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ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION OF ROLES PLAYED BY PROMOTION HUMAINE, REGIONAL
DEVELOPMENT AGENCIES, AND LOCAL INSTITUTIONS IN PROMOTING RURAL DEVELOPMENT
IN SENEGAL AND PROSPECTS FOR FUTURE USAID COLLABORATION.

I. PROMOTION HUMAINE

A. Background

The Animation Rurale Service was established in 1959 as part of a rural development strategy to radically restructure the countryside along African Socialist lines. Self-governing rural communities were eventually to become the basic political unit in the countryside; efficient multifunctional cooperatives run by the membership were to become the basic economic unit of the rural economy; and state bureaucratic control and tutelage inherited from the colonial era would someday disappear as the rural populations took charge of their own destiny.

The Animation Service was part of a trinity of new development institutions designed to implement the government's utopian socialist development strategy. The Centres d'Expansion Rurale (CER) were supposed to be multidisciplinary services operating at the grassroots level (arrondissement) which would attempt to satisfy all the basic needs of the people in their district by lending their technical skills to improve production, productivity, health levels, housing, and educational levels. Unlike the traditional technical services which were concerned primarily with production norms, the CERs were to be concerned with the total development of the people in their district. The Cooperative movement was to provide the basic economic unit for organizing the rural populations. During the early 1960s the government established a network of hundreds of coops throughout the country and broke the monopoly of the major European import-export houses which had previously controlled the peanut trade. The coops did not evolve into the multifunctional coops envisaged in the original African Socialist theory, but remained primarily vehicles for peanut marketing and depositories for rural credit under the heavy tutelage of the State. The departure of Mamadou Dia from the political scene in December 1962 marked the end of the government's initial effort to give priority to an African Socialist development strategy built on Animation Rurale, the CERs, and the Cooperative movement. The Animation Service which initially was supposed to organize and prepare the rural populations for the radical changes implied in Dia's

African Socialism program was transformed into an agency for civic education. The CERS faded in importance as government policy put more stress on raising production and productivity first through foreign aid agencies like SATEC and CFDT during the mid 1960s, and later through Senegalized Regional Development Agencies (RDAs) like SODEVA, SAED, and SOMIVAC. The cooperative movement stagnated and became less popular as it came under the control of ONCAD which was regarded more as a generator of peasant debt and den of corruption by the rural populations than an instrument for improving their lives.

During the late 1960s, the Animation Service's influence waned and in 1970, it was reduced to being a minor direction within the Youth and Sports Ministry and headed for oblivion, a fact which led its founder and director to resign and leave the country.

Towards the end of 1973, the GOS decided to once again upgrade Animation Rurale which by now had become transformed into Promotion Humaine and to call back Ben Mahdi Cissé to head the newly reorganized agency. Cissé was given ministerial status and Promotion Humaine was raised to the level of a Secretariat d'Etat attached to the Ministry of National Education. PH was given responsibility for promoting various forms of non-formal education -- post-primary practical training (EMP), training rural artisans, fishermen, herders, and pilot farmers, functional literacy in the national languages, Maisons Familiales, etc.. Animation Rurale became a residual service which dealt with women and youth and small village level projects and gave some civic training to Rural Councillors. Much of PH's funding came from external donors and funding was never sufficient to do an adequate job in carrying out the various missions which had been formally assigned to it.

After the March, 1978 national elections, PH was in danger of being dismantled. The newly created Secretariat d'Etat à la Condition Feminine took away PH's control over women's projects and half of the Animation Rurale Direction's agents. At the same time the Ministry of National Education took direct control over the Literacy Direction. The government removed Cissé as the head of PH and put Robert Sagna in his place.

B. Recent Evolution

In January 1980, the Prime Minister reorganized his government. As a result of the reorganization, Promotion Humaine and Condition ~~Feminine~~ were combined into one Sécretariat d'Etat à la Promotion Humaine and placed under

the direction of Maimouna Kane who had headed Condition Feminine. Promotion Humaine itself was placed under the direct supervision of the Prime Minister's office, a sign which was to underscore the government's renewed interest in Promotion Humaine.

Analysis of the PM's speech justifying the fusion of Condition Feminine and Promotion Humaine indicates that Diouf still regards PH's mission and constituency as serving a) youth and b) women. That was the way in which Diouf defined Animation Rurale in 1970 when he transferred it to Youth and Sports. This suggests that the PM does not plan to resurrect PH as a major ideological force and influence in defining government policy. He still remains committed to a more technocratic rather than popular participation auto-gestion approach to rural development.

As to Maimouna Kane, she rose to prominence as an advocate of women's rights and improving rural women's status. She is a former magistrate and is well known in international women's circles, having headed the recent world women's conference in Copenhagen. While head of Condition Feminine, Maimouna Kane made many tournées in the rural areas distributing millet mills, equipment for rural maternities, and other items. She is a modern urbane sophisticated woman with little (no?) concrete experience working in rural areas or on rural development. Since taking over PH, she still continues to stress almost exclusively women's issues to detriment of other PH functions. She seems to have no real political base outside support for her by the President and Prime Minister and thus far has showed little interest in either non-formal education functions of PH or traditional Animation Rurale and community development functions. Of course, it is possible that she will take more of an interest now that the Copenhagen conference is over. At any rate, unlike the directors and lower level agents, she has no real attachment to old Animation populist philosophy.

In recent months, the reorganization of PH now seems to be going beyond simply a fusion of Condition Feminine and weakened 1978-80 Promotion Humaine. The reform of ONCAD and "redynamisation" of rural structures discussed by the PS in its April 12, Conseil National meeting may mean an enlarged role for Promotion Humaine in rural development activities. This can be seen in two developments which have not yet become official:

1. The Secretariat executive des Actions des C.E.R.s which previously had been attached to the Rural Development Minister's office will be transferred to Promotion Humaine. This means that the CERs and Animation Rurale will once again be reunited under the same roof after being separated for a decade. What this means remains to be seen, since the CERs have been largely non-functional for lack of resources despite the importance which official texts give to them. Most of the 90 CERs do not have a full team. Even worse, they do not have any operating funds to get out and reach the rural populations. Each CER has about 250,000 CFAF a year which has to cover gas, vehicle maintenance, and other expenses. When vehicles break down there is no money to fix them; and even if they work, there is no money for gas to run them. Hence, it is easy to understand why some say that CERP stands for Centre d'Elegance et de Repos Permanent. Recent government support and a greater role for the CERs in planning social and economic development projects for the Rural Communities. Who will provide these resources? A) foreign donors and/or B) GOS possibly using revenues from a tax levied on marketing of agricultural products.

