

**The Abyei Rural
Development Project:
An Assessment of
Action Research in
Practice**

IRD Field Report

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PREFACE

The evaluation which was the focus of this field visit was designed to provide analysis and recommendations for USAID/Khartoum and the Government of Sudan (GOS) on the status of the Abyei Development Project (ADP) beyond June 1981. The Abyei project is an integrated rural development (IRD) activity conceived as an effort to test, through a program of "action research," a number of activities designed to meet basic human needs of subsistence agro-pastoralists. Concurrently, it was expected to contribute to the larger understanding of rural development strategies. In particular, the project experience was expected to provide for:

- The elaboration and testing of a new strategy for designing rural development projects in remote, little-understood areas; and
- The development of a methodology for gathering information on critical design issues while undertaking pilot efforts in rural development.

Consequently, a major issue recurring throughout the project's extensive documented and oral history concerns the relationship between research (investigation of rural development strategies and techniques) and action (delivery of services and benefits to the target population). The evaluation team acknowledged that the two elements are interwoven in the Abyei Development Project and that this posed certain contradictions in assessing project achievements. Yet, the "experimental" nature of the project and its research goals provided an opportunity to focus on lessons learned during implementation. These should generate insights into the organizational and administrative issues of integrated rural development.

A multidisciplinary team of specialists was brought in to examine and assess the results and impacts of this three-year integrated development project. The team was composed of Dr. Tony Barclay (team leader/social anthropologist); Dr. Gene M. Owens (rural development specialist), Mr. Donald S. Humpal (agriculturalist), and Dr. Edwin G. Charle (development economist). All are members of the professional development staff of Development Alternatives, Inc. Sayed Osman Bedri, an agricultural economist, traveled to Abyei with the team and represented the Ministry of Agriculture.

The evaluation team's preparation included review of reports, files, and documents at the Harvard Institute of International Development (HIID), the grantee responsible for project implementation; interviews of HIID staff associated with the Abyei project; and attendance at a HIID seminar from January 8-10, 1981 in Cambridge, Massachusetts. The team was briefed by USAID/Khartoum staff and the director general of the Planning Office in the Ministry of Agriculture Government of Sudan before departure to Abyei.

The team worked in Abyei from January 15-27, 1981 with Owens and Bedri spending two additional days at Kadugli, South Kordofan to interview provincial officials. Field work in Abyei included group and individual interviews with a range of local leaders (teachers, Sudan Socialist Union officials, omdas (chiefs) of Ngok Dinka sections), with members of group farms, with administrators (including the assistant commissioner of Abyei District and the inspector of local government), and with representatives of the Messiriya Humr at Abyei and at the Damboloya pastoral camp. Thorough interviews with HIID and Sudanese project staff were supplemented by ongoing observation of their activities and detailed study of the data in files and monthly reports maintained at the project site.

This field report is a revised and summarized version of the project evaluation completed in February 1981. On February 10, a draft copy of the evaluation was sent to HIID inviting comments, but none were sent to DAI. This field report both identifies the issues raised, and the perspectives presented, during the field visit and relates those findings to the state of the art of project implementation. Nevertheless, this brief overview cannot capture the complexity or range of issues confronting project execution in Abyei. An effort is made here to focus on lessons learned from a small, remote project setting. While there were many unusual characteristics distinguishing Abyei, prior experiences show that the lessons are generalizable and are perhaps typical of other remote projects. It is hoped that this reinforcement of sometimes harsh lessons can provide better guides for future project execution activities.

No report of this nature can be written without a wide range of support and assistance from various people. They include David Cole of HIID; Art Mudge, Jim Holtaway, and Jerry Weaver of USAID/Khartoum; Richard Fuller and Siddig Abdallah, codirectors of the Abyei project; and numerous other persons both official and unofficial. All of their efforts are greatly appreciated. Responsibility for report content rests entirely with the authors, however.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

| | <u>Page</u> |
|---|-------------|
| SECTION ONE | |
| THE PROJECT AND ITS DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY | 1 |
| SETTING AND OBJECTIVES | 1 |
| ACTION RESEARCH: THEORY AND PRACTICE | |
| AT ABYEI | 5 |
| The Model of Action Research | 5 |
| The Application of Action Research | 6 |
| Agriculture | 6 |
| Water Supply | 7 |
| Health | 7 |
| Construction | 8 |
| Local Organization Program | 8 |
| Action Research: An Appraisal | 8 |
| Selection of Priorities | 8 |
| Selection of a Strategy | 9 |
| Monitoring Action Research | 9 |
| Mutual Participation in Action Research | 10 |
| SECTION TWO | |
| PROJECT ORGANIZATION, OUTPUTS, AND LESSONS LEARNED | 11 |
| ADMINISTRATIVE LINKAGES FOR EXECUTION | 11 |
| PROJECT MANAGEMENT, EVALUATION, AND MONITORING | 13 |
| Outputs and Achievements | 16 |
| Research Products | 17 |
| Physical Outputs | 19 |
| LESSONS | 19 |
| Management | 19 |
| Design | 20 |
| Implementation | 21 |
| Development Strategy | 22 |
| SECTION THREE | |
| CONCLUSION: THE ABYEI EXPERIENCE AND NINE CRITICAL IMPLEMENTATION PROBLEMS | 25 |
| CRITICAL IMPLEMENTATION PROBLEMS | 25 |
| NOTES | 31 |
| ANNEX A | |
| SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY FOR THE ABYEI PROJECT | 33 |

LIST OF TABLES

| <u>Table</u> | <u>Title</u> | <u>Page</u> |
|--------------|---|-------------|
| 1 | Indicators of Purpose Achievement | 18 |

SECTION ONE

THE PROJECT AND ITS DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY

This field report is divided into three sections. The first describes the Abyei Integrated Rural Development Project, its setting, and some of its more salient characteristics. Also included is a brief description of the "action research" methodology which guided project implementation decisions.

Section two highlights some of the findings and lessons learned from the project experience and its evaluation. The evaluation team attempted to derive generalizable lessons or hypotheses from the Abyei experience under four categories: management, design, implementation, and development strategy. These categories are not mutually exclusive, but they provide a convenient way of organizing the conclusions that were reached. The lessons in each category are stated with brief elaboration, and further details can be found in the original project evaluation (Barclay and others, 1981).

Section three of this report relates the findings, lessons learned, and experiences of the Abyei Development Project to a set of nine critical implementation problems developed by Development Alternative's staff: participation and decentralization; information systems; political, economic, and environmental constraints; managing and structuring technical assistance; organizational placement and linkages; timing; counterpart shortages; differing agendas; and sustaining project benefits (for further details, Morss and Gow, 1981). These problems have been identified as critical issues affecting the practice of integrated rural development and are cited as issues that should be given special consideration by project managers. The purpose here is to suggest some practical approaches to improve the ability to manage rural development activities.

