PN-AAW-854

931011162

LTC Reprint No. 136
U.S. ISSN 0084-0807

July 1978



Reaching the Rural Poor and the Poorest: A Goal Unmet

William C. Thiesenhusen

PN-AAD-263

LAND TENURE CENTER

University of Wisconsin-Madison
53706

7

Reaching the Rural Poor and the Poorest: A Goal Unmet

William C. Thiesenhusen

Policy-makers and theorists today have no trouble agreeing that if a country's policy goal is 'development' it must attack poverty in a direct and purposive manner. The rhetoric at the fifth Summit Conference of Non-Aligned Nations (Colombo, August 1976) differs hardly at all, in this respect, from the analyses of more detached scholarly observers: better income distribution is as essential as growth itself if there is to be real progress in the less-developed countries (LDCs) (Shaplen, 1976*b*; Chenery *et al.*, 1974, pp. 3–37). Furthermore, neither can be left to market forces alone: government policy must intervene. Unless that intervention takes the revolutionary path it has in China and Cuba, the lessons and experience to guide it will come from the piecemeal, eclectic course which the attack on poverty is taking, with bewildering variety and a wide range of results, in the contemporary developing world.

For the LDCs the income pyramid is almost invariably characterized by a sector of poverty making up perhaps 40 per cent of the population. This has always included a sub-sector whose poverty tested the ingenuity and goodwill of society because it could be alleviated by job creation, distribution of productive resources, and collective action. For another sub-sector, the basic requirements of a minimum living standard could be met only by income transfers. Yet the most imaginative use of these measures has always left another sub-sector whose poverty has been utterly unresponsive to any technique yet devised by any capitalist society. This paper will concentrate on the first group; the needs of the second group are obvious, and on the third I have nothing to contribute other than to urge that its plight be explicitly and prominently included on the scientific research agenda.[1]

Who and Where Are the Poor?

Given the almost 30-year history of concern with development, it is difficult to realize how few of those who were the earliest to sense the problem envisioned the possibility that a steady rise in *per capita* income in a developing country might leave the majority of its people as badly — or worse — off than before.

It is now dismally evident that the process of development in an LDC often tends to concentrate gains in the hands of an already advantaged stratum of

©William C. Thiesenhusen.

income receivers: landowners, industrialists, businessmen, professionals, government officials, traders, those with foreign connections, etc. These groups fall into three main classifications: those who have wealth because their families were rich, those who occupy key positions at the growth points of the economy, and those who perform brokerage or service functions for the other two.

On the other hand, there are a variety of classifications of seemingly intractable poverty. Most of the categories are relatively large, and some are so large that they encompass the vast majority of people in a country. Each requires distinct solutions which have not been clearly formulated to date.

There are, to be specific, *whole nations — a sub-classification of those we usually call less-developed countries — which in terms of average income have stagnated or dropped in the last ten or fifteen years.* This very likely means that a few within these countries have gained at the expense of the vast majority. How these countries — some 30 of them which are collectively designated as the 'fourth world', with an average annual *per capita* income of under US $150 — can even survive as nation-states, much less progress, without permanently allying themselves with other nations is an unanswered question.

There are, moreover, *backward geographical areas with fairly uniformly low average family-income levels even within economically rapidly growing countries.* They include the Appalachian Mountains region in the United States and North-East Brazil. Size of the area in question and wealth of the country as a whole must figure importantly in dealing with this kind of poverty, but to what extent no one seems to know. There has been at least speculation that an area like the Appalachians as a 'pocket of poverty' can be dealt with only as a welfare problem. That may be so in a nation as rich as the United States, but the vast North-East Brazil is too dominant to be considered a 'pocket' by any geographical tailor. Welfare measures designed and executed in Brasilia are bound to be inadequate for the task. Sub-continents of poverty remain intact today, decades after their plight was first recognized, and as untouched as walled fortresses by the progress that surrounds them. Although not all who live in regions of this kind have been unserved by economic change, by and large those whose incomes have improved have been either traditional élites or resource holders who cannot even be enumerated as residents because they collect their rents or interest or dividends from some other part of the country or the world.

Most countries, and especially the LDCs, have *certain productive economic sectors that contain more poverty than their share of the population.* Agriculture is probably the prime candidate for such a designation, and it is no surprise that the poorest of countries are usually those that are the most preponderantly agricultural. The World Bank has noted that about 85 per cent of the people it describes as living in 'absolute poverty' are in rural areas.

In many countries, under existing institutions, *there is a poor and disenfranchised group that has no real voice and obtains little consideration from political, social, or economic policy decisions. Even where they have been considered by policy decisions, the result has often been ineffectual. For whatever reasons, this group lacks access to the institutions that ostensibly govern and*

serve its society. When whole nations have stagnant or declining average *per capita* incomes, it will usually be found that the vast majority of the population falls into this group. In less-developed countries (let us say those in the self-named Group of 77 whose representatives met in Lima in September 1975), a great proportion is in agriculture and/or lives in a backward region and/or is self-employed. (This last point on self-employment is emphasized by Ahluwalia in Chenery *et al.* (1974), pp. 3-37. The original group of 77 now consists of over 100 nations.) The heterogeneity of sources of livelihood for these people on the bottom-most rung of the human ladder (from bootblacks to intinerant labourers) often means that a government finds real difficulty in designing policies to help them even when there is genuine will to do so.

Some policy issues are best addressed not by dealing directly with these variances within the category of poverty, but by asking: 'How did a particular sub-sector of the poor get where it is?' Those who have been left behind in their own lifetimes by the inexorable forward march of technology or in an otherwise dynamic milieu with which they have been unable to keep pace — those who have become, in effect, obsolete — pose different problems from those who were born into their unhappy situation. Both groups may lack the education, vision, and/or energy necessary to extricate themselves. Both may be held down by unyielding institutions. But those who were once in the economic mainstream present a more tractable problem unless personal or group discouragement is so pervasive that it is impenetrable by any means.

The poverty groups within nations may benefit little from national policies and influence them marginally if at all. To the poor in many LDCs — the majority — their national government could as well be on the moon as in the capital city; it would matter little to them. Likewise, cold and cruel as it may sound, many of these countries pursue economic policies that relate primarily or solely to the market economy and would need little or no modification if today saw the total disappearance of all those below the median income level.

In many ways these policies reflect a continuing and fundamental misunderstanding of the problem of poverty, and imply a belief that if the national income can somehow be raised it will *ipso facto* raise the lot of all those contained therein. The truth that groups of people are differentially (and some even adversely) affected by a rising national average income is hardly a revelation to those who care to recall their reading of Dickens. The key in designating a country as rich or poor, developed or underdeveloped, lies not only in averages, but in how many rich and poor people there are as a proportion of the total population ('rich' and 'poor' being only the two simplest of many arbitrary income categories expressed as some function of the cost of living), how quickly mobility is taking place, and how rapidly the total quantum of both groups is changing.

At any rate, the 'poor' make up from five to ten per cent of the populations of DCs and from 20 to 60 per cent of LDCs. Contemporary language of assistance agencies refers to 'the lower 40 per cent'.

The Public Assistance Record: What Is Being Done About Poverty?

