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ETHNICITY AND DEVELOPMENT: POLICIES TO DEAL WITH  
ETHNIC CONFLICT IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

A Report to the Agency for International Development

by

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## Ethnic Policy: A New Stage

Ethnic conflict is a major problem for developing countries. Very few countries are ethnically homogeneous, and in a large number of Asian and African countries relations among ethnic countries are fraught with hostility. This hostility manifests itself in many ways: in outright discrimination, in ethnically-based political parties, in ethnically-related coups, riots, and wars of secession, to name some of the most obvious and disruptive manifestations.

Ethnicity impinges on the development process at a number of points. In many countries, an ethnic division of labor is present. Offices, factories, or entire occupations become, in effect, the preserve of one or another group, creating an ethnically segmented labor market. Often, as conflict grows, groups that migrated from less developed regions to take up opportunities in more developed regions have been forced to leave, sometimes dramatically and violently, as in the case of Ibo in Nigeria, Kasai Baluba in Zaire, and Ceylon Tamils in Sri Lanka. The result has been to create a shortage of skilled manpower or of credit and marketing facilities, depending on the economic niche occupied by the migrant group. Elsewhere, restrictions imposed on ethnic strangers have produced a variety of unintended economic costs. In Fiji, for example, a prohibition on land-holding by Indians resulted in short-term leases, overfarming, and soil exhaustion. In the most extreme cases, expulsion or even genocide practiced against immigrant groups, such as Asians in Uganda or Chinese in Indonesia, has created considerable disruption of the local economy.

The political consequences of ethnic conflict are at least as serious. Ethnicity is at the center of politics in country after country; it poses

challenges to the cohesion of states and often to peaceful relations among states; and, as I have suggested, these problems are often handled violently, resulting in death, homelessness, and the repatriation or flight of large numbers of people. To be concerned with these problems is therefore to be concerned with some of the most important roots of political instability in developing countries.

This evaluative survey of policies to cope with ethnic conflict draws impetus from a number of significant recent developments. Within a small but growing number of ethnically-divided countries in Asia and Africa, efforts are underway to address ethnic problems in constructive ways. In 1972, the Sudanese settled their longstanding civil war with arrangements for regional autonomy for the ethnically-differentiated South. In the early 1970s, too, the Malaysian government adopted an extensive program of ethnic preferences to alleviate discontent among the Malays without expropriating the Chinese. Various Indian states have also put into effect policies of ethnic preference. Preferential policies have been implemented for Muslims in the Southern Philippines, and there has been cautious movement toward regional devolution as well. Nigeria, eager to avoid the severe tension that led to the Biafran war, has divided its former four regions into 12 and then into 19 states, in the hope of altering ethnic alignments and power balances. More recently, Nigeria has adopted an electoral system designed to encourage multiethnic parties. Tanzania has taken a variety of steps to insure balanced regional growth and proportionality in education. Sri Lanka, after experimenting with systems of weightage to adjust ethnic representation in universities, has turned toward measures to conciliate the disaffected Tamil minority. A new constitution and electoral system is in place. A

bill to devolve power on development councils has been passed, in order both to decentralize certain development activities and to provide the Tamils with an opportunity to manage affairs in their own territories. At the same time, a number of administrative measures has been taken to alleviate longstanding Tamil grievances in language and employment.

These efforts contrast markedly with the earlier, purely rhetorical--and sometimes coercive--expressions of concern about "nation-building." Moreover, these efforts are undertaken in ways that are designed to respect fundamental human rights. Unlike the earlier formulae, these measures are designed against a background of unhappy experience, recurrence of which political leaders would like to avoid. They are serious and determined efforts to restructure institutions in ways calculated either to mitigate the sources of conflict or to alter the structure of political incentives so that politicians will have self-interested reasons to foster harmonious relations.

The time is thus propitious for a preliminary assessment of accommodative measures.<sup>1</sup> That is what is attempted in this paper. But if the time is right, the evidence is by no means as conclusive or as evenly distributed among policies and approaches as one would wish. On some issues, the experience of only one country is available. Sometimes the inferences that can be drawn from one thorough test are highly significant; at other times, the evidence is sketchy or the conclusions are merely suggestive. On a few matters, the experience of several countries is available, and fairly confident conclusions can be derived. Overall, the countries from which the most useful material can be gleaned are those which have made the most extensive efforts at accommodation: Nigeria, Sri Lanka, and Malaysia.

Accommodative policies fall into two more or less determinate classes: structural and distributive. Structural policies include the use of either territorial or electoral devices to alter the structure of ethnopolitical incentives. Distributive policies aim to alter the balance of economic opportunities and rewards among ethnic groups, typically through ethnic preferences or quotas in education, business, or employment. Both approaches are examined here.

Another way to view ethnic policy is to consider how any given policy actually works. Several common mechanisms of interethnic conflict reduction will be apparent as we examine policy consequences, and it is best to identify them at the outset. Interethnic conflict may be reduced by dispersing it, by proliferating the points of power so that the capture of no single body or office will suffice to gain complete power for any ethnic group. Interethnic conflict may also be reduced if nonethnic lines of cleavage (class, territorial, etc.) replace ethnic lines of cleavage. The same result may be achieved if intraethnic conflict becomes more salient than interethnic conflict or if the incentives for interethnic cooperation begin to outweigh the incentives for interethnic conflict. Finally, interethnic conflict may be reduced if disparities between groups are reduced so that dissatisfaction declines. Needless to say, it may not be easy for policy to produce any of these outcomes, but the policies reviewed in this paper utilize, intentionally or unintentionally, at one point or another, all of these mechanisms.

To be sure, not all policies are equally successful. But one conclusion emerges clearly from the evidence we are about to review: there is

much more scope for constructive policy innovation in the area of ethnic conflict than policymakers in divided societies have generally acknowledged. Ethnic problems are intractable but not altogether without hope.

### Federalism, Regional Autonomy, and Conflict Resolution

In spite of the store of human experience with the relation of territory to ethnicity, few are the practitioners or observers who could give confident advice on the key questions of federalism and regional autonomy: Under what circumstances is the creation of a separate state or region likely to forestall or encourage secession? What is the optimal form and scope such arrangements should take? How many units should there be, and should they be ethnically homogeneous or heterogeneous? What powers should be devolved upon them and what controls retained? The skillful division of authority between regions or states and a center has the potential to reduce conflict, but there is little more than dogma available about the utility of federalism; and even then the dogmas are equally divided between those who assume that territorial boundaries should follow ethnic boundaries and those who counsel that they should crosscut them.<sup>2</sup>

### Federalism: The Nigerian Evidence

Every so often, political systems create quasi-experimental conditions in which propositions are inadvertently tested. These conditions are never as controlled as genuine experiments, but the propositions are generally more significant than those that can be tested in experiments. Nigeria provides a far-reaching and continuing test of the impact of federalism on ethnic conflict.<sup>3</sup>

With two quite differently-designed federal systems, separated from each other by 13 years of military rule, Nigerian federalism affords the best evidence available on the varying impact of federalism under civilian rule. The

long period of military government produced greater discontinuity between the two sets of federal arrangements than is ordinarily present when federal systems are altered. For this reason, causal relationships between the new federal arrangements and the subsequent behavior of civilian politicians and electorates are fairly clearcut. These changes in political behavior stand out in especially sharp relief, because some continuities in behavior, harking back to the period before military rule, are also evident. Despite inevitable rough edges in the quasi-experiment, despite the problems inherent in historical comparisons, despite the recency of the Second Nigerian Republic and the risk that it may yet fail--despite all of this, the Nigerian evidence shows that federalism can either exacerbate or mitigate ethnic conflict. Much depends on the number of component states in a federation, their boundaries, and their ethnic composition. Particularly important is the relationship of ethnic group distribution to the distribution of states.

The First Nigerian Republic (1960-66) consisted of three main regions, each of them controlled by a single ethnic majority (and a party representing it) which used its control of the region to struggle furiously for power at the center. The dominance of the three major groups in their regions weakened the representation of minorities by opposition parties. Patronage, coercion, and the apportionment of seats worked together to overrepresent the regional majorities. Most overrepresented were the Hausa-Fulani, who with little more than half of the North's population, held nearly three-quarters of the regional assembly seats from 1961-65.<sup>4</sup> The Northern People's Congress, dominated by Hausa-Fulani and centered in the traditionally ascendant Sokoto emirate, won nearly all the federal seats in the North and was soon in a position to control parliament in Lagos. That control was challenged by Yoruba and Ibo parties that had also used their regions as staging areas for the battle at the

center. Under this federal system, the power of the three main groups, who together comprised less than two-thirds of the total population, was not merely reflected at the center; it was magnified by their control of regions whose boundaries extended somewhat beyond ethnic boundaries.<sup>5</sup>

The advent of military rule and the Biafra war provided the occasion for restructuring the federal system. To counter the Biafran charge that Nigeria was dominated by the large Northern Region, to secure the loyalty of Northern minorities strongly represented in the army, and to wean the Eastern minorities away from Biafra, the regions were carved into 12 states in 1967.<sup>6</sup> The three main groups were relegated to seven states. The dissolution of the old political parties by the military and the creation of new states together liberated the minorities from control of regionally dominant groups and paved the way for new alignments.

The new fluidity was enhanced by the creation of seven more states in 1976, before the return to civilian rule.<sup>7</sup> Now the Hausa were spread among half a dozen states, the Yoruba among five, and the Ibo between two. The proliferation of states produced a lively state politics and a more complex--and therefore less tense--politics at the center. Both of these effects of the new states were visible when civilian politics reemerged in 1979.<sup>8</sup>

The new arrangements transferred a good deal of conflict from the all-Nigeria level to the state level. State-level conflicts have been intraethnic and interethnic. More than half the states have a substantial measure of ethnic heterogeneity, especially in the former regional minority areas. In such states, there has been tension over the allocation of civil service positions and other benefits to various groups and areas of the state. Disappointed groups have in several cases demanded

creation of their own separate states. The Ibo and Yoruba states have much less ethnic heterogeneity, but they have experienced considerable intraethnic tension. Virulent disputes have arisen in Imo, an Ibo state, between Bende and Owerri administrative divisions over jobs and development projects; the same sort of quarrel has occurred in Yoruba states, such as Oyo, among subgroups clustered in Ife, Ilesha, and Oshogbo. The boundaries of the Ibo and Yoruba states tend to follow--and therefore reinforce--existing lines of subethnic cleavage.' The Owerri Ibo in Imo have long been at odds with the Onitsha Ibo of Anambra, while the Oyo and Ogun Yoruba, consigned to states with those names, have fought over the apportionment of resources between their two states. The 19 states thus created a new, lower layer of conflict-laden issues around which already-existing differences crystallized, greatly reducing the previously unchallenged importance of contention at the all-Nigeria level.

This dispersal of conflict was reinforced by a distributive side-effect of creating 19 state bureaucracies. The federal and state bureaucracies are differently composed. Inevitably, the ethnic composition of state civil services tended to reflect the composition of the respective states, albeit not at all proportionately within heterogeneous states. These new bureaucratic opportunities reduced--though they by no means eliminated--the potentially explosive significance of a major ethnic issue at the center: the disproportionate representation of Yoruba, Edo, and a number of smaller groups in the central bureaucracy following the Ibo departure for Biafra.

None of this state level conflict was sufficient in the South to prevent the recrudescence of essentially Ibo and Yoruba parties at the all-Nigeria level. In the 1979 senatorial, gubernatorial, and presidential elections, these two parties won between 74 and 95 per cent of the vote

in the solidly Ibo and Yoruba states. With the exception of a minority segment of Ibo who supported one of the parties with a substantial Northern base, at the all-Nigeria level of politics the subgroup loyalties of the two main Southern groups did not effectively compete with overarching group loyalties. Indeed, as the 1979 elections approached, both the Yoruba and Ibo parties grew more cohesive. Opposition to the Yoruba United Party of Nigeria (UPN) in the Yoruba Oyo and Ondo states was overcome, and Ibo flocked from other parties to the banner of the venerable Ibo nationalist, Nnamdi Azikiwe, when he took command of the Nigerian People's Party (NPP).

Major changes were wrought in the alignments of minorities in the East and North. The Biafran hostilities had widened the gap between Ibo and the minorities in the former Eastern Region. Now concentrated in Rivers and Cross Rivers states, the Eastern minorities have tended to align with Northern-based parties. Non-Muslim minorities in the North were also free to choose new alignments. The period of military rule had sharpened tensions between groups strongly represented in the armed forces--notably between Hausa and certain Middle Belt groups--particularly after the execution of Middle Belt officers implicated in the 1976 assassination of Murtala Mohammed. Now Plateau state, the heart of the Middle Belt, eschewing Northern alignments, supported the predominantly-Ibo Nigerian People's Party.

Most striking of all the changes was the new political significance accorded by the proliferation of states to cleavages within the Muslim North. These cleavages, always observable, were formerly muted by the undivided regional structure and the overriding struggle between the Muslim-majority North and the South.

The new states breathed new life into former Northern opposition parties based on ethnic and subethnic differences. Previously, it made little sense to support a party that would be consigned to futile and often punishing opposition in the Northern Region as a whole. In the federal election of 1959, the Northern People's Congress (NPC) won all but six of the nearly 110 Northern constituencies outside the Middle Belt.<sup>9</sup>

Now, however, electoral incentives were transformed. The pains of opposition in the undivided region became the rewards of power in the states. The creation of 10 states in the former Northern Region simultaneously brought into being 10 state legislatures, 10 governors, and, since each state sends five senators to Lagos, 50 federal senators. A party with only minority support in the old North could now control one or more states, could gain one or more federal senate seats--for these are apportioned by territorial constituencies within states--and could have a respectable voice at the center. There had always been leaders willing to take up the cudgels of opposition in the North, but other leaders and most voters had responded more sensibly to the logic of the situation by supporting the NPC. The new state boundaries turned that logic around, making ethnic and subethnic loyalties at the state, rather than regional, level more important in determining party support. The new federal structure thus facilitated the expression of Northern heterogeneity more accurately than the earlier regional structure had permitted.

Two parties in the Muslim North benefited from the new structure. One, centered in Borno, is dominated by the Kanuri, a large majority in that state but only about 10 per cent of the North as a whole. The other, centered in Kano state, embodies elements of Kano resistance to Sokoto,<sup>10</sup> Hausa resentment of Fulani overlordship, and social-class differences. Both parties had direct antecedents in the First Republic.

The Kanuri had been tied closely to the ruling Northern People's Congress in the First Republic. Some Kanuri, to be sure, had organized the Bornu Youth Movement (BYM), an explicitly Kanuri party. But the NPC carefully nurtured Kanuri support by a combination of rewards and pressure. The Bornu Youth Movement fought back, and interparty conflict, sometimes overlapping Hausa-Kanuri conflict, was often bitter. Nonetheless, the BYM won few elections and was confined largely to urban areas.<sup>11</sup>

In 1976, however, the Kanuri were awarded their own Borno state. They responded by supporting their own Great Nigeria People's Party (GNPP) to govern it.<sup>12</sup> The state assembly, the governorship, and four of Borno's five senate seats were won by this party; the fifth was narrowly lost in a triangular race. The GNPP's strength also spilled into adjacent areas in the north of neighboring Gongola state. With some historical ties to the old Bornu empire, Gongola gave the GNPP a plurality of its state assembly seats (enabling it to form a fragile minority government in that state), as well as the governorship and two senate seats.

The Kanuri had fought and repelled Fulani armies in the nineteenth century. It is not surprising that, once it became possible to control their own state government, most Kanuri would leave their ties to a Hausa-Fulani party behind them. The GNPP, led, significantly, by a former NPC cabinet minister, Waziri Ibrahim, could easily be viewed as the Bornu Youth Movement writ large.<sup>13</sup>

The same phenomenon explains the success of Aminu Kano's People's Redemption Party (PRP) in the Hausa-Fulani state of Kano and in neighboring Kaduna state. The PRP is the reincarnation of the old, unsuccessful Northern Elements Progressive Union (NEPU), also led by Aminu Kano. In the First Republic, NEPU could be suppressed by the NPC's judicious use of regional patronage, by accusations that NEPU was dividing the North in the great

struggle to control Nigeria, and by the taint of its affiliation with the leading Ibo party.<sup>14</sup> In the Second Republic, however, patronage is controlled at the state level, it is more difficult to see the North-South struggle as all-encompassing, and the other Northern parties are the strangers in Kano compared to the PRP. Aminu Kano's party captured the Kano state assembly, the governorship, and all five senate seats by overwhelming majorities. In neighboring Kaduna, the PRP won two senate seats, the governorship, and a strong minority position in the state assembly. It was a far cry from the lean years of NEPU's fruitless opposition, during which, in six regional and federal elections between 1956 and 1964, the party had won a grand total of 18 seats. In the last Northern regional elections, in 1961, NEPU had won one seat to the NPC's 156.<sup>15</sup>

Many of the forces that had supported the NPC in the First Republic were drawn to the National Party of Nigeria (NPN) in the Second. The NPN did well in many traditional areas of NPC strength--indeed, in practically all except those areas where the GNPP and PRP showed the strength denied to their antecedent parties in the First Republic. This limitation, however, was enough to crimp the Northern support of the NPN, so that it won, for example, only half the governorships in states of the former Northern Region.

Each of the five parties of the Second Republic is thus recognizable as a somewhat altered version of one or more of the parties of the First Republic. This is most abundantly clear for the GNPP, the PRP, and the Yoruba UPN, which recapitulates the Action Group but without the Action Group's allies outside Yorubaland. The mainly-Ibo NPP has inherited the support of the Ibo NCNC, but with the addition of support in Plateau state that would earlier have gone to the old United Middle Belt Congress. In the First Republic, the UMBC had been aligned with the Action Group. The

NPN, with the same following the NPC had in many Hausa-Fulani areas of the North, also has a strong following in the Eastern minority areas. Much of that support, too, had formerly been linked to the Action Group. These strong elements of party continuity attest to the persistence of ethnic forces in Nigeria, even in the face of certain changed ethnic alignments.

The main impact of the new federal structure on party politics is, then, not to abolish ethnically-based parties. To the contrary, as parties formed and re-formed in 1978-79, it was easy to discern the sorts of mergers and splits that are so characteristic of the evolution of ethnic parties in divided societies. The GNPP, for example, was originally part of the now mainly-Ibo NPP. It split off when Azikiwe took the NPP leadership, depriving Waziri Ibrahim of a chance to be the NPP presidential candidate. Originally, Waziri took some Ibo leaders with him to the GNPP; but these returned to the NPP camp after the 1979 elections, leaving the GNPP with no significant Southern support and the NPP with no support north of the Middle Belt. Not an end to ethnic parties but a rearrangement of the building blocks of such parties, and--above all--a less distorted reflection of their underlying strength, particularly in the North: these are the main consequences of the new federal structure.

The results of this in federal legislative elections for Northern constituencies are visible in Table 1, which lists parties competing in the North in the First Republic opposite their nearest successors in the Second. The table shows plainly that the difference is the way seats are spread among the Muslim parties of the North: the decreased strength of the NPN vis-à-vis its predecessor, the NPC, and the concomitantly increased strength of both the Kano-based PRP vis-à-vis its predecessor, NEPU, and the Kanuri-based GNPP vis-à-vis the Bornu Youth Movement.

