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REPORT ON THE POLITICAL IMPLICATION OF
THE JOINT ASSESSMENT AND U.S. AID TO SENEGAL.

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PREFACE

I was asked to come to Senegal for two weeks in order to report on the political implications of the joint assessment on U.S. assistance efforts to Senegal, and more generally to look at the political implications of USAID efforts in Senegal. I was to examine the long-term implications of the joint assessment recommendations for Senegal's political and development structure.

Before going to the substance of my comments and recommendations, I should state the basis for these. I am not an expert on Senegal. I had read in the general literature on Senegal and had read extensively in Sahel materials for a seminar given in Princeton University in 1979 on Sahelian drought relief and development programs. These materials dealt with efforts of the CILSS and Club du Sahel to mobilize donor and recipient resources to deal with short term needs and to bring about structural change in Sahelian countries. To prepare myself for my evaluations in Dakar, I read in Princeton the Final Report and Annexes of the Joint Assessment of U.S. Assistance Programs in Senegal; the World Bank's Report on Economic Trends and Prospects in Senegal; various working documents associated with the joint assessment, including a report by Elliot Berg, a report by Lucie Colvin on migration, memos by USAID officials on the ground, surveys of the ENEA, the proposal for PL 480 Title III funding. On arrival in Senegal I continued my education by reading various working papers and reports done for USAID, including: Clark Ross's study of Producer Grain Transactions, and his work on Grain Demand and Consumer Preferences; Lucie Colvin's work on Private Initiatives in the Senegalese Economy; Work in Progress on Rural Animation by Sheldon Gellar; draft PIDs on the OMVS and Casamance; various CILSS's documents on external aid; I was also able to read further in secondary source analysis of the political economy of Senegal e.g., Rita Cruise O'Brien edited volume "The Political Economy of Underdevelopment: Dependence in Senegal". Working with the political officer of the U.S. Embassy, Mr. David Rawson, I had access to various political reports and memos.

I had discussions with various AID consultants including Director David Shear, the Program Officer, Mr. Donald Brown, Professor Sheldon Gellar, Mr. Axel Magnuson. I had frequent discussions with Mr. Rawson. While I traveled for a short time outside of Dakar, I could not and did not see a large part of Senegal. I did visit AID projects but not those of the joint assessment. I am no more an expert on Senegal than I was although I have learned a great deal.

I benefitted from open and extremely useful discussions with the afore-mentioned persons and others. I wish to convey my deep appreciation to all those who took the time and trouble to meet with me and to share their insights into U.S. programs and policies in Senegal and Senegal itself. I am grateful for the opportunity to have come to Senegal and to have participated in the joint evaluation effort.

I will remark in the text of my report on the unusual AID effort in Senegal. It is unusual in that from the Director down there is a strong commitment to monitoring and to continuously reevaluating policies, programs, and projects. It is a very selfconscious attempt to mobilize resources and to frankly try to understand difficulties in the exploration of solutions. Thus the AID programs in Senegal, both for what they are and for the attempt to analyze the aid undertaking, will be important benchmarks in our attempt to understand USAID and aid in the developing countries.

Finally, I have not restated obvious facts concerning the Senegalese economy. There was little point in recapitulating what others have said where that could be avoided.

Outline of Report

- 1) Why aid Senegal: are the U.S. goals clear and established? Are they consistent with wider goals?
- 2) How aid Senegal: are the instruments, projects and programs for aid consistent with wider goals? What are the implications of the framework chosen for aid?
- 3) Has the joint assessment process furthered the clarification for 1) and 2)?

1) WHY AID SENEGAL?

Considered by itself, Senegal can be thought of as a middle rank African country, both in terms of its development and for its interest to the U.S. Senegal's level of development is bifurcated. That is, there is a highly trained elite, a relatively sophisticated civil service in Dakar, an advanced metropolitan development in Dakar, a relatively sophisticated military. The country has African and Third World visibility because of its leader, Senghor, and the place of Dakar as a West African, Atlantic, and to some extent international center. But these features all rest on a weak base. The country does not have a sound incipient industrial base; it has an extremely weak agrarian base compared compared to Kenya, Zimbabwe, Ivory Coast and its potential is weak compared even to Uganda's.

Senegal is not a place of major known resources like Nigeria, Zambia, or Zaire. It is not thought to be a place of major potential resources that are untapped like Angola. Its major export, groundnuts, is one that can be substituted by a number of other commodities from which oil may be made. Senegal falls on the low end of the population size spectrum in Africa.

Black Africa had not been defined by U.S. policy makers as being a place of strategic importance in terms of military balance or even in terms of resources, with the possible exception of Southern Africa.(1)

With the collapse of the Shah's regime in Iran, and Soviet intervention in Ethiopia, fears about access to Persian Gulf oil have risen markedly. Thus negotiations for bases in Kenya and Somalia have taken place. Still, U.S. interests in Africa, and especially in West Africa, have not been defined in strategic terms except for continued access to Nigerian oil.

Access to Dakar as a port and for possible air/military use is convenient; it is not essential. That is, one would not, at least should not,

(1) See Henry Bienen "U.S. Foreign Policy in a Changing Africa", Political Science Quarterly, Spring, 1978.

structure U.S. aid programs around such access or any presumed strategic needs. Where the U.S. has done this, sometimes by renting bases as in Ethiopia (Kagnew), the Philippines, it often runs across the purposes of development assistance. While U.S. policy is to have access to transport and communications/^{facilities} in Senegal, this has not been a defining purpose of USAID and I would strongly argue that it should not become so. I could envision this arising as more of an issue than it has been.

After a period where U.S. foreign policy in Africa ceased to be derived from Soviet-US relations and was based on regionalist perspectives rather than globalist ones, the pendulum has swung back. After the revolution in Iran, growing concern with U.S. security positions in the Gulf and Indian Ocean, Cuban and Soviet intervention in Angola and the Horn of Africa, and Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, high level U.S. policy makers have put the Soviet threat center stage. So far, this has not led to a change in U.S.-South African policies nor has it led to viewing U.S. bilateral relations with African countries largely as a function of U.S.-Soviet competition. But this could happen and we could see new U.S. policies in the Horn, Angola, and Southern Africa. (1)

West Africa is not entirely removed from military conflict and competition. Such conflict already goes on in Chad and parts of Mauritania. Libya, Morocco and Algeria all have stated interests and claims in the Western Sahara and Sudan areas. South of Senegal, too, lie countries of potential instability. Thus the possibilities for disorder within and between states exist. Wherever conflict between states exists, or the breakdown of order within a state comes about, the potential for great power conflict in Africa becomes larger. Even where the powers do not have "traditional" interests nor strategic concerns, they are reluctant to see new political alignments arise.

