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A PROJECT TO HELP PRACTITIONERS  
HELP THE RURAL POOR  
Case Study No. 8

# PLANNING FROM THE BOTTOM UP:

## COMMUNITY-BASED INTEGRATED RURAL DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTH KOREA

Vincent S. R. Brandt  
Ji Woong Cheong

AID/ASTAG-1359

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## GLOSSARY

<b>CBIRD</b>	<b>Community-Based Integrated Rural Development</b>
<b>CDF</b>	<b>Community Development Foundation</b>
<b>Gun</b>	<b>County</b>
<b>Gun Chong</b>	<b>County Administrative Office</b>
<b>Maul Kumgo</b>	<b>Micro-Bank</b>
<b>Myon</b>	<b>Township or Subcounty</b>
<b>Myon Cheng</b>	<b>Subcounty Chief</b>
<b>Ri</b>	<b>Administrative Village Communities</b>
<b>ROK</b>	<b>Republic of Korea</b>
<b>Saemaul Undong</b>	<b>New Community Movement</b>
<b>SCF</b>	<b>Save the Children Federation</b>
<b>UNDP</b>	<b>United Nations Development Programme</b>
<b>UNESCO</b>	<b>United Nations Educational, Scientific &amp; Cultural Organization</b>
<b>UNICEF</b>	<b>United Nations Children's Fund</b>
<b>US AID</b>	<b>United States Agency for International Development</b>
<b>Won</b>	<b>Approx. 500 won = US\$1 (1978)</b>

## INTRODUCTORY COMMENTARY\*

In addition to explaining the background of the accompanying case study, this introduction attempts to view the experiences and lessons of the CBIRD project in South Korea in a broader international perspective.

### WHAT IS CBIRD?

CBIRD (pronounced sea-bird) is the acronym for a development concept devised in the early 1970s by the Save the Children Federation/Community Development Foundation (SCF/CDF) on the basis of their many years of experience with helping the underprivileged in a variety of developing countries.\*\* CBIRD, though often referred to as such, is actually not a "model" in the strict sense; it is more in the nature of a particular strategy, based on a certain set of principles and goals, that can be flexibly applied in different situations in a wide variety of ways.

The CBIRD idea was first introduced in South Korea where SCF/CDF had operated for many years, but it is not limited to South Korea. In recent years SCF/CDF has sought to introduce the

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\*Prepared by Philip H. Coombs in behalf of IGED.

\*\*Save the Children Federation (SCF) began as a voluntary children's relief organization in the USA during the Great Depression of the 1930s. After World War II, SCF extended its child relief activities overseas to several developing countries--one of the first being South Korea in the immediate wake of the Korean War. After the mid-1950s SCF expanded its program scope beyond simple relief to individual children and began supporting self-help development efforts by poor families and communities that could bring about more lasting improvements. To promote and implement these broader self-help projects in the field, SCF created the Community Development Foundation (CDF) in 1957 and established the first CDF field office in South Korea--which later became the sponsor and manager of the CBIRD Project. The two names have since been merged--the official name of the parent organization now being Save the Children Federation/Community Development Foundation (SCF/CDF). But since most Koreans still associate the separate CDF name with CBIRD, the authors of the case study have used this shorthand identification except when referring to the parent organization (as SCF/CDF).

same strategy--though in very different specific forms and on a more modest scale--in 17 other less developed countries in Asia and the Pacific, Africa, the Middle East and Latin America. The South Korean version, however, represents the most comprehensive, sophisticated and ambitious application of the general approach thus far.

### THE NEW INTERNATIONAL CONSENSUS

CBIRD in South Korea held special interest for ICED because it is a living embodiment of the new international consensus on rural development that has evolved since the early 1970s and is receiving wide attention today. This new international consensus advocates a more "integrated" and "community-based" approach to rural development and in particular a concerted effort to improve the condition of the poorest of the rural poor, the status and role of women, and the welfare of young children. This appealing rhetoric has now been adopted and is being actively promoted by virtually all United Nations and bilateral development agencies, by various voluntary organizations, and by top policy-makers in a growing number of developing countries.

The big problem everyone faces at this juncture, however, is how to translate this popular rhetoric into effective actions. This is proving to be much more difficult than the rhetoric itself suggests, and than many people had supposed. The difficulties arise in part from the inherent complexities of traditional rural societies and the stubborn obstacles that stand in the way of transforming them--even in such an economically prosperous and rapidly modernizing society as South Korea. Equally serious difficulties also arise, however, from the fact that the unconventional strategy and goals espoused by the new consensus run directly counter to the conventional doctrines and approaches to rural development that have prevailed almost universally over the past 25 years, and to the way national and international development agencies are structured and accustomed to thinking and operating.

Most government rural programs--ranging from agricultural extension and rural credit to health, nutrition, family planning and educational services--have been and still are operated independently by various specialized agencies, each with its own "delivery system" and cadre of field agents. As a result, rural programs are highly fragmented--the very antithesis of integration--and the bureaucracies that run them are disinclined to yield any of their autonomy in the interest of better integration. Further, these rural programs are structured and operated in a hierarchical, top-down fashion, leaving little room or incentive for participation by the rural people and communities they are meant to serve. Unfortunately, also, these programs--less by design than by force of circumstances--have generally by-passed the poorest segments of the rural population. Such benefits as they may provide accrue mainly to the better-off, thus widening the already large socioeconomic gaps that exist within many villages and often actually worsening the plight of the most disadvantaged. In like manner, what are euphemistically labeled "women's programs" and "children's programs" often turn out on close inspection to be little more than token gestures.

## CBIRD'S RECORD IN KOREA

The architects of CBIRD believed that these serious deficiencies could be substantially remedied, if not entirely overcome, by creating an integrated, bottom-up development system, managed by local community committees, that could be linked, close to the grass roots level, with the top-down government services.

In the context of South Korea, the new CBIRD initiative happily coincided with a strong commitment by the central government to promote and invest substantial amounts in rural development under the aegis of the *Saemaul Undong* (New Community Movement). This strongly top-down campaign put great pressure on all the lower echelon administrators of various bureaucracies to coordinate their rural activities. It also, paradoxically, put great pressure on the villages to engage in bottom-up community planning and extensive self-help efforts. The new CBIRD initiative also coincided with an extraordinarily dynamic national economy that provided an unusually favorable climate for rural development.

The promoters of CBIRD took skillful advantage of these circumstances and tailored their strategy to harmonize with the Government's efforts, but going substantially beyond them by establishing much stronger and more sophisticated mechanisms for local planning and development management.

The evidence in the case study portrays an impressive record of accomplishment. The CBIRD community-based system, all things considered, is working remarkably well in the six selected rural "impact areas." It has clearly contributed significantly to increased productivity and income and to improved living standards in these areas. Its largest and most visible achievements have been on the economic side. The main weakness in the performance record, according to the case study's evaluation, are in the area of social welfare services and help to the poorest 20 percent or so of the population. But this, according to the analysis, was not for any lack of trying on the part of CBIRD's sponsors and field personnel. The main causes of the imbalance between income-increasing projects that would benefit mostly the middle and higher level farmers, and social welfare and other efforts designed to benefit the poor, the women and the young children, were rooted in the traditions and social structure of the communities themselves and reflected the felt needs and ordering of priorities as seen by the local decision-makers.

This phenomenon is not unique, of course, to the Korean context; it can be found in a great many rural societies. But it happens to be unusually well analyzed and brought into focus by this particular case study.

## SOME WIDELY APPLICABLE LESSONS

The findings of this case study, though confined to South Korea, lend support to the following general propositions that have relevance for rural development planners in many developing countries.

(1) If any externally designed rural development model is to have a reasonable chance of success, its original basic assumptions, goals, and strategy must come to terms with the traditional value system, human relationships and felt needs of the rural society into which it is being introduced. This requires a process of sensitive and skillful compromise and adaptation; otherwise the alien scheme will be rejected like an incompatible heart or liver transplant from the human body. The CBIRD experience in South Korea offers useful lessons on how such a process can be successfully conducted, and on why the necessary compromises are likely to result in a significant gap between the originally proclaimed goals of the imported model and the realities of its actual accomplishments.

(2) It would be unrealistic to expect an intervention of this sort in a few pilot areas to bring about, all by itself, a fundamental transformation of the existing socioeconomic structure, traditional values, and pattern of human relationships in these areas. If properly adapted to locally felt needs, preferences and mores, as well as to prevailing government policies and programs, such an intervention--as the CBIRD experience demonstrates--can result in impressive improvements. But a fundamental transformation of existing village structures and behavior patterns can only be brought about by broader and deeper nationwide economic, political and social changes. South Korea in the 1970s was a textbook example of such broad dynamic changes and provided a highly favorable climate for the CBIRD projects.

(3) The rate and extent of local improvements that can be brought about by an innovative rural intervention--such as CBIRD--also depends heavily on the development potential of the particular rural areas to which it is applied. This potential is determined by a combination of factors such as topography and natural resources, social cohesiveness or divisiveness, physical access to markets, the nature and strength of local institutions and traditions of cooperation, and the availability of dynamic local leadership. The importance of these factors, as well as their geographic variations, are well illustrated by the different CBIRD impact areas.

(4) Achieving a sizeable and permanent improvement in the position of the poorest families in virtually any rural area--as distinct from temporary infusions of charitable relief--is a far more difficult task than the currently popular rhetoric suggests. This proved to be the case even in the unusually prosperous circumstances of rural South Korea in the 1970s, despite the best efforts of CBIRD's sponsors. This in no way diminishes the importance of the goal of helping the rural poor, but it does caution against creating unrealistic hopes and expectations that in the end can only lead to disappointment and disillusionment and to making the task even more difficult the next time around.

(5) The pressures from many quarters on the managers of rural development projects to produce quick, visible and quantitatively measurable results tend to create program distortions and to become a major obstacle to achieving equally important qualitative

changes and improvements. There is a crucial message here for decisionmakers and quantitatively-minded program analysts and evaluators of major funding agencies.

The above observations are in no way intended as criticisms of the CBIRD program in South Korea. On the contrary, the fact that CIBRD's managers were able to cope with the realities of the situation, to take such good advantage of the favorable factors in the South Korean context, and to navigate so skillfully around the obstacles, is a tribute to their sensitivity, ability and devotion.

#### HOW THE REPORT WAS PRODUCED

This report is the result of a collaborative effort by two social scientists--an American social anthropologist and a Korean rural sociologist--who were exceptionally well-qualified for the assignment. Professor Vincent S. R. Brandt had studied Korean society for many years and just prior to the present case study had engaged in an extensive case study of the *Saemaul Undong* (New Community Movement) mentioned earlier, which forms an important part of the context of the CBIRD program. Dr. Ji Woong Cheong, Professor of Community Development at the College of Agriculture of Seoul National University, had done numerous previous field studies of rural development in both Korea and the Philippines and already had a first-hand acquaintance with the CBIRD program.

These researchers were encouraged by ICED to give special attention to qualitative evaluation of the CBIRD projects in terms of organizational and interpersonal relationships and environmental adaptations. At the same time they have included extensive quantitative evidence of improvements in productivity, income and social welfare in the impact areas. Of the six CBIRD rural impact areas in Korea, four are described here in some detail. Each of the authors, while responsible for writing about two areas, visited all four in order to obtain a general, comparative perspective.

The data on which the report is based comprise extensive personal observations at the village level, numerous interviews with local leaders and ordinary farmers and fishermen, and long discussions with CDF Coordinators in the field and with the Director and Staff of the SCF/CDF office in Seoul. In addition the authors have consulted and drawn upon the large body of descriptive and statistical documentation compiled by SCF/CDF.

The field research was carried out over several weeks between August and October 1978, during which time the researchers worked closely together exchanging data and observations and discussing conclusions. For logistical reasons, however, the report itself was drafted mainly by Professor Brandt, working on his own, after returning to the United States. Thus, while Dr. Cheong contributed importantly to the substance of the report, Professor Brandt has asked that it be made clear that he personally accepts final responsibility for the views and interpretations expressed in it.

**ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS**

It is my pleasant duty to record here ICED's deep gratitude to all those who contributed importantly to this study, including the villagers and CDF Coordinators in the CBIRD impact areas; the Director of the SCF/CDF Field Office in Seoul, Dr. Melvin E. Frarey, and his staff; other SCF/CDF officials and staff in Westport, Connecticut, especially our former ICED colleague, Dr. Pratima Kale, now SCF/CDF's Program Director for Asia; and the several organizations listed in the front of this report that have been the co-sponsors and financial supporters of the overall ICED research project on "Helping the Rural Poor," of which this case study is a part. ICED is especially indebted to Professor Brandt and Dr. Cheong, the co-authors of this report. I would like to add a special personal expression of appreciation to Professor Brandt for being so tolerant of my sometimes ruthless editorial pencil.

For the sake of the record it should also be made clear that the views expressed in this document are solely the responsibility of ICED and the authors of the report. These views do not necessarily accord with those of the SCF/CDF or of any of the organizations that have co-sponsored and provided financial support to this ICED project.

Philip H. Coombs  
Project Director  
Vice Chairman of I.C.E.D.

## CHAPTER 1

### THE CBIRD CONCEPT AND GOALS

The Save the Children Federation/Community Development Foundation (SCF/CDF) of Westport, Connecticut, U.S.A. has been engaged since 1973 in an innovative, systematic, and highly organized effort to increase rural income and upgrade the quality of village life in South Korea. SCF/CDF, a nonprofit, sectarian, voluntary organization, has appropriately named its Korean program, "Community-Based Integrated Rural Development"(CBIRD).

Funds to support the CBIRD program are obtained from several sources: 1) SCF/CDF funds raised privately in the United States; 2) an Operational Program Grant from the United States Agency for International Development; 3) Republic of Korea Government funds; and 4) contributions and investments by the villagers themselves.

#### BACKGROUND

Save the Children Federation began its work in Korea in 1953 by providing aid to war orphans, widows and refugees. Money contributed by individual American "sponsors" and relief supplies were distributed to the families of needy Korean children during the period of extreme deprivation that followed the Korean War. In particular SCF focused its efforts on uprooted refugee groups in an attempt to preserve family cohesion and stability.

A transition took place after 1957 when SCF established an office of its newly created Community Development Foundation (CDF) in Seoul as its representative in Korea.\* Thereafter aid in the form of cash and relief goods was increasingly converted to self-help support, with CDF providing assistance to poor families in both urban and rural communities. Support spread to encompass children's educational scholarships, family self-help plans, and community improvement projects. In order to increase family productivity, CDF encouraged and assisted farmers in the raising of livestock and the cultivation of cash crop vegetables. For the community as a whole there was support for such public works projects as land reclamation, bridge and reservoir construction, and improved sources of drinking water. From the start SCF/CDF encouraged the maximum

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\*Although the organizational name has since become SCF/CDF, the earlier CDF name is used in this report in the context of CBIRD because this is how it is still popularly known in Korea.

amount of local participation and management in its development projects. P. 1972 various kinds of assistance--to individuals, to families, and to communities--had been furnished to about 7,000 people in some 400 communities.

In 1972 SCF/CDF decided, as the result of a thoroughgoing self-evaluation of its activities, to consolidate the various programs, focusing its main effort on promoting integrated development in clusters of cooperating villages that were called "impact areas." This integrated, "high impact" approach to community improvement was launched in the following three carefully chosen groups of villages: 1) Tong Myon (township or sub-county), Chunsong Gun (county), Kangwon Province; 2) Tong Myon, Yanggu Gun, Kangwon Province; 3) Sanbuk, Yaju Gun, Kyonggi Province.\*

In June 1976 SCF/CDF received from the United States Agency for International Development (US AID) a sizeable Operational Program Grant in partial support of the Korea program. Under provisions of the grant CDF was expected "to establish pilot community-based integrated rural development projects as mini-regional (or small area) development management models, with an ultimate goal, over a five year period, of institutionalizing a process that will improve income, health, education, and community institutions and services for low income rural people." The US AID grant enabled CDF to select three additional island communities off Korea's southwest coast, so that in all there are now six "mini-regional" projects (three island areas and three in the mountainous north central region).\*\*

### *The CBIRD Concept*

In very general terms there are three main aspects of the CBIRD concept that, when taken together, distinguish it from most other development efforts:

- 1) The term, Community Based Integrated Rural Development, represents an attempt to combine the strengths of traditional community development theory and methodology with the advantages of a larger scale, systems oriented, carefully planned and integrated development strategy.
- 2) The unit of development or impact area comprises several villages, roughly corresponding to the lowest level of local bureaucratic administration.

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\*A fourth impact area, not considered in this study, is an urban, low income neighborhood on the outskirts of Seoul; it is inhabited by rural migrants to the city who were formerly squatters.

\*\*US AID/Seoul's funding contribution for the island impact areas during the period June, 1976 through the end of 1978 equalled 16 percent of total investments (including villagers' contributions).

- 3) The CBIRD program is designed to supplement and be integrated with the *Saemaul Undong* (New Community Movement), an intensive program of rural development that is being promoted by the Korean Government throughout the country.

CDF has been prolific and articulate in documenting the aims, methodology, and results of its Community Based Integrated Rural Development (CBIRD) projects.<sup>1</sup> A typical statement follows:

Small area community-based development involves building upon the experience of individual village development with wider concern for inter-village cooperation and systematic planning to create and expand market and employment possibilities, for improvement and utilization of health and educational systems accessible to the villagers, and expansion of credit systems to recycle rural income back into the rural economy. The area size is determined by the linkages, administrative, economically, and socially that are important to the people for a broader development outlook on their needs and resources. Generally, the size of the area encompasses a whole 'myon' (township) including eight to twenty villages and populations from 3,000 to 8,000. CDF has established the project in three island myons off the south-west coast of Korea and in three mountainous areas of the north-east and north-central region of Korea.

In implementing a community based integrated area development program, CDF is introducing and demonstrating skills for improved planning, management and evaluation of economic and social development projects to link macro level development objectives with specifically targetted community goals. The project is designed to involve bottom-up planning and grass-roots representation in the planning process and the implementation of projects with long-range and short-term objectives that reinforce national development plans for increased productivity, income, and improvement of the quality of life for Korean people.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> SCF/CDF, Korea Field Office, *Semi-annual and Annual Reports*, Seoul, Korea, Jan., 1977; July, 1977; Jan., 1978; August, 1978. SCF/CDF Korea Field Office, *Application to AID for Operational Program Grant in Korea*, Seoul, Korea, 1975.

<sup>2</sup> SCF/CDF, Korea Field Office, *Third Semi-annual Report*, Jan., 1978, pp. 1-2.

The general scheme tries to profit from the insights and techniques of the hard-headed economist or systems analyst, while remaining true to basic community development principles. The community development approach has traditionally been people-oriented, with an emphasis on changing values and relationships within a small face-to-face community in order to get things moving. CD practitioners insist that development efforts should be directed at the "felt needs" of a community, and that this can only be achieved by maximizing local participation in decision-making--in the planning and direction of projects. Self help through cooperative effort and the investment of local resources is stressed. And finally there is usually an emphasis on egalitarianism and improving the quality of community life, particularly with regard to the situation of the poor and other deprived groups.

The economist's planned approach to rural development, on the other hand, usually involves both capital inputs and direction from outside the local community, in accordance with a large scale plan that is more concerned with increasing quantifiable measures of production than with such intangibles as human motivation and satisfaction. The plan, which usually covers a relatively large geographic area, is formulated on the basis of more or less rigorous surveys and sophisticated economic and technological analyses of problems to be overcome.

The CBIRD concept combines what are regarded as the strengths of both methodologies. At the same time it recognizes that the actual program operation must take place within the political context of a highly centralized, authoritarian bureaucratic administration. The term, "integrated", in the CBIRD title, then, can be taken to mean that a variety of problems at the village level should be attacked simultaneously, and that local development projects should be mutually reinforcing; but also it encompasses the adoption of a holistic view of village problems within the regional and national economic, sociological, environmental, and administrative setting.

In its theoretical formulations SCF/CDF places great emphasis on local decision-making, and self help. The creation of permanent local organizations capable of planning and implementing various kinds of development projects is regarded as just as important as the actual end results achieved by such projects. This process of "bottom-up" decision-making and management is believed to be superior to centrally planned and directed "top-down" systems imposed on farmers by bureaucrats from outside the villages for two principal reasons: 1) it is alleged that only grass roots participation in the entire process can ensure enthusiastic wide-spread involvement, a correspondence of project goals with locally felt needs, and an equitable distribution of benefits; 2) in the longer term after CDF capital and advisors are no longer available, local initiative and control are necessary in order to ensure that developmental momentum is maintained.

In CBIRD terminology, the "development management model" requires that villagers receive various kinds of training in order to be able to survey local needs themselves, assess capabilities, reach reasonable decisions and carry them out effectively. Accordingly the CBIRD projects all involve extensive programs of nonformal education. In addition to courses in leadership, planning, evaluation and agricultural (or fishing) technology, CDF also trains villagers to manage local credit unions and to operate a system of development loans through a revolving fund, by which increased farm income is recycled into the local village economy. While it is recognized that increases in productivity and income should probably have priority at the initial stages of a rural development program, CDF tries to attack all the major constraints on improving village life, rather than concentrating on any single sector or set of problems.

Thus health care, nutrition, child care, family planning, sanitation, and social/cultural/recreational activities are as much a part of the overall design as projects designed to increase productivity and incomes. In particular, CDF has stressed, both in its general announcements and in formulating specific planning goals, that the CBIRD projects are designed primarily to assist the rural poor, with women and children singled out as the principal beneficiary groups.

These are all conventional community development goals. What is innovative about the CBIRD program is that it is organized to provide an integrated development approach for larger areas, comprising from six to twenty-one villages with populations of from 2,000 to 9,000 persons. There seem to be two main, interrelated advantages to increasing the size of the impact area: 1) it becomes feasible to undertake more ambitious projects in such sectors as public works, education (both formal and nonformal), and health care where large initial investments in trained personnel and facilities are usually required. Also, there is a much larger local resource base to support such projects, both in terms of labor and material contributions; 2) the "mini-regional" area corresponds roughly to the sub-county or myon, which is the lowest Korean administrative unit staffed by full-time government employees. The fact that the local cooperatives and extension service also have offices at the myon level is of great importance. Once a measure of consensus and a willingness to participate in achieving joint goals has been established beyond village boundaries within the impact area, then local leaders can work together with officials in formulating development plans and obtaining additional funding or other kinds of governmental assistance.

Close collaboration with governmental administrative agencies and other outside institutions, both public and private, is an integral part of CDF's method in Korea. The integration of village economies with national markets, the introduction of the latest agricultural and fisheries technology, and the inculcation of efficient methods of local planning and financial management, all require close and constant ties with the more modernized sectors of Korean society.

CBIRD goals in Korea can be summarized then as follows:

- a) To expand the boundaries of the cohesive, cooperating, and developing community from the village to the subcounty or township.
- b) To focus assistance efforts on the rural poor, both by raising incomes and by improving the quality of life through social welfare programs.
- c) To maximize local participation in development planning and management initiatives by mobilizing local energies and resources through effective organization and training.
- d) To integrate rural development efforts with on-going governmental programs and other sources of help outside the village.
- e) To develop techniques that can be applied elsewhere.

The last goal listed above, (e), represents a somewhat different kind of objective as implied by the phrase, "establish... development management models," that was used as part of the rationale for obtaining an Operational Program Grant from AID. Here the emphasis has shifted somewhat from concrete efforts to improve the economic and social situation in particular communities to a more general and abstract goal, that of formulating an organizational structure and method that can be used or built on by those responsible for improving the condition of the rural poor elsewhere.

In analyzing the successes and shortcomings of the CBIRD program in South Korea, we have kept these goals in mind as the principal basis for our evaluation.

## CHAPTER 2

### THE ENVIRONMENTAL SETTING AND IMPACT AREAS

South Korea (the Republic of Korea) has a total land area of about 38,000 square miles (98,500 square kilometers) and a population of about 37,000,000, making it one of the most densely populated countries in the world (374 persons per square kilometer). Less than 25 percent of the land area is arable, however, so that the actual concentration of people, even in rural areas, is much greater. Because winters are fairly cold and dry, double cropping is only possible in the southernmost provinces. However, winter vegetable growing in vinyl greenhouses has been widely adopted in recent years.

Since the Korean War, South Korea has undergone an extraordinarily rapid rate of industrialization, urbanization and economic growth.\* Starting from a predominantly agrarian society, its urban population rose from 28 percent of the total population in 1960 to nearly 55 percent at present, with a corresponding decline in the rural population. The Gross Domestic Product (measured in constant prices) grew at an average annual rate of 8.5 percent between 1960 and 1970, and 10.3 percent from 1970 to 1976. Per capita real income rose at an average annual rate of 7.3 percent from 1960 to 1976, reaching an average of US\$670 per person in 1976. Despite an absolute decline in the agrarian population (due to rapid urban migration and an increasingly effective birth control program), agricultural output grew at an average annual rate of 4.5 percent from 1960 to 1970, and 4.8 percent from 1970 to 1976. However, its share of the total GDP fell from 40 percent in 1960 to 27 percent in 1976 because in the same period industrial production was growing at more than 17 percent a year, boosting its share of the GDP from 19 percent in 1960 to 34 percent in 1976. At present there is an actual shortage of agricultural labor in South Korea--an unusual phenomenon in the developing world.

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\*The statistics in this paragraph are from the World Bank's *World Development Report, 1978*.

In contrast to most other Asian developing countries, the distribution of wealth in South Korea is fairly equitable (comparable to that in the United States).

### RURAL DEVELOPMENT

A thoroughgoing land reform program was carried out in 1949/50. As a result, while over 83 percent of farm families depended to a greater or lesser extent on landlords in 1947, in 1964 (after the reform) the figure had dropped to about 30 percent. During this same period the percentage of completely landless households in the farm population fell from more than 45 percent to about 7 percent.

