


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EGYPTIAN INCOME DISTRIBUTION RESEARCH PROJECT  
*Ibrahim, S.*

SOCIAL MOBILITY AND INCOME DISTRIBUTION

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|                                               |        |
|-----------------------------------------------|--------|
| 2. The Low Stratum: the Poor                  | 71     |
| 3. The Low-middle Stratum: the<br>Border Line | 71     |
| 4. The Middle Stratum: the<br>Upwardly Mobile | 71     |
| 5. The Upper-middle Stratum:<br>the Secure    | 73     |
| 6. The Highest Stratum: the Rich              | 73     |
| <br>Footnotes                                 | <br>78 |

## CONTENTS

|           |                                                 |           |
|-----------|-------------------------------------------------|-----------|
| <b>I</b>  | <b>Introduction</b>                             | <b>1</b>  |
| <b>II</b> | <b>An Overview of Egypt's Socio-politics</b>    | <b>5</b>  |
|           | <b>A. The Hesitation Phase</b>                  | <b>7</b>  |
|           | <b>B. The Consciousness Phase</b>               | <b>8</b>  |
|           | <b>C. The Socialist Transformation Phase</b>    | <b>9</b>  |
|           | <b>D. The Stagnation Phase</b>                  | <b>10</b> |
|           | <b>E. The Socialist Retreat Phase</b>           | <b>10</b> |
| <b>I</b>  | <b>Stratification of Income</b>                 | <b>11</b> |
|           | <b>A. Evolution of Income in Egypt</b>          | <b>11</b> |
|           | <b>B. Relative Shares of Different Strata</b>   | <b>13</b> |
|           | <b>C. Poverty and Income Distribution</b>       | <b>16</b> |
|           | <b>D. Income Mobility</b>                       | <b>17</b> |
| <b>IV</b> | <b>Occupational Mobility</b>                    | <b>23</b> |
|           | <b>A. Changing Economic Activities</b>          | <b>24</b> |
|           | <b>B. Changing Occupational Structure</b>       | <b>27</b> |
|           | <b>C. Intergenerational Occupation Mobility</b> | <b>35</b> |
| <b>V</b>  | <b>Educational Mobility</b>                     | <b>42</b> |
|           | <b>A. Aggregate Educational Mobility</b>        | <b>43</b> |
|           | <b>B. Intergenerational Mobility</b>            | <b>46</b> |
| <b>VI</b> | <b>Linkages of Class Components</b>             | <b>50</b> |
|           | <b>A. Social Correlates of Incomes</b>          | <b>56</b> |
|           | <b>1. Income and occupation</b>                 | <b>56</b> |
|           | <b>2. Income and education</b>                  | <b>60</b> |
|           | <b>3. Income and life-style</b>                 | <b>66</b> |
|           | <b>B. Stratification Configurations</b>         | <b>66</b> |
|           | <b>1. The Lowest Stratum: the Destitute</b>     | <b>69</b> |

SOCIAL MOBILITY AND INCOME DISTRIBUTION  
IN EGYPT: 1952-1977

Saad Eddin Ibrahim

I. INTRODUCTION

This paper addresses itself to the question of income distribution as it relates to social mobility in Egypt during the quarter-century following the 1952 Revolution. Income distribution is a crucial indicator of class structure in any society. It is both a cause and an effect of class position at any given historical point. One's standing on the dimensions of power and prestige in his society is determined, among other things, by the amount and/or source of his income relative to that of others in the same society. A given income, meanwhile, determines the differential access to goods, services, and other scarce rewards -- including power and prestige.

Income rarely operates in isolation from other components of socio-economic status (SES). Together with education, occupation, life-style and power, it provides a fair measurement of socio-economic status. Because of this close link, income may be considered as a rough summary index of occupation, education, life-style and power in most modern-oriented societies. By the same token, income may be inferred from these correlates.

When individuals or groups change their SES, it is often because one of the above components has triggered the change. The latter may be an improvement or a deterioration. The change in either direction is what sociologists refer to as "social mobility." Thus change in SES over time, either upward or downward, is effected by a change in income, education, occupation, or power.

During the past quarter century Egypt witnessed changes in its class structure, income distribution, volume and direction of its social mobility. The causes and consequences

of these changes may be articulated in the following broad questions: How does income correlate with other indices of class -- namely education, occupation, and life-style? What is the overall class configuration in Egypt today? How is it different from what it was before 1952 and the mid-sixties? Who achieved upward mobility and who was forced downwards? And what have the volume and direction of such movement been in the mid-1960's and the mid-1970's?

We hypothesize in this paper that rapid social mobility took place in Egypt after 1952. Consequently, Egypt's class structure was markedly transformed through the mid-1960's as a function of (1) intentional redistributive policies; and (2) rapid expansion of opportunities through planned socio-economic development. At the point when these two factors were slowed down or halted in the late 1960's and early 1970's, there was a similar slow-down of collective mobility.

A new non-revolutionary system has been shaping up in Egypt since 1970. Since then social mobility has become slower and sporadic rather than rapid and deliberate. The pendulum of change in Egypt had swung from right to its furthest point left between 1952 and 1965. It was slowed down between 1965 and 1970, and has gradually been moving back toward the center since 1970.

Attempting to <sup>amplify</sup> answer some of these questions raises various issues, theoretical and methodological. Rigorous treatment of the subject requires more and better data than are presently available in Egypt.

For a multitude of historical and structural reasons, the components of SES (income, education, occupation and power) are differentially distributed in most societies. Social scientists, ideologists, and politicians have vehemently disagreed and debated over such unequal distribution, its underlying reasons, and what to do about it. Without getting deeply drawn into polemic, it may suffice to mention that the two most theoretically developed positions are those of functionalism and Marxism. The reader can find numerous treatments of these two and other positions in the social science literature.<sup>1</sup>

The methodological problems of studying stratification and social mobility are the operational side of the theoretical issues raised by functionalism and Marxism. Defining what constitutes a "class" or a "stratum" is theoretically controversial. More difficult, however, is to operationalize the concept and identify its import empirically in the world of everyday experience. Equally difficult is to establish the number of classes in a society like Egypt with multiple modes of production (if we go Marxist), and with a dual universalistic-particularistic mode of position-reward assignment (if we go functionalist).

Whatever the bases and number of classes or strata we may agree upon, we still have to describe and analyze the flow and outflow among them -- i.e., social mobility. The methodological questions here would center on measures of rates, causes, and consequences of social mobility. In the broad sense of the word, "mobility" is akin to the bettering or worsening of one's living conditions. Therefore it is compelling to consider mobility along several dimensions, e.g., income, occupation, education, and life-style.

Previous studies of Egypt's stratification and social mobility have all, in varying degrees, struggled with the above methodological questions. The attempts in this regard fall into three broad categories: macro-ideological studies,<sup>2</sup> micro-structural studies of specific communities,<sup>3</sup> and aggregate socio-economic studies of Egyptian society.<sup>4</sup>

#### Data Gaps and Limitations

The above studies however reveal serious data gaps. Some theoretical and methodological issues will remain unsettled so long as such gaps persist. Here we are not talking so much of the quality and degree of data refinement. The concern is over basic categories of data. The most obvious gaps in data needed to answer our major research questions are the following:

- (a) Time-series of income distribution in Egypt;
- (b) Consistent time-series of occupation distribution (i.e., uniform or standard classifications over the past twenty-five years);

- (c) Inter-generational mobility data (vertical social mobility);
- (d) Intra-generational mobility data (horizontal social mobility), and
- (e) Correlational data on income-occupation-education.

One source for some of the data needed may be the family-budget surveys of 1958, 1969, and 1974. But this kind of data would still fall into the category of aggregate studies referred to earlier.

It is obvious that supplementary data <sup>especially</sup> generated especially for this study is in order -- by means of a national sample survey. The sample survey is to provide data on at least items (c), (d) and (e) above.

As a partial remedy for the data gaps on social mobility in Egypt, two sample surveys have been conducted. The first comprises 4000 households drawn from several Egyptian governorates. The second is on a much smaller scale and comprises only 640 heads of households, about evenly divided between rural and urban areas. Unfortunately, only the smaller survey was processed in time for this Chapter. Since we draw heavily on it, a word about this mini-survey and some methodological precautions are in order.

The urban sample of the survey comprises <sup>322</sup>~~232~~ heads of households drawn systematically from nine wards (shiakhas) in Cairo.<sup>5</sup> These wards are considered, by Egypt's Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics (CAPMAS), as representative of the population of Cairo proper.<sup>6</sup> Nevertheless, extreme caution must be exercised in generalizing the findings with regard to urban Egypt. For one thing, the sample size is too small for a city of over six million. Second, Cairo is hardly representative of urban Egypt. Being the country's capital, it does tend to have a greater concentration of power, wealth, goods, services, and high level manpower. It since our primary concern is with social mobility inter-generationally, such serious limitations remain within reasonable bounds. That is to say, the question is not whether the percentage of poor is greater or lesser in Cairo than in other cities; the question, from a social mobility perspective,

whether or not the sons of those poor are better off worse off over time.<sup>7</sup>

The rural sample of the survey consists of 312 heads of households drawn also systematically<sup>8</sup> from eight Egyptian villages. Two are from Asyut Governorate in Upper Egypt, and six are from Dakhliyya Governorate in Lower Egypt. Aside from this broad regional representation, we have no grounds to claim that the five villages are typical rural communities. Nor is the sample big enough to warrant hard generalizations. But as was the case with the Cairo sample, such limitations apply mostly to general statements on distribution of income, education and occupation. However, they do not seriously impede our ability to infer rates and directions of social mobility over time -- so long as we are working with percentages and proportions across generational categories of socio-economic strata.

Along with data findings from this small-scale survey, we shall utilize other aggregate data, notably from the national census series (1947, 1960, 1965, 1976), the Family Budget Survey series (1958, 1965, 1975), Labor Force Sample Surveys (1960, 1966, 1974), and other studies.

### The Plan of this Chapter

After a brief overview of Egypt's socio-political evolution in the last three decades, we deal respectively with the stratification of income, occupation, and education. Our treatment of each stratification component is accentuated toward a description and analysis of social mobility. In the final section, an attempt is made to link these components in a way that yields an approximate picture of Egypt's stratification configuration.

(all cap. letters)

## II. An Overview of Egypt's Socio-politics

To make qualitative sense of the numerous tables and quantitative data in this chapter, a brief overview of Egypt's major socio-political change in recent decades is in order.

We propose to begin with the socio-political-economic setting on the eve of the 1952 Revolution, through Nasser's and Sadat's regimes. Even though it is often said that social history contains no surprises, it would be helpful to outline the march and retreat of Egypt's socialist policies. They have had a direct bearing on income distribution and shifting positions of various strata. In other words, these policies are, in a sense, the parameters of Egypt's stratification, income distribution, and social mobility.

The 1952 Revolution inherited a society whose socio-economic transition from "traditionalism" to "modernism" had begun a century and a half earlier. That transition, however, had lingered and been frustrated by external and internal factors, resulting in accumulation of problems and bottlenecks in all aspects of life.<sup>9</sup>

Egypt's sub-structure was characterized by four principal modes of production: capitalist-agricultural; capitalist-industrial; traditional-urban informal sector; and traditional agrarian sector. The size and rate of growth among the four modes was quite unequal, with the capitalist-agricultural dominating in the countryside, and the capitalist-industrial dominating in urban areas. This domination was indicated not as much by the human base involved as by the relative share of each mode in Egypt's national wealth and in the wielding of political power.

The integration of Egypt's economy in the international capitalist system, the slow and imbalanced growth of resources and institutions throughout the first half of the 20th century, resulted in the accumulation of socio-economic problems. The failure of the political system to cope with these problems was a principal factor behind the 1952 coup d'etat by the Free Officers.

The Revolution of 1952 was to confront many challenges: a land-scarce economy, a surplus population, a lopsided production structure, substantial unemployment, capital shortage, dependence on the outside world, maldistribution of wealth, a

half-paralyzed bureaucracy, the British occupation and the task of national liberation and the Arab-Israeli conflict. Some of these problems had reached crisis proportions on the eve of July 1952 and others were to explode later.

It is beyond the scope of this paper to deal with how the 1952 Revolution attempted, failed, or succeeded in meeting this host of challenges.<sup>10</sup> But the sum of actions, measures, and policies undertaken by the new regime resulted in changing the class structure of Egypt. The intensity and implications of the change varied over the next quarter century. It is possible to identify distinct phases during this twenty-five year period.

#### A. The Hesitation Phase

Between 1952 and 1956, the new regime was busiest trying to consolidate its power, establish its legitimacy, and gain full political independence from the British. Socio-economic policies were, by and large, a continuation of the old regime. A major exception, however, was the issuance and implementation of the Land Reform Law in September, 1952, limiting land ownership to 200 acres per family. Although its social objective should not be minimized, the Land Reform Law was, to a large extent, aimed at weakening the landed aristocracy of the previous regime.

The changes in the class structure during this phase (1952-1956) occurred primarily at the top and near the bottom. The top ruling elite was completely changed, as a few members of the middle class replaced the old elite of landed aristocracy and big capitalists.<sup>11</sup> The landed aristocracy, but not big capitalists at this point, lost substantial parts of its economic power-base. The beneficiaries of this loss were the landless and small peasants near the bottom of Egypt's class structure, as well as the rich peasants, or what Binder calls the "Second Stratum."<sup>12</sup>

### B. The Consciousness Phase

Between 1956 and 1960, the leaders of Egypt's revolution became aware of the need to escalate their attention to Egypt's economic problems. Such awareness reflected itself in the following measures: (1) the stipulation in the new constitution (1956) that Egypt's economy was to be managed according to a comprehensive national plan. A commission was established in 1957 to prepare the First Five-Year Plan (1960-1965); (2) Egyptianization of most foreign interests in Egypt, including the Suez Canal Company, banks and insurance companies. A public corporation, the Economic Organization, was established as a holding company for these interests, and was given mandate to expand its activities alone or in partnership with the private sector. Several new projects were undertaken by the Economic Organization in the fields of cement, fertilizers, and textile industries; (3) the establishment of a new Ministry of Industry, in 1957, to undertake the planning and implementation of an industrial program in the interim period 1957-1960, and subsequently for the First Five-Year Plan; (4) laws issued in 1958 for urban housing rent-control, reducing rents by 25% and fixing new rentals according to rules favoring tenants, and (5) a policy of expansion of agricultural cooperatives and agricultural credit to cover the entire country.

The global impact of these measures in the second phase was the opening up of channels of social mobility. The Egyptianization of foreign interests in 1956-57 led to the exodus of thousands of foreigners who used to manage these interests. Egyptian professionals, mostly college graduates, moved up to fill the vacuum. The moderate expansion of industrial activities created a greater demand for highly trained managers, engineers, skilled and semi-skilled manpower. The latter either existed but was hitherto under-utilized, or had to be drawn and trained from middle and lower class pools. The rent-control laws had their redistributive effects on both sides of the class divide. Urban landlords lost, and middle and lower class tenants gained the equivalent of twenty-five percent of the rentals in annual incomes. Thus, in terms of mobility and

sheer improvement in standards of income, the less well-to-do strata gained markedly during the second phase, especially in urban areas -- as their counterparts had gained in rural areas in the first phase.

### C. The Socialist Transformation Phase

The period between 1960 and 1966 witnessed the height of Revolutionary actions in changing Egypt's socio-economic structure. Among the far-reaching measures effected in this phase were the following: (1) an implementation of the First Five-Year Plan for socio-economic development aiming at a 40 percent increase of national income (7 percent annual growth), a more equitable distribution of income, and the creation of one million job opportunities; (2) the expansion and consolidation of the public sector to lead the country's economic activities; (3) the nationalization of all big business in industry, banking, insurance, construction, import-export, and tourism -- this measure brought over 80 percent of non-agricultural activities under state control; (4) the issuing of a second Land Reform law limiting land ownership to 100 feddans per family; (5) the issuing of a second rent-control law in urban housing reducing rentals by another 25 percent; (6) the stipulation in the constitution of allocation of 50 percent of the seats in all popular elective bodies to workers and peasants; (7) decreeing of a mandatory election of at least two workers to boards of directors of all companies, and the appropriation of 25 percent of annual profits for workers and employees in these companies; and (8) the initiation of a new policy of employing all university and trade school graduates in state or public sector jobs.

These measures are known among students of Egyptian society as the Socialist Laws. Regardless of their sheer economic meaning, their implications for the shape of Egypt's stratification structure and social mobility were quite significant. They had marked redistributive effects in favor of the middle and lower strata. The vast expansion of the public sector, resulting from both nationalization and the creation of new industries, substantially increased the demand for new talents and skills. The demand was met by a corresponding

expansion in public education on all levels. The policy of employing all graduates meant the entry of several hundred thousands into white-collar and civil service jobs. The representation of peasants and workers on elective bodies increased the political power of these two groups as never before. Thus, in terms of income, occupation, education, and power, the third phase resulted probably in the biggest change in Egypt's stratification system in this century.

#### D. The Stagnation Phase

Between 1965 and 1970, Egypt witnessed serious military-political setbacks. The defeat of the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, the drain of the Yemen war, the termination of American economic aid, among other factors had a profound effect on slowing down Egypt's socio-economic march. The envisaged Second Five-Year Plan never took off as an increasing percentage of the country's resources were earmarked for military expenditure. The loss of Suez Canal revenues and the Sinai oilfields, the massive destruction of the Suez Canal cities, and the mass displacement of nearly one million people from those cities added to the strain on Egypt's economy. As a result, investments in socio-economic development declined sharply, and Egypt's rate of growth for the period was no more than one percent annually. The public sector stood still during this phase and under some internal pressures the private sector was allowed some margin for movement.

