

Institution Building

***A model for
applied social change***

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EDITED BY

***D.Woods Thomas
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FOR APPLIED SOCIAL CHANGE**



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Preface

This book has been developed from papers presented at a workshop held at Purdue University in the summer of 1969 which was sponsored by The Agency for International Development and The Committee on Institutional Cooperation. This workshop was arranged to bring together a select group of institutional development theoreticians and practitioners in an environment conducive to an extensive examination of conceptual and empirical knowledge about the subject. The interaction among these men contributed greatly to a more complete understanding of the institutional development process.

The specific objectives of the workshop were:

1. To expand understanding of the role of the agricultural college in the achievement of the societal goals of developing nations.
2. To develop analytical approaches and evaluate alternative solutions to problems encountered at various stages of an institutional development activity.
3. To disseminate findings of the Rural Development Research Project and other similar research endeavors.
4. To assess the results of this research in terms of their applicability to the implementation of change in the world's educational and research institutions.

This book presents selected papers which are organized and edited to integrate both the theoretical and empirical issues discussed at the workshop. The much wider dissemination of this information beyond the small group of workshop participants which is possible through this book should greatly enhance understanding of the process and problems associated with development of educational and research institutions.

JOEL BERNSTEIN, AID

D. WOODS THOMAS, Purdue University

Introduction

HARRY R. POTTER

One approach to the world food problem has been the provision of technical assistance to help increase food production in undernourished nations. The use of "technical assistance" has been an attempted solution to many problems, national and international. Cases of success and failure are well documented elsewhere. Such cases show that among the problems encountered are the incompatibility of specific techniques to local physical and socio-cultural conditions and the short time span of most technical assistance projects. Additional difficulties have arisen from the lack of relevance of the technical assistance effort to some segments of the population and from the presence of "outside experts."

The institution building model is an approach to technical assistance which recognizes and attempts to deal with these problems, particularly in so far as they arise from the political-social-cultural components of the society. The objective of the institution building approach is to develop an indigenous, long-run, technical assistance facility that can provide, or create, the techniques for solving problems relevant to its environment.

The purpose of this volume is to present the institution building model of planned social change that has been developed, studied and used in numerous technical assistance projects over the last few years. The various contributors have been among those responsible for the theoretical development of the model, for its use in the field, and for research using it as a theoretical framework.

2 Introduction

Models of Social Change

There are, of course, many other models or theories of change, development and modernization. Some focus on the economic aspects of development, others on the impact of technology, or the industrialization-urbanization complex. Still other theories examine the transition in social organization and values associated with the change from a "traditional" to a "modern" society. In addition, there are theories of innovation and diffusion.

Each of these theories or models tends to emphasize certain phenomena as being particularly fundamental to understanding and affecting change. The institution building model emphasizes the importance of organizations in introducing and developing new technologies. Its uniqueness lies in its attempt to spell out the processes by which organizations can be developed to gain the support of the society through norms and values for new technologies. It is a wholistic model in that it is concerned with the inter-relationships among the various segments of society and with the impacts of change throughout the society.

Institution building is more than "organizational development," at least in the narrow context of the internal structure, table of organization, and job descriptions of an organization. Existing organizations may require modifications in these internal characteristics, but new organizations may also be institutionalized. It is the institutionalization of patterns of action and relationships which are deemed important within the organization, by its clientele and the society at large, that distinguishes institution building from organizational development.

In many of the following papers the new technology that is to be institutionalized is not a physical technology but an organizational technology. In the section on "Application of the Institution Building Model to Technical Assistance Programs," the papers focus on the "land grant college" model of organization developed in the United States as the blueprint for organizing agricultural teaching, research and extension services for use in other countries. Such activities represent the diffusion of an organizational form. As an applied model for technical assistance, it seems that this may often be the case. As with other diffusion efforts, adaptation to the specific socio-cultural environment is a necessary part of institution building.

Uses of the Institution Building Model

Two uses of the institution building model appear in the following papers. The majority of papers are concerned with past or *existing* uses of the model; others are concerned, at least in part, with future or *potential* uses of it. Most of the existing uses of the model have been in some way associated with one of two major endeavors. One was the Inter-University Research Program in Institution Building, a consortium of Indiana, Michigan State and Syracuse Universities, and the University of Pittsburgh, headquartered at the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs at Pittsburgh. This program generally had a public administration orientation. The other was the CIC - AID (Committee on Institutional Cooperation-Agency for International Development) Rural Development Research Project involving personnel from the Universities of Wisconsin, Minnesota, Illinois, and Missouri; and Purdue, Indiana, North Carolina, Ohio State and Utah State Universities. This project, as its name implies, was concerned with technical assistance to agricultural institutions. The publications from these projects are not listed here, but many of them are referred to in the following papers. The papers of Esman, Eaton, Siffin and Jacobson follow from the "Pittsburgh consortium's" work, and the papers of Baldwin, Potter, McDermott, Rigney and Thompson have some lineage back to the C.I.C.-A.I.D. project.

Among the potential uses of the institution building model are its further refinement as an analytic framework and as an heuristic device for action programs. It focuses attention on the study of inter-relationships between institutions, which has been relatively ignored by the social sciences. It can provide a basis for studying the cooperative or conflict relations between institutionalized organizations which operate from different bases of legitimacy. This would include development programs as well as a variety of real and quasi-political or religious movements. It seems apropos to many contemporary urban programs in the United States, many of which have failed to become institutionalized. Janowitz's recent monograph on *Institution Building in Urban Education* is an example of this kind of utilization.¹ Such applications and analyses can provide information not only about the inter-relations of institutions, but also about the external forces influencing the internal operations of organizations.

There is another body of literature on institution building that

4 Introduction

has not been systematically related to those mentioned above. It can be briefly introduced here through S. N. Eisenstadt's *Essays on Comparative Institutions*, which is particularly noteworthy.² This work on the processes of institutionalization and the comparative study of institutions does not have the applied orientation generally present in this volume. It is of great importance, however, for its integration of several conceptual frameworks, as well as its comparative institutional analysis. His discussion of institutional exchange, bureaucratization, leadership and communication are basic problems of institution building, and show up at several points in the following papers. In selecting and editing selections from the writings of Max Weber, published under the title *Max Weber: On Charisma and Institution Building*, Eisenstadt has shown a concern for these same problems in the writings of one of the founding fathers of sociology.³

The General Organization of Papers

These papers have been selected, edited and re-organized from the order of their presentation in the Summer Workshop on Agricultural College and University Development. They have been divided into four sections with different foci to make their presentation more coherent for a wider audience. Each section is preceded by a brief review of the papers within it.

The organizing approach to the entire volume was to begin with a series of papers on the relationships of agricultural policy to national development and the role of the agricultural college or university in such development, i.e., "*A Rationale for Institution Building in Technical Assistance Programs.*" These papers focus primarily on the responsibility of educational institutions for providing resources for development.

The second section presumes at least some familiarity with the institution building model. A decided preference for the phrase "institution building model" rather than "institution building theory" should be noted. Although there are some underlying assumptions to the model, as Esman points out in his paper, and perhaps some pieces of a theory, the main thrust among these writers has been in providing a descriptive model for application to development problems. These four papers indicate an awareness of and concern for theoretical issues inherent in the model; they also indicate a concern for elucidating these issues through empirical study. The

remaining papers provide two kinds of data for such study.

In the third section, a group of people with considerable experience in virtually all phases of agricultural technical assistance discuss the application of the institution building model to their programs. In addition to their program experience, McDermott, Rigney and Thompson were principal investigators in the C.I.C.-A.I.D. Rural Development Research Project, which drew on the institution building model for its conceptual framework. The examples used in this section are in agriculture, reflecting the experience of the authors; but many of the issues with which they deal may be found in many institution building situations. While these authors may speak in more specific language than Esman or Siffin, for example, the problems about which they write are directly related to the more theoretical issues. One of the major strengths of this section, and this volume, is the focus on a single type of technical assistance-institution building project from the many perspectives of these authors.

In contrast to the preceding section, the examples of research discussed in the final section refer to institutions other than agriculture. The first two papers are essentially case studies, while the third falls in the final position because it provides a broad overview of some of the generalizations and their implications garnered from several studies. These generalizations are important for both the institution building researcher and practitioner.

NOTES

1. Morris Janowitz, *Institution Building in Urban Education*, Russell Sage Foundation, New York, 1969.
2. S. N. Eisenstadt, *Essays on Comparative Institutions*, John Wiley and Sons, Inc., New York, 1965.
3., *Max Weber: On Charisma and Institution Building*, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1968.

I

A RATIONALE FOR INSTITUTION BUILDING IN TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS

What is the relationship of a nation's agricultural development to its overall development? What parts do universities play in agricultural development? What is the appropriate role of technical assistance in this development? These are the questions that four distinguished men, experienced in agricultural policy and technical assistance, discuss in this initial section.

The papers assume agricultural development in these nations is a desirable national policy goal and suggest higher educational institutions as one important facilitating organization to accomplish this goal. The papers are in an order which proceeds from the broad issue of agricultural problems in developing countries to the more narrow topic of the internal structure of an institution of higher education in a developing nation.

The first paper by W. W. Cochrane entitled "Agricultural Policy in National Development" discusses several problems of agricultural development. I. L. Baldwin, in "Meeting the Need for Professional Agriculturists," examines in depth alternative solutions to one of the problems of agricultural development suggested by Cochrane, that is, the food production problem. The third paper by L. F. Miller, "Identifying and Meeting Institutional Needs of Colleges of Agriculture in Underdeveloped Countries" considers the organization of the

8 *A Rationale for Institution Building*

components of an educational institution, which is one of the alternative solutions to the food production problem. G. L. Taggart, in his paper on "The Role of the University in International Affairs," shifts from the emphasis in the first three papers on the developing nation to an examination of the importance of international activities for United States institutions of higher education.

Cochrane's paper examines quite broadly the types of policy problems that are faced in a developing nation. He suggests that the problems occur sequentially over time. The first problem was one of improving the health of the population in developing nations. The second problem of food shortages developed from solving the health problem in these nations. The increased production of food in these countries creates, or already has created, the third problem of distribution of this food. Solution of the distribution problem will be followed by the development of a food surplus problem in the developing nation. The implication of the Cochrane paper is that institutions need to be created which permit long term analysis and solution to continually changing agricultural problems which are certain to occur in the developing countries.

In contrast to the Cochrane paper, Baldwin examines specifically the food production problem. The first part of this paper describes the history and the present state of the food problem in the developing world. Then he describes the several types of resources that can be utilized to solve the production problem, that is money, physical facilities, and professional agriculturalists. These resources can be applied at various rates and in various combinations by developing and by developed nations as they share in supporting agriculture in emerging nations. Baldwin's last major topic examines the systems of institutions that can utilize these resources to solve the food production problem. Here he is concerned particularly with developing trained, native agriculturalists through participant training programs to staff the educational, research and extension institutions in the developing country.

Miller's paper focuses specifically on one solution to the agricultural food problem. This solution involves establishing, organizing and operating an agricultural university in a developing nation to train native agriculturalists. Concern in his paper revolves around organization of the components of this educational institution (students, staff and facilities) to effectively conduct the three functions of teach-

ing, research and extension work. This assumes the University will be developed on the Land Grant Model which stresses the service or extension role of the institution in addition to the classical roles of teaching and research.

Taggart's paper examines the appropriate role for the United States university in international affairs. His approach can be contrasted with the first three papers in this section which examine the developing nation rather than the United States. Taggart describes the meaning of education and the history of U.S. universities' involvement in international activities. Then he suggests the broad type of international cooperation that may expand the horizons of knowledge. This interaction of world scholars may include department-to-department relationships, professional partnerships, international exchanges of students and faculty, and joint use of research and teaching facilities. This paper answers the question of who should accept the responsibility to improve educational institutions and the training of agricultural scientists in developing nations, and in developed nations as well. Taggart suggests this is an appropriate role for the U.S. university.

1. Agricultural Policy and National Development

WILLARD W. COCHRANE

Some introductory considerations: What do we have in mind by the phrase "agricultural policy" in this paper? We have in mind all courses of action related to agricultural development in the context of national economic development that have been decided upon and are being pursued by the national society. Our concept is not limited to price and income policy, or research policy, or investment policy, or trade and distribution policy. Our concept is a broad one including all of the above policy areas and many more. And our decision unit is not the individual firm or institutional organization — it is the nation state. But, of course, we are vitally concerned with the response of firms and institutions to national agricultural policies.

In order for the thinking of each of us in this varied gathering to move along the same general path during the course of this paper, it is necessary that all of us have in mind a national society in about the same stage of economic development with similar social and political attributes and problems. Thus, the national society that I will be discussing may be defined as follows:

1. It is a densely populated society, with half or more of its laboring force employed in agriculture, with low worker productivity, that is just beginning to move out of a state of agriculture that may be described as traditional, or subsistence.

2. It has a progress-oriented government: that is, it is desirous of developing itself economically, and it is making a serious effort to do so.
3. To illustrate my definition, I would say that India, the Philippines and Thailand fall in this country category.

As we discuss agricultural policy and national development, we must also have in mind the food and agricultural policy goals of the nation. The specifics of these goals will vary with the stage of development, the beliefs and values of the people, and the broad political and social goals. But the food and agricultural goals for the less-developed, national-society assumed above would certainly include the following:

1. A total production of agricultural products, given the foreign trade of the country, capable of providing all members of the country with a nutritionally adequate diet.
2. A distribution of the total supply of food wherein each vulnerable group receives its fair share of that supply.
3. A rate of agricultural development capable of achieving (1) above, of keeping pace with increases in total demand (thus, serving to stabilize food prices), and of creating an economic surplus which may be traded abroad and/or be used to support the transfer of the surplus rural population to the urban sector.
4. A broad, inclusive agricultural development process, which operates to increase the real incomes of all persons working in agriculture, including the very small cultivator and landless laborer.

A set of agricultural policies and the resulting development process for a particular country which do not make reasonable progress in achieving the four goals described above will, in my opinion, result in serious trouble for that country. At best, the country involved will experience social unrest and political instability, and at worst civil strife and revolution.

Finally, in this introduction I must say a word about the relationship of agricultural policies and development to national policies and general economic development. Transforming a traditional agriculture to a modern, scientific one requires that agricultural policies

be consistent with other aspects of the developmental process, and that the entire economy be developing in a satisfactory manner. This is so because the agricultural sector, although large, has a number of important linkages with the total economy. These linkages include:

1. The inflow of new technologies and practices.
2. The inflow of capital inputs (e.g. fertilizer) from the nonfarm sector.
3. The inflow of credit in an early stage and the outflow of savings at a later stage.
4. The outflow and distribution of surplus agricultural products.
5. The outflow of surplus agricultural labor.

Unless these flows are maintained and facilitated by appropriate and consistent governmental policies and institutional arrangements (e.g. price relationships and marketing institutions), agriculture cannot develop at a satisfactory rate; the agricultural sector of an economy must develop as an integrated part of the total economy in the same way that a man's arm grows in relation to his whole body.

Given the above introductory considerations, what can we say about the content and inter-relations of agricultural policies for our hypothetical developing nation-state? I think we can say quite a bit.

Since our first policy goal is concerned with increasing total agricultural production, a set of policies must be initiated and executed that, in fact, increases production. And since this is a densely populated country, land and water resources will be relatively scarce. This means that output must be increased primarily through technological advance — through transforming this traditional agriculture into a modern, scientific agriculture. This means, in turn, that the country must, very early in the development process, initiate and execute a set of policies designed to bring into being, a set of productive research stations, train research workers, produce research results and convert those research results into new and improved technologies to be disseminated to farmers. This is the first step; research is the engine of technological advance; and technological advance is the policy route to increased output in a society with a high population-resource ratio.

As we know, thanks to Rockefeller and Ford, some spectacular successes have been achieved around the world in the development of

new, high-yielding food grain varieties. The need is now to adapt these varieties to each local producing area so as to maintain the high yields, meet consumer tastes and preferences, and establish disease resistant strains.

Because of these successes in the production of food grains, the developing countries themselves, westerners in general, and A.I.D. in particular, must not conclude that the agricultural development process is complete and the development war won. As we shall see, a whole new set of problems is being created by technological advances in the production of food grains.

In the next step, a set of policies must be initiated and executed which will carry the new technologies from the research stations to all the farmers — large, medium, small, and very small. This means the activation of a whole set of policies ranging from information programs, to special training for adults, to supervised credit, to incentive prices.

Reaching the larger, more aggressive farmers in the development process is, as we discovered in the United States and we are now witnessing in Asia, relatively easy. The larger, aggressive farmers are prepared "to run with the ball of technological advance themselves, once the ball is passed to them." But in the developing country I know best, India, the new technologies are not, in the main, reaching the small farmers — the small farmers are being bypassed. That certainly has been our experience in the U.S.; we have done a miserable job of reaching the little farmer, lacking in resources, with new and improved production technologies and practices. In short, it is extremely difficult to reach the small farmer for at least two reasons: he tends to be ignorant and illiterate, hence obstinate; and, since he is small and poor, his financial resources are severely restricted. But to bypass the small farmer in a country like India means that well over half of the farmers will fail to share in the real income gains of the development process. I don't think a country like India can survive such a polarization process. It will blow apart, as those left behind refuse to live in poverty while their aggressive neighbors are experiencing spectacular income gains. Our hypothetical country must pursue policies which reach the small farmers, as well as the large, with the new and improved techniques — it must or the development process will destroy it.

Next step: a set of policies must be formulated and carried out

which brings into being a marketing and distribution system that can handle, in an efficient manner, the surplus production of the new producing areas. Institutions and agencies must be developed and placed in operation which can assemble the new increased supplies of farm products, store them, grade them, process them, move them long distances and distribute them to consumers with a minimum of waste and at acceptable prices.

This is a new requirement for countries where the marketing system has traditionally moved only small volumes from the countryside to nearby market towns, and every middleman is viewed as a crook and a thief. The task of bringing into being a whole new marketing system employing modern technology and modern commercial practices is a huge and complex one. The creation of a modern marketing system, just as in the case of a modern farming system, will require technical assistance at many levels: engineering, business management, economics of location, grades and standards, and consumer tastes and preferences. Of course, the financial requirements of a modern marketing system are stupendous, but unless such a marketing system emerges, and in a hurry, many of the gains of the current production revolution in the food grains will be lost or wasted. Such a marketing system will certainly not come into being automatically. It will emerge only as a set of national policies support and facilitate its emergence.

The next step is that policies establishing priorities with respect to the uses of agricultural surpluses must be instituted and effectively carried out, if the national goals of adequate diets for all, at stable prices, are to be achieved. Specifically, priorities must be established among the following claimants: (1) the domestic commercial market; (2) vulnerable domestic groups unable to purchase adequate diets because of very low incomes; (3) reserve stock operations; and (4) commercial exports to earn foreign exchange. Of course, imports of food supplies must be integrated into this system of priorities.

Unless a policy is established and programs effectuated to carry out such a system of priorities, the emerging food surplus can easily be exhausted by the domestic commercial market with disastrous equity implications, as well as economic growth implications.

Balanced and satisfactory rates of economic growth cannot be realized in a national society where important segments of the population are suffering from malnutrition and hunger, and food prices are fluctuating in the extreme. In other words, I am arguing that the na-

tional society must make effective use of any emerging agricultural surplus, and not let the more affluent members of society simply eat it up.

Concurrent with the above policy steps concerned directly with increasing agricultural production, handling the surplus so created, and then allocating it among major claimants, must come a set of policies and programs concerned with a facilitating agricultural development. Without these facilitating policies and actions, agricultural development will proceed very slowly or break down in an unpredictable series of discontinuities. Thus, facilitating policies must be formulated and carried out which do the following things:

1. Build market roads to the villages, and improve and strengthen the national system of transport.
2. Produce domestically, or acquire abroad, the capital inputs required of a modern, scientific agriculture (e.g. fertilizer, pesticides, machinery), and establish an equitable and effective system for distributing such inputs to farmers.
3. Provide all farmers, the small as well as the large, with credit — working capital — at reasonable interest rates.
4. Assist the surplus farm laboring force to transfer out of agriculture, relocate and find non-farm work.
5. Support farm prices at harvest time, and thereby maintain the incentive to expand production at the local level.
6. Assist farmers with various kinds of overhead, social services that they cannot provide for themselves, such as market information, control of plant and livestock disease and epidemics, and irrigation works and electric power.

The extent of the above facilitating policies and programs will, of course, vary with the stage of development, political and social goals and, most importantly, the speed of development sought by the country involved. If the country is indifferent with respect to rates of increase in agricultural production, then it will not need, or wish to have, overt policies in the fields of activity outlined above. But if it is desirous, for example, of lifting its rate of increase in agricultural production from 2 percent to 4 percent per year, then it will require effective, internally consistent facilitating policies in the above areas.

Once our hypothetical country is producing a significant grain surplus on a sustained basis, a new set of problems will have surfaced, calling for new policy solutions.

If, as now seems likely, the world is confronted with an economic surplus in the grains over the next decade, the individual developing countries will not be able to solve their surplus problem by selling on the export market. Grain prices will be low in the world market, and there will be little commercial demand for the low quality distressed grains from these countries. Also, if the country has experienced a balanced economic growth, per capita real increases will be rising with a concomitant increase in the demand for animal products. Thus, the agriculture of these developing countries will, within a decade or two, need to undergo a *second transformation* away from primary grain production and on to animal product production: Thailand would seem to be in this stage currently. This means that a whole set of new policies must be initiated with respect to: kinds and levels of research, production education, credit, grain prices, market organization, etc.

The problems associated with this second agricultural transformation of our hypothetical country may be less frightening than spiraling food prices and hunger, but the formulation and implementations of policies to effectuate this second transformation are likely to require more technical information, more sophisticated economic interrelations and more political skill than did the current transformation. In short, the technical and capital requirements of an animal agriculture are much more demanding than for a grain cropping agriculture, the pricing and marketing relationship more involved, and future agricultural and development policies will need to reflect all this.

It should be useful at this point, I believe, to discuss certain problems of policy formulation and execution. Economic policy formulation is difficult in every society, whether developed or developing, since the operations and goals of different and contending economic interest groups within a society must be comprised and reconciled to arrive at a particular policy. But developing countries often have an additional problem with respect to policy formation -- the lack of technical competence to formulate policies that have the capacity to get done what the society has decided it wants done. Also, there is the further logical problem of integrating into a consistent whole the many policies dealing with economic development.

With regard to the acquisition and distribution of fertilizer, for example, important policy questions must be resolved with respect to how much foreign exchange should be allocated to the purchase and importation of fertilizer, and at what prices that fertilizer should be sold to farmers. Answers to these policy questions will have important implications for the national development efforts on one hand, and whether farmers will purchase and use the fertilizer on the other.

Similar technical and integrating issues arise with regard to: levels of farm price support; investment in storage and processing facilities; expenditures for human food programs; and the amount of credit to be made available to farmers, etc.

Somewhere technical competence must be found for our hypothetical developing country to assist it to formulate policies and operating programs that will achieve what the country wants those policies to achieve, and on occasion, tell the country that a particular policy goal is unobtainable, given its other goals and available resources.

It is at this point that our hypothetical country needs technical assistance and needs it badly. But the developing country is often reluctant to seek this kind of assistance and the developed countries are often hesitant in providing it. Developing countries are usually happy to receive technical assistance, for example, on rice breeding, grain storage and statistical sampling, and possibly on the formulation of policies designed to improve the work in these areas. But developing countries are generally cautious about accepting advice in the formulation of policies that have political implications. Unfortunately most policies dealing with general economic and agricultural development have political implications — i.e., have differential income effects on members of their society, hence lead to political controversy. So it is that our hypothetical country would often rather build a dam, or a processing plant, in a wrong location or attempt to operate an economy with an inconsistent set of resource and product prices, than consult foreign experts on these and similar developmental questions.

I am not sure what the solution to this kind of technical assistance problem may be, but I suspect it lies along the following lines. Assistance agencies from the developed countries work with agencies in a developing country over a long period of time in a friendly, constructive way, wherein an atmosphere of confidence is established among the assistance givers and receivers. I know, for example that John Lewis, former AID Director in India, and Douglas Ensminger of

the Ford Foundation, have in recent years succeeded in developing such a relationship with top political officials and civil servants in India. These two men have not hesitated to press their views on the Indians on sensitive policy issues, and the Indians have come to trust their skill, judgment and objectivity with respect to policy matters. So it can be done.

In another direction, the national leaders of developing countries must come to differentiate between their policy goals and ways and means of achieving those goals. The determination of policy goals is obviously the business of the national society, but outsiders from the developed world can lend developing countries valuable assistance in formulating efficient, consistent ways and means of achieving their goals. Sorting out these different aspects of national policy formulation can contribute to the effective use of foreign technical experts in this area.

There is another important point that bears upon both policy formulation and execution in developing countries — it is what Myrdal has called the "Soft State." By the "Soft State" he means, and we follow his definition here, a condition wherein the government is unwilling, or unable, to impose those obligations required by economic development and social modernization on its people, e.g., the imposition and collection of income taxes, compliance with economic regulations, and the undertaking of community projects. In short, the "Soft State" is characterized by a general lack of social discipline. This condition has implications for our discussion of national agricultural policies in two important ways: the inability of the government to raise tax revenues to pay for the many actions and undertakings called for in the policies discussed above, and the inability of the government to execute programs of implementation with vigor and honesty.

If the government of our hypothetical developing country is unwilling, or unable to raise the revenues to carry out its policies for agricultural development, then one of several things must occur. It becomes dependent on foreign loans and grants. It runs the "printing presses" and experiences inflation, or the necessary revenues are not raised, the policies are not implemented, and development does not occur.

Most often the fiscal actions of developing countries involve some of all three routes — with the obvious unhappy results. The

chronic unwillingness of developing nations to impose taxes on its wealthier citizens is in the view of this writer the greatest single barrier to sustained economic development in those countries.

Secondly, the failure of administrative bureaucracies to vigorously and honestly execute programs of policy implementation means that the forward thrust of programs tends to be weak and policy goals are not achieved. Programs of policy implementation tend to bog down in a morass of inactivity, corruption and distrust.

Again, I know of no easy and direct solution to this problem of weak social discipline; all societies suffer to some extent from this problem, but it seems to be a conspicuous characteristic of developing countries. I hope getting the problem out in the open, and discussing it, as one would the mental illness of a family member, may be of some help. If this is the case, Myrdal's discussion of the problem in his *Asian Drama* may lead to greater social discipline on the part of some developing countries. I also have the feeling that when former colonial territories really learn that independence does not mean freedom from responsibility, but rather the right and responsibility to solve their own problems, that social discipline will harden, and the "Soft State" will gradually move in the direction of the "Disciplined State."

In conclusion, let me turn to certain implications of the foregoing analysis. The process of economic development, including agricultural development, is a never-ending process. A new stage of development, with its unique set of developmental activities, is likely to give rise to new social, economic and political problems which must be resolved. The resolution of these problems, in turn, calls for new policies with the capacity to cope with the new problems. The development of new policies, in turn, calls for new institutions to formulate and execute those policies. But the resolution of the last set of problems in the development process invariably creates new problems which in turn must be solved. Thus, the cycle — new problems, new policies, new institutions — turns over and over again in the development process. Let me illustrate from the fields of population, food and agriculture.

The initiation and successful execution of a series of policies and programs in the fields of public health and medicine greatly reduced death rates in the developing countries in the decades of the 1940's and 1950's. The great successes achieved in public health and medicine in turn increased rates of population growth dramatically

and brought on the fear of world famine in the late 1950's and early 1960's. Success in controlling death rates created a world food problem.

The initiation and successful execution of policies designed to increase food grain production in the late 1950's and the 1960's has created a revolution in the production of food grains in that broad, hot, densely populated belt stretching from Morocco to the Philippines. Food grain production is currently increasing dramatically across this broad belt so that the fear of world famine is now receding and production gluts are developing in certain local areas.

But the production revolution in food grains is creating new problems. We can mention two here. First, there is an acute need right now for an efficient marketing system to assemble, store, process, transport and distribute food grains over wide distances and long periods. Such an efficient marketing system needs, in turn, to be buttressed by government programs to support farm prices and manage reserve stocks. If such a marketing and distribution system, part private and part public, does not come into being immediately in those areas where the production revolution is moving the most rapidly, farmers will experience severe income losses, grain will be wasted, and many of the gains of the production revolution will be lost.

Second, the dramatic revolution in the production of food grains is polarizing agriculture in the areas involved. The big, aggressive farmers are adopting the new practices, greatly increasing their production and enjoying spectacular income increases. The small illiterate farmers are, on the other hand, not generally participating in the production revolution, hence are not increasing their grain production, and not experiencing rising real incomes. This polarization process, if it is allowed to continue, will certainly lead to civil strife and political upheavals, as it is already the case in certain areas.

New policies must be initiated and new institutions must be established to carry out those policies that have the capability of solving the two problems described above. If such new policies are not initiated and implemented in the near future many gains in the production revolution in food grains will be lost through price disasters and the wastage of grain. The development process itself will be torn apart as the small cultivators and landless labor revolt against "the establishment" and a development process which excludes them.

If, however, a new set of policies are initiated with the capability of dealing with the above problems, and a set of institutions come

into being that can effectively administer those policies so that in time the above problems are resolved in a reasonably satisfactory manner, then we must, in turn, expect a new set of problems to arise. I would hazard to guess that those problems will be concerned with chronic surpluses in the food grains, low international grain prices, and distress among farm producers, large and small. In this event, there will develop a need to convert those agricultural economies, now devoted primarily to food grain production, to ones placing increased emphasis on animal product production. Consumers, with their rising real incomes, will be demanding increased supplies of animal products, and increased animal production will be required to consume the surplus of grains once destined for direct human consumption. Thus, there will develop a need for a new set of policies dealing with research in animal production, the marketing of animal products, and levels of price support that will assist the countries involved to undertake a second transformation in which animal product production becomes the dominant form of agricultural production. The elements of the cycle of development to follow the one described above I cannot foresee at this time, but I am sure that a next cycle will occur. This cycling view of agricultural development has some important implications for the developed countries of the West, and for Americans in particular. In this view, we don't undertake a crash program designed to fully develop the agriculture of some less developed country in three years, win the development battle, and then pull our resources out and come home. We may, in this view, reduce our volume of economic assistance (grants and loans) after important production gains have been achieved, but we will need to continue to provide technical assistance to cope with the cycling problems of development until the developing country has produced the trained manpower and established the policy formulating and executing institutions capable of dealing with its problems of development in a reasonably effective manner — and this, in most cases, takes a long, long time.

This is a lesson that the American people and their elected representatives must learn. And this is an issue on which administration leaders and AID officials must stop running like scared rabbits. So let's drop the cheap talk and fake goals concerned with winning the battle of economic development, including agricultural development in a few years, and tool up in AID and on university campuses, for

long term programs of technical assistance that have the capacity to cope with the changing problems of the development process.

There is a message in the cycling view of agricultural development for the LDC's too. Some exciting new strains of wheat and rice do not spell full development. They spell important technical progress, which can ward off the threat of famine. But they also spell trouble — deep social and political trouble for many countries, as we discussed earlier.

The message, as I read it, says the following. If the developing countries are to realize important and sustained real income gains over the next two decades, those gains must be distributed among the population so as to promote social and political stability, and the continuing problems created by the continuing process must be solved in a reasonably satisfactory manner. In the short-run, both of the above requirements can be eased by foreign assistance: economic assistance in the form of grants and loans in the first case, and technical skill and know-how in the second case. But in the longer run, each developing country must generate the social discipline to enable it to distribute the fruits of economic progress reasonably equitably, and it must produce its own skilled manpower and institutions (research, planning and operating) which will enable it to resolve the continuing problem of development, and thereby sustain the development process. And, as I understand it, the central purpose of this workshop is to improve our methods and approaches for developing countries to build those institutions and produce the skilled manpower.

2. Meeting the Needs for Professional Agriculturalists

I. L. BALDWIN

1. The Need

Over the last quarter of a century, world food production has grown at essentially the same rate as has world population. But there is still much hunger and malnutrition in the world. The reasons for hunger and malnutrition are many and their interrelationships complex; however, basic to the problem is the hard fact that the world does not now produce enough food of the proper types to provide an adequate diet to all of the people of the world. In some areas of the world, food production has outstripped population growth and these regions are able to export food to those countries which have a food shortage. Unfortunately, the underdeveloped countries, with high population densities and a high rate of population growth, are in the main the areas of food scarcity.

World populations have grown rapidly for at least 2000 years and the rate of growth has steadily increased. The billion mark was not reached until about 1800. The two billion mark came about 1930. At the present time, the population of the world is increasing at a rate of about one billion people in fifteen years. Currently world population is increasing at a rate of almost 200,000 a day or over 70 million a year.

The large proportion of the very young in the population of all countries indicates a continued rapid rise in the world population

even though fertility control programs are pushed vigorously and effectively. In the underdeveloped countries, there will be twice as many women in the high fertility ages (20-30) by 1980 as there were in 1965.

The United Nations projections of world population by the year 2000 are frightening. Assuming that there is no change in fertility, world population would increase from the present 3.5 billion to 7.5 billion, a 112% increase. The medium estimate assumes that fertility control programs will have a significant effect in reducing fertility, and this projection indicates a world population of about 6.1 billion by the year 2000, an increase of over 70%.

Is it reasonable to expect that food production will be expanded at rates equal to or greater than population growth? The pessimists' answer is no and they predict mass starvation within the next decade. The optimists believe that food production will be increased rapidly enough to prevent mass starvation prior to the year 2000 and that population growth will have slowed down markedly by that time. The degree of pessimism or optimism depends not so much on an estimate of what could be done but on the estimate of what will be done.

If mass starvation is to be avoided during the next half century, both fertility control programs and food production programs must receive high priority throughout the world. In the field of agriculture, five broad areas are of immediate concern.

First, public policy in all of its aspects must be designed to encourage increased food production. Among others, this includes pricing policies, taxation policies, land and irrigation policies, institution building policies, etc.

Second, adequate infrastructure must be developed in most of the underdeveloped countries to support modern agriculture. Feeds, fertilizers, pesticides, machinery and seeds must be locally available to the farmer when he needs them. Credit must be available at reasonable interest rates. Marketing, processing and storage facilities must enable the food to move from producer to consumer.

Third, agricultural research must be greatly expanded, particularly in the underdeveloped regions of the world. Although increases in both basic and applied research related to agriculture are needed, first priority in the underdeveloped countries must go to adaptive research which is designed to have an immediate impact on food pro-

duction and marketing. And this adaptive research must be carried out in a greatly increased number of locations. Adaptive research, to be most useful, must be carried out under conditions closely similar to those faced by the individual farmer.

Fourth, in most of the underdeveloped countries, the quality of agricultural extension activities must be sharply upgraded. In most of the underdeveloped countries, the agricultural extension workers are inadequately trained both in the technology of modern agriculture and in the methodology of extension work.

Fifth, there must be a dramatic increase in the number and quality of professional agriculturalists. (I use the term professional agriculturalists to include those with bachelor's, master's and doctor's degrees in agriculture.) Unless competent professional agriculturalists are available in greatly increased numbers, appropriate public policies will not be adopted and enforced, an appropriate infrastructure will not be developed, the necessary adaptive research will not be performed, and the needed improvements in the agricultural extension services will not be made.

For those of us attending this workshop, there are no problems of greater significance or of more urgency than those concerned with meeting the need for more and better trained professional agriculturalists. The problems vary from country to country. In some countries, the most immediate problems lie at the bachelor's degree level; in other countries, the most immediate problems may rest at the graduate school levels. In most countries, the problem is acute at all levels of training. And in every country, the first need is for a careful, thorough evaluation of the needs, the demands and supply. All too often, the present supply seems to meet the present demand, even though the present need is much greater than the supply. In such cases, changes must be effected in public policy which will create a demand corresponding to the needs. Unless public policy is committed to the task of meeting the present and future food needs of the country, the effective demand for professional agriculturalists will fall far short of the real needs. Hence, in many countries, the first task in meeting the need for professional agriculturalists will consist of securing the adoption of public policies which will bring the effective demand nearer to conformity with real needs. This task, although of overriding importance, is beyond the scope of this paper.

II. The Resources

Let us assume that appropriate public policies have been or will be adopted which will serve to bring the effective demand for professional agriculturalists somewhere near the real needs. How can the available resources of the underdeveloped countries and the developed countries be best utilized? These resources consist of, first, money, host country funds, and foreign assistance funds; second, professional agriculturalists, both in the host country and in the donor countries; and third, physical facilities, both in the underdeveloped countries and in the developed countries.

Every country will present its own problems. The problems of the United States concern not only itself, but also are of concern to many other countries. For the last two decades, the U.S. has been actively engaged in trying to help the underdeveloped nations meet their needs for professional agriculturalists. Basically this assistance has been given to the efforts of the developing nations in building institutions to serve agricultural education and research. At the start of this program, neither the United States nor the underdeveloped nations knew much about the needs of the host country or about the methodology of building educational and research institutions.

The U.S. contribution had three main components. First, U.S. agriculturalists were sent to the host country university, usually for two-year tours of duty. Sometimes they joined actively in the teaching and research of the host university. Others were expected to serve only as advisors. In the early stages of the program, emphasis was on the undergraduate program. Later, in a few countries, the emphasis shifted to the development of graduate programs. These were largely master's degree programs, but in a few instances, doctoral programs are being developed.

Second, host nationals were sent to U.S. universities for agricultural education. In some countries, the great shortage of bachelor degree agriculturalists dictated sending students to our undergraduate agricultural programs. In other countries, those sent to the U.S. usually entered our graduate schools for either master's or doctoral degree work.

Third, the United States furnished certain items of equipment for laboratories and libraries. In a few cases, funds were made available for the construction of buildings.

All of these activities made significant contributions to the training of host national professional agriculturalists. The first two made direct contributions; in one case, U.S. teachers served in the host university, and in the other, host nationals received their training in U.S. universities. The urgencies of the present world food situation call for a critical review of the effectiveness and adequacy of both host country and U.S. policies and practices affecting the training of professional agriculturalists.

The situation in the entire world is far different than it was two decades ago. There are many changes which must be considered in a study of the training of professional agriculturalists; however, I will base my discussions on four broad factors which I consider of primary significance.

First, there are many important lessons to be learned from an examination of the experiences of the last two decades. The various research reports and the summary report of the CIC-AID Rural Development Research Project present a great deal of relevant data, and point the direction for changes which should be beneficial. Other broadly based, as well as more narrowly based studies, also have added much to our knowledge about the techniques and methodology of cooperative efforts to build institutions for agricultural education and research.

Second, the agricultural colleges of the underdeveloped countries are far more numerous now than they were twenty years ago, and in many of the underdeveloped countries, one or more institutions have grown materially in strength and stature. However, I doubt whether any of the underdeveloped countries now have an integrated system of collegiate level institutions of agricultural education which is adequate in size, distribution, and strength to meet the present and future need for professional agriculturalists. In some countries, the present supply of agriculturalists seems to be adequate to meet the present effective demand for such individuals. And, in these cases, the actual need for professional agriculturalists is far greater than the supply, if effective measures are to be taken to increase food production enough to keep pace with population growth over the next one to three decades.

Third, the situation in the United States is far different now than it was earlier. The American public has far less confidence in the effectiveness and values of foreign aid than it had earlier. To some

extent, this disillusionment is irrational, but to a large extent it is due to mistakes which we have made in the organization, administration and determination of priorities. The mistakes made in some of the recipient countries have also contributed to the public disillusionment. Fortunately, for future programs designed to increase the supply of adequately trained professional agriculturalists, the college contract technical assistance programs are generally regarded by the U.S. public much more favorably than are many other programs in the foreign aid complex.

Another important factor is the tight budgetary situation now being experienced by most American colleges and universities. The pressures of rapid enrollment growth, particularly in graduate schools, are occurring at the same time that state and federal authorities are much less generous in appropriating funds for education and research. More and more U.S. colleges and universities are finding it necessary to place limitations on enrollments, particularly in graduate schools, and to establish quota systems for enrollments of out-of-state and out-of-country applications. In other words, the loads on U.S. universities are increasing faster than their resources, and this is occurring at the same time that U.S. foreign aid funds are being reduced.

Fourth, there is much greater recognition of the fact that there is an imperative and immediate need to take those actions necessary to make rapid increases in the production of food, if mass starvation within the lifetime of most of this audience is to be avoided. Although recognition of the need is growing, I doubt whether any nation has yet undertaken all of the measures which are required.

III. Meeting the Need

With the knowledge gained from experience, and with a new appreciation of the need for large increases in food production over the next few decades, what actions should we now take to make the best use of our combined resources in increasing the number and upgrading the quality of the professional agriculturalists? The situation is different in each country and no detailed prescription can be applied to all. However, there are certain general principles which are widely applicable and can be used by each country in developing its own detailed plan.

A. Development of a system of institutions to serve agriculture

First, I suggest that far greater attention should be given to the

development of an adequate interrelated system of institutions for agricultural education, research and extension. I do not suggest that all of these functions need to be combined in a single agency. It may be advisable to do so in some cases, but in most cases, the various functions can best be left in separate agencies, but with a greater emphasis on the development of an interrelated, coordinated system of agricultural education, research and extension. No one of these functions can effectively stand alone.

Education cannot be truly relevant unless staff and students have enough concern with extension to be thoroughly familiar with the practical programs of agricultural production and marketing. In like manner, education without research is sterile. If the graduates of the colleges are to be useful in aiding agricultural development, they must possess "the seeing eye and the inquiring mind." These qualities can best be developed in connection with an on-going research program. With the shortage of professional agriculturalists at the doctoral level in most countries, the talents of all such qualified people should be used in the official agricultural research program of the country.

The agricultural research service draws its workers from the graduates of the colleges and universities and it furnishes the technical information to the extension service. To be effective, it must maintain close liaison with both agencies. The research service is interested in securing well trained individuals for addition to the staff, and should consult frequently with college officials regarding the educational program. Frequently, the research worker is the best qualified individual to teach some aspect of the college program and should be used as a teacher whenever possible. If the research service is to be most useful to agricultural development, it must be familiar with the practical problems of agricultural production and marketing. The extension service has these contacts with practical agriculture. Knowledge about agricultural problems should be given to the research workers.

Agricultural extension draws its workers from the colleges and universities, at least at the upper levels, and secures its new technical information from the research workers. In turn, the extension service understands the problems of the farmer and can relay this type of information to the colleges and to the research service. The extension worker should be consulted by the college on curricula and can be effectively used as a teacher in many cases. In like manner, the extension worker is often the best person to carry out field trials in selected areas.

In addition to stressing the necessity of developing an interrelated system of agricultural education, research and extension, I want to stress the necessity of developing a system with units in appropriate locations throughout the nation. There may be a few nations small enough to need only a single agricultural college and a single agricultural research station, but most nations need more than one, and the large nations need many such centers. Local problems of agriculture can only be solved locally. For the larger nations, it would be undesirable and probably impossible to attract sufficient qualified college entrants to meet the need for trained agriculturalists at any one or two institutions. Extension services are generally well distributed over the nation, but colleges and research stations are not so distributed. In many instances, the best use of the few available qualified agriculturalists will be secured by their joint use in adjacent education and research institutions.

Generally, foreign assistance has been given to one, or in the larger nations, a few colleges and research stations. Usually these are the older, better established and stronger institutions. In only a few cases has a system been established which places the responsibility on the stronger of helping the weaker to grow strong. I suggest that any nation which has not established an integrated system of local institutions for agricultural education and research, together with a mechanism by which the strong can give strength to the weak, should immediately start planning for such a system.

A strong U.S. Department of Agriculture, together with a national agricultural university in Washington, could not possibly meet the needs of my country for trained agriculturalists, or the need for research to meet local problems. The limited supply of qualified agriculturalists demands that they be used in an interrelated system of education, research and extension to serve the local needs of the various areas of the nation.

In planning for such a system, I suggest that appropriate leaders visit not only some of the developed nations, but that they also visit several of their neighbors who may be in comparable stages of development. An appropriate plan must meet the needs of the country and fit the government and institutional patterns of the nation. Good ideas frequently are found close to home. A traveling regional seminar for top level officials in agricultural education, research and extension is now being planned for Asia. I predict that it will be very useful.

B. Development of graduate programs in agriculture

In some of the underdeveloped countries, one or more universities have started graduate programs in agriculture, both at the master's and doctoral levels. Many more are needed. I am fully conscious of the cost of high quality graduate programs and the folly of developing graduate programs of inferior quality. However, none but the very small countries can hope to meet their need for agriculturalists at the graduate levels over the next two decades by sending their nationals to the U.S. or to other countries. Neither the U.S. nor the other developed countries have the capacity to serve the numbers needed. In addition, the educational program and the necessarily associated research program of a local graduate school will better serve the national interests than can any foreign graduate school.

There will always be the need for foreign experience, but the great majority of the professional agriculturalists must secure the major part or all of their training at home if the needs are to be met.

C. The participant program

Even though an immediate start is made on the development of additional graduate programs, there will be a heavy demand for graduate training in the United States and other countries for several decades. I see three areas in which I believe we can make decided improvements in our participant training programs with consequent better utilization of available resources. U.S. dollars to support the program will be too few to meet the needs, and space in American graduate schools will not permit any large expansion of the participant program. However, I believe that we can improve our selection process, and can develop more suitable graduate programs for students from the underdeveloped countries. Third, I believe the underdeveloped countries can improve their procedures for the utilization of the returned participant.

Two aspects of the selection process deserve attention. Selection of participants should not be made until a long range plan for the use of professional agriculturalists has been made. Following this, individuals should be selected to fill specific posts. In many instances, participants have arrived at the U.S. graduate school with no idea as to the posts they would fill on return to the home country. As a result, a program of studies cannot be devised to fit particular needs. Granted that changed conditions four years hence may force a change in the

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best laid plans, but the necessity of revising plans presents no excuse for not planning. Unfortunately, selections have sometimes been made on the basis of seniority and consanguinity, rather than on the basis of planning and ability.

A second factor of importance in selection relates to the time of selection. All too often, participants arrive at our graduate schools with an inadequate command of the English language. Others arrive with a variety of other deficiencies in the technical aspects of their proposed program. Frequently, these deficiencies could have been removed at home. It is frustrating to the student, and for the U.S. faculty, as well as a waste of money, for the student to spend one, two or three semesters clearing up deficiencies in English and technical subjects. Careful planning will enable selection to follow English language proficiency and the acquisition of all possible technical subject matter.

With only minor modifications, the foreign graduate student who intends to return home after receiving his degree, generally has followed the same type of program as does the American student. Recognition, both with respect to the selection of courses and of thesis subject, could and should be taken of the fact that the foreign student will return home to the problems of a developing country. Such recognition would greatly improve the program of the student and would not in any way reduce the standards of the school or the quality of the degree. It would cost some money for additional counseling services and for the special expenses inherent in the support of a thesis study germane to the student's native country. Such expenses would be a small part of the total cost and would add greatly to the experience of the foreign student.

In many cases, consideration should be given to the desirability of sending students to a neighboring country rather than to the U.S. In most regions of the world, there are now one or more good graduate schools. Attendance at such a school would certainly cost less and, in many cases, would provide a more germane education.

In most of the underdeveloped countries, institutions to serve agriculture are growing rapidly. As a result, many young people have heavy administrative responsibilities in the field of institution building with neither training nor experience in administration or institution building. There are many ways in which this handicap can be overcome. All participants who come to this country for graduate studies

should receive some instruction in administration, in institution building, and in the philosophy, organization and operation of the U.S. system of institutions serving agriculture. Some of this can be given in connection with the graduate program of one of the agriculture-related intellectual disciplines. However, there is an urgent need for the development of a summer program covering such subjects, to serve the needs of many participants after they have completed work for their degree.

For those with advanced degrees, who are now in or have been selected for administrative posts without specific training in administration and institution building, I suggest the development of an intern program in the administrative offices of our colleges of agriculture. Intern programs for our own college administrators are growing rapidly in this country. An extension of such a program to fit the needs of the young, inexperienced foreign administrator of an agricultural education, research or extension program would fill a real need.

I hope that CIC and AID may cooperate in developing both a summer training program in administration and institution building for the participant now in this country, and an intern program for the young inexperienced administrator of an agricultural education, research and extension program in a developing country.

A third area of concern in the participant training program is that of the utilization of the training after return to his home post. In many cases, foreign students have received master's or doctor's degrees from a U.S. graduate school in a particular academic discipline and returned home with the expectation of being able to use the training received here for the benefit of their country, only to find either that there was no post available for them, or that the post which was available offered no opportunity to use much of the training received in graduate school. Such an experience may seriously damage the future development of a good man and certainly results in the waste of valuable time and money. Better planning at home with respect to the selection of the individual and determination of the role envisioned for him on his return, together with better planning at home and in the U.S. regarding the type and length of the training program, are needed.

D. Use of U.S. Resources

In addition to looking critically at the participant training

programs as one component of our attempt to increase the quantity and improve the quality of professional agriculturalists, we should also look critically at the services which U.S. faculty members give to foreign institutions of agricultural education and research. As I said earlier in another connection, the situation is different in every country and no single detailed formula will serve all situations. However, there are some general principles and conditions worthy of consideration in every country. The discussions which follow are based on the premises that we have learned much about cooperative attempts to build institutions for agricultural education and research over the last twenty years, and that conditions in the underdeveloped countries and in the U.S. are vastly different today from those of even a decade ago.

An institution with the strength and capability to serve its country and its region, with the flexibility to adjust to changing conditions, and with a reputation that insures public support, is more than the sum of its parts. A group of technically competent staff members, teaching a group of competent students in an adequate physical plant with the appropriate library, laboratory equipment and supplies, are great assets for a strong, productive and enduring institution, but they alone do not insure that the institution encompassing them will be strong, productive and enduring. The intangible quality of leadership, the development of an appropriate statement of function, objectives and mode of operation, the wholehearted and enthusiastic support of these functions, objectives and operating procedures by staff, students and administration, and the forging of strong linkages with all related groups, are prime requisites for a strong, productive and enduring institution. This cardinal principle was given too little attention both by host nationals and by U.S. personnel in much of the early work. As we look to the future, all of us must recognize that our prime purpose is that of building agricultural institutions which will be strong, productive and enduring.

If the cooperative endeavors of U.S. and host national professionals are to be productive in building such an institution, we must jointly develop the objectives and the goals which we seek, and jointly determine the strategy to be followed. What needs to be accomplished? How can it best be accomplished with the resources available? What priority is assigned to different tasks? What inputs are needed from each of the partners? In the past, many projects were started without adequate planning either by the host country or by the U.S. and al-

most none had adequate joint planning. As the project develops, joint evaluation should precede joint modifications of goals and strategies. We can no longer afford to start or to continue joint projects in building institutions to serve agriculture without adequate joint planning and development of strategy.

At the start of the joint attempts in institution building, the Americans served as regular staff members of the institutions. Occasionally they served as administrators, practically always they served as teachers of undergraduate students and, in a limited way, as research workers. In fewer cases, the American staff members served as extension workers. In some of the early projects, there were relatively few qualified host nationals to serve as staff members, and the Americans were a majority. For the Americans to serve effectively under such conditions, two-year tours of duty were considered the minimum. This requirement greatly limited the group from which staff members might be selected.

Currently, the host national staffs are larger and much better prepared. In most cases, they have the competence necessary to carry the undergraduate teaching. They usually have only limited contact with workers in the same field but in different institutions and other countries. Their libraries usually are limited in scope and it is difficult for them to grow as their disciplines grow. Often, they need expert help in designing a new advanced course or in designing an appropriate research approach for an important practical problem.

Currently, American graduate schools are faced with rapidly expanding enrollments and restricted budgets with which to handle these enrollments. At the same time, there is a growing realization that we need to know far more than we now do about agricultural development in the underdeveloped countries, about tropical agriculture, and about institution building if we are to use our potential effectively in the battle to drastically increase food production during the next few decades.

Within the limitations of the present conditions at home and abroad, how can we best move jointly to increase and improve the supply of professional agriculturalists?

First, I suggest that we design all new cooperative projects, and redesign the old ones, in a fashion to bring the largest feasible measure of benefit to each partner. Many U.S. faculty members who have served overseas feel that neither they nor their university have received

benefits which were, in any sense, commensurate with the damages sustained by domestic programs. This need not be true. This is not the place to discuss all of the changes in format which would bring more benefit to U.S. faculty members and U.S. universities, but some suggestions are appropriate in the context of this paper.

All too often, past endeavors of this type have not placed enough emphasis on the research component as an important element in building an agricultural college. In addition to being an essential ingredient in building an educational institution, a cooperative research program provides information of value to the host country, serves to strengthen the U.S. university, and adds to the professional competence of the U.S. faculty member. In this connection, greater use should be made of advanced U.S. graduate students in the host country. Such students, working alongside host national students, will have a wholesome influence, and the use of such American graduate students will aid in strengthening the U.S. university by making a positive contribution to U.S. university departmental programs.

Second, many institutions in the underdeveloped countries, which have up to this time confined their efforts to undergraduate instruction, might well consider the need for graduate programs and the adequacy of their resources for the initiation of graduate programs. Just as the underdeveloped countries have accepted the responsibility of developing institutions for undergraduate instruction in agriculture, so must they accept the responsibility of developing graduate schools of agriculture. Such schools are expensive, but their development will be less expensive than sending any considerable number of their students to the United States for doctoral training. In some areas, regional schools will be able to serve several small nations, and some large nations will need more than a single graduate school of agriculture.

Third, U.S. assistance to many of the more advanced institutions might well be shifted from direct work by U.S. professionals with host national students to work with host national staff. In most underdeveloped countries, the university faculty members have very limited opportunity for travel to professional meetings or for visits to other universities. Such isolation makes it difficult to avoid stagnation. A series of seminars, workshops, and short courses would be very helpful in most situations: U.S. assistance in providing expert help in the conduct of such programs, and in financing some of the other expenses, would be most helpful. Opportunities to work with the faculty mem-

bers of host national universities in such seminars, workshops and short courses would prove attractive to the best American faculty members.

Fourth, in most of the underdeveloped regions of the world, there are limited possibilities for publication of the results of worthwhile research, and equally limited opportunities to attend professional meetings where research results are discussed. The publication of research, and the discussion of research before a group of competent professionals, are great stimulators of good research and the spread and use of research results. In most sections of the world, there are now enough qualified professionals to justify the development of regional professional meetings and regional avenues of publication. U.S. professional and financial assistance to carefully planned projects of this type would be rewarding in the improvement of the competency of the professional agriculturalists of the region.