TABLE 1

FEDERAL ELECTION RESULTS IN NORTHERN NIGERIA, 1959 and 1979  
(by party; in percentage of seats)

	1959 House (n=174)		1979 House (n=238*)	1979 Senate (n=50)
NPC	77	NPN	51	58
NEPU	5	PRP	20	14
AG/UMBC	14	→UPN	5	8
		→NPP	8	8
Other (includes BYM)	4		17	12
	<u>100</u>		<u>101**</u>	<u>100</u>

Sources: For 1959, Whitaker, The Politics of Tradition, p. 374; for 1979, official returns.

\*Omits two seats for which final results were not available.

\*\*Total does not equal 100 due to rounding.

It may seem odd to lay so much emphasis on the electoral impact of the new states, but it is not wide of the mark. The Nigerian experience shows that federalism can act as a kind of electoral reform, setting off one arena from another, making and unmaking legislative majorities and minorities by adjusting the territory in which their votes are to be counted. As it changed electoral incentives, the effect of the new states in the North was rather like a change in electoral formula; it substituted something akin to proportional representation for the winner-take-the-whole-region formula that had exaggerated the strength of the largest regional party and of the largest ethnic group that comprised the party's support.

The reduced strength of the NPN in the North gave the party a powerful incentive to do what new electoral requirements also encourage it to do--appeal to ethnic groups outside the core area of its support, indeed outside the North altogether. The NPN had more success in reaching out to groups across the country than any other party did: it won the presidency and the largest number of seats in both federal houses in 1979. That the new states had the secondary effect of reinforcing incentives for inter-ethnic cooperation across North-South lines is evidence of the efficacy of using territorial boundaries as an instrument of conflict reduction. Federalism, in short, can create a new framework for electoral reasoning on the part of voters and party leaders. By heightening the importance of cleavages within the North, the new framework ultimately reduced more dangerous cleavages at the all-Nigeria level.

Finally, the creation of 19 states ranging in population from less than two to more than eight million also created incentives for political actors to see at least a few all-Nigeria level issues in terms of competition among states, rather than among ethnic groups. Electoral issues in the Constituent Assembly that framed the new constitution occasionally arrayed large states against small states. On revenue issues, rich states have argued that revenue should be spent where it is "derived"; resource-poor states, that revenue should be apportioned by population. Interethnic alliances are notable on both sides.

The new Nigerian federal framework thus utilized several mechanisms of conflict reduction. The proliferation of states dispersed some of the conflict into more parochial forums. The new states provided arenas in which intraethnic conflict might also occur. One result of this was to enhance the position of some parties at the expense of others, especially in the North, paving the way for greater interethnic cooperation. As the new states fought to advance their interests, a few nonethnic issues and actors were also introduced. And the separate state bureaucracies provided career opportunities for groups not well represented in the federal civil service. Using all these tools, the 19 states readjusted, realigned, and complexified the Nigerian political system.

In many ways, of course, there is substantial continuity between the First and Second Republics. Even in party politics, what is striking is the considerable importance of small changes in party support. It would, moreover, not be prudent to conclude that the new Nigerian system has fully settled down. There is undoubtedly more flux to come, and ethnic conflict is by no means permanently reduced to manageable proportions. Still, in the wake of all the failures of planned change in the developing world,

the fragile Nigerian arrangements show already that it is possible to take deliberate action to restructure institutions so as to alter ethnic balances and alignments.

### The Design of Territorial Structures

The Nigerian experiment provides a demonstration of the importance of political context in shaping the manifestations of ethnic conflict. If the results are replicable, territorial design may prove a useful instrument of conflict reduction.

In spite of the smaller of federal states in Asia and Africa, several conclusions from the Nigerian experience can be corroborated. There is already good, if limited, evidence on the ethnic impact of homogeneous and heterogeneous states, the consequences of alternative ways of drawing boundaries, and the costs of devolution in terms of ethnic conflict.

If groups are territorially separate and subethnic divisions are prominent, the case for ethnically homogeneous states is strong. (The term "homogeneous," needless to say, does not preclude subethnic cleavages.) India, which moved toward "linguistic" states in the 1950s, provides abundant testimony. The classic case is Andhra Pradesh, a state of Telugu-speakers previously merged with Tamil-majority Madras. The Telugu movement for a separate state "assumed such an intensity that it was unimaginable that within a decade language . . . would have to contend with other claims."<sup>16</sup> Yet, after a separate Andhra was conceded in 1953, language conflict was superseded by the unremitting struggle between the Kamma and Reddi castes, both Telugu, to control the state, not to mention the equally fervid struggle between the Telangana region (which joined the state in 1956) and the coastal region of Andhra.<sup>17</sup> Subethnic differences have also preempted politics in other monolingual Indian states. Kerala politics has revolved around

the rivalry of Ezhavas, Christians, Nairs, and Muslims, a quadrilateral configuration of caste and religious conflict replicated in no other state.<sup>18</sup> Neighboring Karnataka, designed as a homogeneous Kannada-speaking state, "since its inception has been a silent spectator of the uninterrupted virulent race for power between Lingayats and Vokkaligars."<sup>19</sup> Bihar has its quarrels between tribals and caste Hindus. In each case, broader territorial boundaries would probably produce broader ethnic conflict, along the lines of Tamil-Telugu conflict in pre-1953 Madras.

The complexity of Indian society has facilitated the flow of conflict in linguistically homogeneous states into subethnic channels, just as it has in Nigeria's homogeneous states. Under such circumstances, devolution of a generous share of power upon largely homogeneous federal units promises a dramatic reduction in conflict at the center. Many issues will be contested within ethnic groups, rather than between them, simply because many contested issues become state-level issues. It is difficult to infer causality from Switzerland, because it has not had intense conflict, but it has been argued that Swiss federalism, with its powerful and mainly homogeneous cantons, is effective in dampening ethnic conflict because of the sparseness of contentious issues at the confederal level of politics and the "tranquilizing effect" of compartmentalizing them.<sup>20</sup> Whether or not this is what works in Switzerland, it certainly seems promising for countries with these attributes: serious conflict at the center, territorially separate groups, and significant subethnic divisions. It is essentially what was proposed for Nigeria by Ibo leaders on the eve of the Biafra secession: "Since the control of the Centre has been the main cause of friction and tension between the different Regions, thereby

threatening national solidarity and integrity, the distribution of functions between the Regions and the Centre should be reviewed and so arranged that only such subjects and functions as will engender the minimum of suspicion and friction among different groups are allowed in the hands of the Federal Government."<sup>21</sup> Few states in Asia and Africa, however, would be willing to accord as much power to constituent units as Switzerland does to its cantons.

Even less generous devolution, however, promises some results. The regional autonomy agreement put into effect for the Southern Sudan in 1972 carefully limited the powers of the People's Regional Assembly it created for the South, and the agreement specified that the regional Executive Council was to be responsible to Khartoum.<sup>22</sup> Limited though Southern authority was, it was sufficient to set in motion a contest for control of the region that brought to the fore all the intra-Southern differences that had been manifested during the civil war: between those who spent the war years in Khartoum and those who spent them in exile or in the bush, among the various Southern parties, and among the several main ethnic groups of the South. As the regional government began its work, new intra-Southern issues arose. Now it became imperative that bureaucratic appointments and expenditures not favor one group or region over another.<sup>23</sup> The autonomy agreement seems to have achieved some balance between North-South issues and intra-Southern issues.

The development councils designed for Sri Lanka are also centrally controlled, but they, too, augur some restructuring of conflict. Elected councils are to function in every administrative district. However, members of parliament are to comprise a majority of members of each council, and a centrally-appointed district minister is to sit as a member of the council's

executive committee. The councils are to operate as local authorities in rural areas and to have limited powers of taxation, but the district minister and the central government he represents retain ultimate authority.<sup>24</sup> In order to make them more palatable to Sinhalese opinion, which fears Tamil separatism, the development councils were portrayed as mere adjuncts of the district ministers, useful for decentralizing development functions.<sup>25</sup> Yet they are district legislatures, and some policy planners speak of them as a "settlement" with the Tamils, an arrangement for "quasi-federalism," or "24 states."<sup>26</sup> Plainly, the councils were intended to devolve power upon local authorities which, in the North and East, would be Tamil-dominated.

That, indeed, is how they were perceived by Muslim members of the commission appointed to make recommendations regarding the structure of the councils. In a concurring report, two Muslims pointedly opposed inclusion of the Muslim minority, heavily concentrated in the Eastern Province, within the jurisdiction of Tamil-dominated units; they also opposed elections to the councils.<sup>27</sup> Their apprehension reflects the fact that, as Tamils are outnumbered by Sinhalese in Sri Lanka, Muslims are outnumbered by Tamils in the Eastern Province. What the development councils portend is a good deal less Sinhalese-Tamil conflict at the center, in exchange for somewhat more intra-Tamil and Tamil-Muslim conflict in the districts of the East. This last, of course, is not subethnic, for the Muslims are not Tamils (though they are Tamil-speaking), but it is certainly conflict at a lower level and with different alignments. Where groups are territorially concentrated, devolution may have utility, not because it provides "self-determination," but because, once power is devolved, it becomes somewhat more difficult to determine who the self is.

Where groups are territorially intermixed, some reduction in conflict at the center may be achieved by the creation of heterogeneous states. The Malaysian federal system illustrates several purposes that may be fulfilled by carving out states with varying degrees of heterogeneity.

First, if ethnic ratios vary from state to state, a group that is a minority at the center may be a majority in one or more states and may be in a position to rule these states, thereby mitigating its reduced influence or even exclusion at the center. This was the theory behind the unwritten arrangement that gave the Chinese a preeminent voice in the states of Penang and, for a time, Malacca, both overwhelmingly Chinese. Like reserved offices--which it practically is--this arrangement tends to exacerbate subethnic divisions and promote intraethnic party competition.

Second, state governments provide opportunities for the development of interethnic elite relations that sometimes soften ethnic hostility among politicians. In Malaysia, land is a subject reserved to the states. Chinese businessmen who need land for development or who need state approval for other projects find it advantageous to develop close relations with the Malay chief minister or with members of the state executive council. A frequent result of these close business relations is that the Malay politicians involved become "much quieter" on ethnic issues.<sup>28</sup>

Third, though it may seem unlikely, even ethnically heterogeneous states may produce a quarantine effect for certain issues of ethnic conflict. Two of the worst outbreaks of ethnic violence in Malaysia--in Penang in 1967 and in Kuala Lumpur in 1969--were largely, though not entirely, confined to the states in which they began. The issues which precipitated the violence may have been seen as local or state issues; in the latter

case, the precipitant was related to the results of the state elections. Quarantine effects seem more likely where state boundaries have some historical foundation, as they do in Malaysia, and are not merely artificial constructs. The creation of ethnically heterogeneous states may help scale down to the state level some divisive issues that might otherwise engulf the entire country.

If this is so, the benefits of heterogeneous states challenge the conventional wisdom that federalism is an apt prescription for ethnic conflict only when groups are territorially compact and therefore amenable to encapsulation in homogeneous units. In fact, the prospects for federalism are more complex than the conventional formula would indicate, for neither homogeneous nor heterogeneous units are useful under all conditions.

As I have noted, what makes homogeneous states useful in conflict control is the existence of lower-level cleavages that are activated in state politics. Without subethnic divisions or lower-level ethnic divisions than those that prevail in politics at the center--or with a structure that suppresses such lower-level divisions, as the old regional system did in Nigeria--homogeneous states are unlikely to reduce conflict at the center. Rather, they are likely to be, as the Nigerian regions were, springboards to group power at the center. Especially if there are only a few units, homogeneous states on the model of the First Nigerian Republic will exacerbate rather than alleviate ethnic conflict. Consequently, not all homogeneous states are an improvement on no states at all.

On the other hand, heterogeneous states sometimes are a decided improvement on unitary government. However, as we shall see in a moment, heterogeneous states embracing territorially separate groups have some tendency to fission, so that, in practical terms, heterogeneous states with the

greatest potential for reducing ethnic conflict are those whose groups are intermixed or whose territorial boundaries have some longstanding binding force, as the Malaysian states (formerly sultanates) have.

In short, federalism is not for everybody. The federal judgment must be a differentiated and prudential one. Even so, it is safe to say that federalism has conflict-reducing possibilities for many more countries than have so far contemplated it.

Whether to attempt to use homogeneous or heterogeneous states in conflict reduction, and how much power to devolve, depends on which of the underlying mechanisms of conflict reduction stands the best chance of functioning in a given environment. If intraethnic cleavages can be utilized to reduce the energy expended at the center in interethnic conflict, their availability points to homogeneous states and, as indicated earlier, a generous grant of power. Similarly, if group disparities coincident with region are so pronounced that the aim is to use federalism for distributive purposes, either within states or at the center by allocating opportunities by states, then, too, homogeneous states are called for; and if the aim is specifically to create state bureaucracies composed differently from the federal one, this argues for more state-level powers and functions. If the objective is simply to take the heat off an overheated center, then heterogeneous states may accomplish this and in the process help quarantine some conflict-producing issues that might otherwise be carried to the center. If, however, federalism is to foster interethnic cooperation, there are two routes to this. One is the Nigerian, which, using homogeneous and heterogeneous states, whittled down the power of the largest Northern group, thereby heightening incentives for interethnic cooperation at the federal level. The other route is the Malaysian, which proliferates the

occasions for interethnic cooperation at the state level in mainly heterogeneous states, so that state politicians who find their way to the center have already had experience in dealing with leaders of other groups.

Generally, if states are heterogeneous, this points toward more cautious devolution, so as not to jeopardize interethnic cooperation that can be built up at the state level. Moreover, if significant goods can be obtained at the center, the possibility increases that some issues at the center will be defined in terms of state rather than ethnic interest, and competition for those goods will involve one ethnically heterogeneous unit against another. So again, if states are heterogeneous, a more powerful center is advisable.

More often than not, perhaps, homogeneous states will be indicated, but the availability of various mechanisms of conflict reduction--hence the attractiveness of one kind of unit or another--depends on the configuration of divisive issues, as well as the territorial distribution and internal structure of the groups. It needs to be underscored, however, that many regimes will be reluctant to devolve power on homogeneous regions that have exhibited separatist inclinations, and many more will be reluctant to weaken central authority by significant grants of power. More about this shortly.

How many units are optimal for conflict reduction in a federal system is unanswerable for more than one reason. First of all, it depends on the size of groups relative to the state and relative to each other. The Hausa imbalance in Nigeria clearly called for a significant number of states if ethnic and subethnic divisions in the North were to be brought to bear in the creation of incentives to interethnic cooperation. The Southern Sudan did not present the same problem, and a single Southern region was

sufficient to bring subethnicity into play. Equally important, it is difficult to forecast when an exercise in state creation will prove enduring. There is usually room for subsequent pressure to alter the number and boundaries of states. India and Nigeria have been through several waves of proliferating states, and in neither has the last word been spoken.

There has been a propensity for heterogeneous units within which groups are territorially concentrated to be somewhat more inclined to fission than are homogeneous units. In India, there has been the Andhra movement in Madras, the linguistic states movement in general, the division of Punjab into Haryana and a truncated Punjab, and the fragmentation of Assam into a half dozen units along ethnic lines. The strongest demands for new states in Nigeria also emanate from sharply heterogeneous states like Kaduna, Cross River, Rivers, Kwara, and Bendel. But more homogeneous states have not been immune from fissiparous tendencies--witness, in India, the Saurashtra movement in Gujarat and the Mysore movement in Karnataka, or, in Nigeria, the Enugu movement in Anambra and the Oshun movement in Oyo. Absent preexisting states, principalities, emirates, or sultanates, to whose traditional boundaries the new units may cleave, there is a tendency for ethnic groups and prominent subethnic groups to advance claims to statehood that, if granted, might result in a greater-than-anticipated number of largely homogeneous states. Very often, however, such claims can be resisted or placated with much less than separate statehood: strong separatist movements are common but not universal.<sup>29</sup>

Within limits, the more states there are, the greater will be the tendency of ethnic and subethnic groups to be concerned with parochial alignments and issues and the greater will be their difficulty of combining across state lines to make coherent and divisive claims at the

center. All else being equal, therefore, it is probably better to have more rather than fewer states.<sup>30</sup> Yet there is wisdom in Sir Geoffrey Vickers' observation that, in reorganizing institutions, "it is easiest to subdivide, more difficult to combine and most difficult to carve up and regroup the constituents of a going concern."<sup>31</sup> It may be desirable to end up with a large number of units but prudent to begin with fewer.

In most Asian and African states, there are so many obstacles to decentralization that one hardly needs to call attention to the costs of federalism here. Yet there are costs: duplication of function, expenses of building state capitals, various diseconomies of small scale. There is also, however, an ethnic conflict cost that should be underscored.

One of the strongest forces for devolution is the expectation that government offices in lower-level units will be composed differently from central bureaucracies. The assumption may simply be that, if nature takes its course, the composition of the state civil service will generally resemble the ethnic composition of the region or state. To make this happen, no discrimination is necessary--hence the appeal of devolution for achieving ethnically distributive goals--although a language of administration different from the central official language (Tamil in the Tamil districts of Sri Lanka, for example) may be a facilitating condition. In practice, however, ethnic discrimination may occur, affecting particularly the fortunes of well-educated groups willing to migrate in search of opportunities outside their own states. This has been a serious problem in Nigeria. Some states had hired out-of-state employees on limited-term contracts, rather than on the terms available to domiciliaries of the state. The military government and then the new constitution put an end to discriminatory terms of employment, but there is no guarantee that applicants from out of state will be hired at all. The other side of this

particular Nigerian coin was a growing parochialism, signified by an aphorism enjoining civil servants to serve in their own states: "Don't be a peace corps."<sup>32</sup>

Another form of discrimination is perhaps more likely where regional autonomy schemes are implemented. An assumption may grow that members of groups with "their own" regions have no claim to work in the central government or anywhere outside their region. Such a reaction was certainly feared by those Ceylon Tamils who consistently opposed federalism.

I shall deal more extensively with the costs and benefits of distributive policies later. Suffice it to say here that, to the extent that territorial arrangements have an ethnically distributive impact, they are not exempt from these costs and benefits.

#### Devolution to Avert Separatism

Important as it is to ask how a regime of devolved power should be structured, it is also important to ask related questions: when and how devolution and other policies to counter separatism can be put in place and how they can avoid fostering the very secession they aim to prevent. Proposals for devolution abound, but more often than not devolution agreements are difficult to reach and, once reached, soon abort. Most such agreements are concluded against a background of secessionist warfare or terrorist violence. Where central authority is secure, as in India, the appropriate decisions can be made and implemented by the center. But, where the very question is how far the writ of the center will run, devolution is a matter of bilateral agreement, and an enduring agreement is an elusive thing.

The recent history of Arab-Kurdish relations in Iraq is laced with failed agreements for Kurdish autonomy--agreements unimplemented by Baghdad or later rejected by the Kurds when their prospects in warfare seemed better. The federation of Eritrea with Ethiopia was resisted from the first by Muslim Eritreans and was later undone by Addis Ababa, which forced Eritrean integration into the Empire. In the course of the Moro rebellion, the Philippine government put into effect a regional autonomy scheme; it was quickly rejected as inadequate by the Moro National Liberation Front that had sought it. Bad timing, reluctance to relinquish critical areas of central control, or the prospect of additional external assistance for the separatists can easily undo such arrangements.