#### E. The Socialist Retreat Phase

Between 1970 and 1977, four major events took place: Nasser's death, Sadat's ascendance to power, the October War of 1973, and the institution of the Open-Door policy. The latter, though in the making since 1968, took on explicit official endorsement after the 1973 war. It called for revitalizing the private sector, opening the door for foreign and Arab capital to flow into the country, revoking certain aspects of the Land Reform Law (specifically those regulating land tenure), and indirect measures of Egyptian currency

*accomplished*

evaluation. The sum of these policies amounted to a reversal of Egypt's socialist transformation. This phase can be characterized as one of mixed economy, progressively tilting toward capitalist "laissez-faire laissez-passer." The impact on class structure is not definitely clear yet. There are indications, however, that some elements of the pre-revolutionary upper and upper middle class are resurfacing. Upward social mobility is mainly accomplished through (a) private sector activities or (b) migration to oil-rich Arab countries. Strata with fixed income seem to have suffered the most in this phase.

Against this background, the elaboration of the stratification of income, occupation, and education may be understood

*(all cap. letters)*

### III. Stratification of Income

Income is often a summary index of one's earning from wages and salaries, i.e., occupation. The latter is determined, in turn, by one's training or education. Thus both occupation and education are implied by income. Another major source of income is revenue from property (land, real estate, shares, stocks, etc.). Income distribution, therefore, is both a reflection and a cause of stratification in a given society. A separate Chapter deals more rigorously with income distribution (Ibrahim H. El-Essawy, Chapter ). Our treatment of stratification of income here is only meant to provide the context in which income mobility could be best understood.

#### A. Evolution of Income in Egypt

As shown in Table 1, Egypt's national income has risen from 806 million Egyptian Pounds in 1952 to over 1.9 billion in 1974 at constant prices. That is more than 137 percent real increase in 22 years. Given rapid population growth in Egypt, however, income per capita did not rise as fast. In 1952, the average share of the individual was slightly over 37 pounds. It rose to about 53 pounds in 1974, a percentage increase of 43.0 during the 22 years, i.e., at an average

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of slightly less than 2 percent annually for the period.

Most of the growth in national and per capita income occurred during the 1955-65 period, which we referred to in the previous section as the "Consciousness" and "Socialist" phases, respectively. Between 1955 and 1960, the national income grew from 881 to 1,139 million pounds, i.e., over 29 percent, or at an annual average of about 5 percent. Income per capita rose during the same period from 37.7 pounds, i.e., 5 percent. Between 1960 and 1965, the Socialist Transition Phase, national income rose from LE 1,139 to 1554 million, i.e., 36.4 percent real increase averaging over 6 percent average annual growth for the whole period. Despite continuing population increase income per capita rose to 2.2, i.e., 20.3 percent. Taken together the 1955-1965 period witnessed the greatest rise in income per capita of Egyptians in this century.<sup>13</sup> In fact, most of the real gains in individual income during the last quarter century were achieved between 1955 and 1965.

The period 1965-1974, which we referred to as the "Stagnation" and "Socialist Retreat" phases, witnessed a zig-zag in per capita income. Thus, it recorded a negative growth in the years 1966, 1967, 1970, and 1972. In the following year, 1972, income per capita recovered to its 1965 level, and in 1974 it showed a slight increase of 1.6 percent (or up to 52.6 in constant prices).

#### Relative Shares of Different Strata

One way of examining income distribution in Egypt is to divide the population into five groups, each comprising 20 percent, from lowest to highest. Using Household Budget Surveys, Table 2 gives data on relative shares of total expenditure at three time-points (1958, 1964, 1974), broken down into rural and urban areas. The share of the lowest 20 percent in rural areas was 6.4 percent of total expenditure in the countryside in 1958. It rose to 7 percent in 1964-65, but

Table 2  
 Percentage Distribution of Household Consumption Expenditure  
 — 1958/59 — 1964/65 — 1974/75 —

| Percentage of Expenditure<br>According to | 1958/59 |                      | 1964/65 |                      | 1974/75 |                       |
|-------------------------------------------|---------|----------------------|---------|----------------------|---------|-----------------------|
|                                           | Rural*  | Urban**              | Rural*  | Urban**              | Rural*  | Urban**               |
| Lowest 20%                                | 6.4     | 5.6                  | 7.0     | 5.9                  | 5.8     | 6.3                   |
| Second 20%                                | 11.3    | 9.9 <sup>16.9</sup>  | 11.9    | 11.7 <sup>17.0</sup> | 11.3    | 10.7 <sup>17.0</sup>  |
| Third 20%                                 | 15.7    | 13.6 <sup>21.5</sup> | 16.1    | 15.3 <sup>22.9</sup> | 15.7    | 15.8 <sup>22.8</sup>  |
| Fourth 20%                                | 22.8    | 23.2 <sup>52.7</sup> | 22.4    | 20.2 <sup>53.1</sup> | 21.9    | 17.3 <sup>50.1</sup>  |
| Top 20%                                   | 43.9    | 47.7                 | 42.7    | 46.9                 | 46.1    | 50.9 <sup>54.9%</sup> |
| (Top 10%)                                 | 28.2    | 27.9                 | 27.5    | 28.2                 | 31.0    | (29.3)                |

Source: \* Samir Radwan, The Impact of Agrarian Reform on Rural Egypt, Geneva: ILO, 1977, p. 43 (Table 4.4):

\*\* Computed from Sample Household Budget Survey, Cairo: CAPMS, for 1958/59, 1964/65, and 1974/75.

declined to 5.8 percent in 1974-75. In contrast, the share of the top 20 percent declined from 43.9 percent in 1958 to 42.7 percent in 1964-65, but rose again to over 46 percent. Thus, while the lowest fifth of the population lost 1.2 percent in relative share between 1964-65 and 1974-75, the top fifth gained 2.2 percent.

In 1958, the lowest strata comprising 40 percent of total rural population accounted for 17.7 percent of total rural expenditure. Six years later, the figure was 18.9 percent, but by the end of the following ten years it dropped to 17.1 percent. The bottom 40 percent of the rural population, in other words, were worse off in 1974 than they were sixteen years earlier. At both points they were accounting for far less than the upper ten percent in rural areas. In 1958, the latter accounted for 28 percent of total expenditures, then enhanced its share to 31 percent in 1974-75.

As a matter of fact, except for the top 20 percent, all other strata seem to have suffered a decline in their relative shares of total rural expenditure between 1965 and 1975.

In urban areas, the same pattern holds. The lowest fifth had a very slight gain from 5.6 to 6.3 percent of total urban expenditure between 1958 and 1974, i.e., less than one percent. The second fifth suffered slightly between 1964 and 1974 (about one percent). By contrast, the top fifth raised its share by 4 percent, by far the largest proportionate change between 1964 and 1974 -- i.e., during the phases of Stagnation and Socialist Retreat.

The impact of the Socialist Transformation was not felt in urban areas until the mid-1960's. Although all lower strata benefited somewhat, the small middle class gained relatively more. The second and third fifths raised their combined share of total urban expenditure from 23.5 in 1958 to 27 percent in 1964-65. This gain was at the expense of the two strata above, whose combined share dropped from 71 percent to 67 percent in the same period. While the upper 20 percent of urban families more than recouped their losses by 1974-75,

the fourth fifth continued to lose. Its share of total urban expenditure dropped to 17.3 percent. This is by far the greatest loss that any of the five strata experienced at any time. Between 1958 and 1974, its share declined from 23.2 to 17.3 percent, a net loss of nearly 6 percentage points. We suggest that the fourth fifth of urban families is comprised of top civil servants in the government. As any group on fixed income, they tended to suffer as a result of inflationary pressures in the late 60's and early 70's. Naturally, this would reduce their relative expenditures.

### C. Poverty and Income Distribution

In a Third World country such as Egypt, income distribution does not acquire its full social meaning unless it is related to people's needs. The poor are often thought of as those who cannot satisfy their basic needs. But the question of what is basic is quite relative. Nevertheless, it is possible to estimate the monetary value of least-cost diet which fulfills the minimum nutritional requirements as set by specialized agencies such as the Food and Agriculture Organization and the World Health Organization.

The Egyptian economist Samir Radwan calculated the cost of minimum diet, clothing, and housing for rural Egyptian families.<sup>14</sup> He used that minimum as a benchmark to establish a "poverty line" for the years 1958-59, 1964-65, and 1974-75. His attempt is quite ingenious; we only regret that he did not do the same for urban households. To complement his work, we estimated that an urban household requires about 30 percent more than a rural counterpart in order to meet typical urban needs, especially those of housing and transportation in the city.

Table 3 shows the two respective poverty lines for rural and urban areas in three successive periods. In 1958-59, 35 percent of all rural families were below the poverty line. By that date, the first Land Reform Law was implemented, and no doubt several hundred thousands<sup>15</sup> as land recipients and

**Table 3. Estimation of Rural and Urban Poverty in Egypt, 1958-1975**

| Variable                                      | Area    | 1958/59 | 1964/64 <sup>5</sup> | 1974/75 |
|-----------------------------------------------|---------|---------|----------------------|---------|
| Poverty line as measured in L.E.              | Rural*  | 93.0    | 125.0                | 270.0   |
|                                               | Urban** | 121.0   | 163.0                | 351.0   |
| Percentage of families below the poverty line | Rural*  | 35.0    | 26.8                 | 44.0    |
|                                               | Urban** | 30.0    | 27.8                 | 34.5    |

Source: \*Samir Radwan, The Impact of Agrarian Reform on Rural Egypt. Geneva: ILO, 1977, p. 42.

\*\*Our own computation on the basis of 30% increase in minimum living expenditure in urban areas

and tenants had benefited from it. Our estimation is that the percentage of poor families before the 1952 law was well over 40% of all rural households. By 1964/65, the second Land Reform Law was in effect. Along with other policies (credits and cooperatives), there was further reduction of the percentage of poor families to 27% of the rural total. During the next ten years, however, economic stagnation and the socialist retreat affected the situation in the countryside. The percentage of households below the poverty line jumped to 44%, 17 percentage points over the 1964/65 figure.

In urban areas, poverty was the lot of 30% of all households in 1958/59. There was some improvement in 1964/65, the figure dropping to 28%. But again, during the next two phases of Stagnation and Socialist Retreat, urban poverty climbed to nearly 35% of all households. Part of this rise must have been due to the influx of some of the rural poor to urban centers.

#### D. Income Mobility

A micro picture of the changing income distribution may be inferred from the findings of the small-scale survey conducted for the purpose of this study in 1979 (see section I). Respondents

were asked to report their annual income, and that of their fathers and their oldest working sons.<sup>16</sup> The three estimates were categorized differently according to the range of income in the three successive generations.<sup>17</sup>

Tables 4 and 5 together show income mobility across three generations. The respondents (heads of household) in the Cairo sample are the point of reference. Table 4 compares their distribution by eight income categories cross-tabulated with their father's income categories. Looking at the two marginal totals reveals the relative improvement attained by respondents vis-a-vis their fathers. Thus, while 20.4 percent of the fathers were in the lowest income category, only 11.4 percent of their sons (respondents) fell in the lowest category in 1979, an improvement of 9 percentage points. The combined total of categories 2 and 3 for respondents was nearly 59 percent compared to about 47 percent for their parents. The biggest differences are in categories 3 and 5. Proportionally more of the respondents were in the third income bracket (33.3 vs. 24.7 percent of their parents), and proportionally more of the parents were in the fifth income bracket (16.5 vs. 5.9 of the respondents).

If we leave the margin totals and look inside Table 4 we observe more of the inner dynamics of income mobility. To appreciate the extent and direction of that mobility, the reader may look at the diagonal in Table 4 as the dividing line between upward mobility (below the diagonal) and downward mobility (above the diagonal). The diagonal itself represents income immobility between the two generations. Thus, in income category 1 of the respondents (first row) which is the lowest income bracket, we see that nearly 35 percent are locked in poverty for at least the second generation, as their parents were also in the lowest income category. The other 65 percent of the respondents in this income group have moved downward. In category 2, while 29 percent of the respondents improved by one step over their parents, 26 percent remained the same, and 45 percent moved downward by one to five steps below their parents. In income category 3, nearly 39 percent of the respondents moved

**Table 4. Income Mobility: Respondents and Fathers, for a Sample of Heads of Household, Cairo, 1979 (N=255)**

| Income Categories<br>of Respondents | Income Categories<br>of Their Fathers: |             |             |             |             |             |             |     | Total |
|-------------------------------------|----------------------------------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-----|-------|
|                                     | 1*                                     | 2           | 3           | 4           | 5           | 6           | 7           | 8*  |       |
| 1 (Lowest)                          | <u>34.5</u>                            | 34.5        | 20.7        | 6.9         | 3.4         | -           | -           | -   | 11.4  |
| 2                                   | 29.2                                   | <u>26.2</u> | 24.6        | 1.5         | 15.4        | 1.5         | 1.5         | -   | 25.5  |
| 3                                   | 18.8                                   | 20.0        | <u>28.8</u> | 8.2         | 16.5        | 7.1         | -           | 1.3 | 33.3  |
| 4                                   | 6.3                                    | 16.7        | 22.9        | <u>12.5</u> | 25.0        | 10.4        | 6.3         | -   | 18.8  |
| 5                                   | 13.3                                   | 20.0        | 33.3        | 13.3        | <u>13.3</u> | -           | 6.7         | -   | 5.9   |
| 6                                   | 22.2                                   | 11.1        | 11.1        | 11.1        | 11.1        | <u>11.1</u> | 22.2        | -   | 3.5   |
| 7                                   | -                                      | -           | -           | -           | -           | 50.0        | <u>50.0</u> | -   | 0.8   |
| 8 (Highest)                         | -                                      | -           | -           | -           | -           | -           | 100.0       | -   | 0.8   |
| <b>Total</b>                        | 20.4                                   | 22.0        | 24.7        | 7.5         | 16.5        | 5.5         | 3.1         | 0.4 | 100.0 |

19

Statistical  
Measures:

$\chi^2 = 86.29$

P = 0.01

Gamma = 0.35

Contingency Coefficient =  
 $e.e._1 = 0.50$

Source: Original Survey Data

upward (one or two steps over their fathers), 29 percent remained the same, and about 32 percent moved downward, by one to four steps below their fathers. Thus, in the third income category, more of the newcomers to it (39 percent) are from poorer backgrounds, in contrast with the first and second categories where more of the respective newcomers had parents who were better off. What we observe in category 3 applies to the next five income categories, i.e., more respondents in each have experienced upward rather than downward mobility. The greatest single difference is in category 5, where nearly 80 percent experienced upward mobility (became better off than their parents), 13 percent remained the same, and 7 percent moved downward. If this category represents the present-day upper middle class, then we suggest that most of its members have ascended to it from various strata immediately below. The same observation applies to category 6.

As for the top two income brackets (categories 7 and 8), the movement, though also substantial, was only one step upward. All of the respondents in category 8 had fathers who were in category 7, and half of the respondents in category 7 had fathers in category 6, the other half remaining immobile.

In summary, what Table 4 suggests is (a) that income mobility occurred across all income brackets; (b) that this mobility tended to be smaller at the lower income categories and greater at the middle; (3) that in the lowest four income categories the movement tended to be mostly one step in either direction; (4) that none of the respondents whose parents were in the lowest six categories made it to the top income brackets, and (5) that none of the respondents who were in the top bracket slid down to the lowest (1 or 2) categories.

Table 5 compares respondents and their oldest <sup>working</sup> living sons. Not all respondents were qualified, not having sons old enough for a comparison. Again, the diagonal represents cases of income immobility. But below it are cases of downwardly mobile sons, and above it are cases of upward mobile sons. In

**Table 5. Income Mobility: Respondents and Sons, for a Sample of Heads of Household, Cairo, 1979 (N=75).**

| Income Categories<br>of Respondents | Income Categories<br>of Their Sons: |             |            |            |          |            |            | Total        |
|-------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|-------------|------------|------------|----------|------------|------------|--------------|
|                                     | 1                                   | 2           | 3          | 4          | 5        | 6          | 7          |              |
| 1 (Lowest)                          | 55.6                                | 33.3        | -          | -          | -        | -          | 11.1       | 12.0         |
| 2                                   | 22.2                                | 77.8        | -          | -          | -        | -          | -          | 12.0         |
| 3                                   | 26.1                                | 60.9        | 4.3        | -          | -        | 4.3        | 4.3        | 30.7         |
| 4                                   | 18.8                                | 75.0        | -          | -          | -        | -          | 6.3        | 21.3         |
| 5                                   | -                                   | 100.0       | -          | -          | -        | -          | -          | 10.7         |
| 6                                   | -                                   | 71.4        | 38.6       | -          | -        | -          | -          | 9.3          |
| 7                                   | -                                   | -           | -          | 100.0      | -        | -          | -          | 1.3          |
| 8 (Highest)                         | -                                   | -           | -          | 100.0      | -        | -          | -          | 2.7          |
| <b>Total</b>                        | <b>21.3</b>                         | <b>65.3</b> | <b>4.0</b> | <b>4.0</b> | <b>-</b> | <b>1.3</b> | <b>4.0</b> | <b>100.0</b> |

Statistical Measures:  $\chi^2 = 103.53$

P = 0.001

Gamma = 0.49

*Contingency Co-efficient*  
C.C. = 0.76

Source: Original Survey Data

the lowest income category, more than half (56 percent) were born to fathers who were also in the lowest income bracket, while the rest (44 percent) have improved their income standing vis-a-vis their fathers. In the second income category, nearly 78 percent of the sons have remained immobile; the rest (22 percent) were still below their fathers' income levels. In the third category of respondents, the overwhelming majority of sons (87 percent) are still below the income level of their parents, and only 9 percent have exceeded theirs. The same observation applies to the fourth category of respondents, 94 percent of sons being below and 6 percent above father's income level. None of the respondents <sup>Sons</sup> in the top four income categories has reached or exceeded father's income.

In summary, Table 5 suggests the following: (a) given the fact that most sons have not reached the peak of their earning capacity, the majority are naturally below the income levels of their fathers, and (b) the sons of the more well-to-do are, however, markedly better off than the sons of the less well-to-do.

Looking at the measures of association for the data in Tables 4 and 5, we observe that both Gamma and the contingency coefficient are higher for respondents and sons (0.49 and 0.76, Table 5), than for respondents and fathers (0.35 and 0.50, Table 4). The variance in both tables was statistically significant at the 0.001 level. What this implies is that upward income mobility is determined in good part by one's father's income. But this fact was less instrumental twenty years ago than it is at present. In other words, it was relatively easier for more people to improve their income vis-a-vis that of their fathers fifteen or twenty years ago than it is today.

