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BASELINES FOR DISCUSSION
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The Administration of Economic Development Programs

Baselines for Discussion

No. 6

Integrating Services for Rural Development

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Foreword

This sixth volume in the series of discussion guidelines in development administration concerns specific applications of a general problem in development: the integration of public services. "Integrated rural development" is something of a current fad in national planning and foreign aid administration. Its currency is easily explained: it permits planners to focus on "the poorest 40%," to emphasize basic human needs, to maximize the opportunities for popular participation, and at the same time to retain productivity objectives in the often neglected agricultural sector. But it also raises questions as old as the study of administration itself: how much specialization of function is desirable? Which "line" of activities of operating agencies should be joined together, and at what levels should they be coordinated? How should their management be supported by general or internal services that are sometimes treated as "staff" functions? When the objectives of a program have to remain sensitive to regional differences, what strategies of decentralization are most appropriate, and how should local discretion be balanced with central purposes?

Although integrated rural development is often perceived as a mere fad, there has been a flurry of serious writing about its potential and its objectives, and a somewhat less

exuberant flowering of descriptions of project experience. But to the administrative questions posed above there have been few answers, and they are the subject of this "state-of-the-art" report by John Cohen. This paper is still in the discussion stage; Professor Cohen has carefully parsed the existing literature to see how far current thinking goes, and to provide the basis of further discussion of new analytical approaches and requirements for further empirical research.

Like the other monographs in the Discussion Baselines Series, this paper is published in this format under a grant from the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy. The research itself was supported by a small grant from the Office of Rural Development and Development Administration of the Agency for International Development. Dr. John Cohen, the author of this monograph, was released to the Kennedy School of Government for this task by the Harvard Institute for International Development. I am grateful for the extensive support and cooperation that made this research possible. A revised statement is to appear in the summer of 1980, and comments on this version are especially welcome.

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Introduction

If the computer at USAID is instructed to list ongoing "integrated rural development projects" it will generate a lengthy printout of a wide range of activities. Examples of projects identified by this term are the following:

- A $4.4 million project to provide appropriate technological packages to small farmers and herders in drought stricken areas of Upper Volta's eastern region. Components include strengthening the area's extension and marketing activities, providing credit facilities, improving wells, water control, farm to market roads and range management, and promoting increased food production and better diets.

- A $450,000 effort in three rural areas of Colombia aimed at coordinating and improving the delivery of government services as well as training community members in rural development home economics, agricultural techniques, job skills, education, school and road construction, medical services, and community development strategies.

- A $15 million project in two rural Jamaican watersheds aimed at: controlling erosion through soil conservation, terracing and waterway improvement; demonstrating improved multicropping techniques; developing local farmer organizations and encouraging them to provide credit, inputs and marketing for local people; financing improvements in rural electrification, potable water and housing; and beginning reforestation efforts.

A number of papers, articles and monographs have been written in an attempt to describe what these different projects have in common to confirm their identification as "integrated rural development" efforts and justify their importance in the overall enterprise of improving the productivity and quality of life for villagers, 60 percent of the world's population. What is notably lacking in that literature is any discussion of the administrative and managerial issues involved in integrating in one project a number of mutually reinforcing development services that normally are performed by independent bodies.

Responding to such omissions, the purpose of this working paper is to develop a conceptual framework for analyzing the administration of integrated rural development services. This task requires a careful consideration of two concepts that have been loosely used in the discussion of project design: "integrated rural development" and "integration of administrative services."

Integrated rural development has been the victim of faddish, often unthinking dispute, not the less heated because of the vagueness of the concept. A number of definitions and schools of thought on the nature and objectives of this approach to development exist. These have so freighted the model with diverse meanings that it is not really possible to find any common

ground among them. On the other hand, a review of the various schools of thought and the major case studies of the model in action can lead to some clarification of administrative aspects of integrating rural development services. These can range from setting the boundaries and scale of the undertaking, selecting the kinds of activities likely to be successfully linked, or working out the appropriate sequencing of activities to ascertaining the consequences of assigning different technical functions to a single bureaucratic unit, promoting more efficient coordination between a special regional unit and the local government officials or defining the relationship between a semi-autonomous authority and related central agencies.

The first two sections of this paper seek to clear out the underbrush suggesting in the process why practitioners who review the literature and debates surrounding integrated rural development frequently conclude that it is "an ideology in search of a methodology." These two sections are essential because they lay out a foundation for charting a new path.

Section III seeks to formulate a workable conceptual framework for analyzing the administrative issues involved in the integration of rural development services. It begins with a detailed presentation of some two dozen basic issues which relate to the problem of administrating integration. The selection makes an initial effort to organize the hypotheses which flow from the discussion of these issues into a coherent conceptual framework. It is intended to stimulate sustained consideration about the process of integrating rural development services, in contrast to the much considered nature and goals of the integrated rural development movement. The exercise is undertaken in a neutral manner,which should allow it to be drawn up by practitioners running projects, specialists on integrating services, and academics engaged in the more rarefied debate over the nature and objectives of integrated rural development.

The kinds of questions this working paper hopes to address center on how to bring various combinations of rural development services together and run them in a coherent, efficient way. At its core the paper is concerned with determining what kinds of services are likely to be successfully integrated, who can best oversee and administer various combinations of integrated services, how integrative efforts can be better planned and implemented, and why different task environment characteristics affect the overall enterprise of promoting the integration of rural development services.

Formulation of a conceptual framework and preliminary efforts to use it to identify hypotheses do more than take a long needed step toward the consideration of administering integrated rural development. Specifically, it provides a more neutral ground for analyzing the experience of integration and management in such diverse areas as the large American industrial corporation or the public service programs of the welfare state. While this particular working paper will not enter into a consideration of these experiences, a major objective of the paper is to provide a framework for their facilitation.

The literature on administration or management of integration in the corporate and welfare bureaucracy worlds is a rich one.[1] So thin is the developing world literature on how to promote or manage integration in rural development that one can expect substantial benefits to flow from the comparative exercise. The literature that has emerged on the economics of bureaucratic behavior should prove helpful, particularly that which extends micro-economic theory of the firm and the consumer to the analysis of relationships between public and semi-public organizations, the relationships of organizations and their task environments, and the consequences of these relationships on public choice, budget processes, the supply of bureaucratic services and so on.[2] Also helpful is the literature by those public choice experts which focusses on how to design nonhierarchial, flexible, possibly lower cost alternatives to conventional bureaucratic structures for organizing and delivering public services. Comparative exercises toward these ends will occur in subsequent stages of the research project of which the drafting of this paper is the first step.

Another group of analysts is also to be served by this working paper. Their task is to identify and study a carefully selected but extensive set of integrated rural development projects.[3] This effort will have two objectives. First, it will seek to determine if the administrative issues identified in the synthesizing literature are comprehensive and on target. This is an important question, for much of the literature is based on a steady reworking of a few major integrated rural development projects, such as Puebla, Bicol River, CADU or Lilongwe. It may be that the lesser known projects center on issues not found in these commonly studied efforts. Secondly, a comparative analysis of actual projects will help test the options, hypotheses and guidelines that emerge from the underlying literature. Since the

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[1] A good example of relevant literature is: Jeffrey L. Pressman and Aaron B. Wildavsky, Implementation: How Great Expectations in Washington are Dashed in Oakland... (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973).

[2] Examples of the kind of literature that should be consulted are: Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper, 1957); Mancur Olson, Jr., The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (New York: Schocken Books, 1968); and, James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, The Calculus of Consent (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1962).

[3] The utility of this attempt to look at projects is reflected in a recent article by George Honadle. In Section III (iii-b) it is noted that we have little information on management techniques in the secondary literature on integrated rural development. However, a close look at projects should expand insights, as Honadle exhibits in: "Beneficiary Involvement in Project Implementation: Experience in the Bicol," Rural Development Participation Review, I, 1 (1979), pp. 12-13.

theme of administering the integration of services is scarcely developed in the synthesizing literature, the appreciation of the conceptual framework formulated in this paper by analysts with sensitive diagnostic antennae should identify a number of additional issues and hypotheses latent in project archives. This process should not only refine and reshape the framework but contribute significant, comparative insights into the analysis of the administration of integrated services.

To summarize these last two points: this paper has concentrated exclusively on what is in the secondary or consolidating literature on integrated rural development. It has consciously avoided the literature on comparative public administration and the political economy of bureaucratic organizational behavior. Specific case studies in integrated rural development have only lightly been referred to, the emphasis being on making sense out of the diversity of the more general literature. As a result, the hypotheses generated in Section III appear too general and lack detail. There exist, however, a number of detailed studies which contain, in manifest or latent form, the experience necessary to improve that section.[4] These can and must be analyzed in the next phase of the project.

Regretably, the paper cannot simply begin with the formulation of the conceptual framework and the generation of options, hypotheses and guidelines. It is essential to have some acquaintance with the rise in importance of rural development and the issues which have surrounded the debates on how to promote it. Those who begin to test, revise and possibly reformulate the conceptual framework presented here must understand the context in which the problem arose if they are to make a useful--or understandable--contribution to those who must deal with it. Only with awareness of the history of the notion of integrated rural development can one offer helpful insights drawn from a very different literature or deduced from a widely divergent set of case studies.

The paper which follows is a first draft pointing toward a final product commissioned under a grant from USAID's Rural Development and Administration office to Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government. Drafted in August 1979, the effort is tentative, which is the reason that it is presented as a working paper. Comments on the analysis, suggestions as to additional literature, and criticism on any aspect of the paper will be appreciated and in keeping with its intent.

For the most part, this effort flows from the author's own frustrations with the concept of integrated rural development, which began with his work on

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[4]An excellent example of this is the long study: Hubert Zandstra, Kenneth Swanberg, Carlos Zulberti and Barry Nestel, Caqueza: Living Rural Development (Ottawa International Development Research Center, 1979). Other examples include: Clinton L. Doggett, "The Vihiga Project: A Development Experience in Africa" (Mission Report, USAID/Nairobi, July 31, 1973); Marcia L. Odell, "Village Area Development Programme: A Review and Evaluation of an Experiment in Integrated Rural Development" (Paper Prepared for Department of Unified Local Government Service, Republic of Botswana, October 1978); or John R. Schott, ed., An Experience in Integrated Rural Development: The Mampong Valley Social Laboratory in Ghana (Manilla: International Institute for Rural Reconstruction, 1978).

Ethiopia's CADU project in the early 1970s and which have been amplified by his increasing awareness of how little support academics have given practitioners who must promote the final integration of the diverse activities essential for successful increases in agricultural production or improvements in the quality of rural life. Only one month's effort was put into the paper, the result of a prudent decision by the project directors who realize that its purpose is to stimulate debate and that debate will not have been successful if the conceptual framework the paper establishes and the hypotheses it generates do not undergo substantial attack and subsequent revision.

Section I

Rural Development and Integrated Projects

Scope of Rural Development

Academic social scientists and development professionals who focus their attention on the 60 percent of the world's population who live in villages face an extremely difficult intellectual challenge. At its core is the superficially trite but conceptually complex rule that "in rural development everything is related to everything else."

The rise of system and subsystem analysis during the last twenty years has greatly contributed to the tendency to view the rural development process from a broad perspective. No person has been more influential than Arthur T. Mosher in getting individuals and organizations to conceive of agricultural and rural development as involving the systemic interaction of numerous activities which must be carefully orchestrated if successful growth-inducing or quality of life-improving objectives are to be reached.[5] Briefly, he begins by identifying five components essential for increased agricultural productivity: (1) markets for farm products; (2) constantly changing technology; (3) local availability of supplies and equipment; (4) production incentives for farmers; and (5) transportation; and pinpointing five accelerators of agricultural development: (1) education for development; (2) production credit; (3) group action by farmers; (4) improving and expanding agricultural land; and (5) national planning for agricultural development.[6] After carefully elaborating

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[5]This has been achieved largely through the publication of three sequential, broadly distributed books: A.T. Mosher, Getting Agriculture Moving (New York: Agricultural Development Council, 1966); Creating a Progressive Rural Structure: To Serve a Modern Agriculture (New York: Agricultural Development Council, 1969); and his To Create a Modern Agriculture (New York: Agricultural Development Council, 1971).

[6]Mosher, Getting Agriculture Moving, pp. 63-180.

the interdependence of these essential components and accelerators, he develops a set of guidelines for promoting them in reinforcing ways in specifically defined farming localities.[7] Here the objective is to create a range of advice for promoting a number of policy, program and project activities that support the evaluation of a "progressive rural structure." By the end of this three volume exercise, Mosher has expanded the design and implementation of agricultural development from the inclusion of traditional activities, such as research extension, credit, markets and roads, to the incorporation of non-agricultural but production-related activities ranging from rural public works and local government to education, health and family planning.

Increased Emphasis on Rural Development

Mosher's pragmatic instincts to conceive of agricultural development as a complex system of diverse interrelated activities was reinforced by a dramatic shift in economic development theory. Beginning in the 1960s two major trends evolved which shifted much of the development emphasis to the rural sector. First, widespread acceptance was given the view that for many less developed countries agriculture can be the major engine for growth,[8] and second, increased recognition was extended to arguments that small scale farms can play a major role in agriculture-led development.[9]

Many world economic trends contributed to these shifts,[10] but none was more influential than the realization that international trade patterns hampered

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[7] Mosher, Creating a Progressive Rural Structure, passim.

[8] For summaries of this shift see Michael P. Todaro, Economic Development in the Third World: An Introduction to Problems and Policies in a Global Perspective (London and New York: Longman, 1977), pp. 204-33; Derek Healey, "Development Policy: New Thinking about an Interpretation," Journal of Economic Literature, X, 3 (1972), pp. 757-97. James Grant, "Development: An End of the Trickle Down?" Foreign Policy, 12 (1973), pp. 43-65; Michael Roemer, Economic Development: A Goal's-Oriented Synopsis of the Field (Cambridge: Harvard Institute for International Development, Development Discussion Paper No. 51, 1979).

[9] For a summary of the literature on small farm strategies see: Robert D. Stevens, "Transformation of Traditional Agriculture: Theory and Empirical Findings," in Traditional and Dynamics in Small-Farm Agriculture: Economic Studies in Asia, Africa and Latin America (Ames: Iowa State University Press, 1977), pp. 3-24, 237-55.

[10] Among those which might be discussed are increased maldistribution of income, increased population growth and unemployment, higher food prices and increased foodgrain scarcities, improved seed-fertilizer strategies, widespread unrest among the world's poor, increased donor concern with equity and economic justice, and better understanding of the economies of less developed countries.

both industry and export-led growth models, strategies that had dominated development theory since World War II. Specifically, it became clear that many industries in developing nations could not successfully compete in international trade and had only limited domestic markets because of overall poverty. Without markets, industry could not expand, and without expansion there were few urban jobs available for those forced out of the countryside by population growth and land pressure. Hence, by the late 1960s much importance was being attached to rural development efforts and the possibilities of providing not only additional food for rapidly increasing populations, but of improving the income levels of rural inhabitants, thereby helping to generate demand for industrial products.[11]

The shift toward rural-led development was accelerated by the appearance of high yielding varieties of wheat, rice and corn.[12] When matched with fertilizer, water and good farming practices, these seeds can greatly increase yields. Productivity was also improved through such land intensive strategies as multiple cropping. Finally, some progress was made in developing intermediate or appropriate technologies to complement rather than displace labor, an approach quite suited to small farms.

After initial experiences with capital intensive, labor displacing strategies in exploiting the potential of the new seed-fertilizer revolution,[13]

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[11]The theoretical underpinnings of this food grain linkage approach centered on agriculture as an engine for change is found in: Bruce F. Johnson and John W. Mellor, "The Role of Agriculture in Economic Development," American Economic Review, LI (1961), pp. 565-93; Carl Eicher and Lawrence Witt, eds., Agriculture in Economic Development (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964); John W. Mellor, The Economics of Agricultural Development (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1966); Guy Hunter, The Best of Both Worlds (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967). Two recent consolidations of such models are: Bruce F. Johnson and Peter Kilby, Agriculture and Structural Transformation: Economic Strategies in Late-Developing Countries (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975); John W. Mellor, The New Economics of Growth (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1976). The specific arguments are well presented in: John W. Mellor and Uma J. Lele, "Growth Linkages of the the New Food Grain Technologies," Indian Journal of Agricultural Economics, XXVIII (1973), pp. 35-55 and their "Jobs, Poverty and the 'Green Revolution,'" International Affairs (1972), pp. 20-32.

[12]A good summary of the emergence of the green revolution and the initial optimism surrounding it is: Lester R. Brown, Seeds of Change: The Green Revolution and Development in the 1970s (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1970); Carroll P. Streeter, Reaching the Developing World's Small Farmers (New York: Rockefeller Foundation, 1975).

[13]The critique of the green revolution and its effect on inequality is well illustrated by: Keith Griffin, The Political Economy of Agrarian Change: An Essay on the Green Revolution (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974); Harry M. Cleaver, Jr., "The Contradictions of the Green Revolution," American Economic Review, LXII, 2 (1972), pp. 177-86; Carl H. Gotsch, "Technological Change and the Distribution of Income in Rural Areas," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, LIV (1972), pp. 326-41.

many governments and international agencies made corrective efforts to implement laws and policies aimed at reaching and benefiting the rural population through small farm strategies. This choice has been made easier by increasing evidence that small farms can be as productive with food crops and some non or near foods as the larger-scale commercial farms. For example, the highest yields of food grains per land unit in the world are found on small-scale holdings in Taiwan, South Korea, China and Japan.[14] Finally, increased understanding of the risks faced by small-scale farmers and the complex strategies they develop to deal with them have helped undermine the stereotype of the "fatalistic peasant" that had blocked many policy makers from pursuing small farm programs or projects.[15]

Agricultural vs. Rural Development

Mosher's influence in articulating the interrelated components necessary to create a progressive rural structure, and the theoretical guidelines developed by economists and other social scientists for making the rural sector a central focus of development efforts in many countries, has led the emergence of complex, well funded programatic efforts in the countryside. One of the results of this new, broadly focused emphasis has been the rise of integrated rural development projects, the subject of this paper. Another result, one that complicates the discussion on the administration of integration is the gradual blurring of the once clearly articulated distinction between agricultural and rural.

Rural Development has been defined in a number of ways by various academics,[16] but it has had a fairly consistant meaning in program implementation

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[14] See for example, Wyn F. Owen, "The Significance of Small Farms in Developing Countries," in Small Farm Agricultural Development Problems, edited by Huntly H. Biggs and Ronald L. Tinnermeier (Fort Collins: Colorado State University, 1974), pp. 31-6; Celso Furtado, Economic Development in Latin America (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1970), pp. 56-8.

[15] Illustrative of the new tendency to see peasants as "economic men" is: Davydd J. Greenwood, The Political Economy of Peasant Family Farming: Some Anthropological Perspectives on Rationality and Adaptation (Ithaca: Cornell University, Center for International Studies, Occasional Paper No. 2, 1973); A. V. Chayanov, "Peasant Farm Organization," in A. V. Chayanov: The Theory of Peasant Economy, edited by Thorner (Homewood: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1966); William Foote Whyte, Organizing for Agricultural Development (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1975). Joel S. Migdal, Peasants, Politics and Revolution (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974).

[16] Examples of groups of definitions differing from that used here are rural development: (1) as a redistribution of assets with projects centered on problems of access to land or other resources; (2) as focused on development of spatial and functional relationships between villages and major towns through projects that extend to rural areas services and resources monopolized by the urban sector; and (3) as the integration of planning and management aimed at strengthening the linkages between local, rural development institutions. Office of Development Information and Utilization, Development Information on Integrated Rural Development (Draft Document, Development Support Bureau, Agency for International Development, Washington, D.C., October 1978), p. 1.

contexts. In the past the tendency of organizations and experts was to define agricultural development as the increase in production of food and fiber and rural development as the improvement of the quality of rural life. Despite lingering bureaucratic divisions in some major donors or among development ministries in various countries,[17] rural development is increasingly considered to include both types of activities. Under this growing view, rural is typically defined as including the countryside and those villages or towns whose inhabitants are not deeply involved in the production of nonagricultural products for urban or export markets. It is increasingly clear that programs designed to promote one of these objectives invariably contain components that affect the other.

In this particular working paper, the distinction just made between agricultural and rural development will be followed, except both concepts will be considered linked in the phrase "integrated rural development."[18]

Attacking the Undefined

The increasing scope of rural development weighs heavily on those who design, implement or evaluate the diverse programs and projects that national governments and donors undertake in the small t is and countryside of the less developed world. In order to ensure the success of their primary tasks they are forced by that scope to think in terms of diverse, reinforcing activities. They are told that it is not wise to attack single constraints through narrow sector programs and that their programs must be linked together in a theoretically sound, integrated strategy. Approaches such as occurred in the springtime of Taiwan's JCRR, where anything that was needed or wanted was incorporated, without theoretical thought as to their relationships,[19] are said to not make developmental sense. As a guidepost to success they are handed quite general instructions on how to promote integrated rural development.

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[17] The earlier division is still reflected in USAID's distinction between agricultural and rural development offices--as well as health, education and population offices--in both Washington and the overseas missions. The U.S. Department of Agriculture and legislation such as the Rural Development Act of 1972 still maintain this distinction.

[18] An AID position paper on integrated rural development quotes Albert Waterston in support of this view: "The purpose of agricultural development--to increase agricultural production--deals with only one sector, farm commodities. The purpose of rural development--improve the standard of living of the rural population--is multisectoral including agriculture, industry, and social facilities." ODIU, Development Information, p. 79.

[19] See: John D. Montgomery, Rufus B. Hughes, and Raymond H. Davis, Rural Improvement and Political Development: The JCRR Model (Washington, D.C.: American Society for Public Administration, Special Series Papers on Comparative Administration No. 7, 1966).

These are not very helpful because the notion has been expanded to become a pedestrian, hackneyed equivalent of "rural development."

To a large extent this is due to the fact that definitions of integrated rural development and statements of its objectives have tended to become increasingly vague and generalized. A good example of this is Betru Gebregiabher's statement:

> "In the final analysis, integrated rural development involves all the things that can most improve the living conditions of the rural masses."[20]

In this sense, Charles Steedman is correct in his comment that:

> "... the integrated rural development concept suffers from the weakness of over-reaching itself... the dilemma of IRD is that in trying to do everything, it may end up doing nothing."[21]

The frustration faced by development experts who consistently run into the typically overblown concept is well summed up by Development Alternatives Incorporated's Charles F. Sweet:

> "My difficulty with the term 'integrated rural development' is that it has become a guise for almost any effort directed at a rural area. I have heard many definitions, but few appear to represent viable development approaches."[22]

His perception of this problem is widely shared in the development community.[23]

[20]Betru Gebreziabher, Integrated Development in Rural Ethiopia: An Evaluative Study of the Chilalo Agricultural Development Unit (Bloomington: International Development Research Center, PASITAM, University of Indiana 1975).

[21]Charles Steedman, "What Happened to the Concept of Integrated Rural Development" (Unpublished Paper, 1977).

[22]Charles F. Sweet, Perspectives on the Process Approach to Rural Development (Washington, D.C.: Development Alternatives, Inc., Occasional Staff Papers No. 4, 1978), p.8.

[23]Samuel H. Butterfield, now USAID Mission Director in Nepal, sums up the development community feelings: "Regarding semantics, the first step in a practical approach to integrated rural development might be to dispense with the term 'integrated.' Integrated rural development may describe an ultimate national model that would be worth achieving, but it does not comport with reality in very many places in which AID is now working. Also, in AID it has become associated in many officers' minds with donor-orchestrated pilot projects which, while useful in many respects, have generally proved too expansive in terms of funds and scarce managerial talent to permit national replication." (The IBRD Rural Development Report steers away from the term "integrated.") "Draft Summary Statement of A Practical Agency Approach to Rural Development" (Washington, D.C., Paper for USAID/AA/TA, February 28, 1975), Tab I, p. 1.

Yet if his notion of the pedestrian use of the concept is correct one wonders if the critics of integrated rural development have not built their castles on sand foundations.

The most fashionable critique of integrated rural development is that of Vernon W. Ruttan.[24] He argues that integrated rural development is an "ideology in search of a methodology or a technology."[25] A close look at the article, however, reveals that Ruttan has failed to define integrated rural development. Indeed, he clearly, if implicitly, treates the concept as if it were synonymous with rural development broadly construed. The article considers why so many rural development projects are failures and what processes and institutions are essential to the success of future rural development programs.[26] It in no way distinguishes or addresses the particular subset of projects that should be considered to constitute the integrated type.

In reviewing Ruttan's argument one is reminded of Voltair's dictum: "Before we debate let us define our terms." The point here is that Ruttan shows little sensitivity to the diverse meanings that the notion of integrated rural development has taken at the hands of professionals and policy makers. In the end he attacks the emergent, meaningless form that Sweet so clearly identifies. Such a strawman is easy to attack.

In order to establish how clearly Ruttan failed to come to grips with the concept and to shift the focus from definition of integrated rural development and debate about its goals to practical analysis as to how to integrate diverse and essential reinforcing rural development activities, it is necessary to spend some time clearing away the underbrush. Hence, the next section will briefly trace the origins of the concept, the debates over its meaning, and the critiques of national or donor policies advocating its application to the countryside of the development world.

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[24] Vernon W. Ruttan, "Integrated Rural Development Programs: A Skeptical Perspective," International Development Review, XVIII, 4 (1974/75), pp. 9-16.

[25] Ibid., p. 14.

[26] In essence the article addresses the ways in which rural progress is limited by urban growth rates, inadequately tailored technological packages, inefficient institutional frameworks and managerial or bureaucratic incapacity. Only at the broadest level does it consider integration, here in the sense of integrating rural and urban markets, and so on.

Section II

Integrated Rural Development: Beyond Definition to Administration

Origins of the Concept

i. Ford Foundation and Comilla

While development historians privy to the minutes of the development communities' endless meetings and conferences may find deeper roots,[27] it seems most useful to place the birth of integrated rural development in the Ford Foundation's efforts to deal with the 1966 famine in India. Just as the first development decade was beginning, but before the acceptance of the theoretical notion that for many countries agriculture could be the engine rather than the handmaiden of economic growth, a team of Ford Foundation specialists studying possibilities and ways of increasing food production in India drafted a report entitled "India's Food Crisis and Steps to Meet It."[28] The report argued that an intensive, focused and integrated effort was needed to stimulate India's agricultural sector and suggested a ten point program for achieving this goal: (1) adequate and accessible farm supplies; (2) adequate farm credit; (3) intensive educational programs; (4) single individual farm plans; (5) stronger village institutions; (6) assurred prices for agricultural; (7) reliable marketing facilities; (8) rural public works; (9) evaluation and analysis; and (10) a coordinated approach.

To those with longer memory and extensive experience, the Ford report merely confirmed what they already knew and restated what had already been tried in perhaps less self-conscious ways.[29] What the Ford report did was

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[27] For example Zandstra, et al. point at the Shell Foundation project at Borgo a Mozzano in rural Italy as the earliest of the integrated rural development projects, begun in 1974. Caqueza, p. 23. See: L. E. Virone, "Borgo a Mozzano and Other Similar Projects in Rural Development Sponsored by Shell Companies," in Change in Agriculture, edited by A. H. Bunting (London: Dunkworth, 1970), pp. 323-336.

[28] Government of India, Suggestions for a 10-Point Programme to Increase Food Production (New Delhi: Ministry of Food, Agriculture, Community Development and Cooperation, 1959); and Report on India's Food Crisis and Steps to Meet It (New Delhi: Ministry of Food, Agriculture, Community Development and Cooperation, 1959).

