

PN-AMM 897
LGN-29802

62

S McCarty
AFN/CA. R Gray

Report on Mission
to selected African Countries
June 5 - July 3, 1981

James P. Kelley
Africa Program Officer
Bureau for Refugee Programs
July 22, 1981

Table of Contents

	<u>Page</u>
1. Part I: U.S. Resettlement Program	
General Statement	1
Individual Country Reports:	
Botswana	3
Zambia	6
Kenya	8
Sudan	8
Djibouti	11
2. Part II: U.S. Relief Assistance	
General Statement	12
Individual Country Reports:	
Sudan	13
Botswana	17
Zambia	18
Djibouti	20
Kenya	22
3. Summary of Recommendations	23
4. Cultural Orientation/English Language Training Budget - FY '82 (Annex A)	25
5. Khartoum 6094 (Annex B)	29
6. Officials Interviewed (Annex C)	30
7. Itinerary (Annex D)	31

ii

PART I: U.S. Resettlement Program

I. General Statement

The program to resettle African refugees in the United States involves many issues, attitudes and individuals representing a variety of agencies. This report will discuss these issues, attitudes and individuals/agencies on both a general and a country-specific basis and make some recommendations.

The 3,000 admissions level for Fy '81 can very easily accommodate the refugees in the following urgent or special categories:

- those who cannot return home and whose lives are in danger in their countries of asylum (principally Botswana and Zambia);
- those who will be released from detention in their countries of asylum only on condition that they be resettled elsewhere;
- family reunification cases; and
- those whose education and/or employment ties to the U.S. contributed to their persecution or well-founded fear of persecution.

With the exception of those few refugees in Botswana and Zambia whose release from detention is dependent upon their immediate resettlement outside their countries of temporary asylum, the refugees in Africa can remain indefinitely in their countries of asylum, as things stand now. The policies of the African countries range from permanent resettlement leading to full citizenship, e.g., Lesotho, to permanent resettlement without citizenship, e.g., Sudan, to an indefinite period of asylum, e.g., Djibouti. The degree of permanency attaching to the status accorded the refugee has nothing to do with a mean-spirited attitude by the concerned government, but rather with the opportunities for resettlement which the host government can realistically offer, e.g., Djibouti authorities extend asylum without holding out any hope of permanent resettlement, because their small, arid country cannot absorb permanently any significant population increases.

The reality is that even in those countries which have extended to the refugees a very liberal policy of permanent resettlement with or without the hope of citizenship, the prospects for firm resettlement are extremely limited with the possible exception of Kenya. Educational and employment opportunities and access to social services are at a minimum even for nationals.

As a result, about 90% of those refugees who are applying for admission to the U.S. as refugees are not urgent or special cases as described above; rather, they are cases of general humanitarian concern, i.e., they have established their bona fides as refugees and can remain in their countries of asylum, but have little chance of establishing themselves in any kind of meaningful and self-sufficient way.

The 3,000 admissions level for FY '81 does not begin to accommodate the numbers of general humanitarian refugee cases as described above. Nor do I think that the admissions levels for future fiscal years should be so increased as to attempt to accommodate this general humanitarian caseload which could number in the several tens of thousands. Rather, the African admissions level should remain in the 3-4,000 range to maintain a steady U.S. resettlement of these general humanitarian cases. My reasons for recommending that the admissions level not be significantly increased are:

- in order for their U.S. resettlement to be successful, these refugees require more assistance than we are presently providing, i.e., per capita costs must be increased, especially to provide cross-cultural orientation and English language training;
- --current domestic attitudes probably would not be amenable to a significant increase in the admission of general humanitarian cases;
- we would lay ourselves open to more serious charges by Africans that the program results in a brain drain; and
- resettlement outside Africa is not considered a desirable option for the vast majority of African refugees by most private and public sector, USG, UN and African officials knowledgeable about and involved in African refugee issues.

Recommendation: That 3,000 African admissions be proposed for FY '82 and that the caseload be identified as principally general humanitarian cases as described above.

The 3,000 admissions level for FY '81 was generally considered to be a quota and most of the officers with whom I met felt there was pressure to process as many cases as possible. The most recent INS officer visit helped to convey this message. I spent a great deal of time at each post explaining that there is concern to process to completion as expeditiously as possible those cases approved by INS, but that the 3,000 number is a ceiling and not a quota. Department efforts to expedite post-INS processing have been misinterpreted as a desire by the Dept. to resettle as many cases as possible.

Consular officers felt the need for greater clarity about the guidelines and the criteria for admission. After lengthy discussions, most agreed that the guidelines and criteria could not be made more specific and that their application and interpretation were the difficult, individual decisions of the consular and INS officers, with input from Washington as requested.

With the exception of the Djibouti branch office, UNHCR officials with whom I met were grateful for the U.S. resettlement program and are giving their full cooperation. I believe it is important to stress that UNHCR counsellors should think positively about the U.S. resettlement program as one of several options to be explored with each refugee.

The attitudes of African government officials varied. The Botswana officials hoped that as many as possible would be admitted. The Djibouti Commissioner for Refugees criticized the program, on the one hand, as having a magnet effect, while, on the other hand, he encouraged maximum resettlement out of Djibouti. The Sudanese Commissioner expressed his personal view that our program: --acted as a magnet, drawing more refugees from Ethiopia; --resettled the more able refugees and left the less able in Sudan; and --frustrated the Sudanese efforts at permanent resettlement of the refugees by holding out the hope of a solution which is more desirable than settling into the harsh Sudanese situation. While there is an element of truth in what the Commissioner says, he exaggerates the effects of the program.

II. Individual Country Reports

A. Botswana

The four nationality groups of refugees in Botswana can be described as follows:

1. Angolans

There are about 300 Angolan refugees at Dukwe camp. In the main, they are pre-literate and semi-literate FNLA members who fled Angola in late 1975 and early 1976. Their average age is 30; many have left wives and children behind in Angola. Almost all of them fled to Namibia where they resided for an average of six months. Some joined the South African Defence Force for a while and all are

recognized as trained fighters. In Botswana they have gained a general reputation as industrious petty entrepreneurs or subsistence farmers. To date about 200 of them have applied for U.S. resettlement. They are war-weary and not easy to motivate because of the uncertainty of their situation at Dukwe camp. It is universally recognized that they cannot return to Angola so long as the MPLA is in control.

An undetermined number of Angolan refugees have not been moved to Dukwe, principally because they had become self-sufficient where they were living in Botswana, e.g. many of the taxi drivers in Gaborone are Angolans, some of whom received their taxis through a UNHCR loan scheme for resettling Angolans. The UNHCR rep reported that loan repayment is excellent. In reviewing the files of Angolans who had been INS-approved for U.S. resettlement, I noted that several were employed, e.g. an Angolan who was self-employed under the UNHCR loan scheme described above has been approved along with his wife and three children. The "firm resettlement" criteria was evidently overlooked.

In 1977 the Botswana Government extended blanket citizenship to about 10,000 Angolans. It is anticipated that a similar measure will be debated in the September session of Parliament. All of the Angolan refugees are very vocal about their abhorrence of communism and their desire for a democratic government in Angola. It is reported that they were given many assurances of support by the U.S. prior to passage of the Clark Amendment. Although none of the refugees I spoke with feel that we owe them this resettlement opportunity, they have an almost child-like expectation that a new life in democratic America will provide them with the opportunity to establish themselves permanently and with success in terms of education, employment, etc.

