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CHAIRMAN'S REPORT  
SPECIAL MEETING ON THE ROLE OF THE  
CLUB DU SAHEL

OECD - Paris, May 19, 1983

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CHAIRMAN'S REPORT  
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CLUB DU SAHEL

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OECD, Paris, May 19, 1983

1. Introduction

On May 19, 1983, a Special Meeting of senior officials of development agencies which participate in the Club du Sahel was held at the OECD. The purpose of the meeting was to reflect on the functions and work of the Club du Sahel and to solicit views on what its future role should be.

The meeting was held under the sponsorship of the Secretary General of the OECD who felt that, as the Club du Sahel entered its eighth year in operation, it would be opportune to consider the Club experience and to review past achievements and problems so as to better guide its work in fruitful directions in the future. Moreover, it was thought appropriate to hold such a meeting to provide donor input into the work being carried out by CILSS in its Reflection Committee on the Future of CILSS. The results of the meeting could also be a useful input for the forthcoming 5th Conference of the Club du Sahel to be hosted by the CEC, October 26-28, 1983 in Brussels.

It was, of course, recognized by all participants that the meeting in no way represented a unilateral taking of decisions by development agencies on future directions for the

Club du Sahel nor was it intended to be a decision-making meeting. The Club du Sahel was established to work in symbiosis with and to support the CILSS. Therefore, as in the past, all decisions are made jointly within the CILSS/Club du Sahel framework. Nonetheless, it was felt that the Sahelians and the CILSS deserved to receive the frank views of the donor community on how it sees the role of the Club du Sahel and to a certain extent of CILSS and what these roles should be in the forthcoming years.

The meeting was informal and the agenda (copy attached as Annex A) was designed to permit an open, wide-ranging discussion of the Club du Sahel activities on the regional level, the national level and the relationship between donors and Sahel countries. The Club du Sahel Secretariat drafted a "Preparatory Note" in advance of the meeting to help frame the discussions (copy attached as Annex B, along with a Statistical Annex). A list of participants in the meeting is attached as Annex C. The meeting was opened by the Secretary General whose remarks are included as Annex D. Closing the meeting the Chairman informed the participants that a Summary of Main Points would be transmitted to the CILSS and the 5th Club du Sahel Conference.

## 2. Summary of Main Points

There were no conclusions, as such, but the Chairman identified several main points as the outcome of the meeting.

1) The Club du Sahel has generally fulfilled its mandate well. Without it, many donors could not maintain their present intensity of interest in the Sahel. In particular, the Club should continue to function in liaison with the CILSS as a regional "think-tank" and as a forum for dialogue and coordination.

2) The Club du Sahel should continue to function in liaison with CILSS as a center for thought, reflection and study. In particular, to promote a more favorable economic environment for the implementation of aid and to improve the effectiveness of aid, the Club du Sahel should study, analyze and make proposals on development policies related to the long-term objective of regional food security in the Sahel. In doing this, it should not look too narrowly on food but take relevant (macro)-economic issues into consideration.

Other specific ideas for further study are:

- promotion of agricultural research and its coordination in the Sahel (rainfed agriculture, farming systems);
- trade opportunities in the West African market for food produced in the Sahel;
- effectiveness of Sahelian institutions;

3) The Club du Sahel in liaison with CILSS should continue to sponsor or, if necessary, organize meetings in the Sahel countries on the regional and on the national levels, where progress in key sectors and specific development policies can be discussed frankly.

4) Coordination of development assistance to specific countries in the Sahel leaves much to be desired. The Club should do what it can to improve this situation although there is no clear answer yet as to how this can be done. On the one hand the Sahel governments are fearful of donors "ganging up" and moreover some donors do not wish to be coordinated in any direct way. Clearly, the decisions have to be taken by the national governments so

they are the only point of true coordination. If the Club du Sahel could assist CILSS National Correspondents to function effectively and progressively assume a role in the coordination process, this might be helpful.

5) The Club du Sahel and the CILSS should continue to work almost in symbiosis as in the past, focusing on their conceptual role rather than at mobilising funds. The CILSS has the potential to be an important institution in the Sahel. Therefore, it needs to be supported more strongly by its member states, and strengthened on the national level.

6) Food security does not seem to be adequately addressed in the Sahel at present. The CILSS and the Club du Sahel should expedite their efforts to design, negotiate and implement a food security system, including contingency plans in case of emergency.

7) The food strategy process which is unfolding in several Sahel countries is a welcome development and the Club du Sahel should continue, as in the past, to assist in this process.

8) The Club du Sahel has functioned in a flexible manner in the past. It has provided different types of services. One which was mentioned, substantial assistance to the donors meeting on the Office du Niger. This mode of functioning should be continued.

### 3. The Role of the Club du Sahel

#### 3.1 General Considerations

There was general agreement that the Club du Sahel has served an important function and generally fulfilled

its mandate since its creation in 1976, in Dakar.

It has successfully supported the mobilization of resources (see Annex B - Statistical Annex) and the Sahel countries are now among the leaders in receiving development assistance from the donor community. It has informed and sensitized the international community on Sahel development prospects and needs on a continuing basis. It has served as a forum for discussion, study and joint action on development problems, policies and priorities for Sahel development. The Club du Sahel's almost symbiotic relationship with the CILSS and its support of that institution has been pointed out as a model of international development cooperation which might serve as an example for cooperation in other regions.

The Club du Sahel has operated in a very flexible manner with a small permanent secretariat. With the CILSS, it has served the function of a "club" which is a place where people come together willing to act as members without actually knowing in advance the exact nature and substance of the activity to be taken up by the group.

Finally, the Club du Sahel has fostered increased cooperation among donors for the implementation of actions requested by Sahel governments and regional institutions.

Several participants pointed out that the regional CILSS/Club du Sahel framework was important and useful for the orientation and implementation of their programs. Without that framework for international cooperation some donors would not be able to maintain the high level of development assistance nor intensity of interest in the Sahel. Moreover, there was general agreement that the Club

du Sahel has helped to stimulate dialogue on key and often sensitive issues. Its flexible, informal style is also appreciated because it permits the Club to adapt and fill gaps in the unpredictable course of events. Nonetheless, the meeting thought that there still is considerable room for improvement of cooperation and coordination between donors and Sahelian governments in order to increase the effectiveness of aid.

### 3.2 The Club du Sahel as a "think-tank"

There was a strong consensus that the Club and the CILSS have done very useful work in mounting joint studies on problems related to medium and long-term development. The partial and evolutive strategy, which was the first result of a joint study, involved a process of analysis and discussion. It started a process of corrective actions with regard to policies of Sahel Government and donors in order to put the emphasis progressively on food security, rural development and agricultural production. However, there still remains a gap between national plans on one hand and actual budgets and aid allocations on the other.

Despite the general satisfaction expressed concerning the conceptual work of the Club du Sahel, there was considerable concern, expressed about the economic and social performance in the Sahel. As the Club Secretariat's preparatory note points out, the food self-sufficiency goal does not seem any closer now than it was seven years ago.

In passing, it should be noted that participants praised the honesty and truthfulness of Club work, which does not try to mask lack of success, but searches to understand the diversity of internal and external factors which impede progress. Yet, the lack of progress despite relatively high

levels of assistance, raised questions of several participants as to whether there are not some fundamental structural problems in the manner in which assistance is provided and used, and in the CILSS/Club strategy itself.

### 3.2.1 Major strategic orientations

At least one participant, with varying degrees of support from others, argued that a strategy of trying to increase production in the food sector will not enable the Sahel to intensify production or to deal with population migration from rural to urban areas. In his view, modern farms, irrigated and rainfed, should be created, oriented towards the market capable of efficient production, consuming inputs of goods and services, and maintaining close relations with other sectors of urban-type activities. Moreover, much more emphasis should be given to rural and urban enterprises both to manufacture agricultural inputs and to process and market agricultural production. He added that on the basis of experience, aid cannot be a solution in itself and can in fact be an impediment to growth if the policy environment is not conducive to its effective use.\*

While sharing the latter view, other participants felt that a strategy based on the intensification of rainfed and irrigated agriculture and on re-establishing ecological balance is still a viable path. This does not imply a continuation of business-as-usual. A more rigorous approach with respect to the policy environment is both desirable and necessary. This approach implies measures related to subsidies, credit, pricing, marketing, agro-industry, articulation of overall cereals

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\* The BADEA presented a paper "Basic Issues on the Sahel Development Strategy", 19 May 1983, which clearly and eloquently sums up this point of view.

policy with food aid and many other issues on which still exist some differences of opinion on both the strategy and tactical levels. These different viewpoints among Sahelians and among donors highlighted the need for a forum such as the Club du Sahel to enable the partners to discuss their different opinions and try to reach common ground.

