

NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS
IN MANAGING DECENTRALIZATION OF RURAL DEVELOPMENT

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Appendices are forthcoming.

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VOLUNTARY EFFORTS AND DECENTRALIZED MANAGEMENT

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ABSTRACT

This report is concerned with: (1) how rural people in the Third World may be able to benefit from present international interest in providing development assistance through programs that more closely match the scale and interests of rural organizations, and (2) how rural people may gain by a willingness on the part of international donors to deal with them in terms of genuine partnership. Present agendas call for decentralization, which we take to mean the search for agencies which are linked directly with the people who are expected to benefit from development programs and projects. Until the stress began to be laid upon programs involving small-scale technology, there was little point in pressing for a decentralization which reached beyond the level of major provinces or even the national capital itself: large scale projects that underwrite gigantic dams, irrigation schemes, major highways, or high-technology industrial plants are not local-level enterprises, even though local people have to cope with the consequences of their installation.

We examine first the reasons for the shift in policy from large-scale

to small-scale programs aimed at helping the poor, especially the rural poor, and improving output and living conditions in rural areas. The new orientation brought about the recognition that the new kinds of projects could make use of management systems better suited to enlisting local organizations and local leadership in choosing, planning, implementing, and evaluating projects. This is expected to secure both better planning and the long-term involvement of beneficiaries.

Having dealt with the shift in donor attitudes, we examine next the problems donors face when they move towards the grass-roots. These include the fact that decentralization does not necessarily benefit the very poor if it gives the existing local elite additional power over them. We look at differences in the priorities adopted by rural communities, their governments, and international donors. Such differences loom large and have consequences for the choice and implementation of projects if donors are prepared to work with local people in deciding what should be done as well as how to do it. We next consider various organizational features of ascribed and voluntary organizations which may create roadblocks when outsiders try to cooperate with local systems. Finally, we give an account of some of the organizational forms one can expect to find at the local level, giving a warning first that these operate in different fashions according to their local settings. We end with a summary which also contains general conclusions on policy implementation and procedures for evaluation. Case studies appearing as appendices provide more detailed illustrations of some of the points highlighted in the text.

Although this report deals with organizations, inevitably we also

raise questions about participation. This is inevitable because organizations are made up of people inter-relating in particular fashions who have motives, enthusiasms, antipathies, and ideas about what the world is like. Otherwise, one can speak of organizations only as models in someone's head or the statistical outcomes of action. We, therefore, have to talk about people and their priorities if we are to say anything about how organizations work and why organizations are not tools to be manipulated by anyone who knows the organizational chart and the chain of command. The people who compose organizations have their own purposes, and these may be complex and at cross-purposes with each other. The interests held by kin and neighbours, the interests of others in their social environment, and the interests of their government and of international donors may not always coincide.

PREFACE

A. Background and Scope of Report

This study was commissioned by the Office of Rural Development and Development Administration of the United States Agency for International Development as part of the cooperative agreement with the University of California for research on the management of decentralization. We have carried out a literature survey to explore the capability of organizations created by rural peoples to contribute to the sustained development of the poor majority in their countries. This is in line with a recent trend among development agencies to stress the need for strong rural organizations which are expected to play a valuable role in improving the implementation and administration of programs.

In carrying out the survey we first put concentrated effort into the literature on the Philippines, parts of Africa, and the Commonwealth Caribbean, our own areas of expertise. We also looked at some of the literature on India, Thailand, parts of Latin America, and more cursorily at reports from other regions. We began by surveying anthropological studies, but supplemented this by looking at reports written by economists, political scientists, sociologists, biologists, agriculturalists, health care professionals, environmentalists, international management personnel, and others.

The problems addressed in the literature search were defined both

by A.I.D. and by other members of the Berkeley study group. We were concerned with existing organizations, other than government agencies, which might serve as channels for decentralizing the management of development programs and projects. We focused upon organizations that serve those designated as "the poorest of the poor," the population A.I.D. is mandated to serve. We also concentrated primarily on rural areas, again in accordance with the A.I.D. mandate, but included organizations founded and maintained in the towns which also serve "home" people in the countryside. A.I.D.'s mandate is linked to issues of equity: how to distribute goods and services to a greater number of poor, largely disenfranchised people in an effort to raise their quality of life. Its concern with decentralization of management is based on the search for ways to institute changes which are more than superficial, that last and that reinforce self-help and interdependence rather than dependence.

Initially we planned to concentrate our efforts on a few countries, chosen because of significant organizational features and resource distribution, thinking to trace the histories of development projects as these worked themselves out in the local environment and in relation to local organizations. This plan had to be abandoned because development literature, while abundant, does not provide the detailed documentation needed for an assessment. The literature, with few exceptions, told us about different aspects of the planning process but rarely included all aspects of the process from beginning to end; few studies examine implementation or trace long-term impacts. We therefore turned to a more general survey of various kinds of ascribed and voluntary organizations

which have undertaken welfare services or the coordination of economic activities, although we could rarely find a good account of any one of them having been used as a channel for international assistance. We looked at different kinds of rotating credit associations, welfare and mutual aid societies, task-oriented work groups in which reciprocal labor is exchanged, religious organizations with welfare orientations or major impact on the economic activities of their members, ethnic associations, caste associations, hometown associations, secret societies, sports clubs, age-sets, kinship groups, as well as some other special interest groups which have taken on additional welfare functions.

The existing organizations represent certain opportunities. They also have very real limitations as channels of development. We believe that in some instances existing organizations will be the best agents to involve in planning and implementing new projects or that local people should be encouraged to use their own organizational modes in creating agencies to manage new projects. In other instances, donors and national governments may be realistic when they argue for the creation of new rural organizations to accomplish development tasks.

If donors and governments are to find grass-roots and supra-local voluntary organizations useful in trying to meet rural interests, they must understand these organizations, how and why they work, for what purposes, what their limits are. We have therefore asked: What are the principal types of organizations which serve rural development functions and what are the problems they face? What conditions lead to the maintenance and further development of such organizations? What kinds of

demands are likely to overstrain their resources and lead to their corruption and/or demise? What kinds of organizations best contribute to the maintenance and advancement of the interests of the poor majority through giving them means to participate in decisions and mobilize as a constituency? How do these organizations relate to other plans for decentralization, such as a stress on provincial or district centers? In other words, we have asked throughout our search of the literature: What are the opportunities and what are the constraints?

B. Some Basic Definitions

Throughout the report we use the terms "the bottom," "the recipients," "the periphery," and "the grass-roots." These terms are used interchangeably and all usually refer to poor, rural populations, although given the movements between rural and urban areas it is sometimes impossible to view rural populations in isolation from their kith and kin in the cities. In contrast, "the top," "the donors," "the center," and "the national elite" refer to those who plan and control resources at the national and international level. We recognize that the urban poor have just as many problems (sometimes more) in obtaining goods and services as the rural poor, but we were asked to concentrate upon the rural areas. We have paid less attention to the fact that the rural poor are also controlled by a "middle" which may include agencies operating at a provincial or district level. We deal with "the middle" more in terms of our conclusions and recommendations for future research than in the body of our report. In

any event, relationships with "the middle" reflect the asymmetrical nature of the power distribution which has such an enormous influence on all aspects of development, given that potential participants operate from power bases (political, financial, and educational) which are so disproportionate to one another.

I. DEVELOPMENT GOALS AND STRATEGIES:
THE VIEWPOINT OF DONORS AND RECIPIENT GOVERNMENTS

Abstract

International donor agencies emphasize the decentralization of development projects and the utilization of local voluntary organizations because of increasing concern over scarce food and energy resources and the failure of previous intervention models. However, many contradictions exist: national governments are reluctant to share power; local populations are wary of a further draining-off of their meager resources; and the perceptions of national and foreign planners about what is needed by a local community are often at odds with those of the community itself.

A. A Shift in Orientation: Urban to Rural, Large-Scale to Small-Scale

During the early 1970's, the orientation of international development agencies, including AID, shifted. The then-current emphasis upon industrialization, infrastructure, and massive projects dependent upon energy-intensive technology was questioned. Rural development, small-scale technology, and projects to serve the very poor began to be given priority. This change of emphasis reflected a recognition of major world problems relating to food, energy, and the failure of many earlier attempts to bring about rapid economic growth. It also reflected a new concern for

the way some of the earlier development efforts had reduced the real living standards of the poor (World Bank 1975; 1973 amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of the United States, Agency for International Development 1975, discussed in J. Cohen and Uphoff 1979:1-2; Griffin and Khan 1976; and Mellor 1969:221).

1. Famine and Landlessness

In the early 1970s, the competition for energy resources became overt. The spectre of world-wide famine could no longer be ignored. Populations were increasing rapidly, while in much of the world crop yields were either declining or increasing at a moderate rate (Brown 1978). By then, some estimates gave the world 500 million undernourished or starving people (Lappe et al 1978:13). These are extreme estimates, but even the most optimistic figures are horrifying (Crosson and Frederick 1977:12-33; Wortman 1980). Little potential arable land remains which can be brought into cultivation or converted into pasture. Fisheries cannot take up the slack. Food must come from intensifying agriculture and increasing yields from existing acreage. Old technologies, however effective they have been in feeding the smaller populations of the past, are not adequate to meet the new demands. During the 1970s, only seven countries, including the United States, were able to export grain regularly and in any quantity. Most previously exporting countries, including many in the Third World, now must import grain to feed the people in their cities and sometimes in the countryside as well, and not only in a famine year (World Population Estimates 1976, 1979; Wortman and Cummings 1978:1-14). In addition,

3.

as the world searches for renewable forms of energy, land now used exclusively for food crops will increasingly be looked to as a source of crops that can be transformed into energy (Brown 1980). It is also being encroached upon for residential and industrial uses.

Meantime, life in the countryside grows more difficult. Landlessness increases, employment opportunities dwindle, inflation soars, real income drops, shortages multiply, and there is much evidence of environmental degradation. Traditional supplies of fuel are disappearing at a frightening rate, as forests are being logged for foreign exchange, chopped down for firewood and local building materials, or cleared for hill farms and new agricultural ventures. People are being forced into areas of limited resources -- the arid zones, the uplands, and other marginal lands.

All this has focused attention on the need to do something about rural development. Food can no longer be taken for granted. Nor can the willingness of cultivators to stay on the land and produce food when they see city-dwellers enjoying an easier life and when there are few employment opportunities for the landless unemployed.

Rural development, however, poses enormous problems. Some are related to the imbalances in national and international economies; some are inherent in the orientation of the national and international agencies concerned with development. Others arise from the very characteristics of rural areas. It is not only that for many areas no better technology exists than the one already in place. It is also that even if a new technology exists, it may not be organized so that people can adopt it or it may not meet the needs to which they give priority. Rural

people have learned to skeptical of "expert" advice over the past half-century and more. They have experienced a barrage of such advice, too often to no avail. Most of them are veterans of previous interventions which promised much and delivered little or failed dismally.

B. International Development Biases

1. Large-Scale Interventions

Good viable programs to improve the lot of the poor and the general condition of rural populations suffer from the bias of major international organizations toward large-scale financing and large-scale projects, a bias encouraged by the cheap energy of the 1950s and 1960s. Another bias is the placing of national economic development ahead of social programs. In addition, for major foreign donors, "lack of time is a more serious constraint than the lack of funds" (Morss 1976:9). Despite their concern about meeting the problems of development that rural people and developing nations face, donors are constrained by their own requirements. As Frances Korten (1980:12-15) and Tandler (1975:85-90) point out, the ultimate bureaucratic imperative for large donors is to move huge sums of money. They are, after all, in the banking business, albeit extending credit for rural development. Thus, they are under tremendous pressure to commit large amounts of money quickly for projects that make major differences. The needs are glaring. They are here and now. They cry out for massive and immediate attention.

2. Doing Things Quickly

This emphasis on speed is in conflict with the other reality that it takes time to do the background work that is required to design projects that accomplish what they set out to do. For this, knowledge of particular local circumstances is needed. Proposed beneficiaries also need to be involved in the planning, in part because they have the necessary knowledge of local resources and constraints and in part because they must be relied upon for follow-through.

It is not easy to gain the trust of others, especially the poor and powerless who have traditionally been treated as recipients or objects, who do not share a common language with planners, and who also are afraid. They are afraid of rapid, disorienting change, and they are afraid of external power that they cannot resist. They are afraid of what they may be forced to do, and they are afraid of being laughed at if they ask questions, attempt to refute advice they believe to be wrong, or try to discuss the various consequences they foresee. It is a revelation to see intelligent, interested people put on masks of stupidity upon the entrance of someone they perceive as a stranger and a threat. This stranger may be an official of the'r own government as well as a foreigner.

3. The Disadvantages of Centralization and Large-Scale

The critical nature of the problems and the need for bureaucratic speed has led donors to encourage governments to rely on centralized decisions for both planning and implementation. This means that the local barriers against involvement or genuine participation remain in place.

Unfortunately, it is apparently more important to spend money rapidly than it is to carry out the essential grass-roots planning that engenders local interest in a project and local commitment to its future. The constant shifting of AID and other donor personnel also makes it difficult to maintain continuity, either of plans or of trust. In addition, the requirements of spending place a premium on the funding of bigger, more costly projects, while smaller, less costly projects, which may better suit local conditions, have little appeal (Tendler 1975:56).

4. Examples of the Disadvantages of Centralization and Large-Scale

Evaluation studies have questioned the efficiency of approaches based on large-scale interventions. Too often the success is both minimal and short-lived. The Green Revolution, which gave hope to the 1960s, is an example. With the high cost of oil during the later years of the 1970s it lost impetus, but even prior to the rise in energy costs, the worldwide consequences were disappointing (Gow et al 1979, Vol. II:130; Pearse 1974; and Griffin 1972).

Because the inputs required were beyond the means of poor cultivators, it was the wealthy, or at least the middle-scale, cultivator who benefited most from the new technology. Small cultivators are reported to have lost land and become increasingly impoverished, while agricultural laborers lost their livelihood (Havens 1975a and 1975b on effects of the Green Revolution in Colombia; Guillet 1979 on Peru; Maguire 1979 on Haiti; Singh and Day 1975 on India). However, there are those who maintain that all in all the Green Revolution has been a success and has improved the

lot of many (Ruttan 1976 on East and Southeast Asia; Wortman and Cummings 1978:105 on international food consumption). Whatever the final consensus, it has not solved the problems of the rural areas nor diminished the number of the poor. Adelman and Morris (1973:199), for that matter, claim that all economic growth, planned or unplanned, increases poverty (see also Dewey in press:6-7, 18-22; Schumacher 1973:171).

Other development projects, such as irrigation schemes and road building, which, like the Green Revolution, relied on massive technological inputs have not been as cost effective as less expensive projects. Morss (1976) reports on a comparison of the performance of small-farmer development projects which had large inputs of foreign assistance with those which did not. The finding was that the "average 'success' scores of the projects receiving large amounts of foreign funding in early years was significantly lower than the average scores in the other projects."

Large-scale projects, some of which displace agricultural labor or make cultivators view small-scale farming as a losing game, have another effect: they encourage the flight from the rural areas to the cities, a trend characteristic of the 1960s and 1970s (J. Anderson 1980 on the Philippines; Lloyd 1979:188 in general for the Third World; J.C. Mitchell 1970 on urban migration in Black Africa).

5. A Shift to Small-Scale and Appropriate Technology

All these considerations led planners in the latter half of the 1970s to call for the adoption of intermediate and appropriate technologies, usually defined as those which use high inputs of unskilled and

semi-skilled local labor and tools which can be locally produced rather than imported machinery dependent upon oil products and highly skilled technicians (Lele 1975:176-178; Tandler 1979a:v-vi). This is in line with the "small is beautiful" theme which emerged in the United States and Europe during the 1960s (Farvar and Milton 1972; Schumacher 1973:172-190). For many donors, the target for technical aid now appears to be the man or woman with the hoe rather than the man or woman on the tractor.

National governments, overwhelmed by the rapid growth of their capital cities and concerned about the disappearance of scarce foreign exchange, also have been more willing to stress the rural sector in their planning and to adopt self-help and minimal-technology programs than they were in the earlier period of post-independence euphoria (Chernick 1978:19-20, Commonwealth Caribbean; Damachi 1976, various African countries; Franda 1979:12-14, India; J. Anderson 1980, general).

C. The Need for New Organizational Models

1. A New Perception: Existing Local Organizations are Necessary for Success

The shift in scale and the emphasis upon grass-roots participation have led to a perception that new kinds of projects are required. Evaluation of the earlier shortcomings and failures of rural projects has led to a consensus that the fatal flaw in most programs has been in organization and management. The technology may have been appropriate, the funds may have been adequate, the national government may have been supportive, and the personnel may have been both highly motivated and well qualified, but

these components are no guarantee of success. For broad-based egalitarian and self-sustaining rural development, effective rural organizations appear to be essential. Sufficient evidence exists from the evaluation of earlier projects to conclude that international assistance cannot replace local organizations and institutions. It probably can support the evolution of these organizations, but this requires some changes in policy. Too much aid can undercut the organizational strengths that exist and on which people rely for many purposes.

Morss (1976:9) finds that it is not difficult to achieve quick results with massive resources but that these may be achieved at the expense of viable local organizations:

it is done at the expense of small farmers in the sense that immediate effects are easier to achieve through work with the larger more progressive farmers. It causes the demise of local institutions that cannot compete with heavily subsidized project activities. It frequently leads to ultimate project failure because implementers often must impose a new system on a local area rather than go through the time-consuming process of working with local people and their leaders. In short, there is a 'balloon effect': once the external money stops and the foreigners pull out, the system or network made possible by the external funding collapses.

2. Gap between National Organizations and Local Organizations

Although new attention is being given to grass-roots participation, it is not easy to alter the way agencies work in practice (Herdt and Barker 1977; Korten 1980). Those developing new technologies and service-delivery strategies -- carrying out experimental work on new crops, new

tools, new farm management systems, or new health care and educational techniques -- usually operate from regional centers at some distance from the rural populations they eventually hope to influence. This is true even if they are national centers created to serve farmers in that country. The Thailand-UNESCO Fundamental Education Center (TUFEC) project is an example of a project which suffered from this disassociation of the experimental work from the target population.

The center was designed to train local teachers for work in remote villages in North and Northeast Thailand. The overall design was planned to provide basic education through field agents who would work at the local level. The results were disappointing. One reason suggested was that the teacher-trainees became dependent upon the collegial support and the facilities of the center which, once the trainees were placed in villages, was too far away to provide continuing support. Furthermore, the trainees were required to have at least a high school education in order to qualify for the program which a priori meant that only the young were likely to be recruited. It also meant that, for the most part they came from wealthier families. Once trained, they were expected to pass on their new skills and knowledge to the rural poor, with whom they had little in common (TUFEC 1958).

The TUFEC project illustrates a further difficulty. Although it is agreed that proposed beneficiaries must have the opportunity to take part in the planning and execution of projects if they are to be expected to support and maintain them (Siamwalla 1975:77), this stand is at odds with the elite orientation of many project staff. According to Morss (1976:9),

project staff believe that they know what the rural population needs without having to enter into any dialogue with them to elicit their problems and to discuss how a project might assist them. He adds:

it has been our experience that [short-term consultates] are not a substitute for an information exchange between small farmers and project staff that truly operates in both directions. When such exchanges have occurred, the outside experts have usually admitted that they learned as much as, or more than did the farmers (1976:9).

To be effective, the dialogue should reach more than the local elite (Blum 1974).

The elitist bias, the quest for quick results, the emphasis on project over people, of technology over other factors, the assumption of a local organizational void or incompetence all fit nicely with the dominant orientation toward the blue-print style of planning and rigid time scheduling that the banking bureaucracy favors. These have been major obstacles to investment in local organizations in the past. As the 1978 Annual Report of the World Bank comments:

Among the most difficult aspects [of rural development projects] is the establishment of systems within which the small farmers can themselves have a say in how programs are designed and implemented, and how their skills, expert knowledge of the local farming environment, and their capacity to help themselves can be fully integrated into an overall effort (

3. Donor Responses to Decentralization

Both AID and the World Bank have made a major effort to identify

the problems involved in altering procedures so as to cope with the needs of rural development (Yudelman 1976; Barraclough 1972). They are trying to give more attention to negotiation at both national and local levels to ensure that people understand and support agreements before they go ahead with the funding of projects. They try to allow for the fact that local involvement puts a premium on the ability to make accommodations and on administrative flexibility (Cohen and Uphoff 1977; Uphoff et al 1979). They try to set more realistic time horizons in line with the findings that the time span for most projects have been overly ambitious (Maglaya 1975). Short, specific, agricultural development projects are reported to take over 40 percent longer than expected and engineering projects from 50-100 percent longer.

D. National Government Strategies

1. Unwillingness to Decentralize

National governments face some of the constraints that affect the operations of foreign donors. They also have others of their own. The stress upon decentralization runs counter to trends common to much of the Third World since the end of the colonial era. National governments in general have been concerned with political integration and have tried to monopolize resources to further their own programs at the expense of local organizations and interests. New nations, again understandably, have also tried to prevent the consolidation of local power bases and have worked against separatist tendencies (Rocamora and Panganiban 1975:32-45; Worsley

1971:35-56; Franda 1979:26).

Given the rural stagnation which has resulted from the sapping of rural resources to feed national programs, central governments may be more willing now than in the years immediately after independence to consider decentralized policies. Mawhood (1978:216), at least, has argued that in Africa "the ruling elites ought in their own interests to be abandoning the attempt to monopolize all available resources." He calls for political decentralization and the improvement of linkages between the center and local political leaders. Many governments, however, may see themselves as lacking any margin of resources to share with local governments or other forms of local organization. The financial crises of the 1970s have tended to make central governments even more demanding, less able to respond to the counter-demands of rural people, and less able to distribute rewards widely and equitably.

2. Acceptance of Foreign, Large-Scale Models

National governments may be willing to accept projects that donors are interested in selling rather than those local people can use. This may be because such projects fit better with their own drive towards "modernization," but it also reflects the training and ambitions of their elites.

In implementing such programs, they may also proceed in a fashion that ignores the existing forms of organization at the grass-roots. This may be because the elite have found such organizations stifling to their own ambitions in the past, or it may be because they genuinely question the advisability of building on local models. The Fijian anthropologist, Nayacakalou,

who also served within the Fijian government, opposed any attempt to build on traditional organizations:

In the Fijian case, building on traditional institutions has been imposed from above as though it were a necessary condition for development. It has severely restricted the scope for full structural adaptation (1975:129).

Political leaders who led the struggle for independence from colonial rule fought against the attempt to govern through so-called traditional organizations and favored the creation of new forms of organization to implement the programs they hoped to implement with independence. They spoke often of the spirit of community involvement, but they ignored or undercut many of the existing channels of communication and organization.

The strategy, therefore, becomes one of replacement of existing organizations or the addition of new competing organizations. These government created organizations are usually designed and laid down more for the convenience of central government bureaucracies than for that of the people to be benefited. They are likely to find their models in large-scale, sophisticated organizational forms derived from the national bureaucracy or from international organizations. They often are inappropriate to the scale of operation at which local people can be effective. They demand administrative procedures and management skills which often do not exist in the local population.

They are less likely to adopt the strategy of grafting on to existing organizations -- usually continuous, multi-purpose groups -- by adding functions, increasing the scale, upgrading management capacity, and altering linkages. Grafting is often unsuccessful. Usually the existing organizations

are only superficially understood at best. Their qualities and operating logic are often misperceived. Redesigning usually reduces local control and generally is more to the advantage of central government than to local populations (Cheema 1980:4-7).

Tendler (1977) has remarked on the distinction between emphasizing rural development activities and emphasizing the fostering of organizational capacity. It is not surprising that governments usually choose to pursue the former, which promises quick returns, rather than the latter, which is an indirect means to a possible payoff.

II. ORGANIZATION AT THE GRASS-ROOTS

Abstract

Implementing a development project in a community means the introduction of a new source of political power and economic gain for local residents. It is common for these resources to be captured by the local elite and to be used for their benefit, not for the poorest of the poor. This is because local elite have ties to national elite, because they can use threats, coercion, and force against the poorest, and because the poorest lack the resources necessary for supporting long-term political organization and leadership.

A. Power and Poverty: Status Quo of the Recipients

Local systems of organization are power systems, quite as much as are national political structures. They are structured to work to the advantage of those who control them. Existing organizations and existing vertical linkages with the larger system all exhibit this feature. New organizations and linkages are quickly taken under control of those holding power in the existing ones. Those who know how to operate local systems may be benevolent enough in that they have no wish to impoverish their fellows, but they have every reason to work to improve their own economic condition

and their status position vis-a-vis others in their network. Status is always in short supply. To local men and women, resources coming from donor agencies or central government are resources to be used in the competition for status and power. The intermediate position of local elites in the class hierarchy and their occupation of government posts places them in key linkage roles. They often co-opt resources which are not closely controlled and act as patrons or brokers between poorer residents and outsiders.

Those experienced in development recognize this fact. Some see it as an argument for vesting close supervision in the hands of external agencies. Arulpragasam draws on his years of experience in FAO when he comments:

It is necessary to recognize that conflict lies at the heart of agrarian reform implementation--for the proposed reforms are likely to be opposed by the vested interests adversely affected by them. Under these circumstances, successful implementation can hardly be expected if dependence is placed entirely on existing administrative structures working within the existing framework of law and property interests. An administrative structure which does not recognize this inherent characteristic of agrarian reform, being premised on illusions of communal harmony or of a neutral bureaucracy for its implementation is surely doomed to failure (1979:12).