The caseload of 250 Angolans who have applied for U.S. resettlement must be dealt with as a group. No USG official can determine on a case-by-case basis that some are admissible, while others are not. To attempt to do so would be arbitrary, highly subjective and a waste of time.

To resettle the Angolans successfully in the U.S. would be an ambitious and costly operation. Their low level of formal education, lack of English language fluency, almost exclusively military employment experience and traditional African rural life style all militate heavily against successful U.S. resettlement.

Application forms for the U.S. resettlement program have been widely distributed. Counsellors of the Botswana Council for Refugees have assisted the refugees in completion of the forms. The

Botswana Government is hoping that we will take some. The level of excitement, unfortunately, is high.

I have advised the Embassy to suspend all processing of applications by Angolans except for those already approved by INS. My recommendation is that we continue to suspend processing until the Botswana Government has decided whether or not to extend citizenship to this group. In the meantime, we should formally ask the UNHCR to encourage the Botswana Government to make such a generous humanitarian gesture.

Recommendation: That Embassy/Gaborone be advised to suspend processing any additional Angolan applications except those already Ins-approved and interviewed by the consular officer and that RP formally request UNHCR/Geneva to urge the Botswana Government to extend citizenship to the Angolans.

2. Namibians

There are about 150 Namibian refugees at Dukwe camp. Most of them are SWANU members, young, single Herero males who fled Namibia when the South African Government attempted to conscript them. It is reported that this conscription effort has subsequently been discontinued. The educational level and English language fluency of this group is generally higher than that of the Angolans.

About 75 Namibians have applied for U.S. resettlement. Their motivation is more to seek educational opportunities than it is to resettle permanently abroad. Many list individuals at the U.N. Council for Namibia in New York as contacts or potential sponsors.

There is no possibility that the Botswana Government will extend citizenship to this group. They may remain in Botswana, but will be expected to continue to live at Dukwe camp.

I have advised the Embassy to suspend processing all applications by Namibians except for those already approved by INS. In the meantime, the Embassy should work closely with the African-American Institute (AAI) to identify potential candidates for undergraduate scholarships from among those who applied for U.S. resettlement. Since my return to the U.S., I have learned that the proposal to provide funding to AAI for a new intake of students has been put on hold. As a result, educational opportunities for the Namibians should be sought elsewhere, e.g., through UNHCR.

Recommendation: That Embassy/Gaborone be advised to resume processing of applications by Namibians with an instruction to direct to UNHCR those applicants whose real motives are to find educational opportunities abroad.

3. South Africans

There are about 75 South Africans at Dukwe camp. Additionally, many South Africans have taken employment in the public and private sectors in Botswana. South African refugees pose the greatest threat to Botswana, because of fears of infiltration, because of the greater political radicalization of the South Africans and because the South African refugees generally consider Botswana and its people to be backward and less developed.

Very few South Africans have applied for U.S. resettlement. Those who have are almost universally admissible and will resettle with relative ease. The Botswana Government is most eager to see this group move on to other countries. I have advised the Embassy to continue processing South African refugees, but to make special efforts to determine whether educational opportunities or permanent resettlement is the desired option.

4. Basotho

There are several dozen Basotho refugees at Dukwe camp. Most are young members of the opposition party (BCP). Several of these refugees have applied for U.S. resettlement. Again, care must be taken to determine whether educational opportunities or permanent resettlement is the desired option. The director of the Botswana Council for Refugees stressed the point that BCP has received its support, including scholarship assistance, almost exclusively from Eastern Bloc countries. He encouraged the U.S. to offer scholarship opportunities to BCP refugees from Lesotho so that they could "fit in" to the future politico-economic life of the region. The Department has been requested to provide INS with an advisory opinion concerning refugees from Lesotho. This opinion is urgently required in order to resolve those cases conditionally approved by the INS officer in April, 1981 and in order to provide guidance to the consular officers about future applications by Basotho.

B. Zambia

It is claimed that there are about 800 urban refugees in and around Lusaka. Included in this group are Zairians, Angolans, Malawians, South Africans and Namibians. The Zambian government has been slow to grant temporary asylum status to these people. Prohibited immigrants and other aliens without documents, some of whom are refugees, are imprisoned for long periods of time without charges being brought against them. Only recently have UNHCR

officials been able to visit the prisons in an effort to protect and assist refugees. Some ANC and PAC dissidents whose lives are threatened are being hidden by UNHCR until resettlement can be arranged.

A small number of refugees (about 50 to date) have applied for U.S. resettlement. A few who have applied are among those in hiding and those who are in prison as prohibited immigrants until such time as they can be resettled; the majority, however, are general humanitarian cases.

The situation in Lusaka illustrates especially well the fact that the bureaucratic procedure which requires a face to face interview by an INS officer frustrates one of the primary intents of the African admissions program, namely, to resettle quickly refugees whose lives are in danger or whose prison release is dependant upon immediate resettlement. Such high risk cases ought not to have to wait for months to be interviewed by an INS officer. For the time being, I have the agreement of the INS District Director in Rome that the following procedure will be used for these urgent cases:

- After satisfying himself/herself that the case is admissable and must be moved urgently, consular officer notifies the Department;
- Department requests special handling of the case;
- Without giving absolute guarantees, INS informs UNHCR that, if case is moved to INS office, approval will be forthcoming.

This verbal agreement is unacceptable for the longer term because:

- it is dependent on verbal agreements between me and the INS District Director;
- UNHCR is always taking a risk in moving the refugee to a processing site that the case will be found ineligible with the following results:

- 1) the refugee will be stranded;
- 2) UNHCR's relations with the government of the country to which the refugees were moved will be strained;
- 3) UNHCR will be saddled with unexpected costs of travel, care and maintenance, etc.

Recommendation: That INS/Rome be authorized to adjudicate high risk cases based on cabled information provided by the consular officer without a face to face interview.

C. Kenya

By the end of FY '81 about 75 refugees will have been approved for U.S. resettlement from Nairobi. The consular officer is persuaded that most refugees in Kenya are or could be firmly resettled. The INS officer who visited Kenya in May questions this strict interpretation because Kenyan immigration law does not, as far as we know, provide refugees with citizenship opportunities, but rather with a status similar to U.S. permanent resident status and because access to jobs, housing, education, etc. is limited. The consular officer counters the latter argument about lack of access with the contention that refugees are in fact provided with greater opportunities than Kenyan nationals because of support to refugees by UNHCR and other charitable organizations, especially in the area of higher education.

When an unclassified cable about refugee processing in Nairobi was shared with UNHCR/Geneva, UNHCR/Nairobi was questioned by its headquarters about the firm resettlement concept. UNHCR/Geneva's contention was that either refugees are firmly resettled and, therefore, no longer in need of UNHCR stipends or they are not firmly resettled and ought to be eligible for U.S. resettlement. As a result of this line of reasoning, UNHCR/Nairobi is engaging the Nairobi University in a study of the refugee caseload in Kenya to determine:

- to what degree refugees are firmly resettled;
- whether stipends can be discontinued in some cases;
- what measures should be taken in terms of education and training to make the refugees self-sufficient in the context of Kenyan economic realities.

I am researching two questions raised by the INS officer concerning Kenyan immigration law as it relates to refugees.

Recommendation: That we support the consular officer in her interpretation of the issue of firm resettlement and that the UNHCR drop from its stipend roles those refugees who are unwilling to look for work or refuse to take advantage of existing job opportunities within a specific period of time.