(1) See Henry Bienen "Perspectives on Soviet Intervention in Africa", Political Science Quarterly, Spring, 1980

Senegal's present relations with its neighbors are not highly conflictual. It is unhappy with the Gambia over smuggling. But only if the Casamance became an area of extreme tension and demands for autonomy rose would Senegal's southern borders and its borders with Gambia become uneasy. At present, discussions with Mali and Mauritania over regional development, especially water development, have been for the most part cooperative, not conflictual. Water is, of course, the life-blood of the Sahelian countries and thus cooperative development cannot be taken for granted. Relations between Sudan, Ethiopia and Egypt have an underlying tension because of the importance of the Nile to them. When relationships become tense between Ethiopia and Egypt over the Soviet role in Africa or between Sudan and Egypt over Israeli-Arab questions, all parties know that water is a tremendous weapon. And real issues of control of water itself impact on wider concerns. Similarly, the potential for conflict between Senegal, Mali, Mauritania, and Gambia exists. Such conflict, if it were to arise, is not likely to lead to great power involvement but that possibility always exists.

Nor is it likely that migration flows between Sahelian countries, especially into Senegal from its neighbors, would lead to extreme tensions that could not be contained. Already, Senegal has absorbed significant numbers of people from Guinea Bissau and from Mauritania and traditional patterns of migration continue across borders. But again, either severe drought or disorder in one Sahelian country can impact on another. Thus while Senegal has not had the severe tensions that exist in the Horn of Africa or between Zaire and Angola, or between Uganda, Kenya, and Tanzania, it would be foolish not to try and think through potentialities for conflict between Senegal and neighboring states. These potentialities have more to do with sharing of resources and flows of people than with differences that may arise over ideological or international issues regarding Soviet presence in Africa or Egypt's role in the Middle East-issues on which the Senegalese have put their views forward boldly.

It is especially important to consider the ramifications of inter-state

cooperation and conflict because the U.S. has put so much weight on regional frameworks for development aid. Planning for aid is supposed to take place within recipient countries' regional frameworks (CILSS) and within donor multilateral frameworks for the region (Club du Sahel) and within AID through Sahel Development. Also, projects for Senegal's development will focus heavily on water development in the Senegal and Gambia River Basins and through regional organizations to deal with those efforts. To go a step farther, West Africa has proliferated regional organizations for finance and development. Some of them are traditional Francophone African organizations for trade, aid, currency and finance. But ECOWAS, as a new organization bringing together French and English speaking states and dominated by Nigeria, raises important questions for thinking about Sahelian development.

In economic terms, Nigeria will provide major markets for foodstuffs from other African countries if they can produce and transport at world prices to that market. Senegal does not have a comparative advantage against Ivory Coast and others for the Nigerian market though Nigeria, once a groundnut exporter, is likely to be a significant importer. Without getting into details of trade, the question is whether Sahelian development institutions can be made consistent with wider West African and African ones. The answer should be yes. Regional plans for food self-sufficiency face more the problem of individual country's desires to be secure and not reliant on each other than they face conflicts between CILSS and ECOWAS interests. Thus, for example, transportation grids within Senegal link the country internally rather than look to links with Mali for trade. But Sahelian countries do not, basically, have complementary economies.

Nigeria is going to continue to be a much more important country for the U.S., and so is Zaire and Zimbabwe, than the Sahel countries put together. But again, this does not have much implication for U.S. development and aid efforts in the Sahel which do not fundamentally rest on major political interests nor on strategic ones.

The real question for the elaboration of U.S. programs in Senegal has to do with how to rationalize what makes sense within Senegal with

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multilateral frameworks for aid. This question has a number of components. At present, aid is funded significantly through Sahel Development within USAID. It is not likely that funding levels will rise greatly either bilaterally for Senegal or for the Sahel as a whole given the down cycle in USAID in general and the diminished interest in the Sahel and ⁱⁿ aid to Africa as a whole. We can note that major drought and refugee problems in the Horn of Africa have not led to vast new programs for Somalia. Kenya did get a transfusion of food aid because of close relations with the U.S. and our Indian Ocean needs. Aid to Somalia is negotiated through military base concerns. We have not been able to fund aid to Zimbabwe at levels it had been hoped for.

Thus the mobilization of large new aid programs in Senegal will have to be done on some kind of consortia basis if it is to be done at all.

It is hard enough to organize and implement aid through bilateral programs. Aid through international consortia raise their own difficulties concerning the aims and interests of different donors and the coordination of projects. For all the talk about coordination of aid through the Club, there appears to be relatively little coordination between aid missions in Senegal. The joint assessment complains that the donors still overlap and don't know what each other are doing. USAID officials at project and program level do not seem to have a good sense of French and other efforts. If an international consortium were put together even for Senegal alone, it would be likely to act in a concerted way on questions of balance of payment and recurrent costs. The French are, of course, key here. The IMF and Bank have already put stringent conditions on aid to certain countries including Turkey, Zaire, and Tanzania. But one should not have the view that a country's internal development policies are truly hostage to such "receiverships". Important issues can be affected, especially devaluation. Regimes may even fall over this issue, e.g. Busia's in Ghana. But has anyone argued that Zaire has become less corrupt or more efficient through international banks and IMF restrictions?

It may be argued that a consortium can exert great leverage through its macro-economic interventions. If a group of donors insists on recurrent cost ⁽ⁱⁿⁱ⁾ limitations and on total budgetary restrictions, real changes can be brought about. This is true. If it were not, countries would not balk so at IMF imposed budget restraints. However, one recipient strategy is to put more budget expenditures in to donors. Senegal is trying to do this. Another strategy is to let civil servants and military "live off the land". The society goes back to a paibend or "tormulence" (literally officials feed themselves) system. This is very unhealthy. ?

Concerted donor effort can also produce changes in price policies and to some extent have done so in Senegal. And, since public investments over time do give direction to recurrent costs, and in Senegal such a large amount of public investment is from external sources, donors have far from negligible macro-imports.

In the case of Senegal, an argument can be made that for mobilizing new resources, consortium devices make sense. Indeed, the Club is already

in place. But Senegal already operates within the franc zone. Its² devaluation is not at stake. Already, large influence can be brought to bear on Senegalese trade policies and even, within real limits, on recurrent costs and Senegal's budget. The way aid agencies work on a project basis makes it seem less likely that project aid will be well coordinated although we should keep working towards that goal. The only way to do that is to have program officers down to technical level managers, agronomists, etc. meet and discuss joint problems. A strong effort should be made to do this. It is more important than having aid directors meet in Paris or Niamey with outside consultants. In the end, projects are implemented on the ground and it must be the agents of implementation who coordinate their activities.

There is, of course, always a dialectic between specific projects and their evaluation and the macropolicies a donor hopes to affect and implement. Since other donor agencies' projects impinge on macropolicies, the need for coordination again arises, not merely for consistency of projects. This has been recognized by the Club-CILSS framework. The structure for thinking about coordination is in place. How to make it work is another matter. The difficulties here are practical, not conceptual.

French assistance ^{should} must loom very large in USAID thinking for the reasons given above with respect to coordination. But French aid also impacts on U.S. aid in other significant ways. To some extent, the French presence in Senegal, and in the Sahel as a whole, lessens some important problems associated with a growing AID presence. AID missions always have a potential to provoke nationalist feelings among an elite. The elite knows it is being bailed out - especially in Senegal, which has both a sophisticated elite and a high need for aid to maintain its governmental structure, ~~and~~ ^{it} is completely reliant on external sources for development funds. The French make the direct input into budget although PL 480 funds do this too. IMF, Bank, and Club interventions make the U.S. presence less salient. There still is a problem in the way that U.S. officials live compared to the way that the overwhelming majority of Senegalese live (though not the Senegalese elite).

