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**Institutional  
Options for the  
Mandara Area  
Development  
Project**

A. H. Barclay, Jr.  
Gary Eilerts

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Development Alternatives, Inc. 624 Ninth Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20001

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## PREFACE

This report focuses on one component of an ongoing design process for the proposed Mandara Area Development Project (MADP) in northern Cameroon. At the request of USAID/Yaounde, Dr. Tony Barclay and Mr. Gary Eilerts visited Cameroon, from August 2 - August 21, 1980, to carry out an institutional analysis of potential implementation arrangements for the MADP. The report examines the major options for organizational placement and the role of village-level institutions in proposed MADP activities.

This institutional analysis received its intellectual orientation from the action research efforts of Development Alternatives, Inc., through a contract with the Office of Rural Development and Development Administration of the Agency for International Development. This project aims to assist donor agencies and host countries with improving the design and implementation of Integrated Rural Development (IRD) projects, such as the MADP.

The action research efforts address two objectives simultaneously. On the one hand, the objective is to learn more about the most serious problems that occur during IRD project implementation, and to identify alternative organizational mechanisms and management practices that help to alleviate these problems. A comprehensive review of these problems, and some strategies to relieve these problems has been recently released.\*

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\* George Honadle and others. Integrated Rural Development: Making it Work? A state-of-the-art report prepared for the Agency for International Development, Washington, D.C.: Development Alternatives, Inc., July 1980.

The other objective is both to refine and to add to the understanding of these problems through technical assistance to the field staff engaged in designing or implementing IRD projects. To date most of the technical assistance provided under this contract has been to ongoing projects. A chance to enhance the understanding and analysis of IRD project design problems -- particularly those related to organizational options -- could not be passed up.

The work on which this report is based benefited greatly from the support and guidance of Mr. Eric Witt, the Agriculture and Rural Development Officer of USAID/Yaounde. In Mokolo, the headquarters of Margui-Wandala Department, where the MADP will be based, the team received exceptional cooperation, assistance and advice from the Michigan State University team which has carried out extensive and intensive surveys for the project design. To Dr. David Campbell, the MSU team leader, and to Messrs. Larry Lev, John Holtzman, Roger Clapp and David Trechter, we extend our thanks for the satisfaction of close and thoroughly enjoyable collaboration.

This institutional analysis is the outcome of close consultation and discussions with officials and technicians serving the Government of Cameroon. At Mokolo, we were welcomed and encouraged by the Prefect, Mr. El Hadj Bouba Ousmaila Bah. Mr. Mohamadou Labarang, Premier Adjoint to the Prefect, provided numerous insights on administrative processes in the department, and took a major substantive interest in the MADP. We are also very grateful to the chefs de service and field staff of the line ministries operating in Margui-Wandala. While they are too numerous to mention here, all of them took an interest in the work and readily exchanged information and views with us on the proposed structure and content of the MADP.

We were extremely fortunate to work with Marcel Ngue of the USAID staff during most of our time in northern Cameroon. Mr. Ngue's broad knowledge of rural development in Cameroon, and his appreciation of particular problems encountered in the proposed MADP area, sharpened our understanding of project design issues and potential implementation problems as well. We would like to extend our special thanks to him for his assistance.

## INTRODUCTION

This report presents an institutional analysis of the proposed Mandara Area Development Project (MADP) in northern Cameroon. Project design activities for the MADP have been underway since September 1979. AID has funded major extensive and intensive surveys in the proposed project area on land use patterns, local farming systems, livestock production, marketing and nutrition. These surveys, which are being carried out by a team from Michigan State University, were commissioned as major inputs to the Project Paper, which is due to be completed in February 1981.

At the request of USAID/Yaounde, DAI provided a two-person team in August 1980 under its contract with the Office of Rural Development and Development Administration to develop recommendations for the organizational and administrative structure of the MADP.<sup>1/</sup> While the precise content of several project components had not yet been defined at the time of the field visit, the basic strategy and objectives had been established. Government of the United Republic of Cameroon (GURC) personnel in Margui-Wandala Department, where the project will be based, were familiar with the project and had been consulted continuously during the design process. As a result, they had already given considerable thought to how the MADP would be organized and implemented.

The report begins with a brief review of the project area and the objectives of the MADP. Organizational and administra-

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<sup>1/</sup> The team's scope of work is included as Annex A of this report.

tive issues are then introduced, using a framework developed for analyzing integrated rural development (IRD) implementation problems. The two major sections of the report deal with the choice of a project management structure, and the role of local-level institutions in the project. The conclusion examines the prospects for sustaining MADP results beyond the period of donor financing.

### AN OVERVIEW OF THE PROJECT AREA AND THE MADP STRATEGY

The Marqui-Wandala Department of the Northern Province of Cameroon corresponds very roughly to the mountains, plateaux, piedmont, and adjacent plains of the Mandara Mountains. Marqui-Wandala differs in many respects from the surrounding departments. Its estimated population of over 550,000 people is concentrated in a relatively small area where average population density is 67/km<sup>2</sup>, with numerous small pockets where the density reaches over 300/km<sup>2</sup>, some of the most densely populated localities in Africa. The many small ethnic groups that presently occupy the area retreated there ahead of the advance of the Fulani jihads in the early 19th century. The area now composes a relative island of animism in the largely Muslim north.

Fragile mountainous soils, a short but intense rainy season, difficult relief, and a high susceptibility to erosion pose formidable constraints to agricultural production in the area. Despite this, one finds extremely high population densities. This is due to the relatively sophisticated system of terrace farming that the present inhabitants found when they moved in. It uses tiny terraces, many no more than two or three square

meters in surface area, which are built up using rock and vegetation available on the spot. Terrace maintenance demands high labor inputs on an annual basis, and continual application of animal manure is central to maintaining the fertility of the soils.

The extremely intensive terrace system provides sufficient food in most normal years, but cannot cushion the area with a surplus for the relatively frequent years of drought and infestation. This combination of a difficult environment, high labor requirements, and low returns to labor has produced a pattern of seasonal, and, more recently, permanent outmigration from the area in search of employment and income.

In looking at this area as the focus of an IRD project, it is apparent that increased food production through higher returns to labor must be a central objective. However, the present production system is a good example of an ecologically successful adaptation to difficult conditions. It appears to be producing near to its potential capacity, while at the same time maintaining productive potential for the future. At the present stage, major project-induced innovations to the production system are not immediately identifiable.

