

THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER AND THE WORLD'S POOR VILLAGESWITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE SAHEL

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The anthropologist in today's world can no longer pretend that the search for regularities in human lives warrants a retreat into the world's most remote villages where people live relatively untouched by the hustle and bustle of the twentieth century. Those days are gone; that is, if they ever existed, except in the minds of exoticists. Mankind, once separated by great differences in race, language and culture, is rapidly becoming one community. Technology that enabled human beings to inhabit diverse ecological niches, has now shrunken the planet making neighbors of us all. The concern of one person is rapidly becoming the concern of all whether it be peace or war, hunger or famine, or the elementary right to human dignity.

Because of their study of the evolution of human beings, societies and cultures, anthropologists are especially prepared for dealing with the major issues facing the modern world. They can attempt to understand the general by looking at the particular, and can try to place the particular within the

general scheme of place and time. The anthropologists can and perhaps should try to explicate the factors in the great debate that exercise the minds of their contemporaries.

The great debate in today's world is about the future of the species. Must some live, and others die? Or must some die, so that others may live? Or is it possible for all people to live a decent life? This paper will examine the nature of the debate between advocates of a New International Economic Order who feel that this is the only way to help the greatest number of people, and those who believe that the problem can be solved if some means can be found to help the "poorest of the poor." This debate will be examined in the light of the historical and recent experiences of some of the poorest people in the world - the peoples of the Sahel.

The Sahelian ecosystem will be described in an attempt to understand the historical and dynamic inter-relationship of the environment, the biota, and the human societies. The Colonial period will receive close scrutiny because, for good or ill, it provides the basis for the lives of the present-day Sahelian peoples. Special attention will be paid to techniques used by the colonizing power to incorporate the Sahel into its imperial system. The changes that took place will be examined, and so will be proposed changes. Case histories will be used to explicate the process. Case histories will also be used to examine attempts at development in the Sahel during the decolonization period. The plans of the independent Sahelian nation-

states to deal with their development problems will be analyzed against the backdrop of a world now conscious of the existence of Sahelian states especially when they became the victims of a disastrous drought and famine.

A paradigm for development in the area will next be presented. The issue of development will be viewed within the context of the demand for a NIEO, and proposals for helping the poorest of the poor. It will also be viewed against the realities of the rise of a global civilization with its own needs and desires; the importance of the nation-state, with its own agenda; and the stark concerns of people who live in the poor villages. Finally, there is a suggestion that development in the Sahel could be facilitated if the small nation-states there create larger institutions to serve the ecosystem as a whole.

#### I. THE DEBATE

The growing debate between the proponents of the New International Economic Order and those who believe that the real problem of development lies in aiding the "poorest of the poor," might vitiate the efforts of the international community to aid the poorer countries. Fortunately, despite these contrasting conceptual and methodological issues there is general agreement that conditions among the nearly one billion people living in extreme poverty may worsen unless special measures are taken, both internationally and locally, to help the poor fulfill their most basic economic and social needs.

In 1975 Robert S. McNamara, President of the World Bank, declared: "Among our century's most urgent problems is the wholly unacceptable poverty that blights the lives of some 2,000 million people in the more than 100 countries of the developing world. Of these 2,000 million, nearly 800 million are caught up in what can only be termed absolute poverty - a condition of life so limited as to prevent realization of the potential of the genes with which they were born; a condition of life so degrading as to be an insult to human dignity."(1)

Rising to this challenge, Jimmy Carter, President of the United States of America, stated in his inaugural address on January 20, 1977 that "...the relations of the United States with other countries and peoples of the world will be guided during our administration by our desire to shape a world order that is more responsible to human aspirations... The United States alone cannot guarantee the basic right of every human being to be free of poverty and hunger and disease and political repression. We can and will cooperate with others in combating these enemies of mankind. The United States alone cannot insure an equitable development of the world resources or the proper safeguarding of the world's environment... The United States can and will take the lead in such efforts. In these endeavors we need your help and we offer ours... The problems of the world will not be easily resolved. Yet the well-being of each and every one of us - indeed our mutual survival - depends on their resolution."(2)

The difficulty facing most world leaders is the lack of agreement about what is causing the growing gap between the rich and the poor. Without such agreement it is difficult to advance conceptual schemes to understand this gap, and much more difficult to recommend practical solutions for it. Therefore, great care must be taken to insure that the plight of the world's poor villages does not worsen while theoreticians engage in specious arguments and advance simplistic solutions for complex phenomena.

International concern with the problems of the global poor is a recent phenomenon. It arose as a result of World War II during which the Western Alliance promulgated the principles of the Four Freedoms and the Atlantic Charter among whose noble ideals was "freedom from want." This latter notion, among others, was seized upon by the emerging nationalist leaders in the colonial world as a weapon in their drive for freedom and independence. For example, delegates at the Fifth Pan-African Congress at Manchester in 1945, passed a resolution which stated among other things, that "there has been a systematic exploitation of the economic resources of the West African territories by Imperialist Powers to the detriment of the inhabitants." In their declaration to the colonial powers the delegates stated:

We are not ashamed to have been an age-long patient people. We continue willingly to sacrifice and strive. But we are unwilling to starve any longer while doing the world's drudgery, in order to support by our poverty and ignorance a false aristocracy and a discarded imperialism.

We condemn the monopoly of capital and the rule of private wealth and industry for private profit alone. We welcome economic democracy as the only real democracy.

Therefore, we shall complain, appeal and arraign. We will make the world listen to the facts of our condition. We will fight in every way we can for freedom, democracy and social betterment. (3)

In an effort to stem the drive for independence many of the European metropolitan powers promised economic development to their colonies. Writing in the American journal Foreign Affairs in July 1957, Felix Houphouet-Boigny, a leader from the Ivory Coast and then a minister in the French government, explained that unlike Ghana which had become independent, he and some of his colleagues were not seeking independence from France but economic development. According to him, the problem for the Ivory Coast (and for all the French colonies in Africa) was an increasing population and the need for "enough capital aid to allow its inhabitants to make up for the heavy handicaps which nature imposes on tropical countries." He felt that such outside capital assistance was needed by all countries undergoing rapid expansion, whether they were nominally independent or not. Houphouet-Boigny stated that in 1946 France created an Investment Fund for the Economic and Social Development of Overseas Territories (F.I.D.E.S.), "to centralize and coordinate, with the cooperation of the Central Fund for France Overseas, a major program of international development. In the space of ten years, more than 600 billion francs of government

funds have been devoted to territories whose area is 9,000,000 square kilometers but whose population does not exceed 30,000,000."(4) He concluded that the Africans wished "to remain in the French Union because it furnishes us this assistance and does it by an arrangement which seems to us the surest and best adapted to further the social and technical progress of our people."(5) In addition, Houphouet-Boigny saw the advantages for the French Black African states of being able to enter the "European Common Market with more guarantees for their future than they could possibly have achieved if they were independent."(6)

Events were to show that not all the leaders of the French African states agreed with Houphouet-Boigny's reason for remaining in the French Union. The French, however, saw the efficacy of attempting to keep these states with them. According to Teresa Hayter: "Aid to France's African territories was originally intended to facilitate their integration with France and the implementation of the Fourth Republic's policy of assimilation. Self-sufficiency was not a goal. Even when independence finally put an end to ideas of integration, aid at first tended to be used to preserve France's position in Africa."(7) Moreover, having lost Indo-China and being embattled in North Africa, France needed Black Africa in order to remain a world power. These considerations were especially important to President de Gaulle, who accordingly "made concessions in the organic make-up of Franco-African relations to retain a cooperative basis for future French efforts in Africa. When the

fragmentation of sovereignty took place in 1960, neither French economic and cultural relations were jeopardized. Instead the French placed these relations on a new foundation -- the Community which was characterized by interlacing networks of bilateral and multilateral agreements."<sup>(8)</sup>

There is ample evidence that Great Britain, the other major imperial power in Africa, granted economic assistance to its decolonizing territories for the same reasons as did France. British aid policy during the period of transition to independence reflected a concern for growth and stability on the continent, but also a concern for the continuity of cultural and economic ties and the maintenance of British influence. Like France, Britain felt that as a world power she was responsible for the economic and social well-being of her former colonies. She also wished to retain pre-independence relationships between herself and the new states. Therefore, despite severe postwar strains on its own economic institutions, Britain recognized the economic predicament of the developing world and the responsibility of the industrialized countries to provide aid for increased economic and social development of the poorer countries. This policy concern was clearly formulated in a 1960 White Paper by the Overseas Development Ministry, and was carried out by relatively high and sustained levels of economic and technical assistance in the post-independence period.<sup>(9)</sup>

Britain adopted important new measures at the Commonwealth Economic Conference in Montreal in 1958, and further modified

its aid policies after Ghana's independence in 1957. The British provided substantial "independence settlements" for decolonizing territories, and placed their economic and technical assistance program on regular and comprehensive basis.<sup>(10)</sup> The result was significant increase in aid to a number of African countries during the critical transitional period. Official government figures indicate that British economic assistance to all developing countries more than tripled in the ten years following the independence of Ghana - from a total of 65 million in the 1957-1958 period to 205 million in 1965-1966; about half the disbursement went to Africa.<sup>(11)</sup> The philosophy behind Britain's liberalized role in development was reiterated in a White Paper of 1965, which emphasized "the need to make our full contribution in the cooperative effort to promote the development of the poorer countries and the expansion of the world economy."<sup>(12)</sup>

The non-colonial great powers such as Russia and the United States of America gave aid to emerging African and Third World states in order to win their friendship and support during the height of the Cold War. Soviet economic aid to the emerging African states were conditioned by the Orthodox Marxist belief that it was difficult to deal with western-trained "nationalist-bourgeois" elites. The Russians also felt that it was "hard to imagine the African countries being able to isolate themselves from the Capitalist world."<sup>(13)</sup> Nevertheless, Soviet economic and technical aid programs were initiated on a limited scale in the mid 1950's. At first, aid was extended to only a small

number of the more radical African countries, notably Guinea, Mali, and Ghana, and also Ethiopia. Aid was expanded in scope and volume through 1965, as part of Krushchev's intensified effort to compete with the West for prestige and influence in African and other Third World countries. By 1965, Soviet long-term aid commitments to Africa had reached a high of \$230 million, including loans and technical assistance grants.(14)

The initial response of the United States to political events on the African continent in the late 1950's and early 1960's was to give limited but increasing economic support to the emerging African states, and to demonstrate a new and more positive attitude toward them. Joseph C. Satterthwaite, then Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, declared that this new development was guided by the administration's desire to "demonstrate our sympathy with the newly emerging African countries and respond to the varied and complex demands the African Continent makes in this first year of a new and epochal decade for Africa."(15) Referring to the request for more money for Africa, Satterthwaite further elaborated on the administration's rationale behind the proposal:

First, we wanted something which would provide a close identification of the United States with the African people. Second, we wanted to find some way of encouraging closer cooperation and interchange between the many African countries. Third, knowing that Africa's need for economic help is almost unlimited, we wanted to concentrate on the key problem area, one which stands as a major block to development...(16)

The policy shift of 1960 was continued under the Kennedy administration. Confirming the American commitment to the basic objective of aiding the developing regions to improve themselves, President Kennedy said in his inaugural address: "To those people in the huts and villages of half the globe struggling to break the bonds of mass misery, we pledge our best efforts to help them help themselves, for whatever period is required, not because the Communists may be doing it, not because we seek their votes, but because it is right."<sup>(17)</sup> However, Congressional opposition to the administration's generous aid proposals, grounded on the problems of the Cold War, and the issue of economy, undermined the United States' development assistance program. Yet, despite the lack of congressional support, and the belief that United States development assistance should be secondary and supplemental to the aid effort of the former colonial powers,<sup>(18)</sup> some progress was made in altering Africa's proportion of total United States foreign aid. For the period 1961-1964, Africa's percentage rose to almost 10 percent, comparing with only 4.9 percent in the 1956-1960 period. Total commitments in dollar amounts for the same period increased only slightly - from \$460 million in 1961 to \$473 million in 1963, and declined thereafter.<sup>(19)</sup>

The African and other developing states recognized quite clearly that the economic assistance they were receiving from both East and West after World War II had economic as well as political implications. At the Afro-Asian conference in Bandung,

Indonesia, April 1955, they broached the idea of nonalignment in the Cold War; adopted Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence; and expressed the view that most of their efforts should be spent developing their societies. It was partly with these concerns in mind that many of these countries encouraged the United Nations to launch its First Development Decade calling for a minimum rate of growth of aggregate national income of 5 percent at the end of the Decade.(20) Following India's lead, the so-called "Nonaligned" countries then met in 1961 and insisted that they needed "neutralism and nonalignment" to find "their own way forward."(21)

The emerging bloc of African states also subscribed to the view of the nonaligned. Meeting in Addis Ababa in May 1963 to found the Organization of African Unity, the independent African states expressed their concern about the nature of the developing countries' share in world trade and the "persistent deterioration of the terms of trade in these external commercial relationships."(22) These states felt that "economic development, including the expansion of trade on the basis of fair and remunerative prices, should tend to eliminate the need for external economic aid, and that such external economic aid should be unconditional and should not prejudice the independence of African states."(23) In conclusion, the delegates called for that they labelled "the restructuralisation of international trade."(24) It was quite clear that the Africans were having misgivings about the benefit of aid to their economies and perceived a

reorganization of trade arrangements rather than aid was more beneficial.

By this period not only the Africans but also the entire international community had started to doubt the efficacy of foreign aid in assisting the world's poorer countries. The reality dawned on almost all countries that the gap between the rich and the poor, rather than lessening, was in fact, increasing. The gross national product of all less developed countries taken together was increasing at an annual rate of only 4 percent during the second part of that Decade. Moreover, there was the realization that far from eliminating hunger, one of the objectives of the F.D.D. (First Development Decade), per capita food production had decreased by two or three percent. (25) Thus during the United Nations' Conference on Trade and Development (U.N.C.T.A.D.) in 1964, a group of 75 and later 77 non-aligned and poorer countries raised questions about the amount of aid that should be given, the terms of trade, commodity agreements, access to the markets of developed countries by developing ones, import substitution, external debt servicing, and the transfer of earnings and profits.

The conference's delegates generally agreed that the minimum growth target of 5 percent per annum fixed by the General Assembly of the United Nations for the Development Decade, even though not met, was clearly inadequate. They accepted a resolution requesting all countries to take measures to enable the developing countries to achieve higher rates of growth. They also

felt that the private-enterprise developed countries should endeavor to supply financial resources to the developing countries at a minimum amount of as near as possible to 1 percent of their national income. Other resolutions concerned the re-scheduling of consolidation of debts, the right of aid-receivers to purchase goods from sources other than that of the aid-givers (providing there were no balance of payment problems), and the establishment of machinery to resolve conflicts when there was no agreement between the rich and poor countries on U.N.C.T.A.D. resolutions. However, the resolution causing greatest disagreement concerned the crucial resolution on trade and development machinery submitted by the developing countries. This important resolution was approved by 83 votes in favor, 20 against (including the big free-enterprise industrial countries) and 3 abstentions. It took hard bargaining and a spirit of reconciliation for a subsequent compromise resolution on trade and development to receive the conference's unanimous approval. Nevertheless, in the end, the larger developed countries reserved their judgement about the success of the conference.

In contrast, the Group of 77, declared in a joint resolution that they saw U.N.C.T.A.D. as marking "the beginning of a new era in the evolution of international cooperation in the field of trade and development. Such cooperation must serve as a decisive instrument for ending the division of the world into areas of affluence and intolerable poverty. This task is the outstanding challenge of our times. The injustice and neglect

of centuries need to be redressed. The developing countries are united in their resolve to continue the quest for such redress and look to the entire international community for understanding and support in this endeavor."(26)

A major problem for the developing countries after the U.N. C.T.A.D. conference was the beginning of an internal dialogue within the developed countries about foreign aid. The Jeanneney Report on French aid strongly advocated that France should redeploy her aid; that she should stop subsidizing her former colonies by paying prices above the world price for their raw materials; that she ought to encourage her African partners to diversify their economic relations; and that she should insist upon their living within their means.(27) Then in a series of articles in Paris-Match, journalist Raymond Cartier criticized France for using about 3 percent of its national income on foreign aid, and subsequently neglecting the people of France. He charged that leaders of the African states were often leading luxurious lives, and that France should build lycees' in Nancy (France) rather than in Niamey (Niger).(28) The rebuttal by the Africans that much of France's aid went back to the Metropole was dismissed by Cartier and many Frenchmen as irrelevant. The French government also defended its aid policy. The result was that although France's aid to the Black African states remained fairly stable, the percentage of aid declined because its domestic budget increased.(29)

By the mid-nineteen-sixties Great Britain's economic aid

to Africa and the developing world also started to change because its domestic economic situation fluctuated. Whereas, in 1961-1962 the British granted approximately 62 million pounds sterling to all developing countries, 37.2 million of which went to tropical Africa, in 1963-1964 this declined to 47 million pounds sterling, with 29.8 million pounds devoted to tropical Africa. Moreover, whereas, Britain's loans to the developing world amounted to 74 million pounds sterling in 1961-1962, of which 37.2 million went to tropical Africa, this increased to 87 million pounds sterling in 1963-1964 to all countries of which 31.7 million went to tropical Africa. Thus, the British reduced its grants and increased its loans to tropical Africa. They did attempt to sustain these grants and loans at the same level but the frequent devaluation of the pound vitiated their efforts. (30)

Meanwhile, the United States of America also began to reduce its aid to Africa. Congressional sentiment that foreign aid had led to America's involvement in Vietnam precipitated a reduction in aid as one way to mitigate future entanglements in the generally unstable Third World countries. A committee headed by Edward M. Korry, then Ambassador to Ethiopia, attempted to make better use of the smaller amount of aid authorized by the Congress. It recommended "concentrating" aid in a few countries and a regional approach to the others. In vain did the State Department and the African officials in the "non concentrate" countries plead that the Korry formula was a disaster and the reduction in over-all aid detrimental to both the United States

and Africa. Then, like the U.S., the Soviet Union, also started to reduce its aid to Africa. Whereas, in 1965 total aid to the African states amounted to \$230 million, that figure dropped to \$77 million in 1966 and to \$9 million in 1967.(31)

As the U.N.'s First Development Decade neared its end, it was clear that it had failed to achieve its objectives. Meeting in Algiers in October 1967 the "Group of 77 nations" issued a charter clearly reasserting their objectives. Regarding international trade, member nations insisted that negotiated agreements be made for raw materials, and that buffer stocks be set and financed by international institutions to reduce price fluctuations. They asserted that trade should be liberalized by removing restrictions and taxes imposed by developed countries on products coming from developing countries, and that the latter be guaranteed a share of the world market. They especially objected to preferential treatment which some developed countries had with developing countries, such as the European Economic Community (E.E.C.) and the African states, under the Yaounde Convention.

The "Group of 77 Nations" suggested that the agreement of the Kennedy Round be extended to grant free entrance of manufactured products from developing countries to the markets of the developed world. They re-emphasized their request that the developed countries place 1 percent of their incomes at the disposal of the developing world and that foreign aid not be "tied" to products from the aid-givers. The developing countries

asked for a rescheduling of debts and their conversion into long term bonds, and that the connection between the creation of additional liquidity and development financing be underscored. Lastly, they asked for the promotion of trade between developing countries, the organization of and development of adequate technology for the developing countries, the easy transfer for existing technologies to them, and the adoption of special measures in favor of the poorest of the poor among the world's people.(32) These nations noted with approval the Pearson Report of 1969 which stated baldly that there was an "obligation of every government to play its part in cooperation with all others to ensure that all people have a reasonable chance to share in the resources of the world, which should be developed for the benefit of all."(33)

Whether as a rationalization for the decline in aid, or because they agreed with the assessment of Raymond Cartier, the major aid-donors began to openly question the use that the leaders of the developing world were making of the aid they were receiving. Speaking before the Swedish Bankers' Association in Stockholm, October 27, 1967, George Woods, then President of the World Bank declared:

The reason behind this slackening of effort is not only the normal pressure of domestic priorities on governments and peoples. It is also a belief that waste, inefficiency and even dishonesty have all too often deflected resources from development; to give more aid now, it is said, would simply send good money after bad. There are few Parliamentarians who do not have a favorite story of hair-raising waste....Even some of the kinder critics question

whether there is skill and administrative capacity enough in developing countries to absorb more capital, even if aid were to be increased. It is important therefore to try to disperse some of this gray suspicion and discouragement by constant repetition of the actual facts. (34)

Messrs. Woods, Pearson, and Gunnar Myrdal, among others, did attempt to dispel the suspicions of many major donors about the behavior of Third World officials. Whether they succeeded or not was a moot point, because the developed countries did little to meet the demands of the developing countries. Meanwhile, the latter continued to insist that something be done, and took advantage of every forum to do so. Whether meeting as "Heads of State of the Nonaligned Countries," in Lusaka (1970), at Lima, (1971) or at the various U.N.C.T.A.D.s, the "Group of 77" (now more than 100 states) continued to press for "economic development," "collective self-reliance in the development process" and "major international economic reforms." However, the developed world began to press the point that the developing world, or Third World, was internally diversified:

At the upper end of the development range are countries with higher per capita incomes and higher levels of industrialization than those obtaining income of the countries traditionally classified as "developed" or economically more advanced. At the other end are the countries characterized not only by low incomes but also by structural deficiencies that tend to inhibit economic and social change. (35)

As Uri phrased it: "Failure to distinguish between widely

different situations leads to lumping together through which troublesome events occurring in one corner of the world distort the image of other countries or other regions. The disillusionment experienced in giving foreign aid to one country can lead some to want to deny it to all countries, even those whose need is greatest."(36)

It was with this emerging view then that the United Nations in general, and U.N.C.T.A.D. in particular, launched a campaign to take "special measures" to aid the least developed countries. These were countries with a G.D.P. per capita below \$100.00 and included the Sahelian countries (Chad, Mali, Niger and Upper Volta), the Central African Empire, Burundi, Rwanda, Tanzania and such Asian countries as Afghanistan, the two Yemens, Nepal and Laos. Commenting upon what he termed to be anarchy and chaos in the aid allotments of major donors, Uri reported that:

In the period 1960-1970, the poorest countries,-- those with less than \$100 per capita,--accounted for 14.1 percent of the population of the Third World. They received 11.2 percent of the aid. Between \$100 and \$200 per capita are to be found 46 percent of the population and 26 percent of the aid; between \$200 and \$300, 12 percent of the population and 24 percent of the aid; between \$300 and \$400, 9.5 percent of the population and 14.8 percent of the aid. In other words, the poorest countries receive a share of the aid which is far lower than their part of the population as a whole. Where the level of income is higher, the distribution of aid is more generous. One has to go beyond revenues of \$400 per capita before the share of aid becomes inferior to the share of the population; in the \$400 to \$600 bracket the proportions are 4 percent and 7.4 percent respectively.(37)

The delegates to U.N.C.T.A.D. III proposed an absolute and relative increase in the volume of external aid to the poorest countries,

with aid taking the forms of grants and public loans on concessionary terms.(38)

The Arab-Israeli war of October 1973 would have a profound effect on the attitudes of people in the developing world as well as on the desperate plight of the poorest of the poor. The war itself did not have anything to do with the planning for the fourth summit meeting of nonaligned states in Algeria in September 1973. This had taken place before the fighting broke out. At this meeting the "Group of 77" had already supported the sovereignty of each state over all its raw materials and had approved the right to nationalize them in accordance with each country's laws. Moreover, they had advocated the formation of cartels comparable to O.P.E.C. (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries). What the war did was to revolutionize the entire attitude of the developing countries towards the developed world, and to make them more conscious of their bargaining power. They became more skeptical and cynical about the minor concessions and the vague resolutions concerning the reform of the international system, the transfer of technology, and even the special measures in favor of the least developed countries that came out of the conference. When the nonaligned states met to develop a common strategy on aspects of a wide range of issues affecting them, they openly recognized the effectiveness of the oil boycott during the 1973 war. They scoffed at the threats of reprisals leveled at them by leaders in the developed world, and insisted that further gains be

extracted from international economic relationships through the use of new instruments. Many impoverished raw-material-producing countries openly speculated whether or not the O.P.E.C. "model" could be duplicated in other commodity markets such as bananas, bauxite, coffee, copper, iron ore, and tin.(39)

The recognition by the developing countries that the October War had induced the United States of America to become more interested in the implications of economic boycotts prompted them to ask the General Assembly of the United Nations to convene a Special Session in May 1974 to deal with the energy crisis, raw materials and economic development rather than wait for the 1975 meeting they had requested. Nerfin remarked that the sentiment among the poorer countries now was that "The wretched of the earth no longer accept their de facto marginal status on the world scene; they have stated their intention to become full participants in the decision-making process in world affairs." (40) Using the United Nations as a forum, the developing countries working essentially through the General Assembly, were able to have adopted a Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order. The preamble and the first two paragraphs stated:

We, the Members of the United Nations,  
Having convened a special session of the General Assembly to study for the first time the problems of raw materials and development, devoted to the consideration of the most important economic problems facing the world community,  
Bearing in mind the spirit, purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations to promote the economic advancement and social progress of all peoples,

Solemnly proclaim our united determination to work urgently for THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER based on equity, sovereign equality, interdependence, common interest and cooperation among all States, irrespective of their economic and social systems which shall correct inequalities and redress existing injustices, make it possible to eliminate the widening gap between the developed and the developing countries and ensure steadily accelerating economic and social development and peace and justice for present and future generations, and, to that end, declare:

1. The greatest and most significant achievement during the last decades has been the independence from colonial and alien domination of a large number of peoples and nations which has enabled them to become members of the community of free peoples. Technological progress has also been made in all spheres of economic activities in the last three decades, thus providing a solid potential for improving the well-being of all peoples. However, the remaining vestiges of alien and colonial domination, foreign occupation, racial discrimination, apartheid and neo-colonialism in all its forms continue to be among the greatest obstacles to the full emancipation and progress of the developing countries and all the peoples involved. The benefits of technological progress are not shared equitably by all members of the international community. The developing countries, which constitute 70 percent of the world's population, account for only 30 percent of the world's income. It has proved impossible to achieve an even and balanced development of the international community under the existing international economic order. The gap between the developed and the developing countries continues to widen in a system which was established at a time when most of the developing countries did not even exist as independent States and which perpetuates inequality.