[29] During the 1950s some projects in Greece, Latin America and India combined many elements of what today might be considered integrated rural development. An excellent example of this is the Sudan's Gezira Scheme. Arthur Gaitskell, Gezira: A Story of Development in the Sudan (London: Faber and Farber, 1959). Other examples would include the Helmand Valley project in Afghanistan in 1946; Cornell's Vicos project begun in Peru in 1952.

make the concept of integrating rural development activities highly visible and notably different from the then dominant community development model,[30] particularly in regard to efforts to improve the productivity of small-scale farmers and promote more efficient and cooperative institutional performance.[31] The ten point program laid out in the report became the basis of India's Intensive Agricultural District Program.[32] At the heart of that effort lay the notion of a package of reinforcing activities applied to a particular area. The step from that strategy to the notion of integrated rural development was a swift one, and it came primarily through the widely publicized Comilla Project.

In the history of international development, Comilla, or the Pakistan Academy of Rural Development, must rank as one of the most influential programs in the Third World.[33] The project was located at the district or thana level and centered on four major components: (1) a thana Training and Development Center; (2) a public works program for road embankments and drainage; (3) a decentralized small-scale irrigation program; and (4) a two-tiered cooperative

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[30] The literature suggests that community development programs stressed a small number of services or activities, implying among other things that they were not sufficiently comprehensive to be effective. For an interesting criticism to this view see: Lane E. Holdcroft, The Rise and Fall of Community Development in Developing Countries, 1950-65: A Critical Analysis and an Annotated Bibliography (East Lansing: Department of Agricultural Economics, Michigan State University, Rural Development Paper No. 2, 1978).

[31] As Ruttan notes: "Neither the communities themselves nor the village-level worker had access to the materials necessary for high productivity technologies, or the knowledge and authority to realize more efficient institutional performance." "Integrated Rural Development," p. 9. See: Guy Hunter, The Administration of Agricultural Development: Lessons from India (London: Oxford University Press, 1970); Albert Mayer, et al., Pilot Project, India (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1959).

[32] See: D. D. Brown, Agricultural Development in Indian Districts (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971); Rakesh Mohan and Robert E. Evenson, "The Intensive Agricultural Districts Programme in India: A New Evaluation," Journal of Development Studies, XI, 3 (1975), pp. 135-54.

[33] The best description of the project is: Arthur F. Raper, et al., Rural Development in Action: The Comprehensive Experiment at Comilla, East Pakistan (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1970); Robert D. Stevens, "Comilla Rural Development Program to 1971," in Rural Development in Bangladesh and Pakistan, edited by Robert D. Stevens, et al. (Honolulu: East-West Center, University Press of Hawaii, 1976); Harvey M. Choldin, "An Organizational Analysis of Rural Development Projects at Comilla, East Pakistan," Economic Development and Cultural Change, XX (1972), pp. 671-90.

system.[34] The objectives of the project were to modernize agriculture and improve quality of rural life through the formation of farmers' cooperatives and promotion of more responsive government services. A two tiered co-operative system was formed to assist farmers through loans and the provision of agricultural inputs. At the same time the academy studied the local area, developed priorities for removing development constraints, and sought to improve the capacity of the government's development ministries and agencies to effectively meet local needs. Integration was promoted by the Thana Training and Development Center which housed government field agents assigned development tasks and sought to coordinate their activities with those of local institutions and leaders. Out of the Center's efforts came the Rural Public Works Program, the Thana Irrigation Program, the Rural Education Program and the Women's Program and Family Planning. In the process of implementing these programs all kinds of local groups--from Islamic religious preceptors to housewives, brickmakers, farmers and rickshaw pullers--were organized.

The image of the project outside East Pakistan was that of an integrated effort to attack agricultural production constraints and coordinate rural services in ways that promoted communication between villagers and outside sources of knowledge, giving local government officials and local people a larger voice in the enterprise of development. The promotion of diverse activities in one project--credit, inputs, farmer training, cooperative formation, adult literacy, flood cannal clearing, road embankment construction, irrigation promotion, and so on--helped forge the model of an integrated rural development project. Only years later was the successful image of the project questioned through evidence that richer farmers benefited more than poor ones and realization that the project was too costly and management intensive to be replicated elsewhere.[35] And only years later was it clear to Khan that even his well regarded project had not fully succeeded in overcoming

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[34]The basic cooperative unit was the village primary cooperative (KSS, Krishi Samabaya Samiti) consisting of about 200 households and a federation at the thana level (ACF, Agricultural Cooperatives Federation). It served to provide credit, distribute improved inputs and mobilize savings. Cooperatives did not seek to pool individually owned inputs for cooperation in production aspects.

[35]See for example the careful evaluations of the project by Harry W. Blair, "Rural Development, Class Structure and Bureaucracy in Bangladesh," World Development, VI, 1 (1978), pp. 65-82; Azizur Rahman Khan, "The Comilla Model and the Integrated Rural Development Programme of Bangladesh: An experiment in 'Cooperative Capitalism,'" World Development, VII (1979), pp. 397-422.

the persistent difficulties of achieving coordination among the major components of the program or in establishing it on a self-sustaining basis.[36] By then, however, the model suggested had been widely adopted in other less developed countries.

ii. CADU as Example of the Emerging Model

The growing influence of the new economics of growth,[37] arguing for sustained agricultural and rural development as a key to increases in productivity and quality of life, combined with the publicity given Comilla's successes to produce a rapid increase in the type of project now widely denominated as "integrated rural development." This occurred in the late 1960s, during the days of heady optimism about the promise of the green revolution.

Among the best known and most significant of this first flash of integrated rural development projects are the Puebla Project in Mexico (1967),[38] the Chilalo Project in Ethiopia (1968), the Lilongwe Project in Malawi (1968) and the Vihiga Project in Kenya (1970).[39] Of these early efforts, the Chilalo Agricultural Development Unit (CADU) is a typical and influential example.

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[36] Akhter Hameed Khan, "Comilla Revisited: May-June 1977" (Paper Prepared for Department of Agricultural Economics, Michigan State University, 1977). From the administrative side he notes: "...in actual practice, the four programs suffered from distortion, mismanagement, corruption and subversion... There was the disapproval of rural autonomy by politicians and bureaucrats. They had more faith in their own paternal role than in village wisdom." p. 1, 6. He found the training centers flourishing, but "the attempt to separate development functions from magisterial law and order and revenue functions being repudiated." His general conclusion was that "the truly integrated general development program will be a coordinated synthesis of the Thana Training and Development Center, the Thana Drainage and Road Works Programme, the Thana Irrigation Programme, and the Cooperative Project." ODIU, Development Information, p. 14.

[37] The emergent literature on agriculture led growth is summarized in: Bruce F. Johnston and Peter Kilby's unimodal model. Agriculture and Structural Transformation: Economic Strategies in Late-Developing Countries (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975). John W. Mellor, The New Economics of Growth: A Strategy for India and the Developing World (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1976).

[38] Puebla is not a multi-sector project. But it is generally considered an integrated rural development approach because of the range of activities involved, the number of services provided the small farmer, and its concentration in a specific area.

[39] For a comparative analysis of these significant projects as well as those presented in Table I see: Cynthia Clapp, "Significant Cases in Integrated Rural Development Experience" (Paper Prepared as Teaching Materials, Development Studies Program, Agency for International Development, Washington, D.C. December 8, 1978).

It is referred to in its own and other's literature as both a package project and an integrated rural development project, a distinction often used to separate the early efforts focused largely on a set of agricultural inputs to the evolving notion of mutually reinforcing agricultural and non-agricultural services.

CADU was an integrated rural development project undertaken in the western region of Ethiopia's potentially productive Arussi Province by the Swedish International Development Agency.[40] CADU was formed as an independent unit within the Ministry of Agriculture and charged with implementing the project in the Chilalo area of Arussi Province. It was funded by both the Ethiopian government and SIDA, and coordinated by a ministerial committee established to integrate the project with other activities concurrently being undertaken by other ministries of the Ethiopian government. The project was originally scheduled to run for a thirteen-year period with total expenditures of $US 25.3 million. From 1968 to 1973, approximately $US 16 million was spent. The structure of in-country organization for the project is illustrated in Figure 1.



———— Lines of Decision Making
---------- Lines of Information and Coordination
-.-.-.-.- Budget and Work Plan Approval

Figure I. Structure of Organization for CADU Within Ethiopian Government

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[40] Basic background materials on CADU include: Bengt Nekby, CADU: An Ethiopian Experiment in Developing Peasant Farming (Stockholm: Prisma Publishers, 1971); John M. Cohen, "Rural Change in Ethiopia: The Chilalo Agricultural Development Unit," Economic Development and Cultural Change, XXII, 4 (1974), pp. 580-614; and his "Effects of Green Revolution Strategies on Tenants and Small-Scale Landowners in the Chilalo Region of Ethiopia," Journal of Developing Areas, IX, 3 (1975), pp. 335-58; and Betru Gebregziabher, Integrated Development in Rural Ethiopia. The description which follows is taken from the author's long evaluation of the project in: John M. Cohen and Norman T. Uphoff, Rural Development Participation: Concepts and Measures for Project Design, Implementation and Evaluation (Ithaca: Cornell University, Rural Development Committee, Monograph Series No. 2, 1977), pp. 184-99.

At the initiation of the project, the goals for the undertaking were: (1) to bring about economic and social development in the awraja; (2) to give the local population an increased awareness of and responsibility for development work; (3) to verify methods of agricultural development; and (4) to train staff not only for the project itself but for other, similar efforts elsewhere. The basic strategy in this initial stage was that economic change would be given priority and social change would be expected to follow its success. The thrust of the project, therefore, was to assist farmers to adopt new methods and practices. Living standards were to be generally raised by increasing agricultural productivity through use of improved varieties plus provision of credit and marketing facilities.

With the signing of a new agreement in 1971 to cover the next stage of project, the following goals were stated in more explicit form: (1) the main goal was to be achievement of economic and social development throughout the project area; (2) activities toward this end were to be so conducted as to ensure the participation of project area population with their assuming increasing responsibility for those activities; (3) CADU was to avoid adverse employment effects (tenant evictions) and to create additional employment where possible; (4) activities were to be directed mainly toward farmers in low-income brackets; (5) suitable methods were to be continually sought for bringing about agricultural development elsewhere in Ethiopia in an integrated manner; and (6) financial resources were to be increased through improvement in the taxpaying ability of the project area population.

The range and content of project activities can be elaborated with reference to the internal organization and task assignments within CADU, shown in Figure 2. Responsibility for different project activities was



Figure 2. Organization Chart of CADU through 1971

Note: The structure of CADU was reorganized in the middle of 1971, but the second organizational format did not differ significantly from the earlier one.

entrusted to various departments and sections, all of which operated within the common framework of an established work schedule and budget. An executive director was responsible for the overall operation of the project.

The range of agricultural and rural development activities integrated by the CADU project are briefly described below:

1. Crop Production

   Survey and Experimentation: finding new crops and plant varieties, determining optimum growing techniques, establishing pasture improvement methods, regulating improved seed production, improving knowledge of soil conditions and techniques for drainage and erosion control, training extension staff in these new techniques.

   Implements Research: developing new tools for soil preparation, increasing knowledge of conditions under which more mechanized operations could be profitably employed, training extension staff in use of new equipment, training artisans to produce and maintain it.

2. Animal Production

   Livestock and Research: establishing optimal breeding and management methods for diary cattle, sheep and poultry, training of extension staff in new methods.

   Veterinary Services: increase knowledge of prevailing livestock diseases, suppress diseases through preventive services and maintain health of animal population through curative services, introduction of artificial insemination to upgrade cattle, train extension staff in veterinary fundamentals, control milk hygiene.

   Livestock Production: production and sale of upgraded cattle for improvement of milk production.

3. Forestry

   Establishing nursery techniques and methods of planting and management of plantations, finding suitable tree species for the various ecological zones, increasing planting of trees for fuel and construction purposes and for soil erosion control, producing seedlings, establishing timber plantations, reforesting government lands.

4. Extension and Education

   Agricultural Extension: promote adoption of new products, methods and inputs for agricultural development through demonstrations, advice and assistance regarding credit applications, improve knowledge of agricultural conditions through annual analysis of demonstration results, prepare for extension of project's geographic coverage.

Women's Extension: raising concern for development among women in the project area, training them in home economics, establishing women's groups.

Cooperative Extension: creation of cooperative societies to undertake marketing of produce and procurement of supplies and credit.

Training: selection of groups for special training in various aspects of change process, training project staff such as marketing foremen and extension workers, in-service training of CADU staff, offering courses for agricultural staff of other projects.

Information: increase knowledge of development programs and project objectives and achievements, create special campaigns to promote various project activities, in cooperation with the government disseminate information about legislation pertinent to project goals, promote self-help schemes particularly for water and education, promote adult literacy.

5. Commerce and Industry

Establishment of economic incentives for producers by ensuring marketing outlets and fair prices, provision of seed, fertilizer and other inputs, promotion of capital accumulation through savings schemes, assist creation and management of cooperative societies.

6. Other Services

Water Development: organize self-help schemes for building water supply systems, create water supply facilities in accordance with a master plan, increase existing knowledge of hydrological conditions in the region.

Public Health: carry out measures to prevent communicable diseases within area, undertake basic health education for population.

Construction Services: provide equipment and technical skills for project construction projects.

Common Services: provide bookkeeping and other administrative services to the various departments, maintain vehicles for project.

Planning and Evaluation

Maintain a continual evaluation of the entire organization, ensure the efficiency of its various units, recommend ways to improve the attainment of project goals, identify and conduct feasibility studies on potential projects and activities, collect statistical data on the project area and the effects of project activities, develop methodology for planning and evaluation feedback process within project.

This last section, explicitly devoted to evaluation activities, was rather novel for a development project as seldom has this function been specifically provided for within the structure of a project.

The underlying assumption for the project was that for the rural population to realize the possibilities of change, the first step in this direction would come with the establishment of improved marketing facilities. It could be argued that under the conditions of Chilalo, land reform would provide a sounder first stage, since experience in other countries indicated that providing services and capital inputs in areas untouched by agrarian reforms generally results in a maldistribution of benefits toward wealthier, large-scale farmers. But since such reforms were not judged feasible at the outset, the only realistic strategy appeared to be to begin by trying to bring the peasants into the market economy by offering them an opportunity to sell their produce at fair and stable prices. The idea was that as peasants then became involved in the market they would more readily accept the utilization of improved inputs with new varieties of produce, stimulated by offering simple and attractive credit facilities backed up by demonstration of benefits from new inputs by extension and education activities. In the process, CADU was to supply a number of services such as water, education and health and it was hoped the Ethiopian government would introduce some type of tenure reform by the time the overall process had gained momentum, as illustrated in Figure 3.



Figure 3. Basic Economic Development Strategy of CADU

Beginning in 1967 and 1968, CADU introduced trading centers in small market towns offering farmers the possibility of selling milk and wheat at fair, stable prices. These products were chosen because the area was best suited for producing them. Purchase prices for both were maintained above the traditional market prices, which was not difficult to do given the exorbitant margins characteristic of past purchasing practices. Though marketing services were intended for small farmers and tenants, CADU purchased grain and milk from all farmers in order to lower operating costs by increasing its volume.

Since CADU's technological package was similar to existing practices and since risk of failure was relatively low, the project's innovations were attractive. Moreover, the credit program did not require high resource requirements and the pay-off period was short, generally the time it took for grain to grow and be harvested. As a result of these favorable project characteristics the number of farmers participating in the project expanded rapidly.

CADU's marketing activities supported introduction of the three main program elements--improved inputs, credit, and extension demonstrations. Early in the project, good results had been achieved in varietal research,

so the project was soon ready to distribute improved seed varieties, as well as to inform farmers of appropriate practices for soil preparation, seeding rates, weed control, crop rotations, etc. The method used for introducing these improvements to the farmers was to create an extension system based on model farmers and demonstration plots.

Each loan application had to be supported by a simple farm production plan drawn up by the farmer-applicant and extension agent specifying the needed new inputs and related agricultural practices. If the application was approved, the farmer would obtain the requested supplies from the trade center upon paying 25 percent of their value. A 9-month loan agreement was made for repayment of the remainder of the cost of the inputs after the harvest, with interest calculated at 12 percent per annum. Farmers who did not repay their loans were excluded from obtaining future loans.

Loans were extended in the form of inputs but repaid in cash. This brought farmers into the monetary economy since they sold their increased production to CADU's marketing division. CADU stored this grain and sold it later at higher prices on the national market. Hence, participation in credit-taking led to participation in the cash economy.

To facilitate reaching potential participants in the project's activities, CADU set up extension areas under an extension agent who worked with a number of model farmers who had been designated from among those nominated by farmers themselves. Extension agents were located in specific towns where they maintained demonstration plots in addition to those started with each model farmer. The results in the first year of demonstration were remarkable, and demand for these inputs and marketing services began immediately, as seen in the tables on page 23 below. The extension of credit and distributon in inputs grew rapidly after 1968 when first introduced and as trade centers were increased in number from nine in 1968 to 25 two years later.

In the course of this rapid expansion of activity, extension agents and trade centers came under great pressure of increased demand, and there is some evidence that the network of extension areas expanded too rapidly.[41] Still, the project had the favorable "characteristics" of fairly intense administrative coverage and reasonably good accessibility. Though roads in the area were poor, trade centers were well distributed, and by LDC standards, the number of extension agents was considerable.

In the sale of seeds, fertilizer and other farm goods, CADU tried only to break even, with margins figured only to cover administrative, transport and storage costs. As a rule, no subsidies were utilized in any CADU project activities, with the basic policy being that beneficiaries should absorb all

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[41] Extension agents in the process of assisting in credit application and farm plan preparation could get quite involved in giving advice on better farm management practices, over and above their maintaining crop demonstrations. Trade centers were selling seeds, fertilizer concentrate, implements, insecticides, herbicides, knapsack sprayers, plastic buckets and milk pots, while serving also as centers for purchase of food grains.

costs of marketing activities and so that CADU's marketing operations would break even in purely commercial terms. Existing commercial profit margins in the rural areas were sufficiently high to permit CADU to "compete" from the outset, and the increased volume of sales and purchases right from 1968, shown in Tables 1, 2 and 3 indicated that CADU's operations were judged beneficial by rural producers.

From a project perspective, the benefits generated by marketing, input, credit and extension activities appeared to be a very sound investment. For purposes of calculating cost-benefit ratios and internal rates of return, benefits were figured solely in terms of improved wheat seeds, and as seen in Table 4, after an initial period of heavy investment, total minimum benefits by 1970/71 were rapidly increasing. By this time, it should be added, benefits were also accruing from the use of fertilizer as well as minor activities in barley, flax, fodder and beet seeds, milk sales, veterinary services, and health and water programs, so the maximum benefits were if anything considerably more. In direct monetary terms,it was estimated that households participating in CADU activities increased their real household income by some 50 to 100 percent.

However, such data as reported in this table and the preceding three tables do not measure or indicate changes in income distribution, employment within the project area, population migration, tenant eviction, increase in tax collection and public services, changes in expectations, living conditions, food consumption patterns, health, acceptance of new agricultural implements, public participation in the project, attitudes of the population toward change, or many other changes associated positively or negatively with development.

There was a general appreciation that CADU should improve the local population's willingness and ability to participate in processes of rural change. But more effort was directed toward the former--trying to make the target population aware of possibilities of change and stimulating needs which their cooperation and activity could satisfy--than toward the latter, which required more development of local organization and some change in their very weak power position. The general strategy with respect to participation was in part to organize cooperative societies and in part to make direct contacts with local people to win their confidence and support, both approaches to stimulate self-help community schemes as well as changes in individual behavior. The strategy is presented diagrammatically in Figure 4.



Figure 4: Basic Social Change and Participation Strategy of CADU

Table 1

Amount of Credit and Number of Loans Extended by CADU
1967/68 to 1974/75

Year	Number of Loans	Total Amount of Credit ($E)
1967/68	189	15,700
1968/69	868	158,461
1969/70	4,769	502,875
1970/71	14,146	1,437,517
1971/72	12,642	1,063,120
1972/73	13,302	961,938
1973/74*	25,201*	n.a.
1974/75*	40,000 est.*	n.a.

Table 2

Sales of Improved Wheat Seed and Fertilizer by CADU
1967/68 to 1974/75

Year	Improved Wheat Seed (in quintals)	Fertilizer (in quintals)
1967/68	1,470	42
1968/69	4,540	2,820
1969/70	8,202	15,380
1970/71	13,434	41,461
1971/72	2,698	35,309
1972/73	1,640	32,051
1973/74*	2,500*	75,000*
1974/75*	12,000*	60,000*

Table 3

Milk Purchases From Collection Stations by CADU,
1967/68 to 1974/75

Year	Liters Collected
1967/68	4,000
1968/69	136,000
1969/70	318,000
1970/71	159,000
1971/72	147,113
1972/73	262,099
1973/74*	320,000*
1974/75*	323,017*

*Years after land reform began following military coup d' Etat.

Table 4

Cost/Benefit and Internal Rate of Return of CADU Project
1967/68 to 1970/71

Subject	1967/68	1968/69	1969/70	1970/71 (est.)
Total Minimum Benefits (E$)	52,080	511,157	1,726,806	3,954,119
Total Net Project Cost (E$)	2,880,100	7,312,500	3,660,800	5,636,400
Difference (E$)	2,828,020	6,801,343	1,933,994	1,682,211
Internal Rate of Return (%)	--	5%	13%	20%

Source: CADU, Cost/Benefit Analysis on CADU for 1967/68-1974/75 (Asella: CADU, Planning and Evaluation Section, 1971), p. 5.

It is important to note that little effort was made to gain the support and acceptance of project activities by local government personnel or those rural and town community leaders who make up the provincial elite of the region's social system. Basically, the project went against the interests of many government officials, major merchants and businessmen, large landowners, traditional secular and religious leaders and a host of local notables. Significant change and particularly land tenure reforms or peasant mobilization would threaten the power and status of these elites. But this issue was actually side-stepped because the project had few of the participation effects it was intended to promote, at least through 1974 when there was a change in government.

Those who benefited did so by preparing a farm plan, taking credit, using the new varieties and marketing facilities. Considering figures on this as aggregate measures of participation in benefits as seen from the earlier tables, there was certainly a rapid expansion of such participation. It can be extrapolated from these figures that by 1971, about 25 percent of the target population was being reached by CADU activities. Farmers were buying "green revolution" inputs, improving livestock production and beginning to market milk. Wheat and barley production expanded dramatically, and as a measure of benefit, it is estimated that participating farmers and households increased their real income by 50-100 percent. But beyond such income increases, it appears that the major benefits generated by the project have tended to accrue mostly to provincial elites.

Although CADU stimulated dramatic economic growth, most of the envisioned social change did not come about. Moreover, a number of harmful consequences resulted. Although the project was designed to improve and develop the agrarian production of tenants and small-scale landowners, the effects of better agricultural techniques and use of improved seeds and fertilizers were communicated to surrounding landowners. Major as well as middle-sized landowners came to realize that agriculture could be very lucrative. The result was that land prices nearly doubled, and tenants' rents were raised to half of their production (up from one-third). There was pressure to convert pasture land into cultivated area, and large-scale mechanization arrived in force--the use of tractors stimulated by tax and credit incentives instituted by the central government. Outsiders moved in to buy or contract land and take advantage of the infrastructural and production advantages created by more than five years of activity by CADU and its maximum package program. Other negative effects ranged from the absorption of real income gains through increased corruption by local government officials and administrators, to burgeoning market profits by grain buyers who still were able to direct wheat sales to themselves rather than to CADU trade centers because of credit and social obligations.

Given that the existing political and social system changed little through 1974, it is easy to see how the effects of its rigidities began to manifest themselves in project performance. Their cumulative effects contributed to a leveling-out of growth in CADU activities around 1973, with participation stabilized at about 12,000 peasant households absorbing about E$ 900,000 in credit and using about 35,000 quintals of fertilizer. This pattern suggests that little further advance would result without giving more weight to social change and equity considerations, rather than concentrating on production increases as had been the case. In fact, such changes were initiated in the wake of the 1974 revolution, which made land reform one of its major policies for rural development.[42]

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[42]Since early 1974, Ethiopia has been undergoing a remarkable societal transformation. Specifically, an official ideology of Ethiopian-style socialism and a program of "anti feudalism, bureaucratic capitalism and imperialism" have been proclaimed. The former landed aristocracy has been isolated, imprisoned or executed, many senior central government and provincial administrative personnel have been removed, and the monarchy has been abolished and the constitution suspended. Far-reaching urban and rural land reforms have been decreed, with a wide range of rural programs being implemented which aim to mobilize the peasantry. The foremost of these programs is the formation of peasant associations and the use of more than 40,000 university and high school students to help organize the peasantry and bring about improvements in the living standards of rural people. Under the land tenure reforms, all private holding has been abolished and peasants given usufructory rights over up to 10 hectares of land. For further information, see John M. Cohen, Arthur A. Goldsmith, and John W. Mellor, Revolution and Land Reform in Ethiopia: Peasant Associations, Local Government and Rural Rural Development (Ithaca: Cornell University, Rural Development Committee, Occasional Paper No. 6, 1976); Colin Legum, Ethiopia: The Fall of Haile Selassie's Empire (New York: Africana Publishing Company, 1975); and Marina and David Ottaway, Ethiopia: Empire in Revolution (New York: Africana Publishing Co., 1978).

Up through 1974, the price of economic growth was paid most significantly by landless peasants who were evicted to make way for profitable mechanized production. This was a price easily extracted from approximately 3,500 peasant households because of the lack of legal protection afforded to tenants. This unintended consequence of the CADU project--belatedly recognized by project designers and highly embarrassing to the foreign donor--points up the risk integrated rural development projects can pose for the large percentage of the developing world's people who are landless and powerless.[43]

iii. Growth with Equity: Revised and Increased Emphasis

CADU's alarming message about tenant eviction and the risks of the green revolution was confirmed by signals from an increasing number of agricultural and rural development projects throughout the world.[44] This was met by a great deal of rethinking about development, the result being a dramatic increase in rural development efforts coupled with a shift in focus to include the poorest of the rural population together with small scale farmers as the primary targets of projects. In the process, integrated rural development became one of the major approaches used by policy makers to respond to increasing rural inequality.[45]

This increase and shift in rural development emphasis resulted from donor led policy initiatives designed to check the increasingly clear trend that the benefits of growth were not reaching the large percentage of the rural poor. Specifically, the gap between the top twenty percent of many LDC populations

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[43]The increasing recognition of the problems of the landless and the major problems their plight poses for the design of rural development efforts is set forth in: Milton J. Esman, Landlessness and Near-Landlessness in Developing Countries (Ithaca: Cornell University, Rural Development Committee, Special Series on Landlessness and Near-Landlessness. No. 1, 1978). Erik Eckholm. The Dispossessed of the Earth: Land Reform and Sustainable Development (Washington, D.C.: Worldwatch Institute, Paper No. 30, 1979); Inderjit Singh, Small Farmers and the Landless in South Asia (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, Staff Working Paper No. 320, 1979).

[44]The critique of the green revolution and its effort on inequality is illustrated by: Keith Griffin, The Political Economy of Agrarian Change: An Essay on the Green Revolution (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1974); Harry M. Cleaver, Jr., "The Contradictions of the Green Revolution," American Economic Review, LXII, 2 (1972), pp. 177-86.