Improving the distribution of income came to be explicitly recognized as an aim of the Development Decade by the General Assembly of the United Nations in the autumn of 1970. In 1973 the US Congress, in the Foreign Assistance Act setting forth the legal framework for loans and grants to less-developed countries, instructed the Administration to give highest priority to undertakings which 'directly improve the lives of the poorest of their people and their capacity to participate in the development of their countries'. The International Development and Food Assistance Act of 1975, signed by the President on 20 December of that year, likewise directed a heavy orientation toward the needs of the poor majority. At the World Bank, President Robert McNamara's addresses have been milestones in calling attention to the poor. In his now famous 1972 Santiago speech he recognized the gross income inequalities in most contemporary LDCs. A speech the next year in Nairobi added 'the lowest 40 per cent' to the vocabulary of development analysts as he gave emphasis to the needs of people 'who have neither been able to contribute significantly to national economic growth nor to share equitably in economic progress'. In that document McNamara sketched a programme designed to raise the production of 100 million small farmers by five per cent a year by 1985. With optimism he said that as early as 1975 it would be possible to reverse the widening of income disparities in the poor countries. He foresaw eradication of absolute poverty by the end of the century, together with the elimination of malnutrition and illiteracy (Lelyveld, 1975).

But the two years between Nairobi and his 1975 message apparently made him less confident as to the nature of the solution and humbled him to the task at hand. 'The closer we get to the core of poverty in the countryside,' he said, 'the more difficult, complicated and time-consuming the task becomes.' Assessing that year's progress, he was sobered:

> Indeed, in many respects, the outlook now appears worse than it did twleve months ago . . . For the poorest countries — those with *per capita* incomes of less than $200 — the situation is particularly grave . . . In 1974, *per capita* incomes of one billion people living in these nations declined an average 0.5 per cent. For the hundreds of millions of them already severely deprived, it meant hunger and illness, and an erosion of hope (McNamara, 1975, pp. 3–4, 13)

His Manila speech, given in October 1976, seemed equally pessimistic.

Dorner (1975) also sees little reason for optimistic evaluation of the anti-poverty programme sponsored or otherwise supported by the World Bank, USAID, the Regional Banks, or the United Nations Development Programme. Too often these programmes were either: (1) meant to reach the poor but diverted or dissipated in the process, perhaps reaching some other recipient group; or (2) not aimed at poverty groups at all in anything but a rhetorical sense. Commenting on the Bank's 1974–78 lending programme, Dorner (1975, p. 2) concludes:

The $4.4 billion earmarked for agriculture represents about 20 per cent of total lending planned by the Bank over the five-year period. This is approximately the same percentage for agriculture as in the previous five years, 1969-73. How much of this new lending will actually reach and benefit the small farmer? The World Bank's past performance on this score is not encouraging. Only $1 billion out of a total of $25 billion lent during the Bank's first 25 years of existence went to small farmers — a mere four per cent.

Some of those in poverty have enjoyed a modicum of improvement in absolute income levels, and there has been some slight progress toward egalitarianism in some countries in the last several decades. But the most usual result is that the entire income spectrum is raised without changing the ordinal positions of those on the income ladder. A recent time-series study for eighteen countries reveals very little relationship between rates of growth of income and changes in the share of the lowest 40 per cent of income earners (Ahluwalia in Chenery *et al.*, 1974).

The unfortunate situation as it exists today is cautiously summarized by the United Nations:

In a number of developed as well as developing countries, economic and social policy discussions reflect a new and growing emphasis on distributional objectives. National or macro-growth policies have generally failed to remove, or in some cases even to reduce, wide disparities in the level of living or the quality of life. These disparities persist even in conditions of mass poverty . . . Their intractability retards the achievement of an adequate level of living for all people, threatens national unity in some countries, and everywhere impedes the development of human resources for development. (United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 1974, p. 3)

Nevertheless, the plain fact is that the rich are not choosing to redistribute much wealth or economic power and the poor have been too weak, powerless, and unorganized to force them to do so.

There is no standard descriptive model to test the success of programmes meant to aid development. One highly conjectural manner of conceptualizing how such programmes relate to a 'more equality' target would be to visualize their differential impact on each income quintile in a typical less-developed country (deciles or quarters could just as easily be used, since precise data are not at hand).[2] Pertinent government development programmes of the 1950s largely concerned savings and investment, while in the 1960s trade was emphasized. (There is little if anything in Secretary Kissinger's 1976 Nairobi initiatives, some major points of which were rejected by the United Nations Commission on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) itself, to indicate that US policy has progressed beyond this point. Rejection of some of Kissinger's key suggestions occurred some three weeks later at the close of the meeting — see *New York Times*, 7 May 1976.)

Speaking very generally of these policies of recent decades, in most of the less-developed countries the top quintile was benefited more than the second. The third quintile often gained something, but the bottom two either received nothing or were adversely affected. That this is true should not be surprising.

Investment and trade policies both favour those groups who have resources initially. A group gets little direct benefit from low interest, investment tax credits, export subsidies, import duties, protection of infant industries, etc., unless it has a certain quantum of resources to invest or with which to generate a tradeable product. This immediately reinforces the position of the investor and the trader in the upper twenty per cent or so of the population. If, say, the middle quintile or the one above that is to benefit, it must be connected in some meaningful way with those who have the resources — perhaps it sells its labour to the 'haves' in a market where skill is important and thereby benefits when the upper groups enjoy some measure of prosperity. On the other hand, it may be buying food and clothing for its own use at prices so inflated that its gains on the factor market are neutralized by its dealings in the product market, a situation fairly common in the upper part of the middle quintile. The bottom 40 per cent or so includes, along with some unemployables, a vast pool of self-employed, unemployed, underemployed (the *lumpenproletariat* is included within these three latter categories and 'sub-proletariat' might be a better description for it (see Wolfe, 1976). If this lower 40 per cent has any connections at all with the sectors above it, they are likely to be highly exploitative in nature. It is a sector kept alive by certain marginal employment, the necessity at least to subsist, a few welfare measures (including income transfers), and repression.

Changing the way income and resources are distributed is more complex than simply adding to investment or increasing trade. Both of these latter measures are specific, determinate, and thus easy to measure. Perhaps most important, their income repercussions almost always agree closely with the interests of the dominant classes.

It is obviously too simplistic to assume that egalitarian measures always work against the interest of controlling upper and middle groups in the society and influential outsiders, although that interpretation is often made. Even when there are general expressions of support (on at least an intellectual basis) for better distribution, there is little agreement as to how to bring it about. Long before the United Nations made its proclamation, many writers of the 1960s had already seen the problem of growing inequities, called attention to them, and predicted that something would have to be done to revise a development policy whose effects on social and economic relations were to protect the current holders of resources. They foresaw irresistible pressures building among the 'have-nots' to force the 'haves' to a more realistic, if not more benevolent, policy.

