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PEASANT PARTICIPATION IN COSTA RICA'S AGRARIAN REFORM: A VIEW FROM BELOW

by Mitchell A. Seligson

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**PEASANT PARTICIPATION IN COSTA RICA'S
AGRARIAN REFORM: A VIEW FROM BELOW**

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The research for this study has gone on in four continents. It began in Costa Rica in 1976, where the data were collected. Although a number of portions of that data set were analyzed in the years following the field work (see references in bibliography), a comprehensive analysis of the data set as a whole was not undertaken until the Cornell University Rural Development Participation Project decided to proceed with the effort. By that time, in the Winter of 1981, I was Visiting Professor in the Department of Government at the University of Essex in England. The work was begun there and continued as I moved to the Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, where I was a Research Associate during the Spring and Summer. The work concluded at my home institution, in the University of Arizona's Department of Political Science. I wish to thank all of these institutions for use of their excellent research facilities.

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I. INTRODUCTION: OBJECTIVES AND METHODOLOGY

Background

Recent events in Central America have made the five countries in this often-ignored region the object of unprecedented world attention. The revolutionary upheaval in Nicaragua which led to the overthrow of the Somoza dynasty, and the protracted insurrection underway in El Salvador, have ushered in a period of radical political, economic, and social change, the dimensions of which are yet to be fully comprehended. Guatemala, and to a lesser extent Honduras, are also experiencing strong pressures for change. Costa Rica, in contrast, in the past has been insulated from the insurrections, revolutions, and violence of its neighbors, as a result of the number of factors which have been recounted elsewhere (Seligson, 1981). In recent months, however, this pattern shows signs of change. For the first time in memory terrorism has emerged on the Costa Rican political scene, and not since the Civil War of 1948 have people been as concerned about the maintenance of domestic tranquility. The upheavals emerging elsewhere on the isthmus are certainly having an impact upon Costa Rica. Yet it would be misleading to believe that it is purely because of external influences that difficulties have emerged locally.

Two interrelated economic difficulties lie at the heart of Costa Rica's problems: inequality in land distribution and restricted productivity. As explained in some detail elsewhere

(Seligson: 1980b), the expansion of agrarian capitalism in the form of coffee and banana cultivation, beginning in the last century, radically altered the patterns of land tenure in Costa Rica. As a result, a country which in colonial days was dominated by smallholders today suffers from extreme inequalities in land distribution. Comparative data reveal that Costa Rica's inequality in land distribution (as of 1973) was among the most skewed in the world. Moreover the great bulk of the peasantry, somewhere between two-thirds and three-quarters, are landless or nearly landless.

Inequalities in the distribution of land have a direct bearing upon productivity. Although only one-fifth of Costa Rica's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) derives from the agricultural sector, well over two-thirds of its exports are derived from this sector. Hence, the maintenance of a favorable balance of payments is virtually dependent upon agricultural exports. Moreover, direct and indirect taxation of export commodities provide a major share of central government revenues. The concentration of land in the hands of a few restricts agricultural productivity and weakens the ability of this sector to generate capital and employment. Problems of public finance are more serious and complex in Costa Rica than in many other developing nations because of the extensive (and expensive) system of public services maintained by the government.

The dual problems of land inequality and constrained productivity have increasingly preoccupied recent Costa Rican

administrations. One approach to the problem has been to increase emphasis on land reform. While we cannot here detail the history of the expansion of the land reform program in Costa Rica, suffice it to say that by the late 1970s the program was among the most vigorous and extensive in all of Latin America.[1]

In an effort to assist the Government of Costa Rica in its agrarian reform program, the United States Agency for International Development entered into an agreement with the GOCR in late FY1980, providing a total of U.S.\$10 million in loans and grants to assist Costa Rica's land reform agency, the Instituto de Tierras y Colonización (ITCO). The GOCR, in turn, has committed U.S. \$9.3 million to the project. The purpose, as stated in the loan document, is the following: "Emphasizing the Atlantic Region, improve and expand the national program of agricultural asset redistribution, and increase tenure security" (USAID, 1980). The project involves three principal components:

1. Agricultural asset redistribution, under which 935 rural landless families (around 5,500 people) should receive land in three new settlements in the Atlantic Basin region of Costa Rica;

2. Increased tenure security, by which an estimated 4,000 families (around 24,000 people) should receive title to land which they now occupy;

3. Strengthened ITCO administration, concentrating on data management (especially financial, cadastral, and ecological), credit management, planning, orientation and training, titling and program evaluation.

The design of the project envisions strengthening

J. A detailed history of the reform program is contained in Seligson, 1980a; 1980b.

operations and procedures in many areas so that the reform effort can operate at maximum effectiveness in the context of limited financial and human resources. Within the ITCO organization, it is widely believed that one of the more important factors needed to achieve maximum effectiveness is improved evaluation information. Little systematic data currently exist within ITCO as to the impact of its various settlement and titling programs.

In an effort to deal with this problem, one component of the project foresees the establishment of an Evaluation Unit within ITCO's Planning Division which will be staffed by at least five professionals. The evaluation unit will carry out systematic periodic longitudinal analyses of settlers. The findings of these analyses will be discussed with the settlers themselves as well as with ITCO field and central office personnel, hence establishing, for the first time, a crucial feedback channel in the planning procedures of the organization.

The present research effort was undertaken with a view to answering the kinds of questions involved in program evaluation as well as providing a first approximation of the kinds of analyses that the evaluation unit would be carrying out in the years to come. This monograph is a substantially revised version of a study presented to ITCO in November, 1981.

Research Goals

A total of 80% of the funds allocated for this project are earmarked for the new settlements in the Atlantic Basin region.

The project paper states "The ability of the new reform beneficiaries to plan, organize, and implement projects useful to their communities, is a key indication of the success of the program" (USAID, 1980:26). Hence, the success of the project is seen as being closely linked to the effective participation of the settlers. For this reason, a central element of the research presented here focuses on participation.

It is imperative that ITCO have a clear idea of the patterns of cooperation in existing ITCO settlements. In addition, and equally important, ITCO needs to know the factors which are related to the success or failure of settlers. Further, there is a pressing need to understand in as much depth as possible the characteristics of existing Atlantic Basin settlements and how these contrast with settlements in other parts of Costa Rica. It was, after all, not merely a random decision that the Atlantic basin was selected for emphasis in the project. The long-standing social, political and economic difficulties in this region have increasingly come to the fore in recent years. An understanding of the ways in which existing Atlantic basin settlements are similar to or different from the other settlements in Costa Rica should be of help in planning the present program.

The specific goals of this research effort are the following:

1. Analyze patterns of cooperation among settlers on ITCO projects in order to outline success and failures thereof and,

moreover, to determine which factors (e.g., demographic, socio-economic, historical and organizational) are conducive to more successful patterns;

2. Determine the factors which are related to the success or failure of individual settlers, defined in terms of the sense of satisfaction with the settlement or a desire to abandon the settlement.

3. Provide a wide-ranging data base on the existing Atlantic basin settlements so that the particular characteristics of that region may be better known and understood, and so that differences between the characteristics of this region and other regions of Costa Rica may be highlighted;

Data Base

This monograph is based upon one primary and three secondary data sets. The primary data set is the most extensive and systematic study conducted to date on ITCO beneficiaries. That investigation, conducted in May and June of 1976, involved interviews with 753 ITCO beneficiaries on 23 ITCO settlements. The study was made possible by a grant from the Ford and Rockefeller Joint Population and Development Policy Research Program and by the helpful collaboration of ITCO and Lic. Elena A. Wachong. The project was approved and supported by then-executive president of ITCO, Lic. José Manuel Salazar N., and was coordinated with the planning office of ITCO, receiving

the full support of its director, Lic. Juan Rafael González, and assistant director, Ennio Rodríguez.

The interviewers for the study came, in part, from the highly experienced staff of the public opinion research program of the Ministry of the Presidency in Costa Rica. These interviewers made up the core of the field research team and assisted in training and supervising additional members of the field team. The field team itself was trained by the author of this study, Lic. Wachong, and Dr. Susan Berk-Seligson. The field work was supervised by the author in conjunction with Luis Wachong, and Francisco Mejía M.

The interviews on the ITCO colonies were conducted on a completely voluntary basis. Respondents were asked to collaborate with the study after having been explained the basic purposes of the study and having been assured of their anonymity.

Given the considerable distances which separated the settlements, it was necessary to plan a sample which would provide maximum efficiency for the interviewers. It was decided to draw a sample from settlements which would reflect both the geographic and organizational distribution of ITCO's operations. The sample was divided approximately equally between the three major types of ITCO settlements, namely the colonies, the communal enterprises, and the individual parcel settlements. Since most of the communal enterprises are considerably smaller than the other settlements in terms of membership as well as land area, it was necessary to conduct interviews on a greater

number of communal enterprises than on the other types in order to achieve an approximately even division of interviews.

To carry out the interviews on several settlements meant that the interviewer teams had to spend a considerable amount of time traveling from settlement to settlement. Under these circumstances it was not possible, especially in the larger settlements, to employ PPS (Probability Proportion to Size) sampling. Nonetheless, despite this limitation the sample is certainly broadly representative of the ITCO settlers of 1976: it covered 46 percent of the 50 ITCO settlements in existence and 18 percent of the universe of settlers.[2]

It should also be noted that in 1976, and indeed even today, the overwhelming majority of all ITCO settlers are males. As a result, the 1976 study was an all-male sample.[3]

A significant limitation of the sample is that it did not include ITCO beneficiaries who for one reason or another had abandoned the settlement. It would have been ideal to measure the attitudes of those who had left the ITCO settlement in order to be able to determine what the motivations for the abandonment

2. These figures excluded beneficiaries of ITCO's programs in the Titling Programs, the Indian Reserve Program, and the other programs of the Institute which do not involve direct land transfers.

3. ITCO is currently revising its policy on settlers and is now paying increasing attention to females and their desire to become ITCO beneficiaries. ITCO is strengthening its women's office and is directing special programs not only toward the wives of settlers, who have been a traditional focus of ITCO's programming, but toward female settlers themselves.

were. Unfortunately, no lists of such beneficiaries existed.

In order to be able to compare the information gathered from the interviews of the ITCO beneficiaries with that of the general population of Costa Rica, and with that of its peasant and non-peasant subpopulations, three other samples are introduced from time to time in the analysis in the chapters that follow. The most important of these is a national probability sample of 1,707 respondents gathered by the Office of Public Opinion. That survey, directed by Lic. Miguel Gómez B., provides an extensive set of variables identical to several of those included in the ITCO beneficiary questionnaire. This resulted from collaboration of the principal investigator of the present project with the Office of Public Opinion of the Ministry of the Presidency of Costa Rica.

Specifically, a number of items devised for and included in the ITCO beneficiary study were included in a questionnaire administered to national probability sample interviewed by the Office of Public Opinion only a few months after the conclusion of the former study. As a result, a comparison of the responses of the ITCO beneficiaries with those of the population of Costa Rica as a whole is possible. In addition, the availability of such data permits a comparison of the responses of the ITCO beneficiaries with relevant subsets of the national population, namely the peasantry with its landed and landless components. Hence, wherever there are identical questions in the two questionnaires, data from the national probability sample are included and comparisons are discussed in the text.

The national survey is part of a continuing assessment made by the office of public opinion and represents the second of the "Encuestas Periódicas." The sample frame, the most highly refined in the country at this time, provides an unusually accurate representation of both urban and rural Costa Rica. Hence, similarities and differences found in comparing the ITCO beneficiary informants with the 1976 national survey can be taken to represent real differences between the two populations, the ITCO beneficiary population and the non-ITCO beneficiary population. The fact that the two sets of interviews were conducted almost simultaneously virtually eliminates the impact of any temporal factors on the data.

The second source of survey data for this study includes a 1973 study conducted by the author of 531 landed and landless peasants in Costa Rica. A number of items in that study were included in the 1976 ITCO questionnaire, and wherever that occurred, comparisons can be made between the two interviews. Since, however, three years separated the two studies it is possible that, at least to a certain extent, "aging" of the data may have influenced the responses. This factor should be kept in mind when considering the results presented herein. Details of the 1973 peasant study are contained in Seligson (1980b), and the sample design is presented in appendix A of Seligson (1974).

A third source of survey data reported here is the 1973 survey by Costa Rica's National Office of Community Development

(DINADECO). This survey, conducted with the technical assistance of Acción Internacional Técnica, and supervised by Dr. John A. Booth, included respondents in both rural and urban Costa Rica. That study is particularly rich in community organization and participation data, and it is largely those items which are drawn upon here.

In sum, as in any research effort, the data base presents both strengths and limitations. The present data base is limited by the fact that it was not designed on strict probability criteria, nor did the sample include respondents who had abandoned ITCO settlements. However, the sample presents a very broad coverage of settlements under study and is bolstered by three other surveys which permit several comparisons with non-ITCO beneficiaries. These comparisons add depth and richness to the findings presented here. They will also provide a baseline set of data upon which future studies of ITCO beneficiaries can be conducted.

Statistical Analysis Techniques

This analysis was designed for a wide range of audiences, from experts within the Evaluation Unit to the larger audience of ITCO personnel both in the central and regional offices, to students of rural development in Costa Rica and elsewhere. Consequently, an effort is made throughout to avoid unnecessary technicalities and complicated discussions of methodology. For the most part the findings are given as percentages. However, in order that differences in these percentages take on

substantive meaning, it is necessary, in many tables, to include measures of statistical significance and strength of relationship.

The statistic used most commonly here to provide an indication of strength of relationship is the Tau statistic (Tau b and Tau c). This widely used ordinal statistic presents a conservative reflection of the strength of relationship in the data. The Gamma statistic which could have been employed would have provided a higher coefficient in many cases, but in some instances it would have tended to inflate the strength of relationship in the data.

There are a few instances in which multivariate analysis is employed. This occurs especially in the sections predicting cooperative behavior. In these instances, conventional multiple regression analysis is employed, rather than the newer and perhaps more appropriate log-linear methodology. The newness of this later technique, as well as its general unavailability in statistical packages which are likely to be employed in Costa Rica in the foreseeable future, militate against its use in this case. Furthermore, the data employed in the multivariate analysis meet many of the assumptions implied by the regression analysis model. In the case of multivariate analysis, the standard statistical significance test (F test) is employed.

Organization of Study

This monograph is organized in seven chapters. The tables have been organized so as to group together into a single table those interview questions which relate to a particular theme. For this reason, many of the tables are rather lengthy and, unfortunately, somewhat complex. However, the incorporation in one table of several items which correspond to a general theme shortens the presentation considerably.

The study begins, in chapter II, with a description of the settlers on the ITCO projects in 1976. It emphasizes their demographic, socio-economic and political characteristics. This chapter, like the others, not only provides information about the settlers as a whole, but points up distinctions between the Atlantic basin settlers (N = 177) and the settlers living outside the Atlantic basin (N = 576). Wherever possible the tables and the text highlight significant differences between these two groups of settlers.

In Chapter III settler cooperation in terms of attitudes, behaviors and predictors is examined. This chapter reveals the areas in which settlers are successful in cooperating in the various ITCO projects, and helps indicate which factors encourage that cooperation. As has been stated repeatedly in the project paper under which the current ITCO/AID program is being conducted, settler cooperation is crucial to the success of the program. Chapter IV attempts to determine why it is that some settlers find their participation on the ITCO program

satisfactory whereas others find it less so. That chapter deals with the frequency, motivation and predictors of success and failure on ITCO settlements.

Chapters V and VI focus on important political characteristics of the settlers. First, there is a discussion of the nature of political participation in the settlements. Political participation is defined broadly, according to current usage, to include a wide range of activities, with an examination of both "institutionalized" and "mobilized modes." Attention is then shifted to the settlers' relationship with the government. Chapter VI focuses on the respondents' feelings of political efficacy and political trust. These two chapters, taken together, provide a broad picture of the settler and his government.

The final chapter summarizes the findings presented in the study and draws conclusions about the ITCO programs as indicated from the data sets analyzed herein.

It is hoped this study will add to the assessments already completed and that it will provide a basis for future analysis and research which can help improve the quality of ITCO programming. From a larger perspective it is hoped that the analysis offered here and the ones to follow will provide examples for Costa Rica's autonomous agencies, so that their efforts at self-evaluation on a continuing basis will enable them to be more responsive to the public which they serve.

IX. THE SETTLERS DESCRIBED: DEMOGRAPHIC, SOCIO-ECONOMIC, AND POLITICAL CHARACTERISTICS

This chapter describes the settlers, with particular attention to differences and similarities between beneficiaries in the Atlantic Basin and elsewhere. The chapter is organized around seventeen tables of data. The analysis begins with a presentation of the sample characteristics indicating where the interviews were conducted and providing some data about the settlements in which the surveys were done. The study then goes on to detail the age, marital status, and former urban residence of the respondents. The chapter next examines the occupation of the settlers prior to their becoming members of ITCO programs, and the sources of information the settlers had which encouraged them to become ITCO beneficiaries.

The length of residence in the community and the length of residence on the settlement are then discussed. Some information regarding the socio-economic characteristics of the settlement is presented, first on providing the amount of land held by the settlers and the amount of land under cultivation, and then on the income and other indicators of wealth among the settlers. Finally, some information regarding primary political affiliations is presented.

The Survey Sites

The interviews for this project were conducted in 23 ITCO settlements distributed widely throughout Costa Rica. As is seen in Table II.1, the settlements in which interviews took place were distributed in 18 of Costa Rica's 70 (in 1976) cantons. Although interviews were conducted in somewhat less than half of the 50 settlements in operation at the time of the study, the population included in those settlements covered fully 82 percent of all ITCO beneficiaries in settlement programs.

In total, the 23 settlements included 3,412 settlers, although this figure should be taken as approximate rather than definitive. This is because the settlements are always in flux, with some people arriving and some leaving. Consequently it is impossible to establish for any one year a precise number of settlers. Since two of the settlements, Rio Frio and Coto Sur were in the process of being established at the time of the study, exact counts of beneficiaries should be taken as approximate. These qualifications aside, we see that the 753 interviews conducted amounted to 22 percent of the population of the settlements included in the sample.

TABLE II.1. SAMPLE SITES AND SAMPLE SIZE

Settlement	Canton-District	Approximate No. of Settlers ^a (1976)	Number of Interviews	% of Sample	Size of Settlement ^b (Hectares)	Date of Land Purchase
I. Colonies						
*Bataan	Matina-Bataan	230	57	7.7	2,932	1965
*Cariari	Pococi-Cariari	370	54	7.2	7,997	1966
Coto Brus	Coto Brus-San Vito	135	37	4.9	5,329	1963
Guayabo	Turrialba-Sta. Terisita	69	24	3.2	602	1964
Pejibaye	Jimenez-Pejibaye	79	44	5.8	530	1963
La Trinidad	Aljuela -La Garita	205	88	11.7	2,260	1968
		<hr/> 1,038	<hr/> 304	<hr/> 40.4		
II. Parcelizations						
Buenos Aires	Alvarado-Pacayas	27	12	1.6	73	1971
El Control	Corredores-La Cuesta	39	15	2.0	517	1971
Coto Sur	Corredores-La Cuesta ^d	1,500 (est)	93	12.4	22,270	1975
Parruas	Paraiso-Paraiso	38	14	1.9	116	1971
*Río Frio	Sarapiquí-Horquetas	304	66	8.8	8,327	1975
San Luis	Cañas-Cañas	59	25	3.3	1,157	1970
		<hr/> 1,967	<hr/> 225	<hr/> 29.9		
III. Communal Enterprises						
Alianza	Osa-Palmar	59	29	3.9	871	1974
Belen	Carillo-Belen	36	28	3.7	258	1976
Bernabela	Sta. Cruz-Sta. Cruz	36	27	3.6	242	1975
Cerritos	Aguirre-Quepos	21	13	1.7	234	1972
Danta	Coto Brus-San Vito	21	14	1.9	97	1973 ^c
Humo	Jimenez-Pejibaye	39	22	2.9	156	1974
Río Cañas	Carrillo-Belen	41	28	3.7	309	?
Silencio	Aguirre-Savegre	53	27	3.6	597	1972
Utaba	Valverde-Vega Sarchí	23	11	1.5	43	1973 ^c
Utrapez	Buenos Aires-Volcan	7	5	0.7	185	1973 ^c
Vaquita	Corredores-La Cuesta	21	20	2.7	?	
		<hr/> 357	<hr/> 224	<hr/> 29.7		
Totals		<hr/> <u>3,412</u>	<hr/> <u>753</u>	<hr/> <u>100%</u>		

***Atlantic basin settlements**

^a Source: ITCO, *Labor Realizada por el ITCO a 1976: Informe Estadístico*, Mayo 1977. These figures represent the number of settlers as of December, 1976. The actual number of settlers at the time of the interviews in May and June of that year was sometimes slightly different. Since Río Frio and Coto Sur were in the process of being settled at the time of the study, the actual number of settlers was probably considerably lower than the numbers reported above.

^b Source: As above. The size of the colonies reported above includes only land already divided into parcels by 1976. Hence, the total settlement size may be larger.

^c Purchased with A.I.D. "Fondo de Garantía" Support.

Approximately 40 percent of the interviews were conducted on six of what ITCO terms "colonies." The colonization program was ITCO's first settlement program. It began in 1963 with the establishment of three settlements. The model was based upon the classic colonization model in which settlers were generally located in remote regions of sparsely populated areas of the country. In many cases these regions contained limited public service infrastructure, particularly in terms of roads, medical and communications services (postal, telegraph, and radio facilities).

ITCO determined that the colonization program was extraordinarily expensive since it required the agency to invest a great deal of money in infrastructure in order to allow the settlements to survive economically. As a result, although some additional settlements were built in the period 1964 through 1967, a total of only 11 such colonies were established. The year 1967 saw the establishment of the final colony and none have since been opened. By 1976, there were a total of 1,237 families settled on these 11 colonies.

In response to the difficulties encountered in the colonies, ITCO embarked upon two different programs. One of these is the parcel program. The object of this program is to establish settlers in areas which already have a

well-developed infrastructure so as to keep the costs of the settlement down and also to make it possible for the farmers to become economically successful in a shorter period of time. By relying upon the already existing road network settlers can export their crops to the market place without excessive difficulties. In addition, the established medical and communication facilities are available. The parcel program began in 1969 and continues up to the present day. By 1976 there were a total of 21 settlements of this type incorporating 2,476 settlers. Interviews were conducted on six of these 21 parcel program settlements, and included a total of 225 respondents, or 30 percent of the total sample.

The communal enterprise program constitutes the third model for ITCO settlement. This program began in the early 1970s and saw the establishment of a total of 16 communal enterprises, including 473 beneficiary families. The communal enterprise differs from the parcel program in that the land in these settlements is held and worked in common. Each settler in the communal enterprises receives a salary equivalent to all others and all are members of the cooperative, which owns the property. Interviews were conducted on 11 of these communal enterprise settlements yielding a total of 234 interviews (30 percent of the sample).

The reader interested in learning more details about the various settlement programs should consult the numerous ITCO documents on the subject as well as Seligson (1978, 1980a, 1980b). The question as to which model is the most appropriate is one which has occupied considerable attention within ITCO. However, it will not be the subject of this study as the strengths and weaknesses of the various forms of settlement are already fairly well understood.

As can be seen from the final two columns presented in Table II.1 the settlements included in the present study vary greatly both in size and date of formation. Some of the settlements, especially the colonies, date back to the very first years of ITCO's establishment, while others were opened as late as the year in which the study was conducted (1976). Some of the settlements are extremely small, consisting of less than 100 hectares. Indeed, one settlement is as small as 43 hectares. At the other extreme, some of the settlements are extremely large, one extending over 22,000 hectares. In sum, the sample is widely distributed in space, size and dates of foundation. This indicates that, as suggested in supports the contention made in Chapter I, the sample is broadly representative of ITCO's programs.

Demographic Characteristics

The average age of the settlers interviewed was 44 years, as shown in Table II.2. This figure, however, is to a certain extent misleading, since the respondents were distributed quite evenly along the entire continuum of ages from 16 to 80. While only a small percent (4 percent) of the settlers were younger than 20, about a fifth of the sample was distributed in each of the succeeding ten-year age cohorts through age 60. At the upper extreme, in the 61-80 year cohort, only 12 percent of the respondents are found.

The age distributions also reveal that since no settler could have been an ITCO beneficiary earlier than 15 years prior to the date of interviewing (the first settlements were established in 1963), a substantial portion of settlers were involved in other activities prior to joining the settlement. This will be seen in more detail later in the chapter (see Table II.5).

It is also clear from Table II.2 that the average age of settlers in the Atlantic Basin does not differ significantly from that found elsewhere (see the T-test values indicated at bottom of table). Indeed, in many of the age cohorts displayed, the percentage of the respondents falling into the cohort is nearly identical for respondents in the Atlantic basin and elsewhere. The only noteworthy

TABLE II.2. AGE OF RESPONDENTS

Age	Entire Sample		Atlantic Basin		Other Settlements	
	<u>X</u>	<u>(N)</u>	<u>X</u>	<u>(N)</u>	<u>X</u>	<u>(N)</u>
16-20	3.6	(27)	0.6	(1)	4.5	(26)
21-30	16.4	(123)	18.9	(33)	15.6	(90)
31-40	24.2	(182)	24.0	(42)	24.3	(140)
41-50	23.0	(173)	21.7	(38)	23.4	(135)
51-60	21.0	(158)	25.7	(45)	19.6	(113)
61-80	11.7	(88)	9.1	(16)	12.5	(72)
	100.0%	(751)	100.0%	(175)	100.0%	(576)
<u>Ungrouped Data</u>						
Mean	43.5		44.2		43.3	
Median	43.2		43.0		43.2	
Std. dev.	13.6		13.1		13.8	

T value = -.74 Sig. = ns

(Missing data encountered in 2 cases, or .3%)

TABLE II.3. MARITAL STATUS OF RESPONDENTS

	Entire Sample		Atlantic Basin		Other Settlements	
	<u>X</u>	<u>(N)</u>	<u>X</u>	<u>(N)</u>	<u>X</u>	<u>(N)</u>
Married	66.3	(499)	70.6	(125)	64.9	(374)
Common law union	15.3	(115)	18.1	(32)	14.4	(83)
Divorced	0.3	(2)	0.6	(1)	0.2	(1)
Separated	1.9	(14)	0.6	(1)	2.3	(13)
Widower	2.0	(15)	1.7	(3)	2.1	(12)
Bachelor	14.3	(108)	8.5	(15)	16.1	(93)
	100.0%	(753)	100.0%	(177)	100.0%	(576)

difference occurs in the youngest cohort (16-20 year old group), in which less than 1 percent of the Atlantic Basin settlers fall, compared to 5 percent elsewhere. Given the very small sample sizes involved, it is inappropriate to give substantive significance to this finding.

Table II.3 reveals that the overwhelming majority of the respondents are married (66 percent). An additional 15 percent were joined in common-law union. To this figure could be added those who are divorced, separated or widowed. Less than 15 percent of the sample are single individuals. This finding is not surprising, since by statute ITCO is required to assist poor families. Indeed, it is surprising that as many as 15 percent of the respondents are single.

An examination of the data from the Atlantic Basin reveals that the marital status proportions are similar, although a somewhat lower percentage of the Atlantic Basin respondents are single. It is found that only 9 percent of the Atlantic Basin respondents are bachelors, whereas nearly twice as many are unmarried in the other ITCO settlements. This finding comes as somewhat of a surprise since the Atlantic Basin typically has produced a lower proportion of married individuals than elsewhere in the country (Casey Gasper, 1979:254-257).

Apparently, at least in this respect, the ITCO settlements have little in common with banana company society found elsewhere in the Atlantic Basin. More specifically, the pattern of social breakdown frequently attributed to the Atlantic Basin appears not to be found on the ITCO settlements. In that sense, the settlements in the Basin may be "social islands" insulated from the forces around them. Indeed, it has often been observed that ITCO settlements are largely insulated from their surrounding communities, a situation which frequently produces negative outcomes, though in this respect--marital status--the exception may be positive. This theme will be explored in greater detail later, but even at this point in the analysis, there is indication that the Atlantic Basin settlements may be atypical of the social milieu of the region.

Background Prior to Settlement

One concern expressed by several observers of the ITCO programs has been that many beneficiaries may come from the growing masses of the urban unemployed rather than from the landless and rural poor. If that were the case, it would counter the reform efforts for at least three reasons. First, and most important, urban dwellers are unlikely to have the skills necessary for successful farming, nor are they likely to be able to adjust to the rustic living

conditions found on the settlements. Second, the reform program is designed to deal with the problem of landlessness in the countryside and is ill-equipped to deal with urban unemployment problems. Third, to the extent ITCO spends its scarce resources on solving urban unemployment problems it will be ignoring the problems of rural landlessness.

The data collected reveal that ITCO has not been favoring urbanites. As shown in Table II.4, very few of the settlers have had any urban experience and those who have have tended to have very limited experience in urban areas.

TABLE II.4. URBAN MESETA CENTRAL RESIDENCE OF RESPONDENTS

Number of years	Entire Sample		Atlantic Basin		Other Settlements	
	%	(N)	%	(N)	%	(N)
0	85.5	(644)	76.8	(136)	88.2	(508)
1-1.9	3.4	(27)	7.3	(13)	2.4	(14)
2-2.9	4.6	(35)	6.8	(12)	4.0	(23)
3-9.9	3.1	(23)	4.0	(7)	2.8	(16)
10-19.9	2.1	(16)	3.4	(6)	1.7	(10)
20-45	1.1	(8)	1.7	(3)	0.9	(5)
	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>(753)</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>(177)</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>(576)</u>

Ungrouped Data

Mean	0.9	1.6	0.7	T-value =
Median	0.1	0.2	0.1	-2.46
Std. dev.	4.0	5.8	3.2	Sig. = NS

For the sample as a whole, 86 percent of the settlers have had no residence of any length in urban areas.[1] Moreover, among those who had some urban experience, it tended to be fairly short. Of all those who have lived for at least one year in the cities, 57 percent have lived there for no more than 2.9 years. Only 3 percent of the entire sample had lived in urban Costa Rica for 10 years or more. Comparisons between the Atlantic Basin and other settlers reveal no significant difference in the average number of years that beneficiaries have spent in urban areas.[2]

The evidence, therefore, indicates that the overwhelming majority of ITCO beneficiaries are rural folk. However, the data in Table II.4 do not demonstrate that the beneficiaries are landless rural folk. In order to determine that, we need to examine the data in Table II.5.

1. This does not mean that individuals did not visit the cities of Costa Rica from time to time. It simply means that they did not reside there. The question that was asked of the respondents was, "Have you lived in one of these (aforementioned cities) for more than one year?" Short periods of residence, less than one year, could not be detected by the question.

2. It is found, however, that the Atlantic Basin settlers averaged 1.6 years whereas the other settlers averaged only .7 years. Although this difference is not significant, there appears to be some slightly greater urban experience among the Atlantic Basin settlers. Hence, whereas 88 percent of the other settlers have had no urban residential experience, only 77 percent of the Atlantic Basin settlers have had none.

TABLE II.5. RESPONDENT OCCUPATION PRIOR TO SETTLEMENT

Occupation	Entire Sample		Atlantic Basin		Other Settlements	
	%	(N)	%	(N)	%	(N)
Day laborer (<u>peón suelto</u>)*	43.6	(324)	33.9	(60)	46.6	(264)
Steady laborer (<u>peon fijo</u>)	27.2	(202)	40.1	(71)	23.1	(131)
Banana laborer	4.2	(32)	6.8	(12)	3.5	(20)
Worker on father's farm	4.7	(35)	2.8	(5)	5.3	(30)
Farm administrator	0.8	(6)	2.8	(5)	0.2	(1)
Share cropper/renter	3.9	(29)	0.6	(1)	4.9	(28)
Small holder	8.6	(64)	6.2	(11)	9.4	(53)
First job	0.4	(3)	0.6	(1)	0.2	(2)
Other	6.5	(48)	6.2	(11)	6.5	(37)
	100.0%	(743)	100.0%	(177)	100.0%	(566)

(Missing data encountered in 10 cases, or 1.4%)

*The definition of this terminology, and the other peasant occupations indicated above, can be found in Seligson (1977 and 1980b).

ITCO's program is designed to provide land for the two-thirds to three-quarters of Costa Rica's peasantry who are landless. The data in Table II.5 reveal quite clearly that most of the people in the settlements who were interviewed indeed fit into this category. Specifically, 44 percent of all the respondents were day laborers, that is, peasants who do not have a steady job on any one plantation or farm, but rather are forced to go from job to job. Previous research (Seligson, 1980b) has shown that day laborers sense the greatest economic insecurity of all types of Costa Rican peasants. Hence, the fact that nearly half of all of ITCO's settlers interviewed in this study come from this group is an achievement of some note. By selecting many of its beneficiaries from this highly insecure group, ITCO is helping to reduce the problem of rural insecurity.

An additional 27 percent of the settlers come from the steady laborer population.[3] These are individuals who have steady jobs, many of them on banana or other large plantations, but who are nonetheless landless. While these individuals enjoy steady income, they confront the problem of long-term insecurity since none of them can be guaranteed

3. An additional 4 percent of the respondents for the entire sample had been banana laborers before joining the settlement. It is not clear, unfortunately, if these laborers had been employed in steady or casual work.

a job for their entire productive life. It is not uncommon in Costa Rica to find a worker losing his steady position as he enters his early fifties. Individuals who lose their jobs and have no land on which to farm confront a very serious problem of economic survival since without land or capital they find it very difficult to earn a living. Many of these individuals turn to squatting as the only means of insuring survival.

A small percentage of the sample had positions which would make one think they would be unlikely to become ITCO settlers. For example, a few (less than one percent) had had jobs as farm administrators, positions which are presumably comparatively well paid. However, these individuals apparently preferred to have their own farm rather than to continue as farm administrators. Or possibly their position as farm administrators might have been terminated and therefore they chose to join an ITCO settlement, although evidence on this is not available. More surprising is that 4 percent of the settlers had been share croppers and renters. Those who were share croppers and renters may have joined the ITCO settlement because they found it was no longer possible to enjoy the right of share cropping and/or renting and therefore selected the ITCO settlement as the best alternative. Share cropping and renting in Costa Rica provide a very insecure existence, since owners may at any point terminate the right to share

crop or rent. But no more motivational or factual evidence on this is available.

