


**LASA Discussion
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**LESOTHO
AGRICULTURAL SECTOR
ANALYSIS PROJECT**

**Ministry of Agriculture
Kingdom of Lesotho**

**Department of Economics
Colorado State University**

TOWARDS AN INTEGRATED PERSPECTIVE
ON DEVELOPMENT PLANNING IN LESOTHO

L. M. Hartman

Paper No. 3

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Introduction

This paper is written as a background paper for the Lesotho project and continues a topic which was inadequately explored in a project seminar. It follows the theme of an earlier paper entitled "Economics as Science and as Culture," which was presented to the American Agricultural Economics Association meetings in August, 1977. In the Lesotho seminar and in discussions on that project I have expressed the position that we cannot understand another country's problems unless we can understand our own. The basis of that position is the firm conviction that this country and other Western civilization countries are in a pathological condition, and that it would be tragic to attempt to introduce that pathology to other people. The early sociologists, Marx, Weber and Durkheim, and the existentialists, Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, could envision, in the 19th century, the eventual outcome of Western civilization. Their insight was based on an experience which illuminated the nihilism of science and rational, bureaucratic organization, insulated from tradition and moral community; a self-perpetuating maelstrom "sucking" the world into a valueless, purposeless counter-utopia, as for example, Laputa in Jonathan Swift's Gulliver's Travels.

Economics as science and as culture expresses the proposition that the cultural consciousness of Western civilization is captured in the assumptions of human purpose as they are formulated in the economics paradigm and defined through the authority of science. Man as a computerized, directionless amoeba blindly pushing out a pseudopod to soak up utiles. That view of man is

assiduously taught with all innocence and candor in a supposedly Christian society. It is as though we are still in an economically organized Garden of Eden, professing, as in the economics profession, ignorance of the human capacity for both good and evil. That ignorance is expressed in the view that economics as science is value free as though that view was a virtue to be cultivated. The result is a vapid lukewarmness conceived as humanitarianism.

The paper is organized around an interpretation of the Western cultural tradition based on a conceptualization of culture as a theory of action. Within this conceptualization, economics as a discipline is a theory of individual action and of social action, and is interpreted as a transformation of the Greek intellectual tradition. The Judeo-Christian tradition is, also, interpreted as a theory of action and is posed as an alternative to the economic theory. The contemporary crisis in Western societies is analyzed as resulting from a breakdown of the moral community, formerly maintained by the Christian tradition. I propose an integration of these two theories of action as the basis for re-interpreting the modern era and as an integrated perspective on development planning in Lesotho.

Some Interpretive Remarks About Contemporary Society

Western Europe and the United States emerged in the mid-twentieth century as socio-cultural entities structured around the goal of economic growth. That goal has broadened in the past several decades to include the quality of the environment and something called "quality of life." Whatever the terminology, the goal is still goods of some kind which contribute to material well being, and are encompassed within the economics rationale. The recent trend towards citizen involvement with the solution of environmental and quality of life problems is a move to implement some kind of market rationality into the

production of these goods. The move to produce these goods according to central production control by using benefit-cost analysis did not prove altogether successful, thus, the attempt to value these goods by the process of citizen involvement. Citizen involvement is another name for interest-group politics and economic theory has encompassed this process within a new field called public choice. The economist thinks that he is innovative by no longer prescribing economic growth and that he is radical in supporting environmental quality or quality of life. Likewise, those who have developed the theory of investment in human capital and are now discussing the economics of the family consider themselves radical humanitarians. The conceptualization of all aspects of life under the rubric of goods production and the rationality of that process as expressed in the concepts of efficiency, opportunity cost and trade-offs borders on obscenity. It is indicative that Western societies have become culturally conditioned and that that conditioning results from a tradition developed around the economic goal.

The fact that the economics rationality explains social action processes is one indication, to be explained later, of widespread social conditioning. Education is viewed by the general public as investment in human capital. Environmental quality is an economic good. Quality of life in this country is perceived as embodied in the quality of material well being. Community is citizen involvement, conceived as interest group political action. The family is just a consuming and producing unit. The economist thinks that because his theory rationality fits all action situations that it is a scientifically valid general theory of action. The rationality of any tradition that has become traditionalized would appear to be general because that is the only rationality known. Science gives an illusion of generality to the area of human action and consciousness, but science as a methodology for discovery of

truth does not encompass the human consciousness. A scientist can be as much a dupe of his culture as any bushman, be he a physicist, psychologist or economist.

My purpose in this paper is not to criticize economics, or the economics rationality which pervades society, as being wrong, but only to say that if life is only economics, then life is dull and flat. Someone who is conditioned into thinking that dullness and flatness are happiness or "utility maximization" would not know the difference, because dullness and flatness are evaluative terms from experience that can be known only by comparative experience. If one's consciousness is shaped by a rationality that leads to dullness and flatness and that is the only rationality one knows, then, obviously, one will always experience dullness and flatness but will call that experience happiness because that is where his rationality led him and that is what his rationality calls the experience. Happiness is defined as a superior achievement and so, obviously, what one experiences in the experience of happiness is a superior achievement. Even John Stuart Mill, the great exponent of utilitarianism, made the observation, in one of his more lucid moments, that he would rather be a dissatisfied Socrates than a satisfied pig. That one statement refuted his own utilitarian philosophy which was based on the assertion of the ultimate human purpose as being one of maximizing satisfaction.