SETTING AND OBJECTIVES

The Abyei Development Project (ADP) is located some 600 miles southwest of Khartoum, Sudan in a remote area in the southwest corner of South Korodofan Province. It is centered around the town of Abyei, an important meeting ground for Nilotic (Ngok Dinka) and Arabic-speaking (Messiriya Humr) cattle culture peoples, and is also on the border between northern and southern Sudan. The region has acquired political significance since the Addis Ababa accords of 1972. In recent years the movement of

growing numbers of Messiriya who seek to graze and water their cattle further and further south has led to more frequent conflict, especially between the two groups of agro-pastoralists.

The Abyei Development Project was designed to meet two major goals. The first is the improvement of the physical, economic, and social well being of all of the residents of Abyei District (including both Ngok Dinka and Messiriya). The second is the enhancement of those capabilities needed to ensure that a participatory process of development can be sustained over time. These goals are closely interrelated.

The first goal was to be addressed by carrying out action research in agriculture, health, education and training, construction technologies for building and water supply, and transport and logistics. The second goal saw institutional growth as paramount. Central to successful implementation of the ADP and to any sustained effort in the area would be the creation of an institution in Abyei that would elicit maximum local initiative and participation in the design and implementation of development activities. The ADP envisioned the establishment of a local popular organization (new to Sudan) that combined participation by the people with technical and managerial expertise. The proposed Abyei Peoples Development Organization (APDO) was to provide horizontal and vertical linkages to group farms (precooperatives), which were to be formed, as well as to the existing local government structures.

There is no formal statement of the ADP's purpose to which HIID, USAID/Khartoum, and the Government of Sudan officially subscribe. However, substantial agreement appears to exist between the language of the USAID cable (Khartoum No. 9337) which laid out the scope of work for the evaluation team, describing the project's purpose as "to test, through a program of action research. . . a package of services [to meet basic human needs] that can be replicated successfully in areas of Sudan similar to Abyei" and the statement derived from the evaluation team's briefing session at HIID. The latter defined the purpose as being "to test the feasibility of alternative techniques to meet basic human needs and organizational arrangements for participatory development."

Specific aims with respect to improving basic minimum needs include:

- Increasing the availability of sorghum and other basic foods in the people's diet;
- Supplying water for human needs in several hardship areas on a year around basis;
- Improving the extent and quality of basic health care;
- Increasing income derived from nonagricultural activity; and

- Establishing the institutional framework needed to assure the successful management of the several components of the integrated project.

Concurrent with other objectives, an action research framework was to be introduced in order to:

Figure out what sort of a development program made sense for that area. This involved gaining a better understanding of the demographic, ecologic, economic, social, and political conditions in the area. It also involved evaluating the various developmental activities already being tried in, or proposed for, Abyei as well as seeking out alternative technologies and activities that seemed to fit better the needs of the people and the potentials of the area (Cole, 1981).

Some of the specific research purposes include:

- Identifying and testing appropriate technologies for future application in the areas of agriculture, construction, and water supply;
- Experimenting with different nonformal educational approaches so as to identify those most effective both in training residents for economic activities and in equipping them with new basic life skills; and
- Identifying effective integrated rural development strategies for application in an expanded program within Abyei District and in other rural areas of Sudan.

Funds available to the project were never very substantial, and its isolated location imposed serious logistic difficulties. Total funding for the ADP was roughly US\$3 million (\$1.5 million in foreign currency and LS 707,500 (US\$1.15 million) in counterpart funds). With the exception of a 1977 grant to HIID for design related studies, significant delays have occurred in the release of funds and, in the case of GOS contributions, in their receipt by the project.

An equally serious problem concerned the adequacy of funding in relation to the project's broad scope and ambitious objectives. Inputs were scaled to the requirements of a modest project of an "experimental" type that would be managed through an operating program grant (OPG) and initiated rapidly under mission authorization. Funding remained at least 50 percent below the minimum level needed to implement the complex IRD project to which HIID, USAID, and the GOS subsequently committed themselves.

Finally, one cannot understand the Abyei project without being aware that it is a highly politicized project. It was established with the strong endorsement of President Nimeri of Sudan. His support of the project is based on the belief that it

would demonstrate the development benefits to be gained from national solidarity. Also, Dr. Francis Deng, a Dinka who was formerly the Sudanese ambassador to the United States, the minister of state for foreign affairs, and close adviser to the president, has been the political patron of the project. He was responsible for convincing USAID to support it, bringing in HIID to implement it, and acting as the project's political patron in Khartoum (Thomas, 1980).

Partly as a result of the source of its support in Khartoum, the Abyei project is viewed as a "national" as opposed to a "provincial" agricultural project. Its high level of political sponsorship and overriding policy objectives in an area of ethnic tension, give it a political visibility, and a "special" status not necessarily compatible with the small scale of the effort.

In sum, the project, its setting, and aims can be characterized as follows:

- The goals were multiple, ambiguous, and nonmeasurable;
- The expectations were extraordinarily high;
- The project was highly politicized, but with differing agendas among major actors;
- The project had extraordinarily limited resources;
- The setting was remote, even for Sudan;
- The project was located in an area of high social/ethnic tension; and
- The project development strategy incorporated an "experimental" action research methodology.

The ADP has several features that set it apart from other rural development projects. Both HIID and USAID maintained, with considerable justification, that due to the setting, field conditions required flexibility, improvisation, and opportunism. This point was not disputed by the evaluation team. Moreover, project implementers maintained that an action research strategy was adopted to explicitly deal with this need for an incremental approach to change in Abyei. Nevertheless, the evaluation showed some serious deficiencies in how action research was practiced in Abyei.

ACTION RESEARCH: THEORY AND PRACTICE AT ABYEI

The Model of Action Research

The theoretical model designed to guide HIID's approach to its Abyei project was labeled "action research". It was described as "an effort to initiate some action programs . . . oriented toward exploring a range of optional technologies, organizing principles, or cultural attitudes, prior to selection and implementation of longer term efforts . . ." (Cole and Vail, 1980: 3). It was a plan to combine "information gathering, strategy testing, and achievements of concrete development results," (Agency for International Development, 1979).

The idea was put forward in contrast to "the master plan model which involves a long period of research into the human and material resources base of an area as a prelude to designing a detailed plan," and in contrast to "the imported plan, developed and tested in one area and then transferred to another with minimal adjustment despite substantial ecological, cultural, and other differences," (Cole and Vail, 1980: 2).

