REFUGEES AND ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES IN AFRICA

Professor Barry N. Stein
Department of Social Science
Michigan State University
East Lansing, Michigan 43824

A research report submitted to:

Office of Policy Development and Program Review
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination

AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

(order no. OTR-0000-0-00-1150-00)

AUGUST 1981

PNAAQ 395

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION 1

II. OVERVIEW OF REFUGEE ASSISTANCE IN AFRICA 8

Causes of Refugee Flows 12
Types of Refugees 17
Rural Refugees 18
Assisted Self-Settlement 25
Urban Refugees 27
Durable Solutions 31
The Stages of Refugee Assistance 34
Emergency Relief 36
Rehabilitation 39
Settlement 41
Development 44
Actors and Options 47

III. THE REFUGEES 50

The Refugee Experience 50
Trauma and Development 52
Camps 54
Settlement 56
The Pattern of Adjustment 56
Expectations and Behavior 60
Caveat on African Refugees 63

IV. ANALYSIS OF ISSUES AND PROBLEMS 65

The Goals of Refugee Assistance 65
Self-Reliance 65
Self-Sufficiency 68
Choice of Goals 70
Timing and Perspective 72
Immediate Settlement 75
Economic Adjustment of African Refugees 78
Rural Refugees 79
Urban Refugees 82
Women Refugees 85
Domestic Tasks 86
Disappearance of Women's Work 86
Low Social Profile 87
Apathy. 87
Women Heads of Households 88

Implementation of Refugee Assistance 88
Surveys 89
Zonal Development 89
Departmentalism 90
Diversification 90
Self-Help 91
Incentives 91
Top-Heavy Administration 91
Keep It Simple 92
Host Incorporation 92
Economic Viability 93
Development 93
Linkages 93
Research 94

I.

INTRODUCTION

This paper is concerned with refugees and economic activities in Africa. Africa is now, and has been for some time, the continent with the largest number of refugees with estimates ranging from 3.5 to more than 5 million refugees. A key feature of African refugee problems is that virtually all of the refugees stay within the continent and are assisted by their fellow Africans. Refugees from less developed countries are being aided by and in less developed countries.

Refugees who gain refuge in a less developed country are a serious economic drain on their host's scarce resources. Resources which are often inadequate to meet the needs of its own citizens. In some cases, either on a local or a national level, the needs of the refugees for food, shelter, fuel, and medicine may be so great that they create an emergency for both the refugees and their host.

> The citizens of our country have in effect viewed their whole development budget and have now most seriously deflated their national resources and food reserves and often their personal ones (Somali Democratic Republic, 1981).

> Sudan was amongst the least developed countries of the World. It could no longer absorb these great numbers of refugees independently of its huge developmental problems (National Committee for Aid to Refugees, 1980b).

> Many developing countries demonstrate traditional hospitality by accepting for integration on their territories large groups of refugees and displaced persons, despite the fact that only meagre resources are available to them for the benefit of their own population (UNHCR, 1981a).

A refugee influx is an expensive and serious drain on the resources

of a developing host country. Refugees may have an adverse impact on food supplies, land availability, local labor markets, foreign exchange reserves, military expenditures, fuel supplies, ports and transportation systems, the general ecological balance (through their foraging for food, water, fuel, and shelter), medical facilities, and other sectors of the host society on either a local or national level.

Besides the strain that is placed on the host there is the poverty of the refugees themselves. If not aided the refugees will end up leading meager incomplete lives, frustrated, bitter, and a constant drain on their hosts and on international donors. Regarding the condition of spontaneously settled rural refugees, estimated at 60% of all rural refugees and rural refugees constitute approximately 90% of all refugees in Africa, the Report of the Arusha Conference noted:

> Where the influx of rural refugees is large, it creates acute conditions both for the refugees themselves and for the poorer people among their hosts. They drive good prices up and wages down.
>
> Spontaneous integration may mean extreme poverty and insecurity, eking out precarious and marginal existence (Pan African Conference on Refugees, 1979a).

Our concern with the economic activities of African refugees is based on the belief that such activities play a central role in refugee assistance efforts and are of vital importance to both the refugees and the host society. Other factors such as the refugees social, cultural, and spiritual needs should not be ignored but the economic needs of the refugees and their hosts are a key to restoring the refugees to a satisfactory, full, and new life and to ending the strain on their hosts. As President Nyerere of Tanzania stated at Arusha: "Either we make

arrangements whereby refugees can become self-supporting, or they have to be fed for a life time by the sweat of the rest of Africa's people" (Pan African Conference on Refugees, 1979a).

Self-supporting refugees are not necessarily happy, adjusted, integrated refugees who are making a full contribution to their new society. Self-supporting is a minimal goal which indicates an absence of outside aid. Self-supporting refugees might be at a bare survival level with little margin for hard times; in an enclave that is not integrated into the economic and social life of their place of asylum.

Beyond the ending of handouts the possibility exists for refugees to make an economic contribution to their host. Benefits and opportunities for the host have often been a result of refugee assistance programs but they are not an automatic outcome. Progress can, however, be achieved if such a target is kept in mind and if plans are carefully designed and implemented.

It is of course stretching a point too far to view refugee influxes as an opportunity because it is most often the case that the potential for drain and disruption is far greater than the potential for benefit and contribution. At the same time, however, it is clear that failure to try to generate refugee contributions and benefits will ensure an adverse impact on the place of refuge. Most, if not all, refugee assistance efforts are likely to have a negative balance in the short term and only over a period of years will the drain on resources come to an end and contributions and benefits begin. Failure to utilize the skills and resources of the refugees to the utmost will increase the period of

drain and greatly delay the integration of the refugees.

> A refugee settlement that attains self-sufficiency and integrated development could provide an innovative point of departure for further development of an area as a whole (Pan African Conference on Refugees, 1979a).

> The presence of a large, new population in an underdeveloped region with an important agricultural potentiality could provide a useful impetus to government-sponsored rural development - since the new population is already dependent on government and ... (Zartman, 1970).

Besides being a source of innovation or an entry point for government sponsored rural development there are other contributions suggested by past refugee programs (Utkan, 1981; UNHCR, 1980b; Pan African Conference on Refugees, 1979a).

- generate food crop surpluses
- substantial cash crop sales
- improve consolidation and efficiency of domestic markets
- by increasing hinterland's population and economic activity can improve investment prospects for road, water, health, and other projects
- open up unused potentially productive land
- attract international attention and assistance
- expand income opportunities for local population through labor, small business or industry
- enhance regional self-sufficiency
- positive effect on foreign trade by reduced need for imports or supplying exports
- reduce foreign exchange gap

- labor source for large scale agricultural enterprises
- introduce new skills to area
- familiarity with organizational arrangements (cooperatives) government is trying to introduce
- stimulate economic growth

The above list is not exhaustive and it is not suggested that the contributions are easily generated. For countries with economic problems of their own it will be difficult to allocate resources to refugees whatever the projected benefits. Donor agencies and countries must be prepared to assist the host country and the refugees do more than just emergency aid and move in the direction of addressing the longer term developmental aspects of the situation.

There is also a need to provide refugee assistance in a way that improves the lives of the refugees. Failure to become at least self-supporting would mean lives of dependency and a loss of self-respect. Even delays in moving in the direction of self-support have a corrosive effect on the refugees. The longer the time that they are in camps, on the dole, unable to begin new lives, in limbo dependent and depressed, the harder it is to eventually make the refugees into independent integrated participants in society. Dependency is socially and psychologically damaging to refugees.

A last point regarding refugees and economic activities in Africa. To date the countries and people of Africa have been very generous in their reception of refugees. Asylum has been granted, refugees have mixed in with the local populace, land has often been made available,

And all told hospitality has been given in a way that should be a model to other continents. At the same time one must view the future with foreboding. The number of refugees is increasing, populations are growing, availability of land for refugee settlements is decreasing, the potential for most refugees to be repatriated - often referred to as the happy and easy solution - is declining, food production is stagnant, and problems of development continue unabated. The pressures that might inhibit hospitality, generosity, and asylum for African refugees are growing.

In this context it becomes more important to pay attention to refugee economic activities. In the past when dealing with smaller numbers in an atmosphere of solidarity in the struggle for liberation and with high expectations of repatriation it was possible for most refugees to settle spontaneously. Economic cost-benefit analysis did not loom large in the decision to give asylum. In the future the burden of the refugees may influence the decision to admit refugees.

The recent International Conference on Assistance to Refugees in Africa (ICARA) had among its objective

- to mobilize additional resources for refugee programmes in Africa
- to assist countries of asylum, adversely affected by the large-scale presence of refugees to obtain international assistance for projects aimed at strengthening the ability of those countries to carry the extra burden placed on their services and facilities.

Increasingly refugee assistance in Africa is moving away from ad hoc spontaneous solutions and in the direction of durable, organized solutions that are phased into the countries of asylum national and regional development plans. Donor agencies and countries are being asked to

consider refugee problems as part and parcel of Africa's development endeavors. If the burden is not shared and if refugee economic activities do not contribute to the development programs of the countries of asylum then there may be greater reluctance to admit refugees.

II.
OVERVIEW OF REFUGEE ASSISTANCE IN AFRICA

Africa has had sizeable refugee problems since the late 1950's. Often, as is currently the situation, it is the continent with the most refugees. In the late 1960's most estimates spoke of one million African refugees. At the 1979 Arusha Conference, the working figure was 3.5 million refugees. By the 1981 International Conference on Assistance to Refugees in Africa (ICARA) the figure was five million refugees. The recent 1981 World Refugee Survey (U.S. Committee for Refugees) listed 3.5 million refugees and 2.6 million displaced persons in Africa.

The refugee problem in Africa is growing with no signs of abating soon. In addition it has changed in character over the years. In the 1960's and 1970's most refugee movements were caused by struggles against white-minority rule and colonialism, by efforts to attain independence. Today such struggles are limited to the two remaining white dominated states in southern Africa, Namibia and South Africa.

Most current African refugees come from independent African states. This is a major shift in African refugee problems. Refugee groups are less assured of sympathy and solidarity by their hosts and the likelihood of eventual repatriation is diminished.

Despite high hopes by many African leaders that Africa would be different and not repeat the mistakes of other regions it appears that African refugees are now caused by forces and situations that are common to all continents and regions. The independence struggles and the attainment of statehood unleashed political forces that had been suppressed or dormant during the colonial period. Some of the unique elements of African refugee

problems are thus becoming less prominent in today's refugee movements. The hope that the attainment of independence would end or greatly reduce the refugee problem in Africa has not been realized.

Most African states now have a decade or more of independence behind them. Nonetheless with regard to refugee situations the free African states continue to be disturbed by their colonial legacy (Knight, 1978). The creation of states and boundaries that suited foreign rather than local needs; the lack of preparation for independence; the injuries done to traditional ways and institutions; the exploitation of physical and human resources; the continuing impact of neo-colonialism; the exclusion of natives from political and economic life; and many other insults, humiliations, misuses, and wounds comprise the colonial legacy. The legacy is far from the sole cause of African refugee movements but it is an important factor.

The strongest disruptive force is a combination of boundaries that were drawn in Europe to meet European needs and the growth of tribal, ethnic, and nationalistic movements within those boundaries. The process of nation-building has been difficult and violent on other continents and it is likely that Africa will be unable to escape the conflicts that appear to be inherent in this process. Unfortunately the colonial legacy placed most African states in an extremely bad starting position regarding the beginning of the nation-building process. When the boundaries were drawn there was ignorance and indifference regarding the tribal or ethnic composition of of the African colonies. When independence movements developed in Africa they did not coalesce around tribes or nascent ethnic nations but rather around a given colonial territory. Large tribes are split amongst several

states, hostile tribes are now fellow citizens, and "in most African states all the ethnic groups within the state are 'minorities'" (Touval, 1972).

> Africa was thus Balkanized, fragmented, before its people had had any opportunity to develop that kind of nationalism which we saw in the European world . . . There might have been some possibility that Africa, perhaps after a period of conflict, would draw its own frontiers around something resembling nations. This was impossible after 1885 (Hatch, 1970).

Attempts to limit these disruptive forces have not been very successful. The ideology of Pan-Africanism with its emphasis on unity, brotherhood, and respect for other cultures points toward an ideal that African states will successfully accommodate many tribes and nations. "In Africa with few exceptions (notably Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan, Mauretania), there have been no attempts to impose the culture of any single ethnic group upon the rest of the population." The number of "few exceptions" is increasing and the experience of other continents does not bode well for the accommodation ideal of Pan-Africanism.

> In independent Africa, the manipulation and exploitation of political, religious, ethnic, racial and economic differences may create conflicts.
>
> Within their own countries, African governments would do well to respect and instill in their nationals the respect for human rights. Further, they would do well to exercise with a sense of responsibility their function of protecting all their citizens, irrespective of whatever differences may exist within their country (Pan African Conference on Refugees, 1979 a).

A key attempt to limit the disruptive forces was the confirmation of the status quo by the 1964 Organization of African Unity (OAU) resolution "that all Member States pledge themselves to respect the borders existing on their achievement of national independence." Although the colonial boundaries are widely viewed as artificial, unsatisfactory, and as a major

source of trouble, at the same time there is no sensible alternative to keeping them. Any revision of boundaries could open a Pandora's Box of war and disorder and initiate a violent free for all that would be far more dangerous than reluctantly acquiescing to a poor status quo.

The OAU resolution, however, has not produced the desired stability. Revisionest states and groups that find the status quo unacceptable are unceasingly mounting challenges to the stability of the indpendent states. Both the revisionist and status quo states use widely endorsed international principles - national self-determination; territorial integrity; sovereignty; non-interference - to bolster their positions. The result is an impass that leaves little opportunity for accommodation, settlement or compromise (Touval, 1972). A recent letter by a Somali official explained his country's rejection of OAU recommendations to settle the dispute with Ethiopia.

> The committee's recommendations are not evenhanded. They contain only some principles of the Organization of African Unity. For instance, while respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states and non-interference in the internal affairs of states have been cited as a basis for the settlement of the Ogaden dispute, the equally important principle of the right of peoples to self-determination has been deliberately omitted. . . . the Ogaden problem is one of decolonization (Adan, 1981).

In Europe and elsewhere international boundaries have proven to be highly impervious to change. In conflicts involving territory and people most often it is the people that are the transferable element, moving from one land to the other in population exchanges or expulsions or fleeing as refugees.

Causes of Refugee Flows

It is not easy to categorize the causes of refugee movements in Africa. Some movements have multiple causes; some states persecute refugees for more than one reason either simultaneously, separately, or at different points in time; many countries simultaneously cause and harbor refugees; and there is great overlap between the categories. Understanding the cause of a refugee exodus can be important because different causes will affect the number and type of refugees and the possible solution to the problem. Without attempting to be exhaustive and remembering that the boundaries of the groups are fuzzy rather than distinct it is worthwhile to note some divisions.

1. Independence struggles from white minority rule and colonialism: only Namibia and South Africa remain in this category. Over the years this was the most important cause of African refugees. The exodus can take many forms depending on the stage of the liberation struggle. During the formative years the number of refugees is small, comprised of people from urban areas, students, political activists, and fighters. Toward the end, particularly if there is open conflict, guerrilla strikes, defensive relocations of rural populations, repression, etc., the movement may be sizeable with many rural residents trying to get out of harm's way. Victory normally brings repatriation.

2. National self-determination: independence, secession, autonomy, de-colonization, or liberation struggles against non-white foreign occupation or rule. The foreign rule is by one African people over another. In some cases European colonial rulers were replaced by Africans; Italians by Ethiopians in Eritrea or Spanish by Moroccans and Mauretanians in the

Sahara. In other cases either a province or a tribal area seeks to secede from a state either to join another state (dominated by its ethnic kin), the Ogaden conflict or the Ewe movement to secede from Bhana to unite with Togo; or to become independent, Shaba or Biafra. Sometimes the goal is to achieve greater autonomy or federal status rather than independence or merger, Eritrea or the southern Sudan. None of the struggles involving secession have succeeded to date.

National self-determination struggles can last a long time, several decades, and some are still unresolved with poor prospects for a peaceful ending. The conflict may ebb and flow, simmer for a long time and occasionally boil into a crisis. Some have been resolved either by accommodation, the southern Sudan, or by defeat, Shaba, Biafra, and Togo. A resolution normally produces an amnesty and repatriation.

