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FINAL REPORT

THE FIFTH ANNUAL AID/W-FIELD
SAHEL PLANNING WORKSHOP
BAMAKO, MALI
10-14 APRIL 1978

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I. PREFACE

The Fifth Annual AID/W-Field Sahel Planning Workshop was held in Bamako, April 10-14, 1978, under the leadership of Mrs. Goler Butcher, Assistant Administrator for the Africa Bureau of USAID. Africa Bureau participants included appropriate members of her senior staff from Washington and the Directors from the eight Sahelian field posts.

We would particularly like to thank for their attendance and major contribution, Yaya Idrissa, Director, Projects and Planning Division, CILSS; Vernon Johnson, D/Assistant Secretary AF, Department of State; and Dr. George Wing and Tony Babb, Assistants to A/AID.

The hosts for the Workshop were Ambassador Patricia Byrne, whose hospitality, support and participation were notable; Ron Levin, Mission Director for Mali; and Mr. Levin's assistants, Kent Hickman, Larry Mich and Diane Cantwell.

II. INTRODUCTION

A. Background

This Workshop was scheduled at a critical point in the life of the Sahel Development Program.

The Club du Sahel had been in existence for two years, working under the following charter:

"THE CLUB WILL

- support the work of the CILSS;
- inform and sensitize the international community on Sahel development prospects and needs;
- foster increased cooperation among donors for the implementation of actions requested by Sahel governments and regional institutions and facilitate the mobilization of resources for development;
- provide a forum for Sahelian states to articulate their long-term development policies and priorities for medium- and long-term development, and to discuss them with potential donors;
- function as an informal and flexible discussion group following the principles of mutual confidence, equality, flexibility and consensus among its participants;
- meet at least once a year, set up working groups to explore specific issues."

The Club's Working Group and sectoral Working Teams had produced a "first generation" of development strategies and projects. The CILSS had been strengthened and was endeavoring to integrate its planning with national planning through CILSS national committees in each country. CILSS-donor meetings were starting to elicit donor support for the first generation projects. In the U.S., the Sahel Development Program Team had developed sectoral strategies and a number of funded regional projects.

At the same time, the program was being exposed to many critical questions: How much is new or truly regional in the first generation list of projects? How good and how realistic are the products of the Working Teams? Does the African capacity and will exist to implement such a complex planning process? How much real interest do other donors have in this integrated approach? Is there any way to manage a program of such extraordinary complexity? Is it possible to truly integrate regional and bilateral approaches? Sectoral

(II. Introduction, cont'd)

and inter-sectoral approaches? In the final analysis, isn't the SDP primarily a promotional concept, a means to attract greater donor support?

Before the Workshop, there were two events which were supportive of the Club/CILSS, SDP concept. These were a Comptroller General's Report to the Congress, recommending continuing U.S. support (see Appendix 4a), and a visit to AID/W and the Congress by Anne de Lattre, Executive Secretary to the Club, who pointed out the international significance of dependable U.S. support.

The pending move of David Shear, Director/SFWA, to another assignment was a major factor at the Workshop. As "the spiritual father of the SDP," as he was named by one of the Mission Directors, and as the prime mover in developing and managing the U.S. part of the SDP, his plans for departure highlighted the need for greater institutionalization of our efforts.

This need for finding institutional arrangements adequate to the managerial, political, technical and social complexity of the SDP was widely felt as evidenced by many suggestions for the agenda.

B. Workshop Process

This Workshop was managed differently from past workshops in two respects. Firstly, the agenda was prepared by the Geographic Field Offices on the first day of the meeting, working from a list of issues submitted in advance from Washington and from field posts. This ensured that their problems received priority attention. Secondly, field personnel and Washington personnel were seated in their own groups, to facilitate a strong dialogue between Washington and the field and thus help ensure that critical questions were dealt with.

As in past workshops, informal interaction was encouraged and the agenda was flexible.

III. Meeting Results

A. Summary

The Workshop provided a unique opportunity to determine and deal with major issues involved with the planning and implementation of the Sahel Development Program. In addition to Mrs. Butcher, AA/AFR, appropriate members of her Washington staff and of the eight field offices in the Sahel, the Workshop benefited from the participation of Yaya Idrissa, of CILSS; Vernon Johnson and Mark Eaton, of State; Patricia Byrne, U.S. Ambassador to Mali; and George Wing and Tony Babb, of the Administrators Office.

Issues for the Workshop were solicited in advance from AID/W and from the field. The agenda, however, was prepared by the Geographic Field Officers (GFOs) on the first day of the meeting. This ensured that their problems received priority attention.

The GFOs' most pressing need is for better integration of SDP program planning and implementation with their bilateral efforts. To meet this need, they proposed that the Sahel Development Program Team (SDPT) be moved from AID/W to the field and that it be put under their direction. They proposed creation of a Sahel Mission Directors Council (with a rotating chairman) to direct the SDPT as well as to make other appropriate policy decisions affecting the Sahel program.

A Draft Memorandum is being prepared in the field that will recommend the change and will address such critical questions as authorities and the role of REDSO/WA. It will be the main item of business at a Sahel Mission Directors' meeting in Dakar the week of 20 May 1978. While the final decision on the change is pending, potential locations for the SDPT will be assessed and premove planning will be started.

The field participants find that AID/W's project design requirements, as interpreted by the AID/W review groups, result in more detailed and time-consuming analysis than is justified by the basic data available and the ability to predict events, particularly when considering the unfolding nature of development projects in the Sahel. In some cases the detailed design information is provided just to satisfy review group requests with full knowledge that the implementation approach will be much more simple and pragmatic. A Guidance Memorandum to the review groups, that should ameliorate this problem, is being drafted.

The GFOs are very apprehensive about the full implementation of Joint Administrative Operations. Experience indicates that the Mission Directors will have little power to influence the JAO officers who report to the Ambassadors. In addition, elimination of the top administrative jobs from the AID organization will reduce career motivation for more junior AID administration personnel.

(A. Summary, cont'd)

Preliminary planning for the FY'80 program was discussed and each country program was reviewed individually with each Mission Director.

Several other issues were dealt with, as follows: a.) more flexible programming; b.) recruiting (French-language requirement); c.) recurrent costs policy; d.) pricing policy constraints in host countries; e.) absorptive capacity; f.) new infrastructure policies requirement. New and useful information was presented on a number of these issues. Many became the subject of "Action Items" calling for follow-up in specific time periods by named individuals.

At the close of the Workshop each participant received the agenda, a list of "Action Items," and other pertinent summary statements. A draft of the final report will be ready on 15 May.

The Workshop resulted in coalescing many informed views into a coherent plan for the next steps regarding U.S. participation in the Sahel Development Program.

B. Washington Overview

The Congressional Committees are showing a very positive interest in the SDP and will support budget increases where justified. They object to the use of the two budget categories, regular and SDP, and would like next year's request to be incorporated into a single category (SDP). The GAO started its recent study somewhat skeptical of the SDP, but as its investigations progressed this turned into positive support. Its recommendations are helpful and are summarized in Appendix 4a.

During Anne De Lattre's and Art Fell's recent visit in Washington they found very positive support for the program, both in Congress and in the Executive Branch.

It would be helpful to the program if the Mission Directors would brief these offices, as well as Voice of America, on program progress during their visits in Washington. Mission Directors' views on three related areas would also be helpful to AID relations with these offices. These are: 1.) a human rights policy statement for the Sahelian countries. (Mrs. Butcher has asked Princeton Lyman* to draft a guidance paper for comment); 2.) a vivid description on what it means to undertake the development process in the Sahel, which includes some of the world's least developed countries; 3.) what are the U.S. interests in the development of these countries? Mission Directors were requested to send their thoughts regarding these three areas to Mrs. Butcher.

International support of the Club is growing, as evidenced by OPEC funding in Chad, Canadian staff additions to the Secretariat, and increased funding by both the Dutch and West Germans.

Governor Gilligan strongly supports the Humphrey Bill, which would create an independent development agency whose head would have cabinet status. The bill capitalizes on the best AID practice and experience.

Joint administrative operations for the field posts (AID and State) have been agreed to between Governor Gilligan and Mr. Vance. George Wing's survey of eleven posts throughout the world indicated that most of those operating under JAO have no major problems. Workshop participants were quite apprehensive, however, relative to implementation in most of the Sahelian countries. The Mission Directors feel that if JAO is implemented in their countries they should have a significant input to the selection and to the PER of the JAO officer. They think he should be at least FS3 and that there should be a compulsory annual management audit. They also feel that elimination of this top job from the AID organization in the countries will result in reduced motivation for younger AID management officers.