It was suggested that in a place such as Abyei "projects should not be designed fully at the beginning but should evolve gradually through the careful application of rural development principles to specific project area conditions through testing and redesign processes," (Agency for International Development, 1979: 2). The model was seen as especially appropriate for Abyei since the information base regarding traditional farming in Sudan was so inadequate (Cole and Cohen, 1980: 96). Action research was conceived as a process which would "increase local participation both in the selection and in the benefits of improved technologies," (Cole and Vail, 1980: 1).

Action research at Abyei was to take place in three stages.

Stage one: Identification of critical areas. There was to be an identification of the things which the people of the area valued most and those which they found most onerous. Then there was to be an identification of the "potentials"--the positive potential for improvements, the negative potential for detriments. This identification was seen as the work of economists, technicians, and ecologists. This process was to be accompanied by the identification of external constraints, for instance, ethnic and political considerations, and resource limits, which were likely to hinder development. Thus, stage one was to provide definition to a set of critical activities which, through discussion with the affected people, were to determine appropriate priorities (Cole and Vail, 1980: 5).

- Stage two: Testing of alternative techniques. Technologies were to be applied, although the process by which an initial technique was to be selected for application was not stated. The range of alternatives to be tested and the extent and rigor of the tests were said to be "matters of judgement" depending on whether "research facilities" were close at hand (Cole and Vail, 1980: 6).
- Stage three: Combining preferred alternatives into a program. As information became available on the input requirements and the potential outputs of alternative ways of performing critical activities, a partial input/output model was to be utilized. For this purpose it was necessary to "develop information on the stocks and flows or primary inputs, the costs, benefits, and probable risks of the several main alternative technologies." Thereafter, combinations of technologies were to be compared in terms of their mutual reinforcability and the severity of external constraints. Major alternatives were then to be presented to the relevant decision makers who were to guide the formulation of the final program (Cole and Vail, 1980: 8).

The Application of Action Research

Agriculture

Project designers perceived the need for improved technologies to augment dura (sorghum) production, to achieve better grain storage and marketing and to permit crop diversification. Identification, testing, and adaptation of agricultural technologies would lead to increased production through surface area extension and higher yields, a more stable supply due to safer storage and better market leverage, and, eventually improved nutrition from a diversified vegetable diet.

Without an information base on the Abyei area's natural environment or on the farming practices employed, the project undertook a program which initially focused almost entirely on the introduction of animal traction and beekeeping (due to the appointment of an animal traction specialist as agriculturalist and team leader). Addition of an agricultural equipment specialist restored a certain balance to the program by splitting attention between animal traction and tractor-powered cultivation, and adding some agronomic trials. A zero-tillage package was introduced as another alternative in 1980, after a visit to IITA in Nigeria by the equipment specialist/team leader and the Sudanese deputy project director.

Trials designed to date have for the most part not been implemented due to a combination of logistic problems and the extremely poor technical support of an agricultural team with little methodological training or research experience. The lack of an information base on the agricultural activities of Abyei, and the failure to provide technical consulting assistance early on to generate it, resulted in a highly personalized, ad hoc research strategy and extreme tardiness in project consideration of the very important livestock sector in the area's agricultural economy. At present a data base does not exist for statistical comparison of alternative agricultural production technologies.

Water Supply

The people living around Abyei work hard to secure water and welcomed the suggestion that conveniently located wells would be provided. Water production would be an extremely visible development result.

Without precise information on the costs of alternative drilling technologies, a relatively small mechanical drill and a hand-operated drill rig were brought to Abyei under the direction of an experienced expatriate driller on a short-term contract to the project. Holes were dug, but the failure of equipment to arrive prevented casing. A pump technology was selected which promised favorable results under Abyei conditions but which had not been field tested. The results were disappointing and no producing well had been constructed at the time of the evaluation. Local workers were hired to assist the expatriate driller, but the short time available prevented meaningful technological transfer to them. Cost data on the Abyei drilling efforts have not been assembled for analysis.

Health

The people of Abyei evidenced high mortality and morbidity levels and were receptive to ideas that their medical problems might be addressed. Again a highly visible development result was suggested.

Two trained clinicians--a medical doctor and a registered nurse--were sent to Abyei for one-year assignments under the HIID program. Their goals were specified as initiation of a health inventory and the training of local health workers. In fact, they were charged to take stock of the situation and react appropriately. These individuals worked with diligence and compassion and benefited the people of Abyei in many ways.

Yet no clear-cut research strategy was provided to the expatriate health specialists, and their efforts were relatively unmonitored by HIID. No Sudanese were incorporated into the program in a managerial or planning capacity, despite attempts to recruit qualified personnel.

Construction

The project plan called for construction aid to the Abyei community and several expatriate specialists were sent to participate and give direction. Field personnel recognized the obvious need for staff housing, project workshop facilities, and so forth, and devoted most of their efforts during these initial years of the project to these activities. Some (minor) assistance was provided directly to the community. The appropriateness of this direction of effort to project facilitation was not questioned by HIID. There was little feedback to reports sent in from the field with respect to technical aspects of construction technique or training methods.

The original project goal of providing a block-making facility was replaced by the development of brick-making capacity, since local materials were available. Cost data were not accumulated for analysis, and thus, the relative efficiency of the process is difficult to assess; neither were cost data maintained on the construction efforts themselves. Local workers were trained in the technical components of construction, although little transfer of managerial skills has been achieved.

Local Organization Program

A relatively elaborate suggestion was proposed by HIID in its early project proposals for the creation of an Abyei Peoples' Development Organization (APDO). This organization was to participate in development decisions and gradually play an expanding role in the economic life of the community. The early plans contained suggestions as to which local groups should be represented and how appropriate ideas should be generated. Unforeseen resistance to the APDO concept caused this plan to be abandoned. No serious effort was made to develop alternative proposals, with the result that there is no local organization in place to take over project facilities and functions when external funding terminates.

Action Research: An Appraisal

Selection of Priorities

The initial question addressed by the theory of action research related to how development issues were to be selected for possible response. This selection of issues on which to concentrate was said to require "expert" participation, (sociologists, anthropologists, economists, technicians, ecologists) but the question of the appropriate intensity of this preliminary work was left unanswered.

A major advantage alleged for the action research strategy was that the time required for this initial decision-making process could be shortened, because the combination of action and research which was to follow would make the accuracy of the preliminary decision process less important; but here is a dilemma. If the strategy induces too much casualness at this stage, it may do a serious disservice to the planner who may find that his projects fail, because certain issues were not explored when they might have benefited from a thorough initial investigation.