There are real questions as to whether USAID officials get out and stay in the countryside as much as they should - questions that are the more salient when the aid programs are rural based. But the main point here is that should U.S. aid levels be increased, either through multi-lateral or bilateral channels, the counterproductive aspects of a large presence which was so evident in India and southeast Asian countries is not likely to be felt here.

The French presence is also relevant for the security situation in Senegal and West Africa. That presence in military terms is now removed from Mauritania and Chad. It continues to be important in Ivory Coast and Senegal. Nor have the French decided to lessen their economic commitments in the Sahel or other parts of West and Central Africa. Indeed, they have been assertive militarily and economically in Zaire. But it remains to be seen just what the form of the French presence will be after generational change takes place in leadership in Senegal and the Ivory Coast. Whether the political climate in France will continue to favor a French military and civil service presence and a large, overt technical presence, remains to be seen. Whether the French will continue to want this exposure cannot be taken for granted although it is likely to continue. There is a debate within the French government on the best way to extend French political and economic influence in Africa or even whether Africa should continue to be a place of major French focus.

While Senegal does not loom large in U.S. security definitions either in terms of access to resources or in terms of military concerns, the lessening of French presence would focus those questions more sharply. So far, the argument for warm relations with Senegal has been put in other political terms. These terms are: Senegal has been a strong resistor of Soviet incursions in Africa. While it has taken positions on new international economic order negotiations that the U.S. does not find congenial, it has, more generally, been perceived as a force for moderation and cooperation with the U.S. in Africa.

Senegal has a relatively good human rights record domestically with

respect to political prisoners, and civil liberties. It has perhaps the freest press in Africa; it has been outspoken in condemning human rights violations elsewhere in Africa. It has allowed a more open electoral and party process than most African countries.

Thus in terms of political relations, an argument can be made for an aid program but not necessarily for a massive program. Senegal is not Egypt. Nor ^{is} even Kenya politically and economically speaking. One could, before coming to economic and development issues, add other points that make Senegal an interesting country. It is tied into Arab and Islamic countries through its own widespread Islamic networks; it has been a country of greater importance in French speaking countries and in Africa than its economic base would portend. It is a country worth being on good terms with, and having an aid program to support those relations. There is, of course, no guarantee that aid programs and assistance do support political relations. They can have negative effects either by their size and impact, which gets resented, or they can fail on the ground and disappoint; or they can get one intimately involved with a particular regime or even faction and this creates difficulties when regimes change or factions lose. This point has some force since all agree that Senegal is at a point of transition in its internal governance.

Since I believe that the justification for aid to Senegal is largely developmental, I have some reservations about the idea that U.S. aid ought necessarily obtain high visibility for programs which benefit the rural population. Of course, it is natural to want credit if one does well. One must accept the blame for failure too. But it is better to do well in Senegal than to have high visibility. If programs work, both elites and non-elites will know about them. People do not love one for one's aid in any case. We do not have to win the hearts and minds of the Senegalese, happily. Thus the only justification for visibility is to show programs to visiting Congressmen and most of those will not be too keen to go to Eastern Senegal or Bakel.

Let me return to Senegal being in a period of transition. Can U.S. aid of any kind be an important element for stability in the period of transition? Assume that we would like to see a system perhaps more open to competitive

party politics (would we?) but one where there is continuity of regime. At least we can safely assume that neither a radical Islamic regime nor a pro-Soviet regime would be in the U.S. interest. Whether or not a regime that might define itself even in Marxist-Leninist terms à la Congo-Brazzaville or Mozambique or sometimes Benin would matter much for the U.S.A. is also debatable but there is no reason for the U.S. to do anything to further such possibilities. We have to assess these possibilities and then ask what U.S. aid and AID's impact would be on them.

2) THE POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF U.S. AID

U.S. Pl. 480 assistance will ease balance of payments and recurrent revenue constraints. U.S. cooperation, ^{with} and mobilization of international aid will work to do this too. This kind of aid, largely from French sources in the past, ^s which have provided critical direct transfers to Senegal's recurrent budgets, has bailed out the regime. Indeed, neither the maintenance of this regime nor the development of Dakar as we know it would have been possible without such transfers. The productive base in Senegal, all agree, has been stagnating if not running down. Only these transfusions have allowed the wolf to be kept from the door. In this sense, aid would continue to be critical in a transition.

Senegal has very constrained options. Since it has high debt repayment, a desperate liquidity situation, ^{and} relies on external sources for most public investment, aid and technical assistance allow the system to go on. At one level of generality then, the transfusions are a critical element in a transition. But in other senses, or at other levels of generality, U.S. aid cannot be an element, or at least a deliberately wielded element, in any transition. First, projects have too long a period of gestation before they can raise productivity, ease food production problems, etc. Even the immediate action components of the OMVS program in its first phase would not change the economic picture fundamentally. The current AID programs in the Casamance have not started. The health projects, the Bakel livestock and irrigated perimeters, and the cereals project can hardly be thought of as being critical elements in a transitional period. It would

take truly massive projects to make impacts of that kind, e.g., the building of the Manantali Dam. But one should be careful not to leap to the conclusion that such projects either win one's friend (the USSR and Aswan in Egypt) or that even big projects have a predictable impact on the factional politics of a country or on large scale contending social forces.

Furthermore, even blood transfusions usually postpone the date for a terminally ill country. Massive aid to Turkey has helped a development process. But it did not bring political stability to Turkey. Massive aid to Egypt has helped keep Sadat in power, but it guarantees no future. Of course, policy makers have bounded time horizons. But are these issues really at stake here? U.S. aid that helps on foreign exchange, along with other such aid, will buy more time. But time for what? This is a fair question to raise in Senegal because if, as I think, the case here is for development aid and as an important experiment in the aid process, in mobilizing resources, and in evaluation, then the question of the direct and self-conscious impact on the politics of a transition need not be center stage. U.S. aid will not be decisive in any case, certainly not project aid.

Nor is it clear that if aid were withdrawn this regime would fall. The elite's standard of living would fall; there would be severe difficulties. But one should not conjure up a Senegal where revolutionary forces are waiting at the gate and held off only by international transfers plus French troops.

I do not want, nor am I competent, to undertake an in-depth analysis of national and subnational politics in Senegal. Over and over, the literature tells us that Senegal's party politics is the politics of clans, machines, factions, networks of national and local notables.(1) Even those who do not necessarily admire either the style or policies of this type of system(2),

(1) For one account among many, see Donald Cruise O'Brien "The Ruling Class and Peasantry in Senegal, in Rita Cruise O'Brien, The Political Economy of Underdevelopment: Dependence in Senegal (Beverly Hills, 1979).

(2) For an analysis that argues machine politics can be functional in Africa under certain conditions, see Henry Bienen "One party Politics in Africa" and "Parties and Machines in Africa" in Henry Bienen, Parties and Armies in Africa (New York, 1978).

admit that in Senegal it precluded bitter sectional, religious, and ethnic violence. (1) However, the politics of patrons and clients and of political machines has a hard time flourishing in no growth economics. (What politics does not?) Since the machine pays off in material benefits, if it has to play zero-sum politics, it finds it hard to build support without excluding important segments. The trade-offs are severe politically.