2. It is very likely that the Fonds Nationale pour le Développement Communautaire (FONADEC) will become a direction of Promotion Humaine. FONADEC will be a clearing house for collecting money from foreign donors -- governmental and non-governmental -- for community development projects. PH has had a long history of success in obtaining funds from PVOs for local development activities. Since the CERs which are charged with planning and executing community development projects will now be at PH, it seems to make sense to put FONADEC there too. Up until now, the CERs have been able to get external funding from Konrad Adenauer Foundation to put on seminars at grassroots level and from Belgians for a few ferme-pilote projects. With increased party and government stress on community development and greater role for CERs, I would predict that FONADEC will make a concerted effort to get more funding from external donors and channel some of that to CERs as well as to more traditional PH kinds of local development projects.

Growing government and party interest in activating CERs and upgrading status of Promotion Humaine are largely the result of:

1. The need to mend fences and keep the support of rural populations. The "malaise paysanne" is back again and peasants are losing confidence in government's ability to serve their interests. The resurrection of party

politics means that the PDS is there to capitalize on rural unrest. Local PS politicians want resources directed to their constituents whose main concerns are for wells, health facilities, schools, and community halls, items which can not be provided by RDAs. Community development projects can provide these services and meet needs expressed by rural populations. CERS can deliver (in principle) these services if provided with means.

2. A strong revival of pre-SATEC African Socialism ideology in the past year which stress auto-gestion, criticizes the "productionist" perspective of the RDAs as being too narrow, and calls for revitalization of the cooperative movement as basic economic unit of decentralized agrarian socialist society. Even SODEVA (see *Journées d'Etudes*, juin 1979 report) is pushing for decentralized coop structures and its eventual demise. The ideological Left of the PS does not like the fact SODEVA has been given responsibility for promoting evolution of cooperative movement, even though it admits that SODEVA is probably better than ONCAD. The Left would like to see an independent National Cooperative Office which would not be under control of "productionist" regional development agencies.

3. The need for GOS to obtain resources to pay employees and keep services functioning. It can not fire that many people regardless of what IMF wants. Popular Participation, Community Development, Women's activities are "in" with many donors. Hence, one can capitalize on this trend to capture more resources.

Other changes in PH structures resulting from reorganization concern rearranging various directions inherited from old PH and Condition Feminine. These services will be reorganized into four distinct Directions:

A. Direction de la Formation Pratique Rurale which includes:

1. Alphabetisation which comes back to PH after being at Education Nationale. Stress will be on functional literacy rather than mass literacy programs. It will work closely with RDAs. Functional literacy is now being stressed more in government documents. Its importance will probably grow much more rapidly once Senghor departs from political scene. Younger cadres generally interested in literacy programs in national languages which has been resisted by Senghor and French for many years.

2. Formation Professionnelle Rurale: training of artisans, fishermen, herders, pilot peasants, etc..

3. Enseignement Moyen Pratique: post-primary school practical education.

B. Direction de l'Animation Rurale et Urbaine which is becoming more project oriented and tries to concentrate cadres around projects. It depends heavily on PCVs to reach villages.

C. Direction de la Condition Feminine: This service will be responsible for all activities relating to women. Monatrices d'Economie Familiale, women's projects, matrones, etc..

D. Direction du Bien-Etre Familiale. This direction will have tutelle over Maisons Familiales. It also takes over Service de Menager et Sociale which used to be in Social Action Ministry. Finally, it is likely that family planning or espacement de naissance projects will also be located here. Stress will be on family planning as part of broader improvement of women's life.

As a government ministry, PH's star seems to be rising thanks to its expanded functions and missions. Maimouna Kane's political position could be pretty tentative in a society where Islamic pietism is on the move. It looks as though PH could retain its current position even if Kane goes.

The real question of PH's ability to be effective in carrying out its new enhanced mission depends on its getting the resources it needs to do the job. External financing will not be sufficient. PH's fate depends on Senegalese political developments. If it is just a front for capturing foreign aid, it won't be much more effective than old PH. If it gets more support both politically and financially, one could see improvement in its work. Demoralized cadres could begin some enthusiasm. Agents could get out in the field and actually have chance to work more closely with grassroots. More political support and resources would also enhance its ability to challenge the preeminence of the Regional Development Agencies even though the RDAs are more than likely to get their own way, particularly if the current leadership continues to hold sway.

C. USAID and Promotion Humaine

USAID's relationships with PH go back to early 1960s when AID provided vehicles to Animation Rurale Service to get around and some PCVs to help out. During the late 1960s and early 1970s, the Peace Corps developed close ties with the Animation Service. Today the Peace Corps is an integral part of Senegal's Animation Rurale program. USAID interest and involvement with Animation increased after 1973 when PH secretariat was established. New Directions policy with its stress on self-help, organizing the poor, promoting

women's status, etc. made PH a likely agency for USAID collaboration. PH was the only Senegalese government agency which worked directly with rural women in development projects; it was committed to self-help and community organization and reaching the people not touched by productionist agencies. Hence, over the years, USAID began to put PH components into larger projects and to finance small-scale PH projects -- e.g. Peace Corps self-help projects, Women in Development, etc..