Although agricultural production rose in the 1960s, its pace picked up in the early 1970s. Grain production since 1973 has increased at a rate of about 7 percent annually, mainly due to the successful adaptation of new varieties of rice and barley to Korean soils and climate. Urban and export demand for agricultural products, particularly cash crops such as fresh vegetables, fruit, and meat, stimulated even greater increases in productivity in some of these crops. While demand is, of course, an essential stimulus, the rise in farm production has only been possible because more fertilizer and pesticides, improved irrigation systems, greatly increased amounts of rural credit, and improved technical knowledge have been made available in recent years.

Increased productivity and rising prices for agricultural products have improved farm income and the farmers' terms of trade. Better transportation, rural electrification and a rapid expansion in educational facilities have also contributed to the rising quality of rural life. In summary, there has been since 1971 a real transformation in rural living standards with average farm household income approaching that of urban workers. Development is the main preoccupation of most Koreans today. In rural areas new crops, new agricultural methods, and dramatic improvements in social infrastructure are characteristic of most villages.

### THE SAEMAUL UNDONG

While the economist tends to see the causes of this rural economic growth and social transformation in such factors as market incentives, improved seed varieties, and the greater availability of agricultural raw materials and services to the farmer, the Korean Government attributes most of the recent progress to the successful implementation, starting in 1971, of its *Saemaul Undong* (New Community Movement). Although the main focus of the New Community Movement has been rural development, it also has another dimension--the fostering of a new ideology.

In recent years social commentators as well as political scientists have deplored the lack of a genuine national ideology in South Korea, maintaining that anti-Communism and the pursuit of material progress were not enough to provide inspiration as national goals and symbols. By 1972 it was apparent that the New Community Movement in its broadest context constituted part of a determined attempt by the Government to fill this ideological gap. The attempt is still being pursued, and strenuous efforts are made to infuse every aspect of life--from garbage collection to poetry writing--with the Saemaul spirit. The Movement adopted "self help, cooperation, and diligence" as its motto, and the President's frequently repeated words, "Let's live better," became a kind of slogan. Building on both the hierarchical and collective traditions, the Movement stressed obedience to expert, paternalistic administrative leadership and an extension of the idea of community to encompass the entire nation. The ideological component was, of course, closely related to the Park Government's objective of expanding and consolidating grassroots political support.

By the winter of 1971-1972 a major effort had been launched to get the majority of farmers in all 35,000 South Korean villages involved in cooperative village improvement projects. Supplies of cement and steel reinforcing rods were made available by the authorities, and villages were encouraged to use them to improve roads, bridges, wells and sanitation facilities. A major program was also launched simultaneously to persuade farmers to replace their thatched roofs with tile, metal or composition. The expectation was that through participation in projects having an immediate impact on the village environment, farmers would realize the benefits of working together during the off season, and a spirit of progressive community activism would be fostered.

Because of unrelenting pressure from the top, bureaucratic efforts to achieve the movement's goals were intense. Saemaul became the main focus of activity for all local administrative agencies, and thousands of other officials from the capital descended on the provinces to inspect, exhort, direct operations, and, to some extent, compete with local officials. The result initially was often confusion and bureaucratic overkill, while the astonished villagers struggled to comply with mounting and sometimes conflicting demands for compliance with various aspects of the overall plan.

In the beginning most farmers distrusted the motives of officials and resented their constant interference in village affairs. After all, nothing good had ever happened to rural society before as a result of closer contacts with the bureaucracy. Where villagers were slow or reluctant to organize for carrying out suggested projects, official pressures were applied that often amounted to direct coercion. For example, if several farmers in a village were reluctant to replace the traditional brush fences around their houses with cement walls, jeep loads of men from the county seat might arrive and simply tear them down. Similarly, there were occasions when house owners who were unwilling to make the

substantial investment necessary to replace their thatched roofs with composition or tile might return home from a market trip to find the thatch gone and their homes open to the sky. Such excesses, which reflected the concern of local officials with producing quick results to please superiors, generated a lot of resentment and cynicism during the first two or three years of the movement.

But since 1973 attitudes in most places have gradually shifted, as farmers discovered that all the excitement and effort did, in fact, result in substantial benefits. Each village is given a rating by the county chief in accordance with its accomplishments, and local pride has in many cases been stimulated to a high competitive pitch among neighboring communities. Where village leadership is in the hands of determined activists, who are also skillful in maintaining good relations with other members of the community, a considerable degree of constructive enthusiasm has usually been generated and sustained. Once the most influential men in a village are committed to pursuing the Movement's goals, others will nearly always follow, and non-conformists are subjected to subtle but extremely effective social censure. As a result, although distrust and reluctance prevailed a few years ago, now most village councils are eagerly drawing up ambitious development plans and begging for official support to help carry them out.

There is a good deal of variation from one village to another, and while some degree of participation exists everywhere, such factors as the quality of leadership, geographic accessibility, the degree of village cohesion (or conversely, of internal division, usually along kinship boundaries), the distribution of wealth, and commercial opportunities for individual profit, all vary from place to place, and all affect the extent and intensity of involvement in collective community efforts.

Nevertheless, in spite of the uneven performance it is undeniable that the Saemaul movement has transformed the appearance of Korean villages, fostered the successful completion of a large variety of cooperative, self-help projects, and promoted more effective working relationships, both among farmers and between farmers and local officials. It has also given villagers a sense of participation in a momentous national effort, with strongly patriotic overtones. Any visitor to rural Korea today can observe the pride in recent achievements and a confidence in the future that were almost entirely absent ten years ago.

The government's claim that it is the New Community Movement that is responsible for bringing about the new rural prosperity, is not entirely convincing. Actually, it has become increasingly difficult to analyze cause and effect in rural development, because the dimensions of the movement as a "nation building" ideology have been expanded to include everything positive that happens in rural society. It seems clear, however, that it is not so much that Saemaul has sparked rural prosperity, as that it has been pushed in a context of relative rural prosperity that is the result mainly of other factors: 1) the widespread successful adoption of new, high-yielding

varieties of rice and to a lesser extent barley; 2) the maintenance of favorable subsidized grain prices by the government; 3) the increased availability of more effective agricultural extension services; 4) the greatly expanded urban market for a wide variety of new cash crops; and 5) improvements in transportation and storage facilities that have made it possible for farmers to engage profitably in commercialized agriculture.

It is in the upgrading of administrative performance by local governmental and semigovernmental agencies and the improvement of institutional linkages and communications between village and city that the Saemaul Movement has probably made its greatest contribution. Pressures from the top to achieve rapid, concrete and dramatically visible results have been so great that in six years the mass of provincial, county and sub-county officials has been forced to change their outlook and working style from that of conservative, self-seeking, formalistic control and *status quo* oriented bureaucrats to that of relatively enthusiastic activists dedicated to a transformation of the countryside. Their careers have been at stake. The highly centralized, authoritarian political system of South Korea has proved to be well adapted for accomplishing this transformation, even though it has never been specifically enunciated as a goal of the Movement.

The Ministry of Home Affairs and its local agencies, the provincial, county and sub-county administrative offices, have generally exercised effective supervision, making sure that the efforts of various other concerned government agencies were integrated in the overall Saemaul Movement. After many years of "fragmented hierarchical programs" South Korea has finally achieved a coordinated administration of rural development policies. The implications for future rural development of such increased local administrative effectiveness are great. In addition there is now a recognition by villagers that technological advice, capital and improved marketing facilities can best be acquired through official channels and the expansion of ties with the national economy. Officials are no longer feared and avoided as in the past, and the social gulf between farmers and bureaucrats has noticeably narrowed.

Some persistent problems remain, however. The poorest farmers and laborers, who have no land or very little land, and who make up about 15 percent to 25 percent of the rural population, are not particularly enthusiastic about the New Community Movement. They complain that while obliged to participate in village public works projects, usually without pay, they receive no benefits comparable to those of landowners whose property is being improved. They must live by their labor, and they insist that "voluntary" collective work is an unfair burden. Also, higher grain prices are of little help to the 40 percent of all farm households whose land holdings are so small that they have little or no marketable surplus.

The long run future of the Movement is somewhat problematic, because of a potential contradiction in values and organizational structure that is inherent in contemporary Korean society. The

Movement's success (but not necessarily further rural development) depends on continuing community solidarity and cooperative effort at a time when individualism and materialism, both as personal ideologies and as patterns of economic behavior, are challenging tradition in every social sector. So far, although exceptions exist in most villages (particularly those near urban areas), traditional patterns of interaction reinforced by outside official support for collective organizations and cooperative effort seems to have resisted or contained the divisive effects of commercial individualism.

The CBIRD program began some two years after the start of the Saemaul Undong, and it would not be an exaggeration to state that it has managed to embed itself within the Saemaul Movement, both at the village level and in terms of the local administrative environment. In any case it is not possible to understand the CBIRD method of operation or evaluate its achievements without considering the general context of contemporary rural development in Korea as outlined above.

### THE CBIRD IMPACT AREAS

Two inland and two island groups of villages are considered in this report. The unit of "community" in the CDF community-based integrated rural development (CBIRD) program ranges from about one-half of a myon (township or sub-county)\* with six villages to a full myon, with twenty-one villages. The two inland or mountainous pilot areas examined here are both parts of a myon, while the two island areas comprise entire myons.

CDF had two criteria for the selection of its impact areas: 1) that they be isolated and "deprived", i.e., relatively impoverished by Korean standards; and 2) that they possess a good potential for development with regard to such factors as cooperation, leadership, and resources.

CDF has been working in the three inland or "mountainous" areas, Yanggu, Chunsong and Sanbuk, since 1973. Of these, all of which are in north central Korea, the latter two are described below. All three of the island projects, Jeungdo, Yaksan, and Wido, were first implemented by CDF in 1977. An account of the programs in Yaksan and Wido is included here.

#### *Sanbuk Area*

This area comprises eight administrative villages (*ri*), each of which is made up of several hamlets or small natural communities.


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\*The myon office with 15 or 20 full time employees is the lowest level of bureaucratic local administration.

Figure 1  
SANBUK AREA




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Kilometers



SANBUK AREA

Key:

-  mountainous areas
-  community center
-  myon branch office
-  primary school
-  middle school
-  village boundary
-  house clusters

There are 562 households with a total population of 3,134. The main occupation is agriculture on some 539 hectares of land, of which only about one-third is irrigated. In addition an important cash crop--fragrant mushrooms--is harvested on the wooded mountain slopes, which make up 83.5 percent of the total land area. The average holding per farm household of arable land is 1.17 ha., which is above both the national average of .94 ha. and the provincial average of 1.14 ha. Yields per hectare for rice are below the national average, however. Average farm household income (some 95 percent of Sanbuk households are agricultural) was about 1.3 million won or \$520 per capita in 1977, which was also below the national average. Land distribution is relatively equitable with the largest land holding amounting to only 4 hectares.

The Sanbuk area is unusual in that the eight villages are surrounded by high mountains, and therefore, although there is easy access from one village to another, the entire district is somewhat isolated from the rest of the myon and county. In fact, because of the mountains and bad bus connections it takes nearly an entire day to reach the myon office (including a ferry ride across the Han river). The county seat, Yoju, is approximately 30 km. to the south, while Seoul is 60 km. to the northwest. Actually, it is easier for Sanbuk residents to travel to two other county seats, Ichon and Yangpyon, than to their own. Because of this geographic isolation and as a result of CDF initiatives, a branch of the Kumsa myon office has recently been established in Sanbuk.

Several observers as well as most of the local residents themselves attribute their readiness to cooperate and the widespread sense of community encompassing all eight villages to the common heritage of deprivation in a context of geographical isolation. There was no regular bus service until 1963, and residents had to walk 12 kilometers to reach the market in the nearest town. Today, however, busses pass through Sanbuk six times daily, so that transportation with the outside world is no longer a significant problem.

Kinship ties among members of a single predominant lineage that includes nearly forty percent of the area's population provide another source of cohesion among the various villages. A disproportionate number of leaders and wealthy farmers belong to this lineage.

In a mountainous country like Korea the grouping of villages in relation to land, as well as the clustering of houses within a village, have an important influence on patterns of interaction and cooperation. In the case of Sanbuk, kinship ties, both through membership in a common lineage and as a result of marriage, provide a structural channel for frequent interaction among the villages. What was previously a sense of solidarity in terms of shared poverty and isolation has been transformed during the past several years into an extraordinarily dynamic cooperative spirit for self improvement. The special topographical situation of Sanbuk as well as the cohesive spirit of its inhabitants were important factors

in its choice as an impact area. While admirably fulfilling the requirements for development potential, it is somewhat difficult to duplicate this situation in other parts of the country.

### *Chunsong*

This impact area includes six administrative ri (twelve natural village communities) located in interconnecting mountain valleys (see map). Jinaeri 1, which is the administrative center of the myon as well as of the CBIRD impact area, is only about 8 kilometers from the provincial capital, Chunchon, a city of more than 250,000 people.

There are 393 households in the area with a total population of 2,080. More than 100 residents work outside the Chunsong area; most of these commute to the nearby capital city.

Of the 394 hectares of arable land, about one-third are irrigated rice fields. The average land holding per farm household is 1.06 hectares, which is a little more favorable than the national average but less than the average for the province. Yields are still rather low, however, because of the relatively severe climate, poor soils, and lack of advanced agricultural technology. The most important crops raised are rice, tobacco, corn, beans, peanuts, and green onions.


Farm household income averaged 1,590,000 won or US\$515 per capita in 1977, which is almost exactly the same as that of Sanbuk. Although this amount is still less than the national average, the gains for both areas in recent years have been slightly better than the average increase for the country as a whole.

The county seat is in the nearby capital city of Chunchon, and transportation is excellent, with buses running every hour from Jinaeri. The other villages are all fairly close and are connected by reasonably good roads. In addition to the myon administrative office, there are offices of the agricultural cooperative, the extension service, and the health service nearby. A primary school is also located in the same village.

The distribution of wealth is fairly equitable except for one village, where it is concentrated in the hands of a single dominant lineage. This village has generally demonstrated less enthusiasm for participation in CBIRD activities than the other five communities. Two of the villages, Jinae 2 and Jinae 3, have cooperated closely with each other and been particularly active in planning and implementing a wide variety of self-help projects under CDF auspices.

While they have not displayed the same sense of community and cooperative spirit at the "mini-regional" level as in Sanbuk, most of the people in the Chunsong area have been taking advantage of available opportunities, particularly in the economic and educational fields. If the most isolated and least progressive

Figure 2  
CHUNSONG



- Key:
- road
  - contours
  - house cluster
  - myon office
  - community center
  - primary school
  - stream
  - Cooperative
  - rice fields

village--the one with a single dominant lineage and particularly unequal land distribution--is omitted from the averages, then the pace of development for Chunsong is well above the national average, despite disadvantages of the environment.

Ninety-five percent of all houses in the area have electricity. Only 12 percent of farm house roofs are still made of straw thatch; more significantly, composition roofs are rapidly being replaced with the more expensive and prestigious tile. And there are 71 telephones for 376 households, which is a much higher rate than is usual in the Korean countryside. A significant statistic that testifies to the energy, ambition, and solid economic base of the area is the number of primary school students (free, obligatory education) that goes on to middle school, a substantial expense for farmers. In Chunsong 87 percent of children in the appropriate age group attend middle school, compared to a national average of 79 percent.

#### *Wido Island Area*

The Wido impact area comprises all of Wido myon (sub-county) in Buan *Cun* (county), North Cholla Province. In addition to the main island of Wido there are four other inhabited islands in the group. The total population is about 4,500, 80 percent of which lives on the main island. The total land area of the inhabited islands is 1,414 hectares, of which 76 percent is mountainous, 1.3 percent irrigated rice fields, 13 percent dry fields, and 10 percent is used for houses, roads, or other purposes. Average land holdings are very small (only about one-third the national average), and the great majority of households have less than half a hectare. Table 1 shows the distribution of land ownership. The islanders all know that the crops produced in any given year on Wido are only sufficient for about three months local consumption. Farm technology and productivity is low, both because of the lack of an extension service (until 1977), and because most of the population is not primarily interested in farming as an occupation: nearly every household also engaged in fishing, either in their own small boats or as employees on larger fishing boats. Table 2 shows the number of fishing boats by kind and village.

Average household income in 1976 was, according to CDF's 1977 survey, only 748,000 won, or \$275 per capita, about half that of Sanbuk. Fishermen have many different sources of income, however, and it is extremely difficult for the outsider to obtain accurate data. Also, the averages for Wido as a whole are pulled down because of the much greater poverty of the inhabitants on the other, smaller islands. In any case the situation has improved greatly during the last two years (1977 and 1978) because of larger fish catches and higher prices paid for fish.

On Wido island itself there is a much more inequitable distribution of wealth than in most agricultural communities on the mainland.




Figure 3  
WIDO ISLANDS

**Table 1**  
**Number of Farm Households on Wido by**  
**Size of Cultivated Land**

Land Size (hectare)	Farming Households	
	Number of	Percent
less than 0.1	66	10.6
0.1 - 0.3	266	42.6
0.3 - 0.5	203	32.5
0.5 - 1.0	83	13.3
1.0 - 1.5	6	1.0
1.5 - 2.0	1	0.2
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>625</b>	<b>100.2</b>

**Table 2**  
**Number of Fishing Boats on Wido,**  
**by Type and Village**

Village	Engine Powered			Without Power
	Large	Medium	Small	
Jin-ri	0	10	5	18
Beol-geum	4	7	0	26
Chi-do	0	0	20	0
Pajang-geum	0	3	0	9
Dae-ri	0	17	43	0
Jeong-geum	0	0	0	7
Sikdo	1	11	10	0
Georyun-do	0	2	0	2
Sang-wang-do	0	0	1	8
Hawang-do	0	0	0	2
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>79</b>	<b>73</b>

Source: Wido Myon Office Report, 1978

The *ten ri* (administrative villages), five of which are on the main island, are quite distinct from each other in terms of their topographical situation, amounts of arable land, access to marine resources, community cohesiveness, and other aspects of local tradition. For example, Jinri is the myon's administrative center where public agencies are located. Nearby Polgum has a deep water harbor and a good beach with considerable potential for tourism. Pajangum is two kilometers to the northeast and has a large sheltered harbor used by hundreds of mainland boats as a base during the fishing seasons. As a result there is a large and prosperous entertainment industry located there. Daeri, six kilometers southwest of Jinri has the best anchovy resources of the island and a somewhat closed solidarity that is expressed in strong folklore traditions and a reluctance to cooperate with other communities. Jonggum, a presque isle connected to Wido by a narrow strip of land at low tide, and Sikdo have demonstrated strong collective efforts in accomplishing self help projects. The small communities on the other islands are also distinctive, but they are insignificant both in size and in terms of the CBIRD program. (See map.)


There is a regular daily ferry service between Wido and the mainland that takes two to three hours depending on the weather. The mainland port is also rather isolated, however, and another seven hours of travel is necessary to reach Seoul. Transportation on Wido is poor, as there are only narrow steep rocky paths and roads. There are no motorized vehicles and only a few bicycles. It takes about 1-1/2 hours on foot to go from Daeri to the boat landing at Beolgeum. Except for the three villages that surround the main harbor, regular ferry transportation among the villages by small boat is impracticable, because of the lack of landing piers.

Although there are widespread kinship ties among the villages as a result of intermarriage, there are no strong cohesive lineage organizations on Wido.

### *Yaksan*

Yaksan myon is a single island about 9 kilometers long and 5 kilometers wide off the South Coast of Korea in Wando county, South Cholla Province. It comprises 21 villages with a total population of about 9,000 persons. Even though the island is extremely mountainous, the population density of 376 persons per square kilometer is higher than for the county or for the nation as a whole. The average arable land holding is less than half a hectare, of which about 40 percent is rice land. Most households (1,299 out of 1,478) are engaged in both farming and fishing.

Because of the shortage of land and a consequent concentration on fishing, agriculture is not particularly well developed. The major crops are rice, barley, soy beans, potatoes, and vegetables, but production is insufficient for the island's needs. In addition, pigs and goats are raised. The average income per farming household from agriculture is about 500,000 won (US\$1,000).



- Key:**
-  house cluster
  -  pier
  -  road
  -  trail
  -  myon office
  -  Community Center  
(proposed site)
  -  primary school
  -  middle school

Figure 4  
YAKSAN

Income from ocean products--the cultivation and gathering of seaweed is more important than fishing--is much greater than from agriculture. The average per household income from this source is over 1,300,000 won (US\$2,700). This average figure is misleading, however, because much of the income from seaweed production goes to large, wealthy operators.

With only 15 households owning more than 1-1/2 hectares, the land distribution is relatively equitable for the island as a whole. As a result of the varied topographical situation, however, some villages, particularly the eight prosperous communities on the northern side of the island, have much more land than the others. So here again average figures are misleading. The same situation exists with regard to fishing and seaweed cultivation. Some areas have access to much better ocean resources than others. As a result there is, with a couple of exceptions, a relatively sharp division on the island between the poor villages along the west and south coasts and the prosperous villages (which have average household incomes much higher than the national average) to the north and northeast (see map where the names of the prosperous villages have been underlined).

There are also differences among the villages with regard to the distribution of income gained from the sea. While there are many small cultivators of seaweed, its processing is mostly in the hands of a relatively few wealthy men. On the other hand, the ownership of small motor boats for fishing is widely distributed.

Over 90 percent of the houses have electricity, and in 1978 there were 637 television sets or one for every 2-1/2 households. Although the island has 75 telephones, they are unevenly distributed, so that some villages are still without telephone communication.

In addition to the myon office, there is a farm cooperative and a fishery cooperative on the island. A public health office building exists, but at present (1978) it is not staffed.

There are 3 primary schools, 3 small branch primary schools, and one middle school on Yaksan. Just under 80 percent of eligible students attend middle school, which is close to the national average.

#### GENERAL OBSERVATIONS ON THE IMPACT AREAS

If we are to evaluate CDF's contribution to development through its CBIRD program, some allowance must be made for various aspects of the natural setting. Or to put it somewhat differently, the process of change in each area must be examined in relation to environmental factors.

In addition to their later start in the CDF program (only two years ago) the island communities present some special problems that make rigorous comparisons with the mainland areas difficult.

Koreans have traditionally regarded fishermen with contempt, and most small island villages have with few exceptions been relatively poor. In recent years, however, the higher demand and better prices for sea products have brought relative economic prosperity wherever ocean resources are abundant. But the distribution of wealth is generally somewhat more uneven in Korean fishing communities than in inland agricultural areas; and this tendency has been reinforced as owners of boats, nets, and seaweed producing facilities have taken advantage of the improved opportunities. Accordingly, the gap between rich and poor has widened. It is axiomatic, in Korea at least, that such concentration of wealth within small communities makes the organization of cooperative self help activities more difficult.

Another set of more general and intangible contrasts can be hazarded to distinguish the inland and island areas. Farmers tend to be less geographically and occupationally mobile, conforming more to tradition in a variety of economic and social matters. Accordingly the pace of change in agricultural villages is relatively slow and consistent, if not predictable. Fishermen, whose livelihood is closely tied to mainland markets, are less committed to any particular activity or place. In addition to small scale subsistence farming they are engaged in seaweed cultivation, the gathering of oysters and various kinds of fishing, depending on available resources and current market opportunities.

The potential economic rewards for inter-village planning and cooperative effort in building, for example, a reservoir, irrigation or flood control facilities, or roads and bridges are immediately apparent to the farmer. In the two CBIRD island areas, however, the current prosperity of the fishing sector is absorbing much of the available energy; the fishing economy tends to focus villagers' attention on their own harbors, boats, nets, fishing grounds, and markets rather than on the need for cooperation with neighboring communities. At the same time the fisherman's lack of strong ties to the land, his dependence on manufactured goods (engines/fuel/nets) and his involvement in national and export markets, make him particularly sensitive both to the need to acquire the latest technological skills and the requirement that he engage in capitalistic entrepreneurship. Thus, there is a real sense in which fishermen, despite their physical isolation, are being swept along by the processes of social change accompanying economic development even faster than farmers. There seems to be a paradox, however. On the one hand fishermen are more mobile physically in the sense that they are usually more willing than the farmer to change their residence and occupational activity according to economic exigency, while on the other hand fishing villages tend to retain a more closed and ingrown type of isolated solidarity.

The importance of mass communications and transportation for development, particularly in relatively inaccessible areas, is undoubtedly great. The fact that Yaksan is almost completely electrified, which permits the operation of large numbers of television sets, means that island residents are being rapidly indoctrinated in

national popular culture. Even on Wido the isolation is far from complete, since almost every household possesses a transistor radio.

Transportation to and from the island areas is a good deal more difficult, of course, than in mainland rural areas, because passenger boat service is limited. Yaksan, however, is fairly close to the mainland and to other well populated islands, so that ferry service to several different villages is quite frequent. Also, the fact that so many households have boats, while the surrounding waters are mostly sheltered, means that transportation is not a serious problem. Wido, however, is much more inaccessible.

The Yaksan and Wido islands are both mountainous, so that land travel among most of the villages is difficult. While roads have been improved recently as a result of Saemaul and CDF initiatives (using local cooperative labor), there has not yet been time to observe how much this has helped to broaden traditional village feelings of solidarity so as to include a larger geographical area.

South Korea is a small country with a racially homogeneous population. Throughout the peninsula people speak the same language, share a common belief system, wear the same clothes, eat the same kinds of food, and observe most of the same customs. There is a general pattern of rural social organization that is, with few exceptions (e.g., Cheju Do), repeated everywhere. Yet the variations--economic, environmental, social/psychological, and structural--that distinguish different regions as well as communities within the same region have a significant relation to the pace and kinds of developmental processes that are going on.