In analyzing this situation, the MADP project preparation team has defined a set of potential IRD activities which will address short- and long-term needs in the area. They include:

- An agricultural research center to conduct applied research on the agricultural and livestock production systems of the Mandara Mountains;
- A rural public works program dealing with natural resource conservation activities, including anti-erosion measures and reforestation;
- A reinforcement of the governmental technical services and extension capacities;

- A series of village development and self-help activities; and,
- Coordination of other ongoing projects -- small dam and well construction, and health programs -- within an area planning framework.

The short-term objectives of such a program of activities would include stabilizing the natural resource base of the area as a precondition for increased agricultural production; making GURC extension services more competent and more effective in reaching the rural population; eliciting more developed community response mechanisms; and heightening the impact of ongoing projects by making their actions complementary to new initiatives under the MADP.

In the longer term, the project would hope to:

- Identify valid and appropriate innovations for the agricultural and livestock production system;
- Extend such innovations to more receptive communities;
- Improve the productive base of the mountain populations; and
- Improve the social welfare of the area by coordinating improved health and education facilities and capabilities.

These objectives serve to define the probable time-phasing of MADP activities. An initial period of five years would concentrate on the short-term objectives described above, with a second phase of approximately five years needed to make substantial progress towards the long-term objectives. The intractability of the area's problems requires at least a ten-year strategy, though this is probably a conservative estimate of the time that will be required to achieve significant development impact in the area.

## CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR MADP ISSUES

The MADP has most of the characteristics of a classical integrated rural development (IRD) project. It is aimed at a rural population which has had little prior contact with development projects; it is designed to address a set of very complex problems; and it is multi-functional in terms of its content. There are no guarantees of success for the MADP, and it is obvious that the area will require a sustained development effort over an extended period of time. These features highlight several key design and implementation issues that are frequently encountered in IRD projects and programs. This section relates a general framework for analyzing IRD to the specific organizational and administrative issues affecting the MADP.


IRD has been defined in numerous ways, and appears in many different forms, ranging from small community-based projects, to major area development schemes, to national programs linking several ministries. Because of this diversity, it is useful to identify a common process that characterizes IRD efforts, regardless of their size or structure.<sup>2/</sup> This process begins with the introduction of resources (funds, personnel, equipment, etc.) by a donor, host government and/or other intervention agent. The desired outcome is to achieve lasting improvements in the social and economic well-being of the beneficiary population. The sequence of steps needed to complete this process can be shown as follows.

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<sup>2/</sup> This framework is developed more fully in Chapter Two of George Honadle and others, Integrated Rural Development: Making It Work? A report prepared for the Agency for International Development, Washington, D.C., Development Alternatives, Inc., 1980.

FIGURE 1

## STAGES IN THE IRD PROCESS



Progress from one stage to the next in this sequence is highly uncertain, and dependent on whether certain key conditions are met. While technical soundness and economic viability are obvious conditions (and are often difficult to establish), less attention is usually given to the organizational and administrative factors that either support or impede the IRD process. For example, the prospects for efficient conversion of project resources into goods and services may depend on whether implementation responsibility is placed in one part of the host government system or another, or outside that system altogether. In the same vein, a positive response to project interventions -- manifested in the use of goods and services -- may be strengthened or weakened by the strategy used to involve the local population in project activities. Whether this positive response leads to sustained benefits may hinge on the choice of institutions for project implementation, and the changes which these institutions undergo over time.

Thus for the MADP, a key part of the design process is an assessment of the various options that exist for organizing and administering project activities. The scope of work on which this report is based called for identification of the "most appropriate" institutional structure for implementing the MADP (see Annex A). This focuses attention on immediate concerns, particularly on the part of the technical services which function in the project area. But is also calls for a longer-term

perspective which extends beyond the delivery capabilities of the GURC in Marqui-Wandala, to include the issue of local response. This calls for an analysis of existing and potential institutions at the community level which can interact directly with project staff, and facilitate the spread of beneficial interventions.

The major sections of this report deal respectively with the issues of project management structure and local organizations in the MADP project area. In the first, the focus is on the resources-to-goods-and-services linkage, and on the advantages and disadvantages of different arrangements for achieving this intermediate step in the IRD process. In the second section, options are considered for maximizing access to and cooperation from the project area population. The conclusion discusses the implications of this institutional analysis for the sustainability of MADP's results over the long term.

## OPTIONS FOR ORGANIZATIONAL PLACEMENT

### The Administrative Setting

Although Marqui-Wandala has been well outside the mainstream of development in Cameroon, several projects are underway in the department and each of the major technical ministries is represented there by a chef de service. These include representatives of Livestock, Education, Health, Roads, Mines and Energy, and Agriculture. The Departmental Delegate of the Ministry of Agriculture supervises the work of Community Development, Water and Forests and Rural Public Works within Marqui-Wandala. However, each of these services receives its own budget through

vertical channels from the provincial (Garoua) and national (Yaounde) levels.

Within the department, the Prefect ranks as the senior GURC official, with overall responsibility for administration of government services in Margui-Wandala. The Prefect or his Ad-joint (deputy) must sign each authorization for expenditure of funds by a chef de service. Following this, funds are paid out by the Ministry of Finance's cashier for the department, who is attached to the prefecture. Since budget allocations are set in Yaounde and then communicated to the department level, the prefecture deals with each chef de service individually in order to monitor activities and expenditures.<sup>3/</sup> The highly centralized systems of the line ministries do not provide for significant planning inputs from Mokolo, and as a result, do not require cross-sectoral (interministerial) coordination at the department level or below.

While each ministry's staff in Margui-Wandala operates autonomously, the different GURC services suffer from common problems. Their personnel are few in number and have received very limited training; they do not have adequate transport; and they have few, if any, proven innovations to extend to farmers, herders and local community groups. For example, to serve a population of half a million, the Ministry of Community Development has only six field staff for animation; until recently, none of them owned even a bicycle.<sup>4/</sup> The Ministry of Agricul-

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<sup>3/</sup> Records for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1980 showed that revenue from taxes, fines, customs duties, etc., collected in the department totalled 700,697,992 CFA francs. Total government expenditures in Margui-Wandala was 762,323,814 CFA francs. At an exchange rate of \$1 = 200 F CFA, the total inflow of government funds to the department was only \$308,129.