2. The present international economic order is in direct conflict with current developments in international political and economic relations. Since 1970, the world economy has experienced a series of grave crises which have had severe repercussions, especially on the developing countries because of their generally greater vulnerability to external economic impulses. The developing world has become a powerful factor that makes its influence felt in all fields of international activity. These irreversible changes

in the relationship of forces in the world necessitate the active, full and equal participation of the developing countries in the formulation and application of all decisions that concern the international community....(41)

The final paragraphs of the declaration requested all member states to "exert maximum efforts with a view to securing the implementation of the present declaration, which is one of the principal guarantees for the creation of better conditions for all peoples to reach a life worthy of human dignity." Also adopted at this special session was a program for the establishment of a new International Economic Order. This involved such issues as: raw materials, food, general trade, transportation and insurance, international monetary systems and financing development, industrialization, the transfer of technology, regulating and controlling transnational corporations, a Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States (C.E.R.D.S.), the promotion of cooperation among developing countries, assisting states to control their own natural resources, strengthening the role of the United Nations in the field of international economic cooperation, and developing special programs to deal with the specific problems of the least developed and land-locked countries.

There was sharp divergence in views between the developed countries and the developing ones regarding the declaration of the N.I.E.O. and the C.E.R.D.S. The declaration of the N.I.E.O. was adopted without a vote despite the active opposition and

objection of the United States, France, Germany, Japan and the United Kingdom. The C.E.R.D.S. was even more objectionable to the developed countries because of its unequivocal insistence that the rules for nationalization of foreign property be subject to local, not international law, and that the primary raw-materials-exporting countries reserve the right to form cartels (billed as "producer organizations") while denying the consumer nations the right to common retaliatory action. The vote was 120 in favor, 6 against (including the U.S.) and 10 abstentions<sup>(42)</sup>. Nevertheless, the developing countries lost no time attempting to gain support for both the declaration and the charter. At a series of subsequent meetings at Colombo, Dakar, Geneva, Lima and Manila, of the "Group of 77," of the heads of Nonaligned States, of U.N.C.T.A.D. and other U.N. agencies, Third World countries discussed the issues of raw materials, restructuring the present patterns of trade, and similar matters.

Crucial to the chances of implementing both the declaration and the charter was of course solidarity among the nonaligned states, and the support of the United States of America, the leader of the developed world. One problem for the non-O.P.E.C. Third World countries was that many of them were hurt by the higher cost of energy, and this was a possible source of disunity. There was disagreement among the developing countries regarding whether or not the richer ones were doing as much as possible to help the poorer ones. To counter this, the

O.P.E.C. nations allocated \$6.5 billion in grants and loans to Third World nations in 1975 prompting the U.S. Treasury Department to comment that the balance of payments problems of the Third World as a whole would be manageable if that level of aid were maintained and increased. Then in an attempt to enhance solidarity to the Third World countries, President Carlos Andres Perez of Venezuela, declared:

Today industrial nations must share decision-making with us. We believe in interdependence, but interdependence among equals rather than in interdependence in which there are subordinates...We feel that the foundations should be set so that new terms of trade of a more equitable nature are drawn to relieve the inferiority and discriminations suffered by developing countries.(43)

Spokesmen for the developing countries were remarkably unanimous in identifying long range objectives for the N.I.E.O., and what they hoped to achieve from its promulgation. Mr. Amon J. Nsekela, former Chairman and Managing Director of the National Bank of Commerce in the United Republic of Tanzania (1967-1974) asserted that the principal reason for the demand for N.I.E.O. was that the poorer countries wanted to end a situation in which "they are poor because they have been colonized, dominated, drained of their surpluses, locked into bondage in which they are poor and are becoming relatively poorer because the rich are rich and are becoming relatively ever richer. It is because the capitalist world economy has reduced the peripheral economies to the position in which their only right...is to sell cheap

and to buy dear. In that context, small aid transfers are rather like pint-sized blood transfusions given instead of staunching a cut artery."(44) Agreeing with Nsekela, Peter Townsend states:

...the poverty of deprived nations is comprehensible only if we attribute it substantially to the existence of international social stratification, a hierarchy of societies with vastly different resources in which the wealth of some is linked historically and contemporaneously to the poverty of others. This system operated crudely in the era of colonial domination and continues to operate today, though more subtly, through systems of trade, education, political relations, military alliances and industrial corporations.(45)

For those such as Mr. Nsekela, the promulgation of a N.I.E.O. would affect: the distribution of world production; the distribution of the surpluses derived in any country; and the distribution of economic power. First, the distribution of production would ensure that people in the developing world could produce what they needed themselves, and assume a greater role in the processing of their raw materials before shipment to be manufactured into goods in the industrialized countries. Second, the distribution of surpluses was deemed crucial because unless countries could retain the surpluses earned on goods they produce they would invariably remain poor. Third, the distribution of power in international economic terms was deemed necessary so that the poorer countries such as many erstwhile poor members of O.P....C., could force a change in the prices paid for their raw materials in the international economic system. Mr. Nsekela evinced little interest in resource transfers, since for him,

"An effective New International Order would sharply reduce the need for all types of resource transfers. It is better by far that we should produce a surplus at home and keep it there rather than either produce a surplus, let it drain away and then borrow it back as aid or be unable to produce and beg for aid!"(46)

On the other hand, the West, led by the U.S., was reluctant to entertain the idea of a N.I.E.O. The West believed that all new efforts to help the developing world should be based on the existing world economic order. Dr. Kissinger's firm contention was that this order should be "reviewed and improved, but that it should not be entirely eliminated."(47) At the Seventh Extraordinary Session of the U.N. General Assembly in September 1975 the United States Secretary of State suggested: a) a new aid facility under the auspices of the International Monetary Fund to make 2.5 billion dollars available annually to neutralize the effects of price fluctuations in the price that Third World countries received for their raw materials; b) the establishment of a fund of some 100 million dollars through the International Finance Corporation to help poorer countries speed up their economic growth; and c) formation of an International Investment Trust to help developing countries gain access to metropolitan markets. Then, when the delegates at U.N.C.T.A.D. IV met in Nairobi in May 1976 they rejected Kissinger's proposal to establish an International Resources Bank to help stabilize commodity prices, to mobilize capital resources for development

purposes, and to facilitate technological development and managerial training in the hope of expanding the global economy. The United States Secretary of State reacted sharply. He criticized Third World leaders for posturing and wrangling rather than coolly assessing the issues at hand. He told the conference that "the U.S., better than almost any other nation, could survive a period of economic warfare. We can resist confrontation and rhetorical attacks if other nations choose that path." In conclusion he warned, that the U.S. would "ignore unrealistic proposals and pre-emptory demands." (48)

One of the principal reasons for Dr. Kissinger's reaction to the demands for a N.I.E.O. was that, like many Westerners, he rejected the notions advanced by Nsekela, Townsend, Walter Rodney and Samir Amin, that the West was responsible for the plight of the Third World. Some Western critics of Third World demands asserted "that the imperial era was not responsible for Third World under-development since many of the poorest nations were never full-fledged colonies; that the Third World benefits more from the system of international trade in its present shape than it is harmed by that system; that while Americans and other Westerners may overindulge themselves, their per capital production enables them not only to pay for their own consumption but help finance Third World development as well." (49)

P.T. Bauer, the British economist, noted that the foundation and ingredients of modern social and economic life in the Third World were established by Westerners. According to him, the

West was only indirectly responsible for the inequities and poverty of the Third World in two respects: the introduction of Western medicine had increased life expectancy, thereby permitting more poor people to survive; and "the politicization of social and economic life," a model which was eagerly adopted by the nationalists, and gave rise to development of indigenous state controls which inevitably resulted in the inefficient allocation of the limited resources of Third World societies.(50)

Complicating the matter further was the contention of Dr. Kissinger and others that while Third World nations often had legitimate complaints, their voting behavior at the United Nations, coupled with other factors suggested that "At bottom the challenge is political, not economic--whether the interests and weight of the less-developed nations can be accommodated in the international order."<sup>(51)</sup> It was this belief that led Dr. D. Patrick Moynihan, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, to suggest to Secretary Kissinger that "a basic foreign policy goal" of the United States should be concerned with "breaking up the massive blocs of nations," composed mostly of new nations. Obviously, Ambassador Moynihan hoped that with this policy such demands as the one for a N.I.E.O. would vanish. Ambassador Scranton, who would subsequently replace Dr. Moynihan at the U.N., downplayed the confrontationalist attitude that had been developing between the U.S. and Third World countries. He suggested that the main goals of Third World countries "are what we are about," adding that the Third World "should naturally

be our (U.S.) friends, not naturally our enemies." (52) Similarly, a number of Western nations felt that there should not be an open confrontation with the Third World nations. Their position was based not only on the moral issue stemming from the colonial past, but partly on sheer humanism and the feeling that something must be done. There was also the "interest-based recognition that the continuation of the status quo will mean mounting deprivation and political tensions in the poorer nations which could produce a global instability that would not be in the interests of any nation, rich or poor." They concluded that Western policymakers, were likely to respond to Third World proposals with degrees of caution, and that this was apt to increase as the policymakers moved from verbal commitments to tangible actions. (53)

Viewed in historical perspective, it was perhaps inevitable that the developing world would demand a N.I.E.O. and that the developed world would resist this demand. The problem is that the frames of reference used by both groups have now been made irrelevant by such factors as the decolonization process, and the massive socio-cultural changes due to the emergence of a global civilization. Unfortunately, the problem of "culture lag," in this case an inability to square action with aspirations, is frustrating policy planners both in the developed and developing world. This dilemma is clearly seen by Mr. Ponna Wignaraja who declared:

At no previous juncture in history has mankind been more aware of the potential resources, scientific

knowledge, technological capabilities and unprecedented opportunities available for the satisfaction of its needs, not only in narrow economic terms but in wider social and human terms. And yet, the strategies that are being pursued by industrialized and Third World nations alike seem to be leading to a dead-end, from the point of view of the national perspectives and the global order...In both groups of countries the creativity and potential of people is unlimited, yet life lacks a fullness, resources continue to be misused and major social and political contradictions remain unresolved. (54)

Mr. Wignaraja believes that while there is consensus that there are problems that must be solved, or if left unresolved the world will face a greater crisis by the year 2000, "there is still an ambivalence among some theoreticians and practitioners who are still locked into the old framework of thinking and action and afraid to let go of concepts and paradigms developed in the past. Policies and solutions continue to be recommended and carried out which are marginal in character, in comparison with the magnitude of the problem that now confronts all mankind." (55) Charging that while the leaders and elites in both the Third World and the industrialized countries voice the need "for rethinking and new approaches" they are unable to initiate new structural modes and mobilization processes. Mr. Wignaraja suggests that what he calls a "fragmented bureaucracy and highly trained technocrats in Third World countries with 'technical assistance' from the international community are continuing to try to make an outdated framework

of development work 'efficiently' without questioning its relevance or stopping to wonder whether 'bureaucratic' and 'technocratic' solutions would not by themselves only help to get to the wrong objectives faster." (56)

Like many Third World scholars, Mr. Wignaraja, an Asian, is highly critical of past approaches to development. Other Third World scholars are much more caustic and condemnatory of the West in their criticisms. Amon J. Nsekela, some of whose views were cited above, asserts that "the concept of development as maximum growth of gross domestic product and maximum 'modernizations' (meaning maximum change towards imitating European standards and values as well as technology and organization) is inherently Eurocentric and racist. It denies the right of the peoples of the formerly, and to a large extent still, subjugated lands to determine their own development." (57) Nsekela feels that rapid growth without regard to what is produced or to whom it benefits does not eliminate poverty, nor does it meet basic human needs and thereby contribute to true development." (58) In a rebuttal leveled at both local elites and leaders of the developed world, Nsekela charges that past attempts at development only managed "to create small, rich elites which sell to and buy from metropolitan economies; copy their values and standards (or at any rate some of them--even minimal concern for the poor or for any type of democratic participation is rarely copied by such comprador elites) and which are dependent on the continuation of the old economic order."

He concludes that the paradigm of development favored by both the elites of the developed world and those of the Third World was more "liberatarian" than "egalitarian" and that "in general the supposed conflict between human rights and meeting basic material needs is a false one. The 'right' to be a millionaire while thousands starve is an obscenity, not a contribution to libertarianism."(59)

Wignaraja and Nsekela are both saying that past approaches to development in the Third World have been disastrous, and while both are basically supportive of a N.I.E.O. as a framework in which novel approaches to development could take place, they both question whether a N.I.E.O. would or could be implemented. In this regard these two men are not too different from most officials from Third World countries who are caught in a dilemma. They hope for the best, but their experiences lead them to expect the worst from the developed countries. Unfortunately, it is this ambivalence, as well as the real issue of coping with the difficult problems of development, that makes dialogue between policy planners of both developed and developing worlds extremely difficult. Both groups are allegedly committed to helping the poorest of the poor, but both of them can recite ad nauseum instances of projects that have failed whether by faulty conception, haphazard planning, insufficient funds, corruption, or "the cussedness of human nature."

## II. THE SAHEL: A CASE IN POINT

One way of concretizing the arguments of those who are demanding a New International Economic Order as a remedy for problems inherited from the Colonial period, is to examine in detail, the experience of an area inhabited by "the poorest of the poor," the Sahel region of West Africa. The problem of developing this area, or of making it viable, is so difficult that many Western policy planners and social scientists greet the report of each new project failure with the acronym: "WAWA" (West African Wins Again!). Implicit or explicit in this symbol is the notion, or fear, that nothing can induce the people in this region to change their "hidebound" traditions, or that the area can really not be developed under contemporary conditions. Pointing to repeated failures of the past, and the expenditure of huge sums of money and the labor of "face-less millions" of human beings, Western policy planners often greet any new development scheme with a cynicism that often borders on fatalism. Many of them are unwilling to endorse expenditure of any sizeable amount of money unless convinced that the projects are "well-conceived" - a position that often inhibits the acceptance of projects since foreign aid-donors often have no faith in the qualifications of project developers whether expatriate or indigenous.

Similarly, African policy planners, while very critical of those development plans that had patently failed in the region, are usually not very confident that their own approaches to

development can succeed. They cite such powerful constraints as the lack of money, the shortage of technicians, and the persisting old global economic system in which they have to work. In fact, Samir Amin, Director of the United Nations Institute for Economic Development and Planning (I.D.E.P.) at Dakar, Senegal, and a leading theoretician of development and underdevelopment in Africa, doubts that even the New International Economic Order can help such areas as the Sahel, in particular, and Africa, in general. He views the problem of development in this region in world historical economic terms, and believes that "a socialist break" with the existing capitalist system "is here objectively necessary" if fundamental changes would take place. He asserts that the only viable framework in which development according to self-reliant lines could occur is "the struggle of the Third World against the dominant imperialist hegemony. For many reasons, this struggle is still today the main force for the transformation of the world."<sup>(60)</sup> While one can be critical of Samir Amin's propensity to philosophize about the problems of the Sahel and of Africa while the real challenge is to change conditions there, one cannot escape the fact that he and his colleagues are convinced that the recent history of the region is in a large measure responsible for the plight of its contemporary inhabitants.

One can propose, however, another perspective. The Sahel, like other regions of the world, has an ecosystem -- defined here as a dynamic interrelationship between the human societal

subsystem, the plant and animal (biota) subsystem, and the natural environment subsystem. Under normal or ordinary circumstances, an ecosystem adapts or adjusts to small changes or perturbations within its component parts or subsystems. If and when subsystems change, the nature of their linkages or relationships to each other within the total ecosystem are modified. For example, if the population of a society in an ecosystem increases, the changes in the other subsystems may involve a greater use of the biota for food, and/or a more wider distribution of the population over the landscape. More severe changes within any subsystem may generate not only modifications in the linkages between subsystems, but also total changes within the other subsystems. If there is a drought or famine in a certain ecosystem, its human population may migrate to other areas, or develop social and ideological mechanisms to compensate for scarcer food resources and generally, rectify the imbalance and ensure the ecosystem a chance of survival. In other words, ecosystems tend to exhibit an equilibrium of sorts, but one that does not prevent the total ecosystem from changing over time.

Ecosystems can breakdown or be destroyed if they cannot adapt, or are not permitted to adapt to radical changes in their subsystems, or within the wider overall network of ecosystems. Military conquest - accompanied by the seizure of the territory of an ecosystem by people of another ecosystem, the appropriation of its food resources, and the subjugation or destruction of

its population - often causes the disappearance or the destruction of an ecosystem. If the conquerors do not appropriate the land of their victims, seize all of their food resources, or destroy all of their people, the ecosystem may recover, but it is doubtful whether it would return to its previous form. This would be especially difficult if the conquerors were able to condition the way in which the reviving ecosystem related to the larger ecosystem network.

Natural disasters and pestilences can also cause the breakdown or destruction of ecosystems. Thus, the destruction of a society's habitat either by the forces of nature, human beings, animals or plants could cause ecosystem failure. This could happen especially if the population were unable to leave the threatened area, or if for ideological reasons they were adverse to migrating from an area which was doomed. The spread of virulent diseases among an ecosystem's biota, either among plants, animals or human beings could cause the destruction of the system, that is, if the biota does not leave its environment or find other mechanisms to deal with the diseases. If people leave environments threatened either by the forces of nature, man or animals, vacate areas threatened by pestilence or find means for combating the diseases, then their ecosystems might persist. But again, the surviving ecosystem would be different from the former one, and because of its experience might be integrated into an ecosystem network in a novel way.

Natural and social disasters often reveal (that is if the

ecosystem is not immediately destroyed) the interconnections of various components of an ecosystem and which components are most viable or most vulnerable. Hopefully, natural, social disasters also illuminate how the ecosystem could be changed if it is to survive. For example, it is well known that the societies are the most complex subsystems since they possess social groups organized in different ways and holding different values. Under normal conditions the links between these different social groups are either congruent with or do not jeopardize the links between the societal subsystem and the other subsystems. However, when the entire ecosystem is in danger, the links within the social groups in the societal subsystems become tenuous. For example, conflict between social groups may lead them to use the habitat or food resources in ways detrimental to the survival of the entire ecosystem. In such a case the issue might be resolved by changing the links or relationship between the social groups of the societal subsystem.

Similarly, if the examination of an ecosystem under pressure shows that the habitat is being destroyed by the increase of wild species of animals or plants, the condition may be corrected by man's intervention to halt the increase of the other biota, or change the relationship between them and the habitat. Finally, it might be necessary for human beings, the most active entities in an ecosystem, to modify the links between an ecosystem and its ecosystem network if either a subsystem would maintain its viability or the ecosystem survive.

The Sahel ecosystem of West Africa is experiencing such great difficulty that some say that it has reached a point of imminent breakdown. In order to understand why this is so, and what if anything can be done about it, it is imperative to identify the factors that have led to this condition.

The Sahel's environmental subsystem is fragile. Most of this 200,000 square mile area is a plateau some 500 to 1000 feet above sea-level, lying between 12 and 20 degrees north latitude and between 25 east and 18 west longitude. The temperature in this area ranges from 69 degrees Fahrenheit in January to about 90 degrees Fahrenheit in May. The Sahel receives 5 to 30 inches of rainfall per year, but even the rain in the 30 inch zone is concentrated in three to five months. It is therefore, not as useful as it would have been had it been spread over many more months of the year. Some of the rain water finds its way to a water table of variable depth while that which is not lost to evaporation flows into the rivers and water systems of the area. These include the Niger river, the Senegal river, the Volta rivers, and the Lake Chad system. As none of these water systems were developed by the French as irrigation systems, they did not make a contribution to the local economies. The area's vegetation consists primarily of grasses, orchard bush and thorn plants. However, as one approaches the Sahara, all vegetation disappears. The Sahelian soils are potentially rich, but the primarily chestnut and light soils of the area are often lateritic and generally poor. (61)

The history of the Sahel ecosystem is responsible for many of the contemporary biological, physical and socio-cultural challenges. Moreover, it is necessary to point out that this ecosystem has frequently been affected by the action of nature and of man. For example, during the Pluvial and Arid periods of early Sahelian history, the region's vegetation frequently changed from lush tropical forests to sterile deserts with a corresponding change in the animal and plant populations. The last major change took place while humans (then hunters, fishers and gatherers) inhabited the region: lithic kits along the now sandy valleys and bone-dry wadis are evidence of an ecosystem that no longer exists. As the Sahara dried up and humans moved south, hunting and gathering as the basic food producing activities in the region changed. The people in the Niger River Bend faced the problem of adapting to an environment that was becoming increasingly drier. They abandoned hunting and gathering, ennobled the indigenous millets and sorghums which became the basis of their agriculture, and acquired cattle and other livestock from the east which became the basis for their ways of life. (62)

By 300 A.D. the ecosystem of the Western Sahel had become quite complex. The proto-Tuareg populations had already developed camel pastoralism and freebooting as a way of life in the most northern part of the area. Further south, the pastoralists with their cattle moved in transhumance cycles between the edge of the forest zone and the Sahara, often attempting to invade

ecological niches occupied by more numerous agricultural peoples. The latter, more sedentary with a more productive economic base, were able to elaborate more complex socio-cultural systems. Some developed state structures and used their military organization to incorporate weaker agricultural peoples, and to structure relations with the mobile pastoralists and fishing populations in the Niger River complex. The development of trade and commerce within the Western Sahel not only linked the various societies, but enabled the people of the region to establish trading relations with the Mediterranean region, with Egypt, and with the peoples of the forest zone.

The medieval kingdom of Ghana, located in the present-day Republic of Mauritania, used its position between the Mediterranean and the forest zone to generate trade in gold, ivory, salt, slaves, and other luxury items. It also used its power to attack the salt-producing desert area and the neighboring savannas and forest zones. Ghana attracted merchants and goods from the north and south and acted as a conduit for ideas flowing in both directions. But the most important aspect of early Ghanaian society was its ability to interact with people from other ecosystems while retaining its own viability. Thus, when Islamicized traders began to arrive in Ghana's capital from the eighth century onward, the Ghanaians incorporated them by permitting them to live in their own stranger quarters, and to follow their own religion.(63)

The early Ghanaians encountered difficulties when they at-

tempted to expand their state system at the expense of their neighbors. The result was that the Berbers, using Islam as a revivalistic doctrine, revolted (1054), and incorporated the salt-producing territories of the Sanhaja. In 1076 under Abu Bakr, the Berbers conquered Ghana and occupied Kumbi, its capital. Ibn Khaldoun, writing a few centuries later, tells what happens to the people of an ecosystem when they were conquered: "The Kingdom of Ghana declined into utter weakness about the time that the empire of the Almoravids began to become powerful. The Almoravids extended their dominion over the Negroes, devastated their territory and pillaged their lands. Having subjected them to the gizya (poll-tax on non-Muslims), they exacted tribute from them and induced many of them to become converts to Islam. (The authority of) the kings of Ghana was destroyed, and (their southern neighbors) subjugated the country and reduced its inhabitants to slavery."<sup>(64)</sup> Ghana did expel the invaders but the effect of the Almoravid conquest persisted. We are told that "Their plundering and, even more, perhaps, the demands made by their herds on the available grazing, had upset the delicate balance between man and nature on which agriculture depended in a region so close to the desert. Wells were neglected; the soil's essential cover of vegetation was denuded. The desert began to spread southwards until ultimately the lands in which Kumbi, the old capital, was situated could support neither towns nor, indeed, any sizeable number of people."<sup>(65)</sup> Finally, in 1200, Sumanguru, King of the Susu, a people formerly ruled

by Ghana, conquered Ghana and made it tributary to the rising kingdom of Mali.

The Mali empire developed near the junction of the Sankarani and Niger rivers (probably at Niani) in a fertile agricultural area, not too far from the alluvial gold deposits in Wangara. Using Islam with its universalistic codes and creeds as an operational weapon, the kings of Mali incorporated more different populations into their state system than did the Ghanaians. By the 1300's they had extended their rule through Senegal and Gambia to the Atlantic, and eastward beyond Timbuktu to Gao (a Songhai town) and southward into the Volta area. Under Mansa Musa (c. 1325) agriculture was highly developed, trade was extensive, literacy in Arabic increased, and Islamic scholars, many of whom had made the pilgrimage to Mecca (hadj), provided an integrative ideological superstructure for the society.

Nevertheless, the time came when the Malians could no longer utilize Islam as a mechanism to keep their empire unified. Al-Omari indicates that by the end of the fourteenth century the Mansas started to refrain from imposing Islam on their tributaries. They thought that by doing so they "might lose the traditional allegiance of the pagan gold-miners and farmers on whom the empire was dependent for its wealth. By the beginning of the fifteenth century, the central power was clearly weak and the empire was collapsing. The western provinces along the Senegal valley were lost; the Tuareg regained control of Walata and other desert towns, and even took Timbuktu; Mossi

cavaliers began to raid from the south deep into the heart of the empire.<sup>(66)</sup> Mali began to give way to Songhai.