### 3.2.2 The programme

Within the above context, there was general agreement that the Club in liaison with the CILSS should continue to function as a regional "think-tank", to study, analyze, and make proposals on economic policies, particularly related to the long-term objective of regional food security in the Sahel. It should focus on the food and the agricultural sector, because everyone agrees that the food problem is the most important and immediate problem in the Sahel. The Club should continue to identify the main technical and economic constraints to increased food production in the Sahel. In doing this, it should not look too narrowly at food but should take relevant macro-economic issues into consideration. The approach to be followed at the regional level could be similar to the one followed through the food strategies at the national level. Other participants preferred a more systematic step-by-step approach that would result in a food security system for the Sahel, including a contingency plan in case of emergency.

An item for possible joint analysis which received general support was the suggestion to study the future of the Sahel countries within the West African context to identify major trends and problems. One participant suggested that it should be a search for "tomorrow's problems" while another said it might be a study of "macro-trends" ("tendances lourdes"). The main idea would be to look into the future of Sahel countries from an economic policy standpoint

and to see what the human, ecological, commercial and institutional trends and problems will be. By pinpointing the most important obstacles to development and foreseeing the need for change, future planning might be improved and potential disasters averted.

Another subject which the Club du Sahel should investigate further is the possible expansion of trade between the CILSS member countries and their neighbors to the South. It was pointed out that the pursuit of food self-sufficiency on the national level in some cases can lead to a waste in the allocation of scarce resources. Regional food self-sufficiency, if confined to CILSS countries alone can also encounter serious limitations. The countries of the Sahel should, over the medium and long-term, avail themselves of their opportunities in the West African market. Among the many obstacles which will have to be overcome, there is the present tendency to consider food simply as a social good and not as an economic good which can be traded with substantial profits. It was recommended in particular that the Club should focus on the marketing of food production, both at the national and the regional levels, in the wide meaning of the term.

The subject of Sahel institutions merits special attention. Parastatals doing agricultural development and extension have not lived up to expectations. They drain resources from the central government, have become government employment agencies which live perpetually from donor subsidies; their productivity and effectiveness are low. Donors have added to the institutional problems by creating parallel non-durable institutions in the rural sector which have a degree of autonomy but are also very weak in management and implementation. Meanwhile, the central government institutions have been deprived of needed support and are not in a position to carry out their programming, screening and budgeting functions. It was

noted in particular that intermediary institutions tend to absorb a substantial share of external aid which is diverted from its principal purpose which is to help farmers. While participants stressed the complex socio-political nature of this problem, they felt that it could be addressed in the Club framework when the opportunity arises and that it should also be identified as an area for study on future trends and directions.

Another suggestion for study is in the area of "neglected" research. This might mean stimulating more agricultural, and particularly rainfed, agriculture research in the Sahel, or identifying and marshalling support for research in donor countries for items of high priority to the Sahel, but which would not ordinarily be done in the developed countries without some sort of special stimulus. Such research might range from adapting semi-arid species to the Sahel to health prophylactics which are needed in the Sahel region.

### 3.3 The Club du Sahel as a forum for dialogue and coordination

#### 3.3.1 Dialogue

The participants agreed that in providing a forum for dialogue the Club du Sahel serves a very useful role. This implies the organisation, with CILSS, of meetings both on the regional and national levels where progress in certain strategic sectors and specific development policies can be discussed. In the past, regional seminars, colloquies and meetings have been organized by the CILSS/Club, where among others, the development of new lands, the constraints to the development of irrigated agriculture, the intensification of rainfed agriculture, the problems of deforestation and firewood, as well as the economics of food production (price policies, commercialization, storage) and the recurrent costs problems were discussed. National level meetings in several Sahel countries have been and are being organized with CILSS/Club

assistance in forestry, recurrent costs, and agricultural production. Participants agreed that such meetings should be pursued, because they deal with the problems and constraints of development on the level where those problems finally have to be tackled: the national level.

### 3.3.2 Coordination

There was a general consensus that there is much to be desired in the field of coordination. Particularly the effectiveness of aid, a subject that should be addressed on the national level, could be improved by better coordination and more dialogue on the same national level. National level meetings, as mentioned earlier, are deemed to be helpful in fostering coordination, but they are not frequent enough to advance coordination as much as is needed. In supporting national level coordination several international agencies could play a role on different levels (IBRD, IMF, UNDP, EEC).

Because the value of better national level coordination would be, in the opinion of the participants, very high, it was felt that something should be done about it. Several participants said that what they need is not more of the simplistic "auction sales" of projects or "pledging sessions" which really do not accomplish much by way of coordination, but a process of discussion with feedback and interchange among themselves and the national government on development problems and issues in key sectors as related to projects and programs being implemented under donor financing. They felt also that the Club/CILSS framework may have a clear comparative advantage in organizing a process of sectoral policy discussions at the national level under host country leadership. Reference was also made to the meetings on The Office of Niger, organized by or with the active involvement of the Club, which were considered a successful example of coordination on the project level. Such specific problem-oriented discussions among donors and individual beneficiary

states at the donor headquarters level should also be sponsored by the Club du Sahel and CILSS. The recent strengthening of the CILSS National Committee (CONACILSS), that might serve as a catalyst for improved coordination, was viewed by various delegates as a welcome development. The meeting totally rejected the idea of appointing a Club du Sahel donor agency to act as "leader" ("chef de file") on the national level as a counterpart to the CILSS National Correspondent, who animates the Secretariat of CONACILSS. However, without attaining a consensus, but with support from various donor agencies the idea was formulated that one donor agency might assume the role of local correspondent for the Club du Sahel to help the CILSS National Correspondent, i.e. to circulate information or to act as a point of contact to receive and disseminate information that the CILSS National Correspondent wished to circulate. It was clearly understood that, if CILSS decides to proceed, the selection of donor agencies to strengthen CILSS on the national level would be on a volunteer basis.

#### 4. The Club du Sahel and support for CILSS

Participants felt that the CILSS has the potential to be an important institution in the Sahel. On the positive side, the CILSS has a number of achievements to its credit, particularly in the field of joint study within the CILSS/Club du Sahel framework on such subjects as cereals policy, ecology/forestry and recurrent costs. On the negative side, participants felt that CILSS needs to be supported more strongly by its member states and that it needs to raise its own credibility. The authority of the CILSS, vis a vis its member states depends completely on what the member states want the CILSS to do and what they want to accept from it.

Perhaps the most important need is for the CILSS to have assigned to its Secretariat the highly competent technical and management Sahelian staff it requires. Some participants expressed serious concern about the management and financial problems encountered by the Executive Secretariat and the specialized institutions of the CILSS.

The CILSS has played an important role in mobilizing resources for its member countries. However, this role is most effectively played when it is done indirectly. CILSS serves its most useful function when it acts as a center for analysis and reflection on development problems and issues or when it provides a forum for discussion of such problems and issues. It should pursue this work in close collaboration with the Club du Sahel as in the past. Generally speaking, it is not the direct solicitation of funds which is helpful in mobilizing support, but increased assurance that these funds can be used effectively. When the CILSS provides necessary information, analysis and background which enables donors to better comprehend development problems and to formulate the appropriate response, it does mobilize support.

CILSS needs to increase its credibility on the national level. One way of doing so is assisting in the organization of national level discussions in key development sectors (agriculture, ecology/forestry, village hydraulics, etc.).

Coordination in the Sahel between donors and governments depends on governments. Donors perceive such coordination to be poor and this is troublesome, leading to waste or ineffective use of resources. CILSS should work to improve the

level of coordination wherever and however it can. The CILSS National Correspondent could play a role in an improved coordination system.