The motivation of the 9 percent of the beneficiaries who were previously smallholders is the most difficult to comprehend. The hypothesis that the settlers who had owned land prior to their joining the ITCO programs joined because their landholdings were too small to support their families is not borne out. The average size of landholdings for those who held land before they settled on ITCO land was 17.9 hectares, a figure which is larger than the average amount of land obtained by beneficiaries of ITCO programs (see table II.11). However, for one-third (34 percent) of the individuals that explanation does hold, since those who owned 5 hectares or less probably could not survive with the income they earned on those properties. For those, however, who owned larger plots (the 28 respondents who owned more than 5 hectares and still decided to join an ITCO project), the problem of explanation remains. It may be that the land owned was of such poor quality or located in such a remote region that it did not constitute a viable farm. Unfortunately, no data were obtained which would resolve this issue.

There are some notable differences in terms of the occupational characteristics prior to settlement between settlers living in the Atlantic Basin and those elsewhere. As seen in Table II.5, a higher proportion of other settlers

were casual day laborers prior to settlement. It is unclear why this difference should appear. One possibility is that beneficiaries in the Atlantic Basin had been more successful in obtaining steady employment because there were more such opportunities in the regions where they were living prior to obtaining ITCO land. Exploration of that hypothesis, however, would require employment data at the canton level, which are not available. Further details regarding the occupational background of the settlers are presented in Table II.6.

TABLE II.6. PRIMARY AGRICULTURAL ACTIVITY PRIOR TO SETTLEMENT

Crop	Entire Sample		Atlantic Basin		Other Settlements	
	%	(N)	%	(N)	%	(N)
Coffee	19.7	(143)	9.6	(16)	22.7	(127)
Corn	19.1	(139)	24.6	(41)	17.5	(98)
Rice	16.0	(116)	9.6	(16)	17.9	(100)
Cattle	8.8	(64)	4.8	(8)	10.0	(56)
Bananas	8.0	(58)	15.0	(25)	5.9	(33)
Sugar cane	6.9	(50)	6.6	(11)	7.0	(39)
Beans	3.3	(24)	3.0	(5)	3.4	(19)
Other (minor or non-agr. activities)	18.2	(132)	26.9	(45)	15.2	(85)
	100.0%	(726)	100.0%	(167)	100.0%	(559)

(Missing data encountered in 27 cases, or 3.6%)

Of those respondents who were engaged in agricultural pursuits prior to their joining the ITCO settlement, nearly one-fifth were principally involved with basic grain production. Corn predominated among these basic grains (19 percent), followed by rice (16 percent). Bean growing involved a much smaller proportion (3 percent) of the settlers. Given Costa Rica's heavy dependence on coffee it is not surprising that nearly one-fifth (20 percent) of the respondents had been involved in coffee production prior to their joining the settlement. Three of Costa Rica's other major export products, namely bananas, sugar cane, and cattle, each involve less than 10 percent of all of the settlers. It is clear from these figures, therefore, that ITCO settlers had been involved in a wide range of agricultural pursuits prior to their joining the ITCO settlements.

A comparison of the agricultural activities of the Atlantic Basin settlers with those elsewhere reveals many similarities, although there are some notable differences. These differences stem largely from the kind of crops grown in the Atlantic zone, the area from which many Atlantic Basin settlers had come prior to their joining the settlement. Hence, coffee is not a major product of the Atlantic Basin and fewer than 10 percent of the settlers worked on this crop. On the other hand, bananas are much more common in the region, and 15 percent of all the

settlers in the Atlantic Basin had worked on bananas, compared to only 6 percent of the other settlers. The other activity which predominated among the Atlantic Basin settlers was corn, with nearly 25 percent of the settlers cultivating this crop, compared to only 18 percent of the other settlers. Nonetheless, it is clear that the Atlantic Basin settlers were involved in a wide variety of agricultural production prior to their joining the settlement.

It is of interest to note how ITCO beneficiaries first became aware of the land program. In response to this question (Table II.7) over half (53 percent) of the respondents stated that they had heard of the program from their friends and neighbors. Word of mouth, therefore, is the primary mechanism by which Costa Rican peasants hear about the land titling program. A second major source of information is ITCO itself. ITCO field employees have extensive opportunities to talk to peasants either informally or through community meetings. Other sources of information about the program were minor by comparison. The national community development organization, DINADECO, and radio programs were the source of information for 13 percent of the beneficiaries. The other sources of information, political parties, peasant groups, etc., amounted to less than 4 percent each.

TABLE II.7. SOURCE OF INFORMATION OF LAND REFORM PROGRAM

Question: Could you tell me how you first heard of the land program?

Source	%	N	%	N	%	N
Friends, neighbors	52.5	(395)	42.9	(76)	55.4	(319)
ITCO Personnel	22.4	(169)	32.8	(58)	19.3	(111)
DINADECO or radio	13.1	(99)	17.5	(31)	11.8	(68)
Political party or other group	2.7	(20)	1.7	(3)	3.0	(17)
Peasant committee	1.9	(14)	0.0	(0)	2.4	(14)
Other*	3.1	(23)	1.6	(3)	3.5	(20)
Don't recall	4.4	(33)	3.4	(6)	4.7	(27)
	100%	(753)	100%	(177)	100%	(576)

*This category includes, in order of frequency, municipal officials, unions, Peace Corps, landowners.

Some students of agrarian reform have argued that the reform process can be socially disruptive and dislocating since it may involve ripping people out of their communities and placing them in entirely new settings. In the case of ITCO programs, this does not seem to be a valid criticism. As shown in Table II.8, the mean years of residence in the community at the time of the study was 14.2 years. Since, as shown on the following table (II.9), the average number

TABLE II.8. LENGTH OF RESIDENCE IN COMMUNITY

<u>Years</u>	<u>Entire Sample</u>		<u>Atlantic Basin</u>		<u>Other Settlements</u>	
	<u>%</u>	<u>(N)</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>(N)</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>(N)</u>
0.0 - .5	6.1	(46)	14.1	(25)	3.7	(21)
.6 - .9	2.9	(22)	6.2	(11)	1.9	(11)
1.0 - 1.9	5.6	(42)	6.2	(11)	5.4	(31)
2.0 - 2.9	8.0	(60)	5.1	(9)	8.9	(51)
3.0 - 3.9	7.7	(58)	5.1	(9)	8.5	(49)
4.0 - 5.9	8.2	(62)	3.4	(6)	9.7	(56)
6.0 - 9.9	12.5	(94)	20.3	(36)	10.1	(58)
10.0 - 11.9	10.4	(78)	18.1	(32)	8.0	(46)
12.0 - 14.9	7.0	(53)	6.2	(11)	7.3	(42)
15.0 - 20.9	6.9	(52)	2.8	(5)	8.2	(47)
21 - 30.9	8.9	(67)	7.9	(14)	9.2	(53)
31 - 40.9	7.7	(58)	2.3	(4)	9.4	(54)
41.0 - 60.9	6.6	(50)	2.3	(4)	8.0	(46)
61.0 - 80.0	1.3	(10)	0.0	(0)	1.7	(10)
	100.0%	(752)	100.0%	(177)	100.0%	(575)

Ungrouped Data

Mean	14.2	9.3	15.7
Std. dev.	15.3	10.5	16.2

T value = 492 Sig. < .001

(Missing data encountered in one case, or .1% of the sample.)

TABLE II.9. LENGTH OF RESIDENCE ON SETTLEMENT*

<u>Years</u>	Entire Sample	
	<u>%</u>	<u>(N)</u>
0.1- .5	11.6	(87)
.6- .9	5.6	(42)
1.0-1.9	12.0	(90)
2.0-2.9	13.1	(98)
3.0-3.9	12.7	(95)
4.0-5.9	12.8	(96)
6.0-9.9	13.0	(97)
10.0-11.9	13.1	(98)
12.0-14	6.1	(46)
	<hr/>	<hr/>
	100.0%	(749)

Ungrouped Data

Mean years of Atlantic Basin = 5.0

Mean years of Other Settlements = 4.5

T value = -1.62 Sig. = ns

(Missing data encountered in 4 cases, or .5% of the sample)

*The questionnaire only left room for the coding of a maximum of 9.5 years, although the interviewers recorded the exact number of years stated. In those cases where the respondent indicated more than 9.5 years, the file was updated to include the exact number of years by consulting the original questionnaires. Consequently, users of the initial version of the data tape will find the label "9.5 years and more."

years of residence in the settlements themselves hovered between 4.5 and 5 years, most residents in an ITCO settlement had lived in the surrounding community for many years prior to joining the program. This becomes clearer when the data are probed more deeply. Nearly two-thirds (62 percent) of the settlers had lived in surrounding communities longer than they had been living in the ITCO settlement itself. Moreover, the average number of years these two-thirds of the respondents had lived in the surrounding communities prior to joining the ITCO settlement was 10.5. Hence, the great bulk of the settlers were not individuals who were dislocated from their communities, for they had joined an ITCO settlement in their own neighborhood.

While it is true that ITCO beneficiaries are likely to have joined the settlement after having lived for several years in the surrounding communities, it is not the case that most beneficiaries were born in those communities. As revealed in Table II.8, most residents had not been born in the communities in which they were living at the time of the survey. Very few of the settlers resided in the communities for more than 20 years, yet, as known from Table II.2, all but 4 percent of the entire sample was over 20 years of age. Hence, it is quite clear that most settlers were migrants to the communities in which they were interviewed. This does not mean, however, that they migrated from remote parts of

Costa Rica to their present residence; it only means that they moved from some other community. A detailed investigation of these migrations patterns, however, is beyond the scope of the present analysis. Data for such an analysis, however, are available in the survey.

Another finding in Table II.8 is the difference in the length of residence in the communities of the Atlantic Basin residents compared to the other respondents. One can see from the bottom of Table II.8 that the average years of residence of other ITCO respondents is 15.7, whereas the mean years of residence for those living in the Atlantic Basin is 9.3, a difference which is statistically significant. Atlantic Basin settlers, therefore, tend to have shallower communal roots than the settlers elsewhere. This difference is not a result of an age difference between the Atlantic Basin and other settlers, since there is no significant difference in ages between the two groups. This finding has important implications for community development participation and should be kept in mind for the analysis presented in Chapter III.

The average number of years in which settlers have resided in their particular settlement is 5.0 for the Atlantic Basin and 4.5 years for other regions, a difference which is not significant (see table II.9). However, as was noted in the discussion of Table II.8, the settlers outside the Atlantic region have lived on the average a greater

period of time in the communities in which they were residing at the time of the interviews than the Atlantic Basin settlers. This finding suggests that the Atlantic Basin settlers are more likely to have migrated in order to take up residence on the settlement than are beneficiaries in other regions of Costa Rica.

This conclusion is not supported by the data presented in Table II.10. While 49 percent of the Atlantic Basin respondents had migrated to the settlement, only 57 percent

TABLE II.10 RESIDENCE ON SETTLEMENT AS A FUNCTION OF MIGRATION

	Entire Sample	Atlantic Basin	Other Settlements
	% (N)	% (N)	% (N)
Non-migrant ^a	44.5 (333)	50.8 (90)	42.6 (243)
Migrant	55.5 (415)	49.2 (87)	57.4 (328)
	100.0% (748)	100.0% (177)	100.0% (571)

Tau b = .07 Sig. (of Tau) = .03

(Missing data encountered in 5 cases, or .7% of the sample)

^aMigrants are considered to be those respondents who have lived in the community of residence at the time of the survey no longer than they have worked in the settlement. Non-migrants are defined as those who have lived in their community of residence at the time of the survey longer than they have worked in the settlement.

of the other settlers had done so, a difference which is statistically significant, albeit the relationship is a weak one. Hence, the Atlantic Basin settlers are actually less likely to have migrated for the purposes of benefiting from the ITCO program. Once again, further exploration of these interesting migration patterns needs to be undertaken in future studies.

Further examination of Table II.9 reveals that the sample reflects a very wide distribution of a number of years of settlement. It must be kept in mind that no settlers could have become members of an ITCO settlement more than fourteen years prior to the interview in 1976, because the first settlements were not opened until 1963. As shown in Table II.9, only about 6 percent of the respondents had taken up residence on the settlement as many as 12 to 14 years ago. At the other extreme, 12 percent of the respondents had resided there for less than half a year at the time they were interviewed. Another 6 percent of the settlers had resided between a half a year and one year.

Socio-economic Status

In this section, the socio-economic status of the settlers is examined. Tables II.11 through II.15 present data on the amount of land held by the settlers, their income, other indicators of wealth, and their education.

Land Ownership [4]

The settlers own an average of 12.4 hectares of land, according to the survey. The average, however, is somewhat misleading. A surprising number of settlers have tiny plots of land which are far below the average in size. For example, 3 percent of the settlers have only between 1 and 2.9 hectares, and an additional 8 percent of the settlers have between 3 and 4.9 hectares. It is probable that these small parcels are economically non-viable for an average-sized peasant family. Further study in the field would be needed to determine why this many settlers own such sub-optimal farm units. A likely explanation for the existence of these mini-farms is that they are a product of inheritance. That is, these are not individuals who had received their parcels directly from ITCO but are probably sons and daughters of original settlers. It is also possible that many of the small plots had been purchased from ITCO settlers.

At the other extreme, there is a small percentage of settlers who have very large parcels, between 26 and 50 hectares. It is likely that these few individuals,

4. It should be kept in mind that the data presented in Tables II.11 and II.12 refer exclusively to those settlers living in colonies or on individual parcels. The communal enterprise settlers who hold their land in common are excluded from these calculations of average farm size.

TABLE II.11. SIZE OF LANDHOLDINGS AMONG RESPONDENTS
(excluding communal enterprises)

Size (Hectares)	Entire Sample		Atlantic Basin		Other Settlements	
	<u>X</u>	<u>(N)</u>	<u>X</u>	<u>(N)</u>	<u>X</u>	<u>(N)</u>
1-2.9	3.3	(17)	0.6	(1)	4.7	(16)
3-4.9	7.9	(41)	6.8	(12)	8.5	(29)
5-6.9	5.0	(26)	2.3	(4)	6.5	(22)
7-8.9	15.3	(79)	13.0	(23)	16.4	(56)
9.0	4.8	(25)	1.7	(3)	6.5	(22)
10.0	22.4	(116)	31.6	(56)	17.6	(60)
11-12.9	4.8	(25)	0.6	(1)	7.0	(24)
13-15.9	6.2	(32)	4.0	(7)	7.3	(25)
16-19.9	7.9	(41)	8.5	(15)	7.6	(26)
20.9	12.5	(65)	27.7	(49)	4.7	(16)
21-25.9	6.9	(36)	0.6	(1)	10.3	(35)
26-30.9	1.4	(7)	1.1	(2)	1.5	(5)
31-50	1.5	(8)	1.7	(3)	1.5	(5)
	100.0%	(518)	100.0%	(177)	100.0%	(341)

Ungrouped Data

Mean	12.39	13.40	11.87
Std. dev.	7.15	6.96	7.20

T value = -2.31 Sig. = .02

amounting to less than 3 percent of the sample, have acquired property after receiving their titles from ITCO. In some cases these properties may be outside of the original boundaries of the settlement, although the data available do not provide this information. It is to be expected that over time successful farmers will acquire parcels of land beyond their original ITCO settlements.

The presence of both minifundia and farms larger than the original ITCO parcels reveals the impact of time on the settlement process, a factor often ignored when thinking about land reform. Despite the existence of several legal provisions which prevent settlers from selling land given to them by ITCO, land transfers obviously do occur. Some are the result of the death of the original settler, while others are the result of a settler's decision to sell his property and move elsewhere. Still other transfers occur as beneficiaries sell off parts of their property either because they find they cannot effectively farm the entire plot or because they need cash. For whatever reason, land transfers do occur and ITCO settlements do not remain frozen.

The reform process must, therefore, be viewed as a dynamic process influenced by many factors over time. No doubt, some of the tenure adjustments that go on are positive in nature, expanding successful farms and reducing the size of farms that are too large for a single settler to

handle. However, not all of these transfers are likely to produce beneficial results. Specifically, even though the reform process had been underway for only fourteen years at the time of the survey, a process of land concentration is clearly underway. The land distribution among the settlers is far from equal. The Gini coefficient of concentration is 31, as compared to the national figure of 80 for 1973. It is clear, therefore, that the ITCO land distribution is much more equitable than the national average. As ITCO's redistribution program covers an increasingly larger proportion of the nation's land area, one can anticipate a significant reduction in land inequalities.

A comparison of the size of the landholding between the Atlantic Basin and other settlers reveals that the Atlantic Basin settlers have a somewhat larger farm size, on the average. Atlantic Basin settlers hold farms which average 13.4 hectares, whereas other settlers have farms which average 11.9 hectares. This difference, although statistically significant, does not appear to have much substantive import. The reasons for the larger farms on the Atlantic Basin probably have to do with the nature of the soils, crops and agricultural activities appropriate for those areas.

Analysis of the data shows that farmers have been able to cultivate approximately two-thirds of the land they own.

TABLE II.12. SIZE OF LANDHOLDING UNDER CULTIVATION
(excluding communal enterprises)

Size (Hectares)	Entire Sample		Atlantic Basin		Other Settlements	
	<u>X</u>	<u>(N)</u>	<u>X</u>	<u>(N)</u>	<u>X</u>	<u>(N)</u>
1-2	12.5	(65)	18.8	(33)	9.4	(32)
3-4	19.5	(101)	22.2	(39)	18.1	(62)
5-6	16.0	(83)	14.8	(26)	16.7	(57)
7-8	14.7	(76)	11.4	(20)	16.4	(56)
9	5.0	(26)	2.8	(5)	6.1	(21)
10	9.7	(50)	5.7	(10)	11.7	(40)
11-12	5.0	(26)	2.3	(4)	6.4	(22)
13-15	5.8	(30)	4.5	(8)	6.4	(22)
16-19	5.4	(28)	8.0	(14)	4.1	(14)
20	4.2	(22)	8.0	(14)	2.3	(8)
21-25	0.4	(2)	0.6	(1)	0.3	(1)
26-30	1.4	(7)	1.1	(2)	1.5	(5)
31-35	0.4	(2)	0.0	(0)	0.6	(2)
	100.0%	(518)	100.0%	(176)	100.0%	(342)
Ungrouped Data						
Mean	8.1		7.8		8.2	
Std. dev.	5.8		6.4		5.5	
T value = .58 Sig. = ns						

As is shown in Table II.12, the mean size of cultivated properties is 8.1 hectares. Since some land on all farms needs to be reserved for internal roads, housing, and other farm installations, it is not to be expected that any farmer would achieve 100 percent cultivation. Therefore, this two-thirds figure is rather impressive. Comparison between the Atlantic Basin and the rest of the country does not reveal any statistically significant difference, a surprising finding since the Atlantic Basin settlers have farm plots which are significantly larger than those in the elsewhere (see Table II.11).

Nonetheless, this finding needs to be kept in perspective since the difference between the Atlantic Basin and the rest of the country on this variable is very small. Further exploration of the socio-economic data should help determine if the differences translate into differential levels of economic success.

Income and Wealth

The data on average income are presented in Table II.13. The mean family income earned per week is 201.2 colones. Since in 1976 the minimum wage for agricultural laborers was 120 colones a week, the reform beneficiary family was earning a considerably higher wage than it would have earned had they remained landless peasants subsisting on the income from the head of the household. Indeed,

TABLE II.13. WEEKLY AVERAGE INCOME OF SETTLERS*
(in colones)

Income	Entire Sample		Atlantic Basin		Other Settlements	
	<u>X</u>	<u>(N)</u>	<u>X</u>	<u>(N)</u>	<u>X</u>	<u>(N)</u>
35 - 99¢	10.0	(53)	6.7	(8)	10.9	(45)
100-120¢	20.8	(110)	10.9	(13)	23.6	(97)
121-149¢	15.7	(83)	25.2	(30)	12.9	(53)
150-179¢	14.0	(74)	7.6	(9)	15.8	(65)
180-199¢	6.8	(36)	5.0	(6)	7.3	(30)
200-249¢	12.8	(68)	11.8	(14)	13.1	(54)
250-300¢	8.9	(47)	10.1	(12)	8.5	(35)
301-399¢	4.9	(26)	8.4	(10)	3.9	(16)
400-600¢	4.0	(21)	7.6	(9)	2.9	(12)
601-2,000¢	2.3	(12)	6.7	(8)	1.0	(4)
	100.0% (530)		100.0% (119)		100.0% (411)	
<u>Ungrouped Data</u>						
Mean	201.2		260.8		184.2	
Std. dev.	200.0		291.8		160.0	

T value = -3.7 Sig. = <.001

*The data presented in this table are based on the total income reported in three separate questionnaire items. The first asked for weekly income of the respondent, the second asked for "other income" and the third, income contributed to household by children. Of the 753 respondents only 530 provided complete income data (70.4% of the sample). At the time of the study there were 8.6 Costa Rican colones to the U.S. dollar.

reform beneficiaries are earning 68 percent above the minimum wage. However, this finding must be tempered by two further pieces of information. First, the income of 201 colones is far below the family poverty line of 250 colones USAID has identified for assessing programs. While the AID poverty line figure is not to be taken as a "magic number" with special significance for Costa Rica, it is important within the context of the loan agreement now being implemented. That agreement sets as a major goal the reduction of the proportion of Costa Ricans living in poverty in rural Costa Rica. Hence, it needs to be kept in mind that the land reform efforts up through 1976, while reducing the level of poverty experienced by the beneficiaries, did not serve to elevate the average beneficiary family above the poverty line. As seen in Table II.13, only about 20 percent of the beneficiary families are earning enough (250 colones per week) to put them above the poverty line in 1976.

The second factor to note is that a surprisingly large percentage of the beneficiaries were earning a very low income. As shown in Table II.13, 10 percent of the beneficiaries were earning less than 100 colones a week. That is far below the minimum wage. In addition, 21 percent of the beneficiaries were earning between 100 and 120 colones, still below the minimum wage. Therefore, over 30 percent of all the beneficiary families are earning the

minimum wage or less. These low income figures certainly are cause for concern.

The comparison of the Atlantic Basin and other settlers reveals significantly higher income among the former, 261 colones per week, compared to 184. Although this difference seems rather large it must be taken into consideration that in the Atlantic Basin in general, prices are considerably higher. This has been shown in studies by Costa Rica's Nutrition Information System (SIN) particularly in the neighborhood of banana company plantations. Hence, the cost of a daily basket of food per person (i.e., the quantity of food that an adult ought to consume to achieve a diet of 2,900 calories a day) was 8.44 colones in a supermarket in San José and 11.58 colones in a banana zone plantation.

Put more specifically, SIN found that in El Humo, an ITCO settlement not far from Turrialba, an individual would spend 75 percent of his monthly minimum wage on the daily basket of food, whereas on a banana plantation in the Atlantic Basin he would spend 91 percent (Guerra Q., 1981). Therefore, the difference between the Atlantic Basin and other settlers in income is partly counteracted by the higher cost of living in that area. Moreover, even in the Atlantic Basin, nearly 18 percent of the settlers are living at or below the national minimum wage. Although it is seen in Table II.13 that some farmers are able to earn considerably above the minimum wage, in some cases 3 or 4

times above, these fortunate few represent a very small proportion of the settlers. Therefore, the data in table II.13 indicate that although ITCO beneficiaries in general earned more than they would have had they remained landless peasants dependent upon minimum wages, the difference is far less than one would have hoped.

Indeed, the income figures presented in Table II.13 reflect total family income, including that which is donated to the parents by their children. It is to be expected that landless peasants who have children of working age would also have them working in one capacity or another, and have them contributing to the household income. The difference, then, between the ITCO beneficiaries and landless peasants is further reduced. Nonetheless, other factors tend to diminish the importance of these income figures. In particular, having land available to farm for one's lifetime means that landed peasants can be expected to be able to provide for their subsistence needs, whereas the landless peasant is dependent upon his ability to work and obtain work on someone else's farm.

The income figures presented above are placed into clearer context when one considers other indicators of wealth, as is shown in Table II.14. This table provides some comparison of ITCO beneficiaries with the general population drawn from the 1976 national survey mentioned in Chapter I. These data permit a comparison of the ITCO

TABLE II.14. INDICATORS OF WEALTH AMONG SETTLERS / GENERAL POPULATION

	Entire Sample		Atlantic Basin		Other Settlements		Comparison of Atlantic and Other Settlements		General Population (males only)*		
	<u>X</u>	<u>(N)</u>	<u>X</u>	<u>(N)</u>	<u>X</u>	<u>(N)</u>	<u>Tau b</u>	<u>Sig.</u>	Non-Agricultural	Landless Peasants	Landed Peasants
<u>Household has:</u>	<u>X</u>	<u>(N)</u>	<u>X</u>	<u>(N)</u>	<u>X</u>	<u>(N)</u>			<u>X</u>	<u>X</u>	<u>X</u>
Radio	81.6	(613)	87.4	(153)	79.9	(460)	.08	.01			
Electricity	76.3	(551)	90.2	(138)	72.6	(413)	.17	<.001	92.3	58.5	53.3
Piped-in water	60.9	(440)	86.9	(133)	53.9	(307)	.28	<.001	96.1	76.0	71.3
Wrist watch	49.5	(371)	52.6	(92)	48.6	(279)		ns	--	--	--
Sewing machine	44.5	(334)	38.3	(67)	46.4	(267)	.07	.03	49.1	22.8	46.5
Dirt floors	26.8	(188)	24.1	(32)	27.5	(156)		ns	--	--	--
Electric iron	18.4	(138)	11.4	(20)	20.5	(118)	.10	.003	86.5	35.7	47.5
Television	12.8	(96)	4.6	(8)	13.3	(88)	.13	<.001	79.6	31.0	45.5
Indoor Sanitary Facilities	6.7	(48)	8.7	(13)	6.1	(35)		ns	75.5	26.9	35.6
Refrigerator	5.5	(41)	2.9	(5)	6.3	(36)	.06	.54	57.1	12.3	22.8

*Source: 1976 National Probability Sample, males only.

beneficiaries with what is termed in this study "non-agricultural" respondents (i.e., all others) of the general population. Before embarking upon that comparison, however, first the ITCO data alone is discussed.

A substantial portion of the beneficiaries can count on the basic services of electricity and potable water. As shown in Table II.14, 76 percent of the beneficiaries had electricity in their homes and 61 percent had piped-in water. For both of these services, the beneficiaries in the Atlantic Basin were somewhat better off than those in elsewhere. Fully 90 percent of the settlers in the Atlantic Basin had electricity compared to 73 percent in other (this difference is significant at $<.001$ level). The Atlantic Basin settlers were also more likely to enjoy piped-in water than the others (87 percent compared to 54 percent, significant at the $<.001$ level). Electricity and water, however, are not particularly good indicators of individual wealth since these are services provided either by the municipality, or in recent years by the National Water Service (A y A). Therefore the fact that the Atlantic Basin settlers are better off in these two ways is not an indication that they are necessarily more wealthy. Even the wealthiest beneficiaries would find it difficult to provide themselves with piped-in water and electricity if these services were not available from the government.

Less ambiguous indicators of wealth also are presented in Table II.14. Most beneficiaries have radios although settlers elsewhere have a slightly lower probability of owning one. This difference may be directly connected with the higher percentage of beneficiaries in the Atlantic Basin enjoying electricity, for unless the radio is battery operated, an electricity supply is essential. Once again, therefore, the Atlantic Basin settlers appear more affluent, but it is difficult to determine if the difference is a function of their income or the presence of a government-supplied service.

A reversal of the apparently greater wealth of the Atlantic Basin settlers appears in the examination of other artifacts. For example, other settlers are significantly more likely to own a sewing machine (46 percent vs. 38 percent). Similarly, beneficiaries elsewhere are more likely to own an electric iron (21 percent vs. 11). Televisions are owned by 3 times more beneficiaries outside the Atlantic Basin than by Basin beneficiaries (15 percent vs. 5 percent), and refrigerators are owned by twice as many other beneficiaries (6 percent vs. 3 percent). In each case, these differences are statistically significant, indicating that other beneficiaries, despite their lower income and despite the fact that they are less likely to have electricity and water, owned artifacts which are important markers of wealth in Costa Rica. The other

indicators of wealth (indoor plumbing, dirt floors, and wrist watches) show no significant difference between the Atlantic and other settlers.

In sum, although the Atlantic Basin beneficiaries enjoy certain services such as electricity and piped-in water to a greater extent than the other beneficiaries, the latter appear somewhat better off. This finding would reinforce the indication made earlier that costs are considerably higher in the Atlantic Basin than in the rest of the country, thereby reducing substantially the purchasing power of the higher incomes earned. Hence, despite their higher cash incomes, in the Atlantic Basin settlers are probably less well off than ITCO settlers elsewhere in Costa Rica.

Turning now to the general population, indicated on the right-hand side of Table II.14, it is immediately apparent that the non-agricultural population, that is the non-peasants of the sample, are considerably better off than the peasantry, whether landless or landed. This finding, of course, comes as no surprise and has been verified by many prior studies (Booth, 1975). The Costa Rican peasantry, not unlike peasantries in many other parts of the world, simply do not enjoy many of the services available in major cities.

The more important comparisons for the purposes of this analysis, however, are the comparisons between the general population and its subsets on the one hand, and the land reform beneficiaries on the other. For all of the variables

on which there are data in the 1976 national survey it is seen that the land reform beneficiaries live less well than the non-agricultural population of Costa Rica. In most cases, the difference is considerable between the percentage of people enjoying various services and owning various artifacts, although on one variable, ownership of sewing machines, the difference is very small. This contrast, again, is entirely expected since we are comparing a peasant population with non-agricultural individuals, most of whom live in Costa Rica's well-developed urban centers.

The more relevant comparison is between the land reform beneficiaries and the two peasant subsets in the general sample. First, however, a word about the comparisons between the landed and landless peasants in the general population. Some unexpected findings appear. One would have anticipated that the landed peasants would have shown consistently greater indicators of wealth than the landless peasants. This is true among the various artifacts indicated in Table II.14. However, the landless peasants are slightly (although not significantly) more likely to have an electric supply and are slightly more likely to have piped-in water. This finding, however, is misleading if it is taken to mean that landless peasants are wealthier than the landed peasants. The difference arises because many landless peasants live on large plantations and haciendas in which the landlord provides these services. The landed

peasants often live on farms scattered widely in the countryside, where the cost of bringing in piped-in water and electricity is very high.

ITCO beneficiaries, whether living in the Atlantic Basin or elsewhere, are considerably more likely to have electric services than peasants not assisted by ITCO, whether they are landed or landless. Indeed, among the Atlantic Basin beneficiaries, the percentage having electricity (90 percent) is almost as high as for the non-agricultural portion of the general population (92 percent). Availability of piped-in water, however, presents a mixed picture. Overall, reform beneficiaries are less likely to have water services than either the landed or landless peasantry. The Atlantic Basin beneficiaries, however, a very high percentage of whom enjoyed electric services, are more likely to have piped-in water than either the landed or landless peasants.

When it comes to the possession of various artifacts, however, the land reform beneficiaries fall far behind the peasantry in the rest of Costa Rica, except with regard to possession of a sewing machine. It can be seen from Table II.14 that land reform beneficiaries are much less likely to own irons, televisions sets, or refrigerators as compared to either the landed or landless peasants. Ownership of sewing machines, however, is more common among ITCO beneficiaries than among landless peasants, but only slightly less common than among landed peasants.

A difficulty in interpreting these figures is that many of these artifacts depend upon the availability of electricity. Peasants who don't have electric services are not likely to have electric irons, televisions or refrigerators. Yet, a surprising finding is that the landed and landless peasants of the general population are less likely to have electricity, while more likely to own these various artifacts. This finding would seem to support the contention that the land reform beneficiaries, despite the availability of electric service, do not have sufficient excess income to permit them to buy these various artifacts.

A further indication of the relative poverty of the reform beneficiaries appears in the measurement of the availability of indoor sanitary facilities. As seen in Table II.14, a very large percentage of the reform beneficiaries have piped-in water (61 percent), yet very few have indoor sanitary facilities (only 7 percent in contrast with 27 percent of the landless peasants and 36 percent of the landed peasants). Two factors may contribute to this difference. First, as mentioned above, land reform beneficiaries are somewhat less likely to have piped-in water compared to landed and landless peasants. A second, and perhaps more important reason, is that many land reform beneficiaries have not resided in their homes for the number of years that the general population has. It must be kept in mind that the reform beneficiaries are individuals who

have moved to settlements from their homes. As "homesteaders," one might anticipate that facilities such as indoor sanitary facilities would in time be introduced after the basic necessity of bringing the land under cultivation is accomplished. Giving some support to this contention is the low but significant correlation (Pearson $r = .07$, sig. = .03) between length of residence on the settlement and the availability of indoor sanitary facilities.

Taken together, the data presented regarding income on Table II.14 and indicators of wealth reveal some rather disappointing findings regarding the ITCO beneficiaries. Although in terms of income they seem to be doing better than those earning the minimum wage, their expenditures on various artifacts have been less than the comparable population of the peasantry. However, it may well be that land reform beneficiaries are spending most of their excess income on investments in the farm whereas landless peasants, as well as possibly landed peasants who are not beneficiaries of ITCO, are using their funds for consumption purposes. This contention would be supported by the fact that the reform beneficiaries are relative newcomers to their plots and therefore must spend most of their excess income in trying to make improvements on those new farms. However, this conjecture needs to be examined in a much more detailed study of the incomes and expenditures of reform beneficiaries.

The evidence here, therefore, is mixed; it is not entirely clear if reform beneficiaries are on the road to higher incomes or if the reform process has granted them a plot of land but has not been successful in helping them improve their standard of living. This question could be answered more easily if future surveys conducted in the same settlements sampled in the present study were to find that the ownership of artifacts has increased over the years. Moreover, to make a complete determination, other artifacts would need to be included, particularly those related to farming. Investments in that sort of equipment would certainly be an indication of an improvement in the beneficiary's economic situation. Nonetheless, the fact that the reform beneficiaries in many cases are less likely to own several household artifacts than the landless peasantry is a disturbing finding. It implies that obtaining land through ITCO has not enabled these formerly landless peasants to increase their material indicators of well-being. However, if, as mentioned above, expenditure has increased on farm-related items, and consumption of farm production has increased (probably not adequately reflected by the income figures), the implications of these findings would be somewhat different.