Over the past couple of years, there has been growing disillusionment with PH and reluctance to continue to finance PH activities on the same scale as before. Recent evaluations of PH's performance have often been harsh. Here it might be useful to analyze the causes underlying PH's weak performances and the areas of its strengths:

1. Bakel Livestock Project:

One of the main problems here was that PH provided agents who were not prepared for the task at hand. PH did not provide an evelage specialist who had experience with herders. Hence, PH agents operated in a technical knowledge vacuum. Even worse, they did not speak Poular. They thus lacked two crucial qualities needed to do their job, ability to communicate directly with their constituents and to understand their economic organization. PH's agents' lack of technical expertise has always been a major weakness. The lesson is not to use PH agents in projects requiring specialized knowledge which they do not have. On the other hand, small women's projects and Maisons Familiales worked better. Why? Older female cadres spoke poular; they had entrée to women in village; they provided a service which was desired. Maisons Familiales generally work because they are not set up until villagers really want them. MF moniteurs and monitrices work closely with villagers. Hence, they are more likely to work better.

In all fairness to PH agents in projects, it must be said that they received little support from Dakar. This too is a constant problem, PH has little operating funds for logistical support. Moreover, Bakel is very far away and inaccessible. PH agents there felt abandoned, often did not get paid, and felt a sense of isolation.

2. Sine-Saloum Health Project:

PH agents were supposed to explain project to local villagers, organize local management committees to manage village health huts, and encourage

people to use health huts. Beneficiary surveys done by ENEA indicated that PH had done little to "sensibiliser" villagers about project or to help management committees get the knowledge and skills needed to keep project going. There were marked differences in PH performance. In the department of Kaolack, Animation was the main source of information about the health projects. On the other hand, in the department of Nioro, Animation came third after Rural Councillors and health officials as the main source of information. Why did things go relatively better in Kaolack? Was it because the Animation agent was more conscientious? Reports written by this particular agent reflect much concern and understanding of local problems on issues concerning health huts and delivery of services. Or was greater ability to reach rural populations in Kaolack largely a function of greater access to vehicles because PH agent can tap regional service's vehicles to get around. Kaolack agent is less isolated than the one in Nioro.

Another explanation of poor PH performance was that project in general and PH service in particular bit off far more than it could chew. PH did not have the resources to do the job. Poor job performance by a major PH official hindered the project. That agent was eventually removed. There were also problems of coordinating activities and clearly delimiting respective responsibilities of health and PH services. Unfortunately, little love is lost between the Health Ministry and PH. Interdepartmental rivalries thwart effective collaboration. PH still tends to be regarded as "not serious" by technical services and inferior in status. Necessity of being responsible only to own administrative hierarchy also hinders collaboration among field agents.

3. SODEVA Cereals Project:

PH component is considered as an add-on, by USAID officials. SODEVA cadres were disdainful of PH and wanted SODEVA to assume most of PH's functions -- literacy training, training rural artisans, women's projects, etc.. PH performance was horrendous in the department of Diourbel where nothing it did worked. Artisan center did not function most of the time; Literacy program never got off the ground; Maison Familiale did not open. Governor refused at one time to let PH agents to participate in scheduled PH development activities. Marabouts, administrative structures, and technical services also joined against PH in Diourbel, hence, big failure. PH worked better in

department of Thies because of better collaboration between PH and SODEVA cadres. Lesson: Do not support PH activities in areas where there is strong across the board opposition or hostility to PH service. Ministry of Interior also argued with PH over jurisdiction as to deciding when and where Rural Councillors were to get trained by PH agents. PH ineffective in literacy training was due to little logistical and material support from Dakar. No materials to use once basic training in transcribing done. Whose fault? Manque de moyens or lack of technical competence?

The issue raised by SODEVA project is who is most competent to do literacy programs, women's projects, organizing peasantry, small-scale projects? Regional Development Agency or PH? If RDA can do job as it claims, then why does one need Animation Rurale too? Are there some areas which RDAs can not or will not do which have to be done? PH claims that RDA is too narrowly production-programmed; they do not care about civic education and raising overall quality of life. More significantly, PH claims that RDAs do not have pedagogical skills necessary to organize villagers. SODEVA was ready to concede that PH could do home economics better than they, but not much more. At any rate, rivalry between two services will continue and arguments over competence and philosophical orientation will continue to remain a bone of contention.

4. WID and PCV small-scale projects

Here USAID and Peace Corps work closely with Animation Rurale service of PH and set up number of women's vegetable garden projects, daycare centers, childcare, youth projects, wells, latrines, etc.. Results are mixed. Much depends on quality of PCV as well as quality and cooperation of Animation agents. Thanks to long experience, PC and Animation know each other well and can collaborate more effectively. PCVs often criticize some Animation officials for not getting out in villages more. Animation cadre are based now at department level. Thus, he is fairly well removed from constant grassroots activities. He does not have material means to get around. Hence, he is more a manager and supervisor of PC projects than a grassroots development agent. Animation officials thus rely on PCVs to "animate" village and to insure proper execution of small-scale projects.

Participation of villagers a crucial factor in success of project. Projects not initiated by villager demands or interests rarely succeeded.

PC evaluation of 1968-77 activities also indicated that external financing also a major key to successful projects. Projects relying exclusively on village resources rarely succeeded. Evaluation also noted that outside resources meant little if village initiative and interest in the project was not present. Projects requiring technical skills on part of villagers and upkeep tended to fail most of time while structural projects like building latrines or wells had more chance of succeeding. Village projects also suffered from lack of follow-up. Once PCVs left, villagers had no one to go to in case of technical problems. GOS did not provide technical service support needed to sustain project and, villagers lacked technical and managerial skills, e.g. literacy and ability to keep books.

In the past, it is clear why PH agents do not follow-up. One statistic is particularly striking. 96% of budgets of regional services go for salaries while only 4% for operating costs or \$1.2 million for salaries and only \$50,000 for operating costs. These figures explain why PH is so hungry to get into projects and thirsty for access to indemnities, gas, vehicles, etc..

And every time, the GOS announces austerity measures, the regional services and field operating budgets get cut back even more!!

5. USAID and Family Planning

This project is not yet operational. This project is a potentially dangerous one for USAID to handle and is unlikely to provide good results. Bad relationships between Health and PH ministries have delayed implementation of project. Quarrel over competence and who controls what.

