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## COOPERATIVE AGREEMENT ON AREA DEVELOPMENT

### FINAL REPORT

URBANIZATION AND OUTMIGRATION IN SOMALIA



INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM  
CLARK UNIVERSITY

950 Main Street, Worcester, Massachusetts 01610 U.S.A.  
(617) 793-7201 TELEX 951829 CEN TED WOR

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FINAL REPORT

URBANIZATION AND OUTMIGRATION IN SOMALIA

Herbert S. Lewis, Anthropologist, University of Wisconsin

Carol Kerven, Anthropologist, Private Consultant

Nancy Southerland, City and Regional Planner

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## PURPOSE OF THE STUDY

This study was undertaken in response to the concern by the USAID Somalia mission that rapid rural outmigration and urbanization in Somalia was likely to have significant repercussions on rural and urban areas. The study was commissioned in order to examine some of the factors leading to population movement as well as the demographic and economic consequences of this movement and resulting settlement patterns. Both the conditions underlying migration, and its impacts, were perceived by USAID/Somalia as having relevance for USAID's agricultural sector programs and the Somali Government's urban planning strategy. In particular, a number of issues were identified for consideration by the study. These were: i) changes in income and investment patterns arising out of migration; ii) shifts in the settlement hierarchy due to migration; and iii) the types of linkages maintained between migrants and their places of origin. The complete Scope of Work for this study is given in Appendix I.

## A NOTE ON SOURCES OF DATA

The team members interviewed over 30 public employees--ministry officials, city mayors, employees of state organizations and agricultural extension personnel. While almost all individuals contacted were well informed, it was often difficult to obtain published reports, quantitative data, city maps or research results. In many cases reference was made to documents which we were subsequently unable to trace in the time available. However, our impression is that a reasonable body of data sources relevant to the topic of our study does indeed exist, though we were unable always to make use of these sources. Any future investigation of urbanization and migration in Somalia would be well-advised to allocate time and personnel to the task of tracking these sources down, and assessing their validity and usefulness.

Invariably, consultancy reports concerned with aspects of population in Somalia call for more technical and financial assistance as well as training, to be given to those Government agencies responsible for data collection and analysis. (For one of the most recent examples, see the Social and Institutional Profile 1983). This team endorses those recommendations and would only add that a first step in this direction could well be a compilation and evaluation of existing data sources, particularly as several government units are gearing up to undertake more socioeconomic surveys (e.g., the Monitoring and Evaluation Unit in the Ministry of Planning, and the Somali Research Unit for Emergencies and Social Development). This topic is discussed in more detail in Section 5.

The other primary sources of information that this team relied upon were members of the public, in each of the locations visited. The logistics of a four week study do not allow for representative sampling techniques, nor for complete or even adequate coverage of all geographical locations, types of settlement and population groupings. Moreover, as social scientists, we are acutely aware of the bias in our sample of informants. Thus in rural villages, we were sometimes only able to talk with designated local leaders or senior elders of a group. Virtually no Somali women could be interviewed under these circumstances. What we report here therefore reflects these limitations.

## SUMMARY OF MAJOR CONCLUSIONS

1. Somalia's capital, Mogadishu, and some secondary cities have grown rapidly over the past decade, due to immigration from rural areas. The observed pattern of migration, in which family members are dispersed simultaneously and sequentially through urban and rural areas, leads to the recommendation that the urbanization process be taken into account in framing a rural development policy for Somalia.
2. Local government authorities and funds cannot keep pace with the demand for urban services and infrastructure that results from the fast rate of population expansion in towns. Consequently, donor assistance may need to be partially diverted from rural areas. Urban authorities particularly need support in the areas of training and funding for urban capital projects.
3. Regional urban centers currently offer an alternative to the concentration of human and capital resources that is occurring in Mogadishu. At the same time, these regional towns are well-positioned to become service centers for their productive rural hinterlands. Consideration should be given to ways in which regional centers could better serve the needs of rural producers for social services and income opportunities.
4. Rural outmigration is to a great extent encouraged by the existence of income disparities between rural and urban areas, and between different economic sectors. Hence, programs geared towards a single sector, such as

agriculture, also need to evaluate the alternatives available to the workforce in other sectors.

5. Agricultural and livestock development programs will be affected by the social and economic repercussions of migration. These repercussions include a potential crop/livestock labor shortage, investment or disinvestment of income from migration into crop or livestock operations, and the disinclination of some migrants to return to a life in farming or herding. These aspects of migration should be further investigated in the course of designing agricultural and livestock programs.

## 1. IMPLICATIONS FOR USAID/SOMALIA

### 1.1 The Interdependence of Rural and Urban Areas

USAID assistance towards Somalia's development is directed in its entirety at rural areas. Since 1979, 90% of development funds have been allocated to agricultural and livestock development, in support of the Somali Government's "emphasis on food and livestock production" (USAID 1983: 1). USAID's concern in this area is predicated upon the assumption that "80% of the...population gain their livelihood through subsistence agricultural or pastoral pursuits" (USAID 1983: 1).

The conclusions of this study indicate that USAID's achievement of these objectives requires some refocussing of attention upon activities in the non-agricultural sector--the towns and cities of Somalia. The assumption that the bulk of Somali livelihoods are derived overwhelmingly from subsistence crop and livestock pursuits cannot be justified. On the contrary, not only are these pursuits partly commercial in orientation, but many rural Somali families are also heavily involved in income-earning activities removed from the farms and the rangelands. The towns and cities are thus integral to the rural economy and life, and to ignore the function of these urban centers is to ignore the diversification of Somali domestic economies and development (discussed in Section 4.1).

The raising of crops and animals is but one of a portfolio of activities engaged in by Somali families. Portions of crops and herds are regularly marketed by family members who transport the produce to towns. During seasonal slack periods, farm family members move into local towns to seek temporary wage work or run businesses. Pastoralists incorporate towns as points in their nomadic cycle; as water sources, political nodes, social centers and

sources of wage employment. Children of rural families are placed in urban secondary schools. And towns themselves have an intrinsic value as the loci of modern attractions, especially appealing to the young. In sum, Somalia's urban centers function as foci in a geographically-dispersed pattern of interdependence between town and country.

Given this symbiotic relationship, the successful implementation of a crop and livestock development policy rests upon appreciating the mechanisms that link rural and urban areas together. These mechanisms involve the people, money, goods and services that flow between towns and rural areas, in the migration process and in daily life. The viability and profitability of crop/livestock operations are affected by these flows in and out of rural areas. If one is to plan for greater productivity in the crop and livestock sectors, it is essential to assess the beneficial and detrimental impacts of the migration process. One must also understand the role of urban centers in the income strategies and social and economic needs of farmers and pastoralists.

## 1.2 Migration and Urbanization Issues Affecting USAID Programs

Summarized below are several issues, discussed in this report, which should be considered in the course of designing and implementing USAID programs for Somalia.

1) Rural out-migration from farming and herding is in large measure a response to perceived income disparities between these activities versus wage or commercial opportunities located in urban centers. For some migrants, the anticipation is that a higher or more secure income can be earned by combining commerce or wage work with their traditional agropastoral activities. For

other migrants, farming or herding is found to be insufficiently rewarding when compared to urban opportunities, and the traditional source of living is relinquished, either temporarily or permanently. In each case, the decisions are founded on an assessment of the expected economic returns to participating in various activities. Although not all migration decisions can be ascribed to economic motives, when these motivations predominate there are important implications for the planning of pastoral and agricultural development programs (see Sections 4.3 and 4.5).

The foremost implication is that programs aimed at raising production in farming and pastoralism need to compare estimates of the economic returns in both crop/livestock and non-agricultural activities. The intended rural beneficiaries of crop/livestock development programs have other options available to them, and will tend to pursue other options unless expected incomes from farming and pastoralism can match or exceed these alternatives. Therefore, it is not sufficient merely to predict that incomes within farming or pastoralism will be raised as a result of development programs, if this predicted increase does not compare favorably with average increases in wage and business income. Rather, it must be assumed that the rural workforce is mobile and responsive to income differentials.

A secondary implication is that crop and livestock development programs require a broader definition of productivity and income than the standard measures of crop yield or percentage herd offtake. Farmers and herders frequently have multiple income sources, obtained either by their own migratory patterns or via the migration of family members. The strategy of combining income sources is rational on several grounds; it permits risk-spreading, it augments total income and provides greater overall economic security. When family income is viewed in this perspective, the issue of raising productivity

in one segment of the domestic economy, e.g., the family herds, must be weighed against possible income losses incurred in other segments, e.g., wage employment. Moreover, measurements of income obtained from different sectoral activities need to be viewed over the long-term, since families can sometimes absorb short-term income losses in the pursuance of long-term goals. Finally, in measuring income, program designers need to take into account the use value of agricultural and livestock products, in addition to their cash (or exchange) value. For production goals of farmers and pastoralists are not necessarily premised upon the monetary value of commodities such as crops and animals. In fact, one of the primary reasons why farming and herding are combined with wage or business employment is to reduce consumption costs by producing for subsistence, while obtaining cash by engaging in non-agricultural activities. Therefore, concepts of productivity and income are complex in this semi-monetarized rural economy. These concepts need to be clearly articulated and studied, if the objectives of agricultural and livestock development programs are to be achieved.

ii) Since farmers and herders often have access to capital saved through urban ventures (by migrating), a question vital to the success of crop and livestock extension programs is the extent to which this capital is available for investment into recommended technical improvements. Willingness and propensity to invest in agriculture or livestock is based on similar considerations as the decision to "invest" labor in different sectors, discussed above. In other words, the degree of investment is likely to be based on rational economic calculations of probable return on capital. Thus the relative returns to buying a cultivator or building a well will be balanced against investing in an urban shop or financing a family member to seek employment in

the Gulf states. It is important to note that such decisions may not always result in the desired end (of increasing income), just as all investment decisions are prone to risk (see Section 4.7).

iii) Equally essential to the success of extension programs is knowledge of labor patterns in farming and herding. The temporary and permanent outmigration of rural people has a critical bearing on the cost and availability of farm or herd labor. Temporary outmigration often reflects seasonal fluctuations in labor requirements, while longer-term migration is usually in response to push-pull economic motivations, as outlined in (i) above, and represents a potentially severe loss of labor to the production process (see Section 4.6).

Somalia's agricultural and pastoral systems are still largely based on labor-intensive methods of production. Given this, the economic viability of these operations depends upon a low labor opportunity cost and a low actual price for hired labor. As the formal non-agricultural economy creates work opportunities and wage rates rise, there is a radical effect upon the viability of labor-intensive farming and herding systems. The opportunity cost of family labor is increased, given higher wage rates in other sectors, and secondly the price of labor itself escalates due to the competitive wages being offered in other sectors.

In this situation, if commodity prices for crops and livestock do not keep pace with rising shadow and real labor costs, farmers and herders are caught in a cost/price squeeze. The net result is a de facto labor shortage, both seasonal and permanent, at the price levels that farmers and herders can afford to pay and still operate profitably.

The implications of this effective labor crisis are far-reaching, if one

is considering development programs that rely on labor-intensive production methods. The course of action typically taken by farmers and herders in Somalia and elsewhere, is to reduce the labor component of production. This may involve mechanization in order to replace labor or else a reorientation of production goals such that less labor is necessary. Alternatively, the labor crisis may be resolved by changes exogenous to the production process, such as a rise in commodity prices or by the subvention of money earned in other income sources like wage employment. However, in some instances there is no resolution and output simply declines, sometimes to the point of ceasing altogether. Since this is an undesirable end, designers of development programs need to examine the endogenous and exogenous changes that can avert a labor shortage. It appears as though some Somali farmers and herders are already adapting to labor problems by seeking mechanical alternatives to labor-intensive methods or by reorientating production goals. Others claim to want to mechanize, but to be hampered by lack of machinery. These adaptations and desires deserve closer study.

iv) In both the past and the present, pragmatic economic motives together with a strongly-upheld kinship system have cemented together a system of family diversification that encompasses rural and urban areas. The objective of this system is to maintain occupied niches in each favorable sector. The bonds of kinship, entailing mutual support and obligations, ensure an effective flow of personnel, goods, services and money between rural and urban areas, as well as within rural areas. These flows can often efficiently balance the income disparities between different sectors and between rural and urban areas. In other words, Somali families, through the placement of their members, seek to optimize sectoral advantages and minimize sectoral risks.