It takes some special conditions to create a federal or regional autonomy arrangement that will take hold. A more general constitutional change provides an auspicious setting in which to consider new territorial arrangements to cope with ethnic problems. New states were created with alacrity as the Nigerian military began the process of turning power back to civilians. The democratization of Spain was a suitable occasion to provide for regional autonomy for the Basques, Catalans, and Galicians. In Sri Lanka, adoption of a new presidential constitution and the increasing role of district ministers comprised the background against which power could be confided to district-level development councils. A long period of warfare that brings home the destructive impact of unrestrained ethnic conflict can sometimes serve to catalyze change (Nigeria and the Sudan), but not always (Burma and Iraq). Where separatist warfare is ongoing, a decline in the capacities of the antagonists may be conducive to a regional autonomy settlement. The Sudanese regional autonomy agreement

was concluded at a time when Uganda had limited Anya Nya access to supplies. The Numeiry regime in Khartoum had barely survived a communist coup attempt and had to contend to with a continuing threat from the Ansar sect. Both sides therefore felt weaker than they previously had, and regional autonomy seemed more attractive than pursuing each side's preferred alternative, with its high costs and uncertain outcome.<sup>33</sup> Policymakers can search for opportunities, but it is difficult to create them out of whole cloth.

The problem is complicated, as the Sudanese example well shows, by the presence of two sides that must agree. Different techniques are applicable to securing the acquiescence of ethnic groups influential in the central government, on the one hand, and gaining the acceptance of of the separatists, on the other.

Regional autonomy or federal arrangements are often viewed as undue concessions to separatist sentiment. They may entail a diminution of sovereignty, or confer what seem like special privileges on troublesome and disliked ethnic groups, or "strengthen centrifugal forces and play into the hands of the separatists."<sup>34</sup> The widespread fear that regionalism or statehood will merely feed the secession is difficult to dispel, but there are partial answers. One is for the central government to retain ultimate control over the powers of regional governments, as central governments were able to do in the Sudan, Sri Lanka, and Spain, without losing the cooperation of the beneficiary groups. Another way to reduce opposition to regional autonomy is to make it available, not only to separatist regions, but to all regions. The Sri Lankan development councils are operative throughout the country, and Spanish regional government has been offered to all regions on a referendum basis. The Sudanese scheme

followed a local government law decentralizing authority to all the provinces. Here, however, there is a tradeoff, exemplified by earlier Sri Lankan attempts to regionalize and resistance to regionalization in Spain. By universalizing regional autonomy, it is possible to dispel ethnic opposition to special concessions, only to solidify opposition based on the generalized fear of politicians that rival power centers are being created or that central authority will be dissipated altogether. Opposition based on either ground can doom the scheme.

The Sri Lanka scheme might not have been possible without changes in the structure of government. Previous attempts to devolve power on Tamil authorities had failed because Sinhalese opposition had produced backbench revolts.<sup>35</sup> Since 1978, however, Sri Lanka has had a presidential system and a constitutional provision that prevents legislators, elected on a party list system, from crossing the aisle without risking their seats.<sup>36</sup> As intended, the result is much greater latitude for "unpopular decisions"<sup>37</sup> between elections. The prospects for policies to reduce conflict are closely related to the character of broader structural arrangements.

Precautions such as a fixed presidential term may make it possible to offer regional autonomy or federalism, but they are no guarantee of its acceptance by separatists. Here some distinctions, based on timing and the character of the secession, are in order. An early, generous offer of autonomy made before extreme separatist organizations outflank moderate leaders, may avert secession.<sup>38</sup> A similar offer, made after separatist violence has broken out, may well do what opponents of concessions fear: it may testify to the weakness or vacillation of the central government and the success of the separatists, thereby fortifying their will to fight

on. Years after warfare broke out in Chad, the Tombalbaye regime devolved revenue and judicial powers to the North, without any effect on separatism.<sup>39</sup> In addition, there is a greater chance that regional autonomy will reduce separatist sentiment among late, reluctant secessionists like the Ibo and the Ceylon Tamils than among early, eager secessionists like the Chadien Muslims, the Karens, and the Moros.<sup>40</sup> Policy latitude contracts much more quickly with the latter.

Federalism or regionalism will be most attractive if it is coupled with policies whose effect is to raise the costs of a successful secession. Here it is possible to learn something pertinent to policy from negative cases. Why is it that the Luo in Kenya, whose home is in the west and who resent the dominance of the Kikuyu, have never "seriously contemplated a Biafra-type session"?<sup>41</sup> Clearly, it is because they hold influential positions in major Kenyan towns outside their region, especially Nairobi and Mombasa. Like the Lozi of Zambia, but unlike the Ibo, ethnic conflict had not forced them to return home. Secession is less attractive if it is likely to mean a forfeiture of abundant opportunities outside the home region.

This lesson has not been lost on some regimes seeking to counter separatism. Pakistan has continued the British practice of providing Pathans with opportunities in the army, frontier scouts, and militia, while at the same time expending disproportionate funds on investment in Pathan areas, so that other groups even speak sarcastically of the government as "Pathan Raj."<sup>42</sup> The Nagas have had similar treatment from the Indian government: a package of statehood, investment, and reserved offices outside of Nagaland.<sup>43</sup> Once again, structural and distributive policies are used in tandem.

In point of fact, the two principal disincentives to secession are dispersion of the separatist group's population outside of the separatist region, especially in lucrative opportunities, and the regional investments or subsidies that a separatist region would lose if it opted out. It is perhaps revealing that Kurdish demands in Iraq recurrently embody claims to opportunities in Arab areas and expenditures in Kurdish areas, in addition to autonomy.<sup>44</sup> Conversely, the 1980 "sovereignty-association" referendum in Quebec was defeated after a campaign that emphasized the post-separatist isolation that francophones would suffer in Ontario, New Brunswick, and Manitoba, and that made telling points about tariff protection, federal subsidies, and the ratio of funds expended in Quebec to taxes collected there.<sup>45</sup> Even then, as a separatist leader argued, sovereignty was also a matter of "pride,"<sup>46</sup> and the referendum outcome was not foreordained.

Some secession-inhibiting policies are easy to carry out. For advanced, population-exporting groups, this is largely a matter of limiting discrimination and preventing violence against them outside their home region, so as to protect their diaspora. For advanced regions (such as the Basque country) that complain that they are subsidizing the rest of the country, the power confided to regional authorities probably needs to include an ample measure of freedom to tax and spend. For many regions, especially the more developed, financial policies in general may be used to create interregional entanglements and interdependence without explicit ethnic provisions. Beyond this, the problem becomes delicate, for policy may involve ethnically preferential expenditures that can simultaneously

do too little to prevent separatism and yet so much as to provoke an ethnic reaction to the policies. (Here, again, we are up against the costs and benefits of preferential policies, a subject I shall deal with later.)

Territory constitutes a framework in which incentives and disincentives operate. These do not always determine group decisions. Moreover, different sorts of incentives and disincentives are apt for different kinds of separatist groups. Policy measures will not always work or work when policymakers are ready to have them work. Nonetheless, the broader point remains: the most potent way to assure that federalism or regional autonomy will not become just a step to secession is to reinforce those interests that groups have in the undivided state.

#### Electoral Systems and Conflict Reduction

Electoral systems have a role in fostering or retarding ethnic conflict. The delimitation of constituencies, the electoral principle (proportional representation or first-past-the-post), the number of members per constituency, and the structure of the ballot all have a potential impact on ethnic alignments, ethnic electoral appeals, multiethnic coalitions, the growth of extremist parties, and policy outcomes.

Unfortunately, the development of this fertile field has been arrested by two fortuitous circumstances. First, in Asia and Africa, concern for minority electoral protection initially took the form of imposition of a separate electoral roll for Muslims in India and later for certain minorities elsewhere.<sup>47</sup> This began a long and sterile debate over whether

the so-called communal roll widens or narrows existing gaps between ethnic groups.<sup>48</sup> Second, scholarly studies of electoral systems have had a completely different focus: whether proportional representation is more conducive to the proliferation of parties than is the first-past-the-post system of election.<sup>49</sup> Although this debate has some relevance to the impact of electoral formulae on ethnicity, it has scarcely touched explicitly on ethnic variables at all.<sup>50</sup>

Politicians have been more acutely aware of the ethnic impact of electoral provisions. Various forms of electoral manipulation and gerrymandering have been practiced in many countries to favor one group or another. More recently, electoral innovation has been used by a small but growing number of severely divided societies in Asia and Africa as a vehicle for ethnic accommodation.

There are several possible goals of such innovations, and there has not always been great clarity about them. All of the goals stem from the growth of ethnically-based parties in severely divided societies.

Suppose, for example, that two groups, A and B, support their respective parties, A and B. Suppose further that Group A comprises 60 per cent of the population and a majority of voters in 60 per cent of the single-member electoral constituencies, with members elected on a first-past-the-post formula; Group B comprises a 40 per cent minority overall and a majority in 40 per cent of the constituencies. Clearly, as the election returns come in, Group A and its ethnic party appear to have gained power for the indefinite future. This is a simplified version of the situation that prevailed in many Asian and African countries under free elections after

independence. Ethnic parties developed, majorities took power, and minorities took shelter. It was a fearful situation, in which the prospect of minority exclusion from government, underpinned by ethnic voting, was potentially permanent. Variants of this situation were responsible for much of the instability in the post-colonial world in the first 10 years of independence. Civil violence, military coups, and the advent of single-party regimes can all be traced to this problem of inclusion-exclusion. Now the question is whether anything can be done about it while free elections prevail.

In principle, there are three solutions to the pure form of the problem depicted by the 60-40 split. The first is an alternation scheme, such as the rotating presidency that was attempted unsuccessfully among three groups in Benin in the 1960s and somewhat more successfully after civil war in Colombia. Where ethnic divisions are deep, it is unlikely that such an arrangement can be made to work. The second possibility is an all-embracing "national government." This is what many single-party regimes said they were creating when they dissolved the opposition, but what they were actually doing was something quite different. In the absence of an external emergency of the sort that produced the wartime national government in Britain, this is no solution for ethnically-divided Asian and African countries. The third solution is to use the electoral system to encourage party fragmentation with a view to producing one of two outcomes: (1) a split in Party A, resulting in two parties for Group A, neither of them with a majority of seats--hence the need for an inter-ethnic coalition; (2) splits in both Party A and Party B, resulting in

much more fluidity and, depending on how seats are apportioned, perhaps as many as four possible interethnic coalitions. It should be noted, however, that both of these solutions depend on the capacity of the electoral system to induce splits in at least one of the parties (A), that party being the party with the most to lose if it does split.

There are, however, more complex versions of the ascriptive majority-minority problem. For all of them, let us assume that ethnic party voting is proportionate to ethnic shares of the population.

Suppose Group A is 80 per cent, and Group B is 20 per cent, but Group A is divided into two parties competing for the A vote. This is a dangerous situation, in which ethnic outbidding can occur, but it is not necessarily solved by splitting the support of Group A, which is already split. More useful would be incentives for the parties of Group A to behave moderately toward Group B or--and the two may go together--for a device that would make the votes of Group B essential for the formation of a government. An even balance between the two parties of Group A may be preferable for this purpose to a system that splits Group A's support further, perhaps enabling the strongest of the A parties to win a majority of seats by recurrent pluralities in three- or four-way contests.

Another variant of the ascriptive majority-minority problem, a common one in fact, entails a situation in which several ethnic groups, none a majority, are potential contenders for power. There are, however, affinities among Groups A, B, and C, on the one hand, and D and E, on the other. Given the exigencies of forming governments under the parliamentary system, it is possible that the two clusters will form

two ethnically-based parties, thus producing a situation as polarized as the 60-40 situation. Two courses of prevention suggest themselves. One is to create incentives for multiethnic support that will cross the chasm between the two clusters, making consolidation into two parties less likely. The other is to make it less exigent for the existing groups to congeal into a majority. Perhaps there is a plurality electoral formula that can help preserve a more fluid multigroup-multiparty system.

So far, for simplicity, I have hypothesized situations in which ethnic group percentages get translated into the same fractional shares of votes for the party or parties of each ethnic group, which then get translated into the same fractional shares of seats. Thus, a group with 60 per cent of the population was hypothesized to cast 60 per cent of the total vote for its party, and that party was assumed to win 60 per cent of the seats. In point of fact, there is distortion at both interchanges. Demographic and behavioral differences account for the first distortion; the electoral system typically introduces the second.

Even in conditions of acute ethnic conflict, with ethnic parties, ethnic group percentages of a population do not convert perfectly into percentages of a vote. Three variables intervene: (1) relative shares of eligible voters, which, holding registration rates constant, is essentially a function of the age structure of each ethnic group (groups with the largest percentage of members under the age of eligibility obviously have a smaller share of voters than of population); (2) relative rates of voter turnout, which vary with party organization, urban or rural

concentration, and certain cultural features (in some groups, for instance, it is much more difficult to induce women to vote); and (3) relative rates of voting for ethnic parties (even in high-conflict cases, the incidence of ethnic voting varies marginally from group to group). There is not much an electoral system can do about these variables, and I shall not consider them further. For the sake of the discussion, I shall simply assume no difference between shares of a population and shares of a vote.

The translation of votes into seats is a different matter, and it gives rise to yet another majority-minority problem. Quite commonly, a party with a mere plurality of votes obtains a solid majority of seats.<sup>51</sup> Suppose, then, in a 60-40 situation, the support of Group A is divided equally between two parties, while Group B's support is given solidly to one party. In three-sided contests in single-member constituencies, under a first-past-the-post formula, Group B's party, with 40 per cent of the vote, may end up with as much as 60 per cent of the seats. So a cohesive minority group can govern a less cohesive majority group, or a group with a plurality of the vote can gain a majority of seats if the balance of the vote is at all fragmented. Both of these outcomes are generally perceived as instances of illegitimate minority-group rule. Where they occur, they tend to create explosive situations. The question is whether the electoral system can be modified so that shares of votes are translated more faithfully into shares of seats.

These hypothetical examples give rise to essentially five possible aims for an electoral system that is to be harnessed to the goal of ethnic accommodation. An attempt can be made to utilize the electoral system to:

1. Fragment the support of one or more ethnic groups, especially a majority group, to prevent it from achieving permanent domination.
2. Induce an ethnic group, especially a majority, to behave moderately toward another group and engage in interethnic bargaining.
3. Encourage the formation of multiethnic coalitions.
4. Preserve a measure of fluidity or multipolar balance among several groups to prevent bifurcation and the permanent exclusion of a minority.
5. Reduce the disparity between votes won and seats won, so as to reduce the possibility that a minority or plurality ethnic group can, by itself, gain a majority of seats.

The available evidence indicates that many of these aims can in fact be achieved. I intend to show this through an examination of electoral arrangements in four severely-divided societies in four different regions of the world: Lebanon, Nigeria, Sri Lanka, and Guyana.

#### Fluidity Through Fixity: Lebanon

From the National Pact of 1943 to the Civil War of 1975-76, Lebanon had an electoral system that encouraged moderation, that practically required interethnic coalitions, and that prevented the crystallization of allegiances around the overarching affiliations of Muslim versus Christian. Four electoral provisions were conducive to these results: reserved offices, reserved seats, interethnic tickets, and interethnic voting.<sup>52</sup> All the major offices were reserved. The president was to be a Maronite, the prime minister a Sunni, the speaker of the house a Shiite, the vice-speaker a Greek Orthodox, and so on. By the same token, the ethnic composition

of the legislature was prescribed by law; that of the cabinet, by custom. Although there were variations over time, generally most constituencies were multimember and multiethnic. The ethnic identity of each seat was specified. There was a common electoral roll, so that each voter, regardless of ethnic identity, cast a ballot for each seat. Candidates formed competing interethnic lists, appealing to the entire electorate.

Rarely in a severely divided society has there been a system that placed as high a premium on intraethnic competition and interethnic cooperation. That the major political offices were reserved for members of specified groups meant that it was not possible for members of different groups to aspire to the same office and use ethnic appeals to mobilize support. Sunni aspirants for the prime ministership sought to link up with Maronite aspirants for the presidency, each trading the support he could muster in his own group for the support of the other. Reserved offices reinforced tensions within each group, while solidifying ties between one group and another. The same was true of legislative elections. Reserved seats restricted competition to members of the same group. Mixed tickets in multimember constituencies with a common roll required agreements among politicians of various groups, underpinned, of course, by the need for every candidate to obtain votes of members of several groups. The fixed proportions of the system meant that it was impossible to increase the number of seats held by any group or for a group to occupy an office or seat assigned to another group. All that was left was to squabble over who, among members of a given group, would occupy a seat or office and, in the process of doing so, to maximize support from sources outside the group.

This was a system that depended upon and exacerbated preexisting subethnic cleavages, based on family, clan, and region. Lebanon is richly endowed with such distinctions, and so it was by no means artificial to force one Maronite faction to oppose another, for instance, or to induce the Chouf Druze to line up against their Druze rivals, the Yazbakis. Lebanese subgroups were tailormade for this system, and they rose to its opportunities.

With half a dozen major groups and many subgroup factions, typically organized around strong leaders, there was much flux in the system. The cabinet was, of course, composed of fixed proportions of the various groups. There were many candidates competing for inclusion in it, and so it was possible for the president to maintain his power by reshuffling the cabinet frequently. This flux in appointments was a disincentive to extreme opposition. A Shiite, for example, excluded from the cabinet today might be required for a Shiite position in it tomorrow. Extreme behavior could only impair his future attractiveness. Consequently, the same system that made subethnic factions the most relevant political actors encouraged rotation in office and discouraged ethnic appeals that might alienate potential electoral, legislative, or cabinet allies.

The same forces inhibited the growth of political parties. It was the individual leaders who, by dint of ethnic and subethnic identity, were asked to fill reserved places. This enhanced the position of notables who commanded factions. Occasionally, they called their faction by a party name. (Some 15-20 "parties" could be identified in the 1960s.) But

party organization would have deprived such leaders of the flexibility they needed to make and unmake electoral arrangements and to enter and leave cabinets as individuals.<sup>53</sup> Moreover, there was no acceptable ethnic basis for party organization. Since ethnic hostility was strong, it was not possible to create parties that were multiethnic in support. Yet, because of the constant need to forge links and secure votes across ethnic lines, neither was it possible to create ethnically-based parties. The system had to be personalistic.

The Lebanese system provided a deeply divided society with a politics of conciliation for over 30 years.<sup>54</sup> It was undone by many forces, external and internal, only some of them related to the character of the electoral system. Two, however, bear mention.

First, the absence of parties created an organizational vacuum, which facilitated the emergence of armed private militias. These gangs, some of them attached to parliamentary politicians, had much greater freedom than they would have had if real party organizations had existed and seen them early on as rivals for political authority.<sup>55</sup>

Second, the fixed ethnic proportions of the system were a given. Small adjustments in parliamentary representation were made from time to time, but the overall proportional shape of the system, with its reserved offices, could only be challenged by challenging the entire structure. In a sense, Lebanese electoral institutions created two options: moderation or civil war. The former was much more common, but the latter, when it came, was deadly.