USAID/Washington/the USA Government/World Bank/and Population Council are big proponents of population control and are pushing family planning as an important component of aid packages. In Senegal, there is no big demand for birth control information, especially in rural areas. This is a very sensitive issue. PH redefines family planning as spacing children in order to protect the mother's health. They also insist that efforts to cure sterility be included to allay people's fears and gain support. GOS accepting this largely for two main reasons:

1. Donors are putting lots of pressure and propoganda for birth control.
2. Senegal once again shows that it is modern, progressive and of international class in its attitudes. How many Black African countries have a Population Council?

Yet, there is some realization that population growth rates of 2.7% a year put strains on limited resources and that Senegal with 9-10 million people in the year 2000 will be hard-pressed to support such a population without major technological breakthroughs or discovery and exploitation of new resources -- oil, iron, etc..

But given political realities and growing Islamic pietism, no one is going to openly push family planning unless he/she wants to commit political suicide. Thus, USAID projects can best be regarded as "prototypis". It can not possibly make a dent in lowering population growth rates; it could create anti-AID feelings if not handled carefully.

6. Conclusions:

Despite PH's shortcomings, it still has several strengths and/or features which argue for USAID maintaining its collaboration with PH:

A) There is a basic compatibility between official American policy and USAID New Directions philosophy and PH philosophy. The big problem remains implementation of philosophy. We have problems too.

B) PH only GOS agency experienced and equipped to deal with women's projects, community development, non-formal education, and other activities of interest to USAID. Thus, in many instances, it is the only game in town. USAID can not count on GOS letting us deal directly with local populations without passing through a state agency. That agency is PH, even more so if CERS and FONADEC will be located there.

C) USAID can benefit from long Peace Corps experience with Animation and PH ministry. Even more significant is the popularity of PCVs in rural Senegal. It makes little difference to rural people that projects do not work. They appreciate effort and PCV sharing of some of their hardships and the resources which PCVs bring to their villages.

D) GOS likes the USAID participation in these projects and appreciates the aid since we are one of few major community development type donors outside UN and NGOs. We get good marks for that.

E) Senegalese government and PS moving more towards local development and popular participation philosophy. Opposition parties and movements also more in favor of auto-gestion and against ONCAD and RDAs.

F) USAID should not put all eggs in RDA basket. PH another basket to put some eggs in.

Of course, USAID should also take into consideration PH's weaknesses and plan accordingly:

1. Lack of funding for operating budgets;
2. low technical quality of cadres in certain areas -- elevage, agriculture which make them less effective in agriculture or livestock projects;
3. low morale due to lack of resources to do job assigned to them;
4. limited contacts with local populations;
5. hostility of health ministry, Interior, and RDAs;
6. limited political support by PS national leaders and party cadres.

7. Recommendations : Food for Thought

A) Work to strengths of PH.

B) Strengthen PCV component. This can be expanded, but not massively. Village woodlots, community development, etc.. Use PC to get better base data at village level and feedback as to how villagers respond to various rural development projects. Closer collaboration between USAID, PCV, and PH in project design and data collection and evaluation. Experimental projects such as renewable sources of energy.

C) Continue to support women's projects. A political necessity. Do not expand much. PH women cadres often too urban and too educated to feel comfortable with village women. Do not overtrain.

D) Move with extreme caution in funding PH components which are parts of larger projects dominated by agencies/services which do not want to really collaborate with PH -- e.g. SODEVA/Health.

E) Beware of pitfalls of family planning project. Political risks may outweigh any possible benefits.

F) Explore ways with ENEA of providing training to PH cadres which will:

1. improve their ability to do applied research - e.g. dynamics of land use, social networks, responses to drought cycles, usury, etc..

2. really make them more responsible to villagers needs and their perceptions of what is needed and how to get that.

3. encourage more creativity in adapting to different local situations. One often sees a tendency to apply same old PH/Animation Rural package of projects to community much like RDAs apply same technical packages everywhere.

G) Explore possibilities of how USAID might be able to help accelerate progress in functional literacy programs in national languages. Functional

literacy is key to "sensibilisation" of populations and giving them tools to manage own affairs. Literate farmers will not be so easily taken in by dishonest weighers and government officials.

H) Mend fences with PH personnel and improve relationships for better collaboration in future. This process is already begun. There is a need for USAID to understand PH constraints. AID officials should also have more sensitivity to Senegalese sensibilities about going thru protocols and proper administrative hierarchies. On the other hand, PH officials have to understand more about how the AID system operates, AID's constraints and demands on it for accountability from Washington, and other bottlenecks. Thus more regular meetings in designing, implementing, and evaluating projects are needed in order to make projects with PH components work better.

II. REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT AGENCIES, ONCAD, AND COOPERATIVE REFORMS

A. Background

In 1979, the GOS began to think seriously about making major reforms and changes in rural policy. ONCAD, the state agency responsible for marketing peanuts, millet, and rice and distributing rural credit was under heavy attack for corruption and inefficiency. Peasant unrest and dissatisfaction with ONCAD were reflected, in part, by the growing unwillingness of the peasants to repay their debts to ONCAD. In March 1979, the Commission Nationale de la Reforme de l'ONCAD was set up to discuss changes in ONCAD. The rest of 1979 was marked by vigorous debate within the government and among the elite concerning how to reform ONCAD, revitalize the moribund cooperative movement, and transform the RDAs into more effective and responsive development institutions.

The discussions, debates, and studies took place in deteriorating economic climate. The 1979-80 agricultural season was marked by a drought which sent peanut and cereal production plummeting to near record lows and made debt repayment even more difficult for a hard-pressed peasantry. Rising oil prices and declining world market peanut prices further aggravated Senegal's balance of payment problems and forced Senegal to turn to the IMF and other foreign donors for help to keep the economy afloat.