Like other Sudanese before them, the Songhai of Gao were to liberate themselves from their Malian conquerors and in turn subdue their conquerors. Sonni Ali, a Songhai king, invaded Malian territories; established a commercial network based on three towns - Gao, Timbuktu and Jenne; built canals and improved agriculture in his realm. Islam was not used as a unifying ideology. Sonni Ali ruled by the power of his army, and it was from the ranks of the army that Askia Muhammad arose to usurp the throne from Ali's son. Askia, a devout Muslim who made the hadj, restored the might of the Muslim bureaucracy destroyed by Ali and launched jihads or holy wars against the Mossi in the Volta area, conquered parts of Hausa country, and drove the Tuareg into the desert. These actions so alienated the Songhai and the other tributary groups in the empire that the very power of the Askia weakened.

The Songhai empire began to crumble when an expanding Western European commercial system began to exploit gold from the forest region that formerly came north to the Sudan for shipment to the Mediterranean. The early European traders along the west coast of Africa were so excited about this gold that the English, using gold that allegedly came from Jenne minted their 21 shilling piece and called it the Guinea. In 1590-1591, the king of Morocco, anxious about the shortage of gold and wishing to seize the Malian-controlled salt mines in the Sahara, struck Timbuktu,

the very center of power and trade of the Songhai empire. The result was disaster for the rather complex ecosystem that was the Western Sudan. We are told that "trade ceased to flow into Jenne, Timbuktu and Gao in the old way, and the trans-Saharan trade from the two last which might have reached Morocco began to decay. Worse than this, the structures and habits of orderly government, which had been increasingly spread over the whole western Sudan from Ghana, Mali and Gao in turn, and which were so essential for the production and passage of trade goods, both within the Sudan itself, and to feed the more westerly trans-Saharan trade, were now broken up."(67)

With Songhai's decline, the stage was set for the development of marginal and smaller state systems in this region. The Bambara under Biton Coulobali established a non-Islamic and primarily agricultural-based kingdom at Segou. The Manding traders dispersed and organized themselves as travelling merchants. The Tauregs periodically left their desert fastness to sack the riverain towns including Timbuktu where they ended Moroccan-Arma rule. The Mossi people retreated to the Volta region and consolidated their state structure, and the Fulani (now freed from overall political control) migrated eastward, exploiting all available niches with their cattle. Most important of all, the westernmost areas of the Sahel entered the Atlantic slave trading complex. The Europeans needed African manpower for their emerging plantation colonies in the New World.

### III. GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF SAHELIAN TRADITIONAL SOCIETIES

The Sahelian populations that would be conquered by the French and other European peoples and brought into the emerging Atlantic economic community, shared a surprising large number of traits due to adaptation to specific climatic and geographical conditions. Moreover, centuries of contact between them, the spread of Islam in these zones, and a common colonial heritage resulted in patterns of interaction, cooperation and competition that are fairly widespread. The nomadic herders in the Sahara and Sahel and the peasant cultivators of the Sudan have always exchanged goods and services, and have needed each other despite differences in language and cultures and past history of conflict occasioned by slave raiding or imperial conquests. But despite this latest conquest, that changed the very structure of the institutions of traditional Sahelian societies, their institutions are still extant. This is evidenced by the large number of villages relatively free of European influence.

The social institutions of the populations in the regions reflect the long and complicated history of the area. Those agricultural groups such as the Bella and Aser who still reside in the oases on the Sahara may well represent the survivors of an earlier and widespread agricultural horizon which disappeared with the onset of the Arid period that still persists. Whether those agriculturalists who are now found mainly in the Sahel and Sudan area migrated there, or were there before that aridity set in is unknown. But some of these populations were incor-

porated into the kingdoms and empires that appeared throughout the history of this region. This incorporation was possible because these agricultural peoples did produce enough of an economic surplus, which, with the addition of trade and commerce, could support complex societies.

Most of the agriculturalists of this region live in dispersed hamlets, compact and often palisaded villages, and in large towns. For example, such Senegambians as the Serer live in extended-family compounds, each consisting of a cluster of huts, arranged usually in a circle and surrounded by a hedge, wall, or palisade. Wolof compounds adjoin each other forming compact villages. (68) The Bambara, Soninke, Tukulor and other peoples belonging to the so-called Nuclear Mande group inhabit compact villages and towns, sometimes fortified by encircling palisades. The Voltaic peoples such as the Mossi, Samogho, located east of Mande live primarily in dispersed extended family homesteads, but the Dogon, Gurma and some Grunshi sub-groups have internally segmented compact villages. The prevailing residence pattern among the rural Songhai, Hausa, Bornu, Bagirmi is the compact village, but some Hausa and Bornu groups live in dispersed hamlets. The larger towns in the area such as Djenne, Bamako, San, Mopti, Gao, Niamey and others are segmented into wards inhabited by local groups of kinsmen or by such stranger ethnic groups as the Diula and Hausa.

The settlement patterns of Sahelian pastoralists such as the Fulani (Peuls), Maures (Moors), Arabs, Teda and Tuaregs

represent the end result of warriors and nomads adapting to a rather difficult environment. (69) Sahelian pastoralism requires a high degree of social segmentation and a mobile community organization capable of permitting people to exploit available pasture lands, water resources, and small oases. Traditionally, most of these populations have been migratory or have practiced transhumance, but a sizeable number of people have become sedentary. Most Tuaregs live in temporary camps composed of closely related males, but the nomadic Asben Tuaregs have permanent villages and the Ihajenea Tuareg of Ghat live in an oasis town. The agricultural Bella (Haratin), often found servile to the Tuareg, live in moveable huts, or permanent huts or houses. (70) The basis for community organization among the Maures is the "tent" (ahel), a part of the Kabile (or a group of tents), inhabited by near relatives in migratory camps, or sedentary villages.

The Arab populations of the region are also migratory, living in tents. But there are sedentary Arab villages Regeibat and the rather large Arab (Chaamba) sedentary communities at Metlili. The migratory Fulani live in dismountable huts as they transhumance between the forest zone and the desert fringe during the year. However, over time, many Fulani groups have become sedentary or partially sedentary. The Fulani of Masina live in semi-permanent or permanent villages together with their dependent populations such as the Raemibe. Those in the Liptako district inhabit large towns such as Dori with populations ranging between 1600 and 3500 inhabitants. Also present in the Sahara are the

migratory Teda. The Teda occasionally live in the oases where they or their servile populations, known as Haratin, work their gardens.

Whether inhabiting small dispersed neighborhoods, compact villages, large towns, or temporary camps, most of the populations in the region live in extended family groupings. This unit composed of the sons or grandsons of a common ancestor with their families, is normally the smallest unit of larger kinship groups known as lineages. The Arabs, Bambara, Fulani, Mossi, Songhai and most of the peoples in this region trace descent through males (patrilineages), but there are also matrilineal peoples such as the Northern Tuareg and the Fur in Chad. These lineages, many of which form component units of larger organizations known as clans, provide the basis for social organization in all of these societies. The lineage is usually the institutions in which access to animals, land, water, property, offices, titles and even the persons of their members are vested.

Where agricultural villages are small and inhabited by the members of one lineage or one of its segments, all of their land is held collectively by the village and administered by the village headman, usually a lineage elder. Extended family heads of the lineage are allotted plots in usufruct (or farm tenure) and they in turn allot land to the members of their families. In larger villages or areas with dense populations, lineages normally hold part of the land, and the heads of lineage segments allot land to all members including the level of the

extended family and its members. In a few state organized societies of this region such as the Tukulor, ruling families have expropriated land and have awarded it to their members. Rulers in such societies also considered certain lands as restricted to their own relatives, or courtiers, or as public domain, but the rest of the land is controlled by lineage groups. Riverain societies such as the Bozo who are essentially fisherman, have the same attitude toward water as to land. Rights to both land and water are owned by Bozo community kin groups and administered by their headmen.

The control of land by either patrilineages (or matrilineages), except where appropriated by rulers or noble families, means that for all practical purposes, people have only farm tenure in land; they do not own it. They and their descendants can use the land as long as it is fertile, and can reclaim it if they so desire after it recovers from fallow. If for any reasons the users of the land leave or die out, the land reverts to the corporate group, the lineage or the village. Since unused land is normally vested in headmen or village chiefs, they may allot it to other lineages or to newcomers if necessary. Unless the land is needed by lineage members, such newcomers are ordinarily not evicted from the land, and in time become so associated with the land that it becomes their patrimony. By the time this happens, the strangers have been absorbed

by the lineage with no one remembering when and how they arrived.

Among the pastoralists land and water are the two most important resources in this relatively dry region, and are the subject of different patterns of ownership. Thus although the Teda consider pasture land ownerless, each clan has areas which it customarily uses in mutual agreement with neighboring groups. Violations of these informal agreements can and do give rise to skirmishes, blood feuds, and, occasionally, pitched battles; the same is true of some water-holes and water courses for groups of Tuaregs, Maures and Fulani. Among the Liptako Fulani, pasture land is owned collectively by village groups, and may not be alienated by individuals. On the other hand, the agricultural land held by people of this group may be owned privately and may even be sold. Similarly, the trees and gardens owned by Tuareg, Ted and Chaamba (Arab) families in the oases and cared for by servile populations may be alienated by the agriculturalists. Some Tuareg and Teda noble families in this region have land which yields tribute from vassals. On the other hand, some vassals have had their exclusive rights to land abrogated by the more powerful lords.

Livestock, in contrast to land, pasture or water, is subject to more precise ownership by peoples in this area. Extended families are the ones who normally possess livestock, and nuclear families are often the repository of ownership.

These smaller units must often make the decision about how to maximize their gains or cut their losses in the face of new opportunities or grave disasters. Sometimes the availability of pasture and water, affects the ability of lineage members to remain close to each other and herd their animals in common. In cases of aridity, the nomads scatter. During especially dry periods even the tent units of Maure extended family may be forced to herd their animals miles apart. By so doing they preserve their animals, the source of their livelihood.

Comfortable and well-to-do Maure families normally have twenty-five camels, fifteen sheep, and forty goats, but these could be easily decimated by disease, the lack of pasture and water or the attacks of raiders. To counter this, rich men "often lend animals to their poorer neighbors, sometimes for purely material convenience and sometimes as a form of charity. Other owners of very large herds and flocks often lend parts of their holdings to less prosperous relatives and so disperse their property for a greater safety. A borrower enjoys free use of the animal that is loaned and of much of its products that are sold and must also pay some sort of depreciation fee if he is able."<sup>(71)</sup> Such loans bind poor men to richer men or to rich relatives, and afford rich men the opportunity to recover from disasters which occasionally wipe out parts of their herds. Nevertheless, such loans also lead to

conflict (especially upon death of partners whose heirs are not party to the agreement) or to disputes regarding how much livestock was lost as a result of the raids by stronger Maure groups.

Not only are lineages and their segments the basis for access to land and other property among the populations of this region, they also provide the mechanism for continuity: marriages are usually arranged by lineage heads, and heads of extended families through the medium of the brideprice, or bride service. The rationale for this institution differs from society to society. In general the bride payment serves to legitimate a marriage by transferring goods and services from the family of the groom to that of the bride. These goods or valuables may include money, jewelry, livestock, vegetable products, and various types of labor. They are provided by the extended families of the groom or in the case of labor, by the age-mates of the groom, and are received by the extended family of the bride, and often the bride herself. So important is the bride price in legitimizing marriages that, without it, the children born of any union are deemed illegitimate. Some males whose fathers' families failed to complete the brideprice legitimize themselves by paying the price to their mothers' relatives.

The responsibility of families to furnish the bride price or bride service for their members, ensure the

dependence of young men on their elders. Since these elders control most of the resources of the extended family, including the labor and property of all of its members, and especially of the young men, young people cannot ordinarily marry unless the elders approve or give their consent. When this occurs they can only contract marriage if they are able to obtain help from their maternal kinsmen (who are often ritually obliged to help them) or from district chiefs who provide them with wives in return for homage, fealty, and tribute.

The corporate nature of the extended family and its parent, the lineage, is the basis of two other marital institutions that are widespread in this region: the levirate and the sororate. Unless forbidden by Islam, men, especially young men, are permitted to marry the widows of their kinsmen or of their father (except of course their biological mothers). Similarly, if a wife dies before she gives birth to a child for her husband's lineage, her relatives may send her sister (or any woman of her family) as a replacement. The object here is to ensure that the marriages arranged between families serve their function: to provide help and succor to husbands and wives; to link families together; and to provide children to continue the families and the lineages.

Except for populations influenced by Islam most marriages are exogamous, that is, contracted with people outside the

village and lineage. The Arabs and Islamicized Diula and Fulani favor marriage between the children of two brothers or what is usually called parallel-cousin marriages. Some populations such as the Wolof, Bambara favor cross-cousin marriage, (that is, between the children of siblings of opposite sex) especially between a man and his mother's brother's daughter. The Teda restrict marriage between any relatives nearer than cousins four degrees removed. But both parallel and cross cousin marriages, when they occur, have as a consequence the retention of the marriage gifts and family wealth within a narrow circle of kinsmen, thereby enhancing the solidarity of these relatives. In contrast, marriages with distant and non-related persons, widens the distribution of goods and services, and provide the participating families with a wider network of in-laws.

Polygyny is the ideal but monogamy is the norm for the Bambara, Fulani, Maures, Serer, Soninke, Bozo, Mossi, Songhai and most Sahelian populations. The rationale for polygyny is that the more wives men have the greater their chances for having children; the desire to have someone to provide uxorial (wifely) duties when wives with young babies return to their patrilineages to lactate or while practicing sexual abstinence. Then, of course wives are valued for their assistance in economic affairs whether as cultivators, artisans and traders.

Some populations such as the Mossi permit sororal polygyny (the marriage of one man to two sisters) whereas others such as the Serer, Bozo and Songhai prohibit it. In almost every case, however, the senior wife is in charge of her junior co-wives, and normally each wife has her own hut or apartment in the compound of her husband. The husbands are constrained to be impartial in dealing with their wives and to observe the rules whereby each wife in turn provides the necessary uxorial duties.

With few exceptions, Sahelian populations such as the Kanembu, Songhai, Dogon, Nono, Diula, Mossi, Bozo are patrilocal (the new wife or wives go to live with her husband at his father's home). A few populations such as the Bijogo of Senegambia are matrilocal and among some Bobo groups, the Tuareg and Teda newly married couples live matrilocally and often subsequently patrilocally. Tendencies toward neolocality, have been reported for both the Serer and the Wolof.

There is, also some indication that many pastoralist populations are driven by the exigencies of the nomadic life towards neo-locality. Nomadism appears to prevent strict adherence to a residence rule and facilitates the tendency of lineages or clans to attach themselves to stranger groups for protection. Neo-locality is fostered among the Kuntu where children are reared by their paternal uncles, and who consider it shameful for a man to rear his

own children. Likewise, married sons are encouraged to establish independent households.

The nature of married life varies among these diverse populations, but a number of institutional factors do influence the relations between husbands and wives. The clear-cut division of labor in all these societies sharply demarcates the economic and social activities of both men and women. The result is that they interact more often with persons of their own sex than with their spouses. Moreover, the influence of Islam, and the tendency for men who worship together to spend a great deal of leisure time together limit public social activities between spouses. The high incidence of patrilocality in this region also ensures that most married women are surrounded by the relatives of their husbands and must adapt to their husband's corporate kin groups. Their own patrilineages are supportive during marital difficulties but often counsel patience rather than divorce. The Teda are especially hostile to divorce because having no brideprice (but bride service) they have few means of compensating those men whose wives leave them. The Tuareg also frown on divorce, but divorce rates among the Fulani are high. Sahelian men sometimes take advantage of Islamic prescriptions for easy divorce, whereas normally wives cannot exercise such rights. Nevertheless, so important is having a wife that few men exercise this right and women often hesitate

to leave households in which they are mistreated. Both men and women are constrained to maintain their marriages by a mutual involvement in the affairs of their families, and a commitment to having and rearing children.

Children are universally desired by people throughout the Sahel. Almost everywhere barrenness is viewed with disfavor; and barren women are divorced, abandoned, or returned to their own families. Men suspected of infertility are pitied but have alternative mechanisms for becoming the father, if not the genitor, of children. Barren high-status women or successful market women can often obtain other women as "wives" whose children they give to their husbands, and by so doing can fulfill their obligations to these men. Except for twins, which are feared in some societies and therefore killed, children are welcomed and every attempt made to maintain their health and rear them to maturity. It is not unknown for parents to change their religions; leave their relatives; spend huge sums of money to seek both natural and supernatural help for sick children, or to prevent children from falling ill. Children are considered such important repositories of the strength and vitality of a family, such viable sources of links to other families, sources of help and succor in old age, and the means whereby men hope to achieve some sort of immortality in the face of death; that people make every effort to get and to keep them.

Child-rearing practices, among Sahelian people including sexual taboos during the lactation period of mothers, are designed to ensure the survival of infants. Suckled on demand and seldom left alone while small, children learn to depend upon their relatives. As soon as they can walk, children are assigned to siblings who take care of them, and help socialize them as future members of their societies. Just before puberty, the boys in most societies, from the Fulani Wolof, and Serer in Senegal to Kanembu in Chad, are circumcized. The analogous ritual for girls, clitoridectomy, is not as widespread, but is found among the Dogon, Mossi, Bobo and other populations.

Age-sets and age-classes grouping boys, and sometimes girls, of approximately the same chronological ages are widespread in the Sahel. They are associated with the rituals of puberty and sometimes with the "bush" or "Koranic" schools in which the young people learn history, useful arts and crafts, the duties and responsibility of adulthood, and religious beliefs. Members of these age organizations go through life together as cohorts aiding one another at crucial times in their life cycle. Among the Malinke, Bambara and many Voltaic populations, age-mates help each other perform the obligatory agricultural bride service, and cooperate in the agricultural activities of their respect families. They are sometimes the backbone of extra-familial agricultural labor in their societies, especially labor for political leaders. The age organizations

of women, whether formally organized, or as informal auxiliaries of the men's, also provide help and succor to their members and to their families. They, too, often operate as communal labor groups for their families, as well as for their communities at large. Finally, age organizations are used as both formal and informal status markers and as mechanisms for maintaining social order in many of these societies.

Traditionally, Sahelian pastoral societies have been characterized by structural fluidity and often sharp social stratification. Among the Arabs, Maure, Teda and Tuaregs, individuals and groups move up and down the social hierarchy as a result of demographic decline, loss of wealth, or defeat in battle necessitating payment of tribute to stronger individuals and groups. Thus until quite recently these societies were "a rather fluid and unstable constellation of satellite clans bound by politico-economic ties to a core whose elements were held together by ties of kinship, real or mythical as the case might be."<sup>(72)</sup> Among the Tuaregs, apart from the religious marabouts, there are the military noble Imochar, the pastoralist vassal Imrad, the serf-like agricultural Bella (Haratin), the domestic slave, Iklan, and an outcaste group of artisans and entertainers known as the Inaden.

In the more complex agricultural societies stratification is based on conquest or first occupants of the land. First, the hierarchy is the dominant

royal lineages, then follows the administrative lineages, commoners, caste-like lineages (griots, smiths, leather-workers and the like), serf lineages, and slaves. The royals have superior access to the major resources of the societies such as goods, services and in the case of men, wives; and furnish rulers for the various provinces, districts and village of their respective societies. Nevertheless, despite the ideology of the corporate nature of the royal group, those lineage segments or families actually in power, have superior rights to goods, services and power than those cadet or junior branches whose immediate ancestors were not rulers. Indeed, in time, the people of the cadet-branches become indistinguishable from the commoners and like them, provide goods and services and personnel to their distant and more noble relatives. (73)

The relations between the caste-like groups and the other social strata in the Sahel are complex, because although they provide necessary services to their societies, they are maligned, judged dishonorable, or are even held dangerous to all concerned. Thus the griot (bard) who keeps the genealogies of rulers, flatters nobility and the public by praise-singing, and acts as public vituperator by criticizing wrongdoing, is judged a non-productive beggar, subject to mistrust if not scorn, and prohibited from marrying outside of his stratum, and is often not permitted burial in the earth.

Similarly, smiths are mistrusted because while they produce the tools by which people cultivate the soil and gain a livelihood, they also produce the weapons of war and thus cause death. Butchers who kill animals in order that others live are scorned because in the process they take life.

The position of the servile groups in these societies was and often is complex and ambiguous. Persons captured in warfare or sold by their captors, work all their lives for noble families or wealthy commoners. Nevertheless, they were permitted to marry, and able to provide for their children, who inherited a different status than their fathers or parents. Whether distinguished terminologically or not from "captives," the house-born dependents (who may be called serfs) were customarily not sold, and ultimately merges with the other members of their communities as clients of their masters. Consequently they were free to engage in most of the activities of freeman and enjoyed the protection of their patrons whose interest they also protected. Thus when the French abolished servitude many captives returned home. The serfs on the other hand, often remained with their masters. They had become integrated into their communities and valued the patron-client relations they had established with their former owners. Many of these people are still proud of their past relations with their masters and provide

labor when required for activities such as planting, and thatching houses. Moreover, they continue to perform their traditional roles on ceremonial occasions.

Government in most Sahelian-pastoral societies is conditioned by the wide geographical distribution of local groups and their constant migration. Camps and small villages are controlled by headmen (elders of kin-groups) usually assisted by a council of men. Thus among the Maures the elders of the ahel and of the kabile resolve most of the problems that arise among people. Teda headmen perform similar functions, but in addition, used to lead raiding parties and divided the spoils, and act as spiritual leaders. Tuareg headmen are also responsible for grazing schedules and for sending out scouts to search for new pastures. Like all of the heretofore mentioned headmen, the Arab headman has little power except in local affairs. He is elected by and represents a council of married men and collects taxes or tribute from them for their overlords. Fulani headmanship is hereditary within particular lineages in specific local areas. Here too, leadership is consensual since most local groups conduct their own affairs until they coalesce in larger numbers during the rainy seasons.

Most local groups in pastoral societies give allegiance to regional leaders known as sheiks, paramount chiefs or district chiefs. The chiefs among the Maures, usually

members of the aristocratic military or religious groups, preside over councils composed of the committees from the smaller segments of Maure society. These chiefs initiate new policies and direct their application even though the councils have a veto. The Tuareg paramount chief is chosen from a family of hereditary nobility by clan or lineage headmen. His functions are similar to those of the Maure chief, and like the latter, is paid tribute. The Teda paramount chief is selected in rotation from among the noble lineages of the society, but he has little authority and collects no taxes. The hereditary ruler of Fulani states, such as in Macina and Liptako, receive tribute, and appoint district chiefs who levy taxes for him, provide soldiers, administer justice, and appoint or control heads of sedentary or semi-sedentary villages or migratory groups. Yet even in such fairly centralized societies the nature of pastoral societies led to a great deal of rivalry, blood feuds, and warfare over stolen livestock or other goods. The Maures, Arabs and Tuaregs engaged in continual conflict with each other, and at times even the Liptako Fulani, in order to avoid raids, were forced to pay tribute to marauding Udalán Tuareg. The Fulani of Macina although better organized had to maintain a complex military organization both for offense and defense against neighboring Fulani, Tuareg and Mossi.

In the relatively small-scale and stateless agricultural societies, the heads of extended families maintain order among their relatives, and in the event of extra familial conflict, represent them in councils of the heads of other extended families. If, and when, these ad hoc councils could resolve the dispute, there was often a recourse to armed might since there are few if any super-ordinate police powers in these highly egalitarian societies. Because of their proclivity to resort to force in the face of conflict such societies as the Lobi, Dagari and Bobo have been called "anarchic" meaning that they have no authority figures. The issue is not that they have no authority figure, but that they do not have the state, and therefore no officials who have arrogated to themselves the right to use force on behalf of the people. In fact, scattered throughout many state-less as well as state-organized societies are "earth priests," heads of lineages claiming a privileged religious status because of first occupancy of the area. People do indeed appeal to the "earth priests" for supernatural help in their agricultural rituals or during the period of conflict. Nevertheless, these ritual figures lack the power to use physical force on behalf of the entire community of which they are a part. (74)

Most of the societies in this region are organized into "segmentary states" or kingdoms. The rural dispersed hamlets or compact rural villages are aggregated into

larger districts, provinces, and kingdoms by a network or hierarchy of rulers, and administrators. The entire panoply of power and administration of the state is centered at the royal capitals located in the larger towns. Here reside the heads of hereditary and often endogamous noble families, classes of courtiers, war ministers, priests and sometimes Imams, administrators, tax collectors for the state, crown serfs and slaves, and various service classes of smiths, leatherworkers, and especially musicians, bards, and jesters. This pattern is frequently repeated on the subordinate provincial, district and village levels, but without the entire range of personnel and the pomp and ceremony. (75)

Local government in Sahelian traditional states is characterized by the rule of either an hereditary chief or one chosen by the inhabitants. He administers the collective property of the village and dispenses justice with the cooperation of a council of notables. Most issues involving persons outside the village, are presided over by the district chief. It is at the district level that most issues linking the local inhabitants with the state political hierarchy are resolved. Taxes from the periodic markets, traders and war booty are collected for transmissal to the ruler; soldiers are recruited and dispatched to the wars; and it is also at this level that all sorts of administrative decisions are transmitted to the local levels

of the political system. In highly organized states, such as Mossi and Gurma (or at certain periods in the history of the state, such as among the Bambara of Segou and Kaarta) district chiefs relate to provincial officials directly responsible to the king. These provincial rulers maintain courts comparable to those of the king, and aggregate the districts in the same manner as the district chiefs aggregate the villages. However, the provincial level was particularly vulnerable to dynastic disputes and frequently disappeared after conquest, leaving the district chiefs directly responsible to the monarchs at the capitals. (76)

Islam is the dominant universal religion in the Sahel region. (77) The Moslems are divided into two major brotherhoods (tariqas or "ways") the Qadiriya and the Tijaniya, and a number of minor ones such as the Hammalists, and Senegalese Muridiya. Except for small variations in reciting the litanies (dhikr) and matters of orthodoxy, there are no basic differences among these tariqas. All of the brotherhoods encourage members to observe the five obligations of Islam: the profession of the faith ("There is no God but God, and Muhammad is his Prophet"); daily prayer; the fast during the month of Ramadan; the giving of alms; and the pilgrimage to Mecca. Not all of these requirements are easy to fulfill, but the most devout Moslems, especially leaders (muqaddam, imams, and marabouts)

attempt to observe all these commandments, including the hadj. They seek to demonstrate that they possess baraka, defined as a supernatural gift of "blessing" or "mystical power."