ACTION ITEM 1: Cable Director/SER re Workshop views on JAOs. (Done)

* USAID Director, Ethiopia.

(B. Washington Overview, cont'd)

The reorganization of AID under Governor Gilligan started 20 June 1977. The basic purpose is to make the Washington structure more responsive in the way it deals with the field. Changes will be made in three categories:

1. Structure: Program functions have been moved out of SER into DSB and it has been specified that DSB give first priority to field requests. A Private Development Cooperation Bureau is being created.
2. Personnel System: A new director is on board and a new plan to overcome system deficiencies has been prepared. The Obey bill will facilitate planned improvements. (Tony Babb hosted a special session for those interested in further discussion of the new personnel system.)

*ACTION ITEM 2: For those parts of the personnel reorganization which impact field, the field should be consulted before final decision is made. (Babb)**

3. Programming Process: This is being studied with a view toward reducing time between PID submittal and project "ground breaking." *The Mission Directors feel that excessive design specificity is required by Washington and this not only takes unwarranted time to prepare and review, but also misleads reviewers into thinking that more knowledge exists than actually does.*

* Name or office in parentheses indicates responsibility.

C. Integration of SDP Planning and Implementation

a. CILSS

Mr. Yaya Idrissa, Director of Projects and Planning Division, CILSS, addressed the workshop on the role being played by CILSS.* He also asked the Workshop for appraisal and guidance on the role. It was agreed that energizing the CILSS national committees is a priority objective. Mr. Idrissa requested that the U.S. take the lead in getting this done, with respect to both the in-country donor representatives and the host country ministries. It was also felt by some of the field officers that CILSS should request that the Club take a stronger role in implementing the national committees, and that it request the countries to name their national committee members.

Field officers find that their host countries give relatively low priorities to the CILSS list of first generation projects in comparison to those for which they deal directly with the donors. Mr. Idrissa requested that the U.S. strengthen the planning stature of CILSS by taking into account the CILSS prioritization.

*** ACTION ITEM 8: There should be a continuing U.S. effort to sensitize donors to the CILSS role and to support prospective host country national committees. (GFOs)*

ACTION ITEM 9: In national planning and programming, seek greater coordination with CILSS program in pursuing our bilateral programs. (GFOs)

Field officers should use initiative in bending the first generation project designs to re-orient them toward the evolving Club sectoral strategies.

The CILSS is aware of the need for a tracking system and has agreed with the Club to start a study. The national committees will be an important link in the resulting system.

b. Regional Projects

Many of the field officers have felt that SDP regional projects have been identified and designed without adequate involvement of the field missions. This process has led to some possible duplication of effort and some potential embarrassment in bilateral relationships. The integrated pest

* A transcript of Mr. Idrissa's extemporaneous address is included as Appendix 4b.

** Action Item numbering is the same as was used for the list distributed at the Workshop, so some appear in this text out of sequence.

(C. Integration of SDP Planning and Implementation, cont'd.)

management project was used as an example of a regional project that overlaps a bilateral project being developed in Mali. The Mali Mission Director received no adequate presentation of the IPM and did not have staff to find it in the various information materials sent him by the SDPT. The possibilities for overlap were understood in AID/W and were provided for by inclusion of suitable conditions precedent, in the Project Paper

The Sahel training project PID was sent directly to AID/W from Abidjan and was approved without any Sahel field officer approval. Those who did see it had problems with it.

ACTION ITEM 10: Look into strengthening Sahelian institutional capacity PID on return to D.C. (Cable GFOs from AID/W responding to concerns expressed after their review of PID) (SDPT-REDSO)

A health contractor has been engaged to come to Mali and design a project that had not been agreed upon with the Mission. The Mali Mission Director has complained, by cable.

**ACTION ITEM (a.): GFOs should "bite the bullet" and refuse country entry through their AID/W Desk Officers until satisfied with such visits.*

The field officers feel that they should sign off at each stage of project documentation and at that time have the opportunity to review the project with host country ministries.

ACTION ITEM 6: Field be in concurrence process of each regional project affecting their country. (SDPT)

ACTION ITEM 7: Get SDPT people out to field for discussions at early stage of project idea, at all posts. (SDPT/SFWA)

The strategy materials turned out by the working teams are too voluminous to be used as guidance by the missions. Digests are needed for all sectors, similar to the ones done recently for health, rural roads, and ecology and forestry.

c. AID/W, GFO, SDPT Roles and Relationships

Dave Shear and several members of the SDP Team will be leaving for other assignments within the next few months. These changes, together with the maturing of the Club's work, the strengthening of CILSS, and the GFOs' feelings of not being entirely included in planning and programming, caused the issue of integration of SDP planning and implementation to be the GFOs' top priority issue. Also, the "chasm" between DR and the Desks causes problems for the field.

* This Action Item was stated by Mrs. Goler Butcher, but was not included in the list distributed at the Workshop.

(C. Integration of SDP Planning and Implementation, cont'd)

ACTION ITEM 4: Desks and OICs be given more importance -- have D.O. and DR rep. in same office for each field office. (AA/AFR)

ACTION ITEM 5: Consider assigning limited number of technicians from DR to SFWA. (AA/AFR)

The SDPT had prepared a list of the functions that it thinks the Team should continue (Appendix 4e). These were discussed and there was no disagreement on the importance of the functions.

Art Fell presented a list of the purposes of the Club (Appendix 4d).

A call to revolution was issued by Bob Klein, who suggested that when Dave Shear leaves, the locus of power should shift and the GFOs should take over the SFWA job and manage it through a board of directors (SMDC*), with a rotating chairmanship. Shift the SDPT to the field. Eliminate DR. Do project design and approval in the field. DP should remain a part of AFR, to help the assistant administrator manage allocations and budgets. It was recommended that all functions now being performed in AID/W be looked at for possible transfer to the field.

After separate AID/W and field meetings on this issue (and proposal), both groups reported in favor of moving the SDPT to the field, and in favor of transferring more authorities to the field. The outlines of the two proposals are shown in Appendix 4f and g.

While both groups were in general agreement on moving the SDPT to the field, and delegating more authorities to the field, there were many reservations, issues to be studied and suggestions offered, as follows:

- SDPT to include 10 people
- SDPT leader to be executive secretary to SMDC
- SDPT leader to be CILSS contact through liaison person
- SMDC to do the ABS and handle regional projects
- SDPT to recommend regional project allocations
- Sahel mark to come from AID/W

*Sahel Mission Directors Council

(C. Integration of SDP Planning and Implementation, cont'd)

- SDPT in the field would take on a life and direction of its own
- Main problem with SDPT has been communication. Could this be better resolved if SDPT is located in the field or in AID/W?
- SMDC make decisions on U.S. positions and attendance at Club and Working Group meetings
- An OIC would be needed in SFWA for SDP affairs
- Weakness of the SMDC would be the common faults of committees and lack of efficiency
- SDPT leader would have a direct line of communication with AA/AFR
- Will SMDC turn out like MDCC?* (MDCC became ineffective due to nationalism.)
- SDP much more indiginized than ROCAP**
- Research and studies budgets and projects should be controlled by SMDC
- Major obstacle would be finding qualified people willing to move to the field and travel extensively among Sahelian countries
- SDPT is more efficient in AID/W, due to access to reproduction facilities, good communications, and contractors
- Is this just a power play by the field, or will a substantive improvement result?
- GFOs have shown no regional-mindedness. What will happen to regional orientation of the SDP?
- Let's have the difficult questions now, not after the change is accomplished
- SDP evaluation plan is needed. It would be a joint, AID/field responsibility

* Mission Directors' Coordinating Committee (Central America)

** Regional Office for Central America and Panama

(C. Integration of SDP Planning and Implementation, cont'd)

- How much will the move cost?
- Extra costs could be reduced if seven REDSO planning positions were used for the SDPT.
- Moving the SDPT to the field is an enormous step since it gets it out of the Washington psychology

In summary, the strength of the SDP is in the centralized strategy and coordination approach, which has strong support in the Congress, has unified the donors, and has strengthened a Sahelian planning institution (CILSS). The features that provide the strength are those that also supply the principal weakness, which is the difficulty of coordinating the generated information and actions appropriately among the various organizational entities.

CONTRACTOR'S COMMENT: The involved parties must be constantly thinking and acting in ways to resolve the very complicated and interactive aspects of communications, relationships and substantive problems.