Indeed, Senegal has got^{rn} away with it this long because some regions have been neglected and because a traditional elite was in place in important rural areas that did use non-material incentives and had a non-material base of authority on its own turf. But this elite has been linked to the center through client networks. The local notables now face pressures from their own clients and they must respond to them, as the Grand Caliph of the Mourides has been responding by emphasizing peasant interests. And the national government must continue to pay-off its own local clients.

If it cannot make these pay-offs, the networks decline. What then happens? Donald Cruise O'Brien raises the possibility of Mouride leaders leading a peasant revolt. Others will have to assess this. More likely, it seems to me, is that peasants and local leaders withdraw their support and their products from the system. Since the elite could not maintain itself without groundnuts exports, there would be changes at the center. Indeed, this loss of rural support is the most threatening possibility for this regime. For all the talk of lumpen proletariats and marginals in the swelling informal sector in Dakar, the informal sector is not full of revolutionary potential. It is hard to organize, very heterogenous by occupation and ethnic origin. Nor do students and discontented civil servants have much in common with its inhabitants. There is no reason to believe that if surveys were done with recent migrants to Dakar, the results would differ very much from surveys done in Lagos, Mexico City, Lima, Nairobi and other large cities. Migrants say overwhelmingly that they are better off than they were and they expect their children to be better off than they have been. (2) World Bank income data which shows many low

(1) Donald Cruise O'Brien, op. cit.

(2) For a major summary of data and analysis on migrants and formal sector-informal sector relations, see Joan Nelson, Access to Power (Princeton: 1979).

incomes among the informal sector in Dakar, as low as even some rural incomes, also shows a dispersion of income within the informal sector by occupation with many incomes at formal sector worker levels, (1) and does not, in any case, lead me to alter that conclusion.

This is not to say that rising prices in urban areas, especially food prices, may not have severe political consequences. The Egyptians backed down very quickly after riots in Cairo followed the removal of food subsidies. Riots in Monrovia were a harbinger of more sweeping changes. There seems to be common agreement that since 1974 Government has been shifting the tax burden in Senegal from rural to urban populations. There is more debate over whether or not urban standards of living have declined. Wage increases have gone along with a reduction in food subsidies. Colvin says that adjusted for prices, real minimum wages went up about ten per cent from 1970-1980.(2) However, not all urban dwellers fall within minimum wages. Most are outside of that structure. Informal sector workers usually feel a squeeze on the urban sector the most since they cannot protect themselves by bargaining for higher wages. If transfers from urban to rural sectors really are going on in Senegal, and if real urban standards fall, discontent will rise. But this is not necessarily expressed through effective political organization, especially for informal sector workers.

Probably more is to be feared by a Senegalese Government from its own employees and from small businessmen than from the urban poor or even from formal sector/^{industrial}urban workers who operate in trade unions. It has been civil servants who have really held African Governments to ransom. All Governments find it hard to keep public employee wages down, especially military, police, and essential service workers. The critical thing is not to expand the size of this work force, advice the Senegalese Government has not taken as it hopes to absorb educated people. Indeed, the proliferation of government agencies and structures owes as much to this need as to any statist

(1) World Bank, the Economic Trends and Prospects of Senegal, vol. 4.

(2) Lucie Colvin, "Private Initiatives in the Senegalese Economy". USAID Consultant Report, Dakar, July 9-25, 1980.

ideology in Senegal per se much less to any administrative or economic rationality.

Small businessmen and medium sized traders have been ignored groups in many studies of African politics. They are people who have acquired both political and economic resources. They have networks of contacts both within urban areas and back to rural ones and in Senegal are tied into Brotherhood organizations. They are highly leveraged and thus vulnerable to credit restrictions. IMF policies of restraint hit them very hard. Their potential for political action has to be assessed in specific contexts but policies of credit constriction should be evaluated with them in mind.

No one can say with certainty that a squeeze on urban groups will not provoke outbursts in Senegal. The role of police, gendarmerie, military and French forces would then be extremely important. The conventional wisdom about the Senegalese armed forces is that they are relatively professional, dependable and non-interventionist. Professional and non-interventionist are not necessarily highly correlated. Professional armies do intervene sometimes in the very name of professionalism. Their propensity for intervention depends more on their own internal dynamics and their relationships with social classes and ethnic groups than on their professional abilities per se.

There seems to be some parallels between Kenya and Senegal in that the security forces have remained available for use by political leaders and have not heavily involved themselves in domestic political decision-making. Moreover, the civil service, while not necessarily production oriented (less so in Senegal than in Kenya), does seem to be efficient in the sense that it establishes controls in society. And the civil service has a vested interest in continuing a political system from which it has benefitted. The Kenyan model is a transition to a leadership recruited from the close followers of the Grand Old Man and which rests on continued functioning of civil service and security forces. The Kenyan elite was and is probably more internally riven by ethnic and regional splits than the Senegalese. But Kenya has a more buoyant economy and has delivered more services to the rural areas and got more production out of them than Senegal. There

is more of an entrepreneurial class in both rural and urban areas. Nor is there a ^{strong} traditional elite in most places in rural Kenya. No comparisons could be neat in making predictions about a transition.

The real question for the transition may be less that of order in the urban areas, as long as the security forces hold, than the matter of rural discontent. Rural discontent has been hard to channel into radical organizations for change. True in Mau Mau in Kenya in the 1950's, in Zaire in Kwilu and in the Eastern Congo in the 1960's, in Nigeria in the Agbekoya movements of 1968-69 in some Yoruba areas, there have emerged significant peasant movements or peasant based movements. But it has been hard to sustain them and to translate them into national radical movements. Typically they have a strong ethnic component even when they express class interests. In Senegal, strong peasant discontent, if channeled by marabouts back to the center, would be more likely to be a factor in internal elite factional politics than it would be in altering the nature of a regime

As has been pointed out by insightful political analysis in the Embassy, the Islamic Brotherhoods are themselves split and leaders tend to have circumscribed followings, with the exception of the Mourides. The emergence of an Islamic rural based leader appealing to the country as a whole seems small. Whether Cheikh Anta Diop, who is both of the system and makes important challenges to it, could mobilize wide support for an Islamic regime, and what that would mean here, others will have to evaluate.

For those who think that the maraboutic structure can be the channel for radical change in Senegal it should be recalled that representing peasant demands is one thing; committing suicide is another. Could or would the maraboutic structure carry out radical land changes in Senegal? Would a Senegalese military, if it came to power, carry out Ethiopian-type revolutionary policies in the rural areas? There is no reason to believe so.

All in all, the judgement can be made that a regime not dissimilar from Senghor's would remain. Aid transfers are likely to increase that prospect but not to affect the make-up of the regime per se. That is, aid in general and USAID programs specifically, will be irrelevant to the playing out of factional politics in Senegal although they give a regime under severe

constraints with few options a bit of breathing space and time. To ask space and time for what? and could this type of regime bring about development in Senegal? are fair questions. But they must be coupled with another question: can a different regime, whether Islamic right or left, or secular left, change Senegal in terms of the goals espoused by USAID of increased standards of living, more equity, and especially providing for basic needs in rural areas?

