GOAL: Improved agricultural sector management, increase in food production. PURPOSE: Indonesian Department of Agriculture capability improved through utilization of modern agricultural technology inputs in conduct of specific priority agriculture production projects identified by area surveys, feasibility studies. LESSONS: Project said to be outstanding example of what can be accomplished when there is adequate flexibility to respond quickly. even when requirements deviate from detailed, restrictive implementation plan. Project fostered close rapport and credibility between GOI and AID agriculture professionals.

Project Summary

Region: Asia Country Regional Proj #: 4980212
Proj Title: Asian Vegetable Development Center
Amount Oblig: 3,000 Amount Expended: 3,000
Year Start: 1971 Year End: 1976
Documents: Aud Rep(2); PAR; NCAP
Strategy: Resource/Capacity building
Channel: Public/private: Asian Vegetable Center (funded by regional countries)
Focus: Marketing, seeds

Implementation Assessment, Inputs/Outputs: Implementation reported satisfactory in 1975. With support, Center developed quickly. Staff recruited, construction completed. Marketing studies, surveys published. Interaction with export production areas. Seeds distributed.

Implementation Assessment, Purpose/Goal: Insufficient data

Problems/Issues: (1) Procurement problems (2) Problems with international political pressures relating to Centers international organizational structure (3) Funding problems (4) AID disagreed with certain employment incentive policies and expenditures.

Comments: GOAL: Increase yield, quality of selected crops through research and training.

71

Project Summary

Region: Asia Country Pakistan Proj #: 3910403
Proj Title: Dryland Agriculture Development I
Amount Oblig: 688 Amount Expended: 688
Year Start: 1975 Year End: 1980
Documents: Prg Rep(3); Aud Rep; PES
Strategy: Policy/planning
Channel: Public: Barani Provincial government
Focus: Marketing, credit, farm machinery, seeds, fertilizer

Implementation Assessment, Inputs/Outputs: Marketing center construction begun. Efforts made to introduce equipment innovation. Pakistani personnel trained. Marketing surveys done. Seed and fertilizer distributed.

Implementation Assessment, Purpose/Goal: Project suceeded in increasing production on small unirrigated farms. Farmer awareness of better seed, fertilizer, cultural practices enhanced. Use, demand for seeds, fertilizer increased.

Problems/Issues: (1) Measureable objectives not agreed upon by GOP, AID, and contractor. (2) Problem ensuring provincial government compliance with project agreements. (3) Staff organizational structure inadequate to effectively realize broad goals. (4) Goals very broad, had to be re-focused on few well-defined activities, given time constraints. (5) Marketing system was traditional, centralized. Surpluses are small, localized. Poor storage, long transport distances, lack quality control, lack price incentives to produce better quality. (6) Inadequate information on rural life. (7) Startup delays, over-optimistic scheduling. (8) Rapid staff turnover. (

Comments: GOAL: Increase production of principle food commodities. Increase incomes of low income Barani farm families. PURPOSE: Establish conditions sufficient for adoption of production, income-increasing practices.

12

Project Summary

Region: Asia Country Pakistan Proj #: 3910419
Proj Title: Agricultural Inputs
Amount Oblig: 89,196 Amount Expended: 89,196
Year Start: 1976 Year End: 1980
Documents: PP; Aud Rep; CAP
Strategy: Resource/Capacity building
Channel: Public: Federal Directorate of Agricultural Supplies
Focus: Fertilizer

Implementation Assessment, Inputs/Outputs: Outputs largely achieved. GOP adopting series of new policies to broaden fertilizer distribution geographically. Licensing of dealers simplified. Private sector given more access to distribution.

Implementation Assessment, Purpose/Goal: Purpose largely achieved. Small farmers find more fertilizer available. Sustained fertilizer use reached parity with large farmer use--result of incentive policies and more fertilizer outlets.

Problems/Issues: (1) Lack of knowledge of small farmer credit needs implies either delay proposed project or proceed without sufficient information. Little known of grain storage needs. (2) Accounting, procurement problems (3) Increase in world fertilizer prices. Government price ceilings reduced incentive. (4) Small farmer credit coordinated with program--costs too high to be covered with interest revenue.

Comments: Goal: Increase agricultural production and increase farmer incomes. PURPOSE: Increased and better balanced use of fertilizer and other agricultural production inputs by all farmers, especially low income farmers.

Project Summary

Region: L.A. Country: Bolivia Project#: 5110053
Project Title: Agri. Dev. Sector I
Amount Obligated: 8,862 Amount Expended: 8,862
Year Start: 1975 Year End: 1980
Documents: PES(3);Aud Rep(2); Cap Ast Ppr
Strategy: Resource/Capacity building
Focus: Credit; Seeds; Marketing; Insti-building
Channel: Public: MOA, Ag.Dev Bank
Implementation Assessment, Inputs/Outputs: Credit component reached 164% more farmers than expected. $5 million in credit to 5,544 farm families. Average distribution improved seeds increased 1859% but potential production not reached. Training goals not met because of lack of qualified candidates.

Implementation Assessment, Purpose/Goal: GOAL: Per capita income, standard of living of rural people increased. Agricultural GDP increased from 2230 million constant pesos in 1975 to 2611 million in 1979. Production share of small farmer sector increased from 47% to 60% in 1979. PURPOSE: Credit component said to function well, a model for small farmer credit program, but market and price information were being restricted for political reasons. Major purposes of technology development achieved. Lack of necessary policy changes a problem.

Problems/Issues: (1) Construction, engineering problems (2) Delays of implementation activities (3) AID funding restrictions (4) Inadequate GOB counterpart funding (5) Procurement problems (6) Uneven MOA backing of marketing, training aspects (7) Insufficient qualified technicians to send for training without gutting sector's institutions (8) Inadequate market policy (9) Lack liason between credit and seed production (10) Inadequate cooperation between institutions (11) Farmer distrust of seeds (12) Personnel turnover.