### Multiethnicity Through Distribution: Nigeria

A new constitution went into effect in Nigeria in 1979. Determined to avoid a recurrence of the ethnically exclusionary politics that had produced the Biafra war, the framers of the new constitution attempted a far-reaching reconstruction of the political system. Nigeria's parliamentary system was replaced by American-style institutions, replete with a separately-elected president, a two-house Congress, and a strong separation of powers, together with comparable institutions in the 19 states. The reasoning was that the parliamentary system had been conducive to ethnic divisions. Whereas any party with a parliamentary majority--even an ethnically-limited majority--could form a government and rule the rest, a nationally elected president might be more broadly representative. Even if not, the separation of powers could prevent an ethnic group dominating one branch from controlling everything.

The framers of the Nigerian constitution aimed at a multiethnic party system. In this they did not succeed, but they did not wholly fail either. A mixed electoral system produced mixed results. And indeed the framers seem to have succeeded in something they did not quite intend: preserving the fluidity of a multiplicity of ethnic parties against the threat of a North-South bifurcation.

The principal device to encourage multiethnic parties was the presidential electoral formula.<sup>56</sup> To be elected president, a candidate must win a plurality of votes nationwide plus at least 25 per cent of the vote in no fewer than two-thirds of the 19 states. Since no one or two ethnic groups (even in combination) had voters distributed widely enough to meet

this stringent requirement, the expectation was that it would produce a party system with a small number of parties, perhaps just two, each with broad multiethnic support. Otherwise, it might be impossible for any presidential candidate to get elected.<sup>57</sup>

This logic was not incorrect, but it was incomplete. Although the presidential electoral formula did create incentives to multiethnicity and party consolidation, by itself it was not sufficient to produce broadly multiethnic parties or only two parties. Other features of the constitutional structure created countervailing incentives to one or both of these goals.

The proliferation of states, as we have seen, made it possible for minority parties in the North to control states, thereby fragmenting party support in the North and insuring party proliferation overall. In any case, the incentives to party consolidation were not strong. With more than two presidential candidates, only a plurality was required to win. The candidate who did win in 1979 had only a third of the total vote. The winner had to have broadly distributed support, but the party system did not have to congeal into two or three parties to produce a winner. Once a plurality president was installed, he might have to arrange a legislative coalition to get his program through, for his or another party might only have a plurality in Congress, but his appointment power gave him bargaining leverage to negotiate a coalition; and in fact this was done.

The incentives to multiethnicity were also countered. There was, to be sure, no ignoring the distribution requirement for presidential election. All parties sought support outside their core region, but

two did this better than the others. In the first elections under the new constitution, held in 1979, the mainly-Ibo party (NPP) drew considerable support in a Middle Belt state, Plateau, where it was also able to elect a governor. The mainly-Hausa party (NPN) developed strong links outside the Muslim North--in Rivers, Cross River, and Benue states--and came in first or second in nearly every state, in both presidential and senatorial contests. The NPN candidate, Shehu Shagari, was the only presidential contender even to approach the 25 per cent distribution requirement. He had the largest number of votes, more than 25 per cent in 12 states, and about 20 per cent in the thirteenth state. This, the electoral commission decided, was tantamount to having 25 per cent in two-thirds of the states.<sup>58</sup>

The presidential election was not the only election, but it was the only one to have the distribution requirement. Both houses of Congress were elected on a first-past-the-post formula in single-member constituencies. These constituencies generally were ethnically homogeneous or had a majority or large plurality ethnic group. A presidential candidate might take his constituency to be all of multiethnic Nigeria. A representative or senator could hardly do the same. Inevitably, most members of Congress would arrive in Lagos as delegates of their ethnic groups and would expect their parties to be responsive to ethnic claims.

The party system that has so far emerged from this interplay of ethnic groups and electoral incentives is mainly a somewhat realigned, expanded, and newly balanced version of the earlier ethnic party system. Indeed, it is significant that proto-parties began to emerge as divisive

ethnic issues emerged in the Constituent Assembly that redrafted the constitution.<sup>59</sup> But the new system does not seem to have the dangerous tendency of the earlier ethnic party system to polarize into two parties--one Northern, one Southern--for now there are five.

The new system is subject to strong cross-pressures. There is no doubt that Shagari's party has a core of support in the Hausa-Fulani North. There is equally no doubt that, if Hausa-Fulani interests were given untrammelled sway by the president, the support his party enjoys outside the North would erode. That extraregional support is more important than it was for the predecessor NPC in the First Republic. The presidential electoral formula requires it, and the new states have strengthened other parties in the North, reducing the assured support enjoyed by the president's party there. It is not surprising that the president has emerged as a conciliatory pan-ethnic figure. The Congress, on the other hand, seems to be a forum for the expression of ethnic demands.<sup>60</sup> The two electoral systems push those subject to them in different directions. Parties, which aim to elect both legislators and presidents, are pulled both ways. Although they are ethnically based, there is recurrent discussion of reducing their number by merger and concomitantly expanding their ethnic coverage. Electoral engineering in the Nigerian Second Republic has modified but not obliterated the ethnic basis of the party system. That is to be expected, since the engineers went to work only on the election of the president.

Moderation Through Alternative Votes and Proportional Representation: Sri Lanka

As the Nigerians were drafting a new constitution, so were the Sri Lankans. Both chose a presidential form of government, the Nigerian resembling the American arrangements, the Sri Lankan somewhat resembling the French, with a prime minister as well as a president. Both constitutions attempt in different ways to make provision for reducing ethnic tensions. Like the Nigerian constitution of 1978, the Sri Lankan constitution of 1978 adopts a different formula for electing the president from that employed in electing the legislature. But, while the Nigerian presidential formula was devised for ethnic engineering purposes, the Sri Lankan formulae responded to somewhat different concerns. Neither the presidential nor the legislative electoral provisions adopted in Sri Lanka aimed at multiethnic parties. Nevertheless, both Sri Lankan formulae are likely to have important effects on ethnic accommodation.<sup>61</sup>

Whereas the Nigerians constructed a presidential electoral formula that, they anticipated, would produce party consolidation, the Sri Lankans took their multiplicity of parties as a given. With the few parties they envisioned and the stringent distributive formula they enacted, the Nigerians were content to elect a president on a plurality basis, rather than resort to the additional complexities required to construct a majority if there were more than two candidates. With at least several parties, however, plurality election of the president was less attractive to the Sri Lankans, for the plurality achieved by a candidate might be a small fraction of the total vote. Only once in seven Sri Lankan general elections

since independence has any party secured more than 50 per cent of the total vote. The strongest party has generally polled 30-40 per cent. Accordingly, it was provided that the president must have a majority. But how to arrive at a majority if there are several candidates? For this purpose, a preferential or alternative vote system was adopted. Where there are three candidates, each voter must specify his second preference; where more than three candidates, his second and third preferences. In the absence of an initial majority, all but the top two candidates are eliminated. The alternative preferences of voters whose first (or second) choices are not among the top two contenders but whose second (or third) choices are among the top two are reallocated to them to compute a majority.

Under the previous parliamentary system, Tamil parties occasionally held the balance between the two major Sinhalese parties and were able to gain concessions in exchange for Tamil votes in Sinhalese-majority constituencies and Tamil support in parliament. More often than not, however, a plurality for one of the Sinhalese parties could be translated into a majority of parliamentary seats, thus obviating the need for conciliating the Tamils.<sup>62</sup> Under the new system, however, presidential candidates cannot benefit from such a bonus. Consequently, interparty arrangements must be made in advance for second preference votes. In practice, this should give the Tamil United Liberation Front, which largely controls the Ceylon Tamil vote, and the Ceylon Workers' Congress, which controls most of the Indian Tamil vote, good bargaining power. If

Tamil candidates run for president, they are unlikely to finish first or second. The second and third preferences of Tamil voters should thus become quite valuable commodities in political exchange.<sup>63</sup> A Sinhalese president elected on reallocated Tamil votes has a strong disincentive to extremism. The alternative vote is said to be conducive to a politics of bargaining and moderation,<sup>64</sup> and Sri Lanka's use of the technique seems to accord with that view.

The legislative electoral system adopted for the Second Sri Lankan Republic should also have a moderating effect on ethnic politics. As in the case of the president, the probable fate of Sinhalese candidates is linked to Tamil votes.

The principal purpose of the proportional representation scheme that was adopted was to prevent small swings in votes from producing large swings in number of seats. Sri Lanka has had a change of government at virtually every parliamentary election, and shares of seats have frequently been far out of line with shares of the total vote. As Douglas W. Rae has shown, proportional representation, like first-past-the-post, tends to inflate the strongest party's share of seats at the expense of the weakest, but PR does this less prominently than first-past-the-post; and PR does not generally magnify changes in party support when legislative seats are allocated, so it is particularly responsive to the oscillation problem the framers of the Sri Lankan constitution were addressing.<sup>65</sup>

The system adopted in Sri Lanka was the party list system by multi-member territorial constituencies. To avert the party proliferation that

was feared--some say to dilute the strength of the small Marxist parties--any party with less than one-eighth of the vote in a constituency is awarded no seats there. This is a rather high cutoff that disadvantages those small parties whose strength is not territorially concentrated.

In ethnic terms, PR is likely to be conducive to Sinhalese moderation. PR in multimember constituencies tends to reduce the seat advantage enjoyed by territorially concentrated minorities, such as the Tamils.<sup>66</sup> So the Tamil United Liberation Front will generally not gain more seats under this formula than under first-past-the-post.<sup>67</sup> The conciliatory effects derive, rather, from the apportionment of Sinhalese seats, the character of the list system, and the probable nature of electoral appeals.

First of all, PR seems likely to achieve the intended effect of reducing the spread between shares of votes and seats. With Sinhalese seats more evenly divided between the two main parties, Tamil support should more often be pivotal to the formation and maintenance of parliamentary majorities than it has previously been.

In addition, though the Tamil parties do not gain seats under PR, there may well be an increase in the number of Tamil candidates. Indeed, it seems likely that, in constituencies with Tamil minorities, Tamil candidates will now appear on Sinhalese party lists. The constituency list system of PR makes it more attractive for parties to have Tamil candidates than it was under first-past-the-post.

Finally, for similar reasons, PR tends to encourage moderation in electoral appeals where minority voters in a constituency can be alienated

by Sinhalese extremism. Under first-past-the-post, at least in some constituencies, minority voters could be ignored without paying a penalty in seats. Now that every lost vote counts, this is a less compelling strategy.

The new importance of Tamil second preferences, of Tamil votes for parliamentary candidates in the South, and of pivotal Tamil seats in parliament--all of which can be powerful influences in the competition between more evenly-matched Sinhalese parties--is very likely to cement coalition arrangements between the Tamil parties and the more conciliatory of the main Sinhalese parties. This, of course, assumes the continued vitality of two-party competition on the Sinhalese side.

#### Ethnic Proportionality Through PR: Guyana

There are times when first-past-the-post systems distort the electoral demography of ethnically-divided societies. By inflating the share of seats obtained by the party with a majority of votes, first-past-the-post can reduce ethnic minority representation to below proportional levels. By the same process of inflation, the plurality share of the largest or most cohesive minority can be translated into a majority of seats, sometimes at the expense of a less cohesive majority of voters. In these circumstances, proportional representation can change the result in one of two ways. If it reduces the vote-seat disparity, PR can prevent ethnic minority rule by denying a majority of seats to a party with a mere plurality of votes. If, as frequently asserted, PR tends to proliferate parties, the resulting multiplicity of parties can deny every group a majority of seats, thus creating Lebanese-style fluidity and eliminating the problem of perpetual minority status. Both of these

objectives--proportionality and fragmentation--were given a good test by the system designed for Guyana on the eve of its independence.<sup>68</sup>

To be sure, the unqualified assertion that PR tends to proliferate parties is not accurate, but a PR system can be designed, with large multimember constituencies and no minimum percentage cutoff, so as to maximize the chances of both strict proportionality and party fragmentation.<sup>69</sup> Precisely that was done in Guyana. The British moved from first-past-the-post in single-member constituencies in the 1961 election to PR, with the whole country a single constituency and each party putting up a single list, for the 1964 election. It was forecast at the time that PR would produce "a proliferation of splinter parties," that, "since each minor group can have its own representation, the society will find its many divisions increasing . . . ." <sup>70</sup> This forecast proved entirely wrong. Fragmentation did not occur, but proportionality did.

The East Indian-dominated People's Progressive Party (PPP) of Cheddi Jagan had won a solid majority of seats in 1961 on a 42.6 per cent plurality of the vote. East Indians were a majority of the population at the time, but their population was disproportionately under the voting age and slightly less cohesive in ethnic voting than was the Afro-Guyanese population, which voted heavily for the People's National Congress (PNC) of Forbes Burnham. A small third party, the United Force (UF), got many votes from the mixed (Eurafrican) population and the smaller groups of whites, Chinese, and Portuguese. Together the PNC and UF had outvoted the PPP, but, since their votes tended to be more urban and more concentrated than PPP votes were, these two parties were consigned to minority status in the legislature. This result led to considerable unrest in 1962-63.

With independence approaching, the British instituted a PR system. Jagan's Marxists had alarmed the Kennedy administration in Washington, which had urged the British to change the electoral system to effect a change of regime.<sup>71</sup> In this, the shift to PR was remarkably successful, for it apportioned seats much more closely in accordance with votes and made possible a PNC-UF coalition government, as Table 2 shows.<sup>72</sup>

TABLE 2  
ELECTORAL OUTCOMES IN GUYANA, 1961 AND 1964  
(by party; in percentages)

Party	First-past-the-post: 1961			Proportional Representation: 1964		
	Votes	Seats	Seat-Vote Disparity	Votes	Seats	Seat-Vote Disparity
PPP	42.6	57.1	14.5	45.8	45.3	-0.5
PNC	41.0	31.4	-9.6	40.5	41.5	1.0
UF	16.4	11.4	-5.0	12.4	13.2	0.8
Totals	100.0	99.9*	9.7**	98.7***	100.0	0.8**

\*Total does not equal 100.0 due to rounding.

\*\*Average disparity for the three parties.

\*\*\*Total does not equal 100.0 due to rounding and minor party votes.

At the same time, it was thought that PR might provide the necessary inducements for Jagan's East Indian support to split into its component parts: especially Hindu-Muslim, but perhaps also left-wing and right-wing. Several parties did spring up to contest the 1964 elections. One of them was an Indian Muslim party, another an ideologically moderate Indian party. The two managed to obtain no seats and together only one per cent of the vote. The incentives existed, but the electorate set its face against fragmentation.

In fact, the only third party with any significant strength, the United Force, lost votes under PR: four percentage points. This, however, had nothing to do with the electoral formula. In 1961, the UF had benefited from some votes that would otherwise have gone to the PPP in constituencies where the PPP did not put up a candidate because Indian voters were too few to make it worthwhile. Under the list system of 1964, these votes went back to the PPP.

With this insignificant exception, what is impressive about the Guyanese experience is how stable voting patterns remained despite the radical change in electoral system. This stability makes PR a feasible strategy to achieve proportionality where first-past-the-post has distorted the results, but it makes PR an unlikely vehicle to create a new fluidity. It is one thing to say that, starting from scratch, electoral incentives do or do not produce a given result. It is another to claim that they can rapidly undo a result already entrenched in the party system. Guyana is consistent with Maurice Duverger's conclusion that "on the whole P.R. maintains almost intact the structure of parties existing at the time of its appearance."<sup>73</sup>

### The Promise of Electoral Change

These four experiments proceeded from variable motivations. In Lebanon and Nigeria, ethnic accommodation was an explicit goal of electoral innovation. In Sri Lanka and Guyana, PR was invoked to reduce vote-seat disparities, though in Guyana for the special purpose of ousting and perhaps splitting the governing party. In Sri Lanka, the preferential vote was used to prevent capture of the presidency by a candidate with a low plurality. Such a prophylactic measure was perhaps less necessary in Nigeria, with its plurality plus distribution requirement. Although the purposes were various, the experiments illuminate the prospects for achieving the five accommodative aims enumerated earlier: fragmentation, moderation, coalition, fluidity, and proportionality.

1. Fragmentation of the support of a majority group to avert its permanent domination seems a difficult goal to achieve through electoral means. The Guyanese electoral system was as conducive to achieving this goal as any is likely to be; yet it had no significant effect on voting patterns. Of course, the structure of subgroup cleavages in Guyana was not propitious. East Indians were not significantly divided along Hindu-Muslim lines. Had there been Hindu and Muslim factions in Jagan's PPP, then PR might have had an impact. Even then, however, it needs to be remembered that the East Indians had powerful incentives to remain cohesive; had they split, they would have lost their majority status. As Duverger has noted, if a conflict is already bifurcated, party splits in response to PR are unlikely.<sup>74</sup> Group structure is an important variable influencing

the response to electoral incentives, but group interest is a variable bearing on group structure.

Fragmentation was achieved in Northern Nigeria, but not by the electoral system per se. Rather, the federal system, by providing arenas for electoral victory and for power to be exercised, laid the groundwork for a more fragmented ethnic party system. Fragmentation continued despite later-enacted, though incomplete, electoral incentives for party consolidation. In addition to group structure and group interest, features of the territorial environment also affect the response to electoral incentives. The division of territory is probably a more reliable way of fragmenting the support of dangerously large groups to achieve multipolar fluidity than is the introduction of a particular electoral formula.

2. The encouragement of moderation appears easier to achieve through the electoral system than is the restructuring of group support. Several approaches are possible. The elaborate Lebanese system of reserved offices and seats and mixed lists is certainly one way; the Nigerian geographic distribution requirement is another; and the Sri Lankan PR and preferential vote formulae seem to be yet another. Of course, the Nigerian provisions have been tested only once, and the Sri Lankan not yet at all. Still, the Nigerian provisions work according to their conflicting logic, and Nigerian assumptions about a separately-elected president vis-à-vis a prime minister have so far been confirmed. If a presidential system is designed so that the electoral formula encourages moderation and penalizes ethnic exclusivism, as it does in Nigeria and Sri Lanka, the potential for presidential systems to foster accommodation seems considerable.

3. Multiethnic parties are difficult to encourage in severely-divided societies. Nigeria's electoral incentives are sufficiently mixed

so as to reduce their value as a test of the possibilities on this score, Although at least two parties in the Second Republic are notably more multiethnic than their predecessors in the First Republic were, none of them spans, in significant numbers, any two of the the three largest groups. Even so, Nigerian parties are probably pushing close to the limits of their ethnic inclusiveness.

Multiethnic coalitions of ethnic parties are possible, however. In an environment that is not supercharged with ethnic conflict, the need for a majority of legislative seats may be sufficient to induce coalition, as it was in Nigeria and Lebanon. More enduring arrangements--coalitions committed to ethnic accommodation as a policy goal--are more likely to be formed as a result of the dependence of each partner on popular votes commanded by the other, rather than just on an exchange of legislative votes.

There are at least three ways to encourage such party interdependence where it would not otherwise exist: preferential voting (Sri Lankan presidency), list-system PR in heterogeneous multimember constituencies (Sri Lankan parliament), and mixed lists in constituencies with a common electoral roll (Lebanon). This enumeration readily shows how, with a bit of imagination, the electoral system might be used to promote multiethnic coalitions.

