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RURAL DEVELOPMENT

participation review

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RURAL DEVELOPMENT

participation review

The Cornell Rural Development Participation Project*

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For a number of years, members of Cornell University's Rural Development Committee have been involved in the analysis of development issues surrounding topics of decentralized administration, rural local government, grassroots organization, local leadership and self-help efforts aimed at increasing the involvement of rural people in the programs and projects that affect their communities. These interests and the research they have led to provided a firm foundation for the committee to explore the complex conceptual dimensions and developmental possibilities inherent in the new notion of "rural development participation." This effort is funded by a cooperative agreement with USAID's Rural Administration and Development Office. During the first year of the project, several state-of-the-art papers have been published and members of the Cornell team have provided a wide range of technical support to field missions designing and implementing projects focused on issues of decentralization, local organization and popular participation. The purpose of this note is to describe the focus of the Cornell-USAID cooperative agreement, alert professionals to the project's publications, and briefly describe the kinds of applied assistance being provided to various AID missions.

Over the past few years, development specialists have expressed increasing concern over the lack of progress in altering the plight of the rural poor. This concern is based on the realization that one-quarter of the world's people still live in conditions of insecurity and privation on incomes of less than $100 in the rural areas of Africa, Asia and Latin America. The growing gap between rich and poor nations and regions of the world is mirrored by a similar divergence between the well-off and the impoverished peoples within most less developed countries. The pressing task of Development Decade II is to begin to reverse both trends. Towards this end, some new approaches have been proposed, among them an effort to get greater participation in rural development activities by those who should benefit from them.

Because of accumulated experience suggesting that projects are likely to be more successful in the long run when local officials, organizations and people are involved in design, decision-making, implementation and evaluation activities, some governments and many international development agencies have made decentralization, local organization involvement, and participation in the development process by the poor majority one of the central concerns of their official policies. One of the best known is what has come to be called in the American aid community the "Congressional Mandate." This 1973 amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of the United States specifically illustrates the focus on participation by noting: "Decisions concerning the activities to be carried out are (to be) made, preferably, by those benefited (for example, the poor), and if not, at least with effective consultation and substantial acceptance by those benefited." Similarly, several United Nations General Assembly declarations call for "the active participation of all elements of society, individually or through associations, in defining and achieving the common goals of development," urging UN projects to promote "the adoption of measures to ensure the effective participation of all elements of society in the preparation and execution of programmes of economic and social development." And, speaking for the World Bank, Robert McNamara noted that there is greater chance for rural development success if national governments and projects "provide for popular participation, local leadership, and decentralization of authority."

Depending on one's perspective, the importance of local involvement and participation in rural development projects has either just been discovered or rediscovered. We believe there are major distinctions between the older style of community development and this new one. While concerned with the

*An earlier version of this note appeared in January 1978 in *International Agriculture*, a newsletter of the New York State College of Agriculture and Life Sciences at Cornell University.

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The Rural Development Participation Review (RDPR) is published by the Rural Development Committee (RDC) of Cornell University. It is funded by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) through a Cooperative Agreement on Participation and Rural Development between the Office of Rural Development of AID and the RDC.

The objectives of the RDPR are to share knowledge and ideas on rural development participation, to help develop a network of people interested in the subject, and to encourage and facilitate to the maximum extent possible the exchange of information and views between them.

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identification of community "felt needs" and the mobilization of local self-help resources through democratic means, the principal goal of community development was to stabilize the rural sector while national development took place. Moreover, it focused on public goods and welfare more than production, giving little attention to the rural poor or equitable distribution of benefits. To some extent it aimed at promoting stable and responsible local institutions, a focus that inadvertently led to the acceptance of local power structures as given and the domination of activities and benefits by local elites. The new notion is less vague about what "ending rural poverty" means. Its targets are the large number of rural poor and the structural or institutional constraints that limit their productivity and promote inequity. The new participatory strategy aims at complementing specific development projects, such as range management activities, cooperative marketing schemes, or irrigation improvement efforts, rather than becoming a large heavily funded national bureaucracy with local level field agents, as was the case with community development. As such it seeks as its main goals the reinforcement of productivity and welfare objectives of rural development activities, the promotion of wide and equitable distribution of benefits flowing from those activities, the narrowing of the relative income gap between rich and poor, and the mobilization of awareness among local government units, grassroots organizations and common people that they can act effectively to control their own destiny.

Whether this new development thrust is seen as old or new wine, more and more activities have been undertaken to bolster the capabilities of international assistance agencies to promote local involvement in their development programs. The United Nations, the World Bank, USAID, other donors, and private voluntary organizations have undertaken studies concerned with decentralization and participation and begun to design rural development projects insuring more involvement by those communities affected.

Of all the ways in which local involvement can be increased, the greatest uncertainties and confusions surround the participatory approach. Specifically, there is little agreement on what participation is or on its theoretical or applied relationships to processes of development in different environmental or societal contexts. Hence, while arguing that participation must be linked to issues of local government, organization and leadership, and continuing to work on those related topics, members of the Cornell team decided to give extensive emphasis in the early years of the project to "rural development participation." This effort has led to two major studies, several special studies, and the undertaking of field work in a number of countries.

We believe considerable progress has been made in clarifying the conceptual dimensions of rural development participation and synthesizing the basic literature in that area. This is reflected in two publications: *Rural Development Participation: Concepts and Measures for Project Design, Implementation and Evaluation,* published in 1977, and *Feasibility and Application of Rural Development Participation: A State of the Art Paper,* published in 1979. Both of these studies, as well as a working bibliography, *Participation at the Local Level,* are available from the Rural Development Committee.

Over the next few years the project will publish special studies on women's participation, private voluntary organizations and local involvement, *animation rurale,* decentralization, and other related topics. Beyond this, efforts are being made to link through workshops and newsletters academics and practitioners focusing on the relationships between rural development and decentralization, local organizations, grassroots leadership, self-help efforts and popular participation.

Building on these initial studies, as well as such earlier efforts as the committee's *Local Organization for Rural Development: Analysis of Asian Experience* (1974) and *Training and Research for Extended Rural Development in Asia* (1975), the project's team is attempting to conceptualize better the notion of rural development participation; to develop indicators of its various dimensions and contexts; to reflect on the extent to which participation should be treated as either an end in its own right or a means to achieve other ends through mobilization of people and resources; to analyze the relationship between participation and the distribution of power and authority, both within a project setting and in the broader society; to understand the complex relationship between local government, governmental decentralization, and participation; to study the effects of participation on development benefits and spread effects; to develop strategies for appropriate intervention in order to engender or encourage participation in the development process; to analyze strategies for the kinds of interventions that are suitable or feasible, given societal or project constraints; to expand generally the understanding of causes and consequences of participation in development; and to apply this emerging knowledge base to real world problems through case studies and applied consulting activities. These products will be based on accumulated experience and knowledge generated by intensive interaction with Cornell faculty and graduate students, workshops drawing experts together to discuss specific topics, research produced by a core of interdisciplinary scholars supported by the project and in residence at the Center for International Studies, and field experiences flowing from involvement in efforts by particular USAID missions to design and implement participatory strategies in their rural development efforts.

This latter source of knowledge is particularly important. During the next few years the project seeks to undertake special field studies and applied consulting that both serves AID missions and promotes increased understanding of local involvement and strategies for promoting it. Already team members have been engaged in efforts in Botswana, Egypt, Indonesia, Jamaica, Tunisia, and the Yemen Arab Republic. Future work in other countries is emerging. Aside from the central purpose of bringing the Cornell team's insights and expertise to AID professionals working with local people, organizations and governments, it is hoped that experience in analyzing real problems and doing field studies about them will greatly expand our understanding of local involvement strategies.

Examples of the kinds of applied field work the project team hopes to address are: promoting the use of traditional water users organizations in irrigation canal or community water pump projects; promoting local identification of public works needs and involving local people in the decision, implementation and evaluation processes of such projects; promoting the participation of small-scale farmers in plant breeding research activities; or assisting local government reorganization efforts in developing policies that increase the possibilities for grassroots involvement by rural people. Numerous such examples could be given, because the potential for contribution of decentralization, local organization, and participatory strategies to most rural development projects is extremely large.

Those connected with the participation project are eager to work or communicate with interested scholars and practitioners who are working on the kinds of topics and problems just described. For further information, write or call the project director, Norman Uphoff, at 170 Uris Hall, Cornell University.

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Some Aspects of Peasant Organizations in South India

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In this article, we will focus on peasant organizations in the south Indian states of Kerala and Tamil Nadu and examine the impact of their activities on agrarian social structure.

Geographically, south India consists of two coastal strips and a plateau region. The coastal areas with their abundant water and good soil have paddy as the main crop, while the inland area, with less rain and poor soil, grows mainly millets. The concentration of particular crops in areas with particular characteristics has created certain intrinsic relationships between geography, cropping patterns and the social structure. Districts with large areas under paddy, like Thanjavur in Tamil Nadu, East Godovari, West Godavari and Krishna in Andhra Pradesh, and Alleppy and Palghat in Kerala, are characterized by disproportionately large percentages of Scheduled Castes (Untouchables) in the population, landless agricultural laborers among workers, and tenants among cultivating households. On the other hand, in the dry districts, there is a greater proportion of cultivators among workers and a correspondingly lesser proportion of landless agricultural laborers, Scheduled Castes and tenants. It is generally in the former group of districts that peasant organizations have emerged in south India. We will examine first Kerala and then Tamil Nadu, taking up in each case organizations of landless laborers, tenants and cultivators in that order.

Kerala

Labor Unions

In 1939 the Communist Party of India (CPI) formed the Travancore Agricultural Laborers Union as a part of its overall strategy of building "transmission belts" which could be used to pass on its radical ideology to the masses and to create organizations which would serve as a base during a hopeful time of revolution. In the early stage, the activities of the union were aimed at indoctrinating laborers with radical ideology through study classes, dramas, poetry, public meetings, distribution of literature, etc. The first actual struggle came in 1941, focusing on demands for the regulation of working hours and the use of standard measures for paying wages; it included a strike as well. The first real success came in the 1952 agitation, leading to an increase in daily wages and an increase in the wage for harvesting from one-twelfth to one-eleventh of the crop. In the following year the union achieved a further increase in daily wages and the fixation of working hours. In 1954, the union conducted a struggle to compel certain large farmers to pay the agreed-upon wage rates. A year later a struggle was conducted to get the maintenance wage *(Theerpu)* increased. In 1957, strikes conducted in many parts of Alleppy District compelled the state government to grant the wages demanded by the union.

After 1957 there was rapid growth in union activity, which led to increases in daily wages, harvesting wages, reduction in hours worked, etc. An evaluation of the increase in the wage level between 1964-65 and 1969-70 indicated that during this six-year period, the real wage of agricultural laborers in Kuttanad region increased by 65.2 percent, while money wages increased by 140 percent. The harvesting wage increased from one-ninth of the harvested grain to one-fifth. Laborers also achieved some restriction in the right of farmers to employ laborers of their choice. With the Communist Party split in 1964 between Peking- and Moscow-oriented wings, it was the Peking faction or Communist Party of India (Marxist), known as the CPM, that picked up the established agricultural units in Kerala. In 1969 it formed a new statewide organization, the Kerala State Agricultural Laborers Union, with branches in each district. Apart from Alleppy, the largest membership of the union is in Palghat District where it increased from 11,000 in 1970 to 42,000 in 1973. Through agitations, this branch of the union achieved all the gains that the laborers had secured in Alleppy.

Even though labor unions are not as strong in other districts of Kerala as in Palghat and Alleppy, substantial gains have been made in the establishment of relatively high wage rates, regulated working hours, regularity of employment, etc.

Other political parties have also made attempts to form unions of agricultural laborers. The Moscow-oriented Communist Party of India, or CPI, formed a union in 1968 called the Kerala State Agricultural Laborers Federation, which gained some following in Alleppy and Palghat Districts.

Over the years the Indian National Congress (Congress) has made intermittent attempts to bring a section of the agricultural laborers under its fold; but it has not sustained these efforts. In 1971, it formed a statewide organization called the National Agricultural Laborers Federation, but this effort, too, has had little success. The endeavors of other parties have been even more feeble, leaving the CPM's Kerala State Agricultural Laborers Union as the dominant force in the agrarian field.

Tenants Associations

Tenancy was an important institution before independence in the Malabar region, where more than three-fourths of the cultivating households were tenants. Although the Malabar Karshaka Sangham (cultivators association) was formed as early as 1935, it did not become a powerful force with a large geographical base until 1957, when the state of Kerala was formed and the Communist ministry came into power. This enabled the Sangham to give expression to its tenurial demands and led to the enactment of the Kerala

Agrarian Relations Act, which liquidated tenancy by making tenants owners. The existence of a strong organization of tenants in rural areas prevented the eviction of tenants and takeover of their lands by landowners, as had happened in other Indian states in the wake of land reforms. These developments, along with subsequent enactment of radical tenurial legislation, transformed the erstwhile tenants into landowners. In Cannanore, Kozhikode and Palghat Districts, where more than three-fourths of the cultivating land was under tenancy in 1961, less than 10 percent was under tenancy by 1971. As might be imagined, the liquidation of tenancy made Karshaka Sangham a goalless organization, and soon it became a dormant body.

There was also a class aspect in the decline of the Karshaka Sangham. The tenants, now made landowners by the success of their CPM union, were unwilling to pass on a share of their benefits to the laborers through higher wages and improved working conditions. But the laborers, also organized by the CPM, began to conduct struggles against the farmers. In this changed situation, many farmers renounced their affiliation with the CPM and formed a new organization to safeguard their newly achieved interests.

The first important farmers' union began in 1958, with the formation of an association called the Upper Kuttanad Karshaka Sangham (Farmers' Organization). It started in an area dominated by small cultivators who belonged to the Christian and Nair communities, which were generally opposed to Communist agricultural labor activities.

The initiation of the Upper Kuttanad Karshaka Sangham encouraged farmers in the vicinity to face the challenges posed by labor unions and led to the formation of other local organizations. Anti-Communism brought these organizations together, and in 1963, a common organization called the All-Kuttanad Farmers' Organization was formed, which was not affiliated with any political party. This new organization extended assistance to the newly created landowners in Palghat District, helping them form their own Palghat Karshaka Samajam.

After 1967, Kerala was mostly under the rule of leftist political parties, led either by CPM or CPI. These governments adopted a pro-labor and sometimes anti-cultivator policy. In 1972, the government introduced the Kerala Agricultural Laborers Bill, which would provide for such matters as regularity of employment and an employer-financed provident fund for agricultural laborers. Farmers were perturbed with many provisions of the bill, and the All-Kuttanad Farmers' Organization and Palghat Karshaka Samajam organized a series of protest demonstrations in the state capital. Farmers realized that unless they acted as a strong pressure group, their views would go unheard. Therefore, a convention of farmer leaders was held in 1973, at which it was decided to form a federation of farmers' organizations not affiliated to any political party. With this a statewide organization of farmers, called the Kerala Karshaka Federation, came into existence. The federation organized its district committees in almost all districts and began its activities. It is an indication of the success of these measures that its president was inducted into the state cabinet in 1977 and given an important portfolio. The emergence of a powerful organization of farmers also influenced the state government to move slowly in implementing the Agricultural Laborers Act of 1973.

Tamil Nadu

Cultivation of paddy in Tamil Nadu is concentrated in the eastern belt, particularly in the Cauvery delta, with the remainder of the state devoted to dryland farming, principally millets. As in Kerala, the differences in the agrarian social structures of the paddy-growing delta areas and the millet-growing dry area are very sharp. It was in paddy-cultivating Thanjavur district, with its large concentration of tenants, Scheduled Castes and agricultural laborers, that peasant organizations first emerged in Tamil Nadu.

Labor Unions

The first organization of peasants in Thanjavur was started by Communist workers in Thanjavur District in 1939 under the title of the Share Croppers Movement. During this time political parties like the Indian National Congress and the Dravida Munneta Kazhagam were conducting agitations against untouchability and other forms of social oppression. Such activities created considerable awakening among agricultural laborers and other depressed sections of the society, which enabled the CPI to reach them with the message of unionization. The union's agitations led to the enactment of legislation which considerably mitigated tenurial problems.

By 1946 the union had gained three wage increases and had obtained an agreement from the farmers to give up such age-old practices as whipping laborers or making them drink solutions of cow dung or human excreta. In 1948 it was agreed that permanent farm servants could be fired only after payment of compensation—a sort of "severance pay." In the 1950s, the union split into separate laborers' and cultivators' organizations, with the latter taking a more conservative and largely dormant posture. For the laborers' union, progress continued, and in the mid-1960s agreements were made between the representatives of farmers and laborers granting further wage increases; since 1970, many more agreements have been negotiated. The cumulative effect of all this work is that agricultural laborers in Thanjavur now receive the highest wages in the whole of Tamil Nadu.

During this period the Communist Party also attempted to form unions of agricultural laborers in other parts of Tamil Nadu. It did achieve some following in the neighboring district of Tiruchirapalli, but in other areas, particularly in the dry districts, the party has not been able to organize. The Communist Party split of 1964 saw the Thanjavur union go to the CPI, and so the CPM then tried to found a union of its own, but with little success to date either in Thanjavur or in other districts of the state.

Other political parties have also tried to organize agricultural laborers under their leadership, but the main contenders here, the Dravida Munneta Kazhagam and the All India Anna Dravida Munneta Kazhagam, have made virtually no headway in their efforts.

Tenants Associations

Until 1956 the CPI had a joint organization of tenants and agricultural laborers, the Thanjavur Cultivators' Association. The enactment of Thanjavur Tenants and Pannaiyal Protection Act provided for security of tenure, regulation of rent and other aspects of labor-tenant relations. This enabled the association to achieve further improvements in the conditions of tenants (such as further reduction of rents and writing off of arrears of rent) without radicalism, and as in Kerala, this success transformed it into a passive association. Outside of the Thanjavur District, there are few tenants organizations.

Farmers Organizations

Substantial farmer organizations exist in two of Tamil Nadu's districts, Thanjavur and Coimbatore. Some of these organizations, such as the Thanjavur District Landowners Welfare Association or the Pasupatikovil Landowners Association, were formed to look after certain technical problems connected with agriculture and have had little to do with class relations, while others have been more directly connected to class concerns.

The development of tenants and laborers organizations and the enactment of a series of land reform acts stimulated farmers to organize themselves to protect their interests. An early association of importance was the Thanjavur District Farmers Association, which was formed in 1949 after a Communist insurrection in Thanjavur. After the suppression of insurrection and reestablishment of peaceful conditions, the association drifted to a stage of dormancy. In 1964 a new organization was formed under the name of Paddy Producers' Association. The stimulus for organizing the farmers this time was again the increasing activities of CPI.

The main objective of the association was to tackle strikes periodically conducted by agricultural laborers for obtaining higher wages. On such occasions, the association tried to organize farmers to jointly undertake agricultural operations and to meet Communist violence with violence. In one such conflict in 1968, it burnt to death 42 agricultural laborers and their family members. The criminal proceedings that followed led the association to disintegration. Thereafter, in 1973 the group was reorganized under the old name of Thanjavur District Farmers Association. Today it is emerging as the main centre of farmers' interests and is making endeavors to bring together various farmers organizations to present a common front to the government and the labor unions.

Other organizations, like Thanjavur District Landowning Farmers' Association, East Thanjavur Landowners Association, etc., are also concerned with the problem posed by agricultural laborers and successive enactment of land reform legislation. Thus far mutual antagonism of the organizational leaders who represent different castes is preventing the emergence of a unified body. But the increasing threat posed by laborers is bringing them together.

Coimbatore District is another centre where farmers have organized. In 1966, the farmers of Periyanayakapalayam and Sarkarsamipuram villages formed an organization to get certain irrigation facilities extended to their villages. It grew into a state organization called Tamil Nadu Agriculturists Association in 1973, and now the association is trying to organize its branches in all parts of the state.

The main objective of the association is to extract various concessions from government such as fixation of reasonable prices for agricultural commodities and adequate loan facilities for farmers. In 1968 and 1978, it conducted prolonged agitations demanding among other things a reduction in the rate of electricity used for agricultural work and the writing off of agricultural debts.

The Tamil Nadu Farmers Association is another organization of farmers that has emerged in Coimbatore and is trying to establish a statewide membership. Its promoters were some leaders of the former Swatantra Party which represented the interests of large farmers. The main objective of the organization is to improve the conditions of cultivators and agricultural laborers by obtaining better terms of trade for agriculture.

Impact on Social Structure

The activities of the peasant organizations have created change in many aspects of agrarian social structure, particularly in tenancy relations, labor-cultivator relations and *jajamani* relations in areas where they have been active.

Abolition of tenancy and transformation of tenants into landowners were important objectives of tenants associations. The Kerala Karshaka Sangham was the main force which compelled Kerala government to enact legislation liquidating tenancy. Even though the implementation of this legislation has been ineffective elsewhere in India, it has been very effective in Kerala, where tenancy as an institution has been eliminated for all practical purposes. The activities of peasants associations in Tamil Nadu have not succeeded in eliminating tenancy as an institution, but legislation has established fixity of tenure, regulation of rates and mode of payment of rent, etc. in Thanjavur District. A similar change is yet to occur in other parts of the state.

The relation between farmers and laborers in the past was structured within the caste framework. The institution of caste had its base in a system of cultural beliefs that were supported by economic and social forces. Communist activities eroded this belief in caste, making the laborers expect new patterns of labor-cultivator relations and motivating them to struggle for bringing about a new relationship. In most parts of Kerala, particularly in districts where laborers are effectively organized, the traditional relation between the cultivators and laborers has changed.

In Tamil Nadu, substantial change in labor-cultivator relations has occurred only in Thanjavur. In other areas

traditional customs, like the treatment of laborers as untouchables without the right to bargain for higher wages, continue to prevail.

Unionization has gone along with other structural changes, particularly in the patron-client or *jajamani* system, which held together the relations between farmers and the various service castes, like barbers, washermen, blacksmiths, carpenters and the like. With strong unions, this *jajamani* relation had almost disappeared in Kerala's Alleppy District; in parts of Thanjavur, where union activities were moderately strong, there was considerable disintegration in the institution. But in areas where peasant organizations have not emerged, there has been very little change in *jajamani* relations.

Conclusions

We have examined the social-ecological background in which peasant organizations have emerged, their main activities and achievements, and their impact on agrarian social structure. It was found that strong peasant organizations, particularly those of tenants and agricultural laborers, emerged only in certain districts like Thanjavur, Alleppy and Palghat which have a configuration of characteristics such as high incidence of tenancy and a larger-than-average proportion of agricultural laborers, particularly belonging to Scheduled Castes. Such a social structure seems to be a facilitating factor in the emergence of peasant organizations.

It was found that the peasants, at least in the areas within which the present paper deals, are sharply differentiated both in terms of their relation to land and their caste. While relation to land could be a universal criterion for social categorization, the process of formation of interest groups on that basis has been thwarted by the particularistic principle of caste. This force is preventing the emergence of a common organization of farmers in Thanjavur and the organization of agricultural laborers in many parts of Tamil Nadu and in some parts of Kerala. However, the process of modernization and radicalization has weakened the forces of caste particularism in certain areas, allowing members of different castes to come together.

The activities of peasant organizations, particularly those of agricultural laborers and tenants, have created considerable change in agrarian relations. In areas where laborers have organized and conducted struggles for advancing their interests, the traditional relation between farmers and laborers has changed. While the activities of tenant associations have led to the liquidation of tenancy in Kerala, in Thanjavur they have brought about a remarkable improvement in the rights and prerogatives of the tenants. Other aspects of traditional social structure, like the *jajamani* system, are also distintegrating in areas where peasant organizations have emerged. To sum up, the activities of peasant organizations have transformed the pattern of human relations from one that was structured within the framework of intercaste relations into a contractual relation structured within the framework of class relations and mutual antagonism.

Inside Public Bureaucracy: Empowering Managers to Empower Clients

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The advocacy of participation as a strategy to increase the flow of benefits to the rural and urban poor is fast becoming a cliche in the design and implementation of development projects. Numerous policies aimed at removing the structural and institutional constraints to the fulfillment of basic human needs in the Third World focus upon popular participation, localized leadership, and decentralized decision-making as central to the development process.

While some theorists, such as Paulo Freire and Denis Goulet, have advanced radical prescriptions for popular involvement, present-day political realities severely limit the widespread application of such approaches. For practical purposes, the availability of participatory opportunities for the majority in the developing world depends upon the extent to which national bureaucracies are willing and able to integrate participation into their current set of goals, functions, and procedures. This observation suggests that an effective approach to the use of participation must pay attention to the relationships among bureaucracies, bureaucrats, and clients.

A variety of research and empirical study has examined different mechanisms for creating the conditions considered necessary for people to participate effectively in programs that affect their lives. Of those investigations that have concentrated upon methods for bringing clients into the work of organizations with development objectives, few have considered the participation of those already within the organizational sphere: bureaucrat/managers. As a result, little or no attention has been paid to the connections between the degree of participation by organizational members in the organization and the degree of participation by clients. This article suggests the existence of direct links between these two groups, hypothesizing that if there is a low level of participation on the part of bureaucrat/managers within their own organization, then the level of involvement of clients/target groups in development programs administered by those bureaucrats is also likely to be low. In short, bureaucrat/managers who themselves feel powerless and uninvolved are unlikely to empower their clients. The discussion that follows provides a framework for conceptualizing these links.

Bureaucracies are designed to solve

complex problems that are beyond the capabilities of any single individual. By applying the principles of hierarchy, division of labor, formalized procedures and recruitment by merit, bureaucracies seek to maximize anticipated, predictable behavior that can be coordinated to achieve organizational goals efficiently. These principles also result in some unanticipated, but also predictable, behavior which can be dysfunctional. But the important point is that similar structures (defined as recurrent organizational patterns of communication and interaction) tend to produce similar behaviors.

Reinforcing this dynamic are the role orientations of the bureaucrats who work within the organization. Bureaucratic structures affect the socialization process that eventually leads organization members to internalize the norms of bureaucracy. Bureaucrat/managers develop a self-image consonant with the organizational environment in which they function; and this phenomenon further strengthens the link between structures and behaviors.

Since all organizations interact with their environments, these role orientations focus not only on appropriate behavior within the bureaucracy, but they also carry prescriptions for behavior with regard to the outside world. This factor is especially important in public administration where the nature

A Framework for Examining the Relationship between Managers' Participation within Organizations and Possibilities for Client Participation

Characteristics of Organizational Structure	**Traditional Bureaucracy: Low Participation of Manager in the Organization** • low power • low opportunity		**Modified/Expanded Bureaucracy: High Participation of Manager in the Organization** • high power • high opportunity	
Manager's Role Orientations *	*Top Down*		*Bottom Up*	
	in relation to:	sees self as:	in relation to:	sees self as:
	• projects	• an administrator of	• projects	• a champion of
	• policy	• a policy implementor	• policy	• a policymaker
	• locus of political legitimacy	• organization-centered	• locus of political legitimacy	• client-centered
	• effectiveness criteria	• economy and efficiency	• effectiveness criteria	• economy, efficiency, and equity
	• change	• an adaptor who copes	• change	• an advocate who influences
Characteristics of Manager's Behaviors in the Organization **	*Power-related:*	*Opportunity-related*	*Power-related*	*Opportunity-related:*
	• close supervision	• low aspirations	• empowerment of subordinates	• ambition
	• focus on rules	• disengagement	• consultative leadership	• commitment to organization's goals
	• emphasis on routines and procedures	• self-protection	• delegation with support	• strong motivation
	• territorial protection	• passive resistance	• emphasis on accomplishments and achievement	• active problem-solving
Manager's Orientations to Clients/Target Groups *	*Passive Recipients*		*Involved Participants*	
	in relation to:	sees clients as:	in relation to:	sees clients as:
	• program design	• targets to impact	• program design	• consumers with choices
	• attempts to participate	• inexpert intruders	• attempts to participate	• legitimate participants
	• human needs	• collection of categories	• human needs	• requiring comprehensive, integrated analysis
	• resource allocation	• units or cases	• resource allocation	• discrete individuals
	• services	• privileged to receive them	• services	• entitled to receive them

*Adapted from: Ross Clayton and Ron Gilbert, "Participation of Public Managers: Their Implications for Public Service Delivery Systems," *Public Management* (November 1971), p. 10.

**Adapted from: Rosabeth M. Kanter, *Men and Women of the Corporation*, New York: Basic Books, Inc. (1977).

of the organization's "product," usually service to a group of clients, requires constant interplay between bureaucrat/managers and their consumer/clients. Thus, if bureaucrat/managers possess a "Top Down" set of intra-organizational role orientations, they are quite likely to hold a similar set applying to clients. The implications for implementing participation are clear: the probability of "Top Down" administrators recognizing the legitimacy of a "Bottom Up" approach to clients is low.

Given the impact of organizational structure upon the bureaucrat/manager's role orientations, this probability is strongly related to his/her own organizational experience. In most bureaucracies, the chances for meaningful participation within the organization are not evenly distributed throughout it; they tend to be concentrated at the top and within certain career paths. For most field-level bureaucrat/managers whose jobs primarily involve client interaction, possibilities for this kind of organizational participation are minimal. The impact of such a structural environment, plus the norms that accompany it, produce the "petty bureaucrat" who figures in the organizational folklore of both the developed and the developing nations.

The above analysis suggests that an important component of a strategy to increase client participation in development programs must include higher levels of participation by bureaucrat/managers in the workings of the bureaucracies administering such programs. What is required, therefore, are organizational changes that will minimize the dysfunctional consequences of bureaucracy while retaining its capacities for efficiency. A significant contribution to the design of such changes comes from Rosabeth Moss Kanter's book, *Men and Women of the Corporation* (New York: Basic Books, 1977). She identifies and clarifies the connections between dysfunctional patterns of organizational behavior and structural characteristics of positions within the organization.

Using an operational definition of participation composed of two variables—access to power (the capacity to mobilize resources to accomplish tasks) and opportunity (chances for advancement, input into important decisions, increase in skills and rewards)—her analysis demonstrates that an increase in the amount of power and opportunity available to a bureaucrat/manager leads to an increase in his/her effectiveness. He/she identifies more strongly with the goals of the organization, applies job skills more efficiently, delegates and empowers subordinates, focuses on reaching goals rather than adhering to routine, and is less concerned with territorial protection. These kinds of behaviors reflect a more participatory style of management and contribute to improved organizational productivity.

Kanter's theoretical and empirical research represents some of the best work being undertaken in the field of organizational analysis today. This article has presented a framework that indicates the potential applicability of the insights to be gained from a careful sifting of Kanter's work, and that of certain others in the field, to the problems of participation and organizational effectiveness in the developing world. The accompanying table summarizes this framework.

Two examples of fruitful application of these insights are Allen D. Jedlicka's *Organization for Rural Development: Risk Taking and Appropriate Technology* (New York: Praeger, 1977) and David K. Leonard's *Reaching the Peasant Farmer: Organization Theory and Practice in Kenya* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977). [Editor's note: see review on page 14.]

Pitfalls in Implementing Participation: An African Example

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Tanzania's experiment with ujamaa village development is well known. Ujamaa, particularly as it is described in the early writings of President Julius K. Nyerere, is a highly participatory organizational form. Nyerere wrote of ujamaa villages, "The essential element in them would be the equality of all members of the Community and the members' self-government in all matters which concern only their own affairs."

Such a participatory form would seem to be wholly consistent with the avowed political philosophy of the Tanzanian government. Indeed, structures for participation and communication occur in every nook and cranny of political life. The party is organized down to the household level in "ten-cells," which are units of approximately ten households with an elected leader. Villagers meet once a year to set development priorities and to draw up a development plan. Village representatives sit on district-level development planning committees.

But the structures often are less participatory in practice than they appear in theory. Ten-cell leaders define their jobs as conveying the wishes of the government and party to the peasants rather than the reverse. Government and party officials make decisions about what seem to be the minutiae of village life—the siting of houses, which business may operate, when local beer may be brewed, minimum acreages, the dismissal of elected leaders. As far as participation from the bottom goes, the development plans drawn up by villagers are often diffuse "shopping lists" of projects which do not fit easily into the financial and administrative constraints of integrated district or regional planning. The result is a tendency for village-level plans to disappear into the morass of governmental files, never to resurface. In short, the scope for participation is rather narrow.

In order to understand how this came about, it is necessary to look at the process and structures through which ujamaa and village government were

implemented. The immediate post-independence period in Tanzania was characterized by an enthusiastic upwelling of self-help. But self-help proved to be neither predictable nor easily controlled, and consequently development gradually came to be viewed in practice (not in official policy) as a technical problem and an administrative task. As grass-roots initiatives lessened in importance and official activity expanded, the implementation process increasingly bore the mark of the bureaucratic mode of operation.

The Tanzanian bureaucracy, as with most government organizations, is hierarchically organized and centrally controlled. There have been attempts to counter this; in 1972, government operations were decentralized, vastly increasing the numbers of civil servants in the districts and regions. But budgetary and policy control remained at the center. Civil servants remained employees of the center, and because they were hired, fired, transferred, promoted, and paid by the center, they were, not surprisingly, more responsive to signals from above than from the villages. There was no one in the bureaucracy whose job it was to listen to and act as advocate for villagers, nor was there much, if any, reward in the system for such behavior. (And since bureaucrats often viewed peasants as ignorant and lazy, the bureaucratic form simply reinforced their natural inclination not to listen to peasants.)

The Tanzanian bureaucratic style of operation is characterized by the sense of urgency expressed in President Nyerere's phrase "we must run while others walk" and by an inflexibility which has its roots in the national ideology of unity—once a policy has been made, only very limited public debate about it is considered acceptable. Also, as in all bureaucracies, the emphasis is on visible results. The effect of these forces is that when a policy is announced, government and party officials generally put all their efforts into rapid and conspicuous implementation activity rather than into endeavors to solicit serious popular participation in local decision-making.

The initial experiments with ujamaa were voluntary and apparently reasonably successful. But once ujamaa became official policy, it became the responsibility of the bureaucracy to implement it. Often neither officials nor villagers really knew what ujamaa was all about. But the bureaucrats were in the position of having to do something concrete. If, as is often the case in the Tanzanian civil service, one is transferred frequently, it is both possible and necessary to use techniques which will yield quick, visible results. The techniques used by many officials boiled down to carrot-and-stick approaches. Some villages were attracted to ujamaa with tractors, free seeds, water systems, and so forth. Other villages were impelled in with threats of force and jail. The former method produced dependency, the latter alienation. The result was that ujamaa never really got off the ground. Nor by any stretch of the imagination could peasants and bureaucrats be called partners in development.

What became clear in the bureaucratic involvement with ujamaa was that not only is the implementation of a participatory organizational form by nonparticipatory means a contradiction in terms—it also doesn't work. The structure of the implementing organization in this case almost by definition precluded the use of participatory means. Participatory process is something which does not fit well in bureaucratic mode. Units of participation cannot be cited in an annual report or viewed from a speeding Landrover. Officials who sincerely wanted to establish ujamaa and participatory village government were constrained by the demands and reward structure of the bureaucracy as well as by the logistical considerations of lack of time and transportation.

The Tanzanian experience should provide a clear message for those caught up in the current fashion for participation. The structure of the implementing organization may well prove to be the limiting factor. Establishing a participatory institution cannot be a turnkey operation like building a tractor assembly plant. Rather, it requires a time-consuming process which is not necessarily compatible with the internal demands of rigidly structured organizations. When such organizations are charged with implementing participation, it is almost inevitable that something less than participation will result.

projects

Participation in Irrigation Development: A Philippine Example

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In many parts of the world, small community-operated irrigation systems exist. Increasingly, national governments and their irrigation agencies are turning their attention to these small-scale systems and attempting to improve their physical structures and management processes. Unless this assistance is provided in a participatory mode, there is the danger that the external help will be counterproductive: ignoring previous experiences, failing to mobilize local resources and creating no local commitment to the improvement activities. An important attempt to gain experience with this process of agency-community interaction is the Laur project in the Philippines discussed below.

Background

Nearly one-half of the irrigated land in the Philippines is served through communal irrigation systems: locally constructed, maintained and managed entities. Most of the remaining irrigated

area is served by systems built and operated by the National Irrigation Administration (NIA). Recently the mandate of the NIA was expanded to include technical and financial assistance (tnrough long-term loans) to communal irrigation. The NIA's policy is to provide this assistance but to leave responsibility for operating and maintaining the improved system with the iocal irrigation group.

Recognizing the uncertainties involved in providing external assistance to local groups, and having in mind some previous bad experiences with communal irrigation systems, the NIA has undertaken a pilot project in Laur district of Nueva Ecija province. The project involves preliminary activities to strengthen the existing irrigation associations in each of two communal irrigation systems. Following the successful organization stage, improvements will be made in the physical structures of the systems to improve the reliability of water delivery and to expand the area served by each of them.

NIA began the project with the objective of learning more about the creation of durable irrigation associations capable of operating and maintaining the system after its rehabilitation and capable of managing repayment of the construction loan. The initial experiences in Laur also are demonstrating the importance of involving irrigators in the activities of planning and construction as well as the subsequent tasks of system management.

The Approach

The major approach of the Laur project is the assignment of community organizers to work with the existing irrigation systems prior to any work being initiated by the technical staff of NIA. A three-person team was assigned to each of the irrigation associations. These community organizers worked with the assumption that "the utilization of existing indigenous organization in the operation of irrigation systems guarantees a more efficient management and maintenance and resolution of conflicts among water users." Their initial activities emphasized gathering information on these existing organizations and on various group dynamic sessions, and other training activities designed to examine the nature of established association procedures and discussion of modifications for improvement. Stated briefly, the community organizers sought to assist local people in developing an organizational capacity for dealing with potential external assistance agencies (the NIA and others). They attempt: ! to facilitate creation of irrigation associations that are based on high internal participation and which are capable of participating with powerful outsiders in development efforts.

Current Results

Thus far events have been very different in the two systems. System A serves several villages in a relatively remote area of Laur district. Prior to the project it had been a well-organized association and had successfully operated and maintained its simpl: irrigation system. Through the activities of community organizers, it was able to further involve its members in association activities and prepare for the proposed NIA project. It is now actively involved with the NIA in planning and constructing significant system improvements. It seems highly likely that the association will be successful in operating and maintaining the improved system as well as repaying the loan.

Far less success has been achieved in System B. This system serves residents of the municiple center of Laur and several nearby villages. It appears that System B has long been influenced by the district mayor and other town elites, who have attempted to operate the association using non-participatory procedures. As a result, considerable conflict existed in the system prior to the arrival of the community organizers. To date, they have been unsuccessful in helping the association to overcome these internal difficulties. Significantly, with the advice of the community organizers, the NIA has declined to proceed with construction activities until organizational improvements are accomplished. They have recognized that the internal conflicts in the association make it highly unlikely that the association could manage the post-project system or be able to mobilize the necessary local resources for repaying the agency's loan.

In System A, the irrigation association has taken its role in the planning and construction phases very seriously. It has questioned some technical features of the NIA's proposed design on the basis of past experiences with specific flooding, run-off and erosion problems. One result may be the avoidance of some of the "design problems" that occur when design engineers are not in close contact with the environment for which they are planning.

Because the assistance is being provided in the form of a loan, the leaders of the association have become careful auditors of financial and other procedures being used in the construction phase. One incident may illustrate this point. In one of the weekly meetings between the irrigation association and the project engineer of NIA, the association president raised the issue of an equipment operator who drove his vehicle from the work site to the village and back each noon hour. Since the irrigation association was being charged for the gas consumed on the project, they requested that the operator either bring his meal to the work site or find some other means of returning to the village during the lunch period.

This request was accepted by the project engineer—which illustrates the other important element in the participation process. Not only must local people be prepared to engage in the participation process, but so also must the bureaucracy and its local staff. Without the project engineer's tolerance for this local scrutiny, which no doubt is annoying at times, the Laur process could not occur.

Importance of the Project

Given the importance of communal systems in the irrigation sector of the Philippines, the design of viable assistance strategies for use by the NIA is of great interest. It is an activity of growing importance to the Philippine government as indicated by the first World Bank loan to the country that specifically involves the improvement of com-

munal irrigation systems. Furthermore, communal systems exist throughout the Southeast Asian region and many other parts of the world. It is very likely that during the next decade, many governments will be attempting to provide assistance to local irrigation systems in their regions. The experiences of Laur may provide important lessons for policymakers and local leaders concerned with enhancing rural participation in irrigation development.

This project is administered by the National Irrigation Administration with support from the Ford Foundation. For a description of the project see: Carlos Isles, "People Power in Irrigation: An Action Research Program on Two Communal Irrigation Systems," Quezon City: National Irrigation Administration (mimeographed). An evaluation of the first phases of the project is found in L. Delia Unson, "Evaluation of the Social Development of Two Communal Irrigation Associations in Laur, Nueva Ecija, 1976-78." Quezon City: Institute of Philippine Culture, Ateneo de Manila.

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Beneficiary Involvement in Project Implementation: Experience in the Bicol

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Empirical research suggests that the probability of rural development project success is significantly raised by such factors as effective two-way communication between project staff and farmers, and organizational arrangements that give farmers a voice in project decisions. A problem facing project designers and implementors, then, is the need to identify and develop contextually appropriate mechanisms to promote communication and share decision-making.

This brief report presents strategies for decision-making that have been used in the Bicol River Basin area of the Philippines. The report is based on the writer's field experience in 1977 and 1978.

The Bicol Strategy

A major role in the development strategy for the Bicol River Basin area of the Philippines is played by integrated area development projects. Both of the two operational projects now in the area, as well as most of those being planned, include among their outputs the provision of irrigated rice production systems. Thus, irrigation systems are a significant aspect of the Bicol development strategy.

Another important dimension of the Bicol strategy is the intent to turn the systems over to user associations. This implies that technical designs must accommodate to local management capability. It also requires a capable irrigator association at the time of turnover and it places responsibility for institution-building on project staff.

To carry out this responsibility, an institutional-agricultural (I-A) division is contained in each project along with engineering and administrative divisions. The functions performed by the I-A division include agricultural extension, organizational development, management training and land reform. Staff of the I-A division consist both of project employees and of personnel "on loan" from the line agencies most familiar with each function, such as the Bureau of Agricultural Extension, the Ministry of Local Government and Community Development, and the Ministry of Agrarian Reform.

The major management responsibility for each project, however, is entrusted to a "Lead Line Agency." For example, the Libmanan/Cabusao project is being implemented through the National Irrigation Administration, whereas the Bula/Minalabac project is managed by the Ministry of Agrarian Reform. Thus another element of the Bicol strategy is the provision of an "integrated" focus while offering various agencies "their turn" with the major implementation role.

Given this outline of the Bicol development strategy, let us turn to the mechanisms which are being used to promote beneficiary participation during implementation.

Sharing Decision-Making

The significance of participation is especially noteworthy in the context of the Bicol strategy of developing viable water user associations because it suggests that shared decision-making must be an integral part of that strategy.

Four mechanisms are being used to do this. The first is project-level advisory committees that contain local leaders, including the elected heads of fledging irrigator associations. This is a common approach elsewhere and needs no elaboration. The second participatory vehicle is to conduct planning workshops and joint programming exercises with both civil servants and farmer leaders participating. These activities sometimes focus on the resolution of conflicts that have arisen during implementation. Other times they focus on skill development and general information, such as using Gantt charts/network methods and crop research results or new civil service regulations. One output of such exercises has been targeted action plans with detailed responsibilities for the following three months.

A third approach has been the use of a simple field-level management information system (MIS) with reporting procedures that incorporate the irrigator association officers. Used initially in a 300-hectare pilot area of the Libmanan/Cabusao Integrated Area Development Project, the MIS consisted of only two report forms (the largest being ½ page) and one-page tracer forms used by area supervisors. This system promoted two-way information flows which allowed both farmer identification of problems and farmer response to problems noted by project staff. A review of MIS use from October 1977 to May 1978 found that, for all action requests dealing with immediate problems, all were responded to in three days or less and 75% took two days or less. Furthermore, farmer leaders found the "Request for Action" forms very useful for communicating problems they perceived. It should also be noted that the MIS was an outgrowth of joint programming efforts.

The fourth mechanism is formal involvement of association officers in

the periodic performance evaluation of I-A division field staff. This approach was adopted in Libmanan in August 1978. Due to the nature of the integrated approach and the fact that area supervisors from one agency may head an extension team composed of people from three or four other agencies, project evaluations focus on behavior that encourages integrated service delivery and beneficiary involvement in decision-making. The involvement of farmer leaders in targeting and implementing activities is weighted at 25-33% of the performance evaluation and it is assessed by farmer leader groups. This supports staff responsiveness to farmer needs and helps to develop the irrigator association's ability to specify and assess performance criteria, which is a significant aspect of management capability.

Conclusion

All of the four participation mechanisms noted above have two important characteristics: first, they can help to minimize communication gaps which obstruct the implementation process; and second, they can help to assure that a viable irrigator association will emerge from that process.

Nevertheless, caution must be exercised when introducing such approaches into other contexts. Even in the Philippines, where local factors such as "the T-shirt phenomenon" (i.e., the tendency for workers to wear T-shirts with the title of the workshop they had attended printed on them) support joint programming workshops, timing was an important factor in the introduction of the evaluation system. Moreover, the type of performance evaluated, the organizational context of the I-A division, and the fact that performance ratings are *not* linked to remuneration were all factors affecting its adoption. Thus, although the Bicol River Basin provides creative examples of beneficiary participation in project implementation, rigorous attention should be given to local dynamics before introducing them elsewhere.

For more detail see two studies by the author, "Farm Organization for Irrigation Water Management" (August 1978) and "Implementing Integrated Area Development in the Bicol" (October 1977), both for USAID and BRBDP (Bicol River Basin Development Project) available through Development Alternatives, Inc., Washington, D.C.

Baglung Suspension Bridges; Outcome of People's Participation in Nepal

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Construction of suspension bridges in Baglung District with local people's participation provides excellent evidence that indigenous technology can be as useful and effective as any imported technology in fulfilling the needs of the people, and that the cost of development projects can be reduced substantially by enlisting people's participation.

Baglung District residents have in the past developed an indigenous technology for the construction of bridges. Well-to-do people in the district, and occasionally not so well-off people, have often provided resources for constructing bridges for use by the local people, primarily with the hope of enriching their life after death. Consequently, there are people in the area skilled in bridge construction work using iron, stone and wood which are locally available. In short, Baglung has its own technology for construction of bridges without using, for example, cement which must be brought in from outside at great cost and with great effort.

The district panchayat (a political unit composed of people's representatives) made a survey of the requirements of suspension bridges for the entire district, calculating the number of bridges needed in this area of mountains and rivers to be 118. Sources for funding the construction of these bridges were explored, and the Local Development Department (LDD) of His Majesty's Government, after a great deal of persuasion, agreed to provide partial funding for the construction of fifty bridges with spans of fifty to one hundred feet. Of the estimated total cost of Rs. 1,400,000, only Rs. 400,000 was to be furnished by the government for materials like cable and iron fittings. Initially, funding was approved for only five bridges, with the assurance that more bridges would be financed if the first five were successful. Approval for fifty had been given by 1975, and with an amount of Rs. 650,000 ($55,000), construction of sixty-two small and big bridges was undertaken, of which fifty bridges, some with a span of three hundred feet, have already been built.

Project Management

For the implementation of the project, LDD constituted the "Baglung District Suspension Bridge Construction Pilot Program Committee" under the chairmanship of Mr. Omkar P. Gauchan (member of Parliament for the district), with the district panchayat chairman as its vice-chairman. Other members were district Panchayat and district assembly members. The Panchayat Development Officer of the district was the member-secretary of the committee.

At the project level, provision was made for subcommittees to oversee the construction of each specific bridge. The members of these subcommittees could be drawn not only from local panchayat organizations but also from the community at large. The main consideration for subcommittee membership was the degree of involvement and initiative the individual would bring to the task of bridge construction.

Three criteria seem to have been applied to the selection of the bridge sites. First, the village seeking a bridge had to present a roster of dedicated workers who would construct the bridge expeditiously. Second, care was taken to see that bridges were geographically distributed so as to cater to a large number of villages, and third, special effort was made to install bridges in areas of less articulate ethnic groups (who would be less likely to ask for them).

Once a bridge was allocated, the villages themselves decided precisely where, when and how to construct it. The specific site was selected by a

meeting of the villagers. Immediately after the choice of a site, the measurement of the span was taken, and on request by the subcommittee for the needed length of cable, the Pilot Project Committee authorized the person responsible for the construction of the bridge to transport the cables and iron fittings from the nearest highway. The villagers themselves decided how many people from the village should go to the motorhead to bring the materials to the bridge site. Because Baglung is not linked with the highway system as yet, transportation of materials must be done through human porterage, which involves a three- to seven-day walk back and forth from bridge site to motorhead. When the cable and iron fittings arrived at the bridge site, voluntary labor was mobilized to collect stone and start the stone work. Skilled workers were paid wages while persons acting as porters or general laborers contributed voluntary effort. Generally, the construction work was initiated during the slack season for agriculture. Construction of a bridge is completed in two slack seasons.

A few conclusions can be drawn from the project experience so far:

(a) Projects directly related to the needs of the people have a greater chance for the mobilization of both financial resources and voluntary labor from within the village.

(b) Use of familiar technologies to which rural people are accustomed will elicit more participation; it also makes transferability of techniques from one village to another relatively easier.

(c) Having fewer financial transactions in local projects (with inputs from outside provided mostly in kind) makes the villagers more confident that no corruption has taken place, which in turn increases their sense of responsibility toward the project.

(d) Organization at the grass-roots level and involvement of the local people in making decisions about the project definitely helps to implement the project faster.

(e) Use of the existing formal institutions is valuable, but it helps if there is enough flexibility to work through informal organization and leaders where the formal ones are not strong or not committed to the task at hand.

(Note: A more extensive report and analysis on the Baglung bridge building experience has been prepared for USAID/Nepal by East Consulting Engineers, Kathmandu. Dr. Pradhan contributed to the volume on this, *Traditional Technology with Local Initiative: Bridge Studies in Baglung District).*

reviews

Reaching the Peasant Farmer: Organization Theory and Practice in Kenya
David Leonard, University of Chicago Press, 1977

Review by Kathleen A. Staudt
Office of Women in Development, AID and University of Texas at El Paso

Agricultural extension services are frequently plagued with problems of inefficiency, of not reaching enough farmers with the appropriate information, or of not reaching the ones who need it most. Indeed, serious questions have been raised about the overall impact of extension services, whether costs exceed or even match the benefits. David Leonard's book is an important contribution to the development literature, of use to practitioners and researchers, not only for his assessments of experience but for his application of organization theory to finding possible improvements in performance.

Kenya's extension service has a relatively high staff-farmer ratio and a reputable agricultural research establishment, yet staff performance is disturbingly inefficient. The junior, village-level staff spend an average of 2.9 out of 5 workdays a week on farmer visits, and less than two visits per day to farmers, despite a broad consensus that 4-5 visits are reasonable. In addition, the absorption of their technical recommendations is low: when surveyed, only one-quarter to one-half of the questions received accurate responses.

In terms of farmers' participation in extension services, there is a dramatic bias toward large farmers which, as Leonard documents, is not unique to Kenya. "Progressive farmers," those who use hybrid maize *and* produce a cash crop, are almost seven times more likely to get visits than farmers who do only either of these, and forty-five times more likely to be visited than are small farmers who do neither. Leonard comes up with a novel and credible explanation of this bias, not based on social class distinctions but rather on the rational premise that extension agents will try to minimize the probability of getting complaints.

What is perhaps most interesting is Leonard's examination of factors affecting the *agents'* participation in development efforts. Why do agents perform so poorly? The structure within which the staff works produces a substantial amount of alienation and resistance to what are perceived as unfair practices. Authoritarian supervisory styles, exclusion from management decision making, and an inappropriate promotion system contribute to this alienation. Peer groups among junior staff impose minimum and maximum levels of output. Supervisors operate in an overbearing, subjective and remote style that is counterproductive to motivating staff.

The implications for personnel management are that non-authoritarian, helpful leadership style, regularly involving staff in setting work targets, will produce more efficient performance. This goes along with the conclusions of Robert Chambers in his excellent book, *Managing Rural Development: Ideas and Experience from East Africa* (Up-

psala: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1974), which applies "management-by-objectives" methods in that setting. Supervisors judge staff either subjectively or according to prior educational achievements (even though more highly educated staff demonstrate *no* improved performance over those with lower qualifications). The lesson here is that incentive-oriented promotion and objective personnel evaluation practices in a career system with meaningful upward mobility opportunities can constructively encourage and motivate better performance.

To reduce the skewed distribution of services to the well-off farmers, managerial procedures to monitor distribution and special practices for farmer recruitment appear promising devices to facilitate more service to middle farmers and poorer peasants. Most stressed, however, is *group* training which widens farmer access to services and is an easily supervised extension technique. Overlooked in this otherwise fine study was male preference in the distribution of agricultural services in this part of Africa where females traditionally participate extensively in agricultural production, and where female-headed households now number over one-third due to men's migration elsewhere for wage employment. Female farmers are among those most disadvantaged by the patterns of distribution for agricultural extension, services and inputs, and specific monitoring and special recruitment of female staff appear needed in this regard.

Reaching the Peasant Farmer contains many controversial, but well-supported arguments and recommendations that demonstrate how close attention to internal organizational operations can, if carefully constructed, contribute to improved efficiency and a heightened ability to realize organizational goals.

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notes

The Program on Participation and Labor-Managed Systems (PPLMS) at Cornell University has established a Documentation Center on the literature of workers' participation, workers' self-management, production cooperatives, self-help, and related topics. This Documentation Center has been conceived as a not-for-profit, worker-controlled service in the interest of furthering work on and for workers' self-management. The center utilizes a non-computer search and retrieval system developed by Jaroslav Vanek, director of the program, and currently consists of approximately three thousand bibliographic citations containing short abstracts. The principal service offered is the conduct of searches of the basic literature by keyword subject areas and the provision of researchers and practitioners with bibliographies of material directly related to their areas of interest on a cost-covering basis. For further information on the program or on the Documentation Center, please contact: Director, PPLMS, 490 Uris Hall, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY 14853, USA.

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RURAL DEVELOPMENT
participation
review

Animation Rurale: Experience with "Participatory" Development in Four West African Nations

Robert Charlick
Cleveland State University

Since 1960, a number of Francophone African states have advocated and to differing degrees adopted techniques for mobilizing and educating their rural mass which they called "rural animation." With the current interest in promoting broad participation in development it is appropriate to reveiw experience with "animation" techniques. The experience of such diverse states as Niger, Senegal, Cameroon and Upper Volta shows that facile statements about "success" or "failure" should be replaced with more nuanced propositions which account for the particular techniques employed, the tasks assigned, the socio-political environment in which the technique was pursued, and the outcomes anticipated.

The Theory

Animation Rurale as it emerged in the theory of the French Catholic Left was at once a utopian socialist ideology, a strategy for societal transformation and total human development, and a set of techniques for planning and implementing rural development. At each level the theory stressed the full and conscious participation of the rural population in its own development while linking small-scale units to the regional and national level.

Animation was to begin with structural change based on new or revitalized political institutions ("animated" and democratically managed villages and on communes) and new locally controlled economic institutions (democratically run, multifunctional cooperatives). Simultaneously, the post-colonial administrative and technical service apparatus would itself have to be restructured (decentralized and functionally integrated) so as to be capable of working with peasant groups, and its personnel "animated" (motivated to serve rural dwellers). These reforms would lead to a new style of interaction between villagers and government agents, based on dialogue instead of compulsion. Eventually this dialogue would be institutionalized into a pattern of negotiation and contract.

Attitudinal change among both rural dwellers and government workers was expected to result from the experience of working together to resolve specific problems. Both groups would become more receptive to technical and social change. Normally a specialized "Animation Service" situated in the Ministry of Plan or Agriculture, or directly under the authority of the President, would be charged with fostering local organization and mass education. In some instances private voluntary organizations would fill or supplement the role of an "Animation Service."

This service would employ a number of techniques to accomplish its objectives. First, Animation agents would organize mass dialogues (essentially consciousness-raising sessions) with villagers. They would then recruit "representative villagers" to be trained as local "animators." Village animators would be trained by the specialized Animation Service in the identification of local-level problems and in organizational and problem solving techniques. When a sufficient number of "animators" had been trained it was expected that village political institutions would become more open and democratically managed.

Animators were expected to help organize village development committies, village-level cooperatives and functionally specialized groups which would emerge as the need arose to accomplish activities defined by villagers themselves or agreed to in conjunction with government service plans. Specialized groups would select "representatives" to be trained by Animation and technical service agents in such areas as primary health care, functional literacy, agricultural extension, village hygiene and cooperative activities. These unpaid paraprofessionals would not only extend new services to the local level and communicate with higher levels of the administrative system, but would also instigate viable local organizations to support their activities.

Assessment of Animation As a Strategy

With the exception of a brief and incomplete phase in Senegal nowhere has "animation" been adopted as a comprehensive change strategy in the praxis of a contemporary African state.

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The **Rural Development Participation Review (RDPR)** is published by the Rural Development Committee (RDC) of Cornell University. It is funded by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) through a Cooperative Agreement on Participation and Rural Development between the Office of Rural Development and Development Administration of AID and the RDC.

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Managing Editor: Jody Swatling

The practice of "animation" therefore has been restricted to the **selective** adoption of techniques, outlined above which were originally conceived of as part of a comprehensive strategy of change. During the 1960's, and to a more limited extent now, each of the states considered here incorporated some of these techniques into the program, style and practice of their rural development services. The question at hand is whether "animation techniques" have produced promising results when adopted and implemented in a piecemeal fashion.

Results must, of course, be judged in terms of defined objectives. Three objectives can be suggested, although clearly not all of them were treated as serious goals by all of the states studied. First, do animation techniques contribute to the **success of particular projects in technical terms** (changes in health practices, literacy levels, levels of adoption of farm techniques, effective operation of cooperative markets)? Second, do they contribute to a **more equitable distribution of the benefits** accruing from development projects? Finally, do they contribute to the **participation** of the rural mass in development activities, and do they promote an **increasing local organizational capability** to resolve problems and mobilize resources.

Niger

The practice of "animation" has evolved as Niger moved from a phase of power consolidation (struggle against clandestine opposition, and power struggle among national factions) through a phase of no-party bureaucratization and accomodation with traditional brokers, to a period of mass demobilization and technocratic management under the military regime. In the earliest phase dialogue techniques and rural institution-building methods employing "peasant" representatives were used. The stress was on local organization for self-help activities and on cooperative formation as a means of reorienting the flow of rural production toward state marketing mechanisms. Rural credit designed to bolster cash crop production and marketing was stimulated through cooperatives which were to become "self-managed."

Even in this phase the scope of participation on the part of small farmers was quite limited. Village men were encouraged to participate in implementation through the mobilization of local labor and loan guarantee funds. Some village improvement projects were undertaken generally under the direction of traditional authorities who aimed to satisfy higher-level party or bureaucratic allies. Nearly all important decisions concerning cooperative functioning were made by government agents and were imposed on villagers. Offices in the cooperatives were seen as bases of new income or prestige and in most cases were easily monopolized by previously powerful individuals. Efforts by local "animators" to modify cooperatives' organization or working rules were thwarted or ignored by the bureaucracy. It is doubtful whether cooperatives were more cost-effective than the private marketing system they replaced, or whether they resulted in any increased benefits for small farmer producers.

In the second phase, efforts at local level reforms were virtually abandoned, and the role of the generalist "village animator" fell into disuse. Animation agents served instead as promoters for the programs of other technical services. These programs were defined entirely outside the local community. Dialogues were replaced largely with the communication of instructions or orders, and village participation was sought through recruitment and training of persons who would serve as village level auxiliaries for various technical services.

Village primary health care programs are an example of both technical success and fairly widespread distribution of benefits, despite the fact that decisions about the recruitment and monitoring of village health workers were almost exclusively the prerogative of traditional village authorities. On the other hand, participation in the "functional literacy" program in which peasant literacy teachers played a significant role has been more limited. In most areas of the country literacy is valuable only for individuals who can obtain positions in the cooperative markets, and access to such positions narrowed significantly after about 1968.

A program for demonstrating improved farm technology, using "farmer demonstrators" and "demonstration supervisors" and "young farmer trainees" has been fairly successful from the point of view of conducting low-cost field trials, and of persuading many village producers of the desirability of the improved farm inputs. Its economic impact has been very limited and unequal, however, since critical inputs have been available almost exclusively to the "animator-demonstrators," who are naturally drawn heavily from the families of local notables.

A promising exception to the pattern of both local elite domination and top-down initiation was the Women's Animation Program in Niger, begun in the mid-1960's. In its pilot phase the Women's program did use dialogue techniques extensively, and identified primary and infant health care as a major locally-perceived priority. Women were however quickly excluded from all meaningful involvement in the village first-aid and malaria prevention program when traditional male village authorities took over the distribution of medicine. Women were allowed to participate only as mid-wives, which reinforced an existing, traditionally compensated role. Nigerien women, like women in the other countries studied, have not been much interested in participating in traditional women's family economy programs, such as basic nutrition and sewing activities.

Under the military government a number of "animation" programs using specialized animators (primary health care, farmer demonstrators) have been continued, although the Animation Service has been all but disbanded. There has been a declining interest in fostering local organizations which do anything more than implement centrally-determined decisions (cooperative grain and cash crop markets). Rural credit continues to be extremely limited, and it is difficult to see how cooperative operations benefit anyone other than the state and its marketing officials.

Senegal

The evolution of "animation" in Senegal also corresponds to four political phases. Initially, during the period of national consolidation (1959–1962), Senegalese authorities came close to adopting "animation" as a total strategy of decolonialization and economic mobilization. At the local level, serious efforts were introduced to restructure political and economic institutions, thereby reducing the power of conservative local authorities and foreign traders. These efforts were distinctly more successful in areas where key national political supporters of the animation strategy (Dia and Cisse) had their own political bases. Within the relatively successful areas, animation techniques appeared to produce more participatory local institutions where there was competition for local power among several leadership cliques. Elsewhere, structural reforms were limited, and the movement for new rural institutions, such as village groups or cooperatives, was either suppressed or these institutions were controlled by local party bosses and religious leaders.

Where the animation service could operate freely it employed consciousness-raising "dialogue" techniques extensively, and trained many "village animators." Local level response to these techniques included a remarkable outpouring of self-help projects (schools, infirmaries, wells, etc.), particularly in the Casamance where villagers cultivated a number of collective fields to raise group revenues. Throughout the country animation agents devoted considerable time to the formation of local cooperatives, and to defending producer interests against the cooperative market boards. The style of participation, both in cooperatives and in the planning process, however, tended to be one of guided action, with the animation administrators, and not the villagers playing the leading role. This period of rapid growth of local organizations and concern for structural change ceased abruptly following the political crisis of 1962 which saw Prime Minister Dia jailed and his followers purged from the party.

Between 1963 and 1967 the animation service declined precipitously. The only village-level program to be actively pursued during this period was the newly-funded Women's program which trained many female village animators, mainly in home economics activities. Direct contact with villagers through

the dialogue and training programs was sharply curtailed. Instead, the animation service increasingly played the role of introducing villagers to technical programs conceived of from above and implemented mainly through specialized technical assistance organizations.

Cooperative organization slowed in this period as well, and animation agents no longer attempted to assure that local notables did not dominate them. Benefits of cooperative membership to small producers fell, as unilateral decisions were made by government authorities to eliminate food credits, to lower cash crop prices, to charge cooperatives more for transport, and to withhold ten percent of crop revenues as a guarantee fund. Villagers were still urged to cooperate with the technical services by providing trainees for village health care and extension programs. But local contributions in the form of collective work activities declined considerably.

From 1968 to 1974 the Senegalese Animation Service went into a period of virtual suspension. It was effectively barred from working with villagers and was instead assigned the role of vocational education and urban youth training. This major downgrading of the role of the animation service corresponded with an overall withdrawal from the philosophy of mass participation, precipitated in large part by fear of peasant and urban unrest. Faced with falling world market prices for Senegalese exports and farmer incomes still further reduced by drought related crop failures, the government turned increasingly to regional and specialized crop authorities whose methods were notoriously non-participatory. Animation methods were criticized as being ineffective and politically troublesome.

Yet the technical agencies also failed to produce desirable economic outcomes. Peasant resistance to the adoption of new farm technologies and to repayment of cooperative debts was not so much a reaction against the "animation" system as it was a reflection of farmer awareness that cooperatives and village organization had been manipulated against their interests and without their involvement. Not only did the major government programs of animation come to a halt during this period, but small scale self-help activities all but ceased.

Since 1974 the "Animation Service" has been given new, if very limited, life under the Ministry of Human Promotion. Few of its current programs, however, have any relationship to "animation techniques." In some areas trainees are being recruited for village health schemes agricultural extension efforts. But no effort is being made to promote village or functional organizations to support these volunteers. Self-help construction projects are not actively encouraged, except those initiated by Peace Corps volunteers serving as "animators" in accord with national plans. In some areas individual "village animators," and especially female animators, seem to continue to play a role in making demands on technical services. But they have no legitimate channels for their communications or local bases to support their activities.