Islam in the Sahel has been a conservative force, espousing the traditional values in many of these societies. Moslem leaders support the traditional position of women and support the authority of traditional leaders especially when the latter are Moslems. Using the Malikite tradition of the Shari's or Koranic law, the Moslems in this zone have sought to square the canons of Islam with customary laws and values. This law, coupled with the study of the Koran, provide the curriculum for Koranic schools scattered throughout the region. These are presided over by learned men skilled in the dialectics of Islamic discourse -- veritable custodians of much of the local traditions.

Christianity, a heritage of conquest in this area, has had more success among the lower orders in Sahelian societies than among the traditional elite. The missionaries converted many children conferred to them by the European administrators to be educated, thereby creating a class of Christianized and westernized people in most parts of the zone. The Catholic missionaries were more successful primarily because they were supported by the French. In addition the all-male Catholic missionaries established familial, if not paternalistic ambience with their converts.

In contrast, the Protestant missionaries, opposed by the French and nuclear family-oriented, were less successful due to the different nature of the relationship established with converts. In contrast to the Catholics, they tended to be less interested in modern education, and more fundamentalist in their attitude toward many aspects of traditional African life such as circumcision, clitoridectomy, polygyny, and ancestor veneration. Scattered through the region are small groups of syncretistic churches which have attempted to blend Christianity with traditional religious beliefs. (78)

The traditional gods in this region have been losing influence over the past eight centuries. First attacked by Islam the celestial but otiose High Gods have often survived only by fusing with Allah. The Earth Goddess, in contrast, has remained a central figure in many agricultural rites and has been supported by her representatives, the "earth priests." The belief that there are supernatural forces inhabiting the physical and human universes has led to syncretisms of beliefs in local tutelary deities with Islamic jinns. Bori spirits still possess people, especially women. Many Sahelians still believe in the efficacy of the ancestors in helping their descendants during periods of illness, misfortunes, and such major disasters as droughts and famine, and in many areas, ancient Moslem leaders have been fused with the

ancestors as sources of veneration. Finally, the belief that human beings can harm each other through supernatural means is still prevalent. Thus, traditional priests, and even Moslem clerics, are mobilized to prepare charms and incantations against the power of the perpetrators of evil. (79)

#### IV. EUROPEAN CONTACT AND CONQUEST OF SAHELIAN PEOPLES

Although in contact with Europeans since 1441 and participating in the Slave trade and other types of commerce since the end of the fifteenth century, the Sahelians were not the subject of sustained European contact until the middle of the seventeenth century. In 1659 the French established a trading post at N'Dar which they rechristened Saint Louis, and fought both the Dutch and the British for control of the important slave-trading port at Goree. From this region they drew innumerable slaves whose labor, while enabling Europe's ascent to industrial might, was obtained at the expense of Sahelian societies, which suffered from declining population and internecine warfare. The increased trade drew the Sahel into an emerging network of European colonial ecosystems, but only as a peripheral provider of manpower, as a supplier of raw materials for export, and a consumer of alcoholic beverages, and manufactured trinkets.

But even this early and tenuous relationship between Europe and the Sahel was to have severe repercussions within the local ecosystem. Fulani nomads who had been the tributaries of many of the agriculturally-based kingdoms, found themselves being increasingly taxed by kings whose revenues were reduced by the loss of manpower occasioned by the slave trade. The Fulani resented these exactions, and using their newly embraced religion, Islam, as a mobilization weapon launched a series of holy wars throughout the region. They created theocratic states in Fouta-Djalou in 1725, and in Fouta-Toro and Bondou in 1776. In 1810 they defeated the Bambara, founded a theocratic state in Macina, and reduced Segu to tributary status. These conquests not only changed the economic, social, political and religious institutions in the area, but were to have a profound effect on the natural environment. Fulani herdsmen had greater freedom and facility to compete with the agricultural populations for the same natural areas. And while their cattle were not as destructive as sheep in other world areas, the total ecosystem changed.

As the internal and external impact of Europeans in the region increased, some African leaders attempted to use Islam to create new and viable societies. One such person was El Hadj Omar, a Toucouleur from Fouta-Toro who

went to Mecca (the classic prophetic withdrawal) and returned with a new doctrine and sect, the Tidjaniya. His rather democratic teachings won him converts among ex-slaves, women, young men and others oppressed by the local feudal systems. As the movement began to develop political and military aspects, it attracted a diverse and burgeoning following of able and ambitious men, whom Omar armed with weapons obtained from trade at the coast. In 1850, he launched a jihad, conquered Bambuk and Boure, Kaarta, Segou, and finally Macina. However, he could make no headway in Senegal since he was opposed by the local rulers currently being subjected to direct French rule. Defeated by French arms in 1859, Omar signed a peace treaty with General Faidherbe in 1860 renouncing any attempt to conquer Senegal. Omar turned towards the organization of his empire only to be killed during a Fulani revolt.

By 1800 it was clear that the French were prepared to incorporate the whole Sahelian area into their imperial system. The slave trade had ended in 1815 and the Europeans sought other uses of the area in addition to a plentiful source of gum arabic, ostrich plumes, and spices. Already travellers such as Houghton, Mongo Park and René Caille had penetrated the region to discover something of its potential. In 1817, Colonel Schmaltz had

received permission from the Lebou leader, Moctar Diop to introduce some two hundred European emigrants from the Société Coloniale Philanthropique. This small group was soon liquidated by the climate. In 1819, the French succeeded in obtaining a concession of land on which they developed a model farm, La Sénégalais Richard Toll, an agronomist who conducted the first experiments in African tropical agriculture was a part of this venture. The result was to be familiar: "Little by little, the unforeseen difficulties led to its [the farm's] total abandonment."<sup>(80)</sup> Nevertheless, the French retained the area and sought in vain for more concessions.

While the French could initially do little with the agricultural potential of Senegal, the local people had successfully integrated an American-derived crop, the peanut, into their economy, and were producing it in potentially exportable quantities. In 1840, Jaubert, seeking some way to exploit the crops growing in the region sent some 722 kilograms of peanuts to Marseille as a test. Richard-Molard records that "success was immediate; it was necessary to send machines, to introduce railroads and later to send steam vessels. From the time of the July Monarchy, the Saint Simonians were active. Once their man was in power, the era of hesitation ceased. Napoleon the Third proceeded with the occupation [of Senegal] and imperialistic colonization became an economic necessity."<sup>(81)</sup>

It was the growing French economic interest in Senegal as well as their plans to increase their influence in the region that led them to protect Senegal from the empire-building process of el Hadj Omar and conquer the entire area themselves. After defeating Omar, Captain Faidherbe (ultimately General) established French control over the Moors in Maurentania, conquered Fouta-Toro and Fouta-Djalou, and elaborated a policy of "Peace or Powder" which laid the basis for later colonization of the entire region. By 1864, when he left West Africa, Faidherbe had encouraged Christian missionaries to proselytize the people. In addition he had created schools and administrative posts; established the port of Dakar and "had founded the future of Senegal on peanuts which already, each year, it was sending several thousand tons to Marseille and Bordeaux." (82)

France's push to conquer the entire area was halted by her defeat by Germany in 1870. However, as soon as that war was over and the Republicans assumed power in France, the drive for total control was resumed. Jules Ferry led a campaign to develop an economic bastion in West Africa which would later help France take her revenge on Germany. The drive to the east began, but each step of the way was challenged by a powerful black king, either a successor or emulator of Omar. The French conquered Bambara country,

occupied Timbuktu and Gao, humbled the Moors and Tuaregs, defeated the Mossi, and captured and exiled Samori who had used the Dioula merchant complex to create a powerful state. The Berlin conference sanctioned France's incorporation of the Sahel into her colonial realm.

Many economic historians have argued that the French did not gain much by conquering this area. The Sahelian ecosystem was becoming marginal to the important economic developments in West Africa. Fage states that by this time:

the Sudan no longer possessed the economic strength it once had as West Africa's gateway to the trade of the rest of the world. There is no evidence that the trans-Saharan trade was declining in volume or value before the last quarter of the nineteenth century. Indeed it may have reached its peak c. 1875, when one estimate puts the value of the two-way flow of goods across the Sahara at about £1,500,000 or \$3,600,000. But this was now small compared with the trade flowing to and from West Africa by sea. Already a single port like Lagos could be dealing with almost as much trade as all the trans-Saharan routes combined. The maritime traders, , and this means Europeans on one side and coastal Africans on the other, were probably already by the mid-1870s handling five or six times as much trade as the trans-Saharan merchants, and the disproportion was increasing. After the European conquest the trans-Saharan trade shrank to a trickle, and the maritime trade grew out of all proportion. (83)

For administrative purposes France divided her Sahelian territories into six colonies: Senegal, Mauritania, Soudan, Upper Volta, Niger and Chad. The first five were incorporated into a West African federation, Afrique Occidentale Française governed from Dakar, and Chad was linked to a central African federation, Afrique Equatoriale Française. Administratively these colonies were divided into cercles, sub-divisions and postes under administrators who ruled the Africans organized into cantons. These cantons may or may not have coincided with the traditional African political systems.

Demographically the Sahel has never been densely populated. For example, Mauritania (which is larger than Texas and California combined) had less than one million people during most of the colonial period the majority were nomadic herdsman. Mali with an area of 461,300 square miles had 3 million inhabitants. Upper Volta which is as large as Colorado had only about 4 million people during the colonial period, and Niger with 494,000 square miles had only about 2 million inhabitants. Chad with over 2 million square miles had less than 3 million people even through its southern part was well-watered. Richard-Molard indicated that not only was the Sahelian populations small, but "the more the density of the population increased, the more man is penalized by having to work land that becomes more ungrateful the more one asks of it." (84)

Economically, the Sahelian colonies were exploited by a number of giant monopolies: C.F.A.O. (Compagnie Française de l'Afrique Occidentale), S.C.A.O. (Société Commerciale de l'Ouest Africain-which had French and Swiss capital), and Unilever, a primarily British and Dutch holding company which dominated the world market in vegetable oils, and was represented locally by its affiliates: United Africa Company, Nosoco, Compagnie du Niger Française, and the Compagnie française de la Côte d'Ivoire. The giant companies in the Sahel worked closely with the French administration to organize their depots and to obtain the raw materials they needed for export. (85) They utilized Labano-Syrians, some French and a few African merchants to distribute the goods that they imported. Initially, the people in the Western Sahel refused to abandon their traditional economic organization to produce crops for export. In order to force them to do so, the French administration levied taxes to be paid in European currency. When this proved insufficient, they instituted travail forcee which coerced local people to work on European plantations. The French organized champs du commandant or fields delimited by the police in which the local people worked collectively; and instituted "culture obligatoires" which stipulated that the local people had to produce so many tons of specific produce under the pain of severe physical and financial sanctions.

The nature of French economic activities in the Sahel neither contributed to the development of a viable local ecosystem, nor articulated with their imperial network. The dismal failure of their colonial economic enterprise in the Sahel zone could best be judged by what occurred in Upper Volta. In 1919 the new French Minister for the Colonies, Albert Sarraut, outlawed a colonial development plan (La Mise en valeur des colonies française) to build railroads, roads, plantations and other enterprises in order to expedite France's recovery from the ravages of World War I. In the newly created Upper Volta colony, an equally new Governor, Edouard Hesling, sought to implement this plan. He suggested that a colony "with such diverse products and such a dense population, could attain an exceptional level of development by acquiring those economic infrastructures that ensure prosperity."<sup>(86)</sup> Hesling believed that the Upper Volta could and should be able to produce and export "thousands of tons" of cotton as soon as an easy and economical way of shipping could be established. By 1925, he had built some 6,000 kilometers of roads in Upper Volta which represented at that time one-eighth of the entire network of roads in the entire federation. Meanwhile reports from Upper Volta commented on "the enforced enthusiasm with which the natives, under Mr. E. Hesling, have thrown themselves into agricultural labor and in

particular into planting cotton."(87)

There were, however, some reports from the colony which indicated that the people were not happy with work on the champs du commandant. Ossendowski reported that:

Cotton is an artificial crop and one the value of which is not entirely clear to the natives. The chiefs with their superior intellect, seeing the profit to be obtained from the plantation of cotton, are continually enlarging the area of the fields, and resort to draft animals, ploughs, manures, and even partial irrigation of the fields; nevertheless, the great mass of the population submit rather unwillingly to those instructions of the administration which aim at the development of cotton cultivation in the colony.(88)

When the Voltaics were not planting cotton and building roads, they were being recruited for both the French colonial army and for work in other colonies. In 1922 the colony was asked to furnish

6,000 workers for the Thies-Kayes railway, replaceable every six months, and under the same conditions furnished 2,000 laborers to build railroads in the Ivory Coast. Similarly and with the consent of the chief administrator of the colony, it was possible to recruit a thousand workers in the regions of Ouagadougou and Bobo-Dioulasso for private corporations in the Ivory Coast.(89)

Buell states also that between 1921 and 1925, the upper Volta furnished the Thies-Kayes and Ivory Coast railroads with nearly forty-nine thousand men. In 1924, the Upper Volta Colony in addition employed men for a total of

318,814 man-days not including prestation labor and other local labor.<sup>(90)</sup> And Albert Londres reports that in the late 1920's the Upper Volta was considered a "reservoir" of manpower of 3 million people. Everyone went there to get men as they would "go to wells for water."<sup>(91)</sup>

Robert Delavignette, who served in the Upper Volta as a young district officer during this period, and who later became director of political affairs in the French Overseas Ministry accused his government of attempting to destroy the Upper Volta local ecosystem. He declared:

In the course of ten years, 93,000 men were thus sent far away. They came back but without having learned a trade; having on the other hand, lost touch with their families, which had suffered by their absence and which could not be made whole by their return. Fields had been neglected, betrothed girls had not been married, wives had become undernourished, children had been poorly cared for. The recruiters paid no heed to local labor customs. The young leaders of the age associations and of the rural cooperative organizations were not acknowledged (in their true roles) as monitors of peasant life and agriculture, but were seized as ordinary laborers and in preference to others because they were stronger. French Africa has lived on Voltaic labor in the Sudan, and notably in the Ivory Coast.<sup>(92)</sup>

Despite his draconian efforts, Hesling failed to develop the Upper Volta. Two explanations may be cited: (1) the efforts disregarded and/or damaged existing social institutions and (2) the price of cotton plummeted on the world market. By the mid-nineteen twenties, many young

people who could not earn enough money pay taxes or meet their familial obligations "left on seasonal migrations to the Gold Coast where they worked on cacao plantations and on the roads under much better conditions than in the Volta, and for better pay than in the Ivory Coast. There were years when 80,000 men left to contribute to the fortunes of the Gold Coast."<sup>(93)</sup> And when in 1929 the cotton market failed, the economy of Upper Volta was in ruins. People could not pay their taxes; many of the roads that were too extensive, too little used and too difficult to maintain had to be abandoned; and the capitalists abandoned the country. The Colonial Minister ordered that the colony be broken up stating that this "would permit appreciable savings, and would make the administrative and technical personnel serving in its capital available for general service."<sup>(94)</sup>

The French treated a local ecosystem with its societies, natural habitat, and plant and animals resources as a plantation. When it failed, they attempted to liquidate it. A few French administrators who witnessed this tragedy bitterly commented that the Upper Volta with its faceless masses had posed a formidable challenge to administrators:

The more they tried to impose upon it an open economy with a pattern of roads, urban centers, and cotton fields; and the more they tried to discover the vital principle of that economy so that they could establish a new harmony between the land and those faceless masses, the more they broke down the old, established, traditional economy.... No original methods or powerful tools were used, no inventiveness nor clarity of purpose was shown. This was but a megalomaniac copy of old patterns of mercantile exploitation, and [created] in the heartland, futile and joyless work for those faceless masses."(95)

The Upper Volta may have represented an extreme case of the failure of French economic policy in the Sahel, but as we shall see conditions in the other colonies were not much better. Hardly had the territories started to recover from the Great Depression when World War II broke out and they found themselves caught in the conflict between the Vichyites and the Free French. Richard-Molard states that during the period 1940-1943 when the Vichyites were in power the words "Liberté," "Egalité" and "Fraternité" were officially effaced from public buildings. The local regime suppressed hard-won republican privileges in return for vague legal promises and applied repressive laws and decrees at will. Racism was rampant; the indigenat widely applied; arbitrary condemnations multiplied; and freedom of association suppressed. (96)

But the situation did not change in 1942 when French West Africa entered the war on the side of the allies. Then each colony, each cercle, each subdivision or poste was forced to join the war effort. Richard Molard recalls that at that period: "The 'war effort' justified all. Each cercle was imposed so many tons of vine rubber even if no such vines existed in its territory. The natives were thus sometimes forced to walk very far elsewhere to buy rubber at almost any price, to escape 'justice.' They sold it to the commander at a fixed price, several times cheaper than what they paid for it."<sup>(97)</sup> Rice was requisitioned and transported hundreds of kilometers by porters who often traveled twelve days without any provisions being made for them enroute. The Africans suffered in silence but were determined to seek redress at the end of the war.

Even before Germany surrendered, De Gaulle had promised the people of the western Sahel a better deal. They were to be integrated into a new political organization, the French Union, and were to be the beneficiaries of many new rights and duties. When the war did end, forced labor was abolished, local assemblies were created, new schools built, new hospitals opened, and a new economic infrastructure was promised. Attention was called to errors in the former system wherein development in the coastal areas and ports had "completely reversed the former patterns of circulation, and ruined the traditional pivots like Timbuktu, Djenne and

Gao to the Profit of Dakar, Conakry, Abidjan, Cotonou and others."(98) The result was that the savanna world, foremost in West Africa's past, became the 'interior sector' gravely handicapped by its continentality, to the profit of the 'exterior sector' formerly marginal, but had become the sole outlet during the colonial period. The French started to consider the fact that "the landlocked position of their West African possessions, cut off from the sea by the British colonies, presented a formidable problem in development."(99)

#### V. THE PROBLEMS OF DEVELOPMENT DURING THE COLONIAL PERIOD

Whether one agrees or disagrees with those French colonial administrators and contemporary African scholars who claim that France almost ruined the Sahel in attempting to exploit it, it is quite true that the French were never able to transform the region to facilitate development or able to establish viable links between its people and the outside world. There is now widespread agreement that France's penetration of this area was marked by confusion and disorganization. While a number of statesmen such as Richelieu, Colbert, Napoleon III, Faidherbe, and Jules Ferry wanted to colonize the area, and merchant houses and missionary groups saw both material and spiritual riches there, many in Metropolitan France wished reassurance

that their leaders would make no major commitment there. The result was that French policy in this region was characterized by half-hearted efforts, faulty planning, and uncoordinated development. (100)

After experimenting with military rule and local governments in its conquered territories, the French decided to create a West African Federal structure (AOF) "to serve French interests and only indirectly those of the separate colonies; ... the colonies were always regarded as the fundamental political units and ... therefore the Federation was only a temporary structure." (101) Moreover, the Government General of the federation was not the product of creative and directed planning, but, rather, the product of a series of pragmatic and expedient policies having a variety of aims. Centralization was a response to the instability of the expansion process and a need to extend government authority, and the Governor-General, originally an administrative coordinator, became the repository of the powers of the Republic.

From his capital at Dakar, the Governor-General administered the Federal budget, maintained by indirect taxes and metropolitan credits, the Governor-General had final word on the budgets submitted by the Lieutenant-Governors of the various territories, who convened each year in a Conseil du Gouvernement at Dakar. He promulgated metropolitan decrees, and supervised their enactment, and

controlled the movement of French civil servants throughout the Federation. The Lieutenant-Governor of each colony had under his direction a number of Frenchmen who were the "commandants" of the cereles, subdivisions and postes African chefs (chiefs) who headed the cantons and villages. A secretary-General provided liaison with the various units and functional departments of the colony's administration, and a Conseil d'Administration, consisting of the Governor, three officials, and three appointed "notables," was consulted on budgetary matters. (102)

The operation of this structure was constrained by various political contingencies and by inadequacies in funding, personnel, transport, and communications. The major problem was that of finance. The French Metropole provided little support since a law of 1900 required that each colony provide its budgetary needs through direct taxation. Indeed, Faidherbe's and French strategy, was "to dominate the country at as low a cost as possible and through commerce get the greatest advantages." (103) The result was that the colonies never had enough money, either for administration or for development. In 1910 the AOF had only one French administrator for every 5,547 square kilometers and 12,290 inhabitants, while in Upper Volta the ratio was one per 60,000 inhabitants.

The lack of administrators had two important results. First, there was a substantial devolution of authority to too few administrators who had responsibility for order

and justice, taxation, census rolls, and public works. Secondly, there was the utilization of inexpensive local cadres including chiefs and technical subordinates. Thus the French, while advocating "direct-rule" had to practice a great deal of indirect-rule. To mesh theory and practice, they favored smaller political units (called chiefdoms). Such units could dovetail with the cantons, and provide a focus where the chiefs could execute, but not formulate policy. In fact Governor-General Ponty's Circular of 1909 advocated direct contact of administrators with the population labelled a "politique de races." He called for the recognition of local ethnic communities, and where previously conquered by other Africans recognized the antecedent political authorities.

The problem with this formulation of administrative policy was that there was confusion about the new status of the local political authorities: did they have power, or not? Moreover, this new policy disregarded many elements in the traditional political culture, and exposed the rulers known as "chiefs" to the whims of local administrators. Chiefs who were allowed full discretion, and new power. inevitably committed 'abuses' and 'exactions,' and were fined or dismissed accordingly. Even Governor-General Van Vollenhoven (circa 1919) who was supportive of the chiefs, took care to underline the fact that "there are

not two authorities in the cercle, the French authority and the native authority; there is only one! The commandant de cercle alone commands...."(104)

The responsibilities of the chiefs -- which covered the gamut of administrative tasks -- tended to far outweigh their prerogatives and resources. This was evident in the area of adjudication as well as that of policy. After an unsuccessful experimentation with the extension of French justice, the chiefs were made an integral part of the federal judicial system in 1903. In 1912, however, the judicial function of chiefs was restricted to conciliation, and the relative weight of French as opposed to customary law increased. The discretion of colonial officials was heightened by the system of administrative penalties called the indigenat, applicable to all non-citizens. Any administrator could summarily fine people up to 100 francs and jail them for 15 days for any of 26 infractions -- evasion of taxes, labor dues, or sanitary regulations, disrespect towards authority and so on. Not even the chiefs were immune to such penalties. Rendered impotent by an administration too insolvent to finance the development of the area, the chiefs became the tools by which the administration sought to use local resources for development. The chiefs were forced to mobilize both people and resources to work on projects which were meaningless to them. Both they and their followers suffered in the process.

The restructuring of the traditional political institutions of Sahelian societies in the interest of producing export crops resulted in a number of constraints on development especially a distrust of political authority. The rural people saw their traditional chiefs and nobility transformed either into willing tools of the administration, or abused and humbled by outsiders. Some populations had used "chefs de paille" (literally chiefs of straw) in an attempt to protect their true leaders from desacralization; others suffered the maladministration and extortions of "manufactured" foreign chiefs imposed by administrators practicing the old technique of divide and rule. Many peasants resented being forced to cultivate crops that they did not use or need, and which did not fit into their traditional agricultural cycle. They resisted paying taxes with European currency, a device which was designed to induce them to migrate for work, and to enter a money economy by selling their subsistence and services. The result is that for many cultivators or peasants, African political figures lost their legitimacy, if not their power and authority.

Advocates of change encountered subtle but often effective opposition from people who had learned to distrust outsiders -- even neighbors; for experience has shown that outsiders rarely bring gifts. Official public relations campaigns to induce people were often

ineffective because most rural persons had been exposed to campaigns which did not benefit them. In almost every cercle or district headquarters there were dismal remains of the technical paraphernalia of projects that did not work. The result was that peasants grown wise in the ways of the Europeans were loathe to respond to innovations even when assured by their leaders of the possibility of success. The problem here was that despite their oppositions many rural people hesitated to speak out, thereby suggesting by their silence their acquiescence. The denouement came much latter when the innovation failed and frustrated officials were too embarrassed to admit that the peasants never really agreed to the projects in the first place. The economic constraints on accepting innovation were often difficult to overcome. People who lived very close to the subsistence level were reluctant to innovate; for failure could spell disaster.