[45]For a specific application of this argument in Colombia, see: Steffen W. Schmidt, "Integrated Rural Development: The Response of Policy Makers to Rural Inequality" (Paper Presented to 36th Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, April 20-22, 1978).

and the bottom twenty percent was growing wider.[46] Sustained criticism of the causes of this problem[47] led to policy decisions that development efforts in general, and agricultural or rural efforts in particular, must seek to move beyond growth to equitably improving the quality of life of the large percentage of less developed world's population who are poor, malnourished and ill-housed, most of whom live in the rural sector. A number of analysts see the real rationale for integrated rural development as that of responding to this need.[48]

Academics promoting increased emphasis on the rural poor[49] were supported by a growing number of politicians and policy makers who were increasingly aware how wrong Marx and other theorists had been about the revolutionary

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[46]Criticism of urban-industry strategies based on this trend is represented by: Gunnar Myrdal, "Equity and Growth," World Development I, 11 (1973); I.Adleman and C. T. Morris, "An Anatomy of Income Distribution Patterns in Developing Countries," Development Digest (October 1971), pp. 24-38; Arun Shourie, "Growth, Poverty and Inequalities," Foreign Affairs, LI, 2 (1973), pp.340-353; Roger D. Hanson, "The Emerging Challenge: Global Distribution of Income and Employment Opportunity," in Agenda for Action 1975 (New York: Praeger, 1975). Statistics on poverty and income distribution problems are found in Hollis Chenery, et al., Redistribution With Growth (London: Oxford University Press, 1974).

[47]See Dudley Seers, "The Meaning of Development," International Development Review, XI, 4 (1969), pp. 2-6; Keith Marsden, "Towards a Synthesis of Economic Growth and Social Justice," International Labour Review, C, 5 (1969), pp. 389-412; Mahbub ul Haq, "Employment in the 1970's: A New Perspective," International Development Review, XIII, 4 (1971), pp. 8-12. The effects of growth without equity on the rural poor majority are well illustrated in: Charles Elliott, Patterns of Poverty in the Third World: A Study of Social and Economic Stratification (New York: Praeger, 1975); Michael Lipton, Why Poor People Stay Poor: Urban Bias in World Development (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977).

[48]Typical of these is: Herbert R. Kötter, "Some Observations on the Basic Principles and General Strategy Underlying Integrated Rural Development," Monthly Bulletin of Agricultural Economics and Statistics, XXIII, 4 (1974), pp. 1-12.

[49]For example: Edgar Owens and Robert Shaw, Development Reconsidered: Bridging the Gap Between Government and People (Lexington: D.C. Heath and Company, 1972); Mahbub ul Haq. "Employment and Income Distribution in the 1970s: A New Perspective," Development Digest (October, 1971); Lester R. Brown, By Bread Alone (New York: Praeger, 1974); Carl H. Gotsch, "Technological Change and the Distribution of Inocme in Rural Areas," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, LIV (1972), pp. 326-41; Irma Adelman and Cynthia T. Morris, Economic Growth and Social Equity in Developing Countries (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1973).

potential of poor peasants.[50] They were more sensitive than development analysts to events in China, Cuba, Vietnam and other countries where popularly supported guerrilla movements in the countryside had been critical to major political shifts in world politics. "Containing the green uprising "[51] added a counter-insurgency pressure for increased poverty focused rural development efforts in general, and integrated rural development projects in particular.

Powerful political pressures to increase rural development activities began to come from a number of international organizations, foremost of which was the World Bank. This was well expressed in Robert S. McNamara's now famous statement:

> "Without rapid progress in smallholder agriculture throughout the developing world, there is little hope either of achieving long-term stable economic growth or significantly reducing the levels of absolute poverty...The fact is that very little has been done over the past two decades specifically designed to increase the productivity of subsistence agriculture."[52]

The Bank's concern was followed by legislative injunctions about donor activities, calling for increased concentration of development resources on the more than 700 million people who live on the edge of survival.[53] Rural development programming received a substantial shot in the arm, and more so-called integrated rural development projects appeared than ever before, multiplying the diversity of designs. By 1975 Mosher could note with much support that:

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[50] On this point see Karl Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte (New York: International Publishers, 1957), p. 109.

[51] The concern with the revolutionary potential of peasants and the threat to Western interests and political stability is well exhibited in the influential chapter "containing the green uprising" in Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), pp. 433-461. The image the well-off post industrial countries threatened by a worldwide majority of poor and oppressed peoples is perhaps best expressed by: Robert L. Heilbroner, An Inquiry into the Human Prospect (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1974).

[52] Robert S. McNamara, "Address to the Board of Governors, Nairobi, Kenya, September 1972" (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1973), p. 14.

[53] Best known of these is the so called "Congressional Mandate" by which the U.S. Congress in its 1973 Foreign Assistance Act made clear the need to end the trickle down approach to development and concentrate on the lower 40 percent of the population of the less developed countries. See: Implementation of "New Directions" in Development Assistance (Report Prepared by AID for Committee on International Relations on Implementation of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1973, 94th Congress, 1st Session, July 22, 1975).

> "...in recent years...there has been a growing espousal of integrated projects and programs of rural development based largely on the argument that no one development (such as the Green Revolution) is a panacea; what we need are projects and programs dealing simultaneously with a number of different aspects of rural well-being."[54]

Hence, it was now widely accepted that while agriculture could be an engine for growth, its benefits could be inequitably distributed, and that projects directed at single sectors or constraints were not likely to lead to substantial changes in either productivity or quality of life. This in turn led to increasing emphasis on multi-sectorial efforts to integrate activities for increasing agricultural production with other activities in such sectors as health, education, transportation, marketing and so on.

The list of significant integrated rural development projects that began with Puebla, CADU, Lilongwe and Vihiga was extended by such projects as the Kigoma Project in Tanzania (1974), the INVIERNO Project in Nicaragua (1975) and the Bicol River Project in the Philippines (1975). A comparison of these newer projects with the early influential models in Comilla and the Helmand Valley is provided in Table 5. This short list of integrated projects does not capture the diversity that characterized such projects by the late 1970s.[55]

iv. From Technology and Resources to Organization

The history of the rise of rural development must be related to another set of patterns, the understanding of which helps explain the lack of careful consideration of administrative and organizational issues in the integrated rural development literature. Briefly, while the emphasis on rural development was emerging thinking about the constraints to and requisites for development had been changing.[56] Initial prescriptions in the 1950s were centered on narrowing the technology gap. Optimism following the war, the Marshall Plan and the revolution in urban and rural American production saw the development problem as one of transfer of technology. However, by the 1960s the stress was on narrowing the resource gaps that among other things hampered the adoption of technology and the achievement of self sustaining economic growth it could help generate. To avoid retelling the story presented

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[54] Arthur T. Mosher, Thinking About Development (New York: Agricultural Development Council, 1976).

[55] See for example the bibliography in: Dennis A. Rondinelli and Aspy Palia, Project Planning and Implementation in Developing Countries: A Bibliography on Developing Countries (Honolulu: East-West Center, Technology and Development Institute, 1976).

[56] The pattern described was initially worked out by Norman T. Uphoff and Milton J. Esman and summarized in: Rural Development Committee, Third General Report: 1976-78 (Ithaca: Center for International Studies, Cornell University, 1979), pp. 2-3.

Table 5

Background Characteristics of Significant

Integrated Rural Development Projects

Project	Dates of Project	Primary Sources of Outside Assistance	Project Components or Activities									
			Country	Credit	Extension	Marketing	Infrastructure	Inputs Supply	Health	Education	Family Planning	OTHER
Bicol River	1975-	AID	Philippines	*		*	x		Proposed w/Nutrition	* x	Proposed	Resettlement Tenure Reform
CADU	1967-	Swedish Int'l Development Agency	Ethiopia	x	x	x	x	x	*	x		Research Water
COMILLA	1959-1965	Ford Foundation	Bangladesh	x	Trained Selected Villagers	x	x	x		x	x	Research
Helmand Valley	1946-1974 1975-	AID (1952)	Afghanistan				x		x	x		Irrigation Research & Housing
INVIERNO	1975-	AID	Nicaragua	x	x	x	x	x	*	*	*	*Nutrition
Kigoma	1974-	World Bank UN	Tanzania	x	Trained Selected Villagers	x	x	x	x	x		Water Project Resettlement
Lilongwe	1968-1978	World Bank	Malawi	x	x	*	x	x	x	x		
Puebla	1967-1973	CYMMIT & Rockefeller	Mexico	*	x	*		*				Research Crop Insurance
Vicos	1952-1967	Cornell Univ.	Peru	x	x	x	x	x	x	x		Land Tenure
Vihiga	1970-1976	AID et al.	Kenya	x	x		x				x	Rural Industry

x = project provides these components
* = Project coordinates these inputs which come from outside sources.

Source: Adapted from Cynthia Clapp, "Significant Cases," Appendix, p.2.

in prior sections,[57] it need only be noted that efforts to promote capital formation and aggregate rates of growth did not prevent increasing disparity of wealth between rich and poor people or urban and rural areas. By the 1970s increased attention was being given to organization:

> "we became concerned with what might be called the organization gap between national centers and the countryside, so that decisions and even aspirations could be markedly different from one place to the other. This accounted in large part for the failure of development plans or projects to be implemented and to meet the needs of the rural majority."[58]

The lesson drawn from this brief history of shifting emphasis is that development has no single factor solution, that successful projects work out strategies involving technology, resources and organization. Consistent with this pattern, the literature on integrated rural development has largely centered on technology and resources. Until recently, what discussion was given to organization was vaguely concerned with issues of orchestrating services drawn from various ministries, agencies or private sector organizations. Almost no sustained analysis was given to more specific topics such as the administration or management of integrated services. The increased emphasis on organization as one of the keys to development is changing this,[59] and this working paper is part of that process. The concern of the donors and national governments with this topic is seen in a newly signed cooperative agreement between USAID's Office of Rural Development and Administration and Development Alternatives, Inc and Research Triangle Institute[60] aimed at improving the effectiveness and management of integrated rural development. The need to develop both managerial and administrative tools for integrating rural development on the foundations of these organizational efforts is stressed by Ruttan:

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[57] On this history see: Milton J. Esman and John D. Montgomery, "Systems Approaches to Technical Cooperation: The Role of Development Administration," Public Administration Review, XXIX, 5 (1969).

[58] Uphoff and Esman, Third General Report, pp. 2-3.

[59] Emphasis on organization came in three waives. The first emerged in the fairly abstract literature of comparative administration movement, the achievements of which are discussed in: Garth N. Jones, "Frontiersman in Search for the 'Lost Horizon:' The State of Development Administration in the 1960s," Public Administration Review, XXXVI (1976), pp. 99-109. Interest in organization was further stimulated by the efforts of the institution building school, the goals of which are presented in D. Woods Thomas, et al., eds., Institution Building: A Mode of Applied Social Change (Cambridge: Schenkman, 1972). Finally, a major effort to analyze the organizational gap at the rural effort began in the early 1970s, an excellent example of which was the 18 volume study summarized in: Norman T. Uphoff and Milton J. Esman, Local Organization for Rural Development: Analysis of Asian Experience (Ithaca: Rural Development Committee, Center for International Studies, Cornell University, 1974).

[60] USAID Project 936-5300, the basic terms of which are set forth in ODIU, Development Information, pp. 42.2-44.

"...the literature on 'institution building' does seem to me most helpful. This literature has evolved out of an effort primarily in the field of public administration, to provide technical assistance agencies with methodology for external intervention which would induce more effective institutional performance."[61]

Unfortunately, as Section III reveals, only limited attention has been given to basic administrative, organizational and institutional issues involved in integrating rural development services and activities. Rather, excessive effort has been spent on the semantics and objects of the integrated rural development movement.

Diverse Views on Meaning and Goals

It is not the purpose of this paper to consider the diverse views on what integrated rural development means or what its goals are. Nevertheless, the concept is so confusingly used that it is essential to review the most important literature pertaining to it. This will be done briefly, with the acknowledgement that a long treatise could be written on this subsection alone.

i. Common Definitional Characteristics

Since the birth of the notion of integrated rural development in India and East Pakistan, it has been closely connected with the task of increasing the productivity and quality of life of the great percentage of the world's population who work and live on small-scale farms. To be sure, one can identify integrated rural development projects targeted on large farm enterprises, or non-farming objectives, but they are exceptions. Despite the definition of Montague Yudelman that integrated rural development involves encouraging growth in sectors other than agriculture,[62] the fact is that projects without strong agricultural components are not the rule.[63] The emphasis on small-scale farmers has been reinforced by the steady change in international development policy that has been influenced by the success stories of countries following small farm led growth strategies, such as Taiwan and South Korea, or the productive achievements of small scale farmers in places as diverse as Japan and the Nile River delta.[64] From the early 1970s onward, the second development decade has been dominated by mutually reinforcing themes of agricultural and rural development, growth with equity, basic human needs and attack on rural

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[61] Ruttan, "Integrated Rural Development," p. 14.

[62] Yudelman identifies three differences that separate integrated rural development from agriculture: (1) it seeks to increase the income or employment of poor groups bypassed by agricultural development; (2) it emphasizes social overhead and the provision of social infrastructure; and (3) it encourages occupational growth in industrial activities. Montague Yudelman, "A Brief Outline of the Concept of Rural Development" (Paper Prepared for Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development, 1972).

[63] There is no empirical evidence on this point; it may be that agricultural projects are over reported. A quick but well designed content analysis might be a good exercise to undertake.

[64] For a summary of the production of small holders following multi-cropping, land intensification strategies see: R. Albert Berry and William R. Cline, Agrarian Structure and Productivity in Developing Countries (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979); Kusum Nair, The Lonely Furrow (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1969).

poverty. Hence, the initial emphasis on small-scale farmers has given way to a broader one on the rural poor, most of whom are farmers. Improving their productivity and conditions has been a consistent and growing objective of nearly all recent programs or projects labeled integrated rural development.

To a lesser extent there is agreement among analysts that integrated rural development projects are: (1) centered on particular geographic areas;[65] (2) designed and implemented by outside groups, such as national level development agencies or international donors; (3) administratively located in a particular government or bureaucratic unit; (4) involved primarily with the coordination of public goods and services; and (5) multi-sectorial. Most would agree further that such projects are of necessity diverse, there being no magic set of project elements which must be present, though a widely held impression is that most have a strong or central agricultural production core and there are certain "natural" combinations. It is common for most discussions of the concept to list certain preconditions or essential elements,[66] but aside from that pattern there are few commonalities in the contents of the suggestions. There has been some recent discussion in the literature that integrated rural development projects should: (1) emphasize the goal of simultaneity and (3) promote popular participation. These characteristics have not been sufficiently discussed to conclude that they are commonly agreed upon. Finally, implicit in the literature, but rarely explicitly articulated, are the notions that the package of activities and services selected have a synergistic effect on the area's development process,[67] that they are to bring

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[65] For an example of a study that defines integrated rural development more broadly than just specific geopraphic areas and projects see: Dennis A. Rondinelli and Kenneth Ruddle, Urban Functions in Rural Development: An Analysis of Integrated Spatial Development Policy (Washington, D.C.: Office of Urban Development, Technical Assistance Bureau, Agency for International Development, 1976).

[66] For example one writer argues that "...an integrated approach to development needs to be complemented by a rural relief works programme to provide for those among the rural population who are unable to help themselves." This is hardly a common theme in other discussions, though the concern for income generation and employment for the rural poor is. This same author also argues that integrated rural development programs should give "Special attention...to the possibility of reforming land ownership and the system of tenancy." Yusuf J. Ahmad, "Administration of Integrated Rural Development Programmes: A Note on Methodology," International Labour Review, CXI, 2 (1975), pp. 138-40.

[67] In a personal communication David C. Cole notes: "Another concept of integration that has more of an economic efficiency orientation, is that it involves the selection and promotion of a group of mutually reinforcing activities that through their synergistic effects generate more or better rural development than might be expected from the individual activities pursued separately. In this view integration is in part a selective rather than an eclectic process, and it then integrates those selected activities in combinations that give more bang for the buck or more development for the cost, i.e.,that they are more cost effective."

about permanent change and not merely be relief undertakings,[68] and that they are long term in implementation.

ii. Major Approaches to Definition

Beyond these common foundations, one finds the concept of integrated rural development used in quite diverse ways. There appear to be three dominant approaches to defining it. The first conceives of it as a process of combining reinforcing components or inputs of an agricultural or rural development project that are essential for the success of the effort. The second builds its definition on the development goals of the project. Finally, the third defines the concept in terms of project characteristics. There are some themes common to all three approaches but there are also considerable differences among them. Since the intention of this paper is not to dwell overly on definition, only one proponent of each view shall be presented, with the work of Arthur T. Mosher representing the first, Manfred Leupolt the second and Uma Lele the third.

a. Emphasis on Reinforcing Inputs

Given his long identification with the development of the notion of a "progressive rural structure," it should not be surprising that Arthur T. Mosher conceives of integrated rural development in terms of tying together those mutually reinforcing components that are essential to a particular program or project's success. Faced with the diversity of objectives and content in projects presented at the 1971 FAO symposium on Agricultural Institutions for Integrated Rural Development, Mosher concluded the notion centers on the orchestration of a large number of disparate activities aimed at either increasing agricultural production or increasing the satisfactions, economic or non-economic, of rural living.[69] More specifically, he argues that the range and diversity of integrated rural development programs and projects result from the fact that they are usually based on only a subset of the larger system of project activities that are combined together to

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[68] Reflection on the relationship between integrated rural development and relief projects is found in Ahmad, "Administration of Integrated," pp. 138-9. Paul C. Kennel notes: "The desire of development organizations should not be temporary solutions, which basically make the organization a channel of relief for funds and goods, but on (sic.) solutions to problems that bring about permanent change in society." "Agents of Change in Integrated Rural Development" (Paper Prepared for the Mennonite Central Committee, 1976), p. 114.

[69] A. T. Mosher, "Projects of Integrated Rural Development " (Reprint Paper, Agricultural Development Council,Inc., December 1972). For comparative purposes see the outline of other typologies of integrated rural development projects drawn by Zvinakis from his review of the literature: Dennis Zvinakis, "Current Approaches to Integrated Rural Development" (Paper Prepared for USAID, Washington, D.C., 1974).

reach a particular objective. He identifies sixteen such activities,[70] though there are undoubtedly more, and sees the combinations they can take as falling within three types of integrated rural development projects: (1) agricultural development projects; (2) rural development projects with an agricultural component; and (3) rural development projects without an agricultural component.[71]

Using this conceptual framework, Mosher can pinpoint the kinds of project activities being brought together and classify the effort into a particular type of integrated rural development effort. The framework allows for the recognition of both production and quality of life goals, providing in the process an umbrella which allows the diversity of integrated rural development programs or projects to be accommodated.

Mosher rightly recognizes that without qualification, this broad definition is virtually synonymous with rural development. This leads him to amend his definition with two requisite design characteristics. Integrated rural development projects are: (1) limited to specific land areas (they are not nation-wide programs); and (2) limited (or should be) to components or input activities not already present and reasonably effective in the area.

b. Emphasis on Development Goals

The move from design characteristics to development goals as the criteria for defining integrated rural development is a fine one. There is, however, a group of analysts who take a strong stand, arguing that the Mosher type approach is both too inclusive to be meaningful and too insensitive to issues of rural inequality to be acceptable. Representative of this group is Manfred Leupolt, a writer whose analysis moves beyond the project's activities to its development goals.[72] Building on the now widely accepted critique of 1960s growth models, he argues that the concept is "different from general agricultural and rural development because as a matter of policy, it places greater emphasis on the development and mobilization of human resource

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[70]Under agricultural activities he lists: (1) markets for farm products; (2) retail outlets for farm inputs; (3) production credit; (4) extension education; (5) local verification trials; and (6) farm-to-market roads. Nonagricultural activities include: (7) rural industries; (8) rural public works; (9) community development construction projects; (10) group activities-recreational, cultural; (11) home life improvement extension services; (12) health facilities: (13) family planning programs; (14) schools; (15) local government; and (16) religious activities. Ibid., p. 3.

[71]Ibid.

[72]Manfred Leupolt, "Integrated Rural Development: Key Elements of an Integrated Rural Development Strategy," Sociologia Ruralis, XVIII, 1/2 (1977), pp. 7-28.

potential and on achieving a more equitable access to resources and a fairer distribution of income."[73] What is integrated for Leupolt is not Mosher's specific project activities, but project objectives, such as increased production, income distribution, consumption, popular participation or broad based social integration. The task of the manager of an integrated rural development project is to foster "the inter-relationship between overall increase in output and more equitable distribution of income and access to resources and the resulting linkages between agricultural and non-agricultural sectors."[74]

There is an increasing number of development analysts who would agree with Leupolt's value laden assumption that integrated rural development of necessity centers on combining growth and equity objectives in a conscious social change model. For example, Herbert R. Kötter (quite incorrectly in terms of consensus) argues:

> "There is...common agreement that integrated rural development means rural transformation, and hence the application of a package programme including change not only of methods of production and of economic institutions but of social and political infrastructure as well, and transformation of human relationships and opportunities."[75]

If this extra emphasis on transformation were commonly agreed upon, it would exclude many of the more well known integrated rural development projects, primarily because they lack the programatic components necessary to promote social change in an explicit way. One can, however, promote improvements in the productivity and income of the rural poor and look the otherway in regard to the ultimate effects of such efforts, if successful, on political and economic institutions.[76] Many donors do this with their integrated rural development projects, leaving analysts to guess if the goal is the larger social change argued by Leupolt or the counter-insurgency spirited prosperous smallholding world sought by politicians.

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[73] Ibid, p. 13.

[74] Ibid, p. 15.

[75] Kötter, "Some Observations," p. 2, citing in part P. Coombs, et al., "New Paths to Learning," ICED, 1973, p.22

[76] This is certainly the World Bank's approach: Montague Yudelman, "Integrated Rural Development Projects: the Bank's Experience," Finance and Development, XIV, 1 (1977), pp. 15-18.

c. Emphasis on Project Characteristics

Typical of approaches centered on project characteristics is the work of Uma Lele. Her approach, based on the study of 34 projects in 7 African countries,[77] has produced one of the narrowest views taken on integrated rural development. It identified five categories of rural projects: (1) commodity programs aimed at increasing production of export crops in the small holder sector; (2) regional rural development programs focused on making an impact on a given area in a short period of time; (3) functional programs centered on removing a single critical constraint; (4) miscellaneous planned programs directed at providing services to a specific subsector or region; and (5) spontaneous efforts generated by local participation and confined to a particular area and problem.[78] Under this typology integrated rural development projects were classified as one of two types of regional rural development programs and defined as "programs undertaken mainly on the initiative of donor agencies and planned and administered by expatriates."[79] The other type of regional project is "undertaken with substantial initiative and participation by national governments,"[80] and titled regional development programs.

The Lele study based on this classification was funded by the World Bank and its position paper on rural development shaped the typology which so narrowed the notion of integrated rural development. The Bank's staff identified in 1975 three types of approaches to implementing rural development: (1) the minimum package approach centered on increasing agricultural output with modest but broad-based improvements; (2) the comprehensive approach divided into: (a) coordinated national programs directed at a wide population and based on detailed planning, phased multi-sectoral components and extensive changes in related structures, and (b) area development schemes focused on specific areas and tailored to local conditions: and (3) sector or special programs targeted on removing constraints or promoting services, such as rural public works, education and training, credit, electrification, health and so on.[81] The notion of integrated rural development

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[77] Uma Lele, The Design of Rural Development: Lessons from Africa (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975).

[78] Ibid, pp. 12-19.

[79] Ibid., p. 14. Examples of projects classified as integrated rural development by Lele are: the Chilalo Agricultural Development Unit (CADU) in Ethiopia; the Lilongwe Land Development Program (LLDP) in Malawi; the Zones d' Action Prioritaires Intégrées (ZAPI) and the Société de Développement du Nkam (SODENKAM) settlement Scheme, both in Cameroon.

[80] Ibid., using as examples: the Special Rural Development Program in Kenya and the Ujamaa effort in Tanzania.

[81] World Bank, Rural Development: Sector Policy Paper (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1975), pp. 40-57.

is studiously avoided in the paper, yet most projects cited as examples of a given classification involve the integration of diverse activities that are necessary to reinforce and support a particular set of rural development objectives.

iii. Semantics, Confusion and Frustration

Despite the logic underlying the above discussion on major approaches to distinguishing the characteristics underlying integrated approaches, the diversity of definition continues to lead to confusion and frustration. This problem is highlighted in the summary of five regional consultations involving 80 experts on integrated rural development. After extensive discussions at Colombo, Jakarta, Nairobi, Bogotá and Lomé in 1975 and 1976, the FAO report concluded:

> "The review of various concepts of rural development--with or without the prefix "integrated"--does not leave us with the comfortable feeling that a consensus on the concept is about to emerge."[82]

Typical of discussion about the concept, the FAO report noted that the Bogotá session stressed the importance of integrated rural development without recording what was meant by it, the Lomé participants took no position on its meaning and the other three sessions discussed the term only in the most general manner.[83] Clearly one of the most frustrating patterns in the literature is the glib use of the term. Numerous academic writings and a great many project papers could be identified which use the words integrated rural development without any definitional clarification. Such omissions are significant given the variability surrounding the approach.

When definitions are used, they tend to range from pragmatic ones to ideologically heavy efforts, with the three patterns just discussed being intermixed in complex, frequently unreflective ways. The more pragmatic, project centered type definitions are well presented by the following exerpt from a USAID document seeking to help development administrators come to grips with the concept:

> "IDR coordinates various components which include a range of resources and services from a number of different sectors. These components are focused on the interrelationships between the constraints and limitations which constitute rural poverty. For IDR programs this has meant that they are located in rural areas with a local focus (and, to varying degrees, local participation and control); they are multi-sectoral in concept (although the projects

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[82] FAO, Report on the FAO/SIDA/DSE Inter-Regional Symposium on Integrated Rural Development (Rome: Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations, 1978), p. 14.

[83] Ibid, pp. 14-18.

> often begin by concentrating on the agricultural sector and plan to add social service components over time); they are potentially self-sustaining, and there is an element of coordination among the implementing agents for the project. The one element essential to the definition is that an IDR project include components from more than one sector. Practically speaking, this has meant integrated administration of development at the local level in such a way that the components of the different sectors reinforce one another."[84]

A broader definition is offered by Ozay Mehmet. He defines integrated rural development as having three programatic subsets, the combination of which should change the area's political and economic structures:

> "Firstly, the IDR set should contain some income-generating projects (i.e., in conventional terminology 'productive' projects) which are also labour-intensive so that the rural poor may be able to raise their per capita income levels through gainful employment or economic activity... The second subset of IRD projects are those directed at human resource development and utilization. They would include education and training programs...health and sanitation schemes, and community and recreational activities appropriate to rural living conditions...these human resource investments can be expected to enhance incentives for a rural way of life and contribute toward rational political participation by the rural communities... The third subset of IRD projects relate to major institutional and structural reforms, including land reform and decentralized political processes, which are by far the most challenging and difficult reforms to implement and maintain."[85]

It took a group of FAO experts, however, to incorporate ideology with Mosher's narrower notion to produce a definition so broad and frought with political and economic difficulties as to be essentially meaningless:

> "IRD is not merely a management tool but a concept requiring a conscious policy to (i) narrow the gap between urban and rural standards of life and (ii) reduce disparity between various income groups within the rural sector...the test of an IRD program's efficacy lies in its replicability without loss of

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[84] Clapp, "Significant Cases," p. 2, drawing on in part ODIU, Development Information, p. 4.