D. Sudan

I had a series of individual and group meetings in Khartoum with George Wagner, USCC/Washington; Paul Giannone, who was assigned temporarily by ICMC/USCC to Sudan prior to RP's selection of USCC as

JVAR/Horn of Africa; Michael Phelps, UNHCR Resettlement Officer; Robert Boehm, USG vice-consul; and Clarence Hudson, US Consular Officer. Major conclusions of those discussions follow:

1. Role of UNHCR

The UNHCR resettlement office will continue to take bio-data and a statement about the reason for fleeing their country of origin from refugees applying for U.S. resettlement. Those who clearly fall outside the criteria for U.S. resettlement will be so advised by UNHCR. If they persist in their desire to apply, UNHCR will annotate their files and submit them to the JVAR, along with the files of those applicants who appear to UNHCR to be admissible. The UNHCR resettlement officer has a very positive attitude toward the U.S. resettlement program and is trying to counsel the refugees as to their most realistic options.

2. ICM

The ICM representative, an American spouse of a Somali working for a development bank, resigned her position in late May. While in Geneva I learned that an ICM rep would be going to Khartoum July 4 to establish an ICM office and to hire an ICM replacement locally. I support this ICM initiative for two reasons:

- the need for total non-involvement by the U.S. in the movement of Falasha;
- the number of flights and movement of people including the U.S. resettlement program, Falasha movements and resettlement by UNHCR of other refugees to third countries is of sufficient volume to warrant a full-time ICM representative in Khartoum.

3. JVAR

The JVAR will operate in offices separate from UNHCR and the U.S. Embassy. All of those functions which had been performed by the Embassy will be taken over by the JVAR under the supervision of the consular officer. Embassy personnel were extremely pleased with the JVAR decision and provided the USCC reps and me with good support. An office has been located, the Administrative Assistant hired by the consular section to assist in refugee processing has agreed to work for the JVAR, some office furniture and equipment will be purchased from the Embassy and a courier service was identified which can provide 3-day Khartoum to NYC service for submitting bio-data to ACVA, rather than continuing to overburden the Department's communications system with this chore.

A budget for the quarter July-September, 1981 in the amount of \$75,745 has been submitted to RP. RP/FM/GCM is preparing an amendment to the USCC/JVAR grant agreement. It is anticipated that the FY '82 budget will amount to about \$160,000 for the JVAR/Sudan, with a staff of one American and four local hires.

The original plan had been that the JVAR would be based in Khartoum and would travel, perhaps on a quarterly basis, to Djibouti to conduct interviews and to supervise that office and would travel occasionally to Nairobi, Mogadishu and Cairo. I am now persuaded that this is an unrealistic plan for the following reasons:

--processing in Sudan at three sites (Khartoum, Gedaref and Port Sudan) requires a full-time JVAR because:

--internal travel is time consuming;

--Sudan is a hardship post, where communications and travel are particularly difficult;

--the need for cross-cultural and ESL training is apparent (see below);

--the problems in Djibouti require a temporary full-time JVR presence, rather than quarterly visits (see section on Djibouti below).

4. Cultural orientation (CO) and English Language (ESL) Training

My observations of the current and future caseloads of Ethiopians being processed in Sudan, coupled with discussions I have had with volag representatives, lead me to the conclusion that a program of cultural orientation and English Language training is imperative. Ethiopian refugees who were admitted at the beginning of the program were sufficiently fluent in English and aware of American cultural differences that their resettlement in the U.S. was possible without the training I am recommending. This is no longer the case.

Although I made no commitments about such a program, I have discussed with USCC and Ann Morgan how such a program might be mounted. Major elements of those discussions follow:

--Peace Corps has agreed to provide directly to USCC volunteers for refugee work in Sudan. This agreement was reached prior to and independent of my discussions with USCC. Ambassador Kontos is in agreement with the assignment of PCV's to Sudan for refugee work. USCC would be prepared to assign these volunteers to a CO/ESL program.

--Ann Morgan has asked the Center for Applied Linguistics to prepare a budget for adapting to the Ethiopian context training materials prepared for the southeast Asian program. She has

also prepared, in collaboration with USCC, a budget for training refugees in Sudan and Djibouti. This budget is based on a 12-week program conducted during the time after INS has approved the application and before the refugee is travel-ready (see Annex A).

Recommendation: That RP provide USCC/ICMC with a grant for CO/ESL during FY '82.

E. Djibouti

The implementation of the U.S. resettlement program in Djibouti has been plagued with multiple problems, namely:

--Because the admin/consular officer cannot devote any time to refugee processing, the Department has resorted to sending a series of TDY Consular and RP officers to interview applicants and interpret policy/guidelines, etc. for Embassy, UNHCR and Djibouti Government officials;

--Ins has sent four different INS officers to Djibouti;

--UNHCR counsellors assigned to Djibouti and TDY Resettlement Officers assigned by UNHCR/Geneva have done the pre-screening.

--Annette Derito has been providing exemplary administrative support for the past year under these trying circumstances. Originally she solely hired by the Embassy in a PIT position; at the time of my visit she was hired part-time by ICM and part-time by the Embassy; I learned two weeks later in Geneva that she is now a full-time ICM employee. Ms. Derito is in fact fully employed, but is performing tasks beyond the travel and medical which had been envisioned for ICM. Her involvement in pre-INS processing activities is not suitable. I concur in Ms. Derito's self-assessment that, because of her emotional involvement with individual cases, she ought not to perform duties beyond those associated with medical and transport arrangements which she does well and with great personal satisfaction.

--prior to RP's selection of USCC for the JVAR/Horn of Africa, ICMC/USCC detailed one of their officers to Djibouti to help out.

Thirteen officials from INS, CA, RP, USCC and UNHCR have been involved at some stage in refugee processing in Djibouti since August, 1980. There have been inconsistencies in the application of guidelines and criteria. This has resulted in confusion and misunderstandings between and among individual USG officers, UNHCR and the Djibouti Government.

To overcome these problems I make the following Recommendation: The assignment of a JVAR/Djibouti until December 31, 1981 only and the processing during this period of all applications by refugees who were issued refugee identity cards by the Djibouti Government before Sept. 30, 1981.

The establishment of a cut-off date is meant to stop or reduce the flow of refugees into Djibouti, if in fact the U.S. resettlement program is acting as a magnet, and to internationalize third-country resettlement if that is the preferred solution.

PART II: U.S. RELIEF ASSISTANCE

I. General Statement

Aside from new emergency requirements for the Chadian refugees in western Sudan and the Ugandan refugees in southern Sudan and the undetermined needs of Angolan refugees in the Western Province of Zambia, the immediate relief needs of refugees in the African countries to which I travelled are by all accounts and, in some instances, by my own observation being met by the on-going programs of international and private voluntary organizations.

Local government refugee units tend to be weak, especially in terms of field operations, because of limited financial and personnel resources allocated to these units. In several countries, UNHCR and/or local governments resolve this infrastructural weakness by contracting with PVO's to manage field operations. Given the limited resources of these asylum countries and their obvious priority to look after their own nationals first, this solution is undoubtedly justified. Consequently, some carefully targetted support through UNHCR to local refugee commissions and to PVO's is in order.

Several countries are establishing reception/transit/training centers (e.g., Ali Sabieh in Djibouti, Makeni in Zambia and Dukwe in Botswana) in an effort to control the social and/or political problems of young, urban refugees who are perceived to be security risks or who will not settle into agricultural life. Per capita costs of these ventures (probably \$3,000 per capita at Dukwe Camp in Botswana) are high; their objectives are ill-defined; long-term responsibility for the camps has not been provided for. The U.S.

should not provide any support to these centers as they are not yet well conceived. UNHCR/Geneva should be encouraged to hire a consultant expert to review these centers.