REFLECTION ON THE ROLE OF THE CLUB DU SAHEL

OECD - Paris, 19 May, 1983

AGENDA

1. Introduction by the Secretary-General of the OECD
2. Adoption of the Draft Agenda
3. Continuing the activities of the Club du Sahel on the Regional Level :
  - a) Introduction of the discussion :  
Mr. Robert Bailhache
  - b) General Discussion
4. Enlarging the activities on the Regional Level to meet the new situation :
  - a) Introduction of the discussion :  
Mr. Elliot Berg
  - b) General Discussion
5. Undertaking activities on the National Level
  - a) Introduction of the discussion :  
Mr. Rutherford Poats
  - b) General Discussion
6. Re-defining the contract between the Sahel countries and donors :
  - a) Introduction of the discussion :  
Mr. Berend Heringa
  - b) General Discussion
7. Conclusions

CLUB DU SAHEL  
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REFLECTION ON THE ROLE OF THE CLUB DU SAHEL

Preparatory note of the Secretariat  
for the informal meeting  
of May 19, 1983

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## INTRODUCTION

### I. THE ACTION OF THE CLUB DU SAHEL SINCE 1976

- 1.1 General characteristics of the Club's action
- 1.2 The Club's conceptual role
- 1.3 The Club's mobilising role

### II. SOME POSITIVE RESULTS, BUT THE SITUATION IN THE SAHEL IS STILL ALARMING

- 2.1 A better understanding of problems
- 2.2 The increase and re-orientation of external aid
- 2.3 A still alarming situation in the Sahel

### III. SUGGESTIONS FOR THE MEDIUM TERM

- 3.1 Activities to be pursued at the regional level
- 3.2 New activities to be undertaken at the regional level to cope with a new situation
- 3.3 Activities to be undertaken at the national level
- 3.4 Redefining of the contract between the Sahel States and the Cooperation Agencies

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## INTRODUCTION

In October 1983, the Club du Sahel will hold its Fifth Ministerial Conference at the Headquarters of the Commission of European Communities, in Brussels. The Club du Sahel groups, the eight CILSS member countries and most of the bilateral and multilateral cooperation agencies which support their development.

The Club will then have been in existence for seven years. This period of time is long enough to call for stock-taking and reflection on action to be undertaken in the medium term. The OECD Secretary General felt that it would be useful to invite, on May 19, 1983, a certain number of high ranking individuals from cooperation agencies to solicit their views on the role, the performance and the shortcomings of the Club's action and on the means for attaining more significant progress in the future.

The Sahel States have already felt the need for such a reflection on their joint action at the regional level. The Fifth CILSS Heads of States' Conference decided to create a Special Committee composed of Sahelian authorities to reflect on the future functions of the CILSS and its Secretariat.

Taking into account the reflections of the Sahelians on their own regional organisation and the reflections made on May 19, 1983, the CILSS/Club Secretariats would like to prepare a document for the Brussels Conference on the purposes of the Club and its action within a context which has changed considerably since 1976. In 1976 the Sahel countries were still living in the aftermath of a protracted drought period. Climatic conditions have improved somewhat since then, although they have not always been excellent everywhere. On the other hand, the Sahel today is under the influence of the general international situation which is much more critical than it was in 1976.

This note is intended to suggest some themes for reflection for the May 1983 meeting. It is organised in three sections:

- the first section reviews the basic principles of the Club's action and of its role since its creation; a distinction is made between the 'conceptual role' and the 'mobilising role' of the Club;
- the second section presents an analysis of the positive results of the Club's action in the Sahel, but it notes that the situation of the region remains disquieting;
- finally, in the third section, an attempt is made to formulate some proposals which might direct the Club's action in the coming years while adapting this action to the new conditions which are being experienced in the Sahel.

The questions raised in this note and the suggestions made do not, of course, deal with the subject in its entirety: what will be the role of the Club in the years to come? New ideas and suggestions will be welcome.

I. THE CLUB DU SAHEL'S ACTION SINCE 1976

1.1 The original characteristics of the Club's action

First, it may be worth recalling some of the original principles upon which the Club explicitly or implicitly based its action since its creation in 1976.

The first of these principles was that of a long-term program called a "contract for a generation" based on the joint action of the Sahelians and the international community, action which is necessary for the Sahel to make the desired future progress. It was understood from the start that by participating in the Club du Sahel, cooperation agencies became morally committed to increasing the volume of their assistance, to ensuring its continuity, and to improving its modalities. It was similarly understood that the Sahel States would be morally committed to improving their economic and social policies so that national and foreign investments could be more effective. In all their activities, the Club and CILSS Secretariats have worked according to the principles of contract and joint action which involve responsibilities for each partner.

The second principle was a search for more coherence between the theory and the practice of development. When, in 1977, in Ottawa, the Sahel countries and cooperation agencies adopted a social and economic development strategy whose main objective was to ensure regional food self-sufficiency within an improved ecological environment by the year 2,000, the CILSS/Club Secretariats concluded then that their task would be to show the importance of closer links between the objectives of the strategy, national plans, policies of the States and cooperation agencies, and development projects and programmes.

The third principle is centered on dialogue and discussion among the Sahel States on the one hand, and between these states and cooperation agencies on the other. Without a continuous dialogue it is difficult to understand each other and without discussions, activities undertaken by the various partners may clash rather than converge.

The fourth principle involves the flexibility of the Club Secretariat and its capacity for adaptation in its relations and joint activities with its partner, the CILSS Secretariat. The Club staff has been kept small and its main task has been to back up the action of the CILSS in a framework of close cooperation and consensus.

The Club du Sahel has thus become a permanent consultative group which is unique in its kind but whose characteristics could be adapted to situations other than those of the Sahel countries.

These general principles having been recalled, let us turn to the Club's role since 1976. The activities undertaken can roughly be classified in two categories: the conceptual role and the mobilising role of the Club.

## 1.2 The conceptual role of the Club

After the drought, the Sahel States and the cooperation agencies understood that this climatic accident brought into focus the weaknesses of development in the Sahel. It was urgent to provide the Sahel with the means to cope with future droughts since they would be more dangerous, taking into account the increasing population and its growing pressure on available resources. It was urgent to reflect on the basic problems raised by development in the Sahel and to propose new guidelines for the joint action of the Sahelians and the cooperation agencies. The first action of the Club was to deal with these conceptual issues.

### - Development strategy and drought control

When the Club was created, its members asked for a development and a drought control strategy to be worked out in order to be used as a framework for the complementary efforts of the Sahelians and their partners from the international community.

The strategy was drafted by a working group composed of Sahelian and non-Sahelian experts who collaborated harmoniously. Whereas so many studies are prepared from the outside by expatriate experts and then imported, the strategy was the result of partnership, and it benefitted from the close participation of the principal beneficiaries, the Sahelians themselves.

The partial, but priority objective of regional food self-sufficiency was chosen as the centerpiece of the strategy objective to be achieved by the end of the century. It was also acknowledged that the ecological balance objective was inseparable from food self-sufficiency. The strategy was adopted by all the club partners, at the Ottawa Conference in 1977.

Because of the objectives selected, the scope of the strategy was, of course, limited. But it has proved to be useful to orient the activities of the various partners. Moreover, it has continually been enriched with works carried out by both Secretariats. A revised strategy was presented and adopted at the Kuwait Conference in 1980.

### - The economics of food production

The method adopted for the elaboration of the strategy showed that the environment in which development projects were to be carried out was as important, if not more, than projects themselves. As a result, both Secretariats decided to work on the measures accompanying projects and more specifically on the economics of food production.

Their first common action was to assemble Sahelian and non-Sahelian experts to meet in Nouakchott in 1979 to discuss the questions together. The Nouakchott Symposium showed that a consistent policy of prices, marketing and storage and an

adequate articulation of this policy with food aid was, among other conditions, a condition for the success of activities undertaken for the development of food production in the Sahel. Guidelines for a new policy were proposed. After Nouakchott, a flexible and permanent structure proved necessary to pursue the studies on the economics of food production. The CILSS/Club Secretariats created a restricted committee which meets about twice a year or more if necessary to exchange views and to decide on joint activities. The Committee has carried out innovative analyses and made recommendations on food aid and cereals storage; it has started work on the harmonisation of regional trade in cereals. Proposals for reforms have been made to the Sahel States and to cooperation agencies to improve the consistency of their activities and to overcome at least some of the constraints blocking the development of food production.

- Food strategies

One of the best means to ensure consistency is to group action programmes and accompanying measures in a food strategy which is specific to the needs of each country. At the suggestion of the World Food Council, the CILSS/Club Secretariats organised conceptual and organisational support for those Sahel countries which wished to elaborate a food strategy.

Among the Sahel countries, Mali, Mauritania, the Gambia and Cape Verde Islands elaborated food strategies with the assistance of various cooperation agencies.

- Seminars and colloquies

The implementation of the strategy for drought control and development involves many other activities than those which are related to the economics of food production. Various issues have been discussed in seminars, colloquies and meetings, i.e. the intensification of rain-fed farming (1981), the development of new lands (1978), the constraints to the development of irrigated farming (1980), the problems of deforestation and firewood, etc.