For example, the patterns of nomadism and agriculture practiced in the region had evolve<sup>d</sup> over time. By the 1950s they represented adaptation to the demands of a colonial system which had insisted on the production of export commodities. In other words slow but steady changes did take place during the colonial period. Ironically, sentiment persisted both among the pastoralists and administrators, that the herders preferred transhumance and a migratory life to agriculture, despite the presence

of a growing sedentarisation of pastoralists and their adoption of a mixed economy when conditions were suitable. In Niger, Dupire found that the Fulani passed relatively easy from one type of pastoralism to the other, and became sedentary mixed-cultivators. This was proof of their ability to adapt to changing conditions. She concluded that "Nomadism is not a mystique for the Fulani, but a submission to the conditions in the physical milieu which, moreover does not blind him to the advantages of the sedentary life."<sup>(105)</sup> Tuaregs and Bella (Bouzou) also became sedentary when the circumstances permitted. They adapted mixed-agriculture using cattle to fertilize fields, and sent young boys into the bush with herds during the planting season. They, too, took advantage of the two economic possibilities in their environment.

Dupire concluded that the biggest problem in the Sahelian region was always the lack of water. She was convinced that the creation of wells "would resolve this painful dilemma for the sedentaries as well as for the pastoralists."<sup>(106)</sup> What was not understood by the French was that the Fulani, Tuaregs and other Sahelian pastoralist populations had a fairly good idea of the number of animals required to support families under ordinary (and perhaps the worst) conditions. They tried to maintain this number even in the face of administrative pressure. Often their behavior appeared bizarre to

foreigners, and other Africans, since they did not sell their cattle at the most propitious time to gain the maximum profit. But there were environmental, cultural, as well as moral reasons for this type of behavior. The possession of cattle did give the herder "social prestige which he can acquire in no other way and gives him psychic satisfactions in comparison to which the enjoyment of foreign goods or luxury articles remains qualitatively negligible."<sup>(107)</sup> But there were such practical considerations as the fear that the money obtained by selling their stock might be stolen or lost, not to mention the temptation to spend it for trivial purposes. Thus the resistance of pastoralists to sell their cattle for money was in very many cases the "reflection of a wise prudence," at least so long as they did not feel that their own security and that of their cattle, in an ungrateful region, had been brought to a new economic equilibrium.<sup>(108)</sup>

The problem for the herder and innovators alike was that their ideologies, beliefs and values often lagged behind the technical changes that had occurred. They often took emergent patterns for granted without even acknowledging a change in the pastoral way of life. The pastoralists were willing to change, and they were anxious to increase their revenue. Nonetheless -- like most people -- the herders were not willing to change their economic behavior unless they were convinced that they would directly benefit. If new economic activities were designed to produce material benefits to the herder, these benefits were sought because they

contributed toward the satisfaction of the social needs of the people themselves. Force was used periodically to compel the pastoralists to contribute to the "public good" but the pastoralists always reacted by escaping these constraints as quickly as they could. They fled from constraints even though their own behavior was changing in the direction sought by the administrator.

The relations between the nomads and the settled agriculturalists in the Sahel had also not been static, but had been evolving over the years. The nomads exploited lands too marginal for the agriculturalists. They moved into the agricultural areas during those periods when their normal habitats were too desolate to maintain their flocks. Under ordinary conditions the agriculturalists welcomed the presence of the herders. Stenning who worked in Northern Nigeria during the colonial period describes an extensive symbiosis between pastoral Fulani and neighboring agriculturalists. "Except perhaps in the Sahel, he tells us, "the pastoral life is pursued not in isolation, but in some degree of symbiosis with sedentary agricultural communities. Alongside the continuous exchange of dairy products for grain and other goods, there have existed, possibly for many centuries, arrangements for pasturing cattle on land returning to fallow, and for guaranteeing cattle tracks and the use of water supplies. Pastoral Fulani did not, and do not, merely graze at will,

but obtained rights to the facilities they required from the acknowledged owners of the land. The payments in kind made for obtaining the rights were not merely economic transactions but involved the Pastoral Fulani in the local ritual observances relating to land."(109)

Sometimes transhumance did lead to conflict such as when both herders and pastoralists competed for the same areas. When and where the pastoralists were victorious, they not only took over the lands of the agricultural populations, but often established a kind of patron-client hegemony over certain groups of agriculturalists (Bella or Bouzou). When, however, the pastoralists were bested, they moved off with their herds to seek better arrangements with other agricultural populations. Even during the colonial period when periodic droughts and epidemic diseases, decimated some herds many pastoralists temporarily adopted agriculture. However, as soon as their herds recovered they resumed their nomadic existence, even though they retained viable relations with the agriculturalists.

The conquest of the Sahel and its incorporation into the French colonial empire did affect the relations between the nomads and the sedentaries. The abolition of slavery freed the agricultural captives of the pastoralists although it did not end the patron-client relationship between them.

The French attempted to sedentarize the pastoralists in an effort to curb their mobility and to incorporate them into the colonial structures that were being implanted. The pastoralist often escaped by crossing territorial borders, and were able to resist sedentarization and avoid involvement in the many schemes that attempted to develop the region. The irony was that once many agriculturalist schemes were launched, the pastoralists were unable to move their flocks into areas as in the past. Moreover, they gained the reputation of resisting all change and were viewed with disfavor by both the agriculturalists and the administration.

Despite their mobility, the pastoralists were unable to withstand the intrusions of the colonial regime into their affairs. Gradually the French district commanders persuaded the Fulani rulers to settle down, and serve as links with the nomadic populations. The result was status differentiation within formerly fairly egalitarian populations. Gradually, the influence of the colonial regime's activities led to an increase of population among both the human and animal populations of the nomads and agriculturalists. The nomads, being more marginal to the colonial system, were at a disadvantage in this competition. Lack of education, and lack of knowledge of the colonial institutions reversed the status relations that formerly existed between them and agriculturalists.

It was only in the areas truly marginal to the administrative centers that the traditional patron-client relations between the nomads and the agriculturalists persisted. As more persons from the agricultural societies joined the subaltern cadres of the colonial regimes, they eradicated "feudal-like relations" between the nomads and their agricultural vassals. (110)

Every extension of the colonial regime into the traditional economic and social relations of the nomads and the sedentaries, eroded nomad dominance or privilege. The exception was in Mauritania where the demographic superiority of the Islamized nomadic people did not facilitate the development of the colonial-driven high status of the sedentaries. However, even here the nomads were at a disadvantage since they were victims of an alliance between the sedenterized nomadic peoples and the agriculturalists pitted against those who remained truly nomadic. The split between the Town Fulani (Gidda) and the "Bush" Fulani (Boroje) that occurred in Nigeria was replicated in the western Sahel. In Nigeria, the ethnic factor which linked the two Fulani communities, became less important than those factors that linked the Town-dwelling Fulani and the Town-dwelling Hausa. By the end of the colonial period the ability of the nomads to continue their way of life was increasingly being threatened. As agricultural populations improved their techniques they were increasingly reluctant to permit pastoralists to use their lands.

One of the major issues that faced colonial administrators in the field of agriculture was whether or not cultivators would agree to adopt individual tenure. Indeed, many agronomists argued that African agriculture would never become efficient unless the peasants shifted from "farm tenure" or "usufruct" to individual holdings. Pelissier, who studied agriculture among the Sérér of Senegal contends that without institutionalized individual tenure, and mixed farming, the multiple pressure of demographic increase, Islam, the exigencies of a commercial economy and the spread of urbanization could have grave implications for their society. He concluded that "the issue is less in discovering technical solutions than in substituting in one way or another the concept of 'geographic patriotism' for the present 'biographical patriotism' which among the Sérér would facilitate the introduction of a genuine land tenure system."(111)

The issue here was perhaps not individuation of land tenure per se, but what this change might have meant to the relationship among people in a lineage -- the institution in which land and other goods and services were vested. Individuation in land did imply individuation in family or lineage relationships. But if lineage membership meant anything, it meant the mutual cooperation of its members against the exigencies of life, particularly the economic ones. A man therefore unconsciously resisted

detaching himself from his lineage in order to cultivate his own plots, unless he was assured that he would receive a just return for the fruits of his labor. The problem during the colonial period was that there was no such guarantee. And unless people could have been assured that they had the ability to survive isolation from their lineage through the individuation of land, they would remain linked to the lineage and through it to the traditional farm tenure system.

The spectacular growth of vegetable gardening (jardins maraîchers) in and around the emerging towns and larger villages in the Sahel zone at the end of the colonial period suggests that cultivators willingly adopted modern forms of agriculture, and that the issue of individuation in land was not proving insoluble once the benefits became clear. Near every dam, waterhole, or stream in the vicinity of these agglomerations were peasants cultivating garden vegetables to supply the urbanizing populations. In many cases these plots were acquired by the peasants using traditional land tenure practices. The potential user sought permission to use the land in return for goods and services. If the land was unused the owner or custodian permitted the applicant to use it, with the stipulation that tenancy was assured unless revoked for particular reasons. In any case the question of tenure was muted since the crops cultivated were annuals, that is, they were

sown, cultivated, and reaped during the course of a single year. Thus if the proprietor wished to regain his plots, he simply gave the occupant one year's notice to vacate. And since the occupant had not tied up too much labor and capital into the land he saw little difficulty in surrendering the plot. Of course, the situation would have been different if the occupant had planted perennials and had invested a great deal of capital in the plots. The significant fact is that the issue of individualism in land seldom arose unless the proprietors tried to retake the plots to give to persons who promised more money or gifts.

So important was the income from the vegetable gardens that this type of cultivation diffused from the large urban centers to the country districts. One district commandant in colonial Upper Volta told the writer that the future of agriculture in his area lay not in traditional agriculture, that is, cultivating the cereals or cotton, but in the jardins maraîchers. The problem for this official was how to get the necessary water supply for these types of projects. He felt that by doing so he could retain the young people in the rural areas where they could produce enough food for themselves, and for export to larger towns. (112)

Few attempts were made by the administrators during the colonial period to expand these small-scale holdings into large-scale agricultural complexes. True, some

administrators favored certain chiefs by permitting them to dragoon local labor to increase the acreage of fruit orchards. This was especially true in the Upper Volta and in most of the territories in the Sahel. Yet the problem for any such large undertaking was need for water, although the experience at the Office du Niger during the colonial period suggests that water was not the only problem. The problems posed by expansion in scale of the all agriculture projects in the Sahel were major ones. When large-scale projects were developed, the major decisions were taken out of the lands of local peasants. Agronomists who were often unfamiliar with the historical vagaries of the area were placed in charge. Even when they were sympathetic to folk wisdom, they were not able to ask the relevant questions. The waning colonial regime introduced cooperatives, but these cooperatives, linked to larger systems, were often incapable of responding to local concerns. Besides, the cooperatives, in order to maximize their efforts had to make greater demands on the local systems than could have been met. The result was often conflict: missed schedules in production; misunderstanding of price accords; charges of mismanagement, corruption and stupidity; and the breaking of agreement by either the regime or the peasants. The perennial problem was: how could one move from efficient small-scale production to large-scale production without snafu? Was it possible to incorporate the emergent small-scale changes into a larger system of change, rather than impose drastic change on local

systems that had no way of accommodating these changes? This problem was never satisfactorily solved during the colonial period.

Colonial attempts to improve agriculture and livestock production in this region through large-scale projects, large-scale ranching schemes, small-scale mixed farming did not pay much attention to the role of women. True, the administrators all recognized that traditionally women had always participated in the herding and agricultural work in Sahelian societies. Among the Fulani women milked the cows and young girls helped the boys herd the cattle. Wolof, Bozo, Serer, Mossi and Songhoi women helped the men sow crops, cultivate them, and harvest them. Women toiled alongside men in the cooperative fields of their extended families, and in addition had small individual plots where they cultivated vegetables, condiments for sauces, or tobacco for sale in markets. Nevertheless, French colonial administrators always hesitated to use African women in those agricultural schemes that they introduced. Most of the administrators had come from the urban centers of France, and had the impression that only men were suitable for agricultural work. Ironically some administrators used women to transport cotton to the large collection centers and to level roads with iron rollers. These were criticized by the Africans who resented their female relative being subjected to European forced labor,

and by European missionaries and travellers who viewed such female work with horror. (113)

Most administrators in the Sahel were not cognizant of the increased participation of women in the traditional agricultural sector as men withdrew from this work to serve as forced laborers, forced cultivators, soldiers, or as seasonal migrant labor to distant regions. True, the women seldom cleared new fields, but they intensified their activities in other aspects of agricultural work, and reduced the amount of time they spent on their individual fields. As the fertility of the over-used fields declined, the ability of women to increase food production also failed. Thus the women, though unseen, were victims of the economic problems of the Sahel.

Post World War II, pre-independence attempts at introducing voluntary changes in agriculture in this region usually did not involve women. Then, too, the reasons were largely cultural. Westerners, and educated Africans were loathe to place African women behind the animal-drawn plough, the most widespread type of agricultural innovation. Again, most officials did not consider sending the few educated African women to foreign schools or to any school in order to learn improved agricultural techniques. They felt that such women were desperately needed in other crucial areas of development, particularly agencies devoted to social change.

The social constraints to development during the colonial period were often more difficult to surmount than the economic ones. Primarily located within the domestic group -- a sphere of social action which few state systems, even colonial ones, have been able to influence, the social constraints proved to be formidable opponents. As reported above, the extended family and the segments of lineages were the social fields of greatest importance to the people in the Sahel. These institutions controlled the basic resources of their members, and regulated the way in which they dealt with the outside world, economically, politically, socially and ideologically. The colonial regime had the power to change many of the economic and political structures of the societies in this region, but it did not have either the power of legitimacy to effectively change the social and religious institutions of the people they conquered. Moreover, there is little indication that the colonial regime viewed the traditional African social systems (outside that of domestic slavery) as impediments to economic development and therefore the loci of attempted change. Colonial administrators did have the normal ethnocentric attitudes of all people toward the institutions of others -- especially those they had conquered and now ruled. Yet, they were so short-handed that they feared to interfere in the domestic affairs of their charges and risk stirring up rebellion. Moreover, many of these men

subscribed to the philosophical views of Montesquieu, and Gustave Le Bon, and considered the social institutions of Africans as well adapted to their milieu.

The missionaries were the ones who insisted that the African social institutions be changed. They saw these institutions not only as impediments to the spread of their gospel, but also to the introduction of "western civilization" in general. The missionaries attacked these institutions whenever they could, but it was the actions of the colonial regimes in the economic and political spheres that provided the greatest impetus for the Africans to change their social institutions. For example, it was taxation, forced labor, and forced cultivation, that eroded the corporate nature of the lineage. Even when the administration backed away from individual taxes or taxes on women and children, the need of African families to enter the money economy in order to get money to pay taxes affected family and lineage cohesion. This occurred because the heads of families lost absolute control of the goods and services of their charges and thereby the ability to control their lives. For example, the livestock and labor traditionally used as bridewealth by many of these populations entered a universal market economy. Subsequently, young men were able to arrange marriages without the help of their relatives. Once this happened, preferential marriage rules started to change, and so did locality rules. (114)

The institution of forced labor which took young men away from their villages not only weakened family ties, but expanded the social horizons of young people. For the first time, the youth were able to compare their own institutions with those of foreign peoples. When they found these institutions more satisfactory they were more prone to criticize their traditional institutions. They were also now free to leave their communities if they resented the authority of their elders, neighbors or chiefs. For example, those men who no longer viewed agriculture only as a means of subsistence but wanted cash from it, often resented their inability to sell part of the crop collectively produced and left home. Again, young men anxious to marry with the ability to earn money for the bride wealth no longer willingly waited for the permission of their elders to wed, and instead arranged their own marriages, or left home. (115)

Perhaps the greatest impetus for social change in the Sahel was the development of new cities by the colonial regime, or the transformation of indigenous towns into administrative centers or commercial entrepôts. The development of Saint Louis, to serve the needs of Mauretania and Senegal, and the establishment of Dakar to serve the whole federation; the transformation of Bamako and Ouagadougou into modern capitals; and the creation of Niamey and N'Djamena in Niger and Chad respectively,

provided a magnet for the ex-soldiers from Colonial and World Wars who could no longer tolerate the traditional institutions of the rural areas. In addition such centers served as a haven for persons escaping social, economic and political problems in their home villages.

Once in the cities or in the large towns, the migrants were enmeshed in a different social ambiance.<sup>(116)</sup> Some tried to recreate their traditional institutions and to establish ethnic wards in the towns, but nevertheless the total environment of the towns tended to modify these institutions. Moreover, town life did not encourage the persistence of lineage ties, plural marriages, and the traditional division of labor between men and women. New needs arose, and people were constrained to meet these needs by increasing their articulation with the economies of the Metropoles. Many of these urban populations were ready to adopt new lifestyles; the problem was that their countries were still too poor to make this way of life, a possible, alternative.

The rapid growth of towns in the Sahel region had an effect on the rural communities. Not only were the families without men constrained to change their economic activities, but the reduction of resources substantially reduced the power of family and lineage heads. They were no longer able to act for, and make alliances in the name of their dependents. Nor were they able to control the behavior,

lives, and destinies of young people anxious to move to the towns -- the centers of modern life. Parents witnessing the increasing rural exodus became anxious to have more children to remain at home and provide insurance for their old age, and for the continuity of families, whose members were now scattered far and wide.

Not only were the bonds between families loosened by the rural exodus and the growing nucleation of urban households, but different life experiences and incomes produced status differentiation among relatives. This occurred despite the persistence of the ideology of familialism or traditionalism. The cleavages among kinsmen produced by educational differences, economic differences, religious differences, and residential differences, increased despite attempts to control differences by family gatherings, mutual aid to poorer relatives or ritual visits to home communities. Even the cohabitation of family members belonging to different strata did not diminish social distance because these relatives participated in different social economic and political networks. However, important status differences did not emerge among Sahelians during the Colonial period. And French assimilationist ideology to the contrary, the basis cleavage in Sahelian societies were between black and white.

The educational experience of the people in this area influenced how they reacted to attempts at economic change.

Indeed, many development plans produced for this region failed because the planners did not take into consideration the educational profile of the colonies involved. Before the arrival of the Europeans, Koranic schools throughout the region provided a classical Muslim education for their pupils. It was only when the missionary and government schools were introduced that the students were provided the basis for dealing with the dominant western institutions. Even so, the nomadic way of life prevalent in the northern areas restricted the development of schools and the introduction of modern education.

Once Western schools were created in the Sahel region, (in Senegal before 1854 but in Chad, only after World War II)<sup>(117)</sup> the issue of the nature of education for children became an issue. Except for the Koranic schools, all the schools in this region had to provide instruction in French. Moreover -- cliches to the contrary -- it is an incontestable fact that the early French administrators were instructed to use education as a vehicle for commercial relations with the Africans and for their political and psychological subjugation. For example, In May 1884 Felix Faure, Under Secretary of State for the Colonies, sent messages to the officials in Senegal advising them to use the rainy season to analyze the climate and to teach. When he later defended this action before Parliament he declared: "It is only

through the knowledge of our language that the people who live around our outposts will be able to have sustained relations with us, relations that are indispensable to facilitate trade. And it is only when the needs and resources of the countries over which we have extended our influence are known that commercial houses will decide to establish themselves under the shelter of our flag."(118)

In 1897 Colonel Trentinian, governor of the French Soudan sent the following circular to his commanders: "Here in the Soudan, we are in contact with a population which we have conquered militarily, but whose intellectual and moral conquest is our goal. We must therefor try to attract this population to us, to mold it in successive steps, to get hold of its spirit, and to impose upon it our mark, and our particular stamp...."(119) The goal that the governor sought to achieve was also clearly spelled out in the first lesson of the school text assigned to the Sahelian students. It read: "My new country today is France. I am French.... When I grow up, every Sunday I shall place a French flag at the top of my hut and shall say to my subjects 'Look at this handsome flag'."(120)

Occasionally, the Federation's government or local authorities would develop programs in technical matters or agricultural skills. Such programs were meaningless for children held destined for the administration. Moreover, the distortion of agricultural programs into a form of childhood forced labor by teachers

who sold the products of school gardens, made the brighter students hate any form of cultivation. As it was the existing schools were handicapped by many things: the shortage of teachers; the intermittent attendance of students; the lack of suitable teaching equipment and of a clear relationship to the realities of the societies they were to serve. The Moslem community especially resented the lack of higher education in Koranic schools. Many of these communities, especially in the Soudan and in Chad, created their own higher educational institutions modeled on Egyptian ones.

The early attempts to educate Sahelian women ran into several social and cultural obstacles. The Moslems in this zone, especially the Maures, refused to place their daughters under the tutelage of Christians for fear they would forsake Islam or be induced to leave their families. The non-Moslem Traditionalists in the area had some of the same concerns but in addition feared that their practices of infant betrothal and child brides would be jeopardized. Since many of these groups either promised girls to husbands while still small, or married them off while still quite young, parents had to consider the views of their sons-in-law before sending their daughters to school. And since many of these actual or potential husbands were seeking wives and not school girls, they were hostile to the education of women.

Many people throughout the region subscribed to the adage: "If your sister goes to school, your next meal will be your fountain pen!" Another problem was that parents and husbands placed so much value on the work of girls, both in the homes and in the fields, that they refused to permit them to go to school. As far as these persons were concerned, the recruitment of male children for schools (seen as a form of childhood forced labor) was bad enough; to submit girls to this experience was viewed as intolerable. The result was that by 1935 there were only 2,060 girls in Sahelian village schools, and only 15 or so women were being trained as nurses and midwives in Medical School at Dakar.

Post World War II educational programs in this zone were still beset with problems. African nationalists during the decolonization period, who felt that Africans should develop a more authentic model for educating their children, failed to win widespread support. Parents held that it was one thing for the ideologues of the Société Africain de Culture (founded in 1956) to say that Einstein's Theory of Relativity could be translated into Wolof; it was quite another proposition to seek to educate children in this parochial language. Most officials and parents continued to view a metropolitan-type education as a passport to civil servant professions and thus elite status. They feared that any attempt to Africanize education would

result in a fall in standards or "enseignement au rabais." The result was the colonies such as Upper Volta spent some sums of money to provide French of its education to a small number of students. Moreover, most of the Sahelian children who received education lived in urban areas. Rural children were largely ignored unless they were exceptionally bright or could go to live with relatives in town and attend school.

Education in the Sahel area was geared to producing a bureaucratic elite for the towns. Rural parents continued to harbor such aspirations for their children. Children could get an education in an urban center and thereby escape the peasantry. This sentiment is understandable given the vast difference in life chances between the functionary and the peasant. Even when attempts were made such as in Bamoko (Soudan Francaise) to educate students for agronomy, the successful ones became agronomic bureaucrats.

Technical education in this area was subject to a number of important restraints. The infusion of western values was not strong enough to eliminate many Sahelian populations' traditional attitudes of low esteem towards the manual arts. In most of the hierarchically-organized complex societies of the region, the nobility was strongly prejudiced against crafts, and relegated such activity to the lower status groups. Smiths, shoemakers,

weavers, jewellers all belonged to "caste-like" groups, and although functionally necessary to the societies, remained marginal to them. Second, during the colonial period the ruling Europeans refrained from manual work, and also subscribed to the idea that manual work was degrading although necessary for modern societies. Third, the colonial situation was not conducive to the development of industry. Therefore, the few trade schools that existed trained people to repair small machines rather than to participate in industries .

Religion, while usually a conservative force in most societies, did not universally act as a constraint to development in the Sahel. True, the Moslems were vehemently opposed to French penetration and to Christianity, and vigorously resisted westernization and the education of women. Yet, at the beginning of this century, many French administrators saw the universalistic tendencies in Islam as providing the homogenizing force which would eliminate ethnic and religious heterogeneity, and provide an entree for Western civilization and Christianity. (121) The early attempt of the French to use Islam in this way failed, but the Africans themselves saw the efficacy of the universalism in Islam and many became Moslems for this reason. Young people who had left home for the first time as forced laborers or voluntary labor

migrants recognized in Islam a pan-African brotherhood that permitted different peoples to interact with one another. And while many migrants did not adopt Islam when away from home, they readily did so when they returned home to find Islam spreading in their communities. (122)

The Moslems were in the forefront of some of the most important economic activities in the Sahel. The Dioula traders took advantage of the end of the "time of troubles" (from the fall of Songhai until French conquest) to trade both traditional and European goods throughout the region thus stimulating the growth of the money economy. Later, when the opening of roads made motor transport possible, Moslem truck drivers transported both goods and men from one region to another, stimulating trade and commerce in the process. But perhaps the most important group of Moslems to take part in the economic activities of the region were the Mourides of Senegal. (123) Adhering to an ideology of hard labor, but observing the tenets of Islam the members of this sect were largely responsible for extending peanut production into <sup>central</sup> eastern Senegal. They pioneered mechanical cultivation of this crop in collaboration with French commercial organizations, and became the wealthiest community in all of French West Africa. Their central mosque at Touba became the local mecca for thousands of pilgrims, as well as a point for the diffusion of new religious and economic ideas.

Despite their economic activities, the Mourides were not viewed by many younger Moslems as a progressive social force. The young people disliked the persisting dominance of the religious leader, the Marabouts, and resented the alliance between these clerics and the more conservative forces in the region. The young preferred to see Islam become a progressive force in their societies. They especially resented the role that the Marabouts played in suppressing the school instituted by four Wahabists students in Bamako, patterned after the Alazhar University in Egypt. Although they agreed with their elders that Moslem girls should not be Christianized and Westernized they would educate them. Moreover many of the young people believed that unless modern subjects were introduced into their merdersas or koranic schools, the region would continue to suffer, and the Moslems would lose their political, social and economic positions in these societies.

Christianity, garbed with the accoutrements of Western civilization, was a greater force for change in this region. Convinced of the truth of their religion and views of marriage and the family, Christian missionaries attacked not only traditional African religions but African social institutions as well. They used their influence in France to force the hand of administrators, many of whom were anti-clerical, and many of whom respected African social

institutions. But when the missionaries and administrators worked hand in hand, they were quite effective. They introduced western education, new crafts and new agricultural techniques. Most of the clerks who served in the large companies in the region had at one time or another been educated by missionaries. The same thing was true of modern craftsmen. Most of the cultivators of jardins maraîchers in and around the large urban centers had learned their craft from the missionaries.