The refugee flows match the intensity of the struggle and during crisis periods may be large or huge with entire rural populations fleeing from some areas joined by significant numbers of urban residents. Often where there is ongoing fighting the refugee population will be disproportionately women and children. The men remain behind fighting or tending to economic assets.

Where the goal is merger with another state there is normally a sympathetic refuge although this may produce hardship for refugees and local inhabitants (ethnic kinsmen) alike. "Thus, while arbitrary boundaries split tribal groups and often caused internal conflict, these same boundaries allowed groups to find sanctuary with kinfolk (Cultural Survival, 1981)."

A disturbing new way, for Africa, to resolve national self-determination conflicts may be for the challenged state to expel, by persecution and military means, the enemy ethnic group from the disputed territory thereby

altering the population balance and forestalling future attempts to detach the territory (Holcomb, 1981). If this is the case the prospect of repatriation will be minimal.

3. Nation-building: local ethnic, tribal, or religious conflict, tribal based political rivalry, internal conflicts between ethnic-tribal groups over political-economic spoils and benefits, and to see which tribal group will dominate "national" life and provide the "core nationality" of the emerging national identity. Ruwanda, Burundi, Angola, Zaire, Kenya and Uganda (Asians), Chad, Sudan, Ethiopia, ... "Members of dominant ethnic groups, whether actually more numerous or whether simply having been empowered by the departing colonial power, often placed their own personal or group interests first (Cultural Survival, 1981)." Although rooted in similar or identical problems to national self-determination refugee flows (Number 2 above), nation-building refugee movements rarely include a desire to redraw boundaries and thus shift territory. The refugee movements take a somewhat different form because the conflicts are mainly internal involving "the manipulation and exploitation of political, religious, ethnic, racial and economic differences (Pan African Conference on Refugees, 1979a)."

Nation-building conflicts can range from mild to virulent, from localized internal disputes to major national conflicts that attract international attention. It is hard to find a pattern in these disputes. Some dominant ethnic groups represent less than twenty per cent of the population, others are near or over majority. Some have a long history of domination and there is great bitterness between the contending groups

others are recently empowered and inter-group relations are still flexible and capable of cooperation.

Generally those long dominant seem willing to use all state power, in particular military force, to ensure their place. They have a sense of superiority and identity and try to extend their sway through pressured assimilation or to ensure their hold by massacring other elites and forcing other peoples off the best lands. The disadvantaged groups may see military action as their only possible salvation. These disputes can develop into long lasting internal wars and occasionally external intervention has played a key role in either propping up or overthrowing a dominant nationality.

Recently empowered groups tend to be more interested in immediate economic spoils than future domination of the national ethos and their repression is more sporadic and haphazard. While these disputes can evole into interminable struggles there have been many cases of compromise, settlement, amnesty and repatriation.

While there is great variety nation-building refugee flows tend to be sizeable with large numbers of people leaving rural areas to seek sanctuary across the nearest frontier or internally in unaffected parts of their own land. In the milder more economically based cases the likelihood of repatriation is fairly high although refuge may be required for several years. In the others only the overthrow of the dominant nationality is likely to produce repatriation. That sort of resolution has the potential though to solve one problem while creating another, the flight of the defeated group.

4. Political refugees: from one party states, military regimes, lifetime presidents, and revolutionary governments. These refugees closely match the traditional concept of refugees. They tend to be small in number, young, urban, educated and they flee to other African urban centers. The reasons for flight vary but often these refugees have been at or near the centers of power having been party or government officials. Many students are also in their ranks. Ethnic factors play a lesser role in these cases, the cause of flight is more political and even personal.

> . . . the deep feelings of insecurity which motivate many leaders . . . the negative attitude of African leaders towards any form of criticism . . . the identification of the well-being of the nation with that of the Head of State . . . a narrow interpretation of what is vital to national security . . . the tendency to label as "subversive" . . . any dissent . . . and finally with the tremendous awareness, particularly among youth, of the gross violations of human rights (Knight, 1978).

While some political exiles will be forever in exile, others may return due to liberalization, political changes, amnesty, or the next coup. A steady stream of replacements will be available.

5. Tyranny: gross violations of human rights, dictators exercising capricious unbridled power and creating conditions where a wide spectrum of society fears for its safety. Amin in Uganda, Bokassa in the Central African Empire, and Macias in Equatorial Guinea are recent examples of African tyrants. All were overthrown by force and the refugees were repatriated. While they last, however, tyrants can cause tens of thousands of people to flee from both urban and rural areas.

6. Internal disorder: Chaos, sporadic hostility and generalized insecurity, war or civil war, "or events disturbing public order in either part or the

whole" of a country. Although often there is a specific cause, tribal or political, to the disorder many of the refugees are uninvolved bystanders trying to get out of the danger zone. With weak governments and widespread availability of weapons this problem can plague many African countries. Uganda, Ethiopia, Zaire, and Angola are examples. While the chaos may produce massive refugee flows they will keep a close watch on the affected areas. Periodic visits to tend the land or livestock may occur. Although disorder can stretch out for a number of months or years these refugees tend to have a relatively short need for sanctuary and a high expectation of repatriation.

Again, the type of refugee movement will affect who flees, in what numbers, and the form of the possible resolution of the problem. Few refugee situations will fit neatly into only one of the above categories, there will be multiple causes and considerable overlap. Thiopia, which is the source of approximately one half of all current refugees in Africa, has produced refugees that fall into every category save independence from white rule and possibly tyranny.

Types of Refugees

The most common and appropriate typology used to analyze and characterize African refugees is the division between rural and urban refugees. This typology can be used either with regard to where the refugees originate from or where they find refuge. The distinction is relatively small because most refugees move from rural areas to rural areas or urban to urban. This section will focus nonetheless on the refugees location during sanctuary because that will most greatly influence assistance policies and economic

activities. Thus "urban refugees" are in urban areas and "rural refugees" are in rural areas.

There are some other subdivisions that are worth noting particularly regarding their impact on economic activities and refugee assistance. It is useful to divide each category with regard to the likelihood and timing of possible repatriation. It is also important, particularly with regard to rural refugees, to note those who live in organized settlement schemes or camps and those who settle themselves spontaneously.

Rural Refugees

In describing the characteristics of African rural refugees it is vital to note that what is typical of all refugees may not apply to any particular refugee group. Africa is a huge and diverse continent and the rufugees reflect that diversity.

A very high proportion, ninety percent or more, of African refugees are from rural areas and seek refuge in rural areas. The refugees are farmers, pastoralists and nomads plus traders, craftsmen, and other rural workers. They tend to have low literacy rates and levels of education and have had little contact with the outside world. The refugees are more likely to move as a mass than singly. Often whole villages, parts of a tribe, or significant parts of a region may flee together. They flee a relatively short distance across an international boundary that may have little meaning to them. They find sanctuary among their own kind, ethnic kinfolk who provide hospitality, assistance, and refuge. The refugees host is often at a subsistence level so their sharing of resources may mean hardship and scarcity for refugees and their kin. The refugees stay near the border in relatively inaccessible areas but spread out over a large area.

Assistance, particularly during the early relief stage, is difficult due to lack of accessibility, infrastructure, supplies, bureaucracy, and information (Neldner, 1979; Knight, 1978).

An additional characteristic of importance is the absence of adult men from the refugee camps and settlements. In many cases adult men make up no more than twenty per cent, sometimes as low as five per cent, of the population. Women and children predominate. There appear to be few older people because flight takes a heavy toll of the weak and aged. It is widely surmised that the missing men are in their homeland either fighting or tending economic assets, farms or herds; away working in the host country or elsewhere in urban areas, mines, or plantations; have died fighting or during flight; or less likely, have deserted their families. The absence of adult men means family structure is rather defective and a very heavy burden falls on the refugee women (Trappe, 1971).

There are two main forms of rural refugee settlement: organized settlement schemes or camps and self-settlement or spontaneous integration. Rural refugees need access to land, shelter, water, seeds, tools, and other assistance in order to build their own shelters and grow food. Emergency food rations are provided for an initial period, maybe several years, until the crops are harvested and the refugees achieve self-support. This can be done either with government assistance, organized settlements, or by the refugees themselves, spontaneous integration.

Organized settlement schemes involve moving the refugees to land allocated by the host government for agriculture and animal husbandry. The land will be prepared for the refugees, infrastructure provided, administrative and management facilities, and water supply. The host government,

voluntary agencies, and international agencies will work together to create a new self-sufficient rural community.

Although organized settlements are more expensive than self-settlement and require greater expertise and government involvement they are favored by most African governments. Organized settlements give host governments much better control of rural refugees. Settlement schemes allow governments to reduce refugee dispersal thus facilitating relief and rehabilitation efforts; to move refugees away from sensitive border regions and lower political tensions; to keep refugees together to facilitate possible future repatriation; and, to keep refugees away from over crowded urban areas (Roggs, 1981; Neldner, 1979).

Self-settling refugees were estimated at Arusha to comprise 60% of rural refugees in Africa. Spontaneous integration occurs when refugees settle themselves among villagers and towns folk, who are ethnic kin, near the international frontier. The local population bears the main load of emergency aid, it welcomes, feeds, and cares for the refugees as part of traditional hospitality. "This kind of settlement occurs without too much difficulty and offers definite social and psychological advantages" (Pan African Conference on Refugees, 1979a). Given access to land, amongst kin, the refugees quickly re-establish themselves (Chambers, 1979; Hansen, 1981).

There is a great deal of discussion regarding the relative merits of organized settlement schemes as opposed to spontaneous integration (Betts, 1980, 1981; Chambers, 1979; Pan African Conference on Refugees, 1979a; Hanson, 1979a, 1979b, 1981; Scudder, 1981; Rogge, 1981). Hansen (1981)

notes that the refugees have a "reluctance to take advantage of government welfare" and "settle themselves among the host country population rather than live in government administered locations."

> From their perspective, the decision to stay in the villages is completely understandable. The village world is a known one; the problems and processes of absorption and re-establishment are familiar . . . . Further risk and uncertainty are minimized if the refugees can manage to continue in that known environment. At the same time, village life minimizes desocialization and maximizes the transfer or maintenance of previous rank, status and prestige. Although material wealth is greatly reduced in flight, the refugee continues to live in a place where his or her experience, skills and acquired knowledge may be put to use to rebuild.

Besides the advantages to and preferences of the refugees there are other advantages to self-settlement. The role of the government, voluntary agencies, and international agencies is greatly reduced. Aid does not have to be given, the problem solves itself, "all is well with such refugees." "The belief is convenient because it absolves governments and aid-giving agencies from finding out and doing something about problems of this nature" (Pan African Conference on Refugees, 1979a).

Beginning with the Arusha Conference, though, an alarm has been raised regarding both the condition of rural refugees and their impact on their hosts. Chambers (1979) refers to spontaneous integration as a myth, benign and reassuring.

> Refugee populations are not homogeneous. . . . whole populations may suffer in ways which refute the myth. Neither moving a short distance, nor settling among ethnic kin, necessarily assures acceptable self-settlement.

Chambers goes on to list seven points "all suggesting serious problems in self-settlement."

1. Instant impoverishment. Many refugees do not have a short trek to safety, rather a dangerous traumatic flight. They walk and can carry only a few assets with them. Cash may be worthless or devalued, what few assets are rescued disappear in the early days and can't be used for re-establishment.

2. Mixed reception. If there are ethnic differences hospitality may be limited or non-existent. Even among kin generosity has limits. While there are many cases of kin hospitality being an important factor in relieving suffering there are also stories of refugees being robbed and abused.

3. Cheap labour, dear food. "They drive food prices up and wages down, shifting the terms of trade against their main asset, their labour" (Pan African Conference on Refugees, 1979a). "Refugees who earn all their food through exchanging their labour live a truly hand to mouth existence (Hansen, 1979a)"

4. Poor access to land. "Most seriously, and contrary to common belief, access to land is likely to be insecure. . . . Refugees have been either driven off the land or moved from the area in which they have settled themselves"(Pan African Conference on Refugees, 1979a). Plots may be unavailable, too small, poor quality, distant, and insecure.

5. Political and legal vulnerability. Most host governments want rural refugees to be in organized settlements. Those who have self-settled have a vulnerable status, subject to re-location if discovered or denounced. As with illegal aliens elsewhere they are subject to petty exploitation. They fear visibility and avoid investment.

6. First to suffer, last to gain. The refugees are likely to be in a weak position vis-a-vis the government bureaucracy, to have poor land, unequal access to education and social services, pay high rates for credit, and to have little margin for bad times.

7. Costs to the poorer hosts. While those who are wealthy and powerful among the host may benefit from an enhanced cheap labor supply and market for food and goods, the poorer host may suffer from the refugee influx. Food becomes dear, labor rates fall, there is competition for forage, camps are located on pasture, water supplies are depleted or polluted.

Considering the catalog of difficulties with spontaneous integration it is a wonder that organized settlement is not the automatically preferred option. There is, however, extensive criticism of settlement projects.

Although there were many problems with organized refugee settlements in the 1960's when such schemes were an untried method of assistance "over the last two decades, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has developed, in collaboration with the governments of Asylum. and increasingly efficient system of organized settlements (Betts, 1981)."

> Though settlement creation is complicated a basic assumption of this report is that settlement projects tend to be characterized by a range of basic issues and problems about which there is considerable international experience. The major basic issues at the various stages are known -- and because they are known they can be anticipated and dealt with in advance. The same applies to a wide range of problems which have caused the failure of innumerable settlement projects in the past. (Scudder, 1981)

Unfortunately, while the "lessons of the 1960's . . . had been learnt by the early 1970's" (Chambers, 1979) and there is considerable international

experience there is no assurance that the lessons and experience will be utilized by a host government. Further, there are important constraints on the expanded use of organized settlements.

A number of prerequisites are necessary if rural settlement schemes are to be successfully implemented" (Rogge, 1981). These include: availabilty of suitable land, refugees are frequently in areas with low quantity or quality of land and attitudes toward land tenure are changing in Africa as rural population pressure increases suitable soil surveys are crucial before projects begin (Rogge, 1981; Scudder, 1981); water availability, water is a scarce commodity and more of a constraint in many areas than land, water is costly to provide and water problems have caused the cut back of some projects (Rogge, 1981; Scudder, 1981); capital availability, hosts lack resources, major international funding needed, funding cut off too early, long-term upkeep costs not always assumed by government after cut off (Rogge, 1981); planning and administrative skills, complex plans require organizational and management skills that are in short supply, offer little refugee input, new cropping or techniques require competent extension workers, projects are often too elaborate with a top-heavy administration (Rogge, 1981; Scudder, 1981); and, settler cooperation, may be apathetic or resistent, hope to go home, scheme superimposed on them, with little chance to participate, lack of incentives to take risks, believe project benefits host not refugees (Rogge, 1981; Scudder, 1981).

Refugees tend to be reluctant to be institutionalized in settlement schemes. The projects are normally placed far away from the border area,

for political and security persons, and this often moves them away from the refugees kinfolk. With no ties or sense of belonging to the project area the refugees feel no attraction to settle there. Being rootless many refugees would rather try a new life in urban areas than in a distant part of a strange land. This creates problems because most African governments want the flow to be in the other direction. "Search for means of controlling rural exodus and examine suitable ways of resettling some of the urban refugees in rural areas." (Pan African Conference on Refugees, 1979a).

Assisted Self-Settlement

It is clear that no one method of settlement, self or organized, is appropriate for all refugee situations. If the refugee influx is large, kinship is lacking, and land is scarce or marginal then leaving the refugees and the local host population on their own would be risky or irresponsible. Similarly while settlement projects can be very efficiently developed they are also complex and costly, although not the most expensive option, and ought not to be used if conditions favor lesser government intervention, and, management.

While it is certainly possible in many cases of self-settlement to do too little for the rural refugees there are also situations where too much - aid, design, planning, control, expense, building, infrastructure - might be done. Throughout the literature on rural refugees (Chambers 1969, 1979; Hansen, 1979a, 1979b, 1981; Scudder, 1981; Rogge, 1981; Trappe, 1971; Neldner, 1979; O'Keefe et al., 1980) there is an appreciation for certain qualities and abilities of rural refugees. The authorities believe that refugee self-help and participation are strong contributors to successful

assistance. Given a hand and a boost, not an "instant infrastructure" or "total institution", the refugees might do quite well in many situations.