Senegal's "reformist" regime has not exactly had a good track records. But neither has Tanzania's "innovative", and in some ways radical regime, lessened rural-urban gaps or provided for increased productivity in either rural or urban areas although it has delivered rural services, albeit on a narrowing productive base. Mozambique's experiment is coming about face. Angola's economy is a mess. Thus the peasant based, or self styled peasant based, regimes have not much to show in Africa so far. Any regime in Senegal, of whatever political stripe, would require external resources.

Whether a regime which labels itself Marxist Leninist or gets labeled by us one way or another is much less significant than the policies it tries to carry out and the resources it can mobilize. In Africa, policies are somewhat independent of social forces. That is, at one level of generality, regimes have real space for their price, investment, and development policies. Those policies are not derived from a class base or even from an institutional one. There has been as much diversity in the social, and economic policy outputs of military regimes as of civilian ones. What regimes do, of course, is related to their ethnic, social class, and institutional bases and constituencies but not neatly so.

I am arguing that there was nothing ineluctable about disastrous policies undertaken by Nkrumah or Mobutu. There was nothing ordained concerning Houphouet's or Kenyatta's directions. What there was and is in all these cases are heavy constraints; greater or weaker resource bases, both physical, human and infrastructural, severe political consequences for any policies undertaken because margins for error are small in most African countries. But there is policy space. This means a number of things for USAID in Senegal -or elsewhere. First, policies do matter. Thus the ability to influence,

persuade, either by contacts, by showing possibilities, by providing resources for certain endeavors and by carrying out analyses which make connections and reveal options is no irrelevant undertaking. That is, it may not be irrelevant or need not be. Second, all politicians, whether in khaki or mufti, in bubas or Paris suits, try to capture donors and their resources and to use them for their purposes. And the politicians have real advantages in this game. They know vastly more about their political systems than the donors. They structure the interactions between donor and themselves by stating who will be the intermediaries, by providing the institutions through which funds are channeled. Even vast aid programs in Egypt or India or Vietnam at various times faced these situations. Where the regime is terribly weak, it can still capture donors and use them through its very weakness. And the aid administrators in the field have their own worries and need to succeed in their own terms which sophisticated recipients realize. The consequences of this are that while aid may relax constraints, and buy time, and while it potentially can be significant, more through the options it opens up than through the particular projects it may fund, aid and assistance will always be used and manipulated by those who are the recipients. The dialectic is always there.

In the case of Senegal, and before turning to the joint assessment itself and the political implications of USAID projects and possible formats for future AID relationships we can again note the following. 1) The politics of the relationship are complicated by the multilateral nature of possible USAID enterprises, both regional and multidonor projects, and multilateral institutions, Club, CILSS, possible Consortium, Bank, OPEC funders, etc. Moreover, while USAID programs have grown in size, the U.S. operates in a country where the former colonial power still wields tremendous influence. This in some ways makes life easier in that the political salience of USAID is less but it also means that the USA is not the major actor. On balance, that fact and the multilateral nature of the relationships are a plus, not a minus, for exerting the kind of influence I have in mind. 2) The U.S. is not deeply plugged into the political system of Senegal. There

are contacts at a high level between USAID officials and high level Senegalese political people and technicians. The Embassy has had good access. But it seems that unlike Nigeria, for example, where large networks of contacts have been built up between unofficial Americans and Nigerians in the U.S.A. and in Nigeria, through student-teacher relationships, more commercial contact, the dialogue between Senegal and the U.S.A. is narrowly held. This means that we know less about Senegal, have fewer points of contact with it (The Peace Corps component is an exception here, and I hope we are learning from the PCVs). Even officially, my guess is that our understanding of what "Senegal" wants is heavily structured by top level contacts between U.S. officials and a few Senegalese. And those Senegalese risk being seen as too close to donors.

The best political reporting in the world from the Embassy, the greatest sensitivity to political variables on the part of USAID officials, cannot alter the fact that we relate to Senegal in a rather narrow way. This puts a heavy burden for persuasion with regard to policy change on a few officials and on the programs and projects themselves. We do not have many points of entry to influence the political system.

3. The Joint Assessment and Political Implications of AID Project

I do not want to review the overviews of economic analyses of the Senegalese economy. Suffice it to say that there is general agreement on the problems of the economy and the constraints it suffers under. Most would agree that there is no conflict between raising productivity in Senegal and providing for basic needs since the economy cannot support extension of social services without increasing the productive base. There is little quarrel with the idea that basic needs and rural infrastructural development are complementary since marketing problems, storage, transportation affect agricultural output. Different people, marshalling specific data, employing various techniques, and emphasizing individual factors will differ about whether the demand for millet can be expanded or at what price rice can be grown in Senegal or whether a particular health program can be adapted and made more efficient. It is in the nature of operating under limited knowledge with many interrelated and complicated variables, in a society with regional variations and social heterogeneity, that good analysts can have differing opinions. One of the strengths of AID's program in Senegal has been the very process of joint assessment which evaluates ongoing programs with a view to learning from them. It is absolutely essential that the difficulties in programs and projects be faced squarely both for the economic consequences and the political ones.

The joint assessment process is then an internal political process and an exercise in political relations between the Senegalese and USAID. We can and have learned about each other through the assessment process. This is a plus. An assessment process and the continued monitoring of AID projects implies that specific projects can be turned off or altered. This is a contribution made by the joint assessment process because it allows AID to have a way of ceasing to support unproductive projects and it tells the Senegalese that this can happen, with their participation in the analysis and conclusions. Indeed, it allows them to tell us that it should happen. Thus whatever the content of the joint assessment, as an undertaking it was important, beneficial in and of itself and for what it allows in the future.

The burden of my remarks above was to argue that the case for AID to Senegal is essentially a case for aid to get development in the context of a friendly country and in the context of a multilateral effort to alter the trends in a region of Africa, the Sahel. All agree that there is no quick fix in Senegal or in the Sahel for altering trends of environmental degradation; population pressure on resources; stagnant or declining productivity; lack of diversification of the economy; rural-urban dualism. Some of the goals desired are, in the short run, competing. A policy for food selfsufficiency in Senegal may make it less easy to work for food selfsufficiency in the wider Sahelian context, depending on transportation priorities and development of local and regional comparative advantages vis-a-vis neighboring countries. The desire to be more selfsufficient in food may work, over time, to lessen food imports and thus/foreign exchange

constraints. But an immediate emphasis on exports might in the short run help balance of payments event more. Exports to Nigeria, in an ECOWAS context, may move Senegal away from closer Sahelian integration. These examples could be proliferated. The desire to lesson vulnerability to food shortages makes Senegal vulnerable to donors. The desire to produce more millet may have environmental consequence. And so on.

Trade offs in Senegal are sharp because the country is poor and the constraints are severe. Things cannot be done all at once and there are too many noncomplementary aspects of Senegalese development. There are many structural imbalances. It is tempting to think that in poor countries, if we can only find good projects - that is projects that make sense in terms of social and individual profitability, we are in business. Life is not so simple.