In the final analysis, significant numbers who had been in the middle class entered the upper-middle class, and in many countries some who were at the top of the poverty class entered the bottom of the middle class. Meanwhile, top groups became wealthier pretty much in proportion to the resources they already controlled. A few from the second and even the top quintile spoke out for the poor. But if the middle quintile benefited, it tended to be not because of any wholesale benevolence of those at the top, but because of its own increasing restiveness. Those occupying this quintile made it clear, in the words of Falstaff, 'I am poor as Job, my Lord, but not as patient'. In the 1960s this restiveness was

never mobilized into mass rebellion. Except for those who were completely voiceless and effectively repressed, nearly everyone was gaining something in an absolute sense and little meaningful political change occurred or could have been expected.

The 1970s have not as yet brought any astounding new and fresh insights on how much of the bottom 40 per cent of the population can be brought into the mainstream. But a few modest speculations can be stated more confidently now than at the beginning of the decade:

(1) There is little reason to expect a shift in the balance of power that will give the poor a bigger share of the national wealth at the expense of the ruling élites (despite the pious outpourings of intellectuals and liberals on the urgent need for such a change). The only arguments that will be persuasive for such a shift will depend on showing those who have the power that they will either have their power enhanced thereby, or will lose it and its accoutrements entirely if it is not shared to some extent.[3]

(2) Repression will continue to be used in place of reform whenever those in power can do so without fear of losing internal legitimacy or arousing debilitating international condemnation.[4] Military governments, which have proliferated in the early 1970s, will tend to be quite durable and may even be the most efficient — though certainly not the most humane — way to bring about reforms to the upper poor (the only ones who have enjoyed even a modicum of help from anti-poverty programmes). Unfortunately, the reforms may have as a consequence the side-effect of leaving others worse off than before.

(3) There will, in response to more audible and clearly enunciated outcries for social justice and reform, be more and more eloquent proclamations by ruling classes as to the need for distributive equity and broad egalitarian societal goals.[5] It will thus become more difficult than ever for the press and for social analysts to determine where rhetoric ends and accomplishment begins.

(4) To the extent that reformist goals can be met with public policy, the lowest twenty per cent or so of the population (excepting those who receive some income transfers) will not be affected and probably the quintile of income receivers above that will be little touched. We are only slowly recognizing how abysmally little our existing knowledge and the current technology of public assistance — agrarian reforms, taxation, infrastructural development, more schooling, credit earmarked for the poor — do for the bottom twenty per cent of the poor and, for that matter, how little the entire bottom 40 per cent has been helped.

Some say that we should be more optimistic than these arguments would indicate. While there has been waste and inefficiency and, more seriously, we have fallen short of any hope of substantially alleviating poverty, a few at the top levels of poverty have been helped. I feel it is unjustifiable to feel joy in the face of such minimal accomplishments when sweeping change was the enunciated goal of almost every aid progamme in the 1960s.

This argues for analytically separating 'the poor' in terms of the origins of their poverty. In order to develop a technique for helping the poor, we need to examine the disadvantaged groups in each country to attempt to determine why they are mired in such deep poverty.

In most cases people are poor because they do not have income-generating resources; those that exist are firmly in the hands of a small élite. Giving the poor more resources and other means of production to use to generate incomes is one technique for coping with the problem of poverty. Land reform is the most obvious of these policy measures, and it is far from being an alternative that is exhausted, at least in most of Latin America. But given the rapid rates of population growth (which are common in LDCs and which add more to poor categories than to rich ones) even if all available land were to be distributed in some more or less equitable fashion (as individual, co-operative, or collective rights), a large core with little or no attachment to land would remain in most countries.

In every society there are the lazy and the profligate; in every society there are the old, the infirm, the chronically disturbed, the orphaned, and the social misfits who must be dealt with in other ways. But the question remains: What does society do with ablebodied, willing-to-work products of a population explosion of fifteen or twenty years ago who cannot by any known technique be provided with the jobs that will let them earn an honest living? This group must find a productive niche in society if our talk about egalitarianism and development is to be more than rhetoric. This group constitutes the 'poorest of the poor'.

Social research to date gives us few clues for coping with this mass of humankind. My plea is not for abandoning the policy search — the contrary is true. But we must in the process admit that liberal reforms have helped and probably can only help only the upper poor. At the other poverty extreme, welfare measures must be designed to help those who are poor because they cannot work. But to help the rest of the poorest of the poor — the 'critically' poor[6] — we do not know how in any practical, politically feasible sense. Of course, mass income transfers would work, but they are not politically or economically possible.

Reaching the Poor: Services with Basic Institutions Unchanged

During the 1960s and early 1970s it was thought that the problems of the landed peasant could be at least partly eliminated if he could be reached with public programmes. Programmes of this nature never reached the fastest growing and poorest segment within farming (the migrant worker or the worker with only tenuous rights to a piece of land), and indeed were never designed to do so. Research even casts some doubt on how much help established small-scale farmers have had from these auxiliary assistance programmes. Given our earlier paradigm, it seems probable that the middle quintile was by and large missed, and the upper 40 per cent received the bulk of the assistance.

In reporting on the small farmer in El Salvador, Jackson (1974, p. 22) notes that 'credit is only received by 6.3 per cent of the plots and agricultural extension reaches only 3 per cent of small farmers'. In El Salvador, 93 per cent of the

farmers occupy about nineteen per cent of the land. Soles (1974) reports for Colombia that the Caja de Crédito Agrario, Industrial y Minero was founded in 1931 to serve as a source of institutionalized credit for *campesinos* who did not qualify for loans from commercial banks; now it accounts for about half of all official credit. Soles indicates that these loans are small enough so the *campesinos* should be able to benefit from them. They do not even approach the size of loans made by the private and cattle banks, and interest rates are lower. Yet while total loans increased by US $9 million between 1966 and 1967, the *campesino's* share decreased by over US $6.6 million and the share of better-off borrowers increased by over US $17 million. For a detailed examination of loans by purpose see Soles (1972).

Soles continues (1974, p. 37):

> Examination of the Caja's loans for specific purposes also casts considerable doubt upon its claimed *campesino* orientation. Nearly one-half of the Caja's total credit is allocated to livestock, although the vast bulk of Colombia's rural populace are farmers, not ranchers; this credit is not allocated for family livestock purchases but for large-scale cattle-ranching. Non-livestock, or agricultural, loans were over several thousands of dollars. Even crop loans went increasingly in large blocks of credit to the commercial crops — cotton, bananas and cacao.

After presenting more evidence, Soles concludes (1974, p. 39):

> (The Caja's) loan programs come down heavily weighted on the side of owners and large-scale commercial renters. While regional data are unavailable as to loans to tenure groups, where such data are available they indicate the Caja's loan program to be even more skewed away from the *campesino* class in the coastal regions.

In addition to the Caja, Soles reports (1974, p. 33) that there are three other

> main channels of official agricultural loans in Colombia . . . Traditionally they have tended to favour borrowers who possess a capacity for repayment in the form of real goods. Hence livestock enterprises have received 50 per cent or more of all official credit in recent years, leaving only about 45 per cent for the vast majority of Colombian farms.

He concludes that:

> . . . the bulk of this credit has gone to the larger farmers . . . INCORA (The Colombian Land Reform Agency) instituted its supervised credit program in 1963, but has never exceeded 5 per cent of total official credit. Its initial focus was on the *campesino*, but later it began to pull back and focus both on larger farms, and on servicing clients located on its own irrigation and parcelation projects.