It seems to me that some other motive, besides that encompassed within the economics rationality, moved the leaders who created modern society. Can you imagine Columbus calculating, in the safe ordered world of economics, trade-offs and opportunity costs, and evaluating his alternatives in a rational way? Or Henry Ford sitting down and working out the most efficient way to invent the automobile and calculating his profits so he would know whether to begin or not. Surely these men were moved by a passion, a passion to

express themselves in creative discovery. The early Puritans were also moved by a passion, but a passion channeled by a discipline. All we have left is the discipline, and that discipline is given conceptual expression in economics. A discipline suppresses all feelings and values except the one encompassed within its goal, be that goal defined as economic or religious. The conclusion is that our culture embodies the rationality of a discipline towards the economic goal but has lost all the passion or spirit, so the experience within that discipline is dull and flat. The discipline embodied in the rationality of the culture stifles all creative expression and the freedom to experience vitality and excitement because the discipline itself has become the goal rather than a means to a goal.

The sections of the paper to follow will present a background theoretical perspective from which the assertive interpretation of this section may be evaluated. The conclusion to support the forgoing interpretation can be stated simply and straightforwardly--namely, that a person's consciousness, intentionality, or rationality frame of reference is developed from experience. And if the only significant experience is within the structure of the social system, which has developed around a specific goal, so that the individual's only sense of identity is associated with his role in that system, then his consciousness will be determined by that role experience. Within the concept of the role as the only source of identity, the individual is defined as an object, i.e., either as a consumer or as a factor of production, in our society. Involved in this conclusion is the understanding that an individual frames the world in his own image, so if he views himself as an object then he views others also as objects. Thus, there is no anomaly involved in viewing people as inputs, as capital, or as consumers, that is what they are. Being a role, or an object,

is a comfortable position because an object does not have a center of will for taking responsibility but has merely to refer to the theory which defines him as an object and there finds the choice mechanism to function in any situation. The professional role is a particularly insidious one in this respect.

The alternative to role experience is that of an unstructured, open experience where the individual can respond with feelings that are not suppressed by the discipline of the structured action situation. I have been referring to the situational context of such an experience as moral community. It is only a name for expressing a human value. It is meant to convey the affirmation that the individual is unique and has intrinsic worth aside from his role performance within any system of action. It affirms the proposition that human potential is achieved only when the individual's sense of identity is grounded in such a concept of himself. He will then view others in the same light and that bond of mutual respect is the basic order of a viable society. It integrates the individual so that place in society is not a role but just what a person does as a person. This concept of human meaning and order is the basis for the title of the paper. The implication is that we cannot formulate an integrated perspective on development planning in Lesotho unless we have an integrated perspective of ourselves. Otherwise the Basuto will be objects to be manipulated by various planning and control measures to achieve what we have achieved, viz., happiness.

Economics as a General Theory of Action

I proceed by presenting economics as a theory evolving from Western historical experience and, also, critiquing it as a general theory of action or choice. Theory in this use means an understanding of the grounds of action for the individual. This conception of theory is based on the premise that

the making of choice or taking action is a genuine possibility not reducible to psychological or sociological causal relations. Thus, if psychological or sociological theories predict it is in a pathological situation where freedom has been lost. This view would be in opposition to scientific positivism, as expressed, for example, in behaviorism. The question of the grounds of choice within the individual is essentially a question of where is the center of the self, or the will grounded. It is not altogether clear what answer economics would give to that question. The presumption is that choices are a rational process of the intellect. Thus, the presumptive answer is the intellect, although it is not clear how utilitarian weights are derived by the mind. The purpose and use of a theory of action is to enlighten, so as to be more rational in action. This use of the term theory with regard to choice and action is as a theory of the process for gaining understanding of the grounds and potential of an action and the differentiating characteristics of theories of action concern the question of the center of the self and how it is developed. It is my understanding that economics originated as a theory in that sense.

In the liberal tradition and the economics of the modern period the process of choice was conceived as a means-end rationality involving an evaluation of possibilities in terms of their consequences. Evaluation is conceptually perceived as a weighting of different consequences in terms of expected satisfaction or utility. Conceivably all possibilities are considered for any choice situation, so that any one possibility involves sacrificing others, thus, the problem of trade-offs, opportunity cost, etc. Utility weights are developed from past experience, presumably, in terms of experienced satisfaction. Obviously, in market situations prices are evaluative weights. Thus, choice is based on knowledge - the capacity to predict consequences - and the

capacity to know what satisfies wants. The individual is guided by his own self-interest, i.e., the realization of utility or satisfaction or intermediate ends, e.g., income, which lead to satisfaction. Social order is based on rules evaluated in terms of negative freedom, i.e., freedom from constraints, justified on utilitarian grounds as in Mill's On Liberty.