Upper Volta

No post-colonial government in Upper Volta has adopted a national strategy of "animation" or established a specialized agency to promote the use of "animation techniques." Structural issues have rarely been addressed; instead the dominant approach has been like that of classical community development (felt needs, self help, and voluntary local leadership). The use of "animation techniques" in Upper Volta began with agricultural productivity projects initiated during the colonial period (1957) and continuing well into the mid-1960's. Two French technical assistance firms promoted the use of village volunteers (animateurs benevole) as the local agents of their agricultural extension programs, mainly in the densely populated Mossi Plateau. These animateurs were expected to introduce on-farm demonstrations with animal traction equipment given to them. They were also charged with conducting village literacy courses, and organizing village cooperatives, although it is generally agreed that they had little training or incentive to perform the latter activities.

It appears that the program achieved none of its desired goals. The performance of these "animators" in the use of new agricultural techniques was poor. Many reportedly abandoned rural life altogether to seek employment in urban areas. Animators, supervised by non-Mossi extension agents, and by young French "cooperants," were ineffective in the organization of local cooperatives. Although thousands of "cooperatives" were created they existed only as vehicles for channeling credit to individual farm families. Cooperatives were seen as foreign organizations, and the collective fields required of cooperative members as a prerequisite for credit were widely resisted.

Responding to the failure of technocratic "animation" techniques, the first military government (1966–1970) placed more emphasis on local participation, information and attitude change in the achievement of agricultural modernization. Programs were administered by the new Regional Development Organisms (ORDs) in the Mossi Plateau and in agriculturally rich Bobo region. "Animation techniques" were supposed to overcome resistence to technical innovations by fostering a "two way dialogue" and by creating a culture of participation in the village communities. "Animators" would be locally recruited and employed as full-time catalyst agents for information diffusion and organization by the ORD. Yet to the extent that village "animators" were locally recruited they came almost exclusively from the families of the notables. Instead of becoming agents of rural change, they used their salaried positions to escape from the village, and to become petty bureaucrats at the ORD level, or to parlay their position into urban employment elsewhere. (The exodus of village animators was perceived as so serious that in 1969 some ORDs began to recruit female animation agents in hopes that they would be more stable and could get some programs going in the villages.)

With the initiation of a pilot "community development" scheme in 1971–2, male and female "animators" as paid ORD officials were assigned to a small number of villages, and were expected to assist in the formation of a number of "village groups" which would participate in the program. In large measure

the animators merely succeeded in recreating the "cooperatives" of the earlier period. (These obliged individual producers who desired to obtain agricultural credit for new technology to band together and to cultivate a collective field as insurance against loan defaults.)

There is some evidence that animators working intensively with one or two villages were able to foster some self-help activities, such as the construction of wells and maternity clinics. The women's program had limited success in fostering home garden and family nutrition activities.

In 1974 the pilot project for community development became a nationwide program. This was supplemented by the infusion of capital for the promotion of "animal traction" credit in community development villages. ORD animators were charged both with the administration of the credit program, and with the formation of village groups to perform a variety of local-level development activities. Animators were spread thinner, now covering several community development villages in their area. Male animators have gradually merged their organizational-motivation roles with extension activities and now operate primarily as base-level extension workers.

In villages in which community development loans were made available to a few families, these families have become the "village group" to the detriment of the broader organization of interested villagers. The ability of villagers to influence the program, or their interest in using this organizational forum for village-initiated programs appears to be very limited. The economic benefits of the program are not clear, although the rising default on "community development" animal traction credits in several ORDs is reaching alarming levels. In 1976 the government of Upper Volta announced a plan to make the community development program truly national, and to organize and staff with animation agents most of the sedentary villages of the country. Withdrawal of political support for this policy on the part of the new government, elected in the summer of 1978, has placed the entire program in doubt.

A number of private agencies have organized small-scale village-level self-help development programs in Upper Volta, using "animation" techniques. Foster Parents Plan seems to have been able to organize a small-scale village health scheme, using local committees and health trainees, to improve the quality of preventive health services in the Daya area. These programs operate almost entirely parallel to, rather than in conjunction with, Voltan government services. Their impact is limited and difficult to measure. The major benefit to villages thus far seems to be their ability to channel into the village external resources which would not otherwise be available. It is unclear, whether they foster local capability to organize without external resources, and whether they can assist the local community to integrate itself more effectively into the Voltaic development system.

Cameroon

Since 1962 the Government of Cameroon has officially been committed to rural mobilization and village self-help programs. It is doubtful, however, whether the Rural Animation Service created in the Ministry of Development and Planning and a number of corollary agencies have practiced "animation" techniques widely. This may be attributed to the fact that the government, because of the nature of its political base, has not been committed to rural development which increases the capacity of villagers for autonomous action. In Anglophone Cameroon where dynamic local organizations pre-dated the formation of the bilingual Federation, the power of local government councils has been weakened through legislation designed to reduce their planning, taxing and implementation capacities.

Until quite recently rural "development" policies in Cameroon seem to have been designed to serve a number of functions other than the meaningful involvement of smallholders in their economic and social modernization. Agricultural policies have focused on the promotion of cash crop marketing, often through specialized authorities utilizing highly directive techniques. Major emphasis was also placed on the organization of a paramilitary "Civic Service" to socialize rural youths, and to encourage them to found pioneer villages where they would be dependent on external support, loyal to the government and heavily involved in cash crop production. In several areas of the country, "development" projects and resettlement schemes seemed aimed at disorganizing or controlling through new structures certain groups of persons who had been earlier associated with the nationalist movement (not the opposition party) in its guerilla phase. In other instances rural associations with no apparent connection with the opposition party were suppressed and replaced with governing party organizations and party-controlled village development committees.

Even in this highly unsupportive atmosphere, a number of efforts have been made, both by public and private actors, to employ "animation" techniques. From 1963 to 1971 the central thrust of "animation" was the organization of county-level Mobile Teams, including a professional animation agent. These aimed at generating local-level support for national planning priorities, and channeling local level needs upward to county-level planning commissions (CAR). But visits were infrequent, and little was done to train villagers in organizational techniques or in project design and execution. Nominally, "animation councils" were formed in villages, but it appears that these rarely met. County planning commissions anyway had little discretion to act on recommendations which they received. To the extent that the main goal of the program was to generate low-cost implementation of local development projects, it must be viewed to have been a failure, except perhaps in Western Province, where a tradition of self-help already existed among the Bamiléké.

To remedy the problem of a lack of technical competence at the local level, the government of Cameroon promoted a series of programs to train progressive village volunteers in agricultural practices, literacy, health, nutrition, and family economics. These training programs, conducted under the aegis of the Animation Service did attempt to make use of "village animators" to stimulate

local self-help actions. However, they made no effort to link the trainees to a local-level organization process. With the exception of one area of the Western Province there is little evidence that anything was accomplished under the program.

In 1971, the government of Cameroon essentially abandoned the widespread use of "animation techniques" in rural development, and placed the Service under the Ministry of Youth and Sport. For the next four years its only rural program was the organization and management of youth "Cultural and Community Action Centers (ZACC)" which were to create a corps of innovative young farmers. ZACC trainees, like their predecessors, have had little capability to influence technical or organizational decisions at the village level, and they quickly pass into a state of limbo.

For the most part, then, "animation programs" in the Cameroon have neither sought to create structural changes, nor have they been effective in producing improved self-help activities or linkages to national technical programs. Recently, the government has been considering how to improve local capacity for self-help through the extension of "community development techniques," and through the organization of village development committees. These programs are still embryonic, and cannot yet be the subject of a serious assessment.

Conclusion

"Animation techniques" have been employed in a number of differing socio-political environments, ranging from fairly highly mobilized systems with some commitment to rural structural change, to regimes which would appear to have little interest either in meaningful rural development or in peasant organization. We find changes in environment within a single nation-state often within a matter of years or months.

As a technique designed to promote mass participation in rural development, "animation" seems to have the greatest possibility of successful implementation where political competition exists both at the national and local level. Regimes which are attempting to consolidate their power are more willing to promote alternative channels for mass involvement, and may well be more concerned about promoting rural development for both national and local economic reasons, than regimes which have secured their position and have eliminated their opposition. Where this national power situation converges with plural sources of power, or where there is competition over positions of authority, it is far more probable that "self-help" activities will be explored, and that linkages to higher levels of the system will be vigorously sought, than where competition for political position is preempted by the domination of one group at the local level. Where the regime leaders feel secure in their virtual monopoly of power at the national level, but where local competition for leadership still exists (as in some situations in Cameroon), animation techniques may still be useful in promoting participation.

The choice of techniques in the practice of "animation" is clearly related to the goals sought. Where the mobilization of rural participation is not a goal, but where the objective is to mobilize local resources to facilitate implementation of programs, the stress is usually on training specialized animators. This is frequently translated into working with progresssive community residents who have a great deal of difficulty spreading the practice or mobilizing others. Emphasis on "self-help" techniques limited to the local community indicates that the regime either attaches little value to rural development, or believes that symbolic and truncated mobilization can take pressure for performance off the bureaucracy by accomplishing limited social service-oriented projects. Meaningful self-help activities, however, imply both dynamic local organization and increasing demands on government services, which are often not appreciated.

The role of "animation" in improving technical outcomes of nationally defined programs appears to vary considerably, depending on three factors: the degree of existing or readily stimulated **demand for the service**; the degree to which widespread adoption is required for the success of the technique; and the degree to which the benefit is liable to monopolization by a relatively small group at the local level.

The implementation of village primary health care programs appears to be one type of technical outcome which is achievable through the use of "specialized animator trainees" because the service is frequently in high demand and is not readily monopolized. But the scope of this program seems to be limited largely to curative activities, largely because this "animation" technique is not conducive to the widespread voluntary action required of preventive programs.

Technical outcomes are much less satisfactory when the goal is the widespread adoption of a new agricultural practice or of literacy, and when the animation method employed depends mostly on semi-trained volunteers. This is due either to the ease with which credit and demonstration inputs can be captured by village or extra-village elites, or to the limited demand for the new good, service or behavior, due mainly to structural impediments preventing the average smallholder from benefiting from the new opportunity.

"Animation techniques" by themselves may be incapable of producing either structural or technical results, even where they are favored by the existing socio-political environment. The case studies indicate that in some instances limiting factors appear to be the structure and the attitude of the bureaucracy, particularly the members of technical services. As long as they remain unconvinced that they need the willing cooperation of local-level people to improve their performance in ways significant to their career, they are unlikely to facilitate "animation techniques" and they may well sabotage them. "Animating" the technical service agent may be one of the most intransigent bottlenecks in participatory rural development programs.

Professor Charlick is editing and contributing to a series of case study monographs on animation rural experiences in these four countries and is writing an analytical synthesis on this subject. These studies will be published by the Rural Development Committee during 1980.

Developing Research and Planning Techniques That Enhance Local Participation in Development Activities: Indonesia Experience

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Current efforts at enhancing participation in development emphasize the raising of peoples' consciousness about their rights as human beings and the need to help them organize. Far less attention has been paid to the analytic and planning tools which people need to participate effectively. It seems to be assumed that potential participants in the development process already know what their needs are, can articulate them to themselves and to others, and know how to plan and monitor change. Only the first of these assumptions is true. The rural community, including the poor, the local elites, and local government officials cannot always explain what they know. They do not usually know how to analyze and explain development problems using prevailing methods and terminology. Therefore, local people are at a disadvantage in participating in decision-making even in situations where local participation is encouraged. They cannot criticize inactivity or inappropriate action adequately, nor can they argue proposals convincingly to officials who have not accepted Robert Chambers' dictum "simple is sophisticated."

There is therefore a great need for analytic and planning tools that organizationally less-experienced people can use to improve their participation in the development process. Potentially adaptable research and planning methods abound in the social sciences. However, the social science community is structured to reward "sophistication" and not simplicity, theory and not application, and methodological innovation and not informed right choice. What we need are social science methods that assist informed choice for less advantaged participants in the development process. If the circle of participants in development is to expand, so must the range of available tools.

Theoretical Considerations

It is possible to develop appropriate techniques that encourage participation and enhance discourse among groups at different levels of sophistication. To develop them, the characteristics of the users and the decisions they make need to be considered. The following discussions considered each of these three factors in turn.

User Characteristics

In their state-of-the-art paper on rural development participation, Uphoff, Cohen and Goldsmith identify four general types of participants in rural development *(Feasibility and Application of Rural Development Participation: A State of the Art Paper)*. These types are local residents, local leaders, government personnel and foreign personnel. In present efforts at rural development, all four groups may participate, although in different ways, using different tools. These are then our "users".

What should be their attributes? Individuals from any group who want to bridge the gap between the local community's vague articulation of its problems and needs, and the highly rationalized systems of symbolic communication (written and computational) on which decisions about development activities are rationalized should possess the following attributes (note that this includes high level bureaucrats as well as major personnel):

—feelings of responsibility to the community, not just to individuals in it
—paradoxically, feelings of both involvement in and alienation from the larger system in which they work
—attitudes that favor change rather than the status quo, distribution of power more than its aggregation, participation in development instead of authoritarian styles of leadership, and education rather than dictation as the dominant force for change
—basic literacy for communication, both in language and computation
—access to resources: one's own, those of others in the community, and/or those offered by the government

Potential users of applied research and planning techniques should possess the attributes outlined above. However, in the application of the techniques developed, people's roles will differ. The most professionally competent will contribute a richer understanding of each technique and its strengths and weaknesses than will local people, but local people will be better able to determine whether the techniques are appropriate and useful for them. Government personnel in between should act as brokers interpreting the techniques to local people for their use and conveying the results of local efforts to the center.

Decision Characteristics

The decisions that may be affected by the results of research and planning vary according to their specificity and their content. Decisions about development can be very general policy statements (e.g., primary education will be a higher priority than secondary and tertiary education) or very specific (village X will drill two wells this year, one at each end of the village). Decisions at all levels of specificity indicate *what* to do, *where* to do it, *how* to do it, and *who* will do it. In general there is more potential for local participation in specific operational decisions that answer the latter three i.e., the *where, how* and *who* questions.

Where to conduct an activity or construct a building at the subnational level can vary greatly among places without appearing critical of government policy. Thus allocations and

location decisions at the subnational level can be decided locally. Also, *how* a development effort is to be conducted depends on local conditions. Uphoff, Cohen and Goldsmith suggest five factors to consider in answering this *how* question: strategy, financing, staffing, standards, and enforcement. Finally, local conditions strongly influence *who* should and can participate in making the decisions, carry out the project, receive the benefits, and conduct evaluative activities concerning it. While national decisions may indicate who is to participate or benefit, such statements about qualification or eligibility to participate always remain vague or sufficiently unenforceable that many effective decisions can be made locally.

By recognizing what things can actually be decided locally, it is possible to suggest practical tools for participatory research and planning. These tools can then provide local people with information about their community that can help them critically analyze what has been decided (or ignored) about development by the center.

Technique

The decisions that need to be made will define the techniques that are adapted. The capabilities of the potential users will define the appropriate level of sophistication for techniques chosen. In selecting techniques to adapt we should therefore look at various disciplines and their application in different development sectors to match techniques with problems and potential users. In the real world this will mean designing specific tools for specific situations. For example, if village level population workers in area X are to be assigned tasks in nutrition, what techniques do they need to work with local people in identifying, understanding and solving local nutritional problems? For workers at this level, standard techniques for research and planning (survey design and analysis, cost-benefit analysis, etc) are not directly helpful, but they can be simplified. What are needed therefore are some general simplified techniques based on accepted methodologies that can be applied to a variety of local decision-making situations. Based on the kinds of decisions outlined in the previous section, I think new, comprehensible and effective methods are needed in the following areas:

—resource allocation decisions
—location of activities and facilities,
—design and evaluation of projects,
—projections (population production, disease, etc), and
—simple survey methods, including methods for analyzing data and drawing conclusions.

It must be emphasized that the appropriate methodologies should be simple and streamlined to avoid unnecessary demands on time, resources and education of local people whose participation is desired.

Applications

A number of examples of adapted planning and research techniques for education already exist from Indonesia. There, my colleagues in the province of East Java and I developed some simplified planning and research techniques for use by provincial, district and subdistrict education personnel. Our techniques for projecting facility and teacher needs by village, for setting priorities among educational problems according to their relationship to other development goals, and for surveying the province's progress in achieving the goals of the second five-year plan have all been used by local education personnel. The technique for projecting teacher and facility needs is based on the "school mapping" methodology developed by the International Institute of Educational Planning (Jacques Hallak, *Planning the Location of Schools*, Paris: IIEP, 1977). Our model has been used by sub-district officers to estimate future enrollments by village and to allot priority to villages according to their present number of primary schools, their relative economic prosperity, and the availability of land. Between 1975 and 1978 these officers have actually used this technique to help locate over 4000 new six-room buildings (and the newly hired teachers for these schools). Also the technique for setting priorities among a province's educational problems based upon their relationship to developmental problems in other sectors was used in 1977 by all 26 provinces in drafting provincial education plans for the third five-year plan. Finally, an assessment of East Java's progress in education during the second five-year plan was conducted using a variety of adapted methods: (1) a matrix of goal statements was published and measureable indicators were prepared and agreed upon; (2) tables were designed and data compiled accordingly; and (3) analyses were conducted using a structural step-by-step summarization of conclusions from the tables and, where possible, one simple measure of correlation for two-by-two tables.

Two kinds of general methodological approaches have emerged from this experience. First, heuristic methods for determining resource allocations, evaluating project feasibility, and choosing among alternative courses of action can help people structure the discussion of problems so that the alternative conclusions and implications are clearer. Second, simple calculations using real data, be they projections, resource requirements, or simple correlations, can also help structure discussion.

Many examples could be drawn from my Indonesian experience for both kinds of methods, and one of each will be discussed here. The heuristic method is illustrated using the process for determining provincial program priorities in education and culture. The school/teacher allocation method briefly described above offers the best example of a simple quantitative technique which has had significant impact on development programming in Indonesia.

Heuristic Method

The written operational guidelines distributed to all provinces for use in drafting the provincial five-year plan included a set of three forms for relating educational problems to general development problems. The first step in the preparation of the plan was a description of the state of development of the province, both in general and in the educational sphere. Using this write-up, provincial planners then had to (a) summarize specific problems of the province with respect to population, the economy, health, religion, communication/transportation, geography, and other sectors (for Form I); (b) determine

the difference for the province between what conditions in education should be and what they were (for Form II); and (c) compare both sets of problems for interrelatedness and estimate to what extent the solution of an education problem would contribute to the solution of each of the non-education ones (for Form III).

Form I asked for up to five problems in each sector that were considered particularly pressing in the province. Form II elicited a list of brief statements regarding province-specific education problems. Both lists were then transferred to one of two axes of a matrix in Form III. The planners were required to score each relationship on a scale of 0 (no connection) to 3 (very strong relationship) and the totals were averaged for each sector before being totaled for a particular education problem. For example, illiteracy was invariably listed as an educational problem, but its importance in a province depended on the extent to which people in that province believed that literacy would contribute to a range of health problems such as a lower death rate, less malaria, better nutrition, and the like. After making similar judgments for the specific problems in other sectors and then totaling the scores a ranking relative to other education problems was obtained.

Based on this exercise it was expected that each province would better rationalize the priority listing of education programs that the operational guidelines asked for, and would lead to a more sensible allocation of funds. However, a number of problems severely limited the impact of the exercise. First, while all provinces did work through the exercise, many of them did not feel strongly about the results. Even when they did feel the exercise was useful, most provinces only presented the matrix as if it alone were sufficient to explain and justify their programs' priorities. (These shortcomings did not matter much in the end anyway because program allocations were decided in Jakarta for the nation and allocated *pro rata* to the provinces). However, this exercise did help many planners overcome the problem of seeing how their activities related to the larger development context. In visits around the country I encountered a new frustration that well-justified province-specific priorities are not being taken into account. Hopefully in the future they will be. A reasonable, simple method for helping people determine them now exists.

Primary School Facility Needs

Table I: Calculation of Primary School Classroom and Teacher Needs per Village According to the Category of the Village

Sub-district: _____

(to be filled out by sub-district team)

District: _____

Name of Village	Total Children 5-8 in 1976	Total Children 5-8 in school in 1976	Estimate of availability of places for new students in 1st Grade (Total Classes × 33 Children)	Children still to be accommodated in Grade I in 1977 & 1978	Category of the Village	Classrooms Needed	Teachers Needed
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8

Simplifying Quantitative Techniques

The object here is to simplify and demystify forbidding quantitative techniques with the intention of making them more understandable, and therefore usable/manageable, by the "non-professionals." An example is the model used by sub-district officers in Indonesia to select villages in which to build primary schools.

The Indonesian Government built 31,000 six-room primary schools between 1973 and 1978 as part of a bi-annual national program to provide assistance directly to the districts in the provinces. Because of the sheer logistical problems of constructing so many buildings quickly, the problem of deciding where to build them was initially left to chance and local politics. In East Java, however, a model that could be used by sub-district officers for selecting villages was subsequently developed and applied. At the instruction of the Governor it was used in both 1975 and 1977 to calculate out-of-school youth by village and to allow priority to villages according to criteria set forth in the presidential decrees. Because of the usefulness of this method in East Java a sensibly structured decision matrix for selecting villages has been included in the presidential instructions sent out this year for the continuation of the program into a fourth two-year cycle.

For operational purposes the mathematical formulation of the model was put aside and the algebra converted into simple forms with clear instructions. For instance, if the function for calculating projected new places in Grade I is expressed algebraically it is almost guaranteed to intimidate district or sub-district level government personnel. The function is as follows:

$$\frac{(P_{T,\,1976} - P_{I,\,1976})}{2} - 33C = P_{E,\,1977}$$

where $P_{T,\,1976}$ is total population of age 5–8 years in 1976; $P_{I,\,1976}$ is total population of age 5–8 years in school in 1976; C the number of Grade I classes; and $P_{E,\,1977}$ the expected number of children who will need new places in Grade I in both 1977 and 1978.

The form to be filled out based on this equation is shown in Table I. Column 2 is equivalent to $P_{T,\,1976}$, column 3 to $P_{I,\,1976}$, column 4 to the term 33C, and column 5 provides the required statistic of the numbers of children yet to be provided for.

Another simplifying tool in this particular exercise was the use of decision matrices. For example, using the statistic derived above, the sub-district officers were able to calculate classroom and teacher needs using the following decision matrix. The matrix lists all possible totals for grade I candidates from 0 to 130 in nine different categories. Based on the expected average size of the grade I class in the new school each village was categorized according to classroom and teacher needs.

The categories in the matrix had been derived from an analysis of student flows from grades I through VI using prevailing transition rates for the province as a whole. For example, in a complete school that has 40 first graders every year there will be 37 second graders, 33 third graders, . . . , and 17 sixth graders for a total of 175 pupils. Such a village would be in category D and would need a three-room building and five teachers. The matrix was developed by provincial educational planners in East Java using prevailing averages on student flows, existing government policy on class-size, teacher-loads, and shifts, and assumptions about cut-off points in class size to determine when it was necessary to add another room or another teacher. All the sub-district officers needed to do was look at the table to determine a village's classification. Even though it would have been more accurate if they had calculated and determined all these parameters themselves for their own sub-district and/or villages, the task would have been unrealistically complicated and time-consuming.

Using these and other such simplified methods, the East Java contingent then brought their case to Jakarta for the annual meeting of provincial planning boards to decide on allocations for the next year. With the information in hand, the representatives from East Java were able to take a strong stand on what their needs were, in arguing both for their total allocation and for some flexibility in the national regulation that only six-room schools should be built. While East Java did finally receive about a third less units than it needed, to districts according to that fraction of the total need that they had accounted for. In addition, the new presidential instructions for the building programs

Table II: Decision Matrix for Determining Classroom and Teacher Needs by Village

Total Candidates	*Total # Classes*	*Category of the Village*	*Classrooms Needed*	*Teachers Needed*
19 and below	—	A	—	—
20–29	2	B	1	1
30–39	3	C	3	2
40–49	6	D	3	5
50–60	7/8	E1	6	6
61–70	8/9	E2	6	7
71–90	10	E3	6	8
91–110	13	F	7	10
111–130	15	G	8	12

have granted flexibility in school size so that smaller schools can be built and single or double classrooms can be added to existing schools. The extent to which the district officers actually based their village by village allocations on this exercise is not known, but from the enthusiasm with which district personnel assisted in the planning exercise, they must certainly have been used by many district offices to instruct or monitor final decisions made by the subdistrict officers.

Conclusions

It is my belief that people cannot participate effectively in development activities unless they acquire the skills that development planning and research require. This does not mean that all people need to master the sophisticated methods generally favored by development specialists. Rather, the techniques used in planning and research need to be simplified and adapted so that more people can use them and understand their implications. Techniques should serve a wide range of users—local residents, local leaders, government personnel and specialists—in a variety of ways. Given the present state of planning and research technology, much greater attention needs to be paid to the development of methods that local groups and government personnel can use in allocating resources, locating development activities and facilities, projecting needs, designing and evaluating projects, and surveying potential development problems.

My experience in Indonesia suggests that the development of simplified techniques is possible and the results useful. In fact, this experience has suggested two general kinds of techniques: heuristic methods that help people order their thoughts and intuitive understanding, and quantitative techniques using real data that aid in calculating projections and statistical indicators. While neither set of methods will predict the future any better than the complex methods now favored, they will encourage people to more actively and effectively participate in development activities with little danger to accuracy or validity. In general, the democratization of method will encourage greater participation in the development process. But in order to bring this about there must be concerted effort by development specialists at simplifying and popularizing existing techniques in specific settings.

Worker Participation in Jamaican Sugar Production

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When the Peoples National Party Government, led by Michael Manley, came to power in Februray 1972, it inherited the lands of the three largest sugar estates bought by the Labour Party Government in 1971. Whereas the Labour Party had planned to subdivide and sell the lands of the Frome, Monymusk and Bernard Lodge estates, Michael Manley was determined to find a way whereby the workers could share in the ownership. He announced:

> I want to see where in the end these workers will be joint owners of the business, drawing their wages for the functions they perform and sharing in the dividends and profits that are declared. . . . We reject the notion that a society can be either just or efficient where the ownership of the means of production is concentrated in a few hands. . . . The thrust of this Government is to create institutions whereby the workers begin to participate significantly in both ownership and the decision-making process so that democratization of ownership can be achieved. . . .

Actually as far back as 1948 the Peoples National Party had outlined a policy for the development of cooperatives among workers. Thus it was stated in their "Plan for Progress" in 1948–1949:

> The P.N.P. intend to continue and improve the existing programs of land settlement and afford it every support. Side by side with the existing schemes the P.N.P. intend to develop the new idea of Cooperative Farms. To establish such farms the government will purchase, if possible in each parish, 20,000 acres of agricultural land. Then these will be settled 400 farmers for each farm. Houses will be built for them and they will have a small amount of land for their own private use. Over and above this they will be shareholders in the Cooperative Farm, entitled to their share of the proceeds of the farm, provided they have contributed a fair share of effort to its successful operation. . . .

This policy was again restated in 1965 at the Annual General Conference of the P.N.P., when it was stated that: . . . "Emphasis [would] be placed on cooperatives of various forms ranging from sharing of common services and equipment by individuals, to farms used in common ownership." The P.N.P. therefore had long been committed to the cooperative idea.

Historical Background

Jamaica's sugar industry has had a long and continuous history; it has also had ups and downs. Starting with the Spanish at the end of the 15th century, it later flourished under the British with the use of slave labour. It has continued through the intervening centuries to be the major component of the agricultural base of the economy.

The sugar industry continues to be the major employer of labour and a significant foreign exchange earner. As such, the industry is vital to the Jamaican economy and its survival as a healthy, profitable enterprise is of the greatest importance.

The role of foreign capital in the industry has changed dramatically in the postwar period. There has been little

or no foreign investment; rather the period has seen a withdrawal of foreign capital from direct production. Four sugar estates were either taken over or propped up by Government and survived only as a result of Government guarantees or more direct help between 1968 and 1972.

The need for change within the industry has been long apparent; indeed there was a major national debate in the first decade of this century on the prospects of the sugar industry and even at that time reputable students of the industry claimed it could not survive. Since 1960 there have been several commissions of enquiry into the industry, as well as other studies. The industry as it existed at the beginning of the 1970's was virtually on trial for its life. New forces, social and economic, were exerting pressures on all sides. It was therefore vital that a way be found for the industry to meet its reponsibility to the society more adequately.

The Plan

Intensive planning for the utilization of the lands at the Frome, Monymusk and Bernard Lodge estates in a manner which would enable workers to participate in ownership and management was carried out in the latter part of 1972 by a team under the aegis of the National Planning Agency. The report of this National Planning Team recommended *inter alia* the farming of the cane lands under a leasehold tenancy system which would maintain the advantages of the independence of the farmers, and retain at the same time some basic cooperative features. The plan envisaged the establishment of a community of farmers, where each tenant farmer would work his individual holding according to a general production pattern determined by the cooperative structure. In effect, the proposed structure would combine planned farming with a system of private ownership of the lands which would make the individual tenant personally responsible for his own success. In December 1972 three pilot areas were recommended, one on each estate, each approximately 2000 acres in size. After an examination of the areas, it was decided that all workers on the farms who wished to become members of a cooperative be eligible to join.

Mobilization of the Workers

Because the team's report seemed to have gotten lost in the bureaucracy and fearing that proposals to pass over the lands of the Monymusk estate to its staff might take effect, a group of workers endeavoured to seek assistance on their behalf. They approached Father Joseph Owens, who was connected with the Social Action Center, for aid in organizing themselves into co-ops which could secure the cane lands. Father Owens began talking to the workers and by January of 1973, 19 groups (numbering 700 workers) had been formed at Monymusk and were meeting on an average of once a fort-night. By the end of the year similar groups were being formed by the Social Action Center in Frome and Bernard Lodge.

The meetings were devoted to an examination of the practices and principles of cooperative management and to the study of the financial, economic and technical aspects of cane production. These meetings grew into formal training sessions, seminars and workshops, once the services of a cooperative education officer were secured. Eventually, the workers were taking part in the drafting of the rules of the cooperative.

Organization of the Pilot Cooperatives

The three pilot cooperatives began operation in January 1975, under a slightly different design than that proposed by the National Planning Team. The members decided to farm the lands communally, not with individual allotments, as had originally been proposed. It was also decided that each of the three cooperatives be managed by a council of eleven members, elected democratically from and by all the members in an annual general meeting. The council, in turn, elected a chairman, vice chairman and secretary. The major technical inputs were provided by a project manager and other technical staff (accounting clerks, etc.) who were hired by the council. The project manager took the policy directions from the council and was responsible for the day to day management of the farm.

Organizing the Cooperative Structure

Once the pilot cooperatives were functioning and succeeded in reaping their first crop, interest and excitement spread to the other farms on the estates. Meanwhile, the Social Action Center, which had been working with some of the workers in the other farms as early as 1974, was able to expand and intensify its activities once the pilot cooperatives were underway. Gradually the groups of workers interested in cooperative development grew until a large majority in the remaining farms expressed a willingness to develop along cooperative lines.

Extensive negotiations were then carried out with the Government concerning the pace and scale of cooperative development in the sugar industry. A special committee, appointed by the Prime Minister, eventually decided that 17 of the 20 farms remaining on the three estates were ready to go cooperative before the start of the 1976 crop. The same committee agreed that a joint educational effort involving the Social Action Center and the Frome Monymusk Land Company (which had been managing the lands of the three estates) was necessary and desirable. To that end, a syllabus was developed for educating and training the workers in the principles and practices of cooperatives, the business aspect of the operation, and the wider social, political and economic perspectives of the development. This was based on the experiences from the work which had been done with the pilot cooperatives.

The committee also recommended expanding the organizational structure created in the pilot projects to one with three tiers: 1) producing or primary cooperatives: 2) estate cooperatives and 3) a central cooperative. This system was adopted and began operating January 1, 1976.

Briefly, the primary cooperatives are concerned with agricultural activities and improving the life style of its members. The rules of the primary cooperative require that:

a) Membership be restricted to former registered workers of the Frome Monymusk Land Company, on acceptance by the Committee of Management council.
b) Members are required to subscribe to a minimum of ten shares, at $2.00 a share, with no maximum set.

c) The cooperative must be a member of the estate cooperative.
d) Individual members may be disciplined by the Committee of Management council for breach of the rules of the Society.
e) Borrowings of the cooperative are limited to the amount fixed at annual meetings.

Three estate cooperatives (one for each original estate) were established to provide services for, and to coordinate the efforts of, the primary cooperatives in the areas of technical assistance, bookkeeping, and the distribution and allocation of machinery and water. These cooperatives are also responsible for maintaining the capital stock and selling the produce to the sugar cane refineries. Its working capital base was created by requiring each primary coop to buy a minimum of 500 shares ($1,000). The borrowing powers of the estate coop are limited to the amount fixed at the annual meetings (as with the primary coops). The affairs of the estate coop are managed by a Board of eleven members who are elected by (and from among) the delegates of the primary coop. These members meet on a regular basis to carry out the above mentioned functions, but they also perform their cane production activities as well.

The central cooperative known as the United Sugar Workers Cooperative Council (U.S.W.C.C.) was created in order to coordinate and assist the estate and production coops in areas of:

a) financial planning, budgeting, accounting and audit;
b) members services in welfare and education;
c) agricultural production planning;
d) executive administration of personnel and purchasing;
e) insurance and pension administration and management;
f) providing a common meeting place for exchange of ideas; and
g) coordinating and liaison activities with Government and other agencies.

These functions are directed by a Board of Management who hold office for two years and are elected by and from delegates from the estate coops. (Each estate coop is entitled to appoint two delegates and, in addition, one for each completed 25,000 tons of cane produced.) Their working capital is also drawn from shares (a minimum of 5,000 at $2.00 a share) bought by the three Estate coops from their sales revenue.

Viability

In purchasing the estates, the Government agreed that it would undertake the responsibility for severance payments to the workers. As a result, severance was paid to all the workers on the farms that became cooperatives. Those workers who opted to join the cooperatives were then requested to deposit 50% of their severance pay as a short-term loan with the cooperatives to provide the necessary capital to commence operations. Various loans were also made available from the Sugar Industry Authority (SIA) for replanting, replanting development, equipment, and production incentive. But the sum total of these various loans is very small. The viability, especially of Monymusk, was seen to be dependent on taking several steps with the help of the SIA, among them the following:

a) The development of non-cane employment opportunities for surplus labour.
b) Negotiations with Monymusk factory regarding special treatment for field operations where these are marginal or unprofitable.
c) Negotiations for an increase in the price paid to the cooperatives for their cane.
d) Negotiations with Government for a subsidy for irrigation.

According to the lease agreement, the cooperatives were not supposed to have suffered any loss in the first crop, because it was really the responsibility of the land company.

The formula used for the calculation of payment to Frome/Monymusk for the cane in the field at take over was that the net proceeds (cane sale proceeds less reaping and maintenance costs) be equal to the value of cane on January 1, 1976. Therefore, the cost of the crop was equal to the net revenue for the crop period ending September 30, 1976. It became apparent that there would be a loss and cash drain in the first year. Therefore it was suggested that a special program loan of $6.6 M be made by the SIA to assist the cooperatives.

In financial terms the new cooperatives did not commence operation until October 1, 1976. The cash position of the cooperatives at that date was (in millions of dollars):

Members deposit	$4.7	
SIA loans	$2.9	Total $7.7
Share capital	$0.1	

as against the following liabilities:

Starting expenses	$3.6	
Investment in 77/78 crop	$4.9	Total $9.3
Purchase of fixed assets	$0.8	

From the above analysis it becomes apparent that the starting position of the new cooperatives was weak, and therefore from the outset the U.S.W.C.C. attempted to seek additional capital. A further weakness was that members' deposits, the main source of funds, attract interest so that there is no finance of an equity nature.

In 1974 a five-year projection of the earnings position of the U.S.W.C.C. was estimated, based on an analysis of the West Indies' Sugar Company's method of operation. The figures showed losses through 1979, even before interest charges were raised.

The actual losses in this period proved to be even larger than the estimates. In January 1976, the cooperative took over from the Government an operation which was not viable as a group, though the position differed with respect to the individual estates. The Frome Cooperatives were capable of making surpluses in favorable weather conditions. The Bernard Lodge group could

Projected ('000)	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979
Loss before interest	48	1,245	949	780	826	1,145
General overhead	182	300	360	414	476	848
Total estimated loss before interest on borrowed money	230	1,545	1,309	1,194	1,302	1,993
Actual						
Loss before interest on borrowed money	*NA	*NA	1,614	2,061	4,882	*NA

*Not Available

be brought to a position of a surplus with certain additional inputs. It seemed unlikely that Monymusk with its high irrigation costs could ever break even, as long as it relied entirely on cane production.

The Problems

Many of the problems facing the sugar cooperatives existed before the cooperatives were formed:

a) There is good reason to think that lands are being used for cane production which are marginal for this purpose. These lands should be phased out of cane and used for products to which they are suited. This is particularly true at Monymusk where there is inadequate water to maintain profitable yields. Feasibility studies of other crops are currently getting underway.

b) A very high proportion of non-cane lands are being underutilized.

c) There is approximately 25% excess manpower in the cooperatives, due to the agreement to accept all the registered workers of the Frome Monymusk Land Company as members. The severance of excess labour is a social problem and suggestions for their absorption in the development of other agro-industrial enterprises based on sugar are being looked into.

d) The problems of management have increased in view of the fact that while members of staff all have experience in growing cane, their knowledge of cooperatives and their management is virtually nil. In addition antagonism that existed between staff and workers during the pre-cooperative period has not altogether disappeared.

e) Jamaican sugar is tied to the vagaries of the world sugar market as well as an artificial price structure within Jamaica itself; under this structure the pricing formula for sugar cane is unrealistic given the current cost picture. Thus farm operations for sugar cane in many areas basically are not viable for today's world sugar prices.

f) The reality is that although this is a multi-million dollar business, there is virtually no equity capital and it is therefore not in a position to raise long term debt capital. The plain fact is that the cooperatives will require substantial long term development financing if their business operations are to be seriously planned, programmed and implemented.

Performance

By any reasonable standard three years of operations is a short period in which to assess properly any new business organization when it operates in an industry that is on a secular decline and has been plagued with perennial financial problems. Further caution is in order. When we consider the cooperatives, it should be further appreciated that they must satisfy several social goals. What one should look for therefore in an assesment based upon a short period, is whether areas of progress can be identified and whether the areas of retrogress, if any, are likely to be lasting or reversible in a short time.

In 1977, with the first crop that was directly under the cooperatives, Frome and Bernard Lodge had losses that were according to budget. Monymusk, however, had a disastrous drought and a large loss. In 1978, Frome, Monymusk and Bernard Lodge all reduced their losses in spite of a large amount of standover cane (unreaped cane). While production costs were still relatively high compared to world market, production costs per ton of cane fell by 15% at Frome and Bernard Lodge in 1976, and by 20% in 1977. Unfortunately in 1977 production costs increased at Monymusk due to the severe drought.

It is important to point out that between 1976 and 1977 the price earned by the cooperatives per ton of cane fell. At Frome it fell from $19.59 per ton to $18.48 per ton. At Bernard Lodge it fell from $18.70 to $17.95 per ton. Despite this marked drop in unit revenue received, the operating loss per ton of cane produced decreased in both areas. In addition the earnings of the members have been constant (in real terms) over the period.

The performance of the cooperative organizational structure is worth assessing. Through the new cooperative structure, the 5,000 sugar workers have come a long way in a short time in understanding what it means to determine their own future. The weather, world price position and other factors were not as supportive as one would have expected; however, these workers have overcome many hurdles and should continue to press on.

In conclusion, it is fair to say that the sugar cooperatives are a great social experiment for Jamaica. The industry and the country have a unique opportunity not only to support the workers in their venture, but to demonstrate their belief in a new economic order for the island.

The author is currently a visiting fellow at Cornell University engaged in writing a book on the development of the sugar cooperatives in Jamaica.

projects

The PIDER Rural Development Project in Mexico*

Harry Blair
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The launching of PIDER *(Programa de Inversiones para el Desarrollo Rural)* was a response to a socially and economically contradictory situation: Despite the fact that Mexico has achieved the highest sustained growth in agricultural production in Latin America since World War II, rural poverty and rural unemployment have increased in many regions throughout

*Abstracted from *Measuring Project Impact: Monitoring and Evaluation in the PIDER Development Project—Mexico* (World Bank Staff Working Paper No. 332, June, 1979) Available in both English and Spanish.

the country. After increasing for two decades at 5% or more per annum, Mexico's agricultural output beginning with the mid-1960s barely kept pace with population growth and by the mid-1970s was falling behind.

The evolution of Mexico's agriculture had proceded along two simultaneous paths. First there had been a development of the large-scale entrepreneurial agricultural sector through heavy private and public investment (especially in irrigated areas), aided by agricultural research; second, there has been the stagnation and growing exclusion of the broad sector which could be called the peasant or *campesino* economy.

PIDER was originally conceived primarily as a public works-infrastructure program, but was then reoriented to a poverty focus as part of the Mexican Government's policy, aimed at channeling long-denied resources toward the peasant areas. Started in 1973, PIDER now covers more than 100 geographical microregions which contain approximately 50% of Mexico's rural poor.

The beneficiaries of PIDER are intended to be peasant groups located in regions that possess productive resources but lack the necessary infrastructure, services and social organization to launch or speed up their development. Within these microregions (average population: 50,000), PIDER provides assistance in services, infrastructure and social organization to selected rural communities of 300 to 3,000 inhabitants.

PIDER's innovative organizational approach stresses coordination of budgetary authority and active planning and participation at the state and local level, where the programs are designed and executed. In other words, there is a decentralization aimed at involving the beneficiaries in the planning process, and at strengthening of the planning and decision-making process at state and village levels. Given the novelty of this entire institutional approach, and of the planning and financial procedures, an intense monitoring and evaluation effort has appeared to be an essential requirement. This effort which was aided by CIDER (the Research Center for Rural Development) is described in the World Bank Working Paper from which this account is taken.

Principles for Participatory Programming

The basic principles by which programming of the PIDER regions is to be guided can be summarized under six headings:

1. **Participation by the peasant population**

The particular activities composing each regional program must derive from proposals put forward by the peasant populations of the communities that make up the region. This principle is crucial. The proposed guidelines *do not accept a role for officials as interpreters* of the peasant-farmers' interests. Development cannot be planned on the basis solely of studies or ideas put forward by technical or economic agencies or by PIDER's own staff. To do so would be to impose a future perspective on the communities that would conflict with the way its members see their own future or, even in the best of cases, to accept the notion that the officials have a more complete perception of peasant farmers' problems, needs and capabilities than they themselves have.

2. **Community diagnoses**

The principle of community participation requires that a diagnosis of each community be undertaken and that it be continuous or at least extend over a long period.

It would be a misinterpretation of the concept of community participation to believe that this can be achieved simply by listening to a few community leaders or accepting the first investment ideas that the community spontaneously puts forward. Community participation calls for *information* and *organization*, for a *commitment* by the whole of the peasant population; it calls for *reflection*, for a *knowledge* of available resources and of development possibilities, conscious *priority-ranking* of needs, sequential ordering of the works and services that will be required of the program; it calls for time—time to promote, develop and harvest this collective thinking; and it calls for technicians capable of participating in this exercise without imposing their own ideas, without thinking they know everything and without having any axe to grind.

3. **Stages in programming**

The first approximation of a program is achieved within the local community, when the investment proposals of the peasant population are first obtained. The preliminary project plans and later the final project plans subsequently developed from these proposals go into more detail with regard to the technical, economic and social feasibility of each of the activities it is proposed to carry out, ensuring that the various projects are mutually complementary and that funds are available for executing them.

4. **The community and the region**

Good programming is not simply the arithmetical sum of the programs of the individual communities, but rather it is the expression of a strategy for the development of a set of communities. In other words, participatory programming should reconcile the overall strategy with local, individual priorities. There are several sociological and economic reasons for this integrating approach.

—In the PIDER micro-regions there are many systems composed of communities that are linked to the same development center, have similar ecologies and natural resources and similar socio-economic production structures. They share a common communications network and common cultural roots. It is obviously essential in these cases to try to formulate a strategy for the integral development of the entire system.

—Certain works and services will necessarily have to cover a number of neighboring localities. Examples are agroindustries (which because of their scale need to procure their raw materials from a number of communities), roads linking several population centers, and irrigation and water-supply systems.

—Peasant organization is an integrating process which finds its initial expression in the communities but must build up to higher levels (region, state, country) to be most effective. This is true not only of administrative or political forms of social organization but also of producer organizations. One objective of programming is

therefore to identify the possibilities for integrating sets of communities within the region, and this continues to be a fundamentally important task of the peasant organizations.

5. **Inter-agency cooperation**

The programming exercise is a task shared among the responsible officials of the PIDER central team, the PIDER state teams and the participation agencies.

The responsible officials at the national level provide advisory assistance on programming, act as a clearing house for experiences in the regions, set the financial parameters, and approve the final programs for each region, interpolating them into the national program.

The state teams direct the entire programming exercise, coordinate the various stages and activities, integrate the agencies in the different work stages, ensuring that their work is mutually complementary, and propose the final programs.

The agencies contribute their experience and their studies and diagnoses, take part in the field research, express their views on development strategy, and prepare the preliminary and final projects within their specific areas of competence.

6. **The pursuit of the ultimate objectives**

The objectives of the Program must be kept in mind throughout the programming process. This means that the decisions about what to do, where to do it and who the beneficiaries should be must be guided by realistic possibilities of increasing production, employment and incomes while at the same time ensuring that the recipients of these benefits are the peasant groups that are relatively most backward in terms of resources and previous development opportunity.

Getting Peasant Participation

The starting point for peasant participation is in the first stage of programming which we call *community diagnosis,* when investment proposals are sought (see 3. above). One way of securing the participation of the peasant population is to hold meetings attended by *ejidatarios* (commonland farmers) and other members of the local communities. Such meetings have succeeded in getting various local individuals and social groups to participate by providing information, suggesting investment proposals, ranking them according to the priorities perceived by the population, and so on.

To ensure that the meeting as such provides a suitable forum in this stage of the work and reflects the real interests of the locality, it is necessary to grasp and explore the relationships that exist between the various social groups within the locality, particularly between the poor peasants and those who are better off. In short, a sociological understanding of the village community stratification is necessary. Not all of the groups express their concerns with equal forcefulness, and relatively few express them distinctly. Fear of speaking up and the limited participation by women, young people and other groups traditionally neglected by investment policies (such as landless laborers or the smallest farmers) are serious constraints. Accordingly, it is essential that the interdisciplinary field team engaged in the community diagnosis be sensitive to the concerns of the villagers, particularly those in the most deprived groups. The field team, if well oriented, may turn the community diagnosis into an extremely valuable information and education exercise for the community, making the villagers more aware of their own needs, potentials and rights to shape their development programs.

Analysis and Priority—Ranking of the Proposals

The next step is to carry out an analysis of the region as a whole in order to determine what to do in the individual microregions. Investment proposals from each of the localities must be analyzed and then ranked, using the following criteria:

—The degree to which implementation of the investment proposal is likely to solve the locality's more important problems; the main basis for this is the ranking performed by the concerned community itself.

—The quality of the information obtained in support of the investment proposal (this factor is of prime importance).

—The degree to which the proposal complements others in the same locality or in other localities.

—The economic benefits that implementation of the proposal will yield, particularly in terms of employment, income distribution and surplus production, compared with the cost-benefit analysis of possible alternative investment proposals.

The evaluation of investment proposals put forward by local communities requires economic, technical and social analysis. The attention given to social criteria should not obscure the need for sound economic standards and for using formal techniques for measuring costs and benefits, distributional consequences, etc.

Analysis of the Investment Proposals With the Agencies

The investment proposals obtained from the peasant population must also be discussed in detail with the technical agencies, so that the technical feasibility and socio-economic implications of each proposal can be determined in the light of the data supplied by the field team and PIDER's knowledge of the locality.

The analysis of the investment proposals with the technical agencies may result in eliminating some of the least feasible or least beneficial proposals. Information on this process should be communicated to, explained and discussed with members of grassroot communities, to reach a broad agreement within the communities on how their needs and aspirations can be satisfied by the program.

Participatory programming, in particular the discussion of investment proposals with both local communities and technical agencies, may cause a certain lengthening of the planning process and has usually to accommodate a number of divergent views. There is, however, a trade-off, in the sense that participatory programming, as opposed to "top-down" programming, has a better chance to come up with good solutions and may also speed up the subsequent implementation process considerably.

This very brief discussion has not gone into the methods of data collection by project staff, screening of eligible localities, identification of subregions for focused investment, appraisal and negotiation of programs, or monitoring and evaluation. These are described in more detail in the World Bank publication cited above. The project is still in the process of implementation, and not all efforts have been as successful as intended, but the enterprise as a whole represents an ambitious and unusual development effort worth following.

Local Development Associations in the Yemen Arab Republic

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While many developing countries view local development as a strategy for addressing the problem of rural poverty, the Yemen Arab Republic (North Yemen) faces a different task. In the last few years, the country experienced an unprecedented growth in opportunities for its labor force to work abroad, particularly in Saudi Arabia. The dramatic growth in the Saudi economy since the early 1970s has created employment opportunities that currently absorb 35 to 40 percent of the male Yemeni labor force. These workers are sending much of their income back to Yemen. In 1978–79, the annual flow of remittances was approximately $1.3 billion, an amount exceeding the entire GNP of the nation only four years earlier. During this period, real per capita income doubled from about $200 to $400 (adjusted to 1975 prices). The impact of remittance income has been broadly distributed across the population. The vast majority of Yemen's citizenry lives in small rural villages, and in the rural areas nearly every family sends a son to work in Saudi Arabia. With remittances being sent back directly to the family, wealth does not appear to be concentrating in the hands of an elite.

While Yemen has enjoyed a dramatic improvement in the levels of per capita income, the growth of the economy as a system of production has not kept pace. This is a serious problem for the country. Recent economic data suggest that the growth in remittances may be slowing while inflation proceeds unabated. Barring unforeseen political disruptions, the country can expect the income from remittances to remain reasonably stable at current levels. But in the long run, Yemen will have to develop its own economy if it is to sustain a continuing improvement in the standard of living. Yemen is a net importer of food, and while at the moment the country is enjoying a strong positive balance of payments, export earnings are covering only a tiny fraction of import costs. The remainder of the costs are being covered by the foreign exchange remittances. Imports help relieve inflationary pressures, but there is still a shortage of goods and services and a lack of recognized investment opportunities. The bulk of the nation's financial resources are being held in the form of cash rather than being put to work through the banking system. Yemen thus finds itself in the situation of seeking opportunities to harness existing liquidity for purposes of development rather than mobilizing development for purposes of generating investable resources.

Development Context

Yemen has inherited a most unusual development agenda. As recently as the early 1960s, there were virtually no doctors in the country, and literacy was at a very low rate. The country was ruled by an autocratic Imam (Islamic religious leader) who maintained a strongly isolationist policy toward the rest of the world. The policy was so strong that printing presses were banned for a period during the early 1900s. The period between 1962 and 1970 was marked by a protracted revolution which finally ended with establishment of a secular government. In 1973 the new government prepared the country's first comprehensive budget. Illiteracy still stands at more than 85% and infant mortality is at least 150 per 1000. Life expectancy at birth is about 37 years.

While Yemen has no known oil reserves, it does have most of the arable land on the Arabian peninsula and a long tradition of agricultural production. The country includes several different ecological zones ranging from the low coastal plain along the Red Sea through the wadis of the mountains rising to the high (2,000+ meters) interior plain to a second range of mountains and a fringe of the "empty quarter" of the great Arabian desert. In many of the mountain areas the sloping land has been extensively terraced to create flat surfaces for cultivation. Most are served by elaborate irrigation systems of traditional design using water from the wadis or collected rain run-off. The rugged terrain, however, has resulted in a population distribution pattern of small isolated villages. Many lack basic infrastructure such as roads and water systems. The national government has had only limited capacity to address these needs.

Local Development Associations

In the years since the revolution, a very interesting system of local development associations (LDAs) has appeared. Little is yet known about the political setting in which LDAs operate or the variables which contribute to their success. They are supported primarily by their local constituencies and undertake, in some areas, significant development projects such as building local roads, wells, cisterns, water distribution systems, schools, and clinics. Some LDAs have adopted a system of three-year plans. Finances for LDA activities come from the local Zakat (Islamic tax, primarily on income and wealth), voluntary contributions, and central government or donor sources. Differences in the values of crops from one area to another affect the Zakat and lead to variations in funding capabilities from

one LDA to another. Whether the associations have sufficient funds or not, however, they nearly all have trouble obtaining the technical advice critical to project success. Moreover, LDA officials often lack the administrative skills to oversee implementation, management, and maintenance of the projects.

New Rural Development Program

A new rural development program is being initiated in the governorates of Hodeidah and Hadja (coastal plain and adjoining mountain area). It is being funded with support from USAID and is designed to strengthen the capabilities of the local development associations. The program will cover some 15–24 LDAs and will involve training, technical assistance, and a modest amount of matching-grant financial assistance. The participating LDAs will be divided into three groups. The first will receive training, the second will receive training and technical assistance, and the third will receive training, technical assistance, and matching-grant support. The objective will be to develop the LDA's ability to plan, implement, manage, and maintain local projects such as roads, water systems, and agricultural infrastructure.

The program will emphasize participation of the local population in development decision making and in organizing local resources for development activities. Training will be provided both in technical aspects of project design/implementation and in the organization and management of local resources. Each participating LDA will be required to prepare an annual work-plan outlining the goals and objectives for the activities of the year.

With so little known about rural development in Yemen, it will be necessary to learn from this program as it is implemented. To this end, the program design calls for the creation of an information system that can be replicated in other projects. It is expected that this will provide a basis for systematic data collection and analysis. If the initial phase of this program (four years) proceeds well, this data base can be used for designing a follow-on phase lasting up to perhaps six more years. This second phase will concentrate on income generating projects in anticipation of a decline in the national significance of remittances. Implementation of Phase I is beginning in 1980.

The Cornell Development Participation Project is working with the Confederation of Yemen Development Associations (CYDA—national coordinating body for the LDAs), the government of Yemen, and USAID in a collaborative study of LDAs. This research is intended to generate policy relevant guidelines that can be used in future programs for helping local organizations design and implement rural development projects. The major thrust is to analyze and describe a set of carefully selected rural Yemeni communities and their LDAs. The objective will be to determine the relationships between successful local mobilization for development purposes and the resource environments and socio-economic characteristics of these communities. It is expected that the major research product flowing from this exercise will be a set of general baseline evaluation, activity identification, design, and implementation principles that can help CYDA and USAID determine:

1. the resource endowments of rural communities and the potential for agricultural or off-farm development activities by local organizations;
2. the kinds of task environment that facilitate successful organization of local development activity, particularly projects centered on economic productivity;
3. the kinds of socio-economic patterns likely to lead to successes or failures of various types of development activities by local organizations;
4. the types of donor interventions most supportive of development activities by local organizations;
5. the potential of donor-sponsored projects to help mobilize local resources, particularly remittances for projects that promote economic growth and income generation;
6. the kinds of activities and socio-economic community characteristics that lead to broad-based developmental benefits; and,
7. the degree to which local organization and LDA officials are sensitive to broad-based development needs and are open to participation by local people in the identification, design, and implementation of programs and projects.

Archival research and baseline fieldwork for some 20 to 30 communities have already begun. This will lead to the selection of 8 to 10 characteristic-type communities. Detailed micro-surveys are scheduled for early 1980. From these will be selected three particularly significant communities where the Cornell team will work as participant observers for approximately one year. It is projected that the Cornell research will be completed by late 1981.

The Cornell research effort is being directed by Lewis and John M. Cohen. The field staff includes Jon Swanson, Barbara Croken, and Mary Hebert. For more information on Yemen, see: Cohen and Lewis, "Capital Surplus, Labor-Short Economics: Yemen as a Challenge to the Rural Development Strategies," in *American Journal of Agricultural Economics*, Vol. 61, No. 3 (August, 1979); or Cohen and Lewis, *Rural Development in the Arab Republic: Strategy Issues in a Capital Surplus Labor Short Economy*, Development Discussion Paper No. 52, Harvard Institute for International Development, February, 1979.

reviews

Bureaucrats, Politicians, and Peasants in Mexico: A Case Study in Public Policy

Merilee S. Grindle, University of California Press, 1977

Review by Norman Uphoff
Rural Development Committee
Cornell University

This study of CONASUPO (National Staple Products Company) deals with a specific attempt by the Echevarria administration (1970–76) to assist the rural poor through bureaucratic means using subsidized, widely distributed consumer goods and production services. While explicitly concerned with policy formation and implementation from above—the dominant mode in Mexico—the book raises important questions about possibilities for rural participation in such a country.

Afficionados and antagonists of the Mexican political system may insist that it is unique. The ruling party (PRI) has maintained itself in control of the political system for 50 years, nevertheless requiring replacement of the president every 6 years, so no continuing personalized rule results. In comparative perspective however, Mexico stands out as one of the most stable of a large set of developing countries where authority is monopolized at the center and official policy-making is insulated from influences from below. It is useful to look at Mexican experience in this context.

What participation there is must be more on the *output* side of policy implementation than on the input side of policy formulation. As James Scott and others have suggested, this is a fairly common situation among LDCs. Because implementation and formulation are in practice not as dichotomous as the terms imply (influence on a policy's *implementation* can amount to "making ing" policy at the receiving end), the results of having no institutionalized opportunity to influence policy formation need not be as dire as they might otherwise appear.

As many observers have noted, the Mexican political regime is preeminently paternalist and elitist in its orientation, and has effectively limited the participation of most of the population in the policy process. Still, to maintain some semblance of equity and stability, some policies are aimed at serving and even mobilizing segments of the rural population. This was attempted through CONASUPO under Echevarria's regime. Though it was not to amount to "all-round" participation, which might be preferred, it appears to have gone about as far as that system would allow.

The salient characteristics of the Mexican system noted by Grindle are:

(1) Policy does not result from public pressures but from bureaucratic-political interaction. It is the creation of a small number of individuals, whose crucial support must come from the President himself.
(2) All participation is structured through and managed by ties between leaders and followers, commonly known as "patron-client" relationships. This is a logical and rational strategy in an environment where there are few if any effective formal, impersonal rights.
(3) Administrators, despite the presumed power and unity of purpose at the top, face serious problems of implementation, in terms of getting cooperation from both other officials and from the public. Support needs to be gained from various official and public groups.

This third characteristic may open the door to the most feasible and promising kinds of participation under existing conditions.

In this context, officials may or may not work as intermediaries for powerless groups. Such groups can be readily ignored or exploited, but they can be useful for officials such as in CONASUPO. To implement their programs, administrators need to develop alliances for getting cooperation and support. In particular, the state governor was seen as a key person to keep satisfied. Since he often drew some of his support from the peasant sector and its institutionalized representation within the ruling PRI party, a CONASUPO official with good relations with the peasantry and CNC could in turn confer some support on the governor, who would then be more likely to assist CONASUPO when it ran into administrative problems.

Grindle's focus is more on bureaucrats and their career strategies than on peasant strategies, goals, tactics, etc. So she does not go into how peasant groups and leaders could take advantage of this administrative need for support and cooperation to get more adequate and appropriate CONASUPO benefits channelled to the rural majority. But she does look at how CONASUPO in the mid-1970s was making efforts to reach and assist the peasant constituency.

Under Echevarria, instructions went out to CONASUPO staff to open up lines of communication with the rural majority (to "communicate with peasants in the most extensive form possible in order to ensure their solidarity, comprehension and participation in [CONASUPO] programs and activities") and to cut the ties built up by previous CONASUPO administrations with interests antithetical to the peasantry (intermediaries, local economic bosses, truckers who defrauded producers, etc.). To prevent reoccurrence of corrupt practices. 1,483 "analysts" were recruited from *ejido* communities and

were given training to promote their "social consciousness." (Unfortunately, we do not find out how effective the training effort was at this.)

The strategy included experimental organization of groups of peasants "to support directly CONASUPO's activities while at the same time they will serve as effective social linkages between the institution and the communities to promote new activities which will stimulate self-sustained development." Toward this end, a "development worker" trained by CONASUPO was to assist the organization of development committees made up of village members. Obstacles to development at the local level were to be identified and attacked, by e.g. cooperative use of machinery or reasonably priced credit.

Such efforts required going down to the community level, "not as patrones" but more modestly and earnestly, to demonstrate the usefulness of groups working with the CONASUPO-backed "broker." Higher status officials acting as advocates for local-level groups achieved more rapid responses from government agencies than the groups could have gotten by themselves. In a system where everything is done through a "broker," on behalf of a "clientele," the CONASUPO official could encourage peasants to use certain channels, could follow demands up to see where they were being blocked and could advise where next to try to apply some pressure, suggesting what approaches might be most effective. This appears to have been helpful to many communities. Unfortunately, CONASUPO's program ran into some political opposition, and its political support declined with the change in Mexican administrations at the end of 1976. Perhaps most revealing of the limits under which CONASUPO operated was a statement by one of its workers when a peasant leader said to him: "I know you have come to organize us." The response was that they were not to talk about "organization," since that was what the government would not allow. "This government will stand anything except organization." (p. 161).

Serious questions can be raised about whether peasant needs and rights can be advanced without organization, even with well-intended official intermediaries. Grindle's study does not go into these questions because her focus was more on the workings of the political-administrative system. But she does provide some useful insights into the possibilities such a system presents for getting rural participation in shaping that system's outputs.

Grindle's analysis of the environment in which "patron-client" ties are virtually necessary to get anything from the government touches on a far-reaching issue. Though she does not make a case for the connection between "human rights" and "participation," her account of the consequences of a *lack* of formal and impersonal rights suggests that poor people will always be at the mercy of "patrons" unless able to insist on and get satisfied some individual and group "rights." Perhaps organizing *issue*-oriented groups, as distinguished by Carl Landé from *person*-oriented groups, requires in most cases some basic assured rights vis-à-vis government. This question goes in a different direction than Grindle mapped out, but it merits some broader consideration.

Health Needs and Services in Rural Ghana

Institute of Development Studies at the University of Sussex, June, 1978

Review by Katherine Terrell
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Training paraprofessionals in the field of health services has been increasingly welcomed as the method that will overcome the shortage of medical care to disadvantaged groups in developing countries (particularly in rural areas) and, at the same time, involve the communities in their own development. But will this new approach solve the problems which have doomed previous programs to failure? How willing are villagers to undertake and, more important, sustain self-help activities in cooperation with health services? What differences, if any, exist between villages in this respect? Are these differences based on cultural or ethnic variation, or on degrees of urbanization of factionalism? What are some of the major requirements for successfully implementing a participatory health scheme? These are some of the questions addressed by the Institute of Development Studies' research on health needs in rural Ghana. Whereas the scope of the study is much broader, we will consider here its analysis of the village perspective in a participatory health scheme. The reported insights were derived from interviews conducted by an interdisciplinary team with villagers and their leaders in thirteen villages in Southern Ghana, and from an analysis of two ongoing projects in community health participation (the DANFA and BARIDEP projects).

The team found that the villagers they surveyed preferred that all services be made available to them by the central government. However, if village input was required as a condition for the provision of services, then villagers accepted the principle of self-help provided that a significant portion was contributed by the government, and that the entire village community was seen to participate. The concern here was that self-help was acceptable for an individual only so long as there were no "free-riders."

On the question of 'felt needs', it was observed that people's lack of knowledge of causes of disease and of preventive measures inhibits them from

identifying and acting upon particular initiatives. A real 'need' is to increase their understanding of what should be done to reduce disease and disability, particularly in the area of preventive measures.

It appears that there were no differences among the villages in their willingness to cooperate in self-help health-related activities. It was noted, however, that larger and less remote villages tended to desire more modern solutions. These solutions could not be implemented strictly by the villagers and would therefore require more outside technical help than the more traditional solutions.

Participation in the areas of community control, remuneration of the health worker, and communal labor presents problems of perception and practice. "The central planners may stress community control because this is seen as a kind of guarantee that the interests of the villagers will be served (and the project will succeed) if they themselves are in control. However, from the village point of view, control at the local level is no guarantee that the essential support will continue to come from the health services, and it is the failure of that support which is seen as the main danger to the village health programme and hence to villagers' interests. . . . Whereas the interest of the health service is to have what it regards as the most suitable person for the job, villagers will be more conscious of the potential advantages which can accrue to the person appointed. It is difficult to generalize, but it would appear a reasonable policy for the health service outsiders to lay down criteria or otherwise assist in selection."

The question of remuneration of village health workers has been a problematic issue in the BARIDEP project where salaries are currently being paid by the village and the health workers must spend a large proportion of their time pressing village authorities for payment. Since no regular salaries are normally paid by the villagers for any work, it seems inappropriate to attempt to use village organizations to generate these types of funds. The authors also feel that volunteer work is not a solution since "sustainment of initial levels of enthusiasm is an unrealistic expectation. . . . Given that the central government provides funds to support urban hospitals and other health institutions, the villagers have good grounds for expecting the government to pay for their health workers."

Initial experience suggests that a call for a day's communal labor or a single levy for a desired project would meet with a better response than the idea that labor or funds should be given on a regular basis. (Note also that village authorities are reluctant to call for communal labor unless there is a consensus that it is worthwhile.) Potential for communal labor is also circumscribed by the villagers' unwillingness to do 'dirty jobs'. This issue would create more of a problem in villages that would like modern latrines (which require the removal of excreta) than one satisfied with traditional pit latrines. Of the 40 to 50 priority intervention tasks identified by the researchers, only four or five, all dealing with the digging of wells and latrines, require communal labor. This means that although relatively little communal labor is actually needed, there would be some difficulty in acquiring it for at least half of the required tasks.