In conclusion, it is quite obvious from aggregate data that income distribution in Egypt has been a function of: (a) the overall economic growth, and (b) State policies. Overall growth naturally increases [average income per capita], and tends to have a trickling effect on lower strata of the population. This can be seen from Table 1 for the years 1952-1960, i.e., even before the massive socialist measures of 1961.

State policies augment or distort income distribution. The Land Reform Laws of 1952 and 1961 had marked distributive effects in favor of the lower strata of Egypt's population up to 1965. The same is true for urban population, which benefited directly or indirectly from both economic expansion and the Socialist Laws of 1961.

Those significant effects, however, were not substantial enough to become self-propelling for further equalization without steady growth or state intervention on behalf of the poor. When both factors ceased to operate between 1965 and 1970, there was a slight increase of inequality. The trend toward inequality picked up after 1970 when the State began to intervene on behalf of the well-to-do.

The micro-structural data on Cairo's income mobility supports the above conclusion. The respondents' generation, roughly coinciding with the 1950's and 1960's period, had greater opportunities to improve its income standing vis-a-vis the previous generation (pre-Revolution). Their sons, however, remained mostly immobile. The few who attained upward income mobility tend to be the children of the more well-to-do.

#### IV. OCCUPATIONAL MOBILITY

Lipset and Zetterberg assert that "from Plato to the present, occupation has been the most common indicator of stratification. Social scientists have found that occupational categories are one of the major factors which differentiate people's beliefs, values, behavior, and even their emotional expressions."<sup>18</sup> Monitoring change in the occupational structure of a society, therefore, informs us about all these aspects. More important to us, however, is the income implication of occupational mobility.

Occupational mobility may be inferred from differential growth in each type of activity and/or occupational category vis-a-vis both overall population growth and growth of the labor force during the period under consideration (i.e., 1952-1977). The underlying assumption here is that occupational

mobility results from 1) the supply of vacant positions generated by expansion of certain socio-economic activities, and 2) the interchangeability of occupational positions without an overall expansion in socio-economic activities. Thus any mobility which occurs in society is either a consequence of a change in the absolute supply of job opportunities in certain occupational levels or results from an interchange among levels of the occupational structure. The latter means that for every move up there must be a move down. Interchange mobility is determined, to a large extent, by the opportunities which society gives its members of the lower occupational strata to compete with those who enter the structure on a higher level.<sup>19</sup>

#### A. Changing Economic Activities

Egypt's population grew from 19 to 37 million between 1947 and 1976, an increase of 93 percent in 29 years. Its civilian labor force, however, grew by only 38 percent (from 6.99 to 9.63 million) during the same period. Thus while the population at large grew at an average rate of slightly over 3 percent annually for the entire period, the comparable growth rate of employment was only 1.3 percent. The gap between the two rates may be explained by the rapid expansion of elementary education after 1952, which reduced the entry of children into Egypt's labor force. A similar expansion in the military, especially after 1967, appropriated nearly half a million youngsters who would have otherwise been added to the labor force.

Table 6 shows the distribution of Egypt's civilian labor force by broad economic activities between 1947 and 1976. It will be readily observed that those engaged in agriculture have declined steadily over the years. In 1947, agriculture appropriated over 58 percent of the total, and by 1966 it decreased by 5 percentage points. At present the share of agriculture is about 44 percent of Egypt's labor force. This is probably the first time in the country's long

Table 6

## Employment of Labor Force by Economic Activities (Thousands)

| Economic Activities                       | 1947         |              | 1960         |              | 1966         |              | 1971         |              | 1976         |              |
|-------------------------------------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|
|                                           | N            | %            | N            | %            | N            | %            | N            | %            | N            | %            |
| Agriculture                               | 4,086        | 58.4         | 4,406        | 57.0         | 4,447        | 53.4         | 4,471        | 53.2         | 4,224        | 43.9         |
| Manufacturing,<br>Mining and<br>Quarrying | 574          | 8.2          | 734          | 9.5          | 1,089        | 13.1         | 1,045        | 12.4         | 1,210        | 12.6         |
| Construction                              | 113          | 1.6          | 159          | 2.0          | 206          | 2.5          | 195          | 2.3          | 434          | 4.5          |
| Electricity, Gas and<br>Water             | 23           | 0.3          | 37           | 0.5          | 51           | 0.6          | 26           | 0.3          | 47           | 0.5          |
| Commerce and Finance                      | 590          | 8.4          | 641          | 8.3          | 599          | 7.2          | 803          | 9.6          | 1,016        | 10.6         |
| Transport, Communica-<br>tion and Storage | 203          | 2.9          | 260          | 3.4          | 340          | 4.1          | 324          | 3.9          | 422          | 4.4          |
| Other Services and<br>Unspecified         | 1,405        | 20.1         | 1,489        | 19.3         | 1,602        | 19.2         | 1,541        | 18.3         | 2,276        | 23.6         |
| <b>Total</b>                              | <b>6,995</b> | <b>100.0</b> | <b>7,727</b> | <b>100.0</b> | <b>8,334</b> | <b>100.0</b> | <b>8,406</b> | <b>100.0</b> | <b>9,628</b> | <b>100.0</b> |

Sources: Population Censuses 1947, 1960, 1966, 1976; Labor Force Sample Survey 1971, CAPMAS; 1976-1980 Egypt's Five Year Plan, Ministry of Planning.

recorded history in which the majority are no longer engaged in agriculture.

The share of manufacturing (and related activities) in the civilian labor force has grown steadily from 8 percent in 1947 to 13 percent in 1966. This five-point percentage rise is equal to the percentage drop in the share of agriculture between the same dates. It is fair to assume, therefore, that industry's relatively faster growth in manpower was at the expense of agriculture. The implication of this datum lies in the fact that earnings and wages in manufacturing are substantially greater than those in agriculture. In the 1960's the average wage in the latter was L.E. 137 per year, compared to L.E. 208 in manufacturing, i.e., a 52 percent difference.<sup>20</sup> In other words, the rise in industrial manpower between 1947 and 1966 meant definite upward mobility for at least 5 percent of Egypt's labor force. The relative share of industry in the mid-1960's has been the biggest ever. It was a clear and direct reflection of the industrialization program during the "Consciousness" and "Socialist Transformation" phases (1956-60, 1960-65, respectively). During the next two phases (Stagnation and Socialist Retreat) the share of the industrial labor force declined to 12.4 percent in 1971 and 12.6 in 1976.

The other big sectors of the economy are those of services and commerce. The services appropriated slightly over 20 percent of the civilian labor force in 1947. This share declined steadily to reach slightly over 18 percent by 1971. But during the Socialist Retreat phase, which coincides with the capitalist reorientation under the "Open Door" policy, the share of services climbed to an all-time high of nearly 24 percent of Egypt's total labor force. The same thing has happened with employment in commerce and finance. During the Consciousness and Socialist Transformation phases its share in the labor force declined to 8.3 and 7.2 percent in 1960 and 1966 respectively. But by 1976, with the Open Door policy in full swing, the share of commerce and finance

rose to nearly 11 percent of Egypt's total civilian labor force. The share of other sectors in the labor force showed a modest but steady rise, with a tiny halt between 1966 and 1971.

What may be concluded from Table 6 is that agriculture's share of the labor force has steadily and substantially declined over the period 1947-1976, a net loss of 14.5 percentage points. This decline took place regardless of the prevailing economic orientation, i.e., during the Socialist Transformation phase as well as during the Open Door phase. Most of this net loss, however, seemed to have been primarily a net gain for industry during the Socialist Transformation phase, and a net gain for services, commerce and finance during the Socialist Retreat (or Open Door) phase. Table 7 provides a clear substantiation for this conclusion.

### B. Changing Occupational Structure

Another way of depicting mobility is to examine the changing composition of Egypt's labor force broken down by occupational categories. Official statistics report these categories as shown in Table 8. Categories I and II include professionals (doctors, lawyers, engineers, scientists, teachers, and the like) and those in commanding government administrative positions as well as executives and managers of both public and private corporations. Together, these two categories represent the upper echelons of the occupational structure. In 1947, the date of the last census before the Revolution, they totalled 252,000 or 3.6 percent of the civilian labor force. In 1960, eight years after the Revolution, their representation rose to 4.8 percent. By 1966, the height of Socialist Transformation in Egypt, these two top categories totalled 588,000, or 6.6 percent of the labor force. After 1966, the professionals continued their absolute and relative growth, to 5.5 percent in 1971 and 5.7 percent in 1974. Administrative executives and managers, however, steadily declined in absolute as well as relative terms, from 150,000 in 1966 to 126,000 in 1971 to 91,000 in 1974. Of course, the 1974

Table 7  
Percentage Change of Labor Force by Economic Activities 1947-1976

| Economic Activity                    | 1947 - 1960  |                | 1960 - 1966  |                | 1966 - 1971  |                | 1971 - 1976  |                |
|--------------------------------------|--------------|----------------|--------------|----------------|--------------|----------------|--------------|----------------|
|                                      | Total Change | Annual Average |
| Agriculture                          | 7.83         | 0.6            | 0.93         | 0.2            | 0.54         | 0.1            | -5.6         | -1.1           |
| Manufacturing, Mining and Quarrying  | 27.89        | 2.2            | 48.36        | 8.1            | -4.05        | -0.8           | 15.79        | 3.2            |
| Construction                         | 40.71        | 3.1            | 29.56        | 4.9            | -5.40        | -1.1           | 122.56       | 24.5           |
| Electricity, Gas and Water           | 60.87        | 4.7            | 37.83        | 6.3            | -49.02       | -9.8           | 80.77        | 16.2           |
| Commerce and Finance                 | 8.64         | 0.7            | -6.56        | -1.1           | 34.06        | 6.8            | 26.53        | 5.3            |
| Transport, Communication and Storage | 28.08        | 2.2            | 30.77        | 5.1            | 30.25        | 6.1            | 30.25        | 6.1            |
| Other Services and Unclassified      | 6.00         | 0.8            | 7.59         | 1.3            | -3.81        | -0.8           | 47.70        | 9.5            |
| <b>Total</b>                         | <b>10.46</b> | <b>0.8</b>     | <b>7.86</b>  | <b>1.3</b>     | <b>0.86</b>  | <b>0.2</b>     | <b>14.54</b> | <b>2.9</b>     |

Source: Computed from data in Table 6, above.

one percent of Egypt's labor force on the three respective dates.

The third category is that of clerical occupations, which includes white-collars and the lower stratum of civil servants with lower than university level education. In 1947, their number was 140,000, representing 2 percent of the total civilian labor force. By 1966, they more than doubled, to reach 458,000 or 5.5 percent of the labor force. In the following five years, this category declined slightly in both absolute and relative terms, but by 1974 it topped the half-million mark and regained its relative representation of 5.5 percent of the total labor force.

Occupational categories I, II, and III share basically the same change pattern between 1947 and 1974. They assumed a steady growth in both relative and absolute terms between 1947 and 1966. This substantial change was primarily a function of the expansion of the economy in the first three phases of the 1952 Revolution. The rate of change was slowed down or completely halted between 1966 and 1971 because of the 1967 war and its aftermath. In addition, many of the medium and highly educated youngsters were drafted into the military between 1967 and 1973. Since our treatment here is confined to the civilian labor force, the data in Table 8 reflects this deflection in the flow of potential high and medium level manpower into the labor force. The data for 1974 (Table 8) shows the early effects of the post-1973 war, as tens of thousands were released from military service. Categories I and III recovered their 1966 position or improved on it. Category II, however, did not. A tentative explanation for the latter may be attributed to 1) the undermining of the public sector under the impact of the new Open Door policy adopted since 1973, and 2) the out-migration of many elements from this category to neighboring oil-rich Arab countries. Executives and managers, with a high entrepreneurial spirit, would naturally be more prone to migrate for greater fortunes elsewhere once the state ceased to create new opportunities for them. We may expect, however, that many of them

Table 8  
Distribution of Labor Force by Occupation 1947 - 1974 (Thousands)

| Occupation                                             | 1947         |              | 1960         |              | 1966         |              | 1971         |              | 1974         |              |
|--------------------------------------------------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|
|                                                        | N            | %            | N            | %            | N            | %            | N            | %            | N            | %            |
| I. Professional and Technical                          | 189          | 2.7          | 285          | 3.7          | 400          | 4.8          | 462          | 5.5          | 522          | 5.7          |
| II. Administrative and Managerial                      | 63           | 0.9          | 85           | 1.1          | 150          | 1.8          | 162          | 1.5          | 91           | 1.0          |
| III. Clerical Workers                                  | 140          | 2.0          | 285          | 3.7          | 458          | 5.5          | 429          | 5.1          | 507          | 5.5          |
| IV. Sales Workers                                      | 476          | 6.8          | 626          | 8.1          | 525          | 6.3          | 480          | 6.9          | 769          | 8.4          |
| <b>Total Non-Manual</b>                                | <b>868</b>   | <b>12.4</b>  | <b>1,281</b> | <b>16.6</b>  | <b>1,533</b> | <b>18.3</b>  | <b>1,497</b> | <b>17.9</b>  | <b>1,189</b> | <b>20.8</b>  |
| V. Craftsmen, Production, Processing*<br>and Operators | 1,490        | 15.5         | 1,491        | 19.3         | 1,733        | 20.8         | 1,547        | 18.4         | 1,999        | 22.2         |
| VI. Service Workers                                    | 630          | 9.0          | 688          | 8.9          | 701          | 8.4          | 765          | 8.3          | 826          | 9.1          |
| <b>Total Non-Farm Manual</b>                           | <b>1,720</b> | <b>24.6</b>  | <b>2,179</b> | <b>28.2</b>  | <b>2,434</b> | <b>29.1</b>  | <b>2,312</b> | <b>27.6</b>  | <b>2,825</b> | <b>31.1</b>  |
| II. Farmers and Related Workers                        | 4,232        | 60.5         | 4,103        | 53.1         | 4,198        | 50.4         | 4,337        | 51.6         | 4,126        | 45.6         |
| <b>Total Manual (V, VI and VII)</b>                    | <b>5,952</b> | <b>85.1</b>  | <b>6,282</b> | <b>81.3</b>  | <b>6,632</b> | <b>79.5</b>  | <b>6,649</b> | <b>79.2</b>  | <b>6,951</b> | <b>76.7</b>  |
| III. Not Specified                                     | 175          | 2.5          | 170          | 2.2          | 200          | 2.4          | 227          | 2.7          | 235          | 2.5          |
| <b>Total</b>                                           | <b>6,995</b> | <b>100.0</b> | <b>7,733</b> | <b>100.0</b> | <b>8,365</b> | <b>100.0</b> | <b>8,373</b> | <b>100.0</b> | <b>9,075</b> | <b>100.0</b> |

\*Including transportation workers.

Source: 1947, 1960, 1966 Population Censuses; CAPMAS, Labor Force Sample Surveys, 1971 and 1974, Cairo.

90

would return after accumulating seed capital to start private business, taking advantage of the measures provided by the Open Door policy.

Category IV in Table 8, sales workers, includes those working in commercial, financial and related activities, whether self-employed or employed by others. In 1947 they numbered 476,000 and made up 6.8 percent of the labor force. They continued to grow in the early years of the Revolution since free enterprises remained basically untouched by any contrary government policies. Thus, by 1960 their number topped the 626,000 mark, representing over 8 percent of the total civilian labor force. The 1960's decade however was not theirs, as Socialist Transformation began in earnest. The size of this category suffered a serious decline, falling to 525,000 or 6.3 percent of the labor force. But by 1974, the winds of change were in its favor, and sales workers rose to 769,000 or 8.4 percent of Egypt's labor force.

Category V includes skilled and semi-skilled workers such as craftsmen, production and processing workers, and machine operators. Between 1947 and 1960, their number rose by nearly half a million (1.1 to 1.5 million), or from 15.5 to 19.3 percent of Egypt's labor force. By 1966, the height of Socialist Transformation, the size of this category was over 1.7 million, or nearly 21 percent of the labor force. There was a slight decline in the 1966-71 period, as part of this manpower was transferred to the military on the one hand and as expansion in industry was halted on the other. But by 1974, i.e., the post-war years, this category more than recovered to reach nearly 2 millions in size and, over 22 → *nearly* percent of Egypt's total labor force.

Category VI, service workers, includes all the unskilled outside both industry and farming. Their number has been slightly but steadily increasing, from 630,000 in 1947 to 701,000 in 1966, and to 826,000 in 1974. Their percentage in the labor force, however, slightly dropped in the 1960's decade, from 9 percent in 1947 to 8.4 percent in 1966. But by 1974 their proportion rose again to slightly over 9 percent of the labor force.

Category VII includes farmers, farm workers, fishermen, and forestry workers. The size of this category, even though the biggest, seems to have stabilized around 4 millions since 1947. But since the total labor force is steadily growing, the proportionate representation of this category has steadily declined. Between 1947 and 1960, it dropped by 7.4 percentage points (60.5 to 53.1) of the labor force. With the exception of a slight reversal in the 1966-1971 period, the downward trend continued through 1974 to <sup>reach</sup> ~~research~~ 45.6 percent of Egypt's labor force.

We can look at the data in Table 8 in terms of manual and non-manual occupations. Categories I through IV represent the non-manual occupations, whose combined total rose from 868,000 in 1947 to 1.5 million in 1966 and to 1.9 million in 1974. The relative weight of these four non-manual occupational categories rose from 12.4 to 18.3 to 20.8 percent in the three periods respectively. As for manual occupations, Categories V, VI, and VII, we observe that the relative weight of their combined total has declined from 85.1 percent in 1947 to 79.5 percent in 1966, to 76.7 percent in 1974, or a drop of 8.4 percentage points in 29 years. All this drop, however, occurred in the farming and related occupations (Category VII). The non-farming manual occupations (Categories V and VI), rose from 24.6 percent in 1947 to 29.1 in 1966, to 31.1 percent in 1974, a net gain of 6.5 percentage points. To phrase it differently, Egypt's occupational structure though still heavily dominated by manual occupations is changing steadily toward non-manual occupations. The latter have gained 8.4 percentage points at the expense of the former in the course of the last 27 years. But among manual occupations the net loss was in farming and related occupations, amounting to 15.1 percentage points. Part of this loss went to other manual occupations, namely skilled and semi-skilled industrial (6.7 percentage points), and to non-manual occupations (8.4 percentage points).