The theory as it is expressed in economics, or in the politics of interest group action as, for example, in public choice theory, is concerned only with the social system and the individual as an individual. The only source of values that are derivable from the theory are utilitarian values for the individual as an individual and, supposedly, the social rules of action for the individual to realize or achieve his utilitarian end. There is no understanding within that theory about how values concerned with respect for others, social justice or generally ordering values within the individual and within the society are derived. The theory is nihilistic as generally stated. The individual would be hedonistic or, more to the point, socially conditioned. The society would be controlled by power because what better way to predict consequences is there than to control them. Both the Marxian and the public choice power group theories of social action are valid implications from the liberal tradition, economics assumptions about individual and social action and come out with the same conclusion, viz., power is the ordering principle. The early economists and political philosophers never arrived at that conclusion because they took certain values as self-evident; they had no theory of the source of their self-evidency. Being rational in an economic sense meant being rational, as the above theory would prescribe, within the constraints of what they assumed to be self-evident values. Today's pathology exists because these values are no longer self-evident. A more general theory of action must explain the origin of values associated with moral responsibility or individual and social order.

The viable and humanistic thrust of the English liberal tradition and of economics was the enhancement of the potential for the individual to exercise choice through liberation from the traditional constraints of poverty and authoritarian rule. The social theory was based on the affirmation of the potential of the individual to exercise responsibility, and thus, the possibility of a society organized to encourage that response. That thrust was expressed in economics in terms of the assumptions of self-interest, utilitarianism and rationality. I will elaborate these assumptions, briefly, as an entry into critique.

Self-interest meant that freedom for an individual to carry out his own design of action would be a viable ordering principle, if the social order was such that the design of the action would only be justified by its social usefulness. It recognized the already demonstrated fact that the freedom of the individual was conducive to self-development and to a hitherto unexperienced level of motivation and energy. It is to the credit of Adam Smith that he developed that insight as an ordering principle.

The concept of utility as socially or individually useful, or as satisfying needs is straightforward and makes sense. To conceive of utilitarianism as a general theory of human action is to be caught in an empty tautology, it seems to me. To make any sense, utilitarianism is either another name for hedonism or else a disguised form of behaviorism, if it is to take on the status of a general theory. Perhaps my intuitions are not penetrating enough to grasp in it what others do, nevertheless, I would propose an interpretation. Utilitarianism, as used by economists, is a way of saying that the individual is free to decide how to use his time, spend his income, or in other ways express himself. To say that an individual is counting utilities is a distorting way of saying he is making up his mind, deciding, or making a choice. It

would make more sense to say rules are designed to permit and implement freedom of choice, than to say they are designed to maximize utility. To conceptualize choice as maximizing utility is to invoke a spurious sense of scientificity.

Functional rationality is functional rationality, there is no way to dispute that. If one wants to achieve a certain end, and that is all one wants to do, then one sets about to achieve that end and the way one sets about to do that is a rationality of how to achieve that end. To think of that achievement in terms of efficiency is a certain way of perceiving the process. It ignores the process as having value in itself and that is one of the peculiarities of Western rationality. A peculiarity of Western historical development which, as Weber's interpretation would have it and I agree, evolved out of the Puritan discipline.

The characterization of economics as a social action theory or as a cultural paradigm has a specific meaning associated with that characterization. Most importantly that characterization is directed against the misconception that economics is a scientific theory in the usual sense. The concept of a cultural paradigm is derived from an understanding that all societies formulate an interpretation of lived out experience, or action, conceptually and that that conceptualization becomes institutionalized within a cultural center to provide guidance and legitimacy to action. The conceptual order, or theory, is an interpretation of the meaning of the experience and an interpretation of the intentions embodied in the action. For example, within our market society suppose an individual implements a design of action to produce something, culminates the intentions and begins marketing the product. One interpretation of the meaning of that action, which the economist would make, is that his intentions were to make profit. The individual may not be sure of

his intentions. If he were knowledgeable and perceptive he would know that in order to be effective he would have to relate his actions to the social order in which his action is to be initiated. Thus, in a market order he would have to know how to produce at a low cost and produce something that other people wanted, or that he could convince them to want, and so forth. If the individual was responsive to his feelings, which disclose to him his intentions, then he might, for example, interpret his action and experience as the fulfillment of an intention to express himself by providing an item to others which he hoped would be fulfilling to them. Profits would only be an indicator of the achievement of that intention.