IV. Summation

There is an urgent and immediate need for more and better trained professional agriculturalists in the underdeveloped countries of the world if we are to avoid mass starvation for the next few decades.

The resources which can be devoted to the task of meeting the need for professional agriculturalists are limited both in the developed and the underdeveloped countries.

The situation demands careful joint planning to develop more effective ways of utilizing the resources of the developed and underdeveloped countries.

The needs can be met if there is widespread recognition that the needs are urgent.

3. Identifying and Meeting Institutional Needs of Colleges of Agriculture in the Developing Countries

LEONARD F. MILLER

All of us, whether we are fully aware of it or not, approach problems with a background of experience, a philosophical outlook and a set of operational theories and concepts that have a major bearing on what we really see in a given situation and what we believe should be done to change or improve it. Without such mental concepts and tools, problem solving would indeed be a haphazard affair. At the same time, such an intellectual framework can lead us to overlook many aspects of the problem and severely limit our consideration of alternative solutions and their attendant costs. We are all, therefore, much less objective than we give ourselves credit for being, and this would seem to be especially true in the area of educational institution building.

It will soon be clear that I cannot claim to be an exception to this general dilemma so I will state at the outset two operational concepts which obviously have influenced my approach to this topic; others probably will become apparent as the discussion proceeds.

First, an educational institution's program must be continuously related to the country's qualitative and quantitative needs for trained manpower and development plans through a systematic process of effective communication among planning groups, government ministries, industry leaders and education officials. It is likewise important

to keep firmly in mind that an institution cannot accept undue outside interference, or make adjustments too frequently in its program, without suffering a loss of momentum, direction, and purpose.

Second, the Land Grant Model, with its emphasis on teaching, extension, and research activities that are truly germane to the country's agricultural needs and plans, is an appropriate one to guide our thinking and planning, provided necessary adjustments are made in its organizational and operational form to fit varying administrative and political situations in developing countries. At the same time it is recognized that the model is not universally accepted or acclaimed.

It seemed to me that the topic for this discussion could most usefully be structured around the basic components of an agricultural institution; namely, the students, the curriculum, the staff, the facilities, and the closely related functions of research, extension and public service. This practical orientation focuses on the more essential institutional inputs and outputs which need to be considered in any evaluation of its progress and needs, and which would be involved in any decisions to make required adjustments.

It should be pointed out that the assigned topic is a very broad one and the following remarks are not intended to be all-inclusive. Budget support and strategies, and the institution's organization and administration, while implicitly involved throughout, are left for others in the workshop to discuss. Also it is recognized that a number of alternatives for meeting the institution's needs have not been pointed out. Many of these would appear to depend largely on an institution's particular circumstances of time and place, and it is hoped that enough has been said to encourage participants to bring out others that should be considered.

The Students

Regardless of the stage of an institution's development, it is probably safe to say that it is struggling with questions of policy in regard to the qualifications, method of selection, and the number of students to be admitted. There may be general agreement on the value of at least a limited primary education for all children in a developing country, but there is surely no obvious answer as to how many should obtain a college education. Differences of opinion may arise between faculty within the college and the university's committee on admissions, and both may be giving too little recognition to development needs

of the country. A university must be concerned about its admission standards, although it is generally recognized that present criteria for judging a student's potential leave much to be desired. There is also the important practical consideration of high cost per student when faculty and facilities are underutilized.

Measures that have been of some help in meeting institution's needs for qualified students include special admission programs, generally on a trial basis, and intensified summer precollege training sessions in the basic language and mathematical skills.

The preceding assumes that the problem is basically one of an insufficient number of properly qualified high school students. In some cases, the problem may rather be one of a lack of interest on the part of high school graduates in agriculture as a career. In such cases, intensive educational efforts with secondary teachers, with counselors, and with students can be quite effective. A stimulating program of vocational agriculture in the secondary schools is perhaps the most effective approach to encourage students to continue their education in the field of agriculture. It should be recognized, however, that because of the uninspiring content and approach to the subject, some agricultural programs in secondary schools have done little either for development or in recruiting good students for the college of agriculture.

An expanding supply of college graduates who do not have satisfactory employment opportunities because of the slow rate of economic development is quite another problem which, if long continued, may have serious political and social consequences. While this is less likely to be the situation for graduates of agriculture and other professional colleges, it is a possibility that should be recognized. It is worth repeating that over-investment in human resource development is possible, as well as in any other productive factor.

The Curriculum

Sound curriculum building requires a considerable degree of faculty consensus on the basic objectives of the institution's program. This first step is often not achieved easily, even among faculty with similar educational philosophies and backgrounds, and it becomes increasingly difficult as the faculty becomes more cosmopolitan. Once objectives and goals are determined, there still often remains a surprising amount of difference of opinion on the appropriate means for achieving the objectives.

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In this area, as in the previous one dealing with students, a number of outside groups are properly concerned with the college's curriculum. These include other units in the university, agencies providing financial support, development institutions, and employers. It is highly desirable for some organized procedure to be established for obtaining ideas and feedback from such groups for consideration by the college's curriculum committee. It is essential, however, for the college to maintain sufficient independence to resist pressure groups lobbying for special courses, often of a largely vocational nature. This type of training, if not available elsewhere, should be offered by the college as non-credit, in-service training.

One of the important questions that must be faced early in the process of curriculum building is the degree of specialization that should be attempted. Some have argued that generalists are what is needed in the developing countries and therefore a curriculum in general agriculture is all that is required. Others have felt that the country also needs specialists, and that students who have not had some specialization as undergraduates are at too much of a disadvantage when they attempt to enter graduate school. At Alemaya, our approach was to start with general agriculture and then to add a limited number of departmental specialties as needs and resources permitted. The order of additions of departmental majors was plant sciences, animal sciences, agricultural engineering technology, agricultural economics and business, and agricultural education and extension. To help insure adequate breadth of training, students were required to have a minor field of emphasis, and course work in their major was limited to a maximum of about 35 credit hours.

Another important consideration in the curriculum is the degree of emphasis on the basic sciences relative to the more applied courses, or more generally, the question of theory versus practice. Most of us appreciate the great practical value of theory and we realize the handicap of being inadequately grounded in the basic sciences and theory. At the same time, it is important to recognize that many students in the developing countries have only limited practical background and experience, and they often possess an attitude toward the dignity of labor quite different from our own. For these reasons, the instructors of laboratory sections in our more applied course felt it was desirable to make certain students could actually use the skills which we would take for granted in this country.

One approach we employed quite successfully to assist students in acquiring practical work skills, was a noncredit course in the curriculum entitled "Work Experience." Six hours per week were required of first and second year students; in their third and fourth years, most students worked for pay in their major department. Ethiopians and other visitors to the college very frequently inquired about the practical work our students did, and were quite obviously pleased that this was a definite part of the program.

At Alemaya, all fourth year students were required to enroll in a departmental seminar which included a research project or paper. Since we did not have graduate students, some faculty members made surprisingly effective use of these senior students in furthering their research program. In general, we felt that this curriculum requirement helped us in meeting the double objectives of increasing our research effort, and at the same time, providing our students with valuable training in the nature of the research process in agriculture.

As an institution matures, it normally tends to offer a greater degree of specialization and a wider variety of course offerings within each department. Some development in this direction is probably wise in most cases, but experience suggests that majors and course offerings can easily be overdone unless resisted by the administration. The curriculum committee ordinarily receives many suggestions for course additions, but few for deletion or for combining two existing courses.

The foregoing has assumed a four-year college program leading to a B.S. degree, and because of the costs involved, we resisted university curriculum recommendations which would have lengthened the time required for graduation to five years. In most countries, there is an additional need for specialized one- or two-year post-secondary training programs which do not lead to a regular degree. Such programs could train the local technicians that are needed in a developing agriculture, as well as the young men who have an opportunity to enter farming on a commercial scale. The proper role of the college in such programs is another of the many issues where the correct answer probably depends primarily on the circumstances of the particular case. We did not see our way clear to make this addition to our program, and this training is now being conducted by the Ministry of Agriculture in two former agriculture high schools.

While graduate work was not intended to be a part of the Ethio-

pian project, the question of what role, if any, advanced training should play in the future will arise there, as it has in most institutions where such training is not being offered. Obviously, before embarking on graduate work, the expected additional costs and the benefits, including the development of professions oriented more to country problems, need to be carefully compared with the alternative of continuing to obtain such training outside the country. In a number of situations, the case for offering graduate work would not appear to be nearly as strong as it is for an undergraduate program. Developing selected institutions as regional centers for graduate work in certain disciplines may be an alternative worth considering, provided university support in the basis sciences is available to the College of Agriculture.

The Staff

All of us will probably agree that developing a strong professional staff, with a high sense of duty and loyalty, is one of the essentials in institution building. Only as this is gradually achieved, can we begin to have genuine confidence in the college as a permanent, viable institution. Attaining this happy situation appears to be as difficult as it is important, but fortunately, it seems to me, we do know some of the major factors that are involved. Perhaps the most critical decision is the initial identification and selection of staff members, and the chances for success in this endeavor would appear to be improved if the candidate has been a former student, and perhaps a full time employee, at the institution. Also, it has been my experience that academic people at the University level respond in much the same way wherever they live to such considerations as financial inducements, opportunities for professional development and recognition, and wise administrative procedures which recognize superior performance and which give the staff members some voice in decision making.

Our Ethiopian experience and observations in building a staff illustrates some of the problems that may be involved, at least in the early stages of development. There it was almost entirely a question of training our own graduates to replace us. Outstanding graduates were normally hired as full-time assistants on a trial basis for one year before they left for participant training. Their graduate records in the United States were generally good, but the number sent for

training was restricted both by the lack of qualified applicants, and by the questionable premise that one candidate in training for a specific college position was sufficient. It was assumed that the trainee would return to the college, find academic work satisfying, and turn down attractive alternative offers to work in Addis Ababa as a department head or a director general. Naturally, this did not always happen, and the short fall was further accentuated by the fact that the college was located in an isolated area about 300 miles from the capital. Increasing competition among professionals, as more individuals have been trained, is gradually solving the problem, but the original schedule for Ethiopianizing the institution had to be set forward several years.

One of the unanswered questions that probably has arisen in many developing institutions is the proportion of the staff needing Ph.D. degrees, to properly meet the requirements of their positions. Some developing universities have modeled their salary and promotion policies after our own, with the result that the pressure for advanced degrees appears, in some cases, to be out of line with the university's needs. Where university policies promote this attitude, it will be changed slowly, if at all, and perhaps restrictions by scholarship-giving agencies will provide the most effective limit on the number of advanced degrees obtained in those situations where some limit seems desirable.

Key staff members who can provide departmental leadership and program direction, often unofficially, are a valuable asset in any institution. In the newer developing universities, these individuals are especially rare, and hence when they can be recruited, they can often make a major contribution to a department that is composed primarily of well-trained but young staff members. In this connection, it should be pointed out that in the early stages of institution building, staff recruitment from the United States should usually place more emphasis on individuals with a broad background of experience than on advanced, specialized training. Flexibility and adaptability are especially important at this stage, as the recruits often have to "make do" with very limited facilities and equipment. At a later stage when more of the staff are nationals, a key characteristic for success of the U.S. staff member is his ability to work as a true colleague with the host institution's faculty. A determined effort must be made to avoid any tendency toward a foreign staff enclave.

The need for faculty members and the lack of resources have led some developing universities to rely quite extensively on the international market to meet their staff requirements. A few individuals of other nationalities can be a stimulating influence in a faculty but where the variety becomes too diverse, it appears to be difficult to develop a strong unity of purpose and an effective operating program. A developing institution cannot be pulled in too many directions at the same time and hope to do much more than survive. There may be little that can be done to avoid this situation, other than to be alert to the risks involved, and where possible, to limit the range of other nationals employed at any one institution.

The Facilities

We all know of institutional programs that are severely handicapped by the lack of adequate facilities, and at the same time, we are aware of remarkably effective work that has been done with surprisingly small investment in facilities. In our own project, the physical plant had to be built from the ground up. The investment was kept as low as possible while still constructing durable buildings that made an attractive appearance. Considerable use was made of local materials, and in the later stages, the smaller buildings were constructed by our regular maintenance employees when they could be spared from their normal duties. An effort was made to build in some degree of flexibility so that it would be less costly to make improvements and to incorporate newer technology. Foundation support was most helpful with certain research facilities and the library, and in providing scholarships for Ph.D. training.

An agricultural institution must have several hundred acres of land to carry on the minimum amount of research demonstration, and teaching programs in livestock and crop production. It must also try to provide adequate room for a longer range growth of the institution. Normally, none of these requirements should require large tracts at any one location. More often the need is for limited tracts in different locations for research by the college staff, in areas with quite different soil and climatic conditions. But there probably are no very useful answers to the question of how many substations are appropriate in a given institution, where they should be located, or how they should be operated. As in many such problems, the most intelligent answers are likely to unfold through the experience gained in operating the

first one or two that are considered most essential to supplement the work at the college.

The policies followed in equipping a college's laboratories, service areas, and experimental farm, are important from the standpoint of day to day operations of the institution. Factors that need to be considered include the ease of training local employees in the proper operation and maintenance of the equipment, and the availability of local repairs and service. In some cases, these considerations are of sufficient importance for the institution to make a real effort to explore alternatives before accepting outside aid in this area, if it imposes restrictions which are likely to result later in difficult problems of foreign exchange financing, or in the logistics of obtaining essential repairs.

A point having a direct bearing on facilities is the level of technology and equipment that should be used on the college farm. This in turn is related to the broader issue of whether the major thrust of the development effort in the country should be directed primarily to the commercial operators or to the smaller, largely self-sufficing units. To an important degree, the answer would seem to depend on whether the country is facing a critical shortage of food. In general, our approach was to use a level of technology in our operations which we felt would be economically feasible for the progressive commercial operators. At the same time, we were conducting a number of adaptive research and demonstration projects aimed at the problem of the small family units surrounding the college.

Research

The preceding apparent emphasis on the teaching aspects of the college program must not be interpreted as relegating research to a position of secondary importance. There is little disagreement among development specialists on the absolute necessity of research to provide a basis for a more efficient agriculture, and to support a developing agricultural economy. Some research by the teaching staff also seems necessary, if the agricultural courses are to have the desired content and application to the country problems. From the longer run viewpoint of institution building, we probably need to be more concerned about the research than about the teaching program.

One of the reasons for this concern is the difficulty of obtaining adequate support for research either by the college or the Ministry. The

necessity for, and the costs of, research are frequently not appreciated by those in control of financial resources, and research certainly has fewer vocal spokesmen than do students when something has to be trimmed from the budget. The lack of assured longer term support is, of course, especially serious to a productive research effort, and is therefore an area that is particularly deserving of outside assistance that can provide the necessary continuity in the level of support.

Another area for concern in research is the extent to which it is directed towards solution of the most relevant problems to speed the country's economic development. Identifying such problems and assigning priorities is not a simple matter, and as we generally recognize, our training of foreign graduate students in this country has often been of little benefit in this respect. In any case, all project proposals need to be carefully evaluated from the standpoint of their potential contribution to development before being approved, and there should definitely be formal reviews of all research work each year.

Other agencies are doubtless also involved in research, and the college's program should be coordinated with these other efforts to insure an integrated, well-balanced national research effort in agriculture. This is definitely not to suggest that a national research director or committee should have final authority over college research, but rather that some procedure should be established to encourage close communication between research workers, both in the development of project proposals, and in discussing research procedures and results.

Extension and Public Service

It is recognized that the extension function of the college of agriculture is the one about which there has been the greatest debate, particularly with respect to its administration. The fact that the extension service is administratively a part of some government ministry does not eliminate the college's concern with the extension effort. Instead of discussing the merits of different administrative arrangements, we should be working out cooperative procedures for supporting and strengthening the content of the extension program through such activities as in-service training for agents, and in providing educational material for their use. It is, of course, equally important to provide this same type of support to other organizations in the country that are concerned with agricultural development. In many cases, a critical need

in extension is for more technology to extend to farmers that is truly relevant for rural development.

There is one other important aspect of adult education with which colleges of agriculture must be concerned, regardless of what the effort is called. This is an educational program in the farming community within a reasonable radius of the institution. Agricultural colleges are simply expected by everyone to have some favorable impact on the area in which they are located. Failure to recognize this would soon alienate vital sources of public support. Furthermore, faculty and students need the experience of working on problems of direct concern to farm families. Where feasible, it would be my suggestion that such efforts around the college be integrated into a comprehensive development program, rather than the piecemeal or departmental approach that has characterized too many of our development efforts. Much could be learned about development problems, and the process of change from such an approach, which would be invaluable to staff and students, and to the national development effort. Where such efforts are already well under way, consideration should be given to other pilot areas so that the college staff will have continuous exposure to a wide range of development problems.

I will not attempt to summarize these remarks which have touched briefly on many aspects of institutional development and still have not included many others which are relevant, especially for institutions in different countries and stages of development. I am sure these omissions will become apparent as the topic is discussed by the seminar participants.

4. The Role of the University in International Affairs

GLEN L. TAGGART

What is the role of the university in international affairs? In today's world, where so many seemingly insolvable problems are arising, where the needs and ambitions of nations clash fiercely, where a fresh crisis arrives as regularly as the morning paper, where the danger approaches the infinite, education and research have assumed an increasingly important posture in the resolution of the ills which affront mankind.

For the past eleven centuries, the basic idea behind the university has never changed. Like many of the ideas which have altered the course of thinking man, the idea behind the university is simple: a group of people whose main objective is the discovery, gathering, sharing, and extension of knowledge — all knowledge everywhere. The realm of the intellect for any university worthy of the name cannot be fenced by any artificial barriers. Certainly, the search for truth cannot be circumscribed by national boundaries.

In exploring the role of education in international affairs, we need ask ourselves what exactly is an education? An education for whom? And why? And what exactly are we educating for?

A number of years ago I read an essay by the eminent Victorian scientist, Thomas Huxley, in which he posed these questions to himself and then tried to answer them by likening life to a chess game.

"Suppose it were perfectly certain," he mused, "that the life and

fortune of everyone of us would, one day or another, depend on his winning or losing a game of chess. Don't you think that we should all consider it to be the primary duty to learn at least the names and moves of the pieces; to have a notion of a gambit, and a keen eye for all the means of giving and getting out of check? Do you not think that we should look with a disapprobation amounting to scorn, upon the father who allowed his son, or the state which allowed its members, to grow up without knowing a pawn from a knight?"¹

Huxley's metaphor will remind some of you of the curious situation with regard to international education. For it is painfully true that our collective lives, fortunes, and happiness depend on our knowing something of the rules of a game infinitely more complex than chess, a game dangerous in its implications. In this game, the chess-board is the world, and to the country which plays well, goes the highest stakes. Education should be the means of learning the rules of the game, of instruction — as Huxley put it — “not merely (of) things and their forces, *but men and their ways*, and the fashioning of the affections and of the will into an earnest and loving desire to move in harmony with . . . (the) laws (of nature).”

For Huxley, education meant neither more nor less than this. “Anything which professes to call itself education must be tried by this standard,” he said, “and if it fails to stand the test, I will not call it education, whatever may be the force of authority, or of numbers upon the other side.”²

Applying Huxley's standard, how would the university's traditional course offerings fare? Could they stand the test? Probably not, if by instruction of “men and their ways,” we mean *all* men and *all* of their ways, not just those men closest to us and those ways most familiar. A basic component of a liberal education must be an intelligent understanding of our changing world. Assuming we agree on this, we can proceed to outline a minimal role for a university in international affairs.

There is first of all, the need to impress our students with a knowledge of other world cultures. The ultimate amelioration and security of this country will be dependent on a citizenry capable of helping to evolve a more harmonious world environment; a citizenry who understands the basic and underlying sources of conflict, and who are sympathetic to the compulsions which animate the other peoples of this globe. We need, too, to provide opportunities for the general public

to acquire this broader knowledge of the points of world dispute, and to have access to involvement in international experiences. We can do this through comprehensive programs in continuing education, through a more visionary approach to the preparation of teachers, and to formation of new, inventive programs in world affairs education.

We must vastly increase the number of specialists we are producing for international service, specialists with skills which include a knowledge of institution building in foreign cultures. As problems common to all nations escalate, the shortage in America of trained scientists, teachers, engineers, and others with an international capability, becomes ever more acute.

Still another need is *the development of a spirit of educational cooperation among the scholars of the world and the inter-relating of educational programs of American colleges with institutions in other countries.*

We need to build additional world problem-solving activities into the service arms of our universities. We do this not only because we have a responsibility to advance learning wherever it is needed, but also because it will enrich our programs and enable us to do a better job in educating Americans.

We need to assemble in our faculties, scholars from every discipline and culture, that we may explore together questions which man finds so troublesome. Our research personnel should not be fearful of tackling problems international in scope, for they are precisely the problems which demand the best minds for their solution.

These are some of the important roles which the universities must play, and I shall want to briefly discuss them with you. Some are the roles we are playing now, though admittedly there is a need to play them more effectively. Others we have yet to undertake.

Perhaps in tracing what the universities have already done, we can better understand where we are today, and find a sense of direction and perspective. After all, America is no stranger to international education. Some of our nation's religious and private organizations were founding colleges and schools in China, Japan, the Philippines, the Middle East, and Africa as long ago as the nineteenth century. The Robert College in Turkey and the American University in Lebanon are two laudable examples of these pioneering overseas efforts.

Students from foreign lands have been enrolling in American colleges and universities for many years, but until recently their num-

bers were relatively few, and their impact on our system of higher education was negligible.

Both geography and the course of history in the nineteenth century gave America a strong inclination toward an isolationist view of world affairs. A land blessed with almost every requisite for an abundant life and separated from the major world centers by broad oceans left little incentive for involvement abroad. This basic insular viewpoint of the 1800's extended into the twentieth century, and even our nation's involvement in the first World War did little to change these attitudes. The failure to join the League of Nations was evidence that Congress felt the isolationist pulse of the American people was still beating strongly. It was not until World War II that the strategy of isolationism was finally abandoned, perhaps forever.

America emerged from the war ill-suited for the role of leadership in which she found herself. The events of 1939 to 1945 presented the United States with not only a different world, but with a series of extraordinarily difficult, indeed perplexing, problems in the conduct of her international affairs. Those in positions of leadership found themselves grappling with the necessity to maintain a strong military posture to contend with the spread of Communism. They found it necessary to encounter successfully the fantastic developments of world-wide scientific and technical advances. Those in business and industry were faced with demands to keep pace in productivity and development with competing countries, and with opportunities to develop profitable markets abroad. And as the world's most affluent nation, we learned we could not ignore the yearnings of millions in the less developed nations who aspired to a modern standard of living.

To the credit of the universities, they saw the challenge and responded. Many universities joined in the new projects of technical assistance allied originally with the "Point Four Program," and in the intervening years, the underdeveloped regions of the world have savored a rate of unexcelled educational growth. Arnold Toynbee describes the spirit of this period in these words:

"Our age will be remembered, not for its horrifying crimes or its astonishing inventions, but because it is the first generation since the dawn of history to believe it practical to make the benefits of civilization available to the whole human race."

The American university has been loudly and deservedly extolled for its impressive achievements in the technical assistance programs, though who among us, after having read the Summary Report of the CIC-AID Rural Development Research Project, would not conclude that we can do an even better job in the future. And who among us would not acknowledge that there is much left to do in relating the university to the fundamental task of developing in its students and faculty the desired competence in the international area.

Thoreau once said, "If you have built castles in the air, your work need not be lost; that is where they should be. Now put the foundations under them."³ An earned criticism of the university is that it has been too easily satisfied in meeting its obligations to international education. We now know that the international education castles which endure, do so because they rest on foundations whose roots entwine throughout the whole of their institution.

If there has been a real harvest of the overseas experience, it has been the concept of *international education* which now extends beyond the traditional concerns in political science, geography, and the humanities, to applications in agriculture, business administration, engineering, education, and other professional studies. Indeed, we have arrived at a realization that the international dimension cannot be divorced from any academic discipline, and that exacting scholarship is not possible if world realities are ignored.

Thus, university graduates who are not conversant with the important problems and aspirations of other nationalities, who are not fully aware of the fact that they live in a world characterized by a labyrinth of differing economic systems and cultures, have been sorely cheated in their education. Yet the sad part of it is that so many of our young men and women are leaving our colleges and universities without having traversed this international dimension.

Curiously, universities which have shown no reluctance to keep abreast of new knowledge in other areas — from mathematics to biology to teaching machines — have been timid to embrace international education. Can anyone really dispute the need for a knowledge base in America which can relate to the forces at work in the world today? Can anyone deny that improved understanding of the economic, social, and political life of other nations would be beneficial to America and to Americans? Can anyone argue against the need to cope with the internationalization of knowledge? What university would not

covet a deepening knowledge of the peoples of the world, a cognizance of why they live as they do, an understanding of how best to achieve mutual accommodation? What university would not like to bestow upon its graduates the power, as Mark Van Doren put it, "to multiply and explore choices so that the world ceases to be a little place trimmed to the dimensions of one's private experience."⁴

As we assess the need for curriculum reform which reflects an international dimension, we must also explore ways in which the universities can enlarge the nation's manpower resources in the field of international affairs. Since trained personnel capable of dealing with international problems are in scarce supply, our colleges and universities must be committed to improved efforts in providing international specialists.

Both the public and private sectors of the United States are now conducting a wide spectrum of activities in every corner of the globe, and these activities increase with each passing year. The need for well-trained people who have knowledge related to global affairs is acute.

Dr. John Fayerweather, Professor of International Business at New York University, brought home forcibly the requirements for the development of human resources with an international aptitude in a paper he prepared several years ago, but which has even heightened implications for today. Dr. Fayerweather predicted then that in the near future "at least half of those in management positions in major U.S. firms will, during their careers, have some significant international responsibility." One needs only to scan the financial pages of our newspapers to appreciate the vast amount of resources which American business firms are investing abroad. Not a week goes by without my office receiving a request from some firm or institution for assistance in locating prospective staff members with the skills for successful performance overseas.

I have suggested that a proper role for a university in international affairs might be the development of a spirit of educational cooperation, a spirit which would link the American university with educational institutions abroad. I envision a time in the not too distant future when we will enjoy a broad interaction of world scholars and the marriage of educational programs of American universities with similar programs of universities overseas. Such educational arrangements already exist to a limited degree in language and area studies, of course, but I foresee a much broader association, one which would

involve department-to-department relationships on a continuing basis; professor partnerships, one here and one there; a broad exchange of students and faculty; and a sharing of libraries and research facilities, among many other possibilities.

Arguments for these arrangements are compelling. Beyond the obvious implications relationships of this kind would have of increasing our national knowledge base and of injecting new vitality into our educational institutions, consider the likelihood that *such a world-wide community of higher education might be able to transcend the fluctuating relationships between nations and retain avenues of communication and cultural exchanges even in times of crisis and stress. A strong educational linkage of universities might very well be able to surmount the changing attitudes of governments and the seemingly inevitable vacillation between conditions of friendship and hostility.*

The potential in such mutually reinforcing collaborations has already been demonstrated. Through the technical assistance programs sponsored by the federal government, the universities proved it possible to establish direct working relationships with foreign institutions, and verified the existence of conditions for natural partnerships marked by common interests.

The experience gained by participation in various government-promoted technical assistance activities has created a high degree of optimism for the value of such projects and for the impact they can have on the overall educational programs of the university. Most of these technical assistance programs were conceived originally to share our technical resources and capabilities with the less developed areas of the world. But they have also served as vast laboratories in which theories could be proved and techniques honed to a fine point.

Looking ahead to the future, what we have learned in these overseas programs might prove invaluable as universities are asked to attend to the needs of our decaying cities here at home, to lessen the gaps between the poor and the rich, and to reverse the decline of rural America.

In seeking out solutions to the problems which plague less developed nations, scholars and researchers, allied with the technical assistance programs, have exposed large areas in which more knowledge is needed, and have identified the thirst for new ways in which knowledge can be applied.

One such problem — the world population growth — was recently

the subject of a message sent to Congress by President Nixon. In his message, the President cited statistics which illustrated the world's dramatically increased rate of population growth, and he observed that it is in the developing nations that population is growing most rapidly today. In these areas, the President noted, the rate of natural increase is "higher than any which have been experienced in all of human history."⁵ The statistics showed that at present rates, many of the underdeveloped countries will double and some may even triple their present populations before the year 2000.

Is there any problem more deserving of study by our university scientists? In President Nixon's words: "Population growth is a world problem which no country can ignore, whether it is moved by the narrowest perception of national self-interest or the widest vision of a common humanity."⁶

Our universities can help by supporting government efforts which are initiated, and by establishing research and knowledge centers to cope with the dilemma. This obviously will require a comprehensive and innovative approach which probes from all angles and directions. It will have to gauge population and family planning, consider the adaptation and extension of food production and distribution, and develop techniques for helping safeguard the environment. Here indeed is a challenge for our university specialists in the social, environmental, and biological sciences, for our engineers, our ecologists, our humanists, our teachers of law. For the population explosion is a universal problem, one which can — as the panel of the United Nations Association said — "impair individual rights, jeopardize national goals, and threaten international stability."

Nor are the advanced industrial countries like the United States immune from this problem. On the contrary, even our nation's modest population growth rate of one percent per year presents formidable challenges. Where, for example, will we put the additional one hundred million persons who will be living in this country just thirty years hence? How will we house, feed and educate them? When the American society grows to such dimensions, will our political institutions be able to respond to the strains? Will we be able to provide adequate health care and transportation? Will the ecological system be equal to the pressures that will be placed upon it?

These are serious questions that must be answered in the United States, but note how much more difficult it would be for underdeve-

loped countries to answer such questions in behalf of themselves, when faced with far greater growth rates, and when their capacity to deal with the problem is so much less than ours.

Thus you can see that the role of universities in international affairs is limited only by the available resources and our lack of vision. Many of us found hope in the International Education Act of 1966 and were disappointed when Congress failed to fund it. For here was a unique opportunity to build new bridges between peoples and nations, to span the fissures which separate us, and to forge a continuous, reliable and available means of world communications.

It was a golden opportunity which was fumbled. But because Congress failed to perceive the moment, the universities need not commit the same mistake. Indeed, we must share in the blame for Congress's omission, for had we been effectively playing our roles, Congress would have had the public support it needed to have implemented the Act. We can hope for the day when the error is corrected, but in the meantime there is much we can and need do on our own.

Over the past quarter of a century, the universities have been fashioning a critical mass of manpower competence which is not singularly prepared to serve America in the international area. With daring and foresight, we can fulfill our roles and in so doing, be true to the calling of the university.

NOTES

1. Thomas H. Huxley, *A Liberal Education: and Where to find It*, a lecture given in 1868 at the South London Working Men's College.
2. Ibid.
3. Henry David Thoreau, *Walden, Cambridge, Massachusetts* Houghton Mifflin, Riverside Press, 1854, p. 499.
4. Mark Van Doren, *Liberal Education*, New York: Books Inc., distributed by Henry Holt and Company, 1948, p. 66.
5. Richard M. Nixon, *The President's Message to Congress on World Planning of Population Growth*, July 19, 1970.
6. Ibid.

II

INTRODUCTION TO THE GENERAL THEORY AND ISSUES OF THE INSTITUTION BUILDING MODEL

This section provides a current examination of the institution building model. It assumes a basic knowledge and familiarity with the primary institution building concepts. The four papers elaborate on different themes of the institution building perspective, but they share a concern for the usefulness of the model for planned social change, and the need to improve it through greater conceptual clarity and additional research.

The initial paper in the section, by Milton Esman, has a broad state of the art character and consists of four related parts. The first third of the paper is an explication of the objectives and assumptions of the IB model, and spells out the boundaries of the model in terms of its concern with guided social change. The middle third of the paper is a critical examination of the basic concepts of the model. This discussion is particularly valuable because it considers both the problems and uses of the concepts since their early formulation. The third section is concerned with the relationship between technical assistance and institution building, at first generally, and then in terms of five specific problems which continue to plague institution building efforts. These three sections of this paper are concerned with substantive issues and problems of the IB model; the last section is concerned with coordinating the various conceptual and methodologi-

cal activities that are occurring, and with diffusing the information derived from these activities.

In his paper on "Planning and Development: An Ideological Typology," Eaton presents three distinct ideologies which describe three different approaches or orientations of organizations toward public service. While an agency may not have such an ideology in such a pure form, it undoubtedly has some basic assumptions, even if unstated, which serve as a basis for its operational decisions. The paper is directed ostensibly to community development and planning agencies, but its implications for all programs of planned social change are quite obvious. The three ideological models, Social Darwinist, Expertist and Mutualist, have very different assumptions about the nature and role of leadership in effecting change. Of fundamental importance to this volume are the ways the three ideologies influence the type of relationships an agency has with other agencies and the society in general.

Siffin's paper is a critique of the institution building perspective. He critically examines the basic concepts and premises, and then asks whether it constitutes a theory. There is some similarity in topics with Esman's paper, but not much overlap because Esman's focus is more on developing the logical consistency of the model whereas Siffin is more concerned with its heuristic qualities. In this context, much of his paper is devoted to defining an institution not only in terms of internal goals and characteristics, but also how it relates to its external environment. He points to many of the pitfalls, both semantic and operational, that are encountered in the use of the model.

The final paper in this section is concerned with the relationship of institution building *project* goals and the goals of the assisted or host institution. The differences between project and institutional maturity are examined in view of these different goals. The lack of adequate baseline indicators by which to indicate change is also considered. One of the main themes of this section appears again in this paper, i.e., that "organization" is a means of getting a job done. Although Siffin's treatment of this point is quite different, the basic idea is there also. A major section deals with what is meant by institutionalization in an effort to point out various indicators or guidelines that can be used to determine what changes or developments have occurred in an institution. Some broader implications for social change are also briefly considered.

5. Some Issues in Institution Building Theory

MILTON J. ESMAN

Institution building (IB) is an approach to social change. It is concerned with innovations that imply qualitative changes in norms, in behavior patterns, in relationship, in new perceptions of goals as well as means. It is not concerned with reproducing familiar patterns, with marginal deviations from previous practices, or with incremental improvements in efficiency. The dominant theme is innovation.

The IB model however, does not purport to explain or to prescribe a unique process of social change. There at least five major classes of social change: 1) *Evolutionary* changes, the gradual spread of new ideas or technologies usually associated with diffuse "felt needs," demands, or change readiness in appropriate sectors of the society. The change process is more or less autonomous and not sponsored by official authority. Innovations tend to be diffused by pluralistic communication processes. The model implies a reasonably permissive environment in which individuals and organized groups can express their interests, preferences and reservations in accepting, modifying, or resisting proposed innovations. 2) *Revolutionary* changes, produced by the violent rejection of established institutions and the symbols that sustain them. Revolutionary changes may be guided by highly organized groups or they may be largely uncontrolled and directed by mass pressures. Since the principal change tactic is physical and psychological coercion, revolutionary change implies a manipulated

environment in which individual and organized group interests are not free to apply their preferences to the acceptance or rejection of proposed changes except at very high cost. 3) *Dialectical change*, where the struggles between competing values or practices result in a resolution that is different from the original preferences of either party. One version of the dialectic is the mutual adjustment process, a form of compromise or accommodation; another is the integrated solution by which both parties are better satisfied with the outcome than with their original expectations. Dialectical processes are usually unguided and they assume a reasonably permissive environment in which changes occur by non-coercive methods. 4) *Coercive changes* are imposed by domestic (Stalin's collective farms) or external change agents (U.S. military government in Japan, colonial administration) using force as their principal method. Coercive change is guided and it implies a manipulated environment in which preferences cannot be freely expressed and actions must comply with manifest force. 5) *Guidance changes* denote *deliberate* efforts to induce innovations. The environment implied by guidance processes, however, is reasonably permissive. Individuals and organized groups are able to express their preferences and the terms on which they are prepared to accept or reject the innovations which change agents are attempting to introduce by providing useful services (functional tactics), manipulating values (normative tactics) or deploying power (political tactics).

The following chart lists these five models and indicates whether the change process is directed or non-directed and whether the environment is permissive or manipulated:

| <i>Change Process</i> | <i>Directed (D) or Non-Directed (ND)</i> | <i>Environment Permissive (P) or Manipulated (M)</i> |
|-----------------------|--|--|
| 1. Evolutionary | ND | P |
| 2. Revolutionary | D or ND | M |
| 3. Dialectical | ND | P |
| 4. Coercive | D | M |
| 5. Guidance | D | P |

The IB model of social change is meaningful only in the context of the fifth, or guidance category: innovations deliberately induced but toward a permissive environment capable of an autonomous response. It is not adequate to explain or to provide operational guidance for the other models of social change. Thus IB is not a unique social change model nor is it universally valid. But it does apply to innumer-

able situations in contemporary societies in which: 1) change agents, usually enjoying some measure of official sponsorship or indulgence, attempt to impress their goals, their images, or preferred norms and action patterns on a society; 2) the components of the society that are relevant to the proposed innovations must be induced — they cannot be merely coerced — to accept the innovations and have the capacity to resist or to reject them if the inducements fail; 3) formal organizations are employed as the media or vehicles through which change agents develop the technical capacities and the normative commitment needed to guide, sustain and protect the intended innovations. IB is thus a learning and political, rather than a coercive process, but the innovations are deliberately induced and guided by persons attempting to extend their influence. The changes attempted by most non-totalitarian governments in all sectors of activity, from agriculture to industry, health, education, urban affairs, public administration, and science policy, are amenable to guided change in the form visualized by the IB model. This applies especially to activities in which foreign technical assistance is a factor.

A Guidance Model

The IB model does not purport to explain or to prescribe a unique process of social change. It does describe a change process induced and guided by a group of change agents. It is thus an elitist theory with an implicit social engineering bias. Changes occur from the top down, not from the bottom up, and they are guided by persons enjoying a measure of official authority or sanction. The vehicle of change is a formal, and probably bureaucratic, organization which combines the technical capabilities and the value commitments required to initiate innovations, and to promote and protect them in the environment that is relevant to the organization. Its environment is a set of organizations or groups, each operating in its own substantive domain and pursuing its own interests. With these organizations and groups, the innovative organization must establish and maintain a set of transactional and exchange relationships which insure its access to resources, outlets for its products, and environmental support for its innovations.

The object is to achieve *institutionality*—meaning that innovative norms and action patterns are valued within the organization and by the larger society and are incorporated into the behavior of linked

organizations and groups. Thus the environment becomes supportive of the innovations, and the organization, as well as the innovations it represents, become valued and meaningful elements in the surrounding society. At this point, the institution has been built and the process for which this model is directed has been fulfilled. The model does not deal with subsequent stages in the life cycle of an institutionalized organization, with organizational maintenance through time, including their tendency to become the resistors of subsequent innovations, or the process by which an institutionalized organization may sustain and renew its innovative thrust.

Like any system functioning in a changing environment under conditions of uncertainty, the organization and the change processes to which its leadership is committed must be *managed*. However thorough and skillful the initial design and the planning, IB is never a self-executing or self-fulfilling process. It is a continuous process of coping with uncertainty and contingencies, with human and technological shortcomings, and with competitive interests. Thus the leadership must be continuously learning and adjusting, not only correcting variances from an original design, but making major changes in tactics, in timing, in programming, in resource allocation, and even in redefining institutional goals. Continuous and active management is indispensable. The managers must focus simultaneously on the organization itself, so that it may be a viable instrument of change, and on its external linkages and exchanges, so that the environment may become supportive of the new institution and accommodate its innovations. IB theory rejects the proposition that meaningful change can be a straightforward transfer of technology, know-how, or improved practice from one culture to another. Its more significant and sophisticated contributions to social change theory are that: (1) many significant innovations are not spontaneous, they are induced and guided; (2) they are not disembodied, but are incorporated and sustained through organization; (3) diffusion and acceptance of innovations by society is not a mere learning or communications activity, but a political process as well; and (4) building the organization and guiding its linkage relationships are simultaneous, inter-related, and mutually supportive activities.

Some Underlying Assumptions

The IB model makes a number of assumptions about *environment*,

about *organization*, about *change processes*, about *institutionalization*.

About *environment*, it posits not a vacuum into which innovations can be poured and absorbed, but an ongoing pattern of relationships in which individuals, groups and especially organizations, each participating in an area of activity, promote and protect their own interests, which are sanctioned by the larger system of which they are a part. Environments, however, are not closed and static systems, nor are they monolithic. They, too, are changing and differ in their change readiness and change resistance, both to generalized change and to specific innovations. The managers of different organizations may perceive their interests differently and thus vary in their readiness or resistance to proposed innovations. It is the first task of change agents to assess these environmental realities in detail. They cannot assume that there is a demand in the environment for their product, which may be a service, organizational, or technological product, however meritorious they conceive it to be. An unfulfilled demand for a new product may exist but more often than not, such demand is only latent. The market is competitive and must be developed. They have to expect and identify environmental hostility to innovations, and even when this is minimal, they must expect that other organizations may compete for control of the market which the change agents are seeking to enter, and may attempt to preempt proposed innovations by adopting some changes on their own. Briefly, the environment is essentially political, and may present a broad spectrum of generalized change readiness and change resistance, as well as receptivity and resistance to specific innovations. The environment also presents a complex of intellectual, normative, technical, and resource constraints, opportunities and capabilities to provide the inputs or accept the outputs of the organization, regardless of the political factors already referred to.

About *organization*, the model assumes the capacity of formal organizations to socialize those who come within its boundaries to new norms and action patterns, so long as the contact is long enough in duration and socialization is an explicit concern. Thus, organization can decisively influence the behavior of staff members and, in the case of schools, of students whom it processes for new roles. Organizations are not merely technical conversion or service-providing structures, though they do both. They do not merely reflect the values of the environmental system in which they participate. They have the capacity to act on their environment, particularly on the specific sub-systems

with which they carry on transactions and maintain linkage relationships. Thus, organizations can be dynamic vehicles through which change agents can impress their values both on persons within their boundaries, as well as on external contacts. The type of organization implicitly assumed in the IB model is bureaucratic, with specialization of roles, formal rules, and hierarchical authority structures. Not only is this the most common form of organization in modern societies, but it is the one through which guidance methods of management can most readily function. Within this form of organization, there may be many degrees of centralization and decentralization, of authoritarian or collegial decision-making, of permissiveness and of control, but the form is essentially bureaucratic constitutive.

IB implies the process of investing in organization, a concept not yet incorporated into economic theory.¹ This implies the continuity of the organization, and the willingness of change agents to sacrifice current outputs for future capacity. One invests not only in physical facilities, but also in the technical and managerial capabilities of staff, in access to informational resources that are processed and stored for future use, in internal communication capabilities so that information may move quickly and thus facilitate more prompt and rational action, and in sources of social support. One invests normatively in the organization so that its component units and individuals may be motivated by similar goals and expectations, bring the same value premises to bear on problems that arise, develop a high degree of interpersonal trust and thus put forth greater effort than their salaries alone could evoke, because they derive part of their rewards from the psychic satisfactions of serving an organization and a set of purposes they believe in. Organization is more than an aggregation of individuals and equipment, and both the technical performance and the commitments it evokes result from what has been invested in it.

The assumption that an organization must have a minimally effective administrative structure before IB strategies can hope to succeed has been vindicated by one field research report. The Pittsburgh team at the Central University in Ecuador found that the diffuse distribution and the absence of effective central administration in an organization that was already highly institutionalized and in nearly perfect equilibrium, both internally and with its environment, provided none of the leverage that change agents, particularly external change agents, would require to move the institution along the innovative paths to

which they were committed.² Though the structure of the university was not the sole cause of the failure of this project, it contributed significantly. The institution as an entity could not be directed. The IB model implies a leadership with the capacity to evoke some response from its organization and to act through the organization on its external environment. Where the structures and the norms of the organization exclude this possibility and thus deny the opportunity for guidance, the IB model of social change is not applicable. To test this proposition further, the institution building research program has commissioned research on several types of nonbureaucratic structures, such as Yugoslav communes, Israeli *mochavim*, and Mexican business associations. These reports have not yet been completed.

About *change processes*, the model implies induced, rather than spontaneous, initiation and guided, rather than autonomous, diffusion. Unanticipated events, some favorable and some unfavorable to change agent goals will inevitably crop up, but in this rationalistic guidance model, the main reliance is on planned and managed change. The three main change processes are technological, cultural and political. *Cultural* or normative methods rely on efforts to change individual or group values, attitudes, or role perceptions using ideological, indoctrinative, emotional, symbolic, group dynamic and other subcognitive methods. *Technological* or functional methods rely on cognitive information, or on new practices or services to induce fresh action patterns and intellectual commitments to changed roles and activities. *Political* methods rely on the redistribution of power, redefinition of rewards, manipulation of resources, or the use of influence and bargaining to produce behavioral change. In any major IB effort, all three methods must be used in a variety of sequences and combinations which it should be the objective of research to clarify.

About *institutionalization*, the end product of IB, the model stipulates a series of tests. The survival of the organization is a necessary but not sufficient condition of institutionalization. Even the building of a viable organization is not a sufficient test, for the organization may be functioning and even prospering, but if its managers have made too many compromises with its environment so that it has sacrificed its innovative purposes, it represents only another example of a conventional organization. A new institution has not been built. The achievement of intrinsic value in its environment is the second test, and this can be measured by the autonomy it has

gained in the development of its program, in its internal management, in its access to resources, and by the influence it is able to exercise on its external environment. The third test is the spread effect of its activities, i.e., whether the relationships and action patterns embodied in the organization have become normative for other entities with which it interacts. A suggested fourth test is whether the institution can maintain its innovative thrust, that is, the ability to continue to innovate.³ That new norms and action patterns must be established both within the organization and in its relevant environment is clear, and both the organization and the innovations for which it stands should be institutionalized or prized in the environment. But are there circumstances when the new norms and practices become so well accepted by linked organizations, and generate such an innovative thrust in the environment that the original organizational vehicle for change loses its reason to survive? What are the implications for the new organization when this happens? Must the institution be valued intrinsically — beyond the task at hand — or is it sufficient for institutionalization that it be valued instrumentally only for the actual services it renders? The IB model, as originally developed, called for an intrinsic test of institutionality to provide symbolic and emotional sources of continuing support for innovations, to strengthen its legitimacy and thus enhance its capacity to exercise influence on linked organizations. Is this a necessary test of institutionality, and in what circumstances may instrumental, rather than intrinsic, tests be adequate?

About *time*, the original model has little to say on the duration of the process, the synchronization and sequences of activities, or the stages of development, except to recognize time in its many dimensions as a problem. Clearly, the time horizons of the change agents, the availability of resources of all kinds, and the change readiness or resistance of the environment, will influence their strategies. Since institution building is more than a technical activity, it cannot be equated in time with the building of an organization which is only one element in the process. Duncan and Pooler estimate that the IB process should require at least eight years.⁴ The CIC-AID researchers, building on Taylor,⁵ have posited a three stage sequence — launching, growth and consolidation, and maturity — and have identified detailed indicators of progress, especially for agricultural universities associated with external technical assistance inputs. Others have questioned

the conceptual and empirical validity of fixed sequences or stages. Taylor has proposed as one temporal tactic, a Maoist two-step-forward-one-step-backward sequence in challenging and penetrating the external environment of a business school.

Important Problem Areas

The original model developed by the IB research consortium, though expressed in analytical clusters of variables, had a markedly normative tone. The principle change agents were identified as the *leadership*, a group with a series of professional, managerial, and political attributes that facilitated the guidance of the organization building, and the linkage management elements of the IB process. Competent in both these roles and committed to innovation, their tasks were: (1) to define and diffuse *doctrine*, the specification of values, objectives, and operating styles of the organization, both internally and externally; (2) to translate doctrine into *programs* (the outputs of the organization) through policies and action measures that involve choices of tactics; (3) to mobilize and develop personnel, financial, informational, and physical *resources* (the inputs of the organization); (4) to combine men and equipment into *structures* of authority, communications, and technical conversion which enable the organization to carry out its programmed activities and to interact effectively with its environment. Four classes of external *linkages* were identified: enabling (which control the allocations of authority and resources), functional (which supply inputs or use outputs and are complementary or competitive to the subject institution), normative (which incorporate norms and values relevant to its doctrine or program), and diffuse (which reflects unorganized public opinion significant to the institution). The objective of leadership was: (5) to so establish and manage these external transactions and exchanges, with all the pulling and hauling and the competitive influences that these relationships necessarily imply, that the end product would be the acceptance and the institutionalization both of the new organization, and the new norms and action patterns which it represents. The innovations promoted by the change agents would be incorporated into the action patterns of linked organizations, perhaps with modifications produced by the learning process and by political bargaining; the new (or reconstituted) organization, in turn, would become a prized and meaningful structure in an environment that it had helped to modify

and to modernize; and at this point the curtain would fall on the successful fulfillment of an IB venture since this is as far as the IB model extends.

In simplified terms, this is how the process would work if there were no snags. But invariably there are snags that complicate any deliberate tampering with existing social structures or patterns of relationship when one gets down to specific experiences. There are now a respectable number of cases that have been studied and documented, from which insights can be gained and lessons learned. The sources are the case studies sponsored by the IB research consortium itself,⁶ the analyses conducted by the CIC-AID scholars, and independent studies like the Harvard-M.I.T. analyses of the management training in India, all of which have been influenced by the IB model. The comments that follow do not represent a comprehensive analysis of the available materials but rather a set of impressions from a reading of a sample of the available output.

The Conceptual Scheme

A change producing and change protecting organization, transacting in a mutual influence network with linked structures in its environment, has proved to be a useful way of visualizing the process of induced or guided change, and is flexible enough to apply to a wide variety of structures and circumstances.⁷ I am confident that it can be equally useful in industrialized, as in developing countries where social change is the objective. The specific clusters of variables have also held up quite well, although some of them, especially the "resources" variable, have proved to be too inclusive and too aggregative for some scholars. Thus the CID-AID group has eliminated the single "resources" cluster and substituted "technical personnel" and "physical and financial resources," and apparently eliminated "information" as a resource. They have also substituted the anaemic variable, "institutional tradition and attitude," for the more powerful variable of "doctrine," an unfortunate change to which I shall refer later.

Uphoff and Ichman propose that greater emphasis should be placed on the resources variable, for they conceive the IB process essentially in terms of mobilizing and allocating resources that will provide adequate inducements for linked organizations to modify their norms and behavior. Resources should be allocated (i.e., policies, programs, and tactics developed) so as to generate additional and

reliable flows of resources for the leadership to manage. "Resources," as they define the concept, include not only physical, economic, informational and personnel categories, but also "authority," "status," "legitimacy," and "force," which can also be deployed by managers on behalf of change goals — reducing the cost to them of getting changes accepted. They endorse the IB proposition that leadership must attempt to distribute to linked organizations a substantial margin of perceived benefits over perceived costs in values that are salient to the latter, and argue that resource management is the way benefits and costs can be calculated and distributed.⁹

The original scheme did not deal clearly enough with the identification of the *principle change agents*. It tended to equate them with formal leadership. This is clearly not adequate in many cases, yet I am not aware that this subject has been treated systematically in any of the research completed to date. I am familiar with situations in which the real change agents — in addition to those who constituted enabling linkages — were foreign advisors, foundation personnel, local officials in other government agencies, and subordinate staff within the subject organization. The formal leaders were not intellectually or emotionally committed to change (nor were they mere ciphers), yet other change agents were able to exert considerable influence on the organization's behavior.

This is not an optimal or an easy situation, but the influence network manages to work around the formal leadership when this is necessary. Even when leadership is more competent and committed, effective change agents may be located in other centers, e.g., influential sympathizers who can be relied upon for help when needed, yet do not fit into any of the linkage categories. Perhaps it is a good rule not to venture into IB situations unless such informal, influential supporters can be identified and mobilized in advance. Briefly, I suspect that the change agent variable has not been sufficiently defined and analyzed, or distinguished from formal leadership.

The original model does not allot enough attention to *strategic planning*. The case studies report numerous instances of IB ventures (with and without technical assistance support) where commitment and action preceded planning, would-be institution builders were wallowing in oceans of ignorance about the environment in which they were operating, and the resources available to them, had only the vaguest conception of their goals, and improvised strategy as they

coped "pragmatically" with unexpected situations. Often the pressures required to "sell" projects, or political urgency, create irresistible demands for immediate manifest action and feasibility studies are preprogrammed to recommend commitment. In how many cases has the American land-grant college — extension service — family farm model found its way into project agreements with no real assessment of alternatives? And even when the model chosen was feasible and responsive to local needs and the environment had been carefully assessed for supports and resistance, how often was a detailed strategy plotted and time-phased?

Among the strategic issues that might be accounted for in planning an IB venture are the following: a) What *innovations* are most suitable to the circumstances — a decision that depends on the preferences and commitments of change agents, their knowledge of available alternatives, and their assessment in detail of the elements of change readiness and change resistance, and of specific sources of support in the environment? b) What *organization* should be the vehicle, an existing one that can be restructured, or a new one?⁹ c) What *leadership patterns* are suitable — centralized or pluralistic; what are the desired qualifications of leadership? Who are available as the initial incumbents? d) What *sources of essential resources* can be relied on for such inputs as funds, personnel, information, authority and at what price; who are likely to take the *organization's outputs* on acceptable terms? e) What shall be the *initial operating program* and tactics, and how should activities be phased over time? What shall be the relative priorities between building the organization, providing useful services, and extending innovations? f) How shall the *organization be designed* and staff requirements determined so that operating programs may be consistent with organizational capacities, and synchronized with staff development activities? g) What are the *significant linkages*, and how can doctrine and program help to influence the behavior of each linkage in the desired direction? What combination of survival, service, and change tactics should be employed at successive points in time? h) What *control mechanisms* should be employed to monitor current performance and to evaluate institutional progress? i) What shall be the role of *technical assistance* in this venture? What should be the specific relationship of foreign and domestic personnel in the various internal management activities of the organization?