## CHAPTER 3


# ORGANIZATION: STRUCTURE, LINKAGES AND ROLES

### *Local Administration*

As noted earlier, CDF decided in 1973 that its development effort should be organized on a larger scale than the single agricultural village. One important reason was the need to establish and maintain close ties with local administrative agencies in planning and implementing projects, since integration with the Saemaul Movement was a necessary condition for success on both political and economic grounds. The myon (township or sub-county), which is the lowest level of local administration, was a logical and, in terms of size, manageable unit on which to base the CBIRD structure. The myon usually comprises anywhere from eight to twenty-one administrative villages with a total population of from 3,000 to 10,000 persons. In each myon there is an administrative office (Home Ministry), an agricultural extension office (Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries), an agriculture and/or fisheries cooperative (National Cooperatives Federation), and a health office (Ministry of Health and Social Welfare). In addition there are the primary schools and a middle school (Ministry of Education), the post office, and a unit of the national police. Each of these agencies is the bottom link of a large national bureaucracy with its own chain of command, system of communications, and operating procedures that extend from Seoul down through the provincial and county administrative levels. There are also local political party heads--wealthy and influential residents--who have their own formal and informal links to the sources of authority in Seoul.

All of these representatives of the central power structure (except for the outlying primary schools) are grouped fairly closely together near the myon administrative office (*myon samuso*). The head of this office, the *myon chang*, has the highest formal, bureaucratic prestige and authority in the area. It is his responsibility to coordinate the efforts of all the agencies within his jurisdiction in order to promote the development and economic well being of the myon. Since the beginning of the New Community Movement (Saemaul Undong) in 1971, he has been under intense pressure from his superiors at the county administrative office (*gun ch'ong*) to produce fast results in readily observable, quantitative terms. To the extent

Figure 5  
ORGANIZATION OF CHUNSONG COMMUNITY COMMITTEE



that outside voluntary agencies such as CDF assisted him in this task, he welcomes their support. He also usually is glad to have a separate source of public relations outside of official channels that can call attention on a national scale to special accomplishments in his myon.

In choosing the mainland CBIRD sites, CDF has established its base of operations near the official administrative agencies, but has included only a portion of the myon (6 villages at Chunsong and 8 villages at Sanbuk) in the impact areas. Both sociological and environmental factors were taken into consideration in defining these limits so that there would be a good potential for development. In the case of the Yaksan and Wido islands, however, each myon was a single clearly demarcated unit set off from the rest of the country, and accordingly, CDF decided, in order to avoid obvious discrimination and at the suggestion of the Korean authorities, to include the entire myon in its project area. However, the inclusion in the island impact areas of villages that are quite diverse economically, and that do not have easy physical access to each other, has made the achievement of cooperation on a multi-village basis difficult. CDF has discovered that insularity is not necessarily congruent with unity or a sense of community. Also, the much larger size of the island areas has inevitably diluted the "high impact" of CDF programs.

#### *CBIRD Institutions*

CDF has approached the problem of promoting and institutionalizing balanced integrated development on the basis of local needs and goals, by establishing a CBIRD organizational system in each impact area, which comprises three main elements: 1) the Community Committee, 2) a Field Coordinator, and 3) the Community Center.

1) *The Community Committee*. (see chart) is the decision-making body. It is elected and is supposed to represent a cross section of the population from each village. In practice it is made up of village leaders and other men of influence, energy and good reputation. In addition, at the insistence of CDF it includes a number of women representatives. This group, with the encouragement and advice of the Coordinator,

formulates long range development goals, as well as an annual development plan, and it also assists in the implementation and evaluation of projects and activities. The Committee is thus responsible for overseeing all programs in the area including specific projects, finances, management, coordination, etc., in cooperation with the Field Coordinator sent from CDF office. (All quotes from CDF documents.)

The Committee usually consists of from 20 to 25 members under the direction of a Chairman, a vice chairman (sometimes there is another, female vice chairman), a full time, paid secretary-treasurer, two auditors, and a paid clerk. As a rule members serve

for two years, and the Committee meets once a month, but such procedural matters are determined by the Committee itself.

Annual meetings, at which project planning and budgeting for the subsequent year is determined, may go on for two days or even longer, while the monthly meetings to cope with the various problems and changes that occur in the course of the year may take only a half day. "The committee formulates regulations for organization and operation which are submitted to the people along with financial statements in annual general meetings."

The actual composition of the Community Committee is determined locally in accordance with what appears to be the most equitable representation of village opinion and interests. At Yaksan the Committee is made up of the village heads of all 21 villages on the island plus the Chairman and Vice Chairman. In Wido there is a kind of proportional representation with three committee members from each of the three largest villages, two from each of the other villages on Wido itself, and one each from the four small communities on outlying islands. On the mainland Chunsong and Sanbuk both have the same system. Each village has two committee members (three for Chunsong), and in addition there are the two officers and several women representatives. For each village with more than one member the village head is invariably included, and the other representatives are "elected", which usually means appointment by consensus decision rather than formal vote.

The four permanent sub-committees of the Community Committee are, Children, Youth, Women, and Income Increase (or productivity). The sub-committee on children supervises the operation of day care centers for pre-school children, and the youth committee assists the various 4H clubs of member villages, also organizing sports events between villages or local associations. The women's sub-committee encourages such programs as "rice saving" (building up small family savings by decreasing daily rice consumption), the operation of a women's credit union, the provision of meals for day care centers, and in some areas women's joint, cash crop farming. In implementing projects that deal with health care, nutrition, and family planning, the women's sub-committee either organizes its own meetings and training sessions or tries to revitalize such existing organizations as the Mothers' Club and the Women's Club. The income increase sub-committee provides organizational and material support as well as advice to a number of individuals and local groups, e.g., associations for cattle and pig raising, dairy farming, seaweed cultivation, mushroom growing, apple cultivation, green house construction, credit unions, and other financial organizations.

Special temporary sub-committees are established to deal with currently urgent projects such as electrification, flood control, irrigation, bridge construction, and telephone installation. These sub-committees must approach the appropriate government authorities for approval and financial support; in addition they seek advice and assistance from non-governmental experts.

2) *The Field Coordinator* is "a qualified and trained field worker of CDF" who is chosen in consultation with the local administration.

He organizes the Committee initially and works in close cooperation with it subsequently, providing continuing advice on the planning, implementation, and evaluation of projects, as well as on finances. He gives continued support and guidance to facilitate the effective operation of the program and tries to better acquaint the community with available outside resources and ideas.

It is essential that he provide an effective link between the Committee and local official agencies, so as to obtain their support and make sure that the Committee's efforts are integrated with other developmental goals. He also has responsibility for organizing training programs, and he supervises the keeping of descriptive and financial records, making periodic reports to the CDF field office in Seoul.

New recruits for the job are ordinarily given three months intensive training by CDF followed by a period during which they work under an experienced Coordinator in an established impact area. The coordinator lives in the impact area during the first few years of operation of the CBIRD program, until the Community Committee and its chairman are able to function without constant supervision and guidance. Thereafter, he visits the area frequently, consulting with local officials and committee officers as well as participating in important meetings and social events. Successful implementation of the CBIRD program probably depends more on the Coordinator's skill than on any other single factor. Ideally, he should be a diplomat, a charismatic mobilizer of men and women, and a practical trouble shooter. Further discussion of the Coordinator's role follows below under *Roles and Relationships*.

3) *The Community Center* is a building or group of buildings that is owned by and registered in the name of the Committee. It is located near the myon office and other administrative agencies so as to be as accessible as possible to all people in the CBIRD area. The design and construction is carried out with the idea that future additions will be made to the building as the Committee expands its activities and the number of community organizations under its aegis increases. In addition to the office of the Coordinator and full time Committee officials, the center is used for committee meetings, training sessions, workshops, ceremonies, and recreational events. It may also house a day care center, a credit union, a club for the elderly, a small office of an official agency such as the extension service branch. It is up to the Committee to determine how best to use the Center so as to make it the focus for developmental activism in the wider community.

The Korea Office of SCF/CDF has strongly urged the Community Committees to build their Community Centers in traditional style with heavy curving tiled roofs, even though this type of construction is more expensive. The general idea seems to have been that such a uniquely Korean building with all its associations of upper class authority and aesthetic beauty would inspire a great pride in local citizens. And in fact the Community Center at Sanbuk, which built in this style, is the most intensively and constructively utilized of all the Centers. Its functions have been incorporated into the daily lives of local residents, who for the most part do appear to have a sense of proprietorship--a feeling that they share in its ownership and operation. Furthermore there is little doubt that Sanbuk Center is built solidly with local materials and will stand as either a monument or symbol to people of the village for generations to come.

On the other hand, pragmatic modernists (and there are a great many such people in the Korean countryside today) favor westernized efficiency--in this case maximum accommodation for the least cost. At Chunsong, for example, there is also, at least among the elite, local pride in the fact that the Community Center, a modern building, is able to house so many different organizations with so many different functions under one roof. Nevertheless, the mood of the center is somewhat more bureaucratic and formal than at Sanbuk, with fewer visits by ordinary farmers and women. While it is manifestly impossible to reach any solid conclusions with regard to the importance of an intangible factor such as building design in the mix of variables that contribute to community spirit, there is a hint here that greater attention should be paid to the subtler, psychological ingredients of local morale, instead of concentrating entirely on concrete measures of social and material progress.

The following principles are stressed by CDF for the Center's operation: 1) The Center is to be used to promote the economic and social benefit of all the villagers in an integrated manner, without giving undue emphasis to any one area, group, or type of project. 2) There should be more emphasis on fostering self help efforts by the villagers than in providing services or aid from outside. 3) The Center should be used to encourage systematic cooperation and joint activities with other agencies in the area, rather than focussing on independent CDF projects.

As an example there are listed below the events taking place in a typical summer month at the Chunsong Community Center:

Date	Name	Sponsoring Agency	No. of Participants
July 9	4-H Club	Rural Guidance Office (extension)	15
12	Day Care Center Committee	Community Committee	10
14	Governing Board of Women's Bank	Women's Bank	12
14	Women's Bank Context	Women's Bank	80

Date	Name	Sponsoring Agency	No. of Participants
July 14	Welcome Party for University Medical Service Team	Community Committee	30
17	Tong Myon Integrated Development Conference	Tong Myon (Chunsong) Committee	13
21	Civil Defense Drill	Tong Myon (Chunsong) Office	70
23	Evaluation of Training Programs	Community Committee	8
24	Evaluation and Planning Meeting for Saemaul Activities	Tong Myon Office	70
27	Tong Myon Elders	Tong Myon Elders Committee	50
28	Mothers' Meeting for Day Care Center	Kasan Day Care Center	35
29	Monthly Meeting	Community Committee	16

One of the best indications of how effective the CBIRD program has been in any given area is the amount of activity that goes on in the Community Center. Where, in addition to regularly scheduled meetings, the Center becomes a place in which there is frequent informal personal interaction and an on-going exchange of ideas on a variety of matters affecting development in the entire area, then the Center's purpose as the focus of cooperative efforts is probably being realized. Both the sense of popular involvement and of common proprietorship are expressed through continuing, frequent use of the building.

#### RELATIONS WITH OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

One kind of formal linkage between the CBIRD structure and other organizations and agencies in the myon is provided through a local Advisory Committee, which is organized by the Coordinator and the Community Committee. (See Fig. 5.) It comprises the myon chief (myon branch chief in Sanbuk), the head of the agricultural cooperative and/or fisheries cooperative, the head of the Rural Guidance Office (extension service), the police chief, the post office head, the school principals, ex-chairmen of the Community Committee, and other influential men. The Coordinator is naturally anxious to obtain the administrative, material, and social support of such local dignitaries for the work of the Community Committee, and whenever a person is newly appointed to one of these offices, he is asked to serve on the advisory committee and then briefed at some length regarding the CBIRD operation.

The most crucial link for everyday implementation of the program is between the CBIRD structure and the myon office. The Coordinator tries to make sure that both the county (gun) and myon officials are involved with him in joint planning and funding for development, i.e., that CBIRD is incorporated in Sae-maul plans. In this way local officials can participate in and take some credit for CDF accomplishments, while Korean Government funding is made available to the Community Committee for multi-village projects. In 1978 the Korean Government contributed a larger share of outside funding support to CBIRD projects than did CDF. CDF comments, "this is an achievement of the joint planning efforts by local government and the people with motivational and technical support from the CDF field coordinator."

In addition to the Coordinator's diplomatic skill and persuasiveness in dealing with myon officials, constructive relations with the bureaucracy also depend on high level contacts with the national centers of power. The director and staff of the SCF/CDF Korea Field Office in Seoul maintain contacts with the President's office, the Economic Planning Board, and the Ministries of Home Affairs, Agriculture and Fisheries, Health and Social Welfare, and Education. As a result of these initiatives at the top, provincial, county, and myon officials have been instructed by the Home Minister to cooperate with CDF in local development projects, and petitions from CBIRD areas, particularly Wido, for larger scale government investments have been favorably acted upon. Officials at the provincial, county and myon levels have participated in CDF training courses and visited the impact areas to observe actual accomplishments. In this way, as well as through various kinds of mass media publicity, CDF has been able to focus attention on the special problems that exist in remote areas, particularly the islands. The institutionalization of local planning, decision making, and the direction of projects through the Community Committee has given provincial and county officials confidence that their investments will be effectively utilized.

The Korean Government is also interested in the CBIRD program as a source of new ideas and practices that might be incorporated in national development policies. CDF training methods, the mechanisms for establishing revolving funds and providing credit, as well as the overall concept of a small area or multi-village planning and funding unit, are under consideration as possible models for the modification of national programs.

### ROLES AND RELATIONSHIPS

The new institutional structure created by CBIRD to achieve its goal of organizing integrated development on a multi-village or small regional basis, requires that villagers modify certain attitudes and roles, entering into different kinds of relationships. Previous patterns of authority, loyalty, and association had been closely integrated with the traditional, closed, cohesive village structure,

and Coordinators encountered considerable initial resistance to change. In the beginning there was a tendency for relations between the Community Committee and the village power structures to reflect a certain amount of rivalry and jealousy, both over positions on the Committee and regarding the division of available funds. The idea that the total pie was limited, and that one village could only profit at the expense of another, was firmly rooted in rural thinking. Village elites, whose economic and social base had usually been narrowly confined to one small community, were reluctant at first to commit themselves to the new institutions. In addition to their farming tasks there were the incessant demands of the Saemaul Movement, so that established leaders were unwilling to take on new responsibilities. Where this occurred, the Coordinator usually had to go ahead with younger, less prestigious men who were more receptive to change.

Only very gradually as the Coordinator continued to preach his message, and as a few initial projects brought good results, was there increasing acceptance of the idea of several villages joining together in development efforts. Without substantial outside capital inputs from CDF it would have been much more difficult, if not impossible, to get things started. Some Coordinators found it expedient to direct the initial benefits from such projects as cow raising or house repair to village leaders, in order to ensure their enthusiastic participation in the program.

The construction of the Community Center as a tangible symbol of the CBIRD ideal appears to have been something of a turning point in overcoming village parochialism. The fact that the new centers involved joint planning, the mobilization of labor from every village, and the subsequent diversified use for the benefit of the entire impact area has helped to consolidate the idea of inter-village cooperation.

The role of the Coordinator is, of course, especially important during the early phase. He has great influence--amounting almost to control--over the Committee's decisions regarding the expenditure of CDF funds, and he must use this influence wisely, e.g., by urging the Committee to give the best cow to the chairman if necessary, or by opposing extravagant plans that have little prospect of immediate success.

On the other hand, as an outsider it would be counterproductive for him to take too strong a stance in dealing with local leaders. He should exercise guidance as indirectly and subtly as possible, so as to foster the Committee's ability to discuss projects intelligently, resolve conflicting claims, and take effective action on its own. The Committee should not only have responsibility for decision making; it should accept responsibility for failures. Too much dependence on the Coordinator is bound to inhibit the development of a self-sustaining Committee that commands support and respect throughout the area.

If people think the Coordinator can do anything he wants, a number of aggressive individuals will invariably try to get him to support their own private goals, which are likely to be mutually contradictory. Or if local officials find that he is the key man in successfully carrying out Saemaul projects, he will be under intense pressure to achieve their targets for them at the earliest possible date. He must therefore maintain a certain distance as a neutral, objective advisor, guiding people to do things for themselves while avoiding direct responsibility.

The Coordinator cannot remain entirely objective and neutral in his personal relationships, however. The kind of influence over people that is described above is only possible if there is a considerable degree of genuine warmth and respect, and this takes time to establish. He must be able to get along with people of all types and social levels. His character and behavior are under constant, intense scrutiny, particularly when he first arrives in the area. Any moral lapse (one Coordinator was replaced because of a scandalous romance with the Committee clerk) or violation of etiquette will seriously impair his influence and effectiveness.

All of these personality characteristics, including even the Coordinator's style of speaking, are important. His role is to preach a somewhat radically new ideology to the effect that everyone in the larger multi-village community can benefit only if all work together for common goals rather than just for the advantage of their own households or village. For this kind of missionary activity a certain charisma is necessary; once the Coordinator has succeeded in gaining the respect and affection of local residents, then all aspects of the program seem to be easier to accomplish.

Another key role in the CBIRD system is that of the Community Committee Chairman. He is a prominent local citizen elected by the Committee to lead the village representatives in their effort to plan and carry out development projects on a regional basis. He is the main link between the Coordinator and the local population, and he also formally represents the CBIRD area in dealing with the bureaucracy or other outside agencies.

Each village chief in Korea has direct relations with the myon office on Saemaul and other administrative affairs, so that there is a built-in potential for rivalry between village heads and the Committee Chairman, who deals with the local authorities as the representative of several villages on CBIRD matters. If there is widespread confidence in the ability and fairness of the Chairman, however, the several village heads are usually glad to delegate as much of their time-consuming and onerous duties to him as possible, so that a respected Chairman becomes in fact a kind of *de facto* representative of the entire area on most development matters.

On the basis of CDF experience in Korea and by making very broad (and crude) distinctions, one can define four different general types of Chairman: 1) the authoritarian activist; 2) the

respected and energetic leader; 3) the ordinary farmer of good reputation; 4) the honorary officeholder. At various times Community Committees have chosen chairmen who represent variations on all four types, but the job of the Coordinator is made much easier if he is lucky enough to work with type number two, "the respected and energetic leader."

Of course prestige is always an important incentive, since Chairmen receive no salary. It is appropriate in the East Asian tradition that a man of means, ambition, and ability should, as he gets older, devote himself to the general welfare without thought of remuneration. He and his entire family then receive added status from this role. But today the effective Chairman (or village chief in most other Korean villages) must also be a determined activist, deriving satisfaction from the achievement of practical development goals.

Either of the first two types listed above can be effective as chairman, although the authoritarian approach may provoke opposition and exacerbate existing divisions. The third type, the ordinary respectable farmer, may be too busy with his own farming or fishing activities to devote the necessary time to CBIRD matters. And such a person, if he lacks a high school education or special strength of character, may depend too much on the Coordinator, acting more as figurehead than as leader.

Unfortunately, candidates of the fourth type, the honorary officeholder, are not lacking in Korea. Such obvious and widely recognized qualifications as wealth, higher education, and important connections are hard to ignore when people are being chosen for important or prestigious posts, even though the primary interest or talent of such a person may have little or nothing to do with rural development.

Once a progressive style of chairmanship has been firmly established in an impact area, it seems to be easier to maintain the momentum, even though the position itself is rotated every two years or so. It then becomes possible for the Coordinator to play a less conspicuous role, as Chairman and Committee members learn to plan and implement projects within the broader, multi-village environment. The start-up period, i.e., the first six months or so during which CBIRD institutions are established, appears to be crucial in determining local attitudes, procedures, and precedents.

It is an obvious condition for effective performance in planning and implementing development projects that the three key figures on the local scene--the Coordinator, the Committee Chairman, and the sub-county chief (myon chang)--should get along well together. Unfortunately, interpersonal tensions do sometimes arise, and the program invariably suffers as a result.

In contemporary Korea the government has promoted youthful, dynamic village leadership as an integral part of the Saemaul

Movement. When innovations are introduced, there has been some tendency for older, well-established, more conservative farmers to hold back, waiting to assess the results. These informal leaders tend to get more involved in community development efforts, only as the success of the new methods becomes apparent. This same linkage between the adoption of successful innovations and the increased community involvement or public spiritedness of older village elites is also evident in the CBIRD program. When it occurs there is a significant strengthening of the institutional base for development.

### VILLAGE ORGANIZATIONS

In each village there are several organizations established by governmental order to accomplish development goals. The situation varies, of course, from one place to another, but there is a strong tendency for many of these, such as the Mothers Club, the Farm Improvement Club, the Forestry Association, the 4-H Club, or the Women's Club to exist only on paper, or when prodded into temporary activity by local officials. CDF usually tries to encourage such activities, both at the village level and in a regional context, by providing a meeting place, technical advice, and sometimes material support.

As a result of the Saemaul Movement two organizations, the Village Development Committee and the Village Bank or credit union now function more or less continuously, depending on local leadership and the extent of activism in the community. Village Development Committees comprising both formal and informal local leaders, have the main responsibility for planning and implementing Saemaul projects in accordance with the general wishes of the community. The village representatives to the Community Committee are likely to be also members of the Village Development Committee (the village chief invariably is), and this overlap in membership linking the village to the impact area helps ensure that decisions and commitments made under CBIRD auspices will in fact be carried out. It also helps ensure that Community Committee decisions are based as much as possible on responsible grass roots opinion.

The village banks usually suffer from lack of managerial skills and a shortage of funds, forcing farmers and fishermen to continue to rely on usurious loans for a portion of their credit needs. CDF is encouraging the amalgamation of several such small banks into stronger multi-village financial organizations. Training is provided for the bank staff, while the Community Committee makes a portion of its revolving fund available as bank capital.

### RELATIONS WITH OTHER ORGANIZATIONS IN KOREA

CDF has been extremely active in developing contacts with, and utilizing the services of, many other semi-public, and international organizations in the development field. There have been

numerous inspection trips, joint workshops and study groups with such agencies of the United Nations as the Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, the UNDP Asia Center for Training, UNICEF, and UNESCO.

Discussions of particular problems have been held with experts from such national Korean Organizations as the Korea Development Institute, the National Social Workers Training Center, the Korea Institute of Family Planning, the National Agricultural Technical Association, and the Korean Society for the Study of Education. CDF has hired a number of university professors and their research assistants to carry out surveys and provide assistance in refining the CBIRD long term programs. Coordinators obtain help from expert consultants on the technical aspects of particular projects in their impact areas.

University medical teams have carried out surveys in the CBIRD areas on nutrition, public health and medical care. They have also operated temporary dental and medical clinics in the impact areas with a view to developing a comprehensive rural medical service program in the future.

There has been frequent discussion and collaboration with other voluntary agencies operating in the field of Korean rural development. Private business and trading (import-export) firms are consulted on a continuing basis with regard to the technical and economic feasibility of such varied matters as the introduction of new agricultural products, cattle breeding, and the installation of boat engines.

CDF has also established an advisory committee of prominent Koreans and Westerners in Seoul, which has been able to raise over \$15,000 for CDF projects in 1978. Because of the interest that has been generated in the CBIRD development projects, CDF staff are obliged to spend a good deal of their time briefing foreign and Korean visitors and taking them on tours of inspection to the impact areas.

## CHAPTER 4

### THE PLANNING PROCESS

The CBIRD areas have from the outset been engaged in a relatively sophisticated planning process under the guidance of the CDF Coordinator. In this respect, CBIRD is a sizeable step ahead of the Saemaul Movement, which also encourages local planning but within the framework of a standard, nationwide bureaucratic model that often cannot be easily adapted to the varying needs, conditions and capabilities of different villages. Moreover, the Saemaul approach applies only to making separate plans for each individual village, whereas the CBIRD approach applies to a consortium of neighboring villages.

In principle, the CBIRD planning system provides all villagers in the area, whatever their status, an opportunity to express their views not only on their own priority needs and aspirations but on what the priority development objectives of the whole area should be. Since such views are bound to differ from family to family and village to village, the system also provides for mediating these differences through a give-and-take process until a generally acceptable consensus emerged.

This consensus gets expressed in the form, first, of a "long term" development plan (3-year) and later in a series of short term (1-year) development plans for each CBIRD impact area, itemized in terms of specific "productivity" and "social infrastructure" projects with corresponding investment requirements and sources. The process imposes a strong discipline because the overall plan must be cut to fit a clearly defined timetable and the set of resources expected to be available from both local and outside sources. In other words, it cannot be simply a list of dreams and compromises that cannot possibly be implemented. Nor can the process end simply with an overall plan; each individual project must also be planned and properly prepared if it is to be effectively implemented.

Making such plans is inherently a very complex undertaking, especially in a rural society unaccustomed to such sophisticated self-diagnostic and decision-making methods. Not only must the community's own needs, resources and potentialities be accurately assessed and a meeting of minds achieved among conflicting interests, but the local plan must also be compatible with the policies and capabilities of outside supporting agencies—particularly Saemaul and CDF. This requires skillful negotiation. Moreover the plan must

be sufficiently flexible and adaptable so that it can be altered on short notice in response to unforeseen events such as droughts or a serious delay in the delivery of expected outside assistance.

### *Types of Projects*

To interpret a typical CBIRD plan it is necessary first to understand the various categories and terminology used in CDF plans and financial reports.

Following Saemaul practice, all CBIRD projects are classified under two headings: 1) "Productivity/Income-Raising" projects and 2) "Social Infrastructure Projects" (sometimes also referred to as "Environmental Improvement"). The *productivity* projects include mainly agricultural (or fishery) improvements carried out by individuals, largely with their own efforts and investments, though often with temporary loans and technical assistance from CBIRD or others. Typical projects in this category include: raising new livestock, building a vinyl greenhouse for cash crops, or improving boat and fishing equipment. This category may also include, however, certain economic infrastructure items of utility to the whole community, such as a warehouse, local bank or cooperative store.

The *Social Infrastructure* category can be quite confusing to the outsider because it combines several quite dissimilar sub-categories, some of which are more closely linked in conventional parlance to economic development than to social development. These sub-categories include: (a) *household improvements* by individual families (largely at their own expense, using loans where necessary) such as replacing a thatched roof with tile, making kitchen improvements, building a latrine or installing electricity, running water or a telephone; (b) *community health and sanitation activities* such as nutrition, family planning, medical insurance, water systems and parasite control programs; (c) *education and culture* projects, such as day care centers, school improvements, athletic and cultural programs, and scholarships; (d) *public works* projects (with important economic implications) such as road, bridge or dike construction, harbor improvements, truck purchases and the like; and (e) *program management* including local administration of the CBIRD program, operating the community center, technical and leadership training, and emergency assistance. The important point to bear in mind is that this Social Infrastructure category includes a melange of projects, only a few of which could properly be classified as social welfare under customary usage.