Perhaps the most important role the missionaries assumed was to provide alternative institutions and behavioral models for those persons who wanted to change. Many men wishing to avoid forced labor went to work for the missionaries, were converted and learned a trade. Many women objecting to arranged marriages or wishing to leave their spouses sought and received help from the missionaries. The missionaries, citing the relevant biblical texts, supported persons wishing to evade their responsibilities to the traditional or colonial authorities. Both the missionaries and the administration knew there were many "millet-Christians" among the converts, but even those persons who had converted for materialistic reasons got hooked into the European institutions of the missionaries. They or their children were the ones to relinquish the traditional structures and adopt those institutions linked to a more dynamic, alien world.

The traditional African religions, linked as they were to family and lineage, were not so strong as Islam in resisting the forces of change that struck at the root of African economic and social institutions. The traditionalists had no difficulty in understanding that the supreme deity of Christians was more concerned with the actual behavior of people than their own otiose gods. They were more disturbed by missionary attitude toward the cult of the ancestors who, as far as the Africans were concerned, were in some ways more rigorous in their insistence on morality than Jesus Christ. The Africans believed that since the ancestors had lived on earth they had little pity on human beings who continued to do evil. However, with the growing nucleation of families, and other changes that were taking place during the colonial period, the collective ancestors began to lose their effectiveness. People were reduced to dealing with specific ancestors who did not have the force of the hosts of ancestors. Moreover, individual ancestors did not have the interest in extended kinsmen not directly descended from them.

The cult of the earth did not serve as a constraint towards the cultivation of the land because many sacrifices to tellurian deities took place outside the communities and could be shifted from place to place if desired. Moreover, sacrifices to the spirits of specific localities could be

made whether the area was under cash crop cultivation or producing subsistence foods. Therefore, honoring these spirits did not pose insoluble problems. Likewise, the earth priests who were found in many of these societies and whose function was primarily linked to the earth could offer little or no restraint to economic development. Even in the traditional system they were often religious celebrants for the political authorities, and once these authorities had been conquered the earth priests were also demoted. Sometimes, the earth priests believed that without the proper pre-planting ceremonies, crops would fail, and drought and famine would devastate the land. They would secretly make sacrifices to the earth deities thereby avoiding the hostility of the missionaries, the Moslems and the administrators. Since these secret sacrifices had little effect on the behavior of the masses of people and did not affect their economic activities no harm was done. Who knows, perhaps these sacrifices helped them tolerate the burdensome colonial regime.

During the colonial period the Sahelians tended to be quite pragmatic in their attitudes towards their traditional healers. They felt that these practitioners worked in a different universe from that of westerners. Like most peasants they believed in the efficacy of their own traditional medicines and went to the witch doctor (primarily military men) or clinic as a last resort. This

kind of behavior prompted the notion that Africans believed that hospitals were places where people went to die. However, close attention to the behavior of Africans in the rural areas or in the towns did show that they recognized the efficacy of western medicines. What they did not believe was that foreign medicines could cure all types of African diseases, especially those induced by the supernatural. People resisted using western medical facilities when they sensed that these medical institutions were designed for other purposes, such as vehicles for conversion. Again, they hesitated to use these facilities when convinced that the causes of their illnesses lay outside the realm of western medicine or knowledge.

There is no doubt that some of the social practices of the people in the area were inimical to good health, and presented a medical hindrance to development during the colonial period. For example, the deposition of night soil in the areas around compounds provided fertilizer without which maize and early millet, that broke the "hungry period" (that period between the exhaustion of the previous year's harvest and the new crops), would grow. Yet, night soil with its parasites infected and re-infected members of the family. The use of sand, in the absence of water, to perform the ablutions mandatory before prayer also spread parasites. Similar adaptations to the shortage of water in other areas of life had the same effect. Yet,

the people were quite aware of the value of clean water and used it when they could. Nevertheless many of them were unwilling to expend an inordinate amount of energy and resources to behave in a way inconsistent with the total amount of resources available to them.

#### VI. POSTWAR ATTEMPTS AT DEVELOPMENT IN THE SAHEL

As indicated above, it is difficult to get an objective balance sheet on the European colonial period in the Sahel, or for that matter in any part of the world. Africans and other colonized peoples vied with the Europeans to determine who profited or lost the most as a result of the expansion of the West. Those Third World persons who struggled for a NIEO are convinced that their societies were raped and under-developed as a result of European colonization. The Europeans, on the other hand, point to the improvements they had made in the lives of their colonies as if to justify any exploitation that may have taken place. Ironically, there is an emerging school of European historians who insist that the Europeans made a sad mistake by establishing colonies. According to these scholars, the Europeans would have done much better had they expended their energies and their treasure in other pursuits. There is every indication that this debate will continue, especially since both the Europeans and their former "subjects" are still living in the backwash of the colonial period, and inevitably

affected by it. Moreover, there is no telling how long these recriminations will last. More important to a comprehension of the problem of development in the Sahel, however, is an analysis of what occurred when France embarked on a whole series of development projects in the region intended to thwart the nationalist movement.

As Houphouët-Boigny indicated in 1948, the French created FIDES (Fonds d'investissement pour le développement économique et social des territoires d'Outre-mer) and by 1954 had spent some 80 billion francs CFA on such projects in the Sahel as roads, railroads, ports, hospitals, and schools. During the same periods the Caisse Centrale de la France d'Outre-mer loaned part of some twenty million francs CFA at both long and medium range terms to public, private and mixed groups in the Sahel. In 1949 the French government created F.E.R.D.S. (Fonds d'équipement rural pour le développement économique et social) and by 1955 had spent part of a total of three billion francs CFA in the Sahel on rural development. Some of these funds were allocated for development projects such as the Office du Niger designed to provide irrigation on the Niger river, and increase rice production in the Sahel. The French stimulated research in Senegal at the Richard-Toll agronomic center, extended the work of such institutions as O.R.S.T.O.M. (l'Office de la Recherche Scientifique et Technique d'Outre-mer), organized O.R.A.N.A. (l'Organisme

de Recherche sur l'alimentation et la nutrition en Afrique), and supported new research at I.F.A.N. (l'Institut française d'Afrique noire). Thus France made a start towards developing the Sahel by providing funds for all of the major sections of its ecosystem. But as the following case studies demonstrate it was one thing for French economic planners and their now increasingly active African counterparts to plan development in the Sahel. It was another to accomplish it.

#### Case Study No. 1

##### Rice Production in Senegal

In 1946 the French colonial government launched a plan at the Richard-Toll agronomic station to develop mechanized rice production through the irrigation of the Senegal river's delta. The intention was to meet the food needs of a peasantry locked in to the production of peanuts and importing a great deal of rice. The hope was that in ten years time some 50,000 hectares of rice could be brought into cultivation thereby assuring the people an adequate food supply.

The first experimental plot of 120 hectares was planted in 1947 with the use of mechanized techniques. Indeed mechanization was an overriding characteristic of the scheme. Every phase of the work was automated. Machines were used for seeding fertilizing, harvesting, threshing,

ensiling and even for bagging the rice. Other techniques -- such as aquatic germination, which eliminated the need for transplanting -- kept the use of unskilled labor down to a bare minimum. And when the first fields yielded as much as 24.6 quintals per hectare of excellent quality paddy, there was an indication that the Richard-Toll experiment had found the answer to Senegal's food problem. This was allegedly accomplished "...without either the displacement or the participation of the local population." (124) Officials felt that in Richard-Toll they had created a "modern" rice producing operation.

It appears that the officials had not fully understood the principle of ecological interdependence. Natural catastrophes soon began to take their toll of rice production. The first problem was a salinization of the soil. This was finally solved by closing off the flow of salt water which, during the dry season, came upstream a considerable distance. The second problem was dust storms, but not much could be done about them. The third and most devastating problem were the more than 45 million quelea-quelea birds which came in drives and ate the crop. In 1952, they destroyed half the harvest. The administration launched a massive effort to rescue the project and spent 500 million francs CFA in an anti-avian campaign. In 1953-54 some 90% of the birds were wiped out, but at a great cost to the project.

In spite of the heavy expenditures and degree of technical success, rice production in Senegal began to stagnate after 1956. Average yields, which had reached a high of 30.9 quintals per hectare in 1956, dropped to 26.4 quintals per hectare in 1960. The project manager attributed this decline to the re-appearance of the quelea-quelea birds and the invasion of the paddy plantation by wild rice. Nevertheless, they felt that the use of modern techniques and high-yielding strains of seeds had been a success.

Whatever the case, the Richard-Toll experiment did not succeed in producing sufficient rice to cover Senegal's needs. In 1960 the project's total rice production (about 15,000 tons) represented only 10% of Senegal's total rice consumption. A more pressing problem was the fact the scheme did not help Senegal solve its heavy unemployment problem. During the harvest period, when the largest labor contingent was used, the project employed only 18 men for every 100 hectares under cultivation. At other times of the year the project work teams consisted of only 6 men per 100 hectares. This low employment record might not have been a problem had the project been economically successful. But by 1960 the total cost of the operation approached 2,700 million francs CFA. Considering such an investment, the results obtained both

in terms of production level and the provisions of jobs were mediocre and disappointing.

The final act in this tragedy was that with the inability to pay for food with a decreasing amount of money obtained from peanut production, a number of Senegalese peasants returned to a subsistence economy. There are those who interpreted this trend as simply one more indication of the reactionary attitude of "tradition-bound" peasants. In fact, the contrary is indicated by this action. This incipient peasant revolt appears to have demonstrated a willingness to break away from "tradition" if tradition is equated with doing something simply because one's superiors in the social, political and religious hierarchies desired it. The Senegalese farmers made an assessment of their own economic interests and abandoned peanut cultivation in a search for better alternatives.

During the independence struggle and afterwards, the Senegalese political leaders had suggested that they were seeking to create "African Socialism" based on indigenous concepts of communal solidarity. They planned to abandon the model of the Sociétés Indigènes de Prévoyances instituted by the French during the colonial period:

- (1) to organize and control the productivity of the rural populations; and
- (2) to mobilize their cultural surplus to pay for investment in other economic enterprises.

The politicians also promised to eliminate the exploitative middlemen who emerged as profit-making intermediaries in the commercialization of peanuts, and create peasant-based marketing cooperatives. Membership in these cooperatives was supposedly voluntary, but a series of government decrees which forced the private dealers out of business also obliged any farmer who wished to commercialize his crop to deal with the cooperatives.

The problem for the peasants and for the Senegalese government was that these changes did not bring development, and many peasants rejected peanut production. Forced to use the new cooperatives, the peasants found them closely following the model of the former SIPs. Moreover, some independent analyses indicated that despite the cooperatives, the financial interest of producers had been subordinated to those of the central bureaucratic elites and the politicians. In fact, some 47.2% of Senegal's national budget was used to pay the salaries of the bureaucrats.

The situation became untenable in 1967 with the French withdrawal of price subsidies from peanuts. Despite a valiant attempt of all concerned to increase revenues by intensifying peanut production; the incomes of the peasants continued to decline. The peasants -- objecting to being forced to purchase millet and rice in order to have enough food to grow peanuts whose price was declining -- stepped back, re-evaluated their position,

and stopped producing peanuts. The decision of the "unchanging" peasant to cease peanut production in order to grow food for local consumption undoubtedly had grave implications for the Senegalese economy. No one was able to say, however, that the peasants lacked the "capacity to change."(125)

This case study of the problem of rice production in Senegal, and the fate of the Richard-Toll rice experiment demonstrate that development planners in this region did not play close attention to all aspects of the ecosystem. The natural environment was not studied well enough to forestall salinization; the biota was not observed with enough care and forethought to avoid such disasters as the quelea-quelea birds and the infestation by "wild" rice; and the effect of prices and economic policies on the human populations was not carefully thought out. The total mechanization of rice production at Richard-Toll was bound to have a profound effect on that project's contribution to Senegal's economy. Here was a case where the too often unquestioned efficacy of Western agricultural technique turned out to be inappropriate in a particular African context. Subsequently some economists and planners advocated the use of labor-intensive methods for African agricultural development schemes. Since both unemployment and underemployment were and are serious problems

in all the countries of the Sahelian zone, any attempt to develop agricultural production should have given careful consideration to the factor of labor. And since environmental factors have always contributed to the Sahelian problem, attention should have been paid to the interrelationship of the physical, biological and sociological aspects of his ecosystem.

#### Case Study No. 2

##### Office du Niger

The Office du Niger project in the French Soudan (which became the Republic of Mali) is a case study of a disastrous attempt at economic development in the Sahel. As early as 1919, Mr. Belime, an agronomist, led a mission to the inland delta of the Niger River to determine whether it was possible to irrigate the region to grow cotton for France's textile industry. If this proved feasible, it was planned to bring some 750,000 hectares of land under cultivation to produce 300,000 of cotton annually. Apparently, the agronomist had misgivings about the practicality of such a project given the low density of population in the area. This objection prompted the suggestion that about one and one-half million people could be transferred from Mossi country in Upper Volta to "colonize" the region and produce the cotton. Finally,

Governor-General Carde accepted a modified project, the goal for which was to develop some 510,000 hectares of cotton land, and 450,000 hectares of paddy fields, the latter to feed the people of Senegal. Mr. Belime was then placed in charge of the project.<sup>(126)</sup>

The Office du Niger, as the project was named, was officially inaugurated in 1932. While World War II created problems with personnel, the French colonial regime held out high hopes for the project when the war ended. However, after a quarter of a century of attempted agricultural development, the Office du Niger's balance sheet was grim. Of the nearly 1 million hectares that were to have been irrigated, in 1953 the actual land reclaimed did not exceed 25,000 hectares. Instead of the projected 1,500,000 African colonists, in 1955 there were less than 25,000 inhabitants located in 4 main colonization centers. The production of rice between the years 1944-1955, varied from 10,000 to 20,000 tons a year, while cotton production fluctuated between yearly averages of 2,000 and 4,000 tons. This last figure was quite different from the original projection of 300,000 tons of cotton. By 1956 these rather disappointing results had cost the French and African tax payers an estimated 40 billion francs CFA. The failure was attributed to the poor quality of the local soil; attacks by cotton parasites, locusts and the ubiquitous quelea-quelea birds; and the low

quality of the participating farmers. But here, again, faulty planning and an ignorance of the local ecosystem appear to have been a major cause of failure.

The technical problems of dam-building and canal dredging at the office du Niger were simple in comparison to the social problems created by the decision to transfer large number of "colonists" to this labor-deficient area. The administration had hoped that laborers from throughout the Federation, particularly Upper Volta, would voluntarily resettle as colonists on the project's land. This hope was not realized and the decision was made to requisition labor, especially Mossi from Upper Volta (a practice that continued until abolished in 1946). Consequently the project managers were not dealing with free men, but with people who had to be watched and controlled. The colonists were forced to work from dawn to sunset and their movements were restricted after work. Thus even though the cooperation of the workers was obviously crucial to the project's success, the administration's use of force to stimulate production proved inadequate and ineffective. (127)

The Mossi had little difficulty adapting to the environment at the Office du Niger since they came from almost the same climatic zone. Nor did they have too much trouble learning the new techniques for cultivating rice and cotton according to modern methods. Even after

an initial period of illness, most colonists adopted rice as a staple even though suspecting that it was not as nourishing as their customary millet diet. They did, however, have a great deal of difficulty adapting to the new social forms which the project administrators had created in an effort to replicate traditional Mossi institutions. For example, the attempt to reproduce the traditional Mossi residence pattern was meaningless because of the absence of extended families for which this residence pattern had been developed. Equally incomprehensible for the colonists was a distorted attempt to install the traditional political organization. Instead of using as chiefs nakomce (children of the royal family) -- persons who knew the Mosi political culture the project managers used Tengsoba damba persons with supernatural but little if any political power. The Mossi were also confused by the policy which specified that they participate in the administration of the project through membership in "indigenous agricultural associations" when in fact they had no control over administrative matters. Unsure of their rights, unaware of the goals of the project, and inhibited by unfamiliar practices from creating meaningful social relationships at the Office, the Mossi did not identify with the project, nor its objectives.

Meanwhile, the objectives of the project were made irrelevant by the economic changes in the federation.

Initially, the plan was to grow cotton for export and rice for local consumption; therefore, the land was divided into six hectare plots of which four hectares were to be devoted to cotton and 2 hectares to rice. However, the colonists soon realized that they received more money for rice than cotton, and as soon as they were freed from the pre-war constraints, planted more rice than cotton. By 1955, rice production in the Office du Niger had outstripped cotton by more than 10 to 1, representing a major victory for food crops over purely cash crops. Of course one reason for this was that the Senegalese farmers who had increased their production of peanuts, were buying the rice from the Office. The Federation's 1946 economic Plan encouraged this trend and gave priority to rice cultivation over that of all other food crops. Thus, the peasants of the Office du Niger cultivated rice for Senegalese farmers who cultivated peanuts for export. The problem was that neither the Senegalese peasants nor the Mossi colonists were profiting from their labor. The Senegalese farmers could do little to increase the price of peanuts on the world markets, and the Mossi colonists could not produce enough rice to feed the Senegalese. By 1953 the rice they produced represented less than 10% of the Federation's total food crops.

The grandiose Office du Niger scheme fell far short of its goals because, technical reasons aside, it failed

to consider the complexities of the human social institutions. The economic planners had opted for a large scale, spectacular enterprise, and had misunderstood the possibilities and constraints inherent in the social structure of the participating populations. Criticized in the past for having ignored traditional social institutions the planners sought to replicate these institutions in the hope of facilitating the adaptation of the colonists. The problem was that the colonists were operating in a new environment where new economic activities had created new needs which made traditional institutions nonfunctional (even had the planners seriously understood the traditional institutions to begin with). The planners might have been more successful had they permitted the colonists to modify their indigenous institutions to fit these new needs rather than force them to adjust to institutions that no longer served their needs.

### Case Study No. 3.

#### The Logone Valley Project in Chad

The failure to take the social institutions of the Massa people into consideration caused serious problems in the Logone Valley project in Chad.<sup>(128)</sup> Concerned that Lake Chad was drying up, the administration ordered a study of the basins of rivers flowing into the lake in the hope of controlling flooding with the additional objective of

instituting economic changes especially the growing of cotton. Intimately affected were the Massa people, a semi-nomadic population living along the Logone river, who retreated with their animals to the highlands during the six months of the year when the river was in flood, and returned in the dry season to fish and to cultivate millet.

Initially there were no studies of how the riverine populations would react to the new scheme, nor of whether the soil in the Logone valley could sustain cultivation or large dams. In 1952 dikes were built and land bulldozed for cultivation. By 1953 the project ran into difficulty. The dikes, which were simply renovations of older structures, started to break; the response was to patch up or rebuild sections of the system. More difficult to solve were the agronomic and human problems. The soil was not suitable for growing cotton, and by 1958 the private firms that had reserved land along the dikes had either abandoned them or had switched to the production of rice. But even so, the project was deemed both a technical and economic fiasco. Close to 1 billion francs CFA had been spent, to say nothing of the continuing yearly expenses of keeping up the dikes and maintaining the drainage canals.

The impact of this project on the Massa was potentially shattering. In 1955 a report by the Conseil Supérieur des

Recherches Sociologiques appraising the probable effects on the peoples of the Logone Valley of this radical change stated that Massa were extremely reluctant to accept the proposed innovations. They complained that the scheme was interfering with their fishing, and it was forcing them to drive their herds too far in search of pasture. Furthermore, they were reluctant to participate fully in a scheme which would mean changing their semi-nomadic way of life and settling down permanently to engage in year-round agriculture. They were unwilling to grow cotton, and were unenthusiastic about growing rice since they preferred their traditional diet of millet. Moreover, the Massa had no economic incentives for growing these two crops. The prices for rice and cotton in Chad in 1958 were 8 francs and 16 francs a kilo, respectively. Thus, the peasants were not interested in raising either cotton or rice commercially. By 1960, when Chad became independent, only a few Massa had settled on the reclaimed land. This failure may have been avoided if sociological factors were studied before the project was begun. Then many of the social constraints to change and development may have been identified.

As these case studies indicate, the French were not any more successful in developing Sahelian lands during the period of dyarchy (that is during decolonization when they shared power with the Africans) than during the

the colonial period. True, it was easy to see the results of money spent to build new administrative complexes, hospitals, schools, roads and ports. Nevertheless many persons criticized France's whole approach to the Sahel during this period. One critic charged that although the ten-year development plan for the area "marked a sharp break with the past, the orientation given from 1947 to 1952 to the investments made by F.I.D.E.S. in French West Africa served in a large measure to strengthen the existing economie de traite. Abandoning many of the goals set by the plan's first sponsors, its execution reinforced the monopolistic practices of the big French export-import firms, introduced a host of rapacious middlemen into an already anarchic domestic market, and led to an increased taxation of all kinds."<sup>(129)</sup> To make matters worse, when the Korean war boom ended in 1952, France was unable to support colonial products at high prices so that the West Africans would continue to buy expensive French products. The result was that both the French and the West Africans became enmeshed in an archaic economic system from which each, for different reasons, found it difficult to sever relations.

In 1955, Richard-Molard viewing the future perspectives for French West Africa in General, and the Sahel in particular, was not too optimistic. He suggested that the area would remain agricultural for a long time and that it

was the peasants who would ultimately develop it. Richard-Molard was concerned that "the fragility and sterility of the soil would limit agricultural possibilities; and that the European agronomists did not yet find any techniques for dry land cultivation incontestably superior to the reputed primitive technique of the indigenous peasant...." He looked forward to cooperation between the Sahel and France on the one hand, and the United States of America on the other, hoping that they would find some means of "collaboration respecting the dignity of each one and opening fruitful perspectives for the future."<sup>(130)</sup> It is instructive to note that as liberal as he was, Richard-Molard could not envision the end of colonial rule in the Sahel. This acknowledged "friend of Africa" could not foresee that the Sahelians would one day sever their ties to France and blame her for their under-development.

By 1956 and 1957, France's crisis within her colonial empire and the emergence of the European Common Market led her to modify certain relationships with the Sahelian states. She was now prepared to give them greater political autonomy but also wished to protect them from the "virus" of African nationalism spreading north from Ghana. France also wished to lead them into the emerging European Common Market system not only to retain relations with them, but also to have the Europeans help with their development.

France and her Sahelian satellites entered the EEC in March 1957, after signing the Treaty of Rome, but this did not stop the growth of nationalism in West Africa. In fact, many of the nationalists were apparently prepared to face the economic consequences of their act. Mamadou Dia of Senegal declared: "Given the direction which we are taking, there can no longer be any question of F.I.D.E.S. or of the Common Market.... That will involve on our side much austerity and a sense of national discipline."<sup>(131)</sup> The Sahelian states did not find it necessary to leave the Common Market as they advanced towards independence and were assured aid from FAC (Fonds d'Aide et de Co-operation). In September 1960, France sponsored the admission to the United Nations of Senegal, Mauritania, Mali, Upper Volta, Niger and Chad. As a political scientist concluded: "The attempt to find a formula which would rationally unite the land and peoples irrationally conglomerated by French colonial expansion, which would end colonialism but preserve the empire, was at last abandoned."<sup>(132)</sup>

Seen in cold economic terms, rather than in the light of national anthems or national flags and seats in the United Nations, France's granting of independence to her Sahelian colonies was a form of abandonment. Fearing that she could not effectively control the West African federation, France balkanized it and tied each of the new weakened states to her and the Common Market countries.

True, the French and their Common Market partners still gave aid to the Sahelian countries, but this aid was not sufficient to make them viable. Much of the aid was spent to pay the salaries of French ex-colonial civil servants now seconded to the African governments as technical agents; to provide overvalued European products to the emerging elite; and to finance non-productive projects that were more beneficial to the foreign construction firms than to the recipient countries in the Sahel. Moreover, French aid firmly locked these countries into the franc zone, so that even if they wanted to, they were economically too weak and dependent upon France to establish economic ties with other foreign countries. It was these considerations, among others, that resulted in the charges of those who are demanding a New International Economic Order that many ex-colonial Third World countries never became free or independent, but were given what De Gaulle called "international sovereignty" and N'Krumah alleged to be the victims of "Neo-Colonialism."

VII. INSTITUTIONAL INADEQUACIES IN THE FACE OF CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

Independence presented the Sahelian countries of West Africa with almost insoluble problems. Except for Senegal, which had in Dakar (former seat of the French West Africa) a capital worthy of a modern nation-state, all of the other countries felt constrained to use their scarce resources to build adequate administrative centers. In the case of Mauritania, the capital, Nouakchott, had to be created literally out of the desert. These projects cost a great deal of money. According to the 1970 International Monetary Fund survey of the Sahelian economies, "The increase in ordinary budget expenditure [in these states was] necessitated by new services relating to representation abroad, defense expenditures, postal service, and telecommunications -- expenditures previously borne by France. Expenditure has also risen with expansion in administrative machinery, higher wages and salaries and the need to subsidize new public and semipublic enterprises."<sup>(133)</sup> Some of this money certainly came from foreign sources, but a great deal was raised by taxes from the rural agricultural and pastoral populations, and any savings the states possessed.