Even the most carefully laid strategic plans may go awry as they

encounter unexpected events, or the consequences of failure to assess conditions or predict responses correctly. This is why IB is a guidance activity, not only correcting for minor variances in preprogrammed action, but often requiring major adjustments to feedback, including shifts in goals and time horizons, painful trade-offs between the promotion of particular innovations and the protection of the organization, and numerous unexpected adjustments in program content and in organizational structure. The complex and uncertain environment of social change, including both technical and political pitfalls, guarantee problems for any IB venture. But strategic planning can increase the probability of success without exacting unacceptable costs in delay, and it may prevent some projects from ever being started. More exacting strategic planning, and the required analyses, would probably have prevented the disastrous and costly Pittsburgh project at the Central University in Ecuador from ever being undertaken.¹⁰

Allied with strategic planning, as Jacobson has indicated, is the need for evaluative research, not only to support particular projects, but also to contribute knowledge to the science and the practice of guided social change.¹¹ The need for ongoing research to appraise the activities of an institution, along many dimensions of performance (including internal development, program performance, environmental acceptance) at different stages in its development was recognized early in the history of the IB consortium. The related need to identify generalized indicators of the major dimensions of performance, along with specific indicators for each project, was also recognized. Nehnavaysa devised a comprehensive scheme for the ongoing evaluation of institutional performance.¹² The purpose of such research would not merely be to appraise and correct variances in an earlier plan, but to point out needs and opportunities to adjust strategy and tactics to new and emerging realities, and to the product of organizational learning. The IB research consortium was never able to build this admittedly costly element into any project to which it was able to gain research access; its studies were all retrospective. Any such research effort would have to involve indigenous scholars and research institutions. It would have to begin with the initiation of the project, and would represent innovation in societies not accustomed to empirical social science research of ongoing experiences, especially when governments and bureaucrats are involved.

All the case studies confirm the decisive importance of *leadership*.

The combination of attributes prescribed for successful institutional leadership has probably never been achieved in any human organization. The leaders that have actually been available in several cases already reported, their less than enthusiastic commitment to innovation or even to the organization itself, their limited competence, their disfunctional leadership styles, are a sobering expression of the less than optimal conditions under which many IB ventures begin. In some instances, no other leadership choice was feasible, and even better strategic planning might not have yielded better choices. Since leadership can be a group phenomenon, what tactics are available to compensate for particular leadership deficiencies, including the co-optation of technical assistance personnel into informal leadership roles, attenuating organizational goals to accommodate weak leadership while preparing for more adequate leadership succession, building on strength elsewhere in the organization, or even in linkage groups? None is a substitute for effective formal leadership, but it may be necessary for change agents either to improvise or to abandon their efforts.

So dependent is an embryonic institution on its leadership that this cluster of variables requires more systematic attention than it has yet received. Analytically, one might suggest such sub-variables as: a) *commitment* — the energy the leadership invests in the new organization and their intellectual and emotional interest in innovation (bearing in mind that in cases reported by Siffin and Birkhead, the leaders served part-time, their main attachment was to a more conservative institution, and they were not interested in innovation); b) *competence* — the technical, managerial, and political ability of leadership to handle internal and external tasks along IB lines; for this purpose it might be useful if research would yield more precise statements about the actual tasks of leadership, in both its internal organizational and its linkage management roles at different stages in institutional development, and for different kinds of organizations — action agencies as well as educational bodies; c) *continuity and succession* — the period of time the same leadership group is available to impress their influence on the organization, and the consequences of stability and discontinuity in leadership, planning for succession, the factors relevant to these choices, and the adjustment of institutions to the shock of leadership succession; d) *leadership styles* — including the degree of hierarchy-collegiality and authoritarianism-permissiveness in internal management, aggressiveness-accommodation in external relations,

and other attributes relating to style and the distribution of influence within the leadership group; e) *leadership tactics* — including relative priorities to internal and external problems, to caution and risk taking, longer or shorter time horizons, and the reference groups that claim its priorities. Closer definition of these or other sub-variables and the enunciation and testing of hypotheses that would indicate the consequences of different combinations of behavior for institutional performance at different stages in the IB process, would be instructive to those who may participate in the choice of institutional leaders, or in influencing their decisions and their behavior. Such knowledge might also help to orient leadership to their specific guidance responsibilities.

Doctrine has been the most elusive, but in my judgment, one of the most important clusters of variables in IB strategy. I am distressed that it has been downgraded by the CIC researchers as “institutional tradition and attitude,” which is a pale shadow of the originally rich concept. The underlying assumption of the doctrine variable is that the expression of values is a powerful orientor, motivator, and guide to behavior. It represents a set of criteria against which specific program decisions can be weighed, it develops group cohesion and evokes extra effort (a powerful “withinput” to use Frank Sherwood’s term), and it projects an image in the environment of what the organization stands for.¹³ The original institution building definition of doctrine as the “specification of values, objectives, and operational methods. . .the stable reference point. . .” has been proved by several researchers to be too static and too monolithic. Fred Bruhns has demonstrated that institutional doctrine is a combination of themes which can be and are manipulated by institutional leadership to enhance internal cohesion, and to make it more acceptable in the external environment.¹⁴

Management of values is not a trivial function of leadership, especially in an organization committed to innovative purposes in an environment where neither the organization nor its innovations have yet been accepted. It appears that doctrine is both a constraint and an instrument for leadership. As important orientors and motivators, values cannot be tampered with casually. Yet as expressed in doctrine, value themes can be manipulated to rationalize or pave the way for changes in program or styles of operation. Doctrine ought to be one of the key elements in strategic planning. Those IB efforts which have

been most successful, like the College of Education at the University of Nigeria, as reported by Hanson, had a highly visible and compelling doctrine that socialized its membership toward a common outlook, enhanced their productivity, reduced internal conflict, and made the organization and its innovations more acceptable and meaningful in its environment.¹⁵ The Public Administration Institute for Turkey and the Middle East, as reported by Birkhead, had little sense of identity or of purpose because it had no consistent or appealing doctrine. There is much to learn about value management at different stages in institution building, about the orienting and motivating effects of different kinds of value statements on different internal and external publics, about the consequences of different styles of articulating and projecting doctrinal themes, and about how various uses of doctrine produce varying outcomes. It is likely, for example, that inconsistent doctrinal statements indicate disagreement within the leadership group; that ambiguous doctrinal statements indicate a need to appeal to broader clienteles at the expense of normative purposes; and that pronounced emphasis on doctrinal themes indicates a determination to push normative changes rather than expand clientele or accommodate to the environment. Guided social change, unless it is purely opportunistic, cannot take place in the absence of guiding ideas and symbols relating to goals, means, and styles of organized action. Both for actors and analysts, it is essential that this cluster of variables be prominently represented in their orienting models.

Linkages. This concept has proved to be one of the most fruitful in the institution building scheme because it treats explicitly of the organization's external environment, and disaggregates that environment into identifiable structures and patterns of relationship that are both analytically and operationally capable of manipulation. It is less certain that the designated classes of linkages — enabling, functional, normative, and diffuse — have been analytically helpful. At one time, the IB consortium hoped that it might be possible to develop linkage mapping techniques that would graphically represent the universe of an institution builder, and help him to plan and to monitor the management of his primary and secondary linkages. Into this mapping scheme would be fed the substance and the styles of actions that were planned in advance — in the processes of strategic and program planning — for each linkage treated as a separate problem of tactics and relationships.¹⁶ The concept is simple, but the technology

has not yet been worked out to operationalize it.

The change-oriented organization not only makes demands on its environment and on specific publics, but it is also the target of their demands in a cooperative and competitive exchange of services and influences. Happy is the institution builder who enters a vacuum as the monopoly supplier of a desired or non-threatening service (like Blaise's Cambodian Teacher Training Center); or better still, is swinging with societal demands (like Hanson's College of Education in Nigeria).¹⁷ Often the demand is latent and has to be created, or program space is occupied or claimed by existing organizations and their products. In either case, the institution builder must determine what combinations of activities, including provision of useful services, the manipulation of doctrine, or the application of power, can move linkages in the desired directions, what coalitions are possible, which targets should assume priority in time, and what expedient concessions may have to be made and when. Every sophisticated institution builder deploys a battery of *survival*, *service*, and *change* tactics and uses them as appropriate. He does not just start producing and wait for the environment to respond. He plans and calculates and then responds to what he learns — or this is how our model institution builder would behave. But how distressingly few do so. Many of them regard their task as primarily technical — and fail to plan for their linkage encounters; or they react to resistance by premature accommodation and the sacrifice — or the deferment — of their innovative goals; or they move doggedly forward, innocent of the environment that is closing in on them, like the inept leaders of the ill-fated National Resources Planning Board in the United States government in the early 1940's.

Institutionalization means that the organization and its innovations are accepted and supported by the external environment. The environment has accommodated to their innovations more than the organization has accommodated to the original environment. But accommodation in the real world is usually a reciprocal process so that the operative question is how much "A" accommodates to "B," and on what issues. This adjustment process involves functional, normative, and power relationships. Institution builders must sometimes sacrifice or defer indefinitely a whole program in order to save another. Accommodation is often less dramatic — a set of incremental concessions that result in much accommodation and little innovation — the organiza-

tion survives (perhaps to fight tomorrow's battle), but no new institution has been built. The IB model implies a relatively stable, non-revolutionary environment. Too radical a set of deviations from familiar norms and practices will attract unmanageable and destructive opposition. Thus the managers of substantive and procedural innovations must make concessions to the local milieu, identify with well established popular themes, symbols, and slogans so that the venture starts with a maximum of legitimacy, supplementary to the services it can render and the power it can generate and deploy.¹⁸ Hanson and Siffen have pointed to the utility of providing useful services that meet the felt needs of skeptical clienteles, thus developing compatibilities, reducing perceptions of threat, and at the same time softening them up for more fundamental innovations in the future. Taylor has developed some interesting hypotheses on this process, including the "see-saw" model of first pushing hard, then retreating a bit, then resuming the offensive at a later date. Concessions in form or in style may provide trading opportunities for important issues of substance.

The complex question of linkage transactions and exchanges is in an unsatisfactory state of development in IB theory. Much experience is now available in completed reports and many insights have been produced, but they have not been reduced to systematic treatment. The management of linkages is part of strategic planning, as well as of the continuous tactical process of adapting an original plan to contingencies, unplanned consequences of action, and to the feedback from experience. We know increasingly what to look for, but we have yet to develop systematic analytical categories that enable us to bring the complexity of linkage phenomena under adequate intellectual control.

Technical Assistance

Technical assistance or external intervention is not an explicit variable in the IB model. The assumption is that non-coercive social change (as opposed, say, to military government) is essentially an indigenous phenomenon, and that particular instances of deliberate or guided change may or may not involve external participation. There has been no external participation that I know of, for example, in Yugoslav IB activities, nor even any external models to draw on. Nor are there any significant external influences in our own IB experiments in urban ghettos. Nevertheless, a large number of ventures in induced

change in less developed countries since World War II have involved external technical assistance change agents. Most of the researchers working in IB research have been drawn to the subject in order to strengthen technical assistance performance, and most of the sponsors of this work have clearly hoped for a payoff in this area.

It is clear that technical assistance can influence IB at any point, including strategic intervention with enabling linkages, in a manner that may be closed to indigenous change agents. (The latter must usually work within the styles and the channels of the indigenous system, while external interveners need not be so restricted.) The optimal roles of technical assistance personnel no doubt vary — as the CIC researchers have documented — at different stages in the IB process, but it appears that technical assistance is most critical in five types of activities:

- 1) *As providers of change models.* Technical assistance implies on the part of the indigenous elites, a recognition of inadequacies in the structure or performance of their own institutions. They are looking for better models and they rely on the experience or the intellectual achievements of other societies to supply these models, as well as the technical and managerial know-how to help local people use these instruments and fit them to local conditions.
- 2) *As participants in the leadership function,* in the framing of doctrine and priorities, the development of programs, and especially the building of the internal organization.
- 3) *As providers and allocators of valuable resources* (advisors, participant training opportunities, equipment, money, and information), which facilitate the process of induced change by providing both inducements and independence for domestic change agents. Resources also legitimize and increase the influence of foreign TA personnel.
- 4) The traditional Point Four and agricultural extension function of *transferring and adapting technology* through teaching, training, and demonstration is only one of the functions of technical assistance in an IB situation. In addition to its intrinsic importance, their technical contribution helps TA advisors to build confidence among local personnel, and this is indispensable to their major IB purposes.
- 5) An emergent, but increasingly important function for IB forms of technical assistance, is to incorporate *evalua-*

tive research into projects, research that will help local change agents to appraise their performance, adjust their programs to changing conditions and new information produced through organizational learning, and to contribute new knowledge to the science and to the art of guided social change. The United States, particularly its universities, has a pronounced advantage over aid donors in applied social science research. Its utility to developing countries may be so great that it ought to be included explicitly, perhaps as a requirement for future U.S. participation in many kinds of IB activities, and indeed, in other forms of technical assistance that relate to the design and management of large scale action programs.

Institution building research has already added materially to our knowledge of technical assistance. Technical assistance factors have been an important ingredient in virtually every IB study. Thanks to the CIC group, concepts and hypotheses are now available on (1) the roles of technical assistance groups, (2) at three stages of the institution building process, (3) for six elements (or variables) of institutional development, (4) for each of four relationship patterns (individual-technical, departmental level, top management organization, and external), plus (5) a scheme for measuring "institutional maturity"—the approach to institutionalization, and (6) a strategy for moving toward that phase.¹⁹ The uses of various technical assistance resources for guiding the IB process has been systematically treated.²⁰ Potter's related work on identifying and measuring progress toward the accomplishment of IB goals is also significant.²¹ While the CIC group of reports deals specifically with agricultural universities, they follow the basic IB model and their findings can readily be generalized to broader classes of experiences, particularly to educational structures in other disciplines and professions.

If one combines insights from the research-generated knowledge on technical assistance as an element in IB, a substantial body of useful data is now available. Even though, as academicians, we tend to discount what we know, and focus, for additional research opportunities, on what we still need to know, or on propositions that have not yet met rigorous tests of verification, we now have a respectable body of knowledge at our disposal. The time has come to codify it for two purposes:

- 1) to indicate important gaps in our knowledge which can focus priorities for future library and field research, and
- 2) to provide inputs for teaching and training IB practitioners.

In addition to its appeal to academic audiences — which for any work in induced social change or organization theory is far larger than the immediate technical assistance community — this codified knowledge could be used to orient and train technical assistance personnel, including those associated with U.S. universities prior to their participation in IB activities.

Five Outstanding Problems In IB-Oriented Technical Assistance

Of the many interesting problems in IB theory that require continuing attention, I have singled out five that relate especially to technical assistance:

How to get technical assistance personnel to perceive their roles in IB perspectives, not only through verbalization but also through behavior. Research findings indicate that most U.S. technical assistance personnel continue to be concerned more with immediate organizational outputs than with developing indigenous capabilities, more with technological transfer than with new norms, behavior patterns and organization building, and more with the internal organization than with external linkages. The emphasis is still overwhelmingly on secondary, rather than primary objectives, and this is even more true of non-American than of American effort. These distorted perspectives characterize AID mission directors, technicians, and contractors as well as officials of host governments. What can be done about this through sponsors such as AID and Ford, as well as by technical assistance contractors?

Though this is not a new theme, we are still weak in our cross-cultural perspectives and we are still inclined to assume, despite verbal disclaimers, the applicability of U.S. models to entirely different cultures, without recourse either to comparative models, which are increasingly available, or sufficient effort at the strategic planning stage to redesign familiar models to indigenous needs and capabilities, and to force local change agents to join in this kind of hard thinking. The fact that local change agents may be enthused about such American fads

- as PPBS or about TVA, or the Harvard case system of management education (or French planning techniques or Israeli *Kibbutzim*) does not absolve TA planners of the obligation to compel a joint and hard assessment in depth of alternative models.
- 3) There is still work to be done on the most fruitful tactics for applying external technical assistance energies in a particular IB project. The significant variables probably relate to the kinds of institutions being built, their stages of development, the capabilities and disposition of local leadership, and the change readiness or change resistance of the environment. We need criteria for determining what resources to apply and what tactics to employ under different conditions. Duncan and Pooler find that U.S. technical assistance seems more productive with internal organizational activities rather than external linkage management, and on technological rather than on normative issues and relationships. The CIC researchers indicate "optimal" patterns for deploying TA resources, particularly advisory personnel at successive stages in the development of agricultural universities.²²
 - 4) More attention is needed to patterns of association after major technical assistance has been terminated, presumably after an adequate degree of "maturity" and institutionalization have been achieved. The U.S. government is now considering how to maintain associational patterns and contacts after it withdraws foreign assistance from a country (e.g., Korea). But the same problems apply even more critically to specific institutions. Intellectual associations, cultivated by years of technical assistance, ought to be maintained if both parties find it beneficial. The pattern would have to be fully collegial. The U.S. institution might find it advantageous to have overseas partners for joint research enterprises, and for exchange of students and teachers. The foreign institution might find it useful to be in continuous contact with sources of professional innovation which are often not available to them in their own environment. Stable financing would appear to be the main problem in sustaining these relationships.
 - 5) How to train indigenous institutional leaders and prospective leaders in institution-building theory and practices.²³ U.S. professional schools and disciplinary departments are almost totally committed to specialized work, their bias is technological, and their implicit field of application is the United States. Could U.S. schools of

administration, if assured of sufficient long-term support, meet this requirement? Would their teaching be considered legitimate by other professional schools in the United States? And would participation in this type of experience carry enough professional clout in their home environments to make it attractive to indigenous personnel? What alternative education and experience might be available, recognizing that organization theory, combined with social change theory and practice, cannot be conveyed in quickie courses? The commitment must either be substantial or the training should not be attempted.

Final Query

The underlying assumption of IB theory is that IB is a generic process. This is still an hypothesis. The community of interested scholars is now spinning off research in a number of directions, each concerned with a functional class of institutions. As a result of the efforts of the CIC, we have probably delved deeper into agricultural teaching and research institutions — following the American land grant model—and their specific problems than any other type. But we also have evidence from more than a single source on management training centers, on youth service organizations, on national planning agencies, on administrative training institutes, and work is under way on local government, regional development authorities, universities, Chambers of Commerce, and even religious institutions. All of these studies, however, draw from, and contribute to the same mother lode of IB theory. Though the Ford Foundation, which has been very generous, will no longer support this research directly, AID has indicated a continuing interest in relation to its renewed emphasis on technical assistance. And though it began with a strictly international, less-developed country focus, IB may well be in demand for domestic development activities.

As groups like the CIC push more deeply into their specialized areas of concern, provision must be made to maintain communication among these groups and individuals working on specific sectors. To do so effectively will require that a group of scholars maintain a generic focus. We know much more about IB, we have a much richer repertory of concepts, and far more disciplined data than we did less than six years ago when the first exploratory conference on IB was held. But these data have not been sufficiently mined for generic insights,

theory building, or practitioner guidance. In fact, most of them have not been published. The IB consortium is now out of funds, and though IB field research will probably continue under many auspices, I am concerned about how the results of this research can flow together so that it may be collated, analyzed, and interpreted. The objective should be a more integrated product that may form a continuing process of improved theory building and operational guidance on which scholars in more specialized sectors may draw, and from which practitioners too may benefit.

The first phase of IB research has been completed. The objectives of the IB consortium which received its initial Ford Foundation grant in 1964 were to 1) develop a set of conceptual guidelines, 2) initiate field research disciplined by these common concepts, 3) determine whether field research using these guidelines was feasible and the results were theoretically and operationally interesting, 4) stimulate interest in IB approaches and in significant research and analytical work among other scholars in the U.S. and overseas, 5) further develop initial concepts and methodological approaches, and analyze and evaluate the research product comparatively, and 6) publish and disseminate the field research and the analytical studies. The first four of these objectives have been achieved; the fifth and sixth have not.

Now that IB has a much broader constituency, the next stage in IB research may call for a revised pattern of organization. What may be needed now is a looser structure that will facilitate exchanges of information on on-going research, on conceptual developments and methodological experiments, and on analyses and interpretations of research data in a comparative and generic framework. A headquarters will probably be needed to pull together these diverse constituents — each working more or less independently — and to serve as an exchange clearing house. It should, however, provide continuing intellectual leadership by stimulating and even initiating research designed to analyze and interpret available data, by drawing general conceptual and operational inferences from more specialized studies, by convening more conferences of scholars and practitioners on topics relevant to IB, and by other devices.

NOTES

1. I am indebted to Bertram Gross for this concept.

2. Hans Blaise and Luis Rodriguez, "Introducing Innovation in Ecuadorian Higher Education," (mimeo) IB Headquarters, University of Pittsburgh, 1967.
3. John Hanson posits the following tests of institutionality: Use of service, survival, support, respect and approval, normative spread, autonomy, innovative thrust. *Education Nsukka, A Study in Institution Building Among the Modern Ibo*. Michigan State University Press, 1968.
4. Richard Duncan and William Pooler, "Technical Assistance and Institution Building," (mimeo) Institution Building Headquarters, University of Pittsburgh, 1967.
5. Donald A. Taylor, *Institutionalization of the Discipline of Business Administration within the Brazilian University System*, Michigan State University, 1968.
6. A reasonably complete list appears in the Inter-University Research Program in Institution Building's *Report to the Ford Foundation* (mimeo), Institution Building Headquarters, University of Pittsburgh, 1964-68.
7. One of the minor and as yet unresolved problems in institution building theory is to outline the boundaries of the concept of "institution." While it must be a formal organization, it encompasses neither a whole sector of activity (the "educational" or "agricultural institution" of a society) nor a constituent unit which is totally dependent on a parent organization (the Biology Department of a College of Agriculture or the Statistics unit of the Bureau of Statistics). Is a national Department of Agriculture or its constituent Farm Credit Agency, Purdue University or its College of Engineering, an institution? Does it depend on the purpose of the inquiry? Are there institutions within institutions? The criteria suggested in 1962 (Esman: "Institution Building in National Development," *International Development Review*, December 1962) were "functional specificity of program, operating autonomy of management, and corporate identity of staff." Perhaps we should add "visibility to specific publics."
8. Norman Uphoff and Warren Ilchman, "The Time Dimension in Institution Building," Institution Building Headquarters, University of Pittsburgh, undated. This monograph is an interesting critique of IB theory.
9. One of the classical strategic problems of choice—to build a new institution or attempt to reform an established one—was recognized early in the deliberations of the institution-building consortium. As yet, no clear criteria of choice have been specified in the research that has been undertaken, though most scholars tend to favor the new organization as a less inhibiting vehicle for innovation, where this is possible. More precise criteria for this strategic choice are needed. See for example: Philip F. Warnken, "Strategies for Technical Assistance," (mimeo) Columbia, Missouri, June 1968 (one portion of the CIC-AID Report).
10. Blaise and Rodriguez: *op. cit.*
11. Eugene Jacobson, "Research in Institution Building: Lessons from the Field," (mimeo) prepared for CIC French Lick Conference on Institution Building Overseas, August 1968.

12. Jiri Nehnavaysa, "Methodological Issues in Institution Building Research," (mimeo) Institution Building Headquarters, University of Pittsburgh, 1964.
13. Frank Sherwood, "Social Exchange in the Institution Building Process," (mimeo) Institution Building Headquarters, University of Pittsburgh, 1967.
14. Fred Bruhns, "The Role of Values in the Management of Institutional Doctrine — the Institution Building Experience of an African Regional Organization," (mimeo) unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Institution Building Headquarters, University of Pittsburgh, 1969.
15. John Hanson: *Education Nsukka, A Study in Institution Building Among the Modern Ibo*, Michigan State University Press, 1968. Guthrie Birkhead: "Public Administration Institute for Turkey and the Middle East," (mimeo) Institution Building Headquarters, University of Pittsburgh, 1967.
16. Nehanvayas, *op. cit.*, proposed three sets of maps-blueprint (the original design), operational (actual performance), and image (the perceptions of salient participants and publics).
17. Hans Blaise, "The Process and Strategy of Institution Building in National Development," unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Pittsburgh, 1964.
18. Gilbert Siegel wisely cautions against excessive dependence on a single enabling linkage, for they are transitory. When President Vargas was overthrown, the Brazilian DASP, which had relied almost entirely on him for its support, and had not built linkage supports in its environment, was virtually wiped out, along with its administrative innovations. Prudent institution builders diversify, where possible, their sources of supply, their markets, and their normative support. See Gilbert Siegel, "Development of the Institution Building Model: Administrative Department of Public Service in Brazil (DASP)," (mimeo) Institution Building Headquarters, University of Pittsburgh, 1966.
19. The work by J. A. Rigney, J. K. McDermott, R. W. Roskelley has been combined in the North Carolina Agricultural Experiment Station publication "Strategies in Technical Assistance," Technical Bulletin 189, December 1968.
20. Philip Warnken: *op. cit.*
21. Harry Potter, "Criteria of Progress and Impacts of Technical Assistance Projects in Agriculture," (mimeo) CIC, Purdue University, 1968.
22. See Rigney, McDermott and Roskelley: *op. cit.*
23. I am indebted to Dean Rigney for highlighting this problem.

6. Planning and Development: An Ideological Typology*

JOSEPH W. EATON

The transmission of ideas from one country to another is an important ingredient of foreign aid. This is why experts are sent abroad or students from developing countries study in the United States methods of agricultural extension, the establishment of a University, or of a manufacturing plant. The concept of *institution building* has been adopted to describe this mechanism by one inter-university group dedicated to basic research in that field. The focus is on analysis of techniques to create "viable innovation organizations which perform important services and set standards for society."¹

The adoption of new organizational procedures is a more complex process than the cross-cultural transfer of money or technical skill. New procedures have ideas associated with them. And they tend to have an impact on the larger social system. It is relatively simple for a country to accept dollars for relief or to buy tractors. A greater potential for change exists when there is the transfer of an ideology or scientific ethos, such as a Youth Corps and its expectation that adolescents accept a public service ideology — not merely one to serve personal needs.²

It is rare for one country to be able to adopt *in toto* the organizational procedures and ideals of another. What usually takes place are

* Revision of a previously published essay on "Community Development Ideologies" *International Review of Community Development*, No. 11, 1968: 37-50.

selective adaptations, along with variations to cushion the impact of the new ideas on the established order of things. The new organization has to have linkages with well established ones. Those concerned with foreign aid therefore must make use of analytical tools that enable them to abstract from one culture the most relevant ideas of an institution, and recognize them when they first appear as a new organization, often in a very different form, in another cultural system. One such analytical tool is what sociologists know as *ideal type* conceptualizations.

Ideal type concepts, in contrast to empirical concepts, go beyond that part of reality that can be observed through sense organs and instruments. They include inferred explanations of how phenomena are related to each other. Ideal types are abstract logical constructs, which as Arnold Rose points out, are almost never realized in actuality.³ They are formed by a one-sided accentuation of one or more points of view, and a synthesis of a great many diffuse, discrete, and more or less present, and occasionally absent, concrete individual phenomena.⁴ The logical process by which they are derived has been described as analytical induction by Florian Znaniecki.⁵ An ideal type concept is a symbolic sketch, as for example, the distinction to be made in this essay between *Social Darwinist*, *Expertist* and *Mutualist* modes of community development. None of these types fully describe a particular social system. They are concepts to identify comparable elements found in many systems.

Applying the Ideal Type Method to Community Development

Much of what foreign aid specialists think they know is based on intuition derived from specific experiences. In order to test their hunches, it is necessary to find comparable situations where checks can be made to see if the experience can be verified. This methodological requirement, if strictly applied, would make systematic research impossible. There are no fully comparable social systems. Comparability has to be inferred by isolating elements that occur in many otherwise different social systems. The government of Israel, for instance, is helping several dozen countries to develop youth corps programs. Trainees are brought into the country to study both theory and practice under the tutelage of Israeli experts. Other youth program specialists are sent overseas to conduct courses in the more than fifty countries requesting aid, and to assist them administratively in getting

programs started. No two aid efforts are alike. Each has been adapted to local conditions, expectations, and beliefs.

Comparative study of these institutional innovations can proceed by abstracting a number of variables, such as ideology or doctrine, leadership selection, administrative control, and membership turnover. They are found in each program. These variables of planned organizational development can be compared by relating them to other relevant concepts for describing the larger social system in which they occur.

This is useful whenever there is self-conscious concern with national development. Organizations are set up—often where none existed before—primarily to serve “public service” objectives. Public service ideologies are generally equated vaguely with goals like good citizenship, patriotism and being a good neighbor. Such planned developments are the opposite of fatalistic acceptance of the status quo. They rest on the assumption that man need not be passive with regard to nature. He can exploit its resources to benefit himself. He can prevent floods, tooth decay, pestilence, reduce infant mortality, and crime. He can improve seeds, roads, and slum sections.

Most of the contemporary literature of social planning or community developing processes describe them in specialized settings, particularly in rural areas.⁶ Often the two concepts are related since they refer to efforts to maximize the economic and human resources of an area such as a village, a section or a city, or an entire region. Planning is the first step; development is—hopefully—its consequence. In newly emerging countries, planning and development are currently focused on problems of survival — excessive mortality, over-population, marginal productivity. There is less concern with problems of the good life, such as the prevention of crime and delinquency, mental illness and urban blight, which have come to be the dominant concern of the welfare systems of technologically more advanced nations.

In a historical context, three ideological models can be distinguished in the explanations of how planning and development proceed: the *Social Darwinist* approach, the *Expert* approach and the *Mutualist* approach. Each of these ideological types has somewhat different answers to the following questions (see chart, p. 95):

1. *Authority*: Who sanctions the right to make decisions?
2. *Personnel*: Who are the planners of community development?

3. *Problem Solving Process*: How are plans formulated?
4. *Distribution of Losses*: What dislocation and suffering can be anticipated as part of the development process?
5. *Public Service Ideology*: What is the operational definition of the "public"?

The three ideological types of planning and community development to be outlined each specify different assumptions about reality, and about what reality should be. They include statements about *what is* as well as theories of actual or plausible relationships between two or more variables. They also specify normative convictions about *what should be*.

These ideologies are characteristic of planning and community development programs of divergent sponsorship. Soviet technicians, Christian missionaries, and United States Public Health Service physicians share certain expertist assumptions in the way they attack a problem. There is much overlapping in ideology of such persons functioning under seemingly different — even antagonistic — labels. Their common philosophical base, as well as their differences, will become clarified as we identify the essential assumptions of each of the three proposed ideological typologies.

Social Darwinism

Social Darwinism was the development ideology of the laissez faire economists. It was prominent in the English and American industrial revolutions. It is the ideology of economic development in much of South America, Arabia, and South Africa; in countries ruled by dictators and oligarchies.

Social Darwinism presumes that development is primarily the result of the achievement of leaders. It is dependent on their managerial skill, their capacity to take risks, and their technological "know-how." Leaders are believed to emerge after a struggle for existence and survival against their opposition. Thus they prove themselves as having been most fit to survive. They are the product of a natural selection process,⁷ more worthy than the rest in their superiority. They equate public service with service to the ruling class.⁸

In both the American and Russian development experiences, there were Social Darwinist phases. In the United States, actual development has deviated significantly from the country's constitutional expertist and mutualistic ethos. There were the slave-owners,

COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT AND PUBLIC SERVICE IDEOLOGY

| | | | |
|---------------------------------------|--|--|---|
| | | | <i>Mutualism</i> |
| | | | Representatives of the people |
| | | | Persons delegated by representatives of the people |
| <i>Problem Solving Process</i> | Authoritarian | Programmed Democracy or authoritarian | Enabling, catalyst and democratic |
| <i>Distribution of Gains</i> | Very unequal: Most to those fit to rule; some to those who work for them | Unequal: Most to those who cooperate; less to those who do not | Fairly equitable distribution to all segments of the public |
| <i>Distribution of Losses</i> | Very unequal: Mostly to the unproductive | Unequal: Most to those uninterested or opposed to planning and development | Fairly equitable distribution to all segments of the public |
| <i>Public Service Model</i> | Help the ruler | Help the public | Help the public |

many of whom developed plantations, with the firm belief that their inborn superiority entitled them to command the services of others. And there were the titans or tycoons of business, some of whom shared the same belief system.⁹ While the West was settled, industries established, and communities vied with each other to develop their resources, large segments of the population barely had enough to live on. Dwellers in the city slums, subsistence farmers, Southern slaves, American Indians, and many others suffered and died prematurely.

Development programs in Soviet Russia have deviated much from the expertist ideals of classic Communism in which dictatorship by dedicated experts was to be a temporary interlude before a more mutualistic socialist society could emerge. During the Stalin regime, the country was run by leaders who were oligarchs. They never developed an ideological position as being superior human beings. But they acted often as if they believed in the theory that they were more fit than anyone else. They became, in large measure, concerned with meeting personal preferences and idiosyncracies. They proceeded against anyone who did, or could be suspected of wishing to, oppose such a policy. Russian managers and scientists under Stalin attained intermediate positions of leadership, only if they could work within this authoritarian framework. Those who were not needed or were not completely subservient to those in control often ended up in labor camps or in the grave. Pre-industrial segments of the population, such as peasantry, were driven into poverty far greater than what they had ever known, to provide the capital needed for the development processes.

Public service in such a system is measured by the personal standards of those in authority. It is rewarded as service to the ruling clique, and will be opposed vigorously if the welfare of others than those in power is being used as a criterion. Those who render service must internalize a belief in the validity, or at least expediency, of accepting the caste-like division of power and privilege between those who rule and those who are ruled. Idealistic concern with the needs of the public at large will become suspect of treason. It implies a loyalty to ideas rather than to persons.

The Social Darwinist model is rarely advocated openly. It has little popular appeal. It presumes leaders are free to dispose as they wish of the benefits of planning and of community development. As a matter of expediency, they are likely to share their entrepreneurial gains with supporters. They will benefit, though at lesser rates of remuneration. They may even be invited to make suggestions about

policy but have no right to affect final decisions. The oligarchic leaders do not regard such consultation as morally necessary, as do those subscribing to a mutualistic ideology, and, to a degree, the supporters of expertism.

Social Darwinist leaders may become renowned for their efficiency. They built pyramids in Egypt, steel mills in America, and made the trains run on time in Italy. Stalin made Russia into a world power. But their monuments are often built with the blood and bones of subordinates, who did not "count." Social Darwinism accepts as natural that persons defined to be of inferior status need not benefit from the development process. They are expendable.

Poverty is viewed as a normal state for large segments of the population. However, few Social Darwinists thought through their philosophical position with the consistency of Herbert Spencer. He opposed all state aid to the poor; he was concerned that generosity to the "inferior elements" in society would make survival possible without work. It would undermine the economic incentive system. Spencer also thought that the cost of maintaining the poor, who make no substantial contribution to the common effort, would be so great as to take away the resources necessary for investment on the part of those responsible for the development program. In most actual totalitarian systems, the leadership group usually takes measures to ameliorate poverty as suits its whims, but such activities are viewed as elective and strategic, rather than morally obligatory.

The Social Darwinist ideology is conservative *and* revolutionary. It sanctions the use of force, to wipe out opposition as well as revolutionary change. It holds that it is natural for change to occur when an elite no longer deserves the superior status acquired by their predecessors. New and more superior men will take their place. Leadership need not remain in the hands of those who were traditionally powerful, the ruling families of many generations' standing. Power will shift from time to time to co-opt emerging entrepreneurs, technicians with greater management skills, lest they turn against the regime. And often they do. When it happens, the interpretation given is that those who were once fit were superseded by those more fit to rule.

Expertism

The expert ideology assumes that development serves a higher purpose. It may be broadly nationalistic, a religious ideal, as in the case of missionary efforts, or utilitarian, as in the case of technical

assistance programs. Leadership goes to those who are identified with the ideal and who have the technical capability to rule in its name.

The expert approach was simply stated by Ghana army leaders who overthrew the government of Kwame Nkrumah on February 24, 1966. They were reported as having acted because Nkrumah abused individual rights and liberties. One leader explained: "He ran Ghana as if it was his own personal property."¹⁰ They released Nkrumah's imprisoned opposition, but the new regime took no chance with immediate democracy. They dissolved the Nkruman parliament, dismissed the president and outlawed the ruling "Convention People's Party." They legitimized their revolution by an appeal to their public service values, which they promised to be of a higher, less self-serving level than the government they had just overthrown.

Such is the ideological rationale of many a revolution and *coup d'etat*. Leaders invite general public support by words — and often by deeds — demonstrating their intentions to serve the public. Expertists are not inherently opposed to democratic processes. Often they promise elections at a later date, when they think they can succeed in establishing themselves securely in the role of experts, who can be elected because of their merit, not only because they held the reins of power. Indeed, they often prefer a democratic governmental structure, provided they support the ideals of the experts; and they are generally opposed to the Social Darwinist procedure of allowing development to take place on a "survival of the fittest" basis.

Experts will prefer to consult trusted subordinates, provided this occurs under conditions precluding the formulation of recommendations inconsistent with their mission. They prefer to involve public representatives, but they will resort to *programmed democracy*, the co-optation of pre-selected community leaders who know what is expected of them and vote for it in the name of "the people." There may be all the forms of democratic participation in policy making — such as voting — but important decisions are predetermined almost like data programmed for computer analysis. "Representatives" are screened for their amenability to goals the experts think are good for them. For instance, in a study conference on community development held in England in 1957, community development was defined as:

A movement to promote better living for the whole community with the active participation (of), and if possible on the initiative of the community, but if this

initiative is not forthcoming spontaneously, by the use of techniques for arousing and stimulating it in order to secure its active enthusiastic response to the movement.¹¹

What can a sanitation expert do when villagers are suspicious of a new sanitary well, or cities vote against a fluoridated water supply? Farmers are not always ready to adopt improved seed and crop rotation procedures when extension agents or community development specialists are sent into an area. These resistances provide an incentive to manipulate persons who have a standing in the community and who can be "sold" on expertist development goals. Robert A. Manners calls this process "prefabricated assistance."¹² Expertist (in contrast to mutualist) community development adherents believe that in the absence of community response to the technical program deemed necessary, it should be imposed in the name of the ideals which the program is designed to serve in the name of the community's "greater good."

There are great variations in the means regarded as ideologically acceptable to impose such programs, ranging from persuasion and the offer of incentives, to aggressive propaganda, the use of intimidation, fear, and terror. The latter are used sparingly, but in the name of a higher ideal, they are employed as in the days of the Holy Inquisition of the modern Catholic church.

The priests often showed much kindness and compassion towards the populace, but they also were capable of primitive tortures and of extermination of those who held a different faith. In more recent decades, Christian missions all over the world have brought technical, medical and educational development to natives whom they regarded as heathens, in accordance with an expertist ideology. The modern missionary conceiving of himself as a qualified agent of God, assumes much, though not all authority for program planning and the execution of those plans.

Expertism can be observed in contemporary American domestic development programs, as, for instance, the United States Extension Service, the Soil Conservation Service, the Neighborhood Settlement movement, or the U.S. Public Health Service. It is particularly strong in foreign aid programs, in which assistance is generally conditional on acceptance of an expert proposal, worked out whenever possible on the basis of prior consultation between American specialists

and their foreign counterparts. All these programs officially favor mutualism as a matter of principle. But many of their policies reflect an expertist orientation. As a technician, the extension agent, the group worker or health officer thinks he knows what must be done. He prefers to work with local leaders, but if they are apathetic or opposed to what seems technically necessary to accomplish a goal, some of these experts feel that they should try to convert significant segments of the community to accept their objectives. Irwin T. Sanders designates such manipulative technological experts as *outside* professional organizers, in contrast to community workers who take an enabling approach to work with people in whatever their objective may be.¹³

The expert ideology has been a significant factor in Soviet Russia before and since Stalin. Immediately after the Russian revolution, the Communist Party was controlled by idealists preaching the "gospel" of Karl Marx and his disciple, Lenin. They viewed themselves as more knowledgeable than the workers and peasants about what the latter needed. In time, those idealists were weeded out by Stalin and his coterie, who acted increasingly in terms of Social Darwinist ideology.

Expertists justify revolutions as do the Social Darwinists, but such an overthrow of an established ruling group is sanctioned in their minds by their ideals, rather than the goal of self aggrandizement. Expertists also differ from the Social Darwinists in the assumption of how benefits should be distributed. The experts are interested in a social cause. They view themselves as serving their world, rather than their world serving them. Although some expertist leaders will be corrupted by power, the ideology holds that leaders aim primarily for "higher" than material objectives. They are to find satisfaction more in the exercise of power to reach their ideals than in the accumulation of material goods and hedonistic satisfactions.

Benefits of development are primarily reserved for those who actively support it. Others may get some help incidentally or deliberately, in the hope that in time they might be converted to the expert's point of view. However, most expertists have compassion for those who are not yet fit or who may be entirely unfit, provided they also believe in the right goal, or at least, are not opposed to it. They see those unable to participate or to understand the mission's view as persons who may become converted to the ideal, and therefore worthy of attention. But unlike the mutualist development leaders, the expertists need not acknowledge their opposition as having equal "right" to a diver-

gent point of view. Those who actively oppose the mission of the experts are viewed as being outside the network of benefits of the developments. They are the "heathens" of the early missionaries, the "capitalist enemies of the proletariat" in contemporary Russia, or the "communist sympathizers" in America. There is doubt that they deserve any benefits. Indeed, if their opposition is active, they must be fought. Some experts will even sanction the destruction of the opposition, if this is deemed to serve the "higher" objectives of their ideology.

Mutualism

This ideology holds that community development should benefit all inhabitants of an area. Problems are solved by consensus or a majority vote of those affected by a program. There is much emphasis on mutual aid, and a decided preference for voluntary participation of citizens in the developmental programs. As Irwin Sanders points out, active grass roots participation is welcome, not only on philosophical grounds, but also it has the practical consequence of utilizing underemployed labor reserves that are found in local communities throughout the world. "If local people build their own roads, their own recreation facilities, and devise and support programs for economic improvement, then scarce financial resources can be shifted to other uses."¹⁴ Self-help is seen as a relatively inexpensive way to increase social capital.¹⁵

Leaders are expected to function as enablers, advisors and catalysts. They may also be hired to direct the implementation of a program. More often than not, however, their role "is that of a guide who helps the community establish and find means of achieving its own goals."¹⁶ Decision-making is by consensus or by persons elected or otherwise identified as being representatives of the community. It is they who are to do the planning or who turn it over to civil servants who are responsible to them. Benefits of development, while not necessarily equal, are to accrue to all.

The mutualist ideology is favored in many official declarations of governmental and voluntary agencies. A United Nations document suggests that community development:

should not be regarded simply as a series of episodes embodied in concrete achievements, (that) success in

these, important though they may be, is less important than the qualitative changes expressed in attitudes and relationships, which add to human dignity, and increase the continuing capacity of people to help themselves to achieve goals which they determine for themselves.¹⁷

The mutualist approach was succinctly stated by Glen Leet, on the basis of his experience with a United Nations mission in Korea:

1. Low-powered salesmanship — don't oversell — ask questions — let them convince you — act skeptical and get them to overcome your doubts — let them make it theirs.
2. Learn what not to do — more important than what to do — don't be overactive.
3. Villagers know what they want to do for their village — slight incentive (honorary bonus) overcomes inertia.
4. Motivation includes loyalty to village — honor of being included in public honor roll — dignity of taking part in officially approved plan — self interest and benefit to village — pleasure of being active at something when long unemployed.
5. Make it clear that you can furnish little — no equipment — only small appropriation.¹⁸

A similar approach was stressed in guidelines to overseas missions of the U.S. International Cooperation Administration in 1957. While it is willing to provide expert leadership and appropriate large sums of money for approved prospects, it defined community development as:

a process of social action in which the people of a community organize themselves for planning and action; define their common and individual needs and problems; make group and individual plans to meet their needs and solve their problems, execute these plans with a maximum reliance upon community resources; and supplement these resources when necessary with services and material from governmental and non-governmental agencies outside the community.¹⁹

The mutualist approach to development is a cherished ideal in the contemporary world. Most expertist, and even some of the Social

Darwinist models, are advocated in the name of "the people." Community plans imposed by dictatorial means often are described as representing the "true" will of the people by the regime's propaganda machine. Efficiency, in the sense of getting a job done quickly, often is sacrificed for efficiency in terms of getting a strong public backing.

The mutualist community development leader may have strong ideals, but he is not willing to impose them. He wants to work *with* the community. In the Tennessee Valley Authority, there was much emphasis on the doctrine of *grass roots administration*. Acting under Federal authority to plan and control the land and water resources of a vast area, the TVA elicited considerable participation by local personnel in the planning process. While power for making final decisions was not delegated to them,²⁰ proposed changes were often postponed and some abandoned in the face of determined opposition by strong local interests. Even greater power for decision making was delegated to Citizens' Development Councils (Vikas Mandal) in a Ford Foundation program to improve urban slums in India.²¹

The mutualist ideology has been important in the verbalization that accompanies planning and development on both sides of the iron curtain. Mutualism is embedded in the American Declaration of Independence and Constitution. It also pervades early expression of the Communist program. But in neither country, do planning and community development follow a purely mutualist model. For instance, racial equality in schooling, and other aspects of contemporary America, is being imposed in many areas on majorities who voice disapproval of this doctrine. Even less controversial objectives, like the control of river pollution, involves such larger areas and populations that there is much reliance on expertism. The Founding Fathers of the United States combined expertist and mutualist procedures in the country's constitution. A democratically elected House of Representatives and state representative Senate were given many powers for problem-solving, decision-making, and the distribution of benefits of developmental progress. But the Constitution also provides for strong Executive and Judiciary branches of government; they have power to set policies, within limits, without public consensus, particularly under emergency conditions.

Party leaders exercise much more power in Russia than do American development leaders. Experts designated by them make many decisions without concern for public opinion, but there are signs of a

preference for consensual actions. Programmed elections for the Supreme Soviet have been held in Russia repeatedly, at the national and provincial levels. Representative bodies also are elected at factory and local community levels. They are expected to play a limited role in problem solving, decision-making and in apportioning a part of their available resources.

Community workers in the American health and welfare field generally espouse the mutualist theory of development. They are very much concerned with the encouragement of citizen participation. As a result, they often end up substituting process for accomplishment. In community councils, designated as instrumentalities of planning for voluntary welfare programs in most of our cities, many problems remain unattended. The professionals find it impossible to get sufficient voluntary consensus for carrying out a development plan. Such citizen boards engage in many committee discussions, conduct studies, and hold extensive hearings; but they often become stalemated when it comes to implementing major proposals, which cannot help being controversial.

In a mutualist program, a point may be reached when a planner's own ideals conflict with those who dominate the community. Can a community organization specialist help a neighborhood to organize itself to keep Negroes from moving into it? Should the United States assist Pakistan to develop a weapons technology? Can American legal experts help a revolutionary country write a law to nationalize private property?

Models and Reality

Ideologies describe models of what ought to be. They are rarely found in their "pure" state, with applications being entirely consistent with the theory. Social Darwinism, expertism and mutualism are ideal type concepts: conceptual tools of analysis, that represent abstractions from reality of characteristics that are useful for identifying important distinctions. They are a useful technique for differentiating among complex social systems. As Seymour Martin Lipset illustrates in an application of this methodology to four large English-speaking democracies,²² ideal types serve to single out central trends from less dominant value orientations.

In relatively pure mutualist communities, like Israel's *Kibbutzim*²³ or the cooperatively inclined Ejide communities of Mexico,²⁴ there is

usually a high degree of reliance on experts when technical changes are being made. In Mississippi plantation communities, like the many other oligarchic rural areas of the world, where land ownership is by a small group exercising fief-like control over the peasantry, Social Darwinism is the predominant ideological orientation. But during a war, the threat of revolution, or other pressures against the status quo, elements of an expertist, and even mutualistic, ideology appear. Expertist societies generally give much lip service to mutualism. Democracy is held out as an ultimate objective, to be instituted at some unspecified later date, when the people are "ready for it." At the same time, experts in control, in order to insure themselves a secure and lifetime post, sometimes take on the posture of Social Darwinist leaders.

The utility of the above mentioned ideological models lies in the very fact that they are widely applicable abstractions from reality, rather than detailed descriptions of the way planning or community development proceeds. When applied to an actual situation, the models can be used as descriptive variables for comparative study of such questions as the following:

How can the idealistic, realistic and detached segments of the society be mobilized to contribute the optimum development, or the solution of a crisis?

Do planning and development of new organization benefits proceed more smoothly if there are many linkages to the established order of things?

What happens when rulers impose changes upon people of a community, even if they are good for them by criteria they are inclined to accept?

Can urgent reforms be postponed until a majority of the people can agree to support them? If so, what are the consequences?

Can an ignorant and backward population decide what kind of development is good for them, and by what criteria should success be measured?

Is it advantageous to proceed slowly with a development proposal to obtain majority support?

Can development benefit those who are opposed to it?

Each of the forementioned ideologies suggests a different norma-

tive answer to these questions. Such solutions are not derived from observation or experience. They reflect ethical (ideological) imperatives.

These same questions can also be posed in more researchable terms. What are the public welfare consequences of adherence to a given ideology of development? Under what circumstances is one more likely to be employed than another? Will one give rise to more idealists, and fewer detached people, who feel they have no stake in the future of their society? Empirical studies are necessary if we are to distill scientific generalizations. They are not a matter of ideology, but of observation and experience.

There is a paucity of research evidence regarding the consequences of various planning and development techniques for the people concerned, their productivity, and their derived benefits. But as one compares ideologies and realities, many interesting hypotheses come into focus. A few will be cited here for illustrative purposes to suggest the utility of using these ideological models for analytic and research purposes:

1. Agreement on positive objectives in a social system is rarely comprehensive, especially in a society in transition. When traditional ideas vie with new ones in the market place of ideas and men's emotions, disagreements are inevitable. If mutualism is expected to influence the planning process, research consultation and pertinent negotiation among conflicting interest groups are necessary. This process of accommodation and compromise takes time. Social action may be repeatedly postponed until "the people" are ready for it. Often the complex process of *looking* for common goals prevents decisive action to accomplish a development objective for many years, such as Medicare in the United States.
2. Mutualistic leaders often become impatient with the slow pace of change that generally is possible, if that method is applied in its pure form. This has led to their sanctioning of the use of force. The American Revolution, India's passive resistance, or Israel's "illegal immigration" campaign were launched by essentially mutualistic leaders to overthrow oppressive regimes which used their

power to impose goals that enjoyed little popular support.

3. Many contemporary emerging countries have governments which avow mutualist ideals, but act on the basis of expertist considerations. Their leaders see themselves as self-appointed guardians of the "people's interest." The expertist ideology gives rise to less ambivalence than the mutualist point of view. Expertists (like technical specialists or missionaries) know they are right, and believe that they should work towards the attainment of their objectives. They feel justified in using manipulative devices to induce people to support their development goals.
4. Social Darwinist approaches flourish when there are major social cleavages and strong cultural sentiments favorable to kinship, rather than national or ideological loyalties. The fruits of development may be siphoned off largely for the benefit of ruling classes, as in Saudi Arabia and Liberia. This policy is legitimized in many preindustrial countries by traditions of family loyalty. National objectives, when in competition with kinship obligations, take a secondary place. As a United Nations report observes:

Modern administrative systems demand that the civil servant should be impartial in his dealings with the public, unswayed by the special interests of relatives or friends, and uninfluenced by political considerations. In most pre-industrial societies, however, this ideal conflicts with the tradition of mutual aid within the family and community that has provided the only form of social security; public opinion places a higher value upon family loyalty than upon impartial efficiency in the service of the

Conclusion

In the contemporary world, the Social Darwinist approach is clearly unfashionable, but it exists. The expertist approach is the most common. The mutualistic approach is the most prestigious. It offers

respect for the expectations of each and everyone in a population. It does not accept as "natural" that sacrifices inherent in any development program are concentrated in one segment of the population. But it is slow moving. In the interest of "getting results," expertist practices and philosophies infiltrate even the most mutualistic development program.

None are entirely free of Social Darwinist thinking. Even clearly mutualist idealists want a comfortable chair in which to sit, enough to eat, and a bed in which to be taken care of in the event of illness. In underdeveloped countries, there are not enough resources to provide such chairs, food, and beds for everybody. Some men emerge as more equal than others. Leaders, managers, and entrepreneurs in every developing society enjoy the higher standard of living privileges, even when the predominant ideology of their development plan is expertist or mutualistic.

No development program, past or present, has ever proceeded only on the basis of a single ideology. But this does not make them alike. It makes a great deal of difference whether a country is developed, like Saudi Arabia under the late King Ibn Saud. There, a few leaders suddenly became so rich that they had more money with which to buy Cadillacs. Or whether development involves a greater diversification of benefits, which occurs when there is a heavy emphasis on expertist patterns, as is the case in such countries as Kuwait, Jordan, Turkey, Yugoslavia, Egypt and Ghana. In Western Europe after World War II, in Israel and in Mexico, there has been much development through heavy reliance on both expertist and mutualistic organizational arrangements.

The overlapping of Social Darwinist, expertist, and mutualist ideologies in the actual operations of contemporary development programs helps to explain the existence of much similarity in the wording of speeches of operationally varying programs. The U.S. financed *Alliance for Progress*, for instance, has expertist overtones. It is a program that gives monetary or technical assistance to achieve social, economic, and other improvements. The *Alliance* has a mission: the strengthening of democracy in South America. Countries led by persons who are anti-democratic, such as Communist Cuba or Social Darwinist areas like Haiti, are being excluded.

Soviet leaders also talk of serving the will of the people. They hold elections even though only one slate is offered. They sanction

that the power to rule is derived from "the people," but they are not willing to take the risk of losing power through the operations of an elective procedure. Criticism of existing policies is permitted at a technical, not a political level.

Mutualism enjoys great prestige in India. This ideology is strong even though it means that traditional values often defeat development objectives. Irrigation waters often remain unused. Quite a few of the Indian peasants interviewed by Kusum Nair possessed nothing but poverty. But they said they wanted no more.²³

In a world with multiple models for planning and for social and economic development, the overlapping action-implications of their ideology provides a common basis for comparative analysis. There are common goals to such divergent programs as are found in Russia and the United States, in Israel and Egypt and in India and Pakistan. All wish to provide more food for the hungry, more medicines for those who are sick, and a better life in terms of materialistic objectives. Such similarities in objectives can and do provide a basis for accommodation strategies. They also can be employed to arrive at cross-national criteria for comparative study of planned institutional and organizational innovations.

NOTES

1. Inter-University Program in Institution Building, University of Pittsburgh, Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, 1965. Printed announcement, p. 3. Sociologists employ the concept of institution to describe a network of normative patterns related to a broad social function. In their empirical research studies, the Institution Building Study Center generally concentrates on an institutional segment—a particular organization.
2. For details see Joseph W. Eaton in collaboration with Michael Chen, *Influencing the Youth Cultures: A Study of Youth Organizations in Israel*. Los Angeles: Sage Press, 1970.
3. Arnold Rose, Editor, *Theory and Methods in the Social Sciences*, Chapter 22, "A Deductive Ideal-Type Method." Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1954, pp. 327-342.
4. Max Weber, *The Methodology of the Social Sciences*, translated and edited by Edward A. Shils and Henry A. Finch, Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1949, p. 90. For an illustration of this method for obtaining social science knowledge, see also: Howard Becker, "Constructive Typology in the Social Sciences," *American Sociological Review*, Vol. V, No. 1 (February 1940), pp. 40-55.
5. Florian Znaniecki, *The Method of Sociology*. New York: Farrar and Rinehart, Inc., 1934, pp. 249-331.