### *CDF's Financial Strategy*

The financial aspects of CBIRD plans and CDF summary reports can also be confusing to the outsider who is unaware of CDF's basic financial strategy. This rather unusual strategy has four main objectives: (1) to maximize self-help by individual farmers, fishermen and households by providing easy access to loans at moderate interest rates; (2) to recycle a substantial portion of CDF grant funds back into the local economy in the form of loanable assets

under the control of the Community Committees; (3) to combine CDF project support wherever possible with substantial local and government support; and (4) to use a portion of available CDF funds--if need be without matching funds from other sources--to spearhead certain social welfare activities considered important by CDF but not yet considered high priority by the local community or the government.

Evidence presented in the next chapter sheds light on how effective this financial strategy has been. Before presenting this evidence, however, it is important to explain how CBIRD plans are made.

### *Making a Plan*

Getting the CBIRD type of planning process implanted is not an easy matter and requires great skill and ingenuity on the part of the Coordinator. It works somewhat differently in each area, but in principle the planning process starts with a survey of the impact area to obtain "baseline data." In addition to a general description of the area, the survey contains demographic data, lists of local organizations and institutions, and detailed quantitative information on land quality, ownership and use, crop yields, agricultural implements, household income, housing conditions, and facilities for health care and cultural activities. A parallel and somewhat more informal survey collects the views of people in the different villages on the most pressing needs and priority goals to which the plan should be addressed.

On the basis of all this information--and after extensive informal and formal discussions--the Community Committee with the help of the Coordinator draws up a *three-year plan* based on selected priority development goals and targets, with corresponding cost estimates and projections of anticipated "investment" resources from CDF, the local people, the Government (mainly under the Saemaul program), and any other outside sources. A sample of such a 3-year plan, from Chunsong for the period July 1976-June 1979, is shown in Table 3. This plan envisages 45 different projects and activities over three years at a total investment of nearly \$270,000, equally divided between productivity and social infrastructure projects. Of this total, 52 percent would come from "self-help" (cash plus contributed labor), 17 percent from CDF, and 31 percent from Government.

The process of developing an *annual plan*, according to Coordinators, has proved to be a heavy and difficult task for the Chairmen and members of Community Committees, requiring continuous and extensive assistance by the Coordinators. A summary of the FY 1977/78 annual plan of the Chunsong Area is shown in Table 4.

The gestation period for an annual plan is usually about five months, starting in February and ending in late June with a new plan ready for implementation. At the formal level the Coordinator usually initiates the process by presenting the overall scope of the annual CDF grant to the Community Committee. He then suggests that the Committee draw up its development program, taking account of the villagers' most pressing needs and the extent of local resources

Table 3

Example of a Three Year CBIRD Plan

(Chunsong Impact Area)

Planning Period: July 1976 - June 1979

Type	Name of Project	Contents	Relative Investment (U.S. dollars)			Total
			Self-Help	SCF/CDF	Others	
<b>Productivity</b>	<b>(Agriculture)</b>					
	Water way	5 places	2,000	2,000	3,000 (Govt.)	7,000
	Water Lift System	1 place	1,000	1,000	3,000 (Govt.)	5,000
	Land Improvement	20 ha	2,000	2,000		4,000
	Seed Improvement (rice)	100 bag	1,200			1,200
	Seed Improvement (other)	100 bag	600			600
	Vinylhouse Culture	100 houses	6,000	1,000	2,000 (Govt.)	9,000
	Fruit Tree Plantation	20,000 trees	5,000	1,000	6,000 (Govt.)	12,000
	Warehouse Construction	6 places	5,000	5,000	7,500 (Agr. Coop)	17,500
	Cow Raising	278 head	13,900			13,900
	Milk Cow Raising	30	4,500	1,000	6,500 (Govt.)	12,000
	Bee Hives	50 boxes	1,000			1,000
	Deer Raising	10 head	3,000			3,000
	Fish Raising	1 place	5,000	1,500	2,000 (Agr. Coop)	8,500
	<u>Sub-total</u>		<u>50,200</u>	<u>14,500</u>	<u>30,000</u>	<u>94,700</u>
<b>Productivity</b>	<b>(Commerce &amp; Industry)</b>					
	Cooperative Stores	10 places	2,000		2,000 (Agr. Coop)	4,000
	Village Bank	3 places	3,000	1,500		4,500
	Mine Development	5 places	30,000			30,000
	Village Industry	2 places	1,000	1,000	2,000 (Govt.)	4,000
	<u>Sub-total</u>		<u>36,000</u>	<u>2,500</u>	<u>4,000</u>	<u>42,500</u>
<b>Social</b>	<b>Infrastructure (Environment Improvements)</b>					
	Roof Improvement	110 houses	6,100	1,100	3,300 (Govt.)	10,500
	Kitchen Improvement	143 "	2,860	1,430		4,290
	Latrine Improvement	151 "	3,020	1,510		4,530

Table 3 (continued)

Type	Name of Project	Contents	Relative Investment (US dollars)			Total
			Self-Help	SCF/CDF	Others	
<b>Social Infrastructure</b>	<b>Compost Places Constr.</b>	147 places	882			882
	<b>House Improvement</b>	13 houses	2,600	1,300	2,600 (Govt.)	6,500
	<b>Barrier Improvement</b>	43 "	1,270			1,270
	<b>Community Beautification</b>	6 villages	5,000			5,000
	<b>Sub-total</b>		<u>21,732</u>	<u>5,340</u>	<u>5,900</u>	<u>32,972</u>
<b>Social Infrastructure</b>	<b>(Health &amp; Sanitation)</b>					
	<b>Running Water System</b>	6 places	3,600	1,200	2,400 (Govt.)	7,200
	<b>Nutrition Program</b>	450 children	1,600	1,600		3,200
	<b>Medical Insurance</b>	6,000 people	1,500	1,500		3,000
	<b>Parasite Control</b>	2, times/yr.	300	300		600
	<b>Family Planning</b>	80 people	200	200		400
	<b>Sub-total</b>		<u>7,200</u>	<u>4,800</u>	<u>2,400</u>	<u>14,400</u>
<b>Social Infrastructure</b>	<b>(Education &amp; Culture)</b>					
	<b>Daycare Centers</b>	4 centers	3,000	3,000		6,000
	<b>Athletic &amp; Culture</b>	3 years	1,500	1,500		3,000
	<b>Scholarship Program</b>	10 students (10 y.)	3,000	1,000		4,000
	<b>Amplifier System</b>	6 places	600	600		1,200
	<b>Playground</b>	6 places	600	600		1,200
	<b>Sub-total</b>		<u>8,700</u>	<u>6,700</u>		<u>15,400</u>
<b>Social Infrastructure</b>	<b>(Program Management)</b>					
	<b>Community Center Operation</b>	1 center	1,000	3,000		4,000
	<b>Village Centers</b>	7 centers	700	700		1,400
	<b>Training Programs (Leaders.)</b>	21 courses	1,000	2,000		3,000
	<b>Technical Training</b>	30 courses	2,500	1,000		3,500
	<b>Emergency Assistance</b>	21 cases	500	420		920
	<b>Administration</b>	3 years	1,500	1,500		3,000
	<b>Sub-total</b>		<u>7,200</u>	<u>8,620</u>		<u>15,820</u>
	<b>GRAND TOTAL</b>		<u>140,332</u>	<u>45,960</u>	<u>83,300</u>	<u>269,592</u>

Table 4  
Example of an Annual CBIRD Plan  
 (Chunsong Impact Area)  
Period: July 1, 1977 - June 30, 1978

Type	Date: Month	Starting	Ending	Relative Investments (U.S. Dollars)					TOTAL
				Community		CDF	Govt. & Other Sources		
				Cash	Inkind	Cash	Cash	Inkind	
<b>A. Priority CBIRD Projects</b>									
P*	Tobacco Drying Houses	Feb. 78	June 78		3,742	2,079	4,158		9,979
P	Cow Raising	Sep. 77	Nov. 77	4,158	2,599	4,158			10,915
P	Animal Pen Construction	Sep. 77	Nov. 77	4,158	2,079	4,158			10,395
P	Vinyl Houses	Jan. 78	Apr. 78	2,079	4,158	3,534			9,771
P	Project Bank	July 77	June 78		2,079	1,040			3,119
S*	Community Center	Ongoing			1,040	2,798			3,838
S	Leadership Training	Ongoing		416	2,911	1,663			4,990
S	Daycare Centers	Ongoing		1,247	3,119	2,079	1,559	2,275	10,279
S	Education & Culture	Ongoing		208	1,462	2,214			3,884
S	Health & Sanitation	July 77	June 78	1,87	1,558	1,736			5,165
	Administration	Ongoing				1,341			1,341
	<u>Sub-total</u>			<u>14,137</u>	<u>24,747</u>	<u>26,800</u>	<u>5,717</u>	<u>2,275</u>	<u>73,676</u>
<b>B. Supplementary Projects</b>						4,158	62,370		66,528
<b>C. Locally Supported**</b>				12,682	1,663		8,316		22,661
<b>GRAND TOTALS</b>				<u>26,819</u>	<u>26,410</u>	<u>30,958</u>	<u>76,403</u>	<u>2,275</u>	<u>152,865</u>

\*P = Productivity

S = Social Infrastructure

\*\*Projects not utilizing SCF/CDF Funding but which resulted directly or indirectly from SCF/CDF's assistance or involvement.

The Planning Process

available for investment to supplement or match outside help. There is continuing reference to the general guidelines and objectives established as part of the area's three-year plan, although considerable flexibility in adjusting to changing conditions or in adopting new and innovative ideas is encouraged.

The village chiefs, who are also members of the committee, then convene a series of meetings at their own villages, where there is discussion of which projects are particularly desirable and feasible in the light of local capabilities. The projects may be either on behalf of individuals, such as raising cows or installation of a fishing boat engine, or a cooperative project such as the construction of a bridge or piped water system.

A great deal of what eventually takes place is as much determined by informal conversations among the Coordinator, local officials, the Committee Chairman, the village heads, and farmers or fishermen as by the deliberations in regularly scheduled meetings. Often the latter merely ratifies what has been already worked out informally in advance. Accordingly, the social skills, intelligence and good will of the major figures involved are crucial factors in achieving results.

#### COORDINATION WITH GOVERNMENT

Once the Community Committee has settled on a *draft* of the new annual plan, its members meet with representatives of government agencies at the sub-county (myon) office to coordinate with the Saemaul program and to request and negotiate for specific government inputs. This is a time-consuming process and is considerably complicated by the lack of fit between CDF's fiscal year and that of the Government of Korea.

There is considerable variation in the way this process is carried out, depending on the method of operation of the myon office chief. Saemaul projects are generally planned and implemented as separate village efforts, and many are not included in the Community Committee's program. Conversely, some CBIRD projects, particularly those dealing with education, day care centers and health, but also some projects designed to increase income, are excluded from the official Saemaul program.

The actual integration or linkage of CBIRD and Saemaul programs usually takes place in one of two ways. First, the myon office may decide to incorporate the CBIRD plan in its overall development program for the area and retain responsibility for coordinating and directing all the various projects within its jurisdiction--in which case the Community Committee is subject to a greater degree of myon office control and loses some of its autonomy. The second way, practiced at Sanbuk, is for the Community Committee to review not only the CBIRD projects but also the Saemaul projects of its member villages, revising and eliminating some of them on the basis of its own estimate of local needs and capacities, then submitting the whole package for review. The advantage of this method for the myon office is that instead of dealing with representatives from each

separate village on several different plans, it can discuss a single unified CBIRD/Saemaul program with the Community Committee that encompasses all the villages. The Committee benefits by retaining more independence and gaining greater bargaining power with the myon office concerning the amount and direction of governmental inputs.

#### REVIEW BY CDF

When negotiations with local government agencies have been completed, the projects are then divided by the Committee into those that can be funded and carried out by the community alone and those requiring outside assistance from CDF, the Korean Government, or other agencies such as CARE. As the final step, the Committee not only submits the plan as a whole to the CDF Seoul office for review and approval but also a statement describing and justifying each individual project. An example of such a Development Project Description Form relating to the creation of a community bank in Yaksan, is shown in Appendix I. The plans for each impact area are reviewed by the director of the CDF Korea program, a procedure that requires a series of meetings in Seoul of the Coordinators and other members of the CDF staff. There is heavy pressure to complete this final clearance process before the end of June so that implementation can begin in July.

#### PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTING SPECIFIC PROJECTS

Specific project proposals usually originate from four different sources: 1) Local leaders and Committee members representing the population of their villages are likely to bring up economic (i.e., income raising) projects. 2) The Field Coordinator tends to propose projects dealing with training, welfare, and the development and management of CBIRD institutions. 3) Local agencies such as the schools, the extension service, or the myon office also make project proposals from time to time. 4) Many project ideas arise from discussions that take place in the course of various meetings. Most project ideas are discussed informally with the persons or organizations most immediately concerned before being put to a formal meeting of the Community Committee.

Once a project is adopted, its effective implication requires further careful planning and preparation. For example, for innovative projects on which local knowledge is inadequate, expert advice is sought from a number of sources, either through such governmental agencies as the extension service or the cooperative, or through CDF. The Coordinator may directly seek out experts in nearby towns or cities, or he may ask the CDF office in Seoul to obtain the services of a specialist consultant. Coordinators find that obtaining timely, expert, technical advice is often a difficult problem. In Chunsong the fact that the local agricultural extension office is located in the Community Center has made it easier to obtain such help in introducing new kinds of agricultural practices.

## THE PLANNING ROLE OF THE COORDINATOR

The CBIRD concept and methodology envisages an initial strong role for the Coordinator that gradually diminishes as the local population--particularly the local leaders--gain experience and competence and develop self-confidence in running their own program. Though in principle the Community Committee is responsible for the planning, scheduling, implementation and evaluation of projects, the ideas of the Coordinator and the main concerns of CDF inevitably tend to predominate in the formulation of plans during the first couple of years. In addition to promoting the proclaimed CDF goals of responding to local needs and helping the poor, the Coordinator endeavors to mobilize interest and involvement on the part of the local population that will produce sufficiently dramatic results to inspire confidence in the effectiveness of the CBIRD approach.

A comparison of the impact areas in Korea indicates that it is important right from the start for local leaders to be given as much responsibility as possible so as to acquire from the outset the conviction that they are operating their own program rather than one controlled by CDF. Once an initial habit of dependence on the Coordinator is established, it becomes more difficult later to promote local leadership and institutions on an independent, self-sustaining basis. There is a tendency for Koreans to adapt naturally and easily to hierarchical, paternalistic relationships, particularly where the patron possesses knowledge, relatively high status, and material resources. This kind of problem can arise not only where there is a particularly strong and competent Coordinator, but also if the Chairman of the Community Committee has a great deal of power and authority in the area.

If all goes well, the Coordinator gradually recedes into the background of the planning process and the Committee members take over increasingly. Nevertheless he continues to exert considerable influence in determining the actual mix of projects in the annual plans. He must occasionally discourage what he regards as excessive local enthusiasm for an impractical or risky undertaking, and he must also counter the local preference for income-producing or public works schemes by pushing social welfare projects that are considered by CDF an essential part of village development. Such projects, which include athletic and cultural events, film showings, day care centers, health clinics, meetings for the aged, and help for local education, are also designed to develop cooperation and community spirit among residents of the several villages that comprise the impact area. So far the greatest local enthusiasm for this kind of project has been demonstrated in Sanbuk.

The acid test of any planning process, of course, is the extent to which it ultimately gets translated into action and positive achievements. The next chapter examines the record from this point of view.

APPENDIX I

DEVELOPMENT PROJECT DESCRIPTION FORM

1. Name of Project Village Bank
2. Project Number \_\_\_\_\_
3. Name of Country Korea Name of Field Office KFO
4. Impact area number and name 07 Yaksan
5. Village Name Jangyong area and Oedu-ri
6. Number of Beneficiaries - Direct 530 ; Indirect 890
7. Date of preparation May 20, 1978
8. When Will Project Begin July 1, 1978 When Will Project be completed June 30, 1979
9. Problem - Why is the project needed?

There are 2 financial organizations and a few village banks in Yaksan area. But since they fail to meet the islander's financial requirements, usurious debts are prevailing in this community. The said village banks have a little funds and are operated inefficiently. It is, therefore, necessary that there should be some measures to improve this discouraging situation.

10. Purpose - How will these conditions in your community be measurably improved during the next year by carrying out the project?

This project is designed to help the islanders reduce their usurious debts and meet their fund needs by merging four village banks into one for its efficient operation--through reduction of operational expenses.

11. Activities - What will you do in order to make these changes?

The 4 village banks will be merged by June 1979 with supporting fund of \$4,158 to be made available from the revolving fund of the community committee. The staff members of the newly-established bank will be provided with training in management and they will observe the community which is operating the village banks efficiently and successfully. The training and observation will be carried out in cooperation with the village bank federation. Also, this project will place emphasis on Bank members' investments in order to increase its fund.

12. Inputs - What will you need in order to do these activities?

RELATIVE INVESTMENT

Community		CDF	Others			Total
Cash	Inkind	Cash	Cash	Inkind	Source	
\$9,355						\$9,355

## APPENDIX I (continued)

BREAKDOWNS

<u>Contents</u>	<u>Fund</u>	<u>Calculations</u>
Bank Merger	\$9,355	Supporting fund: \$4,158 Jangyong Bank: \$2,079 Oedu " : \$2,079 Kuseong/Yeodong Banks: \$1,039
Total:	\$9,355	

13. Assumptions - For what reason could your project fail or have only partial success?

Discouraging factors in operating this project could be failure to merge village banks, inefficient operation, slump in investments and failure to conduct training in management for the accountants and other staff of the village bank.

14. Goal - What long range social or economic problem in your community does this project help to change?

Improved management of the bank resultant from a merger would be able to help the population reduce or exterminate usurious debts by meeting partial or entire requirements of the islanders' funds. As a result people here would benefit by this project.

15. Benefits for Children - What benefits will this project provide for the target group of children and youth?

Children will benefit directly or indirectly by this bank. Because their parents are able to borrow some money from this village bank when they are in dire need of funds for their living earning business or for their children's schooling or clothes, etc.

16. Community Development - How will the community be able to continue this project after funding coming from SCF/CDF is no longer available to the community?

The Community Committee would continue this project with its own fund in cooperation with bank's members by expanding its fund.

17. The field coordinator should sign the copy of the Development Project Description Form (plan) sent to the National Office to indicate approval. (In addition, copies of project descriptions retained by the community committee and/or field office must also be signed by the representative of the community. During field visits National Office staff will verify that the community representative has signed the project plans.

Oh Byung Sup  
Chairman on behalf of  
The Community People

SCF/CDF Field Coordinator

## THE IMPLEMENTATION RECORD

In examining the implementation record of CBIRD plans it is important to bear in mind the following environmental factors, discussed in Chapter 2, that strongly influence the development capabilities, incentives and behavior of CBIRD and other Korean rural communities.

Rural development in Korea today--in contrast to earlier years--is very much an active concern of both the farm population and local administration. The booming prosperity and industrialization of the urban areas and the rapid growth of the economy have created unusually favorable conditions for development in both agriculture and fishing. Villages have been carrying on extensive self-help projects since 1972 within this favorable economic climate and there have been significant increases in living standards and agricultural productivity. Expectations for further progress are high, and there is a general acceptance of the need for innovative change. In contrast to the suspicion and hostility with which officials were regarded in the past, villagers now tend to look to local administrative agencies for advice and material assistance. Although progress has been uneven, government planners are making efforts to provide more assistance to lagging areas.

Environmental factors, however, vary a great deal in Korea and play an important role in determining the developmental opportunities and constraints that any particular village or group of villages confronts. While the CBIRD areas all have considerable potential for development in terms of topography and arable land--or access to marine resources--the mainland farming communities have certain advantages over the island areas, at least at this stage. They are more homogeneous, both with regard to kinds of productive activity and the distribution of wealth. They are also more compact, comprising fewer villages, among which transportation is easier. Moreover, CBIRD programs were initiated in the mainland communities in 1973 and 1974 whereas the island programs have only been in operation since 1976.

These and other differentiating factors must therefore be taken into account in comparing CBIRD accomplishments in such disparate areas. Some--probably most--of the difficulties encountered in the island projects are attributable to aspects of the physical environment,

the amounts of investment, and the relatively short period since CDF launched its project. In addition, the unfortunate tradition in Korea of contempt by educated city dwellers for fishermen, whose characteristics are contrasted unfavorably with the sturdy virtues of the farmer, still persists to some extent. Accordingly, there is some tendency on the part of officials and other outsiders (sometimes even CDF coordinators) to attribute certain problems to the particular social organization of island communities or the peculiar personality and customs of island people.

### THE EVIDENCE

CDF has developed an extensive statistical reporting system designed to monitor and assess progress in project implementation in each CBIRD area and to keep close track of financial flows. Although the reports from different areas differ in clarity and comprehensiveness, and one encounters occasional puzzling discrepancies between different reports from the same area as well as among the numerous summary accounts of the Korea program, they nevertheless provide a useful quantitative picture of the physical progress being made on various types of projects and of their financial dimensions.

These quantitative statistics do not, however, shed much light on significant *qualitative* changes taking place (which sometimes are even more important than the quantitative ones). Nor do they reveal what sorts of impact the successfully implemented projects are actually having on the lives of various subgroups in the local population. It is especially difficult to ascertain from these quantitative data whether and to what extent the poorer families are sharing in the overall benefits of the CBIRD program--a question we will return to later.

The present chapter draws upon a number of different CBIRD statistical reports for quantitative purposes but relies upon the authors' discussions and direct observations in the four selected project areas with regard to qualitative and distributive aspects.

### IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FINANCIAL STRATEGY

The CBIRD program has clearly made substantial progress in implementing the financial strategy described in the previous chapter. Cumulative CDF grants to the six rural CBIRD areas through June, 1978, totaled \$683,000 (excluding expenditures of the SCF/CDF field office in Seoul).<sup>\*</sup> Investments in CBIRD projects by the Government of Korea over the same period somewhat exceeded this amount. Community self-help investments and contributions of materials and labor totaled an estimated \$1,500,000. (This figure, particularly the portion relating to contributed labor, is only a rough approximation and could be somewhat inflated.) Thus it appears that, overall, each CDF dollar has been matched by four to five dollars of local effort and government funds. These figures do not mean, of course, that in the absence of CDF grants and the CBIRD program none of the other investments would have been made. There is good reason to believe, however, that the CDF funds primed the pump for considerably larger efforts by others--especially the communities themselves--than would otherwise have occurred.

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<sup>\*</sup>See note on Table 8 for SCF/CDF Field Office expenditures.

The impressive local effort shown above is partly explained by the fact that 40 percent of the CDF grant funds were recycled back into the local economy as loan assets (controlled by the Community Committees), against which local people can borrow for their own private productive and household improvement projects. An additional 34 percent went into physical property and facilities (e.g., the Community Centers) vested in the Community Committees. These growing assets, summarized in Table 5, have given the Committees an increasingly stronger base of authority and viability.

We can reasonably conclude from the above evidence that CDF's financing strategy, calculated to produce a multiplier effect on total investment funds for the CBIRD programs and to build financial foundations for continuing the CBIRD approach after CDF's withdrawal--has been quite successful.

#### A COMPARISON OF TWO CBIRD AREAS

It is instructive to compare the FY 1978 record of one of the early mainland CBIRD areas, Chunsong, and one of the later island areas, Yaksan, in terms of their mix of planned projects and the extent to which they were implemented.

##### *Chunsong*

The projects planned for the Chunsong area for FY 1978 and the extent to which they were actually implemented are shown in the first two columns of Table 6. The next three columns show the relative investment of CDF, Community, and Government funds in each project. Out of a total investment of \$94,800, CDF grants accounted for \$29,400; community effort, \$53,400; and Government contribution, \$12,000.\*

The annual plan as depicted in Table 6 originally provided for six productivity/income-raising projects and five social infrastructure projects. Two important modifications were later made, however. The project for building 20 tobacco drying houses was dropped because, even though local farmers had been heavily and profitably engaged in tobacco growing, increased problems with plant disease and falling prices convinced them that other crops would be more profitable in the long run. Hence, some of the funds earmarked for the tobacco houses were redeployed to irrigation pumps to counter the adverse impact of the 1978 drought on cash crops.

The striking fact is that, according to the year-end report to CDF, all the remaining 10 projects (except for Health and Sanitation) achieved or exceeded their planned targets during the year--an impressive record.

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\*These totals are taken from Table 8. The totals for community and government contributions shown on Table 6 are provisional and hence do not quite jibe with the corrected totals on Table 8.

Table 5

**Community Assets Created by CDF Grants**  
**as of 1978 (in U.S. dollars)**

	<b>CDF Grants</b>	<b>Community Committee Property</b>	<b>Revolving Fund Loan Assets</b>
Sanbuk	165,135	78,703	70,157
Yanggu	167,131	66,112	58,694
Chunsong	125,042	63,027	48,422
Wido	74,552	--	29,923
Yaksan	76,639	6,570	36,417
Jeungdo	74,224	17,671	42,931
<b>Totals</b>	<b>683,323</b>	<b>232,083</b>	<b>284,544</b>

Table 6

Implementation Record of Chunsong  
CBIRD Projects FY 1977-78

Projects	No. of Projects		Actual Investments <sup>4</sup> (US\$)		
	Planned	Actual	CDF	Community	ROK Govt.
Tobacco drying houses	20	0 <sup>1</sup>	--	--	--
Cows	10	10	4,158.	6,757.	
Cow pen construction	10	15	6,237.	9,356.	
Vinyl greenhouses	10	10	3,534.	6,362.	94.
Community center	ongoing	1 center	2,798.	1,040.	
Leadership training courses	16	16	595.	666.	
Day care centers	ongoing	4 centers	2,524.	4,366.	6,220.
Education & culture	8	10	2,144.	1,331.	
Health & sanitation	4	1	1,247.	7,445.	
Irrigation pumps		19 <sup>2</sup>	2,219.	3,169.	561.
Administration			1,341.		
<b>Totals</b>			<b>27,072.</b>	<b>40,492.</b>	<b>6,875.</b>
<u>Locally Supported Projects</u> <sup>3</sup>					
Garlic planting	2 ha	4.2 ha		10,395.	
Truck purchase (co-op)	1 truck	1 truck		2,079.	8,316.
Women's Welfare Bank	1 bank	1 bank		1,206	
<b>Totals</b>			<b>27,072.</b>	<b>54,172.</b>	<b>15,191.</b>

<sup>1</sup>Cancelled; see explanation in text.