As long as this system is extant, it is sound policy for state and donor funds to be distributed both to rural and urban areas, since the kinship mechanism redistributes resources between these areas. In fact, it makes little sense to restrict funds to rural areas, on the principle of concentrating assistance to the primary production sectors. For, if the "primary producers" (i.e., farmers and pastoralists) are also substantially engaged in the urban economy, that economy is also contributing to primary production, via the income remitted back to rural areas. Moreover, as long as this income does continue to "trickle back" to the rural economy, any increase in urban income potential will ultimately also benefit rural areas.

v) It is widely believed that Africa will be the most rapidly urbanizing region of the world until the end of this century. Somalia is a clear illustration of that phenomenon. Given the increasing rate of urbanization in Somalia, the situation in Somalia's cities cannot be overlooked for the following reason. There is every indication that the percentage of the population living in urban areas will continue to grow rapidly from the present approximate figure of 29% of the total population, due to natural population increase and rural-urban migration.

As it is becoming clear that urban places can and do contribute to rural development, it will be important for any development program in Somalia to not regard urbanization as a hindering process in national development. Rather, it is a process that can provide certain advantages to promoting growth with equity and spreading development benefits to the rural areas that the urbanizing cities serve. In particular, strengthening secondary cities and regional centers through the decentralization of urban policies, and by directing development resources to them, the net effect can spread benefits

to the rural areas that have close links to these regional service centers. These benefits include creating off-farm employment opportunities there, maintaining sufficient social services and facilitating marketing activities.

## 2. CURRENT PATTERNS OF URBANIZATION AND OUTMIGRATION

### 2.1 Mogadishu

By all accounts Mogadishu is experiencing a high rate of urbanization in a relatively short time. Some feel it will soon become a "city nation" because of its unchecked expansion and rapid increase in population. There are no figures on the actual growth rate of Mogadishu, but population estimates projected from the 1975 census have been given as follows:

1966-7	172,000
1975	450,000
1980	520,000
1983	700,000

Currently government officials give estimates of the city's total population that range from 700,000 to over one million.

The rapid urbanization that is occurring in Mogadishu as a result of immigration from both rural and other urban areas is distinct from the type and rate of urbanization occurring in other cities and towns in Somalia. This is due above all to its primacy as the capital city, its natural attraction as the center of government, education, industry and commerce, and the greater variety of resources, facilities and opportunities it contains. No other region has experienced as much immigration, seasonal or otherwise, as Mogadishu has in the past five or ten years. Migrants come from all over the country and the travel distance from point of origination does not appear

to be the limiting factor that it is for other regional centers. The reasons given for migrating to Mogadishu are many: for higher education, better housing and health facilities, for starting or expanding businesses, to obtain a visa to go to the Gulf, or to find skilled and unskilled work that is not available elsewhere. Newcomers see Mogadishu as an area of influence and opportunity and are willing to make the trade-off between the high cost of living there and the attainment of such benefits as education, better jobs and other services.

The vice mayor of Mogadishu reported that there are an estimated 10,000 daily arrivals into Mogadishu from outside areas, but of that number 7,000-8,000 also leave the city the same day. What is occurring therefore is a continuous movement of people in and out of the city for different purposes. Some come to bring fodder for the estimated 50,000 cattle inside Mogadishu; others bring milk, livestock, firewood, charcoal, or produce, handicrafts and materials for sale at markets; and some come for casual labor. Of this daily influx, a considerable number each month stay on permanently in Mogadishu.

The picture that emerges is one of a constant shift in the number of people in Mogadishu over time, coupled with an ever-growing permanent population. We have discovered that although the city seems to be coping under the increasing pressure for services, jobs and goods, if the increase continues at the present rate unchecked and without adequate planning, existing problems will be exacerbated and new ones will emerge.

At present there is no operative master plan for the city of Mogadishu, and no fixed boundaries or city limits. Ten years ago the city was estimated to stretch approximately 10-20 km along the Indian Ocean; it is now more than 30 km long and extends inland to the 21 October Road. Throughout the city, a great amount of mostly privately-funded construction is underway; offices,

stores, small houses and large villas are being built, changing the face of the city. The lack of sufficient control over urban development activities, however, can lead to the inefficient location of urban uses, overcrowding and higher densities, and a basic problem of land supply.

The problems due to increased migration to Mogadishu are many and appear to be mounting. Among them are the provision of adequate public transportation, hospitals, schools, electricity, water and roads. The housing situation in Mogadishu is not perceived to be as problematic as some other conditions, but there is a need for more available low income housing and the enforced control of rents and land speculation. The reason for the relative sufficiency in housing is that most of those who arrive in the city are able to find relatives or friends with whom to stay while they seek employment and housing of their own. For example, a number of informants in Mogadishu reported that they had five or six people staying with them at the present time. The strong kinship system which exists in Somalia, in which assistance is readily provided to extended family members, is therefore a positive factor in the pattern of rural-urban migration and lessens the cost of moving. For this reason the majority of people who arrive in the city are rarely left destitute or homeless.

There are, however, some who come from villages and know no one in Mogadishu, or cannot find their relatives. A number of shantytowns or squatter settlements have gone up on unused land, in areas where there are no provisions for water, sewers, electricity or roads. It was reported that in Mogadishu one can live in these open areas without authority because "it is not a planned area". Squatters can build shelters and pay no tax on the land until the area is zoned by the city planning office. At that time they may have to move or may have the option of applying for the land from the municipality.

Leasing the land is not expensive: a 15 x 15 meter plot may cost 1,000 shillings, depending upon the particular zone. Land is distributed in this way when there is sufficient pressure to zone a new area. When all of the available plots have been allocated, further distribution is closed for a period of time.

There are two recognized systems of land use in Mogadishu and in other urban centers in Somalia: land for permanent use and land for temporary use. On permanent land one can build any type of building (one to two story, stone or wood) and the land can be used for any purpose. One generally has to pay more for a permanent lease, which technically is for 100 years, although if the local government decides that a road or school should be built on privately leased permanent land, the residents there will have to move (in theory they will be compensated for the expense). The sizes of permanent land plots range from 13 x 13.5 meters to 60 x 60 meters for large villas. A house on temporary land cannot be two stories or of stone, and a temporary lease has no time guarantee. This system was established ostensibly because the government felt that some people do not have the resources to build permanent houses; it is also easier to redevelop land without permanent structures. Temporary land can be reclaimed by the government at will; or through what is commonly known as eminent domain. When such a decision is made, the residents are given a certain amount of time to vacate their houses and possessions from the area property, and are assisted in their removal.

In addition to these two land use systems the people of Mogadishu have created a third type of land use officially referred to as "abusive". The local government does not recognize their rights to this property, which generally represents land that has been taken over by squatters. This year (1983) the local government has begun to prevent people from taking land this

way and to declare it either permanent or temporary, in order to prevent widespread squatting on the outskirts of the city.

A good example of the mechanism used by the local government to clear slums and redistribute land for planned settlements is that occurring in Wardigle, the oldest and most densely populated shantytown in Mogadishu. The municipal government has decided to raze the area to put in roads, electricity and other services, and remove the newest residents (those who are unregistered or have not paid taxes) to Karan, a newly zoned area 2-3 km to the east of the city. There they will each be allotted plots of 33 square meters in what will become a planned, permanent settlement. The municipality will be responsible for providing access to public transportation, construction materials, and basic social services. This is the first of similar efforts the local government is planning to upgrade slum areas.

In summary, the city of Mogadishu has grown rapidly in both population and physical size, and to an extent that the demand for basic social services and infrastructure has surpassed what the public and private sectors can provide. The rate of urbanization has also outpaced the level of planning activity required to manage a city of its size.

## 2.2 Secondary Centers

It is impossible to be precise about the rate of growth of Somalia's towns and cities because up-to-date population data do not exist and the old ones are suspect. While it is clear that Mogadishu, the capital, is a rapidly expanding city, there are no reliable estimates for the growth of secondary cities. We have heard it said that Baidoa has almost doubled its population in 8 years, from about 31,000 in 1975 to 55-60,000 in 1983, while the mayor of Kismayo places that city's population at between 40,000 and 60,000, versus the

30,000 of 1975. Even assuming that these examples of growth are accurate estimates, (and this is granting a lot), it does not seem unreasonable for a developing economy and polity to maintain a number of regional centers of this size. On the contrary, it seems a necessity. The issue for development planning is rather whether existing institutions can cope with the rate of urbanization and what are its effects on the rural areas.

TABLE I  
POPULATION OF SOMALIA'S LEADING SECONDARY URBAN CENTERS  
According to the 1975 Census<sup>1</sup>  
(Rounded to the nearest thousand)

		<u>1983 estimate<sup>2</sup></u>
Hargeisa	63,000	
Bur'ao	37,000	
Baidao	31,000	(55-60,000)
Kismayo	30,000	(40-60,000)
Merka	22,000	(40,000)
Jowhar	20,000	
Belet Weyn	15,000	

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<sup>1</sup>Source: Central Statistics Department

<sup>2</sup>These estimates were obtained by the team from town mayors.

Our team was able to spend some time in three regional (secondary) centers: Baidoa, the center of the Bai Region; Merka, an old port city and the largest city in the Lower Shebelle Region; and Kismayo, the regional capital of Lower Juba. In addition we had some interviews in the smaller community of

Shalimbod, which acts as the administrative capital for the Lower Shebelle region.

The three cities are all multi-functional central places which function as centers of local government, commerce, education (through secondary school level), medical services, light industry, etc. Baidoa is the center of a rich agricultural region; Merka and Kismayo are ports and have fishing industries. All three have apparently undergone considerable growth in the past decade and seem to serve as "growth poles". (However, we do not know the extent to which this may apply to other secondary or tertiary centers.)

The regional and district towns have an important role as the loci of economic activity. It is true that the amount and scale of modern industry in these centers is quite limited, and they present a rather simple, even poor appearance, especially when one leaves the main streets, but the amount of commerce and service that is carried on is quite impressive. While town officials were concerned about underemployment and unemployment, there is active pursuit of business among people of all ages and both sexes. These are centers of the "vibrant parallel economy" spoken of in SIP (1983:3).

It is our impression that, for many migrants, the towns are not a refuge of last resort for people forced from the countryside or unable to cope. Although this may be true of some individuals and families that we encountered, for many Somalis these regional centers are seen as places to better one's situation in life. There is, consequently, a high level of activity and investment.

Baidoa, for example, has a vast open market accommodating a great variety of products and skilled artisans, an important livestock market, and its many long streets are lined with shops. There are tea shops, restaurants, and tiny grocery stores everywhere, as well as clothing stores, pharmacies, tape

stores. Herds of cattle are taken out to graze each day and their milk sold each evening. There is a lively trade in fodder, firewood, and water. (In Shalimbod little boys buy barrels of water for 3 shillings and sell them from donkey carts for 12 shillings per barrel!) There are signs of construction all over, and loads of building material, stone and cement, as well as wattle and thatch, stream into the city by truck and by cart. There is an air of buying and selling and the pursuit of economic advantage.

In each of the three cities we were told by city officials that the growth of the population during the past decade could be as high as 100%. This growth is due in large measure to the influx of people from the surrounding districts and region. Many have come straight from the rural areas as unskilled or semi-skilled farmers or herders, but some have come as shopkeepers or as school children, moving to larger centers from the tertiary settlements or rural villages.