Arulpragasam recognizes that where agrarian reform has been imposed from the top without consultation with those involved or manipulated by those in power, the reforms have not worked. On the other hand, decentralization, if it involves either devolution or delegation of power and resources, is only too likely to lead to a capture of the program by those who already dominate--elites at the center or elites at the local level. According to Arulpragasam:

There is no question that a decentralization of decision-making to levels closer to the people, takes it closer to the people and theoretically improves their prospects of participation. But this re-statement of the obvious by numerous writers on rural development, can have the effect of side-tracking the real issue. The real issue is not where the decisions are taken, but the extent to which the beneficiaries themselves can participate in the decision-making process -- whether at the central or at decentralized levels (1979:14).

B. The Role of Rural Elite

1. The Powerlessness of the Very Poor

Poor beneficiaries usually occupy long-standing dependent roles vis-a-vis the local elite, a relationship that they are rarely prepared to challenge. Therefore, they participate little in the decision-making process, except indirectly through their patrons. The relationship and the assistance they seek are personal, not collective or categorical in nature. Thus, in the programs to organize the poor and the powerless, not only are assistance and services usually captured by the local elite, but so are leadership roles.

The poor are poor not only because they have limited access to the system but also because they do not know how to work it. Graham, in response to discussions of the need to adopt a client-centered perspective with client-participation as the ultimate goal, observed that, "from the standpoint of the recipients of social services, those most in need of such services are least likely to understand and be able to cope with existing bureaucratic mazes" (1980:2).

2. The Entrenchment of Local Elite

Those who do know how to work the system are those who have direct access, or more often those with links, to the national elite and those long in power locally. The activities of local elites, who are knowledgeable about such channels and have the connections to move through them, deny such knowledge to their dependent poor followers. From frequent practice, the elite know how to adjust to attempts at shifting the distribution of advantage within the system.

In Nepal, as in some other countries in Asia, the Near East, and Latin America, handing agrarian reform programs over to local community organizations played into the hands of the asymmetrical power relationships that link patrons and clients and led to the domination of the programs by the wealthier patrons who were those most capable of exploiting the situation. When this was recognized, national or provincial governments, in some instances, intervened with statutory provisions devised to give majority representation to tenants and small farmers on the various committees and boards set up to carry out land reform or to manage other rural enterprises (Arulpragasam 1979, Eckhom 1979, and F.A.O. 1979a, b and c on agrarian reforms; Gow et al 1979, Vol. II; and Handler 1965 on the Caribbean; Ledesma 1980a and Wurfel 1977 on Asia and the Philippines).

Such measures often count for little in the face of the hostility of wealthy landlords or wealthy tenant cultivators or other patrons (though see Hollnesteiner et al 1979; Ledesma 1980b; and Paul and Dias 1980 for examples of recent collective mobilization of poor people in the

Philippines who have successfully confronted local power holders). Given the fact that donor-sponsored programs usually are supported on a short-term basis, four or five years at most, their proposed beneficiaries may be acutely concerned with what happens when these new patrons leave and they are left fact-to-face with the old patrons who still hold the real power. In the absence of continued strong backing from central government or from provincial or national associations, the local poor see themselves as vulnerable and virtually powerless. They are right. Mandatory committees set up within villages are limited in what they can do. They have only the functions given them by law and are inhibited from expanding their role. It is not common for such committees to be able to affiliate with others across the country to form political organizations capable of bringing pressure on government or on coalitions of landowners (Arulpragasam 1979; but see Hollnesteiner et al 1979 and Po and Montiel 1980 for a contrary situation in the Philippines).

Local managers, who are usually members of the local elite, not infrequently drain development funds from those who cannot protest. In India, for example, "local block-level administrative agencies usually divert funds away from the poorest of the poor" (Franda 1979:95). Local elite also attempt to sabotage programs which threaten their power. In Niger the "induced participation" program sponsored by government failed because of the entrenched power of the local elite (Charlick 1972). In Senegal, leaders of the Islamic brotherhoods, especially the Mourides who control large rural followings, have been able both to expand their own economic bases and to preempt new rural organizations, such as

cooperatives, sponsored by the national government, or have banned organizations such as Rural Animation which tried to work directly with the cultivators and so appeared to undermine their authority (Behrman 1970: 143-144; O'Brien 1971b:228,230).

Where strong governments of a reformist bent have maintained control over land reforms and other rural programs, the benefits have been more widely spread. Improvements in income distribution and moderate-to-rapid economic growth have been associated with land reform in China, Japan, Sri Lanka, Korea, and Taiwan (Chenery and Syrquin 1975). In Kerala, India, the state government instituted measures to advance the poor cultivators and landless, whereas in other Indian states less committed to reform the land legislation remained largely ineffective (Mencher 1978:117-125).

In most instances those who have benefited most from land reform and other programs have been the relatively well-off, and not the poorest of the poor. The usual result for the poorest cultivators and landless laborers has been much less happy. In most Indian states, landowners have found numerous ways to avoid restrictions on the number of acres that can be held, such as retaining control over land registered under their clients' names (Epstein 1977:92-94; Franda 1979:233-235; Mencher 1978:177-125). In Tunisia, the spread of individual tenure is leading to a polarization of society into a class of large farmers and a class of laborers (Hopkins 1979: 320).

In Africa south of the Sahara and north of the Republic of South Africa, most rural families until recently had direct access to land and were not subject to landlords or employers. The situation is rapidly

changing to the disadvantage of the poorest. In Kenya, land reforms have favored those with the most resources (Brokensha and Glazier 1973; Oslo-Nasubo 1977). The writers contributing to a new assessment of socialist impact on sub-Saharan Africa indicate that the elite, whether traditional or newly emergent via the colonial and post-colonial bureaucracies, have managed to maintain control in the countryside (Rosberg and Callaghy 1979).

One's assessment of land-reform and other programs, therefore, depends in part on which sector of the population one looks at. Land reforms and other rural programs have benefited many small cultivators, sometimes at the expense of large landlords, especially where the cultivators have been able to organize on a scale sufficiently large to allow them to exert counter pressures (Huizer and Stavenhagen 1973). However, only part of the rural population benefits; those without access to land are often worse off after reform.

C. Prospects for the Organization of the Poorest

1. Richer vs. Poorer Peasants

Rural political action groups were mobilized with some success in the years after World War II and included a wide spectrum of cultivators motivated by a common desire for security of tenure. These associations usually disintegrated once the initial purpose was achieved and they no longer faced a common enemy.

The well-to-do peasants participated actively in the agrarian movements of this period only as long as the struggle was carried out exclusively against remaining

feudal strongholds, or for lighter taxation, better marketing conditions, credit, and so on. When the village poor eventually turned their attention to the fact that rich peasants often used the same exploitative methods as feudal landlords . . . the allegiance could no longer be maintained and quickly degenerated into extreme hostility between rich and poor peasants (Alexandrov 1973:357).

The assumption that communities have common interests which need only to be defined to call forth a common enlistment does not hold for most rural regions in the 1980s. It certainly does not hold true for the poorest, who are the least organized.

Communities are more likely to be collections of factions and persons with diverse interests engaged in battle as each interest group seeks to prevail. It is not only that large and small producers clash. Rural communities are now arenas within which the cultivator with land is increasingly pitted against the growing class of landless laborers, as described in the previous section. In India, approximately 30% of the rural population consists of landless laborers (Franda 1979:3). Elsewhere in Asia (Hollnsteiner 1963, 1964; Rosenberg and Rosenberg 1978; Singh 1979; Esman 1972) and in much of Latin America (Dobyns and Doughty 1971) the situation is becoming almost equally desperate.

We give one example of the diversity that exists, using the typical income distribution within a Philippine village.

Findings from Ba. Balulang, Cagayan de Oro show that a mean household income for 311 households is 6,800 pesos a year. The household median is 5,839. The average per capita income for the 1,677 persons in

the village is 1,262 pesos, or about \$168. The upper 10% of the households earns 27% of the total income, while the lower 10% of the households earns less than 1% of total income. Only 19% of total income for all households comes from agriculture. From 60 to 70% of income comes from employment in the informal sector and from craft industries. Evidence now available indicates that modern agriculture will never provide more employment than at present and that, what with new technology, it will undoubtedly provide less.

How can one village organization serve the "needs" of such a diverse, income-skewed population? It cannot. Yet such an organization has been proposed as an umbrella for development. In such an organization the members of the small number of households in the highest income brackets will come to hold the power, and they will use it to further their economic position. The poorest one-third will let them because they will not openly challenge those who serve them as patrons and intermediaries for the provision of services and to whom they are indebted. In any case, the wealthier tend to provide the leadership that the poorest of the poor cannot because they are less educated and too busy scavenging to make a living. (J. Anderson 1980).

2. Lack of Leadership among the Poor

Organization requires time, energy, and resources, including some means of gaining access to those in power. The very poor lack such resources. Even where there have been mass movements of rural people against landlords or other opponents, they do not seem to have drawn their leadership from amongst the very poor. A long delay between the creation of organizations for the poor and the ability of the poor to provide leadership for such organizations is characteristic. Landsberger maintains that few who head such movements have been cultivators; few even have been

reared in the households of poor cultivators (Landsberger 1973a:47-49). Leaders of rural movements almost always come from among the more secure rural families and/or from educated or experienced townspeople with roots in the countryside (Huizer 1976:328-331; Midgal 1974:232).

On the basis of their work in Mexico, Landsberger and Alcantara estimate that it takes a generation for such leadership to emerge from among the heirs of those drawn into the original advance (Landsberger and Alcantara 1971:336). In India, again it seems that the poor begin to provide their own leaders only two or three decades after their organizations have been established under external protection (Franda 1979:3, 16, 146). It has been the safe-guarding of their political rights by national, and sometimes by state, agencies which has given the Indian poor the chance to influence legislation and sometimes even to ensure that the legislation was implemented.

Organizations of the poor need such sponsorship because attempts to organize on their own, or even sometimes under central government auspices, are likely to be met with brutal opposition. They are a challenge to existing claims to power and status.

The poor may understand that to improve their circumstances they must organize collectively. Yet, they understand as well the difficulties that they face in achieving such organization. Effective social organization for whatever purpose requires persons to join together in mutual collective action. This is difficult and costly in terms of members' time, energy, and resources under the best of circumstances.

Difficulties are obviously greatly increased when marginalized

people with cultures shattered by poverty, dislocation, and alienation are involved. Any addition of sociocultural heterogeneity, differentiation of interest, high spatial mobility, devolution of collective capacity for action, institutionalized competition, and mutual distrust simply increases the difficulties of organizing.

Recreating a foundation of mutual agreement, trust, understanding, and reciprocal expectations when these have been eroded becomes very costly in terms of time, energy, and resources of the potential members of a collectivity. People must ask themselves: "Is it worth it? Will the benefits be balanced by the costs? Will they come when needed and in the volume needed? What are the possible negative consequences of organizing, such as angering local elites or stirring up factions?"

Benefits must be obvious. But this is just the beginning. Poor people often lack trustworthy, proven leadership. They lack knowledge about how to gain some of their ends through links with potential external allies. They are unable to assess the probable consequences of specific organizing actions. They need assistance in overcoming these difficulties. Most of these needs can be met by outsiders, but there is good reason for the poor to doubt whether outsiders can be trusted to advance their welfare.

The choices of the poor are very restricted. They cannot make overwhelming commitments to organizations unless the payoff is likely to be markedly superior to the strategies they presently pursue. The poor are not risk averse. They are always at risk. But if they are to risk their energy, resources, and lives, there must be a solid guarantee of a quick and substantial return.

3. Protest Movements and Rebellion

Those who already have some power base are freer to organize themselves to improve their lot. The Tamilnadu riots of 1978, for example, involved wealthier farmers who work with mechanized equipment (Franda 1979: 23). The Bihar farmers' protest of Jate 1980 was also dominated by farmers operating with mechanized equipment who were protesting farm prices and the high cost of farm inputs. In India, small- and medium-scale cultivators are more fearful of organizing protest movements, although landless laborers with nothing to lose have sometimes erupted briefly in violent protest (Klass 1980; Mathur et al 1977; Mencher 1978:196; Rao 1979). In the Philippines, protest movements have involved the poor, but they have been led as a rule by people of some education who often have some stake outside the rural area. Purely local leaders sometimes come from poor families (Kerkvliet 1977:48-53; Po and Montiel 1980; Sturtevant 1972 and 1976). Protest movements in Kenya prior to independence also seem to have been initiated by those who were regarded as better off than their fellows (Roseberg and Nottingham 1966; Wipper 1977).

Violent, seemingly spontaneous, rural rebellions usually burn themselves out quickly, leaving no apparent trace. The more successful, sustained movements, according to Migdal (1974:237-252) have been characterized by local-level organizing, based on the redress of deeply felt grievances, rather than by violent flareups. Leaders have developed alternative structures to solve basic problems through a process of power building, increased radicalization, and successful confrontation. This

means that they are posed against existing organizations until they are in a position to take them over or replace them. Case studies illustrating the process, including the role of external leadership, have been documented for the Philippines by Hollnsteiner (1979), Hollnsteiner et al (1979), Po and Montiel (1980), and Sturdevant (1972), and for the Caribbean by A. Lewis (1939), Phelps (1960), Anglin (1961), M.G. Smith (1965), and Williams (1969).

4. Participation in Rural Associations

In the developing world, education and higher socio-economic status are positively correlated with participation in both political and non-political activities, as they are in the United States (Almond and Verba 1963:380-381; Anderson 1964b; Cancian 1979). Among cultivators, it is those with some local standing who are likely to form farmers' associations to demand better extension services tailored to their own needs. They are also the individuals who are able to enter into one-to-one relationships with technical personnel and obtain a larger share of what they have to offer (Broehl 1978:44 and Mencher 1978:245, India; Rocamora and Panganiban 1975:103, Philippines; Guillet 1979:137-142, Peru; Mbithi 1974:28, Kenya; Charlick 1972, Niger; Igbozurike 1976:119, 121, Nigeria; Van Hekken and Van Velzen 1972:45-47, Tanzania). Cooperatives, also, have been founded and led by those who have access to resources and are likely to be joined by those who have more resources. Paul Bonami, who, along with a number of small African traders, founded the very successful cotton-buying cooperative association in Western Tanzania was

a returned World War II veteran with at least some secondary schooling (Lang, Roth and Lang 1969:60; Roth 1976:47; Saul 1971:351).

The poorest cultivators do not appear to join together to put in pleas for services tailored to their own scale of operations (Mayer 1956: 38-40, India; Gudeman 1978:157, Panama; Murray 1977:28, Thailand; Heyer and Waweru 1976:204, Kenya). Gillette (1980) documents the willingness of small-scale Kenya cultivators to experiment with new farm inputs as well as their failure to demand better farm packages. Here, as elsewhere, the demand for research aimed at the small cultivator has come from outside the farm community.

5. Reluctance to Participate

Wealthier farmers and traders are in a position of being able to consult extension workers and other officials but not be dominated by them (Gow et al 1979, V. II, on Jamaican coffee growers). They see themselves as maintaining control over the situation. This we believe is an essential point. They are able to use government and not be used by it (Mayer 1963). Those who are poor and without power are more likely to see themselves best served by intermediary patrons or brokers or by an avoidance of interaction with those in power (Bilmes 1980).

This precludes them from making collective, programmatic demands upon the system, though not from a covert resort to threats, arson, and other forms of sabotage, which are the ultimate resources of the powerless (McHenry 1979b:142; Van Velzen 1975), nor does it prevent their withdrawal from participation in cash-crop production or other programs.

O'Brien (1971a:275) reports Senegalese shifting from peanut production to subsistence crops as they became disaffected with the policies of the government and the cooperatives. Simmons reports (1980) that this shift persisted into the late 1970s, at least among those who were not so indebted to the agricultural credit agencies as to be forced into compliance.

The differences in participation, and the way in which the various members of rural communities use such organizations as they have are very much reflections of how they see their place in the larger system of which the rural areas are only a part. We therefore turn to deal at length with the view of the system from "the bottom."

III. THE VIEW FROM THE BOTTOM

Abstract

Outsiders often see the poor as negative, hostile, or passive about development efforts. These responses of the poor are a part of their strategies for maintaining local control over their resources by being flexible and "street-wise" and their fears of being further exploited by the local elite and government. They are also the result of having seen new schemes, and often new governments, come and go and of being very familiar with the unreliability of agricultural timetables and the frustrations of bureaucratic red tape.

A. Linkages between Local Populations and the Top

The kind of linkages which occur between the local population and central agencies or international donors is a reflection of the structure of the society and vertical bridging mechanisms and of how people perceive the balance of power between themselves and the officials representing such agencies.

1. Brokers

Opening up rural communities to political and economic external forces usually creates a niche at the local level for persons who can

communicate, articulate, or manipulate in the new channels. These persons, often referred to in the literature as "brokers," are important interpreters and agents of change who come from "outside," and from national or international levels. They explain and so bridge gaps. They are often entrepreneurs who manipulate both local and exogenous resources. They may bring in outside resources to satisfy their followings. They try to use their contacts with those in power to "land" development projects or services for their following, or they may mobilize a faction against a proposed project if a rival broker has secured it. They may block the flow of information to prevent their followers from obtaining direct access to the sources of their own influence or external agents from having direct access to their following. Their operations are extremely important in micro-level politics.

2. Barriers

Given their experience, local people are ambivalent at best about the wisdom of closer relationships with external agencies, especially where these represent the power of central government. They may block the efforts of brokers who wish to operate in the larger world, or they may encourage them to use blocking tactics.

One tactic adopted in such cases is to keep existing organization sub rosa so that people cannot be exploited through the organizations (Jeanne-Marie Col 1980 on Uganda; Po and Montiel 1980 on the Philippines). Mbithi (1974:168-169) reports that poor farmers in Kenya now create new self-help groups which they do not register "in order to avoid being

expanded by politicians or administrators into a project they cannot afford." Thai villagers demonstrate this attitude (as reported by Bilmes 1980:186-189) in words that might be echoed from other rural communities exposed to central planning. On this occasion, the villagers were discussing whether or not to start a village farmers' association and register it with the government:

Headman: If we want to register, that is okay also. They will help us, for example, with equipment and so forth.

Kaew: They will also bother us, you know.

Som: Seeing we haven't got much money, they'll come and sell things to us.

Yet another tactic is to give surface compliance. Though the people of Vicos, Peru, have been subject to much well-meaning intervention from which, on balance, they have benefited, Mangin (1979:81) reports them as responding to intervention from the outside in a pattern typical of many communities: "'Be suspicious. Say what they want. Drag your feet, keep doing what you have always done.'" Target groups who adopt this approach may agree to the formation of new voluntary associations to carry out some functions to meet outside demand, but they do so with no intention of proceeding beyond the initial stages (Walker and Hanson 1978). They work on the principle that if they agree, the outsiders will go away and forget about the matter, but if they argue, the campaign to persuade them continues (Colson 1971:21).

3. Fear and Skepticism

It is difficult for those who wish to be benefactors to accept the fact that they may be seen as dangerous intruders by those whom they wish to help. It is also difficult for them to recognize that promised benefits may not be desired by potential recipients who, themselves, may have other priorities. Nevertheless, it is not difficult for local people to doubt the advantage of cooperation with external agencies. Even brokers who may not fear the foreign promoters of a project may still see little individual benefit for themselves from working with programs of the national government or foreign donors if by doing so their current status is threatened. Those who have no particular reason to object to the project under discussion may have had earlier hopes frustrated when they cooperated on projects in the past. As a result, they are unwilling to cooperate in the new project unless guarantees are offered. Others have suffered to their disadvantage by cooperation in the past which left them exposed to local retaliation when project sponsors left the area. They will need long-term guarantees (Nair 1979; Popkin 1979).

4. Opportunism

The poor are required to be extremely flexible in the way they operate, alert to any possible advantage wherever it may be found. This works against a regard for the sanctity and continuity of organizational forms and puts a premium upon exploiting rather than cooperating with external agencies. If possible, they will milk these for short-term gains without committing any of their own resources. Since they live at risk,

opportunism, "street-smarts," and the ability to optimize a situation become part of a strategy of life. Where the poor see intelligent exploitation of one more resource, officials see dependency and parasitism.

B. Expectations of Permanency

1. The Stability of Local Institutions

The poor in the non-Western world have much less reason than ourselves to regard organizational forms as sacrosanct. They are more accustomed to change than the citizens of the industrial nations of the West. They have seen international development programs of many kinds come and go in the course of a few years. Not only have their governments changed, frequently the institutions of government have been revolutionized during their lifetime, and not only once. Local institutions have had to adjust, often drastically, in response to external forces. Periodically they are under threat of reform from the center. Voluntary organizations in high favor in one year have fallen from favor the next and been banned or had their activities placed under close scrutiny. People are well aware that the institutions and personnel they now confront may be equally ephemeral. Since they are skeptical that any particular set of officials or agencies can make good on long-term promises, they have even less reason to be interested in cooperating in programs that do not provide immediate benefits.

2. Effect upon Timetables

An acceptable time-scale at the local level is likely to be even

shorter than the short timetables used by international donors who live between budgets and expect programs to be completed, and have a major impact, within five years, or at the most, ten. Thus, those who need to cooperate to make a project a success are at odds: each demands a different payday, each works according to a different clock.

Donors and recipients face other differences in time constraints. While donors must operate in terms of fiscal years, recipients are moved by climatic and other considerations. According to Wharton (1969a:388): "The time span required in agricultural production involves numerous and varied decisions The production decisions of the cultivator throughout the crop cycle are different and require different skills and knowledge: which crops to choose, which varieties, when to plant, when to weed, when to harvest." Participation in new programs must be fitted to other routines which may be dominated by work patterns controlled by seasonality of weather (see Philpott 1973:31-32; Mellor 1969:221) or by maintaining supplementary forms of economic activity. The routines also must allow for the requirements of ritual and social obligations necessary if the local support network is to be maintained (Frucht 1966:105-112; Swetnam 1980).

Increasingly the timetables of rural people must take into consideration the time it takes to obtain various inputs from external suppliers. Donors may assume that the inputs are routinely available, while supply may be highly problematic to people aware of local holdups. The lead time necessary in ordering inputs such as seeds, fertilizers, petrol, and farm equipment is likely to be longer for rural people in the Third World than for employees of donor agencies or for American farmers. Often there are

no reliable guidelines worked out for alerting people to the need to put in orders if goods are to be delivered on time. In the past, ritual leaders signaled when people should begin to clear fields, plant, carry out other routines, and begin to harvest. The stupid did not need to rely upon subtle cues in planning the yearly routine; schedules were given to them. In the much greater complexity of current timetables, those planning for innovation rarely seem to consider how to build in to such programs the cues that alert people as to when they must begin to act if they are to be able to act in the future.

Planning for activities to come some months in the future becomes especially difficult under the conditions with which most farmers operate in the developing world. Donor agents, accustomed to reliable communication and transportation systems and well-developed marketing arrangements, may find it difficult to understand the unreliability of the national and commercial systems with which most rural populations have to cope (Harris and Moran 1979). A good many innovations have been abandoned because of the impossibility of dealing with the complexity of timetables.

C. Bureaucratic Red Tape

Even if local people become educated in how to cope with the red tape of government programs based on an international donor working in their area, they may not be able to cope with the red tape of their own governmental agencies, especially if these agencies are inefficient and/or unstable or if they rely largely upon personal networks to produce action. For that

matter, the donor may have set up a system whereby the resources of various national ministries are pooled for the benefit of those involved in the project, but the system depends upon the donor's continued presence. Local people are well aware that donor agents may be able to get necessary supplies regularly and on short order, but they have no reason to think that they will be able to get the same results when left to cope on their own. They may not have staff cars, money for petrol, or money for per diem support while they go the round of the various agencies to put together the necessary package.

It would not be surprising if expectations of donors and recipients differed. Donors view projects as successful if they persist after the donors withdraw, and this is the expectation on which they operate. Recipients may well expect projects to be successful only while donors are actively involved and not expect them to survive the pull-out.

IV. LOCAL VERSUS DONOR PRIORITIES:
DYNAMICS BETWEEN POVERTY AND POWER

Abstract

The priorities of national governments and international development agencies are often in conflict with those of local people, rich and poor alike. For example, high on the outsiders' list is increasing agricultural production; it is near the bottom for locals in so far as it involves community action. What they want is improvement of community amenities -- transportation, water supplies, schools, marketing facilities, and health care. These priorities are affected by a desire for an easier life, the influence of migrant kin, and the importance given to local prestige. There are also conflicts over the placement of facilities and the responsibility for long-term maintenance. Ignoring local priorities discourages community participation and contributes to project failures.

A. Differences in Priorities

Planning is likely to be more realistic with respect to the local environment, both physical and social, if it is carried out in conjunction with local leaders who know their area, especially if these are men and women who have some stake in the region and who are not using the new opportunities opened by the projects to build careers for themselves in

the national or international bureaucracy (see Garcia-Zamor 1977:10-18). Local involvement, however, will not necessarily result in the kinds of projects which central governments or international agencies regard as most desirable. Local people, whatever their social status, may well have priorities which differ from those of the planners (Wellin 1955; Handler 1965; Berleant-Schiller 1979).

B. Amenities versus Productivity

1. Differences between Donors and Local Communities

Those planning for rural areas, whether in international agencies or national ministries, usually give priority to programs to increase agricultural output and the supply of other commodities that figure in the gross national product (Ajaegbu 1976:71; Bunting 1976:38-71; Huddleston 1979:10; Mbithi 1974:27; McLin 1979; Okpala 1980; and Olatunbosun 1975:44). Although AID, the Asian Development Bank, and the World Bank have begun to shift priorities, recognizing that better education, health and nutrition, family planning, and local infrastructure development promote economic growth as effectively as investment in direct economic assistance, most top-down planning still reflects the earlier orientation (USAID 1975a; World Bank 1980).