For example, it may make good sense to explore the Casamance as an area of development potential and one that has been relatively neglected. It may appear that both growth and equity can be maximized. But the Casamance is a region with uneasy relations to the Senegalese Government. No where in the documents I have read on the Casamance Regional Development Project is the political aspect of Casamance to Senegal explored. (1)

Because the Casamance projects have not been far enough along, they have not been part of the joint assessment. Another example: In the OMVS PID, it is suggested that new perimeters will displace a certain

1) I may not have full documentation. I am referring largely to the Action Memo to the AID Administrator of July 27, 1978 and Volume III of the Casamance Regional Development Project.

number of flood recession or rainfed cultivators who will be offered a share in the irrigated perimeters as compensation. "The same perimeters will also become a resource for other elements of the population who traditionally have less access to land, since all social levels will be invited to participate on an equal basis."⁽¹⁾

How does AID guarantee that? What leverage does it have to make sure who will be offered a share in irrigated perimeters. Does it know so much about the nature of caste relationships in the Fleuve that it can determine what groups will be offered a share? If so, it will be able to cut into critical social structural areas in a way not frequently accomplished by outsiders in Africa.

Perhaps AID is counting on the development of civil service structures which undermine traditional authorities and would be available for egalitarian allocations. Colvin points out that Conseils Ruraux are given responsibility for land allocation and that village chiefs and their relatives are ineligible for membership. She says that the traditional lines of authority at the village level are negated by the Conseils Ruraux system. The weak councils are dominated by the sous-prefect who is appointed by the Ministry of Interior.

1) P.52 of Draft PID, June 20, 1980. The July 1980 PID for the OMVS makes very few changes.

There are also cooperatives involved in the rural areas. ⁽¹⁾ AID is convinced that cooperative reform "will play a fundamental role in guaranteeing that the farmer receives his full share of the benefits to be derived from the new, higher farmgate prices." ⁽²⁾ This is very important because USAID/Senegal has a stated concern to see that increased production brings a maximum return to small farmers and to the poorest of the rural poor. ⁽³⁾

The putting in place ^{of} a new civil service structure does not guarantee either that traditional authorities will be undermined or that civil servants will act either for production or equality, much less for both. We have many examples in Africa of general administrators and agricultural extension workers getting captured by better off farmers. Cooperatives too have usually been controlled by better off farmers. This happened even in Ujamaa Villages in Tanzania. ⁽⁴⁾

I am not suggesting that in Senegal civil servants cannot be agents of social change and equitable development. I am suggesting that this will not necessarily be the case any more than cooperatives will ipso facto fulfill those roles.

The concern for egalitarian development is again stated in the OMVS PID.

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1. Colvin, op.cit. p. 11
 2. AID, Senegal Country Development Strategy Statement, FY82, January 1980, p.28.
 3. Ibid. p.21
 4. See the work of Goran Hyden on Kenya's Cooperatives and the work of Dean McGowan on Tanzania's Ujamaa villages.

This document recognizes that with the introduction of irrigated plots, a woman may lose access to her private fields, "Ways to correct this situation are being examined." Not a very strong statement. If you set a process forward which raises the value of land and commercializes it, disrupting either traditional caste or sex defined rights to land use, you have changed fundamental parameters. One should not fool oneself into thinking that this is a process that can be controlled down the line by outside agencies, whatever legal stipulations they impose in the short run. I am not suggesting that all improvements or rise in land values work to the disadvantage of already relatively disadvantaged groups, be they women or low origin groups. Sometimes the contrary takes place.

A great deal of status reversal took place in Africa when missionaries brought education to low social status groups or when roads or access to resources came to relatively disadvantaged areas. This process frequently took place not through deliberate colonial manipulation but through investments, education, and developments that had unforeseen impacts. The latent consequences of development were more significant for ethnic relationships between groups in the Congo or in Uganda than the conscious ones. Or, when the colonial regime did use divide and rule tactics or recruited militaries from marginal ethnic and economic groups, it could hardly know what it was setting loose in Uganda.

We can doubt whether excellent predictions can be made about the impacts that projects have on social mobility and on power relationships without knowing a very great amount about the indigenous social structures as well as actual economic outcomes which will occur.

The PID for the OMVS is partially sensitive to the issues raised. It takes up the possible erosion of local institutions under the impact of outside agencies and the possibility that accumulation of land will create sharecroppers or wage laborers. Indeed, some traditional institutions prove highly flexible and capture new resources brought to them by outside agencies be they missionaries, colonial administrators or aid donors. The Baganda chiefs did so as did chiefs in Sierra Leone,⁽¹⁾ The critical variables are the nature of organization in the traditional structures, the values of local belief systems, and the interactions between outsiders and locals, and the resources being exchanged.

Venema, in the Wolof of Saloum, argues that government organizations in Senegal that have been concerned with increasing agricultural productivity have insufficient knowledge of the fragmentation of domestic units or the hierarchy of local power networks - and aristocratic cultural patterns. This is consistent with situations elsewhere in Africa. There is no reason to expect, a priori, that civil servants will be sensitive to local political factors or know much about them.

1) See David Apter, The Political Kingdom in Uganda (Princeton: 196); Martin Kilson; Political Change in a West African State: The Case of Sierra Leone (Cambridge: 196)

Whatever the intervention of civil servants for egalitarian development in rural areas, it maybe that agricultural productivity is not going to rise without social differentiation on the land and an intensification of class differences. This process has gone on in a great deal of the world but the amount of social differentiation on the land varies and the ability of urban areas to absorb those who lose from the rural areas or the ability of off-farm rural employment to absorb them varies too.

It can be fairly asked why not more of an attempt was made to come to grips with these questions raised in the context of the OMVS where they are very critical from the experiences of the Bakel Small Perimeters Projects.

The experience of Bakel is used to make estimates about operating costs but not social structural change or political-administrative relations, except by inference in some of the concerns with private sector-administrative agency relations.

This is an important point. The first stated conclusion in the Joint Assessment's Final Report reads: "In difficult environments as in Senegal, all projects are protypic and should be explicitly recognized as such. This means that an emphasis must be placed on data collection and analysis so that a project may be carefully monitored and conclusions drawn from project experience."

Agreed. If we turn to the Annexes of the Joint Assessment we find a frank appraisal of the Bakel irrigated perimeters and integrated crop production projects.

But no monitoring system on the impact of technology on local social and economic networks was in place. Recommendation 5 calls for one to be out in place. (p.2.1.7.) The comments on Sociological Aspects (p.2.1.14,) are very sparse but presumably provided the base for the confidence which the OMVS PID faces social concerns. More is available on institutional analyses (p.2.1.16-17).

If a monitoring and reevaluation system is going to be useful, then what we learn from Bakel must be plugged into OMVS new projects. Of course, the timing is difficult. The OMVS PID is put forward when the Joint Assessment Bakel evaluation team is in the field and the ENEA team is carrying out their beneficiary survey. Since the social structural impact data was not there to begin with, and time for such data to be forthcoming was short, there was a built in problem.

If trade offs are severe and the point of pilot projects is to learn about them by evaluation, not only must the evaluation be full but what we do have should be reflected in new proposals. Was it in the OMVS PID?

A similar criticism can be made about the ways that/^{what}was learned concerning training and manpower difficulties, including those of SAED project staff was glossed over or not taken into account in the OMVS PID.