Table 9 shows the percentage change in various occupational categories between 1947 and 1974. We divided this time span into periods which roughly correspond to the successive phases of Egypt's major policy orientations. Thus the 1947-1960 period covers the first eight years after the 1952 Revolution. As we indicated earlier, the first phase of these years up to 1956, saw the new regime concentrate on political consolidation, improving economic performance without much change in the nature of the economic order. Egypt's labor force as a whole grew at rates higher than the overall average. Highest rates of annual growth were accomplished in clerical (8 percent), professional (3.9 percent), and industrial (2.8 percent) occupations. Lower rates of annual growth were recorded in administrative and managerial occupations (2.7 percent), sales (2.4 percent), and service workers (0.7 percent). Farming occupations registered negative growth of -3 percent for the entire 1947-1960<sup>period</sup>, or -0.2 percent annually.

The following period, 1960-1966, is the Socialist Transformation period. The new socialist orientation involved not only measures of greater equitable distribution of wealth, but also a deliberate policy of planned economic growth, with special emphasis on industry. The labor force averaged an annual growth rate of 1.4 percent. All but sales, farming, and service occupations registered higher rates than this global average. The leading occupations in growth rates during this period were administrative and managerial (12.8 percent), followed by clerical (10.1 percent), industrial (9.8 percent), and professional occupations (6.7 percent). Sales occupations, in contrast, registered negative growth (-2.7 percent annually). Farming and service occupations grew at the very modest rate of 0.3 percent and 0.4<sup>percent</sup>, respectively.

The 1966-1971 period represented stagnation years. The war efforts and the drafting of about half a million into the military caused not only a halt but also a negative growth in several occupational categories. Training for professional, managerial, and production occupations did continue, but these

**Table 9**  
**Percentage Change of Occupational Composition 1947 - 1974**

| Occupational Category                       | 1947 - 1960   |                       | 1960 - 1966   |                       | 1966 - 1971   |                       | 1971 - 1974   |                       |
|---------------------------------------------|---------------|-----------------------|---------------|-----------------------|---------------|-----------------------|---------------|-----------------------|
|                                             | Entire Period | Average Annual Change |
| Professional and Technical                  | 50.8          | 3.9                   | 40.4          | 6.7                   | 15.5          | 3.1                   | 29.8          | 9.9                   |
| Administrative and Managerial               | 34.9          | 2.7                   | 76.5          | 12.8                  | -16.0         | -3.2                  | -17.8         | -5.9                  |
| Clerical                                    | 103.6         | 8.0                   | 60.7          | 10.1                  | -6.3          | -1.3                  | 18.2          | 6.1                   |
| Sales Workers                               | 31.5          | 2.4                   | -16.1         | -2.7                  | -8.6          | -1.7                  | 60.2          | 20.1                  |
| Craftsmen, Production Workers and Operators | 36.8          | 2.8                   | 59.0          | 9.8                   | -10.7         | -2.4                  | 29.2          | 9.7                   |
| Service Workers                             | 9.2           | 0.7                   | 1.8           | 0.3                   | 9.1           | 1.8                   | 7.9           | 2.6                   |
| Farmers                                     | -3.0          | -0.2                  | 2.3           | 0.4                   | 3.3           | 0.7                   | -5.0          | -1.7                  |
| Not Specified                               | -3.0          | -0.2                  | 17.6          | 2.9                   | 13.5          | 2.7                   | 3.5           | 1.2                   |
| <b>Total</b>                                | <b>10.6</b>   | <b>0.8</b>            | <b>8.2</b>    | <b>1.4</b>            | <b>0.1</b>    | <b>0.02</b>           | <b>8.4</b>    | <b>2.8</b>            |

Sources: Computed from data in Table 7.

new trainees, instead of joining the civilian labor force, were inducted into the army. Thus, as soon as the 1973 war was over, a huge backlog of trained manpower was released to join the civilian labor force. By 1974 we see the impact, as shown in the last column of Table 9. The annual growth rate for the entire labor force was the highest (2.8 percent) of all four periods covered in the table. The growth rate for sales occupations was remarkably high (20.1 percent), also reflecting the early thrust of the Open Door policy of the Sadat regime. But, high also were the growth rates in professional (9.9 percent), industrial (9.7 percent), and clerical occupations (6.1 percent). Service occupations grew modestly at 2.6 percent annually; administrative and farming occupations showed negative growth (-5.9 percent and -1.7 percent respectively).

### C. Intergenerational Occupation Mobility

Along with the aggregate data on Egypt's occupational structure, the 1979 Survey, conducted for the purpose of this volume, sheds more light on the inner dynamics of occupational mobility.

Table 10 compares the occupations of a Cairo sample of heads of households with those of their fathers. The occupational categories are arranged ordinally from "higher" to "lower." The diagonal (underscored values) represent the dividing line between upward (below it) and downward (above it) as well as cases of occupational immobility across two generations.

First, we look at the margin totals where the last column refers to respondents', and the last row their fathers' occupations. We observe immediately that professionals are nearly four times greater in the respondents' generation (9.3 percent) than in their fathers' generation (2.6 percent). Executives are twice as many in the respondents' generation (15.1 percent) compared to that of their fathers (7.7 percent).

There were similar, though less dramatic, increases in the percentages of clerical and sales occupations. In contrast, there were less production and service workers among the respondents than among their fathers. And since Table 10 contains data on Cairo only, obviously we can not compare the change across generations with regard to farming occupations. It is interesting to note, however, that as many as 29 percent of our respondents who are engaged in typically urban occupations had fathers who were in farming occupations. This in itself may be construed as a partial measure of rural-urban migration precipitated by and/or resulting in occupational mobility.

If we look at the inner cells of Table 10, we observe that a) as many as 50 percent of the professionals among the respondents (top row) are sons of peasants (34.5 percent) and workers (13.8 percent). Thus the entry into this high occupational category was only partly determined by father's occupation. This was also somewhat the case with the next category, executives, in which 34 percent of its ranks had peasant or working class fathers; b) But since workers and peasants accounted for over 70 percent of Egypt's labor force a generation ago, their sons (our respondents) were still markedly under-represented in the top occupational categories; c) Respondents whose fathers were professionals and executives tended to appear in greater percentages than their proportionate shares in the higher occupations, and in smaller percentages in lower occupations. Thus, only 4 percent of respondents in clerical and 1 percent in working class occupations were sons of professionals. And only 6 percent of the respondents in clerical, 2 percent in sales, and 1 percent in working class occupations were sons of executives. This suggests that the entry into higher occupations was relatively greater than exit from them across the two generations under consideration; d) The middle occupational categories, clerical and sales, tended to be manned primarily by sons of peasants, service workers, and people in the same occupations; e) Production workers among the respondents heavily tended to have working

Table 10. Occupational Mobility: Respondents and Fathers for a Sample of Heads of Households, Cairo, 1979 (N=312)

| <u>Occupation of Respondent</u> | <u>Occupation of his Father:</u> | <u>Profess. - Exec.</u> | <u>Clerical - Sales</u> | <u>Produc. Workers</u> | <u>Service Workers</u> | <u>Farming</u> | <u>Total</u> |      |       |
|---------------------------------|----------------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|----------------|--------------|------|-------|
| Professional                    |                                  | <u>10.3</u>             | <u>17.2</u>             | 10.1                   | 13.8                   | -              | 13.8         | 34.5 | 9.3   |
| Executive                       |                                  | 4.3                     | <u>25.5</u>             | 17.0                   | 19.1                   | 6.4            | 10.6         | 17.0 | 15.1  |
| Clerical                        |                                  | 4.2                     | 6.3                     | <u>16.7</u>            | 18.8                   | 2.1            | 20.8         | 29.2 | 15.4  |
| Sales                           |                                  | -                       | 2.3                     | 6.8                    | <u>36.4</u>            | 2.3            | 13.6         | 38.6 | 14.1  |
| Production                      |                                  | -                       | -                       | 13.3                   | 20.0                   | <u>20.0</u>    | 40.0         | 6.7  | 4.8   |
| Service                         |                                  | 1.0                     | 1.0                     | 6.7                    | 12.4                   | 2.9            | <u>42.9</u>  | 32.4 | 33.7  |
| Farming                         |                                  | -                       | -                       | -                      | -                      | -              | -            | -    | -     |
| Housewives                      |                                  | -                       | 8.3                     | 12.5                   | 25.0                   | 12.5           | 16.7         | 25.0 | 7.7   |
| <b>Total</b>                    |                                  | 2.6                     | 7.7                     | 10.9                   | 19.2                   | 4.5            | 25.6         | 28.8 | 100.0 |

Statistical Measures:  $\chi^2 = 106.41$      $P = 0.001$      $\text{Gamma} = 0.22$      $\text{Contingency Coeff.} = 0.50$

Source: Original Survey Data

class fathers (60 percent) or other typically middle urban occupations (33 percent). Very few had peasant fathers (7.7 percent). f) The primary source of manning the service workers category was from its own ranks (43 percent of their fathers were also service workers) and from the peasantry (32 percent).

The relationship between respondents' and fathers' occupation is positive in direction, though modest in volume (gamma 0.22, contingency coefficient 0.50). A weaker relationship implies greater mobility across occupational lines between the two generations. In other words, the data in Table 10, which is statistically significant at the 0.001 level, suggest a moderate to high degree of mobility. Respondents were generally better off than their fathers for the sample as a whole. Most of the respondents with fathers in higher occupations continued to be in equally high occupational categories. But the opposite was not true. Many respondents ~~of~~ with fathers in lower occupations managed to move up in the occupational ladder.

Table 11 shows the extent of occupational mobility between respondents and their sons. Here, we notice right away that upward mobility has become more difficult for sons of the working class. Only 9.7 percent of the sons of service workers made it to the professional category (compared to 13.8 percent in the previous generation, as shown in Table 10), and none made it to executive occupations (compared to 10.6 percent in the previous generation). None of the sons of production workers made a change to either one of the two top occupation categories (compared to 6.4 percent who made it to executive occupations in the previous generation). About the only upward mobility channel that was still open for sons of working class respondents was clerical occupations (33.3 percent of production workers' sons and 41.9 percent of service workers' sons). Otherwise, they were locked into working class occupations like their fathers (66.6 percent of production workers' sons and 48.4 percent of service workers' sons).

Table 11. Occupational Mobility: Respondents and Sons for a Sample of Heads of Households, Cairo, 1979 (N=91)

| <u>Occupation of Respondents</u> | <u>Occupation of Fathers:</u> | <u>Profess.</u> | <u>Executive</u> | <u>Clerical</u> | <u>Sales</u> | <u>Produc. Workers</u> | <u>Service Workers</u> | <u>Total</u> |
|----------------------------------|-------------------------------|-----------------|------------------|-----------------|--------------|------------------------|------------------------|--------------|
| Professional                     |                               | 87.5            | -                | 12.5            | -            | -                      | -                      | 8.8          |
| Executive                        |                               | 28.6            | 57.1             | -               | -            | 14.3                   | -                      | 7.7          |
| Clerical                         |                               | 20.0            | -                | 30.0            | -            | 20.0                   | 30.0                   | 10.9         |
| Sales                            |                               | 10.5            | 5.3              | 26.3            | 10.5         | 15.8                   | 31.6                   | 20.9         |
| Production                       |                               | -               | -                | 33.3            | -            | 33.3                   | 33.3                   | 3.3          |
| Service                          |                               | 9.7             | -                | 41.9            | -            | 6.5                    | 41.9                   | 43.1         |
| Housewives                       |                               | 23.1            | -                | 46.2            | 7.7          | 7.7                    | 15.4                   | 14.2         |
| Total                            |                               | 20.9            | 5.5              | 31.9            | 3.3          | 10.9                   | 27.5                   | 14.2         |

Statistical Measures:  $\chi^2 = 91.65$

P = 0.001

Gamma = 0.48

Cont. Coeff. = 0.71

Source: Original Survey Data

In contrast, nearly 88 percent of professionals' sons were also professionals, and nearly 86 percent of the executives' sons were either professionals (28.6 percent) or executives like their fathers (57.1 percent). In other words, there seems to be a greater consolidation at the top occupational categories, i.e., sons inheriting fathers, and thus restricting entry of newcomers from the ranks of the lower occupation categories.

Sons of respondents in middle level occupations, e.g. clerical and sales, showed a mixed record, though still on the whole better than those of the working class. Twenty percent of the sons of respondents in clerical jobs managed to join the ranks of professionals, and nearly 16 percent of the sons of respondents in sales occupations managed to rise up to the ranks of professionals (10.5 percent) or executives (5.3 percent). But as many as 50 percent of these sons slipped down to occupations lower than those of their fathers.

To sum up, the picture in Table 11, we may add up the values below and above the diagonal to show the extent and direction of mobility for the sons of respondents in each occupational category. For sons of professionals, 88 percent continued in top ranking occupations and only 12 percent experienced downward mobility. For sons of executives, 29 percent moved up, 57 percent remained upward mobile, and 14 percent moved downward. For sons of clerics, 20 percent moved up, 30 percent remained in place, and 50 percent stepped downward. For sons of sales occupation respondents, 42 percent moved up, 11 percent remained in place, and 47 percent moved down. For sons of production workers, one-third moved slightly up, one-third remained in place, and one-third moved down. Finally, for sons of service workers, 10 percent moved higher up, 42 percent moderately up, and 42 percent remained downward mobile.

The relationship between respondents' and sons' occupations is positive in direction, strong in volume ( $\text{Gamma} = 0.48$ , contingency coefficient 0.71), and highly significant, at the 0.001 level. This suggests that the respondents'

occupation made a substantial difference in determining his son's occupational standing, i.e., the higher that of the respondent, the higher that of the father and vice-versa.

Taken together, Tables 10 and 11 show occupational mobility across three generations, father, respondent and son. While father's occupation made only some difference in determining respondent's occupation ( $\text{Gamma} = 0.22$ ), the respondent's occupation made more than twice as much difference in determining son's occupation ( $\text{Gamma} = 0.48$ ). In other words, the middle generation enjoyed greater mobility (mostly upward) than did the younger, present, generation. The middle generation was occupationally placed in the 1950's and early 1960's, the younger one in the late 1960's and 1970's. The respondents' fathers (grandfathers to respondents' sons) were occupationally <sup>placed</sup> in the pre-1950 decades (1940's and 1930's). Thus, those who started their careers in the 1950's and 1960's had, on the whole, better occupational opportunities than both the preceding and following generations.

The data and analysis presented in this section seem to support our hypothesis concerning social mobility in Egypt since 1952. Manual occupations have subsided in favor of non-manual occupations. Farming activities have steadily declined in favor of non-farming occupations. In other words, an increasing portion of the labor force has been moving up occupationally, with all the implications entailed with regard to income and prestige. This upward occupational mobility, however, was greatly affected by the prevailing socio-economic policies in the successive periods of the 1952 Revolution. Between 1952 and 1966 most of the upward movement was channeled into professional, managerial, and manufacturing occupations. Then there was a slowdown or complete halt of occupational mobility in the years following the 1967 war, up to the early 1970's. After 1973, upward occupational mobility accelerated again. But with a new socio-economic orientation under President Sadat, known as the Open Door policy, most of the upward mobility was channeled into sales occupations. The latter include commercial and finance occupations which seem to

This conclusion based on national aggregate data is further sharpened by structural data on intergenerational mobility for a Cairo sample. Strong evidence shows that upward mobility was much greater in the 1950's and 1960's than it was in the pre-1950 decades or in the post 1960's decade. The upward occupational channels were much more open to sons of peasants and workers in the middle period than at any time before or after.

## V. EDUCATIONAL MOBILITY

Education is one of the principal indicators of socio-economic status. In modernizing societies, education is the fastest path to social mobility. Modernization implies at least two things: 1) the unfreezing of formerly rigid barriers among various strata, and 2) institution-building and expansion of modern economic activities. Educational achievement becomes a major criterion in manning these institutions and in carrying out those activities. Income, especially in the form of salaries and wages, becomes mainly a function of educational attainment. The channeling mechanism of status, in other words, becomes "achievement" rather than "ascription." The latter implies status determination on the basis of particularistic criteria such as kinship, family, tribal or ethnic background, i.e., inherited privileges.

The 1952 Revolution was keen from the beginning on undermining such inherited privileges and instituting principles of fairness and equal opportunities. One of its earliest acts was to abolish aristocratic titles such as "pasha," "bey," and "effendi," along with titles associated with the monarchy. Another major objective of the Revolution was modern institution building and economic development. Both thrusts meant the primacy of educational achievement as a social mobility vehicle. The efforts of the Revolution to expand education are covered in a separate Chapter in this volume (M.A. Fadil,

Chapter .). Our concern in this section will be mainly of educational mobility, both aggregate and intergenerational.

#### A. Aggregate Educational Mobility

The expansion of education in Egypt after 1952 allowed new groups in society to send their children to school, enlarged the pool of literate population, and increased the size of those groups in the medium and higher educational levels.

Tables 12 and 13 show the evolution of and relative changes in population over ten years of age by educational levels, from 1947 to 1976. The inference we may draw from these data is that between 1947 and 1976, greater numbers were being educated at a rate faster than that of annual population increments. Thus, while the population as a whole increased by nearly 198 percent in 29 years, the literate pool increased by 289 percent, i.e., nearly twice as much. To assess the aggregate educational mobility, we can assume that zero mobility would obtain if the literate pool grew at a rate similar to that of population in general, i.e., 198 percent between 1947 and 1976. That pool in 1947 was 3.1 millions. Had it grown by 198 percent, it would have been 6.1 millions in 1976. Any increase over the latter figure would mean upward educational mobility, and any decrease below the figure would imply the opposite, or downward mobility. Since the actual figure for 1976 was slightly over 12 millions, it means a net increment of 5.9 million or nearly 97 percent over the hypothetical figure (6.1 millions) had there been no mobility whatsoever.