Education

The final area of analysis of socio-economic status concerns education. Beginning in 1886, 80 years before the U.S. state of Mississippi, Costa Rica made primary education compulsory and free for both sexes (Stycos, 1980:3). As a result, Costa Rica today has one of the highest educational standards of any Latin American country. Indeed, there is a higher proportion of the population, aged 20-24, enrolled in higher education than in Switzerland (1976 data). Adult literacy is enjoyed by 90 percent of the population, exceeded only by Uruguay, Argentina, Trinidad and Tobago, and South Korea among the world's "middle-income countries" (World Bank, 1980:110-111).

Unfortunately, the fact that education has been compulsory for over a century has not always meant that Costa Rica's peasants have been able to obtain a basic education. In some cases this occurred because they lived in areas which were very remote and there were no schools in which a student could attend classes. The impact of remoteness is evident in the ITCO beneficiary sample. As shown in Table II.15, nearly 20 percent of the beneficiaries have not received any education. More disturbing is the fact that a total of 49 percent of all the beneficiaries have received less than 3 years of education, the minimum which the Costa Rican educational system believes necessary

Table II.15. YEARS OF EDUCATION COMPLETED BY SETTLERS

Years of Education	Entire Sample		Atlantic Basin		Other Settlements		General population (Males only)					
	Z	(N)	Z	(N)	Z	(N)	Non-Agric-cultural		Landless peasants		Landed Peasants	
0	19.9	(150)	24.9	(44)	18.4	(106)	4.7	(25)	21.6	(37)	13.9	(14)
1	10.0	(75)	11.3	(20)	9.6	(55)	5.1	(27)	19.9	(34)	17.8	(18)
2	17.8	(134)	14.7	(26)	18.8	(108)						
3	17.8	(134)	15.3	(27)	18.6	(107)	24.2	(129)	33.9	(58)	33.7	(34)
4	10.1	(76)	9.6	(17)	10.3	(59)						
5	6.9	(52)	6.2	(11)	7.1	(41)						
6	15.3	(115)	17.5	(31)	14.6	(84)	24.2	(129)	18.7	(32)	18.8	(19)
7	0.1	(1)	0.0	(0)	0.2	(1)	19.9	(106)	2.9	(5)	6.9	(7)
8	0.7	(5)	0.0	(0)	0.9	(5)						
9	0.4	(3)	0.0	(0)	0.5	(3)						
10	0.1	(1)	0.0	(0)	0.2	(1)						
11	0.7	(5)	0.6	(1)	0.7	(4)	9.7	(52)	1.8	(3)	4.0	(4)
12	0.0	(0)	0.0	(0)	0.0	(0)						
13	0.0	(0)	0.0	(0)	0.0	(0)	2.4	(66)	1.2	(2)	5.0	(5)
14	0.1	(1)	0.0	(0)	0.2	(1)						
	100.0%	(752)	100.0%	(177)	100.0%	(575)						
Mean	2.9		2.7		2.9							
Std. dev.	2.3		2.2		2.3							

T value = 1.28 Sig. = ns

(Missing data encountered in 1 case, or 0.1% of the sample)

^aThis category includes those with some university, university completed and teacher training school completed (Escuela Normalista).

for the firm establishment of literacy. The implications of this figure are underscored by the mean education figures provided at the bottom of Table II.15. These show that reform beneficiaries on the average have only 2.9 years of education.

The comparatively low levels of educational achievement among beneficiaries must be having some impact on the success of the various ITCO programs. With individuals who have an average level of education that is so low, it is easy to understand why many well-intended programs would run into difficulties. The introduction of many modern agricultural practices depend heavily upon the peasants being able to read and follow directions. To the extent that ITCO beneficiaries do not have that minimal capability, the various agricultural training programs are unlikely to be entirely successful. Indeed, this finding takes on particular importance because in the Atlantic Basin the mean level of education is even lower, 2.7 years, although the difference is not statistically significant for the other ITCO settlers.

Some comparisons are possible with the national probability sample, although the data for that study were coded in aggregated form. As expected, the non-agricultural sectors of the general population have much higher levels of education than do either the reform or non-reform

respondents. Hence, while only 5 percent of the non-agricultural population has had no education, 14 percent of landed peasants and 22 percent of the landless peasants are without formal education. The reform beneficiaries fall between the landed and landless peasants of the general population. A similar pattern is encountered throughout the remainder of the education pyramid. Hence, the reform beneficiaries have educational achievements which lie somewhere between the landed and landless peasants of the general population.

The findings immediately suggest that a concerted effort be made to determine the levels of functional literacy on IICO settlements. Wherever it is found that existing beneficiaries are not functionally literate, an effort should be made, perhaps through a campaign involving high school and university students, to teach them basic literacy skills. Moreover, beneficiaries who are in the process of being selected for settlement ought to be given basic instruction if they do not have the reading and writing skills necessary. At a minimum, an effort should be made to help insure that the new Atlantic Basin beneficiaries can take maximum advantage of the various programs being planned for the new settlements.

On a more positive note, the data in Table II.15 also revealed that 15 percent of the settlers have already completed 6 years of education. This means that it may be possible to draw upon this "educational elite" in the settlements to carry out some relatively complex projects. For example, in many of the settlements in which cooperatives function, there is a need for accounting skills. Those individuals who have completed sixth grade could fairly easily be taught the rudimentary accounting skills necessary to conduct cooperative business. Overall, however, it is clear that education of beneficiaries and potential beneficiaries must become a significant element in ITCO programming.

Partisan Preferences

In concluding this chapter, a brief look is taken at the political preferences of these individuals. Looking at the left hand set of columns on Table II.16, it is clear that the most popular party among reform beneficiaries, both for the entire sample and for the subsets, is the National Liberation Party (PLN). This finding would tend to support the conclusions reached in many other studies, that in rural areas the PLN has particularly strong support (Seligson, forthcoming).

One surprising finding of Table II.16 is that the Communist party (PASO) was more weakly supported among the Atlantic Basin settlers than among other respondents. This is a surprise because it has long been the case (since the 1953 elections) that Communist voting strength has come from the Atlantic Basin (see Seligson, forthcoming). Such support for the Communist party among Atlantic Basin settlers goes back to the period of the 1940s when the Communists were allied with the Calderón Guardia forces. It would seem, therefore, that the political dynamics on the Atlantic Basin settlements are quite different from those existing elsewhere in the Atlantic Basin. Here again, then, there is evidence that the Atlantic Basin settlements are isolated from the larger social-political environment in which they are located.

A comparison of the ITCO beneficiaries with the general population appears to reveal higher support for the PLN among reform beneficiaries than among the general population. It was found that whereas 46 percent of the reform beneficiaries expressed a preference for the PLN, only 34 percent of the non-agricultural population did so. Even lower percentages of the peasantry expressed support for the PLN among the general population. However, this finding must be strongly qualified by the very high percentage of the general population who expressed a "Don't know" opinion on this item. As can be seen from the table,

between 55 and 63 percent of the general population didn't express an opinion on this item.

Further insight may be obtained by examining voting behavior data in the 1974 election, as presented in the bottom panel of Table II.16. It was in this election that PLN's candidate, Daniel Oduber won the election with 43 percent of the national vote. The opposition unification candidate received 30 percent of the vote and the major Communist, PASO, received 2 percent of the vote.[5]

As can be seen from the data, the PLN was more strongly supported by the beneficiaries than by the general population. Over half (54 percent) of the beneficiaries on the ITCO settlements said they voted for the PLN in 1974, a figure which is nearly 10 percent above the national totals. Similarly, the Unification candidate was supported by only 16 percent of the reform beneficiaries, only half of the national totals. The Communist party, in contrast, did considerably better among the reform beneficiaries than in the population as a whole, with 6 percent of the beneficiaries saying they voted for that party.

A comparison of the voting in the Atlantic Basin with other parts of the country reveals some small but nevertheless noteworthy differences. First, it is found that the PLN receives somewhat higher support in the

5. The source for the voting data is Jiménez Castro, 1977.

TABLE II.16. PARTISAN PREFERENCES OF SETTLERS / GENERAL POPULATION

Party	Settlers						General Population (males only)*					
	Entire Reform Sample		Atlantic Basin		Other Settlements		Non-Agricultural		Landless Peasants		Landed Peasants	
	<u>X</u>	<u>(N)</u>	<u>X</u>	<u>(N)</u>	<u>X</u>	<u>(N)</u>	<u>X</u>	<u>(N)</u>	<u>X</u>	<u>(N)</u>	<u>X</u>	<u>(N)</u>
<u>Present (1976) preference:</u>												
PLN	46.1	(347)	50.8	(90)	44.6	(257)	34.1	(182)	26.3	(45)	27.7	(28)
UN	10.5	(79)	10.2	(18)	10.6	(61)	7.9	(42)	10.5	(18)	7.9	(8)
PASO	8.2	(62)	4.0	(7)	9.5	(55)	2.1	(11)	1.2	(2)	0.0	(0)
Natl. Ind.	0.5	(4)	1.7	(3)	0.2	(1)	0.2	(1)	0.0	(0)	0.0	(0)
Democ. Ch.	0.3	(2)	0.6	(1)	0.2	(1)	0.2	(1)	0.0	(0)	0.0	(0)
Democ.	0.3	(2)	0.6	(1)	0.2	(1)	0.4	(2)	0.0	(0)	1.0	(1)
Social CR	0.1	(1)	0.0	(0)	0.2	(1)	0.2	(1)	0.0	(0)	1.0	(1)
Don't know	34.3	(256)	32.2	(57)	34.5	(199)	55.1	(294)	62.0	(106)	62.4	(63)
	100.0X	(753)	100.0X	(177)	100.0X	(576)	100.0X	(534)	100.0X	(171)	100.0X	(101)
<u>Vote in 1974 election:</u>												
PLN	53.8	(405)	58.8	(104)	52.3	(301)	41.0	(229)	39.8	(68)	46.1	(35)
UN	15.9	(120)	13.6	(24)	16.7	(96)	15.0	(84)	15.8	(27)	18.4	(14)
PASO	6.4	(48)	1.7	(3)	7.8	(45)	1.4	(6)	0.6	(1)	0.0	(0)
Natl. Ind.	2.1	(16)	2.3	(4)	2.1	(12)	5.4	(30)	8.2	(14)	5.3	(4)
Ren. Demo.	0.7	(5)	0.4	(1)	0.7	(4)	7.7	(43)	2.3	(4)	2.6	(2)
Democ.	0.5	(4)	0.6	(1)	0.5	(3)	1.8	(10)	0.0	(0)	0.0	(0)
Democ. Ch.	0.1	(1)	0.6	(1)	0.0	(0)	0.7	(4)	1.2	(2)	0.0	(0)
Social CR	0.1	(1)	0.6	(1)	0.0	(0)	0.4	(2)	0.0	(0)	0.0	(0)
Didn't vote	14.7	(111)	13.6	(24)	15.1	(87)	22.0	(123)	27.5	(47)	22.4	(17)
Don't know	5.6	(42)	7.9	(14)	4.9	(28)	4.7	(26)	4.7	(8)	5.3	(4)
	100.0X	(753)	100.0X	(177)	100.0X	(576)	100.0X	(559)	100.0X	(171)	100.0X	(76)

<u>Key</u>	<u>Party</u>	<u>Candidate in 1974</u>
PLN	Partido Liberacion Nacional	(Daniel Oduber)
UN	Unificacion Nacional	(Fernando Trejos Escalante)
PASO	Partido Accion Socialista	(Manuel Mora)
Natl. Ind.	Nacional Independente	(Gonzalez Marten)
Ren. Demo.	Renovacion Democrata	(Rodrigo Carazo)
Democ.	Partido Democrata	(G. W. Villalobos)
Democ. Ch.	Democrata Crisitiano	(Jorge Arturo Monge Zamora)
Social CR	Partido Socialista Costaricense	(J. Francisco Aguilar Bulgareli)

*Data from 1976 National Probability Sample, males only. Note that the "don't know" category for the partisan preference variable includes those who are listed as having no preference (45.0% of entire sample). Also included in this category were those who provided preferences not mentioned in the settler sample (i.e., Frente Popular, "Oposicion" and "Calderonista"). A total of 1.4% of the entire sample indicates these preferences.

Atlantic Basin, and Unification receives somewhat less support. The finding of greater PLN support in the Atlantic Basin confirms the party preferences figures provided in the top panel of Table II.16. It is also found, as with the party preference data, that the Communist party is less strongly preferred in the Atlantic Basin. In the 1974 election, only 2 percent of the Atlantic Basin beneficiaries stated that they had voted for the Communist party (PASO), whereas 8 percent of the other beneficiaries did so. Again, this contradicts the larger apparent trend of higher support for the Communist party in the Atlantic Basin. For example, as already mentioned, the PASO party received 2 percent of the vote nationwide, but in Limón province, it received 7 percent of the vote. Therefore, once again it appears that the Atlantic Basin settlements are somewhat atypical. The survey data from the general population tend to confirm the findings indicated above, but are somewhat less reliable since the percentage of "Didn't vote" and "Don't Know" is quite high. This leads to some ambiguity in the

interpretation of the findings. Nonetheless, the basic pattern of stronger PLN support in 1974 among beneficiaries is still in evidence.

In sum, it appears that the reform beneficiaries have political preferences more or less in line with the national population. However, there is somewhat of a trend among reform beneficiaries to be supportive of the PLN to a greater extent than the general population. This conclusion is beclouded by the high percentage of missing data reported in the partisan preference figures of Table II.16, but is much clearer in the voting statistics reported in that table where the missing data are of a reduced magnitude. One can only speculate why there would be somewhat higher PLN support among the reform beneficiaries. One motivation might have to do with the fact that Costa Rica's landed peasantry has typically provided a support base for the PLN in Costa Rica.[6]

Hence, as it is shown on the bottom panel of Table II.16, the landed peasants gave it more support than the

6. In the Seligson article cited above, an extensive bibliography lists the various studies which have concluded that the PLN has higher support in rural areas. However, it is clear from the data analysis presented in Seligson (forthcoming) that the strength of the PLN in rural areas is modest. That is to say, it is not appropriate to infer that rural areas are bastions of PLN support. It is seen that Atlantic Basin settlers are somewhat more likely to prefer the PLN, but the difference was quite small.

landless peasants, and indeed more than the non-agricultural population as a whole. That support, however, is manifested only in the election results and not in the party preference results in the top panel of Table II.16. The reform beneficiaries, being landed peasants, may be conforming to the national pattern of higher support among landed peasants for the PLN. At the same time, the reform program has been somewhat more strongly supported by the PLN than the opposition, although this statement must be tempered with the qualification that some PLN presidents have not been as supportive as others. Therefore, it is possible that during PLN administrations beneficiary recruitment was particularly attractive to peasants who were PLN supporters.

Further evidence regarding the positive attitudes toward the PLN among the settlers is contained in Table II.17. On this table, the results of a party preference question are displayed in order to indicate the intensity of support for the party. As is seen, fully 51 percent of the entire sample responded that they were "very positive" toward the PLN, compared to 12 percent being very positive toward the Unification Party (PUN) and 12 percent feeling so for the PASO. Indeed, it is surprising to see how high the support is for the PASO, almost exceeding that of the PUN. This finding is offset by the fact that 66 percent of the beneficiaries indicated that they were "very negative" toward the PASO, compared to 42 percent feeling so toward

TABLE II.17. ATTITUDES TOWARD MAJOR POLITICAL PARTIES*

Question: I am going to read you a list of political parties, and for each one I am going to ask you how you feel toward this party. (To assist respondents, a drawing of five coffee baskets was shown, each with varying levels of coffee beans filling the baskets. Respondents were instructed to select the basket that best reflected their attitude toward the party.)

	Entire Sample			Atlantic Basin			Other Settlements		
	PLN	PUN	PASO	PLN	PUN	PASO	PLN	PUN	PASO
Very negative (empty basket)	23.4	42.3	66.2	24.5	51.6	72.3	23.1	39.5	64.3
Somewhat negative (1/4 full basket)	4.0	9.8	8.9	1.9	5.7	8.2	4.6	11.1	9.2
Neither negative nor positive (1/2 full basket)	10.2	15.6	9.8	5.7	11.9	6.3	11.5	16.7	10.9
Somewhat positive (3/4 full basket)	11.9	20.4	3.4	7.5	15.1	3.8	13.3	22.0	3.3
Very positive (full basket)	50.5	11.9	11.6	60.4	15.7	9.4	47.5	10.7	12.3
	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

(No significant T-test differences between Atlantic and Other Settlements on any party.)

*N's not shown because of lack of space. The PLN was rated by 679 respondents (90.2%), the PUN by 673 (89.5%) and the PASO by 671 (89.1%).

the PUN. The trend of higher support in the Atlantic Basin for the PLN is once again revealed in this question. Fully 60 percent of the respondents were "very positive" toward the PLN. Once again the PASO party comes off less well in the Atlantic Basin settlements than it does elsewhere in Costa Rica. These findings have been confirmed in the data presented in Table II.16, indicating fairly strong support for the PLN among the beneficiaries, with even stronger support in the Atlantic Basin.

Summary

The length of this chapter and its many varied details must preclude comprehensive summarization. Only the major points will be touched on here.

First, the settlers' demographic characteristics reveal them to be a largely middle-age population, with a substantial proportion concentrated in the over-50 cohorts. Most settlers are married.

The settlers' backgrounds are largely uniform. Few have had any significant experience of living in urban areas. The great majority were landless peasants prior to joining the ITCO settlement, and most were producing basic grains and export crops.

Although migration patterns were not fully explored in the study, the settlers have had fairly long-standing roots in their communities before being re-settled on ITCO land. The Atlantic Basin beneficiaries, as a group, appear to have had somewhat shallower roots. The average number of years worked on the settlement was approximately five, and about half of the settlers migrated from some other area to take up residence on the project.

The average farm size was a little over 12 hectares, with the plots being somewhat smaller in areas outside the Atlantic Basin. Approximately two-thirds of the land on the settlements was under cultivation.

In many ways, the socio-economic information presented in the chapter was the most interesting and unsatisfactory. While the average income earned by ITCO beneficiaries was above the minimum wage for agricultural work, many respondents earned far below the minimum. Moreover, over 80 percent of the beneficiaries remain below the poverty line determined by AID analysis. Income alone, however, can be a misleading indicator of wealth, especially among peasants. An examination of several alternate indicators revealed that from the standpoint of services provided by the government (especially electricity), the ITCO beneficiaries lived well compared to the non-beneficiary population. However, for the most part, the settlers remained quite poor even when compared to the landless non-beneficiary population.

Moreover, for the most part, the Atlantic Basin beneficiaries appeared to be even poorer than the beneficiaries as a whole, despite their significantly higher incomes, owing to the significantly higher cost of living in the Atlantic zone. It is possible that the apparent poverty of the settlers, compared to the landless peasant population, is less real if considerable income is being invested in farm equipment and improvements which did not show up in the indicators employed in this study.

Another disturbing finding is that despite the high levels of education achieved in Costa Rica, two-thirds of the beneficiaries have only a third-grade education or less, and nearly one-fifth have no formal education at all. The lack of sufficient education probably hampers many developmental efforts on ITCO settlements.

Finally, it was found that ITCO beneficiaries are heavily supportive of the PLN. This came as no surprise since that party historically has been the major advocate of land reform in Costa Rica.

This chapter in painting a picture of Costa Rica's reform beneficiaries as of 1976, contained few surprises, except to uncover some evidence of a disappointing standard of living and unfortunately low levels of educational achievement. These data serve as background for the analysis presented in the following chapters.

III. SETTLER COOPERATION: ATTITUDES AND EVIDENCE

This chapter deals with attitudes, behaviors and predictors of cooperative behavior among settlers. If it is true that a central element in helping assure the success of the settlements is the extent to which the beneficiaries cooperate with each other in achieving collective goals, a clear understanding of settler cooperation is vitally important for ITCO. Fortunately, the data available on settler cooperation are among the most extensive in the entire survey instrument used, and, moreover, numerous comparisons are possible with the general population since such data also exist in abundance in the survey of the general population.

The chapter begins with an examination of attitudes toward cooperation. The analysis first focuses on general attitudes of interpersonal trust. The discussion then moves to an examination of attitudes toward group cooperativeness among settlers, and then examines the ways in which settlers solve community problems. A discussion of optimism or pessimism regarding the solution of these problems is then undertaken. The analysis then turns to cooperative behavior manifested among settlers. A final section develops an index of cooperative behavior and examines the correlates and predictors thereof. In this discussion a distinction is made between participation in cooperatives vs. participation in other forms of community activism.

Attitudinal Support for Cooperation

Interpersonal Trust

Analyses of Latin American culture have frequently emphasized the low levels of interpersonal trust found there (Lewis, 1960:82; Foster, 1967:91; Fromm and Maccoby, 1970:37-38). Many researchers have attributed a number of the region's developmental problems to the allegedly high levels of suspicion which prevent individuals from cooperating to their mutual benefit. Latin American peasants in particular have been characterized repeatedly as mistrustful and therefore prevented from cooperating effectively (Seligson and Salazar, 1979).

It is important to examine the levels of interpersonal trust found among settlers, and to compare those levels with the general population, since it is generally believed that settlers with low levels of interpersonal trust will exhibit lower levels of cooperative behavior. In fact, as shown in the final section of this chapter, interpersonal trust does have an important bearing on cooperative behavior. Indeed, it is the most powerful attitudinal factor associated with cooperation. It is appropriate, therefore, to begin with an examination of interpersonal trust levels. Two sets of items measuring interpersonal trust are explored here

First, levels of interpersonal trust with respect to society at large are examined, and then, interpersonal trust among the settlers themselves is explored.

The four items used to measure interpersonal trust are similar to the original Rosenberg (1957) items, except that they have been modified to eliminate the acquiescence response set.[1] The pattern of responses shown for the four items of Table III.1 is so clear cut that it is worth anticipating the conclusions at this point. Most importantly, it is found that reform beneficiaries have considerably higher levels of interpersonal trust than the general population. Not only are the levels of interpersonal trust higher than among the non-agricultural population, but they are higher than among either the landed or landless peasants. This finding certainly bodes well for those who believe that cooperative behavior is crucial to the success of the ITCO settlements.

The first item asks "Do you think that the majority of

1. The original items asked respondents either to agree or disagree with a statement. It has been found, in subsequent social science research, that individuals of lower socio-economic status tend to agree with the interviewer, believing that they are thereby ingratiating themselves to him/her (Crowne and Marlowe, 1964). The items used in this study have all been rephrased so as to eliminate an acquiescence response set. It was particularly important to do so, given the fact that the reform beneficiaries are, almost universally, of much lower socio-economic status than the non-agricultural sectors of the Costa Rican population.

the time people watch out for themselves or do you think that the majority of the time people try to help others?" Slightly more than a quarter (28 percent) of the reform beneficiaries believe that the majority of the time people help others. No significant differences were found between the responses on this item in terms of Atlantic Basin or other residence. Although this appears, at first sight, to be a rather low expression of interpersonal trust, two factors contradict such a conclusion. First, among the general population, only 18 percent would agree that the majority of the time people help others. Second, this item and the two that follow it are phrased in such a way as to encourage only a small percentage of the respondents to respond in a positive way. That is, these items are dichotomies and ask the respondent to talk about "the majority of the time." Therefore, only those who clearly believe in a trusting world would be likely to respond in the positive "help others" way. One final comment about this item is that among the general population, although there are no significant differences between non-agricultural respondents and peasants, both components of the peasantry were less trusting than the general population, and both were significantly less trusting than the reform beneficiaries.

The next item states, "Talking in general about people, do you think that one can trust the majority of people, or do you think that one must be very careful in friendships with them?" The overwhelming majority of reform beneficiaries as well as of the general population believe that one should exercise prudence in dealing with people. That is, only slightly over 10 percent of the population (13 percent of the reform beneficiaries, 14 percent of the non-agricultural general population) believe that one can trust the majority of the people. In Costa Rica, at least, it appears that for all sectors of the population, trust takes place in the context of caution. Hence, on this item, no significant difference is found between the attitudes of the settlers and the general population. However, it is worth noting that among the landless peasants, the percentage of respondents who believe that one can trust the majority of the people is significantly lower than it is among the general population or among the landed peasants. Only 4 percent of the landless peasants believe that one can trust the majority of people, whereas 12 percent of the landed peasants of the general population believe so.

The third interpersonal trust item reads, "Do you think that the majority of the people would try to take advantage of you given the opportunity, or do you think that they would not?" Over one quarter of the reform beneficiaries (27 percent) responded in a trusting fashion to this item, as

compared to significantly fewer in the general population (17 percent). It is noteworthy that the landless peasants once again are less trustworthy than either the landed peasants or the general population, although the difference is not significant. Landless peasants once again emerge as significantly less trustful than the reform beneficiaries. On this item, an important difference emerges between the Atlantic Basin settlers and the other settlers, one which is paralleled in the later analysis of participation in cooperatives. A significantly higher level of interpersonal trust was found among settlers elsewhere in the country as compared to the Atlantic Basin settlers: 31 percent to 16 percent. This pattern also emerges in the next item.

The final item in Table III.1 asks "Some say that in these times one doesn't know who one can count on in moments of need. Others say that one does know. What would you say?" It is important to note, before presenting the findings that this is the only item in which the attention is shifted from the majority to individuals. Therefore, it is to be expected that on this item, higher levels of interpersonal trust should emerge. This is exactly what is found. As can be seen in Table III.1, nearly three-quarters (72 percent) of the reform beneficiaries felt that in moments of need there was someone on whom one can count. In contrast, however, only slightly over half of the general population (55 percent), and even fewer of the landless

TABLE III.1. INTERPERSONAL TRUST: COMPARISONS AMONG SETTLERS / NON-SETTLERS

	Settlers						General Population (males only)*					
	Entire Reform Sample		Atlantic Basin		Other Settlements		Non-Agricultural		Landless Peasants		Landed Peasants	
	\bar{X}	(N)	\bar{X}	(N)	\bar{X}	(N)	\bar{X}	(N)	\bar{X}	(N)	\bar{X}	(N)
Question: Do you think that the majority of the time people watch out for themselves or do you think that the majority of the time people try to help others?												
Help others	28.2	(212)	24.9	(44)	29.2	(168)	18.3	(53)	15.5	(13)	14.0	(7)
Watch out for themselves	67.5	(508)	74.0	(131)	65.5	(377)	79.9	(231)	82.1	(69)	86.0	(43)
Don't know	4.4	(33)	1.1	(2)	5.4	(31)	1.7	(5)	2.4	(2)	0.0	(0)
	100.0%	(753)	100.0%	(177)	100.0%	(576)	100.0%	(289)	100.0%	(84)	100.0%	(50)
	Non-Agri.	Landless	Landed	Sig. = ns			Sig. = ns			Sig. = ns		
Tau b	.11	.09	.08									
Sig.	< .001	.009	.018									
Question: Talking in general about people, do you think that one can trust in the majority of people, or do you think that one must be very careful in friendships with them?												
Trust	12.7	(96)	11.2	(20)	13.2	(76)	13.5	(39)	3.9	(3)	12.0	(6)
Be careful	86.1	(648)	87.0	(154)	85.8	(494)	84.8	(245)	94.0	(79)	88.0	(44)
Don't know	1.2	(9)	.7	(3)	1.0	(6)	1.7	(5)	2.4	(2)	0.0	(0)
	100.0%	(753)	100.0%	(177)	100.0%	(576)	100.0%	(289)	100.0%	(84)	100.0%	(50)
	Non-Agri.	Landless	Landed	Sig. = ns			Tau b = .10			Tau b = .16		
Tau b	.08	.08	.08				Sig. (of Tau) = .02			Sig. (of Tau) = .03		
Sig.	.001	.001	.001	ns								

* Data from 1976 National Probability Sample.

TABLE III.1. INTERPERSONAL TRUST: COMPARISONS AMONG SETTLERS / NON-SETTLERS
(Continued)

	<u>Settlers</u>						<u>General Population (males only)*</u>					
	<u>Entire Reform Sample</u>		<u>Atlantic Basin</u>		<u>Other Settlements</u>		<u>Non-Agricultural</u>		<u>Landless Peasants</u>		<u>Landed Peasants</u>	
	<u>X</u>	<u>(N)</u>	<u>X</u>	<u>(N)</u>	<u>X</u>	<u>(N)</u>	<u>X</u>	<u>(N)</u>	<u>X</u>	<u>(N)</u>	<u>X</u>	<u>(N)</u>
Not take advantage	27.4	(206)	15.8	(28)	30.9	(178)	17.3	(50)	13.1	(11)	18.0	(9)
Take advantage	69.2	(521)	81.9	(145)	65.3	(376)	86.3	(232)	84.5	(71)	80.0	(40)
Don't know	3.5	(26)	2.3	(4)	3.8	(22)	2.4	(7)	2.4	(2)	2.0	(1)
	100.0%	(753)	100.0%	(177)	100.0%	(576)	100.0%	(289)	100.0%	(84)	100.0%	(50)
	Non-Agri.	Landless	Landed	Tau b = .15			Sig. = nr			Sig. = ns		
Tau b	.11	.10	.10	Sig. (of Tau) = <.001								
Sig.	<.001	.004	ns									
<u>Question:</u>	Some say that in these times one doesn't know who one can count on in moments of need. Others say that one does know. What would you say?											
Can count on	71.6	(539)	67.8	(120)	72.7	(419)	54.7	(158)	45.2	(38)	58.0	(29)
Can't count on	22.6	(170)	28.8	(51)	20.7	(119)	42.6	(123)	45.2	(38)	42.0	(21)
Don't know	5.8	(44)	3.4	(6)	6.6	(38)	2.8	(8)	9.5	(8)	0.0	(0)
	100.0%	(753)	100.0%	(177)	100.0%	(576)	100.0%	(289)	100.0%	(84)	100.0%	(50)
	Non-Agri.	Landless	Landed	Tau b = .08			Sig. = ns			Sig. = ns		
Tau b	.20	.17	.10	Sig. (of Tau) = .02								
Sig.	<.001	<.001	.004									

*Data from 1976 National Probability Sample.

peasants (45 percent) felt this way, differences which are statistically significant. Hence, once again, the pattern emerges that reform beneficiaries are more trusting interpersonally than the general population. In addition, the pattern that emerged on the previous item with regard to higher interpersonal trust among other beneficiaries is also seen.

Overall, then, reform beneficiaries express rather high levels of interpersonal trust when compared to the general population. Although the phraseology of the items encouraged the negative response of three of the four items, when this was not the case, as on the last item, a very strong majority of the respondents expressed interpersonal trust. In addition, the findings in this table reveal stronger interpersonal trust elsewhere than in the Atlantic Basin.

In Table III.2 attention is shifted from people in general to the reform beneficiaries as the group which is to be either trusted or distrusted. Since the focus is on reform beneficiaries alone, no comparison with the general population is relevant. However, on one item the identical phraseology is used as in Table III.1, so that comparisons may be made within the reform beneficiary sample on interpersonal trust toward people in general as compared to interpersonal trust toward other beneficiaries.

The first two items on Table III.2 need to be examined together. The first item asks, "Upon meeting a member of this (communal enterprise, colony, cooperative, etc.) for the first time, should one trust him or wait until one knows him better, or not trust him?" The second item is almost identical, but asks, "And what do you think of non-members...", and then goes on to ask the same item. It is clear that interpersonal trust levels among the members of the settlements is much higher toward other members of the settlement than toward non-members. As shown in the top panel of Table III.2, one-fifth (20 percent) of the reform beneficiaries would trust a member of the settlement upon meeting him for the first time, whereas only 7 percent of the beneficiaries would trust those who were not members. Hence, membership in the settlement significantly increases the levels of trust that beneficiaries are willing to extend toward individuals whom they meet for the first time. However, even among members, four-fifths of the respondents would not immediately trust the member who they are meeting for the first time. This finding is tempered by the fact that only 4 percent of the reform beneficiaries stated that they would "not trust" a member upon meeting him for the first time. The overwhelming majority (76 percent) would prefer to wait to decide whether or not they would trust him. It should also be noted that although the first two items on Table III.2 indicate a slightly higher level of

TABLE III.2. INTERPERSONAL TRUST AMONG SETTLERS

Question: Upon meeting a member of this (communal enterprise, colony, cooperative, etc.) for the first time, should one trust him or wait until one knows him better, or not trust him?

	Entire Sample		Atlantic Basin		Other Settlements	
	<u>X</u>	<u>(N)</u>	<u>X</u>	<u>(N)</u>	<u>X</u>	<u>(N)</u>
Trust	19.5	(147)	23.2	(41)	18.4	(106)
Wait	76.2	(574)	70.1	(124)	78.1	(450)
Not trust	3.6	(27)	6.2	(11)	2.8	(16)
Don't know	0.7	(5)	0.6	(1)	0.7	(4)
	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>(753)</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>(177)</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>(576)</u>

Sig. = ns

Question: And what do you think of the people who are not members of the (communal enterprise, colony, cooperative, etc.) upon meeting them for the first time, should one trust him, or wait until one knows him better, or not trust him?

	Entire Sample		Atlantic Basin		Other Settlements	
	<u>X</u>	<u>(N)</u>	<u>X</u>	<u>(N)</u>	<u>X</u>	<u>(N)</u>
Trust	7.2	(54)	9.0	(16)	6.6	(38)
Wait	83.0	(625)	79.7	(141)	84.0	(484)
Not trust	9.4	(71)	11.3	(20)	8.9	(51)
Don't know	0.4	(3)	0.0	(0)	0.5	(3)
	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>(753)</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>(177)</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>(576)</u>

Sig. = ns

TABLE III.2. INTERPERSONAL TRUST AMONG SETTLERS
(Continued)

*Question: Some people tend to help others. Other people only watch out for themselves. Thinking again about the member of this (communal enterprise, colony, cooperative, etc.) do you think that the majority help others or do you believe that the majority watches out for itself?

	Entire Sample		Atlantic Basin		Other Settlements	
	<u>X</u>	<u>(N)</u>	<u>X</u>	<u>(N)</u>	<u>X</u>	<u>(N)</u>
Help others	42.5	(320)	32.8	(58)	45.5	(262)
Watch out for themselves	56.3	(424)	66.1	(117)	53.3	(307)
Don't know	1.2	(9)	1.1	(2)	1.2	(7)
	100.0X	(753)	100.0X	(177)	100.0X	(576)

Tau b = .11 Sig. (of Tau = .001)

*A comparison between the results of this question and the one presented in Table V.1 (Interpersonal Trust: Comparisons Among Settlers/Non-Settlers) reveals that for the reform sample as a whole, 28.2% of the respondents answered "help others" to the question posed about people in general, whereas 42.5% responded in this fashion when the question was posed, as above, regarding settlers. This difference is significant at <.001 (paired T-test results).

trust among the Atlantic Basin beneficiaries, the difference is not significant, and is therefore taken to have no substantive import here.