Although the new states were creating new administrative services, they were having great difficulty developing the

economic base to support these services. Mauritania was fortunate in discovering and exploiting minerals to help its development. The other states were less fortunate. The IMF survey found that despite great efforts, most of these states were not advancing economically. For example,

Senegal has achieved little improvement in its economy, remaining heavily dependent on the earnings from the export of ground-nuts, which have steadily declined in price on the world market. Many Senegalese industries, originally created to serve all of French West Africa have found themselves with an excess capacity and accordingly have had to adjust their operations to a much smaller market. Although Upper Volta is poorly endowed with natural resources, the Government has tried through planning to stimulate economic growth, which, since independence, has barely kept pace with increases in the population. The broad objective of the Government's development effort is to encourage the productive sectors of the economy and to limit expansion in current budget expenditures that would follow enlarged social services."(134)

Almost all the Sahelian governments found that although they would have liked to limit the amount of money spent for social services in order to develop their productive sectors, demographic changes as well as rural-urban migration prevented them from doing so. As a result of inter-war and post-war development of health services, the population of the six Sahelian countries passed twenty million (today it is between 22 and 23 million) and are increasing at the rate of about 2.0 to 2.2 percent per

year. Even if the governments had developed a population policy, they did not have the means to institute family planning -- besides, this is a more complicated problem than many people are willing to admit. The result is that the populations are still growing; and the people are demanding employment, goods, and services. When these are not available in the rural areas, people migrate into the urban areas, putting pressures on weak urban economies and depriving rural sectors of their labor and the government of rurally-derived taxes. The failure of the Sahelian states to provide economic opportunities to their citizens has contributed to the fall of two governments in the region.

A number of the factors cited above were operating in the Sahel when nature added to the woes of the region and threatened its ecosystem. Many geographers and climatologists assert that since 1940 "something has intervened to make the earth cooler and to make the dome of cool air covering the polar regions increase in size."<sup>(135)</sup> This has resulted in the gradual displacement of all climatic zones a few latitudinal degrees closer to the equator. Thus while the equatorial regions received more rain than usual, there was a growing crisis in the Sahel where, in the words of one climatologist, "life is balanced on a knife's edge by the success or failure of the summer rains." Since about 1966, local meteorologists have noticed a net

diminution of rainfall in an area which normally received between 100 and 400 mm from May or June to September or October. Some climatologists suggest that the change was cyclic -- one famine occurred in 1910-1914, another in 1941-42, and another one was due in the 1970s. Other scientists did not believe that there were enough data to indicate either that the droughts were cyclic, or the result of permanent changes on a continental scale. Moreover, these people denied that the Sahara was spreading south thirty miles a year. Most climatologists do agree that the World Weather Watch system should be made more effective so that macro changes can be foreseen and people can be warned to expect changes in their micro systems.

By 1970, the Sahelian populations noticed a rapid decrease in rainfall, and by 1972 they realized that their ecosystem was seriously threatened. In less than three years the water table throughout the region had fallen some 20 meters or 100 feet. The Senegal river which normally crested at 26 feet during the height of the rainy season, crested at only 18 feet in 1972. Lake Chad, whose fluctuations have always been a guide to the amount of precipitation in the region, dwindled to one-third its normal size. In 1972 it contained only 12,000 million cubic meters of water, whereas in 1970 it contained 31,000 million cubic meters.

The effect of drought within an area of increasing aridity was disastrous for the biota: plants, animals and people. For example in Senegal where the normal rainfall is some 300 mm, only from 60-120mm fell. The result was that the 600,000 tons of peanuts and about 700,000 tons of millets and sorghums harvested in 1970 would be reduced by one-third, and 55 percent in 1973. The shortage of water and pasturage actually reduced the Senegalese livestock population of 2.7 million cattle and 2.8 million sheep from about 20 to 40 percent. Comparable or worse figures were gathered from the other countries with Mauritania and Niger being especially hard hit. So drastic was the shortfall of crops in the region that by March-June 1973 (known as the "hungry-period" because the previous year's food is almost exhausted and the new crops are not yet harvested) some two million out of Mali's population of five million had been affected by hunger and thirst; the United Nation's FAO had declared the Upper Volta a class D drought area; and hundreds of thousands of people in Mauritania, Niger and Chad were fleeing the northern areas and were congregating around the southernmost towns and cities.

A shocked world discovered with alarm that unless emergency measures were quickly taken, some six to ten million people might die of hunger.<sup>(136)</sup> To add to the tragedy, there were reports that cholera, virulent measles, scurvy, meningitis and other diseases brought on by

malnutrition and poor sanitation were on the increase. The threat of pestilence was added to the misery of famine. The children of the region were especially devastated; in Niger infant mortality is normally close to 50%, and drought and famine greatly increased this mortality rate. Government and relief officials feared that unless help came quickly, the herds of the nomads would decrease beyond recovery, and the human populations would consume their seed grain and thus be unable to plant crops for the 1973/1974 year.

There are still many questions, arguments, and discussions about whether the governments in the Sahel region were aware of their growing plight; whether or not their alleged early pleas were heeded by a world engaged in other affairs; whether the aid that was sent was too costly, too little and too late; and whether the aid that was sent was badly used, or not sufficiently acknowledged or appreciated. This was to be expected given the extent of the disaster, the passions it aroused and its economic, political, social and technical implications. What is not contestable is that the Sahalian ecosystems -- under enormous pressure for decades -- have been badly impaired. Unless the reasons for this are understood, all discussion will be in vain and will not lead to the restoration of equilibrium or the elaboration of a larger and more viable ecosystem.

If, as it is clearly possible, the macro changes in the world's climate are independent of human action then homo sapiens sapiens, like the Neanderthals before them, (but with a more complex culture) may have few choices open to them. They may either migrate from the area, use their efficient technology to change the local environment, or simplify their socio-cultural systems to lighten the pressures on that area's meagre food resources. If, however, there is reason to believe that climatic changes are being accelerated by "man-made air pollution" which has had an adverse affect on the entire biosphere, a major political problem is presented. It might mean that those nations contributing to the macro climatic changes in the world may be asked to make changes within their societies so as not to jeopardize the habitat of all mankind.

The political implications of this suggestion are tremendous since the issues involve the world's strongest nations whose power is due to their control and use of much of the world's energy and resources. Which world agency has the power to compel these states to end pollution, or to impose sanctions if they fail to comply? Can the world continue to tolerate anarchy in its ecosystem network at the expense of the survival of its weaker or more marginal ecosystems? Will we attain a new plateau in human cooperation or understanding, or are we faced with possible ecocides at a time when mankind is seeking

to stop genocide? However, even if the Sahelian disaster was induced by the larger ecosystems, was there nothing that the local people could do to protect themselves?

A number of scholars, both African and foreign, have identified the factors within the Sahel that have exacerbated its difficulties. These include: the progressive destruction of the vegetation caused by an increase in domestic animal populations; the accelerated destruction of the light soils due to the burning of the grasses, shrubs and trees either to provide new leafage for the animals, or new land for cultivation; local climatic changes caused by the destruction of trees and forests by people seeking more fuel (this is especially severe around the burgeoning urban centers where modernization and changes in life styles necessitate the use or more fuel); and a growing human population which is especially dangerous since man is more destructive of his habitat than any other living creature. The view of these Africans is that unless some means can be found to halt the vicious cycle within this ecosystem, there will be diaster.

There is little doubt that the inability of the officials of many of the Sahelian states, like that of other Third World developing countries, to make major changes in the economies of their societies, was at the core of the demand for a NIEO. Yet, both they and the developed world should examine at length not only those

factors surviving from the Colonial period which continue to prevent development, the so-called "external" factors, but also the equally important "internal" factors that continue to do so. For example, one issue that arose during the decolonization period and continues to attract some attention among scholars and planners is whether or not the Sahel ecosystem can be made viable given the multiplicity of nation-states that now exist within it. True, at certain periods in the past, there were more independent societies in the region than there are today. But it is also true that the Sahelian societies achieved their greatest florescence when they were quite large. One only has to think of the past greatness of ancient Ghana, Mali and Songhai. These states grouped various types of societies, inhabited different environments, and had rather complex economies. We also know what happened when these ancient Sahelian ecosystem failed: famines, wars and disasters. Is the same thing happening today? The European conquerors of the Sahel initially had small colonies; however, they soon found it profitable to create a federation in the region, link the colonies by roads and trade. When the total area was threatened by economic disaster in the 1920s, the French dismembered the Upper Volta colony and distributed its parts to the surrounding territories to

increase their viability. The French were only promoting their own interests when on the eve of independence they encouraged or tolerated the balkanization of the federation.

Almost all of the post-independence attempts at larger and more viable Sahelian entities foundered on the shoals of political ambitions -- rather than economic difficulties. This was true of the Mali Federation grouping Senegal and the Soudan, the West African Economic Community, the Organization of the Senegal River States, and others too ephemeral to cite.

The experience of the Mali Federation is a case in point. When the formation of the federation was announced Leopold Senghor, the President of Sénégal, declared: "We have made a good start in Mali by united populations whose natural characteristics -- climate, soil and blood, language and customs, art and literature -- are similar. Senegal and the Soudan constitute, moreover, a rather homogeneous and relatively rich economic ensemble." When the Federation broke up Senghor gave this rationalization:

We underestimated the present strength of territorialism, of micronationalism [a euphemism for 'tribalism'?] in Africa. We forgot to analyze and understand the sociological differences among the territories of what used to be French West Africa, differences that the colonial administration had reinforced. (137)

It is doubtful whether micronationalism was the important issue in the dissolution of the Mali Federation.

Modibo Keita, President of the Soudan believed that "there was a contradiction between the economic political and social systems to which the leaders of Mali (Soudan) and Sénégal belonged."<sup>(138)</sup> Some disinterested scholars felt that "basic opposition lay in the fact that in the terminology of the Union Soudanaise the UPS (Union Progressive Sénégalaise) was essentially a 'bourgeois' party, whereas the Union Soudanaise was a 'socialist' party."<sup>(139)</sup> In other words, not "tribalism" but differing ideologies was the cause for the dissolution of the Sahelian and Africa's first precolonial federation.

Despite the disagreements between political leaders in the Sahel, the rural people have continually crossed both natural and political boundaries in the pursuit of a better life. Agricultural populations have been moving over the landscape in search of better lands unhampered by political considerations and often in spite of political constraints. And when the rural youth can no longer satisfy either their traditional or modern desires, they have not hesitated to migrate to the larger towns within their own countries or the industrial or plantation centers of neighboring onces. Similarly the pastoral populations have continued their transhumance cycles across national boundaries, and in the absence of valid reasons for sedentarizing have resisted the efforts of governments to keep them in place.

Traders, too, have continued to cross boundaries. Frustrated by a change in currency when Mali, for understandable reasons, left the franc zone, the traders resorted to contraband to continue their activities.

The smaller Sahelian countries had neither the infrastructure nor the resources to meet the trauma of drought and famine. First, their communication systems were so weak that even when the local leaders knew the scope of the problem they were unable to dramatize it to the outside world. True, the African ministers met in Ouagadougou in March (1973) to plan their strategy, but it was only when such international papers as Le Monde, the Manchester Guardian, The New York Times, and The Washington Post picked up the story that the world became alarmed, and the personnel from the United Nations, USAID, and the U.S. State Department would have their voices heard. Nevertheless, not one of the major world powers nor relief agencies could deal with the problem by itself. France, which still controls the major economic interests in the region, did not have the resources (including the cereals that most of the people use) to deal with the crisis. The result was that the United Nations agencies had to be mobilized, and nations friendly to the states of the region had to cooperate in order to help. The neighboring African states below the affected area -- such as the Ivory Coast, Guinea, Ghana and Nigeria -- gave what help they could.

The United States channelled sorghum to the areas from coastal ports as far south as Cotonou, and this grain together with milk products from Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Holland, the USSR and other nations were airlifted into the remote areas by planes from the American, Belgian, French and German Air Forces.

The major problem encountered by relief agencies was the lack of local structures to serve as conduits. This was due to different administrative and political traditions and differences in scale. Western countries with hundreds of millions of inhabitants, with scores of political units, and with budgets often running to billions of dollars simply did not have either the traditions or the structural elements to relate to countries which were sparsely populated, with embryonic political units, and with very small budgets. Consider the problems of the United States of America when dealing with the six Sahel countries whose total population is equal to the state of California and whose annual budget of \$600 million is two-thirds that of Washington, D.C. People from these two ecosystems must have difficulties conceiving their respective problems, since they do not have have common points of reference. These difficulties are compounded when the interactors do not even realize that they face structural differences as well as sociocultural ones. The result is that even with the best will in the world people from large scale societies

could not plan effectively for smaller scale ones. When failure ensued the people involved charged each other with incompetence or bad faith.

#### VIII. A PARADIGM FOR DEALING WITH THE POOREST OF THE POOR IN THE SAHEL

In order for any paradigm or model to help the public for whom it is intended, its point of departure must correspond as objectively as possible to the reality in which people find themselves. This truism may sound like a cliché, but it is seldom recognized since by definition any paradigm for change is mainly concerned with the future. The result is that theorists or planners often ignore the present as they devote their energy to dealing with the future. When this occurs failure is built into the paradigm since it can have little relevance to the reality involved.

There is a consensus that the now discredited model for development in the Third World had as its three major components: (1) Central planning, control and coordination of the economy as a top-down process; (2) Industrialization and expansion of the modern sector as a means of rapid economic and "take-off"; and (3) Assistance from developed countries to bridge the savings of foreign exchange gap, whichever was dominant, and transfer of international

technology.<sup>(140)</sup> This model failed due to the inadequacy of financial and technical external aid and the resistance of the rural peasants who were called upon to meet this shortfall. The result was the growth of the sentiment among the leaders of developing countries for a NIEO, and also the recognition by such world leaders as Donald Pearson, Gunnar Myrdal and Robert S. McNamara that the model had only left the rural peasants worse off than before. The call for a policy of "aiding the poorest of the poor" was viewed by persons, both in the developed world as well as the developing one, as a criticism of earlier development models as well as a possible substitute for the demand for a NIEO.

As expected, the criticism of the "(Anti-) Rural Development" model suggested among other things, that the early development planners were terribly wrong in concentrating on the urban sector when most of the poor people in the world live in rural areas, thus resulting in the creation of its antithesis: a model almost exclusively concerned with the rural poor. Development planners are now almost required by major aid-donors to concentrate most of their energy and financial resources to solving the problems in that sector. Thus the first of four principal policy goals in the "International Development Cooperation Act of 1978" submitted to the Congress of the United States by the late Senator Hubert Humphrey

emphasized: "alleviation of the worst physical manifestation of poverty among the world's poor majority."<sup>(141)</sup> The other goals included: the promotion of conditions enabling developing countries to achieve self-sustaining economic growth with equitable distribution of benefits; the encouragement of development processes in which individual civil and economic rights are respected and enhanced; and the integration of the developing countries into an open and equitable international economic system. However, it is clear that for the Congress as well as for the Executive Branch of the U.S. government the mot d'ordre was to aid the poorest of the poor.

The economic planners of the developing world, while suspicious of emphasis on the poorest of the poor, showed their dissatisfaction with the early "Euro-centric" development plans, particularly the inadequacy in the transfer of both financial and technological resources by stressing "self-reliance" and "adequate technology" i.e. reliance on indigenous technology. Samir Amin, one of the chief ideologues of "self-reliance" insisted that this approach to development was necessary "because externally-propelled development in all phases of evolution of the imperialist system effectively benefits the privileged dominant classes which make an alliance with the monopolies. Conversely and as a corollary, a 'popular' development

can only be national and self-reliant."<sup>(141a)</sup> Similarly, "self-reliance and ujamaa" was proclaimed the basis of Tanzania's development strategy. The Arusha Declaration of 1967 stated explicitly: "The development of a country is brought about by people, not by money. Money, and the wealth it represents, is the result and not the basis of development. The four pre-requisites of development are different; they are: People, Land, Good Policies, Good Leadership."<sup>(142)</sup> Significantly, Nyerere saw the village as the basis of Tanzania's development" because that country's goal would be "determined by the extent to which the peasants understand, accept and formulate the policy's implications."<sup>(143)</sup> Samin Amin too, wished to start development with the villages, thereby reversing the earlier emphasis. He asserted that "... in order to serve the mass of the peasantry, industrialization must first be made to concentrate on improving rural productivity. Similarly, in order to serve the urban masses, it is necessary to give up luxury production for the local market and give up exporting, since they are both based on the reproduction of a cheap labor force."<sup>(144)</sup>

This emphasis on self-reliance and rural development while laudable as a development strategy, runs the risk of leading development planners to ignore forces and processes still at work in the contemporary world. There are clear-cut signs that the rise of a global civilization,

characterized by the increasingly dominant role of multi-national corporations and planet-wide institutions of all sorts, are increasingly bringing about what is often called "the global village." It should be recalled that one of the major concerns of the NIEO proponents was the spread of the multi-national corporations against whose activities they appear helpless. But these organizations are also the bane of developed countries which have difficulty controlling them. Seemingly oblivious of such erstwhile loyalties as nationality this economic species is moving about the globe with modern technology and currencies of all kinds. Seeking sources of cheap labor, the multinationals go where this is found, among the peasants, detach these people from subsistence economies and integrate them in the world economy. Perhaps indicative of the view that economic parochialism is counterproductive in today's world, the Humphrey bill advocated concentration on helping the poorest of the poor, and simultaneously "the integration of the developing countries into an open and equitable international economic system."

While the proponents of self-reliance all declare that "self-reliance does not necessarily mean self-sufficiency."<sup>(145)</sup> Their rhetoric does not bear out this claim. The problem is that few nations can now be self-reliant -- culturally, economically, ideologically, politically, socially or technologically. This is true of major industrial countries

such as the United States despite Dr. Kissinger's aforementioned statement to the contrary. It is patently more true for the developing countries. Once part of large empires, their economies, socio-cultural systems and other aspects of their national lives are still linked to their former Metropoles. Moreover, the modern sectors of their societies, especially the new structures, could not exist without links to the developed world. The national capitals of these states are primate cities housing most of their modern institutions. Such cities are often more closely integrated with the cities of the developed world than they are with their own rural hinterlands. Even though only small percentages of these countries' populations live in the primate cities, the urbanites not only control the countryside, but provide the link for the diffusion of modern cultural traits from the developed countries, and set the cultural tone for the entire country. The cities are the mecca for rural persons eager to live in urban centers and benefit as much as possible from aspects of modern life. Thus, more than the proponents of self-reliance are seemingly willing to admit, the world's poor villages are linked through their nation-states to a global society that is becoming more integrated every day.

The proponents of the thesis that the developing world should eschew the use of costly modern technology should be careful not to make a virtue of a necessity. True, there

are recorded cases in the developing world where people bought electrical appliances when they had no electric power, and acquired machines that they did not need and did not know how to maintain. Yet if there was one element in the arsenal of the expanding West which enabled it to contact and conquer the non-Western world during the fifteenth century and afterwards, it was superior technology. The Chinese emperor Ch'ien-lung who in 1793 responded to the envoy of the "red-faced barbarian" people of England that his Celestial dynasty possessed all things and that "strange and costly objects" from the West did not interest him, only set the stage for a later "Open-Door" policy in which China was a helpless victim of European and American power politics and economic imperialism. (146)

It is also true that a telling point in the debate regarding why the West conquered the world was that "We had the Maxim gun, and they had not."

The people of the developing world must examine carefully such notions as the one advanced by Tetteh A. Kofi, a Ghanaian economist at Stanford Food Research Institute, who declares that his "Abibirim strategy for development.... recognized that, however universal the technical problems of economic growth may be because of different social, economic and historical institutions, each society must solve its growth problems in different ways." (147) This is not to deny the right, if not the duty, of African peoples "to contribute their own brick

to the construction of the universal" as Leopold Sedar Senghor asserts. But given the nature of the contemporary world, and the nature of technology (that almost universal aspect of human culture), today's Africans must do so with care or, like their ancestors, suffer the consequences.

But if the advocates of "self-reliance" and the use of "appropriate technology," and a NIEO should exercise ease in viewing these approaches as central to a new paradigm for development, the proponents of "aiding the poorest of the poor" should also recognize the dangers in the hidden assumptions of their approach. The first flaw is the assumption that they can really reach the people in the world's poorest villages. By harboring such beliefs, development planners risk ignoring one of the major forces at work in the developing and especially ex-colonial countries, -- nationalism. This mistake is especially common among American (and Soviet) planners who, involved in a global struggle for supremacy, have really never understood what they deem parochial nationalism. True, most have progressed beyond Foster Dulles's view of the "immortality" of non-alignment, and the Stalinist view that the only road to salvation is to follow the lead of the Soviet Union. But many expatriate planners really believe that the leaders of the new states would be immoral to stand in the way of persons who would bring help to their poor people. Unfortunately, they are ignoring the very basis of the nationalist

struggle, namely, the right to political self-determination, and psycho-cultural autonomy.

So strong was the sentiment of nationalism among African and Asian leaders that they were determined to become independent even in the face of economic threats and hardships. This was true of Sekou Toure of Guinea who refused membership in the French Community, and it was at the base of Kwame Nkrumah's doctrine: "Seek ye first the political kingdom and everything else shall be added thereunto!" Time and circumstances have moderated many aspects of the prickly nationalism of the Third World Countries, but the feeling that they shall not abide coercion still stands. Moreover, their sentiment of nationalism is buttressed by the fact that the nation-state is still the most important political structure in the contemporary world. Thus, development planners who attempt to react the people in the world's poor villages without considering that these poor people are the citizens of independent nation-states are courting disaster.

Another danger facing non-African development planners is the curious notion that they themselves are most concerned about the poor than local leaders. Such sentiments smack of patronizing arrogance, and ignore the former antagonisms between dominant outsiders and the local people based on race and colonial conquest. Expatriate developers with this

notion often defend their attitude by alluding to statements of the local ideologues that their elites are rapacious, non-caring, and hopeless members of a "comprador bourgeoisie." Like Nselela, mentioned above, Haque and his colleagues also criticize the comprador bourgeoisie of many poor countries who "by their high consumption expenditure on foreign goods" deny the possibility of the expansion of their own market and future accumulation, while contributing to the worsening balance of payments of their own societies.<sup>(148)</sup> Samir Amin also charges that the elite of the developing countries have not only become the allies of the "feudal and imperialist classes," but also contribute towards the "marginalization of the masses" within the world system by adopting "European patterns of consumption," ensuring the profitability of the luxury-goods sectors of their fragile economies, and thereby confirming "the social, cultural, ideological and political integration of the privileged classes."<sup>(149)</sup> Nevertheless it is also true that few members of the so-called "comprador" classes in the developed world have held their status long enough to become so entrenched, that they have severed ties to their proletarian and rural kinsmen. Close ties of kinship, region, ethnicity, and race, still exist between the elite and the masses and enable the former to gain support against outsiders. The poorer classes both in the urban areas and in the villages also use these ties to

protect themselves against the worst depredations of their higher status relatives.

Expatriate developers should also recognize that the new emphasis on reaching the poorest of the poor in the world's villages is often interpreted by national developers as an attempt to continue to control the pace and nature of Third World development. This attitude is unfortunately reinforced by the often spoken and unspoken assumption of the expatriates that development on the village level is not only more effective, but cheaper. These expatriates argue that instead of the grandiose and costly country-wide projects which failed, more modest projects designed with the local poor farmer in mind, might well succeed. From the perspective of the national developers the issue with this new approach is not only that it permits outsiders to determine what is good for their countries, but permits them to keep ignoring nationally generated development plans for the entire country. In an ironic reversal of roles, the battle is waged between national planners who are now viewed as "centralists," and expatriates one who are considered the new "peripheralists."

Paradigms designed to encourage development in the proper countries in the contemporary world must take into account that a NIEO cannot be effective unless it deals with the problems of the "poorest of poor," and that an attempt to deal with the "poorest of the poor" cannot

succeed unless the demands for a NIEO are understood and placed in perspective. This is more than a case of a dialectical unity of opposites; it is a recognition of the realities of a global society that is struggling to emerge. Therefore, both expatriate and national planners must consider and be cognizant of three distinct, but related levels of reality: a global dimension with its own demands, rules, and givens; the nation-state structure with its own historical logic, interests and capabilities; and the village level which, while poorer and more dependent, is the arena where most people live, and where more people suffer as a result of decisions made on the higher levels. If there are objections to the hierarchial nature implied in this analysis, it must be pointed out that funds for development, theories about development, and most developers, belong to the global arena, less to the nation-state, and lesser still to the poor villages. This does not, and should not, mean that the poor villagers ought to be ignored in planning, since they cannot be ignored when plans are executed. It only means that their position in the scheme of things be clearly recognized, and understood, rather than made the subject of a demagoguery that is counter-productive to everyone.

For example, the world community as an emerging entity is becoming more important everyday even though it is often only reacting to events that occur on the level

of the nation-state and the villages. Thus the decisions made by such international bodies as UNCTAD, FAO (Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations), the World Bank, and the World Food Council to institute programs aiding the poorest of the poor were the result of data collected in the poor villages, aggregated on the level of the nation-states, and presented to the world community. This does not suggest that the villagers were ignorant of not having enough to eat, enough to wear, and enough of the wherewithal to house themselves, heal themselves, and to educate their children (a caveat here is that the notion of "poverty" is often culturally defined, and "poor" people may not conceive of themselves as "poor"). It only means that by themselves, the poorest of the poor do not have the resources to deal with their condition.