The literate pool includes three broad categories: those who read and write (minimally educated), those with intermediate certificates (9-12 years of formal schooling), and those with college or higher certificates. We can apply the above method to assess the mobility for each category, i.e., rate of entry into it. Thus, had the minimally educated category grown at a rate similar to that of population between 1947 and 1976, its size would have been 5.8 millions, meaning

Table 12

Distribution of Population (Over 10 Years Old) by Educational Level  
1947 - 1976 (in Thousands)

| Educational Level             | 1947          |              | 1960          |              | 1966          |              | 1976          |              |
|-------------------------------|---------------|--------------|---------------|--------------|---------------|--------------|---------------|--------------|
|                               | N             | %            | N             | %            | N             | %            | N             | %            |
| Illiterate*                   | 10,900        | 78.0         | 12,726        | 70.5         | 13,770        | 65.3         | 15,611        | 56.5         |
| Read and Write                | 2,911         | 20.8         | 4,356         | 24.2         | 5,886         | 27.9         | 6,923         | 25.1         |
| Intermediate Certification    | 113           | 0.8          | 801           | 4.4          | 1,293         | 5.7          | 4,475         | 16.2         |
| College or Higher Certificate | 57            | 0.4          | 170           | 0.9          | 235           | 1.1          | 606           | 2.2          |
| <b>Total</b>                  | <b>13,972</b> | <b>100.0</b> | <b>18,053</b> | <b>100.0</b> | <b>21,084</b> | <b>100.0</b> | <b>27,615</b> | <b>100.0</b> |

\*including not classified.

Sources: Population Censuses, 1947, 1960, 1966, 1976, CAPMAS, Cairo.

Table 13  
**Percentage Change in Egyptians' Educational Level, 1947 - 1976**

| Educational Level              | 1947 - 1960              |                       | 1960 - 1966              |                       | 1966 - 1976              |                       |
|--------------------------------|--------------------------|-----------------------|--------------------------|-----------------------|--------------------------|-----------------------|
|                                | Change for Entire Period | Average Annual Change | Change for Entire Period | Average Annual Change | Change for Entire Period | Average Annual Change |
| Illiterate                     | 16.8                     | 1.3                   | 8.2                      | 1.4                   | 13.4                     | 1.3                   |
| Read and Write                 | 49.6                     | 3.8                   | 35.1                     | 5.6                   | 17.6                     | 1.8                   |
| Intermediate Certificates      | 608.8                    | 46.8                  | 48.9                     | 8.2                   | 275.1                    | 27.5                  |
| College or Higher Certificates | 198.2                    | 15.2                  | 38.2                     | 6.4                   | 157.9                    | 15.8                  |
| <b>Total</b>                   | <b>29.1</b>              | <b>2.2</b>            | <b>16.8</b>              | <b>2.8</b>            | <b>30.9</b>              | <b>3.1</b>            |

Source: Computed from data in Table 12.

no net mobility in or out of this category. But since the actual size in 1976 was 6.9 million, there is a net increment of 1.1 million, i.e., about 19 percent higher than the hypothetical no mobility figure. For the intermediate category, the hypothetical no mobility figure would have been 274,000 in 1976; the actual figure was 4.2 millions higher, i.e., about 1900 percent new entries into that category between 1947 and 1976. For the college-educated category, the new entries in the same period were 463 percent (or 493,000 persons) increment over the expected figure had that category grown at the same rate as the general population.

Another conclusion we can draw from Table 13 is that the average annual growth rate in the read-and-write category peaked during the 1960-1966 period (5.6 percent). The comparable averages for both intermediate and college categories reached their peak in the 1966-1976 period (at 2.7 and 15.8 percent, respectively). This seems natural, since each educational level represents a pool from which the next higher level would draw in successive years.

#### F. Intergenerational Mobility

Given the impressive rates of aggregate educational mobility in Egypt in the last quarter century, the question remains: which of the various strata in the society had greater access to available educational opportunities? This question can ideally be answered by surveying a representative cross section of all Egyptian families to collect comparative data on the educational level of sons, parents, and grandparents in the same family, along with information on their occupations and incomes (i.e., the other two indicators of socio-economic status). Such data is not available. However, we have a few small scale studies which shed some light on the question.

The first study was conducted in 1962 on government and public sector employees.<sup>21</sup> As Table 14 shows, nearly 43 percent were sons of professionals and managers. The combined total of these two latter categories in the labor force in

1960 was 4.2 percent. In other words, occupational categories I and II (Table 14) supplied the government and public sector with university-educated people at a percentage rate ten times bigger than their proportionate representation in the labor force. Category III, businessmen, finance and sales workers and landowners represented 10.2 percent of the labor force but supplied government and the public sector with 30.8 percent of the college-educated, i.e., three times their proportionate share. The other occupational categories, IV through VII, were all under-represented in the college-educated employees of government and public sector. Thus, only 2.7 percent of the latter were sons of parents in clerical occupations, which make up 8.1 percent of the labor force. Slightly over 4 percent of the college-educated were sons of craftsmen and skilled production workers (16.2 percent of the labor force). Service and unskilled workers, with 12.4 percent of the labor force, supplied government with only 1.4 of the college-educated employees. Occupational category VII, all others including small farmers, represented 41 percent of the labor force, but their university-educated children in government represented less than 18 percent of all employees.

The first three categories, I, II, and III, in Table 14 correspond roughly to the upper and upper middle strata in Egypt. They made up 14 percent of the labor force in the early 1960's. Together, however, they appropriated nearly 74 percent of all the higher-track positions in government and the public sector for their children. Categories IV and V correspond roughly to the small middle stratum; with a combined total of 24.3 percent of the labor force, they appropriated less than 7 percent of the high-track positions in the state apparatus. Finally, we may consider categories VI and VII as the lower strata. Their total in the labor force was about 54 percent, but the share of their children in high-track state positions was only 19 percent.

Among state employees with intermediate certificates, there was less lopsidedness. The upper occupational groups (I, II, and III in Table 14) appropriated for their children

**Table 14**  
**Percentage Distribution of Government and Public Sector employees by**  
**Their Educational Level According to Parents' Occupation, 1962**

| Father's Occupation                     | Percentage of Occupational Category in Labor Force (1960) | Educational Level of Employees |                                   |
|-----------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------|-----------------------------------|
|                                         |                                                           | College or Above Per Cent      | Intermediate Certificate Per Cent |
| I. Professionals                        | 3.1                                                       | 39.2                           | 18.4                              |
| II. Administrative and Managerial       | 1.1                                                       | 3.9                            | 0.8                               |
| III. Business, Commerce, and Landowners | 10.2                                                      | 30.8                           | 33.5                              |
| IV. Clerical (White Collars)            | 8.1                                                       | 2.7                            | 18.8                              |
| V. Craftsmen and Skilled Workers        | 16.2                                                      | 4.1                            | 12.7                              |
| VI. Service and Unskilled Workers       | 12.4                                                      | 1.4                            | 2.8                               |
| VII. Other Occupations                  | 41.1                                                      | 17.9                           | 13.0                              |
| <b>Total</b>                            | <b>100.0</b>                                              | <b>100.0</b>                   | <b>100.0</b>                      |

Sources: M. A. Shafshak, "Role of University in the Formation of Egyptian Elite," in National Review of Social Research (Arabic, Cairo), No. 2-3, 1968; Nazih N. Ayubi, Educational Policy in Egypt (Arabic), Cairo: Center for Political and Strategic Studies, 1978, p. 72; 1960 Census.

52.7 percent of the medium-track positions in the state apparatus. The middle categories (IV and V) appropriated 31.5 of the medium-track positions; the lower categories appropriated 15.8 percent of such positions. It is clear, here, that medium and lower occupational categories fared better in medium-track positions than they did with higher-track slots. Their combined share in the former was 26 percent, and in the latter 47 percent.

Another study conducted in 1966 on the students of Cairo University,<sup>22</sup> also offers a partial answer to the question of intergenerational mobility. The data are presented in Table 15. Being a university student, presumably, means that upon graduation the person will occupy a high-track position in the state, public or private sectors, i.e., upper occupational categories. Therefore, we may assume that there is greater upward mobility if the proportion of students whose parents are from middle or lower occupations is rising over time. Categories I and II in Table 15 may be considered upper occupational groups since they include professionals, scientists, top administrators, executives, managers, businessmen, and rich farmers. In 1966 they made up about 17 percent of the labor force, but they appropriated for their children nearly 63 percent of all slots in Cairo University. Even though still over-represented, their share in potential high-track positions has dropped (from 74 percent in Table 14) by about 11 percentage points between the early and middle 1960's.

Students whose parents were in medium occupations (categories II and III in Table 15) totalled about 29 percent of Cairo University's student body. Assuming that they enter higher track positions upon graduation, this represents a jump of 22 percentage points over their share in government in the early 1960's (Table 14). The farming occupations were still heavily under-represented. They made up over 50 percent of the labor force, but appropriated only 6 percent of the university slots for their children.

**Table 15. Distribution of Students in Cairo University According to Parents' Occupation, 1966**

| Parents' Occupation                       | % of Occupational Category in Labor Force | Students at Cairo University |
|-------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------|------------------------------|
| I Professionals, administrators, managers | 6.6                                       | 33.2                         |
| II Businessmen, landowners                | 10.1                                      | 29.3                         |
| III Clerical (white collar)               | 5.5                                       | 21.0                         |
| IV Craftsmen and skilled workers          | 18.4                                      | 5.6                          |
| V Farmers                                 | 50.4                                      | 5.8                          |
| VI Others                                 | 9.0                                       | 3.1                          |
| Total                                     | 100.0                                     | 100.0                        |

Source: M.A. Shafshak, "Role of University in the Formation of the Egyptian Elite," National Review of Social Research (Cairo) No. 2-3, 1968 (Arabic); and 1966 Census.

Finally, we present data from the Cairo sample survey conducted in 1979, thirteen years after the above mentioned study. Tables 16 and 17 show the levels of education for respondents and their fathers, and for respondents and their sons, respectively. Together, they reflect the extent and direction of educational mobility across three generations.

The margin totals in Table 16 show the overall improvement in educational attainments of respondents over their fathers. The illiterates among the latter were proportionately more than twice that among the former (48.4 versus 22.6 percent). The college-educated among respondents (15 percent) were nearly four times that of their fathers (4 percent). Looking at the diagonal reveals the dynamics of such improvement. Many of the illiterates among respondents (85 percent) had illiterate fathers (i.e., two-generation illiterates). The rest, 15 percent, had fathers who were at least literate. Their... In the

**Table 16. Educational Mobility: Respondents and Fathers for a Sample of Heads of Households, Cairo, 1979 (N = 313)**

| Education of Respondents | Education of their fathers: | (3)         |              |            |             |             |               | Total |
|--------------------------|-----------------------------|-------------|--------------|------------|-------------|-------------|---------------|-------|
|                          |                             | Illiterate  | Read & Write | Primary    | Preparatory | Secondary   | College grad. |       |
| Illiterate               |                             | <u>84.7</u> | 13.9         | -          | 1.4         | -           | -             | 22.6  |
| Read & write             |                             | 62.4        | <u>32.3</u>  | 4.3        | -           | 1.1         | -             | 29.2  |
| Primary                  |                             | 48.4        | 41.9         | <u>9.7</u> | -           | -           | -             | 9.7   |
| Preparatory              |                             | 29.4        | 58.8         | 5.9        | <u>-</u>    | 5.9         | -             | 5.3   |
| Secondary                |                             | 21.2        | 40.4         | 11.5       | 3.8         | <u>13.5</u> | 9.6           | 16.4  |
| College                  |                             | 4.2         | 39.6         | 20.8       | 2.1         | 10.4        | <u>18.8</u>   | 15.1  |
| Post-graduate            |                             | -           | 20.0         | -          | -           | 40.0        | <u>40.0</u>   | 1.6   |

Statistical Measures:  $\chi^2 = 158.58$      $P = 0.001$      $\Gamma = 0.68$     Contingency coefficient = 0.58

Source: Original Survey Data

next educational level, reading and writing, 62 percent of the respondents had illiterate fathers, i.e., one step improvement; 32 percent were like their fathers, and 4 percent were worse off than their fathers, or one-step downward mobility.

Respondents in the third category, Primary education, were mostly better off than their fathers: 48 percent of them have illiterate fathers, 42 percent have fathers who only read and write, and 10 percent had fathers who were at the same level. In other words, there is no downward mobility in this category.

Respondents with Preparatory certificates showed nearly the same overall improvement. Over 29 percent of their fathers were illiterates (i.e., three steps up); 59 percent of their fathers read and write (two steps up), and 6 percent of their fathers had primary certificates (one step up). All in all, 94 percent of the respondents in this educational level have experienced upward mobility and only 6 percent moved downward.

Respondents in the category with Secondary certificates were mostly sons of illiterates (21 percent) or of barely literate fathers (40 percent). Slightly over 15 percent of the respondents had fathers with primary or preparatory education. All in all, then, about 77 percent in this category have experienced upward mobility (from one to four steps). Nearly 14 percent have remained at the same level as fathers and about 10 percent have experienced downward mobility.

Among respondents with college education, few (4 percent) of their fathers were illiterates, but the majority of fathers (60 percent) were either barely literate (40 percent) or with only primary level education (20 percent). For these respondents, the educational mobility was indeed substantial, i.e., five and four steps up, respectively. All in all, 77 percent of the respondents with college education were born to fathers who did not exceed the secondary level. The rest (23 percent) were born to fathers with university or post-graduate education.

The relationship shown in Table 16 is positive in direction, strong in volume ( $\Gamma = 0.68$ ), and highly significant (at the 0.001 level). But it is a complex relationship. Thus, while it is shown that father's education is a major determinant

of respondents' education, this determinancy varied markedly from one level of fathers' education to another. The channels of upward educational mobility opened up the most to respondents born to fathers not in the very lowest educational level but in the two levels immediately above.

Table 17 shows the relationship between respondents' and their sons' education. Again, we notice a continuation of the upward educational mobility for the third generation. Illiteracy among the sons has been reduced to about one-third of that of the respondents (10.5 versus 28.9 percent). Sons with secondary certificates were nearly three times more than among their fathers (34.7 versus 12.6 percent). Sons with college education made up over 16 percent compared to 10 percent among their fathers (the respondents).

Of the illiterate respondents, only 24 percent of their sons remained illiterate. The rest (76 percent) of the sons moved up on the educational scale: 20 percent by one step, 15 percent by two steps, 7 percent by three, 24 percent by four, and 11 percent by five steps above their fathers.

Of the sons of literate respondents, 88 percent were better off educationally than their fathers, 11 percent remained the same, and 11 percent were worse off. Among those who moved up, 19 percent did so by one step, 17 percent by two, 31 percent by three, and 12 percent by four steps. The middle educational categories of respondents (primary, preparatory, secondary) had no illiterate sons. Most of the latter are concentrated in the middle and upper educational levels. Greater concentration of the sons of college-educated respondents are in the upper educational end of the scale (college and post-graduate add up to 63 percent). All in all, Table 17 shows many empty cells below the diagonal, reflecting the general upward mobility for the sons in educational attainment.

The relationship implied by the data in Table 17 is positive, moderate in volume ( $\text{Gamma} = 0.50$ ), and highly significant at the 0.001 level. But while there is no doubt of the fact that most sons are better off than most fathers (respondents) educationally, we still notice that the degree of betterment varies markedly from one educational level of

**Table 17. Educational Mobility: Respondents and Sons for a Sample of Heads of Households, Cairns, 1979 (N = 190)**

| <u>Education of Respondents</u> | <u>Education of their Sons:</u> | <u>Illiterate</u> | <u>Read &amp; Write</u> | <u>Primary</u> | <u>Prepara-tory</u> | <u>Secon-dary</u> | <u>College</u> | <u>Post-grad.</u> | <u>Total</u> |
|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|-------------------|-------------------------|----------------|---------------------|-------------------|----------------|-------------------|--------------|
| Illiterate                      |                                 | <u>23.6</u>       | 20.0                    | 14.5           | 4.3                 | 23.6              | 10.9           | -                 | 38.9         |
| Read & Write                    |                                 | 10.8              | <u>10.8</u>             | 18.5           | 16.9                | 30.8              | 12.3           | -                 | 34.2         |
| Primary                         |                                 | -                 | 5.0                     | <u>30.0</u>    | 5.0                 | 50.0              | 10.0           | -                 | 10.5         |
| Preparatory                     |                                 | -                 | -                       | 16.7           | <u>16.7</u>         | 66.7              | -              | -                 | 3.2          |
| Secondary                       |                                 | -                 | -                       | 4.2            | 8.3                 | <u>58.3</u>       | 25.0           | 4.2               | 12.6         |
| College                         |                                 | -                 | -                       | -              | 15.8                | 21.1              | <u>47.4</u>    | 15.8              | 10.0         |
| Post-graduate                   |                                 | -                 | -                       | -              | -                   | -                 | 100.0          | <u>-</u>          | 0.5          |
| <b>Total</b>                    |                                 | 10.5              | 10.0                    | 14.7           | 11.6                | 34.7              | 16.3           | 2.1               | 100.0        |

Statistical Measures:  $\chi^2 = 98.95$        $P = 0.001$        $\text{Gamma} = 0.50$       Contingency coeff. = 0.57

Source: Original Survey Data

respondents to another. Thus, while only 11 percent of illiterate respondents' sons and 12 percent of literate respondents' sons made it all the way to college, more than twice as many of the sons of secondary-educated, and four times as many of the sons of college-educated respondents got to college. This situation is relatively no better than it was a generation earlier (as implied in Table 16). To clarify this point we reconstruct the total margins of Tables 16 and 17 of the three upper educational levels for the three generations:

| Generation:<br>Level of Education | I<br>Fathers<br>% | II<br>Respondents<br>% | III<br>Sons<br>% |
|-----------------------------------|-------------------|------------------------|------------------|
| Secondary                         | 4.7               | 16.4                   | 34.7             |
| College                           | 4.4               | 15.1                   | 16.3             |
| Post-graduate                     | <u>0.6</u>        | <u>1.6</u>             | <u>2.1</u>       |
| Total:                            | 9.7               | 33.1                   | 53.1             |

We see immediately that the middle generation, II, has nearly quadrupled its percentages in secondary and college education vis-a-vis generation I (their fathers). On the other hand, generation III (the sons) only doubled its percentage of secondary education and slightly increased its college and post-graduate education vis-a-vis generation II. In other words, the upward educational gains of generation II are substantially greater than those of generation III.