<sup>2</sup>Added; see text for explanation.

<sup>3</sup>Defined as "projects not utilizing SCF/CDF funding but which resulted directly or indirectly from SCF/CDF's assistance or involvement."

<sup>4</sup>The figures on this table for community and government contributions are provisional. The correct totals are shown on Table 8 below.

The emphasis of the Chunsong program is revealed by the allocation of expenditures. Two-thirds of the total expenditures went into economic projects (principally cattle raising, vinyl greenhouses for cash crops, garlic planting and purchase of a truck), reflecting a strong local preference for income-producing projects. Within the social infrastructure category the largest expenditures were for operating the four existing day care centers for children, a health and sanitation project, and the operation of the Community Center, all of these reflecting CDF priorities. Smaller amounts went to leadership training, education and culture, and administration.

### Yaksan

This island area presents a quite different pattern than Chunsong in FY 1978. As shown in Table 7, the plan provided for 10 basically economic projects representing a wide assortment of activities (e.g., animal raising, vinyl greenhouses, growing medical herbs, kelp and seaweed, planting fruit trees, an abalone nursery, and an irrigation channel). The 12 planned social infrastructure projects were equally varied. They included, for example, building a community center, a public bathhouse, a consumer cooperative store, a road and ferryboat landing, kitchen and roof improvements on private homes, school supplies and equipment, athletic and cultural events, health (parasite extermination), and leadership training.

The actual implementation record was considerably poorer than Chunsong's. Of the 21 planned projects only ten met their target, five fell short, and six were delayed or cancelled, but four small unplanned projects were added. In the circumstances, however, this was actually not so bad a record. The CBIRD program in this area, after all, was quite new and the management inexperienced; expected government funds for some important projects failed to materialize; the drought upset certain other projects; competing Saemaul projects diverted funds and energies; market conditions for some agricultural products declined, and popular interest in certain projects evaporated.

Despite all these problems a total of \$240,000 in cash and in kind was invested during the year, including \$39,900 of CDF funds, \$75,900 in local resources, and \$108,100 in government funds and materials.\* The largest single expenditure was on re-roofing houses (\$24,000); the main agricultural projects together took \$35,000, and public works over \$11,000. Less than \$5,000 was devoted to social welfare.

A puzzling contrast emerges when CDF grant funds to Yaksan on a *per capita* basis are compared to other CBIRD areas. As shown in Table 8, the FY 1978 figure for Yaksan is only \$5.85 per capita compared to a range of nearly \$12 to \$14 for Wido, Chunsong and

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\*These totals are taken from Table 8. The investment figures on Table 7 for the community and government are incomplete. CDF actually granted \$53,000 to the Yaksan Project for FY 1978 but \$13,500 of this was not used due to delays in the community center.

Table 7

Implementation Record of Yaksan  
CBIRD Projects FY 1977-78

Project	No. of Projects		Actual Investments (US\$) <sup>2</sup>		
	Planned <sup>1</sup>	Actual <sup>1</sup>	CDF	Community	ROK Govt
Animal Raising			5,925.	6,998.	
Cows	35	3			
Goats	100	50			
Pigs		60			
Medical Herbs (stavia)	.02 ha.	.02 ha.	1,663	3,746	
Consumers Co-op Store	1 store	1 store	1,040	946	120
Vinyl Greenhouse	0.3 ha.	0.2 ha	624	249	
Kelp Cultivation	3.0 ha.	delayed	4,158		
Women's Sub-committee (various projects)			1,040	2,721	
Community Center	construc- tion planned	delayed	5,489		
Kitchen Improvement	30	30	624	936	
Abalone Nursery	2 ha.	cancelled			
Irrigation Well	not planned originally	½ acre irrigated	624	959	
Leaders Training			2,079	1,372	
Athletic & Cultural Events	cancelled because of drought				
Roof Improvement	41 houses	41 houses	6,819	17,364	
Seaweed (laver) Cultivation	1 nursery	1 nursery	2,079	6,237	2,079
Public Health	Parasite Extermination		1,040		1,040
Housing	30 houses cancelled				
School Supplies	Books & drawing materials		624		624
Telephone Line	1	1	520	21	
Public Facilities	bath house village hall		cancelled		
Road Construction	100 m.	100 m.	416	499	
Water Tank	not originally planned	1 tank	624	895	
School Drinking Fountain	not originally planned	1 system	2,017	1,490	
Administration			2,495		
<b>TOTALS.....</b>			<b>39,900</b>	<b>44,433</b>	

Table 7 (continued)

Project	No. of Projects		Actual Investments (US\$)		
	Planned <sup>1</sup>	Actual <sup>1</sup>	CDF	Community	ROK Govt.
<u>Balance from previous page</u>			39,900.	44,433.	3,823.
<u>Locally Supported Projects</u>					
Fruit Tree Planting	3,000 persimmons	3,000 persimmons		5,884.	
Irrigation Channel	400 m.	300 m.		1,238.	624.
Ferry Boat Landing	1500	150 m.		labor	10,400.
<b>TOTALS</b>			<b>39,900.</b>	<b>51,555.</b>	<b>14,847.</b>

<sup>1</sup>Additions and cancellations of projects explained in text.

<sup>2</sup>The figures on this table for Community and Government investments are incomplete. The correct totals are shown on Table 8.

**Table 8**  
**Funding Sources and SCF/CDF Grants**  
**Per Capita, FY 1977-78**

Impact Area (population)	Funding Sources (U.S. dollars)			CDF Grants (per capita)
	SCF/CDF	ROK Govt.	Community	
Yaksan (9058)	53,000. <sup>1</sup>	108,100.	75,900.	5.85
Wido (4500)	50,000.	78,100.	69,600.	11.84
Chunsong (2108)	29,400.	12,000.	53,400.	13.94
Sanbuk (3134)	43,000.	107,500.	198,300.	13.72

Sources: CDF Semi-annual Reports and Project Evaluation Summary Sheets, FY 1978.

<sup>1</sup>Includes \$13,500 not yet spent because of delays in planning the Community Center.

Note: Overall SCF/CDF expenditures in Korea for FY 1977-78 included:

1) SCF/CDF Field Office Budget	
Salaries (including CDF Coordinators)	
Transportation & Administration	\$231,777.
Training	11,992.
Consultants	4,318.
Sub-total	<u>\$248,087</u>
2) Grants to (7) Impact Areas	<u>295,769</u>
3) Grand Total	<u>\$543,856.</u>

Sanbuk. The explanation may lie in the fact that Yaksan's population is two to four times larger than the other areas whereas an equal \$50,000 of the US AID grant to SCF/CDF was arbitrarily earmarked for each of the three new island areas regardless of their differing population size. Or alternatively, perhaps the SCF/CDF office in Seoul felt that Yaksan simply was not yet ready to absorb larger funds. In any event, this marked discrepancy poses an interesting question as to whether there may not be some "minimum critical mass" in terms of the per capita grant below which a new CBIRD impact area will have great difficulty "taking off." It also raises the question of how the limited funds available to CDF in Korea can most effectively be divided among relatively well established CBIRD areas, such as Sanbuk and Chunsong, and new areas such as Yaksan and Wido that are still in the early stages. A related question is, when should CDF start phasing down its annual grants to the older project areas, and when will it be prudent to pull out altogether?

Another point of interest is the great variation in the amount of government funds made available to the different CBIRD areas in any year, the large annual fluctuation in these funds from year to year, and the disruptive impact on local plan implementation when such funds fail to come through. The instability of Government funds--and the incompatibility between the Government's fiscal year and CDF's fiscal year--clearly creates some difficult problems for making CBIRD plans and implementing them.

#### EXAMPLES OF SUCCESSFUL AND UNSUCCESSFUL PROJECTS

It is helpful to get behind the cold statistics and discover why some projects work out better than others. The following sample cases illustrate some of the reasons.

##### *Credit Union in Sanbuk*

In April 1976 the Sanbuk Coordinator, *WILSON HUGHES*, extensive experience with rural cooperative credit organizations, introduced the credit union idea to the Community Committee. After extended discussion the Committee adopted the idea and decided that its permanent employee, the secretary-treasurer, should receive intensive training as the credit union manager. On May 21 the union was established with 87 initial members who invested a total of 44,510 won. With the strong backing of the Committee the credit union prospered. By January, 1977 there were 119 members and by the end of June, 1977 the membership had reached 200.

During the first year of operation the credit union provided low interest loans averaging \$186 to each member household from a total fund of about \$18,000, of which CDF had contributed \$7,732.

Earlier, under the Saemaul program, each village in the impact area had established an officially sponsored micro-bank. Since these organizations had the same function and rationale as the credit union,

there was considerable competition--in which the village micro-banks were losing out. In order to solve the problem, a joint meeting was arranged in June, 1977, attended by the village micro-bank chairmen, the Sanbuk credit union chairman, Community Committee members, the Coordinator, and myon officials. It was decided to integrate the village micro-banks with the credit union on the condition that the new organization would retain the Saemaul name of *Maul Kumgo* (micro-bank), and that its operations would be reported through official channels, following the previous practice of the several smaller micro-banks. On August 23, 1977 the credit union in effect absorbed the micro-banks, while retaining its original organizational structure and method of operation. By June, 1978 when the former Chairman of the Sanbuk micro-bank was elected Community Committee Chairman, the credit union had 491 members and investments of about \$33,000. During FY 1978 each member received dividends equal to 31.2 percent on his deposit, an impressive yield.

The new Sanbuk credit union has practically eliminated the dependence of farmers on usurious loans from private moneylenders. Members have utilized credit union loans for both home improvement and productive investments. Since the credit union is an integral part of the Community Committee, its success has helped to strengthen the Committee as a local institution. The Committee's secretary-treasurer is busy every day with credit union matters, and the Community Center has become the focal point of the area's financial affairs.

#### *Electrification on Wido*

Because of the strong desire for electricity on the part of all Wido Island villages, a sub-committee for island electrification was organized as soon as the CBIIRD Community Committee was established in 1976. Soon thereafter an electrification project proposal was submitted, both to the local administration and to CDF. After a Coordinator was assigned to Wido in the spring of 1977 several meetings of the Committee were held to discuss basic strategy. The Committee selected eight members for an observation trip to study a model electrification project on another island. Other Committee members together with the Coordinator were able to obtain promises of technical and financial support for the project under Saemaul auspices from the local fisheries cooperative and the myon office. The Committee with the help of the Coordinator then submitted a detailed plan for electrification to the national government through the local administration.

As finally approved, seven out of ten villages on the island are included in the project. The plan provides for the construction and transportation to the island of concrete electric power poles, to be installed by contributed local labor. As part of the myon Saemaul effort, the Government is providing about \$35,000 of support. The fishery cooperative is furnishing \$10,000 more, and CDF's investment is \$14,000. Each electrified household must pay \$60.

As of late 1978 the project was being implemented under the supervision of an advisory team composed of the myon chief, the gun chief and the Coordinator. CDF employed an electrical technician and three assistants to direct the actual work, and village labor was mobilized as needed.

It was hoped that the completion of this project would not only raise the living standards and morale of the islanders but would also increase their respect for, and involvement with, the Community Committee as the key local development agency.

The project was originally scheduled for completion by June, 1979 but a number of problems have arisen and work has gone more slowly than expected. Some of the villagers have only been willing to work on the sections that directly lead to their own communities. Villages on the outlying islands and those individuals who are too poor to pay the 30,000 won are excluded from the project, and this has resulted in widespread dissatisfaction.

In retrospect, perhaps the initial planning should have taken these problems more into account. Possibly low cost, long term loans to the poor might have been arranged. Also, there might have been more discussion of the situation of the remote villages on outlying islands together with a stronger bid for aid from the authorities on their behalf. Even if unsuccessful, such actions might at least have given the disadvantaged persons and villages more of a sense of participation in CBIRD development efforts.

#### *Livestock and a New Cash Crop on Yaksan*

The original Yaksan plan was to buy black goats and Korean cows for distribution to selected farmers, since they were well adapted to local conditions, and the villagers were already familiar with their care and feeding. Just as this CBIRD project was getting underway, however, the market price of cows more than quadrupled. At the same time, the government together with the local fisheries cooperative decided to distribute 80 cows on the island. With such a large government cattle project under way it seemed unnecessary for the Community Committee to spend the limited amount of available CDF funds for the same purpose.

Accordingly the Coordinator looked into the possibility of raising pigs. About 80 percent of the farmers on the island were already raising the Korean variety of pig, but compared to western varieties the east Asian pig has a slower rate of growth and produces much less meat when mature.

The Coordinator consulted experts from the Office of Rural Development with regard to appropriate pig varieties, techniques for raising them, prevention of disease, and market conditions. He then presented all the information to the Community Committee, recommending that the project be adopted. The Committee decided to buy 60 pigs and selected 30 skilled, conscientious farmers from two villages who, it was hoped, would be able to raise the new varieties of pigs carefully according to instructions. The farmers were sent to the

county experimental livestock farm for two days of intensive instruction in pig raising, and the pigs were purchased through the good offices of the county administration and the experimental farm. Since the new pigs required more sanitary conditions than the Korean variety, the selected farmers had to build concrete-floored pens at their own expense.

The Yaksan extension office was able to arrange cooperative purchasing of pig feed and immunization materials for the new owners. Most other farmers had shown little interest in the project initially, but after seeing the astonishing growth rate of the new pigs, everyone wanted to raise them. Those persons involved in the project thus found themselves in a position to make substantial profits, both from the sale of pork when the mature pigs were slaughtered and by selling the piglets, now in great demand locally.

It is expected that eventually every household on the island will be able to raise the new breed of pigs. There is a large national demand for pork, and the Yaksan agricultural cooperative has agreed to market the pigs so as to maximize profits for the farmers. Regular courses of instruction in pig raising are to be held twice a year for prospective new owners. A local pig raising association has been formed, and there will be strict regulation to ensure that immunization and breeding are carried out properly.

#### *An ill-fated New Cash Crop on Yaksan*

In contrast to Yaksan's highly successful pig project, an attempt to introduce an innovative cash crop there in 1978 ran into difficulties. *Stevia*, a plant of the chrysanthemum family originating in Paraguay, has been developed in Japan as a sugar substitute with a wide variety of uses. The Coordinator had heard a radio report that the plant was successfully grown over a two year period on Cheju Do (a Korean island province), and there was widespread interest when he mentioned it at a Community Committee meeting.

The Coordinator then made inquiries at the provincial branch of the Office of Rural Development, at large city nurseries, at the Fishing Village Development Institute in Seoul, and at pharmaceutical companies. He discovered that good profits could be made if sizeable amounts were grown for export to Japan. People with experience in growing *Stevia* were asked to visit Yaksan where they explained to the Community Committee that income from the plant, which is harvested three times a year, would be about double that from beans or sesame on the same field.

The Community Committee selected 20 farmers as *Stevia* growers, loaning them a total of \$1,829, or about one-third the cost of the seedlings. The other two-thirds of the cost was born by the individual growers. Unfortunately, because of the severe drought in 1978, only one harvest instead of three was possible, and the expected income did not materialize. Even so, the return was better than for beans under similar drought conditions, and most of the farmers want to try again.

### *Vinyl Greenhouses in Chunsong*

Some of the problems involved in introducing new agricultural technology, even under the most advantageous circumstances, are illustrated by the vinyl (polyethylene) greenhouse cash crop project in Chunsong. Until 1974, because of lack of confidence, resources and know-how, there were almost no vinyl greenhouses in Chunsong, although they were widespread and a source of good profits among the more progressive and prosperous farm villages in the neighboring myon just across the Soyang river. The Community Committee, having discussed the problem several times, finally decided to organize a training program, which took place in January, 1975. A specialist instructor from the provincial Office of Rural Development emphasized the profit-making potential of planting sweet corn in greenhouses, because this crop would reach markets early and command high prices. He also described the necessary techniques to the 80 farmers who had indicated a desire to participate.

Those attending the training program decided to go ahead with the project. CDF, in addition to arranging the instruction, was to provide loans covering one-third the cost of building the greenhouses. After returning home and discussing the project further, however, most of the farmers backed out, because they felt that the new techniques were too complicated.

The Committee then set up another training session. This time they invited two experts with more practical experience. Those attending listened closely and exchanged ideas and opinions. Once again they seemed to be confident at the meeting of their ability to engage in this kind of farming, but after more reflection at home they again felt they could not apply what they had learned.

In early March of 1975 the Committee organized a chartered bus study tour for direct observation of vinyl greenhouse cultivation techniques. The 40 people who took part were much impressed, and on their return more training sessions were held locally in cooperation with the extension service. Still there were objections that the cost of building the greenhouses was too high. So a revised construction method was devised by the Committee in cooperation with the extension service, using bamboo instead of steel ribs. Two demonstration greenhouses were built and more detailed instruction on setting out the plants and transplanting was provided. Finally, only twelve farmers actually undertook the greenhouse cultivation, and most of them failed, even though the Committee worked closely with them to make sure that everything was done properly. According to the Coordinator, the trouble was that farmers would not follow instructions exactly.

During the past three years the Committee has continued to encourage greenhouse cultivation, and the number of farmers successfully using this method has slowly increased, though with many ups and downs. In FY 1978 CDF supplied \$3,534 in loans for vinyl house operations. In contrast to the original 1975 plans, however, the CDF loans covered about two-thirds of the cost, with farmers putting up

only one-third. It is expected that from now on the expansion of this form of cultivation will be rapid.

### AN IMPROVED MONITORING SYSTEM

A clearer picture of the progress being achieved in the impact areas is provided by the new *Project Design Summaries* recently adopted by CDF, based on the "Logical Framework" method of project evaluation devised by U.S. AID. The Sanbuk version is shown in Table 9.

Under this system a list of "objectively verifiable indicators" is established under various program headings such as training, agricultural improvement, health services and so forth. Quantitative measures of these indicators are provided for three different dates: (1) the base year (1975), (2) the date of the most recent survey (in this case May 1977), and (3) the target year (1980). A comparison of the quantitative indicators for these three dates reveals how far various parts of the overall program have progressed since the base year toward the objectives set for the target year.

To illustrate: one of the Sanbuk objectives under Agricultural Improvement is to increase the number of milk cows from 400 in 1975 (the base year) to 800 in 1980 (the target year). By May, 1977 the number of cows had actually increased to 467. Thus it was evident that, although some progress had been achieved in two years, much more would have to be made in the next three in order to reach the target.

An examination of all the indicators on Table 9 reveals wide variation in the rate of progress up to mid-1977 toward various 1980 CBIRD targets in Sanbuk. Projects under the Training Program (except for youth training) scored consistently high. The Agricultural Improvement Program had made measurable progress but would have to speed up to meet the 1980 targets. The Home Industry and Off-Farm Employment Program was clearly in trouble. The record for Health Services presents some puzzling paradoxes. On the positive side dramatic reductions are reported in infant mortality, TB cases, and the rate of population growth. By contrast, as of mid-1977 nearly one-third of the children had not yet received government required immunizations; the proportion of preschool age children receiving supplementary food had increased only six percentage points; and less than one-quarter of the population was utilizing public health services or was supplied with sanitary water. However, household improvements (on roofs, kitchens, etc.) were making substantial progress toward some very ambitious goals, as were Public Services (new and improved roads, telephones, electrification, etc.).

Overall, the Sanbuk implementation record between 1975 and 1977--notwithstanding the shortfalls in some program areas--was quite impressive, considering that the momentum of the CBIRD program was

Table 9

Project Design Summary  
Logical Framework

The Sanbuk Project

<u>Narrative Summary</u>	<u>Objectively Verifiable Indicators</u>	<u>1975 Base Year</u>	<u>May 1977 Latest Survey</u>	<u>1980 Target Year</u>
<b>Outputs for Sanbuk Miniregional Development Area</b>				
The expected functional output included the following components  1. Training	a. 1 community committee established and functioning	1	1	1
	b. 20 committee members trained in develop. components	5	20	20
	c. 25 women trained in spec. dev. comp.	8	24	25
	d. 20 youth trained in spec. dev. comp.	0	5	20
	e. 8 trainees particip. in spec. dev. courses (e.g. credit, agr. tech.)	0	6	8
	f. 7 agriculture improve. club functioning	1	6	8
	g. 8 mothers clubs functioning	8	8	9
	h. 7 youth clubs functioning	7	7	8
	i. 24 community leaders trained in spec. comp.	10	17	24
	j. 3 local officials involved in dev. train. sessions	0	3	3
	k. 1 joint plan. session with local officials	0	1	1
	l. 1 field coordination placed	1	1	1
	2. Agriculture Improvement Program	a. 200% inc. in food crop	1,460 ton	1,533 ton
b. 200% inc. in cash "		8.5 ha	10 ha	25 ha
c. 100% inc in livestock		400 cows	467 cows	800 cows

Table 9...continued

Narrative Summary	Objectively Verifiable Indicators	1975 Base Yr.	May 1977 Latest Survey	1980 Target Yr.
3. Credit & Finance Program	a. 75% inc. in farm bank savings	\$40,000.	\$53,600	\$70,000
	b. 150% inc. in low interest loans	\$40 per household	\$186 per household	\$300 per household
	c. 200% inc. in aver. household income	\$900	\$2,000	\$3,700
4. Home Industry and Off-Farm Employment	a. 50% inc. in home industries	10	0	15
	b. 36% inc. in off-farm employment	100 persons	105 persons	136 persons
5. Health Services Nutrition & Family Planning	a. 100% people utilizing public health services	0	20%	100%
	b. 1.5% population growth	2.0%	1.2%	1.5%
	c. 70% children achieving normal growth standard	50%	<i>n.a.</i>	70%
	d. 60% pre-school child. receiving supplementary food	30%	36%	60%
	e. 95% people sanitary water supplied	0%	23%	95%
	f. 70% non-parasite infected	30%	<i>n.a.</i>	70%
	g. 3.0% infant mortality	4.0%	1.4%	3.0%
	h. 100% child. receiving immunizations required by govt. standard	60%	70%	100%
	i. 2.0% active cases of TB	4.0%	1%	2.0%
6. Education	a. 95% eligible child. enrolled in middle school	75%	84%	95%
	b. 50% inc. in nonformal education activities	2	<i>n.a.</i>	3
	c. 100% inc. in daycare kindergarten programs	1 (program)	1	2
	d. 50% inc. in no. of child. attending voc. training	2 (programs)	1	3

Table 9...continued

Narrative Summary	Objectively Verifiable Indicators	1975 Base Yr.	May 1977 Latest Survey	1980 Target Yr.
7. Environm Improver	a. 90% of roofs improved	53%	81%	90%
	b. 90% of kitchens improved	138 houses	200 houses	539 houses
	c. 90% of toilets improved	92 houses	152 houses	543 houses
	d. 90% of chimneys improved	92 houses	126 houses	543 houses
	e. 90% inc. in no. of sanitary drainages	40%	50%	90%
	f. 10 community beautification projects	0	3	10
8. Public Services	a. 10 km of new farm roads constructed or improved	11 km	18 km	21 km
	b. 7 community cntrs in operation	7	8	9
	c. 8 projects of telephone	0	4	8
		villages	villages	villages
	8 public speaker	7	8	8
		villages	villages	villages
	d. 5 projects of embankments	0	0	5
	e. 1 community owned bath house per village	0	4	8
	f. 100% houses electri.	10%	98%	100%
9. Cultural Enrichment	a. 4 film showings annually	1	2	4
	b. 10 community libraries established	5	7	10
	c. 3 community playgrounds established	0	5	3
	d. 2 facilities for elders established	0	0	2
	e. 3 cultural events org. annually	1	2	3

just building up in this period and was likely to accelerate from 1977 to 1980.

As helpful as these quantitative indicators are for monitoring the progress of implementation, some important qualifications about them must be noted. First, they do not reveal important qualitative dimensions or changes, nor do they shed any light on *why* some projects are doing well and others poorly. Second, they provide little if any evidence of actual impact that successfully implemented projects are having on the lives of people, and no clues whatever on how the benefits are being distributed among different sub-groups in the population--especially the poor. Finally, some of the recorded improvements may be the result of separate Saemaul projects, individual initiatives or any other cause; hence it is not possible to determine how much is attributable specifically to CBIRD actions. However, every indicator listed corresponds to a CBIRD objective, and in many cases--such as, for example, women's training, day care centers, and technical training--CBIRD is probably the only organization sponsoring that particular kind of activity.

Despite these qualifications, the conclusion we draw from the evidence cited in this chapter is that the CBIRD program, viewed in the large and judged by any realistic standard, has achieved a remarkably good record of implementing its project plans. One can reasonably expect that as more experience is gained the record will become even better.

## CHAPTER 6

### THE SOCIAL WELFARE RECORD

The evidence examined in the previous chapter reveals a generally impressive record of achievement in terms of the physical implementation of local CBIRD project plans and the practical application of CDF's basic financial strategy. The evidence also suggests--even though direct measurements are not available--that the CBIRD program in combination with the Saemaul Movement is making a significant contribution to increased productivity and income and to better living standards in the rural impact areas, and that this contribution is likely to increase over time.

It is important, however, to ask a further question: How well are all these activities serving CBIRD's basic *social welfare goals*?