Drawing from the experiences of the DANFA and BARIDEP project, several points are made with respect to implementing a village health worker (VHW) scheme:

1. Training fewer VHW's in a wide variety of activities, rather than many in specialized functions, may not only be easier to implement but more effective. It is more likely that attention would be paid to preventive activities recommended by one who also gives curative attention (a 'doctor') than if these two tasks were given to separate people.
2. The size of the village is a crucial factor in determining the number of VHW's. In a village of over 1,000 a single VHW would be overworked if given a wide range of tasks.
3. A strong case can be made for VHW's training in the vernacular since this is the language they will be communicating in on the job.
4. Supervision must be adequately provided for as it is the central element of the support system which will determine the success or failure of a program of community participation. The supervisor must be "able and willing" to get a first-hand view of the VHW's work. In addition, the entire hierarchy of supervision must be intact—i.e., there must be a supervisor of the supervisor, etc.
5. Special recognition should be given to the high level of motivation demanded of staff who must not only spend most of their time visiting villagers but continuously use initiative to solve the problems they find there. One suggestion for keeping VHW's morale up was to ease the transportation problem by supplying a vehicle to a group of them.

The researchers' message is that the potential for village participation in health services is there, but the government must take a strong initiative at the outset in order to demonstrate the benefits that village level schemes can provide as well as the Government's seriousness in supporting them. If (and when) the demonstration effect takes hold, control over the system can be gradually devolved to the villagers, as long as the hierchical structure of supervision and support continues. These ideas are a valuable contribution to the debate between the advocates of top-down and bottom-up approaches in project planning. Perhaps they are more compatible than was originally conceived at least in the realm of village health care. The answer may lie in some *sequencing* of these two approaches in a project. For more detailed analysis of these issues, readers are referred to the IDS study.

notes

A research project on **"Access and Participation"** organized by the Institute of Cultural Anthropology in the Netherlands is undertaking to establish approaches in local or regional rural development programs that will improve the access of poor farmers to resources and mitigate the previous undesirable consequences of development processes. The project starts from the proposition that autonomously proceeding development tends to increase inequality in access to economic resources.

The project has three focuses: (1) the sociology of participation (2) solidarity and mobilization of resources, and (3) service organizations and the rural poor. Among the questions being investigated are: In what ways do the groups that appear to be able to participate differ from groups that do not or hardly do so? At which stages does the participation process actually exist, and on which planning levels does participation have some importance? What pitfalls in the participation process have to be avoided and how can one intervene to obviate them? What organizational adjustments are necessary for the government departments involved in directing the work and integrating efforts of several executive authorities, so that decentralization, flexibility and participation can be realized?

The research is under the direction of Prof. B. F. Galjart, Department of Non-Western Sociology, Institute of Cultural Anthropology, State University of Leiden, Leiden, Netherlands.

The next **American Political Science Association meetings,** August 28–31, 1980, in Washington, D.C., will include a panel-workshop on "Reaching the Poorest of the Poor: The Role of Local Elites in Poverty-Oriented Development Programs." It is being organized by Donald Emmerson, University of Wisconsin, and Norman Uphoff, Cornell.

It has been generally observed that local elites present barriers to poverty-alleviating problems. Yet seldom have poorer sectors been able to put forward and sustain leadership from their own ranks on their own behalf. While this remains desirable, some thought needs to be given to issues such as the following, which are planned to be examined: (a) what are the *conditions* under which local elites are more or less likely to support development programs benefiting the poorer sectors; (b) what differences are there among *types* of local elites, e.g., landowners, merchants, middlemen, religious figures, teachers, administrators, in terms of their support or opposition to assisting the poor; (c) what *incentives* may lead local elites to take a more supportive position toward poverty-alleviating programs; and (d) what can *governments* and *poorer sectors* do to make local elites more responsive to the development needs of the poor.

The Rural Development Participation Project is concerned with these questions and will be undertaking comparative analysis of them. Any persons with information to contribute to the APSA workshop or to the ongoing analysis should contact Norman Uphoff, 170 Uris Hall, Cornell University, Ithaca, N.Y. 14853.

The **Interamerican Society of Psychology** has created a *Task Force on Community Psychology* to: a) Promote the development of Community Psychology as a discipline, b) Increase communication between psychologists interested in Community Psychology, and c) Disseminate information from the existing studies in this field. To these ends, a bilingual newsletter will be started and plans are being made for the publication of a book, in Spanish, with contributions from the Latin and North American psychologists who attended the XVII Interamerican Congress of Psychology in Lima, Peru.

Those interested in the activities of the Task Force and in receiving the newsletter should write to: Dr. Luis Escovar, Community Psychology Program, Florida International University, Miami, Florida 33199.

The **U.N. Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD)** has determined that its research program will focus on improving the livelihood and increasing the *participation in development* of the world's poor. The two themes are closely related, according to a recent UNRISD account of its approach and activities, *Studies for Social Change:*

"It has also become obvious that the poor seldom benefit from measures intended to mobilize them to overcome poverty unless they participate in decisions that determine the allocation of public resources. This means that they must share in political power—if only to ensure that the services, facilities and benefits intended for them do in fact reach them."

The publication, *Studies for Social Change,* including a listing of UNRISD publications, is available from the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, Palais des Nations, 1211 Geneva 10, Switzerland.

The **World Conference on Agrarian Reform and Rural Development,** organized by the FAO in Rome, July 12–20, 1979, made the following declaration on *People's Participation:*

"Participation of the people in the institutions and systems which govern their lives is a basic human right and also essential for realignment of political power in favour of disadvantaged groups and for social and economic development. Rural development strategies can realize their full potential only through the motivation, active involvement and organization at the grass roots level of rural people with special emphasis on the least advantaged strata, in conceptualizing and designing policies and programmes and in creating administrative, social and economic institutions including cooperative and other voluntary forms of organization for implementing and evaluating them."

The Programme of Action adopted by the Conference contains many references to the role and means of participation in agrarian reform and rural development. The Programme can be obtained from the Food and Agriculture Organization, WCARRD Secretariat, Via delle terme di Caracalla, 00100 – Rome.

A new **Institute of Rural Management (IRMA)** is being set up at Anand in the state of Gujerat, India. It is promoted by the Governments of India and Gujerat, the National Dairies Development Board of India (NDDR) and the Indian Dairy Corporation. The objective of the Institute is to provide education, research, training and consultancy services for co-operative and other agencies engaged in economic and social development of rural communities. It will offer initially a one-year graduate degree program called the Program in Rural Management (PRM) which will be aimed at providing young women and men with an understanding of rural realities, and the professional skills and abilities to deal with programs of rural development. The Institute is presently looking for both full-time as well as visiting faculty. Information about the Institute and the faculty-search is available from Ms. Kamla Chaudry, Institute of Rural Management, Anand 388 001, India.

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Fortmann, Louise. *Peasants, Officials and Participation in Rural Tanzania: Experience with Villagization and Decentralization.* 136 pages. ($4.00)

Fortmann, Louise. *Tillers of the Soil and Keepers of the Hearth: A Bibliographic Guide to Women and Development.* 53 pages. ($3.50)

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Staudt, Kathleen. *Women and Participation in Rural Development: A Framework for Project Design and Policy-Oriented Research.* 77 pages. ($3.50)

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RURAL DEVELOPMENT
participation
review

The *Harambee* Self-Help Experience in Kenya

Barbara Thomas
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Frustration over the inadequacies of national planning and related efforts to generate rural development has led to a growing concern for decentralized planning, local participation in project planning and implementation, and the use of local institutions for development purposes. Getting such participation, however, remains a vexing task. An analysis of self-help activities in Kenya provides a variety of insights on issues concerning peasant organization for rural development.

In Kenya, local self-help development efforts — *Harambee* — have been operating concurrently with centrally planned and implemented programs since independence. Local communities and groups have undertaken projects which focus on small-scale community needs such as schools, clinics, cattle dips, village polytechnics, social halls, feeder roads or fish ponds. They have established local organizations or committees to assess community needs, make decisions about projects, generate resources, mobilize participation by community members, and manage projects upon completion.

To date, most analyses of self-help have focused on specific categories of projects, such as secondary schools, or on the accumulation of data concerning project involvement. There has been no effort to test this method of local participation in development within the context of the community.

Research on *Harambee* in Kenya was conducted by the author while affiliated with the Institute for Development Studies of the University of Nairobi in 1978–79. Six Locations (an administrative unit) in three Districts were selected for a detailed longitudinal study of their self-help efforts, as well as a cross-sectional comparative analysis of specific types of projects found within these communities.

The Districts were chosen on the basis of contrasting approaches and performance with *Harambee* projects, and Locations were selected for their contrasts in land potential, land use, population density and levels of well being. Questionnaires were administered to 500 residents in the six Locations, using stratified sampling techniques. In addition, 130 project committees and self-help groups were interviewed about the work of the committee or group, the performance of the project and the role of the project within the Location. Interviews were conducted with a variety of officials at all levels of government.

Apart from determining factors affecting project "success," the research dealt with the *impact of self-help on equity* (intra-community effects, inter-community variations, and urban-rural disparities), with questions of *participation and local-level leadership* in self-help organizational mechanisms, and with the *use of a decentralized mode of development* — the role of external aid, and social linkages (patron-client) and cleavages (ethnic) as these affect central government efforts to foster this form of development.

The Role of *Harambee* in Kenya

There are indigenous principles and traditional forms of mutual assistance out of which self-help in Kenya arises and which legitimize this form of collective effort in many parts of the country. As a national approach to development, however, *Harambee* was first articulated by former president Jomo Kenyatta in May, 1963 and since that time it has played a key role in the development of the rural areas in Kenya. The most recent statement concerning this role can be found in the 1979–83 Five Year Plan which specifies that *Harambee* has been a major strategy for accelerating rural development since Independence and, at the village level, has not only dominated development but will continue to do so. The new plan focuses on the theme of "alleviation of poverty" — increased income per capita, new employment opportunities, expanded educational opportunities, improved medical services and water supply, and rural infrastructure. These are indeed some of the objectives toward which self-help has been directed.

Between 1967 and 1973, *Harambee* contributed 11 percent of the national development expenditure in Kenya. The average annual people's contribution to *Harambee* projects between 1967 and 1978 comes to $11.4 million per year — contributions in cash, material and labor which are given a cash

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Publications of Interest

The Rural Development Participation Review (RDPR) is published by the Rural Development Committee (RDC) of Cornell University. It is funded by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) through a Cooperative Agreement on Participation and Rural Development between the Office of Rural Development and Development Administration of AID and the RDC.

The objectives of the RDPR are to share knowledge and ideas on rural development participation, to help develop a network of people interested in the subject, and to encourage and facilitate to the maximum extent possible the exchange of information and views between them.

Subscriptions to the RDPR are available to interested parties, free of charge, upon request. Contributions, suggestions, comments, inquiries, and items of information are encouraged. Reproduction of contents is permitted with an acknowledgement of the source.

Please write to: Editors, RDPR, 170 Uris Hall, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY 14853, USA; telephone (607) 256-6370.

Editors: Harry Blair, Porus Olpadwala, Katherine Terrell, Norman Uphoff

Managing Editor: Jody Swatling

value. The new plan estimates that *Harambee* will contribute about 10 percent of the total national development expenditure, and 30 percent of all capital formation in the rural areas.

Since 1971, between 1400 and 2000 projects have been completed annually. Over half the projects are related to education. Recently, completed economic projects have constituted 15 to 28 percent of the annual total. The remainder are in health and social welfare. The contribution of the people themselves ranges from 85 to 94 percent of the total value of the projects. Government or donor funding provides the balance.

Government has assumed some of the recurrent costs of projects, however. For example, the Government anticipates that 8 percent of its recurrent expenditures for secondary schools during the plan period will be directed toward teachers' salaries for *Harambee* secondary schools. Since these schools comprise nearly 70 percent of all secondary schools, it is evident that this aid is primarily token assistance to encourage the upgrading of these schools.

What is a Successful Self-Help Project?

First, a successful project is one completed fairly expeditiously. The time frame may be several months or several years, depending on the complexity of the project. Within one or two years of initial collection of funds, there must be visible evidence of progress on a project and of benefits to be derived from it, or people become discouraged and disillusioned. Many projects can be completed in components or segments, and upgraded as time and money permit, so that progress is visible from a fairly early stage.

Second, contributions must be made equitably by community standards, otherwise hostility toward the project ensues. Communities vary as to whether a flat rate or a graduated assessment is considered fair for a particular project, for example.

Third, benefits must reach a broad cross-section of the community either actually or potentially. That is, if a family has contributed to the con-

struction of a clinic, it must have access to the facility even though family members may not yet have had opportunity to use it. Benefits must improve productivity or wellbeing of local residents.

Fourth, the project committee must build and maintain the project in a manner which receives broad community support. Using these four criteria, it is possible to judge the success of a given project, and whether self-help has had a positive or negative impact within a community.

Conditions Leading to Project Success

In the six Locations studied, ten conditions were found to be important factors in project success. These were often related. It is useful, however, to disentangle them and examine them in their simplest form. The first three are essential conditions; the remaining seven are facilitating or enabling conditions.

1. *Competent local-level leadership* is of central importance in motivating the rural population and in bringing *Harambee* projects to prompt completion. Both the Chief and Sub-chief, administrative officers of the Location and Sublocation, play key roles in fostering interest in development projects, in responding to the concerns of the community, and in initiating development efforts. Most projects are undertaken at the Sublocation level. Should the Sub-chief be unconcerned, unmotivated or inclined to place personal interests before public ones, a situation not only stagnant but detrimental to the community can develop. Within a Sublocation there will be few others in a position to exert leadership. These may include a primary school or secondary school headmaster, a minister, retired government official, or prosperous farmer-businessman. But any will find it difficult to initiate change without the concurrence and support, if not the leadership of the Sub-chief.

2. *Good project management* is a critical factor in the success of projects. Many project committees are selected on the basis of established criteria understood and supported by the community. Members may represent distinct geographical sub-divisions within the community, or they may represent different constituencies. Primary school committee members, for example, are selected by the body of parents, by the District Education Board and by a sponsoring institution such as a church. If the committee establishes reasonable objectives with procedures for meeting them, keeps records, keeps funds in a bank account, provides for supervision of contractors to ensure technical competence, and minimizes opportunities for unscrupulous use of funds or materials, then a project is likely to succeed.

3. Local residents need a *clear perception of the benefits* to be derived from a project. Most villagers see a strong link between the existence of a primary school, a health dispensary or a water supply, on one hand, and their own wellbeing. Such projects have received widespread community support. In the case of other projects such as cattle dips or secondary schools, the benefits may not be self-evident to each family. A project may flounder if it does not have widespread community support based on a realistic assessment of benefits to be derived from it.

4. Closely related to good project management is *external supervision and oversight* of projects. Sometimes project committees adequately supervise the building and maintenance of projects, but more often, additional supervisory mechanisms play a useful role in ensuring the requisite level of planning and management skills. The District Education Boards, for example, supervise the use of funds on the part of primary schools. *Harambee* secondary schools must submit monthly audits to the Provincial Education Boards. The Community Development Office requires written records of cash, labor and material flows. A donor agency may provide on-site supervision of the use of materials it has contributed. An institution such as a church may provide supervision for projects which it has helped to fund. Locally prestigious people may serve on project committees, adding their personal status, and that of the institution they represent, to the committee's membership. In all these ways, external mechanisms of supervision and review of projects assure appropriate use of funds and improved performance of projects.

5. The strength of *patron-client relationships* in a given area affects in several ways the number and performance of *Harambee* projects. The most important patron, insofar as *Harambee* projects are concerned, is the Member of Parliament. The MP seeks to demonstrate his loyalty to his constituency and to gain the support of local residents by helping to organize development projects, by contributing to projects, and by getting the support of others for projects in his community. An MP with powerful links to the center, particularly to high levels within the administration, can be instrumental in bringing both private and public assistance to projects in his home constituency. Evidence from all six Locations suggests that assistance from patrons facilitates the completion of projects and helps ensure their satisfactory performance. A small percentage of projects gets caught in the crossfire between competing patrons. Although these projects may receive wide publicity, they are not characteristic of customary levels of project success with patron involvement.

6. *Other outside assistance* — governmental, private local donor, or international aid donor — has been important in encouraging mobilization of local resources for projects and in facilitating the prompt completion of projects. Such assistance has been provided in the form of matching grants, whereby the local community raises a designated sum for a project, and the government or outside agency releases funds which permit the project to get underway. Alternatively, some agencies provide "topping up" funds or material which bring to completion a project the local community has nearly finished. Both are incentive mechanisms which help motivate the local population and encourage the release of local resources.

7. A *strong resource base* facilitates the implementation of *Harambee* projects. Those communities, for example, with a cash crop have more funds to put into a range of projects and greater

ease in bringing the projects to fruition than do those without cash crops or other significant sources of income. In Kenya those areas with a strong resource base are relatively densely populated and thus the fixed capital costs of many projects can be spread over more families than is the case in the resource-poor areas. Research also revealed that the resource-poor areas had more problems than affluent areas in terms of project completion and management because of resource limitations and inadequacies of rural infrastructure.

8. A *strong sense of community, group consciousness and communal solidarity* can enhance project success. In one Location, where land adjudication was in process and clan rivalries were strong, *Harambee* projects were not thriving. In another, where factionalism had emerged during the coffee boom and disagreements over the administration of the coffee cooperative and the location of the coffee factory had become bitter, it was difficult to get people to work together on a location-wide basis. In a contrasting case, strong community loyalty had fostered the creation of a *Harambee* development organization by Nairobi and Mombasa residents who sent money back to their home district for *Harambee* projects. (For an extended analysis of local politics and their consequences for cooperation in one of the areas studied, see Geoff Lamb, *Peasant Politics: Conflict and Development in Murang'a*, New York: St. Martin's, 1974.)

9. An *increasingly aware and sophisticated community* can enhance the success of *Harambee* projects. Awareness is encouraged by educational opportunities, by radio and newspaper, and by local administrators and other leaders who kindle a development interest in their communities. All of these foster knowledge of the options and opportunities open to rural residents and encourage them to become more active in determining the course of change within their own communities. Although *Harambee* may derive from traditional activities, the use of cash and the modern functions to which it is put give the more knowledgeable and sophisticated community an advantage in the self-help approach to development.

10. *Integration* of a project into an overall framework for development is an important ingredient of project success. For example, some *Harambee* secondary schools have failed when the community simply did not have enough graduates from Standard VII to fill the secondary school's Form I annually. Some economic projects have failed because the supporting infrastructure was insufficient to permit the villagers to take advantage of them. Those projects which have been most successful have received careful planning in the initial stages to ensure not only community support but also the ability of the community to use and benefit from the project in the context of the existing rural infrastructure and an overall framework of change.

Keeping these conditions for project success in mind, it is useful to consider the data from the six Locations in regard to the issues posed at the outset of this report.

Self-Help and Equity

Results of the survey questionnaire indicate that within communities, self-help is a method for enhancing equity among local residents. Contribution levels, in all six Locations, were higher among more affluent socio-economic groups while benefits were enjoyed across socio-economic strata. Twenty-six percent of the respondents in the poorest quintile did not contribute to any self-help projects, whereas only 7 percent of the wealthiest quintile, and 14 percent of the entire sample did not contribute. Among the non-contributors in the poorest quintile, 68 percent indicated that they were enjoying benefits from one or more *Harambee* projects. Benefits accruing particularly to higher or lower socio-economic groups vary according to project type. Projects undertaken through a self-help mechanism have not been of a sort easily captured by local elites for the benefit of only a few.

Data reveal that self-help is an important means of directing urban wealth back into rural areas, but the process, operating as it does through a decentralized organizational structure and through strong patron-client links, contributes to increasing disparities among geographical areas. There were substantial differences in rate of project completion, complexity of projects undertaken, and satisfactory management of projects, between the affluent Location and the poor Location in each of the Districts studied. Looking at the national figures, Central Province, already the most powerful politically and economically of Kenya's seven Provinces, receives nearly one-third of the value of *Harambee* resources generated.

Variation in project choice, complexity, completion rates and performance suggest that inequities among communities will remain, though the "floor," the basic minimum of facilities and opportunities available in any community, will rise. Thus, within a community, *Harambee* self-help is an equitable means of development generally directing private wealth to public uses with broad-based benefits for all. It is a contributing factor in widening differences among communities, however.

Harambee and Participation

Responses to the questionnaire indicated that participation in the implementation of *Harambee* projects through contributions of cash and labor is widespread. Eighty-six percent of respondents had made cash contributions; 62 percent had made labor contributions. Labor contributions by the rich and poor quintiles within a Location were approximately the same, a surprising finding. An average of 94 percent were benefiting from one or more projects to which they had contributed; 48 percent were benefiting from all contributions they had made; and only 6 percent said they were benefiting from none of their contributions. Seventy-three percent of individual project contributions made by respondents were bringing benefits to the contributor at the time of the survey.

Participation in planning and decision-making, as well as in evaluation of projects, however, is minimal. Among the male respondents, 18 percent had had committee experience, and of

these, over one-third were from the top socio-economic quintile. Among female respondents, half as many—9 percent—had had committee experience, and over one-fourth of these were from the top quintile. While committee membership may be skewed toward more affluent local residents, they clearly do not have a monopoly on committee positions. There is, however, a network of committee members, and within a community an interlocking committee structure customarily exists. Local notables circulate among the various committees within a Sublocation, and the committee structures emphasize continuity and stability with few changes in personnel.

Decentralization as a Mode of Development

Evidence indicates that there is no neat formula or "mix" for the ratio of central versus local planning, initiation and implementation of projects. Decentralization may accentuate disparities in the ability of local communities to organize themselves and to generate development. On the other hand, in those very communities which have the most difficulty under a decentralized system, centralized planning has led to failure. One of the six Locations graphically demonstrated the failure of both centrally initiated projects and decentralized projects in the absence of most of the conditions for successful projects listed earlier. Findings of this study suggest that a careful blend of approaches, using central government or external technical skills, supervisory mechanisms and outside resources, as well as local community resources and organizational base are essential to the development process. This corresponds to the overall conclusion reached by Cornell University's Rural Development Committee from its comparative study of 16 countries in Asia, concerning the importance of "linkage" (Uphoff and Esman, *Local Organization for Rural Development: Analysis of Asian Experience,* 1974).

Development Through Self-Help?

Evidence collected from the six Locations indicates that self-help projects enhance the application of local initiative, knowledge and resources to the development process. Comparisons of project types across Locations demonstrated the utility of maximizing this local input through careful formulation of project committees which can ensure that development efforts are undertaken by the local community and that projects which are undertaken are of value and use to local residents. Moreover, findings of this study suggest that increasing public knowledge and participation, including involvement of patrons in projects, are important ways to ensure that funds are used appropriately and that powers are not abused.

While Kenya's Five Year Plan acknowledges the central role of *Harambee* self-help in the rural areas, Nairobi's planners have not infrequently dismissed the impact of self-help as negative or, at best, inconsequential. Rural residents perceive self-help differently. Among respondents to the survey, only 5 percent held negative attitudes toward self-help. An additional 6 percent were indifferent or uninformed. Eighty-nine percent responded positively to the presence of self-help projects and to the prospect of more projects within their home communities

Self-help is not without problems in managing priorities and ensuring adequate planning, appropriate use of funds, and a high level of technical competence. It is, however, not only self-help which faces these problems, and as an organizational framework, this approach to development offers a way to broaden involvement in development efforts, to widen participation in decision-making, management and implementation of projects, to release private resources for public benefit, and to increase productivity and welfare for all socio-economic strata within communities such as Kenya.

Linking Levels of Planning and Action for Participatory Rural Development

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Promoting farmer participation in the choice and operation of their own agricultural programs on a national scale requires the creation of institutional linkages which extend and regularize communication and cooperation between farmers and government staff. Relevant levels of decision-making and implementation range from the village to the sub-district (in India, the block), to the district, and finally to the state and/or national government.

If a new and better pattern of agricultural planning is to be accomplished, the organizational and administrative implications of this problem of linkage, from the farmers' level to higher tiers of administration must be thought through. This is something which the Agricultural Administration Unit of ODI is concerned with and which it is studying jointly with counterpart institutions in India, where a wealth of experience raises both problems and possibilities for improving agricultural performance.

Diagnosis and Programming at the Farmers' Level

"Participation" implies that farmers themselves have a major say in the choice of innovative programs, in deciding on the methods to be used, and in organizing their own contributions of labor and management. The degree to which they can make decisions which will advantage them, without outside aid, will depend very much on circumstances. Farmers cannot decide by themselves

to use a technique unknown to them (e.g. the Anand Milk Scheme in India), for which the processing and marketing element is not at the time available to them. On the other hand, their own knowledge of their own conditions and constraints -- and sometimes entirely self-generated successes — can be an absolutely decisive factor (too often unknown or disregarded by officials) in shaping their best course of action. Sometimes such a course is only made possible, not by technical advice, but by minor investment for which some outside help is needed even if their own labor is provided.

Today, a fresh approach to local programs is particularly needed in environments to which the all-too-standard official programs to adopt high yielding varieties and heavy credit debts are inapplicable — in dry lands with low or uncertain rainfall, mountains, pastoral situations. "Participatory" strategies are all the more relevant in such conditions even if these are difficult and costly environments to work in.

From the outside, the first problem is to improve the methods of helping farmers in such situations where one factor at least is outside their knowledge or their control. There are many individual examples of how this has been successfully done, from particular spots in Asia, Africa and Latin America. But these small spots of achievement are a tiny fraction of whole countries in which participatory action should be widely possible. Moreover, they often spring from Voluntary Organizations which have gotten to know local farmers, or from individual technologists who have been able to spot and extend particular opportunities/innovations which Government staff, overburdened by cut-and-dried duties and programs, have either not perceived or been unable to pursue within bureaucratic rules. There is a host of such local examples of small-scale success in India, with which I am most familiar, and in the literature from all over the world.

To regularize and extend local diagnosis of needs and of hitherto unseen potential, to devise consequent local programs, and to attain cooperative, consultative attitudes on the part of the Government staff raises many practical problems. Who is to consult, with how many farmers, what skills are needed, how long would it take per village or with small groups of villages, what about continuing contact? We might assume a diagnostic team of three persons (local field man, agriculturalist, engineer), but perhaps animal husbandry, tree planting, fisheries, or economic appraisal would be needed. True, they could be brought from block or district offices, with specialists contributing one or two days' consultancy as needed. But will non-specialists recognize opportunities? In many real life cases, results have come from a single enthusiast with technical knowledge, or a group of non-governmental enthusiasts, or from a university or research institute deploying far more, and more skilled, staff to a few villages than ever could be found or afforded by government for widespread application.

There is need for research and experimentation on this. Do we know of *any* scheme which could be a model *suitable for general, widespread application,* with reasonable costs, time taken, manpower required, and provision for imagination and flexibility? At present, it seems we know mainly small spots of enthusiasm, single techniques, voluntary effort — or formal, overstaffed surveys. Getting *systems* of participatory rural development, based on well-conceived and imaginative diagnosis of concrete local situations, remains a great challenge to all of us.

Implications for Planning and Operation at Higher Levels

Sub-District or Block Level. Assume for a moment that such participatory, locally adapted programs (not merely shopping lists) are possible and are submitted upward for approval, support and inclusion in sub-district plans— and such planning efforts are growing fast in India — what are the implications at this sub-district level?

They are considerable, even alarming. They involve first a training of village-contact field staff: (1) to spend more time getting to know farmers and listening to them; (2) to use imagination; and (3) to know when to stop trying to sell existing programs and when to rectify them for local circumstances. It involves therefore specific *management* of field staff which gives them time and authority to behave like this. This means not preempting their time and their wits by smothering them with routine, top-down duties and reports. It means, also, that much of their work will be concerned with local diagnosis.

A simple planning and programming mechanism is needed, with proposals coming from villages being aggregated in terms of supplies, minor investment, staff availability, timing, finance, and necessary follow-up and monitoring. Who is to do this? Is the Programme Implementation and Management (PIM) system proposed by Chambers and Belshaw (*Managing Rural Development,* 1974) essentially right and feasible? There is plenty of room for research on what *is* being done now, and what could *better* be done. It might be noted that an examination of the content of village plans proposed under the Daudzai experiment in Northwest Frontier Province, Pakistan, were radically different *after* consultation and technical diagnosis from the pre-existing, top-down plans and programs. This fact speaks volumes. The misfit of bureaucratic programs and style with participatory action was excellently illustrated in Fortmann's article on Tanzania (*RDPR,* Vol. 1, No. 1).

District Level. Implications at this level are also formidable. In a situation where provisional plans were coming from the sub-district level and where they were genuinely assumed to be the best set of solutions to locale-specific needs and enterprises, district allocation of resources should be more heavily influenced by such considerations than is at present the case. Now the bulk of programs are in fact centrally devised or put forward based on district-level information. In a revised scheme of things, the district would have a number of tasks:

(1) To aggregate and reconcile sub-district proposals with necessary national, regional or district priorities;

(2) To allocate staff, money, materials, etc. accordingly;
(3) To coordinate the efforts of many departmental staffs;
(4) To give technical support and managerial supervision to subdistrict personnel, including work on diagnosis.

The latter considerations need further comment. In a great many countries, and particularly those influenced by British administration in the past, district level coordination of departmental staffs has been managed by some form of leadership or coordinating authority vested in a District Commissioner, or Governor or Minister. It is the almost universal experience that this fairly loose arrangement works, in fact, badly, even where it works amicably. It can be argued that a task of this complexity requires not this type of personal "coordination" but a unified management.

This implies something like a District Agricultural Development Authority (the title does not matter), with a modern, unified management structure having appropriate functional divisions (Finance, Personnel, Production. Supply, Transport, Marketing, Planning, etc.). The divisional directors would be very much the same as the departmental district representatives today. But the crucial difference is that this staff would deal with its own management (the Authority), and the lines of contact with State-level departments would run *to the Authority*, not directly to district representatives sharing the sovereignty of their State departments. Apart from this lateral unification, there remains a problem of technical guidance and supervision from the State level (engineers, foresters, agronomists, etc.). This vertical line would, however, pass as guidance to the Authority, in a way that designers of industrial management systems improvised long ago when they faced this issue.

This concept is still revolutionary in most countries, but not inconceivable. It has very large implications for State level performance and duties. Reaction to such a suggestion needs to be tested with LDC governments, if we are to regard agricultural administration as a *management system*, with some possibility of systems analysis. At present, as a management system, agricultural administration might be said to have largely failed.

State Level. The implications at the next higher level, where it exists, as in India and Malaysia (States), Indonesia, Pakistan and Turkey (Provinces), Egypt (Governorates) or Thailand (Changwats), is primarily with regard to devolution over the whole agricultural development field. This means transferring some authority downward to the district level, except where state (or multi-district) planning and control are essential (often power, water, trunk communications and some other national investments). Forms of devolution include finance, with block allocations to districts, subject to audit, subdivided into fungible sectoral budgets at district level, and managerial authority over all district staff, subject to technical supervision as mentioned already. There are other implications, but these two are of overriding importance.

There have been tentative experiments in devolution, such as in Sri Lanka, and numerous suggestions that the center should take a sharp step backwards from the detailed controls now exercised (see *Agricultural Administration*, 1979, No. 6). The pattern of devolution here mentioned implies a supervisory, technical and broad financial *policy* control from state level, directed toward self-contained *operational management* at the district level. This latter would be in support of still lower-level planning and implementation with much greater participation of rural people than is now the case.

These proposals may be regarded as radical, even visionary. But if we are serious about participatory systems at farmer level, the degree of flexibility and local discretion, the alterations in planning and programming procedures and content, and the coordination of the multiple functions inherent in agricultural development in fact demand an administrative and managerial movement towards the goals indicated here. All experience suggests that effective participation will not otherwise take place.

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Editor's Note:

The Agricultural Administration Unit, which Mr. Hunter heads in London, is working on various parts of the problem discussed here, including: the nature, effectiveness, etc. of various types of farmer groups; local diagnosis and programming; farmer service centres; district and area planning and operation; management of programs for the unemployed landless; management of irrigation schemes; and central management systems reaching from the state to the farmer, with particular reference to the implications of participatory schemes at field level for higher management and planning staff.

The AAU is seeking information from persons and institutions in various LDCs which can improve operational understanding of these problem areas. Because of Mr. Hunter's experience in India, some of the initial work of the AAU is focused on collaboration with Indian counterparts. (The reader is referred to Mr. Hunter's books, *Modernizing Peasant Societies*, and *The Administration of Agricultural Development: Lessons from India*, Oxford University Press, 1969 and 1970.) Two monographs published recently by ODI are reviewed in this issue. Communictions to the AAU on these subjects can be addressed to the Overseas Development Institute, 10-11 Percy Street, London W1P OJB, England.

8

Organizational Impediments to Making Participation a Reality: "Swimming Upstream" in AID.

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Among the many changes mandated by the 1973 foreign assistance legislation which initiated the "New Directions" for the U.S. Agency for International Development, participation of the poor in helping themselves has generated the most interest. Congress and the Agency are committed, at least in theory, to participation of the poor in planning, design and implementation of projects and programs emphasizing basic human needs. Yet for all that, there has been far too little consideration of operating rules and styles within the donor organization itself which complicate, if not defeat, those officials who may be committed to participation of beneficiaries in projects and programs. Indeed, there are almost no incentives for officials to design projects which are effectively participatory, and there are a multitude of disincentives to do so. The official who wants to, and succeeds in designing participatory projects, is *swimming upstream*.

The discussion here undertakes to identify various factors within donor organizations that impede effective participation of the poor in program and project planning and implementation. USAID is not unique in this problem, and may even be more receptive to new approaches than some other donor agencies. But its clear mandate from the U.S. Congress means it should be attentive to organizational limitations in its pursuit of these objectives. Its experience should be instructive for all concerned with participatory approaches to rural development.

The body of learning known as "organization theory" has emphasized that organizations replicate in their outputs what they practice internally. An hierarchical organization with its pyramidal structure of authority has clearly demarcated levels of influence and status which themselves inhibit participation within the organization. Such an organization will not suddenly become participatory when interacting with its external environment, and indeed, there is something of a bias against participatory features of its program since these would be dissonant with its own operation.

The presence of hierarchy within a donor agency gives rise to patterned hierarchical behavior when agency members interact with, for example, host country officials and, should they ever be contacted, the rural poor of a host country. Host country officials are themselves often as removed from contact with the poor, especially the rural poor. So the effects of hierarchy within the donor agency may be reinforced in this regard by the existence of hierarchy in host country government organizations.

AID is not an overwhelmingly hierarchical organization. Its many bureaus, missions and offices are, however, indeed hierarchical and execute as much authoritarian control as one encounters in any large organization. In practice, it is a patchwork quilt of organizational patterns, and it is more hierarchical than one might assume, given the nature of the cleavages between "field" and "headquarters" which we will discuss below.

Some of the pulls toward centralization and hierarchy are predictable and spring from external pressures on the Agency, such as from the U.S. Congress. One of the ironies observed is that AID's efforts to meet Congressional directives calling for more participation at the grassroots in development programs are caught up in responses to other Congressional pressures making for more hierarchical and less participatory management of program design and delivery. No aspects of this paradox is more evident than in the pressures to "move money."

In *Inside Foreign Aid,* Judith Tendler goes into some detail about the peculiar pressure on Agency officials to "move money," giving examples from experience in Brazil. Officials must obligate money as quickly and expeditiously as possible for two reasons: to meet internal management targets which measure "progress" in terms of expenditure, and so that the agency's appropriations do not get cut in next year's budget. Moving money is far easier to do in large projects, which move through the review process as quickly as small projects (sometimes more quickly). They are thus more "efficient" in terms of administrative overhead. Large projects are usually too complicated or too technical to allow for participation by intended beneficiaries. Indeed, consultation with beneficiaries, giving them some voice in identifying problems and in the means to be used, invariably slows the process of design and approval. Even if it might speed subsequent implementation, this does not get counted.

Participatory projects are commonly more difficult to initiate and take more time to organize. They tend not to use large blocks of money, work best when small scale, and, if participation is more than symbolic or manipulative, they may give rise to conflict. The rational official will rarely opt for the participatory project, which cuts into his obligation rate and may affect his future career adversely. If no credit is given for developing participatory projects, to use our initial metaphor, he must swim upstream if he designs and implements such projects.

Responsibility for this "money box" paradox is divided. It can be most effectively unlocked by Congress. Congressional control and oversight of AID's activities is far more pervasive than for any domestic agency. Congress must signal whether or not it wants its priority for participation to be smothered by contrary behavior intended to meet or anticipate Congressional criticisms on "efficiency" or "effectiveness" grounds. At the same time, an overly anxious agency, possessing "normal" bureaucratic instincts, is inclined to overract to criticism and to self-impose unnecessary restrictions and criteria which inhibit pursuit of participatory goals.

In addition to the money box paradox, one can cite organizational problems, personnel systems, and work group styles as among the other major kinds of constraints which impede the design and implementation of participatory development projects. One of the disturbing aspects of a hierarchy or highly centralized organization is the loss of information and of *quality* in that information as it is transmitted from one level of organization to another. The agency's dilemma is that it has both distortion in information flowing from bottom to top, and span of control problems given the nature of the field-headquarters split.

There are special problems arising from the cleavages between Washington and the field missions. This is no ordinary kind of field-headquarters cleavage as described in textbooks. Woven throughout this division is a dual personnel system. Civil service personnel need not and usually do not serve overseas, and only foreign service officers can be regularly posted abroad. This concentrates civil service officials in Washington, among whom are numerous politically appointed personnel. Considerable effort has been made this past year, however, to merge the foreign service and civil service systems. The presence of these two personnel systems has consequences directly impeding effective personnel interchange between field and headquarters. So complicating the differences in roles and perceptions between Washington and the missions are differences in experience between the two sets of staff.

Responsiveness to Congress gives the Washington-based staff its prime responsibility. Yet often these officials explain problems to Congress without knowing the circumstances of the country or project in question. Washington-based officials are perceived by field staff as having a more overtly political job and also less technical expertise. They are thought to have less knowledge of working and living abroad and little knowledge of projects visited on a parachute team basis. One mission director told me, "typically AID's own senior headquarters staff, many of whom are political and/or new to the Agency, get in about one orientation visit per country." Thus the staff in Washington make "well-meaning but often counterproductive suggestions, and give detailed guidance on programs that originate and are planned and carried out across oceans and in different cultures."

No small part of the tension between headquarters and field is the contradiction between operating procedures and the content of the "New Directions." As one official said plaintively to me, "The change to the basic needs approach argues for a 'bottom-up' approach. But the change was mandated to me from the 'top-down'. They tell me that peasants need to feel ownership by participating in the decision-making process. What about my participation in this decision-making process?" Even when, or if, this official comes around to accepting the central importance of participation by the poor in decisions which affect them, his own issue has salience and credibility. One can argue that he might well have generated participatory projects with more commitment and vitality if he had had some, even small, voice in the decisions launching these "New Directions."

Missions, it is true, contribute to some of the problems impeding participatory development. The mission community has its own social life and style; housing is often elegant and free; and many posts carry handsome hardship post differentials. These factors complicate easy relaxed interaction with host country people on any but a most formalized basis.

Beyond such influences, there is the less visible but certainly important issue of group work styles in missions. To the extent that Washington requires a fairly elaborate and steady flow of paperwork, and to the extent that amounts of money to be obligated have increased without concomitant increases in personnel, skill in design work is important, visible and rewarded. Status and rewards thus flow to the project or program officer, whose performance is considered essential for mission success. He, or more rarely she, has to go through the socializing peer rituals so that the mission will prosper. A staff member who decides to break away and build his or her own relationships among host country nationals likely finds that such individualistic behavior is disapproved because it carries negative externalities for the collective work of the mission.

Mission personnel spend most of their time interacting with one another for some intrinsically rational reasons, given the reward structure of their agency. Cultivating relationships among host country officials is difficult enough; establishing substantial relationships among the rural poor is out of the question. At most, keeping "in touch with the rural poor" requires twice annual visits to the "boonies," a visit probably involving only a quick visit with some other official. In many missions, it is rare to find more than a handful of staff who visit (not stay) for any length of time in the field to discuss participatory projects with local people. Visits to the field are usually of short duration in order to get back to the more comfortable headquarters to catch up on paper work and keep one's political fences mended. Even some of the recent efforts at decentralization are not likely to address this problem fully since the project process itself remains largely unchanged. Too many projects are generated within mission offices among staff rather than growing organically from discussions with rural people.

As Tendler says in *Inside Foreign Aid,* "The organization expands backward into the task environment and starts to manufacture project applications itself. It hereby lessens the high degree of uncertainty of the environment from which it gets its inputs, assuring itself of a more reliable source of supply." This "source of supply" is crucial if one recalls the essential importance of obligating funds before the end of the fiscal year in order to sustain the appropriation from Congress the next time around. Consider the implications of this interlocking set of processes for participatory planning.

There is little time for the long, careful nurturing of contacts with host country nationals outside or beyond those in the counterpart bureaucracy. Indeed, since one must work through the host government, many people within missions argue that it is highly inappropriate for them to have many

contacts with nationals beyond the government. This means that "participation" in project planning is limited to what the counterpart administrator says about a project idea.

Many of those working with a serious commitment to participation labor long and hard at creative, if not ingenious ways for eliciting participatory projects, going around the obvious hurdles we have considered. Often this route requires contracting with a private voluntary organization which will in turn establish contact with other voluntary organizations within the host country. Yet it can be argued that this is still not participation where host country nationals generate a project or contribute significantly to its design. The likelihood of ideas being drawn from the "poor majority" is extremely low, since organizational membership, as we know from ample research, is highly correlated with income and urban residence. Going outside the agency, to engage PVOs, is no guarantee of substantial participation from the so-called "target groups." The organizational constraints within the agency which block the efforts of officials interested in designing participatory development efforts need in any case to be addressed.

One of the most unfortunate aspects about the agency is that all too often it frustrates the very able people within it who are deeply committed to development work normatively as well as professionally. These people continue to swim upstream, developing special "coping mechanisms" as they go. These officials deserve a more conducive work environment, buttressing their efforts to further goals mandated by the U.S. Congress. These persons are not only deeply frustrated, they are also overworked. The agency at its peak employed nearly 16,000 persons; now it employs approximately 5,000 and spends far more money. Many of the problems discussed above are magnified by this fact: there is more work to do and fewer people to do it. No wonder that time and energy are not sufficient to initiate projects more in keeping with the Mandate.

Some empirical verification of this was received in the spring of 1978 when the Development Studies Program of USAID designed and administered a sample survey on work conditions, behavior and attitudes to a stratified random sample of 101 officials in the Agency. All questionnaires were administered in person; interviews ranged from 45 minutes to over 90 minutes. Interestingly enough, some 34 percent of the officials interviewed ranked local participation as their most preferred policy for implementing basic needs. On the other hand, some 42 percent of the respondents said they had designed very few programs or projects in the last three years which had improved access of the poor to decision making in those projects.

There are many hurdles in the way of those interested in participatory projects, but even small gains are worthwhile. Reversing decades, even centuries of contrary practice and belief is a slow process. We find participatory projects to be intrinsically worthwhile as part of that generative process by which the poor begin to affect their own future. Those who perceive the linkages between poverty and powerlessness of people will appreciate the potency of participation for development.

Participation and Project Success: A Reanalysis of the Development Alternatives Study

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The proposition that "participation" of small farmers in the design and implementation of rural development projects increases the project's chance of "success" is accepted as an ideal by most of those engaged in development work and as a fact by a growing number of agencies and development teams. The idea of encouraging participation as an end in itself and as a counter to the many centralized government bureaucracies that control rural development originated in the liberal wing of the U.S. Congress, but as a scientific hypothesis, it has analogues in the literature. If true, the hypothesis would significantly widen our understanding of the rural development process and open up new possibilities for project design, administration and implementation.

It is remarkable, therefore, that only one rigorous study of this proposition exists. That research is reported in the two-volume study by Development Alternatives, Inc., *Strategies for Small Farmer Development: An Empirical Study of Rural Development Projects* (Westview Press, 1976). This research compared successful and less successful projects in Latin America and Africa, 36 in all. Using multiple regression analysis, the authors assessed a broad range of determinants and concluded that "local action taken by small farmers to complement outside development management and resources . . . explained 49 percent of the variation in the overall success rankings" (p. 203). A strong result, indeed.

Their master variable, local action, was a composite measure based on four components:

- Value of farmers' labor resource commitments divided by the average of pre-project and post-project on-farm incomes.
- Value of farmers' money resource commitments divided by the average pre-project and post-project on-farm incomes.
- Small farmer involvement in idea generation and initial project design, coded 1–5.
- Small farmer involvement in the implementation phase, coded 1–5. (Dialogue = 1; dialogue, decision-making and project control = 5.)

Thus, the overall local action scale, which was formed by adding the

standardized scores of these four components, combined two types of involvement and two types of commitment of resources. Each of these components is important in itself, but together they constitute an operational definition of local action or, more loosely, participation.

The measure of overall success was also a composite with four standardized components:

— Adjusted ratio of total project cost to total project income over the life of the project.
— Scale of increased agricultural knowledge.
— Scale of self-sufficiency.
— Scale of self-help capability.

The first component is an overall economic conception of project success. The details of this ratio are discussed below, but it is apparent that project "income" is a complex denominator, involving estimates of the increased farmer income, separate from other income sources. This figure is calculated over the life of the project which, in some cases, was quite long. The scale of agricultural knowledge is also a "gain score," and the knowledge considered covers both cognitive information and the farmers' ability to utilize a wide range of new practices. Indeed, it is almost an "adoption scale."

The third and fourth components are quite innovative in their attempt to assess the capacity for continued development. The self-sufficiency scale focuses on economic continuity, while self-help reflects organizational build-up.

In addition to these "core" variables, the field investigators collected a vast amount of detailed information on the projects from which they constructed a broad range of variables. Some of these are important and innovative in themselves, but for present purposes we can consider them as "controls."

All told, this is a remarkable and pioneering study. The criticisms made below should be read against this generally positive view. Although I conclude that the work has some serious flaws, and the reanalysis of those variables which are salvageable results in a major qualification of the DAI claims, no more refined analysis of this problem area could have been attempted if this data set and analysis had not been provided in the first place.

Criticisms

The problems with this research are partly inherent because the projects were heterogeneous in content, area covered, time span, country context and many other factors. The measurement error that probably resulted from such heterogeneity cannot be helped. It is an argument in favor of the research findings that there were regularities despite such probable error. But some deficiencies could have been avoided.

Time sequence of independent and dependent variables. Two of the dependent variables, the income/cost ratio and the scale of new knowledge are bona fide dependent variables because they could only have resulted from project activity, but the other two dependent variables, self-sufficiency and self-help, involve components that functioned at least in mid-stream and very likely even at the beginning of project activity. In short, some of the "effects" existed before the presumed causes could operate, making the research design faulty.

Mixing of independent and dependent variables. It is difficult to establish the operational separation of social variables under the best of circumstances, but in this case, redundancy in the measurement of some of the independent and dependent variables is serious. Two of the independent variables, small farmer involvement in project design and involvement in project implementation, are linked, via the existence of local groups, to two of the dependent variables, self-help and self-sufficiency. The latter two dependent variables involved local groups in the specific mechanisms of self-sufficiency and self-help, and in the second index local social organization is specifically measured. At the same time the description of the measures of involvement (p. 402) emphasizes dialogues with project staff and decision-making on key aspects of the project. It is doubtful, however, that farmers participated as individuals. More likely they did so as members of local groups. In any event the authors acknowledge a group context for small farmer involvement, especially project implementation. They comment, "The importance of groups was brought home again, as two group proxies appeared to have a significant impact on involvement" (p. 62).

Technique for constructing composite measures. The four principal independent variables and the four dependent variables all involved complex judgments, weightings and combinations of components, and this complexity is further compounded by combining these sets, by way of standard scores, into two composite variables: overall local action and overall project success. The problem with these composite indices is that they combine components that are either not related at all or are related at a low level. Thus the cost/income ratio correlates .35 with the self-sufficiency index, and the self-help index correlates .30 with cost/income. With respect to the local action index, involvement in implementation correlates .01 with labor commitment and -.02 with money commitment, while labor and money are themselves correlated only -.22 (p. 299). So it appears that these two composite indices are mixing apples and oranges.

The authors of the study seem aware of this heterogeneity, because they note that standardization permits the addition of variables with distributions that are initially different. That is true, but the merging of such weakly correlated components defeats the whole purpose of index building, which is to construct a broader measure which is still interpretable as a single variable. Pinning the label "project success" or "local involvement" on these disparate bundles simply confuses analysis. It would be much better to deal with the components separately — they are complex enough as it is. The authors do this in some cases, but they were not systematic in their effort, and consequently missed a crucial pattern.

Barriers to replication. These projects took diverse forms and lasted varying lengths of time. Some were area specific, while others extended across a whole country. Talking with project personnel and a few farmers is probably inadequate to obtain the

rather precise information called for as raw data in the report, but only further research can resolve that point. A more serious question is whether this field technique tends to build in a bias. After all, the researchers knew the hypothesis that they hoped to prove, and it must have been difficult to be completely objective when they gathered information on various measures of participation at the same time and in the same circumstances as they gathered information for the dependent variables.

From the point of view of future replication, some of their combinations of items are equally questionable. Their index of self-help is a combination of the answers to six complex questions. Each of these questions has a number of parts, varying from two to ten, and the parts often require complex judgments. For instance the area of "creation of new (non-traditional) leadership positions and specializations" requires a judgment between the following possibilities: no new non-traditional leadership positions; number of leadership positions in local area increased; many positions created with evidence that leadership developed can move beyond the local organizations to larger leadership opportunities (p.255).

The income/cost ratio involved several complex steps to arrive at a numerator, and about the same number for the denominator. Each one of these steps was itself a complex estimate, such as percent yield increases per standard land unit, percent income increases per standard land unit, etc. And these numbers themselves, as noted above, were based on estimates and averages.

A Reanalysis

If the foregoing criticisms are accepted, we are left to work with two of their four dependent variables: knowledge increase, and the income/cost ratio. The composite measure of success is dubious on the grounds of incommensurability of the four components. The other two indicators, self-sufficiency and self-help, may be moved to the independent variable column, assuming they are not consequences of the project activity.

The cost/income ratio is still troublesome, however. It is not reasonable to expect participation and other project-specific determinants to predict this ratio, since the cost of the project is often determined by political and other exogenous factors and may be capriciously inflated. At this stage of research, it is more important to discover the factors that predict increases in farmer income, regardless of project costs. It is, however, precisely such variables that are embedded as components of the denominator of the cost/income ratio and they deserve attention. Accordingly, we may extricate the following measures from the composite income index and add them to the list of dependent variables:

— Percent change, pre-project and post-project, in on-farm family income that resulted from project activity. (Note that this is an average of all family farms, regardless of the amount of land.) (p. 246)

As potential independent variables we can retain the four components of local action: farmer involvement in project design and in implementation, and small farmer commitments of labor and money. Additionally, we have available the indices of self-help and self-sufficiency as predictors. Unfortunately the report did not include the values for the many "control" variables, so it is impossible to use them in our analysis. But from the results already published in the DAI report, we can judge that variables such as per capita income and involvement in the marketing economy would continue to predict components of project success, but would not reduce the contribution of any of the participation variables that are used here. This working assumption can be checked later when all the variables are available for analysis.

Before presenting the regression results that use the variables listed above, there is one more amendment that must be made. The analysis that follows deletes five cases on the grounds that the country-wide operation (or in one case the duration) of the projects probably undermines the credibility of data on small farmer income or involvement. Thus, in an attempt to sharpen the results by eliminating a probable source of measurement error, the following cases were dropped: KTDA/Kenya, NCDS/Bolivia, CAH/Paraguay, FECUAC/Bolivia, and Vicos/Peru. The sample was further reduced in some runs by lack of data for certain variables, so the working sample is uncomfortably small. Thus, it will not be possible simply to put all the potential independent variables into one equation even if that were desirable, which it is not.

A reasonable starting point for the reanalysis of these data is to ask whether the same variables predict increases in knowledge and increases in farm income. These two dependent variables are correlated to the extent of .45, but they differ fundamentally. Income is usually considered a final output (despite differing consumption habits), while knowledge must still be converted to income. It does not follow, however, that knowledge increases are the cause of income gains; there are other possible causes of that. Moreover, income and knowledge gains were measured in this study at the same time point, so we cannot know whether knowledge gains are linked to income gains in these particular projects.

What independent variables should we use? The choices in Table 1 were based on the surmise that the determinants of knowledge and income gains were class specific. Commitments of money are more typical of the better off farmers. In contrast, poor farmers can only contribute labor. All farmers, regardless of class, could be involved in the organizational support of the project although it is reasonable to expect differential participation in this aspect too. The results of the multiple regression analysis shown in Table 1 support this hypothesis. Monetary commitment is a significant predictor for both knowledge and income gains, but it is a stronger predictor for the latter. The relation of labor commitment to income gains is non-significant, while involvement in implementing the project is *negative*. In other words, those projects where the farmers make monetary commitments show more monetary gains. Involvement in project implementation, on the other hand, is

Table 1. Multiple regression analysis of small farmer knowledge and income gains (N = 26).

Dependent variable	Independent variables			$\bar{R}^2$
	Implementation	Labor	Money	
Farm income gains	-.31*	.15	.90*	.69
Knowledge gains	.42*	.31	.57*	.54

*All numbers are standardized partial regression coefficients (betas). Betas significant at the .05 level (an F of 4.24 or higher) are noted by an asterisk.

Correlations for variables in the regression analysis:

		2	3	4	5
Farm income gains	1	.45	-.15	-.33	.81
Knowledge gains	2		.59	.22	.49
Involvement in implementation	3			.34	.12
Labor commitment	4				-.41
Money commitment	5				

negatively associated statistically with such gains.

What variables predict knowledge gain? Monetary commitment as noted, but also labor commitment. Even more significant, from the point of view of this analysis, is the finding that small farmer involvement in project implementation is a *positive* predictor of knowledge gains.

What these results suggest, then, are two patterns of project success: a direct and compact sequence of monetary commitment leading to high economic pay off, versus a more organizational and poor farmer-specific strategy of improving practices and knowledge, presumably as a step to pay-off.

Substituting involvement in project design gave virtually the same results. A similar but weaker pattern appeared when self-sufficiency was substituted as an independent variable and when income per unit of land was substituted as a dependent variable. But substituting self-help for implementation in Table 1 sharpened the results; then money commitment became the *only* significant predictor of monetary gain. All three variables — labor and money commitment, along with self-help — contributed strongly to the prediction of knowledge gains, increasing the adjusted $\bar{R}^2$ by 14 points, to .68. A likely interpretation of this last result is that although self-help and implementation are strongly correlated (.79), self-help is a more comprehensive index and better reflects the organizational aspects of small farmer involvement.

Whatever the interpretation of Table 1, there is clearly a contrast in the way the implementation involvement variable operates with respect to the two dependent variables. Thus, the central DAI result is confirmed only with respect to knowledge gains. Small farmer involvement of the type that most people would call "participation" did not contribute to money gains; only money contributions did that. Thus, participation may not be the all-purpose determinant of project success. A skeptic might even wonder whether it comes into play only when the farmers have nothing else to contribute.

Why did the DAI analysis miss this result? There are several reasons. In the first place, family income gain was only one component of the more complex measure of project success in economic terms. If the DAI authors studied this dependent variable separately, it is not reported. They did, however, report their equations for knowledge gains and one of these equations included labor and money commitments, but it did not include involvement in implementation. In their study of knowledge gains the DAI authors were content to use their overall measure of local involvement, which obscured the separate contribution of its heterogeneous components.

A New Variable

One other result which I was able to draw out of the cornucopia of data and analysis is a new variable labeled "regional solidarity." The second volume of the DAI report, which includes brief case studies of each of the projects, supplied the information for coding three levels of regional solidarity. The descriptions were coded 1 to 3 to the degree that some overarching regional organization reinforced the motivating, coordinating, and disciplining aspects of rural development. This coherence would be attributed to widely held values and/or widely accepted roles making for cooperative behavior. Thus, for example, the Tiv in Nigeria were coded 3 on the basis of the following description:

> The Tiv have a strong traditional structure, though one which is not highly stratified. Unlike other parts of Nigeria, leaders at the village and district levels are elected by adults eighteen years and over. In most cases this means approving the traditional leader in line for the job; however it does allow the Tiv the option of rejecting individuals who might be unsuitable. . . . The cohesiveness of the Tiv has been reinforced by their religion. Most are Christians, belonging to either the Dutch Reform Church or the Catholic church. In part due to the influence of the Dutch Reform Church, the Tiv have become known for their strict rules of discipline in their own lives and in their social and political institutions. (II, 223)

In contrast the following description of a project in Colombia was coded 1:

> Generally, the only elements in common between the *Futuro*-assisted communities are those which explain or reinforce their poverty, such as small farm size; severely eroded soil; scarcity of

Worldwatch Institute, Worldwatch Paper no. 30, June, 1979.

Inayatullah (ed.) *Rural Organisations and Rural Development: Some Asian Experiences.* Asian & Pacific Development Administration Centre (APDAC), P.O. Box 2224, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 1979. 511 pages. (US $4.00)

Inayatullah (ed.) *Approaches to Rural Development: Some Asian Experiences.* APDAC, 1979. 429 pages. (US $4.00)

Inter-American Foundation. *They Know How . . . An Experiment in Development Assistance.* Washington, 1977.

Jaworski C., Helan. "Towards a New Information Order: Rural Participation in the Peruvian Press.' *Development Dialogue,* 2, (1979): 115–145.

Stiller, Ludwig F. and Yadav, Ram Prakash. *Planning for People: A Study of Nepal's Planning Experience.* Nepal: Research Centre for Nepal and Asian Studies, Tribhuvan University, 1979.

Wignaraja, Ponna, et al. "Bhoomi Sena: A Struggle for People's Power." *Development Dialogue,* 2, (1979): 3–70.

Wong, John (ed.) *Group Farming in Asia: Experiences and Potential.* Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1979.

Income and Employment. 184 pages. ($4.50)

Rosenberg, David A. and Jean C., *Landless Peasants and Rural Poverty in Indonesia and the Philippines.* 133 pages. ($4.00)

Staudt, Kathleen. *Women and Participation in Rural Development: A Framework for Project Design and Policy-Oriented Research.* 77 pages. ($3.50)

transport infrastructure, schools and social services; underemployment; malnutrition, and a collective inertia born of despair and distrust. (II, 327)

Projects oriented to small farmers living under the control of large landowners were usually coded 1. On the other hand, tribal differences per se were not necessarily rated low; it depended on whether the project used different approaches for the differing tribes. Most of the groups were coded 2, reflecting an overall judgment of a "normal" rural area or one with a mix of factionalism and traditional leadership.

Clearly, this approach required fairly well defined areas, and thus (as before) four cases of nationwide activity were dropped. Another case, Vicos, Peru, was dropped because the time span was so long that it was impossible to tell whether the DAI field investigators had coded the first phase, the middle or the last and apathetic period.

This crude score of regional solidarity did not predict the dependent variables very well when put in a regression analysis along with measures of self-help or involvement in implementation. Aside from the possibility that regional solidarity was irrelevant to this analysis, the measure involved a great deal of coding error and, more importantly, the other variables were "closer" to the dependent variables. However, regional solidarity does show up as one variable in a factor analysis of the independent variables, as shown in Table 2. It loads at an acceptable level on factor I which includes involvement in design, in implementation, and the self-help and self-sufficiency measures. The other factor is based only on money and labor contributions (with opposite signs). What this means is that the first four DAI variables may be aspects of a broader dimension. A weaker interpretation is that regional solidarity reinforces the tendency of farmers to participate, perhaps via the local organization implied in the self-help and self-sufficiency measures.

Substituting regional solidarity for the four participation variables would decisively change the interpretation that the DAI authors give to their measures of local action. Their view is that "After studying the local environment, project designers can most strongly influence potential success in rural development projects by generating various types of local action — small farmer involvement in project design and implementation and his commitment of resources" (p. 52). Thus, local action is a potential policy variable, something that administrators can foster and perhaps create. If, on the other hand, the components of local action are embedded in a regional structure, the policy potential of these variables is greatly reduced. Is the project director prepared to generate tribal cohesiveness or to break the hold of the large landowners in a region?

The existence of supra-local variables is made more plausible by an interesting finding in the DAI study which, however, the authors are unable to interpret. In four out of five of their *sets* of equations (302ff), they report that the number of riots occurring in the country was a positive and significant predictor of their various measures of project success. Considering the small number of cases and the fact that this variable applies to the whole country, while most of their projects are operating in a particular region, this is a remarkable result. It admits of the simple interpretation that if the repressive forces in a country have relaxed to the point where riots and protests are even possible, then perhaps rural development is also facilitated, even if officials consider it simply as a bargaining chip. Riots and protests are the poor man's lobby. Their appearance is a good sign for advocates of rural development.

Table 2. Principal factor analysis (varimax rotation) of social action measures

Variable	I	II	Communality
Involvement in project design	.65	-.13	.44
Involvement in project implementation	.91	-.21	.86
Commitment of labor	.24	-.43	.24
Commitment of money	.32	.94	.98
Regional solidarity	.55	.17	.33
Self-help organization	.95	.04	.90
Self-sufficiency mechanisms	.79	.03	.62
Percent of variance explained	74	26	

*Communality measures the degree to which the combined factors predict the individual values of the variables. A low number means that other factors or measurement error are significant predictors, and therefore the variables may be weak. By this measure regional solidarity is weak — but commitment of labor is even weaker.

Conclusion

This partial reanalysis of the data from the DAI's pioneering study of the determinants of rural development project success suggests, contrary to the interpretation in the report, that local action is not a unitary phenomenon and that in fact its several components make contrasting contributions to the prediction of two measures of project

success, increased income and increased knowledge. DAI's most direct measure of small farmer involvement is negatively related to the first and positively to the second dependent variable. The fact that contributions of labor show a similar pattern suggests two types of projects, one for poor people and another for the less poor. In the second case, where the farmers contribute money, the result is increased income. Where the farmers participate and contribute their labor, the result is increased knowledge of agricultural practices which may — or may not — be converted later to increased income.

Another conclusion of this analysis is that a supra-local variable, here called regional solidarity, is an integral part of the cluster of participation variables. These include small farmer involvement in project design, implementation, and two measures of local organization. This interpretation is consistent with a less policy oriented interpretation of the local action variables, again contrary to the DAI thesis.

In sum, this partial reanalysis of the DAI study suggests that approaches to managing rural development projects should be keyed to the resources of the small farmers that we work with. *But* it may also be that the possibility of such differentiated approaches is strongly conditioned by the shape of the social organization in the area as a whole, and perhaps even by the state of politics in the nation. Only more research of the type that DAI has initiated will settle the question of whether it is worth tuning the piano even if the legs are going to be cut off.

Professor Young, a member of the Rural Sociology Department at Cornell, was assisted in this data analysis by Linda Bush, Chris Hermann, Will Waters and Douglas Young.

projects

Innovative Approaches to Development Participation in Rural Bolivia

Kevin Healy
Inter-American Foundation

Over the past nine years, the Inter-American Foundation (IAF), a Congressionally funded alternative foreign aid agency, has sought out and discovered unusual, innovative and autonomous local organizations. Part of the IAF's Congressional mandate is to be responsive to poor people's self-designed project proposals, a process that often involves a kind of risk taking and pioneering predisposition which traditional major donor agencies could ill afford to entertain. Further, by operating in the non-governmental sector, the IAF has been able to skirt large-scale bureaucratic environments and power elite clienteles of national governments. This approach has opened a wide field for funding bottom-up initiatives contained in locally developed project proposals. The Ayni Ruway project generated among the Quechua-speaking people of the Bolivian Andes is an excellent example of such a program.

Spread across the Andean chain between Colombia and northern Argentina, the Quechua people number close to 20 million, representing the single largest native-American linguistic group in the Western hemisphere. As in many remote areas of Third World countries, few programs during the last two "development decades" have made inroads toward improving the low incomes, apathy and low agricultural and livestock productivity of the Quechua. That this unhappy past need not represent the future, though, has been shown by an IAF-supported group or "network" primarily in the Bolivian Department of Cochabamba calling itself *Ayni Ruway* (collective work). In the years since 1974 this group has forged a remarkably original rural development strategy rooted in an Andean cultural focus.

Ayni Ruway is both the name of this particular group and its system of organization and social communication. The group consists of the "external team" or *equipo externo*, comprised of five rural school teachers, a psychologist, and an economist, 12 *jatun kamachis* (supra-local leaders) and 60 *kamachis* (local leaders). Starting six years ago with two communities, they have now articulated a network of over 80 highland rural communities and four urban barrios of low income families to pursue conventional development goals within a movement of cultural revitalization.

Ayni Ruway aims to increase rural production, employment, incomes, and access to lower priced basic consumer items as well as to improve overall market relations. The tactical elements employed thus far include barter, theater as a non-formal education tool, and diverse forms of production and exchange. The Quechua concepts which underpin the integral system of social communiction are the *Ayni Wasi* (house for everyone), *pirwa* (collection/exchange centers), *ruway* (production), *khuyay* (social aid and concern), and *phyllay* (play and festivity).