In reporting on Fómeque, Haney (1971) notes that a branch savings bank of the Caja Agraria was opened in 1946, and in 1952 the regional office for the credit programme was transferred there. Haney could not determine the distribution of the US $84 547 available for distribution in 1966, the year of his Fómeque study, but noted that in practice loans were disbursed to those who have over 3 hectares, and the major portion goes to livestock farmers. He

continues (1971, p. 55):

In July 1964, INCORA initiated a supervised credit program in Fómeque... In 1965, the program was extended to other *municipios* in the eastern part of Cudinamarca, and by the end of 1966 the project with its principal office in Fómeque included 329 borrowers in five *municipios* who held nearly US $295 000 worth of loans. As in other parts of the country, most of the INCORA borrowers were recruited from the more progressive, middle group of farmers who had successful borrowing records with the Caja Agraria.

In February 1967, the *municipio* of Fómeque had 124 INCORA borrowers (about 5 per cent of the total number of rural families). The average amount of land owned by the borrowers was about 12 hectares ... Nearly 40 per cent of the borrowers owned 10 or more hectares of land. A number of borrowers were farming part of their land — conditions which are supposed to disqualify them for supervised credit ...

In another paper, Soles (1973, pp. 5–6) analyses data on credit for other Latin American countries:

The older 'peasant-oriented' institutions are often criticized for not serving the peasants. Mexico's Banco Ejidal has been accused of 'creating more problems than it solved' (by driving many *campesinos* into debt); it is very doubtful if the Caja Agraria is in fact '*campesino* oriented' -- though it now claims to again be moving in that direction; and Bolivia's Banco Agrícola though also specifically directed by law to serve *campesinos* now pleads with the government to be allowed to do anything but.

The 'new' *campesino* credit agencies recognize that credit funds *per se* are not productive and hence have also emphasized the use of modern technical inputs and practices — in short, the 'package approach' of supervised credit and extension activities.

However, these programs and agencies often regress toward either serving the larger farmers or simply have not been effectively serving many *campesinos*. INCORA's supervised credit program, after an initial flurry of expansionist activity in Colombia's countryside, is now seen to be reducing its activities to concentrate on the few *campensinos* it has already settled on its irrigation and parcelation projects. The largest of the ACAR programs in Brazil (in Minas Gerais) reached only 5 per cent of the small farmers — which is at least better than the 2 per cent reached by the SCICAS program in Guatemala. INDAP, on the other hand, in Chile apparently did provide credit for a substantial proportion (47 per cent) of its potential clientèle through a program of credit in kind (e.g., loanings bags of fertilizers instead of money) to *organized groups* of *campesinos*. Credit to organized groups of *campesinos* also appears as one of the key mechanisms of the Puebla Project in Mexico.

About Puebla, Díaz Cisnero (1974, p. 496) concludes, '... the existence of institutional problems has prevented the project from reaching the vast majority of *campesinos* inhabiting the region'. But on balance he concludes that 'the strategy in current use there represents a realistic alternative to effectively help the *campesino* family to improve their material conditions and general well-being'.

Haney (1971) reminds us that credit is not the only public service programme which may miss its target in trying to eliminate poverty. He describes the marginal situation of the majority of Fómeque's farmers (pp. 58–59):

A reassessment program completed in 1967 increased the theoretical property taxes of the *municipio* by more than five times. But in context of the existing local political structure, peasants will have little incentive or justification for paying the additional taxes. With little or no peasant representation in the local government, there is no assurance that the additional revenue will be channeled into the much needed improvements in rural infrastructure . . .

Fixed costs account for a high percentage of total local government expenditures. In 1964, the combined costs of administration, justice, public order, and tax collection comprised 27 per cent of the total disbursements by the local government. Most of this outlay goes to support a local bureaucracy which, by and large, is indifferent toward the felt needs of the peasantry. In general, peasants have no opportunity to air a public problem before a local government official; they are not treated with justice in legal confrontations . . .

Reaching the Poor: Technological Change with Institutions Unchanged

Technological changes in agriculture – new knowledge, new forms of organization, new physical inputs, new infrastructure – have positive income effects on those who have resources, and there is often some spillover to the upper end of poverty groups. So far there is little evidence that they touch those in middle- and lower-poverty groups except perhaps adversely.

What repercussion they have in specific countries depends largely on the institutional milieu, especially initial resource distribution.[7] For example, the most likely consequence is an accentuation of income (and hence class) differences when the land tenure pattern is inequitable (bimodal, as, for example, in the *hacienda* system); this is less probable when land is distributed in a fairly egalitarian manner (unimodal, as in the family-farm system).

Green revolution technology may affect income distribution through the factor market in that (1) it might cause some agricultural workers to be more fully employed than formerly, while others would be adversely affected (unemployables would not be touched); (2) some farmers might completely or partially be denied access to the new technology, thus increasing the income gap between the rich and poor. I need spend little more time on (2) since it was alluded to in the last section. The point is clear: to be optimally effective, green revolution technology requires more fertilizer, better seed, and better regulated water. This means more credit, which the poor may not have or be able to obtain.

More generally, the success of the green revolution rests on how well the non-farm sector can provide inputs: the seed–fertilizer revolution is distinguished by its increased dependence on purchased inputs. If bottlenecks in the distribution of these inputs affect the quantity delivered and the timing of their delivery, income will be affected. The chances for the large-farm sector to obtain seed and fertilizer may be greater than that of the small-farm sector simply because the large-scale farmer has more expertise in dealing with complex bureaucracies. And if there is a problem with an input shortfall, the large-scale farmer can use his personal vehicle to pick up seed, fertilizer, and pesticide at a more distant

location, an alternative usually not open to small, undercapitalized farmers. Griffin (1972, p. 47) believes that:

> Perhaps the most important reason for the bias of the 'green revolution' is the bias of government policy. For many years research, extension and investment programmes in agriculture have been devoted to raising output (preferably exportable output); their primary concern has not been to increase the welfare of the rural population and improve the distribution of income and wealth (see also chapter 8 by Pearse in this book).

This does not mean that those with small farms are always denied green revolution inputs. Rochin (1971) found that *barani* (rain-fed) smallholders in Pakistan 'have adopted dwarf varieties of wheat in a remarkably short time'. In Hazara they heard about it on the radio, saw it growing in demonstration plots, and were quick to purchase the inputs when available.

Alternatively green revolution technology might affect income distribution through the product market in that it might cause prices for a commodity to drop. Non-adopters would lose because they would not be able to make up in quantity what they lost in price. They would either retreat further into subsistence cultivation or take advantage of high land prices to sell out. Whether they ultimately benefit would depend largely on what happened to them then; if they were able to obtain better jobs after they liquidated their land assets, they would ultimately benefit, but this is unlikely in a labour-plentiful economy where the displaced smallholder is likely to be unschooled and without skill. Adopters would likely gain and, unless markets were exceedingly oligopolistic, so would consumers.

