

PUTTING THE CART BEHIND THE HORSE:  
PARTICIPATION, DECENTRALIZATION, AND CAPACITY BUILDING  
FOR RURAL DEVELOPMENT\*

By

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ABSTRACT

Common views of development experience present either technocrats or villagers as heroes while bureaucrats are viewed as villains. This paper takes the stand that implementers, be they bureaucrats, entrepreneurs, villagers, or others, are legitimate beneficiaries of development and key actors in the process. To improve the track record of development programs, it is necessary to use participatory, decentralized management approaches while simultaneously building implementer capacity at the field level. Experiences in five countries of Africa, Asia, and Latin America are used to support the argument and to emphasize the centrality of enhanced institutional capacity.

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**I: INTRODUCTION**

Development specialists often subscribe to one of two myths about how development occurs and why it fails. The first myth is that of the technical fix. This viewpoint accepts the idea that development is simply a technical problem, and it promotes the idea that solutions are known and the reasons that they are not applied are due to bureaucratic ineptitude and political shortsightedness.

The second myth is that of the noble peasant. This viewpoint accepts the idea that rural villagers are the only legitimate inheritors of development benefits, and it promotes the idea that local participation is the panacea for elite aggrandizement and bureaucratic bungling. The first myth exonerates technocrats from responsibility for failure; the second exonerates villagers.

Both myths make use of bureaucrat's whipping boys. This paper argues that these two myths place the cart before the horse. Development policies require implementation. If those charged with the task of implementation are treated as the enemy, it is not sensible to expect programs to work. Moreover, development is not simply program execution. Rather, it is a self-sustaining increase in people's welfare resulting from an improved capacity to achieve objectives. Given this, it is necessary to place the cart back behind the horse. That is, a new view must be introduced which not only treats implementers as legitimate participants and key actors in the development process but also supports positive relationships between them and villagers.

The position taken here is that the essence of development is the enhancement of institutional capability. Although participation and decentralization often support human resource enhancement, not until institutional capacity building receives priority attention will the horse pull the cart in the desired direction.

**II: UP THE BUREAUCRACY**

Recent literature on government employees working in rural development is damning, "poorly trained, poorly motivated, poorly supervised, and poorly served by logistical supply systems." [1] Since most development agencies came into being long before

"participation" became part of the dominant development paradigm, many of these agencies were designed for the more centralized, control-oriented needs of colonial powers, and the agency's structures, systems, and norms posed important barriers to effective participation.[2] Furthermore, as weak newly independent central governments attempted to engage in "nation building" and bring their peripheries under control, bureaucratic practices became even more rigid.

For example, nearly all agricultural extension services are government run and function according to a standard set of procedures, rules, and precedents which engender both inflexibility and slow response to field needs. Both prospects and incentives, particularly for those working in the field, are typically bad. Often it becomes more important to please immediate superiors than to do good work in the field by yielding to the bureaucratic emphasis on documenting the completion of facilities, training of farmers, or disbursement of funds rather than concentrating on the impact of such activities.[3]

With such incentives there is little to encourage bureaucrats to look beyond procedural compliance. Just as the small farmer wishes to minimize risk, so does the bureaucrat.[4] A case in point is credit, where the key indicator of performance is often the default rate--not because it says anything about productivity, but because it is administratively convenient. In order to avoid default, it is safer to lend to those with obvious collateral, in this case the larger farmers who, it so happens, are also more likely to default. But performance is not the measure used by bureaucrats; their risk is related to fiscal accountability rather than impact. As Blair states:

What is relevant is that the bureaucracy be able to defend itself against a charge of fiscal irresponsibility in its distribution policy by showing that it lends only to the 'best' credit risks--those with the collateral to repay loans.[5]

This example indicates the obvious need for strategies to reorient the behavior of program implementers.