Assisted self-settlement is largely undefined and certainly unstudied but it points toward a middle level of aid between spontaneous and organized settlement. The assistance might include government selection of settlement sites, after appropriate surveys, some site preparation such as roads and water supply, and limited services such as credit and extension facilates. This "site and service" preparation (Scudder, 1981) approach combined with provision of some food, seed, tools and other inputs (Chambers, 1979) would not leave the refugees on their own but would give them primary responsibility for rebuilding their own lives.

Urban Refugees

Urban refugees are a tiny minority, variously estimated at four to ten per cent (Chambers, 1979: Simon-Thomas, 1979), of all refugees in Africa. Nonetheless despite their small numbers they receive a great deal of attention and resources. "Urban refugees, often educated, articulate and politically active, demand attention and usually receive it" (Chambers, 1979). Although they are a minority of all refugees, perhaps receiving undue and disproportionate assistance, the urban refugees do represent a real problem for their host countries. Considering the large number of refugees in Africa even the low percentage of urban refugees totals in the hundreds of thousands and some asylum states have tens of thousands of urban refugees in their major cities.

Urban refugees in Africa tend to follow more closely than rural refugees the refugee pattern found on other continents. They flee singly or in small groups, they tend to be educated, young, male, politically active with strong ideological views, often students or professionals, and some have held high government or other positions.

Drawing from several sources (Simon-Thomas, 1979; Walker, 1979; Pan African Conference on Refugees, 1979; Knight, 1978; National Committee for Aid to Refugees, 1980a: vol. II; Joof, 1979; Mutiso, 1979; Finley, 1975) it is possible to list some of the variety of African urban refugees:

- educated individuals who were the active leaders of political parties;
- intellectuals forced to discontinue teaching or studies;

- opposition party members avoiding prison or death;
- government officials and ministers currently in disfavor;
- leaders and members of liberation movements;
- dissidents and deserters from liberation movements;
- villagers and rural refugees who are illiterate and don't know the local language;
- small businessmen and traders;
- students from rural refugee settlements trying to continue their education;
- upwardly mobile refugees ostensibly political but really seeking educational and other opportunities;
- educational refugees seeking scholarships and education not available or denied at home;
- freebooters, freelivers, and vagabonds who want adventure and to see the world;
- mentally disturbed or handicapped social outcasts who did not fit at home, also some whose mental disturbance results from the trauma of flight;
- criminals;
- skilled workers, mechanics, tailors, repairmen;
- widows with small children.

Although many urban refugees are educated, professionally trained, prominent, and political active, many others, very likely a sizable but unnoticed majority, have minimal skills and education. There is an increasing trend for refugees of rural origin to drift to the cities.

Additionally, not all refugees from urban areas come from the educated political professional classes.

Urban refugees tend to be viewed by African host governments with a great deal of disfavor and even hostility. There are a variety of reasons for this, several of which can be traced back to the refugees behavior. The hostility tends to focus on the educated politically active refugees but it affects all urban refugees.

The refugees tend to have high expectations about their reception and treatment and when these expectations are frustrated the refugees become demanding and shop around for the best deal.

> It is a dynamic group and is aware of potentials in the future through education and employment as ways to a more comfortable life, its demands tend to be in the sight of the host countries, too high. . . . move from country to country in search of what they consider to be a more suitable resettlement location. (Simon-Thomas, 1979)

> They tend to have a record of non-conforming attitudes and behavior. The more urbanized their backgrounds, the more sophisticated will be their aspirations and intentions. (Finley, 1975)

The refugees "abuse the trust and hospitality" (Knight, 1978) of the host country.

Many urban refugees find themselves unexpectedly in insecure positions. Like refugees everywhere they flee for their safety giving little thought to the future. Often they are surprised and disillusioned by their reception. They must prove they are genuine refugees, their suffering and trauma is not believed. They expect sympathy and approval for their political cause only to find their political activities hindered or prevented. "They may see themselves as victims of the host government

and some consequently consort with opposition factions." (Finley, 1975)

Most African countries have urban problems aplenty without the additional burden of urban refugees. The refugees compete for jobs and places in school, they expect and demand alot, and all this goes on under the close scrutiny of the local citizens. Many countries fear "that overt sympathy or the provision of special facilities might encourage into the country more such individuals." (Finley, 1975) Trying to avoid "anger and anti-refugee feeling on the part of its citizens" (Knight, 1978) the host country will screen applicants carefully before granting refugee status and will be reluctant to grant work permits.

Most host countries have plans for urban refugees that differ widely from the refugees own expectations. In some cases viewing the refugees with distrust they wish they would just go away, "they would usually rather see the urban refugees 'vanish' or pass through in transit to some other destination than be helped to stay." (Simon-Thomas, 1979) Many host governments would like to move the urban refugees to rural areas but understandably this is met with reluctance and resistance by the refugees.

Against this background of lukewarm welcome urban refugees have major problems and needs. Chief among these are:

- insecure status, refugees are dealt with under alien laws, deal with bureaucracy and police to prove they are genuine, long delays and difficulties, difficult to get work permits, danger of refoulement;
- culture shock, although still in Africa may experience great ethnic and cultural differences and disparity of development between home and host;

- education, many are young students with urgent desire to improve education or training, shortage of places in host schools to accommodate nations, curriculum and language of instruction differences, need scholarships and support;
- orientation to host country and right, obligations, and expectations as a refugee;
- housing and services, tension with nationals, government wants aid at lowest native level;
- counseling services to assist with jobs, housing, services, are overcrowded, government does little so burden falls to voluntary agencies;
- credentials and occupational adjustment, professionally qualified and well educated refugees may lack documentary proof or may have to re-qualify to match different standards of competence, need for retraining or upgrading;
- employment of professional and skilled refugees is difficult, often local surplus in those fields or preference for expatriates so eventually nationals will get position;
- employment or work opportunities for lesser skilled refugees also difficult due to local oversupply or lack of tools or start up capital;
- integration and naturalization, refugee not seen as permanent resident or future citizen, government would prefer they repatriate or resettle.

Durable Solutions

There are three classic solutions to refugee problems:

1. Voluntary repatriation and subsequent economic and social rehabilitation of returnees.
2. Economic and social integration of refugees or displaced persons in the country of first asylum.
3. Resettlement of refugees or displaced persons from the country of first asylum or temporary refuge in a country of durable asylum and their economic and social integration in that latter country. (UNHCR, 1980)

A durable solution means helping the refugees to become self-sufficient and enabling them to participate fully in the social and economic life of their new country or their homeland if they repatriate. It means more than the relief and limbo of a refugee camp, life is no longer temporary, one can put down roots.

Repatriation is the preferred solution, it means going home and involves relatively little adjustment on the part of the refugees. Repatriation has been a frequent occurrence in Africa with refugees often going home in triumph after independence is attained, the tyrant is deposed, or political changes occur. It can also happen after civil disorder ends or a secessionist movement is defeated. Some refugees repatriate swiftly only months after their initial flight, others have waited years or more than a decade before going home.

Repatriation is likely to be happy but it is not necessarily easy. While cultural adjustment is virtually automatic, material needs may be great. War and conflict may destroy infrastructure, it takes time to plant and harvest, to get things going again. Although assistance may be required for several years repatriation remains "the ideal solution." (UNHCR, 1980)

In the future it appears there will be significantly less repatriation in Africa. Formerly most refugees were from independence struggles

which, however prolonged, had a great likelihood of eventual repatriation. The increasing percentage of refugees from independent African states, particularly those involving nation-building and national self-determination conflicts, may have much lower prospects of return home. Further, even if repatriation will eventually occur in those cases it may be more delayed than in the past.

Refugees tend to cling tenaciously to the hope of repatriation. They want to go home and will clearly see all favorable indications and ignore pessimistic news. Refugees will resist efforts to move away from the border, from home, and resist learning new ways and starting new lives. Refugees who hope to repatriate will be reluctant to invest themselves in a new land.

Resettlement means going to a third land, neither home nor neighbor, to begin a new life. It normally means a move of thousands of miles to another continent (there has been some resettlement within Africa) and to vastly different cultures. There are virtually no opportunities for resettlement of African refugees outside of Africa. The only large groups of African refugees that were accepted for resettlement on other continents consisted of peoples not indigeneous to Africa. For rural African refugees this is not an option. For urban refugees a few thousand each year are able to resettle often to facilitate further studies or because they have valuable skills or high political visibility. The vast majority of African refugees are taken care of within the continent. (Godemann, 1981)

Integration or settlement means the refugees stay in their place of

refuge, normally a neighboring country. Often, particularly in Africa, there will be great similarities between home and host and elements of the host population will be ethnically and culturally related to the refugees. If, however, the refugees are relocated away from the border, as is required by the OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, they may find themselves in a quite different human and physical environment from what they have known.

Settlement is increasingly likely to be the only available durable solution option for most African refugees and host governments. The increasing recognition of this possibility will have a major impact on the type and timing of assistance provided to African refugees.

Stages of Refugee Assistance

From a development and aid point of view concerned with the economic activities of refugees in developing countries the most important type of durable solution is settlement and integration in the country of asylum (UNHCR, 1981a). Within the developing countries the focus is in the rural areas where the great bulk of the refugees are located. The stages of refugee assistance are: 1) emergency relief and survival; 2) rehabilitation and self-reliance; 3) settlement-integration and self-sufficiency; and, 4) development and integrated growth.

Not all refugees will go through all of the stages of assistance. Many refugees who are expected to repatriate quickly only receive emergency relief, others whose repatriation is a more distant prospect may receive rehabilitation assistance. Similarly, many resettled refugees, depending on the speed of their resettlement, only receive emergency

relief or rehabilitation assistance. Most refugees who are to be locally integrated, and some whose repatriation will be long delayed or even problematical, receive assistance designed to help them achieve self-sufficiency. Development assistance to refugees is a relatively new idea and has not been provided to many refugees, only those refugees who will definitely stay and be integrated locally would be candidates, but it has been the subject of much current discussion (UNHCR, 1981a; OECD, 1981; Scudder, 1981; Utkan, 1981; Kozlowski, 1981).

Further, not all refugees experiencing the same durable solution will go through the stages in the same way. Self-settling refugees to a degree avoid or fail to receive much assistance while a relatively complete package of assistance is given to those relocated to organized rural settlement schemes.

The stages do not flow inevitably from one to the next. Although the goals of a particular stage may be achieved refugees may linger at that level while waiting for political or assistance decisions to be made, situations to stabilize or clarify, or planning and preparation for following stages to be completed or even begun.

There is no uniform model of refugee assistance. UNHCR, other international agencies, voluntary agencies, and many host and donor governments have considerable expertise and experience in providing refugee assistance but still each assistance program must be tailored to the particular refugee situation. Abundant fertile land, scarce resources, overpopulation, a hostile environment, ethnic kin, the skills and backgrounds of the refugees, a continuing or static influx, the expected

durable solution, self-settlement or organized schemes, host attitudes, political complications, the willingness of donors, and many other considerations must be factored into an assistance program.

Lastly, assistance programs will be affected by the mandates and missions of the assistance agencies. No international agency, not even UNHCR, has a clear mandate to work in all of the stages of assistance (OECD, 1981a, 1981b). "Promotion of productivity and living standards beyond that level [equal to that of the surrounding population] falls outside of the High Commissioner's mandate and is the concern of development institutions" (OECD, 1981b). Some agencies limit themselves to only one stage, such as relief or development, others have somewhat broader missions. These limits increase the need for collaboration between those involved with different aspects of the problem.

Emergency Relief

Refugee survival may be precarious at the outset of an emergency and may remain precarious for some time, particularly if there is a continuing influx of refugees or interruptions and delays in the delivery of relief supplies (Aall, 1979). The refugees are impoverished and weakened by the traumas of their flight. The most pressing needs are for food, shelter, clothing, blankets, and medical care. Rural refugees "tend to cross borders in relatively uninhabited areas and settle in districts lacking in basic support services and necessary infrastructure" (UNHCR 1981b). They are in an inaccessible area and supplies are not locally available or are quickly exhausted. Local shortages may require inclusion of local inhabitants in relief program. Aid comes from host

government, voluntary agencies, bilateral donors, international agencies. Problems of coordination and management strain the administrative capacities of developing countries. A significant part of the capacity of ports and transport services may be tied up by a large relief program thereby disrupting the normal life of the country.

Refugee camps are a major feature of the emergency phase. Camps are used as a means of concentrating the refugees, assessing the problem, and facilitating the delivery of relief supplies. Camps are normally established wherever the refugees happen to be located. Little thought is given to their size, location or future, they are seen as temporary emergency measures. Refugee camps are not economically viable communities although there will be some economic activity in the camps. They are dependent on external supplies. There is little concern for the land's carrying capacity. In some situations the foraging of the refugees for food and shelter materials, the impact of refugee livestock, and the sheer number of refugees has depleted or polluted water supplies and "reduced the zone around the camps to desert conditions" (Lewis and Wisner, 1981).

Refugee economic activities are not a major concern during the emergency phase but decisions made or deferred at this point can have an impact on later attempts to generate refugee economic activities. The greatest fear is that the relief and camp period will drag on and become open-ended. A drawn out relief period is very expensive, the drain on resources simply continues year after year. The cost of relief over any period greater than a few years is likely to be "more expensive than

durable solutions." (UNHCR, 1981a) Additionally, local inhabitants may get restive seeing refugees cared for while they have to work to survive.

A long relief and camp phase can also have a detrimental effect on the refugees themselves. "Refugees that have lived in relief or 'holding' camps for extended periods invariably become dependent . . . without having to work, the idea that the world owes them a living becomes ingrained" (Rogge, 1981). The limbo and handouts generate inertia, helplessness, and a loss of will power. The refugee loses structure, the ability to coordinate, predict and expect, and his basic feeling of competence. Once drive and self-respect decline it becomes hard to get refugees to help themselves and participate in activities in the future. The greatest danger from an extended stay in camps is that the apathy generated will make the refugees less economically vibrant once they are repatriated, resettled, or settled.

A long camp and relief phase represents lost time and resources. Money is spent to feed not to produce. Many refugees in camps eventually get placed in assistance programs that could have begun years earlier. The transition from relief to the other stages of assistance needs to be as rapid as possible.

Refugees quite often linger in the relief period for a long time because of false expectations that they will be repatriated soon. As a result only short term measures are undertaken rather than planning for other possibilities. Additionally some governments fear the magnet effect of a comprehensive refugee program. Unsatisfactory conditions in a refugee camp may discourage some potential refugees from fleeing or

encourage those already in the camps to re-evaluate their view of conditions at home. "We left our country to escape tyranny. But the life we lead as refugees has its own tyrannies." (Gupte, 1980)

Rehabilitation

The rehabilitation and self-reliance phase is an intermediate and half hearted stage of assistance that is preparatory to resettlement or more often repatriation. It is inappropriate for refugees who will stay in their land of asylum. The refugees involved will not stay forever but they will be around for awhile. The refugees are likely to have been in camps for several years already and while repatriation has not occurred as hoped the host sticks to repatriation as a goal. The host does not want to provide much land or infrastructure or to make investments on the scale needed for permanent residents. Additionally the reluctant host does not want to give the refugees the impression that they might stay. "In order to avoid problems of long-term land-right claims, no family may keep the same plots for two years in a row" (Lewis and Wisner, 1981).

The goal is to reduce costs and dependency, to get the refugees to contribute "to their own maintenance and to the betterment of their economic and social situation" (Lewis and Wisner, 1981). Self-reliance emphasizes refugee self-help and participation but the refugees are given inadequate inputs, particularly land, to become self-sufficient. Self-reliance means in effect partial self-support. Outside aid is still needed but refugee is no longer in limbo, inactive and completely dependent. Rehabilitation provides the refugee with structure and activity and a chance to improve one's conditions.