Comments: GOAL: Reduce food gap by meeting growing food requirements through domestic production. PURPOSE: (1) Achieve significant increase in basic food production by target group (2) Strengthen commercial credit to respond to credit needs of small farmers (3) Increase credit made available for food production. LESSONS: (1) Cannot program technological development like production of "widgets" The plan for early extension of research results was faulty design. (2) Acquisition of commodities and technical services is time-consuming. Project should be scheduled accordingly. Implementation period should have been 5 years at beginning. (3) Future success of credit depends on implementation of consistent credit policies and administration free of special interests created by unstable socio-economic environment.

Project Summary

Region: L.A. Country: Bolivia Project#: 5110364
Project Title: Cereals Development
Amount Obligated: 17,562 Amount Expended: 17,562
Year Start: 1966 Year End: 1973
Documents: PAR(3); EOT(6); SPE(3)
Strategy: Resource/Capacity building
Focus: Seeds, Fertilizer, Credit
Channel: Public: MOA, YPFB, National Wheat Institute

Implementation Assessment, Inputs/Outputs: Soil, seed, and fertilizer research conducted. Viable wheat varieties identified, recommended, but suffered inadequate financial support. Seed Division of MOA strengthened, but has budgeting, personnel problems. Number of coops and pre-coops serving wheat growers increased, but were lacking in ability to serve members. Credit program noted as unacceptable to farmers.

Implementation Assessment, Purpose/Goal: Program not success envisioned, but production increases may have prevented more desperate domestic situation. Small decline in wheat imports observed in 1971. Increased use of improved seeds, increase in milling of domestic wheat. Yield increases of 30% in trad. production areas, but unable to develop new wheat technology to significantly break through present yield levels.

Problems/Issues: (1) Host country funding irregular, insufficient. (2) Political instability, lack continuity (3) Initital study of cost production by Bank inadequate.(4) Lack proper facilities for returned trainees (5) Farmers met consumption needs on less land, then increased production of competing crops with higher net return, rather than turn to off-farm wheat sales. (6) Lack farmer faith in certified seeds. (7) No grain seeds standards adopted by GOB. (8) Coop formation hindered by too complex regulations. (9) Difficult to know exact production figures--millers consider info private, farmers do not keep accurate records. (10) Timing of imports poor, often coincided with harvest, resulting in false shortages and surpluses

Comments: GOAL: Reduce dependence on foreign wheat sources. PURPOSE: Upgrade agricultural technology and improve wheat varieties to increase production. LESSONS: (1) Introduction of viable technology into subsistence environment depends on development of technology compatible with farmer objectives and feasible with physical, economic, cultural capabilities. Requires more time, effort, funds than recognized generally. (2) Relevant technology without appropriate institutional policies, especially regarding research and extension, may not result in more production. (3) Marketing policy not sensitive to external market forces such as contraband discourages millers from buying domestic.

Project Summary

Region: L.A. Country Brazil Proj #: 5120311
Proj Title: Northeast Agricultural Marketing
Amount Oblig: 12,728 Amount Expended: 12,728
Year Start: 1971 Year End: 1977
Documents: Design Abst; Annual Rep; Final Rep; Misc
Strategy: Resource/Capacity building
Channel: Public: National Bank for Economic Develpment, GEMAB
Focus: Marketing

Implementation Assessment, Inputs/Outputs: Five of 7 originally identified wholesale or mixed markets were loan-financed, plus three others. Seven assembly markets were constructed or were being terminated by 1977.

Implementation Assessment, Purpose/Goal: Public acceptance of wholesale markets was good; occupancey rates generally satisfactory, but should be higher for greater influence on marketing system. Markets operate highly independently of each other, although within project system.

Problems/Issues: (1) Problems in information disemmination, wholesale market facilities, grading and classification of goods. (2) State government changes (3) Disbursement slow due to need for redesign of certain markets, in response to inflation and higher costs.

Comments: GOAL: Improve marketing and distribution of food in North and Northeast of Brazil. PURPOSE: Financial and technical assistance to National Bank for Economic Development and the Executive Group for Modernization of Food Supply (GEMAB) in creating appropriately structured, viable, and efficiently managed and operated agricultural marketing system.

Project Summary

Region: LA   Country: Chile   Project#: 5130296
Project Title: Rural Coop Upgrading
Amount Obligated: 250   Amount Expended: 250
Year Start: 1976   Year End: 1980
Documents: Aud Rep; PP; PES; Prog Rep(2)
Strategy: Resource/Capacity building
Focus: Insti-building, Marketing
Channel: Cooperative: IFICOOP

Implementation Assessment, Inputs/Outputs: By 1978 50% of loaned funds were going to targeted low income members of reform sector coops. Classes given in accounting, economic planning and administration to member coops. Participant training given to managers, accountants, coop leaders

Implementation Assessment, Purpose/Goal: Financial crisis of IFICOOP and funding availability changes necessitated changes in expectations. IFICOOP felt to be performing adequately in reaching rural poor with resource availability constraints. IFICOOP's recovery to be monitored by GOC.

Problems/Issues: (1) IFICOOP overextended by replacing GOC as concessional agricultural production credit lender. Situation compounded by soaring interest rates, tight credit, poor management, monitoring. Went bankrupt in 1977. Later renegotiated debts and reorganized. (2) Termination US funding to Chile lowered available funding. (3) 25% delinquency rate observed in 1978 may have reflected poor lending policy or attempt to help high-risk clients.