Given the discouraging evidence, there is a great temptation to say "a pox on your bureaucracy" and to bypass the public sector all together. However, small farmers need the bureaucrats--perhaps more than the bureaucrats need small farmers. Indeed, for each case of "bureaupathology" there is a corresponding case of "acute localitis." This latter ailment can be alleviated only with assistance from outside the community.[6] The major symptoms are:

Development resources controlled and manipulated by local elites for their own ends;

- Coopted elites practicing "majority discrimination" against the rural poor;
- Villages which cannot be effectively developed by local leadership; and
- Local organizations which are extremely limited in financial resources and management capabilities.[7]

Thus, programs designed to bypass government bureaucrcies may produce parallel complications in the community setting; the actors change but the problems remain. Given the need to transform implementers--be they bureaucrats, local elites, technicians, or entrepreneurs--into more effective development agents, the question is, how is this to be achieved? Field experience suggests four general strategies:

- Through an authoritarian management style;
- Through a participatory management style;
- Through decentralization; and
- Through capacity building.

Experience with each of these strategies is discussed in the sections that follow. It should be kept in mind, however, that these approaches are not all mutually exclusive. In fact, the last three are mutually supportive.

### III. AUTHORITARIAN MANAGEMENT

The blueprint approach to rural development carries an implicit aura of authoritarianism with it. Such an approach is typified by certainty on the part of planners and managers that predetermined technologies and intervention techniques will work in a given situation. It assumes that solutions to problems are known and that projects are vehicles for the application of these solutions. In its purest form, such an approach means little or no participation by either beneficiaries or project staff, who are expected to obediently follow instructions from headquarters. Policy is set above and administered below. It also implies a demand for hard work and constant discipline on the part of project staff, and it equates management with control.

Research demonstrates, however, that management should not be equated with control.[8] Managers who view their role as rule enforcement are much less successful than those who see it as a process of bargaining and persuasion.[9] Political dynamics do

not end with policy statements: the authoritarian perspective is both naive and counterproductive; an alternative approach is needed.

### Process Approach

A viable alternative to authoritarian blueprinting is the "process" or evolutionary implementation model. This assumes considerable uncertainty and is characterized by flexibility, learning, and continued openness to redesign and adaptation to changing circumstances; evolutionary, on-the-spot study and collaborative solution of problems are relied on rather than remote outside expertise and inherited predetermined plans.[10] The process approach is thus more capable of responding to political dynamics, technical uncertainty, and the need for local learning.

A recent study of small farmer organizations, however, indicated that neither approach is intrinsically superior in terms of overall impact--in this case a composite of six measures: income change, financial viability, services, equity, influence, and leadership.[11] Indeed, blueprinting has enjoyed a history of success when applied to development problems requiring technological solutions in a well-defined physical environment such as road building, industrial development, and other transport and capital-intensive infrastructure. However, where people--both staff and beneficiaries--are a crucial part of the process, the record is less clear.

A case in point is the Kou Valley Cooperative in Upper Volta--a rice-producing colonization project "using technological solutions in a well-defined physical environment." The project was planned and implemented by external donors, in this case the Taiwanese. Before the first settler arrived, the land and irrigation system had been laid out and the accompanying technological package developed; intervention was total. Settlers received land, water, technical assistance, production credit, short-term loans, and marketing services--and were subjected to autocratic social control, which stultified personal initiative. When a semiautonomous Regional Development Authority (ORD) assumed complete control, this approach was continued, exemplified by the domineering behavior of the ORD extension agents, the monopsonistic policy of the ORD, and the police who manned control points at the entrance to the project area.

Members were, however, rewarded with a high economic payoff, the result of literally working the land to death. As one member expressed it, "With two harvests a year, you can't go wrong." However, overall productivity in the cooperative fell almost 50 percent in the five-year period from 1972 to 1977. The technical assistance provided by the extension agents was viewed with justifiable skepticism: members believed they knew as much as, if not more than, the extension agents, but it was always the agents

who made the final decisions regarding type and amount of seed, fertilizer, and insecticide. The members felt they were regarded as "little children" and treated as such--a statement reinforced by the extension agents, who referred to their clients as "illiterates" who must be told what to do. Had the agents been able to take the members seriously, both as small farmers and as human beings, then the Kou Valley Cooperative might have been a very different type of project.[12]

Authoritarian management, then, appears to be the managerial analog of the "technical fix." And, of course, it seldom works. Rule enforcement and the policy/administration dichotomy are clearly inadequate guides for development administration. An alternative and more promising approach to bureaucratic reorientation is to be found in participatory management.