In a rehabilitation effort the refugees will be given relatively small plots of land close to the camp, perhaps some plots in the camp for vegetables, handicrafts and cottage industries will be encouraged, and the refugees will be given some poultry and small livestock. In some cases refugees will also have opportunities to work for wages or increased rations at nearby large farms or small agro-industries. A training program for agricultural, handicrafts or certain skills useful in rural areas may also be included. The idea is to improve the refugees agricultural skills so they may contribute more to their homeland on their return, or be better equipped to function in their land of resettlement.

Although rehabilitation is an intermediate and temporary effort it is still relatively complex and likely to require extensive planning, management and inputs. The refugees have to be provided with land, water, seeds and implements. Surveys of the land and extension services are needed. Additionally, because most refugee camps have a shortage of adult men, child care arrangements need to be made as well as programs to reduce the time women must spend foraging for fuel or waiting for rations.

The major problem with rehabilitation programs is inducing the refugees to participate in them. This will be especially difficult if the refugees have been in the camps for some time and dependency has developed. Rehabilitation is not a full and new life, the refugee receives no right to the land and gets only part of the crop or low wages or improved rations. Additionally the perception exists that rehabilitation is of more benefit to the host than the refugees. Already receiving full and

free rations the refugees have little motivation and incentive to participate.

Settlement

Settlement is the most important stage of refugee assistance. It is neither an emergency or temporary effort, it is a durable solution that aims at the integration and full participation of the refugees in their new land. There is no set timetable for settlement, some well planned and fortunate settlements have achieved self-sufficiency in two or three years while others have suffered setbacks that stretch over a decade.

The goal of self-sufficiency is a modest and sensible one. The refugees are to be brought up to the level of the surrounding population. The refugees must be accepted by the local population if integration is to occur. This will not happen if the settlement is an enclave and the refugees have benefits and privileges denied the area's inhabitants. To facilitate acceptance attempts are made to include refugee settlements in regional and zonal development plans and to make settlement services available to the local population.

The process of integration is a two way street. While one must forestall host hostility and indeed gain acceptance of the refugees it is also necessary to get the refugees commitment to their new land. The fact that they have little choice about their situation makes the task even harder. Self-sufficiency defined in local terms may not be too attractive to the refugees. It may be lower than their prior living standard or just too different to be acceptable. Often due to both major differences in

ecology between home and host and due to host desires to use refugees as a means of innovation and demonstration the refugees may have a new way of life drastically different from home. Different foods, different labor and agricultural techniques and demands, different language, culture and government; different customs and neighbors, relationships and statuses; a whole different world. Further being at the same level as local communities is not really being equal. The refugees lack ties to the area and the social networks and relationships that protect rural dwellers during temporary economic deprivations. The refugee is far more vulnerable and marginal. If self-sufficiency is not really adequate the refugees may be reluctant and passive and will drift away from the settlement and gravitate toward the towns.

Settlement is the most viable option for rural refugees with no prospect of repatriation. It is also an effective solution for those whose repatriation will be long delayed. Some African refugees have had to wait more than a decade before repatriation was achieved. To wait in camps or the intermediate half life of a rehabilitation project is destructive of the human spirit and expensive to boot. While waiting for repatriation, if it ever comes, the refugees will be productive and instead of draining resources they contribute to their host society. If repatriation does become a possibility some refugees may decide to stay while others leave. If some settlement sites are abandoned they will be available to the local people.

A key problem with refugee settlements is the speed of their establishment. It is best to get refugees out of camps quickly before apathy

and dependency set in. At the same time it is difficult to rush the settlement process. Site selection is a crucial step. Scientific knowledge of land and climate is scanty in parts of Africa. Surveys and feasibility studies must be done but only a short time is available. Unused land is often avoided by local people due to some major difficulty or disability. "Especially crucial are suitable soil surveys, the absence of which time and again have been documented as a major cause for failure of new lands settlements throughout the world" (Scudder, 1981, his emphasis). Ulyankulu, a settlement scheme for Burundi refugees in Tanzania, received its first refugees less than six months after the exodus began. Later difficulties with low rainfall led to the settlement being cut back by about half. One is on the horns of a dilemma, excessive time in camp can destroy human potentialities, rushed and failed settlement can discourage and frustrate.

The establishment of a refugee settlement requires assistance, intervention, cooperation, and expertise by the host government, international agencies and often voluntary agencies. Often the creation and management of a settlement is covered by an implementation agreement between the government, UNHCR, and perhaps a third party as UNHCR's implementing partner. As a settlement approaches self-sufficiency "UNHCR assistance is phased out and any further development becomes the responsibility of local authorities" (UNHCR, 1981a). Depending on the settlement's fit into local and national development plans government's role may or may not continue. The pullback in international aid may be followed by a local government pullback. Some settlements on the brink of success have

lapsed backwards when aid was withdrawn and continuing costs were not covered. Further there is an opportunity that is being lost. A good start that could aid refugees and host alike is wasted. Human energies are released and then prevented from going beyond self-sufficiency.

Development.

The idea of refugees and development goes one step beyond the point of self-sufficiency for refugees. It takes a broader view of the settlement and assistance process and tries to ensure the full achievement of the goal of integration between the refugees and the people of the settlement area. Integration ought to be part of the stage of settlement but it is a target that is often not fully realized. Refugees and development looks to integrated growth for the refugees, the adjacent region and the host country. The prior stage of settlement and self-sufficiency stops on the brink of development. Bringing refugees to the level of the surrounding population is equitable but one must realize that the surrounding population wants out of its situation. All across Africa, and the rest of the developing world, the desire is for development, for a movement away from self-sufficiency to some higher levels of economic activity.

The refugees and development approach recognizes that refugees increasingly impinge on the development efforts of poor countries. A large refugee influx can divert attention, resources, energies and time away from development projects and disrupt or set back years of effort aimed at changing conditions in a less developed country. In part the refugees and development approach is aimed at raising the level of awareness of

host countries and, more importantly, the funding sources in donor governments and international agencies of the connection between refugees and development.

While all are aware that a refugee emergency requires humanitarian assistance and emergency funds an awareness is also needed that an influx may make desirable changes in development plans. Additional resources and flexibility may be needed for infrastructure and activities not directly connected to the refugee situation. Plans may need to be adjusted to take account of the presence of the refugees and to include them in development efforts. There are two great dangers during a refugee situation, aid may be given only to the refugees, and, aid may be given only to the host population. What is needed are coordination mechanisms to bridge the role of UNHCR, which phases out as self-sufficiency is approached, and the role of the development agencies, UNDP and World Bank, which have little responsibility for the refugees but a great deal regarding development.

There is a need to tie refugees and the local population more closely together. In setting up a refugee settlement a process has begun that ought not be truncated. Refugees are receptive to intervention and innovation because they have a great need for assistance. Properly integrated into zonal plans a refugee settlement can be a catalyst and focal point for development.

What is needed is a great deal more thought on how refugee assistance programs can be designed to aid less developed countries. On a simple level there is the perception on the part of developing countries

and those involved in development work that refugees attract attention and can be used to attract additional money. On a more sophisticated level there is the growing belief - hinted at by past programs but largely unstudied - that refugee settlements can have a beneficial ripple and multiplier effect on the host country (Utkan, 1981; Scudder, 1981).

Properly done a refugee settlement through direct and linkage effects can be a source of innovation, improve a hinterland's viability, provide cash crops and regional food surpluses, improve foreign exchange positions, open up productive unused lands, and other impacts (Utkan, 1981).

> Settlements must attempt to facilitate a broad based process of integrated area development which includes generation of both farm and nonfarm employment, the development of existing regional centers and townships, and (in remote underdeveloped areas) the creation of new regional centers and townships. If this scope is accepted, careful regional planning becomes crucial, both in regard to the sequencing of particular settlement areas in relationship to one another and in regard to the sequencing of infrastructure within individual settlement areas (Scudder, 1981).

It is hard to introduce a refugee settlement into a poor area without the settlements services and conditions being above that of the adjacent area. Medical, educational, extension and other services are likely to be superior. Many refugee settlements are quite large, 10,000 to 60,000 people, and such a community has to impact resources, land availability, politics, markets, jobs, and opportunities. The refugee settlement can be used as an entry point to a neglected area. Its roads, water and services can be expanded to local villages. The settlement can serve as a prototype for new developments in an area.

Host governments may not be ready to tie refugee settlements into

development plans. Certainly if additional funds are not available it will be unlikely to divert resources from citizens to refugees. One ought not try to pressure a government to integrate refugees if it is not ready. The government may be hoping for repatriation or some other solution. But someday a government may accept the need for integrated development. "Rather than await that day, it makes sense for the major donors to prepare for it by helping to fund necessary surveys now, by helping to establish the initial settlement prototypes now." (Scudder, 1981).

Actors and Options

Refugee assistance in Africa involves a number of actors and options. Assistance is provided to refugees by the host government, local inhabitants and kinfolk, bilateral aid from donor governments, international refugee relief and development agencies, and voluntary agencies. And a great deal of assistance is provided by the refugees themselves through their own spontaneous or structured self-help efforts. This assistance is provided within a framework that has many stages and options ranging from relief to development, going home, resettling, or staying in the country of asylum. Each of the actors has its own view of the options and stages and its own motivation for being involved.

Ths host government has the central role. As a sovereign state its perceptions, policies, plans and decisions will control or limit the activities and options of the other actors. While some host governments do try to do most of it alone, many governments of developing countries lack the expertise, management skills and resources to assist refugees.

A more normal pattern is for host countries to turn to the U.N. system, particularly UNHCR, for assistance. Nonetheless the government's decisions are still crucial. The government is the source of land for settlement, directly or indirectly, and its expectations or plans regarding a durable solution, particularly repatriation or settlement, will set the framework for assistance. Further, the government decides which other actors will be allowed into the country and permitted to provide assistance.

The options available as a solution to a refugee situation will have a tremendous impact on the type and level of assistance given to the refugees. Clearly it makes little sense to relocate refugees to an organized settlement if they are likely to quickly repatriate. Or to hold refugees in camps when there is no possibility of repatriation. Unfortunately the situation is rarely clear. Refugee movements are not simple events, they tend to be ongoing flows with changing conditions and patterns. There is a continuous interaction between the changing situation and the available options and this will affect the movement of the refugees through the stages of assistance. Governments, in particular, tend to hope for an easy solution, normally camps and repatriation, either because they wish to be rid of the burden or have their own political stakes in the problem. The result, however, may mean long delays in getting refugees started on the right track back to a normal life.

The refugees play a central role in the eventual solution of their problem. The behavior, needs, characteristics and expectations of the refugees need to be included in any analysis of refugee economic activities.

The next section will look at refugee behavior generally, and examine how well African refugees fit that pattern.

III.
THE REFUGEES

The refugee problem is worldwide, today no region or continent lacks refugees. The range of possible refugee groups is as great as the range of the human experience, from the stone age to the space age. Despite this diversity it is possible and useful to develop a perspective which sees certain consistencies in the refugee experience and refugee behavior. Refugees should be seen as a social psychological type whose behavior is socially patterned. Viewing refugees and their problems as patterned and recurring means that one is not working in isolation confronting a unique problem. Rather one can learn from colleagues and the past, share experiences and remedies, anticipate problems, and design programs to fit expected behaviors.

The Refugee Experience

The heart of the refugee experience is trauma and loss. Refugees leave their homelands because they are pushed out by fear of persecution, by actual persecution, or are expelled by their government. Given a choice, virtually all refugees would have stayed put. Refugees are pushed out of their homelands by political factors. They have not failed within their homeland. Some were successful, prominent and educated, almost all were well-integrated, independent, functional, self-sufficient individuals. Refugees are not poor people in the sense of having been failures or dependent at home, they are temporarily without funds or opportunity.

Some people sense danger early, anticipatory refugees, and leave

home before a crisis makes orderly departure impossible. The whole family moves, brings resources with them, and has made preparations for a new life. Any destination will do for an anticipatory refugee as long as it provides safety. Anticipatory refugees are normally educated, well to do and alert (Kunz, 1973).

Acute refugee movements result from an overwhelming push. War or political crisis or government policy puts the emphasis on immediate escape. The acute movement may be a mass flight which includes many who actually have little to fear but flee due to an atmosphere of panic or hysteria. Or, if escape is restricted only small groups or individuals may get out. In an acute movement the refugees leave their homeland on a moment's notice. They have not planned or prepared for the journey; they are not looking at their future; they are simply trying to get out of harm's way. Acute refugees tend to be young, educated, male, and from the more active age groups.

Because the acute refugee makes his decision within a short time span, he will give little thought to the consequences of flight. Not until the refugee reaches a place of asylum, often in a state of shock, in a condition akin to "midway to nowhere" (Kunz, 1973), will the refugee ponder the three classic choices that face refugees: to return home, to stay in the place of first asylum, or be resettled far away. Often the refugees' desires and the choices available will not match and a great deal of pressure will be applied by all actors, including the refugees, to force a choice from among the unsatisfactory alternatives.

Trauma and Development

The extreme trauma and stress inflicted on the refugee will leave lasting scars and changes in the refugees behavior long after the crisis is past. Refugee losses are difficult to measure in terms of tangible objects and possessions, the real losses are more personal and meaningful. The refugee goes through the shattering experience of being uprooted from home,and all things familiar,and being violently transplanted to alien soil. In the process the refugee is attacked, loses loved ones, suffers a loss of identity, and experiences insecurity and hostility. "The material restoration can be effected in a short space of time, while the scars of uprooting and separation are deeper and often permanent" (Doheny, 1981).

The trauma of flight can produce residual psychological states in the refugee - residual states that will affect behavior for years to come (Keller, 1975). Those who endure the greatest hardship and loss are most likely to be affected. Refugees come out of the experience with three residual characteristics: guilt, invulnerability, and aggressiveness. Guilt for the loved ones lost because the refugee delayed flight, chose the wrong path, or failed to protect them during attack. The feeling of invulnerability develops because the refugee has been through the worst and has survived. And the aggressiveness is seen as an outgrowth of the other two states: a displacement of guilt onto others and a willingness to take risks because one is invulnerable.

The increased aggressivensss of refugees is the most important residual characteristic. Observers have noted this aggressiveness

displaying itself in several ways. It can come out in the form of subsequent political unrest, in Africa this has been so common that it is now standard practice to move refugee groups away from the border zone in order to prevent raids and other political activities by exile groups. Interpersonal violence, crimes or suicide are another way aggressiveness may appear. In Africa, violence within liberation movements, and the association of refugees with criminal activities fit quite well with this pattern (Simon-Thomas, 1979; Klinteberg, 1978; Knight, 1978; Hawley, 1971; National Committee for Aid to Refugees, 1980: vol. II; Finley, 1975).

There is one other way in which increased refugee aggressiveness can manifest itself, one which is vitally important to the position of refugees in less developed countries. Refugees become risktakers, entrepeneurs, innovators; refugees behave in ways that promote economic development (Keller, 1975). Development, at least in part, requires a belief that change is not threatening, a willingness to take risks, and a competitive world view. Whatever the refugee may have been like before exile it is likely that flight and the struggle to restore oneself will produce changes in attitudes and behavior more conducive to change, innovation, risktaking and development.

A refugee who has re-attained self-sufficiency is different from local inhabitants at that same level. While self-sufficiency is the normal condition of life in much of rural Africa the refugee did not get there in a normal way. The refugee has experienced trauma, loss and a complete economic disaster, the refugee has mobilized his resources and made a comeback. In most cases the comeback is done on your own -- the

self-settling refugee portrayed by Hansen (1981) is following a "conservative tactic" culturally and socially, but in its rejection of government provided material aid and striking out on one's own it is certainly not timid. The refugee is forced by the need to survive to be unorthodox, to be more mobile than non-refugees, to be pushy and competitive to get relief and resources, to be venturesome and innovative. Those who are settled in organized schemes experience a much closer relationship with government and external agencies than is the norm for rural Africa getting the benefits of wells, roads, seeds, water systems and technical advice. The refugees may be forced by ecological differences into completely new economic patterns. Aggressive, invulnerable, uninhibited, mobile, innovative, risktaking, competitive, and involved in a process of restoration - either on your own or with government intervention - the refugee reaches deep into his own reservoirs of strength and finds qualities within himself previously unused, confronts new experiences and risks, and makes a comeback. Once one has been involved in such a process is it likely the refugee will want to stop the comeback at self-sufficiency and be satisfied to be static?(Keller, 1975).