That orientation is based on the very reasonable position that other services can be maintained over the long run only if people have the means to pay for them and that improvement of income must come from increased productivity. Priority given to production also comes from the concern about

world food shortages. Economic development, therefore, is seen as an essential basis for other forms of development, and it should be broadly based to include opportunities for all strata of the population, especially the poor, the unemployed, or the underemployed. Yet, there is good evidence that neither rural nor urban residents volunteer for communal projects to increase productivity (Derman 1976:416-429).

Rural people, including the poor, want to improve their lot, but they do not address problems of production through large-scale collective action. Their own productive activities are usually organized at the household level: this means that they involve those who expect to benefit immediately from what is produced through the working team. Otherwise, people use reciprocal work arrangements. Then the household requiring labor is expected to make a future return (Philpott 1976, Caribbean; J. Potter 1976, Thailand). The reluctance to invest in collective effort to improve productive resources is an indication of this situation and of their priorities.

When people are prepared to volunteer time, labor, and money, it is usually to produce amenities to bring their quality of life closer to town life, which now sets the standards for human well-being. Unfortunately, while they are often prepared to work together for a time to create new amenities, they may not be willing to maintain them subsequently, seeing maintenance as a task for governmental agencies. This reflects their belief that central government and international donors have a pool of resources, including administrative capacity, that can be used to make their lives better and that this pool is available to those who know how

to tap the pool and divert the resources to their own purposes.

Okpala explains the difference in priority by pointing out that rural people, at least in Nigeria, make a crucial distinction between rural development and agrarian development, a distinction which is not shared by officialdom. Okpala's finding holds good very generally. It is the lack of amenities that concerns rural people, not the level of agricultural productivity for the nation as a whole (Okpala 1980 on Nigeria; Bratton 1980:104 on Zambia; Setchell 1980 on the Philippines; Ralston 1980 on the Commonwealth Caribbean). The low priority given to increasing agricultural productivity reflects the fact that in normal times cultivators are not as concerned about the supply or price of food as urban dwellers and the national elite. They themselves can usually eat, no matter who else goes hungry. Landless laborers, who are concerned about the price and supply of food, are not immediately interested in improving productivity as it generally benefits only their employers. What rural people see as scarce are good roads, good water supplies, health and educational facilities, and public buildings, the goods which at least the better-off urban dwellers can now take for granted. These are things which the household cannot get for itself, unless it is very rich. It is therefore prepared to join with others to obtain them for the community, although even then it would prefer that government provide such services without cost to local people.

2. The Evidence for Rural Priorities

The list of amenities which rural people want is monotonously the same throughout the developing world. Their priorities are witnessed

by the projects in which they have been prepared to participate.

Nigerian rural communities have not mobilized themselves for agricultural development projects, and when asked what they would choose if given the chance, agricultural projects came near the bottom of their list. They work on roads, bridges, schools, civic centers, market places and motor parks, water supplies, health centers, and hospitals. They say that first of all they want improved water supplies, which ease life in many ways, but improved water systems are expensive and their installation may require outside assistance. Communities, therefore, are more likely to begin with less expensive, more easily built, amenities such as roads. Roads and bridges at least connect them with the rest of the world and give them easier access to markets (Okpala 1980).

In Kenya people organize to build schools, clinics, roads, and water supplies, the last sometimes including irrigation ditches. Few of the Harambee (self-help) endeavors about which so much has been written have involved attempts at agricultural improvement per se. According to Mbithi (1974:139), self-help groups "show peculiar disregard for and even rejection of official programs." They not only choose projects other than those recommended for rural areas, but they build facilities which government regards as redundant. In Tanzania, at the height of the self-help movement, rural communities cooperated in building schools, dispensaries, water supply systems, and shops but did not participate in agricultural projects, unless compelled to do so by government (Hyden 1968:213; McHenry 1979b:155-156, 170-171). In Zambia projects undertaken by Ward and Village Development committees conform to the same pattern (Bratton 1980:104).

Rural communities in Papua-New Guinea, and the Peruvian highlands pursue the same kind of amenities (Levine and Levine 1979:118; Doughty 1970:42).

3. Rural Devaluation of Agriculture as Investment and Way of Life

The lack of interest in agricultural projects reflects not only the positive preference for other amenities but the negative attitude many rural people now have for farming as a way of life. Many regard investment in agriculture as less profitable than use of assets in other ways. In Nigeria, according to Okpala (1980:166), "a high proportion of loans made for agricultural projects had gone into commercial and other ventures--namely petty trading, purchase of transport vehicles, construction of residential buildings. . . ." Much rural credit in Zambia was deflected to non-farm activities during the 1960s (Colson and Scudder field notes). Comparable behavior has been reported for the Commonwealth Caribbean (Philpott 1973) and Indonesia (Mary Judd, personal communication).

The downgrading of farming is reflected in expressed preferences for schools that teach children skills for use in town and as employees rather than skills for farming. Parents want their children to get jobs through which they can provide support for their parents and other kin. In Nigeria,

Rural community members have come to believe that their progress lies in educating their children. The rural people, particularly farmers, believe that there is no salvation in farming. Many of them realize that they have spent their whole lives in farming and have made no noticeable progress, nor improved their living standards (Okpala 1980:165).

Other Nigerians report the same attitude: "Parents send their children to school, not to make them better farmers, but rather to provide them an escape from traditional society. . . . Under these circumstances it is foolish to think that a solution can be found by 'vocalizing' the curriculum, i.e., teaching farming, handicrafts, etc." (Damachi 1973:92).

The same motivation for escape lies behind the eagerness for education in rural Zambia (Scudder and Colson 1980) and the importance that Kenyans give to building and staffing schools which will provide children with certificates (King 1977:17-21). In the Philippines, rural people are dissatisfied with farm life and want their children to escape (Pal 1963:278). By now, the rapid flight to the cities should leave no doubt that rural people throughout the developing world want educational systems that prepare them and their children for anything but the life of a cultivator (Shabtai 1975; Aluko 1975:238; Lloyd 1979).

Central planners talk about appropriate education for rural children, meaning schools that teach rural skills, but these are not the kind of schools that people want to build and support. The attitude towards farming will not be altered by school curriculums. Instead, there is a need to improve conditions in rural areas and to give assurance of a better return from farming. Government policies which cream the profit from farming by setting prices at a level to provide cheap food for the cities make the latter difficult.

4. Effect of Migrants on Rural Priorities

Okpala and others attribute the low priority given to agricultural

projects to the belief that agriculture is less profitable than other activities and is properly the domain of the individual farming unit. We believe another factor may also be involved. Rural priorities are being shaped not only by those dependent upon the land for subsistence and income but also by their kith and kin who have moved to the cities or have gone abroad for work. These city people are often active in initiating and subsidizing self-help programs back "home." Indeed, the most active rural self-help programs appear to be able to draw upon the resources of ethnic, caste, and hometown associations which originate in the cities where migrants from the same region turn to each other for assistance. One goal of such associations is usually the improvement of home communities to which they contribute funds to build schools, health centers, community centers, churches, mosques, and temples, and roads (Berry 1975:85-87, Eades 1980:62, Akereodolu-Ale 1975:50, all for Nigeria; Little 1965:24-84 for West Africa generally; Parkin 1978:191-192 for Kenya; Shack 1974-1975:8-9 for Ethiopia; Levine and Levine 1979:118 for Papua-New Guinea; Osterling 1978, Mangin 1959, and Doughty 1970:42 for Peru; Buechler 1970:68 for Bolivia; Hardgrave 1969:146 for India; Frucht 1975, Philpott 1976 and Patterson 1978 for the Commonwealth Caribbean).

Migrants do make some economic investments in their home communities, but, in general, home is not the place where one expects to make one's fortune, and investment is to provide for ultimate retirement or the loss of a city income. Some individuals build themselves improved housing in the home village to which they may eventually retire (J. Anderson 1964a for the Philippines). Individual migrants invest in farming through the

purchase of land, stock, and farm equipment which kin put to use until the migrant returns. Migrants also help to fund agricultural improvements through remittances sent to kin. Remittances may be substantial. In Kenya it is estimated that 20 percent of incomes earned in the cities are remitted to rural areas (Johnson and Whitelaw 1974:477). In one district of Morocco some 20 percent of the cash income for the district as a whole came in the form of remittances sent by workers in France (Combs-Schilling, personal communication; see also).

In the small islands of the Caribbean, most of the population is supported entirely by remittances from kin working overseas (Frucht 1975; Ralston 1980; Philpott 1976). Usually recipients spend the remittances on consumer goods -- food, clothing and school expenses -- or for building up shops or other non-agricultural enterprises (Anderson 1975). Sometimes, however, the money is used to buy land, farm equipment, or livestock.

We found no evidence that migrants or their associations have sponsored programs of agricultural extension or other collective investment in agricultural production. Migrants are concerned about the price of food in town, but this does not translate itself into a belief that they should put pressure on cultivators at home to improve agricultural output. They leave this to the cultivators and look to government to bring down the price of food.

Increasing food production, then, has a low priority when rural residents and their migrant kin plan to improve local facilities. The migrants, some of whom may be working in foreign countries, usually restrict their remittances to family use only. When they make donations to

social units beyond the family, it is to enhance personal prestige or village pride. It is appropriate to help one's home community acquire the visible signs of progress which can be eyed by members of rival communities. Buildings such as clinics, schools, or religious centers speak to the affluence and devotion of the men and women who still identify with their place of birth although they live and work elsewhere. Like public-spirited alumnae and other donors who support American universities, they take more comfort in bricks and mortar than in support funds for regular maintenance, including teaching programs.

5. Land Reform

Where people are very conscious of gross inequities in land distribution, priority among rural poor is often given to land reform, and migrants may be prepared to back such programs that free up the land. In India, the Philippines, parts of Latin America, and in some African countries, rural people will back movements which they see as getting them land. The importance given to land-holding, however, cannot be interpreted as a sign that they are also looking to improve farm production through collective action. Once land is acquired, those who benefit adopt the same priorities as other rural people. In Kenya, for instance, although men and women have joined companies to finance the purchase of a farm collectively, they did so with the expectation of splitting up the farm into individual small holdings once the purchase loan was paid off. They did not plan to operate it as a joint venture under some improved farm management system (Von Kaufmann 1976:265; Hinga and Heyer 1976:249).

C. Pride versus Efficiency

1. Duplication of Facilities

Government and local priorities often clash over the placement and duplication of facilities. For economic efficiency and because of scarce trained personnel, central governments have every reason to try to distribute facilities so that they serve a large number of people without costly duplication. If one community has a school, other communities in the neighborhood can use it and do not need schools of their own. They would be better advised to put their energies into a health center here, a market there, and so on in an orderly fashion. Or it may be advisable to group all the facilities together in one place, the surrounding communities contributing labor and funds for maintenance, and perhaps being represented on overseer committees to ensure that their interests are not neglected.

Such planning to optimize resources disregards basic realities of social life. If people must travel on foot, services need to be dense on the ground. They are reluctant to walk long distances to obtain services (Wellim 1955). Few, for instance, will walk more than five miles to use a health center (Van Etten 1976:70; Wooley 1971). They may dislike using services sited in an area dominated by old rivals. Furthermore, local communities, like other social entities, by and large define themselves in terms of oppositions to other communities in their vicinity. Each wants the range of what the others have so that it can boast about the distinctive merits of its own particular creations.

Services provided by the same kinds of facilities in adjacent small localities may be redundant from the point of view of the central government or international donors. The prestige conferred by them is never redundant from the point of view of the communities involved. In Nigeria and Kenya, as elsewhere, the self-help movements are spurred by rivalries between communities as well as by the sheer desirability of the facilities built. Community civic centers, for example, "are also considered as symbols of a community's prestige, enlightenment, and development, and a community without one feels insignificant and unhappy when neighboring communities have built their own civic centers" (Okpala 1980:166).

Competition and resulting factionalism can be expected to interfere with efforts to promote solidarity within some larger unit to sponsor a particular project to serve a region, but where rivalries are in abeyance, so very likely is an interest in community self-help. Insistence that priority be given to agrarian development, against local interests in rural development, and attempts to organize the distribution of new facilities in some rational fashion which ignores the social dynamics involved are likely to fail. Even worse, they discourage people from an involvement in joint efforts for local improvement.

D. Provision versus Maintenance

1. Reluctance to Maintain Improvements

Localities, central government, and international donors disagree on another crucial matter: who shall be responsible for long-term maintenance

once building is completed. Each side prefers to have the fun of initiating something new and to leave to others the burden of maintenance. Each wants to husband its resources to start something else. International donors generally expect to hand over maintenance to national agencies or local organizations, neither of which may have the necessary resources. Local communities and voluntary organizations generally assume that government ought to take responsibility for maintenance and staffing. Only when the benefit is very apparent, or the need very great, will people continue to fund ongoing programs out of their own limited resources. They have done so in Kenya and Nigeria and in the Philippines for schools and clinics which the government has not taken over. Other projects die: those who worked on them are likely to have little enthusiasm for the next suggestion that they mobilize. For instance, many of the water systems so laboriously installed in Kenya by self-help effort, with the expectation that government would take them over, are no longer in use because government cannot maintain all those now in place, given its limited resources, and local people will neither tax themselves to maintain the systems nor pay water fees (Carruthers and Weir 1976:298).

The social dynamics here involve more than the difficulty of maintaining enthusiasm over time for any particular project. Certainly self-help projects have the greatest chance of success if they can be quickly completed. Developing countries are littered with reminders of projects begun with great enthusiasm, especially in the first days of independence or the winning of a political struggle, which were never completed or were abandoned when government or donor agencies did not come through with

promised inputs (e.g., the demise of many projects and the enthusiasm for self-help as a strategy in Tanzania, Schanne-Raab 1977:25; Maguire 1979:1 on Haiti; Paddock and Paddock 1973 on Central America). It is also true that many rural communities, having exhausted themselves in building, do not have funds for maintenance, especially given the fact that central governments usually monopolize the right to taxation and cream a good deal of the profit from the marketing of rural produce. Maintenance competes with plans for new projects for local funding and attention. Furthermore, maintenance and initiation may involve very different organizational forms and management skills and therefore personnel.

Pride, however, is also at stake. Communities regard their ability to induce government to take over responsibility for operation as evidence of political strength vis-a-vis rivals. Ethnic and hometown associations, once the new structure is built or the new water system is in place, become pressure groups to persuade government to take over, and they use their networks to urge officials to include their projects in the new budget. Failure is implied when the community must continue to finance its local projects. Such financing then becomes a sign of political impotence rather than evidence of affluence and independence.

Communities and voluntary organizations associated with them appear to undertake long-term responsibility only where projects are seen as lying outside the normal scope of central government services, where they were initiated independently, and if the projects are closely linked to prestige. Local associations in Nigeria, therefore, are prepared to maintain civic centers, although these are also financed through the payment of fees by

various users (Okpala 1980:166). Schools and technical institutes in Kenya, Nigeria, and the Philippines not taken over by government are financed in part by fees paid by parents desperate to give their children opportunity as well as by the locality. Caste associations in India make long-term commitments to the banks, schools, and other facilities they create for the benefit of their own communities, both to serve individuals and to raise the caste in the overall hierarchy (Hardgrave 1969; Mandelbaum 1970a, V.I., 240-244; Rudolph and Rudolph 1967).

V. VOLUNTARY ORGANIZATIONS AND MANAGEMENT

Abstract

Voluntary organizations -- such as religious, ethnic, and caste associations -- are often suggested as vehicles for development activities. They have leadership and organization which make them attractive, and they engage the loyalty of their members in a fashion which permits them to overcome temporary setbacks. Recruiting them as partners in development projects, however, can be problematic for a number of reasons. One is that these groups are exclusive in their membership; thus, they do not distribute benefits equally to non-members. Second, if they are strong enough, they are often seen as threatening or divisive by the national government. This precludes international development agencies from working with them. Voluntary organizations with more limited purposes and less loyalty from members are often short-lived and thus limited in usefulness. Cooperatives usually have proved disappointing as vehicles of rural improvement.

The ability of a rural community to participate in development projects is dependent upon many things, including the success of its urban migrants, the mode of settlement, the ecological system, and the national social and political system. Descriptions of three contrasting regions -- Thailand, India, and the Caribbean -- illustrate the contrasts.

A. The Bases of Organization: A Variety of Forms

1. Voluntary Organizations: Bases of Organization and Continuity

When international donors think of community and rural organization, it is likely to be in terms of locality rather than of an exclusive clientele which may or may not be localized. Yet most voluntary organizations which operate effectively to improve living standards are likely to have been formed to work for the benefit of such non-geographic clienteles. Without realizing the full implications of what they ask, donors expect voluntary organizations to widen their scope geographically or functionally so that they may become appropriate vehicles for inputs from donor agencies and central government. The underlying contradiction exists because donors require that distribution of benefits be "democratic" and this expectation clashes with the obligations recipients have to already existing clienteles. As a result, according to Texier (1976:215):

Since the early 1960's, many developing countries have reacted quite sharply against the use of 'imported' systems, following their failure to take as agencies of change in social environments to which their sponsors paid insufficient attention. And it may not be an exaggeration to say that the efforts of these sponsors to introduce conventional cooperation directly into traditional rural environments have had the effect not only of paralyzing the progress of cooperatives in developing countries but also, by putting a brake on the contribution which many of the better-organized producers could have made to their countries' agricultural development, of considerably delaying their integration into the national economy.

As a Kenyan representative at an FAO/ILO seminar in 1966 stated,

"The uncompromising democratic imperative of European cooperation is absolutely out of place [in Kenya]" (Texier 1976:215).

Religious, ethnic, and caste associations draw part of their strength from the fact that they are associated with clienteles which are both well-defined and assumed to be permanent and because their interests are expected to range over a wide spectrum of activities in the service of their members. Their leaders therefore have the freedom to shift objectives without destroying the organization. This results in a great deal of organizational flexibility. Other forms of voluntary organization, such as cooperative, which are functional in nature and created for a particular purpose, usually lack this underpinning of long-term identification and loyalty. They depend far more upon easily understood objectives and feasible short-run pay-offs as well as upon good leadership. People come together in such organizations for clearly defined purposes and then only temporarily (Koll 1973). Initially, such organizations are likely to recruit new members rapidly; they decline equally rapidly if success is demonstrated neither by the attainment of the set objectives nor by continued recruitment. The majority are short-lived.

The longevity and flexibility of the multipurpose associations are offset by their disadvantages. Religious, ethnic, and caste associations, and other comparable kinds of voluntary organizations by definition are exclusive and derive their motive power from the desire to advance their own people. If used as channels of aid, such groups are likely either to deflect inputs to their established clienteles or to lose their effectiveness. They have been highly successful in improving the lot of their own

members, and sometimes, incidentally, the lives of others who live in the same locality, but the fundamental difference in ethic makes it difficult for donors to use them as auxiliaries to or managers of international programs.

Where everyone within a region belongs to an association, or is represented within it by a family member, then the association may be a very effective channel for reaching and enlisting the population.

In Thailand, the Buddhist church has been used as an agency for sponsoring new programs, and local Buddhist temple associations have been enlisted to build and run schools and to assist in other projects. The Buddhist monks have been active in backing the Village Scouts. The Scout organization, first created in 1971, had over two-and-a-half million members in 1978. It was founded as one of various efforts to curb "communist" threats at the country's borders.

Although their non-worldly roles precludes Buddhist monks from joining the Scouts as individuals, the Buddhist Sangha (order of monks) is very much involved in support of the Scout program. All Village Scout . . . training sessions are held at Buddhist monasteries. . . . As in most official and semi-official Thai ceremonies, each day of Village Scout training officially begins with Buddhist observances. Further incorporation of Buddhism occurs when proper Buddhist etiquette and merit-making postures are part of the Village Scout curriculum, and when, at the closing ceremony of the five-day training, monks chant and give a sermon supporting Village Scout ideals (Muecke 1980:8).

Associations can risk a good deal from becoming sponsors of development programs. In Thailand, some commentators attribute recent signs of

politicization and polarization within the Buddhist church to its use in forwarding secular programs (Suksamran 1980; Rabibhadana 1980).

Where strong associations are not in close partnership with government, they may be difficult agents of development even though they incorporate most of the population. The fact that their leaders can claim the allegiance of a loyal, committed membership can lead to the organization being seen as threatening by the national elite. Single-purpose associations are less likely to be suspect by that leadership because they cannot depend on such loyalty. Single-purpose organizations can be effective in promoting changes which require short-term action, but because members view them as instrumental institutions, they do not easily survive failures. They, therefore, are problematic as allies when long-term management is needed since temporary set-backs are almost inevitable.

2. Religious Organizations

Sectarian religious groups have been especially effective change agents throughout history since they have the power to demand the reorganization of their adherents' lives. Jones (1977-78) has examined the association between fundamentalist Christian sects and agrarian development in Africa. The literature on the association between religious innovation and economic innovation in the non-western world is enormous (Parkin 1972 and J. Lewis 1978 on the consequences of Islamic conversion in Kenya and Mali; Simmons 1980, O'Brian 1971b and Behrman 1977 on Islamic Brotherhoods as development agents in Senegal; Barrett 1977 and 1979 on the Holy Apostles in Nigeria; Peel 1968 and Turner 1967 on Aladura churches in Nigeria; Baeta

1962 and Mullings 1979 on separatist churches in Ghana; Long 1968 and Poewe 1978 on Watchtower and Seventh Day Adventists in Zambia; Bond 1979 on the Lenshina church in Zambia; Dillon-Malone 1978 on Masowe Apostles in southern Africa; Jules-Rosette 1974 on John Maranke's church in central and eastern Africa; Peacock 1978, Siegel 1969, and Geertz 1960 on Islamic reform movements in Malaysia and Indonesia; Klausner 1972:133-134, Niehoff 1964, and Bunnag 1973 on Buddhist temple groups in Thailand; Manning 1975 on Seventh Day Adventists in the Caribbean; and Sexton 1978 on fundamentalist protestant success in Latin America).

Missions established by mainstream churches had a major impact upon rural communities in earlier years. They transformed whole populations and were the source of much technical and social innovation (Hardgrave 1969: 43-70 on the Anglican Church in Tamilnad, India; M. Wilson 1977:171-179 on the Lutherans in Tanzania; Ayandele 1966 on various missions in Nigeria). Now established as fully-developed churches, these institutions continue to be active and much assistance is channeled through them. Catholic Action Groups in Latin America and the Philippines have been deeply involved in attempts to provide organizations for the poor. In the Commonwealth Caribbean, the Caribbean Conference of Churches has been one of the most powerful advocates for the poor (Gow et al 1979, Vol I.:69).

During the colonial era, governments frequently used church-based organizations such as missions as vehicles for educational, health, and technical services in the rural areas and sometimes in the towns. On occasion, they backed missions even though the majority of the target population was indifferent or hostile to the religious teachings of the mission.

However, established governments, of whatever era, have never had much sympathy for religious organizations and communities with a radical reformist stance or for those likely to offend locally established religious communities and leadership. African governments have restricted and sometimes banned Watchtower (Jehovah's Witnesses) and other religious communities regarded as rival political forces. Protestant church missions in Latin America are seen as subversive by the Catholic establishment, especially when they attract the more ambitious poor who hope to use them to build communities free of old restrictions and old masters (Sexton 1978). Catholic missions intruding into strongly Islamic, Buddhist, Hindu, or Protestant terrain meet with the same suspicion, as indeed do Catholic orders which preach a message of radical reform even though they work in nominally Catholic countries. The Ahmadiyya proselytizing in orthodox Islamic countries meets with a good deal of opposition. Some West African governments have refused the Ahmadiyya permission to build schools despite the overall contribution of the sect to a westernized Muslim education (Fisher 1969:138-139).

3. Ethnic Associations

Ethnic associations become suspect by national leaders on two counts: they are seen as promoting divisiveness, and they are seen as providing political bases for rival leaders. They may be acceptable when they serve as welfare societies or local improvement societies with limited objectives and have no nation-wide umbrella organization or linkages to political power or foreign entanglements. They often are forced to disband

or go underground if they become powerful enough to offer an alternative organization to that provided by the government and its chosen political party, where a political party is allowed to exist (Barnes and Peil 1977; Meillassoux 1968:70). In 1980, the Kenya government called for the disbanding of the large ethnic associations in that country (New African 1980:17).

4. Caste Associations

Caste associations have had real impact on the politics of India and have been able to demand legal protection and advantage for their members (Rudolph and Rudolph 1967). However, the government of India is unlikely to look with favor on any link between them and international donors (Franda 1979:158). Because caste is associated with entrenched inequalities, the international community might well find cooperation with such organizations even less acceptable than cooperation with ethnic or religious associations.

5. Service Organizations

Rotary Clubs, Chambers of Commerce, and other international service organizations, such as the Red Cross, the YMCA, the YWCA, and the Masonic Order, now have local chapters in many countries (see, for example, Lloyd 1974:131-132). Their link to the middle-class commercial establishment, their Western origin, and their international networks may make them unacceptable intermediaries for international donors in many countries which receive development aid. The Masonic Order, despite its rule against involvement in politics, has fallen under suspicion in some countries (see

A. Cohen 1971 on Sierra Leone). Various women's organizations, including some affiliated with international organizations, are generally acceptable, but only when they work within the range of interests locally regarded as appropriate to women and in the fashion demanded by local mores (Cardon et al 1976-1977; Mba n.d.; Steady 1977; Stroebel 1976).