- Recurrent costs

The CILSS/Club have been concerned with the recurrent costs occasioned by an increasing number of projects financed by external assistance and by the means with which the Sahel States would meet these expenses. Specifically, it was becoming obvious that because of political reasons, scarce public resources in the Sahel and the unsatisfactory management of these resources, a growing share of international assistance was being devoted to the functioning of administrations rather than to the expansion of the productive economic base. It had also been observed that the Sahel States tended to propose new projects without taking into account the costs involved in maintaining these projects and that cooperation agencies often accepted these new projects while avoiding taking responsibility for the maintenance of previously financed projects. As a result, costly equipment was steadily being degraded since the

governments did not have the resources necessary for their maintenance, and massive disinvestment was occurring with damaging consequences for some sectors, for instance in irrigated perimeters. The CILSS/Club du Sahel published a report on the assessment of recurrent costs and the ways to solve the problems posed. They organised a seminar to discuss the issue in Ouagadougou in January 1982. The seminar showed that there were many possibilities at the micro and macro economic levels to better control recurrent costs, but it also showed that the implementation of such new modalities was subordinated to reforms of policies in the Sahel states and in aid policy.

### 1.3 The mobilising role of the Club

The Club Secretariat did not limit its activities to a conceptual role alone.

Mobilising an increasing volume of resources for the Sahel was one of the objectives assigned to the Club since its creation. This objective was supported by the conceptual effort made by the Club du Sahel, which helped in giving each agency the impression that its activities, if well oriented, could be supplemented by the efforts of other assistance sources and by the Sahelian's own efforts.

But other more specific activities were undertaken by the Club to this end. They are briefly reviewed below.

#### The first generation programme

To mobilize foreign assistance, CILSS member states had, as early as 1973, set up a programme of projects entitled the "Ouagadougou Compendium". After the first Club du Sahel Conference, they revised and completed the document which became the "First Generation Programme", considered as a first step towards the implementation of the strategy. The first generation programme was imperfect but it played a mobilising role during the first years following the drought. Aid agencies had considerable funds available and they financed a great number of projects included in the first generation programme under the various sectors of the strategy.

#### Sector analyses

It was decided to undertake sector analyses in each CILSS member country to improve the focus of the strategy, to assess the progress made in various sectors, to identify constraints which had been met and overcome, and to encourage assistance sources to channel more of their contributions to priority sectors of the strategy. Such analyses have already been carried out in the field of rain-fed farming, irrigated farming, ecology-reforestation, continental fishing and village hydraulics.

By analysing the constraints to the success of projects and by suggesting a number of new projects and policy measures which could improve their chances of success, these sector analyses have had or may have a mobilising effect (many are fairly new ones). At the same time they have contributed to furthering an understanding of the Sahel.

An effort in public relations

Finally a word should be said about the public relations effort carried out by the Club du Sahel to inform public opinion on the situation in the Sahel, to persuade cooperation agencies already committed to the Sahel, to continue their effort to get other agencies interested in Sahel countries, etc.

II. POSITIVE RESULTS, BUT THE SITUATION IN THE SAHEL IS STILL ALARMING

2.1 A better understanding of problems

The first effect of the Club's activities was to better understand the nature of the problems in Sahel countries and the need for better adapted policies to solve them. Everyone understands today that, to achieve real progress in the development of these countries and to fulfill the objectives of the strategy, it will be necessary to adopt a much more global and coherent policy and to give as much importance to qualitative as to quantitative factors in national and foreign efforts. It is well understood now that national policies and programmes should take more account of constraints in terms of space and time: limited areas on which an increasing number of people have to live, complementarity between national areas, continuity in the efforts required to move from traditional systems of production to more productive ones.

The second positive effect was to provide the Sahel States and the cooperation agencies with a forum for dialogue, open and free, and relatively unconstrained by the pressures which weigh on national policies and cooperation policies. Essential problems and sensitive issues are dealt with in a free and frank atmosphere so much so that the Club has often been characterised as a place where a positive dialogue between North and South is being practised at a human scale. To facilitate this dialogue the CILSS Secretariat has played a very positive role: it has proposed themes for reflection, contributed to tasks jointly defined between its officials and the Club officials, and has played a mediating role between the Club and Member States. It has disseminated ideas and proposals elaborated during joint meetings extensively. The Club on its side, has received strong support from its participants. Since 1976, real progress has been made in understanding the problems of the Sahel and in formulating appropriate development policies.

2.2 Development and re-orientation of assistance

The following table retraces the evolution of O.A.D. commitments to Sahel countries since 1975.

in \$ Millions

| 1975  | 1976    | 1977    | 1978    | 1979    | 1980  | 1981  |
|-------|---------|---------|---------|---------|-------|-------|
| 816,9 | 1.135,8 | 1.002,2 | 1.378,3 | 1.622,6 | 1.502 | 1.972 |

In current dollar amounts the aid commitments nearly doubled between 1974-75 and between 1981-82. Taking account of currency erosion aid commitments increased by around 30% and the Sahel countries receive now close to 40 \$ per inhabitant per annum as compared with 20 \$ for the rest of Africa and 12 \$ for the underdeveloped world as a whole.

The effort in reflection, in the formulation of policies and in programming joined to the effort in public relations made by the Club Secretariat no doubt played a role in this increase of aid provided by the International Community to Sahel countries. The re-orientation of the distribution of this aid between the various sectors of the strategy is certainly as important as trends in the volume of assistance.

An analysis of aid allocation among the sectors of activity directly concerned in drought control strategy between 1975 and 1980, brings out the following results:

|  |        |   |
|--|--------|---|
| - intensification rain-fed food production | 3 to 4 | % |
| - development of irrigated farming         | 9.5    | % |
| - development of livestock                 | 5      | % |
| - development of fisheries                 | 1.5    | % |
| - reforestation                            | 1.4    | % |
|  | <hr/>  |   |
| Percent of total aid assistance            | 21.4   | % |
|  | <hr/>  |   |

The share of the assistance allocated to those sectors of activity of vital importance to the Sahel may seem modest - the question will be discussed further - but it should be noted that there has been a marked re-orientation of aid to the benefit of the priority sectors of the strategy.

- during the decade of the 60's almost all of the aid allocated to rainfed farming was devoted to cash crops - an important share is now devoted to food crop production;
- aid to reforestation was practically nil in 1975; from 1975 to 1980 the Club contributed to the growing awareness to this problem and to its importance. As a result, aid commitments were multiplied by 15.

### 2.3 A still alarming situation in the Sahel

In spite of the positive results achieved by the Club and its partners, the situation of the Sahel countries is still a cause for major concern.

In spite of data uncertainties, all indicators tend to indicate that the Sahel has not yet moved towards regional food self-sufficiency. It may even have regressed: food aid and cereals imports have increased as well as imports of milk products. The population is still malnourished: their meat and fish rations are declining, etc.

The sector analyses carried out by the Club and the CILSS show that the climatic factor is not the principal cause of the deterioration but rather the present situation is largely

due to the fact that farming and pastoral production systems have not become more intensive. Although there are a few favourable signs of intensification, the traditional systems have practically not been changed.

The major problems of the Sahel, identified in 1976, are almost unchanged in 1983. To these problems must be added other difficulties which were not so acute in 1976.

The Sahel was seriously affected by the second oil shock in 1978. The recent, perhaps only provisional, decline in oil prices has not improved the situation of those Sahel countries which are the larger importers of oil and oil by-products. Food imports have also increased. In some Sahel countries the burden of food imports is now heavier than that of oil imports. Conversely, exports have hardly increased, they have even stagnated or decreased both in volume and in price. Trade balances register an increasing deficit which is not made up for by international aid and Sahel countries' foreign debts have increased considerably.

Studies carried out on recurrent costs show that the internal situation of most Sahel countries is poor. Administrations in the Sahel are steadily increasing and they face serious difficulties in meeting their operating costs, not to mention new investments for the renewal of public equipment. A large share of international assistance is now being allocated to functioning of administrations as well as para-statal institutions.

The Sahel States are confronted with an internal and external financial crisis.

Not only have the Sahel countries failed to develop their system of production while the population is growing steadily, but the region now finds itself in an unfavourable international environment which makes it even more difficult to find a solution to internal problems. The situation is now probably more alarming than it ever was. What can the International Community do to help overcome these problems and what can the Club do?

### III. PROPOSALS FOR THE MEDIUM TERM

The proposals below follow from the analysis of the situation of the Sahel made by the Secretariat. As noted in the introduction, they obviously do not exhaust the subject and are mainly formulated to guide the discussion.

#### 3.1 Proposals for the medium term

With the critical situation the Sahel is going through, it would be advisable for Sahel States to reinforce regional cooperation. It will be quite interesting in this respect to know more about recommendations of the CILSS 'Reflection Committee' on the future role of this organisation and its Secretariat.