Certain functions must be performed in a consistent and continuous way in conjunction with the international strategy activities -- Club, Secretariat, CILSS, Working Teams, other donors' headquarters units. U.S. "going in" positions must be synthesized and cleared appropriately before the international meetings occur and results must be conveyed, in the appropriate level of detail, to the U.S. entities involved, i.e., GFOs, AID/W, other Government Agencies, Congressional Staffs.

These functions also include preparation of development goals, strategies, and policies, as well as donor coordination on documentation and funding policies, host country coordination, development analysis, data collection, research, and policy determination.

Discrete institutions and organizations are needed to implement many of these functions.

A management scheme and an information and tracking system are required to institutionalize information circulation and to provide for accountability.

While these things are required, the act of creation of the organizations, systems, and schemes will not ensure that they function -- it is necessary that all levels work to surface issues and problems promptly and that these be resolved promptly, either by the joint overcoming of the obstacles or by changing the path or the objectives. This attention to problem surfacing and solving, while not necessarily the favorite use of time for the people involved, must be diligently attended at all levels.

(C. Integration of SDP Planning and Implementation, cont'd)

The jobs of the Managers and Directors are to make certain the system works, and that the job gets done properly. This requires definition of roles for the people in the system, goal setting, provision of needed resources and changes when needed, and a system of accountability in which accomplishment is recognized and rewarded and corrective actions are instituted promptly where objectives are not accomplished.

At this point it was suggested that the SDPT be moved to the field, to better serve its function.

ACTION ITEM 11: Present to AA/AFR an action memorandum recommending a decision to move the SDPT to the field, where it will report to a "Sahel Mission Directors' Committee" (SMDC)

This memorandum is to be prepared by "ardent protagonists," and accompanied by statements of divergent views prepared by the persons holding them, within a reasonable time.

The action memorandum must address critical questions of authority, and the REDSO role.

It is noted that a decision on this matter is urgent for SDPT and REDSO planning.

*Initial action: Jay Johnson, John Hoskins
Draft to field - 15 May
Mission Directors' meeting in Dakar,
to consider -- 20-25 May*

D. FY'80 Planning

FY'80 ABS instructions were passed out and a preliminary idea of country marks (omitted here due to sensitivity) was presented. Zero-based budgeting will be used, involving three budget levels. A decision overview narrative is required for each budget level. The CDSS* can serve as the basis for the narrative.

Budget marks presented include OPG and family planning, but not AIP.

OPG, AIP and project design budgets should show in field submittals.

The AA/AFR agreed that the field will be consulted before any budgets are cut in the future, unless time pressure makes it unavoidable -- then there will be an explanation.

Individual program review meetings were conducted among each GFO, AA/AFR, Director/SFWA and others as appropriate.

Livestock Sector

Livestock donor meetings will be held 25-26 April, in Paris. The field was solicited for attendees. Sector strategy was discussed by the SDPT sector specialist. The strategy is basically a 3-year foundation program that will lead to production projects. Sahelians favor animal health for early projects, while the U.S. also places strong emphasis on user pricing of animal health services and development of more useful marketing policies. A livestock paper has been issued and discussed with all the GFOs by the livestock sector specialist.

Transport Sector

The transport donor meeting will also be held in Paris, on 27-28 April. A sector paper has been circulated to Sahelian field posts for comment prior to the donor meetings, and a transport team traveled to the posts in March. The strategy concentrates on road maintenance, road rehabilitation, and rural roads. There has been very little response from the field, due to the lack of transport specialists at the posts.

The sector specialist feels that countries should be looking at the largest rural roads projects with which they would feel comfortable.

Constraints for road projects have been that U.S. policies in the past have de-emphasized infrastructure investments and one of the major donors, the World Bank, has insisted on a rigorous host country contributions policy.

ACTION ITEM 12: Infrastructure. Washington will provide guidance to the field as to the specific views needed from them with respect to its FY'81 infrastructure plans. (SFWA to field -- 7/1)

* Country Development Strategy Statement

(D. FY'80 Planning, cont'd)

ACTION ITEM 13: AID management move on a more flexible World Bank policy re host country contribution. (SFWA in cooperation with IIA -- 30 days.) Memo to IIA from Director, Mali. Clear statement of problem and impact. Telegram to Washington and other GFOs -- 1 week.

E. Other Issues

a. Pricing Policies

Most of the field officers, as well as the SDPT sector specialists, find that one of the major problems to be overcome in developing greater food production in the Sahel is that prices paid to farmers are kept too low by government policies. It is felt by most of the sectoral specialists that the Sahelian farmers have the entrepreneurial zeal and resource to produce more, if the incentives were better.

A paper on the status of the Club's position on pricing policies (see Appendix 6, Papers Listing) was prepared for the meeting. Additional studies are being pursued by Eliot Berg and CRED. The field officers find that host country ministers understand the issues, but can't deal with them politically.

The Malian Government is hopefully awaiting results from a promised IMF study, the objective of which is to show how to manage a developing economy which includes proper price incentives, as well as price controls.

The pricing policies issues will be on the November Club meeting agenda.

ACTION ITEM 14: Pricing policy. We should pursue with other donors as planned, but at the same time pursue alternative solutions. (SFWA -- status in 60 days)

b. Recurrent Costs

It was agreed generally that these "poorest of the poor" Sahelian countries may require many years before being able to fully cover their recurrent costs. Continued full donor financing of recurrent costs, however, may nurture bad economic judgments which would keep the countries in a continuing state of dependency.

The governments should be finding ways to turn the increasing production, brought about by development, into government revenues. Most of the governments find it politically easier to give away most services than to charge for them. Some of the governments feel that the high dams are the only projects that will generate sufficient revenues to allow the covering of recurrent costs.

This issue has been dealt with before, with some success, in Tanzania and in the L.A. Bureau.

A statement of the U.S. position and plan relative to the recurrent costs in Sahelian programs is needed.

(E. Other Issues, cont'd)

ACTION ITEM 16: Recurrent costs. SFWA should prepare for AA/AFR an action paper. (SFWA -- 90 days). (See A. Rollins note for input.) (Will be field input and comment on draft policy.)*

The GFOs have been asked to highlight recurrent costs implications in their 1978 Project Papers.

c. Evaluation

The PAR system has degenerated to the point that it is no longer considered useful. An evaluation schedule is submitted with the ABS, but no one follows it. It is generally agreed that USAID is lacking a suitable system. A properly designed and implemented system is a key prerequisite for effective redesign of development projects.

The CILSS has asked the Club for help on an evaluation system.

ACTION ITEM 15: An evaluation system and schedule should be implemented for the SDP and at the same time we should actively support the Club/CILSS in doing likewise. (SFWA -- status in 90 days)

d. Infrastructure Policies

Infrastructure is almost totally lacking throughout most Sahelian countries, excepting in the capitals. It is clear that certain infrastructure is required if the Congressional Mandate is to be carried out. Without rural roads, health facilities, communications, and provision for energy distribution, the rural majority would have little opportunity to profit from development unless they migrate to the cities.

There is a danger in including questionably allowable infrastructure projects in the ABS since rejection would result in budget reduction rather than allowing substitution of alternative projects. Such projects should be included only as supplemental to the basic levels until clearer guidance is available.

ACTION ITEM 12: Infrastructure. Washington will provide guidance to the field as to the specific views needed from them with respect to their FY'81 infrastructure plans. (SFWA to field -- 7/1)

e. Recruiting

The reorganization team is working on a plan to enter people into FSI for language training before they are needed in the field.

*A. Rollins note: AA/AFR should request from the Administrator of AID a policy determination that, in the Sahel, Missions can begin to plan: 1.) long-term support for recurrent costs beyond the normal 3-5 year life of project for individual projects; 2.) sectoral programs covering budget support/recurrent costs where such programs directly support U.S. policy objectives in the sector.

(E. Other Issues, cont'd)

Seventeen French-language trained people have been assigned to the field recently and EMS has fifteen more language-qualified applicants.

f. More Flexible Programming

The PPC representative did not feel that his organization would favor program funding, but might approve of sector funding. DP is preparing a guidance paper relative to the use of the various funding instruments, both loan and grant type.

ACTION ITEM 3: Flexible programming. Papers be prepared for field and others on sector programming. SDRs and similar areas. (Tate, DP -- 60 days)

g. Pipeline Analysis and Project Reporting

Since explanations of large pipelines are difficult and large pipelines lead to OYB cuts, the Chad Mission was asked for a detailed analysis of its pipeline. The resulting analysis included all accrued expenses and was found to be very useful to the project managers in revealing project weaknesses. The analysis proved to be much more thorough and useful than that provided by the U203 report. The Chad Mission considers it useful enough to justify doing it quarterly. It also provides the information needed in Washington by the Desk, to defend Chad's OYB, as well as to provide information for progress reporting.