II. Individual Country Reports

A. Sudan

Because of the instructions from the Department that I should assist and accompany the congressional delegation which subsequently did not visit Sudan, I had to make some decisions which resulted in my not travelling outside Khartoum. This section is based, therefore, only on individual and group discussions with representatives of UNHCR, WFP, USAID, Ford Foundation, IRC, Euro-Accord, Sudanaid, CARE, ICRC and the Sudan Refugee Commission in Khartoum, with the Regional Food for Peace officer (RFFPO) in Nairobi and the UNHCR/Sudan Desk Officer and Acting Area Chief in Geneva.

Discussion of the three principal nationality groups of refugees follows:

1. Chadians

There are about 8,000 refugees who have fled across the border into western Sudan. Sudanese Government officials, concerned about the security risks these refugees pose, are determined to move these refugees away from the border to a permanent settlement near El Geniena where there is adequate water availability for domestic and limited agricultural purposes. UNHCR and Government had just submitted to UNHCR/Geneva a budget for this special program. At my request, UNHCR/Geneva will be submitting this special program budget to us officially.

Recommendation: That RP earmark a contribution to this program, notifying Embassy/Khartoum of the amount and purpose of the contribution.

2. Ugandans

During a visit to the UNHCR/Khartoum office, a telex was received from the UNHCR suboffice in Juba that 10,000 additional Ugandan refugees had arrived in southern Sudan, bringing the total number of Ugandan refugees to about 85,000, of whom about 40,000 are being assisted by UNHCR.

The WFP representative reported an immediate food deficit for the south of 2,000 m.t. of maize. The RFFPO in Nairobi confirmed that PL-480, Title II commodities could be diverted for this purpose if an official request were made, but he doubted WFP/Rome had the required funding for inland transport (Mombasa to Juba). A series of cables has accomplished the following:

- established the need and formalized an official request;
- confirmed WFP's lack of inland transport funding;
- notified Embassy/Khartoum and WFP/Rome of RP's intent to provide WFP with a \$420,000 grant for inland transport costs and to divert 2,000 m.t. of maize for the Ugandan refugee feeding program in southern Sudan.

Recommendation: That RP and FFP implement as expeditiously as possible the following commitments:

- diversion of 2,000 m.t. of maize to Ugandan refugee feeding program;
- grant of \$420,000 to WFP/Rome for inland transport of maize.

3. Ethiopians

Some of my interlocutors expressed serious reservations about the validity of the claim that there are 250,000 Ethiopian refugees in Eastern Sudan. There is no systematic and expeditious system for the registration of refugees entering into or residing in Sudan. Many Ethiopian refugees are not living in organized camp settlements. The UNHCR estimates that it will have permanently resettled 100,000 Ethiopians by the end of 1981.

The even more difficult statistical question is the number of Ethiopian refugees in need of assistance. Clearly, many of them are employed in positions left vacant by Sudanese nationals who have departed for better opportunities in the Gulf States. Others provide cheap labor on agricultural schemes.

Recommendation: That UNHCR be requested to provide better estimates of total numbers of refugees and of number in need of assistance to support their 1982 budget submission to the Executive Committee.

Other special issues in Sudan which deserve discussion follow:

4. Delivery of relief supplies to southern Sudan

An earlier mission, led by Mr. Dewey of S/R, surveyed the refugee situation in southern Sudan and took special note of the need for a more cost-effective and efficient mode of transport for relief supplies. The Sudan Refugee Commissioner agrees that this is

a high priority need. The Sudan Government had in fact submitted to ICARA a \$1 M project to repair river barges, steamers and related river transport facilities. Efforts by the Commissioner to arrange a meeting for Jim Holtoway, Deputy AID Mission Director and me with the Chairman of the River Transport Corporation failed. The WFP Adviser indicated that, in addition to upgrading of river transport, another warehouse in Juba and enhanced transport capability from Juba to refugee settlements are required. Holtoway agreed to pursue this total southern Sudan relief delivery project and report to Washington. Any further RP action is dependent on this AID mission analysis.

5. Sudan Refugee Commission (SRC) Reorganization

Commissioner Bashir told me that Government was planning a reorganization of the SRC. We have since learned (Khartoum 6094 attached as Annex B) that a reorganization decree has been issued.

Several persons indicated that the SRC management, especially financial, is weak. This was also the judgment of a team of UNHCR internal auditors who found no instance of misappropriation of funds, but a generally low level of competence. UNHCR Acting Area Chief Blavó told me in Geneva that UNHCR is prepared to provide technical assistance in the SRC office's financial section.

In order to undertake any further long-term resettlement efforts of Ethiopian refugees in the north and east of Sudan beyond the resettlement of the 100,000 refugees by the end of 1981, there will have to be careful planning by teams of experts, including agriculturalists, hydrologists, health care specialists and sociologists. The SRC is not currently staffed to undertake such ventures; there is serious question as to whether the Sudanese civil service can cope with such demands or whether the Commissioner is prepared to accept expatriate technical assistance. Furthermore, UNHCR representative Muller told me that the Sudanese will be hard pressed to find additional refugees for resettlement who do not feel themselves already permanently resettled where they are. He expressed concern about some of the settlements being made this year without adequate preparation and involving some forced resettlement of people into conditions that were less hospitable than those they were leaving.

Although Sudanese resettlement project proposals to ICARA are most appropriate projects for funding under AID's FY 1982 program, AID/Khartoum will undoubtedly be advising AID/Washington about these serious problems of planning and implementation.

6. Coordination of PVO activity

I had an opportunity to attend an informal gathering of PVO representatives called by the Ford Foundation rep. The need for coordination was expressed by all the PVO reps. It would appear, however, that UNHCR has felt threatened by past efforts to "organize" on the part of PVO's and that the Commissioner has felt more comfortable with the current arrangement where he can deal with the PVO's individually. Both the UNHCR rep and the Commissioner now recognize that coordination is necessary and hope that the Ford Foundation sponsored conference in early September will be the occasion at which serious and non-threatening efforts at coordination will begin. The most obvious area in which coordination is required and in which the pay-offs for all would be the greatest is the health sector which has been the sector of heaviest PVO concentration. Standardized drug usage, bulk purchasing, customs clearance assistance and integrated health care planning are some of the areas of health coordination that would have immediate pay-offs for beneficiaries, government and health care deliverers alike. The UNHCR rep and the Commissioner acknowledged the need and desirability of such health care coordination and appeared interested in investigating the Somali model in which a Somali doctor was seconded by WHO to UNHCR.

7. ICRC

I spoke with two ICRC delegates in Khartoum. They explained that, after the 1978 Eritrean-Ethiopian conflict, ICRC contacted the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) and the Eritrean People's Liberation (EPLF) to arrange for assistance to victims of the civil war. Over 3,000 m.t. of food and medical supplies have been provided by ICRC/Sudan to the Eritrean Relief Society as its operating agency inside Eritrea. ICRC believes that Ethiopian authorities in Addis Ababa tolerate this ICRC support to the Fronts because ICRC conducts a similar activity for the Ethiopian victims.

The Liberation Fronts claim that there are four million people in Eritrea; ICRC estimates that the population is probably closer to 2.5 million.

ICRC delegates travel regularly inside Eritrea. One of the delegates with whom I met had in fact just returned from Eritrea. He stated that the Eritreans are in full control of the countryside and that the Ethiopians would not dare to venture outside the towns without full military protection and only during day-light hours.