In addition to this intraregional process of migrating from tertiary to secondary cities, there is also a process of interregional transfer of government and military personnel. In large part this is due to the expansion of government functions and services, and the consequent stationing of teachers, bureaucrats, army and police personnel, and similar functionaries in these cities. As these places have grown in numbers and functions they have also attracted more traders and business people, as well as skilled workers, from other regions, who see enhanced earning and commercial possibilities. It is not uncommon, however, for such newcomers from other regions to leave at least a portion of their families in their home districts and towns.

It should be emphasized that Merka and Baiddoa, if not Kismayo, are also composed in part of farmers, as in Shalimbod. Sometimes these are farmers whose farms are within walking distance of the town (as is the case in the

Bulo Jama'a district of Baidoa). Other farm owners or agricultural workers travel to the farms from their homes in town by bus or truck. As noted above, some farmers live in town only seasonally, but others seem to use the city as their primary residence, or perhaps divide their time or their family between the farm and the city. In this way, too, the connection between the city and the rural area is a close one.

Although the team was not able to visit the major pastoral areas of the central and northern parts of the country, the findings of Thomas in the town of Bur'ao and the Togdheer region suggest that what has been described above is a general pattern throughout the country. Thomas writes that it is "impossible to separate town from country in Somalia.... Towns are so essential to the nomadic system that, if people concentrate in a grazing area where there isn't a town, they make one." (Thomas 1982)

### 2.3 Migration to the Gulf States

Somalis have a long history of employment connections with the Arabian Peninsula, mainly working as seamen (Lewis 1961). However, since 1975 when new employment opportunities for work in the Gulf States were opened up, the magnitude of this outmigration rose sharply.

"Recently, the disparity between local wages in the Somali Democratic Republic (higher in the north than south) and those obtainable in Arabia and the Gulf States has led to a large exodus of able-bodied men. This 'muscle drain' augments the 'brain drain' to the same countries and leads to a large influx of remittance earnings in cash and kind...the northern pastoral nomads have recently become part of a remittance economy" (Lewis 1981: 26).

While the northern regions have a high rate of outmigration to the Gulf states, this has not been confined to the north, and both men and women have begun migrating to the Gulf (although migrants are predominantly male). Estimates given by officials and quoted in studies are that between 100,000 and 150,000 Somalis are presently working in the Gulf (SIP 1983, and information obtained by this team).

Perhaps surprisingly, given the obvious economic and social impacts that such a large migration stream must have upon Somalia, this team could find little published data on aspects of Gulf migration. The implications of this outmigration for domestic employment policy, foreign exchange and skills training are important, yet there seems to be no articulated system for study and policy formulation on the issue of Gulf migrants. Gulf migration has several clear advantages and disadvantages, from a national perspective. Among the advantages are an outlet for job-seekers who might otherwise swell the ranks of the unemployed, the opportunity to learn new job skills which may be utilized in developing Somalia's industries and the generation of foreign exchange earnings via migrants' remittances. Among the disadvantages are the loss of essential skills, dependence on foreign states for the employment of a large body of one's citizens and increased trade deficits incurred through the importation of goods bought with foreign earnings. It is this latter issue which seems to have drawn the most attention from the Somali Government (see discussion in SIP 1983). A problem frequently mentioned by informants interviewed by this team was the inability of companies and parastatal agencies to retain their best personnel, who were drawn to higher incomes available in the Gulf states. Government restrictions on the resignations of middle and senior level civil servants seem to have prevented a massive drain from the public sector, however.

People who migrate to the Gulf are mainly younger men, who have obtained some education (the ability to speak Arabic is important for job success), and who have some technical skill: driving, construction, machine repair, book-keeping, etc. Some women are able to go to the Gulf states, where they can use a network of male Somali relatives to purchase commodities for importation into Somalia. (In countries such as Saudi Arabia, women are only permitted to visit if they have close male relatives residing there, or are accompanied by a male relative).

The principal method of obtaining work in the Gulf states is through relatives who are already working there. Apparently, many prospective migrants first apply for a religious visa, for the Hajj, which permits them to spend four weeks in Saudi Arabia. During that time, the migrants then try to obtain a job through the assistance of a relative, and if successful, obtain a work permit.

Recently, the prospects for Somali employment in the Gulf have started to decline. This is ascribed to competition from southeast Asian migrant workers, who are willing to work for lower wages, and also to reductions in oil production in many Gulf nations. Several informants noted a decrease in the number of Somalis able to find work in Arabia. This reduction of employment opportunities is likely to have significant impacts on Somalia's economy.

The issue of how migrants' earnings are used in Somalia is discussed in Section 4.7 of this report. In general, remittances and savings are invested into building houses for urban rental, in livestock purchases and improvements such as construction of water points, and for commercial ventures such as transport services and shops. Ex-Gulf migrants do not seem to be putting money into crop farming on any noticeable scale.

### 3. PLANNING FOR INCREASED URBANIZATION

#### 3.1 Shortage of Funds for Urban Development

A direct result of expanding populations in urban areas is the increased pressure on existing services and infrastructure. In order to keep pace with increased demand and to make sure services such as health, education, water, public transport and roads are accessible to the growing population, these services must be expanded. In each area the team visited, local government officials and residents alike indicated that resources, both technical and financial, for the provision of social services and urban infrastructure were not sufficient to permit the expansion of existing services or the creation of new ones.

As a result, electricity is usually available only to approximately half of the urban population, water shortages are frequent and health and educational facilities are inadequate for the total number of residents.

On the other hand, it is also felt that investment of revenues collected by local governments in the form of taxes on farm products and market fees, has been directed more toward urban areas. In this case, urban areas are perceived to be deriving disproportionate social and economic benefits from available resources, to the detriment of development in the rural areas.

Given this situation of lack of sufficient funds for necessary urban development and the need to restructure the method of generating domestic finances, it is recommended that the overall district and regional level revenue structure be studied to see how the system of local tax assessment is working, what the perceived shortfalls are in terms of revenue generation and expenditure, and what potential revenue sources can be tapped to offset the current inadequacy. Further, it should be determined to what extent local governments are permitted to raise tax levies to meet capital requirements for

urban development, and if adequate user fees are being charged on services such as water, sanitation and transportation.

All budget decisions regarding government assistance for Somalia's regions are made at the central ministries. In the 1983 budget, approximately 155 million shillings (\$1.00 U.S. = 15.108 shillings in March, 1983) have been allotted for 67 districts in 15 regions. Funding allocations are not equal across all regions, and are distributed according to perceived need, amount of locally-generated revenue available and development potential.

At the district level, local revenue is generated through taxes on the sale of livestock, on license fees for shopkeepers, market taxes, and taxes on land. Each district has its own budget, and sends budget proposals and recommendations to the regional level. Districts are also responsible for their own development. The regions themselves are semi-autonomous in their planning and development activities, but they are constrained by a recurrent lack of public funds targeted for development activities.

The fiscal situation of the Mogadishu municipality is representative of those found in the urban areas visited by the team. The main difference is that Mogadishu gets no financial assistance from the central government. The Mogadishu municipality derives the majority of its revenues from local market taxes, which are estimated to bring in between 250,000-300,000 shillings daily. The second major source is the land tax, while other main sources are taxes on livestock sales and shop licenses.

The city budget is established as follows: before the end of the fiscal year the municipality prepares estimates of projected expenses and revenues for the coming year. (The 1983 budget is particularly problematic because of the recent government prohibition of the sale of gat, which used to bring the city a daily tax of about 230,000 shillings. As a result, the 1983 budget

will have to be revised substantially downward.) Expenses enumerated for the 1983 budget for Mogadishu included line items for salaries for permanent and temporary staff, stationery and office equipment, vehicles and spare parts, maintenance of roads and vehicles, telephone and post office expenses, leases on stores and property, charity donations, and loans and interest. About 40% of the total budget is allocated for development projects, and no breakdown of specific planned project activities is given. We were told that the funds are allocated when a special problem is identified, such as the need for new roads. Last year most of the development money was spent on construction of public housing. A total of five blocks of two story buildings were built to accommodate a total of 50 families.

This situation illustrates not only the limited nature of funds for urban capital development projects, but also the lack of development planning that will be discussed in Section 3.2. It is clear that future development of adequate facilities and services will be severely constrained by the current, rapid population expansion. The existing funding mechanisms and tax structure need to be upgraded to permit local governments to cover costs for basic services. It can also be expected that current standards of living in urban areas cannot be greatly improved and may decline without reforms in the fiscal structure.

### 3.2 Local Government Planning Capability

From our interviews with city officials in Mogadishu and in secondary cities such as Baidoa and Kismayo, it is clear that planning for the modern industrial city in Somalia has only recently been initiated and organized. Thus far, therefore, local governments have been making spontaneous, ad hoc efforts to deal with city expansion and respond to rising community develop-

ment needs. With no operative town plans or maps, basic demographic data, forecasting of physical and population growth or long-term projections of development activities and needs, there is an inadequate data base on which to make informed decisions on urban planning and management.

The Mogadishu City Planning Office itself is only six months old, and presently has only two staff members. All previous planning activities were undertaken by the Land Department, also under the Mayor's Office. To date, only one feasibility study for city planning has been done (in Italian) and completion of a master plan by an Italian firm will not be until 1986.

Given Somalia's rapid rate of urbanization and its concomitant problems of pressure on existing services and infrastructure and insufficient capital for urban development, it will be necessary to strengthen the current planning capacity of local government urban authorities to plan and implement urban projects, as recommended in the USAID Urban Strategy in Sub-Saharan Africa (Driscoll 1982: 8). To accomplish this we recommend for the short-term the initiation of short, basic training courses for existing planning personnel in local municipalities, on fundamental issues of planning policy and practice. Over the long-term we recommend the creation of a planning curriculum in existing training institutes to provide training in technical skills, such as land use planning, community development and urban design.

### 3.3 Employment Generation and the Informal Sector

At the present time, the perceived possibility of obtaining employment in an urban area is still a "pull" factor contributing to outmigration from rural areas, although in real terms those employment opportunities are becoming more and more scarce. Although the government has had since 1971 a policy of guaranteed employment for school leavers, that policy has become more and more

difficult to effect. As a result, the private sector is being encouraged to absorb school leavers in gainful employment, but the possibility of creating more jobs in this sector are limited by market and other economic factors.

What has happened is that the high rate of urban growth, coupled with low growth of formal employment has led to the expansion of the informal sector. This sector includes tradesmen and women, street vendors, handicraft producers, carriers, and the like. As this sector continues to grow so will its importance in terms of its potential contribution to economic growth, as it makes up a large share of the urban economy. Although planners are aware of this, very little has been done to determine how the informal sector can be tapped to promote economic activity and expand productive employment opportunities. It is recommended, therefore, that more attention be paid to this sector in planning development activities, in assessing the nature and size of the informal sector that exists in urban areas, and how government services and credit can be extended to this sector to stimulate its productivity and permit establishments to expand to the formal sector.

### 3.4 Planning for the Growth of Regional Centers

As stated in Section 2.1, urbanization in Mogadishu has been more rapid and extensive than in other Somali cities. In fact, there appear to be two distinct types of internal migration leading to increased urbanization; one having Mogadishu as its terminus and the other from rural to secondary urban areas. What we have found is that public and private investments in infrastructure, commercial and service activities, manufacturing and industrial enterprises have been heavily concentrated in Mogadishu, so that it has come to dominate the national economy. Because the city attracts migrants in large numbers, who come to reap the benefits of higher incomes and greater access to

services and amenities, it has by all appearances drawn a disproportionate amount of productive manpower and investment capital away from other regions.

In addition, it is clear that Somalia is becoming increasingly urbanized in terms of total population and its cities have become the centers of a number of economic, social and commercial investments. In order to maintain and increase the level of agricultural productivity in rural areas, it will be necessary to provide, at the regional level, essential services and inputs. It will also be necessary to increase farm incomes to overcome the present rural/urban disparities in income and to improve access to services and productive resources between urban and rural areas, and between more and less urbanized regions.