4. The existing fluidity of a multipolar system of ethnic parties turns out to be easier to preserve than it is to create anew through efforts to fragment already-consolidated parties. Not only the Nigerian experience, but the Lebanese experience, suggests this. Lebanon's subgroups were, to be sure, the main actors of politics, but there was also

a tendency for higher levels of group identity to assume increasing importance. "In times of trouble," Michael C. Hudson remarks, "one is compelled to identify himself as a Christian or a non-Christian; in ordinary times it is often necessary for an individual to assert or exploit his membership in a particular sect, like the Sunnite (Muslim) or the Maronite (Christian)."<sup>75</sup> In a different electoral system, these ultimate identifications, Christian and Muslim, could have formed the basis of party loyalty and of a bifurcated, conflict-prone party system. Similar North-South loyalties did exactly that in the First Nigerian Republic. The elaborate Lebanese electoral system did a remarkable job of keeping the center of gravity of Lebanese politics at the lower levels of the groups and sub-groups. The Nigerian plurality election of the president also reduces the impulse to consolidate, and thus to bifurcate, the party system.

Proportional representation can also help in such cases, by making party consolidation in a fragmented system less attractive. Some light is cast on this possibility by a sideways glance at Belgium. For many decades, the Belgian party system was organized along Left-Right and clerical-secular lines, each of the three major parties spanning ethnic divisions, albeit in different proportions. When Fleming-Walloon conflict rose to the forefront of Belgian politics in the 1960s, so did explicitly ethnic parties on both sides. By 1971, these two parties had between them gained about 20 per cent of the vote. Under a first-past-the-post system, the ethnic parties would have been submerged. Even under PR, the three major parties were long able to prevent ethnic claims from producing splinter ethnic parties with substantial electoral strength.<sup>76</sup> It took a major surge in ethnic

tension to do this. Once five parties, rather than three, were in existence, however, PR helped them stay afloat, just as it had earlier kept the third party (the Liberals) alive, thereby preventing the consolidation of opinion into only two parties.<sup>77</sup> In multipolar countries like Belgium and contemporary Nigeria, governing is difficult, because a majority is hard to find, but polarization is averted by the fluidity of relationships possible among contending forces. The electoral system cannot manufacture ethnic and subethnic divisions, but it certainly can help sustain them once they have crossed the threshold of political relevance.

5. Certain versions of PR can reduce the disparity between votes and seats. Sometimes the disparity is not great, and it makes no difference to the outcome. Sometimes the disparity is significant and desirable. In Malaysia, it has strengthened the position of a permanent multiethnic coalition against ethnically-based flank parties. In six parliamentary elections, first-past-the-post has provided the ruling National Front and its predecessor, the Alliance, a bonus of between 18 and 30 per cent of seats over votes.<sup>78</sup> First-past-the-post in this case countered centrifugal forces. But where all parties are ethnically based and a minority is seriously underrepresented because first-past-the-post provides a voting majority with a bonus in seats, or where a minority group rules because its plurality of votes translates into a majority of seats, then PR with a list system, large multimember constituencies, and low or no cutoffs for minor parties can help bring seats and votes into line.

There is a more intriguing question of ethnic accommodation lurking in the vote-seat disparity issue. Is it possible that this version of PR, imposed before a party system crystallizes, can actually prevent the

emergence of ethnic parties? In the early evolution of ethnic parties, lines frequently are not clearly drawn. Ethnic voting may not approach 100 per cent the first time around, but it may be high enough, in a first-past-the-post system, so that, if groups are territorially concentrated, the party that gains most of a group's votes will win all of its seats. This will make it fruitless for dissident members of the group to withhold support from that party. Rates of ethnic voting will increase, and the identification of each party with an ethnic group will be complete. Under PR, however, dissident votes will count, and perhaps it will be harder to complete the alignment of parties with groups.

Although the point is well worth a test, I am inclined to think that the process by which ethnic parties emerge in severely-divided societies cannot be retarded once a strong majority of an ethnic group casts its support for one party. Two exceptions come to mind, however.

The first is where support for such a party is limited by subethnic cleavages. If a prominently demarcated subgroup withholds its support from a party purporting to represent the whole group, PR may be enough to fortify this reluctance. Very likely, however, this will not make for nonethnic or multiethnic parties; it will only mean that this particular ethnic group will be represented by more than one party.

The second is not really an exception, for it involves a case where ethnic divisions, though significant, are not so powerful as to be the only divisions. There are countervailing forces for moderation. A number of Western countries fit this description; fewer ethnically divided Asian

and African countries do. In Canada, the vote-seat disparity is so significant as to foster regional and ethnic polarization, and PR has been recommended. Under these conditions, the remedy should work.<sup>78</sup>

It should surprise no one that electoral reform cannot work magic on ethnic conflict. It cannot, for example, solve the pure form of the 60-40 problem posed at the outset. No electoral device can split Group A's 60 per cent, so that Group B will not be a perpetual minority. Yet it is extraordinary just how much an electoral system can do in what seems an intractable situation. Various combinations of electoral formulae, ballot structure, and constituency delimitation can operate to preserve fluidity, promote moderation, induce coalition, and produce proportionality.

None of these effects is a matter of party reconstruction: no system examined here abolishes ethnic parties any more than it succeeds in fragmenting them. Many of the effects are matters of party posture more than structure. But nothing in ethnic conflict is more crucial than whether a party adopts a conciliatory posture on ethnic issues.

Similarly, the work of electoral systems is vulnerable to the offsetting effects of other variables: the strength of the conflict, the way territory has been carved up, the timing of innovation (did the proliferation of states, for example, precede the new electoral formula?). The electoral system is one part of the total framework of incentives and disincentives in which ethnic groups and parties operate. The Nigerian experiment shows with supreme clarity the extent to which countervailing incentives can produce mixed outcomes. What stands out, in spite of the limitations, is just how important a piece of the incentive structure the

electoral system is and what a dearth of imagination there has been in most countries in utilizing its potential for ethnic accommodation.

#### Ethnic Preferences and Conflict Reduction

Electoral policies have a short time frame from adoption to impact; preferential policies do not. A new electoral formula or constituency delimitation produces (or fails to produce) a political response in the next election or two. Any reduction in conflict behavior on the part of politicians will soon be visible. Policies to reduce ethnic disparities, by augmenting the representation of particular groups in, for example, modern-sector employment or higher education, do not have the same quality. Measuring changes in ethnic representation is more difficult than computing election results, and representational changes do not necessarily augur changes in ethnic conflict behavior. Then, too, the impact of preferential policies on ethnic relations may vary over time, compounding the difficulty of evaluation.

All of this may simply be to say that electoral and, for that matter, territorial changes do not really operate on the structure of society but on the epiphenomenal behavior of voters and politicians. Preferential policies have more far-reaching aims and are inherently more difficult to guide to their intended destination. The difference resembles the distinction developed by Martin Shapiro and James Q. Wilson between point and line decisions. "A point decision is one that involves a self-effectuating choice among competing alternatives; a line decision is one that requires the coordination by plan of the actions of many people extending over a substantial period of time."<sup>80</sup> With point decisions, the consequences

are "immediately and continuously felt."<sup>81</sup> With line decisions, they are more distant and liable to deflection. The adoption of a preferential policy is plainly a line decision.

#### The Range of Preferential Programs

Preferential policies are common in ethnically-divided societies, but they vary in scope, formality, and explicitness. Some are limited to public-sector opportunities, while others extend to the private sector as well. Some reach broadly into business and education, in addition to employment. Others are confined to particular spheres, such as higher education or civil service positions. Some policies are formally stated and openly pursued, whereas many others are adopted sub silentio.

On the whole, the more ceremonious the adoption, the more extensive the policies tend to be. The Malaysian program is as extensive as any, and it has its roots, though not all of its branches, in the Malaysian Constitution. The Constitution recognizes the "special position" of the Malays and authorizes reserved shares of public service positions, scholarships and educational benefits, certain lands, and certain business permits.<sup>82</sup> The current Malaysian program lays down ambitious targets in share ownership and employment and extends also to licenses and contracts, as well as secondary school and university admission, all with the aim of restructuring the society to "reduce or actually eliminate the identification of race with economic function."<sup>83</sup> India's Constitution reserves educational places, civil service positions, and legislative seats for "scheduled" castes, and tribes.<sup>84</sup> The states may, as some have, also make provision for "backward" castes, and an increasing number of states have enacted preferential policies to protect indigenes from competition from migrants.<sup>85</sup>

Not all broad preferential programs originate in constitutions, and not all constitutional provisions authorize broad programs. In the First Nigerian Republic, the former Northern Regional Government adopted a policy of "Northernization" that affected the tender of contracts and employment in the public service. The results were dramatic. In 1959, only one senior civil servant in eight in the region was a Northerner; by 1965, Northerners outnumbered expatriates and Southerners together.<sup>86</sup> At the national level, regional quotas were also used for recruitment to the officer corps of the army and for scholarships for higher education.<sup>87</sup> The Biafran war altered Nigerian thinking on such questions; in general, it strengthened the forces opposed to parochial discrimination. Before the return to civilian rule, the military regime overrode state policies that had permitted preferential terms of employment for indigenes of a state. Nevertheless, the Constitution of the Second Republic contains provisions stating in general terms that public-sector appointments should "reflect the federal character of the country,"<sup>88</sup> and on this basis there have been demands for a policy that would rectify the allegedly skewed composition of the Nigerian services.<sup>89</sup>

In the Southern Philippines, a quite extensive program to prefer Muslims for bank loans, scholarships, government employment, and university admissions has grown up with little formal acknowledgment. Principally, this has been the work of government officials, but large private employers in the South have also been induced to participate.<sup>90</sup> As is typical of such informal programs, the Philippine measures operate largely by exempting

Muslim applicants from meeting formal requirements, such as credit for loans or examinations for civil service entry.

A number of countries have adopted preferential programs targeted at particular sectors. In Fiji, nearly all the cultivable land has long been reserved to Fijians. In Sri Lanka, a policy of "standardization of marks" gave extra points to applicants for university admission who took their examinations in Sinhala, so that Sinhalese applicants were preferred to Tamils. And in Indonesia at least 20 per cent of the shares in new companies must be held by pribumis (indigenes); there are comparable preferences for non-Chinese in business loans. In Andhra Pradesh, India, a fixed percentage of government positions was to be reserved for Telanganas. Land, education, business, and employment--these are the most common subjects of targeted programs.

Programs also vary in the depth and specificity of their coverage. Programs that prefer certain groups in employment may not prefer them in promotions, though in practice the extension from one to the other is frequently made. Programs that prefer certain groups in the generalist services of government employment may or may not prefer them in the professional and technical services. Programs that apply to positions under a specified salary level may leave positions above that level untouched.

Finally, preferential programs vary in the explicitness with which ethnic criteria are used to define the preferred category. Malaysia and Indonesia prefer ethnic groups deemed to be indigenous (bumiputera or pribumi). The "Northernization" policy in Nigeria, though framed in territorial terms, had essentially the same meaning. Andhra Pradesh cast

its definition in terms of mulkis, meaning roughly "domiciliaries," leaving room for long-resident migrants from areas outside Telangana to claim preferred status. Sri Lanka used language of examination as a proxy for ethnicity. Tanzania's regional equalization policy in education employs regions as a clear proxy for ethnic group: "If you talk about Moshi area, you talk about tribes; if you talk about Didoma area, you talk about tribes."<sup>91</sup> Whatever the formulation, the aim is to adjust rewards and opportunities among ethnic groups.

The exact formulation matters a great deal in implementation. First, an inclusive formulation increases the chance that the benefits of the policy will accrue to those who need them least. The inclusion of all pribumis in the Indonesian policy opens the way for established entrepreneurial groups like the Minangkabau to improve their position through preferential access to share offerings and credit. Second, an ostensibly non-ethnic definition of the preferred category allows room for evasion of the policy. That the Andhra preferences were cast in terms of domiciliaries rather than Telanganas created a brisk trade in false "mulki certificates" rendering large numbers of non-Telanganas eligible for employment preferences. Third, the same breadth of formulation allows for flexibility in enforcement so that countervailing policy objectives, such as productivity, or political opposition can be taken into account. Fourth, the way the preferred group is defined dictates the direction of what might be called the politics of preferential inclusion and exclusion. An amorphous formulation like "backward classes" that prevails in some Indian states encourages claims of backwardness. In one state, Karnataka, this went so far that every caste except

Brahmins--including some wealthy landowning castes--was officially designated "backward" and accorded preferences, until the Supreme Court of India overrode that determination. The issue was eventually confided to a "Backward Classes Commission" to sort out. A more exact formulation may set in motion a struggle within the preferred group over the distribution of benefits. In Bihar, preferences for tribals have led to demands from non-Christian tribals that Christians be excluded from coverage, because Christians, better educated, were able to reap a disproportionate share of reserved positions.<sup>92</sup> The criteria of inclusion, in short, affect the way intra-ethnic politics develops.

#### The Adoption of Preferential Policies

Virtually everywhere, policies of ethnic preference are regarded as exceptions, temporary expedients, often with a specified time limit. In a surprising number of countries that have made special provisions to enable particular ethnic groups to "catch up," such measures carry a heavy presumption of illegitimacy. The acknowledged norm remains equal treatment of all individuals. Provisions that depart from this norm are usually explained as distasteful concessions to the unfortunate inability of the preferred group to compete on equal terms without preferences.

In view of this ambivalence, why are such programs so frequently adopted? Two explanations are immediately obvious and pertinent.

The first is the existence of influential political constituencies with an interest in the adoption of such policies. The adoption of preferential policies depends in part on how well organized and effective such groups are, and the scope of the policies depends in part on the sectors in which they are active.

The second is that preferential policies appear to be cheap. They require no initial outlay in expenditure. In education, the rectification of regional and ethnic disparities in examination results might entail considerable capital investment in facilities and personnel, even if the technology required to reduce those disparities were readily available. Reallocating existing places in educational institutions by ethnic group involves no incremental outlay. In employment, the same appears to be true: a labor force must be assembled, and its ethnic composition may be a secondary concern.

In the private sector, securing government good will is an additional incentive to adopt preferential policies. Vulnerable foreign firms see special advantages in such policies. If they do not know the host country well, they are susceptible to persuasion that ethnic employment quotas will minimize the political risks of their operations. They may, in some circumstances, be able to extract concessions from the host government in exchange for preferential employment policies, concessions such as training assistance or pressure on unions to moderate demands. Sometimes preferential employment policies are a condition of the tax concessions that are offered to attract foreign investment. But, even if the policy is not formally articulated, a variety of informal pressures is frequently brought to bear on foreign firms.<sup>93</sup>

The adoption of a formal preferential program by government usually involves something else: a conviction on the part of policy makers that ethnic preferences or quotas are required to achieve some larger purpose. That conviction is either part of their intellectual baggage at independence, as the need to enhance opportunities for scheduled castes and tribes is in

India, or it is the product of dramatic events that happen later. After the Malay-Chinese riots of 1969, a change came over Malaysian elites.<sup>94</sup> The belief spread that development policy had failed the Malays, that economic imbalances were at the root of ethnic hostility, that time was running out, and that the only way to insure peace was to embark on an extensive program to put the Malays in all sectors of the economy at all levels. A crucial role was played by young, Western-educated Malay civil servants and politicians who were able to persuade conservative Malay political leaders to make decisions they had earlier avoided. Two deputy prime ministers were pivotal actors: once they were convinced, the New Economic Policy, with its ambitious aims, was assured.

It was in this sense that the riots were described by more than one participant in this process as "a blessing in disguise," for they shocked the leadership into a realization of the need for drastic action. Indeed, the riots also had an impact on Chinese opinion, convincing some Chinese leaders, though they quibbled about details, that a different course was required. As disasters are often used by advocates of a policy to put it on the policy makers' agenda and to neutralize opposition,<sup>95</sup> the violence of 1969 performed these functions in Malaysia, making possible the adoption of policies previously shunned because they appeared ethnically biased and loaded against merit criteria.

The adoption of preferential policies is thus fostered by the confluence of several beliefs: (1) that preferential policies require little in the way of expenditure and hence are a low-cost strategy for coping with ethnic conflict; (2) that they are necessary, at least temporarily, if groups are

ultimately going to be able to compete on equal terms; and (3) that the causes of ethnic conflict reside in objective economic disparities between groups that can be eliminated through policies aimed at those disparities. Beneath preferential policies lies a mind-set that sees ethnic conflict as the product of economic differences and ethnic harmony as the result of proportional distribution of all groups at levels and in all functions of a society.

#### The Costs and Benefits of Preferential Policies

The late Wallace Sayre once said that the benefits of a reform are immediate, but the costs are cumulative. With preferential policies, there is reason to believe instead that the costs precede the benefits. Gains in the ability to compete and in the reduction of conflict appear much later, if they appear at all. In the long run, to be sure, it is possible that preferential policies may have a payoff in enlarging the pool of trained manpower and creating new pools of capital. Even if the first generation of new entrepreneurs, professionals, and bureaucrats is not efficient, subsequent generations may still benefit from the advantages the first generation is able to confer. Preferential policies, however, are not generally cast in these terms or geared so as to maximize the chances that long-term benefits will occur. The primary rationale of these policies is to reduce disparities in the present, and it is in the present that the costs show up.

The precise impact of preferential policies seems to vary with the field in which they operate. Because of this, it is useful to examine separately preferences in education, business, and employment.

Preferences in Education. Ethnic preferences in admission to schools and universities involve gatekeeper decisions. Consequently, in a short time, they can effect dramatic changes in the composition of student bodies. In 1977, the Malaysian constitution was amended to permit the government to control the admission of Malays to university. Between 1970 and 1973, the percentage of Malays in degree-level courses rose from 39.7 to 52.7.<sup>96</sup> In Sri Lanka, Tamils comprised nearly half of all university admissions in medicine and engineering in 1969-70; Sinhalese comprised barely more than half. By 1974, after preferential policies were put into effect, Tamils comprised 16 per cent of engineering admissions and 26 per cent of medical admissions.<sup>97</sup> If representation is the goal, a formula can be found to achieve it. As we shall see, this is much more straightforward than is the attainment of ethnic group representation in business.

Representation, however, does not end the matter. Preferential admissions policies have important consequences for the educational and political systems.

A principal effect is to shift applicants for places denied because of preferences at government institutions into the private sector of education or to create a private sector where there was none. Tanzania's regional equalization policy had precisely this effect.<sup>98</sup> Preferential policies are in force only for secondary-school admissions in Tanzania. Before regional equalization, groups such as the Chagga and the Wahaya sent disproportionate numbers of students to government secondary schools. Under the equalization policy, secondary-school places are allocated to each region on the basis of its proportionate share of the total number of primary school leavers eligible

to attend secondary school. Within each regional allocation, candidates are selected by test scores. Since Chagga and Wahaya students tend to perform well, their cutoff scores tend to be significantly higher than those of students from other areas. To accommodate the demand for secondary education from capable but rejected students, a network of private secondary schools has sprung up.

A good many of these schools are in the Kilimanjaro region, where the Chagga live and support the schools through their coffee-growing cooperatives. With a small fraction of Tanzania's population (the Chagga are about 3 per cent), Kilimanjaro has 28 per cent of all its secondary schools. To prevent private schools from defeating the equalization policy, in 1979 the government began to require them to reserve 25 per cent of their places for students from other regions. Socialist Tanzania thus finds that its equalization policy stimulates the private sector in education, which it then seeks to regulate.

Malaysia's preferential policies at the university level have had a comparable effect. Many able Chinese students, prevented from attending university in Malaysia, departed for universities in the West. By the mid-1970s, there were some 25,000 Malaysians, overwhelmingly Chinese, at universities outside Malaysia. Moreover, as university enrollment within Malaysia has expanded, enrollment outside has kept pace. For every university student inside Malaysia, there is one outside. In terms of the total pool of university students, therefore, the Malaysian policies have altered the ethnic mix only in government institutions at home. In Malaysia, as in Tanzania, preferential policies gave a fillip to the

private sector in education, as students sought ways to secure education outside the reach of government policy.