If the resultant agricultural product is exported rather than consumed locally, income effects will depend on who gets the foreign exchange that is generated. Will the government get a share? If so, how will it be used? What will happen to the share retained by individuals? Will it make up an income stream for the already rich with little 'trickle-down' effects on the poor? Will it be invested in towns or in the countryside? Will it be used for conspicuous consumption? Will it be sent out of the country and hoarded abroad? If benefits flowing to the rich are taxed away, the poor could benefit, but LDCs do not have a good record of either taxing the rich or spending public revenue in such a way that the poor would be helped.

Effects through the labour market are most likely and should be explored somewhat further. The employment problem in rural areas of less-developed countries is serious and becoming more so (Thiesenhusen, 1971, 1974*a*). Some feel that the green revolution technology may be exacerbating what is already a bad situation. The most direct way that income distribution can be affected by the green revolution is if rural workers — who are already crowded at the low end of the spectrum of income receivers in most LDCs — lost their jobs or find fewer days of work than presently because of it.

In summarizing one seminar on the green revolution in New Delhi, Das (1972, pp. 2266-2267) indicates that determining the income impacts of technology on various tenure groups is not an easy task:

While in UP (Uttar Pradesh), the neglected group may be the sharecroppers on large estates, in Maharashtra it may be the marginal farmers on hill-side slopes. Landless labour might have gained in Punjab, whereas sharecropper dispossession in Tamil Nadu may have worsened the position of agricultural labourers there.

Barker *et al.* (1972) discovered that with the introduction of the new technology in the Philippines, the structure of employment in rice farming changed while total demand for labour remained fairly constant. The reduced labour requirements for mechanized land preparation were more than offset by increased labour requirements for weeding and harvesting or more possibilities for double-cropping. It remains to be seen whether the labour peaks created for these operations might be so steep that mechanical processes will ultimately be substituted for hand-work or day labourers substituted for resident workers. At any rate, chances are good that as accentuated peaks and valleys appear in the structure of employment less resident farm labour will be needed. When labour requirements were more or less evenly spread throughout the agricultural year, resident farm labour was called for which related the labour force to the landlord in a traditional patron-client dyadic contract. Landlords frequently provided live-in workers with a house, some land, and/or other perquisites while the worker provided his labour. When the rhythm of work is changed so that some labour-use peaks get very steep and troughs appear in other seasons, there is no good reason to support permanent workers full time on the farm. Frankel (1971, p. 198) discusses this point with reference to India:

> The rapid progress of agricultural modernization tends to undermine traditional norms of agrarian relationships based on the exchange of mutual, if noncompatible, benefits and services that have historically provided a justification for inequalities between the propertied upper and middle castes, and the landless low castes and Harijans.

What this means is that where a patron-client relationship exists, it may well break down. This may be applauded as one more necessary step toward development, but in some countries where the system had overtones of landlord benevolence or *noblesse oblige*, the change is liable to be a wrenching one for many workers.

Tenants, especially in Asia where they are more common and poorer than in Latin America, face a very special problem as green revolution inputs come to be used and farming becomes more profitable. As land values rise with increased crop values, rents rise. Certainly landlords do not allow benefits of the green revolution to flow entirely — often not even in part — to renters. They are successful in raising rental payments because of the competition from many potential tenants for rental property. Some owners are simply reclaiming the leased property and working it with hired labour and/or machinery. Of India, Frankel (1971, p. 197) states rather bluntly 'Certainly, (landlords) do not hesitate to raise rentals in line with appreciating land values and/or to evict even tenants having longstanding cultivating possession of the land'.

There are other ways in which the green revolution may have an effect on

labour use, and they involve substitution of machines for hand labour:

(1) The green revolution might shift land away from high labour-use crops to crops that are not so labour-intensive. This is not to say that all shifts are unwarranted or should be foregone.

(2) The technological opportunities presented by the several green revolution crops vary in their potential for creating employment. Rice farmers may move toward the structural labour-using forms of Japan; because wheat is more amenable to mechanization, wheat farmers may adopt the capital-intensive structural form of the United States (Saito, 1971).

(3) Even where double-cropping is not possible, modern grain varieties may require precision seedbed preparation that hand labour cannot provide and larger machines may be used.

(4) Even seemingly small changes in technology and institutions may result in enormous changes in labour use. This is especially the case where there is a superabundance of labour. (One example of this latter kind is documented by Collier *et al.*, 1973, Sinaga and Collier 1975.)

There is still hope of increasing jobs and hence bettering income distribution via the seed-fertilizer revolution. The truth is, however, that upon close analysis some innocuous changes, or those which by any superficial analysis seem as though they should be labour absorbing, turn out to be the opposite (for a more detailed discussion see chapter 8 by Pearse in this book).

Reaching the Poor Through Reform: Institutions Changed

Even the efforts to introduce direct institutional change (in contrast to the earlier examples of directing assistance programmes at groups within the existing institutional system and introducing technological change into the existing system) have not reached those without some prior resource foothold. The example of agrarian reform in at least non-socialist countries during the period after the Second World War is a good one. Why it has not reached the poorest of the poor and who it benefits or is likely to benefit requires some understanding of prereform claims on the peasantry on the land.

Each LDC has sub-classes of peasantry recognizable to each other by a relationship to the land which has been dignified by local or national nomenclature. Status is incurred by this relationship, and while those with no relationship to the land, living, say, in Santiago, may call all peasants '*campesinos*', those with even a passing knowledge of agriculture will be able to run down a status list that usually tops out with '*mediero*' (sharecropper) and ends with '*afuerino*' (seasonal worker, migratory labourer or day labourer), with various, sometimes quite complex, combinations along the line.

Some sub-classes in any country are more apt to benefit from agrarian reform than others. The existing smallholder is unlikely to get more land and this seems, on the surface, no more than just. If not all can be accommodated anyhow, there

seems little to justify granting more land to those who already have some. But within the smallholder category there are those heads of households who have plots so small (*minifundistas* or *comuneros* in Latin America) that they are unable to scratch a living and must work on estates for the bulk of their income, perhaps leaving their land to be tended by other family members. They are as poor — maybe poorer — than the other group of labourers which has next to no chance to obtain land in a reform, the day labourers. Indeed, because their plots are so tiny they must be considered in the itinerant labour classification; they are day labourers with the added burden of reduced mobility to seek more remunerative employment elsewhere.

The migratory day labourer constitutes a group least apt to benefit from any reform. He is unorganized and has no prior, enduring ties to one farm, such as a usufructuary plot, a contract, or often even an established or continuing work pattern.

The resident farm labourer, who has these claims and can be considered at least in a middle-poor category, is more apt to receive land in a reform. He is more often organized (and if not, organizable). Especially in the case of 'top down' liberal reformers, the resident labour force of an estate is a propitious target group. It already possesses some tools and implements, may have certain proprietary interests on the land because of its longevity or that of its ancestors in the area, is handily located, and has more managerial experience; among the peasantry, it poses the least risk for those who must concern themselves with maintaining production goals.