The last item in Table III.2 is identical to the first item on Table III.1 and therefore permits comparison. On this item, the respondents were asked, "Some people tend to help others. Other people only watch out for themselves. Thinking again about the members of this (communal enterprise, colony, cooperative, etc.) do you think that the majority of people help others or do you believe that the

majority watch out for themselves?" It will be recalled that when this item was asked in Table III.1, 28 percent of the respondents answered "help others" (see footnote at the bottom of Table III.2 for clarification). When asked, however, about trusting members of the settlement, the percentage of those who express trust increases dramatically and significantly to 43 percent. This finding further demonstrates that among reform beneficiaries interpersonal trust is higher when they are considering the members of their settlement, compared to when they are considering those who are non-members. We note that on this item the Atlantic Basin beneficiaries are, once again, less trusting than other beneficiaries, a difference which is statistically significant.

Three overall conclusions emerge from Tables III.1 and III.2. First, reform beneficiaries have higher levels of interpersonal trust than the general population. Second, reform beneficiaries express higher levels of trust toward members of their settlement than they do toward those who are non-members. Taken together, these two findings point in the direction of a reasonable basis of interpersonal trust among members of the reform beneficiaries which can provide the attitudinal foundations for high levels of cooperation. The third finding is that the Atlantic Basin beneficiaries demonstrate somewhat lower levels of interpersonal trust than do other beneficiaries.

Group Cooperativeness among Settlers

Interpersonal trust is a general background variable which will relate to cooperative behavior. In Table III.3, attitudes more directly linked to group cooperativeness are measured. From Table III.3, it is found that on two of the three items discussed, attitudes quite conducive to group cooperativeness are found. However, on one of the items, the first, some ambivalence is detected toward working in groups. In addition it is found that there is further support for the earlier finding that Atlantic Basin settlers have somewhat less supportive attitudes toward group cooperativeness.

The first item in Table III.3 seeks to determine whether individuals think it is better to work in groups or work alone. The respondents were almost evenly divided on this item, with a somewhat higher proportion opting for working alone (57 percent vs. 42 percent). This does not mean that they would not work in groups, but that there is a preference for working alone. It is noted that a higher proportion of settlers outside the Atlantic zone would prefer to work in groups than would the Atlantic Basin settlers, the difference being statistically significant. This item, then, provides further evidence of a somewhat lower level of positive attitudes toward cooperation among the Atlantic Basin beneficiaries.

TABLE III.3. ATTITUDES TOWARD GROUP COOPERATIVENESS AMONG SETTLERS

Question: Select from among these alternatives: (1) Better results are obtained working in groups rather than working alone; (2) It is better to work alone than to depend upon others.

	Entire Sample		Atlantic Basin		Other Settlements	
	<u>%</u>	<u>(N)</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>(N)</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>(N)</u>
Work in groups	42.1	(317)	32.8	(58)	45.0	(259)
Work alone	57.1	(430)	67.2	(119)	54.0	(311)
Don't know	0.8	(6)	0.0	(0)	1.0	(6)
	100.0%	(753)	100.0%	(177)	100.0%	(576)

Tau b = .11 Sig. (of Tau) = .002

Question: Select from among these alternatives: (1) In order to make a decision, it is better to listen only to the point of view of the person who is well-informed; (2) Before making a decision, it is better to listen to the opinions of others. (Coding reversed for consistency).

Opinions of others	83.1	(626)	79.1	(140)	84.4	(486)
Only informed person	15.9	(120)	19.8	(35)	14.8	(85)
Don't know	0.9	(7)	1.1	(2)	0.9	(5)
	100.0%	(753)	100.0%	(177)	100.0%	(576)

Tau b = .06 Sig. (of Tau) = .05

Question: Select from among these alternatives: (1) All leaders ought to be very strict in order to earn the respect of those they lead; (2) A leader earns respect from his followers only by treating them well. (Coding reversed for consistency).

	Entire Sample		Atlantic Basin		Other Settlements	
	<u>%</u>	<u>(N)</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>(N)</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>(N)</u>
Good treatment	87.0	(655)	88.7	(157)	86.5	(498)
Strict	10.0	(75)	9.6	(17)	10.1	(58)
Don't know	3.1	(23)	1.7	(3)	3.5	(20)
	100.0%	(753)	100.0%	(177)	100.0%	(576)

Sig. = ns

TABLE III.3. ATTITUDES TOWARD COOPERATIVENESS AMONG SETTLERS
(Continued)

Question: Select from among these alternatives: (1) A person ought to struggle in order to succeed even though others envy him; (2) In the long run, it is more important that one's friends and neighbors like and respect one than to succeed in life. (Coding reversed here for consistency).

Respect of neighbors	65.2 (491)	68.9 (122)	64.1 (365)
Succeed in spite of envy	32.5 (245)	30.5 (54)	33.2 (191)
Don't know	2.3 (17)	0.6 (1)	2.9 (16)
	<u>100.0% (753)</u>	<u>100.0% (177)</u>	<u>100.0% (576)</u>
		Sig. = ns	

The next item in Table III.3 attempts to tap attitudes toward democratic decision-making style. Respondents were asked to state whether decisions should be made by listening only to well-informed individuals or by listening to the opinions of others. An overwhelming majority of the respondents opted for the democratic decision-making style. Over four-fifths (83 percent) of all respondents felt that the opinions of others should be listened to, as opposed to only 16 percent who preferred the opinions of informed people. Once again, beneficiaries outside the Atlantic zone distinguished themselves on this item as a significantly higher proportion opted for the democratic decision-making style.

The last item on Table III.3 returns to the question of leadership. The item asks whether leaders gain respect by being very strict with those whom they lead or whether they earn respect by treating them well. It was found that an

overwhelming majority of the respondents believe that good treatment is the way that leaders gain respect. Hence, 87 percent of the respondents chose the "good treatment" response. There was no significant difference between the Atlantic and other beneficiaries on this item.

In sum, Table III.3 revealed definite evidence of a positive disposition among reform beneficiaries to work together. In addition, it was found that such dispositions were generally somewhat lower in the Atlantic basin. Taken together, the evidence presented in Tables III.1 through III.3 provides a picture of a favorable attitudinal disposition toward cooperation. The analysis now turns toward preferred modes of community problem solving before seeing to what extent these attitudes influence behavior.

Modes of Community Problem Solving

The data presented in Tables III.4 and III.5 focus on modes of community problem solving and attitudes and behaviors related to them. The first item in Table III.4 examines the ways in which the respondents actually work to solve a local problem. Each respondent was first asked to name the problem most important in his community. Later, if he had done something to solve the problem, he was asked to state the ways in which he had done so.{2}

2. The responses to the first question of Table III.4 thus do not deal with the entire sample, but only those who both named a problem and had done something to help resolve it. Hence, the responses on Table III.4 concern 49 percent of the reform beneficiary sample.

By far the most frequent form of community problem solving is attending meetings: 69 percent of the reform beneficiaries attended meetings to help resolve community problems. Among the general population this form of community problem solving was also the most common, reported by 63 percent of all the non-agricultural respondents. Among the peasantry of the general population, the percentage attending meetings to solve community problems was almost identical to that found among the reform beneficiaries (73 percent of landless peasants, 70 percent of landed peasants).

Three other forms of community problem solving were much less common. It was found that only a little more than one-fifth of the reform beneficiaries had donated money or materials, asked for someone's help, or donated labor. Among the general population, these other forms were also less widespread, although asking for someone's help proved to be much more popular than it did among the reform beneficiaries. One can surmise that in the settlements the reform beneficiaries are more inclined to self-reliance than are either the general population or the peasant population elsewhere in Costa Rica. That is, they resolve their problems by group activity rather than by asking for outside help.

One interesting finding contained in the first panel of Table III.4 is that among the Atlantic Basin beneficiaries

who have sought to resolve a community problem, there is a significantly higher percentage of cooperative behavior. That is, that among those in the Atlantic Basin who have participated in community problem solving (a slightly lower total percentage than elsewhere, 45 percent compared to 51 percent elsewhere), there is a higher percentage who have attended meetings, donated money and materials, etc. The findings presented in the previous tables, that the Atlantic Basin beneficiaries exhibited lower tendencies toward cooperative behavior, are thus not contradicted by these findings. These are encouraging in that they suggest a higher degree of initiative among those beneficiaries in the Atlantic zone who do identify and act on community problems.

The following two items on Table III.4 deal with hypothetical situations, and therefore are somewhat less conclusive than the findings presented in the first panel. Nonetheless, some of the results are quite interesting. The respondents were asked, "Generally speaking, what is the most important thing for improving the conditions of this place among the following four things?" The choices included cooperation of neighbors, municipal assistance, national government assistance, and God's help. Although none of these alternatives was selected by a majority of respondents, God's help and cooperation of neighbors were the two most popular, chosen by about one-third of all the respondents. Assistance of the national government was

TABLE III.4. FORMS OF COMMUNITY PROBLEM SOLVING: SETTLERS/GENERAL POPULATION

Question: Have you done any of the following things (to solve respondent named community problem)?

Activity	Reform Sample			Taub	sig.	General Population (males only) ^b		
	Entire Sample ^a	Atlantic Basin	Other Settlements			Non-Agricultural	Landless Peasants	Landed Peasants
Attended meetings	69.1%	82.5%	65.4%	.15	.002	62.5%	72.7%	70.4%
Donated money or materials	22.3	52.5	14.0	.38	<.001	14.8	22.7	24.0
Asked for someone's help	22.0	37.5	17.8	.20	<.001	56.0	66.7	66.7
Donated labor	21.8	50.0	14.0	.36	<.001	33.6	54.2	53.8

^a Responses are based upon subset of entire sample who both named a problem in the community and who stated that they had done something to help resolve the problem. These respondents amounted to 372 (49.4% of the entire sample), 292 in the Other Settlements, and 80 in the Atlantic Basin settlements. Multiple responses permitted.

^b See note a. Total N for this item is 157. Source: 1978 National Probability Sample.

TABLE III.4. FORMS OF COMMUNITY PROBLEM SOLVING: SETTLERS/GENERAL POPULATION (cont)

Question:	Generally speaking, what is the most important thing for improving the conditions of this place among the following four things? ^c											
	<u>Settlers</u>						<u>General Population (males only)</u>					
	Entire Reform Sample		Atlantic Basin		Other Settlements		Non-Agricultural		Landless Peasants		Landed Peasants	
	<u>X</u>	<u>(N)</u>	<u>X</u>	<u>(N)</u>	<u>X</u>	<u>(N)</u>	<u>X</u>	<u>(N)</u>	<u>X</u>	<u>(N)</u>	<u>X</u>	<u>(N)</u>
Cooperation of neighbors	32.0	(241)	34.5	(61)	31.3	(180)	24.9	(133)	18.7	(32)	24.8	(25)
Municipal assistance	10.4	(78)	6.8	(12)	11.5	(66)	21.5	(115)	14.0	(24)	7.9	(8)
National government assistance	20.7	(156)	15.3	(27)	22.4	(129)	24.9	(133)	25.7	(44)	28.7	(29)
God's help	35.2	(265)	42.9	(76)	32.8	(189)	15.9	(85)	20.5	(35)	20.8	(21)
Don't know or other	1.7	(13)	0.6	(1)	2.1	(12)	12.7	(68)	21.1	(36)	17.8	(18)
	100.0%	(753)	100.0%	(177)	100.0%	(576)	100.0%	(534)	100.0%	(171)	100.0%	(101)

^c Items listed in the same order in which they were read to the respondents.

TABLE III.4. FORMS OF COMMUNITY PROBLEM SOLVING: SETTLERS/GENERAL POPULATION (cont)

Question: Let's suppose that a group of your neighbors believes that the government is not treating it justly. Among the following, what do you think would produce the quickest results?

	<u>Settlers</u>						<u>General Population (males only)</u>					
	<u>Entire Reform Sample</u>		<u>Atlantic Basin</u>		<u>Other Settlements</u>		<u>Non-Agricultural</u>		<u>Landless Peasants</u>		<u>Landed Peasants</u>	
	<u>X</u>	<u>(N)</u>	<u>X</u>	<u>(N)</u>	<u>X</u>	<u>(N)</u>	<u>X</u>	<u>(N)</u>	<u>X</u>	<u>(N)</u>	<u>X</u>	<u>(N)</u>
Talk to a <u>municipio</u> or <u>diputado</u>	55.6	(419)	53.7	(95)	56.3	(324)	37.3	(199)	40.4	(69)	40.6	(41)
Organize public meetings	26.0	(196)	28.8	(51)	25.2	(145)	27.5	(147)	19.3	(33)	26.7	(27)
Ask a political party for help	7.2	(54)	10.2	(18)	6.3	(36)	3.6	(19)	7.6	(13)	4.0	(4)
Organize a strike	6.6	(50)	5.6	(10)	6.9	(40)	1.7	(9)	1.8	(3)	1.0	(1)
Don't know or other	4.5	(34)	1.7	(3)	5.4	(31)	30.0	(160)	31.0	(53)	27.7	(28)
	100.0%	(753)	100.0%	(177)	100.0%	(576)	100.0%	(534)	100.0%	(171)	100.0%	(101)

^d Items listed in the same order in which they were read to the respondents. The general population sample included the alternative "speak to a member of the community development association." A total of 22.7% of non-agricultural respondents, 15.2% of landless respondents and 12.9% of landed respondents selected this alternative.

chosen by one out of five respondents, and municipal assistance by only one out of 10. These findings stand in marked contrast to the general population, among which God's help was the least popular choice (16 percent) and the other responses were chosen between a fifth and one-quarter of the respondents, with no one choice clearly predominating. Relatively few of the beneficiaries would turn first to the national government or to the municipality to resolve local problems. Rather they would rely upon their own resources. In a country like Costa Rica, where which demands on national resources far exceed the supply, these attitudes are very helpful. They indicate that the individuals in the reform beneficiary settlements are relatively willing to rely upon their own resources to solve problems, rather than to demand them from the national or local government. In such an environment, community development programs are more likely to be successful.

The findings in the final panel of Table III.4 reveal that the reform beneficiaries are political realists. That is, when attention is turned away from solving local problems toward potentially unjust treatment from the government, the beneficiaries realize that the fastest way to achieve relief is by talking to a politician. The respondents were asked, "Let's suppose that a group of your neighbors believes that the government is not treating you justly. Among the following, what do you think would

produce the quickest results?" The choices were: "talking to a municipal councilman or congressman, organizing a public meeting, asking a political party for help, or organizing a strike." Over half (56 percent) of the beneficiaries stated that talking to a municipal councilman or a congressman was the fastest way to get results. An additional quarter of the beneficiaries stated that they would organize public meetings.

At first glance, the responses to this item for the general population appear to be rather different from that of the reform beneficiaries; however, this is largely as a result of the much higher percentage of non-response. It is found that only 37 percent of the non-agricultural component of the general population would talk to a municipal councilman or congressman, in contrast to 56 percent of the reform beneficiaries. However, when the 30 percent of the general population who are listed as "Don't Know or other" are eliminated from the responses, the percentage of the non-agricultural general population selecting this category jumps to 53 percent, almost identical with that of the reform beneficiaries. The reason for the big difference between the general population and the reform beneficiaries is the much higher percentage of the respondents with missing data. However, the general population was also provided with an additional response, not given to the reform beneficiary population: "Speak to a member of the community development association." (see footnote d on Table

III.4). Since 23 percent of the non-agricultural respondents selected that choice, it is clear why the percentage of respondents selecting the other choices would have dropped so precipitously. However, when these incompatibilities in the questions asked of the general population on the one hand and the reform beneficiary population on the other are eliminated statistically, the results appear to be rather consistent. For example, it is noted that the order in which the choices are selected is identical for both the reform sample and the general population. That is, talking to a municipal councilman or congressman is the most frequently chosen, followed by organizing public meetings, followed by asking a political party for help and concluded by organizing a strike. The reform beneficiaries in the Atlantic Basin responded approximately the same way on this item as did those in the rest of the country.

Optimism/Pessimism Regarding Problem Solving. The above question indicated the ways in which reform beneficiaries go about solving local problems. It is important to know how optimistic or pessimistic the beneficiaries feel that these activities are likely to be successful. These data are reported in Table III.5.

Those beneficiaries who named a local problem were asked, "What hopes do you have that the problem would be resolved if you tried to resolve it? Would you have high

TABLE III.5. OPTIMISM / PESSIMISM REGARDING SOLUTION OF LOCAL PROBLEMS

Question: What hopes would you have that the problem (previously mentioned by respondent) would be resolved if you tried to resolve it? Would you have high hopes, average hope or little hope?

	Entire Sample ^a		Atlantic Basin		Other Settlements	
	<u>X</u>	<u>(N)</u>	<u>X</u>	<u>(N)</u>	<u>X</u>	<u>(N)</u>
High hopes	70.8	(432)	88.7	(141)	64.5	(291)
Average hope	22.5	(137)	6.3	(10)	28.2	(127)
Little hope	6.7	(41)	5.0	(8)	7.3	(33)
	100.0%	(610)	100.0%	(159)	100.0%	(451)

Tau c = .18 Sig. (of Tau) = <.001

^a Respondents to this item include only those who named a problem. Of those 645 respondents, 35 had no opinion on this item (5.4% of those mentioning a problem).

Question: Would you say that the problem(s) you have just mentioned affect you and your family a lot, somewhat or do not affect them?^b

	Entire Sample		Atlantic Basin		Non-Atlantic Basin		General Population (males only) ^c					
	<u>X</u>	<u>(N)</u>	<u>X</u>	<u>(N)</u>	<u>X</u>	<u>(N)</u>	Non-Agricultural		Landless Peasants		Landed Peasants	
	<u>X</u>	<u>(N)</u>	<u>X</u>	<u>(N)</u>	<u>X</u>	<u>(N)</u>	<u>X</u>	<u>(N)</u>	<u>X</u>	<u>(N)</u>	<u>X</u>	<u>(N)</u>
A lot	77.2	(494)	88.7	(141)	73.4	(353)	59.2	(213)	68.1	(64)	73.5	(50)
Somewhat	18.0	(115)	5.7	(9)	22.0	(106)	29.2	(105)	24.7	(23)	17.6	(12)
Not at all	4.8	(31)	5.7	(9)	4.6	(22)	11.7	(42)	7.4	(7)	8.8	(6)
	100.0%	(640)	100.0%	(159)	100.0%	(481)	100.0%	(360)	100.0%	(94)	100.0%	(68)

Tau c = .11 Sig. (of Tau) = <.001 Tau c = .10 Sig. (of Tau) = .008 Sig. = ns

^b Respondents to this item include those who stated that there were problems in the community, even if, in a subsequent problem, no specific problem was mentioned.

^c Source: 1976 National Probability Sample.

hopes, average hopes, or little hope?" The respondents were very optimistic about solving the problems, with 71 percent responding that they had "high hopes" and only 7 percent stating that they had "little hope." It is interesting to note that the Atlantic Basin beneficiaries were even more optimistic, with 89 percent of them having high hopes and only 5 percent having little hope, a difference which is statistically significant. However, it must be once again kept in mind that the Atlantic Basin beneficiaries were less likely to have named a problem and been involved in solving such a problem than the general population. Therefore, this greater optimism should be seen as representing the views of a somewhat smaller but more activist portion of the population.

Seriousness of local problem

The concluding item concerns local problem solving attempts, to tap the extent to which individuals felt that the problems they have are serious. Hence, the respondents were asked, "Would you say that the problems you have just mentioned affect you and your family a lot, somewhat, or do not affect you?" It is clear from the bottom panel on Table III.5 that the respondents feel the problems are quite serious. Fully 77 percent of the general population felt

that the problem would affect them a lot, compared to 59 percent of the non-agricultural component of the general population. Similarly, only 5 percent of the reform beneficiary sample felt that the problem would affect them "not at all" compared to twice that (12 percent) in the general population.

An explanation for these findings emerges when one compares the non-agricultural population to the two peasant samples in the general population. There it is found, as shown in Table III.5, that the non-agricultural population feels significantly less affected by the problems mentioned than does the peasant population. This can only mean that Costa Rican peasants feel more severely affected by local problems than do urbanites. For example, peasants who have inadequate roads connecting their farms to the towns and market places find it either difficult or impossible to transport their products to the market. Urbanites who complain about a bad road, however, perhaps are discomforted only by bumpiness or minor traffic delays on the way to work. They would not be prevented from getting to work.

It is noteworthy that the Atlantic Basin beneficiaries feel more seriously affected by the problems than do other ITCO beneficiaries. Fully 89 percent of those living in the

Atlantic Basin felt that they were affected "a lot" by the problems, a significantly higher percent than those elsewhere. Hence, even though the Atlantic Basin beneficiaries are more hopeful that the problems will be resolved, they also feel more severely affected by the problems.

Cooperative Behavior

Frequency

The tables discussed so far have focused primarily on attitudes toward cooperative behavior. The data regarding actual participation in various cooperative endeavors have been limited to those individuals who indicated that they had actually become involved in helping solve a community problem (see Table III.4, top panel). The data, therefore, do not provide information on the cooperative behavior of the entire sample. In order to get a complete picture of cooperative behavior among all the respondents a different set of questions was asked.

To measure the participation of the respondents in various forms of cooperative behavior, the following question was asked: "I'm going to name several organizations. Tell me if you attend their meetings...." The question went on to ascertain the frequency of participation in meetings of these organizations, and finally sought to determine whether or not the individual

was a member or a leader of the organization. A total of ten different organizations were named for the respondent, and room was left to name other organizations not mentioned on the list. The list covered the following organizations: the municipality, the school board, the parent-teacher association, the community welfare committee, the community development association, political parties, nutrition committee, social protection committee, cooperatives, and the church committee. This question produced a rich set of information regarding cooperative behavior, in that it covered a very wide range of organizations, and for each organization it determined frequency of participation, membership and leadership. Most previous studies of cooperative behavior and participation of this nature have limited themselves to fewer organizations and have often not attempted to ascertain frequency of meetings, membership and leadership.

Some of the results of the question regarding cooperative behavior are summarized in Table III.6, where six of the ten organizations named for the respondent are listed.[3] The data in Table III.6 also contain comparable data from the general population sample.

3. The four excluded are the community welfare committee, the nutrition committee, the social protection committee, and the church committee. The motivation for eliminating the first three was that many of the communities in which the survey was conducted did not have such organizations in existence, and it would have been

Several important conclusions emerge from an examination of Table III.6. First, since the organizations are listed in order of the frequency with which they are attended, it is clear that cooperatives are far and away the most important organization among settlers. Over half of the settlers attend cooperative meetings at least some of the time, and fully one-third are frequent attenders. No other organization achieves such a high rate of attendance. This finding is not surprising for on nearly all the settlements, there are cooperatives to attend to the production, marketing, and credit needs of the beneficiaries. However, looked at from a different perspective, it is surprising that despite the existence of cooperatives on the settlements, slightly less than half of the beneficiaries state that they never attend cooperative meetings. Since cooperatives are viewed as so vital to the success of the reform programs, and are assigned a central role in the new settlements being undertaken in the Atlantic Basin, one may want to know why only about half of the

inappropriate to report on the non-participation of respondents in organizations in which they could not possibly have been members. An explanation as to the problem of non-participation in non-existent organizations and how this can be dealt with from a methodological point of view is contained in Booth and Seligson (1979:12). The church committee was eliminated from the list largely because much of the activity of this committee is related principally to the support of church activities, such as improving the building of a church and running various religious festivals. These activities are of a different sort from the type that are of major concern in this paper.

settlers are involved in cooperatives and another half are not.

In this connection, a second important finding emerges from Table III.6. As can be seen from Table III.6 (footnote a), there is only one organization on which there was any significant difference between the Atlantic Basin settlers and settlers elsewhere, and that was in cooperatives. There was significantly more cooperative meeting attendance among the settlers outside the Atlantic zone (58 percent) than among the Atlantic Basin settlers (37 percent). An explanation of why this is so will emerge in the analysis of the predictors of cooperative behavior presented in Table III.9.

The finding of lower cooperative involvement among Atlantic Basin settlers is consistent with information reported in the tables presented earlier in this chapter. For example, there were indications that the Atlantic Basin settlers had lower trust than the other settlers (Table III.1), and that, as indicated in Table III.2, interpersonal trust among the settlers themselves was lower in the Atlantic Basin (Table III.2). In addition, there were more negative attitudes toward group cooperativeness (Table III.3). Finally, although Table III.4 revealed that among those who named community problems and stated they had done something to help resolve a problem, meeting attendance was

TABLE III.6. COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR: SETTLERS / GENERAL POPULATION

Question: I am going to name several organizations. Tell me if you attend their meetings and if so, how frequently.

Organization and attendance	Entire Reform Sample ^a		General Population ^b (males only)					
	%	(N)	Non-Agricultural		Landless Peasants		Landed Peasants	
	%	(N)	%	(N)	%	(N)	%	(N)
Cooperative:								
Frequent	36.0	(271)	4.1	(22)	2.3	(4)	4.0	(4)
Once in a while	11.0	(83)	3.4	(18)	0.6	(1)	7.9	(8)
Infrequently	6.1	(46)	2.1	(11)	1.8	(3)	5.9	(6)
Never	46.9	(353)	90.1	(481)	95.3	(163)	82.2	(83)
	100.0%	(753)	100.0%	(532)	100.0%	(171)	100.0%	(101)
School Board:								
					(either School Board or PTA)			
Frequent	12.1	(91)	3.2	(17)	8.2	(14)	4.0	(4)
Once in a while	8.1	(61)	3.0	(16)	6.4	(11)	7.9	(8)
Infrequently	6.0	(45)	1.9	(10)	2.3	(4)	7.9	(8)
Never	73.8	(556)	91.8	(490)	83.0	(142)	80.2	(81)
	100.0%	(753)	100.0%	(533)	100.0%	(171)	100.0%	(101)
Parent-Teacher Association:								
Frequent	10.4	(78)						
Once in a while	7.2	(54)						
Infrequent	6.2	(47)			(see above)			
Never	76.2	(574)						
	100.0%	(753)						
Community Development Association:								
Frequent	5.6	(42)	1.7	(9)	5.3	(9)	6.9	(7)
Once in a while	4.0	(30)	2.6	(14)	1.8	(3)	9.9	(10)
Infrequent	1.9	(14)	3.4	(18)	2.9	(5)	2.0	(2)
Never	88.6	(667)	91.1	(491)	90.1	(154)	81.2	(82)
	100.0%	(753)	100.0%	(532)	100.0%	(171)	100.0%	(101)
Municipality: (i.e., county council)								
Frequent	0.9	(7)	1.9	(10)	0.0	(0)	4.0	(4)
Once in a while	3.6	(27)	2.2	(12)	1.2	(2)	4.0	(4)
Infrequent	5.0	(38)	3.2	(17)	1.8	(3)	4.0	(4)
Never	90.4	(681)	92.7	(494)	97.1	(166)	88.1	(89)
	100.0%	(753)	100.0%	(533)	100.0%	(171)	100.0%	(101)

TABLE III.6. COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR: SETTLERS / GENERAL POPULATION
(Continued)

Organization and attendance	General Population ^b (males only)							
	Entire Raform Sample ^a		Non- Agricultural		Landless Peasants		Landed Peasants	
	<u>X</u>	<u>(N)</u>	<u>X</u>	<u>(N)</u>	<u>X</u>	<u>(N)</u>	<u>X</u>	<u>(N)</u>
Political party:								
Frequent	1.1	(8)	2.6	(14)	1.2	(2)	4.0	(4)
Once in a while	2.5	(19)	1.3	(7)	1.8	(3)	1.0	(1)
Infrequent	3.5	(26)	0.9	(5)	1.8	(3)	2.0	(2)
Never	93.0	(700)	95.1	(506)	95.3	(163)	93.1	(94)
	100.0%	(753)	100.0%	(532)	100.0%	(171)	100.0%	(101)

(One or two cases of missing data in these variables were encountered)

^aNo significant differences in organizational activism appeared between Atlantic vs. Other Settlement Basin settlers except for cooperatives for which it was found that whereas 58.0% of Other Settlements settlers attend cooperative meetings, only 37.5% of Atlantic Basin settlers do.

^bData from 1976 National Probability Sample.

higher in the Atlantic Basin than elsewhere, Atlantic Basin beneficiaries were less likely to have named a problem and to have attempted to do something about solving that problem. Therefore, it appears that among Atlantic Basin beneficiaries, cooperative behavior is lower. However, these findings appear confined to participation in cooperatives. No significant differences emerged on the frequency of attendance in any of the other organizations listed in Table III.6. Therefore, this evidence of non-cooperativeness should be distinguished in terms of the type of organizations, namely cooperatives versus other community organizations.

That the extent of cooperative meeting attendance among reform beneficiaries is high can be appreciated from a comparison with the general population, shown in Table III.6. Whereas 47 percent of the reform beneficiaries never attend cooperatives, 90 percent of the non-agricultural population, 95 percent of the landless peasants, and 82 percent of the landed peasants do not do so. Hence, cooperative meeting attendance is nearly twice as frequent as in the general non-agricultural population.

These findings should come as no surprise. Among the non-agricultural sectors of the general population cooperatives are far less popular than they are in rural areas. In urban areas, savings and credit cooperative are the most frequently encountered cooperatives. Although the savings and credit cooperative is comparatively popular in urban Costa Rica, it generally attracts only the working class strata of society. Moreover, since the initiation of the Banco Popular some years ago, many small savers are likely to use that institution rather than cooperatives. In rural areas, Costa Rica's landless peasants rarely earn sufficient money to permit them to save. Their salaries normally place them at, or even slightly below, subsistence levels. Moreover, since they are not owners of the means of production, they have little economic motivation for forming cooperatives. Landed peasants in Costa Rica, however, more often become members of cooperatives. These cooperatives

are frequently used for the marketing of their goods, particularly coffee and sugar. The reform beneficiaries, on the other hand, own the means of production, have long been encouraged by ITCO to form cooperatives, and clearly stand out as being unusually participatory in these organizations.

The school board and parent-teacher association, are, respectively, the second and third most popular organizations among the reform beneficiaries. In Costa Rica virtually every rural community has its village school, and all schools are required by law to have a school board (Junta de Educación) and a parent-teacher association (Patronato de Educación). The school board does not have control over curriculum or hiring and firing, as it does in the United States, but it is nonetheless a key organization in most rural communities. The parent-teacher association helps raise money for the school so it can improve classroom facilities and the materials supplied to the students.

Among the reform beneficiaries, approximately one-quarter of the respondents participate in school board or parent-teacher association activities. Indeed, over ten percent report frequent attendance in such activities. Since participation in these activities can be expected only from those who have children in the school system, participation could not be expected from the 14 percent of the respondents who have no children. Hence, that one-quarter of the respondents participate in school-related

activities whereas three-quarters do not must be viewed within the context of these demographic parameters.

A comparison of the school-related activity participation of the reform beneficiaries with that of the general population reveals significantly higher participation among the former. As shown in Table III.6, only 8 percent of the general population says it is involved in either the school board or the parents association, compared to approximately one-quarter of the reform beneficiaries.[4] Moreover, among the non-agricultural components of the general population, only 3 percent state that they attend school-related meetings frequently, compared to 4 times that (12 percent) in the reform sample, and about three times more (10 percent) in the reform sample for parent-teacher association activities.

This difference is partly accounted for by examining participation in school-related activities among the peasant components of the general population. It is seen that participation in these activities is higher than it is among the non-agricultural population, although still significantly lower than among the reform beneficiaries.

4. Unfortunately, the question put to the general population asked about school board or parent-teacher association and did not distinguish between the two; hence, if the respondent attended either the school board or the parent-teacher association the questionnaire recorded participation in these organizations.

That is, close to a fifth of the peasant component of the general population participates at least to some extent in school board or parents association meetings. Since peasants in Costa Rica have more children than those living in urban areas, a primary determinant of the higher participation of the peasants in school board activities may be directly related to their having more children. This finding is substantiated by the fact, noted elsewhere (Seligson, 1979b) that landless peasants in Costa Rica have fewer children than landed peasants, largely because landed peasants find that their children can help them on their farms. Therefore, it should not be surprising that landed peasants are somewhat more active than landless peasants in terms of their participation in school-related activities. Yet, the fact that reform beneficiaries participate in school-related activities to an even greater extent than the landed peasants of the general population indicates that above and beyond having children, there are other factors at work stimulating participation among the reform beneficiaries.

It would appear appropriate to conclude, therefore, that although the higher incidence of children among the reform beneficiaries as compared to the non-agricultural part of the population helps explain school-related participation, this is not the only factor. That is, reform beneficiaries are more active in school-related activities

than one would anticipate given the proportion having children. However, this contention needs to be examined more carefully through a detailed analysis of family size among reform beneficiaries compared to that of the general population, an examination that would take us beyond this analysis.

An examination of participation in the remaining organizations listed in Table III.6 is somewhat less interesting. That is because participation in these organizations (community development association, municipal council, political party) is rather infrequent. In addition, no notable difference appears between the reform beneficiaries and the general population, with perhaps one exception. It is found that slightly more than one in ten reform beneficiaries (11 percent) participate in community development associations, a figure which differs little from the non-agricultural population and the landless peasants. However, among the landed peasants of the general population the figure jumps to almost two in ten (19 percent). Hence, among the landed peasant population, community development association activities appear to be more attractive than among any of the other groups examined in Table III.6.

Attendance at municipal meetings is only found among one in ten of the reform beneficiaries (11 percent), and slightly less than that among the non-agricultural and

landless peasants of the general population. A slightly higher percentage (12 percent) of the landed peasants attend municipal meetings, but the difference is not significant. Finally, political party meetings are attended by less than one in ten (7 percent) of the reform beneficiaries and by about the same proportion of the general population, whether agricultural or peasant.