[85] Ozay Mehmet, Economic Planning and Social Justice in Developing Countries (London: Croom Helm, 1978), pp. 243-4.

> efficiency--productive and allocative--over the whole country, whatever the approach used...IRD is a comprehensive concept. The term integration has several meanings. First, it means integration of the rural poor into the mainstream of development; secondly, a strategy taking into account the inter-dependence of political, technical, economic, socio-cultural elements as well as the urban-rural sector; thirdly, IRD as an integral part of national development programme/plan is a productive programme wherein classically defined economic and social components complement each other in realizing the untapped productive potential of the rural majority. IRD is a poverty-oriented development approach, aiming at releasing the productive potential of the rural poor..."[86]

This definition was drawn out of five regional workshops involving a wide range of experienced civil servants and academics. Its scope is so wide[87] one suspects that this document led Ruttan to be skeptical of integrated rural development. What is remarkable about this definition is that the meeting which produced it scarcely considered administrative or managerial issues surrounding the integration process. It is submitted that definitions with this kind of scope are not the result of efforts to improve the success of projects but the product of soul-searching inquiry into the nature of poverty and the failure of the first two development decades to address its root causes.

Numerous other conceptual definitions could be presented if one wished to take a long march through a wide range of research monographs, articles, applied policy papers, project design and evaluation reports, and workshop or conference symposiums. So diverse and unsystematic are these that an attempt to resolve them is not possible, first because of the time involved and second because a prior exercise in analysis is essential. Among the possible prior approaches is an elaboration of a conceptual framework for administrating integration, the formulation of which should provide a better fix on the conceptual dimensions of integrated rural development.[88]

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[86] FAO, Report on Symposium, pp. xi, 104. A example of other analysts who push the term "integrated" beyond project parameters is Kotter's argument that integrated has two aspects: "...a) the integration of the hitherto by-passed into the whole system; b) the application of the package approach, taking into account the interrelationships of socio-political, economic and technical factors," "Some Observations," p. 11.

[87] The problem with a whole subset of literature, namely that of international symposiums and workshops, is that it is the product of good willed people whose interests and politics are to avoid project issues and mix dependency, north-south debates and agrarian reform with integrated rural development topics.

[88] The FAO report correctly notes: "Programmes logically follow from concepts. If they do not, they tend to be ad hoc and reflect individual bias or preference and depend for continuity on the personal enthusiasm of incumbents, which is not a stable factor. Hence, to skip over the first step is to opt for a course which is likely to be sporadic..." Symposium on Integrated, p. 8.

Administration of Integration

i. Methodology for the Ideology

If one concludes that the strategy elaborated for rural led development makes sense for many less developed countries, and if one also concludes that carefully articulated and designed integrated rural development projects provide one of several major approaches to stimulating agricultural and rural development, then one must ask what are the major constraints that can prevent integrated rural development projects from reaching their full potential, holding back overall development of a country's agrarian potential in the process. Clearly, as William J. Siffin points out:

> "The feasibility of integrated approaches to rural development turns on organizational and administrative factors as much as on anything else...[for while] Resource requirements can be projected with considerable assurance...organizational and managerial necessities...are the hardest to address. They are not easy to stipulate, and they are less easy to deliver. So one can argue that the applicability of the concept of integrated rural development--its suitability as a solution--usually turns on the issue of administrative feasibility."[89]

Given the importance of administration to the successful integration of rural development projects, it is remarkable that so little of the literature is addressed to organization and management issues. Central to the few thoughtful critiques of integrated rural development is the argument that it is a descriptive rather than a programatic concept. This is what Ruttan meant when he dismissed it as an "ideology in search of a methodology," or what Sweet meant when he noted that its various definitions do not include viable development strategies.

To some extent this charge is unjustified, for there exists a highly specialized literature that articulates the theoretical reasons for linking various agricultural and non-agricultural activities together in integrated, mutually reinforcing ways. Beyond this there are a growing number of case studies, project reports and analysis papers that document the experience of a wide range of specific efforts seeking to integrate diverse but essential activities into one rural development project. What critics correctly sense is that little systematic or practical thought has been given to translating this theory and the scattered case studies into a framework that can guide designers, implementors or evaluators in the applied task of doing integrated rural development.[90]

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[89] William J. Siffen, Administrative Problems and Integrated Rural Development (Bloomington: International Development Institute, Indiana University, A PASITAM Design Study, 1979), p. 1.

[90] The only literature which directly addresses this topic is: Ahmad, "Administration of Integrated," pp. 119-42; and Siffin's earlier cited Administrative Problems, pp. 1-12.

The central purpose of this discussion paper is to begin to amplify one of the dimensions of this larger task: the elaboration of a conceptual framework for analyzing and improving the administration of integrated services. Over the next year, the framework and its hypotheses will be tested against specific cases in a series of seminars at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government.[91] If they do not hold up they should certainly give way to improved ones, for the step toward the development of policy and administration options and guidelines is an essential one.

ii. Charting a New Path

A review of the first two sections of this working paper raises substantial questions as to whether it makes any sense to consider how to organize and administer integrated rural development activities when there is no commonly held agreement as to the nature, scope or objectives of such projects. The answer is yes, if one retreats from the endless academic debates on what the notion does or does not cover, and returns to programatic perspective of Mosher. To do this, however, requires both a single-mindedness and a methodological approach that can easily bias the effort. These are risks which must be taken, for the confusion that abounds as to the meaning of the topic would, if taken seriously, create complexities which would prevent any clear, consistent thought from emerging on the administration of complementary development activities.

Although one cannot wipe the slate clean, it is essential to chart a new path that allows an analyst to avoid the larger debates of equity and reform that dominate the literature while concentrating on the increasing critical problems of administering integrated services. The path followed here is to formulate a narrow definition of integrated rural development that centers on its widely agreed upon programatic or project related characteristics. Next a set of seven core groups of issues are identified which allow the range of problems and opportunities connected with the administration of integrated services to be fully explored. Finally, the analysis of those administrative problems and opportunities is consolidated in a number of hypotheses which can be tested through application to a carefully selected set of case studies on integrated rural development in action.

Section III

Conceptual Framework for the Administration of Integrated Services

Bringing Services Together and Running Them

At the core of a programatic definition of integrated rural development is the notion of "bringing services together and running them." It is possible to draft a widely acceptable definition based on this core foundation.

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[91] This strategy is outlined in the research proposal paper submitted to obtain the grant funding the project of which this paper is a part: John D. Montgomery and Robert E. Klitgaard, "Approaches to Integrated Rural Development" (Research Proposal Submitted on Behalf of the John F. Kennedy School of Government and the Harvard Institute for International Development, November 5, 1978).

In such a definition it is essential to give attention to the terms "integrated" and "activities and services." The formulation which follows is in agreement with Yusuf J. Ahmad's position that:

> "The term 'integrated' is a concept of administration: the planned supply of simultaneous services that enables a rural development programme to become operational."[92]

Moreover it uses the term "activities and services" in the broadest of senses, so that the term includes obvious services such as extension agent visits, the supply of institutional credit and the provision of elementary schools, and actions not usually defined as services, such as the construction of physical infrastructure or the training of local government officials in decentralized planning techniques. Hence, "administration of integrated activities and services," as used in the rest of this paper, means the planning, combining and coordinating of financial, technical, material or manpower resources and their application to rural development efforts.

While the FAO conclusion that there is little hope for an emerging concensus on the concept of integrated rural development is valid,[93] a recent USAID study is also correct in arguing that "there is broad agreement in the literature as to the programmatic aspects of IRD."[94] Their programmatic definition is broader but similar to the two just described:

> [Integrated rural development efforts] "are programs in the rural area, with a local focus (and, to varying degrees, local participation and control); they are multi-sectoral in concept (although the projects often begin by concentrating on the agricultural sector and plan to add social service components over time); they are potentially self-sustaining, and there is an element of coordination among the implementing agents for the project."[95]

While the notion of a programatic characteristics underlying this definition is acceptable, this particular product is not. A more relevant effort at capturing this project centered perspective is provided by Development Alternatives, Inc. in the paper it successfully submitted for a major

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[92] Ahmad, "Administration of Integrated," p. 141.

[93] See footnote 82.

[94] ODIU, Development Information, p. 4.

[95] Ibid.

USAID contract to do applied consulting on integrating rural development activities:

> "[An effort aimed at] "breaking the web of poverty that holds the majority of the world's population [through] a concerted attack based on a strategy of mixing income production activities (agricultural extension, credit, appropriate technology, off-farm employment) with social services (health, education, nutrition, family planning, and so forth)" [in a single project].[96]

The problem with the above definition is that its clause "breaking the web of poverty" opens a Pandora's box of issues that can complicate any attempt to logically explore issues of administration. So while the author supports this added qualification and recognizes its roots in the growth with equity tradition, it is essential to delete such considerations from the operating definition used in the rest of this paper. This being the case, a more neutral definition is adopted. It is drawn from one of the few studies written on the integration of rural development services:

> "...a series of mutually supporting (inter-related) agricultural activities oriented towards a stated objective (involving) the progression of rural sub-systems and their interaction leading to desired improvements in the rural system as a whole."[97]

Aside from the justification that broader consensus exists on the programatic thrust developed here, there are three other arguments that support the definition selected to underpin this paper's inquiry into administration of integrated services. First, if the ideological FAO view is accepted, the problems and opportunities involved in administering integration would be lost in the analytical debate on causes of poverty, agrarian reform, the new economic order, economic dependency and so on. Secondly, the topic of this working paper is project centered. Given the way the administration of integration has been neglected, such a specific definitional thrust seems justified. Finally, the literature survey just completed indicates that most perspectives on what integrated rural development is are compatable with this narrower working definition, incorporating it either explicitly or implicitly into their statements.

A word of warning might be appropriate here. Even when an operational definition is grounded in programatic concerns there is the risk that laundry-list proclivities will come to dominate. One cannot read the catalogues or typologies that follow the Mosher approach without feeling a sense of

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[96] Development Alternatives, Inc., "Administration and Organization of Integrated Rural Development" (Project Paper Submitted to Office of Rural Development and Administration, USAID, 1978), pp. 1, 3.

[97] Ahmad, "Administration of Integrated," p. 119.

unreality.[98] In the real world it is hard to do a great deal at once, or in the words of Siffin:

> "The administrative problems of integrated rural development include that sometimes fatal common cold of public administration--the sheer difficulty of doing ordinary things."[99]

It is essential to keep in mind the economist's central notions of scarce resources in general and managerial capacity in particular. For as one administrator of a difficult integrated rural development project put it:

> "I look at the long lists of the experts and realize how out of touch they are with the reality of doing integrated rural development."[100]

One further qualification must be added to this narrower definition: the services being brought together are administratively coordinated and/or controlled by one bureaucratic unit through a single project.[101] This qualification intensifies the administerial and managerial aspects of integrated rural development and its import should not be glossed by the reader.

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[98]An example of such lists is seen in Dennis A. Rondinelli's Figure which is entitled "Essential Elements of Integrated Rural Development" (emphasis provided). "Administration of Integrated Rural Development: Government Action for Small Farmers in Developing Countries" (Paper Presented for Seminar Series on Land Management Issues in Developing Countries, Lincoln Institute of Land Policy and JFK School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, March 1978), p. 7. It is hard to imagine any one project of integrated rural development providing all of the items listed, and the author did not mean to do this. Rather both the list and the use of the concept over-ran their useful limits.

[99]Siffin, Administrative Problems, p. 1.

[100]Personal communication from David C. Cole in regard to the Abyei Integrated Rural Development Project in the Sudan's South Kordofan Province.

[101]An illustration of the need for this view is found in the USAID evaluation of its Afghanistan Rural Works project (3060131): "With the exception of placing village-level workers in one region, no special activities could be identified at the time of the evaluation; even though village-level workers continued to identify needs, no projects had been defined and readied to meet these needs. It also appeared that the (project) assumed that separate activities conducted in the same general area constituted an 'integrated' program. The evaluators concluded that a unifying concept--such as a defined goal and purpose--is needed to support coordination on an integrated program." ODIU, Development Information, p. 30.

The problem Ruttan sees in integrated rural development projects centers not on their content or package of components and theoretical underpinnings but on their workability. Specifically, he argues:

> "...rural development program activities must be organized around...well-defined technologies or methodologies and objectives. It is important to rural communities that such activities and services be simultaneously available, but not necessarily administratively integrated." [102]

John Fisher, on the other hand, argues for a move toward administrative integration of services and activities, though not necessarily for their being under the full control of a particular project or project-directed bureaucracy.[103]

Administration can be achieved through either coordination or control. The unit which administers the project can have varying mixes of coordination or control over the full range of activities and services it seeks to orchestrate--or "bring together and run." It might be a division of a ministry, the field office of a ministry, a local government body, and agency of the government, a parastatal organization, a quasi-public body and so on. But is it public and singular. While it is possible to have private units managing an integrated rural development project, such as a religious group, a private voluntary association or a local citizens' development association, this pattern is less common[104] and raises a set of issues that complicate what is already a difficult topic. A paper similiar to this might well be drafted for non-governmental units seeking to administer integrated services.

Hence, central to the analysis which follows is the notion of one governmental or quasi-governmental unit administering a project's selected set of mutually reinforcing activities and services through a mix of persuaded compliance and authoritative control. Variations on this approach are possible, so to promote clarity of focus they are excluded from this particular inquiry. Still, in conclusion, it is submitted that these qualifications are justified by virtue of the fact that the great majority of integrated rural development projects fall within these narrower boundaries.

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[102] Ruttan, "Integrated Rural Development," p. 16, emphasis added.

[103] John Fisher, "Integrated Rural Development Projects in a World Facing Food and Rural Poverty Crises" (Paper Presented to the CENTO Seminar on Integrated Development Programs and Projects, Islamabad, 1975).

[104] After reviewing a number of experiences, Mosher concluded: "Integrated projects are almost always public projects; they are seldom private-for-profit organizations," "Projects of Integrated," p. 6.

Basic Issues and Hypotheses

A review of the limited and disparate literature on the task of "bringing services together and running them" suggests a set of six clusters or core groups of issues that organize the problems and opportunities that arise in the administration of integrated services. These are: (1) which types of integration are being promoted; (2) where does integration occur, (3) how are integrated services organized; (4) what combinations of services are integrated with what success; (5) why are services integrated; (6) and who administers integration.

The discussion of these issues is based on a review of the literature and a number of case studies. However,to promote clarity, illustrations of them and the hypotheses they generate will not be woven into the text, rather when appropriate they will be detailed in footnotes. While the dimensions of these issues and hypotheses have emerged inductively from a careful review of the literature, it is important to note there is no guarantee that they cover the range of considerations related to administering integration. Clearly, many subtle variations exist which are not discussed here and some major issues and hypotheses must have been overlooked. As noted in the introduction, it may be that the major cases cited in the literature--the Pueblas, CADUs and Comillas--do not exhibit the range of issues, that more can be learned from the study of lesser known projects. This hypothesis is to be pursued, with the following issues tested, amplified, altered or challenged by a series of case studies. Hence, the discussion which follows is generalized, seeking to locate in the secondary literature hypotheses[105] which can aid in the comparative analysis of a wide range of integrated rural development projects. It is essential to conclude, however, with a strongly worded caveat that many of the hypotheses presented are untested, some are of doubtful validity. The task is to stimulate the administrative imagination of researchers in this area and not to provide guidelines for project designers and implementers. Equally as important, when the general literature on a topic was undeveloped, no attempt was made to analytically expand it. Rather, the practice was to make a call for research.

i. Which Form of Integration is Promoted?

a. Horizontal or Vertical Integration

From the perspective of administration integration takes two major forms: horizontal and vertical. Both are ill-defined in the literature. Here three specific patterns based on these two forms will be considered:

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[105] A methodological decision was made early on to avoid descriptive hypotheses and produce relational ones. This is because it appeared far more useful to suggest relationships between independent and dependent variables that can test the present set of administrative ideas that can be drawn out of the service integration literature. See Bernard S. Phillips, Social Research: Strategy and Tactics (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1971), pp. 52-6.

(1) horizontal integration of normally independent services at the local level; (2) vertical integration of national policies on integrated rural development; and (3) vertical integration of intra-organizational capacity to do integrated rural development. Figure 5 illustrates these three patterns.

Horizontal integration is generally viewed as lying at the heart of the task of integrating rural development components. It stresses the process of linking together different activities and services at a given level, usually the local project level. The problem of beginning with the issue of horizontal integration is that it opens up a number of other issues that are more appropriately discussed under other headings. Specifically, the task of horizontal linkages raises substantial questions about coordination, control and identification of an integrating agency, all of which are analyzed in later subsections. They arise because, as Ahmad notes, ultimately one of the integrated "bodies must assume the functions and responsibilities of a coordinating agency."[106]

Far more than coordination is often involved. The real question is whether the "responsible" unit has control or only coordination over the activities and services that the integrated project design assigns to it. Two closely related questions are whether the responsible unit existed prior to the design of the project, and, if so, whether it had any established functions of its own to which those of other units were added.

Since integrated rural development projects take place in a given geographical area, the task is to work out and formalize the relationships between various public and/or private organizations whose services make up the package of activities essential to the successful implementation of the project.[107] Specifically, horizontal integration seeks "to secure unity of purpose and joint action by bodies which normally work independently."[108]

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[106] Ahmad, "Administration of Integration," p. 129.

[107] As Ahmad notes, the range of possible combinations is large for: "The objective of an integrated rural development programme is to create mechanisms for the mobilization of human resources and investment, the formation of local leadership and management cadres and the diffusion of knowledge and technical know-how. These mechanisms take the form of organizations and institutions for the planning and implementation of projects. The institutional machinery created by the activation of the rural subsystems must necessarily be an amalgam of governmental, semi-governmental, foreign (both official and voluntary), private-sector and people's organizations." "Administration of Integration," p. 122.

[108] Victor A. Thompson, "Administrative Objectives for Development Administration," Administrative Science Quarterly (1964), pp. 95-6.



Figure 5: Ideal Organization Chart Illustrating Three Patterns of Integration

Achieving this, however, is no mean task.[109]

It appears useful to conceive of two different sets of horizontal integration problems. Assuming that an integrated rural development project is housed in a government or quasi-government unit, then careful attention must be given to issues surrounding integrating: (1) the functions of other governmental or quasi-governmental bodies with the responsible or central unit; and (2) the functions of private bodies or local organizations within the central unit.[110] Developing and carrying off a plan to transfer the coordination or control of various activities and services among these units is not easy. Separate budgets are involved, histories of bureaucratic power struggles are received, political backers are mobilized and legal, jurisdictional arguments begun. The degree to which such resistance on the part of those units not selected as the "responsible" one is manifested depends on several

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[109]Providing an illustration of difficulties is the evaluation USAID's Costa Rica Rural Development Project (5150120) aimed at a strategy of strengthening the institutional infrastructure responsible for providing services to the small farmer." The Ministry of Agriculture was to undertake demonstration projects; the National Cooperative Federation (INFOCOOP) was to provide production, marketing, and processing credit; and the Municipal Development Institute (IFAM) was to finance road, water, electrification, and agribusiness-related projects. Several unanticipated events and problems slowed projects implementation. An August, 1977 Project Evaluation Summary (PES) states that the planning assumptions relating to integration of the activities of the three institutional components and the overall coordinating role of the National Agricultural Council (CAN) were unrealistic. The CAN had not prepared annual plans for the program, and is probably in no position to exercise this kind of authority over the three implementing institutions, Min Ag, INFOCOOP, and IFAM, each of which has unique interests and objectives beyond those held in common.[1] Thus the underlying assumption of the project--that institutional coordination could be achieved--was unrealistic." ODIU, Development Information, p. 18.

[110]Some other, possibly important forms of integration are not being looked at here. An example of one of these is what might be called "horizontal integration of donors." The Helmand-Arghandab Valley Regional Development Program in Afghanistan is an illustration of this. V. A. Noory and O. Nrrvik report: "As the responsibilities of the HAVA grew, the administrative problems were further aggravated by the involvement of three major decision-making bodies in the project, the foreign sponsor represented by USAID, the Royal Government of Afghanistan (RGA) and the regional Afghan development authority, the HAVA. The lines of communication and authority between the three often became blurred, and the project goals never quite became definite." Report on Field Trip to Helmand Valley (Robert R. Nathan Associates, Afghanistan). Butterfield looks at problems of integration just within a donor agency when he argues that "...AID needs to continue increasing the attention it pays to the practical coordination of our different technical offices and officers working within a country. The approach to this should be to help the sector experts comprehend: (a) the relationship of their technical area to the system as a whole, and (b) where their area can effectively reinforce the work of other sectors..." "Draft Summary Statement," Tab I, p. 4.

forces described later in this paper. One clear fact is that in integrating to facilitate the administration of activities and services a whole new set of administrative problems is generated.

As will become clear in a later subsection, one of the keys to resolving these rests on the degree to which the selected unit must rely on voluntary coordination or has enforceable powers of control. Here the task of integrating functions of two or more government or quasi-government bodies raises a number of classic problems associated with bureaucratic turf. Among the general hypotheses that elaborate some of these are the following:

1. The greater the importance of the integrated function to the central identity of an organization, the higher the probability it will resist transferring any control of the function to another unit.

2. The more any development project effort has to rely on voluntary coordination to obtain horizontal integration of services, the lower the probability effective integration will occur:

   a. unless the organization asked to cooperate can be made to see its interests safeguarded, its aims achieved, its compliance related to overall project success; and/or

   b. unless the organization asked to cooperate can be made to feel strong support for the cooperative activity, if any, from national leaders.

3. The less an integrated rural development is viewed as a possible national program and the more area specific and small in scale it is, the less central levels of organization will resist transferring control of the integrated function to another unit.

4. The more a given organization is asked to transfer its technical, as opposed to administrative, control over a function, the greater its resistance will be to integration efforts by project administrators.

5. The more decentralized the rural local government system, the greater the number of administrative problems that will face project efforts aimed at promoting integration, unless:

   a. local government officials or representative bodies participate in project design and implementation; and/or

   b. local government officials or representative bodies see the project as clearly in their interest.

The above hypotheses are merely illustrative of the general kinds of administrative issues that surround the horizontal integration of services. Before expanding them and increasing their detail through a more fine grained focus, it is necessary to consider vertical integration.

Getting a fix on vertical integration is not easy because it is variously defined in the literature. For some it implies tying together a single sector from officials in the capital city to field agents in the provinces, from policy direction to training of local level personnel; while for others it centers on improving the patterns of organization and administrative control in a given ministry, agency or public body. Here the focus is primarily on improving the ties between the organization's central, provincial, district and subdistrict levels. This notion of vertical integration is obviously concerned with internal administration efficiencies so as to insure that field offices and central units are functioning in a unified mutually supporting manner. A good example of the importance of this pattern is found in ministries of agriculture. As noted elsewhere, the core component in many integrated rural development projects consists of a package of rural inputs matched to the output of research stations, the extension of advice on how to use the package, and the provision of agricultural credit. Typically, all of these components of the core agricultural development package are found in the ministry of agriculture. Obviously, solid vertical integration of that ministry's organizational format, bureaucratic administration and policy positions can go a long way toward insuring that the burdens of horizontal integration are reduced.

A second pattern of verticalintegration stresses the need for securing cooperation between local and national bureaucratic units, groups and bodies. Under this pattern vertical linkages are intended "to prevent rural development projects from being conceived, analyzed and prepared at cross purposes with national policies" under the assumption that "when developed in close cooperation with the powerful ministries, divisions and autonomous bodies at the center, the projects become national concerns and are assured of political, administrative and financial support."[111]

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[111] Ahmad, "Administration of Integration," p. 133. Lele confirms the need for strong central support and coordination, noting that evaluations of rural development programs in Africa reveal "...multiple, and at times, conflicting objects have rendered overall rural development strategy inconsistent and very self-defeating." Design of Rural Development, p. 142. Rondenelli points out: "In the Philippines, programs to improve land tenure, develop agriculture and physical infrastructure, strengthen marketing and cooperative institutions and deliver credit to farmers must be coordinated among the Departments of Agrarian Reform, Agriculture and Natural Resources, Local Government and Community Development, and Public Works, the Bureaus of Lands, Public Schools and Agricultural Economics, extension programs in at least ten different agencies, and more than a half dozen government or semi-independent financial institutions. Even under a martial law government, the agencies often are at odds with each other on administrative and budgetary matters, and rarely integrate their activities within rural areas. Coordinating committees have been established to coordinate the coordinators." "Administration of Integrated Rural," p. 9.

Obviously, designers, managers and evaluators of integrated rural development projects need to consider the two types of vertical integration described, for case studies suggest that horizontal integration is more likely to be successfully implemented when: (1) national leaders are strongly committed to the integration of rural development services; (2) national development policies clearly articulate that commitment; and (3) central ministries and agencies are sufficiently organized to extend those policies to their local field offices. Review of the literature suggests the following hypotheses:

6. The stronger the integration between central units and local level field offices, the greater the likelihood that national policies supportive of inter-organizational cooperation and/or integration will be positively responded to at the local level.

7. The more clearly articulated and backed the national policy is in terms of supporting cooperation or integration of mutually reinforcing services, the greater the probability that ministries or agencies will insist on supportive policies by their field offices.

8. The stronger the commitment of national political leaders to the concept of integrated services, the greater the probability a clearly articulated national policy will emerge.

9. The larger the role played by the central government in the formulation of the project, the greater the probability:

   a. high level commitment will be secured;

   b. effective administrative mechanisms and procedures facilitating coordination, control, evaluation and operational flexibility will be included and supported; and

   c. strong budgetary and staffing support will be extended to the project.[112]

10. The more integrated projects are supported by the center and the more linked they are into the national plan, the greater the probability they will get increased domestic financial support when their special funding sources are ended.[113]

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[112] See Ahmad, "Administration of Integration," p. 130.

[113] One way to promote this would be to include in the project design the placement of a high-level advisor at the national level who could advise the government on coordination in general and promote specific coordination for the project. ODIU, Development Information, p. 29

11. The more the central government is involved in the conceptualization and design of an integrated rural development project, the less the likelihood that the program will be viewed as a product of a power-hungry ministry or an [illegible]ity foisted on the country by political or economi[illegible] donor adventurism.

These five hypotheses suggest that issues of vertical integration cannot be overlooked in formulating design or implementation strategies promoting horizontal integration. Nor should they be neglected in evaluative analysis of the success or failure of integrated rural development projects.

From a policy point of view, it is extremely difficult to insure that such a perspective exists. While it is easier to obtain such support than to promote land reform or decentralization, the fact remains that strong commitment on the part of national leaders is not likely to emerge unless the importance of integrated efforts is clearly understood and seen as supportive of political interests. Dynamic ministers can sway national leadership, strong planning commissions can build such support, and donors can provide programmatic initiative for such policies. On the other hand, elite interests, urban biases, bureaucratic politics and a number of other forces can block or constrain the emergence of a supportive policy. This being the case, careful comparative research needs to be given to: (1) task environment characteristics that facilitate, constrain or block the emergence of national leadership and policy commitment to integrated rural development; (2) processes through which support or opposition to the integration of rural development services is mobilized; and (3) strategies which are followed to stimulate bureaucratic support once central government officials are committed to the horizontal integration of services.