6. For a comprehensive survey of the contemporary community development literature, see Irwin T. Sanders, "Community Development Programs in Sociological Perspective," in James H. Copp, Editor, *Our Changing Rural Society: Perspectives and Trends*. Ames: Iowa State University, 1964.
7. Richard Hofstadter, *Social Darwinism in American Thought*, New York: George Braziller, 1959.
8. This is the view of Vilfredo Pareto who thought that "Practically, the doctrine of 'public needs' is useful to the governing class, or a class aspiring to power, as justifying its control and having it more readily accepted by the subject class." Vilfredo Pareto, *A Treatise on General Sociology*. New York: Dover Publications, Vol. 4, 1918.
9. For a brief analysis and bibliography see Max Lerner, *America As a Civilization*, "The Rise and Decline of Titans." New York: Simon and Schuster, 1957, pp. 274-284; p. 971.
10. According to a report of Kenneth L. Whiting, Associated Press Staff Writer in Accra, Ghana, *Pittsburgh Post Gazette*, Friday, 25: L; 1.
11. Community Development: A Handbook prepared by a study conference on Community Development held at Hartwell House, Aylesbury, Buckinghamshire, September, 1957; Her Majesty's Stationary Office, London, 1958; 2.
12. Robert A. Manners, "Anthropology and Community Development," *The Social Service Review*, Vol. 35, No. 3, September, 1961, pp. 276-277.
13. Irwin T. Sanders, "Theories of Community Development," *Rural Sociology*, Vol. 23, No. 1 (March, 1958), pp. 1-12.
14. Irwin T. Sanders, "Community Development Programs in Sociological Perspective," in James H. Copp, Editor, *Our Changing Rural Society: Perspectives and Trends*. Ames: Iowa State University, 1964.
15. Douglas Ensminger, "Community Development and Its Contribution to National Development." Report of the *Inter-Regional Conference on Community Development and Its Role in Nation Building*, Seoul, Korea, May, 1961. New York: pp. 21-33.
16. Murray G. Ross, *Community Organizations: Theory and Principles*. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1955, pp. 200-201. Ross calls attention to the fact that "the professional worker does not operate without bias of what should be done and how it should be done in and by the community— but the professional worker is aware of his bias, controls it, and moves only when, and to the degree, the people in the community are ready for such action."
17. United Nations Economic and Social Council, Document E/2931, 18 October 1956, *Twentieth Report of the Administrative Committee on Coordination to the Economic and Social Council*, Annex III.
18. Quoted in Clarence King, *Working with People in Community Action: An International Casebook for Trained Community Workers and Volunteer Community Leaders*. New York: Association Press, 1965, pp. 24-25.
19. International Cooperation Administration Manual, *Order No. 2710.1*, Washington, D.C., July 2, 1957.
20. Philip Selznick, *TVA and the Grass Roots*, Berkeley and Los Angeles: The University of California Press, 1953.

21. Marshall B. Clinard, "The Sociologist and Social Change in Underdeveloped Countries," *Social Problems*, Vol. 10, No. 3, pp. 207-219.
22. Seymour Martin Lipset, "The Value Patterns of Democracy: A Case Study in Comparative Analysis" *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 28, No. 4 (1963), pp. 515-531.
23. Malvin Spire, *The Kibbutz*. New York: Schocken Publishers, 1963. (also Aryed Fishman, *The Religious Kibbutz Movement*, Jerusalem, The Religious Section of the Youth and Hechalutz Department, Zionist Organization, 1957.)
24. Eyley N. Simpson, *The Ejide: Mexico's Way Out*. Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 1937; also Henrik F. Infield, *Cooperative Communities at Work*. New York: The Dryden Press, 1945, pp. 89-108.
25. *United Nations International Survey of Programmes of Social Development*, N.Y. Bureau of Social Affairs, United States, 1959, p. 121.
26. Kusum Nair, *Blossoms In the Dust*, New York: Praeger, 1961, p. 47.

7. The Institution Building Perspective: Properties, Problems, and Promise

WILLIAM J. SIFFIN

Institution Building as Perspective, Theory and Heurism

Since November, 1962, an Interuniversity Research Program on Institution Building¹ has been using an "institution building" perspective in studies of certain efforts to induce social change. Between 1964 and 1968, the Committee on Institutional Cooperation² did a massive study of technical assistance in agricultural development overseas, and chose as the focus of its analysis the idea of *Building Institutions to Serve Agriculture*. Other scholars have been attracted by the idea of "institution building." Plans and proposals are being made to teach institution building (hereafter referred to as IB) in seminars and training programs for officials involved in social change efforts.

The CIC research group developed enthusiasm for the IB orientation, and some of its members see it as a valuable tool for promoting agricultural development. CIC studies have made important contributions to the literature on institution building, including thoughtful, experience-based prescriptive and evaluative statements.³ At this point, a candid evaluation of the IB perspective seems in order.

How the Institution Building Problem is Perceived

The IB perspective has two elements: (a) assumptions about the characteristics of certain kinds of organizations and their environmental relations, and (b) derivative assumptions about strategies and

tactics useful in building such organizations as the constructive instruments of desired social change.

The term "institution" enters the picture in two related ways—first, to refer to the normative qualities of an organization, as distinguished from technological characteristics, and second, to indicate that the "institution" established by institution building is not just an organization, but a set of continuing patterns of action that encompass both the organization and its transactional relations with its environment.

The organization is significant (in part, at least) because of its own distinctive normative qualities. Its larger importance lies in its environmental impact. To make that impact, the organization must be legitimized and endowed with a flow of supportive resources. Using them, it is supposed to produce desirable changes in its setting.

The name of the game in institution building is social change, and thus those who have articulated the IB perspective, posit that the organization to be created in an institution building effort is in some ways deviant from, or not entirely consonant with, the initial circumstances of its environment. It doesn't operate like other organizations, and it seeks to produce new values within its environment. These are likely to be in conflict with the status quo, in one or both of two ways: (1) The organization may be a real threat to some of the important actors in its environment. (2) Even if it isn't, the organization cannot plug into a setting nicely set up to support it, and accept its claims and outputs. In the somewhat tedious language of discussions of this sort, "the environment is not normatively predisposed to be supportive of the organization's aims and methods."

An example may bring this down to earth: Where universities are valued as avenues of status mobility, and higher status means "white collar" status, urban residence, and some form of well-established professional identity, a new institution inspired by the land-grant agricultural college model may be difficult to create. Even if there is no powerful opposition, the participants themselves will tend to undermine the organization's aims, and the school's customers will try to escape or avoid the roles for which they are presumably being prepared—intended roles that may not even exist. Rather than go back to the villages, or out into the field, if they can, they will opt for the urban life, the headquarters of the bureaucracy, or almost any alternative to rural service work. And it will be exquisitely difficult to link

the research and teaching that go on in this organization to relevant needs and problems.

Therefore, institutionalizing the central premises in this effort at social change will involve more than establishing an organization with the appropriate technical skills. The professionals inside the organization must have the right orientations. The organization's key customers—students—must be appropriately indoctrinated. And suitable environmental conditions will have to be achieved—including inducements to cause and enable the organization's products to be properly used. From the IB perspective, if and when all of this comes to pass, a social change will have been institutionalized (and, if the scheme works well, the mechanism will make a continuing contribution to developmental goals).

Thus the IB perspective focuses emphatically upon normative concerns. It describes institution building as "the planning, structuring, and guidance of new or reconstituted organizations which (a) embody changes in values, functions, physical and/or social technologies; (b) establish, foster, and protect normative relationships and action patterns; and (c) attain support and complementarity in the environment."⁴

The Elements of the IB Perspective

The aim of the Interuniversity Research Program in Institution-Building has been to build a theory of institution building, and to lay out useful guidelines for practitioners of social change. The program has studied efforts to create organization-centered institutional complexes, describing what happened in each case, assessing and attempting to explain the outcomes, and looking for general patterns of experience. The effort has obtained its coherence from a set of "guiding concepts," which have served as the focus for collecting and analyzing data.

One set of these concepts states which features of any organization are important to the study of institutionalization. According to the IB perspective, there are five relevant features:

1. *Leadership*, defined as "the group of persons. . .actively engaged in the formulation of the doctrine and program of the institution, and who direct its operations and relationships with the environment."

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2. *Doctrine*, defined as "the specification of values, objectives, and operational methods underlying social action."
3. *Program*, defined as "those actions which are related to performance of functions, and services constituting the output of the institution."
4. *Resources*, defined as "the financial, physical, human, technological, and informational inputs of the institution."
5. *Internal Structure*, defined as "the structure and process established for operation of the institution, and for its maintenance."⁵

As noted, the IB focus is not restricted to organizations per se — it concerns organization-environment interaction—"the interdependencies which exist between an institution and other relevant parts of the society." The relation between organization and setting is perceived as one of exchange. The exchanges that take place between the organization and entities in its environment are labelled "linkages," and the IB perspective classifies them into four types:

1. *Enabling* — relationship with entities that "control the allocation of authority and resources needed by the institution;"
2. *Functional* — relations with "organizations performing functions, and services which are complementary in a production sense, which supply the inputs and which use the outputs of the institution;"
3. *Normative* — relations "with institutions which incorporate norms and values. . . relevant to the doctrine and program of the institution;" and
4. *Diffused* — relations "with elements in the society which cannot clearly be identified by membership in formal organizations."

This can be taken as a classification of the *types of relationships* an organization has with elements in its environment, even though the language used in the classification literally refers to relationships with types of organization — *i.e.*, organizations differentiated in terms of functions. Obviously, a single relationship may be more than one type. For example, it might be both "enabling" and "normative."

This organization-environment-exchange perspective amounts to

a "system" perspective—not a closed, stable, explicit systems theory, but an implicit assertion that an "institution" is a package of behaviors and relationships that include a particular organization and its interactions with its environment. Thus the test of "institutionalization" in the institution building perspective is the normative impact of the organization upon its setting. In Professor Esman's words: "The concept of institutionality denotes that 'certain relationships and action patterns incorporated in the organization are normative both within the organization and for other social units, and that some support and complementarity in the environment have been attained.'" Successful institutionalization involves an organization that affects standards and characteristics of behavior in its environment.

Basic Premises in the IB Argument

The IB perspective rests upon an explicit view of a certain kind of situation. This view amounts to an "argument" or set of assertions upon which the relevance of the perspective rests:

1. Formal, purposive organizations are an important means for inducing beneficial changes within societies. Esman has said,

The Institution Building approach has a pronounced social engineering bias. Its root proposition is that a very large proportion of the most significant contemporary changes, especially in the developing countries, are deliberately planned and guided, and can be distinguished from those that occur through gradual evolutionary processes, or as the consequences of political or social revolution. It further presupposes that the introduction of changes takes place primarily in and through formal organizations. These organizations symbolize, promote, sustain, and protect innovations, and it is these organizations as well as the new normative relationships and action patterns they foster which must become 'institutionalized,' meaningful, and valued in the societies in which they function.⁶

2. There is an important difference between institutionalizing organizations for social change purposes, and establishing viable organizations within congenial settings. The essence of that difference is the hostility of the environment in the former case. This produces a

double-bared problem: getting intended and desired organizational behavior, and getting the organization's claims and output accepted outside. In friendlier circumstances, it will be relatively easy to obtain suitable personnel, relatively well socialized, prepared and predisposed to behave in conformity with organizational needs and expectations. Likewise, in a friendly setting, the legitimacy of the organization and the possible utility of its output will be more or less self-evident. But in hostile (or uncongenial) environments, the critical (though not exclusive) problem of organizing for social change is normative, and the effective resolution of that problem can be described as institutionalization. It may be difficult and expensive to create the core of the organization; people will have to be socialized, as well as made skillful and knowledgeable. It is equally hard—perhaps harder—to *maintain* the organization. And it will probably be hardest of all to cause the organization's product to be accepted and used in the intended way.

To some extent the IB perspective is a response to often-thwarted efforts to transfer particular organizational forms to so-called developing nations, or to promote development through an emphasis upon the application of technologies. The IB perspective is not anti-technological. In fact, it says nothing about technology per se—a point to which we shall return. But its focus is on something other than technology per se, and organization in a narrower sense of that term.

IB as Theory

Is this IB perspective—or this combination of perspective and argument—a theory? There are two appropriate answers: "Yes and no," or "It depends."

The term "theory" is itself subject to definition, and social scientists do not always agree on definitions. Some are more liberal than others in their use of the word.

From the most rigorous view, the IB perspective cannot be properly called a theory. This viewpoint holds that a theory is an empirical generalization—a general statement about some regular predictable relationships between two or more types of things.⁷ Isaac Newton's generalization about gravitation is a common example of a theory—a generalized explanation of a kind of phenomenon. This broad and basic statement, this axiom, explains a lot of things. For example, Galileo's "law" about the behavior of falling bodies can be deduced from Newton's generalization. The axiom, and the lesser generaliza-

tions, or laws, that can be deduced from it are useful in explaining countless individual occurrences—occurrences that are instances of a general pattern of regularity in the behavior of phenomena.

In this rigorous sense, the IB perspective certainly isn't a theory. For example, one cannot deduce from the IB perspective how "institutionality" occurs. It does assert that there is a quality, a phenomenon, that can be labelled "institutionality;" that organizations can be the nexus of the manifestation of this quality; that certain characteristics of organizations are important if one wants to look for evidence of institutionality (or try to achieve it); and that the relations of organizations with their settings—also important to institutionality—can be typologized in a certain way. But the IB perspective does not systematically explain how institutionality occurs, nor "how to do it."

Yet there is balm for those who must have their theory. Some social scientists speak of a different kind of theory—"concept-generating theories," or "speculative theories."⁸ (Others might call these "pre-theories.") Unlike Newton's axiom and Galileo's law, such theories don't explain anything. They have no real explanatory power. But they do have an "explanatory appeal." Part of this lies in the "naming" and classification function of such theories.

Strictly speaking, knowledge of names confers no predictive power. The reason naming has explanatory appeal is that it facilitates *recognition*, which is a transformation of something unexpected into something expected. Classification (the naming of names) facilitates recognition still further. For this reason, theories which are little more than systems of classification. . . often have great explanatory appeal. We feel we understand the world if we can put our experiences into proper pigeon holes. . . Naming and classification in the social sciences have much more far-reaching consequences than in the 'hard' sciences. Therefore systems of classification, so-called concept-generating theories, which pervade the social sciences and which are valued mainly for their explanatory appeal, cannot be summarily dismissed. . . . At the same time, reliance on theories characterized by only explanatory appeal is fraught with serious danger.⁹

The danger lies in the potential for explanatory self-seduction

that lurks in such theories. "The effort to create a viable organization failed because the organization was not institutionalized." Accepting this as an explanation is like accepting the explanation of Moliere's physician in the *Imaginary Invalid* when he said that opium puts people to sleep because of its dormative property.¹⁰

Speculative theories *can* help clarify thinking. They stimulate the growth of new ideas; they challenge conventional wisdom; and they may lead to hypotheses about phenomena that we would have otherwise not invented—manageable hypotheses, that can be studied and tested in the real world of social action.

If the IB perspective is a theory, it is this kind of theory. It names some phenomena that are otherwise easy to ignore. It stimulates an awareness of problems that seem to be important, and encourages people to state those problems in ways that get beyond a conventional wisdom. The perspective is thought-provoking. It can facilitate a different, and quite possibly more acute, understanding of situations.

The IB perspective, as "theory," can "do" two quite important things: First, it can stimulate the development of more manageable, more restricted, more concrete hypotheses. These to varying degrees can be objectively assessed, thereby adding to our knowledge in an important area of interest. Second, it can stimulate the growth of more, possibly better, "conventional wisdom." The people who wrestle with practical problems (and the people who study those concrete struggles) can build up bits and pieces of information out of limited pragmatic experiences—information which can be extrapolated into "practical guides to action," "checklists of important factors to take into account," "practical standards of evaluation," and other items of this sort.

Ideally, these two feasible lines of action could—and should—reinforce one another. In that case, conventional wisdom will be tested by the relatively firm canons of applied social science; and those who apply those canons will avoid the all too often justifiable indictment of triviality and irrelevance. They will be working on questions that are important in the world.

Such scholars will avoid empty argument over the "naming" of the IB perspective. And those who do not like the label, "speculative theory," may rightly choose instead to call the perspective a "huerism," for this is a convenient synonym for "speculative theory." A heurism, or heuristic device, is an intellectual gadget that can be used to generate useful concepts, manageable hypotheses, and interesting questions.

If I were to play the naming game with the IB perspective, I would opt for this term in preference to the somewhat grander, nobler label of speculative theory, but only because of this personal judgment: In some quarters, the label "heurism" generates—and legitimizes—different sorts of expectations than the term "theory." And it is easy to slip from the idea of speculative theory toward the idea of other-than-speculative theory—toward assumptions that there can be firm, determinate, explanatory theory of institution building in general. This, I think, is less likely if one uses the label of huerism. Heurisms do not have to be developed into firm, fullblown theories. As a heurism, the IB perspective does not promise more than it can deliver.

The IB Heurism — Problems and Opportunities

If the IB perspective is an interesting heurism, let us make the most of it. This means we must examine the manifest limitations of the device, and consider opportunities to make it more potent.

Enhancing the Concept of Organization

One salient feature of the IB perspective is a conceptualization of an organization. This conceptualization has some real limitations. Certain refinements and variations could make the IB perspective more useful.

An organization (i.e., of the relevant sort) is, we are told, an aggregation of significant factors—leadership, doctrine, program, resources, and internal structure. Call these "variables," if you must, or even "clusters of institution variables." Actually they are only labels, or the analogs of boxes or buckets into which to put information. They are a classification scheme for ordering data about an organization (or a group of organizations, or a type of organization, or even a group of types of organization).

If the IB perspective reflected serious pretensions to being, or becoming, "hard" theory, then one of its elements would be a statement that: "An organization can be viewed as a set of discrete, interacting variables. The interactions are patterned. The patterns can be perceived (described, assessed, measured). The ways in which the patterned interactions take place will affect the achievement of institutionality, or the probability of that achievement."

Actually, the perspective says: "Here are the things we judge to be the important features of organizations. By collecting information in accordance with this classification scheme, you may be able to find

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out something about ways in which organizations do, or don't achieve the elusive quality of institutionality. We have picked this particular classification scheme because we have a hunch that it puts the focus on the information that is most likely to tell us something (and to de-emphasize attention to extraneous material)."

There are a number of problems in this conceptualization of organization. For one thing, it covers almost everything but the kitchen sink, and does so at such a high level of generality that some interesting and quite possibly relevant questions about organization remain implicit and invisible.

This is no fatal flaw. In fact, a narrow and highly selective conceptualization of organization would be quite risky in a first-draft heuristic; it might deter the collection of important information. Yet there are certainly opportunities for improving the IB conceptualization of an organization, even without making any radical change in the scheme itself. For example, there is that elusive factor called "doctrine." Is this really something that exists distinct from leadership, program, resources, and structure? Is this a label for a discernible phenomenon? Are there not other, better, ways to get at the object of concern reflected by the presence of this term?

There are at least two other opportunities for developing and improving the "organization" facet of the perspective. One is to go beyond the all encompassing view of organization, and establish a typology of relevant organizations. There are, after all, different types of organizations, just as there are different types of organizational environment. Extending the initial classification scheme to take this into account would sharpen the focusing capability of the IB perspective considerably.

Even more important—and more promising—there are a number of different ways to conceptualize an organization.¹¹ Some of these alternative conceptualizations open the door to a more vigorous analysis of institution-building questions. In fact, the IB perspective sits on top of a veritable midden-heap of what is loosely called "organization theory." That material is incorporated in the IB heuristic almost entirely by implication, and, because of the nature and scope of the classification scheme dealing with organization, without much selectivity. A powerful development of the heuristic would be the refinement of its organizational aspect, by now conceptualizing an organization in a more analytical fashion.

James D. Thompson's *Organizations in Action*,¹² published a few years after the IB perspective was formulated, is a distinguished example of what I have in mind. Thompson is concerned only with "instrumental organizations which induce or coerce participation," and not voluntary associations. He calls his work a "conceptual inventory," but he generates a number of significant propositions. His focus is contemporary American organizations, but he seeks to transcend the boundaries of the particular. A central feature of his approach is the application of Talcott Parsons' axiom that an organization can be disaggregated into three distinct levels of responsibility and control (or, for that matter, of distinctive types of action) — *technical, managerial, and institutional*. He conceives of his organization as an open system, interactive with its environment, faced with uncertainty but subject to criteria of rationality. He lays a foundation for a typology by which organizations of the general type that concern him can be differentiated on the basis both of technology and environmental characteristics. Finally, he produces a set of relatively limited, manageable propositions about ways in which organizations function under certain specified conditions.

Without attempting to summarize Thompson's work, I would argue that it offers the basis for a powerful development in the conceptualization of organization beyond that set out in the initial IB perspective. There may be other comparable opportunities. By examining them, and in some cases adopting them, the initial IB heuristic could be improved.

Taking Technology into Account

A significant feature of Thompson's approach is his treatment of technology as a subsystem of any organization. In terms of institution-building, it should be possible to build on Thompson's concept and propositions. This would lead to certain interesting questions about technology as a factor affecting the construction of institutionalized organizations for social change purposes.

In the most elemental sense, a technology is "a reliable body of practical knowledge." There are science-based technologies, pragmatic technologies, and—most commonly perhaps—technologies that incorporate a mix of science and pragmatism. Not all technologies are "organization-centered," and organizations themselves vary in the extent to which they are "technology-centered." Technology is probably a vital variable when it comes to efforts at institution-building.

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If so, the IB perspective would be greatly enhanced if it took explicit account of this assumption. For instance, one might start with the primitive assumption that "it is easier to institutionalize an organization whose operations are primarily concerned with applying a well-developed technology than an organization that is not technology-centered."

Refining and exploring this premise poses problems. One is to get a good working conceptualization—perhaps even a typology—of technology. Another is to deal with the premise that all large-scale organizations have their technological aspects—including, for that matter, the technologies involved in their administration. Yet it does not take much imagination and experience to perceive that technology is a salient organizational variable. One has only to compare a police department and a fire department.¹³ Or contrast a school with a pharmaceutical factory. Or a highway department with a welfare organization. Or a malaria eradication program with a population control program. In gross and somewhat oversimple terms, it can be argued that effective and powerful intervention in many situations depends upon the availability of a suitable technology, and that technological transfer is quite rightly the most alluring object of concern to those who would essay social change. Quite clearly, it is easier to build roads, spray mosquitoes, and generate electricity than to induce people to willfully modify their breeding habits.

Some technologies, if not all, have features that make them particularly germane to efforts at organization and institution-building. They are bounded, specified, and self-contained. Within a certain inevitable range of variance, these technologies are output-specific. It is possible to say in advance that resources with certain specifiable qualities, in certain amounts, combined in accordance with certain standards and procedures, can reliably be expected to produce specifiable outputs over determinate amounts of time.

Grant that the sweep of this statement is vulnerable to attack by anyone who has ever labored to achieve a large-scale application of an established technology—say, a new steel mill in Indiana. Grant that even more vociferous objection can be raised by anyone involved in trying to apply a technology in a truly alien setting—say, a diesel engine factory in India. Acknowledge that "doing" a complex technology is not a routine, automatic thing, that art and skill and judgment are involved, and that mankind's fantastic capacity to standardize and

transmit "packages" or combinations of skill-and-standard is never fully free of the effects of that slippery phenomenon known as "the human element." Grant all this, and you still must admit that an established technology offers certain large advantages when it can serve as the substantial nexus for the creation of a viable organization—or an institutionalized change within a society.

Viewed as a social system, an organization-centered applied technology is a rather highly determinate set of linked rules and actions that are marked by a high degree of rationality. If such a technology is going to work, the behavior involved in its application must be substantially specified, and must be substantially consistent with technical norms—norms that are explicit and objective. Within certain boundaries, an applied technology either is or it isn't — it either functions or it doesn't.

The relative immutability of the requisites of such a technology is both a problem and an opportunity — a problem because there are many circumstances in which it may not be possible, and certainly not easy, to obtain the requisite behaviors. But at least the behaviors can be rather clearly specified in advance, and some of the central requirements for achieving them—skill and knowledge requirements—can be specified ahead of time, and met by more or less known methods. And, to a large extent, skill and knowledge requirements are so intimately linked with technical norms that meeting the former is likely to mean also internalizing the latter. And this, of course, is a form of institutionalization.

Furthermore, the relatively closed-system quality of many technologies means that the behaviors they require are quite particular to their operation—and not to the socio-cultural system at large. There are interesting questions that may merit exploration about cultural impedences to technological behaviors, but it is doubtful if such questions have broad, general empirical answers. Cultural patterns do tend to shape, in some ways, the structure of a technology-in-action—but not the most central, salient features of that technology. Al Italia may have St. Christopher medals in the cockpits of its 707's and the social organization of Japanese, American, French, and German automotive industries does differ. It is not being argued that *any* technology can be established in *any* place, but only that (a) there is no one-to-one relationship between technology and its socio-cultural setting, and (b) that some technologies, at any rate, are little (and partial)

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social systems of their own that can function wherever appropriate resources are available, output is relevant, and there are no inexorable environmental impediments. Further, it is being argued that technologically oriented organizations are relatively easy to plan and construct because: to the extent that an organization is technologically-centered, it contains a set of determinate action patterns—patterns spelled out in advance, and subject to continuing evaluation on the basis of hard criteria, as distinguished from others that are soft, elusive, and often reducible to that final residual test, survival.

In short, it seems likely that technologies are relatively easy to institutionalize in comparison with looser, less determinate systems of intendedly purposive social action. If so, technology is relevant to institution building, and one might make more discerning statements about institution-building if technology were incorporated as a factor in the overall perspective.

Finally, as we all recognize in general, the application of technologies can have interesting impacts on the environment. The more we know about specific characteristics of such impacts, under particular conditions, the more we shall know about potential strategies of social change. For instance, I know of cases in which simple mechanical contrivances were placed in local community settings to enable manifest improvements in the conditions of existence—pumps for wells—and the arrangements didn't work well, or at all. But I also know of dozens of villages in a Southeast Asian country where diesel generators and small-scale electricity distribution schemes seem to work quite well. Not only was the technology introduced, but somehow, and in a relatively unplanned fashion, arrangements for maintaining the systems emerged, and they work—in the absence of any deliberate, specifically related vocational training programs for diesel mechanics. What factors seem to explain the evidently effective "institutionalization" of the electricity operation, and the failures in the case of the water pumps?

There are other interesting questions about the institutionalization of technologies. For example, applied aviation technology is quite widespread, and by-and-large, it seems adequately institutionalized in lots of places. People have had their share of hair-raising and vexing experiences on India's domestic airline, and others like it, but mass carnage has not resulted from the wide dispersal of aviation technology. The same cannot be said for motor vehicles. Access to the

role of bus driver does not require intense socialization in the norms and skills of a relatively high technology, so it is safer to fly the local airline than ride the local busses in many parts of the world. The technology most commonly institutionalized in the domain of the motor vehicle has been maintenance. Bizarre and improbable things are sometimes done to vehicles, but the intrinsic technological requirements for keeping the wheels turning are quite often met in an adequate fashion.

These primitive and anecdotal observations suggest interesting questions about the institutionalization of social change that focus upon the interaction of some kinds of technologies with their environments. A concern with such matters, currently not specified as an explicit element of the IB perspective, might be one channel for further evolving the heurism.

The Matter of Time

In its original formulation, the IB perspective said nothing about the time-dimension of institution building, nor did it explicitly raise questions about this subject. Some of the studies that have resulted from IRPIB's efforts, however, have addressed this subject. Their findings and surmises should provide something of a basis for developing this critical facet of any comprehensive concern with the subject of institutional development—and possibly institutional decay as well.

Organizational Memory, Learning, and Teaching Mechanism

Some organizations have been called "nothing more than the lengthened shadows of particular men." Others obviously exert powerful influences on the perceptions and value-orientations of their participants. The IB perspective calls for as much as possible of the latter, for organizations in which certain kinds of value-orientations are effectively institutionalized.

We are all familiar with tactical devices for indoctrinating people with the organization's viewpoint. They range from elementary preaching-training to the kinds of "basic training" used by the U.S. Marine Corps. There is something of a "technology of indoctrination," and it is germane to institution building. To indoctrinate, an organization must have some subject-matter to sell, and some idea of what that is. It must have arrangements for remembering and relearning its value orientations, as well as for teaching them. These arrangements must take the form of "mechanism," or "process." They must

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be something other than personal recollections, attitudes, and perceptions of a given group of actors.

Designing and applying organizational memory processes must be a vital element of an institution building perspective. Institution building must take account of the "normative" aspects of organizational memory—and do it in a way that will cause "memory" to mean more than dead files. The "memory" process must also be a "learning" process, so that the organization's ideology is more than an immutable set of images and "truths." Normative adaptability and innovation must be key institution building concerns. The alternative is an almost certain guarantee of doctrinal obsolescence—and this is hardly compatible with the aim of pursuing social change through institutionalized organizations.

The Question of Linkages

The facet of the IB scheme that refers to linkages parallels the arrangement for conceptualizing organization. It is a classification scheme, based upon the premise that any organization must interact with its environment in certain ways. As such, it is a sterile perspective, devoid of direct explanatory potential. The linkage element of the perspective was, of course, intended to be this way—to serve as a simple means for trying to order information. The development of the heurism would, by now, be served by moving beyond this simple, sweeping classification.

One way to do this would be to adopt the sort of conceptualization of an organization as a partially open system (a la Thompson), and to try to specify with discrimination the key processes and problems likely to characterize organization-environment relations. To do this it might be useful to create a typology of environments, for processes and problems probably vary according to environment. This is only the cryptic statement of a hunch. However, the general premise—that the "linkages" idea could be further evolved to enhance the utility of the perspective—is not. It is more than a hunch.

To sum up, there are opportunities for developing and strengthening the institution-building perspective. Seizing them would make it intrinsically more appealing. To say this is not to attack the perspective. Rather, to sketch such problems and to note opportunities for doing something about them, is to illustrate one of the blessings that heurisms like this one provide: they stimulate thought; they breed new conceptualizations; they advance inquiry. Just how well

my own critique meets the heuristic ideal the reader must decide. But in intent, if not effect, the preceding appraisal of intrinsic features of the IB perspective is to be constructive.

Concerning the Use of the Perspective

The IB perspective is based upon the axiom that rational strategies of social change are possible—that, in some cases at any rate, one can say: “These initial-state conditions can be changed to a more desirable set of end-state conditions by deliberate efforts to create a rational, purposive organization that can be institutionalized.” The concern with institution building grew out of a conviction that earlier efforts at development-through-organization-building had failed precisely because they were insufficiently rational. They had concentrated on the transfer of organizational structures to new environments, or had aimed at establishing technological competence without concern for the organizational-environment context in which that competence would have to function.

Many of these ill-starred efforts failed to take adequate account of the normative aspects of organizations, and of their linkages with their settings. Thus IB posits the need for, and the possibility of, a more potent rationale, a more complete rationality, for efforts to achieve social change through organization. As Professor Esman has said,

. . .the institution building scheme is a rationalistic model. If the ideal type institution building man were in a position of institutional leadership, what are the problems that he would have to deal with and what are some of the tactics which he would rationally choose to employ in order to achieve his goals at minimum cost?¹⁴

Rational Decision-Making Under Conditions of High Indeterminacy

Rationality is a fragile and precarious value; it is more often than not achieved only in retrospect, and to posit it as the basis for continuing collective action is to look at the world through the eyes of Rebecca of Sunnysbrook Farm. It comes as no surprise that there is a position arguing broadly and well against the feasibility of comprehensively rational problem-solving efforts under certain conditions. A potent, compact statement of that position was set forth by A. O.

Hirschman and Charles E. Lindblom, in an article that asserted "... that a carefully thought out plan of research may be a hindrance rather than a help in achieving the desired goal, and that sometimes it may be easier to solve a problem if it is *not* fully understood."¹⁵

According to Lindblom, synoptic, or comprehensive, problem-solving is not possible (a) to the degree that clarification of objectives founders on social conflict, or is blocked by potential conflict; (b) to the degree that required information is not available or is available only at a prohibitive cost; and/or (c) to the extent that the problem is too complicated for man's intellectual capabilities.

Such conditions as these are not unfamiliar to the student and practitioner of social development. B. A. Klein has examined this problem of developmental decision-making, drawing a sharp contrast between developmental decisions, and those involving the relatively small uncertainties of established production processes.¹⁶ Klein argues for looseness in developmental goal-setting, and other-than-linear approaches to the goal. The objective, he says, is to persistently reduce the initial vast indeterminacies in the developmental situation, so that successive decisions can be made with increasing degrees of confidence. Along this line, Lindblom offers certain strategies—he calls them "disjointed incrementalism — that may, in developmental circumstances marked by a high degree of indeterminacy, be preferable to efforts at straightforward rationality:

(1) One is to limit consideration to possible policies that differ only incrementally from existing policy.

(2) As a variant of this strategy, limit consideration to only a relatively small number of means.

(3) Another is to choose ends that seem appropriate to available, or nearly available, means (rather than trying to adjust means to ends).

(4) Compare alternative ends in light of assumptions about means.

(5) Choose both ends and means simultaneously—or, in other words, without attempting to link them logically.

(6) Let ends be loose and diffuse, and

(a) regard analysis and policy-making as serial and successive, while action proceeds under such strategies as two and possibly five;

(b) recognize that at any one point the analysis of consequences is quite incomplete; and, if appropriate,

(c) perceive that analysis and policy-making are socially fragmented, occurring simultaneously at different points (and involving different mixes of premises).

Lindblom assumes that, as action proceeds, "adjustment" may be achieved through the interaction of different participants in analysis and policy-making, that errors of incompleteness will come to light through feedback, and that deliberately serialized (incremental) policy-making is best suited to deal with these kinds of conditions. Lindblom's is an argument that there is a preferable alternative to synoptic policy-making in a wide range of developmental situations.

His view stems in part from a rather compelling assumption: that "a 'system' or economy is never quite finished. Today's system . . . is likely to turn into tomorrow's subsystem, . . . because of unforeseeable repercussions, newly emerging difficulties, unanticipated counter-strategies, changing tasks or techniques, or whatever other forces with which the system or economy has to deal."¹⁷ Such repercussions, problems, and changes can never be fully visualized in advance. This developmentalist postulate is an argument against spending too much early time and effort at a neatly balanced, integrated "program."

The Hirschman-Lindblom-Klein argument has important implications for the institution building perspective:

1. The authors provide an orderly and perceptive general sketch of the intended environment of institution building. The initial IB perspective dealt with the environment only in terms of linkages. Hirschman *et al.* offer strategic premises about characteristics of the setting in which institution building efforts might be undertaken. These add enormously to the substance of a comprehensive IB perspective.

2. They raise important questions about the feasibility, as well as the character, of broadly rational social change strategies. In their most extreme form, these questions cast doubt on the feasibility of an institution building strategy. Push the logic of these authors all the way, and you end up saying it is utterly unlikely that somebody can conjure up a reasonably sound strategy for changing a complex set of given—and not-so-given—social conditions through an organizational intervention to produce a specified, desired outcome in the

future. In other words, mankind's capacity to intervene successfully in the terms of existence is undoubtedly limited and certainly doubtful. To which the most appropriate response is probably, "Of course!" Followed by three "buts."

(a) But even if all the arguments, and all the evidence, pointed toward the impossibility of sensible and constructive intervention into bad conditions through the use of organizations to foster social change, we should still have to try.

(b) But Hirschman *et al.* have made a general speculative statement—and the kind of action that concerns us is not general, but specific. Their general statement is inevitably too simple to fit and cover the conceivable range of specific activities that concern us. (Otherwise, instead of heurisms and speculative theories, we could have "hard" theories in the realm of social behavior—like those of the natural sciences.) There is in the work of Hirschman, Lindblom, and Klein a vital caveat for all who would think about things like institution building, and act to try to induce social change. That caveat ought never be ignored. But it should not be taken as sound ground for a fatalistic posture. Their perceptive heurism is nonetheless a heurism.

(c) But it is possible to stop short of the argument that planned, organized social change is essentially impossible—and to make quite constructive use of the Hirschman-Lindblom-Klein perspective in at least two ways: First, to improve the design of social change strategies—by avoiding the synoptic fallacy, for example—and by sharpening our judgments of the feasibility of such things as institution building strategies in particular circumstances. And second, by incorporating in an IB perspective, decision-making strategies that derive from the indeterminacy argument.

Concerning Social Change Strategies

One study of the Interuniversity Research Program in Institution-Building makes a point that fits the Hirschman-Lindblom-Klein warning against synoptic strategies, as well as the major premises of the IB perspective. The study concerned the establishment of an Israeli youth movement.¹⁸ It was originally created for a relatively specific set of programmatic purposes. As conditions in Israel changed, so did the programmatic activities of the organization. The study found that the meaningfulness of this organization to its participants did not derive primarily from its specified programmatic goals. It

stemmed from a more diffuse purposiveness, and the vitality of the structure persisted even though its substantive, programmatic goals changed rather radically.

Youth movements are rather atypical organizations, and one case is no basis for a sure generalization. But it does illustrate the idea of institutionality as an attribute that can be distinguished from an organization's program goals. And it does imply that "diffuse" organizational strategies may, under some circumstances, be compatible with institution building aims — a "diffuse" strategy being one in which the organization is not tightly and discretely structured in terms of one distinctive set of goals.

Concerning Decision-making

In its initial form, the IB perspective said nothing about the decision-making strategy involved in efforts to engage in institution building. Yet the aura of rationality as a guiding ideal of institution building has not been extrapolated into a simplistic argument that this is a direct, logical process requiring synoptic planning and decision-making. As Esman says, institution building "involves a combination of learning tactics and political tactics."¹⁰ And, one might add, all of the risk and indeterminacy that novelty can allow. Under the circumstances, it would seem appropriate to take into account a strategic perspective on decision-making, which may be utterly rational under certain conditions—conditions of considerable interest to would-be institution-builders for social change, and conditions where synoptic problem-solving efforts may be absurd.

When Is IB a Relevant Strategy?

The discussion of rational strategies under conditions of high indeterminacy raises an important question: "Under what circumstances is institution building likely to be an appropriate strategy, assuming that the decision to apply a strategy is a matter of choice?"

The IB perspective does not say much about the relevant conditions of its application, only noting that organizations are the prime vehicles by which men seek to change undesired conditions in our time. Yet Hirschman, Lindblom, and Klein imply, at least, that there probably are circumstances in which a decision to create an organization for a certain intended purpose may be to fly in the face of reality. Experience indicates that there are clearly cases in which alternatives to deliberately organized effort are attractive. In the earlier-mentioned

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instance of rural electrification, there was no complete organization plan for doing the job. Some of the essential resources emerged, Topsy-like and unpremediated. They *could* have been produced through a deliberate arrangement.

In some cases, certainly, organizations seem to have effects more perverse than constructive on the situations they are intended to remedy. But in *what* cases, under *what* conditions? Insofar as possible, the IB perspective ought to specify the circumstances of its relevance, or at least to try to identify the circumstances of its irrelevance, and the conditions in which alternatives will be considered.

IB and the Concept of an Institution

The IB perspective takes as its problem, "How to build an institution." So it must answer the question: "What is an institution?"

In his interim appraisal of the IB perspective, Professor Esman says an "institution is defined not as a set of sanctioned norms like marriage or contract, nor as a sector of action like business or religion, but as a *change-inducing and change-protecting formal organization*."²⁰ Such formal organizations "symbolize, promote, sustain and protect innovations, and it is these organizations, as well as the new normative relationships and action patterns they foster, which must become 'institutionalized,' meaningful, and valued in the societies in which they function." And "institutionalization" is "the process by which, through the instrument of organization, new ideas and functions are integrated and fitted into developing societies, are accepted and acquire the capacity to sustain themselves, and in turn influence the larger environment in which they function."²² In short, an institution, for our purposes, is an organization that successfully produces changes—"new ideas and functions"—within a social system.

This statement is cryptic, general, and important. Like other basic premises in the IB perspective, it is an iceberg statement—it sits on top of a large underlying argument, or set of premises and assumptions. Some of them concern the nature of an organization.

Let us stipulate that a formal organization is, for our purposes, a set of partially-specified patterns of action that involve the behavior of more than one person. In some sense (or senses) the action is purposive—it is performed for some reason other than merely to be performed. By "pattern" we mean action that is regularized—we mean that individual behaviors are related in some more or less orderly way.

"Partially-specified" is merely a synonym for "formal."

We can "name" the mechanisms that regularize and relate the behaviors to produce the pattern, calling them "norms," "standards," "rules," "conventions," etc. The naming is not so important as the recognition that patterned behavior reflects and tends to conform to, underlying principles. Some of these are formal-specified, perhaps written down. Others are not, but they do exist, and can be discovered by watching what goes on. Some of these principles, or norms, etc., are technical-objective specifications that must be met if a certain kind of intended pattern is to be fulfilled. Never will all of the principles be technical; others include rules about status, conventions about the legitimacy and limits of particular inducements, and so forth. The essential point is that in all organizations there is a normative dimension, most immediately manifested in the "rules" that show up in behavior.

A complex organization will include dozens, hundreds, perhaps thousands of such normative premises—some quite stable, others ephemeral, and still others somewhere in between these two states. Many norms will govern only little pieces of the overall action; others will have a relatively broad application. And to some extent—and in ways that may be complex, incomplete, and elusive—various of these norms will be coherent. In practice they will never be fully coherent; but unless the organization is rife with conflict and confusion, norms will reflect an underlying "value-orientation." A number of such value-themes may exist within the organization. There will probably be layers of them. To some extent they are almost bound to be potentially conflicting. But individually and collectively they produce—and reflect—tendencies toward coherent patterning within the organization.²³

This view argues that the normative qualities of an organization are matters of critical importance. So does the IB perspective. In its frankly prescriptive fashion, it takes up a concern with building organizations that have "the right kind" of normative qualities—qualities that will promote new ideas and functions in society. A relevant organization is one that will produce desirable social innovations. The IB perspective assumes that this means organizations whose normative qualities are in some important ways different from what already exists.

As already noted, a big part of the IB problem can be stated as

building organizations with the right kinds of normative qualities, in settings where this may not be easy because the particular organization will not be able to merely replicate existing, sanctioned patterns of action.^{24, 25}

Another facet of this idea of an institution, or of institutionality, concerns organization-environment relations. Earlier in this paper, in describing the IB perspective, I used the term "institution" to refer to a pattern of action, or a set of action patterns, not located entirely inside an organization, but reaching across some part of the organization and its environment. Any organization will typically be involved in many such patterns, and they will be different in various of their features. Any such trans-organizational activity could be either: (a) governed by single value-orientation existing both inside and outside the organization, or (b) governed by a set of differing, but not contradictory, value-orientations. (Rural people may not respond to and partake in activities promoted by the land-grant-type institution because they are oriented toward benefiting rural people, but because they have confidence in representatives of the organization, are motivated by self-interest, perceive this as linked with deferred gratifications, with changes in enterprise systems, etc. . . .)

Intuitively, it seems that the most common situation faced by organizations, including those committed to fostering social change, is (b) rather than (a). The problem, in other words, is often not likely to be the construction of an "institution," in the sense of a trans-organizational activity made coherent by a single set of value-orientations. More likely the problem will be one of constructing an organization that can induce attitudes, awareness, and behaviors congruent with elements of its own value-orientation.

To thus induce social change, it may well not be necessary for an organization *per se* to be valued, or to be loved, in a sense. What really matters is that it exist and have the appropriate environmental impact. Grant that *in some cases*—in some kinds of activities—boundaries between organization and elements of its setting must be low; that there must be a fulsome normative intimacy between agency and allocators, or clientele, a set of truly shared values. Grant, too, that changes in the normative aspects of behavior are a key part of what is meant by "social change." But also grant that organizations can conceivably have—*do* have—many different kinds of normative relations with their environments. Grant these things, and the IB

perspective becomes a bit sharper, moves a bit more toward operational relevance, and becomes a question of: "How can we build organizations that will have normative (as well as technological and managerial) qualities that will enable them to promote social change?"

If this is the question, then "institution building" is a special case of "organization-building," its distinctiveness deriving from two factors: (1) the particular type of normative problem likely to be involved in creating the organization, and (2) the particular type of effects the organization is intended to have.

One way of saying this is: "There are special problems in creating change-inducing and change-protecting organizations. One set of those problems concerns the intrinsic organization; the other concerns its extrinsic relations with its setting. The problems may be related, but they are also distinguishable." One can conceive of an organization that solves the intrinsic problem without having much of the intended impact on its environment. It is also possible to conceive of an organization that has no major intrinsic problem to solve, but that has significant social-change effects upon its setting. If we view an organization in James Thompson's terms, we will find circumstances in which a new technology can be "organized," or put into operation in a structure that is otherwise not a whole lot different from other existing structures in its setting—with significant environmental effects. A critical factor here will be the compatibility of existing social circumstances and the technology. For example, in Thailand one can establish a road-building organization that is in many ways quite similar to other organizations in the existing administrative culture; in its fashion it will "work"—it will get the roads built; and the roads may be important mechanisms of developmental change.

On the other hand, in Thailand it will be exquisitely difficult to establish an effective community development program, for at least two reasons: First, community development has no closed-system technology, like that involved in road-building; and second, factors in the administrative culture—thematic value-orientations within the bureaucracy and society—are not highly compatible with value-orientations requisite to community development-type activity. In this second case, it may be appropriate to define the problem in quite different terms, given the aim of pursuing social change through community development.

All of this illustrates an important point: It is possible to talk about such things as social change and institution building "in general," but it is possible to do them only "in particular." In getting from the general to the particular, the more relevant factors that we can identify, and the more statements we can make about how they seem to be related to other factors, the further we can go from a general speculatively theoretical orientation towards applicable guides to action-strategies.

Measuring Institutionalization

One useful consequence of the stress on "institution" is a derivative emphasis upon *extrinsic* measures of success in institution building efforts. Effects in the environment are what count, even though the big problem may be to build an organization that can get those effects. The developers of the IB heuristic have encouraged the development of "criteria of institutionality," and authors of institution building case studies have tried to specify them. The most elaborate of these endeavors has been that of Professor John W. Hanson, whose careful and thorough study of the College of Education, University of Nigeria, Nsukka, covered an effort spanning more than half a decade.²⁶

According to Hanson, ". . . an organization or an innovation may be said to be institutionalized to the extent to which it is viewed within the environment as having value, that is, the extent to which it is prized."²⁷ In his view, "prizing," or institutionalization, could be judged in his own case study in terms of six criteria: (1) use of the services provided; (2) verbal approval; (3) survival and growth; (4) outside support; (5) autonomy, or freedom from external control—particularly discriminatory external control; (6) normative spread, or outside adoption of normative themes of the organization.

The idea of "prizing," or "valuing," as an ultimate criterion of institutionalization is rather well established in the IB literature, and is found, too, in Selznick's assertion that the institutionality of an organization means the extent to which it is valued "beyond the technical requirements of the task at hand."²⁸

There is a certain utility in this orientation, as well as a considerable amount of trouble.²⁹ Part of the merit lies in the fact that "criteria" of these kinds are inevitably better than the picayune standards which have apparently been used in some evaluations of or-

ganized social change efforts. Roskelley and Rigney's assessment of terminated AID agricultural projects in the agency's Far East region judged that,

the criteria used to determine institutional maturity were clearly inadequate. The decisions to terminate projects were made on the basis of achievement in physical characteristics, such as numbers of buildings, faculty and students, but they did not take into account the spirit, tradition and institutional role which had been established. . . .None of the institutions had achieved the kind of overall maturity that was essential for them to sustain a dynamic, self-generative level of performance. It was questionable whether they would be able to make meaningful contributions to the economic, social and political growth of the country in which they were located.³⁰

Numbers of buildings, faculty and students in all likelihood are not very adequate indices of "institutionality." Neither, unfortunately, is "prizing," or "meaningfulness" (the reductive term I once used myself in an IB case-study). At the broadest level of generality, the ultimate test of "institutionality" is really quite simple (generally speaking). It is: Does what is sought for come about; does something that was intended happen; does the job get done; or does the change-process show signs of working?

Once we move below the level of generality represented in a simple statement about "getting the job done," or having the desired sort of effect, we move to the level of the particular, or the level of particular types of organization-settings-aims. Here the extrinsic tests of efficacy are likewise particular. We judge the organization in terms of results—acknowledging that under conditions of novelty and uncertainty the results may not be the ones that someone had in mind when the venture was begun. In some types of effort, the results will be hard to assess, and possibly impossible to assess in any satisfying manner. In others, it will be possible to find out what happened as a result of the organized efforts—or some of what happened, because the organization's aims and effects will be knowable. We will be better off if we conceive of institution-building as creating organizations with "good" institutional characteristics (perhaps using the Parsons-Thompson perspective as an element of our perspective). Then we

can give out attention to decisions about when to try to establish organizations that promise to be suitable in their "institutional" features, and relevant to social change goals.

This may be objectionable to those who want to focus not on organizations, but on "institutionalization"—that "process by which. . . new ideas and functions are integrated and fitted into developing societies. . . ." But once it is agreed that building or changing organizations is going to be a relevant method for doing these things, then it should be possible to concentrate on such questions as: the circumstances under which organizations of certain kinds are likely to achieve results of some desired kind; the strategies for developing such organizations; and the ways of assessing their substantive impacts, to the extent this is likely to be possible. It will not be necessary to try to construct elegant, elusive, and in some ways, extraneous categories of extrinsic impact measures, for the sheer fulfillment of a prescript that there must be institutionality measured in terms of "prizing" or "meaningfulness."

This does not mean that we can ignore "linkages," nor that we are not concerned with normative qualities of the organization's environment. It does mean, however, that "institution building" is a particular approach to what might otherwise be called "organization building," that social-change goals are the *raison d'être* of this particular concern, and that a prime working hypothesis is that advancing such goals is likely to involve organizations with distinctive normative features. In this view, an "institution" is an organization, an organization that can never exist in isolation. "Institution building" is the study of the ways and means by which certain kinds of organizations can be used to promote certain kinds of developmental goals. And "institutionality" means that the blooming organizations are established, and are somehow effective.

These assertions abandon absolutely none of the substance of the aims and concerns that underlie the IB perspective. They forego none of the focus upon central substantive problems that the institution building perspective has brought to the study and use of organizations as developmental tools. They relinquish not one of the opportunities for fruitful development of that perspective. They do suggest that there is no special magic, no lurking mystique, in the label "institution building." The same dark, difficult jobs will remain to be done; the identical problems will have to be faced; the indetermin-

acies will be just as high. And the inadequacies of narrowly construed "organizational technology," with its emphasis upon formality that all too often becomes formalism, will be just as great as it always has been. So let us keep the label. Let us expand, develop, and try to apply the stimulating IB perspective. But let us also make it as clear as we can what it is we're trying to do, and keep that task within boundaries that are as clear and manageable as we can make them.

Putting the IB Perspective to Work

The initial version of the institution-building perspective has already been used in about forty studies of efforts to induce social change through the construction or re-construction of formal organizations. Almost all of these have been case studies, although a few are more general analyses. The IB perspective has already been put to work. Some limited effort has been made to synthesize findings from these studies, but not much. Professor Esman's interim appraisal of the perspective, and his paper, "Some Issues in Institution Building Theory," are the two major efforts.³¹ But much might be done to enlarge the potential and the payoffs of the IB perspective.

As noted, the perspective itself needs development. This would make explicit important questions that are now buried in the perspective—questions about technology for example. And it would link the IB perspective with such existing knowledge and surmise as "organization theory," and speculative theories about decision-making under conditions of high uncertainty.

The findings of past IB studies also need to be reviewed. The promising "lessons" embedded in those studies should be extracted, collated, and synthesized. This will not transform the IB perspective from heurism to hard theory, but it could produce hypotheses and suggestive guides to strategic action. For the IB perspective can be put to work in two related ways—to develop knowledge to move us a little further down that endless road from heurism to hypothesis, law, and systematic explanation, and to develop elements of action strategies that can be useful, even if scientifically impure.

The distinction between systematic knowledge and action strategies is by no means complete, but it is worth making. Many of the people interested in institution building are concerned with solving problems. They want "useful" knowledge—and not all the knowledge that can be produced by the study of aspects of "institution-building"

is likely to have precise and particular applications. Statements that help us understand things do not necessarily tell us what to do in specific situations. On the other hand, practical information sometimes takes the form of hunches, examples, unanswered questions, checklists of things to find out about (classification schemes)—in short, material that is not systematic explanation, but that seems better than past conventional wisdom. A very fine example is the limited, general, speculative statement of Professor Lindblom about possible decisional strategies in situations of great uncertainty. These statements have much practical relevance; they help us; yet they are not—and are not likely to be converted into a determinate empirical theory. (For one thing, the guides to action do not determinately specify the situations in which they apply, and the selection of a strategic approach remains a matter of judgment.) Never mind; we can use such premises, just as we can use much of the more or less pragmatic and tentative information that the IB perspective can develop.

In the relativistic realm where action strategies are formed and followed, information is needed for three purposes: problem definition, problem solving, and evaluation. The IB perspective—particularly if it is developed and made more powerful—can serve all three of these needs.

Problem Definition

“The most significant feature of any problem is its subjective aspect. A problem is not an objective thing. A problem is neither a fact nor a concrete phenomenon. Schistosomiasis is not a problem—it is a fact. A problem emerges only when someone inputs a certain kind of meaning to an assumed or evident set of facts. A problem is a synthetic statement—one that combines observations about some. . . condition with a judgment that asserts that ‘the situation. . . should be changed.’”⁸²

Some people have already found the IB perspective useful in efforts to define *their* problems—e.g., the stipulated problem of using technical assistance to promote education institutions in agriculture. Others, who apparently defined this sort of organizational problem in different terms, overlooking its subtle but very real normative aspects, were less than successful in trying to do something about their problems.

In practice, problem definition, and the shaping of strategies for attacking problems, go hand-in-hand. Sometimes, in fact, the order

is reversed, and the problem is defined in terms of the means available for attacking it. Hirschman *et al.* have noted this is not necessarily an irrational strategy. Sometimes it may make sense to set out to "build an institution," even if the circumstances are so uncertain that we cannot be very sure at the outset that they call for building an institution. In such perplexing conditions, the IB perspective may at least help us proceed. An expanded, enlarged, more potent perspective should narrow the zone of indeterminacy, and help us decide when and whether a particular social change problem is best defined in institution building terms. So the more we can find out about the circumstances in which "institution building" is *not* the answer, or is not likely to be a sound and sensible way to define a particular problem, the better off we are likely to be when we choose to act as social change agents.