In summing up this discussion, it is clear that participation in cooperatives is the most common form of organizational activism among the reform beneficiaries, and therefore it needs to be singled out for particular attention. Participation in other forms of community organizations is far less frequent and is probably best dealt with as a whole. Finally, reform beneficiaries distinguish themselves from the general population only in terms of higher participation in cooperatives and in school-related activities. In other areas of participation, their behavior is about the same as that encountered in the general population.

Indices of Cooperative Behavior

The analysis proceeds to an assessment of the factors which encourage or discourage cooperative behavior among beneficiaries. In order to do that, it is necessary to create an overall index of cooperative behavior because the data contained in Table III.6 are too varied to be analyzed

succinctly. Moreover, Table III.6 does not include data on membership and leadership of the various organizations listed, a factor which would further complicate analysis if no index were created. An equally compelling reason for creating indices of cooperative behavior is that by doing so it is possible to obtain an overall measure of the respondent's level of behavior in these spheres, permitting a comparison of the Atlantic Basin and other settlements to see if there are any overall differences which emerge.

Two separate indices of cooperative behavior are created and presented in Table III.7. As pointed out in Table III.6, participation in cooperatives is far higher than in any other organization among the beneficiaries. Moreover, it is of crucial importance to the success of the projects being planned in the Atlantic Basin. Therefore, an index called "cooperative activism" is created and presented in the top panel of Table III.7. This index measures participation, membership, and leadership of cooperatives. The second index created on Table III.7 is the communal activism index, which is an index of participation, membership and leadership of the various organizations listed on Table III.6 other than cooperatives. Not included in the communal activism index is participation in political parties. This was done so as not to confuse communal participation with participation that relates to politics at the national level, which is the primary focus of political

party participation in Costa Rica. Hence, communal activism focuses on community development kinds of activities.[5]

Looking first at the cooperative activism index, the overall data confirm the findings already presented in Table III.6 with respect to differences between the Atlantic Basin and elsewhere. The mean score of the index, which ranges from zero to five, is 1.3 for the Atlantic Basin beneficiaries, and 2.2 for other beneficiaries, a difference which is statistically significant.

Looking briefly at the extremes on the cooperative activism index, it is noted that whereas four out of ten of the beneficiaries elsewhere (42 percent) score at the low end, fully six out of ten (63 percent) of the Atlantic Basin beneficiaries score this low. At the other extreme, among other beneficiaries, fully 15 percent score at the highest level, compared to only 5 percent of the Atlantic Basin beneficiaries. Hence, the mean score of cooperative activism does not distort the actual data; Atlantic Basin beneficiaries participate far less in cooperatives than do other beneficiaries.

Turning to the communal activism index in the bottom panel of Table III.7, no major differences emerge between

5. The details concerning the method in which the indices were created is contained in Footnotes a and b of Table III.7, and the interested reader should consult those notes.

TABLE III.7. DISTRIBUTION OF INDICES OF COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR

<u>Cooperative Activism Index:</u> ^a						
Index Score	Entire Sample		Atlantic Basin		Other Settlements	
	<u>X</u>	<u>(N)</u>	<u>X</u>	<u>(N)</u>	<u>X</u>	<u>(N)</u>
Lo 0	46.6	(351)	62.7	(111)	41.7	(240)
1	1.7	(13)	1.7	(3)	1.7	(10)
2	5.2	(39)	5.1	(9)	5.2	(30)
3	8.6	(65)	9.6	(17)	8.3	(48)
4	25.1	(189)	16.4	(29)	27.8	(160)
Hi 5	12.7	(96)	4.5	(8)	15.3	(88)
	100.0%	(753)	100.0%	(177)	100.0%	(576)
Mean	2.0		1.3		2.2	
Std. dev.	2.0		1.8		2.0	

T value = 6.02 Sig. = <.001

<u>Communal Activism Index:</u> ^b						
Index Score	Entire Sample		Atlantic Basin		Other Settlements	
	<u>X</u>	<u>(N)</u>	<u>X</u>	<u>(N)</u>	<u>X</u>	<u>(N)</u>
Lo 0	55.2	(416)	50.3	(89)	56.8	(327)
1	4.2	(32)	5.1	(9)	4.0	(23)
2	8.4	(63)	7.9	(14)	8.5	(49)
3	6.1	(46)	6.8	(12)	5.9	(34)
4	7.2	(54)	7.3	(13)	7.1	(41)
5	8.1	(61)	9.0	(16)	7.8	(45)
6	3.7	(28)	4.5	(8)	3.5	(20)
7	1.6	(12)	1.1	(2)	1.7	(10)
8	1.5	(11)	2.3	(4)	1.2	(7)
9	1.6	(12)	1.7	(3)	1.6	(9)
10	1.3	(10)	2.8	(5)	0.9	(5)
11	0.4	(3)	0.0	(0)	0.5	(3)
12	0.4	(3)	1.1	(2)	0.2	(1)
Hi 13	0.3	(2)	0.0	(0)	0.3	(2)
	100.0%	(753)	100.0%	(177)	100.0%	(576)
Mean	1.9		2.3		1.8	
Std. dev.	2.7		3.0		2.7	

T value = -1.68 Sig. = ns

^a A summated index composed of frequency of participation in cooperative meetings and membership/leadership in a cooperative. Scores are as follows: non-attendance = 0 pts.; infrequent attendance = 1 pt.; attend once in a while = 2 pts.; frequent attendance = 3 pts.; non-member = 0 pts.; member = 1 pt.; leader = 2 pts.; Maximum hi score is 5 pts.

^b A summated index composed of frequency of participation in and membership/leadership of: school board, parent-teacher association, community development association, municipality. Index scored as in note a above, with theoretical maximum score of 20.

the Atlantic Basin and other beneficiaries. Hence, communal activism² participation goes on at about the same levels in the Atlantic Basin as it does in the rest of the country.

Correlates of Cooperative Behavior

Table III.8 begins the discussion of the factors which are related to cooperative behavior. This table presents the correlates (Pearson r) of the cooperative activism index and the communal activism index based upon the variables already explored in Chapter II as well as other chapters of this study.

As can be seen from a cursory examination of Table III.8, there are many more variables correlated with the cooperative activism index than with the communal activism index. This makes sense since communal activism is much less common than cooperative activism among the reform beneficiaries. Hence, the various correlates are attempting to predict a much rarer form of behavior in communal activism than they are among cooperative activists.

Two variables stand out as being strong correlates of the cooperative activism index: number of families in the settlement and size of the settlement in hectares. In fact, these two variables are really different measurements of the same thing, namely, the size of the settlement. Settlements which are larger in size almost invariably tend to have a

TABLE III.8. CORRELATES OF COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR*

Independent Variables (and source table)	Dependent variables	
	Cooperative Activism Index	Communal Activism Index
	<u>r</u>	<u>r</u>
No. of families in settlement (II.1)	-.58	ns
Size of settlement in hectares (II.1)	-.56	ns
Interpersonal trust among settlers (V.2)	.21	ns
Gini index of cantonal land inequality	.17	ns
Gini index of district land inequality	.24	ns
Group cooperativeness index (V.3)	.18	ns
Length of residence in settlement (II.9)	-.12	ns
Length of residence in village (II.8)	.19	ns
Socio-linguistic index of SES	.14	ns
Marital status, married vs. other (II.3)	ns	.15
Frequency of church attendance	ns	.10
Index of condition of dwelling unit (II.14)	.24	ns
Problem solving efficacy scale (V.4)	ns	.21
Index of efficacy toward local bureaucrats (IV.2)	ns	.09
Size of land owned (II.11)	-.19	.12
Index of ownership of household artifacts (II.14)	.15	ns
Years of formal education (II.15)	.14	ns
Family member invaded land (IV.7)	.07	ns

*Includes only variables which are statistically significant at the .05 level or better with either or both dependent variables. N varies owing to non-response. See source tables for frequencies.

larger number of families. Hence, size is quite clearly related to activism in cooperatives among the reform beneficiaries. The relationship, however, is an inverse one. Specifically, the larger the size of the settlement, the lower the cooperative activism index ($r = -.58$ for families, and $-.56$ for size in hectares).

The finding of a strong if negative relationship between size and cooperative behavior is significant. The correlation indicates that larger settlements tend to discourage cooperative participation, whereas smaller settlements tend to encourage it. This finding corresponds to considerable research on participation in many countries. The study by Dahl and Tufte (1973) confirms that participation worldwide tends to be higher in smaller units. In Costa Rica this same finding has been confirmed by Booth (1975), in which he found that participation was highest in small communities and much lower in larger towns and cities.

Two factors are thought to be at work in stimulating higher cooperative activity in small communities. First, small communities mean a higher rate of person-to-person, face-to-face interaction, which is likely to be more satisfying than more impersonal contacts. Individuals in small communities can become involved and actually see the fruits of their labor, a satisfaction which is not obtained in larger more impersonal situations. A second factor

involved is that in small communities individuals need to become more self-reliant because there is less likelihood of outside assistance. In the larger communities, the government at both the national and local level finds it efficient to send in various forms of resources, both material and human, whereas such assistance is more difficult to render on an efficient basis in the smaller communities. Indeed, ITCO itself might find it more difficult to service the smaller settlements, and it is generally impossible to have full-time ITCO employees located on each of these small settlements. In the larger area, however, ITCO often maintains fairly large staffs. It would not be surprising, therefore, that beneficiaries would tend to leave it up to the public employees to take care of the work of the cooperative rather than take it on their own shoulders.

The strength of relationship between size and cooperative activity leads one to examine this relationship in more detail. Is there an extraneous quality about the particular settlements involved which would stimulate cooperation in the smaller ones but not in the larger ones? If such were the case, the high correlation would be spurious. An examination of figure III.1, in which the actual scores of the cooperative activities index are presented for each of the settlements in the study reveals this is indeed the case. The nine settlements with the




FIGURE III.1. Participation Levels Per Settlement

highest cooperative activism index are all communal enterprise settlements, and the remaining two communal enterprises of the eleven in which the survey was conducted fall close behind. Hence, communal enterprises have levels of cooperative activism much higher than found in the bulk of the colonies and individual parcel settlements. Since, as shown in Table II.1, the communal enterprises tend to be among the smallest settlements in the sample, it is likely that at least part of the relationship between cooperative activism and size is accounted for by the nature of the smallest settlements. That is, the smallest settlements are also the communal enterprise settlements. All of those communal enterprise settlements have cooperatives and in all of them, membership in the cooperative is essentially obligatory, since land is held in common and people are paid by virtue of the fact that they are members of the cooperative. However, as will be shown in the discussion of Table III.9, the nature of the settlement is not the entire explanation for the relationship between size and cooperative activism. That is, size has an impact on cooperative activism above and beyond its relationship with the size of the communal enterprises. Therefore it will remain a crucial variable in the prediction of cooperative activism.

Other variables also are correlated significantly with cooperative activism but to a lesser extent than size. It

is found that there is a significant correlation (-.19) between size of land holding and cooperative activism. That is, the larger the plot owned, the lower the cooperative activism. Since the smaller settlements tend to have smaller parcels of land, it is not surprising that cooperative activism is higher in those settlements, given the relationship just noted between the size of the overall settlement and cooperative activism.

Higher inequality in land distribution in the area in which the settlement is found is related to higher cooperative activism. That is, the Gini index of both cantonal and district land inequality is significantly correlated with cooperative activism ($r = .17$ and $.24$, respectively). Further analysis needs to be undertaken to determine why this relationship emerges, but it is possible that higher inequality in the distribution of land in the area in which the settlement is located implies that the beneficiaries face stiffer competition from the agricultural enterprises in the area. That is, in those areas in which the land is more inequitably distributed, there may well be a few large farms with overwhelmingly powerful economic interests. In response to those forces, the settlers may feel that they are compelled to join together in cooperatives in order to form a united front against those powerful forces. However, the connection between land inequality and cooperative activism can only be hypothesized

here, since there are no data in the survey to confirm the explanation just presented.

Two attitudinal indicators are modest predictors of cooperative activism. It is found that an index of interpersonal trust has a correlation of .21 with cooperative activism, and an index of group cooperativeness has a correlation of .18. That is, those beneficiaries who are more favorably disposed to trust other settlers and to cooperate with other settlers indeed do so. This finding, while certainly not surprising, confirms the connection between attitudes and behavior suggested earlier in this chapter.

Indicators of socio-economic status predict rather consistently, although not particularly strongly, cooperative activism. Education is found to have a correlation of .14 with cooperative activism, and an indicator of wealth based upon ownership of household artifacts (see Table II.14) has nearly the same strength of association ($r = .15$). A somewhat stronger socio-economic correlate of cooperative activism is found in the index of the condition of the dwelling unit, producing a correlation of .24. Finally, an unobtrusive measure of socio-economic status provided by a socio-linguistic index produces a correlation of .14.[6] Hence, as has been found in previous

6. An extensive discussion of the measurement of this socio-linguistic index is contained in Seligson and Berk-Seligson (1978).

studies of participation, there tends to be an association between higher socio-economic status and participation. The better-off members of the community probably have more time to become involved in cooperative activism, and, perhaps more importantly, might feel they have a larger stake in the cooperative, and therefore are more active in it. In addition, it is likely that better-off members of the settlements are perceived as being the more successful by other members, and are therefore encouraged to take leadership roles in the cooperatives.

Length of residence produced two puzzling correlations. On the one hand, it is found that length of residence in the community in which the settlement is located produces a positive correlation ($r = .19$) with the cooperative activism index. However, length of residence in the settlement produces the opposite relationship ($r = -.12$). Although this relationship is puzzling, and further explanation is needed, it is possible that since ITCO has been actively involved in promoting cooperatives in recent years, a program which was less actively pursued in the early years of the settlements, those who have been on the settlements for many years and date from the early years, may have become accustomed to operating without a cooperative and therefore were less likely to join when ITCO began promoting this program. However, further analysis of this relationship is needed.

Finally, it is noted that there is a weak relationship between a family member having invaded land and cooperative activism. The interpretation of this correlation, which we would have expected to be positive, is difficult. It is probably related somehow to the dynamics of the settlement process, and the history in which the individual and his family became involved in the ITCO programs. Such data, however, are not provided by the survey instrument and would need to be explored in other studies.

Turning now to the communal activism index, we find that few of the variables measured in this study were capable of predicting behavior of this type. The strongest predictor, which is not really very strong at all, is found in the problem-solving efficacy scale ($r = .21$).^[7] That is, individuals who feel more efficacious with respect to solving local problems are more likely to be more active in community organizations. Such a finding comes as no surprise, and further confirms the connection between attitudes and behaviors in this study. The index of efficacy toward local bureaucracy is also significantly related to communal activism ($r = .09$), but this is a very weak association.

7. A full discussion of the construction and measurement of this scale is contained in Seligson (1980c).

The second strongest variable related to communal activism is marital status. That is, individuals who are married are more likely to be involved in community activities than those who are not ($r = .15$). This finding comes as no surprise, since married individuals are more likely to have children and therefore to find themselves involved in a number of community activities, particularly those related to the school.

Size of land owned also is related ($r = .12$) to communal activism. What is somewhat puzzling about this relationship is that the larger the size of land owned by the individual, the higher the communal activism, whereas the smaller the amount of land owned, the higher the cooperative activism. Since, however, part of the relationship of cooperative activism to size was a function of the nature of the communal enterprises, this divergence is partially explained in such terms.

Finally, it was found that church attendance is associated with communal activism. Individuals who attend church more frequently are more likely to be active in community affairs. This association is not a function of a correlation between church attendance and participation in church committee activities, since church committee participation was not included in the index of communal activism. However, one may attribute less substantive significance to this association since individuals who

attend church probably also live closer to the village center and have less physical difficulty in attending group functions.

Predictors of Cooperative Behavior

Analysis of the correlates of cooperative behavior permitted the exploration of bivariate (simple) relationships. However, the limitations of that approach are well known. In particular, it does not permit assessment of the relative strength of the association for each of the correlates of cooperative behavior, taking others into account. To do this it is necessary to enter the variables found to have a significant association with cooperative behavior into a multivariate analysis. This is done here through use of the technique of multiple regression. This technique enters all of the presumed causal variables into a regression equation in order to determine their relative predictive power.[8]

The results of two separate analyses are presented in Table III.9. The top panel of the table presents the

8. The particular approach used here is step-wise multiple regression. This technique selects the variable which has the greatest predictive power and enters it into the regression equation first. After this predictor has explained all the variance it is capable of doing, the second most powerful predictor in terms of the variance which has not yet been accounted for is entered. This process continues until all the variables which can have any significant capability of augmenting the prediction of cooperative behavior are entered.

TABLE III.9. PREDICTORS OF COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR AMONG SETTLERS*

<u>Dependent variable: Cooperative Activism Index</u>		
<u>Independent variables (and source tables)</u>	<u>Beta</u>	<u>Sig.</u>
Size of settlement in hectares	-.50	<.001
Gini index of district land inequality	.11	.001
Length of residence in settlement (II.9)	-.13	<.001
Length of residence in village (II.8)	.11	<.001
Family member invaded land (IV.7)	.09	.003
Group cooperativeness index (V.3)	.08	.008
Interpersonal trust among settlers (V.2)	.08	.013
	R = .62	
	R ² = .38	
	Sig. = <.001	
<u>Dependent variable: Communal Activism Index</u>		
Problem Solving Efficacy Scale	.20	<.001
Marital status, married vs. other (II.3)	.15	.001
Size of land owned (II.11)	.10	.024
	R = .27	
	R ² = .08	
	Sig. = <.001	

*Final step of stepwise multiple regressions.

predictors of the cooperative activism index, and the bottom panel the predictors of the communal activism index. Of the 14 variables which were found to have some significant association with the cooperative activism index, only seven turn out to be significant predictors of that variable when taken together. An examination of the top panel of Table III.9 reveals that, as demonstrated in Table III.8, the strongest association is found with the size of the settlement. Since both size of settlement in hectares and size of settlement in terms of number of families living on it were very closely associated (multi-collinear), only one of these variables was retained in the equation, namely, size in hectares. The beta weight indicated on the table shows that the size of the settlement in hectares is the strongest predictor (it has the largest beta weight) and, moreover, it is a very strong predictor of cooperative activism.

As was pointed out in the discussion of Table III.8 and Figure III.1, the fact that the communal enterprises are also the smallest settlements has a distorting effect on the impact of this variable. That is, it tends to inflate its importance in predicting cooperative activism. In order to determine whether or not the size of the settlement would have a relationship with cooperative activism when the confounding effect of the communal enterprise situation is eliminated, those settlements were dropped from the analysis

and the regression equation was re-run exactly as indicated on Table III.9. It is found that the relationship between the size of the settlement and cooperative activism is not a spurious relationship. That is, although the correlation between size of settlement and cooperative activism drops when the communal enterprises are eliminated, it remains quite high. It will be recalled that the size of the settlement in hectares had an r value of $-.56$ with the entire sample, whereas with the communal enterprises eliminated, it is reduced to only $-.45$. Moreover, entered into the regression equation for the subset of non-communal enterprise settlements, the size of the settlement in hectares still remains the strongest predictor of cooperative activism. Therefore, one can conclude that size is strongly and closely related to cooperative activism. Settlements which are smaller are likely to produce higher levels of cooperative activism.

The second best predictor of cooperative activism is the Gini index of district land inequality. While this variable is a much weaker predictor than the size of the settlement (beta weight of $.11$ compared to beta of $-.50$), it nonetheless makes a significant contribution to the equation. Hence, settlements located in districts where land inequality is higher are likely to find higher cooperative activism. It was also found, as explained in the analysis of Table III.8, that length of residence in the

settlement and length of residence in the village are both significant predictors of cooperative activism. Length of residence in the settlement is negatively associated with cooperative activism whereas length of residence in the village is positively associated. The regression equation also uncovers a significant relationship between the respondent having a family member who had invaded land on the one hand, and cooperative activism on the other.

Two attitudinal indicators are found to have a significant association with cooperative activism in the regression equation, but these are the weakest of all the predictors. That is, the group cooperativeness index and interpersonal trust among settlers were both found to be predictors of cooperative activism; however, their beta weights are quite low (.08) and they add very little predictive power to the equation. Therefore, these attitudinal factors are far less important in predicting cooperative activism than are the other variables which had entered the equation earlier on.

In sum, this effort to predict cooperative activism proved to be highly successful. An indication of this is that the multiple correlation coefficient is very high ($R = .62$). Hence, this study has been able to determine, to a large extent, key factors which are conducive to high cooperative activism in the ITCO settlements.

Less success was achieved in predicting communal activism. As shown on the bottom panel of Table III.9, only three variables were found to have a significant association with communal activism, and the multiple R of the equation is only .27. Hence, the analysis is able to predict almost five times the amount of variance in cooperative activism as it can on communal activism.

The strongest predictor of communal activism turns out to be the problem solving efficacy scale. Thus, it appears that efficacious individuals are more likely to become active in community affairs. Marital status proved to be the second most powerful predictor, those who were married being more likely to be active in community affairs. Finally, size of land owned was a significant predictor of communal activism: the more land one owns, the more likely it is that one will be active in communal affairs.

Summary

Almost all observers agree that a key to the success of ITCO settlements is the establishment and maintenance of active and viable cooperatives. If this is so, the analysis presented in this chapter helps to highlight those factors which are likely to be conducive to the success of these cooperatives. Moreover, the data presented here point to ways in which such participation can be augmented. Fortunately, the key variable in determining cooperative

behavior is one which is manipulable. That is, the size of the settlement is perhaps the one variable which is most directly under the control of the land reform agency. If it were otherwise, and cooperative activism were best predicted by such things as attitudes, then the prescription would be much more difficult, since social scientists have been particularly unsuccessful in suggesting mechanisms for attitudinal change. The size of the settlement, on the other hand, is a variable which can be manipulated quite easily by ITCO. The results presented in this chapter strongly point to smaller settlements as contributing to active cooperative behavior.

At first glance, it might appear that although the size of the settlement is manipulable by ITCO, there are certain economic constraints which make opting for very small settlements impractical. That is, ITCO usually acquires land as complete parcels, having expropriated them from owners of farms. Moreover, ITCO's new policy orientation in the 1970s has guided it toward the expropriation of functioning farms which have a well developed infrastructure. This frequently means that the expropriation will be on larger farms. In addition, the agency's financial and legal resources are more efficient when it expropriates one or two large properties, since the process of acquiring many smaller ones is a tedious and often expensive one. Moreover, and most importantly, the

process of land reform in Costa Rica is directed at the larger farms rather than at those which are smaller. There would be considerable social and political resistance toward a redirection of ITCO's efforts away from larger farms toward smaller ones. Hence, such a policy is entirely impractical.

The factors mentioned above, however, do not mean that ITCO needs to revise its land acquisition policies. Rather, what the findings here suggest is that it revise its settlement policies. Hence, land acquired in large parcels can be divided into smaller administrative units. Each unit could establish its own cooperative, although there could be ties among the cooperatives in the area. That is, there could be a common pooling of machinery and credit. But the actual operation of the cooperatives, the membership and the election of officers, should take place in small units.

How small should these units be? Some guidelines are given in the information presented in Figure III.1 in conjunction with data presented in Table II.1. It is seen that the two settlements which have the highest scores on participation in cooperatives are Cerritos and UTABA, settlements which have 21 and 23 members respectively. However, El Silencio, which has 53 members, has a participation score which is only slightly lower than that of UTABA and Cerritos. Hence, it would appear that membership can reach as high as the fifties and still be

likely to produce satisfactory levels of participation. However, once membership approaches 100 or more, cooperative participation drops precipitously. While there is not a perfect association between size and participation as indicated by, for example, the relatively small size of Guayabo and its rather low levels of cooperation, the overall association does exist and needs to be recognized. Hence, it would appear that cooperatives which have membership in the order of approximately 40 to 60 members would be ideal for stimulating participation. Hence, any large-scale appropriation should be planned in such a way that the settlement is divided into a number of sub-settlements such that each will have cooperatives of the indicated number of members.

No doubt before such a policy is contemplated further, more data are needed. A specific and careful investigation has to be made of cooperatives on ITCO settlements. Those that have succeeded as well as those that have failed have to be studied in some depth. The data presented in this chapter deal with participation in cooperatives, a variable which is viewed as a key to success. It does not, however, examine whether or not the cooperatives have in fact been successful. This information would need to be factored into any effort to restructure ITCO planning for future settlements. Hence, before one would seek to establish policy in this area it would be necessary to embark upon

such an in-depth study. One would not necessarily need to confine the analysis solely to the ITCO settlements. Data could be gathered on the vast array of other agricultural cooperatives in Costa Rica to try to gain additional information from the experiences found there.

The only other variable which predicts cooperative behavior and which is "manipulable" by ITCO is the length of residence in the village. While ITCO cannot, obviously, increase or decrease a beneficiary's length of residence in the village, it can use the length of residence as a criterion in selecting prospective candidates for ITCO projects. Hence, the data presented in Table III.9 would suggest that those individuals who have long-term residence in the nearby villages around the settlements being planned would be preferable beneficiary candidates. Alternatively, the findings might discourage ITCO from allowing individuals who do not live near the settlements to become members. Obviously, this policy cannot always be adhered to. In many cases, there is no readily expropriable land in areas where there are many landless potential beneficiaries. In such cases some dislocation is to be expected. However, in any given settlement it would be best to try to seek a maximum number of individuals who have resided for a considerable length of time in the villages nearest the settlement. The presence of these individuals in the cooperative would help promote high levels of participation.

The finding that the Atlantic Basin beneficiaries tend to have lower levels of participation is more easily understood when it is recognized that all three Atlantic Basin settlements are rather large. Indeed, the three settlements in the Atlantic Basin are among the five largest settlements of the 23 analyzed in this study. In this connection, it is noteworthy that 2 of the 3 settlements being planned under the new ITCO program for the Atlantic Basin are also very large. Hence, it would be of considerable use if cooperatives with smaller numbers of members were considered for these new settlements.

IV. ASSESSMENTS OF LAND REFORM SUCCESS: SETTLERS' VIEWS

How does one measure the success or failure of a land reform program? At least two different perspectives can be taken. First, success/failure can be evaluated on the basis of the impact that the program has had on the nation as a whole. Such a study would involve comparing the goals of a program with the accomplishments of the program. Hence, if the goals include, as they do in Costa Rica, more equitable distribution of national land and increased productivity in the agricultural sector, one would need to conduct an investigation treating the reform as one variable out of many which influence the nation as a whole. Such an investigation would constitute a major component in the overall evaluation of a reform program. However, the present investigation is not directed toward examining the impact of the program on the nation, and, indeed, data are not available to do so. Rather, this study looks at the impact of the reform program on the individual, leaving to others the evaluation of the impact of the program on the nation.

The two perspectives for assessment, while separate conceptually, are intertwined empirically. For example, reform beneficiaries who become highly successful, productive farmers add to national levels of agricultural productivity. Nonetheless, the focus of the present study is exclusively on the individual. As such, many of the

elements comprising an overall evaluation of the impact of the program upon its beneficiaries have already been traced. A great deal of data have been presented on the economic, political, and social life of the beneficiaries as contrasted with other Costa Ricans, both peasant and non-peasant alike. In this chapter, the focus is on the settler's own evaluation of the impact of the reform program.

The chapter attempts to determine how many of the settlers feel that their experience as ITCO beneficiaries has been a good one. This will be done by examining first some general attitudes, and then by discussing the disadvantages of the reform program as perceived by the settlers. The study will then examine the respondent's own estimate of whether or not he feels he is going to remain on the settlement, and to what extent he feels he is better off or worse off for having joined the program. Finally, a brief examination will be made of satisfaction with communal land ownership.

There is one important caution that must be kept in mind. The data are confined to beneficiaries living on the settlements at the time of the interviews, and do not include those who have once been ITCO beneficiaries but have subsequently left. Therefore, many of the "failures" have escaped the analytical arm of this investigation. Nonetheless, since the sample is large and contains

individuals, as shown in Chapter II, who have lived on ITCO settlements anywhere from a few months to a few years, the survey should be able to pick up those who are potential failures.

Relative Deprivation

People do not assess their success and failure in life in isolation. Rather, they compare themselves with others to determine the extent to which they have achieved success or failure. In the social sciences, the study of "relative deprivation" has become a major focus of investigation (Gurr, 1970).

The central methodological question in measuring relative deprivation is to determine the group or groups against which the respondent compares him or herself. Individuals may feel relatively deprived when they think of themselves in comparison to one group but not in comparison to another. Since it was not known a priori with which group the reform beneficiaries were comparing themselves, this study sought multiple points of comparison. Three different reference groups were used, each one progressively further away from the respondent: first, the individual was asked to compare himself with his friends; second, he was asked to compare himself with farmers that he knows; finally, he was asked to compare himself with the majority of people living in Costa Rica.

The data regarding relative deprivation experienced by reform beneficiaries are reported in Table IV.1. The top panel presents the first question and as can be seen from the data in Table IV.1, the great majority (69 percent) state that they have had about the same amount of success as their friends. There is no significant difference between the Atlantic Basin and other settlers on this. This finding repeats itself for the other two questions in this set of items. That is, about two-thirds of the respondents feel that their success in life has been about the same as that of others. What does vary is the extent to which people feel that they have had either more success or less of it. As can be seen on the first panel of Table IV.1, only one in ten of the respondents (12 percent) feels that he has had less success, whereas somewhat more (17 percent) feel that they have had more success.

The second item had the respondent compare himself with the majority of farmers whom he has known. Once again, about two-thirds (69 percent) of the respondents feel that their lot has been about the same as that of others. However, in contrast to the comparison with friends, a somewhat lower percentage of the respondents (9 percent) feel that their situation has been worse, and a somewhat higher percentage (19 percent) feel that the situation has been better. Hence, when ITCO beneficiaries compare themselves to other farmers, two out of ten feel that they

TABLE IV.1. RELATIVE DEPRIVATION

Question: Comparing yourself to your friends, would you say that you have had more success than them in realizing your plans, the same success, or less success?

More success	17.1 (129)	19.8 (35)	16.3 (94)
Same	68.9 (519)	67.8 (120)	69.3 (399)
Less success	11.6 (87)	10.2 (18)	12.0 (59)
Don't know	2.4 (18)	2.5 (4)	2.4 (14)
	100.0% (753)	100.0% (177)	100.0% (576)

Sig. = ns

Question: Comparing yourself to the majority of farmers who you know, would you say that your life has been better than their life, has been worse, or has been more or less the same?

	Entire Reform Sample		Atlantic Basin		Other Settlements	
	<u>Z</u>	<u>(N)</u>	<u>Z</u>	<u>(N)</u>	<u>Z</u>	<u>(N)</u>
Better	19.4	(146)	18.6	(33)	19.6	(113)
Same	69.3	(522)	68.4	(121)	69.6	(401)
Worse	8.8	(66)	11.9	(21)	7.8	(45)
Don't know	2.5	(19)	1.1	(2)	3.0	(17)
	100.0%	(753)	100.0%	(177)	100.0%	(576)

Sig. = ns

Question: Comparing yourself to the other people who live in Costa Rica, do you think that you get the share in life of the things that are necessary to live comfortably, or do you get more than your share or less than your share?

More	4.2 (32)	3.4 (6)	4.5 (26)
Your share	61.8 (465)	57.1 (101)	63.2 (364)
Less	32.0 (241)	39.0 (69)	29.9 (172)
Don't know	2.0 (15)	0.6 (1)	2.3 (14)
	100.0% (753)	100.0% (177)	100.0% (576)

Tau c = .06 Sig. (of Tau) = .02

have done better. Once again no significant difference emerges between the Atlantic Basin and the rest of the country.

The final item in this series asked the respondents to compare themselves to other people living in Costa Rica. On this item, the pattern shifts considerably. The percentage of the respondents who feel that they have done just about the same as others in Costa Rica changes only slightly dropping to 62 percent. However, those who feel that they have gotten more than others has dropped to only 4 percent of the sample. Most importantly, the proportion who feel that they have gotten less out of life has risen dramatically to almost one-third (32 percent). Also, it is important to note that on this item, there is a significant difference between the Atlantic Basin and other beneficiaries. For the first time, on this item, the Atlantic Basin beneficiaries feel a greater sense of relative deprivation (39 vs. 30 percent) than do the rest.

Summarizing the relative deprivation data, it is relatively unambiguously concluded that when the reform beneficiary compares himself to other groups of comparable status, very few feel deprived. More specifically, only around one in ten has a sense of relative deprivation when compared to friends and farmers. However, the sense of deprivation increases considerably when the comparison is made to Costa Ricans in general. Then, nearly one third of

the beneficiaries feel relatively deprived compared to this reference group.

By any objective measure, they are indeed a deprived group in the national context. The Costa Rican peasantry, including the reform beneficiaries, is at the bottom of the socio-economic ladder in the country. What is surprising is that a larger share of the respondents do not feel that they have gotten less out of life than Costa Ricans as a whole.

Despite the objective conditions of deprivation, nearly two-thirds felt that their lot has been about the same as that of Costa Ricans in general. Perhaps this finding can be explained by the very small proportion of respondents who have had urban experience (see discussion of Table II.4) and who therefore do not have an appropriate yardstick for comparing. Another explanation is that many Costa Ricans, even those living in urban areas, still think of the country as a rural, agrarian one even though by 1978 only 29 percent still worked in agriculture (World Bank, 1980). Hence, the reform beneficiaries may be comparing themselves to agrarian Costa Rica. Whatever the explanation, it is not possible to come away from the data in Table IV.1 with the feeling that there is a strong sense of relative deprivation among ITCO beneficiaries. On the contrary, most of the beneficiaries feel that they have done reasonably well in life compared to other people.

Disadvantages of the Settlements

No program, however well conceived and executed, can leave all participants completely satisfied. In the case of Costa Rica's reform program, numerous factors provide grounds for dissatisfaction. Foremost among these are inadequate funding and lack of experience on the part of the planners. How have the settlers reacted to these programs?

In order to measure discontent, a direct, open-ended question was employed: "What are the disadvantages of working on this (communal enterprise, colony, cooperative)?" The interviewers noted as many as three disadvantages listed by each respondent. However, since only 2 percent of the respondents offered two disadvantages and less than 1 percent gave three disadvantages, the analysis in this study focuses on the first disadvantage which was mentioned.

Table IV.2 lists the disadvantages which were mentioned. Since the responses were noted in their entirety and later coded into categories (a total of 37 categories were employed), it was necessary to reduce these for ease of presentation here. The disadvantages are grouped into six primary categories.