One method is to strengthen Somalia's secondary or intermediate-sized cities. This would have the effect of stimulating the efficient and productive exchange of goods through the national economy, provide a range of services and facilities and offer off-farm employment opportunities to people who are seasonally unemployed due to the cyclical nature of agriculture.

Studies have shown that the pattern of spatial development shapes the future rate and direction of economic growth and the distribution of benefits among people and places in a region. What we propose is a plan for effectively strengthening the contribution of Somalia's urban centers to rural development. This will entail initially selecting target settlement areas and conducting surveys to obtain information on the principal economic activities, the range of services and facilities located there and the extent of the area served by those establishments. Overall, this will give a better picture of the patterns of regional economic development, spatial development, and resource flows, and provide a basis for making investment decisions.

Specifically, we recommend pilot projects in two areas that have already

indicated a capacity for growth. Likely target areas would be in the Bai Region, which is strategically placed for future growth at a crossroads of southern Somalia and in a relatively high rainfall area; and the triangle of cities in the northwest: Bura'0, which has developed as a major livestock trading center of northern Somalia; Hargeisa, located at an intersection of trade routes, and whose urban economy has been stimulated by the livestock industry and remittances from migrants abroad (Clarke 1981: 5); and Berbera, an ancient seaport and commercial link in the export industry. In these areas the traditional marketing networks for the movement of goods and people as well as commercial opportunities are already firmly in place, so that development efforts focused there can easily have spread effects to their hinterlands.

The goals of such an exercise would be to 1) divert human and capital resources away from the capital city to regional centers, and 2) create a healthy economic climate among the regional centers and secondary cities that act as market centers for the rural areas. Based on the team's findings, the critical objectives for strengthening these regional centers would be to:

- 1) stimulate agriculture;
- 2) stimulate sufficient flows of inputs to rural areas, especially agricultural inputs;
- 3) provide essential social services such as schools, health care and water; and
- 4) create seasonal and year-round off-farm employment opportunities.

The method of study would be to conduct analyses of the settlement system and linkages and of the resource base, in order to obtain a socioeconomic, demographic and physical profile. The project would also seek to:

- 1) identify the components and characteristics of the existing urban system;
- 2) delineate with greater precision the linkages between rural and urban areas (such as population movements and flows of money and goods);
- 3) describe the distribution of existing services, facilities, infrastructure and productive activities, and as well as the system of land distribution and zoning; and
- 4) identify the capable institutions and organizations to carry out a plan for regional center development.

Specific studies to be carried out would include collecting information on population data, possibly using the 1984 census as baseline data to determine population distribution and locate catchment areas for services. Next, a study of the local population could be made by surveying families in the urban and rural areas of the selected target areas to obtain information on accessibility to markets and services, migration flows, frequency of visits to towns and journey time. Other studies could be conducted on the labor markets in the selected areas to obtain information on the types and levels of employment there, and on productivity levels by examining labor and capital inputs and the value of output for a number of economic activities, both agricultural and non-agricultural. This information would provide an illustration of the current characteristics of rural life, services and facilities distribution, and land use patterns. It would also indicate the location, size and density of market towns, small cities and regional centers in the selected areas. Finally, the information collected from these studies can assist planners and administrators to identify specific projects and establish locational criteria for future investments in services and facilities such as light industry and other economic and social functions.

## 4. MIGRATION AND THE RURAL ECONOMY

### 4.1 The Strategy of Family Diversification

Somalia's people have long pursued multiple economic strategies, in which pastoralists and agro-pastoralists incorporate trading, commerce and wage employment into their methods of subsistence, thus diversifying income sources and insuring against the vagaries of the environment. The historical depth of this system has recently been documented by Cassanelli (1982) who notes that: "Every pastoral clan was linked in some way to a market town...in essence, the establishment of commercial, credit and kinship ties with townsmen was one of the basic forms of pastoral adaptation to a given region of the country" (Cassanelli 1982: 73). I.M. Lewis described this system in 1961, and emphasized the point again twenty years later, writing that:

"It is...important to stress that the nomads have been for centuries part of a vast, monetarized trading network connecting Ethiopia and the Arabian Peninsula. Commercial attitudes are consequently strongly developed" and furthermore "Northern Somalis have a long tradition of labour migration and overseas employment..." (Lewis 1981: 25-26, emphasis in the original).

Virtually all recent studies of Somali society and economy have noted the integration of agro-pastoralism with far-flung trading, commercial and employment networks maintained by family members. For example, trading and urban investment by nomads "is said to be substantial" according to one article on the nomadic economy, which continues by noting that this investment is "probably less than the financial support of [nomads'] school-age children lodged with settled relatives or foster parents at places having educational facilities" (Reusse 1982: 6). Likewise, a survey in Nugal Region (northeast)

found that one third of the households in semi-nomadic and settled villages had income from outside employment, usually from the full-time employment of the male head (SRUERD 1982: 72). The same patterns are reported by Thomas (1982) and Putman (1962), for the northwest and the Bai Region, respectively.

The role that migration plays in permitting Somali rural families to continue farming and herding under capricious climatic conditions has perhaps been best described in "A Social and Institutional Profile" (SIP 1983), which can be extensively referred to for an elucidation of this pattern. For example, it is noted that, with regard to the Bai Region:

"Households and extended families...have long engaged in flexible, multiple income strategies, often requiring multiple residence and involving the transfer of labor and capital resources from one decentralized management unit to another in response to changing circumstances. The strategy a particular household and extended family decides to pursue depends upon its consumption needs; the age and sex structure of its labor force; its access to productive resources, including arable land, water and pasture; its location in relation to commodity and labor markets; its assets, most particularly in livestock; and its ties with kin groups in urban centers."

This report goes on to stress that:

"Understanding the nature of variations in household and extended family organization and the linkages between the local and national economy is essential to formulating an effective rural and agricultural development strategy..." (SIP 1983: v.10-11).

While no national data are available which would amplify this point, a sample survey of three southern regions (Benadir, Bai and Lower Shebelle; Central

Statistics 1981) provides evidence of the degree to which rural residents participate in the non-agricultural economy. A conservative estimate which can be derived from this survey indicates that at least one quarter of the rural employed population are in occupations other than agro-pastoralism. Despite the imprecision of this result, it does indicate that the "local", i.e., rural economy, contains people who are also active in the formal employment sector.

The strategy of family economic diversification and the exploitation of as many economic niches as possible is quite evident even to the casual observer, and this team encountered examples of such systems again and again. Several individual cases will serve to illustrate: A related group of elders farm some 15 kms. outside of Baidoa town. During the long dry season, these men come into Baidoa, bringing in each case one of their wives. The men come to town in order to sell their crops, after which they use this money to purchase goats and sheep locally. They then trade these livestock to bigger traders in Mogadishu. They also run small shops in Baidoa town. When they "see the clouds" at the end of the dry season, they return to their farms to cultivate. During the time they are in town, they have left behind some of the other wives. One man had a wife with him in town, and two in the rural areas, one of whom was tending the camels, the other tending goats. Another of these elders had a wife who stayed all year round in Baidoa running a shop, while the other wives assisted with the family agricultural tasks.

The second example is that of a nomadic pastoralist, in the extreme southeast of the country, who bought a house in Kismayo some 20 years ago and rents it out. When asked why he had a house, he replied that "there is a tendency for Somalis to have a town property as an investment income". His brothers take care of his camels while he is in Kismayo collecting rent, and his oldest son takes care of the cattle in the countryside. His next three

sons attend school in the district town, living with one of his wives who he has "brought to town"; his hope is that his children will complete their schooling, as livestock is not as reliable as having an education. This man does not cultivate any crops, but he trades ghee (clarified butter) and milk with his "many relatives" who have shops in his district, receiving food in return.

The third example is a senior local official in Merka. When asked if he had a farm, his terse response was, "Of course, do you think I live on my salary?" He then elaborated that his family had lived in Merka and farmed outside the town for many generations.

There are many possible combinations of activities, and we encountered evidence of such multiple strategies again and again, at all levels of society. Not every family is equally well-placed, of course, but the general principles seem to obtain throughout the society. These examples demonstrate not only the interweaving of rural and urban economic opportunities, but also the extent to which this system is conscious and articulated by its practitioners. It is this system which must be seen as a backdrop to the succeeding discussion of migration and the rural economy.

#### 4.2 Seasonality and Crises

A second important characteristic of Somali migration and urbanization is the element of seasonal variation, and change from year to year. It is common for Somali farmers or agro-pastoralists to come to towns in search of wage work during the dry seasons, after harvest and before the rains. It is said that the population of some towns can increase by 25-50% during the normal dry season (Clarke 1981: 1). This pattern will be intensified in times of drought, but when the rains come the farmer usually returns to his or her fields.

Similarly, and more markedly, nomadic herders move to towns, or even create them at their home wells during the long dry season (see Thomas 1982: 48-49). In times of drought or in case of the loss of livestock, herders may come to town themselves or may send their families. This is as true today as it was in recent historic times (Cassanelli 1982). When the rains begin or once the time of stress has passed, the family or the herder usually returns to the rural areas (although apparently larger numbers these days are deciding to stay on in town indefinitely). Sometimes these nomadic herders simply move to the edge of town and set up camp there. At other times they move into the homes of relatives.

Currently, the populations of Mogadishu and other towns are also being augmented by tens of thousands of refugees from the fighting in the Ogaden and adjacent areas, and these people, too, are being housed by relatives until they can find work and their own housing or, perhaps, return to their old homes. The code of mutual aid among family and lineage members is a powerful one among the Somali, and it seems that kinsmen can be turned away only at great social cost. It is either a complaint or a boast of many government officials that they are housing numerous relatives from the Ogaden.

Somalia's towns and cities are thus unusual in the extent to which they function as temporary places of refuge and augmentation of income, and their populations may vary both seasonally and as a result of environmental and social crises and fluctuations. Any future census or studies must take these factors into account.

#### 4.3 Income Differentials

The disparity between income levels associated with different economic activities is frequently a major cause of migration, as has been noted recently with respect to Somalia:

"The [labor] market may not be in equilibrium and information may not be perfect, but villagers explain changes in seasonal and long-term labor migration in terms of wage differentials and the monetary and psychic costs of moving" (SIP 1983: III.20).

Any effort to document income differentials in Somalia is fraught by data inadequacies and inaccuracies. Several studies have attempted to quantify the variety of incomes available to Somalis pursuing different activities (reviewed in SIP 1983 Appendix 4, and Ministry of Local Government 1981). However, the utility of these studies is highly compromised by several problems. These problems include the absence of a rigorous and cross-sectoral definition of income, the absence of data, the exclusion of the value of subsistence production and, finally, by the categorization of Somali households as unidimensional economic isolates; i.e., as farmers, pastoralists or urban dwellers. In consequence, the results of these studies are unacceptable; "[t]he surveys are so riddled with internal contradictions that they should be regarded as conveying no more information than would random number tables!" (SIP 1983, Appendix 4, p. 6).

The propensity of rural people to migrate in response to more attractive incomes is rarely doubted; however, this process is more rarely verified by reference to available data. Research results from another African country with high migration rates, Botswana, provide some substantiation for this process. Using national survey data, a series of possible contributing factors to migration were examined by regression analysis. These contributing factors included individual attributes (sex, education, age, etc.), household wealth indicators, regional variation, the probability of obtaining a job at the destination, and finally, rural versus urban wage rates. It was found that:

"...the high employment chances and high wages of the towns are the major drawing factor [of rural migrants to town]...the higher the wage one can expect in town, the more people come to town and conversely the higher the wage one can expect at the rural home the more one stays at home" (Lucas 1981: 267).

Wages, of course, only comprise one type of income, and cannot readily be compared to income-in-kind from subsistence production. There do not appear to be any reliable estimates for Somali household income accrued from agropastoralism (Hogan et al 1981 and Ministry of Local Government 1981). Even should this information exist, a comparison of income across sectors would only be meaningful if the variation in cost-of-living was taken into account. Thus, although urban wages may seem, at face value, considerably higher than rural wage or farm income, the urban cost-of-living is also higher, since most if not all food must be purchased and rents, services, etc., are more expensive than in the countryside. Studies of urban and rural household expenditure patterns in other countries reveal that Poverty Datum Lines must be set higher in towns in order to meet higher basic living costs.