In Table 7.1, which depicts only a few of the many peasant tenture types in several Latin American countries, the labourers in 'A' would probably benefit from a reform (in some countries they are benefiting). Labourers in 'B' would not. Indeed, when the resident labour-force gets land, it may systematically deny it to the 'poorest of the poor', the migratory labour-force, which, in most countries, is the numerically fastest growing portion of the peasantry. From the standpoint of the beneficiary this is reasonable: heirs need to be accommodated and, if post-reform organization is communal, more members are perceived of not only as potentially disruptive interlopers on an established farm, but as unnecessary claimants to a share of joint profits. From a national standpoint the result may imply a paradoxical result of reform: after land redistribution, income distribution may be as skewed as before.

Pearse (1975, p. 149) reports that in the Bolivian reform distribution 'followed the existing pattern', presumably with those who had strongest claims to demesne land getting most. While it was not explicit in Law 16 040 (the agrarian reform legislation of Chile), preference in land assignment under the Frei government was given to those who had worked on a permanent basis on the farm being allocated for at least three of the four years prior to expropriation (Barraclough and Affonso, 1973, p. 2). Even enunciated efforts to include poorest rural workers — as in Peru and in Chile under Allende — have come to little. In analysing the progress made in the Allende reforms, Barraclough and Affonso noted that in only eighteen months, November 1970 to June 1972, the

Table 7.1. Two generic types of peasants in several countries of Latin America

		Country	Local term	Lives on estate (*hacienda, estancia, fundo, fazenda*)	Cash wage	In-kind payment (like pasturage, food)
(A)	Farm labourer who is paid for work on landlord's property by land usufruct	Brazil	*condição* *colono camarada*	x	x	
		Chile	*inquilino*	x	x	x
		Colombia	*cuidandero* *recomendado* *arrendatario* *viviente* *concertado* *terracero*	x	sometimes	sometimes
		Costa Rica	*péon*	sometimes	x	sometimes
		Ecuador	*huasipungero*	x	sometimes	x
		El Salvador	*colono*	x	x	x

	Guatemala	*colono*	x	seldom	sometimes
	Peru	*colono* *arrendire* *allegado*	sometimes	sometimes	sometimes
(B) Farm labourer who is paid for work on landlord's property in cash and/or rations and not land usufruct	Chile	*afuerino*		x	
	Colombia	*jornalero* *peón*		x	x
	Ecuador	*yanapero*			x
	El Salvador	*jornalero*		x	
	Guatemala	*cuadrillero* *peón* *trabajador*	seldom	x	
	Peru	*enganche* (system) *yanacona*		x	x

Note: x denotes 'usually'. Systems often vary from region to region within countries.

government expropriated and incorporated 3282 farms. They calculated this at 21 per cent of the productive agricultural land of the country, estimating that 75 000 had directly benefited from the 1967 law (on which Allende as well as Frei built his programme. The authors found this progress praiseworthy — since other peaceful 'reforms' such as those in Colombia, Ecuador, and Italy had not affected more than five or ten per cent of the agricultural land. Yet the direct beneficiaries were seldom the migratory farm labourers: 'The position of the most backward agricultural groups, such as the Mapuches (the Indians who live on reservations in the South), the *comuneros* of Norte Chico, the *afuerinos* (day labourers) and the poor *minifundistas* continues now as in the past . . . (Lopez *et al.*, 1968, p. 93).

Assessing the progress made under the Peruvian land reform law of 1969, Lastarria and Havens (1976, p. 28) report that the agrarian reform under the Military Government

> affected the vast majority of the large landholdings in Peru. However it has affected only 25 per cent of the total agricultural population. Significant sectors have been neglected by the reform activity, particularly the landless peasant, the part-time day labourer and the large small-farm and *minifundista* sector.

That so few non-resident *hacienda* or plantation farm labourers have been incorporated in the Peruvian reform process comes as no great surprise; it is continuation of a trend described in 1974 by Horton (pp. xxvii-xxviii) who noted that:

> One of the major disappointments of the reform is its impact on employment. Neither striking increases nor declines have been reported, and it seems likely that the net effect is a small positive one . . . Reform enterprise members are by no means interested in increasing membership or non-member employment at the expense of profits. On most of the estates visited the trend in pre-reform employment was downward. The reform has greatly diminished this trend, but there is little evidence of a marked increase in employment.

After a careful examination of a number of cases of agrarian reforms, Horton (1974, p. 166) concludes that

> In no case did members or managers consider it rational to cut back or delay mechanization in order to employ more field hands. Nor were cases found where members cut the number of days each worked in order to take on more outside labourers.

In the Philippines only tenants on rice and corn farms above a certain acreage have been affected by the agrarian reform, often called the number one priority of President Marcos' New Society. While it is generally agreed that more progress has been made in the last three-and-a-half years than the past 30, the similarities to Chile and Peru are obvious in that only groups with some foothold in the system benefit. As Shaplen reports (1976*a*, p. 92).

> The major part of the land problem — the freeing of peasants from bondage as impoverished tenants and sharecroppers — has been only partly solved by the program, which

covers merely those areas devoted to the cultivation of rice and corn. Nearly a million and a half hectares (a hectare is about two and a half acres) of these crops, worked by nine hundred and fifteen thousand tenant farmers, are covered under the program. When it is completed — sometime in 1977, the government hopes — over half the land will have been transferred to almost four hundred thousand tenant farmers under permanent leasehold arrangements. This is no more than a third of the country's total agricultural land; the rest is devoted to other crops, the most important of which are coconut and sugar. Peasants working land devoted to these crops want to bring it under the reform program, too, but no such action is imminent, even though workers in sugarcane fields are, with one exception, probably the worst paid and most underprivileged of all agricultural employees. The exception is landless peasants, who work when and for whom they can — a category that, according to some estimates, comes to perhaps three million people.

Conclusions

Previous papers have catalogued and provided a rationale for the known policies that I believe most LDCs must follow if they are to alleviate poverty and narrow the ever-increasing income and resource gap in rural areas (Dorner and Thiesenhusen, 1972; Thiesenhusen, 1974*a*, 1974*b*, 1974*c*, 1975*a*). Each country is distinct, and which policies are followed and which take priority depends on political exigencies, the state of knowledge, and the 'art of the possible'. In general, we know that most countries require a land reform early in their development effort followed by programmes which deliver inputs that will increase the ability of beneficiaries to be more productive. Because of land scarcity these programmes will, in the context of contemporary reform laws, reach the 'upper poor'. Others who cannot be reached in this manner must be employed through agroindustries and infrastructure development. Intermediate technology must receive certain favoured status, and a proper climate for peasant reorganization and co-operatives must be fostered. But because of the magnitude of the problem, it is likely that a substantial group of poor will be left behind even given the most favourable of conditions. Some of these can be helped only through income transfers; there may not be another way to incorporate them into society.

The challenge of eliminating or at least substantially alleviating poverty in the coming decades seems almost insurmountable. People form the core of the problem and human beings are not known for predictability or, fortunately, for manipulatability. Furthermore, mainline academics have either neglected the poverty issue or treated it within a narrow disciplinary framework. But if the complex secrets of space science, solar energy, nuclear power, poliomyelitis, RNA, and DNA can be unlocked in the course of one generation, certainly the poverty in which at least two-thirds of the world's people live must be attacked with equal resources and intellectual vigour

(1) How can appropriate institutional reforms and delivery of all the supplementary inputs that must accompany them be speeded?