<sup>4/</sup> Motorbikes and mobyettes for CD agents are being supplied under the USAID-funded small dams project.

ture's extension staff includes 15 "technical" agents (chefs de poste) with two years of post-primary school training and 39 moniteurs who have not been formally trained; none of them has been provided with transport. The four veterinary staff working under the Ministry of Livestock's chef de sous-secteur at Mokolo are concerned almost exclusively with monitoring and controlling diseases. They have no functional links with the extension staff of the Ministry of Agriculture.

These factors have effectively immobilized GURC development services in Marqui-Wandala. While the problems listed above are not unique to the area, or to Cameroon for that matter, they do pose major constraints to the success of any major area-based development project. They indicate that implementation capacity must be improved if a project such as the MADP is to operate successfully. In other words, the infusion of additional resources into the existing system will not automatically lead to the delivery of goods and services needed for the area's development. This has major implications for the choice of an institution to implement the MADP, because the burden of new tasks may overload the existing system, unless that system can be significantly strengthened. This issue is examined below, with reference to the principal organizational options that exist for the project.

### Coordination and Decentralization

The rationale for an area-based development project in the Mandara Mountains was present in an earlier section of this report. It is based on the need to develop interventions that are appropriate to the area's unique characteristics, and on the need for a concentrated effort that addresses basic inter-related problems. Yet, because funds and policy directives move vertically through line ministry structures, the GURC system

cannot easily accommodate an area focus in project planning and management, particularly when more than one ministry is involved. A preferred solution for development projects in Cameroon -- and one of the options being considered for the MADP -- has been to bypass that system by creating new area development authorities which either co-opt or replace existing government services in their target areas. Before examining the advantages and disadvantages of such an approach in the Mandara case, the needs for coordination and decentralization which are implied in the emerging design of the MADP should be considered.

Coordination of project activities will be needed to obtain maximum efficiency in the delivery of goods and services. The human resources of the department are too thinly spread to allow for a high degree of specialization, even if this were desirable. More importantly, several ongoing activities, as well as new ones proposed under the MADP, are intended to be mutually reinforcing: for example, health education and small dams for potable water, or soil conservation measures and applied on-farm research.

As described above, existing administrative practice contains no formal mechanisms for coordination between the staffs of the different ministries. When collaboration does occur -- sharing or transport to remote areas, or convening a joint meeting of different services -- it is usually based on informal, personal ties between the technicians concerned. With the likelihood that many new small projects will be launched which require input from more than one service -- particularly in rural public works -- the need for more formal coordination procedures will grow very rapidly.

With strong cooperation from the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Planning (MINEP) and officials at the department lev-

el, and with USAID's blessing, a new coordination mechanism has been created for the Mandara Mountains Water Resources Project. Management authority for this project has been vested, through MINEP Decision Number 400 of June 20, 1980, in a department-level committee which is chaired by the Prefect, and includes representatives from the five technical services which will be directly or indirectly involved in implementing the project. MINEP's representative in Mokolo -- the Agent Provincial de Developpement (APD) -- has been designated as Project Coordinator. The Prefect, as President of the Committee, is likely to retain de facto control over this small dams project, particularly its finance.

It is always worth asking whether formal government decrees calling for coordination are likely to have the desired effect, particularly when this function is entrusted to a committee. A key feature of the Mandara Mountains Water Resources Project is the decentralization of control over resources -- the project budget, in particular -- as opposed to an arrangement when a committee can only encourage coordination among technical staff who draw their resources and instructions from different line ministries. In the latter case, coordination may be readily endorsed by all parties as desirable, if not essential, but it is rarely practiced because the incentives to negotiate changes in work plans, or to reach compromises when one group's plans conflict with another's, are weak or non-existent. The fact that budgetary control for the Mandara Mountains Water Resources Project has been delegated to departmental authorities within the existing structure and not to a new, autonomous institution, represents an important initiative by the GURC.

The water project committee has been given a significant degree of decisionmaking authority. Of course, until the pro-

gram of dam construction actually gets underway,<sup>5/</sup> its performance cannot be judged. But while the administrative structure remains to be tested, and may well need to be modified as implementation proceeds, it does provide an operational model on which the larger management structure of the MADP might be based, because it places responsibility for planning and implementation at the same level. Dam sites have already been identified, but the scheduling of construction activities will require detailed planning to fit each site's specific needs and characteristics. This process will also be an essential ingredient in the broader spectrum of activities to be implemented under the MADP.

#### Options for Organization and Management of the MADP

While the details of each IRD project's management structure are influenced by factors that are situation-specific, it is useful to identify four types of organizational arrangements which constitute the major options for a new project such as the MADP. Figure 2 presents the four alternatives with their associated strengths and weaknesses:

- Placement of implementation responsibility with a single line agency or ministry;
- Delegation of responsibility to a unit of government below the national level, such as a province or district;
- Creation of an area-based integrated development agency; and
- Establishment of a "para-administrative" unit with temporary status.

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<sup>5/</sup> At the time of the fieldwork for this report, contract negotiations were still in progress between the GURC and Louis Berger International, the consulting engineers.

FIGURE 2

ORGANIZATIONAL PLACEMENT ALTERNATIVES AND TRADEOFFS

No.	ALTERNATIVE	TRADEOFFS		
	Implementor	Major Advantages	Major Disadvantages	Supporting Conditions
1	<u>National Line Agency</u> (permanent) such as Ministry of Agriculture	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Provides a base in a permanent institution;</li> <li>● Provides high level decision involvement;</li> <li>● Sometimes appropriate for non-area focused projects;</li> <li>● Often simplifies initial preparation process and resource flows.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Limits sectoral focus of project strategy;</li> <li>● Often there is a preoccupation with national problems rather than local variations;</li> <li>● An unwillingness to delegate significant operational authority is common;</li> <li>● Often accompanied by jealousy of other line agencies.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● High capability in appropriate agency;</li> <li>● High priority on institutionalization;</li> <li>● Agency has high target group orientation;</li> <li>● National leadership commitment critical for success.</li> </ul>
2	<u>Subnational Government Entity</u> (permanent) such as a region, province of district	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Provides local focus;</li> <li>● Sometimes helps to concentrate authority over project activities;</li> <li>● Can build planning and implementation capability in permanent entity.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Often has low institutional and human resource capability;</li> <li>● Subnational units often have little leverage over line ministries whose activities affect the project.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● High commitment to decentralization;</li> <li>● Uniqueness of target area;</li> <li>● High capability in appropriate agency;</li> <li>● Agency has high target group orientation.</li> </ul>
3	<u>Integrated Development Agency</u> (permanent) such as a national authority	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Helps comprehensiveness of project overview;</li> <li>● Provides local focus with access to higher level authority;</li> <li>● Can avoid overly oppressive audit and control procedures.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Line agency competition can cripple performance;</li> <li>● Complex communication needs.</li> <li>● Creates new recurrent cost burden unless strong revenue-generation potential exists in area.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Good history of inter-agency cooperation;</li> <li>● Technology sensitive to lack of complementary inputs;</li> <li>● High capability in appropriate agency;</li> <li>● Agency has high target group orientation.</li> </ul>
4	<u>Project Management Unit</u> (autonomous and temporary) such as those often created as part of an IRD project design	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Can be used to concentrate authority in project area;</li> <li>● Familiar to engineers who staff infrastructure projects;</li> <li>● Can avoid oppressive audit and control procedures;</li> <li>● Can avoid inappropriate boundaries.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Very difficult to institutionalize;</li> <li>● Temporary nature creates personnel management problems.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Environment hostile to target group;</li> <li>● Simple infrastructure focus;</li> <li>● Standard operating procedures very cumbersome;</li> <li>● Technology highly uncertain.</li> </ul>