ACTION ITEM 19: Implementation status monitoring. Send Chad pipeline analysis report to GFOs. GFOs indicate if they want to prepare and use such reports in the future. If not, why, and suggest an alternative method of project reporting. (Washington requires system for communicating the status of projects.) (G. MacArthur -- 1 May)

h. Peace Corps Interest

Bob McAlister described the interest of the Peace Corps in the programming areas of basic human needs -- village level, health education, wells, roles of women, and ecology and forests. He would like the Peace Corps to be involved in the programming process, starting with the identification phase. GFOs were encouraged to involve local Peace Corps people. AA/AFR has agreed to allow Peace Corps access to the PIDs as they come in.

i. Documentation Complexity

The AID documentation and review processes involve excessive and unwarranted specificity and lead to wasteful practices. Levels of detail are called for that are beyond reasonable capabilities to analyze or forecast. This causes expensive teams to be fielded to do final and detailed designs for projects that ultimately must evolve and grow by trial and error from an initial low

(E. Other Issues, cont'd)

level intervention. The GFOs were encouraged to submit their ideas for a pilot project approach to the reorganization committee which is studying the programming process (as noted in the Washington Overview section).

GFOs' feel that the basic nature of the Washington bureaucracy causes a call for too much specificity during review. It is bureaucratically easier to ask for more information than to render a controversial approval.

Efficiency would be enhanced if there were continuity of personnel through the programming process. Frequently, different people sit in the consecutive reviews of a project and different contractors are used at the successive stages. The reorganization committee is considering ways to improve continuity.

Field officers' opinions of the AID documentation process are included in Appendix 4c.

ACTION ITEM 17: REDSO assume responsibility for obtaining field inputs into changes in the design and review process and direct to DR. (Miller -- 45 days)

ACTION ITEM 18: Guidance from AA/AFR to those involved in the review process that it is unrealistic to hold many of the Sahel projects to the detail normally requested. (SFWA/Shear/DR -- 45 days) (See Coulter's typed version)

F. Critique

- a.) It was generally felt that field control of the agenda was beneficial and ensured that top priority issues for the field were dealt with.
- b.) Earlier transmittal of pre-agenda would aid field planning for workshop.
- c.) Less cluttered agenda than in past workshops resulted in more thoughtful treatment of priority issues.
- d.) Open discussions were excellent.
- e.) Seating arrangement was awkward (some people couldn't see each other due to a large post in the middle of the room).
- f.) In future, segregate substance items from process insofar as possible.
- g.) The effectiveness of the follow-up on Workshop Action Items has varied for past workshops. The field people requested that a more formal follow-up system be instituted for this Workshop, with 60-day status reports.

IV. CONTRACTOR RECOMMENDATIONS

We want to comment on the Workshop proposal to move the SDPT to the field, under the "Sahel Mission Directors' Council."

We like the proposal as a means of focusing responsibility for the SDP in the field. Particularly with Dave Shear's leaving, the success of the SDP will probably depend more on the Mission Directors than any other group, hence the responsibility should be there, too.

We like the proposal as a means of attacking the issue of regional versus bilateral emphasis. Each member of the SMDC will need to learn to wear two hats (total program and individual country), much like the top management team of a company.

We feel the proposal would release a lot of positive energy and ideas among the Mission Directors, which would not be likely to happen if they had a senior SDP chief in Washington or the field.

The question is, how successfully will the arrangement work? We think there are three principal issues:

1. Whether the Directors have the commitment, and the ability to work together
2. Accountability of the SMDC, and
3. The qualifications of the head of the SDPT.

With respect to item 1., we think this is an assessment the Directors should make among themselves, prior to accepting the responsibility. What would be involved would be a meeting of approximately three days, in which they would examine:

- the details of how they would work together
- what each wants and doesn't want from the arrangement
- what reservations each has about working with each of the others
- what problems they can anticipate and how they will deal with them
- who they will select as chairman for the first time period
- how they will monitor their performance as a "Board of Directors."

With respect to item 2., we think AA/AFR should work with the SMDC by using a Management by Objectives system in which goals are agreed on and progress reviewed regularly, probably quarterly.

(IV. Contractor Recommendations, cont'd)

With respect to item 3., we believe the head of the SDPT should be junior to the SMDC and receive his PER from them. He/she should be outstandingly talented, energetic, direct, and diplomatic.

The issue of the SMDC is not success or failure but degree of success or failure. In our opinion it should be tried if the field commitment exists. It is unlikely that its failures will be as significant as the learning and motivational gains. If it doesn't work, the Directors themselves will be ready for a change.

APPENDIX 1
Action Items

14 April 1978

ACTION ITEMS
5th Sahel Planning Workshop

1. Cable Director/SER, re Workshop views on JAOs. (Done)
2. For those parts of the personnel reorganization which impact field, the field should be consulted before final decision is made. (Babb)
3. Flexible programming: Papers be prepared for field and others on sector programming, SDRs and similar areas. (Tate, DP - 60 days)
4. Desks and OICs be given more importance -- have D.O. and DR representative in same office for each field office. (AA/AFR)
5. Consider assigning limited number of technicians from DR to SFWA. (AA/AFR)
6. Field be in concurrence process of each regional project affecting its country. (SDPT)
7. Get SDPT people out to field for discussions at early stage of project idea, at all posts. (SDPT/SFWA)
8. There should be a continuing U.S. effort to sensitize donors to the CILSS role and to support respective host country national committees (GFOs)
9. In national planning and programming, seek greater coordination with CILSS program in pursuing our bilateral programs. (GFOs)
10. Look into strengthening Sahelian institution capacity PID on return to D.C. (Cable GFOs from AID/W responding to concerns expressed after their review of PID) (SDPT-REDSO)
11. Present to AA/AFR an action memorandum recommending a decision to move the SDPT to the field, where it will report to a "Sahel Mission Directors' Committee." (SMDC)

This memorandum is to be prepared by "ardent protagonists" and accompanied by statements of divergent views prepared by the persons holding them, within a reasonable time.

The action memorandum must address critical questions of authority, and the REDSO role.

It is noted that a decision on this matter is urgent for SDPT and REDSO planning.

Initial action: Jay Johnson, John Hoskins
Draft to field -- 15 May
Mission Directors' meeting in Dakar,
to consider -- 20-25 May

12. Infrastructure: Washington will provide guidance to field as to the specific views needed from them with respect to their FY'81 infrastructure plans. (SFWA to field -- 7/1)
13. AID Management move on a more flexible World Bank policy re host country contribution. (SFWA in cooperation with IIA -- 30 days)
Memo to IIA from Director, Mali, clear statement of problem and impact. Telegram to Washington and other GFOs. (1 week)
14. Price policy: We should pursue with other donors as planned, but at the same time pursue alternative solutions. (SFWA -- status in 30 days)
15. An evaluation system and schedule should be implemented for the SDP and at the same time we should actively support the Club/CILSS in doing likewise. (SFWA -- status in 90 days)
16. Recurrent cost: SFWA should prepare for AA/AFR an action paper. (SFWA-- 90 days) (See A. Rollins's note as input*) (Will be field input and comment on draft policy.)
17. REDSO assume responsibility for obtaining field inputs into changes in the design and review process and direct to DR. (Miller -- 45 days)
18. Guidance from AA/AFR to those involved in the review process, that it is unrealistic to hold many of the Sahel projects to the detail normally requested. (SFWA/Shear/DR -- 45 days) (See Coulter's typed version)
19. Implementation status monitoring. Send Chad pipeline analysis report to GFOs. GFOs indicate if they want to prepare and use such reports in the future. If not, why, and suggest an alternative method of project reporting. (Washington requires system for communicating the status of projects.) (G. MacArthur -- 1 May)
 - a. GFOs should "bite the bullet" and refuse country entry through their AID/W Desk Officers until satisfied with such visits. (This Action Item was stated by Mrs. Goler Butcher, but was not included in the list distributed at the Workshop)

*Note, A Rollins: AA/AFR should request from the Administrator of AID a policy determination that, in the Sahel, Missions can begin to plan: 1.) long-term support for recurrent costs beyond the normal 3-5 year life of project for individual projects; and 2.) sectoral programs covering budget support/recurrent costs, where such programs directly support U.S. policy objectives in the sector.