In Sudan, ICRC also does tracing of missing Eritrean family members. I was favorably impressed with the ICRC office which appeared busy and efficient.

B. Botswana

Aside from counselling and some modest self-help schemes for individual refugees in Gaborone, the bulk of the refugee-related activity and of the UNHCR budget are devoted to the refugees at Dukwe Camp. The total 1981 support for Dukwe Camp amounts to about \$1.5 M, including cash and in-kind contributions from Lutheran World Federation, WFP, UNHCR and the Botswana Council for Refugees. This is for a camp population officially stated to be 700. The camp commander explained to me that he had recently circulated registration cards and was able to count only 500 refugees. On the basis of a camp population of 500, per capita costs are \$3,000 for 1981.

Housing, social services facilities, etc. are of excellent quality. Some of the Angolan and Namibian refugees are engaged in agricultural and petty entrepreneurial pursuits. Additional housing is under construction by a contractor who hired refugees as painters, hod carriers, etc.

All officials with whom I spoke expressed difficulty in handling South African refugees belonging to newer "fringe" groups such as the Black Consciousness Movement and student groups. As far as these officials were concerned, the groups like ANC and PAC were able to discipline and control their members in ways that the newer groups cannot.

Resources at Dukwe Camp do not appear to be utilized adequately. There is a lot of "hanging out" by refugees. Getting passes to travel out of the camp is a preoccupation of many refugees.

The Minister of Information and Public Service states that there are four types of "refugees" in Botswana: 1) true refugees fleeing persecution; 2) opportunists/adventurers; 3) those fleeing prosecution in their country of origin; and 4) infiltrators. He contends that a benignly controlled situation like Dukwe Camp is the only way the Botswana government can cope with the potential for mischief, political unrest, etc. such a disparate group of "refugees" can cause. I tend to agree with the Minister.

Refugees are currently provided free education, medical attention, food, agricultural land, skills training, and a monthly stipend. It is time for UNHCR to schedule progressively reduced assistance to encourage the refugees to self-sufficiency. All the officials with whom I spoke agreed with this idea.

Recommendation: That UNHCR should initiate in its 1982 program for Botswana a schedule of reduced assistance to the refugees at Dukwe Camp. Barring some unforeseen new influx, UNHCR should discontinue its support by CY '84.

It should be clear from the above that there are no projects in Botswana which would merit additional U.S. support beyond the U.S. contribution to the UNHCR General Program for Africa.

C. Zambia

Because of the expulsion of the U.S. Embassy political officer and the public affairs officer from Zambia shortly after my arrival, I was not able to travel outside Lusaka. This report is based, therefore, only on discussions which I had with WFP, UNHCR, Red Cross, Lutheran World Federation, Zambian Episcopal Conference, Zambia Christian Council, and the Zambian Refugee Commission.

After the repatriation of the Zimbabwean refugees, the UNHCR staff at the Lusaka Branch office was completely replaced. The new staff does not yet have a firm grasp of the program for the remaining refugee caseload in Zambia.

Meheba Settlement, which has about 11,000 refugees (90% of whom are Angolans), is moving quickly to agricultural self-sufficiency. At the end of 1981, the settlement will be handed over to the Zambian government.

UNHCR is proposing to continue its support in 1982 for South African and Namibian refugees at two agricultural settlements. It would appear, however, that UNHCR is not as free as it should be to visit these settlements and to monitor its assistance through the operating partners, ANC and SWAPO. The HCR representative complained to me that these two groups are not even meeting minimal HCR reporting requirements.

Recommendation: That UNHCR make as conditions of its continued relationship with ANC and SWAPO complete access to their rural settlements and compliance with reporting requirements.

The official estimate of refugees in Lusaka is 800 persons. Assistance is provided to this caseload through a variety of existing projects, all of which are being proposed for continuation in 1982. These projects include educational assistance at the secondary, university and post secondary/vocational levels; multipurpose assistance in the form of stipends, clothing, transportation, etc.; support for Makeni Center which is to provide transit quarters with counselling and, in some instances, training; and employment generating schemes at Makeni and other settlements.

Makeni Resource Center has been established for a variety of reasons, including the following:

- the Zambian Government will not release from detention certain aliens, including refugees, without documents, until there is a place they can go which will provide surveillance capability; thus, Makeni may well take on the image of a quasi-detention center;
- refugees who are resettling outside Zambia or who will be travelling abroad for educational purposes, need a place to stay while they are making arrangements in Lusaka.
- refugees in need of prolonged counselling can best be served at such a facility.
- school leavers who will not fit into agricultural settlements like Meheba, will receive counselling and training.

UNHCR officials stressed that refugees would be processed through Makeni quickly. I share the concern of others whose opinion is that Makeni will become a long-term residence for a limited number of refugees (the present capacity is 70 persons). Lutheran World Federation, which is to be the operating agency, and UNHCR are currently negotiating the terms of an agreement.

Angolans, estimated to number 10,000 in the Western Province, are by far the neediest refugees in Zambia. In the late 1960's this group fled to Zambia where they have ethnic affinity with the local population. Government attention was again focused on this group in early 1981 when famine hit the southwestern corner of Zambia. Because of South African and UNITA activities in the area, Zambian officials have restricted relief operations and visits by international officials. A Swedish doctor working for LWF reports that the conditions of refugees and nationals alike are stark. Embassy efforts to provide emergency assistance with OFDA funds have been frustrated by the lack of a contract between the contract haulage firm and the Zambian government. Although the firm delivered relief supplies along a main road in the area, it has not prepared a contract agreement which would permit transfer of funds

from the Embassy to the Zambian government. UNHCR is arranging for the transfer of mine-proof four-wheel drive vehicles from Zimbabwe to Zambia to enable the distribution of much needed relief supplies in the area.

Zambian government officials have not been particularly seized with the problem of these Angolan refugees because nationals (and by association, the refugees) in southwestern Zambia have had secessionist tendencies in the past. In spite of the expressed wish of refugees not to be removed from the area, Zambian officials are contemplating moving these refugees from the western to eastern side of the Zambezi River. UNHCR plans to engage students at the University of Zambia to survey the situation and to gather demographic data. Before the U.S. can support a project that would resettle 10,000 people who have firmly and spontaneously resettled with their ethnic kin over a decade ago, we would have to be persuaded that conditions are so extreme as to require such a financially and socially costly and disruptive venture.

D. Djibouti

In Djibouti I had individual and group discussions with officials from the U.S. Embassy/AID Mission, UNHCR, CRS and the Djibouti Government's National Office of Refugees and Displaced Persons (ONARS). I visited Dikhil and Ali Sabieh refugee camps, Alee Adey displaced persons camp and the settlement at Maloud.

There are about 21,000 refugees at Dikhil and Ali Sabieh camps. Most are nomads from the Ogaden Region of Ethiopia. With modest funding from UNHCR, a total of 1000 traditional stone houses are being built at the two camps. An additional 1,500 are planned in the second phase. Refugee builders are being compensated for their labor with food rations only. Three French volunteers are supervising the construction.

Although the District Commissioners are the ultimate organizational authorities, commanders assigned by ONARS and paid salaries with UNHCR funds are responsible for daily camp management.