The tradeoffs outline in Figure 2 provide the basis for analyzing organizational alternatives in a specific project context. To varying degrees, these tradeoffs were perceived and articulated by the MSU team, USAID staff and Cameroonian decisionmakers. Each of the alternatives will be discussed in turn, in order to assess its suitability for the MADP.

Option 1, the "lead" line ministry solution, had no strong advocates at either the departmental (Mokolo) or provincial (Garoua) level. While MINEP would appear to be a logical sponsoring ministry for the project, it is not an implementing agency. Each of the technical ministries represented in the project area has acknowledged weaknesses, and their respective chefs de service are highly dependent on decisions made at higher levels. The multi-sectoral nature of the MADP was cited by many interested parties as a good reason not to channel project resources through a single ministry. While the fourth disadvantage listed in Figure 2 (interagency jealousy) was not specifically cited by Cameroonian personnel, several indicated that coordination problems would be aggravated rather than reduced if one ministry was given higher status and authority than others within the project area.

Option 2, using "subnational" institutions to implement the project, was given fairly strong endorsement by officials in Mokolo, who saw it as a logical extension of the arrangements developed for the Mandara Mountains Water Resources Project. It is not surprising, of course, to find that enthusiasm for decentralization grows as one moves down through a government's administrative structure. In this case, both the Premier Adjoint to the Prefect of Marqui-Wandala (speaking authoritatively for his superior), and technical ministry personnel made a strong case for placing all development activities (both ongoing and new projects) under the authority of a department-wide commit-

tee. Significantly, since the project area will include part or all of the Meri arrondissement in neighboring Diamare Department, the Meri Sub-Prefect and the Diamare Deleque for Agriculture also agreed to serve on the committee, if this option is selected.<sup>6/</sup> This would mean, in effect, that technical services operating in Meri arrondissement would take direction (and would receive resources) from the project structure based in Margui-Wandala.

As shown in Figure 2, the third advantage of this option, and the first disadvantage, represent two sides of the same coin. A project management system based on subnational institutions will only be as good as the skills, experience and commitment of the people in those institutions. Any attempt to justify option 2 as appropriate to Margui-Wandala must be based on potential rather than existing capabilities. The mere provision of additional moyens (e.g., transport) will not make the existing structure more dynamic. A far broader effort at capacity-building will be needed (wherever management authority is finally lodged), encompassing a range of new skills, a continuous program of in-service training for both technical and para-technical staff, and thoughtful modifications in the system of rewards and accountability for personnel serving under the project. Those measures must be an integral part of the MADP -- and at the present stage, they are considered to be so by the project designers -- for option 2 to be a plausible organizational strategy.

Because option 2 has several attractive qualities, several "supportive criteria" can be spelled out which will be crucial

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<sup>6/</sup> A meeting was held with Diamare officials at Meri on August 8 to discuss the MSU team's survey results and proposed MADP activities. The Prefect of Diamare had previously expressed his support for collaboration across departmental lines.

to its chances of success, if selected. These are as follows:

- An experienced individual with training in economic planning and rural development must be recruited for the post of Project Coordinator, to assume operational authority for the MADP under the guidance of the Project Committee. While the Coordinator position should logically be staffed by the MINEP representative (APD) in Margui-Wandala, the present ADP is not qualified for such major responsibility, and would presumably need to be replaced.
- The leader of the U.S. technical assistance team should be a planner with project experience at some level of decentralization, whose primary role will be to advise the Project Coordinator. If the GURC encountered recruitment difficulties, the U.S. team leader could serve as Coordinator for an initial period (say two years), with responsibility for training a Cameroonian counterpart on the job (rather than waiting for someone trained overseas to return).
- Projects already operating in the area would need to be placed under the same structure -- that is, under the MADP committee and coordinator -- so that the implementation schedule for each project<sup>7/</sup> can be integrated into an area-wide planning framework. The financial integrity of each existing project's budget would be maintained; and
- Most importantly, budgetary control over project resources would have to be lodged with the project committee (and operating authority delegated to the coordinator), rather than with central government deci-

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<sup>7/</sup> The existing USAID-funded projects include the Mandara Mountains Water Resources Project (for small dams); the Margui-Wandala Water Supply Project (in which CARE, under an operating program grant (OPG), is assisting with well construction); MED-CAM I (health); and Support to Primary Education. The first two projects contain health education components. The latter two are projects targeted at all of Northern Province, with some activities sited in Margui-Wandala.

In addition, the World Bank is financing construction of ten small dams in the department, and is supporting a stall-fattening scheme for cattle through FONADER (the National Rural Development Fund).

sionmakers. This represents a big step (the volume of funds will be much larger in the MADP than in the Mandara Mountains Water Resources Project), but it will be a prerequisite if option 2 is to be given a fair test.

By comparison with option 2, which has many uncertainties, option 3 offers a model that is widely known in Cameroon, with certain recurring characteristics. Parastatal organizations with permanent status have been created to administer area development schemes, almost always with a firm foundation in the form of a cash crop that is produced for export. SODECOTON, a parastatal operating in much of Northern Province (with 49 percent French ownership) is the nearest and most frequently cited example. It is generally credited with delivering inputs and marketing services to participating farmers, efficiently and consistently operating at a profit. It is also characterized by an authoritarian, centralized structure with little flexibility, and has a reputation for perpetuating forced cotton cultivation in some areas.