Camps

Although the physical conditions of refugee camps may vary widely, from hell to hotels, the effects tend to be uniform. The most important characteristics of the camps are: segregation from the host population, the need to share facilities, a lack of privacy, plus overcrowding and a limited, restricted area within the whole compass of daily life is to be conducted. This gives the refugees a sense of dependency, and

the clear signal that they have a special and limited status, and are being controlled (Murphy, 1955; Mandani, 1973; Hansen, 1977).

It is during the camp experience that the enormity of what has happened finally strikes home to the refugee. The focus is on what has been lost. Besides the suffering, trauma, and persecution already endured, and the loss of loved ones, the refugee must now face up to loss of homeland, identity, and his former life. A new life in a strange land awaits. Anxiety, fear, frustration, and emotional disturbance appear, and often the refugee regresses to a more infantile state, loses his willpower, and becomes apathetic, helpless, or manic and aggressive. The refugee loses structure, the ability to coordinate, predict and expect, and his basic feeling of competence. Apathy and dependency are especially marked characteristics (Bakis, 1955; Stern, 1955; Houston and Houston, 1973; Jensen, 1966; Murphy, 1955).

There are several reasons to encourage great speed in getting refugees out of camps. The point has already been made (p. 38) that a quick exit avoids the onset of apathy, helplessness, dependency, and a feeling of being owed a handout. There is, however, a more practical reason favoring speed. Early in their exile the refugees are in shock, disorganized, flexible, pliable, controllable, less able to resist government policies. Refugees want out of the camps but their solution is often markedly different from the government's plans. The refugees want to stay near the border, be with kinsmen, migrate to urban areas, once the camp develops a life of its own even the camp will be preferred to relocation to a distant settlement. The longer they are in the camp the more the refugees collect their wits and develop a will of their own.

Settlement

In examining the refugee experience during settlement it is important to take a split-screen view of what is happening. On one side is what research indicates happens to most refugees, what they should actually expect regarding life in a new and strange land. On the other side we have the refugees' expectations, often romantic and unrealistic, which are quite different from what we know they should expect. The refugees' expectations will have a large impact on their behavior in exile.

The Pattern of Adjustment

The general pattern of adjustment over time can be analyzed in four stages: (1) the initial arrival period of the first few months; (2) the first and second years; (3) after four to five years; (4) a decade or more later (Stein, 1979; 1980). Without being exhaustive and looking across the spectrum of occupational and economic adjustment, social adjustment, cultural adjustment, and mental health, the pattern develops as follows.

In the initial period the refugees will be confronted by the reality of what has been lost. From a high occupational and social status at home they will plunge downward in their new land - from professional to menial, from elite to impoverished minority.

> A highly educated person with professional competence becomes a non-entity over night (Doheny, 1881).

> Refugees with drive and energy have had to take employment without first obtaining work permits or clearance. . . . they were compelled to receive lower salaries than was due to them by virtue of their qualifications

> and experience (Simon-Thomas, 1979). Compelled to take second or third grade position in the field in which they were masters in their country of origin . . . learn a new profession or take employment . . . at reduced self importance and often of wages as well (Simon-Thomas, 1979).

And they will confront the loss of their culture -- their identity, their habits. Every action that used to be habitual or routine will require careful examination or consideration.

> Refugees suddenly find themselves virtual islands in a strange and sometimes hostile sea. Their desire to establish new links with others is tempered by the fear, insecurity and mistrust. . . (Mutiso, 1979).

> All these sudden changes aggravate acute feelings of loneliness and of being lost in a hostile world (Doheny, 1981).

> He cannot express himself, his emotions remain locked up inside him, his needs are misunderstood and the exchange of ideas with his host is impossible. The Angolan refugee who crosses into Zambia cannot make himself understood and so tensions and frustrations accumulate (Doheny, 1981).

Strains will appear at home because the husband can't provide, the women must work, the children don't respect the old ways. Nostalgia, depression, anxiety, guilt, anger, frustration are so severe that many refugees toy with the idea of going home even though they fear the consequences.

> Resettled Africans have often expressed to me this sense of dislocation . . . would prefer to return to her country at war . . . the strange culture . . . too much for her. She suffered acute loneliness and isolation in exile (Doheny, 1981).

During the next period of one or two years the refugees display an impressive drive to recover what has been lost, to rebuild their lives. Some of the factors which caused the refugees' initial downward mobility can be ameliorated by time, acculturation, language improvement, training

programs, and hard work and determination. There are two key factors here. First, the refugees were successful and prominent, or at least independent and functioning, at home, and those qualities that led to their earlier success can facilitate upward mobility in their new land.

> In some states such refugees compete easily with nationals for employment in the urban sector. Many have had substantial business experience, if not professional training (Finley, 1975).

Second, the refugee experience may make them more aggressive and innovative. They will work hard and try many new approaches to rebuild their lives.

> Most refugee families utilize most of all of these varied sources of income, combining them in different seasons of the year and according to the number and skills of the refugee household (Hansen, 1977).

> had traditional ideas at first, but soon discovered they had to act in new ways in order to survive . . . . . younger refugee women exert a new-found independence of sorts to change their marital partners to facilitate assimilation (Spring, 1979).

In this period many of the refugees will change jobs, some men will even do women's work (Johnson, 1979), go to school, and move from their initial placement to an area of refugee concentration. They will also experience increased problems within the family, and the level of mental dysfunction is likely to shift and increase.

> One way for a woman to improve her position is to divorce her refugee husband and marry a settler (Spring, 1979).

> The general demoralization, frustration and hopelessness bordering on cynical despair that is likely to affect refugees even when most of their more immediate and serious problems have been solved (Mutiso, 1979).

After four or five years the refugee has completed the major part of his adjustment. Less change occurs after this point. "For most refugees the period of re-establishing control over adequate, supplies of foodstuffs and the access to cultivating land takes four or more years" (Hansen, 1977). The refugee has acquired the language and the culture, been retrained, worked hard. If the goal is not near or at hand now, the refugee is likely to abandon the efforts. Skills are getting stale, the refugee is older, the family and routines of living demand attention. Drive and determination wane, discouragement sets in, and the refugee is resigned to the changes in his life and statuses.

> The mental state . . . is a product not of the initial trauma . . . but rather . . . the inordinate amount of time . . . before they see themselves as making any progress toward the attainment of long-term goals (Mutiso, 1979).

By this point many refugees talk of their exodus as having been for the sake of the children; hopes are transferred to the next generation.

Resignation, of course, does not necessarily mean happiness. Many will be embittered and alienated. Many will be just surviving, acculturated enough to function but far from assimilation or integration.

After ten years the refugee group will have achieved a certain stability. The recovery of lost status will have continued but at a much slower pace. The sum total after the first decade is one of decline. Despite the drive and determination, lives torn apart are not easily repaired, the effect of exodus is to produce lower status.

> The relative ease with which many African refugees blend into their host society and establish self-sufficiency, however, must not cause their impoverishment to be overlooked. There are significant

> material losses that are not immediately compensated for, even though subsistence self-sufficiency is regained (Hansen, 1977).

Expectations and Behavior

After all the trauma and suffering, after lanquishing in a refugee camp, a refugee approaches his new life and land with mixed feelings. The refugee left his home to get away from danger, he had no destination in mind, no "positive original motivations to settle elsewhere" (Kunz, 1973).

> panic brought about by a sudden, often irrational, sense of uncontrollable fear. The decision to move is often based on the judgment of others, the herd instinct . . . there is generally no turning back, and remorse may result (Doheny, 1981).

The decision to settle, resettle or repatriate is often chosen against or despite his wishes, the refugee is taking a "plunge" into the unknown.

> On his way to the country offering him asylum, the refugee experienced...his liberation from the troubles and cares which has driven him from his fatherland; the oppression of the uncertain arrival which he was to face; the sorrow on account of all that was dear to him and left behind. Against the background of his...experiences ...he fostered undifferentiated and rosy-coloured expectations about things awaiting him in the country lying ahead. (Ex, 1966)

> all age groups had high aspirations for a better life... it was precisely because of such high expectations that many became disillusioned by the harsh realities (Liu, 1979).

> the greater will be their disappointment when the type of reception given to them and the conditions in which they are obliged to live in their countries of asylum fall below their expectations (Pan African Conference on Refugees, 1979a).

Refugees have high expectations about their new life, especially

regarding their economic and occupational adjustment.

> begin to look for opportunities for education or employment. They are a dynamic group of persons whose demands tend to be in the sight of the host countries too high (Pan African Conference on Refugees, 1979a).

They do not expect to lose anything because of their migration. The refugees want to recover their lost status and are resistant to accepting jobs that represent underemployment.

> the refugees would not accept the jobs given to them or move to places outside the cities to work (Pan African Conference on Refugees, 1979a).

> ...that rejection and dispossession created in them a burning desire to make a place for themselves to prove their worth (Weinstock, 1964).

> The question of obtaining employment looms high on his agenda. Because he feels he is able and qualified to work, any delays encountered in securing the necessary permits, create anxiety in him (Simon-Thomas, 1979).

A phenomenon of particular importance regarding refugee behavior while being assisted is the refugees' strong belief that they are owed something by someone. Since their persecutors are unavailable, the refugees shift their demands to the government and the helping agencies.

> Urban refugees, often educated, articulate and politically active, demand attention and usually receive it: they queue for interviews daily, they protest, they do not go away (Chambers, 1979).

> No more succint observation could be made then there exists a complete breakdown in relationships between refugees, 'management' and sponsors. Refugees no longer trust 'management'; the 'management' in turn distrust refugees... (Collinson, 1970).

> They begin to feel insecure and often become angry with both themselves for leaving home, and with the host country, its people and its officials for encouraging them to leave their countries of origin in the first place (Simon-Thomas, 1979).

Neither the government or the agencies are able to satisfy all of the refugees' demands. As their requests are frustrated the refugees become suspicious and bitter. Denied what they believe is owed them, feeling that the agencies seek to control them, the refugees suspect "counterfeit-nurturance," that is, aid given to benefit the host, given to humiliate and subjugate the refugees rather than from motives of genuine charity (Keller, 1975; DeVoe, 1981).

> There is often the absence of real love and genuine care for the victim. There is often the self interest of personal satisfaction, and a gratifying feeling of achievement and accomplishment. The human touch is missing (Doheny, 1981).

> Instances where refugees believe that the object of relocation is primarily to benefit the host country through bringing new land into production or settling thinly peopled regions (Rogge, 1981).

A vicious spiral can set in: refugees are helped because they are helpless; they must display their need and helplessness; the caseworker cannot accede to all who are needy, must shield himself from emotional involvement; the cool attitude of the caseworker conveys suspicion to the refugee about his truthfulness; if they won't believe the truth the refugee inflates it; hearing exaggerated stories the caseworker becomes suspicious (Keller, 1975).

> puzzled and disillusioned when ... confronted by officials who demand to be satisfied of their identity as genuine refugees (Pan African Conference on Refugees, 1979a).

> Relief workers often create great suffering, and generate bitterness in spite of their good intentions. Their lack of sympathy and empathy with the victims, their obsession about getting things done, their eagerness to be efficient, their lack of time to

> share some of the sadness of refugees, leaves hurtful scars and deep antagonism (Doheny, 1981).

A last point regarding refugee behavior: the refugee is searching his way through a strange and frightening society. The patterns of behavior that sustained life at home are no longer sufficient. The refugee is uncertain about how to mobilize his resources to succeed in his new home.

> regardless of any apparent similarities between their own country and the country of asylum, refugees are generally unfamiliar with the ins and outs of their new situation and are ignorant as to how to make their way within it. ...lack basic knowledge and information ... what is available, what to expect and above all, what they are entitled to (Mutiso, 1979).

The split-screen view of the refugee experience reveals a tension that must be dealt with if refugees are to integrate successfully into a new society. The refugees and those assisting them have different views of the same situation. In pursuing their rose-colored expectations of their ability to recover what they have lost, refugees can become aggressive, demanding and suspicious. Behind those behaviors, though, is confusion, insecurity, uncertainty, and a need for guidance. If the assistance system does not provide clear expectations and unambiguous situations, then we will have refugees who must seek their own way and who are likely to be demanding and suspicious.

Caveat on African Refugees

Almost all of what is written above was originally developed to describe the patterns, expectations, characteristics and behavior of refugees in developed countries (Stein, 1979; 1980; 1981). Although it has

been possible to find African examples to fit each of the points an uneasy feeling lingers about. There is precious little that has been written about African refugees that sees them as individuals and looks at their behavior. Rural refugees are most often dealt with as part of a group or mass not as individuals. There is more information on urban refugees because their plight is more singular. Based on what is available it seems clear, although stated with some doubts, that urban refugees in Africa share a great deal with their fate-mates on other continents. Rural refugees also appear to fit the pattern but there is much we do not know. It would be premature to presume the match is there, rather it would be better to do many many more studies, perhaps using the patterns as a starting point, but with an open mind that is prepared to absorb and enjoy new discoveries.

There is one more long quotation to offer and endorse. It is from Lewis and Wisner (1981) and while it refers to refugee camps the points are valid for the whole range of the refugee experience.

> Little is actually known about the origins and background of the refugees, or about the actual problems and workings of the camp. There is an economic and social life in these camps which workers are not aware of, knowledge of which may be very important in order to plan rationally and to avoid egregious errors. It is our strong impression that a short period of direct observation and participation in camp life by a social scientist can pay considerable dividends.

IV.
ANALYSIS OF ISSUES AND PROBLEMS

This section presents an analysis of some of the major issues and problems regarding the economic activities of refugees in Africa. The analysis tried to review and bring together some of the background themes and ideas presented earlier regarding durable solutions and the stages of refugee assistance and the behavior and characteristics of the refugees and apply them to some key questions relating to refugee economic activities. The main points that are examined are: the goals of refugee assistance; the economic adjustment of African refugees; the status of women refugees; and a review of the salient lessons regarding implementation of refugee assistance.

There are two important aspects to consider regarding the goals of refugee assistance: 1) the content of the goals, namely self-reliance and self-sufficiency; and, 2) the choice and implementation of goals particularly the roles of the main actors and the timing of the choices.

Self-Reliance

As a goal self-reliance attempts to promote partial self-support amongst refugees. The objective is to generate a degree of independence and self-help so as to reduce stagnation and dependency and the costs to the host government. Some external support will be required but the refugees have an opportunity to better their own conditions and be active and useful.

Self-reliance is chosen as a goal only when there are limits on the assistance to be given to the refugees or the refugees are limited in their own ability to achieve self-sufficiency. There are three major conditions where self-reliance is likely to be the goal: 1) massive refugee influxes; 2) refugees expected to repatriate early; and, 3) refugees who are part of defective families, the men are missing and women are the head of households.

When there is a massive refugee influx, in the hundreds of thousands or exceeding one million refugees, there will be resource limits to how rapidly the refugees problems can be addressed. In a case such as Somalia with approximately two million refugees even if permanent settlement had been chosen at the start as the preferred durable solution there would still be delays of years or decades before all of the refugees could leave the camps and receive settlement assistance. Many refugees will have long stays in the camps while the assistance effort gears up to the magnitude of the problem. In this context self-reliance programs are strongly preferable to a continuing dole and dependency in the camps.

Establishing and running a self-reliance program with refugees who will have a long wait in camps is very difficult. The refugees will have little motivation to participate in a temporary solution while free and full rations are available. Pressuring refugees to participate by threatening to cut off their rations may seem necessary but will be of dubious utility. It is important to give refugees an incentive to participate in self-reliance programs. Activities that are just menial or busy work or for the benefit of the host - clean-up camp, work for rations roughly

equal to what is already free - will not attract the refugees. Incentives and benefits in the form of better conditions are necessary. Opportunities to engage in trade and handicrafts in the camps or to keep the lion's share of agricultural output from tiny plots, small livestock or poultry. Any long term camp awaiting a durable solution should be allowed and encouraged to become like a functioning small city albeit one that is not truly viable but depends on external aid. In this last regard permitting a refugee leadership to develop and function also becomes important.