Basic food rations are provided by WFP and special food items, such as tea, salt, sugar and meat, by UNHCR. ONARS coordinates the distribution system with technical assistance from CRS under a USG grant. Curative health services are provided at Ali Sabieh by

LICROSS and at Dikhil by the German Doctor's Association. UNHCR has recognized the need for and is looking for a PVO to provide primary health care. Nutrition intervention for vulnerable groups, waste disposal and health education are urgent needs, especially at Dikhil, where housing construction has not been planned, together with such public health measures as latrines and a water distribution system for domestic purposes.

UNHCR has insisted upon primary education, in spite of the Djibouti Government's reluctance because of indecision over the language of instruction. Although Djibouti is a Francophone country, it has finally decided on English and Arabic as the languages for instruction in these refugee schools. World University Services of U.K. has agreed to provide teachers. Four classrooms will be built at each camp with 50 pupils per classroom. About 10% of the eligible children will be able to be accommodated by these classrooms. Existing schools built with modest local materials will be handed over to the refugees for Koranic instruction.

By far the greatest need at both refugee camps is water. Water is piped into Ali Sabieh from Mouloud (about 30 km), but, because of frequent pump failures, water must often be trucked to Ali Sabieh. UNHCR plans to drill for water in Ali Sabieh in 1982, an activity which the U.S. may want to support. UNHCR has incorporated into its revised 1981 and proposed 1982 budgets all the projects submitted to ICARA by the Djibouti Government, including projects to provide water. The District Commissioner in Dikhil explained that there had been a demonstration in front of his office the previous week because of the lack of water. It was a relief, therefore, that just the day before my visit, the German drilling team had struck water in sufficient quantities. Funds for a distribution system to bring the water to the camp are required.

Recommendation: That the U.S. make an earmarked contribution to the UNHCR for the Dikhil water distribution system, estimated to cost \$150,000.

The displaced person camp at Alee Adey has a population of about 6,000 people. They are Djiboutian nomads who lost their animals during the recent drought. The conditions of housing, health care, water and food provision are about as bad as I have seen anywhere. Most of the people who crowded around our vehicle were coughing and showed signs of malnutrition. The single hole from which water was drawn was badly polluted. A sense of apathy and abandonment was all-pervasive. It was reported that LICROSS health workers

occasionally visit the camp from Ali Sabieh. Several women were waiting at the tent which the LICROSS team uses with children who were so wasted that I am confident they did not live through that night. The CRS Director with whom I travelled to these camps was as shocked as I by the conditions we found. He planned to investigate the situation with the authorities at ONARS, since there is sufficient food available in country and several PVO's had recently contacted the Djibouti Government about fielding medical teams in the camps in Djibouti.

During a debriefing before my departure, the ONARS Commissioner assured me that steps would be taken to remedy the situation. A follow-up cable has been sent to Djibouti to determine what corrective measures have been taken. Since adequate resources are or could be immediately available, there is no USG action required at this time. Since returning to Washington, I have informed several PVO's inquiring about conditions in the Horn (e.g., Project Concern International, Phelps-Stokes and IRC) that there may be program opportunities in Djibouti.

E. Kenya

Mr. Ngandu, UNHCR/Kenya representative, expressed the need for a survey of the principally urban refugee caseload in Kenya. The purpose of this survey would be to determine:

- whether some refugees are so firmly resettled that they are no longer in need of UNHCR assistance;
- whether there are refugees who have refused to look for or who have turned down employment opportunities and should, therefore, be taken off the UNHCR stipend roles;
- for the remaining urban caseload, what are the most appropriate types of assistance UNHCR can offer, e.g., scholarships outside Kenya, education/training in Kenya, etc.

This survey is to be conducted by the University of Nairobi under contract with UNHCR. The results will be shared with the U.S. Embassy for transmission to RP.

No USG action is recommended in Kenya at this time.

Summary of Recommendations

- p.2 That 3,000 African admissions be proposed for FY '82 and that the caseload be identified as principally general humanitarian cases as described above.
- p.5 That Embassy/Gaborone be advised to suspend processing any additional Angolan applications except those already INS-approved and interviewed by the consular officer and that RP formally request UNHCR/Geneva to urge the Botswana Government to extend citizenship to the Angolans.
- p.5 That Embassy/Gaborone be advised to resume processing of applications by Namibians with an instruction to direct to UNHCR those applicants whose real motives are to find educational opportunities abroad.
- p.7 That INS/Rome be authorized to adjudicate high risk cases based on cabled information provided by the consular officer without a face to face interview.
- p.8 That we support the Nairobi consular officer in her interpretation of the issue of firm resettlement and that the UNHCR drop from its stipend roles those refugees who are unwilling to look for work or refuse to take advantage of existing job opportunities within a specific period of time.
- p.11 That RP provide USCC/ICMC with a grant for CO/ESL during FY '82.
- p.12 The assignment of a JVAR/Djibouti until Dec. 31, 1981 only and the processing during this period of all applications by refugees who were issued refugee identity cards by the Djibouti Government before Sept. 30, 1981.
- p.13 That RP earmark a contribution to the UNHCR special program for Chadians in western Sudan, notifying Embassy/Khartoum of the amount and purpose of the contribution.
- p.14 That RP and FFP implement as expeditiously as possible the following commitments:
--diversion of 2,000 m.t. of maize to Ugandan refugee feeding program;
--grant of \$420,000 to WFP/Rome for inland transport of maize.

- p.14 That UNHCR be requested to provide better estimates of total numbers of refugees and of number in need of assistance to support their 1982 budget submission to the Executive Committee.
- p.18 That UNHCR should initiate in its 1982 program for Botswana a schedule of reduced assistance to the refugees at Dukwe Camp. Barring some unforeseen influx, UNHCR should discontinue its support by CY '84.
- p.18 That UNHCR make as conditions of its continued relationship with ANC and SWAPO complete access to their rural settlements and compliance with reporting requirements.
- p.20 That the U.S. make an earmarked contribution to the UNHCR for the Dikhil water distribution system, estimated to cost \$150,000.

25

Intensive English-as-a-Second Language
and
Cultural Orientation
for
African Refugees in Gedaref, Sudan

Budget
(Oct. 1, 1981 - Sept. 30, 1982)

I. Personnel

A. Teaching staff

1. Internal costs for 5 Peace
Corps Volunteers (a)

	US\$	US\$
a. Settling-in Allowance at \$250 x 5	1,250	
b. Monthly Living Allowance at \$275 x 5 x 12	16,500	
c. Medical Insurance at \$350 x 5	1,750	
d. Domestic Travel and Per Diem at \$15 pd x4 days per mo. x 12 mo. x5 PCVS	3,600	
e. Vacation Allowance at \$25 p.d. x 24 days x 5 PCVS	3,000	
f. Misc. expenses-at \$200 x5 PCVS	1,000	
g. Reimbursement for stolen articles at 10% of mo. living allowance (16,500)	1,650	
h. Housing (implementing agency contribution)	-0-	
		28,750

(a) External costs (international travel, training, readjustment allowance, recruitment to be paid by Peace Corps

B. Administrative Staff

1. Program Manager/Teacher Trainer		
a. Salary at \$22,500 p.a.	22,500	
b. Housing (implementing agency contribution)	-0-	
c. Domestic Travel and pd. at \$25 p.d. x 6 days p.mo. x12	1,800	
d. Int'l Travel (2 round-trips conus-Khartoum) at \$2000	4,000	
e. Int'l Per Diem at \$70 p.d. x 10 days x2 trips	1,400	
f. Travel to U.S. training site	1,000	
g. Per Diem at U.S. training site \$70 x 21 days	1,470	
2. Secretary		
a. Salary at \$250 x 12	3,000	
		63,290