For the reasons given above, a satisfactory measure of income differentials is required in order to evaluate the relationship between income and migration. The measurement of income differentials needs to start with a comprehensive definition of income. This definition should encompass cash income (from wages, self-employment and sale of products), and imputed value of in-kind income (crops, animal products, household capital assets). The total of all household income then needs to be weighted according to locational variations in cost-of-living. Finally, net income can be calculated by subtracting all costs associated with income (e.g., taxes, fees, production costs and depreciation). As already mentioned, such an exercise is not possible now in

Somalia, due to the lack of primary data. However, policy planning for future migration cannot be well-founded unless income differentials are measurable and assessed.

Data on wage income is currently the only available base upon which to discuss the effect of income differentials on migration patterns in Somalia. Presented below in Table II are a series of unskilled daily wage rates obtained by this study, in all the locations visited by the team. These should be treated as indicative only, since multiple samples were not obtained. However, some verification can be made of the hypothesis that migration is partly fueled by the search for better incomes, if the data in Table II is combined with information given by people interviewed in the course of the study. Since the patterns of migration were found to vary within different regions, each region will be discussed separately: first Bai Region (Baidoa town and area), then Lower Shebelle (Merka District) and lastly, Lower Juba (Kismayo town area).

Several informants in Baidoa town and its environs commented on the attractiveness of construction work because of the good wages offered. Members of local farming families move into Baidoa town to take advantage of these jobs, on a seasonal basis during the dry low season (jilaal), or on a longer-term basis. One older farmer, himself temporarily residing in Baidoa during jilaal, remarked that "Now people are coming to town as construction workers; they can earn 50 or 60 shillings a day so they don't want to come back to farming".

In the Merka District of Lower Shebelle, by contrast, few settled agriculturalists were said to be seeking season wage work due to the year-round labor requirements of the irrigated cultivation system, which has no marked low season. However, younger men from pastoralist groups as well as from

TABLE II

COMPARATIVE WAGE RATES FOR UNSKILLED LABOR,<sup>1</sup> BY SECTOR AND REGION (DAILY)  
(\$1.00 U.S. = 15.108 shillings)

Baidoa Town <sup>2</sup> construction workers	80-100 sh.
Bai Region <sup>3</sup> charcoal workers	10 sh.
Bai Region <sup>4</sup> seasonal weeding	20-50 sh.
Lower Shebelle <sup>5</sup> seasonal weeding	40 sh.
Lower Shebelle <sup>6</sup> harvesting	20 sh.
Lower Shebelle <sup>7</sup> plantation workers	5-20 sh.
Lower Juba <sup>8</sup> Sugar Project	21-27 sh.
Lower Juba <sup>9</sup> seasonal weeding	70 sh.
Government <sup>10</sup> Ministries (scaled 1-12)	10-33 sh.

#### Notes

1. "Unskilled" here refers to manual labor not requiring any formal technical training.
2. Rates paid by one of the biggest private building contractors.
3. Rates stated by the head of the Bai Region Charcoal Cooperative; derived from calculating 60 workers producing a total of 900 quintals of charcoal a month, each quintal sold at 16 sh.
4. Rates given by two different farmers, based on a rate per tacab, a strip of land measuring in this case about 60 x 6 meters. (See Putman 1982 for a discussion of land measurements and variations in Bai Region).
5. Rate given by one farmer near Genale, based on a rate per jibal, a strip of land measuring about 1/16th of a hectare.
6. Rate given by same farmer as above.
7. Rate given in one village near Genale.
8. Rates stated in 1983 Juba Sugar Project paysheet, derived from monthly rates.
9. Rates given by an agro-pastoralist in the Kismayo District, based on a rate for one jibal, measuring in this case about 20 x 20 metres.
10. Rates stated by an official in the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs for Grade D workers.

settled agricultural groups were seeking regular construction work and other unskilled positions both in Merka town and in Mogadishu. According to one senior official in Merka town, there are "enormous opportunities" for immigrant nomads, in the construction industry, government development projects and in other unskilled manual positions.

In the Lower Juba catchment area for Kismayo town, it was said that men from nomadic groups were likewise migrating into town seeking jobs in the construction industry, at the port and in other laboring jobs. Settled agriculturalists were not perceived to be moving into town in order to get wage work on a regular basis, though some farmers do seek seasonal urban employment as drivers, for example, having learned to drive on tractors in rural areas.

Although information on employment in other urban industries is lacking, rural residents interviewed frequently referred to younger people leaving so as to get employment in towns; as a headman in a Lower Shebelle village succinctly put it: "The man has to gain other income while the family remains farming". Thus it is very likely that rural people migrate to towns not only because of higher income possibilities, but also to augment existing sources of income by adding another component.

Responsiveness to wage rates can also be demonstrated by reference to the Juba Sugar Project, located at Merere in Lower Juba Region. The project was built in a low-density population area and difficulties were encountered in hiring sufficient labor, both skilled and unskilled. These difficulties are considered by some to be due to the low wages offered. Recruitment campaigns had to be mounted by the company, which is, however, still plagued by a high labor turn-over particularly in the skilled categories. Net monthly salaries for the skilled, experienced grades (requiring technical certificates) range from 2,000 to 2,500 shillings per month. By comparison, one private building

contractor in Baidoa was paying about 4,800 shillings per month for carpenters and electricians.

Many skilled technicians working at the Juba Sugar Project were said to have migrated to the Gulf states, where salaries were vastly superior. For example, it was estimated that skilled men such as electricians, masons, steel erectors, etc., could earn 20,000 shillings a month (5,000 riyals) in the Gulf states. For some, private ventures may offer a higher income, as in the case of one man, a highly experienced engineer, who was approached by the Juba Sugar Company. The company offered him a salary of 3,000 shillings per month while he demanded 15,000 shillings. For him, private local sub-contracting has proved to be far more lucrative and the Gulf does not tempt him. Similarly, a manager of a large non-government building firm reports little difficulty in recruiting good workers, many of them returnees with experience in the Gulf states.

A strong relationship between wage rates and willingness to migrate can also be found in the case of seasonal labor migration from the dryland farming areas of Bai Region to carry out short-term weeding jobs in the riverine areas of the Lower Shebelle and Lower Juba Regions. Table II shows that seasonal wages for weeding are among the highest rates for unskilled labor jobs. The pattern of temporary migration in response to these job opportunities has been well-documented (see Putman 1982; SIP 1983). This annual migration corresponds with the lowest period of labor requirement in the dryland farming system (jilaal, the dry season), when the absence of labor would be least detrimental to family farms.

The high wages offered for weeding jobs do not so much reflect the overall prosperity of small-scale agriculturalists as the "fact that weeding...is the binding constraint on production" (SIP 1983: V p. 7). Since ultimately

the amount of harvest may depend upon weeding being performed, farmers are willing to pay a premium price in order to get the job done. Weeding is also the single biggest labor requirement in the crop cycle, requiring around 24 person/days per hectare in each season (derived from estimates given in Lewis 1981: 29). Therefore many farmers have to hire additional labor, over and above available family labor, in order to complete all weeding. The actual weeding period may only span a short time; since no detailed studies of agricultural labor patterns appear to exist, we cannot state how long this period is. However, one farmer in the Bai Region said weeding took about 30 days each season. Despite the short-term nature of these jobs, it is nevertheless clear that people are sufficiently motivated by the prospect of good wages to annually migrate from their permanent homes so as to take on temporary, well-paying jobs.

To conclude this discussion of the role that income differentials play in inducing migration, it is important to note several points. Firstly, wage rates alone cannot be taken as an adequate indicator of income differentials in an economy still primarily non-industrialized. Rather, the function that wages may provide in a mixed subsistence/commercial economy is as a source of ready cash to supplement agro-pastoral subsistence and sales incomes. One must be careful not to overestimate the "pull" of wage jobs, given the generally healthy state of crop and livestock operations in Somalia.

Secondly as a corollary to this point, wage opportunities, particularly well-paid wage jobs, may fulfill temporary, seasonal or cyclical income needs for members of Somali households. Wages offer one type of income (cash) in a multi-faceted system of income generation. As such, wage jobs may be sought by rural residents in order to balance out temporary losses incurred in herding or cropping, due to drought or other misfortunes. Wage jobs may also be

used as a means of accumulating savings to be invested into family herds or private business ventures. Moreover, wage work may consist of a stage in a life cycle, appealing to young men who later return to farming or herding. In other words, wage jobs provide one method of redressing income differentials between economic sectors, and have the special attraction of giving access to cash that may be scarce in a semi-subsistence rural economy.

#### 4.4 The Attraction of Towns and the Harshness of Nomadic Life

Several regional and city officials expressed the belief that young nomads are increasingly leaving the rural areas because of the harshness of pastoral nomadic life, and are drawn to the towns and cities by the attractions--the "bright lights" phenomenon. Young men see their peers leave the camel camps for town, and then return some time later to show off their new possessions, tell of the fun of town life, and the relative ease of life compared to the rigors and hazards of tending livestock. It seems quite reasonable that this is sometimes the case, but also that it must be an oversimplification of the decisions involved. From recent accounts it appears that the livestock business is flourishing (Holtzman 1982; Reusse 1982; SIP 1983), and livestock continues to be a good investment and business--though it is clearly better for big owners and dealers than it is for families that are poor in stock. Livestock raising is also risky business, and some pastoralists in the southern areas, at least, want either to diversify their "businesses" or even get out of nomadic pastoralism altogether. On the other hand, the move to town for a young herder may even be just a phase in the life cycle, after which he will return to the camel camp, perhaps having acquired the resources with which to purchase more livestock.

Certainly of greater importance than the "bright lights" phenomenon is the opportunity for both individual and family advancement. To a greater extent than was true in earlier times, the city today offers improved life chances, or at least a perspective on another way of life for individuals, and increased control over a family's situation. To begin with, the cities offer those services which people in rural areas are aware of and would like to have in their own communities: available water, health services, and education or training for their children. Rural people spoke to us poignantly on several occasions regarding the losses and difficulties they encountered through the lack of water, schooling, and medical care in their areas.

In addition to an increased earning potential, secondary schooling can offer an individual the opportunity for guaranteed government employment. While this may not, in itself, result in high wages, it does offer the chance for status, connections, political importance, etc. From the point of view of a family diversifying its strategies, it is clearly advantageous to have some members well-placed in government or the armed forces and in urban occupations such as trading and shopkeeping.

Once a family has a base in an urban area it is likely that others will be drawn to it, especially children for schooling. In fact it is evidently common for polygynous families to divide up so that one wife remains in the rural area while the other lives in town with the children of school age. A well-placed or well-off relative in a city or town may become a magnet drawing more family and lineage members to that place.

Another opportunity offered by every type of clustered settlement, from bulo or tulo to town or city, is commercial. There is apparently enough money in both the rural and urban economies that shopkeepers do well, and the

profits can be put back into farms and livestock, or used to acquire plots and build houses for rental (see Section 4.7).

While the "bright lights" phenomenon may play some role, it seems that economic and socio-political factors probably play a much larger role. The city and town serve the interests of both the marginal farmer or herder, who can receive a higher return for his or her labor in the developing urban areas, and for the more successful families, who can cut their risks, diversify their interests, and increase their security through the opportunities these areas offer--without giving up their farms or their herds and flocks.

#### 4.5 Crop/Livestock Production and Income

Accelerating rural outmigration is related in a number of ways to levels of production and income in farming and herding. Outmigration can be construed both as a response to changes in these sectors, while at the same time migration will bring about further alterations in production systems and income. The nature of this relationship is of critical significance for the determination of rural and urban development policy. Before discussing this team's findings, there are several factors which need to be considered when assessing the association between outmigration and crop/livestock output. These factors should be included as the criteria used in objectively measuring increases or declines in production and income. Until one has a better understanding of economic factors in farming/herding, one cannot analyze the impacts of outmigration upon these sectors.