Comments: SUBGOAL: Improve standard of living of Chilean SF. PURPOSE: Develop financing and tech assistance system for creation of marketing opportunities for SF coop members, increase income, value-added, and employment at coop level. Project to promote return to competitive, free-market economy and more rational efficient allocation of resources. GOC believed that efficient and equitable production and marketing services can be provided to poor farmers through coop framework.

Project Summary

Region: LA   Country: Colombia   Project#: 5140203
Project Title: Small Farmer Development
Amount Obligated: 2,157   Amount Expended: 2,157
Year Start: 1976   Year End: 1980
Documents: Design Abst; Audit Rep; PES(2)
Strategy: Resource/Capacity building
Focus: Institution-building
Channel: Public: Instituto Colombiano Agropecuario

Assessment Impl. Inputs/Outputs: Progress made more in "letter than in spirit". Progress noted in collection, utilization of objective data: description of field areas, methods for using secondary data.GOC lacked adequate structure: omitted certain concepts to be tested, such as adaptive research to solve identified key contraints.

Assessment Impl. Purpose/Goal: Prospects for achieving purposes and goal said to be limited, in 1979 PES. Goal indicators not felt realistic given three year project of such complexity.

Problems/Issues: (1) GOC accounting system inadequate for proper auditing purposes; no special accounting, reporting requirements from AID. (2) GOC implementation plan lacked adequate organizational structures. (3) GOC resisted AID efforts to redirect project and obtain necessary technical assistance. Disbursements suspended 2/15/80, pending reexamination of loan. (4) Critical inputs of technical assistance not made--GOC resistance to contracting non-Colombian personnel. (5) Incongruence of project design and implementation. Design required new methods that were in conflict with implementing agency's tradition of strict commodity approach. (6) AID managers not specifically skilled in technical areas of project.

Comments: GOAL: Identify and test methods which will lead to net increase in small farmer income and welfare on basis that will become self-sustaining. PURPOSE: Develop system for helping solve small farmer problems through identification, design, development of appropriate improved technology and other critical services.

Project Summary

Region: LA Country: Costa Rica Project#: 5150120
Project Title: Rural Dev. Program
Amount Obligated: 7,900 Amount Expended: 7,846
Year Start: 1975 Year End: 1979
Documents: Misc; PES(3); SPE(2); Ln Ppr
Strategy: Resource/Capacity building
Focus: Multiple, marketing
Channel: Public/Private: MOA, Nat. Ag Council, INFOCOOP, coops

Implementation Assessment, Inputs/Outputs: Progress made in increase of input sales, marketing services through coops. INFOCOOP lacked clear policy line. Marketing policies and structures instituted, but planned market info system and crop forecasting services were not, as of 1981. Improvements made in staff, farmer training. No improvement in info disemmination to farmers.

Implementation Assessment, Purpose/Goal: MOA not most effective delivery system for reaching SF. Design, implementation of projects slow, although system evolved. Loans to SF members made. Coop component reported as overall success, meriting further support. INFOCOOP strengthened. Coops in 1977 said to be becoming more viable and business-like.

Problems/Issues: (1) MOA as key instrument for changes in policy in short time part of faulty assumptions. Staff did not fully understand, support objectives. (2) Overambitious, one-sided planning. Project results described as largely budget-support operation rather than insti-development. (3) Insufficient participation of beneficiaries in design of projects. (4) Implementing agency linkages artificially created by need to have single loan package. Each has independent objectives. (5) GOCR financial system not appropriate for small scale decentralized operations.

Comments: GOAL: Increase income, living standard of SF
PURPOSE: (1) Improve MOA capability to service ag sector with special emphasis on SF. (2) Strengthen capacity of coop movement to respond to needs of members, especially SF.
LESSONS: (1) MOA delivery system for SF not most effective. Need system with greater flexibility and more rapid response capability. (2) Need agreement structures to allow institutional technical assistance prior to compliance with pre-conditions for disbursal.

79

Project Summary

Region: LA Country: Guatemala Project#: 5200204
Project Title: Rural Development
Amount Obligated: 22,846 Amount Expended: 22,846
Year Start: 1970 Year End: 1976
Documents: PES; SPE(3); LnPpr.
Strategy: Resource/Capacity building
Focus: Credit, Marketing, Seed, Fertilizer, Insti-building
Channel: Public: GOG, INDECA, BANDESA

Implementation Assessment, Inputs/Outputs: Participant training, technical assistance increased. Credit goals for 1971-75 mostly achieved or exceeded, but delinquency rate observed to increase. Grain storage, marketing activities below target in 1975. Lack adequate linkages to market. Too optimistic cost/return estimates initially.

Implementation Assessment, Purpose/Goal Final PES noted that advances made were necessary but not sufficient to increase production. Institutional development activities largely successful. A principle accomplishment was establishing institutional framework of loan. Confusion about loan purposes. AID administered it as if were loan for number of individual projects. GOG considered it support of general financial requirements of sector program. Impact on income, well-being of SF uncertain. Survey data conflicting.

Problems/Issues: (1) Too many trips to BANDESA for SF credit necessary. (2) Difficult to organize, maintain coops as viable economic entities (3) Need for close fertilizer liason with private sector (4) Insufficient evidence for evaluation of farm-level approach (5) Need more specific technology packages adapted to farmers situation, capacities (6) SF not homogeneous group (7) BANDESA reluctant to deal with small farmers. (8) INDECA processing, storage, marketing of diversified crops seriously weak. (9) SF adoption of tech slower than expected (10) World price hikes of fertilizer

Comments: GOAL: Help draw rural sector into more active participation in national life. PURPOSE: Introduce modern technology to processing of basic grain, diversified crops, handicraft production. Support GOG in reorganization, improvement administration of sector LESSONS: (1) Private sector slow building storage, handling facilities. (2) Programs do not demonstrate public channel is most effective in provision credit, technical assistance to SF. Programs greatest success in strengthening institutional base. (3) Education, transportation, off-farm employment opportunities may be more related to improvement well-being than production assistance provided directly. (4) SF development a long term undertaking Expectation of SF impact in under 5 years unrealistic. (5) High initial costs for information generation, analysis, pilot-testing hard to accept by LDC. Taxes patience, because development results are basis for judgement by peers.