In Tanzania, Sri Lanka, and Malaysia, the change in ethnic representation in public educational institutions, however, is undeniable. The cost in student performance, as measured by test scores, is also apparent. There are no reliable figures for Tanzania, but it was estimated that secondary-school admission from Kilimanjaro might require a score of 180, whereas admission from some other regions might be possible with a score of only 140. Much more precise data are available for Malaysia and Sri Lanka.

Among a sample of students in technical high school in Malaysia, ethnic differences in performance on the Lower Certificate of Education examination were marked. There were equal numbers of Malays and non-Malays (Chinese and Indians) among the students, roughly proportionate to ethnic group shares of the population. However, 91.7 per cent of the non-Malay students scored 3.4 or better (a score of one is highest) in math and in the average of history, geography, math, and general science, whereas only 37.1 per cent of the Malay students had such a high math score and only 34.3 per cent of the Malays had average scores so high.<sup>99</sup> Preferential policies thus made it possible for Malays with distinctly poorer scores to secure admission to upper secondary school.

There was, in addition, some dampening of Chinese aspirations for higher education as university admission for non-Malays became more difficult. Survey data indicate that Malay students were somewhat more willing than Chinese students to forgo job opportunities in order to pursue Form 6 (pre-university training). Test scores were much more strongly correlated

with willingness to forgo a job in favor of Form 6 among Chinese than among Malays. Indeed, among Malays, there was practically no such correlation, largely because nearly all the Malay students in the sample expected to gain university entrance--such was the effect of preferences on the relationship of performance to aspirations.<sup>100</sup>

In Sri Lanka, preferential policies were a reaction to the greater success of Tamil students in gaining university admission in the sciences, medicine, and engineering. Responding to unsubstantiated rumors that Tamil graders were unduly lenient with examination papers in the Tamil medium, the government in 1971 adjusted admissions for each ethnic group on an ad hoc basis and in subsequent years instituted a system of adjusting or "standardizing" grades on university entrance examinations. The scheme reflected "the ascendancy of a group of Sinhalese in the Ministry of Education, a group which firmly believed that some adjusting mechanism was necessary to give Sinhalese students a chance in competing for the coveted places in science based courses at the University."<sup>101</sup> The effect was to reduce grades in the three examination media--English, Sinhala, and Tamil--to a common scale, so that the number of students qualifying for university admission from each medium would be proportionate to the number taking the examination in that medium.

This was the system adopted for 1973. It had its biggest impact in the two fields in which Tamil students outperformed Sinhalese students most strongly: pure and applied mathematics. In 1972, in pure math, for example, Tamil-medium candidates comprised just under one-third of those taking the exam; they had, however, a pass rate of 54 per cent, compared to the Sinhalese pass rate of 40 per cent, with the result that Tamil

candidates comprised 39 per cent of the total passes (and fully 54 per cent of those with a grade of A).<sup>102</sup> With standardization in effect the following year, this disparity between the percentage of Tamils taking the exam and those doing well on it was eliminated, with a concomitant decline in Tamil enrollment in science, engineering, and medicine.<sup>103</sup>

The following year, this system was supplemented by district quotas. Standardization by medium of examination had only reduced Tamil admissions moderately, because the standard was the proportion of students taking the exam in each medium, and Tamil candidates took the exam far out of proportion to their share of population. However, weightage by district shares of population had an enormous impact on the Tamils, who are heavily concentrated in a few districts. The largest concentration is in Jaffna, where, in 1974, 398 students qualified to enter university medical and biological science courses and 575 qualified to enter engineering and physical science courses. By district quotas, only 34 and 37 places, respectively, were open to these candidates.<sup>104</sup>

The result of these measures was to alter raw scores dramatically. Even in 1971, when ad hoc adjustments of raw scores were first made and Tamils comprised more than 40 per cent of engineering admissions, the minimum raw score for a Sinhalese student to be admitted to engineering was only 90 per cent of the minimum Tamil raw score.<sup>105</sup> Later adjustments of raw scores are not available, but the ethnic gap in minimum raw scores must have grown enormously, because the percentage of Tamil engineering admissions declined precipitously--from 40.8 in 1970-71 to 34.7 in 1971-72

to 24.4 in 1973 to 16.3 in 1974, the year district quotas were introduced.<sup>106</sup> The inference is inescapable that significantly less qualified Sinhalese students were being admitted.

The Sri Lankan preferences do not appear to have stimulated private-sector educational alternatives. Whereas a good many Malaysian Chinese could afford to send their children abroad for university education, few Ceylon Tamils are in the same position. The situation was even more acute for them, because--in contrast to the significant Malaysian expansion in places available in higher education in the 1970s, when preferences were enforced--the number of places available in Sri Lanka remained constant. If in Malaysia it is conceivable that accelerated recruitment of Chinese communist guerillas in the early and mid-1970s was linked to preferential educational admissions, in Sri Lanka a new wave of Tamil separatist violence, including the assassination of policemen, rather clearly flowed from standardization of marks and district quotas. This admission system "convinced many Sri Lanka Tamils that it was futile to expect equality of treatment with the Sinhalese majority. It has immensely strengthened separatist forces within the Tamil United Front and contributed to the acceptance of a policy of campaigning for a separate state in early 1975."<sup>107</sup> It also, however, convinced the government to open a new campus at Jaffna. So, in the end, preferences indirectly operated in Sri Lanka, too, to expand the total number of university students.

In both Malaysia and Sri Lanka, preferential admissions reached a point at which the preferred group, formerly underrepresented, ended up by being significantly overrepresented in university student bodies. In both, political reactions were strong enough to require modification, but in neither was there an end to preferential admissions.

Among Malaysian Chinese, a demand grew in 1979 for the establishment of a Chinese university to offset Malay admission preferences. The Malaysian Chinese Association, a component of the ruling coalition, stood firm against that demand while simultaneously threatening to leave the government unless a change in admissions policy were forthcoming. Eventually, it was agreed that the Chinese share of students in the University of Malaya would gradually rise until it approximated the Chinese share of the population. Preferences thus led, not to admission by test scores, but to proportionality.<sup>108</sup>

The Sri Lankan changes came in two parts.<sup>109</sup> The first, adopted in 1975-76, allocated 70 per cent of university places by mediawise standardized marks and 30 per cent by district quotas, but with augmented quotas for Jaffna as well as Colombo. In 1977, the newly-elected UNP government had pledged to abolish preferential admissions altogether, but when grades were processed it was revealed that Tamil students would again outnumber Sinhalese in medicine and engineering. An uproar among Sinhalese students was followed by supplemental admissions of all who would have been admitted on the basis of standardized marks. The formula that finally emerged admitted 30 per cent of all students on raw marks, 55 per cent on district population quotas, and 15 per cent for educationally backward districts. Tamil admissions are higher than under the system of standardized marks, but lower than under free competition. And the last word has not yet been spoken, for now there are demands from the educationally backward Muslim minority for admissions proportionate to its population. Preferences are difficult to abolish, and they tend to end up at or near proportional quotas.

These data are not as extensive as one might wish, but they do seem to point to some regularities in the consequences of educational preferences. To begin with, preferences in school and university admission are likely to be demanded where there are significant disparities in the educational performance of the affected ethnic groups. Preferential policies therefore result in the admission of students with significantly lower test scores. Applicants displaced by preferential admissions may simply lower their aspirations, but many seek admission to institutions, either private-sector or foreign, in which preferential policies do not operate. Although it is percentages, rather than absolute numbers, of students that preferential admissions seek to regulate, in the end they tend to produce an unintended expansion of the total number of students. This may render the preferences less effective, but also less explosive; for the dissatisfaction they generate seems likely to be expressed in the form of ethnic extremism, especially if alternative educational opportunities are not available.

Preferences in Business. Judgments on the impact of preferential policies in the field of business licenses, contracts, and ownership are more difficult to make. The short-term costs are apparent, though their magnitude is not easy to gauge, whereas the long-term benefits are difficult to estimate.

Preferential policies in business lead to the widespread use of front men of the preferred ethnic group. Licenses are applied for in their name, title to land is conveyed to them, shares are issued to them, contract bids are signed by them, but they have no role in the enterprise beyond collecting a fee for the use of their name. In Malaysia and Indonesia, such arrangements

are called Ali-Baba combinations, Ali being the bumiputera or pribumi front man and Baba the Chinese businessman.

Alternatively, preferential policies multiply opportunities for official corruption as businessmen make payments to secure immunity from enforcement of ethnic requirements. Transportation in Malaysia, for example, has been a sector long marked out for preferences to Malays in the award of licenses. In the mid-1970s, it became difficult for Chinese to secure transport licenses, with the result that a M\$4,000-\$6,000 bribe was sometimes offered for a taxi license and even more for lorry licenses. Whether front men are recruited to achieve nominal compliance or corruption is employed to avoid compliance, preferential policies impose an added cost of doing business. This raises the possibility that preferential requirements may discourage investment and even encourage the export of capital without necessarily strengthening the business class among members of the preferred group.

New business classes are not created overnight. In recognition of the magnitude of the task, the Malaysian government in the early 1970s embarked on an ambitious program designed to move Malay share ownership from less than 2 per cent of all holdings to 30 per cent in 20 years. Preferences were not abandoned; indeed, they tended to harden into 30 per cent quotas, to be enforced more vigorously, and to be extended to new spheres as Malay businessmen and bureaucrats made their influence felt. It was, however, understood that expropriation was not permitted; only new opportunities were to be subject to the policy.

To implement the program, several new government agencies were established. Pernas, the National Corporation, "began to purchase assets

to be held in trust for eventual distribution to the Malays; initially, it was intended primarily to be a wholesaler to Malay merchants, but it has moved far afield in acquiring assets and operating businesses. UDA, the Urban Development Authority, was assigned the task of providing premises for new Malay businesses and also giving Malays a share in development in town. The various states established state economic development corporations, which made investments in a variety of business ventures. MARA, the Indigenous People's Trust, was involved, even before the New Economic Policy was adopted, in training and making credit available to Malays on generous terms. Bank Bumiputera also antedates the New Economic Policy, but its activities expanded enormously after the policy was adopted. All of these organizations moved rapidly after 1971, to facilitate Malay entry into business.

The final verdict is by no means in on the activities of these entities. But several trends are already clear.

At least in Malaysia's expanding economy, these extraordinary efforts to foster Malay enterprise have not generally impinged on Chinese interests in politically significant ways. Preferential educational admissions and employment quotas are both more serious in their competitive impact. Chinese businessmen have largely adapted to the new requirements, treating them as a cost of doing business, and some have benefited from them. Chinese firms have frequently profited from participating in joint ventures with UDA and Pernas, and they have sometimes been able, through such partnerships, to obtain approval for projects that might otherwise have been approved readily. Chinese expertise has been essential to many new ventures, and it has frequently been called upon.

Moreover, in at least one way, the effort to foster Malay entrepreneurship has assuaged Malay-Chinese tensions. With the expansion of opportunities targeted specifically for Malays, Malay politics has grown more complex, and Malay intraethnic competition has increased considerably. Various groups of Malay businessmen have sought to maximize their opportunities. In doing this, they have sometimes linked up with leading Malay politicians in pursuit of their ambitions. To provide but one example, in 1975 a representative of the Malay Chambers of Commerce severely criticized UDA for failing adequately to help the Malays. UDA was then headed by the brother of a leading Malay politician who had been outspokenly critical of the selfishness of the Malay business class. The president of the Malay Chambers was another Malay political leader; the two were rivals within the ruling party. The availability of an array of benefits set in motion struggles to realize them.

If the new organizations do not seem to have cost much in terms of ethnic conflict, their performance has not been free of difficulty. Their mission of aiding Malay business has made it politically very difficult for them to enforce business terms on Malay beneficiaries. Many of MARA's loans have been in default, many of UDA's rents have been in arrears, and many state development corporations have made decisions on other than business criteria.

By 1980, government investment in trust for Malays represented some 8.2 per cent of total corporate ownership; individual Malays owned an additional 4.2 per cent.<sup>110</sup> For some years, there has been considerable discussion about how shares held in trust can be transferred to individual Malay owners. There have been two fears: first, that, because most Malays

are short of capital to purchase shares, distribution of these assets will concentrate wealth unduly; and, second, that, especially if shares are distributed at below market value, they will quickly be resold for capital gains, typically to non-Malay businessmen. If the latter were to happen, the entire policy would be thwarted. Some state enterprises have now transferred their holdings to a national equity corporation, which is to sell shares to individual Malays in a closely-controlled national unit trust.

As the distribution debate suggests, there remains some question about whether new equity can be kept in the Malay community over time. At some point, restrictions on resale of these shares will have to be lifted. The real test of the success of the policy is, then, the long-term--indeed, the intergenerational--test of capital preservation.

Preferences in Employment. In some respects, the consequences of ethnic preferences in employment are a hybrid of the consequences of preferences in education and in business. They increase the cost of doing business in ways that business may be able to absorb, and they generate competitive resentments that find political expression. Competitive resentments, however, tend to be greater in employment than in education, because disappointed job applicants cannot generally seek places in a sector beyond the reach of preferences, as they often can in education. Consequently, the political costs of employment preferences tend to be high.

The representational impact of employment preferences is sometimes difficult to gauge. In their studies of preferential policies in India, Myron Weiner and Mary Katzenstein have shown that the demand for preferences often follows the growth of an educated labor force; Maharashtrians, for example, were improving their employment position before preferential

policies were adopted in Bombay, and it is not clear that later Maharshtrian gains in employment were a result of the policy.<sup>111</sup> Where, however, the policy is enforced vigorously and produces results beyond what would have occurred in the absence of preferences, the immediate consequences are quickly visible. Typically, the target is representation in proportion to total population. Often this is a quite unrealistic standard, since it takes no account of the widely varying demographic structure of ethnic groups.<sup>112</sup> A group that is significantly younger, less educated, and more rural will find it difficult to produce a proportionate number of job applicants in the modern sector. Not surprisingly, the demand for qualified personnel of the preferred group quickly outstrips the supply. Unproductive employees may be added to the payroll to satisfy statistical requirements or, as in the case of representation in business, enforcement may be avoided through corruption.

The most detailed data on employment preferences come from Malaysia and India, which have the most extensive policies. The Malaysian evidence is particularly instructive on short-term effects.

Unlike share ownership, Malaysian employment targets have not been stated with great precision or fanfare. In general, the goal has been to have employment in the modern private sector mirror the composition of the population, so that firms have been pressed to aim at a 50 per cent Malay workforce at all levels. The Ministry of Labor oversees compliance. Sanctions for noncompliance have generally amounted to delays in the renewal of business or professional licenses.

As a result of this policy, there has been heightened competition on the part of non-Malays to secure positions in what is seen as a declining

share of the total job market. Employment grievances in the non-Malay middle class are longstanding and abundant. They relate to both hiring and promotion. Educational and employment preferences seem to produce somewhat opposite reactions, however. In education, the Chinese feel that they must perform well to be competitive now in a tight education market and later in a tight employment market. Malay students, who sense that their future is assured, feel less pressure to perform. On the job, however, the impact of preferences is to dampen the enthusiasm, and perhaps the performance, of the Chinese, as they see younger Malays with brighter prospects.<sup>115</sup>

Malaysian policymakers, aware of these and other pressures, have had the latitude to be flexible. In recent years, while attention has been riveted on Malay share ownership and business opportunities, the government has been responsive to the complaints of businessmen that they cannot find qualified Malays to hire. Some policymakers have also felt that the heavy demand for Malay executive talent is excessive, that Malay executives have so much mobility that they do not stay in a job long enough to accumulate useful experience. Consequently, preferences have been implemented in a relaxed way. A firm with a reasonable explanation for a shortfall in Malays on its rolls will generally incur no penalty. This flexibility, though it does not wholly eliminate the grievances of non-Malay job applicants, may well have saved the Malaysian government some economic and political costs a more strictly enforced policy might have incurred.

To a limited degree, the response of business and labor to preferential employment policies is comparable to the response to preferential

education policies. As preferential admissions displace some of the demand for education onto the private sector, expanding the total number of students, so preferential hiring may result in a larger labor force. This can happen in two ways. Convinced that he must hire a less qualified member of the preferred ethnic group, an employer may hire that applicant as an extra and expect little of him. In addition, some disappointed applicants may displace their efforts into another labor market, by emigration. In India, Keralites, disproportionately educated and closed out of employment in some states that now prefer "sons of the soil," have sought employment in the Persian Gulf states.<sup>114</sup> In ordinary circumstances, however, neither of these adaptations would seem likely to be as pervasive as the displacement of students to the private sector. Emigration opportunities do not always exist, and the extent to which employers will expand their own rolls seems limited.

It is therefore not surprising that where employment preferences are implemented they produce "angry responses on the part of other ethnic groups."<sup>115</sup> Weiner intimates that, in Bombay, Andhra, and Assam, preferences may also have aroused more ethnic conflict than they assuaged, particularly because proposals for preferences often emanate from "politicians not as a response to popular demands, but as a means of mobilizing political support."<sup>116</sup> Where groups are territorially differentiated, separatism is sometimes mooted among groups, such as the Ceylon Tamils, who feel the brunt of employment preferences.

Perhaps the best way to illustrate the dilemmas of preferential policy is to examine in detail a worst-case scenario, one in which preferences

came to be seen as the quintessential symbolic issue, in which preferences assumed a zero-sum aspect, and in which oscillating policies fed, not one, but two, complementary separatist movements. The case is Andhra Pradesh, India, in the 1960s and '70s. Barely a decade after the merger of several territories into a single Telugu-speaking state, Andhra Pradesh was torn by a separatist movement in Telangana. The policies adopted to respond to Telangana separatism led directly to a separatist reaction among coastal Andhras, who had earlier been foremost among proponents of the unified state.<sup>117</sup>

Telanganites were the prototypical backward group in a backward region. With a literacy rate barely more than half that of the remainder of the state, with poorer soil and less development, Telangana joined Andhra Pradesh somewhat reluctantly, subject to a series of safeguards known as the "Gentlemen's Agreement." By its terms, only mulkis (Telanganites or residents of the region for at least 15 years) were to be eligible for government positions in Telangana, with a few exceptions. There were also provisions restricting entry of non-mulkis to Telangana educational institutions, specifying Telangana proportions in the state cabinet, and apportioning revenue preferentially for Telangana. The position of Telangana and the mulkis was thus guaranteed by an elaborate system of preferences and quotas.

The unification of the state, however, had its own dynamic. With the capital at Hyderabad in Telangana, better-educated coastal Andhras migrated there. Exceptions were made to the mulki rules, based on the alleged unavailability of qualified applicants. False "mulki certificates" were easily procured. Andhras were said to be favored in salaries

and promotions; seniority and proportionality requirements were equally ignored when it suited Andhra interests.<sup>118</sup> Disparities in the price of land permitted enterprising coastal Andhra farmers to sell a few acres in their home region and for the same sum acquire significantly more acreage in Telangana, which many did. The apprehension of Telanganites that they would be "swamped and exploited by the more advanced people of the coastal area"<sup>119</sup> was seemingly confirmed.