Previous studies have noted the emergence of a richer class of farmers and pastoralists in Somalia and a growing differentiation between classes (Swift 1979; World Bank 1981). The existence of different classes of producers means that one must be careful to distinguish between average or

national changes in crop/livestock output, versus declines or increases specific to particular groups of producers. The few surveys of rural income distribution in Somalia also indicate an unevenness in production levels and income, both inter-region and intra-community (summarized in Ministry of Local Government 1981). The heterogeneity among producers will most likely be accompanied by a series of different relationships between outmigration and crop/livestock output. For instance, among some groups of producers, outmigration may be imperative to overcome consistent losses in production; among other groups, outmigration may be an option which will yield additional income to be used for investing in crop/livestock operations. For yet other groups of producers, outmigration may be a sporadic activity intended to redress occasional production losses and also to provide capital for crop/livestock investment. In each case, the initial level of wealth (whether in the form of livestock, land or equipment) will play a major role in shaping the particular patterns of migration. Regional and climatic factors are similarly contributing forces that affect both the levels of wealth and the type of migration pattern. Thus, in order to analyze the causal relationships between production and migration, one must begin by delineating the wealth and environmental variables that differentiate classes of producers.

A second aspect of the relationship between crop/livestock output and migration that merits careful attention is the question of labor costs in farming and herding. These costs have a major bearing on the profitability or otherwise of crop/livestock operations, yet they are frequently undervalued or ignored in project designs (a point also made in SIP 1983). Estimations of current and potential income in farming/herding should include the value of family labor participation, the opportunity cost of this participation, and the costs of hiring labor. Farm management surveys which exclude the full

costs and benefits of labor run the risk of miscalculating the real returns to farming and herding, thus making it difficult to evaluate the extent of a "push" effect leading to outmigration. Without an appreciation of labor markets in farming/herding, it is likewise difficult to evaluate the impact of migration, in terms of lost labor and wage income used to hire replacement labor. Unfortunately, consideration of the value of labor is often missing in policy design; for example, a major analysis of USAID agricultural strategy (Hogan et al 1981) nowhere mentions the question of labor costs and has this to say on the economics of crop production: "It would appear that low technology, low input farmers, who by definition incur little or no monetary costs during the production process, would be relatively unaffected by any cost-price squeeze" (Hogan et al 1981: 51). This team's findings, however, indicate not only a crisis of labor costs (see Section 4.6), but also a high family labor opportunity cost, created by a mobile labor market which responds with alacrity to better income potentials in non-agricultural sectors. There are, indeed, all the symptoms of a cost/price squeeze, as the costs of labor cannot be recouped by some types of farmers through the value of sales and home consumption.

A third point concerns the measurement of production and income in the short term versus the long term, since the drought-prone environment leads to variation in output between different seasons and over the longer term. Climatic factors lead to production deficits in some seasons, which are balanced out by good seasons. Farmers and herders have adapted to this environment by storing surpluses in good times, in the form of grain or livestock, to be exploited in times of need. Thus climatic variation and the adaptations made to this variation need to be taken into account when assessing the changes in

income and production levels. It would be misleading to conclude that because, in any given year, farmers or herders are making a loss,<sup>1</sup> that these losses always lead to a greater impetus for outmigration. Rather, it seems as though cyclical production shortfalls are expected by producers, who compensate in part by drawing on stored reserves, and in part through the outmigration of some family members in order to earn alternative income. Therefore, observers cannot determine whether there is a real trend towards declining production and income in crop/livestock operations, unless this trend has been documented over a period of some years.

Turning now to the cursory observations made by this team, several distinct patterns of crop/livestock income and production were found according to the region visited. These regions were i) Baidoa town and its environs in the Bai Region, ii) Merka District in Lower Shebelle Region and lastly, iii) Kisumayo town in Lower Juba Region. Following is a brief review of the situation in each area visited, as reported in conversations with agro-pastoralists and extension personnel. Caution is required in interpreting these observations, which could not be substantiated by reference to the factors discussed above, nor by any data on production economics. Additionally, older persons may often assert that "life was better in the old days", in terms of more rain, more pastures, more livestock, higher yields, more labor, more land, etc. We were frequently told that this was the case, and can only report these remarks in good faith, in the absence of any independent data.

<sup>1</sup>One small study in the Middle Shebelle area, in 1982, estimated costs of producing one quintal (100 kgs.) of sorghum = 511 sh. while farmgate price per quintal was only 180 sh. (SOURCE: Abdurahim H.M. Hussein, Ministry of Agriculture, personal communication.)

In the Baidoa agricultural area, conflicting reports were received regarding the status of agricultural productivity and its relationship to rural outmigration. One viewpoint, expressed by a senior government official, is that agricultural productivity and output is expanding, and additional income from crop sales is fueling the urbanization of Baidoa town as farmers invest in house construction. Several agro-pastoralists interviewed stated, by contrast, that soil exhaustion, rising costs of hired agricultural labor, lack of inputs and low official grain prices to producers combined to create much pressure on farming, leading in turn to greater numbers of people seeking alternative incomes in the urban areas. One group of settled farmers explicitly stated that "The major cause of outmigration [in the Baidoa area] is because of poverty; fewer livestock and the productivity of crops is getting worse".

The actual position may include both these extremes. It is quite likely that some town-based groups of farmers, who can afford to pay for technical inputs such as fertilizers and tractors, are benefitting from higher yields. These farmers are increasingly forming group or co-op farms, giving them greater access to government agricultural equipment and inputs, and also permitting larger capital outlays. Many of these farmers have turned to cash crops (groundnuts, sesame, vegetables) and are experimenting with yet other cash crops (such as cotton and Sudan grass for fodder). One such farmer was realizing a healthy profit selling in the local market, after only several years in a co-op farm. These type of farmers are also investing in house-

drift to the regional centers in search of wage jobs. This leads in turn to a greater labor shortage in farming and spiralling labor costs; less land can be tilled or weeded, and output declines even further. This latter group of poorer farmers are most probably the group who send some family members seasonally into town, to get a temporary wage job or run a family shop; these seasonal urban migrants return to the family farms with the arrival of gu (long rains).

The relationship between agricultural productivity and income to out-migration appears to be somewhat different in both the Low Shebelle and Lower Juba Regions. In the Lower Shebelle (Merka District) access to irrigated land is a critical factor, and for those who cannot obtain such land, migration to the district center at Merka is apparently an alternative. One must distinguish here between "settled workers", (i.e., plantation workers who have been allocated one-half or one hectare of irrigated land), versus independent farmers, who may have much larger tracts of irrigated land available. (One farmer interviewed had about 50 hectares). Amongst the settled workers, farming is usually at pure subsistence levels, with little if any surplus for sale. In bad seasons, (in one case, for the past two rainy seasons) crops may be totally insufficient for family requirements. Outmigration from these small hamlets was said to be limited to very local areas, primarily in search of more or better farming land rather than for wage employment. Migration for employment was stated to be restricted by the lack of skills attained by plantation workers, though other informants noted that as plantation workers acquired basic skills handling machinery (e.g., tractors) they tended to migrate to towns where higher wages were offered. The initial impression in these "settled worker" hamlets was that both crop and livestock activities were limited and static, if not declining. In one hamlet visited, only 2 men

out of an estimated population of 700 people owned cattle, and three men owned one camel each. Overall, there seemed to be little movement of people in or out of these hamlets, and little income generated from family agriculture.

The independent farming communities of Merka District have more dynamic patterns, both of migration and agricultural activity. On the question of whether total crop output was declining, the crucial factor seems to be the availability and price of agricultural labor (discussed in greater detail in Section 4.6). The issue of declining agricultural production is clearly linked to that of labor outmigration, inasmuch as local residents of Merka District stressed that farm land is being abandoned in the face of rising labor costs. Likewise, irrigation canals are not being maintained due to the lack of men to carry out cooperative work.

The Lower Juba Region experiences yet another pattern, in which livestock production was said to be suffering as more pastoralists leave the nomadic system, and come to Kismayo and other towns in the region in search of unskilled work. There was general agreement amongst all those interviewed that this was a very serious problem from the point of view of the viability of the herds left in the care of older relatives. However, no information was obtained on whether income from herding had declined; one can assume, in the absence of adequate data at present, that younger nomads are leaving the pastoral life not only because of its legendary harshness, but also because of the economic attractiveness of wage employment relative to herding. Nevertheless, this does not assist in answering the question of whether declining livestock productivity has been responsible for pushing people out of the livestock sector. However, informants stated that most younger pastoralists who leave in order to get employment in the local towns do send back part of their earnings to their families; this money was in the past used by

pastoralists to purchase more livestock. It was said that these days, pastoralists are more likely to use their wages to build houses in town and to start up businesses. If these statements reflect a common pattern, then the livestock economy is declining, as it is losing manpower without gaining back capital from the proceeds of migration.

To sum up this discussion of the relationship between levels of crop/livestock output and rural outmigration, it has been noted that a number of distinct patterns prevail in the different ecological areas of Somalia, (bearing in mind that the team was unable to comment on the situation in the north or central regions). Differences also exist depending on the socio-economic class of the producers, their access to land and their access to technical innovations. In general, there appear to be multiple and complex interrelationships between farming, herding and outmigration.

#### 4.6 The Labor Question

The theme of agricultural labor scarcity recurs throughout this report, as it does among the rural residents we interviewed, who perceive outmigration as the primary cause of a labor shortage. Whether there is an actual shortage of people to carry out farming or herding tasks, or whether there is a scarcity of people willing to work for the wages that are offered, is a question open to speculation. This is clearly an issue that deserves closer investigation. The team's findings on this question are discussed below. The existence of a labor shortage or scarcity has at least two implications for development programs in livestock and agriculture. Firstly, it implies that research and extension programs must concentrate on developing alternative techniques that reduce the labor component of production, and these programs must seek ways of improving the cash returns to herding and farming, to allow

for the higher wages being demanded by laborers. Secondly, a scarcity of labor at current wage levels tells us something about the economic status of agro-pastoralism, for it suggests i) that rural people are aware of better-paying opportunities in other sectors, and ii) that agro-pastoralism cannot compete, at present, with the wages offered in these other sectors.

While there is inadequate supportive data to elaborate on this point, further study of the labor question would assist in setting feasible development goals for the crop/livestock sector. It may well be that, for the majority of producers, the trend is for participation in agro-pastoralism to yield less attractive returns than engagement in other sectors. In that case, development efforts should perhaps focus attention on these other sectors if the goal is to increase welfare for the majority. At the same time, a minority of producers with greater access to capital and labor may be able to benefit from agro/pastoral programs designed to increase production levels. In this case, technical improvement "packages" may be appropriate only for a particular class of producers.

Further study of the labor question should include the following topics: i) trends in agricultural labor wage rates, over the past years, ii) labor activity patterns in cropping and livestock, according to season and the types of individuals involved, iii) patterns of temporary in and out-migration from production areas, which together with (ii) above provides iv) a picture of labor supply and demand, v) overall activity patterns of producers and their families, to ascertain the degree of flexibility in activity patterns and whether there is in fact a labor surplus and underemployment at certain times, vi) investigation of the effects of a labor shortage on productivity and incomes in agro-pastoralism. A research program with these goals would

provide insight into one of the principal phenomena now occurring in Somalia's rural areas; a labor crisis brought about by outmigration.

The problem of labor shortages was mentioned by farmers and pastoralists interviewed in all three regions visited by this team. As in the previous sections, each region will be discussed separately, beginning with Bai Region, and then considering Merka District (Lower Shebelle) and Kismayo area (Lower Juba).