TABLE IV.2. PRIMARY DISADVANTAGES OF SETTLEMENT*

Disadvantage	Entire Sample		Atlantic Basin		Other Settlements	
	<u>X</u>	<u>(N)</u>	<u>X</u>	<u>(N)</u>	<u>X</u>	<u>(N)</u>
No disadvantage mentioned	72.1	(543)	59.9	(106)	75.9	(437)
Dissatisfaction with locale (roads, soils, climate, market, etc.)	6.6	(50)	14.1	(25)	4.3	(25)
Lack of external support (credit, ITCO, etc.)	6.2	(47)	13.0	(23)	4.2	(24)
Poor organization of settlement/cooperative	3.7	(28)	2.8	(5)	4.0	(23)
Low earnings/debts	3.7	(28)	3.4	(6)	3.8	(22)
Lack of cooperation among settlers/members	3.3	(25)	1.7	(3)	3.8	(22)
Other disadvantages	4.2	(32)	5.1	(9)	4.0	(23)
	100.0X	(753)	100.0X	(177)	100.0X	(576)
Dichotomization of disadvantage/no disadvantage for Atlantic and Other Settlements			T value=4.19 Sig<.001			

*The actual question asked: "What are the disadvantages of working in this (colony, communal enterprise, cooperative, etc.)?" The responses were noted by the interviewers and later coded into 37 categories which are reduced here for comprehensibility. Up to three possible disadvantages were coded for each interview, but only 2.1 per cent of the respondents offered two disadvantages and only 0.4 gave three disadvantages. Hence, only the first disadvantage mentioned is considered in this table.

The most striking finding of Table IV.2 is that the overwhelming majority of the beneficiaries listed no disadvantage whatsoever. Fully 72 percent of the beneficiaries did not name a single disadvantage of living on the settlement. Given the difficulties which rural life and the settlement process itself present for Costa Rican peasants, it is indeed encouraging to find that so many did not name a disadvantage. It should be noted that the small percentage of respondents who named a disadvantage is not a methodological artifact. That is, it is not the case that the beneficiaries were not capable of responding to this type of item. Indeed, on a nearly identical item, not presented in this study, the respondents were asked to list the advantages of living on the settlement. On that item, 96 percent of the respondents listed at least one advantage. The obvious conclusion is that most of the beneficiaries must be sufficiently satisfied with the settlement for them not to have any complaints worthy of note. This contention is further substantiated by the data presented in Tables VI.3 and VI.4.

Looking now at the principal disadvantages which were mentioned, clearly the major dissatisfaction concerns various problems with the locale itself. These include such things as roads, soil, climate, market facilities, etc. The principal dissatisfaction listed within this category, it should be noted, was with roads. The second most frequent

TABLE IV.3. SUCCESS/FAILURE OF SETTLEMENT

Question: Do you think that you are going to continue being a member or do you think that you will cease being a member of this (colony, communal enterprise, cooperative, etc.)?

	Entire Sample		Atlantic Basin		Other Settlements	
	<u>Z</u>	<u>(N)</u>	<u>Z</u>	<u>(N)</u>	<u>Z</u>	<u>(N)</u>
Continue	93.1	(701)	91.0	(161)	93.8	(540)
Cease	2.5	(19)	4.0	(7)	2.1	(12)
Not sure	2.7	(20)	4.0	(7)	2.3	(13)
Don't know	1.7	(13)	1.1	(2)	1.9	(11)
	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>(753)</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>(177)</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>(576)</u>

Sig. = ns (with "not sure" treated as "don't know")

Question: Are you in agreement or in disagreement with this type of organization?

Agree	88.8	(669)	84.2	(149)	90.3	(520)
Both agree and disagree	2.0	(15)	4.0	(7)	1.4	(8)
Disagree	7.8	(59)	11.3	(20)	6.8	(39)
Don't know	1.3	(10)	0.6	(1)	1.6	(9)
	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>(753)</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>(177)</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>(576)</u>

Tau c = .05 Sig. = .01

(Statistics calculated treating "don't know" as missing data)

TABLE IV.4. IMPACT OF REFORM ON SETTLER

Question: Does it seem to you that you and your family are better off now than before, when you weren't members of an ITCO organization, or are you the same or worse?	Entire Sample		Atlantic Basin		Other Settlements	
	<u>X</u>	<u>(N)</u>	<u>X</u>	<u>(N)</u>	<u>X</u>	<u>(N)</u>
Better off	84.2	(634)	80.8	(143)	85.2	(491)
Same	11.8	(89)	12.4	(22)	11.6	(67)
Worse off	3.3	(25)	5.1	(9)	2.8	(16)
Don't know	0.7	(5)	1.7	(3)	0.3	(2)
	<u>100.0X</u>	<u>(753)</u>	<u>100.0X</u>	<u>(177)</u>	<u>100.0X</u>	<u>(576)</u>

Sig. = ns ("don't know" treated as missing data)

complaint concerned lack of external support, particularly credit and technical help from ITCO. Each of these most frequently mentioned dissatisfactions was noted by only a little over 6 percent of the sample.

The third most frequent complaint concerned organization of the settlement. Individuals complained that the cooperatives in which they worked were not properly organized. The fourth major complaint centered on economic problems. Low earnings from their farms, the high indebtedness to ITCO for land costs, and unpaid bank loans were of principal concern. Lack of cooperation among the settlers was the final major area of complaint listed. A number of other disadvantages of a miscellaneous nature accounted for 4 percent of the complaints.

Although most beneficiaries had no complaints about the settlement, it is clear that this was not the case among the Atlantic Basin beneficiaries. As shown in Table IV.2, only 60 percent of the Atlantic Basin beneficiaries mentioned no disadvantage, compared with 76 percent of other beneficiaries, a difference which is statistically significant. Hence, these findings conform to the ones presented earlier with respect to relative deprivation. Moreover, they can be seen to relate directly to the lower cooperative activism among the Atlantic Basin beneficiaries. The Atlantic Basin beneficiaries participate less in cooperatives, feel a higher sense of relative deprivation with respect to Costa Rica as a whole, and are more likely to have complaints about the settlements.

Success/Failure

Perhaps the most important data in Chapter IV appear in Tables IV.3 and IV.4. Respondents were asked whether or not they planned to continue to remain members of the project. As is seen in the top panel of Table IV.3, an unusually high 93 percent stated that they were planning to continue to remain members. Moreover, only 3 percent said they were planning to abandon the settlement, the remaining respondents indicating that they weren't sure. Even if it is assumed that all of those who were "not sure" or who "didn't know" were planning to abandon the settlement, fewer

than 7 percent of the beneficiaries were sufficiently dissatisfied to be planning to leave the settlement. Certainly ITCO can look with great satisfaction upon this result; few public programs are received so positively by their beneficiaries as has been the Costa Rican land reform program. It is worth noting that despite the discontent expressed by the Atlantic Basin beneficiaries, shown in the previous table, no significant difference emerges between the Atlantic Basin beneficiaries and other beneficiaries on this item. Although the Atlantic Basin beneficiaries are slightly less likely to be willing to continue on the settlement (91 percent vs. 94 percent), the difference is insignificant. Hence, their greater difficulties in the settlement are not a factor pushing them toward greater abandonment rates.

Since a crucial component of the analysis presented in this study concerns organizational activism, particularly as it relates to cooperatives, data are presented in the bottom panel of Table IV.3 indicating the degree of satisfaction with the organization itself. Individuals may be unwilling to abandon their plots but at the same time may be very dissatisfied with the cooperative, colony or communal enterprise. Such was not the case, however, as seen in Table VI.3. Fully 89 percent of the beneficiaries stated that they were in agreement with the organization. An additional 2 percent cast themselves in the neutral category

of both agreeing and disagreeing. Only 8 percent of the respondents stated that they disagreed with the type of organization with which they associated. Hence, these findings directly parallel those presented in the top of Table IV.3. That is, the settlers are neither planning to abandon their parcels, nor are they dissatisfied with the organizations established in the settlements. However, once again the Atlantic Basin beneficiaries demonstrate somewhat greater discontentment with the program, which though statistically significant is not very great (7 compared with 11 percent).

From the long-term perspective, the most important data contained in this chapter appear in Table IV.4. Beneficiaries were asked to estimate whether or not they feel that they are better off, the same, or worse off than they had been before joining the settlement. Once again, overwhelmingly positive results are reported. Fully 84 percent of the beneficiaries stated that they were better off, and only 3 percent stated that they were worse off. Hence, this information helps place into broader context the data presented in the top panel of Table IV.3. There it was found that 93 percent of the beneficiaries planned to continue on in the settlement. The data in Table IV.4 indicate that they do not plan to continue merely because the settlement is an unpleasant last resort: rather, most of these people (84 percent) feel they are better off than

they had been before joining. The Atlantic Basin beneficiaries, once again, appeared to be somewhat less content: 81 percent of the Atlantic Basin beneficiaries considered themselves to be better off, compared to 85 percent of other beneficiaries, and more of the former (5 percent) feel they are worse off, compared to the others (3 percent), but the differences are not statistically significant.

Communal Land Ownership

At the time this investigation was planned and executed in 1976, a major question being discussed within the ITCO organization was the efficacy of various forms of settlement organization. The study, therefore, hoped to determine whether the communal enterprise experiments going on at the time offered a more effective organizational format. Since that time, ITCO has moved away from the communal enterprise program, and no new communal enterprises have been established. Yet, support for the communal enterprise form of organization persists in Costa Rica. There is especially strong support among some elements in the international community, particularly the Interamerican Institute of Agricultural Sciences (IICA). There is no scope in this study, however, to go into a comparison of the perceived impact of organizational form on beneficiaries.[1]

1. One such attempt, focusing on the demographic impact, appears in Seligson (1979).

One key variable should be examined in this study, however briefly. Communal enterprise respondents in the sample were asked whether or not they would prefer to have their own farm or continue to work the land in common. Fully half (50 percent) of the communal enterprise beneficiaries stated that they would prefer to have their own farms. This does not mean that the communal enterprise beneficiaries were necessarily planning to abandon their enterprises. Rather, given the choice between communal farming and individual farming, half would prefer individual farming. Because the survey instrument did not ask whether or not these individuals were opposed to communal farming when they joined the settlement, but did so because it was their only opportunity to get land, or whether they became dissatisfied

TABLE IV.5. SATISFACTION WITH COMMUNAL LAND OWNERSHIP
(Communal enterprise respondents only)

<u>Question:</u> Would you prefer to have your own farm or would you prefer to be a member of a communal enterprise and work the land in common?		
	<u>X</u>	<u>(N)</u>
Individual farm	50.0	(112)
Communal enterprise	48.7	(109)
Don't know	1.3	(3)
	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>(224)</u>

with the communal form of farming only after having experience with it, we cannot interpret this dissatisfaction as based on basic value preferences or unhappy experience with the communal enterprise.

Satisfaction Scale

The initial plan of analysis for predictors of satisfaction was to use as the measure of satisfaction the first item contained in Table IV.3, and/or the item contained in Table IV.4. That is, the criteria of satisfaction were considered to be (1) whether or not the respondent thought he would continue to be a member, and (2) to what extent he felt that being an ITCO beneficiary meant that he and his family were better off. However, the overwhelmingly positive responses to these items made such an analysis methodologically problematical, because there was so little variance in the key dependent variables. Therefore, an effort was made to develop a more sensitive dependent variable which would distinguish more clearly between degrees of success among the beneficiaries. To do this, five items were used from the tables reported thus far in this chapter. These five items are presented in Table IV.6.[2]

2. The items appear to form a Guttman, or cumulative scale pattern. For this reason, in Table IV.6 they are subjected to a Guttman scale analysis. They meet the coefficient of reproducibility criterion (.95); but they fall slightly short of the coefficient of scalability criterion (.54).

TABLE IV.6. SATISFACTION SCALE: GUTTMAN SCALE ANALYSIS*

Item	Per cent passing	Biserial Scale-Item Correlation
1. No disadvantages of working in settlement mentioned (Source: Table VI.2)	72.1	.40
2. In agreement with the type of organization (Source: Table VI.3)	88.8	.69
3. Belief in continued membership in organization (Source: Table VI.3)	93.1	.60
4. Respondent and family perceived as not worse off than before joining settlement (Source: Table VI.4)	96.0	.65
5. Did not name second disadvantage of working in settlement	97.9	.51
Coefficient of Reproducibility = .95 Coefficient of Scalability = .54		

*In order to develop a scale with data for all cases, "don't know" responses were treated as passing for items 1 and 5, and failing for items 2, 3, and 4. Hence, not naming a disadvantage of the settlements in items 1 and 5 is considered to be the same as believing that there are no disadvantages.

Unfortunately, even using all five items together does not establish a scale which finely divides the respondents into lower to higher satisfaction. As seen in Table IV.7, the distribution is highly skewed. Fully 64 percent of the respondents scored in the highest category. An additional 25 percent scored in the next highest category. Only 1 percent of the respondents were on the low end of the scale. This distribution, therefore, makes it quite difficult to search adequately for predictors of satisfaction since the population is so closely clustered at one end of the scale. Nonetheless, it is the best measure available.

The pattern noted earlier of greater discontent in the Atlantic Basin settlements emerges also in the overall satisfaction scale scores presented in Table IV.7. As can be seen, there is a significant difference between the mean score for the Atlantic Basin as compared to the rest of the country. Whereas 68 percent of beneficiaries elsewhere scored in the highest level of satisfaction, only 50 percent of the Atlantic Basin beneficiaries did so.

An attempt was made to use the satisfaction scale as a dependent variable in a multiple regression analysis. However, given the highly skewed nature of this variable, the regression analysis proved unsatisfactory and very little variance was explained. Future studies will need to pay more attention to measuring this important concept.

TABLE IV.7. DISTRIBUTION OF SATISFACTION SCALE SCORES

Satisfaction Score	Entire Sample		Atlantic Basin		Other Settlements	
	<u>X</u>	<u>(N)</u>	<u>X</u>	<u>(N)</u>	<u>X</u>	<u>(N)</u>
Lo 1	1.2	(9)	0.6	(1)	1.4	(8)
2	2.9	(22)	4.5	(8)	2.4	(14)
3	7.4	(56)	11.9	(21)	6.1	(35)
4	24.6	(185)	32.8	(58)	22.0	(127)
Hi 5	63.9	(481)	50.3	(89)	68.1	(392)
	100.0%	(753)	100.0%	(177)	100.0%	(576)
Mean	4.5		4.3		4.5	
Std. dev.	0.8		0.9		0.8	

T value = 3.38 Sig. = <.001

Conclusion

This chapter has attempted to assess the overall satisfaction with the ITCO program. The overall conclusion is quite clear: beneficiaries by a large majority perceive the program as a success. Specifically, nearly three-fourths of the beneficiaries did not name a single disadvantage to living on the settlements, while nearly all (96 percent) mentioned at least one advantage. Moreover, more than nine out of ten beneficiaries are planning to remain on the settlement with less than three out of one hundred planning to leave it. Finally, over eight in ten felt that they were better off after having become beneficiaries than they had been before, while fewer than four out of one hundred felt they were worse off.

Comparisons of the Atlantic Basin beneficiaries with beneficiaries elsewhere revealed a pattern encountered earlier in this study. It was found that the Atlantic Basin beneficiaries are somewhat more discontented with the program than their counterparts elsewhere in Costa Rica. The differences, however, were generally small and not statistically significant.

**V. POLITICAL PARTICIPATION:
INSTITUTIONALIZED AND MOBILIZED MODES**

Democratic systems, of which Costa Rica is one of the foremost in Latin America, place a high value in involving citizens with matters of public concern. The study of political participation for the land reform beneficiaries who are the object of investigation in the present study is thus of special relevance. In recent years ITCO officials have been attempting to find ways to increase beneficiary participation in decision-making. This effort is in response to the recognized need to reduce the paternalistic tendencies evidenced in many ITCO programs. Moreover, the current "Agrarian Resettlement and Productivity" project undertaken with USAID financial assistance project was designed with a number of participatory objectives in mind. For all these reasons it is appropriate to look at political participation among ITCO beneficiaries.

First, a word about definition. Traditionally, political participation has been defined by political scientists in rather narrow terms, limited basically to voting. However, in recent years as a result of a number of cross national investigations, the definition of political participation has been widened considerably so as to include the analysis of the many varied ways in which individuals have some involvement in political life. Hence, the definition used in the present paper is drawn from the

public goods perspective enunciated by Seligson and Booth (1978, 1979). This perspective defines political participation as "those activities which influence, or are intended to influence, the distribution of public goods." The definition has a number of advantages; however, for the purposes of the present study, its primary advantage is that it does not limit participation to those activities which involve the formal institutions of government. As a result, a wide range of community-based activities for redistribution and creation of public goods are included under the definition.

This chapter focuses on the more directly political aspects of political participation, having covered the community-level aspects in Chapter III. We look first at the more traditional forms of political participation, namely voting and campaign activism, and then shift to an examination of particularized contacting, a mode of participation first discussed by Verba and Nie (1972), and elaborated in comparative perspective by Verba, Nie and Kim (1978). In addition, a brief look is taken at political communication. The chapter then considers unconventional forms of participation, referred to here as "mobilized participation."¹ These include participation in strikes

1. A discussion of the distinction between institutionalized and mobilized forms of political participation is contained in Seligson (1980:75, n. 1).

and land invasions. Thus the chapter is divided into a discussion of two major modes of political participation, "institutionalized" and "mobilized." The effort here is to distinguish primarily between those forms of participation which are largely conventional and not challenging of the system and those which involve mobilization and potential challenges to the political system.

Institutionalized Participation

Electoral Participation

Since voting is the form of political participation which has been studied most frequently, the analysis begins with suffrage. As is seen in Table V.1, 85 percent of the ITCO beneficiaries say they voted in the 1974 election and 76 percent report having voted in 1970. The difference between the two elections is not indicative of lower voting in 1970, but rather more a consequence of the percentage of the respondents interviewed in 1976 who had been too young to vote in 1970. Since the abstention rate for the 1974 election on a nationwide basis was 20 percent, ITCO beneficiaries appear to be participating in elections at a rate somewhat higher than the national population as a whole.

Jukam and Seligson, 1982). In Mexico, for example, abstention rates in the 1970 and 1976 presidential elections ran to over 30 percent, and the 1978 congressional election in that country saw abstention hit an all-time high of over 50 percent (Seligson, 1979). Indeed, comparison of Costa Rican voting levels with data reported in the seven-nation study by Verba, Nie, and Kim (1978:57-58) reveals that they are higher than those found in the United States, Nigeria, the Netherlands, Japan and India, and are exceeded only by those of Austria. The fact that among ITCO beneficiaries voting is higher than it is among the population as a whole certainly would seem to suggest low levels of political alienation. However, since the present data set contains a number of much more direct measures of political alienation, it would be best to defer a firm statement on that subject until those data are analyzed. What can be said at this point, however, is that voting participation among ITCO beneficiaries is very high.

Campaign Participation

Respondents were asked about four different ways in which they might have become involved in political campaigns. Unfortunately, no comparative data from other sectors of the Costa Rican population are available. In an effort to provide some basis for comparison, data from the United States and India, two other democracies, one

industrialized and the other agrarian, are presented. The data for these two nations are at the national level, and therefore no direct comparisons with the Costa Rican peasant population is possible.

Table V.2 presents these forms of campaign activism in order of increasing frequency. Among reform beneficiaries who, as has been pointed out in Chapter II, are rather poor, very few of the beneficiaries actually went so far as to contribute money to a political party or candidate. Only 4 percent of all beneficiaries had contributed money during the past three or four years, compared to 13 and 21 percent for the national populations of the United States and India. Although the Atlantic Basin had a slightly higher percentage of contributors, it was not significantly different from the other settlers. However, because of financial limitations, this low percentage of contributors should not be taken to mean that people in the ITCO settlements are not actively involved in campaigns. This point is made more forcefully in analysis of the other forms of campaign activism discussed below.

One way in which individuals become involved in political campaigns is by talking to friends and neighbors and attempting to persuade them to vote for a certain party or candidate. Indeed, in the United States this form of campaign participation is engaged in by the greatest number of people. Persuading individuals to vote for a party is an

TABLE V.2. POLITICAL PARTICIPATION: CAMPAIGN ACTIVISM AMONG SETTLERS

Question: During the last three or four years have you contributed money to a political party or to a candidate or to some other political group?

	Entire Sample		Atlantic Basin		Other Settlements		United States ^a	India ^a
	%	(N)	%	(N)	%	(N)	%	%
Contributed	3.5	(26)	4.0	(7)	3.3	(19)	13	21
Not contributed	95.6	(720)	94.9	(168)	95.8	(552)	87	79
Don't Know or Too Young	0.9	(7)	1.1	(2)	0.9	(5)	--	--
	100.0%	(753)	100.0%	(177)	100.0%	(576)	100%	100%

Sig. = ns

Question: During the political campaigns, have you tried to convince people to vote for a certain party or a certain candidate?

Tried to Convince	16.7	(126)	21.5	(38)	15.3	(88)	28	--
Not tried	82.7	(623)	78.5	(139)	84.0	(484)	72	--
Don't Know or Too Young	0.5	(4)	0.0	(0)	0.7	(4)	--	--
	100.0%	(753)	100.0%	(177)	100.0	(576)	100%	--

Tau b = .07 Sig. (of Tau) = .03

Question: (For respondents who have tried to convince people to vote for a certain party or candidate): You do it frequently, sometimes, once in a while, or almost never?

Frequently	24.6	(31)	34.2	(13)	20.5	(18)
Sometimes	34.1	(43)	36.8	(14)	33.0	(29)
Once in a while	27.0	(34)	26.3	(10)	27.3	(24)
Almost Never	13.4	(17)	2.6	(1)	18.2	(16)
Don't Know	0.8	(1)	0.0	(0)	1.1	(1)
	100.0%	(126)	100.0%	(38)	100.0%	(88)

Tau c = .21 Sig. (of Tau) = .01

TABLE V.2. POLITICAL PARTICIPATION: CAMPAIGN ACTIVISM AMONG SETTLERS
(Continued)

Question: Have you worked for one of the political parties or for some candidate. For example, have you put up posters, distributed handbills, asked friends to vote, etc.?								
	Entire Sample		Atlantic Basin		Other Settlements		United States	India
	\bar{X}	(N)	\bar{X}	(N)	\bar{X}	(N)	\bar{X}	\bar{X}
Worked	18.5	(139)	28.2	(50)	15.5	(89)	26	25
Not Worked	80.6	(607)	70.6	(125)	83.7	(482)	74	75
Don't Know or Too Young	0.9	(7)	1.1	(2)	0.9	(5)	—	—
	100.0%	(753)	100.0%	(177)	100.0%	(576)	100%	100%
Tau b = .14						Sig. (of Tau) = .001		
Question: In the last three or four years have you attended a political meeting or a campaign rally?								
Attended	27.2	(205)	36.2	(64)	24.5	(141)	19	14
Not attended	72.5	(541)	62.7	(111)	74.7	(430)	81	86
Don't Know or Too Young	0.9	(7)	1.1	(2)	0.9	(5)	—	—
	100.0%	(753)	100.0%	(177)	100.0%	(576)	100%	100%
Tau b = .11						Sig. (of Tau) = .001		

^aSource: Verba, Nie and Kim (1978:57)

activity engaged in by 17 percent of the reform beneficiaries. This compares to 28 percent reported in the Verba-Nie study for the United States. This form of campaign activism is also somewhat higher in the Atlantic Basin: 22 percent of all Atlantic Basin beneficiaries attempted to convince someone to vote for a certain party or candidate, compared to 15 percent in the other settlements. This difference is statistically significant although the strength of the relationship is rather weak.

Among those who attempted to convince someone to vote for a particular party or candidate, it is found that nearly one-quarter attempted to do so "frequently." Among the Atlantic Basin beneficiaries, this percentage is higher; 34 percent of the Basin beneficiaries attempted to convince someone to vote for a particular candidate or party frequently, compared to 21 percent of the other beneficiaries. This difference is also statistically significant. Hence in terms of the type of campaign activism which involves convincing people to vote for a particular candidate, the Atlantic Basin beneficiaries stand out as being considerably more active.

Working for a political party in the form of putting up posters, distributing handbills, etc., is a form of campaign activism engaged in by somewhat more of the beneficiaries than the other modes. We see that 19 percent of the beneficiaries had worked on campaigns in these ways, compared to 26 percent and 25 percent in the United States and India, respectively. Conforming to the findings reported above, the Atlantic beneficiaries were once again more active.

The most common form of campaign activism is attending political meetings and rallies. Fully 28 percent of the beneficiaries attended such meetings. In India only 14 percent study attending such meetings, while in the United

States, the figure rises to 19 percent. Therefore, in comparative perspective Costa Rican reform beneficiaries are quite active especially when it is considered that comparisons are being made between a comparatively poor peasant population and the national populations of the other nations. Once again, the Atlantic Basin/other area comparisons reveal the former as more active.

Overall, then, Costa Rican reform beneficiaries are rather active in terms of campaign participation. It was surprising to find that the Atlantic Basin beneficiaries are more active than the beneficiaries in other areas, but this may be due to the somewhat more politicized nature of political discourse in the Atlantic Basin. The Basin is an area undergoing long-term political stresses and strains, and these factors are likely reflected in the higher levels of political participation found in the region. Hence, when in Chapter II there were indications that the Atlantic zone settlements were social islands, not closely linked to the larger society of which they form a geographic part, the initial evidence in this chapter indicates that the insular status does not carry over into political life.

Personal Contacting

Two forms of personal contacting have been identified by students of political participation. The first of these is "contacting with a communal referent," that is, contact with some political figure or government official in an

effort to help achieve some communal benefit. The second, the one focused on here, is contacting with a personal referent, known as "particularized contacting." An example of such contacting would be an individual petitioning a municipal executive to improve the road leading to his farm. Ideally, data for both forms of contacting should be examined, but unfortunately only data on the latter form are available in the survey.

The data presented in Table V.3 reveal that the most common form of particularized contacting is talking to ITCO officials. This finding is not surprising since ITCO is the governmental agency which usually has the greatest visibility on the settlements. Indeed, most settlements have one or more representatives of ITCO permanently based there. For this reason it is not surprising that 46 percent of the beneficiaries have asked an ITCO official for help. No other contacts compare in frequency with those made with ITCO officials. The police, the next most frequently contacted public figures, were approached by only 12 percent of the beneficiaries. The municipal executive was contacted by 10 percent of the beneficiaries, while slightly fewer (10 percent) of the beneficiaries had contacted a congressman.

The only real surprise in the data emerged in the low frequency (9 percent) with which the beneficiaries state that they have contacted a government office. It was expected that because the settlements are government

TABLE V.3. POLITICAL PARTICIPATION: PARTICULARIZED CONTACTING

Question: Have you ever asked for help on a personal or family problem from any of the following
(Per cent answering "yes")

Person or Institution	Entire Sample	Atlantic Basin		Other Settlements		Atlantic Other Settlements Sig. (t-test)	General Population (males only) ^a				
		\bar{x}	(N)	\bar{x}	(N)		\bar{x}	(N)	\bar{x}	(N)	Peasant/ Urbanite Sig. (t-test)
ITCO	43.3 (349)	67.8	(120)	39.9	(229)	.001	---	---	---	---	---
The police	12.2 (92)	13.0	(23)	12.0	(69)	ns	7.1	(22)	8.8	(30)	ns
Municipal executive	10.0 (75)	7.9	(14)	10.6	(61)	ns	9.3	(29)	17.1	(58)	.003
A congressman (diputado)	9.6 (72)	13.6	(24)	8.3	(48)	.04	10.6	(33)	12.1	(41)	ns
A government office	8.5 (64)	13.0	(23)	7.1	(41)	.01	---	---	---	---	---
A political party member	8.1 (61)	11.9	(21)	6.9	(40)	.04	---	---	---	---	---
A councilman (municipe)	6.6 (50)	6.2	(11)	6.8	(39)	ns	9.9	(31)	10.9	(27)	ns
Sample size	(753)	(177)		(576)			(312)		(339)		

^aSource: Booth, et. al, data tapes used for Estudio de tipología de comunidades, Vol II, 1973.

^bns refers to number of respondents who reported contacts.

sponsored programs, there would be repeated need for the beneficiaries to go to government offices to arrange one detail or another. Respondents could have interpreted the question as referring to government offices in the capital city, because in Costa Rica the word "el gobierno" refers to the party and president in power. Hence, local offices of the municipality or social security (Seguro Social) may not have been considered government offices. However, if this explanation does not account for the low percentage, and it probably does not, at least not fully, a troubling explanation suggests itself. Quite possibly most problems experienced by settlers are referred to the local ITCO representative rather than taken to any other government office, councilman, or party member. If this is the case it is further evidence of the isolation of ITCO settlements from the normal channels of political and social life. Hence, ITCO representatives, no doubt in a well-intentioned effort to be of assistance to the settlers, perform tasks which probably should be done by other agencies. For example, problems with local roads are probably being referred to ITCO rather than to the municipal executive.

An examination of the comparative data from the general population does not support this contention. It is found that the reform beneficiaries are much more likely to have contacted the police and are slightly more likely to contact the municipal executive than are peasants (landed and

landless) in the general population. While it is also true that the general population peasants are more likely to have contacted a congressman, the difference is minute. The only contacts which are notably higher among peasants in the general population than among the reform beneficiaries are with municipal councilmen. Hence, whereas 10 percent of the peasants in the general population have made such contacts, only 7 percent of the reform beneficiaries have done so here.

The relative isolation and recent arrival of a substantial proportion of the reform beneficiaries might well explain this lower level of contacting. A brief look at the data from the urban sector of the general population reveals that with the exception of contacts with the municipal executive, the levels of contacting are not significantly higher than they are among the peasant population. Hence, the reform beneficiaries exhibit levels of particularized contacting very similar to that found in the population of Costa Rica, whether peasant or urbanite.

Particularized contacting is generally higher among the Atlantic Basin beneficiaries than it is among other beneficiaries, a finding which conforms to the pattern which emerged in campaign activism (Table V.2). Fully 68 percent of the Atlantic Basin beneficiaries had contacted an ITCO official, compared to 40 percent for the other regions, a difference which is statistically significant. There was

also significantly higher contacting among the Atlantic Basin beneficiaries with congressmen, government office, and political party members. Hence, here again we find the Atlantic Basin beneficiaries as demonstrating higher political participation.

Political Communication

The final form of institutionalized political participation to be discussed in this chapter is political communication. As seen from Table V.4, few reform beneficiaries spend a great deal of time talking about politics. Only slightly less than 4 percent of the beneficiaries talk about politics as frequently as once a week or more often. Yet one-third of the beneficiaries stated that they talked about politics at least once in a while.

A comparison of beneficiaries and other peasants (landed and landless) reveals that their levels of political communication are quite similar. While there appears to be some evidence that the beneficiaries are slightly less likely to engage in political communication, the minor differences in question wording might well be responsible for the differences. It is clear, however, that urbanites are much more likely to engage in frequent political communication than are peasants. As shown on Table V.4, nearly one-third of the urban component of the general population is likely to talk politics frequently.

TABLE V.4. POLITICAL PARTICIPATION: POLITICAL COMMUNICATION

Question: In general, with what frequency do you talk about politics and about political matters with your friends: almost every day, once a week, once in a while, or rarely?

	Entire Sample	Atlantic Basin	Other Settlements	General Population (zones only) ^a	
				Peasants	Urbanites
	<u>X</u> (N)	<u>X</u> (N)	<u>X</u> (N)	<u>X</u> (N)	<u>X</u> (N)
Almost every day ^b	3.7 (28)	4.8 (12)	2.8 (16)	2.9 (9)	31.3 (106)
Once a week	0.3 (2)	0.6 (1)	0.2 (1)	15.4 (48)	14.7 (50)
Once in a while	33.7 (254)	41.8 (74)	31.3 (180)	30.1 (94)	18.3 (62)
Rarely	60.7 (457)	50.3 (89)	63.9 (368)	51.0 (159)	35.7 (121)
Don't know	1.6 (12)	0.6 (1)	1.9 (11)	0.6 (2)	0.0 (0)
	100.0% (753)	100.0% (177)	100.0% (576)	100.0% (312)	100.0% (339)

Tau c = .11 Sig. (of Tau) = <.001 Tau c = .31

Sig. (other) <.001

^aSource: Booth, et. al. "Estudio de tipología de comunidades,

^bThe wording of the questionnaire used to gather the national data was as follows: You and your friends talk about national politics: frequently, once in a while, very rarely, or never?

Beneficiaries in the Atlantic Basin once again turn out to be more participant. As seen from Table V.4, the higher rate of political communication in the Atlantic Basin is statistically significant. There are more Atlantic Basin beneficiaries who talk about politics almost every day and more who talk about politics once in a while.

In sum, one has a picture of institutionalized participation among ITCO beneficiaries as being comparatively frequent. These are individuals who are not isolated from mainstream politics in the country but are relatively involved.

Mobilized Participation

Unionization and Strikes

In rural Costa Rica union activity is not very common. Indeed, in the country as a whole the percentage of the population unionized is generally lower than found elsewhere in Latin America. Whereas union membership constitutes 33 percent of the economically active population in Argentina, 24 percent in Colombia, and 21 percent in Mexico, it is only 4 percent in Costa Rica, among the lowest levels of any Latin American country (Statistical Abstract of the Latin America). However, the union movement has been experiencing some growth in recent years. Hence, whereas in 1953 there were only 74 unions legally registered in Costa Rica, by 1968 there were 250, and by 1974, 411 (Anuario Estadístico,

1974:151). Rural unions, however, are not very common except among banana workers on the Atlantic and Pacific coasts. It is in these areas which, in 1934, the first strike of banana workers was held. Traditionally, support for labor unions has been highest in these regions. This pattern also emerges in the data on beneficiaries of the ITCO programs.

As seen from Table V.5, nearly three-quarters of the beneficiaries had at least heard people talking of unionization. In the Atlantic Basin the talk of unionization, as expected, was significantly higher. There, 84 percent of all the beneficiaries had at least heard some talk about unionization.

Strike participation, however, was rather low. Only 16 percent of all beneficiaries had ever participated in a strike. Once again, Atlantic Basin beneficiaries, as expected, were more likely to have participated in a strike. One-fifth of those beneficiaries had participated in a strike, a difference which is statistically significant when compared to settlers elsewhere. However, these findings do not mean that they had participated in a strike after having become beneficiaries of an ITCO settlement. Rather the question merely asked, "Have you ever participated in a strike?" It is quite likely that most of the strike behavior had occurred prior to the respondent's having received land

TABLE V.5. MOBILIZED PARTICIPATION: UNIONIZATION AND STRIKES

Question: Have you heard talk of unionization?