When early repatriation is expected it does not make sense to mount elaborate assistance efforts aimed at self-sufficiency. Self-reliance programs while awaiting repatriation aim at reducing the corrosive aspects of camp life, reducing maintenance costs, and at preparing the refugees for their return home. If this last point is emphasized self-reliance efforts in this context may have better prospects for success than those associated with mass influxes. Again motivation and incentive are a problem with any camp-based self-reliance programs. Refugees expecting to repatriate will have a high motivation to bring things back with them. Especially attractive will be items to replace things lost in flight, materials need for reconstruction and reestablishment of one's life, new useful skills or techniques, and "luxury" or prestige items not normally available at home.

It is not clear that self-reliance is the appropriate goal for refugee families headed by women, even those with small children. If this goal is chosen it is at the settlement stage not in the camps. The problems of refugee women are discussed more fully below but briefly the

major constraint on women heads of houscholds achieving self-sufficiency is limited labor time due to the demands of child care and domestic chores. There are numerous other constraints particularly the failure to include women and their needs in program designs and plans but they can, hopefully, be addressed in the future and are not inherent or unavoidable constraints.

Choosing self-reliance rather than self-sufficiency as a goal for refugee women heads of households is justifiable only if it is not possible for the women to achieve self-sufficiency. There is far too little known about the changing, economic roles of rural women to make any blanket assumptions. In some cases cultural and other constraints will make self-reliance the appropriate goal. In others the women may have been heads of households even before exile or may be capable of adjusting to this new condition and achieving self-sufficiency as refugees. What is clear, and is discussed below, neither self-reliance nor self-sufficiency for women refugees can be achieved if the needs are not added to and given priority in program design.

Self-Sufficiency

Self-sufficiency is an appropriate goal for refugee assistance. While it benefits the host government in reduced assistance costs its main benefits are aimed at the refugees. The object is to make the refugee independent and capable of functioning and participating as a full member of his new society. Self-sufficiency must be more than bare bones survival for the refugee. There must be economic advantages and incentives that engender in the refugee a commitment to an alien place, that

create a desire to put down roots and integrate with the local population.

Self-sufficiency for refugees needs to come quickly and to at least include the possibility, if not the probability, of surpassing the living conditions of the local population. Refugees have been uprooted and set down in a place where they have no ties to the land, people or panorama. Rootless the refugee will drift or wander if unhappy or discouraged. It is difficult yet imperative to make rapid progress toward self-sufficiency. Surveys, planning and competent extension advice are required to offset the refugees' lack of knowledge of the area and crops. Failures in the first few years of settlement will discourage and frustrate refugees, weaken their already tenuous roots, and increase their dependency on aid.

Satisfactory, root encouraging, self-sufficiency is likely to have a different content for refugees than for long time inhabitants of an area. While the refugees' past living standard will figure in their evaluation of the present, even assuming their past standard was similar to the local inhabitants' level, in exile the refugees will need a bit more. Not only do the refugees lack emotional ties to the place they lack the social relationships and networks that give security in hard times. They need a diversified economy so they can be more resilient and productive. Diversity also spread economic activities throughout the family. A refugee family may be doing well as a whole but the change in environment may erode the role and economic base of individual members, particularly the women. Diversity provides cash and status for more family members and promotes domestic tranquility. Lastly, cash crops are an important component of refugee self-sufficiency in that they provide access to amenities

and are a source of taxation for local governments, thereby encouraging the provision of services.

No one would stop natives who endeavored to rise above self-sufficiency and one must not put artificial constraints on refugee activities. If because of outside and, their own drive and innovativeness, or because their past and skills give them an advantage, the refugees will rise above self-sufficiency it is best not to stop the improvement but rather to find ways to include others in the growth (Holborn, 1975: vol. II).

Choice of Goals

The host government's decisions and goals are the controlling element in responding to a refugee crisis. As a sovereign state it determines under what conditions the refugees will remain, who is permitted to assist them, the design and parameters of the assistance program, and, whether the refugees' future is repatriation or integration. The government's decisions, however, are subject to influence by external agencies who will fund much of the program and provide expertise and advice, and by the refugees who may be willing or recalcitrant participants and beneficiaries. There is a strong possibility that the refugees' goals and views may conflict with the government's and that the refugees will sabotage or weaken the assistance program.

While the refugees' goals and desires ought not to be ignored there are several reasons, beyond the physical and political weaknesses, to give the refugees judgments and goals less weight. Refugees tend to be unrealistic and demanding, expecting too much or taking a romantic view of their political prospects. Refugees are in shock and disoriented

for a long initial period, and many are made unstable by their experiences. It is easy for refugees to make mistakes, they have never been refugees before, they lack information on the ways of the host society, they may resist solutions that are in their best interests. Refugees from Ruwanda in the 1960's "saw themselves as merely biding their time ... awaiting an opportunity for a triumphant return" (Holborn, 1978: vol II). Eritreans in the Sudan in the 1970's felt "they would soon be returning home for good ... spectacular victories" (Johnson, 1979). Today many refugees in Somalia, and the Somali government itself, hope to be able to return soon. "Considerable resistance was shown toward acceptance of any measures implying permanent settlement" (Holborn, 1975: vol. II).

> It is easy for refugees to slide into wrong channels of education or livelihood, etc. Thus bemused, bewildered, and insecure, their own contribution to decisions on their future is lessened in quality (Collinson, 1972).

While one ought not be bound by the refugees' goals one must not take this as meaning they are incapable of self-help and participating in decisions regarding their future. No greater assurance of resistance exists than to take involuntary migrants and further attempt to control and institutionalize them without their consultation and consent. Their participation in decision-making is required for success. The refugees, nonetheless, require guidance and a firm hand. It is better to provide this earlier rather than later.

Situations tend to stabilize and become fixed. The conservative response of refugees confronting the unknown - "to conserve and strengthen their control by minimizing the opportunity for more changes"(Hansen,

1981) - is to stay with the current situation even if it is the dole of a refugee camp.

This situation is made much worse if the government is indecisive or entertains false hopes. Most governments hope for the easy solution, repatriation. Or they wait for the situation to be clarified. This hemming and hawing means that time is lost, money is wasted on the wrong durable solution, hopes are raised that will be later dashed.

The host government, with the help of the experienced international agencies, needs to be decisive and not give in to false hopes. Refugees are prone to switch between euphoria and depression, activity and apathy, hope and despair, when they are "hovering" between escaping and assenting to the frustrating circumstances" (Ex, 1966), refugees have a need for structure and guidance. This is the role for the host government. "In such a situation the autocratic paternalism ... is not only almost a necessity, it is probably beneficial" (Murphy, 1955).

Timing and Perspective

If repatriation is not immediately and clearly likely it is best to operate and plan as if refugees will stay permanently in their land of asylum. Refugee movements rarely take the form of a single burst exodus, rather they tend to be ongoing irregular flows from persecution to safety. The first group of refugees in a new situation are unlikely to go home soon if ever, more likely they are the harbingers of more and more refugees in the future. Most predictions and expectations of repatriation turn out to be wrong. Repatriation is long delayed if ever possible, rather than returning the first refugees are joined by a new

influx.

In providing assistance there are minor differences between a refugee who will be around for five years and one who will stay permanently. If sure of the refugees return in five years one might hold back on some infrastructure investments in the durable solution of settlement but the cost of a relief or self-reliance effort for five years is likely to be as great or greater than the cost of helping the refugees to achieve self-sufficiency (Neldner, 1979; Doheny, 1981; Rogge, 1981; Holborn, 1975).

> It may be said that as refugees can possibly return to their countries of origin, much unnecessary expense may be incurred by planning a settlement aimed at self-support when it is not known whether the refugees will remain in the country of asylum. It can, however, be shown that in most situations the cost in purely financial terms to bring refugees to self-support over a three to five year period is no greater than sustaining them in a fully dependent situation for a relatively little longer period of time (Neldner, 1979; emphasis added).

The perspective that the refugee problem is only temporary has damaging repercussions throughout the assistance system. Things will go undone or be done poorly. Future problems will not be addressed until they are immediate; preparations, surveys, studies, projects, will lag while time is lost.

> In a high proportion of cases shortage of time cannot be blamed, and the only other causal factors are either incompetence ... or lack of information (Collinson, 1972).

It would be better to take Holborn's (1975) advice that "the faster each stage is carried out, the better the results and the less chance there is of stagnation."

An important point to consider is: what if you are wrong? You can

be wrong if you begin settlement but repatriation comes quickly. You can be wrong if you wait for repatriation and it never comes or is long delayed.

If the refugees return home early the consequences of preparing for settlement are not likely to be severe, some greater expenses will be incurred but much of them can be turned to the host's advantage. The refugees will leave behind sites and infrastructure that can be used by the local inhabitants. Soil and water surveys can be used either for a future refugee influx or for the benefit of the local population. There are benefits, though, for the refugees in human terms.

> Past experience ... suggests that the settlements may perform their most valuable function in the case of refugees who are able to repatriate before long, in the sense that the settlements have made it possible to do away with the refugee camp -- that temporary or not so temporary refuge which has proved so destructive to the human spirit because self-sufficiency is not possible there (Holborn, 1975: vol. II).

If the refugees do not repatriate and the government has not started them on the path to self-sufficiency then the consequences of being wrong are likely to be more severe. Money has been spent for a number of years on relief and maintenance with no return. Not only has time been wasted but now the attempt to promote refugee self-sufficiency will be more difficult. The numbers of refugees are likely to have grown year by year and so instead of dealing with the more manageable small initial flow and each year's increment one confronts a much enlarged problem. One characteristic of an assistance effort will be missing, as a refugee problem grows the capacity to deal with the flow also grows. Experiments and prototype solutions are tried, staff is trained, one learns from trial

and error, expertise, experience and management skills increase. Lost time means the problem continues to grow but not the capacity to promote a durable solution. Further, the refugees will be more difficult to work with. The refugee camps will have taken their toll, dependency, despondency and apathy will make achieving a durable solution more difficult.

President Nyerere of Tanzania gave sound advice at the Pan African Conference on Refugees (1979a).

> Although virtually all refugees initially expect to return home at some time, there will often be large numbers of people who will be unable to return home safely for months or years to come. It is therefore impossible to deal with these refugees as if all that is required is temporary relief from distress. They must as quickly as possible be given a means of producing or earning their own livelihood. The only practical way of proceeding is to work as if they are likely to be permanent inhabitants of their host state. (emphasis added)

Immediate Settlement

Many African states are generous in providing relief and asylum but are slow in promoting settlement and integration (Holborn, 1975). Governments act slowly because they fear accusations from needy nationals that they are favoring refugees; they lack a commitment to integration or hope the problem will go away; and they may feel they lack the resources need for integration projects. In an odd but true way some governments feel that prompt and generous action on their part may actually reduce their level of international assistance by giving the impression that the crisis is under control. While some obstacles to integration are internal and political, the prompt generous provision or availability

of aid would greatly assist in the choosing and promoting of immediate settlement.

> An infusion of external aid is an absolute prerequisite. ... Regrettably, such capital outlay is all too often limited to initial investment, with no consideration of maintenance or long-term upkeep costs (Rogge, 1981).

Besides the quick and full provision of external financing there are other measures that can be taken to promote settlement as soon as possible.

--Changes in the relief stage to facilitate movement to the settlement stage. Refugee camps are often set up with little thought given to their size and location. They spring up where the refugees enter, grow as new arrivals flow into them, and when capacity is reached, often determined by the prospect of breakdowns and disasters, new camps are opened. In Somalia there are 34 camps with an average of 40,000 refugees each and located an average of 63 kilometers from the nearest urban centers (Lewis and Wisner, 1981). More camps, smaller camps and in particular campsites selected with the possibility of becoming permanent settlements would improve prospects for shortening or bypassing the relief stage.

--Advance soil, site and water surveys. A major delaying factor in moving refugees immediately to settlements is the need to conduct surveys beforehand. The lack of surveys has been identified as a major cause of settlement failures (Rogge, 1981; Scudder, 1981; Holborn, 1975; Neldner, 1979). Advance surveys and site selection or efforts to gather such information at the outset of a crisis would expedite settlement. In this vein "UNHCR might consider reaching provisional agreement with various states about potential settlement areas" (Weinstein, 1975).

--Basic information about the refugees. Settlement schemes should not be designed without knowledge about the participants. "What they did for a living previously, what skills they bring with them, or about the division of labor or economic organization in their homelands" (Lewis and Wisner, 1981). Such information would enable the settlements to be designed to fit the refugees, rather than vice versa, and improve prospects for success.

--Quick response capability. At present most of the information needs indicated above cannot be satisfied by the host government which either lacks the capability or is overwhelmed by other aspects of the refugee emergency. Similarly international and voluntary agencies are too busy, lack the capability, or do not see basic information gathering as their role. Organizations exist or are now being created -- International Refugee Integration Resource Center in Geneva, Refugee Resource and Policy Center in Washington, D.C. - which could play a facilitating role in gathering the above information.

The prospects for successful economic adjustment for most African refugees are generally good provided there is immediate assistance toward settlement and sufficient external aid. The ability of a refugee to transfer his economic skills and status from his homeland to his sanctuary is of crucial importance to the degree of integration and satisfaction a refugee achieves in his new land (Stein, 1979). Generally the higher a refugee's original status the more difficult it will be to return to that level in exile. Refugees whose original status was low not only have good prospects for regaining that level, due to assistance programs, there is even a possibility of an improved life. The prospects for most African refugees are good because of programs to assist them and because most began with a relatively low level of economic activity, the degree of adjustment required is not too great. There are, however, a great variety of possible constraints on the transfer of economic skills in Africa.

The most important constraints are the degree of match or mismatch between economic skills and activities at home and in exile, and whether or not refugees have access to the means of production. In some cases refugee economic activities are either not practised or are not possible in their sanctuary -- nomadic refugees will find restrictions on their activities as will many refugee politicians. In other cases the economic activities are carried out in the host but in greatly altered ways - farmers may have to adjust to a different climate and soils, new crops, methods, techniques and ways of organizing economic activities. Sometimes the refugees may

bring new and more appropriate skills with them than are possessed by the local population; this may facilitate adjustment and progress but it could also generate envy and hostility. If the skills of the refugees are poorly matched to their new land adjustment will be slow and require greater guidance and assistance. Generally, the greater the degree of match between skills and environment at home and in exile the more it will be feasible to resort to spontaneous or assisted self-settlement rather than organized schemes. The greater the disparity the more need there will be for organized settlement schemes involving refugee participation and consent plus competent extension services.

In examining the economic adjustment of African refugees it is useful to separate them by location, rural refugees and urban refugees. In each case the discussion will focus on the degree to which refugee characteristics, particularly their economic skills, fit within the host economy and environment and the degree to which it may be necessary for the refugees to alter their economic activities in their new land.

Rural Refugees

There are several possibilities regarding the economic activities of rural refugees.

-- Refugee skills and activities fit well within the area and economy in which they settle. This is often the case with self-settling refugees who move a short distance, cross the border, and are amongst kin or where schemes are located at sites with condition similar to the exiles' homeland. In such cases, where the amount of new learning by the refugees will be low the likelihood of a successful adjustment will be high. When there is a

match the emphasis should be on assisting the refugees but leaving them relatively unsupervised and autonomous.

-- Refugee skills and activities do not fit in the host economy. A mismatch can occur in many ways' crops, animals, soils, climate, environment, pastoralists without animals, nomads being settled, farmers becoming wage laborers, the methods of cultivation - hoe, ox, plow, tractor, irrigated, rain, dry land - individual small holdings, state farms, marketing and trade patterns. Where there is a mismatch the refugees will have to engage in extensive new learning and are likely to be dependent needing supervision and extension services.

It is important to note that there are two main ways a mismatch may occur; basic environmental conditions may preclude use of the old ways, or, the refugees may not be allowed to live in the old way, even though possible, because of political and social goals of the host government - to establish communes, state farms, cooperatives or to sedentarize nomads - or because of a desire to introduce new ideas and higher production with the refugees used as a pliable population for innovation and demonstration.

Settlement of refugees is in itself complex social engineering. Radical changes in the refugees way of life, however well-intentioned, should be avoided if possible. When there is no choice the changes should be introduced with explanations, thought and care. When there is a choice it is vital to get the refugees participation and consent in the process of change. "Uprooted as they are, refugees are . . . frequently more receptive to new agricultural methods" (Holborn, 1975). If that is the case then they will go along with the changes. It is a mistake to experiment with the

refugees way of life because they are disorganized and resist weakly. A familiar way of life is a comfort in exile. Further, the greater the changes in economic activities the greater the difficulties and cost and the need for effective management of the refugee settlement; and the greater the potential for failure (Chambers, 1969).