One finds in the literature some discussion of a third form of integration, usually denominated "policy integration." It stresses the need to integrate outcome variables and to relate them to social, political and economic considerations. If this working paper had chosen to take a broader, less programmatic definition of integrated rural development, it would have been essential to consider this form. Clearly, the perspective advocated by the FAO symposium or those associated with that exercise, such as Leupolt or Kötter, would have necessitated such a focus. However, if it is decided that the definitional thrust adopted in this paper is too narrowly suited to the administration of services, that issues of inequality and powerlessness must be considered as inherent to an integrated rural development effort, then substantial thought will have to be given to the administrative issues surrounding policy or outcome integration.

b. Centralization, Decentralization and Participation

One of the first issues that arises in the selection of a responsible unit to administer an integrated rural development project is whether it will be (1) within a particular development ministry; (2) a semi-autonomous central government agency, either established or newly created for the purpose of administering the project; or (3) a decentralized local unit

associated with the local government system or a quasi-governmental local group.[114] No content analysis is available on this point, but it appears most decisions follow either of the first two routes.

Since, as pointed out elsewhere, a majority of integrated rural development projects have large agricultural components,[115] when particular development ministries are selected as the locus of the responsible unit, it is usually the Ministry of Agriculture. However, it is a mistake to mechanically place integrated projects in a ministry just because it argues for its dominance over the rural sector:[116]

> 12. The more conservative, biased toward the power elite of rural areas a ministry is, the more administrative and political problems project staff will face, despite the perceived advantage of placing the unit in the ministry most closely connected to its objectives.

Development ministries tend to be the most poorly financed, staffed and organized of the central ministries. Their field offices are not infrequently technically weak, inefficient and unable to carry out assigned functions. Often the technical skills, development biases and bureaucratic interests of central or field officials are not compatible with the new approaches

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[114] Some work needs to be done on building a typology of organizational arrangements and perhaps analyzing their differences relative to administrative tasks. Rondinelli and Ruddle use the following similar scheme: "... (1) assignment to an existing government agency, usually the Ministry of Agriculture or Rural Development or to a provincial government unit from which regular civil service staff are obtained for management and coordination; (2) creation of an area-based coordination council or committee which attempts to integrate the inputs of a variety of ministries, agencies and private organizations through a board of directors composed of the heads of participating agencies and with a staff seconded from one or more of the ministries for temporary duty; and (3) establishment of a distinct project implementation unit, with staff recruited specifically to serve with the unit, earmarked financial resources and independent authority to perform specified functions. Urban Functions, p. 148.

[115] In the words of a World Bank agricultural economist: "Most of those who live in rural areas are still, to varying degrees, dependent on agriculture for their livelihood. Consequently, any approach to development in the rural areas has to be concerned largely with agriculture." Yudelman, "Integrated Rural Development," p. 16.

[116] "In national capitals and at international seminars and symposia one sometimes comes across the view that it is the Ministry of Agriculture which, by some inherent right, should perform the coordinating function. One suspects that this is special pleading by the officials of such ministries, who attend most international meetings dealing with rural problems and project themselves, at home and abroad, as the guardians not only of agricultural productivity but of the well-being of rural life as a whole." Ahmad, "Administration of Integrated," p. 129.

to development that underly and energize integrated rural projects. It is for this reason that governments or donors either consider creating a new ministry, such as a "ministry of rural construction" or the establishing of a special agency controlled by the center but able to cut through or bypass the blockages caused by conservative, inefficient or incompetent central ministries and local government institutions.[117]

13. The more project designers perceive central units as inefficient, understaffed, technically incompetent or developmentally conservative, and the more they worry about blockages or opposition in the local government system, the more they will see clear administrative advantages in establishing a separate agency, despite all the new administrative problems that route raises.

14. The more separate a unit, the less linked it is into established government structures, the less likely it is to get domestic financial support when, or if, its donor funding or particular national support ends.[118]

Testing these hypotheses should be interesting, for it could be argued that the separate unit strategy has been followed somewhat mechanically as a design principle rather than for sound reasons of public administration.

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[117]For example, an experienced professional lists as one of four practical constraints in getting rural development moving the fact that "...existing government institutions of all types--usually central government ministries extended into rural areas--are generally unresponsive to the rural poor and must be reformed or bypassed." Samuel H. Butterfield, "Rural Development: Why It Is Hard for Developing Country Leadership to Get Started," International Development Review, 1 (1977), p. 11.

[118]"Integrated projects must be financed. Sooner or later they must get increasing financial support domestically. To accomplish that, their support must be integrated into national procedures of budgeting and planning. At this point they are at a serious disadvantage because they fit neither into established ministry budgets nor into a particular 'sector' of the economy," Mosher, "Projects of Integrated," p. 7.

The CADU project, described in Section II, and the Bicol River Basin Development Project in the Philippines,[119] provide good examples of such units. A critique of the administrative problems with them is presented elsewhere, the most damaging element of which is that they tend to be artificially grafted onto the system, staffed by expatriates and unable to survive the end of project funding. Thus, some argue:

15. The more independent and showcase designed an integrated project, the more other goverment units will act to see it fail or to discredit it, increasing the project's administrative problems in the process.[120]

16. The more administrative control in a project is decentralized, the greater the probability there will be popular participation in the project (assuming local elites do not move to block it) and the greater the probability self-sustaining, equity promoting efforts will occur.

This last difficult hypothesis merits a comment. Analysis of social behavior rarely, if ever, finds all of the arrows moving in the right direction. Different patterns do cancel each other out through their

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[119]This project was created in May 1973 by an executive order which initiated the institutional development process. Presidential Decree No. 926 of April 28, 1978 declares the BRBDP an "integrated area development program of the national government under the supervision and direction of the Cabinet Coordinating Committee on Integrated Rural Development Projects of the National Economic and Development Authority" (p. 1-2 of "Presidential Decree No. 926")...The Decree also provided for a Bicol River Basin Development Program Office, under the supervision of the Cabinet Coordinating committee, which was responsible for coordinating and monitoring the planning and implementation of the projects in the Basin. It was composed of line agency regional directors and provincial directors as well as some of the local leadership." Cynthia Clapp, "Significant Cases in Integrated Rural Development" (Paper Prepared for USAID, Development Studies Program, December 8, 1978), Appendix, p. 3. On Bicol see: Dennis A. Rondinelli, Bicol River Basin Urban Functions in Rural Development Project: Summary and Evaluations (Washington, D.C.: USAID, Development Support Bureau, Urban Development, 1978); Frank Lynch, "Bicol River Basin Study," (Draft Teaching Materials, USAID, Development Studies Program, March 1977).

[120]"Government officers typically look upon any independent project as an implicit criticism of their own established activities and are, therefore, more eager to see it fail than succeed. They are less likely to want to learn from it than to discredit it. Consequently, it is worth taking considerable pains to have the initial pilot project not only approved by, but administratively related to, an established unit of governmental administration from the beginning," Mosher, "Projects of Integrated," p. 8.

inconsistency. When an exercise draws hypotheses out of as thin and diverse a literature as this one, contradictions become inevitable. Hence, Section III in no way is intended to present a mutually reinforcing set of hypotheses. Rather it presents views in the literature for analysis, testing and improvement.

Even failed projects have an impact. It is probable that if an integration effort does not succeed, some of the components will take hold in the project area. It is hypothesized that:

17. The more an integrated rural development project is organized within the existing government system, the higher the probability some of its activities or services will take hold in the local area, even if the larger project fails.

In short, the strategy of creating autonomous implementation units has advantages and risks. To their advantage, they are initially highly visible and able to obtain the resources and manpower they need to meet their objectives. They can often move forward without coordination and simply provide their own services in the project area even if another unit providing the same services is already there. And they can take a fresh start at growth with equity strategies, something which established units may not be able to do. On the other hand, they attract much bureaucratic lightening, and other ministries or agencies fighting for scarce funds are readily tempted to warfare. This inclination is stimulated by their tendency to offer higher salaries and compete with other government units for scarce talented manpower. They can also become dependent on expatriate personnel and external financial and technical support. Most worrisome of all, they tend not to integrate with the established system, a fact which lowers the probability the project will become self-sustaining.

Several countries have pursued a variation on this approach by creating separate regional and national administrative units charged with administering integrated projects and ensuring that they receive horizontal and vertical support in regard to the activities and services they seek to coordinate or control.[121] This has not proven successful because of overlapping bureaucratic jurisdictions and fear of the rise of a super agency by the development ministries whose functions are typically sought by integrated projects.[122]

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[121] Mosher, "Projects of Integrated," p. 7.

[122] "...Since different parts of each country are appropriate for different types of integrated projects, having one set of regional and national units of administration for <u>all</u> integrated projects would be ambiguous, and having a separate set for <u>each</u> type of project would result in a proliferation of agencies." <u>Ibid</u>.

Increasingly strong, if unreflective,[123] statements are found in the literature arguing for decentralization of and active local participation in project administration. A recent USAID paper states:

> "...decentralization of delivery systems, personnel, resources, skills and initiative is...required if (USAID projects') prospects are to be bright. The consequences for LDC institutional, operational and managerial infrastructures are equally significant: hitherto centralized policy making and operational control must be decentralized, and weak local authorities must be materially strengthened."[124]

What the effects of such strategies might be on the effective and timely integration of rural development activities and services is seldom carefully considered.[125]

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[123]This is typical of papers flowing from United Nations agencies or worldwide workshops, where generalities rather than hard thinking dominate. For example: United Nations Secretariat, "Analysis and Planning for Social Aspects of Integrated Development: A Local and Intermediate Level Approach" (ESA/SDHA/Misc. 20, April 1977); or for example the superficial consideration of administrative issues in: FAO, Symposium on Integrated, pp. 59-98, and decentralization in particular, pp. 59-65.

[124]USAID, "Managing Decentralization: Request for Application for Cooperative Agreement RACA-DSAN-2007" (Office of Rural Development and Administration, Washington, D.C., July 27, 1979), p. 27.

[125]An exception is provided by Peter Hopcraft's unfortunately too short reflections on decentralization and integration in Kenya's Special Rural Development Programme. Integration, Decentralization and Implementation in Rural Development Programming (Nairobi: Institute for Development Studies, University of Nairobi, Discussion Paper No. 252, 1977), pp. 8-16. There he notes that "Implementation systems for integrated rural development programmes need explicit attention in their design if they are to counter-act the tendency for any development programme to grind to a hault." He discusses briefly four administrative innovations: (1) the local development committee; (2) the area coordinator with explicit responsibility for the whole programme, regardless of the agency involved; (3) the direct grant to be allocated at the local level; and (4) the use of simply designed management and monitoring systems to identify bottlenecks and delays and to resolve problems. Lele questions whether SRDP is an integrated project, Design of Rural Development, p. 16.

After making a strong argument for decentralization,[126] Siffin indicates how much his advice is based on hope when he admits:

> "There are no general recipes for solving the problems of decentralization...There is an important and largely unmet need for garnering and assessing experience-based models of ways to promote and achieve decentralization for rural development. Such models, buttressed by knowledge of the circumstances in which they are likely to work, would help fill an important need for information about a major administrative problem."[127]

"Decentralization" is one of those confused words in the public administration literature, similar to political science's "power," sociology's "status" or anthropology's "caste." Here decentralization is used to refer to the transfer of certain powers and functions to local authorities, as opposed to deconcentration which merely moves central authority downward to provincial and district levels.[128] As a rough illustration, the British local government system is decentralized, the French prefectoral system deconcentrated.[129] This meaning is used throughout this section because it appears to be the dominant meaning given to decentralization in the integrated rural development literature.

Proponents of decentralization argue that recent research has demonstrated that in the right task environment, and with the right design approach, decentralization of planning and management of rural development projects leads to: (1) better identification and tailoring of project strategies to specific task environment characteristics in optimal ways; (2) improved response to locally perceived needs and generation of local support; (3) increased local leadership participation with resulting project benefits; (4) better gathering, processing and responding mechanisms for analyzing and altering project implementation activities; (5) improved local horizontal integration of multi-sectoral activity; (6) increased efficiency of central bureau operations; (7) avoidance of diseconomies of scale; and (8) increased

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[126] Siffin argues: "Decentralization is one of the essential requirements of integrated rural development...Decision-making authority must be located closer to the sources of action than any ministry headquarters can ever be. And local-level participation in some of the substantive decisions is essential to effectiveness." Administrative Problems, pp. 12-13.

[127] Ibid., p. 13.

[128] "Deconcentration implies delegation to subordinate offices of the national government. These subordinate units of local government do not decide matters of policy or make fundamental decisions and their members are appointed from above with no input from the local citizenry. See: Annemarie Hauck Walsh, The Urban Challenge to Government: An International Comparison of Thirteen Cities (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1969), p. 157.

[129] See the comparison of the two systems in: Harold Alderfer, Local Government in Developing Countries (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964).

participation and greater involvement by the traditional and non-governmental institutions and organizations in development.[130] All these supposed advantages need to be treated as hypotheses and tested as such.

On the other hand, proponents admit to substantial organizational and management issues in decentralized programs, foremost of which are: "(1) balancing local action with continued national authority; (2) effectively and efficiently managing large numbers of dispersed actors and programs; and (3) maintaining program coherence and integrity as number and diversity of participants increase." [131] All this being the case, and given the fact that an integrated rural development strategy transfers coordination or control of activities and services normally provided by independent bodies to a responsible unit, one must ask what is the appropriate unit for selection, how do the selection criteria vary by type of project, and what administrative problems are likely to be raised when a decentralized unit seeks to administer integrated services? Even more basic questions center on the kinds of local government characteristics that are necessary to provide a task environment conducive to decentralizing an integrated rural development project, and how to improve the local government system to make decentralization of projects more feasible. Or more specifically, how can decentralized project units deal with recurrent costs, avoid program fragmentation, and be linked to centrally based planning, logistical, personnel and budgetary functions?

Again, those who proscribe decentralization do not address these first order problems. It would appear that the basic understanding of decentralization has not moved along well enough at the general level to allow careful

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[130] USAID, "Managing Decentralization," pp. 31-37.

[131] Ibid., p. 3. Specific organizational and management issues that these three problems raise are: (1) identifying and implementing the appropriate mix of functions between spatially oriented, multifunctional authorities, and vertically organized, single-function ministries; (2) integrating local initiative with national planning, programming and budgeting responsibilities; (3) integrating local accountability of programs with hitherto nationally based and controlled personnel systems; (4) determining the optimal location and logistical support for deconcentrated services; (5) upgrading local management and information generation and utilization capacity; (6) institutionalizing local participation into the organization and management of programs; (7) avoiding control by local elites; (8) avoiding the deterioration of national planning and goals into merely local "pork barreling"; and (9) preventing local factionalism from paralyzing decentralized projects and programs.

consideration of more specific issues of decentralization of integrated rural development projects.[132]

Logically, the responsible unit could be: (1) a local government body, such as a rural district council or a town's municipal government;[133] (2) a local development association with quasi public or voluntary community foundations,[134] or (3) a cooperative group of local people organized around a function, such as multi-purpose farmers' associations.[135] A fourth variant might be a local center, such as the one at Comilla, where an integrated rural development project is undertaken after the center has evolved through several stages, such as: (1) a common building that increases communication among field agents of independent sector ministries and makes it easier for local people to obtain services; (2) a move toward economies of scale by

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[132]Substantial administrative and managerial questions remaining include: (1) how to design personnel systems which provide for national technical support and local accountability; (2) how to develop field reporting and information systems which encourage field service delivery and provide top sector officials information appropriate for management; (3) how to provide financial control systems which free field personnel from overcentralized, slow disbursement procedures but insure fiscal integrity; (4) how to coordinate local project identification with national level sector planning; (5) how to develop local level systems of cross-sector communication and coordination; (6) how to define the appropriate level to lodge technical support services and develop systems to apportion them among field actors; and (7) how to relate different decentralization strategies to different types of sectoral programs. That some experience is beginning to be documented on these types of questions is exhibited by Honadle's recent article, "Beneficiary Involvement," pp. 12-13, or Hopcraft's discussion of FSMS in SRDP, Integration, p. 16.

[133]An example here is the Organization for Reconstruction and Development of Egyptian Villages (ORDEV), which under Law 52 seeks to by-pass established bureaucratic red tape and reach village councils directly in an effort to promote village-level economic activities, generate employment and income, promote infrastructure and social services, and achieve increased local participation. James J. Dalton, "Project Paper: Development Decentralization I-Egypt" (Paper Prepared for USAID/NE/TECH/SP-RD, December 13, 1977).

[134]A good example here is the movement to fund a range of self-help development activities by newly emerged Local Development Associations in the Yemen Arab Republic. See: James Wyche Green, Local Initiative in Yemen: Studies of Four Local Development Associations (Washington, D.C.: United States Agency for International Development, October 1975); John M. Cohen and David B. Lewis, Rural Development in the Yemen Arab Republic: Strategy Issues in a Capital Surplus Labor Short Economy (Cambridge: Harvard University, Harvard Institute for International Development, Development Discussion Paper No. 52, 1979), pp. 43-46.

[135]See: Y. T. Wang, "Chinese-American Commission on Rural Reconstruction (JCRR): Its Organization, Policies and Objectives, and Contributions to the Agricultural Development of Taiwan," Agricultural Administration, IV, 3 (1977), pp. 179-90; Montgomery, et al., The JCRR Model, passim.

pooling staffing, secretarial, administrative and other resources; and (3) the establishment of a training center to encourage better skills, local planning, programing, and coordinated implementation.[136] Finally, a range of decentralized units have been experimented with which cut across these four types, such as: (1) municipal development corporations, banks and institutes established in Honduras, Guatemala, Costa Rica, Venezuela, Brazil, Paraguay and Bolivia; or (2) Peru's Vicos Project, begun by Cornell University in 1952 and transferred to local Vicosinos in 1956.[137]

Whatever the type of unit, considerable attention needs to be given to issues of: (1) strengthening the selected unit's capacity to manage and administratively carry out activities; (2) increasing the technical skills of the unit's staff; (3) creating a basis on which they can either provide activities and services or supervise the integration of normally independent local field agents of other units who can; (4) improving the capacity of such units to plan and design project activities, and mobilize higher units of government to provide them with technical, financial and manpower assistance to do so; (5) evolving organizational approaches and problems involved in transferring activities and services of normally independent bodies to such units; and (6) balancing local autonomy, initiative and action with continued national leadership and authority.[138]

Comparative public administration specialists are currently spending much time talking about "debureaucratization," the attempt to work "through non-governmental organizations, both private enterprise and non-profit, through non-hierarchical and decentralized single function, special district authorities, and through increased use of local government."[139] The argument

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[136] Examples of partial models of this approach in USAID programs are: The Philippines' Rural Service Center (492-0304); Bangladesh's Family Welfare Center Project (388-6038); and Bolivia's Sub-Tropical Lands Development Project (511-0369).

[137] Cornell came to the project as the "patron" and began to make changes in the hacienda pattern of organization. New practices were introduced and the local capacity to take over the project improved. Then "In October 1956, democratically, by a direct vote of all its adult citizens, the people of Vicos elected their own delegates to assume the direction and management of community and hacienda affairs." Allan R. Holmberg, "Vicos: A Peasant Hacienda Community in Peru," in Economic Development and Social Change, edited by George Dalton (Garden City: The Natural History Press, 1971), p. 545. See also: Henry F. Dobyns, et al., Peasants, Power and Applied Social Change (London: Sage Publications, 1964).

[138] Illustrations of the kinds of studies needed are: Uphoff and Esman's directed 18 volume study cited earlier, and summarized in Local Organization for Rural Development; and Development Alternatives, Inc., Strategies for Small Farmer Development: An Empirical Study of Rural Development Projects, 2 Vols. (Washington, D.C.: Development Alternatives, Inc., 1975).

[139] USAID, "Managing Decentralization," p. 14.

is that such efforts bring management and responsibility closer to the people, shorten bureaucratic chains of command, promote quicker decisions, make activities and services more responsive to local people. It generates the following hypotheses:

18. The more project management is decentralized and non-hierarchical, the closer it is brought to clients and users, the more explicit local responsibility from the start, the more local consumer needs will be met and the higher the volumes and lower the costs of services.

The problem here is that this literature is primarily concerned with single function projects.[140] Little thought has been given to whether local units can handle the complexities of integrated rural development. To be sure one can point to Taiwan's JCRR, which in its early years placed what were in effect integrated rural development projects within the jurisdiction of local farmers associations, bypassing central bureaucracy. One also thinks of the "Saemaul Undong" program in Korea,[141] though the amount of central manipulation seems strong, and the municipal development institutes funded in Central and Latin America in the late 1960s. But on the whole, there have been few experiences where decentralized units take on the kinds of complex projects described in this paper. Indeed, if the new "cutting edge" of donor thinking is to move toward larger numbers of smaller projects, this step may not be taken, though "decentralization of minimum package" projects may well be promoted.

It scarcely needs to be noted here that the risk of placing the unit responsible for controlling and/or coordinating an integrated rural development project's activity and service components in a decentralized unit can be quite high:

19. The more powerful, conservative elites dominate an area's political economy, the more probable it is that local government officials will act in their interests.

Exclusion of the FAO's definition asserting that integrated rural development projects must aim at rural reconstruction and equitable growth makes it difficult to comment here. Still, it should be noted that:

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[140] Most common are projects involving health extension services, family planning, nutrition education, small scale irrigation and water management, potable water systems, range management, reforestration, small-farmer credit, or savings mobilization.

[141] See: Jin H. Park "Saemaul Movement in Korea" (Paper Presented for Seminar on Strategies of Training in Support of Integrated Rural Development, Seoul, October 1977); Republic of Korea, Saemaul-New Village Movement (Seoul: Republic of Korea, 1976).

20. The more powerful traditional local officials or rural local elites perceive an integrated rural development project as undercutting their interests, the less likely they are to comply with horizontal integration administrative strategies.

Despite wide spread populist fever in the literature,[142] and strong arguments that "integrated rural development requires by its very nature greater participation, of the rural masses,"[143] donors and governments seeking "bankable projects" are chary of placing their investments in the hands of local organizations. If moving money is a key to a successful career in a donor's bureaucracy, then despite the rhetoric about participation, it is unlikely that they will fund an integrated rural development project organized and run by participatory local associations or other such groups. This is because participation typically implies going at the people's pace and struggling with their learning processes, the result of which can frustrate logistical design, donor and project management schedules, and project cost/benefit scores.[144] Hence, it is hypothesized that while donors are willing to support participatory rural development efforts in general:

21. The more components a project seeks to integrate, the more donors will resist active participation by local people in the administration of the project or local control over the project.

Certainly, the validity of this hypothesis needs to be tested. Whatever the cause, the fact is that:

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[142] For a thoughtful consideration of the relationship between participation and administration see: John D. Montgomery, "The Populist Front in Rural Development: Shall We Eliminate the Bureaucrats and Get on with the Job?" Public Administration Review, XXXIX, 1 (1979), pp. 58-65.

[143] Kötter, "Some Observations," p.3. He goes on to argue for more than just formal participation: "Democratization, however, must be functional and not restricted to formally 'progressive' institutions and legislation. In concrete terms, it means the mobilization of 'activity cells,' a delegation of initative, task execution and decision-making in accordance with the principle of subsidiary, i.e., what can be decided and implemented at a lower level should be handled there." Ibid. Lele provides a rare example of more program-based assertions and ideas, Design of Rural Development, pp. 120-26.

[144] Norman T. Uphoff, John M. Cohen and Arthur A. Goldsmith, Feasibility and Application of Rural Development Participation: A State-of-the-Art Paper (Ithaca: Rural Development Committee, Center for International Studies, Cornell University, Monograph Series No. 3, 1979), pp. 282-3.

> "In practice, integrated projects...are designed and launched by some outside group...usually national or regional government, or an external technical assistance agency...almost all integrated projects are initially designed for rural people."[145]

If donors take this position, do national bureaucracies? Inquiry should be undertaken to determine whether national governments are likely to take the same perspectives about the administrative capacity of their own bureaucracies to undertake the difficult task of integrating activities and services or about the effects of grassroots participation on such administration. For the purposes of debate it is further hypothesized that:

22. The more complex an integrated rural development project, the less likely donor agencies or national governments will encourage local participation in the design or implementation of the project, tending to confine participation to sharing in project benefits.[146]

Consultations are a different matter and are likely to be pursued by integrated project designers and administrators,so long as they don't get in the way of perceived efficiency, for consultations can provide valuable returns in the form of important local information, mobilization of popular support, and matching of locally perceived needs.

23. The more project designers and administrators consult with local organizations, official and non-official, the greater their capacity to win their cooperation in the integration of project related actions, all other factors remaining neutral.[147]

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[145] Mosher, "Projects of Integrated," p. 8.

[146] On these dimensions of participation see: John M. Cohen and Norman T. Uphoff, Rural Development Participation: Concepts and Measures for Project Design, Implementation and Evaluation (Ithaca: Rural Development Committee, Center for International Studies, Cornell University, Monograph Series, No. 2, 1977).

[147] The importance of consultation and understanding local values is underlined by Ahmad who argues: "Without such a process it is difficult to obtain the agreement or support of the rural communities concerned, because what is being attempted is not merely the reform and readjustment of rural life but something much more demanding: the creation of a completely new kind of rural economy, with new attitudes toward life, education, the community, cooperation effort and reward...After the appropriate services have been identified they need to be evaluated in terms of national and regional factors (such as) wealth and income distribution, cultural traditions, the legal framework, social and religious structures, the state of agrarian reform and technology, political and social organizations, public administration services, the employment situation, the state of rural indebtedness, the mobility of agricultural labour, savings and investment programmes." "Administration of Integration," p. 121.

Little attention has been given to the creation of mechanisms for promoting consultation.[148] In one of the few comments of the topic, Mosher submits:

> "The least undesirable semi-solution would appear to be ..have a small advisory staff at the regional level for each specific type of integrated project. The purpose of this regional (or national) advisory staff would not be to exercise administrative control but to counsel with the staffs of each integrated project about ways in which the project might be improved."[149]

Consultation appears to have a useful role to play in helping administrators of integrated projects gain the support and services of private firms and local organizations when they are essential to project objectives:

24. The more secure the working relationship between the civil administration at all levels and the private firms or local organizations, the greater the probability needed horizontal integration between them will successfully occur.

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[148] When addressed, the suggestions typically appear superficial, optimistic and naive. See for example: Kennel, "Agents of Change in Integrated." The difficulties of actually doing this in a large project are illustrated by the CADU experience. One of the examples cited by Cohen and Uphoff, Rural Development Participation, pp. 201-302 relates to efforts to involve local government officials. Early on CADU established an Awraja Development Committee which could have played a role in implementation had it functioned as intended. The ADC was supposed to provide a forum for discussion and coordination of various development efforts, which could have led into decision-making activities as well. It met only once, in January 1969, to discuss an agenda covering an introduction to CADU, marketing, credit and cooperative programs, industrial and commercial possibilities, extension programs, identification of model farmers, experimental land adjudication issues, rural science teaching, the Asella town water system, and water and road development programs. Attending were the awraja governor, the mayor of Asella, the governors of weredas (sub-districts) in the project area, the provincial education officer, health officer, agriculture officer and land reform officer, the executive and assistant executive directors of CADU, one farmer representative for each of the then existing six extension areas, and representatives of the major area businessmen and landowners. The problem was that the members varied considerably in terms of status and power, which under the values and norms of the traditional system inhibited from the outset any real interchange of ideas or cooperation. In the presence of such barriers to communication, the meeting was static, neither side ever seeming able to muster the effort to bring another meeting together.

[149] Mosher, "Projects of Integrated," p. 8.