In Bai Region, a senior official commented that labor shortages were causing a reduction in productivity for some agro-pastoralists, as people were "abandoning" their farms and migrating into Baidoa town. According to this official, an urgent priority is to upgrade the services available in the farming communities (services such as health, schools and water), in order to retain people in the rural areas and promote greater productivity in crop farming. This viewpoint was confirmed by agro-pastoralists interviewed. One group of farmers noted that agricultural labor used to be available. The work parties (barbar), organized by age-sets, which could be called upon to till and weed a farm are no longer prevalent. When asked about future prospects in farming, this group replied the future would get worse because of the problem of labor. In another village near Baidoa town, farmers stressed the lack of services in the rural communities, which was making rural life less and less attractive relative to the towns. This lack of services was seen as being responsible for the exodus of people, resulting in a labor shortage for those left behind. Amongst all the agro-pastoralists interviewed, it was said that agricultural wage rates were climbing sharply, and hired labor was becoming more and more difficult to obtain.

In Merka District, Lower Shebelle Region, two distinct agricultural systems prevail; the large plantations worked by "settled labor" (communities

allocated small parcels of irrigated land by plantation owners) and secondly, independent farmers cultivating irrigated land. Both farming systems are apparently experiencing problems of labor shortages. In the case of the plantations, it was said that more land was being brought under irrigation, creating a demand for labor which was often met by nomads seeking temporary work. However, the nomads "only stay a short time [on the plantations] and then run away to other jobs as waiters, construction workers and other town jobs". This informant believed that nomads use the plantation jobs as stepping stones to make contacts and get acquainted with town people, in order to obtain town jobs. Given that plantation wages quoted in one area ranged from 5-10 shillings/day, it perhaps is not surprising that nomads are keen to try for urban jobs.

Among the independent farmers of Merka District, there was general agreement that the cost of hiring labor was going up and up, and it was often hard to get workers at the wage rates a farmer could afford. Farmers appear to be sensitive to the cost/benefit of hiring ever-more-expensive labor to perform weeding and other operations. To quote one farmer who had difficulty getting labor at the price he was willing or able to pay: "Sometimes, if they [laborers] want more money, I look at my fields to see how many weeds there are, and whether I can afford to pay more and get a return at the harvest. If I think I can get more [harvest] I pay for weeding; otherwise I leave it". He admitted having miscalculated on occasion and commented that in the past, he used to reap up to 1000 kgs. per hectare, whereas recently he yields only about 300 kgs. per hectare. This farmer explained his declining productivity in terms of the general loss of men occurring in the community, as younger men were leaving to seek jobs in Mogadishu and Merka town. In his opinion, there was no solution possible at the village level, as it was "a national problem".

Finally, the same overall pattern was found in Kismayo area, Lower Juba Region, with a major difference being that the labor shortage was confined to pastoralism. According to a senior official, pastoralists leave the rural areas because of inadequate social services (particularly schools), and because of declining productivity in the livestock business, due to drought and tsetse fly. Once pastoralists have come to town to get jobs, they rarely want to return to the nomadic life, said this official. (This opinion was common among all officials interviewed). From the perspective of pastoralists interviewed, shortage of labor to herd and otherwise manage livestock was similarly perceived as a major problem. In the view of one nomadic pastoralist:

"If one has no grown-up children looking after livestock, it's not possible to get employees...the problem is that the able grown-up people among the pastoralists have mostly come to town, to look for work, because life is easier in the towns. Twenty years ago people used to come to one's house and say 'I need to herd your livestock if you need labor'--now you have to go and look for the laborers, which means you don't find them".

To conclude this discussion of the labor question, there is good reason to believe that outmigration from herding and farming is responsible for inducing a real shortage of able-bodied people to carry out essential tasks. Outmigration also induces inflation of agricultural wage rates as demand for labor outstrips supply and local people can insist on higher wages in the agricultural sector.

#### 4.7 Investment of Income Generated by Migration

As people migrate from one location to another, and engage in new economic activities, additional amounts of income earned at the destination points become available for individual investment. This facet of migration is

potentially very beneficial both to families and to the economy as a whole, and it is therefore a matter of interest to development planners. In addition to the investment potential generated by migration, private consumption income may also be increased, a fact less often recognized in the analysis of migration impacts. Depending on how additional income is invested or consumed, there will be different effects upon the economy as a whole as well upon individual welfare. "Investment" is usually taken to mean the process by which capital is used to generate more income, in contrast to consumption expenditure which does not yield any income return. Both investment and consumption expenditure can have the effect of stimulating the economy by increasing productive capacity and services, in the case of investment, and by raising demand for products and services, in the case of consumption. In Somalia's present foreign exchange situation, an important issue is whether investment and consumption results in a higher demand for imported commodities, or whether national production and services are improved.

In the course of this study, it was observed that different types of migrants exhibited varying investment and consumption patterns, and accordingly, each type of migrant category will be discussed separately. Three basic types of migrant in Somalia are i) rural-urban migrants, ii) migrants to the Gulf States, and iii) seasonal migrants.

Urban migrants to the capital, Mogadishu, or to large towns such as Baidoa and Kismayo, appear to be investing both at the urban destinations and back into their rural home areas. Urban investments include building houses for rental purposes, opening stores, operating donkey cart businesses, and restaurants. Forms of rural investment include purchasing livestock, opening stores, buying trucks to run transport companies, amongst other options. It should be stressed that urban migrants often invest simultaneously in several

spheres. However, no accurate picture can be drawn of the predominant direction of capital flows, (i.e., whether to urban or rural areas) nor which economic activities are the most attractive to investors. Despite this caveat, urban informants more frequently mentioned house building in towns, and shops, as recipients of investment income. The attractiveness of house investment is a reflection of the urban housing boom, discussed in other parts of this report. The other side of the housing boom is that many urban migrants, particularly in Mogadishu, have to spend a large portion of their earnings in high rentals. This is consumption expenditure paid out by some migrants which is providing high rates of return to investment in housing made by other, wealthier migrants.

Urban migrants also invest directly into livestock and agriculture, by purchasing animals, paying for tractors to plow their family farms, building wells and other water points, and less often, purchasing agricultural machinery. For example, an urban migrant in Baidoa town, who is capitalizing on the boom in housing, is also investing in hiring machinery to develop a commercial farm. Urban migrants from the irrigated areas of Merka District are expanding their farms by building irrigation canals and buying water pumps. However, most informants emphasized that investment in housing and commerce takes precedence over crop/livestock investment. While the team did not visit the central and northern nomadic regions, other recent studies indicate that much migration income is going towards building water points and purchasing livestock (Cassanelli 1982; SIP 1983). However, the source of this income is far more often based on migration to the Gulf states, which will be dealt with in more detail below.

A second major category of migrants are those who go to the Gulf states for work, and either return with sizeable savings or else remit large portions

of their earnings while still abroad. Prior to the restrictions imposed in 1982 on imports and use of foreign exchange by Gulf migrants (see SIP 1983), many of these Gulf migrants were operating car import businesses, as well as importing consumer items such as clothing and furniture. A major policy issue centers around the use of money earned by migrants to the Gulf. The dimensions of this policy debate are discussed in some depth in the recent Social and Institution Profile (SIP 1983) and therefore will not be repeated here. At issue are large amounts of potential income, estimated in 1981 as high as 9.375 million Somali shillings, which would constitute 55% of Gross Domestic Product; meanwhile, the estimated remitted portion of this income that would accrue directly to Somalia was around 5.358 million shillings, equivalent to more than six times the domestic wage bill in 1980 (summarized from SIP 1983, Appendix 4: 10). The Ministry of Labor and Social Services was holding meetings in early 1983 with its counterparts in all the Gulf states, to discuss mechanisms to control and utilize these migrant earnings. The Somali Government apparently wishes to have Somali migrants deposit their savings directly into Gulf state banks, which would remit these funds to the state banking system of Somalia, thus permitting the government access to this important source of foreign exchange. It remains an open question, however, as to whether a free foreign exchange system is ultimately more beneficial to the national economy of Somalia. It is to be recommended that close analysis of the past and present uses of Gulf migrants' earnings be conducted, to assess the economic impact of the import and exchange restrictions, and the likely outcome of greater government control over these foreign exchange earnings. (Similar recommendations are presented in SIP 1983).

Many Gulf migrants were said to be investing in urban house construction; as one informant phrased it, with reference to Mogadishu: "Gulf migrants

build four villas, rent three and live in one". In Baidoa, some ex-Gulf migrants were said to spend up to 500,000 shillings on building houses for rental; another example concerned a man who had been a successful cash crop farmer, in the Bai Region. He went to the Gulf states to work, and upon his return, built a shop in Baida town which cost 100,000 shillings. The land on which he had been growing peanuts was then rented to another farmer, and the ex-migrant bought a Landrover for himself. A final example concerns a woman in Mogadishu, whose husband has worked in Saudi Arabia for 8 years, herself runs an import business between Mogadishu, the northwest and Saudi Arabia, has already built one large house for 285,000 shillings and has bought another building plot for which she paid 56,000 shillings. To round out this picture, this same woman's husband has also purchased 28 camels, which his brother tends in the northwest area, and has bought about 300 goats, all from his earnings over the past 8 years in Saudi Arabia. This pattern was confirmed in Baidoa, Merka and Kismayo.

The third category of migrants are seasonal or temporary, consisting of people who move from one rural area to another or from rural to urban areas, in order to find temporary work or to engage in the informal sector. The general purpose of investment by temporary migrants seems to be towards meeting recurrent costs in farming, such as hiring labor or machinery. This was found in both the Bai Region and in Merka District, Lower Shebelle Region. Though little information could be collected on expenditure patterns, mention was made of seasonal migrants using their earnings to supplement basic subsistence expenses, such as clothing, medical fees and to purchase food. Since seasonal migrants are unlikely to be able to accumulate large sums of money, they are also unlikely to be in a position to make major capital investments.

In summary, it seems as though the bulk of income generated by migration is being invested into service sectors rather than productive sectors; housing, shops and transportation are frequently mentioned by local officials and families of migrants as being the main types of investment. There is also evidence that some extra income is spent on "luxury" commodities, such as video cassette recorders, furniture, radios, etc. A major question, which cannot be even partially answered at present, is the extent to which migration income is being used to cover living costs, such as food purchases. However, it seems clear that some income earned by migration is being invested, with the result that local employment and commerce is stimulated (e.g., through the construction industry), transportation services are being improved, and local marketing infrastructure is assisted through the opening up of shops and trading companies. Overall, the transfer of wealth from urban to rural areas is a key element in the process of economic change, although the precise effects of this process are as yet unknown.

##### 5. FUTURE MONITORING OF URBANIZATION AND MIGRATION TRENDS

The scope of work for this study called for a monitoring base from which future trends could be studied. Several future alternatives are outlined, with a brief discussion of their feasibility and methodological considerations. First, it should be noted that the recent SIP report recommends several studies on migration and related topics (SIP 1983: Summary of Recommendations). These are: 1) Labor Migration to the Gulf, and ii) Internal Labor Markets in Somalia. The SIP authors suggest that these two studies should ideally be combined. The team strongly endorses these recommendations in principle, but would add a number of modifications and alternative proposals, to achieve the same ends as set out in the SIP document.

### Alternative A:

This team was able to identify several Somali institutions with experience in conducting socioeconomic population surveys. These include: the Somali Research Unit for Emergencies and Rural Development (SRUERD), located in the Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development; the Manpower Department of the Ministry of Labor and Social Services; the Project Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation Unit in the Ministry of National Planning; and the Rural Development unit in the Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development. These departments are all either currently engaged in conducting population surveys covering a number of topics, or else are preparing to mount such surveys in the near future. In addition, several other ministries apparently conduct ad hoc surveys when a need arises, or as donor agencies provide funds and technical expertise in the course of implementing a particular project. However, the team gained an impression that there is potential for greater cooperation between these data-collection units, to ensure complementarity and communication of research results between these units.