Several positions were staked out which reflected three different approaches towards reforming ONCAD and the cooperative movement:

1. SODEVA's Position: All Power to the RCA SODEVA's position, was spelled out in a document entitled Rapport Presente aux Journées d'Etudes de la SODEVA, 11, 12, 13 juin 1979. This document reflected a sharp shift in rural development philosophy and policy which included:

- a. rejection of the technocratic/productionist approach of SATEC and earlier SODEVA policies.
- b. Praise of the holistic approach to rural development which stressed improving conditions of peasantry characteristic of the pre-SATEC 1959-1963 period.
- c. Strong affirmation of the need to create a socialist society.
- d. Stress on collective groups (groupement de producteurs) rather than individual farmers as the main target of rural extension efforts.
- e. The need to reduce dependency on foreign donors in order for SODEVA to gain more control over rural development policy.
- f. Call for greater farmer control over cooperative decision making.

SODEVA was sharply critical of ONCAD's past performance. ONCAD failed to deliver its inputs on time and messed up the agricultural calendar. Its credit system was not geared to meet other peasant needs besides agricultural credit for peanut production inputs. It promoted peasant indebtedness by pushing agricultural equipment regardless of possibility of equipment being used to raise productivity. ONCAD's structure was too heavy and not geared to rural development. And its cooperative service no longer served as an instrument for educating farmers as to how to run their own cooperatives.

The SODEVA solution to this problem was to decentralize cooperative decision making by making the groupe de producteurs the basic coop unit. Each groupe de producteurs would have about twenty members and be situated at village or quartier level. SODEVA agents would be responsible for providing both technical advice and cooperative formation. ONCAD's responsibilities would be limited to financing agricultural credit program, delivering inputs, and collecting peanuts. SODEVA would be responsible for helping peasants order inputs and executing the Programme Agricole correctly. SODEVA would try to cut down peasant indebtedness by encouraging peasants to conserve own seeds (seed repayment debts account for 60% of peasant ONCAD debts) and buy less agricultural equipment. SODEVA thus regarded itself as defender as the peasantry's interests vis-à-vis ONCAD and its enlightened guide leading them along the road to co-gestion and auto-gestion. At some point in the future, SODEVA's

advice would no longer be needed and the peasants would run their own cooperatives all by themselves.

SODEVA also saw little need for maintaining the CERs which according to the official texts were to serve the newly established Rural Communities and deliver all kinds of technical and social services to the local populations. SODEVA maintained that the CERs were too far removed from the daily life of the peasants to carry out this mission. Moreover, they had no resources at their disposal to enable them to function well. SODEVA argued that it was the only agency with regular grassroots contacts and thus was in a better position to provide the services which the CERs were supposed to provide. SODEVA was already broadening its role to do literacy training, small livestock and vegetable projects, reforestation, and other services. SODEVA maintained that it could take over the rest of the functions of the CERs. Eliminating the CERs would provide the rural populations with a unified and coherent rural development service and thus reduce peasant confusion as to which service is responsible for what as well as the proliferation of development services which wasted scarce resources.

It is interesting to note that the SODEVA document made no mention of Promotion Humaine and its activities. This was consistent with SODEVA's past disdain for PH.

Since the Rural Community was the basic unit of political decision-making, SODEVA maintained that it should be present at that level and serve as an advisor to the Rural Community. Local cooperatives would be regrouped around the rural community eventually as originally conceived in the old Animation Rurale utopian socialist blueprint.

Thus, SODEVA saw itself as fulfilling all the roles originally assigned to Animation Rurale, the CERs, and the cooperative service during 1959-63 era.

2. The position of the PS theoreticians of Auto-gestion: Power to the CERs and an Independent Cooperative Service.

The theoreticians of decentralized agrarian socialism in the PS rejected SODEVA's argument that it could become the major instrument for bringing about self-governing cooperatives. SODEVA and the other RDAs were still "productionist" in orientation and not concerned with meeting the total needs of the peasantry. Despite good intentions, the RDA would still be more concerned with using the coops as an instrument for raising production than in giving

the rural populations the cooperative training and education needed to run their own affairs. Instead of turning the cooperative service to the RDAs the government should establish a national autonomous Cooperative Service which would be free to promote true cooperative education and auto-gestion. This would also preserve the unity of the cooperative movement whose unity and coherence would be threatened by parcelling out coop agents to the various RDAs which had different perspectives and policy orientations.

The theoreticians of auto-gestion also argued that the role of the CERs should be reinforced and that the CERs should get the financial support needed, to carry out its mission of organizing planning at the Rural Community level and delivering global services at the grassroots -- better housing, health, and education as well as technical advice needed to raise rural productivity and output.

This position was articulated during the debates following the Minister of Rural Development's report to the national council of the PS on April 12, 1980.¹ By this time, the government had already decided to detach the Direction of Cooperation from ONCAD and to give SODEVA responsibility for absorbing the cooperative services field agents from the regional level on down. At the same time, the Ministry of Rural Development argued that the CERs should be given the means which it needed to carry out its community development projects.

3. The Technocratic Position : Rationalizing Development Structures

For the technocrats, reform of ONCAD and the cooperative movement is necessary in order to improve efficiency in the rural sector. ONCAD is a heavy administrative structure which has been beset by corruption and inefficiency. The peasants are getting tired of supporting it. Hence, it is time to strip ONCAD of some of its functions and perhaps to eliminate some of its personnel. The government is under heavy pressure from IMF plan de redressement to make cuts in personnel and the unpopular ONCAD service is likely to be the government agency to take the major brunt of such measures.

The decision to decentralize cooperative decision-making for the techno-

1. Also see the speech delivered by Cheikh Tidjiane Sy before the Club Nation et Développement in December 1979 entitled, "L'ONCAD est-il un Mal Necessaire?".

crats is one based more on economic efficiency than socialist criteria. SODEVA is probably in a better position to know peasants' real input needs than ONCAD. More rational purchasing will reduce debts, raise productivity, insure repayment of debts, and restore peasant confidence in the system. The rural credit system is in a shambles and so something must be done about it.