#### IV: PARTICIPATORY MANAGEMENT

The bottom line of all the participation rhetoric is better projects, that is, those that increase beneficiary well-being in the long run. By the same token, it is argued that such beneficiary participation is unlikely to be encouraged unless there is also project staff participation.[13]

But what do we mean when we talk about staff participation? In broad terms, such participation can be defined as involvement "in such actions which enhance their [the staff's] well-being--their income, security, or self-esteem." [14] More specifically, Brinkerhoff--drawing on earlier work by Kanter--provides the following operational definitions of such participation:

- Access to power--specifically the capacity to mobilize resources to accomplish tasks; and
- Opportunity--specifically chances for advancement, input into important decisions, and increase in skills and rewards.[15]

In sum, "good management" is "participatory management."

#### Colombia

An example of this is provided by Colombia's Integrated Rural Development (IRD) program--administered by a special unit located within the National Planning Department, one of the most powerful and respected government ministries. One of the outstanding characteristics of this program has been its ability to attract and keep well-trained, motivated professionals. The Colombians call this type of professional behavior mistica, and it appears to result from the following factors:

- Some financial control over participating agencies in the IRD program;
- Security of employment;
- The opportunity to present and implement one's own proposals; and
- The opportunity to complain and be heard.

Moreover, beneficiaries have played an increasingly important role in planning IRD activities and in allocating the budgetary resources to implement them. Although beneficiaries do not control the budget, they do have some say in how it is allocated. Hence, their participation in the planning exercises does have some bite to it.[16] Here it appears that Brinkerhoff is correct--that staff participation did, in fact, encourage beneficiary participation.

### Indonesia

It also appears that "participatory management" supports "good development." This is confirmed by an Indonesian example. In two different kabupaten (districts) on the island of Madura, there were motorized fishing projects. In both cases boats, motors, and nets were supplied. However, in one location villagers received two types of nets and in the other location they received three. The difference is important, because during the three months of the year, fishing is poor except for the availability of one species of large fish. The two types of nets were appropriate for small fish and shrimp, but only the third type of net was effective for catching this large fish. In the kabupaten where three nets were provided, villagers were consulted during project design. In the other case, they were not.

The connection between participatory management and project substance lies in the operational styles of the two bupati (district commissioners). One stressed a participatory style in his relationships with local line agency personnel. He called it "collective responsibility." However, the second bupati followed a very authoritarian approach. The project with only two nets was in the district of the authoritarian bupati, and it was evident that sectoral agency staff in that area were less interested in villager participation in development-related decision making.[17]

This Indonesian example supports Brinkerhoff's argument, and it further suggests that, due to the fact that villagers sometimes do possess important technical knowledge, participatory management can promote more sound development initiatives by identifying local constraints and opportunities.[18]

## Nicaragua

Some ways in which staff participation can be encouraged are exemplified by INVIERNO--an IRD project in Nicaragua, whose main component has been supervised credit. An autonomous project management unit, INVIERNO has staff at three levels: central, regional, and local. Without exception, the various evaluations and studies praise INVIERNO's management system which, like the IRD program in Colombia, has managed to attract and keep highly qualified and motivated personnel.[19] The reasons include the following:

- Competitive salary scale;
- Liberal fringe benefit package;
- Twice yearly performance evaluation;
- Promotion from within;
- Participation in planning and evaluating project activities;
- Encouragement of constructive criticism;
- Pre-service and in-service training to strengthen employee's technical and social skills; and
- Follow-up supervision.

In essence, INVIERNO offered its staff various opportunities for improvement--through training, financial remuneration, and promotion. Although it did not necessarily offer them much power, it did invite participation in planning, evaluation, and constructive criticism.