Project Summary

Region: L.A. Country: Haiti Project#: 5210073
Project Title: Small Farmer Development
Amount Obligated: 6,403 Amount Expended: 6,403
Year Start: 1974 Year End: 1981
Documents: PES; SPE(3); PROP; FR; NCAP; CAP; Prog R; IRR; IE
Strategy: Resource/Capacity-building
Focus: Fertilizer, Credit, Inst-building, Marketing
Channel: Public/private: BCA, IHPCADE, SACs

Implementation Assessment, Inputs/Outputs: Progress made in testing group-lending concept. BCA administrative capacity strained by by 1979 by rapid influx of new loan societies. Coffee marketing facilities built, but not being fully utilized. Storage facilities inadequate. Road improvements had positive socio-economic effects on villagers, but felt unlikely to be sustained because low priority given component by GOH. Input supply of fertilizer adequate but with logistical, scheduling problems.

Implementation Assessment, Purpose/Goal: Incomes increased 70% by 1980 in target areas, coffee production up 40%. But did not break production constraints resulting from GOH fiscal policies. Largest improvements observed ion 1979 on poorest farms--1/2 from increased employment of under-utilized family labor, 1/2 from increased farm profits. Coop, society organization generally good. Farmer attitudes of coops changed, more awareness of coop importance. Project reduced dependence on informal credit.

Problems/Issues: (1) Delay beginning coffee research, delay in extension tech package. (2) Design evades policy constraints. tax question, perjudicial coffee export tax policies (3) Most SF not coffee producers, but subsistence farmers with coffee bushes. Use fertilizer on crops with highest anticipated return. (4) Delinquency rate high. (5) Loan processing too long. SF use them for other purposes because arrive late.

Comments: Evaluations differed in assessment of project success. One observed that using indirect institutional performance indicators as indicators of success or failure in achieving farm level change oversimplifies complex problem. GOAL: Increase net income of SF. Induce him to participate in self-help organization to increase socio-economic well-being. PURPOSE: Develop effective rural institution for provision of technology, services, supplies, credit to SF targets. LESSON: (1) SF assistance should be provided by institutions whose mandate or past performance demonstrates concern for target group. (2) Experience with BCA was an example of development focused on immediate project impact to detriment of institutional development: too much required too soon. (3) Group lending approach superior to individual lending structure. Costs lower, collective responsibility possible.

Project Summary

Region: L.A. Country: Haiti Project#: 5210083
Project Title: Small Farmer Marketing
Amount Obligated: 750 Amount Expended: 114
Year Start: 1977 Year End: 1983
Documents: Misc; PES(2); PP; IR;
SPE
Strategy: Resource/Capacity building
Focus: Marketing, Insti-building
Channel: Public/private: DARNDR, SACs

Implementation Assessment, Inputs/Outputs: Marketing information, technical assistance objectives not being reached in 1981 because of funding cuts, lack of GOH support. Many trainees not subsequently assigned to coops as intended. Training funds cut, hindering attainment objectives.

Implementation Assessment, Purpose/Goal: Partial improvement management capabilities of existing coops observed in 1981. Improvement quality of coop coffee but still not high enough. Most coops said to exist in name only. High coffee tax remains, principle constraint to favorable coffee market conditions.

Problems/Issues: (1) GOH export tax unfavorable. (2) Lack adequate roads. (3) Incidence producer dishonesty. (4) Lack adequate quality standards. (5) Training, marketing information, technical funds cut. (6) Lack beneficiary participation in regional coop organization. (7) Lack adequate institutional coordination. (8) Inadequate GOH support.

Comments: GOAL: Increase income, standard of living of rural poor. Provide additional foreign exchange or reduce food imports to alleviate BOP difficulties. PURPOSE: Develop improved marketing network of zonal, regional, local agricultural coops, and National Coffee Processing Center.

42

Project Summary

Region: LA   Country: Honduras   Project#: 5220150
Project Title: Agricultural Sector II
Amount Obligated: 19,000   Amount Expended: 8,679
Year Start: 1979   Year End: 1984
Documents: PP; Audit Rep
Strategy: Resource/Capacity building
Focus: Institution-building, Credit, Marketing
Channel: Public/private: Ag sector agencies, DIFICOOP, National Development Bank, Central Bank, municipalities

Implementation Assessment, Inputs/Outputs: 1982 Audit reports little progress for most activities. Many implementation, administrative problems. Information system activities show limited results. Marketing analysis delayed. Little progress with extension service. 35 of 900 community volunteer leaders recruited. No real progress with infrastructure component. Short term training not being implemented, but in-service training reprogrammed, operating smoothly. University and coop activites headed in proper direction but regional BANDESA offices not staffed or operational. Some reorganization done.

Implementation Assessment, Purpose/Goal: 1982 report states that as conceived at that time, project would be able to achieve neither broad goals or specific objectives. Assistance to strengthen Agricultural Planning sub-system mostly unsuccessful. Project felt to be in need of redesign.

Problems/Issues: (1) Design very ambitious and complex, "fraught with flaws and erroneous assumptions", according to 1982 audit. (2) GOH unable to contribute counterpart funds: deteriorating economic condition and/or GOH disinterest in the activities. (3) Program Administraton and Coordination Unit in Ministry of Natural Resources was inadequate, not a legal entity and lacked permanency and authority. (4) Lack of needed personnel. (5) Project documents failed to specify roles of different planning institutions involved. (6) Little progress made in addressing delinquency problem of BANDESA. (7) GOH not fulfilling adequately reporting requirements. (7) Mission monitoring not as effective as should have been, due in large part to design and complexity of program.