-- The refugees may have skills and techniques not yet widely present in the host society or a particular region but deemed appropriate for wider use. In this case there is an opportunity for the host to benefit from innovation and demonstration while the refugees do not have to engage in extensive new learning or radical changes in lifestyle (Scudder, 1981).

> Cash crops . . . which many of the . . . refugees were growing in their own country, will also be encouraged. This will allow the refugees to improve their standard of living while their cultivation will have a demonstration effect.
>
> . . .
>
> are aware of the advantages of a well organized cooperative system, and hence such organizations will be promoted among them. This is expected to have a healthy demonstration effect. (National Committee for Aid to Refugees, 1980:Vol. IV)

In this sort of case the refugees can serve as a source of innovation without radical lifestyle changes and without increasing the complexity, need for supervision, and chance for failure of the settlement.

Refugees do not respond solely to an economic calculation of cost and loss, there are many other factors of great importance to them. While they are struggling for biological and economic survival refugees also have a need for cultural and social survival (Doheny, 1981). Economic activities often provide the basis for a peoples behavior patterns, institutions, values, attitudes, and relationships. To the extent that

economic skills and activities can be transferred one will ease cultural and social disruption and thus ease the refugees transition into a new land.

The refugees will be going through a period of uncertainty, stress and insecurity. Settlement "can require a considerable act of faith on the part of settlers to submit to the risks, controls and changes entailed" (Chambers, 1969). Refugees even in the easiest cases of adjustment will still have to take many risks and make many adaptations. Needlessly adding to the burden of adaptation by requiring changes not dictated by the environment will increase the stresses and the possibility of failure. It will also require far greater intervention, cost, control, and skill on the part of the host government.

Urban Refugees

There is a distinct dichotomy in the economic activities of urban refugees. On the one hand there are the familiar African urban refugees "largely consisting of educated individuals with strong views on political issues" (Pan African Conference on Refugees, 1979). They are students, teachers, party leaders, government officials, professionals and members of liberation movements. On the other hand there is a growing majority of African urban refugees who are from the urban commercial, business and working classes or are of rural origin. They are businessmen, traders, shopkeepers, clerks, mechanics, drivers, carpenter and furniture makers, hairdressers, tailors, shoemakers, repairmen and blacksmiths. The educated and political refugees normally have great difficulties in transferring their skills and economic activities within Africa. Those refugees

from the more numerous and lesser educated group appear to have distinctly better prospects for a successful transfer of economic activities.

Educated-professional urban refugees face as the most important constaints on their economic adjustment not the degree to which their skills and abilities match the labor market in their country of asylum but rather problems of oversupply of those skills, restricted access to certain professions, and a preference for hiring citizens not refugees. Additionally there are problems with language barriers, lack of documents, and the need for many skilled refugees to revalidate their qualifications or retrain to fit local requirements. Lastly, for some highly skilled refugees there is a problem with skills that are not internationally mobile. Some skills are specific to a homeland or region and may require extensive revamping before careers can be resumed. Lawyers shifting between Anglo- and Franco-phone areas or politicians separated from their people have special difficulties. Some highly educated refugees contribute to their own problems by resenting suggestions that they retrain or requalify and be resisting job offers that are beneath their status or away from the center city (Pan African Conference on Refugees, 1979a).

A problem for urban refugees, and in particular the highly skilled, is the reluctance or failure of African governments to offer naturalization to the refugees. This failure combined with discrimination in favor of citizens and the fact that a significant proportion of skilled urban employment is government controlled dims the prospects for these refugees. It must be noted that some of the highly political refugees would reject naturalization or accept it only for instrumental reasons, but many would eagerly welcome it.

In lieu of naturalization the only option that is likely to give many educated and professional urban refugees a chance at a full life would be resettlement out of Africa. This would produce a brain drain that would not be in Africa's best interests but would better serve the refugees. However, with the exception of the availability of work permits and the option of naturalization the resettled refugee would confront most of the same problems, often with higher standards, in adjusting in a distant land as in Africa.

Business and skilled labor urban refugees are virtually unmentioned in reports and studies of refugees in Africa. The few references that are available (National Committee for Aid to Refugees, 1980; Lewis and Wisner, 1981; Knight, 1978) provide enough information for speculation but not for factual analysis.

One can speculate that the course of adjustment will be relatively successful for those refugees who have previously lived in urban areas and already have urban working skills. For unskilled newcomers migrating from rural areas to urban ones for the first time the adjustment is likely to be very difficult.

-- Generally the business and small industry skills held by these refugees are highly transferable within Africa. Particularly between neighboring countries there should not be major variations in work required and skills needed.

-- African cities are growing, not always to the delight of the government, and this creates a need for these skills.

-- Because they are already skilled the refugees will not need expensive training or retraining.

-- Many refugees can set themselves up in business with relatively small loans or grants for tools, supplies and equipment.

-- The Sudan with the largest urban refugee population in Africa views these refugees as potentially beneficial to its economy.

> the relatively advanced industrialization in Eritrea in particular implies that skills and experience of real value to the Sudan may be available, even to ... provide import substitutes and possibly articles for export (National Committee for Aid to Refugees, 1980: vol, II).

Nonetheless, despite the favorable elements there are some constraints on the adjustment of these refugees.

-- In a large influx it is doubtful that an urban area's business and labor market can expand sufficiently to absorb the refugees.

-- One can expect hostility from local businessmen who find themselves disadvantaged in competition with refugee traders who are likely to accept lower profit levels as satisfactory. Local workers will be similarly affected.

-- Those refugees who are in urban areas without work permits or residence permits will be vulnerable to exploitation and victimization.

Without basic information about working and business class urban refugees particularly in towns other than the capital cities it will be impossible to know the dimensions of the problem or its possible resolution.

Women Refugees

Although "women constitute a majority caseload in the adult refugee population" and women "share with men in working the family land" and in some cases "assume the entire responsibility of the agricultural workload"

(UNHCR, 1980a) the amount of information available on women refugees generally and their economic activities specifically is close to non-existent. There are some problems that can be highlighted, nonetheless, and some questions that can be framed.

Domestic Tasks

Domestic tasks normally take a large percentage of a rural woman's working time. In exile, particularly during the establishment period of a settlement, domestic chores can be inordinately time consuming as fuel and water supplies must be newly established and cooking can be an extra burden as the woman becomes accustomed to new foodstuffs, either provided as rations or because the new location won't produce familiar items.

Excessive domestic tasks for the women can be a major constraint on the family's total production. Agriculture is marked by certain peak season labor demands which can limit the amount of seeding or harvesting. The woman's role in the family's economic activities is thus more than a mere supplement rather it is a key and limiting ingredient.

Disappearance of Women's Work

In rural societies many agricultural and economic tasks are often sex specific. This division of roles can be quite important to the women, the community as a whole, and to domestic tranquility within the refugee family. The woman's work provides her with an independent source of income and often as in the case of petty trading, with an important social outlet. In exile the lot of women may be worsened because there are limited opportunities for trading and marketing, certain key raw

materials for handicrafts are lacking, or the men appropriate the women's role (Chambers, 1969). "Many women became even more marginalized in refugee society then they had been" at home (Johnson, 1979).

Low Social Profile

Even when a majority of a refugee group's adults are women they often take a low profile and thus the visible leadership of the camp will be provided by men who push to the front. This leads to ignoring of the women's needs and a failure to include them in the design, planning and implementation of a settlement scheme.

Rural women often make crucial decision-making inputs to such activities as selling crops, joining cooperatives and obtaining credit. They are frequently prime movers in self-help projects and play a major part in agricultural production. The low social profile means that despite their importance they are seldom incorporated into key facets of the project particularly the transfer and dissemination of new techniques which are often a key ingredient in organized settlement schemes.

The refugee woman's role as a major component of production must be included in plans even if they don't push themselves forward.

Apathy

Refugee women often suffer tremendously during the relief and camp stage. Malnutrition often is the result of widespread cultural practices that put food distribution in men's control. Further activities such as foraging for domestic supplies and waiting for rations both consume time and weaken the women. Lastly women separated from their traditional roles are prone to development of apathy, listlessness and helplessness

in camps.

The importance of these observations for the settlement stage is that failure to address these problems in the camps provides a weakened and dependent labor force to the settlement.

Women Heads of Households

It is often reported that over 90% of a refugee camp's population may consist of women and children. The missing men are believed to be away fighting, at home tending the herds or fields, working elsewhere at plantations, mines, or urban areas, to have died or been killed, or to have deserted their families. This leaves the women as head of household and main economic support for the family.

A key question for which basic information is lacking is: what has been the fate of the missing men and what will happen in the future? Will the men eventually show up or send for their families or are they gone forever?

In the interim it is necessary to take special measures to assist women who head their own households. Because of the missing labor input it is necessary to design projects that require less labor and to minimize the waste of labor. Smaller plots, irrigated plots, holdings closer to the settlements services, assistance in plot preparation and other measures could assist the women.

Implementation of Refugee Assistance

This closing section draws from many sources (Scudder, 1981; Lewis and Wisner, 1981; Utkan, 1981; Rogge, 1981; National Committee for Aid

to Refugees, 1980a; Betts, 1980; Neldner, 1979; Hansen, 1977; Holborn, 1975; and, Chambers, 1969) to review some of the salient lessons regarding implementation of refugee assistance in Africa. Most of the points relate most directly to organized settlement schemes but with a little thought and imagination they can often be applied more widely. This review is offered as a reminder that refugee assistance is a complex, difficult and human experience and is full of pitfalls. Refugees can be restored to full economic health and participation in the life of their sanctuary but it is not easy.

Surveys

Careful surveys of the site particularly regarding soil and water are essential before establishment of a refugee settlement scheme. Lack of surveys has frequently been identified as a major contributing cause to failure of settlements. Nonetheless surveys present a difficulty because they take time and thus delay the movement from relief to settlement. There are two possible approaches to the problem; first, development of a pool or bank of settlement sites that have been surveyed in advance, and, second, expediting surveying at the very onset of an emergency -- it is clear that a great deal of time is wasted during the relief stage that could be used to move refugees toward self-sufficiency (Scudder, 1981; Neldner, 1979; Holborn, 1975).

Zonal Development

"Economic measures aimed solely at the refugee community were in the long run counter productive" (Holborn, 1975). For reasons of integration with the local inhabitants, to promote benefits for the host

and the refugees, to prevent development in isolation, and to "catalyze a process of integrated area development" (Scudder, 1981) settlements must "become involved in the life and development of the district or region as a whole" (Neldner, 1979). Inclusion of refugees in zonal development involves extensive planning and careful liaison with regional officials.

Departmentalism

"It is not uncommon for scheme facilities to quickly grind to a halt if local funding is inadequate or totally lacking" (Rogge, 1981). A crucial moment in the life of an assistance project comes when the external funding and implementing agencies declare the settlement self-sufficient, a success, and hand it over to local authorities. Unfortunately, if the local authorities have not been consulted or involved in the project previously they may feel no responsibility for it and the "handover" may mark the beginning of the backslide and decline of the project (Chambers, 1969).

Diversification

A diversified farming system is essential for refugee settlements for both economic and social reasons. Diversification means as varied a set of economic activities as possible rather than dependence on one or a few methods of production. Economically it is more flexible and resilient, leads to higher productivity, provides a more varied diet, and provides for integration of various production techniques and supports a wider variety of non-farm economic activities (Scudder, 1981). Socially it provides "better use of family labor" and "different family members

with a cash income and the status" of being useful (Scudder, 1981). (Chambers, 1969; Hansen, 1977).

Self-Help

Refugees should be expected to do as much as possible for themselves, particularly clearing the land and constructing their own housing out of locally available materials. When facilities and work are done for the refugees "they come to demand such assistance as a right" (Chambers, 1969). (Rogge, 1981; Scudder, 1981; Neldner, 1979).

Incentives

Refugees need incentives to work hard and produce. The best incentive is ownership and control of small farms and the opportunity to increase one's income. The refugees are taking the risks and they need to sense that they will get some benefits. On the other side of the coin, state farms, poorly demarcated plots, wage labor, heavy administrative control, cooperatives and other measures that reduce the refugees personal stake and control are disincentives (Chambers, 1969; Scudder, 1981; Rogge, 1981).

> believed that they had become little more than unpaid labourers on government farms ... the more institutionalized schemes become, the greater is the tendency for settlers not to identify individually with their land, and thus their enthusiasm for the scheme is minimal (Rogge, 1981).

Top-Heavy Administration

"Refugee settlement schemes ... have had a tendency to incorporate a top-heavy administrative framework" (Rogge, 1981). Too many schemes are over-institutionalized superimposing their will on the refugees.

A greater management role is particularly needed when major changes are being made in the refugees economic activities. Over-managed refugee schemes tend to promote apathy and dependence on the part of the refugees and to put too great a strain on a less developed country's pool of administrative talent. "A number of poorly qualified local managers" (Lewis and Wisner, 1981).

Keep It Simple

The other side of the above point is that schemes that are simple, rely on small units, and on refugee participation have a better chance of success both by avoiding "management failure" and increasing refugee motivation. (Scudder, 1981; Rogge, 1981).

> The most independent and active settlers are generally found where there is least 'scheme', and the most dependent and inactive where the greatest effort has been made to transform their way of life (Chambers, 1969).

Host Incorporation

Settlement projects should be designed so that they include the local host population in as many of their projects and services as possible. This is desirable in order to tap local knowledge of the settlement area, to reduce hostility, to promote integration, and for reasons of equity. This point is made so often (Neldner, 1979; Chambers, 1979; Holborn, 1975; Scudder, 1981; Rogge, 1981) that one might suspect it is a truism. Yet problems still arise when funding agencies restrict aid to the refugees alone (Betts, 1980).

Economic Viability

"In the very long term, the best assurance of survival is economic viability" (Chambers, 1969). Because of the eagerness of international donors to provide amenities refugee settlements often have better facilities - improved housing, medical and educational services, then the surrouding area. Partly this is out of a desire to get "the basic capital input for building before international aid is phased out" (Neldner, 1979). Nonetheless, whatever the marginal attractiveness of such amenities the crucial activity for a settlement is not services or housing but being economically viable (Scudder, 1981).

Development

> International aid to refugee projects really ends where normally a development aid project begins. As refugees have been motivated to achieve local community standards of living in relatively few years -- does this not provide a suitable launching point for a development project with international support for the community as a whole (Neldner, 1979).

Linkages

Another reason to ensure that refugee settlements are integrated into their region and to go beyond the minimal goal of self-sufficiency.

> Insofar as refugee settlements do not develop in a vacuum, the economic potential they embody spreads within the region and thereby stimulates further growth. This new dynamic is introduced into regional development by means of linkages ... (Utkan, 1981).

As refugees generate cash incomes the demand for a variety of consumption and production goods and services increases. There is an increase in demand for clothing, foodstuffs, furniture, and a variety of

light consumer and handicraft goods. Additionally on the production side the "expansion of agricultural production speeds up the establishment of agro-industries ... which use or process that output" (Utkan, 1981).

> This engenders new marketing channels and results in expanded income opportunities for the local population. This again leads to a better integration of production and exchange functions within the region, which in turn further stimulates production. A cumulative process of change and growth is thereby set in motion (Utkan, 1981).

Linkages can provide jobs for local inhabitants in rural areas "as well as making them more attractive places to live" (Scudder, 1981).

Research

There is a tremendous need for long and short term research on all aspects of refugee problems.

> Uncertainty about the place of origin ... virtually no social science study carried out -- ever ... no idea about what they did for a living ... no idea about the extent to which there are intact social groups ... we know almost nothing about the original social organization of these people.
>
> We do not know much about economic and social activity in the camps ... (Lewis and Wisner, 1981).

The lack of basic information, particularly in refugee situations that are four or five or more years old, is irresponsible, dangerous, wasteful, and begging for disaster.

REFERENCES

Aall, Cato
1979 "Disastrous International Relief Failure: A Report on Burmese Refugees in Bangladesh from May to December 1978," Disasters, 3(4).

Adan, Ahmed Mohamed
1981 "Somalia's Case Against an O.A.U. Panel," letter, New York Times, August 1.