Generation I is mostly made up of persons whose educational opportunities were charted in pre-1952 times (i.e., in the 1920's, 1930's, 1940's). Generation II is made up mostly of persons whose opportunities were determined in the 1950's and early 1960's, i.e., the height of the 1952 Revolution. Generation III is mostly made up of youngsters whose educational opportunities were set in the late 1960's and throughout the 1970's, i.e., years of stagnation and socialist retreat.

The national aggregate data as well as the data from the three surveys cited above strongly support our hypothesis with regard to Egypt's social mobility in the last three decades. Taking education as an indicator, the volume of upward mobility reached its maximum in the 1950's to the mid-1960's period. Although upward mobility continued through the late 1960's and 1970's, its relative increase has markedly been smaller and more concentrated between the middle and upper educational levels.

## VI. LINKAGES OF CLASS COMPONENTS

In this final section an attempt is made to link the various components which determine one's class position, i.e., his socio-economic status (SES). Four components are considered: income, occupation, education, and life-style. The first three were separately elaborated in earlier sections. The fourth, life-style, is operationalized here in terms of acquisition of certain durable goods.<sup>23</sup>

Since income distribution is the focus of this volume, we will first elaborate its linkages with other components of SES separately. Then we shall construct a composite<sup>index</sup> of all four indicators including income and measure it against how people subjectively perceive their own class standing.

### A. Social Correlates of Incomes

We made several assertions to the effect that income is determined by and is a determinant of education, occupation, and life style. Tables 18 through 25 give data which substantiate these assertions.

1. Income and occupation: To suggest that occupation and income are interrelated in a modern or a modernizing society is not new. What would be of greater significance is to reveal the strength of such relationship. Table 18 shows the annual income distribution by broad economic activities for a national sample survey of heads of families of Egypt's labor force in

1974

1977

Although economic activities are not occupations per se, it is still obvious that agricultural occupations have their central tendency toward the lower end of the income scale. The "modal" category<sup>(Circled in Table 8)</sup> is L.E. 150 income per family per annum. Manufacturing, construction, commerce, transportation, and services occupations are included in the same income bracket above. Their modal category is L.E. 200-250 per annum, and they are closer to the middle of the income distribution. Finance and insurance activities have the highest central tendency; their modal category is the L.E. 600-800 per annum.

Table 19 shows distributional data by occupational category for another national sample survey conducted in 1978. The income categories here are in U.S. dollars, and the occupational classification is not strictly comparable with similar Egyptian data, since the survey was conducted as part of a comparative attitudinal study in several Arab countries. What matters, however, is the magnitude of the relationship. We observe from Table 19, for example, that mass media, medical and legal occupations are at the top of Egypt's income scale. They are followed in this respect by engineers, academics, craftsmen and skilled labor. At the lowest end of the scale (less than \$1000 per year) we find farming, unskilled and semi-skilled labor, agronomists, and educational occupation. The lowest income category in this table is at a relatively high cutting point, and it therefore may contain a greater variance within it than between it and other income categories. This suggests some precautions in drawing any firm conclusions. The findings, nevertheless, substantiate one of the impressionistic observations made in recent years about the rising income of craftsmen and self-employed skilled labor (e.g., mechanics, carpenters, electricians, plumbers, etc.). Respondents in these manual occupations reported, on the average, higher annual incomes than some of the white-collar and college-based occupations. The correlation between occupation and income,

18. Distribution of Sample Families According to Activities and Levels of Income (L.E. per Year), 1974

| Levels of Income:          | <50 | 50- | 75-  | 100- | 150- | 200- | 250- | 300- | 350- | 400- | 500- | 600- | 800- | 1000- | 1400- | 2000- | **  | Total |
|----------------------------|-----|-----|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|-------|-------|-------|-----|-------|
| Activity                   |     |     |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |       |       |       |     |       |
| Agriculture                | 78  | 184 | 689  | 1193 | 1414 | 1259 | 918  | 658  | 518  | 445  | 300  | 196  | 112  | 51    | 30    | 11    | 11  | 8068  |
| Mining & Quarrying         | -   | -   | -    | 5    | 9    | 14   | 13   | 10   | 8    | 6    | 4    | 5    | 2    | -     | 2     | 4     | -   | 86    |
| Manufacturing              | 4   | 23  | 95   | 378  | 818  | 905  | 697  | 606  | 497  | 474  | 819  | 297  | 136  | 66    | 52    | 27    | 9   | 5403  |
| Electricity, Gas & Water   | -   | 1   | -    | 14   | 32   | 27   | 11   | 30   | 13   | 15   | 12   | 16   | 8    | 2     | -     | 1     | -   | 182   |
| Construction               | 2   | 6   | 12   | 78   | 157  | 181  | 151  | 118  | 86   | 82   | 65   | 56   | 46   | 19    | 10    | 7     | -   | 1075  |
| Commerce & Hotels          | 24  | 54  | 157  | 385  | 669  | 686  | 584  | 507  | 475  | 463  | 311  | 306  | 190  | 100   | 55    | 48    | 6   | 5020  |
| Transport & Communications | -   | 9   | 23   | 95   | 197  | 236  | 237  | 253  | 224  | 224  | 169  | 159  | 79   | 49    | 20    | 9     | 1   | 2044  |
| Finance & Insurance        | 1   | -   | 4    | 9    | 40   | 30   | 33   | 37   | 36   | 44   | 49   | 69   | 33   | 29    | 16    | 4     | -   | 434   |
| Services                   | 22  | 61  | 175  | 430  | 789  | 896  | 643  | 638  | 476  | 560  | 444  | 450  | 299  | 217   | 142   | 69    | 10  | 6277  |
| Unclassified               | 610 | 479 | 796  | 901  | 1057 | 831  | 566  | 518  | 408  | 435  | 289  | 305  | 188  | 133   | 85    | 48    | 41  | 7690  |
| Total                      | 741 | 817 | 1951 | 3488 | 5183 | 5098 | 3853 | 3367 | 2732 | 2748 | 1962 | 1859 | 1093 | 670   | 412   | 228   | 78  | 36280 |
| Average                    | 2.0 | 2.3 | 5.4  | 9.6  | 14.3 | 14.1 | 16.1 | 9.3  | 7.5  | 7.6  | 5.4  | 5.1  | 3.0  | 1.9   | 1.1   | .06   | .02 | 100   |

Source: Labor Force Sample Survey, May, 1974. CAPMAS, Cairo, 1976.

Relationship between Occupation and Annual Income of a Sample of Heads of Households in Egypt, 1978, in U.S. Dollars (Percentages), N=1972

| Occupation       | Income: Less than 1000 | 1000-2000 | 2000-3000 | 3000-4000 | 4000-5000 | 5000-6000 | 6000-7000 | 7000-8000 | 8000 & above | Total |
|------------------|------------------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|--------------|-------|
| Unclassified     | 65.1                   | 24.3      | 6.9       | 1.6       | -         | 1.6       | -         | -         | 0.5          | 100.0 |
| Managerial       | 49.7                   | 28.2      | 11.9      | 7.3       | 1.1       | 0.6       | -         | 0.6       | 0.6          | 100.0 |
| Engineering      | 52.1                   | 35.1      | 8.5       | 2.1       | 1.1       | -         | -         | -         | 1.1          | 100.0 |
| Professions      | 50.5                   | 29.0      | 4.3       | 8.6       | 1.1       | 2.2       | 2.2       | 2.2       | -            | 100.0 |
| Media            | 19.1                   | 29.8      | 18.3      | 11.5      | 4.6       | 6.1       | 8.4       | - 0.8     | 1.5          | 100.0 |
| Arts and culture | 78.0                   | 16.0      | 4.0       | 2.0       | -         | -         | 0.4       | -         | -            | 100.0 |
| Education        | 80.9                   | 16.7      | 2.0       | -         | -         | -         | -         | -         | -            | 100.0 |
| Scientists       | 82.1                   | 17.0      | 0.9       | -         | 3.3       | -         | -         | -         | 40.0         | 100.0 |
| Professional     | 43.3                   | 10.0      | 3.3       | -         | -         | -         | -         | 1.5       | -            | 100.0 |
| Administration   | 79.4                   | 17.6      | 1.5       | -         | -         | -         | -         | 0.3       | 0.3          | 100.0 |
| Service          | 72.5                   | 20.0      | 2.7       | 2.4       | 1.5       | 0.3       | -         | -         | -            | 100.0 |
| Skilled labor    | 68.3                   | 24.4      | 2.4       | 2.4       | -         | -         | 2.4       | -         | -            | 100.0 |
| Unskilled labor  | 89.2                   | 9.6       | 1.2       | -         | -         | -         | -         | -         | -            | 100.0 |
| Unemployed       | 91.0                   | 7.2       | 1.2       | 0.6       | -         | -         | -         | -         | -            | 100.0 |
| Total            | 69.0                   | 19.0      | 4.9       | 2.7       | 0.8       | 0.8       | 0.8       | 0.3       | 1.7          | 100.0 |

Statistical Measures:  $\chi^2 = 983.99$  P = 0.01 Gamma = 0.32 Contingency coefficient = 0.58

Source: Survey data, S.E. Ibrahim, Arab Attitudes toward Unification in Ten Arab Countries (forthcoming), Beirut: Center for Arab Unity Studies.

as shown in Table 19, is statistically significant at the 0.01 level, and its magnitude is moderate (Gamma = 0.32, contingency coefficient 0.58). This suggests that income is positively related to occupation, though not always or strictly along manual versus non-manual lines.

Table 20 gives the results of a smaller scale survey of a Cairo sample of heads of household conducted in 1979. The occupational classification here is similar to that used in official Egyptian census and surveys, and is different from that used in Table 19 above. Yet, the magnitude of correlation as measured by both Gamma (0.39) and contingency coefficient (0.52) is very close to that reported in Table 19. The modal income category for professionals and executives are in the fourth highest income bracket (L.E. 1000-1500 per annum), and as many as 16 percent of the professionals and 22 percent of the executives were in higher income brackets. The modal category for clerical occupations and production workers was the second income bracket (L.E. 300-500 per annum), and except for housewives, they ranked closest to the lower end of the income scale. Between them on the one hand and the professionals and executives on the other hand, we find people in sales and service occupations situated nearly in the middle. The modal income category for sales and services (who tend to be self-employed) is the third income bracket, L.E. 500-1000 annually.

In summary, the data in the three tables, though not strictly comparable, substantiate the proposition that income and occupation are interrelated. The correlation between the two variables, however, is far from perfect. At best, occupation explains slightly more than 50 percent of the variance in the income of Egyptians surveyed between 1974 and 1979. This suggests that other factors must be introduced to explain the rest of the variance.

2. Income and education: Education is thought of as another determinant of income in most societies, i.e., the higher the education, the higher the income, and vice versa. Tables 21, 22, and 23 contain data from the same three surveys cited above.

**Table 20. Relationship between Family Annual Income and Occupation for a Sample of Heads of Households in Cairo, 1979 (Percentages);**  
**N = 320**

| Occupation         | Annual Income, LE: | (1)<br>Less than 300 | (2)<br>300-500 | (3)<br>500-1000 | (4)<br>1000-1500 | (5)<br>1500-2000 | (6)<br>2000-3000 | (7)<br>3000-5000 | (8)<br>5000 & above | Total        |
|--------------------|--------------------|----------------------|----------------|-----------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|---------------------|--------------|
| Professionals      |                    | -                    | 10.0           | 33.3            | 40.0             | 6.7              | -                | 6.7              | 3.3                 | 9.4          |
| Executives         |                    | -                    | 10.6           | 27.7            | 38.3             | 10.6             | 10.6             | -                | 2.1                 | 14.7         |
| Clerical           |                    | 8.3                  | 35.4           | 31.3            | 18.8             | 6.3              | -                | -                | -                   | 15.0         |
| Sales              |                    | 19.1                 | 31.9           | 34.0            | 6.4              | -                | 8.5              | -                | -                   | 14.7         |
| Production workers |                    | 17.6                 | 47.1           | 23.5            | 5.9              | 5.9              | -                | -                | -                   | 5.3          |
| Service workers    |                    | 17.0                 | 32.1           | 35.9            | 7.5              | 6.6              | 0.9              | -                | -                   | 33.1         |
| Housewives         |                    | 28.0                 | 36.0           | 28.0            | 8.0              | -                | -                | -                | -                   | 7.8          |
| <b>Total</b>       |                    | <b>12.8</b>          | <b>28.4</b>    | <b>32.2</b>     | <b>16.6</b>      | <b>5.6</b>       | <b>3.1</b>       | <b>0.6</b>       | <b>0.6</b>          | <b>100.0</b> |

$\chi^2 = 117.23$

$P = 0.001$

Gamma = 0.39

Contingency coefficient = 0.52

Source: Original Survey Data

The National Labor Survey data (Table 21) shows the modal income category for illiterates to be L.E. 150 annually; the barely literate (second row) are concentrated in the next income category (L.E. 200 per annum). But the next three educational levels jump their modal categories by three steps, i.e., L.E. 400-500. The college-educated are concentrated in the upper third of the income scale (modal category L.E. 600-800), with as many as 50 percent in income brackets higher than the mode. The same applies to those with post-graduate education; their modal category is L.E. 1000-1400 annually, with as many as 38 percent of them in higher income brackets.

The 1978 Arab Attitudes Survey data for the Egyptian National Sample, shown in Table 22, gives another distribution of income and education. Again, the correlation between the two variables is highly significant (at the 0.001 level), and the measure of association, Gamma, is 0.47. At the lower end of the income scale (below 1000) we find 93 percent of the lowest educated respondents, compared to only 49 percent of the highest educated. The comparable percentages for respondents with intermediate and college education are 82 and 68, respectively. None in the lowest educational level goes beyond the third (of nine) income category, and none in the intermediate level earns beyond the fifth category. In contrast, both the graduates and post graduates span all income brackets to the top.

Finally, Table 23 shows the same relationship between education and income for a Cairo sample in 1979. The results are quite consistent with the two surveys cited above. The lowest income category (less than L.E. 300) shows a preponderance of illiterates (57 percent) and the barely literate (31 percent). These lowest two educational levels decline gradually as we go up the income scale until they disappear by the fifth and sixth brackets completely. In contrast, the highest two income brackets are populated entirely by the college educated and post graduates. The correlation between

21. Distribution of Sample Families According to Educational Status and Level of Income (L.E./year), 1974.

|                              | 1   | 2   | 3    | 4    | 5    | 6    | 7    | 8    | 9    | 10   | 11   | 12   | 13   | 14    | 15    | 16    | Un-   | Total | %     |
|------------------------------|-----|-----|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
|                              | <50 | 50- | 75-  | 100- | 150- | 200- | 250- | 300- | 350- | 400- | 500- | 600- | 800- | 1000- | 1400- | 2000- | clear |       |       |
| literate                     | 709 | 743 | 1697 | 2697 | 3392 | 2863 | 1993 | 1501 | 1127 | 918  | 582  | 385  | 168  | 59    | 22    | 8     | 43    | 18907 | 52.1  |
| can read & write             | 27  | 66  | 224  | 682  | 1526 | 1787 | 1451 | 1287 | 1093 | 1066 | 742  | 577  | 294  | 153   | 98    | 48    | 16    | 11137 | 30.7  |
| low intermediate certificate | 1   | 1   | 10   | 23   | 68   | 114  | 88   | 131  | 112  | 148  | 101  | 93   | 48   | 30    | 11    | 7     | 4     | 990   | 2.7   |
| intermediate certificate     | 4   | 7   | 20   | 80   | 188  | 285  | 265  | 322  | 281  | 386  | 293  | 368  | 189  | 109   | 62    | 34    | 14    | 2907  | 8.0   |
| low intermediate certificate | -   | -   | -    | 2    | 4    | 39   | 37   | 57   | 40   | 64   | 58   | 56   | 40   | 25    | 10    | 3     | -     | 435   | 1.2   |
| university certificate       | -   | -   | -    | 3    | 2    | 6    | 16   | 67   | 78   | 158  | 180  | 364  | 331  | 263   | 186   | 99    | 1     | 1754  | 4.8   |
| post graduate certificate    | -   | -   | -    | -    | -    | -    | 2    | 1    | 1    | 8    | 4    | 14   | 23   | 31    | 23    | 29    | -     | 136   | 0.4   |
| illiterate                   | -   | -   | -    | 1    | 3    | 4    | 1    | 1    | -    | -    | 2    | 2    | -    | -     | -     | -     | -     | 14    | 0.04  |
| total                        | 741 | 817 | 1951 | 3488 | 5183 | 5098 | 5853 | 3367 | 2732 | 2748 | 1962 | 1859 | 1093 | 670   | 412   | 228   | 78    | 36280 | 100.0 |
| percent                      | 2.0 | 2.3 | 5.4  | 9.6  | 14.3 | 14.1 | 16.1 | 9.3  | 7.5  | 7.6  | 5.4  | 5.1  | 3.0  | 1.9   | 1.1   | 0.6   | 0.2   |       | 100.0 |

Source: Labor Force Sample Survey May Round 1974, CAPMAS, Cairo, 1976.