Proponents of action research suggest the appropriateness of local participation at this (initial) stage. This seems a helpful idea. If local residents can be used effectively in the initial selection of issues, their ideas may cut short the need for outsiders. But there were no specifics as to how such a trade-off between locally and externally derived knowledge is to be achieved, thus without guidance as to when to move forward from the preliminaries to implementation.

With respect to the project at Abyei, there is little evidence of in-depth preliminary studies by outsiders with or without local assistance. This implies that a degree of risk was assumed in the belief that errors in the preliminary design, if they were to occur, could be quickly corrected. The value of the preliminary aspects of the approach must, therefore, be judged by the record of subsequent achievement.

Selection of a Strategy

Once the development issues are selected on which to concentrate, the action research strategy requires the planner to choose from among alternative technologies. But the question of which technology to try first is not addressed. The range of possible technical responses to any specific development problem presents the planner with an enormous area of choice. The action research strategy proposes to economize in this search by resorting to an implementation program which combines action and research. But the question of how short to cut the search for a "best" technology to try at first is left a matter of personal discretion. Of course it always is; the problem being that some may interpret the theoretical prescriptions themselves as undermining the usual inducements to diligence and rigor.

Monitoring Action Research

One conclusion presents itself forcefully at this point in respect to action research. Once a set of development issues has been chosen for experimental response and once a technology has been selected for experimental adoption, records of performance

must be carefully maintained and monitored. If they are not, any errors which occurred in prior stages can be expected to take their full toll. This point seems serious and is, indeed, carefully prescribed in the theoretical plan of action (see the outline of stage three, above).

Thus, it is disappointing that deficiencies appear consistently in the monitoring of the various activities underway at the Abyei project. Initial research designs are cursory. There are few well-planned data-gathering instruments. There is little evidence of rigorous analysis and rapid feedback to reports from the field. Conventional requirements for cost accounting data have been neglected. Without such backup support, the field team will be seriously disadvantaged in its efforts. Without such support potential verification of the research strategy will be undermined.

Mutual Participation in Action Research

Participation by the people of the Abyei area was recognized as crucial by the planners of the program, and without such involvement it is difficult to see how permanent success could be achieved even if other problems were solved. But shaping a plan for effective local participation and implementing such a plan once conceived are notoriously difficult.

This issue is relevant to an analysis of action research. If the application of this strategy is to effectively reduce the time required for the preliminary identification of issues and the selection of an appropriate technology, there are strong reasons to expect that local participation will be a vital requirement for a project's success from its inception. The inputs of those who know local conditions seem essential if others are to be relieved of the need to learn them for themselves. Furthermore, it would seem essential not only that locals "be involved," but that this involvement constitutes genuine commitment. They should stand to benefit from success or lose from failure in respect to the preliminary identification of issues and each technological choice.

SECTION TWO

PROJECT ORGANIZATION, OUTPUTS, AND LESSONS LEARNED

ADMINISTRATIVE LINKAGES FOR EXECUTION

Preliminary studies by HIID emphasized that "any development program that bypasses the local administration will fail in its ultimate objective of providing stability in this meeting-ground of North and South," (Cole and others, 1977a: 4). The overall organizational arrangements for the Abyei project were expected to achieve the following aims:

- To demonstrate a national commitment to rural development in traditional areas. Additionally, Abyei had a symbolic role in support of a national policy of solidarity and unification between the north and the south;
- To establish a permanent institutional base to insure continuity of the government's commitment for rural development, in Abyei in particular, and in the traditional sector in general; and
- To provide an organizational framework to test a new approach to rural development that linked policy planning, technical support, local mobilization and participation to identifiable institutions at the national, provincial, and local levels.

The proposed organizational arrangement represented a new approach to rural development that did not fall within the normal range of responsibility of the existing ministries and governmental bodies. Organizations would have to be created, roles and responsibilities identified, and institutional structures supported in order for these aims to be realized.

Initial documents envisioned three coordinating and oversight bodies to facilitate the implementation of the project and to monitor its progress:

- A national coordinating committee--to be comprised of high level representatives from the several ministries involved, including the Minister of Agriculture, Minister of Planning, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, the Provincial Commissioner for South Kordofan, and high level representatives from other ministries;

- A provincial coordinating committee--to be established by the provincial commissioner and comprising those assistant commissioners and other agency representatives who were most concerned with the channeling of personnel and resources to the Abyei Development Project; and
- An Abyei Peoples Development Organization (APDO)--to consist of a board of directors, a managerial staff, and a technical staff. This advisory body was to provide a mechanism for soliciting popular opinion concerning development needs and priorities, and help to mobilize community resources in support of project activities.

Few of the organizational arrangements originally envisaged for the ADP have been established or are functioning in the manner originally expected. The difficulties encountered can generally be attributed to both structural and behavioral factors within the Sudanese administrative context.

The distance and physical isolation of the Abyei project from the South Kordofan provincial system presents a major barrier to communication, and consequently to both understanding and support for the project. There has been little official contact between Abyei and Kadugli (the Provincial Capital) concerning the project and little exchange of reports between them. The Provincial Coordinating Committee which has been established to review all agricultural projects in South Kordofan views Abyei as a relatively minor project in light of its small size relative to other projects in South Kordofan and its external source of financial support.

The lack of close or continuing contact has resulted in conflicting views. South Kordofan authorities view the ADP as "being taken care of" by national authorities and resources. The ADP staff on the other hand perceive the project as deliberately ignored and deprived of expected provincial support.

It appears that much of the concern over provincial level support occurred after the ADP design and its objectives were set and approved at the highest political levels. The "special" political objectives of the project were perceived as precluding tradeoffs or compromise to achieve mutual administrative interests and commitment. Yet, discussions with provincial officials suggest that the ADP was perceived from its inception as failing to give adequate attention to incorporation of the Messirya population in its activities.

The organizational asymmetry in terms of the level of governmental responsibilities, power, and administrative prestige envisioned for overall administrative supervision suggests that there were major weaknesses in the organizational design. It cannot reasonably be expected that a committee of ministers would devote continuing attention to the implementation problems of what

is a very small project in the national context. Moreover, the "top-heaviness" perhaps stifled initiatives and objections from lower-level administrative officials.

In retrospect, there are few administrative incentives provided by the Abyei project as a basis for building national-provincial-local linkages. The major incentive is national political commitment and high level support for an overriding policy objective. On the other hand, in bureaucracies high political visibility means high political risk. Disincentives are many: little money, an untried approach, new organizational arrangements, and little prior knowledge about what the ADP intended to accomplish. The ADP was not built upon a complementary program of provincial investments or commitment in the Abyei area, and there is little likelihood that the project could survive without the infusion of resources, both technical and financial, from national levels.