The result was a massive agitation for a Telangana state that began in 1969 and reached its apogee with the victory in 10 out of 14 Telangana parliamentary seats by the main separatist organizations in 1971. Teachers, civil servants, and students were the most enthusiastic participants. The movement had a number of sources, but above all it was stimulated by the perceived failure of preferential policies designed to protect Telanganites from the "clever and cunning"<sup>120</sup> coastal Andhras.

The Telangana movement died down for two main reasons. The first, which has to do with Indian federalism, is that the movement's leaders continued their ties with the Congress Party at the national level and aimed at factional advantage at the state level by unseating the Congress chief minister. When that was accomplished, it was in their interest to press their gains by rejoining Congress, rather than continuing the movement.

More important for present purposes was the second reason. The movement had been stimulated by a decision of the Supreme Court of India holding residence requirements for jobs in Telangana unconstitutional. The response to the movement, however, had been to grant a number of concessions to Telangana. A Telangana regional committee was set up; one of its functions was to increase employment opportunities for mulkis.<sup>121</sup>

In 1972, the Supreme Court decided that the mulki rules were valid after all. Thereafter, some students continued to demand a separate Telangana, but the movement had been broken by major concessions to the preferential scheme. Employment preferences were the most important component of Telangana grievances.

What broke the movement in Telangana created a new separatist movement in coastal Andhra. The Telangana movement had produced a stream of migrant Andhras returning to their home region "telling stories of hardships, insults and physical violence"<sup>122</sup> suffered at the hands of the mulkis. When the Supreme Court validated the old mulki rules, grievances in coastal Andhra ignited. Mrs. Gandhi proposed a compromise formula that restricted the application of the mulki rules only slightly. This added to the Andhra sense of grievance. Andhra ministers in the state cabinet resigned, government servants began a strike, and law and order deteriorated. The mulki rules and the discrimination they entailed produced a separatist reaction.

In an independent state, either of these movements would probably have led to armed secessionist warfare. Only the fact that Andhra Pradesh was a component state of a federation prevented this outcome, for the raw claims were utterly irreconcilable. In the end, the Andhra agitation was brought under control by the central government through a formula that, while purporting to establish regional preferences, watered down domicile requirements and made murky the concept of mulki. It was the Andhra movement that the center had to cope with last, and Andhra's grievances dictated the outcome. Thereafter Andhra Pradesh was administered more or less as an integrated state.<sup>123</sup>

Had it been possible to revive the Telangana movement while the Andhra movement was at its peak, the state would probably have been partitioned, as the Indian Punjab was in 1966. One of the most important reasons why this did not happen is inherent in complementary secessions: they are likely to be sequential, rather than simultaneous, because of the opposite grievances that bring them about. Enforcement of preferential policies breeds secession among advanced, population-exporting groups; the withdrawal of such policies breeds secession among backward groups. Andhra Pradesh experienced both types of separatism, one after the other, because it experienced oscillating policies.

Here, then, was a case where policymakers committed themselves firmly to preferential employment policy, simultaneously laying a foundation for grievance and depriving themselves of the flexibility to work their way out of the resulting conflict. Other policymakers who have gone down similar roads seem to be retracing their steps. Most notably, in Sri Lanka there is now a conspicuous effort to reverse 20 years of government employment preferences for Sinhalese. Language requirements are being relaxed in government service, and there is an explicit program to recruit Tamils to the police and armed forces.<sup>124</sup> The government has seen the face of Tamil separatist terrorism and connected it to preferential employment. The connection is probably not spurious.

#### Development Policy and Ethnic Policy

Many conclusions might be drawn from this rather wideranging excursion into policy. I shall confine myself to a few selected observations that seem most pertinent to development planning.

To begin with, those who, on economic or administrative grounds, find advantages to making certain development decisions at levels lower than that of the central government will find much comfort in the material on federalism and regional autonomy. In a good many countries, devolution makes good sense in terms of ethnic conflict. As frequently-heard strictures about the need to keep central control and avoid spreading power too thin were exaggerated, so, too, is the notion that decentralization is the first step to secession. As we have seen, the federal units need not even be homogeneous (Malaysia and some Nigerian states) or, if homogeneous, need not embrace the whole of an ethnic group (the Hausa, Yoruba, and Ibo Nigerian states). Ethnic secession of heterogeneous units or of units embracing fragments of ethnic groups is unlikely. Moreover, the ethnic and administrative advantages of devolution may be mutually reinforcing. The Sri Lanka development councils, for example, are a way of placating the Tamils and rationalizing the structure of local government in the countryside.

There is one caveat. Perhaps devolution for ethnic conflict reduction raises the risk that the benefits of development projects, controlled at lower levels, may be ethnically skewed. If so, perhaps the risk is increased that aid donors will be involved more frequently in, for example, Tamil-Moor or intra-Yoruba conflicts or that donors will find it more difficult to extricate themselves from such complications if and as they arise. But, before firm conclusions could be drawn about the magnitude of such risks, one would need to know a good bit more about development projects in federal versus unitary systems. In any case, these risks are by no means absent where development is a central government function.

The electoral materials provide comfort of a rather different sort. The claim has often been made for Asian and African countries that there is little leeway to cope with ethnic divisions in a democratic setting. Western scholars who should have known better nodded in agreement as Nkrumah and Obote dismantled the opposition in the name of ethnic harmony. As the range of electoral techniques makes clear, however, ethnic moderation can be encouraged in ways compatible with democratic institutions. It has often been said that fundamental conflicts cannot be bridged by constitution writing. But this turns out to be a half-truth. Where there is some determination to play by the rules, the rules can restructure the system so that the game itself changes.

To the extent that moderate, democratic politics precludes ethnic eruptions of the sort that destroyed Uganda's marketing network, Cyprus' tourist industry, and Lebanon's appeal as a commercial center, democratic politics that limits ethnic extremism should encourage risk taking and investment. And the presidential systems of Nigeria and Sri Lanka would seem to suggest that democratic politics can be structured so as to make it possible for political leadership to make difficult decisions in matters affecting both ethnic conflict and economic development.

The evidence is not complete yet on preferential policies and development. But it is clear enough that ethnic preferences pushed too far produce short-term economic and political costs--costs in efficiency, costs in unplanned expansion in education, costs in ethnic conflict. It may still be true, as it is assumed to be, that there will ultimately be less ethnic conflict if ethnic groups are proportionately represented in all sectors at all levels. One reason that the truth of this proposition

remains elusive is that few, if any, societies approximate this description. If it is true, however, that does not mean that the end is worth any cost. In the developing countries, the short- and medium-run is very important. That preferential policies have not produced even more short-run costs is testimony more to the wisdom and political sensitivity of those who enforce such policies than it is to the policies themselves.

Preferential policies tend also to have a redistributive effect that has gone largely, though not entirely, unnoticed.<sup>125</sup> If they proceed as intended, they reduce disparities between ethnic groups, thereby increasing disparities between classes within ethnic groups. Their redistributive effect, in other words, is horizontal rather than vertical. Malaysian policymakers are well aware of this, but it is unclear whether anyone can control the effect of such policies on classwise income distribution.

There are alternatives to preferences that cost more in initial expenditure, but may cost less a short way down the road and yet bring greater benefits in both productivity and ethnic harmony. Many of the current economic disparities between ethnic groups are traceable to accidents of colonial location. Groups near a port, a missionary school, a colonial capital or commercial center, obtained a head-start that they retained. Location policy and investment policy in general may well be more efficacious than preferential policies in reducing ethnic conflict, but that is a subject for another paper.

For the moment, what needs to be stressed is that territorial and electoral policies have the advantage that they are oriented to the short term, whereas the benefits of preferential policies lie in the long term.

Ethnic conflict in a good many countries is urgent, and policymakers need to be made aware of the availability of tools to cope constructively with conflict in the present. The tools are more abundant and more apt to the task than many policymakers have been led to believe.

1. For an earlier survey, see Claire Palley, Constitutional Law and Minorities (London: Minority Rights Group Report no. 36, 1978).
  
2. For the former, see Ronald L. Watts, Multicultural Societies and Federalism (Studies of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, no. 8; Ottawa: Information Canada, 1970), p. 34; Ivo D. Duchacek, "Antagonistic Cooperation: Territorial and Ethnic Communities," Publius, Vol. 7, no. 4 (Fall 1977), pp. 3-29, at p. 13; Kenneth C. Wheare, "Federalism and the Making of Nations," in Arthur W. Macmahon, editor, Federalism, Mature and Emergent (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., 1955), p. 32. See also Arend Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), pp. 42-43, 163, 193; Max Beloff, "The 'Federal Solution' in Its Application to Europe, Asia, and Africa," Political Studies, Vol. 1, no. 2 (June 1953), pp. 114-31. For the latter, see Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics (Garden City: Doubleday, 1960), pp. 91-92.

For purposes of this discussion, the precise differences between federalism and regional autonomy are not of great moment. In some cases, such as the Sudan, regional autonomy is accorded to particular regions by otherwise unitary governments. In others, such as Sri Lanka, the grant of autonomy to one region would not be feasible

unless the same arrangements were made for all regions. The line between federal and unitary states is elusive. but, in substantial measure, the distinction turns on whether the relation between the center and the component units is regarded as having an intrinsically constitutional character, often exemplified by representation based on the units in a separate legislative chamber at the center. Whereas regional autonomy necessitates only devolution, and regional decisions are sometimes subject to a central veto, federalism generally entails some degree of independence on the part of the constituent units. Cf. Palley, Constitutional Law and Minorities, pp. 13-14.

3. For a discussion of such "natural experiments," see Richard A. Brody and Charles N. Brownstein, "Experimentation and Simulation," in Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby, editors, Handbook of Political Science, Vol. 7 (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Pub. Co., 1975), p. 218.
4. C.S. Whitaker, Jr., The Politics of Tradition: Continuity and Change in Northern Nigeria, 1946-1966 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), p. 324.
5. This was no longer true of the Yoruba after a fourth, largely non-Yoruba region was carved out of the Yoruba Western Region in 1963. Thereafter, the West, save for cosmopolitan Lagos, was nearly all Yoruba.

6. For a succinct analysis, see Crawford Young, The Politics of Cultural Pluralism (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1976), pp. 301-08.
7. The 19 states were intended, as were the 12, to respond to the demands of minorities and to subdivide the large ethnic groups further. See Ali D. Yahaya, "The Creation of States," in Keith Panter-Brick, editor, Soldiers and Oil: The Political Transformation of Nigeria (London: Frank Cass, 1978), pp. 201-23.
8. The observations that follow are based on interviews in Nigeria in 1978, supplemented by several additional interviews in 1980.
9. Richard L. Sklar, Nigerian Political Parties (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 338. Properly modified for ethnic differences, the situation of Northern Nigeria under the NPC was not far from that described by V.O. Key, Jr., for one-party Virginia under the Byrd machine. For opposing parties to emerge, Key notes, "each party must, almost of necessity, have a territorial stronghold in which it can win legislative elections and control local governments. . . . The punitive powers of the organization, through its control of the perquisites of local officials and its ability to obstruct local bills in the legislature, can discourage competing factions territorially segregated." Southern Politics in State and Nation (New York: Vintage Books, 1949), p. 33.
10. Cf. Whitaker, The Politics of Tradition, pp. 279-82; John N. Paden, "Islam, Constitutional Change, and Politics in Nigeria," unpub.

paper, October 1979, p. 4.

11. Sklar, Nigerian Political Parties, pp. 339-44; Whitaker, The Politics of Tradition, p. 386.

12. The GNPP was not intended to be solely a Kanuri party, for it was earlier linked to a party with Ibo support, as explained below. But that does not detract from the fact that it was assuredly not linked to the successor to the NPC.

It should be noted that the spelling of Bornu has now been altered to Borno.

13. So uncanny, in fact, is the resemblance that the former interparty, interethnic violence has reappeared in Borno, and in the election the traditional ruler of the Bornu emirate, the Shehu, threw his support to the NPN just as he had earlier supported the NPC over the Bornu Youth Movement.

14. Whitaker, The Politics of Tradition, pp. 385, 410.

15. Ibid., p. 374.

16. Jyotirindra Das Gupta, "Ethnicity, Language Demands, and National Development in India," in Nathan Glazer and Daniel P. Moynihan, editors, Ethnicity: Theory and Experience (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975), p. 485.

17. G.N. Sharma, "Aspects of Andhra Politics," in Iqbal Narain, editor, State Politics in India (Meerut, India: Meenakshi Prakashan, 1968), pp. 96-104.
18. Lloyd I. Rudolph and Susanne Hoeber Rudolph, The Modernity of Tradition: Political Development in India (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967), pp. 71-76; Selig Harrison, India: The Dangerous Decades (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960), pp. 196-99; V.K.S. Nayar, "Communal Interest Groups in Kerala," in Donald Eugene Smith, editor, South Asian Politics and Religion (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), ch. 8.
19. Sushil Kumar, "Panorama of State Politics," in Narain, editor, State Politics in India, p. 68.
20. Hans Daadler, "On Building Consociational Nations: The Cases of the Netherlands and Switzerland," in Kenneth D. McRae, editor, Consociational Democracy: Political Accommodation in Segmented Societies (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1974), p. 110; André Siegfried, Switzerland: A Democratic Way of Life (Edward Fitzgerald, trans.; New York: Duell, Sloan & Pearce, 1950), p. 161.
21. Statement of Lt. Col. Ojukwu to Diplomatic Representatives of the U.K. and U.S.A., September 1966, reprinted in Nigerian Crisis, 1966: Eastern Nigerian Viewpoint (Enugu: Eastern Nigeria Ministry of Information, 1966), p. 42.

22. "The Addis Ababa Agreement on the Problem of South Sudan," ch. IV-VI, in The Grass Curtain (London), Vol. 2, no. 3 (May 1972), pp. 18-20.
23. Nelson Kasfir, "Southern Sudanese Politics Since the Addis Ababa Agreement, African Affairs, Vol. 76, no. 2 (April 1977), pp. 143-66; James E. Sulton, Jr., "Regional Autonomy in the Southern Sudan: A Study in Conflict Regulation," unpub. Ph.D. diss., Johns Hopkins University, 1980, pp. 200-03, 255-56, 410; Sudanow (Khartoum), Vol. 5, no. 6 (June 1930), p. 12.
24. By the terms of the Development Councils Act, sections 59-61, the district minister is empowered to remove any council member or dissolve the entire council for incompetence, mismanagement, abuse of power, unlawful behavior, or default in the performance of duty, while the president of Sri Lanka is authorized to dissolve a council's executive committee if there are differences between it and the district minister or to remove executive committee members for incompetence or mismanagement.
25. See, e.g., Far Eastern Economic Review (Hong Kong), August 17, 1979, p. 15. In an interview, however, President Jayewardene referred revealingly to district ministers as becoming "rather like the Chief Ministers who run Indian states." Ceylon Observer, April 6, 1980, p. 13.
26. I am drawing here and elsewhere in this discussion on interviews with several members of the Presidential Commission on Development Councils and some leading politicians and policymakers, Sinhalese, Tamil, and Muslim, in Colombo in April 1980.

27. Report of the Presidential Commission on Development Councils, Sessional Paper No. V--1980 (Colombo: Government Publications Bureau, 1980), pp. 83-95 (Note of Reservation by Mr. A.C.M. Ameer, Q.C., and Mr. M.A. Azeez).
28. The phrase is drawn from an interview with a Malay politician, in Alor Star, January 1968. Joseph S. Nye has pointed out that one function of corruption is sometimes to "overcome divisions in a ruling elite that might otherwise result in destructive conflict," and he specifically notes that elites based on power and on wealth sometimes have "assimilated each other" through corrupt payments. "Corruption and Political Development: A Cost-Benefit Analysis," American Political Science Review, Vol. 61, no. 2 (June 1967), pp. 417-427 at p. 420. In Malaysia, interethnic elite relations at the state level are greatly facilitated by the multiethnic alliance that has long ruled the country and nearly all the states. Because of this party arrangement, state-level Malay and Chinese politicians simply must deal with each other.
29. For an example of placation, see Howard Spodek, "'Injustice to Saurashtra': A Case Study of Regional Tensions and Harmonies in India," Asian Survey, Vol. 12, no. 5 (May 1972), pp. 416-28.
30. There is a related question regarding when to encapsulate a whole group in a single state and when to split it between two or more states. There may be a tradeoff here between the need to break up a large group and the desire to quarantine conflict within state boundaries.

The former is aptly illustrated by the allocation of the Hausa, Yoruba, and Ibo to more than one state each. The latter is illustrated by Indian federalism. In those Indian states that encapsulate whole groups, a conflict that flares up typically does not spill across state boundaries. Not all groups are so encapsulated, however. There are Bengalis in Assam, as well as in West Bengal, and anti-Bengali agitation and violence in Assam can not be confined to that state. Likewise, tensions between "backward castes" and upper castes in North India tend to cross state lines, particularly in Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, so that conflicts in one state reverberate in the other.

31. The Art of Judgment (London: Chapman & Hall, 1965), p. 59.
32. I am grateful to Dr. Martin Dent for a letter, January 6, 1978, containing the quotation and a discussion of the problem and to Dr. Anthony Oyewole for a helpful conversation in Ife, January 16, 1978.
33. Numeiry had executed his communist Minister of Southern Affairs, replacing him with another Southerner (Abel Alier) who came to enjoy his confidence. Even before the agreement, Numeiry signalled willingness to provide funds for the South and had enacted a Local Government Law that decentralized authority to the provincial level. On some difficult issues, such as language, the regional autonomy agreement was ambiguous but conciliatory to the South; and it made the regional council executive subject to Numeiry's authority. But the agreement also offered the separatist guerillas the chance to join

- the Sudanese armed forces. See generally Sulton, "Regional Autonomy in the Southern Sudan: A Study in Conflict Regulation;" Kasfir, "Southern Sudanese Politics Since the Addis Ababa Agreement;" John Howell, "Politics in the Southern Sudan," African Affairs, Vol. 72, no. 2 (April 1973), pp. 163-78.
34. Astri Suhrke, "The Muslims in Southern Thailand: An Analysis of Political Developments, 1968-78," unpub. paper, Washington, D.C., December 1978, p. 4.
35. See Donald L. Horowitz, "Multiracial Politics in the New States: Toward a Theory of Conflict," in Robert J. Jackson and Michael B. Stein, editors, Issues in Comparative Politics (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1971), pp. 169, 180 n. 28.
36. The Constitution of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, section 99 (13) (Colombo: Department of Government Printing, 1978), as amended by the Second Amendment to the Constitution, February 22, 1979.
37. "To ensure the stability of the Government between elections was very important because in all developing countries Governments had to take what may be termed unpopular decisions . . . ." Statement of H.E. Mr. J.R. Jayewardene, President of Sri Lanka, at the Commonwealth Heads of Government Regional Meeting, September 1980 (mimeo., n.d.), p. 2.