(2) How can meaningful income transfers to the unemployable be implemented?

(3) How can the numerically rapidly growing groups that are not affected by liberal reforms, job creation, collective action, or income transfer be reached?

(4) How, at minimal cost, can the poor who already have some resources be assisted to increase their income?

(5) How can technology be adapted or created to accommodate more 'employables'?

(6) How can the rich within poor countries and the rich countries within a poor world be convinced that without their voluntary — or, if it comes to that, involuntary — help the problems of poverty can never be alleviated?

(7) How can the world community avoid solutions that are discouragingly piecemeal responses to the endless and unsupportable wave of population growth?[8]

Acknowledgements

I wish to thank my colleagues Marion Brown, Peter Dorner, Archibald Haller, Henry Hart, Don Kanel, Bryant Kearl, Jane Knowles, H. A. Oluwasanmi, Arthur Padilla Lira, Kenneth Parsons, Raymond Penn and Edward P. Reed for comments on an early draft.

Notes

1. Dividing the poverty sector into groups for analytical purposes is not a new idea but it is one that has been neglected by those individuals and groups who ask the broad question, 'How can the poor be helped?' Raj Krishna (1974) concludes:

   > We already know from other analyses of family expenditure data that at least 30 per cent of the population is poor. Thus, once again, with all-India data, we can safely maintain the view that the poor are more numerous than the idle; the idle are more numerous than the willing; and only a fraction of the idle are willing to work more . . .
   >
   > It is clear, first of all, that the elimination of poverty is a much more gigantic undertaking than the elimination of the idleness of those who are available for additional work. Any attempt to identify the two by definition cannot help the policy-makers. Fundamentally, of course, it is poverty that must be eliminated. But the poverty of the employed, the unemployed, the self-employed, and the unemployable requires different treatment. The unemployables need simple income transfers; the self-employed (small farmers and artisans) need additional inputs, credit and knowledge; the employed need more effective unionism; and the unemployed need work and/or means of production. (See also Parsons, 1969)

2. Among the less developed countries, studies on income distribution are beginning to appear using Latin American data for some selected countries which might be interpreted as corroborating, in rough fashion, the observations above. Comparing 1960 and 1970 data:

(*a*) The top five per cent of income receivers have gained the most in *per capita* terms in nearly all countries.

(*b*) In most of them the fifteen per cent below this group have gained in relative terms and have substantially bettered their situation in absolute incomes. In others, this category has just held its own in terms of relative shares.

(*c*) In a number of Latin American countries (dominated by Brazil) groups closer to the median lost more ground in relative terms than any other of the groups on the income ladder, but held their own in absolute income. In a larger number of countries (dominated by Mexico) these groups held their own or gained in relative terms, but less than the groups above them.

(*d*) Those groups below the median lost in relative terms. In the former countries, losses were less pronounced than those of the groups immediately above them; in the latter countries, losses contrast sharply with gains by the groups above them.

(*e*) Absolute income levels of the poorest groups remained practically static while their income shares deteriorated markedly. Deteriorating levels of living are characteristic of this bottom quintile.

(See United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America, 1975, pp. 57-64).

3. As one of President Laugerud's key advisors said before the 1976 earthquake in Guatemala, 'Either the Indian is integrated into the present system, or else they will massacre our children' (*Latin America*, 5 March 1976, pp. 77-78).

At first sight it might seem strange that Laugerud should wish to challenge the political, economic, and social elite which, together with the army since 1954, has been the backbone of the Guatemalan power structure at which he stands. His motives can be traced back to the 1974 elections, in which Laugerud . . . was defeated at the polls, but saved by the army in a fraudulent event . . . The biggest swing against the ruling coalition was precisely among the Indians of the *altiplano*, who have not entirely lost the political awareness and ability to organize themselves that they acquired in the decade from 1944 to 1954 . . . It seemed to Laugerud . . . that it would be . . . sensible to support and develop the co-operatives which already existed in the *altiplano* to a limited degree . . . All these plans now are in ruins. The 'class quake', as it is now being called, caused the greatest damage in the *altiplano* areas where the co-operatives were being developed, while the wealthy *latifundistas* and exporters emerged virtually unscathed.

4. 'Using strategy of rhetoric and repression, the government works skillfully through the official National Peasant Confederation and, when necessary, the army to mobilize the peasant on its behalf and to crush occasional outbursts. "The killing of peasants is a routine event," a respected student of Mexican politics said. "The latest massacres only drew attention because one of them was used as an excuse to overthrow the Governor of Sonora. Otherwise it could not have been newsworthy" (*New York Times*, 'Mexico: Heedless of Peasant Plight', 1 December 1975).

5. It continues to be somewhat surprising — and it perhaps should not be — to hear elected and non-elected leaders speak self-critically of their régimes. In September 1975 President Ferdinand E. Marcos admitted that after three years of martial law in the Philippines, 'we are in fact a nation divided against itself — divided between urban and rural, rich and poor, majorities and minorities, privileged and underprivileged . . .' (Robert Shaplen, 1967*a*, p. 82).

   President Michael Manley says,

   > 'The fact is, we have both a massive urban unemployment . . . in 1972 the unemployment figure was 23.7 per cent island-wide . . . some of the rural parishes had an even higher figure than the national average. Jamaica's problem is like that of almost all other developing countries, with the chronic rural unemployed drifting to the town' (*Tropic* (Miami) 'Conversation with Michael Manley', 11 April 1976, p. 28).

   In another story President Manley was quoted as saying that Jamaica is 'being made a time bomb', citing the fact that 60 per cent of the people are under 30 years of age and 30 per cent of these are unemployed (Ralph Blumenthal, 'Political Violence in Slums of Jamaican Capital Has Subsided, But Island is a Time Bomb', *New York Times*, 29 February 1976).

6. The lexicon of adjectives to describe poverty is as rich as it is imprecise. Marshall Wolfe distinguishes between the 'relatively' and 'critically' poor in Wolfe (1976).

   The World Bank prefers to make a distinction between 'absolute' and 'relative' poverty:

   > Approximately 85 per cent of the 750 million poor in the developing world are considered to be in absolute poverty — based on the arbitrary criterion of an annual per capita income equivalent to $50 or less. The remaining fifteen per cent are judged to be in relative poverty — having incomes above the equivalent of $50 but below that of the national average per capita income (World Bank, 1975, p. 4).

   Edward Teller claims that three-quarters of the world is 'wretchedly' poor (*Newsweek*, 17 May 1976, p. 15).

7. With historical perspective, Kuznets (1974) believes that technological imperatives bring about institutional change and cultural adjustments and, while modern technology provides the potential for economic growth, lack of appropriate institutional responses can limit or halt it. These adjustments are accompanied by changes in ideology and changes in the conception of man and nature brought about by the innovation. Whether this is true of matters concerning equity, whether it applies in contemporary LDCs (Kuznets' observations were based on the historic Western European and US experiences), and/or whether this is a long-term rather than a short-term view are matters for conjecture.