Comments: GOAL: Increase incomes of rural poor in Honduras. PURPOSE: (1) Establish efficient and cost-effective institutional structure and delivery system to serve needs of SF. (2) Increase number and quality of professionals in agricultural sector.

Project Summary

Region: L.A. Country Honduras Proj #: 5220120
Proj Title: Agro-Industrial Export Development
Amount Oblig: 1,187 Amount Expended: 1,178
Year Start: 1976 Year End: 1981
Documents: Aud Rep; PES(3); SPE(2); FR;
Strategy: Resource/Capacity building
Channel: Private Sector: Standard Fruit Co.
Focus: Marketing

Implementation Assessment, Inputs/Outputs: Planned project management group never created in GOH. Standard Fruit managed from year to year. Only two of seven target crops were field and market tested extensively. Loans begun to be made only in 1980-81. No baseline surveys completed. Packing plant built. Most formal training targets met, but trainees not always assigned to serve project. Transfer of growing, packing technology largely successful.

Implementation Assessment, Purpose/Goal: 1979 evaluation noted project created profitable model produce marketing business. Progress made in organizational development, training, dissemination new technology, achieving market acceptance of tomatos and cumbers. Income increase observed for 1680 of 3319 planned farmed families. 580 of 1800 metric tons vegetables planned exported regularly. No coordination mechanism for demonstration projects. No evaluation committee formed. No new agribusiness projects undertaken. No project funds established by GOH.

Problems/Issues: (1) One of private sector firms, Mejores Alimentos, (gov-protected industry), had poor relations with farmers, paid low prices. (2) Freezes, mediterranean fruit fly quarantine blocked tomato exports in 1980. (3) Redesign need noted for self-management and self-financing in 3-5 years. (4) Goal of raising farmer income in 4-5 years felt unrealistic. (5) Use of Standard Fruit complicated transfer of ownership to non-government group to serve needs of producers. (6) Little training of local people to take over operation at termination of contract with Standard Fruit. (7) Standard Fruit felt unlikely to allow peasant-controlled organizations to participate in marketing process. (8) Perception of Standard Fruit as multinational corporation noted as problem in 1978.

Comments: GOAL: Raise farm income. LESSONS: (1) Project needed longer time frame, took longer to accomplish objectives than anticipated. (2) Needed more systematic AID monitoring. (3) These activities more effectively-managed by private, not public, sector. (4) Farm groups should be required to have some knowledge of project, able to self-finance production costs for 1st year, later pay minimum packing payment. Allocate degree of risk to beneficiaries.

Project Summary

Region: L.A. Country Paraguay Proj #: 5260067
Proj Title: Assistance Agriculture Credit Loan
Amount Oblig: 8,786 Amount Expended: 8,786
Year Start: 1964 Year End: 1976
Documents: CAP; Misc; PAR
Strategy: Resource/Capcity building
Channel: Public: National Development Bank of Paraguay
Focus: Credit

Implementation Assessment, Inputs/Outputs: Careful consideration given farm plans. Credit demand by 1969 was higher than anticipated. Bank had realistic system to handle overdue accounts, with rescheduling of loans high. Lower net rate of delinquency. Problem noted disbursing remaining balance in 1975 by 1976 terminal date. Loans made to commercial dairy, poultry, other farming efforts, including to colonies and coops of European immigrants with experience.

Implementation Assessment, Purpose/Goal: First phase placed heavy emphasis on wheat but results disappointing: lack grower experience, unfavorable climate, poor seed quality, pests, diseases and high delinquency. Second phase emphasized additional crop, soybeans, reducing risks and delinquency rates.Credit program contribution was by 1975 effective in supporting expansion commercial farming, allowing changes in production technology. Borrowers observed using modern equipment.

Problems/Issues: (1) Delays in meeting conditions precedent to initial financing. (2) Finding counterpart financing of 1/3 guarani costs for each loan. (3) Sub-loan delinquency high. (4) Inexperience of technical staff approving loan. (5) Late equipment (6) Lack experience of some growers. (7) Weather problems (8) Loans from Argentina, Brazil lowered demand for US commodities.

Comments: GOAL: Fiscal reform, development planning, economic institution-building, economic growth, human resources development.PURPOSE: Development of agriculture, pasture improvement, cattle-breeding, dairy, lumbering, with directed credit and technical assistance. Note: Loan was tranched to provide leverage for fiscal reform. Loan aimed at middle and large commercial farmers. Only to farmers with access to motorized transport.

95

Project Summary

Region: L.A. Country Paraguay Proj #: 5260113
Proj Title: Small Farmer Development
Amount Oblig: 3,000 Amount Expended: 3,000
Year Start: 1975 Year End: 1979
Documents: LP; Aud Rep; FS; SPE(2); PES(2)
Strategy: Resource/Capacity building
Channel: Cooperative: CREDICOOP, UNIPACO
Focus: Credit, Insti.-building, marketing

Implementation Assessment, Inputs/Outputs: Project reported as successful in achieving most objectives, although one of implementing agencies was dropped in 1975. Although the AID loan came a year late, most inputs were utlimately provided on schedule. 1978 evaluation found that CREDICOOP marketing services had had positive impact and its financial condition was basically sound.

Assessment Impl. Purpose/Goal: 1978 evaluation described overall results as ranging from successful to limited. In area of share capital, savings in central coop, and marketing, goals reached or exceeded. Progress satisfactory in area of financial results, membership, loan value, delinquency rate. Project building foundation for effective savings and credit system. Project impact on SF income not ascertained.