Non-Monetary Exchange Network

The Ayni Ruway non-monetary exchange network departs from the conventional organizational patterns of co-operatives and rural associations to link together communities in a mutually supportive production exchange structure through the barter mechanism. Barter is an institution with a long history of adaptation to Andean social and economic life, but it has been undermined by modernization forces and the commercialization of agriculture during recent decades. It is based upon two other Andean concepts

related to resource management and product exchange — "verticality" and "reciprocity". Both these cultural continuities are overlooked by modern rural development planners and administraters. "Verticality", as described by the anthropoligist John U. Murra, signifies that the peasant household and community ideally seeks to maintain access to multiple plots of land (or access to products) in a critical maximum of micro-climatic and altitudinal zones within the rugged, mountainous Andean terrain. This optimal arrangement offers peasant households a more diversified food basket because of sharp contrasts among climatic zones for crop specialization. "Reciprocity" involves symmetrical patterns for the exchange of goods, gifts, and labor services between families, kinship groups and communities without middlemen or markets. Ayni Ruway links together communities in diverse ecological zones through a chain of strategically located storage-exchange centers, the *pirwas*, and *Ayni Wasis* (houses for everyone) managed by the *kamachi*. Each community joins the network by endorsing the basic principles of social communications and by offering a specific product (e.g., wheat, wool, freeze-dried potatoes) for which demand exists and whose exchange value gives access to a variety of basic consumer items which are also locally produced (e.g., candles, soap, noodles, hats, sugar, salt). For example a *campesina* will take her spun alpaca yarn to the nearest *pirwa* to obtain the equivalent value or credit balance for noodles, soap and candles. The exchange values for these items are set regularly by an assembly of *kamachis*, *jatun kamachis* and members of the "external team" of educators; there is no cash involved in these transactions. In addition to the network's operations, there is also a great deal of undocumented exchange taking place spontaneously. In a sort of multiplier effect, various communities take initiatives to change trading partners in a wide range of permutations for the flow of goods. Overall, the network constitutes an alternative rural development strategy to satisfy some basic needs and to minimize the prevailing inequal market relations of rural communities with the outside world.

To supply non-farm products to the Ayni Ruway network, small cottage industries (*ruway*), have been organized in *Ayni Wasis* in urban Cochabamba to produce bread, noodles, flour, candles, soap, looms, clothing, hats, and furniture, mobilizing 130 workers full or part-time, mostly female. Rather than wage payments they receive the exchange value of other rural produced goods. The steady, systematic progression of Ayni Ruway to organize new cottage industries for the production of other necessary consumer goods reflects the ideology of self-reliance and long term goal of self-sufficiency. Nevertheless, the value and volume of the goods transferred within the non-monetary network remains relatively small. All the members and communities do not rely exclusively on Ayni Ruway to satisfy the consumption needs for these products.

Ayni Ruway transports goods between and among the rural and urban *pirwas* by its own pick-up trucks and encourages the use of public transportation (buses and trucks) by the *kamachis*.

Handicrafts Production

Handicrafts production is the single profit-making activity built into the non-monetary exchange network. Over 450 artisans in rural communities make ponchos, bags, scarfs, alpaca fabric, etc., to be sold by the Ayni Ruway's urban commercial outlet, PROCAM. PROCAM exports a portion of this diverse production to Western Europe, but the major volume passes to tourist and internal middle-class markets. Not to be taken as wild-eyed romantics, the business-minded actors of Ayni Ruway have organized an elegant centrally located store for tourists which also offers chic fashion for Cochabamba's urban elite.

Artisans are rural-based and exchange their products at the local *pirwa* to obtain the basic consumer's items flowing through the network channels. If alpaca wool is not produced and spun locally, they obtain it from the *pirwa*. Wool spinners are sometimes separated by a division of labor and location from the artisan. They exchange their wool for consumer items; the wool then passes to an artisan community via the *pirwa* where it passes another exchange step to become the raw material in the hands of the artisan. Once a sweater or poncho is finished it passes back through the *pirwa* again for transport to PROCAM. Over a recent three-year period, $20,000 worth of artisan products were exported and $60,000 were sold locally by PROCAM.

As its retail outlet, PROCAM gives a cash flow to the Ayni Ruway system for incremental capital accumulation, savings and the capacity to invest (redistribute) earnings in the expanding urban and rural productive and social infrastructure. The *jatun kamachis* participate by taking turns handling specific administrative functions in bookkeeping, accounting, banking, and investment decisions in PROCAM.

In order to increase control over the cost and supply of alpaca wool, Ayni Ruway has begun to purchase its own alpaca herds to put under the control of communities with extensive grazing lands and herd management skills. A part-time veterinarian has been contracted to oversee these production operations which will be a key to Ayni Ruway's future in handicrafts.

Decision Making

Ayni Ruway's system displays an interesting blend of centralized and decentralized decision-making functions in a non-bureaucratic setting. The *equipo externo* members are stationed ¾ of the time in rural communities and the rest in Cochabamba with PROCAM. There are no centralized officers, a difference from most rural development agencies. The *equipo* works closely with the *jatun kamachis* in the administration of grant monies, the quality-control of the handicrafts products, the PROCAM handicraft business, co-ordination of transport, production, technical training of the *kamachis* and in the reinvestment of earnings in productive and social-cultural infrastructure. For informalized decision-making, however, there is a great deal of interaction with the *kamachis* administering the *Ayni Wasis*

and *pirwas;* in fact for many decisions the actual decision-maker is difficult to discern given the highly mobile style and constant mode of interaction between the *kamachis* and the center. Decisions are made within a dynamic process.

On a day to day basis the local level *kamachis* have the following duties and responsibilities: the administration of the *pirwas* in accounting, bookkeeping, and quality control of handicrafts, the establishing of exchange values, communications with other *campesino* communities, organization and supervision of production workshops, recruitment and orientation of new Ayni members, communication with local authorities as representatives of Ayni Ruway, and organization of theatre presentations.

The on-the-job training in administration and bookkeeping is a non-formal education process which rivals that of state schooling. As one *campesino* woman remarked:

> "My daughter will not attend school but rather will be educated in the Ayni, going with the *kamachis* to organize the Ayni, know other places, learn how to write, do calculations, sew and whatever else, but above all helping poor *campesinos* such as ourselves."

Forty-eight out of fifty-eight *kamachis* are young Quechua women in their teens and twenties. This is partly explained by the nature of exchange and handicrafts activities, which are traditionally in the domain of Andean women, and because of the seasonal out-migration of many male heads of farm households in an area of acute agricultural underemployment. However, recent expansion into regions of heretofore isolated Quecha-speaking ethnic groups has engendered more male participation.

Kamachis are not elected formally by the community as is the case among most peasant organizations. *Kamachis* volunteer themselves after a demonstrated commitment to action endorsed by Ayni Ruway principles. They simply "*salgan por si*" (they just emerge), and are easy to identify. The *jatun kamachis* and "external team" approve their self-selection once support, dedication and ability have been ascertained. The widespread presence of young women in local leadership positions in the movement undoubtedly helps reduce the "bossism" syndrome which still plagues *campesino* syndicate organizations.

It should be noted, however, that not all members of affiliated communities participate in Ayni Ruway (an estimate would be on the order of 46-60%) nor has Ayni Ruway totally replaced the market with the barter mechanism. Its barter system presently functions in terms of a limited number of priority products for the farm households, which have been the easiest to produce technologically and/or the easiest to acquire and transport in bulk.

Parallel market participation continues on another level (sale of potatoes, corn, wage labor, credit) for those tied into the non-monetary exchange network. Nonetheless, self-reliance remains a long term goal and measurable advances toward it are made each year.

Cultural Revitalization

Along with the organization and institutionalization of the barter mechanism, Ayni-Ruway motivates rural participation by using a repertoire of activities which revitalize Quechua language, culture, values and history. Perhaps the foremost concern is upgrading the status of the mother tongue, Quechua, which has historically been second class compared with Spanish and systematically suppressed by the State since the European invasion centuries ago. Social communication within the system is expressed in the Quechua concepts of *ruway* (productive activity), *pirwa* , *phullay* (play and festivity), and *khuyay* (social services).

Phullay is best exemplified through the rapid proliferation of theater groups within the community network. Over 15 *kamachi* organized theater groups involving 70 people perform dramas on a regular basis with themes such as rural-urban conflicts, declining ritual practices, problems with merchants, truck-owners, local bosses, and schoolteachers, and the superior shared values espoused within Ayni Ruway . The *campesino* theater performances, with the exception of a troupe of the *jatun kamachis,* are not well rehearsed nor technically refined. It has become a spontaneous mode of collective expression, in a randomly picked rural outdoor setting, to tap local themes, sentiments and values.

It is primarily based on improvisation and mime, and fosters audience participation. The drama frequently triggers dance and song about Quechua legend and tradition. An Ayni Ruway publication expressed the following:

> "As a contrast the forms and meanings of the educational action in Ayni Ruway has another kind of reasoning. In the case of theater, they put into play the total language; words, looks, smiles, tones, symbols, gestures, all of which transmit and revive an ancestral message."

Quechua theater serves additionally as the vehicle of entry into new communities to introduce them to Ayni Ruway.

Phullay is also embodied in the local printing of *Quechua* newspapers which convey current events, episodes and popular stories. One member will dictate and another literate *campesino* will write in Quechua (the Ayni Ruway experience demonstrates that a bilingual native who writes in Spanish can easily learn to write in Quechua). Other *campesinos* will draw scenes from local Andean life. One recently drew color images of the principal types of woven articles and geometric symbolic motifs they express for in the Quechua newspapers. The newspaper is written in the community by Ayni Ruway members, printed by the "external team" in the city and then returned to the community for distribution and discussion as the official organ of popular cultural expression. The process instills pride and self-confidence, and presents real incentives and opportunities for self-expression and the maintenance of cultural integrity. Newspapers are then exchanged and shared among communities in the network.

Ayni Ruway gives systematic support and reinforcement to ritual practices, traditional fiestas, and local fairs which

have fallen into disuse. They remain as vital solidarity mechanisms. Ayni Ruway has encouraged the restoration of "sacred local places", for instance repairing old shrines and a cemetery door, examples representing non-productive investments to build psychic energy for a variety of Andean development endeavors. A recent publication by Ayni Ruway said of its philosophy.

> "Since communication is fluid, participation is not subject to complicated rules of control. 'Barter' as well as 'theater' and the 'fiesta' present communal schemes for exchange and integration. Nobody remains outside the process of communication. There exists a basic sentiment of help, cooperation and the natural distribution of roles. . ."

Spin-offs

Ayni Ruway is attracting attention from different sectors. Last year in the anniversary issue of the Cochabamba daily newspaper, a major article appeared with the title: "Ayni Ruway, El Novedoso Ensayo de Desarrollo Rural" (the novel effort in rural development). The Ministry of Education has signed an agreement with Ayni Ruway to receive from it technical assistance in non-formal education through Quechua theater. It has assigned numerous schoolteachers to establish *Ayni Wasis, pirwas,* and Quechua theaters in communities of work. Ayni Ruway educators and *jatun kamachis* have been working with them during the past year with promising results.

The network has extended into wool-producing, Quechua speaking areas of northern Argentina and a few middle-class Argentines have become full-fledged supporters and promoters. It has also spread recently into other regions of Bolivia among some of the most traditional and isolated ethnic groups generally outside the mainstream of rural development programs and projects of any kind, public or private. In these areas, where cultural continuities are so deeply embedded and protected, Ayni Ruway can be expected to generate another fascinating chapter in the Latin American rural development experience.

reviews

Agricultural Development and the Rural Poor

Edited by Guy Hunter
Overseas Development Institute,
London, 1978

Extension, Planning and the Poor

Paul Devitt, Guy Hunter, and Janice Jiggins
Overseas Development Institute,
London, 1977

Revlew by Milton J. Esman
Cornell University

The Agricultural Administration Unit of ODI, under the leadership of Guy Hunter, has pioneered in articulating and exploring the implications of what has become the prevailing doctrine of rural development. The thrust of the ODI position may be identified through such statements as:

> We believe that a radical revision of both strategy and tactics are needed. . . The fundamental objective must be to *enable* the mass of rural population who are now in poverty to *earn* by their own efforts the basic human needs of livelihood.
> *PARTICIPATION.* But administration, even of good policies, cannot do the job by itself for the millions of the poorer rural people. There can indeed be dynamic government action, in investment in the rural environment and infrastructure, so that the field of action can become one in which human energy can be more fruitfully employed; in service, to follow up that action; in technical innovation and information; and in maintaining a stable framework of costs and prices and a fair balance of rural-urban terms of trade. But final achievement depends upon the initiative and self-organization of the poorer people themselves and the demands which they make upon government. It is the business of government and administration so to cast their policies and their contacts with the rural population that this initiative can be far more widely supported and translated into action. Growing participation and self-confidence will enable a whole section of the rural population both to initiate more of their own small-scale development and to assume their share of the civic responsibility and influence which has hitherto been almost wholly outside their grasp. 'Rural activists' are needed, both from the people and from the staff who support them. Finally, the whole process, if it is to retain its dynamism, must be backed by continuous (and increased) programmes of education and progressive upgrading of skills.

This doctrine evoked a remarkable consensus among senior agricultural administrators from developing countries and knowledgeable academics who participated in a conference at Ditchley Park in May 1978 and approved in substance the vigorous "Declaration" and "Guidelines" for action. This approach is explicitly billed as a "reformist" strategy, assuming as it does that there are untapped opportunities within most existing political structures to achieve significant improvement in the productivity and welfare of the rural poor.

The Declaration and Guidelines cover a wide sweep of policy and program issues, ranging from land tenure and land settlement schemes, through credit, marketing, and farmers service center, to the problems of rural livelihoods under such "special environments" as pastoral societies, irrigation systems, and steep hills and mountains. While it is impossible in a brief review to summarize the analyses and proposals affecting these diverse problem areas, there are two common themes that inform the entire exercise. The first

is the participation and empowerment of the rural poor through organization; the second is the challenge of improving agricultural administration.

While the appropriate form of local organization depends on factors specific to each society, two kinds of organizations are identified: local public authorities which are governed closely by law and supervised by agents of the state; and small associational groupings organized informally around common tasks of mutual interest to members, but with the capacity to expand, in time, into formal organizations serving large numbers of participants. The state should aid and support such farmers' groups, especially those oriented to production, but avoid the temptation to assume control of them.

But in order to work with and through such grass roots organizations, state bureaucracies oriented to agriculture and rural development must be drastically reformed and improved. In this hitherto frustrating dimension of rural development, the ODI approach seems to focus on three major themes: (1) improving and upgrading the quality of field level staffs, those who are in direct contact with the rural public, e.g., the thrust of Janice Jiggins' essay "Motivation and Performance of Extension Field Staff;" (2) the need for more flexible and responsive structures and more decentralized procedures to deal with the site-specific and often unpredictable problems encountered in providing services to the rural poor; and (3) the importance of implementing improved procedures for integrating the various specialized services intended for rural people, especially those concerned with agricultural production, both at the planning and the operating levels of government. The vital interface between state administration and organized rural constituencies has been identified by the ODI — in company with Cornell's Rural Development Committee — as a major focus of attention where improved public intervention can be fruitful.

From these very useful short publications, a number of contentious issues emerge. These include such, by now, standard questions as whether rural credit should be subsidized. What particularly interested this reviewer was the contrasting emphasis by Paul Devitt (presented in "Poverty-Oriented Rural Development") and Guy Hunter ("Planning and the Small Farmer") on the appropriate balance between local autonomy and bureaucratic services. Devitt's view, as I understand it, is that the rural poor must develop greater self-reliance, that too prominent a state bureaucratic presence, even when well intended, creates debilitating dependency; local groups should be encouraged to develop on their own and in their own good time without outside interference, except for that of young, educated, short-term volunteers who can serve as catalysts and resource persons.

Hunter and the Ditchley conference argue, in contrast, the necessity for improved and more responsive service bureaucracies, since the rural poor can never command all the resources that are required to improve their livelihoods. In fact Hunter argues against devolving functions and committing public resources too rapidly to "democratic" local bodies, if such bodies are likely to be dominated by the non-poor who would preempt for themselves the benefits intended for the poor. Both arguments recognize the importance of vigorous local organizations of the rural poor, but they imply different operating strategies and time perspectives.

In the opinion of this reviewer, Hunter's argument is more persuasive; while too much state activity can smother local initiative, the neglect of the rural poor by the state has been one of the principal contributors to their poverty and powerlessness. The main value of the ODI papers is in identifying and exploring the combinations of local initiative and state support that can chart effective reformist strategies of broadly based rural development.

Political Participation in Latin America

Volume 1 *Citizen and State*, John A Booth & Mitchell A. Seligson (eds),
Holmes and Meier Publisher, New York and London, 1978.

Volume 2 *Politics and the Poor*, Mitchell A. Seligson & John A. Booth (eds),
Holmes and Meier Publisher, New York and London, 1979.

Review by David Scott Palmer
Foreign Service Institute

Political participation is an old and honored concern of social scientists. From Plato to Polanyi keen interest has been expressed in the ways individuals relate to the broader systems of community and state and the implications of these relationships. One strand of traditional theory, reflected in the writings of Rousseau, among others, argues that both citizens and society are enhanced by their fullest possible involvement. Another strand, from Burke et al., emphasizes the dangers to citizen and society alike which can result from active mass participation. Yet a third, Marxism and its variants, challenges the very bases of existing society and postulates the necessity and inevitability of establishing a new system through militant, revolutionary class action.

A number of modern American economists and political scientists, the so called "pluralist" school of Schumpeter, Truman, Dahl, and others, attempt to reconcile such disparate views by postulating that a reasonable, moderate, and stable political system requires only moderate levels of citizen involvement for its continuance. In this view, high rates of participation are dangerous to system, read democratic, stability. Such contemporary "institutionalists" as Huntington reach similar conclusions with a somewhat different theoretical approach.

The predominance in the non-Marxist development literature of such modern pluralist or institutional theory has been challenged recently by a number of "participation advocates". Pateman, Vanek, Key, Berger, Bay, Woodcock, and others argue that both theory and practice suggest that participation in workplace, community, party, or bureaucracy, whether on the

"input" or the "output" side of government, enhances the capacities of both citizen and system. The two volumes under review deal explicitly with these strands of democratic theory and then review through both case and comparative research articles the varieties of participation in Latin America. That the result is uneven and incomplete does not detract from the importance of the effort or the utility of the findings.

In November 1976, some 60 social scientists (this reviewer included) were brought together by Booth and Seligson for a conference at the University of Texas at San Antonio on "Faces of Participation in Latin America: A New Look at Citizen Action in Society." Virtually all of them had been concerned, from a variety of disciplinary perspectives, with the ways in which citizens relate to their political systems. The better part of three days were spent discussing a provocative preliminary article written by the conference organizers ("Political Participation in Latin America: An Agenda for Research," *Latin American Research Review*, 11:3, 1976, 95-119). These volumes are a collection of some of the papers presented and discussed at the conference.

These two books, containing 28 articles by 30 different social scientists (22 of them political scientists) and a very complete bibliography, represent perhaps the most systematic effort to deal with this question in the context of Latin America. Each volume begins with three analytical pieces on participation theory. *Citizen and State* offers several country-specific studies (on Venezuela, Uruguay, Costa Rica, Cuba, Chile, and Peru) and a comparative article on participation and social security policies in the region. *Politics and the Poor* deals, predictably enough, with the peasantry, workers, and the urban poor. It contains case studies based on field research (on Brazil, Peru, Costa Rica, Mexico, Guatemala, Colombia, Bolivia, Chile, and Ecuador).

The theoretical contributions of the volumes are particularly useful. Booth and Seligson conclude that political participation in Latin America is typically neither violent nor irrational nor limited; if it does appear that the wealthy tend to dominate such participation, government action often plays an important role in its expansion. Thomas Baylis suggests that participation plays important roles in a variety of institutional settings, authoritarian and otherwise, which go well beyond mere influence of government and government policy. Lawrence A. Scaff and Edward J. Williams articulately lay out the argument that participation is the key to development. In their view, perspectives emphasizing the primacy of economic factors or the destabilizing nature of participation miss the crucial point that the citizen is both subject and object in the development process.

One of the most useful case studies in *Citizen and State* is William LeoGrande's discussion of the expansion of nontraditional participation in Cuba and the degree to which it serves as a satisfactory alternative to formal liberal democratic politics. The pieces dealing explicitly with state policies and participation, particularly Mark Rosenberg and James Malloy on social security and the two articles by Henry Dietz and Scott Palmer, and by Sandra Woy on the military government of Peru since 1968, illuminate the tensions involved and the opportunities created when governments presume to know what kind of participation is best for citizens and try to do something about it.

The various case studies in *Politics and the Poor* show quite dramatically the degree to which citizens, often described as passive or withdrawn, have a clear sense of their needs and understand the mechanisms necessary to accomplish them. While many of the results are not dramatic in national terms, they often provide important benefits to the so-called marginal groups. The importance of unions, as in Howard Handleman's study of Mexican workers, or of party, as in Brian Loveman's study of rural labor in Chile, suggest the impact of such organizations of participation; Thomas Greaves and Javier Albó's examination of a tin miners' strike in Bolivia indicates their limitations.

Both John Fishel's and Susan Bourque and Kay Warren's research in rural Peruvian communities show ways in which local aspirations can be accomplished for peasants and females, though subject to severe constraints. Booth's comparison of rural violence in Guatemala and Colombia indicates how electoral parity among parties and support for opposition parties can trigger large-scale violence under certain circumstances. Seligson's research with Costa Rican peasants leads to the conclusion that land reform can reduce pressures from the alienated for the overthrow of the existing system. Shepard Foreman's analysis of Brazilian peasants questions the value of self-help projects to bring about truly effective participation.

While both volumes contain short critiques by prominent discussants (Richard Adams in *Citizen and State*, Roberto Varela in *Politics and the Poor*), and while most authors frequently cite and discuss issues raised in their colleagues' contributions, there is in neither volume a concluding chapter bringing together the themes in an effort to achieve some sort of final synthesis. This is all the more necessary because a case study approach has been most often employed by the contributors. The inherent problem of generalizing from a single case could have been overcome more fully than it was by good synthesizing concluding chapters. Some of the case studies detract from themselves by emphasizing methodology at the expense of the details of participation itself. There is, furthermore, no systematic effort to relate citizen participation and government initiative (a small number of the case study chapters do deal with the issue), even though the argument is made that government policies are often the key to expanding participation.

Perhaps the most controversial theoretical issue is in their choice of definition for political participation. By defining it as "behavior influencing or attempting to influence the distribution of public goods," they are restricted to an examination of citizen-state or state-citizen relationships. This limits treatment of antisystem movements; hence, the volumes have little or nothing to say about such vital current issues in Latin America as guerrilla movements,

strategies, and potential for success.

In addition, as a number of modern participation theorists have argued, a great deal of the average citizen's time is spent in relating to non-government entities such as church, workplace, or community. Under their definition, however, such involvement cannot be readily dealt with though some of the individual authors do touch upon these aspects. Nor can the question of whether such activities satisfy citizen needs or serve as substitutes for the citizen-government alternative. A more satisfying definition of participation, from this perspective, would have been "citizen involvement in the decisions that affect their lives".

These limitations, while important, do not offset what is on the whole a ground breaking effort. As Booth and Seligson suggest in the introductory essay for *Citizen and State*, political participation in Latin America is perceived in a variety of ways, depending on the level of analysis and the theoretical baggage which analysts bring to their task. The number and range of studies on participation which they integrate into their work make it a very useful guide. While the articles within the volumes reflect many different approaches and display various kinds of limitations, one may still conclude, with Scaff and Williams, that participatory politics is indeed essential for development. Both volumes of *Political Participation in Latin America* help the reader understand why.

notes

A Symposium on the Economic Performance of Participatory and Labor-Managed Firms was held at Hamilton College May 3-4. The papers focus on: (i) theoretical issues; (ii) methodological problems of evaluating performance of these firms; (iii) empirical work in each of the various degrees of worker control (total, majority, and partial). Case studies range from Israeli kibbutzim to U.S. plywood cooperatives, codetermination in Germany, the Chilean experience, and the self-managed industrial complex of Mondragon (Spain). Those interested in receiving the list of papers presented may write to: Prof. Jan Svejnar, Program on Participation and Labor Managed Systems, 486 Uris Hall, Cornell University, Ithaca, N.Y. 14853.

The **Second International Conference on Self-Management and Worker Participation** has been organized for June 23-28 in San Jose, Costa Rica. Participants from many of the third world countries are discussing their experience and research in such areas as: (i) problems faced by these firms; (ii) methods of financing; (iii) self-management and employment generation; (iv) the role of self-managed firms as an alternative form of development. Information on the conference and on the papers being presented can be obtained from: Dr. Leopoldo Sandoval, Secretaria General, Conferencia Autogestion, I.I.C.A., Apartado 55, San Isidro de Coronado, San Jose, Costa Rica.

Begun in 1976 as a part of the Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations, the **Rural Organizations Action Programme (ROAP)** has taken as its central focus the role of the rural poor in development. Primarily it has looked at the question of why there has been relatively little participation of the rural poor in development programs, with the objective of devising development strategies that would incorporate the poor as active participants. Given the experience that most rural development projects have not been successful in attracting the poor in participatory roles of any significance, what can be done to put together approaches that will attract the poor? This is the central query that ROAP seeks to answer.

ROAP's specific objectives are: first, to ensure that existing organizations are revised if need be to attract the rural poor and promote the active participation of the poor in self-development; second, to stimulate the creation of new and different forms of rural organizations, which the poor can regard as their own and which will better satisfy their specific needs; and third, to promote self-supporting group activities among the rural poor through their organizations.

Thus far ROAP has undertaken and completed some 22 case studies on the role of people's organizations involving the poor in rural development; these studies included 4 in Subsaharan Africa, 7 in Asia, 6 in Latin America and 5 in the Near East. A consolidated report on the country studies has been published as "Participation of the Poor in Rural Organizations." A report on "Research Guidelines for Field Projects Promoting the Participation of the Poor in Rural Organizations" has also appeared.

Field research and action projects are currently underway in Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Nepal, Pakistan and the Philippines. Further projects have been planned for Cameroon, Egypt, Ghana, Kenya, Senegal and Zambia; possible projects are under consideration for Liberia, Sierra Leone, the Sudan and Somalia.

For more information and copies of ROAP's published reports, readers should contact the Rural Organizations Action Programme, Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations, Via delle terme di Caracalla, 00100 - Rome.

Cornell University is hosting the 1980 meetings of the **Rural Sociological Society** August 20-23. The focus will be on 'utilizing sociological research for public interest'. In addition to a panel on the role of participation in rural development, sessions on topics such as 'women in development', 'consequences of technological change in agricultural development', 'energy and rural development', and 'methods of rural development' have been arranged. Abstracts of the papers (available from August 7, at $1.00) or additional information about the meeting can be acquired from: Prof. Paul Eberts, Rural Sociology Department, 323 Warren Hall, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York 14853.

The University of Guelph sponsored a national conference on **Evolving Approaches to Rural Development in Canada,** in Guelph, Ontario, during 11–14 May 1980. The conference consisted in the main of an extensive series of workshops on contemporary issues in Canadian rural development, including workshops devoted specifically to participatory approaches, voluntary organizations, the "Animation Sociale" enterprise in Canadian francophone communities and appropriate technology.

Further information on the conference may be obtained from the Division of Continuing Education, Room 103, Johnston Hall, University of Guelph, Guelph, Ontario, Canada N1G 2W1.

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RURAL DEVELOPMENT
participation
review

Paraprofessionals in Rural Development: Reality and Potential

Ellen Taylor and **Cynthia Moore**
Rural Development Committee
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In response to the challenge of providing services to the rural poor, government and foreign assistance agencies alike are increasingly focusing their interest on the use of paraprofessionals as a low-cost, more appropriate way to extend needed and useful services. Orienting services along conventional western lines is financially impossible for most governments of developing nations; even when possible it is likely to result in an unequal distribution of services, or provision of services which are inappropriate to rural needs. The indigenous, community-based paraprofessional is a necessary extension to agencies charged with delivering services to rural populations. Through his/her greater cultural accessibility and affinity, the paraprofessional is expected to extend acceptable and appropriate services while activating local people to participate in the improvement of their own welfare. Arguments such as these have led to a proliferation of paraprofessional programs. Due to the lack of empirical evidence to support these claims as well as the relevance of this strategy to the broader concern of participation, the Rural Development Committee (RDC) of Cornell University, under its cooperative agreement with USAID, started a research program to analyze and document the paraprofessional phenomenon. The following discussion summarizes this research effort and highlights the major findings. The full report is being published as a State-of-the-Art Paper to be available Fall 1980.

Paraprofessionals: Roles and Functions

There is no standard definition of a paraprofessional. The role we find varies depending upon the country, the services being provided, the nature of the local community and the character of the paraprofessional. This front-line service extender has been called a village health worker, promoter, *animateur*, model farmer, or community health aid, among other names. While the concrete ramifications of the paraprofessional strategy vary with the situation and circumstances, the following characteristics form the core of the paraprofessional role:

—limited formal schooling
—limited pre-service training not exceeding several months
—indigenous to the service area although not necessarily of the same community in which s/he works
—direct contact with community members as a community-based worker
—part of an organized private or public agency
—semi-autonomous role in making day-to-day decisions.

Our research revealed that paraprofessionals generally work part-time and perform as many as eight major functions: service delivery, education, referral to other agencies or persons, community organization for self-help activities, acquisition of external resources, demonstrations and testing of new techniques or ideas, record keeping, and collection and analysis of data. While paraprofessionals often are expected to perform several functions at a time, the evidence suggests that it would be advisable initially to limit the scope of activities assigned to them and progressively expand their role as they gain confidence and experience.

Because an extensive literature review conducted by the RDC revealed that few systematic analyses or evaluations of paraprofessional use were available to aid program planners and administrators, field research was undertaken to enhance the available data base. Case studies in six countries on three continents were selected to illustrate varying circumstances in which paraprofessionals work and the scope and nature of their roles. The Rural Health Care Program in Guatemala and the Sine Saloum Health Care Project in Senegal were selected to study paraprofessionals serving in various aspects of rural health, as first-aid attendants, as midwives, or as general community health and environmental sanitation promoters. The Samahong Nayong and Farmer-Scholar Programs in the Philippines provide examples of paraprofessionals working in the field of agriculture. Cases dealing with the broader tasks of community development were the Community Devel-

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The **Rural Development Participation Review (RDPR)** is published by the Rural Development Committee (RDC) of Cornell University. It is funded by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) through a Cooperative Agreement on Participation and Rural Development between the Office of Rural Development and Development Administration of AID and the RDC.

The objectives of the RDPR are to share knowledge and ideas on rural development participation, to help develop a network of people interested in the subject, and to encourage and facilitate to the maximum extent possible the exchange of information and views between them.

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Please write to: Editors, RDPR, 170 Uris Hall, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY 14853, USA; telephone (607) 256-6370.

Editors: Harry Blair, Porus Olpadwala, Katherine Terrell, Norman Uphoff

Managing Editor: Barbara Williams Smith

opment Service in Bolivia, the Sarvodaya Shramadama Movement in Sri Lanka and the Project for Equal Access to Education for Women and Girls in Upper Volta. The project in Upper Volta also provides an example of paraprofessionals working in a development program primarily oriented to women.

A mix of government and non-government programs was selected in order to be able to compare the use of paraprofessionals in public and private development programs. In addition, choosing case studies from different countries made it possible to observe the use and performance of paraprofessionals under a variety of socio-cultural and political contexts ranging from villages in West Africa, where the influence of traditional chiefs and customs still predominates, to villages of Sri Lanka, whose long history of political democracy and experience with universal suffrage has fostered the emergence of numerous local organizations yet where patron-client relations still remain influential.

The case studies were researched in late 1979 after a month-long workshop when common research strategies and guidelines were developed to facilitate comparative analysis. The major research effort involved 2–3 months of in-depth field work in a selected number of villages within each country. Keeping the sample of villages small (4 to 6) allowed us to examine more closely the relationships among the paraprofessional, the community and the service agency, with confidence in the quality of the data and in our ability to define the realities of implementing a paraprofessional program.

As might be expected, evidence from the case studies confirms that (a) paraprofessionals can and do successfully extend useful services which would otherwise be unavailable to the rural majority and at relatively low cost, and (b) they are able to stimulate broad community involvement, including the transformation of traditional roles (such as the midwife) into new or expanded patterns of service delivery. This is all the more remarkable considering the hardships paraprofessionals face and considering that for

minimal or no compensation they are willing to do what others will not do for a salary. While the potential for using paraprofessionals has been conclusively shown, it often is not achieved in rural development programs because of poor management practices and inadequate support. The very problems which have plagued past development strategies reappear in paraprofessional programs.

Paraprofessionals Not Costless

Even though paraprofessionals have succeeded in extending needed services to significant portions of the rural population previously unserviced by conventional delivery systems, it would be a gross misconception to assume that the use of paraprofessionals is a cheap and easy solution. While a major rationale for adopting this approach has been its perceived cost-effectiveness, paraprofessionals are not costless. In fact, the cost of developing and realizing the potential of a paraprofessional program may be considerably higher than expected. Tacking paraprofessionals on to an existing, overburdened program or expecting them to function without sufficient referral and support services will do little to improve the welfare of the rural poor majority.

A recurring theme which appeared throughout the research analysis is that paraprofessionals tend to be more dependent upon a program's support services than are professionals. This reliance stems largely from the fact that paraprofessionals have only minimal training and little prior experience in the range of activities they are now expected to perform. Villagers are cognizant of the paraprofessional's limited technical competency and may be even further biased by the non-professional status accorded this worker, regardless of the paraprofessional's social position in the community and his/her actual competency vis-a-vis that of a professional.

Villagers want and need access to outside resources — material and technical — and the paraprofessional's credibility often depends upon being able to provide them this access on a reliable basis. Visible program support is necessary, therefore, not only to improve the paraprofessional's technical abilities but to establish and maintain the paraprofessional's credibility in the eyes of the community. We identified, in the analysis of the research data, three elements of program support commonly underfinanced or overlooked in paraprofessional program development but which are critical to paraprofessional performance: in-service training, supervision and the provision of supplies.

Training

Paraprofessional performance tends to be impaired by a lack of solid and reliable training support. Almost all of the programs observed using paraprofessionals offer some sort of pre-service training, of varying lengths (from one week to several months), at various sites (in local villages or in special training centers), and using varying pedagogic techniques (conventional and participatory). The research data, however, imply that more attention needs to be placed on the continuing educational needs of paraprofessionals, an aspect of training that is frequently neglected. No matter how thorough pre-service training may be, paraprofessionals cannot be expected to absorb enough material in a single training session to enable them to perform effectively: their limited educational backgrounds and unfamiliarity with their new or expanded roles, combined with the changing needs of a community, preclude this possibility. Paraprofessionals in our case studies continually stressed the need for more in-service training sessions. While administrators recognize their need, funds are seldom available to provide this service.

Supervision

Even though "control" tends to be the central function of most supervision, this aspect appears to be the least important to paraprofessional performance. More essential aspects of supervision include: providing assistance and continuing education to the paraprofessional; offering encouragement to sustain morale; and establishing visible support from the program which is crucial for maintaining the paraprofessional's credibility and legitimacy. All of these functions necessitate regular on-site visits by a competent outside supervisor. Other mechanisms such as communications media (radio broadcasts, cassette tapes, etc.) or community councils may be used as supplementary approaches to delivering a wide range of supervisory tasks, but should not be adopted as alternatives to person-to-person, on-site contacts.

Although it is consistently written into program designs, supervision is often glossed over in the actual implementation stages. The number of supervisors frequently is insufficient to serve the number of paraprofessionals in the program on a reasonable basis. Furthermore, supervisors tend to be poorly prepared for their tasks, especially in terms of personal communication skills, and poorly equipped to perform their roles, lacking means of transportation or access to technical materials for use in the field.

Supplies

The provision of program supplies and their delivery also suffers from inadequate planning and financing. The timely and regular delivery of supplies can be crucial to the continuance of, for instance, a village pharmacy or an agricultural program. Without drugs to dispense or fertilizer to distribute, the paraprofessional and his/her program may have no reason for existence. Yet supplies provided for by the program often are delivered late, on an irregular basis, or in insufficient amount. In other cases, the paraprofessional must follow a complicated and time-consuming procedure to secure supplies. All of these conditions discourage the paraprofessionals in their tasks and can undermine their credibility in the community.

To assure that a paraprofessional program has a solid training program, an adequate supervisory system staffed by well-qualified. people and a well-programmed supply distribution system, time must be spent in the organization and management of these components, and project funds for staffing and financing these activities must be sufficient. This will come only from a clear commitment to the

paraprofessional strategy, and often, a reallocation of funds. It also may require a reorientation of roles and responsibilities throughout the program.structure to facilitate the two-way flow of information and support. The effectiveness of a paraprofessional program is clearly correlated to the quality and extent of program support available to the front-line worker.

Greater Participation but with Qualifications

Evidence from the case studies verified that the use of paraprofessionals has indeed prompted broader local participation in rural development programs. Rural inhabitants have the opportunity to become involved in making decisions concerning their welfare and future through such programs. Paraprofessionals can and do activate rural publics into expanded self-help efforts. However, as may be expected, the extent and nature of this local participation is contingent upon the scope of participation permitted by program officials, the existing patterns of decision-making in rural settlements, and the interest and expectations of the rural populations.

Participation can be an ambiguous concept. References made to participation in paraprofessional programs often are couched in broad statements alluding to a wide range of activities. "Full community participation in the selection of the paraprofessional" or "the community council will arrange for the contribution of voluntary labor to project activities" are common phraseologies. Such participation by the local community is announced as assuring the choice of an acceptable paraprofessional who will be attuned and responsive to village needs. It is thought that through community support and management, the paraprofessional will be accountable to the community, self-sufficiency will be promoted, and the burden now falling on programs in terms of supervision and program support will be alleviated. The fact remains, however, that rural societies are rarely homogeneous. Rather several "communities" of varying socio-economic status with varying interests and priorities often exist within the geographical boundaries designating a community. Neglecting to take this into account may mean that the paraprofessional selected is unacceptable to or refuses to deal with other groups in the village, low-status groups may be underrepresented in project decisions and management, the flow of information may stop with the village chief and not be disseminated to the broader population, or project supplies and equipment may be controlled by local elites.

That local leaders and influentials play a crucial role in achieving local participation is clear. This is especially pertinent since what passes for a local organization is often a local leader with some following, perhaps in extended kinship or patron-client terms. Thus, it becomes essential to gain the support, or at least acquiescence, of authority figures who have considerable influence in rural areas. The deference accorded local leaders and their styles of leadership may either greatly promote or limit villagers' involvement in the paraprofessional program. If local elites are supportive of the paraprofessional program, the possibilities for success are greatly enhanced. However, the extent of local involvement may be compromised by situations where villagers are accustomed to "following" leaders' decisions. Also, we found cases where the traditional authority figures did not enjoy wide-spread confidence, and trying to work through the established village structure thwarted the paraprofessional's efforts.

For the purposes of our study, we looked at local participation in terms of *who* participated in project formulation, implementation (including evaluation) and benefit sharing, *how* they participated and to what *extent* their involvement influenced the nature of the program and the distribution of benefits. Specifically, we examined local participation in several key aspects of paraprofessional program management; program initiation and selection of the paraprofessional; community contribution to support the paraprofessional and his/her activities; local involvement in supervision, program management, and evaluation.

Program Initiation and Paraprofessional Selection

The determination of a paraprofessional program's nature and scope tends to be a policy decision with limited involvement by the local community. Village leaders often make the decision of whether to have the community participate in the program, and information in their hands does not necessarily disseminate to the broader population. An affirmative decision often requires some form of village commitment such as the construction of a health hut, the formation of a village committee and/or the selection of the paraprofessional for training. The most visible form of local participation is in the paraprofessional selection.

Our research suggests that community input into the selection process is essential. However, before complete control is given to the community, a careful assessment is needed of how the selection process is likely to occur and a strategy adopted accordingly to circumvent elite control or the dominance of factional interests. Programs often stipulate a variety of selection criteria which may include: literacy, village residence, age, sex, marital status, previous experience, and personal characteristics. Our evidence indicates that literacy is not as necessary as many suggest and, in fact, it often serves as a selection bias. Older paraprofessionals tend to have a greater potential for success given their established respect and creditability, and women can perform equally well in many roles reserved for men, but they are commonly underrepresented unless specifically recruited. While paraprofessionals should have the same cultural backgrounds as their clientele, a resident of the community is not necessarily more effective as is commonly assumed. Ties to local factions, past reputations, or low expectations of a peer may mean that someone from outside the community, but indigenous to the area, may be more effective than a local resident. Or in highly stratified villages, more than one paraprofessional may be necessary to reach the various interest groups.

Resource Contributions

Participation in the contribution of needed resources for the program not only can reduce overall agency costs but is seen as a way to evoke heightened local commitment to the program. This participation often involves contributing to the paraprofessional's personal support, sometimes a salary. Rural villagers, however, are short of cash and those programs seeking to raise substantial cash contributions encounter difficulty. Villagers generally are not able or willing to pay the full salary of the paraprofessional.

While in our six case studies, the major motivation cited by the paraprofessionals for performing their work was "helping fellow villagers improve their lives," the low or non-existent material benefits created difficulties. The extent of altruism varies, but it appears unrealistic to expect paraprofessionals to contribute much time and effort voluntarily over an extended period of time.

While paying the paraprofessional a salary may be unfeasible, our studies confirm the testimony of others that villagers are willing to make significant resource contributions. Villagers can and do contribute goods and services in kind (primarily labor and building materials) and are willing to pay small fees for services or commodities. Contribution of resources, of course, depends upon the individual's perception of the accrued benefits.

Community Supervision, Management, Evaluation

Local organizational support greatly enhances the potential for success. Thus, most programs endeavor to work through a local committee, either an existing community organization or a "new" committee. These groups are to direct and support the paraprofessional and his/her activities. Despite rhetoric to the contrary, most of the decision-making in our six case studies was concentrated within the program administration. The role played by the local committees was primarily one of generating support for the already defined paraprofessional activities. And often these committees are dominated by local influentials.

Rural publics, however, are in a natural position to exercise a supervisory role especially in monitoring, control, and evaluation (this last element being the most neglected aspect of supervision and participation). Community management is essential, not only to augment infrequent visits by outside supervisors, but to build a community-based, self-sufficient program. Seldom, however, are these committees adequately prepared to take an active management role. Channels need to be delineated, procedures established, roles and responsibilities delegated, and villagers oriented to these tasks. Of course, local management is likely to be exercised only if judged efficacious, i.e. if the program responds to individuals' stated needs which often involve the provision of visible outside support.

While not what we might have hoped for, these findings were not surprising. At the same time, the outlook is more encouraging than what the above might lead one to suspect. Even though communities are not yet actively involved in managing paraprofessional programs, and even though local authorities appear to retain influence in program activities, considerable progress has been made in extending more responsibility to individuals other than the traditional decision-makers. Paraprofessionals are not only selected from the ranks of local notables and their families, but in many cases are selected from among the respected members of the broader community. Paraprofessional programs are notable in that they appear to have the potential to achieve considerable devolution of responsibility to rank and file village members. "Average" villagers are beginning to serve in new roles and assume more responsibility and prominence in village affairs.

Equally significant is the relatively equitable distribution of benefits in the programs observed. Most paraprofessional services are of the public goods nature, providing basic health services or small-scale infrastructure development that do not lend themselves readily to skewed distribution. This finding is offered with caution, however, since the type of service and the nature of the benefits appear to determine who participates and who benefits. For example, while an agricultural project (i.e., home gardens) may be open to all, actual participation may be contingent upon access to land.

The fact remains that there is only minimal evidence of active community management of paraprofessional programs. This situation places an additional burden on the sponsoring agency, undermines the paraprofessional's accountability to the community and may, over a period of time, contribute to community disinterest in the program. For varying reasons, some of which are discussed above, even community organizations created specifically to assure local involvement in the program often assume a passive character. It was unusual in our case studies to find villages which initiated action against an incompetent paraprofessional or sought ways to modify unsatisfactory services. In most cases, villagers respond by "voting with their feet," refusing to use the paraprofessional's services. The modalities of shared community and agency responsiblities have yet to be worked out in most paraprofessional programs.

The Potential

The potential of paraprofessionals for extending basic services to the previously unserved rural majority (who are likely to remain so if conventional delivery patterns are employed) and their ability to stimulate broader community self-help is clear. However, this potential will continue to be compromised unless governments and foreign assistance agencies commit the resources needed to plan and implement a realistic paraprofessional strategy — programs with adequate supervision and reliable logistical support so that paraprofessionals can provide appropriate services, compatible with emerging needs, and can enjoy the confidence of the rural people.

The potential effectiveness of using paraprofessionals is not doubted but the potential costs of creating and maintaining effective paraprofessional programs needs further study. Our research

has uncovered a variety of factors influencing the paraprofessional's effectiveness and has identified the choices available to planners which have implications for building a paraprofessional program. There is now a need to evaluate more rigorously their cost/effectiveness and to identify ways in which paraprofessionals can best be utilized in resource-poor situations. The immediate challenge is to develop a viable paraprofessional strategy based on affordable costs and with sustained community participation so that the potential of paraprofessionals does not wither before being given a realistic trial.

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Revolutionary Participation in Ethiopia

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Participation in rural development processes has generally been considered in the context of countries with non-revolutionary political postures. This should evoke neither surprise nor criticism since the number of genuinely revolutionary countries is small compared with all less developed countries. Moreover, some of the impetus behind the focus on participation in rural development comes from donors of foreign assistance, such as the Agency for International Development, which characteristically focus on countries with relatively stable political processes, engaged in incremental development measures. But participation in rural development has also been the hallmark of several modern revolutions, including that in China and, more recently, Ethiopia. It is instructive to look at rural development participation in a revolutionary context, and to examine some similarities and differences arising in more and less revolutionary settings.

One of the important features in rural Ethiopia leading up to the country's revolution was the extent to which pretense surpassed performance in the rural development initiatives undertaken by Haile Selassie I from the conclusion of World War II to the time of his downfall in September, 1974. Some important commercial farming ventures did contribute to the country's overall agricultural growth, and a few experiments in district-wide integrated rural development were undertaken in Chilalo, Wolamo and Ada. However, the participants in these projects were not poorer farmers, despite the intentions of the external donors. In addition, such development as did take place was sharply regionalized so that rural development outside the target areas was seldom achieved. For example, pastoralists in the Awash Valley were net losers from compartmentalized plantation irrigation development. They lost their best grazing lands along the river and yet were not compensated in any way by plantation owners.

Perhaps most important, Ethiopia's many traditional land tenure systems had the common effect of virtually disinheriting large sections of the rural populace. Frequently absentee landlords extracted usurious rents from their tenants and kept tenancy so insecure that development initiatives presented unacceptable risks. Even somewhat more egalitarian tenure systems in the northern districts frequently left farmers with too little land to be either secure or productive. Such land tenure systems sustained a traditionally autocratic arrangement in which popular participation in development decision-making was marginal at best.

The old regime collapsed in the face of pressure emanating from a process of socio-economic modernization with which the regime's only superficially modernized institutions could not cope. Among these pressures were inflation and international publicity critical of the regime's failure to address a major drought and famine crisis. (To some degree, frustration with the regime's inability to deal with pressures for autonomy in Eritrea were also a factor.)

After futile attempts to reconstitute a civilian administration, Haile Selassie eventually yielded to a committee of military men who proceeded to dismantle his regime, depose him, arrest most of the notables of his administration, and eventually execute a good number of them. Radical officers' execution of the military committee's own designated head of state, who had succeeded the emperor, plus 60 notables of the old order, constituted a final dramatic break with the past.

The military government, increasingly under the leadership of Mengistu Haile Mariam, made popular participation in development the *raison d'etre* for the revolution it sought to lead. Rural and urban reforms were undertaken. Control over land and other resources was removed from landlords and given to peasant associations. Urban land was vested in housing cooperatives. University and high school students and teachers were mobilized in the *zemecha* movement to explain land reform to peasants and to equip them for their new control over the means of livelihood. Nationalization of major industries and firms also took place but somewhat ironically, with little emphasis on workers' participation in management.

The *derg*, as the country's military leadership came to be called (the word means "committee" in Amharic), sought to make such economic reforms the foundation for a new political order. However, this sequence of political reconstruction has failed, largely be-

cause civilian supporters of revolutionary change have believed such reconstruction should precede rather than follow socio-economic reforms. In addition, the military's position as designer of new political institutions has been suspect in the eyes of many potential supporters of revolutionary change.

Neither a national democratic revolution, to include wide measures of autonomy for local regions and tolerance of several parties leading to one mass workers' movement, nor a late 1979 effort to form a monolithic workers' party, has brought the desired results. The *derg* has remained in violent conflict with Eritrea, the Ogaden and other secessionist regions, as well as with certain civilian groups struggling for control of the local urban cooperatives. Today, Mengistu's own position appears relatively secure but his writ runs within a gradually shrinking perimeter. Secessionist groups have *de facto* control of substantial portions of the country while the newly-enfranchised rural smallholder producers have balked at selling produce to urban areas without better terms of trade and greater availability of consumer goods. How far Mengistu's regime depends upon Russian and Cuban help for its survival in lieu of domestic support is unclear.

Who has participated in what ways, with respect to rural development in revolutionary Ethiopia? The results of the rural land reform have not yet been comprehensively assessed and it appears still too early to do so. Although opportunities for conducting the necessary research have been very limited, certain tentative conclusions are plausible. While debate swirls around the question of what Ethiopia's proper revolutionary course should be, and who should lead it, the uncontroverted fact remains that millions of peasants now have a large measure of control over their primary asset — land — which they did not previously have. Ownership of land has been legally vested in peasant associations which are to cover up to 800 hectares each. All citizens, including disposessed landlords, are entitled to claim up to a maximum of 10 hectares, provided that within any given area, holdings are as equal in size as possible. Peasant associations, while not immune from central government efforts to co-opt them for purposes of legitimizing the government, have enjoyed a large measure of discretion concerning the provision of security, educational facilities, dispute resolution, local level development planning, and mobilization of constituents for participation in the cooperative societies which link associations together.

Mengistu's government initially left many responsibilities to local peasant associations, partly out of ideological commitment to peasant and tenant empowerment and partly because of the pragmatic realization that its own resources for governing the associations are exceedingly limited. Gradually, however, the *derg* has sought to give increasing central direction to the activities of the associations. This was undertaken by creating a hierarchy of peasant associations at the district and provincial levels culminating in a national union of associations. The *derg* has also sought to build political support for itself by influencing the selection and retention of local association leaders. Although its methods have been somewhat less violent and extensive in rural areas than in the urban cooperatives created under the urban land reform proclamation, the *derg* has attempted to use the peasant associations to mobilize support and personnel for war efforts in the Ogaden and in Eritrea (the whole world witnessed the peasant marches on Eritrea in 1976 and 1977).

The most important issue at present, however, is how to induce the peasants to produce more through the associations, to do so more efficiently and to market the produce through official channels to meet export and urban food supply requirements. Mengistu has complained of unseemly residual individualism on the part of the peasants, and since 1978 has mounted efforts to bolster development processes in ways that imply more cooperation with the regime from the beneficiaries of the rural land reform. The success of these efforts has been questionable.

One of the more significant —though unintended — forms of participation in rural development within revolutionary Ethiopia has been an implicit process of bargaining between the peasants and the regime over the terms of their relationship. While Mengistu has decried the persistence of competitive individualism in rural areas, the rural land reforms instituted by his government have encouraged such individualism. Peasants and former tenants do not hold rural plots on a freehold basis but on an individual basis. By removing the power of landlords to control the livelihood of peoples in the rural areas, the government has given peasants enough independence to successfully resist unattractive terms of trade. Food crops can be consumed instead of marketed, or they can be marketed unofficially and locally rather than through official channels. At the same time, peasant farmers appear to be holding out for more and better consumer goods, at prices comparing favorably with those received for their produce. As a result, the government has opted for less reliance on peasant production by resorting to state farms to provide an increasing share of food production (this resembles to a considerable degree Haile Selassie's practice). Nevertheless the poverty which the military government is committed to relieving probably cannot be alleviated unless it successfully engages the participation of farmers in official marketing channels. The *derg's* success in this regard has been very limited to date.

Implicit bargaining over terms of trade between central governments and peasant producers is by no means peculiar to Ethiopia or to revolutionary circumstances. What is different in Ethiopia is the extent to which the government has weakened its own bargaining position, and risked its own viability, in the process of empowering the peasants. For example, the very thorough land reform, which exemplifies its ideological commitment, has limited the government's capacity to impose successfully what it believes is the crop marketing pattern most in line with the country's good and the peasants' own interest. The *derg* has liberated the peasant, via land reform,

not only from the shackles of the *ancien regime*, but from its own policy directives. The government has not yet developed mechanisms for dialogue that will enable government and peasant associations to discover, and act on, their common interests.

Among LDC leaders, participation in rural development has been of less importance than retaining office and maintaining basic political stability. People's participation has been granted similar priority by the Ethiopian revolutionary regime, even though it also appears to rest its legitimacy on the implementation of participatory land reform. The questions of how and by whom the peasant associations should be managed, and how scarce resources should be allocated have not been effectively determined in detail by the Ethiopian government. Nor do we know much about how these questions are in fact answered by peasant associations on a working basis. Macro-level questions of participation concerning the relationship of regions to the center have claimed priority over working out tenable answers to all these micro-level concerns. The *derg's* implicit theory has appeared to be that the post-imperial political order could only be defined and established by the empowered peasants themselves. Peasants, acting through their associations, would need to be vested with control over the primary economic asset of land so that genuinely new leadership could emerge to supplant that left behind by the emperor's government.

Yet this strategy has had less of an effect in mobilizing the poor peasants than the urban elite which is initially better able than the peasantry to articulate and assert its positions. This elite domination of the agenda has threatened the *derg's* legitimacy to the point where it has been obliged to apply force in a way which has resembled Haile Selassie's treatment of his opponents. This use of force, plus efforts to co-opt the support of peasant and urban association cadres, appears to have substantially diverted the attention of peasants from micro-level development concerns and toward the larger questions of what form the future Ethiopian order itself should take. Peasant associations apparently have functioned throughout much of the country and, in many instances, operate very well. But the macro-level political struggles of government have prevented participatory peasant associations from becoming fruitfully linked to national level policy designs for rural development in a continuous, constructive way.

There has been a tacit assumption in many non-revolutionary regimes that participation in rural development may not be a zero-sum game. Strengthening local rural constituent's participation in decision-making on resource allocations, for example, has been assumed to grant rural citizens authority without seriously diminishing that of elites at local and higher levels. Within revolutionary Ethiopia, it has not been entirely clear how far the empowerment of peasants and former tenants through the peasant associations has in fact granted them power at the expense of former landed elites. In an effort to create more rural equality, the land reform proclamation of 1975 abolished the agricultural labor class. Rather than assert the rights of labor along with former tenants and peasants, however, the proclamation forbids the hiring of labor on plots except in the case of the aged and the infirm. Landlords were given higher priority in the competition for plots under the proclamation than were the tenants they may have displaced prior to the revolution. The position of women is also uncertain. Where previously they may have shared a lack of empowerment with their male relatives and friends, it appears now that the land reform is empowering mostly men within the framework of the associations. It is not clear whether pastoralists have participated in the reform to the same degree as peasant and tenant agriculturalists. Finally, under the urban land reform proclamation, household servants have gained nothing.

Even after making allowances for wide differences in the origins and character of revolutionary movements, and for the lively debate over the authenticity of the *derg's* credentials as a revolutionary cadre, the preceding discussion suggests that revolutionary regimes genuinely determined to empower constituents at the grass roots may experience obstacles similar to those facing less revolutionary governments. Revolutionary authorities may experience difficulty in "bargaining" with those they have sought to liberate, while non-revolutionary governments may often tacitly find it in their interests not to do so. Agenda items of higher priority than popular participation may overtake revolutionary governments as readily as less revolutionary ones. Revolutionary governments enacting reforms premised on increased rural equality and broader empowerment of peasant constituents may indeed create or increase inequalities along new dimensions as they alleviate older bases of inequality.

The problems of establishing participation in rural development appear to have different focal points in revolutionary Ethiopia than in other less revolutionary settings. These center less upon strengthening participatory organizations in on-going processes of policy making and development administration, than upon defining the *terms* under which newly established organizations will work with central authorities in policy making and administrative processes that are only just evolving or being reconstructed. In the Ethiopian's case the *derg's* agenda for action has to deal with at least three major problems:

1. The *derg* does not have at this point a cadre that it can draw upon to assist local farmers and mobilize their support for the revolution. This role, analogous to the role of paraprofessionals in less revolutionary settings, was to have been performed by the *zemecha* campaigners. These were university and high school students (and their instructors) called upon to explain and organize the land reform, introduce basic literacy and preventive health care practices, and disseminate simple improvements in agricultural technology to Ethiopian peasants. The *zemecha* participants have received only limited training and have not been socialized to supportive roles that keep them from taking the revolution into their own hands. As a result, they have pushed for collective farming before the

derg was prepared to do so, and attacked the legitimacy of local administrative officials held over from the old order. When the issue was drawn, the *derg* frequently sided with local officials against the students, resulting in the imprisonment and death of many, and the alienation of many of the potentially most ardent potential supporters of a socialist revolution.

The roles to be played by such paraprofessional-like individuals need to be defined, and a middle ground must be established between pushing revolutionary political organization too little or too much. The *derg* needs to determine how such individuals might be made effective and fairly autonomous in their activities without having a political impact beyond that which it is prepared to countenance. At present, however, macro-level questions concerning how the new Ethiopian state will be constituted preclude such paraprofessional-like assistance at the local level, however badly needed.

2. A second area of concern is the volume and magnitude of responsibilities that are left to local peasant associations. The danger in Ethiopia has not been that too little will be left to the associations but that too much may be. Given the continuing administrative weakness of the central government, and the distraction of the *derg* by wars in Eritrea and the Ogaden, peasant associations have been left with a great deal of responsibility for development with very little in the way of material or technical assistance. Even if these problems were not present, the country is so large and so poor that the government's capacity to assist processes of participatory development is limited, even by less-developed nation's standards. What is the likely outcome of participatory rural development efforts in a poor country where unassisted responsibility for defense, education, basic health care, and agricultural production resides at the local level? Despite the effectiveness of an agricultural "minimum package" program (which in addition to its other functions has been responsible for much of the drought-famine relief effort), work on linking local level participation to a broader national level rural development effort has in reality only just begun in Ethiopia.

3. A third agenda item, of the many that might be cited, concerns the prerequisites for effective participation in rural development in Ethiopia. This question is reminiscent of the debate over the prerequisites for democracy in developing countries that took place in the early 1960s when the focus was upon institution building at the national level. The Ethiopian case suggests that an analogous question might be asked about local-level participation within a larger revolutionary framework: what minimum levels of macro-level economic development and administrative capacity are requisite to the attainment of democratic participation in micro-level rural development? With regard to natural-level development, must struggles over the terms of membership in the state be confined within certain limits before participatory local institutions can play useful roles? Must the central government have crossed a certain threshold in its capacity to deal with local communities before participatory local institutions limiting its jurisdiction will be encouraged? Recurrent problems of drought and famine suggest that some minimal level of economic viability is required for local participatory rural development to succeed. What are these thresholds, and how can they be achieved by central government without entrenching non-participatory institutions at the local level?

The lessons of the Ethiopian revolution for participatory rural development appear to be that economic and political empowerment of peasant communities by a weak central regime is far easier than defining the relationship of such "liberated" groups to a reconstructed central authority — even one which identifies the "masses" as its source of support and the *raison d'etre* of its seizure of authority. In such circumstances the scope of "rationality" of peasant entrepreneurs may be subjected to the ultimate test as macro and micro rationality can come into conflict. Not only the viability of particular agricultural policies or rural development strategies but the nature of the relationship between central and local authorities — even the possibility of central authority itself — may come to depend on understanding and meeting peasants' interests as they define them. The resolution of this central-local contradiction more than the reforms proclaimed by the central government in Addis Ababa may constitute the real Ethiopian revolution.

Cooperatives and the Poor: Comparing European and Third World Experience

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The cooperative society is an integral part of the rural landscape in most developing countries, but it is one which often malfunctions. In fact, in recent years there has been an increasing criticism of the cooperative society as an agency of rural development. Apart from not being properly managed, cooperatives have been accused of failing to serve and involve the poor. This criticism, like the response from defenders of cooperatives, however, lacks a reasonable perspective on what can really be expected of rural cooperatives in the Third World. Two questions are pertinent to the on-going debate between assailants and defenders of cooperatives: (1) Under what conditions can cooperatives be expected to reach and involve the poor? (2) What alternatives exist where these conditions do not prevail?

The Capitalist Origin of the Cooperative Form

The modern cooperative is a product of capitalism, perhaps one of its finest. It grew out of a very special historical

situation in 19th century Europe when workers, and in many places peasant farmers, were faced with the choice of accepting or rejecting the capitalist system. The naked character of incipient capitalism had very dramatic social effects on these people. They were socially uprooted and exploited and therefore faced with the hard choice of finding a mechanism to defend themselves within the system or to join the revolutionary forces bent on destroying it. The majority of European followed the former line of action. The Rochdale pioneers in England and similar groups on the continent accepted the notion that economic cooperation could salvage their situation. In Europe, it became a principal economic instrument of the poor.

The circumstantial variables that dictated the origin of the modern cooperative cannot be ignored. It certainly was not created by a "free" human will. Cooperative advocates often make a big point of the voluntary nature of membership in their organization. This may apply to those few who join the cooperative from a position of relative wealth. For them the cooperative is not an economic necessity; it may for a variety of reasons be socially or ideologically more attractive than individual activity. In a historical perspective, however, where cooperatives have prospered they have been an economic necessity to the members. Cooperation has grown out of an "enlightened self-interest," itself a product of the adverse effects of the market forces on the exploited classes in society. Thus, the choice of joining the cooperative is voluntary to these people only in a relative sense. In a wider "systematic" context, it can be argued that membership is enforced by circumstances.

Proponents of the cooperative also stress the democratic and egalitarian nature of their organization. Again, these features are very much the product of the circumstances in which the early cooperatives emerged. These organizations were confined to poor workingmen among whom equality was not difficult to establish (because everybody owned so little in the first place). Nor was it very hard to promote the principles of sharing equally and participating in organizational affairs as both were seen as requirements for success.

Cooperatives in Europe and America are often portrayed as "socialist" institutions, mainly because of their association with the working class. This impression, however, must be qualified. They are socialist in the sense of stressing equal sharing of wealth as opposed to individual pursuit of it, but they are at the same time fundamentally a capitalist institution in that they depend on the prevalence of market forces for their success.

Although the cooperative might not be labelled a "capitalist" institution in Eastern Europe, it comes close to being one. With the growth of "market socialism" in these countries, cooperatives have been given a new lease on life. Riding on the effects of the market forces, cooperatives have flourished, particularly in a country like Hungary where the "liberalization" of the economy has proceeded especially far. Cooperatives in Eastern Europe have for a long time been forced to exist in a hybrid form. In some places they have been transformed beyond recognition; for instance, many have been turned into *agro-kombinats,* the socialist version of agribusiness. The cooperative experience in Eastern Europe underscores the market connection of modern cooperatives. They are an economic institution that depends on a well-functioning market and on people who are prepared to accept the premises of such an economy.

As cooperatives over the years have become part of the economic establishment in Europe, understanding of what really determined their initial growth and success has naturally faded away. Cooperative ideologoues and business pragmatists alike have promoted cooperatives in the Third World more on the ground that they have succeeded in their own countries than on the basis of knowledge of the specific factors determining this success. Thus, in advising cooperative enthusiasts among Third World politicians, this cadre of international experts on cooperatives have often been overconfident in their conception of what cooperatives can do. There has been too little cautioning, although in recent years the effect of excessive optimism of yesteryear appears to be more a circumspect attitude in cooperative development circles.

Experience of Cooperatives in the Third World

Although cooperatives have never lacked supporters among peasants and workers in Third World countries, it is important to remember that these institutions have been implanted ready-made into their new environment. Their task has mainly been to pull people more effectively into the modern market economy. The operational principles that have been incorporated into cooperative laws and by-laws in these countries have all been derived from European practice. The underlying assumptions have all been borrowed from a full-blown capitalist economy.

The environment in which the cooperatives have been established in the Third World, however, is very different. Nowhere has the capitalist economy taken root to such an extent that feudal and other precapitalist social formations have been eliminated. With the exception of urban areas and isolated pockets in the rural areas, these older forms still hold sway. They dictate social behavior by offering institutional patterns other than those provided by the modern economy. The "market mentality" is by no means prevalent. Particularly in the rural areas, the circumstantial factors that explain in large part the success in Europe of early cooperatives as an instrument of the poor are simply non-existent.

This does not mean that cooperatives have failed as business organizations in these countries. In fact, their business record is oftentimes quite impressive, particularly in areas where the market economy is well-established and social behavior adapted according to its demands. One finds invariably, however, that the driving force behind these cooperative successes is a core of relatively well-to-do farmers. There is no evidence that the cooperative in the rural areas of the Third World has been able to serve as an instrument of the poor. The reason for this is not too

difficult to find. As a means to incorporate rural producers into the modern economy the cooperative has proved particularly attractive and important to those with the strongest inclinations and greatest capacity to move in that direction. Thus, it has become the tool of rural entrepreneurs. The argument that these people are using the cooperatives to exploit the majority of the rural producers is too simple. It must be recognized that it is primarily to these market-oriented farmers that the cooperative makes a difference. They have a stake in it to a much greater extent than the ordinary peasant producer who still might stand with only one of his legs in the market economy. He tends to be a more reluctant participant in cooperative business affairs.