Such consultations increase the awareness of such groups and lead to the following expectations:

25. The more visible the benefits and the more clear the project's promotion of efficient markets and improved public services, the more likely private firms will participate in horizontal integration.

26. The more local organizations perceive participation in horizontal organization as leading to technical, finance, public good, income or quality of life benefits, the more likely they are to cooperate actively.

Therefore, stimulating interest through this narrow form of participation is seen in the literature as a major asset to the successful administration of integrated rural development projects.[150] However, much careful research needs to be done on the possible implications of participation in actual implementation processes and the conditions under which those implications operate.

For example, Ahmad argues:

> "Popular participation is a vital factor in any integrated rural development programme. It services to neutralize the resistance of the local power structures, to counter the indifference of the local administration and most important to encourage owner-user identification."[151]

Most development specialists today would recognize the hope underlying this statement and some would note that it underplays the possible effects of participation. But specialists in touch with the literature on participatory experiences know that the prescription is not easy to promote and the processes necessary to successfully involve local people in project identification, design and implementation are frought with risk, both for the people and the project. There is ample and growing evidence to support a general hypothesis that:

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[150] For example, Ahmad notes: "The success of a rural development programme depends, to a very large extent, on the interest which it is able to evoke in the rural population. Such interest is undoubtedly created by the incentives offered, but broad-based participation also has a role to play--not only in administrative, financial and technical terms but by enabling the rural population to identify with the projects and programmes launched for them." "Administration of Integration," p. 122.

[151] Ahmad, "Administration of Integration," p. 133.

27. The more local people are involved in designing or implementing an integrated rural development project, the greater the probability they will comply with the integrative tasks requested of them.[152]

But there is also evidence that popular participation is not a panacea and inherently political, facts which can lead under some circumstances to quite disfunctional impacts on project administration. For example, a community receiving a special integrated rural development project may become more passive or dependent, more reluctant to undertake self-help activities. Or local people may be unable to successfully employ finely honed techniques for avoiding bureaucratic unequities when faced with a more powerful integrating unit than normally more isolated ministerial field offices.

There are grounds, however, for the populist to be optimistic, for recent research has illustrated the positive role of participation in project activities that are frequently components of integrated rural development projects, such as irrigation, health paraprofessionals, public works and agricultural research.[153] Model farmer strategies also merit further examination as a way to promote better administration of services through participation at the grassroots.[154] Successful efforts in promoting what in effect are integrated rural development projects by Kibbutzim in Israel or Chinese communes may provide additional support for this hypothesis.[155]

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[152]The two major studies cited in support of this view are: John M. Montgomery, "Allocation of Authority in Land Reform Programs: A Comparative Study of Administrative Processes and Outputs," Administrative Science Quarterly, XVII, 1 (1972), pp. 62-75; DAI, Strategies for Small Farmer, passim.

[153]Uphoff, Cohen and Goldsmith, Feasibility and Application, pp. 163-278.

[154]The Comilla experience with the model farmer has been experimented with elsewhere as a means to reach a number of villagers quickly and coordinate the delivery of diverse services to them: "...farmers participating in the project selected one of themselves to serve as the 'organizer,' acting as the intermediary between the village and the academy. The organizer would receive weekly training, which he in turn communicated to the villagers in weekly meetings. He also served as the fiscal agent responsible for collecting village savings for later investment in joint purchases. Another feature of the program was the use of 'model farmers,' selected by the villagers for their success in farming and their literacy and leadership qualities. Extension work thus used existing resources and leadership." ODIU, Development Information, p. 13.

[155]As Kötter notes: "A commmune is not, as is commonly understood, a more elaborate device for collective farming, but a multi-purpose political, administrative and organizational unit covering the full range of economic, social and administrative activities necessary and feasible in a rural community." "Some Observations," p. 7.

Their experiences in participatory management certainly bear further inquiry.

c. Separate or Linked Strategies

Lele's observation that integrated rural development projects originated with international donors has a good deal of validity to it. Limited discussion in the literature suggests that donor-introduced projects tend to be developed along theoretical lines or based on models which have shown promise in other regions of the country or elsewhere in the developing world. The questions which must be raised are whether designers of such projects fully understand the administrative and local government task environment in which their project will operate or whether they appreciate the differences between the task environments where the theoretical underpinnings or successful model were drawn from the one their project is to function in.[156] There are substantial possibilities that the assumptions underlying the project's design in general, and its approach to the administration of integrated services in particular, may be out of alignment with national policy and bureaucratic realities.[157]

The following hypotheses can be generated from the literature on linkages between project design and national policies:

28. The more isolated the project design principles from the national policy position of the country, the more difficulties will arise in obtaining and maintaining integration over services normally performed by independent bodies, unless their is no policy or it is ignored in practice.

29. The more out of alignment the project's strategy for administering integrated rural services is from existing bureaucratic procedures and practices, the less likely effective administration or integration will occur, unless other forces minimizing the effects of this lack of alignment intervene.

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[156] Ahmad makes a strong argument here for solid understanding of the task environment: "It is necessary to ensure that the policies and measures aimed at the rural subsystems are in broad agreement with the amalgam of concepts, precepts, traditions, institutions, resource availability, employment characteristics, and the state of physical and social infrastructure existing in the country. It is important for the acceptability, and the eventual success, of an integrated programme that the planning of development services should pass through a 'filter.'" "Administration of Integrated," p. 121.

[157] See: A. G. Papandreou and Uri Zohar: "Programme-Project Formulation, Evaluation and Selection in the Context of a National Plan," Economics of Planning, XI, 1-2 (1971), pp. 59-79.

30. The more design teams are made up of both donor experts and knowledgeable host country professionals, the greater the probability of the opportunities and problems involved in obtaining and maintaining integrated services will be recognized and dealt with successfully.

Such hypotheses highlight the fact that decisions to promote integration should be based on a careful study of present patterns of government organization, national legislation and regulations governing ministries, agencies, civil servants or rural local government, earlier histories of bureaucratic change and conflict, and current efforts to expand or protect bureaucratic turf. One clearly senses that background papers and studies for integrated rural development projects rarely, if ever, give careful consideration to the bureaucratic backdrop.[158] The path of administering integrated projects is lined with numerous land mines, any one of which can limit, alter or block the successful implementation of an integrated effort. Consultations with experts on national and local government early in the design stage can be helpful, but they alone will not prevent unintended mistakes. There is, thus, no alternative to careful, diplomatic discussions with the heads of the units whose services are to be in some way integrated.

d. Unique Effort or Pilot Project[159]

The objectives of an integrated rural development project are frequently either: (1) to develop a particular area; or (2) to test a particular methodology for subsequent expansion to other parts of the country. As noted earlier, many efforts to layout the characteristics of integrated rural development include the element of expanding the model to a larger area, in some definitions on a nationwide basis. There appear to be two key reasons for this view: (1) the concentration of an integrated rural development project in one area promotes regional disparities when successful; and (2) integrated rural development projects typically are large costly undertakings that absorb in inequitable ways a developing country's scarce financial, managerial and technical resources. Hence, for political or other reasons, national leaders, central policy makers and international donors tend to argue that the project's integrated activities will be extended more broadly through a tested and improved design.[160] On this point the literature suggests;

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[158] One exception appears to be Comilla, and the pay-off for studying the local government system initially seems to have been high. "The Comilla Rural Development Academy, headquarters for the program, was designed in such a way as to integrate research, evaluation, training, and extension efforts. The first task was a study of the administrative unit within which the Academy was located, the thana of Comilla...(an) important result of the Comilla project was the improvement in relations between government officials and the village farmers." ODIU, Development Information, pp. 12-13. The link between the better understanding of the bureaucratic setting and the cooperation of local officials merits further inquiry.

[159] See: C. A. P. Takes, Pilot Projects for Integrated Rural Development (Wageningen, The Netherlands: International Institute for Land-Reclamation and Improvement, 1967).

[160] An example of a fairly well documented study that might be looked at closely because of its intention to provide the basis for further projects is the Kigoma Regional Project in Tanzania. See: James H. Weaver and Richard N. Blue, "An approach to Integrated Rural Development: A Case Study of Kigoma Region of Tanzania" (Paper Prepared for USAID, Washington, D.C., November 1976); Harvard Business School, "World Bank Kigoma Rural Development Project, Tanzania" (Cambridge: Harvard University, School of Business Paper, 1977).

31. The more a project is presented as a pilot effort to be expanded to adjacent or other areas as successful testing occurs, the more demands for such extension will occur, which if met will increase the difficulties of administering integrated services.[161]

32. The more financial, managerial or technical resources an integrated development project consumes, the less likely it will ever be replicated on a national level but the more likely it will be expanded to a province-wide area, increasing the difficulties of administering integrated services.[162]

Integrated rural development projects should be extended carefully, for as Mosher notes: "...the scope for multiplication of pilot projects is not unlimited. It can be substantial, but it is limited to other areas of the same type in each country."[163]

33. The more successful integrated rural development projects are borrowed from other regions of a country or other countries, and the less careful design changes accompany the borrowing, the higher the likelihood the project will face difficult administrative problems.

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[161] Butterfield comments: Policy elements normally will be national. A national program in a small country may be no more difficult than a regional or district program in a large country. Political considerations may make regional concentration infeasible...In large countries, if the internal political stress can be handled, focusing on a few experimental areas at the outset of multi-sectoral development seems the most sensible avenue. However, great care must be taken to avoid complex or costly approaches that cannot be replicated nationwide. Similarly most pilot projects should be viewed as multiple input experiments from which cost-effective elements can be drawn for nation-wide replication rather than as over-all models to be replicated." "Draft Summary Statement," Tab I, p. 3.

[162] The CADU project well illustrates this point. Beginning in the center of one district, the project gradually expand to fill that district. Such expansion was envisioned in the project design. Politics forced the project to expand faster than it intended. Each subdistrict adjacent to the project boundaries pressured for inclusion in the project area. Soon the project was spread thin, particularly in terms of manpower. By 1973, the presures were such that the project was forced to consider going province-wide: Lars Leander, "A Proposal for the Extension of the CADU Program into Arba Gugu and Ticho" (Internal memorandum, July 8, 1973). After the revolution, CADU became ARDU, the A standing for Arussi Province. While not yet documented, personal communications to the author suggest that the overall project suffered as a result of this too rapid an expansion based on initial success and pressures not to apply so many resources in such a small area.

[163] Mosher, "Projects of Integrated," p. 5.

e. Area Development or Integrated Rural Development

There is some confusion in the literature between these two concepts, a fact well illustrated in recent study of spacial development policy and urban-rural linkages by Rondinelli and Ruddle.[164] Careless use of these two concepts needs to be avoided. However, it is not easy to be specific about their differences for like integrated rural development, "spatial or area development" lacks conceptual clarity in the literature. While its roots lie in the central-place theories of Walter Christaller,[165] its contemporary form of spatial or area development is based on the work of E.A.J. Johnson,[166] who sees the relationship between urban centers and the countryside, and the emergence of spatial patterns in convenient central places, as the key to economic development. A large literature has emerged from this view, and in recent years its proponents have adopted the disturbingly similar but quite different conceptual label "integrated rural development planning."[167]

Spacial or area planners' basic position is summed up by Dennis A. Rondinelli and Kenneth Ruddle:

> "Neither the goals of increased productivity and income expansion nor those of greater equity in income distribution can be attained without increasing interaction among villages, market towns, intermediate cities and metropolitan areas in developing nations, without integrating urban and rural functions into a national spatial system. Spatial integration transforms societies and accelerates modernization.
>
> Two fundamental observations seem valid for all developing countries with elements of spatial articulation. First, increase in the number and diversity of linkages and the growth or transformation of development centers--from villages to market towns, market towns to small cities, small cities to intermediate urban areas--are inextricably related...Secondly, the variety of linkages that integrated urban and rural areas into an articulated spatial system are themselves inextricably linked. Creation of one new linkage may produce a 'cascade effect' making other activities and linkages possible, and promoting the growth of existing or new central places."[168]

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[164] Their otherwise useful state-of-the-art paper is marred by the failure to carefully define either term, so that the reader has trouble distinguishing just what is meant by "integrated" and "integrated rural development." Rondinelli and Ruddle, Urban Functions, passim.

[165] Walter Christaller (translated by Charles W. Baskin), Central Places in Southern Germany (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1966).

[166] E. A. J. Johnson, The Organization of Space in Developing Countries (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970).

[167] Ian Livingstone, "On the Concept of 'Integrated Rural Development Planning' in Less Developed Countries," Journal of Agricultural Economics, XXX, 1, (1979), pp. 49-53.

[168] Dennis A. Rondinelli and Kenneth Ruddle, "Integrating Spatial Development," Ekistics, XLIII, 257 (1977), pp. 185-6.

There is obviously much in common between this view and the theoretical underpinnings of integrated rural development, as described in Section II. Rondeinelli and Ruddle go on to describe seven linkages,[169] two of which, service delivery linkages and political-administrative-organizational linkages, come close to the concerns underlying this paper. The key concept for many spatial or area development proposals is a development center which serves to promote the range of linkages that are deemed theoretically essential.

John Friedmann's work comes the closest to relating area development to integrated rural development. He defines his "spatial framework" as targeted on:

"1. A comprehensive strategy designed to achieve greater productivity, income, and employment in agriculture as well as a steady improvement in the social conditions of rural people.

2. A planning process that effectively links local projects for rural development to a long-term national strategy for balanced urban and regional development.

3. A program designed to benefit primarily the small, low-income farmer as well as populations living in agriculturally-based service towns.

4. A method of operation that seeks actively to involve local people in the planning and implementation of programs that benefit primarily themselves.

5. A process that will provide for the coordinated delivery of mutually supportive services for rural development."[170]

He proceeds to sketch out the concept of a "rural service center,"[171] and it has some interesting ideas in it for those seeking to make applied progress with the issues presented in this working paper. However, he, like other spatial planners whose work was reviewed for this study,[172] fails to get beyond ideology to methodology.

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[169] Political, economic, population movement, technological, social, service delivery and political, administrative and organizational. Ibid., pp. 187-90.

[170] John Friedmann, "A Spatial Framework for Rural Development: Problems of Organization and Implementation," économie appliquée, XXVIII, 2-3 (1975) p. 519-20.

[171] Ibid., pp. 530-533.

[172] See, for example: D. G. R. Belshaw, "Rural Development Planning: Concepts and Techniques," Journal of Agricultural Economics, XXVIII, 3 (1977), pp. 279-91.

Indeed, Ruttan's critique of integrated rural development has been applied by other planners to the spatial or area development literature, most notably Ian Livingstone, who argues:

> "All this, however, does not mean that what passes under the head of 'integrated rural development planning' can be usefully so described or that a 'science' of integrated rural development planning has been evolved which can invariably justify substantial and time-consuming 'master plans.' These could, while providing employment for more expatriate experts, actually obscure a synoptic view of the development possibilities of a region or district."[173]

Still, there may be in this literature some useful ideas and experiences which might be borrowed by those analyzing how to improve the integration of rural development activities and services. This is particularly likely in the literature on area planning which seeks to establish planning machinery at the local level through a horizontal organization involving cooperation among government field agents, officials and local people.[174]

ii. Where Does Integration Occur?

a. Area vs. Sector

One characteristic of integrated rural development projects which seems clearly established is that they are not sector programs.[175] Rather, they are centered in a particular graphic area. (It must be noted,

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[173] Livingstone, "On the Concept," p. 53. The Belshaw article cited in the prior footnote tried to respond to Ruttan's critique of an ideology in search of a methodology by seeking to establish that at least "integrated rural development planning" had "a set of relatively powerful planning techniques." Belshaw, "Rural Development Planning," p. 14. Livingstone argues in this paper that Belshaw does not present a convincing case.

[174] Ibid., p. 50, passim.

[175] Calling these "functional programs," Lele notes they "... are undertaken to remove a single constraint that is considered to be particularly critical for getting rural development underway." Design of Rural Development, p. 17. Examples are a feeder road construction program or an agricultural credit program. They have clear, limited objectives and are somewhat easier to implement.

however, that not all analysts agree that integrated rural development is area specific).[176] Despite the simplification in administration this narrowing of scope has, a number of issues remain which are related to the relationship between geographic area and project design issues connected with administrative strategies. Specifically, the questions are concerned with how the administration of integrated services is affected by: (1) the type of boundary selected; (2) the size of the project area; (3) the reasons for selecting the particular area as the project site; and (4) the uniqueness of the project area.

b. Size of Project Area and Project

Evidence presented elsewhere in this section suggests that the task of administering integrated development projects is affected more by number and scope of services provided than by the size of the project area. Nevertheless, it can be argued that:

34. The more the size of the project area corresponds to a general farming district,[177] the greater the probability services can be effectively integrated, all other factors remaining neutral.

Integrated rural development projects range from large-scale efforts which bring together at the district level multi-sectoral service delivery components requiring coordination and planning of existing programs and commencement of new ones, such as CADU or the Bicol River, to small village level interventions centered on local multi-functional organizations offering a limited set of activities and services. Obviously, different administrative and managerial problems are related to each type, and the real range--shifting from classification dualism to the notion of continuum--is probably quite large. Yet, the literature review underlying this study revealed no effort to build a typology comparing this diversity at the general level, much less at the administrative level. Clearly, this point illustrates the problems with the general treatment of the paper's topic throughout Section III.

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[176] For example, E. E. Ekong, "A Critical Appraisal of the Emerging Models Within the Integrated Approach to Rural Development in Africa" (Paper Presented to Conference on Rural Development and Regional Planning, University of Science and Technology, Kumasi, April 11-17, 1977). He identifies three types of integrated rural development: (1) the rural-urban integration model; (2) the intersectoral and/or zonal coordination model; and (3) the package model. The first type is clearly not area specific, and he provides as an example the Tanzania policy of villagization to achieve balanced urban-rural development. See also the use of Rondinelli and Ruddle, who see integrated rural development as both area and project specific, and spatial, as in promoting urban-rural linkages. Urban Functions, passim.

[177] On a farm district see: Mosher, Creating a Progressive Rural Structure, pp. 13-30; as specifically related to integrated rural development: Mosher, "Projects of Integration," pp. 5-6.

Analytical typology building along these lines, based on carefully selected case studies, should do much to promote the emergence of more detailed and situation-specific hypotheses.

c. Ecological, Economic or Administrative Boundaries

Despite the fact that some major new projects have been organized on a geographical basis,[178] perhaps under the influence of area development methodologies described earlier, logic and experience suggest that project boundaries should match those of administrative divisions. While the secondary literature argues that administrative boundaries are most appropriate, there is little consideration of ecological or economic boundaries. Ecological boundaries tend to be based on river basins, crop or livestock production zones or geographical characteristics, such as highland or wadi development schemes. Economic boundaries are found in projects that come out of spatial economic theories, such as central-place literature, market linkage theories and so on. Since a comparative study of these types of projects, together with the more common pattern of administrative units, does not appear to have emerged in the literature, a research effort in this direction, focused on the effects of different boundary criteria on administration of integrated services, is very desirable.

Proponents of the administrative boundary choice argue there is enough evidence available to hypothesize:

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[178] For example, the Bicol River Basin Development Program established in 1973 as a cluster of projects within the Bicol River Basin, a geophysical area which does not coincide with any established political unit. The program covers almost all of the Camarines Sur Province, most of Albay Province and parts of two other provinces in southern Luzon, an area economically depressed but one with high resource potential. The Basin is divided into geographic zones called Integrated Area Development units, each of which is encouraged to decentralize organizational and coordination activities and promote popular participation in the project. Management is divided into a policy-making body called the Area Development Council and a project planning and implementing unit called the Area Development Team. See footnote 119, for basic articles. Another project worth looking at is the Helmand-Arghandab Valley effort in Afghanistan, on which there appears to be ample documentation. On this generally overlooked project see: Lou Stamberg, "Helmand-Arghandab Valley Regional Development (1954-1974) Afghanistan" (Draft Paper, 1975); A. R. Baron, "General Background Paper on Development in the Helmand-Arghandab Valley in Southwestern Afghanistan" (Paper Prepared April 27, 1971); Marvin Brant, "Recent Economic Development," in Afghanistan in the 1970s, edited by Louis Dupree (New York: Praeger, 1974); Louis Depree, "The New Look in American Aid to Afghanistan," AUFSR, South Asia Series, XVIII, 6 (1974).

35. The more the boundaries of the project area coincide with administrative boundaries, the more clear the integration tasks will be and the more efficiently integration will be achieved, assuming other obstacles to integration can be overcome.

36. The more the boundaries of the project area coincide with district or subdistrict administrative boundaries, the greater the opportunity for the project to work with well-defined bureaucratic entities and organizations of local people.

37. The more a project can be confined to a specific district or subdistrict, the easier it will be to obtain administrative authority over services performed by normally independent bodies.

Several other issues arise in the analysis of the effects of area boundaries and size on administrative issues. In many developing countries governmental penetration below the provincial level is often confined to the maintenance of order and the collection of taxes. This is particularly likely to be the case in remoter areas where greater concentrations of the poor are to be found. Most notably, ministries or agencies providing the kinds of public goods and services that are often the target of integration efforts frequently do not have field offices at the district or subdistrict level. When they do, they can be less reluctant to second their personnel and functions to an integrated project if the loss of bureaucratic turf can be confined to a single administrative area. However, if the project is based on an ecological zone that cuts across several administrative units, then more bureaucratic turf is threatened. Additional jurisdictional issues are raised when only part of a given district or districts is covered by the project's integrated efforts. On the other hand, if the ministry or agency has no field agents or programs operating in the area, then it should be less reluctant to allow an integrated project to introduce them. This analysis suggests the following hypotheses:

38. Integrated rural development projects are more likely to gain effective administration of given services normally held by independent bodies if they cover all rather than part of an administrative unit, assuming such services were provided in the area prior to the project.

39. All things considered, the more localized the administrative unit, the smaller its size the easier it is to organize and administer integrated services.

40. All things considered, the more remote or bureaucratically isolated the administrative unit, the easier it is to organize and administer integrated services.

41. Conversely, the closer the administrative unit to the capital city and the better linked it is to the bureaucracy, the more difficult it is to organize and administer integrated services.

Selection of boundaries also affects the capacity of the project's managers to effectively obtain necessary services from private firms or politically independent local organizations. Branch banks, farmers' associations, youth leagues, and other types of independent groups are more frequently organized along lines of administrative units. This observation is, however, only tentative and research on this point would be useful. Nevertheless, it appears:

42. The less projects cut across the boundaries of local private or semi-public groups, the more likely project managers are going to be able to obtain their support, particularly if they look to local officials of the project for advice and leadership.

d. Selection for Political, Experimental or Developmental Reasons

There are a number of reasons why a particular area is selected as the site for an integrated rural development project. Among the most important of these are: (1) political reasons based primarily on geopolitical goals, tribalism and ethnicity, or needs of powerful national or local politicans; (2) experimental reasons based on an area's suitability for the testing of particular technical or administrative strategies; or (3) developmental reasons based on an area's socioeconomic potential or high level of poverty and misery. It is tentatively suggested that the reason for selecting a project area has effects on the probability of the project successfully administering the services it seeks to integrate. Among the hypotheses suggested by the general literature are the following:

43. The more a project area is selected for political reasons, the greater the probability it will have strong support to obtain and maintain the integration of services normally provided by independent bodies, unless more powerful or effective countervailing political pressures exist.[179]

44. The more a project area is selected for experimental reasons, the more difficult it will be to obtain the cooperation or compliance of normally independent bodies unless:

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[179] This hypothesis is an example of one which might appear improbable to some but which is presented because it is suggested in the literature. Hypotheses were not excluded just because the author disagreed with them.

a. they view the experiment as having potential technical or bureaucratic benefits; or

b. they see the experiment as non-threatening, either because it has a low probability of success or a potential for only limited impact if successful.

45. The more a project is selected for developmental reasons, the more the growth potential of the area will affect the task of obtaining and maintaining project administration of integrated services, since:

a. areas of high potential tend to have already attracted field offices and agents with vested interests;

b. areas of high potential tend to be dominated by local elites who may fear the power of an integrated rural development project promoting both growth and equity.

46. The lower the potential of an area, the less inequality it has and the more remote it is, the less effect selection criteria are likely to have on the successful organization and administration of integrated services.

d. Unique vs. Typical Area

Given the prior position that most integrated rural development projects are cast as pilot enterprises, and given the relationship between minimum and comprehensive package approaches discussed in a subsequent section, a strong argument can be made that:

47. The more a pilot project form is intended, the more important it is that the project be located near the center of a larger area of roughly comparable potential into which it can expand.

48. The more a comprehensive project is intended to provide a model for minimum package efforts, the greater the need to ensure that it is not implemented in an area with unique characteristics.

49. The more an area selected for an integrated rural development project is isolated or atypical, the greater the desirability of designing a unique rather than pilot project format.

Of course, these particular hypotheses are highly generalized. They do have direct relevance to administration, however. It is widely recognized that administrative and technical patterns and practices followed by various ministries or agencies can and do vary from area to area within a given

country.[180] Indeed, there is often no bureaucratic or functional presence in the more isolated or remote rural areas. Since one of the major constraints on the success of integrated rural development projects relates to the administration of integrated rural development services, it can be argued:

50. The more the area selected has administrative and technical characteristics similar to promising areas elsewhere in the country, the greater the probability the lessons learned in a pilot project will be extendable elsewhere.

51. The more the task environment, local government system, and administrative context of a project is carefully studied and taken into account in the project design, the greater the probability an effective strategy for integrating activities and services will emerge.

52. The more care that is given to considering the comparability of an integration strategy borrowed from another successful project, the greater the probability the design will reflect the realities of the task environment and be more likely to succeed.

f. Presentation and Expectations

Integrated rural development projects, by their very nature, tend to raise expectations of local officials, elites and citizens in the areas where they are to be implemented. They also tend to raise expectations of national and provincial level officials. The literature suggests:[181]

53. The less clear the goals of the project and the less forthcoming project designers about the potential political, administrative, logistical, etc., pitfalls, the higher expectations about the project's performance.

Since much of the evidence in this paper is that integrated rural development projects face difficult success barriers, early on, designers and implementors should avoid the operation of the second hypothesis:

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[180] For one of the most detailed studies of such variability in a country considered to be highly centralized see: John M. Cohen and Peter H. Koehn, Ethiopian Provincial and Administrative Government (East Lansing: African Studies Center, Michigan State University Press, 1979).

[181] For example, while Kenya's SRDP project stressed its experimental nature in project documents, it was not understood as an experimental project in the field or at higher government levels. Most officials expected a substantial development impact. As two evaluators noted: "To some extent the failure of the SRDP to achieve this has been a cause of substantial disillusionment with the program." Edward D. Harmon, Jr., and Tom Zalla, "A USAID Sponsored Evaluation of the Vihiga Special Rural Development Project/Kenya" (USAID Evaluation Paper, 1974).

54. The less realistic are local expectations, the more support will be withdrawn from the project when early stage delays and problems are encountered, increasing the burdens of administration greatly.

iii. How Are Integrated Services Organized?

a. Coordination vs. Control Models

As noted in the discussion of horizontal integration, the authority of the project director to orchestrate the interaction of mutually reinforcing development activities and services ranges along a continuum from persuasive coordination to authoritative control. The terms coordination and control are used simply and directly here in an effort to avoid further semantic problems.[182] Cross cutting this continuum is another ranging from no control over any services to complete control over all services. Together these two continua suggest three types of organizational models for integrating services in one project that are normally provided by an independent body: (1) coordination model; (2) core control group plus coordination model; and (3) control model.