Problems/Issues: (1) UNIPACO, marketing central coop, found incapable of continuing operations and dropped from project. Project purposes revised to focus solely on CREDICOOP. (2) SF inexperience using modern farm technology and formal credit. (3) Small margin for failure results in SF conservative attitude. (4) Coop institutions recently formed. (5) AID loan disbursed a year late.

Comments: GOAL: Increase SF production and income. PURPOSE: Develop, strengthen, institutionalize national level coop centrals' delivery services to SF.

86

Project Summary

Region: L.A. Country Paraguay Proj #: 5260102
Proj Title: Marketing Services Cooperatives
Amount Oblig: 682 Amount Expended: 682
Year Start: 1972 Year End: 1978
Documents: PAR(3); NCAP; SPE; PES
Strategy: Resource/Capacity building
Channel: Cooperative: UNIPACO
Focus: Marketing

Implementation Assessment, Inputs/Outputs: 1973 evaluation observed that output target achievement was low; some targets were unrealistically high.. 12 member coops marketed for 1250 farmers in 1974. Continuous on-job training provided coop leaders. Storage warehouses provided all coops; less progress in construction of silos. UNIPACO provided technical assistance to members in coordination with CREDICOOP. Adequate credit lines established. Participant shares increased.

Implementation Assessment, Purpose/Goal: Inadequate handling of expanded volume of marketing operation observed in 1975. UNIPACO had trouble building sufficient capital. Impact observed in 1975 on ensuring higher prices for producers. UNIPACO found grossly incompetent in 1975. Assistance was to be terminated. Grant activities refocussed on small farmer coops. Satisfactory progress toward improvement of financial position of 6 coops, now viable institutions. Contribution made toward goal of increasing income of 400 participating SF, as noted in 1977.

Problems/Issues: (1) Little progress in training coop management. (2) UNIPACO needed more than technical services of one advisor (3) Commodity procurement a problem. (4) Director Generall of Coops slow granting legal charter. (5) Lack sufficient manpower. (6) Inadequate GOP training assistance.

Comments: GOAL: Increase net income SF, 50% increase over 5 years. PURPOSE: Develop agricultural coop central and financially self-sufficient, well-managed members coops with viable farm supply and crop marketing. LESSON: Short term loan to coops that allow cash on delivery to farmers were important incentives.

87

Project Summary

Region: L.A. Country Peru Proj #: 5270149
Proj Title: Soy and Corn Production on Small Farms
Amount Oblig: 2,260 Amount Expended: 2,245
Year Start: 1979 Year End: 1981
Documents: Design Abst; Audit Rep; Misc
Strategy: Resource/Capacity building
Channel: Public: Agriculture Sector agencies
Focus: Seeds

Implementation Assessment, Inputs/Outputs: Considerable progress made, but shortfall in target achievement expected. Work plan developed with contractor team assistance for soybean research, production processing and marketing. Progress made in selection of candidates for training, commodity procurement.

Implementation Assessment, Purpose/Goal: Data insufficient

Problems/Issues: (1) Design problems (2) Lack of coordination among GOP ministry agencies involved. (3) GOP budget cuts, personnel shortfalls (4) Delays in Washington approval of project personnel.

Comments: GOAL: Increase productivity, employment, and income and improve nutrition among the poor. PURPOSE: Establish soybean production on 34,000 hectares of high jungle land, raise planting of improved highland corn seed to 36,000 hectares by 1980.

Project Summary

Region: Near East **Country** Afghanistan **Proj #:** 3060002
Proj Title: National Agriculture Development
Amount Oblig: 11,561 **Amount Expended:** 11,561
Year Start: 1952 **Year End:** 1979
Documents: Design Abst; PAR(3); Misc
Strategy: Resource/Capacity building
Channel: Public/Private: GOA, private input retailers
Focus: Fertilizer, seeds, machinery

Implementation Assessment, Inputs/Outputs: Eighty-three of 123 sales outlets established. Fertilizer imported and guidelines for its distribution developed. Mechanic operators trained. Foundation seed distributed. Farm machinery facilities constructed. Limited success getting seeds and fertilizer to private entrepreneurs. Seed division within MOA developed contracts with private producers. Participants trained.

Implementation Assessment, Purpose/Goal: Wheat production rose 10-12% in 1969. Where fertilizer and improved seeds were available through private retail outlets, 60% of farmers within 5-10 mile radius utilized them, as opposed to national average of 7%. Two major tasks were confronted: convincing government officials that importation and sale of agricultural inputs can be handled by private sector while government takes regulatory function, and demonstrating to private sector the long-term profitability of private import marketing.

Problems/Issues: (1) Bureacratic problems relating to pay scales, management of commodities, insufficient delegation of authority. (2) Public sector felt to be inadequate channel for handling large-scale distribution of inputs, but private sector only partially developed. (3) Inadequate coordination with other ministries, government agencies. (4) Scarcity of trained personnel. (5) Government subsidies of fertilizer were direct deterrent to establishment of private importation, distribution, sale. (6) Lack baseline date for planning of input requirements. (7) Storage facilites inadequate to handle doubled fertilizer imports.

Comments: GOAL: Generate sustained self-sufficiency in agricultural diversification. PURPOSE: Distribution and maintenance of agricultural inputs and machinery. NOTE: Project designed to promote long term private sector decentralized approach, transferring marketing of agricultural inputs from government to private sector.

Project Summary

Region: Near East Country Afghanistan Proj #: 3060143
Proj Title: Afghan Fertilizer Company Management Support
Amount Oblig: 1,190 Amount Expended: 1,190
Year Start: 1975 Year End: 1980
Documents: Design Abst; PP; SPE(2)
Strategy: Resource/Capacity building
Channel: Public/private: Afghan Fertilizer Co.
Focus: Fertilizer

Implementation Assessment, Inputs/Outputs: Some output goals felt unrealistic by AID. Management services provided successfully, with commodities. Uniform accounting, financial systems developed. On-job training emphasis was successful.