Whatever those recommendations may be, the joint work carried out by both Secretariats (Club and CILSS) during the last years have been helpful in bringing out some lessons. The first one is that it is as important, or even more important to improve the context of programmes and projects than the programmes and projects themselves. It may be more important to improve programming methods than to seek additional financing.

In the light of these observations, it seems necessary to carry on the action undertaken in cooperation with CILSS and particularly to pursue what has been called the Club's conceptual role.

There is still much to do in this field. What activities should be priority ones in the coming years? The following themes may be suggested:

- pursuing work on the economics of food production and regional harmonisation of cereals policies,
- elaboration of a realistic regional plan for food security,
- deforestation and land erosion control and economics of forestry production; in particular, how could activities in reforestation and fuelwood saving be made more efficient?
- livestock policy and the economics of livestock; this is a sector where the main principles of action are not well defined
- the farmer's role in his own development,
- management of programmes and projects, and particularly financial management and accounting for funds in development projects.

This list is not comprehensive. Can participants make any suggestions? How could they pool their efforts to better support the activities of general interest carried out by the Club and CILSS Secretariats?

### 3.2 Extending the action carried out at the regional level so as to meet a new situation

In 1976, shortly after the great drought, it seemed advisable to define priority objectives in food self-sufficiency and in ecological balance and to focus the Club activities on themes related to these objectives. Experience has proven that it is necessary to go beyond this limited framework and to tackle more general issues of economic policy notably when studying the economics of food production and recurrent costs.

The deterioration of the international environment and the critical situation in the Sahel leads to the question of whether it is possible today to be solely concerned with ecology and food problems.

Is it not necessary now to work within a comprehensive framework giving more importance to macro-economic aspects, to problems of organisation and management, to the place of the Sahel in the overall African framework and in the world?

In the absence of such a comprehensive framework - and an agreement on its orientations, actions tend to be piece-meal and short term, to deal with emergencies and it is very difficult to assess the long term consequences of the actions which are taken. The structural adjustment programmes of the World Bank and IMF represent an initial effort to make up for these shortcomings but they are inscribed within a short term or at best a medium term framework. Would it not be advisable to undertake a prospective reflection on the future of the Sahel? Would it be useful to have a macro-economic framework which would help orient long-term efforts and re-focus the drought control strategy within a larger context? The need for such a framework seems to be a real one, to improve the efficiency of policies and it would probably be useful to devote as much conceptual effort to building such a framework as was devoted to the drought control strategy.

### 3.3 Undertaking activities at the national level

Since 1976, CILSS and Club activities have not been aimed at the national level of each of the CILSS member countries, as opposed to the regional level. But, all analyses carried out clearly show that if the results of the CILSS/Club conceptual work are to have an influence on development plans and national policies, an action at the level of each state is necessary.

The principle of an action at the national level, the principle of a policy dialogue among donors at this level still raises some problems with the Sahel governments, but circumstances are changing. Evidence of these changes was provided when the Niger government invited cooperation agencies to take part in a seminar on the structures of intervention in the rural sector (1), when donors organised a joint effort around the OFNACER in Upper Volta (2), when the Senegal government decided to discuss a five year forestry development plan with

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(1) Zinder, November 15.22, 1982

(2) Ouagadougou, October 29, 1982, February 11, 1983

the principal donors (3), at the round table in Mali when there was an opportunity for dialogue on the food strategy (4), in Senegal during the meeting organised by the government on the structural adjustment plan (5), etc.

In the future, the CILSS/Club Secretariats' objective at the national level could be to demonstrate that a dialogue among cooperation agencies under the auspices of the country concerned is not a threat to national sovereignty, but constitute an absolute necessity for efficient joint Sahelian-donors' action.

In this field a progressive demonstration through example will be more convincing than a discussion on principles. Therefore, the CILSS/Club Secretariats have proposed to initiate this dialogue at the national level by organising in each state:

- a meeting on agricultural and food production and the food strategy with the participation of cooperation agencies,
- a meeting on agricultural and food production and the food strategy with the participation of cooperation agencies,
- a meeting on ecology-reforestation,
- a workshop on recurrent costs,
- a workshop on village and pastoral hydraulics
- a workshop on fisheries and fishing
- a cooperative effort between donor agencies for the reconstruction and the development of Chad.

These activities will only be meaningful if they are strongly supported by aid agencies and if these agencies participate actively in the concertation. They will gradually acquire more meaning if habits are created and if the dialogue is gradually extended to all economic sectors - or at least to those sectors included in the drought control strategy.

It is worth pointing out that this does not mean tying each individual donor to a constraining set of actions, but rather creating the minimum synergy for each aid source to have maximum efficiency in its own interventions.

These activities will also be more effective if there is a follow-up to the work undertaken in the framework of organised concertations. The CILSS/Club Secretariats need to be supported at the national level. Up to now the CILSS National Committee has not been very active. It is planned to give it more impetus and to assign more precise tasks to the CILSS National Correspondent. The CILSS cell in each country could be backed up (not only financially) by a representative of a cooperation agency delegated by all the others to this end.

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(3) Dakar, June 2.5, 1982

(4) Bamako, December 13, 1982

(5) Paris, October 19-21, 1981

This 'Club Correspondent' at the national level would not be a coordinator but a resource person around whom, if need be, the dialogue of assistance sources and the follow-up of dialogue requested by the government could be organised.

Are donor agencies prepared to follow the proposals of the Club in this field and to support them effectively?

A policy dialogue at the national level appears all the more necessary in the light of some new ideas which are presently being discussed: in particular the idea of a more contractual aid framework. Launched in 1976, during the constitutive meeting of the Club du Sahel, the idea of a contract has remained largely an informal one since then. It is now making steady progress. The recent publication of the "Community Memorandum" on future European assistance to the Third World illustrates this progress. Other aid sources are negotiating or are interested in "contracts" in various forms.

There is of course a serious risk for these various contracts to proliferate and they may also prove incompatible with each other. Under such circumstances a real and not simply a formal dialogue between aid sources become all the more necessary. What can the Club do to promote this real dialogue?

#### 3.4 Re-defining the contract between the Sahel States and aid sources

If it is admitted that a trend towards a more contractual and more concerted assistance is advisable, there should be at the same time a minimum agreement on the content of the contract. In this respect, recent trends are not very encouraging.

##### The allocation of aid

It has already been stated that there was a re-orientation of aid to the benefit of priority objectives of the strategy, but that the scope of such an orientation was still very modest. A large portion of aid is devoted to running administrations and Sahel institutions. This may be indispensable for the survival of the Sahel in the medium term. But, a substantial share of aid is also devoted to strategy projects, which are directly productive and generate considerable recurrent costs such as, infrastructure projects. A meager portion of assistance is allocated to the restructuring of the farming system and to the strengthening of the productive base which is a prerequisite if the Sahel is to make some future progress.

Further, it is rather disconcerting to note that the conceptual effort which has been made to define a strategy and reach an agreement on its orientation, has not yet resulted in a significant re-orientation of the joint efforts of Sahelians and the international community. One is aware, of course, of the inertia and of the many constraints which hinder the Sahel governments and the donors, and of the problems which block changes in the allocation of aid. But can one seriously hope that the Sahel will make substantial progress towards increasing food production - or will even stop regressing - if only 3% of

of aid flows are allocated to rain-fed agriculture which supply 95% of cereals produced in the Sahel?

Given the international environment, it is unrealistic to rely on a substantial increase of assistance in the short and medium terms. Is not this yet another reason for allocating this assistance to activities which are really a priority in the area? Is it not necessary to think about increasing its effectiveness?

#### Effectiveness of aid

The conception and design of development projects in each sector are as important as the volume and the distribution of assistance.

Sector analyses have made it possible to make a critical, clear and constructive analysis of the trends and problems in each sector considered. Such analyses had seldom been carried out by the governments or by the cooperation agencies, which are heavily burdened by the management and the implementation of projects. They have helped to better understand the consequences of projects on sectoral development and on the economy of each state. They have also contributed to an awareness of the similarity of problems. For instance, analyses on irrigated farming have shown that in spite of considerable efforts made by the Sahel States and donors in the last years, the financing of new perimeters (around 5,000 H. per year) has been roughly equal to the surface area of facilities which became degraded due to unsolved technical, economic, management and human difficulties. Analyses on rain-fed farming have proved that intensification has hardly started yet in Sahel countries in spite of seed projects, productivity projects, input projects, farming equipment, etc.