In the Annex A to that document, a number of severe difficulties are slipped over. The attracting of skilled people to rural areas is a problem. The project proposes to deal with it through institutional development and policy reform components. These are worthy programs. But given the incentives in Senegal, it is a very intractable problem. I do not expect PIDs that propose programs to then state that the programs cannot work because of an inability to direct skilled people to rural areas, but the whole treating of manpower constraints in this and other documents seems overly optimistic. How are private sector groups to be protected against resistance by the parastatals working in the OMVS? Surely not by the stipulation of legal conditions in a PID(1). This brings me to a fundamental problem, almost all AID and other evaluations raise serious questions about the ability of Senegalese state structures to provide useful services and inputs to the rural areas at reasonable costs.

(1) See p. 7 of Annex A, OMVS P.D.

Indeed, the image received of these structures is that they are inefficient, sometimes corrupt, and frequently stifle the rural private initiatives that exist. Commentators do differ as to how ^{much} private rural and urban trade, investment, and entrepreneurial potential there is in Senegal, but they suggest that there are trade and investment network in rural Senegal (1) There ^{once was} the belief that Regional Development Agencies would operate more efficiently as they took over responsibilities for directing agricultural production from central ministries. The joint assessment makes clear that this hope cannot be sustained and USAID no longer shares it. Nonetheless, fundamental political problems are rarely solved by administrative reforms. The Senegalese Government can abandon ONCAD when the opposition focuses on its corruption and inefficiencies. It can respond to donor pressures for administrative reform. It is much more difficult, even granting the political will, to transform a civil service built for control and the transfer of resources to a political and administrative center into a civil service

(1) Colvin, op.cit. discusses this as does Martin Klein in "Colonial Rule and Structural Change: The case of Sine Saloum," in O'Brien, op.cit. pp. 65-99. Also see Bakel Lives-tock Joint Assessment.

(2) Senegal, CDSS, op.cit. p. 27

that is production oriented or equity oriented.

Unfortunately, Africa provides rather few examples of this transformation.

Even when there is political leadership committed to creating "development administration" out of bureaucracy, as in Tanzania, bureaucracy persists. African state enterprises for trade, production and investment have invariably been high cost and inefficient. Marketing boards have functioned to tax farmers in Africa much better than they have functioned to increase agricultural productivity. In Tanzania, the state bureaucracy itself is seen by the Left as an exploiter. But since those to the left of Nyerere, as well as he and his colleagues, are so committed to state intervention and the emasculation of private capital in production and trade, they have nothing to offer but the creation of "new men" in the civil service by exhortation and negative rewards. It is true that a strong regional or provincial civil service can function better as a development mechanism than a highly centralized one in Africa. The Kenyan provincial administration was built for control. But it has also given production and low cost inputs to farmers a high priority. Indeed, the Kenyan provincial administration has been wary of rapid Africanization of trade networks through licensing and government intervention precisely because it feared that a low cost,

albeit Asian dominated, trade network would be replaced by a high cost Africanized one and that farmers would suffer from high costs of inputs to them.

Whether the creation of new agencies in Senegal will produce more efficient services remains to be seen. A civil service does not operate in isolation from norms in the society as a whole. Furthermore, Kenyan farmers have been effective pressure groups on central policy making and implementation because there have been effective political links between districts, regions, and central political power. These links operate through party, ethnic groups and the civil service. Perhaps they can be made to operate in Senegal too, so that administrative reform is not merely rearranging deck chairs on the Titanic. But this requires realignment and a different functioning of patron client networks and the party operation in Senegal : not administrative reform alone. So far, reporting on SAED and other RDAs makes them appear unpopular, more a deconcentration of central power than a real effort at decentralization. (1)

(1) See the work of Sheldon Gellar on Rural Animation
E. Schumacher's work in bureaucracy and rural development
in Senegal raises serious questions too.

Furthermore, at the heart of the system lies a contradiction not easily overcome. The Senegalese leadership requires political support from rural areas. But this political support is based on a network of local leaders who do not wish to be administratively reformed, or "modernized" or programmed out of existence. These local notables may resist the ending of political restraints on farmers just as civil servants will resist a dismantling of the state structures which they operate and through which they are rewarded. But USAID must ask itself if anything less than a dismantling of state structures or a truly radical reorganization of them will allow a more productive agriculture. It is a major step forward that Senegal appears committed to rural development. Governments have a much harder time translating their commitments in the rural areas into workable programs. It is difficult to get resources out into the rural areas in a constructive way. It is hard to find good projects because rural development is a holistic phenomenon. And, at every step, political questions of power-control of land, water, transportation, external resources-intrude. The political will and political strategies for development have to be constructed from within. Nor will USAID, nor any outside donor have much social engineering leverage on the reorganization of administrative and political networks. Even where AID has been much more massive than it will be in Senegal, whether mobilized by/^aconsortium or not,

the ability of outsiders to restructure according to their values and wishes has been very limited.

Outsiders can intervene but they can rarely produce the results they want in intended ways. Different types of AID projects and technical assistance allow for various kinds of intervention. Indeed, the larger the projects and the more concentrated they are, the fewer the points of intervention in the system although the interventions may have more weight.

What occurs in the development process in Senegal will owe much more to internal political factors and to exogenous factors than to directed interventions by outsiders. The exogenous factors include world prices for commodities that Senegal must export and import. They include weather. Then there are semi-exogenous factors which USAID may have some effect on, e.g. the amount of AID flows from OPEC countries or Europe. There are also internal social and demographic ^{factors} / donors will not be able to alter in the short run. Population growth will not slow down appreciably within the time horizons of envisioned AID programs. Whatever projects are put in place, total rural to urban migration will not slow down either. Rural incomes simply cannot be raised across the board for enough people to affect rural to urban migration although a sharp rise in urban costs of living will have some impact. These internal factors become parameters within which to work and to plan.

Given the severe constraints in Senegal and given the limited knowledge and abilities of all donors, USAID included, the start of wisdom is to realize one's limited ability to affect change. This need not be considered a statement of despair. Since US political interests in Senegal are modest and limited, the USAID programs can be thought of as development oriented, and prototypical. It is important to learn from them both for AID to Senegal and for the AID effort in poor countries with limited resource bases. Moreover, the attempt to mobilize international resources and to plan in an organized multilateral way for both recipients and donors is a very important step which needs support. This is true for the commitment to evaluation of programs in Senegal and the Sahel as a whole. In situations where our knowledge is limited, constant reevaluation is critical.

There are number of paths that AID can take in Senegal:

- 1) AID can continue with experimental/pilot projects that also try to make an impact through raising productivity in health and rural development areas.
- 2) The projects selected can be better related to the wider economic transactions in society and their managerial costs can be reduced, or at least this can be attempted. The joint assessment suggests that projects can certainly be improved

and also suggests that USAID might take on more direct managerial roles.

One and two are not different in kind. Nor would necessarily imply inexpensive projects in terms of cost per project or total costs. It is also difficult to monitor a large number of scattered projects or to influence the direction of many projects if one becomes unhappy about them.

3) There is thus a tendency to want to move towards larger, fewer programs because they are:

- a) easier to relate to macro trends in Senegal ;
- b) it is thought they have more visibility ;
- c) they will be more appropriate for consortia type funding and also for group monitoring and evaluation.
- d) it is thought that such programs give you policy leverage vis-a-vis government because they may be so critical to its development needs. Such projects include OMVS development ; Casamance regional development, redesigned ; soil fertility reconstruction in Sine Saloum.