Sub-total Personnel Costs \$63,920

II. CAPITAL EXPENDITURES

	US\$	US\$
A. Vehicles		
1. 6 CT 110 Hondas at \$858(b)	-	5,148
		69,068
B. Instructional Equipment		
1. Tape Recorders 40x\$75	3,000	
2. Slide Projectors 2x\$200	400	
3. Movie Projectors 1x\$500	500	
4. Screens 2x100	200	
5. Typewriters 4x200	800	73,968
C. Office Equipment		
1. Copiers		
2. Calculators 2x30	60	
3. Furnishings	500	76,028
D. Reference Library	2,000	78,028
E. Classroom Construction (5x\$1200)	6,000	84,028
F. Classroom Furnishings (5x600)	3,000	87,028
G. Office Construction (1x1500)	1,500	88,528
H. Language Lab Construction (1x1500)	1,500	90,028

Sub-Total Capital Expenditures=26,108

(b) 110 cc engine, 120 m.p.g., 45 miles m.h., recommended for adverse road conditions

<u>III PROGRAM SUPPORT</u>	\$US	\$US
A. Office Supplies	1,000	
B. Student Supplies 400x\$2.00	800	
C. Vehicle shipment conus-Khartoum	1,200	(est)
D. Vehicle & equipment maintenance	1,000	
E. Communication Expenses	2,000	
F. Material Development (c)	30,000	
G. Teaching Materials ESL/CO (500x\$25)	12,500	
H. Consultants 2 x 2 trips at \$2,000	4,000	
P.D. at \$70 x 10 days x 2	1,400	143,928
Sub-total Program Support=\$53,900		
IV Indirect Costs (Implementing Agency Contribution)	-0-	
V Contingency at 10%	17,843	196,271

SUMMARY

A. Personnel	63,920
B. Capital Expenditures	26,108
C. Program Support	53,900
D. Contingency	14,392
TOTAL:	\$158,320

Note: Budget assumes 400 trained student per year resettled in groups of approximately 33 students per month. It further assumes a 12-week training cycle for each graduating class of 33 per month. Instructional hours are 180 in ESL and 100 in CO. 3 hrs per day in ESL, 5 days per week. 8-1- hours per week in CO. PCV teachers teach both ESL and CO, which assumes a teaching load of 22 1/2 -23 1/2 platform hours per week per teacher. Class size not to exceed 20 students in both ESL and CO components.

FY '82 Per Capita Cost = \$395

FY '83 Per Capita Cost = \$281

(FY '83 costs, projected at \$112,680, are adjusted for inflation but exclude certain capital expenditures and program support costs which will not be incurred during year two of operation.)

(c) Sub-contract costs to Center for Applied Linguistics to adapt Indochinese material for use as primary student cultural orientation material in three languages: Amharic, Somali and Tigrinya. Total reflects costs to produce camera-ready copy. Does not include printing.

Budget Addendum

This budget covers costs required to support a sixth Peace Corps Volunteer to be assigned by USCC to Southern Sudan to work in sanitation and preventative health.

I. Personnel

	US\$	US\$
A. Sanitation Worker		
1. Internal costs for one Peace Corps Volunteer		
a. Setting-in allowance at \$275 one-time payment	275	
b. Mo. Living Allowance at \$275 x 12	3,300	
c. Medical Insurance	350	
d. Domestic Travel and Per Diem at \$15p.d. x 10 days per mo x 12	1,800	
e. Vacation allowance at \$25 p.day x 24 days	600	
f. Misc. expenses	200	
g. Reimbursement for stolen articles at 10% of monthly living allowance	330	
h. Housing Allowance (implementing agency contribution)	-0-	
		6,855

II. Capital Expenditures

	US\$	US\$
A. Vehicle		
one ct 110 Honda	858	7,173

III. Program Support

A. Project Seed Money (a)	3,000	
B. Vehicle Shipment	200	(est)
C. Vehicle Maintenance	100	11,013

Summary

I Personnel	6,855
II Capital Expenditures	858
III Program Support	3,300
TOTAL:	\$11,013

TOTAL FUNDS REQUESTED

EDUCATION:	\$158,320
SANITATION:	11,013
	<u>\$169,333</u>

(a) Matching funds should be sought from the government of the Sudan or UNHCR

SUBJ: REORGANIZATION OF GOS REFUGEE COMMISSION

1. ON JUNE 22, 1981 PRESIDENT NIMEIRI PROMULGATED BY PRESIDENTIAL DECREE A POTENTIALLY FAR-REACHING REORGANIZATION AND AUGMENTATION OF THE GOS OFFICIAL REFUGEE AFFAIRS ADMINISTRATION.
2. DESPITE A TERSE PUBLIC NOTICE IT IS APPARENT FROM THE DECREE ITSELF THAT THE GOVERNMENT HAS MADE AN IMPORTANT COMMITMENT AND HAS THE INTENTION TO BOLSTER ITS ADMINISTRATIVE AND PERSONNEL CAPABILITIES AT THE HEADQUARTERS LEVEL TO SUPPORT ONE OF AFRICA'S MAJOR REFUGEE PROGRAMS. THE NEW ORGAN UNDER THE CONTINUING LEADERSHIP OF DR. ABDEL RAHMAN EL BESHIR WAS RENAMED THE REFUGEE COMMISSIONER'S OFFICE AND REMAINS AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE MINISTRY OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS. DR. EL BESHIR STILL REPORTS TO THE MINISTER, BUT NOW OCCUPIES A POSITION RECLASSIFIED FROM THE CIVIL SERVICE GROUP 4 TO GROUP 3, EQUIVALENT TO A DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY, WITH AN ANNUAL SALARY FROM L.S. 4,429-4,780.
3. THE PRESIDENT'S DECREE PROVIDES THE NECESSARY ADMINISTRATIVE MANDATE TO ESTABLISH A MORE SPECIALIZED REFUGEE ORGANIZATION AND TO AUGMENT THE PROFESSIONAL STAFF SIXFOLD. THE NUMBER OF AUTHORIZED PROFESSIONAL POSITIONS HAS BEEN INCREASED FROM 3, INCLUSIVE OF THE COMMISSIONER HIMSELF, TO 18. THE NEW ORGANIZATIONAL PLAN CALLS FOR 5 ADMINISTRATIVE UNITS:
 - A. PROJECT PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTATION UNIT;
 - B. STATISTICS, RESEARCH, AND DOCUMENTATION ADMINISTRATION UNIT;
 - C. PUBLIC RELATIONS ADMINISTRATION UNIT;
 - D. INDIVIDUAL CASES UNIT; AND
 - E. ACCOUNTS UNIT.
4. IN ADDITION TO BROADENING THE REFUGEE ORGANIZATION, KEY POSITIONS HAVE BEEN RECLASSIFIED SUBSTANTIALLY UPWARD VIA-A-VIS COMPARABLE JOBS ELSEWHERE IN THE GOVERNMENT TO PROVIDE FINANCIAL INCENTIVES FOR ATTRACTING AND RETAINING PERMANENT STAFF.
5. COMMENT: THE GOVERNMENT HAS TAKEN A VERY SUBSTANTIAL STEP FORWARD IN ITS EFFORTS TO EXPAND ITS INSTITUTIONAL CAPABILITY TO ADMINISTER PROGRAMS FOR APPROXIMATELY 500,000 REFUGEES LOCATED THROUGHOUT THE SUDAN. HOWEVER, IT IS AT THIS TIME ONLY AN ADMINISTRATIVE MANDATE, A SHELL WITHOUT THE EQUALLY IMPORTANT INGREDIENTS OF BUDGET, FACILITIES, EQUIPMENT AND TRAINED STAFF. THE NEXT MILESTONES TO WATCH WILL BE THE MINISTRY OF FINANCE'S APPROVAL OF SUFFICIENT OPERATING FUNDS TO MEET THE EXPANDED ADMINISTRATIVE MANDATE AND THE SUCCESS WITH WHICH QUALIFIED STAFF CAN BE RECRUITED. DR. EL BESHIR'S NUMEROUS ALLUSIONS TO ANTICIPATED NEED FOR DONOR SUPPORT IN THE FORM OF "TOPPING OFF" PERSONNEL SALARIES. LARGER FACILITIES AND EQUIPMENT SERVE AS AN EXPRESSION OF SOME PESSIMISM THAT THE GOVERNMENT WILL ALLOCATE SUFFICIENT FUNDS.
6. IN THE RECRUITMENT OF PERSONNEL THE REFUGEE OFFICE WILL BE FACING THE UBIQUITOUS PROBLEM OF FLIGHT TO THE GULF STATES ALTHOUGH THE MORE ATTRACTIVE CIVIL SERVICE GRADES MIGHT ENCOURAGE SOME TO STAY HOME.
7. NOTABLY TWO POSITIONS HAVE BEEN ESTABLISHED AT THE ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER LEVEL TO COORDINATE WITH INTERNATIONAL AND VOLUNTARY ORGANIZATIONS, A CURRENT SORE POINT FOR UHNGR, WFP AND VOLAGS WHICH HAVE ATTEMPTED TO FUNCTION WITH CONSIDERABLE DEDICATION AND PURPOSE, BUT INEVITABLY ARE FRUSTRATED BY AN OVERTAXED, UNRESPONSIVE 3-MAN COMMISSIONER'S OFFICE.
8. FINALLY, SUCH A DRAMATIC EXPANSION WILL VIGOROUSLY TEST DR. EL BESHIR'S MANAGEMENT COMPETENCE. THUS FAR HE HAS SHOWN CONSIDERABLE RELUCTANCE TO DELEGATE TO HIS, IN OUR VIEW, COMPETENT SUBORDINATES AND A PROCLIVITY TO DO SO MUCH OF HIS ADMINISTRATION OFF-THE-CUFF WITH LITTLE FORMAL RECORDKEEPING OR CORRESPONDENCE TO THOSE IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY WHO FOOT THE BILLS. DECONTROL FOLLOWING JULY 8, 1982
9. BY SEPARATE MESSAGE MISSION INTENDS TO ADDRESS HOW U.S. MIGHT HELP IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS REORGANIZATION. KIRBY