This is born out by the experience of cooperatives in various Third World countries. They have functioned particularly well, in the business sense of the word, in those areas where the market economy has made its strongest inroads. In Africa, this means in the areas producing agricultural commodities for export: the central highlands of Kenya; the slopes of Mt. Kilimanjaro in Tanzania; the highland plateau in Uganda; the coastal belts of West Africa, to mention some that are well-known. In all these places, cooperatives have helped to reinforce capitalism, as they did in Europe a hundred years ago. There is one significant difference, however; in Africa, and elsewhere in the Third World, the cooperative tends to leave out the poor rather than to save the poor for the capitalist system.

The prevalence of precapitalist social formations tends to block any attempt to make the cooperative effectively reach the poor. This has been particularly true in Asia and Latin America where feudal land tenure systems still prevail. From the point of view of rural transformation, the commercialization of agricultural production, which has followed in the wake of the Green Revolution, has been at least a blessing in disguise. The social contradictions in the rural areas have come to appear in a more naked fashion and it is not coincidence that in India, as elsewhere, landless laborers, tenants and sharecroppers have in increasing numbers initiated their own organizations. The conventional cooperative is abandoned in favor of a more struggle-oriented organization. The latter tends to attract full commitment from the poor and it is a potential base for radical social and economic action. Because of its challenge to the establishment, however, it rarely gets the administrative support and the professional advice it needs to compete with existing cooperatives.

The exception might be those instances when radical political action leads to land reform as it has in countries like Chile (under Frei and Allende) and Peru. Experience from these two countries, however, suggests that even with a "flying start" like a land reform, cooperative forms of organization catering only for the rural poor have great difficulties in becoming successful as business organizations. The initial good-will and enthusiasm are often drowned in poor management. Thus, even where the precapitalist social formations are giving way, the poor are by no means ready to make full use of the cooperative as their organization.

Organizational Alternatives to Cooperatives

In recent years there has been an attempt to identify organizational alternatives to the conventional rural cooperative. Some have suggested special cooperatives for the poor, i.e., people above a certain ceiling of income would not be allowed to join the cooperative. While this might work in certain circumstances, it is by no means a panacea. First of all, the poor lack the managerial capacity needed to run their organization. Even more seriously, they tend to lack the business acumen. The latter has to be created and promoted before the cooperative of the poor can be made to flourish.

Viable local organization is often the missing link in the grass-roots development efforts, particularly in Africa. Research has shown that if market forces are not very strongly entrenched the chances of the cooperative providing this link are minimal. In countries where the local cooperative has been preempted by community organizations initiated from above as part of a national campaign to "transform the country-side," e.g., Tanzania and Ethiopia, experience suggests that only hollow structures result.

The point is that neither the conventional cooperative nor new community organization can function if there are not economic and social forces in the local environment supporting them. The last two decades have taught us that neither a nation-wide structural transformation nor institutional training is enough. Even the best organized political party is ill-equipped to deal with the task of rural transformation because its cadres tend not to possess the technical and organizational skills that are needed to help the poor develop. Development training institutions also have their shortcomings. They are usually too far removed from the actual problems of implementation. Internships or other field experiences, while often useful, tend to make only a limited difference. In order to change the economic and social forces to support local organizations, a more intensive and focused effort at human development is needed.

An Example

Freire's pedagogy, which stresses "problematizing" as opposed to problem-solving, is a step in the right direction but in itself not enough. Problematizing is only a first step and will be of little value unless combined with a greater *capacity* to solve problems. The task of merging the two is not easy. One such approach which so far has met with some success is that of the Chicago-based Institute of Cultural Affairs, which operates as a non-governmental development agency in about twenty-five countries. Its emphasis is on stimulating creative thinking among the poor, developing local organizations and providing the necessary technical and commercial skills to develop the community. There exist other similar agencies but the ICA has proved particularly effective in its holistic approach to human development.

Although the approach is necessarily adapted to local circumstances, it tends to stress the development association as a predecessor to, if not substitute for,

the cooperative. ICA organizers see the cooperative as an economic organization which requires business skills. The poor tend not to possess such skills and must be trained before they can make full use of that organization. Such training, however, must deal with a range of issues that affect the development of the community. The community needs to be organized not just for business purposes. Thus, the ICA encourages the establishment of guilds, a form of work brigades, with responsibility in a given sector. It also emphasizes the development of greater assertiveness among the local population. It trains them to extract resources from other agencies without falling into the traps of patron-client relationships.

One of the secrets behind ICA's relative success is its presence in the local community in which its organizers work. They share the living conditions of the poor and receive no remuneration but a $30 monthly allowance. Still they are able to attract local volunteers who constitute the majority of their cadres of development workers.

Conclusions

The ICA story is much more complex and intriguing than space allows here. The purpose of my reference to ICA is to suggest that there are some alternatives to the conventional cooperative or community approaches. Although it is obviously premature to draw any firm conclusions at this stage about the value of the approach of ICA and other similar non-governmental development agencies, it is clear that greater research effort is needed to assess their effectiveness. To promote grass-roots development, and particularly to incorporate the poor in such programs, has not been easy using party or government machineries. The non-governmental agencies have a greater potential in achieving this task, and greater interest in their work seems justified if the shortcomings of prevailing approaches are to be overcome.

projects

Nepal's Community Health Leader Project

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The Nepal Community Health and Integration Project (CH&IP) was established with the purpose of bringing health services closer to the people. The crux of this project has been and continues to be training and supporting Village Health Workers (VHWs) whose job is primarily to motivate people for a variety of improved health practices while visiting all houses in a given area once every two months. Although this program is proceeding reasonably well, the number of houses each VHW is expected to 'cover' — ranging from 500 to 1250 monthly — severely restricts the influence he can wield. Any rapid increase in the number of VHWs is precluded by lack of availability of rural 8th grade graduates (VHWs are full-time government employees who must fulfill educational requirements established by the Public Service Commission) and the various difficulties in developing an adequate training and supervision infrastructure for their support. What, then, can be done?

About two years ago, the CH&IP decided to do something about this problem by establishing a project designed to encourage villagers themselves to act to improve their own health situation. The basic intention was to stimulate activity at the country's lowest political and administrative level, the ward. (Nepal's 13 million population is divided into 75 districts, each with about 40 village panchayats; each village panchayat area is in turn divided into 9 wards.)

The major criteria guiding design of the new effort were the following: (1) any new activity should complement, rather than compete with, the VHW program already started; and (2) any program should be feasible on a large scale. This second point is important and often tends to be ignored. It is usually not too difficult to get small-scale participation projects to work, often very well. The constant attention from the capital city or the project headquarters ensures that personnel really do get posted as planned, that materials really do reach the field posts, that staff really are paid on time. Charismatic leaders can visit project sites regularly to motivate, push, prod, facilitate or simply intimidate villagers into participating.

But large-scale projects must rely primarily upon 'average' people for their implementation; charisma at the top can only go so far. Nationally-stimulated community participation projects can never hope to achieve the success *rate* of smaller-scale projects. However, if they follow standard procedures for optimizing achievement of project goals, their larger scale can more than compensate for a lower success rate. Success will primarily be due to the extent to which overall planning and management produces quantitatively and qualitatively adequate training programs, supervision, instructions, commodities, incentives, and other mundane project elements.

The first exploratory move into community participation activities by CH&IP consisted of a pilot effort in three health posts (the subdistrict level) in which village panchayat leaders were given three days of orientation about health post and VHW activities and were asked to suggest ways to improve their functioning. Beyond this brief orientation, each village panchayat

team was requested to select, organize training for and coordinate nine ward-level health volunteers (HV). The job of these ward-level HVs would be to provide assistance and organizational support to the VHW, though, since they could only be given a day or two of training they could not provide any health services independently.

This initial activity was designed so that it would parallel the various constraints which a large-scale project would face. Central office personnel conducted the initial training, then returned a year later to see what had happened; there were no interventions from the center during the year. When evaluating the initial effort, we discovered that the majority of the district and health post personnel who had participated in the original training had been transferred and replaced by people who knew nothing about the project. Clearly, follow-up from the official health sector had been minimal... so this was a 'realistic' pilot project.

At the village level, we discovered that interest in such a program still existed, and in a few places, some activities in the local health field had occurred. The villagers who had been selected as ward-level HVs were saying, in essence, that (a) they needed more guidance from the health post staff, and (b) they wanted sufficient training to be able to do something more than provide assistance and organizational support for VHWs; they wanted to provide health services themselves.

Simultaneously with this pilot effort, a fairly substantial research program was being conducted to look at existing community involvement projects in health and other sectors, and to try to elicit from villagers and health post staff their opinions of possible ward-level health activities. Some of the conclusions were unrealistic if understandable: villagers would like to have a hospital built in each ward; a ward-level health volunteer would like to be able to perform any medical task short of (and perhaps not short of) brain surgery. Nevertheless, their basic reaction to the idea of a ward-level health worker, with training and responsibilities far more substantial than our original ward-level HV, tended to be very positive.

A third factor also contributed to the conclusion that HVs should be able to provide health services, or at least health education services, independent of the government's VHW. A committee including chiefs of the various 'vertical' projects (single-function semi-autonomous projects for family planning, malaria, TB, leprosy and immunization) met to discuss the functions of the HV. Each was dissatisfied with the minimal job description originally proposed and suggested that the ward-level HV needed specific responsibilities in each of the health ministry's project fields.

Since all available evidence seemed to point to the conclusion that each ward should have some type of health worker who is reasonably competent to promote health education messages and provide at least a minimum level of health services, CH&IP's next activity was to devise such a role. First we prepared a job description, then a training manual based upon this job description. This manual, which has now gone through the first of three planned revisions (as more experience becomes available from the field), is the crux of what we hope will be an effective program which will be started at the beginning of this report.

A 'new' ward-level health volunteer, now named Community Health Leader (CHL) is selected by his or her ward. The CHL works six hours per week out of a building or room constructed or assigned by a ward health committee and dispenses drugs supplied by this committee. The health post only provides training (24 days, spread over a period of one year), some technical guidance and various materials (the manual, posters and other health education aids, and an initial drug supply).

Since the government does not need to provide a continuing supply of drugs or substantial financial assistance, it should be possible for this project to be applied later on a larger scale.

Complementarity of this new role with the VHW program is promoted by the following approach. Although the VHWs themselves had had only six weeks of training beyond an 8th grade education, we are counting on them to play a substantial role in CHL training and supervision. The bulk of the training will be in the village panchayat, not at the health post, and will consist of the VHW and the nine CHLs sitting together, each with a copy of the manual, reading to each other and discussing each paragraph. Since many of the CHLs are likely to be illiterate or only marginally literate, the manual has been prepared in very simple Nepali and contains a large number of pictures to illustrate as many of the concepts as possible (there are 391 pictures in a 226-page manual). The VHW is instructed how to serve the group as a resource participant rather than as a teacher. Applying this somewhat sophisticated approach to teaching and learning is less of a problem than one might imagine, simply because the VHW's knowledge level is not substantially higher than that of the CHLs. Lacking the confidence to 'take over' a class and become its center of attention, the VHW is forced to promote more of a learner-centered atmosphere. Still he is usually slightly more knowledgeable than the others, and can improve his status by the role of knowledge-giver which he tends to play during this training.

Subsequent to the training, the VHW visits each of the CHLs during his regular rounds, serving as a link among them and between the CHLs and the health post. In addition, it is expected that the VHW's job will be modified in a variety of other ways to increase his ties with CHLs. Although he is not quite their supervisor, still the VHW's role is a substantial one. By serving as a 'semi-trainer' and a 'semi-supervisor,' the VHW can improve his status in the community and his image of himself. We are hoping that he will also translate this into sufficient motivation to take creative steps to promote the project's success in new ways.

Thus far, the initial CHL training has been conducted in only four village panchayats. Preliminary evidence suggested that it is proceeding well. Health committees have been established in many of the 36 wards. Several ward health education centers have been built and drug resupply schemes de-

vised. VHWs seem pleased with their enhanced responsibilities.

An analysis of the interaction among the VHW, the CHL and the people of the ward will not be attempted as a way of learning how a large-scale national program can best use its thinly-spread resources to promote participation of villagers in health service and health education activities. The results of this analysis will be applied to the next phase of this project, an expansion towards the 1985 target of 5000 CHLs.

Popular Participation in Sudan: The Abyei Project

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The Abyei area is a transitional area in terms of geography, environment, politics, language and religion. It is part of a much larger transitional band stretching right across the Democratic Republic of Sudan and in fact all across that huge region of Africa known more generally as the "soudan," including parts of Chad, Upper Volta, Mali, Niger, Mauretania and Senegal. The area bridges drylands and wetlands, nomadism and sedentary transhumance, Moslem and non-Moslem populations.

As a rural area Abyei is unique in many respects, but it is also profoundly representative of a large and important area of Sudan and of Africa. Situated in South Kordofan Province, Abyei is in the Western Region of Sudan at the border of the Southern Region; its people represent both these regions. The great majority of its permanent residents are the Dinka people whose cultural and linguistic ties are with the Nilotic peoples of the South. At the same time Westerners, nomadic Humr, have long relied on this area for seasonal cattle grazing during the dry months. Thus both populations have an attachment to the area. The Dinka practice a mixed economy of agricultural production, livestock, and fishing/hunting/gathering. During the wet season they keep their cattle near their compounds and work in the fields. In the dry season, Dinka youths take the herds south, while the Humr bring their herds down from the north to graze in the area.

The Abyei project is termed an "integrated rural development project," and recognizes the close relationship between such diverse sectors as agriculture, livestock, water resources and health services. Rather than enact a concentrated project in one sector, say agriculture, the project aims at a balanced program in which chosen improvements in several sectors are coordinated. The lead sector is agriculture, but important activities in health services, water development, livestock management and training support the program of increasing and stabilizing production of grains for local consumption.

The project is "integrated" also in terms of the relationship between the outlying areas and the town of Abyei. Too often "rural" development projects succeed in creating and enlarging the small towns of rural districts more than in actually aiding the rural economic sector. The focus of activity for the Abyei project is a number of "group farms" in the areas outside of Abyei town. These are essentially block farming arrangements in which 50 farmers cooperate to clear, prepare, weed and harvest a large field in conjunction with the technical staff of the project. Although much of the planning and work is cooperative, each man and his family are responsible for their own subplot.

The project aims to create a complimentary relationship between these group farms and the project's development training center in Abyei town. Training, logistical support, and coordinating activities at the center are adjusted and designed to meet the needs of the residents in those villages participating in the group farm sites. In addition to agricultural production, the technical staff works with the group farmers to help with such things as grain storage and marketing, water for human consumption and the training of volunteer health workers.

The Abyei project is under the jurisdiction of the Department of Planning of the Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Natural Resources in Khartoum. The Government of Sudan contracted with the Harvard Institute for International Development (HIID) to design and implement the project, which is funded in large measure by USAID. Preliminary work began in 1977 with investigations of environmental, social, economic and nutritional factors in the area.

The initial implementation phase which runs until June 1981 has proceeded in a careful step-by-step fashion, aiming to sharpen the understanding of what types of development interventions will provide long-term benefits for the people of Abyei and of similar rural areas. On the basis of current experiences, a more comprehensive development framework is being designed for the succeeding phase of the project.

Social Structural Constraints on Participation

The issue of popular participation is a call for broader involvement at all levels of people who will be most directly affected by a project. From our experience with the Abyei project so far, there appear to be three grave problem areas in implementing a participatory rural development project. These constraints are inherent in the nature of the social structural context of rural development projects in general:

(1) Rural social formations are often deeply riven by factions.
(2) Development projects with international bureaucratic involvement are exceedingly complex phenomena.
(3) Government, especially in remote areas, is a fragile and rapidly shifting institution in many Third World countries.

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Participation is a relative matter. At one level it implies a large role in decision-making for host country nationals rather than expatriate advisors and managers, but at the same time the development work is funded by foreign or supra-national donor agencies. A first issue regarding participation, then, relates to what extent a donor organization is going to work with and through established national institutions or bypass these in favor of direct activity. Any solution to the participation question at this level must always be a compromise tailored to the situation. An immediate if temporary solution to the problem often presents itself in that the middle-level administrative personnel provided by foreign donors take pressure off the already overextended national ministries' staff, but the longer-term issue of host-country project management remains.

At another level the question of participation also requires the balancing of competing interests. In Sudan, the policy of "decentralization" has focused thus far on efforts to create viable provincial administrative capacity. Theoretically there is no contradiction between decentralized government operating at the province level and a greater role for local populations, but it may be difficult to initiate both simultaneously. In the case of either centralized or decentralized government, there is a difficult compromise to be made between the involvement of local people and of staff from ministries centered elsewhere.

It is one thing for foreign development agencies to espouse general principles of participation, but it is difficult and not always productive to try to implement such a policy in the face of strong, legitimate and vested authority in the provincial and national capitals. And how much local participation is really compatible with the need for rational planning of the stewardship of the government's limited resources? Further, any call for local participation must be balanced by the need to maintain the linkages between the local area and the wider economic and administrative system. Foreign donor agencies in their current enthusiasm for popular participation must not forget that this issue relates to sensitive constitutional issues which each country must work out for itself.

The demand for popular participation refers mainly to the local level of the political system. Yet it is precisely at this level that its implementation becomes most relative and most problematic. Rural areas are often riven by factions — factions that are considerably deeper and more bitter than the divisions and competitions of the specialized bureaucracies of the administrative sectors. The practical question "participation by whom?" can open a Pandora's box of animosities that does little to promote agricultural development. Do those policy-makers who speak in such glowing terms of popular participation understand the true nature of most rural social formations in poor countries? From afar one may see in rural Africa an equality and uniformity born of poverty. But such uniformity does not necessarily entail unity. Quite the reverse, such uniformity is often bitterly competitive. All that may be needed to put an end to rural tranquility is something to contest, such as a participatory agricultural project.

Participation by whom? Ethnic group A or their mortal enemies of ethnic group B? Powerful lineage C or the strong but opposed lineage D? Those who fought the last war on side X or those who even now have weapons hidden for the opposition? These are hypothetical examples, but in the vast multi-ethnic, resource-poor stretches of rural Africa examples like these often provide a more accurate model for social formations than the vague view of bucolic tranquility and unity which seems to underlie some arguments for popular participation.

There are many ways in which people may participate in a project. The most important questions pertain to the stages and levels of the planning process at which local people help identify the significant needs and factors of their development. They are, after all, the world's leading authorities on matters pertaining to their area. Participation in this sense is a practical necessity. It is the only way to acquire full and accurate information for a project. However, there is a difference between local people providing information and their contributing to the decision-making process.

The call for significant popular participation in the decision-making process must take into account how complex is the process by which modern agricultural projects are designed, funded and implemented. The Abyei project, for instance, is the result of long negotiations among at least four parties: the people of Abyei (the "target group" in the jargon of development agencies), the U.S. government (the donor), the Sudan government (the host), and HIID (the contractor). Each of these parties is complex in itself. Many aspects of a project must be negotiated through at least four ministries of the Sudan government. The bureaucracies of Harvard and the American government are also complex. The intricacies of Abyei local politics have already been alluded to.

The funding for the project comes from two separate governments, is augmented by a special grant, runs through four separate accounts, and is paid in two currencies. Needless to say, the project must operate under a number of separate and partially contradictory accounting procedures. The negotiation process never ends and it stretches from Washington to Cambridge to the Ministry of Agriculture to the University of Khartoum to the USAID mission in Khartoum to Kadugli to Abyei. Hundreds of compromises must be made in order to appease various interests or fulfill the requirements of various bureaucratic procedures.

Development projects are international bureaucratic phenomena of exceeding complexity. Since many parties are involved it is rare that the final result even vaguely resembles the vision held by any one of them. It is understandable that each party feels that its interests are severely underrepresented. Among all the competing interests, local people who will actually share or suffer the consequences of the project are perhaps the most disadvantaged in the negotiating process. They are far from the corridors of negotiations and are structurally outside

the bureaucratic process that spawns development projects. They have the greatest stake and the least influence. Redressing this imbalance is as necessary as it is difficult.

Before looking at local participation in the Abyei project, we would do well to consider some of the problems of the donor agency. It too has its difficulties. All donor agencies, like all local communities, differ in their structural arrangements, and it is difficult to generalize. Let us look at the situation of the American AID mission in Khartoum as an example. As an outsider, I certainly do not understand all the intricacies of this institution, but it seems to be forced to operate under a policy that is not without its contradictions.

The American Congress has mandated that AID focus on providing development programs for the rural poor. Such programs are supposed to be broadly participatory and aimed at meeting basic needs. To carry out this policy AID must make extensive use of specialized contracting institutions, such as HIID, and host country ministries and research institutions. Since AID's brief calls for it to create projects that are to be (1) far from the capital, (2) participatory and (3) implemented through separate contractors and national ministries, it has little hope of effective control over what it is undertaking.

However, the same Congressional policies that have led AID to "decentralize" its operations have also mandated that it be strictly accountable for a greater range of aspects of its programs. Its representatives must verify that a project will have no adverse ecological effects. They must verify that it will have no adverse sociological effect on the local area. They must make sure that the bulk of the AID funds reach the poorest 30% of the population. They must verify that certain steps have been taken to include programs for women. They must make sure that all buildings meet U.S. standards, set in Washington and monitored from Nairobi.

Just as the local populace may despair that it has little control over projects that affect it, the donor agency may despair that it has little control over events for which it is held responsible. To a greater or lesser extent, other donor agencies as well as national ministries find themselves in similar quandaries. They must work within a paradoxical system in which local participation is mandated from abroad while at the same time severe constraints on that participation are also mandated from abroad.

Participation in the Abyei Project

These contradictions cannot easily be escaped. No project can be designed to rectify them for they are an intrinsic part of the current overall context of development efforts. However, the Abyei project has tried to a large extent to create a context in which the participation of local people is feasible.

First, the impetus for the project originated among the leadership of the Dinka community in Abyei. There was a process of negotiation between Dinka leaders and the central government in Khartoum which led to an invitation in 1976 from the government to HIID to consider the feasibility of an Abyei development project. For the initial visiting HIID teams, the people of Abyei identified the problem areas that have since become the program divisions: grain production, storage and marketing, health care in villages, education and training, water for human consumption, better communications, and construction of facilities. They stressed the need for a multisectoral approach, though not in that jargon. The then local leadership, especially Assistant Commissioner Justin Deng, also urged that the agricultural program focus first on grain for local consumption rather than on a cash crop for export from the area.

The first HIID visit was quite brief and focused on identifying those things which Abyei lacked and suggested some large capital-intensive improvements. A second visit in January 1977 was longer, included a larger Sudanese/HIID team and allowed more time to listen to a wider range of people. Also it was able to learn what development processes and institutions were already in place struggling with the enormous problems of development in Abyei.

This joint Sudanese-American team concluded that in Abyei, development projects must begin on the base of what is already being done there and gradually work together with the people and leadership to expand and improve upon this. The difference between these two early reports caused some confusion and some questioned just what HIID's program was. HIID's intention was and is to discover and to help Abyei people discover what is and what might reasonably become their development program.

Let us consider who participates in what capacities in the Abyei project so far. The core of the program staff consists of twelve people: seven educated Dinka, two northern Sudanese officers from the Ministry of Agriculture, and three Americans. The Sudanese are seconded from their home ministries or departments. The Americans are recruited and hired by HIID. The technical staff includes specialists from the fields of agriculture (agricultural engineering, plant pathology, animal traction), livestock, forestry, training, health, construction, and finance. The director, a northern Sudanese, is with the Ministry of Agriculture. The assistant director is a government official originally from Abyei. The Dinka staff members are all civil servants who have spent many years living and working away from Abyei.

In terms of "local" participation, the latter staff form a key part of the project. One might question whether these people are the most appropriate to spearhead a participatory program. Although they are from the area and committed to helping, their career aspirations and lifestyle goals are aimed away from Abyei and they do not expect to reside there permanently. On the other hand, an area like Abyei needs a bridge between its local problems and the realities of the wider social and governmental milieu of Sudan. It seems highly appropriate that trained local people rather than outsiders should constitute that difficult bridge.

In addition to this senior technical staff, the project employs about 80 local people in various capacities. In all

of these positions, employment is combined with a certain amount of training and apprenticeship. Some of these people, such as the volunteer health workers, the ox-plow trainees/trainers, brick makers and others being trained are helping to give form to entirely new activities for themselves and for Abyei. Others such as mechanics, drivers, carpenters, etc. are receiving additional training and experience in their own fields to upgrade their skills. One aspect of this is called "cross training." For the construction group, masons are given training in carpentry and vice versa. For the mechanical services group, drivers are given new training in maintenance skills and maintenance people receive some training in driving, and so on. In a project aimed at increasing the capabilities of local people to control their own economic development, overspecialization would be counterproductive.

The most important local participation is by the 200 members of the four group farms. Of these four group farms, two were quite successful in mobilizing labor and enthusiasm and in facing certain necessary group decisions. Another group was very slow getting started and suffered from indecision and dissension, though it finally did manage to equal the other two in land cleared and in planting activities. The fourth group failed to get its activities really started this year.

Examining these four situations suggests some lessons about popular participation at this basic level in Abyei. Among the Dinka, the coherence, allegiance and identity is strong within each of the nine subtribal territorial groupings. Each of the two most successful group farms is situated well within a traditional subtribal area and its members are entirely from that group. One of these successful group farms is of the most prestigious subtribes; the other is of the least prestigious (most "recently" formed or arrived). The one group is imbued with a sense of chiefly pride; the other with a strong desire to demonstrate their capabilities. A certain positive competition has developed between these two group farms, as shown by how their members are always up on the latest word on how many feddans the other group has cleared.

In the past, age sets were the medium of such proud competition. Originally, they carried out warrior tasks and during the colonial period they were mobilized for competitive community service labor. Age sets have always been associated with the subtribal territorial units. In recent years the dynamics of the age set system have atrophied. To some extent, it seems that the group farms with strong subtribal identity are reviving something of that spirit and organizational style.

In the two group farms that had little or slow success, this subtribal identity was lacking. The operations were located in areas on the boundaries between subtribes and the group membership also cut across the traditional social divisions. This was not accidental. These two sites and farms had been set up before the arrival of the current project. The Dinka former assistant commissioner had intended that these activities could help to diffuse intersubtribal animosities and create a more modern type of social identity for development. Next year there will be negotiations to reformulate these two group farms. It has already been decided for one of them to have two volunteer health workers instead of one. The project will probably facilitate the natural fission of these group farms into a more traditional organizational level.

One must be wary of too much social engineering and meddling with such traditional loyalties. Such subtribal allegiances are deep and strong and one does not wish inadvertently to set in motion the negative conflicts that the former assistant commissioner wanted to defuse. All four of the group farms are changing, expanding and evolving. There are many serious unresolved issues. Even within the framework of subtribal identity and organization, the people must work out for themselves the degrees and kinds of cooperation and individualism desirable for their activities. The aim of the project is to provide a context for this local institutional evolution.

The total number of local people participating in the Abyei project at the end of the first year was about 250, including senior staff, trainees, employees and group farmers. The people hailed from a number of locales and from several clans and subtribes. All of them were receiving either a sizeable share of their livelihood or important economic services through their involvement. All are being nudged (by the staff, by each other, and by their growing perceptions of the problems) to expand their horizons and consider new approaches.

What are the numerical implications of this participation for the total population of the area? In a simple material sense, each of these participants has several dependents and kin who benefit significantly—a total of over 1200 people. Since estimates of the Abyei population (in residence) vary between 20,000 and 40,000, with the lower figure being more credible, 1200 beneficiaries would constitute as many as 6% of the entire population (or up to 12% of the population of the eastern half of the Abyei area where the project operated during its first year). This is a significant initial base for an expanding participatory project in a rural area. The group is still small, and there is no danger of Abyei becoming the sort of mini-welfare society that sometimes results from development projects in demarcated areas. At the same time, it is large enough, diverse enough and dispersed enough that it may have a much wider influence.

Tentative Conclusions

In the attempt to create a dynamic and complementary relationship between "town" and "country", activities are taking place on two local levels. At the local administrative level the pressing problem is largely one of finding new organizational means to mobilize essentially local resources and technologies. At the group farm level, the task is to mobilize traditional organization to absorb and attempt new technical innovations, especially procedural innovations in agriculture. At this basic level, it appears advisable not to try to change but rather to work within

existing patterns of social organization and identity.

There is an understandable tendency on the part of the project staff to put the emphasis the other way around. Though the staff tends to shy away from the reorganization of their own structures and technical procedures to meet the needs of a given project, it tends at the same time to think that the traditional farmers out in the villages need somehow to be reorganized. This is not a criticism of the project staff, but an attempt on my part to understand one of the paradoxical dimensions of the problem of uniting local participation with an equally important requirement of reorganizing the governmental operations. It does appear more fruitful for projects to undertake creative institution building at the level of local administration and to resist the temptation to focus on organizational changes at the basic level of implementation.

At the local administrative level, the Abyei project has been somewhat stymied to date, because of problems of a more political nature. The project paper called for the gradual creation of an Abyei People's Development Organization (APDO), a locally based institution with the authority to advise and guide the development process. The proposed APDO became a focus of factional competition even before it could emerge, however. There was controversy over the extent to which it should be autonomous or under the direct control of the provincial commissioner of Kadugli. The distrust between Abyei and Kadugli is great and each side fears being closed out of the project by the other. In a similar way, the proposed organization became an object of contention between factions among the Dinka.

As a partial solution to this impasse, rather than have one overall Abyei Development Organization, several single purpose development groups could be formed. An Abyei medical group could do much to coordinate and make decisions regarding the direction of the health program. An education and training group could oversee those programs. Such groups could each have budgeted funds and considerable authority over their programs, with coordination handled by the staff. With each of these groups responsible for handling very specific tasks, and with a number of different groups active, the negative effects of all-out political fights for control should be reduced.

The planning implications of a participation-oriented enterprise like the Abyei project are clear. Such projects cannot be over-designed in advance. Planning may specify the direction and initial steps of implementation. But much leeway must be left for the practical, on-going negotiations among all the participants. For all of the emphasis so far on local participation in the Abyei Project, much too much of the program is still resulting from pressures from Khartoum, from inappropriate cost-benefit auditing notions in the donor bureaucracy, and from trendy ideas from development theorists.

Additionally, the road has not been smooth. Given all of the diverse interests involved, periodic "participation" in decision-making has resulted in intense disagreements and lobbying to influence the course of planning. Programs such as animal traction, cooperation with the provincial tractor program, the location and type of water wells, and the style of health services have all engendered seemingly bitter battles as various interest groups jockeyed for position. I do not mean to suggest that all this debate has been selfish. People have legitimate differences in what they genuinely think is best for Abyei. HIID, USAID, and the Dinka patrons in the Sudanese government all agreed that they wanted a broadly participatory project. Now they must be prepared to work with a process that is, when successful, somewhat disorderly and unpredictable. This is, after all, the nature of participation.

Participation in Program Evaluation at the Regional Level in Honduras

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One important aspect of creating a participatory society is the development of members' capacity to evaluate their surroundings and social organization in a critically constructive manner. If this kind of assessment is carried out by a few technicians or "experts" and followed by a program for development (even though there may be some provision for citizen participation) then the basis for a fully participatory society is lacking. Just as an informed populace is necessary for democratic decision making, so too is the ability to evaluate one's socio-economic surroundings necessary for the development of a participatory society based upon democratic principles.

While individuals are generally capable of stating displeasures and desires, the social organization and individual knowledge to systematically evaluate social processes and plans for change is uncommon. It is not that people do not have the ability to plan and evaluate (most do this on a daily basis at the individual, family and sometimes community level), it is that they have not experienced the formal process of interacting with bureaucracies and agencies.

This paper describes an effort on the part of a group of peasant leaders, at the regional level, to conduct an evaluation of five non-governmental, rural service organizations for the purpose of coordinating the activities and promotion of the five organizations. Part of the evaluation objective was to establish, at the regional and community levels, the capacity to critically and constructively review programs. In brief, the objective was to increase local participation in program evaluation, review and planning.

The experience to be described took place while I was employed at the Instituto de Investigaciones Socio-Economicas (IISE) in Tegucigalpa, Honduras. The purpose of IISE is to provide surveys, rural appraisal, program design, and the like to support popular organizations in both rural and urban areas. In 1974 a representative of a group of peasant organizations came to the institute seeking assistance concerning a study they wished to do. The leaders of the peasant organizations (radio schools, housewives' clubs, consumer cooperatives, peasant leagues, and an agricultural extension program) in the Department of Olancho wished to "evaluate" their programs so that they could improve them to meet the needs of the members at the community level. All of these programs were non-governmental. Support came from the church and other agencies abroad rather than locally. In fact, there was a great deal of local opposition to these organizations from bureaucratic and landed elites.

The degree of opposition was such that some of the agronomists in the extension program wore guns to protect themselves from the hired gunmen of the landlords; the consumer cooperative trucks were at times attacked by people who did not appreciate the competition they created. In brief, the Department of Olancho was not, and still is not, a friendly environment for participatory organizations. Yet this was the context for the work reported herein.

The leaders of the region who requested assistance at IISE for the evaluation were, for the most part, people who had participated in some of the programs as members and then had taken over leadership positions. The desire to coordinate their efforts at the regional level was an important organizational step because these organizations were linked only vertically to the national level. As a result, the activities of these organizations were coordinated with national projects rather than specific projects for regional needs.

It was decided that I should go to the region to assist them with the evaluation that they wanted to do. I saw this regional evaluation as the first step in a feedback system for information flow from the members in the communities to the regional level which could be used for regional program coordination and design. At the same time, there were personnel and financial limitations in the IISE as well as time constraints. A sampling technique was out of the question because many of the seventy communities involved would probably want community-specific information as well as general regional characteristics for program guides.

Above these rather technical organizational and design questions was the more substantive question of just what did these organizations have as goals and what did they think were the means for attaining them? Given the informality of the organizations at the regional level, it seemed possible that their vision of purpose might be different from the national level programs which had publicly stated goals. Thus, a review of documents was out of the question as a means to determining their goals and means beforehand, although familiarity with the national level programs was useful background information.

The best tactic appeared to be the use of a modified town meeting approach. In this model one is invited by community members to assist in community problem solving. An assembly of interested parties is called and a structured brainstorming session takes place to identify problems, resources available and alternative actions which may lead to a program design or even directly to a solution.

In summary, my strategy was to sit down with the leaders and promoters of these programs and to discuss their programs with them — goals, means to goals, why the concern for evaluation, etc. At the same time we would assess the human resources available to conduct a community level survey based upon group discussions in each community if that seemed appropriate to them and in accordance with the reason for the evaluation. As part of a possible agenda for the first of a series of week long meetings I included: 1) discussion of program goals, means to these goals, characteristics of each program; 2) concrete questions which would be indicators of an abstract concept which might be a program goal; 3) ideas on how a questionnaire could be used as a data management instrument and as a group discussion guide; 4) some approaches to data manipulation; 5) the conduct of group interviews; and 6) time frame for the actual evaluation.

During the initial session with local leaders, I found that their perception of my role in the evaluation was quite simple and straightforward: I was to bring them a questionnaire and tell them where to administer it. Later I would gather up the information to be processed at the institute. They expected a report as soon as possible with suggestions as to what should be done to improve and coordinate the programs. It seemed that because I had come from an institute known to them, and because one of them had met with me for a half an hour when asking me to work with them, legitimacy had been established, and they were willing to "turn themselves over to me". The possible misuses of the data to come from our study were of no concern to them at all. When working with organizations such as these, one is actually working with information which can affect the lives of not only regional leaders but also community members working with them; their lives can be affected not just in the "socio-economic impact" terms of Title XII of the Foreign Assistance Act, but also in terms of brutal military and para-military repression.

Accordingly, I felt it necessary to encourage a greater awareness of the implications of information gathering. I explained who I was and where I had come from, why all of the information that they planned to gather had to remain in their possession and should not be carried off to the capital for analysis, and what types of information should not be recorded. My role was to help them set up an information system, show them how to manage the information, and to help them design programs. They readily agreed with this role and were taken back by their own innocence. This whole area of confidentiality and professional ethics is

Participation in rural development processes has generally been considered in the context of countries with non-revolutionary political postures. This should evoke neither surprise nor criticism since the number of genuinely revolutionary countries is small compared with all less developed countries. Moreover, some of the impetus behind the focus on participation in rural development comes from donors of foreign assistance, such as the Agency for International Development, which characteristically focus on countries with relatively stable political processes, engaged in incremental development measures. But participation in rural development has also been the hallmark of several modern revolutions, including that in China and, more recently, Ethiopia. It is instructive to look at rural development participation in a revolutionary context, and to examine some similarities and differences arising in more and less revolutionary settings.

One of the important features in rural Ethiopia leading up to the country's revolution was the extent to which pretense surpassed performance in the rural development initiatives ventures did contribute to the country's overall agricultural growth, and a few experiments in district-wide integrated rural development were undertaken in Chilalo, Wolamo and Ada. However, the participants in these projects were not poorer farmers, despite the intentions of the external donors. In addition, such development as did take place was sharply regionalized so that rural development outside the target areas was seldom achieved. For example, pastoralists in the Awash Valley were net losers from compartmentalized plantation irrigation development. They lost their best grazing lands along the river and yet were not compensated in any way by plantation owners.

Perhaps most important, Ethiopia's many traditional land tenure systems had the common effect of virtually disinheriting large sections of the rural populace. Frequently absentee landlords extracted usurious rents from their tenants and kept tenancy so insecure that development initiatives presented unacceptable risks. Even somewhat more egalitarian tenure systems in the northern districts frequently left farmers with too little land to be either secure or productive. Such

own designated head of state, who had succeeded the emperor, plus 60 notables of the old order, constituted a final dramatic break with the past.

The military government, increasingly under the leadership of Mengistu Haile Mariam, made popular participation in development the *raison d'etre* for the revolution it sought to lead. Rural and urban reforms were undertaken. Control over land and other resources was removed from landlords and given to peasant associations. Urban land was vested in housing cooperatives. University and high school students and teachers were mobilized in the *zemecha* movement to explain land reform to peasants and to equip them for their new control over the means of livelihood. Nationalization of major industries and firms also took place but somewhat ironically, with little emphasis on workers' participation in management.

The *derg*, as the country's military leadership came to be called (the word means "committee" in Amharic), sought to make such economic reforms the foundation for a new political order. However, this sequence of political reconstruction has failed, largely be-

extremely important when working with any organization, especially now that a major theme in the donor community is direct participation. As participation becomes greater and greater in turbulent environments, there will be tension between the central offices of organizations and the local level, just as there will be an increase in the tension between the marginal population and those who wish to keep them there. It thus becomes even more important to keep much local information at the local level.

The next major stage in the sessions became the discussion of questionnaires, a process which took up a good deal of time. Although their tendency was to expect me to have questionnaires fully prepared, I explained that my role was only to share experiences from other studies as to the form the questionnaires could take to better enable those interviewing and those being interviewed to discuss and record information. The idea that the initial questions should be factual information about the community to "warm up" the group for further discussions was considered as a means to identifying the members of the group which needed to be brought into the conversation. After all, the idea of the questionnaire was more than information recoding; it was to be used as an instrument in the community, just as our conversations were in the sessions, to bring about an analysis of situations within the community and to raise their consciousness at the community level. True, the formal objectiv of the evaluation was to consolidate information, but just as the programs being analyzed were aimed at local initiative and participation so too could the evaluation process. And just as the regional leaders were attempting to coordinate their activities and programs via information systems so too, by facilitating discussion within the community, it would be possible to improve the verbal communication between members and leaders on the same issues. Thus we broadened the purpose of the evaluation — it was not to be an exercise produced by outsiders who would produce a final report at a later date, but an interactive process with immediate feedback at the community and regional levels.

We went over the problem of objectivity on the part of the interviewers, and the problem of leading questions and remarks so that the team of interviewers would be aware of the consequences of the discussions to be held concerning the organizations and the work being done in the communities. The conclusion was that each section of the questionnaire would be completed and used an as introduction to discussion. It should be noted that in the context of the regional team there was an ideological commitment to the concept of self criticism. Furthermore, because it was a form of self-evaluation those involved did not have to be concerned that someone "above" them in a bureaucracy would be studying the findings which could be used "against" them. As for the sensitizing that would accompany the group discussion approach, it would be helpful rather than harmful (as might be the case in some survey designs), because one of our basic goals was to stimulate awareness and a critical analysis at the community level. In short, the evaluation process was to be part of the social formation process of the five programs being evaluated. In each community, leaders of the five organizations would form a committee for further discussion of community problems, conditions, and the part that the organizations could play in the solutions to community problems. The regional leaders wanted the communities to make demands upon their programs and to suggest alternatives as well as specific problems to be solved.

Once these preliminary plans for the scope and objectives of the evaluation were agreed upon we began the task of the questionnaire. The first suggestion from the group was to divide into groups according to organizational affiliation so that those who were most familiar with each organization's program would be working on the definition of their goals and the description of their means. They felt that this would be the most expedient approach. But because one of the goals of the evaluation was to coordinate activities between organizations and programs it was suggested that we work through each program as a group so that the members from each organization would begin to know the other program in detail. It would be an exchange of vocabulary and definition as well as purpose.

We began the discussions with the peasant leagues, and they proudly stated that the overall goal of the organization and the programs was *Liberación Campesina* (peasant liberation). There were nods of agreement all around the circle in which we sat. Needless to say we were beginning at the abstract level. From here we discussed how we could ask a question to a community group such as , "Has the peasantry of this community become more liberated since the league formed here?" Immediately everyone agreed that the definition needed improvement and that, perhaps, by going over the activities of the leagues and the programs which were being promoted, we could identify questions which would help elucidate the meaning of "liberation".

The housewives' club came forth with *Liberacion Feminina* (Women's Liberation) and the men chuckled over it. The conditions of the meeting at that moment were perfect for the discussion of women's liberation because one of the male members had stepped out for cigarettes and upon return went around the circle offering cigarettes to men only! The session paused as cigarettes were offered, but this pause was broken by women saying, "Ah, what about us?" The poor fellow who had offered cigarettes had missed the definitional statement about women's liberation (equality, etc.), but this action abruptly brought the meaning into practice and down from the theoretical level. He went for more cigarettes. It was in this way that we operationalized the broad, abstract goals of the programs and came upon indicators for the questionnaire. At the same time the members of the organizations began to gain a deeper understanding of the problems of the other organizations and to see how they could be coordinated ideologically.

By the end of the first week a

cised rural smallholder producers have balked at selling produce to urban areas without better terms of trade and greater availability of consumer goods. How far Mengistu's regime depends upon Russian and Cuban help for its survival in lieu of domestic support is unclear.

Who has participated in what ways, with respect to rural development in revolutionary Ethiopia? The results of the rural land reform have not yet been comprehensively assessed and it appears still too early to do so. Although opportunities for conducting the necessary research have been very limited, certain tentative conclusions are plausible. While debate swirls around the question of what Ethiopia's proper revolutionary course should be, and who should lead it, the uncontroverted fact remains that millions of peasants now have a large measure of control over their primary asset — land — which they did not previously have. Ownership of land has been legally vested in peasant associations which are to cover up to 800 hectares each. All citizens, including disposessed landlords, are entitled to claim up to a maximum of 10 hectares, provided that

national union of associations. The *derg* has also sought to build political support for itself by influencing the selection and retention of local association leaders. Although its methods have been somewhat less violent and extensive in rural areas than in the urban cooperatives created under the urban land reform proclamation, the *derg* has attempted to use the peasant associations to mobilize support and personnel for war efforts in the Ogaden and in Eritrea (the whole world witnessed the peasant marches on Eritrea in 1976 and 1977).

The most important issue at present, however, is how to induce the peasants to produce more through the associations, to do so more efficiently and to market the produce through official channels to meet export and urban food supply requirements. Mengistu has complained of unseemly residual individualism on the part of the peasants, and since 1978 has mounted efforts to bolster development processes in ways that imply more cooperation with the regime from the beneficiaries of the rural land reform. The success of these efforts has been questionable.

One of the more significant —though

has opted for less reliance on peasant production by resorting to state farms to provide an increasing share of food production (this resembles to a considerable degree Haile Selassie's practice). Nevertheless the poverty which the military government is committed to relieving probably cannot be alleviated unless it successfully engages the participation of farmers in official marketing channels. The *derg's* success in this regard has been very limited to date.

Implicit bargaining over terms of trade between central governments and peasant producers is by no means peculiar to Ethiopia or to revolutionary circumstances. What is different in Ethiopia is the extent to which the government has weakened its own bargaining position, and risked its own viability, in the process of empowering the peasants. For example, the very thorough land reform, which exemplifies its ideological commitment, has limited the government's capacity to impose successfully what it believes is the crop marketing pattern most in line with the country's good and the peasants' own interest. The *derg* has liberated the peasant, via land reform,

compact questionnaire had been designed. It was decided that all of the communities would be included in the evaluation. Because we had designed the questionnaire as a group, any member of the group could go into a community and conduct the interview/discussion. In this way the approximately twenty leaders at the regional level could easily cover the seventy communities in the evaluation. It also meant that all of the regional leaders would have heard the statement of members and leaders of all of the organizations in at least some of the communities. It was felt that in four weeks all of the interviews could be done, so that two months later, just prior to the end of the year, I should return to assist with the tabulation and analysis. This fit into the national framework of year-end reviews of the organizations, and our region would have a concise and studied position paper to present at the planning sessions for the coming year.

Upon return at the end of the year it was found that the study had been carried out as planned. A few communities had not been covered, and a few which had not been on the initial list were later identified and brought into the study. Upon final typing of the questionnaire the members of the team had discovered omissions and questions that did not seem adequate and they had changed them accordingly. These changes indicated that they were thoughtfully working on the task at hand and that they had maintained a critical attitude toward our group work. There was no mystery behind "evaluation technology".

In the tabulation process we used simple frequencies at first to compare responses across organizations and to see what the regional strengths and weaknesses were. We were also able to identify communities with specific problems and make note of them for the coming year's promotional activities. The tabulation stage, which is often processed by machine or personnel not involved with analysis, also became a session for analysis. We were able to discuss conditions in specific communities because the person who had conducted the interview/discussion was there to relate more details. Also, where there was more than one organization in a given community the regional team had at least one member who had been working with that community and a more thorough analysis could be carried out.

One of the specific concerns of the organizations was leadership in the communities. We wished to identify the communities which needed leadership training programs to broaden the responsibilities within communities and to make them less dependent upon a few people. One problem with few leaders in a community is that the leaders complain of the burden upon them. The interviewers were to ascertain the number of leaders in each community and simply note the ratio of leaders to organizations, but the regional group insisted upon noting the names of all leaders and their organization on the first page of the questionnaire. They felt that this was very important information for future work with the communities. It was also very risky information to have in one central location. I tried to strike a compromise with them to reduce the information to a ratio, after the first round of tabulations, but in subsequent visits the information was always intact. The incident points out that the urge to hold onto every bit of information is not limited even where such information can be risky for the security of an organization.

Another concern was with which types of organizations should be promoted in which communities in the coming year. I had a related hypothesis that cooperatives worked better in communities with many organizations than in communities with few organizations. In order to test this hypothesis and address the concern, we began by preparing frequency distributions of the number of organizations in each of the communities and the number of communities with each type of organization. We then used a large sheet of newsprint to put the ordered (cross-tabulated) frequency distribution (scalogram) on the wall. The step-like appearance of the distribution was ample to demonstrate that the organizations did indeed have a unidimentional growth pattern. That is, there was a clear order as to when each type of organization appeared in the community. This aided the promoter in deciding which organizations should be promoted next. We then discussed what the data meant. For example, why were some communities more active than others? What substitutes did some communities have for the organizations? Answers to these questions also explained some of the outliers to the scalogram's step-like pattern.

The next step in testing my hypothesis was to ask team members to describe how well the cooperatives were working and to classify them with a "good" or "bad" rating. After circling the good cooperatives on the scalogram, a line was drawn between the good and bad cooperatives. Above the line were the communities with many organizations and below were communities with few organizations. The hypothesis was graphically and intuitively supported by this method which did not use any statistical techniques for which more formal training (beyond the level of the members) was required.

The promotional work for the following year was to focus on filling in the scale and moving communities up the scale, with the promoters coordinating the effort. The idea was that as the promoter of organizations below a given scale step found that there was an expressed need for a higher level organization, that promoter would contact the promoter of the next organization on the scale and together they would go over the background of the community and introduce the new promoter to the community. In this way there would be less haphazard promotion and more coordination. Plus, the organizations would be able to pass on information to each other concerning particular aspects of given communities. This would save the scarce resources (human and material) usually spent in random promotional activities.

Prior to my second planning visit the following year the regional team telegramed to advise me that the meeting would be postponed a week or so because most of the team was going to be involved in a nationwide hunger

march upon the capital city. Thus, I was not there when a local coalition of landlords, local bureaucrats and a bribed major with his troops stormed the center in which the organizations had their meetings. In all, fifteen people were killed, including the regional coordinator of the radio schools, the leader of the consumer cooperatives, the warehouseman, promoters of the peasant leagues, peasants, a couple of priests, and several bystanders. The army burned all printed material found at the center, and, fortunately, all the key names that had been saved went up in smoke. The fear engendered in the communities by this incident lasted for years, as the organizations slowly began to rebuild. Those who survived from the regional team and who managed to return were the basis for an assessment of the local conditions. In the communities there remained those who had begun the community discussions; they could continue to assess their needs and plan solutions.

There are at least two major lessons to be drawn from this experience. The first is that local communities can conduct effective program evaluation, even when all the "evaluators" have no formal training. If properly organized, in fact, the participants can arrive at much more insightful assessments of program effectiveness than any formally trained outside team of professionals.

The second lesson is that participation does not come easily. When grass roots organizations form and begin to inquire into the conditions that maintain the status quo, however innocuous their inquiries may seem, it must be expected that those who have benefited from that status quo will react, sometimes violently.

reviews

The Rational Peasant: The Political Economy of Rural Society in Vietnam

Samuel Popkin
University of California Press, 1979

Review by Forrest Colburn
Department of Government
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This exciting new book offers a view of peasants at odds with the influential interpretations of Eric Wolf, Joel Migdal, and, in particular, James Scott. The academic literature on peasants up to this point has been based largely on the "moral economy" paradigm which in Popkin's opinion has tended to romanticize peasant society. By looking at the peasant as a self-interested rational decision-maker, Popkin is able to present an analysis of peasant society that is more in keeping with the sober experience of those working in rural development.

In his first two chapters, Popkin presents a model of the rational peasant and the political economy of peasant society. The following three chapters investigate the history of Vietnam from precolonial times to the emergence of the Communist movement. A particular attempt is made to assess the impact of historical events and socio-economic trends on village life and on the social behavior of the peasantry. Drawing upon French studies of Vietnam as well as his own field work, Popkin offers a succinct account of the development of peasant society in Vietnam that supports his "political economy" model. These chapters also offer interesting insights into the emergence of the Vietnamese revolutionary movement. The last chapter of the book is devoted to analysis of peasant movements generally and the possibilities for peasants undertaking collective action.

Popkin's discussion of the history of Vietnam is so readable that even those with no particular background or interest in Southeast Asia will find these chapters to be of interest. It is, however, the first two chapters and the last which will stimulate a good deal of controversy and command the attention of those working in rural development. These chapters are buttressed by material and observations from a number of different cultures and stand on their own, apart from any discussion of peasant society in Vietnam. Of more than historical interest are the fruits of Popkin's research into the rural institutions of pre-modern Europe, including a "revisionist" interpretation of the enclosure movement in England.

Moral economists emphasize the importance of considerations of subsistence and survival. The village is seen as a ritual and cultural unit as well as an important part of peasant economic life. In addition moral economy analyses of the village stress the role of community norms and assume that practices within villages are derived therefrom. Moreover, patron-client exchanges are seen as based on some mutuality of interests rather than on differentials in power and exploration.

Popkin argues that although peasants are poor and live close to the margin of existence, there are still many occasions when they do have some surpluses and do make risky investments; the fact that they are poor and averse to risk does not mean that they do not make investments. The main thrust of Popkin's analysis is that the locus of investment decisions is the individual or the family, and not the village as a collective entity. Peasants rely on private, family investments for their long-run security and so will attempt to derive short-term gain at the expense of the village. Thus, economic conflict over advancement to more secure positions is inevitable within the village. A much less benign view of the village thus emerges: villages are not egalitarian, welfare-oriented or necessarily harmonious. Village life is shaped and

restricted by individual self-interest, the difficulty of ranking needs, the willingness of individual peasants to raise their own subsistence level at the expense of others, aversion to risk, leadership preoccupation with profits, and the "free-rider" problem discussed in organization theory by Mancur, Olson and others.

Popkin's analysis also leads him to question the conventional interpretation of the impact of the commercialization of agriculture on peasant societies. To moral economists, commercial agriculture and the growth of the state inevitably threaten the subsistence levels of peasants and undermine traditional institutions, thereby leading to the stratification of rural society and greater poverty and insecurity for the poorer strata. Consequently, peasant protests are seen as "conservative"—a collective effort to reinstate the traditional institutions and values threatened by capitalism. Popkin argues convincingly, though, that peasant involvement in commercial agriculture is generally not a last-gasp response to declining or threatening situations, but a response to new opportunities. Peasant liberation movements, he says, are antifeudal, directed at the reshaping of traditional practices as well as the "taming" of capitalism.

Although the commercialization of agriculture and the development of strong central authorities dramatically alter peasant society, they are not wholly deleterious to peasants. This is not because commercial agriculture and/or colonialism are necessarily more benevolent than moral economists assume. Rather, traditional institutions according to Popkin's analysis are harsher and work less equitably than they believe. Furthermore, the increased stratification of rural society that accompanies the commercialization of agriculture results in large measure from the willingness of so many members of the village elite to use their outside connections in village power struggles to entrench their property and authority advantages.

The debate between the moral and political economy approaches is not simply a matter of historical or academic revisionism, but has contemporary relevance for the study of rural development. Popkin's political economy approach focuses on factors which are necessary to achieve collective action. Popkin argues that even if collective action were beneficial to the village at large, villagers would likely not contribute to a coordinated effort unless they were convinced that their respective individual benefits outweighed costs. Collective action requires conditions under which peasants would find it in their individual interests to allocate resources to their common interest—and not be free-riders.

When there is little or no trusted leadership, only small groups are viable because they minimize problems of coordination and incentives. Effective leadership enables collective action to take place on a larger scale; however, given the usual disheartening experience of peasants and their general aversion to risk, leaders have to go to considerable effort to establish their credibility. Furthermore, since peasants judge the value of using state institutions or joining political movements on the basis of the same kind of rational investment logic they follow in their daily affairs, leaders must convince peasants that they can produce individual benefits that exceed individual costs.

This is a realistic and useful book which would be of particular help in sharpening issues of individual motivation and group action for students of peasants and rural development. Unfortunately, for the sake of contrast and argument, Popkin sometimes slights the nuances and complexities of those scholars whom he classified as moral economists. Still, his overall approach to peasants and peasant society is so stimulating and compelling that the book may well become a classic.

Self-Help and Popular Participation in Rural Water Systems

Duncan Miller
Development Centre Studies
O.E.C.D., Paris, 1979

Review by John W. Thomas
Harvard Institute for International Development

Development theory and the resulting strategies of national development have had a continuing centrist cast to them. This can be attributed to three mutually reinforcing views. First, the dominant role of economists in propounding development theory has focused attention on maximizing the efficient use of resources. Economists proceeded from the assumption that resources are scarce (correct) and that the resource constraint is of central importance (not always correct). The conclusion has been that central planning is a necessary ingredient in the organization of national development programs.

Second, the great disparities in educational background within the populations of developing countries have meant that the educated have become a technical elite that has dominated government. Historically such elites have seen themselves as better able to plan and guide their nation's development programs efficiently, than their less trained countrymen.

Third, for several reasons (ranging from the fact that many developing countries inherited a highly centralized governing apparatus from their colonial period, to the importance of foreign aid which channels resources through central governments), most national development programs have been planned, directed and implemented by technical elites employed by central governments with little participation from the intended beneficiaries. The convergence of these factors has resulted in development strategies that emphasize centrally administered development programs.

Entering the Third Development

Decade, uneven and unsatisfactory results in previous decades have called into question the conventional approach. The limited effectiveness of centrally directed development has meant that serious consideration is now being given for the first time to the concepts of self-help and participation. Probably the strongest endorsement of these principles for development has come from the U.S., where both concepts are thoroughly ingrained in our political philosophy. However, such endorsement as found now in the USAID mandate is not limited to the U.S., and the two concepts have found increasing currency in development programs around the world.

Despite this interest and official sanction, skepticism as to the efficacy of participation and self-help remain. Controversy surrounds them. Skeptics claim that since their benefits cannot be quantified or rigorously proven, their value must remain suspect. Naturally, the officials of governments who have planned and directed development are skeptical of the value of giving responsibility over to less technically-qualified villagers who are the intended beneficiaries of the programs.

Unfortunately, much of the debate is based on the underlying value of the debaters, so despite widespread recognition of the need for much broader involvement of people in development, despite the limitations of past strategies, and despite official endorsement of participation and self-help, the precise effects of the application of these two concepts remain unclear. One reason for the controversy over the validity of the concepts is that their impact varies tremendously depending on the nature of self-help and the character of participation, on the social, economic, cultural and physical environment in which they are implemented, and on a wide variety of other factors. These variations are of course inevitable when one deals with people of highly diverse backgrounds in widely varying contexts.

The controversy and debate on the role and impact of self-help and participation make the OECD Development Centre's study, ***Self-Help and Popular Participation in Rural Water Systems,*** by Duncan Miller a very valuable contribution to the literature on development. It is a careful attempt to analyze the impact of self-help and participation in one development activity, rural water systems, in each phase of their life: identification of need, design preparation, implementation and construction, finance, and operations and maintenance. The origins of the book go back to 1976 when OECD convened a meeting of experts on the subject of water resource management and utilization. The topic of self-help was given high priority by the experts at that meeting and the Centre was encouraged to "undertake specialized and comprehensive case study investigations" on the role of self-help, (p. 10). This publication is the result.

The opening section by Duncan Miller discusses concepts of self-help and participation, develops a paradigm of self-help for rural water systems, explores the potential for self-help applications and establishes a set of project-related and impact-related hypotheses for self-help and participation in rural water systems. This is followed by two case studies which form part of the project. The first, by F.L. de la Barra Rowland, is an "Analysis of Experiences of Self Help and Public Participation in Rural Water Supplies: The Case of Mexico." The second case is "Public Participation on Village Level Irrigation Perimeters in the Matam Region of Senegal" by Sylviane Fresson. Section four, by Duncan Miller, reports on an earlier study by OECD on the planning and design of rural drinking water systems in seven African countries. This study, while not initiated to test the self-help hypothesis, contains considerable data that can be used to test it in a comparative context. This is followed by a summary of evidence drawn from other literature that bears on the study's central hypotheses. At the end of the volume there is a structure bibliography on self-help and popular participation.

The volume specifically avoids a new definition of self-help and participation, but instead aims at constructing a hierarchy of possible levels of popular involvement and describing the major characteristics attributable to them. It generally sees self-help as individual action while participation "implies a greater scale in terms of group size . . . more representativeness . . . and a larger or longer-term goal being pursued" (pp. 11–12). Because the study is focused on the self-help and participation aspects of water systems it focuses primarily on the process of water project development and use, and much less on the impact of rural water systems in rural communities.

In laying out the framework and hypotheses for study, Miller is very careful to place limits on their scope in order to achieve a rigorous testing of the basic hypotheses. While the tenor of this section is technical and research-oriented, it does note briefly the larger political context which may ultimately be crucial in determining the impact of self-help and participation. "The commitment (to popular participation) necessitates shifting decision-making centres closer to the people, not just a device of shifting problems to them. For many countries, if not most, this is not just a question of some degree of 'fine tuning' but rather a 'paradigm shift', a reorientation of basic political and economic tenets." (p. 27). Unfortuntely the three studies which are subsequently reported tend to neglect this crucial issue.

De la Barra Rowland's study of Mexico tries so hard to be rigorous in terms of presentation that it becomes hard reading, and the conclusions are so cautiously drawn that they tend to present the obvious. However, for persevering readers the case does provide some solid evidence on the values and limits of self-help and participation. The data appears to demonstrate that:

- —User involvement will lead to cheaper and better maintenance and more effective collection of water rates.
- —User involvement will lead to community motivation and institution building and will catalyze community development action.
- —User involvement in the implementation phase tends to cause inefficiencies, diseconomies, higher cost and poor technical standards.

(He notes, however, that the data on this were derived from the opinions of officials in charge of institutions which implement self-help programs and therefore may lack substantive validity. This is a qualification to which I can only agree and ask why, when the other hypotheses were being so carefully tested in the field, those relating to this controversial question were treated with so little rigor.) (pp. 63–64)

Fresson's study of Senegal focuses on village and river perimeter irrigation systems rather than village water supply. It deals much more than the other studies with the conditions which make self-help and participation effective. Fresson summarizes factors that influence the effectiveness of participation and relates them to land tenure, to the production system, to social organization, and to the system of finance. (p. 119) These basic conditions for participation in an irrigation project should be reviewed carefully by anyone concerned with the uses of participation in development projects. Because this case treats participation in conjunction with the production system, and Fresson correctly attaches importance to that, it is difficult to compare this with the other two studies in the volume.

Duncan Miller's final section review is an OECD seven-country study in Africa, originally designed to test the impact of rural water systems on rural villages. He reanalyzes the data to test this study's hypothesis about the role of self-help and participation, by examining the frequency of failure of water systems facilities and the duration of the breakdowns vis-a-vis the degree and nature of participation in each phase of the project. He summarizes the relationships as suggesting that participation plays an important role in project design and recurrent maintenance, but that in the more physical aspects of the project preparation, construction and finance, there is less of a role for local participation and finance. (p. 129)

Miller goes on to summarize five other country studies done independently of the OECD study. He reports that some of these studies support and others contradict the OECD findings. He derives some useful policy-oriented generalizations from the literature along two lines. First, that objectives should be modest, the focus should be on small groups, and indigenous traditions should be utilized, without being confined to local elites. Second, that self-help and participation are not readily transferable and are most effective where there is a tradition of mutual assistance and of local government.

The study's findings are summarized as follows: "First, in general, self-help and participation have greater benefits on aspects of project design and implementation if they are incorporated into the project from the outset and repeated at each step of the project cycle. The nature and scope of participation is clearly culture- and case-specific. Second, the financial impacts of participation are yet unproven as a general rule. On the other hand, savings to public funds and efficient rate collection appear to have been more prevalent where participation was active in the early stages of project design and implementation. Finally, self-help and participation had their most powerful impact on the operations and maintenance aspects of water systems. This is most important because this is usually the weakest area of rural water supplies." (p. 133)

In the future whenever involved in debates on the value of self-help and participation, I will cite the OECD study for evidence of efficacy of self-help and participation. When I am involved in the design of projects, however, I will use the study more sparingly because not all the arguments are as yet conclusive. Miller recognizes this. His study certainly represents an important contribution to the literature that is slowly making the usually normative concepts of self-help and participation more applicable to the actual problems and programs of development.

notes

A new *Asian and Pacific Development Centre* is taking shape with the merger of four research and training institutions sponsored by the Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP). Of these, particularly the Asian and Pacific Development Administration Centre (APDAC) and the Social Welfare and Development Centre for Asia and the Pacific (SWDCAP) have been active in dealing with issues of rural development participation, and it is expected that the new APDC will continue those interests. One of the last outputs of the SWDCAP before the merger is a volume on *Working with the Poor in Bangladesh: Ten Case Studies and Lesson Plans for Social Work Education and Allied Fields*, edited by Dr. Ahmadullah Mia, professor of social work at the University of Dacca. The APDC is located in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.

The *Canadian Hunger Foundation* (CHF) is a non-profit organization which grew out of FAO's Freedom From Hunger Campaign 20 years ago. Over the years it has evolved into an international development agency whose major activity is rural development in direct cooperation with rural non-governmental groups in developing countries. Development programs of the CHF are chiefly concerned with the viability of the rural community from the farm to the market-town level.

A fundamental principle on which the CHF operates is that of local participation or self-help, believing that the input in the form of cash, goods, or services by the people of developing countries is the best guarantee of dignity and pride, and goes a long way in ensuring the success of a project. CHF-assisted projects should develop leadership, an organizational base and programming capacity so that depen-

dence on foreign expertise is minimized; they should encourage the use and local development of appropriate technologies and equipment needed to improve productivity without damage to the environment, the economy or employment opportunities. The aim is for self-reliance, which eventually renders the services of the CHF unnecessary.

As of 1978, the on-going programs under administration had a total value of nearly $4 million — with a local input in cash, goods and services of 46% of total program value. Projects range from training and rehabilitation for physically and mentally disabled persons in the Dominican Republic to construction of two dairy barns and corrals for a cooperatively-managed dairy herd in Senegal and agricultural youth training in India. The CHF has published two versions of *Handbook on Appropriate Technology* which is designed for use by people at all levels of development. It also publishes a newsletter, *Thought for Food*, which can be obtained from the Foundation at 323 Chapel Street, Ottawa, Ontario, K1N 7Z2, Canada.

In collaboration with the University of Denver and the Solar Energy Research Institute, the *International Association for the Advancement of Appropriate Technology for Developing Countries* is holding its second annual symposium October 10-12, 1980 at Denver, Colorado. The theme of these meetings will be "Agriculture, Rural Energy and Development." Those interested in obtaining more information may write to: Mr. R.S. Ganapathy, Urban and Regional Planning Program, Art and Architecture Building, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48105.