In terms of the tradeoffs listed in Figure 2, the greatest drawback of option 3 for the MADP concerns its prospects for self-financing. No high return economic enterprises have been identified in either the crop, livestock or non-farm sectors which would generate revenue for a profit-oriented parastatal like "SODEMAN."<sup>8/</sup> As a permanent entity with recurrent costs probably far higher than those now required for GURC services, it would thus require major government subsidies -- a situation which most such parastatals are expressly designed to avoid.

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<sup>8/</sup> Societe de Developpement des Monts Mandara, or Mandara Mountains Development Corporation, is one name that has been proposed for an option 3 structure.

Further complications are likely to arise in the integration of existing technical services. To avoid duplication of effort, existing project personnel would have to be seconded to the new agency or replaced by new recruits whom the agency hired directly. While many agencies of this kind are multi-functional in theory, in practice they tend to emphasize the sector or enterprise that generates revenue, at the expense of other functions. These considerations reinforce the doubts already stated regarding option 3's suitability for the MADP.

Support for option 4 was voiced at the provincial level, in Garoua, by the MINEP Delegue who oversees all development activities in the North. His preference for a "para-administrative" Project Management Unit (PMU) was based on a view that GURC services in Margui-Wandala (and elsewhere) are so non-functional that a powerful external stimulus is needed. A Mission d'Etudes based on option 4 has been operating in the FED-financed Northeast Benoue Resettlement Project since the mid-1970s.

An interview with the Cameroonian Deputy Director of the Northeast Benoue unit highlighted both the strengths and weaknesses shown in Figure 2. FED support, which to date has totalled about \$11 million in Phases I and II for a project serving an area with fewer than 50,000 people (about half of whom are recent settlers), is anticipated to continue for at least several more years. The key questions of institutionalization and continuity beyond donor financing have been postponed, but not resolved.

This dilemma is imbedded in each instance where option 4 is selected, and it has rarely been resolved in a satisfactory fashion. To whom does the PMU hand over when its mandate is fulfilled? What changes have occurred in the residual "host" institutions to whom a transfer should take place? Are perpet-

ual external financing and the maintenance of high-cost, specialized managerial expertise the only ways to avoid a collapse of project activities?

These are long-term questions that must be included in the selection process. Precisely because they are so difficult to answer, they introduce an element of uncertainty into an otherwise straightforward management option which has an appeal to donors and to host country decisionmakers. Because a PMU operates outside the normal administrative structure, it may be able to implement special incentive systems (salary supplements, or allowances) which aim at increasing staff motivation and performance. Yet these measures may be inherently non-sustainable, since they tend to carry a recurrent cost burden that the host government will be unable or unwilling to bear after donor funding terminates.

### Recommendations

The evidence is mixed in three cases, with option 1 having been effectively ruled out, underscoring the fact that no ideal solution exists. Whatever selection is made in the design process and instituted by the GURC, further modifications and adjustments will be needed as implementation proceeds. From this perspective, option 2 -- the subnational planning model -- appears to be the preferred choice. While it will require a major commitment to upgrade human and institutional resources in the project area, it offers the best means of building needed planning and implementation capacities, and sustaining these capacities over the long run.

While the parastatal model (option 3) does not seem well matched with the resource base and economic potential of the MADP project area, the tradeoffs associated with option 4 are

more evenly balanced. Option 4 is not recommended, however, because it does not contribute to (and risks undercutting) the capacity-building objective that is central to the area development strategy which USAID and the GURC have adopted.

#### ENSURING A POSITIVE COMMUNITY RESPONSE TO MADP

While an efficient project organization structure can transform resources into goods and services, and place them at the disposal of eventual project beneficiaries, it cannot ensure their acceptance or use. This is rather a function of the social and technical appropriateness of the goods-and-service package, and of the methods by which it is delivered. Putting aside the question of the technical appropriateness of the package, the concern in this section is to define some of the options available to the MADP in the methods of delivering goods and services.

The effectiveness of the delivery system of an IRD project is frequently assumed to depend upon the capacities, both logistic and technical, of the field personnel of the project. A very common outcome of this assumption is non-adoption or incomplete adoption of the goods and service package by project beneficiaries. In these cases, insufficient attention has been paid to the local social structures within which the package is received, diffused, maintained and eventually validated. A more sound analysis of the IRD delivery mechanism would address four general questions:

- With whom can the project work at the community level? What organizations already exist, what are their capacities, and where do the interests lie for local participation in project activities?

- Who can identify these groups at the field level and gain their commitment to participate in project activities?
- What are the logistical and technical capabilities of project field personnel?
- How will the project contribute in the long run to sustaining these actors in their developmental roles?

Responses to these questions are very important in initially determining and fine-tuning the proposed delivery mechanisms of an IRD project. They are also absolutely essential if the project proposes an element of capacity-building in the local communities as a primary short- and long-term objective. They will be related below to the MADP environment.

#### With Whom can the MADP Work at the Local Community Level?

The conclusions of Allen Hoben, after a review of ethnographic literature dealing largely with the Mandara Mountains, are significant in terms of traditional organizational structures of the groups found there. He concludes that the area is characterized (and is somewhat peculiar in Africa) by its relative lack of "supra-village political authority"<sup>9/</sup> structures, and the household's "remarkable degree of autonomy as a management unit from larger units of organization based on kinship, vicinage, or chieftanship."<sup>10/</sup> Outside of the Mandara ethnic group found on the northern perimeter of the project area, and

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<sup>9/</sup> Allen Hoben, "Social Soundness Analysis of the West Benoue Integrated Rural Development Proposal." Yaounde: Agency for International Development, May 1976; p. 17.

<sup>10/</sup> Hoben, p. 26.

the pervasive presence of the Fulani in the administrative structure and in most sectors of the economy in northern Cameroon, no strong, widely-based traditional political structures exist to unite the disparate individual ethnic communities of the mountains. This is probably due as much to the breakdown of traditional structures which came under attack and retreated in the conflicts that used to characterize the area, as to the isolating effects of a difficult, broken terrain. Such supra-village structures, therefore, will not be available to the MADP to work through.