6. Cooperatives

Cooperatives are a good example of the single-purpose type of association and demonstrate their limitations as vehicles of development (Bennett 1979; Dore 1971; Lyon 1968; Peterson 1981). As noted earlier, international donors and many national leaders have regarded cooperatives as the natural outcome of a local propensity to cooperate (Apthorpe 1979). In fact,

Virtually all cooperatives in developing countries were originally stimulated by government. The pattern was established in India, early in the century, with the promulgation of Cooperative Societies' laws and the appointment of Registrars of Cooperative Societies. From India the model spread to Ceylon, to East and West Africa and to the rest of the British dependencies. Outside the Commonwealth, a similar model was usually followed, for example, by the Dutch in Indonesia (1916). Independent countries have also followed the model. The Ethiopian Cooperative Law (1964) and the Kingdom of Tonga Cooperative Law (1973) are recent examples (Youngjohns 1976:239).

Cooperatives, if not officially introduced, are likely to be initiated by ambitious men who have observed cooperatives at work elsewhere and see in them a means to build an empire (Hyden 1970; Shivji 1976:73). Cooperatives recruit members because people regard them as a means to a

particular end, which may be raising the price of their own produce or undercutting prices of imported goods through the creation of competitive outlets (Okereke 1970:171-172; Migot-Adholla 1970:32). People do not give exclusive loyalty to a cooperative, unless this is a means of making a political statement against those in power, as happened in Tanzania and Uganda in the days when government opposed the formation of cooperatives (Roth 1976; Kasfir 1970; Vincent 1976). Where governments try to use cooperatives as a tool for introducing their own programs, this basis for commitment and participation is lost, and the cooperative organization must then prove itself by meeting the economic goals of its members (Handler 1965; Epstein 1968:122-130).

Governments are encouraged in the illusion that people have long-term attachment to cooperatives as institutions of their own because official recognition and the provision of credit and other resources initially lead to rapid recruitment of those who see additional benefits to be distributed. The enlarged scale of operations then creates new possibilities for corruption and so for divisiveness, and the new tasks thrust upon the cooperative organization test the managerial ability of its officers (e.g., Laure 1968 on cooperatives in Thailand). Governments also regard cooperatives as a source of personnel and funds. They recruit the most qualified managers for the central bureaucracy. They raid the accumulated savings to finance their own programs. So long as world prices are favorable, cooperatives may still be able to provide enough benefits to hold their members. When prices fall, there is no such cushion, and the general disrepute of cooperatives, including their use in agrarian programs of reform, follows

(Dorner, ed. 1977; J. Nash et al., eds. 1976; Okereke 1970; Schanngge-Rabbe 1977:64; Widstrand, ed. 1970a; Worsley, ed. 1971).

Because cooperatives have definite circumscribed purposes, it is easier to judge success or failure than it is with ethnic unions, caste associations, or religious communities where goals may not be so clear cut, and so to decide whether or not the organization is the right way to the desired end. Members regard them as instrumental devices which must provide immediate returns, and deal with them opportunistically.

7. Summing Up

Organizations which can evoke loyalty, which for the most part are likely to be based on religious or ethnic or other long-term affiliation, may not be acceptable channels for official international development agencies, although small voluntary international organizations may have greater leeway in approaching them. Ties among their members clash with the claims of national governments to primary loyalty. The principles of exclusivity which give them cohesion may be disliked by the metropolitan constituencies to which the international agencies are ultimately responsible.

National governments are likely to attempt to direct development inputs into governmental channels or to small voluntary agencies, such as cooperatives, which have been created to advance particular limited goals. Where the latter are independent of government, they have their own purposes and may well refuse to jeopardize these by being deflected into the programs acceptable to donors.

B. The Separate Agendas of Local Governments and Voluntary Organizations:
Perceptions of Control

We have already referred to the clash between local and central government interests with respect to the locus of control. From the point of view of their members, voluntary organizations are formed to pursue particular interests without interference from outside, or they have as one goal an alliance for the purpose of tapping the resources of the center (Worsley 1971:35). Even organizations created by central governments to represent local interests are likely to pursue the latter path. For example, the panchayat organizations created by the Indian government to represent village and regional interests are reported to have produced little by way of spontaneous rural development but to have become rather good at extracting patronage from the center (Franda 1979:120). In Zambia, District and Ward Development Communities and Village Productivity Units have also taken as their primary goal the extraction of resources from the Zambian government (Bratton 1980:104). In this they resemble the centers created on some of the Indian reservations in the United States whose representatives have developed techniques for lobbying in state capitals and in Washington.

Tapping the center, however, involves risks to local autonomy. If the center is seen as thereby likely to obtain additional power to intervene in local affairs, the risk may appear to be too great. Local people rather try to use their organizational skills to create a screen between themselves and the demands of the center. They do not want to be co-opted and forced to engage themselves in self-help programs, which, as Chambers

points out (1974:103), may often involve forced labor and forced contributions. One of the best ways of preventing interference from outside is to keep those at the center from acquiring information about the details of local organization and leadership.

The dilemma faced by Malian residents in the town of Kita is a common one:

Whatever Kitans might have thought of the government's programs for change -- and the reaction was not totally hostile -- any attempts to apply these programs were resented as dictatorial moves that interfered with local political and social realities. . . .It seems in Kita that insofar as an institution was under effective central control it could not be an institution of local self government; insofar as it adapted to local conditions it escaped from central control (Hopkins 1972:22).

From the point of view of the central government, local organizations are potential resources for the management of its own programs and a means whereby new loyalties to the national institutions can be created. National subventions are likely to be channeled only to projects that conform to central planning or those which are backed by powerful political interests. Independent planning and action are not valued as ends in themselves, especially if these lead to new demands on center resources, as is only too likely, or to a questioning of policy or actions opposed to the ruling ideology.

National political leaders are well aware of the risks to themselves and national unity from spontaneous voluntary action at the local level, and they seek to control it or suppress it. Although the Ruvuma

Development Association, created by residents in a number of villages in southeastern Tanzania, was once looked upon as the exemplar of Tanzanian socialism, it quickly became suspect when it enlarged its scope. Local administrative and party officials then saw it as setting up a rival organization under its own leadership. It was banned (Ellman 1977:249; McHenry 1979a:41; McHenry 1979b:90, 114, 213). In Benin, administrative and party officials opposed cooperatives, in part because they feared a loss of their traditional constituencies as cooperative members became better informed about national policies, but they also resented being pressed on issues brought forward by the cooperatives and by the voice the cooperatives gave to women and youths (Mensah 1977:285). In India, despite much rhetoric about the need for decentralization, the fear of strong rural organizations has dominated central government planning (Franda 1979:

The contradiction is clear. The central government wishes to use local organizations and voluntary associations as a channel of command and control; local people, on occasion, wish to use the same organizations as a channel upward through which they can lobby for new services. Neither welcomes the reverse flow.

C. Problems of Scale

Religious, ethnic, and caste associations, political parties and labor unions can provide organizational channels for large constituencies. Most rural organizations, however, operate in terms of small-scale social groups

which serve the people of a village or a small neighborhood. The scale or level of rural organizations are often smaller than the scale with which donors or national agencies prefer to work. Such scales dictate a multiplicity of local organizations each with its peculiar interests, orientations, leadership, and linkages. These characteristics vitiate against the bureaucratic preference for the smallest possible number of regularly organized agencies with a consistent set of interests and capacity.

If they wish to be effective in working with rural organizations, donors and government agencies must be willing and able to adjust their operations to the basic working requirements of small, usually face-to-face groupings of kin, friends, and neighbors. As Tendler (1976a and 1976b) and others have emphasized, reliance on introduced, large-scale, relatively sophisticated organizational forms of cooperatives and credit unions, which do not resemble familiar local arrangements, is usually a recipe for failure. This is mainly because they are alien, often inappropriate and permit little flexibility at the local level. They often center on complex tasks such as marketing. Top management is usually unable to understand what incentives motivate the people they are trying to reach.

D. Rewards for Management: Gains Pursued by Local Leadership

There is usually no lack of organization, including voluntary organizations, in rural areas, but organizations, whether voluntary or otherwise, do not work of themselves. Someone has to remind, persuade, cajole, threaten, coordinate, and enunciate goals and their attainment. In other

words, even in the most ephemeral of voluntary activity, someone has to manage. It requires greater skill when the activity depends upon some liaison with those outside the organization.

A good deal has been written about innovators and the willingness to take risks, but this has been in the context of the diffusion of technology (Cancian 1977, 1979; Rogers and Shoemaker 1971; Roumasset 1977). Very little appears to have been written about what rewards are needed to induce those who are the local "managers" to risk their political capital by undertaking to involve their constituencies in particular development projects (Honadle et al 1980:39-44).

The literature on trade union leadership might be relevant here, for basically the problems are much the same. Trade unions appear to have accepted the fact that strong leadership is worth the trade-off in high salaries, corruption, and the use of union office to rise into the national elite. They do not expect officers to remain with the rank and file, though members may grumble about the growing gap between top leadership and the workers. The crucial question asked is not, "What are they getting?" but "What are they getting for us?" The result is that unions do not lose effective leaders to rival organizations.

In contrast, the very development activities which are meant to build strong rural communities are likely to rob these communities of their most effective leaders who use their newly acquired skills, knowledge, and networks to move into the bureaucracy or into the cities where the rewards are seen as greatest.

Those trying to co-opt local organizations and local leadership into

development programs appear to operate from the assumption that rural people ought to be motivated by a disinterested concern for community improvement. They expect that the local people who provide liaison and management should draw their rewards from a sense of a task well done and from symbolic tokens of respect. No matter how well they do for their constituencies, if they obtain more for themselves than for others, they are betraying the ethic of communal action. This stance draws on the tradition of voluntary public service associated with the security of income and position of those of middle and upper class status in Britain and America. Wealthy intellectuals in India and elsewhere have been prepared to adopt this stance, but the voluntary organizations which they have founded are as much intrusions into the rural areas as foreign-based organizations and do not represent local enterprise. Rural managers have few incentives to divert their energies to public service on such a basis. If they cannot use their involvement in joint efforts with central government or donor agencies to obtain a better income or other perquisites, including the chance for promotion in the larger system, they are better off "managing" where they can expect better returns. The pay-off for local managers may come from the sense of power derived from being able to frustrate the projects put forward by outsiders.

Potential managers may also shy clear of taking jobs within a project because of their perception of the difficulties they will face because of the conflict between the requirements of the job and correct behavior according to local standards. In the West Indies, for example, a common

complaint focuses on the difficulty of inducing local people to take on managerial positions. This is not due to laziness, to lack of ability or intelligence, or to various other explanations commonly offered by outsiders. There is, rather, a problem in being a "boss" at work while living within a village context and subject to village rules. People know they will be subject to pressures to grant favors against the rules of the organization; they expect to be the target of gossip and other measures from the envious who covet their position; they expect loneliness because few of their fellows will be in the same socio-economic bracket while the outsiders with whom they associate at work are not associates in non-working hours. Rewards may seem small, therefore, in comparison with the anticipated penalties and losses.

E. From the General to the Specific: Factors Affecting the Way Organizations Function

So far we have dealt with the characteristics, which, in general, condition interactions between donor and government agencies and such local organizations or other voluntary associations as may exist. There is no lack of such organizations (Ardener 1964; Arhin 1979; Banton and Sills 1968; Benedict 1979; Gordon and Babchuk 1959; P. Hill 1963; Kerri 1974; Ross 1976; Ryan 1975). Some organizations are regarded as existent from time immemorial. Others are recognized as having been brought into being to cope with the exigencies of the twentieth century (Johnson 1975; Johnston and Clarke in preparation; F. Korten 1980; Parvey 1972; D.H.

Smith et al 1972; Uphoff and Esman 1974). All of them are strongly affected by the overall setting within which they must operate. Here we call attention to only three of the possible variables that may be operating: national political system, support from migrant diasporas, and mode of settlement.

1. The Political System

Organizations based on different principles may have similar functions, and groups conforming to the same organizational type may have very different functions. They may be more or less amenable to recruitment for development purposes and more or less effective depending upon resources, leadership, and the variable situations within which they must operate. Lloyd, for instance, has pointed to the crucial variable of the political order in the national system:

Where political power is held firmly by a single party or by the military, programmes of self-help may be encouraged, as in Kenya or Peru. These contribute to local community development while allowing national finances to be directed exclusively towards major industrial projects or prestige schemes which bring more benefits to skilled and clerical workers than to the very poor. But a danger lurks in that the very success of local projects encourages the poor to make greater and more unacceptable demands. Government must be seen to be firmly in control of the political process--not vainly trying to master a runaway vehicle--it stresses mobilization very firmly from the top. In contrast, where rival political parties contend for power, each will try to argue that social benefits flow not from local action but from the beneficence of the government; political support will receive its later rewards. An attitude of dependence upon the government is thus encouraged (1979:188).

The extent to which non-governmental groups, or for that matter local governments, can mobilize resources from local populations for various projects presumably also varies with the economic ideology of the country, its wealth, and the extent of migration from the rural areas. Under strongly socialist regimes, it might well be foolhardy to contribute anything save labor since other contributions would be proof of illicit dealings for private profit, whereas in countries with a capitalistic bias, such as Kenya and Nigeria, organizers can count on cash contributions to pay for materials and skilled labor. The wealthy indeed usually refuse to contribute their own labor. Again, although scale of contribution is not necessarily correlated with the wealth of the giver--Mbithi describes how Kenya's rural poor stint themselves to contribute to Harambee collections (1974:197)--there is a usually positive correlation between levels of wealth and financial contributions to voluntary action.

2. The Role of Migrants

Those rural communities with many urban-based or overseas sons and daughters may be in a better position to undertake new projects than those which keep their children at home, for they have a broader resource base to tap. In fact, their real community has expanded to occupy a wide variety of ecological niches. Johnson and Whitelaw, for example, reported that in the early 1970s urban-rural income transfers absorbed about a fifth of urban wages in Kenya (1974:477). On some Caribbean islands upwards of 50 percent of the income comes from relatives abroad (Patterson 1978). Political leaders are aware of this potential, which is of the

same nature as the linkages which sent a flow of remittances back to Europe from the Americas and Australia, and indeed remittances now flow to many Third World countries from workers in the OPEC countries, Europe, and elsewhere. Some of this flow goes to providing new community amenities.

The then Prime Minister, Moraji Desai, during a 1978 visit to the United States urged Indians living in the United States to form support groups to raise funds for the development of particular villages (Franda 1979:81). The most prosperous village in the Hong Kong settlement area may well be the one whose migrants have pioneered the Chinese restaurant business throughout Britain (Watson 1975). Nigerian communities assess their overseas members for hometown improvements: This one is to pay \$1,000 that one \$500. Those who have been supported for training by fellowships supplied them by their home communities have a special debt, but even those who have made their own way or who have been supported by university and government fellowships are still held responsible as citizens of their hometown to support its improvements.

3. Mode of Settlement

Finally, we suggest that mode of settlement may be of some significance. Despite the efforts of the Zambian government to encourage village and neighborhood improvement societies, little has happened, in contrast to the outpouring of resources for the benefit of home communities in Nigeria and Kenya, or in Peru, often without government prodding. We note that Zambia was a region of both shifting cultivation and

occasionally shifting settlements until very recently. Villages usually bore the name of founding headmen, and villagers can be thought of as the followers of particular leaders rather than as corporations with vested interests in a permanent organization. Migrants from these villages remit considerable amounts to kin in the countryside, but they do not form hometown associations nor do they usually contribute as individuals to home community projects. Their attachment appears to be to individuals or to kinship groups, rather than to place. This phenomenon is also reported for the Commonwealth Caribbean (Dirks 1972; Frucht 1975; Philpott 1976; Patterson 1978). Those who leave provide support channels through which their kin can move upward and outward to the cities rather than investment in the amenities for villages from whence they came, whose homesteads may well have dispersed in the ordinary passage of time.

Mode of settlement may also affect ability to organize and condition managerial strategies in other fashions. How important residential systems may be in determining organization is suggested by Leis (1974). She found women in one Ijaw village in Western Nigeria creating numerous, very effective associations to further their trade and other interests. In another Ijaw village with a different residential pattern, women had produced no associations, and when one was organized for the, it quickly foundered.

F. A Comparison of Three Different Systems

There is no magical blueprint which can serve as the constant departure

point for those trying to transform rural environments and rural peoples. The various countries in which donors work have different combinations of organizational types, different national political systems, different modes of settlement, different resources.

1. Thailand

In Northern Thailand, the main focus of local organization is the Buddhist temple, the village wat. Buddhist brotherhoods associated with these temples are highly organized; their members are both educated and motivated to work for the community (Bunnag 1973; Klausner 1972; Niehoff 1964). The Buddhist church, through its nationally organized hierarchy, is able to direct the local monks into programs favored by the government and church.

Villagers respect the local monks and look to them for advice on many subjects (Klausner 1972:133). By comparison, secular leadership is weak (Amyot 1964; Moerman 1968, 1969; Niehoff 1964:237). Each village has its headman, but greater power rests with the temple school council, composed of various village leaders and heavily influenced by the Buddhist brotherhood (Amyot 1964; Moerman 1964; S. Potter 1977; J. Potter 1976: 36-37). Since all village men can join the brotherhood, power and influence at the local level are not monopolized by a small segment of the male population. Women form their own associations to provide support for the temple.

Although families vary in wealth, differences do not loom as large at the village level as they do in India and the Philippines, nor is

Thailand as pinched for agricultural land. Despite an increase in landlessness, especially in the Central Thai plain (Piker 1975), the majority of cultivators in many regions, especially in the north, are independent producers working their own land. This means they are more likely to be able to engage in common efforts since it is easier to arrange an equitable distribution of the advantages realized. They also have some surplus of resources, and this allows them to take risks and experiment with new techniques (Murray 1977:101).

2. India

Rural India presents a very different problem with its wealth and status differentials, its land hunger, and its tight caste organizations which still excludes, in many regions, members of scheduled castes, the untouchables, from participation in civic and ritual life. Many cultivators are tenants. Many rural families own no land whatsoever and eke out an existence as seasonal wage-laborers. Observers may be right who claim that the poor of the Indian countryside can improve their lot only through outside intervention and that decentralization of development programs only leads to a further entrenchment of the existing elite. "The alliance between the rural elite, local politicians, and the arms of justice (police and courts) is well known. In this context, it is clear that it would require considerable organizing on the part of the poor to bring about any kind of meaningful change in the structure of production relations, or even such simple improvements as increased wages or greater security of employment" (Mencher 1978:282; see also Dube 1956 and 1958;

Pocock 1968; Franda 1979:227-257 and Alexander 1979). In contrast, the Thai social system is open. Individuals can advance on their own. The Thai stress individual effort or the manipulation of patron client ties, not the need for caste associations or rural unions of the landless and the nearly landless, as the key to a better life.

3. Commonwealth Caribbean

In the Commonwealth Caribbean, a third pattern of social organization and leadership dominates responses to attempts to create an environment for economic growth. This is an outgrowth of its historic experience of external domination. Thailand was never colonized nor subject to a colonial power; India had a long history of independence prior to colonial rule, and its rural institutions did not collapse under the Western impact. The population of the Commonwealth Caribbean has known only colonization. During the period of slavery, slaves were forbidden to organize (Elkins 1961; Dirks 1972; Mintz and Price 1976). After emancipation, lack of resources perpetuated an atmosphere of dependency (Braithwaite 1968; Hall 1972; Garcia-Zamor 1977). Poverty and lack of attachment to the land encouraged geographical mobility in a search for better conditions until transience has become the norm. As a result, local initiative lacks continuity. There is an emphasis on short-term goals (Philpott 1973; Frucht 1968:205; Patterson 1978). Local leadership has been consistently drawn off to foreign ports or to major urban centers, leaving behind in the rural setting the less ambitious and the less capable (Ralston 1980). Rural populations do not undertake complex and

costly self-help projects. These are traditionally left to government. For that matter, West Indians have a deep suspicion of all organizations, based on the fear that organization permits them to be manipulated by those at the top (A. Cohen 1980:78).

G. Implications of these Differences

Those working within development agencies are aware of the importance of the social context within which they must operate and have adapted to it. In Thailand, international donors and the Thai government have come to see the temple associations and the Buddhist church as agencies facilitating innovation and new programs in both towns and villages (Klausner 1972; Niehoff 1964; Tambiah 1976). The Indian government has attempted to deal with the rigidities of the caste organization and the land tenure system through laws calling for the redistribution of land (Mencher 1978: 111; Franda 1979:184, 246-253), as well as through industrial and commercial policies outlawing caste segregation (Pocock 1968:56-58). In the Commonwealth Caribbean, a generation of educated West Indians, imbued with a growing sense of nationalism, is providing new leadership. Given that opportunities for migration between islands and to Europe, Canada, and the United States are diminishing, emergent leaders are more likely to remain in their home communities. This is no guarantee, of course, that they will work with international agencies to help solve local problems as has been suggested (Garcia-Zamor 1977). They may seek revolutionary solutions.

VI. ORGANIZATION FROM THE GRASS-ROOTS

Abstract

To be at all effective in planning for and working with local development projects, the outsider needs to understand the social situation within which he or she will be operating and the variety of ways that local people organize themselves. The formal categories worked out by anthropologists for their own purposes of comparison are likely to be misleading because they imply a greater uniformity among the members of each category than is true in practice. Superficial, formal resemblances may mask important differences in actual recruitment of members, goals, channels of communication and authority, and power to make and enforce decisions. In this chapter we describe a spectrum of organizations, using basis of recruitment and specificity of purpose as a basis of classification. They range from organizations based on kinship, age, sex or ethnicity to those based on shared economic interests. Some implications for decentralization schemes are discussed.

A. The Human Propensity to Organize

1. What this Means

We human beings continually organize for mutual benefit; organizations emerge even without deliberate planning among people interacting closely. Most of our various activities require social organization to

get things done effectively, to order and manage important relationships and to provide meaning for our actions. Through the process of organization, the significant groupings of a society are established; the systems of mutual expectations, satisfactions, and cooperation are reinforced. Social organizations necessarily constrain and control individual action; the tradeoff is that they offer possibilities for attainment of goals through collective action which would be impossible for individuals.

Organizations have emergent characteristics beyond those of the people who make them up: organizational goals; principles of recruitment; systems of roles; maintenance systems composed of procedures, rules and sanctions; cycles of activity; external relationships with other organizations. We therefore tend to reify organizations, to think of them as having a life of their own. Organizations also have consequences that are intended and recognized by their members -- the manifest functions -- and those that are neither intended nor recognized -- the latent functions. They may engender cooperation at one level and conflict at another.

Social organizations thus influence how people interact and how things are done in a particular society, but they are not blueprints which people must follow mechanically. As Firth has suggested, organization is

the working arrangements of society. It is the process of ordering action and of relations in reference to given social ends, in terms of adjustments resulting from the exercise of choices by members of the society (1954:10).

As such, organizations require significant investments of time, energy,

and resources. They require leadership and a certain degree of commitment and involvement of their members. Organizations provide special rewards for those who invest their efforts to create or maintain them. Not all members can or wish to so involve themselves. Most organizations thus exhibit a hierarchy of participation and commitment.

In economically stratified societies some members, sometimes a majority, are barely able to make the investments of time, energy, or resources necessary to maintain membership. Moreover, their specific interests may not be fully represented in the organization. Their involvement thus is usually directly related to their investment and to their perception concerning how well the organization represents their interests. Understandably, the poor and the powerless, who are socioeconomically marginal and insecure, are unable to participate fully and actively in most rural organizations. Furthermore, they tend to lack the experience, capability, common interest, leadership, and resources to organize or maintain effective organizations of their own.

2. Taxonomy

Some distinctions used in building up taxonomies of organization are useful, some are not. For instance, many writers contrast "traditional" organizations with "modern formal organizations" (Blau and Scott 1963; Saunders 1977). This is not a distinction that we find useful. So-called "traditional" organizations may turn out to have evolved recently in response to contemporary pressures, to have been introduced in the not-far-distant past by external authority, or to have been borrowed from

neighbors. They may or may not be relatively small, face-to-face groups. They are certainly not unchanging. Of necessity, rural peoples have had to respond to the massive pressures and changes to which they have been subject. This does not mean that local organizations can be treated as unstable forms, easily transformable into Western-style organizations. They are adapted to a purpose or purposes. For that matter, their members may not be convinced of the efficacy of Western models, given the conditions under which they exist.

Categories which refer to life-span, exclusivity/inclusivity, and multiplicity of purpose have some analytic value. These cross-out each other. Local organizations with the capacity to take action in behalf of rural development may be divided into two major categories: (1) those that provide enduring bases for the provision of vital services and which usually play a role in perpetuating community solidarity and morale and (2) those which emerge to respond to more specialized tasks and usually are mobilized only for the term of the tasks. The first are likely to be inclusive of the adult population, although some restrict their membership by sex. The second are likely to have limited membership. It is questionable whether organizations of the second type are more flexible than the first, flexibility being a quality defined in terms of the ability to take on additional responsibilities without jeopardizing the organization's primary commitments. On the other hand, the demise of organizations of the second kind may have less serious long-term impacts.