Suppose the product were a well designed bicycle. The economist would interpret the choice process of deciding to buy the bicycle in terms of indifference curves or moving up a utility function, or whatever. The basic assumption of such a theory is that goods are substitutable within certain constraints. It is a logically feasible assumption but empirical or normative validity is another question. Substitutability depends on how the individual's intentionality develops. Substitutability of goods is indicative of a mass society where the individual has no unique sense of self-consciousness on which to base a choice. All choices become trivial as a consequence. The individual making the purchase might conceivably have such a passion to express his physical prowess on a bicycle that has this particular design that he is single-minded in making that decision. The bicycle is useful to him in getting back and forth to work so it satisfies a need in a utilitarian sense too. Some form of physical expression is a necessity to him, not just a need or a want, because it is essential to his sense of well-being and the bicycle fulfills that intentionality. Satisfying a need or fulfilling an expressive intention are two ways of interpreting an action. A need is imposed

from the outside, one satisfies it. Expressiveness as an intention creates the necessity of fulfillment. Utility, as originally conceived, was an interpretation of satisfying a need, as for example in Adam Smith. Utilitarianism as now conceived is the passive response to wants imposed from the outside and, thus, substitutability is a valid assumption. Both conceptions, i.e., responding to a need or a want, take a different view of experienced meaning, than that meaning interpreting the act as creative expression and fulfillment as the culmination of that kind of intentionality, and joy as the feeling associated with the experience. Happiness is the term applied to feelings in the utilitarian theory and is experienced when all needs have been satisfied and the organism is in a state of somnolence.

To perceive economics as either a scientific theory or as a general theory of social action is, within the characterization of economics as a cultural interpretation suggested above, to assert that a particular historical experience evolving out of the pursuit of a particular goal and interpreted in a particular way be elevated to the status of an absolute. That conclusion has signaled the end of other societies in the past and indicative of a closed, conditioned society. The fact that economic theories predict within Western societies would be another way of saying these societies are monolithic, i.e., completely dominated in action orientation towards a single goal and in the pursuit of that goal in a systematized way, characterized by a high level of social conditioning, counter-utopian in central power control, and so forth. These conclusions suggest the nature of a social pathology existing in Western societies. The economists interpretations as they have evolved up to the present time, are interpretations indicative of the pathology. Utilitarianism as a contemporary interpretation of demand behavior, not action, is another way of saying that wants are socially conditioned. By self-interest the

economist now means pursuit of selfish ends. Rationality means behavior which conforms to a traditionalized cultural tradition. The path to professional status is a path of social conditioning, not education as the liberation of the creative impulse. These are assertive indictments. They reflect deep feelings which have grown out of my own struggle to liberate myself meaning, or intentionality, from that of the discipline. That struggle entailed the development of a different theory perspective from which to re-interpret the cultural tradition, as conceptualized in economics. The next section presents some aspects of that theory perspective as supportive of the re-interpretations suggested in the examples presented above.

An Alternative Theory of Action

In discussing a theory of action I am using theory in two different senses as already intimated. A scientific theory is a way of knowing by reducing the phenomena to certain observables. In terms of human purpose, scientific theory is knowledge for control in the achievement of certain ends, and in that sense its meaning is its usefulness. Scientific knowledge also leads to understanding of the world, both human and natural, in which we live and, thus, to a better understanding of ourselves as a part of that world. Part of the alternative theory of action to be presented contains propositions which can be tested according to scientific methodology.

The other sense of the term theory is in the sense used in the previous section with respect to economics as a theory of action. The way theory was used there the term is synonymous with rationale or a form of rationality; as an interpretation of meaning associated with actions. I will broaden that sense of its use.

If we apply that sense of theory to social action and to the cultural tradition of the society, then instead of an individual theory of action it

would be a social theory. A social theory encompasses the rationale of the individual but, also, includes an understanding of the rationale of the social order and social purpose through time. For example, the English liberal tradition and economics as a part of that tradition would constitute a social theory. There are variations within that social theory tradition but all include the concept of social purpose as constituted by individual purposes and that expressed in some form of utilitarian end such as welfare, well-being, satisfaction, happiness and so forth. Change through time is accomplished through some form of democratic process as encompassed within the government of a nation state. Generally, the concept of purpose through time is formulated as progress in terms of growth in scientific knowledge and in its application to increase welfare (happiness). As it has worked out the institutionalization of science within the university system becomes the center of that tradition, since growth in knowledge is the working out of the social purpose. Knowledge is implemented in terms of activities through the agencies of business, government and educational institutions.

In the way I am using social theory, every cultural tradition would be a social theory. However, every social theory would not necessarily be a cultural tradition, since a social theory could be proposed by an individual but it would not be appropriate to call it a cultural tradition, if it were only held by one individual. The liberal tradition social theory is a continuation, or further development of the ancient Greek intellectual tradition. The view of the world as ordered by natural laws and man as a part of that order, the concept of the intellect as the source of order within the individual and, thus, the concept of science as the ultimate source of truth, and, also, of knowledge, so conceived, as the meaning of achievement or progress, are all Greek. One of the crucial aspects of this view is that of the intellect

as the essence of man, and that view, as developed by Hume, of the passive subject receiving sensory data through which the intellect develops its order.

The liberal tradition social theory is the working out a only one part of modern societies cultural tradition as having continuity through time. Modern society emerged out of both the Greek and the Judeo-Christian traditions. I would propose that the Judeo-Christian tradition is also a social theory. I will present that tradition as a social theory as it has been interpreted by writers such as Soren Kierkegaard, Martin Buber and Paul Ricoeur. The understanding of a cultural tradition as an interpretation of experience, which I am using, comes from the work of these people and that of Ernst Cassirer in his three volume work, The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms. The use of that approach has already been illustrated in viewing economics as an interpretation of experience. For the purpose of interpreting Christianity as a social theory I will elaborate some aspects of this approach relevant to that interpretation.