Fifth AID/W-Field Sahel Planning Workshop

11 April 1978

AGENDA CONTENTS

Introductory Remarks - Ambassador Byrne

- I. Washington Overview
 - A. Butcher/Shear
(include future funding prospects, Humphrey Bill status)
 - B. Wing -- comments including status of JAO policy
 - C. Babb -- comments
- II. Integration of SDP Planning and Implementation
 - A. Club/CILSS and CILSS national committees; roles
(Relations with field, others)
 - B. Other donors -- headquarters offices and field offices
 - C. AID/W-field: SDPT role and location; SFWA configurations, responsiveness of desks and control of field workload, DSB, RA/REDSO, regional projects, CP responsibilities.
 - D. Donor meetings
 - E. Alternate planning and implementation models -- status?
 - F. Project planning design and implementation under new arrangements
 - G. More flexible programming
- III. FY'80 Planning
 - A. General guidelines, including all allocations (CDSS, ABS)
 - B. Meaning of country and regional marks
 - C. Procedures to be used in reallocation
 - D. Individual discussions of country programs
- IV. Other Issues
 - A. Recruiting -- French speakers

APPENDIX 2
Agenda Contents, cont'd.

- B. Personal services contracts (policy?)
 - C. Clarify delegations to missions
 - D. Recurrent costs -- policy?
 - E. Pricing policies in host country (a constraint)
 - F. Absorptive capacity
 - G. Infrastructure policy -- loans and grants
- V. Workshop Wind-up
- A. Issues action plans
 - B. Workshop follow-up plans
 - C. Critiques

SCHEDULE

Monday, 10 April	Start 12 noon Close 5:30 p.m.	Field officers only Afternoon meeting
Tuesday, 11 April	Start 8:30 a.m. Close 12 noon Start 2:00 p.m. Close 5:30 p.m.	Full attendance " "
Wednesday, 12 April	Start 8:30 a.m. Close 12 noon Start 2:00 p.m. Close 5:30 p.m.	" "
Thursday, 13 April	Start 8:30 a.m. Close 12 noon Start 2:30 p.m.	" Program discussions GFOs and Washington -- USAID office
Friday, 14 April	Start 8:30 a.m. 12 noon 2:00 p.m. 3:20 p.m.	Close Workshop BIFAD presentation -- Hotel Institut de Sahel -- Institut

APPENDIX 3
Workshop Participants

PARTICIPANTS
FIFTH SFWA-FIELD PLANNING WORKSHOP
BAMAKO -- APRIL 10-14, 1978

Tony Babb	Assistant to A/AID
Douglas Broome	A00/Banjul
Goler T. Butcher	AA/AFR
Patricia Byrne	U.S. Ambassador to Mali
Robert Carmody	BIFAD
Peter Cook	SDPT
Carey Coulter	USAID/Ouagadougou
Mark Eaton	AF/W
Arthur Fell	Club Secretariat
Jack Fordyce	Action Programs International
Harold Gray	AFR/SFWA
Howard Helman	SDPT
John Hoskins	DIR/Ouagadougou
Yaya Idrissa	Dir. Projects & Planning Div., CILSS
Jay Johnson	DIR/Niamey
Vernon Johnson	D/Asst. Secretary, AF, Dept. of State
Robert Klein	DIR/Nouakchott
John Koehring	DIR/Yaounde
Ronald Levin	DIR/Bamako
John Lundgren	DIR/N'Djamena
Owen Lustig	AFR/SFWA
Robert McAlister	Peace Corps/W
Gordon MacArthur	AFR/SFWA
James Maher	CDO/Bissau
Jonathan McCabe	AFR/DR
Howard McFarland	Action Programs International
Ellen Méhu	AFR/SFWA
Donald Miller	REDSO/WA
Raymond Odom	AFR/EMS
Anilee Rollins	AFR/SFWA/SDP
Norman Schoonover	DIR/Dakar
Howard Sharlach	PPC
David Shear	DIR/AFR/SFWA
Walter Sherwin	USAID/Niamey
Glenn Slocum	OMVS/Dakar
Wayne Tate	AFR/DP
Lowell Watts	BIFAD
George Wing	Asst. to A/AID

APPENDIX 4a
Workshop Papers
Comptroller General's Report to the Congress
March 24, 1978

COMPTROLLER GENERAL'S REPORT TO THE CONGRESS

The Sahel Development Program -- Progress and Constraints

DIGEST

The great drought and famine of 1968 to 1973 that crippled a vast area of central and western Africa -- a region generally referred to as the Sahel -- is over. Yet food shortages still persist and the region continues to be in great need of external assistance. The region includes some of the most impoverished of the poor countries of the world.

To alleviate the human suffering during the drought, the international community provided a massive relief effort. The United States' share amounted to about \$200 million in food and other emergency assistance.

Efforts are underway to help these countries -- Chad, The Gambia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, Upper Volta, and the Cape Verde Islands -- repair the drought-caused damage and establish some measure of food self-sufficiency and economic improvement.

The Agency for International Development is authorized to participate in a long-term development program supported by several countries and international organizations in consultation and planning with the Sahelian countries. The Congress has initially authorized \$200 million of which \$50 million is appropriated to finance Agency efforts beginning in fiscal year 1978 for long-term development in the Sahel.

The Sahel countries and international members recognize the usefulness of coordinated planning and development. This belief led to forming the Club du Sahel, an organization to undertake an overall development strategy and plan for the region. It consists of the Sahelian countries, the donor community, and the major international development institutions.

This report outlines the progress made by the Club. It examines remaining problems and the status of United States' participation in the overall development process.

The Club and the Sahel Development Program, while still in their early stages, provide a unique and worthy approach to addressing the Sahel's development constraints. There are still issues and problems which must be confronted to meet the long-term objectives of the program. However, the progress made to date for implementing the overall concept indicates that the program deserves continuing United States support.

Through its planning teams the Club established a consensus about the region's overall development and the general strategy to be pursued. Its principal goal is developing a mutually agreed upon plan of action, includ-

ing (1) a sense of priorities by development sectors, (2) a time frame for program implementation, and (3) measures to be undertaken by all the parties involved. Its goal has not yet been fulfilled.

Additional work is needed to establish a management system to (1) provide overall information on program direction and procedures to monitor project implementation and (2) review financial management and evaluate program/project performance. (See pp. 16 to 17.)

The Sahel Development Program, announced and approved at the May to June 1977 meeting of the Club, in Ottawa, is a useful first step. Many issues such as export potential, pricing policy, and land-use management, have yet to be adequately considered. Attention must be given to these shortfalls and to establishing an overall plan of how the development problems will be solved. (See pp. 26 to 27.)

A number of solutions for managing Sahel development have been presented, and it is generally recognized that the programs/projects for the Sahel should be implemented by the present national and regional development institutes. Yet, there is a need to define the (1) interrelationships among all the organizations involved and (2) procedures to be followed to coordinate donor activities and the program activities being carried out. (See p. 28.)

While the amount of economic assistance is increasing, there is much concern about the ability of the Sahelian countries to use this available assistance effectively. Constraints to effective development include:

- the absence of enough locally trained administrative and technical personnel;
- limited internal sources to finance local costs of development;
- many physical infrastructure weaknesses, such as ports, roads, and transport facilities.

Attempts to resolve these problems are underway. While these efforts are being made, the Agency should ensure that new development funding will not be dissipated because recipient countries may not be able to use this aid effectively. (See pp. 46 to 47.)

The United States is attempting to formulate its participation in the Sahel development by supporting strategies established and recommended by the Club. The Agency's current and proposed projects generally are consistent with Club strategy. It is too early to tell whether they are fully integrated with the overall program since a full range of project proposals has not yet proved useful in form and substance to Agency programmers.

Also, the Agency is uncertain of the degree to which it should help finance some of the infrastructure projects necessary to effective development in the Sahel. (See pp. 52 to 53.)

ANNEX 4a
Workshop Papers
Comptroller General's Report to the Congress (cont'd)

Many of the Sahel's development problems have been intensively studied and researched. Yet, some efforts have not been productive because they were too general and not project oriented. More work is needed to avoid unnecessary study and research and to be sure that more effective use is made of funds available. (See p. 59.)

In another review,¹ GAO assessed the extent to which those drafting development plans for Sahei were considering the impact population growth would have on achieving development goals. Concluding that planners had not adequately considered this important issue, GAO made a number of recommendations for action.