The questions which must be addressed are: (1) what are the various advantages and disadvantages of each model; (2) to what extent does the answer to the first question depend on the relationship between the package of activities and services being integrated and the task environment in which the project is taking place; (3) if the relationship discovered in the second inquiry is strongly positive, what are the basic principles that govern the relationships and how can they help in the design of the organizational format and authority relationships on which the project is based?

It is beyond the scope of this paper to answer these questions despite the fact that they critically affect the capacity of project management to integrate needed development services. Still, it is possible to look at past patterns of integrated rural development and suggest:

55. The more project designers are concerned primarily with achievement of project goals, the more likely they are to insist on the control model.

56. The more the control model is followed, the more likely it is that the project will be artificially fitted into the task environment and the less likely it will survive the completion of the project.

These first two hypotheses arise largely from the experience of the World Bank and other donors who until recently have insisted on setting up a separate governmental agency that controls most or all of the package of activities and services that the project they are funding depends on. Sustained criticism in recent years of this model has been largely supported by reference to the second hypothesis.[183]

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[182] See Martin Landau and Russell Stout, Jr., "To Manage Is Not to Control: Or, the Folly of Type II Errors," Public Administration Review, XXXIX, 2 (1979); Russell Stout, Jr., Management or Control: The Organizational Dilemma (Bloomington: International Development Institute, Indiana University, A PASITAM Design Study, 1979). Siffin notes: "To control is to reduce or eliminate uncertainty. To manage is to deal with what is left, the residual uncertainty and the imperative of judging and deciding what cannot be computed," Administrative Problems, p. 7.

[183] See Lele's criticism, Design of Rural Development, pp. 127-41, for example.

Alternatively reliance on the capacity of an individual project leader of good will to obtain the voluntary coordination of independent bodies whose services are essential can be equally questioned. Numerous examples of this could be given, but the frustrations of the coordination model, summed up in the experiences of India's village level community development worker,[184] provide sufficient support for the hypothesis:

57. The more a project has to rely on the voluntary provision of essential services, the less likely it will be able to integrate them successfully in pursuit of its objectives.

One does not need to have a Hobbesian view of the world to appreciate why this is the case. In the words of Siffin:

> "Coordination, a venerable prayerword of administration, stands for another major administrative problem that is frequently institutional, always strategic with regard to integrated rural development, and inevitably operational as well.
>
> "Policies should coincide. Conflict should be minimized. People and their organizations should be inspired by a higher common purpose, and a shared sense of ways and means. Wouldn't it be lovely?
>
> "When people call for coordination, they usually mean that they need support for what they can't command... 'coordination means getting what you do not have.' How to get it is a problem, and there is no set of simple solutions."[185]

There are a number of reasons why managers in units independently controlling activities and services may not comply with coordination requests: (1) the goals or strategy of the project may be incompatible with their bureaucratic commitments or interests; (2) other projects or programs may be the preferred target of their limited financial resources; (3) the project is likely to be only one of a number of projects in the unit's ministry or agency and other commitments may have priority; (4) the need for timely, efficient arrival of the activities or services to be coordinated may not be appreciated or understood by them; (5) the jurisdiction, and legal or procedural steps toward coordination may be disputed by them; (6) the leadership style of the project's managers, and often their personalities, may be resented; and (7) the agreements reached on coordination may not be enforceable.[186] All this being the case, very careful attention must be steadily given to management of coordination issues at all stages of the project.

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[184] See: Stanley Higinbotham, Cultures in Conflict: The Four Faces of Indian Bureaucracy (New York: Colombia University Press, 1975).

[185] Siffin, Administrative Problems, pp. 13-14.

[186] Based on Ibid., pp. 15-16.

The fact is that in the rural areas of the developing world the provision of services by independent bodies willing to comply is problematical at best. Hence, project designers seek to minimize the risk of the services not appearing by seeking to control them in ways that promote forward planning and timely delivery. Under this perspective, control is pursued to minimize risk rather than to build bureaucratic empires, though some of the latter interests may also be involved, or at least feared by those normally independent bodies asked to surrender control. Here risk is minimized by insuring that the project has timely, adequate priority over the financial, manpower or technical resources of the normal service provider.

If the control model is likely to fail in the long run and the coordination model is likely to fail in the short run--both hypotheses needing further elaboration and testing--then if an effective organizational model is to be discovered, it must be located somewhere between these two polar extremes. There are two variations on the core control group plus coordination model which offer some hope.

The first builds on the notion of a core group of services already in control of the project's mother ministry or agency. Assuming that the project can either gain control of these core services in its geographical area--no certainty in any bureaucratic system--then with proper project design its managers should be able to focus a larger part of their scarce administrative resources on ensuring the voluntary provision of project-necessary services located in independent bodies beyond their control.[187] An alternative to this submodel is to build on Mosher's notion that integrated rural development projects should be limited to the provisions or input of activities not already present and reasonably effective in an area. Under this approach project designers would seek out services not provided (or poorly provided) in the area and organize them in a way that produces an integrated effort at improving the quality of rural life and/or the productivity of the agricultural sector. These could be combined as a core control group and also coordinated with a smaller set of services outside the project's control, in the manner described above. Finally, one can conceive of combinations of these two approaches, where for example, the core group under the project's ministry or agency can be combined with a set of related, mutually reinforcing services not presently provided in the project area.[188]

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[187] For example the Ministry of Health might have the core components of child care, family planning and nutrition, and link up with the Ministry of Communications for radio classes, and the Ministry of Agriculture for food storage extension and kitchen crop extension activities.

[188] For example, the Ministry of Agriculture would provide the core of agricultural services but need assistance from the Ministry of Water and Irrigation and perhaps the small farmer organization agents of the Ministry of Community Development to help establish irrigator groups. Credit to finance irrigation works might be provided by a local bank through its central offices. And the Ministry of Education might provide some non-formal education courses on input instructions and irrigation techniques.

Before these intermediate models are recommended as having higher probabilities for allowing the project to reach its immediate goals and be self-sustaining after its termination, it is essential to carefully identify a number of integrated development projects that allow the testing of the following hypotheses:

58. The more a project is based on a core set of services normally provided by its own ministry or agency, the greater the probability it can ensure the timely and adequate provision of essential services through coordination with independent bodies beyond its control.

59. The more poorly or infrequently a given set of services is provided in the project area, the greater the probability the project can obtain defacto control over their provision, so long as the independent body normally charged with providing them does not feel threatened and is unable to perform them directly.

There is a small amount of writing on specific strategies that can help promote administrative coordination when control is not possible:

60. The more project management provides independent units whose activities and services it seeks to organize with a common pool of information that promotes a shared viewpoint, the greater the probability of gaining the desired cooperation, all other things being equal and assuming the information is similarly interpreted by decision makers in the involved units.

b. Decision Points and Sequencing

The administrative problems here are well described by Siffin:

"A development project is not like a train trip to a ticked destination. It is more like sailing on a ship, hopefully beyond the point where the internal rate of return becomes favorable, in the direction of a better and more generously endowed climate. Or, with reference to its decision pattern, it might be compared to a game of chess..."[189]

It is not as simple as a game of chess, for integration implies that there are many activ[illegible]ies to the game.[190] Each has his own advisors and most

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[189] Siffin, Administrative Problems, p. 7.

[190] Useful insights may be drawn here from game theory literature in American Community Development, especially Norton Long's "Community Development as an Ecology of Games."

are playing in other games, many of which may be more important to them. Control over some is desirable to simplify the game, but coordination with some players is unavoidable. One of the keys to this process can be found in better management of decision points.

A central problem in the administration of integrated activities and services results from the existence of a number decisions or clearances by different actors, each of which can lead to delay and disruption of often essential timing or sequencing strategies.

61. The larger the number of different providers of activities and services, the more they are spread among national, provincial and local decision making levels, and the more their actions are affected by established jurisdictional or technical regulations, the greater the number of decision points and the more critical the need to develop a strategy for simplifying them.

The task of developing a strategy to overcome or simplify the multiplicity of decision points is complicated by the fact that "the actual decision paths of a novel project cannot be predicted at the outset."[191] This being the case:

62. The more project administrators can reduce the indeterminacy of multiorganizational decision paths, the greater the probability delays in timing and sequences can be minimized, all other factors remaining neutral.

There are several techniques for minimizing the complexity of decision points and reducing indeterminacy. All things remaining equal:[192]

63. The more project administrators can reduce serial interdependence and translate them into parallel flows of decisions, the greater the probability some activities and services will be delivered on time and in proper sequence.

64. The more project administrators know about the decision points of organizations whose activities and services they seek to control or coordinate, and the more they know about who will make these decisions, the greater the probability they can act to ensure timely delivery of them.

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[191] Siffin, Administrative Problems, p. 6.

[192] The following eight hypotheses were stimulated by Siffin's thoughtful reflections: Administrative Problems, pp. 5-9.

65. The more project managers can develop "determinate goals" to detail and focus their longer range project outputs or goals, the more likely it will be that they can effectively act to obtain timely, correctly phased integrative activities and services.

One idea bears interjection here. A very valuable tool in economic planning is the input-output table.[193] Hence:

66. The more project managers can conceptualize the role of various providers of activities and services in an input-output matrix, the greater the probability they can understand the administrative tasks before them and act to effectively promote their project strategies.

67. The more project managers can use such programing techniques as PERT or CPM to plan for integration and check on potential delays and pitfalls, the greater the probability they can act to ensure the timely delivery of activities and services, so long as these techniques are used hueristically rather than rigorously.[194]

68. The less the design process is separated from the implementation process, and the more designers are both experienced in the administration of integration and knowledgeable about the bureaucratic and development environment of the proposed project area, the greater the probability project integration schedules will be realistic and successfully met.

The last two hypotheses are expanded in subsections on leadership, local high level staff, decentralization and participation, and information and evaluation systems.

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[193] See Todaro, Economic Development, pp. 357-69.

[194] Siffin notes: "...linear programming techniques of planning and scheduling can be avoided when action just isn't very linear and the main line of decisions can't be delineated in advance. Thus: the potential snare of Management by Objectives, which under uncertain conditions is an invitation to pernicious and meretricious suboptimizing, can be if not altogether avoided, then treated as a highly tentative and hopeful enterprise." Administrative Problems, p. 8.

c. Managing Transferred Functions

Remarkably, the literature review underlying this paper found no analysis of administrative issues centered on obtaining and managing transferred functions. Under the operational definition of this paper, integrated rural development occurs when one particular unit gains control or coordination over activities or services normally provided by another independent body. The responsible body, as discussed earlier, can be either a new unit which takes on the coordination or management of activities and services, or an established unit which has functions of its own to which it adds new responsibilities. No comparative thinking has been given to the kinds of administrative problems either of these two organizational routes faces.

One does find some discussion of: (1) whether technical, administrative or both coordination and control are transferred; (2) whether the transfer of function is permanent or temporary; and (3) whether the transfer of function is only for the specific area. These topics have been discussed in other sections of this paper. Other undiscussed topics readily come to mind, examples of which are: (1) what administrative strategies are involved in setting up a new unit and obtaining managerial supervision over functions to be transferred to it; (2) how are administrative and technical personnel who oversee or perform the transferred activities and services best handled in terms of personnel management and secondment procedures; and (3) what are satisfactory managerial techniques that can deal with the divided loyalties that this process is bound to generate?

d. Organizational Incentives to Comply

Little thought has been given to the problem of providing sufficient incentives--or avoiding disincentives--to obtain the cooperation of organizations whose activities and services are essential to project success but over whom the project administration has no control. The importance of working out strategies for strengthening the hand of project managers seeking to persuade organizations to voluntarily cooperate with the project is well summed up by Siffin:

> "Unless this strategic problem of incentives can be solved with some reasonable degree of adequacy, necessary inputs from the public sector will not be forthcoming, or will not persist beyond the first flush of enthusiasm or the impulse of external donors."[195]

Unfortunately, neither he nor the rest of the literature offers any suggestions on the kinds of incentive strategies that are likely to assist managers in obtaining and maintaining the cooperation of organizations whose services and activities are necessary but beyond their control. At this point one can only conclude:

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[195] Siffin, Administrative Problems, p. 12.

69. The more incentives can be provided to independent organizations whose activities and services are beyond the control of project administrators, the greater the probability they will cooperate with overall project strategies.

e. Information and Evaluation

Management of the complex problems described throughout this paper are better served if continuous monitoring and evaluation of performance is carried out. This cannot be done without good base line data on the project area, solid and expanding intellegence about the other public and private organizations the project is in contact with, and reliable analysis about potential or actual managerial trouble spots.[196] Achieving this is not easy, for it requires the investment of scarce manpower and resources needed elsewhere, and involves subtleties and complexities requiring time and patience to be understood.[197] Hence:

70. Management objectives of an integrated services project are more likely to be achieved the better the capacity of the project's staff to monitor, interpret and act upon data relating to issues of organization, coordination and control.

One of the few more focused hypotheses in the literature is that:

71. The smaller the project area, the easier it is for project managers to closely moniter and evaluate the program.[198]

f. Budgets and Administration

The general literature on integrated rural development has given little attention to linkages between administrative capacity and financing. A look at particular case studies, however, illustrates that the delays that appear inherent in such projects are often compounded by finance procedures. For example, a review of a Costa Rica project notes:

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[196] The CADU project was quite innovative in this regard. It had a Planning and Evaluation Section charged with maintaining a continual evaluation of the entire organization, ensuring the efficiency of its various units, recommending ways to improve the attainment of project goals, identifying and conducting feasibility studies on potential projects and activities, and developing the methodology of development which this planning and evaluation feedback process should produce. It edited or produced more than 100 monographs which document the progress of the project, some of which were quite influential in changing the policy directions of the implementation process.

197 Siffin notes: "...even the simplest integrated development scheme will have its share of subtleties and complexities, for the scheme must work at once in several directions: toward and with the clients, with input suppliers and product marketers, with credit sources, public authorities, and other vested interests." Administrative Problems, p. 15.

[198] Based on Comilla analysis in ODIU, Development Administration, p. 13.

> "Other problems encountered were delays in the acquisition of technical assistance...due to stringent conditions precedent prior to disbursement of loan funds; failure of the government to request timely publication of its budget, required before donor funds can be used; relative lack of attention to the loan by a previous Ministry official, for political reasons; and changeovers in key government and USAID staff."[199]

It is relatively easy to argue that administrative tasks involved in integrating services are difficult enough without compounding them with financial problems. Rather than generate an obvious hypothesis here, it will only be noted that research on types of funding mechanisms best suited for integrated rural development projects is neglected when it should have a high priority.

Alternatively, Israel's experience with integrated development suggests that the essential coordination discussed earlier is promoted by conscious efforts to relate planning closely to budgeting and programing.[200] How to do this and what the effects are are likely to need careful attention.

iv. <u>What Kinds of Services Are Integrated</u>?

Numerous laundry lists of possible components of integrated rural development projects can be found in the literature,[201] all of which reflect the multi-dimensional or sectoral thrust of the approach. Clearly as Yudelman points out:

> "The nature and content mix of activities in any rural development program will vary depending on the political social and economic consequences."[202]

Against this diverse task environment one finds two approaches: one lets the area determine the package and the other lets the

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[199] USAID project No. 5150120, ODIU, <u>Development Information</u>, p. 19.

[200] Raanan Weitz and Avshalom Rokach, <u>Agricultural Development Planning and Implementation: An Israel Case Study</u> (New York: Praeger, 1968), p. 329.

[201] For example: FAO, <u>Inter-Regional Symposium</u>, pp. 83-4; Mosher, "Projects of Integrated," p. 3; Kötter, "Some Observations," p. 10; Rondinelli, "Administration of Integration," p. 7.

[202] M. Yudelman, "The World Bank and Rural Development" (Draft Number 3, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Washington, D.C., 1973), p. 4.

package determine the area.[203] Neither approach is well worked out. Little thought has been given to the formulation of decision rules on how to go about selecting a project's components,[204] and even less consideration has been given to the effects of different combinations on the administrative enterprise.

a. Generic vs. Unrelated Package Components

The administration of integrated services is likely to be easier to organize and maintain if there are generic sets[205] which fit together. Sets can arise by virtue of at least three conditions: (1) they share a common infrastructure which brings them together; (2) they share a common administrative bureaucracy which brings them together; or, more typically, (3) they share a set of functional objectives which can best be reached when they work in concert. It may be that what appears to be a "natural combination" in one setting may not be natural in another, and research is needed here. When combinations do appear generic, they are often divided up among various governmental or private bodies, though a majority of them might be found in a single unit. Two obvious generic sets are found in integrated rural development projects centered on health or agriculture.

A child centered integrated health project may have its well-baby clinics, mid-wife training component, medical supply resources and paraprofessional visit program elements all within the ministry of health. But a generic set of services would also include a home economics education program focused on nutrition and centered in the ministry of education or perhaps the agriculture ministry's extension program, a safe household water program located in several possible ministries--interior to water resources--and a kitchen garden nutrition component likely to be found in the ministry of agriculture. Likewise the core of an integrated small farm sorghum project might find

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[203] "Persons who launch integrated projects do not all approach it in the same manner. Some begin with an interest in a particular type of project and then set about trying to identify the most suitable place to locate it. Others start with concern about a particular area or type of area and then consider what type of program would be most appropriate for it." Mosher, "Projects of Integrated," p. 4.

[204] Kötter suggests: "... a) establishment of normative targets for development; b) assessment of the different elements promoting or restricting development possibilities; c) investigation of their interrelationships in a systems approach; d) identification of bottlenecks and key factors as starting points for development activities in tackling the basic problem of rural poverty, since existing resources and capabilities will usually not permit simultaneous action on all fronts." "Some Observations," p.5.

[205] "Generic" is a potentially useful but yet undeveloped concept suggested by John D. Montgomery. Here it is used to refer to a "required interdependence." For example, where the building of a major trunk road into an area or the expansion of agricultural production requires the provision of additional feeder roads to facilitate the marketing of produce.

agricultural research, improved seed and fertilizer inputs and agricultural extension in a single ministry. However, to be successful the project may need to include a credit service located in another government agency or the private sector, a marketing component under the jurisdiction of the ministry of commerce, and a road improvement program dependent on the ministry of public works.

The notion of "generic" or "natural" packages is a difficult one that has not been developed in the literature.[206] Nevertheless, common sense and experience suggest that while coherent sets of services can be identified they are rarely to be found unified within a single service providing body. Perhaps more importantly, organization theory and administrative folklore suggest a number of reasons why location of a generic set of services in a single unit does not necessarily mean that a project can obtain and maintain integration of those services in its particular geographic area, even when it is located within the same ministry. Beyond this, differences in colonial history, bureaucratic reorganization and reform in the post-independence period and significant differences in political and economic task environments make it difficult to identify natural bureaucratic patterns that match up with generic service combinations that can be identified.

Nevertheless, logic and familiarity with integrated rural development projects suggest:

72. The more natural the combination of services, the more likely they will be located in the same service providing unit, or if not, in different units which have an historical pattern of working together, however conflict ridden.

73. The more natural the combination of services, the greater the probability of bureaucratic competition among units which provide them, unless there is clear government policy to prevent it.

There is little evidence yet accumulated to support this pessimistic second hypothesis. Yet, it seems more plausible than an alternative hypothesis of bureaucratic cooperation. Careful comparative research is needed here, formulated on one of the more sophisticated models of

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[206] One exception is found in a paper by Peter Hopcraft, who on looking at Kenya's SRDP integrated rural development projects concludes..."The concept of integration...emanates from the complementarities that are inherent in the rural development process. It involves a recognition that the productivity of particular investments can be enormously enhanced if they are undertaken in an appropriate relationship with complementary investments." Integration, p. 3. In this regard, Uphoff and Esman note that they "...found no case where only one institution was carrying the full responsibility for rural development or where complementarities among institutions were not as important as what the institutions themselves did." Local Organization, p. xi.

bureaucratic organization and style that are found in the literature on public administration in developing countries. Such research should: (1) identify natural or generic combinations;[207] (2) identify and consider a set of unrelated integrated combinations; (3) compare the performance of a set of integrated rural development projects that fit these two models; and (4) correlate their performance with a focused set of comparative administrative and bureaucratic characteristics.

Such research is essential because of its presumed utility to project designers attempting to formulate a set of procedures and processes that facilitate the smooth and efficient administration of integrated project services. This is because of the plausible but possibly naive hypotheses that:

74. The more natural the combination of services, the more likely an integrated rural development project will be able to successfully integrate them in its project area.

75. The more unrelated the services incorporated into the projects design, the more difficult will be the tasks of obtaining and maintaining their integration.

b. Synergistic vs. Ecclectic Goals

Integrated rural development projects are likely to be more successful in promoting growth and equity goals if their package of activities and services is selected for synergistic effects. Promoting this task places increased burdens on project designers and administrators. Designers must have sound theoretical reasons for selecting action components and exercise greater care in drafting procedures for securing their effective and timely integration. Administrators must be far more skilled in orchestrating integrated activities and services when their selection is based on carefully planned synergistic objectives.

Some interesting research might be done testing the hypothesis:

76. The more the action components of an integrated project are selected for their synergistic impact, the greater the need for experienced, skilled administrators.[208]

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[207] An example of the kinds of studies which might be undertaken is Bruce Johnston and Anthony Meyer's argument that a composite package of health, nutrition and family planning does belong in an integrated rural development project. While this may not be a generic combination, the argument is that it is a strongly natural one. Nutrition, Health and Population Strategies for Rural Development (Nairobi: Institute for Development Studies, University of Nairobi, Discussion Paper No. 238, 1976).

[208] This hypothesis is vague precisely because there is so little on it in the literature that discusses this point. The hypothesis needs to be sharpened and made testable, no easy task.

It may be, however, that ecclectic projects based on the politics of design and less thoughtful opportunistic selection of targets of opportunity may lead to more difficult administrative issues, and possibly generate an additional hypothesis that need not be stated here.

c. Minimum vs. Comprehensive Packages

Closely related to administrative issues of coordination vs. control and generic vs. unrelated package components is the question of the project's size. There are some analysts who distinquish two types of integrated development projects: (1) the minimum package approach; and (2) the maximum or comprehensive area approach.[209] This is a rather useful distinction for considering the size of a project in terms of the number and complexity of the services being integrated.

A minimum package approach puts together a limited set of mutually reinforcing services.[210] Frequently the task is to provide these in a number of areas in order to avoid the problems of over concentration of benefits in a single area, as has typically been the case with maximum package programs. Review of these kinds of projects indicates that their designers face difficult decisions in deciding what are the absolutely critical service components and how can they best be provided in a number of different geographical areas by the same project.[211] Nevertheless, it is hypothesized that:

77. The more the strategy of a minimum package project is followed, the less the problems the project management will face in obtaining and integrating services normally provided by independent bodies.

78. However, the larger the number of areas in which a minimum package project seeks to provide its integrated services, the more difficulty it will have in administering its integrated services.

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[209] ODIU, Development Information, p. 5.

[210] The maximum package CADU program gave way, in 1971, to a minimum package approach when it became clear that the maximum package was too costly to be expanded on a larger scale. It was also too potentially disruptive. The minimum package project (MPP) provided farmers with a simple input package through change agents located along all-weather roads in various parts of the country. On this type of project see: EPID, The Agricultural Minimum Package Program: Phase II 1977/78-1979/80 Project Proposal (Addis Ababa: EPID, Publication No. 37, 1976); Tesfai Tecle, The Evolution of Alternative Rural Development Strategies in Ethiopia (East Lansing: Department of Agricultural Economics, Michigan State University, African Rural Employment Paper No. 12, 1975); Manfred Schulz, Organizing Extension Services in Ethiopia Before and After the Revolution (Saarbrücken: Verlag der Schriften Breitenbach, 1976).

[211] See, for example, Mellor's review of the Ethiopian minimum package experience: John W. Mellor, "Report on Rural Development Issues in Ethiopia--Problems and Prescriptions with Special Reference to EPID and the Ada Project" (Mimeographed Report to USAID, Ithaca, July 24, 1974).

79. The fewer the number of services that make up the package, the more critical the selection and design processes, for if the rationale of integrated rural development projects holds up, the fewer the service components, the lower the likelihood broad-based project goals will be achieved.

Rationale underpinning these hypotheses can be drawn from those presented elsewhere in this section. Among the more salient of these are:

80. The smaller the number of service components in a project, and the more critical they are, the greater the probability they will be generic combinations and likely to be in a single providing unit.

81. The more minimum package programs and integrated services are located in a single providing unit, and the more widespread the areas where the package is implemented, the greater the probability the effort will be supported by the unit, unless conflicting bureaucratic power or jurisdictional issues are overriding.

Unverified impressions from the literature suggest that most integrated rural development projects are comprehensive or maximum package efforts. This impression, however, may be the result of the fact that only large projects attract the attention of evaluators and publishing academics. In any case, comprehensive programs seek to include nearly all of the service components theoretically thought to be essential to the rural development of a given geographical area. The major cases in the literature--Comilla, CADU, or Bicol River--are all examples of such projects.

Given hypotheses already presented, it is relatively easy to argue that:

82. The more comprehensive a project, the more complex and difficult will be the task of obtaining and maintaining the coordination or control of services normally provided by independent bodies, unless:

    a. the project is of such perceived importance that its strategy and goals receive strong commitment from national level leadership;

    b. the project is organized as a separate unit with national regulations issued transferring services normally provided by independent bodies to it; or

    c. the project is operated in a remote area where services are not normally being provided.

83. The more comprehensive a project, the more difficult it will be to replicate it in other areas of the country.

84. The more successful a comprehensive experiment and the more conscious the government's awareness of the disproportionate concentration of benefits in a single area, the greater the pressure to formulate a minimum package project for a large number of specific areas.

d. Potential of Project Area

It has been suggested that the package of components should be in part determined by the potential of the project area for agricultural growth. Mosher identifies three types of areas: (1) immediate (agricultural) growth potential; (2) low (agricultural) growth potential; (3) future (agricultural) growth potential.[212] Then he offers some minimal policy advice on how to match integrated rural development strategies with them. A similar approach might be developed for the administrative task environment. Clearly the potential of an area affects administrative problems and tasks; how this is so needs further analysis.

e. Political Risks and Administration

Experienced observers of integrated rural development projects note that they can carry with them high political risks.[213] This is particularly the case when project goals promote changes in land tenure patterns or tenancy rules, redirect government investment priorities away from urban areas, or stimulate demands for decentralization of power or increased popular participation. Whether such political risks emerge depends on the project design and the given task environment's political and economic characteristics. Nevertheless, it can be argued that:

85. The more political heat a project generates, the more difficult it will be for project administrators to obtain and maintain the integration of services normally provided by other bodies.

There are several reasons why this is a probable outcome. First, when economic or political interests of powerful elites are threatened, they can use their ties with local government officials and field agents of units whose services the project seeks to integrate to frustrate the project's goals. Secondly, in task environments where the vested interests of local elites are threatened by rural development efforts, the interests of some local government officials and established central government field agents are also likely to be threatened. Finally, when the above two conditions are present, they are

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[212] Mosher, "Projects of Integrated," pp. 4-5.

[213] Butterfield, "Draft Summary Statement," Tab H, pp. 1-4.

usually accompanied by effective patron-client or inter-provincial elite linkages between the two groups.[214] Hence:

86. The more pervasive the perceived threat of project activities to local vested interests, the more likely efforts will be made to block the provision of those services which lead to the perceived future economic or political damage.