That part of a tradition which can be classified as theory is that part of the original conceptualization of experience which can be tested back or verified in experience. Those aspects of Christianity conceptualized in theology and certain doctrines represent an intellectual elaboration to form a completed system and are not testable. In religion they constitute a dogma, as they also do in science and philosophy. To use a mundane example, the term value is a concept, within this view, which developed from experience. The original experience was felt in a positive way and expressed in many ways to capture the experienced meaning and advanced through different levels of conceptualization. The value level of conceptualization is defined within a general social theory, and takes on an intellectual meaning within that

theory. Within the intellectual view that is the only meaning it has. However, in the Keirkegaard-Buber-Ricoeur perspective the meaning is an interpretation of experience and one would not know the meaning except in experience. Thus, one cannot know a theory of action except through experience, which is its test.

To continue the example, the value concepts of economic freedom, efficiency and so forth only have meaning, other than as a doctrine, in terms of experience. The utilitarian theory is an attempt to elucidate the meaning in experience and if the theory leads to meaningless experience, the theory becomes meaningless. This perspective is different from that of the intellect as an autonomous order and the subjective as a passive receiver of sensory inputs. It is one aspect of Christianity as a social theory, since the dynamic of Christianity has always been an appeal to experience and existential understanding.

For Christianity as a social theory, the social order within which the individual finds identity and place is the community. The community is conceived as continuous through time and does not necessarily coincide with an established church. The individual's self-consciousness, or intentionality, is grounded in his faith. The center and principle of order within the self is faith, and faith as experienced, not expressed in doctrine, is a belief in the self as an order and as the final source of truth. Faith is achieved by an affirmation of the self through an act of will, not through knowledge. The purpose of the community is the sharing of experience and mutual support in self-development. The theory of action, expressed in symbolic form in Christianity, is an interpretation of the meaning of experience in the action of achieving self-development. The steps of self-development, as expressed in the Protestantism of Luther, Calvin, Wesley and others are liberation, or

the achievement of negative freedom, the freedom from alien determinants of meaning, for example, liberation from social prestige, riches, the dependency upon parents, wife and friends, intellectual accomplishment and so forth. This step was expressed as laying down the "old" man. Rebirth was a step of positive freedom, the creation of new meaning, and was an affirmation of the self in faith, as the grounds of self-consciousness or intentionality. The next step, termed growth in grace, was the continual creation of meaning as an exploration of potential within the self.

Several aspects of the Christian concept of the nature of man have been elaborated and explored by the writers referred to, as representatives of a continuous tradition outside the English liberal tradition. Some of their findings can be formulated as propositions that are testable in a scientific sense. Other formulations and insights lead to enlightened understanding and are only testable in experience, i.e., they contribute to a theory of action. I will only touch on these as a comparison to the liberal tradition. One important conception is that the subjective is not passive in receiving sensory data but active and expressive. The world of objects, for example, is constituted as an expression of the self. This insight was formulated first by Kant, who termed it a Copernican revolution, as a solution to Hume's problem. This insight is crucial to a theory of action as formulated and expanded in terms of self-knowledge by Kierkegaard, Ricoeur and Cassirer. It is a science for the self. The potential of the individual is developed by creative expression in work, in skills and in expressive listening and sharing with others. And that potential is explored and tested in experience in terms of an active self-consciousness, not as a passive response to needs imposed from the outside.

In the Christian existential conception of choice or action, there exists a priority ordering of the choice process. The initial and fundamental choice is the affirmation of the self as a center of responsibility and worth. It is the love of the self and is a recognition that the "world" is created by the self-consciousness, thus, to be an individual is to create one's own world, not to be created by an imposed alien world. The individual's sense of identity is established by a faith in himself as an ultimate order and in a moral community which also affirms that faith. Thus, the individual is not dependent upon socially defined measures of worth, such as contained in the concepts of status and prestige. The ultimate source of moral authority is in the individual, thus, the social theory structure of action would have to be by agreement. The affirmation, or choice, of this sense of meaning for the individual is the basic form of the intentionality or self-consciousness, and it is formative of a moral order. All subsequent choices are a working out of the moral order and/or exploration of potential for the individual and the development of knowledge through experience and so forth. Choice is, thus, not just limited to a rational evaluation of consequences of alternatives but for important decisions amounts to an exploration of potential within the individual in terms of opportunities and the actual choice becomes an affirmation of one's potential. A person's feelings about the choice is that it is what one has to do to be what one is. The rational prediction of consequences based on knowledge is a part of the process, but evaluation is not evaluation in the utilitarian sense.

An important and distinctive aspect of both Judaism and Christianity is the sensibility of continuity of the community through historical time. Thus, identity, self-consciousness and the feeling of belonging to an order is not associated with a particular social structure of action, but is associated with

the historical community. Thus, the possibility exists within that cultural tradition social theory to transcend the conditioning processes of a closed, monolithic social system. That aspect of that tradition along with the focus on a moral order growing out of existential experience lead to components of a general theory of action.