Call for papers. The editors of a symposium issue of *Women & Politics*, on women in development, are looking for papers on policy issues, case studies or data on the impact of development projects on women, and critiques of the treatment of women in foreign assistance programs. Manuscripts should be short (25 pp or less, typewritten), specific (i.e., focussing on a specific issue rather than reviewing the literature), and accompanied by a 100 word abstract. Footnotes should be in the University of Chicago ms. style. Manuscripts should be accompanied by a stamped, self-addressed envelope plus a stamped, self-addressed manila envelope, if the manuscript is to be returned. Two copies of the manuscript, one in a form suitable for anonymous review, should be sent to Kathleen Staudt, Department of Political Science, University of Texas at El Paso, El Paso, Texas 79968.

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RURAL DEVELOPMENT
participation
review

Rural Development Programming: The Learning Process Approach

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Ford Foundation, Manila

One of the clear lessons of the 1970's has been that effective participation of the rural poor in the development process is more easily mandated in programming documents than achieved in the real world of program implementation. It is not, however, a new lesson. In earlier decades, experience with cooperatives and rural development produced similarly disappointing results in the context of high expectations and good intentions. Generally the cooperatives proved to be creations of government operated under government management—which provided little market power, produced few returns to members, and consequently enjoyed little or no popular support. Similarly community development, when implemented on a large scale, ended up as little more than one more set of centrally formulated programs and targets implemented through conventional bureaucratic structures and largely unresponsive to local preferences and/or needs.

In hindsight the results seem quite predictable. Yet in spite of the monotony with which the basic lessons thus learned have been repeated and the fairly substantial progress made in understanding the nature of the problem, it remains the rule rather than the exception to see in development programming: a) reliance, even for the planning and implementation of "participative" development, on centralized bureaucratic organizations which have little capacity to respond to diverse community-defined needs or to build on community skills and values; b) inadequate investment in the difficult process of building community problem-solving capacity; c) inadequate attention to dealing with social diversity, especially highly stratified village social structures; and d) insufficient integration of the technical and social components of development action.

Prominent among the barriers to effective participatory programs are pressures on development financing agencies to move too much money too quickly in time bounded, pre-planned projects in pursuit of short-term results; while the need is for a flexible, sustained, experimental, action-based, capacity-building style of development effort for which both donors and recipient bureaucracies are ill-equipped. Pressures for immediate results measured by goods and services delivered drive out attention to building the capacity of the responsible institutions to provide these goods and services in ways which are responsive to local needs *and* build the local problem-solving capacity on which sustained development depends. Programming procedures which demand detailed up-front planning coupled with rigorous adherence to fast-paced implementation schedules and pre-planned specifications all but assure that the projects will be unresponsive to subsequent popular input—or even to a growing understanding of what the real problems are on the part of the project's professional staff.

Three Asian Successes

Are there options? Apparently so, as there are a number of successful experiences that provide exceptions to the more typical outcomes. These bear examination in a search for useful lessons. Three cases selected for examination from Asia share several common characteristics: a) involvement of rural people in their own advancement; b) greater than average success, with results that are not dependent on uniquely favorable settings; and c) a scale of operation that places them substantially beyond the pilot project stage.

Indian National Dairy Development Board

India's National Dairy Development Board (NDDB), built up from the model of the Anand Milk Producers' Union, is frequently cited as an example of the potentials of cooperative organization in the Third World. By the end of 1976 it was comprised of 4,530 village cooperatives with a combined membership of 2 million farmers. The cooperative collects milk from members at village collection points twice each day, transports and processes it, and markets the processed products in major urban cen-

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ters. It is known for being efficient, free of corruption, and effective in providing major benefits to even the poorest members of the village communities it serves.

But it did not begin with the NDDB operating a national-scale program. Its roots go back to the mid-forties when a group of dairy farmers grew tired of cooperating with the government-sponsored milk market program which offered them low and fluctuating prices. Boycotting the government program, they formed their own cooperative under the leadership of a farmer-member. By 1947 eight village cooperatives with 432 members had formed a cooperative union. These were difficult times for the cooperative and in 1949 they called on the assistance of Verghese Kurien whom, it seems, destiny had brought to their village. Along with the farmers, Kurien learned how the problems of milk production and marketing within a village cooperative framework could be overcome. As they learned, other cooperatives were formed and brought within the organizational umbrella. Gradually methods were refined, and the organization that was eventually to become the NDDB grew—from the bottom up—adding new layers and branches as it grew, always under the sustained leadership of Kurien. Appropriate management systems to meet the demands of the program were worked out through experience. The values of integrity, service, and commitment to the poorest member-producers were deeply imbedded in its emerging structures. Management staff were hired fresh from school, trained through experience on the job, indoctrinated in the values of the program, and advanced rapidly as the program grew.

Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee

BRAC was formed in early 1972 under the leadership of Mr. F. H. Abed, a practicing accountant, as a modest relief effort to resettle refugees in the Sulla area of Northeast Bangladesh following the war of partition with Pakistan. Those involved soon learned that relief alone was not going to overcome the

miserable conditions in which even the successfully resettled refugees were forced to live, and it was decided to reorient their efforts toward village-level development.

A multi-sectoral program was evolved which included construction of community centers, functional education, agriculture, fisheries, cooperatives, health and family planning, and vocational training for women. In each sector early failures led to program modifications. For example the teaching methods and lesson plans of the functional education program were substantially revised to make them more relevant to village life. In the health program they turned to use of paramedics, with physicians reorienting their roles to be first trainers, second planners, and only lastly curers. But close monitoring of the villages in which they were working revealed to BRAC staff that they still were not producing the results they wanted. Too few of its programs were addressing the needs of the landless. Conflicting interests of landed and landless made it nearly impossible to address the interests of each within a single village association. Each sectoral activity tended to operate independently of the others. Village activities remained overly dependent on the presence of BRAC staff. The paramedics tended to concentrate on cures rather than prevention. The literacy program was not producing useable skills.

BRAC programs had fallen into the patterns of most sectoralized government sponsored rural development efforts—with similar results. Again a major review was undertaken to assimilate the lessons learned and evolve a change in strategy. The new strategy would concentrate entirely on the poorest 50% of the village population—defined operationally as those families whose livelihoods depended in part on selling labor to third parties—and program initiatives would come largely from the beneficiaries. When entering a new village, an initial survey identified members of the target group. Informal discussions at traditional gathering places served to identify the major concerns of this group and to single out those with leadership potential. Discussion groups grew until a village assembly of the poor became formalized. Leaders received training at a special BRAC center in organizing and consciousness-raising methods.

To insure against dependence on BRAC and to discourage participation by those only interested in handouts, initial activities developed by the group had to be carried out exclusively with local resources. Only when the group had proven capable in mobilizing such resources were supplemental BRAC resources offered. Education provided literacy and numeracy skills, but was designed concurrently to raise consciousness of class exploitation and to build commitment to group action. The activities dealt with truly basic needs such as demands for a rightful share in government programs; bargaining for improved wages, share cropping and land-lease terms; and schemes to gain control over productive assets. Women's activities emphasized productive employment, often involving difficult physical work under a food-for-work program. All schemes were planned and implemented under the supervision of leaders from the target group.

As the strongest possible indication that BRAC's new approach was indeed responding in an effective way to strongly felt needs, the program was being self-replicated by the villages themselves. As one village set out to organize another to protect its newly-negotiated gains in wages and contract terms, the landless of other villages came from miles away asking organized villages to help them achieve the same.

At about the time that BRAC moved from a sectoral to a more people-centered approach, it also established a research unit to advance the understanding of its staff of rural poverty. Questions were addressed such as: Who controls what assets in the rural village and how? How are some families able to advance themselves while others become increasingly impoverished? What is the peasant's perception of famine and credit? Participatory research techniques such as the use of peasant panels to generate data on peasant perceptions of famine and credit proved highly effective. Researchers and field workers often exchanged roles or worked jointly to insure that research was fully integrated with operations. By January 1980, 378 BRAC staff were working with some 800 villages.

Thailand's Community-Based Family Planning Services

As an official of Thailand's development planning agency responsible for observing government programs in action from 1965 to 1971, Mechai Veravaidya reached two conclusions: 1) the government's development programs were largely failing because they were designed from the top down, involved no participation of the people, and seldom provided effective follow-up on completed projects; and 2) the few gains made were rapidly overtaken by Thailand's rapid population growth. Mechai left the planning agency in 1971 and began experimenting with the idea of bringing family planning closer to the people. He tried having a doctor offer family planning services in a local school. The people responded, but he could not get a second doctor interested. He tried using student recruiters to send potential acceptors to a clinic. The doctors liked this approach, but the people didn't. After a variety of failures he tried in 1974 a totally new approach which would not be dependent on physicians. Shopkeepers were recruited in each of five villages, given a supply of birth control pills, instructed in their use, and encouraged to sell them for a small commission. Good sales led to recruitment of seventy new distributors. Expansion continued thereafter and Mechai eventually set up a new organization specifically to service his distributors and expand the program.

As the program expanded, Mechai became preoccupied with the design and operation of strong management systems consistent with the needs of the village-level operations. Continuous testing and revision resulted in important changes in supervisory, resupply, and reporting systems. New layers of management were added as required. As top management became further and further removed from field operations he instituted a requirement that each make periodic visits to the villages with local supervisors to keep them grounded in village reality. Finding

donor-mandated statistical reporting systems cumbersome and of little utility, he drastically simplified reporting requirements to gather only the most basic of performance information, directly related to program operations. Color coded graphs and monthly staff meetings were mechanisms for encouraging staff to make regular use of this data. Unimpressed with the utility of conventional impact surveys which did not relate to administrative units and produced results only after the time for action had passed, he devised his own "mini-survey" method by which his supervisors gathered data from a sample of households each month, processed the data, and put it to immediate use.

The Common Feature: A Learning Process

The performance of a development program can be characterized as a function of the fit achieved between beneficiaries, program, and assisting organization. In more specific terms a given development program is likely to perform poorly in terms of advancing the well-being of a specific group unless there is a close correspondence between: beneficiary needs and program output; program task requirements and the distinctive competence of the assisting organization; and the mechanisms for beneficiary demand expression and the decision processes of the assisting organization. (See Figure 1)

The various programs examined in the cases above each found a particular solution to the requirement for fit appropriate to its time and circumstance. If we look to these experiences for a program or an organizational blueprint for replication elsewhere we are only likely to be disappointed. It is to the *process* of their development that we must look for the most useful lessons. The nature and significance of this process is best understood by contrasting it with a more conventional approach to development programming, understood as the "blueprint" approach.

The Blueprint Approach

This approach, with its emphasis on careful pre-planning, reflects the textbook version of how development programming is supposed to work. Researchers are supposed to provide data from pilot projects and other studies from which project designers will choose the most cost-effective designs for achieving given outcomes. Administrators of the implementing organizations are supposed to execute the project plan faithfully, much as a building contractor would follow construction blueprints, specifications, and schedules. Once implementation is complete an evaluation researcher is supposed to measure actual changes in the target population and report actual versus planned changes to the planners at the end of the project cycle so that blueprints can be revised.

Its clear-cut order, allocation of funds for precisely-stated outcomes, reliance on "hard" data and expert judgment, and the clearly-stated implemetation schedules make project justification easy in budget presentations. It is a programming approach quite appropriate to certain types of development projects—most notably physical infrastructure projects—where the task and outcomes are defined, environment stable, and cost predictable. Unfortunately, however, in rural development the objectives are more often multiple, ill-defined, and subject to negotiated change; task requirements are unclear; environments are constantly changing; and costs are unpredictable. Although knowledge is severely limited, the blueprint approach calls for behaving as if it were nearly perfect. Where there is need to build institutional capacity for sustained action on unfamiliar development problems, it assumes that development actions are terminal and that hastily assembled temporary organizations will suffice. Where the need is for a close integration of knowledge-building, decision-making, and action-taking roles, it sharply differentiates the functions and even the institutional locations of the researcher, the planner and the administrator.

Awareness is becoming widespread that the blueprint approach is an inadequate response to the rural development problem, but its assumptions and procedures continue to dominate most rural development programming and to provide the core content of most training courses in development management. This is unlikely to change until viable options are understood and supported.

Figure 1 SCHEMATIC REPRESENTATION OF FIT REQUIREMENTS



The Learning Process Approach

Examination of the three Asian success cases suggests that the blueprint approach never played more than an incidental role in their development. None was designed and implemented. Each emerged out of a long-term learning process in which villagers and program personnel shared their knowledge and resources to create a fit between needs, actions, and the capacities of the assisting organization. Each had a leader who spent time in the villages with an idea, tried it, accepted and corrected his errors, and built a larger organization around the requirements of what he learned.

In each instance the overall process can be broken down into three stages, each with its own unique learning requirement. (See Figure 2) The elements of each stage can be described roughly as follows:

Stage 1: Learning to be Effective. One or more teams of highly qualified personnel are sent to one or more villages which constitute their learning laboratory or pilot site. Here they develop a familiarity with the problem in question from the beneficiary's perspective and try out some promising approaches to addressing jointly identified needs. They may be supported by a variety of external resource persons with expertise in the social, managerial, and related technical sciences. Errors will be common and the resource inputs required will be high relative to results. It is assumed that rapid adaptive action will be taken as errors in initial assumptions are identified.

Stage 2: Learning to be Efficient. As insights are gained into what to do, attention is redirected to learning how to do it more efficiently, eliminating activities which are relatively nonproductive and working out simplified problem-solving routines for handling critical activities within the grasp of less skilled persons. New learning laboratory sites may be selectively established to test and further refine such methods—simultaneously giving additional personnel experience in their application.

Figure 2 PROGRAM LEARNING CURVES



Note: There are likely to be trade-offs between effectiveness, efficiency, and expansion which will lead to some loss of effectiveness as efficiency increases, and to losses in both effectiveness and efficiency during expansion.

Stage 3: Learning to Expand. Then attention is again redirected, this time to the phased development of a supporting organization geared to the requirements of carrying out the prescribed activities on a larger scale. It requires building into the organization the supporting skills, management systems, structures, and values.

The three stages as represented here are a simplified abstraction of what in reality may be a very disorderly and largely intuitive process. Yet the abstraction helps to explicate an alternative to the blueprint approach to programming.

A key point worth special note is that in the cases examined, there was no thought given to simply testing a program model in a pilot context and then leaving it to others to implement. To the contrary, each was distinguished by *a substantial continuity of personnel.* The people who had the experience of figuring out an original program design capable of doing the job were the same people who then built an organization around that model adapted to its requirements.

The Learning Organization

Any pre-planned intervention into a varied and constantly changing socio-technical system inevitably will be in error by some margin; the outcome will nearly always deviate from the outcome intended. It is the response to this error that tells the true character of the organization and its leadership.

In the *self-deceiving organization* those in authority treat error as synonymous with failure and seek to place blame on some guilty party. In response, the organization's members become skilled in hiding such errors. Those in authority, thus removed from operating reality, are reassured that as a result of their "brilliant" leadership everything is going just as intended. They may impress the unwary visitors with their briefings on program accomplishments. But to more sophisticated observers the claim that a program addressed to the rural poor is working effectively exactly as originally planned is a sure indicator that mistakes are being hidden, that leadership is ineffective, and that actual program operations are probably in a state of disarray which bears little resemblance to what has been described.

In the *defeated organization* the source of error is assumed to stem from forces beyond the control of the organization's members. Thus while adverse factors may be discussed in rich detail, no action is taken. When individual members feel impotent and therefore refer all problems to their superiors for action, they render their superiors equally impotent, ultimately immobilizing the entire organization.

In the *learning organization* error is treated as an essential source of information. Since some margin of error is treated as inevitable, particularly in the early stages of the learning process, it is viewed neither as a sign of failure, nor of environment perversity. Error is discussed candidly in such organizations, but in the context of lessons learned and corrective actions being attempted. There may be no surer indicator that an organization has effective leadership.

New Role for Social Sciences

While the demand for greater sensitivity to the dynamics of social behavior in rural development programming is now notably high, the influence of the social sciences in programming decisions is notably low. Given the roles normally accepted by social scientists in relation to action programs, their limited influence is hardly surprising. In their role of summary evaluator they have mainly engaged in documenting failure long after the time for corrective action has passed. In doing social soundness assessments, they have most often been called in after the basic choices affecting project design have been made to certify that there will not be serious adverse social consequences. In testing the program concepts in pilot projects, they have been asked to certify program blueprints when in reality the results achieved will often reflect more the operational competence of the organization which has done the implementation than the specific validity of the program design. In carrying out baseline surveys there is seldom any real presumption that the data will be used as a substantive input to planning. More likely the survey was contracted only to meet a requirement set in some programming document for baseline evaluation data.

What is all too rare is for the social scientists to help an organization build its capacity to actually *use* social science knowledge and data as a normal part of its operating routine. What the case studies suggest as needed is a willingness to experiment with new research methods by researchers committed to providing action agency personnel with simple tools to facilitate their *rapid* collection and interpretation of social data directly *relevant to action* for which they are responsible. The task is to make a demystified social science available as every person's tool, turning agency personnel, and in some instances the villagers themselves, into more effective action researchers.

This most often seems to involve disciplined observation, guided interviews and informant panels rather than formal surveys; emphasizing timeliness over rigor; employing oral more than written communication; offering informed interpretation rather than extensive statistical analysis; making narrative rather than numerical presentations; and giving attention to the processes unfolding and to intermediate outcome data required for rapid adaptation, rather than dwelling on detailed assessment of "final" outcomes. Rather than provide the static profiles found in the typical socio-economic survey, it involves a quest to understand the dynamics of the socio-technical systems that govern village life, to provide a basis for operational-level predictions of the consequences of given development interventions. It means identifying target group members and behaviors in terms relevant to program action rather than simply producing aggregated statistics.

Application to an Established Bureaucracy

The framework of the learning process approach can be applied in either of two ways. One is by building an entirely

new program and organization—from the bottom up—as illustrated in the three cases discussed earlier. The other is by introducing an analogue of this same process within an established organization which seeks to build a new capacity for effective village-level action. The methodologies for the latter application are presently being worked out by the Philippine's National Irrigation Administration (NIA) in an effort directed toward strengthening its capacity to work in effective support of small farmer owned and operated (communal) gravity-fed irrigation systems.

Concerned that the communal irrigation system it was assisting often fell into disrepair and disuse soon after rehabilitation construction was completed, NIA officials concluded that attention was needed to strengthen the water user associations concurrently with work on physical construction. They first selected for special attention two systems scheduled for assistance. Since the NIA had no community organizers of its own, a number of experienced organizers were hired on a temporary basis to work with NIA engineers on these systems. The idea was to integrate the social and technical aspects of the work—developing the social and technical capacity of the water user association through active involvement of its members in such activities as planning system layout, obtaining water rights and rights of way, organizing volunteer labor inputs to system construction, and exerting control over project expenditures. Known as the Laur Project (described in *RDPR*, I:1), the experience established that such integration was at once important and difficult to achieve.

In one community, local power struggles emerged which led to a two-year postponement of construction plans. In the second community, a high level of cohesion greatly facilitated farmer involvement, but seldom in ways which made life easier for project staff. Delays resulted from farmer demands for scheduling and design changes. The use of volunteer labor posed unfamiliar problems of supervision worked out only through lengthy meetings. The engineers did not always welcome farmer interest in monitoring purchases and limiting the staff's personal use of vehicles operated on gasoline charged to the farmers' loan account. Particularly tense was a conflict in judgment between farmers and engineers as to whether the materials chosen for dam construction would withstand the force of local floods. Farmers said no. Engineers said yes. (The farmers won a Pyrrhic victory when the dam, finally constructed to the engineers' specifications, washed out a few months after completion.)

At this stage the pilot projects were a failure from the standpoint of any normal evaluation criteria. But it was quite evident to those involved that the weakness was not in the basic concept—it was in the as-yet-limited capacity of the NIA to make it work. And the experience provided extensive insights as to what was required to develop that capacity on both the technical and institutional sides. A major commitment to further learning was implied, involving major changes in the NIA's structure and operating procedures.

A series of new pilot projects was initiated, the designs of which were carefully worked out to incorporate the lessons of the earlier Laur experience. New personnel were brought in and thoroughly trained in these lessons. A top-level national communal irrigation committee was established to coordinate the learning process under the leadership of NIA Assistant Administrator Benjamin Bagadion, a man with total dedication to the idea of independent farmer owned and operated irrigation systems. The committee included central level NIA officials, representatives of related action agencies, and senior members of collaborating academic and research institutions—each of whom had a major day-to-day commitment to the effort. A new social science research program supported by the Ford Foundation was introduced to build within the NIA the new skills, methods, and sytems it would require for its new participative approach. Social scientists from the Institute of Philippine Culture developed guildines for rapid collection and assessment *by NIA field staff* of "institutional profiles" which contained social-institutional data critical to project selection and planning. They also observed field activities and produced monthly "process documentation" reports which provided non-evaluative narrative feedback on key process events.

Concurrently, management experts from the Asian Institute of Management assessed the fit between requirements of the new methods for assisting communals and the existing NIA management systems, advised on new management roles and procedures, assisted in planning the organizational change process, and coordinated workshops for NIA managers and engineers on the new methods. On the technical side, an agricultural engineering team from the International Rice Research Institute and the University of the Philippines at Los Banos was developing simplified methods for diagnosis and correction of common water management problems by farmers and NIA engineers, and designing water management systems suited to needs of small water user associations.

Once the new methods for assisting the communal projects seemed to be proving more successful in the second round of pilot projects or learning laboratories, a second set of 12 sites was chosen, one in each region of the country, to test their broader application and to begin building the basis for the expansion stage. As of mid-1980 the NIA was perhaps half way through the learning process on which it had embarked three and a half years earlier. It was likely to be a total of seven or eight years before the new capacity would be in place throughout the agency. Such a lengthy undertaking does not fit well with normal donor programming cycles and requires uncommon commitment, patience, and continuity of leadership. But it may be exactly the type of undertaking in which any major agency concerned with being effective in assisting the rural poor must become engaged.

Conclusion

The programming methods which gained currency in the days of large-scale capital infrastructure project construction

continue to dominate development action, even though they are manifestly inappropriate to the requirements of new style programming. However, a basis can be found in current experience for the formulation of alternative and more appropriate programming frameworks and methods based on a *learning process approach* which recognizes that in working with rural people, our knowledge of what is needed and our institutional capacity to do this are both limited. There should be no call for endless research. But neither should there be continuation of blind action based on inappropriate statements of the problem and ineffectual implementing organizations. The challenge is to integrate action-taking, knowledge-creation, and institution-building into a coherent learning process, as a number of relatively more successful development programs are already doing.

The research on which this paper is based is documented in detail in a much longer version: "Community Organization and Rural Development: A Learning Process Approach," which appears in a special supplement of the *Public Administration Review*, September-October, 1980. The paper also draws on another article by the author, "A Learning Process Approach to Working with the Rural Poor," *INNOTECH Journal*, Vol. IV, No. 1, January-June 1980, pp. 11-23. The author is asssisting the Rural Development Participation Project in its Sri Lanka work on participatory irrigation rehabilitation. He is a Project Specialist in Population and Social Development for the Ford Foundation and a Visiting Professor with the Asian Institute of Management.

Decentralization, the Market and Participation in Rural China

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Dramatic changes have taken place in China's agrarian strategy since the death of Mao and the subsequent purge of the remaining Cultural Revolution radical leadership group, the so-called "gang of four". In agrarian policy, China has done an about-face, reversing trends set in motion during the resurgence of radicalism in the countryside of the early 1970s. The Chinese are now in the process of dismantling a highly planned economy and replacing it with a more decentralized, market-responsive approach. A form of market socialism is in the making.

Xue Muqiao, a leading economist and one of the architects of the new agrarian policies, states in the *Beijing Review* (November 2, 1979): "In the past, the state organs used to pass regulations down from level to level to the communes, production brigades and teams in regard to crop acreage and methods of cultivation. This infringed on the right of these units of self-management. . . . It should be made clear that all state plans for farm produce are only for reference: the state may pass its plans down to various levels for consultation, but it is the production units alone that have the final say. . . . *We will have to rely mainly on the law of value,* that is to say, adopt a policy of making use of pricing. . . . A production team, having fulfilled the required amount (prescribed purchases) may sell its surplus to the state which pays 50 percent more, or sell it at a rural fair. . . . *Sales on the market must not be determined by production plans but the other way around.*"

A born-again faith in the marketplace, evident in Xue Muqiao's comment, is reflective of the recent ascendency of professional economists in policy making. Their market-oriented orthodoxy stands in sharp contrast to the ultra-left agrarian policies implemented during the latter phase of the Cultural Revolution. The ultra-leftists, in keeping with Marxist tradition, were deeply suspicious of the market, and saw in the rural open market the seedbed of a resurgent capitalism. While they tolerated rural free markets as a necessary evil in the transition phase, their policy was gradually to control and restrict them, with the intention of eventually reducing their importance as a factor in the rural economy.

In place of the market, the ultra-left believed in state control and planning. This they saw as necessary for the management of the economy, as well as needed to ensure that radical values prevailed in society. A commitment of the ultra-left to decentralization of state control to local governments at the country and commune level distinguished them from orthodox state planners, however. It was believed that such decentralization would overcome the rigidities of centralized state planning, and also serve to bring the state closer to the masses, thus revitalizing the Maoist "mass-line."

In 1969, under the campaign to "learn from Tachai," the left-leadership of the Cultural Revolution instructed radical bureaucrats in the newly established country and commune revolutionary committees to mobilize peasants for a fresh radical upsurge in the villages. Local delegations were sent to Shansi province to tour Tachai, the Maoist model production brigade. Ultra-leftists believed that large-scale organization of agricultural production was a precondition for a fully socialist agriculture because farm work would assume the rational organization of the factory enterprise system. Tachai's success in transforming an impoverished mountain village into a prosperous agricultural community was heralded as an example of participatory self-reliant development.

The campaign to learn from Tachai was made the vehicle by which the ultra-left hoped to pull the countryside back onto the Maoist road to socialism, which they believed was being abandoned by the "capitalist-roaders" in the Party leadership. To varying degrees throughout the country, local bureaucrats sought to implement the Tachai

model. Rural free markets were cut back, and the sizes of private plots were reduced. The production team (usually 20-40 households) was set aside as the accounting unit and replaced, instead, by the next higher unit of local organization, the production brigade. The Tachai workpoint system was popularized, rewarding political consciousness as well as performance. Reminiscent of the Great Leap period, brigade and commune cadres mobilized peasants for local construction projects.

What had worked to make Tachai exemplary, however, was not necessarily appropriate for other areas where local conditions and history, especially in South China, were quite different. In many areas peasants proved reluctant to go along with the new radical upsurge, having only recently recovered from the traumatic failures of the Great Leap Forward. Local bureaucrats, in order to carry out the ultra-left policies, were therefore compelled to direct agricultural production through detailed regulations sent down to the villages, followed by inspection tours to check up on compliance. As a result, local state bureaucrats, as in the Great Leap years, were for a while calling the shots on basic technical decisions such as when to transplant rice seedlings, the optimal spacing between rows, the number of crops to plant in a year, etc.

Ironically, measures imposed to further participatory "mass-line" development policies instead stifled participation in the villages. By undermining team autonomy, peasant discretionary power was severely curtailed, making a charade of participation since little of importance could be decided by villagers. On the other hand, bureaucrats in local state agencies appeared not to be better at managing production units than the central ministries. The Chinese now claim that ultra-leftist control of the rural economy during these years resulted in a significantly reduced rate of growth, a view confirmed by economist Christopher Howe who estimated that agricultural products grew at only 1.5% per annum, which was below the natural population increase.

As a result of the discouraging economic performance of the past decade, a profound disenchantment with a centrally-directed economy has gathered momentum among policy makers in China. A recent editorial in the first volume of the journal of the newly created Academy of Social Sciences states: "People have gradually come to realize that the present set-up is too weighty and clumsy for a modernizing nation." The main thrust of economic thinking appears to be that a market economy is fully compatible with the goals of socialism. Moreover, a properly functioning market is seen to provide a superior mechanism for regulating supply and demand, giving management some incentive to increase efficiency, and providing effective incentives for higher productivity in all sectors of the economy.

As a corollary to the new market-oriented policies, the Chinese have implemented a broad-based plan for decentralization of economic decisions to the enterprise, and, in the countryside, to the production teams. Production teams now have the rights of an independent enterprise, collectively owned by its members, and these rights, according to the new policy, appear to be respected by local state bureaucrats and production brigade cadres. The latter are no longer allowed, for example, to requisition labor from the teams at will, and without compensation, for local construction projects.

It is significant that allowing a greater role for the market with accompanying economic decentralization to producer units has provided conditions for meaningful participation in rural communities. Though the state can be expected to remain the final arbiter, the less the state is enmeshed in regulating and controlling the economy, the wider the range of decisions that can be made by the farmer. This enhances the ability of producer units to take advantage of opportunities as they arise. It is when peasants perceive that their vital interests are likely to be furthered through participation, that we expect a higher level of involvement in community politics.

Participation is therefore seen in the degree to which people are involved in the process of making decisions on matters that affect their lives. Such a definition distinguishes between the motions of participation, such as people's involvement in a study group of political editorials, yet having no ability to influence decisions on issues of real consequence to them, and genuine involvement in day-to-day affairs. If people are powerless to affect decisions on issues they consider important, then nominal "participation", whether it is under the label of the "mass-line" or *animation rurale*, is of limited value to those involved. If, on the other hand, the production unit is given the final say, as stipulated by the new agrarian policies, then peasants are in a position to determine a broad range of decisions that directly affect their interests, whether it be the proper balance between inputs into the private and collective sectors, or how best to invest team savings, or how to arrive at the optimal strategy whereby the team can develop its economy, or whether to sell surplus grain or meat in the open market or to the state purchasing agency.

Report from a Chinese Village

On a recent visit to the People's Republic of China, I lived for a month in the countryside in western Fujian province while I conducted field work in a production brigade. The recent history of the village followed the general pattern discussed above. It was clear that by the time I arrived in the village, in March 1980, the market-oriented decentralization policies were in effect. Several visits to the weekly open market, held at the commune, revealed a thriving exchange. Reflecting the recent liberalization of state regulation it was no longer illegal to sell rice on the open market. As a result, the previous black market in grain was no longer in operation. To prevent speculation, however, the state offers rice at a price slightly higher than market prices, as it does for the major commodities sold on the market.

Commune officials told me that peasants are free to sell whatever they produce at the prevailing market prices, which are determined by supply and demand. Investigation with the production teams confirmed that decentralization had taken place, with villagers empowered to make independent deci-

sions in the economic management of their teams. However, it was my impression that the mechanisms for bureaucratic control were still in place, and that if national policies were to shift, the degree of team autonomy experienced in recent years could recede quickly. The habit of intervention and control appear to be deeply ingrained in Chinese bureaucrats, and it is not likely that the full implications of the new national policies have been entirely appreciated by local authorities.

A brief listing of village issues and controversies that emerged in the course of my field work will suggest the character of team autonomy now enjoyed in the production teams. These were discussed and debated by villagers in team meetings which I attended, and were also mentioned to me in the course of informal discussions held with villagers. Meetings were convened in villagers' homes in the evening after dinner. Debate and discussion were lively, and frequently heated and intense. Both women and men participated freely, voicing their opinions with little inhibition. Meetings often lasted until late at night, with informal discussion continuing the next day as villagers canvassed for their points of view. The atmosphere at meetings was relaxed, with mothers bringing nursing babies and children running in and out. The following activities were observed in one of the twenty-three production teams in the production brigade (population 2,400):

1. *Election of a new team management committee:* Each year the team elects a committee of fellow villagers to run day-to-day affairs. Elections are held by secret ballot. At the team election which I attended, villagers voted to retain their entire previous team management committee (made up of a team leader, vice team leader, accountant, treasurer, women's representative, militia squad leader, and an amateur agronomist) *with the exception of the team leader,* who received a vote of no confidence. Villagers voted instead for a young man, the leader of one of the small work groups in the team.

The brigade party secretary, upon learning of the results of the election, came to the hamlet and tried to persuade villagers that they should instead maintain continuity of team leadership. He argued that the rejected team leader, an experienced cadre, had done a reasonable job. The team was the only one in the brigade to increase production in 1979, while production dipped in the other teams due to a severe spring drought. Without leadership continuity, the party secretary argued, management might be weakened, and if they changed team leaders each year, in the future nobody would want the job. He also expressed doubts about the young man elected by villagers as the new team leader, who he said was too temperamental, always blowing hot and cold. He preferred a more experienced villager, someone who would be more steadfast and reliable. He expressed these views to the influential members of the team.

However, village opinion revealed widespread dissatisfaction with the old team leader. Villagers felt that he was more interested in attending meetings at the commune and county town center than actually fulfilling the day-to-day tasks of running the team. They worried that the old team leader was not decisive enough in taking matters into hand, and tended instead to avoid making difficult decisions which might incur anger or complaints. Although they agreed with the party secretary's evaluation of the young man as having a bad temper, they were impressed by his energy and decisiveness, and felt that he would provide more dynamic leadership at a time when they were eager to achieve an even more rapid increase in production than had been realized in recent years. Thus, despite the party secretary's attempts to persuade villagers, they held their ground, and the young man became the new team leader.

2. *Maintaining the balance between the private and collective sectors:* In recent years the pace of agricultural mechanization has increased sharply, with the number of hand tillers owned by the teams in the brigade increasing from two in 1973 to 17 by 1980. As a result of mechanization, the amount of time required from villagers for work in the collective sector has declined by almost 30%. Whereas a strong laborer worked approximately 280 days a year several years ago, today the person might work as little as 200 days. Moreover, the workday in the collective sector has been shortened by more than two hours during the non-busy seasons. Yet due to the rapidly increasing costs of production, due in part to the increased use of chemical fertilizer and purchase of hand tillers and insecticide, net income from the collective sector has not increased as rapidly as might have been expected from the dramatic increases in grain production since 1976, from 1,588,161 *jin* to 2,085,426 *jin* in 1979, a 24% increase. Net per capita income has remained more or less flat in the past decade.

With more free time to devote to household sideline production—hog raising, fishery, vegetable production, poultry, various handicrafts, the exploitation of forest resources in the mountains such as resin, mushrooms, bamboo shoots, herbal medicine—and with the liberalized market policy, peasant interest in developing household sideline production has grown substantially. However, work attendance in the team could become irregular, resulting in a weakening of the collective economy. This problem of irregular work attendance would be particularly acute during the busy planting and harvest seasons when all hands are needed in the collective sector.

A weakening of the collective sector would be detrimental to the interests of all, since it has been and continues to be the primary source of income, making up over 70% of household annual income. While household sideline production can increase peasant's cash income, grain, the basic food stuff, comes from the production team. Anticipating that work attendance might become a problem, the team management committee brought to the villagers a proposal to set a fine of 5 yuan for failure to show up for work during the busy season. (The value of one workday is about .75 yuan.) In the course of the debate over the proposal the village's resin collectors argued vehemently against the fine, and also against having to pay the team 1 yuan per day for the right to spend full time collecting resin, which is sold directly by the resin col-

lector to the state purchasing agency. Resin collectors, some villagers thought, represented the interests of villagers who were contemplating spending more time in sideline production.

The management committee was split over the issue, with the team treasurer, whose son was a resin collector, taking the minority position. Resin collectors felt that it was unfair that they were required to pay 1 yuan a day even during the winter slack season when other villagers were also engaged in sideline activities. Although majority opinion supported the strict regulations on work attendance, it was clear that the resin collectors would continue to press their case, suggestive of the long term character of interests among some villagers to make it on their own through individual enterprise. Moreover, this conflict is likely to deepen if income from the collective sector is unable to keep pace with the private economy. If not handled properly, it has the potential of resulting in a serious erosion of the collective economy. Yet, the debates arising from conflicts of interest aired in open team meetings, and the toleration of minority positions, can be interpreted as evidence of participatory politics.

There were other issues which were not aired at the village meetings during my stay there, but which were discussed informally among villagers:

3. *The feasibility of the team's investing in developing collective sideline production.* Some villagers suggested starting a fruit orchard which could utilize land on the low mountains near the village. Others, however, felt that collective sidelines had to wait for further mechanization. The eventual acquisition of rice transplanters, they felt, would solve the problem of seasonal labor bottlenecks. Others worried about the risk of failure, since they had no previous experience in fruit growing. If the project resulted in failure, other villagers might complain and criticize them. Team cadres, however, were convinced that collective sideline production had the potential of raising team income significantly, thus strengthening the collective economy. Relying solely on grain production, they felt, would not lead to a real breakthrough in the team economy. This, they argued, was the limitation of the Tachai model.

4. *Adopting the most effective incentive system for their team.* The system the villagers were using set quotas for each of the two small groups based upon previous years' production. Production above the set quota was distributed to small group members as a bonus. Another team was having success with what is called the "household contract" system whereby workpoint values are assigned to a specified plot of land or task.

Villagers felt the advantage of the "household contract" system was that it rewarded efficiency, but they worried that the quality of work might be sacrificed by villagers eager only to get the task done as fast as possible. Since each production team could decide on its own incentive system, villagers liked to talk about the relative merits of the systems that were being used elsewhere in the brigade and in the country thinking that if they heard of a better, more effective system they might try it out.

5. *The possibility of creating another team.* Villagers had recently experienced a team fission in 1978 when they voted to divide the former team into the present two teams in the hamlet. Now there was discussion of allowing two small groups to become independent production teams. Villagers believed that small teams made management easier and encouraged productivity since in a smaller team one could identify more with the fruits of one's labor. This was why, they felt, the brigade accounting method had failed; people did not want to work hard since the fruits of their labor would be redistributed to poorer teams.

Discussion

Decentralization of economic decision-making to the level of producer units, expanding the scope of the marketplace, permitting greater participation, and trends towards market socialism in China do not mean the state has no positive role to play in Chinese rural development, or that the best thing local state bureaucrats can do for rural development is to stand aside and do nothing. Clearly this is not the case. Interviews with county and commune bureaucrats revealed that the local state agencies were very much involved with rural development, in providing technical assistance to farmers, popularizing new seeds, providing accurate weather reports, running agronomy seminars, making available to teams low interest loans for the purchase of farm equipment, carrying out a strict birth control campaign, running village schools, administering local public health projects, planning new commune enterprises, building infrastructure projects such as roads, local hydropower stations, and other service oriented projects. Although teams have greater autonomy than before, the state is still the ultimate regulator of the rural economy.

Though current policies limit the state from overly controlling producer units, it does continue to set limits to market forces in order to prevent a sliding back to individual cultivation, private ownership of land, and exploitative economic relationships. There does not appear any weakening of the state's commitment to promoting socialist agriculture. Indeed, the present period in China bears certain resemblance to the Soviet N.E.P. period, which suggests that there is always the possibility of a swing in the pendulum toward more state controls.

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Local Organization, Participation and Rural Development: Results From A Seven-Country Study

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This report examines the advantages and disadvantages of working through local organizations to promote rural development. Specifically, it seeks to: 1) identify the potentials and dangers of using local organizations to increase the well-being of the rural poor; and 2) detail how development agencies might design and implement projects to make more effective use of local organizations. In addition to reviewing the literature on this subject, it draws on field research conducted by DAI in seven countries.

Pros and Cons of Local Organizations

In 1973 the "New Directions" mandate of the Agency for International Development stressed that development efforts were to be directed toward reaching the poor and involving them as active participants in the development process. It is tempting to assume that one of the ways to achieve this participation would be through the creation of local organizations of small farmers. But the more recent literature on local organization, as well as the research on which this report is based, argues against attempting in such a wholesale manner this assumption of the key role of organizations.

For example, the Cornell Rural Development Committee argues that local organizations are a *necessary,* though not a *sufficient,* condition for viable rural development. Without the support of local organizations, the best technical packages and the most skilled administrative personnel are not likely to be of much benefit to the rural poor. (See, for example, the Cornell Rural Development Committee monograph by Arthur Goldsmith and Harvey Blustain, *Local Organization and Participation in Integrated Rural Development in Jamaica,* Cornell, 1980.) The predominant, rather pessimistic view currently expressed in much of the literature is that local organizations will rarely be vehicles through which small farmers can benefit directly, though they may often benefit indirectly.

Local organizations potentially can play the following positive roles as vehicles for:

- —Two-way information flows which provide technical information, reinforce those individuals who try new approaches, and break down barriers between groups or individuals;
- —Minimizing risk and practicing economies of scale;
- —Adapting project activities to local conditions;
- —Marshalling local resources;
- —Achieving greater political and economic independence for local people by exercising influence over local administrators, asserting claims on government, and providing mutual assistance; and
- —Coordinating and spreading the benefits of outside assistance.

In considering the possible negative roles of local organizations, it is important to remember that they can also serve as vehicles for:

- —Perpetuating inequitable social systems;
- —Controlling the local population from above; and
- —Weakening or even destroying viable local cultures.

The Traditional Viewpoint

The studies and orientations concerning the role of local organizations as instruments for small farmer development can be grouped under three major headings: traditional, progressive, and technical. The traditional view is perhaps best reflected in the response made by the International Cooperative Alliance (ICA) to a three-continent study of rural cooperatives and certain related institutions such as syndicates, unions and farmers' associations, by the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development. The director of the UNRISD study concluded that:

> ". . . rural cooperatives in developing areas today bring little benefit to the masses of poorer inhabitants of those areas and cannot be generally regarded as agents of change and development for such groups." *(Rural Cooperatives as Agents for Change: A Research Report and a Debate,* UNRISD, Geneva, 1975, p. ix.)

The ICA responded to this critique by observing that the goal of reducing income inequalities involves realignments in the fundamental economic and cultural fabric of a society. It is unrealistic to think that a local organization, supported in various ways by outsiders, will be able or allowed to effect such changes. What is realistic, argued the ICA, is for local organizations, supported by outsiders, to aim at increasing the access of small and medium producers to the means of production, new technologies, and markets. The ICA distinguished between equality and equity, defining the latter as benefits commensurate with contributions. Local organizations can and should promote equity but it would be an extremely difficult and touchy matter to employ alternative criteria such as strict equality for the distribution of benefits. *(Ibid.,* pp. 25-30.)

The traditional viewpoint emphasizes the potential economies of scale to be derived from local organizations in terms of communications, purchasing, producing, and marketing. It views the historical record of local organization as basically encouraging and further asserts that:

- —There is no real alternative to working with the economically progressive and politically powerful elements in the local population; and
- —The whole local population, includ-

ing the rural poor, will ultimately benefit through some form of trickle-down process.

The Progressive Viewpoint

Certain progressives, on the other hand, view the historical record as quite unacceptable. They see local organizations as having been used by the wealthy and politically powerful as vehicles to achieve their own ends, often at the expense of the rural poor. The progressives, in marked contrast to the traditionalists, see little hope in using local organizations as a vehicle to benefit the rural poor until a fundamental redistribution of assets takes place, i.e., real land reform for the rural sector. Keith Griffin, for example, states that:

> ". . . the principal component of a successful attack on poverty must be a redistribution of the stock of wealth. Given that the economies of most underdeveloped countries are largely agrarian, it follows that a redistribution of landed property is almost certain to be of prime importance. A land reform in isolation is not sufficient to remove rural poverty, but it is a *conditio sine qua non* in many countries." (*Land Concentration and Rural Poverty*, Holmes & Meier, New York, 1976, p. 10.)

The conclusion from such analysis is that there is a role for local organizations—but primarily a revolutionary one—in effecting the fundamental redistribution of assets.

The Technical Viewpoint

The central premise of this view is that the techniques of intervention can be modified and improved in a way that increases the developmental impact of local organizations. From this perspective, the choice of development strategy, or marginal changes in the application of a particular strategy, will influence the prospects for success. To be sure, by concentrating on variables such as leadership and participation—to name but two—the technician is either tacitly accepting the position of the traditionalists or rejecting the conclusion shared by both traditionalists and progressives that the benefits of local organizations will be necessarily distributed in accordance with the distribution of assets and political power.

For better or for worse, this paper takes as its starting point the latter perspective, inquiring whether means can be found to assist local organizations in delivering self-sustaining development benefits to the rural poor. There are four principal issues raised by the technical perspective: the role of traditional organizations, the structure and scale of operations, leadership, and participation.

Traditional versus New Organizations

Divergent views are expressed in literature concerning whether intervention strategies should work through existing, indigenous organizations or create new ones. Proponents of working through existing organizations argue that:

—This can be done relatively quickly and easily;
—Results are likely to "stick," inasmuch as existing organizations have proven capacity for survival; and
—Existing organizations have demonstrated a capacity to "modernize" and impressive results have been achieved. (See, for example, H. D. Seibel and A. Massing, *Traditional Organizations and Economic Development: Studies of Indigenous Cooperatives in Liberia*, Praeger, New York, 1974.)

This view has a number of detractors who argue that:

—Traditional organizations reflect the interests of the existing power structure and consequently will not be enthusiastic proponents of change;
—It is extremely difficult for a traditional organization to adopt the modern practices that are essential for sustained growth; and
—It is unlikely that the membership and structure of existing organizations will be suitable for the needs of a new development strategy. (See, for example, Ronald Dore, "Modern Cooperatives in Traditional Communities," in *Two Blades of Grass: Rural Cooperatives in Agricultural Modernization*, P. Worsley, ed., Manchester University Press, 1971, pp. 43-60.)

Neither position is proved by the empirical evidence available. There have been examples of success in working through both types of organization. The critical question is, what criteria can be used for deciding between the two approaches in a particular context? As yet, we have no conclusive answer.

Structure and Scale of Operations

There are a variety of opinions concerning the appropriate scope of activities for local organizations. One group advocates an evolutionary approach in which activities are begun on a small scale and others added as capabilities expand and needs arise. (See, for example, Judith Tendler, *Inter-Country Evaluation of Small Farmer Organizations*, USAID, 1976.) In contrast, there are others who argue that larger scale, multi-tiered systems of organization involved in a multitude of activities are needed. Recognizing that certain social diseconomies of scale exist, and advocating small base level organizations as a foundation, such analysts argue that for significant long-term support to development, the strategy should be to aim for larger scale systems of organization. (See, for example, Norman Uphoff and Milton Esman, *Local Organization for Rural Development: Analysis of Asian Experience*, Cornell Rural Development Committee, 1974.)

Interestingly enough, this latter approach is based more on experience in Asia, whereas proponents of smaller-scale alternatives cite evidence from Africa and Latin America. The question thus arises whether such larger scale, more structured organizational systems are appropriate for the latter two regions of the world. The unequal distribution of assets in many Latin American countries and the weakness of formal government institutions and services in much of sub-Saharan Africa suggest that an Asian "model" of local organizational development may not be applicable.

Leadership

A common experience for any field worker in rural development is to come upon projects whose success appears to depend largely upon the wits, dynamism and charisma of one or a few individuals. In contrast to the apparent lack of direction in surrounding areas, this individual is a beacon of hope. The literature, however, has treated these situations with considerable skepticism. (See, for example, C. Toth and T. J. Cotter, "Learning from Failure," *Focus*, 1978, No. 3, pp. 27-31.) Such projects are at the mercy of individuals and are highly susceptible to personal whims, which may or may not reflect community needs. In addition, the impact that a charismatic leader can achieve is severely constrained by the environment in which he has to operate. Overdependence on one such individual makes it easy for those opposed to the project to effectively neutralize him and the organization he leads. Under certain conditions, however, strong, capable, dedicated leadership may be a great asset.

The question of leadership should be examined more broadly. Should the leadership be drawn from among the exceptional individuals or should it be more representative of the community? What role should outsiders play in leadership? There are benefits associated with the involvement of each group, but also attendant costs. While meaningful questions have been raised, generalizable answers have not been found.

Participation

The belief that small farmer participation is essential for meaningful rural development is held about as widely as any in the rural development literature today. (See, for example, Elliott Morss, et al., *Strategies for Small Farmer Development*, 2 vols., Westview Press, Boulder, 1976; and Norman Uphoff, John Cohen and Arthur Goldsmith, *Feasibility and Application of Rural Development Participation: State-of-the-Art Paper*, Cornell Rural Development Committee, 1979.) Participation is seen as essential, both as a vehicle for an upward information flow and as an incentive for small farmer resource commitment. Indeed, it is fair to say that participation, decentralized decision-making, and accountability are the key words for a new development doctrine.

In the context of local organizations, several points stand out. First, a distinction should be made between small farmer participation, on the one hand, and decentralized decision-making, on the other. It has been shown that the latter will frequently end up reflecting the conservative biases of the local power structure, with little accountability to the rank-and-file membership.

A second and more fundamental point of view is that, while many positive things have been said about participation, few descriptions of what it should mean operationally have been presented. Fieldwork for this study showed "participation" including weekly meetings where delegates doodled and snoozed (Upper Volta) to sporadic confrontations where members shot it out with non-members (Yemen). It is, therefore, important to think beyond the participation slogan to something that is both practical and beneficial. If participation is to have a concrete, operational meaning, three fundamental questions need to be addressed:

—Who should participate?
—In what should they participate?
—How should they participate?

Answers to these questions should be governed by what would maximize the benefits from participation activities.

The Research

Seven countries were included in this study: Upper Volta, Cameroon, the Yemen Arab Republic, Guatemala, Peru, the Philippines, and Jamaica. In each country, three to four different organizational intervention strategies were studied at the grassroots level. The term "organizational intervention strategy" simply refers to the approach used by a development agency, foreign or national, public or private, to create and develop local organizations.

In order to reduce the possible universe of local organizations to manageable proportions, the study concentrated on small farmer organizations that were directed toward increasing agricultural production. This decision was also based on the belief that the most basic need in rural development is that small farmers should be able to help themselves and that this can be most easily achieved through increases in producton and net income. (Charles F. Sweet, "Perspectives on the Process Approach to Rural Development," DAI Occasional Staff Paper No. 3, Washington, 1978.)

This qualification must be borne in mind when generalizing from the results of this study. There are many types of local organization ranging from functional groups such as small farmer marketing cooperatives to social or religious bodies. The organizations studied here include but one type of functional groups—those devoted to increasing agricultural production. Others include those involved in public works and water management. For example, the mode of participation in the public works projects—where many people may benefit and where ultimate success is directly dependent on such participation—may be very different. (See, for example, the RDC monograph by Prachanda P. Pradhan, *Rural Local Institutions and People's Participation in Rural Public Works in Nepal*, Cornell, 1980). Likewise, in many countries indigenous irrigation organizations have operated successfully for decades and one of the reasons for their effectiveness has been the accountability of their leadership. Such leaders are locally selected and paid for their services—either in cash or in kind. If the organizational members are not satisfied with their performance, then they are replaced. (See, for example, E. Walter Coward, Jr., "Irrigation Management Alternatives: Themes From Indigenous Irrigation Systems", *Agricultural Administration*, 1977, Vol. 4, pp.223-237.)

To the extent possible, the study tried to concentrate on interventions designed to assist the rural poor. But given the emphasis on production-oriented organizations, this virtually excluded the poorest of the poor, those with little or no resource base—the land-poor and the landless. With little or no land base and insecure tenure arrangements, it is often extremely difficult for such people to form local organizations. (See Milton Esman, *Landlessness and Near-Landlessness in*

Developing Countries, Cornell Rural Development Committee, 1978, pp. 27-29.)

For the purposes of this study, a local organization was defined as a "grouping of small farmers, with some formal structure, directed toward increasing the agricultural production of members." This broad definition was employed in order to include several levels of complexity—from a local organization with a handful of members engaged in a single activity, to one with several hundred members engaged in numerous activities. All told, a total of 41 local organizations were studied.

The research concentrated on the nature of the relationships depicted in the figure below. This is admittedly an oversimplification; effects go from right to left as well as vice versa, and there are important reactions within each of the three boxes. However, this diagram gives the conceptual framework that served as the basis for the field data collection effort.

The methodology used to gather the relevant data was a combination of the qualitative and the quantitative: participant observation, structured and unstructured interviews, documentary research, and detailed case studies. Data were collected on environmental factors, organizational factors, and project impact. Two types of data were collected on project impact. One type traced impact all the way to the small farmer and referred specifically to income change. The other, admittedly second-best, focused on organizational performance and included service delivery, financial viability, equity, influence and leadership.

The analysis started with the generation of a correlation matrix. An attempt was then made to explain variations in project impact by means of coded data derived from the environmental and organizational data, by means of stepwise multivariate regression. This approach examines a host of variables and selects the one that does best at explaining variations in project impact. It continues to select variables in this fashion until none of the remaining variables "explain" any of the remaining variation in project impact. Use of this approach virtually ensures avoiding the problem of high correlations among potential explanatory variables.

The Results

First, the *involvement of the rural poor in decision-making* turned up in two equations: those explaining income change and overall impact. This finding underscored the importance of their involvement if projects directed at helping the rural poor are to succeed. Second, the importance of *high potential for increasing agricultural productivity* showed up in two equations: those explaining financial viability and overall impact. A favorable physical environment itself tends to attract intervention in the form of development projects. In an unfavorable physical environment, a local organization may be able to attract and provide scarce resources which otherwise would be unavailable. In addition, it is in precisely such an environment that the rural poor are most likely to be found.

Distribution of Assets

Finally, the critical nature of unequal distribution of land was signalled by the fact that it appeared in three equations: those explaining financial viability, leadership, and overall impact. It was by far the most "resilient" variable when a series of regressions were run using different formulations of overall impact as dependent variables. Also, the variable was "well-behaved" in the sense that despite the fact that unequal landholdings appeared to result in greater overall impact, they were negatively associated with one dimension of that impact—equity—which was to be expected.

Serious thought needs to be given to accounting for this observed relationship, which seemingly calls for unequal landholdings, since it runs counter to the findings of some other studies, such as that by Uphoff and Esman (*op. cit.*, pp. 49-51, 64-67). From an examination of the equations, it appears that unequal landholdings are in fact a proxy for the existence of a group of dynamic and progressive farmers. Their presence and involvement could increase the likelihood of high agricultural development impact through local organizational effort, by boosting cash resource mobilization and leadership initiative. Otherwise, unequal holdings would seem to impede broad-based participation in organizations.

Organizational History

All the areas studied had some previous history of local organizations. While



some interventions built upon existing organizations as well as dormant ones, the most important criterion for selecting such organizations was their amenability to change. A recent comparative study concluded that there is probably no single set of favorable conditions for the transformation of such organizations into more adaptive ones. (June Nash and Nicholas Hopkins, "Anthropological Approaches to the Study of Cooperatives, Collectives and Self-Management," in *Popular Participation in Social Change*, Nash, Dandler and Hopkins, eds., Mouton, The Hague, 1976, pp. 3-32.)

Structure and Scale of Operations

The analysis demonstrated that no single structural "formula" can be considered appropriate for the application to local organizational development. A debate about whether multi-tiered structures are preferable to small organizations limited to the local level has no operational meaning outside of the specific contexts in which interventions take place. No straight-forward correlation was found between structural type and overall impact.

Given the uncertainties about how to proceed with organizational intervention in the first place, there appear to be serious risks in a strategy that implements a rigid structure and makes no allowance for evolution and maturation. In this sense, organizational blueprints have obvious limitations, since they are focused on immediate, measurable objectives. They may be well suited to meeting those particular objectives, but for significant further development within the local organizations themselves, new blueprints will eventually be required. The greater flexibility allowed by an evolutionary or process approach increases the options for structuring a local organizaton.

Leadership

Leadership, as one of the components of overall impact, was intended to measure the competence and problem-solving ability of the leadership of the local organization. The results of the regression equation indicate that leadership is more effective when exercised at the *local* level, rather than above. This challenges the belief of some that there is no leadership talent in remote areas and that decisions must be made at district, provincial, or national levels. Although the "charismatic leader" variable did not appear in any of the regression equations, it did correlate positively with the general leadership variable. However, this relationship is not conclusive. The lesson appears to be that, while charisma adds to the power of leaders, effective decision-making can take place among the most responsible persons in any local population. In short, a strong leader is a useful but unnecessary component of the organizational intervention.

Participation

As mentioned earlier, the involvement of the rural poor turns up in two equations, including the overall impact equation. Findings on the equity dimension indicate that a greater proportion of benefits accrue to the poor when the poor make a resource commitment to the activity and when decisions within the community are made democratically.

In addition, the literature review, together with a qualitative analysis of the data gathered, indicated several other aspects of participation. First, it has been said that participation can contribute to *the identification of new development ideas and activities.* Nonetheless, many of the new ideas seem to be developed by external agents, and the poorest farmers are unlikely to have much to contribute. Second, participation may assist in *adapting a new idea to local circumstances.* It is critical here that someone be held accountable for properly adapting a new initiative to fit local circumstances. This accountability can be facilitated by organizing a group of farmers to make their views known about a new technology.

Third, participation may also be useful in *gaining adoption of a new idea.* It appears that the most important local groupings for this purpose, at least with regard to agricultural innovation, are the local power structure and progressive farmers. For example, if these groups can be convinced to use a new technology, other members of the community will follow, providing they have the opportunity and resources to do so. Finally, participation may be useful as a means of *reducing exploitation.* Given that effective participation can counter exploitation, the most sensible thing to suggest is that those who are exploited group themselves (or be grouped) together for the explicit purpose of reducing or eliminating that exploitation.

Conclusions

This study took as its starting point the technician's perspective: can means be found to assist local organizations in delivering self-sustaining development benefits to the rural poor? In the most general terms, the major conclusions are:

—The traditionalists are right: there is no alternative, particularly for development agencies, to working with progressive farmers and the politically powerful when trying to promote overall increases in agricultural productivity;

—The progressives are right: the past history of using local organizations to assist the rural poor is unsatisfactory; and

—The technicians are right: certain types of small farmer participation in local organizations can serve as a vehicle to get a greater share of benefits to the rural poor than in the past.

It is important to be clear on the type of participation that is appropriate:

—New ideas can be developed without the participation of the rural poor;

—Participation is useful for adapting and gaining acceptance of a new idea in the local environment;

—A local resource commitment not only demonstrates real support for a project, but also increases the chances that the activity will become financially viable; and

—Finally, and of most relevance here, to avoid exploitation, the rural poor should have their own groups and insist on having a direct say in organizational decision-making.

In essence, the basic issue involved in

local organizations and participation is that of power—and ways in which the relatively powerless can achieve more economic and political clout. A recent World Bank staff working paper takes specific note of this: "The process of organizing is a political one. The organization (has) a political base. . . . Each of the steps (in the organizing process) represents an increase in the degree of power." (William E. Smith, Francis J. Lethem and Ben A. Thoolen, *The Design of Organizations for Rural Development Projects - A Progress Report*, World Bank, Washington, 1980, p. 15.) This conclusion may not be as palatable as others that flow from our study, but as in other dimensions of development, the technical and political aspects of economic and social change are linked.

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projects

Peasants Who Write a Textbook on Subsistence Farming: Report on the Bolivian Traditional Practices Project

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Textbooks are normally written by college-trained professionals or academicians. But in Bolivia a unique effort is underway to make textbook authors out of 127 peasant farmers, none of whom has received more than five years of primary schooling. All are Aymara or Quechua Indians—direct descendents of the precocious Inca Civilization which dominated South America's rugged Andean highlands over four centuries ago. Since early 1979 these would-be authors have been keeping daily records, giving demonstrations, answering questions, preparing narratives, being photographed, and even lecturing—all for the purpose of creating a textbook which represents their knowledge to the outside world.

Their contributions will culminate, by late 1981, in a detailed and profusely illustrated document which explains indigenous production systems and subsistence strategies from the perspective—and where possible, in the very words—of the peasants themselves. While avoiding value judgments as to what practices are good or bad, appropriate or superstitious, the textbook will describe the crop and livestock tasks of typical rural households on an individual enterprise basis—who does what, how, when, and why. It will also document the farming and subsistence system as a whole—infrastructure maintenance, marketing and barter, household manufactures, construction of tools, and off-farm employment. The textbook will carefully examine the rituals by which the Indians predict the weather, attract rain, ward off hail or frost, enhance animal fertility, and coax from the Earth Mother and mountain spirits a fuller harvest. In close contact with the wives and daughters of participating farmers, the project will also describe family diets and nutrition, hygiene, childbirth, and health practices in general.

The singular importance of this undertaking lies in its highly participatory approach to learning what traditional farmers know. It is a project designed to listen, not predicate solutions. It accepts the rural poor as teachers, not just respondents. It gives them fundamental control over the research instruments and information flow.

The activity is funded jointly by the Agency for International Development and the Bolivian Ministry of Agriculture. (Because the project is at its midpoint, and is generating research results and methodologies of great interest both within and outside Bolivia, it was selected for continuation by USAID despite the July 1980 military coup and cut-off of U.S. economic assistance.) It is administered by Rural Development Services (RDS), a small consulting firm based in New York which specializes in the design, management, and evaluation of projects assisting small farmers in the Third World. As President of RDS, I have the distinct honor to be the Editor-in-Chief of the forthcoming textbook.

Subsistence Specialists

The fact that the project's peasant-authors possess exceptional farming skills cannot be doubted. They have to be experts in order to survive in settings such as Bolivia's *Altiplano* or near-perpendicular *Valles*, which represent some of the most challenging locations for agriculture to be found anywhere in the world. Many of the project's participants farm at altitudes ranging from 10,000 to 15,000 feet above sea level, where the vegetative growth cycle of common grain crops must extend up to 250 days, and where farmers are continually punished by frequent hail, frost, winds, drought, and even floods. Soils are rocky, shallow, easily eroded, and require sophisticated management to forestall erosion. Not only is their land of marginal quality to begin with, and

too steep to mechanize, but holdings are extremely small. The average holding is less than 5 acres per family (including fallow and fodder crops for draft animals). Rural households must therefore supplement their subsistence by grazing livestock, producing ceramics or other artisan crafts, and engaging in considerable off-farm employment.

Furthermore, Aymara and Quechua households subsist with farming tools that are predominantly homemade—from wooden plows to hoes and sickles. They must conduct their farming activities without benefit of bank credit for financing modern inputs. They must supply most of their fertilizer requirements with the manure of their animals. They must supply most of their own food, obtaining what they cannot grow themselves through barter transactions or very limited cash expenditures. They must make most of their own clothes, blankets, sacks, rope, kitchen or household furniture, and construct their own shelter and storage facilities. They must meet educational expenses, social obligations, medical emergencies, and a few daily consumption necessities within an annual per-capita income constraint of about $150. Under such conditions as these, even the most astute farmers of more temperate climes might easily starve to death.

These subsistence specialists, whom modern man has regarded for decades as "backward" or "primitive", are at long last coming to be appreciated for their own wisdom. In an age of shrinking land, water, and energy resource—coupled with a clamor for "appropriate" technology—there has developed a renewed interest in documenting and preserving the extant knowledge inherent in virtually self-sufficient, subsistence-oriented farming systems. On the one hand, such systems may hold many insights that an guide more efficient utilization of presently available resources. On the other, subsistence agriculture must be much better understood if its productivity is to be transformed sufficiently—through synthesis of traditional practices and modern science—to allow Third World nations to feed their swollen populations more successfully.

"We Too Are Agricultural Engineers"

The origins of this undertaking to create a textbook written by subsistence farmers go back to 1972 and Peru. In that year, under a Fulbright-Hays research fellowship, I spent two crop cycles (winter and summer) hiring myself out as an unpaid laborer to some 30 small farmers from Peru's northern desert coastal region. These producers were genuinely flattered that a university-trained outsider would wish to study and acquire their expertise. And once initial incredulity with our bizarre "classroom" relationship was overcome, my "professors" simply reveled in their teaching roles. Rather than wait for my naive questions, they usually volunteered long and fascinating explanations about their practices. In turn, I was overwhelmed by the wealth of knowledge these farmers possessed, by the dizzying complexity of their operations, options and responses, and by the technical and practical rationale which justified every decision made or practice employed. I systematically collected these insights into what eventually became an illustrated manual of traditional farming technology entitled *The Corn Farmers of Motupe* (University of Wisconsin, Land Tenure Center Monograph No. 1, 1976).

The opportunity to repeat and improve upon this experience came to me in Bolivia in 1978. Here the idea was not for a *gringo* outsider to work farm tasks with indigenous farmers (because of insuperable language and perhaps cultural barriers), but rather to find Indian-born Bolivian professionals willing to conduct such work in their regions of origin, and willing to listen to peasants rather than lecture them. I found two such rare individuals in early 1979—an Aymara anthropologist and a Quechua sociologist.

With the help of these very dedicated and sensitive professionals, 43 subsistence farmers in five Aymara communities were selected from the *Altiplano* region, while 44 farmers from three Quechua communitiese were selected to represent the *Valles* region. Participation in the project was strictly voluntary, requiring the approval of both the Indians involved and their community authorities. The selection of communities themselves followed criteria of representiveness but also was limited only to those villages where residents showed a genuine interest in the project.

We encountered the same phenomenon as in Peru. Farmers responded enthusiastically to the opportunity to describe their farming skills to outsiders and to be listened to seriously. They saw in the textbook project a chance to legitimize their heritage of practical wisdom and mystical science which they and their ancestors have relied upon for survival from time immemorial. One of the project's very first and most avid supporters was a 60-year-old farmer with no formal education. He gave the project perhaps its most succinct and eloquent justification when he announced publicly: ". . . You (outsiders) have studied at the university and learned to work with your eyes. We (farmers) have no diploma or degree, and we only know how to work with our backs and our hands. But *we too* are agricultural engineers!"