	Entire Sample		Atlantic Basin		Other Settlements	
	<u>X</u>	<u>(N)</u>	<u>X</u>	<u>(N)</u>	<u>X</u>	<u>(N)</u>
Heard	73.6	(554)	84.2	(149)	70.3	(405)
Not heard	26.0	(196)	14.1	(25)	29.7	(171)
Don't know	0.4	(3)	1.7	(3)	0.0	(0)
	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>(753)</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>(177)</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>(576)</u>

Tau b = .15 Sig. (of Tau) = <.001

Question: Have you ever participated in a strike?

Yes	15.7	(118)	27.9	(37)	14.1	(81)
No	84.3	(635)	79.1	(140)	85.9	(495)
	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>(753)</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>(177)</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>(576)</u>

Tau b = .08 Sig. (of Tau) = .01

from ITCO since it is difficult to imagine who the strikers would be striking against once they received land. Unfortunately, the questionnaire did not indicate when the strike had occurred.

Comparative data regarding sympathy for unionization and strikes are contained in Table V.6. In that table, the beneficiary data are supplemented by data on non-settlers drawn from the 1973 peasant study discussed in the introduction (Chapter 1).

Information concerning union membership is contained on the first panel of Table V.6.[2] Looking first at union membership among the settlers, nearly one in five had once been a member of a union, a rate far above the national average. As anticipated, union membership in the Atlantic Basin was even higher, involving 26 percent of the settlers in that region, a difference which is statistically significant.

A comparison of union membership among settlers and non-settler peasants reveals that membership rates among the settlers fall between that of the landed peasants and that of the landless peasants. That is, among landed peasants in the non-settler sample, only 6 percent of the respondents had ever been a member of a union, whereas 37 percent of the

2. The data on union membership are given in Table V.6, rather than in Table V.5, because of the possibility of showing comparisons with non-settlers.

TABLE V.6. UNIONIZATION AND STRIKES: SETTLERS/NON-SETTLERS

Question: Are you now or have you been a member of a union?

	Settlers			Non-Settlers		
	Entire Reform Sample	Atlantic Basin	Other Settlements	Landless Peasants	Landed Peasants	
	\bar{X} (N)	\bar{X} (N)	\bar{X} (N)	\bar{X} (N)	\bar{X} (N)	
Member	19.1 (144)	26.0 (46)	17.0 (98)	37.3 (98)	6.2 (16)	
Not a member	80.2 (604)	73.4 (130)	82.3 (474)	62.4 (164)	93.8 (242)	
Don't Know	0.7 (5)	0.6 (1)	0.7 (4)	0.4 (1)	0.0 (0)	
	100.0% (753)	100.0% (177)	100.0% (177)	100.0% (263)	100.0% (258)	
	Landless	Landed				
Tau b	.19	.16	Tau b = .10		Tau b = .38	
Sig.	<.001	<.001	Sig. (of Tau) = .004		Sig. (of Tau) <.001	

Question: Now I am going to tell you a story in order for you to give me your opinion about it. Don Alfredo has two nearby farms. One day the workers on one of the farms go on strike. The owner asks the peasants of his other farm to work on the farm which is on strike. Should the workers of that other farm help the owner, or should they do nothing, or should they help the strikers?

	\bar{X} (N)				
Help strikers	46.2 (348)	52.5 (93)	44.7 (255)	55.9 (147)	33.3 (86)
Do Nothing	18.6 (140)	8.5 (15)	21.7 (125)	12.5 (33)	12.0 (31)
Help Owner	19.0 (143)	28.2 (50)	16.1 (93)	30.4 (80)	52.7 (136)
Don't Know	16.2 (122)	10.7 (19)	17.9 (103)	1.1 (3)	1.9 (5)
	100.0% (753)	100.0% (177)	100.0% (576)	100.0% (263)	100.0% (258)
	Landless	Landed			
Tau c	.02	.25	Sig. = ns		Tau c = .26
Sig.	.001	<.001			Sig. (of Tau) <.001

*Data from 1973 peasant study, males only.

TABLE V.6. UNIONIZATION AND STRIKES: SETTLERS/NON SETTLERS (Continued)

Question: In general, thinking about unions of agricultural day laborers (jornaleros y peones agricolas), would you say that you are in agreement with them, against them, or neither in agreement nor against?

	Settlers					Non-Settlers*				
	Entire Reform Sample		Atlantic Basin		Other Settlements	Landless Peasants		Landed Peasants		
	\bar{X}	(N)	\bar{X}	(N)	\bar{X}	(N)	\bar{X}	(N)		
Agree	48.3	(295)	41.6	(87)	50.7	(228)	75.0	(183)	53.4	(117)
Neither	39.4	(241)	40.4	(65)	39.1	(176)	11.9	(29)	22.4	(49)
Against	12.3	(75)	18.0	(29)	10.2	(46)	13.1	(32)	24.2	(53)
	100.0% (611)		100.0% (161)		100.0% (450)		100.0% (244)		100.0% (219)	

Landless Landed Tau c = .09
 Tau c .19 Sig. (of Tau) = .007
 Sig. < .001 na Tau c = .21
 Sig. (of Tau) = < .001

Note: For this item there are 142 respondents in the reform sample (18.9% of the sample) who did not respond because they either did not know what a union was or were unsure of the answer. The above percentages, as well as the ones in the question following, are based only upon those who responded. In the non-settler sample 58 respondents (11.1% of the sample) were in this category.

Question: Talking about strikes of agricultural laborers (jornaleros y peones agricolas), would you say that you are in agreement, against, or neither in agreement nor against this kind of strike?

	\bar{X}	(N)	\bar{X}	(N)	\bar{X}	(N)	\bar{X}	(N)	\bar{X}	(N)
Agree	37.5	(252)	35.9	(60)	38.0	(192)	49.6	(124)	29.2	(73)
Neither	37.6	(253)	37.1	(62)	37.8	(191)	18.4	(46)	20.0	(50)
Against	24.9	(167)	26.9	(45)	24.2	(122)	32.0	(80)	50.8	(127)
	100.0% (672)		100.0% (167)		100.0% (505)		100.0% (250)		100.0% (250)	

Landless Landed Sig. = ns.
 Tau c .18
 Sig. na < .001 Tau c = .23
 Sig. (of Tau) < .001

Note: See previous question for non-response data explanation. On this item, 81 respondents of the reform sample (10.8%) and 21 respondents of the non-settler sample (4.0%) did not respond.

*Data from 1973 peasant study, males only. Landed peasants include titled and untitled landowners as well as squatters. Landless peasants include renters, sharecroppers and all landless laborer types. See Seligson (1980) for details of classification.

landless peasants been members of a union at some point. The percentage of settlers who had been union members, at least at one point in time (19 percent), falls in between that of landed and landless peasants. This reflects the fact that beneficiaries are individuals who had once been landless peasants, and therefore were in a position to become union members. Once they have achieved membership on an ITCO settlement, however, the reform beneficiaries lose most of their economic motivation for union membership. Since the question asked for union membership at any point in the past, the survey was picking up historical information which probably exaggerated the number of beneficiaries who were union members at the time of the survey. Hence the reported intermediate position of union membership among the settlers as compared to the non-settlers is quite understandable.

The intermediate position of the settlers vis-a-vis non-settlers with regard to union membership is reflected quite clearly in their attitudes toward unionization and strikes, as shown in Table V.6. The first panel presents choices read to the respondent based upon a short story in which he is asked to choose whether the workers should assist the farm owner, do nothing, or help the strikers in a particular situation. Not surprisingly, the reform beneficiaries had an opinion intermediate between that of the landed and landless non-settler peasants. Whereas 56

percent of the landless peasants would help the strikers, only 46 percent of the reform beneficiaries and 53 percent of the landed peasants would do so. However, these findings, to a certain extent, diverge from the "help owner" response. As seen among the non-settlers, many more landed peasants would help the owner (53 percent) than would landless peasants (30 percent). However, among the reform sample, only 19 percent of the respondents would help the owner, less than either the landed or the landless peasants.

Two additional comments are in order with regard to this question. First, the difference between the landed and landless peasants in terms of their willingness to help the strikers is statistically significant. Second, there is no statistically significant difference between the Atlantic Basin and other settlers among the reform sample. Hence, although the Atlantic Basin settlers are somewhat more likely to select the "help strikers" response than are the other settlers, they are also more likely to select the "help owner" possibility.

Respondents were asked to what extent they agree with the formation of unions among agricultural day laborers. These results also present some ambiguities. It was found that 75 percent of the landless peasants supported unions, while, as expected, many fewer landed peasants supported unions (53 percent), a difference which is statistically significant. However, only 48 percent of the reform

beneficiaries supported unions. Hence, it appears that the reform beneficiaries are less sympathetic toward union formation than even the landed peasants. This finding is contradicted by the number of respondents who stated they were against the formation of such unions. Among non-settlers, landless peasants were much less likely (13 percent) to be opposed than were the landed peasants (24 percent). However, among the reform beneficiaries, only 12 percent of the respondents were against the formation of these unions, less than the percentage found among the landless peasants. In sum, reform beneficiaries are both less likely to support or to oppose unions than either the landless or landed peasants.

The findings of this question are further confused by the fact that, contrary to expectation, the settlers in other parts of the country seem to be more positive toward unions than are the Atlantic Basin settlers. Since, as already shown, Atlantic Basin settlers were more likely to have been union members and more likely to have participated in strikes, it is difficult to understand why Atlantic Basin settlers would be more hostile toward the formation of unions than other ITCO settlers. Yet, not only are they more hostile toward the formation of unions, but they are somewhat more hostile toward the holding of strikes (although the difference is not significant, as will be discussed immediately below). Perhaps experiences with

unions among the Atlantic Basin settlers had been rather negative, and this may have caused them to disavow their support for unionization and strikes. However, there are no data in the survey to test this hypothesis.

Turning to the fourth panel on Table V.6, we see that whereas 50 percent of the landless peasants were in favor of strikes, 38 percent of the reform sample were in favor of strikes and only 29 percent of the landed peasants were in favor of strikes. This "intermediate" position of beneficiaries has been observed before.

A final note on the findings on this item is that there was no statistically significant difference between the Atlantic Basin and other settlers. Even though it was found that there is a somewhat higher percentage of support for strikes among other settlers than among Atlantic Basin settlers, the difference is not statistically significant.

Sorting out the attitudes toward unionization and strike is somewhat complicated. It was found that only one-fifth of the beneficiaries had ever been members of a union, and only 15 percent had ever participated in strikes, yet attitudes toward strikes and unionization were more positive than these figures suggest. On every item there were more respondents from the reform sample who expressed support for unionization and strikes than were opposed to it. To be sure, the support for unionization was somewhat higher than support for strikes. Nonetheless, when

presented with a hypothetical situation (refer to the second panel of Table V.6), nearly half of the respondents in the reform sample would support the strikers. Comparisons with the non-reform settlers are beclouded by the fact that the intermediate category of response was selected by many more reform beneficiaries than by non-settlers. This difference may reflect a substantive difference or may reflect differences in the way the interviews were conducted. The large number selecting the middle category may well reflect a transitional orientation of settlers as they move from being landless peasants to smallholders.

Some support for this view is found when one examines the correlations between length of residence and attitude toward unions. There is a consistent positive association between the length of residence in the settlement and a less favorable attitude toward unions. For example, referring to the first question on Table V.6, a correlation (r) of .16 ($\text{sig.} = .001$) is found between being in favor of the owner's position and length of residence in the settlement. An identical (though reversed) correlation is found in the third panel on Table V.6 with respect to being in agreement with strikes of agricultural laborers. Therefore, one can conclude that as the reform beneficiaries spend more years on their farms, their attitudes will continue to shift as they become more like those of the landed peasants which they have become.

Land Invasions

The problem of land invasion, or squatting, has become a major one in Costa Rica in recent years. The serious inequalities in the distribution of land have caused many peasants, in light of the high prices of land, to occupy land without purchase or authorization in order to find a place to farm and live. Since, as shown in Chapter II most of the respondents had been landless peasants before they acquired their ITCO properties, it is not surprising that many of them would be quite sympathetic toward land invasions. Indeed, it is likely, if not probable, that many of the respondents had been contemplating invading land before becoming members of the ITCO settlement.

Respondents were asked three questions with respect to their attitudes and behaviors toward land invasions. First they were asked to what extent they agree or disagree with such invasions; then they were asked whether or not any members of their family had ever invaded land; and finally they were asked whether they themselves had personally invaded land. Looking at the top panel on Table V.7, it is not surprising to find that an overwhelming majority of respondents agreed with land invasions: 87 percent of respondents agreed with such invasions, whereas only 12 percent disagreed. It is found that support for land invasions was somewhat higher in the rest of the country as compared to the Atlantic Basin, a difference which is

statistically significant. The more important finding is that the reform beneficiaries, whether they live in the Atlantic Basin or not, strongly support land invasions.

The strong support for land invasions among reform beneficiaries may have long-term political implications. That is, peasants seeking land in areas near existing settlements might find allies in their struggle. Political parties in Costa Rica which seek to capitalize on that support might be able to do so. On the other hand, this support for land invasions could also be used to mobilize strong rural support for an active reform program. Political parties which have as one of the planks in their platform, support for a vigorous land reform program could expect to have strong support from the reform beneficiaries.

Personal experience among reform beneficiaries with land invasions is considerably less than beneficiaries' support for such invasions. As shown in the second panel of Table V.7, only 21 percent of the reform beneficiaries stated that some member of their family had invaded land. There was no significant difference between the Atlantic Basin and other settlers, although there was a somewhat smaller percent among the Atlantic Basin settlers (17 percent) who had a family member who had invaded land as compared to the other settlers (22 percent). This difference, although not significant, might help explain the findings presented in the first panel of Table V.7, where

TABLE 7.7. MOBILIZED PARTICIPATION: LAND INVASIONS (SQUATTING)

Question: Some people find themselves obliged to invade land to maintain their families. Are you in agreement with those landless peasants who invade land that they need, or are you not in agreement that they invade?

	Entire Sample		Atlantic Basin		Other Settlements	
	<u>X</u>	<u>(N)</u>	<u>X</u>	<u>(N)</u>	<u>X</u>	<u>(N)</u>
Agree with invasion	87.4	(658)	84.2	(149)	88.4	(509)
Disagree with invasion	11.6	(87)	15.3	(27)	10.4	(60)
Don't know	1.1	(8)	0.6	(1)	1.2	(7)
	100.0%	(753)	100.0%	(177)	100.0%	(576)

Tau b = .06 Sig. (of Tau) = .05

Question: Has some member of your family had to invade land?

Invaded	21.0	(158)	16.9	(30)	22.2	(128)
Not invaded	78.5	(591)	83.1	(147)	77.1	(444)
Don't know	0.5	(4)	0.0	(0)	0.7	(4)
	100.0%	(753)	100.0%	(177)	100.0%	(576)

Sig. = ns

Question: Have you participated in a land invasion, or have you taken land that wasn't yours?

Invaded	25.6	(193)	22.0	(39)	26.7	(154)
Not invaded	74.2	(559)	78.0	(138)	73.1	(421)
Don't know	0.1	(1)	0.0	(0)	0.2	(1)
	100.0%	(753)	100.0%	(177)	100.0%	(576)

Sig. = ns

significantly higher support for land invasions was seen in the area outside the Atlantic Basin. The findings reported on this item need to be accepted with some caution, however. Because land invasions are an illegal activity in Costa Rica, it is possible that a number of respondents who are related to persons who had invaded land would prefer not to mention this fact. Nonetheless, the very small percentage of non-response in this item does tend to lend credence to the 21 percent overall figure.

The data presented in the bottom panel of Table V.7 encourage greater confidence in the veracity of self-reporting of this illegal activity. It was found that 26 percent of the beneficiaries stated they had personally participated in a land invasion, a figure which is somewhat higher than that reported for family members. If the respondents were attempting to hide personal "guilt," it would be expected that reported frequency would be lower for personal invasion than for invasion reported for family members. In any event, at least one-fourth of the respondents are willing to admit squatting behavior. Squatting again appears more frequent elsewhere, conforming to the pattern established on the previous two items, but the difference is not statistically significant.

Summary

This chapter has examined the levels of various kinds of political participation among the settlers. A number of patterns have emerged for both the institutionalized and mobilized modes.

Institutionalized participation was found to be frequent among the reform beneficiaries. Specifically, voting was found to occur at levels higher than the national average, and particularized contacting of ITCO officials was very frequent. Compared to non-beneficiaries, seeking assistance from the police occurred far more frequently. Contacts with other public officials tended to go on at about the same rates as among the general population. Although there were no comparative data for non-beneficiaries, that a substantial number of beneficiaries had become involved in various forms of political activity which did not involve require financial sacrifice. Finally, although beneficiaries engaged in less political communication than did Costa Rican urbanites, they did so with about the same frequency as the non-beneficiary peasant population.

Unionization, strikes and land invasions were the principal forms of mobilized participation examined in this study. While most beneficiaries had heard about unions, less than a fifth had participated in a strike. However,

these figures are difficult to interpret since they may have only historical relevance. Most opportunities to participate in strikes probably would have occurred prior to the beneficiary's joining the settlement. Nonetheless, there is still considerable sympathy for unionization and strikes among the beneficiaries. Very strong support was expressed for land invasions, and over one-fourth of the respondents admitted having participated in an invasion.

Comparisons of Atlantic Basin settlers with those from the rest of the country revealed no differences in voting, but higher levels of campaign activism and particularized contacting among the former. It was also found that while the Atlantic Basin settlers were more likely to have participated in strikes and to have been members of unions, they were somewhat more likely to be opposed to unionization than other settlers. Finally, there was somewhat less support for land invasions in the Atlantic Basin than elsewhere, but even there, well over eight in ten beneficiaries supported such direct action.

The overall picture is one of fairly high levels of political participation among the reform beneficiaries. These are not "passive peasants" by any means. Rather, they are active, involved citizens who expend considerable energy participating politically.

VI. THE SETTLERS AND THE GOVERNMENT:

EFFICACY AND TRUST

In Chapter V, a number of dimensions of political participation behavior were explored. Social scientists have come to view behavioral experiences as very important in conditioning attitudes. It is expected, therefore, that the quality of participatory experiences has a strong influence on the extent to which individuals feel efficacious and trusting toward their government, two attitudes which are thought to be of crucial importance in determining long term stability of political systems (Seligson, 1979; 1980c). In this chapter, these attitudes are examined, with numerous comparisons offered between the beneficiaries and the general population of Costa Rica. An extensive discussion of the relationship between efficacy, trust and participation is contained in Seligson (1979).

Political Efficacy

Efficacy toward Local Government

Previous research among Costa Rican peasants (Seligson, 1980b:117:119) has demonstrated quite clearly that land tenure has a very strong influence on efficacy. In particular it has been found that landed peasants express a much higher sense of efficacy than do landless peasants. Such findings are confirmed by the data on the top panel of Table VI.1. Respondents were asked to state what they

thought they could do about a law which they consider to be unjust or harmful and which was being discussed by the local municipal council. As is shown in Table VI.1, landed peasants were significantly more likely to state that they would do something about such a law than landless peasants (65 percent vs. 51 percent).

It was anticipated that the reform sample beneficiaries would have an efficacy level somewhere between the landed and landless peasants, as found in the study of political participation in Chapter V. However, rather different findings emerged. Fully 83 percent of the reform beneficiaries stated they would try to do something about a law being proposed which they thought was harmful to their interest. Thus, reform beneficiaries indicate significantly higher efficacy levels than the landed peasants.

This is an extraordinarily high percent, much higher than encountered in most other studies that have been done cross-nationally. In the classic five-nation study conducted by Verba and Nie (1965:172, 1973), which used a slightly different version of the question used in Costa Rica, it was found that of the five nations, the percent feeling that they could do something about unjust laws was highest in the United States. But even there only 77 percent of the population felt "efficacious." In Mexico, only 52 percent of the population felt politically efficacious. Only U.S. respondents with a secondary

education or above were more likely to respond in as efficacious a way as the reform beneficiaries (85 percent for the U.S. vs. 83 percent for the beneficiaries).

Assuming that the reform beneficiaries, prior to their receiving a piece of land from the reform program, had had efficacy levels similar to those of the landless peasants, an assumption which seems warranted [1], efficacy levels have increased substantially since the beneficiaries have been granted land. It appears that because beneficiaries have been given such strong attention by the government through the land reform process, their feelings of efficacy have risen so high.

Another important finding emerging from the first panel on Table VI.1 is that the Atlantic Basin settlers have a much greater sense of efficacy than do other settlers. An extraordinarily high (94) percent of the Atlantic Basin settlers stated that they would do something about a law which they considered to be unjust, a difference which is statistically significant. This finding is consistent with the findings reported in Chapter V, that in many areas, Atlantic Basin beneficiaries had significantly higher levels of political participation. Hence, the Atlantic Basin beneficiaries not only participate to a greater extent, but

1. The justification for this assertion is contained in Seligson, 1978.

they also feel more efficacious than do the other beneficiaries.

Further support for the finding that reform beneficiaries feel themselves more efficacious than non-reform beneficiaries, and that Atlantic Basin settlers feel more efficacious than other settlers, is contained in the bottom panel of Table VI.1. Settlers were asked what chance for success they thought the action they suggested would have with regard to the aforementioned law. Among the non-settlers, only about 2 out of 5 respondents thought that their actions would have a good chance for success. Although landed peasants were somewhat more likely to believe that the actions would have a good chance for success than landless peasants, the difference was not significant.

Significantly higher levels of optimism regarding the outcome of action were expressed by the reform beneficiaries, 69 percent of whom thought they had a good chance of success, and only 4 percent thought that they had a bad chance. This result stands in marked contrast to the 21 percent of the non-settlers who thought that they would have little chance for success. In sum, taking both panels of Table VI.1 together, one finds that the reform beneficiaries are significantly more likely to be willing to do something about a local law which they consider unjust, and are significantly more optimistic that that activity

would have a good chance for success.

Moreover, among the Atlantic Basin beneficiaries there is even greater optimism that action will lead to success. Fully 85 percent of the Atlantic Basin beneficiaries thought they would have a good chance for success, a difference which is statistically significant as compared to the rest of the beneficiaries.

It is important, however, to qualify these findings by noting that they refer exclusively to feelings of efficacy toward local (i.e., municipal) government. It is necessary to look further to determine if this pattern of higher efficacy among Atlantic Basin settlers is paralleled with respect to government beyond the local level.

Efficacy Toward Government Administration

All over the world, government bureaucracies frustrate individuals. People are accustomed to waiting in long lines in front of bored-looking bureaucrats who often seem to be totally unresponsive to their demands. It is surprising, therefore, to find that the reform beneficiaries believe that they would receive good treatment by bureaucrats, as seen from VI.2. In the top panel of Table VI.2 we see responses when persons were asked how well they thought they would be treated if they went to a government office to discuss a personal problem. It was found that 7 out of 10 of them felt that they would be treated well, and an

TABLE VI.2. EFFICACY TOWARD GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATORS

Question: Let us suppose that you had to go to a government office to discuss a personal problem, for example, a legal matter or an identification card that you need, how do you think that they would attend to you there? Well, fair, or badly?

	Entire Sample	Atlantic Basin	Other Settlements
	\bar{x} (N)	\bar{x} (N)	\bar{x} (N)
Well	70.7 (532)	67.8 (120)	71.5 (412)
Fair	21.2 (160)	20.9 (37)	21.4 (123)
Badly	3.6 (27)	5.6 (10)	3.0 (17)
Don't know	4.5 (34)	5.6 (10)	4.2 (24)
	100.0% (753)	100.0% (177)	100.0% (576)

Sig. = ns

Question: If you tried to explain your problem to the people of that office, do you think that they would pay you a lot of attention, only a little attention, or that they would ignore you?

	Entire Sample	Atlantic Basin	Other Settlements
	\bar{x} (N)	\bar{x} (N)	\bar{x} (N)
A lot	54.2 (408)	50.8 (90)	55.2 (318)
A little	36.4 (274)	36.2 (64)	36.5 (210)
Ignore	5.3 (40)	10.2 (18)	3.8 (22)
Don't know	4.1 (31)	2.8 (5)	4.5 (26)
	100.0% (753)	100.0% (177)	100.0% (576)

Tau c = .06 Sig. (of Tau) = .04

Question: And if you went to that office as a representative of the (communal enterprise, cooperative, colony), to discuss some problem of your organization, do you think that they would pay you a lot of attention, a little attention, or would they ignore you?

	Entire Sample	Atlantic Basin	Other Settlements
	\bar{x} (N)	\bar{x} (N)	\bar{x} (N)
A lot	64.1 (483)	61.6 (109)	64.9 (374)
A little	28.8 (217)	29.4 (52)	28.6 (165)
Ignore	3.6 (27)	7.3 (13)	2.4 (14)
Don't know	3.5 (26)	1.7 (3)	4.0 (23)
	100.0% (753)	100.0% (177)	100.0% (576)

Sig. = ns

Question: If you were to have some problem with the police, for example, if you were accused of a misdemeanor, how do you think that you would be treated at police headquarters? Would they treat you well, fair or badly?

	Entire Sample	Atlantic Basin	Other Settlements
	\bar{x} (N)	\bar{x} (N)	\bar{x} (N)
Well	37.1 (279)	23.2 (41)	41.3 (238)
Fair	29.9 (225)	41.2 (73)	26.4 (152)
Badly	19.4 (146)	19.8 (35)	19.3 (111)
Don't know	13.7 (103)	15.8 (28)	13.0 (75)
	100.0% (753)	100.0% (177)	100.0% (576)

Tau c = .11 Sig. (of Tau) = <.001

additional 2 out of 10 felt that they would be treated fair. Only 4 percent felt that they would be treated badly. The comparison between the Atlantic Basin and the rest of the country did not reveal any significant difference.

The first item presented on Table VI.2 was probed with a follow-up question which asked the respondents to what extent they thought that the officials in the office would pay them attention if they tried to explain their problem to them. Here, the reform beneficiaries were less sanguine about receiving a great deal of attention, yet the majority still felt that they would receive a lot of attention. An additional 36 percent thought they would receive at least a little attention. Only 5 percent of the respondents thought that they would be ignored. Given that the respondents are all peasants, albeit smallholders, it is truly surprising to see to what extent these individuals indicated they felt that they would be received well by the bureaucracy. After all, these are individuals who are far from wealthy, yet the findings reveal that despite their absence of wealth they felt that they would receive reasonable treatment. These findings are notable when compared to the results of the five nation study noted earlier. It was found that in the United States a lower percentage of the population (48 percent) responded that they would get serious consideration from the bureaucracy. In Mexico, the difference was even greater, with only 14 percent responding that they expected

serious consideration.

It is noteworthy that there was a significant difference in the second item presented on Table VI.2 between the Atlantic Basin and other settlers. It was found that the latter felt somewhat more likely to receive a lot of attention than did the Atlantic Basin settlers. This finding contradicts the pattern presented earlier in this chapter as well as in Chapter V, in which it was found that Atlantic Basin settlers stand out as individuals who had higher levels of political participation and also felt that they could be more efficacious toward the municipal government. This difference, although statistically significant, is very small, and it is difficult to interpret its substantive significance.

An attempt was made to determine to what extent people's collective action would have upon feelings of efficacy toward government bureaucrats. That is, the survey attempted to determine if petitioning government bureaucrats as a member of the ITCO organization, whether it was a communal enterprise, cooperative or colony, would make a difference in the extent to which the individual felt efficacious. The results of this question are presented in the third panel of Table VI.2. It was found that feelings of efficacy increased when individuals were petitioning government as members of an organization rather than as individuals. Hence, 64 percent of the respondents felt that

they would get a lot of attention if they went as representatives of their organization in contrast to 54 percent who felt they would get a lot of attention if they went representing only themselves. Organizational representation, therefore, does tend to increase perception of efficacy. On this item, no significant differences were detected between the Atlantic Basin and other settlers.

Policemen are not well-loved by the poor in many societies, and Costa Rica is no exception. The survey sought to determine the extent to which individuals thought they would get good treatment from the local police. It should be noted, however, that the local police in Costa Rica are not highly visible. It was only a few years ago that the local police services in Costa Rica were organized into the Guardia de Asistencia Rural. Before that time the local police forces were only loosely organized. Given the extremely peaceful nature of life in the Costa Rican countryside, it is rare for the police to have to use force. Indeed, probably the most common use of the local police is to help maintain order on Sunday afternoons when drinking sometimes becomes too heavy. Yet, despite the low visibility, the reform beneficiaries are not particularly positive toward the police. As is shown on the bottom panel of Table VI.2, only 37 percent of the beneficiaries thought they would be treated well by the police, and nearly one in five thought they would be treated badly.

The one area in Costa Rica which has had significant rural unrest in recent years is the Atlantic Basin. It is not surprising, therefore, that the Atlantic Basin beneficiaries might feel somewhat more antagonistic toward the police. Only a little more than one out of five Atlantic Basin beneficiaries thought they would be treated well by the police compared to two out of five in the other settlements, a difference which is statistically significant. However, the percentage of Atlantic Basin respondents who thought they would be treated badly by the police did not vary from those elsewhere (one out of five).

Trust in Government

Diffuse support has long been considered to be one of the basic and crucial political variables in any political system. Over a decade ago, David Easton emphasized that the maintenance of diffuse support is critical if a political system is to survive: "When such support threatens to fall below a minimal level, regardless of the cause, the system must either provide mechanisms to revive the flagging support, or its days will be numbered" (Easton, 1965: 124). In a more recent evaluation, Miller (1974a: 951) ominously warns that: "when such support wanes, underlying discontent is the necessary result, and the potential for revolutionary alteration of the political and social system is enhanced." In Latin America, which has long been characterized by political instability, many analysts have sought to link the

prevalence of instability with the absence of strong support for the system of government. That is, they do not see a consensus underlying the system.

In Costa Rica, which has been blessed with an exceptionally long history of political stability (Seligson, forthcoming), one would anticipate that there would be stronger levels of support for the system than elsewhere. However, the peasant population in Costa Rica lives much less well than does the population living in urban areas, and a marked degree of social and economic duality has emerged in this century (Booth, 1975). Therefore, among those who are landless in Costa Rica one would anticipate a considerably lower level of support for the system than among those who are landed. What of the reform beneficiaries? Has the reform program made them more supportive of the system? The information presented in this section will address this question.

First it is necessary to define diffuse support. Although the terminology differs, there is general agreement on its definition. Easton (1975: 445), relying on Parsons (1958), defines "diffuse support" as "support which underlies the regime as a whole and the political community." Almond and Verba (1965: 63) used the term "system affect," meaning "generalized attitudes toward the system as a whole..." while Miller (1974: 952) refers to "political trust, which is ...basic evaluative or affective

orientation toward the government." In the 1960s, a measure of diffuse support, called "trust in government" was developed by the Survey Research Center of the University of Michigan. These items were included in the questionnaire used in the present study. In addition, a number of more recently developed items that are designed to tap diffuse support were also included. These items were developed because it had been found that the responses to the trust in government items tended to be affected by support for the incumbents, that is, individuals who were more supportive of the incumbents would tend to be more trusting of government. Diffuse support is a variable which is thought to be independent of respondents' attitudes toward the incumbent regime.[2]

The data for trust in government are presented in Table VI.3, in which eight separate items are analyzed. In this table comparisons are made between the Atlantic Basin and other subsets in the reform sample, on the one hand, and between those two and the general population on the other.

The first item contained on Table VI.3 is the one which most respondents found most difficult to answer, and therefore has the highest percentage of missing data. This was an item in which the respondents were asked to estimate

2. For a complete discussion of the definition and measurement of diffuse support, see Muller, Jukam, and Seligson, 1982.

TABLE VI.3. TRUST IN GOVERNMENT: SETTLERS / GENERAL POPULATION

Question: Let's talk about government, not only the present government, but all the previous ones as well. Do you think that government misspends a lot of the money that the people pay in taxes, misspends little of the money, or misspends some part of the money?

	Reform sample						General Population (males only)*					
	Entire Reform Sample		Atlantic Basin		Other Settlements		Non-Agricultural		Landless Peasants		Landed Peasants	
	<u>X</u>	<u>(N)</u>	<u>X</u>	<u>(N)</u>	<u>X</u>	<u>(N)</u>	<u>X</u>	<u>(N)</u>	<u>X</u>	<u>(N)</u>	<u>X</u>	<u>(N)</u>
A lot	47.8	(360)	61.6	(109)	43.6	(251)	49.5	(143)	41.7	(35)	42.0	(21)
Some	23.1	(174)	15.8	(28)	25.3	(146)	10.4	(30)	11.9	(10)	6.0	(3)
A little	6.9	(52)	2.9	(5)	8.2	(47)	25.6	(74)	20.2	(17)	20.0	(10)
None	4.0	(30)	4.5	(8)	3.8	(22)	5.2	(15)	2.4	(2)	10.0	(5)
Don't know	18.2	(137)	15.3	(27)	19.1	(110)	9.3	(27)	23.8	(20)	22.0	(11)
	100.0%	(753)	100.0%	(177)	100.0%	(576)	100.0%	(289)	100.0%	(84)	100.0%	(50)
	Non-Agri.	Landless	Landed	Tau c = .14			Sig. = ns		Sig. = ns			
Tau c	.09	.03	.03	Sig. (of Tau) = <.001								
Sig.	<.001	<.001	<.001									
Question: How often do you think that one can trust in government to do the right thing? Can you trust it almost always, almost never, or at times?												
Almost always	11.2	(84)	11.3	(20)	11.1	(64)	21.1	(61)	14.3	(12)	16.0	(8)
At times	50.3	(379)	43.5	(77)	52.4	(302)	47.1	(136)	33.3	(28)	34.0	(17)
Almost never	33.1	(249)	39.5	(70)	31.1	(179)	28.7	(83)	41.7	(35)	36.0	(18)
Don't know	5.4	(41)	5.6	(10)	5.4	(31)	3.1	(9)	10.7	(9)	14.0	(7)
	100.0%	(753)	100.0%	(177)	100.0%	(576)	100.0%	(289)	100.0%	(84)	100.0%	(50)
	Non-Agri.	Landless	Landed	Tau c = .06			Sig. (of Tau) = .04		Tau c = .13		Sig. (of Tau) = .005	
Tau c	.09	.03	ns									
Sig.	<.001	.03	ns									

* Data from 1976 National Probability Sample, males only.