An Outline of a General Theory of Individual and Social Action

What I am proposing as an outline of a general theory of action is essentially an integration of the Christian and Greek cultural tradition social theories. That integration involves a resolution of questions and paradoxes evolving from the historical confrontations between these traditions, which are in a more general sense intrinsic to the human condition. The promise in the title of an integrated perspective on development planning in Lesotho follows from the synthesis of these two social theories. The main sense of the proposed integration in terms of action is the integration of community with social structure, or as Don Sorenson and Dale Pfau address the problem, it is vertical and horizontal integration.

In terms of the modern period and the contemporary socio-cultural crisis of Western civilization, so defined as a crisis by the perspective being presented, the beginning developed from an uneasy melding of these traditions and crisis has resulted from the loss of Christian community, and all that is left is social structure. The university as an institution is comprised of professionals who serve the structure, not a community bearing the responsibility of a tradition dedicated to truth and understanding, thus, the university is not a substitute community. Science has destroyed that responsibility because it destroyed experience and tradition and substituted for that a form of empty

intellectualizing; the Greek world in all its nakedness. A world populated with men formed by a weak faith, no feelings and a big head full of empty tautologies, moving along an indifference curve between nothingness and a void. Thus, the modern world is left without moral community, a massive ship without a rudder.

The antithesis between the Greek and the Christian theories of individual and social action is expressed most sharply in the dichotomy between faith and reason, and between the body and the spirit, or the spirit and the "world." If we approach these two cultural traditions from the perspective that they both conceptualize authentic responses to experience, then that perspective implies there are generalizable aspects to them. This would be true of all cultural traditions. This perspective is based on the proposition that traditions are theories of action not reducible to human science explanations, i.e., that consciousness is an autonomous order, not explainable by reduction. It can only be understood in terms of principles of order. The theory of action embodied in the tradition incorporates principles of order for consciousness development. The criteria of judgement to be applied to the theory is not verification according to traditional scientific methodology but testable in experience in terms of realized human potential. For example, in terms of historical experience, the combination of the Greek and Judeo-Christian traditions resulted in a creative breakthrough, which has developed the accomplishments of the modern period. We are assuming that the historical process is ordered but characterized by a non-reductive order, thus, only understandable in terms of a theory of action as a principle of order. The German historical school, including Max Weber, use the concept of verstehen, subjective understanding. The existential-phenomenologists, including Paul Ricoeur, use the concept of interpretation, or re-interpretation known as the hermeneutic method.

For example, Christianity is an experience conceptualized in symbolic and mythical language, understandable to the believing Christian, but to be understandable in a generalizable language the original conceptualization must be re-interpreted, or de-mythicized. I have been using re-interpretation to de-mythicize the language of economics, for example. I interpret contemporary economics as a response to social conditioning, i.e., as a response of society alienated from feelings, not a response to an authentic experience. Authenticity reflects the understanding of meaning through experience, not as an ideology. Christianity, philosophy and science all contain conceptualization growing out of the same kind of response, i.e., ideological elements. I am using ideology to mean the closure of the conceptual order in response to a competitive threat from another conceptual order.

The dichotomy between faith and reason, as expressed historically, is an ideological dichotomy. It is not a dichotomy or conflict growing out of authentic experience. In the self-awareness of experience one recognizes that one's reasoning develops from a faith in some order. The philosophy of science has demonstrated conclusively that all theory, and all rational, logical processes of thinking, develop from premises. Scientific theory ends in conclusions testable through observation. An ideological system of thought or theory is closed, moving from its basic premises to derived propositions about the world and back to its premises in a circular path. The basic premises are not testable in experience, so the world it creates is immutable. The premises are only established by faith, where faith is defined as the belief in a certain order. Thus, the conflict between faith and reason is essentially a conflict between different faiths. A brief discussion of the two traditions out of which this conflict arose will provide an understanding of the integration I propose.

The Greek intellectual tradition flowered in the Athens of Socrates, Plato and Aristotle, and it is from their writings that the English liberal-economics tradition can be traced. This is not to imply that the early discoveries may not have been re-discovered, independently, by early moderns. My purpose is just to show the incompleteness of the theory of action developed in that tradition, as viewed from contemporary knowledge. Socrates' purpose in life, according to Plato's account, was to be the "midwife" in the birth, or development, of self-knowledge. Thus, he conceived of himself as a teacher who taught by asking questions which guided the student in self-discovery. The process of questioning was a process of liberation from traditional beliefs by revealing the inadequacy of their premises. Socrates' faith was a belief that the order of truth was inherent in man to be self-discovered, once liberated from illusory traditional beliefs. Socrates proposed no paths or solutions to the process of self-discovery for the liberated person, and refused to prescribe. Socrates was existential. Plato's solution to the Socratic dilemma was to posit, by faith, the conception of a world of ideals discoverable through the powers of intellectual knowledge. The Aristotelian solution placed the ultimate order in the natural world and an order discoverable by the intellect. Thus, the Platonic solution leads to philosophical systems, whose eventual validity lies in their premises. The belief in that solution has resulted in two thousand years of empty intellectualizing by theologians and philosophers. The Aristotelian solution leads to science and as we have discovered from contemporary science, it leaves the individual lonely and empty of meaning. The Greek cultural tradition is an incomplete theory of action, according to the way a theory of action has been defined. There was no basis of faith for a positive freedom process of creating meaning, except faith in an existing social system, which leads to

social conditioning. Epicurianism, or hedonism, and stoicism developed in the Hellenistic period as solutions, and both are implicit in the original solution. The English liberal tradition developed utilitarianism as a solution, but, as pointed out above, the originators of this tradition took certain moral values evolving from Christian experience as self-evident. The origin of these values was not contained in their theory.