Neither kind of organization should be assumed to be operating autonomously. They both are generated and maintained as responses to

internal needs and the challenge of the larger economic, political, and social forces with which people have to cope. They are linked with other organizations, both horizontally with those of near equal status and vertically within sets of unequal power relationships. These last are likely to characterize relationships between the center and the organizations at the periphery. Underlying these uniformly unequal relationships are differences in aims, expectations, information, and resources, and mutual suspicion. Each side is trying to optimize its advantages, and both are aware of each other's goals. Local organizations operate in part to defend their members as far as possible against predation by agencies extending from the center. Otherwise acceptable programs may be rejected precisely to prevent central government agencies from acquiring greater access within the local scene.

Wanasinghe (1979:317-318) prefers to use manifest functions as the basis of his categorization of rural organizations, which he classifies into three basic types:

- (1) organizations which are formed for common action for making demands on government, for services or action on projects, or for agitation, with the aim of achieving particular economic, political, or social goals.
- (2) organizations which are formed for the performance of economic functions relating to production, such as provision of credit or production inputs, processing and marketing of produce, provision or maintenance of irrigation systems, or provision of consumer facilities; and
- (3) organizations directly involved in production activities such as organizations for communal production or for the regulation of production.

Wanashinghe also suggests that such organizations can be characterized as being informal or formal, which he distinguishes on the basis of relative continuity and the nature of linkages with government agencies (1979:318-319). Rural organizations also differ in the extent to which their goals emphasize the attainment of equity, local solidarity, and production.

The principal roles that rural organizations play in the process of rural development include the following:

- (1) identifying local group needs and the possible tactics for pursuing them;
- (2) mobilizing and agitating for the active pursuit of identified needs;
- (3) formulating longer-term activities in pursuit of more general rural development goals;
- (4) generating or mobilizing resources for rural development activities, which may be local or external and may range from capital to labor; and
- (5) organizing for the planning and implementation of activities (Wanasinghe 1979:32-322).

Particular organizations may not perform all these roles, or they may perform them at different times, but the degree to which they perform them effectively should be a measure of their ability to achieve rural development. Their effectiveness is contingent on such things as the strength of support which members are willing to extend to their organizations, the capacity of the organization to deal with problems, the extent of linkage and the degree of rapport which rural organizations have developed with government or private agencies, and the extent of collective consciousness and willingness to undertake collective action. Each of

these are related to the basis on which the organization came into being and whether local or extralocal origins or government or private agencies were involved.

B. Inclusive, Basic Institutions with Multiple Purposes

1. Organizations Based on Kinship

Although the past hundred years have increased possibilities for individual mobility throughout the world and so encouraged the development of organizations based on ties other than descent, kinship still plays a strong role as the basis for economic, political, and religious organization in much of the developing world. According to Western prejudices, often it has much too important a role in determining who may do what and how resources must be used. Here we do not deal with the nuclear family as such, but rather with larger groupings that provide families with assistance in emergencies and a greater security.

Such larger groupings are exclusive in that membership is restricted to those who have the right to membership through birth, adoption, or marriage. On the other hand, where they are strong, every member of the community is incorporated into one of the kinship units of which the community is composed. Although anthropologists make distinctions between lineages, based on unilineal descent, and bilateral descent groups, whose members have a degree of choice with respect to which group they choose to join, lineages and bilateral descent groups may function much the same in practice. Lineages are the common form of organization throughout much

of Africa, the Middle East, India, parts of Sumatra, China, Papua-New Guinea, and highland Latin America. Bilateral descent groups are common in much of Southeast Asia and Oceania and in some regions of Latin America. The term clan is also used for some types of descent groups, but ambiguously. In West Africa the term may be used for groups that have little to do with kinsnip per se, being applied to territorial divisions which may or may not be organized around a dominant lineage as a nucleus. Such divisions may have populations of over 50,000 members; some have only a couple of thousand. Elsewhere clan may be used to refer to dispersed, non-localized populations claiming descent, either through males or through females, from a common remote ancestor. Such units do not act as corporations, nor do they form a focus for political action.

Lineages and bilateral descent groups often control land allocation, or for that matter the right of entree to fishing sites as in Sri Lanka (Alexander 1980:91). They may control the right of appointment to political or religious offices. They may provide the formal conceptual framework for the political organization of hamlets, villages, or even larger divisions. Bilateral descent groups are less likely to incorporate a large number of subordinate units and include many people. Segmentary lineage systems can incorporate much larger populations. The Tiv of Nigeria, who must now number over a million, regard themselves as members of one enormous lineage whose members can trace their descent from Tiv himself (L. Bohannan 1958:35). On the other hand, in some regions lineages do no more than frame large extended families composed of a set of siblings or at most of cousins, their spouses, and their children.

a. The Importance of Kin Loyalty

Because kinship groups provide various welfare benefits to their members, including assistance in times of emergency, they also can inhibit members from exercising freedom of action. The ideology of descent emphasizes respect to seniors and may vest control over assets and the power to initiate or veto activities in the hands of older men and women. Elders may have considerable authority to control the deployment of labor for agricultural purposes or in community services, to adjudicate in disputes among members, to represent the group and its members when they become involved with outsiders, and in any number of ways affect what is happening locally. Where populations conceive of their social order as composed of a set of kinship corporations, the outsider who wishes to be heard is wise to consult the heads of these corporations before pressing onward. If ignored, these leaders may uphold their authority by vetoing the proposed action. They may also refuse to accept a program because, upon consideration, it appears to threaten their control over the younger members of their units upon whose labor they must rely in cultivation and for other purposes.

John Lewis (1978) describes how Bambara elders in Mali, in villages which had been able to maintain strong lineage organization and control over land, rejected the small farmer credit program acceptable to villages composed of pioneering strangers or Muslim converts who had made a radical break with their past.

The tendency of kinship groups to subdivide and for each unit to see itself in opposition to other segments, the basis of segmentary

lineage systems, can also affect the way in which new organizations become structured. Widstrand (1970:233) comments that even literary groups and cooperatives become segmented when adopted into segmentary societies.

Organizations based on kinship are not co-opted easily by outside agencies to new self-help programs in the interests of increasing productivity. Uchendu's comment, although made with reference to Africa, applies much more widely:

A major problem in traditional social structures lies, not in their inflexibility, but in the fact that what flexibility they have is not oriented toward economic growth. . . [T]he units of competition. . . whether lineages, clans, or wards, are much more adapted to political action and schism than to collective action that serves the needs of development (1968:237).

He finds authority structures in such societies not opposed to innovation per se but opposed to changes that require any restructuring of existing relationships. Bilateral, or cognatic kin groups, may enjoy somewhat greater flexibility, but they lack the potential for organizing for large-scale corporate kinship activity.

b. The Ability to Assume New Economic Tasks

1) West African Kin-based Firms

The kinds of rights which lineages or other kinship groups exercise vary tremendously from region to region. This diversity affects both their ability to control their members and the kinds of new activities in which they may decide to engage.

In some regions of West Africa, lineages control landed estates and

and may have a common purse used to finance ceremonies and other lineage activities. They have found it easy to create fellowships to further the education of young men and women who are then expected to contribute to the advancement of their kin. They have also formed business corporations to pioneer new farming areas or to undertake new businesses. Yoruba of Nigeria and Ashanti of Ghana have used kinship loyalty to create companies of lineage-mates to pioneer new cocoa farms or undertake commercial ventures (Berry 1975:85-87; P. Hill 1963). Igbozurike (1976:127), writing about southern Nigeria, calls for the designing of agricultural development to take advantage of the capacity of the kinship system to organize collective farming. Ogionwo points to the role of the extended family in Western Nigeria in the drive towards economic growth and rural improvement: "In the context of Nigerian economic growth, large extended families have provided striking instances of major industrial organizations growing out of, and supported by, traditional family units" (Ogionwo 1978:83). He may be overly optimistic in this respect, for Aluko, Ogumtoye and Afonja (1973) report that family firms are almost nonexistent among the small Nigerian businesses covered in their survey. Either family firms are rare enough to have escaped their mesh, or their study was not tuned to pick up such information. Lineage or extended family business corporations, including farming schemes and transport businesses, are again reported from Gabon, Congo-Brazzaville, and Zaire (Janzen 1969:72).

It may be noted that it does not seem to matter what the mode of descent may be, whether patrilineal, as among the Yoruba, or matrilineal, as in southern Ghana and among the BaKongo of Gabon and Zaire; the crucial

matter appears to be rather how property is vested, whether in the kinship unit or in individual households with the lineage exercising only a reversionary right. In the one case, the use of extended families and lineages as the basis for forming new corporations is an easy step forward since people are accustomed to accepting the authority of the leaders of the unit and their right to administer at least a portion of the assets derived from members' activities. Even then such units do not appear to operate with the idea of a treasury for which an accounting must be made. Rather their leaders, as senior members, absorb a large share of the profits and assume the major responsibility for meeting financial obligations against the unit and its members. Elsewhere lineage-mates expect to operate independently of each other, and they do not form extended family or lineage corporations to exploit new opportunities.

2) East African Entrepreneurs

Various writers have commented on the failure of East African entrepreneurs, craftsmen, and farmers to use the loyalties associated with kinship as they move into commercial transactions. This is particularly striking since many of them had their apprenticeship in Indian family firms where kinship relationships are viewed as a basic business asset (Benedict 1968). Among Kenya craftsmen and entrepreneurs, the typical pattern is a partnership or private company formed by men of the same generation who often have been at school together. Some shared the common experience of being together in detention camps during the MauMau emergency. Very rarely are partners related by kinship ties (Marris and Somerset 1972:107).

Marris and Somerset suggest (1972:145) that East African kinship groups do not identify their own welfare "with the welfare of commerce because commerce is marginal to the landholding, on which the family concentrates its concern." But this can only be a partial explanation at best and seems to be contradicted by the evidence. East African lineages and clans do claim rights in land, but this is much more a statement of political dominion than a claim to the control of landed estates. Clan elders claimed the right to allocate land to newcomers to their territory and the right to regain all land abandoned by outsiders. Transfer by individuals to outsiders was forbidden without lineage approval. During the Kenya land reforms, when land was surveyed and allocated to individuals, clan and lineage elders were called upon to supervise the process. They then mobilized their units to contest disputed areas of land, as clans and lineages had done much earlier in Zaire when land began to have commercial value. The Kenya elders collected fees from their lineage mates with which to fight the legal battles (Brokensha and Glazier 1973; Lamb 1974:17-19). But this common action was a temporary phenomenon. When lineage-mates pooled their money to buy land, it was with the intention of subsequently splitting up the farm into individual holdings. They did not plan to operate the farm as a lineage enterprise in the fashion reported for some West African lineages (Hinga and Heyer 1976:249).

The organization adopted by craftsmen and entrepreneurs presumably requires some other explanation. Marris and Somerset refer to the importance of family patterns. In India, joint families lived together in one household and farmed the land or operated other enterprises corporately,

whereas in East Africa each married son was expected to establish an independent establishment, receiving if necessary a share of the family land. Partition was always implicit in the system, for men divided their holdings among the houses of their wives, each wife and her children having preemptive rights to use and inherit the goods associated with that house. "For a married man to work for his brother is intrinsically humiliating, unless he has his own stake in the enterprise" (Marris and Somerset 1972: 146).

King, who studied the training and activities of small Kenya craftsmen, suggests that they turned to age-mates rather than kin in learning artisan skills and organizing a workshop because of the continuing force of the age-grade system which once provided a major framework for political organization throughout much of East Africa (King 1977:135). Age-grade organization is probably influential, but again it should be noted that the Luo and other western Kenyans, who gave less significance to age-grading, have not used their lineage organizations to create commercial or industrial corporations. Like other Kenyans, they have created lineage associations in the towns which have welfare functions and which work for the improvement of home communities and provide scholarship support to promising young men and women.

3) In Asia and Elsewhere

West African lineages, in the way in which they operate, have a closer resemblance to Chinese lineages than they do to their East African counterparts, especially in their readiness to form new enterprises.

Chinese lineages have founded villages, built ancestral halls, brought land into cultivation, and when opportunity offered, organized a chain migration to Southeast Asia, Britain, Europe, and North America. Lineage links are used to provide a commercial network instrumental in setting up lineage members as restaurant owners and workers in restaurants and other businesses. According to Watson (1975:101), many overseas Chinese commercial networks are articulated through lineage structures.

The Indian extended family organization seems to lead to smaller networks than can be created by Chinese lineages, but it appears to be equally effective in providing the basis for business enterprises, both in India and among Indians overseas (Bernea 1959; Benedice 1968). Arab-speakers in Africa and the United States use the same kind of kinship network in establishing interlinked small establishments which are associated in buying produce and sharing risks (Winder 1967; Craig James, personal communication).

Bilateral descent groups, characteristic of Southeast Asia, including Thailand and the Philippines, seems to be less effective in fielding corporate action by their members, although some of the peoples of Borneo and Indonesia have used them to control and allocate land rights (S. Potter 1976 for Thailand; Anderson 1964a for the Philippines; Freeman 1970 for Borneo). In Sri Lanka use of land and fishing sites as well as other resources is dominated by the basic concept of "an estate as a common property domain in which co-owners are also kinsmen, the use of genealogies to allocate floating shares in the estate, and a system of rotation to equalize environmental effects" (P. Alexander 1980:91).

2. Organizations Based on Age

In the past, associations of age-mates provided for cooperative action in many regions. Schooling and wage labor have strongly affected their capacity to organize, striking at the basic assumptions about the equality of age-mates. Age associations were probably most highly developed in some regions of West Africa and in East Africa, but in many other areas age has been the basis for the creation of sports clubs, dance groups, and political action groups as well as for communal labor and police action.

a. West Africa

In West-Africa, young men's groups functioned as labor gangs which could be co-opted in turn by elders heading family and village units for field work, building purposes, and public work such as weeding paths, building village assembly halls, and police work. Such groups might hire out their services and use their joint earnings to finance feasts or other common activities (Wail 1971:283; Meillassoux 1968:50-51). Generally, they were organized on a village, ward, or neighborhood basis and so usually ranged in size from perhaps twenty to a hundred members, but in populous areas they might be considerably larger. In pre-colonial Dahomey, the kin could call out all members of the various young men's associations throughout the kingdom for public works (Gosselin 1976).

Wage labor and western-style schools have led to the demise of age-work associations over most of West Africa although in a few regions elders are still able to use something of the old machinery. Formal age-sets are

formed only rarely, and public work is no longer organized through the use of the age associations (Lloyd 1974:129-130; Brokensha and Erasmus 1969). The exploitation of their labor in the demand for "voluntary" village improvement projects in the years immediately after independence, encouraged the flight of young men from the countryside to escape corvee labor and helped to bring about the demise of the work-groups. Informal social groups of age peers continue to be common; youths also now create organizations on a western pattern, with such officers as presidents and secretaries, to promote sports and other social activities. But if they work, they expect to be paid individually.

b. East Africa

Age-sets are still being formed in some regions of East Africa, especially among pastoral peoples. The sets once had both political and military functions, but they played a less active economic role than their counterparts in West Africa. Here age-sets transcended local boundaries, with the result that a single set might incorporate some thousands of men, but the whole set was rarely mobilized. The effective units were the individual chapters, based on small districts within which people frequently interacted. Each such chapter had its own set of officers. Regional officers were either nonexistent or had only ritual duties. This meant there was no easy way to coordinate the activities of the various chapters. Age-sets may have been used in the terracing and digging of irrigation channels that still speak to the ability to mobilize a large labor force, but on this we have no information. In recent years they have

not been much involved in public works. Where they still function, it has not been possible to persuade the chapters to participate in the creation of communal ranches nor have they taken on other new functions (H. Schneider 1979:248-250).

Age-grading affects current behavior to the extent that respect for those of senior status is still inculcated, and elders have a right to be heard. It also may affect the way in which knowledge is being transmitted among craftsmen and others, through links with peers rather than through family ties, as King suggests (1977:135). Mbithi refers to the participation of age-mates in Harambee programs in Kenya (Mbithi 1974:172), but in general age-sets do not seem to initiate such programs as an organized group project nor do age-sets play a role in their management. The most recent description of East African age-sets ascribes to them few service functions (Baxter and Almagor 1978).

c. African Women

West and East African women had age-sets only in places where age organization was strongly stressed among men. Even then, age-set placement seems to have been of less importance in determining their activities than other characteristics. Usually women married earlier than men, and thereafter if they went to live in new communities on marriage, they lost the solidarity with other women based on the common experience of initiation or childhood companionship. They stressed instead solidarities based on common work experience and common status.

d. New Forms of Organization Based on Age

New forms of organization, based on peer groups, which recruit both men and women are increasingly important. Young men and women are expected to join youth organizations attached to political parties, to serve in national service battalions, to belong to church-sponsored youth groups. Boy scouts, girl scouts, and similar voluntary organizations are also reported (see, for example, Little 1965 for the range of voluntary associations found in West Africa at the beginning of the 1960s). These introduced forms are common in many parts of the developing world at the present time, whether or not the region has any tradition of age-set organization in the past (Vetter and Schneider 1979:9 who discuss leadership-training for youth in Jamaica).

National leaders regard youth brigades as useful tools of national development policies. Such units are linked to parent organization dominated by adults who belong to the national elite (Meillassoux 1968:71). Church-sponsored organizations may have some autonomy, but most such formal youth organizations appear to the youth and their parents to be off-shoots of the central government rather than organizations under local control. Spontaneous youth organization is usually for the purpose of forming sports clubs or dance groups, both very commonly reported. Though formed for such purposes, sports clubs and dance groups on occasion have transformed themselves into welfare associations or the forerunners of political movements. Paul Bonami was able to use neighborhood dance teams as auxiliaries in his drive to induce cotton-farmers in western Tanzania to form cooperatives. The early successes of the cotton cooperative movement

in that region is sometimes attributed to the use of elements from the dance team organization as the basis for the cooperative organization (Roth 1976).

3. Organizations Based on Gender

a. Economic Role of Women

In the past, development programs often began with the assumption that women had their principal role within the household structure and that the interest of households were adequately represented by male heads. We also note the possibility that more international aid effort may have gone into sponsoring new organizations for women than for men, given the common assumption that women in the developing world have had low status and no independent organizations of their own.

In fact, in much of the developing world, women are producers first, housewives second. They are cultivators, wage laborers, traders, and increasingly clerks, teachers, and health workers. Development activities which seek to reach them only in their roles as housekeepers and mothers therefore do little for some of their central concerns.

International donors have become aware that economic programs aimed primarily at male cultivators, traders, and incipient professionals have undercut the position of women as producers and entrepreneurs (Boserup 1970; UNCP 1980). Bratton (1980:85) raises a further issue when he suggests that given the importance of women as farmers, their exclusion from development committees minimizes the likelihood that these committees will emphasize agricultural projects.

Under the Percy Amendments to the 1973 and 1974 U.S. Foreign Assistance Acts, U.S. bilateral assistance is to be administered with particular attention to the improvement of the status of women (Germain 1976-77:165). This mandate puts a premium on the creation of linkages with women leaders and with organizations which are able to represent women. Male organization, or organizations dominated by male interests, should not be the only channels through which U.S. aid funds flow.

b. Why Women Organize

Women in the developing world have organized for many purposes, although the degree to which organization is formalized varies enormously. Women have formed craft guilds, reciprocal work groups, rotating credit unions, secret societies, church groups, curing societies, trade associations, and even on occasion political associations (see, for example, Little 1965 on West Africa; Steady 1977, Sierra Leone; Mba n.d. on Nigeria; Robertson 1977, on Ghana; Stroebel 1976 on Kenya; Misch and Margolin 1975, on Columbia, Korea and the Philippines). We have dealt with these along with comparable men's groups and organizations which recruit both sexes. Here we only point out that where organizations proliferate, both men and women are likely to have a full set of parallel organizations which operate with a fair degree of independence of each other but with cross-linkages between their officers to minimize clashes.

Western style women's organizations have been introduced by missions, and other expatriots have encouraged the formation of women's clubs based on prototypes such as the English Women's Institute. Elite women in these countries have also created new organizations through which they try to

reach both the urban and the rural poor. These associations reflect the interests which elite women regard as appropriate to women per se rather than those perceived by their targets who are likely to stress their occupational roles as traders, craft workers and cultivators. Sometimes, admittedly, elite women and poorer women share the same interests. Poor working women are also responding to new working conditions by joining labor unions which can represent their interests not just within the arena of the village and the countryside but also vis-a-vis the national political regime or against their employers.

In India, for example, the elite-sponsored type of organization is represented by the All-India Women's Conference, founded in 1929 to work for legislative reform. The Bharatiya Grameen Mahila Sangh is another such organization but one which focuses on rural women and rural development. An instance of common action by women from different social strata is associated with the United Women's Anti-Price-rise Committee of Maharashtra, which was able to bring out over 25,000 protesting women in 1973-1975. The workers' union, the second category of introduced organization, is represented by some of the agricultural workers' unions in Tamilnadu and Kerala in which women workers now preponderate (Jacobson 1976-1977:239).

C. Exclusive Organizations with Multiple Purposes

1. Organizations Based on Caste

Caste associations are probably confined to India and Indian communities settled outside the borders of India or to Hinduized populations

in Nepal and other bordering regions (see Rosser 1966 on Newar caste associations in Nepal). They are like the ethnic associations, described below, in that membership is limited to those born into a particular category, they rise commonly under urban conditions, and they give formal organization to those from different local communities who had not previously associated together for common action.

According to the Rudolphs, caste associations are "paracommunities that enable members of castes to pursue social mobility, political power, and economic advantage" (1967:29). Presumably, the term "paracommunity" is used here because members of such associations transcend territorial boundaries. They are comparable to the voluntary associations found in Europe or America with the important qualifier that they have as a necessary, but not sufficient, qualification for membership birth in the particular caste. Membership is not purely ascriptive; those who wish to be members must join. They must also provide financial support and active service or at least political support at election time.

a. History

Caste associations of the modern type began to emerge in the early 19th century but have blossomed during the 20th century as a result of the same factors that led to the emergence of ethnic associations elsewhere: improved means of communication, new economic opportunities, and the growing power of the centralized state. They provided the means whereby previously isolated local branches of various jatis (effective castes) could become linked together in an organization whose first mission was to upgrade

the position of the jati in the caste hierarchy. Later they began to shift to other goals, pressing for places in schools and colleges for their members, providing scholarships, and demanding access to jobs in the administrative and political bureaucracies. They became both pressure groups and actual or potential political parties, working to maximize the influence of their caste in state governments and other bodies and to gain economic and social objectives. Because of the large numbers that can rally behind them at election time, their leaders are listened to. Like other forms of voluntary association, caste associations have officers. They may produce publications and hold elections and annual meetings where representatives have some input into the formation of the association's policy.

b. The Caste Association of the Nadars

Probably the best organized, and certainly the best described, is the caste association of the Nadars, the Nadar Mahajana Sangam, founded in 1910 to uplift the Nadars who, as toddy tappers, were scorned by clean castes. The association has built schools and colleges, libraries, reading rooms, a cooperative bank, a flour mill and has also created water supplies in villages where Nadars are resident. It has worked to form local chapters to improve life in general at the village level for fellow Nadars.

It also offers assistance in securing legal counsel for Nadars deprived of their rights. In one instance, which occurred in 1964:

the Sangam received a complaint from a Nadar in a Maravar-dominant village in Paramagudi taluq of eastern Ramnad. The Sangam found that the Nadars were not allowed to take water from the public well, even though it had been constructed by the Panchayat Union, that they were denied entrance into the public hotel, that they were not allowed

to walk on certain streets, or even sit on the verandahs of their own houses in the presence of the Thevars. Most important, the Nadars were prevented from cultivating their lands. The implements were damaged, and the services of the carpenter were denied to them. The Sangam backed legal action by the victims. (Hardgrave 1969:160).

In another instance, when small cultivators of this caste used a court order to secure land, the former landlord sent bands of armed men to destroy crops and cut down trees. Here, as in other such cases, the Nadar Mahajana Sangam provided for representation of the villagers before the police. It has been sufficiently successful in raising the status of Nadar to arouse a good deal of hostility on the part of other castes. As a result, in 1964 the Sangam agreed to allow members of other castes to use its schools, dams, wells and temples. It also changed the name of the Nadar Bank to the Tamilnad Mercantile Bank and did not use the name Nadar for the new hotel built by the association which was to be open to anyone.

D. Organizations Based on Ethnicity

1. Origin

Ethnic associations have emerged in many of the world's cities as migrants from the country have joined together with others from their home region, usually broadly defined at first, because it is with these people that they can talk and deal on known terms. Later as their numbers increase, the associations may represent the people of a particular set of neighboring villages or some other small locale. The associations provide a meeting place, assistance for those hunting work, emergency lodgings, and help in other emergencies, especially in illness and death. Having

someone who can arrange for a funeral is usually a matter of primary concern, and it is no wonder that funeral associations seem to be one of the first forms of association to be created as migrants are feeling their way into a new environment. Once formed, ethnic--and home town associations--take on ever widening ranges of functions. For example, they may become political forces, working for the advancement of their members in the cities and for the advancement of their home regions. Unlike the caste associations, which otherwise they resemble closely, they do not plan their strategies within the framework of an overarching national hierarchy which assigns status to ethnic groups, and therefore it is individual advancement that they sponsor rather than rising group status per se.

While caste associations are kept together by external pressures as well as by their internal dynamics, ethnic associations are more likely to find that their appeal waxes and wanes with the impact of urbanization and class differentiation upon those they represent.