Making Authors Out Of Illiterates

In every participating village there are 6-12 rural households that participate in the effort. Many of the male household heads are illiterate. Those who can read and write do so only in Spanish—the language they learned in school—but the large majority can communicate verbally only in Aymara or Quechua. As for adult females, very few have gone to school and speak no more than a handful of Spanish words. But virtually all of the households have a son or daughter or grandchild who has or is attending school. Hence literacy skills are concentrated in the young, and it is they for the most part who are responsible for daily narrative and record-keeping duties on which the project is so dependent.

Each participating household keeps a daily journal of its activites. Essentially the family is asked to record what each of its members does each day. When crop tasks are involved, the journal entries should record the crop and its location, which task(s) occurred, who participated (family and hired labor), what animals and inputs were used, and

if a harvest task, the quantity harvested. On market days the family records its sales and purchases. When on-farm maintenance, exchange labor with neighbors or relatives, or off-farm employment occurs these tasks also are recorded. A running tally of livestock tasks as well as animal births and deaths is also kept. At the option of the journalist, descriptions of family celebrations, community fiestas and sports events, trips to the city, and even participation in religious or political activities—all may be mentioned in the family journal. Beyond a minimum target of specificity for crop and livestock reporting, the keynote is on flexibility. Some families write a page a day, others even more, still others only a few terse lines. Many families compete with each other for presentability of their records; they adorn the journal pages with drawings of animals, birds, and flowers, or frequently render page headings in gothic script.

The project pays each journal-keeping family the sum of $5 per month. But beyond this symbolic payment it is apparent the participants derive a psychic income. Many enjoy the writing task. For them it is a pastime that affords a pleasant distraction at day's end, and they take great pride in the care and appearance of their journals. All visitors to the farm are asked to sign their names under the most recent journal entry. The project has been careful to insist that the journals are the exclusive property of the participants, they should never be loaned to third parties without the family's permission, and once the project has completed its analysis of the journals they will be returned—carefully bound in hardcover with the family's name engraved and with copies of photographs taken of the family—as a permanent record of their participation.

The project has also introduced a visual-image record-keeping system for families with no literacy skills, or who have volunteered to document a "control" plot (intensively supervised) for a selected crop. The visual instrument consists of a cardboard sheet with a grid containing images of crop inputs (labor, seed, fertilizer, animals, irrigation water, etc.) aligned with other images representing crop stages (land preparation, planting, cultivation tasks, and harvest). On this format the illiterate farmer keeps track of units of inputs used or yield by using simple scratch-marks. These scratches are subsequently counted by the Bolivian professionals during their farm visits, converted into numerical and monetary units, and used for economic analysis (cost and net income) of the referenced enterprise. A similar visual instrument is used for monitoring livestock enterprises.

Making Peasants Out Of Professionals

The Bolivian professionals visit all participating farmers (up to 45 in a region) at least once and usually twice a month. During these visits family journals are supervised, corrected where necessary, and data disaggregated by information categories—by crop, livestock enterprise, market purchases and expenditures, off-farm activities. Once in each crop cycle the professional prepares with the farmer a detailed map of his holdings which displays the distribution of crop lots and their utilization. And once a month the professional brings the family its journal payment.

But the primary purpose of the professional's visit is to participate in a learning activity planned by the farmer. Usually the "class" concerns a crop task, but occasionally the professional gets a demonstration in tool-making, castrating an animal, making *chuno* (freeze-dried tubers) or *chicha* (fermented corn beer), pottery-making, tanning hides, hauling water, or other activites. During his participant-observation classes the Bolivian professional usually will conduct an interview with his farmer-teacher using a tape recorder. The transcripts of these interviews—translated from Aymara or Quechua to Spanish—are subsequently included in narrative reports on activities observed which the professional submits monthly to the project's editor in New York. Eventually, these transcripts will allow textbook descriptions to convey a peasant "flavor" by using direct quotations from, and terms used by, the farmers themselves.

Over time the Bolivian professionals have also assembled hundreds of slides of project participants conducting different subsistence activities. The farmers themselves have become quite adept at posing in different work postures, in suggesting useful close-ups and angles, and in planning photographic sequences. Of course, such cooperation is also motivated by the potential notoriety of public exposure. For twice each year the Bolivian professionals give slide-shows of their mammoth collections in all participating communities. It is expected that much of the photographic material will eventually be worked into the textbook itself, as well as into a variety of crop-specific slide shows or filmstrips.

The Effort At Mid-Point

After 18 months in operation we have assembled a great wealth of material. For each participating family a careful sketch exists of all its holdings, the distribution of land use, and how this pattern evolves over time. We have complete inventories of livestock herds and their seasonal variation. For each of 14 crops in the highlands and 18 crops in the valleys region, there now exists a detailed task profile, a production calendar, and a set of production cost and net income summaries for representative farmers. Over 75 in-depth task narratives or interviews have been written. Many participants have already completed one journal and are beginning a second or even third.

During a three-day conference of project participants in January 1980, farmers from the highlands gave lectures on traditional practices to their colleagues from the valleys, and vice versa. This novel interchange between "experts", possibly the first of its kind ever, was accomplished using a three-stage translation process of Aymara to Spanish to Quechua and back again. Working also in small discussion groups with newsprint and marker-pens, the participants generated enough descriptive material on their respective crop and livestock technologies to fill a 48-page *Proceedings* document—itself representing the first farming manual written exclusively by Bolivian peasants. The conference also provided the

occasion for a hotly-contested Aymara-Quechua soccer championship that ended in a zero-to-zero draw, as well as a closing ceremony where many tears were shed, and a celebration in which one steer and 250 gallons of chicha were consumed in the space of four hours. The event greatly solidified the commitment and enthusiasm of the farmers towards the project.

In April 1980 the project was extended to Bolivia's Tropical Lowlands region in order to document how indigenous technology changes and is adapted as these farmers become colonists. There are 34 households participating from six communities which are representative of both old and new colonizations. A third Bolivian professional was hired to supervise the project in this new region.

The project has also been expanded with the addition of three female technicians, all indigenous language speakers with rural promotion experience. They have been entrusted—in the three regions—to work exclusively with the female members of households participating in the project. Experience has demonstrated that our knowledge sources to date were male-dominated, and many areas of rural family subsistence activity involving predominantly women could not be accurately described through the man's perspective. The project's new female staff will live two-thirds of every month in the villages and will participate actively in tasks involving rural women. To ease the potential burden of their presence on respondent households, each female staff member has an expense account for buying bread, sugar, salt, kerosene, and other gifts-in-kind for host households. In written narrative and interviews the women staff will cover the role of females in crop and livestock tasks, in produce marketing and barter activities, in home manufactures, and other economic activities. They will describe what rural families eat, the ingredients and preparation involved for typical dishes, and will calculate the cash and in-kind costs of these diets. Finally they will describe practices of personal hygiene, study childbirth and other medical events, and document morbidity and malnutrition.

In conclusion, the project promises to deliver a great deal. That it can offer so much is not so much a tribute to the ingenuity of its designers as a testimony to the energy, initiative, and enthusiasm the project has received and continues to generate from rural households. It does so because it treats them with respect. For most of the participants this is the first time that outsiders have credited them with knowledge that is worth listening to. Even if the much-awaited textbook of traditional practices does not meet all or most of the expectations its preparation is awakening, the process of researching the document may prove as useful as the final product. It is providing the farmers with a new self-image. It is making us, the outsiders, progressively more humble about the extent of our ignorance.

The Evolution of a Water Management Project by Participatory Demand: The Citanduy Basin Project in Indonesia

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Over recent years, rural sector and developmental assistance projects sponsored by foreign donors have witnessed the evolution of informal appraisal "check-lists." The following represents an example directly applicable to watershed resource conservation projects, but equally applicable to many other sector-specific development activities.

1. *Local-Level Participation.* Since over 90% of any project activity is by and for the local people, in contrast to at least some major downstream irrigation systems, local participation should control the identification, planning design, implementation *and* evaluation of most major project components.

2. *Village Cooperation/Coordination.* The efforts to save the upper basins and make them productive requires joint and communal efforts, sacrifices and benefits. Such activities are incorporated in the terraces, spillways, catchments, reforestation, etc.

3. *Local Leaders.* Local projects are generally small, and their benefits should be focused almost totally on the involved local area. Local leaders must be allowed to have primary and major roles in the project, and have end-result responsibility. Centralized bureaucracies with visiting officials from the capital cannot be ultimately responsible for managing project outcomes.

4. *Multi-crop Focus.* Single crop production is generally unsuitable for saving and revitalizing the upper watersheds. Most successes have occurred with the integration of agricultural production beyond paddy rice with livestock, fish, fruit, legumes, grains, tree crops, etc.

5. *Delayed Synergistic Benefits.* Benefits from such projects cannot be seen immediately nor can they be separated or isolated. These joint benefits accruing from project activities include runoff rate, siltation and flood controls which are not effective or measurable until full vegetative cover is restored and control structures are operational. Improved filtration and improved water tables may not be quantifiable for several years.

The formulation and application of such a "check-list" appears to be a logical and necessary, but insufficient, determinant of project design/implementation/evaluation success Its impli-

cations for "participation" in the realistic context of actual development work are enormous, especially for components 1, 2, and 3. This can be seen from an evaluation of Indonesia's Citanduy I project, particularly from "lessons learned" and "unplanned impacts." The participation dimensions inherent in the "check- list" components have been sharpened and strengthened in the recently approved and more comprehensive Citanduy II project.

Citanduy I. . . and Participation

The Citanduy Basin is located on the core island of Java, with its 87 million people and its critical need for quick, effective application of water and land resource conservation. Population pressures have resulted in the application of intensive and extensive methods of agriculture (primarily rice cultivation) on every type of available land, both lowland and highland. It has been estimated that more than one-third of the families of rural Java are landless and, for those having any access to production assets, the average farm unit is less than three-fourths of an acre.

In 1976, the Government of Indonesia in cooperation with USAID began a major development project of flood control and irrigation rehabilitation/extension in the lower basin of the Citanduy River. The area of this basin, subject to increasingly severe annual flooding and inundation, is over 250,000 acres. It falls under the administration of 4 Kabupaten (districts) within 2 provinces (West and Central Java), and contains over 2.8 million people, of which 1.2 million are directly engaged in agricultural production.

The Citanduy I River Basin Development Project is administered as a central government project by the Directorate of Water Resources, Ministry of Public Works, with an initial investment of $19.5 million from USAID and the Government of Indonesia. Primary objectives of the project were to provide for new and rehabilitated irrigation for more than 150,000 acres of paddy land. The project also provided for long- and short-term training in watershed management, operations and maintenance, and flood control.

In the spring of 1979, Citanduy I was intensively evaluated (ad interim) by the USAID Mission and Government of Indonesia. Although the entire project had been targeted on the 250,000 acres of lower basin land, some unforeseen results, particularly as they applied to the upper watershed and local participation components of the project, were noted:

—Improved agricultural practices were concurrently being practiced in some upper watershed areas; self-initiated water control and irrigation systems as small-scale pilot activities were being undertaken in the watershed, including development of back-slope terracing to reduce soil and water run-off.

—The centrally-planned project encountered an unplanned, yet widespread, phenomenon of the development of a "local-level project constituency" which created throughout much of West and Central Java a general "climate of opinion" supportive of the project aims; local leaders and spokespersons associated themselves to the project on a continuous basis, without central direction or authority, but rather in a self-sustaining innovative posture.

—Auxiliary agricultural and social agencies, both central and local, had joined the successful water resources project activities, thus assuring momentum and voluntary coordination of existing crucial institutions.

By late 1978/early 1979, the importance of highland activities and of participation in upper-watershed management had been recognized by the Government; a complementary pilot activity located in the upland Kabupaten (district) of Panawagan was begun. The enthusiasm of the people in Panawagan for the add-on pilot project was matched by the cooperation of the local and regional government officials and by both neighboring and far-flung leadership, farmer participation and interagency coordination. Other upper-watershed management projects both in and outside Java are now beginning to use the model and momentum of Panawagan as their guide. The farmers of Panawagan are even providing "exportable technical assistance" to nearby upland areas.

The Javanese have cultivated rice on terraces for generations, but the steeper the slope, the greater the chance for erosion problems. Although they have always built "bunds" or lips on the terraces, these bunds could not withstand heavy, prolonged rain. Now terraces are being sloped backward into the hillside, and excess water is carried away by rear ditches, then carried downward through bamboo or rock-lined trenches with descending spillways intersecting with other laterals to allow controlled drainage of excess water. Economic development for the villages and businesses in the upper-watershed began growing rapidly and agricultural activities are diversifying and expanding into livestock, forage planting, fish breeding, multicropping, etc. as the "risks" involved in production become ameliorated.

Participation. . .and Citanduy II

Creative participation by the upper-watershed citizens above the Citanduy Basin, and Indonesia's recognition of the critical nature of the upland area relative to lower basin (rice-bowl) success, literally reached its own "watershed" in late 1979. Acting upon the participation success, innovation and *demands* of people in the upper basin, the Government officially requested AID assistance in supplementing the Citanduy I Project with Citanduy II. This involved an *additional* AID contribution of $27 million to which Indonesia has pledged another $19 million equivalent.

The Citanduy II project design was finalized and submitted to Washington in May 1980. It reflects a nearly 180-degree turn around from the centrally planned processes which designed Citanduy I, now responding to the needs and demands of participation. As its primary purpose, Citanduy II is to "establish and catalyze local (and, parenthetically, national) capacity to design and implement comprehensive water management programs and to initiate these programs in selected areas which target upon and benefit the rural

poor." This new project shifts the emphasis to water and erosion control in the upper basin while assisting all of the *local level* institutions responsible for its management. Included are locally-devised integrated rural development activities with planned widespread benefits. More than 200,000 persons in the upper-watershed are expected to benefit directly as the program moves to stabilize and improve upon available agricultural and rural sector assets which will result in increased employment generation.

No one at this point should assume the Citanduy II project represents an optimal standard for participatory development. Nevertheless it does represent a major reversal of design and implementation processes resulting from local initiative and efforts. Citanduy II is purposely designed to encompass a broad range of sectoral activities with strengthened horizontal and bottom-up linkages. Project coordination, while officially monitored by a National Watershed Commission and the Ministry of Public Works' Directorate for Water Resources, will emanate from the locally-based Citanduy Basin Coordinating committee, composed of *Bupatis* (district chiefs), officials of BAPPEDA II (district plannng boards) and *petani desa* (village farmers).

In preparing for the project, the social soundness and socio-cultural feasibility sections of the project paper focused on local-level requests, acceptance, and participation roles. Potential impacts, spread-effects, social consequences, planned benefit-incidence, local planning and management capacities, technical and administrative feasibilities, and environmental concerns were all considered directly and as interrelated components. Most important, the primary viewpoint for these analyses was the local participation level. This is not the first time such analyses have been undertaken, obviously, but such an approach was previously confined to small-scale, local-level project activities. Since Citanduy II is a major *national level* development project, the magnitude and focus of local level analyses is unique.

The key element that can be deduced from the experience thus far is that projects *can* be undertaken in response to demands and initiatives of local people. Does this indicate that the Government of Indonesia and AID are becoming more responsive to the intended beneficiaries? Probably yes. We have every indication that any other approach, centrally instigated and planned, will have much less success.

Will Citanduy II be assured of success due to its participatory identification, design and implementation? The answer to this question must be left to the future, but the result should be optimistically awaited. One critial factor will be to make the interim and final project evaluations *as participatory as were the design and implementation.* The bottom line, of course, is the developmental impact on the project beneficiaries who are in this case the same as the project participants. That evaluation of impact must be viewed not only quantitatively, but perceptually, from the viewpoint of the participants.

At the time this was written, the author was Senior Officer for the Rural Development Staff in the Asia Bureau, USAID/Washington. He is now Rural Development Officer for the USAID Mission in Egypt. The views stated are those of the author and not any official position.

reviews

Politics and Policy Implementation in the Third World

Merilee S. Grindle, Editor
Princeton University Press, 1980

Review by Norman K. Nicholson
Northern Illinois University

Politics and Implementation in the Third World presents case studies from Africa, Asia and Latin America together with analyses that provide an excellent overview of the basic causes behind the enormous gap observed as a rule between policy and implementation in the Third World. The main themes are familiar. First, bad policy can hardly be effectively implemented. One is reminded of Theodore Lowi's discussion in *The End of Liberalism* of the growing confusion in U.S. regulatory policy where ambiguous ends produce ineffective means. Second, when policy is made at one level and implemented at another, there is ignorance of the needs of the clientele, of local conditions, and of the appropriate incentives to motivate the various actors. Students of Pressman and Wildavsky's book on *Implementation* would not be surprised. Finally, in an environment of resource scarcity, administrators have little control over the implementation process. These are the constants. The most important variables affecting success or failure appear to be the character of the regime (any concentration of political power, and the pattern of participation) and the nature of the program (whether distributive, redistributive, etc.).

If one is tempted to conclude from the above description that there is nothing unique in the circumstances of developing countries, Peter Cleaves provides a valuable concluding chapter which analyzes the causes for the unusual severity of implementation failures in the Third World. Most serious is the rather small portion of the population that is politically mobilized. As a consequence, the implementation process is either biased by the articulate or the corrupt on an *ad hoc* basis. Second, the absolute paucity of resources, both public and private, influences the survival strategies of both citizen and policy

maker, commonly subverting the public interest, and certainly the interests of the poor, by particularistic maneuvers. In spite of these dynamics, the authors seem agreed that one can tackle such fundamental problems as making the structure of regimes, and the distribution of assets, more equitable through the process of program design and management. This is comforting if it is true.

Part One contains case studies from Zambia (Stephen Quick) and from Peru (Cynthia McClintock) which, in the words of the editor, "consider the linkage between policy formulation and the implementation process". Both studies show how the complexity, internal contradictions, and abstractness of developmental and reform *goals* themselves cause many of the implementation failures encountered. Such deficiencies at the policy formulation stage permit excessive opportunities for reinterpretation or distortion of goals at the local level. This vulnerability was compounded in these cases by nationalist leaders' lack of experience with the administrative problems of implementation, and by their inability to manage the process. Lowi's observations that vague policy is bad policy apparently applies beyond U.S. borders.

The potential for implementation failure is increased where political local elites are able to align themselves with bureaucrats having compatible or similar interests in order to redefine vague policies to their advantage. A Ministry of Agriculture committed to increasing productivity as a principal goal characteristically finds allies among the privileged members of the cooperatives who want to limit others' access to the benefits they control. In contrast, social reform agencies which have a concern for the poor may find the latter reluctant to cooperate to secure the public goods provided, prefering instead to focus their limited resources on the pursuit of income. Rural institutions are likely to become overloaded with incompatible demands, conflicting incentives and competing interests. Either the rich prevail or, just as frequently, institutions become catatonic.

The plea made, then, is for simpler and more direct policies, illuminated by realism about people's motivations and capabilities rather than by the hopes of reformist ideology. It appears, however, that what is really being said is that fundamental reforms are difficult to implement. Ineffective political structures fail to produce consensus, ineffective bureaucracies fail to translate confused policy into operational clarity, and programs in general fail for lack of adequate incentives. Recognition of this reality has led some observers to emphasize improvement of policy-analysis techniques in the planning wings of national ministries. It has also led international aid agencies to substitute the disciplined and insulated "project" for the broad national program. These same factors tend to make agronomy more attractive than integrated rural development. In short, practitioners in the development field have already reacted, or over-reacted, to the pitfalls of bad policy along the lines suggested by these case studies, but preference in project planning for greater focus, simplicity, and clarity has not necessarily produced happy outcomes.

The studies in *Part Two*—three from India (Gerald Sussman, David Pyle, and Susan Hadden) and one from Colombia (Irene Rothenberg)—reveal how the choice of *policy instruments* is typically a political and not a technical decision. The authors feel that the interest of the political leadership is disproportionately focused on the *means* through which policy is effected—on the institutional choices to be made rather than on the impact which the program promises at some future date. The selection of the case studies themselves may have exaggerated this characteristic of the policy process. Several of the cases focus on attempts to institute fundamental structural changes in *the implementation process itself* either through community mobilization and self-help, or through administrative decentralization. In such circumstances, it may be that the instrument of implementation is more important than the specific program or set of benefits which provide the occasion for the structural reform.

The politicization of the implementation process is endemic in all the cases presented. However, the studies offer interesting contrasts in the form which such politicization takes. Grindle makes the point, alas with brevity, that distributive programs which provide divisible goods tend to engender political responses quite different from those providing public goods. Thus, public housing produces more factionalism and corruption than rural electrification, which appears to encourage cooperation and a more developmental orientation. It is unfortunate that no one has attempted to develop this comparison further.

It is reasonably clear that policy makers recognize these differences, and that their concern with institutional means rather than with the technical requirements of development may stem from attempts, often futile, to reduce conflict, to stimulate party advantage through patronage, or to encourage national integration. There is generally not much confusion among policy makers concerning the implications of choosing to implement a rural development program, for example, through the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Social Welfare, *or* the Ministry of Agriculture. It is the technocrat and the social scientist who require better understanding of the difference between development institutions as *mechanisms* for delivering services or inputs, on the one hand, and as *systems* for structuring the political and economic terms of trade between the urban and rural sector on the other.

The Indian case studies by Pyle and Sussman catalogue all that usually goes wrong with pilot projects. Both cases bore the heavy stamp of external experts and donors—who can be counted on to miss the point of a program politically, and who thus get into misunderstandings with practical actors who all along saw and pursued different aspects of the program. Both cases were heavily dependent on the personalities of the actors, because neither was rooted in the stabilizing reality of an organized and identifiable constituency. Protestations to the contrary notwithstanding, both were "hot house" products that were unsuited for rapid dissemination. This last point is particularly critical since the programs sought to reform the relationship between government

and citizens. Both demonstrated a shortage of bureaucratic entrepreneurship able to replace foreign staff. Both suffered from the imposition on the client group of exogenously derived social models. As policy instruments, pilot projects seem perennially to exhibit these faults.

The studies in *Part Three* (by Merilee Grindle, Nelle Temple, Janice Perlman) analyze the diversion of policy goals by both political and bureaucratic forces in the course of implementation. The pattern of deflection is established by the political character of the specific regime—i.e. what forms of participation are encouraged and which groups the leadership "answers" to. Beyond this, however, it is evident that the absolute scarcity of resources makes competition for benefits intense and that the poor, usually poorly organized, tend to lose in this struggle. It is thus rare that benefits targeted to the poor reach them. A strong case is made for "empowerment" of the poor so that they can defend, at the local level, the programs intended for them against the plurality of competing demands.

In these studies, bureaucrats are seen as responding either to their own class interests (e.g., biasing public housing programs toward their own needs) or as buying peace and quiet from powerful local interests (as in the allocation of subsidized consumer goods in Mexico's rural development program). Success in redistributive programs, therefore, is unlikely without strong political support from the regime, clear signals of this to both the privileged and underprivileged, and powerful administrative incentives to achieve equitable program goals. Even then, Grindle concludes, one may need to find a way to produce ingrained bureaucratic as well as political commitment. This is what is behind the establishment of new, development-oriented bureaucracies such as Social Welfare Departments, Community Development Programs, or Agrarian Reform Departments. The limited success of even such specially-recruited bureaucracies, however, contributes to a growing conviction among practitioners that the place to start is with empowerment, access, and participation for the intended beneficiaries themselves.

The essays contained in this book are diverse and Merilee Grindle and Peter Cleaves are to be complimented for drawing some significant observations out of the diversity. This is not a critical comment on the quality of the individual contributions, for they are quite good, but a recognition that a focus on "implementation" is somewhat artificial. The boundaries of this process fade the more intently one looks for them. The case studies provide considerable insight into the diversity of implementation problems but, by themselves, they make only a limited contribution to the state-of-the-art.

This said, the undertaking is to be applauded. For too long, project and program design have been viewed as technical problems. A problem is identified and the best (technical) solution is proposed; resources are allocated, and staff assigned. These essays demonstrate that there can be various definitions of a "problem", that the choice of policy instruments reflects those differences, that the forces pressing for redefinition of goals are considerable, that the pressures modifying bureaucratic good intentions are strong, and that, for all these reasons, administrative entrepreneurship is vital and the institutional and political context of the program shapes its outcome more than a policy maker's original intentions. Success appears to require that either programs be simplified and aspirations limited to reduce demands on institutional capacity, or support groups be mobilized to assist in scrutinizing and disciplining administrative performance.

Important implications for participatory development can be read from the studies. The Zambian cooperative and Indian community development experience show how confused and ineffective will be the response of rural people if bureaucratic good intentions are not matched by intelligent program structures, reflecting the realities which rural people face. Open-ended decentralization of program implementation in an environment fraught with partisanship and already entrenched interests will not bring in productive participation, as the case study from Colombia shows. Where, on the other hand, clear guidelines for equitable and productive public investment are laid down for decentralized decision-making, as in the Rajasthan case in India, participation can produce eminently desirable policy outcomes.

Perhaps the most interesting case for readers, even if its focus is urban rather than rural, is Perlman's account of how squatters in Rio de Janiero managed to have some influence on decision-makers in Brazil through the mobilization of the poor in their own organizations, even though the former were little disposed to help the poor or to be responsive to their demands. The squatters in Kenya whom Temple describes faced a less authoritarian regime and yet could not protect their interests, in large part because tribal and other factors kept them divided. In the Peru and Mexican case studies, there were benign bureaucracies, SINAMOS and CONASUPO, which were supposed to be aiding the poor, but which took a less supportive stance once beneficiaries tried to move beyond a passive role. This in itself provides an important signal, that the orientation of the bureaucracy itself holds a key to local participation. Local organization and participation efforts by themselves appear unlikely to get very far without administrative support.

notes

The **Seventh Annual Symposium on Law and Development** will be held at the University of Windsor during March 19-21. The theme for this symposium is *Law in Strategies of Alternative Development*. Those interested in receiving papers from the conference may write to *Prof. M. Lakshman Marasinghe/ University of Windsor/ Faculty of Law/ Windsor, Ontario N9B 3P4, Canada.*

The **Coordinating Council for Hunger Concerns of the National Council of Churches** is sponsoring a conference entitled *The Challenge of World Hunger: A Church-University Conference* to be held April 23-26 in the Yahara Conference Center, Madison, Wisconsin. Those interested in attending or obtaining more information may write to *Louis L. Knowles/ Coordinator/ Hunger Concerns/ National Council of Churches/ 475 Riverside Drive/ New York, New York 10115.*

Over the last several years the **International Labour Office** has been engaged in an action research program of *Participation and Organisation of the Rural Poor (PORP).* In its first phase ILO efforts focused on promoting the PORP program in different developing countries at both macro- and micro-levels by governments as well as by NDOs, private groups and the rural poor themselves.

The most successful of these initial participatory research projects was the *Bhoomi Sena* study in India. Others were undertaken in Bangladesh, Chile, Ethiopia, North Vietnam, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea and Tanzania. The methodology of the studies varied, but an attempt was made in each to engage in "dialogical research" in which the researcher sought to obtain rural people's reflections and perceptions on the questions involved. The questions concern such issues as the unity of ends and means in promoting participation, contradiction in participation (e.g., leadership vs. people, bureaucracy vs. people, class vs. class), the transition to collective agriculture (in Ethiopia, Tanzania and Vietnam), the economic basis of participation and self-reliance. These studies have now been put together into a volume, which is currently under consideration for publication by ILO. Building on the experience to date, further PORP studies have been initiated in Bangladesh, Chile, India, Nepal, Pakistan and Peru.

The ILO is also cooperating with the *International Centre for Law in Development (ICLD)* in developing a parallel program on *Law and Participatory Organisations of the Rural Poor* being executed by the ICLD, which is giving a legal dimension to the ILO's PORP program. In a first phase the ICLD has launched a series of case studies in a number of developing countries to investigate, also by the methods of dialogical and participatory research in varying degrees, the rate of existing and potential laws and legal resources in promoting PORP.

Another new research program consists of a series of case studies on interventions to enhance the mobilization of local-level human and material resources for greater employment and income generation for the rural poor, and in particular to generate grassroots self-reliance under different socio-economic and historical circumstances. These case studies will search for insights into questions such as how self-reliant consciousness emerges in traditionally dependent communities or is sustained and strengthened in other communities subjected to development initiatives from outside; what are the internal and external forces that operate against the generation or realization of this consciousness; what kind of educational effort and organizational development are most conducive to the promotion of grassroots self-reliance; and what kind of external intervention of assistance may be helpful or harmful in this respect.

Those interested in obtaining further information on any of these ILO activities are encouraged to write *Dr. M. A. Anisur Rahman/ ENT-RU/ Room 8-104/ International Labour Office/ CH-1211/ Geneva 22/ Switzerland.*

The **Institute for Development Studies at the University of Sussex** held a workshop on December 17-19 devoted to *Room for Maneuver in Public Policy.* Papers and discussion focused on the scope for public policy interventions in rural development in such areas as irrigation, agricultural research, land reservation and local governmental council. Those interested in more information may write either of the workshop organizers, *Dr. Edward Clay or Dr. Bernard Schaffer/ Institute of Development Studies/ University of Sussex/ Brighton, Sussex 9BN 1RE, England.*

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Heli Perrett and Francis Lethem. *Human Factors in Project Work.* Washington, D.C.: World Bank Staff Working Paper, No. 397, June 1980.

New Rural Development Committee Publications

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Lynn Gostyla and William F. Whyte. *ICTA in Guatemala: The Evolution of a New Model for Agricultural Research and Development.* Special Series on Agriculture Research and Extension No. 3, Rural Development Committee, Center for International Studies, Cornell University. Also available in Spanish as: *El ICTA En Guatemala: La Evolucion de un Modelo de Investigacion y Desarrollo Agricolas.*

Cheryl A. Lassen. *Reaching the Assetless Poor: Projects and Strategies for Their Self-Reliant Development.* Special Series on Landlessness and Near-Landlessness No. 6, Rural Development Committee, Center for International Studies, Cornell University.

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RURAL DEVELOPMENT
participation
review

Stimulating Community Participation: Obstacles and Options at Agency, Community and Societal Levels

Frances F. Korten
Ford Foundation, Manila

Over the past several decades there has been a characteristic pattern in development programming throughout the Third World. Programs typically have been designed in national and regional capitals, with government personnel hired to serve some group of "beneficiaries." Seldom has it been presumed that the beneficiaries would themselves have a role beyond using the services offered. Yet this centralized "service-delivery" approach has four key limitations which have become increasingly apparent to development professionals throughout the world.

The first problem is one of limited reach. It is nearly impossible for government funded and supervised professionals to effectively reach every village. Consequently, many government programs, such as health services and agricultural extension, are estimated to reach only 15 - 20% of their rural target populations.

Second is the lack of capacity for sustained local-level action. Development projects have all too commonly produced new facilities without adequately providing for their operation and maintenance. Government workers see their task as being to build a facility such as a road, a local water supply, or an irrigation system, assuming that maintenance will be done by the local people. Yet when no attention is devoted to developing local capacity for such tasks, these are often simply not done.

Third is the limited adaptation to local circumstances. The needs of rural people differ substantially from one community to another. But centrally designed programs are seldom able to adapt to such differences. Consequently the services offered are often ill-suited to the needs of the community, resulting in underutilization and waste of resources.

Fourth is the tendency to create dependency. The very ability of the poor to survive under the most unfavorable circumstances suggests that they are already fairly skilled in meeting their own basic needs, even if only at intolerably low standards. Too often government programs seek to improve their lot, not through interventions intended to strengthen their own capacity for "self-help" action, but through doing for them some of the things they previously did for themselves—with the government making the decisions and providing the resources. As a consequence the people's former degree of self-sufficiency turns to dependence on government, possibly leaving them even more vulnerable to changes in policy or lapses in delivery systems.

As a means of overcoming these limitations, development planners and policy makers are increasingly turning to various forms of local participation. One form is the locally-based paraprofessional, who is supposed to extend the reach of programs such as health and family planning (see article by Taylor and Moore in *RDPR* II:1). A second form is through the development of local associations able to handle the operation and maintenance of infrastructure projects. A third form of participation is the creation of local committees to meet the need for local adaptation of programs by planning them together with government officials. A fourth form is simply the use of local labor and skills in carrying out projects, creating local employment and contributing to self-sufficiency.

Experience indicates that serious obstacles to making any of these forms of participation effective exist within the implementing agency, the community and the broader society. Yet these obstacles and the means for dealing with them have received too little attention, either in the development literature, or in planning and implementation documents. Some key obstacles are reviewed below, with suggestions noted for circumventing them, based on case studies and analysis growing out of the collaborative effort of the Management Institutes Working Group on Social

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Development which draws on experience in Asia, Africa and Latin America.

Obstacles Within the Implementing Agency

Most development agencies came into being in times when participation was not a major theme in development thinking. They were designed for a centralized, service-delivery approach, and their structures, systems and norms today pose serious obstacles to significant people's participation.

Centralized Decision-making. Under the centralized, service-delivery approach, most decisions are made in national or regional capitals, e.g., those related to basic program design, personnel, budgets, equipment and support, etc. As a result, when local committees or associations make suggestions regarding the adaptation of programs to their specific needs, it is often difficult to respond adequately. For example, in a Venezuelan program multi-service modules were built to house a variety of government services in poor squatter areas. While top policy makers were advocating "the promotion of base organizations to exercise the representation of collective interests," each agency within the module already had fixed programs determined at much higher levels, with no mechanisms for making local adjustments. If one particular community wanted more garbage collection and less day-care, agency personnel had no way to accommodate this trade-off. Indeed under existing procedures, they could not even change the hours a food store was open to be more responsive to local needs. Official rhetoric and even genuine policy decisions regarding the use of more participatory approaches can have little effect unless implementing procedures allow flexibility in dealing with issues likely to be of concern to local people.

Inappropriate Attitudes, Values and Skills of Personnel. The usual premise on which centralized programs are built is that the agency has something to offer people which is otherwise not available to them. While this may in many cases be true, particularly for financial resources and technical knowl-

edge, agency personnel often assume that they know best in all matters. As a result they expect people to behave predictably and passively, simply accepting the professional's greater expertise. For example, one study of an Indian community health program documented how clinic personnel berated the "leader-like behavior" of a community health worker, even though the community help workers were intended to exercise leadership in mobilizing community activity.

Agency personnel may also be too fixated on using technical language to communicate effectively. "Jargon" can be a real barrier to communication. A study in Tanzania noted that despite the major efforts of the government to involve local people in decision-making, government officials used terminology with villagers that was "overly complicated even to an educated but non-technically oriented mind and which was surely no more than barely comprehensible to semi-literate people."

Developing more appropriate attitudes, values and skills is clearly a major task. The slogans about humility and learning from the people that accompany grassroots oriented programs and movements are more than routine rhetoric—they should be taken seriously. Training personnel to understand more profoundly the real meaning of technical terms they have been taught may help them be confident in using less technical language, just as developing their understanding of the broader purposes of their program may also help and encourage them to adapt it to specific circumstances.

Inappropriate Evaluation Systems. An organization provides its employees a multitude of signals regarding what it expects of them. The types of accomplishments an organization stresses determine the trade-offs personnel make in deciding how to go about their work. For example, are staff encouraged to take the time needed to have the community develop a plan of action, or are they pressed to do it themselves in order to get it done more quickly and to insure conformance with certain centrally defined "technical standards"? Are they given more credit for assisting the community's participation or for emphasizing their own role in getting results? Signals given by agencies accustomed to centralized, service-delivery approaches are likely to be very different from those seeking more broad-based participation.

One frequent need in reorienting evaluation systems to suit participatory approaches is to shift the emphasis from intermediary activities to results. For example, evaluation systems in many irrigation development agencies are oriented towards the completion of construction activities. Yet the agency's real goal is to expand the cultivated area under irrigation. To meet this *real* goal participation of the people is required—both in contributing to building better systems, and in operating and maintaining them to cover the maximum potential area. If the engineers' evaluation rested more on area reliably irrigated and less on completed construction, the combined need for quality construction and strong community organization would be embedded in the evaluation system.

A second important need is to incorporate accountability to the community. Typically agency personnel are evaluated only by their supervisors, not by the people they are expected to serve. Explicit mechanisms for encouraging accountability to the local community are therefore also needed. The strongest mechanism for encouraging accountability is giving the local community the power to hire and replace individuals who are to serve them. This is often cited as an important contributory factor for the effectiveness of the agricultural extension work in Taiwan. Another mechanism for encouraging accountability to the community is the requirement that the community contribute money, labor, and/or materials before an agency can implement a project. This gives the community the power to provide *or withhold* the needed contributions, giving it some leverage over agency personnel.

Frequent Transfers of Personnel. When programs are centrally designed and personnel are expected to carry out a standard set of activities regardless of location, individuals can be transferred from one post to another with relative ease. However, when a participatory approach is desired, frequent transfers become a serious obstacle to development of the mutual knowledge and trust needed between agency personnel and local people. For the latter to invest their time and effort in a development program, they must be certain of the reliability and goodwill of the implementing agency, a condition difficult to develop if agency personnel change frequently. At the same time, agency people need time to understand local needs and they need to know that they will be working on a given assignment long enough to employ participatory approaches that may take longer to get started than the more traditional centralized service-delivery strategies. If they expect to be elsewhere by the time the longer-term benefits are attained, they will be less likely to invest the additional time and energy required for participatory approaches. Studies done in a tribal area of India by the Indian Institute of Management in Ahmedabad revealed the crippling effects of frequent personnel transfers. Substantial adaptation of national programs to local conditions was impeded by the fact that the Block Development Officer who had to initiate and approve such adaptations changed every three to four months.

All this is to say that participation cannot simply be mandated. A major transformation of policies, procedures and organization structures is required, and this demands strong leadership, a good understanding of the needed changes, and time for them to take root. (See article by D. Korten, *RDPR* II:2)

Obstacles Within the Community

Poor rural communities are generally faced with a variety of obstacles preventing them from using a more participatory approach to development.

Lack of Appropriate Local Organizations. For many types of programs a local organization is needed through which people can participate both in the development of the program and in its long-term implementation. The need for a broad-based organization of bene-

ficiaries is particularly acute in programs for community management of such resources as water, forests, fisheries or grazing land. Other programs such as health and education also often require some kind of local organization. Frequently, however, no suitable organization exists. In such a situation the implementing agency should have the capacity to help develop one. Nevertheless the need for specific personnel and support systems to do this task is often overlooked. The Venezuelan multi-service module program mentioned above provides an example. The coordinator in each module was expected to develop a community organization which would advise on how to adapt module programs to community needs. Yet the administrative demands on the coordinator just to keep the module running and to communicate with the various agencies housed within it left little time for contact with the community. Consequently it is not surprising that no community organizations developed.

In cases where it is recognized that personnel are needed specifically to do organizing work, it is often assumed that the organizing task can be carried out independently from the technical intervention. Thus, typically in irrigation projects the personnel expected to develop water-user groups are completely separate organizationally from the irrigation engineers. Yet the location of irrigation structures and the timing of water distribution are issues of great interest to water users, and altering these to meet farmer needs is much desired. In such situations organizers without technical competence and without linkage to technical decision-makers come to the farmers with an "empty hand"—unable to give them incentives for forming a strong organization. Organizing work should be viewed as an integral part of technical investments, in order to allow local people to participate in decisions important to them.

Lack of Leadership and Organization Skills. In many communities people have had little experience with running participatory organizations, and therefore lack skills in organizing meetings, reaching consensus, choosing capable leaders, keeping records, or handling organizational funds. A common response to this problem is for the action agency to send a few community leaders to leadership training programs which teach them basic skills and provide them information about the technical and financial assistance being offered. If the program is a small one and only a few individuals are needed, this approach may be adequate. But if the training is a principal input to activation of the community and if participation by more than a few individuals is necessary, then this approach is likely to be inadequate. For one thing, it segregates the people chosen for training from the rest of the community, making the development of a broader leadership base more difficult. Second, it divorces learning from doing.

An approach which avoids these problems has been used in the Philippines in the development of communal irrigation associations. Community organizers build skills on an informal basis, right in the community, in conjunction with carrying out specific tasks. The irrigators' association must get a water permit, register the association, plan canal layouts, obtain rights of way, determine membership rules, and mobilize labor for construction. In the context of these specific tasks, skills in holding meetings, reaching decisions, developing recording systems, etc., are developed both by leaders and regular members jointly.

Poor Community Facilities. The lack of roads, telephones, and literacy in many rural areas in developing countries makes such otherwise simple matters as calling a meeting a major task and makes mobilizing large numbers of people more difficult. In some cases the problem can be mitigated by developing organizations which cover a relatively small area where people can easily contact one another. Yet carrying out many tasks demands groupings that extend over a number of residential clusters. One solution is to create sub-units of a larger organization or to aggregate smaller groups into a larger association, and to allocate as many tasks as possible to them. For example, in 1962 staff of the Pakistan Academy for Rural Development in Comilla, while studying problems experienced by agricultural cooperatives, found that a major limitation on broader participation was that fairly large cooperatives were organized on a multi-village basis. Only a few of the richer people could afford to travel the distance required to attend central meetings. This contributed to their domination of the cooperatives. Yet the Academy staff also felt that some broad scale of organization was needed for the cooperative to be financially viable. The solution was to have small, village-level cooperatives in which much of the business was transacted. These were, however, also federated to form a larger, financially viable organization.

Factionalism and Different Economic Interests. Communities are seldom unified groups of people. Histories of enmity or divergent economic interest often divide them into conflicting groups. These differences make it difficult or impossible to create an organization to voice "the community viewpoint" since there are actually many viewpoints. Community organizers may help to form reasonably cohesive, goal-directed organizations, particularly by generating peer pressure to move individuals towards community, rather than individual or faction, interests. However, in many cases, more structural approaches may be needed.

One important structural feature of organizations is the basis on which they are formed. Individual members need to share common incentives for action. The Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee, after several years of trying to develop broad-based community groups, concluded that the interests of the landed and of the landless and near-landless were sufficiently irreconcilable that the only solution was to develop separate groups to serve each section. Similarly, a study of fishing cooperatives in Malaysia concluded that their success was dependent on the exclusion of fish-sellers from the cooperative, since the latters' interests were usually quite different from those of the fishermen themselves.

Corruption. A further obstacle to participation is the natural tendency of some powerful individuals in any community to take personal advantage of

opportunities for individual gain. For example, in Comilla, once the strict supervision provided by the Pakistan Academy for Rural Development was relaxed, many cooperatives reverted to becoming a source of wealth for the few.

Agencies interested in generating broad-based participation must develop a variety of mechanisms to curb these corrupting influences. Otherwise, they risk losing the broader participation of the community. One mechanism is to ensure that all program beneficiaries are aware of the purposes of the program, the resources available, and the intended constituency, and are sufficiently organized to stand up to more individualistic pressures in the community. Second, clearly-stated agency procedures can lift the veil of mystery shrouding how resources are supposed to reach the community, and so make more difficult local distortions of the process. Third, requirements of public access to information can also be helpful. For example, in government-supported Malaysian smallholder rubber cooperatives, a government auditor is supposed to check the cooperative's books once every three months, and requires that the quarterly financial statement be displayed on the walls of the cooperative building. Further, specific kinds of checks can be developed which are appropriate to the functions undertaken by the local organization. For example, the National Dairy Development Board in India relies on thousands of village-level cooperatives to collect milk for delivery to the cities. A system of checks for the butterfat content has been developed to insure that the milk is not watered at any point in the delivery system.

Discovering the likely sources of corruption, and building systems to curb them, is an important part of the learning process which an agency wishing to promote community participation must undergo. To do this the agency must free itself from corruption, and attention must be given to providing internal checks on its own personnel. Community organizations can be helpful in this regard, since their members are in intimate contact with the field work. In the Philippines, for example, irrigators' associations receiving government construction assistance impounded government vehicles each evening, so that operators could not make personal use of them, since it was the farmers' association that was expected to pay for the fuel.

The five kinds of obstacles discussed above reveal the need for intervening agencies to help community organizations develop structures, procedures, and skills which channel participative processes in ways specifically suited to the needs being addressed. But structures, procedures and skills vary from area to area and program to program. Thus each agency must learn for itself what is needed by paying close attention to the problems encountered in implementing its program in a few villages and developing the appropriate frameworks for avoiding the most serious of these problems on a broader base of operation.

Obstacles Within the Society

Participation is generally viewed as a way of helping poorer elements of society increase their welfare. But this involves a change process that conflicts with the status quo, and presents societal-level obstacles to participatory approaches. Certain aspects of politics, law, and bureaucratic procedures are all likely to be impediments. Strategies for dealing with these obstacles must be carefully tailored to the particular society, but some general suggestions may be sketched.

Politics. Community organizing is normally intended to increase the welfare of the poor, and this usually involves some enhancement of their power. The potential for conflict with entrenched interests is self-evident. Any program stimulating community organization must recognize that if the local groups take on political characteristics, there is likely to be a backlash, possibly resulting in a withdrawal of official recognition, loss of resources, or even physical coercion.

Two contrasting strategies for dealing with this problem are either to gain the protection of a strong political party directly by working with it, or to avoid political identity as much as possible. The rural development work in Tanzania exemplifies the first strategy, where community organizing is carried out under the banner of the national political party. The fact that only one party exists under a fairly stable government committed to the welfare of the rural poor makes this a reasonable strategy within that context. However, in countries where the party in power changes frequently, such political affiliation may destroy the program, particularly if it is dependent on government resources. For example, in Venezuela, any local organizations created at a time when one party is in power tend to be viewed as threats to the other and to be dismantled when that party attains power. Situations where political affiliations would be damaging to community organizations call for the contrasting strategy of insulating the community organization from politics. Confining issues to local ones as much as possible, and focusing on developing the local group's capacity to serve a specific set of local functions (such as managing water, milk delivery, forest area, etc.) can help avoid overtly political identification.

Laws. In many contexts meaningful participation can only be generated if certain rights are recognized. Community and social forestry programs exemplify this problem. These programs are often caught at an awkward point in the evolution of societal perceptions of who is responsible for forested lands. For centuries sparsely inhabited, hilly forested areas of many developing countries were seen as a resource properly owned and protected by the government. But exploding populations in the lowlands have forced larger numbers of people into these upland areas, where they cut down trees to cultivate the soil, causing massive erosion that exacerbates floods and droughts in the lowlands, and reduces future productive potential of lands both high and low. Governments are beginning to recognize that approaches using police or guards to solving this problem are futile, and that people living in upland forested areas must be encouraged to take responsibility for resource management and to plant economically productive trees as a means of liveli-

hood. But since the people have no security of land ownership, the dilemma arises that they are legally nothing but encroachers on government land. Consequently they have no incentive for planting and tending trees which will not become profitable for several years, unless they are sure they will be allowed to stay to reap the benefits. Yet resolving this dilemma by actually deeding government lands to private individuals is a step that few national governments are willing to take, and such a move might lead to a situation where absentee landlords acquire large holdings of land once it is available for private ownership.

In such situations, program managers need to search for alternative ways to provide the legal framework necessary to pursue the programs. In the Philippines, one tribal group has worked out an agreement with the government to lease a 14,000 hectare area for 25 years with an option to renew. With this security the tribal group has developed programs to preserve and develop large areas of forested land. Other forestry programs have provided individual or community permits validating the people's rights to use the land at least temporarily. Finding different solutions in different parts of the country appears to be a more workable approach than to confront the broader issue of national policy governing land ownership in all forested areas. If these programs are seen as successful, a climate conducive to broader legal and policy changes may develop.

Bureaucracy. The problem of centralized control exists not only with implementing agencies but also within the larger bureaucratic frameworks in which agencies operate. National governments set up procedures that maintain central control over resources in order to keep the programs of individual agencies responsive to the government's changing priorities. Yet these same procedures make it difficult for individual agencies which wish to pursue participatory approaches to do so.

Philippine experience with communal irrigation work has thrown light on one such bureaucratic obstacle. The Ministry of Budget allocates funds to the National Irrigation Administration based on a list of specific construction projects. These funds are released when projects are ready for construction. This arrangement is based on the assumption that only minor work is required before construction begins and the costs of this can be covered under the construction project's "overhead" category. But participatory approaches demand that community organizers and technical people work with the people in communities over a six to nine month period in planning the relevant systems before construction proceeds. It is possible that construction will not proceed at all if community interest or technical feasibility are not sufficient. Thus funds are needed for preparatory work which is not tied to construction. Similarly, there are cases where what is needed to improve a communal irrigation system is not construction, but other forms of assistance such as strengthening irrigators' associations, improving water management methods, systematizing financial record keeping, or resolving disputes. Yet meeting these more varied needs is precluded by the funds being linked to construction activities only.

The appropriate strategy for resolving this kind of bureaucratic dilemma is likely to depend both on the degree to which government procedures interfere with participatory approaches and on the required size of the program. One strategy is to redefine the program so as to avoid some of the more onerous government restrictions. In communal irrigation work, if the budgeting process were reformulated to operate on a program basis rather than as a collection of individual construction projects, the agency would have the needed flexibility. A different strategy for avoiding such rigidities is to create a new agency that is exempt from many of the normal government rules—such as a government corporation, or even a completely private organization. New organizations, however, are unlikely to have the geographic reach of established government agencies, are costly to create, and are often shortlived.

In the long-run, if participation is to make its crucial contribution to development, various changes will have to be made which reduce these societal obstacles. In the short-run, however, program managers must be imaginative and sensitive in their search for ways to accomplish needed reforms without eliciting reactions which destroy their programs.

This review of obstacles to participation at the agency, community and societal levels shows the difficulties of participatory approaches. Often these obstacles are ignored in program design and management; hence it is not surprising that many efforts to stimulate participation fail. Success requires transformations in the way an agency performs its task, in the way community members relate to each other and to the agency, and in the way the society views the poor, their needs, their capacities and their rights. Such transformations are inevitably slow and liable to setbacks. But the reasons for seeking participation are compelling, and the instances of success with participatory development programs around the world show that the efforts required are worthwhile.

The analysis offered in this article is based on the author's experience with the National Irrigation Administration in the Philippines as well as on reports presented at a meeting held in March of 1979 by the Management Institutes Working Group for Social Development. A longer version of this article is to be published in *Bureaucracy and the Poor: Closing the Gap*, edited by David C. Korten and Felipe B. Alonso (Singapore: McGraw-Hill, 1981). The volume includes various case studies, cited in this article, which address in more detail the problems of "closing the gap."

Women in Forestry for Local Community Development

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Until recently, organized forestry efforts have been focused on industrial plantations and on reserve and park-land management. Land-use decisions were made and enforced by technicians, and local residents had little or no role as either decision makers or beneficiaries.

Currently, however, the concept of community forestry with local participation and control is gaining prominence in development forums. Forestry for local community development, sometimes called FLCD, is coming to mean more than simply changing the local resident from an invisible being to a pawn in someone else's plan. It is a new philosophy calling for new definitions of forestry projects and for new roles for foresters as well as for local residents. No longer are forestry projects confined only to creating or maintaining dense stands of trees ("forests"). Now they may cover any tree or shrub planting, care, or product use, and are increasingly likely to be integrated with other agricultural, economic, or existing social needs or interests. The greater part of the new forestry agent's time will no longer be confined to forest management, control, and rule enforcement. These responsibilities will shift wherever possible to the local community, so that the forester plays more of a technical advisory and support role. The resident is now to be the central actor. The forestry program should help local people gain control over local circumstances. As a result, program designers are more conscientiously talking with community leaders or with village councils. This means that they are talking, almost invariably, with men. Unfortunately, this ignores one group of essential actors—women. Program after program has failed because participation of women, so essential to the effort's success, was overlooked. This paper highlights some of the areas in forestry where women play an important role, presents various factors affecting the success of forestry projects, and points out some key indicators for selecting successful women's forestry projects.

Role of Women in Forestry

There is one aspect of women in forestry where their role is direct and highly visible—*collection of firewood.* Publications are filled with photos of women bent under heavy piles of wood on their heads or backs. Studies of fuel use present a familiar scenario wherein women collect wood near the homestead and when this supply is depleted they walk greater and greater distances until finally they have to start buying wood—usually from men, who control carts and beasts of burden. Women, and thereby their families, then lose control over their fuel supply and have an added living expense. The growing cost of such fuel has become an urgent problem in many areas, and in West Africa there is now a common saying, "it costs as much to cook the rice as to fill the bowl."

Descriptions of the genuinely difficult and time-consuming task of carrying loads of wood seldom point out that during this process women are also experimenting and innovating, turning to alternate fuels such as local plant stalks, dung, and even imported charcoal. Women are not only victims of changes in firewood supplies but they actively seek everyday solutions in locating and conserving fuel and are the local experts regarding burning qualities of various local woods and of firewood alternatives.

When available fuels are scarce, women also change their cooking and eating practices. For example, in Nepal, diets are reportedly including more and more raw foods. In eastern Upper Volta, local officials are distressed that although the soybeans introduced in a large development scheme have grown extremely well, women are not accepting them because soybeans require much longer cooking time. Throughout the Sahel people are turning to rice instead of millet, largely due to the fact that it cooks more rapidly. In the peanut basin of Senegal, one woman remarked, "One can starve with a full granary if one has no fuel with which to cook the meal." This woman is probably not starving. She has, however, given up serving two hot meals a day to her family. First she served just one hot meal a day, and then one every other day, frequently serving just water mixed with raw millet flour.

The actual extent of these changes and their impact on nutrition and health should be examined. For example, the increased consumption of raw foods and unboiled water may cause an increase in otherwise avoidable diseases. This information should be made available to local women and men and to program planners alike, when discussing local priorities and evaluating local needs for forestry in community development.

In many regions of the world, women raise small ruminants around the compound. Aerial forage supplied by bushes and trees is the basic diet of these animals. When forage becomes scarce, women walk their animals farther away until the distances are too great. Then, they again lose control of an activity important to the well-being of the family and lose a source of personal income.

Women have *other interests in forestry* that are often overlooked. When contemplating changes in planting or exploration of vegetative resources, women are relevant "experts" to consult. In many countries a large amount of the nutritional value in meals comes from leaves or fruits and nuts collected by women from a variety of trees and shrubs, and women know of alternative foods from new sources when favored foods become scarce. Because women do much farming and gardening, they are aware of decreases in the carrying capacity of the land and can advise outside experts on this. Often they are knowledgeable about what tree species

hold and improve the land and which may "poison" the soil. When appropriate species for hedgerows and windbreaks are introduced, women as well as men are interested in ways this can be done within their own cultural and economic framework. Moreover, women know a lot about forestry products for building material, medicines, crafts materials, etc. to fulfill their responsibilities for the well being of their families and in some regions, for personal and family income. Thus, although they are seldom formally trained in forestry, women are frequently the local experts on the current and most appropriate uses of forestry products.

Not only is women's expertise generally unnoticed, but sometimes their *forestry-related activities* are invisible even to local village men. It means that program designers must make an extra effort to inquire beyond the more easily available answers offered by male village leaders.

As an example, in Senegal a regional forestry officer, with whom we talked about starting community forestry programs, was insistent during discussions covering several days, that Senegalese women did not, indeed could not plant trees. Yet in the evening, when chatting alone with his wife about sayings or beliefs that might limit women's desire to plant trees, it became evident that her grandmother, her mother, and she had all planted trees. In fact, all the trees in this forester's own courtyard had been planted by his wife, and she remarked that where there were trees in courtyards, women had probably put them there. At that very time, in the capitol city, women's organizations had hung banners across the major streets in celebration of the "Day of the Senegalese Woman" proclaiming "For Every Woman a Tree." They were officially encouraging women to plant more trees, while the forestry officer imagined cultural barriers to this.

Roles women can take in forestry projects differ not only from country to country and by ethnic group, but sometimes vary from village to village. In some communities, only women may put seeds in the earth while men do all the other planting and harvesting chores. In other communities, they have separate fields and both sexes do all planting tasks. In some communities, men and women do complementary work, and in others their projects are completely independent. Women know the specific local needs, the roles they can play, and also taboos which may influence project success.

Factions Affecting the Success of Forestry Projects

There are *social* issues especially raised by the nature of trees, particularly when communities are involved. Since trees take time to grow, any unclear or unfavorable land tenure situation, any competition for land, and the permanence or mobility of the population are more important issues than they would be for short-term agricultural crops. Trees often compete for labor at the height of the agricultural season and require year-round protection the first few years. Land tenure, social structure, political and economic organizations, and the capacities of extension and forestry services to support such programs are all important factors affecting project success.

It is the experience of community developers that projects introduced in a community which build on existing skills and accepted practices have a better chance of success. It is, therefore, a sobering fact that communal forestry programs are common neither in the developed nor in the developing world. This means donors, designers, and participants have very little to go on in the way of experience or models. It is no wonder there have been difficulties in establishing community participation with locally controlled benefits in forestry projects.

Foresters, agriculturalists and developers from a number of countries have identified four major constraints for FLDC programs: (1) competion for land; (2) the time frame for forestry; (3) spatial considerations; and (4) unfamiliarity with a tradition of forestry. (FAO "Report on the Third FAO/SIDA Expert Consultation on Forestry for Local Community Development," Semarang, Indonesia, December 1977.) These are constraints whether the project is for men, women, or mixed community projects.

However, because women frequently lack control over land, they may have the least flexibility in time use, have the least mobility, the least access to financial resources, and are least well served by extension services especially in nonhomemaker subjects. They may be invisible in terms of their inputs and needs. These facts make it imperative to make special efforts in program design to resolve each of these issues in light of women's potential participation.

The very term "forestry" calls to mind either forests controlled by foresters, or hired labor working in industrial lumber, coffee, rubber, or other plantations. In neither picture does one see the *participation* of women in designing or controlling the project. If forestry with a local community development approach is to include women successfully, informed women must help design the project. No simple "women's programs" can be designed in any capital city and dropped full-fledged on a community. Not only is it true that failure to include women from the beginning often assures failure of the project, but the opposite is true also. Inclusion of women who are knowledgeable and concerned about forestry problems, community priorities, and their own roles, when designing programs adds a valuable source of information and potentially adds enthusiastic support for program success.

In order to have projects that are likely to succeed in incorporating women into active participation, one should start by looking at women's traditional activities. As mentioned above, in most parts of the world women plant fruit or shade trees in their yards. They often collect tree seeds for food or other uses and may sell the surplus and they may have an active part in raising agricultural crops, or in gardening. In areas where wood is the fuel they usually collect, transport, and store their family's supply and may trade or sell any surplus.

Many projects can be introduced to expand women's normal activities or to make them more profitable. Some of these projects are: to raise seedlings in the courtyard or garden area; to increase the number of courtyard trees; to

plant trees in the market for shade; to collect tree seeds for sale to the forestry department or to a local nursery; to improve the harvest, transport, or storage of wood. If trees are approached as just another type of agricultural crop, except that they take longer to reach maturity, tree planting by women who already plant crops should not seem startling. Actually, the most startled by this approach to forestry may be the forestry technicians, host country and expatriate alike, who have gained a mystique of exclusivity and elitism through their rigorous and intensive training.

However, it is not a good idea to overstress women's participation in the act of planting, transporting, etc., without looking at the total picture. Just as it is unfortunate to plan projects with men, over which women have no control but their labor is expected, it would be unfortunate to draw up arbitrary rules on women's involvement in projects. In areas where women have already over-charged work schedules, men may be willing and able to actually plant the trees for their families or community while women do support activities and also profit from the benefits.

More important than who physically plants the trees is the issue of *who needs, will benefit from, and who will control use of the product.* In a Peace Corps project with women in Latin America, women purchased fruit tree seedlings and paid men in their community to plant them. But it was the women who chose this activity so they could profit from the fruit. In areas in the Middle East where women live inside walled compounds, sons may purchase fruit tree seedlings and later sell the fruit in the market for their mothers. If the women profit from the benefits, promoting this type of activity would still be considered a legitimate women's program.

There are difficult issues to consider, however, when the work is not under the control of women. For example, in a project in Niger, women provided food and support for men while men planted trees in a woodlot. The wood was supposed to go to the man who planted the tree to give to his wife or wives. Although this system would benefit women, a woman's share of the wood would depend entirely on how many trees the man plants and how many wives he has. A woman with a lazy or an absent husband, or a widow would have no way to receive adequate benefits from the project. These types of issues in benefit sharing have not been adequately addressed. They must be examined in the design stage of each project and be spelled out clearly in the project management plan.

Indicators for the Selection of Women's FLCD Projects

One can look for indicators in order to select areas in which participation of women in FLCD projects appears potentially successful. One should look for motivation—are the benefits from the FLCD project a high priority for that person? One should consider women's potential activities—what roles do women currently play in the social and economic life of their community and what is their work cycle? One should examine the likelihood of women's profiting from participation—what chances have women in that location to acquire and maintain control over benefits in a potential project? One should consider adminsitrative support—have there been other women's projects, is there a motivated female extension worker and foresters ready to offer appropriate support?

Women who have not been involved in project planning or decision making may have a difficult time imagining project ideas for their community or indeed expressing their own needs. A list of apparently viable options could be drawn up from the first brief information and presented to start discussions. For example, if the women are herders and there is not enough forage, might the women be interested in the option of raising forage trees, if the community would assign them land and help protect it? If women gardeners have problems with animals attacking their gardens, they might want to develop a live fencing project. If women have a garden plot near a well and find it too small to be profitable for vegetables, they might wish to turn a portion into a nursery which requires limited space. Options of these types of appropriate projects could be made known to the women.

After they find projects in which they are interested, local women can help identify information they would need for choosing between options. They themselves could help identify and fill in missing information required in designing a good project, and information needed to write a management plan. This is not to say there is no need for professional socio-economic analysis required in projects. It is to say, however, that the project could be strengthened by the input of participants at the information collecting stage.

Lessons from Experience

In looking at successful projects in which women have participated, one usually finds that: (1) local community residents defined their own goals and priorities and the extension agent and forester acted as facilitators; (2) a woman extension agent often helped to take the interests of the women into account; (3) there was follow-through and flexibility especially when the facilitators were living in the community. Currently growing demands for forestry products are putting an alarming strain on the environment, and top-down forestry projects are having an alarming rate of failure.

The new approach to expand community participation is an attempt to change the top-down approach in forestry and to enlist local support; to have local residents participate in solving their local problems. The very need to discuss women separately is a sign that they have been consistently overlooked. There is a need to make women as visible as any other members of the community in relation to forestry.

It is essential for all FLCD projects that the organization and the responsibilities of participants and cooperating support agencies be clear from the beginning. A project management agreement could help address these issues and give added protection to participants, especially women. A suggested management agreement would identify participants, goals, land to be used for

the duration of the project, start-up and maintenance costs in time and money, potential benefits with a formula for their distribution, and finally a way to evaluate the program, with feed-back leading to appropriate revisions. This type of agreement would help make all the elements of the project clear from the beginning. It would provide a schedule and an organizational framework making more likely, to all those concerned, the successful completion of the project. It should be discussed in detail, and each section should be agreed upon by all those affected, including women. It should be signed as a contractual agreement so that participants and support agencies alike will take seriously their rights and duties.

Forestry for local community development is an exciting new field. It brings with it a potential for communities to participate in improving their environments and gaining control over their futures. Since women are important local experts on forestry and are the most affected by changing availability and diminishing supplies of forestry products, to have FLCD without including specifically women is not only to overlook a vast untapped resource but is also to risk failure.

This analysis is presented in more detail, with a format for a project management agreement plan, in the author's study, *Women in Forestry for Local Community Development: A Programming Guide*, available from the Office of Women in Development, USAID, Washington, September 1979.

Peasant Participation in Agricultural Planning in Peru: The Impediment of "Expertise"

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The participation of ordinary people in planning processes usually requires fundamental changes in the institutions involved. But, less obviously, associated social roles and expectations also need to be changed, particularly the status associated with "expertise." This need was demonstrated in an agricultural planning exercise which I observed in the highlands of Peru in 1974. The Government had introduced some far-reaching structural changes through agrarian and educational reforms in the rural sector. The language of the time was "revolutionary" and definitely supportive of peasant participation. Yet the practice of rendering technical assistance to agricultural communities was still one which created subtle forms of dependence. Though peasants had been given the forms of power, through government-sponsored cooperatives, actual decisions remained heavily under the influence of the "experts." The purpose of this account is not to deny a role for expertise but rather to explore, with reference to some real experience, the problems of eliciting and sustaining productive participation by peasants in their own development planning.

The cooperative "San Martin" in the Department of Cuzco had been set up with the encouragement of government representatives on the basis of several ex-*haciendas*. Peasants discovered that the decision of *whether* or not to have a cooperative had already been effectively made by the officials; ultimately the only real decision left open to the coop's new members was *what* to name their organization. There were, not surprisingly, some objections from certain ex-*hacienda* communities over being forced into the coop, and having their assets consolidated into the whole. But in time, these objections were overcome, and elections were held for various committees to manage the cooperative enterprise. Our account begins with the initial effort to formulate a Plan of Production. The first step was taken when the Agriculture Committee sent representatives with the Ministry of Agriculture's agronomist "engineer" to inspect the fields under their jurisdiction. The reconnaissance, discussions, and acceptance of the plan by the cooperative's General Assembly took three days. We were able to follow the whole process, almost word for word.

At the first estate, when the first few hectares of land were discussed, the engineer suggested that wheat should be grown. There were other suggestions from the committee, and in an effort to generate participation from the peasants, he asked for comments or objections to his suggestion of growing wheat. There was enough water, the ground was favorable, and since local experience and scientific judgment were in agreement, the choice was confirmed.

As everyone moved on to the next field, the engineer announced his plan to have one crop grown on each estate in order to facilitate the commercialization of agriculture in the whole valley. Thus he was of the opinion that wheat should be planted in the next field, and the next, and the next, as long as certain "scientific" questions were answered satisfactorily—was there enough water? would there be a suitable rotation? etc.