The early tradition of Judaism was the explicit, and systematic response to the necessity of a moral order. The idea of a moral order was expressed in the concept of the law. The law consisted of a set of rules defining action situations. As that tradition developed, the conception of a monotheism gave expression to the belief in a universal ordering principle. Later prophets gave expression to the experience that the law had no meaning except it be "written in the heart." Re-interpreted, that expression conveys the truth that the law could not be imposed from the outside but must develop from individual experience as an affirmed response to feelings. Christianity represents a breakthrough in terms of that insight, expressed in the early teachings as being liberated from the law through faith and Christian love. Faith and love are simply the affirmation of ones self as unique and intrinsically worthy, thus, the capacity to respond to others in the same light. This conception is a principle of moral order and is integrating to the self-consciousness, or intentionality, embodying that principle. The conception of historical moral community and continuity in the tradition reflects the experience that liberation and the positive creation of meaning involves courage, trust, mutual support, example and guidance, i.e., a communication or sharing of experiential knowledge. A form of knowledge passed down from generation to generation, according to a structure growing out of the human

condition. That is, man is born free and develops meaning, first, within the family in growing up, and, then, within the community. The process ends only in death.

Within the concept of tradition as a theory of action and as a science of self-development, the implication is that it is possible for the tradition to be open and transforming in response to new knowledge from experience. Thus, each generation may be faced with the task of liberation from the errors of the past, but do not start from the beginning. There is an implication of growth in knowledge, which become publically verified through the sharing, or communication, of experience and feelings. This process integrates faith and reason. Faith becomes paradoxical to reason only when reason closes in upon itself within the circularity of a system of thought, this is the problem of maintaining openness. The concept of theory and science is a proposition that the conceptualization of meaning in a tradition ends in experience as a verification or test, feelings are the observational data of experience. For example, happiness is a feeling that verifies an active choice. However, if one is closed in to the discipline of a theory and has, consequently, suppressed the feelings, then happiness is just a term prescribed by the theory, as a rationalized interpretation of the action as experience.

In the existential conception of experience, the feelings disclose the intentionality of the individual in a situational context. For example, the feeling of anger discloses a situational context of unfulfilled intentions. The exploration of that feeling reveals one's own intentions, of which the individual may not be aware, and allows analysis of the situational context in which unfulfillment occurs. The process is an interpretation of meaning, which is defined as experience. Thus, the growth of self-consciousness develops through openness to feelings and their interpretation, which reveals the

persons intentionality or consciousness. A person can only change or develop through knowledge of his own intentionality frame of reference, and this process is a theory of action which leads to development of self-consciousness through change. This process is facilitated through communication with others, and along with communication as a form of verification, is the central process of community development, and transformation of the cultural tradition.

The existentialist interpretation of moral self-consciousness involves two types of experiences. One is the encounter with a "thou." The other is resolve. The encounter with a "thou" is an interaction relationship with another person through the sharing of feelings. That means responding to the person with respect for the person's intentionality, not responding to the person as an object. The response to another person's feelings by its nature is an expression of one's own potential, for to understand another person's meaning necessitates the exploration of one's own meaning - thus, understanding is expression and self-discovery. The bond of the relationship is thus mutual and, if it develops, results in self-affirmation. It is a relationship referred to as love, although the connotation associated with that word make it risky to use. Resolve is self-affirmation and the conscious recognition of mutual respect, or love, as the integrating principle of one's intentionality, self-consciousness or moral order. This experience or process cannot be imposed, or ordered by a theory, or prescribed by the priest and so forth. It evolves from the experienced feelings of creative fulfillment. These comments are from an observational perspective of the Christian historical experience, from that of humanistic and existential psychology, from the existentialists, e.g., Buber and Kierkegaard, and from my own experience.

The creation of the self is a basic creative act and essential to or integral with all other creative acts. Marx's insight of the importance of work is consistent with this perspective, viz., that the individual creates himself

through the creative expression of work. Thus, one is alienated from oneself when one is alienated from the product of one's work creation.

Integration of the Greek and Christian theories of individual action, in terms of the generalizable aspects, is to develop the self-awareness that reason is grounded in the faith order of one's intentionality. To lack self-awareness of one's intentionality is to be determined by that which is not included in the rationalizing process of choice. One is "trapped" in a closed process of reasoning, and reason becomes the tool for irrational drives or needs. The drives or needs are imposed as it were from the outside, and irrational because there is no awareness of their source in the intentionality. This is the basis of social conditioning or traditionalization and occurs without the experience of moral community. Traditional Christianity has not developed the rational understanding of faith, since faith is still grounded in the sacredness of an historical event, a form of objectifying the consciousness, or traditionalizing the consciousness. The viability of historical Christianity resulted from a faith as experienced. What I have been presenting is not traditional Christianity but the generalizable aspects of it, which is a Christianity de-mythicalized. The integration of the two social theories would involve recognizing the necessity of moral community and experiential knowledge and its priorness to the structuring of action and scientific knowledge.