Participation by beneficiaries, however, was limited almost exclusively to taking advantage of the services offered--in this case primarily the provision of agricultural credit, inputs, and technological packages. At the end of the third year of operations, several proposals were on the table to have small-farmer organizations administer group loans and also to become actively involved in the planning process. Even participation in the services offered was limited. During the first two years of operation, a large number of intended beneficiaries borrowed only once, and did not return--even through they had a line of credit valid for five years. Possible explanations for this lack of participation include the following:

- Borrower's preference to first cancel outstanding obligations resulting from an earlier drought before seeking more credit;

- INVIERNO's decision to reject many who participated initially so that project resources could be concentrated even more on the target group; and
- Many borrowers were replaced by other family members.[20]

Thus just as beneficiary participation and the "noble peasant" view are not panaceas for improving impact, so too staff participation alone is not adequate to improve implementation. In fact, INVIERNO's failures may have been largely due to the project design: it was based on sophisticated technologies, including the use of computers to process credit applications. The evidence indicates that when a project is highly complex, it is less likely that project staff will encourage intended beneficiaries to become actively involved in project implementation.[21]

It also follows that, along with simple designs (or components), it is necessary for field staff to have the authority to make decisions in collaboration with beneficiaries. This usually requires a degree of decentralization.

#### V: DECENTRALIZATION

For field staff to participate meaningfully, there must be devolution of both decision-making authority and control of development resources from the center toward the periphery of government.[22] Without such decentralization, government field staff lack the wherewithal to stimulate beneficiary participation.

In most developing countries, the government is seen as the provider of development resources. Given this, there is no point in villagers developing project ideas until local government officials are prepared to work with them to procure the necessary development resources from the government. At the same time, there is no point in getting decentralization efforts far ahead of participation efforts for, in this case, the result will be that lower-level government officials will end up designing and implementing all the projects.

Participation and decentralization initiatives will, therefore, have significant political implications. Broader participation is likely to change the use and allocation of resources among social groups; indeed, this is often why participation is advocated.[23] Decentralization will both offset power relations within government as well as affect the distribution of resources among social groupings.[24]

## Controlled Decentralization

The crux of the problem lies in the extent to which the central government is willing, or can be convinced, to devolve authority to lower levels. Unless there is the political will at the national level, there is little chance that decentralization will actually occur. Even when this will exists, effective implementation may be extremely difficult if the government has to deal with powerful line ministries or if it exercises only nominal control in rural areas.[25]

Blair, while admitting that the political and economic problems of rural development may be soluble, confesses that the issue of decentralization may not:

In rural development, the contemporary version of the center-periphery conflict lies in the area of supervision. There must be control from the top, yet there must also be flexibility at the bottom, and the two needs are fundamentally contradictory. If there is too much autonomy from control, rural development goes astray, with the benefits going to the rich. And if there is too much emphasis on supervision from above in administering government programs, rural development also goes astray, with the benefits again going to the rich. Finding the right mix of supervision and autonomy is probably the most difficult bureaucratic problem there is in the whole field of rural development.[26]

This view is overly pessimistic, however, and it is not fully substantiated by recent development work where decentralization is being pursued. What is substantiated is the ever-present pressure from central government line ministries to promote their own development ideas, since this is essential for their continued power.[27] What may be required then is some form of controlled decentralization. That is, the center must maintain a modicum of symbolic control while giving field personnel the autonomy and resources to demonstrate their capabilities.[28]

Controlled decentralization requires both strong linkages and shared responsibility between the center and the periphery. Such an arrangement is unlikely to be viable in a country with a weak central government since it often leads to subversion of program goals when the center has little control over the penalties necessary to elicit compliance.[30] Nevertheless, there are some settings where it might work.

### India

Susan Hadden provides an illustrative case study from Rajasthan, India, of how such controlled decentralization can be implemented successfully.[31] There the center has a virtual

monopoly on funds for rural development projects while the state has formal constitutional authority. In the case of rural electrification, central power is largely limited to review of large projects and coordination of those involving more than one state. At the state level, there is a State Electricity Board (SEB), an autonomous technical body within the state government, which receives some funds from the state but also raises capital on the open market.

Prior to 1969, the SEB in Rajasthan operated under the assumption that rural electrification was a technical problem to be solved by technicians. As a result, the SEB isolated itself from other state agencies and potential beneficiaries and used only information provided by its own engineers in selecting villages for electrification.