GAO recognizes the complexity of the development effort underway in the Sahel. Effective implementation of the development strategy will require the coordination and cooperation of all the Sahelian countries and of the participating donor nations and development institutions. Accordingly, GAO recommends that the Administrator, Agency for International Development, continuing to support and exercise United States leadership in the Club development program and working with other donors and the Sahelian nations, take the following measures to improve the programming and implementing of the ongoing development activities in the Sahel:

- A management system should be established for disseminating essential data about ongoing development activities and providing for the review and evaluation of Club-sponsored programs and projects. (See p. 17.)
- The Club's development program should be supplemented with (1) an analysis of development problems and policy issues not yet explicitly addressed, (2) a method of identifying and giving priorities to projects with the greatest potential development, and (3) an annual work plan setting forth short- and long-term actions to be taken. (See p. 27.)
- An overall management plan should be developed outlining the management for the Sahel development program; national and regional development planning and management capabilities should be strengthened and development coordination in the region should be improved. (See p. 16.)
- Action should be taken on the region's training shortfall, and its financial inability to pay the local and recurrent investment costs of development projects. (See pp. 46 to 47.)
- A special effort should be made to determine that the Agency's projects are consistent with the Sahel development strategy and effectively complement it and the development efforts of other participants. (See p. 54.)

1. "Influencing Fertility Through Social and Economic Change in Developing Countries," ID-78-6.

APPENDIX 4a
Workshop Papers
Comptroller General's Report to the Congress (cont'd)

The Agency should inform the Congress (1) of the amount and type of infrastructure contemplated under the overall Sahel Development Program and (2) the role the Agency proposes to play in financing these infrastructure projects. (See p. 54.)

Action should be taken to require future studies and research projects be directly associated with development progress. (See pp. 59 to 60.)

The Agency agreed with GAO's recommendations and said that appropriate actions will be taken to implement them.

Adresse Improvisée de Monsieur Yaya Idrissa
12 April 1978Adresse Improvisée de Monsieur Yaya Idrissa (Unedited transcript from tape)

Parce que je veux peut-être essayer d'être assez court sur la présentation même des travaux du CILSS, puisqu'un grand nombre d'entre vous ici ont participé, ou en tout cas connaissent assez bien ce que nous avons pu faire tous ensemble au cours des deux années ou un an et demi qui viennent de s'écouler, je veux tout simplement donc vous présenter la situation actuelle dans le cadre des travaux que nous avons fait avec le Club du Sahel.

Vous savez bien que le CILSS en lui-même, bien sûr, est né en 1973. En même temps qu'il s'occupait des problèmes d'aide d'urgence, il avait aussi un programme fait assez rapidement sur les activités de développement du moyen et long terme. C'est sur cette base d'un programme purement confectionné par les Sahéliens de projets déjà existants, que le CILSS a démarré son programme de recherche des moyens de développer l'agriculture sahélienne tenant compte des problèmes de la sécheresse. Par contre, vous savez que c'est bien ça l'initiative d'un de vos compatriotes, le président Maurice Williams, qu'est né le Club du Sahel et que l'objectif essentiel était surtout, à la place d'une activité qu'on pourrait dire spontanée ou non-organisée, d'essayer de programmer l'activité du développement du Sahel à long terme afin que d'une part les pays sahéliens eux-mêmes sachent vers quel horizon ils vont, mais que par ailleurs leurs partenaires de la communauté internationale sachent aussi sur quelle activité ils peuvent apporter leur soutien et dans quel délai ce soutien paraît nécessaire. Donc c'est là la base du Club du Sahel que les pays sahéliens ont acceptée et que leurs partenaires de la communauté internationale ont acceptée également.

L'activité même de programmation, il faut dire, était assez difficile dans la mesure où programmer signifie quand même partie d'une certaine connaissance de certains éléments de base; or, au Sahel, étant donné les structures de nos administrations, de nos services de développement, cette information n'était pas très disponible, et le groupe de travail que le Club a constitué pour faire une tentative de programmation avait la tâche très difficile. Elle a tout simplement simplifiée, en tenant compte si je synthèse, de peut-être trois éléments importants. Le premier c'était l'objectif essentiel vers lequel on devrait tendre, étant donné les circonstances de la sécheresse; cet objectif c'était résoudre le problème alimentaire. L'autre facteur essentiel c'était aussi qu'il faut résoudre ce problème alimentaire en tenant compte de l'aléa climatique de la sécheresse notamment; et le troisième facteur encourageant c'était qu'en voyant très brutalement les potentialités du Sahel -- la terre, l'eau, les problèmes, disons ce qu'il y avait comme ressources naturelles immédiates, on était convaincu qu'avec un certain nombre d'efforts organisés, cet objectif pouvait être atteint dans un délai peut-être long, mais on pouvait espérer l'atteindre. Donc c'est sur ces bases là, ces trois éléments qui ont servi à encourager un groupe d'experts des pays sahéliens, des pays membres de l'OECD en particulier, la communauté internationale, à se jeter dans le Sahel et à essayer de débrouiller, de chercher des informations pour établir la base d'une programmation qui soit relativement correcte. Les résultats, après huit mois de travail, sont relativement encourageants. Si on considère

quand même l'étendue du Sahel, le manque d'information, les structures administratives, on est quand même arrivé à s'entendre, je crois, sur les grandes lignes d'une activité à mener dans presque tous les secteurs de développement rural en particulier; on arrivait à ces grandes lignes que les gouvernements sahéliens ont acceptées, sur le plan de l'adoption théorique en ont fait leur problème. Et puis on est entré dans la phase plus pratique qui était l'établissement peut-être des premiers pas d'essai de ce programme là, de ces grandes lignes, et c'est là peut-être que la tentative n'a pas été tout à fait parfaite. La raison est tout à fait évidente -- on ne peut pas rassembler en si peu de temps les éléments pour faire toute sorte de projets dans tous les secteurs, qui soient parfaitement dans ces grandes lignes qu'on a définies, surtout qu'on s'était donné comme objectif que, dans l'espace de dix mois, on devait non seulement donner les grandes lignes de la stratégie mais donner même des projets à mettre en oeuvre le plus immédiatement possible. Donc cette phase de projet à mettre en oeuvre a été en quelque sorte accommodée en prenant les projets qui étaient dans, disons, dans des perspectives de réalisation, dans des tiroirs, dans des dossiers, et en essayant de les accommoder le plus possible avec les grandes lignes des objectifs que nous avions définis dans la stratégie. Voilà ce qui a donné comme résultat ce que nous appelons les projets de première génération.

Je pense que cette première phase est extrêmement importante et encourageante pour nous parce qu'on peut considérer que, arrivé en si peu de temps à s'entendre sur un objectif aussi essentiel, à donner les grandes lignes dans ce secteur, le reste maintenant est un problème de persévérance de part et d'autre dans la préparation des dossiers, dans l'affinement des travaux, de persévérance dans l'effort de mise en oeuvre et même de remise en cause de tout autre forme ou d'objectif qui ne paraîtrait pas très conforme à l'objectif principale qui est atteindre l'auto-suffisance alimentaire à un certain horizon qu'on a fixé à l'an 2000.

Je pense que les pays où des structures n'étaient pas si bien aménagées, que des sources de financement qui participent pour la grande partie à l'activité d'assistance des pays sahéliens, que tout le monde arrive à s'entendre sur ces objectifs, ces grandes lignes en si peu de temps, nous paraît comme une chose extrêmement importante. Maintenant à nous de voir dans cette persévérance comment traduire dans des faits ces grandes lignes, d'abord en essayant de réaliser au maximum les projets de première génération qui ne sont pas totalement, parfaitement cohérents, parfaitement dans la ligne de la stratégie, mais qui sont un premier pas, un pas nécessaire et qui, nous sommes certains, les résultats concrets étant toujours l'objet d'un encouragement du gouvernement et des populations intéressées, nous pensons que le meilleur encouragement c'est de réaliser autant que possible la majorité des ces projets, leur apportant bien sûr chaque fois que possible, plus de cohérence et plus de, disons, de conformité, avec l'objectif principale.