On the Lesotho Project

The general theory of action, presented in the previous section as an integration of the Greek and Judeo-Christian traditions, is a theory of change and development. The theory is derived from the non-reducible phenomenon of individual consciousness as expressed in action. Within that perspective, the phenomena of culture is explained as growing out of the interaction relationships of moral community, which is expressed in action and actions become organized

by rules, or institutions, as constituting a social system. Viewed from an abstract point of view, there are two interrelated types of action. One type of action is individual self-consciousness development, or the process of constituting the grounds of action. The other type of action is expressed outwardly in producing things, managing, planning and so forth. The sequences of change places priority on the moral order with the social order as a derived form. From an individual perspective, the theory is saying a person has to know his own grounds of action before choice and action situations can be rationally organized. As a macro theory, it is a theory of cultural development, where the cultural tradition is conceptualized as a theory of action. The stress on the transformation of the cultural tradition recognizes that imposed institutional change results in social conditioning, not an authentic sense of consciousness growing out of the self-awareness of experience. Economics posing as a general theory of action has been interpreted as a theory of social conditioning and a theory embodied in the contemporary cultural tradition of Western societies as a conditioned response to a social structuring of experience disembedded from moral community.

In the Lesotho project, I am proposing, therefore, the goals of the project should emphasize the indigenous development of a theory of action through the processes conceptualized as community development. Community development, within the macro theory point of view, is cultural development, and is essential and prior to social planning, but integral with it. The process of community development involves a growing individual self-awareness of the theory of individual action of the tradition through exploring, sharing communication interaction relations. Considerable understanding of that process and how to facilitate it is implicit in some of this paper. More systematic approaches to facilitation have been developed from community development

work, and will be presented in a later background paper. I will conclude this paper with a brief overview of Max Weber's framework and historical explanation of the development of modern society, as that relates to the Lesotho problem.

Weber was preoccupied with the problem of social order. He used the concept of legitimacy as referring to the basis of a social order. His typology of social order was developed from different types of legitimacy, which were (1) traditional, (2) charismatic, and (3) legal-rational. These types classified the transformation of the traditional medieval social order through the charismatic order of the Protestant movement into the legal-rational social order of the modern period. Weber's charismatic order corresponds to the concept of moral community used in this paper. Instead of the concept of charisma I use the concept of shared experience and meaning, the experience being the basis of legitimacy. The legitimacy for the order of a traditional society is based on pastness, a belief in the sacredness of the formative events of the past. Legitimacy for the legal-rational derives from agreed upon values, which are claimed to be universal, and which, from the existential conception, develop from experience. The significance of this scheme for Lesotho, and with reference to the general theory section, is that the processes of moral community are the dynamic of transforming the traditional social order in response to new activities and purposes. According to David Little, the moral order of Protestant community was the basis of prescribing the legal order of modern society, and particularly forming the law in accord with the values of freedom. His book documents that process. In terms of the concept of an integrated theory, the early modern society was integrated, or embedded, in the sense that the social structure of action was an expression of community in purpose and values developing in community. The values of community growing out of experience give legitimacy to the social structure and provide the

basic process for change. There is no question that the emerging legal-rational social structure was functionally specialized in terms of political and economic activities with considerable autonomy, as compared to the integration and absence of specialization or functional specificity in a traditional society. However, in the early modern period there was integration in the sense that economic and political activities were only autonomous within the constraints of what the economic and political philosophers took to be self-evident values. These self-evident values were maintained by a viable moral community. The strongest tie of integration resulted from the fact that political and economic leadership was vested in individuals whose sense of identity and intentionality developed out of experience in the community. This was expressed in the concept of the "calling" as the individual's place in society, as compared to the social science concept of role. What is intimated in the concept of a "calling" is a truth implicit in the previous discussion, that an authentic self-consciousness expressed in creative activity is essential to and formative of a social order. Thus, outside rules need not be imposed on the individual but designed to encourage freedom of response. That is the meaning I interpret from Adam Smith's concept of self-interest and, also, the design of democratic government as formulated, for example, by Locke and Jefferson.

It is informative to be aware of the time perspective when change is presented as cultural development, as in Weber's historical analysis. The period from the Protestant Reformation to the Industrial Revolution is the formative period of modern society. That period would be interpreted as a continuous process of cultural-community development, within the theory of change developed in this paper. That period spans more than two centuries. Knowledge from that experience implies a more rapid pace of change for contem-

porary societies, but certainly not the concept of time perspective implied by the economic planning approach to development. That approach comes close to assuming that people's consciousness can be re-programmed by a planning memorandum.

The background paper to follow will address the implications from this paper in terms of project activities.

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