2. How Ethnic Associations Operate

Where umbrella associations have been formed and manage to persist, they may adopt some of the institutions common to western service institutions. In this they are like caste associations. They elect officers who provide for some continuity of action and communication between the various branches of the association and with home communities. They accumulate funds from dues and fees and therefore require a treasurer and procedures for ensuring proper disbursement of funds. They need some way of deciding upon a budget, however informal this may be, and some system

for accounting for expenditures against accomplishments. Ethnic associations may be plagued with rumors of corruption, but they seem to survive with less attention to formal procedures than most western institutions, possibly because they have the powerful sanction of ostracism. R. Cohen (1980:80) quotes Peter Ekeh as reporting that Nigerians who are corrupt as government officials may be scrupulously honest in handling the funds of their ethnic association even when these are too large to operate as face-to-face organizations.

Smaller associations and sometimes branch chapters of the larger associations may operate much as do the rotating credit unions described below: they are able to dispense with most formal organization because they rely upon personal networks for many of their functions. When they need to collect funds for some purpose, they may be able to combine collection and expenditure in a single operation, the collected fund being paid over immediately to assist a member or pay for some project. In such cases, they have no special need of a treasurer, and officers--if they exist--function primarily as a communications network and to give order to a meeting, or the offices are honorary devices to give status to members.

Some ethnic associations adopt an organizational form which reflects the structure of the local region from which their members stem. Southall (1975) has suggested that segmentary political systems are likely to give rise to segmentary associations, whereas centralized systems do not. The Yoruba of Nigeria, who ordered themselves in towns and kingdoms rather than in terms of a segmentary lineage framework, do not model the ethnic associations they found in foreign cities on a segmentary format. The

Ibo of Nigeria and the Luo of Kenya, both of whom had segmentary rather than centralized systems, create associational structures in which the various branches representing local units are arranged in a hierarchy which recalls the nesting of lineage segments (Cottenberg 1955). Ethnic associations also vary with reference to the degree to which they are sex segregated. Ibo women join with men; Luo women are excluded.

3. Regional Variation

a. Ethnic Associations in Africa

Even though they may flock into the cities, not all African populations create ethnic associations. Barnes and Peil, for example, found immigrants in five Nigerian and Ghanaian cities studied in the early 1970s showed a very different propensity to form ethnic associations according to their place of origin.

Eastern Nigerians are famous for their propensity to form ethnic and hometown associations and their ability to apply sanctions to force potential members to join and to contribute to association activities (Akeredolu-Ale 1975; A. Smock 1971). Their associations are also famous for the amount they contribute to the self-help programs in the rural area and the willingness of elite members to provide technical advice and other services to their local home branches. No one has satisfactorily explained why Nigerians from other regions and other West Africans migrating to the same Nigerian cities may use other organizational devices to ease their settlement. Yoruba, for instance, develop ethnic associations only when settled in cities outside southern Nigeria. They have developed strong associations

in Ghana and England. Northern Nigerians, including Hausa traders settled in the cities of southern Nigeria, are reported not to form or join ethnic associations (Barnes and Peil 1977). They use commercial relationships, including links with landlords who serve as brokers, or religious orders, such as the Tijaniya brotherhood, to provide themselves with a framework of mutual support (A. Cohen 1968 and 1969).

in Ghana, migrants from northern Ghana and Upper Volta appoint leaders to whom first generation migrants look for adjudication and other services, but they do not create ethnic associations with officers, rules, and membership fees, nor do they, as communities, contribute to the building up of their home areas (Schildkraut 1974). Children of northern migrants who grow up in the cities join numerous formal associations, but these do not recruit members on an ethnic basis. Residence in a particular city ward, shared interest in sports, or membership in the same school generation are the preferred basis of association.

Ethnic associations are not prominent in Zambia, but have flourished in Kenya. GEMA is an association which incorporates Gikuyu, Embu and Meru. The Akamba and Luo unions have also been strong organizations. Parkin (1978:191) describes the Luo associations as they existed through the mid-1970s in Nairobi and other Kenyan cities.

There are three main "functions" of the whole associational framework: first, its segmentary arrangement constitutes a kind of cognative map for placing other fellow Luo and, in this capacity provide [sic] guidelines for marriage choices; second, it provides a range of potential recruitment bases, from small lineage to large location or district on which to organize common interests, including welfare projects, setting up business, and organizing for elections; third, the

associations keep Luo in communication with each other, both within and between cities, and between town and country.

Potentially, of course, a Luo is a member of as many associations as are represented by different segmental levels. The range of interests represented by the different associations for him at any one time may be correspondingly wide: a small lineage association provides him with his go-between, . . . with information as to an appropriate marriage choice for himself or his children, and may at any time intervene in an unstable marriage; a larger association mediates disputes between affines, or organizes the collection of money to repatriate a deceased member; a location association has plans to set up a soccer team and to link this with setting up a Harambee (self-help) school back home; and the Luo Union keeps a man informed, at its mass meetings, of political and other developments affecting Luo in Nairobi as a whole.

Luo associations also had branches in the cities of Uganda and Tanzania.

Ethnic associations have to adjust to the demands of central governments which look upon the large umbrella organizations with many branches with considerable suspicion. In Nigeria, Mali, and Kenya, for instance, the umbrella associations have been ordered to disband (Barnes and Peil 1977 on Nigeria; Meillassoux 1968 and Hopkins 1972 on Mali; New African, November 1980:11-17 on Kenya). Meillassoux reports of the situation in Bamako, Mali, "Not knowing the exact terms of the law, people are only aware that regionalism is treated with suspicion and accordingly act with care. They often neglect to register their associations for fear of falling under possible prohibition" (1968:70). The formal banning of the Ibo Union, the Ibibio Union, and other umbrella ethnic associations by the Nigerian government also took place in the late 1960s. The Kenyan government, which had enjoyed a period of considerable stability, acted to ban the large associations in 1980.

The popularity of ethnic associations may decline with increasing familiarity with urban institutions. Barnes and Peil, for example, found that those born or reared in the cities of Ghana and Nigeria and those with the most education and the greatest economic success were least likely to join an association (Barnes and Peil 1977; see also Barnes 1975 on Lagos, Nigeria; and Jerome 1976 on declining involvement in Igbo associations in London). Meillassoux (1968) and Hopkins (1972) also found a decreased interest in membership among those well established in the cities. Luo men maintain active membership in their associations even though they have been long settled in cities, but the associations may not be equally successful in recruiting second and third generation urban residents, unless they succeed in providing some advantage in the political struggle to control the allocation of jobs and state funds, as has happened in the United States. The Kenyan government currently determines that the associations shall not entrench themselves in such a fashion.

b. Ethnic Associations in Indonesia

Despite the tremendous importance of ethnicity in Southeast Asia, ethnic associations do not play a major role in the organization of urban migrants in collective support of their rural kin in the same way that they have in Africa (J. Anderson 1980). Ethnic associations also have a restricted distribution. Bruner (1974) suggests that the growth and continued appeal of such associations is related to the population mix in the particular urban area. Tobak Batak formed ethnic associations in Medan on Sumatra, but not in Bandung in Java. The first city is a city composed of immigrants, but no one ethnic group dominates. Each is in competition

with all others for whatever benefits the city offers. In Bandung, on the other hand, the local Sunda are predominant. The Batak and other immigrants try to accommodate themselves to the Sundanese as the best strategy of advancement, and downplay their own ethnic attributes. Bruner gives no information on the extent to which the Medan associations function as service groups to provide support for home areas.

His argument about the importance of "mix" does not appear to hold for the Nairobi situation, where Kikuyu now predominate and which was founded within Kikuyu territory, but where ethnic associations have flourished. Nor does the argument hold for Lagos, which was initially a Yoruba city, but where again ethnic associations have been a favored device by many in the population.

c. Ethnic Associations in the Commonwealth Caribbean

Although a few ethnic associations have been reported for migrants from the Commonwealth Caribbean (e.g. Jamaicans in New York), Caribbean people in general have been less willing to create formal associations than African and Asian migrants who may be living in the same cities. According to A. Cohen (1980:78):

[T]he development of associative organizations [in Britain] has so far been inhibited by a variety of factors. . . . One is a deep suspicion among West Indian working class people of all organizations, a suspicion born of past experience. They simply fear that any organization they join will enable the system to control them. This is probably the reason why, for example, such a deep-rooted spiritual movement as Rastafarianism remains very largely unorganized. . . . The movement, massive as it is, is completely acephalous in both Jamaica and Britain,

decentralized, mercurial and elusive, leaving the police and the authorities in both countries completely in the dark. This may be its strength, though also its weakness, in that the movement is lacking in corporate coordinating mechanisms.

The lack of formal associations does not prevent Caribbean peoples from creating some impressive shows of ethnic solidarity. They simply do not produce formal organizations with a continuous identity to this end. The West Indians in Britain have been able to organize the two-day Notting Hill Carnival, staged each August since 1965. Preparation takes months of work by various ad hoc groups recruited from permanent cliques of friends who have decided to participate, much as happens in the organization of public celebrations in the Caribbean itself (Manning 1977).

d. Hometown Associations

Some ethnic associations are in fact hometown associations. Hometown associations have proliferated in some of the cities of South America, playing the same role of helping rural migrants adapt to city life as ethnic associations do elsewhere. They provide occasions to share familiar food, music, and common experiences with people from the same rural region. They also mobilize for political purposes, putting pressure on the national government to assist their home communities. The associations also become involved in development schemes for their home communities, sharing the same priorities for rural improvements described earlier in this report.

Our best descriptions of South American hometown associations deal with Lima, Peru. Osterling reports that there are more than 4,000 such

associations in Lima alone. Most of them have a relatively small membership of no more than 200 members, and in general, they are associations of men. Their meetings take place most often over the weekends when people have time off from their jobs. Some have already advanced to the point where they have built a meeting place which is a permanent symbol of the association's ability to survive (Osterling 1978). Osterling (1978) and Doughty (1970) both show how important such associations are in providing a bridge between the countryside and the cities and assisting in local improvement projects (see also Mangin 1959).

The Lima associations do not link up into some larger umbrella organization which could form the basis for a political movement, although presumably district and provincial origin could provide the basis for such umbrella organizations. Where associations are linked together in such a fashion, they are most likely to be used for pressing for political reforms, since communication links are in place and the organization has the possibility of applying sanctions against those who falter in loyalty. Regional or other umbrella organizations might be more easily incorporated into development planning than the numerous small hometown associations, each of which represents only a tiny local rural constituency. In the past, the Peruvian government encouraged the formation of rural unions based directly in the countryside which gave rise to provincial and departmental federations. These continued to hold meetings, at least until 1973, and continued to demand wider representation of rural interests (Orlove 1977:] 346). We have no information on the extent to which these unions may link with the Hometown associations based in the cities.

E. Long-Term Multipurpose Organizations: Based on Religion or Other Shared Beliefs

I. Organizations Based on Initiation and Oath

Exclusive organizations, based on initiation, oath, and the instruction of new members in the rituals and other secrets of the organization, have played political, economic, and educational roles in Europe, the United States, Latin America, Asia, and especially in Africa and Oceania. Both craft guilds and political cadres planning revolutionary action frequently take this form of organization, but so do welfare or service organizations. Secret societies that parallel the established order or support it seem less common in Latin America and Asia than in Africa and Oceania. Secret organizations seeking to subvert the established order occur there much as elsewhere (see, for example, Douglas and Pedersen 1973 on voluntary associations in Malaysia; Chesneau 1972 on Chinese secret societies within China, and Freedman 1967 and Topley 1967 on Chinese secret societies in Singapore; and Cheema n.d. on nongovernmental organization and the rural poor in Asia).

Secret associations that claim a share in political power have suffered even in areas where they were once common, in this era when central governments refuse to countenance rival claims to the loyalty of their citizens. They also suffer from competition with proselytizing world religions. Christianity and Islam have frowned upon African and Oceanic secret societies and forbidden their converts to take part in their activities. The Ogboni, formerly so powerful in Western Nigerian towns, is rarely mentioned in current descriptions (Lloyd 1974; Eades 1980). Although associations

that exist to confer titles upon their members have recently taken on new life in Eastern Nigeria, they are devices for confirming social status rather than action groups (John Ogbu, personal communication). The Masked Figure Association which dominated Mandinka villages in Gambia and Senegal still occasionally organizes performances, but it no longer regulates public works or disciplines a failure to participate in reciprocal work parties. The spread of Islam undercut its authority; so did the disinclination of young men to give unpaid public service once they had become accustomed to wage work (Weil 1971:291). New secret associations, such as the Masonic Order and other Western service-oriented associations, have spread to major African cities and among the new elite, but they have not spread to the countryside or become grass-roots organizations (A. Cohen 1971; Lloye 1971: 131-132).

Poro and Sande (also known as Bundu) continue to recruit members and have considerable political influence in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea (Fulton 1972; Hoffer 1974; MacCormack 1979). They have been compared to the Masonic Order and the Grand Order of the Eastern Star. They resemble them in being male and female organizations with cross-linking offices, based on local lodges which initiate new members, but whose members once initiated may enter lodges wherever they may travel. Officials of the various lodges, at least within a local region, are in communication and sometimes organize joint activities. Because of the expense of initiation into the advanced grades of the lodges, only a few members from wealthy families are likely to reach the topmost grades. They also fill offices at all levels. Although every youngster is expected to join either Poro or Sande, the associations are effectively in the hands of an oligarchy.

Officers organize the initiation schools and so control the right of entry into manhood or womanhood since initiation should precede marriage. They discipline even non-members who break the rules of the association. Although they no longer can use the death penalty, they can punish with fines, public ostracism, and beatings. Officials profit from the sale of agricultural produce and crafts created by those in the initiation schools, from work parties of members, and from initiation fees. The network of lodges provides a means for political caucusing and the control of votes, further enhancing the power of officers and their allies.

The membership in each local lodge may be relatively small, but the overall network insures the influence of lodge officers. The secrecy of lodge dealings means that little is known about their mode of operation. Although officers collect substantial sums from initiates and their parents and from other services, we do not know if local chapters have a treasurer or if they accumulate funds over time. Some of the collected money is used in financing lodge feasts and other lodge activities. Given the power exercised by lodge officers, they do not need to account for sums disbursed, nor probably do they have to explain various other decisions. This lack of public accountability would stand in the way of using the lodges as partners in introducing and managing new projects.

2. Religious Organizations: Major Traditions

a. Islamic Organizations

Sufi orders, also known as Muslim or Islamic Brotherhoods, have assumed political and economic roles, especially in North and West Africa. They are organized in a fashion that gives the head of an order,

who represents the founder, very real authority over those who head its branches and the rank and file of adherents. An order has a chain of command and can initiate far-reaching actions. The Senussi order led the fight against the Italian occupation of Libya and for a period provided much of the governing apparatus for independent Libya when the head of the order was recognized as king (Evans-Pritchard 1959). Some hundred Sufi orders are active in North Africa, especially in the Maghrib (Trimingham 1968:75). In recent decades, some of the governments of that region have tried to minimize the influence of the orders, and the orders have been deprived of land and other property which has been nationalized. Nevertheless, in Tunisia and Morocco, the orders have recently attracted large numbers of followers again, especially among women (Pamela Johnson, personal communication).

In Africa south of the Sahara, only two Sufi orders have any great significance. These are the Tijaniyya and Quadariyya, but the latter has a number of separate branches including the Mourides who are active in Senegal (Trimingham 1968:75-76). Both have been active in the economic development of their followers.

Simmons (1980:463) reports the creation of a strong religious organization by a marabout of the Tijaniyya order. The marabout settled in a village in Senegal from whence he came to dominate some 50,000 devotees. He started large-scale projects for both subsistence and cash crops and encouraged the development of new trading outlets. Given his following, he was able to demand services from the state agencies and came to function "much like a labour union executive, vis-à-vis state and private corporations on behalf of his following."

This marabout's localized success is overshadowed by the powerful role played throughout much of Senegal by the Mourides Brotherhood. Its leadership has encouraged adherents to adopt new agricultural methods and systems of farm management. It has functioned as a cooperative, and in the 1960s it handled about 50 percent of the Senegal peanut crop, the major cash crop (Monteil 1969:100). Since the order has some 400,000 followers in Senegal alone, it has been in a position to put strong pressure on the government. O'Brien (1971b) and Behrman (1977) also report that the Mourides leaders frequently obstruct government programs which they suspect of challenging their control over the countryside. They were very effective in opposing the Rural Animation Program.

Much less has been written about the effectiveness of the Sufi orders in eastern Africa, except for the Sudan and Somalia, but lodges seem to be established in some of the coastal regions. Elsewhere the power of Islamic religious orders to direct or deflect international programs is becoming increasingly obvious, as reformist leaders demonstrate their power in North Africa, the Middle East, Pakistan, Indonesia, and Malaysia (Geertz 1960; Murphy 1980 and Murphy in press; Bellman 1979; and Bledsoe 1980). Islam, of course, has also been the symbol upon which unity, protest, and recently movements toward succession have been forged among Muslim Filipinos in Mindanao and Sulu. The roots of conflict with Christian Filipinos lie also, of course, in struggles for land and other resources and in a lack of political representation. The rebellion has forced significant political, economic, and social concessions on the part of the central government, although demands for decentralized autonomy, which might end hostilities, have not yet been met (Rixhon 1978).

b. Christian Organizations

As we have already pointed out, established churches through their missions and sectarian movements have played strong roles in transforming rural communities, sometimes through the provision of technical services and sometimes through giving rural people the cohesiveness, power, and protection to demand change. Here we give only a couple of instances of church involvement in rural change.

In the Philippines, folk religious beliefs and magical symbols were the vital unifying factor for the large number of popular peasant movements which expressed the pleas of the rural masses for freedom from taxes and forced labor, for land tenancy reform, and for the restoration of village harmony and folk values (Ileto 1979; Sturdevant 1972). Some of these popular movements were of considerable extent and persistence despite the fact that they were organized at the grass-roots (Covar 1977; Cullen 1973: 9-13; Ileto 1979). Few of them had connections with or support from the Catholic Church, which indeed was often hostile to them.

It is only during the past two decades that formerly rather conservative Catholic orders, notably the Jesuits, Society of Divine Word, and Maryknoll Sisters, have taken the lead in socioeconomic reforms and social action. The conservative role of the Catholic Church hierarchy in its longstanding support for the reactionary elements in society has just begun to be liberalized. Thus, it has been mostly indirectly that the Catholic Church has played a role in the organization of rural people in the Philippines for socio-economic reform. The Federation of Free Farmers (Cater 1959; Montemayor 1966; Po and Montiel 1979; 39-54) has focused its activities on the organization of tenants and of landless agricultural workers. The Ateneo de Manila University has been at the forefront of

of research on the use of community organizers (COs) or groups organizers (GOs) for the organization of the poor (Hollnsteiner 1976; Hollnsteiner et al. 1979; Hollnsteiner 1979; Ledesma 1980a). The Association of Major Religious Superiors and the Catholic Bishops' Conference have increasingly questioned the continuation of martial law and its consequences, especially concerning its influence upon cultural minorities (Rixhon 1978).

Protestant groups have played important roles in the Philippines in organizing upland cultural minorities (Southeast Asia Chronicle 1979). Numerous groups are actively involved, for instance, in the Philippine Association for Intercultural Development (Southeast Asia Ethnicity and Development Newsletter, various issues).

The most highly organized, disciplined church in the Philippines today is Iglesia ni Kristo, which has a large (perhaps two million) and growing membership. Iglesia ni Kristo demands much of its followers, including mandatory tithe, and uses its resources for the social and economic benefits of its members and for rural development projects more generally.

We have dealt here at some length with the Philippines, but can point to Christian church activities of comparable nature elsewhere. In Zambia, the Archdiocese of Milan has been supporting a training program in Gwembe District and has also built and staffed a small hospital. In the same district, the Salvation Army has various health programs and supervises the treatment of lepers; the Gellner Team, an organization of Lutherans, is attempting to bring about development through an irrigation scheme, creating an outlet for the sale of crafts, and the encouragement of local communities to unite in various improvement projects; and the Jesuits and

the United Church of Zambia (which absorbed both the Methodists and the Pilgrim Holiness Church) are active in a number of programs, although they have handed over their schools and health centers to the Zambian government (Colson and Scudder, field notes).

c. Buddhist and Hindu Temple Associations

Both Hinduism and all forms of Buddhism have religious centers, i.e., temples, which interact with the community in the locality where they are placed. Many of them are supported by temple associations, which help to maintain the structure and organize the ritual program. Traditionally, the associations have also been a means of mutual-aid, although the poorest of the poor, who usually belong to the scheduled classes, may not have benefited from associations dominated by the clean castes. They have been excluded from the temple structures whose priests refuse to serve them (Mandelbaum) Caste associations serving members of castes excluded from the local temples have been active in the building of temples to serve their own members and have helped to organize local associations to maintain the temples (Rudolph and Rudolph).

Among Buddhists, both Theravada and Mahayana, there are still active temple networks. In Thailand, temple associations or monastery committees are the center of village social, political, and recreational life (J. Potter 1976:36). Each local temple association is autonomous. The temple symbolizes village identity and is an object of village pride. The temple itself, the land on which it stands, the library, the monastery and the school are in fact the property of the village. Villagers cooperate in the maintenance and general upkeep of the temple complex. This is one of the obligations of citizenship. Since religious merit is sufficient

quantities is necessary if one is to be born into a better life in the next reincarnation, people are happy to have opportunities to make offerings to monks who, in turn, may redistribute the accumulated wealth according to the decisions of the temple committee.

The temple committee is elected by the villagers. Other committees associated with the temple, including the school committee, are also elected bodies. The temple committee, however, is the most important. Most important decisions are made at the temple, and the temple committee members usually play a leading role in shaping public opinion. Potter describes the temple committee involved in discussions and decisions concerning the political coup in Bangkok in 1971, the government's offer to share the cost of installing electricity in the village, and the planning of a temple fair to raise money for the library (Potter 1976:36-37).

Temple committees are often comprised of several laymen, the abbot, and one or more junior monks (Bunnag 1973:129). Villagers who concurrently hold positions both on the temple committee and on committees set up by government to cope with development issues may ultimately wield a great deal of power. They may ". . . negotiate with builders concerning any work of construction or restoration which is necessary, collect rent from the tenants of the monastery lands, and take the proceeds from fund-raising fairs to the bank" (Bunnag 1973:129). The laymen are in charge of the financial affairs of the temple, since monks are not supposed to involve themselves in economic matters. The laymen also deal with members of the civil service when temple association and government are to cooperate.

The importance of village temple associations in the planning and implementation of development projects is obvious. The Thai government has been active in seeking their support. Klausner (1972:77) reports that village monks in the northeast

. . . have taken an active and leading role in governmental community development projects now in operation. Both the government and ecclesiastical authorities are becoming more aware of the potential of the Sangha, or brotherhood of monks, in contributing towards national development. Additional training is being given to rural . . . [monks, to better prepare them for their rural leadership role and highly qualified. . . graduates of the two Buddhist Universities, located in Bangkok, are increasingly assuming responsibilities that involve education and community service work in rural areas.

F. Long-Term Single Purpose Organizations: Based on Common Suffering

The belief that those who suffer from the same affliction can join together to combat or contain the affliction is the basis on which various kinds of curing associations are formed. Such associations are particularly important in Brazil, the Commonwealth Caribbean, and in some parts of Africa (Besmer 1980; Leacock and Leacock 1975; I. Lewis 1971; Onwuejeogwu 1969; Stroebel 1976). Once initiated, members are expected to rally to the assistance of anyone afflicted with the same source of illness or other misfortune. Frequently, the source is thought to be an intrusive spirit. They may function as associations of more or less equals, or they may accept a leader who then has considerable power to make demands on the resources and time of the members. Some associations may recruit both men and women, but attract a larger number of women; others are exclusively composed of women.

Their importance within the purview of development lies in the role they play in healing, the competition they offer to other kinds of health services, and the way in which they provide a vehicle for the spread of particular ideas

about the nature of illness and its treatment. Usually healing associations do not operate in the political sphere, although in Northern Nigeria, towards the end of the colonial era, the leaders of the Bori cult "became the core organization of the women's wing of political parties and rallies: (Onwuejeogwu 1969:292).

G. Multipurpose Inclusive Organizations: Protective Basis

1. Friendly Societies and Welfare Associations

One of the most common reasons for people to join together in an organization is to provide themselves with various forms of mutual insurance. Since they usually put their trust in those with whom they have some other link, especially if the organization is to work as a savings agency, the mutual aid society is likely to appear under the guise of a caste, ethnic, hometown, or religious association. Banton (1957:187-195), in discussing the proliferation of friendly societies in Freetown and other towns of Sierra Leone, points to the frequency with which such societies were based on ethnic and religious communities. Frequently the welfare societies are the first form of formal organization to appear among migrants to towns and other work places. On occasion, however, neighbors and/or fellow workers, even though unrelated in other ways, create an association for mutual insurance.

Welfare associations are not unique to the developing world. Bryce Ryan (1975:553) notes that,

In the hey-day of European migration to the United States, Chicago Italians . . . had 110 mutual aid societies based on provincial and village origins. Within these large associations and the constituent lodges provided economically against sickness and death while members personally visited and assisted those of their lodge who lacked the physical presence of family members who could care for them.

He sees Japanese prefectural societies and Chinese companies and tongs operating in the same fashion (see also Gallin and Gallin 1977 on Chinese "brotherhoods" on Taiwan).

Those who live in The Commonwealth Caribbean, both at home and abroad, despite their general suspicion of formal organization (A.Cohen 1980), have adopted the Friendly Society format, an outgrowth of the ancient English guild system which spread throughout the British Empire. Originally these Friendly Societies were multifunctional, providing all manner of support in emergencies. They are described as being societies "of good fellowship for the purpose of raising from time to time, by voluntary contributions, a stock or fund for the mutual relief and maintenance of all and every one of the members thereof, in old age, sickness, and infirmity, or for the relief of widows and children of deceased members" (Beveridge 1948:21).