If the operational definition underlying this paper had included the ideological thrust of the FAO conceptual definition of integrated rural development,[215] it would not be possible to suggest design strategies seeking to avoid political heat-generating components related to land tenure, credit reform, decentralization, popular participation, or equitable distribution of benefits. Still, no such position is taken here other than to note, together with Butterfield, that "immediate political risks of rural development are high and many of the needed tools are not at hand." Therefore:

87. The more integrated rural development projects seek to promote objectives that generate political heat, the more their designers and implementors must give attention to strategies for minimizing the capacity of those threatening to undermine project success by blocking the timely or efficient provision of essential services.

One of the ways projects threatening local interests can be blocked and their benefits skewed away from the rural poor is through elite colonization of the program. A good deal of thought needs to be given to design strategies and administrative procedures which can prevent this common pattern from emerging. None of the studies read in preparing this thought paper gave consideration to this quite real problem and no hypotheses are offered at this time.

f. Building on Perceived Needs

Private voluntary organizations have been particularly committed to designing integrated rural development projects on the basis of the perceived

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[214] A good example of this is seen in the CADU project. When tenant evictions became a major problem, CADU staff tried to work with the Ministry of Land Reform and Administration, the local government system and the Ministry of Justice to see that CADU lease arrangements were enforced, that displaced tenants obtained government land in the area, and that local officials supported CADU efforts to protect tenants from strong-arm tactics of landowners. It was not successful in any of these efforts. Cohen, "Effects of Green Revolution," pp. 347-55.

[215] See footnote 82.

needs of the majority of people in the project area.[216] No doubt this extends to the perceived needs of local government officials, governmental field agents and influential local elites, so long as they do not run against the perceived needs of the majority. Sufficient knowledge has been developed on the promotion of local participation that it makes sense to urge project designers to involve local people in the process of identifying needs and selecting mutually reinforcing services that can help resolve them. Without duplicating hypotheses on the effects of participation presented earlier, one can argue:

88. The more local people are involved in identifying the targets and components of integrated rural development projects in their community, the higher their support will be for the enterprise.

89. The higher the support for a project in the community, the greater the probability normally independent providers of development services will feel pressures to comply fully with the service integration strategies of project managers, all other pressures remaining neutral.

g. Setting Priorities for Agricultural and Rural Components

Without the benefit of a careful content analysis of components of integrated rural development projects, most reviewers still conclude that "the majority tend to include agricultural elements, if not consist solely of such elements."[218] This being the case it is necessary to consider design and administration issues surrounding the timing and sequencing of agricultural and rural development components. Unfortunately, there is little discussion in the literature on whether mixed component integrated rural development projects should: (1) begin with agricultural activities and then phase in rural development services; (2) begin with rural development services and then phase in agricultural components; or (3) begin simultaneously with both types of project services.

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[216] See, for example, the approach developed by the Mennonite Central Committee: Kennel, "Agents of Change in Integrated." It provides advice on how to take into account the "prevailing social atmosphere" of the village and obtain and retain committed local personnel.

[217] For a summary of this literature see Uphoff, Cohen and Goldsmith, Feasibility and Application.

[218] ODIU, Development Information, p. 6. Offering one voice in a differing direction, Ahmad contends: "It is assumed that (integrated rural development projects) will have as their first objective, not an increase in agricultural productivity or an improvement in one sector of rural life, but a reduction of rural unemployment. These objectives are, of course, not contradictory, and progress in one may very well lead to progress in another--they have common elements--but the primary thrust of the projects we have in mind will be towards employment." "Administration of Integration," p. 122.

Given the limited analysis of this administrative issue, it can only be tentatively hypothesized that:

90. The more central the integrated agricultural components are to the success of the project, and the larger or more comprehensive the effort, the more project success is likely to result if scarce administrative resources are initially centered on agricultural objectives and rural development components phased in later.

91. The more comprehensive an integrated rural development project, the more likely its objectives will be achieved if secondary service components are phased in only after the core components are successfully integrated and introduced.

Only a few analysts have made specific arguments for phasing, and they tend to argue more generally for income and employment objectives in the first stage, followed by human resource objectives in the second. They suggest the hypothesis that:

92. The sooner integrated rural development projects can stimulate increases in agricultural or off-farm production, income or employment, the more likely it will be that other public welfare services can be adequately integrated into project activities.[219]

While this hypothesis is not directly centered on administration of services, it does suggest that project designers and administrators phase the services the project provides. Specifically it argues that the initial services provided should be technology packages, extension services, manpower training, market improvements, feeder road construction, and so on.[220] Once these are in place and generating income and employment benefits, project managers are likely to be more successful in orchestrating the appearance of linked components, such as non-formal education programs, health clinic construction, mother club formation, or potable water system construction. Hence:

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[219] Lele, Design of Rural Development, pp. 189-92.

[220] In a variation on this point, Butterfield argues for starting "with a commonly perceived and critical need (e.g., food, employment, health, or learning opportunities) as an entry path from the LDC government to the rural poor. Beginning with a specific difficulty faced by the small producers and of interest to the LDC government (e.g., the timely provision of fertilizer for the farmer or of working capital for traditional local industry) the program would build out as constraints and opportunities become apparent to all, which they quickly will." "Draft Summary Statement," Tab I, p. 2.

93. The lower the ability of the project to generate production, income, employment and savings increases, the lower the probability of successfully integrating public welfare services.

94. The simpler the combination of project interventions, and the more they attack critical constraints, the more a project will evolve through time-phased activities.[221]

Anticipating a later part of this paper, it should be noted that the scarcity of administrative resources suggests careful consideration of these hypotheses, for if they are correct then it might be better to focus available managerial talent on integrating successfully those services which are essential to success of first phase activities.

v. Why Are Services Integrated?

Aside from the larger theoretical reasons for attacking rural development constraints with an integrated approach, there are a number of reasons for hoping the more program-grounded type of integrated rural development analyzed in this paper can contribute to improving governmental service delivery to rural areas and populations. Among the most important of these is the fact that when properly designed and administered they should provide: (1) more systematic use of available resources; (2) possibilities of merging related services to enhance their individual effectiveness; (3) economies of scale in service delivery; and (4) advantages of conserving scarce managerial capacity. Assuming that this study has uncovered most of the secondary consolidating studies on integrated rural development, it appears that only some of the available articles, papers and monographs address these very important reasons for struggling to make integrated rural development a strategy with an administrative methodology, and none that were reviewed treated these topics in any detail. This is unfortunate since the literature contains many maxims about the importance of integrating the services-planning function, coordinating the delivery of services through better administration, and introducing improved management-monitoring systems to aid in evaluating and improving the coordination. Development experts writing in this area can be rightfully chastised for failing to address these concerns or make progress in developing a methodology or administrative format for following particular priorities or sequences in integrating activities, calibrating degrees of integration, or incorporating different technological, logistical, political and motivational factors into a coherent program. Hence, this section will be brief. Yet, of all the sections, it stands to benefit the most from the comparative analysis of American public policy and micro-economic behavior literature on bureaucracy, consumers and services.

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[221] Based on Lele, Design of Rural Development, p. 178.

a. Allocative Efficiency

It is argued in the secondary literature that efficient management can integrate project activities and services so that an optimal point can be reached on the mix, thereby using scarce resources in the most efficient way. Moreover, integration efforts are said to enable planners to capture program externalities across service sectors, so that when integrated, rural programs reinforce and enhance each other.[222] The literature review underlying this paper did not turn up, however, any analytical work carrying forward the above generalities. Critical questions need resolution, such as: Does the dilution of functional specialization which integration implies result in less efficient services because something is lost when the burden on local units exceeds the capacity to perform? Is it possible that "...the application of Western administrative principles--emphasizing economic efficiency, technical rationality, avoidance of 'overlap' and 'duplication' and central coordination--may seriously inhibit innovation and be inappropriate for serving the rural poor?"[223] No hypotheses are offered in the secondary literature that readily illuminate these or other questions.[224]

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[221]Based on Lele, Design of Rural Development, p. 178.

[222]An example of some thinking in this direction in the SRDP project in Kenya is Hopcraft's comments: "The question is: where does one stop in justifying the inclusion of additional projects in an integrated rural development programme? The logic developed so far is completely consistent with normal criteria used in the social analysis of investments. The benefits attributable to the marginal project may in large measure result from increasing the productivity of other projects, but as long as the costs are at least justified by these benefits the project should be included. The crucial step is that of identifying the inter-relationships between projects so that the additional benefits that accrue as a result of the interactions are considered in deciding on the package. The logic for integrating a series of projects is straightforward (though incredibly widely violated)." Integrated, p. 5.

[223]Rondinelli, "Administration of Integrated Rural," p. 19.

[224]An example of some ideas which do, and which illustrate the potential value of further thinking come from Rondinelli: "Programs that depend on cooperation among government agencies are vulnerable in any country, but in much of the Third World they are simply doomed to failure. The insistence on creation of rural development programs that require large numbers of inputs from different ministries and the coordination of their activities in rural areas creates impossible administrative burdens on governments in most developing nations. Formal coordination mechanisms rarely work in traditional cultures. In much of Asia and Africa interaction among various levels of the bureaucracy is often highly constrained--evaluation or 'feedback' from subordinates is often construed by superiors as criticism, and is neither expected nor encouraged in bureaucracies where hierarchies reflect and reinforce social status differences. Time is valued differently in most

b. Economics of Scale

Likewise, little beyond generalities is found on the presumed economies of scale that integrating rural development activities or services can have on overhead costs, managerial talent and technical infrastructure. At most one finds the hypothesis that:

> 95. The more integration of services occurs under good management, the greater the probability that scarce resources will be conserved, complementary services coordinated, duplication of effort avoided and joint planning to prevent bottlenecks promoted.[225]

This hypothesis only partially touches the issues of allocative efficiency or economies of scale. It is, however, about as far as the general literature on integrated rural development has gone.

c. Administrative and Operational Efficiency

Despite the administrative problems and issues discussed in this paper, the reason why integrated rural development projects are used as the major method for promoting the dominant small farm rural development strategies described in Section II is because they are administratively feasible. Ozay Mehmet argues that integrated projects are selected as the vehicle:

> "...not because the macro approach, based on multi-sectoral interdependence, is technically inferior, but rather because, from an administrative and operational standpoint, implementation and financing can be expected to prove more manageable at the project level than at the sectoral level.[226]

Since ministries and agencies are organized along functional lines, such as agriculture, health and education, it is monumentally difficult to promote comprehensive orchestration of their mutually reinforcing activities and services, national planning theory notwithstanding. However, what is not

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developing nations than in the West; promptness is not necessarily considered a virtue and deadlines or schedules are met 'in good time' rather than on time. The seeming rigidity of hierarchical organization structures, however, may belie the lack of real control at the top and mask the informal processes of interaction through which tasks are actually performed. Corruption, favoritism, dependence on political authority outside the bureaucracy and the inability to match skills with job needs may all undermine the capacity of government organizations to coordinate." Ibid., 19-20.

[225] For example, Ahmed, "Administration of Integrated," p. 142.

[226] Mehmet, Economic Planning, p. 242.

feasible on a sectoral level appears possible in a project that is located in a specific area:

96. The more specific a development project's objectives and the more manageable its geographic area, the higher the probability integration can be better managed.

Little thought has been given to this emergent hypothesis. Why should one ministry cooperate with another in a given local area when it does not cooperate well in sectoral probrams? This question raises a number of analytical issues undeveloped in the literature on integrated rural development. Comparative application of public administration insights existing in other bodies of literature might be quite useful in thinking through the issues this question raises.

d. Donor Pressures

International donors have played a significant role in stimulating the design and implementation of integrated rural development projects. The reasons for their interest was described in Sections I and II of this paper. Since bureaucratic and financial "laws" of donor operations make it difficult to do small projects, and since the invocation of integrated efforts stimulates the imagination of project designers, donors tend to promote comprehensive packages. As project costs rise, they become more concerned with ensuring that the projects will be administratively sound and have adequate cost/benefit ratios. Concern mounts when the development ministries, their field operations, and the local government system are considered inefficient or otherwise incapable of undertaking or participating in an integrated rural development effort. Hence:

97. The larger the amount of funding provided by donors, and the more inadequate the national and local government system appears, the greater the tendency for the donor to attempt creating a special unit which can circumvent the local government system, use expatriate specialists, and be granted the control necessary to successfully obtain and maintain key activities and services.

External assistance can play a significant role in stimulating or strengthening particular development activities and services, and even when costs are high they are willing to work within the government bureaucracy. However, as soon as the administrative complexities increase, as is inevitably the case with larger integrated projects, the pressure is on to use expatriates and set up special agencies.

vi. Who Administers Integration?

a. Dynamic vs. Bureaucratic Leadership

There is substantial evidence to indicate that the head of an organization seeking to administer integrated services must have solid leadership abilities. One needs to look no farther than the role played by Akhter Hameed

Khan at Comilla[227] to obtain evidence for the following hypothesis:[228]

98. The stronger and more acceptable the personality and the more dynamic the project manager, the greater the probability he will be able to obtain and maintain the coordinated services of other normally independent bodies.

99. The more the decisions and judgments of the project manager are based on seasoned political experience and creative understanding of the development process, the higher the probability the project will achieve its service integration objectives.

These two hypotheses argue that substantial administrative advantages can come from a careful project manager selection process. While this would come as no surprise, the fact is important, for the selection processes which are in tune with these hypotheses are seldom worked out in advance. This is particularly the case with selection processes aimed at replacing an original director, a tentative hypothesis suggested by cases which note the decline or immobility of integrated rural development projects whose initial dynamic leader has left. It would appear that:

100. The more experienced a candidate and the more respected he is in the civil service, the greater the probability he will provide effective leadership in the administration of integrated services.

101. The better in tune a candidate is with the problems of rural people, the more sensitive he is to the clash between subsistence and market oriented worlds, and the better he understands the politics of bureaucracy, the greater the probability he will provide effective leadership in the administration of integrated services.

102. The more generalist the education of a candidate, and the less identified he is with a particular technical perspective or unit, the greater the probability that he will provide effective leadership in the administration of integrated services.

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[227] For example, Blair, "Rural Development in Bangladesh," pp. 66-7; Khan, "Comilla Model," p. 398.

[228] Hypotheses 97, 98 and 99 were difficult to draft as the thrust of the argumentation in the literature on these points is judgmental. Care must be given to developing these so that objective indicators can be applied to them.

b. Expatriate or Local High Level Staff

One of the substantial constraints facing the newly emerged rural development paradigm is that of managerial capacity. An emerging fact of life is that while rural development efforts are managerially intensive, host countries and international donors have significant problems with top level administrative capacity. As just noted, it appears essential to have projects run by senior local managers with unusual qualifications. The extent to which this holds for the next level of project management is unclear, even though these are the people who will probably be most involved in obtaining and maintaining the integration of services. This is an important area on which data is needed for it can be hypothesized that:

103. The more remote a project area or distant it is from the capital city, the more difficult it will be to find seasoned senior level local personnel who will accept and hold over the medium term top level project positions.

104. The more foreign expatriates are hired to fill top level project positions, the greater possibility that local bureaucratic procedures and processes will complicate the ability of project staff to obtain and maintain the integration of administrative services.

It would be quite helpful to have data on three questions related to the difference between expatriate and local personnel capacity to administer integrated services: (1) to what extent is western administrative training helpful in dealing with the tasks involved in managing integrated services; (2) what advantages, if any, do expatriates have over local personnel in obtaining and maintaining the integration of services normally provided by independent bodies; and (3) what skills, knowledge and personal characteristics should top staff members, local or expatriate, have if they are charged with administering integrated services? Given the substantial problem of administrative incapacity, as well as the importance of solid integrative management, research on this question seems essential.

c. Technical vs. Administrative Supervision

The literature on public administration and local government discusses at length the problems which result when administrative and technical supervision over field agents of a given ministry are divided. This is a common problem in many developing countries, particularly those that use deconcentrated systems in which provincial or district governors in the ministry of interior have administrative control over all government employees, their own ministries holding technical supervision. The administrative difficulties this can cause are numerous.[229]

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[229] A good example is the unintegrated prefectoral system in Italy. See: James J. Heaphy, ed., Spatial Dimensions of Development Administration (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1971); Brian C. Smith, Field Administration: An Aspect of Decentralization (London: Routledge and Kegan, Paul, 1967); Robert C. Fried, "Prefectoral Linkage of Nation and Locality," in Comparative Local Politics: A Systems-Functions Approach, edited by Jack Goldsmith (Boston: Holbrook Press, Inc. 1973).

The parallel of this relationship to management of integrated rural development projects is clear. However, none of the consolidating literature reviewed probes this relationship. Still one would assume that important design and implementation considerations relate to how the field agents of normally independent bodies are controlled by the administrators of the selected responsible unit. Since no mention of this is made in the literature, the obvious hypotheses will not be stated here.

d. Increasing Administrative Capacity

Given the importance of administration to the success of an integrated services project, it has been argued that:

105. The integration of rural development services is more likely to be achieved the sooner the project staff and project area personnel's administrative efficiency and planning and coordinating abilities are adequately achieved and widely spread.[230]

This hypothesis implies that it may be advisable to insure that a minimum level of administrative capacity is in place before an integrated rural development project begins.[231] Indeed, it has been suggested that the initial phase of such projects should concentrate on improving "the regional

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[230] For example, an USAID evaluation of a Tunisia project (No. 6640285) notes: "Project is about one year behind schedule...(due to) inability of AID/W to recruit key technical staff in timely fashion, and project dependency on such persons; national and provincial difficulties in coordinating activities in the context of an integrated rural development project; and lack of a rural development planning and management staff within a single rural development agency." ODIU, Development Information, p. 64.

[231] This point is made by Lele, Designing Rural Development, p. 188-99, noting that administrative incapacity arises because "...the integrated programs have set themselves to accomplish far too many visible results in too short a time period and, therefore, have been able to allocate only limited time and effort to development of institutional capacity...(because) the indigenous regional administrations do not have the capability to carry out the policy and coordinating functions at the regional headquarters...the instructions to handle the commercial aspects of the programs, such as... credit (or) marketing either do not exist...or do not have the administrative capacity to manage the activities on a scale on which the programs have carried them out...the local organizations and local administrative units being developed by programs (have difficulties) related to maintenance and expansion of the various local services.

administrative capability to plan and implement IDR programs."[232] This being the case it can be argued:

> 106. The heavier the emphasis on training project and government field or administrative staff, and the sooner in the project life this occurs, the greater the probability services can be effectively integrated, all other forces being neutral.[233]

Obviously, training programs should be extended to private firms and local organizations if activities or services which they normally provide independently are to be incorporated into the project's integrated activities.

These are important considerations, for as Tuttan notes:

> "The success of many of the rural development pilot projects has been due to the relative intensity of the human resources devoted to organization, management, and technical assistance. When an attempt was made to generalize a pilot project on a national or regional scale, the intensity of human resource input could not be maintained."[234]

Aside from the more established methods of raising administrative capacity, some relief could come through increased local level participation. Cohen and Uphoff present a sustained argument for increasing the role of local people in rural development projects,[235] and Chambers presents a well reasoned approach for developing management systems that are "simple and optimal,"

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[232] ODIU, Development Information, p. 7

[233] A World Bank article notes: "Building comprehensive management training systems into first-phase rural development projects may help generate the capability necessary so that 'repeater' or second-stage projects can cover larger areas and reach greater numbers of beneficiaries. Management problems may be addressed through a separate education project--as in Tanzania. Or, as has been done in the case of Nigeria, local leaders and administrators may be sent to nearby countries to study successful ongoing projects similar to those proposed for assistance from the Bank...It is not only management which is often in need of training. Technical training is also important for those who are responsible for implementing the project." "The Start is Promising, but the Problems are Formidable," Report, News of the World Bank (September-October 1977). For a brief, highly general discussion of manpower needs and training for integrated rural development see: FAO, Symposium on Integrated, pp. 59-65.

[234] Ruttan, "Integrated Rural Development," p. 15.

[235] Cohen and Uphoff, Rural Development Participation, 30-47, 201-54.

allowing fewer trained people to participate and avoiding inefficient use of scarce administrative manpower.[236]

e. Incentives for Project Personnel

One of the most difficult administrative problems in running an integrated rural development project is finding and holding talented, capable staff.[237] Administrative and technical personnel often resist appointments to rural areas because they become isolated from the bureaucratic struggle for advancement which generally takes place at the national center. Moreover, rural areas tend to lack the amenities and excitement that qualified administrative and technical staff have come to rely on. Since the ability and enthusiasm of these people greatly affect the capacity of the project to adequately administer the integrated services essential to its success, design elements must be included which promote commitment and creative efforts. Hence, it can be hypothesized that:

107. The administration and technical delivery of integrated services in a timely and effective manner is likely to be enhanced the more the project design provides its staff with adequate performance incentives.[238]

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[236] Robert Chambers, "Project Selection for Poverty-Focused Rural Development: Simple is Optimal," World Development, VI, 2 (1978), pp. 209-19. See also: Honadle, "Beneficiary Involvement," pp. 12-13.

[237] Siffin notes: "The incentive problem of the clients is relatively simple compared with the problem of providing sufficient incentives--and avoiding perversive incentives--for the administrative and technical personnel and the organizations necessary to make the program work." Administrative Problems, p. 11. The Lilongwe Land Development Project in Malawi illustrates the problems there and how they relate to the administration of services. "Organizational handicaps arose from persistent staffing problems, which affected the evaluation unit in particular. Efforts to train Malawians for senior positions in the program were hampered by a shortage of university graduates; a staff development program was set up to expand training efforts. Morale within the lower technical staff was adversely affected by inadequate promotion opportunities." ODIU, Development Information, p. 17.

[238] Working out income and quality of life benefits is relatively easy but limited in scope. One can offer a bonus for those who work in rural areas and a reenlistment bonus for those who stay beyond their tour. Hardship allowances can be granted, transportation (cars to motor bikes and bicycles) can be provided, and improved housing offered--all of which can help make it easier to recruit and hold capable staff in rural areas. But more basic reforms are needed, particularly in the process by which personnel offices and high level ministerial officials reward civil servants, track their progress and seek them out for new assignments. An example of a negative approach to incentives appears to be illustrated by the INVIERNO project in Nicaragua. "...it is so far working impressively--largely due to the efficiency

108. The less committed the central government is to rural development, the less likely it will provide incentives in that direction or correct disincentives that hamper the efforts of managers to improve the ability of their projects to attract and hold good staff members.

It may be that the incentive environment provides a good indicator of the levels of support an integrated rural development project is likely to get from the government.[239]

Section IV

Conclusion: Next Steps in Developing the Framework

Remarkably, this working paper is one of first efforts in the literature that attempts to identify a pragmatic common ground from which the problems and opportunities involved in the administration of integrated services can be systematically considered. That this can be the case despite the growing body of literature on integrated rural development confirms the argument in the proposal for funding that the Kennedy School submitted to USAID's Office of Rural Development and Administration. It also underlines the tentative nature of the effort just completed.

In the preceeding sections a systematic effort was made: (1) to clear out the underbrush surrounding the notion of integrated rural development; (2) to produce an operational definition that is neutral to semantic and theoretical debates and conducive to the analysis of administrative issues; (3) to formulate a conceptual framework for analyzing the central issues involved in the administration of services; and (4) to generate from an analysis of the secondary literature a number of hypotheses which can be tested by those seeking to expand in greater detail the understanding necessary to allow project designers, implementors or evaluators to better promote rural development objectives.

Section III, in particular, confirms the view that after years of experience, important design and implementation decisions on administering integration still have to be made essentially intuitively. Little progress

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of the management (drawn from the Harvard School of Business and INCAE). However, this does result in a lack of flexibility, extension workers reportedly spending most of their time filling out forms (there was computer assistance to the project), and no opportunity to benefit from the creativity and individuality of the staff. Although the organization is new and the personnel inexperienced, the balance between tight control and flexibility should be carefully considered in future planning." Clapp, "Significant Cases," Appendix, p. 20.

[239] Yudelman notes: "One indicator of the commitment of governments to rural development is, of course, the extent to which they assign capable officials to work on rural development and give them adequate support in the form of attentive terms of service. This is something that only a few governments do, notably those of Mexico, Korea and India." "Integrated Rural Development," p. 16.

has been made in developing policy guidelines for a newly appointed Secretary of Rural Development, seconded expert on designing integrated rural development, or project manager on: How to manage and implement the integration of different sorts of public services? How to find out what administrative systems work best with different task environments, project characteristics and service combinations? How to select, support, motivate and coordinate (or effectively control) public officials and field agent technicians who are to provide the activities and services necessary to the project? How to overcome the training and socialization of such officials and agents, people who are accustomed to quite different systems of inputs, outputs and processes? How to experiment with decentralization and popular participation in the selection and delivery of integrated activities and services? These and other questions which might be put to an advisor have yet to be answered in a systematic way.[240]

This initial effort, born in the confusion of a conflicting and unsystematic literature, is bound to undergo substantial revision. Still, it is submitted that the foundations of the approach are solid ones. Little progress can be made unless one is aware of the origins of the notion of integrated rural development and the debates surrounding it. Progress in analyzing the administration of services is also unlikely if a neutral, more pragmatic conceptual definition is not followed. Expansion of the sociology of knowledge underlying the use of the concept "integrated rural development" will occur, but the direction of the analysis presented is not likely to change. Improvements in the pragmatic definition of the concept are to be expected, though they are likely to follow its basic thrust. New issues in service administration are certain to be discovered, some of them filling major areas of omission in this paper. In addition, each issue briefly expressed here can and should be elaborated by a more detailed set of understandings that in the end will amplify the emergent hypotheses with greater specification of the conditions under which they are likely to operate and the linkages between them and other administrative principles.

Nevertheless, the brief but intense exercise that produced this working paper has set a foundation which can and must be built upon. The increased attention to rural development described in the opening sections has become

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[240] What are needed are efforts similar to those taken by David C. Korten in the family planning field. See his edited monograph Population and Social Management: A Challenge for Management Schools (Caracas: Instituto de Estudios Superiores de Administración, 1979). Perhaps the only sustained effort has been that of Dennis A. Rondinelli and Kenneth Ruddle, some of whose work was unavailable when this paper was drafted, for example: "The Importance of Project Management in Asian Development: An Integrated Framework for Planning and Implementation" (Paper Prepared for Project Management Seminar, Manila, the Philippines, 1977). Most of their ideas, however, are summed up in their Urban Functions, passim. An example of the kinds of specificity needed is: Enstace P. Fernando, "Use of Interdependency Matrix for Expediting Implementation of an Integrated Development Programme in a Developing country," in Project Planning by Network Analysis, edited by H. J. M. Lombaers (Amsterdam: North Holland Publishing Co., 1969), pp. 76-85.

a major thrust in national and international efforts. Whether denominated as such or not, projects integrating rural development services are steadily increasing. Sustained reflection on the administrative issues involved is essential. The administration of integrated services has been neglected too long. Hence, this paper will have been successful if it stimulates this effort, and the enterprise is not likely to make much progress if it does not in the end find the framework inadequate, or the discussion of issues marred by either omissions or shibboleths, or some of the hypotheses incorrect, simplistic or inadequate.

Siffin takes a rather dim view of this exercise, noting:

> "In the final analysis, none of these problems can be solved on paper or through reflection. We can--and should--address the administrative problems of integrated rural development by laying out the issues and tendering possible answers. But the palpable problems can only be truly confronted and sometimes resolved in concrete and particular actions."[241]

The abstract and field-remote effort begun in this working paper can be better justified if those who follow the path of critique and reformulation just described set as their goal the elaboration of policy, design and implementation guidelines directly relevant to those in the field.

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[241] Siffin, Administrative Problems, p. 16.