The analyses help explain the reason why progress is so slow in the strategy priority sectors. While acknowledging the responsibility of the Sahel States, they show that cooperation agencies carry much responsibility: the conception of projects is defective, the time frames adopted are unrealistic, equipment supplied - for instance in the case of village hydraulics - is too diversified for maintenance and spare parts service to be satisfactorily carried out, efforts are poorly organised, cooperation agencies do not have the instruments which might have enabled them to finance the accompanying measures necessary to support national reforms necessary for the success of projects, training provided is not well adapted. All these inconsistencies become harder to explain since the experience acquired could help correct them.

#### Supporting policies

The considerable efforts made by CILSS and the Club on the economics of food production and on policies have not yet yielded all the results expected in spite of the support provided by various cooperation agencies. The cooperation with the Sahel States has not yet been fundamentally revised: there are still many traditional projects and programmes or limited operations whose success is doubtful for want of adequate

policies from the Sahel States. There are some reasons to explain this situation: restrictions imposed by the sovereignty of states, problems requiring emergency solutions, inertia in administrations, etc. Some cooperation agencies have tried to negotiate with the Sahel governments on the implementation of appropriate policies along with the implementation of projects, but aid donors have not acted in concert very often, and they do not necessarily hold the same views on which policies are needed. This is a serious problem for the future: all donors are now convinced of the need for appropriate policies, as are the Sahel governments. But without a minimum of consensus among cooperation agencies on the policies to be proposed, Sahelians might have difficulty in meeting conflicting demands.

The sectoral distribution of assistance, the conception of projects, and the accompanying policies are three closely linked factors which account at least in part for the poor results achieved up to now in spite of the efforts which have been made. What can be done to change this situation and to improve the content of future contracts between the Sahel States and donor agencies?

It would perhaps be advisable to tackle limited problems first.

The elaboration of a prospective economic framework could provide an opportunity for a dialogue on the content of contracts. This could also be done in the framework of the elaboration and the implementation of food strategies in Sahel countries. The European Economic Commission has already committed itself to supporting reforms proposed by some states which have decided to adopt the food strategy. Would other cooperation agencies support this proposal? Can the Club and CILSS Secretariats contribute to providing it with an operational content? Can they contribute to ensuring improved action in concert between the states wishing to elaborate a food strategy and cooperation agencies which are prepared to help them carry them out? Can both secretariats contribute towards a better adjustment between food strategies and overall aid policies?

CLUB DU SAHEL  
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REFLEXION SUR LE ROLE DU CLUB DU SAHEL


Reunion Officieuse 19 Mai 1983

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ANNEXE STATISTIQUE  
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**TOTAL DISBURSEMENTS AND COMMITMENTS OF PUBLIC  
AID FOR DEVELOPMENT IN THE SAHEL 1974-1981**  
**ENGAGEMENTS ET VERSEMENTS D'AIDE PUBLIQUE AU DEVELOPPEMENT  
POUR L'ENSEMBLE DES PAYS SAHELIENS ENTRE 1974-1981**

\$ Million / Millions de dollars courants



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**TABEAU N° 1: EVOLUTION GENERALE DES VERSEMENTS NETS D'AIDE PUBLIQUE AU DEVELOPPEMENT**  
1971 - 1981

(en millions \$ U.S. Courants)

|                                 | 1971   | 1974    | 1975    | 1976    | 1977    | 1978    | 1979    | 1980    | 1981    | Taux de Croissance<br>annuel moyen 1971-81 |
|---------------------------------|--------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|--|
| Iles du Cap Vert                | -      | -       | 8,8     | 24,8    | 24,9    | 33,2    | 34,3    | 64,4    | 50,3    |  |
| Tchad                           | 30,6   | 78,8    | 65,1    | 62,3    | 83,1    | 119,0   | 79,8    | 35,3    | 59,7    |  |
| Gambie                          | 3,7    | 10,4    | 8,1     | 12,0    | 21,6    | 35,2    | 33,8    | 54,4    | 58,3    |  |
| Mali                            | 30,2   | 117,5   | 144,6   | 89,0    | 112,6   | 161,5   | 192,4   | 252,1   | 229,5   |  |
| Mauritanie                      | 12,2   | 88,4    | 61,5    | 180,2   | 164,9   | 216,8   | 163,7   | 159,3   | 187,2   |  |
| Niger                           | 38,0   | 137,0   | 140,8   | 129,6   | 96,2    | 154,1   | 173,6   | 170,2   | 201,1   |  |
| Senegal                         | 53,1   | 138,7   | 132,7   | 126,8   | 121,9   | 225,9   | 307,3   | 263,0   | 400,4   |  |
| Hte.Volta                       | 28,7   | 96,6    | 88,9    | 84,1    | 110,4   | 159,4   | 198,3   | 212,3   | 216,9   |  |
| <b>TOTAL SAHEL</b>              | 196,5  | 667,4   | 650,5   | 708,8   | 735,6   | 1105,1  | 1183,2  | 1211,0  | 1403,4  | 21,6 %                                     |
| Afrique Sud Sahara (hors Sahel) | 1248,5 | 2068,8  | 3037,4  | 3001,4  | 3426,1  | 4373,7  | 5533,1  | 6797,6  | 6598,4  | 20,1 %                                     |
| Asie                            | 3620,5 | 6674,8  | 7886,4  | 8055,6  | 7222,0  | 8515,8  | 11009,8 | 12949,9 | 11639,1 | 13,7 %                                     |
| Total Pays en Devopt.           | 7612,1 | 14057,2 | 19307,9 | 18537,9 | 20193,5 | 26025,4 | 29109,9 | 34109,4 | 33120,4 | 17,3 %                                     |

**TABLEAU N° 2: Comparaisons internationales des versements nets d'aide publique au développement per capita**

(en \$ U.S. Courants Par Habitant)

|                                 | 1975 | 1979 | 1980 | 1981 |
|---------------------------------|------|------|------|------|
| Pays du Sahel                   | 23   | 40   | 39   | 44   |
| Afrique Sud Sahara (hors Sahel) | 10   | 17   | 21   | 20   |
| Asie                            | 6    | 9    | 10   | 9    |
| Egypte                          | 67   | 38   | 35   | 32   |

**TABLEAU N° 3: Place de l'aide dans l'économie du Sahel**

(en \$ U.S. Courants et %)

|  | PNB par habitant en 1980 | Aide par habitant en 1980 | Aide/PNB |
|--|--------------------------|---------------------------|----------|
| Cap Vert                                   | 200                      | 161                       | 80%      |
| Gambie                                     | 250                      | 90                        | 36%      |
| Haute Volta                                | 160                      | 35                        | 21%      |
| Mali                                       | 201                      | 36                        | 18%      |
| Mauritanie                                 | 326                      | 106                       | 32%      |
| Niger                                      | 356                      | 32                        | 9%       |
| Senegal                                    | 465                      | 46                        | 10%      |
| Tchad                                      | 111                      | 8                         | 7%       |
| Ensemble du Sahel                          | 262                      | 39                        | 15%      |
| Ensemble des Pays les moins avancés (1979) |                          |                           | 9,7%     |

**TABEAU 4: Aide publique au développement et dette  
extérieure des pays du sahel en 1980**

(en millions \$ U.S.)

|                | Dette Extérieure<br>Totale<br>1980 | Dette Extérieure<br>Provenant de l'Aide<br>Publique au Développement<br>1980 |
|----------------|------------------------------------|--|
| GAMBIE         | 120                                | 86   |
| HAUTE VOLTA    | 302                                | 234  |
| MALI           | 636                                | 573  |
| MAURITANIE     | 731                                | 486  |
| NIGER          | 635                                | 215  |
| SENEGAL        | 960                                | 382  |
| TCHAD          | 161                                | 120  |
| ENSEMBLE SAHEL | 3545                               | 2096   |

**TABEAU 5: Service de la Dette Extérieure Des Pays Sahéliens (1980)**

(en millions \$ U.S.)

|             | Service de la Dette<br>Extérieure per capita<br>(1) | PNB per Capita<br>(2) | Dette/PNB<br>(en %)<br>(1) / (2) |
|-------------|---|-----------------------|----------------------------------|
| GAMBIE      | 2,3   | 250                   | 0,9 %                            |
| HAUTE-VOLTA | 2,8   | 190                   | 1,5 %                            |
| MALI        | 2,5   | 190                   | 1,3 %                            |
| MAURITANIE  | 25  | 320                   | 7,8 %                            |
| NIGER       | 17  | 330                   | 5,1 %                            |
| SENEGAL     | 31  | 450                   | 6,9 %                            |
| TCHAD       | 2,7   | 120                   | 2,2 %                            |
| BRESIL      | 116   | 2050                  | 5,6 %                            |
| MEXIQUE     | 137   | 2130                  | 6,4 %                            |