Like the rotating credit associations, described later on in this report, the friendly societies which took hold in the Commonwealth Caribbean operate by collecting regular dues from members. These dues are redistributed to members in their particular time of need: there is no regular pay-out as with the rotating credit association. Administration is kept simple so overhead costs remain minimal. This is possible because most societies are small, and leadership is drawn from the ranks and is

directly answerable to members who are often neighbors of one sort or another. This aspect of accountability is important.

In what used to be the British Windward Islands, the principal benefits provided by the societies include ". . .doctors' fees and cash payment on the occasion of a member's illness (sick benefit); a lump sum payment on the death of a member or a dependent (the funeral benefit)" (Fletcher 1977:193). The friendly societies do not depend upon government for any direct services. "Since government's role was limited to the passing of enabling laws and to making provisions for registration and moderate supervision of friendly society units, the flourishing of that institution was an excellent example of the possibility of voluntary action. . .in catering to the social security needs of large segments of the population" (Fletcher 1977:198). The objectives are simple and straightforward, and local people are able to provide all the management required.

Foreign based insurance companies have now set up agencies on the islands of the Caribbean and offer a competing service. Friendly societies continue to persist, as on the islands of St. Vincent, Grenada, and St. Lucia, although they have declined somewhat in popularity because of the attractive packages put together by the insurance companies. People still want to retain membership in a friendly society which offers a wider range of services than the insurance companies and gives them a voice in management and policy making. Credit unions on British lines and insurance policies for industrial workers and other employees do not meet the needs of the truly poor. The credit unions do not offer the broad range of benefits provided by the friendly societies, and work-related insurance policies,

by their very nature, help only those who have been fortunate enough to find and keep a job. Fletcher concludes, "[T]he purely voluntary institution of friendly societies, with proper public guidance and oversight, could very well be a suitable vehicle for ensuring a significant measure of social security for the majority of people in the islands" (1977:198). This assumes, of course, that "proper public guidance and oversight" do not make the kind of demands that in turn require some elaborate forms of record keeping and accounting and so more expensive management.

The activities of various small associations on Nevis indicates the kind of services friendly societies perform within a community.

In 1976-77 various voluntary associations functioned to promote the welfare of members of the community. The Happy Hearts Club and the Black and White Club helped to pay funeral costs when a club member or a member of a club member's family died. Everyone in the club gave between \$.75 and \$2.00 to help defray costs. The Red Cross, run by the ex-matron of the hospital and her sister who had been a teacher, gave dinners and organized other occasions to raise money for the poorer members of the community. The Anglican Church's Mothers' Union collected money from its members to make up food baskets to take to the elderly poor at Christmas and Easter. It also put on a concert using local talent. The \$100 it raised by selling tickets was also used to defray the cost of the Easter food baskets. The Boys and Girls Brigades organized raffles. The Nurses' Association raised money through garden parties. Other groups raised money for a private school through the device of tea parties or for the netball association by selling dance tickets (Ralston 1981:4).

Given that the Commonwealth Caribbean is said to be lacking in strong organization at the grassroots, this suggests that people engage in a good deal of cooperative effort for their own purposes, and that for the most part this takes the form of small-scale groups undertaking small enterprises

which provide an immediate benefit either to individuals or to the group.

2. Trade Unions and Organized Labor

Trade unionism may be an introduced form of organization which spread first among urban workers, but due to the movement between rural and urban areas most people are probably aware of the possibilities of this form of organization. Trade unionism by now may also be a form of "traditional" organization: those now active in unions may be the children and grandchildren of those who first organized forty years ago or more.

Governments usually look with kindly eyes upon the existence of friendly societies which help to mop up distress. They look with much less approval at organizations which seek to attack the bases of distress. Yet unions which cut across ethnic, caste, religious and local boundaries may be the most powerful tool the poor have in obtaining better wages, better working conditions, better services, and a voice in political affairs. Among the rural landless, who must rely upon their labor, organization through a union may be the only means whereby they can gain advantage from any attempts to introduce an improved technology. Unions have also called for land reforms to give the landless and the small cultivator the chance to acquire holdings. They have been the resource against landlords and merchants who unite against the poor (See, for example, Orlove 1977 on rural unions in Peru; Mencher 1977; 1978:280-283, on rural unions in South India).

We deal below in some depth with union activity in only one region, the Caribbean.

a. In The Commonwealth Caribbean

In the Commonwealth Caribbean, the role of labor unions is particularly dramatic because of the long history of slavery which

deprived the poor of rights even over their own labor and their own offspring. After Emancipation (1834), most of the ex-slaves were worse off than before. They had to sell their labor cheaply and no longer received the minimal benefits such as health care which owners had once supplied. The first organization, other than friendly societies and churches, began to emerge at the end of the nineteenth century when the first labor unions appeared.

West Indian workers first began to organize themselves into groups to protect their own interests. . . In Cuba the tobacco port workers set up the first organizations in 1889 and 1890. In 1898 in Jamaica, a Carpenters, Bricklayers and Painters Union was formed and in 1907, there was the Jamaica Trades and Labour Union as well as organizations of printers and cigar makers. The Working Men's Associations started in Trinidad at the end of the eighteen-nineties. In 1906 in British Guiana, Hubert Critchlow, a stevedor, led a strike of dockers in Georgetown (Augier et al. 1960:270).

By the 1930s, the labor organizations and trade unions had grown stronger and organizations appeared among cane workers and other agricultural laborers. In the midst of the world-wide depression, the unions assumed new functions and became the focal point for political rallying. Frustrating working conditions in St. Vincent, for instance, led to the formation of the action-oriented Working Men's Association which vigorously pursued a program of land resettlement and bargained for a new constitution (Augier et al. 1960:280). Elsewhere union organized strikes and political demonstrations led to reprisals and rioting, and this in turn to increased support for the unions.

After the riots the value of trade unions was widely appreciated; membership of existing unions became much larger and new ones were formed in all the islands.

In the five years after the riots, 58 unions were registered with about 65,000 members. Another important consequence was that the middle-class politicians now demanded not only self-government for their islands, but also higher wages and better social services for the workers. In Jamaica, Barbados, Antigua and St. Kitts, political parties were grounded in association with the new trade unions and support for the party came from members of the unions (Augier et al. 1960: 281-282).

Movements were built by force as well as persuasion. The Grenada trade union movement used violence against workers who refused to support union called strikes. During strikes, estates were looted and public buildings burned (M. G. Smith 1965:285-293).

Over some decades the union movement not only made gains for workers. They also provided a training ground for Caribbean men and women who became the political leaders of the new nations that began to emerge in the 1950s and 1960s: Michael Manley of Jamaica, Grantly Adams of Barbados, Vere Bird of Antigua, the late Robert Bradshaw of St. Kitts-Nevis, Patrick John of Dominica.

Once in power, they have sometimes turned against the union movement they once led. But Caribbean unions have also had to contend with the massive out-migration from the islands and the collapse of estate agriculture:

"...the Montserrat Trades and Labour Union, which was the basis of the politicians' power, had been primarily an association of agricultural labourers desirous of higher wages and better working conditions. With the collapse of estate agriculture and the shift to small rented holdings or no agricultural production at all, the former estate workers were no longer concerned over minimum wages for agricultural work. In fact, many complain that they are unable to pay the minimum wages set by the government, if they have to hire someone to help with their cotton, and still make any profit. This union was almost defunct in 1965" (Philpott 1973:58).

b. In General

The recent flight of capital to take advantage of the cheap labor and lack of unionization of workers in various countries of Africa, Asia, and Latin America will encourage renewed efforts to unionize the workers in these countries, even where government opposition is strong. One can also expect unionization among rural people who must depend on wage labor or among farmers who resent their inability to control the prices at which they must sell and buy. Since their primary thrust is against the price structure and existing allocation of resources, unions inevitably are seen as political forces and as challenges to the status quo. They also serve as welfare organizations, and local branches may have an interest in participating in community action to obtain better health services, better education, and better general amenities. Since they already have organization, they can provide assistance for the formation of producer and consumer cooperatives. They also can provide channels through which local people can reach those in the national agencies with whom they may have to deal to forward any projects of their own (Leonard and Marshall et al. 1981).

II. Single Purpose Inclusive Organizations: Basis in Shared Economic Tasks

A great variety of associations are formed for the performance of specific economic tasks. Processes of production, allocation, and meeting emergency needs require cooperative arrangements that recruit assistance from beyond the household or kinship group. A recent survey of such forms of cooperation among rural people was carried out by Saunders (1977) as part of the efforts of the World Bank to explore the potential of existing associations, a resource it had previously underused in its efforts to bring about rural development.

Saunders suggested that such associations fell into three classes:

1) irrigation associations, 2) mutual aid work groups, and 3) rotating credit and savings groups. He ignores craft associations and associations of traders whose members serve rural people and sometimes reside in rural areas where they may be part-time farmers. We have not had time to research the literature on either craft guilds or trade associations. We note, however, that craft guilds are important agents in controlling quality of production, techniques, entry into the craft, and prices. They also, however, have their welfare and religious functions. Traders combine to control prices, restrict entry in the market, and sometimes to provide for bulk purchasing and the credit needs of their members. Associations of market women in West Africa are reported as having all these functions (see, for example, B.C. Lewis 1977 on market women in Abidjan, Ivory Coast).

1. Irrigation Associations

A good deal of argument has taken place over the extent to which irrigation requires the emergence of strong cooperative organizations (see Hunt and Hunt 1976 for a review of the literature for both theoretical stances and ethnographic studies of irrigation systems). Of special interest to this report is the Hunts' discussion of arguments concerning the question of political centralization and the scale of irrigation systems (1976:392-396). They conclude:

Massive construction and conflict resolution are closely linked with extra-local organizations, while maintenance and daily allocation matters are in local hands with large artificial systems, allocation of water to the local segments is a matter of central policy and management (1976:396).

During the past decade, major research on irrigation organization has focused on Southeast, East, and South Asia, areas where irrigation associations have long existed. Southeast Asia has received special attention (Geertz 1973; Germain 1978; IRPI and ADC, eds. 1976; Coward 1976; Taylor and Wickham, eds. 1979; Bagadion and F. Korten 1979a and 1979b; Potter 1976; Reyes 1980). The insular character and/or irregular topography of Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia, and northern Thailand (as well as Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan) encouraged the development of relatively small-scale irrigation developments as contrasted with those in the delta regions of Asia. Characteristically, they involve rather remotely located groups of rice cultivators who have access to limited amounts of diverted river water. These "communal" irrigation systems were generally constructed by the water users themselves and are operated and maintained by them.

a. The Problems of Expansion of the System

The connections between cultivators and irrigation development in small-scale systems encourages a high degree of participation in a system's day-to-day operation. It does not necessarily follow that maintenance activities will involve cultivators if the systems are developed beyond their initial local scale by government interventions to improve the system. Government then usually sets fees and assumes responsibility for maintenance. Local water users usually resent attempts by government to return to them responsibility for maintenance, fee collection, and conflict resolution and to push them into new irrigation associations formed on models laid down by external authority. They seem to view the system as either in their hands or in government's hands, finding it difficult to share responsibility.

This is understandable because to share responsibility places them in a dependent position vis-a-vis the flow of water in the larger system. They find themselves required to follow a rotational regime based on someone else's schedule rather than enjoying continuous irrigation. They also have to abide by decisions made elsewhere such as when and how to maintain the system and how to operate their association.

National governments and their agencies believe that it is necessary to intervene if systems are to be upgraded and the full potential of first-class agricultural lands realized. They argue that the greatest gain in improved water management will occur at the farm level. This belief follows from the logic that professionally designed and constructed main canals should be more efficient than the ditches and turnouts at the terminus of the system and that management of operation and maintenance of macro-facilities are more efficient than management of microfacilities in the hands of numerous non-professionals, that is, the water users. However, several recent studies find that the problems of water distribution are greater in the laterals and sublaterals of the main canal than at the farm level (Wickham and Valera 1979).

Although governments and donors prefer to expand a country's potential for agricultural production by constructing large-scale, new irrigation systems that reach new lands and people, investments are also being made in rehabilitating existing facilities that have deteriorated or require major capital inputs for other reasons. In these efforts governments often have attempted to convert what appears to be unemployed labor (Swetnam 1980) into productive capital in the form of irrigation systems, roads, and

other infrastructures. However, "the success of this strategy depends upon effective organization of labor at the village level" (Hafid and Hayami (1979: 123). Successful examples of the organization of local labor by government agencies to rehabilitate small-scale local systems are described by Dozina et al. (1979), Hafid and Hayami (1979), and Unson (1978). All point to the critical importance of local leadership in mobilizing participation and organization. The last author provides a rich case study of the process of popular participation, the development of leadership, and organizational mobilization in two associations in eastern Central Luzon, Philippines. Bacdayan (1974) has traced the organizational impact of the expansion, without external assistance, of a traditional irrigation system, the ensuing problems of inter-village competition for resources with the resulting need to resolve the conflicts, and the forging of stronger vertical linkages with government so as to guarantee water rights.

b. Leadership and Participation

A number of other recent studies (Coward 1976; Hanks 1972; H. Lewis 1971; Pasandaran 1977; Potter 1976; Reyes 1980) have pointed to the critical factor of trustworthy leadership in effective operation of irrigation associations. Coward (1976) generalizes that accountability of leaders, especially those who serve as water masters, is essential for an irrigation association to function. The personal element of respect and trust is sometimes eroded when the accountability of leaders shifts from association members to government authorities as local systems are incorporated into larger systems.

Participation by water users is a very fragile thing. Lazaro et al. (1979:6-7) reach the following conclusions with respect to participation:

- 1) It is unrealistic to expect farmers to participate in irrigation activities, as individuals or as members or groups, unless they believe their participation will benefit them.
- 2) The assumption that improved water management always requires greater participation of farmers in irrigation needs to be double checked.
- 3) National strategies to introduce widespread uniform water-user associations may not be advisable.

Duncan (1979) has documented water user reluctance to participate unless adequate and timely delivery of water by the main system can be assured. Stressing the importance of understanding the users' perspective in water management, Reyes (1979) suggests that participation is based on hard-headed, rational decisions. Hutapea et al. (1979) point out that actual conditions vary enormously in different local irrigation environments. In some regions progressive leadership may be more readily available. Existing organizations also influence the ways in which local group activities can be channeled. In Indonesia, for example, five factors influence the effectiveness of user participation (Hutapea et al. 1979:167):

- 1) The congruence of the boundaries of irrigation groups, irrigation command areas, and village jurisdictions;
- 2) The coordinated organizational responsibility for irrigation;
- 3) The nature of village values and leadership and the extent of economic and social disparities within villages;
- 4) The perception by irrigators of who owns their water supplies; and
- 5) The uniformity in the structure of irrigation organizations and the speed at which they are introduced.

In concluding their discussion of participation, Lazaro et al. (1979:7) state:

These findings suggest that a strategy tailoring water-user associations to local needs and initiating them on a phased basis, beginning with the situations in which the chances of success are greatest, may be more productive in the long run than the commonly advocated attempts in some countries for widespread and immediate introduction of associations. For either strategy, however, research can help identify the nature of local needs and determine which needs might be met most effectively through group action.

In the Philippines, two projects supported jointly by the National Irrigation Administration and the Ford Foundation serve as landmarks of real efforts by a government agency to utilize or form local organizations in support of program activities. One was to create a pilot project which aimed at developing the capacity of associations of water-users through encouraging members' active participation in planning and construction and by giving them some control over project expenditures (Isles and Collado 1979, Bagadion and Korten 1979, and Unson 1978). The second was the commissioning of a series of research reports on the operation of communal irrigation systems (Reyes 1980a, 1980b; Reyes et al. 1980; Ilio 1980). However, it is too soon to assess the long-term effectiveness of such projects.

2. Mutual Aid Work Groups

Collective work organizations are common devices to provide a work team for production and for community work, including that needed to maintain rituals, in regions where a basically subsistence orientation has not been overridden by the market economy, high capital investment, commercialization, and the full cash nexus. Sex and age are basic principles by which

differentiations of persons and tasks may be made. Rank, occupation, and special skills are other common principles. Beyond the question of how work is divided is the question of how it is organized. That is our concern here--specifically, local organization for mutual collective work. Social organization for such purposes is affected by ecological factors, economic forces, and social constraints.

The people of any particular locality are usually able to mobilize a variety of mutual aid work groups which may have multiple functions, unless the region has become highly dependent upon management by patrons or central government agencies (Anderson et al. 1979:7-12; Gooneratne et al. 1978:8; Guillet 1980; Moore 1975; Seibel and Massing 1974; and Udy 1959: 57-58). Some of these groups may be permanent; most are mobilized only occasionally for a specific task. Some are based on reciprocity, either "direct", as with exchange labor (J. Anderson 1964b; H. Lewis 1971; Bennet 1968; S. Polter 1977), or "generalized" when work parties are mobilized in return for food or some other form of hospitality or reward (Anderson et al. 1979; Hollnsteiner 1970; Barth 1967; Gulliver 1971:194; and Koentjaraningrat 1961). Other work groups function with no expectation, not even eventual, of reciprocation, as with groups mobilized for the aid of an aged or disabled person (Ralston 1981). Some groups have a fixed membership, as those collective agricultural groups which work systematically through the fields of all those who have agreed to cooperate until the cycle is completed. Others have a fluctuating membership or are ad hoc collections of those who turn up when the call for a work party goes out. Some groups are composed of near social equals, and then the expectation of direct reciprocity is likely to be greatest, while others mobilize members of one class

(or cast) to aid someone belonging to another (Gosselin 1976:66). Some are voluntary, others are not (Gosselin 1976 and Roth 1976:48). Some groups work for individuals, who may also be participants in the group or may be outsiders with the right to command or the ability to reward services. Others are summoned for public or community works (see, for example, Gosselin's distinction between the adjolou and the donkpa in Benin).

Leaders of developing countries often become eloquent about the tradition of cooperative mutual aid that exist in their countries, citing this as the natural basis for the development of cooperatives and local self-help projects. However, as we noted earlier, most mutual aid work groups are small in size, rarely including even all who might be eligible within a community. The work groups have also been seen as a cheap and effective way for mobilizing labor for rural development, on the grounds that they are a built-in device for public service (Ames 1959). This ignores the context within which such groups flourish. Numerous studies show that work groups, especially those based on the exchange of labor, decline in popularity with the penetration of a money economy, commercialization of agriculture, specialization of labor, and proletarianization. They survive only under special conditions and with restricted functions (Anderson et al. 1979; Erasmus 1956; Brokensha and Erasmus 1969; Dozina and Cordova 1980; Gosselin 1976; Koentjaraningrat 1961; Moore 1975; Wilson 1977:183-185; Castillo 1977; Hollnsteiner 1964:302; Frucht 1968:205:206; and Wickham et al. 1974). However, under conditions of labor shortage, as on the agricultural frontiers, exchange labor may persist or be reintroduced (Charsley 1976, Collier 1964a; Dozina and Cordova 1980; Guillet 1980; James 1979; Krinks 1974; H. Lewis 1971; and Sandoval 1957), and exchange labor may also be resorted to in periods of

drastic retrenchment in technology (Anderson et al. 1979).

3. Rotating Credit Associations

The same period and the same areas that have seen the decline of the cooperative work group have provided conditions for the rotating credit union to flourish. This is an organization which is adaptive to conditions of wage-labor, urbanization, and all the other forces of the contemporary world and may well have been brought into existence by the very factors that undercut cooperative work arrangements.

Rotating credit associations are single-purpose organizations, in contrast to the welfare societies which in some ways they resemble. They provide a simple, efficient way to pool funds so that periodically participants receive a useful lump sum of cash. The pool is created by "a core of participants who agree to make regular contributions to a fund which is given in whole or in part to each contributor in rotation" (Ardner 1964:201). Management demands are few, and the cost of management non-existent or minimal.

Ardner (1964:201) provides an example of the simplest form of rotating credit association:

Ten men meet every month and contribute one shilling each to a fund which is straightway handed over to one of their number. The following month another member receives the fund and so it continues, members receiving in rotation, until at the end of ten months, each member will have put in ten shillings.

The group may then break up, its members perhaps joining in other groups, or the cycle may start again. The right to take the pool in any particular month may be decided by a draw or by prior arrangement. Some

groups permit members to draw out of turn for a small fee. Others do not distribute the whole pool on each occasion but retain a portion which is then available for loan at interest to members or to outsiders. In that case records and a treasurer may become necessary. Variations are numerous, but the basic pattern remains the same.

a. Who Uses Them?

Reports of rotating credit associations locate them in almost every part of the world, including among the poor in Los Angeles. Some are created by persons earning good salaries or trading on a substantial scale; then, the amounts paid in may be large. More typically they are a device adopted by small cultivators, wage-workers, and small traders (Geertz 1962: 242 for Indonesia and elsewhere; Wu 1974 for Papua-New Guinea; Ottenberg 1968, Bascom 1952 Delancey 1977, and Miracle, Miracle, Hill 1970, and Cohen 1978, all for Africa; Gamble 1944, Fei 1939, Fei and Chang 1948, Freedman 1958, all for China; Embree 1939 for Japan; Hollnsteiner 1970 and Davis 1973 for the Philippines; Halpern 1964 for Lao; R. T. Anderson 1966 for India; Benedict 1964 for Mauritius; Katzin 1958, Philpott 1973, and Gray 1977 for various sites in the Commonwealth Caribbean; Beals 1970 and Cope and Kurtz 1980 for Mexico, Metge 1964 for New Zealand).

Geertz (1964:246-249), reporting on Java, found credit associations used by both sexes, but they were particularly popular among women. Lump sums were used for the purchase of clothing and bicycles and to defray the cost of various ceremonies, but they were also used as capital to be loaned at interest, or, more rarely, as capital for small businesses or craft enterprises. He views the rotating credit association as an adaptive "middle-rung" institution that is adopted when a mainly subsistence-based

economy has begun to shift towards cash crops, wage work, and a reliance on the market (1962:260).

Ottenberg (1968), discussing the development of rotating credit associations among the Afikpo Ibo of Eastern Nigeria, essentially agrees with Geertz and sees the associations as a way to provide the answer to the cash shortages people begin to experience in such circumstances. Although Saunders (1977:9) and Bouman (1977) mention the importance of the savings function, it is the provision of needed capital that is most stressed. Of course, there is the forced savings aspect which allows people with small incomes to avoid the temptation to quick spending (Ardener 1964).

Recent studies have documented the adaptability and resilience of the associations. They are found in towns and cities as well as in rural areas and in economies that have moved far beyond the early stages of coming to terms with the cash nexus (see Kurtz 1973; Kurtz and Showman 1978; and Wu 1974).

Some of the rotating credit associations reported for Africa have had as many as four hundred members and functioned over a cycle of several years. Associations as large as these tend to have officers and require that members have guarantors. They have been successfully adapted to meet the requirements of traders and other entrepreneurs. In the Ivory Coast, Lewis reports credit associations, there called esusu groups, to be popular among market women and to compete successfully with newly introduced banking systems. Although market women say they do not like to join esusu because of the possibility they will be disrupted by quarrels, friction is not reported to be common in groups formed outside the market place. Market women have also begun to patronize ambulatory bankers, who regularly visit

their clients at their market sites to collect their money. The women complain, however, that such agents sometimes abscond with the money, and the esusu groups retain their popularity as a more trustworthy form of saving. Funds from the esusu are used for any number of purposes, including the meeting of business debts, the expansion of business operations, funeral and hospital costs, costs of marriage and birth ceremonies, and school fees (B. Lewis 1977:140-150; see also Robertson 1977 for the use of such groups by market women in Ghana).

b. Why They Work

The beauty of the rotating credit system lies in simplicity. Groups may form and disband at will, once the cycle is completed. In smaller associations, members control recruitment and policy, the amount of dues, the length of the cycle, and the method of payout, and they are able to exert direct pressure on members who threaten or in fact default. The larger the group, the more likely default and therefore great care is taken in selection of membership.

Devices reported for Mexican participants appear to be comparable. There (Cope and Kurtz 1980:229), participants "try to limit the problems of default by selecting individuals who share their attitude toward life and who show a commitment toward remaining in their community." Participants who default on their obligations, especially if they have already benefitted from a pay-out, become pointed out. They may be refused entry when other savings groups are formed. The worst offenders may be ostracized by both their former fellows and by the community at large. As a result, outside monitoring is unnecessary. The credit associations police themselves and can do without either bookkeepers or auditors.

Rotating credit organizations are simple and they work. In contrast, formal banking and credit unions which come under government inspection are often too large and too enmeshed in red-tape to be useful to the people who need small amounts of credit. Miracle et al. (1978) have recently reviewed the situation with respect to the rotating credit unions and other banking institutions for Africa. They note that banks and building-and-loan societies are reluctant to provide credit in small amounts or to those without visible assets. They require much paper work, which people neither understand nor wish to understand. In turn, the paper work is often responsible for delays, which people cannot afford. Moreover, banks and building-and-loan institutions keep records which government officials may inspect, and this means that government becomes privy to one's business. Add to this that the branches are usually located at a distance from where most rural people live, and their failure to attract investors away from the rotating credit union is not difficult to explain (Miracle et al. 1978).