Problem Solving

The IB perspective makes rather obvious contributions to certain kinds of problem-solving. In some cases it enables people to avoid defining their problems in unduly narrow terms, or too casually embarking upon "problem-solving" efforts without first having engaged in an effort, however thwarting and unruly, at problem-definition. And where there are plausible grounds for trying to solve (attack) some problem by building an organization with the appropriate normative features, in order to strive for a desired change in society, then IB can offer guidelines, checklists, caveats, rules-of-thumb, and occasionally even more it can identify some of the possible pitfalls in an action strategy. It can sensitize those who would plan and act to the nature of the situation.

The IB perspective will never reduce the task of striving for social change to a pre-programmed pattern of constructive action. Novel and complex problems of social change will never be reduced to routine decision-making. But the perspective, its framework enlarged and reinforced by evidence from experience, can, in a limited and bounded field of activity, reduce somewhat the grossness and the vagueness of problem-solving strategies.

Evaluation

The basic problems of evaluation are about the same as those of defining situations and designing strategies. The big difference is the frequent retrospective orientation of evaluation, which asks "What has happened, how, why?" The snare that lurks in efforts at evaluation

is retrospective rationality—the sometimes irresistible tendency to work backward through a multidimensional maze of only partially perceived actions and events, lo! to discover a neat sequence and to impute causation.

Backward looks can summon up the thin, sweet consolations of retrospective pseudo wisdom. If that were all, they might not be worth the trouble. Beyond this, at the ultimate level of reduction, the only difference between evaluation, problem definition, and the design of intended problem-solutions is one of tense. The same canons of description and explanation apply. But their application can be easier (as well as more dangerous) in the past tense. More of the returns are in; more is known about the situation. Evaluation is faced with lower levels of indeterminacy than exercises conducted in the present and future tenses. In this lies the distinctive merit and appeal of evaluation. Less uncertainty means better description and analysis, and this can mean an incremental gain in knowledge for the next round of action. These observations are so banal they would not be worth making, were they not also equally basic. (And were it not all too often the case that evaluation operates as a closed system, not feeding its findings into present-tense and future-tense activities.)

The main points, then, are three: First, apart from all the pitfalls, the essential problem of evaluation is not different from that of defining and resolving problems—it is a function of the indeterminacy, the complexity, of the situation. Second, the time-orientation of evaluation, however, tends to reduce indeterminacy somewhat, albeit in a thoroughly dangerous fashion. Third, insofar as the perspective of evaluation is also the perspective of problem-defining and problem-solving action, the opportunity for constructive use of the results of evaluation is increased. *Ergo*, the IB perspective is logically as appropriate for evaluation efforts as for other uses. If it does not nurture the beguiling pseudo-explanations that are really rationalizations, IB evaluation can contribute much to knowledge of the use of organizations as prime tools of social change strategies. Sans evaluation, the potentials of the IB perspective—and their limits—can never be known with much adequacy. And the potency of such evaluation will lie not in discrete case examinations, but in efforts to synthesize the findings of such studies.

Conclusion

There is no magic in institution building. Under certain conditions—and they are not easy to know—the IB perspective makes sense as the source of a strategy of social change action—more sense than the narrower perspectives it seeks to supplant.

The IB perspective, however, remains limited and incomplete. The key to its enhancement is to refine and enlarge the heuristic. But data collection and analysis are also important, and both tasks should be undertaken. IRPIB studies, the CIC/AID project, and other studies offer valuable data. Interpreted and related within an analytical framework, the findings could be presented in training manuals, planning guides, and speculative analyses. The process could be set up to cumulate knowledge over time.

The results will never add up to a broad, determinate theory of institution-building. The IB perspective, however enhanced, can never meet the hard tests of empirical theory. Nor can any other comprehensive scheme for helping deal with novel, indeterminate, elusive but ineluctable problems of social change. Not even, in retrospect, will the University of Pittsburgh be able to know determinately whether it is possible to have restructured the Central University of Ecuador. Looking back at this particular and unsuccessful effort,

. . . the diffuse distribution, and the absence of effective central administration in an organization that was already highly institutionalized and in nearly perfect equilibrium both internally and with its environment, provided none of the leverage that change agents . . . would require to move the institution along the innovative paths to which they were committed. . . . The institution as an entity could not be directed.³³

Sensitivity to important qualities of the Central University might have led to a better subjective judgment about a contemplated project or a better action-strategy. Yet the IB perspective, in either present or future form, could never produce a firm prediction that "the institution as an entity could not be directed." It could never crank out a precise and accurate answer to a "go-no-go?" question in Ecuador, or anywhere else. It could have helped decision-makers better iden-

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tify and assess the evidence on which to base a decision. And the evaluation of the Ecuadorian experience, through the lens of an institution building perspective, might contribute to wiser judgmental action in other times and other places. And this is all we can hope for—and strive for.

NOTES

1. The program has involved participants from Indiana University, Michigan State University, the University of Pittsburgh, and Syracuse University. A small research headquarters has been located at the University of Pittsburgh. The acronym, unfortunately, is IRPIB.
2. The Committee on Institutional Cooperation consists of representatives of the Big Ten universities and the University of Chicago.
3. See, in addition to the group's summary report (title mentioned above), J. A. Rigney, J.K. McDermott, and R.W. Roskelley, "Strategies in Technical Assistance," Technical Bulletin No. 189, North Carolina Agricultural Experiment Station, Raleigh: North Carolina State University, December, 1968. This bulletin examines the role of technical personnel in the technical assistance institution building process, and offers means of measuring the maturity of newly developed agricultural universities.
4. Milton J. Esman and Hans C. Blaise, "Institution Building Research — The Guiding Concepts," Pittsburgh: Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, University of Pittsburgh, 1966 (mimeo).
5. The "Guiding Concepts" paper refers to these as "five clusters of institution variables." As for "organization," it is quite clear that the IB perspective refers to an intendedly rational, purposive, bureaucratic (or more-or-less bureaucratic) entity.
6. Milton J. Esman, "The Institution Building Concepts—An Interim Appraisal," pp. 1-2.
7. We are not talking about "formal" theories, the tautologies of arithmetic, but only about theories pertaining to the "real world," or in other words applying to empirical phenomena.
8. For a useful discussion see: Anatol Rapoport, "Explanatory Power and Explanatory Appeal for Theories," Ann Arbor: Mental Health Research Institute, University of Michigan, January 30, 1968 (hecto), especially the discussion at pp. 24-30.
9. *Ibid.*, pp. 7-9.
10. As noted by Rapoport, *Ibid.*, p. 7.
11. For an interesting related discussion see Fred W. Riggs, *Organization Theory and International Development*, Bloomington: Carnegie Seminar, Indiana University, 1969.
12. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967.
13. Or to read Jerome H. Skolnick's *Justice Without Trial*, New York; Wiley, 1966, with its perceptive analysis of the law-enforcement process, and the

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- role—and limitations—of technology in the pursuit of law-enforcement goals
14. "The Institution Building Concepts—An Interim Appraisal," *op. cit.*, p. 56.
 15. A. O. Hirschman and Charles E. Lindblom, "Economic Development, Research and Development Policy Making: Some Converging View," *Behavioral Science*, (April, 1962), p. 211. The article on which the following paragraphs are based is at pp. 211-222.
 16. B. A. Klein, "The Decision-Making Process in Development." Paper P-1916. Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, Feb. 19, 1960. Cited and discussed in Hirschman and Lindblom.
 17. *Ibid.*, p. 12.
 18. See the chapter by Joseph Eaton in this volume entitled "Institution Building: The Case of the Gadna Youth Corps."
 19. ". . . An Interim Appraisal," *op. cit.*, p. 68.
 20. ". . . An Interim Proposal," *op. cit.*, p. 1. The italics are Esman's.
 21. *Ibid.*, p. 2.
 22. Esman and Blaise, "Institution Building Research: The Guiding Concepts," *op. cit.* cited in Rigney, McDermott and Roskelley, p. 37.
 23. For a somewhat fuller discussion of this perspective see: W. J. Siffin, *The Thai Bureaucracy: Institutional Change and Development*. Honolulu: East West Center Press, 1966.
 24. The immediate source of this aspect of the IB perspective is probably Phillip Selznick, *Leadership in Administration*. Evanston: Row, Peterson, and Co., 1957. As noted earlier, the idea of the institutional dimension of any non-voluntary formal organization has been developed in a most fruitful analysis by James Thompson.
 25. Not so incidentally, the whole subject of "professionalism" might be brought into the picture at this point. It probably ranks with technology as a factor affecting efforts at building organizations to promote social change in uncongenial environments, and in distinguishing those efforts from organization-building in modern societies. Professionalism greatly facilitates the development and creation of organizations for many purposes in a modern environment. In a social setting where many fields of occupational endeavor are professionalized, or proto-professionalized, much of the job of establishing an organization, and keeping abreast of technological (and certain other kinds of) developments does not have to be done by the organization *per se*. The various structures that comprise a manifestation of professionalism do much of this—for a very real price, of course.

One prime feature of any profession is the specification of various norms and standards, the internalization of those in professional neophytes, and to some extent the maintenance and enforcement of norms and standards among professionals. Building the kinds of organizations that are a concern to "institution builders" is complicated by the common absence of any, or much, or suitable kinds of, professionalism within the setting. So, in a very real sense, a comprehensive concern with "institution building" becomes in part a concern with professionalism.
 26. The following is based upon his study, *Education, Nsukka, A Study in Institu-*

tion Building Among the Modern Ibo, East Lansing: African Studies Center and Institute for International Studies in Education, Michigan State University, 1968, chapter 7.

27. *Ibid.*, p. 305.
28. Quoted in Esman, ". . . Interim Appraisal," p. 36.
29. There is also considerable appeal in Thompson's formulation. Following Talcott Parsons, he deals with institutionality from the viewpoint of the organization: ". . . the organization which consists of both technical and managerial suborganizations is also part of a wider social system which is the source of the 'meaning,' legitimation, or higher-level support which makes the implementation of the organization's goals possible. In terms of 'formal' controls, an organization may be relatively independent; but in terms of the meaning of the functions performed by the organization, and hence of its 'rights' to command resources and to subject its customers to discipline, it is never wholly independent. *This overall articulation of the organization, and the institutional structure and agencies of the community, is the function of the third, or institutional, level of the organization.*" (p. 11; italics added) This view enables him to deal with the subject of institutionality in terms of the strategy which organizational leadership takes (or may tend to take) in dealing with the environment, and is linked with a multi-sided approach to the evaluation of an organization, again in terms of assessments made *within* the organization (See his Chap. 7, "The Assessment of Organizations").
30. "Measuring Institutional Maturity in the Development of Indigenous Agricultural Universities," in Rigney, McDermott, and Roskelley, *op. cit.*, p. 38. This is a summary statement drawn from a more extensive review by Roskelley of project evaluations and terminations.
31. Milton J. Esman, "Some Issues in Institution Building Theory," a paper delivered at a workshop sponsored by the Agency for International Development and the Committee for Institutional Cooperation, Purdue University, July, 1969.
32. W. J. Siffin, "Institution Building for Development and Social Change: An Evaluation of the Perspective," Remarks at the AID-CIC Workshop, Purdue University, July, 1969.
33. Esman, "Some Issues in Institution Building Theory," *op. cit.*, pp. 8-9.

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8. Criteria of Institutional Change As Guidelines for Assessing Project Maturation

HARRY R. POTTER

This paper examines some of the criteria that are used in estimating and measuring institutional change. The focus is on changes in institutions that are receiving technical assistance, and on how those changes are related to the goals of the technical assistance project. In part, this paper draws on work on the criteria for impacts of technical assistance projects upon the host institutions done as part of the CIC-AID Rural Development Research Project.¹

The general organization of this paper is to start by examining some of the implicit and explicit ways in which technical assistance and institution building are viewed; then it turns to the tests of institutionality and the environment in which the institution operates.

Project Maturity and Institution Maturity

Technical assistance projects with an institution building component have among their goals certain changes in the organizational components of the host university. They may be to make "research more relevant," or to develop certain teaching programs, for example. It is important to recognize the distinction between project goals and institution goals: they should be commensurate with one another, but they are not identical. This distinction is important in its own right, but it is also important for distinguishing between project maturity

and institution maturity. I think it's quite important that we recognize the distinction between these two types of maturity, and treat them as separate phenomena. At times that seems to be difficult to do. A technical assistance project may be programmed to run for a certain number of years, and those numbers of years are varied, yet in most cases, regardless of the duration of the project, as the termination of that time period is approached, there are usually suggestions that perhaps the project should be extended. And in many cases that seems to be very justifiable, but nevertheless there is the matter of the project and its time duration, as opposed to that of the institution. After all, the stated objective of an institution building project is to create or develop an institution or organization which will, in a sense, be enduring, implicitly forever. Thus, the question of inaturity of such a phenomenon is a difficult one. Nevertheless, the project, per se, sets out to accomplish certain more or less stated goals. These goals of the project need to be considered independently from the activities of the institution. That is not to say that project goals are not related to institutional goals, but that they are related but separate, have a different time span, and involve different personnel.*

This raises a variety of interesting kinds of dilemmas. Institutions may behave really quite differently; we say that we have an institution at some point in time, 1969, for instance, in which we bring in a technical assistance project. That institution may do a variety of things. It may go along for several years showing very little change, either in spite of or because of a technical assistance project; it may progress slowly; it may or it may not even follow such a straight line, it may show a little bit of a sag, perhaps as a technical assistance project comes in. There are some real attempts to change certain aspects of the institution that may, in fact, cause a little bit of a sag before it begins to really move. An interesting question then, that arises is the ability of the technical assistance project to move in correspondence with the changes in the institution per se. What we may have in the case of the project is that it may start, and may set out over a period of time to move toward a specified goal. It may attempt to move that way because it says in the contract, "these are our goals," and really

*This is not to deny the important point made by McDermott that project personnel need to identify with the host institution. McDermott's point is concerned with the social psychological processes of team members, while this is directed toward project management or organization.

pay little attention to the kinds of problems, and the way the institution (in many cases a university), is shifting or not shifting over the course of the technical assistance project. This is one of the kinds of things which creates dilemmas in attempting to keep the project in line with the objective of the technical assistance effort.

Base Line Indicators

One of the major problems is the lack of adequate base line indicators of the condition of the institution when the project is initiated. There may be descriptions of the institution in a sense, but often not very explicit data. I deliberately do not say harder data, in the sense of the statistical data, although that would be legitimate for certain kinds of information. The notion of really trying to specify some base line indicators of the condition of the institution when a project starts, can give us a better means of assessing things that have changed. It is against that type of information that we attempt to say, "all right, these kinds of changes have taken place." That sounds like a nice model.

If project goals were clear, and *if* adequate base line indicators were available, would projects mature and come to an easy end? Some might, but I expect many would not. I think the problem is that education, like a variety of other phenomena, for instance health, is a relatively indeterminate goal. It's not something that has an explicit, finite quality that we wish to acquire. You achieve much education, and you decide you'd like to have some more. Or society in general should have more education. It's this indeterminateness, this indefiniteness, which leads us into some of these kinds of problems. We often recognize that when one problem is solved, additional problems are created.

Maturity and the Organic Analogy

One of the interesting things that has struck me during these discussions of institutions and their development is the variety of references to what has been called the "Organic Analogy." Organic analogies have been used extensively in the social and behavioral sciences. At the present time, they are thought of as being relatively inaccurate and fallacious. However, they may be used as either hueristic or poetic devices, in some cases to describe certain things about organizations. Let me document my case. Warren Haynes, for

instance, made perhaps the most explicit statement when he referred to the fact that the word 'organic' has become quite popular in organization theory, *per se*.² Milton Esman made, in a sense, a similar reference when he was talking about the growth and development of institutions. One of the more intriguing ideas was suggested by Joel Bernstein. If I may assign a title to his topic, he was almost talking about institutional birth control. He was referring to whether the solution of problems lay in the development of new institutions, or whether there may not already be enough institutions of some kinds, and that perhaps we should turn our attention to emphasizing quality building within existing institutions. Haynes also talked about problems of withdrawing from India with the Harvard-MIT project, and the close parallel to this of the problems of adolescents of breaking the aprons strings, and getting away from the control of the parents. Perhaps within the past few years, that analogy has become less a problem in the United States, but it showed up again when Bill Wayt was talking about how he would hate to see the problems that would arise from the development of some *new* institutions, particularly perhaps in Africa, where they would have to go through infancy and the teenage vacillation stage.

How is this relevant to the present task? One of the problems Roskelly, Rigney, and I had in talking about some of the attempts to measure maturity in the CIC-AID Rural Development Research Project was precisely what we meant by maturity.³ It focused exactly on one of the kinds of problems that the organic analogy gets into. Organisms mature; but we really are not so concerned with the physical process of maturation, as with the psychological or social process of maturation. There are several distinctions that could be noted. Biological organisms are discrete, social organisms are diffuse, for example. Biological organisms also clearly have a demise, but the objective of institution building projects is to create an ongoing institution, one which will not have a demise. This is the thing which really poses a major problem. Most people, in talking about drawing this particular type of analogy, don't pursue the point quite that far.

Organization as a Means

What are the objectives of institution building projects? One objective certainly is to create an organization that is responsive to

the needs of the society around it in some degree. It should help solve the problems of that society. It is an attempt to make the organization have some intrinsic value or relevance to that society.

Within this context, an organization becomes institutionalized, i.e., it becomes a valued *object*. There is, however, the question of treating "organization" as a means or an end. Within agricultural technical assistance-institution building projects, there is discussion of the form versus the function of the land grant college, or what combinations of form and function are most appropriate to accomplish some institution building objective.

Organization, as viewed by organizational theorists, is not treated as an end. Organization is really a means to accomplish certain ends. There has been considerable discussion of the notion that if we have the right man in the right place at the right time, we can get the job done. I find that unacceptable. That is a pretty flimsy kind of rationale, because all that really means is that if we give a thousand monkeys a thousand typewriters and let them go to work, after a certain period of time they will have produced all the great books. It is a purely random phenomenon if you take that kind of approach. Unless we really attempt to specify the characteristics of the person needed, and the environment in which we place him, we do not have a systematic, scientific approach to the problem. We've got to try to move on to that point.

There has been a great deal of discussion over separating the functions from the form of the land grant college model. Conceptually, form and function must be considered as separate phenomena. However, from the point of view of organizing to accomplish agricultural development, there is a traditional relationship which has been important in the United States. The land grant institution, with its combining of three functions, produces an organizational entity which provides a great opportunity for interaction between the persons who performs these different kinds of functions. If you create quite different administrative structures independent of one another, one of which is going to provide college or university teaching, one agricultural research, and a third extension service, there will generally be little coordination between the organizations. As the college graduates go to work for the research agencies and extension agencies, they often go to work for competing organizations. A single individual does not have to consider the relationship between his research, and

the problems of his extension clientele. Research workers go to work for an agency over which the extension agency has little or no control or perhaps contact. How can coordinated efforts between three agencies be created and maintained? That is a very difficult question to deal with. Clearly part of the development of the land grant college is that one organization is responsible for a wide variety of activities, a broad sector of the total research, teaching and extension of information to the public. In part, it is through the responsiveness of extension agencies back to the teaching and research programs, that research and teaching programs retain a focus.

The intent is not to ignore the differences in the existing organization of these types of services in any particular country. The important point is tying them together in whatever form is necessary to obtain this interaction among the agencies which provide these services.

The Institutionalization of Organizations

It is necessary first to turn to an explicit examination of the definition of institutionalization. Esman and Blaise have defined institutionalization as "the process by which normative relationships and action patterns are established."⁴ Parsons, *et al*; use the term institutionalization to mean "the integration of the expectations of the actors in a relevant interacting system of roles, with shared normative patterns of values. The integration is such that each is predisposed to reward the conformity of others with the value pattern, and conversely, to disapprove and punish deviance. Institutionalization is a matter of degree, not of absolute presence or absence."⁵ It seems to me in both cases, the focus is on establishing and integrating patterns of interaction so that they become expected and valued. For institution building to take place, these patterns of interaction must occur between the organization and its environment. Administrative or organizational structures which do not provide the opportunity and leadership for interaction to become institutionalized pose a serious problem.

The basic point here is whether or not, in the process of a technical assistance project, you are able to help coordinate the work of various agencies, not just teaching, research, and extension activities, but a wide variety of additional agencies which provide service throughout the country in an integrated fashion. Frank Parker speaks of the national system.⁶ This seems to be the point of providing this kind

of totality of action—working in concert toward a common objective.

Another concept of considerable utility in understanding interaction between organizations is the norm of reciprocity, the idea being that as you do something for someone else, he becomes obligated to you.⁷ Within the past few years, the whole set of information which is referred to as exchange theory is developing about this kind of relationship. The norm of reciprocity essentially says that as you do something for the other person, he has a kind of implicit obligation; it doesn't necessarily mean you've got to be paid off in dollars, but you establish a relationship such that he will help you and you help him. As this exchange begins to develop, it can become a crucial and very important aspect of the establishment of effective working relationships.

How do these concepts apply to the institutionalization of organizations? In the tests of institutionality in the early work of the Pittsburgh consortium, there were three indicators for the degree of institutionalization: the organization's ability to survive, the extent to which it is considered to have intrinsic value by its environment, and the degree to which specific relationship and action patterns of the organization have become normative for other organizations of the society.⁸ More recently, then, they've added a fourth, that is whether the institution can maintain its innovative thrust.⁹ That is a very difficult problem with which the institution must contend. The new fourth test is a very significant one, not a simple one for the institution to be able to accomplish. A major strength of the institution building approach is the emphasis it places on the relationship between the institution and the society. In the final report, the CIC-AID study talks about three classes of indicators having to do with institutional development.¹⁰ One is the kinds of inputs the institution receives from the society. For an academic institution, this input is basically money and students. The money may come in dollar form, or it may come in other forms. Second, there are outputs that the institution provides to the society, outputs in the form of graduates, and new knowledge, which comes about through research and then the extension of this new knowledge through adult education programs. The third class are the facilitating mechanisms that the institutions must have to provide these kinds of outputs. These facilitating mechanisms are buildings, quality of staff, etc., that are necessary to do their work. An educational institution obtains its input of funds and students from

the society, and returns these outputs of knowledge and graduates to that society. The interrelationship between the university and the society stresses the relevance of knowledge and activities to societal needs. However, it is also important to have technical competence to effectively contribute to the solution of problems.

Several people at this workshop have really begun to stress the importance of competence and quality, and the key role that quality can play in creating an effective institution. The basic point is that a concern for relationships with society alone will not do a good job of institution building, and will certainly not provide an institution which will meet the test for survival. The second factor, demonstrated competence, or ability to get the job done, is equally important. A point here that is of particular relevance for academic institutions is that the emphasis is on demonstrated competence or performance, not on inactivated quality or competence. Lack of involvement in problems relevant to the society is what creates the ivory tower image.*

If the objectives of a land grant institution are the provision of educated manpower, services, and information, then much of the attention of institution building theory is addressed to those mechanisms which provide that output and influence its quality. A re-examination of Esman and Blaise's definition of institution building shows that they have not ignored output, as they refer to physical and/or social technologies. They state that "the introduction of new technologies takes place primarily in and through organizations. . . . Institutions as used in this context are organizations which incorporate, foster and protect normative relationships and action patterns, and perform functions and services which are valued in the environment."¹¹ Nor have they ignored the element of input, although it is less apparent in their definition. They state, "if there is deliberate planning and guidance of institutional change concomitant with induced technological change, then this will lead to a more effective utilization of the society's resources."¹² They view the institution and its environment as parts of a system. A similar position is taken by Gross in discussing performance elements in social systems accounting. He says, "the performance of any social system consists of activities (1) to satisfy the interests of various parties, by (2) producing various kinds qualities

* I don't want to be interpreted as being against basic research, or of saying that all program decisions should be made for the general public, only that a concern for its clientele should be present within the institution.

and quantities of output, (3) investing in the system's capacity for future output, (4) using inputs efficiently, (5) acquiring inputs and doing all of the above in a manner that conforms with (6) various codes of behavior and (7) varying conceptions of technical and administrative rationality."¹³ Gross's performance elements are quite similar to the notions of inputs, facilitating mechanisms, and outputs that I've been describing.

One of the things we have a tendency to do is to treat an organization as being of equal quality throughout, when we really recognize that that's not the case. Especially in regard to universities, we know that departments vary in strength; in the case of other organizations, certain departments within them will be relatively strong, while others are relatively weak.

We need to keep in mind the same kind of thing about the social environment;—what are its characteristics and how are they differentiated? When we talk about *the* environment, what is it that we are really talking about? One of the ways to subdivide the environment from the social scientist's point of view has been to refer to three kinds of systems—the cultural system, the personality system, and the social system.¹⁴ This helps to separate and to keep in mind that there are different kinds of phenomena which we confront. We generally recognize the existence of individuals with varying personalities, varying needs, varying wants, etc., and in our own personal behavior with people, we are very conscious of this. But when we move to talking about organizations, institutions, and national systems, it is sometimes very difficult to keep up with that kind of information input. But the objective of organization as a means, is to say, "all right, there are persons out there; we want to be able to create organizational plans, schemes, charts, which recognize that not all persons are the best in their field, and when it really gets down to doing the work, we are going to have to use a relatively normal group of people, some more competent, some less competent, and our organizational plan must recognize very clearly that this is the case." One has to deal with relatively normal people in most of these circumstances, and this is where the organizational theorist or the administrative scientist has to focus much of his work—how do you get the job done with the kinds of people that we have?

The concept of the social system recognizes the fact that there are in all societies various criteria on which societies are divided.

One of these is the stratification of the society into something resembling lower, middle, and upper-class groupings. These different groupings have, to an extent, their own interests to protect. You may say that the upper class has more to protect than the lower class, but interestingly enough, in some ways, the lower class tries to protect its interests. The lower class may be very resistant to change in many ways. All societies have a set of working relationships among the various parts or classes. Different people may not be entirely satisfied with the nature of those working relationships, but at least they know what they are.

Institution building projects very frequently set out to destroy a part of that working relationship as a first effort. They do this by saying, "we're not here to destroy something but to build something." But implicitly this means a change, a destruction of an existing pattern of relationships for some segment of that society, and that is an issue which poses a very serious threat to the viability of the institution building project. In other cases, people are very willing to accept and move relatively rapidly in this new direction. But to think that you're going in and working on a clean slate is a pretty falacious assumption. You are going into a situation that is already relatively well structured.

The cultural system involves the kinds of values the people hold, those basic considerations of what's important and what's not important for the society. In many cases, institution builders may be very naive about this. One of the basic problems that the institution has in establishing linkages with the society focuses around the nature of this interaction pattern that it's going to establish with other organizations, both formal and informal, in its environment. Who is going to lead whom, or what is going to be the nature of that interaction? I'm not really sure that the question is properly phrased in such a way as to attack the basic problem, when we say who is going to lead whom. The basic point is that the nature of the interaction per se, and the extent of the interaction, is a very important part of the institution building activity. To try to maintain communication and services back and forth between the different segments is very important. There may be times when ideas and leadership come from one organization, at other times it may come from somewhere else, but this interaction is of considerable importance. One of the advantages of this goes back to the matter of innovative thrust. A serious problem

of institution building is who is going to lead and what kinds of relationships are going to be established. What is going to keep a new or remodeled university from falling into the clutches of some organization which really wants to drown it, and keep it from providing new kinds of incentives, new kinds of activities in the society? If, through interaction, people in the institution are able to come in contact with people who continually have new problems which must be solved, this provides a continual input of problems which these experts may attempt to resolve. Like education, success or production is also an indeterminate goal. Once you have produced so many kilos per hectare, you want to produce more, or if your income reaches a certain level, there is a demand for it to reach a higher level—you constantly want to keep doing this. If you have this kind of a situation, it provides one basis by which an incentive can be created for the institution to do a better job, to solve a problem a little bit further.

*Some Implications of Institution Building
for Broader Social Change*

This attempt to approach things in a problem solving sense may not be shared by all segments of the society. It has been suggested that in many cases, the lower classes are relatively resistant to technological change. Given this situation, with whom do you work? The strategy generally has been to work with those you can. You work with those people who are receptive to your suggestions, in places where you can affect change, where you can, in fact, make an impact on society, recognizing both the values of the society and the personalities of the individuals with whom you are working.

In a sense, we are now talking about the ideological component of this kind of activity. Esman has suggested that perhaps it is through the attempt to capitalize on the ideology of a segment of the population, and to expand that to a larger segment of the population, that we are able to maintain this innovative thrust. Another potential way of maintaining innovative thrust is a recognition of another value in society— that of mobility. Many people want to live better than they are, at the present time. It has been recognized in this workshop, as many times before, that agricultural education has been a means of mobility for rural youth, a means for them to obtain enough education, a broader perspective, to move out of the agricul-

tural environment. From certain points of view, that may be undesirable, but perhaps from a broader point of view of society as a whole, that may not be undesirable. Are people with bachelor's degrees actually needed on farms, in terms of the large quantities of work that has to be done? I'm not in the least suggesting that there is not an appropriate amount of work for them to do, but particularly in developing nations where competence and knowledge is quite scarce, is this the best utilization of resources both in terms of the money and time necessary to train them? The notion of mobility is a very important one. It implies an open society in which competence and performance are positively rewarded. Some system of rewards seems necessary to maintain innovative thrust within an organization or society.

Summary

How do technical assistance personnel on institution building projects know that they are accomplishing their goals? This paper has attempted to specify some problems and some criteria to be considered in answering this question. An initial consideration is the distinction between project goals, and the related but not identical institutional goals. Confusion on this point can lead to confusing project maturity with institutional maturity.

One of the things that is needed is adequate base line indicators describing the host institution at the beginning of the technical assistance project. These indicators should not only describe inputs and outputs, but should also describe organizational characteristics and relations with the environment. The central theme of institution building theory is the development of viable organizations with a relatively high degree of interaction with clientele, and an orientation toward helping solve the problems of that clientele. A technical assistance-institution building project, then, should be concerned with the development of these characteristics in the host institution. The goal of the project is to help provide a significant increase in these characteristics within the institution. When this occurs, the project matures in the sense of reaching an end-state; the institution is maturing in the sense of acquiring the ability to perform its tasks more adequately within its environment.

NOTES

1. Harry R. Potter, "Criteria of Progress and Impacts of Technical Assistance Projects in Agriculture," Lafayette, Ind.: Purdue University, June 30, 1968.

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2. This statement by Haynes, and the immediately following statements by Esman, Bernstein, Haynes and Wayt were made during their presentations and discussion during the workshop.
3. J. A. Rigney, J. K. McDermott and R. W. Roskelley, *Strategies in Technical Assistance*, North Carolina Agricultural Experiment Station, Technical Bulletin No. 189 (December, 1968), pp. 37-57.
4. Milton J. Esman and Hans C. Blaise, "Institution Building Research: The Guiding Concepts," Inter-University Research Program in Institution Building, Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, Pa. (mimeo) p. 1.
5. Talcott Parsons and Edward A. Shils, editors, *Toward a General Theory of Action*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1959, p. 20.
6. Personal comments during the Workshop of Frank W. Parker, Consultant, Agriculture and Rural Development Service, Office of the War on Hunger, Agency for International Development.
7. Alvin W. Gouldner, "The Norm of Reciprocity: A Preliminary Statement," *American Sociological Review* (April, 1960), pp. 161-178.
8. Esman and Blaise, *op. cit.*, pp. 5-7.
9. See Milton J. Esman's paper in this volume on "Some Issues in Institution Building Theory."
10. Potter, *op. cit.*, especially pp. 6-12.
11. Esman and Blaise, *op. cit.*, p. 1.
12. Esman and Blaise, *ibid.*
13. Bertram M. Gross, "The State of the Nation: Social Systems Accounting," in *Social Indicators*, Raymond A. Bauer, ed., Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1963, p. 184.
14. See for example Parsons and Shils, *op. cit.*, for a discussion of these three systems.

III

APPLICATION OF THE INSTITUTION BUILDING MODEL TO TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS

Has the institution building model been useful to people in the field, the practitioners of technical assistance? What insights and what problems have they encountered? The seven "practitioners" in this section approach the application of institution building to technical assistance from a variety of perspectives. In general, the papers support the basic assumptions and objectives of the institution building model provided in the first paper in this section. However, once past the basic premises of institution building, the authors distinguish themselves from one another on the basis of their concern for the various strengths and weaknesses of technical assistance programs. Thomas points out that one of the problems of the technical assistance model is that there is no clear-cut correspondence between the model (which is general) and the instances of its application (which are specific). The papers in this section may roughly be divided into two groups: those primarily concerned with a discussion of the model and those concerned with critiques and modifications of the model on the basis of experiences from technical assistance projects. The first two papers fall into the former group, while the remaining five papers fall into the latter group. A brief summary of the papers is now in order.

McDermott is concerned with the "Strategies and Levels of Operation in University Institution Building." He argues that the objective of technical assistance to developing nations is to build innovation centers which function to allow a significant sector of the economy (agriculture) to make a more efficient contribution to the total economy. The innovation centers which he refers to are Land Grant-type universities. McDermott describes the four phases of an over-all strategy for technical assistance-institution building. According to his model, the success of each phase depends on the success of the previous phases. Importance is placed upon the U.S. technical assistance teams for success during the early stages of institution building. During the latter stages, stress is laid upon the structuring of the new university in such a manner that it provides useful services for other institutions in the country, including the government.

Rigney's paper is primarily an elaboration of the strategies and functions of the technical assistance team and team leaders which McDermott made in the first paper. Rigney points out that the responsibilities of team members are located within the developing university while those of the team leaders are located both within and beyond the university. After describing the various functions of team members and leaders, Rigney notes that it is often difficult to recruit good team members, and especially team leaders. He doesn't offer any solutions to the problem of recruiting team leaders, other than making their role more attractive. However, for team members, he suggests that they perform those activities which both they and their home departments find meaningful, whether the activities be in teaching, research or extension.

Thompson is concerned with the role of the U.S. university in technical assistance-institution building projects. He argues that one of the reasons for failure of such projects can be traced to the lack of interest by U.S. universities. He therefore proposes that in the future, programs be geared toward "cooperation," rather than "assistance," such that benefits for the U.S. universities will be incorporated in the overall project objectives. Thompson goes on to describe the characteristics of the U.S. university which are relevant for an understanding of its strengths and shortcomings as a resource for technical assistance.

Gautam evaluates the U.S. technical assistance program in India from the perspective of its impact upon the Indian government and universities. One of the functions that his paper serves is to provide a concrete example of the history of a technical assistance program in a developing country. Gautam then describes what he feels are the strengths and weaknesses of the assistance program in India. After doing this, he proposes remedies for the deficiencies.

Coutu is to some extent more critical of assistance programs than any of the other authors in this section. He sees the low level of investment in assistance, and the underestimate of the time and resources required to build stable institutions, as being largely responsible for the past failures in technical assistance programs. Coutu also questions the transferability of U.S. technical knowledge and organizational structure to other countries. He feels that such knowledge and structure must evolve around the problems peculiar to the developing country. While other authors in this section have focused upon the developing *university* as the institution to be stabilized, Coutu places emphasis on the university *department*. He intimates that the department is more capable of adapting to the country's needs than other organizational structures.

Long focuses his attention on three issues concerning technical assistance. First, he delves into the differences between the "advisory role" and the "participant role" in technical assistance. Second, he proposes that the proper means of keeping assistance programs relevant to country needs is to insure that research-in-action programs are continuously undertaken. Finally, Long looks to what the future has in store regarding institution building. He feels that the 1970's will offer the greatest potential pay-off, both to the developing countries involved and to the U.S. This requires that we continue to help institutions provide useful functions for the continued growth of their societies. However, Long feels that the structure of technical assistance programs will have to change to be useful in the seventies. One change is that instead of providing assistance on a country-to-country level, university level and professional level relationships should be the dominant levels of interaction.

The final paper in this section is a review of the papers and discussion of the workshop. In his paper, Thomas notes that the

institution building model lacks the specificity desired by those actually engaged in the activity. While feeling that practitioners have expected too much from the model, he notes that the adjustments which they make should be taken into account and revisions made in the model. In proposing future orientations for institution building, Thomas suggests that the existing information on management be exploited for its application to the growth and development of educational institutions in developing countries.

9. Strategies and Levels of Operation in University Institution Building Projects

J. K. McDERMOTT*

One of the essential aspects of strategy is to know clearly what you are striving to attain, and it follows that you must establish some attitudes or points of view compatible with that objective, and recognize the important elements in the situation in which you find yourself, as you attempt to attain it.

The Situation

We are trying to attain the development of a Land Grant type of institution for higher education in agriculture in a country and culture outside its native habitat. This institution must function to help a significant sector of the economy to contribute to economic development. It has no reason to exist other than as an instrument for economic development. We cannot be interested in the pursuit of knowledge or the advancement of scholarship. We are interested in economic development, and care only about knowledge and scholarship to the extent it contributes to that end. We will return to this a bit later. Now let's take a look at economic development.

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We are interested in two aspects of economic development, an increase in total product, the production aspect, and participation in the process of development by a broad spectrum of the population, the distributive aspect.

Economic development is a tough taskmaster, with some rigid requirements, and if we want to achieve development, we have to come to terms with these requirements. "We" means the human race, not the recipients of the U.S. technical assistance. "Coming to terms" involves change, and the U.S. is no more free of the need to come to terms than anyone else.

The important element of this assignment in which we are interested today is the fact that one country is attempting to assist another in economic development. Specifically, we have an aggregation of persons from these two countries attempting to build or improve upon a concrete agricultural educational institution.

This "coming to terms" with the requirements of economic development perhaps will help clear up one of the most confusing issues we face in this general situation. That issue is, "to what extent can you attempt to make other countries similar to the United States?" I think that I would hold that the concern about what the United States is like is largely irrelevant. The relevant issues are what are the demands of economic development, and what have been the experiences of the U.S., and other countries, in coming to terms with them. Two observations support this proposition. One is that there is a tremendous autonomous imitation of the U.S. now happening in the world. Perhaps the most dramatic is in the field of communication, in which we can cite two examples, the airplane and the transistor radio. People and nations want these things, and want them badly. To this extent they want to be, and are like the United States. It is highly logical to expect that the impacts these communications innovations will have in other countries will be roughly similar to the impacts they have had in the United States. Air transportation imposes important discipline. A load of people has to be willing to go to the same place at the same time, a maintenance program has to be organized, capital has to be accumulated, and so on. We must do these things because the innovation requires them, not because the U.S. did them.

A second observation is that the United States is not like the United States. Economic development decrees change, and the U.S.

has obeyed the decree. If you were to describe the U.S. today to a friend of yours, who saw the country a generation ago, you may not agree you were talking about the same country, and I am not referring only to physical change but also to social change.

I take time to bring up this point because the attitudes taken by members of the contract team, and members of the entities of the host country toward each other, are highly significant in the accomplishment of the project, and in your strategy, you have to be concerned with these attitudes.

Now we can become one step more specific, in terms of the task you face as members of a bi-national effort to build an institution for higher education in agriculture.

First, let us consider the relationship between the foreign team and the host country personnel. The foreign team is not made up of supermen, and both groups need to recognize this. The U.S. team is on the project for the purpose of helping the host country take advantage of U.S. experience in coming to terms with economic development. It is true that the economic system of the U.S. team gave the team members good training, but the training was likely to have been fairly specialized, and fairly specific to one situation. Some host country personnel will have been well trained also, and in the same system, but many will not have been. U.S. team personnel are accustomed to a system that is fairly effective in paying salaries on time, and in providing facilities and operating expenses for programs. In many cases the host country system has not done this, and survival under this system would be difficult for the U.S. personnel. Host country personnel adjustment to the inadequacies of their system is often mistaken by the U.S. group to be a personnel inadequacy, rather than a system inadequacy. This interpretation is likely to cause host country personnel to regard the foreigners as arrogant.

The Attitudes

Let us turn to the positive side. U.S. team personnel have to develop two attitudes in order to operate successfully. One is a rather complete identification with the host institution and its problems, its responsibilities, and its opportunities, and the other is an honest and sincere respect for the host institution personnel. The most important attitude for host personnel to develop is confidence, real confidence in their own inherent ability, in other words, avoidance of an inferiority

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complex in relation to the well-trained foreign team, while at the same time taking an *objective* viewpoint of the difference in technical training, and perhaps experience. These attitudes may not at first be based completely on reality, but they are useful in that they tend to be self-fulfilling. However, if there is not a considerable objective basis for these three attitudes, then the project is due to fail. It is my judgment that in most cases, there is adequate basis for these attitudes. You will note that these three attitudes are towards host country personnel, a fact which suggests another attitude or realization—that the host country, its institutions, and its personnel are the only reason for the contract. The foreign team is an instrument, a temporary instrument whose members very shortly will leave, even though if the team identifies as it should with the host institution, it will not feel itself as merely an instrument.

The need for self-confidence of host institution personnel deserves emphasis. An inferiority complex (and it is a complex in that there is seldom an objective basis for the feeling) has two major manifestations, each of which can impair project success, sometimes seriously. One is that host country personnel depend too heavily on foreign personnel. They allow the U.S. team to do too much, and they accept its judgments without adequate questioning. The other manifestation is just the opposite. The host institution personnel will not make enough use of the U.S. team because of the need to prove their own equality or superiority, and thus an important resource is not fully utilized.

This confidence can be built. The arrival and presence of a foreign team implies change, and this involves a threat and various implications. If the project is successful, there will be change, or the project is unnecessary. But *what* change, and how much is still in the hands of the host institution? Few U.S. groups have ever brought about change not concurred in by the host country personnel. Much change has been brought about by the host institution making good use of the foreign team. Some persons will not want change, and their position has to be carefully considered by others, but this is another problem. A second observation in building confidence is to treat lack of training on the part of personnel as an objective phenomenon, not as a personal fault, and to treat inadequacies in the organization of the system as a part of the environment to be changed if necessary, and possible, under the rules of the system. As to train-

ing inadequacies, this is one thing the project is designed to correct, and probably more opportunities will soon be available.

One other small, but important point: members of the two groups have to talk to each other. They have to maintain simple communication. A high percentage of frustrations in both groups could be avoided or resolved by the simple expedient of adequate conversation. However, maintaining simple communication often presents an important problem to project management.

To summarize in slightly different words, what I have described up until now, is a host institution staff, with confidence in itself, to accomplish something important with the help of a foreign team, well trained technically, who recognizes itself as an instrument to help the host staff accomplish its ends, and who identifies with the host institution and respects its staff. And I emphasize that this attitude formation is (1) completely possible for project management, and (2) an essential element in strategy, at all levels.

Objective and Criteria

Now let us consider what is the "something important" that the host institution is to accomplish. The important thing that I want to think about is the building of a Land Grant College. The words "Land-Grant" are a label, no more. They have no significance, even today in the United States, other than as a label, and perhaps we need to come up with a more useful label. I am not thinking of a Land-Grant College as an organization with a dean, associate directors for teaching, research and extension, a network of experiment stations, and a field organization of extension workers. What I am thinking about is an institutionalized innovation center dedicated to the task of helping a considerable sector of the economy make a more efficient contribution to the total economy. This can be accomplished for any sector of the economy, and it can be accomplished in a variety of ways. Agriculture, by its nature as an industry, however, imposes some of its own conditions, and we will talk about this mechanism in terms of agriculture. The major characteristic of the agricultural industry that is relevant for us, is the fact that it is a widely dispersed industry of numerous small firms, and it is dependent in turn upon services of widely dispersed, numerous, small firms, and numerous, dispersed, small communities. Thus, achieving changes in this industry poses some massive problems. For this reason,

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we are talking about an educational institution dealing with agriculture. Many of these same ideas will apply to other institution building tasks, but our task here is simplified if we talk about a specific type of institution. By talking about a specific type of institution, we can demonstrate the need to be clear about objectives.

Why be so firm about the Land Grant College? It was in the development of this system of higher education that the United States made one of its greatest achievements in coming to terms with the demands of economic development. Just a bit of review is needed in order to see what this method of organizing higher education for agriculture contributed to economic development of the United States. Until the time of the Land Grant College, higher education tended to be largely a consumer good, rather than a producer good. Virtually only the elite had access to higher education, and it was not intended to be particularly useful in a productive sense, in the process of earning a living, but to be useful in improving the quality of life of the few members of the elite who had access to it.

The Land Grant College, with its emphasis on agriculture and the mechanic arts, set out deliberately to have an impact on the productive capacity of a nation, to enable the country to dominate the vast land resource. The most important new element in the innovation was the creation of the extension function, even though more than a quarter of a century was to pass before this element was added. Of course, the Land Grant idea had roots. Research had long been introduced into the higher education structure. But extension was the innovation that linked higher education to the economy, and made it into an important force in economic development.

Let us look at extension, the function of extension, not the administrative form devised in the United States to perform the function. As long as agriculture is traditional, with very slow changes, fathers can teach sons perfectly well. One generation can pass the information on to another generation. New members of the society can be trained in an acceptable fashion. But when changes are introduced on any substantial scale, older generations cannot adequately teach succeeding generations. When older generations are teaching the young, the family is a completely adequate institutional arrangement to perform this essential function. Conventional elementary education is useful generally in passing along the stock of knowledge of a society. When innovations come along, however, at a very substantial

rate, teaching the young is not adequate. It takes too long for the young to succeed to positions of decision-making. Society then has to devise new mechanisms for teaching, for passing along information and knowledge with respect to the innovations. The Land-Grant College devised this mechanism in close relation to the mechanism it had devised for the generation of innovation, namely, the experiment station. Only from the point of view of the experiment station, does the term, "extension," have meaning. It literally meant and means extending the experiment station, but this extension of the experiment station was only one of the innumerable mechanisms devised in the U.S. for teaching adults. We probably cannot unravel all the strands in the communication network which has grown up in the United States for transmitting information concerning innovations to those managers responsible for the performance of the economy, but extension was one, and it was highly significant.

With all of these strands, one is tempted to say that the function of extension is not essential to the Land Grant idea. Let others do it. It is my firm conviction, however, that extension is essential to the concept. Extension performed another function which has almost always been overlooked. It kept the experiment station in close contact with the agricultural sector, with the result that its research, or its innovation output, was relevant to the agricultural sector. Relevance of agricultural research is the element so often missing in research programs, and it is inconceivable to me how researchers can maintain relevance in their work, without some sort of fairly intense contact with those for whom the research is intended.

Why is this relevance so important? There is no science or body of knowledge involved in an agricultural college that is not involved in other colleges. The *only* justification for an agricultural college is that it serves agricultural development. If we were interested in science, scholarship, and education, without the specific objective of economic development, we would have no justification for the agricultural college.

In the terms of the institution building model presented to you earlier, extension is the most important functional linkage, and is closely related to the enabling linkage, and the establishment of these two linkages is essential in the task of institution building.

One other thing happened in the U.S. which is of significance in viewing your task of building Land Grant type institutions. The

product of the oldest function, teaching, i.e., the body of graduates, mainly found employment in either the generation of technological innovation, or the diffusion of this innovation. That, too, is highly logical as can be seen in retrospect. Unless there are innovations in agricultural technology, there is no real need for the profession of agricultural scientists. You do not have a great need for professions if you are dealing *only* with traditional technology.

To summarize, the development of a strategy demands that you have a clear vision of your objective. The forms will vary greatly. Our objective is to build an institutionalized innovation center that is *relevant* to a substantial sector of the economy, and further, is dedicated to serving that sector in such a way as to increase the efficiency of its contribution to economic development. All the things we do, such as train people, improve research, initiate graduate programs, develop extension organizations, and the like, are only means to our objective. If we are satisfied with only the means, we can easily miss the point.

The main responsibility for keeping the project oriented to this objective falls to the foreign team, the United States university group. This is true simply because that group comes out of a tradition that has been attaining that objective now for almost three quarters of a century. Unfortunately, because of the complicated administrative structure, the division of labor, and the heavy demands U.S. agriculture places on its innovative center, many of these essential functions and characteristics of the Land Grant system tend to be obscured, even to the members of it. It is still their responsibility to know these things, and to maintain an orientation for the project that will make it productive. The essential nature and function of the Land Grant idea also is not clearly revealed to one who visits the United States in 1969. Visitors are impressed by the advanced state of U.S. agriculture and its institutions, but the few frames of the moving picture they see, explains little of the process it has undergone and is undergoing, or of the institutions that advance the process. Graduate students who go to the U.S. for degrees are so immersed in their own technical studies that they have little opportunity to appreciate the total story. For this reason, you must depend on the U.S. team to interpret the U.S. experience for you, and further, you must insist that they do it, and the U.S. group must accept this responsibility.

Let me repeat an earlier point, or perhaps tie several earlier

points together. The U.S. has had a considerable experience in coming to terms with economic development, and the U.S. team is operating in the host institution for the main purpose of making the experience of some value to the host institution. If the U.S. team functions only as a group of technicians, if it performs only a technical function, most of its potential usefulness will be lost.

This discussion of the role and function of the Land Grant College has not been a digression. Half of the task of designing a strategy is knowing what your objective is, and most of the other half consists of imagination. If you know your objective, there are numerous ways to get to it, but it takes some imagination to be able to see them. They are not immediately obvious, and unfortunately much too little imagination—innovation, if you will—is brought to bear on this task.

Although I have put great emphasis on the need for an objective and given some criteria for it in the case that interests us today, I must sound two warnings. One warning is not to be misled by United States forms of organization. The confusion between organizational form on the one hand, and role in economic development on the other, has been responsible for innumerable delays and wrong starts in the business of international cooperation. Not all of the problem lies with members of the U.S. team. Observers from other countries sometimes are as enchanted by U.S. forms, as are the U.S. people.

The other warning is not to expect perfect agreement among all of the entities and all of the persons involved as to what the objectives of the project are, and especially as to what the strategies are. Even if entities and all persons are in *apparent* agreement, chances are they are not. Written documents, especially if they have to be in two languages, simply cannot communicate the same idea, or the same meaning, or the same emphasis to everyone who reads them; nor can oral conversations. Since there are so many alternative strategies, and so many ways to state an objective, be prepared for your colleagues to have, or seem to have, different viewpoints from yours. Much can be accomplished with substantial differences in ideas as to what objectives and strategies should be. Of course, if the ideas vary too much, the project will fail, and I cannot tell you what is "too much." The point is to have a clear idea of your own as to the objective of the project, and of the way you need to proceed to reach it. Be prepared

however, to accept delays and postponements in accomplishments, and in most cases, be prepared to accept alternate strategies. If all of the parties are rigid, nothing will be accomplished. Do not expect that others will accommodate themselves to your ideas, anymore than you are going to accommodate yourself to theirs.

Specific Strategies, Phase A

Now we are getting into specific strategies, and to orient the discussion to specifics, I want to use the Rigney-McDermott Model which is presented in the article, "Role of Technical Personnel in the Technical Assistance-Institution Building Process," published in the N.C. Agricultural Experiment Station Technical Bulletin No. 189, *Strategies in Technical Assistance*. This Model is now about three years old, and I am happier with it today, than when we put it together. Everything I have said so far is perfectly compatible with the Model. I do not intend to repeat much from the Model, although my remarks from here are built on it, and assume you are familiar with it.

The Model recognizes, first of all, the many facets of institution building, and the many different things that have to happen if you are really to accomplish institution building. This scheme gives emphasis to the individual technical relationships between two people on a technical basis. This emphasis is achieved by discussing it first, and by labelling it, Phase A. This tends to be confusing, because we do not have these kinds of projects until there is a certain degree of agreement on what the project is to accomplish at the highest levels. Often this agreement is stated in such terms that the casual reader may think that earlier stages have already been accomplished. That is rarely so, and never so in any case about which I have any knowledge. This simply means that there is enough agreement on objectives for the project to get underway. To think that this agreement represents any significant institution building, leads to a series of expectations that result in (1) a waste of time, since you eventually have to go back and do a job erroneously considered already to be done, and (2) frustrations and frictions that almost invariably emerge when colleagues behave differently than one expects.

This introduces another strategic issue, namely, the pre-project planning. One cannot be against pre-project planning, but one can certainly warn of the dangers of taking it too seriously. In the final

analysis, in an institution building project of this nature, the only group that can build an institution is the institution itself, including, in our case, the contractor field team. If this team's personnel does not identify adequately—and that means almost completely—with the host institution, it will be cut out of the institution building process rather early after the technical phase. If its identification is good enough, it will never be cut out and will participate in the process to the extent its own competency will allow. If pre-project planning sets objectives and strategies that are too rigid, and they do not have to be very rigid to be too rigid, this team of builders simply has too many restrictions on it, either real or imagined, and the imagined have the same consequences as the real. There are so many odds and ends of information about a situation that a pre-project planning team cannot understand the situation intimately enough to set very rigid intermediate objectives and strategies.

Note the processes that must occur in Phase A. The first four stages refer mainly to human relations, whether two people can work together or not. Four points need special emphasis. One is the initiation of joint short-run activities. Nothing, of course, is accomplished unless someone gets busy and does something. In the Model, this is part of the process by which the bi-national pair becomes productive in institution building. This is an important element of strategy. The more innovation you can induce between two workers at this level, rather than attempting to impose innovation from higher eschelons, the more thorough will be your institution building.

The second item concerns the bi-national pairs: the working together of two people representing the two groups. Communication between the two groups can only take place between two individuals. These pairings are key and deserve your attention. These pairings call to mind the administrative arrangement dealing with counterparts. One needs to allow plenty of flexibility. Effective pairs do not need to be Siamese twins, and a person can be an effective member of more than one bi-national pair. There will be times when individuals of either national group will work alone. But the U.S. team will make most of its contribution to the institution building process through these pairs.

The third point that deserves interest is the references to attitude change. Three are especially important: the ability to look at inadequate training objectively, rather than as a personal or sub-

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jective trait; the development of increased confidence in oneself; and the sense of institutional commitment. The sense of institutional commitment is a necessary step on the way for the institution to define and execute its role in the process of national economic development.

The fourth item to be emphasized is the role of the U.S. member of the bi-national pairs. He must know when to take initiative and when not to be aggressive, so that his pair member has the opportunity to take initiative. He needs to encourage his colleague without being condescending. Not everyone has all of the human relations skills needed to do these things, and this underscores the need for identification with the host institution, and respect for its personnel. These two attitudes compensate for a considerable lack of skill, but it will take a tremendous amount of human relations skill to compensate for the lack of these two attitudes.