TABLE VI.3. TRUST IN GOVERNMENT: SETTLERS/GENERAL POPULATION (continued)

Question: Would you say that government is interested in resolving the problems of the majority of Costaricans or is it interested in only in the problems of a select few?

	<u>Reform Sample</u>						<u>General Population (males only)*</u>					
	Entire Reform Sample		Atlantic Basin		Other Settlements		Non-Agricultural		Landless Peasants		Landed Peasants	
	<u>X</u>	<u>(N)</u>	<u>X</u>	<u>(N)</u>	<u>X</u>	<u>(N)</u>	<u>X</u>	<u>(N)</u>	<u>X</u>	<u>(N)</u>	<u>X</u>	<u>(N)</u>
Majority	43.3	(326)	45.2	(80)	42.7	(246)	42.2	(122)	41.7	(35)	38.0	(19)
Select Few	51.1	(385)	50.3	(89)	51.4	(296)	54.3	(157)	45.2	(38)	50.0	(25)
Don't Know	5.6	(42)	4.5	(8)	5.9	(34)	3.5	(10)	13.1	(11)	12.0	(6)
	100.0%	(753)	100.0%	(177)	100.0%	(576)	100.0%	(289)	100.0%	(84)	100.0%	(50)
Sig.	Non-Agri. ns	Landless ns	Landed ns	Sig. = ns.			Sig. = ns.			Sig. = ns.		

Question: Do you think that among public servants the majority do not have the preparation necessary for their job or the majority does have the preparation or there are some who do and some who do not have the preparation?

Prepared	29.6	(223)	31.1	(55)	29.2	(168)	39.8	(115)	39.3	(33)	38.0	(19)
Some prepared	53.7	(404)	50.8	(90)	54.5	(314)	21.5	(62)	17.9	(15)	14.0	(7)
Not prepared	10.1	(76)	9.6	(17)	10.2	(59)	33.9	(98)	25.0	(21)	28.0	(14)
Don't Know	6.6	(50)	8.5	(15)	6.1	(35)	4.8	(14)	17.9	(15)	20.0	(10)
	100.0%	(753)	100.0%	(177)	100.0%	(576)	100.0%	(289)	100.0%	(84)	100.0%	(50)
Tau c	.07				Sig. = ns.			Sig. = ns.			Sig. = ns.	
Sig.	.001	ns	ns	Sig. = ns.			Sig. = ns.			Sig. = ns.		

Question: Do you think that the majority of public employees get their jobs because they have the necessary preparation or do they get them through friendships?

Preparation	26.7	(201)	27.1	(48)	26.6	(153)	27.7	(80)	32.1	(27)	30.0	(15)
Friendships	66.5	(501)	68.4	(121)	66.0	(380)	68.2	(197)	54.8	(45)	56.0	(28)
Don't Know	6.8	(51)	4.5	(8)	7.5	(43)	4.2	(12)	13.1	(11)	14.0	(7)
	100.0%	(753)	100.0%	(177)	100.0%	(576)	100.0%	(289)	100.0%	(84)	100.0%	(50)
Sig.	Non-Agri. ns	Landless ns	Landed ns	Sig. = ns.			Sig. = ns.			Sig. = ns.		

* Data from 1976 national probability sample.

TABLE VI.3. TRUST IN GOVERNMENT: SETTLERS / GENERAL POPULATION
(Continued)

Question: Do you think that among public servants there are many who are honest, there are some who are honest, or there are few who are honest?												
	<u>Reform sample</u>						<u>General Population (males only)*</u>					
	Entire Reform Sample		Atlantic Basin		Other Settlements		Non-Agricultural		Landless Peasants		Landed Peasants	
	<u>X</u>	<u>(N)</u>	<u>X</u>	<u>(N)</u>	<u>X</u>	<u>(N)</u>	<u>X</u>	<u>(N)</u>	<u>X</u>	<u>(N)</u>	<u>X</u>	<u>(N)</u>
Many honest	16.6	(125)	20.3	(36)	15.5	(89)	27.7	(80)	20.2	(17)	12.0	(6)
Some honest	44.6	(336)	42.9	(76)	45.1	(260)	42.6	(123)	35.3	(28)	48.0	(24)
Few honest	27.1	(204)	29.4	(52)	26.4	(152)	20.1	(58)	29.8	(25)	28.0	(14)
Don't know	11.7	(88)	7.3	(13)	13.0	(75)	9.7	(28)	16.7	(14)	12.0	(6)
	100.0%	(753)	100.0%	(177)	100.0%	(576)	100.0%	(289)	100.0%	(84)	100.0%	(50)
	Non-Agri.	Landless	Landed	Sig. = ns			Tau c = .13 Sig. (of Tau) = .003					
Tau c	.12											
Sig.	< .001	ns	ns									
Question: Do you think that the government does help you, hurts you, or neither helps nor hurts you?												
Helps	39.3	(296)	49.7	(88)	36.1	(208)	25.0	(74)	23.8	(20)	24.0	(12)
Neither	45.6	(343)	35.6	(63)	48.6	(280)	52.6	(152)	54.8	(46)	56.0	(28)
Hurts	12.2	(92)	12.4	(22)	12.2	(70)	18.3	(53)	13.1	(11)	14.0	(7)
Don't know	2.9	(22)	2.3	(4)	.1	(18)	3.5	(10)	8.3	(7)	6.0	(3)
	100.0%	(753)	100.0%	(177)	100.0%	(576)	100.0%	(289)	100.0%	(84)	100.0%	(50)
	Non-Agri.	Landless	Landed	Tau c = .09 Sig. (of Tau) = .005			Sig. = ns		Sig. = ns			
Tau c	.13	.05	.03									
Sig.	< .001	.04	.05									
Question: Some say that government isn't interested in the problems of people like you. Others say that government is interested in the problems of people like you. What do you think?												
Interested	67.7	(510)	72.3	(128)	66.3	(382)	55.7	(161)	57.1	(48)	56.0	(28)
Not interested	27.0	(203)	24.3	(43)	27.8	(160)	37.7	(109)	34.5	(29)	32.0	(16)
Don't know	5.3	(40)	3.4	(6)	5.9	(34)	6.6	(19)	8.3	(7)	12.0	(6)
	100.0%	(753)	100.0%	(177)	100.0%	(576)	100.0%	(289)	100.0%	(84)	100.0%	(50)
	Non-Agri.	Landless	Landed	Sig. = ns			Sig. = ns		Sig. = ns			
Tau c	.11	.06										
Sig.	< .001	.04	ns									

*Data from 1976 National Probability Sample. The significance test reported between the columns "non-agricultural" and "landless peasants" is a test of the difference between the non-agricultural respondents on the one hand, and the landless and landed peasants on the other. The test reported between the last two columns is a test of the difference between the landed and landless peasants only.

how much they thought the government misspent the money that people pay in taxes. The item, as can be seen, is deliberately skewed in the negative direction. That is, the respondents were not asked whether or not the government misspent tax money, but how much it misspent. This was done because it was assumed that if it had been put in the neutral phraseology many people would have tried to "escape" from criticizing the government in a very sensitive area. As can be seen in the first panel of Table VI.3, nearly half of the respondents in the reform sample thought that the government misspends a lot of tax money. This was almost identical to the percentage of respondents in the non-agricultural, general population who felt that the government was misspending tax money. However, as shown on the table, a much larger percentage of the non-agricultural components of the general population felt that the government was misspending only a little tax money, and therefore the reform beneficiaries are statistically significantly more likely to feel that the government wastes money than are the non-agricultural respondents of the population as a whole.

The landed and landless peasants of the general population were slightly less critical of government spending of tax money; however, the difference is very small. Moreover, the high non-response rates among the landed and landless peasants make the interpretation of

these differences rather difficult. For example, if the non-respondents are eliminated from the landless peasant subset of the general population, fully 71 percent of the respondents who answered this item felt that the government misspent a lot of tax money, whereas only 54 percent of the landed peasants who provided a response to this item felt that way. These responses are more in concert with what one would have anticipated, namely, that landless peasants would be less trusting in government than landed peasants, but the non-response rate cautions against drawing this conclusion.

A comparison of the Atlantic Basin settlers with others reveals that the former are significantly less trusting in government. Many more Atlantic Basin settlers than others agree that the government misspends a lot of tax money (62 percent vs. 44 percent). Another perspective is derived from these data by comparing them with the 1976 national election study conducted by the University of Michigan. In that investigation it was found that 74 percent of the respondents had stated that the government wastes a lot of tax money, a figure far higher than encountered in the Costa Rican data.

The second panel in Table VI.3 asks the respondent how often he believes he can trust the government to do the right thing. It was found that among the general population, non-agricultural respondents were significantly more likely to trust the government than the landed or

landless peasants. That is, contrasting the peasantry with the non-agricultural sector of the society, the peasantry is more distrustful of government. There was, however, no statistically significant difference between the landed and landless peasant component of the general population.

Looking at the reform sample, it is found that 11 percent of the respondents thought they could trust the government almost always, a figure which is somewhat lower, unexpectedly, than that for the landed or landless peasants of the general population. However, this finding is contradicted by the fact that fewer reform beneficiaries thought they could trust the government "almost never," than could peasants in the general population. It was found that 33 percent of the reform beneficiaries thought they could trust the government almost never, whereas 42 percent of the landless peasants and 36 percent of the landed peasants felt so negatively about the system of government. A comparison of the reform beneficiaries with the landless peasants finds the former significantly more trusting in government, whereas there is no significant difference between them and the landed peasants. Hence, on this item, the reform beneficiaries express levels of trust that are indistinguishable from those of the landed peasants.

The comparisons with the Atlantic Basin settlers reveal once again significantly higher levels of distrust there. More of the Atlantic Basin settlers feel that they can almost never trust the government to do the right thing than do those elsewhere. At the same time, it is clear that the reform beneficiaries are not as trusting of government as the non-agricultural parts of the general population. This conforms to the anticipated finding that the peasantry, even those who had received land from the government, are less trusting of government than those who live in non-agricultural sectors.

The third question in Table VI.3 asks the respondents to what extent they think that the government is interested in resolving the problems of the majority of Costa Ricans. On this item, there was no "intermediate" category, therefore the respondents were forced to choose between the trusting and distrusting response. A little over half of the reform respondents felt that the government was interested primarily in the problems of a "select few." There was no significant difference in the degree to which Atlantic Basin beneficiaries responded this way compared to other beneficiaries, nor was there any significant difference between the non-agricultural respondents and the peasantry, or between the landless peasants and the landed peasants. Finally, no significant difference was found between the reform beneficiaries as a whole and the various

components of the general population. Hence, in Costa Rica, whether you are a reform beneficiary, a peasant or a non-peasant, it appears that public opinion is about evenly divided on the issue of whether or not the government is interested in the problems of the majority of the people as opposed to those of only a few.

For comparative purposes it is worth noting that in the United States in 1976, 66 percent of the voting age population felt that the government is only interested in a few big interests, a percentage notably higher than found in Costa Rica.

Somewhat more negative opinion is expressed regarding the preparation of public officials. Panel 4 of Table VI.3 asks whether or not the respondent thinks that the majority of public officials are sufficiently prepared for their jobs. It was found that among the reform beneficiaries, somewhat less than a third felt that they were prepared, whereas among the general population somewhat more than a third felt that they were prepared. However, this finding is balanced by the fact that many more reform beneficiaries selected the intermediate category "some prepared" in contrast to the general population, and only 10 percent of the reform beneficiaries felt that the majority of public servants were not prepared in contrast to 34 percent of the non-agricultural population who said officials were not prepared. Overall, then, the reform beneficiaries are

significantly more assured of the preparation of public officials than is the general population.

There was no significant difference between the Atlantic Basin and other respondents. The data on the peasant subsets of the general population are more difficult to interpret since the missing data on these items amount to nearly one-fifth of the sample.

The next item in the survey, reported in panel 5 of Table VI.3, asked the respondents to state their opinion as to whether public employees got their jobs because they were prepared or whether they got them through friendships. Approximately two-thirds of the reform beneficiaries and the non-agricultural components of general population thought that people got jobs in Costa Rica through friendships. There was no significant difference between the Atlantic Basin and other settlements, nor were there any differences between the non-agricultural and peasant components of the general population. Therefore, there seems to be rather consistent opinion on this item.

Respondents were asked to what extent they thought public servants were honest. As is shown in panel 6 of Table VI.3, the non-agricultural general population respondents are significantly more likely to feel that public servants were honest than are those in the reform sample. Over a quarter of the non-agricultural respondents

felt that the public servants were honest, while less than one-fifth of the reform sample felt this way. It is also worthy of note that the non-agricultural respondents in the general population were significantly more likely to feel that public servants were honest than were the peasant parts of that sample. Surprisingly, however, the landless peasants were somewhat more likely to feel that the government officials were honest than were the landed peasants. The peasant portions of the general sample, however, have attitudes much like the reform sample. That is, similar numbers of peasants in the general population estimated that the public servants were honest as compared to the reform beneficiary sample.

The last two questions in the trust in government series differ in substance from all the ones which preceded them. These items asked the respondents to comment on the government's relationship directly with them or with people in the same work situation. The other items asked the respondent to comment on issues with which he may have had very little experience. For example, the previous questions asked the respondents about government honesty and preparation of public servants. Therefore, these last two items are perhaps the best indicators of the respondent's attitude toward the way he feels government is behaving. It is particularly noteworthy, therefore, that the results of these items are different from the ones presented above: on

these two items, a significantly higher percentage of reform beneficiaries respond in a trusting fashion as compared to the general population.

Looking at the next-to-the-last panel on Table VI.3, one sees responses as to whether or not the government helps or hurts the respondent, or whether it neither helps nor hurts him. It was found that nearly two-fifths (39 percent) of the beneficiaries felt that the government helped them, in contrast to one-quarter (26 percent) of the general population's non-agricultural respondents feeling this way. Furthermore, the percentage of the non-agricultural general population which felt that the government hurts them was higher than the percentage among the reform beneficiaries. Moreover, the reform beneficiaries are also significantly more likely to feel that the government helps them than are either the landless peasants or the landed ones.

It is also interesting to note that on no previous item on which the respondent had three possible choices was the percentage of the respondents in the most positive category so high. This would appear to indicate that on this item, the reform beneficiaries were very positive. For example, it is worth comparing the responses on this item with the question regarding the preparation of public servants. It is found that fully 10 percent more of the reform beneficiaries responded with the most positive response on the "government helps" item as compared to the "public

officials prepared" item, whereas among the general population nearly 15 percent less of the general population responded with the most positive response on the "helps" item compared to the "preparation" item. Hence, it is not the wording of the item itself which is altering the responses. Rather, the respondents appear to be reacting directly to the content of the item. In the case of the reform beneficiaries, the respondents are indicating that they feel fairly strongly that the government is helpful. The responses to the next item support this contention.

The final question of Table VI.3 asks whether or not the respondents think that the government is interested in the problems of people like themselves, or whether they think it is not interested. As can be seen, over two-thirds (68 percent) of the reform beneficiaries felt that the government was interested in the problems of people like themselves, whereas only slightly over half of the general population (56 percent) felt this way, a difference which is statistically significant.

The reform beneficiaries were also significantly more likely to respond that the government is interested in them than were the landless peasants. The very small N's among the landed peasants prevented the differences here from becoming significant, since the differences between the landed and landless peasants were not significant. Comparisons with previous items indicate the dramatically

different nature of the responses of this item. On no previous item in which there were only two choices was the positive response selected by such a large percentage of the beneficiaries. The third question on Table VI.3 saw 43 percent of the beneficiaries choosing the positive response, and the fifth item on Table VI.3 found only 27 percent of the respondents choosing this item. Indeed, on no other item of the entire series of trust in government questions was such a high percentage of respondents found selecting the positive response. While this is also true of the general population, the fact that the reform beneficiaries significantly exceeded even those responses indicates once again the higher trust level among the beneficiaries.

Two final points need to be made on these last two items before an explanation is offered. First, among the general population no significant differences were found between the non-agricultural/landless/landed peasants. On the next-to-the-last item, the one referring to whether the government hurts or helps the respondent, there was a significant difference among the reform beneficiaries, the higher percentage of Atlantic Basin respondents (50) selecting the positive response as compared to the other settler respondents (36 percent). This difference was significant. On the last item, a higher percentage of the Atlantic Basin beneficiaries responded in a positive fashion, although the difference was not significant.

These last two items indicate that on those issues where the respondents have some direct experience, their attitude toward the government is much more favorable than is that of the general population. The most probable explanation for this finding is that the reform beneficiaries have had favorable direct contact with a government assistance program, namely, the land reform program. Apparently, they have concluded that the government is generally interested in assisting them in their efforts to secure a better life. This conclusion is tempered somewhat by the fact that many of the respondents did not select the "helps" response on the next-to-the-last item, but it must be recognized that these items were quite general and did not refer to the land reform program in particular. That is, it was a general question about whether or not the government helps or hurts the respondent. Therefore, the respondent may have been thinking about the government programs globally, rather than about the reform program in particular. He may, therefore, have been tempering his evaluation of the reform program with dissatisfaction with other programs such as the public education system, road construction, health care, etc. The information presented in the fourth chapter of this study indeed revealed very positive attitudes toward the reform program itself. It would be appropriate to conclude that

the reform program appears to have helped increase the levels of trust in government among the reform beneficiaries, exceeding those of the general population, at least on those items where the individuals have had personal experience.

Diffuse Support

The results of the trust in government items presented above may have been quite disturbing to many readers. That is, it may have come as some surprise that such a large percentage of the reform beneficiaries, as well as the general population, should reflect such negative attitudes toward the government. For example, only 11 percent of the reform beneficiaries felt that the government could be trusted almost always to do the right thing, and less than a third of the reform beneficiaries thought that government officials were prepared, or received their positions because of their preparation rather than through friendships. Such findings might lead one to the conclusion that just because many respondents, both reform beneficiaries and the general population, responded rather negatively on these items, they were reflecting low levels of diffuse support. This is an erroneous conclusion to draw in the light of recent research, which has shown that the trust in government items, although they have been widely used now for over twenty years, tend to exaggerate the extent of negative feelings toward the system of government (Muller, Jukam and

Seligson, 1982)). They seem to be tapping attitudes which can be classified as "ritualistic negativism." Many of the items dealt with in Table VI.3 express commonly heard sayings of disgruntlement among the population. They do not necessarily imply that the respondents are rejecting the system of government in favor of some other. In order to measure those feelings, it is necessary to turn to items which more directly tap attitudes toward the system of government.

A series of four items, reported in Table VI.4, attempt to reflect attitudes toward the system of government in a more direct manner, avoiding ritualistic negativism. On these items, it is found that negative attitudes toward government are much less frequently expressed by the respondents. Unfortunately, no data currently exist for comparison with the general population. The first item on Table VI.4 asks the respondents whether there are many things about their form of government in which they can take pride, or whether there are not many such things. It is found that among the reform beneficiaries, well over half (57 percent) feel that there are many things of which they can be proud. Once again the pattern of higher support for the system of government is found among the Atlantic Basin beneficiaries, when 61 percent of those respondents felt that there were many things they could be proud of. However, this difference is not statistically significant.

TABLE VI.4. DIFFUSE SUPPORT FOR THE SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT

Question: With which of the following opinions are you in agreement?
 "I am very proud of many things about our form of government."
 "I can't find many things about our form of government to take pride in."

	Entire Reform Sample		Atlantic Basin		Other Settlements	
	<u>X</u>	<u>(N)</u>	<u>X</u>	<u>(N)</u>	<u>X</u>	<u>(N)</u>
Proud	57.4	(432)	60.5	(107)	56.4	(325)
Not proud	35.5	(267)	36.7	(65)	35.1	(202)
Don't know	7.2	(54)	2.8	(5)	8.3	(49)
	100.0%	(753)	100.0%	(177)	100.0%	(576)

Sig. = ns

Question: Some people think that a change in our form of government is needed in order to solve the problems which exist. Do you think that a large change is necessary, some change, or no change?

	Entire Reform Sample		Atlantic Basin		Other Settlements	
	<u>X</u>	<u>(N)</u>	<u>X</u>	<u>(N)</u>	<u>X</u>	<u>(N)</u>
No change	29.0	(218)	31.6	(56)	28.1	(162)
Some change	37.8	(285)	30.5	(54)	40.1	(231)
Large change	26.8	(202)	30.5	(54)	25.7	(148)
Don't know	6.4	(48)	7.3	(13)	6.1	(35)
	100.0%	(753)	100.0%	(177)	100.0%	(576)

Sig. = ns

Question: Some people say that our form of government and politics is good for the country; others think that it is bad. Without talking about a specific party, in general, do you think that the present system of government and politics is good, or is bad for the country?

	Entire Reform Sample		Atlantic Basin		Other Settlements	
	<u>X</u>	<u>(N)</u>	<u>X</u>	<u>(N)</u>	<u>X</u>	<u>(N)</u>
Good	57.5	(433)	51.4	(91)	59.4	(342)
Neither	23.5	(177)	22.0	(39)	24.0	(138)
Bad	14.5	(109)	23.2	(41)	11.8	(68)
Don't know	4.5	(34)	3.4	(6)	4.9	(28)
	100.0%	(753)	100.0%	(177)	100.0%	(576)

Tau c = .09 Sig. (of Tau) = .003

The second item on Table VI.4 asks the respondent to what extent he feels that changes are necessary in the form of government. As can be seen, slightly over one-quarter of the reform beneficiaries felt that a large change was necessary, whereas three-quarters felt that only some, or no change was needed. Curiously, the Atlantic Basin beneficiaries were slightly more likely to suggest that a large change is necessary, but at the same time a slightly higher percentage of the reform beneficiaries stated that no change was necessary. These somewhat ambiguous findings are not statistically significant, and therefore lead to no definitive conclusions.

The third item on Table VI.4 asks respondents whether they think that the form of government and politics is good for the country, bad for the country, or neither. Only 15 percent of the respondents felt that the system of government was bad for the country. However, a somewhat higher percent of the Atlantic beneficiaries (23 percent) felt that the system was bad for the country. This response is at variance with the response just reported, it should be noted.

The final item on Table VI.4 taps diffuse support toward the system of elections. Slightly more than a quarter of the respondents felt that it is not important to pay attention to election campaigns, and Atlantic Basin beneficiaries were somewhat more likely to suggest this.

TABLE VI.4. DIFFUSE SUPPORT FOR THE SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT
(Continued)

Question: Some say that it's a good idea to pay attention to election campaigns because it is important that the best candidate wins. Others say it is not important if the people elect one candidate or the other because nothing changes.

	Entire Reform Sample		Atlantic Basin		Other Settlements	
	<u>X</u>	<u>(N)</u>	<u>X</u>	<u>(N)</u>	<u>X</u>	<u>(N)</u>
Elections important	68.5	(516)	61.0	(108)	70.8	(408)
Not important	28.3	(213)	36.2	(64)	25.9	(149)
Don't know	3.2	(24)	2.8	(5)	3.3	(19)
	100.0%	(753)	100.0%	(177)	100.0%	(576)

Tau b = .10 Sig. (of Tau) = .004

This difference was statistically significant. On this item and the one that preceded it, lower levels of diffuse support are expressed by the Atlantic Basin beneficiaries than by other beneficiaries, a pattern different from previous items. No clear-cut explanation emerges from the data.

Summary and Conclusions

This chapter has explored feelings of political efficacy and political trust. It was found that the beneficiaries demonstrated significantly higher feelings of efficacy toward their local government than did non-settlers. It was also found that settlers expressed comparatively high levels of efficacy toward government bureaucrats.

There are strong indications that the reform beneficiaries have more positive attitudes toward their government than does the general population, although there are some exceptions to this pattern. Specifically, much higher levels of trust in government were found among the reform beneficiaries on two key items: the degree to which the government is helpful and the degree of interest the government has for its citizens. These items are important because they relate directly to the attention the individual feels he receives from government. It is clear that the beneficiaries believe very strongly that the government is

helpful and interested in their problems.

That Costa Rican reform beneficiaries show comparatively high levels of political efficacy and political trust has important implications for the long-term development of the settlements. Individuals with high trust and high efficacy, often referred to as "allegiant activists" in social science literature (Seligson, 1980d), are those who are most likely to participate in constructive, developmentally oriented community projects. These are individuals who feel that the government is responsive to their demands, and who also trust that government. ITCO's beneficiaries, therefore, are more likely to be active participants in community development programs. Evidence of this was seen in Chapter V.

VII. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This study has attempted to provide a picture of Costa Rica's land reform program as seen from the point of view of its beneficiaries. Although extensive data have been presented and the general outlines are clear, many questions remain to be answered. Some of these questions can be approached by further analysis of the present data base, while others require the gathering of additional data. In this concluding chapter a summary of the main findings will be presented. Policy implications of the research then will be discussed. Finally, suggestions will be made for additional analysis and data collection as a guide to future study.

Summary of Main Findings

The findings presented in the preceding chapters cannot all be summarized here. Only those findings of wider interest are noted.

The major achievement of the program revealed by the study is the high level of satisfaction expressed by the beneficiaries. Few governmental programs are received as positively by their beneficiaries as this one has been. Programs directed at the poor in the United States rarely receive such strong support (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973). Indeed, even in programs noted for their success, it is unusual to find such strong support among the participants (Mazmanian and Nienaber, 1979:173).

Most research on agrarian reform has focused exclusively on technical and economic issues to the exclusion of an analysis of beneficiary satisfaction, participation, feelings of efficacy, trust, etc. It is the latter factors which have been the primary focus of the present study. One study, however, which did look directly at some of these attitudinal impacts of the reform progress was conducted in Colombia (Egginton and Ruhl, 1974). In that study it was found that the beneficiaries did not feel greater levels of economic satisfaction when compared to non-beneficiaries. In addition, it was found that the beneficiaries exhibited less trust in the political system than non-beneficiaries. Finally, however, it was found that there was a substantial increase in future expectations.

As has been shown, the Costa Rican reform has produced very different and much more positive results. Although the data are not precisely comparable, the Costa Rican beneficiaries have a much more positive reaction to the reform than do their Colombian counterparts. While these comparisons are too limited to permit drawing firm conclusions, they support the view that the Costa Rican program, with all its acknowledged limitations, is a success.

Other findings in this study lead to similarly optimistic conclusions. It was found that the respondents had a high sense of political efficacy and political trust.

Such attitudes provide the foundation for more active involvement in local development programs. Additional evidence supports this contention. For example, the settlers demonstrated very high levels of interpersonal trust and positive attitudes toward group cooperation.

Behavioral indicators of cooperation revealed that the settlers were strongly oriented toward solving problems at the local level. Moreover, they were very optimistic that local self-help activities would bear fruit.

The most frequent form of participation involved cooperatives. It was found that the majority of the settlers participated in cooperatives, compared to less than 10 percent for the population of Costa Rica as a whole. Cooperative participation was found to be particularly high in the smaller settlements. Apparently, the intimacy and the frequency of face-to-face contact encourages cooperative participation in the smaller settlements.

The Costa Rican reform program is, however, not without its negative aspects. Two major ones merit mention in this concluding overview. First, although the settlers earn more than their landless counterparts, they do not live well in any absolute sense. Far too many are without of basic services (water, electricity, plumbing, etc.). Moreover, compared to other Costa Ricans, even landless peasants tend to have more material comforts. Second, the Atlantic Basin

settlers emerged as a more discontented lot. Numerous measures of political and interpersonal trust, group cooperativeness, cooperative participation, relative deprivation and dissatisfaction with the settlement, showed greater negativism among the Atlantic Basin settlers compared to those settlers living in other regions of the country. While the differences were not unusually great and while there were a few variables on which the Atlantic Basin settlers fared better than other settlers, the persistent, statistically significant pattern of negativism in the Atlantic Basin is clear.

Recommendations

A series of policy recommendations emerge from this analysis. It is abundantly clear from the data presented in this study that, at least up to 1976, the Costa Rican agrarian reform program has been a great success among those affected by it. In light of this central finding one hesitates to make recommendations that would substantially alter the ITCO formula, which has permitted such a successful program. However, there are components of the program which have achieved markedly lower rates of success than some others and in those there is room for improvement.

The most serious problem identified by the research was the limited economic progress that has been made by the beneficiaries. Although the data are admittedly

fragmentary, there are several signs that the beneficiaries are not making sufficiently rapid progress toward breaking out of poverty.

What can account for this limited economic progress? Going back over the data on income presented in Chapter II and correlating it with a number of other variables analyzed in the study, the following conclusions emerge. First, incomes increase the longer the settlers reside on the settlements ($r = .15$, $\text{sig} < .001$). Hence, one explanation for the limited economic growth is a temporal one; over time settlers can expect to earn higher incomes. Second, it was found that cooperative participation increases income ($r = .11$, $\text{sig} < .004$). Third, incomes increase as education increases ($r = .08$, $\text{sig} < .02$).

Taken together, these findings suggest three policy directions. First, new settlers are the ones who need increased institutional support. Second, added emphasis needs to be placed on cooperative formation and participation. Neither of these suggestions is novel, for, basically, they conform to the program lines established for the new Atlantic Basin settlements. However, as will be noted below, there is reason to question whether such a policy will be fully effective. The third finding suggests that ITCO embark upon an adult educational program, probably in cooperation with the Ministry of Education, to improve the educational levels of the beneficiaries.

Looking first at the problem of limited education, it is clear that all too many of the beneficiaries are in need of assistance in this area. As shown in Table II.15, one-fifth of all beneficiaries have had no formal education whatsoever, and nearly half (48 percent) have had less than a third-grade education, the minimum level for functional literacy. Moreover, ITCO peasants are as likely to be without formal education as the country's population of landless peasants, an indication that little or no effort has been made to improve the educational preparation of the beneficiaries.

Few agrarian reform programs can expect to succeed fully in rural Costa Rica when the participants are illiterate. Agrarian development today relies upon the application of fairly sophisticated technology. Moreover, effective participation in cooperatives virtually requires literacy. With one-fifth of the reform beneficiaries illiterate it can be expected that technological innovation and cooperative development will both be hampered.

The Atlantic Basin project incorporates a heavy emphasis on technological innovation. The agricultural products to be produced in the new settlements are likely to be profitable only if the technology is applied effectively. The low levels of education among a large proportion of the beneficiaries will seriously hamper these plans. It is

obvious, therefore, that ITCO needs to improve the levels of education during the training and orientation process. Illiterate and semi-literate beneficiaries should be given intensive courses in reading and writing. Since literacy training for adults works best when the element of fear and embarrassment is eliminated, one-to-one training is a necessity. Perhaps students from the local high schools could volunteer to conduct these classes. However it is done, it must be done early in the training process, since the success of future training will depend on it.

Since literacy training, even when done in an intensive fashion, takes several months, it will be impossible to conduct such training in the ITCO training centers. Rather, the literacy instruction should go on prior to settlement, if at all possible. In cases where this will not be possible, it is very important that it be initiated at the outset of the settlement process.

It should be emphasized that the goal of one hundred percent functional literacy among beneficiaries is not a difficult one to achieve, nor is it costly. Cuba, Nicaragua, and Ecuador have all dramatically reduced illiteracy through massive campaigns. If those campaigns, which coped with national illiteracy rates many times higher than those found in Costa Rica, have been successful, then the elimination of illiteracy among ITCO's several thousand settlers is an achievable goal.

The importance of cooperative participation in economic advancement of the settlers raises the question to how such participation can be further stimulated. Findings reported in Chapter III in part answer the question. It was determined that the size of the settlement had a very strong influence on cooperative participation. Specifically, those settlements which have fifty to a hundred members provide a better environment for the stimulation of cooperative participation. Therefore, ITCO should consider forming smaller settlements. Since many land acquisitions are often made by expropriation of large farms it would be appropriate to consider subdividing these parcels into smaller units of fifty to sixty plots each.

Nonetheless, even if the above-mentioned policies are pursued, more dramatic changes would be needed if the standard of living of the beneficiaries is to be substantially increased. The correlations noted a weak relationship between income on the one hand and education, cooperative participation, and time worked on the settlement on the other; few settlers live very well. Indirectly, in spite of the successes of the program, few reform beneficiaries, even after five or ten years, manage to earn enough to live above the poverty line. While increased cooperative participation and education promise to be possible solutions, they alone are unlikely to alter the situation dramatically.

How can ITCO best achieve higher incomes for the settlers given the severe financial constraints under which the Institute, and Costa Rica in general, presently operate? It would appear that a more effective use of the human potential of the settlers is needed. The beneficiaries, it has been shown in this study, have a large reservoir of positive attitudes toward cooperation. Moreover, the beneficiaries have a positive attitude toward the reform program, the government and the great majority believe that they have become better off since joining the program. Under these circumstances, it would appear that a carefully designed program would find ready acceptance among the beneficiaries.

Over the past few years, it has been increasingly recognized that the success of rural development project depends crucially upon the active involvement of the participants of the program in both policy formulation and implementation. Programs that are imposed from above rarely are effective, even when those programs are designed with the best expert advice. All individuals, peasant and urbanite, rich and poor, are more likely to understand and support a program if they are involved in its formulation and implementation. This is particularly true in Costa Rica, which has a long-standing tradition of participatory democracy.

In Costa Rica, peasants have not often played a major role in policy formulation and implementation. Rather, peasants often learn after the fact about the nature of a particular project, long after their ideas could have any influence on the design. An earlier analysis of the titling program, conducted by the investigator (Seligson, 1981), revealed that many beneficiaries of the titling program were very poorly informed about the nature and goals of that program, and hence retained their suspicions of it. In some instances a clear lack of cooperation was detected. Informal interviews with the reform beneficiaries revealed some of the same complaints.

This study has not been designed to indicate ways in which the reform program now underway in the Atlantic Basin could be made more participatory. However, the project paper already contains some concrete proposals along these lines with respect to the community development component of the project. In the months to come, as the Atlantic Basin program proceeds, ideas for increasing participation should become concretized and, no doubt, will be discussed at length with the appropriate ITCO officials.

In conclusion, the Costa Rican agrarian reform, as seen through the eyes of its beneficiaries, is a valuable and positive program. Its full impact, however, is not yet been realized. Some of the findings and suggestions contained in this report may help achieve an even more satisfying outcome.

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