When they came to a field already containing potatoes, the engineer proposed wheat again, in accordance with his plan. When a peasant suggested instead that potatoes be planted for a second year (as was a common practice), one of the technicians accompanying the engineer and committee retorted that the peasants would have to forget their old-fashioned ways of planting potatoes year after year in the same field until there was hardly any yield. The peasant's suggestion was not pursued, and wheat was planned for that field too.

At the next field, in contrast to the preceding one, wheat had been grown for two years, and accordingly should be succeeded by another crop. Nevertheless, the engineer stated that wheat should be grown again; a third year of the same crop would not matter; it was better for commercial agriculture to keep a large area under one crop. The engineer was demonstrating his "expert" status not in the realm of growing things but in the more esoteric realm of selling them. In his role as "expert" he stood up to all objections to his plan of growing a single crop on each estate, agronomic considerations voiced by the peasant growers notwithstanding.

Expert status is validated by resisting others' suggestions and having one's own views prevail. This runs directly counter to the spirit of participation, however. As may be expected, there is some scope for give-and-take in planning for such a large enterprise: the engineer agreed, after some discussion, to the proposal from one of the technicians that one of the estates be planted in alfalfa to "rest the land." Thus was an ally lined up who also had a similar vested interest in upholding the idea that (1) there is such a thing as scientific knowledge, (2) it takes a lot of education to acquire it, and (3) only a few people have it. It also demonstrated the similarity of engineer and technician as "experts."

By the second day of the land inspection, the peasants had learned these lessons. They had also learned that effective participation required the free interchange of ideas by people with similar quantities and qualities of expertise. While their expertise consisted in a lifetime of experience, the engineer's consisted of scientific knowledge gained through formal education. This was considered qualitatively superior to mere experience. They also discovered that the authority invested in titles *engineer* and *technician* was deployed on the side of scientific knowledge as opposed to experience. The result was that participation was aborted.

A description of one part of this process will illustrate this point. A long debate had taken place over what to plant on two hectares of land on a hillside some distance away, too far to visit. The *hacienda* owner who had given the land to the cooperative and was acting as a friend of the coop in suggesting it was well-suited for growing potatoes, was eventually overruled. This land too would be planted in wheat, though a technician worried that there was no water. This would be provided by the first rains, the engineer countered, and his judgment was accepted, confirming his status as expert.

While this wrangling had been going on, the peasants sat on the hillside gazing over the flat land of the valley as the sun shone warmly down. The decision having been reached, they readily lent their assent. They had learned that their suggestions were not heeded anyway. So now they were content to sit in the sun until the decision was made by others. This lack of activity confirmed the technocrats' view of peasants, which was buried just under the surface of the revolutionary gloss of belief in participation. Rather than regard peasants as thinking human beings, the outsiders considered them lazy and unable to concentrate even on tasks that concerned them. Their apparent disinterest confirmed the stereotype of peasants — *"indios"* who are unable to concentrate on a task. Apparently, the decision was not yet final; the *hacienda* owner invited the engineer to come into his house out of the sun, and he and the technicians continued talking around the decision to plant wheat. At that moment, a peasant leaned through the open window to say, "Yes, wheat there, that's right, that's right." No one took any notice.

Acceptance of the Plan

The decisions reached by the engineer, with the support of the two technicians and the Agriculture Committee, had to be ratified by the General Assembly of the whole cooperative. The engineer stressed that what had been decided was not final—the assembled members had the ultimate decision. He was about to go through a discussion of the parcels of land one by one, when the leader of one of the estates, who had already heard the plan, stood up to approve the whole plan for his estate. He was followed by the leader of another estate.

Although the engineer had stressed that the people could disapprove of the plans, there were no objections to what had been approved by the Administrative Council and the Agriculture Committee until the decision to put alfalfa on so much of the land in the central estate came up. This had been the suggestion of the local technician, as we have seen, but some of the peasants from the estate wanted to plant maize instead. The engineer explained things privately to local leaders, and one of them, the president of the cooperative, explained to the assembly in Quechua what had been suggested. The objection began to weaken.

The technician spoke of the six estates as being "like one man." The idea of having maize was not in the interest of the cooperative as a whole. There was enough maize in other fields, which he demonstrated with figures. Alfalfa would rest the land and provide fodder for the cattle to be raised on one of the other estates. By the end of his speech, everyone was in agreement with alfalfa and the president stepped forward (knowing there was consensus) to put it to the vote. There was no more disagreement.

The important point is that by now there appeared to be a consensus. Where there had been a spark of disagreement, of discussion, it had quickly been put out. The pros and cons of alfalfa or maize were beside the point. What shaped opinion was the technician's emphasis on the six estates existing "as one man." With such a stress on "harmony," there was no room for objections. And with no discussion, no dialogue between official and peasant, this meant that what the official said had to be accepted as true.

Expertise

We are concerned here with the relationship between official and peasant, normally one of dependence, perpetuated even in a "revolutionary" situation. The continuing superiority of the official is legitimized by control of special knoweldge—expertise. It is believed that there is a certain kind of agricultural knowledge gained by studying for several years in an agricultural college.

Examinations both test the "correctness" of what has been taken in and validate the reality of that knowledge.

In our case it must be remembered that agriculture is important for both the engineer and peasant. The latter, however, also has great respect for the wonders of education. It ensures a better place in the world. Engineers hold social positions with great status which is received through education. Engineers, therefore, are people to be respected for both status and specialized knowledge. That peasants themselves believe engineers have specialized knowledge well above that of ordinary peasants legitimates that higher status.

If we had a situation where an industrial manager confronted a peasant, each could acknowledge each other's expertise. Yet in a situation where education confronts experience *in the same field,* it is not so easy for peasant experience to stand on an even footing with an official's education. What forms the basis of "superiority" is the pre-existing elevated social position of one party, not anything inherent in the knowledge itself. Yet this "superiority" enters into knowledge in the way people view it, so it in turn upholds the elevated position of the official.

Because the engineer has status he has expertise. Because he has expertise he deserves status. The two ideas interact to maintain the *status quo.* A consequence is that peasants concur with their own low status.

We see in this case how difficult it can be to get effective participation in a setting where "expertise" is injected. Where people's preferences come into confrontation with expertise, where experience is at odds with education, the conflict is resolved in favor of the latter. This is not because of some objective superiority but because the solution was socially derived, based on the *status* of the engineer.

In such a setting, education, even if made more "progressive" by various education reforms, serves to reinforce the pattern of dominance by which one group remains superior to another. Education, while appearing to provide the key to opening the door from peasant to bureaucratic status, serves individuals (those with merit and able to be educated) rather than the group. It has the effect of "creaming off" the most intellectually talented of the lower group and placing them in the ranks of the dominant group. As vertical mobility increases for individuals, it becomes more limited for groups as a whole and the social pattern generally becomes more rigid.

Thus problems of participation are not readily resolved by various institutional reforms because they arise not only from social inequalities in the distribution of education and/or means of production, but also from the confrontation of different types of knowledge backed by unequal social status. On the one hand, the "expert" commands scientific knowledge gained through education; on the other, peasants have experience of local conditions and productive possibilities. For participation of local people to be realized, the "expert" must recognize that local experience is not only valuable, but that indigenous knowledge systems, such as described in D. W. Brokensha et. al., *Indigenous Knowledge Systems and Development* (University Press of America, 1980; see pages 24-25 below), might even in some respects be superior to the knowledge of the highly educated expert.

projects

Schistosomiasis Control on a Community Self-Help Basis

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Schistosomiasis is generally considered to be one of the most important and rapidly spreading parasitic diseases. It poses a real threat to large-scale agricultural development in many tropical and sub-tropical parts of Africa, the Middle East, the Far East, the Caribbean Islands, and South America. An estimated 200-300 million people are currently affected by this debilitating disease, while another 400-500 million are potentially exposed to it.

Schistosomiasis is a typical man-made disease. Most developing countries depend on agriculture for economic advancement. Well-intentioned agricultural projects requiring irrigation canals have often resulted, unfortunately, in the creation of new breeding habitats for the snails which transmit this disease. Infected and non-infected people brought to work together in such areas must drink from, bathe and labor in the same canals. All too often, human wastes are also excreted, dumped, or washed, in the same water. This deadly combination is all that is needed for the rapid spread of schistosomiasis, especially among highly vulnerable children.

Scientific and Social Challenges of its Control

Schistosomiasis is now virtually uncontrolled. There exists no single, effective way to check it. Much progress is being made in the search for an appropriate drug, but at present there is nothing suitable for mass treatment. The major problems in seeking a pharmaceutical product to do the job are the high toxicity of drugs which could be used, and the need for sustained treatment and careful supervsion of patients. Even if the ideal drug is available for treatment, it would be of no value in effective control of the disease; people after treatment could be reinfected as long as the source of infection remained.

Although progress is being made in immunological studies which may eventually lead to development of an appropriate vaccine for mass-immunization against schistosomiasis, development of a vaccine such as BCG, which reduces tuberculosis, is still very far off because the immunological problems of controlling a worm infestation are too many.

However, health education and sanitary improvements would help immensely in the struggle to master the disease. Unfortunately, low levels of education and living standards amongst the 400-500 million people exposed to the infection—along with their increasing involvement with water for personal use and agricultural development—make the control of schistosomiasis through teaching and sanitation unrealistic. A third approach, for the moment the most promising, is to interrupt the life cycle of the parasite by eliminating the snails that transmit the disease, in much the same way that using insecticides to kill mosquitoes controls malaria.

Snail-Killing Chemicals

Several snail-killing chemicals (molluscicides) have been developed over the past fifty years. The oldest and the most widely used are copper sulphate and sodium pentachlorophenate. In the past decade, new and much more effective chemicals have also come on the market. The key to their successful use is thorough and repeated application, reliable dosage and careful monitoring. These are accomplished only by hard work and sufficient funds. Successful programs involve the continuing purchase of large quantities of imported molluscicides for treatment in the affected regions. This requires hard currency, a critical matter for those who manage the hard-pressed budgets of developing nations.

Yet purchases of molluscicides are often given low priority because of the lack of convincing proof of the "dollar benefit" from schistosomiasis control and because numerous other demands are made on the limited foreign exchange available in most of the poorer countries where the disease prevails. Little is therefore done about this rapidly spreading and debilitating disease. Lacking a growing market demand, chemical companies are reluctant to invest much in research and development for new molluscicides or to improve existing ones. It seems unlikely that this situation will soon change, so an alternative solution is required. The "best" molluscicides would appear to be ones produced locally and used as needed.

Endod: A Locally-Producable Plant Product Molluscicide

There are several plant products that are known to have molluscicidal properties. One of these, perhaps the most extensively studied, is the Endod plant. The promising results obtained so far from these studies indicate the possibility that this product, or other similar locally-producable natural products, could be used to control schistosomiasis on a sustainable community self-help basis.

Endod is the Ethiopian name for the soap-berry plant *Phytolacca dodencandra.* The berries of this plant have been used for centuries in Ethiopia and other parts of Africa as soap for washing clothes. In 1964, while making an ecological study to determine the distribution of schistosome-transmitting snails in a small stream in northern Ethiopia, I observed large numbers of dead snails at spots immediately downstream from where the local people were doing their laundry using Endod. Areas upstream and farther downstream from such laundry sites were abundant with live snails. This led to the discovery of the molluscicidal property of Endod.

As low a concentration as 20-30 parts per million of the sun-dried, ground Endod berries suspended in aqueous solution, kills schistosome-vector snails within twenty-four hours. This molluscicide is effective over a wide range of acidity or alkalinity and with various concentrations of organic and/or inorganic matter in the water. It is not significantly affected by ultra-violet light from the sun. These characteristics contrast favorably with the chemicals available commercially, which are impaired by one or more of the conditions just mentioned.

The molluscicidal property of Endod has been exhaustively studied since 1964 in Ethiopia and elsewhere. Over 40 scientific articles have been published on the studies to date and several patents have been registered on different aspects of this plant product. Unfortunately, most of these publications were made in journals that have relatively limited distribution, such as the Ethiopian Medical Journal, and therefore the results of our studies have not been widely circulated and known by many scientists and potential users in different parts of the world.

Field Evaluation of Endod

Encouraged by results of preliminary laboratory studies, we initiated a relatively large-scale schistosomiasis pilot control project in the town of Adwa, where the molluscicidal property of Endod was first discovered, an agricultural community in northern Ethiopia. Base-line studies showed that about 64% of Adwa's population of 17,000 were infected with *Schistosoma mansoni.* The source of infection was identified to be two small streams, each originating from some small springs a few miles north of the town. Large numbers of the intermediate-host snail of schistosomiasis, *Biomphalaria pfeifferi,* were breeding and transmitting the disease intensively in these streams, which are the only sources of water for the whole area.

The Adwa project involved a systematic and monitored application of the locally-gathered ground berries of Endod in aqueous solution to kill the snails in both of these streams. Application of the molluscicide was checked by weekly surveys of the snail populations to determine their sizes and infection rates, over a continuous period of five years. The degree of success of the control effort was to be measured by the yearly incidence rates of the disease among children between the ages of one and five years, permanently residing in the town. We established a sampling technique whereby 10% of the permanent residents of the town, including all sexes and ages, were randomly picked and examined for infection with schistosomiasis through stool examinations

and skin tests. The assumption was that if the control effort was to be 100% successful, all the children born and raised in that town during the five year control period would be free from the infection. The yearly new infection rate of the disease in children between the ages of one and five years would thus provide a measurement of any success in the control effort. If there is no reduction in the infection rate of the disease in that age group during and after the five years of the control period, then it would mean that the control effort has failed.

Because Endod does not kill the heavily protected egg-masses of snails at concentrations that are normally sufficient to kill adult snails, a second treatment of the snail habitats with the same concentration was routinely administered two weeks after the first treatment, timed to kill juvenile snails that hatched from the unaffected eggs, before they in turn matured to lay new batches of eggs. Such double treatment schedules were applied twice yearly, with continuous weekly monitoring and on-the-spot application of additional treatments if needed to kill any snails that might escape the double treatment scheme, or to control any new snails that might be brought from other areas by birds or washed down by floods. Such treatments were routinely carried out during the period of 1969 through 1973.

Community Involvement and Evaluation of Results

One of the essential components of the Adwa project was that it involved active community participation. The provincial governor-general, the mayor of Adwa and the Municipal Council were all involved in the program from its early stages through its completion. Indeed, their role in planning and executing the project was an essential component of its ultimate success. The budget for the five year pilot-control project was provided by the Adwa municipal council. The council also provided the necessary facilities and manpower, including provision of a headquarters for the project, staff to run the field work, and the collection of Endod from wild growing plants or its purchase from local markets where it is sold for use as soap. The council also received and reviewed reports on the progresses of the study.

The overall evaluation of the Adwa experiment after the five year control period led to the following major conclusions: (1) Endod is very effective in controlling snail populations; (2) the incidence of schistosomiasis among children between the ages of one and five years was gradually and dramatically reduced from an initial 50% to only 7% at the end of the fifth year (an 85% reduction rate), while the incidence of the disease among children in the nearby untreated control village of Intitcho remained the same; (3) the overall prevalence of the disease in the 17,000 population (all ages and sexes) of Adwa was also reduced by about half, from the original 64% before the control program to about 34% after the five year control effort; and (4) continuous application of the molluscicide had no apparent effects on the flora and fauna of the streams.

Indeed, continuous application of high concentrations of Endod solution to economically important plants over long periods of time appeared to serve as a fertilizer, favoring the more rapid growth and production of the experimental plants compared to the controls which were only given water.

Our studies have further shown that Endod is rapidly biodegradable. When Endod solution is applied to streams, canals or lake shores, its effect lasts for only 24 to 48 hours, after which it rapidly loses its potency.

Improved Extraction and Formulation Procedures

The fermentation-based procedure for preparing the Endod extract depends on very practical and simple techniques, using yeast that is normally found on the berries. When ground Endod berries are soaked in water and left in a warm place, they ferment rapidly and eventually separate into a fluid, which contains the active principle, and a residue, mainly yeast and debris. The fluid is easily separable from the residue, and can be dehydrated with the use of small "home-made" solar drying chambers, and prepared into fine powder by grinding. The powder can then be either dusted directly over the infected water or be prepared in different formulations, such as flakes that can either sink or float on water to attack specific snail habitats, emulsion concentrates for spraying, or special briquettes of different hardness for slow-release in water. Farmers and villagers can be easily taught how to prepare such briquettes and how much and how often they need to apply the Endod at pre-determined spots to control the snails in their area.

The simple fermentation chambers and the various drying and processing apparatus needed for this molluscicide could be constructed by students at neighborhood schools, by the local blacksmith, or by roving *"barefoot technologists"*. Such apparatus should be simple enough for easy operation by village-based community health workers. Our preliminary studies on these possibilities have given us much promise, though the methodologies involved and the "packaging" of the technology and know-how have yet to be properly developed and standardized. The yeast residue from the fermentation process can be washed, sun-dried and used as a high-protein supplement for animal feed, particularly as an additive to chicken feed. These prospects also have yet to be fully explored and developed.

For all these reasons it makes sense to search for an alternative approach, an approach that would rely on a locally producable molluscicide for use as needed on a rural community self-help basis, thus relieving governments to concentrate on other important tasks and also saving hard currency. Our last 15 years of studies on Endod have paved the way towards this direction, a direction which we believe is very much worth pursuing. A systematic use of

such locally-producable molluscicides on a community self-help basis can indeed control schistosomiasis. However, as stated already, any such snail control effort would give better results if augmented with direct treatment of infected individuals and with provision of better sanitary conditions and proper health education to the affected community.

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Using Local Peoples' Participation in a Food For Work Program in Nepal

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Food for work programs are often designed to provide a quick response to a critical food shortage. Because of the need for quick decision-making, local people are often overlooked when decisions are made on what kind of programs should be done, how they should be implemented, what kinds of foods, etc. Because of the necessary speed, decisions are often only made by the central government and/or donor agencies.

In 1980, His Majesty's Government (HMG) of Nepal along with United Mission to Nepal (UMN) took part in a food for work program in which the local people's participation was one of its key elements. The program's success was enhanced by both quick decisions made early in the program by HMG and UMN and the approval to delegate the decisions necessary for implementing the program to local institutions.

UMN has been involved for eleven years in health work in two panchayat areas of Nawal Parasi District, namely Buling Tar and Upallo Arkhala. After several years of poor harvests, the spring maize crop of 1979 did not amount to anything (due to a shortage of rain). Villagers came to UMN and asked for assistance. They suggested that we undertake a food for work program (FFW) similar to the ones which had been carried out in other nearby areas.

A trip was made to the area to ascertain whether or not there was a need for assistance, and a willingness to undertake work for food aid. The first panchayat visited, Arkhala, was populated entirely by Magars, persons of an ethnic minority common in the Nepal hills, and generally poorer than the non-Magar population of Brahmins and others. I spent over ten hours talking with the head person of the largest village in the panchayat area who was also a former district panchayat member. He gave me information on the present famine, history of how people survived in past famines, and in case there might be assistance from the outside, how work projects should be organized. I asked several times if he could call a panchayat meeting to involve more participation by the villagers, but he said no one would come because people were very busy farming.

At Buling Tar, the other panchayat, I talked with several local leaders and then went to a meeting of the panchayat. People from nearby, largely non-Magar villages, attended. Those from further away and those from Magar villages did not come. They told me that they had previously decided that, should outside assistance come, they would build a large irrigation scheme which would irrigate the land of the *tar* (village), owned mainly by more wealthy, non-Magar persons. This irrigation scheme has been in the government plans for ten years. After the meeting I was convinced that this was a work project that all the local people had decided on.

Upon being informed of my findings, the UMN head in Kathmandu said he would be willing to commit funds to a food for work program, pending government approval. I was asked to return to the area to begin designing the project. However, I was told that the large irrigation scheme should not be included in the FFW. I was disappointed that the only program that was apparently actively desired by the local people was being turned down.

At Buling Tar panchayat, with its large non-Magar population, a panchayat meeting was again called to discuss possible FFW activities. This time several villages that had not been represented before sent some persons. When I informed the meeting that the large irrigation scheme had to be ruled

out, many people became upset as they had waited ten years for this canal. In their anger these large non-Magar landowners walked out of the meeting. I asked those who were left what kind of work projects could be undertaken which would either increase food production or raise cash income in the hope of alleviating future food shortages. Each village came up with ideas such as irrigation canals, foot trails, and fruit tree plantations. We wrote them all down, and told the people we would visit each one to do a feasibility survey.

We then went to Arkhala, the all-Magar panchayat, and collected their ideas for projects. Unfortunately, their panchayat meeting was not well attended as some of the letters announcing the meeting had not been delivered to the farthest away villages.

In the next month, feasibility surveys were done for all of those projects. Villagers assisted us with the surveying, and showed us the proper alignment of the canals to be built. We used their estimates of how many days and how many persons it would take. We also asked them what kinds of food they preferred and how much the local daily wage should be. From all of this information I began to prepare a proposal which I would submit to HMG and send to donor groups asking for aid.

During talks with HMG officials, in particular from the Home Panchayat Ministry, I realized that I had not thought of the organizational aspects of the program. The Ministry felt that this program should be the local people's program and that they should be responsible for it. It also wanted a local implementation committee to be formed in each panchayat, and that the emphasis of the committee be on "implementation and action."

At this time we were also building up a staff of persons from other UMN projects. This included technical overseers, storekeepers, and an accountant. We concluded among ourselves that this was not to be a UMN program, but rather one that the local people would run and operate—this would be a new experience for all of us.

As we were trying to make our first decision—where to locate the *godown* (staff quarters building)—we had our first surprise. We called a meeting in the hills of the Buling Tar panchayat, where most of the Magars live. After this meeting many persons came up and told me not to build the godown in the village that was selected. When I asked why they had not spoken up in the meeting, they answered that they were "dumb"; the person who persuaded everyone else was very rich and powerful. (This same person, we would find later, would give us many problems throughout the program.)

As a result, before we called a local implementation committee, a person from our staff met with every village and asked them to select one representative to send to this meeting. We explained that these persons should be able to speak up for their village in meetings. At one village we were told that when there are high caste persons in a meeting the Magars cannot speak. They showed me the school they had built several years ago, and told me how much rock had to be dug. One old Magar man said, "We Magars may not be able to speak (to high caste people), but we can really dig rock!"

At the first implementation-action meeting at the Buling Tar panchayat, a representative from each of the 35 villages came. The wealthiest and most powerful person in the panchayat was selected chairman. We explained that the purposes of these meetings were: (1) program implementation, and (2) decision making. At this first meeting the following decisions were made: what food was preferred; the food wage for work; how carrying of food should be organized; how work projects should be organized; whether children or women should be allowed to work; how distribution of food was organized.

Some decisions, such as how much wage (ration) should be given for a day's work, were very difficult. On the one hand, there were wealthy farmers who were afraid that paying too much to workers would affect what they would later have to pay to their laborers. Then there were those who would benefit from the irrigation canal: they wanted a high wage so that they could be assured of having enough people to work. There were also those persons who would actually work and they wanted a high wage. After several hours of talk the issue was unresolved, and they asked me to make the decision. I made a compromise which I felt was on the high side, but everyone seemed to agree with it later.

In evaluating this meeting afterwards, we felt that nearly all the decisions were made by the wealthier higher caste minority and not the Magar majority. Later when talking with our Magar acquaintances, we tried to encourage them to speak up at the following meetings. In this Buling Tar panchayat much progress was made in getting the Magars to speak out.

In the all-Magar panchayat, Arkhala, the implementation-action committee was very different. Here, there is no large landowning group and there is an excellent history of panchayat-level decision making. At the first meeting, over 150 persons came from all but one of the villages. Traditionally, decisions are not made unless everyone agrees; this also proved to be the case in this meeting. However, it was somewhat difficult to make free decisions when everyone knew that the Buling Tar panchayat had already made its own decisions. The people of Arkhala felt that these decisions also had to be adopted. With each decision to be made, however, there was much discussion with everyone participating.

Before starting each work project, the villages involved had to approve the project unanimously and select the *naike* (the work supervisor). Nearly all of the *naikes* selected were already the traditional leaders of their village; some were selected because of their power and influence over others, while others were selected because of their good reputation.

In the early weeks of the program, important changes had to be made. Many villagers in the Arkhala panchayat felt that some of the UMN staff who came from the outside were not doing their job well. They claimed that the UMN staff was lazy. After getting slightly drunk on home-made *rakshi*, they began to argue with our staff. We tried to solve this problem by placing the former district panchayat representative (also headman of the Arkhala vil-

lage) as director of the program. We also hired five "school boys" (18-30 year olds who had gone to school) to help staff the *godown*. It should be noted, however, that this measure did not improve the efficiency of the operation; it may have actually worsened it. Yet because their fellow villagers were working, never again was a complaint raised. Our new director did an excellent job of running the program, mainly due to the respect all persons had for him. He always made decisions in typical Magar fashion—he asked all parties for their opinions, and then came to a compromise.

In the Buling Tar panchayat we did not have this same problem with finding a director for the program. In wanting to be sure that the Magar population was neither excluded nor taken advantage of because of status differences, we looked for a person who would have the respect of the Magars as well as the high caste persons. There was only one such person who, however, would not leave his work of teaching. It seemed that everyone was pleased to have UMN staff, who came from the outside, direct the program in this panchayat.

Reflections on the Program

The food for work (FFW) distributed 685 metric tons of grain, lentils, and oil purchased from nearby markets. On average, about 1,200 persons worked on community development projects, with another 300 persons carrying food. Fifteen new irrigation canals (totaling 30 kilometers in length) and four new footpaths (totaling 29 kilometers) were built. The irrigation canals will benefit 322 families who own the land which will be irrigated.

One reason for success of the program lay in the fact that many villagers had worked in the British or Indian army. Their ability to organize and run a village project was excellent. Each village operated its own project in its own way. One village, feeling that the UMN did not provide enough tools, decided to purchase more on their own. Each village chose whether to construct the canal on a contract basis (per meter) or on a per day basis. Work groups were formed and their leaders selected.

As the program progressed the number of people coming from outside the two panchayats in search of work increased. At one point, as many as 2,500 persons were working daily. About half of these persons came from outside the two panchayats. Villagers were told that the program's deadline was set; if projects were not finished in time, it was their responsibility to finish them. As a result, many villages took on the people from outside to work on their projects.

The panchayat implementation-action committee met every few weeks. As a group they became more able to make decisions; they also became more demanding. A feeling developed that if a matter was passed by the implementation-action meeting, no matter how outlandish or extravagant, the UMN must accept this. There were several matters that we felt we had to veto. These included: extension of the three-month program so that all the work projects could be completed; UMN payment of compensation to a family in case of a worker's death; worker's maintenance of old canals and footpaths as acceptable work projects.

When the FFW ended, the farmers were very busy getting their fields ploughed and planted. In most cases they did not have time to prepare their newly created land for irrigation. During the following monsoon, many of the canals had landslides which would require much maintenance. (This is typical in the hills of Nepal—following the construction of roads, canals, etc. landslides put them out of service.) It will be interesting to see which villages will fix their canals, and how it is done.

Not all villages worked well during the FFW program. Some village projects were led by corrupt persons, who cheated some of their workers. (Interestingly, each one of these projects were not completed.) However, in the majority of cases, villages worked well enough together to complete their projects. In these villages, there were two factors that produced success, namely, good leadership, and the participation of those involved. The leaders were well respected, and asked for advice from other villagers before decisions were made. Meetings were called by the village to discuss major problems, such as how will the canal be dug through very hard rock. Decisions were nearly always made by consensus.

What will happen in the future? We think that villages that worked well together will maintain their projects and take up other village development projects at their own initiative. Those villages which did not work well together will not finish their projects, and will take little initiative in other kinds of projects. This would not be suprising because it follows the existing patterns of cooperation and performance in the hill villages of Nepal. Such patterns are all too often ignored by official programs, though local development work is increasingly being carried on through panchayat institutions.

The problems we encountered, where some groups—the geographically more remote, or the socially less respected—did not participate in decision-making, or where autocratic, even corrupt leadership took over activities, would of course be likely to appear again with such efforts by government. The consequences of unequitable benefits, or simply non-completion of projects, would also be similar to those we observed. The experience with this food for work program demonstrates what can be accomplished at relatively low cost with an approach involving rural people in the planning and implementation of local improvements. (See article by Prachanda Pradhan on a similar approach to building suspended bridges in Nepal, *RDPR I:1.)*

The Batasan-Durgapur Format for Rural Development in Bangladesh

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One of the perplexing questions of economic development in Bangladesh is how the living conditions of the villagers, who constitute 90% of the people in the country, can be improved without massive foreign assistance and/or immediate basic structural change, since neither is likely.

Although there are few big landlords in Bangladesh (the ceiling of land holding is fixed at 33.3 acres per family or 3.3 acres per head, whichever is less), the distribution of land in this country is still quite skewed. The top 7% of the households own about 36% of the cultivable land while the bottom 22% of the households are either landless or own only homesite land. Of the remaining households most are barely subsistance farmers. What is more, the number of landless households is fast increasing. In some villages it has already reached 50-60%. Further, a large number of owners of land are absentee landlords, who cultivate their lands through sharecroppers and take half or more of the total produce without contributing any of the inputs. The sharecroppers naturally do not have any incentive to invest in land for modern cultivation. Some people believe that without a basic structural change, such as drastic land reform in favor of the actual tillers of the soil, no permanent improvement in agricultural production can be brought about in Bangladesh.

This account shows how the late Noor Mohammad Mondol, a modest farmer and a social-minded community worker in the village of Batasan-Durgapur in Rangpur district, tried to meet the situation through community effort during 1973-79. Within a few years he turned his village from a food deficit to a food surplus area, simultaneously bringing the rate of population growth from about 3.0% to about 0.4% and making the village a crime-free zone.

Batasan-Durgapur is only about 1½ square miles in area and is divided into two sectors. The northern sector, which pioneered in the experiment with self-reliant development, includes about 600 people divided into 85 households. The total land area is 285 acres, of which only 235 acres are cultivable, with the remaining land used for homesteads. In 1973 it had only two shallow tubewells and a few derelict ponds. Because of this shortage of water, the village was in no position to cultivate a high yielding variety of rice. The local variety yielded only about 1,200 to 1,500 pounds of rice per acre (in *aus* and *amon* seasons) resulting in a shortage of rice of around 200,000 pounds, or 100 tons, for the whole village. The land distribution pattern in the village was as follows:

Above 15 acres of land	=	9
3 to 15 acres of land	=	40
Less than 3 acres land	=	11
Landless farmers	=	25
		85

The village represented a set of complex questions of which the most important were how to meet immediately the food deficit of 100 tons in the village and how to improve the conditions of the landless and the marginal farmers? There were also two other related problems. One was the problem of setting up an institutional mechanism for resolving village conflicts and disputes. Noor Mohammad Mondol realized very clearly that unless these conflicts and disputes among the villagers could be amicably resolved, no unity among the villagers could be forged to promote broader development. The other problem was the high rate of population growth. Unless this growth could be substantially reduced, all efforts to lessen the food gap could be self-defeating.

To meet the situation, Noor Mohammad Mondol organized the villagers into a Swanirvar (self-reliance) Committee and three subcommittees:

—An *Arbitration Committee* consisting of five members, including one big farmer, one medium farmer, one sharecropper, one landless person, and one woman.

—A *Planning Committee* with six members: two big farmers, two medium farmers and two female members (one from big farmers and one from landless).

—A *Krishi (Agricultural) Brigade* having twenty-five members, of which twenty were students and five were literate youth.

How was the initiative taken to organize the village in this way and why did the villagers respond? The story behind the stimulus of village development is interesting. In 1973, Noor Mohammad Mondol was an ordinary medium-scale farmer with eight acres of land and a large family. While he was still a child his father had died, and he was brought up by an uncle who got him married while he was still in junior high school. Because of family obligations, Mondol could not pursue his studies beyond the high school. By 1973 it was not possible any more for him to meet his family expenses from agriculture alone, so he became a dealer in fertilizer. In that capacity he became acquainted with some local *thana* officers (the thana is the lowest unit of government administration in Bangladesh, with an average population of around 200,000).

At that time there was a highly motivated Agricultural Extension Officer (AEO) named Mumtazuddin Ahmed at the thana headquarters. In 1973, he was trying to develop another village (Kusi Pukur) in the thana with the help of the local people. One day he was travelling in a car with a businessman from the district headquarters to his office. On the way the businessman accidently hurt a boy belonging to the village of Batasan-Durgapur. With the assistance of Mondol the incident was amicably settled, with the businessman paying compensation. The boy recovered, and in the process both the businessman and the Agricultural Extension Officer gradually got to know the villagers and became accepted by them.

Soon Mumtazuddin and Mondol started working together for the development of the village. Within a short time Mumtazuddin became so involved

in the development of the village that he occasionally started to stay there overnight. Sometimes he even brought his wife so that she could work with the village women.

In this way a joint initiative was taken for the development of the village by a community leader and a government officer. They organized the villagers both in small groups and in large assemblies. They discussed the village problems and their probable solutions. Ultimately the villagers agreed to organize themselves into a Central Swanirvar Committee with three subcommittees. How did the committees work? The Arbitration Committee was soon able to settle amicably all village disputes and establish such a reputation that the villagers ceased engaging in expensive litigation to settle their disputes. Indeed, it is now claimed that no case has gone from this village to the local police or magistrate since 1975. All cases and disputes are settled locally.

The Planning Committee tried to formulate broad plans and policies for undertaking various kinds of development work in the village through a village survey and mutual discussions. In this field Mondol was particularly concerned with the plight of the 25 landless families. He pleaded with the relatively well-to-do families to give some of their land on a sharecropping basis to these landless farmers. Initially he did not receive much response. He then devised a unique strategy to convince the people that this should be done for the development of the village.

As mentioned earlier, Mondol owned eight acres of land himself, of which seven were good for cultivation. He had a large family, and needed all the produce of the land as well as some side income to maintain his family. However, in order to prove his sincerity and the importance of his philosophy, he gave seven acres of his land for sharecropping to 12 landless families. This helped to reduce unemployment by about 50% in his village, but it also meant that Mondol would now have a smaller income from agriculture as half the produce of his land would now be taken by the sharecroppers to whom he had given land to cultivate. Mondol, therefore, had to become a sharecropper himself by taking land for cultivation from the landholders in the neighboring village. This example established Mondol as a genuine and sincere social worker. It also showed how the unemployment of small and landless farmers in a village could be solved by some accommodation from the landowners, even within the existing socio-economic constraint of landholding.

However, such rearrangement in the cultivation of land through sharecropping was at most a necessary but not a sufficient condition for increasing agricultural production. Overall productivity had to be increased through modern cultivation. The greatest single problem here was to be the shortage of water for irrigation, for the village was situated in an area with scanty rainfall and little available surface water. So Mondol mobilized the people through the Krishi (Agricultural) Brigade for digging wells in search of water. Soon they had dug about 200 wells, which added somewhat to the water supply, though not as much as had been hoped.

The village began receiving more agricultural inputs such as fertilizer, insecticide, etc. The villagers also gained more knowledge of modern agriculture from the extension workers. Soon they learned about soil classification, the proper combination of fertilizers to be used, the intricacies of improved cropping patterns, and the techniques for use of water and insecticide. Gradually their attention turned also to horticulture. They discovered that the local variety of palm could be crossed with an improved variety. A number of youths learned this technique, and soon had 75 improved trees in place. Simultaneously, production of commercial crops such as sugar cane and tobacco increased. Wheat production, which required less water than rice, also grew considerably.

In 1974 a neighboring part of the village suffered from severe flood. There was wide-spread damage and crop failure, and a gruel kitchen had to be opened in the area to save the people from starvation. The people in Batasan-Durgapur, however, fought the situation on their own, without any government help. Agricultural production was somewhat better there, and the villagers devised a mutual welfare system that provided food and other aid. They claimed that there was no case of starvation in that village during the 1974 famine.

The achievement of the village in the field of family planning and population control was no less spectacular. Mondol adopted a series of unconventional strategies to reduce the growth rate of population from 3% to 0.4% per annum.

1. He first tried to identify who was opposing the propagation of family planning efforts and a population control program and found that the traditional religious leaders were the main opponents. They claimed that control of population was irreligious and an unethical act. Mondol looked into the matter and found that there were many books and pamphlets issued by the Government which clearly showed that there were verses in the Holy Quran and other religious books in support of population control measures. After one Friday prayer, Mondol and his associates asked the traditional religious leaders to discuss the matter with them in the mosque. The traditional religious leaders at first refused to discuss such a matter in the mosque, but later agreed and produced verses from the Holy Quran in support of their contention. Mondol and his associates produced counter verses in support of a family planning program. He pleaded with the traditional village leaders not to oppose a program which had some support in Islam. The religious leaders agreed that the Holy Quran provided for the withdrawal (Uzal) method of control and some of them even agreed to support that.
2. Having thus neutralized the main opponents of the family planning program, Mondol next observed that people who wanted to adopt family planning measures often had problems in obtaining them. He also found that the women were more motivated to use family planning devices than the males, though in many cases the husbands did not want their wives to use such measures. In some cases such opposition came from mothers-in-law of the women. In order to counter such

situations, Mondol found a group of elderly ladies with social status and authority in the area who could go directly to such village women and supply family planning devices to them privately and secretly, if necessary, even in the face of opposition from husbands and relatives of the women.

3. Mondol's third strategy was to supply family planning materials through such organized groups as youth committees, labor associations, etc. He asked the officials of these committees and associations to encourage all the members to practice family planning and obtain supplies of family planning materials. In order to ensure a sufficient supply of materials, he made sure that the family planning officers at the thana level were contacted regularly.

In this way the family planning program spread among all sections of the village without much noise or publicity. It was also complemented by such efforts as later marriage, with the marriageable age voluntarily fixed within the community at 16 for a girl and 25 for a boy.

Special Projects for the Poor and the Disadvantaged

For the relatively poor and the disadvantaged group still left out from the benefits of development, Mondol and his associates organized programs such as fish culture, cattle fattening and poultry farming. Some of them were given bulls and a plough on loan so that they could work in others' fields and gradually repay their loans. Within three years it was possible for the village to provide employment to all able-bodied unemployed workers, and the number of beggars was reduced to zero. It was found that about 60% of the people in the village were illiterate and that the incidence of illiteracy was highest among the landless. A series of adult education centers, both formal and informal, were organized throughout the village and educated youths were mobilized through committees of the Agricultural Brigade to educate the illiterate. As a result, by 1979 about 95% of the villagers had become literate.

It would be incorrect to say that all these achievements came about without some ups and downs. There were, indeed, times when the whole program came under severe tests. One test came when a very poor farmer applied to the Arbitration Committee for justice against a rich and powerful man in the village. The powerful man had a bamboo grove on his land, and the poor peasant had a piece of land adjacent to it. The bamboo grove extended itself and spread over part of the adjacent land, and so the poor peasant thought that the grove that grew onto his land belonged to him. To his surprise, he found that the powerful man had one day cut five bamboo poles from the part of the grove that had extended into his field. So he lodged a complaint against the powerful man to the Arbitration Committee.

The Arbitration Committee had a problem. So far they had settled disputes only among relatively less powerful men. They were not sure whether they would be able to bring this powerful man to the village assembly. However, a notice was served on him with a request to appear before the assembly on a particular date and explain his conduct. After some hesitation, the powerful man came to the assembly. To the surprise of many he took the initiative not only to return the five bamboos he had cut from the field of the poor peasant but also to give another five bamboos to him in compensation. Later, when asked why he had behaved that way, the powerful man said that the villagers had organized themselves and he decided it would be foolish on his part to go against organized public opinion. Therefore, he tried to maintain his leadership status in the village by changing his behavior to fit to the new reality.

Mondol was all along very careful not to give any impression to anyone that he had been trying to develop his village for the purpose of becoming a leader. In fact he always tried to keep himself away from leadership prominence, although under pressure he agreed to become the Secretary of the Swanirvar Committee of his village. During the election for the National Assembly in Bangladesh, he was approached by his followers to compete for membership in the Parliament. Many people thought that he had a fairly good chance of winning in the election. But he deliberately refrained from such temptation so that his motives for development work in the village would not be questioned.

In 1979, Mondol was awarded the President's Medal for family planning and population control activities in his village. Along with a gold medal he received a sum of Tk. 10,000. Out of this he donated Tk. 4,000 to the National Swanirvar (Self-reliance) Trust in Dacca for the welfare of the poor although he himself was not well off.

The critical question that can be asked is whether Mondol had really developed a distinctive and coherent format for rural development which can be made replicable to other areas of Bangladesh, or whether what he achieved was mainly due to his personal initiative, drive and leadership. This is a big question, and we are not sure how to answer this. In his own lifetime the effort did not spread to the neighboring villages. There is even uncertainty whether the good works that had been done in his village will continue in the future or whether his village will again reduce itself to its previous conditions of poverty, unemployment and despair.

However, recognizing these questions, we can perhaps highlight the main features of his strategy as follows: (1) The role of community workers in a village is critical for development. (2) Village community workers need the support of higher administration in order to be effective. (3) If there is a linkage between the community workers and at least some highly motivated district officers, it becomes easier for the village workers to take initiative for development of the village and sustain it later. (4) The strategy of attracting people to a village development program can involve (a) pursuading relatively well-off villagers to go to the relatively poor and disadvantaged to explain the program so that the latter group does not feel shy in attending meetings organized by the

former group; (b) offering practical solutions immediately to some of the problems of the villagers so that they get immediate benefit by associating themselves with such activities; (c) developing a mechanism for continuously resolving social and economic conflicts (through Arbitration Committees) so that the unity of the village can be increased over time and (d) continuously proving by various sacrifices that the informal leaders who are taking initiative for the development activities are really selfless and dedicated and that they are not aspiring to become formal leaders through such work.

(5) Once the program of development has started, there can be a comprehensive survey of the availability and requirements of village resources so that resource potentials and gaps can be more scientifically identified. Available educated but unemployed youths can be fruitfully utilized to conduct this survey. (6) After the problems have been identified, the whole village can be organized into a Central Committee with a number of important subcommittees such as Agricultural Committee, Planning Committee, Justice Committee, etc. Initially, the role of the Justice Committee would be crucial to forge unity among the people. The importance of the Agricultural Committee and the Planning Committee would come next.

(7) In the agricultural sector, the existing constraints of uneven ownership of land and increasing pauperization of the landless can be partially resolved by persuading the relatively better-off landholders to give at least some portion of their land on a sharecropping basis to the landless or near-landless who are good cultivators. This would increase agricultural productivity even if the share of production cannot be increased in favor of the sharecroppers in the immediate future. (8) It is possible to increase the supply of water and other strategic inputs through organizing villagers and linking their organization with the thana support network. If this linkage is effective, a village can go in for modernization of agriculture, including reorganization of the cropping pattern in favor of more economic crops and horticulture development and other side-line production such as poultry farming, pisciculture, etc.

(9) In the field of family planning and population control, the strategies can be (a) to neutralize traditional religious leaders from opposing the program, (b) to organize elderly village ladies so that family planning devices can be supplied reliably through them to conservative families even in the face of opposition from husbands and mothers-in-law; (c) mobilizing other groups through their respective organizations and coordinating the efforts of community workers with the programs of a thana family planning officer.

(10) Through the Arbitration Committee the village may ensure not only resolution of village disputes but also a sense of justice to the poor and some kind of social control on the rich. (11) The program then can be followed through an intensive training curriculum for each group of people under different organizations to increase their knowledge, skill and efficiency in the respective fields. (12) The relatively young group in the area may be mobilized to play a crucial role in organizing income-raising activities for the relatively poor and the disadvantaged through pisciculture, cattle fattening, and poultry farming. Because of their young age and idealism, these youth groups can be brought to act as the spokesmen for the rural poor and the landless.

Needless to say, the Batasan-Durgapur format is no substitute for development through necessary social legislation at the national level that would change production relations in favor of the poor and the disadvantaged. But it is a format which has shown that something can be done for everybody in the village even within the existing social-economic constraints and that it can be done without pumping massive external assistance into the village.

Noor Mohammad Mondol died at a relatively young age of 44 years on April 1, 1980 in a local hospital at Dacca suffering from hepatitis. We hope that his example will live on through his fellow community workers in Bangladesh.

reviews

Poverty and Problem-Solving Under Military Rule: the Urban Poor in Lima, Peru

Henry Deitz
Austin: University of Texas Press, 1980

Review by Joan Nelson
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Urban poverty is endemic in the developing world; military governments are widespread and recurrent; and neighborhood organizations are common in low-income districts in many places, most notably in Latin America. How do these interact? Henry Deitz's study explores this set of issues in the specific context of the reformist regime of General Juan Velasco (1968-1975).

Deitz's study is based on survey data plus extensive observation in five squatter settlements and a central slum district in Lima, selected to represent wide variation in their age, location, physical and legal circumstances, and experience with neighborhood organization and

with the national authorities. The research was developed in collaboration with Wayne Cornelius' similar work in Mexico City *(Politics and the Migrant Poor in Mexico City,* Stanford University Press, 1975), enhancing the value of both studies.

The study addresses three topics: the neighborhood as a channel for political participation; the Velasco regime's links with the urban poor and the role of its mobilization agency SINAMOS (Sistema Nacional de Apoya a la Movilizacion Social); and the relations between military regimes and the urban poor more generally. It is most successful on the first topic.

The detailed accounts of the six neighborhoods add substantially to the rich literature on squatters and the relation of regimes to them in Latin America. Deitz is familiar not only with the communities but also with many of the working-level officials involved in various programs. He thus can provide a sense of day-to-day realities of local-level politics and development. Paralleling Cornelius' study in Mexico City, Deitz moves beyond such description to extensive and sophisticated analysis of the ways in which neighborhood characteristics shape both individual political participation and the extent and nature of community action.

As anyone familiar with earlier work on Lima would expect, participation is high: roughly a quarter of Deitz's sample are classified as "activists" on the basis of the frequency and range of their activities in solving neighborhood problems. As in Cornelius' study, the proportion varies widely among neighborhoods, reflecting different local contexts. Deitz also notes a tendency to "specialize": many *pobladores* concentrate their efforts only at the local level; some specialize in contacting and petitioning national level officials.

Not surprisingly, activists show substantial differences from the inactive with respect to their commitment to and favorable perception of their neighborhoods. Most striking is the activists' conviction that hard work (as opposed to government aid) is the most promising means of solving community problems. In contrast to some earlier studies, Deitz argues (correctly, in my view) that *membership* in neighborhood organizations, rather than being viewed only as a factor promoting participation, should be regarded as itself a mode of political participation.

On the topic of links between the Velasco regime and the urban poor, the study provides a detailed glimpse of the operations in Lima of SINAMOS. Established in 1971, SINAMOS represented Velasco's alternative to divisive political parties. It was assigned the tasks of mobilizing, guiding, and ultimately controlling participation by major segments of the mass public. Deitz's account of SINAMOS activities among Lima's poor would have gained from a slightly fuller and more systematic discussion both of the organization itself, and of Velasco's urban policies. The reader unfamiliar with these topics will have a hard time extracting a clear picture from Deitz's presentation.

What does emerge clearly is that SINAMOS was saddled with a wildly ambitious scope and an unrealistic organizational timetable. Patronizing attitudes and a lack of relevant information and experience were demonstrated by many SINAMOS organizers; their insistence on uniform structure and a monopoly of organization in the neighborhoods had the effect of sweeping aside earlier organizations and leaders. It would have been useful for Deitz to speculate a bit more on the sources of these weaknesses: among the possible explanations are the military's predilection for tidy charts; the inherent pressures attending centralized sponsorship of a network of organizations intended to embrace all urban neighborhoods within a short span of time; and growing concern that participation might burst out of control (a concern reflecting events in Peru that Deitz does not sketch for the reader).

Deitz's most ambitious topic is perhaps his least successful: the impact of authoritarian military rule on the urban poor more generally. He suggests early in the book that this topic provides the primary rationale for his work. But the generalizations he draws are shakey. Deitz observes that when elections were eliminated after 1968, Lima's poor could continue their community self-help activities as before. "Bureaucratic demand-making" (petitions and pressures on the relevant government agencies for neighborhood improvements and, in some cases, legalization and distribution of titles to individual lots) not only continued, but became more salient after electoral options were closed off. The increasing pressure from the regime to channel participation through the institutions it provided—most clearly through SINAMOS after 1971—had the effect of making participation itself a political issue. The decision to take various political actions was no longer a choice of priorities and means, but a symbolic statement of support or non-support for the regime.

These conclusions are persuasive for the Peruvian experience. But they are much less helpful in a broader comparative perspective. Clearly the impact on the poor (or any group) of removing electoral options depends on the role of elections and elected representatives in the previous system, and the sophistication with which the poor used that option. Thus the disappearance of elections may have had little impact on Lima's poor, but one can hardly say the same of the poor in Santiago, Chile after 1973. The ongoing salience of demand-making on the bureaucracy is also a contingent generalization. The Velasco regime in Peru was concerned about integrating and assisting low income districts, especially squatter areas. Community associations and leaders therefore found that it was more salient than ever to cultivate contacts with and maintain pressure on implementing agencies. But where a military takeover ushers in new and repressive policies towards squatter areas—as, for instance, in Rio de Janiero after 1964—then "bureaucratic demand-making" will not remain an important mode of squatter participation in any meaningful sense. Another of Deitz's conclusions—the conversion of political participation into a symbol of regime support—applies not only to military regimes but to mobilization regimes of many different ideological leanings. It is an important, but not a new, observation.

The weakness of Deitz's generalizations regarding relations between military regimes and the urban poor flows

in part from a failure to identify clearly the characteristics of military regimes that might bear particularly on that group. The main characteristic on which he foucsses is the absence of competitive elections, but this of course describes not only military regimes but also other regime types. Perhaps reflecting this vagueness, Deitz vacillates between the terms "military" and "authoritarian." He also quite properly notes that military regimes differ widely. (Indeed, it is not clear that "military regimes" is a useful category for comparative study at all, or if so, for what analytical purposes.) In short, the book does not clarify concepts and classifications of regime characteristics, or analyze causal mechanisms as would be necessary to support generalizations about military regimes and the urban poor. *Poverty and Problem Solving Under Military Rule* is an excellent study of interactions between neighborhood characteristics and individual and community political participation. It also offers case material for a comparative study of military regimes and the poor. But it does not itself perform that broader task.

Rural Development in Pakistan

Shoaib Sultan Khan
Vikas Publishing House, Delhi, 1980

Review by Harry Blair
Bucknell University

For a time in the middle 1970s, the Daudzai project in Pakistan was outstanding among rural development programs in South Asia and one of the most promising enterprises in this field anywhere in the Third World. We should expect that the man in charge of the Daudzai project would have some important things to say, and so he does, in the form of this book by the ex-director of the Pakistan Academy for Rural Development (PARD) at Peshawar.

By 1973 or so, much of the bloom had faded from that other rose of rural development in the subcontinent, the Comilla experiment, which in the 1960s had been widely acclaimed as peerless in the field. This program, managed by the other PARD in East Pakistan under the inspired leadership of Akhter Hameed Khan, had put together a very successful package of small farmer cooperatives, savings, credit, physical inputs and knowledge generation through extension. It all worked very well for a number of years, but them came the 1971 war, the secession of East Pakistan to become Bangladesh, the departure of Akhter Hameed Khan and the realization that even before the war, the program (particularly in its areas of expansion but also in its original Comilla Kotwali Thana experimental area) had become dominated by larger farmers, who diverted much of the benefits to themselves.

It was at this juncture that Shoaib Sultan Khan began a new experiment at Comilla's sister academy, the PARD at Peshawar, which, up until this point had experienced little of the excitement or success that had characterized Comilla during its heyday. Akhter Hameed Khan was by now spending most of his time in semi-retirement at Michigan State University in the United States, but was able to return to Pakistan fairly often and was eager to get involved in a project again.

Thus began a most unusual experiment in rural development, with Shoaib Sultan Khan directing things on the ground at Daudzai and Akhter Hameed Khan advising mostly from afar, always seeking to build upon the successes and mistakes encountered earlier at Comilla. The parallels were many: Daudzai Markaz, the "laboratory" area, was an administrative subregion of about 90 villages and just under 100,000 population, located adjacent to the PARD campus, almost the same as at Comilla. Also, over 90 percent of the farms were holdings of less than five acres in size (equivalent to, say, two acres or even less in the more intensive agricultural Comilla area).

The project got underway with a lengthy and thorough survey of development needs of the Daudzai area, done in extensive consultation with the villagers themselves. Not surprisingly, it emerged that the wants and needs of villages differed greatly from one to the next, a pattern of variation generally lost sight of in large-scale "topdown" programs that typify most rural development efforts. Cooperative organizations were started along the same lines as in Comilla, with heavy emphasis on the discipline of attending weekly meetings, contributing regular savings, participating in training sessions, etc., all on a continuing basis, month after month and year after year.

Throughout the experiment Akhter Hameed Khan kept up a steady series of letters of advice and exhortation, many of which appear as an appendix to the book. Especially interesting to those familiar with the ups and downs of the Comilla experience are his repeated admonitions on the need to maintain discipline in the cooperatives, to keep impeccable and frequently checked account books, to supervise the managers (elected heads of the village cooperatives) closely, to expand slowly and above all to focus on organization at the village level. All these spheres were areas of trouble in Comilla, and Akhter Hameed Khan seemed determined to prevent similar problems from arising in Daudzai.

Other old problems did surface. Some of the cooperatives were taken over by big farmers, some became dormant after a few months, and some found themselves mired in corruption as time went on. Other problems appear to have been ignored in Daudzai, just as they were in Comilla: never once are landless agricultural laborers, sharecroppers or non-farm workers mentioned in the book. Is this omission because there were none, or (more likely, one suspects) is it because as in Comilla, those who owned land were a much easier group to work with, so much so that the very poorest in the rural areas never really figured in the picture at all.

The Daudzai project proceeded slowly—even after four years there were only 2,700 cooperative members in the orig-

inal experimental area, while the baseline survey showed over 17,000 farm households in the under-five-acre category in the Daudzai Markaz. But progress was also steady and even exciting. One gets a feel for the enthusiasm and zeal that Daudzai generated from the author's account and Akhter Hameed Khan's letters. Alas, Daudzai was to be short-lived, at least in its initial phase, for in late 1975 Shoaib Sultan Khan was abruptly posted elsewhere, the result apparently of the kind of intrigues that have plagued South Asian bureaucratic life for so long. The machinations are hinted at (pp. 66-67), but not really explained. Most likely the full story will never be known, save to a few insiders.

At any rate, this is where the story ends. Since then both PARD and Daudzai continue, but without either founder or mentor. The story of subsequent events, though, is one for the successor to relate. There are some signs that there will be such a story. Recently, for example, the governor of Pakistan's Punjab province has pointed to the Daudzai "model" as one suitable for the whole country. Clearly, it is not yet time by any means to write off Daudzai as just another brave but ultimately abortive attempt.

The book is not without shortcomings. Foremost is the editing, which is poorly done. There are many repetitions, and the chapters do not flow logically or coherently. Numerical data, when given, seldom have any reference point or base against which to be interpreted and so are largely meaningless. Also, why are only Akhter Hameed Khan's letters included in the appendix but not Shoaib Sultan Khan's end of the correspondence? The record would have been much more valuable if both sides had been published.

These complaints, however, while not negligible, are clearly minor in relation to the overall worth of the book. What we have here is a genuine contribution to the practical and intellectual history of rural development in the subcontinent, given us by one of the principals involved. Shoaib Sultan Khan's book deserves a place alongside the works of F. L. Brayne, Albert Mayer and Akhter Hameed Khan, and like theirs it should be read and digested by serious students of rural development in South Asia.

Indigenous Knowledge Systems and Development

David W. Brokensha, D. M. Warren and Oswald Werner, Editors
University Press of America, 1980

Review by Louise Fortmann
Ministry of Agriculture, Republic of Botswana and
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One of the more encouraging development fashions is the increasing effort to find out what people know, what they do, and why they do it before trying to introduce a development project. The approach is hardly new. A long-used text in development courses has been the book Edward Spicer edited in 1952, *Human Problems in Technological Change* (Russell Sage, New York). Among other things, it pointed out that Latin American farmers will not continue growing a new maize variety if their wives discover it makes lousy tortillas. The volume being reviewed is in the tradition of Spicer. It makes the argument for development from the bottom, using indigenous technical knowledge and taking into account local social systems in development planning. One of the tools offered is "ethnoscience," which is defined as "an attempt to understand the organizing principles underlying behavior" (p. 68).

The argument goes that a change agent or development planner needs to understand how local persons classify the elements of their natural environment and how they justify their production practices for at least two reasons. These are facets of any environment which are not readily available or apparent to the uninitiated outsider as one can see from the spectacularly erroneous judgments by generations of foreign scientists about the African range lands and their use. Further, the manner in which farming and family decisions are made will affect how any outside intervention is perceived and acted upon. The article by Christina Gladwin, examining the reasons for lack of adoption of the CIMMYT fertilizer recommendations for Plan Puebla, provides a good illustration of this. The recommendation was to increase the number and timing of fertilizer applications for maize. Gladwin shows that, given the soil and rainfall conditions at the project, farmers did not find the recommendation profitable. She provides decision-making "trees" showing the criteria by which farmers in practice decide whether or not to follow the recommendations.

The Gladwin article provides a case in which prior ethnoscientific research clearly would have enabled agricultural research to be more responsive to local conditions. Paul Richards' description of the "ethno-ecological" study of the variegated grasshopper in Nigeria classifies ways in which "expert" and indigenous knowledge can complement each other. Some findings of the scientific research team, such as the "possible role of chemical attractants in helping to create and sustain egg-laying sites," transcended local knowledge. In some aspects, such as the nature of typical egg-laying sites, local and expert knowledge were the same. Sometime local knowledge showed the way for more precise scientific research, as in the locally-reported connection between the grasshopper and a certain weed. Finally, in some ways, local knowledge exceeded research findings, for instance revealing the dietary value of the grasshopper.

These two articles represent the solid core of collection. They raise two issues which, unfortunately, are never brought together in a single discussion. The first is that of cost. This type of obviously desirable knowledge is not readily produced by rapid survey techniques. On the contrary, it requires an anthropological approach, with large amounts of

time from highly skilled (and, therefore, probably expensive) persons. Can development planners afford either the time or the money that such research requires? This is an important question, to be sure, but any number of development disasters would argue that planners cannot afford not to have such research. Perhaps the most compelling reason such work is not done comes from the constraining units within which project efforts are organized, the budgetary year, the two year contract, the six week consultancy, the five year plan.

The second issue concerns the extent of possible involvement of the local community in the research and planning process. There is a danger of overwhelming the national center with data from the periphery. But there is also opportunity to use such research as a vehicle for communicating local opinion to the center and for involving local people in project design. Again, such a strategy may increase immediate costs and time required but have long-term pay offs.

There are a number of articles with useful and imaginative methodological information. Richards' article, for instance, points out the inappropriate assumptions of "traditional" social science surveys and the "politeness" in peasant respondents which conceals so much that is important. The best articles are those by Richards, Custred, Barker, Warren, and Werner and Begishe (Warren lists a series of howlers by previous social scientists using less sensitive techniques). Those interested in participation will find helpful the article by Compton on the uses of folk media and the review article by Howes and Chambers on "indigenous knowledge."

The book should be viewed not only as a collection of separate essays, however, but also an entity. It ought to have been a very good book. The topic is timely, the editors knowledgeable, the material at hand rich. There is much in this book that is very good. The case studies should be enlightening to anyone working in those particular cultures. The annotated and pooled bibliography provide many useful references. Stephen Brush's taxonomy of Andean potatoes and the Brokensha and Riley article on Mbeere vegetation, among others, provide instructive examples of the value and method of ethnoscience. But on the whole the book demonstrates the results when editors don't edit. Many articles are repetitive and overlapping. Linking essays are not offered, nor is a good summary or introduction. The index is not well done, so anyone who wants to use this as a handbook or reference volume must wade through over four hundred badly printed pages. Astonishingly, for a book whose readers are expected to include widely varied nationalities—and mother tongues—the spanish words for maize, beans, and maize field are left untranslated. If this is someone's notion of ethnic authenticity, it is badly misplaced. The editors argue for making indigenous knowledge more accessible. One wishes they had done so with their own.

notes

A seminar on **Strategy for Mass Mobilisation and People's Participation in the Implementation of Watershed Management Programme** was held at Delhi under the auspices of the Central Board of Irrigation and Power on October 29 - 30, 1980. The Seminar focused on the complexity of the problems involved in integrated watershed management programs and strategies to educate, motivate and mobilize people for successful implementation of watershed management programs. Specialists in hydrology, geology, forestry, agronomy and sociology contributed papers and participated in discussions. A number of international delegates also took part.

The Seminar reached the consensus that there is an urgent need to carry out watershed management programs not only for the preservation of the ecological and environmental assets of the country, but also to evolve a methodology for optimal use of its land and water resources. It was unanimously agreed that the technology to be adopted for this purpose would be interdisciplinary in nature, involving specialists in the fields of irrigation, geology, agronomy, economics and social sciences.

Since programs of integrated watershed management are intimately linked with the people, their socio-economic and cultural background invariably play a decisive role in programs' successful implementation. The work of watershed management needs to be tackled by the people as a people's movement with the Government providing the financial assistance and the know-how.

The Seminar agreed on the need for forming watershed management cooperatives at the village level which would be responsible for planning and implementing miniwatershed programs with the guidance of technologists. This would provide more incentive to the farmers to take up such works and would also boost people's participation on a larger scale. Funding would be channeled to the cooperatives through a "Rural Watershed Development Corporation" to be set up on the lines of Rural Electrification Corporation.

The **International Rural Development Centre of the Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences, Uppsala** has published a *Manual for the Analysis of Rural Underdevelopment,* by Lars-Erik Birgegard, which systematically outlines the kinds of information needed and the methods that can be used to plan project activities.

The manual focuses on information relating to the analysis of people's participation, with an inquiry "tree" (similar to a "decision tree") for ascertaining attitudes, institutions and incentives for participation. People's participation is defined as "the direct involvement of the rural inhabitants in the decision-making, planning and implementation of development activities. A situation

where government representatives *consult* the local people (normally through their leaders) to guide *government* decision-making, and where people's involvement in the implementation of development activities is confined to the provision of local resources (generally free labour) would not qualify as people's participation." (p. 95)

The analysis attempts to determine to what extent households in the target group participate, and if not, why not. If participation is low, the protocols spelled out in the manual are designed to "explain" this situation. An inventory of existing traditional and non-traditional local-level institutions and organizations such as clans, cooperatives, and political organizations, and their role and functions, would form the basis for the analysis. Participation in relation to each of the important local organizations should be explored one by one.

There are also formats for information generation on access to productive resources, non-farm income, uneven income distribution, selected characteristics of rural underdevelopment, and social structure (including power and influence) in a rural area. Methods of information gathering, including identification of respondents and establishing rapport, are discussed.There are specific chapters on preparation for field work and on actual conduct of field work, as well as on analysis of the information generated. The manual, which was field-tested in Nepal and Sri Lanka, is available from the *IRDC/ Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences/Uppsala/Sweden.* The cost, including postage, is 40 Swedish konor.

A seminar entitled **Responding to the Needs of Rural Women** was held May 4 and 5 at Kentucky State University. Panels of women and men who have worked domestically and internationally, including students from other countries, presented and exchanged their viewpoints concerning effective extension systems. The seminar focused on: (1) the history of the U.S. extension system; (2) effective programs designed to meet the needs of rural women in the southeastern United States; (3) extension systems in developing countries; and (4) responsiveness of the systems to the needs of women in a changing world. Funding was provided by the Office of Women in Development at the Agency for International Development. For information on the seminar, write to: *Ellen Fenoglio/SECID/400 Eastowne Drive, Suite 207/Chapel Hill/North Carolina 27514.*

A workshop on **Social Problems of Low-Income Urban Groups: Some Legal Approaches** sponsored by the **Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP)** was held in Bangkok last February.

Participants from India, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Sri Lanka and Thailand presented country papers which summarized social problems of low income groups, both rural and urban, in relation to legal approaches. The focus of the workshop was on the complementarity of law and participation: "The legal process must be a central focus of the effort to increase participation. Law and participation go together because lawmaking and its application is the exercise of political power." (p. 20 of the Draft Report on the Workshop, February 22, 1981). The consensus was that participation and law are closely related in the context of development because new law is needed to resolve the kinds of conflicts which result where new forms of co-operation emerge. At the same time, as the poor are made aware of their legal rights and as these rights are expanded, this will have the effect of increasing their assertiveness as their fear of reprisal or injustice is reduced.

The participants decided to follow-up this workshop with **three country workshops to be held during 1981** with the assistance of ESCAP. The first workshop, meeting in early June, will be organized by the Consumers' Association of Penang. It will focus primarily on urban problems and will discuss two major problems of disadvantaged groups: (1) depletion of natural resources such as water, land and forests which threaten the environment and livelihoods of communities previously having free access to them; and (2) establishment of "urban renewal" or "development" projects which result in large-scale eviction or forced resettlement of communities. The second workshop, to be held in late August, will be organized by the Institute of Philippine Culture in Manila and will be biased toward rural problems. The third, in mid-October, will be organized by the Indonesian Legal Aid Assistance Program in Jakarta and will focus on problems related to law and participation.

For more information about these workshops and the incipient work of ESCAP in this area, write to: *Mr. K.R. Emrich/Social Development Division/ ESCAP/U.N. Building/Rajadamnern Avenue/Bangkok 2/Thailand.*

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