The technocrats are also committed to regrouping the existing cooperatives into larger cooperatives. They thus hope to reduce the number of Senegal's peanut cooperatives from 1658 to 600 eventually. At present, many cooperatives are too small to be economically viable. Regrouping coops will cut down operating costs and make coops more sound economically. One can then supply larger coops with equipment which will service its membership at lower costs.

SODEVA accepts the need for regrouping on efficiency grounds. But it argues that one should not suppress present cooperative collecting points. Peasants oppose having to bring their peanuts longer distances and are wary of government promises to provide special subsidies for coops further away from the center. Villagers also do not want to be farther away from weighers and coop presidents than before. They are afraid that weighers and presidents from the new coop center will be less likely to feel responsible to them. SODEVA officials thus maintain that peasant wishes should be respected in the short run. Otherwise their confidence in new reforms will be undermined and they will withdraw their support, thus sinking the chances for reforms to take hold. For SODEVA, this is a tactical rather than strategic concern.

The technocrats' position on upgrading the CERs is also based on economic rather than ideological criteria. The CERs are regarded primarily as a community development delivery service. Without resources, these services can not be delivered. Hence, there is a call for finding more resources for CERs, largely by setting up a FONADEC and making a pitch to sympathetic foreign donors. Technocrat's do not see CERs as decentralized planners attuned to needs of grassroots. Technocrats see Plan as the main planning body.

The technocratic position is best represented by the Prime Minister. Although his speeches mention socialist society in broad terms, one notes that the substance of the speeches is more concerned with economic rationalization. Promotion Humaine and Condition Humaine are used as part of "technical" reorganization of government. Different services are delivered to different constituencies in clearly defined patterns.

Given the present configuration of the power structure, Senegal's precarious economic situation, and extreme dependency on foreign donors and the IMF, it is likely that the technocratic position will prevail in the short run.

This means that the RDAs will continue to be given most of the real authority for promoting rural development, largely because of their productionist orientations. SODEVA is the only one of the large RDAs to have attempted to stake out a position based on strong socialist ideological principles. And even with SODEVA, auto-gestion is many, many years off. On the other hand, there is no sign that SAED, SOMIVAC, SODEFITEX, and SODESP are filled with the cooperative spirit. SAED pays lip service to auto-gestion as a goal. SOMIVAC has little to say on the issue. I suspect that most of the RDAs besides SODEVA will go on with business as usual. The coop tradition is largely one found in peanut basin. There are few non-peanut cooperatives. Millet coops exist on paper in the Fleuve and do not function. Herders coops also do not function very well.

On the other hand, there is a growing tendency to reaffirm auto-gestion agrarian socialist ideals among the younger cadres in the party. This may someday be translated into major policy changes which might lead to reduction in power of RDAs.

USAID in determining where it would like to channel its resources should probably consider the risks entailed in becoming too closely associated with an unpopular RDA. This raises a few policy questions:

1. Should AID provide assistance to strengthen ability of RDA to control rural development activities in the name of economic efficiency or should it work thru the RDAs as little as possible?

a. I would suspect that close identification with RDA would be more risky in Fleuve with SAED than with SODEVA or SOMIVAC.

b. Bakel livestock project indicates that it is possible to work directly with local populations without being tagged as agents of SAED.

2. Can AID do anything to strengthen local population's bargaining power vis-à-vis RDA? Should it?

3. Which RDAs should AID work more closely with and for what goals?

4. Is a RDA agency like SODEVA in danger of being too spread out to be the all-encompassing rural development agency which it aspires to become? If so, what does one do? Provide it with more resources to help it succeed? Or concentrate in one area where it is more likely to succeed? Or stay away.

The answers to these questions will depend on USAID's strategic goals and priorities, the extent to which USAID's strategic goals are compatible with those of the RDAs, and finally the potential of the RDAs to successfully implement these goals.

Like the Senegalese government, AID also has to debate whether it is to give priority to the "productionist" option or to the global, integral, development option with stress on basic needs, community organization, and development, and a myriad of other concerns.

Two final words about working with the RDAs in Casamance and Fleuve on rice growing schemes. First, unless there is a marked change in pricing policy, peasants will have little incentive to invest to grow rice for market. That has been the case in the past. One should also encourage investments in small rice huskers so that rice farmers can "valorize" production and sell the husked rice at higher prices. Second, one has to look more carefully into ramifications of dams and irrigated agriculture on land tenure and labor availability.

On August 14, the National Assembly will begin debate on reform of ONCAD. The debates should be followed closely to see a) details about the nature of the reforms and who will get what and b) the reaction of the opposition as to which parts of reform will be criticized most.

As of now, one can make a tentative balance sheet of what ONCAD will retain and what it will lose:

A. Losses:

1. Control over the Cooperative Service

A. Direction will be centralized at ministry of Rural Development.

B. Field agents from regional level down will be absorbed by RDAs.

Probably some firing will take place. Effective integration of coop agents will be difficult and require time. SODEVA has own tentative integration scheme. They hope to give coop agents technical training and SODEVA agricultural and livestock agents coop training. SODEVA hopes to put its own and coop agents at rural community level where they will serve as advisors. I do not know how other RDAs will handle integration problem.

2. Control over marketing of secondary products -- millet, maybe rice?

Several options are open to government:

A. Let merchants in private sector handle marketing with minimum of regulation. This solution is highly unlikely.

B. License several dozen merchants to handle millet and other crop marketing. This option is more likely to be followed with careful regulation of prices, margins, and other aspects of commercial transaction.

3. Shelling operations of peanuts now handled by ONCAD will be turned over to private sector or to coops. Private sector shelling now concentrated in hands of two marabouts and one PS party big shot. Hopefully, ONCAD will lose monopoly over rice husking as well. This could provide more incentives for rice farmers.

4. Control over the execution of the Programme Agricole which will be turned over to SODEVA and other RDAs. ONCAD will deliver and SODEVA will see to proper distribution and use.

5. Loss of personnel. How many, remains to be seen. ONCAD has over 2200 permanent and nearly 1000 temporary employees. Some compression has already taken place.