Another example: It is a fact that the Sahel had been the victim of repeated and perhaps cyclical droughts in the past, but this is the first time in history that the world community was seized with the issue. No one knows if, or how the ancient Sahelian kingdoms and empires, as contrasted to the villagers, reacted to droughts and famines. The French Colonial regime sometimes attempted to ameliorate the effects of this scourge, but at least on one occasion the Catholic

missionaries had to threaten to expose the suffering of the Sahelians before the administration would take any action. There is some evidence that the present independent African states in the region hesitated to publicize the drought because they were initially unsure of the facts, and later because they feared that such a calamity would call into question their ability to take care of their citizens. As a matter of fact, once the world community was seized with the news of the drought it reacted so massively that the fragile and undeveloped institutional structures of the African states could not cope with the attempt of outsiders to help. Then when the Sahelian states mobilized, created CILSS (Comité Inter-états de Lutte contre la Secheresse dans le Sahel), and attempted to use this instrument as way of obtaining funds to deal with the overall development problems of the region, they discovered that the United Nations, and the World Community, working through such organizations as Le Club des Amis du Sahel had their own agenda that conditioned what funds were to be made available, and what avenues to explore. (150)

The way in which the global community attempted to deal with the Sahelian drought highlights one of the facts of development in the contemporary world. The world community has its own agenda, and the other levels, the nation-states, and the poor villages have theirs also.

The United Nations working through such international agencies as the World Bank, UNCTAD, and UNDP is attempting to get as much money for development as possible. Its efforts are conditioned by its dependence upon sovereign states for contributions. With its limited resources the United Nations attempts to walk a thin line between the often conflicting theories, demands, and programs of its own bureaucracy, and those of the different nation-states. Many of the latter are jealous of their sovereign prerogative, and the smaller ones are quick to note when the U.N. agencies are following the dictates, or rather the suggestions, or goals of the major powers, at the expense of the smaller nations. However, the United Nations and other global development agencies have their own structures through which they mediate development programs. Inevitably these programs reflect the major concerns of these world bodies.

The major nation-states, the principal donors of funds for development, between the level of the global community and that of the developing nations within whose borders lie the poor villages, often attempt to manipulate these other two levels. Some of these states, especially the Socialist ones led by the Soviet Union have hesitated to contribute to the United Nations' effort because they insist that no development initiatives

instituted by capitalist countries can ever be effective. If such ventures are effective, they would only produce capitalist economies which, according to the Soviets, are reactionary at a time when the Socialist wave of the future has appeared. Many Socialist states prefer bilateral relations with the developing nations. They take pride in funding projects (such as the Tanzam railroad which the Chinese built) judged economically unviable by the financial organs of the United Nations, or major Capitalist nations.

The Western nations, led by the United States of America, have also hesitated to support the development activities of the United Nations, either because they disapproved of the proposals of the world body, or because they have their own views about development. For example Graham Hovey, reporting in The New York Times<sup>(151)</sup> wrote that the Congress of the United States is now more hostile to overseas spending than any time in the 30-year history of aid programs. Both Conservative and Liberal Congressmen are attacking the \$7.3 billion appropriation bill. This figure is already \$1.1 billion below what the Carter administration originally requested, and constitutes one-fourth of 1 percent of the U.S. gross national product (barely more than 1 percent of the overall Federal budget) thereby making the U.S. the 13th in rank among 17 donor nations in the percentage of G.N.P. allotted to aid. Conservatives resented

the United States inability to block credits by the World Bank's International Development Agency or the United Nations Development Program to avowedly Marxist governments. Liberals objected to loans granted to governments charged with serious violations of human rights. Some Congressmen are attempting to cut \$584 million from the allocation for the International Development agency and the Inter-American Development Bank charging that they are "elitist institutions run by oligarchs, skilled in keeping crumbs from falling off the table to reach the hungry."<sup>(152)</sup> In this latter case it would seem that the Congressmen are concerned that the global development agencies are not helping the poorest of the poor, but such a supposition would be only partially correct since these men form part of a coalition whose opposition to foreign aid is more national and parochial.

More serious opposition to the current U.S. foreign aid bill came from some Congressmen, who would prevent the developing countries from producing goods and materials that might affect United States' interests. Hovey reported that "With protectionist sentiment also rising, an unusual coalition formed in Congress to try to prevent the use of American funds for loans to certain countries or for the development of products that compete with American goods. To head off such restrictions, President Carter ... agreed

that the United States would oppose loans for the production of sugar, palm oil or citrus fruits where exports of these commodities could injure producers in the United States."<sup>(153)</sup> Thus it appears that with the changing financial and technological position of the United States in the world arena, both the administration and the Congress despair of rallying any sizeable constituency for foreign aid among bankers, farmers and manufacturers. This is true, even though very few dollars for development loans or grants ever leave the United States.<sup>(154)</sup> Some other Western countries behave exactly like the United States in their aid policies. Therefore, any paradigm developed for aiding the poorest of the poor, which depends upon help from the rich, must take these strictures into consideration.

The poorer developing nation-states, such as those in the Sahel, attempt to put their own development plans into operation in so far as they can obtain the funds to do so. One of the major complaints of the ministries of development in these states is that not only must they rely upon expatriate technicians working in their development agencies to develop plans (thus making these plans Eurocentric) but that the major aid donors pay absolutely no attention to these plans (an African Minister of Development who attended an international meeting of CILSS and major donors in 1973 never forgot a remark of a Western representative who

declared that he would fund projects" only if they were well conceived." The Minister wondered out loud who was to determine whether projects were "well-conceived"). Sahelian planners are now saying that in so far as they were able, they were always interested in helping the "poorest of the poor," and that even projects which are now viewed as national in scope rather than village-specific were designed with these persons in mind.

Official surveys only partly bear out the contention of the Sahelians that they have always concentrated on the poorest of the poor. A survey of the economics of Mauretania, Niger, Senegal, and Upper Volta, by the International Monetary Fund published in 1970 reveals that as soon as these states became independent, they elaborated provisional plans whose objectives were "to undertake certain priority projects (in agriculture, manpower, health, and administration) and to lay the foundation for further planning. In all countries, the intermediate plans covered only investment in the public sector, having no global targets of growth for all sectors of the economy. During the period of intermediate plans, special efforts were also undertaken to strengthen the planning authorities and to improve the statistical basis for subsequent planning, especially for demographic data, agricultural survey, and social research."<sup>(155)</sup> As they gained some experience in planning, all of these countries quickly formulated

"second generation" plans such as the five Four-year Plans of Mauritania, Niger, Senegal and Upper Volta. They did so with the participation of representatives from the executive and legislative branches of the government, and with help and guidance from chambers of commerce, trade unions, business firms, and youth and labor organizations. The I.M.F. found that the general object of these plans was "the achievement of economic independence and the raising of living standards and welfare for the population over a relatively short period of time (e.g., to double per capita income in 10 to 20 years [the target growth rate in G.D.P. ranged from 4 per cent in Upper Volta to 9.2 per cent in Mauretania]). The planners aimed at: (1) elimination of regional economic discrepancies, (2) structural changes in the economy, (3) diversification of the agricultural sector, (4) creation of import-substitute industries, (5) orientation and training of technicians, and (6) setting the stage for further growth in the long terms."(156)

Given the structure of their economies and especially the absence of important capitalist classes, all these states planned a greater capital outlay by the public sector than by the private one. For these countries as a whole the average was 60 per cent from the public sector, as against 40 per cent from the private sector -- ranging from 50 per cent public and private in Mauretania with

its mineral wealth, to 83 per cent public and only 17 per cent private in Upper Volta, a primarily agricultural country. Moreover, most of the public investment was in the domain of infrastructure, especially on roads, water resources and agriculture while that of the private sector was to be in industry (mainly manufacturing and processing) and mining.

The IMF survey suspects that the Sahelian planner concluded that since the agricultural sector dominated most of their economies (about 60 per cent in Niger) "the development strategy during the 1960's apparently placed greater emphasis on the need for structural changes in the economies. Consequently, all the plans projected much faster growth rates for the secondary sectors (industry, mining, energy, and construction) than for the primary [agricultural] sectors.... In Senegal the rates were 5.1 per cent for the secondary sector and 3.8 per cent for the primary sector, and in Mauretania 19.1 per cent and 2 per cent" The IMF study concluded that "Thus while all plans recognized the important role of agriculture, they envisaged a decrease in agriculture's share in the GDP by the final year of plan implementation. The high growth rate projected for the industrial sector appeared to reflect the widely held belief throughout the developing nations that industrial development is the shortest road to economic progress and expansion in the economy."(154)

A closer examination of the development plans of the Sahel countries reveals that while their planners wanted to diversify, they were constrained by the nature of their ecologies and economies to deal with the agricultural sector. The exception was Mauretania which decided to place more emphasis on mining than on agriculture because of the relative lack of rain in that country and the fact that only about 1 per cent of its land was arable. Niger, on the other hand, allocated 27 per cent of its investment to agriculture which accounted for one third of its GDP and two thirds of its export receipts. Most of this money was spent for developing water resources and promoting irrigation in an attempt to booster peanut production. Agriculture was the focus of Senegal's second plan. "Heavy public investment in agriculture was envisaged in order to implement the Government's agricultural diversification program covering cotton, rice, vegetables, and fruit production and to increase yields of groundnuts and millet." (158)

The Upper Volta allocated some 35 per cent of its 1967-70 Plan's budget for infrastructure "with priority given to the improvement of the national road network in order to increase its access to the outside world.... Investment in roads alone amounted to CFAF 6.7 billion, or over 60 per cent of resources provided for infrastructure." (159)

Although the Voltaics, among other Sahelians, have found it necessary to devote a great deal of their resources to road building in order to get to the poorest of the poor, they have had difficulty obtaining funds to do so from donors some of whom did not view these "national" projects as being especially related to the poor. During the period, 1966-1969, a number of consultant teams from prospective donor countries attempted to ascertain whether it was feasible to finance the building of roads to evacuate vegetable products by counting the number of trucks passing over roads during a given period. What these persons did not realize was that the roads were so bad that unless trucks were hauling gold or equally valuable products it would not have been profitable for truckers to go into the region. These consultants had acted exactly as though they were conducting a survey in a developed country, and defended their action by insisting that if the local people wanted to develop, then modern methodologies must be used to solve their problems. Unfortunately, these surveyors were influential enough to prevent the funding of the project, and had it not been for more sympathetic views from other donors, the road network would not have been built.

Given such a situation, it is understandable why many national planners often have negative attitudes towards paradigms developed by outsiders. Yet their cooperation is crucial to the success of any model designed to help the

poor in the developing countries. It is not that the national planners doubt the qualifications or capabilities of outsiders, but in most cases they must be convinced that their own views are respected. This is often more difficult than one realizes. True, most contemporary planners do at least make an effort to consult with their local colleagues about the nature of projects, but this is often more pro forma than real. Very few planners of developing countries can veto projects they dislike, but when they can do so without fear of sanction, then they will always be resentful. It is only when expatriate planners realize that the sooner the national planners are independent enough to dictate the scope of their own development, the sooner it will be for real cooperation to take place.

A much more difficult task, and unfortunately, one that few development paradigms can deal with, is how to encourage the national elites to view their own poor in a different light. Just suggesting that this may be a problem might "turn off" and embitter the local elites. Ideologues in developing countries criticize each other -- sometimes bitterly. They also admit that there is a "consciousness gap between leaders in developing societies and the masses of the people."<sup>(160)</sup> Moreover they all criticize the "comprador bourgeoisie." What many of these ideologues (often also viewed as "comprador" by their opponents) fail to understand is that had these elites ~~or~~

or bourgeoisie not appeared, nationalism would not have arisen, and colonialism would still be in place. It took the acculturation of many of these persons to European ways, and in the process to have become "black" or "brown" or "yellow" white men before they could challenge European hegemony, and bring about the liberation of their countries. The Europeans in the colonies have always understood this. How many of them used to say, and still say, that they prefer the "tribal people in the bush" to the garrulous and pretentious elite, spouting sonorous words which more often than not are improper and meaningless, and who are bitter and unhappy semi-intellectuals.

Ideally, the national planners should attempt to close the "consciousness gap" between themselves and the masses. They ought be those persons who are "ahead of others in perceptions of the need for social change, in their ability to systematize ideas whose origins are in the masses themselves, in seeing through complex relationships and in relevant technical expertise."<sup>(161)</sup> They should also be conscious of the need to halt what is considered the "alienation" of themselves and of their people. The problem is to help them accomplish this task. It might well be that when all is said and done, the demand for a NIEO from Third World leaders is not only linked to economics as they believe, and to politics as Dr. Kissinger and others insist, but ultimately has important

psychological implications. After all, economic power is linked to political power, and any form of power is psychologically liberating. It is possible that only after the elites have liberated themselves that they can go beyond their eliteness and work in the interest of a society which is not "fragmented into elites and the masses, the ruler and the ruled, the privileged and the under-privileged, the 'superior' and the 'inferior'." (162) For many of these persons then, development will mean "a process of de-alienation, i.e. liberation from all inhibitions derived from the structure and superstructure of society." (163) It will be a process which will prevent the dehumanization of the broad masses and to permit them to use their full potentiality.

Any paradigm developed for aiding the poorest of the poor must be realistic about the conditions of the poor, and the nature of the poor. One of the major challenges for the people in the world's poor villages is their isolation from the life of their nation-states. This is especially true in the Sahel given its large surface area and the relative lack of roads and other means of communication. An example of the plight of some of these persons can be gathered by a casual observation that Suzanne Lellemand made with respect to a village in Upper Volta: "Bântenga is a village of two to three hundred inhabitants in the Yatenga region, and administratively part of the cercle

of Kongoussi. Very far from any urban center, the facilities that it possesses are still very rudimentary. The secondary roads that lead to it are hardly passable, so during the buying period the commercial company charged with exploiting the cotton in that region insists that the inhabitants take their crops up to a laterite road situated several kilometers from the settlement.<sup>(164)</sup> Another statement made by Suzanne Lallemand, also in passing, gives us some idea of the plight of these villagers. She states:

This settlement is very little affected by innovations coming from the outside, and to these they adopted an attitude which vacillates between envy and distrust; rather envy, since most of the men migrate to the Ivory Coast before their marriage, and having seen other types of life, return at least seduced by the consumer goods coming from industrialized countries. Many of them have adopted a view of their natal villages which is at one and the same time pessimistic and warm. They are conscious of its dreariness and its mediocre immediate economic perspective. They do not see any other solution except individual exile or after having reached thirty years of age, a resignation masked by unremitting agricultural labor."<sup>(165)</sup>

Those who would plan to help the people in Sahelian villages such as Bâmtenga, must take into consideration the need to expend money to reach these people physically. This means planning for roads, and a realization that these roads could well be costly. It also means planning for water, and planning for water from small wells, instead of large dams may be as useful as building tracks instead of roads. This too, takes money, and involves activities on a level

larger than, and higher than, the villages. It is only when the people in these villages are in communication with the outside world that they can have a meaningful input into the plans created with them, or with them in mind.

It must also be recognized that while villagers may be remote from the center of their national life, they have had intermittent contact with it and have specific ideas about it. In other words, very few of the poor rural villages in the Sahel are the "primitive isolates" so fondly sought after by lovers of the exotic. They are instead entities whose inhabitants have always had often tragic relations with the outside. The evidence from Upper Volta cited above can be replicated for the other parts of the Sahel, but the pithy description Lellemand gives of one of the inhabitants of Bâmtenga is instructive in this regard. About the chief of this village, she writes:

He was born about the turn of the century, or perhaps even a few years before this. As a young man he was recruited by the colonial administration which sent him to work on the building of sections of the railroad in Senegal. He recalls with horror this voyage for forced labor which took him to Ouahigouya, to Mopti, to Bamako and then to Dakar, and considers himself lucky to have returned. Disgusted by these trips, he never ever again participated in those voluntary migrations that the men of his generation had taken to the coastal areas. He admits smilingly not to have ever seen Ouagadougou, a town that all of his sons had known since their adolescence." (166)

Naaba, as this man was called, is no doubt a survivor of those peasants whom Louis Tauxier referred to as "those faceless masses." He undoubtedly views outside officials with skepticism or outright hostility. Thus in addition to his world view -- that of persons living in small-scale communities, he does have some understanding of the larger universe in which he and his village exist.

Development planners must accept the strong possibility that the traditional institutions in the rural Sahelian villages are still viable and still functional. They must understand and appreciate the efficacy and resiliency of these institutions, which can be defined as highly patterned behavioral activities of human groups living in and exploiting specific environments, and which are valued by their possessors because they have usually stood the test of time, and have proven their worth. Having emerged as a result of a dynamic interaction between human beings and their environment, these institutions are often regarded by people as the sole basis of social life. Sustained by technical paraphernalia, ideological charters, and making use of specialized vocabularies and symbols, these institutions permit people to cooperate with each other, and to maintain their socio-cultural and biological continuity. But as indicated above, although hallowed by time and function, these institutions do change, and as we have seen (within the case studies) those of the Sahelian populations have indeed

already changed. Nevertheless, they continue to have meaning, and attempts on the part of outsiders to change them without considering their utility could result in a form of socio-cultural and often real death.

Yet, respect for the traditional institutions of people living the camps, hamlets and villages in the Sahel does not mean, and should not mean, that planners should refrain from introducing change. Change in these communities is inevitable if only because the nation-states of which these are a part, and the global complex to which their nation-states belong are also changing. To remain unchanged is to be retrogressive in a world in constant evolution. Planners must attempt to harmonize their development plans with the rhythm of life in the villages where possible, and depend upon the accelerated pace of life on the level of the nation-states to speed up changes in the rural areas.

The question as to whether development planners, both national and expatriate, should foster total change, or settle for incremental change is usually a moot one. Except when faced with natural or man-made catastrophes human societies normally resist change. It often takes the imminence of physical death to induce people to abandon doomed communities, and then they frequently jeopardize their chances of survival by moving too slowly or symbolically looking back. Sometimes in the face of

extreme societal disorganization induced by either human or natural forces, charismatic or millenarian leaders arise and attempt to lead their followers into a promised land. Yet even the promise of a better future, again symbolized as "a land flowing with milk and honey" or an epoch in which "the cargoes will come," or "the conquerors shall depart," is often not sufficient to induce people to abandon a difficult but customary life. Metaphorically, the generation socialized in the old ways may have to wander in the desert until it dies before the youth, freed from the customs and traditions of the past, can embark upon the new journey.

Planners can take advantage of the actuarial, complexity to bring about changes. It has always been true that the youth in all human societies have been more responsive to innovations than their elders. However, their ability to change was conditioned by their total environment. In rural agricultural and pastoral societies the pace is slow and the experiences of the elders are respected. Characteristic of these societies is the notion that children are seen and not heard. And children, anxious to escape the watchful eyes of parents take advantage of the arrival of foreign guests to disappear and to follow their own inclinations. Thus they often learn nothing new. However, it is a truism in the contemporary world, and even in the most remote villages of the Sahel, that the experiences of elders

are increasingly irrelevant to youth. Young people do not even have to challenge the ways of their elders; they have only to listen as these elders complain about new duties, obligations and unwelcome practices to understand that the traditional ways are being challenged. Therefore, developers can and should take advantage of the greater receptivity of youth to new ideas and plan their innovations with these persons in mind.

The presence of persons in rural communities with experiences radically different from those of their local peers, and the possibility that they could be used as agents of change is seldom appreciated by development planners. The visitor to rural Sahelian communities often finds that camouflaged by traditional garments are persons who had served in France's foreign wars, or had been recruited for forced labor on the railroads, the roads, and plantations in the forest region, or who had gone there as voluntary labor migrants. Many of these persons have returned home because they preferred to do so, or because of familial obligations of various kinds. Yet, as sentient beings they are unable to forget their experiences outside of their villages, and in many subtle, or not so subtle ways, indicate by their behavior that they are different from their fellows. Often these are the persons who attempt innovations, but even if they do not, they are likely to be the ones who might be more willing to

innovate if the opportunity arises. But even if they appear to be as conservative as their fellows who had never been away, this appearance should not stop developers from attempting to use them as innovators. They are really more amenable to change than the stay at homes, because they know what the developers are attempting to accomplish.

Development planners should be aware that the heightened concern of persons on the global level for helping people in the poor village and camps is in itself creating an environment for accelerated change. Human beings have always experimented with their environment both natural and socio-cultural. Tinkering is universal, both in biological organisms, and socio-cultural ones. It is always heightened by changes in the environment. But whereas nature is very ruthless with mutations that are not well adopted, socio-cultural innovations are not so easily destroyed. Planners can take advantage of socio-cultural mutations brought about by a more receptive climate for change by deliberately looking for them, and in aiding their development when they do appear. For, in contrast to innovations brought in from the outside, and which may not find a suitable environment, those which emerge internally have already managed to cope with the environment, and may well be better adapted to their environment than any other.

A difficult problem for persons designing paradigms for helping people in villages is how to cope with those who resist innovation. It may not be that the rural people are against the innovation per se, but that the planners cannot discover why they resist certain changes. This should not be completely surprising since the values of human societies are not always understandable by outsiders and sometimes by insiders. At some time in the past the values may have been necessary for the survival of the community, but became less so with time so that people forget what purpose these values served. Thus even the most logical person in the community might admit illogic in holding on to customs whose value is unknown to them. In such cases, the development planner has little recourse but to proceed with change, especially when that change is dictated by levels higher than that of the village. It is a truism, but hardly a consolation to persons whose traditions have been changed against their will, that no change is painless. Every rite de passage, whether for the individual or for a society is painful even when better condition is certain. There is a story, perhaps apocryphal, told about a Mossi chief who when announcing the end of forced labor said to his followers: "You blamed us, and said that we sold you to the white man. Now you will see that you will sell yourselves." What this man realized was that despite the rigors of forced labor

migration, each succeeding generation of migrants was not only more accustomed to going away, but their home communities were becoming more integrated into the contemporary world, and the migrants often returned with valuable goods from that world. The official ending of migration did not bring about the end of the new needs. It simply accelerated them since free people are often more innovative than controlled ones.

Finally, development planners should be aware of the continuing dialectic in human affairs when embarking upon projects to help the poor in the world's villages. The injunction to involve the local people in planning is an excellent one especially in projects on the village level. By so doing the planners can take advantage of local expertise, and use the social and political systems to facilitate their task. Yet the planners must be aware of the matter of scale. In many cases the concerns of villages are quite parochial. Whether due to the environment or socio-cultural system, some of these concerns cannot be easily generalized so that they can be dealt effectively either on the nation-state level or on the global level. For example, the people in a village situated near a certain geological formations may be the only ones in an entire district who could profit from a well-digging project. The challenge for the district officials is how to appeal to his superiors for funds to build one well

since both to him and them, it would be a waste of time and energy to make such a request. The result is that such district officers in the name of efficiency might ask for funds to build hundreds of wells so that they could really get funds to dig one well. Consequently, without being dishonest such district officers may run afoul of the system simply by attempting to make it work for the lowest common denominator. As strange as this might seem, it could occur and has probably occurred in districts throughout the Sahel. It is perhaps more common on the national level when nation-states, often encouraged by the agents of donor countries, are encouraged to augment their demands simply in order to have them noticed and dealt with. Of course the villain here is the issue of scale, but it is not often recognized as such.

Scale is very much at the core of most of the problems in the Sahel as it is in much of the developing world.<sup>(167)</sup> It is one thing for the poorer nations to ask for the restructuring of the global economy and for a New International Order; it is another thing for the wealthier developed countries whether in the true interest of the developing world or because they wish "development on the cheap" to stress aid to the poorest of the poor. However, between these two extremes there are many worlds with their own requirements and their own agendas, and it is doubtful

whether they can be by-passed by either the poor or the wealthy. What the developing world wants from the developed world is clearly demonstrated in the Declaration of the NIEO and the Charter.

What the poorer nations can do is not so clearly adumbrated, but the developed world does have the right to know how the developing countries plan to use those funds that are allotted through the NIEO or other mechanisms. They must be told how the countries of the Sahel plan to maximize their possibilities of development.

An essential part of any paradigm designed to aid the poor Sahelian countries must include plans for larger economic units in order to best serve the small and almost unviable nation-states. The people of the Sahel should be encouraged to create larger regional bodies because this is possible the only way that they can deal with their problems of development. For example, it might well be that the northern part of the Sahel where pastoralists often compete with marginal agriculturalists should be given over completely to pastures. For this to happen, however, the agriculturalists living there should be able to migrate to coastal regions. This is a political decision that only federated states could make. Again, it is quite possible that the water resources of the region could be improved by building more local dams, and by digging deeper wells.

But the long-range solution to the water problems of the entire Sahel might involve construction of dams built on the Upper Niger at Nianden and on the upper Senegal river at Manantali. Moreover, if the electric potential of the Akosombo Dam in nearby Ghana could be linked to the electric power from the other complexes on the Senegal and Niger, then electricity could be obtained to pump water from wells in areas far from the river systems.

Cooperation between the states in the Sahel could facilitate the use of weather and Earth Resources satellites to chart changes in the weather, to locate underground rivers, discover fertile areas, inspect crops, and locate mineral resources. Yet, these costly instruments are only economical if used over vast areas. Moreover, the opportunities suggested by their use will require decisions by people living in the different nation-states and with the cooperation of the world community. On the ground, the region may require all sorts of technical schools for agronomy, livestock science and mechanical skills, but single states are too poor to afford any or all of these. However, when all is said and done the issue of money remains, and here is where the NIEO comes in. The Sahelians would really prefer to eschew foreign aid with all of its woes, and rely upon trade to develop their economies. But it is doubtful whether such a goal is possible in an area whose potential may only be realizable

at another stage in the development of the ultimate global system. Meanwhile sufficient funds and technical aid must be pumped into this area so that its contemporary populations can use their resources to live modern lives while at the same time structuring their activities so as to harmonize with the realities of their environment. It is only if and when this is done that the goals of those who desire a NIEO, and those who prefer to aid the poorest of the poor will be realized.

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