38. For the succession of increasingly intransigent organizations, each outflanking the one that preceded it, see, e.g., Brian Crozier, The Rebels: A Study of Post-War Insurrections (Boston: Beacon Press, 1960), pp. 85-89; Martin R. Doornbos, "Protest Movements in Western Uganda: Some Parallels and Contrasts," unpublished paper, 1966, p. 11. Somewhat the same thing can be said for a policy of repression. Early, decisive, and consistent use of force against separatism seems to deter separatist warfare; late, equivocal, or sporadic repression (alternating with concession) seems merely to strengthen the separatists' resolve, as it surely did in Burma and the Sudan. Cf. Joane Nagel, "The Conditions of Ethnic Separatism: The Kurds in Turkey, Iran, and Iraq," Ethnicity, Vol. 7, no. 3 (September 1980), pp. 279-97, esp. pp. 295-96.
39. For a discussion of these measures, I am indebted to a conversation with a Chadien economist in Washington, July 19, 1971.
40. For the basic distinction between these two types of separatist groups, see Donald L. Horowitz, "Patterns of Ethnic Separatism," Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. 23, no. 2 (April 1981), pp. 165-95.
41. David Parkin, "Congregational and Interpersonal Ideologies in Political Ethnicity," in Abner Cohen, editor, Urban Ethnicity (London: Tavistock Publications, 1974), p. 142.
42. Hugh Tinker, India and Pakistan: A Political Analysis (rev. ed.; New York: Praeger, 1968), p. 146.

43. Far Eastern Economic Review, May 11, 1979, pp. 27-29. See also the report of Walter Schwarz, Washington Post, March 3, 1974, p. F5.
44. The Kurdish demand is usually for proportional representation in government positions and proportional per capita expenditure in Kurdish areas. Lorenzo Kent Kimball, The Changing Pattern of Political Power in Iraq, 1958 to 1971 (New York: Robert Speller & Sons, 1972), pp. 141-42; Charles M. Benjamin, "The Kurdish Non-State Nation," paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Washington, D.C., February 19-22, 1975, p. 6; Abdul H. Raoof, "Kurdish Ethnic Nationalism and Political Development in Republican Iraq," paper presented at the annual meeting of the Middle East Studies Association, Denver, November 11-13, 1971, pp. 4, 10.
45. It was said that, if Quebec seceded, the Franco-Ontarians would become homeless "Palestinians of North America." The Gazette (Montreal), April 22, 1980, p. 14. To allay fears of Francophones in New Brunswick, the Parti Québécois announced its support of a separate Acadian state there. Ibid., February 1, 1980, p. 5. Quebec's dependence on the Ontario market, on federal oil and health subsidies and pension supplements, and on spending in Quebec above Quebec's tax contributions were all stressed in the anti-separatist campaign. The PQ conceded the last point, but argued that the relevant measure was lower federal spending per capita compared to that in other provinces, rather than expenditures against revenues. Financial Post (Toronto), March 8, 1980, p. 14. I am deeply indebted to Barbara G. Haskel for an array of press clippings on Quebec ethnic issues.

46. Jacques Parizeau, quoted in The Gazette, January 22, 1980, p. 2.
47. In 1906, the British in India were first confronted with a demand for a separate Muslim electoral roll, the first of many such demands they encountered in the colonies. See Sir Reginald Coupland, The Indian Problem, Vol. 1 (London: Oxford University Press, 1942), pp. 28-36. Although they yielded in India, the British eventually resisted in other colonies, such as Ceylon, which had communal rolls until the Donoughmore Commission, which drafted the universal suffrage constitution adopted in 1931, set its face decisively against them. Ceylon Tamils accordingly boycotted the first elections under the constitution. Robert N. Kearney, The Politics of Ceylon (Sri Lanka) (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1973), pp. 28-33. As independence approached, the British tended to accede to separate rolls or seats only where white settlers insisted, as in Kenya, or where the British saw self-government as impossible without them, notably in Fiji and Cyprus. See Glen Wright, "Fiji Approaches Independence," Race Today (London), April 1970, pp. 114-15; "Fijian Independence," Current Notes on International Affairs (Canberra), Vol. 41, no. 9 (September 1970), pp. 461-64; Adamantia Pollis, "Intergroup Conflict and British Colonial Policy: The Case of Cyprus," Comparative Politics, Vol. 5, no. 4 (July 1973), pp. 575-99.
48. The debate was sterile because it was abstruse and acontextual. A splendid example of the debate is W.J.M. Mackenzie, "Representation in Plural Societies," Political Studies, Vol. 2, no. 1 (February 1954), pp. 54-69.

49. See Maurice Duverger, L'Influence des Systèmes Electoraux sur la Vie Politique (Paris: Armand Colin, 1954); Maurice Duverger, Political Parties (Barbara & Robert North, trans.; New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1954); Douglas W. Rae, The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws (rev. ed.; New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971).
50. An outstanding exception in J.A. Laponce, "The Protection of Minorities by the Electoral System," Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 10, no. 2 (June 1957), pp. 318-39. See also J.A. Laponce, The Protection of Minorities (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1960).
51. Rae, The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws, pp. 75-76. In Rae's sample of Western countries, every party with more than 48 per cent of the vote secured more than 50 per cent of the seats. Sometimes a party with as little as 40 per cent of the vote was able to gain more than 50 per cent of the seats. Occasionally, a party could gain as much as 73 per cent of the seats with less than half the votes. Ibid.
52. See generally Michael C. Hudson, The Precarious Republic: Political Modernization in Lebanon (New York: Random House, 1968); Leonard Binder, editor, Politics in Lebanon (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1966); David R. Smock and Audrey C. Smock, The Politics of Pluralism: A Comparative Study of Lebanon and Ghana (New York: Elsevier, 1975); Ralph E. Crow, "Religious Sectarianism in the Lebanese Political System," Journal of Politics, Vol. 24, no. 3 (August 1963), pp. 489-520; Michael W. Suleiman, "The Role of Political Parties in a Confessional

Democracy: the Lebanese Case," Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 20 (September 1967), pp. 682-93; Michael C. Hudson, "Democracy and Social Mobilization in Lebanese Politics," Comparative Politics, Vol. 1, no. 2 (January 1969), pp. 245-63.

53. Hudson, The Precarious Republic, pp. 148, 265-66.
54. The brief 1958 civil war was an exception, but it was largely brought on by a breach of the rules by the then-president.
55. The notorious weakness of the Lebanese state, related to its ethnic structure, was also conducive to the flourishing of militias.
56. There is also a formal requirement of geographical distribution of party membership, to discourage ethnically-exclusive parties, but this, predictably, was easily satisfied and was no impediment to any of the ethnically-based parties. For the new Nigerian constitution, see Donald L. Horowitz, "About-Face in Africa: The Return to Civilian Rule in Nigeria," Yale Review, Vol. 68, no. 2 (Winter 1979), pp. 192-206. I am also drawing here on interviews in Nigeria in 1978 and 1980.
57. The framers were much concerned with the possibility of deadlock, and they considered a number of different presidential electoral formulae to minimize the possibility. See ibid., pp. 197-201. In the end, they settled on a vote of federal and state legislators if no candidate won on the first ballot, but the military government prescribed a run-off election instead.

58. Unofficial returns of the presidential election may be found in West Africa, August 27, 1979, p. 1573.
59. A split over a proposed Sharia court of appeals, favored by the Muslim North, opposed by the Middle Belt and South, helped draw the first party lines, but later splits increased the number of parties eventually formed.
60. On such matters, for example, as the composition of the civil and foreign service, which has occasionally been debated angrily in the Congress.
61. The electoral innovations are described in C.R. de Silva, "The Constitution of the Second Republic of Sri Lanka (1978) and Its Significance," Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, Vol. 17, no. 2 (July 1979), pp. 192-209; James Manor, "A New Political Order for Sri Lanka," The World Today, Vol. 35, no. 9 (September 1979), pp. 377-86; K.M. de Silva, "Political and Constitutional Change in Sri Lanka," The Round Table, No. 273 (January 1979), pp. 49-57; W.A. Wiswa Warnapala, "Sri Lanka 1978: Reversal of Policies and Strategies," Asian Survey, Vol. 19, no. 2 (February 1979), pp. 178-87. The provisions are contained in The Constitution of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, chap. XIV.
62. For a convenient summary of party votes and seats since 1947, see James Manor, "The Failure of Political Integration in Sri Lanka (Ceylon)," Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, Vol. 17, no. 1 (March 1979), pp. 23-46, at p. 45 n. 99.

63. For similar assessments, see de Silva, "The Constitution of the Second Republic of Sri Lanka (1978) and Its Significance," pp. 198-99; Manor, "A New Political Order for Sri Lanka," p. 381. A more cynical interpretation of the second preference system holds that Tamil second preferences will generally go to the United Party, thus insuring election of its candidate. The constitution was promulgated by a UNP government. But this argument comes to the same thing, for if any other Sinhalese candidate wishes to be elected president, he will have to bid against the UNP for Tamil support. Under either interpretation, the provision encourages interethnic bargaining.
64. Palley, Constitutional Law and Minorities, pp. 16-17. Cf. Laponce, "The Protection of Minorities by the Electoral System," pp. 326-28.
65. The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws, pp. 88-92, 101.
66. Ibid., p. 170.
67. For illustrations, see de Silva, "The Constitution of the Second Republic of Sri Lanka (1978) and Its Significance," p. 203.
68. What follows draws on interviews in Guyana in 1965. For election results, see Report on the General Election of Members of the Legislative Assembly, 1961 (Georgetown: Government Printery, 1964); Report on the House of Assembly General Election, 1964 (Georgetown: Government Printery, 1965). See also Peter Simms, Trouble in Guyana (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1966); Cheddi Jagan, The West on Trial: My Fight for Guyana's Freedom (London: Michael Joseph, 1966);

- B.A.N. Collins, "The End of a Colony--II: British Guiana, 1965," Political Quarterly, Vol. 36, no. 4 (October 1965), pp. 406-16.
69. See Rae, The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws, pp. 151-70.
70. Peter Newman, British Guiana: Problems of Cohesion in an Immigrant Society (London: Oxford University Press, 1964), p. 97.
71. See Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965), pp. 645-49.
72. The PNC-UF coalition, though more or less multiethnic, did not really span the main fault line of Guyanese politics: the Creole-East Indian division. Consequently, it was not the sort of accommodative coalition I have been speaking of. It should also be noted, in connection with Table 2, that the comparison is restricted to 1964 versus 1968, because post-1978 election data in Guyana are not reliable.
73. Political Parties, p. 252.
74. Political Parties, p. 244.
75. The Precarious Republic, p. 21.
76. Rae has shown that PR does not automatically make it easier for a new party to gain seats. The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws, pp. 151-67.
77. George Armstrong Kelly, "Biculturalism and Party Systems in Belgium and Canada," Public Policy, Vol. 16 (1967), p. 326.

78. In 1959, the Alliance won 71 per cent of the seats on 52 per cent of the votes; in 1964, 86 per cent on 53 per cent; in 1969, 64 per cent on 49 per cent; in 1978, 85 per cent on 55 per cent. I have omitted 1974 because the National Front then included a Malay party that in all other elections has been in opposition.
79. In the 1980 Canadian parliamentary elections, the victorious Liberals, with 23 per cent of the vote in the western provinces, gained only two seats there; the Conservatives, with only twice as many votes in the West, won 25 times the number of seats the Liberals did. In Quebec, the results were reversed: the Conservatives, with 13 per cent of the vote, won just one seat; the Liberals, with two-thirds of the Quebec vote, won nearly all the seats there. The Gazette (Montreal), March 1, 1980, p. 26. The result was to make the Liberals appear to be --and to behave as--a wholly eastern party and the Conservatives a wholly Anglophone party, thereby exacerbating ethnic and regional tensions. The remedy proposed is to supplement first-past-the-post seats with a minority of seats elected by provincial constituencies on a PR formula. The aim is to assure parties seats wherever they have significant votes and so to mitigate polarization. Alan C. Cairns, "The Strong Case for Modest Electoral Reform in Canada," paper presented at Harvard University Seminar on Canada-United States Relations, September 25, 1979 (mimeo.).
80. James Q. Wilson, "What Can Be Done?" paper presented at the Fourth Annual Public Policy Week conference sponsored by the American Enterprise Institute, Washington, D.C., December 10, 1980, p. 23.

81. Ibid.
82. Constitution of Malaysia, sections 89, 153.
83. Government of Malaysia, Second Malaysia Plan, 1971-1975 (Kuala Lumpur: Government Press, 1971), p. 1.
84. Constitution of India, articles 341-42.
85. Myron Weiner, Sons of the Soil: Migration and Ethnic Conflict in India (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978).
86. C.S. Whitaker, Jr., The Politics of Tradition: Continuity and Change in Northern Nigeria, 1946-1966 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), p. 390.
87. W.F. Gutteridge, Military Regimes in Africa (London: Methuen, 1975), p. 117; Omolade Adejuyigbe, "The Size of States and Political Stability in Nigeria," African Studies Review, Vol. 16, no. 2 (Sept. 1973), pp. 172-73.
88. Constitution of Nigeria, sections 14(3), 157(5).
89. Daily Times, (Lagos), January 18, 1980, p. 1.
90. These observations draw on interviews conducted in the Southern Philippines in 1980.
91. I am quoting an informed academic observer of the Tanzanian program, Dar es Salaam, 1980.

92. Weiner, Sons of the Soil, pp. 184-86.
93. Thus, one firm operating in ethnically sensitive Aceh, in Indonesia, was easily persuaded by politically powerful Acehnese to adopt a 50 per cent Acehnese employment quota, over the objections of Javanese officials of the central government who were involved in the project. A firm operating in French Guyana adopted an elaborate ethnic division of labor for its operations. "Northernization" was also pressed on expatriate firms in Nigeria. Leonard Plotnicov, Strangers to the City: Urban Man in Jos, Nigeria (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1967), p. 60. I have dealt with some of these issues in a short article, "Ethnic Demands Abroad," The Wall Street Journal, December 18, 1978, p. 28.
94. What follows draws upon extensive interviews in Malaysia in 1975. See also Karl von Vorys, Democracy without Consensus: Communalism and Political Stability in Malaysia (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), pp. 398-412; R.S. Milne, "The Politics of Malaysia's New Economic Policy," Pacific Affairs, Vol. 49, no. 2 (Summer 1976), pp. 235-62.
95. Jack L. Walker, "Setting the Agenda in the U.S. Senate: A Theory of Problem Selection," British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 7, no. 4 (October 1977), pp. 423-45.
96. Bee-lan Chan Wang, "Governmental Intervention in Ethnic Stratification: Effects on the Distribution of Students Among Fields of Study," Comparative Education Review, Vol. 21, no. 1 (February 1977), p. 111.

97. C.R. de Silva, "Weightage in University Admissions: Standardization and District Quotas in Sri Lanka," Modern Ceylon Studies, Vol. 5, no. 2 (July 1974), p. 178.
98. What follows draws on interviews with government education officials and academics in Tanzania in 1980.
99. Wang, "Governmental Intervention in Ethnic Stratification," p. 113.
100. Bee-lan Chan Wang, "Sex and Ethnic Differences in Educational Investment in Malaysia: The Effect of Reward Structure," Comparative Education Review, Vol. 24, no. 2, pt. 2 (June 1980), pp. S140-59.
101. C.R. de Silva, "The Politics of University Admissions: A Review of Some Aspects of the Admissions Policy in Sri Lanka 1971-1978," Sri Lanka Journal of Social Sciences, Vol. 2, no. 1 (June 1979), pp. 85-123, at pp. 89-90.
102. Computed from de Silva, "Weightage in University Admissions," p. 160.
103. Ibid., p. 162
104. Ibid., p. 164.
105. Ibid., p. 156.
106. De Silva, "The Politics of University Admissions," pp. 105-06.
107. De Silva, "Weightage in University Admissions," p. 166.
108. I am drawing on interviews with leading politicians in Malaysia in 1980.

109. De Silva, "The Politics of University Admissions," pp. 94-101.
110. Far Eastern Economic Review, January 23, 1981, p. 52.
111. Myron Weiner, "Assessing Policy Consequences," in Weiner and Mary Fainsod Katzenstein, editors, India's Preferential Policies: Migrants, the Middle Classes and Ethnic Equality (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, in manuscript); Katzenstein, "Preferential Treatment and Ethnic Conflict in Bombay," Public Policy, Vol. 25, no. 3 (Summer 1977), pp. 313-32.
112. In Lebanon, for example, Shiites long complained of their underrepresentation in the civil service. In proportion to population, they were underrepresented, but they were represented in numbers fully proportionate to their share of university graduates.
113. Similar descriptions of the morale of caste Hindus in Indian employment are available. There, places are reserved for scheduled castes, the employment and promotion of whom, it is said, hurts the interests of more qualified caste Hindus.
114. Weiner, "India's Preferential Policies in Comparative Perspective," in Weiner and Katzenstein, editors, India's Preferential Policies.
115. Ibid.
116. Weiner, "Assessing Policy Consequences."
117. My material on separatism in Andhra Pradesh is derived from conversations in Hyderabad in 1975 and from the following

written sources: Duncan B. Forrester, "Subregionalism in India: The Case of Telangana," Pacific Affairs, Vol. 43, no. 1 (Spring 1970), pp. 5-21; Gray, "The Demand for a Separate Telengana State in India;" Rasheeduddin Khan, "Political Participation and Political Change in Andhra Pradesh (India);" K. Seshadri, "The Rise and Fall of the Telangana Praja Samithi-- A Case Study," Journal of Constitutional and Parliamentary Studies, Vol. 5, no. 4 (October-December 1971), pp. 674-85; Myron Weiner, "The Socio-Political Consequences of Inter-State Migration in India," unpublished paper, ca. 1971; The Telangana Movement: An Investigative Focus (Hyderabad: Anand Rao Thota, for the Telangana University for College Teachers' Convention 1969); G. Ram Reddy, "Uni-Party Dominance in Centre-State Relations--Andhra Pradesh Experience," in B.L. Maheshwari, editor Centre-State Relations in the Seventies (Calcutta: Minerva Associates, 1973), pp. 1-32; Hugh Gray, "The Failure of the Demand for a Separate Andhra State," Asian Survey, Vol. 14, no. 4 (April 1974), pp. 338-49; "Telengana and Caste," Economic and Political Weekly (Bombay), March 8, 1969, pp. 455-56; Weiner, Sons of the Soil, pp. 217-64; Hugh Gray, "Andhra Pradesh," in Myron Weiner, editor, State Politics in India (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968), pp. 399-431; G.N. Sharma, "Aspects of Andhra Politics," in Iqbal Narain, editor, State Politics in India, pp. 96-104.

118. The Telangana Movement is replete with figures documenting alleged disparities and malpractices.
119. Ibid., p. 43.
120. Reddy, "Uni-Party Dominance in Centre-State Relations--Andhra Pradesh Experience," p. 15.
121. Ramashray Roy, "India 1972: Fissures in the Fortress," Asian Survey, Vol. 13, no. 2 (February 1973), pp. 231-45, at p. 237.
122. Gray, "The Failure of the Demand for a Separate Andhra State," p. 339.
123. The terms of the 1973 formula appear in ibid., pp. 348-49. Not only were mulki rules abolished, but so was the redirection of revenue surpluses to Telangana under the Gentlemen's Agreement. The solution clearly favored the Andhras. Telanganites, many of whom felt betrayed by the political leaders of their earlier movement--who rejoined Congress as soon as the chief minister was unseated--were not up to beginning a new agitation, even if financing had been forthcoming, which apparently it no longer was. I am indebted for this information to several sources whom I consulted in Hyderabad in 1975.
124. The new language concessions were effective on July 9, 1980. See also Ceylon Observer, April 6, 1980, p. 13.
125. See Jacob Meerman, Public Expenditure in Malaysia: Who Benefits and Why (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), p. 37.