Our first alternative, therefore, calls for an investigation of whether these local data-collection units which are functioning and capable could be better coordinated in order to share some data-collection responsibilities; in this case, on questions relating to urbanization and migration. This would involve initially determining each unit's strengths, in terms of trained and motivated professional personnel. Secondly, efforts could be made to set up an inter-unit research group, which would begin by setting data priorities and discussing division of data-collection tasks. At this point, technical assistance would be necessary, to aid in the delineation of data priorities; such assistance should be backed up by providing short-term technical and professional training courses at appropriate institutions. At the same time, the

technical advisor would endeavour to collate data requirements on the subject of migration and urbanization, as expressed by the Government of Somalia, USAID and any other agencies concerned with gaining information on these processes in Somalia. This would require coordination with other donor agencies and institutions. Essentially, the role of the technical advisor would be to rationalize all requests for socioeconomic population data with reference to migration and urbanization, and then to coordinate with the inter-department research group in order to set priorities, timetables, division of work, develop methodologies and arrange for dissemination of results to interested parties.

Alternative A would have the following goals, in summary:

- Communicate with all local institutions having responsibility and capability for socioeconomic population data collection. Set up inter-unit research group.
- Act as liaison with all donor agencies and other institutions which are concerned with aspects of migration and urbanization in Somalia. Determine their data requirements and priorities.
- Rationalize these data needs and communicate them to the inter-unit research group. Initiate discussions with inter-unit group of how to carry out tasks of data collection.
- Determine personnel training needs of each cooperating department, and assist in arranging for technical/professional short courses.
- Ensure that all Government agencies and other interested groups receive research results, in the forms most useful to them.

Alternative A could be achieved in the following manner: initially, inquiries must be made as to the interest in this proposal within the

government units and ministries that would participate. If reaction is positive, a technical advisor should be engaged, for a minimum of 9 months, or else on a part-time basis for a longer time period. It is recommended that the technical advisor be placed within one of the ministries, possibly the Ministry of Planning, in order to permit greater coordination with other government research units. Funding commitments should include short training courses, logistical support for conducting surveys (e.g., transportation, publication costs), as well as provision for the technical advisor.

#### Alternative B

There have been several recent socioeconomic population surveys funded by USAID, and carried out cooperatively between a local data collection unit and a U.S. institution. One of the most impressive examples of this type of collaboration is the Central Statistics Department publication, produced in conjunction with the University of North Carolina: Demographic Survey of Benadir, Bay and Lower Shebelle Regions (1982). A similar project could be undertaken to study questions of migration and urbanization, based on a national sample survey. In considering this alternative, several advantages and disadvantages can be pointed out. Among the advantages are a methodologically sound and statistically valid set of results. Secondly, local professionals are fully involved in the exercise and also gain greater experience in data collection techniques and analysis. Some disadvantages of this approach might include the costs of conducting a national survey devoted solely to one issue (migration and urbanization) and the difficulty of justifying this in the face of other high priority subjects requiring research. Secondly, many of the processes causing and accompanying migration and urbanization are better studied by in-depth sociological methods, rather than by

sample survey methods. However, there is no reason why a statistically sound research program could not be complemented by a series of small-scale in-depth studies. (This was the approach used by a recent large national migration study, in Botswana, which was implemented fairly successfully.) Thirdly, a drawback to this alternative is the length of time required to design, conduct and analyze a national sample survey. Logistics, computer processing and staffing are all components that are very demanding in terms of time.

On balance, Alternative B would be feasible with the following provisos:

A national sample survey should be accompanied by several small in-depth sociological studies, highly localized and focussed on particular aspects of the migration/urbanization process. It is advised that only professional social scientists should be engaged to carry out these surveys, as experience elsewhere cautions against relying on graduate students conducting their own private research projects for dissertation purposes. In these cases, students tend to be reluctant or unable to fully collaborate with the government institution responsible for conducting the larger national survey. However, it is highly recommended that national students completing graduate studies in relevant disciplines be encouraged to cooperate with the national survey, and to team up with professional social scientists carrying out local in-depth studies.

This form of collaboration provides field experience and research opportunities to national students, and assists the senior researchers in conducting their in-depth studies. It is thus mutually rewarding, and permits greater local participation in the research process.

Alternative B would have the following goals, in summary:

- Provision of nationally representative statistical data on the migration and urbanization process, together with insights generated

through in-depth sociological analysis.

- Collaboration of local professionals in the data collection and analysis programs.
- Field training of national university students.

Alternative B could be achieved through a cooperative agreement between USAID and a U.S. institution with expertise in population surveys and migration studies.

#### Alternative C

This alternative is that proposed in the SIP document (pages VI.4 and 5), which is to rely upon a Ph.D. student and a team of professionals from a U.S. institution, to conduct several studies of the migration/urbanization issue. This approach would have the advantage of being more manageable, compared to Alternatives A and B already outlined, since only a few individuals would be involved. Depending upon the personnel who would perform the tasks, this approach could provide a multidisciplinary perspective on the issues, with the potential for in-depth investigation of several of the critical variables. The disadvantages of Alternative C might be that too much reliance is placed on a few individuals, some of whom (i.e., professional staff) might not be able to devote their time fully to this project if they had other commitments. A second disadvantage would be the dependence upon a Ph.D. student, (see remarks under Alternative B, above), to carry a large burden of the study, with an extensive program of research, (as described in the SIP, p. VI.4). However, any reduction in this ambitious research program would lessen the validity of the results. Possibly, several more experienced investigators might be able to cover a greater amount of ground. A third, and serious drawback to Alternative C is the lack of involvement of local educational or

government institutions. This could of course be remedied, but the emphasis would still remain on the research results of non-national academics. Given the level of local expertise and interest in research that this team has encountered in Somalia, Alternative C would not appear to be justified.

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## APPENDIX I

### SCOPE OF WORK FOR RAPID URBANIZATION STUDY

Consultants: Herb Lewis  
Carol Kerven  
Nancy Southerland

#### Scope of Work:

##### a - First week

- identify a local institution to provide assistance to the project;
- obtain quantitative data from published sources;
- meet with government officials to collect information on changes in urban service demand; the rural and urban labor and housing market; and the flow of capital;
- meet with government officials and local leaders in small towns and rural areas.

##### b - Field surveys

The first survey will focus on a few areas that are representative of the range of economic and ecological conditions that exist in Somalia. The survey will explore several issues:

- What are the conditions that are leading to rapid outmigration?
- What are the negative results of the migration process?
- What has happened to the income that urban migrants and migrants to the Gulf have returned to the rural economy? Are their investments being made in the production system? In infrastructure? In entrepreneurial ventures?
- How have household investment strategies changed in terms of, both capital and the dispersal of family members?

The second survey will look at several urban centers at different levels in the central place hierarchy. The following questions will be asked:

- What are the linkages between migrants and home areas? Include remittances, visitation and rates of migrant return.
- How do migrants view small vs. large towns as alternative sites for relocation?
- Which urban centers are dominated by investment followed by economic growth? Which by decline due to depopulation?

- Where investments have led to an improved local economy, is there evidence of increasing capacity to market goods, provide off-farm employment or provide services to rural people?
- Have new service centers appeared to fill gaps in the hierarchy of central places?

c - Study outputs and their application:

- The findings of this study will be related to USAID's program content and priority areas. Given USAID's emphasis on the agricultural sector, it is important to determine if there are linkages between urbanization and 1) the growth of commercial opportunities in rural areas; and 2) agricultural productivity. Whenever household investment strategies do result in improved productivity in the rural areas, donor and host country funds can support their activities through supplemental investment.
- Other insights should be gleaned from the study including an assessment of the GSDR capacity to plan for urbanization. The team should determine institutions that need to be strengthened, the programs that need to be introduced, and the personnel that need to be trained.
- Finally, the study can provide a monitoring base from which migration trends can be examined over the next twelve to eighteen months at a very low cost.

## APPENDIX II

### LIST OF PEOPLE CONTACTED

#### Mogadishu

Awil Mohamed Farah

Mohamed Awad Guleid

Paula Roark

Mohamed Dubeid

Willy Young

Abdi Yusuf Dualleh

Dr. Hussein Alabi

Mahumud Mohamed Ulusow

Abdullahi Jisour

Abdurahim H.M. Hussein

Farah W. Addo

Akar Amin

Mohamed Geilani

Abdul Zini

Hussein M. Adam  
'Tanzania'

Mohammed Uluso

#### Baidoa town, Bai Region

Mohamed Sultan

#### Officials

Director, Central Statistics Department,  
Ministry of National Planning

Project Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation  
Unit, Ministry of National Planning

Monitoring and Evaluation Unit, Ministry  
of National Planning

National Refugee Council

National Refugee Council

Dairy Department, Mayor's Office

Director General, Ministry of National  
Planning

Director of Planning, Rural Development  
Department, Ministry of Rural Development  
and Local Government

Asst. Director for Manpower, Ministry of  
Labor and Social Services

Director of Planning, Ministry of  
Agriculture

Vice Mayor (Social Affairs), Mayor's Office

Deputy Mayor for Finance, Mayor's Office

Director of City Planning, City Planning  
Office

Deputy Director of City Planning,  
City Planning Office

Somalia Research Unit for Emergencies and  
Social Development

Director of Planning, Rural Development  
Department, Ministry of Local Government and  
Rural Development

#### Officials

Regional Governor, Bai Region

Adan Addinan Ahmed	Mayor of Baidoa
Mohamed Awali Asser	Agricultural Extension Officer, Bonka Extension College
Omar Mohamed "Chicago"	Extension Agent, Bonka Extension College
Sheik Abdul Abdullahi Sheik Mohamed	Head of Bai Region Agricultural Cooperative
Abdulle Olusow	Head of Bai Region Charcoal Cooperative

Merka Town, Lower Shebelle Region

Haji Osman Mohamed	Mayor, Merka town
Haji Mohamed Bhere	Deputy Mayor, Merka town

Genale, Lower Shebelle Region

Abdi Nur Hassan	Regional Officer for Extension, Extension Training Center
Buck Richards	Agronomist, Extension Training Center
Seyid Mahumud Abdi	Extension Training Center
Ahmed Omar Jama	Extension Training Center
Abdi Slew Mohamed	Extension Training Center

Kismayo Town, Lower Juba Region

Mahumed Mohamed Liban	Regional Governor, Lower Juba Region
Mohamed Sheel	District Commissioner, Kismayo District
Mohamed Suggele Hersi	Mayor, Kismayo town

USAID Mission, Mogadishu

Jim Kelly, DIR  
 Flynn Fuller, AGR  
 Gerard Neptune, AGR  
 Gary Bivings, RA  
 Charles Habis, GDO  
 Akim Martinez, PROG  
 Laura McPherson, GDO

Medical Services Consultants Inc. (MSCI) Baidoa

Ed Mazerowski

## APPENDIX III

### TEAM TIMETABLE AND ACTIVITIES

- March 17-18 Team met at Clark University and discussed project with Prof. Len Berry, Director of International Development Program at Clark University. Also met with Prof. John Harris, Director African Studies Center, Boston University and member of Social Institutions Profile team on Somalia.
- March 19-20 En route to Somalia.
- March 22-26 Team met with GSDR officials in Mogadishu, and with members of the USAID/Somalia mission. Collected documents and conducted familiarization tour of Mogadishu.
- March 27-  
April 1 Team field trip to Baidoa town and surrounding rural areas in Bai Region. Interviews with town and regional officials, farmers, shopkeepers, students, a builder, smiths, extension workers.
- April 2-4 Meetings with Mogadishu City officials (Mayor's Office) and officials of the Somali Government Ministries.
- April 5-10 Team field trip to Merka town and District (Lower Shebelle Region), including Shalimbod and agricultural areas. Then to Kismayo in Lower Juba Region. Interviews with local city officials, farmers, shopkeepers, pastoralists, extension workers and former personnel of the Juba Sugar Project.
- April 11-14 Meetings with officials of Somali Government Ministries and preparation of preliminary report.
- April 16 Depart Somalia and return to USA.
- April 20-  
May 30 Revision of draft and preparation of final report.