**Table 22. Relationship between Annual Family Income and Education for a Sample of Heads of Households in Egypt, 1978, in U.S. Dollars (Percentages)**  
N = 1972

| <u>Annual Income</u> | <u>Education:</u> | <u>Intermediate &amp; below</u> | <u>Inter-mediate</u> | <u>College</u> | <u>Post-grad.</u> | <u>Total</u> |
|----------------------|-------------------|---------------------------------|----------------------|----------------|-------------------|--------------|
| Less than 1000       |                   | 93.0                            | 82.2                 | 67.8           | 48.6              | 69.0         |
| 1000-2000            |                   | 6.1                             | 12.7                 | 20.2           | 27.6              | 19.0         |
| 2000-3000            |                   | 0.9                             | 1.1                  | 4.5            | 11.5              | 4.9          |
| 3000-4000            |                   |                                 | 0.4                  | 3.0            | 5.2               | 2.7          |
| 4000-5000            |                   |                                 | 0.4                  | 0.7            | 1.9               | 0.8          |
| 5000-6000            |                   |                                 |                      | 1.0            | 1.4               | 0.8          |
| 6000-7000            |                   |                                 |                      | 0.8            | 1.6               | 0.8          |
| 7000-8000            |                   |                                 |                      | 0.2            | 0.8               | 0.3          |
| 8000 and above       |                   |                                 |                      | 1.9            | 1.4               | 1.7          |
| <b>Total</b>         |                   | <b>100.0</b>                    | <b>100.0</b>         | <b>100.0</b>   | <b>100.0</b>      | <b>100.0</b> |

$\chi^2 - 186.18$        $P = 0.001$        $\text{Gamma} = 0.47$

Contingency coefficient = 0.29

Source: Survey data from S.E. Ibrahim, Arab Attitudes toward Unification in Ten Arab Countries (forthcoming), Beirut: Center for Arab Unity Studies.

**Table 23. Relationship of Annual Family Income and Education of a Sample of Heads of Households in Cairo, 1979 (Percentages)**  
**N=322**

| Income<br>L.E.       | Education: 1<br>Illit. | 2<br>Read &<br>Write | 3<br>Pri-<br>mary | 4<br>Prepar-<br>atory | 5<br>Secund-<br>ary | 6<br>College | 7<br>Post-<br>graduate | %            |
|----------------------|------------------------|----------------------|-------------------|-----------------------|---------------------|--------------|------------------------|--------------|
| 1. Less than 300     | 57.1                   | 31.0                 | 4.8               | 2.4                   | 4.8                 | -            | -                      | 13.1         |
| 2. 300-500           | 29.7                   | 34.1                 | 13.2              | 7.7                   | 11.0                | 1.1          | 3.3                    | 28.3         |
| 3. 500-1000          | 17.5                   | 34.0                 | 9.7               | 5.8                   | 20.4                | 12.6         | -                      | 32.1         |
| 4. 1000-2500         | 5.7                    | 15.1                 | 7.5               | 3.8                   | 22.6                | 41.5         | 3.8                    | 16.5         |
| 5. 1500-2000         | 11.1                   | 33.3                 | 11.1              | -                     | 16.7                | 27.8         | -                      | 5.6          |
| 6. 2000-3000         | -                      | 10.0                 | 10.0              | 10.0                  | 40.0                | 30.0         | -                      | 3.1          |
| 7. 3000-5000         | -                      | -                    | -                 | -                     | -                   | 100.0        | -                      | 0.6          |
| 8. 5000 and<br>above | -                      | -                    | -                 | -                     | -                   | -            | 100.0                  | 0.6          |
| <b>Total</b>         | <b>23.1</b>            | <b>29.3</b>          | <b>9.7</b>        | <b>5.3</b>            | <b>16.2</b>         | <b>15.0</b>  | <b>1.6</b>             | <b>100.0</b> |

$\chi^2 = 133.62$      $P = 0.00\%$      $\text{Gamma} = 0.51$      $\text{Contingency coefficient} = 0.54$

Source: Original Survey Data

education and income is naturally positive in direction and highly significant (at the 0.001 level). But the magnitude of this correlation is moderate ( $\gamma = 0.51$ ).

The results of the three surveys, taken together, suggest what we expected--a positive relationship between education and income. But as was the case with occupation, this relationship is not perfect. Education, at best, accounts for only 50 percent of the variance in income.

### 3. Income and life-style.

In the 1979 Cairo Survey, life-style was operationalized by two separate indicators. The first comprised a weighted scale of certain durable goods (e.g., radio, TV, refrigerator, private car, etc.).<sup>23</sup> The second was simply the size of residence as measured by the number of rooms. Tables 24 and 25 give the relationship between the two indicators and income distribution. Both ~~distributions~~<sup>Tables</sup> show that the variance on each pair of variables is significant at the 0.001 level. Equally, the magnitude of the two correlations as measured by Gamma are substantial, 0.56 and 0.59. Though they still do not correlate perfectly with income, the two life-style indicators (durable goods and size of residence) show a higher association than did both occupation and education. In other words, the two indicators of life-style are slightly better predictors of income than either education or occupation. This may be of some methodological significance in third world countries where income data is either hard to obtain or its reliability is suspect.

### B. Stratification Configurations

Of the three surveys cited in the previous section, only the 1979 Cairo study gives data on the four indices we consider important for measuring relative class positions. We have, therefore, constructed a composite index of stratum out of the four indices for each respondent in the sample. We offer the results here not so much as a generalization

**Table 24.** Relationship between Annual Family Income and Acquisition of Durable Goods for a Sample of Heads of Households, Cairo, 1979 (Percentages), N=298

| Income<br>L.E. | <u>Durable goods</u> |             |             |             |            |                       |              |
|----------------|----------------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|------------|-----------------------|--------------|
|                | (Lowest)<br>Category | Category    | Category    | Category    | Category   | (Highest)<br>Category |              |
|                | 1                    | 2           | 3           | 4           | 5          | 6                     |              |
| Less than 300  | 33.3                 | 33.3        | 30.0        | 13.3        | -          | 4                     | 10.1         |
| 300-500        | 17.3                 | 18.5        | 44.4        | 18.5        | 1.2        | -                     | 27.2         |
| 500-1000       | 4.9                  | 16.7        | 42.2        | 32.4        | 3.9        | -                     | 34.2         |
| 1000-1500      | 3.8                  | 1.9         | 28.3        | 58.5        | 7.5        | -                     | 17.8         |
| 1500-2000      | 5.6                  | -           | 27.8        | 50.0        | 5.6        | 11.1                  | 6.0          |
| 2000-3000      | -                    | -           | 10.0        | 60.0        | 10.0       | 20.0                  | 3.4          |
| 3000-5000      | -                    | -           | -           | -           | 50.0       | 50.0                  | 0.7          |
| 5000 & above   | -                    | -           | -           | -           | -          | 100.0                 | 0.7          |
| <b>Total</b>   | <b>10.7</b>          | <b>14.4</b> | <b>35.6</b> | <b>33.9</b> | <b>3.7</b> | <b>1.7</b>            | <b>100.0</b> |

$\chi^2 = 146.54$      $P = 0.001$      $\text{Gamma} = 0.56$      $\text{Contingency coeff.} = 0.57$

Source: Original Survey Data

**Table 25. Relationship between Annual Family Income and Size of Residence for a Sample of Heads of Households, Cairo, 1979 (Percentages), N=318**

| Income L.E.   | Size of Residence: | One Room    | Two Rooms   | 3-4 Rooms   | 5 Rooms or more | %            |
|---------------|--------------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-----------------|--------------|
| Less than 300 |                    | 59.5        | 36.2        | 14.3        | -               | 13.2         |
| 300-500       |                    | 16.5        | 50.2        | 27.5        | 5.5             | 28.6         |
| 500-1000      |                    | 10.8        | 37.3        | 44.1        | 7.8             | 32.1         |
| 1000-1500     |                    | 3.8         | 11.5        | 67.3        | 17.3            | 16.4         |
| 1500-2000     |                    | -           | 22.2        | 66.7        | 11.1            | 5.7          |
| 2000-3000     |                    | -           | 11.1        | 66.7        | 22.2            | 2.8          |
| 3000-5000     |                    | -           | -           | 100.0       | -               | 0.6          |
| 5000 & above  |                    | -           | -           | -           | 100.0           | 0.6          |
| <b>Total</b>  |                    | <b>16.7</b> | <b>33.3</b> | <b>41.2</b> | <b>8.8</b>      | <b>100.0</b> |

$\chi^2 = 135.99$      $P = 0.001$      $\text{Gamma} = 0.59$      $\text{Contingency coeff.} = 0.55$

Source: Original Survey Data

about class configuration in Egypt as a whole but as an attempt to summarize and synthesize the data of the Cairo Survey. It is also meant as a methodological contribution which may be useful in future studies on stratification.

Each of the four indices has a weighted score and the sum of the four scores represents an Index of SES for each respondent.<sup>24</sup> Respondents were divided into six strata according to their sum of scores on the SES Index. Table 26 shows the distribution of the Cairo sample among the six strata as well as how they correlate on each of the four objective indices. It turned out that 21.5 percent of the families fall in the two lowest strata (11.2 percent were destitute and 10.3 percent were poor), 26.5 percent in the third stratum (low middle), 36.1 percent in the fourth (middle), 15.3 percent in the fifth (upper middle), and less than one percent in the sixth stratum (highest). The SES Index (class position) correlated highest with life-style (Gamma = 0.70), then income (0.69), occupation (0.62), and education (0.61). What follows is a brief description of each of the six strata as it can be inferred from empirical data.

1. The Lowest Stratum: the Destitute: This category mostly comprises families whose annual income is less than L.E. 300, who live in one room, own no durable goods or only a radio, and whose breadwinner is unskilled, a production or service worker. He is likely to be an illiterate, born to an illiterate father who was equally poor, a worker or poor peasant. The urban poverty line in 1975 was L.E. 350 (see Section II above). Given an inflation rate of at least 10 percent annually in the following four years, the urban poverty line in 1979 would be well over L.E. 500 in 1979. This would suggest that these 11 percent of Cairo's families are rock-bottom poor. If not illiterates like fathers and grandfathers, the children of these destitute families only read and write, with very few past primary school. All in all, this stratum epitomizes the "culture of poverty,"<sup>25</sup> in which low income is only one manifestation of several in a multitude of vicious circles gripping several successive generations.

**Table 26. Relationship between Class Position and Four Indicators of Socio-economic Status for a Sample of Heads of Households, Cairo, 1979 (Percentages)**

Source: Original Survey Data

| SES INDICATORS:      | INCOME (LE) N=320                                                  |         |          |           |           |           |           |       | OCCUPATION N=320                                                  |           |          |       |            |         |            | EDUCATION N=321                                                    |              |         |             |           | DURABLE GOODS (Life-style) N=258                                   |               |                     |            |            |            | TOTAL |            |                      |
|----------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------|---------|----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-------|-------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------|----------|-------|------------|---------|------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------|---------|-------------|-----------|--------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------|---------------------|------------|------------|------------|-------|------------|----------------------|
|                      | Less than 300                                                      | 300-500 | 500-1000 | 1000-1500 | 1500-2000 | 2000-3000 | 3000-5000 | 5000+ | Professional                                                      | Executive | Clerical | Sales | Production | Service | Housewives | Illiterate                                                         | Read & Write | Primary | Preparatory | Secondary | College                                                            | Post-graduate | Category 1 (Lowest) | Category 2 | Category 3 | Category 4 |       | Category 5 | Category 6 (Highest) |
| I Lowest             | 12.1                                                               | -       | -        | -         | -         | -         | -         | -     | -                                                                 | 2.1       | 6.5      | 17.6  | 8.4        | -       | 4.1        | 1.1                                                                | -            | -       | -           | -         | -                                                                  | -             | 3.0                 | -          | 16.0       | -          | -     | -          | 11.2                 |
| II Low               | 31.0                                                               | 18.7    | 2.0      | 1.9       | -         | -         | -         | -     | -                                                                 | 6.4       | 16.7     | 21.7  | 41.2       | 29.0    | -          | 24.7                                                               | 10.5         | 12.9    | -           | -         | -                                                                  | -             | 39.4                | 14.0       | 1.9        | -          | -     | -          | 30.3                 |
| III Low Mid.         | 47.4                                                               | 34.1    | 23.5     | 11.3      | 11.1      | -         | -         | -     | 6.7                                                               | 8.5       | 33.3     | 41.3  | 41.2       | 47.7    | 20.0       | 42.5                                                               | 35.8         | 32.3    | 5.9         | 19.2      | -                                                                  | -             | 33.3                | 46.5       | 34.0       | 11.0       | -     | -          | 26.5                 |
| IV Middle            | 7.1                                                                | 42.9    | 64.7     | 58.5      | 44.4      | 10.0      | -         | -     | 80.6                                                              | 55.3      | 35.4     | 19.6  | -          | 15.0    | 56.6       | 24.7                                                               | 47.4         | 41.9    | 64.7        | 57.5      | 40.4                                                               | -             | 24.2                | 37.2       | 44.7       | 68.0       | 45.8  | 24.0       | 26.1                 |
| V Upper Mid.         | 2.4                                                                | 4.4     | 9.8      | 26.4      | 44.4      | 90.0      | 100       | 50.0  | 11.3                                                              | 27.7      | 12.5     | 16.5  | -          | -       | 20.6       | 4.1                                                                | 5.3          | 12.9    | 29.4        | 21.2      | 37.5                                                               | 40.0          | -                   | 2.3        | 8.5        | 29.0       | 64.5  | 66.0       | 15.4                 |
| VI Upper             | -                                                                  | -       | -        | 1.9       | -         | -         | -         | 36.8  | -                                                                 | 2.1       | -        | -     | -          | -       | 4.0        | -                                                                  | -            | -       | -           | 1.9       | 2.1                                                                | 68.0          | -                   | -          | 0.0        | -          | -     | 20.0       | 0.6                  |
| Total                | 13.1                                                               | 28.4    | 31.9     | 16.4      | 3.0       | 3.1       | 0.6       | 0.6   | 9.4                                                               | 14.7      | 15.0     | 14.4  | 5.3        | 33.4    | 7.8        | 22.7                                                               | 29.6         | 9.7     | 5.3         | 16.2      | 15.0                                                               | 1.6           | 33.1                | 14.4       | 35.6       | 33.6       | 3.7   | 1.7        | 100                  |
| Statistical Measures | $\chi^2=261.37$<br>$\text{Gamma}=0.69$<br>$P=0.001$<br>$C.C.=0.67$ |         |          |           |           |           |           |       | $\chi^2=79.21$<br>$\text{Gamma}=0.62$<br>$P=0.001$<br>$C.C.=0.66$ |           |          |       |            |         |            | $\chi^2=115.94$<br>$\text{Gamma}=0.61$<br>$P=0.001$<br>$C.C.=0.57$ |              |         |             |           | $\chi^2=174.04$<br>$\text{Gamma}=0.70$<br>$P=0.001$<br>$C.C.=0.61$ |               |                     |            |            |            |       |            |                      |

27

2. The Low Stratum: the Poor: This category comprises over 10 percent of Cairo's families, whose annual income is between L.E. 300 and less than 500. The typical family lives in one or two rooms, with a breadwinner who is illiterate or barely literate, and who is a semi-skilled worker, vendor, or in a clerical occupation. The breadwinner is generally born to an illiterate worker or a peasant, and has moved up slightly over his father. His children have gained more education and if working, they are in skilled or clerical occupations, with very few going to college or joining professional and executive ranks. In sheer income alone, these families are immediately below the poverty line. But socially and culturally, they are not as caught up in its vicious cycle. Many of them do not "feel" poor (see Table 27).

3. The Low-middle Stratum: the Border Line: This category comprises nearly 27 percent of Cairo's families. Their annual income is between L.E. 500 and 1000 per family. The typical family lives in two rooms and owns a few durable amenities such as a radio, gas stove, and a black-and-white TV. The breadwinner is likely to be literate or with intermediate education, a skilled worker or in clerical or sales occupations. In most cases, he is better off than his father educationally and occupationally. Nearly half of the heads of household are from rural backgrounds. Their children have attained as much educationally or slightly more. These families "feel" and try to lead a middle-class life style. Since their income is immediately above the poverty line, they are <sup>b</sup>found to feel hard-pressed.