PROJECT MANAGEMENT, EVALUATION, AND MONITORING

Field project management has been the subject of considerable controversy between the donor and the grantee. It appears that little thought has been given to management objectives; neither was there much concern with the records, controls, information formats, work plans, timetables, schedule of inputs, or similar management tools as crucial variables that bear on the replicability, sustainability, and design of future projects. The absence of work plans, program budgets relating cost to outputs, or readily available records of staff inputs appears symptomatic of the fact that management was consistently underrated as a factor in project implementation.

There were two major factors that influenced the quality of project management for the ADP:

- The distance separating project coordination functions in Cambridge from field project management in Abyei; and
- The award of the implementation contract under an operating program grant (OPG) by USAID/Khartoum.

Effective management, reporting, and project monitoring were greatly influenced by the distance, remoteness, and inaccessibility of the Abyei project area. The action research project strategy with its built-in flexibility was at times subject to varying interpretation at Cambridge and in the field. The distance and lack of communication served to exacerbate the varying perceptions of what was important, the order of priority of certain actions, and what was expected as the project unfolded.

One would have expected under these conditions that a chief of party with project management skills and experience would be placed in the field with broad discretionary authority, if not control, over project inputs. Such skills and experience were conspicuously lacking in the initial year. While this situation subsequently improved, there are few controls to ensure that field decisions are in line with overall strategy.

The decision to fund the Abyei Development Project under an OPG arrangement seemed appealing to a newly reestablished (August 1976) mission for several reasons:

- The project promised national visibility and an opportunity for rapid start-up;
- The low budget approach created an opportunity to avoid delays in the AID/Washington approval process. (At the time projects funded for less than \$500,000 were authorized for mission approval);
- USAID/Khartoum was presented with a ready-made proposal by HIID and Francis Deng, demonstrating high-level political support and a link to a prestigious university;
- The proposal fit the "New Directions Mandate" guidelines. Beneficiaries were in a poor, disadvantaged area not previously supported; and
- The project's small scale seemed to indicate limited risk by not locking USAID into a major multi-year commitment. Thus USAID could retain program flexibility.

Countering these apparent advantages, the Abyei project presented several potential disadvantages:

- Almost all the information on the potentials and problems of the project area had been interpreted for the project planners by parties with vested political and economic interests;
- HIID had no track record in the implementation of integrated development projects at the local level;
- Operating program grants (OPGs) are usually awarded to institutions with established records in the execution of previously tested and "proven" activities. The Abyei project proposed multiple activities which were open ended, due to information gaps and technological uncertainties;
- Such a project imposed serious budgeting problems for USAID/Khartoum, and no attempt was made to adjust the scope or scale of the project to a level more consistent with the level of available resources; and

Even assuming the Abyei project would be relatively trouble-free (a dubious assumption at best), standard OPG arrangements do not provide for the type of reporting, monitoring, and evaluation procedures that would have maximized the payoff to USAID's emerging country program from what was learned at Abyei.

Project documents call for semiannual progress reports to be submitted to the GOS and to USAID. The reports are to include the status of work, progress made, difficulties encountered, and recommendations on future project activity. Recognizing the experimental nature of the project, the scope of work calls for careful evaluation of results, including relative achievements of specified objectives, positive and negative social effects, and evaluation of the social, economic, and organizational factors which hindered or promoted program operations.

For a project of relatively limited scope and duration, limited funds, and limited staff inputs, a large amount of written material has been generated. The studies vary in terms of quality, level of generality or specificity, and usefulness. The research output to date has been more descriptive than prescriptive. Many lessons have been learned and are cited, and knowledge gaps have been filled in some instances. However, one wishes on reading this material that more would have been said about what to do rather than what not to do.

Using the benchmark of usefulness, it should be noted that much of the research is not complete. Also, one must question timeliness of the research output. The seasonality of the area's activities, remoteness, and the fact that synthesis and analysis are carried out in Cambridge raise the question of whether analysis and action are linked sufficiently so as to generate timely modification or response to research activities. While it has been agreed that action research is a unique approach to guiding decisions in the field, the case of Abyei is not strikingly different from the day-to-day modification of plans and processes in any rational implementation strategy.

Perhaps the most glaring weakness of the ADP as a design effort has been the virtual absence of data relating costs to outputs. The budgets prepared for yearly operations are broken out by line-items, with amounts allocated for salaries, commodities, travel, and similar categories. To ascertain the costs associated with the introduction of a given technology and to recommend this over an alternative "low cost" technology requires comparative cost data. These data are absent. A program budget would imply a detailed work plan with specific outputs related to available financial resources. Even if poorly administered, this type of budgeting exercise might have shown project expectations to exceed project resources.

Monitoring and evaluation, and the establishment of management systems and controls were not necessarily constrained by the funding level of the project. These functions required greater attention than was allocated. Guidance for research design, attention to the phasing of action research activities, and more systematically scheduled work plans would have alleviated a situation in which too much was attempted with too few resources.

Outputs and Achievements

The main difficulty in evaluating ADP outputs is the variability and inconsistency in targets and criteria for project activities as related in project documents, and in the timing and sequencing of these activities. A carefully designed implementation plan would have alleviated many of these problems. In the absence of any concensual work plan, there was no set criteria with which to evaluate achievements. In the course of the evaluation, this dilemma was resolved by distinguishing between research products and physical outputs at the Abyei project site. Accomplishments in each category will be discussed separately.

Research Products

In view of the stated understanding that the research mode was to produce a design for a major project in the area, the evaluation team noted an overall lack of technical data in support of trials, baseline data for surveys, or maps and charts for land use analysis. Reportedly, these are maintained in Cambridge, but are not physically available in Abyei for use by the field team. In some instances, variables influencing experiments are not stated and there is a general lack of rigor and control of data generated during agricultural field trials. Casual experimental design, loose control over inputs, and inadequate basis for costing decrease the level of confidence in the analysis and their usefulness for design.

The research products were expected to be a major and important output of action research. Many have not been completed but are expected. The overall research effort has not as yet achieved a common focus that could be used as the foundation for a major phase two design. Positively, the monitoring, evaluation, and research effort has produced a wealth of interesting data on working in a remote rural community. Several lessons have been learned, some more significant than others, and knowledge about the area has been expanded. There is an opportunity to do much more with the data.

Physical Outputs

This category of outputs is more problematic because of its vulnerability to logistical, financial, and staff constraints. As a general observation, the project team has placed special emphasis on completing the construction of housing and project facilities. This decision has involved trade-offs in terms of the resources and staff time--particularly at the senior level--that have been diverted from other activities, especially agriculture. With the exception of construction, the numerical "targets" cited in the several project documents have not been approached. Several of the physical outputs of component activities were described in the previous section on how action research was applied.