Other traditional organizational units suggest themselves as potential vehicles through which the MADP can introduce its activities. These include chefs de village and their associated notables (counselors), surgha communal fieldwork groups, and lineage groups in the villages. Through each may provide an effective organizational unit for project purposes, depending on the village, each also suffers from centrifugal forces very common in the area. The great geographic dispersion of hamlets in a village and the traditional independence of the household frequently reduce the powers of the chefs de village. The surgha work groups have usually been limited to cooperation in times of peak work periods, and show many signs of becoming dependent on monetary incentives to stimulate cooperation. The clans, too, suffer greatly from growing geographic dispersion due to older sons moving elsewhere in search of land, and from the pervasive effects of the various short- and long-term migratory patterns of the area.

In some cases, more recently introduced organizational units may be attractive to the project as intermediaries. Although the cantonal divisions of the area date only to the 1940s, their importance to the governmental administrative authorities is easily seen, and their increased power since that

time over more traditional leaders and populations is indisputable. A cautionary note is appropriate, however. Since chefs de canton are named to their positions by administrative authorities, their loyalty to the populations they administer and their ability to elicit and organize popular participation in voluntary project actions is open to question. This factor could be crucial, particularly in project actions which would superficially resemble activities undertaken in the past under the direction of the chefs de canton which required participation under corvee conscription, e.g., schoolroom construction through village "self-help" labor.

Several other recently created institutions are potentially of interest to the MADP. However, they are small in number, composed of a relatively low percentage of the population that composes them, and in most cases, require only a light degree of commitment of their members. These include: the Groupements d'Agriculteurs Modernes (GAM), a joint Ministry of Agriculture/FONADER (rural credit) institution by which loans are extended to small groups of farmers; SOCOOPED, a nascent cooperative structure in the area with little popular support; UNC branches (the local arm of the national political party); and some development project related village level units (Projet Semencier farmer groups, CARE health committees, etc.).

Notable for their absence in the area are examples of the type of village development committees (Comites de Developpement Villageois) found in other regions of Cameroon. Such multi-functional groupings are viewed dubiously by administrative authorities in the north, who suspect a potential political orientation in such groups dealing with development issues. No precise forecast can be made with available evidence about the future of such groups in Margui-Wandala, but present conditions do not favor their emergence.

A factor which centrally affects the actual or potential commitment of individuals to the above-named institutions is the "plains alternative," the option of migration out of the mountains. The MADP may come to view this factor as a two-edged sword as it initiates contact with local organizations. On the one hand, the locally perceived viability of this alternative will tend to weaken the commitment of an individual's time and resources to the mountain area, and thereby diminish the potential impact of project activities. On the other hand, the return of migrants from other more developed areas may serve as a mechanism for awakening local interest in change in the mountains, thus strengthening commitment to project activities. This uncertain balance will have to be recognized by project field personnel in identifying project participants and in the anima-tion (mobilization) activities directed at them.

The deficiencies of local organizations as intermediaries for IRD project actions are not new in Africa, and therefore not surprising in the Mandara Mountains. Because obvious potential intermediaries as for the MADP are not immediately apparent, complex problems are likely to arise during implementation. This will require two things from the MADP:

- Flexibility of administrative procedures to deal with a number of cantonal, village, and subvillage level local organizations. Protocol requirements, capacities, for acceptance of project action responsibilities and differing channels of communication will have to be determined for each local organizational unit involved in project activities; and
- Definition of MADP's objectives for local capacity-building, and how they relate operationally to sub-village, village and perhaps cantonal level local organizations. For example, should a subvillage level intermediary be encouraged to take on more responsibilities in its area's development if the wider village structure does not or cannot respond?

Who can Identify MADP Intermediary Organizations at the Field Level and Gain their Commitment to Participate in Project Activities? What are the Logistic and Technical Capabilities of MADP Field Technical Personnel?

While these two questions refer to two conceptually distinct activities, animation (mobilization) and delivery of technical services respectively, they are often most effectively performed by a single agent in the field. A number of potential animation agents will be examined here. Since ministerial technical service personnel would theoretically perform both functions, their logistic and technical capabilities will also be briefly analyzed.

Given the nature of the MADP project activities as they have been outlined, the agriculture sector will be a primary focus, and agricultural service personnel are likely to have a major role in implementation. Looking at the service as it exists in Margui-Wandala outside SODECOTON (cotton production) areas,<sup>11/</sup> two points stand out:

- Its resources in personnel and logistic material are already inadequate for the number of people and the area it must serve; and yet,
- Its present coverage of the rural area is the most comprehensive of any of the GURC technical services.

As of the end of June 1980, Agriculture Service personnel numbered approximately 15 chefs de poste agricole, and 39

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<sup>11/</sup> The parastatal SODECOTON has organized its own extension service in the plains area where cotton can be grown, and has attracted many Ministry of Agriculture staff from other departments offering higher salaries and benefits than those normally provided by the Ministry.

moniteurs.<sup>12/</sup> With an estimated farm population of 339,900, <sup>13/</sup> there is a ratio of 6,798 people to every extension agent. Each agent must cover an average territory of 148 square kilometers. Far less than half of these agents have access to any means of personal transport. Interviews with some of these agents have produced a picture of low morale, poor mobility, and tenuous professional competence.<sup>14/</sup>

Training for the chefs de poste consists of two years at the Ecole Technique d'Agriculture at Maroua which trains, at present, approximately 15 additional chefs de poste every two years for the whole Northern Province. Animation courses make up a minuscule portion of their training at this facility. Formal training of the moniteurs consisted, until 1976 when the facility was closed for lack of funds, of less than a year of coursework at Babouri. Since then, all training has been done informally at the postes agricoles. The siphoning-off of the best chefs de poste and moniteurs by SODECOTON further diminishes the capabilities of the agriculture service in this area.

This rather discouraging view of the capabilities of the agriculture service, for either animation activities or for extension of technical services, will surprise no one involved in working with it. The discouragement is such that higher planning and administrative authorities have come to prefer organizational arrangements for IRD projects which avoid direct involvement of this service, and strip it of its best agents for

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<sup>12/</sup> Bureau de Statistiques Agricoles, Mokolo. Year End Report.

<sup>13/</sup> Burgett p. 27 -- Contract Farmers involved in the Seed Multiplication Program in North Cameroon.

<sup>14/</sup> Reggie Harley -- personal communication.

use in other structures. This seems a rather short-sighted solution to the problem, and one which only compounds the difficulty of the eventual and inevitably necessary reformation of this technical service.