8. This point relates directly to issues discussed at the United Nations Conference on Human Settlement (Habitat) held in Vancouver, 1-13 June 1976. Extensive press coverage began in all major newspapers on 30 May 1976. See, for example, Gladwin Hill, 'A Look at the Man-Made Mess', *New*

York Times, 30 May 1976; and 'World Seeks Way to Aid Its People', *Milwaukee Journal*, 31 May 1976. See also the following articles in *Science*, 4 June 1976, pp. 941-975: Margaret Mead, 'Habitat', p. 941; Frederick C. Turner, 'The Rush to the Cities in Latin America', pp. 955-962; Richard L. Meier, 'A Stable Urban Ecosystem', pp. 962-968; Roger Revelle, 'Energy Use in Rural India', pp. 969-975. Also relating to this issue is Thiesenhusen (1975*b*).

References

Barker, Randolph, Meyers, William H., Crisostomo, Cristina M., and Duff, Bart (1972), 'Employment and technological change in Philippine agriculture, *International Labour Review*, **August-September**, pp. 111-139.

Barraclough, Solon, and Affonso, Almino (1973), 'Diagnóstico de la reforma agraria chilena (Noviembre 1970-Junio 1972)', separada de la revista *Cuadernos de la Realidad Nacional*(CEREN), 16, **April**.

Chenery, Hollis, Ahluwalia, Montek S., Bell, C. L. G., Dulor, John H., and Jolly, Richard (1974), *Redistribution With Growth* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

Collier, William *et al.* (1973), 'Recent changes in rice harvesting methods', *Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies*, 9, **July**, pp. 36-45.

Das, Amritananda (1972), 'Understanding the green revolution', *Economic and Political Weekly*, **18 November**, pp. 2266-2267.

Díaz Cisnero, Heliodoro (1974), *An Institutional Analysis of a Rural Development Project: The Case of the Puebla Project in Mexico*, Ph.D. thesis (Madison: University of Wisconsin).

Dorner, Peter (1975), 'International assistance for agricultural development: new directions?' (Land Tenure Centre Paper No. 107, University of Wisconsin). A shorter version of this paper is published as 'International assistance for the small farmer', *Challenge*, **May-June**.

Dorner, Peter, and Thiesenhusen, William C. (1972), 'Latin American Rural Development Strategies for the 1970s', paper prepared at the request of the Organization of American States, **August**.

Frankel, Francine R. (1971), *India's Green Revolution: Economic Gains and Political Costs* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press).

Griffin, Keith (1972), *The Green Revolution: An Economic Analysis*, Report No. 72-76 (Geneva: UNRISD).

Haney, Emil (1971), 'Possibilities for the economic reorganization of *minifundia* in a Highland Region of Colombia', Land Tenure Centre Research Paper No. 43 (Madison: University of Wisconsin).

Horton, Douglas E. (1974), 'Land Reform and Reform Enterprises in Peru'. Report submitted to the Land Tenure Centre, University of Wisconsin, and to the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

Jackson, Don (1974), 'Communal Production Co-operatives: The Salvadorean Experience'. *Land Tenure Centre Newsletter*, 45, **July-September** (Madison: University of Wisconsin).

Krishna, Raj (1974), 'Unemployment in India' in Agricultural Development Council Teaching Forum, *Development Processes and Planning*, 38, **March**.

Kuznets, Simon (1974), *Population, Capital and Growth: Selected Essays* (London: Heinemann).

Lasbarria, C., Susana, and Havens, A. Eugene (1976), 'Agrarian structure, agrarian reform and Peru's "Revolution"' (mimeo), prepared for *Latin American Perspective*, special issue on Peru, Lima, **April**.

Lelyveld, Joseph (1975), 'McNamara's style at the World Bank', Business and Finance Section, *New York Times*, **30 November**.

Lopez, Pedro M., *et al.* (1968), *Exposición metódica y coordinada de la ley de reforma agraria de Chile* (Santiago: Editorial Jurídica de Chile).

McNamara, Robert S. (1975), Address to the Board of Governors, World Bank Group, Washington DC, 1 September.

Parsons, Kenneth H. (1969), 'Poverty as an issue in development policy: a comparison of United States and underdeveloped countries', *Land Economics*, 45, **February**.

Pearse, Andrew (1975), *The Latin American Peasant* (London: Cass).

Rochin, Refugio (1971), 'Dwarf wheat adoption by *barani* smallholders of Hazara district: technological change in action (Islamabad: Ford Foundation) (mimeo).

Saito, Kazuo (1971), 'On the green revolution'. *The Developing Economies*, **March**, pp. 16-30.

Shaplen, Robert (1976*a*), 'Letter from Manila', *New Yorker*, **3 May**.

Shaplen, Robert, (1976*b*), 'Letter from Sri Lanka', *New Yorker*, **13 September**.

Sinaga, Rudolf, and Collier, W. L., 'Social and regional implications of agricultural development policy'. Paper presented at the South East Asia Agricultural Economics Assiation meeting, Balikpapan, Indonesia, 3-4 November, 1975.

Soles, R. (1972), 'Rural Land Invasions in Colombia: A Study of the Macro- and Micro-conditions and Forces Leading to Present Unrest'. Ph.D. Dissertation, Chapter 4, App. 1, pp. 220-237 (Madison: University of Wisconsin).

Soles, Roger E. (1973), 'Agricultural credit in Latin America: persistent problems and potential promises', Land Tenure Centre Paper No. 96 (Madison: University of Wisconsin); reprinted from *AID Spring Review of Small Farmer Credit*, **16**, *Additional Papers*, no. SR116, **June**.

Soles, Roger E. (1974), 'Rural land invasions In Colombia', Land Tenure Centre Research Paper No. 59 (Madison: University of Wisconsin).

Thiesenhusen, William C. (1971), 'Latin America's employment problem', *Science*, **5 March**, pp. 868-874.

Thiesenhusen, William C. (1974*a*), 'What changing technology implies for agrarian reform', *Land Economics*, 50, **February**.

Thiesenhusen, William C. (1974*b*), 'El desarrollo agricola de América Latina en la mittad de la década del sesenta', *Desarrollo Rural en las Américas* (San José), 6 **(September-December)** pp. 44-62.

Thiesenhusen, William C. (1974c), 'Food and population growth', *Ekonomi dan Keuangan Indonesia* (Jakarta), 22, **September**, pp. 209-224.

Thiesenhusen, William C. (1975*a*), 'Development and equality: partners or rivals', *Solidarity* (Manila), 9, **(January-February)**, pp. 7-19.

Thiesenhusen, William C. (1975*b*), 'Population growth and agriculture', Paper delivered at the Seminar on Population Growth and Programme Change, International Union for the Scientific Study of Population, Liège, Belgium, at the Colegio de México, Mexico City, 15-17 December.

United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (1975), *1974 Report on the World Social Situation*, E/CN. 5/512/Rev. 1, St/E SA/24 (New York).

United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America (1975), 'Human development and social change, E/CEPAL/981, *Latin American Development and the International Economic Situation*, part 1, Chapter 1.

Wolfe, Marshall (1976), 'Poverty as a social phenomenon and as a central issue for development policy', ECLA/Draft/DS/133, Social Development Division (Santiago.

World Bank (1975), *Rural Development: Sector Policy Paper* (Washington DC)