I do not mean to be condescending in suggesting that members of a foreign team can be helpful, in the ways listed above, to members of the host institution. In addition to being the beneficiaries of a system that has accumulated a rich store of experience, the simple fact that there is a project often means that there are more resources and new opportunities in the host institution than there were before. We should expect initiative from the U.S. team.

Specific Strategies, Phase B

What applies in the individual-to-individual phase, or phase A, will also be applied as one moves to the departmental stage, top management stage, and to the government and public stage. The manifestations are different. We need to say a word about the relationships between the stages.

One would never have to concern himself with a higher stage, as long as he were not stymied for some reason. In other words, it is necessary to work at the departmental level, when a pair of technicians needs more resources, or needs permission to be able to see their work evolve. When they need something, they must be able to offer something. What they offer can be a new service or a better product than had previously been turned out. It can also be in terms of more prestige or more power for the department, or next higher unit. To state this concept in another way, the work at the higher levels is aimed at facilitating work at lower levels, and there has to be

an adequate justification for facilitating work at the lower levels. It is at the technician level that the product of the institution is turned out. For this product to increase or improve, the technician must have the will to increase or improve it, and he must have the opportunity and resources to be able to do it. The will can be generated at the technical level, and better use can be made of the opportunity and resources that exist. New resources and opportunity can only be provided by higher levels. Higher levels can take actions that will generate the will at lower levels, as well as provide resources and opportunity, but the essential fact is that the will does have to be generated. In some cases, a simple order from a higher eschelon generates the will. In other cases, a wide variety of techniques are necessary.

In considering Phase B, we need to call your attention to three specific points.

First, the need for communication and the relevance of bi-national pairs does not diminish. In fact, more effective communication is needed. If the member of the U.S. team is going to be effective at this phase, the host institution member has to give him perhaps a more thorough test. This communication needs to be effected in a variety of ways. Official appointments for conferences are usually not enough. Anything that can be done—such as arrangements of offices, travelling together, even social engagements—which will facilitate communication will be productive.

Second, some new aspects emerge in the higher stages. One of these is that as you move to higher eschelons, the U.S. team member cannot rely as directly on U.S. experience as he can at a lower stage. At higher stages, one commences to put together administrative forms that will facilitate technical activity. Administrative forms are much more sensitive to the social and cultural environment than is technical activity. At the same time, administrative forms can be changed more slowly, which means that errors will be more difficult to correct. Simple technical activity can be informal, in that it has not taken on permanent form. It is difficult to emphasize enough the need to be sure that administrative forms do facilitate technical activity. At the same time, one must warn against imposing too much form, more form than is needed for the technical activity. Not infrequently, more administrative formality is imposed than is necessary and in some cases it actually inhibits technical or productive activity.

The third point grows out of the previous discussion on administration, and that is that activities in all succeeding phases, after Phase A, are facilitating phases. Their only product is facilitation of work at the technical level, so actions take on much more significance. Not only are a pair of individuals involved, but many other persons are also involved.

Specific Strategies, Phase C

Perhaps Phase C is the most difficult part of the course which an agricultural college building project must negotiate. The process of institution building is not precise enough to identify just when certain phases begin or must be initiated. And we must recognize that our phases are not chronologically neat in the real world, as we have set them out in the Model.

In this phase, a consensus must be reached on the host institution's role, in relation to the needs of the country, and top management of the host institution must articulate this consensus. The main orientation of previous phases has been internal to the host institution. In this phase, the orientation must begin to be more external, without the lessening of attention to the internal aspects.

The role to be established must emerge as a function of the country's situation and needs, the host institution's competencies and previous experiences, and the aspirations and competencies of collaborative and competing institutions. More attention must be given to collaboration with other institutions than to competing institutions. The details of the role, and the form in which it is defined, simply have to be put together in the project. Our discussion of the Land-Grant College above is relevant to this task of role definition, but it does not go far enough, and we cannot, in a general discussion, go very far.

This phase has to result in some sort of formal articulation. Articulation is necessary for internal morale and attitude formation. If the project has the correct orientation—namely, a concern for the contribution the host institution can make to the nation's economic development—there will have been considerable interaction with other institutions and entities in the economy. However, in Phase C, this activity must be formalized, at least to the extent of the host institution's arriving at a consensus among its members of what its role needs to be, and a fairly clear statement of the consensus. This

will be modified in Phase D through more formal interaction with the government and other agencies.

The leader of the U.S. team has a particularly important role to play in this phase. Probably the greatest single problem that institution building projects in agricultural education face, lies in the host institution's relations to the rest of the economy. In contrast, this is probably the single most important strength of the U.S. Land Grant College. Because of this contrast, because the U.S. institution is so intimately related to the economy, the team leader in his experience has not seriously confronted the problem before. Yet if the U.S. team is going to be helpful to the host institution, it must be through him. It is in this phase that the host institution is probably going to need the most help, simply because of the isolation among institutions that prevails in so many countries.

The team leader in this phase must be a technician in this process. He has all of the responsibility of looking after the team, but he also has the additional responsibility of program leadership to the host institution, as well as to his own team. Not all team leaders are up to these responsibilities. In discharging his responsibility to the project in this phase, the team leader needs all of the support generated by the earlier suggestions that he and his team identify completely with the host institution, and that there is a mutual respect between the two groups, as well as support generated by the team's general performance. If these supports do not exist, and if the U.S. team has not been successful at the technical level, the chances are that the team leader will not even have access to the central problem of Phase C. And if he does not participate in Phase C, then the host institution is not likely to be able to take advantage of the U.S. experience. It will be gaining only the services of a limited amount of technical manpower, and will be foregoing the real potential contribution that a contract with a U.S. university can make.

Specific Strategies, Phase D

Phase D is the culmination of institution building. Only the society in general can institutionalize, and for our case, the society will do it, or refuse to do it, through its management entity, namely, government. Society cannot affect this institutionalization unless the institution is useful to the society. Here we must distinguish formalism from institutionalism. Many societies do maintain organizational

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forms, sometimes at considerable cost to them, when these organizational forms perform no useful function for the society. This is what is meant by formalism.

A useful, functional institution must perform a productive role in the society, and the society, in turn, must provide resources to the institution. Neither of these processes are likely to occur automatically. In other words, even if an institution is performing a useful function and could easily perform a more useful function, there is no assurance that the society will provide it with the resources. By the same token, more resources do not automatically result in more usefulness. It is the responsibility of the administration of any public agency to obtain the resources necessary to maintain that agency, just as it is the administration's responsibility that the agency does a good job. Any institution building project that leaves these two aspects out of its strategy is almost certain to achieve limited, sometimes very limited, success. In terms of the institution building model, these aspects are the enabling linkages and the functional linkages.

The burden of responsibility to establish these linkages is too great to expect that the top administration of the institution will bear it alone. For this reason, we must emphasize the importance of establishing multi-level contact with the government and the other entities relevant to the institution. Here we should recall two previous assertions, one with regard to production being accomplished at the technical level, and the other with regard to informal contact rather than formalization. Other institutions are the same as yours, in that there is a group of technical workers who get the productive work done, and the higher echelons in the organization exist only to facilitate the work of the technicians. In establishing functional linkages, you need to take advantage of all of these levels, and especially the technical level. The technical level is particularly useful for informal activities. We shall have more to say about this later.

Complete institutionalization occurs when an institution can feel itself protected against whimsical decisions of the government, and through the frequent changes in government. This will likely be a long way off. Similar U.S. institutions have long been relatively free of these whims and changes, and direct transfer of experience will be of limited value. There is yet another warning that must be sounded. There are important differences in the process by which

public decisions are made between the U.S. society and other societies. It is difficult to generalize about these differences, but let me give you one example. In the United States, individual legislators are elected by persons from a relatively small geographic area to represent that area. In some countries, all legislators from a relatively large area are elected at large from the entire area. The way public opinion is fed into the legislative process, varies significantly between these two situations.

Strategies for establishing enabling linkages have to be specific to your own situation. Until the linkages are strong enough to withstand changes in government, all of the work in establishing relations with governments will have to be continuous, and it will have to be repeated with changes in relevant officials.

The technique of establishing enabling linkages differs from that of creating functional linkages. We can generalize fairly safely among countries—which means that the U.S. experience is probably much more useful to you—in the establishing and maintaining of the functional linkages. For example, short courses by professors, and especially researchers, are almost always popular with technicians of other public agencies and private firms. These workers are always eager, and sometimes almost desperate, for technological information that will help them win esteem among their clients.

If the host institution—and by now we have to assume a successful project in which the U.S. team is sufficiently identified with the host institution as to be considered part of it—thinks in terms of both enabling and functional linkages, and not simply in terms of enabling linkages, it is logical to expect a substantial change in relations between the host institution and the government. It sometimes happens that the government only has contact with the agricultural college when the latter needs money. The government sees it only as a solicitor of funds, almost a beggar, but not as a collaborator in its task of agricultural development. But if the host institution is as concerned with providing a service to the economy that fits in with the economy's needs, as it is with its own short-run needs, then it becomes useful to the government. And once a dialogue is established on this realization, any number of useful things can happen, including even the involvement of other institutions in the same kind of dialogue in which they also are concerned with their own functions, in relation to those of other institutions.

The participation of the U.S. team in this phase of institution building is somewhat more difficult to anticipate. On the one hand, the contract-sponsoring agency may not understand the U.S. team's role. And for this problem, the strategy is clear. The U.S. team must be so clearly identified with the host institution that there can be little doubt that its contact with government is as a member of host institutions, and not as a representative of the sponsoring agency. On the other hand, the U.S. team leader—the individual who has to carry the burden—may not have developed the competency to be effective in this phase. But no matter what the team's participation is—whether direct or indirect—this aspect of institution building is essential to the completion of the task.

General Observations

Now, I would like to make some general observations regarding the strategy of institution building project.

Projects of this nature present a great challenge to management of the project. Management refers to the handling of rather unusual situations, in which no past experience can give exact answers. Thus, until we know much more than we know today about institution building, any discussion of strategy has to have limited value. Project management has to come up with the answers with only very general assists from experience, either its own or someone else. Without imaginative, innovative project management, it is difficult to expect substantial success, no matter what we say here. If such leadership is provided, discussions such as this may have some value. Project management must be a strategical process, not simply routine administration and ceremonial function.

A second observation is that no matter how effective is the management of a project to build institutions, many important variables are outside its control. Sometimes virtually the only strategy alternative open is simply to wait until some of these conditions are improved. Sometimes, others can do something. But anyone involved in a process such as this should recognize that sometimes waiting is the best strategy. Understanding the need for waiting, at times, will often prevent frustrations and frictions that will make even later accomplishments impossible or very difficult. Jack Rigney has called this the strategy of adversity.

In much the same way, project management often is faced with

unforeseen opportunities. Perhaps as much of the success of such projects as these, will come from the ability to exploit these opportunities, as will come from well-prepared plans. At any rate, project management needs to think in terms of opportunities, rather than only in terms of problems to be solved. Many opportunities have been lost because project managements have been too attentive to the problems they faced to be sensitive to the opportunities. Frequently to the good strategist, always in search of alternatives, the very same situation that poses a problem may also contain an opportunity. Perhaps this refers to the phenomenon called, Power of Positive Thinking.

A fourth general observation is a recognition of the value of the small, informal activity when you are attempting to get a new program started. Innovation is a tricky business, and you cannot expect a very high proportion of initial successes. You have to leave your own way open to be able to make adjustments to correct either oversights or outright mistakes. You can do that much better if you can start something very small and very quietly. We have alluded to this in various places previously in this discussion. Be very cautious of formalization, and especially formalization that precedes function. If you want to develop a new activity, the least announcement you can give the better, and the least attention to form you can give the better. It is almost impossible to get agreement on the form of a new function, before you or your colleagues have had a chance to see it operate. This accounts for a great waste of time and unnecessary frustration and friction. Formal agreements have to be developed at high levels. Action takes place at the technical level. Adequate communication downward is difficult. If you can build it up from the technical level, and think in terms of formalizing on the basis of experience, you have a much more thorough job of institution building and a more effective form. It will not cost you as much time as you may suspect. This is the basis for the old adage of public administration that form follows function.

Another observation is a warning against building beyond your resources. Often the infusion of a U.S. team that originates in large institutions leads both groups to think in terms too big for the host country to support, especially in the short run. Thinking too big will often mean that nothing gets done quite well enough, that the institution is not productive enough to convince government or

collaborating institutions that it has value, and that eventually, things will either have to be scaled down, or the host institution will exist as a grouping of rather functionless forms. It is well to keep in mind that you almost always have enough resources to do something well, if you use any imagination at all, and you never have enough resources to do everything well. Making choices, when you have limited resources, is tough and always painful, but it is far more productive than simply doing a little bit of everything.

Finally, in all the successful action institutions I have known, there is a dedication of the personnel to the institutional task that elicits productive work far beyond what they are being paid for. Some call it a mystique. Whatever it is, it is productive. It is part of the attitude, and it can be attained by proper management.

In summary, I want to list some of the points made in the paper, from which flow most items of strategy, if the project has imaginative management.

One is to be clear on your objective. Clarity does not necessarily mean preciseness. It is the opposite of vague, not the opposite of general.

The role of the U.S. team is to help transmit and interpret U.S. experience in meeting the demands of economic development. It is not simply a source of technical manpower.

Three essential attitudes have been identified. The U.S. team must develop a nearly complete identification with the host institution and must have a high respect for its colleagues of the host institution. Host institution people must have a high regard for themselves, so as to prevent unproductive attitudes toward the U.S. team.

The need for simple communication between the two teams is tremendous, but simple as it is, it rarely is accomplished adequately.

Institution building involves external phenomena to the same extent as internal phenomena, and your strategies have to take this into account. Sometimes the simple existence of a bi-national project can prop up an institution relatively well, but if it is not supplying a useful product to the economy and receiving adequate resources from the economy, your project has not attained its full success.

10. Team Strategies and Functions

J. A. RIGNEY

I. Introduction

This paper assumes that the major decisions have been made regarding the particular type of institution that is to be developed, the role of that institution within the developing agricultural society, and the general level of commitment to the institutional development by the host government, and by the technical assistance agency. It further assumes that a U.S. university has assumed responsibility for providing the technical assistance inputs. The questions to be addressed are those relating to strategies and perspectives which will achieve the greatest results in institution building, from the application of technical assistance efforts.

The comments offered here are organized around the various important topics which were identified in the CIC-AID study, and which were found to have the greatest influence on the success of the entire venture.

II. Establishing Rapport and Professional Credibility

The arrival of foreigners in any culture is viewed with interest, and with reserve by their hosts. The reserve is not dispelled until the foreigners have assured their hosts that their intentions are honorable, their personalities are acceptable, and their technical capabilities are useful in the local environment. These are thresholds which must be crossed by technical assistance team members before their personal and professional credentials are fully established.

These are achievements which must be realized as prerequisites for the more serious business of participating in institution building.

The techniques of achieving personal acceptance are varied and are reasonably understood. They involve the employment of courtesy, genuineness, and an extrovert type of interest and concern for other people.

Technical acceptability, however, is more subtle and requires specific actions on the part of the visitor. It is not enough to have a professional dossier which documents previous accomplishments in a technical field, although this is a necessary first prerequisite. The world has seen, however, a vast number of traveling experts who are incapable of bringing their professional competence to bear in new environments which do not contain the cultural or technological infra-structures which are tacitly assumed at home. The activities which generate technical acceptance usually involve demonstrations by personal achievement that technical competence can be brought to bear under the local setting and can be adjusted to the requirements of the local environment. "Going to work" may include initiating a demonstration of techniques or ideas which have proven valuable elsewhere. It might involve giving seminars or lectures with a specific attempt to adapt the material to local conditions, or it could involve preliminary investigations of useful topics under the local environment. The sooner these activities are initiated, the sooner the host nationals will realize that the visitor has come to work, rather than "to advise" or "to observe." It is only after host nationals are convinced that the visitor has come to work that they will attempt to exploit this presence in the serious business of institution building.

III. Institution Building Functions of the Team

It has been all too common for a team member to arrive at a project site, and after a few days of contact and inquiry, to become highly confused as to the specific goals which he must achieve while he is there. It is a common experience for a plant pathologist, for example, to arrive at a host institution with the full expectation of serving as a plant pathologist. (Note that I use plant pathologist to refer to a specialist in any field.) He will have brought reference materials, lab equipment, and a head full of plant pathology ideas, with the confident expectation that he will teach, research or perform other activities of a plant pathology nature while he is at the host institution.

The specific expectation of others, however, is that the plant pathologist will engage in *institution building*, an activity for which he has little orientation or formal training. What can he do as a plant pathologist which will contribute to the development of an agricultural university or an agricultural research organization? Will this involve only technical inputs in his own field of plant pathology, or will there be other things which he must accomplish? A quick review of the institution building functions of the team would be helpful. These were alluded to by Dr. Esman at the beginning of the workshop, and hence they are only sketched here again.

The institution building elements with which the normal team member will be concerned will be one or more of the following:

1. *Development of the leadership of the institution.* This may involve a department head, a dean, a director, or a vice chancellor; and the visitor may have the opportunity to make inputs at all of these points. The inputs that could be made in the development of leadership of the institution by a plant pathologist can be real and helpful. Every department head appreciates the opportunity to discuss the broad technical content of his department's program, and to gain new insights into approaches that must be made in providing adequate departmental coverage. The department head must also make hard choices as to priorities in the commitment of scarce resources, and it is very helpful to have an unbiased person with whom these matters can be discussed. What is needed is not so much a specific answer regarding priorities, as there is need for exploring the bases on which they are established with someone who can help in posing viable alternative choices, and in examining the probable consequences of each. Questions of allocation of the personal resources of the department to satisfy priority needs of the institution; questions of departmental policies which would derive greatest productivity from individual department members; questions of the relationship of this department to other elements of the university; questions of the role of this department in the development of the agriculture of the nation. These are all matters which must be discussed frankly, candidly,

and sympathetically by the department chairman with someone who can listen and argue, rather than dictate pat answers. A plant pathologist, or a soils specialist, or an agricultural economist can perform these functions equally well, and he can perform them at several levels of administrative leadership within the institution.

2. *The formation of technical personnel.* Institution building must include the improvement of the technical qualifications of the staff members. They must enlarge their understanding of their professional field, and they must become expert in the applications of their profession to the problems of the nation's agriculture. Perhaps equally important, they must develop a professional commitment to the institution and to the nation which supports the institution—a commitment which would provide incentive for the highest possible use of technical capability. The plant pathologist is perhaps most at home in assisting in these functions. Therefore, little more needs to be said about this activity except to observe that he generally attempts to create a professional, in his own image.
3. *The organizational structure.* The specific purpose of organizational structure is to achieve greater productivity from the human, physical and financial resources of the institution than could be achieved without such organization. It is very unusual for a visitor to be invited to participate in institution building activities where no organizational structure exists. Thus, he will normally be confronted, not with generating new organization, but in examining, with host nationals within departments and with their leaders, the existing structure, the rationale for its continuance, and the basic principles which should be called into play in deciding whether to change it. In this respect, it is well to recall the comment of a Latin American administrator after he made a tour of a number of different types of agricultural institutions. He said, "It is now clear that almost any type of organization will work effectively if it is staffed with competent people who want to make the organization work."

4. *The program content.* The content of university courses, research programs, and extension activities will very largely determine whether they are important and central to agricultural development, or whether they are irrelevant or peripheral, and hence of low priority. The technical quality of the program must be congruent with the local needs of agriculture and with the capability of the staff members. Again, it is the function of the visitor to provide a forum in which these issues can be examined objectively, and to help in deriving principles and rationale on which decisions are made.
5. *Physical and fiscal resources.* The development of the physical resources is normally a responsibility assumed by the host institution and its leadership. Since this has high visibility, it is usually one of the first activities undertaken in strengthening an institution. The development of fiscal resources to support the institution's program and to enhance its technical capability, is a matter which is much more difficult to achieve and which constantly needs attention. It is very uncommon for the institutions in a developing nation to think of augmenting their resources through development of a "grass roots" level of public support. The concept of an institution being supported in proportion to the service it renders to society, is quite novel and unfamiliar. Therefore, the plant pathologist coming from this country has an opportunity to introduce, at all levels of the institution, a philosophy that the institution must serve the public, and that it must be visible in such service if it is to enjoy increased support from society. This is a concept which is endemic to the Land Grant philosophy, but it is not often included in the set of materials which the plant pathologist intends to display to his colleagues overseas. The development of fiscal support is often hampered by serious competition between Ministry of Agriculture programs and agriculture universities. Considerable progress has been made in resolving this competition in the U.S., and any insights which can be gained by the developing nations along these lines would be most useful.

6. *The institutional tradition and attitude.* The role of the institution in society is usually described in general terms which are broad enough to admit almost any institutional posture which its leaders care to assume. The tradition and attitude within which U.S. agricultural scientists and technologists have worked may be referred to as "the Land Grant philosophy." This philosophy conceives the role of the institution in society as one of *service* to the agricultural sector. The institution assumes responsibility for defining the priority problems in agricultural development, of committing its resources to resolving them, and of reporting the solutions back to the agricultural community. This is a different perspective on the role of an agricultural university than is normally held in the European tradition, and it is not realistic to expect to import technical assistance from the U.S., without bringing with it the Land Grant views on institutional role and attitude.

IV. Team Leader Functions

The leader of the technical assistance team has one of the most important and varied responsibilities in the entire process. There are at least four sets of people looking to him for leadership and guidance in the everyday operation of the project: namely, the U.S. university, the AID Mission, the host institution administration, and his own team members. The needs and expectations of each of these four groups have much in common, but they also have much that is distinctive, if not contradictory, and the team leader has responsibility for reconciling them. Let us look at each of these four groups briefly.

The U.S. university has obligated itself to render a technical service in a very unfamiliar environment, and it has little recourse but to entrust much of the outcome to the expertness of its designated representative, the team leader. The university spends much of its communication effort with the team leader on the minutiae of the operation, and leaves the overall strategy of institution building almost entirely to the team leader's own judgment. The university selects the team members, but leaves to the team leader their orientation and indoctrination into project activities.

The AID Mission usually finds that the particular institution

building project is only one of several efforts that it is making in enhancing agricultural development of the host nation. Therefore, it cannot relinquish authority for the project, although it has little to offer in the way of institution building *per se*. Furthermore, this legally represents a U.S. government involvement with a foreign government by a nongovernment entity—the U.S. university. Therefore, the government bureaucrats worry themselves unmercifully for fear they will unwittingly fall heir to commitments or obligations they never intended. In this sense, the team leader is their representative, but not under their strict control.

The host institution has negotiated for outside help and advice from the team, but it has not proposed to relinquish authority over its programs, its policies, or its people. The institution has specific expectations as to what should come from the contract team, and they look to the team leaders to deliver on these expectations. Normally, the expectations were spelled out only in very general terms in the official documents. Thus, the top administrator in the host institution looks to the team leader as his counterpart in the joint management of the team's input and impact on host institution development. He looks to the team leader for guidance in the total institutional organization and development. He expects the team leader to intervene promptly in personality clashes and other awkward situations involving team members, but he cannot delegate authority and responsibility to the leader for making changes in the host institution.

The team members look to the team leader to help them get their families settled in the country, resolve educational and housing needs, clear their household goods through customs, obtain the necessary licenses and permission for local operations, and do the myriad other things needed when U.S. families move to foreign soil. The sticky interpretation of contract provisions regarding allowances and other perquisites, are negotiated by the team leader for the team members. The overall strategy for the project is the responsibility of the team leader, and the team members look to him for constant guidance in this respect. The team members are introduced to the host institution by the team leader, and he is expected to open the professional doors and set the stage for their effective performance.

The recruiting of a person with sufficient technical and administrative skill to fulfill all of the expectations described above is a difficult assignment at best. In order to persuade a competent person

to leave a productive and satisfying position at home, and to undertake this type of activity, almost inevitably requires the implication, if not the guarantee, that he will have a relatively free hand in bringing the total resources of the project to bear on the institution building exercise. This inevitably builds within him expectations for the position which sooner or later will run counter to the expectations of the four groups described earlier.

Most U.S. universities have had difficulty recruiting competent team leaders for overseas assignments. No institution has an excess of outstanding administrative capability, and the hard choice of picking among top administrators for overseas assignments, brings this problem into sharp focus. The universities must look for someone with administrative experience who has great imagination and flexibility, and can look at basic problems and devise solutions, rather than merely transplanting solutions out of his past experience. He must have an unusual amount of energy, since living in an unfamiliar environment is physically more strenuous, as well as more demanding in mental alertness and vigor. He must be an individual capable of developing empathy for host nationals with whom he will work, since he cannot perform effectively if they sense any dislike or disrespect on his part. He must be available for a relatively long period of time. The development of the confidence of host nationals, and an understanding of their problems and of their environment, is a slow and tedious process, and this quality is not transferable to his successors. Therefore, once the team leader has gained competence and acceptance, it is inefficient to repeat the process at short intervals. Finally, if the team leader is to gain and hold the confidence of the university administration, of AID, and of the host nationals, he must be able to walk the uneasy path of assuring each agency that he has their best interest at heart.

Institution building is a long-term process, and progress seems painfully slow under the best of circumstances. If the project goals or objectives are redefined frequently, or if the strategy for obtaining them varies from year to year, progress is seriously handicapped. Continuity in the institution building processes cannot be assured if the team leader position is changed every two years. Therefore, one major change that must be made in the future is that the role of the team leader must be redefined with a view to attracting and justifying the services of exceptionally qualified persons. This is the key position in the total technical assistance-institution building

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process. The development of an effective strategy, and its efficient execution, depends on being able to fill this position with a capable person on a long term basis, and the contracting terms should be negotiated to facilitate such recruitment. U.S. universities should not initiate or renew contractual commitments unless they are confident of being able to supply such leadership.

V. Professional Development of Team Members

In the early years of technical assistance activity, there were great expectations that the overseas experience of staff members would have a highly beneficial effect on their performance and usefulness at home. The nature of the assignment, however, tended to relegate them to a passive, advisory, rather than an active, professional, role; and as a consequence, upon their return home, they found that, in fact, they had lost ground professionally in the interim. Most professionals feel that they cannot keep up with all the reading and the other professional contacts that are important in remaining abreast of the developments in their profession, even while they are actively engaged at home. The rather isolated and inactive role overseas has greatly reduced the individual's contact with his profession during that period. Thus, many returning professionals have advised their colleagues against making such professional sacrifice, merely for the sake of the exotic experience of working abroad. This has seriously handicapped U.S. universities in recruiting their best talent for participation in overseas projects.

The CIC-AID project documented what many people have observed earlier—that it is necessary to give the team members a professionally active and challenging assignment abroad, if they are to be fully efficient in their undertaking. If they are given a specific research, teaching, or extension type of activity, this will keep them professionally alert and innovative. If such activity is designed prior to their departure from the home campus, it can be incorporated into the overall interests of the parent department, and thus bring a high degree of relevance to the further development of the U.S. institution. Such an approach would make continued participation in technical assistance by the best members in a department a real possibility.

This change in format for the role of the team members would have the additional advantage of making them generally more palat-

able to the host institution. It is generally observed that advice is sought from those individuals who are demonstrating day by day their ability to be productive in the strange environment. Thus, active participation in activities within the host institution provides a platform from which advice is sought and given on a variety of topics. Such a format of activity challenges the individual to the utmost in bringing his professional competence to bear on problems in the local environment. This is the only circumstance under which his production can be maximized. The one great danger to be avoided in moving in this direction is the temptation to *neglect institution building* in favor of personal professional aggrandizement.

This change in role and format for team members will necessarily drive the technical assistance activities strongly in the direction of more applied research by individual team members than has been the case heretofore. Again it is a pleasure to report that AID perspective on these matters is changing markedly, and should be reflected in future technical assistance undertakings.

Total responsibility for maximum use of the team members' time cannot be laid entirely at the door of the team leader or AID, however. The host institution has considerable responsibility in providing an administrative framework within which these activities can be discharged. Several host institutions, for example, appoint all team members as visiting professors, and they expect the team members to perform their daily functions as though they were bona fide staff members. This provides the visitors with certain perquisites, and access to host institution facilities. It also provides them with responsibility for host institution development, which again will challenge the professional capability of the visitors to the utmost.

VI. Continuing Collaborative Activity

If one attempts to visualize the ultimate optimum state of development of the host institution, it would include a condition in which the staff members of the host institution would be in intimate and continuing contact with their peers and colleagues around the world. It must be the function, therefore, of the members of the technical team to foster this type of contact and collaboration at the earliest possible moment. It is not reasonable to expect such contact to be viable and productive until staff members at the host institution begin to achieve a degree of professional maturity, but

it should not be long until technical assistance, which is largely a one-way street in the beginning, gives way to collaborative two-way contribution and effectiveness. This is the condition which most professionals long for, in widening their contacts and their experience.

It is a common experience in the U.S. for research personnel to engage in collaborative activities with colleagues in distant parts of our own nation. This is done in an effort to widen the ecological foundation within which research observations are based. It is easy to see that as quickly as host nationals become competent in a professional area, they can provide an even wider ecological base for such collaborative undertakings. Thus, the stage is quickly set for finding ways to continue a peer relationship between technical assistance personnel, and host nationals with whom they have been working. Unfortunately, this aspect of technical assistance has received far too little attention from all parties in the past.

The CIC-AID project indicated that all too frequently, the intercourse between professionals ceases the moment the technical assistance professional returns home, or the moment the foreign participant is awarded his degree. This has been a function of the meager amount of research resources available to the technical assistance activities in the past, and again there is hope that changes in the AID perspective on technical assistance in the future, will greatly facilitate the continuation of collaborative activities under foreign assistance funding, until other means of financing can be found. This step will greatly enhance the effectiveness of technical assistance, both in the institution building process in the host country, and in the strengthening of the U.S. university community.

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11. Home and Host Campus Relationships

W. N. THOMPSON

McDermott has shown in simplified form how the technical assistance and the host country organizations are tied together in an institution building undertaking.¹ In the case of U.S. Government and U.S. university cooperative efforts in assisting in building agricultural research and education institutions, this involves the home campus and its field team, AID/Washington and its field representatives, and the host country government, university, and other institutions.

Rigney and McDermott have studied the relationship patterns of technical assistance personnel in the host country, both within and beyond the host institution.² The impact of institution building projects on U.S. universities has been reported on,³ but there has been relatively little organized critical analysis of the relationships between the home campus (U.S.) and the host campus. In general, it has been thought that the primary function of the U.S. university was to keep the contract team fully staffed with competent personnel, provide administrative surveillance and backstopping for the field team, train participants, assist with commodity procurement, and handle the administrative arrangements with AID/Washington.

The technical assistance work in agricultural institution building, carried out on a contract basis between the U.S. Government and the land-grant colleges of agriculture, has taught several valuable lessons. The contract arrangement contains an implicit assumption that the

contractor (U.S. university) is fully capable of fulfilling the provisions agreed to in the contract, just as the contract signed by a business man or prospective homeowner with a building contractor to complete a structure with certain specifications by a specified date, indicates these capabilities. Many people in AID, particularly contracting officers, have viewed the contract in this way. Interesting enough, in the early years, U.S. university administrators viewed their institutions as fully capable of "developing a college of agriculture of the land-grant type" in a foreign country. They, and those who have served on university/AID contract projects, are now more aware of their limitations. We are more sensitive of the need to transform, not transplant, our ideas and technologies into terms that are meaningful within the biological, economic, political, and cultural realities of the countries with which we cooperate. These and other lessons have led U.S. university and AID representatives to take seriously the recommendation of the CIC-AID Rural Development Research Project that "more flexible project agreements and improved liaison between AID and the university community would effect needed improvements in AID-university relations."⁴

U.S. university personnel have been going through a process of discerning that the term, "technical assistance" is inadequate to describe the two-way learning process that is involved in the individual and institutional relationships between the home and host campuses. Those who have been engaged in development and modification of agricultural colleges and universities, now recognize that "technical cooperation" and "technical exchange" better describe the process. Furthermore, we are beginning to see that institution building goes far beyond technical exchange, at least as the word "technical" is narrowly defined by many agriculturists.

Weidner has pointed out that the American universities have been more affected by their institution building efforts than some of the host country institutions. He concludes that "the most striking thing about university contracts overseas, is the vast experience, both institutional and individual, that has been built up."⁵ This judgment was confirmed by the CIC-AID Rural Development Research Project; however, "vast" is accurate only with reference to the experience base of two decades ago. U.S. universities are still operating from a thin international experience base, if viewed in terms of their total manpower resources. The average annual man-

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power input to agricultural AID contract projects has been less than seven, with about two of the seven being recruited from, and usually returning to, non-university sources.

The experience that U.S. universities have had through participation in agricultural AID contract projects is not to be minimized, and at the same time, the sum of a large number of experiences may not be institutional capacity. Some of the impacts on U.S. universities have been viewed as unfavorable, so there is less agreement on the best ways for U.S. universities to be effective in international development work, than on the importance of the work itself. This is illustrated by the fact that two fifths of a sample of U.S. university department heads indicated that "our department would be better off if we did not have to give up staff members for overseas assignments," while 85 percent of them agreed that "international technical assistance needs to be a definite part of our department's program."⁶

We are now beginning to learn about the complexity of the institution building process. In my view, few U.S. university contract team leaders, team members, or home campus administrators, have had institution building as their primary goal, with definite plans and strategies for its attainment. I am using "strategy" as used by Warnken: "A planned dynamic sequence of actions directed toward the achievement of determinate objectives. . . . a plan for sequencing technical assistance activities to achieve specific institutional building objectives."⁷

In general, small groups of technically oriented persons have been assembled into what we call a team under the leadership, primarily administrative leadership, of a team leader. In far too few cases, has the team leader been looked on as a strategist whose primary role is to work with leaders of the host institution, in carefully supervising activities in order to reach specific objectives.

Earlier in this workshop, Esman described the institution building model of social change as being meaningful only in the context of the "guidance" change process, one in which deliberate efforts are made to induce innovations, i.e., the change process is directed in a "reasonably permissive" environment. I suspect that his mutual adjustment version of the "dialectical" change process (a form of compromise or accommodation) is more descriptive of a good share of the U.S. university/AID-supported institution building efforts of the past. Such change processes are characterized by Esman as "usually un-

guided," and as assuming a reasonably permissive environment in which changes occur by "noncoercive methods."⁸

These introductory remarks should begin to give some clues about my uneasiness over the possibility that we may continue institution building efforts in the future as in the past. This statement should not be interpreted as judging past efforts as being unsuccessful. They have been about as good as our knowledge and experience base have permitted. But we have had nearly 20 years of experience which has been critically analyzed. A theoretical framework for institution building has emerged and is being tested. U.S. university international work can ill afford to continue as described by one university vice-president with international responsibilities as "a series of ad hoc decisions and quiet accretions."

The emphasis in this paper is on the U.S. university, primarily because the emphasis in preceding Workshop papers has been on institution building in the host country. The part of the CIC-AID Rural Development Research Project in which I was most intensively involved, pointed up some features of home campus and host campus relationships that have serious implications for long-run U.S. university international development assistance capacity.

Let me summarize the main threads of my argument, and then proceed with glimpses of evidence, drawn largely from the CIC-AID Rural Development Research Project results:

1. Building the international dimensions of U.S. universities is a task coordinate with the task of building agricultural institutions in other countries. We have been more successful at the latter than the former.
2. U.S. university capacity to serve effectively to assist in a foreign agricultural institution building project on a continuing basis, is dependent upon developing programs, professional, and administrative relationships that provide for "gaining," as well as "giving" throughout, and beyond, the life of the project. Simply stated, the U.S. university that gains the most, will serve best.
3. Institution development project planning and evaluation should consider both the foreign and U.S. university institutional development goals and objectives, and means for attaining them. Home campus and host campus leaders, as well as cooperating organization person-

nel, should be actively engaged in the "two-way" institution development process.

4. Institution building concepts that are appropriate in building foreign institutions should be equally applicable in building the international dimension of the U.S. university. It is a curious fact that the concepts have been tested more overseas than in the U.S.

Our friends from other countries are likely to interpret this switch to development of U.S. institutions as a curious turn, at this point in the workshop. It should be emphasized that I am thinking in terms of a harmonized institution development process, with the gains to both institutions being mutually supportive. A substantial portion of the benefits to the U.S. university would result from improved management of the inputs and returns from participation in the host institution building process, and improvements in the environment both on and off the campus of the U.S. university.

Understanding the U.S. University

For this two-way institution building process to be effective, the main characteristics of the U.S. university must be understood by the host institution, as well as by the U.S. university personnel. Particular attention must be given to those parts of the university to be directly involved, i.e., the college of agriculture, in the case of an agricultural institution building project.

There are wide differences among U.S. universities, even among the land grant colleges. They vary in size, but are likely to seem large and in command of vast amounts of resources, as viewed by agriculturists from the developing countries. But there are many demands placed on these resources. Student enrollments are rapidly increasing at both undergraduate and graduate levels. Agricultural enrollments are increasing at a slower rate than in some other colleges, whose deans make a strong plea for allocating resources on the basis of enrollment growth rates.

An agriculture characterized by high levels of technology, commercial farmers, a large non-farm private agricultural sector, and diverse institutions demands and absorbs tremendous educated manpower resources. Reports of farm surpluses in the U.S. should not lead one to think that our problems of agricultural production are solved. The annual rate of overall farm production has never greatly exceeded

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domestic and commercial export requirements, with the so-called surpluses concentrating in a few commodities. Political considerations have confounded inevitable economic adjustments. In the U.S., there is now more concern about high food prices than farm commodity inventories.

National studies of agricultural research and extension manpower needs are indicative of the demands on U.S. educational institutions. Nearly 27,000 full-time new scientists for agricultural experiment stations, the U.S. Department of Agriculture, and industry are estimated to be needed in the period from 1965 to 1977.⁹ A similar study of manpower needs for agricultural extension projected a doubling of staff from 1966 to 1975.¹⁰

Several of the broader social issues that concern U.S. citizens have their agricultural implications and are certain to place additional demands on research and educational institutions, e.g., environmental quality, use of natural resources for non-farm purposes, and relationships between technological changes and economic and social inequities.

Therefore, there are many competing demands for highly educated and experienced manpower resources, those that are likely to be most effective in assisting in building agricultural institutions.

There are also institutional characteristics of U.S. land grant colleges of agriculture that serve as constraints to expanded international work. These suggest needs for modification of both the internal and external institutional environment. The land-grant philosophy of service to people, and one or more colleges of agriculture in each state, has developed a degree of provincialism that results in many faculty members and agricultural clientele groups who feel that the first obligation of the college is to residents of the state. This doctrine persists, suggesting elements of hostility in an environment that is basically friendly to expanded international work.

There are also internal organizational characteristics of U.S. colleges of agriculture that have a bearing on their responsiveness to international demands and abilities to accommodate to the needs for the so-called international dimension. The legal mandates creating the system of agricultural experiment stations and the cooperative extension services, along with the resident instruction function, have led to a "three-dimensional" administrative organization. In the past few years, several colleges of agriculture have added a

"fourth dimension" with the appointment of an administrator for international program. This has led to a geographical and functional administration combination, presenting opportunities for improvement in international administration, but not without its administrative complexities.

The departments within colleges of agriculture are discipline-oriented and "where the work gets done." They developed as applied departments from parent disciplines, under conditions within the university environment that demanded and, in general, got strong leadership. Tenure in administrative positions has been long under either a headship or a rotating chairmanship arrangement in which the rotation was slow. College-level administration has had similar characteristics. On balance, this has been good. It explains in large measure the effectiveness of the U.S. land grant system. However, it has resulted in a degree of rigidity that makes response to needs of an interdisciplinary nature somewhat difficult. Much of the international work to be done by U.S. universities is of an inter- or multi-disciplinary nature.

In commenting on the role of university-level international program administration, Gardner has succinctly concluded that "all such discussion of central administrative measures must end with the reminder that in universities, power resides in the departments and schools. Enthusiasm and commitment at this level is essential to successful development of the university's international capacity."¹¹ This quotation should be underscored as it applies to U.S. agriculture colleges and departments, especially departments.

These are only a few brush strokes in beginning to sketch a picture of the U.S. college of agriculture and its environment. It is intended to illustrate the type of things that need to be understood, if host institution personnel are to assist in the growth of the international development capacity of U.S. universities.

May I now be specific in pointing up some problems which surfaced in the CIC-AID Rural Development Research Project, with some thoughts on changes needed that will point the way toward two-way institution development.¹²

The Faculty Member's Optimum Role

Rigney has carefully analyzed the optimum role of the overseas "adviser," emphasizing effectiveness within the host institution.¹³

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Enhanced professional capability and stature, and re-entry into the U.S. professional stream, are two of the five criteria to be optimized. He recognizes the problem of the overseas assignment being a personally rewarding experience, but an interlude in the professional career, an "assignment to ambiguity." Time is lost in getting re-established in work upon return to the home university, particularly in research, but also in extension and teaching at the graduate level. Department heads view the time lost in readjustment as a more serious problem than it is seen by the returnee. The very fact that we talk about readjustment time shows that there is not a true collaborative professional relationship between what is done on host and home campuses.

The ideas of Rigney and McDermott, if widely applied, would lead to substantial gains in relationships between the home and host campus. They are highly commended to you without attempting to summarize them here.

Host and Home Campus Department Relationship

In his "generalized optimum role," Rigney emphasizes the importance of the team member developing plans for his overseas tour with his department, and taking steps upon his return to report professional accomplishments and implications of the foreign experiences for work at home.

There is need to extend Rigney's ideas that place emphasis on the individual. These should focus on the discipline-oriented department and its international program including the several faculty members concerned. International work in the U.S. university presents special problems in program organization and implementation, personnel management, and funding that are difficult for the individual to handle. Co-operative efforts among overseas faculty, returnees, potential overseas faculty members, participant trainees, graduate students and administrative personnel are needed.

The "Lost Role" of the Home Campus Department

The U.S. university department has been the weakest link in the home campus part of the institution building chain, both in terms of contributions to the host university, and to the building of international capacity on the home campus. Thus, the real strength of the U.S. university has not been behind most institution building efforts.

There are understandable reasons for this weakness, some of

which are not easy to correct. The overseas service orientation of past activities has minimized the importance of the role of research. The most powerful tool of the educator, the graduate student, has been left out of the tool kit. The field team has been a multi-disciplinary group, with a thin spread of any one discipline. The department head has been "short cut" in project planning and personnel management. He has had to wrestle with problems of continuity of domestic programs, created by insecurity of funding for international work. College and university-level administrators have obligated the U.S. institution to projects with less than adequate communication and involvement of faculty members, and department administrators.

The weak tie of the individual, while overseas, to his home campus department is shown by the less than one in five university department heads, with faculty members overseas, who indicated that the faculty member had any responsibility to them while overseas. Three-fifths of the department heads said that there was no arrangement for technical backstopping of the overseas staff member by the department. It is understandable that university faculty members are not uncommonly referred to as being "on leave with AID." One-half of the department heads had not visited the overseas project.

Campus to Campus Program Leadership

The continuing process of program planning, recognizing the goals and objectives of both institutions, needs to be strengthened. From the U.S. university vantage point, more emphasis is needed on technical backstopping and institution building backstopping. "Housekeeping" backstopping is important but only a small part of the total support effort.

The field team should not be a satellite of the U.S. university with a weak communication system, and no provision for inter-planetary guidance. The team leader, representing the U.S. university, should have a clear delegation of authority and responsibility to represent his institution in pursuing the objectives of the overseas project. However, there should be definite policy guidelines within which the field team is to operate, thereby ensuring program continuity. This requires definite understandings between host and home institution leadership, at several levels of administration.

Improvements in overall program management by many U.S.

universities are needed with clarification of roles to be played by university and college-level directors of international programs, campus coordinators, and deans. The most important single need is to bring home-campus and host-campus department heads into the continuing and changing process.

A critical look at the role of such means as executive visits, "reverse" executive visits (host-campus personnel visits to U.S. and other institutions), joint teams, and consulting assignments is needed. For the two-way institution building process to be effective, there must be a two-way flow of both faculty members and graduate students.

Flexibility in length of overseas assignment is needed. The task to be accomplished should be the primary determinant of the time period, recognizing that the talents of highly trained and experienced personnel are more scarce and costly than jet plane travel.

Research as a Connecting Link in Home and Host Campus Relationships

It is clear that research should have high priority in building connecting links between home and host campuses, particularly at the department level. The principles of science serve as a common bond. Carefully planned and conducted problem-solving research has multiplier effects in both its results, and in its role in training of young scientists for many years of service in research and education. It holds considerable unexploited potential in capitalizing on the interest and enthusiasm developed by the first international experience of U.S. personnel.

Important as research may be, it is not the only scholarly work to be done by educators. There is other challenging and rewarding work to be done. In many areas of the world, there is a crying need for improved textbooks and instructional aids. Curricula improvements are needed, both in the U.S. and in host countries. Youth and adult education programs are to be developed and improved upon. These, as well as research, hold promise on both the home and host campus for contribution to institution development. Some of these things might well be more easily accomplished by experienced persons on the U.S. university campus, away from the pressure of host institution building.

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Expanding the Institution Building Horizon

We are only now focusing on institution building in an organized way. There is a strong tendency on the part of the modern specialized agricultural educator to think that agricultural institution building is limited to building colleges, research stations, and adult education programs. The strength of the so-called U.S. land grant system rests upon development of a wide variety of public and private agricultural institutions, many of which are still to be built in the developing countries. Agricultural educators of an earlier generation had an active role in developing such institutions as secondary schools with a strong agricultural component, farm organizations, cooperative marketing and input supply cooperatives, credit cooperatives, cooperative farm business management associations, and fertilizer plants. I doubt that research and education institutions in any country can really flourish and be a high pay-off investment unless educators assume a progressive and aggressive leadership and service role in developing this broad array of agricultural institutions.

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12. Utilization of Technical Assistance by Host Governments and Host Institutions

O. P. GAUTAM

In the preparation of this paper I have mainly drawn upon our experience with the utilization of technical assistance received by India for the establishment and development of agricultural universities in India. But before I proceed to discuss the subject matter of technical assistance, I draw your attention to the supplement to this paper entitled "Agricultural Universities in India," which provides the context in which the technical assistance was needed and utilized.

The Need for Technical Assistance

The need for technical assistance in India arose, as indicated in the supplement to this paper, mainly to improve the standard and quality of education and research through upgrading of teaching faculties, and creation of better physical facilities. The decision to improve the then-existing institutional organization and system of education required that we share the experiences with governments and institutions in other advanced countries of the world that had succeeded in developing efficient institutional models. As the institutional structure and organization of agricultural universities in India was essentially an adaptation of the Land-Grant College model, it was only logical that the government of India sought technical assistance from USAID.

This step was also consistent with the spirit of international cooperation in the field of science that has become almost a necessity in the wake of terrific growth of new knowledge. This has necessitated educational institutions the world over to develop new relationships to deal with cross-disciplinary subject matter and research. The complexity of such programs, the diversity of needed facilities, and the high degree of specialization involved make such international collaboration in education and research almost imperative, especially for developing countries like India, which apart from technological developments, has comparatively very limited resources available on science and technology compared with some of the advanced countries of the world.

Yet another gain sought through technical assistance was to pick up values, attitudes and operational norms that characterize successful institutions, and which eventually contribute toward building up of institutional traditions.

Technical assistance programs, however, need to be viewed only as an interim arrangement, and must eventually yield to technical cooperation, where the developing countries become independent of technical assistance and begin to function as co-partners, and contribute towards complementarity of talent and resource. In fact, it is our hope that the sisterhood relationships, now created between U.S. universities and agricultural universities in India under the USAID assistance program, would develop into co-partnership of an enduring nature, based on professional bondages rather than on incentives, unilateral need, or governmental agreements.

The Technical Assistance for Agricultural Education

Although a beginning was made as early as 1952 for extending technical assistance on an *ad hoc* basis through a contract with the University of Illinois to the Allahabad Agricultural Institute, the credit for systematic promotion of this assistance program belongs to Dr. Frank Parker, whose untiring efforts culminated in the signing of the Operational Agreement Number 28, "Project for Assistance to Agricultural Research, Education and Extension Organizations," in 1954. This agreement envisaged provision of capital inputs, equipment and books, U.S. specialists to work at Indian institutions, and advanced training of Indian staff members at U.S. universities. A supplement to this agreement, signed in 1955, allowed the participa-

tion of five U.S. universities in the assistance program for strengthening agricultural institutions in India. Each U.S. university was to work with a number of agricultural colleges on a regional basis. Technical assistance received by these colleges did help to strengthen these institutions considerably. In several cases, however, some of the sophisticated equipment received could not be fully utilized partly due to lack of spare parts, and partly due to the lack of experience for using them. It was soon realized that U.S. technical assistance was spread too thin over many colleges, and that there was need to concentrate on fewer institutions which had the necessary potential for development. The program was accordingly reviewed in 1963-64, and the assistance was earmarked only for the development of agricultural universities in India. It was at this point that the sisterhood relationship between U.S. universities and Indian agricultural universities started and has continued since, to the enrichment of the program. Today six U.S. universities are extending technical assistance to eight agricultural universities in India.

In addition, technical assistance was also received from the Rockefeller Foundation for the P.G. School at the Indian Agricultural Research Institute at New Delhi and for the Cereal Improvement Project, and from the Ford Foundation for the Intensive Agricultural Development Project. Largely the assistance received from the three sources has been complementary.

From 1960-61 to 1967-68, 552 participants (7,928 man-months) received training, and U.S. advisors' services totalling 2,831 man-months were made available under the USAID program. Equipment and books worth about \$2.5 million were also supplied during the same period. Under Rockefeller and Ford Foundation programs, participant training accounted for additional 3,100 man-months (174 participants) and consultant services, 237 man-months. Since 1966-67, the "capital input" component has been practically dropped from the USAID program. Commodity needs are now supposed to be met out of the Project Loan. For the last two years, Trust Fund Rupee assistance has been received for specific projects, but only in support of the U.S. specialists' areas of activity.

Utilization of Technical Assistance

There are many facets to the problem of utilization of technical assistance by the host governments and host institutions. Magnitude,

quality, timeliness and proportions of different forms of technical assistance have to be viewed in relation to the institutional building process, particularly the stage of development of the institution. Effective utilization of technical assistance depends to a very large extent on the clear understanding of the goals, suitability of the model to local conditions, efficiency of management and operation, availability of local resources, and the degree of support given and coordination exercised by the host government/institution on one hand, and the USAID and the collaborating U.S. university on the other. Moreover, utilization of technical assistance is to be viewed at four levels: (1) Government level; (2) Institution level; (3) Department level; and (4) Individual or counterpart level.

There is absolutely no doubt that the technical assistance received by India for the development of agricultural universities has played a very significant role in this institution building process, and has been utilized with great advantage. This operation, in my view, will go down as a magnificent example of the institution building process, and demonstrate effectively what can be achieved through international cooperation and technical assistance programs. A number of developing countries have already shown interest in this program. We hope more will benefit from this experience.

There is no doubt, however, that the efficiency of utilization of technical assistance in the future can be greatly enhanced. The CIC-AID team has looked into this matter and made suggestions. A joint team of GOI-USAID officials also examined the program operation two years ago, and have made a number of recommendations. What is needed is concerted and timely action singly or jointly by the host government (HG), host institution (HI), U.S. University (USU) and USAID.

The suggestions that follow emanate from our experience with the planning and operation of this technical assistance program in India. Other HG and HI would, I hope, find these of use to their respective programs.

1. At present, an advance survey of the potentialities of the new institution to be established in a state is carried out by a team from the U.S. university willing to enter the contract. It is necessary that a similar survey is done with regard to the potentialities of the contracting university, if possible, jointly with the representatives of the host institution.

2. At the time of finalizing the contract, it must be insured that the new institution has a sufficient legal base conforming to the model, and that the HG has, or would delegate, the essential responsibilities of research, teaching and extension education beyond any shade of ambiguity, within a certain time limit after the institution is started.
3. Adequate financial support for the establishment, and continuing support later for the development, must be guaranteed by the host government against a plan prepared in advance. The plan must set forth the main goals of the institution and should spell out in reasonable details the mode of approach and operation. Procedures to be followed, as also the technical assistance required, should likewise form part of the agreement. The agreement must insure the autonomy of the institution as well as the delegation of authority and responsibilities the new institution is expected to shoulder and carry.
4. Periodic reviews of the progress made, and of new needs of the institution, should be carried out jointly. Continuing education of the decision makers should be a deliberate and specific goal of such joint discussions at appropriate levels. This is particularly necessary in view of the high turnover in governmental positions so that decisions are made by those who are well acquainted with the basic concepts, the agreed plans and operation of the program.
5. At the institutional level, a more comprehensive plan indicating organizational pattern, the phasic development, creation of new facilities, requirements of local resources, and technical assistance should be prepared in the early stages of the program. Both the organization and operation of the institution should conform to the basic concepts and features of the new institution, as well as to the agreement at the government level. It should be insured that institutional autonomy is shared by each departmental unit as well.
6. The emphasis in sisterhood relationship between universities should shift from *ad hoc* assistance, to the develop-

- ment of professional bondages of an enduring nature, based on mutually agreed projects.
7. Technical assistance programs should be pointedly geared to foster initiative and creation of potentialities for scientific work in the host institution and the counterparts. Greater emphasis needs to be given to the quality of technical assistance in the future.
 8. A few items of technical assistance, which are of interest to all new institutions covered under the overall program, should be planned jointly involving all contracting universities, and need not be catered to individually.
 9. The stage has been reached in India where competence already created within the country at some of the agricultural universities can supplement the technical assistance received from outside. Future programs should therefore encourage inter-university collaboration for the development of new agricultural universities. Areas where adequate competence has been created need to be identified.

Inter-university and inter-departmental programs involving participation of trained personnel in a subject matter area should be encouraged. Joint training programs between U.S. and Indian universities, or between Indian universities themselves, may be mentioned as a particularly promising avenue that needs to be exploited to a much greater extent.

10. There is need for greater flexibility in the technical assistance program, particularly in view of the varying need of different universities that are at different stages of development. There is need to work out the optimum timing, level, and combination of these inputs, viz., technical personnel, participant training and supplies of commodities. The need for advisory assistance may be predominant in the beginning of a university but as its organization takes shape, departments are set up and trained people take positions, the requirement will shift to subject matter specialists, to strengthen research and education programs.
11. Whenever the need for a change is clearly identified,

organized effort should be made to incorporate it in the agreements between USAID and the host government. At present, the process of bringing about such changes is rather slow on either side.