In the late 1960s there was increasing pressure to decentralize electricity planning and bring it into line with other rural development efforts. This added social and political criteria to the technical and economic ones previously used. In 1969, District Agricultural Production Committees (DAPC), which included politicians, administrators, and technicians were given the power to select villages for electrification. This produced an increase in adherence to political criteria, primarily as a result of the increased accessibility of decision makers. Since many more villages qualified under the stated economic criteria than could be electrified in any one year, the DAPCs were able to expand the criteria and include the concerns of local constituents. Although the DAPCs could not countermand the criteria imposed nationally, they were able to choose among priority concerns within the general guidelines.

Such controlled decentralization may strike a viable balance between the center and the periphery, retaining the best features of centralization and decentralization in the following ways:

- By combining the long-range perspective of the center which establishes technical criteria with the short-range perspective of the local context which establishes additional political criteria;
- By stimulating officials to be more responsive to the local population;
- By increasing efficiency; and
- By achieving both economic and political goals.[32]

However, there is also the danger of decentralization commonly recognized by bureaucrats and peasants alike. That is, responsibility may be transferred to those without the ability to carry it out, failure will result, and the experience will be used

to justify recentralization and the return to an authoritarian style. Thus participatory management and decentralization are not likely to work unless they are accompanied by building local capacity.

#### IV: CAPACITY BUILDING

New responsibilities require new skills and new skills mean a need for training. Thus one result of decentralization is usually an identified requirement for training as a way to build capacity. In fact, capacity building is sometimes equated with training.

But capacity building is not just training. The importance of this fact is illustrated by experience in Tanzania. District officials there had received training in the use of project design methods. At its conclusion, the participants praised the quality of the workshop. However, they also posed a critical question: why should they use the new methods when they knew that the projects chosen to be funded were selected on the basis of criteria unrelated to the use of these new techniques? Thus training individuals did not automatically increase organizational capability.

This demonstrates the need to increase the stock of organizational resources and the concomitant necessity of critically examining incentive systems guiding the behavior which surrounds the use of those resources. It must also be remembered that the rationale for capacity building is not just use of techniques or more efficient implementation; rather it is the need to use implementer empowerment to help achieve self-sustaining development.

#### Sustainability

Too often, development projects only achieve temporary asset relocations rather than self-sustaining improvements in human well-being. When this happens, success remains as ephemeral as ever. To prevent this, it is necessary to build capacity within both implementing and beneficiary organizations. Real development will not occur without enhanced capacity.

Advocates of participation have commonly assumed a zero-sum relationship between government agency capacity and community organization capacity. Some experience can be mustered in support. For example, the case has been made that the strengthening of a project management unit in Liberia resulted in less willingness on the part of staff to devolve marketing functions to local organizations. The excuse was put forth that these organizations were not capable enough to perform well, whereas the project now was.[33]

Nevertheless, the opposite is often true. Until implementers have confidence in their own abilities, they are not likely to welcome increased power within the community. The previous discussions of experience in Upper Volta, India, Nicaragua, Colombia, and Indonesia support this contention.

Confidence is not a sufficient condition, however, as the Tanzanian anecdote illustrates. When organizational incentives do not support clientele empowerment or the use of skills and resources in appropriate ways, no change will occur.

For example, when administrative procedures reward nonperformance, that is what can be expected. An example is reported from Aceh, Indonesia. There, responsibility for each project vehicle is assigned to one individual. That person receives, in cash, a standard monthly allotment to cover fuel and routine maintenance costs. Though the practice does minimize false expense claims, it provides a strong disincentive not to make frequent trips to isolated rural areas, because this increases both fuel costs and the likelihood of minor repairs. Since any costs which exceed the allotment must come from the individual's own pocket, the procedure is an effective deterrent to delivering services to rural areas, monitoring fieldwork, or working collaboratively with villagers.[34]

Capacity building, then, requires a critical analysis of the incentives and penalties which guide the behavior of implementers and villagers. Furthermore, empowerment involves redesigning those elements of the system which inhibit appropriate performance and long-run development.

Long-run development, however, is probably not programmable. That is because creative responses to new situations are by definition unprogrammed. Even so, development initiatives strive for such a goal, which was described by James Coleman in the following way:

Conceptually, developmental capacity . . . includes . . . the power constantly to create new and enhanced capacity to plan, implement, and manipulate new change as part of the process of achieving new goals. It is, in short, a 'creative' and not just a 'survival' or 'adaptive' capacity that is the hallmark of a developing polity.[35]

But such a creative ideal is far easier to express than it is to produce.