In examining this question it is important to bear in mind that the CBIRD approach and objectives are founded on a broad eclectic view of rural development which holds that economic and social development must go hand-in-hand. Economic growth, the argument runs, is essential to provide increasing support for meeting basic human needs and improving living conditions; but a strategy that focuses largely or exclusively on economic growth results in a lopsided and morally and politically unacceptable form of development that enriches the better off and may actually worsen the plight of the poor and disadvantaged. Moreover, widespread chronic ill-health, malnutrition and ignorance can be serious deterrents to increased rural productivity, and unrestrained population growth can offset the gains of economic development.

Taking this view, the CBIRD approach therefore calls for an integrated combination of economic and social improvement measures, with special emphasis on improving the welfare and status of the most disadvantaged families--particularly the women, the young children and the helpless who comprise the most vulnerable group. These humanitarian goals and principles are constantly stated and restated in CDF reports, evaluations and brochures prepared for outside visitors and supporters; they are also stressed in CBIRD training programs and by Coordinators in Community Committee meetings; and they get reflected in various social welfare projects within local CBIRD plans involving, for example, health, nutrition, child care, education and culture, family planning, and women's activities.

## THE EXTENT OF CBIRD EFFORTS TO HELP THE POOR

The previous chapter showed that large expenditures have been made under the rubric of "social infrastructure." But, as noted earlier, only a fraction of the projects within this category can be properly classified as authentic social welfare projects calculated to help the poor. For example, the investments going into home improvements--particularly new roofs, running water, latrines, tiled kitchens, electrification and telephones--have been quite sizeable, but such improvements are largely restricted to better off families with sufficient assets to afford the cost and are generally out of reach of the poorer families. Even the day care centers, which charge fees, are very difficult for the poor to patronize, except in special cases where scholarships for indigent children are provided by the Community Committee.

An analysis of the projects undertaken in the CBIRD areas shows that only relatively small investments are being made in direct social welfare services such as health, child care and nutrition, to which the poorest families are likely to have effective access. Precise calculations are difficult to come by, but our estimates indicate that in the three year plans for Chunsong and Sanbuk for FY 1976-79 no more than 15 percent of the overall projected investment appears to be earmarked for such social welfare programs.\* Or, if we consider the annual plans for FY 1979 of Chunsong and Yaksan, the equivalent percentages are only 14 percent and 12.5 percent respectively. As a further check, the CDF project evaluation sheets for projects actually implemented in FY 1978 give the following even lower estimates for social welfare projects:

Chunsong	12 percent
Sanbuk	10 percent
Wido	5.5 percent
Yaksan	5.5 percent

The above expenditures, it should be noted, are not specially designed to benefit only the rural poor; rather they are for social welfare projects from which the poor as well as all others may have a real opportunity to benefit.

These facts are generally obscured by the way in which projects are categorized on the forms used for planning, reporting and evaluation; genuine social welfare programs are shown under the "social

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\*For purposes of this calculation, the running water systems under the category "health and sanitation," which require substantial investment by the home owners, are excluded. Similarly, under "education and culture" the day-care centers, which charge a fee, and the athletic and cultural events that are enjoyed by the whole community, are excluded. Some small portion of the funds spent on home improvement may be of benefit to the poor, but there is no record of how much.

infrastructure" category which, as explained earlier, also includes such items as public works, housing improvements, technical and leadership training, the operation of community centers, and CBIRD program administration. In order to permit analysis for review and evaluation of projects in terms of their contribution to meeting basic CBIRD objectives--particularly the objectives of improving the welfare of children, women and the poor--there is pressing need for more refined summary tables or graphs that would give a clearer picture of which particular subgroups in the population are most likely to benefit--or are actually benefitting--from particular projects.

There is no suggestion here whatsoever that any of this confusion represents a deliberate effort by CDF to mislead anyone. On the contrary, it appears to be the result of determined, dedicated efforts by everyone concerned to get on with the business of rural development within the particular context and constraints of the Korean milieu, without abandoning cherished humanitarian goals.

### CONFLICTING VALUE SYSTEMS

It may be that South Korea is a special case, but it seems obvious now in the light of both the Saemaul and CBIRD experience that rapid rural development is possible without first or simultaneously attacking the problem of primary health care, for example, or doing much about the situation of the very poor. What has emerged from the Korean experience is the fact that effective local planning and the mobilization of local self-help efforts in conjunction with coordinated bureaucratic help and a favorable economic climate has provided the formula for progress. Increased purchasing power on the one hand and the greater availability of goods and services on the other is contributing to higher living standards and improved life chances pretty much in accordance with the desires and aspirations of the rural population. Except for the poorest 20 to 30 percent, farmers and fishermen are eating well, dressing well, traveling a great deal, buying all sorts of personal accessories and household appliances, sending their children to higher schools, and investing in their own productivity. Their behavior reflects Korean priorities and should not be thought of as a distortion of some ideal conception of rural development. The focus of government development policy has also been economic rather than social, and integration has been achieved mainly in economic terms: rural credit, technical advice, agricultural inputs, transportation, storage facilities and, above all, increasing demand for the farmers' crops at profitable prices, have all been made available more or less simultaneously.

Slowly improving health care, more social services and a steady but very gradual rise in the position of women--subject to the constraints of an evolving national cultural tradition--are following along behind. With higher incomes farmers have been able to purchase more and better services, both as individuals and cooperatively through village organizations. The more able-bodied of the landless poor have benefitted from the much higher wages paid for rural labor, thanks to a labor shortage and the relatively high profits to be made from commercialized agriculture. In other words, most of the social and

economic benefits for the poor are the trickle down effects of general economic progress. In the mainland CBIRD communities, as a result of several years of effort, it is now beginning to be possible to undertake more significant social programs on behalf of the entire local population, using the revolving funds established through successful economic projects. But it will evidently take a long time for the island impact areas to reach this position.

From this perspective the CBIRD approach does not really appear to differ so radically from the Saemaul model, except in the size of the development unit and the sophistication of the planning and management structure. Rather, it is a refinement of what appears to be a standard pattern of Korean rural development with some supplementary emphasis on cultural affairs, health, education, and family planning. The social welfare side of the CBIRD effort, rather than being an essential aspect of the integrated approach to development, appears more as an extra benefit derived from increased economic productivity.

This is certainly the way the Korean farmer or fisherman views the matter. Their strong preference--notwithstanding CDF's social welfare objectives--is for productivity projects that will raise their own income. The CBIRD impact area Coordinators are thus caught in a dilemma between two value systems. In order to promote local decision-making, to work towards the fulfillment of genuine locally felt needs, and to win the enthusiastic support and participation of those who count most in the community, most of the program's emphasis must be on productivity and income-increase projects. But in order to promote CDF's humanitarian principles and objectives and to satisfy the sponsors, the Coordinators must also do their best to persuade the Community Committee to devote a reasonable proportion of available funds to genuine social welfare programs, aimed especially at the poor. The result is usually a compromise strongly tilted toward economic projects, which in the circumstances is undoubtedly the best that can be hoped for.

Such projects as the construction of bath houses, toilet and kitchen improvements, day care centers, improved nutrition, village libraries, and cultural events do not really correspond to strongly felt popular needs. Farmers and fishermen have to be taught to value these projects, and even then they are likely to be more important as competitive status symbols--sources of individual and regional pride--than for their inherent usefulness in improving the quality of local life. This kind of project reflects the outside change agent's view of the direction progress should take more than it does local aspirations.

In spite of the intentions of planners, some social projects such as day care centers, more sanitary kitchens and toilets, or the installation of telephones actually increase the distance between poor and well-to-do farmers rather than improving the position of low income groups. In each case some contribution is required in order to participate, and the poor either cannot afford to spend anything, or they have different priorities for using whatever meager surplus may be available. On the other hand, a shiny tiled kitchen or

private telephone gives added prestige to the more affluent house owner.

### THE EXAMPLE OF RURAL HEALTH

Although lack of adequate health services is a major problem in most Korean villages, the perspective of outside observers and development agents, who usually have a particular solution in mind--whether it be a proliferation of small rural clinics, the organization of para-medical services, or education for disease prevention--is likely to be somewhat different from that of the local population. Traditional attitudes, the lack of nearby medical personnel, and popular conceptions of what constitutes adequate health care, all make it extremely difficult for CDF to achieve major results in this field.

Until quite recently most Korean farm families have been reluctant to seek medical help outside the village, partly because they were not entirely convinced of the efficacy of scientific medicine, partly because the fees charged by doctors in town were exorbitant in proportion to rural incomes, and partly because of the poor quality of whatever health care was available closer by.

In the past, with most people's energies focussed primarily on survival, scientific medicine as practiced in towns and cities was an unattainable luxury, except for the richest farmers. Still today local remedies are tried first, and there is usually resort to a doctor only in desperation when the patient is very sick or badly injured. For these reasons health care still has a relatively low priority for much of the rural population, in terms of how people actually allocate scarce resources. The traditional practice of taking care of the sick at home without seeking expert treatment outside the village remains widespread, although it is often modified today by the more or less random purchase of antibiotics or other medicines on the advice of the drug-store owner in a nearby town. Or again, on the store owner's advice, injections may be administered by the village head or other reputable local figure. In any case, doctor's fees and hospitalization costs are still regarded as outrageously high by most ordinary farmers.

The farmer's relatively low priority attached to professional health care is mirrored in the meagerness of the Government's rural health programs. Part of the problem lies in the "Seoul-centered" attitude of most members of the central bureaucracy who, although they themselves have access to the most modern medical facilities in the city, see no pressing need to tamper with the existing situation in the provinces. A perhaps even more difficult problem to overcome is the unwillingness of reputable doctors (and even many nurses) to live and work in small towns, let alone large villages such as the subcounty seat (myon). Everyone--even the farmer--is likely to think there is something wrong with a person who acquires so much education and expertise and then buries himself in a rural town. In any case, county and sub-county health clinics have a poor reputation among the rural population.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Peace Corps volunteers who have worked in these clinics are invariably appalled at the conditions and the poor level of treatment.

Rapid rural economic development is bringing many changes in this area as in most others. Farmers watch TV programs that show modern operating rooms in city hospitals; and increasingly they have money to spend. Nearly everyone has at least one close relative living in the city who consults professional medical practitioners as a matter of course. The result seems to be that while most people may continue to put off going to the doctor as long as possible, when they finally do go they prefer to make the journey to a nearby city and consult someone who inspires in them some degree of confidence.

Until very recently Korean doctors and nurses who did not work in large cities have usually gone abroad. Financial and social-psychological rewards are still not adequate to attract them in significant numbers to rural areas. The situation will probably improve in the future, however, as new medical and nursing school graduates find the Seoul job market completely saturated and opportunities overseas more restricted. Also, a gradual change in high level bureaucratic attitudes is taking place in the direction of providing more welfare services to ordinary people. This, combined with the greater availability of public funds, should eventually result in some sort of government subsidized health scheme. But since Korea is a small country with increasingly frequent and ubiquitous rural bus transportation, it seems more likely that adequate and relatively cheap medical care will be made available at the county seat level (usually towns with a population of 30,000 to 60,000), rather than that rural clinics will be established on any extensive scale.

Given the particular situation described above, the goal of establishing genuine rural health facilities must be regarded as out of reach for the foreseeable future. On this basis the fact that CDF has not made a major effort in the field of rural health must be seen as a wise acceptance of the realities of the situation.

Nevertheless, some of the CBIIRD projects have made significant contributions to health improvement. The medical and dental schools of major Korean universities commonly send teams of doctors and students to the countryside during the summer to provide low cost health care, and CDF has arranged for such temporary clinics to be held in most of the impact areas. But farmers and their wives, even while taking advantage of the medical and dental services, invariably grumble because they believe that the treatment given by students is second rate.

CDF attempted in 1975 to set up modest health insurance schemes in Sanbuk and Chunsong, utilizing such intermittent clinics as well as government services. By the fall of 1977, 70 percent of the households in Chunsong were enrolled, but a year later the plan was no longer operating. No systematic investigation has been made into the causes of this failure.

CDF funds have also been used to try to revitalize family planning programs at the village level. Community Committees in several of the impact areas have sponsored lectures by well-known authorities on birth control and expenses were paid for more than a hundred

women in FY 1977 who chose to have laparotomy tubectomies at provincial hospitals.

### *The Difficulties of Reaching the Poor*

Due to the relatively equitable distribution of land and the recent economic prosperity in the Korean countryside, the majority of the population can be classified as self-supporting, middle level farmers enjoying a fair degree of economic security. And, as was pointed out earlier, the skilled agricultural laborer can now earn a living wage, even if he possesses no land of his own. But the poorest 20 percent or so of the rural population--often comprising the sick and physically or mentally handicapped, the widowed, the old and the very young--remain in an extremely difficult and vulnerable situation. Some meager welfare benefits are available through official channels and these are increasing. But this sector of the population is genuinely deprived and without real hope of improving its situation in the rural context.

It has proved extremely difficult for CDF to reach these people because of a variety of structural constraints in the local environment. The need to work with village elites in order to establish development management institutions that can evolve in the direction of autonomy has meant that most of the CBIRD program has been focussed on the more prosperous sectors of rural society. Efforts to help the poor are hampered by their lack of matching resources, low levels of competence, and inferior standing in the community. Anyone who fails to attend the separate village meetings at which individual "income increase" projects are discussed, either through lack of interest and confidence in the program or because he lives far away, loses his opportunity to participate. Usually it is the poor who tend to live in the most isolated and inconvenient areas, and they are the ones most likely to be cynical and discouraged, because they do not have enough money or other resources to make a significant matching investment of their own.

Farmers and fishermen in the impact areas receive two kinds of loans under the CBIRD system. The CDF money allocated for income-increase projects is first loaned at low interest rates; then, when it is repaid, a revolving fund under the control of the Community Committee is established as a source of further credit. As village leaders learn to manage these financial resources more efficiently and rationally, the emphasis on raising productivity--on obtaining a good return on revolving fund loans--increases. The poor farmer is a bad risk, both because he needs the money for consumption, and because his productive capacity is lower. The requirement that each borrower must have two guarantors willing to sign his note effectively excludes most of the poor from access to the revolving fund.

Coordinators have tried to get around the problem by developing projects that are suitable for the poor. Korean cattle have been provided to some poor farmers in mountainous areas where forage is available to all. Similarly, various kinds of fishing equipment have been furnished on a small scale in the islands. Efforts have also been

made to provide more loans to poor people by encouraging the formation of larger financial institutions, i.e., through merging the village banks established under Saemaul auspices. CDF project funds have been used in some instances to back these higher risk loans. In some cases scholarships have been given to poor children, and in the long run these may have the greatest effect. But overwhelmingly the main thrust of the program has been to increase the earning power of middle and well-to-do farmers and fishermen.

It is hard to imagine how a community development system could function otherwise, with most really poor families today suffering from various kinds of social/pathological problems that prevent them from taking effective advantage of whatever opportunities exist. Where genuine community spirit can be developed along with a widely shared sense of social responsibility, Community Committees may elect to do more for the poor. It should be recognized, however, that for the most part such efforts will amount to charity, and there is no special reason to expect prosperous farmers in a Korean CBIRD area to be more charitable than people anywhere else. Thus, help for the poor remains a minor and relatively ineffective part of the overall program, despite the high importance attached to this objective by SCF/CDF and its Western financial supporters.

## CHAPTER 7

### THE EDUCATION AND TRAINING RECORD

For over 1,000 years Koreans have valued learning above most other activities, and during the past 500 years or so education has been the main path to upward mobility and high social status. These traditions are very much alive today, as they are in all countries that derive their higher culture from the Confucian tradition. Under Japanese colonial rule most farmers in Korea had no schooling, but after 1945 large investments were made in education; by 1960 nearly everyone was attending primary school for six years. Today, with relative rural prosperity, over 80 percent of rural primary school graduates go on to middle school, and of this group 40-50 percent continue their education in high school.

During the modern period, and especially since the Korean War, educational aspirations have increasingly shifted from classical and humanistic studies to science and technology. The ability and eagerness of large numbers of students to absorb Western scientific and technical knowledge has been one of the most important contributing factors to Korea's economic "miracle." Thus, not only is the prestige of study both as an activity and as an end in itself still very high, but more specifically, the acquisition of practical technical skills for development is regarded as one of the most useful and worthy activities that one can engage in.

These generalities also apply to the rural scene with certain qualifications. In the past only a few village youths attended middle and high school, and most of these moved to the towns and cities after graduation. Those few who returned to their villages were automatically regarded, upon reaching maturity, as being the best qualified among the local population for leadership roles, regardless of the nature of their education or their personal competence, simply because of the social and ethical prestige inherent in education. One problem in the past has been that not infrequently the high school graduate who assumed such a role possessed neither leadership qualities nor a dedication to public service, with disastrous results for village development programs. Fortunately in recent years much higher percentages of the rural school age population have been going on to middle and high schools, so that in each village there are many more persons in the 35 to 45 year-old group (the usual age of active leadership) with some capacity to read technical

articles and administrative directives, keep financial records, and write reports. Such skills are increasingly necessary for village heads to enable them to cope with larger amounts of paper work and deal with officials and other townspeople without being humiliated. CDF leadership and management training has been primarily directed at this group.

While the rest of the rural adult population with only a primary school education or less may be only barely literate or illiterate, they are usually also eager to participate in whatever training possibilities are offered, even though nonformal education provides less prestige than the academic variety. In addition to the need for new skills there are important rewards in terms of self-confidence and standing in the community that derive from having completed any course of instruction.

CDF has taken full advantage of this extremely favorable situation to develop a large number of specialized training programs for the CBIRD areas. Some sort of nonformal and informal training accompanies virtually every specific project. The flexibility of the CBIRD program enables the Coordinator in consultation with the Community Committee to tailor educational programs to local requirements. The Korean field staff has also recognized that even non-formal education has its formal aspects--that the special aura of prestige and confidence bestowed by even a short course in leadership may be as important for subsequent performance as the contents of the instruction. Consequently such formalities as introductory oratory, group photographs, and closing exhortations are all utilized to reinforce the educational process.

CDF classifies its training programs according to three categories: 1) Community Basic Skills Training; 2) Intermediate Training; and 3) Advanced Management Training.

During FY 1978, a total of 8,520 persons participated in basic skills training at the community level, of whom 3,530 were women. Some 193 different courses were offered, lasting from one to three days. Basic skills training accounts for the vast majority of all hours of instruction, total numbers of participants and numbers of courses. A descriptive breakdown for all six impact areas is shown in Table 10.

CDF has placed particular emphasis on the training of women, both in order to improve their standing in the community and to utilize their energy and abilities for development. In all, 3,530 women participated in some form of basic skills training during FY 1978. Another 34 women leaders attended leadership courses conducted in Seoul, while 78 women received special training in development planning in the island areas. If educational policy were determined solely on the basis of local initiative or Korean Government programs, there would be far fewer women enrolled in training courses

Table 10

Summary of CBIRD Training Activities, All Areas, FY 1978

Type of Training	No. of Participants	Males	Females	No. of Courses
Agriculture	1,241	1,047	194	27
Animal Husbandry	216	147	69	15
Community Development and Planning	1,825	1,408	417	63
Cottage and Off-farm Industry	59		59	2
Child Care	61	2	59	13
Credit and Finance	935	815	120	10
Family Planning	789	128	661	15
Nutrition	679		679	10
Para-medical	2,227	1,013	1,214	19
Water Resource Development	488	430	58	19
<b>TOTALS</b>	<b>8,250</b>	<b>4,990</b>	<b>3,530</b>	<b>193</b>

There are many different kinds of rural training institutions in Korea, both public and private. Coordinators can arrange to have selected trainees from their impact areas enrolled in appropriate courses, with the necessary funds provided either directly by CDF or through their Community Committees. The Saemaul Movement, the Office of Rural Development, the Federation of Cooperatives, the National Agricultural Technical Association and provincial universities all organize various kinds of training programs in which motion pictures, slides, charts, pamphlets and other kinds of visual aids are prominently used. The Korean concern--some might say obsession--with education is increasingly penetrating to rural areas, as funds have become available and organizational linkages established between the villages and national institutions.

Where Coordinators perceive that a need exists for specialized instruction, they can either invite experts to the community or arrange for villagers to attend regularly established courses of instruction (see the examples in Chapter V of pig raising on Yaksan and vinyl greenhouse construction in Chunsong). The Coordinators themselves, who usually have wide experience in teaching, conduct most of the leadership and management courses at the basic skills level. Some of them also have more specialized knowledge, for example, regarding such matters as cooperative financial organizations or particular aspects of animal husbandry, and they provide instruction and guidance accordingly.

In Sanbuk where the Committee has been particularly active in organizing training programs, an outside specialist is invited to come and instruct each time a new kind of project is adopted. For example, instructors in knitting as a cottage industry and in various kinds of food processing techniques were hired with money from the revolving fund to teach groups of women in FY 1978. In addition, using its own funds, the Committee has organized numerous tours, so that project participants can travel to other areas in order to observe similar, successfully functioning projects.

With the exception of technical subjects requiring qualified experts, most of the courses are taught by the Coordinator, local officials, knowledgeable Community Committee members, or other competent persons living nearby. In Chunsong, for example, officials of the agricultural extension service, which has its office in the Community Center, provide frequent instruction to farmers on technical matters, both in formally organized sessions and on an *ad hoc*, informal, individual basis.

In addition to carefully planned courses of instruction a good deal of informal training takes place. Frequently in the course of meetings or in casual conversations the Coordinator or members of the Community Committee will attempt to "correct" deep rooted values, attitudes, and patterns of behavior that are seen as limiting the effectiveness of developmental efforts. For example, the lack of punctuality, both in meeting deadlines for the submission of documents and with regard to attendance at meetings, is a persistent

irritant and obstacle to getting things done. Older farmers in particular, who still own most of the land and therefore make many of the decisions, tend to retain a more easy-going, pre-modern sense of time. Another problem is the failure to comply exactly with detailed instructions as, for example, when raising a new variety of pig or planting vegetables in vinyl greenhouses. A particular innovation involving precise quantitative measures that are in fact crucial, may appear to farmers to be relatively trivial, so that they find it easier to retain their old ways or fail to follow instructions exactly. Then, when the project does not live up to expectations, there is likely to be general discouragement and a reluctance to recognize the real problem.

Another persistent cultural trait that sometimes interferes with the effective operation of CBIRD institutions is the belief by certain farmers--often influential ones--that a direct, informal approach to the Committee Chairman, the Coordinator or local officials is the best way to obtain special personal advantages from a given situation or opportunity. Sometimes the Coordinator does, in fact, find it useful to treat an important person with special consideration in order to ensure his whole-hearted cooperation. But as a rule Coordinators are likely to emphasize during training sessions as well as in informal conversations that the Community Committee must operate with objectivity and fairness, putting the general welfare ahead of personal interests in order to acquire and retain the general respect of the community. In other words, the Coordinator has the extremely difficult role of trying to inculcate universalistic principles of thinking and acting in a highly particularistic social environment.

In spite of its emphasis on training the "consumer" of developmental efforts, CDF has encountered some obstinate problems in mobilizing continuing enthusiastic participation in CBIRD activities. Often attendance at Community Committee meetings is no better than 60 percent. The reluctance of women to violate traditional norms of respectability by playing an active role outside the home has proved to be very hard to overcome. Significant progress is being made in both these areas, however, partly through the cumulative influence of repeated training courses, but also because of the more general effects of modernization--including the changing values and patterns of behavior that characterize younger generations.

CDF organizes more elaborate programs of instruction at its Seoul office for local leaders (usually Community Committee members) to broaden their understanding of CBIRD principles and to develop both leadership and management skills. The training periods vary from two to ten days and often include field trips to the various impact areas, so that participants may learn from each other's practical experiences. CDF staff, including the Coordinators, lecturers from universities or technical institutes, outside experts, and Saemaul or other officials, provide the instruction, which deals with such subjects as the planning process, financial management, working with other local agencies, relations with the Saemaul

Movement, record keeping and reports. There are also more inspirational sessions designed to increase motivation and the intensity of participation in CBIRD activities.

A more complete breakdown for the 1977-81 planning period of the contents of this kind of relatively highly organized and centralized training follows: 1) specialized management training for the Committee secretary/treasurer from each impact area; 2) further motivation and development training for all Committee members (approximately 20 from each area); 3) special development training for women (about 25 from each area); 4) special development training for youth (about 20 from each area); 5) specialized technical training of various kinds (numerous groups with from 8 to 32 persons from each area); 6) training in agricultural techniques for Agricultural Improvement Club members (6-10 from each area); 7) family life improvement for day care center mothers (10 from each area); 8) leadership training for youth (10 from each area); 9) development training for local officials (3 from each area); 10) development training for community leaders (24 from each area); 11) training for joint planning with local officials (1 or 2 from each area); 12) intensive training (three months) for new Coordinators before they begin work in their impact areas.

Most of the trainees are selected at Community Committee meetings, taking into consideration the interests, qualifications, and place of residence of those who volunteer. Village heads and other Committee members make recommendations, and in general the Committee tries to select about the same number of trainees from each village. The local institutional machinery for selecting trainees appears to operate in a reasonably effective and democratic manner, but inevitably the best qualified candidates tend to come from middle level and well-to-do farm families.

Occasionally there will be joint training sessions organized by local officials in cooperation with the Coordinator or Committee Chairman, at which matters of concern to both CDF and the government are discussed. There have been occasions in the past when officials used these meetings so blatantly for propaganda purposes that the popular reaction was highly unfavorable. In this kind of situation, when dealing with over-zealous local officials, great diplomatic skill on the part of the Coordinator is necessary in order to straighten things out.

Under the Saemaul Movement the acquisition of techniques for the planning and management of development projects by village leaders has usually been a long and difficult process that has slowed down community development in many ways. The CBIRD approach of directly attacking this problem with well organized training programs designed to give local leaders the ability to operate their own institutions effectively represents an important innovative advance.