Les tâches qui restent donc dans cette mise en oeuvre des programmes de première génération et des programmes qui peuvent suivre, sont des tâches essentiellement, je pense, de ceux qui font le travail sur le terrain. D'abord,

bien sûr, les services nationaux des pays concernés. Il faut reconnaître que dans la phase de programmation que nous avons vécue, ces services n'ont pas toujours participé pleinement. Vous savez très bien que dans nos pays il y a si peu de monde pour beaucoup de choses et il n'est pas toujours possible qu'un chef de service se consacre pleinement à toute sorte de tâches, même celles qui paraissent les plus prioritaires. Donc il reste à trouver auprès des états vraiment la compréhension et la prise en considération effective, en dehors de la décision politique de faire de ces stratégies la stratégie du Sahel, il y a quand même la prise en considération effective et pratique que dans les programmes nationaux, que dans les plans nationaux de développement, les services intègrent parfaitement ces grandes lignes de stratégie. Je pense que du côté des pays sahéliens, c'est cette phase qui nous paraît essentielle aujourd'hui. Vous savez que pour prendre pleinement conscience de ce fait, nous avons proposé que dans chacun des pays, il soit créé un groupe de techniciens, de responsables, qui peuvent parfaitement être informés de ces activités et pouvoir les traduire dans les faits de chaque jour, d'abord dans le plan national, ensuite dans la réalisation des projets. Ce comité, c'est ce que nous avons appelé le comité national du CILSS qui comprend en générale toutes les responsables techniques des ministères, des départements surtout de développement rural, bien sûr, mais des autres départements -- santé, éducation, etc. Théoriquement, aujourd'hui, la plupart des états ont créé tout au moins des textes pour mettre en place des comités. Mais il reste que dans la pratique il y a des problèmes d'organisation interne de conflit, de compétence, des moyens de mettre en oeuvre les problèmes même d'hommes à qui il faut confier la responsabilité de ce comité, qui font que nous ne pouvons pas assurer que partout cela est effectif. Mais je peux citer qu'en particulier nous avons eu l'occasion de vivre déjà des travaux fournis par des comités, comme un comité technique au Chad qui nous a fourni des comptes-rendu de ses travaux pour arrêter les projets prioritaires sur les problèmes de production. Nous avons des résultats de travaux de comité technique comme au Sénégal qui lui a déjà aidé à intégrer des projets et à fournir la liste prioritaire pour développer l'activité en matière de production vivrière. Nous avons des rapports de ces pays là. Donc, il y a cette phase qui nous paraît essentielle parce qu'en dehors des possibilités de réaliser individuellement chacun des projets, nous avons considéré, et la stratégie est bien sur cette base, que tout cela se tient. Si on ne réalisait que des projets sur des problèmes de protection des cultures, sur des problèmes seulement de santé animale, sans réaliser les autres projets de production, les autres projets de défense des pâturages, je crois que la stratégie n'aura pas fait avancer, c'est à dire on sera resté au stade d'avant où chacun choisissait le secteur, le projet qui l'intéressait et aidait à sa réalisation. Donc sur le plan national, voilà la phase qui nous paraît essentielle avant que, bien sûr, dans les prochains plans de nos états, véritablement on sente dans les préambules notre préoccupation essentielle, l'auto-suffisance alimentaire dans un pays climatiquement livré à la sécheresse, qui est un des objectifs essentiels des gouvernements; cela je pense, au fur et à mesure que les plans seront refaits qu'on pourra voir cela dans certains préambules.

APPENDIX 4b
Workshop Papers

Adresse Improvisée de Monsieur Yaya Idrissa (cont'd)

L'autre base aussi de cette programmation c'est aussi du côté de nos partenaires du Club. Puisque nous sommes partis d'une stratégie globale qui nous amène à concevoir des activités d'une très grande taille et non pas le projet de dimension modeste comme on le faisait auparavant, il y a une nécessité d'une part que ces partenaires continuent à partager avec nous ces grands objectifs. Il y a aussi une nécessité qu'ils puissent partager avec nous la possibilité de réaliser en commun, de la même façon que l'intérieur de chacun des pays, nous essayons de développer une sorte de concertation pour des projets nationaux, qu'à l'échelle des donateurs il y ait une concertation pour des objectifs ou des projets qui dépassent de toute évidence peut-être la possibilité de chacun d'entre eux. Cela, c'est l'activité que nous menons avec le secrétariat du Club en organisant ces rencontres où tous les projets de l'ensemble des activités sur un secteur pour que chacun puisse apercevoir ce que son voisin a comme objectif, comme possibilité de contribution, ce que lui aussi peut amener pour que l'objectif global soit atteint dans un délai correcte et non pas le choix individuel comme on avait pris l'habitude de le faire. Comme vous le savez, nous avons déjà eu l'occasion d'organiser plusieurs réunions, une sur le problème de protection des cultures et des récoltes, une autre sur le problème de reboisement et de lutte contre la désertification, et nous allons avoir une série de trois autres sur l'élevage et le transport, la pêche, au cours de ce mois. Ce qui est très encourageant, je dois dire, c'est que pour l'instant en tout cas les choses se passent très bien et après avoir, par exemple, organisé la réunion globale sur les programmes de reboisement, nous passons sur le plan nationale de concertation pour la réalisation de projets nationaux, et pour le reboisement nous venons de tenir une réunion entre donateurs sur tous les projets de Haute Volta en matière de reboisement, de lutte contre la désertification et ceux qui ont participé la ont eu l'occasion de partager leur expérience et chacun connaissant l'apport de l'autre, la complémentarité a pu se faire. Nous allons envisager une réunion semblable pour la Gambie et une autre pour le Cape Vert, etc. J'avoue que cette forme est extrêmement satisfaisante, en tout cas à nos yeux, et je crois que les états sahéliens, ceux qui ont vécu le cas, en sont très satisfaits et considèrent que c'est une forme nouvelle ne tout cas qui peut permettre de développer une activité dans un cadre d'entente générale de la part de ceux qui veulent les aider. Evidemment, le problème est sur le plan matériel assez difficile dans la mesure où nous au secrétariat du CILSS nous-même nous n'avons pas toujours les moyens en personnel, les moyens financiers pour résoudre les problèmes qui nous sont soumis et surtout aussi que sur le plan national des états, il n'y a pas toujours cette possibilité de répondre totalement à cet effort d'intégration que nous espérons dans le cas des comités nationaux, sera bien mené, mais qui n'a pas encore pris corps à l'heure actuelle, mais que nous allons encore reparler au cours du prochain conseil des ministres du CILSS qui se tiendra au mois de mai à Bamako.

Disons ce qui est peut-être aussi important en tout cas à rappeler aussi, qui nous facilite les tâches, c'est cette possibilité pour nous d'avoir en face de nous un certain nombre de donateurs, mais d'avoir effectivement non

seulement un partenaire mais aussi un interlocuteur, un seul on pourrait dire, à la place d'une certaine dispersion que nous aurions eu certainement si nous devions aller discuter avec chacun individuellement de notre programme. Cela aujourd'hui est une chose qui vraiment nous donne pleinement satisfaction puisque je dois dire que moi qui vous parle, je suis un peu seul à tourner, à rencontrer, à passer dans plusieurs réunions; si je devais rencontrer autant de donateurs individuellement pris pour chacun des programmes, cela paraîtrait impossible à l'heure actuelle. Et c'est une forme qui nous satisfait pleinement. Nous ne cessons de dire à tous les donateurs intéressés à notre activité que ce cadre du Club est en tout cas à nos yeux, un cadre pleinement satisfaisant pour cette activité.

Voilà très sommairement ce que nous avons entrepris à l'heure actuelle.

Levels of Detail and Comprehensiveness Required for PID and PP Design
in Order to Survive the AID/W Review Process

Carey Coulter
13 April 1978

Calculating to the Tenth Decimal Place

The level of detail and precision in project analysis and design demanded by AID/W reviewers and implied in design guidance often far exceeds that permitted by the available data and the uncertain and highly changeable environment within which we operate in the Sahel. By analogy, we are commonly expected to calculate to the tenth decimal place when we can be accurate only to the first. The result is frequently a deceptive appearance of perfection (or, more modestly, the appearance of relatively complete and thorough analysis leading step-by-step from the inputs to the projected results) on paper which may bear only a rather casual relationship to the actual specifics of project function and outcomes several years later when implementation is well underway. Note that no argument is made here that analysis is unnecessary or that goals and purposes of projects as stated in project design will be different from those of project implementation. The only point is that we should not be required to analyze and design in detail beyond what is warranted by the often marginal data base available or developable or beyond that plausible given the degree of economic and political uncertainties of the situation in our countries. And we usually are.

The Perfect is the Enemy of the Good

It is the virtually unanimous perception of the Sahelian field missions that AID/W reviewers and the review process demand such analyses as described above, and that if it is not provided, project proposal approvals may be significantly delayed or denied. Consciously or unconsciously, field missions and design teams do almost inevitably respond to this perceived imperative, accepting the long-term evil of unrealistic analysis and expectations in order to obtain the short-term benefit of project approval, which is correctly perceived as essential if we are to have any chance of participating constructively in the development process.