**TABLEAU 6: Aide publique au développement et ressources budgétaires des états sahéliens**

**Ressources budgétaires et aide hors projet**

(en millions de dollars courants)

|                    |        | Ressources budgétaires<br>consacrées au fonctionnement | Aide Publique<br>hors projet |
|--------------------|--------|--|------------------------------|
| <u>NIGER</u>       | . 1975 | 66,8   | 72,7                         |
|                    | . 1980 | 379  | 56                           |
| <u>SENEGAL</u>     | . 1975 | 257  | 81,7                         |
|                    | . 1980 | 502  | 167                          |
| <u>HAUTE-VOLTA</u> | . 1975 | 64,3   | 40                           |
|                    | . 1980 | 166  | 85                           |
| <u>MALI</u>        | . 1975 | 68,8   | 58,3                         |
|                    | . 1980 | 161  | 71                           |

**Ressources budgétaires et aide aux projets**

(en millions de dollars courants)

|                    |        | Ress. budgétaires<br>consacrées à<br>l'investissement | Aide publique au<br>développement<br>dans le cadre de<br>projets |
|--------------------|--------|---|--|
| <u>NIGER</u>       | . 1975 | 10,8  | 48,4   |
|                    | . 1980 | 123   | 153  |
| <u>SENEGAL</u>     | . 1975 | 72,4  | 73,6   |
|                    | . 1980 | 113   | 120  |
| <u>HAUTE-VOLTA</u> | . 1975 | 6,07  | 73,7   |
|                    | . 1980 | 24  | 165  |
| <u>MALI</u>        | . 1975 | 4,9   | 105  |
|                    | . 1980 | 4,7   | 137  |

**TABLEAU N° 7 : REPARTITION SECTORIELLE DES ENGAGEMENTS D'AIDE  
PUBLIQUE AU DEVELOPPEMENT ENTRE 1975 et 1981**

|   | <u>en % de<br/>l'aide totale (*)</u> | <u>Taux de croissance<br/>comparée à<br/>l'aide totale</u> |
|---|--------------------------------------|--|
| <b><u>AIDE HORS PROJETS :</u></b>   |                                      |  |
| . Assistance technique, recherche, bourses .....  | 14,3                                 | ↗  |
| . Aide alimentaire, aide d'urgence  | 10,3                                 | ↘  |
| . Aide au fonctionnement (dont soutien à la balance des paiements, soutiens budgétaires...) | 11,5                                 | ↗  |
| <b><u>AIDE DANS LE CADRE DE PROJETS :</u></b>   |                                      |  |
| . Cultures pluviales (**)   | 9                                    | ↗  |
| . Cultures irriguées  | 7                                    | ↗  |
| . Grands bassins fluviaux (OMVS,OMVG)   | 6                                    | ↗  |
| . Elevage   | 2,5                                  | ↘  |
| . Pêche   | 1,3                                  | ↘  |
| . Reforestation   | 1,6                                  | ↗  |
| . Mines   | 3                                    | ↘  |
| . Approvisionnement en eau (rural et urbain)  | 3,3                                  | ↘  |
| . Infrastructures (transports, télécommunications, développement urbain)                    | 19                                   | ↗  |
| . Education, formation  | 6                                    | ↗  |
| . Santé   | 2,7                                  | ↗  |
| . Industrie et tourisme   | 2,2                                  | ↗  |

(\*) Moyenne des engagements 1975-1981.

(\*\*) On estime que moins de la moitié des engagements d'ADP vont aux cultures vivrières, soit environ 3,5 à 4,5%.

**TABLEAU 8**  
**QUI FINANCE QUOI ?**

(Total engagements 1975-1981)

| <u>SOUTIEN AUX BALANCES DES PAIEMENTS</u> |                          |             | <u>SOUTIENS BUDGETAIRES</u>   |                          |             | <u>AIDE ALIMENTAIRE &amp; AIDE D'URGENCE</u> |                          |             |
|---|--------------------------|-------------|-------------------------------|--------------------------|-------------|--|--------------------------|-------------|
|   | <u>en millions \$ US</u> | <u>en %</u> |                               | <u>en millions \$ US</u> | <u>en %</u> |  | <u>en millions \$ US</u> | <u>en %</u> |
| OPEP                                      | 244                      | 41          | France                        | 214                      | 44          | Etats-Unis                                   | 272                      | 28          |
| FED                                       | 235                      | 39          | OPEP                          | 208                      | 43          | FED  | 204                      | 21          |
| Allemagne                                 | 52                       | 9           | IDA                           | 30                       | 6           | OPEP   | 131                      | 13          |
|   |                          |             |                               |                          |             | Allemagne                                    | 82                       | 8           |
|   |                          |             |                               |                          |             | ONU  | 82                       | 8           |
| <u>ASSISTANCE TECHNIQUE</u>               |                          |             | <u>RECHERCHE FONDAMENTALE</u> |                          |             | <u>DEVELOPPEMENT RURAL MULTI-SECTORIEL</u>   |                          |             |
|   | <u>en millions \$ US</u> | <u>en %</u> |                               | <u>en millions \$ US</u> | <u>en %</u> |  | <u>en millions \$ US</u> | <u>en %</u> |
| France                                    | 667                      | 63          | France                        | 129                      | 88          | OPEP   | 274                      | 28          |
| Etats-Unis                                | 72                       | 7           | Allemagne                     | 6                        | 4           | Allemagne                                    | 115                      | 12          |
| ONU                                       | 37                       | 3           |                               |                          |             | FED  | 105                      | 11          |
| OPEP                                      | 37                       | 3           |                               |                          |             | IDA  | 88                       | 9           |
|   |                          |             |                               |                          |             | France                                       | 83                       | 9           |
|   |                          |             |                               |                          |             | Etats-Unis                                   | 78                       | 8           |
| <u>CULTURES PLUVIALES ET DIVERS</u>       |                          |             | <u>PECHES</u>                 |                          |             | <u>CULTURES IRRIGUEES</u>                    |                          |             |
|   | <u>en millions \$ US</u> | <u>en %</u> |                               | <u>en millions \$ US</u> | <u>en %</u> |  | <u>en millions \$ US</u> | <u>en %</u> |
| Etats-Unis                                | 104                      | 18          | OPEP                          | 41                       | 32          | IDA  | 121                      | 22          |
| France                                    | 88                       | 15          | Canada                        | 26                       | 20          | France                                       | 95                       | 17          |
| FED                                       | 76                       | 13          | Japon                         | 17                       | 13          | OPEP   | 74                       | 14          |
| ONU                                       | 73                       | 12          |                               |                          |             | FED  | 68                       | 12          |
| Allemagne                                 | 51                       | 9           |                               |                          |             |  |                          |             |
| <u>ELEVAGE</u>                            |                          |             | <u>ECOLOGIE-FORETS</u>        |                          |             | <u>MINES</u>                                 |                          |             |
|   | <u>en millions \$ US</u> | <u>en %</u> |                               | <u>en millions \$ US</u> | <u>en %</u> |  | <u>en millions \$ US</u> | <u>en %</u> |
| IDA                                       | 50                       | 22          | IDA                           | 33                       | 22          | OPEP   | 175                      | 61          |
| Etats-Unis                                | 47                       | 20          | Etats-Unis                    | 28                       | 19          | Japon  | 59                       | 20          |
| OPEP                                      | 32                       | 14          | France                        | 18                       | 12          | France                                       | 21                       | 7           |
| FED                                       | 22                       | 9           | Suisse                        | 18                       | 12          |  |                          |             |
| Allemagne                                 | 21                       | 9           | Allemagne                     | 15                       | 10          |  |                          |             |
| <u>APPROVISIONNEMENT EN EAU</u>           |                          |             | <u>COMMUNICATIONS</u>         |                          |             | <u>ENERGIE</u>                               |                          |             |
|   | <u>en millions \$ US</u> | <u>en %</u> |                               | <u>en millions \$ US</u> | <u>en %</u> |  | <u>en millions \$ US</u> | <u>en %</u> |
| Allemagne                                 | 93                       | 29          | France                        | 77                       | 42          | OPEP   | 79                       | 33          |
| FED                                       | 36                       | 11          | Canada                        | 52                       | 28          | France                                       | 51                       | 21          |
| France                                    | 34                       | 11          | Allemagne                     | 18                       | 10          | Allemagne                                    | 49                       | 20          |
| FAD                                       | 30                       | 9           | OPEP                          | 17                       | 9           | Canada                                       | 19                       | 8           |
| Etats-Unis                                | 28                       | 9           |                               |                          |             |  |                          |             |
| <u>TRANSPORTS &amp; INFRASTRUCTURES</u>   |                          |             | <u>EDUCATION</u>              |                          |             | <u>SANTE</u>                                 |                          |             |
|   | <u>en millions \$ US</u> | <u>en %</u> |                               | <u>en millions \$ US</u> | <u>en %</u> |  | <u>en millions \$ US</u> | <u>en %</u> |
| OPEP                                      | 353                      | 28          | France                        | 95                       | 20          | ONU  | 41                       | 16          |
| IDA                                       | 231                      | 18          | IDA                           | 81                       | 17          | FED  | 36                       | 14          |
| FED                                       | 196                      | 16          | FED                           | 48                       | 14          | FAD  | 34                       | 13          |
| Allemagne                                 | 115                      | 9           | ONU                           | 35                       | 11          | Etats-Unis                                   | 30                       | 12          |
| Canada                                    | 107                      | 8           |                               |                          |             |  |                          |             |