Aiboni, Sam Amaize
1978 Protection of Refugees in Africa. Uppsala: Swedish Institute of International Law.

Ankrah, Kodwo E.
1979 "The African Refugee Situation: Policy Issues and Administrative Problems," REF/AR/CONF/BD. 11, Pan African Conference on Refugees, Arusha, Tanzania, May.

Bakwesegha, C.J.
1979 "Giving Assistance to Refugees," REF/AR/CONF/BD. 14, Arusha, Tanzania, Pan African Conference on Refugees, May.

Bedjaoui, Mohammed
1979 "Asylum in Africa," REF/AR/CONF/BD. 1, Pan African Conference on Refugees, Arusha, Tanzania, May.

Betts, Tristram F.
1981 "Rural Refugees in Africa," International Migration Review, XV.

Betts, Tristan F.
1980 Spontaneous Settlement of Rural Refugees in Africa. London: Euro Action ACORD, April.

Binaisa, Godfrey L.
1977 "Organization of African Unity and Decolonization: Present and Future Trends," Annals, 432, July.

Brooks, Hugh C. and El-Ayouty, Yassin eds.
1970 Refugees South of the Sahara: An African Dilemma. Westport: Negro Universities Press.

Buvinic, Mayra and Youssef, Madia H.
1978 Women-Headed Households: The Ignored Factor in Development Planning. Report, Grant AID/otr-G-1593, Washington, D.C.: AID, March.

Byerlee, Derek et al.
1977 Rural Employment in Tropical Africa: Summary of Findings. African Rural Economy Program Working Paper No. 20, East Lansing: Michigan State University, February.

Chambers, Robert
1979 "Rural Refugees in Africa: What the Eye Does Not See," Disasters, 3(4).

Chambers, Robert
1969 Settlement Schemes in Tropical Africa: A Study of Organizations and Development. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Citizens Commission on Indochinese Refugees
1981 "Refugees and Drought Victims in Somalia and Sudan: A Citizens Delegation Report," New York, International Rescue Committee, mimeo.

Cliffe, Lionel
1976 "Rural Political Economy of Africa," in Gutkind, Peter and Wallerstein, Immanuel (eds.), The Political Economy of Contemporary Africa. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications.

Collinson, J.D.H.
1972 "Research: A Luxury or Necessity in Refugee Work," in IUEF, Ten Years of Assistance to African Refugees Through International Cooperation. Geneva: IUEF.

Collinson, J.D.H.
1970a Refugees: A Dual Problem in Ethiopia, Geneva: International University Exchange Fund.

Collinson, J.D.H.
1970b Some Refugee Problems in Kenya. Geneva: IUEF.

Colson, Elizabeth
1971 The Social Consequences of Resettlement. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Congressional Research Service
1979 World Refugee Crisis: The International Community's Response. Committee Print, United States Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st Session. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, August.

Cultural Survival
1981 "Ethnicity and Refugees in Africa," Cultural Survival Newsletter, 5(2), Spring.

Davis, Morris, ed.
1975 Civil Wars and the Politics of International Relief. New York: Praeger.

Davison, Lani
1981 "Women Refugees: Special Needs and Programs," Journal of Refugee Resettlement, 1(3), May.

DeVoe, Drosh Marie
1981 "Framing Refugees as Clients," International Migration Review, XV.

Development Alternatives, Inc.
1974 A Seven Country Survey on the Roles of Women in Rural Development. Contract No. AID/CM/ta-C-73-41, Washington, D.C.: December.

Doheny, Kevin
1981 "The Plight of the Refugee: A Case in Point - Africa," Migration News, 1, January.

Eldridge, John
1967 "Education and Training of Refugees and Their Potential Contribution to Development," in Hamrell, Sven (ed.), Refugee Problems in Africa. Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies.

Eriksson, L.-G. et al., eds.
1981 An Analysing Account of the Conference on the African Refugee On the African Refugee Problem: Arusha, May 1979. Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies.

Ex, J.
1966 Adjustment After Migration: A Longitudinal Study of the Process of Adjustment by Refugees to a New Environment. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.

Farer, Tom J.
1976 War Clouds on the Horn of Africa: A Crisis for Detente. New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Finley, Terence
1975 "The Permanent Settlement of African Refugees," International Migration, XIII (3).

Finnan, Christine R. et al.
1981 Alternative Approaches to Refugee Resettlement: Analysis. Menlo Park: SRI International.

Godemann, James P.
1981 "The Resettlement of African Refugees in the USA," ICVA News, No. 89, April.

Gould, W.T.S.
1974 "Refugees in Tropical Africa," International Migration Review, 8 (4), Winter.

Gupte, Pranay B.
1980 "Refugees Pour into the Sudan With Problems," New York Times, July 17.

Hamrell, Sven (ed.)
1967 Refugee Problems in Africa. Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies.

Hansen, Art
1981 "Refugee Dynamics: Angolans in Zambia 1966 to 1972," International Migration Review, XV.

Hansen, Art
1979a "Once the Running Stops: Assimilation of Angolan Refugees into Zambian Border Villages," Disasters, 3(4).

Hansen, Art
1979b "Managing Refugees: Zambia's Response to Angolan Refugees 1966-1977," Disasters, 3(4).

Hansen, Art
1977 Once the Running Stops: The Social and Economic Incorporation of Angolan Refugees into Zambian Border Villages. Ph.D. Dissertation. Ithaca: Cornell University, Department of Anthropology.

Hatch, John
1970 "Historical Background of the African Refugee Problem," in Brooks, Hugh C. and El-Ayouty, Yassin eds., Refugees South of the Sahara: An African Dilemma. Westport: Negro Universities Press.

Hawley, Edward A.
1971 Refugees in Kenya Formerly Affiliated with Liberation Movements. Geneva: IUEF.

Holborn, Louise W.
1975 Refugees: A Problem of Our Time: The Work of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. 2 vols. Metuchen: Scarecrow Press.

Holcomb, Bonnie
1981 "Somali Refugees or Refugees in Somalia?: The Oromo Flight from Ethiopia." Cultural Survival Newsletter, 5(2), Spring.

Holdcroft, Lane E.
1981 "The Role of External Aid," Africa Report. 26(4), July-August.

Hutton, John ed.
1972 Urban Challenge in East Africa. Nairobi: East African Publishing House.

International Conference on Assistance to Refugees in Africa
1981 Refugees in Africa: A Country by Country Survey. Geneva: UNHCR.

International Council of Voluntary Agencies
1981 African Refugees - A Challenge to the World. Geneva: ICVA, February.

International Council of Voluntary Agencies
1980 Compendium on Voluntary Agency Assistance to Refugees in the Sudan. Geneva: ICVA, June.

International University Exchange Fund
1972 Ten Years of Assistance to African Refugees Through International Cooperation. Geneva: IUEF.

Johnson, Trish
1979 "Eritrea Refugees in Sudan," Disasters, 3(4).

Joof, G.W.
1979 "The Education, Training and Employment of Refugees in Relation to Africa's Manpower Situation," REF/AR/CON/BD. 7, Arusha, Tanzania, Pan African Conference on Refugees, May.

Keller, Stephen L.
1975 Uprooting and Social Change: The Role of Refugees in Development. Delhi: Manohar Book Service.

Klinteberg, Robert af
1978 Equatorial Guinea--Macias Country: The Forgotten Refugees. Geneva: International University Exchange Fund.

Knight, Derrick
1978 Refugees: Africa's Challenge: A Special Report by Christian Aid. London: Christian Aid.

Koshy, Ninan
1978 "The Horn of Africa: Travel Report - First Reflection," Commission of the Churches on International Affairs, World Council of Churches, Geneva.

Kozlowski, Anthony J.
1981 "Refugees and Development: Some Observations," Note prepared for meeting of Development Assistance Committee of Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. Paris: March 6.

Kunz, E.F.
1973 "The Refugee in Flight: Kinetic Models and Forms of Displacement," International Migration Review, 7, Summer.

League of Red Cross Societies
1981 "Eastern Africa Task Force." Circular No. 819, Geneva: March 26.

Lewis, Herbert S. and Wisner, Benjamin
1981 "Refugee Rehabilitation in Somalia: Report of a Mission -- March 1981," Report prepared under USAID Contract No. AID/DSAN-C-006J, June.

Liu, W.T.
1979 Transition to Nowhere: Vietnamese Refugees in America. Nashville: Charter House.

Mabogunje, Akin L.
1975 "Migrants and Innovation in African Societies: Definition of a Research Field," African Urban Notes, Ser. B, No. 1, Winter.

Melady, Thomas Patrick
1974 Burundi: The Tragic Years. Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis.

Melander, Goran
1981 "Refugees and International Cooperation," International Migration Review, XV.

Melander, Goran
1980 Refugees in Somalia. Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies.

Murphy, H.B.M.
1955 "The Camps" in Murphy, ed. Flight and Resettlement. Paris: UNESCO.

Mutiso, Roberta M.
1979 "Counseling of Refugees in Africa," REF/AR/CON/BD. 10, Arusha, Tanzania, Pan African Conference on Refugees, May.

National Committee for Aid to Refugees
1980a Documentation For the June 20-23 Conference, Khartoum, 1980. Vol. I: Background and Project Summaries. Vol. II: Economics and Projects Implementation. Vol. III: Projects Proposals. Vol. IV: The Refugee Settlements in the Southern Region: Their Development Needs. Khartoum: June.

National Committee for Aid to Refugees
1980b International Conference on Refugees in the Sudan: Report Adopted at the Fifth Session. Khartoum: June.

Neldner, Brian W.
1979 "Settlement of Rural Refugees in Africa," Disasters, 3(4).

Newland, Kathleen
1981 "Refugees: The New International Politics of Displacement," Worldwatch Paper 43, March.

O'Keefe, Philip et al.
1980 Refugees in Eastern Africa: Towards a Policy Formulation. Eastern Africa Regional Studies, Regional Paper #3. Worcester: Clark University Program for International Development.

Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Development Assistance Committee
1981a "Summary Record of the 395th Meeting," DAC/M (81) 3 (Prov.), Paris, March 6.

Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Development Assistance Committee
1981b "Draft Agenda: Refugees and Development," DAC/A(81)5, Paris, February 11.

Pan African Conference on Refugees
1979a Report of the Conference on the Situation of Refugees in Africa: Arusha, Tanzania, 7-17 May 1979. REF/AR/CONF/Rpt. 1, Arusha, Tanzania, May.

Pan African Conference on Refugees
1979b "Employment, Education and Training of Refugees in Relation to Africa's Manpower Situation," REF/AR/CONF/WP.12, Arusha, Tanzania, May.

Pan African Conference on Refugees
1979c "Urban Refugees in Africa," REF/AR/CONC/WP. 11, Arusha, Tanzania, May.

Rogge, John
1981 "Africa's Resettlement Strategies," International Migration Review, XV.

Scudder, Thayer
1981 "From Relief to Development: Some Comments on Refugee and Other Settlement in Somalia," Report to USAID, June.

Shepherd, Jack
1975 The Politics of Starvation. New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Shope, Mark Williams
1979 "Causes of Refugee Problems in Africa," REF/AR/CONF/BD. 6, Pan African Conference on Refugees, Arusha, Tanzania, May.

Simmonds, Stephanie P. and Brown H.
1979 "Angola: Meeting Health and Health Related Needs With Refugees," Disasters, 3(4).

Simon-Thomas, Acolia
1979 "Urban Refugees: Refugee Welfare in a City," REF/AR/CONF/BD. 9, Arusha, Tanzania, Pan African Conference on Refugees, May.

Somali Democratic Republic
1981 Short and Long-Term Programme for Refugees in the Somali Democratic Republic. Mogadishu: Ministry of National Planning, April.

Spring, Anita
1979 "Women and Men as Refugees: Differential Assimilation of Angolan Refugees in Zambia," Disasters, 3(4)

Stein, Barry N.
1981 "The Refugee Experience: Defining the Parameters of a Field of Study," International Migration Review, 15(1-2).

Stein, Barry N.
1980 Refugee Resettlement Programs and Techniques. Report to the Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy.

Stein, Barry N.
1979 "Occupational Adjustment of Refugees: the Vietnamese in the United States," International Migration Review, 13(1), Spring.

Sutcliffe, Claud R.
1973 "The East Ghor Canal Project: A Case Study of Refugee Resettlement, 1961-1966," Middle East Journal, 27, Autumn.

Swanson, Jon C.
1979 Emigration and Economic Development: The Case of the Yemen Arab Republic. Boulder: Westview Press.

Tanzanyika Christian Refugee Service
1972 Annual Report, 1972, mimeo, Dar es Salaam.
1977 TCRS Annual Report 1977, Dar es Salaam.
1978 TCRS Annual Report 1978, Dar es Salaam.

Touval, Saadia
1972 The Boundary Politics of Independent Africa. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Trappe, P.
1971 Social Change and Development Institutions in a Refugee Population. Geneva: U.N. Research Institute for Social Development and U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees.

Twaddle, Michael ed.
1975 Expulsion of a Minority: Essays on Uganda Asians. London: University of London.

United Nations Economic and Social Council
1974 Assistance to Southern Sudanese Refugees and Displaced Persons: Final Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees E/5483. New York: June.

United Nations, General Assembly
1981 Report of the Economic and Social Council: Assistance to Refugees in Somalia: Report of the Secretary-General. A/36/136. New York: March.

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
1981a "The Refugee Problem in a Development Context," note prepared for meeting of Development Assistance Committee of Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. Paris: February.

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
1981b ICARA: The Refugee Situation in Africa: Assistance Measures Proposed. Geneva: UNHCR.

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
1980a "The Situation of Women Refugees the World Over," note prepared for World Conference of the United Nations Decade for Women, Copenhagen, July.

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
1980b UNHCR: The Last Ten Years. Geneva: UNHCR.

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
1972 The Water-Road: Highway to Regional Development at Qala en Nahal, Sudan. Geneva: UNHCR Reports, August.

United States Agency for International Development
1980 "International Migration and Development: Implications for AID Programs and Policies," Washington, D.C.: AID/PPC, March. Mimeo.

United States Committee for Refugees
1981 1981 World Refugee Survey. New York: USCR.

United States House of Representatives
1981 Reports on Refugee Aid Staff Reports, Committee on Foreign Affairs. 97th Cong., 1st Session. March.

United States House of Representatives
1979 U.S. Policy and the Conflict in the Western Sahara Hearings, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittees on Africa and on International Organizations. 96th Cong., 1st Session. July.

United States Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations
1980 An Assessment of the Refugee Situation in Somalia: Staff Report. 96th Cong., 2nd Session, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, September.

Utkan, H.
1981 "Mission to Tanzania: Report on the Feasibility of a Cost-Benefit Analysis of Refugee Settlements and Their Impact on Regional Development," memorandum, Geneva: UNHCR, April.

Waldron, Sidney R.
1981 "Somali Emergency: 2,000,000 Refugees," Cultural Survival Newsletter, 5(2), Spring.

Walker, Gary A.
1979 Development Needs and Opportunities for Cooperation in Southern Africa: Annex B: Refugees. Washington, D.C.: United States Agency for International Development.

Warioba, J.S.
1979 "Rights and Obligations of Refugees in African Countries," REF/AR/CONF/BD. 2, Pan African Conference on Refugees, Arusha, Tanzania, May.

Weinstein, Warren
1975 "Burundi," chapter in Davis, Morris, ed. Civil Wars and the Politics of International Relief. New York: Praeger.

Weinstock, S. Alexander
1964 "Some Factors that Retard or Accelerate the Rate of Acculturation with Specific Reference to Hungarian Immigrants," Human Relations, 17, November.

Wingert, Norman A.
1974 No Place to Stop Killing. Chicago: Moody.

Wolfgang, Marvin ed.
1977 "Africa in Transition," The Annals, 432, July.

Zartman, I. William
1978 "Coming Political Problems in Black Africa," in Whitaker, J.S. (ed.), Africa and the United States. New York: Council on Foreign Relations.

Zartman, I. William
1970 "Portuguese Guinean Refugees in Senegal" in Brooks, Hugh C. and El-Ayouty, Yassin, eds., Refugees South of the Sahara: An African Dilemma. Westport: Negro Universities Press.