The CDF principle that sustained, long run benefits depend more on local mastery of the *processes* of development than on

immediate project success is supported by significant achievements in all the impact areas, but most particularly at Sanbuk. There, local leaders are intensely involved in utilizing the CBIRD institutions to promote development. They take their responsibilities seriously and dedicate long hours to the practical nuts and bolts aspects of getting things done. One result has been that local participation, in terms of both labor and resource investment has been consistently high, with a corresponding degree of success in achieving project goals. Concurrently, participation in community-wide cultural and recreational activities has also been widespread and enthusiastic. Chunsong leaders, while not generally as outstanding as those from Sanbuk in their desire and ability to take over responsibility for running the CBIRD program, have nevertheless also acquired valuable experience and training in a variety of management skills. The island areas are still at the stage where Coordinators, local officials, and other important persons exert a disproportionate influence relative to farmers and fishermen.

Another CDF innovation has been the organization of special training courses for officials concerned with development in the impact areas. The job of the Coordinators and Committee Chairmen is greatly simplified if the local myon and gun administration has a sympathetic understanding of the CBIRD objectives and methodology. The willingness of county and sub-county chiefs to send some of their subordinates for CDF training has enabled the impact areas to develop and improve working relationships with the local bureaucracy.

In addition this kind of training has provided CDF with a means of getting its ideas on integrated community development across to working levels of the Korean administration. Although there is no evidence yet that CBIRD principles have been adopted on a national scale, it is certain that they are being considered in governmental circles as possible models for further developmental initiatives. And it can be expected that those aspects of the CDF approach that are particularly successful will probably be incorporated in some form in the Saemaul Movement. In any event Korean Government policy for rural development appears to be gradually converging with CDF ideas in two respects. There is now somewhat greater emphasis on regional as opposed to village projects, and slightly greater attention is being paid to rural social welfare.

In all the impact areas Community Committees, usually working through an educational sub-committee, have used CDF funds to improve the educational facilities provided by local primary and middle schools. Various CBIRD projects have financed classroom furniture, teaching aids, library books, and such amenities as school drinking fountains. In Chunsong, where collaboration between the Community Committee and the Kasan primary school has been particularly productive, CDF funds have been used, in addition to the kinds of projects listed above, to support a school newspaper and for the repair of a small educational greenhouse. In 1978 the Chunsong Community Committee Chairman

received a letter of commendation from the Minister of Education in recognition of the Committee's role in raising the school's academic performance. Where extensive day care programs have been underway for some years (Chunsong and Sanbuk), the beneficial effects of pre-school experience in raising learning ability are now becoming apparent, and the establishment of day care programs on a national scale is under discussion by government officials.

In addition to the educational projects mentioned above, small scholarship funds have been made available in all the impact areas to help poor and worthy students.

There is another way in which collaboration between Coordinators and the primary schools helps to further CBIRD objectives. Each school usually serves several villages, so that school activities involving parents tend to promote inter-village contacts and to some degree, cooperation. Where Community Committees actively support and assist schools on such occasions as Children's Day, athletic contests, the exhibit of agricultural products grown or raised by students, and outings with parents, they are contributing to the creation of a larger community beyond single village boundaries. The school, therefore, can serve as another focus of multi-village activities in addition to the Community Center, provided the Coordinator is able to establish appropriate relations with local educational authorities. School teachers throughout Korea have been commanded by the Saemaul authorities to contribute to development by helping raise the scientific and national consciousness of the rural population, but often because of the teachers' lack of practical knowledge, farmers and fishermen do not take their efforts seriously. Nevertheless, school teachers are in a position to contribute to leadership and management training as well as the inculcation of a broader regional sense of community. The fact that primary school teachers are somewhat overworked and underpaid limits the extent of their participation in CBIRD activities, however.

## CHAPTER 8

### SOME INTRACTABLE PROBLEMS

The CBIRD experience in Korea throws penetrating light on several deep-rooted problems that are generic to innovative rural development undertakings in many countries and therefore need to be understood by all who seek to bring about social and economic improvement in rural areas.

It is hoped that the discussion of these problems below will not be misconstrued as minimizing in any way CDF's impressive achievements in Korea, which are considerable. These achievements have been described and documented in the foregoing chapters, and indeed one wonders how it would have been possible to accomplish more with the available resources. The CBIRD program has been both innovative and flexible. Lessons learned in other parts of the world and through long experience in Korea have been incorporated in it, and the Korean Field Office director and staff have shown extraordinary dedication and ingenuity in pursuing both the basic goals and detailed practical procedures.

In spite of these positive factors, however, one lesson drawn from this study must be that, even under relatively ideal conditions, community and rural development is an extraordinarily difficult and complex undertaking, and we still have a great deal to learn about the best ways to carry it out.

#### INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL SOURCES OF DIFFICULTY

Part of the difficulty lies in the fact that so much of the community development literature--even including practical guides for use in the field--is tinged with missionary zeal born of Western humanitarian ideals. Expectations are high and there is so much at stake; upgrading the lives of unfortunate people is seen as a virtuous undertaking of such pressing importance that ordinary objections and constraints must not be allowed to stand in the way. But certain intractable constraints nevertheless do stand in the way, not least of all the traditional village social structures and patterns of behaviour that stoutly resist change in the face of outside blandishments and efforts. And to compound the difficulty, the proclaimed basic goals of the innovative model, reflecting the assumptions and value system of a distant "donor" society, may be quite incongruent with the current

priority concerns, traditional value system and basic realities of the "recipient" society in which the new model is to be applied. In this event a sizeable gap inevitably develops between the stated goals and the actual accomplishments, and a distorted picture of the reality tends to emerge.

A further part of the difficulty is that once the new program gets underway, pressures mount steadily to produce quick, visible and measurable results. This pressure comes in part from a natural eagerness on the part of the project managers to prove to the local people and the host government that the particular innovative development model is indeed viable and capable of yielding sizeable benefits. But the pressure also derives from the need of the external sponsoring organization to demonstrate to its own constituency and major funding sources that their money is producing good results, consistent with the originally proclaimed priority goals. If a major funding source happens, as in this case, to be an official bilateral aid agency accountable to its national legislature for the effective use of the taxpayers' money in a manner consistent with the policy objectives set forth in its legislative mandate, then the pressure for demonstrable results becomes even more acute. Moreover, whether consciously or unconsciously, the bilateral agency's own evaluation staff, distant from the scene of action and unfamiliar with the surrounding realities, may exert a decisive influence on the project's built-in evaluation provisions and on the kinds of performance data that get periodically reported.

The inevitable net effect of these various constraints, incongruities, pressures and statistical reports is to build up a somewhat distorted picture of the internal realities of the project and its actual accomplishments, making them appear to fit the originally stated objectives more closely than the actual facts may warrant.

The point to be emphasized is that socio-economic change in any society has its own inner dynamic, patterns, and processes, and these often resist or even run counter to attempts by governments, voluntary organizations and local change agents to carry out programs of social engineering in accordance with predetermined ideas about where rural communities should be going. To a considerable extent the belief that one can transform local institutions, attitudes, relationships, and behavior is bound to be frustrated. For example, the whole complex of ideas, ideals, and rhetoric surrounding the concept of "community," which lies at the core of the CBIRD concept, appears on close examination to be fuzzy and somewhat unrealistic in the light of social reality (a point we will return to later). Or, to take an example at a different level, although the periodic CBIRD field reports have generally provided the types of statistics called for, they have devoted little attention to the analysis of problems; thus the failure of health insurance schemes, for instance, and of projects designed to promote small or cottage industry, have not been examined in a thorough, analytic fashion in order to determine what went wrong, and whether further efforts might be worthwhile. It is almost as if there were a general, informal agreement to the effect that there must be no dwelling on failures or concerns with problems that might interrupt the positive, optimistic momentum of the parent organization.

Anyone familiar with the financial and operational exigencies of voluntary organizations based in developed countries but seeking to assist developing countries will appreciate that the problems sketched above are by no means unique to SCF/CDF in relation to CBIRD; they are the common fare of virtually all such organizations, and they are well known also to official bilateral and multilateral agencies.

#### DILEMMAS IN THE SELECTION OF PILOT AREAS

The first problem faced by any organization, public or private, that sets out to test a new rural development model is to establish appropriate criteria for selecting the pilot areas, then to select a manageable number of areas that fit the criteria. CBIRD's experience suggests that this selection process is likely to pose some difficult dilemmas.

In CDF publications two criteria for choosing the impact areas are stressed: 1) poverty and inaccessibility and 2) high potential for development. With regard to the first, it is observed that "all six project areas qualify as being among the most economically disadvantaged areas [in the country] with substandard conditions of economic and social needs." And, in fact, CDF base line statistics do show that income levels were somewhat below the national average at the time the areas were chosen.

Direct observation and further evidence now available, however, indicate that the levels of productivity and income in the selected impact areas are actually not greatly below the national average (in a period of rapid rural development), and that topographical constraints are not particularly severe. Although the mainland areas are characterized as "mountainous," this simply means that they are located in valleys with mountains rising up around them. The statement that "83% of the Sanbuk area is mountainous" should be compared with the fact that 88% of the entire country is too mountainous for agriculture. Sanbuk is only three hours by bus from the capital city of Seoul. The Chunsong area is very near a large provincial city with frequent bus service. In both regions the arable land per household is not significantly less than the national average.

In the island areas, there are a number of distinctly poor and relatively isolated villages, but the sharply rising prices for seaweed and fish in recent years and improving productivity have given many of the villages on Yaksan and Wido higher average incomes than nearby mainland communities. Nor is isolation such a severe problem any more, at least for most villages in the group. On Yaksan there are regular dialy ferries connecting several different island villages with each other, with the mainland, and with other islands. On Wido there is one large (100 ton) ferry making a dally connection with the mainland.

Thus the image of backward, isolated communities as the setting for CBIRD projects is somewhat exaggerated. Most of these villages are very much in the main stream of current Korean rural development, with the transition from a subsistence to a market-oriented economy

either well under way or virtually completed. Of course, GDF efforts have helped speed the transition and decrease the degree of isolation, but in the main it is rapid national economic growth, the Saemaul Undong, and other governmental actions that are transforming Korean rural society in this regard.

The other criterion for village selection was developmental potential. GDF has reported that "cohesive areas" were chosen "where linkages exist to market and growth centers," where there is a "potential for investment," a "demonstrated willingness to learn," and the "potential for the development of leadership." Given this favorable constellation of attributes, it is almost inconceivable that in contemporary Korea fairly rapid development would not take place in any event. The CBIRD initiative, however, ensures that a few clusters of villages will have an advantage, moving ahead faster than others, with a more secure basis for managing their own affairs and more effective procedures for linking their efforts with outside resources, both private and official.

A number of questions can be raised about these procedures for choosing impact areas. To what extent is it justifiable to "stack the deck," as it were, in choosing villages that already have most of the ingredients for successful development? Is there an element of discrimination against the "hard cases"--the *really* mountainous villages or the *really* isolated islands--where outside help is much more desperately needed? And how long should a voluntary agency assist a carefully chosen community before seeking to extend its initiatives to other less favored areas?

The dilemma here, of course, is that trying out a sophisticated and complicated new approach such as CBIRD, even in relatively favorable situations, is bound to entail unforeseen difficulties and risks of failure. But to select the "hardest" cases will greatly compound the difficulties and risks of failure, and even at best visible results will come more slowly. Therefore prudence suggests the initial selection of areas that lie somewhere between the most and least promising situations, where the new approach will stand a reasonable chance of success. But the further one moves in this direction, the more one must stretch the criterion of "poverty and inaccessibility," and the less relevant the experience may be to truly disadvantaged and poverty-stricken areas, whether in Korea or in lower income developing countries.

A further dilemma arises once an impact area is chosen and actions get underway. Understandably, there is a compulsion to do everything possible to promote its success, regardless of comparative needs elsewhere. The success of that particular initiative becomes almost an end in itself. Attention and resources are concentrated on it without too much concern for whether similarly intensive assistance is possible on a much larger scale. The Coordinator's personal sense of mission and identity as well as his career reputation are linked to successful project completion in one particular context. And to some extent this phenomenon is reinforced at higher echelons, since the

SCF/CDF Korea field office is naturally anxious to report the successful achievement of its planned goals to the U.S. headquarters and its principal financial supporters.

These are difficult issues. CDF is confronted with the problem of proving its case in Korea. Unless there is fairly rapid, tangible progress in the CBIRD areas, neither the local population nor the Korean Government is going to become enthusiastically involved in furthering CDF objectives. Obviously results are necessary in order to make an initial impact, demonstrating to others that CDF innovative practices are effective. But the basic problem remains. If one avoids the "hard cases" not only in other parts of Korea but even the hard villages within the designated CBIRD impact areas, how relevant and useful will the lessons be to other countries where incomes and resources are much lower, and the rural economy is relatively stagnant?

For example, the Yaksan impact area, as noted earlier, is an island with 21 villages, some 12 of which on the East and North sides are quite prosperous, while the other 9 villages on the Western and Southern coasts are relatively poor, both in terms of amounts of arable land and access to marine resources. When questioned as to why so many of the CBIRD projects were clustered in the better-off communities, the Coordinator pointed out, quite rationally, that projects involving complex agricultural and fishery innovations were unlikely to succeed unless the farmers or fishermen in question are fairly well off, with resources of their own to invest and a reputation for competence. When it was suggested that some of the current projects in the more prosperous areas might be phased out to permit a greater concentration of effort in the poorer villages, there was immediate objection on the grounds that confidence in the credibility of CDF initiatives could only be established through continuing support of projects over a period of several years. Little could be accomplished, it was asserted, without this kind of follow-through. And without doubt the Coordinator was right!

The dilemmas are apparent. Conscientious, dedicated staff, both in the field and at higher levels, are committed to making certain development strategies work in the selected areas. But this process entails unforeseen consequences: there is a built-in tendency to favor places, projects, and persons where the risk of failure can be minimized. And the voluntary organization as a whole comes to identify its mission and accomplishments primarily with the ongoing progress of a few carefully nurtured impact areas. The more fundamental goals of 1) improving the situation of the "low income rural population" and 2) testing a "development management model" for eventual use in areas where development initiatives have been less successful inevitably are relegated to a lower priority.

#### OBSTACLES TO CHANGING SOCIAL STRUCTURES AND INCOME DISTRIBUTION

Throughout the international development community today there is a new emphasis on the humanitarian goal of improving the lot

of the rural poor. What this actually requires, of course, is altering the social structures, the human relationships, and the pattern of income distribution within rural communities. Again the CBIRD experience demonstrates how difficult this can be, even in an unusually dynamic milieu.

Despite the fact that Korean rural society is undergoing a process of extraordinarily rapid change and development, there is also a great deal of social, political, and moral continuity. Contemporary rural society is firmly rooted in traditional institutions, both the cohesive natural community, which for more than 1,000 years has supported itself by cooperative rice culture, and the beliefs and patterns of behavior that are regulated in accordance with Confucian doctrine. Thus the outside change agent, whether Korean or foreign, who goes into a Korean village with a little capital and technical advice, expecting to bring about planned "reforms" in the structure of social relations, has little chance of success. Both the inexorable changes associated with long term modernization and the deep-rooted traditions are usually impervious to his efforts. But in Korea, at least, development along economic lines does not require a thoroughgoing transformation. Fatalism, dependency, and lack of confidence are being overcome within the context of a traditional social environment that still emphasizes hierarchy, paternalism and the subordination of individual goals and desires to the interests of family, lineage, and community.

Historically, Korean villages have been left pretty much alone by the central bureaucratic authority, and accordingly there is a long tradition of self-government and self-reliance. Today the transition has been made nearly everywhere from leadership by an older elite concerned mainly with survival and preservation of the *status quo*, to leadership by younger activists determined to promote change. But in other respects the traditional system is pretty much intact.

This system of authority and decision-making at the village level can best be described as "consensus politics." There is extensive discussion among all those who are interested in any given issue, and everyone's voice is heard. But it is the village elite--comprising formal leaders, wealthy farmers and other influential men--who actually determine (often informally) what decisions are reached and how they will be implemented. It is their responsibility to make sure that decisions are fair and equitable, and social censure is usually effective in insuring a reasonable degree of conformity with the ideal. Others are expected to go along once agreement has been reached. Every man's voice does not have equal weight, and no one, least of all the poor, expects that it should. Persons of education, wealth, high status, experience, and good reputation are "naturally" regarded as more qualified to make decisions.

Land ownership is one essential attribute of status, respect, and authority in traditional peasant societies. The landless poor are dependent on the good will and charity of their neighbors (usually relatives), and their influence on decision-making in village affairs

is slight. They are clients and go along with their patrons' wishes.

Twenty years ago 35 to 50 percent of Korean rural households could be classified as very poor--either landless or with so little land as to make them dependent on laboring for others. Today the combination of land reform, rural development, and very large scale rural/urban migration has probably lowered this figure to around 20 percent or even less. Another 20-30 percent might also be considered poor in the sense that they are barely able to make ends meet. But each year the "ends" in the sense of acceptable minimum standards for food, clothing, education, material goods, medicine, and so forth, become a little more ample.

Although wages and living standards of agricultural laborers have improved considerably (with the shortage of agricultural labor), the prospects for structurally altering the status of the rural poor are not particularly good. Land prices are well out of their reach, and without land they are unable to take advantage of most of the development projects that have been designed to raise productivity and increase income. An occasional competent, diligent, healthy, lucky, and austere individual will in fact succeed in breaking out of the category of the landless poor, but he is the exception. The hard core of the very poor are old, or young, or sick, or widowed, or lazy and incompetent; and the amount of self-help of which they are capable is limited. Except for the opportunity provided by migration and entry into the industrial labor force, the able-bodied rural poor are pretty well stuck with their role of agricultural labor, dependent for their well being on the trickle-down effect of increasing prosperity among their land-owning fellow villagers.

In the traditional village, kinship ties and a sense of communal responsibility provided a kind of primitive welfare system for the poor and unfortunate. With the exception of a few landowners, everyone's living standard was low, and the difference between the poor (ordinary farmers) and the very poor was as much one of status as of consumption levels. But as part of the modernization process there has been a weakening of kinship ties and communal responsibility during the past 30 years or so, with a corresponding development of individual initiative. Today, the attitude of middle-level and well-off farmers towards the village poor is not much different from that of Americans: they are necessary in order to perform manual labor, but their wages are regarded as outrageously high. Where personal ties exist, there are numerous individual acts of generosity. But most farmers still consider their own financial situation to be precarious, and they are primarily concerned with ways to take advantage of expanding markets and new technology in order to increase their own earnings. Any utopian notion on the part of change agents that such people are going to redistribute income in order to promote economic egalitarianism or operate a thoroughgoing communal welfare system must be rejected as utterly unrealistic.

### LIMITATIONS ON REACHING THE POOR

It is within this context of traditional patterns of village leadership and decision-making and in terms of the intractable problems confronting the rural poor that one must consider CBIRD objectives and accomplishments.

The Coordinator is obliged to work with local elites. Most (in some cases all) members of the Community Committee are village chiefs, while the Committee Chairman and Vice-Chairman are likely to have an even more exalted status. The "felt needs" expressed as a result of the Committee's deliberations are those of middle-level and well-to-do farmers with capital resources in land worth from about \$20,000 to \$50,000 or more (in 1976) and annual incomes ranging from \$2,300 (average farm household income in 1976) to over \$6,000 (on the average, for that 5 percent of the farm population who owned more than 2 hectares of land in 1976). These figures are, of course, much higher today. To the extent that there is grass roots representation in the planning and implementation process, these, then, are the grass roots. The "bottom" in "bottom-up" planning comprises for the most part agricultural or fishing entrepreneurs with considerable capital, who are keenly cognizant of and participate in regional, national, and overseas markets for their products, and who have had rapidly rising incomes for the past ten years or more. The rural poor, on the other hand, have neither the confidence, the education, the status, nor the opportunity to participate, except passively, in the planning or implementation of village self-help projects.

Any program to redistribute land or provide long term low interest loans for land purchases would require a major policy decision on the part of the Korean Government (many such ideas have been discussed) and an enormous capital investment. A massive program along these lines is unlikely, however, because from the economist's perspective--and economist/bureaucrats are now the most influential technocrats in the Korean technocracy--continuing economic development requires that more and more of the rural population leave the land and join the industrial labor force. Korean farms are too small to be really efficient, it is argued, and to some extent current rural prosperity is indeed dependent on artificially high (government subsidized) grain prices. It can be expected, therefore, that in the future government policy will promote the increased mechanization of larger individual farms rather than efforts to assist the lowest income groups to acquire land in rural areas.

Such detailed background information regarding the rural economy may seem irrelevant to an evaluation of CDF's highly practical and effective initiatives in the six impact areas. But the issue we are considering here is not whether the CBIRD system is helping farmers and fishermen increase their productivity, incomes, and quality of life, or whether it is helping them learn to manage their own village affairs. It is doing this and doing it well. The present issue is, to what extent is CBIRD reaching the rural poor?

It is our conclusion that, given the stage of development in Korea, the nature of village social structure and politics, and the direction of government policy, the capacity of self-help projects to improve the situation of the landless poor to any marked degree (except through charity) is quite limited.

If we examine the actual results in the impact areas, it is evident that most of the assistance and benefits are going to middle level and well-off farmers. Even the loan programs and most of the social welfare projects are relatively inaccessible to the poor. Loans from the village revolving fund require two guarantors. As a result the poor can borrow only very minor amounts. The fees of day care centers or health insurance schemes are too great for most poor families. And as we have shown earlier, except for a relatively few projects such as the raising of Korean cows, most of the efforts designed to raise income have not been directed towards the poor.

In short, in the rural Korea of today there appears to be an inherent contradiction between the aim of improving the relative position of the poor and the aim of fostering a solidly-based, energetic program of development through self-help. CBIRD productivity projects are mostly geared to the requirements of independent cash-crop farmers or fishermen with some resources of their own to invest. By building up the economic base and supporting the authority of these village elites, CBIRD is in effect ensuring that the socio-economic structure of rural society will not be radically disturbed. If this is so, it is an important, albeit discouraging finding and should help to make the enunciation of future development goals and programs more realistic.

#### ACHIEVING A BALANCED "PROJECT MIX"

In the circumstances just described, achieving the "right" mix or balance in each CBIRD area between social welfare and productivity projects becomes very difficult. The fact that the direction of Community Committees is firmly in the hands of village elites means that there is a predilection for investment in projects that will increase incomes. The opinions or desires of women, children, the sick, or the old are not forcefully presented, yet one gets the impression that even if they were, village opinion would not differ drastically from that of their leaders. For the most part Koreans today seem to be strongly imbued with a capitalist, free enterprise mentality. They want to earn more money, and then from a position of relative economic independence decide themselves how to spend it.

On the other hand, there is in most places also a strong sense of communal responsibility and a tradition of cooperative effort. There is often great pride in successful cooperative undertakings and an improvement in morale as a result that goes far beyond actual economic benefits. This tension between traditional rural communalism on the one hand and the exuberant new individualist activism on the other is another factor contributing to the enormous complexity of contemporary Korean society.

In any case, among the projects requiring joint effort there seems to be more enthusiasm for building roads, dikes, bridges, and water supply systems than for day care centers or health clinics. And even when such social projects are carried through to completion, it is primarily the actual building that is the focus of popular attention and effort rather than the activity that is supposed to take place inside. All over Korea farmers have built village meeting halls at the urging of Saemaul officials, and there is often a good deal of local pride in the finished product as a monument to village cooperation and progressive spirit. But in many places the halls are seldom used for meetings, serving instead for storage or living quarters. The building itself is a tangible sign of development effort, but the activity, particularly where it is unfamiliar and not specifically addressed to urgent, locally felt needs, remains outside the villagers' immediate concern, even though they may regard it as desirable.

Through numerous and repeated training sessions CDF has--with considerable success--stressed the importance of conducting frequent regular meetings at the community center to discuss development programs, as well as the maintenance of a permanent office where management of development matters can take place on a continuing basis. These are an integral part of the CBIRD concept. Probably a similar concerted educational effort is necessary in order to create a local demand for, and a sense of personal involvement in, more intensive health, welfare and cultural activities.

Actually the problem is quite complex. There are different voices within the CDF organization itself urging greater emphasis on one or the other kind of project. Different Coordinators have different points of view and, of course, the extent to which they influence the Community Committee's decisions varies in each area. Villages and impact areas are at different stages of development, and the psychological environment also varies from place to place, so that it is extremely difficult for any outsider to judge what combination of projects is best suited and most feasible in a given situation.

In general things are left up to the Coordinator's judgement. He must balance the Committee's expressed wishes against his own conception of integrated and balanced development, or what he believes is necessary in order to comply with CDF's goals or its obligations to funding sources. For example, on Yaksan one of the Coordinator's greatest problems has been the gap between the kinds of projects desired and expected locally (large scale public works) and the varied small scale assistance programs that are regarded as appropriate by CDF. In Sanbuk, where community solidarity in support of CBIRD goals is highest, a medical insurance scheme was organized at the urging of the Coordinator, but it has broken down through lack of popular interest.

Probably the current, somewhat amorphous situation, in which there is a formal delegation of authority to the Committee combined with continuing informal pressure exercised by the Coordinator is as effective as any other system might be in reconciling these opposing points of view. But the compromise solutions are bound to fall

short of the ideal, both for the local proponents of concentrating on income-raising projects and for the CDF proponents of giving greater attention to health, nutrition, child care and the status of women.

### THE ELUSIVE CONCEPT OF "COMMUNITY"

While the main focus of interest on the part of CDF and of the villagers themselves is development--the actual accomplishment of projects that will improve incomes and the quality of life--it is important also to consider holistically the kind of residential entity, i.e., the social-economic-psychological-spatial environment, within which development can best take place. On the one hand there is the process itself--the dynamic activity that produces desired developmental results. And on the other, there is the social context--a particular set of relationships among local people, their institutions, values and patterns of behavior--that provides a favorable setting for that process. The conceptual difference here is not between economic projects and social welfare projects. Rather it is between concrete developmental activity of all kinds and the small society where it takes place. In other words, it is useful to make a distinction between community and what the community can accomplish. The CBIRD program represents an innovative approach to both aspects of the problem.