Despite its present problems, the agriculture service still presents the best existing option available to the MADP in its search for a field presence. It has more field agents and more comprehensive coverage of the probable target populations of the MADP than any of the other existing technical services. It is also in relatively permanent contact with the rural populations where it is installed, as opposed to other services which operate out of Mokolo, the departmental headquarters. Weak technical, logistic, and organization/mobilization capacities will have to be dealt with by the MADP, as they would have to be with the other potential choices. However, a stronger nucleus for building an implementation capacity for the MADP exists here than in any other service. Finally, the agriculture service option also allows an integration of the animation function and the technical delivery function into one agent, which in the absence of a specialized and efficient animation agent is an acceptable alternative.

Other technical services which could potentially be considered for an animation function, as well as a technical delivery function, are Eaux et Forets (Water and Forests) and Developpement Communautaire (Community Development), which operates under the direction of Genie Rural, the rural engineering service). Their limited presence at the field level suggests that they might be used in specific project activities, if those activities do not demand much initial animation or close supervision, and are sited near their posts. By way of comparison with the agriculture service, Eaux et Forets has four postes forestiers in the department, of which only three are presently

staffed, with one agent each. Developpement Communautaire would seem to be a logical choice for undertaking animation functions. However, the size and present orientation of this service will probably limit its utility to most of the activities presently planned for the MADP. Of nine agents presently in the project area, three are male (of whom one is a Peace Corps Volunteer). Present activities of this service revolve primarily around health and nutrition, to which the MADP's preliminary design has assigned a relatively low priority.

Two other weak options are potentially identifiable, but probably not practical. One concerns using traditional authorities, in effect, as MADP animation personnel to identify groups to participate in project activities and to organize their commitment to those activities. Except in rare cases, the likely outcome of such a strategy would be unsatisfactory. These authorities could probably not satisfy the minimal disinterested objectivity necessary to the MADP in seeking to identify voluntary interest in project activities, and might well not be able to organize and maintain local commitment from those project participants for want of effective influence in their areas.

The other weak option is the creation of a specialized MADP animation unit outside of existing structures. The questions of where the personnel for such a unit would come from, under whose supervision they would work in the administrative, technical service, and project hierarchies, and what their relationships would be with technical service personnel at the field level, would make this option very difficult to implement.

The implications of this analysis can be summarized as follows. The primary agents around which the MADP should seek to identify project activity participants (local organizations) should be the local agriculture service chefs de poste and moni-

teurs. Considerable input would have to be made by the MADP to raise the level of their logistic and technical capabilities, as well as their skills in mobilizing local participation (anima-tion). Project actions should probably be geographically focused in the immediate period around the present posts of these agents. Project activities requiring the input of other technical service personnel should still be locally organized by the agriculture service agents, unless compelling reasons exist otherwise.

How will the MADP Contribute in the Long Run to Sustaining These Actors in their Developmental Roles?

The preceding discussion on the choice of the most effective project field personnel, and of local organizations capable of acting as project intermediaries, has aimed at ensuring a maximum community response to MADP activities. However, as the MADP is a finite activity which will come to an end at some point in the future, there is another key dimension to its concern with these developmental actors. Not only is the careful choice of these actors necessary to begin and maintain the developmental change that is introduced by the MADP, they will be essential to sustain this process after the MADP terminates. Assuming that USAID/Yaounde and the GURC wish to stimulate a self-sustaining and self-generating process of local development, they must specify objectives for the end of project capabilities of these actors, and some ideas on how to achieve those objectives.

For example, three end of project capability targets for project field staff can be identified:

- Establish no capability target levels because the project field staff would be recruited only for the duration of the project, and would not be composed of existing departmental technical service personnel;

- Promote no change in capability levels; and
- Reinforce the capabilities of existing departmental technical field staff so that they may reasonably be expected to continue the same functions after termination of the MADP.

If option 1 were selected, the MADP would resemble other IRD projects in the province by assembling a new technical field staff, rather than utilizing personnel already serving in the area. Such a staff would be dissolved upon project termination. Option 2 reflects a situation in which the MADP would assume either that capabilities as they now exist are sufficient, or that no appropriate mechanisms for reinforcement of capabilities can be found. Option 3, which as argued above, is the most likely and sensible alternative for the MADP, would necessitate direct involvement of the project in reinforcing existing technical field staff capabilities as a part of its activity package.

Potential elements of this reinforcement might include short training and refresher courses given to field staff by mid-level technical staff and existing governmental training institutions, by the INADES training center in Maroua (which has been used and appreciated by the agriculture service and other development projects), or by short-term visits to Margui-Wandala by experts in selected fields. It might also call for considerable MADP and/or GURC support in resolution of the transport problem of agriculture agents. Preference in choice of reinforcement mechanisms should, however, be given to those which call the least upon exclusive MADP financial and other support, in order to promote post-project mechanisms for resolution of these recurring problems.

In the case of end of project capability targets for the local organizations acting as project activity intermediaries,

the objectives become more difficult to discern, because they depend so heavily on the strength of the government's political will to decentralize development responsibilities. Three potential strategies suggest themselves:

- Ignore existing organizations and attempt to create new multi-functional development-oriented organizations on the village or other level;
- Use a number of existing single function village organizations and attempt to increase their technical capabilities in whichever project activity they are involved; and
- Use an existing single function organization, and encourage its gradual expansion into more varied functions by increasing its participation in a number of project activities.

Option 1 is obviously the most difficult objective to attain in the case of the MADP. It requires a political sponsorship which is not apparent at this time. It also demands a volume of resources and a level of attention that the project as now conceived will not be able to provide. Given the presence of cooperatives and village development committees in other parts of Cameroon, this strategy will eventually find sponsors in the Northern Province, but the MADP has little with which to hasten its arrival in Marqui-Wandala. This type of organization is well suited, however, to the sustainability concerns of IRD projects and where openings exist, the Option 1 strategy should be continuously introduced.

Option 2 is the easiest strategy for the MADP to follow, because it requires the least amount of attention and resources and most closely conforms to the present governmental vision of the objectives of rural development projects in the Northern Province. It seeks only efficient participation in present activities and introduces no new, unknown structures into the rural equation.

Operational examples of this approach in a single village might include: the use of the chef de village to organize self-help labor for construction of a classroom; the use of a surgha work group to participate in erosion control measures in the fields; and the use of a GAM for on-farm trials of new seed varieties. The only capabilities that would thus be introduced into this village are technical ones. No coordinating body would be formed to deal with developmental needs and village-level capabilities to resolve them.

Option 3 lies somewhere in between the other two. By gradually eliciting the formation of a modest community body capable of dealing with several developmental needs and organizing a common response to them, it is unlikely to threaten administrative concerns about excessive decentralization. It provides a basis for more complex developmental organizations (e.g., cooperatives) should they become a part of the picture in the future. It is also within the capabilities of the MADP to accomplish this during the time of its existence, and with the resources it will have available.