Within the larger projects, there is the view that one can still hold into a project mix. That is projects can still be pilot-prototypical ; they can still be labor intensive and spread out. They can still have a research component and can be adjusted while they go on.

But it is harder to keep large scale projects prototypical. For one thing, there is more pressure to see direct output results when large funds are at stake. This is more true rather than less for multilateral donor programs. Thus there is also pressure for more visible hardware and physical output results when one moves to larger projects. There is pressure for more visibility. The matter of leverage over the recipient government is a two way street. The large donor commitment with heavy sunk costs makes it more difficult to pull out or to adjust projects in mid-stream. The large projects may or may not get one more involved in the political system. They can become more involving as they are more critical to government. If they are large capital investment projects, the interaction is usually with government at very high levels, and may get one into inter-ministerial conflicts. If the projects are integrated regional development ones, the interaction may be take place at more levels in the political system. Then, in order to make the projects "work", intervention seems necessary at levels in which AID officials have no comparative advantage. The more integrated the programs are meant to be, the more extensive and sensitive the interventions.

I do not suggest that it is easy to collect base line data from which to assess economic, social, and political impacts. Moreover, the analytical structures for assessment are hard to develop. Strong social science theories for examining sound changes set loose by foreign and are not readily at hand. The task should not be minimized. And, Governments frequently do not want this kind of work done by either nationals or foreigners.

Senegal has allowed a good deal of open and unfettered research to go on in rural areas. Research organizations exist in Senegal with whom to collaborate. This is an area where donors should concert their support for research, should make materials available to each other and support the collection and maintenance of documentary and research facilities together with Senegalese institutions.

Conclusions and Recommendations

The Joint Assessment process has been useful in and of itself. Indeed, it points the way as an important model for AID evaluations. It does not clearly point the way to the kinds of projects and programs that ought to exist for Senegal. These depend on funding levels available and whether multilateral frameworks for the AID effort can be continued and extended. Moreover, it is early in the evaluations process. Especially, political and social impacts of AID programs and projects have not been determined. There is relatively little political analysis of projects. Thus while the political implications of USAID strategies on the macro level can be sketched out, the micro impacts of projects and the ways that macro policies will affect different social and economic groups in Senegal is hardly revealed by the Joint Assessment. Nor could that be accomplished readily.

1) One conclusion then is that since we still have many unknowns about impact of aid in Senegal, it is important to build more social and political analysis into the evaluation process. It also is noted that high visibility projects run the risk that unintended consequences and perhaps failure will also be very visible. Even if USAID goes the route of concentrating project resources both for reasons of economic impact, and/or managerial/implementation

efficiency, and political visibility (and I am less impressed with the need for the last).

2) There is much to be said for program phasing as the OMVS does. That is, direct action programs, research and pilot projects, and aiming towards long term results should be continued and interrelated(1). But as programs are developed, what is learned from one should be better integrated into others.

3) It makes sense to try to mobilize resources through integrated donor planning and coordination. Most international consortia under either IBRD/IMF auspices or consortia of banks have been involved in monitoring and controlling expenditures and to a lesser extent trade policies. It is harder to establish and maintain consortia groups for mobilizing resources, making commitments to specific projects and coordinating programs in the field. The donors do not have the same interests politically nor necessarily in functional terms. And project coordination is difficult because of different modes of operating, funding procedures, communications problems and time available for coordination. Nonetheless, given the anticipated AID funding levels available for Senegal, the US might be able to maximize its aid leverage by placing a key role in mobilizing funds and

(1) As a matter of presentation, the interrelationship of long run and short run goals as put forward on p. 3 of Chapter II, of OMVS proposal should be made clearer. This involves relating micro projects to macro programs and policies and making clear how monitoring will affect projects and programs.

coordinating aid, although it is unlikely that the French will subordinate their aid and technical assistance efforts to a wider consortium group. They might well collaborate and put partial funding through such a group as they have done with the Club.

4) One warning signal. If the U.S. spends great effort in organizing consortia groups, will it be able to maintain its own funding commitments over time? Will the expectations of fellow donors and of Senegal be disappointed? We should not create a structure we cannot maintain and we should not create one that might depend on personal ties and influence within AID and State and with donors. This is danger in a country such as Senegal where U.S. interests are not large in political or economic terms.

5) Aid to Senegal is justified politically but the real thrust of aid should be towards serious development. This has been conceived of as immediate action programs to raise productivity, research, long term institution building and structural change. The conception makes sense. Even if USAID should move to concentrate its efforts in a few major areas, for example, reforestation, it is important to maintain a concern for evaluation and the structural impacts that programs have. We might no longer think of particular projects as "prototypical". However, any project one can envision, including planting trees or recapturing land from dessertification, has sound and political impacts and we ought to try and understand these. As we learn from experiences, projects, in one sense, cease to be prototypical. But the need for evaluation and reevaluation is not lessened.

6) However, the United States does not have great leverage over Senegal. Nor at the program/project level can interventions easily be made into a political and bureaucratic system which has not yet been development oriented in an efficient and productive fashion. The ability of outsiders to effectively work with a social engineer is always limited although outside interventions may produce important impact - sometimes unintended ones.

The points of contact between USAID and Senegal seem limited. The highly factional and complex indigenous political system is extremely hard to manipulate even if there were some sense that US personnel knew how or thought it desirable to do so. While USAID, in conjunction with other aid, makes an important contribution to easing financial and food constraints in a period of political fluidity, USAID both cannot and should not be intervening in factional politics. Its efforts are not relevant to those politics ; it has no tools to be determinative in that endeavor. USAID time horizons should be long term. Short run political changes in Senegal are not likely to lead to a political structure with which USAID could not work or would ask USAID to leave or to curtail its efforts. It would be wise to keep the goals of USAID foremost in development terms and in terms of learning how best to operate in Sahelian countries. It will be necessary to keep in mind the limited impacts of that aid both politically and economically.

7) Change cannot be brought about in Senegal in a controlled, directed way by USAID or any groups of outsiders. Too many intractable endogenous as well as exogenous factors are at work. No matter how much monitoring is done, it is extremely difficult to predict and to anticipate the effect of one's aid programs on social changes. Indigenous groups try to capture resources and to bend programs for equity and growth to

their own purposes. Resources exist to try to maintain USAID goals but those goals will sometimes be at odds with those of local and national groups. This tension is built into any aid process. Even if we know this and try to take account of the fact, responses have to be partially ad hoc and contextually determined.

8) A strong tension in Senegal is the desire to play a role in reforming state structures that havenot worked well and to help rationalize policies set by and implemented by those structures. Also, USAID looks forward to using private initiatives more. Can this be done in Senegal ? Can reformist and incremental policies make an impact on real increases in standards of living and do so to produce more equitable outcomes between sectors and groups ? It is worth trying to further those ends. It is not clear that either "radical" change is possible in Senegal or that it would produce more desirable outcomes in terms of USAID's stated goals and American interests. However, one must end up agnostic as to the political possibilities for effective reforms in Senegal.