### Lessons

There have been lessons learned in the attempts to develop capabilities of governmental and community organizations. For

example, a recent study of experiences in five Asian countries suggests that organizations go through a three-phase learning process. First, they learn to be effective in their internal tasks and in their interactions with the environment. Next, they learn to be more efficient in those activities. And finally, they expand their portfolio either by entering new geographic areas or by engaging in new functions.[36]

Another study in Latin America concluded that successful organizational strengthening invariably began with a simple focus on a single function requiring cooperation and utilizing skills already possessed by organization members.[37] A study of 36 development projects in Africa and Latin America found that risk-sharing and two-way communications were important factors contributing to self-sustaining development.[38]

Experiences such as those above suggest that there are both process and substantive dimensions to capacity building. Characteristics of a good process are:

- Risk sharing;
- Involvement of multiple organizational levels;
- Collaborative implementation styles;
- Demonstration of success; and
- Emphasis on learning.

These characteristics underlie the previous discussions about participatory management and decentralization. Additional substantive factors must also be considered:

- Incentives for behavior; and
- Organizational resources.

These last two items address the Tanzanian question (incentives), and they also confront the political nature of capacity building (resource control). Consequently, they imply the need both to understand the structure of social relationships and to build on an established base.

The point to be emphasized is that strategies founded on bureaucratic whipping boys are not likely to achieve long-run success. While civil servants, the rural poor, local elites, and entrepreneurs all have legitimate claims on development benefits, they do not all have an equal ability to press those claims. Until this is accepted, spectators and poselyters alike are not apt to have any better diagnoses than they have had to date. Bypass operations have a very poor record in social surgery.

Recognizing this, capacity building is based on preexisting skills, resources, and organizations. This avoids the enclave mentality reminiscent of the institution-building school of the 1960s.[39] Instead, the emphasis is on such factors as folk management practices[40] and traditional resource utilization patterns. [41]

The question of resource bases is a central issue along with incentives. Without control over resources, exhortations for participatory management or decentralization are hollow and irrelevant. The essence of both empowerment and capacity building is resource control. This remains true regardless of whether the focus is on the public or private sectors, or whether it is at the national, provincial, project, or community levels.

### New Directions

When development is recast as capacity building, the test of development becomes "what works and lasts?" Honest answers, unfortunately, do not support any single dogma. Discovering clear pathways may require us to discard some recently learned and highly cherished false truths about alternatives; even these new paths will be strewn with uncertainty.

For example, people with noble intentions of reaching the poverty stricken minions have often advocated bypass strategies which cut off the role of middlemen and entrepreneurs, because they are viewed as predators whose sole function is to exploit the powerless. Sometimes, indeed, this is an important aspect of their operations. However, it is not always the case. In fact, behavior observed from Tanzania to the Philippines indicates that small-scale urban entrepreneurs often give services mainly to the downtrodden--those with the resources to buy only a pack of cigarettes serve those with only enough resources to purchase a single cigarette.

A similar finding emerges from rural experience. Salaried government or parastatal employees may be unwilling to gather the produce of isolated farms, while self-employed private merchants will do so. Examples of this are common in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Moreover, these services are often crucial for the survival of marginal peasants.[42] Thus sustainability considerations may require abandoning antientrepreneurial dogmas.

Another recently popular battlecry is "small is beautiful." But this, too, can produce unwanted consequences. When resources are dispersed widely to fund numerous small projects, limited management capacity may be spread so thinly that it is depleted instead of being enhanced. Additionally, this can lower the chances that any of the projects will become self-sustaining, because technical dimensions may be ignored, benefits highjacked, and lessons lost.

Since the conviction that small is better is a relatively new one for many policy makers, there is resistance to an examination of its weaknesses. Moreover, the existence of such small, isolated efforts is often paraded forth as the evidence that programs are, in fact, reaching the rural poor. Thus what first appears as progress may be no more than the changing of the dogma.