B. Retains:

1. Marketing monopoly over peanuts. Although this function is eventually to be turned over to coops at some future date when coops are more "mature" and able to run own affairs.

2. Financing of Programme Agricole. ONCAD thus remains main channel for rural credit.

3. Delivering agricultural inputs.

4. Control over its own financial and budgetary system.

Questions to be asked : Will it still be responsible for collecting peanut crop or will this be turned over to private sector?

Note about the private sector. The Senegalese government is not likely to create any free market sector in the rural areas concerning the peanut, rice, or millet trade. Turning things over to the private sector means that the government gives out licenses and contracts to merchants and transporters which it favors. The government continually decries "anarchy" in the commercial circuits which are flooded by too many "inefficient" small merchants, traders, and transporters. Rationalization means reducing licenses and number of people involved in trade and careful government regulation of profit margins.

There is little prospect for revitalization of private sector in rural areas unless one sees a marked recovery in the purchasing power of the rural populations. That should be first priority. There is not much business to be

done there because peasants do not have money to spend. The main flourishing private sector group and the usurers and parallel market hustlers who buy cheap when peasants are hungry and have to pay debts. While they may help peasants survive when government does not pay on time or distribute food aid, they are not a very productive force. Trade flourishes only when there is some purchasing power. Hence, Saloum has more of a private sector going than Louga. Mouride traders also do well, thanks to links between rural and urban economy and social networks.

In theory, the Government expects the cooperatives themselves to become the "private sector". This has been a given of Senegalese policy since independence. Most GOS cadres are anti-business, especially commerce. Their attitudes are not likely to change. Hence, there is little likelihood of "unleashing" free market forces in near future. Government regulation is thus going to remain a feature of Senegal's economic institutional structures for quite some time.

III. Local Institutions : Rural Communities and the Territorial Administration

Since the early 1970s, the GOS has stressed the importance of both administrative deconcentration and political decentralization. This was reflected in the passage of the Administrative Reform of July, 1972 which created the institution of the Rural Community, the basic political unit in countryside. The reform was not applied to all of Senegal's eight regions but staggered in time -- first to Thies and Sine Saloum, in 1974 then in 1976 to Louga and Diourbel, and in 1978 to the Casamance. This year the reform will be applied to the Fleuve and Senegal Oriental is scheduled to have its Rural Community structures in 1980. As one can see, the government began the reform in the peanut basin where land tenure problems are less acute. At present most Rural Communities remain under the thumb of the sous-prefet.

Deconcentration is a means of extending government administrative control down to a lower territorial unit. The 1972 administrative sharply strengthened the powers of the sous-prefets who replaced the chefs d'arrondissements. The sous-prefets have the tutelle over the rural communities. They have to approve the budgets voted by the Rural Councils of the Rural Communities. They control the execution of the budget and they often intervene to impose or "persuade" the Rural Council to vote for projects which meet government priorities. For example, now the Ministry of Interior which controls the territorial administration wants the Rural Councils to channel its funds towards investment.

Thus most budgets earmark more than 80% of budget for investments in equipment, wells, schools, youth centers, maternities. Rural Councils are discouraged from using resources to hire personnel. This is done to discourage Rural Councils from being used as an instrument for patronage to local clients of politicians as well as to avoid need for recurrent expenditures. Sous-prefets also discourage spending for maintenance or replacement of materials needed. For example, one sous-prefet told a council not to vote funds to buy medicines to restock village pharmacy because UNICEF was supposed to give them out free; in another case, the sous-prefet said that the rural council could not spend money to maintain an important well because that job was the role of the state. Such attitudes discourage local initiative and the maintenance and upkeep of local equipment.

Traditionally, the Territorial Administration is primarily concerned with maintaining order, collecting taxes, and insuring balanced budgets of local institutions. The territorial administration does not like competitive politics because it makes their life more difficult. On the other hand, the government and ruling party needs some form of competitive politics in order to keep party alive and to funnel resources down to the grassroots which will be translated into support or acceptance of the government.

At independence, department centers were transformed into full communes which had its own elected mayor, council, and budget. The Department was and still remains the main unit of party life in rural Senegal. Communal budgets gave local party leaders resources to regard their followers with jobs, services, and money. The government also had a slush fund known as the Fonds de Concours Communal to channel money to the communes. This money was used mostly to hire personnel and for prestige projects-- fancy city halls, race tracks, etc.. In 1963, the Fonds was suppressed. More significantly, the government thru the Ministry of Interior took control of communal budgets from the mayors and administered them directly in order to make them more "productive" and stop plethora of personnel and patronage. This in turn coincided with the absence of competitive party politics in the country and the establishment of a one-party state. Party activities dried up as administration took tutelage over all spending at local level -- e.g. communes and also the regional assemblies. Administrative reform strengthened the powers of governors and prefets and reduced those of local institutions. The result was the absence of political development in the interior.

The 1972 administrative reforms which created the framework by giving rural populations some voice in local government and control over resources. The head tax, then known as regional tax which went up to the governors level was transformed into the rural tax which was supposed to provide the Rural Communities with its budgetary resources. At present, there are 284 Rural Communities in the country, each with its own budget:

Rural Communities by Region

1. Sine Saloum:	76	Total budget =	\$4.1 million
2. Thies	: 31	Total Budget =	\$1.3 million
3. Diourbel	: 33	Total Budget =	\$1.6 million
4. Louga	: 48	Total Budget =	\$2.0 million
5. Casamance	: 68	Total Budget =	\$3.3 million ?
6. Fleuve	: 28	Total Budget =	\$0. million

Each Rural Community has a budget which averages between 40,000 and 50,000 dollars. This provides the local populations with some resources which are used primarily for wells, dispensaries and maternities, schools, and community and youth centers. Wells are by far the number one priority item in most areas. It should be noted that this expenditure follows the pattern of spending during the post-war era of local competitive politics in Senegal where the territorial Councillor promised their rural constituents this very same mix of resources.