Let us consider first the issue of the mini-regional (or multi-village) impact area as a community.\* To what extent has CBIRD been able to expand the psychological and behavioral boundaries of residents in the hamlets and clusters of hamlets that make up its impact areas? In Sanbuk it seems evident that there is a broader sense of community beyond village boundaries. It is not, of course, the same closed, exclusive, "we/they" type of solidarity that characterizes most small natural villages where there are tightly grouped clusters of houses; and certainly everyone in the Sanbuk area is not included. Nevertheless, a large measure of cooperative, constructive effort takes place in Sanbuk, not only in the mobilization of labor for carrying out projects but in their planning and direction as well. The management of and participation in other local institutions of a social, administrative, recreational, financial and educational nature also reflects the fact that the social field, i.e., the territorial environment within which farmers are accustomed to share their ideas, work, and visits, and within which they feel comfortable in pursuing their goals, is in fact larger than the single village.

But Sanbuk is exceptional, not only among the CBIRD areas but in Korea as a whole. "Community" is essentially an ideology for those who participate in it. The community's members must not only share common beliefs and goals; they must derive psychological

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\* Community is used here in the sense of a group of frequently inter-acting people who share similar ideals and work together effectively for achieving common goals.

satisfactions from joint participation in work, play, and ceremony. There must be a common sense of belonging that is stronger than the rivalry, jealousy, and competition that exists among individuals, kinship groups, or natural hamlets.

Creating such a working social ideology where it does not already exist is not easy. Perhaps it is not even possible in the short run. It is all very well to use such names as Community Committee and Community Center, or to refer to groups of villages in the impact areas as a community.\* And it is certainly a worthwhile objective to try to foster a sense of community and cooperation for the achievement of desired goals. But this whole operation--at least the English-speaking part of it--sometimes seems to involve a certain amount of self deception. One has the impression that because the term "community" is used so much, the rhetoric has taken on a life of its own, convincing the promoters of change that the desired result is being more fully achieved than may actually be the case. One can argue, however, that in Korean rural villages today, particularly those that are developing most rapidly, there is, in fact, an increase in individual ambition and the pursuit of private goals compared to the past. Genuine community is being gradually eclipsed by modernization, just as it has been throughout much of the industrialized world. Thus, the basis for cooperation is increasingly self-interest, and the basis for effective leadership is increasingly expertise and demonstrated performance. At the level of the impact areas Coordinators are fully aware of these social realities, and the programs are being designed accordingly. Thus, training, the efficient operation of organizational structures, and administrative linkages among organizations are crucial. Closely knit bonds of community, except for such efforts as mobilizing the labor of a single village, are, although always desirable, less and less likely to be an integral factor in regional development.

Another essential characteristic of the successful mini-regional area as exemplified by Sanbuk is that most local residents, whether they play a leading role or not in the management process, have a sense of proprietorship--a feeling that the Community Committee, the Credit Union, the Community Center, and the revolving fund all are in some degree their own institutions rather than just the instruments (however welcome) of an outside agency. As a result there is a qualitative as well as a quantitative upgrading of their participation in such organizations.

There is a good deal less evidence of community in the Chunsong area, where the program has been going on for the same length of time. And in the islands where CBIRD was first initiated in 1977, the extension of villagers' sense of mutual responsibility, territorial loyalty, and focus of cooperative endeavor is still in its initial stages.

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\*Actually, the word for community in Korean is an esoteric, technical term used mainly by rural sociologists. It is unknown to farmers. The Korean for "Community Committee" and "Community Center" stresses development and welfare rather than community.

It is evidently impossible to pin down the causes of such an elusive psychological trait as community solidarity. The best that can be done is to suggest a set of variables that are related; each community must then be considered in terms of its unique mix of these variables.

Important among these variables, of course, are the *given* characteristics of any particular place--the structural factors that affect cohesiveness and its expression in group activity. Distribution of land ownership, the composition of kinship groups, settlement patterns, ease of transportation, and the quality of local leadership are all significant elements. In both the Chunsong and Wido impact areas those villages where there is a particularly uneven distribution of wealth demonstrate less internal solidarity as well as less desire to cooperate in projects with other communities. In the genuine mountain villages that are outside of but adjoin the Chunsong impact area, most houses are widely dispersed because of the shortage of arable land and steep terrain. In such places cooperation even within a single village is difficult to organize, because few projects can be devised that benefit everyone more or less equally. It is also more difficult to obtain a village consensus, particularly with regard to such projects as electrification or water supply, where the costs of supplying outlying households are much greater than for a single tightly clustered group of dwellings. Topography has an effect also on communication and ease of access, complicating the task of anyone trying to organize cooperative work or participation in other activities. As indicated earlier, these kinds of problems are particularly severe in the island areas.

One of the most crucial variables is the Coordinator's skill and style. It is not only what he does but what kind of person he is--from the villagers' perspective--that makes all the difference. He must be respected, but he must also be liked. One essential ingredient of community is egalitarianism; if the social gap is too great there can be no community. In Korea there are two traditional dimensions or models for personal relationships, the collective or communal and the hierarchical. The Coordinator usually comes to an area with considerable authority, an urban manner, wealth (he controls substantial funds), and education. His relations with high local officials are cordial. The farmer, even the influential farmer, initially accords such a person high status and relates to him in a deferential, subordinate, and somewhat formal manner. Villagers fit naturally into a hierarchical relationship (that of the inferior) in dealing with powerful outsiders; but this is also a way of keeping them outside, of asserting local exclusiveness.

The problem for the Coordinator is to break through the formality and status barrier, so that he can interact on the basis of mutual respect with the local elites. The Coordinator must be popular as a human being, able to relate easily to all kinds of people without being patronizing or paternalistic.

As part of his efforts to instill in influential members of the local population a sense of proprietorship in operating their own

local institutions, the Coordinator should stay in the background, boosting the importance and active participation of local leaders. But he must also keep some kind of control over the direction of local initiatives, opposing or somehow mobilizing opposition to impractical schemes. In other words, he must be strong enough to stand up to local interests when the occasion demands it. The ability to keep everything on the right track without antagonizing influential local citizens requires great political skill.

There are some situations, of course, where no amount of skill or good will on the part of the Coordinator can overcome local distrust, at least in the short run. For each impact area there are stories of the jealousies, resentments and hostility engendered during initial stages of the program. It is not yet clear whether some of the problems encountered in the island areas are due to particular states of mind characteristic of isolated communities, to lack of social and political skill on the part of the Coordinator, or simply to the fact that the programs have only been in effect a short time.

No matter how effectively the Coordinator plays his role, or how successfully development projects are carried out, other factors can impede the growth of community feeling beyond village boundaries. Unless there are close social or kin ties linking the villages, or strong common economic interests, it is extremely hard to create a larger sense of community. In the last analysis it also depends on the predominant values and the mood or morale of the local villages making up the impact area. Where many of the influential and wealthy farmers are primarily concerned with furthering their own interests, there is a tendency for them to disengage from close involvement in community affairs and develop independent ties with outside persons and institutions. Or they may try to co-opt the CBIRD structure to further their own ambitions. In such a situation efforts to mobilize support for educational improvement, health care, or recreational events are much more difficult, and the goal of enlarging the community may become unattainable. It seems axiomatic that only where key individuals become personally involved in furthering collective goals is there much chance for success.

#### **CBIRD'S SPECIAL CONTRIBUTION**

If we shift our attention away from such lofty themes as abolishing rural poverty, creating harmonious communities, or inculcating participatory democracy in villages and consider instead the CBIRD strategy in terms of its immediate practical goals, we begin to get a clearer idea of its actual accomplishments.

First of all it is widening the social field of farmers and providing the skills and experience they will need in order to survive and prosper in the complex world of commercialized, high technology agriculture. In this connection it is worth noting that in Korea rural development is no longer a matter of jolting farmers out of traditional apathy or conservative agricultural practices. The question is simply how far and how fast rural development will be pushed relative to other sectors of society. A wide variety of services to

the farmer such as agricultural extension, credit, storage, distribution, and marketing advice is becoming increasingly available through official channels.

The Saemaul Undong, while centrally planned and administered with the continuing personal backing of the President, has also strongly emphasized the important role of local village leadership in planning and implementing self-help projects. The announced goal has been to transform the consciousness of farmers so that they will recognize the potential benefits of working together for collective community goals. It is not a contradiction to state that strong "top down" bureaucratic pressures have been used to promote enthusiastic "bottom-up" participation. A resemblance to certain mass mobilization strategies in socialist countries, particularly the principle of "democratic centralism" in the People's Republic of China, is probably more than coincidental. On the other hand, the national economic system with which Korean farmers are being more and more tightly integrated is one of free enterprise and competition. As a result, the rewards for efficient agricultural production involving advanced technology are increasing, while incompetent or overly conservative farmers are being driven off the land. And not surprisingly, for the reasons given earlier, the rate of progress in different villages has been quite uneven.

It is in the areas of leadership, the acquisition of relatively sophisticated management skills, and the exploration and utilization of better ties with institutions outside the villages that the CBIRD program is making a particularly useful and important contribution. It supplements the Saemaul Undong in the areas where it is weakest, by providing training in those techniques of integrated rural development that can be practiced by the villagers themselves: systematic long and short range planning, the management of local development organizations, the creation of financial institutions designed to recycle increased income back into the "community" economy, and techniques for obtaining various kinds of outside help from both public and private sources.

To the extent that CBIRD is successful in promoting effective cooperative efforts at the multi-village level, it will enable the traditional cohesive solidarity and mutual interdependence of the village to survive on a larger, more viable scale. In the small, closed, Korean natural community there has always been a great deal of economic and social mutuality. Correspondingly, there has also been an easy intimacy as well as a security and harmony of personal relationships that is expressed constantly in the sharing of work and material goods, generous (often extravagant) hospitality, and frequent informal gatherings. But today a considerable degree of atomization is taking place, as time honored values and customs clustered around such concepts as mutual help, cooperation, and the amicable settlement of disputes give way to the hard driving individualism of the cash crop farmer. As individuals expand and strengthen their connections with outside institutions, ties with their neighbors are weakened. Everywhere there is increased dependence on sources of leadership, capital, know-how, and

manufactured goods beyond village boundaries, with the drive for higher living standards taking precedence over most other considerations.

The CBIRD strategy, best exemplified by the Sanbuk area, helps the rural population deal with both of these challenges, the pressing need to expand links with the world outside the village and the threat of commercialized individualism to cooperation. Where successful the CBIRD model can point the way to another alternative direction for rural society: the formation of larger, economically prosperous cooperating social units within which the most important humanistic aspects of traditional rural society can perhaps be preserved against the enormously powerful influences of consumption-oriented materialism and economic individualism. Although the goal of creating genuine multi-village communities may prove somewhat illusory in many instances, the CBIRD approach offers many advantages by enlarging the scale and therefore the effectiveness of self-help and self-management. This permits the Community Committee to undertake more ambitious projects to deal more effectively with local administration, to tap other outside sources of technology and capital, and to train its own leaders in relatively sophisticated management skills.

## CHAPTER 9

### SOME LESSONS AND OPEN QUESTIONS

In examining the operational record of CBIRD in search of useful lessons, this report has stressed certain special characteristics of the Korean setting that provide a generally favorable context for rural development, as well as certain other characteristics that place practical limits on the CBIRD approach. Both sets of factors--positive and negative--need to be kept in view in considering the future potentialities of CBIRD in South Korea and the feasibility of replicating some or all of its special features.

This final chapter recapitulates some of the special contributions the CBIRD program has made in the Korean context and suggests some considerations that will determine its applicability in other countries. It also addresses two outstanding questions of importance to many countries, and a third concerning the survival and future influence of CBIRD in South Korea.

Since 1971 the pace of change in virtually all of South Korea's 36,000 villages has picked up dramatically, as village economies have become more and more tightly integrated with that of the nation as a whole, and as bureaucratic influences on almost every aspect of farm life have deepened. From this standpoint the CDF program must be seen as an effort to fine-tune and accelerate the process in a few carefully selected areas. The rural populations of the CBIRD impact areas are particularly fortunate in that the kinds of benefits, training, and experience they are receiving will have long lasting effects, enabling them to compete more effectively in the materialistic sweepstakes that are now going on in South Korea.

Korean rural development in recent years has taken place under the influence of the Saemaul Movement with its emphasis on paternalistic guidance and material support from above combined with the mobilization of popular cooperative effort under local leadership. CBIRD has supported the Saemaul efforts but has gone beyond them, enabling farmers, fishermen and others in its impact areas to exercise a greater degree of control over the development process. While

one general effect of both Saemaul and CBIRD initiatives has probably been to reinforce a realization by these local producers of their dependence on outside institutions and the linkage of their livelihood with the national economy, the CBIRD approach has clearly demonstrated better ways to plan, finance, and direct further progress in accordance with villagers' own goals and needs. It has furnished the multi-village area with a set of institutions and a methodology that enables the local population to make the most of their available resources. Most importantly it provides them with a workable means of acquiring those essential factors of production that are everywhere in short supply: capital, technical know-how, and management skills.

So far, particularly in the mainland impact areas, the CBIRD initiatives have produced impressive results in increased productivity, incomes, and local living standards. On the islands there have been some initial problems and delays, but a wide variety of projects is now being implemented, and given the fact that some of the island programs represent much smaller per capita investment by CDF, the benefits already achieved are significant.

#### APPLICABILITY OF CBIRD EXPERIENCE TO POORER COUNTRIES

In a report such as this it is not possible to reach any firm conclusions regarding the extent to which successful CDF programs in Korea are replicable elsewhere. Nevertheless, it seems useful to ask some leading questions that might help to establish a comparative basis for exploring the possibilities.

- 1) How important is the relatively egalitarian distribution of land ownership in determining the outcome of the CBIRD experiment in Korea?
- 2) Has the strong demand for agricultural and fishery products from prosperous urban centers been a necessary condition for raising farm income?
- 3) To what extent does the success of CBIRD's non-formal educational program depend on popular attitudes towards learning?
- 4) How much has CBIRD depended on the effective operation of local administrative agencies and Korean government inputs in order to achieve its planned goals?
- 5) To what extent does CDF's concentration on areas with a "good potential for development" account for the program's impressive achievements? Or, conversely, would the CBIRD experience be more relevant for less developed countries if there were greater emphasis on "hard cases"?

There can be no doubt that the first four factors listed above--the relatively equitable distribution of land holdings, the profitable and expanding markets for agricultural and fishery products, the

high value traditionally placed on education and learning in the Korean culture, and the aggressive promotion of rural development by the government--have all contributed importantly to the effectiveness of the CBIRD program. It would seem to follow, therefore, that the absence of any one or combination of these positive factors in another country setting--especially a very low income country with a low economic growth rate--would constitute if not an outright barrier at least a serious impediment to replicating the successful CBIRD experience in South Korea.

As to the fifth question concerning CDF's concentration on areas with a "good potential for development," we can give only a speculative answer. CDF was undoubtedly well advised to choose such promising areas as Sanbuk and Chumsong in which to launch its experiment because it required testing out a complicated and untried approach that would inevitably present sizeable problems and risks even under relatively favorable circumstances. To have started with the hardest cases could well have doomed the experiment to failure from the outset. In moving on from these initial areas to the island areas of Wido and Yaksan, CDF did indeed take on some relatively "harder cases." Yet even these areas had a good deal going for them, especially in terms of prospering markets and rising prices for marine products, and the availability of substantial local savings--albeit concentrated in relatively few hands--for reinvestment in development.

There are, however, some much "harder cases" in Korea, particularly isolated mountain villages with only poor to moderate development potential and still lying outside the mainstream of the dynamically growing Korean economy. It is reasonable to suppose that if the CBIRD approach were now to be tried out on some of these truly "hard cases" it would encounter much greater difficulties and would probably have to be modified substantially in certain respects in order to achieve significant results. But the experience thus gained would undoubtedly offer much poorer countries to the south a wider range of useful lessons--both positive and negative--than the present CBIRD experience.

This observation is not intended to imply, however, that the CBIRD approach and the lessons of its experience in South Korea have no relevance to less prosperous countries. On the contrary, it may well be that certain features of CBIRD's strategy and methodologies--for example, its way of dovetailing local planning and implementation with broader nationwide planning and development efforts, its technique of recycling outside grants into local revolving loan funds, and its successful efforts to link rural communities with outside sources of know-how and technical support--may well have considerable applicability to other countries, provided, of course, that they are properly adapted to the quite different circumstances of these countries. Indeed, no one can really know until it has actually been tried.

What is very clear, however, is that CBIRD's unusually favorable environment in South Korea, especially the extraordinary

economic dynamism, cannot readily be replicated elsewhere. Therefore, the expectations of what a modified CBIRD approach might achieve under much less favorable economic circumstances should be appropriately modest and realistic. In other words, inflated rhetoric and false hopes should be studiously avoided.

### THREE OUTSTANDING QUESTIONS

The discrepancies noted earlier between CBIRD's more intangible goals--particularly concerning social change and welfare--and the actual program accomplishments pose a few important unresolved questions that merit brief review, especially since they apply to many countries.

#### 1. *Can the Poor Really be Helped?*

It has been pointed out in previous sections that most of the benefits from CDF investment accrue to middle level and well-off farmers, and that relatively little can apparently be done to change this pattern despite the best intentions and efforts on the part of the CDF staff and Coordinators. In the Korean case it seems evident that except for outright charity, attempts to help the poorest sector of the rural population must depend mainly on the trickle-down effect of generally increased village prosperity. The goals of restructuring society so as to change the distribution of wealth, and of establishing a new welfare-oriented mentality among local elites, are simply beyond the capacities of the CBIRD program--or any other program for that matter, short of a thoroughgoing political revolution or an ideological revitalization movement.

The question then inevitably arises; despite the widespread international consensus on the need to improve the lot of the rural poor, to what extent is this goal really practicable? Perhaps there is something wrong with our perceptions of the problems. Have we taken adequate account of the very solid and durable social/structural obstacles to the kinds of change that are so widely regarded as desirable? Or, to put the matter in terms of practical strategies, is it possible to redistribute wealth or focus efforts mainly on aiding the poor, while at the same time promoting self-sustaining rural development? We must conclude here that, in Korea at least, the answer seems to be no. Further, our assessment of the CBIRD programs suggests that, regardless of its statements of basic principles and objectives, SCF/CDF--at the level of actual operating procedures--has implicitly reached the same conclusion.

Unless a rural society is in a state of chaotic demoralization or upheaval, which has not been the case in South Korea, an effective integrated development program must be based on existing traditions, values, and institutions. It may be possible to modify their operation in gradual and subtle ways, but if the change agent's commitment compels him to confront and try to do something all at once about such intractable problems as the role of women, child-rearing practices, village authority structures or hierarchies of wealth and status--all in addition to technical agricultural innovation--then

truly his program's failure is assured. In Korea, at any rate, effective self-help efforts depend on strengthening and improving village institutions and leadership in accordance with generally recognized, traditional standards--not on undermining or radically transforming them. The community worker can never afford to lose sight of the social mechanisms through which people interact and organize their group efforts, no matter how dedicated he may be to certain overriding objectives.

Hard questions must be asked: is the ideal of integrated economic and social development always valid as a working strategy? The CBIRD experience in Korea suggests that this issue should be approached through carefully planned stages, with the major push in social welfare projects coming after effective improvement in the economic sector and after extensive indoctrination through non-formal education. Such an approach reflects two particular characteristics of the Korean context. First, while rural health care is grossly inadequate by Western standards, health problems are not so severe as to impair either village morale or work output. Second, the Korean farmer or fisherman gives highest priority to economic development.

CDF Coordinators and Community Committees have arrived at reasonably successful compromises on this issue in the actual working out of a viable mix of projects in the impact areas. The social welfare effort has been concentrated mainly on women's training, day care centers, and actions to reinvigorate and supplement existing family planning programs. Except for the day care centers, however, the amounts invested have been minor compared to other kinds of projects. And, as has been pointed out before, even with these kinds of projects it is the better educated, more confident, and more aggressive women from economically secure households who receive most of the benefits.

Another lesson here, then, is that if "bottom up" participation and decision-making has any meaning, it is that under the CBIRD approach local leaders will determine the direction that development takes in accordance with their own (and the local administration's) ordering of priorities. The Coordinator has considerable influence on the Committee's deliberations, but any serious effort to alter local priorities would be self-defeating, which is to say that any major and direct effort to improve the lot of the landless and help-less poor will have to wait.

## *2. Will Villages Work Together?*

Another major objective of the CBIRD system has been the formation of multi-village communities as the focus for development efforts. Here it is useful to make a distinction between a true sociological community and a set of villages that are able to plan and work together under unified leadership for mutually agreed upon goals. The distinction can be illustrated by differences in the degree of solidarity and the manner in which CBIRD institutions are operated in the different impact areas. Only in Sanbuk does there appear to be a strong and broader sense of community in which

feelings of mutuality and social responsibility--a concern for the common welfare--go beyond village boundaries to encompass the whole impact area. The impression is inescapable in Sanbuk that farmers not only participate energetically, they also take pride in operating the CBIRD machinery for their own purposes. This same sense of proprietorship is popularly reflected in the frequent, everyday use of the Community Center, where, for example, a steady stream of people conduct their business with the credit union.

In the other CBIRD areas the same general formula is being followed, and there is widespread and grateful recognition of the benefits derived from it. But for most people the activities remain something that is being done for them by outsiders in accordance with externally imposed rules and procedures. In terms of their associations, loyalties and economic goals people continue to identify themselves with a particular village or kinship group. Or, where such ties are weakened, they are likely to migrate to the city. In other words, the CBIRD spirit has not yet become an integral, deeply rooted part of the local sub-culture and social system. The lesson here would seem to be that while the advantages of larger scale, inter-village cooperation are self evident, the erosion of village solidarity and the formation of an expanded rural community is likely to be a very slow process.

CDF's goal of establishing multi-village development units on a larger scale is impeded by other factors as well. The idea of the natural village community as the focus of social life and (now) of developmental aspirations is deeply ingrained in Korean mentality. Intimate, long term personal association is regarded as the proper and natural basis for both rural leadership and cooperative effort. Accordingly the Saemaul organizers (reportedly including President Park), while recognizing the importance of planning and coordinated effort on a regional basis, have continued to emphasize the individual village, both as the local decision-making unit and as the basis of labor mobilization. Coordination of larger projects beyond the village level is regarded as the function of local administration.

Is it likely that the demonstrated effectiveness of the CBIRD methodology will change official thinking on this issue? On the basis of the present study it seems highly problematical. The emotional associations of the village as a social and political unit have been mentioned above. In addition there are powerful bureaucratic and political forces influencing the direction of development of rural institutions. The Korean administration's approach is eminently pragmatic: 1) any concessions and adaptations to foreign organizations that are necessary in the short run in order to ensure the continued flow of outside assistance are readily made; 2) there is a genuine eagerness to learn new techniques and technologies, which if useful will probably be incorporated somehow in future practices. In the longer run, however, the prestige, authority, and ubiquity of Korean governmental agencies will determine the form and manner of operation of all local institutions.

### 3. *What are CBIRD's Long Term Prospects?*

Today the social and economic horizons of Korean farmers are rapidly expanding, and CBIRD projects are accelerating the process. Local leaders are actively participating in guiding the development of their communities. But the Korean Government depends on the docile support of the rural population. It does not look kindly on the formation of any independent, private associations at the local level that might be in a position to challenge the authority of official agencies or serve as a rallying point for demands for greater local autonomy. It would be highly misleading to assume, as some have done, that the organization of local decision-making for economic development represents a significant trend in the direction of grass roots political democracy. Korean tradition, current governmental practice, and the geo-political situation in Northeast Asia all oppose such a tendency, at least in the immediate foreseeable future.

Thus it seems unrealistic to expect that a set of model or pilot communities implanted in Korean rural society can eventually transform that society by example in accordance with a particular ideal vision. Rather it is the other way around. As CDF phases out its operation, the model will inevitably be transformed by the particular conditions and popular attitudes of each area and by the ubiquitous and growing influence of the bureaucracy.

But even if the present CBIRD model seems unlikely to spread spontaneously throughout South Korea, will it survive in the present impact areas after CDF withdraws? Without occasional capital inputs and at least periodic encouragement and supervision from the outside, can the CBIRD program sustain itself in anything like its present form? The answer, in our view, will depend heavily on whether by then the CBIRD system has achieved a sufficiently high degree of integration in the sense of being supported and sanctioned by local values and customs, in addition to achieving the sense of proprietorship referred to earlier. Given these conditions, the survival prospects seem promising, but lacking this, there seems little likelihood that it will be perpetuated after the Coordinator and his capital are withdrawn.

One promising possibility that merits consideration, even if it may seem remote at the moment, is that the myon level cooperatives might take over the local CBIRD role of promoting and coordinating integrated rural development. But before this can be regarded as a serious alternative, there will have to be some drastic changes in the structural organization and operating style of the cooperative system, and in the attitudes of its officials. Local branches of the National Agricultural Cooperatives Federation in Korea are cooperatives in name only. The parent organization is a centralized government bureaucracy with a strong "top-down" orientation. It is extremely powerful, with great resources and authority in the fields of rural credit, farm input supplies, and in the collection, storage and distribution of agricultural products. There have been many changes for the better in its operations as a result of the Saemaul Movement, but no one believes that it

represents the farmers' views or interests.

At the time of this case study discussions were reportedly going on at high levels in the Korean Government with a view to restructuring the cooperative system to achieve a greater degree of active local participation and greater responsiveness to local needs. Were this to occur, the national organization would then play more of an advisory and facilitating role than, as at present, a strong-handed directive role as executor of government policy. In such a climate, the seeds of local planning, management and self-help that CBIRD has planted and nurtured would have a real chance to thrive. Whether such a vision is utopian or not, it appears to us that the local cooperative is in fact the logical focus of integration and the most promising successor to CBIRD.

In any event, there can be little doubt that in the long run the CBIRD innovations will leave some useful and enduring impacts on the Korean rural scene. But just what form they will take and how extensive they will be, only time can tell.