The implementation of such a strategy in a village would proceed from the identification of the most vital and willing group within that village to its participation in an MADP activity. Other appropriate and desired activities might then be offered to that same group. By seeking broader membership and giving additional functions to the group, a de facto development committee could potentially be created, thus realizing in a series of steps what might be more difficult to create in one step.

## CONCLUSION

This field report has been written near the mid-point in the project design process. Agreement has been reached on the broad goals of the MADP, and on the strategy for achieving those goals, but major decisions remain regarding the inputs, outputs and implementation timetable for the project. It will be especially important for the forthcoming Project Paper to show how the different project components will be integrated, both conceptually and operationally.

This report has argued for a decentralized planning model, in which primary implementation responsibility would be placed with the existing GURC institutions in Margui-Wandala. This management structure was recommended over two others, the parastatal model and the project management unit (PMU), which have been used in other donor financed projects in Cameroon, and which are familiar to Cameroonian policymakers. Findings were presented to the USAID/Yaounde and GURC representatives who will make the final choice of an implementing institution for the MADP.

In considering the tradeoffs associated with the principal institutional choices for project implementation, the field team used a framework developed in the comparative analysis of numerous IRD projects around the world. The framework, with its categorization of strengths, weaknesses and supporting conditions affecting the selection process, proved extremely valuable in focusing discussion and analysis with USAID staff and GURC officials. Their own experience with other projects in Cameroon served as one point of reference, and this was augmented by lessons drawn from projects which DAI has been involved with under its DS/RAD contract (Organization and Administration of Inte-

grated Rural Development) and other contracts. Among the latter are AID-supported projects in Egypt, Botswana, Indonesia, Tanzania and Sudan, to which DAI has furnished technical assistance in design and/or implementation. All of these projects represent new initiatives by the host government and the donor, and are "experimental," to some degree, in channelling resources and decisionmaking authority to subnational units of government.

Important linkages exist between the process of decentralization, as advocated in this report and as practiced in other countries, and efforts to promote popular participation in the development process. The latter part of this field report examined the prospects for creating and working with broadly based local organizations in Margui-Wandala. There are cultural, demographic and logistical reasons why few institutions of this kind exist at present, and considerable flexibility will be required of MADP field staff in approaching the rural population and enlisting their active support for project activities.

The argument for flexibility can be applied to the overall design of the MADP, and to the ways in which that design will be used during implementation. It has traditionally been assumed that all of the major feasibility questions affecting a rural development project can be answered before funds are committed and implementation begins. Increasingly, though, experience with such projects has shown that it is often wiser to begin implementation with acknowledged uncertainty in some areas, than to work with a design that cannot be modified.

In the case of the MADP, a strong case can be made for an evolutionary design, provided that the applied research effort is closely tied to project objectives, specifically including the development of improved production packages.

If this approach is adopted, the implementing agency will have to be given considerable flexibility. The decentralized planning model recommended in this report, which would utilize the existing GURC structure through an area development project committee and a project coordinator representing MINEP, would fulfill this requirement. This does not mean, however, that it would be spared all of the organizational and management problems that typically arise in IRD projects. Some of those problems have been anticipated in the consideration of various options and strategies in this report, but others will only be identified, and possibly resolved, in the course of implementation.

This analysis should therefore not be seen as prescriptive in a final sense. Periodic assessment of implementation performance will be needed in the MADP, as in all ambitious and difficult IRD projects. If such assessments suggest the need for changes in the institutional framework of the project, the provision of flexibility in organizational design increases the likelihood that managers and technicians charged with implementation will be receptive to such advice, and will be willing to carry it out.

**ANNEX A**  
**SCOPE OF WORK**

UNCLASSIFIED  
Department of State

INCOMING  
TELEGRAM

PAGE 01 YAOUNDE 04043 071016Z  
ACTION AID-35

020379 AID4687

ACTION OFFICE DSRD-02  
INFO AAAP-01 AFRA-03 AFDP-02 AFDR-06 AFCA-03 STA-10 AADS-01  
CH8-01 RELO-01 MAST-01 AFDA-01 /032 AI 11

INFO OCT-01 /036 W

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4538

UNCLAS YAOUNDE 4043

IRD  
823

AIDAC

E.O. 12065: N/A  
SUBJECT: MANDARA AREA DEVELOPMENT 631-0032

REF: STATE 170346

1. MISSION CONCURS TRAVEL OF DAI TEAM
2. PURPOSE OF TEAM'S VISIT WILL BE TO MAKE RECOMMENDATIONS TO GURC AND MISSION RE MOST APPROPRIATE INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE TO IMPLEMENT THE PROPOSED MANDARA AREA DEVELOPMENT PROJECT. TEAM SHOULD EXAMINE RANGE OF POSSIBILITIES FROM THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A NEW DEVELOPMENT SOCIETY (SODEMAN) TO THE UTILIZATION OF EXISTING GOVERNMENTAL PERSONNEL AND STRUCTURES.
3. THE TEAM WILL EXAMINE THE EXISTING HUMAN AND PHYSICAL RESOURCES OF THE MARGUI WANDALA DEPARTMENT. IT WILL DISCUSS PROPOSED PROJECT ACTIVITIES WITH THE MICHIGAN STATE TEAM IN MOKOLO. THE TEAM WILL DISCUSS POSSIBLE INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS WITH GURC OFFICIALS AT THE NATIONAL, PROVINCIAL AND DEPARTMENTAL LEVEL. IT WILL DETERMINE LEGAL REQUIREMENTS AND PROCEDURES TO ESTABLISH ANY PROPOSED NEW INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE OR ADMINISTRATIVE AUTHORITY. PRIOR TO ITS DEPARTURE THE TEAM WILL HAVE DISCUSSED ITS RECOMMENDATIONS WITH APPROPRIATE GURC AND MISSION OFFICIALS AND LEAVE ITS DRAFT REPORT WITH THE MISSION.
4. TEAM SHOULD RE TICKETED WASHINGTON TO YAOUNDE WITH AN OPEN TICKET FROM YAOUNDE TO GAROUA TO YAOUNDE AND CONFIRMED SPACE YAOUNDE TO THE U. S. TEAM MEMBERS MUST OBTAIN CAMEROON VISA IN WASHINGTON.  
LORD