Actually, the experimental, pilot nature of the Abyei project suggests that a rigorous matching of physical outputs against indicative targets was never intended, and this was not the evaluative methodology followed by the team. A summative assessment of project success, in the case of Abyei, should focus on whether feasibility testing has refined a rural development strategy for Abyei to the point where implementation (and eventual replication) can begin. In the view of the evaluation team, an evolutionary approach to strategy formulation and implementation remains conceptually sound. But the rate and direction of the evolution must be measured and verified by comparing action steps taken against visible developmental achievements.

In the context of a development project, verification requires assessment of the component parts of the strategy in terms of their specific objectives. Table 1 summarizes material found in the project evaluation summary and annexes (Barclay and others, 1981). Indicators were chosen to reflect the types of end of project status (EOPS) conditions that were generally anticipated but never formally stated. They were formulated collaboratively with HIID staff and consultants during the preevaluation briefing. The status, of course, refers to conditions at the field site.

These results are not an absolute measure of success or failure, because the targets set in 1979 were provisional and subject to revision. Yet the process of revision was so casual and ad hoc that few clear performance standards survive by which the staff--much less external evaluators--can measure accomplishments in an objective fashion. On the other hand, the results shown in the table are consistent; they indicate that the project will fall far short of achieving its purpose, as defined above, by the time of its scheduled termination in June 1981. There is little evidence that this conclusion would change if the project were to continue for an extended period under its present mode of operations.

Table 1: Indicators of Purpose Achievement

| Indicator | Status as of January 1981 |
|---|--|
| Improved agricultural technologies developed for crop production. | No breakthroughs and no systematic comparisons made; results to date impressionistic. |
| Improved water supply facilities developed. | No new water points yet in operation; serious problems with technologies tested to date. One test well operational 2/81. |
| Improved medical facilities and services. | Minor improvement in physical facilities; services developed. Temporarily augmented by HIID health adviser who departed 1/81. |
| Experimental cooperative farms established. | Four group farms receiving subsidized tractor services with little experimentation introduced by project. |
| Low-cost, locally adapted building technologies developed. | Cost data not compiled or analyzed for comparative purposes; techniques have been adapted to conditions and appear sound. |
| Local development organization established and operating. | None in existence and no proposals developed. |
| In-service and formal training programs developed. | On-the-job training system functions for project employees, but with no significant outreach. |
| Administrative links with province and district strengthened. | Total absence of support to project except from national level. |
| Monitoring and evaluation in place to guide ongoing IRD activities. | Structure of system poorly defined; decision-making roles unclear; data collection and analysis functions not responsive to project needs. |
| Improved transportation situation and communication links. | No change in transport except improved airstrip; logistical support and radio system operating reliably. |

LESSONS

The experience of the Abyei Development Project offers several instructive lessons relating to the theory and practice of integrated rural development. That it would do so was one of the project's original justifications: the entire effort was represented as an "experiment" that would advance the state of the art in IRD design and implementation. In this sense the ADP was always destined for comparison with other projects, both within Sudan and elsewhere. HIID has already undertaken such comparisons in its publications (Cole and Cohen, 1979; Cole and Vail, 1980) during the lifetime of the project. Much of the argument presented in those publications is philosophical, contrasting process-oriented "action research" with conventional project planning models in which "blueprints" are developed with inflexible timetables and input/output schedules. In this evaluation, however, it is the application of the "action research" philosophy in the ADP that provides the most interesting and provocative lessons.

The evaluation team attempted to derive generalizable lessons or hypotheses from the ADP experience under four categories: management, design, implementation, and development strategy. These categories are not mutually exclusive, but they provide a convenient way of organizing the conclusions that were reached. The lessons in each category are stated with brief elaboration, and further details can be found in the annexes of the full evaluation (Barclay and others, 1980).

Management

The system that was used in this project is unusual in terms of the roles that were taken by the donor (AID), the grantee (HIID), the field team, and the host country government. An overriding conclusion of this evaluation is that the system did not function well, nor did it serve the needs of the project:

- "Experimental" projects are management intensive by nature, but this aspect tends to be underestimated. Abyei demonstrates the limitations of a field team staffed by technicians with specialized backgrounds and with neither the preparation, the time, nor the mandate to carry out key managerial functions.
- Clear lines of decision making need to be established between a home office and its field team, particularly when the former assumes responsibility for definition and coordination of basic project strategy. Total delegation to the field--as reflected in a "bodyshop approach" in which the home office abdicates all such responsibility--has obvious weaknesses. But the model employed

at Abyei appears equally unsatisfactory: too many key operational decisions were made outside of the field setting, while some critical policy decisions were never dealt with or were resolved in an ad hoc fashion.

- The management and monitoring demands posed by an "experimental" project in which USAID/Khartoum took a substantive interest were poorly suited to the OPG framework. The OPG is designed to minimize USAID's management role, while allowing a private voluntary organization, contractor, or university to carry out known activities in which it has a proven track record. The ADP, however, was a high-risk project and HIID had almost no prior implementation experience relevant to the situation found at Abyei. As difficulties arose, the OPG framework did not provide accountability to the degree that USAID desired and expected.
- The remote location of Abyei and similar IRD project sites contributes to a syndrome of "management by anecdote," in which the field team is judged on the basis of fragmentary (and not always accurate) information. The impact on team morale is negative and this undermines the work, which is difficult enough to begin with. USAID staff must be prepared to spend far more time in the field, directly experiencing the project environment of an IRD activity, if this syndrome is to be avoided.

Design

Within the philosophical framework that was articulated for the ADP, various project design strategies and techniques can be applied. The fact that an evolutionary approach is preferred does not provide a formula for design; there are options available, and the options selected for the ADP can be weighed against alternative design models. Several lessons can be drawn when such an analysis is performed:

- An IRD project with "experimental" content and flexibility to permit modifications should be designed with clear specification of the structure and timetable for decision making. Without this, information use and management will be inefficient, crucial decisions will be deferred or made precipitously, and project implementation strategy will drift. Both structure and process are essential ingredients in evolutionary designs. The ADP emphasized the second at the expense of the first.
- The initial reconnaissance of a potential IRD project area must be sufficiently thorough to define technical parameters, particularly for the natural resource base. Disdain for "master-planning" and a shortage of relevant HIID institutional expertise produced a flawed design that

grossly underestimated the significance of the livestock sector--a curious outcome of reconnaissance in South Kordofan.