This has several undesirable effects:

- It distorts the project planning process, leading us to design too much with a view toward meeting unrealistic AID/W review requirements at the expense of a frank appraisal of the range of possible productive outcomes which a project may be expected to produce. Project design striving for perfection that is unattainable is, therefore, less good and less realistic than if done in a less "perfect" fashion but more within the constraints of what is realistically achievable.

APPENDIX 4c
 Workshop Papers
 C. Coulter paper(cont'd)

- It wastes a great deal of Mission and design team efforts which could be usefully channeled into more productive endeavors.
- It creates make-work in the Washington review process, delays sound projects and misuses the time of our scarce technically skilled AID/W personnel.
- It leaves us often, several years later, hoisted by our own petards when the outcome predicted so precisely, in such detail, and so unrealistically in project design turns out to be different in the real world (although not necessarily less useful).

Project Comprehensiveness, or One Must Crawl Before One Walks, and Walk Before One Runs

We note a theoretically admirable tendency on the part of some AID/W reviewers of PIDs and PPs to demand that a project "cover all the bases." It looks good on paper. In the real world, this can be a pernicious, destructive and counter-productive approach. A recent example is a PID for forestry education and forest management proposed by a Sahelian mission. The argument was strongly made by some AID/W reviewers of the PID that the project was not worth doing unless it encompassed a comprehensive and integrated agro-silva-pastoral strategy which in a thorough way would cover all the major aspects of natural resource (non-mineral) development and management. And further, it was suggested that the project should be used as a device to force re-organization of the Ministerial structure of the country in question in a way that no other donor supported, and that the Mission in question did not support. These positions contributed little or nothing to probable project success, but did succeed in delaying PID approval at considerable expense to the government in terms of time wasted by high-cost officers.

It is normally beyond the capability of Sahelian governments and their component ministries and services to develop and execute projects of the complexity suggested by the reviewers noted above. It is even questionable to some extent that a government of the sophistication of that of the U.S. has fully been able to do this. What is required is assistance to elements of the Sahelian governments to develop the capacity to do discrete projects, which do not answer all the requirements and problems, and by such assistance to aid them to develop the capacity to address progressively wider and more comprehensive issues. That is not the work of a few years, but, in keeping with the Club/CILSS planning horizon, that of a generation or more. But if we insist that they run before they can walk, we might as well opt out of the entire process. Our options, essentially, are: to participate in an imperfect and sometimes even rudimentary process, assisting the Sahelians to do what they can reasonably be expected to do, given a wide variety of constraints; to disrupt Sahelian efforts, supported by other donors, which attempt to take sometimes perhaps halting but essential steps towards a better future by conditioning our support on unrealistic demands for comprehensiveness and perfection in each project activity beyond their capacity;

or to decide the problems are intractable and simply not worth our time or money. The Sahelian Mission Directors, with complete concurrence of AA/AFR, support the first of those options.

Action Recommendation:

SDP projects now appear at the working level in PID and PP reviews to be reviewed by the same criteria as all other AFR projects. This should not continue. In conjunction with, but prior to the preparation by AA/AFR of the paper explaining the uniqueness of the problems of the least developed African countries and assistance to those countries, SFWA should prepare guidance, to be approved by AA/AFR, for those participating in review of Sahel Mission PIDs and PPs, explaining the rather special parameters within which we must operate and the different criteria which those should imply. These guidelines should be promptly circulated to the field for comment and, in final form, should be circulated to the field so that we know what to expect in the AID/W review process and can adjust our design efforts accordingly.

CLUB DU SAHEL (PURPOSES)

THE CLUB WILL:

- Support the work of the CILSS
- Inform and sensitize the international community on Sahel development prospects and needs
- Foster increased cooperation among donors for the implementation of actions requested by Sahel governments and regional institutions, and facilitate the mobilization of resources for development
- Provide a forum for Sahelian states to articulate their long-term development policies and priorities for medium and long-term development, and to discuss them with potential donors
- Function as an informal and flexible discussion group following the principles of mutual confidence, equality, flexibility and consensus among the participants
- Meet at least once a year, set up working groups to explore specific issues

The meetings of the Club will be placed under the joint chairmanship of a representative from Sahel country governments and a representative of Donor Friends of the Sahel.

SDPT FUNCTIONS

1. Interaction with international teams
2. Inter-sectoral coordination
3. Contribute to defining sectoral and overall goals
4. Establish an evaluation system
5. Monitor evaluation and refine SDP strategies
6. Participate in: ABS (Regional Projects); CP (Regional Projects); Special Report to Congress; Hearings information (Regional Projects and Club-CILSS only)
7. Interact with field for joint planning relative to strategies as well as PID, PP, and project reviews
8. Facilitate donor coordination
9. Facilitate CILSS coordination
10. Coordinate U.S. research and studies planning among SDPT, field, DR, and DSP/RD
11. Coordinate U.S. SDP development strategy
12. Liaison with other AID/W and Government agencies
13. Information resource to DR relative to design needs (ideas and recommendations on staffing teams)
14. Coordinate U.S. support for Club and CILSS

FIELD PROPOSAL FOR
FIELD MANAGEMENT OF THE SDPT
Sahel Mission Directors' Council

A. SMDC

- Eight members, rotating chairman
 - Quarterly meetings
 - Meets prior each working group
 - Donor meeting to formulate U.S. position which then is forwarded to AID/W
-

B. SDPT Leader

- SMDC Executive Director
 - Ten members
 - Based in Abidjan; not part of REDSO
 - Close relations with CILSS liaison
(A. Rollins to draft proposal)
-

C. Critique of Field Proposal

1. How much would it cost?
 2. Another ROCAP? Will it develop a life of its own, operate from the full control of the SMDC?
 3. Is the basic problem one that can be resolved simply by working or better communications?
 4. Can we staff the field SDPT with good people willing to work under the conditions of the job? (Travel, etc.)
 5. Will nationalism break the whole idea apart?
 6. Can the eight people do it? (Or will they fall apart?)
 7. Reaction of State, embassies -- what will be done better, in substance, under this arrangement?
 8. Will it take time away from implementation? (Might get planning and implementation in better balance)
 9. What are the staffing implications? (For the Missions)
-

D. The Field Proposal

The Schoonover Amendments

Real problem lack of communications and involvement of SDPT in operations.
Would have to be small SDP group in Washington anyway.
Question setting up an SDPT in field.
If Washington will keep field involved in regional programs from early state, that will go a long way to solving problems.
Proposed planning function for field unrealistic.
Question whether "unattached rump" group can work very efficiently.

Alternative Proposal

1. In lieu of SMDC, have periodic meetings among field personnel, based on commonality of interest (Management and technician level)
- * 2. Desks and OIC be given more importance -- have D.O. and DR representative in same office for each Field Office.
- * 3. A limited number of technicians from DR be assigned to SFWA.

* Not part of alternative.

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Shear comment: Good intentions in this proposal not sufficient. We need an institutional way to guarantee a Sahel-wide approach by Missions.

Jay comment: We need to start with an analysis of what, substantively, we are trying to do -- before coming to institutional arrangements.

Goler comment: The issue is how we can think bilaterally and regionally at the same time

Helman comment: Key questions are:

1. Getting on the part of Field a sense of regional responsibility, which comes from facing the problem.
2. Institutionalizing management of field SDPT can work. Will in part "disenfranchise" Washington. Good.

Ron comment: Important issue is conflict over use of funds for regional projects about which field has doubts, in lieu of bilateral programs.

Goler comment: Not just how field relates to SDP; they should be making so much input that they own these projects.

WASHINGTON PROPOSAL

A. Field Functions

Program formulation
 Project formulation and design
 Implementation
 Country coordination
 Representation in working teams
 Input into donor meetings
 Participate in evaluation
 SDP Planning Unit (see functions on SDPT role list)

B. Washington Functions

Policy guidance
 Overall budget
 Agency coordination
 Congressional
 Implementation support
 Other donors
 Information flow
 Evaluation

Residual Issues:

Project approval
 Implementation delegations

C. Example of a Program Track

e.g., Reforestation

- Source of policy -- Club/CILSS
- Working team -- SDP/USAID
- U.S. project participation -- USAID
- Donor meeting group -- Washington-1

USAID	-1
SDP	-1
- Project selection -- USAID
- Project approval -- Washington

D. Organizational Implications

SDPT Unit in Abidjan or elsewhere in West Africa (separate from REDSO)

AID/W

- Relationship of SFWA to SDP
- Role of DR

USAID

- Inter-USAID relationship (coordination)
- Design process
 - Budget
 - Who represents at field meetings

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