Implementation Assessment, Purpose/Goal: Great improvement found in distribution of fertilizer with early AFC operations. AFC showed that goverment entity organized along corporate lines can operate more effectively than other goverment agencies.

Problems/Issues: (1) Some stress from close government supervision and pressure to revert to traditional operating modes. (2) Less active AID Mission support than in previous years. (3) Advisor reccomendations not always implemented.

Comments: GOAL: Increase agricultural outputs of Afghanistan and increase small farmer income. PURPOSE: Increase Afghan farmer annual usage of fertilizer, spreading its use among small farmers. NOTE: Factory operated and managed by international contractor with Afghan trainees. Project is follow-on to previous support to AFC in project #3060129.

Project Summary

Region: Near East Country Jordan Proj #: 2780207
Proj Title: Credit for Jordan Valley Farmers Association
Amount Oblig: 1,500 Amount Expended: 1,500
Year Start: 1978 Year End: 1982
Documents: Design Abst; Audit Rep; PES(2)
Strategy: Resource/Capacity-building
Channel: Public/private: GOJ, JVFA
Focus: Credit

Implementation Assessment, Inputs/Outputs: 1980 PES predicted project would not meet most objectives due to inadequate GOJ support, contractor and JVFA inadequacies. Delinquency rate reduced by 1980 from 69.2% to 41.5%. Participant-training delayed. On-job training a "total failure." Credit program growing: 1,317 loans out, but loan size felt inadequate.

Implementation Assessment, Purpose/Goal: Too much expected of JVFA too quickly, although was said to be maturing and adjusting to match farmers' needs and its limited resources. Crop collatoral system hampered by lack of involvement of extension agents and delays in development of marketing centers. Small farmer loan elegibility consequently reduced and delinquency rates increased.

Problems/Issues: (1) Extremely overambitious design (2) Inadequate GOJ support, cooperation of agencies Lack of GOJ extension agents (3) Poor performance of contractor (4) JFVA staff inexperienced, ill-prepared (1) Staff problems (5) Jurisdictional disputes (6) Farmer loans too small because of PP restrictions of $5000.

Comments: GOAL: (1) Agricultural yield, production increased, farmers' income increased. (2) Viable effective farmers' association created providing benefits equitably to Jordan Valley farmer. PURPOSE: Jordan Valley farmer, especially small farmer, assisted in obtaining equitable seasonal production credit.

91

Project Summary

Region: Near East Country Jordan Proj #: 2780186
Proj Title: Jordan Valley Farmers Association
Amount Oblig: 1,161 Amount Expended: 1,022
Year Start: 1978 Year End: 1983
Documents: Design Abst; SPE(2), PES(2); CAP; Aud. Rep
Strategy: Planning/ Policy
Channel: Public/private: GOJ, JVFA
Focus: Institution-building

Implementation Assessment, Inputs/Outputs: Sale of fertilizer, pesticides, improved seeds, one of more successful components. On-job training generally unsuccessful although one staff member received US short-term training in credit management. Some delays in provision of project inputs.

Implementation Assessment, Purpose/Goal: Results mixed. Bylaws, operating procedures developed. IVFA in-experience hindered long-range planning capability. Management information system development slow. Credit system developed. JVFA assigned over-ambitious program by GOJ, without adequate resources or follow-through government support. JVFA felt to be ill-prepared for the development of individual farm management planning and guidance system.

Problems/Issues: (1) Lack of extension agents obviated planned individual farm production plans. (2) Inadequate GOJ support. (3) Poor performance of host-country contractors. Dealt more with theories applicable to mature organization. (4) JVFA a new organization, assigned over-ambitious program. (5) GOJ food and import subsidies go to consumers, rather than as production incentives to farmers. Producer price controls are counterproductive. (6) Lack of beneficiary participation in JVFA. One farmer-one voice concept caught up in reality of tribal elite environment.

Comments: GOAL: Increase yields, production, improve farmers' income. SUBGOAL: Create viable, effective association providing benefits equitably. PURPOSE: Assist JVFA to establish policies, procedures, systems in areas of: overall management planning, farm management guidance and information, credit. LESSONS: (1) Too much expected too quickly of JVFA. Contractor unable to adjust with more realistic expectations. Result was limited applicability and adoption of recommendations. (2) General project agreements left resource requirements and critical relationships undefined. Should be made more explicit. GOJ unable, unprepared to take proper action.

92

Project Summary

Region: Near East Country Morocco Proj #: 6080058
Proj Title: Cereals Production
Amount Oblig: 1,590 Amount Expended: 1,590
Year Start: 1968 Year End: 1978
Documents: PrgRep; EOT; PROP; PAR (2)
Strategy: Resource/Capacity building
Channel: Public: MOA Agricultural Development Division, National Agronomic Research Institute
Focus: Seeds, Fertilizer, Credit, Institutional-building

Implementation Assessment, Inputs/Outputs: Performance found generally satisfactory. Some delay in contracting technicians, locating candidates for advanced participant training.

Implementation Assessment, Purpose/Goal: Per hectare yields found higher on commercial production lands, twice national average. But production yield increases were greatly aided by favorable weather.

Problems/Issues: (1) Farmers generally failed to follow all recommended practices. (2) GOM rejected counterpart approach, did not assign counterparts, preferred use of foreign experts. (3) GOM expected to be unable to sustain improvements. Lacked long term staff planning. (4) Lack of high level coordination. (5) Bureaucratic delays caused difficulties since project was tied to seasonal calendar. (5) Research facilities, demonstrations, not used effectively to train farmers.