- Serious attention must be given to the match between financial and human resources and the scope of "experimental" research to be undertaken. The ADP design did not acknowledge important trade-offs and promised a low-budget program to address very complex socio-technical problems.
- Project designers must carefully weigh the timing and sequencing of multiple components in an IRD project. Simultaneous initiation of all components is likely to be the most difficult course of action, even if all of the concerned host government agencies appear to be "geared up" and ready to start. If they are not equally well prepared, as was the case at Abyei, a phased approach may prove more workable. The selection of initial components, particularly the choice between income-generating and social service activities, is a development strategy problem rather than a design issue per se.

Implementation

Implementing the ADP was even more complicated than usual, because it included a learning function and a benefit delivery function. This combination produced a conflict in the way the project was represented and perceived. It also led to difficulties in the day-to-day implementation of the project's components. If the need for learning in an Abyei setting is acknowledged, and the realities of host country politics (especially local-level realities) are taken into account, then an either/or approach to the "action-research" dilemma is unjustified. The key problem is then to find ways in which an appropriate balance between the two can be achieved under implementation conditions. There are no "recipes" for doing this, and the ADP has had to confront an extraordinarily difficult situation, in which a multitude of agendas and special interests collide. The experience gained at Abyei suggests the following:

- The sponsoring institution undertaking an "action research" project must accept the full burden of implementation support. HIID never formally accepted that burden, it did not undertake similar projects elsewhere; it did not make a long-term investment to develop in-house capabilities in logistics or personnel recruitment. The ADP has remained a peripheral activity, and only the energy and dedication of the project coordinator has maintained support at a survival level.

An IRD project's client group--small farmers who are its intended beneficiaries--must be incorporated into the learning process at the outset. If their perceptions remain fundamentally at odds with those of the project staff, that is, one group's "problem" is the other group's "solution", the project will never develop broad credibility and support in the community. The ADP has been significantly weakened by its failure to foster participatory learning.

Development Strategy

The Abyei Development Project has several features that set it apart from other rural development projects in Sudan. The integration of multiple components and the gradual approach towards improved agricultural production are not typical of GOS interventions in the "traditional" sector. There are other atypical elements in the development strategy adopted for the ADP:

- The targeting of an area with high political visibility and especially complex socio-political problems;
- The decision to assign a very small-scale project special "national" status; and
- The proposal for a local development organization (the APDO) with a degree of autonomy hitherto unknown in Sudan.

No single project provides a full test of the viability of IRD approaches or the wisdom of evolutionary project designs in Sudan. The evidence is not yet in on those issues, and the findings of this evaluation indicate shortcomings in the ADP that are specific to that project, rather than generic to IRD efforts. Analysis of the three elements in the Abyei strategy cited above suggests the following lessons:

- An area whose future political status is uncertain and which is experiencing even occasional armed violence, may be targeted on a need basis, but rarely because the prospects for successful development are considered bright. In the case of Abyei, a donor-assisted development project had a high symbolic content, but multiple meanings were associated with the symbol. The idealistic vision of a project that would transcend politics was never translated into a feasible plan of action.
- Special status, that is placement outside the conventional system, has very high costs for a development project that is intended to have a long implementation cycle. The ADP was launched in a manner that effectively bypassed the provincial administration in South Kordofan. Efforts to

remedy this situation later did not succeed because no incentives existed to attract provincial support: credit for ADP success would not accrue to Kadugli in any event, and officials there perceived a high risk of failure in the project. As a consequence, the project must depend on its special "national" status in order to survive.

Appropriate local organizations evolve as a result of adaptation to changing circumstances. A prescriptive development strategy specifying a model of local control that satisfies "participation" criteria may be counter-productive when there is no frame of reference for the model. The ADP never got off the ground for this reason.

SECTION THREE

CONCLUSION: THE ABYEI EXPERIENCE AND NINE CRITICAL
IMPLEMENTATION PROBLEMS

The January/February 1981 evaluation of the Abyei Development Project provided an opportunity to: (1) carry out the scope of work in providing technical assistance for the evaluation mission, and (2) also undertake some action oriented research of the implementation problems of an integrated rural development project. With the selection, definition, and elaboration of nine critical implementation problems, the experience from Abyei can be made more useful to both policy maker and project staffer (Morss and Gow, 1981). While several of the shortcomings are specific to that project, linking these experiences to general issues can provide a baseline for anticipation of future implementation problems and the circumstances or context in which they are likely to be encountered.

CRITICAL IMPLEMENTATION PROBLEMS

Based on prior experiences and an on-going research strategy, of which this field report is a part, the Organization and Administration of Integrated Rural Development Project being carried out by DAI has identified the following subjects as those most frequently encountered as problem areas for IRD projects:

- Participation and decentralization;
- Information systems;
- Political, economic, and environmental constraints;
- Managing and structuring technical assistance;
- Organizational placement and linkages;
- Timing;
- Counterpart shortages;
- Differing agendas; and
- Sustaining project benefits.

These problem areas are briefly examined in the light of the data and lessons learned from the Abyei Development Project.

As noted in an earlier section, participation and decentralization were recognized as important components to make the project self-sustaining and as an especially crucial element of the action research framework. Nevertheless, the ADP was unable to realize its aims in this aspect. Efforts to decentralize and enhance local level participation were stymied for several reasons. Most importantly, the proposed participatory structure was not appropriate to the institutional setting. The proposed Abyei Peoples Development Organization (APDO), for example, did not build on any existing pattern of social relationships, local elites, or institutions.

Participation in either goal selection, in establishing priorities, or in mobilizing community resources continually fell below expectations. This occurred partly because there was never a clear understanding on the part of the client beneficiaries of what was meant by action research. Research without action was correctly perceived by clients as an implementation failure.

It can be surmised that participation will be problematic where the clients do not understand goals or expected outputs. More important for operationalizing participation is that the implementation team, even if they understood this, was never willing to commit themselves to an action plan with stated targets or goals. The principal lesson is that where program outputs are deliberately left undefined and ambiguous, there is no logical way of setting priorities or organizing routines for project activities, since any activity can be justified in terms of some goal. In effect, as practiced by project management at Abyei, process became an end in itself.

Also, a key beneficiary group, the Messiriya Humr, were not included in the project's activities in spite of stated goals to the contrary. The ethnic status of project staff, logistics, and political constraints served to make this group very hard to reach. This breach left a wide opportunity for criticism by the project's opponents.

The control and management of the action research was casual. Information systems, as that term is normally used in project implementation, were largely inadequate. This led to several deficiencies:

- Research was ad hoc for the most part, with a limited range of technology choices backing up the research effort;
- Institutional support and oversight of project activities was constrained both by distance and the organizational structure for implementation;

- Some data were irretrievably lost with short-term staff departures, or research data were not relevant to the project due to differing agendas of researchers;
- Much of the research was not replicable due to the fact that there was no control over major variables, particularly delivery of material support for activities;
- Research activities were sometimes defined in terms of available skills, or were poorly designed; and
- The time and costs of research were not well integrated within the project design.