## VII: CONCLUSIONS

This paper has attempted to put the bureaucrat back on center stage--not as a hero or as a villain--but as a key supporting actor. Villagers need the bureaucrats perhaps more than the bureaucrats need the villagers. Although bureaucrats receive generous amounts of harsh and often fully justified criticism, this is no reason to throw up one's arms in despair and cry "a pox on your bureaucracy." Without the bureaucrats, there is little chance that self-sustaining development will take place.

Three mutually supportive strategies were suggested to improve the performance of implementing bureaucrats. The first was participatory management--characterized by:

- Access to power--specifically the capacity to mobilize resources to accomplish tasks; and
- Opportunity--specifically chances for advancement, input into important discussions, and increase in skills and rewards.

The second strategy suggested was "controlled decentralization" in which the center gives field personnel the autonomy and resources to demonstrate their capabilities while, at the same time retaining a modicum of symbolic control. Such a strategy may strike a viable balance between the center and the periphery while retaining the best features of centralization and decentralization:

- By stimulating officials to be more responsive to the local population;
- By increasing efficiency; and
- By achieving both economic and political goals.

The final--and perhaps most important--strategy suggested was capacity building which, to a certain extent, subsumes the first two. Capacity building is characterized by the following process dimensions:

- Risk sharing;
- Involvement of multiple organizational levels;
- Collaborative implementation styles;
- Demonstration of success; and
- Emphasis on learning.[43]

In addition, the following substantive factors must also be considered:

- Incentives for behavior; and
- Organizational resources.

Nevertheless, these three strategies should not be viewed as new and single answers to an old problem. Rather, the combination of participatory management, controlled decentralization, and capacity building must be viewed together as another set of hypotheses to be tested and modified on the basis of practical experience. All three strategies emanate from the same belief that alterations in the existing authoritarian, centralized bureaucratic setting can be accomplished, and in so doing provide bureaucrats with the incentives and skills to play a lead role in development. Only when the cynicism about bureaucracy is challenged is it likely that the cart will, indeed, be put back behind the horse, and the role of the implementer will receive the priority attention it deserves.

## NOTES

- 1 Esman and Montgomery, 1980.
- 2 Korten, 1981.
- 3 Jiggins, 1977.
- 4 Not recognizing this, however, has often resulted in project designs which assume that civil servants will behave as irrational "noble bureaucrats." See Honadle, 1979.
- 5 Blair, 1978.
- 6 For further discussion, see Cleaves, 1980 and Esman and Montgomery, 1980: 213.
- 7 Montgomery, 1979.
- 8 Stout, 1980.
- 9 Honadle and others, 1980.
- 10 Sweet and Weisel, 1979.
- 11 Gow, Morss, and Jackson, 1979; Uphoff, Cohen, and Goldsmith, 1979.
- 12 Gow, Morss, and Jackson, 1979: 5-16.
- 13 Brinkerhoff, 1979:7.
- 14 Cohen and Uphoff, 1980: 214.
- 15 Kanter, 1977.
- 16 Jackson and others, 1981.
- 17 Honadle, 1981a.
- 18 Chambers and Howes, 1979.
- 19 Bathrick, 1981.
- 20 Gonzalez-Vega and Tinnermeier, 1979: 28-85.
- 21 Cohen, 1979: 66.
- 22 Armor and others, 1979: 279.
- 23 Uphoff, Cohen, and Goldsmith, 1979.
- 24 Chambers, 1974: 113.

- 25 Regional Planning and Area Development Project, 1980.
- 26 Blair, 1978: 72.
- 27 Morss, 1980.
- 28 Chambers, 1978.
- 29 Esman and Montgomery, 1980: 197.
- 30 Grindle, 1980.
- 31 Hadden, 1980.
- 32 Hadden, 1980: 188-189.
- 33 U.S. Agency for International Development, 1980.
- 34 Honadle, 1981b.
- 35 Coleman, 1971: 74
- 36 Korten, 1980: 480-511
- 37 Tandler, 1976.
- 38 Morss and others, 1976.
- 39 This mentality is represented in Eaton, 1972.
- 40 Iversen, 1979.
- 41 Klee, 1980.
- 42 Nyanteng and Van Apeldoorn, 1971.
- 43 This is very much the strategy advocated in Korten and Uphoff, 1981.

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