Best Available Document

Officials Interviewed
Africa Trip
June 5 - July 3, 1981

	<u>USC</u>	<u>UNHCR</u>	<u>WFP</u>	<u>Local Govt</u>	<u>Volag</u>	<u>Other</u>
dan	Amb. Kontos DCM Kirby Pol Off. Martin Military Attache Con Off. Hudson Vice Con Boehme AID Director Mudze Deputy Dir. Holtoway	Rep. Muller Resettle. Off. Phelps Public Inf. Off.	Gaston Eban	Commissioner Bashir	USCC - Wagner USCC - Giannone CARE Rep. Euro - Accord Rep. SCE/UK Rep. IRC - Euklund Ford Found. - Singer Sudanaid	ICRC Dele ICM Rep.
hiopia	Charge Navez Con Off Wilhelm					
nya	Con Off. McKee Vice Con. Vasquez RFFPO - Strong	Rep. Ngandu Protect Off. den Hond				
ibouti	Amb. North Adm/Con Off. Hackett AID Affairs Amundsen IRS/Rome - Dougherty	Acting Rep. Protect Off. Rodriguez Counsellor Sevestre UNHCR/Geneva Rigoy	Advisor	Commissioner Malew	CRS - Bourassa	ICM - De Rito
mbia	Amb. Wisner DCM Egan Con Off. Smith AID Director	Rep. Kawuki Dep. Rep. Prot. Off. Chikawe Social Service Off.	Advisor		Red Cross Dir. LWF Doctor Zambia Christian Council Zambia Episcopal Conference	
tswana	DCM Landfair Con Off. Segal Peace Corps Mullaney	Rep. Mkanda Protect Off. Yde		Minister Kwelagobe Admin Secy. Modimakwane Dist. Off. Thwane Dukwe Comm. Mathibela	LWF - Hunter Dukwe Coord. Kulseng	BCR Bakwasi
me	INS Dist. Dir. Feldman Deputy Dir. Wagner INS Off. Dougherty					
ussels	USEC Billo					EC - Van Hoek EC - Molinier EC - Russell
neva		East Africa Blavo South Africa Lambo Sudan Off. Bijleveld Somalia Off. Johannesen Protection Sect. Feldman " " Carpenter " " Young Counselling Sect. Rigby				UNV Reps ICM Jarrell ICMC Rep. AAI Raseroka

Itinerary

-31-

Friday, June 5

WA-556	Depart DCA	3:55 p.m.	Arrive JFK	5:05 p.m.
WA-880	Depart JFK	7:10 p.m.		

Saturday, June 6

MS-753	Depart Cairo	1:50 p.m.	Arrive Khartoum	9:00 p.m.
--------	--------------	-----------	-----------------	-----------

Friday, June 12

SN-324	Depart Khartoum	2:45 a.m.	Arrive Nairobi	6:40 a.m.
--------	-----------------	-----------	----------------	-----------

Saturday, June 13

DJ-24	Depart Nairobi	10:10 a.m.	Arrive Djibouti	12:30 p.m.
-------	----------------	------------	-----------------	------------

Thursday, June 18

ET-763	Depart Djibouti	10:20 a.m.	Arrive Addis Ababa	12:25 p.m.
--------	-----------------	------------	--------------------	------------

Friday, June 19

ET-781	Depart Addis Ababa	9:00 a.m.	Arrive Nairobi	10:50 a.m.
--------	--------------------	-----------	----------------	------------

DZ-711	Depart Nairobi	3:25 p.m.	Arrive Lusaka	4:45 p.m.
--------	----------------	-----------	---------------	-----------

Wednesday, June 24

BP-131	Depart Lusaka	1:15 p.m.	Arrive Gaborone	5:05 p.m.
--------	---------------	-----------	-----------------	-----------

Sunday, June 28

BP-171	Depart Gaborone	3:45 p.m.	Arrive Johannesburg	4:45 p.m.
--------	-----------------	-----------	---------------------	-----------

AZ-815	Depart Johannesburg	7:50 p.m.		
--------	---------------------	-----------	--	--

Monday, June 29

			Arrive Rome	7:45 a.m.
--	--	--	-------------	-----------

Tuesday, June 30

AZ-410	Depart Rome	10:30 a.m.	Arrive Geneva	11:55 a.m.
--------	-------------	------------	---------------	------------

Friday, July 3

SN-792	Depart Geneva	9:35 a.m.	Arrive Brussels	10:45 a.m.
--------	---------------	-----------	-----------------	------------

Saturday, July 4

SN-639	Depart Brussels	8:05 a.m.	Arrive Paris CDG	8:55 a.m.
--------	-----------------	-----------	------------------	-----------

WA-891	Depart Paris CDG	12:30 p.m.	Arrive Dulles	2:55 p.m.
--------	------------------	------------	---------------	-----------