REUNION SPECIALE SUR LE CLUB DU SAHEL  
Paris, 19 mai 1983

SPECIAL MEETING ON THE CLUB DU SAHEL  
Paris, 19 May 1983

Liste des Participants - List of Participants

- AUTRICHE : Dr. Georg LENNKH, Représentant Permanent  
Dr. Christina RECHT, Conseiller
- BADEA : M. Chedly AYARI, Président  
M. H. CHAKER, Ingénieur Agronome
- BANQUE MONDIALE : Mr. David KNOX, Vice-Président
- CANADA : M. François PCULIOT, Vice-Président,  
ACDI
- COMMISSION DES COMMUNAUTES  
EUROPEENNES : M. Michel HAUSEWIRTH,  
Directeur Général Adjoint, Direction  
générale du Développement  
  
M. Hans SMIDA,  
Direction Afrique sahélienne
- DANEMARK : Mr. Jørgen TRANBERG,  
Représentant Permanent Adjoint
- ETATS-UNIS : Mr. Jay JOHNSON,  
Deputy Assistant Administrator,  
Africa Bureau, AID/Washington  
  
Mr. Lawrence DASH,  
Director, SDPT, Bamako (Mali)
- FONDS MONETAIRE  
INTERNATIONAL : M. Oumar MAKALOU,  
Directeur, Département Afrique
- FRANCE : Mme Nicole BRIOT, Directrice,  
Direction des Politiques du Développement  
Ministère de la Coopération et du  
Développement  
  
M. Michel PENENT,  
Directeur pour l'Afrique de l'Ouest,  
Caisse Centrale de Coopération Economique  
  
M. Jean-Julien BIDAUT, Chargé de Mission  
Ministère de la Coopération et du  
Développement
- ITALIE : M. Enrico AUGELLI,  
Directeur Programme Sahel,  
Dépt. de la Coopération internationale  
Ministère des Affaires Etrangères  
  
M. Antonio TARELLI, Conseiller

KUWAIT FUND : Mr. Bader AL-HUMAIHI,  
Deputy Director General

PAYS-BAS : M. L.P.J. MAZAIRAC,  
Directeur pour l'Afrique,  
Ministère des Affaires Etrangères

SUISSE : M. R. WILHELM, Directeur, Direction de  
la Coopération au Développement et de  
l'Aide humanitaire,  
Dépt. Fédéral des Affaires Etrangères

M. Andri BISAZ, Direction de la  
Coopération au Développement et de  
l'Aide humanitaire

UNSO - UNDP : M. Charles-Henri LA MUNIERE,  
Directeur Général, UNSO

WORLD FOOD COUNCIL : Mr. Maurice J. WILLIAMS,  
Executive Director

- - -

M. Robert BAILHACHE, Consultant Spécial  
Mr. Elliot BERG, Consultant Spécial  
Mr. Berend HERINGA, Consultant Spécial

- - -

O C D E : M. Emile VAN LENNEP, Secrétaire Général  
M. Paul LEMERLE, Secrétaire Général Adjoint  
M. Toshio OSHIMA, Conseiller Spécial  
M. Rutherford M. POATS, Président du Comité d'Aide  
au Développement  
M. H. FÜHRER, Directeur de la Coopération au  
Développement  
M. Stephen JOYCE, Cabinet du Secrétaire Général

CLUB DU SAHEL :

Mme Anne de LATTRE  
M. Arthur M. FELL  
M. Yves GARNEAU  
M. Paul J. SCIARONE  
M. Jacques GIRI

STATEMENT OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE OECD  
to the informal meeting on the CLUB DU SAHEL  
(Paris, 19th May, 1983)

I wish to thank your distinguished group, among which I recognise many familiar faces, for accepting my invitation to this informal meeting on the Club du Sahel. I am convinced that a frank exchange of views between officials responsible for African aid programmes can take the Club a step forward and can help prepare the Fifth Club du Sahel Conference which will be hosted by the European Commission, in Brussels, from 26th to 28th October.

While the purpose of this meeting is to focus on the Club du Sahel's contribution to improving the development of a specific african region, your ideas and suggestions are of interest to the development work carried out by several bodies of the OECD: to the Development Assistance Committee, the Development Center, the Executive Committee in Special Session and the Group on North South Economic Issues, which are considering ways and means of strengthening the content of interdependence between developed and developing countries.

The OECD Council at Ministerial Level which met on 9th - 10th May has agreed that this work is of major importance. It has recognised that the present prospects for continuing economic recovery in OECD countries provide new opportunities for cooperation and particularly for assistance to the poorer developing countries which have experienced acute difficulties

in recent years. Innovative concepts will be necessary to translate these opportunities into practical action.

I think you will agree that the Club du Sahel has made an original contribution to development cooperation since its creation in 1976 and that the CILSS and Club Secretariats have attempted to fulfill their initial mandate of aid mobilisation and analysis, of dissemination of information and of increasing coordination.

Primarily, the Club has effectively practiced a continuous policy dialogue between cooperation agencies and CILSS Member countries. Some of the interesting aspects of the policy dialogue have been the joint discussion of strategic development choices, the adoption of a common strategy which focuses on regional food self-sufficiency and ecological balance and the analysis of policy issues which have a direct influence on the success or failure of development projects and programmes.

With regard to development priorities, CILSS and Club du Sahel experts proposed from the outset, to concentrate on agriculture and food production, and on the improvement of the ecology because they became convinced that a prerequisite to a more diversified economy was the progress of the rural sector. Their work prepared them to understand and to give full support to the food strategy process when it was proposed by the World Food Council and the European Commission.

With respect to policy issues, the CILSS and Club du Sahel Secretariats enlisted the support of their respective participants to delve into macro-economic questions such as the economics of food production, as well as, management and maintenance problems, included under the term "recurrent costs." They felt that such analysis could help in guiding the decisions of the Sahel governments and the donors. It was also their hope that closer concertation among partners would foster better understanding of problems to be solved and closer coordination among the Sahelian countries themselves on the one hand, the donors on the other, as well as jointly.

The work sponsored by the Club du Sahel has already had some positive results. In particular, the existence of this permanent consultative group has had a direct and indirect effect on the flow of resources to the Sahel region, which has remained high in absolute amounts, and the highest in Africa, in per capita aid ratios.

But the progress achieved so far, and the collaborative style set by the developed and developing partners in the Club du Sahel, needs further stimulus and improvement.

As practitioners and decision makers, you are fully aware that the problems and pressures in the Sahel region, as in most of the poorer countries of the developing world, are acute and you are also aware of their principal characteristics:

- food production is increasing, but much too slowly to keep pace with population increase;

- the productive base of the CILSS countries' economies is expanding very slowly;

- the external debt has reached critical levels both in relation to gross national product and exports;

- the balance of trade is deteriorating due to increasing food imports to cover the needs and changing consumption patterns of urban areas, to the imports of costly manufactured goods and to the high energy costs; exports of agricultural commodities have had a spotty record at a time of declining international prices;

- the efforts to reverse ecological deterioration remain very small in relation to needs;

- trained personnel is still very scarce particularly in the field of management.

These problems and others will constitute the background to your discussions on the role of the Club du Sahel. They should not lead to discouragement because there is no alternative to pursuing the development effort, but they should prompt donors to the practical changes, the new concepts, the new aid methods and the types of coordination for which the needs are now sharpened. The Sahel is already, and can become even more, an example of international cooperation in the African continent.

These were the few comments that I wanted to make before I wished success to your meeting. I understand that Mr. Mazairac has been requested informally to chair this informal meeting and that he has kindly agreed to do so, and I wish to thank him on your behalf for taking this responsibility.