4. The Middle Stratum: the Upwardly Mobile: This category comprises 36 percent of Cairo's families. The typical family has an annual income of around L.E. 1000, lives in three or four rooms, and has more than half of the durable items (of LSS). The heads of households in this stratum are likely to be young professionals, middle executives, or in senior clerical and sales positions. Most of them have had college

21

Table 27. Relationship between Subjective Perception of Own Socioeconomic Status (SES) and Objective Indicators of SES for a Sample of Heads of Households, Cairo, 1979 (Percentages)

| SES INDICATORS:       | INCOME (L.E.) N=321                            |         |          |           |           |           |           |        | OCCUPATION, N=321                             |           |          |       |            |         |            | EDUCATION, N=372                              |              |         |             |           |         |               | DURABLE GOODS, N=299                           |            |            |            |            |                      | Total |
|-----------------------|------------------------------------------------|---------|----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|--------|-----------------------------------------------|-----------|----------|-------|------------|---------|------------|-----------------------------------------------|--------------|---------|-------------|-----------|---------|---------------|------------------------------------------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|----------------------|-------|
|                       | Less than 300                                  | 300-500 | 500-1000 | 1000-1500 | 1500-2000 | 2000-3000 | 3000-5000 | 5000 + | Professional                                  | Executive | Clerical | Sales | Production | Service | Housewives | Illiterate                                    | Read & Write | Primary | Preparatory | Secondary | College | Post-graduate | Category 1 (Lowest)                            | Category 2 | Category 3 | Category 4 | Category 5 | Category 6 (Highest) |       |
| I<br>Lowest           | 7.1                                            | 2.2     | -        | -         | -         | -         | -         | -      | -                                             | -         | -        | 2.1   | -          | 3.7     | 4.0        | 2.7                                           | 2.1          | -       | 5.9         | 1.9       | -       | -             | 12.1                                           | -          | -          | -          | -          | -                    | 1.9   |
| II<br>Low             | 28.6                                           | 16.5    | 9.7      | 1.9       | -         | -         | -         | -      | -                                             | 6.4       | 8.3      | 14.9  | 17.6       | 12.2    | 28.0       | 20.3                                          | 16.8         | 6.5     | -           | 3.8       | 2.1     | 20.0          | 21.7                                           | 18.6       | 11.3       | 1.0        | -          | 11.5                 |       |
| III<br>Middle         | 61.9                                           | 67.0    | 73.8     | 75.5      | 61.1      | 60.0      | -         | 50.0   | 76.7                                          | 57.4      | 75.0     | 63.8  | 64.7       | 73.8    | 60.0       | 67.6                                          | 67.4         | 74.7    | 58.8        | 76.9      | 70.8    | 20.0          | 60.6                                           | 69.8       | 73.6       | 73.3       | 54.5       | 68.8                 | 68.8  |
| IV<br>Up.Middle       | 2.4                                            | 12.1    | 13.6     | 15.1      | 27.8      | 30.0      | 20.0      | 50.0   | 20.0                                          | 25.5      | 8.3      | 14.9  | 17.6       | 10.3    | 4.0        | 8.1                                           | 11.0         | 16.1    | 29.4        | 13.5      | 16.7    | 40.0          | 3.0                                            | 7.0        | 13.2       | 19.8       | 36.4       | 48.0                 | 13.7  |
| V<br>Upper            | -                                              | 2.9     | 3.9      | 7.5       | 11.1      | 10.0      | -         | -      | 3.3                                           | 10.6      | 8.3      | 4.3   | -          | -       | 4.0        | 1.4                                           | 2.1          | 3.2     | 5.9         | 3.8       | 10.4    | 20.0          | 3.0                                            | 4.7        | 1.9        | 5.9        | 9.1        | 20.0                 | 4.0   |
| Total                 | 13.1                                           | 28.3    | 32.1     | 16.5      | 5.6       | 3.1       | 0.6       | 0.6    | 9.3                                           | 14.6      | 15.0     | 14.6  | 5.3        | 33.3    | 7.8        | 23.0                                          | 29.5         | 9.6     | 5.3         | 16.7      | 14.9    | 1.6           | 11.0                                           | 14.4       | 25.5       | 33.8       | 3.7        | 17.7                 | 100   |
| Statistical measures: | $\chi^2=63.16$ P=0.001<br>Gamma=0.48 C.C.=0.41 |         |          |           |           |           |           |        | $\chi^2=41.30$ P=0.02<br>Gamma=0.35 C.C.=0.34 |           |          |       |            |         |            | $\chi^2=41.10$ P=0.02<br>Gamma=0.35 C.C.=0.34 |              |         |             |           |         |               | $\chi^2=70.48$ P=0.001<br>Gamma=0.50 C.C.=0.51 |            |            |            |            |                      |       |

Source: Original Survey Data

Best Available Document

education. More than half of them are newcomers to the middle class and have ascended to it from lower strata in which the father was a peasant, a worker, a clerk or salesman. Respondents in this stratum have experienced more upward mobility than any other. Their children seem to have more opportunities than the strata below, but not more than their fathers had a generation ago.

5. The Upper-middle Stratum: the Secure: This group comprises 15 percent of Cairo's families. The typical household has three to five rooms, almost all the durable items, and around L.E. 2000 to 3000 in annual income. The head of the family is likely to be college-educated and an established professional or executive. Most respondents in this stratum are born to fathers who had at least intermediate education, and were themselves in one of the middle strata a generation ago. Their children are continuing on the upward track for the third generation, both educationally and occupationally.

6. The Highest Stratum: the Rich: This is the smallest group, consisting of about one percent of Cairo's families. The typical household comprises five rooms or more, enjoys all the urban amenities, possesses all the durable goods (included in the LSS), e.g., private car, color TV, air-conditioners, etc. The family income averages more than L.E. 5000 per annum. The typical head of household is college educated, well established professional, senior executive, or a businessman. Almost all respondents in this stratum were born to college educated fathers and have college educated sons. In other words, this group seems to be locked in the highest stratum for the third generation in a row.

This six-strata configuration is based on objective criteria. There may be a degree of arbitrariness in the indices or in the cutting points along the stratification continuum. But this is unavoidable in any such attempt. Nor is this the only approach in depicting class configuration

in a community or in a society at large. One approach is to figure class structure on the basis of relations of production, e.g., ownership of means of production versus hired labor. We opted against this method since most large scale means of production in Egypt have been state controlled for nearly twenty years.

Another approach is to construct social stratification on the basis of subjective identification, i.e., how people perceive their class standing.<sup>26</sup> The premise here is that if the concept of "class" is to be a useful analytical tool of general behavior, it matters less where people objectively stand, than what they think of their standing. It is the latter, not the former, which shapes their attitudes and behavior. The objective and subjective may or may not coincide. In the case of our Cairo sample, we did ask the respondents to identify the class they belong to. Table 27 summarizes (p.72) the answers and correlates them with the objective indices. It is striking that less than 2 percent identified themselves as belonging to the lowest stratum (as compared to 11 percent of the sample who "objectively" belong there). It is equally striking that as many as 69 percent of the respondents perceived their class standing as exactly in the middle. If we add to them those identifying with the upper middle class (14 percent), the total jumps to 83 percent of all respondents identifying with one or another layer of the middle class. In other words, there is a tremendous social-psychological pressure to be members of the "middle class," whether or not people "objectively" qualify to be so. This tendency, revealed by the Cairo sample, is not much different from the pattern found in some western societies.<sup>27</sup> The "middle-classification" tendency has a multitude of socio-political implications, not least of which is the preservation of the status quo. This may be disheartening to those who seek radical change; they would label it as a classical case of "false class-consciousness."

Finally, we take a look at the objective class configuration (based on the SES Index) cross-generationally. Table 28 shows the respondents in the Cairo sample broken down by

**Table 28. Relationship between Age of Respondent and His Class Position (SES) and the Class Position of His First Son and of His Father, for a Sample of Heads of Households, Cairo, 1979 (Percentages)**

| Age of Respondent     |                    | CLASS CATEGORIES |          |               |                     |      |                 | Total |
|-----------------------|--------------------|------------------|----------|---------------|---------------------|------|-----------------|-------|
|                       |                    | (Lowest)<br>I    | II       | III           | IV                  | V    | (Highest)<br>VI |       |
| 20-30                 | Son                | -                | -        | -             | -                   | -    | -               | -     |
|                       | Respondent         | -                | 5.3      | 36.8          | 47.4                | 10.5 | -               | 5.9   |
|                       | Father             | 5.3              | 21.1     | 57.9          | -                   | 15.8 | -               | 6.0   |
| 30-40                 | Son                | -                | 100.0    | -             | -                   | -    | -               | 2.9   |
|                       | Respondent         | -                | 13.9     | 17.7          | 48.1                | 20.3 | -               | 24.6  |
|                       | Father             | 6.3              | 21.5     | 40.5          | 29.1                | 2.5  | -               | 24.8  |
| 40-50                 | Son                | -                | 14.3     | 57.1          | 28.6                | -    | -               | 20.3  |
|                       | Respondent         | 1.2              | 7.1      | 29.4          | 49.4                | 11.6 | 1.4             | 26.5  |
|                       | Father             | 6.0              | 38.6     | 41.0          | 13.3                | 1.2  | -               | 26.0  |
| 50-60                 | Son                | -                | 16.1     | 71.0          | 12.9                | -    | -               | 44.9  |
|                       | Respondent         | 5.0              | 8.3      | 27.1          | 42.9                | 16.7 | -               | 29.9  |
|                       | Father             | 7.4              | 43.2     | 33.7          | 10.5                | 5.3  | 1.1             | 29.8  |
| 60+                   | Son                | -                | 18.2     | 72.7          | 9.1                 | -    | -               | 31.9  |
|                       | Respondent         | 7.1              | 16.7     | 31.0          | 31.0                | 14.3 | -               | 13.1  |
|                       | Father             | 4.6              | 41.9     | 46.5          | 4.7                 | 2.3  | -               | 13.5  |
| Total                 | (N=69) Son         | -                | 18.8     | 66.7          | 14.5                | -    | -               | 100.0 |
|                       | (N=321) Respondent | 11.2             | 10.3     | 26.5          | 36.1                | 15.3 | 0.6             | 100.0 |
|                       | (N=319) Father     | 15.3             | 35.1     | 30.4          | 14.4                | 3.4  | 0.3             | 100.0 |
| Statistical Measures: |                    |                  |          |               |                     |      |                 |       |
| Sons:                 |                    | $\chi^2=11.70$   | $P=0.05$ | Gamma = -0.06 | Cont. Coeff. = 0.38 |      |                 |       |
| Respondents:          |                    | $\chi^2=33.09$   | $P=0.05$ | Gamma = -0.09 | Cont. Coeff. = 0.31 |      |                 |       |
| Fathers:              |                    | $\chi^2=46.45$   | $P=0.01$ | Gamma = -0.21 | Cont. Coeff. = 0.37 |      |                 |       |

Source: Original Survey Data

age categories, and compares their class position with that of their fathers and that of their first adult sons.<sup>28</sup> Respondents in the oldest age group (60 or above) had their life-opportunities set in the pre-1952 Revolution period (e.g., in the 1940's) and respondents in the youngest age group (20-30) had their life-opportunities set in the late 1960's and early 1970's. The middle age categories (30-50) had such opportunities set in the 1950's and 1960's. If we look at their relative representation in the three upper strata (IV to VI), we notice marked differences that are statistically significant (at the 0.05 level or better). Measures of association such as contingency coefficient, show a higher correlation between age and class position for both fathers (0.37) and sons (0.38) of respondents than for respondents themselves (0.31). This suggests that on the whole, fathers and sons (i.e. generations I and III) were generally worse off than respondents in terms of class standing. To put it differently, the middle generation fared better than either of the older or the younger generations. This conclusion was confirmed by other data earlier. But to sharpen the picture further, let us compare the percentages of respondents in the strata V and VI in each age group. For respondents in the 20-30 age group there were 58 percent, compared to 16 percent of their fathers, a difference of 42 percentage points. For the next age group (30-40), there were 68 percent of the respondents in the three top strata compared to 32 percent of their fathers, a difference of 36 points. But this age group is 10 points better than the 20-30 age group. As for the 40-50 cohorts, we find 62 percent in the top strata, compared to only 15 percent of their fathers (respondents 47 points better) and 20 percent of their sons (respondents 31 points better). The 50-60 age group of respondents were represented in the upper half of the stratification scale by nearly 60 percent, compared to 17 percent of their fathers (respondents better by 42 points), and to 13 percent of their sons (respondents better by 47 points). Finally, 45 percent of the oldest

respondents were in the three top strata, compared to 7 percent of their fathers and to 9 percent of their sons (respondents better 38 and 36 points, respectively).

Respondents who are 30-40 in 1979 were 3-10 years old at the time of the 1952 Revolution. They benefited the most from the expanded educational and occupational opportunities made available during the 1956-1965 period, i.e., the upswing phases of the Revolution. The age groups immediately younger and immediately older also benefited greatly but not as much. Older age groups also benefited from these years, but their sons have not benefited as much.

Thus, manipulating the data by age cohorts adds more substantiation <sup>of</sup> the hypothesis stated in the introductory section of this Chapter. Specifically, Egypt's stratification system reached its maximum fluidity from the mid-1950's to the mid-1960's. Along with ambitious programs in education and industrialization, and with bold socialist policies of equalizing opportunities, the Egyptian society witnessed more social mobility than in any single decade in this century. *But fi* Since the late 1960's <sup>m</sup>, the class structure appears to have been hardening again. During the last 15 years, upward mobility has increasingly become "confined" to children of the middle and upper strata. For younger members of the lower rungs, the system does not offer as many opportunities to move up. For them, such opportunities are to be found outside the Egyptian system. It may be a sheer accident of social history that as Egypt no longer held as bright promise for its dispossessed children, other parts of the Arab World were opening doors of opportunity to them.

## FOOTNOTES

1. An excellent account of major theories and debates of class structure and inequality can be found in Reinhard Bendix and Seymour Lipset (eds.), Class, Status and Power: Social Stratification in Comparative Perspective, New York: The Free Press, 1966 (2nd ed.). For an original statement on Functionalism, see Kingsley Davis and Wilbert Moore, "Some Principles of Stratification", The American Sociological Review 10:2: 242-249. For a classical critique of the functionalist theory of stratification, see Melvin Tumin, "Some Principles of Stratification: A Critical Analysis", The American Sociological Review, 18 (1953), 387-393. For a statement on the Marxist conception of class, see Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy Vol. III (unfinished chapter), Moscow: Foreign Language Publishing House, 1962, p.862. Other Marxists, especially Lenin, have elaborated the concept of class. See F. Lenin, The Complete Works, Moscow: Foreign Language Publishing House, vol.29, p.410. Most recent Marxist accounts of Egypt's class structure would couch it in terms of the "Asiatic mode of production". See Nazih N.M. al-Ayubi, Bureaucratic Evolution and Political Development: Egypt 1952-1970 unpublished D.Phil thesis, Oxford University, 1975; and E. J. Hobsbawm, Karl Marx: Pre-capitalist Formations, trans. Jack Cohen, London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1964.
2. For typical examples of macro-ideological studies on Egypt, see Anouar Abdel Malek, Egypt: Military Society, New York: Random House, 1968; Mahmoud Hussein, Class Conflict in Egypt, 1945-1970, New York: Monthly Review Press, 1973; Samir Amin (under pseudonym Hassan Riad), L'Egypte Nasserienne, Paris, 1964; Mohamed al-Gawhary, Im al-Ijtima' w Qadva al-Tamweya fi al-Anlam al-Tha'leth (Sociology and Development Issues in the Third World), Cairo: Dar al-Maaref, 1978, pp.314-315; Gamal Magdy Hassanein, "al-Bina' al-Ijtima' w al-Tamweya al-Ijtima'iyya fi Misr", Abhath al-Mu'atamar al-Dawli al-Tha'leth Lil-Ihsaa' w al-Alt al-Masiba w 'al-Buhouth al-Ijtima'iyya ("Social Structure and Social Development in Egypt" in Proceedings of the Third International Congress of Statistics, Computers and Social Research). Cairo, 1978, Vol. I, pp.95.108.
3. For examples of micro-structural studies, see A.I. Abdul-Wahab, Taitheer Imdet Tawzi'a al-Ard Ala al-Bina' al-Ijtima' Li-Qariya Misriya (The Impact of Land Redistribution on the Social Structure of an Egyptian Village). Unpublished M.A. thesis (Sociology), Ain Shams University, Cairo, 1975; Abdul Baset Abdul Mouety, al-Sira' al-Tabaqi fi al-Qariya al-Misriya (Class Conflict in the Egyptian Village), Cairo: Dar al-Thaqafa al-Jadida, 1977.
4. For examples of aggregate socio-economic studies, see Robert Mabro, The Egyptian Economy: 1952-1972, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974; Donald C. Mead, Growth and Structural Change in the Egyptian Economy, Urbana: Illinois University Press, 1967; Samir Radwan, The Impact of Agrarian Reform on Rural Egypt (1952-1975), Geneva: International Labour Office Working Papers, 1977; Ali el-Greily, Khamsah w Ishrun Aman, Dirasa Tahliyya Lil-Siyasat al-Iqtisadiya fi Misr (Twenty-five Years: An Analytical Study of Egypt's Economic Policies 1952-1977), Cairo: al-Hayaa al-Misriya al-Aama Lil-Kitab, 1977; M.A. Fadil, Development, Income

Distribution and Social Change in Rural Egypt (1952-1970), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975.

5. The ward (shiakha) is the smallest administrative unit in urban areas, and corresponds to a census tract.
6. The nine shiakha's samples were: Rod El-Faraq (51 cases); El-Sharbiyya (86 cases); Hadayek El-Kubba (60 cases); El-Zeitoun El-Gharbiyya (30 cases); Ibn El-Rashid (18 cases); Abdeen (10 cases); El-Gamaleyya (13 cases); Misr El-Gedida (27 cases); and Asaad El-Sahel (24 cases). A total of 319 cases were drawn using a multiple stage probability sampling method. The sample size was set by the project coordinator (300 cases) and it was fractioned among the nine wards according to their relative population (by the 1976 Egypt census). A door-to-door counting of households in each ward was conducted to determine the nth fraction of the systematic samplings. For example, if the Abdeen shiakha turned out to have a total of 500 households, then every 50th household was selected for inclusion in the sample, as the relative share of that shiakha was set at 10 cases (its population being 3.4% of the population total of the nine shiakha's combined).
7. For a relevant discussion of this issue, see Thomas Fox and S. M. Miller, "Occupational Stratification and Mobility: Intra-country Variations", in Studies in Comparative International Development, 1:1:3.10 (1965).
8. The Asyut villages are: Maasara; Nazlat Mustapha Abd el Halim; Nazlat Saragna. The Dakahlia villages are: El-Singa; Kafr Allam; Al-Shibul; Mit Sweed; Sallaat, and Kafr Qansouh. The sampling method was the same as that described in footnote 6 above.
9. For an analysis of these mounting problems, see Charles Issawi, Egypt in Revolution: An Economic Analysis, London: Oxford University Press, 1963 and Robert Mabro, The Egyptian Economy, op.cit.
10. There are tens of scholarly accounts. See, for example: R. Hrair Dekmejian, Egypt Under Nasser, a Study in Political Dynamics, Albany: State University of New York Press; Raymond Baker, Egypt's Uncertain Revolution under Nasser and Sadat, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978.
11. For an account of the changing elite structure, see R.H. Dekmejian, Egypt under Nasser, op.cit., pp.167-224, and Robert Springborg, "Patterns of Association in the Egyptian Political Elite" in George Lenczowski (ed.), Political Elites in the Middle East, Washington D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1975, pp.83-108.
12. Leonard Binder, In a Moment of Enthusiasm: Political Power and the Second Stratum in Egypt, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978.
13. Ali el-Greidy, Khamsah w Ishrun Aman, Dirasa Tahliiliyya Lil Siyasat al-Iqtisadiyya fi Misr (twenty-five Years, An Analytical Study of Egypt's Economic Policies 1952-1977), op.cit., pp. 118-121.