By permitting rural communities to have control over some resources, the government is encouraging the flow of goods and services down to the local level. Local politicians then try and capture control over allocation of these resources and to use it to support their clients or for their own benefit. As in the past, the departmental party leader continues to control much of the allocation of resources. The Rural Council may say what projects they want, but often the departmental level politicians determines which village gets it. This was a source of complaints by local rural councillors in Louga, for example, who asked that sous-prefet enforce the decisions made by local rural council and not cave in to pressures of prominent politicians.

The peasant malaise and growing rural disaffection with rural development institutions and policies makes it politically wise to get more resources down to the grassroots levels. This may in part explain why government is now once again speaking of upgrading the importance of the CERS which are earmarked to be the instrument for promoting community development. The establishment of FONADEC indicates a strong drive to find foreign donors to

feed community development projects which will provide more resources and services to rural populations. This in turn, the government and PS hopes will make the peasantry less hostile to the regime and more amenable to collaborating with RDAs and other government institutions.

At the same time, the decentralization of cooperative decision-making has also increased the RDA's interest in the rural community as a basic unit to work with. Or at least, this is the case for SODEVA which sees its role as advisor and guide to the development of the rural communities.

The Rural Community thus is becoming the object of a range of different government institutions and forces seeking to exert its influence. This will probably intensify rivalries between services and between the various services and the sous-prefet, and between the sous-prefet and the local politicians.

Examples:

1. Sous-prefets want order. Hence, they are prone to intervene to stop a decision which may lead to bloodshed. This is more likely to happen if rural council which has power to allocate and takes land away from one group and give it to another. Hence, recent government decision gives sous-prefet authority to veto rural council decisions about land allocation. On other hand, same decision gives rural council right to appeal to higher court.

2. Politicians want control over resources. They may come into conflict with rural council whose majority is not under their control. This can intensify political conflict. Now that there is a legal opposition party, the PDS, the danger is that dissatisfied people will go over to PDS. PS and government does not want this.

3. RDAs want control over basic land use and technology choice decisions. SAED may come out as greedy monster and come into direct conflict with rural communities. SODEVA could become defender of peasants against greedy politicians or local notables of their cadres are politicized and want reform. This too can raise political tensions and conflict.

Thus, the desire of the government to promote "responsible participation" is fraught with danger from their perspective. If they do not do something to regain confidence, rural economy will fold. If too much energy and competition over resources takes place, then political stability in the countryside may be jeopardised and the opposition may get an opportunity to erode the PS' traditionally strong rural base.

Thus, if USAID expands its role in Community development projects, it should be prepared to become embroiled in local politics. For example, the evaluation of the Sine Saloum health project noted that the choice of location of health huts did not make sense or follow the criteria laid down in the project. Many huts were located too close to health posts or in bigger villages instead of being spaced out to serve those villages which had less easy access to health post. Why was this so? Was it the lack of planning? Or was it the intervention of local politicians who had some clout who saw to it that their village got the health hut.

To do community development projects in the future, especially if one wants to work through the rural community/rural council structures, one will have to be more attentive to local politics and implications of local politics on project location and vice versa. Otherwise, one could get burned over and over again if AID can not assert some control over choice of localities to conform with project objectives.

It might be wiser to do village projects using Peace Corps and government services to make choice rather than working thru rural communities which are bound to become more politicized with revival of competitive politics. Of course, the GOS may decide to put a halt to this as it did with the communes, and reinforce territorial administration's control over local budgets. This is possible too.

Epilogue:

I was very much struck by the possibility of doing massive conservation/ reforestation project. I think that it is a great idea and should be pursued. It has the advantage of providing vital resources which are collective goods which are more difficult to appropriate by local or national power structure. It could provide work in the dry season. It should also be very popular and would make a strong visible impact.

I also appreciated working with such a stimulating group of people. This has been my most intellectually stimulating experience during the six or seven times I have worked with USAID-Senegal.

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USAID PROSPECTS FOR WORKING THROUGH NGOS IN SENEGAL

Right now the climate is right for stepping up the activities of NGOs in community development projects. The government wants more resources poured into rural areas directly to populations. It has upgraded the CERs designated as the unit for implementing community. It has created FONADEC as a clearing house for attracting funds for such projects.

However, before USAID plunges into financing some of these NGOs, it should be aware of certain problems:

1. There is already a proliferation of NGOs and UN agencies distributing goodies in the countryside. These projects often do more harm than good and can sabotage projects in other areas of Senegal:

A. Example: USAID trying to set up health delivery system in Sine Saloum which tries to organize villagers to finance restocking. Village responsibility for running hut and reordering was stressed and their financial obligations as well. This kind of approach is sabotaged by UNICEF which is running around distributing free medicine and other health equipment. Thus, sous-prefet in one arrondissement chides rural council for putting money in budget for buying medicine since UNICEF will come along in a while and distribute it free. This does not encourage responsibility. Moral: There is a need to coordinate NGOs efforts so that one project does not work against another.

B. Example: Everyone wants wells. There are many PVOs doing wells all over Senegal. They come in and put in a well. Problem is that each PVO has own kind of well, motorpump, and equipment. Equipment upkeep of wells is extremely difficult once PVO leaves area. The casual observer of rural Senegal is struck by the number of wells put in by various kinds of projects which no longer function because no one bothered to find replacement parts or because no one knew how to fix the pump. Here again there is a need to coordinate NGO projects as far as equipment and training in order not to disperse resources and make survival of project possible after the toubabs are gone.

2. One also has to be careful about Senegalese sensibilities and not channel funds through PVOs which use lots of expatriate personnel which eat up much of the funds and create tensions with Senegalese counterparts.

Awareness of what other PVOs are doing throughout Senegal and how their projects impinge on USAID projects is essential.

It looks as though the GOS will be pushing PVO projects and they will proliferate. GOS is more likely to evaluate them in terms of how many resources come in than in their viability after project is finished or the possible negative impact on other projects or on other areas not touched by project.

I would recommend that USAID move cautiously in this area and make sure that it is not funding projects which undermine what USAID is trying to do in other AID projects.