Comments: PURPOSE: Increase annual production of wheat 50% by 1974. NOTE: Suggestion was made that AID should emphasize assistance to local seed production agencies.

Project Summary

Region: Near East Country Morccco Proj #: 6080131
Proj Title: Dryland Farming
Amount Oblig: 226 Amount Expended: 226
Year Start: 1976 Year End: 1981
Documents: Design Abst; PES
Strategy: Policy/Planning
Channel: Public: Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform
Focus: Institution-building

Implementation Assessment, Inputs/Outputs: High quality, five stage strategy proposal to improve range management prepared. Evaluation of Moroccan extension system completed. Long-term training of two participants completed; short-term training completed of five others.

Implementation Assessment, Purpose/Goal: Data insufficient

Problems/Issues: (1) Scarcity of information for guiding production and infrastructure. (2) Need for M.S., PhD level U.S. training.

Comments: GOAL: Increase basic food production to meet needs of Morocco's fast-growing population. PURPOSE: Strengthen GOM's capability to plan and implement program geared to increase food production and improve activities in dryland area of country.

Project Summary

Region: Near East Country Tunisia Proj #: 6640302
Proj Title: Small Farmer Supervised Credit
Amount Oblig: 18,237 Amount Expended: 17,815
Year Start: 1979 Year End: 1984
Documents: PP; PES; SPE(2); EOT
Strategy: Resource/Capacity building
Channel: Public/private: DAPME, SCMA local credit societies
Focus: Credit

Implementation Assessment, Inputs/Outputs: Office of Medium and Small Farmrs created, and in-service training provided to staff in credit management and farm plan development. 95% of 3000 loans totally 3.5 million by 1980 were supported by farm production plan. SCMA credit societies inadequate as local vehicle for guarantee of loans.

Implementation Assessment, Purpose/Goal: Positive impact observed on productivity and income of participating farmers. Project was instrumental in introduction of new technology. Increase in yields, decrease in fallow lands observed. Diversification pattern improved. But overall economic impact was uneven: farmer revenues in humid areas increased but decreaased in dry areas.

Problems/Issues: (1) Social distance between semi-literate Arabic farmer and program with French bureacractic orientation. (2) Procurement difficulties (3) Farmers lack previous credit experience: farm plans more info source for extension agents than educational tools for farmers. (4) Bank slow in processing loans: felt to have little interest in development of growth-oriented, or service-oriented programs. (5) Inadequate interest rates, controlled by law but inadequate for project needs. (6) Local credit societies not functioning adequately. Bank carries little risk while societies carry the weight. (7) Scarcity of inputs supplies (8) Inadequate coordination with other goverment agencies noted in early years. (9) Slow startup and slow draw on funds created need for project extension. (10) Small farmers not a homogenous group in socio-economic terms. Many SF aim at auto-consumption, not market-oriented production.

Comments: GOAL: Increase basic food production, improve income level of small and mediums size farm units. PURPOSE: Through supervised credit program, provide access to improved production inputs and technical information necessary to increase level of production technology used by significanly larger number of small and medium-sized farmers. LESSONS: (1) Need for cultural sensitivity: multiple written forms, organizational structures were foreign to traditional production systems and behavioral patterns. (2) Need for establishment of department in Bank to operate exlusively for small farmer. (3) SCMA societies were artificial construct of Bank, did not guarantee peer group pressure for payment as expected. Indigenous institutions use being considered.

Appendix B

Projects Drawn at Random but Rejected

	Project	Country	Reason Rejected
1.	6150153	Kenya	Insuff. data on inputs, marketing activities
2.	6630179	Ethiopia	Insuff. data on project activities
3.	6210103	Tanzania	Insuff. data on inputs, marketing activities
4.	6210133	Tanzania	Insuff. data on project activities
5.	6630166	Ethiopia	Insuff. data on inputs, marketing activities
6.	6850235	Senegal	Insuff. data on inputs, marketing activities
7.	6410053	Ghana	Mainly program development and support
8.	6210107	Tanzania	Insuff. data on inputs, marketing activities
9.	6950101	Burundi	Not sufficiently near completion
10.	6310008	Cameroon	Not sufficiently near completion
11.	6980173	Af. Reg.	Insuff. data on inputs, marketing activities
12.	6500103	Sudan	Insuff. data on project activities
13.	6770002	Chad	Insuff. data on project activities
14.	6770014	Chad	Insuff. data on project activities
15.	6250600	C.&W. Af Reg.	Insuff. data on project activities
16.	4930275	Thailand	Insuff. data on inputs, marketing activities
17.	3860366	India	Insuff. data on inputs, marketing activities
18.	3830039	Sri Lanka	Insuff. data on project activities
19.	5170029	Domin. Rep.	Insuff. data on project activities
20.	5170142	Domin. Rep.	Insuff. data on project activities
21.	5260109	Paraguay	Insuff. data on inputs, marketing activities
22.	5240073	Nicaragua	Insuff. data on inputs, marketing activities
23.	5380010	W.Ind.E.Crb.	Insuff. data on project activities
24.	5110059	Bolivia	Deobligated
25.	5180051	Ecuador	Insuff. data on inputs, marketing activities
26.	5980440	L.A. Reg.	Insuff. data on project activities
27.	5240198	Nicaragua	Insuff. data on project activities
28.	5170116	Domin. Rep.	Insuff. data on project activities
29.	6080158	Morocco	Insuff. data on inputs, marketing activities
30.	3060129	Afghanistan	Overlaps with project # 3060143
31.	2760013	Syria	Insuff. data on project activities
32.	2760005	Syria	Not sufficiently near completion
33.	2630070	Egypt	Insuff. data on inputs, marketing activities
34.	6640237	Tunisia	Insuff. data on inputs, marketing activities
35.	2630027	Egypt	Insuff. data on inputs, marketing activities