The political, economic, and environmental constraints were major factors influencing project activities and outcomes. How the project coped with these issues can only be assessed in the light of its overall level of achievements. Major issues influencing the project included:

- The Arab-Nilotic tribal-social conflict which is an historical as well as resources-based factor. The consequent insecurity in the area proved to be a major constraint to project outreach.
- Severe seasonal obstacles to transportation and agricultural equipment operation restricted travel and supply to, and within, the area, limiting both the possibilities for data collection during the main growing season and the willingness of Sudanese and expatriate staff to reside in the area.
- Attitudinally, the traditional, earlier emphasis on large scale mechanization generated a situation where client expectations were in conflict with the low-key action research effort.
- The overriding national policy goal of unification in this area of conflict created a "special" status for the project.

In terms of a personnel strategy for management of technical assistance, the project grantee contracted for staff on a temporary hire basis. On the other hand, the institutional ties of HIID to Harvard University strongly implied that a link to faculty research networks would be established. Using other terminology the personnel strategy attempted to combine the advantages of quick recruitment of short-term technical assistance ("the bodyshop strategy") with links to an established research networks ("the academic strategy") as discussed in Mickelwait, Barclay, and Honadle (1981). In reality the faculty research network was not realized and short-term assistance was recruited either externally to the university or from among students. Thus

the weaknesses of both strategies were combined, while strengths of both were undercut. There are other weaknesses of this personnel strategy:

- The grantee was inexperienced in recruitment and chose whoever was available and willing to go with limited scan of the existing pool of specialists;
- Temporary (non-affiliated) staff was a handicap to field management both in terms of turnover, and lack of previous experience with the home office. HIID was ambivalent in giving discretion to (temporary) staff in the field;
- Since the grantee was seriously constrained by the resources available for staff salaries, the staff recruited frequently had limited technical experience;
- The reward system for staff was ambiguous; this may have tended to emphasize research but not action; and
- A "talent search" capability was never built up by the grantee since it never saw itself as a long-term implementing organization.

Although the ADP has as a major aim to test a new approach to rural development that linked policy planning, technical support, local mobilization, and participation to identifiable institutions at the national, provincial, and local levels, this was never fully realized. Some of the constraints to establishing organizational linkages arose because:

- The "top-heaviness" of the central coordinating linkage was not appropriate for the size and scale of the project. The central structure may have inhibited criticism and provided no means for correcting error;
- There were no incentives to promote provincial level participation; and
- Clear lines of decision making needed to be established between the home office and its field team. This is particularly important when the former assumes responsibility for definition and coordination of basic project strategy. Too many key operational decisions were made outside of the field setting, while some critical policy decisions were never dealt with or were resolved in an ad hoc fashion.

Timing posed some special issues at Abyei and must be considered a crucial issue in view of the extreme remoteness and seasonality of communication in the area. As noted previously, the action research framework as applied by the project deliberately offered little structure or phasing of activities. Priorities were to be established after the identification of

critical areas. Since there were no existing priorities, virtually all activities were of equal importance, for the Abyei area is typically poor in a multifaceted way. This led to a scattershot approach, and consequently little measurable impact to activities.

Unfortunately, this situation was known to exist, and was discussed and written about by the donor agency (USAID/Khartoum), but the OPG funding arrangement limited the kind of control mechanism that might have been employed to guide project implementation. In the absence of control, the project tended to drift with little supervision.

Identification and placement of qualified counterpart Sudanese staff for the project has also proven difficult. Efforts to recruit Dinka personnel from the Abyei area have been partially successful, however. Difficulties in recruitment arise due to:

- The remoteness and lack of supporting facilities for staff;
- The limited pool of qualified staff; and
- The lack of incentives to continue in the area due to an ambiguous political-administrative setting.

Perhaps the most serious difficulty affecting the project, its implementation, and perceptions of its success or importance are due to the differing agendas of key players and institutions involved with the project. These are so many that they can only be briefly described here. Actors with differing agendas pose a special problem since they do not, either individually or collectively, place the highest priority on achieving project goals. Some of the key players and interests or perceptions would include:

- USAID/Khartoum (neutrals)--those willing to judge the project on its merits;
- USAID/Khartoum (antagonists)--those who judge the project based on negative attitudes toward other actors involved in the project;
- HIID (the project coordinator)--who additionally sees Abyei as a broader approach for HIID involvement in rural development implementation research;
- HIID (other members)--who do not see Abyei as any more than a single peripheral project;
- Dr. Francis Deng--political patron of the project which is seen as justification of prior political-anthropological studies and beliefs;

- HIID (Abyei field team)--attitudes vary depending on personal perceptions and interactions vis-a-vis the project coordinator;
- GOS (Abyei field team)--whose agenda is perhaps most attuned to the stated action aims of the project;
- Abyei residents (Dinka)--who see the project as a basis for redressing economic/social imbalance;
- Abyei part-time residents (Messiriya)--who see the project as principally benefiting the Dinka;
- South Kordofan Provincial authorities--who see the project as a "national" project;
- Ministry of Agriculture, Sudan (mechanization advocates)--who view the traditional small farmer approach as inadequate. Abyei is cited as an example;
- Ministry of Agriculture, Sudan (traditional agriculture advocates)--who see the mechanization strategy as inefficient and ineffective. Abyei is cited as an example; and

AID/Washington--who sees the Abyei Development Project as a problem causing more attention than its size would warrant.

Lacking among most actors is a willingness to harmonize different interests and perceptions to encourage a more realistic implementation plan for Abyei.

Not surprisingly, there were few factors in the ADP that contributed to sustainability of the project. Project beneficiaries to date have been limited in number, due to the nature of activities and the serious constraints on implementation capacity. Health and employment benefits have been realized by the target population, but these are results of a resource transfer initiated by the project. Resource transfer effects predominate in the services provided to group farmers (150 of whom receive subsidized tractor service); to health care recipients (primarily at the hospital and health clinic); and to about 180 project employees. Major doubts were raised during evaluation concerning the sustainability of these benefits beyond the life of the project.

Recognizing that the duration of the implementation period is relatively short, the basic purpose/goal linkage of the project appears sound. In other words, if the ADP had achieved greater success in identifying, testing, and applying technologies and participatory organizational arrangements, the potential for goal achievement would have been significantly enhanced.

NOTES

1. The attached bibliography (annex A) includes the research products made available to the evaluation team. Products generated from data or findings at the Abyei Development Project, as cited in the bibliography, include:

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ANNEX A
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY FOR THE ABYEI PROJECT

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