12. The program stands to gain a great deal through better coordination of technical assistance given by USAID, the Rockefeller Foundation, and the Ford Foundation to agricultural universities. It is understood that steps have already been taken in this direction. Further, it would be highly desirable if other programs proposed by USAID, or contracting universities, that involve participation of the host institutions or scientists are developed in consultation with host government well in advance, and are coordinated with other programs.
13. The need for advance preparation on the part of both specialists and the participants, before they move out to the host institution and U.S. universities respectively, can not be overemphasized. A running account of technical assistance maintained at each institution/department concerned would be of value in this connection. A clear job description and a competent counterpart, and where possible, advance project preparation would materially help utilization of consultant services. It would appear that the best strategy, at least in selected cases, would be for a specialist to have short reconnaissance assignment to gain direct insight into the local potentialities for his work, and to work out the project plan with his counterpart, to be taken up during his long-term assignment to follow. This would ensure that the timing of his assignment is consistent with the university's developmental stage. Participant training has played a very useful role in upgrading faculties qualitatively and functionally. Here, there is need to recognize the changing needs of developing universities. It is necessary to have advance selection, initial academic preparation, and advance planning of course work to be offered at U.S. universities.
14. Areas of participants' training in U.S. should be restricted to subject matter areas where training and research

facilities are not available in the host country. Emphasis should be on quality of training. Likewise, the USAID program should provide for training in strong departments of U.S. universities outside the contracting university. Joint training programs, and short-term refresher training for senior faculty members are other forms that participant training can take. In order, however, to insure that the training is really used at home and to ensure proper placement of participants, continuing support to the participant at the host institution for a short period would appear to be a step that must be taken to enhance utilization of the participant training.

15. In any program of science education, the need and importance of equipment and books stands next only to the trained faculty. Giving separate consideration to equipment when developing technical programs has resulted in the neglect of the proper proportions of equipment to personnel. Appropriate action needs to be taken to ensure that the new institutions that are now coming up, do not suffer for want of essential equipment.
16. Each specialist, at the termination of his assignment, makes a report and offers suggestions. It would be interesting to consolidate the recommendations already made with respect to subject matter area, and review the action taken, or that needs to be taken, for speedy development of the institution. Arrangements to implement this suggestion on a continuing basis would appear highly desirable.
17. In addition to the sharing of technical information, one of the most important goals of technical assistance should be to encourage and foster new attitudes, help establish lofty traditions and spirit of dedication.

These suggestions for increasing efficiency of technical assistance have been offered in full awareness that the operational efficiency of such international programs are intimately linked with our own efficiency for working with the timeliness and degree of our own commitments as individuals, departments, institutions and governments in host countries.

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13. Identification of Country Needs and Available Resources

A. J. COUTU

The objective of this paper is to add some clarity to the institutional development process, as related to agricultural research and educational establishments. The relation to country needs and available resources should be apparent.

Toward the goal of clarity in the institutional development process, the paper will focus on four broad issues:

1. A brief criticism of past and emerging guidelines for institutional development in agricultural education and research establishments. Initial comments will be directed at the failure of U.S. efforts to plan and program, consistent with the seriousness of the issue. Some attention will be given to more recent guidelines that appear to de-emphasize the role of indigenous institutions and seek generalities without focusing on the specifics.
2. This section offers some specific guidelines to efforts at educational and research institutional development. The greater specificity will focus on essential departmental building elements of a developing university, research station or extension service.
3. Subsequent comments will be directed at possible phases in the institutional development process, particularly as related to US-Host university relationships.

The three phases to be discussed are:

Phase I — Initial Departmental Development

Phase II — Early Maturity

Phase III — Emergence of a Domestic Constituency

4. Finally, I would like to suggest three basic instrumental changes in U.S. university programs abroad. One relates to the need for a specialized agency during the initial departmental, or advisor phase, another towards increasing the productivity of the early maturity, or research-development phase, and finally with respect to the politically sensitive issues relating to social welfare and income redistribution.

Past and Emerging Guidelines

From a U.S. technical assistance position, dominant since 1950, of transferring knowledge and technology, we now seem to be seeking substitutes for depth in indigenous research and educational institutions. Such substitutes include efforts to concentrate support in international research centers, to emphasize U.S. involvement in management systems to resolve the slow pace of agricultural development, and to seek different institutional development guidelines in accelerating social changes. In these efforts to hasten institutional development, we have ignored, and seem to be continuing to ignore, the hard core of what is really required. The hard core is the long, arduous task of developing essential assets, such as an adequate commitment to science in the development process, well-trained and matured human capacity, and essential physical facilities. The realization of depth in these hard core assets is essential to moving into a research and development approach to increased rates of social and economic growth.

Before focusing on the many issues raised, the research and development, or "learn how" approach to institutional development, needs elaboration. As is the case for most things, relatively little knowledge, few systems, or organizational structures are directly transferable from one society or culture to another. Most definitely, the essential knowledge and technology necessary to sustained high rates of agricultural development are not transferable. It is a myth that U.S. universities working abroad are involved in transferring the land grant system. Some attitudinal and organizational pieces might be transferable, but the hard core of depth in human and

physical capacity, as related to physical, biological and social issues, is not. If the above assertions are accepted, then real institutional development must provide a capacity to do research and development on problems and issues peculiar to the indigenous culture and economy.

At this point, it might be useful to ask what have been the real costs of this effort. The most costly item may have been the delay in commitment to the agricultural sector by the indigenous countries, and higher rates of development that have been foregone. Another high cost item has been disillusionment by the U.S. people in support of efforts abroad—they were sold a false hope that agriculture abroad would flourish with the transfer of U.S. technology. Still another cost has been the limited number of essential indigenous educational and research institutions just getting a good start—what level of agricultural educational and research assets would exist in the world today, if the U.S. had devoted more than 10% of its agricultural investments since 1945 to such efforts? Certainly substantially more of the critical assets would exist—they are a greater commitment to science and education, depth in human scientific capacity, and the presence of essential laboratories, libraries and experiment stations.

On the other extreme, the new guidelines towards technical assistance in institutional development are also disturbing. The first concern is that a position will solidify around the view that a few international research centers are substitutes for strong indigenous research and training institutions. Research centers do not offer adequate training capacity, and it is doubtful that the difficult adaptive research requirements can be met without indigenous capacity.

Another concern implied in the U.S. technical assistance effort is the growing enthusiasm over management systems, and that an active or dominant U.S. role should continue.¹ Implied here is the idea that knowledge transfers are still the most acceptable development method, but need to be strengthened through the development of management systems.

Yet another disturbing element is the possible over-commitment to research and action programs relating to normative models of institutional development. Some of the key elements in the analysis of the institutional building process are leadership, doctrine, organization and the environment.² The disturbing implication is that we will fur-

ther delay an adequate amount of U.S. resources being allocated to building research and educational institutions, because we lack a systematically derived and broadly based theory of how the technical assistance process operates.³

Perhaps the principle reasons for past directions, and these questionable future guidelines, on institutional development are:

1. A continued dependency on immediate results or the issue of high visibility.
2. A failure to examine the time and dollar requirements needed to initiate and mature the essential assets of a research and development, or "learn how," process of economic and social development involving the structuring of essential indigenous institutions.

Some Alternate Guidelines

The basic unit or essential element in creating the necessary assets for building institutions, such as agricultural universities or experiment stations, is well-developed disciplinary departments. The essential elements in developing strong disciplinary departments are observable and measurable. Some of the basic elements are:

1. Concensus among administrators and staff members on critical components of philosophy and policies of department.
2. Staff members well trained in their disciplines.
3. A balance between the number of mature and maturing staff members.
4. A limited number of well developed courses relating to the theory, application, and methodological tools of the discipline.
5. A commitment to, and capacity to do, relevant research, ranging from contemporary problems to theoretical and methodological developments.
6. A strong involvement in developing a graduate training program, as essential to good teaching and research.
7. The capacity to publish, as well as to participate in scientific meetings, seminars, etc.

To assist in bringing these essential elements into being within a reasonably short period of time, requires commitment, substantial

resources and continuity between foreign and U.S. institutions. The technical assistance program of the U.S. abroad has not been adequately committed to these essential departmental development elements. There are few well developed indigenous agricultural universities and experiment stations as a result of twenty years of effort.⁴

The failure on the part of the U.S., and most multilateral foreign assistance efforts, to help develop disciplinary departments is the result of not developing successful programs for investing in agricultural research and education in emerging countries. The failure is not related to the lack of a theoretical model, experience or willingness to interact in helping to build, for example, strong plant pathology, genetics or economics departments. Usually the problem has been a level of investment far below what is required, and a false sense of the real time and resource requirements needed to develop well-trained and experienced agricultural scientists.

Further, when some elements of a strong departmental program have been achieved in indigenous institutions, the technical assistance program is assumed to be complete. On the contrary, a successful program to develop agricultural research and training capacity must assist in building interdisciplinary depth on high priority problems. The need at this point is to assist in developing regional or functional research and training capacities, particularly with respect to an optimum size and organizational structure.

Institutional development in agricultural education and research (I suspect in other sectors) is not without its guidelines. To seek new models with an emphasis on the emerging science of behavioral-managerial processes is likely to delay or divert badly needed resources.

Institutional Development: A Continuum

The process of developing departments and programs within an agricultural university, experiment station system or extension service is a continuous one. Within this continuum there are phases of development. It may be useful to identify possible phases in order to more closely relate alternative forms of U.S. technical assistance. Some possible phases and their relevant characteristics are:

Phase I — Initial Departmental Development

This phase is characterized as a period when philosophy and policies are being formulated, the staff has limited numbers and is inexperienced, the quantity of teaching demanded is dominant, and

research if any is primarily designed to give experience to the staff. If the unit has a developmental plan, it will likely include M.S.-level training for selected staff, recruitment of external human resources to substitute for indigenous staff undergoing training, and the seeking of external resources to assist in acquisition of equipment, as well as the building of libraries and physical capacity.

Unless high quality and mature indigenous human resources can be diverted from other opportunities, the departmental growth rate will be dictated by the length of the graduate training programs, losses of trained personnel to other economic opportunities, continuity of support by administrative leaders, and the level of internal as well as external support.

During this period, the external assistance must be of very high quality. The issues to be tackled are difficult, including guidance on course offerings and content; teaching, seminarizing and less formal exchanges on alternative philosophies and policies; internal organizational questions, as well as organizational issues relating to other developing units within the institution; and the initiation of some applied research with indigenous staff members, as well as carrying on some individual research activity. The foreign scientific resource is typically cast in the role of an advisor.

Phase II — Early Maturity

As some inexperienced but discipline-trained staff members return to the indigenous institution, a mistakenly high set of expectations arise, but are followed by a realization that training without experience still leaves much to be accomplished. These false expectations are raised by indigenous, as well as external assistance agencies, particularly as they both expect the immature research or educational human resources to yield early insights into the complex biological, physical, social and economic issues facing the country.

This second phase of the continuum must be a period when staff training is continued; returning staff members are given an opportunity to mature in teaching, research and science oriented activities; a climate for greater disciplinary specialization is provided; and where foreign assistance needs to respond to these changing conditions. Very productive foreign assistance would take the form of nominal research support for host country scientists, continued fellowship support in the form of small research grants for immature staff

members returning from foreign study, and research grant support for joint projects. The critical issue is to support high priority research projects and promising scientists.

During this period a colleague-to-colleague relationship between indigenous and foreign staff members should emerge. Real opportunity exists for professional gains by both members—joint educational and research activities on relevant issues.

Most significantly during this phase should be the realization by the U.S. government and university administrators of increased opportunities for greater reciprocity in educational and research efforts. Unfortunately, it is at this point that many U.S. government and home campus administrators begin to pressure for completion of the international technical assistance activity. On the contrary, when death begins to occur in the respective indigenous departments is when increased product from research and education can and does begin to emerge.

Phase III — Emergence of a Domestic Constituency

As quality and quantity emerge at the departmental level, the human product of improved training, as well as increased research products begin to emerge from the institution. A real test of this early maturity can be measured by requests to the department to assist in developmental issues, increasing competition for staff, recognition at domestic and international seminars and conferences, and most significantly, sustained budget support by domestic elements.

A critical error at this stage would be to expand the functions of the department beyond the capacity of the limited human and physical resources. Serious attention must be given to priorities that consider the essentiality of further departmental maturity, as well as growth elements in a departmental and total institutional context. The department must respond to relevant problem areas, usually in conjunction with staff members from other departments. Preferably, there should be depth rather than breadth, opportunities for initiatives by individual professionals, and discrete administrative processes to guide program development and implementation.

The opportunities for very productive, adaptive and new knowledge creation, and for expanding the colleague-to-colleague relationships between indigenous and foreign scientists are developing. The essential assets are beginning to fall in place for effective exploita-

tion of the "research and development" or experimental approach to increased rates of social and economic development. It is also at this phase that relationships between indigenous and foreign institutions can be sustained with little direct involvement or management from governmental entities.

Changes in Institutional Development Instruments

The central thrust of this paper has been that the basic country needs are for depth in departmental structures, leading to more productive research and technological developments in the critical institutions of emerging countries. The U.S. failure over the last 20 years to adequately assist in developing successful public programs in research and education cannot be blamed on the lack of adequate guidelines towards institutional development. Nor can it be blamed on a lack of desire on the part of most U.S. universities. The fault lies in a false belief that adequate knowledge existed and needed only to be transferred; and a false belief that the U.S. Congress insisted on short-run highly visible products from U.S. foreign aid.

Regardless of past mistakes, and with experiences gained, it is hoped that more adequately funded programs, through some improved instruments, will resolve the lack of essential agricultural research and training depth. The suggestions in this section relate to possible new or expanded technical assistance instruments.

An International Agricultural Education and Research Corps

In the "initial departmental development" phase of institutional building, the ideal foreign advisor should be well trained in a discipline, have had experience as a departmental chairman, have made research contributions, be experienced in graduate training, and knowledgeable of the necessity and methods for maturing young staff members. These are demanding requirements and have very seldom been satisfied in the past. Further, the opportunities for this type of resource are great throughout the expanding U.S. educational and research complex.

A possible instrument to meet this declining, but still critical, need abroad would be the creation of an International Agricultural Education and Research Corps. Such an effort might be organized and implemented by a science division within US/AID, a quasi-private research and training foundation or an association that links

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necessary disciplines. Success would require adequate and sustained support from the U.S. government and administrative flexibility to compete for the high quality resources required.

Preferably such a corps would be able to attract the scientist-administrator for periods of six months to three years under leaves-of-absence from universities throughout the country. Such a corps was badly needed ten years ago, but still can be very productive in:

1. Countries where the departmental building process has lagged or is just beginning;
2. Situations where existing experiment stations or extension services have not made progress;
3. Identifying international or regional opportunities for joint or cooperative educational and research activities;
4. Serving as reviewers of educational and research projects throughout the world.

Such a corps can also serve a valuable role in improving the allocation of scarce U.S. university scientific talent to international efforts. The U.S. scientist is seeking a colleague-to-colleague relationship more in line with opportunities described in the previous section under Phase II — Early Maturity, and Phase III — Emergence of a Domestic Constituency. With very challenging alternatives on the domestic scene, the U.S. agricultural scientist is most reluctant to tackle the initial departmental building phase. At the same time, the young agricultural scientist is quickly deterred because the domestic measuring devices for professional advancement do not clearly recognize the types of activities required in Phase I — Initial Departmental Development.

An Instrument for Colleague-to-Colleague Relationships

When the essential institutional building assets begin to emerge abroad, the opportunities for productive joint research and educational prospects are high. The essential assets are disciplinary departments with a commitment to science and technology, staffs with academic training and experience, as well as increased physical capacities including libraries, labs and other experimental facilities. At this phase of the institutional development process, U.S. agricultural universities have many interested applicants, colleagues abroad want to interact and what is missing is an adequate instrument to serve this opportunity.

It is also under Phase II and III that increased reciprocity from joint research and educational efforts has, and will likely continue to emerge. The emphasis can be applied research, but much of this research will be more basic than many realize.

The need is to have a flexible instrument to build on the basic departmental assets that exist and will develop. The goal is to mature and capitalize on the gains that have been made. The need includes long term research support for the U.S. and indigenous scientists, capacity to really involve U.S. and foreign graduate students, and essential resources for publishing, and disseminating research results.

An International Agriculture Policy Institute

Within the last year, some U.S. leaders in International Agricultural Development Activities have emphasized the need for expanded research on sensitive social and economic issues in emerging countries.⁵ A recent review held by AID/Washington identified the critical issues of income redistribution and rural social justice as complex and high priority developmental elements.⁶ Within the developing countries, the human and dollar resources for research on these issues are almost nonexistent.

Any viable solution of these sensitive income distribution and social justice issues is closely related to increased efforts at world population control, and will be pressured further by expected progress in modernizing commercial agriculture through biological, physical and social science innovation. The issues range from more sensible factor and product price policies; more economic knowledge of systems of rural conventional and vocational education; knowledge of alternatives in countrywide community development programs related to such elements as decentralization of nonfarm industries, labor-intensive farm and non-farm development, economically sensible changes in necessary land tenure policies; and among others, knowledge of how labor can substitute for capital in the broad area of the infrastructure development.

A viable International Agricultural Policy Institute must be legitimized within a multilateral setting. A logical site is within the scientific community of the United Nations — the emphasis must be on cooperative research with indigenous agricultural scientists. A critical need is to promote research on the methods and models for

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such analysis, as well as provision for empirical evaluation of policy choices.

Summary

Within the last few years, there have been some improvements in U.S. agricultural efforts abroad. The need is to prevent diversion of resources from the hard core efforts required to assist in developing vigorous biological, physical and social science departments at essential institutions abroad, and to join in the maturing phase of departments that have progressed over the last few years. The present level of support to international agriculture is likely adequate, if channeled in proper directions.

NOTES

1. See Joint Statement by NPA Subcommittee on U.S. Foreign Aid and NPA Board of Trustees, "A new conception of U.S. Foreign Aid," National Planning Association, Special report No. 64, Washington, D.C., March, 1969.
2. For more discussion on this point, see two papers, M. J. Esman and F. C. Bruhus, "Institution Building in National Development: An Approach to Induced Social Change in Transitional Societies," December, 1965, and M. J. Esman and H. C. Blaise, "Institution Building Research - The Guiding Concepts," February, 1966. Unpublished preliminary papers, University of Pittsburgh, Graduate School of Public and International Affairs.
3. See CIC-AID report, *Building Institutions to Serve Agriculture*, Committee on Institutional Cooperation, Lafayette, Indiana: Purdue University, September, 1968.
4. See T. W. Schultz, "What Ails World Agriculture," *Agricultural Policy in an Affluent Society*, edited by Ruttan, Waldo and Houck, New York: W. W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1969.
5. See L. S. Hardin, "Later Generation Agricultural Development Problems," Ford Foundation, paper prepared for a conference on agricultural development, Bellagio, Italy, April, 1969.
6. Agency for International Development, "Spring Review of the New Cereal Varieties," AID/Washington, May, 1969.

14. Philosophical Differences in Approaching Agricultural Technical Assistance*

ERVEN J. LONG

I

It is a little difficult to decide what is expected of one who is given this assignment. I am particularly interested in the word "philosophical" when used in this context, and especially why it is assigned to me. Perhaps it is because I minored and taught in the philosophy department. I doubt if one can say that there are different approaches to technical assistance sufficiently well articulated to qualify as alternative general theories, much less as expressions of different underlying philosophical systems. I presume much less than this is being suggested for me; certainly much less will be forthcoming.

But perhaps there is some justification in a philosophic approach—in a somewhat formal meaning of the term — to the discussion today. For, ... a real way, philosophy's role is to question many of our normally accepted ideas — and to doubt most of the answers.

From the vantage point of this self-imposed detachment, I should like to raise some questions, in a non-systematic way, purely for the value of the thought they might stimulate among you. I shall raise my questions chiefly through assertions designed to challenge prevailing ideas. And if they seem too obviously wrong, please don't

* Views expressed in this paper are those of the author and not necessarily those of the Agency for International Development.

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be unduly concerned; they cut across the grain of many of my own biases, too. And this luxury of detachment is only for a day. Tomorrow I shall again be a bureaucrat, tied perhaps more closely than any of you to prevailing premises, principles and practices.

II

I should like to arrange my questions on different approaches to technical assistance into those of *method*, those of *substance* or *content*, and those of *structure*.

On matters of method, I should like to question the emphasis we have all placed on the so-called advisory role as contrasted with a more participatory role of U.S. technical assistance workers.

The accepted characterization of our proper role is that of advisor. This concept has much going for it. It emphasizes the necessity for host countries, institutions and personnel to develop their own capacities, and not to rely on us to do their job for them. It removes the temptation (except where there is no alternative) for those countries to use our personnel simply to plug holes of special manpower deficiencies. It reduces the temptation for our personnel to design, carry out and judge their work in terms of their own project's success, rather than of its catalytic or generative impact on development of the host country or its institutions. And an advisory role implies a greater multiplier effect than does a participatory role because one can presumably advise with respect to more activities than he can participate in. Finally, the advisory-role doctrine connotes the proper degree of non-involvement with host country processes to assure maximum personal and diplomatic comfort.

But these propositions are often more impressive in logic than demonstrable in fact. It has always seemed to me that we have been most successful — as in Taiwan — where our role was most participatory, where our efforts and theirs were so conjoined as to be essentially one. Similarly, it has seemed to me that specific technical assistance projects or activities have been effective, largely in the degree that our personnel have been deeply involved as participants in local decision-making and implementation processes. Of one thing I am sure, individual Americans who have been most effective are those who developed *modus operandi* which built their contributions in as organic components of local decision-making processes — in short, those who participate rather than simply advise.

There are some generic reasons for this. In part, it is no doubt a result of relatively poor translation of the general advisory-role "philosophy" into specific implementation practices. For example, the policy of utilizing a U.S. technician primarily for in-service training of a single "counterpart," so fashionable a few years ago, had a ridiculously low multiplier potentiality. Also, the advisor-role approach places great strain on the absorptive capacity of the host country. As in my own office, most countries and institutions can absorb an almost unlimited number of people *to help them do their job*, but they can absorb the assistance of only very few advisors who suggest (often unreasonably numerous) new approaches and activities which may be improvements, but which are necessarily time-consuming to adopt and implement.

But there are two deeper — more "philosophic" if you prefer — limiting factors in the advisor-role concept. The first has been identified, in its opposite, in the notion of non-involvement in local affairs. There is, I would assert, a sort of moral irresponsibility inherent in the very concept that it is for us to advise, and for them to accept, or reject, but in any event to take the consequences. Advice is cheap! But not to the one who acts upon it, if it is wrong. There is no doubt that advice-giving on the range of issues with which this conference is concerned is serious business. If acted upon, it commits resources, redirects careers, restructures bureaucracies, and in many cases vastly redefines the entire set of opportunities, and even ways of life of many, many people. There is a simple but brutal reality to the fact that if advice is not right, it is wrong.

There certainly is no way by which an American can be brought to share fully with his local counterparts in the consequences of his advice, no more than a physician's prescriptions can be made as important to him as to his patient. But surely the *system*, the *doctrine*, should work at maximizing, not minimizing, the responsibility of the technical assistance process.

In clarification, I should add that this is not an issue of morality or personal responsibility, but of policy, of approach, of design, of technical assistance. Also, I should indicate that it is quite a different issue from that of the proper degree of official U.S. involvement in the affairs of other countries.

The second philosophic issue in the advisory versus participatory-role concept has to do with the way the American looks

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upon his job. Is his job, from his base of superior knowledge and experience, to advise them on what to do? Or is it to mix his specific scientific or other analytical capabilities with their special insights and experiences in a mutual, systematic effort to try to figure out what to do? These may not seem, on superficial glance, too different—but they are diametric opposites. The first assumes that the American expert *knows* what should be done! Or, more accurately in most cases, that our solutions apply to their problems, if they are of a roughly similar nature. Sometimes they do. More often, they won't even apply to our own problems by the time the expert returns home. The second formulation assumes only that the problem will yield to research or analytical treatment and that, if it is in an area of the American's special competence, he can make a highly important—perhaps essential—contribution to its solution. If he *is* competent, and if the problem *is* in his field of competence, and if he *does* work in a way that thoroughly integrates his contributions with those of the host country personnel, he can almost certainly improve on the judgment that would have been made without his participation. Often, of course, his contribution might be simply to assure that no judgment be made from the evidence in hand.

For the local officials, this is the heart of the distinction. It is not the foreign advisor who speaks to them, but the evidence. Not his report, but their own analysis — to which, to be sure, the American had made a very important contribution. It carries its message of general principles through data, analysis and conclusions directly relevant for action after it has first met the requirements of such external issues as expediency, local acceptability, politics and the like. In other words, they have something they can act upon. And it is just possible, if the right combination of people have been in the exercise, that the next time they can do it alone.

For the American, the value of this type of participatory role is that his recommendations stand a good chance of being right. He has done what he has been trained for and knows how to do — apply his special capabilities as a scientist to the solution of a problem at hand. He has contributed to only a part of the total judgment, but it is the part where he understands the scientific basis for his contribution.

III

This takes me to the point of different approaches as they apply to *content or substance* of technical assistance. Much of what I would say has already been implied, and time permits me little more. Pursuit of proper methods of technical assistance, which might be characterized as research-in-action, would go far to assure the proper shifts in substance. Certainly there are great differences from country to country and local institution to institution, and few generalizations apply to all. One of the most commonly encountered situations in the less developed countries is the relatively old institution which has rigidified into a mechanical teaching machine (or if we use terms loosely enough, a research and teaching machine), and which has lost whatever contact it may have had with national development processes. Lacking this interplay with its own society, it stultifies, loses local support, further stultifies — in short, “institutionalizes.” In such a case, the adjustments most immediately called for are usually organizational.

A certain amount of form must be built up before substance can be built in. Therefore, much of our technical assistance — especially university contract work — has been, quite literally and properly, institution building.

In other cases, we have started from scratch. Obviously, here the building of organizational staffing and physical structure must come first.

But we must not forget what caused its older cousins to reach a condition requiring such extensive repair; namely, the lack of a powerful, sustained, creative contribution to the development of their own society. Such a role would have created — and required — a corresponding sensitivity and responsiveness of the institution to the needs of its society. And thus the circular interaction of institutional and societal development — instead of impotent stagnation — would have been institutionalized.

I would suggest:

—that, in most countries, the first phase of institution building is behind us;

—that the job now *is* to put genuine substance into the activities of these institutions;

—that this requires much more attention to specific research and service opportunities for these institutions;

—that this is a much longer-term job, requiring different types, more highly trained and more scientifically-oriented Americans than the first job;

—that if we fail to do justice by this stage, the accomplishments to date will wash out in all too many cases because we stopped too soon — and probably wound up on the wrong points of emphasis;

—that in trying to help them out of their traditionalism, we may have made a lateral pass of organizational and structural forms relevant to our country in only one point in time — and that for this to rigidify through lack of functionalism may be no great improvement over what they had without us!

Fortunately, it need not be this way. But I would submit that not much (but clearly some) of the work we have been doing is of the right content or character for most of the work, essential work, yet to be done.

IV

I should like to conclude with some comments on the structure of technical assistance. As the nature of the job to be done through technical assistance to agriculture changes, so should — and we should hope will — the structure of technical assistance programs.

In the decades of the fifties and sixties, we have been engaged primarily in institution building. In the seventies, we shall, in part, be engaged in finishing this part of the job. But more importantly, I should hope, we shall be engaged in helping institutionalize in those institutions the capabilities and patterns of participation in their societies, which will assure their continued growth and significance. The basic structure of technical assistance operations required to achieve this is undoubtedly very different from that we have followed for the earlier phases.

Policy should reflect the fact U.S. interest in this follow-through is essentially independent of the question of whether or not the host country's balance of payments or short-term political situation is such as to merit U.S. financial assistance.

A first and obvious requisite is that opportunities be created for such follow-through. Also, that policy recognize that the rate of return to the United States, as well as the host country interest, is vastly greater to this last increment of input than to that which preceded it. In fact, like the last chapter of a detective story, it is the part which gives the payoff to that which went before.

Clearly we should think of new patterns of relationships between our country's professional resources and those of the less developed countries. Probably government-to-government dimensions of the relationship should be greatly reduced. So-called sisterhood institution-to-institution relationships should no doubt continue to play a part. Probably formal professional associations, as well as less formal within-discipline world-wide relationships, need to be expanded. No doubt, genuinely international, organized research efforts on specific problems must evolve. Substantial reorientation of our own institutions to give international scholarship its due weight is clearly imperative. The proper blueprint is by no means clear. I can only hope that we build it around careful analysis of the job to be done and our own interest in it, rather than from minor patchwork on past practice.

Probably the most serious single question for this activity in the seventies and beyond has to do with the extent to which we attempt it purely through country-by-country activities. The development of institutional and human resource capabilities in the less developed countries is, of course, a necessary condition of their development. But it is necessary that we—and most especially they—have a real comprehension of the limitations of this approach. There is absolutely no possibility that any less developed country can even approximate the capability of going it alone in bringing the powers of modern science, and scholarship generally, to the service of their country—at least within our lifetimes. Improved communications, journals, conferences, professor and student exchanges and the like will contribute greatly. But problems of scale will completely stop the great breakthroughs necessary to change adequately the parameters of the possible for these countries.

The imperative challenge to our ingenuity is *not* that of how to enable the less developed countries to parallel our scientific, technological and economic growth, but how to enable them to participate fully in it. It would be the easiest and most disastrous of mistakes to squander our and the less developed countries' resources in unorganized dribbles of minute, endlessly replicative bits of research and development on problems, which by their nature, require great concentration of not only financial resources, but extremely scarce scientific capabilities. We absolutely must reflect seriously on this basic problem of scale in research. We should consider, for example,

both the significance and the magnitude of an all-out effort to bend completely the plant to the human will — towards which we have already made substantial beginnings. We should realize that local adaptation is essential, but that is also easy if there is something relevant to adapt (like the photo-insensitive wheats or the high lysine and tryptophan genes in maize). Also, we need to reflect seriously on the numerical dominance of this country in scientific capability, and ask ourselves how to use this as a resource to the development of world-wide capability for development. And how to avoid allowing *de facto* chauvinism and false national prides from preventing development of such a genuine capability for world-wide development.

The effort simply to aid countries to “catch up” with the developed countries is, in itself, a losing game because ours is — and I should hope will be — an accelerating momentum.

Viewed in this light, the disparities can only widen. But we can build bridges to them, across which scholars and scholarship cross, and over which they can enter as participants in our progress. More specifically, we can work with them to develop systematic efforts to take advantage of the opportunities which organized research effort can create — so that they participate fully with us in the trip to the new moon which is surely on this earth. This we can do if we recognize that it is as much in our interest as theirs. I believe we will.

15. The Practice of Institution Building Revisited

D. WOODS THOMAS

This workshop was arranged to bring together a select group of theoreticians and practitioners in institutional development for the purpose of examining the current state of knowledge concerning the subject. An attempt has been made to combine theoretical concepts thought to explain the process of institutional development, with first-hand experiences gained during recent years in pragmatic programs designed to bring about directed, positive change in universities in the developing nations.

The workshop has had three basic elements; one, a series of papers treating the theoretical constructs; two, a series of papers and discussions treating the experiences encountered in the actual process of changing institutions and, three, a group of highly competent, experienced people dedicated to the task of expanding the capacity of the universities of the world to produce and disseminate knowledge useful to the societies they serve. It has been, in my view, an extremely stimulating experience.

It is my responsibility to briefly reflect upon the exchanges which have occurred in the past two weeks, and attempt to evaluate their meaning and relevance in terms of expanding our current knowledge about the complexities of institution building. This is far too great a task to treat comprehensively in a short period of time. The real implications of this workshop, insofar as the practice of building institutions is concerned, will be fully realized only after a more lengthy period of intellectual digestion and contemplation.

Allow me then to limit my remarks to a few major points which have surfaced in a number of different ways during the conference. In so doing, I take the liberty of making one comment on the theory of institution building; the remainder of my remarks will be directed to the practice of institution building *per se*.

With respect to the bundle of notions and concepts constituting the theoretical institution building models, two things have become quite clear. First, these models have stood up well under the confrontation of experiences and "data" during the whole of the two week exercise. They provide an analytical mechanism that can be highly useful when attempting to sort out the nature of the many phenomena involved in the process of institutional development. They also provide a framework for assessing types of individual and aggregate behavior that have been difficult to handle in their absence. However, while the models have proven their utility, they nevertheless have not met all of our demands. This brings me to the second point. It appears that the practitioners of university development have found the current stage of theoretical development lacking in specificity and operationality. For these purposes, the models suffer many kinds of definitional, specification, identification and measurement limitations. Here, I would make two or three observations. One is that we practitioners hold expectations and aspirations far greater than any theoretical construct is likely to provide. Theories designed to explain complex human and institutional behavior seldom, if ever, are capable of accounting for all variability in such events. Fortunately, the explanation of all such variability is not necessary for the constructs to be useful. A second point is that "practitioners" should not expect to have a full-blown theory capable of handling each specific phenomena they encounter, handed to them on a silver platter. Rather, the "practitioner" has the responsibility of taking the general theory, modifying it, adjusting it and expanding it to the particular set of phenomena with which he is concerned. This has been the way of all science. It will be no less true of this particular aspect of science. My charge to the "practitioner" is one of taking the general theory where it is and applying the intellectual effort and creativity required to make it more useful and applicable to this particular set of phenomena. This may require such things as disaggregation of broadly defined variables into more specific and meaningful sets of explanatory variables. It may require more careful and precise

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definition of variables, the construction and testing of concepts specifying the functional relationships among such variables, and expected changes in universities or other institutions of interest. Finally, it may be necessary to develop means of quantifying variables in order to make the theoretical models operational.

The foregoing points up my first comment on the practice of institutional development. Past, present and future efforts to bring about change in educational and research institutions would seem to provide a unique laboratory for evolving, testing and reformulating theory. Much of the potential contribution of past activities to this purpose has been lost for lack of foresight in providing means for recording these experiences in ways useful to this purpose. The same is true of many such efforts currently in progress. The same could very well be true of future programs. It is my belief that each activity should have a built-in mechanism to permit the expansion of verified knowledge about the nature of this most fundamental of processes. Payoffs would be extremely great, not only to this specific area of concern, but to a wide range of problems associated with bringing about desired change in all social institutions.

Still another significant fact which has surfaced in a number of different ways during the past two weeks is that the theories and the empirical knowledge about institutional development are little understood and little used by those engaged in the process of changing the world's educational and research institutions. This points up a major limitation in our joint efforts to meaningfully expand the research and educational capacity of the world. That is, we have not made provision for systematically arming ourselves with what is known, both conceptually and empirically, about the process in which we are engaged. This, in my view, has been and continues to be, a major failure on our part. It is a situation that we cannot allow to persist. It clearly suggests the need for a major educational effort to provide all those engaged in these activities with an adequate knowledge base about the phenomena with which they are working. Failure to take aggressive, positive action to ameliorate the situation will constitute negligence of a most serious order.

The entire exercise of university development, both theoretically and in practice, concerns itself with the process of deliberately bringing about change in the nature of an institution. This tends to assume a set of rational goals with respect to the ends of the institution, and

the process by which it might best attain these ends. Consequently, there must be some comprehensive strategy which will stand a chance of bringing about the desired kind of change. It follows that the question of strategic courses of action and reaction are central to the entire process. The CIC-AID study pointed out the dearth of well-conceived strategies for reaching the identified and desired goals of institutional development. This workshop has once again demonstrated (a) the significance and importance of strategies, and (b) our lack of conceptual and empirical knowledge relative to this aspect of the development process. It seems reasonably clear that the technical assistance-institutional development complex, as now known and practiced, involves several kinds and levels of strategies. For example, it involves questions of appropriate interpersonal strategies, inter-institutional strategies, inter-country strategies and the several permutations of these sets. Yet, we have done very little to conceptualize and test the kinds of strategic behavior involved in this process. I would argue that this particular element of the process deserves and demands far greater attention, both theoretically and operationally, if the mutual ends of host countries and assisting nations are to be attained effectively and efficiently.

The theory of institution building speaks to the issue of an institution's environment. Practitioners of institutional development either overtly recognize, and in some way take into account, the social, cultural, economic, political, and physical environment of the institution, or they fail. Effective institutional development activities presume near perfect knowledge of these environmental factors. Yet many such activities continue in a state of highly imperfect knowledge about the environment in which the institution exists, and make little or no systematic provision for perfecting the state of knowledge about the environment. There is only one way in which knowledge about an institution's environment might be expanded. This is through systematic research designed specifically to provide the requisite information. The implication here is quite clear. All institutional development ought to be programmed in a manner that allows an assessment of its impact upon the institution's environment. This should be continued to the point where the value of additional environmental information about the effects of the development activity no longer justifies the additional costs of investigation.

Another subtle, but pervasive element seems to have permeated

many of the papers and discussions. It is likely that this will surface more sharply during the seminar on the team leader function. However, it is so important to the practitioners of institution building that I feel it should be flagged at this point. This element consists of (a) the importance of the management factor in the efficient change, growth and development of educational and research institutions, and (b) the dearth of managerial information and training and, more specifically, human elements capable of providing this most crucial of all inputs. It is imperative that specific attention be given to the decision-making functions associated with the management of educational institutions and technical assistance projects designed to assist in the process of institutional development. Managerial processes are researchable. Management is teachable. High payoffs to both research and education on management have been demonstrated in other arenas. There is no reason to question the high rates which will accrue to well-conceived and properly conducted research and education programs on the management function in these situations.

Let me make one final comment with respect to the theory and practice of institutional development as treated during the past two weeks. This is that the focus has been largely on the individual institution. This, of course, is most important and worthwhile. However, I was impressed with the suggestions made throughout the conference that the needs of the developing world can hardly be met, even if we enjoy perfect success in the micro-elements of institutional development. The point, of course, is one of finding means by which we might create an institutional framework whereby requisite scientific and educational capacity might be brought to bear in sufficient scale on the problems of the developing nations. The existing international institutional mechanisms are entirely inadequate to the need. The implication is clear. A major job of "institution building" in this area still remains to be done. It seems imperative that we "institution builders," both theoretical and applied, focus on this problem and get on with this crucial aspect of the "work of the world."

IV

RESEARCH APPLICATIONS OF THE INSTITUTION BUILDING MODEL

The previous sections of papers in this book have stressed the institution building theory and its application to agricultural institutions. However, institution building theory has broader applicability than agriculture. It can be applied to any type of institutional development program. This section illustrates the flexibility of the IB theory by application of the theory to business management training institutions and the *Gadna* Youth Corps. Examining these non-agricultural applications of the theory demonstrates the generality of the theory and provides insights about differences in its application to non-agricultural institutions in comparison with its application to agricultural institutions described previously.

This section consists of three papers, the first two of which are essentially case studies. The first paper entitled, "Strategic Planning of Management Education Institutions," by W.W. Haynes, describes and compares the development of two management training institutions in India. The second paper entitled, "Institution Building: The Case of the Gadna Youth Corps of Israel," by J. W. Eaton, discusses the development and changing functional roles of these Youth Corps. The third paper entitled, "The Institution Building Process and Research," by E. Jacobson, draws from the applications in this section and other case studies to identify key features of the

institution building phenomena that have been isolated by several case studies.

Haynes describes the major conceptual ideas of the IB model in relation to his specific cases in India. For example, he considers the enabling and functional linkages that would be desirable in the Indian situation. His major findings emphasize leadership as a key factor in the institution building process. There are serious problems associated with preparing indigenous leadership to take control of the institution as the foreign experts depart. The leadership role of the foreign expert changes greatly as the institution develops and matures. The leadership style, i.e., participant leadership vs. authoritarian leadership, can influence the success of an institution building program.

Following Haynes' emphasis on leadership, Eaton describes the importance of leadership in the early days of the formation of the *Gadna* Youth Corps. Eaton suggests the personal relationships between the key educator and military leader that they had developed over many years before the formation of the Corps was essential to their successful establishment. Since the Corps is in a rapidly changing environment, Eaton suggests the key to their continued survival has been the willingness of the leadership to adapt its functions and role to the changing needs of society in different time periods. This internal institutional flexibility saved the Corps from early obsolescence at least twice during the short period the author studied it. The author suggests the ability of the institution to maintain flexibility is related to the rotation of leadership, and the emphasis on youthful leaders.

In his paper, Jacobson expands, generalizes, and extends some of the issues raised by Eaton. He addresses the question of what is the implication for research on Institution Building if flexibility in the institution is needed to allow adaptation to continually changing goals and objectives. He lists twelve generalizations derived from case studies which have been undertaken using the IB theoretical model. These generalizations imply that constantly changing performance norms require research personnel on site continually re-evaluating the current and the appropriate direction of the institutional program of development. This implication is in contrast to most IB research which has been conducted to date because it has been research after the fact, which attempted to reconstruct how the institution developed in relation to goals specified at the beginning of the development process.

16. Strategic Planning of Management Education Institutions

W. WARREN HAYNES

This paper is a condensed version of several chapters in a study Professor Thomas Hill, Howard Baumgartel, and I are completing on institution building in India. The study is concerned primarily with two major management education institutions in which the Sloan School of Management at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and the Harvard Business School have been involved. The main purpose of the study has been to learn from our experience in India about the design of effective institution building projects.

Several major topics of the complete study cannot be included in this short paper. I cannot, for example, review our measures of effectiveness of such projects nor the conclusions we have reached about the impact of these particular projects in India. Nor can I summarize our conclusions on the application of cost-benefit analysis to planning or evaluating such projects. One of the major topics of the study has been in the area of organizational behavior; it concerns the allocation of influence between the administrations and faculties of these institutions, and between the American collaborators and the Indians. It will be possible to refer to these findings only as they relate to the main topic of this paper, which is that of the initial strategic planning of projects of this type.

Strategic Planning

The most important stage in building new institutions is that of initial planning. A major error in the initial assessment of the environ-

ment or in the design of a strategy to deal with that environment is not easily corrected in later stages. The most dedicated administrators cannot overcome the handicap of a misconceived plan, whereas a well designed project carries its own momentum which reduces the risks of weak implementation.

A systematic study of strategic planning in overseas institution building projects has not yet been made, though case studies of a few projects are available. An unsystematic review of the available materials on post-World War II projects suggests, however, that the initial planning is often neglected in the eagerness to get on with the job. In the developing countries, such impatience is understandable, for one of the problems of development is that too much time is often spent on surveys, debates on the nature of the problem, and discussions of the merits of various alternative approaches, and too little on implementation.

Institution building, therefore, requires a trade-off between the benefits of more careful planning, and the opportunity costs of delays in implementation. If a more systematic study of the planning stage can both increase the benefits of planning and reduce the delays, it is conceivable that the terms of the trade-off can be shifted sharply, so that better plans and more timely implementation are both achievable. Plans may delay the initiation of a project, but should accelerate the later stages of development.

Nature of the Study

The concept of strategic planning is drawn from the literature on business policy. We have resisted the temptation to invent a new set of terms to be applied to the special problem of institution building. One of the major obstacles to progress in the behavioral sciences is the tendency to proliferate terminology, rather than to build on concepts already developed. We see no reason for not transferring the terminology developed by the students of business policy who in the past decade have developed the approach called strategic planning. Nothing about strategic planning restricts its application to private business; the concepts are clearly applicable to formal organizations of all types in both the private and public sectors.

The two projects under study were both in management education. They were a result of the identification of a need in the Central Government of India which led to the involvement of the Ford Foundation.

Calcutta was the natural site for one of the institutes, for it was one of the two major centers of commerce and industry in India. Bombay was expected to be the second center, but Ahmedabad was selected instead because of the unusual interest in the project there. The result was the formation of the Indian Institute of Management, Calcutta, in 1961-62, and the Indian Institute of Management, Ahmedabad, in 1962-63. The two institutes soon became leading centers of management education in India.

Many strategic decisions were made in the early years of these projects, let us say from 1961 to 1964. One of the major purposes of this study is to review and evaluate these decisions. Before doing so, however, it is desirable to develop a conceptual framework within which the findings can be organized.

Conceptual Framework

One definition of strategy is "the pattern of objectives, purposes, or goals, and major policies and plans for achieving these goals, stated in such a way as to define what business the company is in or is to be in, and the kind of company it is to be."¹ This definition will serve our purpose if we substitute the word "institution" for the word "company." Strategy is concerned with the major decisions, usually long-term in their implications, which set the general direction of the institution. In this study, therefore, we are not concerned with detailed policies and decisions, but rather with the overall plan within which such details are worked out.

Strategic planning of institutions involves a series of major decisions which do not occur in a definite sequence but rather overlap. The planning is not necessarily formal and systematic; in general practice, even in progressive business firms, it consists of both pre-determined lines of action, and a series of *ad hoc* decisions. In fact, one of the major issues in planning is the degree of formal planning, as opposed to flexibility to meet changing or unknown situations.

The key elements in the strategic planning of institutions are:

1) Identification of a need and an evaluation of its importance in terms of alternative needs.

2) A forecast of the capacity of the proposed institution to fill this need. This requires an analysis of the environment and its receptivity to the institution, as well as of the resources likely to be available for the purpose.

3) The planning of "enabling linkages." These are the linkages with the organizations and groups which will provide the resources required.²

4) The planning of "functional linkages." These are linkages with the suppliers and customers of the institution — the agencies which supply inputs or use the outputs. This might be called marketing planning and procurement planning.

5) The planning of relations with similar institutions which provide similar services, including plans for cooperation or competition in doctrine, marketing, or the acquisition of resources.

6) The planning for environmental constraints, especially government regulations or restrictions.

7) Selection of an institutional site and development of a building program closely related to the institutional requirements.

8) The selection of top institutional leadership and planning for succession in leadership.

9) Determination of a leadership style.

10) Determination of the "mission" or objectives of the institution.

11) Determination of the institution's "doctrine," that is, definition of the general way in which it proposes to carry out its objectives.

12) Design of the internal organization of the institution, especially the character of superior-subordinate relationships and of horizontal relationships among the personnel of the institution.

13) Determination of the time dimensions within which various purposes will be achieved, and a preparation for the phases of growth and consolidation through which the institution will pass.

Each of these steps requires some elaboration.

Major Findings

It is now necessary, because of space limitations, to become highly selective about the topics to be covered. In our complete study, we discuss each of the above elements of strategic planning, both in general principle, and in relation to the experience in India. Here I can review only the highlights of the study, by concentrating on the most significant strengths and weaknesses in planning we have found in our study of the Indian projects.

Indigenous Leadership

It is perhaps unfortunate to start with the most banal of our findings: the planning for the top leadership of these projects was of

crucial importance. This is a conclusion of previous studies and is so obvious that it hardly requires stating. Yet I think I have something to add to the subject.

The initial indigenous directors of both projects were intelligent, aggressive and respected leaders who were fortunate in their connections with government officials and the business community. They can be given major credit for the initial success of these projects; without their vision and energy, the developments might have been hampered by confusion in the faculties, and by attacks from external forces jealous of the financial support won by the projects from the Government of India and the Ford Foundation.

Surprisingly, both of these leaders suffered from the same two limitations: 1) they had widespread interests outside of the institutions they were heading; and 2) they failed to plan for the succession in leadership. On the Ahmedabad project, the small amount of time the director of the project had for the project reduced the vertical communications to dangerous levels. Some faculty members had access to the director; others did not. Competition for access became a source of tension. In Calcutta this development came later, but when it came, it was far more serious, for it was clear that the director would eventually leave the Institute, and an internal battle of succession produced wounds which have not yet healed.

In both cases, the development would have been smoother if a successor had been found at an earlier date, before the uncertainties and jealousies had accumulated. In neither case is there evidence of adequate energy in the search for a successor. In Ahmedabad, a strong leader was found after two years of intermittent search, which at times appeared to be aimed at proving that no one was available; fortunately, the project has progressed successfully since he became director in 1965. In Calcutta, the agony of succession was even more prolonged and the scars remain.

Leadership Styles and Internal Organization

I am strongly of the view that the style of leadership, and the allocation of influence within an institution, are among the most crucial determinants of its internal health. Institutions may survive in the face of tensions arising from poorly designed styles or confused allocations of influence, but only at a heavy human cost. Unfortunately, our knowledge of these human factors is still limited, and we continue to suffer from dogmatism and ideology on the

subject. My conclusions are necessarily tentative, but my belief in the importance of this topic is firm.

Educated Indians appear to be highly sensitive on the subject of organization and leadership. It is possible that no organizational design will satisfy an Indian faculty, or any other group brought together for a common purpose, with some exceptions, to be sure. Traditional Indian faculties are frequently subject to degrees of hierarchical control which Westerners would find intolerable, especially when that control appears to conserve traditions which require modification and resist innovation. The two Institutes under study, however, had deliberately broken with the Indian university traditions; this was part of the strategic plan on which everyone agreed. The problem was that few seemed satisfied with the organization which resulted.

Some of the American participants in these projects became involved in these issues of organization. In retrospect, it appears doubtful that these Americans, even the behavioral scientists among them, always served a constructive role in the debates on the subject. Some of them saw threats to academic freedom which never existed, but their pronouncements on the subject strengthened the Indian fears that the "hierarchy" was indeed threatening such freedom. Some of the Americans insisted on degrees of participation and degrees of openness which are seldom experienced even in American institutions. The combination of inexperience of some Indian and American teachers, with faculty traditions, the reaction against traditions in the Indian universities, and the overly dogmatic criticisms of some American advisors created tensions, but these were offset by the high degree of commitment by most of the Indians and Americans involved.

The problem is that observers do not agree on even the facts in these two Institutes. In Ahmedabad, there were many complaints about hierarchical or authoritarian control, but the fact is that the original director had little inclination or time for authoritarianism. In more recent years, there have been as many criticisms of "permissiveness" as of "authoritarianism," and considerable evidence to support this position. Perhaps more accurate is the charge that the leaders have been "personalistic" in their approach to the faculty. They have provided access to some more than others, and not always, it would appear, on the basis of merit. They have left themselves

open to charges of favoritism or nepotism, and have taken too little care to protect themselves from misunderstandings of their reliance on some advisors more than others.

It might be argued that the real problem was over-reliance on bureaucratic organization, including limits on permitted discussion as being outside defined "terms of reference." But it could equally be argued that the leadership was too little bureaucratic in failing to clarify the criteria for evaluation of faculty performance, for salary increases, and for promotion. Perhaps the problem was the uncertain wavering between bureaucracy and its opposite.³

It can be argued persuasively that the need in these Institutes was for firm leadership which clarified the objectives and defined the major lines of action to be taken. Firmness, and frankness about the need for strong leadership, would appear to be preferable to a pretense of the spontaneous formulation of policy by the faculty, especially in the situation common in India in which faculty consensus is extremely difficult to achieve. In Ahmedabad, such firm leadership seems to be evolving to the benefit of the Institute; in Calcutta, past hostilities make it more difficult to win faculty support for this approach.

Still another view, with considerable merit, is that a status gap between an "in group" close to the director, and the bulk of the faculty was a serious source of tension. India is extremely conscious of status, and highly educated Indians are probably unusually sensitive to status differences. My observation is that Indians are frequently jealous of rewards to others when those rewards carry status. In Ahmedabad, the pattern of leadership at times has been to maintain a status gap from day to day, but to permit pressure from groups of protesters to overturn decisions on major issues. This is the reverse of what appears to be the sound practice: warmth, support, and participation from day to day, but firmness on major principles.

It is too easy to be critical of someone else's leadership style, in a period in which academic leaders everywhere, particularly in the United States, are finding it difficult to find the right mixture of participative involvement and the maintenance of basic policy. The question is, whether it is possible to plan an effective leadership style and an organization which will be productive, with a minimum of tensions and misunderstandings. I think it is possible, even im-

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perative to do so, but I am reluctant to provide a formula. I think the answer must be in the direction of a so-called organic organization, involving higher degrees of participation and openness, with a greater willingness to explore differences of opinion in open meetings, and the working through of emotional problems stage by stage.

I conclude that it is possible to plan leadership styles and organizational patterns for more effective performance. In the Indian projects, such planning might have reduced the risks of failure and increased the personal rewards of involvement. The projects have survived and, by measures which I cannot summarize here, have been successful. But the outcome might have been a failure, at least in one of the two projects. If the risks of failure are to be reduced, much more conscious and planned attention must be given to organizational design and leadership style than is found in these two Indian projects.

The Role of the Foreign "Experts"

Similarly, much more planning of the role of the foreign experts would contribute to the productivity of projects like these, and would reduce the misunderstandings and tensions arising from unclear relationships. The foreigners are expected to have influence or they would not have been invited in the first place; but the type of influence should vary from individual to individual, and from time to time.

I believe strongly that it is a mistake to apply the label "consultant" to all of the foreigners engaged in an educational project such as this. This title conveys the impression that all of the foreigners, junior and senior, are qualified to advise on top policy issues. The result may be that all of them conceive of themselves as chairmen of the board, whose views are to be taken with great seriousness by the director. The Americans on these projects normally expected to have access to the directors which exceeded that of their Indian colleagues, a fact which inevitably was resented on the Indian side. Therefore, it is imperative in planning these projects that it be made clear which foreigners are to have a special responsibility for policy, and which are to assume more precise responsibilities for research or course development. This does not mean that the views of the non-policy foreigners must be suppressed; they should be given the same opportunities as the host country nationals to express their

views on policy, but not greater opportunities and greater influence.

One of our major conclusions is that the role of the foreigners must change from one phase of the project to another, and that it is desirable to plan the change from phase to phase, rather than to leave it to chance. In the early months, the foreigners may play a central role in formulating the mission of the institution, in recommending appropriate models to carry out that mission, and in suggesting ways to implement these models. It is obvious in principle that the relative influence of the foreigners must diminish over time, and that eventually, they must take a completely secondary role as they are "phased out." In the two Indian projects under study, this was understood intellectually but not emotionally, and the process of withdrawal was more confused and painful than was necessary. Finally, the Americans saw that the solution was to abandon all claims to "rights" over these projects, and to turn all authority over to the Indians. When this was done, the communications between the Indians and the Americans immediately improved, presumably because American influence was no longer a potential threat.

I would like to add a brief comment on the role of U.S. and Indian behavioral scientists on these projects. They were all entirely committed to the projects and showed great energy and zeal in developing courses, in research, and in curriculum planning. My view, however, is that they at times permitted their missionary fervor to carry them into doctrinaire positions which were not always constructive. My view, as one who is not a behavioral scientist, is that action-oriented behavioral scientists sometimes work from ideological positions which are contrary to the scientific spirit. The extremists of this type withhold support from the Indian leadership, unless it conforms to their models of what is right; they become intolerant of alternative models, and sometimes join with some Indian colleagues in undermining alternative approaches. I suggest that this may become destructive; perhaps further research is required before one can take a firm position on this issue.