Nevertheless, an environment in which people are accustomed to using rotating credit groups may be favorable to the development of strong credit unions of the western type when conditions are right: In English-speaking Cameroon, rotating credit groups are an old story (Ardner 1964). In 1963 two Catholic priests, trained to work with credit unions in the United States and Canada, helped organize a formal credit union in Bamenda. By 1967, 13 credit unions were registered and 20 were in process of formation. By late 1967, two staff members of the Department of Cooperatives had been appointed to assist in the supervision of the unions. Despite this government input, Delancey (1977:316) reports that the movement has "remained

independent of official control." In 1968, the primary societies joined together to form the West Cameroon Credit Union League which, in turn, became a member of the African Cooperative Savings and Credit Association. The League later received help from Catholic Relief Services. Later still, volunteers from Holland and from the United States Peace Corps offered field services. Funds and equipment also reached the league from various European foundations and from Canadian and United States aid programs. Eventually the movement also spread to Francophone Cameroon. In 1975, 12 years after Bamenda opened its first credit union, Cameroon had more than 181 credit unions comprised of 26,000 members with a total capital asset of 399.5 million CFA. Essential elements in this success appear to be both the prior existence of rotating credit associations in the regions and the high quality of leadership. We also suspect that the long-term involvement of the Catholic Church in the background may have done much to keep the branches functioning smoothly.

VII: FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONSAbstract

Here we sum up, recapitulating some of the earlier discussion, but going beyond this to comment on the possibilities we see for successful decentralization. We also comment on the need for better evaluation studies and on the possibilities for future research.

A. Findings and Conclusions1. Decentralization as a Development Strategy

There is nothing particularly new about the call for decentralization. It is highly reminiscent of the doctrine of "indirect rule" once favored by the British colonial office, which on occasion tried to co-opt even such recalcitrant social organizations as dance groups and secret societies as agents of local government (Magid 1976:155-156). This call also echoes much of the philosophy behind the community development approach which dominated so much of international effort in the 1950's. It draws as well upon more recent ideological convictions that Asian, African, and Latin American cultivators are imbued with a communal ethic upon which, although somewhat attenuated, they can still draw when the need arises to cooperate for production of for community services. By the end of the 1960's, the general failure of cooperatives had already put such beliefs in question. As Carroll points out, after a careful review of the literature on development efforts in Latin America, there is good evidence that most rural

communities are usually "neither cohesive nor egalitarian" (1971:220). Lyon had earlier pointed to the same conclusion (1968:63) based on her work in Peru. Dore, on the basis of a world-wide sample, also stresses the lack of cohesiveness and egalitarianism (1971:60). Worsley refers to the belief in their actuality as a "mythological charter" used in justification by those trying to create cooperatives or socialist societies (1971:21).

Decentralization is a loose term. It means different things to different people; it has different implications in different situations; it may be used to characterize an entire system (e.g. Tanzania) or it may be used to describe a partial system (e.g. cooperatives in the Commonwealth Caribbean). Other members of our team have specifically addressed the problem raised by definition itself.

Regardless of which form is selected, decentralization in weakly organized local units usually leads to a further penetration of the central power, which more often than not results in the extraction of what few local resources remain, including the most able among the local leaders. Decentralization usually favors the local elite. It may do so as over and against the national elite. This has its advantages in the more realistic planning of programs to fit the local situation, but the process is in conflict with the proclaimed goal of improving the conditions of those living in extreme poverty and is not likely to help the poorest 40 percent of the world's population.

Thus, it is unrealistic to think in terms of one broad decentralization policy framework without appending a good many qualifications.

The interest in decentralization arose from a real need to include local people in project participation. However, although local input is always important, there are going to be many cases in which a good centralized plan will accomplish the goals of both the recipients and the donors in a much more satisfactory fashion. Or, if we are even more realistic, it may be that a plan has to be broken down in terms of its linkages and at each point where decision-making is involved, an assessment should be made as to whether or not central government should be responsible, the donor is willing to be responsible, or whether local people are both able and willing to be responsible. This implies a mixed planning strategy which, on the surface, may appear messy. However, it doesn't have to be. What is required throughout is a monitoring body which has no direct involvement or indirect interest in either the success or failure of a project. This is not easy to find in some countries where religious ties or kinship bonds are far-reaching and can be called upon at any time. However, there should be an ideal standard of performance which is being strived for but with a great deal of flexibility at regional, provincial and even village levels. Local organizations might help out in this capacity if they are linked with supra-local organizations with welfare orientations.

a. The Poor Must Be Included in Decision-Making, Not Just in the Implementation

Development planners can work with proposed recipients in their own milieu, in their terms of reference, encouraging inclusion of local conceptualization, experience and decisions.

They can work to develop partnership and break the syndrome dependency. A major way in which this can be pursued is through decentralized local planning, carried out at the appropriate social scale. It must involve a reciprocal learning progress between government agencies and the people themselves. And it must involve more than the local elite or the more wealthy, commercially-oriented producers. The poor and the powerless must be given the means to participate. Otherwise they will apply the usual and ultimate tactic of the poor--benign neglect toward government efforts.

2. Characteristics of the Lesser Developed Countries (LDC's), in General

In this report we try to take account of the perspectives and agendas of the rural poor themselves. We believe that this is a unique contribution that this report can make to provide adequate balance within the set of the state-of-the-art reports. We also understand that major differences separate the perspectives, interests, and expectations of local rural peoples, their governments at various levels, and contributors to international development assistance. These differences must be recognized and resolved if decentralizing strategies are to lead to rural organizational development and an involvement of rural people in planning and implementing projects from which they are expected to benefit.

The countries which receive international aid for the most part share common characteristics. They tend to be:

1. Poor.
2. Dependent on foreign aid.

- 3. Troubled by rural/urban conflicts.
- 4. Lacking in educational opportunities.

3. Expectations of Local Rural Poor

a. Perspectives of the Rural Poor

If decentralization means that the government is prepared to offer more services to the people of the countryside, they stand to gain if this means better health, better education, more jobs, and greater opportunity for upwards mobility. If it means that local people are to be consulted, then it should mean that the programs are better suited than in the past, being adjusted to meet regional characteristics and the needs of various elements within the population. Involvement in projects which train them in new skills and familiarizes them with government channels gives them the opportunity to become more effective citizens. They are more likely to get what they want from government as they become able to articulate their priorities and exert pressure at the right points. If they can get what they want through channels, they may not need to expose themselves to the dangers inherent in protest.

It cannot be assumed that strong local organizations necessarily will put an end to "dependency". i.e., to the expectation that external agencies will provide both services and support for local ventures. From the local perspective, organizations may be effective only if they are successful advocates with agencies that control external resources. This is not unrealistic. A community has a much better chance to realize its goals if it has the ability

to lobby and apply pressure: demonstrations of local support and organization through self-help programs are less effective than political pressure in securing the influx of the desired funds, equipment, and experts needed to complete a project. Local people are competing with other communities for scarce resources, and they know it. They want organizations that will ensure them their share, or more than their share.

On the other hand, the impingement of external agents working on local projects may undercut the power of the local elite and the arrangements by which it keeps control over clients. Or, if development is to local power groups, the poor may be worse off. What some members of the community may see as opportunity, may therefore be seen as threat by others.

Most people may have reason to suspect any attempt to involve their local organizations and leadership in central government ventures as leading to new demands upon them: they therefore need some assurance that they will receive as well as give. New projects, whether in their interest or not, in the short term are likely to make demands on their limited resources, and in the long run make them vulnerable to the imposition of standardized ways of operating. If the projects link them more firmly to the world economy, it also makes them more vulnerable to the fluctuation of international markets and their country's ability to export and import.

But whatever the balance of opinion, rural people throughout the world are part of the world system. It is better that they

have a chance to make decisions about how they will deal with it through organizations which they understand, and over which they have power of control, whether these be long established institutions or organizations recently introduced or created to help them deal with the world in which they now live.

b. Priorities of the Rural Poor

While it is true that economic development must occur if social and environmental development are to be sustained, it must be recognized that rural community priorities are more those of survival and for the increase of amenities than for increased production per se. Rural organizations are much more likely to be effectively mobilized for projects that meet local needs in providing comfort, conveniences, security, education (as a means of upward mobility for their children), or local pride than for projects that promise higher production. These latter are premised on intensification, requiring major changes in allocation of time, energy and resources. They require higher capital and labor inputs which are not commensurate with possible gains to the producer. Moreover, collective organization for production is rarely a purely economic arrangement among rural people; it is usually embedded in a social and often in a ritual context and underlain by mutual reciprocity. It often is eroded by commercialization and other developments encouraging individualism. Group farming is a rarity.

It also must be recognized that initiation of development projects and their maintenance are two different things in the priorities

of most rural people. To date most "participation" of local people in their own development through their own organizations has amounted to mobilization of labor in the implementation phase of the project. They are rarely involved in planning or in making basic decisions. Yet they are expected to maintain the project once the developers have left. It often is not realized that organization for relatively brief implementation periods to bring forth something with tangible benefits is entirely different from the requirements of the process of maintenance. Many rural organizations are mobilized on an irregular basis for a particular purpose or event. Continuous, intensive organization is not sustained. Examples of successful, locally organized self-help usually exhibit periodicity and a purpose-specific character. Thus maintenance requires a new structure of incentives, rewards for leadership, a building of new capacity into organizations. Today migrants from specific rural areas who have "made it" outside take on a responsibility and a pride in local improvement that may provide a basis for sustaining projects. Still government agencies cannot assume that to include local people in the planning of their own development and to encourage participation and organizational capacity are going to get them off the hook of sharing in responsibility for maintenance.

c. Nourishing Local Organization

On the point of organizational modes, there exists a very strong tendency to impose models familiar to donors on potential beneficiaries. In particular, the favored model for organization for development is the voluntary association as conceived in the West, especially

if it takes the form of a cooperative. "Democratic" and individualistic values are projected on the workings of indigenous Third World rural organizations or on those they have borrowed in the past. Horizontal participation is expected to develop and vertical patron-client arrangements are expected to disappear. This is expecting too much. At least over the short term, people are likely to operate within any new or expanded organization in their established fashion. Imperfectly "democratic" distribution of responsibilities and benefits need not condemn an organization to failure. Existing ties and systems of obligations necessarily impinge on the functioning of any organization but if controls are available they need not necessarily signal organizational weakness.

It is not surprising when governments and their development agencies do not favor strong independent local organization and initiative. Nor is it surprising when they insist on remaining in control and withhold major power and decision making from rural people . especially if large sums of money are involved or if they see projects as generating new demands upon their resources. Thus contradictions readily arise in their "decentralization" policies and in linkages with local organizations.

Both government and local people want control. Both hope to get more than they give. Within and between agencies internal struggles for power are usually more immediate and important than struggles to benefit the poor. Likewise, within local level organizations struggles for power between elders and youths, conservatives and

liberals, men and women, and the better-off and the aspirants to position, are normal, not exceptional, aspects of local organization, especially these days.

d. The Myth of Conservatism

It is not that rural peoples are opposed to external efforts for change, but they resist change which requires major restructuring of existing relationships and those which require large risks in comparison with the scale of their resources. Thus, to work effectively with local peoples and their organizations and institutions is to try to work with and within their capacities, to reinforce and extend them rather than to try to replace them.

4. Perspectives of LDC Governments and International Donors

a. The Constraints on Donors and Recipient Governments

Constraints on the local people are matched by those on international donors and national governments. For the latter, the efforts to achieve large and rapid results encourage orientations toward investing large amounts of capital almost exclusively in large-scale, largely technologically-based projects. Such projects are centrally planned, implemented, and controlled. They are the antithesis of development through grass roots projects which engage the proposed beneficiaries and enhance their capacity to organize for their own advantage. If rural areas are to be developed rather than depleted, all planning, decision-making, and implementation simply cannot be done for people. These must be done to some extent by the people themselves, establishing a stake in the venture.

Donors and governments are also constrained by the technological bias that operates in development projects. Technology is treated as a given, and people, their organizations, and institutions are assumed to have to adjust to it somehow or disappear. But organization and institutional arrangements themselves are factors of equal importance with technology. They offer potentials and opportunities to which appropriate technologies can be adjusted. The relationship between organization and technology, in fact, is interactive. This may now have begun to be recognized. Perhaps the possibility for equal interaction in development planning will receive new attention in a period in which expensive, high-energy technologies no longer appear to dominate the world's future. Precisely the major failures of large-scale, high capital, centrally planned and implemented projects have been failures of organization and management in the utilization of development "benefits." That is, they are people problems. Efforts to overcome these with externally induced involvement have usually met with failure. Introduced organizations have not been able to substitute for indigenous organizations in many cases although they have seriously undermined them.

b. The Advantages and Disadvantages of Decentralization from the Point of View of the Center

From the point of view of governments, decentralization has advantages in terms of closer linkages with rural populations and expected greater efficiency from more realistic planning. Governments may also hope to use the transfer of some obligations to local agencies as a means of lessening costs. Healthy local organizations

working to provide ways of improving local conditions and engaging the free energy and time of the population are seen as good insurance against subversion. They also meet the need of a country to believe in its own ability to meet the standards associated with developed countries of the west. If development does not take place, the exodus from the rural areas to the towns may be stemmed, giving governments a breathing space in which to cope with the problems of the urban poor. The possibility of building a rural infrastructure which will permit the growth of rural industries, also promises to undercut the current dominance of the population in the capital. Finally, it must be recognized that the inefficiency of many government agencies gives good reasons for governments wishing to shift responsibility, and so blame, to external agencies.

Those at the center recognize that goods and services can be distributed more effectively if more field offices are established and if these are staffed with personnel knowledgeable about the area and sensitive to local needs and opinion. They see the growth of the network of agencies as giving them more direct access to the periphery and look to this as a way of promoting national sentiments and the unification of the country.

The disadvantages that lurk within the promises held out by those who advocate decentralization are also apparent. Encouragement of local communities and voluntary organizations to engage in planning and implementing projects means having to deal with a large number of particularistic institutions rather than working from a standardized

model. Decentralization, moreover, is a form of reorganization which affects the balance of power. If carried out, those at the periphery have a better chance to compete for scarce resources, and to withhold them from the center. Local priorities may conflict with national priorities.

The situation is complicated by the addition of the component of international aid. Foreign donors may have agendas that upset existing relationships between the government and the rural areas, especially if they insist on focusing upon raising the expectations and ability to protest of the poor. Central governments therefore may have good reason to wish to confine development efforts to the capital where they are least likely to escape official control. It can do this the more easily if it underplays the existence of alternative agencies which can link with the international donors in planning what should be done.

5. Conflicts and Misunderstandings

a. Coming to Terms with Reality

Donor organizations cannot expect to work with small groups at the grass roots and be effective unless they can make radical changes in their mode of operation. Given the constraints of time that donors insist on working under, it is unrealistic to expect to come to terms with local modes of operating. The belief that it is easy to create linkages with the local order only leads to frustration and mutual recrimination over project failure. In fact, however, the goals were never clearly stated, the design for the project was drafted at a desk without sufficient input

from those in the field, the expectations on all sides are too high, the concerns of the local people were never properly addressed because they were never understood, and local participation in effect meant provision of manual labor. The following rule of thumb may prove a defense against such frustrations.

B. Recommendations

1. Short Time, Simple Projects

Where there is neither the time nor experiences personnel to make a good on-site evaluation, it does not make good sense to plan a complex project to be carried out through heavy local participation. This does not mean that local people are to be ignored. It does mean that they cannot be expected to take on the kinds of responsibilities needed to ensure local input. Local level organizations are too small-scale, too resource-poor, too partisan if strong, and too wary to become deeply involved in a project formulated by those who have not been able to take the time to understand local constraints.

The project should therefore be a simple one with short-range goals. It should be one that requires a minimum amount of maintenance, and this dependent upon resources locally available.

2. Complex Projects, Timing, and Flexibility

Where there is time to sound local opinion and involve local leadership and organization in the planning, local people may be prepared to invest in more complex operations. Here it is essential to involve them in the working out of time schedules for both the

initial stages and for the subsequent period of maintenance. These need to link to their existing routines. They also need to be provided with a warning system which alerts those in charge of when they must put in orders for supplies and services if later sequences are to be implemented.

Complex projects also need to have the ability to make readjustments to meet unexpected possibilities and blockages. In the planning literature there is much discussion of the need for organizational redundancy to provide for back-up operations. Within the project's guidelines there should be leeway for change. Temporary setbacks should be expected and handled as learning situations for staff and local people rather than as grounds for termination.

3. Standards of Success

Success is a judgment based squarely on expectations. If local people have welcomed a project because it gives them temporary access to local wage labor, the project has been a success if it provides this even though it fulfills none of the donor's goals. A project planned to raise agricultural output may seem a failure to the donor if some years later the recipients have abandoned their farming system: they may have used their profits to finance entry into other preferred ways of making a living. Those who organize a scheme to provide credit through a local organization may judge success in terms of recovery of loans: the organization and its members may judge success in terms of how they prospered from the loan. Decentralization calls for an appreciation of

the existence of different definitions of success and how these affect the possibility of partnership in different kinds of enterprises. In some instances standards will differ to the degree that each partner is likely to be outraged by what the other will accept as a successful outcome. Such enterprises are poor bets for partnership.

4. Urgency and Local Involvement

Standards of urgency differ. If donors are in a great rush to implement a project because they see the necessity of growing more food or building irrigation canals in strategic positions, they may be wise to proceed without trying to involve local organizations and participation. It is unrealistic to expect people to contribute their resources when they do not share the same sense of urgency. Decentralized schemes are more congenial to enterprises that can be fitted to local agendas and where there is time for consultation and the working out of compromises.

5. The Need for Workable Organization

Decentralization assumes that people have viable organizations which they can use to handle new inputs. It may not be feasible where populations are refugees from man-made or natural disasters. Uprooting may destroy or discredit organization above the household level.

6. Decentralization May Be Feasible only Where Populations are not Refugees from Man-Made or Natural Disasters

Today much aid must go to cope with the immediate needs of the large refugee populations of the uprooted. In South and Southeast Asia and in Africa this problem is staggering. Displaced populations

share in common the stress of dislocation, but they differ in other respects. Akbar S. Ahmed, an administrator in the Pakistan Government, who works in a region now housing 800,000 refugees from Afghanistan, makes a pleas for informed workers (1980:8)

Some knowledge of social structure and organization, of the history and culture of a group, and of its domestic economy are important in helping to administer aid effectively. For instance, the Cambodian household will be different to the Afghan, and therefore they have to be handled differently. It was therefore a pleasure to meet and discuss refugees with the Austrian aid relief team, the head planner of which is Alfred Janata, a well-known anthropologist. The team had with them Dr. Bernt Glatzer, an anthropologist who had worked in Afghanistan, and within a few minutes the difference in approach was apparent. Relevant questions regarding the nuclear family, household economy, seasonal migrations, etc., were being asked of me. The difference in perception and understanding between this and other teams was clear.

7. The Need for Better Evaluation Procedures

Evaluation procedures still retain a rather narrow focus upon what was originally proposed, what inputs were used, what was completed, and how much was spent rather than what occurred with the people involved. As a result, evaluation reports are uninformative on many crucial matters concerning social development except in a rough and superficial way. The absence of detailed documentation of decision-making and planning processes as well as of implementation efforts from both donor and recipient points of view makes it impossible to assess intelligently the real success or failure of a project. Evaluations in the future should take into greater account indigenous considerations of risk, shifts in local perceptions of the project,

changes in local organizational capacity and changes in living standards.

If the evaluation process were improved upon, we would know better how to set and reach development goals. Donors and national agencies as well as recipients may be laboring under unrealistic and artificial time constraints which frustrate both. "Failure" might be seen as "success" and some "successes" as "failures," if evaluators reviewed events over a longer period of time and incorporated into their evaluations the views of the recipients. It is inappropriate for donors to rely too heavily upon an economic cost-benefit frame of reference, based upon the initial plan. Where a project has not produced the desired, planned-for results, this may be offset by other gains which were not initially foreseen. Lack of documentation makes it difficult to know when and where such surprise successes have occurred, but anyone with experience in the field knows that plans are rarely executed as originally conceived or as specified by the original timetable.

8. Characteristics of Local Organizations Most Likely to Succeed in Within a Decentralized Framework

Donor and recipient government organizations most likely to succeed in working within such a decentralized framework and to be most effective in forwarding local involvement are likely to have the following characteristics:

1. Access to power while simultaneously holding the trust of local people.
2. Access to sufficient funds to carry out proposed projects over time.

3. Staff with good ombudsmen-like qualities, insuring good communication between local people and donor and government agencies.
4. A long-term commitment on the part of project managers and other staff to insure continuity.
5. Programs which include an educational component so that local people may feel confident that they can carry on when the time comes.
6. Realistic expectations, including a realistic assessment of the time needed to accomplish objectives.
7. Flexibility to implement what is learned as a project is implemented.
8. Willingness to examine how the particular project affects the community over a range of activities and relationships, including those involving other communities.

C. Summing Up

If much of our discussion has appeared to strike a negative chord, it is because the new thinking about development comes so late, after several decades of dramatic change among the rural peoples of the world. This has been a period during which poverty has increased both in terms of the number of people affected and in terms of its severity. The pressure of massive population growth on limited resources has been a major factor but increasingly inequitable distribution is at least as important. These dramatic changes have exacerbated already serious constraints which affect rural people and often have eroded previous local organizational and institutional capacities. They have outdated some previously effective arrangements and in general reduced collective orientations in favor of more individualistic orientations. They have

diminished the willingness to meet traditional obligations and enhanced narrower economic interests. They have vastly expanded the kind and frequency of external linkages, opening up peasant villages, integrating rural people into national and international systems but in a highly marginal and dependent status. Therefore, while the goals of decentralization are worthy goals, their achievement has been made more difficult by recent and continuing processes of change, including those brought about by earlier attempts at development, in which donors were too organizationally inflexible to be sensitive (Tendler 1975: 102-110). Today, the people who occupy the same area and need to cooperate if local organization is to work, often have very different interests and may work at cross-purposes to an extent that never existed before.

If governments are sincere in their expression of concern for giving the poor a better chance, then it is time to stop doing development for the poor, too the poor, and on the poor. It is now generally recognized that development needs to be defined in local terms and tailored to specific local scales and local context. It is time to act upon this understanding and to break the long established dependent relationships that block the development of confidence, of skills and of genuine participation of rural peoples in matters which concern them.

What is needed are rural organizations, or, for that matter, organizations among the urban poor as well, whose leadership can perceive and articulate what it is that their members want and the problems they face. This leadership also needs to be able to cope with the agents of government and such donors as are able and willing to work outside the channels of the central administration. If rural populations, or the urban poor,

are to be asked to contribute their labor and resources to projects sponsored by outside donors or their own governments, then they need to be consulted about their own priorities and given a chance to plan the project in such a way that it gives them maximum advantage. The days of governments and donors limiting "participation" to voluntary labor in self-help project, hopefully are numbered (see, for example Chambers, 1974:103). Since rural people have become gun-shy over attempts to involve them in schemes for development proposed by outsiders, especially during the recent decades, they are likely to drag their feet or otherwise subvert interventions if they are not consulted and their views taken seriously. Smaller projects ought to make this possible.

Successful organization of small farmers for rural development appears to be associated with the following features: 1) Organization around concrete goals that can be accomplished in a limited time; 2) Organization centered on a single task where success depends on cooperation and locally available skills; 3) Organization of small-scale, exclusive or insulated groups where scale works in favor of peer pressure and which can promote healthy rivalry.

Tendler (1976) suggests that if goals are remote and unfamiliar and government pressure us more on generating organization than on meeting immediate needs, then rural populations respond with a decline in interest. Organizing per se for more distant, potential benefits is obviously not as attractive to anyone as working together toward a direct desirable payoff. Morss et al. (1976) add to these criteria the key element of local participation in decision-making during planning and implementation.

Addressing the other side of the coin, Toth and Cotter (1976) pinpoint likely causes of failure when non-governmental organizations become involved in new programs. They base their analysis on projects sponsored by the Inter-American Foundation. The Foundation's approach is to fund selected small-scale local projects designed and operated by indigenous, non-governmental organizations. Projects failed for a variety of reasons:

- 1) excessive emphasis upon the leadership of a single central figure;
- 2) too optimistic estimates of the management skills of the organization;
- 3) the capture of a locally conceived project by an administrative elite who proceeded to use it as a vehicle for their own purposes;
- 4) the use of external funds to substitute for lack of enthusiasm for a project and lack of any organizational commitment to it;
- 5) the projects were basically attempts at social engineering designed to inculcate behavior approved by an administrative elite.

This last reason demonstrates that in deciding about locally initiated projects, there is also the danger of assuming that the local people have the kind of organization required to carry it through and the risk of assuming that someone who comes forward with a project is an authentic spokesman with an organization prepared to work to meet commitments.

The new mandate that focuses upon helping people to help themselves deserves to be tried. It clashes with the priorities that still govern many of those involved in planning development. What they see as most compelling is the need to increase food production and improve distribution to the end that the rural population, and especially the poor, will obtain better nutrition and better living conditions generally. There

is widespread agreement that production must be increased on lands presently under cultivation through strategies of intensification. Nevertheless, over a decade of experience following the introduction of new cereal technologies shows that agricultural development cannot occur without rural development and that new agrotechnologies cannot succeed without appropriate organizational and institutional arrangements (Bunting 1976, Castle 1977, Ruttan 1975). These technologies cannot simply be transferred. They can only develop with a congenial organizational and cultural context. This is nowhere more true than in the majority of developing countries where small producers predominate. And with agricultural production, so with other development endeavors. It is increasingly recognized that the major constraints are human factor constraints.

Thus, both from the moral and practical perspective, creating decentralized people-centered development, involving participation and congenial local organization, is the order of the day.