In fact, the whole subject of the relationship between host country and foreign personnel requires additional thought. The problem is not primarily the one so frequently discussed of a gap between two cultures. It is much more complex than that. The Indians in these projects were not of a single "culture." Some of them were

more Westernized than others. Some had been educated abroad and were sympathetic with U.S. educational models. Some of them were more sensitive to hierarchy and nepotism than others. The Americans, in turn, differed in their views. Informal coalitions, therefore, cut across national lines and this complicated relationships. Some Indians, at Ahmedabad at least, looked upon the Americans as supporters in a battle against undemocratic Indian leadership, and as protectors of academic freedom. Those Americans who refused to take a firm stand against the Indian hierarchy were sometimes looked upon as defectors from the movement to reform Indian authority relationships.

If the complexity of these relationships is more fully understood, the foreigners should be able to plan their roles for greater effectiveness. This view has been expressed beautifully by Margaret Mead in these words:

"The objectivity which combines respect for the values of another culture, a determination to bring about change in ways which promote the mental health of the population, and a certain amount of detachment from the clash of old and new values going on within the culture, are invaluable assets which come from long experience in working with members of other cultures. Many of the members of technical assistance teams will not, however, have had that experience, that sum total of memories of felicitous suggestions and disastrous mis-steps, of plans that misfired and plans that succeeded inexplicably, which make up the delicate certainty of the experienced expert."⁴

Other Findings

So far I have concentrated on problem areas in the long-range planning of the two Indian institution building projects. My view is that we can learn best from studying problems; but we need to maintain perspective. As already stated, these projects have been successful in terms of carefully defined criteria. I would like to review some of the reasons for these successes.

1) In 1962-63 when these projects were started, India was ready for a major effort in management education. Those who studied the situation in 1959 on both the Indian and Ford Foundation sides were able to identify the opportunity, and to see a constructive direction such projects might take.

2) Both projects benefitted from creative long-range planning in the early stages. The objectives of the Institutes were defined. A sound mix of programs was designed. American models of management education were effectively adapted to Indian conditions, to provide both a doctrine, but also a detailed design of specific programs.

3) Both projects operated on a tight time schedule, on which early deadlines were set for concrete accomplishments, such as commencing executive development and postgraduate programs, and developing indigenous teaching materials. The tight schedule created pressures and tensions but was, I think, a major factor in raising the productivity of the Institutes. I strongly believe that a more cautious and gradual schedule would have failed to create the enthusiasm and motivation necessary for such projects.

4) The leaders of both projects were successful in establishing supportive linkages with the business community, governmental agencies, foundations, and prospective employers of graduates, but were less successful in developing cooperative relationships with the universities, which were also entering the field of management education. In a short time, both Institutes became known as the leading Indian centers of management education. Both benefitted from their connections with M.I.T. and Harvard, and in their publicity made effective use of this connection.

5) Both Institutes were able to attract qualified teachers willing to break with the traditional patterns of Indian education. In Calcutta, the faculty consisted largely of persons with advanced degrees in traditional disciplines, such as economics, social psychology, history, or mathematics. The traditional professional ties were a source of a strength in establishing standards of research, but they encouraged loyalties to the professions, more than to the Institute, and increased the mobility of the faculty. Furthermore, this pattern of faculty recruitment tended to detract from a stress on the "administrative point of view," which was the Institute's main educational purpose. In Ahmedabad, the faculty was less well qualified in terms of the traditional academic criteria of specialized doctoral degrees and lists of publications, but more committed to the teaching of management. Ahmedabad has been far less threatened by faculty departure.

The Ahmedabad setting has proven more supportive than that in Calcutta, which is a major industrial center, but which suffers from political tensions which have clearly disrupted the Institute's develop-

ment. In retrospect, one might argue that the Calcutta location should have been rejected as too volatile, but perhaps this conclusion is invoking a hindsight not available to the original planners.

Conclusion

The major claim of this paper is that we can learn from past experience how to do a better job of planning new institutions. A study of experience does not produce simple formulas or models for institution building, nor does it produce a list of "principles" for the successful management of new institutions. It does, however, indicate the most crucial areas in which planning can make a contribution. The issue of leadership style is a central one in India, and apparently in other developing countries. The planning of leadership styles, and of the quality of organizational relationships, can make a major contribution to the smooth development of a new institution. To leave this issue to the haphazard shifts of opinion of faculty members, foreign advisers, and administrators, is to invite fears and unproductive debate, which may weaken the organization or even destroy it.

Similarly, the planning of cross-cultural relationships can reduce misunderstandings and tensions. The influence of foreigners must shift from stage to stage; planned shifts are more productive than unplanned ones.

The chief purpose of strategic planning is well expressed in a leading book on business policy: "From the point of view of implementation, the most important function of strategy is to serve as the focus of organizational effort, as the object of commitment, and as the source of constructive motivation and self-control in the organization itself."⁵ In educational institutions, it is a great asset to have a common understanding of the mission of the organization, and of the general lines of action which are proposed. A clear "image" of the institution's purpose is also likely to make it more visible and acceptable to outside agencies, and thus to contribute to stronger enabling and functional linkages.

NOTES

1. E. D. Learned, C. R. Christensen, K. R. Andrews, and W. D. Guth, *Business Policy: Text and Cases*. Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1965, p. 17.
2. This expression is taken from M. J. Esman and H. C. Blaise, *Institution Build-*

ing Research: The Guiding Concepts. Pittsburgh, Pa.: University of Pittsburgh, Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, n.d.

3. This wavering might have been a result of a conflict between two systems, the traditional Indian system and a more modern Westernized system. This conflict would have existed even without Western advisors, since many Indian faculty members had been trained in the United States and shared the Western orientation.
4. Margaret Mead, editor, *Cultural Patterns and Technological Change*, New York, N.Y.: Mentor Books, 1955, p. 18.
5. E. P. Learned, C. R. Christensen, K. R. Andrews and W. D. Guth, *op. cit.*, p. 23.

17. Institution Building: The Case of the Gadna Youth Corps of Israel*

JOSEPH W. EATON

Whenever a new social activity must be performed, those responsible for planning it can consider two alternate strategies: Should the function be assigned to an existing service, which already enjoys stable linkages to others in the larger social system? Or should a new organization be established, to serve the unique requirements of the new program?

This paper will ask and answer this question on the basis of the development of a particular youth corps, the Gadna of Israel. There are many such youth programs all over the world — in Russia, in Jamaica, in Kenya and Ghana. These programs often have a special appeal to rural youths, to provide them with a route for learning to serve the requirements of a modernizing society. Each of the youth corps programs reflects the application of a strategy by adults to in-

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fluence the emerging youth culture through an adult organization. In modern societies, innovations are less and less haphazardly introduced. They are planned. New administrative relationships and personal interactions are organized on the basis of a design to accomplish specific purposes.

The Gadna Youth Corps, organized in 1939, will be reviewed from this point of view, as a case study in institution building. *The planned establishment of a new organizational arrangement to serve purposes which are thought to require more and different resources than those which can be allocated by already existing administrative units.* This paper presents a brief historical review of how Gadna developed, to provide a basis for suggesting explanatory hypotheses about the way this new organization is linked to others in the country's extensive network of youth services.

Little is known about the general principles of planned institution building—the restructuring of an organization or a more diffuse social action pattern on the basis of a model. It must begin with estimates of how the new program can operate, and its probable impact on the existing network of available services. These estimates must then be translated operationally. Such market research is almost standard when a new commercial product is introduced. It is less often done when public service modifications are being considered. Almost unheard of is the idea of a planned trial of alternate organizational arrangements. In Israel, the multiple network of youth programs approximates such a natural experiment which began when Gadna emerged to supplement the program of youth organizations.

How New Institutions Develop¹

When a new function is planned, there usually are several alternatives. It can be assigned to a new agency, specializing in the nurturance of a new service and the establishment of supportive linkages with already existing and related institutions. Or an added function can be taken on by an existing agency. A rotary club can sponsor a service project of tutoring children in a slum area to become "more related" to the key issues of the time. A small church-related school can expand to become a general university. But some new function cannot be integrated by an existing body without jeopardy to those that are already being performed. This is how Gadna became a separate program.

It began in 1939, when Jewish adolescents seemed needed for defense, for lack of a supply of adult manpower sufficient to meet a triple threat to the community's survival by Nazi Germany, the British police in Palestine, and the Arab guerrilla forces.

Before World War II was over, 33,000 adult Jews enrolled as volunteers from a community of only 465,000. This total included children and the aged. The volunteers served under British command, to assist in such varied campaigns as the ejection of Vichy French forces from Syria, the defeat of Nazi-supported nationalists in Iraq, and the battle against the Germans in Greece and in the desert in Egypt and Lybia. Jewish battallions helped to liberate Italy. They remained, at the end of the war against Germany, as part of the occupation forces until the British removed them to put an end to Jewish activities to help the surviving refugees reach Palestine.

While Jews were allied with the British in the battle against the Nazis, they were in opposition at home. In 1939, after repeated failures to get Jews and Arabs to negotiate a bi-national agreement, the British Government decided to grant the principal Arab political demand: termination of the League of Nations mandate to facilitate establishment of a Jewish national home. The British hoped to rectify what some of its leaders had come to regard as a serious political mistake, the Balfour Declaration in 1917 committing British support to the Zionist movement. Independence was promised to Palestine after a ten year transition period. Except for a final quota of 75,000 persons, the British would subject further Jewish immigration to Arab agreement. Purchase of additional land by Jews was immediately forbidden in 95% of the country.

A majority of the League of Nations, which had originally mandated Palestine to Britain for the express purpose of implementing the Balfour declaration, disapproved of the new British policy. But the League had no power to enforce this judgment. If the British policy was to be stymied, the Jews would have to do it on their own. And it had to be done by passive resistance, along with selectively applied force, even while a large proportion of the young men and several thousand women were away from Palestine, in the joint allied effort to defeat Germany. Under circumstances such as these, adolescents were badly needed for paramilitary purposes.

Even later, when the Jewish soldiers fighting against Germany

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had returned home, there was an acute manpower shortage. After the United Nations had voted in 1947 that Palestine be divided into an Arab and a Jewish state, the British Government refused to assist in implementing the decision. Empire troops, which at times exceeded 100,000, were often employed to stop Jewish military efforts to defend themselves against Arab guerrilla warfare. The Jewish army had to function clandestinely. The underground *Hagana* could maintain a full time force of no more than 400 men, who performed mostly general staff, planning and training functions. It could count on support from a small *Palmah* striking force, most of whom worked as farmers in *Kibbutzim*. It included 2,100 men and women, plus 1,000 in the active reserve. They were backed by 32,000 in the *Hagana* civilian reserve. Other adults could be called up in case of need, but they had no military training.² Adolescent manpower could make a difference in such an emergency.

The small clandestine Jewish force had to protect settlements against Arab guerrilla actions in a civil war without a solid front. Jews and Arabs in Palestine lived in close proximity. Help was also needed to smuggle Jewish immigrants into the country above and beyond the British quota, and to establish new Jewish settlements on land purchased for this purpose.

No existing organization could take on the task of training adolescents for participation in these activities, without many risks. There was a Jewish settlement police force, but it was commanded by British officers and it was not allowed to train reserve forces. The clandestine *Hagana* could not muster-in adolescents without exposing them and their recruiters to punishment in case of discovery.³ This led to the decision to establish a "physical education" program (*Hagam*) to serve as a legal cover for what was proscribed activity, a youth corps in the high schools.⁴

Through their high school affiliation, *Hagana* agents could reach all qualified students as a group. Paramilitary training could begin during gymnasium periods and on school hikes. Sticks took the place of guns, and whistles simulated bullets. Youngsters learned about military discipline, self-defense, leadership, the geography of the country, and night orientation. Those with proper capabilities were then allowed to graduate into the secret *Palmah* shock troops of the *Hagana*.

*A Marriage of Convenience —
Education with Paramilitary Service*

Before 1939, the *Hagana* (Jewish self-defense force) occasionally recruited a few youngsters as runners, to put up posters and to perform other non-combat tasks. Those selected were generally associated with youth movements. Older members were invited to undergo pre-military conditioning under the guise of scouting. The curriculum included physical training, group living, capacity to live off the country in isolated places, desert warfare, the use of small arms, ju-jitsu and the experience of moving throughout the country at night.

This clandestine organizational arrangement was inefficient. Each boy and girl had to be recruited separately. A different administrative umbrella was needed to recruit and train larger numbers of youths more openly, without opposition of the British authorities or the risk of protest from parents who did not want their adolescent children to be part of an underground army. This is how an administrative merger of school and youth corps came into being.

The program was first known as *Hagam*, an abbreviation in Hebrew of "Expanded Physical Education." It was administered within the framework of high schools. While there were British inspectors who had to approve this curriculum idea, as all other general policies, *Hagam* could be justified as an application of the British public school emphasis on physical fitness and the ideals of the ancient Greeks, who are reported to have stressed the utility of combining intellect and sports.⁵

In its origin and subsequent development, the *Gadna* also parallels the Boy Scout movement. Both began as a paramilitary force. Both were later transformed, with official sponsorship, into a permanent peacetime "character-building" agency. Both avow such nonpartisan objectives as "endurance, resourcefulness, self-control, defense of honor and trustfulness."⁶ But unlike the Boy Scout Movement in Europe and America, *Gadna* still retains a close linkage to the country's defense establishment. It also includes boys and girls within the same organization. This coeducational policy was consistent with the ideology and the practice of youth movements, which stress the spirit of equality and comradeship of all members. Girls were not expected to equal boys in the rigor of the exercises, but they were

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needed to meet the severe manpower shortage. Many enjoyed this opportunity in *Hagam* to play a new role, hitherto not generally open to women. Their presence also added much to the morale of the units.

For working youths and those not enrolled in a high school, administrative arrangement other than *Hagam* was needed. The clandestine *Hagana*, therefore, assigned a few men who could be spared to recruit adolescents into what they began to designate as *Gadna*, the Hebrew initials of the term, Youth Corps. At first, this was a very small enterprise. Its name ultimately was to be applied to the school related *Hagam* units as well.

The *Gadna* and *Hagam* never focused exclusively on military training. Few of its officers were professional soldiers. Many had an interest in education. Nearly all of them were graduates of youth movements. There were many students and *Halutzim* who had come to Palestine, trained in developmental skills. They viewed military activities as an unfortunate but necessary deviation from pioneering. They, therefore, combined paramilitary exercises with exposure to hard work.

Many city children had no prior experience with either. They were, therefore, taken on hikes where they learned to ford streams, survive in the desert on berries and snakes, and move at night without fear of "spirits." The emphasis was on acquisition of self-confidence, derived from a knowledge that, as part of an elite corps, they could endure hardships and would be ready to help their country, as workers in time of peace, and as fighters if the need arose.

A Prestigious Institution

Youth corps all over the world are organized by adult-making institutions (parents, school and the state) for two purposes which differ drastically in their consequences. A youth corps can function as an elite selector, or can serve a welfare function. Participation can serve as a rite of passage from childhood to adulthood.

An *elite* youth corps is quite different from a *welfare*-oriented program, such as the United States Civilian Conservation Corps, or the current United States Youth Corps. Both are designed for impoverished youngsters. They provide social services for the marginal. They are virtually without members from the more influential segments of the population.

In Israel, as in the Boy Scouts or the present American Peace Corps, the elitist theory predominates. Middle-class elements set the tone from the very beginning. The *Hagan* trainees in high schools outnumbered the few who were recruited outside of schools through *Gadna*. The status of a new institution within the total network of related agencies was very much influenced by the high status of those involved in its initial development.

Organizational Linkages

The Youth Corps began as a legal cover for an illegal program. It developed gradually into a permanent administrative organization that combined educational with military requirements, and was linked closely to two major adult-making institutions: the schools and the army. Their cooperative relationships were symbolized by the linkage of the chief architects of this program: Dr. Arthur Biram, a school principal in Haifa, and General Yaakov Dori, one of his many illustrious students. They developed a bifocal organizational pattern which still persists today.

Both Arthur Biram and Yaakov Dori spanned, in their lifetime, the era of Jewish history when the idea of Jewish statehood became transformed from improbable romanticism into a political reality. Biram had started out as a reform rabbi in Berlin by graduating from the "*Hochschule für Jüdische Wissenschaft*" (College of Jewish Studies). But this calling did not suit him for long. He decided to study classics, especially Greek and Latin, and obtained a degree from a secular university. This qualified him for a teaching post in one of Berlin's high schools. But in 1914, at the age of 36, he left a promising career in German Civil Service to settle in Palestine and to become headmaster at the *Reali* High School in Haifa. He was a man in search of himself, whose sense of identity was a mirror of the conflicts of his generation of early Zionist leaders.

Jacob Dori (Dostrovsky) was one of Biram's first students. He had been born in Haifa of Russian parents. After graduation, Dori joined the *Hagana* to become the Haifa Commander of this Jewish underground army. For many years, he was one of its few full time military experts. He had a strong interest in education. After his retirement as Chief of staff, he became the President of the Technion in Haifa, Israel's center for high technical studies. He served in this second career until his retirement in 1955.

The outbreak of World War I interrupted the relationship between Biram, the school principal, and Dori, his soldier-student. Both were Zionists, devoted to the same cause, but they served different armies. Biram decided to return to his German fatherland to do military service. He reappeared in Palestine in 1916, as a German officer in the Turkish Army. Young Dori joined the Jewish Legion in Egypt. He re-entered Palestine in the service of the British Army, which captured the country from the Turks.

When students had to be recruited for clandestine service, Dori and Biram could work together. Neither liked the politically partisan spirit of most youth movements. Some students, far from being old enough to understand the complexities of politics, would barely talk to fellow students enrolled in a competing youth movement. Biram actually banned them from operating in his high school. Nor did he relish the idea that the underground *Hagana* might directly recruit students in his school. He wanted educators to retain exclusive administrative responsibility for all students, including their military preparation. He was first and foremost an educator, but with a classical Greek regard for the importance of fitness and defense.

Dori had a similar outlook. He thought the Army should have an educational aspect. He did not mind if his officers were appointed to the faculty, when directing a voluntary and clandestine military program. They could then turn to school authorities to enforce discipline.

This cooperative arrangement between the clandestine Jewish Army and the Jewish high schools worked well, in part, because this arrangement supported certain key values of leaders of both institutions.

1. Defense conditioning should be conducted under a non-partisan umbrella, within which youngsters from youth movements of different parties, and those not affiliated, could participate together.
2. Teachers and students should be united in support of the cause of independence. They should be on the same side of this issue. This helped develop a spirit of comradeship, which affected the total milieu of a school.
3. Educationally oriented leaders could counteract an excessively militaristic spirit, which might develop more

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easily if military training were to be conducted outside the school system.

When World War II broke out, *Expanded Physical Education* became a "course" in most Jewish high schools. Few youths refused to participate. Training officers of the underground army could function as high school faculty members, thus reducing their isolation and helping to broaden their perspective and their social prestige. The schools provided office space and other services. In some cases, they also gave financial aid, since the clandestine training officers did not have a regular source of income.

Gadna Survives Success

When the Independence War was joined, *Hagam-Gadna*-trained youths were among those who fought, died, and helped with the country's independence on the field of battle. In Jerusalem, under siege for many months, manpower became so short that *Gadna* units were assigned to battle stations.⁷ But after establishment of a Jewish State, necessity for a clandestine youth corps disappeared. Not even during the Six-Day War in June 1967, did the *Gadna* Youth Corps have to be mobilized for military tasks. The fighting was done by the regular reserve, which yielded a force of more than 300,000.⁸ Although through the school and the *Gadna*, youth were organized in many localities to help in distributing mail, newspapers, and milk, and aiding such civilian defense activities as filling sandbags. Approximately 1,000 *Gadna*ists worked temporarily in ordnance factories, the aircraft industry, in making camouflage nets, in hospitals, and as farm helpers in border villages.⁹

When an institution attains its goals, why should it continue? The certainty which united those who worked together, tends to be displaced by uncertainty about what priority to give to new objectives, if indeed such new goals can be agreed upon.

The idea of *Gadna's* dissolution was entertained in 1948, but rejected. The issue of its future was resolved at the highest level by Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion. Independence had brought sovereignty, but not peace. Neither the High Command of the Israel Defense Force nor the political leaders of the country wanted to disband the *Gadna*. Successful organizations generally tend to exert pressure for their continuity. In this instance, what had begun as a military

emergency program became a permanent organization in which paramilitary objectives were supplemented by social welfare, educational and development goals.

In Israel, as elsewhere, serious outside threats have had a tendency to unify divergent streams in the nationalist movements. In politics and religion, Israelis disagree in many ways. But there is overwhelming consensus that the shaping of youthful minds is too important to be entrusted to any single program. The *Gadna* Youth Corps was designed as a survival-oriented non-political youth program in an otherwise zealously partisan community.¹⁰

Though under government sponsorship, the *Gadna* has remained non-political. Unlike the Hitler Youth of Germany, China's Red Pioneers, Russia's Komsomol, and the youth corps in several newly emerging countries, *Gadna* has never been used to stage "spontaneous" protests and riots. Its leaders neither have the power nor seem to aspire to control their participants. Disciplinary infractions, and there are few, are turned over by the *Gadna* Commander to the school principal. There is no legislation to make *Gadna* compulsory and permanent. Each school can decide on whether or not to have a *Gadna* program. Few principals refuse. *Gadna* offers them an enrichment and physical education program without cost. All instructors are paid by the Army or the Ministry of Education.

The Rehabilitation Mission

Gadna has shifted its program priorities a number of times since statehood. After the Independence War, premilitary activities were reduced in favor of new developmental challenges. The organization was mobilized and greatly expanded to help meet a new "emergency," mass immigration.

Before independence, Israel had been a predominantly European community. In 1968, over seventy percent of the children in primary grades had parents born in the underdeveloped countries of Asia and Africa. The biblical prophecy of Jews being gathered from the four corners of the earth came true. The entire Jewish community of Yemen made their way to Aden, to be flown by air to Israel. From every other Arab country, Jews came by plane or ship, often after having to leave behind all their belongings. Europe's displaced persons camps were emptied of their Jews. From the Americas and South Africa, as well as the democracies of Europe, came smaller groups to cast

their fate with the new nation. Israeli's Jewish population doubled in thirty months and quadrupled by 1968.

An influx so large and fast taxed the country's resources to the limit. During the first few years, strict rationing had to be introduced. Many immigrants had to be housed in tents and asbestos huts. There were shortages of teachers, social workers and other public servants to help integrate the newcomers. The Ministries of Education and Social Welfare did what they could. But their manpower and budget were sufficient only to meet the most urgent needs. *Gadna* was given a new mandate, to give "social first aid" to help decrease the gap in educational and welfare services.

This emergency national service mission was launched with eleven people, two rooms and a bicycle. It was soon given more funds and manpower, released in large from the Defense Ministry budget. With it, the Youth Corps established over 200 youth centers in immigrant towns and slum sections. They offered recreation and supplemental education. In a few locations, *Gadna* also helped in hospitals and creches, in fire fighting and in the building of new roads. Several youth villages provided shelters for poorly housed adolescents. Many had been living with their families in hurriedly put up tent cities. Some of them lacked the rudiments of knowledge about twentieth century living. They had to learn the use of flush toilets, and tooth brushes and the care of their new clothing. Nearly all needed instruction in Hebrew. *Gadna* also organized summer camps, where thousands of youngsters from poor homes were given a chance to spend a few weeks under healthy conditions. They received good food, medical care and free clothing, along with a chance to mix with Israeli children from more established sections of the population. Trips were organized to different parts of the country to acquaint youngsters with the new land to which they had come.

The challenge of helping new immigrants attracted some adolescent volunteers from the more settled families of the country. Helping to integrate the refugees was a new cause, with powerful youth culture appeal. For some of the immigrant youths, *Gadna* had glamour. What could be more inviting to a recent immigrant, living in a leaky tent, than to be taken to an Israeli Army Camp? There, his rags were exchanged for an army uniform. He ceased being a poor refugee. He became part of a prestigious organization.

The education-welfare emphasis was reflected in the outlook

of Colonel Akiba Azmon, the first commander of the *Gadna* after independence. His military career began in the Engineering Corps. He came to the Prime Minister's attention during the war, with a plan to employ border village housing for defense purposes. Living quarters were built so that they could be used as fortified positions. He was a charismatic pioneer personality, with direct access to David Ben-Gurion, the Prime Minister, who also was the Defense Minister. Akiba Azmon sometimes used this power to circumvent normal military channels. He was no organization man. He was the kind of person who would smile and thumb his nose in response to a salute when entering a room of junior officers, to whom he was to lecture.

When Azmon was appointed as *Gadna* Commander, he decided on a program with just enough military drill to make youngsters feel part of a military unit — which has prestige value. Most of their attention was devoted to the welfare and character development aspects of the program. He recruited a staff of educators and youth movement enthusiasts, rather than persons who had a military orientation.

An "elite" image is projected by the symbolic recognition given to *Gadna* by the Prime Minister and many leading persons. *Gadna* is highly visible in ceremonial celebrations. Its units, *without arms*, participated in every Independence Day parade. In 1969, the military aspect of the festivities was canceled. Public celebrations to mark Independence Day were focussed around *Gadna* activities as a deliberate move to tone down the previous military emphasis of this national anniversary.

Gadna also sponsors an international march to Jerusalem, lasting two to four days, for different participants who walk from the coast to Jerusalem, before the Passover season. This march also includes youth movement units, foreign visitors, golden-age club members and in many years, a small unit of the United States military who are stationed in the country as embassy guards.

Gadna entertains the participants with mass gymnastic, singing and acrobatic spectacles in an open-air auditorium, located on the hills outside Jerusalem. *Gadna* also sponsors other mass hikes, track and swimming meets. Each involves large numbers of youth, usually entire school classes. They are conducted to give the students a sense of participating in a national program of considerable visibility. There is only limited emphasis on individual competition. Most prizes are given for group performance.

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The significance of this civilian transformation of what was supposedly a paramilitary youth corps is heightened if one keeps in mind that the Israeli government had no money for "extras" in 1952. Instruments for the *Gadna* Orchestra had to be imported. There was severe austerity, including food rationing. Some army officers raised their eyebrows: "Is it army business to maintain a music education program?" they asked, "when funds are also badly needed for strictly military purposes?" There also were staff recruitment problems. Well-qualified youth leaders were in short supply. Among recruits with qualifications for *Gadna* leadership, most of them preferred a truly military assignment to being a youth leader.

These substantive issues about budgetary and manpower priorities were complicated by organizational "politics." Some staff officers envied the personal prestige of the *Gadna* Commander in the Prime Minister's office. Azmon acted more like a civilian in uniform than a soldier. The integration of immigrants rather than paramilitary training seemed to be his priority concern. In 1954, he was asked to leave his post, immediately after David Ben-Gurion first resigned from the Government. With his protector out of power, the army's High Command preferred a *Gadna* Commander with more military orientation. Most staff officers, whom Azmon had brought into *Gadna*, gradually left as the Youth Corps shifted policies reasserting to a degree the priority of its paramilitary objectives.

Stabilization

In the 1960's, the need for *Gadna's* recreation, informal education and welfare programs began to decline. Attendance at voluntary *Gadna* programs dropped markedly in many towns and villages. The Ministry of Education was rapidly expanding more varied and hobby-oriented leisure time activities. *Gadna* had to use army personnel who were draftees and were changed each year, while the school and youth movements could employ youth leaders for longer periods. By 1968, all had been liquidated except for a few youth clubs in Druse Arab villages in response to Druse demands for fuller integration in the Israel military establishment.¹¹

The phasing-out of most of *Gadna's* welfare program did not affect its paramilitary and national service programs. They have become stabilized, encompassing an increasing proportion of the country's adolescent population. Officials estimate that their program reaches 60 percent of the country's adolescent population. This partici-

pation rate is likely to increase soon, since the government is extending compulsory education through the tenth year, and most secondary schools have a *Gadna* program.

Gadna is today the largest youth program of Israel. It has more members than at any time in its over 25 years of history. It enjoys financial and logistic support from two administrative units, the Ministries of Defense and Education. For the army, it is a non-defense activity; for the schools, it falls into the "non-school" category. This gives the program a diffuseness which allows for highly flexible content. The Ministry of Education pays for *Gadna* instructors in academic high schools and full time vocational schools. The army furnishes leaders to agricultural, *Kibbutz* and other rural schools, to part-time vocational training programs, and to welfare institutions, including those for juvenile delinquents.

The Army *Gadna* is headed by a Colonel, who did not have prior experience in the Youth Corps. The post is not a step towards a power position. It usually is the last military assignment for a man reaching his early forties, the conventional "retirement" age for command officers. The first commander during our survey period, after completing his tour of duty, entered the Foreign Service as a military attache. The present commander plans to retire from the army to enter the field of education.

Day by day programming is by a more permanent career cadre of education oriented officers. They enter the *Gadna* Corps as young officers and remain to train and supervise successive cadres of draftees, who are assigned each year by the army to direct youth corps programs in vocational schools, youth centers, apprenticeship classes, agricultural settlements, welfare and reformatory institutions.

General policy and budgeting of the Youth Corps are supervised by a civilian "Department of Youth and Nahal" of the Ministry of Defense, in line with the overall Israeli policy of civilian control over military affairs.

The Ministry of Education branch is headed by the Director of Sports and Physical Education. He hires civilian youth corps instructors, who are paid by the Ministry. They are assigned administratively to function as *Gadna* teachers in local schools. Their program supplements what is being taught in physical education classes, which are staffed by teachers, who have to complete a university or teachers college curriculum. *Gadna* instructors who perform many of the same

tasks can be hired with lower academic credentials. This overlapping in function was organizationally reflected by a recent shift of the *Gadna* Director in the Ministry of Education, to be a subordinate to the Director of Physical Education. In previous years, the two posts had enjoyed equal organizational status.

Neither the Defense Ministry, nor Ministry of Education, controls the program. Funds must be allocated each year by both Ministries from a tight budget. These allocations occur in spite of the fact that the army has military units that are understaffed. The Ministry of Education is unable as yet to provide free high school level education for all. But it finances *Gadna* Youth Corps teachers in most academic and vocational schools.

The *Gadna* Youth Corps, much like the Reserve Officers Training Corps in the United States, forges a link between the country's armed forces and its schools. In the view of many army officers, *Gadna* is uneconomic if judged by purely military criteria. *Gadna* trainees may not be outperforming non-members with equivalent qualifications. Adolescents are certainly no longer needed for military service, but strategists want to maintain *Gadna* as a conditioning program. It is a convenient organizational framework for reaching youngsters of all social classes. The most publicized *Gadna* activities are not those involving paramilitary training, like target practice. The *Gadna* orchestra, which plays on many state occasions and gives excellent concerts both at home and abroad, the Bible Quiz and *Gadna's* many work projects are emphasized, as if to symbolize the symbolic liaison which Israel's civilian militia wishes to maintain with the civilian sector. *Gadna* wants to be identified with both the military *and* the development accomplishments of Zionism. Pioneering, along with defense, are key organizational values.

Replanning

When *Gadna-Hagam* was set up in 1939, no existing agency could offer illegal paramilitary training without endangering its other functions. What emerged was a new institution, closely linked to both the school and the clandestine *Hagana* army. *Gadna* still functions cooperatively as a program run by two separate and different bureaucracies. Its structure has changed little, although much else has changed. *Gadna* is now a legal youth corps. It is less needed militarily.

Social planning cannot be a one-time activity. It must be continuous, so that changes in social functions can be reflected in the organization's structure and its goals.

The unequivocal support of *Gadna* by most school and army officials has given way to the consideration of new policy issues. For instance, should pre-military training receive quite as much priority in 1969, as seemed justifiable in 1939? Israel can today maintain a military deterrent force without reliance on adolescent manpower. Why should the process of training for national security begin at age 14 when, only four years later, all Israeli citizens are subject to military conscription? There also have been discussions of the question whether *Gadna* should be made an elective subject in high schools for those vitally interested. Other issues up for consideration involve the qualification of youth leaders. Is it feasible to attract young officers who want to leave the army to enter the field of education?

These and other questions illustrate the fact that in any planned program, there is a need for periodic re-assessment. When such a re-assessment is made, planners must confront conditions different from those that pertained originally. Before a program is set up, many more options tend to exist than afterwards, when a stable organizational structure has been in operation. It can be altered, it can grow or decline. It can even be abolished, but all of these alternatives first have to answer the question: Is the change better than the condition it is designed to replace?

These policy considerations provide the background of an ongoing re-assessment of *Gadna* by its administrative leadership. New programs, such as first aid clubs, are being set up to fit the desire of many young Israelis (especially girls) to acquire technical skills that have personal, as well as public, utility. *Gadna* has become a comprehensive internal tourism enterprise, offering young people a chance to see their country under circumstances that also offer tests of endurance and the opportunity for peer-group companionship. It facilitates volunteering by adolescents for adult-like roles, whenever such help is needed.

Conclusion

Gadna originated during Israel's struggle for independence as a seemingly temporary program of clandestine paramilitary training.

It became a permanent institution after the country's independence, though this event outdated its original functions. Israel's defense requirements can now be satisfied without reliance on adolescent manpower.

Over the nearly three decades of its existence, *Gadna* has maintained a stable organizational structure. But this has not meant a freezing of its functions, which have shifted repeatedly, in response to different public priorities. Without abandoning its paramilitary training objectives, an educational and social welfare dimension was added. This organizational flexibility also may be related to the fact that *Gadna* regularly rotates its top leadership.

Gadna does not compete, but supports and uses other youth serving institutions, especially the schools and the youth movements. Most *Gadna* instructors have had experience in youth movements. They provide high schools with a nationally planned, supplementary education program. Their instructional services are rendered without charge to the local taxpayers. This budgetary fact is particularly important in immigrant quarters and rural areas, where the local educational authorities lack resources and manpower to provide them with enough leaders to organize hikes or to maintain an orchestra. Efforts are made to enroll youngsters from disadvantaged families and those not enrolled in secondary schools. *Gadna* confers prestige on those who participate in its program. But the tone is set by youths who are achievement oriented.

Gadna is compulsory for all those enrolled in a post-primary school with a *Gadna* instructor. In addition, there are voluntary programs with an elite appeal. The curriculum includes physical toughening, volunteering for developmental pioneering, and visits to historic sites, natural wonders and other points of interest. The Youth Corps espouses only very general civil and patriotic objectives consistent with the country's core ideology, such as defense readiness, ingathering of the exiles, and Jewish cultural renaissance. Its leaders are selected on a merit basis. *Gadna* avoids many of the divisive controversies, such as religion versus secularism, socialism versus free enterprise, and others. This ideological neutrality is reinforced through *Gadna's* linkage with two of the country's other major non-political institutions — the army and the school system.

Chester Barnard once observed: "An organization must disintegrate if it cannot accomplish its purpose. It also destroys itself by

accomplishing its purpose."¹² This contingency has been avoided by adding new functions. *Gadna* devotes a proportion of its resources to sponsoring developmental, rather than military activities. This combination of paramilitary training, with education and recreation, gives the program a high degree of public acceptability, in conformity to the predisposition in Israeli society that the civilian sector gain ascendancy.¹³ Also, the innovative potential of the organization is emphasized. *Gadna* has succeeded in becoming institutionalized by meeting the following operational criteria proposed by Jiri Nehnevajsa:¹⁴

1. It survived as an organization, in spite of several major changes in functional priorities.

2. The organization is viewed by its environment to have intrinsic value.

3. The innovative, as well as routinized, programs of the organization are becoming normative for the high schools, where *Gadna* programs are largely centered.

Gadna's history represents an instructive case study of the capabilities and limitations of operating a nonpartisan governmental youth program in a democratic political system. It established strong linkages with the school system. Its ideology is congenial to the organizational requirements of two major institutions of the Israeli society. *Gadna* reinforces a concern with security which is understandably viewed to be important in a country, which for 50 years, spanning three generations, had to develop while under constant military opposition by the competing Pan-Arab Nationalist movement. The program of *Gadna* also encourages student concern with national security for developmental objectives, to conform to the humanistic aspirations of the country. *Gadna* is an organization, but it has acquired institutional characteristics, by virtue of its capacity to survive major changes and the way it is linked to the larger society.

NOTES

1. Milton J. Esman, *The Institution Building Concepts — An Interim Appraisal*; Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania: Research Headquarters, Inter-University Research Program in Institution Building, University of Pittsburgh, 1967, (Lithographed), also Donald A. Taylor, *Institution Building in Business Administration*. East Lansing, Michigan: Michigan State University, 1968.
2. Natanel Lorch, *The Edge of the Sword: Israel's War of Independence, 1947-49*. New York: G. P. Putnam & Sons, 1961, pp. 45-46.

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3. Munya M. Mardor, *Strictly Illegal*, London: Robert Hale Ltd., 1957. Efraim Dekel, *Shai: The Exploits of Hagana Intelligence*. New York: Thomas Yoseloff, 1959.
4. For youth who were working and who were not enrolled in a high school, a different administrative arrangement was needed. It was called *Gadna*, the Hebrew initials of the term, Youth Corps. Its name ultimately was to be applied to the school related units as well.
5. William Barclay, *Educational Ideals in the Ancient World*, London: Collins, 1956, pp. 49-77.
6. Sir Robert Baden-Powell, *Scouting and Youth Movements*. London: Jonathan Cape, 1931, p. 26.
7. Natanel Lorch, *op. cit.*, p. 121.
8. This estimate, quoted by Leo Heiman without revealing its source, appears plausible, although it represents between 13 and 14 per cent of the entire Jewish population. Even the major powers which scraped the bottom of their manpower barrel in World War II, seldom approached a ten per cent mobilization rate. Leo Heiman, "Can Israel Build Defense Industries?" *The American Zionist*, Vol. LVIII 1967, No. 4, p. 21.
9. Reuven Alcalay and Mordechai Nurock, *Israel Government Yearbook 1967/68*, Jerusalem Government Printing Press, 1968, p. 121.
10. Its ideological particularism was even more pronounced before statehood than today. Many schools were under the auspices of a political party. Each youth movement strongly advocated its own general, socialist or religious prescription for a better world. But a high measure of unity could be obtained around one issue: survival.
11. Gideon Weigert, "Young Druse to Gadna: Want to Join Nahal as Well," *Jerusalem Post Magazine*, July 19, 1968, p. 19.
12. Chester Barnard, *Functions of the Executive*, Cambridge, Massachusetts: University Press, 1950, p. 29.
13. Amos Perlmutter, "The Israeli Army in Politics: The Persistence of the Civilian over the Military," *World Politics*, Vol. XX (July 1968), pp. 606-643.
14. Comparative Administration Group, Department of Government, Jiri Nehnevajsa, in "Institution Building: Elements of a Research Orientation." Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Publications, 1968, pp. 3-5.

18. The Institution Building Process and Research

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It is tempting to think of institution building as a simple linear progression toward a set of specific, firmly established, detailed goals or objectives. If that were the case, it would be possible to define the goals unambiguously and well in advance of the institution building effort, design a comprehensive set of indicators of progress toward the achievement of the objectives, and evaluate the total enterprise in terms of readily accepted criteria. The model suggested is that of constructing a house with well-tested blue prints, or taking a voyage to the planets, after exhaustive preliminary testing of operations, equipment, field conditions and contingency alternatives. Institution building may approximate this model more closely as we gain experience in the enterprise.

But, if we accept the definition of Esman and the Inter-University Research Program, that institution building means "planning, structuring, and guidance of new or reconstituted organizations that embody changes in values, functions, physical and/or social technologies, etc.,"¹ it is clear that we are not intending to use this model at all, but rather one that is, at many points, radically dissimilar. The major difference is that the intent is not to build a structure or project whose appearance, functions and use can be anticipated and simulated in detail, well in advance of operation, but rather to initiate a change process whose outcomes can only be described in broad program objectives. If institution building, in this sense, is successful, one of the measures of its success will be the emergence of unanticipated combina-

tions of events, circumstances and products. And, because the domain of institution building is the domain of human values, beliefs, aspirations and competence, and the tools of institution building include interpersonal influence, human communication, and management of the learning process, it is inevitable that the criteria of success will be complex, difficult to quantify, and measurable only within broad margins of error. Goals and objectives are likely to change, not only in detail, but even in major components, as the institution building process continues.

The completed studies in the Inter-University Program illustrate the pattern of changing goals and criteria. The interplay between short term and long term objectives that determine crucial decisions, the strategic importance of flexible planning that allows exploitation of unanticipated opportunities, and the massive influence, at all stages of institution development, of simultaneous, uncontrolled events in the institution's environment that demand reconsideration of objectives, are apparent in all of the studies. Esman, in his *Interim Appraisal* of the Inter-University Program concepts, concludes an insightful analysis of the published study reports with ten hypotheses about institution building.² His third hypothesis is particularly relevant to this analysis. Esman proposes that "Specificity in doctrinal themes provides firm guides, high levels of predictability, and 'stable reference points' for leadership in making program decisions, and in managing relations internally and with linked institutions. Imprecision in doctrine themes facilitates the mobilization of support and provides options for adjusting programs to new situations and to feedback from experience. Leadership will be under pressure from normative linkages and from committed persons within the organization to opt for specificity, but will tend to favor imprecision because of the greater flexibility it affords."³

Esman does not intend to have us consider this tendency of the leadership to prefer imprecision in stating goals and objectives as whimsical, or nonfunctional, or a breach of faith with those who are committed to the outcomes of the institution building project. Rather, he identifies leadership preference for imprecision in stating goals with the leader's need for learning from experience and mobilizing support for the project.

Each of the research reports from the Inter-University Program reinforces this generalization. What, then, are the implications for

doing research on institution building if we accept this perspective? In the following paragraphs, I will enumerate some of the generalizations suggested by the research and Esman's summary, and their implication for research planning.

1. The process of institutionalization of innovation is not a simple linear function. There are interruptions, retreats, accommodations, regroupings, diversions, and emergence of secondary goals, amended objectives and altered doctrine.

Implication: It is not possible to evaluate progress toward goals unless it is known what the goals are at each point in time. If there are changes in goals, or substitution of goals, or any of the alterations suggested above, institution building research should be in a position to take this into account. In retrospective research, it is less likely that this will be done. The researcher will have a tendency to accept ultimate goals as criteria, ignoring the important achievement of proximal goals and the criteria of adaptability to changing circumstances. In practice, this means that research should be continuous with the project, rather than retrospective, and should be capable of identifying the actual steps taken, direct and indirect, as movement toward change takes place.

2. Technical assistance teams have unreliable means of estimating success or failure of specific actions they are taking. They have only partial and incomplete access to performance criteria.

Implication: It is not reasonable to expect that the technical assistance team that has operational responsibilities, will also have a research orientation or capability. If an operational research component is a part of the institution building team, it is more likely that change in procedures or doctrine will reflect realistic program needs. John Hanson, in his report of the effort to introduce an innovative instructional program in the College of Education at the University of Nigeria, illustrated how operational research, in response to the innovation early in the program, was helpful in giving the field team a realistic set of performance criteria.⁴

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3. Because changes in the adjacent environment are crucial for institution building, it is unlikely that criteria for assessing the success of institution building in one circumstance will be appropriate, without modification for use in a different circumstance.

Implication: For each project there is continuous need for systematic monitoring of the relationship between the project and its environment. This monitoring should lead to changes in criteria for success as the relationship changes. During the Ecuador University reorganization project, the Government changed twice, and the Government's relationship to the university changed accordingly.⁵ Hans Blaise and his research associates were doing research at the time of the changes, and could adjust their criteria for evaluating project success to account for the altered environment. In one instance, the criterion for success was the emergence of new doctrine and new operations. In the changed circumstance, the criterion for success was the preservation of the gains made, and the avoidance of loss of position. In a third circumstance, the criterion was the ability of the project to remain active in any sense.

4. Prediction of response to innovation is difficult under any circumstances. In developing countries, prediction must be based on more inclusive and careful data gathering.

Implication: In developing countries, it is often necessary to redefine categories of data. "Confidence in leadership" or "acceptance of innovation" or "readiness to change" in more technologically complex societies may be expressed quite differently from the way it is expressed in developing countries. This does not mean that complete ethnographic analyses have to be made before any evaluation research can be done in developing societies. It does suggest, however, that there should be some meaningful ethnographic analyses of the process of change, and response to innovation. Assuming that there will be "resistance to change" is neither more nor less

appropriate than assuming that "improvements will be welcomed." And a little movement toward change in a culture that, in fact, is resistant can be a much more positive indicator of project achievement than a larger movement toward change in a culture that has already accelerated its change processes. John Hanson, in his Nigerian study, emphasized the importance of the compatibility between project objectives and community objectives in the achievement of project goals during the initial stages of the University of Nigeria program. He could make this analysis because he had extensive information about the doctrine of the Nigerian community that was relevant to the planned innovations.⁶

5. Innovation creates new situations, which, in turn, demand innovative solutions. But original objectives and doctrine, which may become obsolete, will dominate a program, unless emergence of new demands is made apparent.

Implication: To use the criterion of number of persons trained to a given level of expertness, or number of persons actually engaged in occupations for which they were trained, as a measure of success of a project, is appropriate only as long as the training program remains relevant to the operating situation. In the report on the Thai project, Siffin describes the varying usefulness of the training programs over a period of time. At one stage of the project, the graduates of the training were needed to fill positions that had been created and were not adequately staffed.⁷ At another stage of the program, graduates found occupations where they could use their training, but less directly. Ideally, as the needs of the recipient community change, the project would be sensitive and responsive to the new demands. But, unless the project is looking for the altered demands—that is, has built-in capability for sensing new performance criteria, it is likely that response will be delayed or inappropriate, or, at worst, that the institution building team will equate the success of project operations with the success of the institution building effort, inappro-

privately. It is probably true that to the extent to which institution building actually results in innovation, the need for changing performance criteria systematically becomes more central. A successful institution building project should have constantly changing performance criteria.

6. As an institution emerges or changes, it has different interchanges with its environment at different phases of growth. The nucleus group, defining its objectives and functions, does not make the same demands on its environment, nor receive the same environmental responses as the relatively mature, relatively powerful, independently supported, competitive institution.

Implication: The criteria for success at the initial stages of institution building are necessarily different from criteria at later stages, but how they are different and what criteria should be at different stages is, itself, researchable.

The Thai Institute of Public Administration, in its mature stage, could serve as a framework for the establishment of a larger, more inclusive and more innovative institution.⁸ The new institution emerged in an environment, created, in part, by the Public Administration Institute. It was not anticipated, at the beginning of the Public Administration project, that the Institute would serve this function, but it is possible to evaluate the extent to which it served the function well. Similarly, it is possible to evaluate the entirely different process through which the Institute served as a means for assimilating Thai and European doctrine about public administration, and, at an earlier stage, served as a vehicle for increasing the cadre of trained civil servants in the government. Simply as a function of project maturity, the characteristics of expectations about performance change in relevant publics. Whether the emerging institution fails to meet the changing expectations, or surpasses them, can only be assessed if the changing expectations are known.

7. As an institution changes and matures, its opportunities for attracting and retaining different kinds of personnel change.

Implication: Evaluating the performance of individuals who differ in experience, training, capability, motivation, status, etc., demands flexible criteria. What should the evaluator expect from persons who are relatively central to their communities, who have important contacts with key officials, who are well trained and experienced, as compared with the performance of marginal, highly motivated, poorly trained individuals with Utopian aspirations and relatively undeveloped skills? It is necessary throughout the life of the institution building effort to have accurate information about the performance potential of the staff, as a base for measuring performance success.

8. The leadership of a new or reconstituted institution has different needs for being responsive to environmental demands than the leadership of a more mature institution.

Implication: The leader of a new institution usually has more freedom from environmental demands than someone directing an established program. Networks of linkages and reciprocal expectations about performance are weak, or have not yet been established. Norms for performance are still being formulated. Success in introducing innovation, then, has a different meaning when the leader has a new or reconstituted institution as his base. Evaluation of leadership performance has to be conditioned by explicit knowledge about the challenge to innovation that resides in the network of linkages and expectations that exist. Hanson credited the relative freedom from such constraints, as well as the prevailing community readiness for change, with facilitating the Nigerian program.⁹ Birkhead described the early Turkish situation as one in which the new institution leadership was not significantly distinguishable from the old.¹⁰

9. A new institution in a developing country, with an expli-

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cit program for selection, training and placement of staff, will, in many instances, be an important resource for providing new cadres of leadership in the society.

Implication: If loss of staff to other institutions is taken as a criterion of failure, many genuinely successful innovative efforts will not be properly assessed. It may be that loss of personnel to adjacent institutions, if the loss can be shown to increase the innovative potential of the community, should be accepted as a positive criterion. The need for a given institution's trained personnel could be expected to change over time, probably in the direction of making any given institution's product less valuable, as other institutions increase their ability to reproduce the skills being exploited.

10. Changing domestic leadership and technical assistance staff may lead to changes in expressed goals and objectives. However, situational demands and opportunities may, in fact, produce a relatively stable and continuous influence on doctrine, as operationalized through the actual program.

Implication: If the success of a project is determined by evaluating performance in terms of the changing expression of goals and objectives by changing leadership, an inaccurate assessment of project impact may result. This would be true particularly if there were good contact between other members of the institution building team and the community, and the project were meeting real community needs and expectations. It is important to know what goals and objectives are expressed by individuals who happen to be in leadership roles at a given point in time, but also to have sound measures of the relationship between actual project operations and situational demands to evaluate success adequately.

11. Although new technologies and procedures may be introduced at a relatively rapid rate, there may not be corresponding complementary changes in significant interpersonal relationships. The impact of traditional social relationship may enhance or reduce the effect of the technological changes.

Implication: If the technological change implies impor-

tant changes in interpersonal relationships, it is important to know how, over time, the interaction between the technological and social processes will develop. Some patterns of family or status or group relationships may be in the process of changing, and the introduction of a new technology may simply accelerate the change. In other situations, as in the Thai project reported by Siffin, patterns of personal relationships were not compatible with the innovative administrative procedures. After apparent initial acceptance of a new procedure, there was a decay in the effectiveness of the procedure because it did not support existing social relationships.¹¹ Criteria of initial acceptance, could, in this instance, lead to an inaccurate estimate of long term impact of the project.

12. When an educational institution is being created or reconstituted, as contrasted, for instance, with an agricultural research institute, because of the flow of students through the school, there is a relatively rapid and extensive dissemination of information about the institution.

Implication: The impact of an institution building project is a function not only of the characteristics of the project and its relationship to its environment, but also of the ways in which information about the project are made available and used. Schools have a built-in information dispensing process in the rapidly circulating student body. Other kinds of projects have other means available. In evaluating the success of an institution building effort, the impact of the information dissemination process has to be accounted for.

This small selection of generalizations was chosen to illustrate some of the kinds of propositions that are implicit and explicit in the institution building research that has been reported by the Inter-University Program, when the model of institution building as an emergent process is accepted. The propositions and implications were intended to focus on criteria for project evaluation, and meet the constraints that they:

1. have wide applicability and important practical consequences for institution building as reported in the pilot studies;

2. are documented by reliable research reported in the pilot studies;
3. demand additional research for:
 - a. application to each new institution building effort;
 - b. increased precision in specifying parameters and constraints.

In Turkey, the Birkhead report may be some value to the future of the Public Administration Institute, but it could have no impact on the first fourteen years of the project. Some of the analysis reported by Siffin suggests that there was institution building research going on during the first ten years of the Thai Public Administration Institute that did provide guidance and feedback to the project. The Hanson research was designed, five years after the College of Education at Nigeria was established at the University of Nigeria, in part to allow the staff of the College of Education to assess progress of the College toward institutionalization and to guide further College development. Data were gathered by College faculty and students. Blaise went to Ecuador two years after his university began a technical assistance relationship with Central University. He went to Ecuador first to conduct institution building research on the project, and then to become head of the Pittsburgh group. It is likely that his research analysis is having some influence on the Pittsburgh program in Ecuador.

What follows then, from examination of field experience and the generalizations that can be derived from research on field experience, and the examples of how research and operations have meshed, are three recommendations about the relationship between institution building and research on institution building.

1. Systematic research on institution building, that has a comprehensive theoretical base, can provide findings that have practical implications for increasing the effectiveness of institution building. Systematic applied studies should be an integral part of all phases of institution building, from the initial exploratory period through long term evaluation.
2. When possible, institution building research should be initiated by persons who will have responsibility for important aspects of the institution building process,

including host country persons who introduce and administer change.

3. The use of applied research in institution building should be explicitly anticipated in planning and administering the project. Expert use of applied research requires training for the staff who will manage the change process.

Models for the use of applied research in institution building exist in the industrial sector. Studies are conducted to determine needs and readiness for innovative institutions and practices, to monitor interaction between the innovative institution and its environment, and to assess the effectiveness of the institution, and its own internal change processes.

Applied research of this kind has been demonstrated to be useful to institutions providing relatively routine services in relatively stable and predictable environments. When an effort is being made to create an innovation-fostering institution in a relatively unstable and unpredictable environment, those responsible need all of the reliable information that can be obtained about prospects, progress and impact. Applied research, based on the kinds of studies described above, could furnish this guidance.

NOTES

1. Milton J. Esman and Hans C. Blaise, *Institution Building Research: The Guiding Concepts*, Pittsburgh, IRPIB, GSPIA, University of Pittsburgh, 1966, 19 pp. (mimeo).
2. Milton J. Esman, *The Institution Building Concepts — An Interim Appraisal*, Pittsburgh, IRPIB, GSPIA, University of Pittsburgh, 1968, 66 pp. (mimeo).
3. Esman, 1968.
4. Hanson, John W., *Education, Nsukka, A Study in Institution Building Among Modern Ibo*, MSU Press, 1968.
- 5. Blaise, Hans C., and Rodriguez, Luis A., *Introducing Innovation at Ecuadorian Universities*, IRPIB, GSPIA, University of Pittsburgh, 1968, 135 pp. (mimeo).
6. Hanson, 1967.
- 7. Siffin, William J., *The Thai Institute of Public Administration: A Case Study of Institution Building*, Indiana University, 1967, 275 pp. (mimeo).
8. Siffin, 1967.
9. Hanson, 1967.
- 10. Birkhead, Guthrie S., *Institutionalization at a Modest Level: Public Administration Institute for Turkey and the Middle East*, 1967, 326 pp. (mimeo).
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